


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International Political Economy and Mass Communication in Chile

National Intellectuals and Transnational Hegemony

Matt Davies



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International Political Economy and Mass Communication in Chile

**National Intellectuals and
Transnational Hegemony**

Matt Davies

Assistant Professor

Department of Political Science

Behrend College

Pennsylvania State University–Erie

Foreword by Stephen Gill





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Foreword: Hegemony, Culture and Imperialism

Problems of hegemony involve not only questions of power, authority, credibility and the prestige of a system of rule, they also involve the political economy and aesthetics of its representation in culture and its media. Systems of cultural meaning and signification are the complex products of the making of history, a process which also generates forms of state and civil society. In this context, any understanding of hegemony and indeed cultural imperialism also means consideration and analysis of the roles of education and other key cultural institutions, such as churches, political parties, trades unions, and of course, the activities of intellectuals, and artists, poets and entertainers. Cultural hegemony involves political struggles to constitute what Gramsci called the 'common sense of an epoch' and the identity of social forces in and across complexes of civilizations.

This book focuses on specific aspects of these questions: the way in which Chilean-based media intellectuals, many of whom were working in leading universities, sought to make sense of national cultural development in the context of the global political economy. Often these intellectuals developed the concept of (American) cultural imperialism as a critical tool, and applied it in a series of studies of media texts and communication forms. These intellectuals of the left sought to find ways to extend a democratic-popular culture both *horizontally* across Chilean society, and *vertically* within the media industries or complexes. Some of these intellectuals were inspired by the way in which Gramsci consistently emphasised that counter-hegemonic struggles involve cultural dimensions of social life. For Gramsci, to found a new type of society required the foundation of a new democratic form of culture. So the issues raised in this book – a scholarly monograph on media intellectuals in Chilean society – are also general ones. They are important for understanding the constitution of world order and the problem of hegemony.

And indeed, Matt Davies shows how the achievement of hegemony is a complex, contested, contradictory and necessarily incomplete process.

From the vantage point of both right and left in Chile in the 1960s and 1970s, the media was seen as a crucial site of hegemonic struggle, and a set of agencies and processes of both domination and subordination, as well as of resistance and emancipation.

The year 1967 was a key turning-point, and Chilean politics swung to the left. Also the period 1967–73 was one of great creativity in media studies in Chile, and important initiatives were taken to try to mobilise democratic media and communication projects. Indeed, prior to 1973 American cultural and politico-economic imperialism was resisted from within Chilean society. The political struggles were reflected in scholarship concerning the mass media, often involving foreign intellectuals, such as Armand and Michèle Mattelart (from France) and Mabel Piccini (from Argentina). For example, Armand Mattelart used Roland Barthes' notion of mythology to develop an ideological analysis to unmask the system of bourgeois rationality. And Mattelart argued that bourgeois ideology is at its most effective in areas which appear to be politically neutral. So Mattelart's work, which was widely read and appreciated throughout Latin America, identified the cultural imperialism in Disney products sold in Latin America (for example Donald Duck comics). He linked this to the penetration of foreign capital, publications, movies, television programs and other cultural products in the region. Mattelart also argued that freedom of the press, which is usually defended by the owners, has in fact little to do with freedom of expression, since the expression of universal values is structurally precluded under conditions of transnational oligopoly and monopoly.

This type of intellectual critique and creativity came to an abrupt end with the *coup d'état* on 11 September 1973. The Chilean left was crushed and critical theory was removed from the universities.

Davies is careful to point out that, although the military took control in Chile, there were also divisions within the ranks of the officers, as well as within the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Some officers and members of the bourgeoisie

wanted a swift return to civilian rule, and to a national, state capitalist development project. Many were hostile to the combination of neoliberalism and authoritarianism represented by Pinochet. Nevertheless, following the military coup, left-wing democratic forces were generally either killed, exiled or imprisoned, and critical university media institutes were closed down. The political economy of the Chicago Boys (neoclassical economists trained at the University of Chicago) was brutally imposed in Chile by Pinochet, with considerable help from the US government and from I.T.& T. (The CIA had for many years invested much time, money and effort in developing its media and political 'assets' in the country, in particular the most powerful newspaper, *El Mercurio*, which consistently produced editorials in favour of neoliberal economics.) In this context it is worthwhile to remember one of the last and most stark visions of the great Chilean poet laureate of the masses, Pablo Neruda (who was the official Communist Party candidate for the presidency in 1969 before a coalition agreed to nominate Allende). Neruda published a collection in early 1973 just before he died and before the coup actually occurred. *Incitement to Nixoncide and Celebration of the Chilean Revolution* was written as if the poet was anticipating the approach of barbarism. And his final poems included images such as the poet's expulsion from his house and garden by an army of corpses, and a terrifying vision of the world flooded by 'a great urinator'.

Needless to say, the traumatic moment of the coup gave rise to very different cultural and political conditions in Chile. Everything was framed by brutal repression. Under Pinochet there was a shift from broad popular and intellectual cultural resistance to gradual cultural incorporation (*transformismo*) along with a shift from authoritarian rule to a newly dominant discourse of formal democracy and market civilization – that is, the discourse of US power and transnational capital (involving, amongst other things, what Davies calls the victory of Donald Duck and Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles in Chile). So, on the one hand, Davies suggests that this seems to have produced a domestication of radicalism. On other hand, the author notes that subordinated classes in Chile were not simply passive victims of these processes of repression and incorporation. Indeed, opposition to the

Pinochet regime began to regroup and this led to protest movements in the 1980s, indicating a continued potential for counter-hegemonic projects. In fact, given that these protests and their communications strategies were emerging whilst Chile was still under military rule shows how, as with the Correspondence Societies in England during the repression of the 1790s (discussed by E. P. Thompson in *The Making of the English Working Class*), popular-democratic forces in Chile (and indeed elsewhere) can always create the cultural and political resources, not only to resist, but also to challenge the rationality of dominant forces.

Thus one way to read this book is in terms of the ways that American and Chilean ruling class strategies have been framed in a struggle to consolidate power. Indeed, although the USA has from time to time largely succeed in supporting or indeed forging a 'national' (*sic*) historical bloc to rule in Chile, the evidence that is presented by Davies suggests to me that the USA never achieved hegemony in the sense of an active and broad-based endorsement of the central tenets of its rationality and civilizational form amongst a majority of the citizens of Chile. Of course, American attempts to promote the hegemony of (transnational) capital in Latin America have always had a cultural dimension as well as political economy forms: from the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century to modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s (for example, both involving different concepts of the civilizing mission of the USA); from the early forms of the structural adjustment and stabilization policies in the 1960s to those practised today by the IMF and the World Bank; from covert action and manipulation of the media and politics in the 1960s and 1970s to the strategy of the normalization of market rationality, commodification and limited democratization today. Nevertheless, Davies is right to conclude that neoliberal hegemony in Chile is fragile, particularly since struggles for representation and democracy continue and because of the weaknesses of the neoliberal model of accumulation despite the fact that it has some popular appeal in a more commodified and televisual cultural universe.

In conclusion, we might suggest that the present condition of global politics is reflected in the Chilean case. On the one hand, the US leaders are at the apex of a transnational historic

bloc of neoliberal forces that is anchored in the state apparatuses of the G7. This bloc has achieved *supremacy* over apparently fragmented and subordinate forces in the new context of globalization. One central characteristic of supremacist strategy is the way that it involves the coercive imposition of power over apparently fragmented populations in a situation of extreme class inequality and political impasse. On the other hand, this supremacy is being challenged. Many are calling into question the rationality of the neoliberal form of accumulation under the dominance of the giant oligopolies and monopolies of transnational capital. The vulnerabilities of the system are being increasingly exposed, for example, in the series of intense financial crises in the Americas and in East Asia in the 1990s. Now we are on the threshold of the new millennium, a global depression is once again a possibility. In similar ways to the 1930s, the dominant forces of capital are being challenged politically, not only from the left but also from the right, which comes in various stripes: authoritarian, dictatorial, fundamentalist and of course nationalist (compare Nazism and Fascism in the 1930s). A central question for world politics is, therefore, whether this American-centred, neoliberal form of supremacy is sustainable and this is a question that will be posed on the terrain of culture and politics, as well as political economy.

Toronto

STEPHEN GILL

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Preface

This book grew out of two long-standing preoccupations. In the first place, studies of international political economy have not always taken seriously Marx's observation that people make their own history, though not in conditions of their choosing. This is not to say that, as a field, international political economy has never taken seriously the 'agent-structure problem', nor that it has been preoccupied exclusively with structures or systems. However, the field has typically treated elites, international agencies, states and corporations as the significant agents of the international political economic systems it studies. It is not necessary to deny the importance of these agents to recognize that such a perspective brackets out most of the people who live in – and produce – the international political economy. Furthermore, it is not necessary to deny the reality of domination in the international system to recognize the creativity and autonomy of its subordinate agents.

The other preoccupation stems from my interest in issues related to culture and communication and in Chile's fascinating political history. In Chile, this history and these issues are inextricably intertwined, and as a result, the creative capacities of internationally subordinate agents becomes apparent to anyone examining these interconnections. Chilean intellectuals with an interest in problems of communication and culture are, for the most part, unknown beyond the Southern Cone countries, although their knowledge of the theories and studies of these problems from the North is extensive. They are subordinates in an international division of scholarly labour, but they are not the passive receivers of the cultural or scholarly goods and services that the North exports.

However, my concern here is not merely to provide some minor redress to this 'one way flow' of knowledge or information, even though I believe that the contributions of the Chilean scholars deserve wider recognition. Instead, I have chosen to write an intellectual history in order to show how the subordinate agents of the international political economy themselves produce that system. By recognizing the

agency – that is, the creative capacities, culturally and historically situated – of the subalterns, along with the importance of that agency in producing global systems such as an international political economy, we can begin to understand just how tenuous domination and hegemony are. This, in turn, can help us to see why, both in theory and in politics, the dominant forces and agents resort too often to violent measures to repress, disguise or hide the creativity and autonomy of the dominated.¹ At the same time, it also helps us to see how our own intellectual labours can contribute to emancipatory political projects.

The book begins with a theoretical overview, in which I discuss transnational hegemony and cultural imperialism, and culture and intellectuals in international relations. The subsequent chapters are arranged chronologically, as befits a historical account. However, a word about periodization is in order. The various governments of Chile divide the period from 1958 to the present into five obvious sections: the presidency of Alessandri from 1958 through 1964, that of Frei from 1964 through 1970, the Popular Unity government of 1970 through 1973, the military government under Pinochet from 1973 through 1990, and the civilian-led governments after the transition. However, the particular history of communication scholarship does not always follow the rhythms of presidential politics. The organization of this book reflects the development of the various theoretical positions available to the communications scholars, a development which was conditioned only in part by the changes in regime.

Thus Chapter 2 covers the period of the reception of the ‘scientific’ study of communication in Chile, which covers the years 1958 through 1967. The year 1967, the mid-point of Frei’s administration, was a watershed in Chile’s history, due in large part to the University Reform movement and the changes in academic life that flowed from the accelerating political forces that produced the reforms. Chapter 3, covering the period from 1967 through 1973, gives an account of the emergence of critical communication scholarship in Chile, which was cut off along with much of Chile’s cultural and political life with the coup in 1973.

Chapter 4, covering the period of dictatorship from 1973 through 1990, describes the changes in academic life that the

military regime provoked and the re-emergence of critical scholarship linked to the anti-dictatorial social movements. The book concludes with an evaluation of communication scholarship after the transition to civilian rule, and a synthesis of the observations on the relations between the order of the international political economy, the development of the social sciences, and the possibilities for democratic politics.

A great number of people have provided me with support, encouragement, criticisms and passionate arguments during the long gestation period for this book. I would like first to acknowledge the many communications scholars in Chile who made time for my interviews and who helped me understand the reasons they felt their field has developed the way it has. Most are mentioned in the bibliography; however, I want to thank especially Claudio Avendaño, Paulina Domínguez, Eduardo Santa Cruz, Carlos Ochsenius, and Fernando Ossandón for sharing so generously their time and materials with me. Without Shelley Schreiber's generous assistance, my stay in Santiago would have been much more difficult. Mustapha K. Pasha started me down this long road years ago, when he first introduced me to the work of Armand Mattelart. I have benefited greatly from his criticisms and comments on this work at various stages, along with those of Diane Waldman, John McCamant, Alan Gilbert, Ritu Vij, Elizabeth Davies, David Blaney and Randall Germain. Any failure on my part to heed their advice or warnings can only be taken as evidence that I am a very slow learner. Except where English translations are cited, I am responsible for all translations of sources originally appearing in Spanish. I apologize to the authors and to my readers for any clumsiness or obscurity in my renderings. Tim Shaw has been an enthusiastic editor, and his comments and suggestions as much as his optimism have helped me to see this project through, even through some tough times. I would like to thank my parents, Keith and B. J. Davies, for their unflagging support and unconditional love. I dedicate this book to my most patient reader and my most ardent critic, Gigi Herbert, without whose laughter, endurance and support this book would never have been completed.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|----------|---|
| CENECA | Centro de Indagación y Expresión Cultural y Artística (Centre for Research and Cultural and Artistic Expression) |
| CEPAL | Comisión Económica Para América Latina (Also known as ECLA) |
| CEREN | Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Nacional (Centre for the Study of the National Reality) |
| CIA | (United States) Central Intelligence Agency |
| CNT | Consejo Nacional de Televisión (National Television Council) |
| CORFO | Corporación de Fomento (Corporation for Development) |
| CPC | Confederación de Producción y Comercio (Confederation of Production and Commerce) |
| CUT | Central Única de Trabajadores (Workers' Single Central, union confederation) |
| DESAL | Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Social para América Latina (Centre for Studies for the Social Development of Latin America) |
| EAC | Escuela de Artes de la Comunicación (School of Communication Arts) |
| ECLA (C) | United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (and the Caribbean) |
| ECO | Educación y Comunicaciones (Education and Communication) |
| FECH | Federación de Estudiantes de Chile (Federation of Chilean Students of the University of Chile) |
| FEUC | Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica (Catholic University Students' Federation) |
| FLACSO | Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences) |
| FRAP | Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Action Front, left coalition preceding UP) |

| | |
|--------|--|
| FRENAP | Frente Nacional del Area Privada (National Front for Private Property) |
| IAPA | Inter-American Press Association |
| ILET | Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies) |
| ITT | International Telephone and Telegraph Company |
| NIICO | New International Information and Communication Order |
| PC | Partido Comunista (Communist Party) |
| PDC | Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party) |
| PEM | Programa de Empleo Mínimo (Minimum Employment Programme) |
| PN | Partido Nacional (National Party) |
| POJH | Programa Ocupacional para Jefes de Hogar (Occupational Programme for Heads of Households) |
| PS | Partido Socialista (Socialist Party) |
| PUC | Pontificia Universidad Católica (Catholic University of Chile) |
| SIP | Sistema Interamericana de Prensa (Inter-American Press Association) |
| SNA | Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (National Agricultural Society) |
| SOFOFA | Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Society for the Promotion of Manufacturing) |
| SORO | United States Army's Special Operations Research Office |
| TVN | Televisión Nacional de Chile (Chile's National Television network) |
| UCh | Universidad de Chile (University of Chile) |
| UCV | Universidad Católica de Valparaíso (Catholic University of Valparaíso) |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization |
| UP | Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, coalition headed by Dr Salvador Allende) |
| WACC | World Association of Christian Communication |



Map of Chile

1 Introduction

INTELLECTUALS IN TRANSITION IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: HOW DONALD DUCK AND THE TEENAGE MUTANT NINJA TURTLES WON IN CHILE

For Chile, 1971 was a year of effervescent social and political transformation. The Popular Unity government, under the presidency of Salvador Allende, had just come to power, and the possibilities of a peaceful transition to socialism seemed both realistic and desirable to a healthy plurality of Chileans. Writing in this moment of historical transformations, Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart published a book which is probably the best-known example of communications scholarship produced in Chile: *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*. Their book combines semiological analyses of the Disney comics that were widely available and read in Chile with an analysis of Chile's dependent position in the global political economy to show how the discourse of these comics provides cultural props for imperialism.¹ The book has been one of the most widely read works of social science produced in the Third World, having been translated into numerous languages and distributed virtually all over the world – moving against the usual current of international cultural and scientific influence. It has also been intensely controversial.² Whatever one makes of the analyses of Dorfman and Mattelart, the book – that is to say, the struggle against Donald Duck – was clearly the product of a broadly-based cultural and political struggle in Chile against imperialism.

Twenty years later, in 1991, Chile had passed through a long, dark night of brutal military dictatorship and shattering economic recessions. When I arrived in Chile for field research in 1991, one of the first images I saw as I rode into Santiago was a Pizza Hut with giant, inflatable models of the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles on its roof. In my previous stay in Chile, during the dictatorship, there had been ubiquitous signs of cultural resistance on the streets and in less public places, but this resistance appeared to be entirely demobilized after the

inauguration of a civilian government. Many – though clearly not all – of the intellectuals who had been active in the opposition were now in the government, and had little taste for analyses of cultural imperialism. The very words ‘cultural imperialism’ sounded strange in the new Chile, and seemed to hearken back to a failed political project from which the intellectuals now wished to distance themselves.

Transitions of all kinds were evidently taking place: transitions of government, of discourse, of culture. In the comparative politics literature on Latin America in recent years, ‘transition’ has generally referred the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, or more accurately, from military to civilian-led governments. Intellectuals have played a notable, and noted, role in this transition.³ However, the relatively recent transitions from one sort of regime to another have themselves taken place in a broader and deeper flow of historical time. Development theory and policies, exported from the United States in the 1950s, initiated a process which unleashed autonomous social forces that themselves began a struggle for deep transformation of Chilean society, and that clearly understood that such a transformation had to take place in a hostile international context. These social forces came to their fullest expression from 1967 to 1973. The recent transition from military to civilian government in Chile has been a moment in a broader historical struggle to find a secure accumulation project while politically containing these emergent social forces. The social forces locked in this struggle have always been both national and transnational: Chile’s history is also the history of the development of the international political economy.

This book investigates the complex interactions between the political, economic and cultural forces that affect the possibilities for transnational hegemony. This study of the international political economy thus takes a very concrete orientation, by examining *how* people produce their international political and economic relations. Such an orientation fills an important gap in international theory. The use of the concept ‘hegemony’ illustrates this point. Neorealists like Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, or Robert Gilpin have treated hegemony as the product of particular states establishing co-operative regimes to regulate an otherwise conflictual international environment. Critical international relations

theorists, such as the Gramscian theorists influenced by the work of Robert Cox, examine hegemony from the perspective of the transnational alliances between, or producing, dominant classes. Both of these approaches treat hegemony as an elite or 'top-down' relation imposed on subordinate states, classes or groups. Such approaches cannot explain the variety of political and cultural responses to international relations on the part of subaltern groups, and thus do not properly examine the conditions for hegemony or its dissolution: they do not properly understand hegemony to be a form of struggle.

The object of study through which the problem of transnational hegemony will be examined here is the development of communications scholarship in Chile. This is an important case for three reasons. First, while the dominant theories of mass communication have developed in the United States, a great deal of challenging and original work has been done in Chile. International relations between Chile and the United States can hardly be said to be equal, but in this case creative agency in the subordinate social formation is evident.

Second, in the social processes of constructing relations, including international relations, communication is of particular importance. As will be seen, the various political actors struggling in Chile in the periods covered in this book have had explicit concerns with communication, and with culture. The Chilean case demonstrates how the complexity of cultural production and communication constitute hegemony as a force field or site for struggles.

Third, intellectuals, including scholars, play a particular role in these processes of communication, culture, and the constitution of society. The reflections of Chilean intellectuals on social processes provided analytical tools and cognitive maps which in turn enabled or constrained social subjects in their political, cultural and communications practices. Scholarly work took place in the contexts of the commitments of scholars to political parties and movements, of professional commitments to the development and administration of media, of debates in the various media about communications and culture in Chile, of the repression of institutions and scholars concerned with communication, and of popular struggles to transform Chile – against the resistance of Chile's dominant classes and of imperialism.

Thus, a practical concern also informs this study. Chilean history is marked by moments of both intense hope and extreme fear. The struggles of the Chilean people to improve their lives and to control their own destiny have been an inspiration for people in the dominated regions of the world, including those regions in the 'developed' world. To reflect on the contributions of intellectuals to these struggles can help us to understand our own responsibilities and to deploy our own capacities in the much-needed transformations of the global political economy.

DOMINATION AND COMMUNICATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

How do people make their world, in its political, economic and social dimensions? The crucial notion here is that people *make* their relations, whether in the intimacy of their private lives or in the apparently remote and impersonal international arena. In the disciplines of international relations and international political economy, it has been the scholars' habit, or our conceit, either to assume that only elites – diplomats, bureaucrats, bankers, or generals – produce these relations, or to reify the international system so that it appears not to have been produced at all, but to appear as a given.⁴ Yet viewed from the angle of international domination and resistance, the list of the *dramatis personae* lengthens considerably. A variety of social agents struggle, co-opt, sabotage, co-operate, destroy, advance, or retreat: the constitution of international relations is a conspicuously *political* process.

Our intellectual habits of reification and our fascination with power have too often blinded us to the extent to which international relations are political for all of the people who live them. In a famous episode, Henry Kissinger lectured Gabriel Valdés, Chile's foreign minister under Eduardo Frei in the late 1960s, about the order of international relations. Kissinger said to Valdés: 'You came here speaking of Latin America, but this is not important. Nothing important can come from the South. History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What

happens in the South is of no importance' (Hersh, 1982, p. 35). Kissinger's protests notwithstanding, he and Nixon were involved intimately with the Chilean political process, making the politics of the relations between Chileans and people in the USA unmistakably imperialist.

US intervention in Chile took a variety of forms, but at the heart of all of the strategies was the process of social communication. One of the CIA's most important assets in Chile was the conservative and influential daily newspaper of record, *El Mercurio*. However, Nixon and Kissinger and the CIA, through the agencies and institutions under their command, were not the only speakers. The number of voices heard in Chile – and in the USA – multiplied remarkably in this period. And in the terrible aftermath of the coup, inspired and supported by the US government and sustained by vicious repression, it soon became evident that the many voices could not be kept silent.

The process of social communication in Chile included the development of research and of theories of communication. Scholars reflecting on these social processes, and in turn communicating their reflections, formed an important force for the production of the social, political, economic, cultural and communicative worlds. Under different conditions and in different ways, communications scholars contributed to creating political possibilities in Chile. This book begins in 1958, when the scientific study of mass communication began in Chile, and continues its analysis through to considerations on the situation of the civilian governments installed since 1990. Much took place in Chile during this period. Chile was a major concern for US policy-makers and its politics were followed closely by observers all over the world; and communication, both as an object for social thought and as a practice in politics and society, was a central preoccupation for many of the political actors concerned with Chile's development. The study of communications scholarship in Chile brings into focus a number of larger questions relevant not only to understanding Chile's politics and position in the international political economy during this tumultuous period, but also to understanding the possibilities for democratic politics generally.

The nexus between a variety of fields provides the ground for the exploration of the topic: international political economy,

social formation in the developing world, culture and communications – in short, the nexus between international relations, politics in a developing country and the field of the study of mass communication. Communication is a key concept in the constitution of societies and in the strategies of the various political actors attempting to shape those societies. The relations between communication, social and economic development, and politics are seen differently by different communicating subjects, according to their needs and goals.

To begin to understand these different relations between communicating subjects and their social world, we may draw a distinction between communication and information. The difference between these two concepts is not always clearly articulated, especially in celebratory discussions of new communications and information technologies. At the most elemental level, the difference is between a process, communication, and a product, information. The relationship between the process and the product is not fixed or given, in the sense that cybernetic models give to the communication process; instead, for some agents the communication process is more important, as in the articulation and protection of civil society, while for others, the technological or political control of both the process and the product, information, is the essence of the relationship. Political struggle in Chile frequently produced conflicts between, on the one hand, social agents using propaganda and their control over the communication media to reframe historical events ideologically in terms which could justify their continued dominance or which could mobilize other actors to support their social projects, and, on the other hand, social agents attempting to determine the character of communication, not as a matter of competing forms of propaganda, but in terms of whether communication would be an autonomous social process in the self-determination of social agents.

Thus rather than relying on the metaphor of a cybernetic communicating machine, producing information as an outcome of its smooth operation, a better analogy would be that of the vampiric relation between living labour and 'dead' or accumulated surplus labour.⁵ Under this relation, social conditions in which the product dominates the process are characterized by competition or conflict over the technical and political

control of information. Information becomes an element in the process of capital accumulation, in the various activities of planning and of circulation, including marketing and finance, and of surveillance both for monitoring productivity and for social control. The general social tendency will be to subordinate the communication process to needs determined by 'information accumulation'.

Simultaneously, however, as the demand for information increases, so too does the complexity and autonomy of the communication process, bringing increasing numbers of communicating subjects into contact with each other. Thus, for example, as the historical tendency of capital to internationalize itself has accelerated, production and marketing disperse themselves across a variety of national commodity and labour markets – a process made possible by improved communications technologies and increasing information about the conditions in various markets. At the same time, the transnational communications networks which provide the technical infrastructures for the accelerated transnationalization of capital are also becoming increasingly accessible to a large variety of social actors. Fax machines, video cameras, personal computers and the Internet have all become important tools for political organizing at the same time they have restructured the labour process and the social relations that accompany it.⁶

Knowledge about the technologies and the social systems in which they are embedded determine the uses and alternative uses of these technologies. Thus a crucial component in the development of communications systems is scholarship – about communications as well as about social formations. Another way of framing the object of inquiry in this book is how the social and political situation – or better, situatedness – of the Chilean communications scholars determined their knowledge producing activities, which in turn produced the social capacities for hegemony and the challenges to it.

The idea for examining communications and communication scholarship in Chile in the context of international relations of domination or hegemony derives in part from the idea of a 'standpoint epistemology', that is, the idea that scientific knowledge is socially situated. The production of knowledge within a given field is determined by the ways in

which social and political interests operate in and upon the field. Different kinds of theory, with differing aims, embedded values, and explanatory power, appear at particular times because of the politically and socially determined capacity of scholars to find the standpoints – dominant, residual or emergent – of social subjects to which to link their scholarly activities. To take the standpoint of Chilean communications scholarship, that is, to examine seriously and critically the contributions of this community, which has been marginal to the mainstream of communications theory, will help us ‘to detect the social mechanisms through which power relations are made to appear obviously natural and necessary’ (Harding, 1992, p. 584).

One objection to taking this particular standpoint could be that scholars are not usually an objectively subordinate, oppressed or subaltern group – although many scholars and their institutions were targets for repression during the years of the military regime in Chile. In an international context, however, the division of scholarly labour does have a distinct hierarchy. Challenges to this hierarchy coming from the subordinate, peripheral regions help lay bare the political assumptions which structure a scientific field internationally. But even more than this, the systematic challenge to the orthodoxies itself depends on the political initiative for transformation and emancipation of the subaltern classes. Scholars play a role in this by *communicating*, that is, by investigating the activity of social agents, by making their reflections on these activities available, and by helping to create spaces or media through which these active subjects can themselves communicate. The intellectual history related in the following chapters illustrates this political process, as theories of communication play roles in both domination and subordination – dominant theories – and in resistance and emancipation – alternative, contestatory theories.

The dominant paradigm in the study of mass communication emanated from structural functionalist sociology in the 1950s. Its primary concerns were with the effects of media and media messages on given audiences. It articulated a conceptualization of the communication process in which information tended to predominate over the process of communication. Over time it evolved a deeper concern with the process itself,

yet still with a highly instrumentalist emphasis: the idea was that the communication process could be manipulated to produce desired social results.

This paradigm was very definitely 'made in the USA', and disseminated in the Third World as a matter of public policy. And yet to refer to it as a dominant paradigm is slightly misleading, for almost as soon as the study of mass communication was implanted in the newly formed departments of sociology in the Chilean universities, it came under withering intellectual criticism, especially from intellectuals with ties to the political movements which were beginning seriously to challenge Chile's long stable political system. Thus, from a particular vantage of international relations, one which understands nation-states as the primary political agents, the imposition of a theory and method for the study of mass communication appears as a minor instance of international domination; but when viewed from the vantage of real human agents with a stake in the outcomes of their struggles, domination no longer appears so straightforward. Political initiative passes from one group to another in changing conjunctures, which change as a result of political conflict.

In the following sections of this chapter, I shall examine the notion of international domination as it relates to communication and culture, and review critically two of the leading theories which attempt to account for it: transnational hegemony and cultural imperialism. The argument will then proceed by explicating a theory of culture for international relations, developing a coherent concept of cultural domination which addresses the shortcomings of these two leading theories of international relations.

In order to make these arguments more concrete, and to probe more deeply into the nexus described above, we have to examine the specific social agents involved in the development of mass communication research and theory. While I contend that questions about communication are of strategic importance to broad sectors of any society, and therefore that the study of communication concerns more people than only the professional intellectuals, these intellectuals are the primary agents concerned with the production of the research and theory studied here. Indeed, it is because the processes and structures of social communication have broad political

significance that a detailed examination of the intellectuals who study social phenomena such as communication and disseminate their ideas is important: it is our reflection on our own activity, a glimpse in the mirror, which we require in order to see our own roles in social reproduction and transformation. The changing relations of Chilean intellectuals with other social actors in Chile will be explored in subsequent chapters. For the present, I shall proceed, after discussing hegemony and cultural imperialism, by examining intellectuals as social and political agents, and by examining the political importance of the practice of studying of society for the various actors involved in this international drama. Thus the issues of cultural imperialism or transnational hegemony will be revisited in this section by scrutinizing the transnational dissemination of social science in the post-Second World War period.

TRANSNATIONAL HEGEMONY

An important line of research and theory influenced by the work of Robert Cox on the International Political Economy has opened with respect to the critique of the notion of hegemony. This critique developed out of dissatisfaction with both the predominant radical approaches to international relations and with mainstream IR theory, especially realism and neorealism. The critiques of these major schools of thought in IR are well known in our field, and are examined in detail by Stephen Gill (1990); his criticisms are summarized here.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Gill's critique of radical and realist approaches to IR is that they share a series of inadequacies: inadequate conceptions of the state, inadequate accounting of the rise of transnational capital, and 'state-centredness' with respect to the explanation of international relations. The radical approaches Gill discusses are the orthodox Marxist versions of imperialism and World Systems theory. The Marxian positions, derived from the debates between Lenin and Kautsky, turn around the issue of whether the capitalist ruling classes can co-operate in a form of 'ultra-imperialism' (Kautsky's position) or whether they must inevitably struggle with each other within their respective

national bases (Lenin's position). These debates, which took place over 70 years ago, did not foresee the advent of the development of transnational capital, which has expanded beyond national boundaries both in its organization of the production and circulation of commodities, and in the accelerated transnationalization of finance capital made possible by new communications technologies.⁷ The orthodox versions of the theory of imperialism have also been criticized for their instrumental or reductionist theories of the state (Gill, 1990, p. 37). World Systems Theory is taken to task for its state-centric conception of international relations, coupled with its tendency towards economic determinism, and its emphasis on exchange relations as explanations of capitalist development (Ibid., p. 41).

Realism and neorealism also have theoretical shortcomings, and fail to give satisfactory accounts of international relations. In the first place, the key explanatory concept in Realism, power, is conceived as a one-dimensional, behavioural attribute – coercive ‘power over’ – in contrast to more subtle conceptions, such as ‘structural power’ (Gill, 1990, p. 63). Second, like World Systems theory, both realism and neorealism tend to produce state-centred explanations of international relations, treating the state as a ‘rational actor’, seeking to maximize its influence or power. The rational actor model of the state can only be sustained, however, at the cost of neglecting the role of domestic politics and any internal conflicts in discussions of hegemony (Ibid., p. 72). Together, these two theoretical problems tend to produce a notion of international hegemony that is conceptually equivalent to straightforward coercion or domination. Such a view has contributed to a reified notion of ‘hegemonic decline’, in which cycles in the international system produce the rise and fall of Great Powers. The inevitability of hegemonic decline allows these approaches to neglect the roles of agents, and in particular their ideas, culture and consciousness, in establishing and sustaining hegemony.

If the notion of hegemony as used by realists and neorealists lacks conceptual clarity, it is not because interesting conceptual work on the idea of hegemony is lacking. Robert Cox, after studying the conceptual work done by Antonio Gramsci, has applied the Gramscian notion of hegemony to international

relations. Because Gramsci's ideas referred specifically to the cultural and ideological means of sustaining a dominant group, this work is of interest to us as well.

Gramsci did not invent the term 'hegemony', of course; it had currency in radical circles as early as the Russian Social-Democratic Movement, from the late 1890s (Anderson, 1976, p. 15). In its early uses, hegemony seems to have referred to the leadership role that the proletariat was to assume with respect to the other classes involved in the struggle to overthrow tsarism. Gramsci seems to have been the first writer to apply the term in examining the leading role of the bourgeoisie with respect to classes subordinate to it.

The problem that occupied Gramsci was that the revolutionary movement that carried the Bolsheviks to power had not spread successfully to the Western states in Europe. This failure led Gramsci to observe that the nature of the state was different in the East from in the West. In Russia, the state was strong but it ruled by force, with little support from subordinate classes. Thus an insurrectionary 'war of manoeuvre' proved to be a successful strategy. In the West, on the other hand, the leading groups relied less on coercion than on consensus to rule; the state was still a repressive apparatus, but force was needed less, since subordinate groups rarely posed a fundamental challenge to the direction of society. Where a leading class rules with the apparent consent of subordinate classes, rather than by domination, it could be said to be hegemonic.

Consent is won by making the project for social development of the ruling class or class fraction into a 'universal' project; that is, a project the goals of which are shared by subordinate classes or groups. To achieve this, some compromise may be necessary, or the corporate demands of subordinate groups may even be incorporated into the ruling project (*'trasformismo'*, in Gramsci's term). To make the social project of a class or class fraction into a universal one involves a progression in consciousness, in which the economic or corporate interests of a class fraction become the basis for solidarity or class consciousness, which in turn is transformed into a hegemonic consciousness which universalizes the particular interests. This progression in consciousness is organized through ideas as well as through political practice – hence the

importance that Gramsci assigns to the role of intellectuals. Hegemony involves both 'the building of institutions and the elaboration of ideologies' (Cox, 1983, p. 168), which appear to the social formation as universal in form. Thus hegemony is not only an effort to describe the relatively stable political formations of the developed Western European states, it is also an argument against reductionism, in both the forms of economic determinism (or 'economism') and of idealism.

As a practical matter, Gramsci's ideas account for politics at the level of the national social formation. He made only passing references to international relations. It has been Cox's contribution to elaborate the application of the concept of hegemony to international relations. He describes a system of international hegemony thus:

[I]t would appear that, historically, to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception, i.e., not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most other states (or at least those within reach of the hegemony) could find compatible with their interests. (1983, p. 171)

It should be emphasized that unlike the realist, neorealist or World Systems approaches, Cox's is not state-centric. Hegemony is founded by social forces within a nation, which in turn determine the nature of a state. As the dominant social forces within a state are able to project and universalize their own conceptions of a historic project for social development beyond their nation's borders, hegemony becomes international. 'The hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally-conceived civil society, i.e., a mode of production of global extent which brings about links among social classes of the countries encompassed by it' (Ibid.). Thus international hegemony implies the transnationalization of social forces, the foundation of a transnational 'historic bloc' of classes and class fractions bound together by shared hegemonic ideas and ideologies and by the international institutions and organizations for regulating the transnational order, incorporating concepts and personnel from the peripheries of the world order, and for facilitating the expansion of hegemony (Cox, 1983, p. 172).

It is with regard to the problem of incorporating the periphery that certain difficulties in the application of the concept of hegemony appear. Cox states the issues thus:

A world hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class. The economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad. Such an expansive hegemony impinges on the more peripheral countries as a passive revolution. These countries have not undergone the same thorough social revolution, nor have their economies developed in the same way, but they try to incorporate elements from the hegemonic model without disturbing old power structures. While peripheral countries may adopt some economic and cultural aspects of the hegemonic core, they are less well able to adopt its political models. Just as fascism became the form of passive revolution in the Italy of the inter-war period, so various forms of military-bureaucratic regime supervise passive revolution in today's peripheries. In the world-hegemonic model, hegemony is more intense and consistent at the core and more laden with contradictions at the periphery. (Cox, 1983, p. 171)

By 'passive revolution' Cox (and Gramsci) mean 'historical changes which take place without widespread popular initiative, from "on high"'. Gramsci uses it to describe both specific historic developments, for example the establishment of an Italian nation-state, and 'a style of politics which preserves control by a relatively small group of leaders while at the same time instituting economic, social, political, and ideological changes' (Sassoon, 1982a, p. 15).

Cox has highlighted here a difficulty in the Gramscian concept of transnational hegemony: its view of politics is markedly 'top-down'. Within the concept of hegemony, political initiative seems to lie with rulers or leaders; peripheries, national or international, appear to be static spaces on which politics is articulated. The incorporation of ruling classes or class fractions from the periphery into the ideologies and institutions of transnational hegemony clearly is part of the process of building and sustaining hegemony. However, those ruling

classes may not enjoy hegemony in their own social formations: indeed, even if they have nothing else in common, the 'various forms of military-bureaucratic regime' share the characteristic of extreme violence against their own citizens as a method of rule, not a characteristic typical of rule by consent. The infamous 'national security doctrine' which was taught along with counterinsurgency techniques at the US Army's School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone to Latin American military officers, according to which the Latin American militaries were to defend their nations against 'internal subversion' – that is, go to war against their own populations – could certainly be analysed as an ideology and institution of transnational hegemony, yet its basic assumption is that (local) hegemony is not possible. Furthermore, the violence characteristic of national security states was not *sui generis*: it was a military response to political gains made by progressive forces through social, and particularly class, struggle.

Though Cox is sensitive to the difficulties of simply applying Gramsci's concept of hegemony to international relations, his account nevertheless suffers from the absence of an elaborated theory of culture. As will be discussed below, cultural domination does not work in the same ways as political or economic domination may. Cox's description of the process as the adoption or emulation of cultures abroad, while it does not go so far as to deny the agency of the receivers of cultural influences, does seem to imply either that the process is a national one, thus leaving no room for the analysis of or the political weight of different responses, or that only those social groups that do emulate foreign culture are relevant to the process of hegemony. Cox's primary concerns were with the transnationalization of production relations and international organization, and not with culture. But culture is clearly central to Gramsci's thinking about hegemony, and the lacuna in Cox's conception is reproduced in works influenced by his contributions. Thus, where Gill and Law discuss 'global culture', it is discussed primarily in political economic terms, leaving the specifically cultural moment out of the analysis (Gill and Law, 1988, pp. 155–6). Similarly in Stephen Gill's more sophisticated argument, where he observes that: 'A recent study indicates that 75 percent of the world communications market is controlled by 80 transnationals. [...] In

the Third World these firms introduce value patterns native to the metropolitan capitalist states, especially American ones' (1990, p. 206). On its face, this may be an uncontroversial, empirical claim; however, when considering the construction of hegemony, it is fair to ask whether these value patterns are in fact reproduced in the Third World cultures, or if they are rejected or transformed by the receiving agents.

These descriptions of the role of culture in transnational hegemony recall earlier arguments about the role of culture in international relations, which were developed under the rubric of critiques of cultural imperialism. What is cultural imperialism, and how can it be related to the process of constructing transnational hegemony?

CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

It turns out that cultural imperialism is a difficult phenomenon to conceptualize. Unlike imperialism as a political or economic concept, which can be conceptualized as domination in relatively straightforward terms, culture requires us to take into account the ways in which individual and collective agents actually live their own lives. Thus an occupying army, a colonial administration, or the commercialization of agriculture can oblige people to act in ways that they would not voluntarily choose. However, a foreign television programme cannot force a person to do anything, even to make the person watch the programme.

The usual solution to this difficulty is to emphasize either the political economic dimension of cultural imperialism, or the cultural aspect of the term. Each of these ways of approaching the concept creates problems.

The first type of conceptualization, the political economic, examines the transnational structure of cultural industries and the flow of cultural goods in international markets. Such studies often demonstrate convincingly the dominant position of the core countries', in particular the USA's, cultural industries. There are many works that could be cited as examples, but especially notable is Herbert Schiller's work *Mass Communication and American Empire* (1992). Written between 1965 and 1967, this book examines the growing importance of the

communications, information and cultural industries in the political economy of the United States in the post-Second World War period. The basic premise is that these industries play a crucial role in the projection of US corporate and state power abroad. Thus imperialism is conceived as a political economic phenomenon, involving the spread of capitalism throughout a world system, and examined in light of the *political* and *economic* importance of the cultural industries.

Critics of this type of approach, such as Boyd-Barrett (1979) or Tomlinson (1991), correctly point out the problem of reducing culture to a political economic effect, which is sometimes a consequence of this approach.⁸ Even a sympathetic critic, like Fred Fejes (1981), prefers to treat such political economic studies as heuristic, indicating the need for empirical research into the effects of foreign media on developing countries' cultures. Such criticisms lead us to the second way of conceptualizing cultural imperialism, as a specifically cultural phenomenon.

This second approach to cultural imperialism stresses cultural change, influence or domination. Usually, when a definition of cultural imperialism is offered explicitly, it emphasizes this aspect of the problem. Arnove cites two dictionary definitions which put this emphasis on culture: in the *Dictionary of Social Science*, cultural imperialism is 'the deliberate and calculated process of forcing a cultural minority to adopt the culture of the dominant group in a society'; and in the *Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought*, it is defined as 'the use of political and economic power to exalt and spread the values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a native culture' (Arnove, 1982, p. 2). These definitions understand cultural imperialism as imperialism through or over culture; politics and economics are instruments of cultural domination. However, not every approach to cultural imperialism that emphasizes culture takes this instrumental approach to politics and economics. Thus Armand Mattelart offers the following definition:

The definition of imperialism, which contributes on a daily basis to the erosion of the cultural identity and vitality of nations by the insidious penetration of a very particular way of viewing life, is precisely believing in the universality

of its values and imposing them as if they were self-evident truths, as if they corresponded to the natural and happy evolution of things. (1979, p. 58)

This point of view opens up the possibility of studying the culture of imperialism itself.

One of the best-known examples of a study of cultural imperialism which focuses on culture is Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart's *How to Read Donald Duck* (1984). Armand Mattelart went to Chile in the early part of the 1960s to teach and research in the recently established School of Sociology at the Catholic University of Chile. By the middle of the decade, Chile's intellectual milieu was in a state of great ferment and creativity, exemplified by the contributions of many of the original *dependencia* scholars working in Chile at the time. Mattelart brought together the political economic insights of the dependency school with theories of culture and communication influenced by French structuralism, especially the work of A.-J. Greimas (see, for example, Greimas, 1983). Thus while *dependencia* attempted to describe the economic means by which underdeveloped countries were integrated into an international system of capital accumulation, Mattelart attempted to describe ideological and cultural integration, and the ramifications of dependency for the cultures of the Third World. Using semiological techniques, Dorfman and Mattelart uncover the 'latent content' of the Walt Disney comics popular especially among children in Chile; they demonstrate quite convincingly that an imperialist ideology of the subordinate status of the underdeveloped world and the unmitigated benefits of contact with the West organizes the narratives of the Disney comics.

These two conceptual approaches, the political economic and the cultural or ideological, established a conceptual basis for most of the research on cultural imperialism. On the one hand, researchers have documented the international political economy of the communications, information and cultural industries, including the corporate structure of these industries and the flow of cultural products such as the news, international versions of magazines, movies or television programmes in international markets. On the other hand, critics of cultural imperialism have made explicit examinations or

implicit denunciations of the underlying ideologies of these products. However, the wealth of evidence of the political and economic influence of US-based transnational cultural industries and the often elegant ideological dissections of their products still left scholars with questions about the specifically cultural effects of imperialism. The political economic approach is most often criticized for being reductionist, or for allowing the analysis of the specifically cultural domination to recede indefinitely. The analyses of the cultural products of imperialism are usually criticized for being functionalist, that is, for analysing culture as if its function were to reproduce capitalism and imperialism in a seamless and non-contradictory way, or for crudely adopting a 'hypodermic' model of media effects, thus treating Third World subjects as the passive receptacles for imperialist ideology.⁹ Such criticisms have led many to reject the cultural imperialism thesis.

In order to avoid both reductionism and functionalism, a line of research opened that attempted to examine empirically the effects of transnational cultural goods, typically North American television programmes, on foreign audiences (such as the work of Ang, Leibes, Penman and others, discussed in Schiller, 1989). Besides the effort to collect data on the phenomenological reception of such products, these studies have been organized around the notion of the active audience, the audience as a producer of meanings. These studies have tended to conceptualize the active audience as either individual producers of readings, in the context of the 'pleasure' of the encounter with, for example, the melodramatic narrative of soap operas, or as inserted in plural social contexts, which mediate the audience member's readings. However, the active audience thesis can in turn be criticized for defining power out of the concept of culture (Schiller, 1989, pp. 148–54). The active audience thesis has tended to treat culture as an entirely autonomous, and therefore depoliticized, realm: a space for 'pleasure' and an escape from politics and the vicissitudes of the market.

Each of these approaches to cultural imperialism, and their critiques, demonstrate conceptual difficulties as well as certain strengths. Can a synthetic conceptualization of cultural imperialism – one which is not reductionist with respect to politics, economics or culture – be developed, one which would

incorporate the strengths and avoid the difficulties? The solution offered by John Tomlinson is to shift the focus of the analysis from the geographical expansion of capital (some degree of articulation with the 'world capitalist system' seems to be a *fait accompli* for most of the world's communities, in any case), to the historical perspective on the passage from tradition to modernity. Tomlinson sees modernity as a conflicted and contradictory process, one which offers the possibility of rational self-determination – a goal that critics of cultural imperialism value – while at the same time producing 'modern' economic, political and cultural institutions that often block this goal. To critique cultural imperialism is to suggest that:

people need something modernity has not properly provided. This is a need not for material well-being, or political emancipation, but a specifically cultural need: to be able to decide how we will live collectively in the widest possible sense – what we will value, what we will believe in, what sense we will make of our everyday lives. The failure of modernity which the discourses of cultural imperialism register is the failure of the autonomised institutions of modernity to meet this cultural need. (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 169)

By emphasizing a universal cultural need, this conception of cultural imperialism helps prevent the discourse of cultural imperialism from degenerating into a nationalist or nativist sort of discourse. While we may want to preserve the idea that the critique of cultural imperialism entails a critique of the institutionalization of modernity in particular ways, however, Tomlinson goes too far in suggesting that the needs for material well-being or political emancipation somehow lie outside the problematic of cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism is a problem because imperialists have had the material wherewithal to project their influence, norms and values onto the world, and because this way of living has meant material deprivation and political repression for most of the people in the world.

If the way that imperialism organizes the passage from tradition to modernity forms the substance for a critique of cultural imperialism, then a related and important issue that also needs to be examined is the culture of imperialism or of

the imperialists. This is the question investigated by Todorov (1985), Said (1993), and the contributors to the volume edited by Dirks (1992). Each of these writers asks: what are the images that the *conquistadors*, colonialists or imperialists have of themselves, their 'civilizing' mission, and their relations to the populations and territories they subject? Such questions reach beyond any parochial interest in European history, because the work of projecting onto subject populations the image of the 'other' contributed to the formation of this image, as well as to the techniques of administration and political control that would characterize not only the colonial situation, but also 'modern' political institutions in the metropolis. Whereas colonialism created the Third World both geographically as a system of nation states and as a dependent system of economies, it is also true, as Frantz Fanon pointed out, that Europe was a creation of the Third World (cited in Dirks, 1992, p. 1).

Furthermore, while the historical projects of conquest, colonization and empire were possible thanks in part to the material power of the imperialists, evidently empires were not maintained solely by armies and administrators. A form of cultural power also played a role. As Stoddart argues,

[the] success of this cultural power rested with the ability of the imperial system to have its main social tenets accepted as appropriate forms of behaviour and ordering by the bulk of the client population, or at least by those important sections of that population upon whom the British relied for the mediation of their ruling practices, objectives, and ideology. (1988, p. 650)

This last point suggests that the effectiveness of external cultural power rests on the structure of the social relations of the colony or peripheral social formation. That is to say, 'external forces can only appear and exercise their deleterious activities in each nation through mediation with internal forces. [...] To pose the problem of imperialism therefore also means posing the problem of the classes which act as its relays in these different nations' (Mattelart, 1979a, pp. 58–9).

Having reasserted the importance of economic and political factors in cultural imperialism, we may now reincorporate the insight of the 'active audience thesis'. This insight derives

from the fact that culture is, above all, *produced*; traditionally, we in the West have opposed the concept of culture to that of nature precisely because while nature is encountered as existing apparently independent of human agency, culture is always encountered as a product of human agency, to be reproduced and transformed by human agents. Thus, just as humans produce cultural artefacts, audiences make meanings; however, they do not do so just as they please, they do so in conditions encountered and with skills acquired in their own cultural development. To assert the material character of culture, in other words, that it is produced by human agents in certain relations of production and with respect to certain forces of production, does not require us to claim that culture 'reflects' or 'corresponds' to the predominant relations of production in the economy. However, a class or class fraction that is struggling to be a ruling class also struggles, as Tomlinson said, 'to be able to decide how we will live collectively in the widest possible sense – what we will value, what we will believe in, what sense we will make of our everyday lives' (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 169). To the degree that such a cultural project is successful in attaining the consent of subaltern groups, we may describe it as a hegemonic project.

CULTURE AND HEGEMONY

What is the relationship between culture and hegemony? Above, I asserted that culture is central to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Gramsci himself never provides a complete definition of his term, but he does offer many suggestive statements. For example, hegemony is presented, in contradistinction to force or domination, as 'intellectual and moral leadership' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57). Given Gramsci's insistence that everyone is an intellectual or a philosopher – although not everyone is a specialist in philosophy – hegemony seems to be in part a question of consciousness. Early in the *Prison Notebooks*, he describes hegemony as the

'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically'

caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production. (Ibid., p. 12)

This further suggests that in a class society, hegemony shapes the consciousness of subordinate groups in such a way as to produce admiration for the dominant groups. Thus the term 'hegemony' suggests that in a society of dominant and subordinate groups under certain political conditions, the prevailing political and economic relations determine consciousness. Gwyn Williams provides a succinct statement of this thesis:

By 'hegemony' Gramsci seems to mean a sociopolitical situation, in his terminology a 'moment,' in which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations. (cited in Sassoon, 1982b, p. 94)

Thus hegemony permeates social life, including areas which would normally be thought of as part of a culture: taste, morality, customs, religious principles. Raymond Williams makes this point even more forcefully:

[the concept of hegemony] sees the relations of domination and subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, as in effect a saturation of the whole process of living – not only of political and economic activity, nor only of manifest social activity, but of the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense. (Williams, 1977, p. 110)

For Williams, however, hegemony is not only extensive in society; it is intensive as well: 'The true condition of hegemony is effective *self-identification* with the hegemonic forms: a specific and internalized "socialization" which is expected

to be positive but which, if that is not possible, will rest on a (resigned) recognition of the inevitable and the necessary' (Ibid., p. 118, emphasis in original).

With the extensive and intensive limits and pressures – by Williams' definition, the determinations – exerted by hegemony, it is tempting to approach it as an order, a given dimension in society. But Williams cautions against this tendency. Rather, he insists, 'A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. [...] It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own' (Ibid., p. 112). This emphasis on the nature of hegemony as a process and a *product* of social conflict creates a crucial link with Williams' account of culture itself. For Williams, culture cannot be conceived of as a 'superstructure'. It is itself a material process, through which people make themselves by producing their means of life; culture is: 'a constitutive social process, creating specific and different "ways of life"' (Ibid., p. 19). As a material process, culture is thus subject to materialist analysis. Hegemony, as a concept for analysing social relations, sharpens cultural materialism:

'Hegemony' goes beyond 'culture,' as previously defined, in its insistence in relating the 'whole social process' to specific distributions of power and influence. To say that 'men' define and shape their whole lives is true only in abstraction. In any actual society there are specific inequalities in means and therefore in capacity to realize this process. In a class society these are primarily inequalities between classes. (Ibid., p. 108)

Thus hegemony does not merely contain elements which can be described as 'cultural'. Rather, it is a characteristic way of organizing the material social process itself, in which culture generates 'an inherent and constituting "practical consciousness"'; of which language and signification are 'indissoluble elements [...] involved all the time in both production and reproduction' (Ibid., p. 99).

To reiterate: culture is not a 'superstructure' which reflects a supposedly prior material economic process; culture is itself a material process, a constituent part of a 'whole way of life'.

Culture both constitutes and is produced by social agents, therefore both constituting and constituted by the class structure of class-divided societies. The practical consciousness that culture generates is not 'about' the world, that is, abstracted from the world and forming a separate realm; it is *in* the world.

Social formations are organized hierarchically by class structure in their socioeconomic dimension and by struggles over domination or hegemony in their political dimension. Such distinctions in social life indicate an obvious but important point: that culture is not singular in a given society, but plural, as the cultures of constituent social groups. Virtually all theories of culture recognize this point, from elitist theories of 'mass culture' in contradistinction to authentic or 'elite' culture, to more contemporary notions of multiculturalism. However, both elitist and pluralist notions about the various kinds of culture that can exist in a social formation tend to treat the various cultures as relatively independent from each other and as inherently 'belonging' to social groups. Cultural materialism criticizes such views on the grounds that social life is produced by the various social agents in relations (of struggle, of production, of domination and subordination, of solidarity and co-operation, and so on) to one another, producing their ways of life in these relations. Thus the major characteristics of the dominant and subordinate cultures are determined by the social relations between dominant and subordinate groups in society.

The Italian anthropologist Alberto Maria Cirese has explicated Gramsci's writings on folklore in an effort to build a framework for analysing these cultural relations (Cirese, 1982). In Gramsci's account, according to Cirese, the fundamental opposition in the social formation between dominant and subordinate groups is expressed culturally in the opposition between 'official' culture and folklore. The 'official' conceptions become dominant and acquire their characteristics precisely in relation to the folkloric conceptions. Thus where a 'whole way of life' is imposed or is accepted as normal, it will be the culture of the hegemonic social class; it will consist of cultured or complex intellectual categories; its formal expressions will be organic; its internal organization will be unitary; its mode of expression will be explicit; its content will

be original; and it will have an aggressive character which in consciousness will be expressed as an intentional opposition to other cultures. In contrast, folkloric conceptions pertain to subaltern social classes; they consist of simple intellectual categories in unorganic combinations; their internal organization will be fragmentary; their mode of expression implicit; their content debased; and their opposition to the dominant culture will be mechanical, meeting the dominant culture's aggression with an attitude of resistance (Ibid., pp. 215–22). Cirese goes on to point out, however, that this simple dichotomization of cultures is too neat. If Gramsci does indeed discuss folklore in uniformly negative terms, he nevertheless values it as an object for study because the elements of the folkloric cultures can form the bases of a counter-hegemony, allowing subaltern groups to begin to become prominent and to organize their own bloc for the direction of society. This view of the relations between dominant and subaltern cultures underscores the nature of both hegemony and of culture as *processes*, and not as reified, static characteristics of people or social relations.

To conceive of dominant and subordinate cultures as processes draws our attention to the need for the dominant groups continually to renew and reorganize their dominance, as well as to the procedures through which the subaltern groups adjust their own culture to the changing conditions of their subordination. Thus the schema suggested by the dichotomous descriptors 'hegemonic/subaltern' or 'dominant/subordinate' must be further elaborated. As for the leading groups, Gramsci already distinguishes between the conditions in which they enjoy the consent of the governed, which is hegemony, and the conditions in which they must impose their leadership or rule by force, or domination. We have already alluded to the difficulties of conceptualizing cultural domination; some of these difficulties can be resolved by recognizing that it is not the dominant classes or groups that determine whether conditions of hegemony or dominance prevail, rather it is the level of resistance to hegemony from the subaltern groups that indicate the appropriate strategies. Under hegemony, the characteristics of folkloric conceptions described by Cirese prevail. When force is required, it is required in part because subaltern classes have a conception of the world that

does not conform to these characteristics, and thus they have a culture of rebellion.

Thus, the culture of the subordinate groups in a social formation is not always 'folkloric'; rather the non-dominant cultures may be what is called popular culture, alternative culture, or oppositional culture. In academic literature, 'popular culture' has been a notoriously difficult term to define (see, for example, MacCabe, 1986). For the present, we will treat popular culture in a straightforward way, as the sense of the people's culture closest to the notion of 'folkloric' described by Cirese, or by Gramsci as 'common sense' or 'spontaneous philosophy' (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 323–43). Alternative culture exists in opposition to the dominant conceptions, but it either rejects the 'common sense' conceptions or does not have strong ties to the conceptions of the subaltern groups. It is potentially counter-hegemonic, if these ties develop or the alternative conceptions displace the hegemonic ones in the popular appropriations or adaptations. Oppositional culture attempts to reformulate the subaltern cultures into a counter-hegemonic project. The possibilities for alternative or oppositional cultures to become counter-hegemonic projects are, in the end, problems of education and creativity:

Creating a new culture does not only mean one's own individual 'original' discoveries. It also, and most particularly, means the diffusion in a critical form of truths already discovered, their 'socialisation' as it were, and even making them the basis of vital action, an element of co-ordination and intellectual and moral order. For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent fashion about the real present world, is a 'philosophical' event far more important and 'original' than the discovery by some philosophical 'genius' of a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 325)

In sum, cultural domination can only be understood as a dynamic process, in which contending groups attempt to define their 'ways of life' in the contexts of other social and political relationships. It is the materiality of culture, its dual character as a process through which people live their lives and as a product of their social life, which makes these processes of domination and resistance in culture possible. Therefore

conceptions of hegemony which see it as imposed from above cannot capture the political and cultural essence of the dynamic of hegemony. At the level of transnational relations, the culture of the core or hegemonic classes is not a given set of values or practices to be emulated by subordinate groups. Hegemony, even transnational hegemony, is first and foremost a relationship – not necessarily a stable relationship – in which the subaltern cultures can only be articulated in terms of the dominant cultures, either as a matter of self-identification with the dominant forms, or as a matter of the passive acceptance of their inevitability or ‘natural’, ‘common sense’ character. Subordinate classes and groups must also produce hegemony, otherwise other forms of domination become necessary.

This dual character of culture is not easily separated into analytically distinct features. It more closely resembles the ‘duality of structure’ described by Anthony Giddens with respect to the concept of ‘structuration’. As we turn to the examination of the intellectuals as a particular social group bearing and producing culture, this concept will help to integrate the analysis of culture developed so far with the roles played by the intellectuals in communication and in society.

THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE INTELLECTUALS

The debates in social theory between advocates of structuralism and advocates of agent-centred or ‘action’ models are quite complex, and have resulted in a greater sensitivity in social theory to what is now referred to as the ‘agent–structure problem’. Various efforts to resolve this problem have begun to make themselves felt in international relations scholarship.¹⁰ One of the most influential contributions in social theory has been Anthony Giddens’ theory of ‘structuration’ (Giddens, 1984).

Structuration breaks with both the structuralist and the agent-orientated theories, while preserving crucial insights from both. From the latter, but especially from the hermeneutical tradition, it takes the notion of the individual social agent as a creative actor in social processes, interpreting reality and

acting according to the desires, motivations, rationalizations, and strategies derived from the agent's capacity for interpreting the consequences, intended and unintended, of its acts.

'Structuralism', the other side of the debate from which Giddens works, actually refers to two different traditions in social theory with different concepts of 'structure'. Giddens creates a synthesis of the two. In the structural-functionalist tradition, structure refers to patterns or a patterning of behaviour. In European structuralism, the concept of structure is borrowed from structural linguistics, and refers to the underlying codes which must be inferred from their apparent manifestations (Giddens, 1984, p. 16).

Structure thus refers, in social analysis, to the structuring properties allowing the 'binding' of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernable similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them 'systemic' form. To say that structure is a 'virtual order' of transformative relations means that social systems, as reproduced social practices, do not have 'structures' but rather exhibit 'structural properties' and that structure exists, as time-space presence, only in its instantiations in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents. (Ibid., p. 17)

The dialectical relationship between agency and structure – agency being implicated by structure, structure being realized, reproduced and transformed by social agents – highlights Giddens' other contribution in structuration theory: the concept of the 'duality' of structure.

According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize. Structure is not 'external' to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more 'internal' to their activities. [...] Structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling. (Ibid., p. 25)¹¹

In other words, because agents are creative, but creative within the contexts of their social situations, the structures of

social life must be seen both as limits on the possible actions of knowledgeable agents and as the resources they have for their action – action which both reproduces and transforms the social structures.¹²

The structuration approach developed by Giddens may be applied to the question of the commitments and the autonomy of intellectuals in the context of international political economic relations or of transnational hegemony. For example, appeals to intellectuals to take a stance of value neutrality or of political commitment depend on the intellectuals' freedom to make such a choice. Examining the structural factors involved in the social constitution of intellectuals opens the issue of the limits to and conditions for the autonomy of intellectuals. Pierre Bourdieu addresses this issue in his analysis of the scientific 'field' as not only the accumulated knowledge and methodologies accepted by the scholars working within the field, but also as the:

locus of a competitive struggle, in which the *specific* issue at stake is the monopoly of *scientific competence*, in the sense of a particular agent's socially recognised capacity to speak and act legitimately (i.e. in an authorized and authoritative way) in scientific matters. (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 19; emphasis in original)

The outcomes of this struggle depend only in part on the distribution of power, or, more specifically, of 'cultural capital'¹³ among the competing agents within the field; the relative autonomy of the field from the class struggles of the social world must also be determined. For Bourdieu, a field's autonomy will depend on both the capacity of its scholars to win and preserve that autonomy and on the interests of the dominant class in the products of the field.¹⁴

Thus, the interactions between politics and science are necessarily complex. Just as scientific developments cannot be reduced to the structural constraints emanating from the political 'field', neither can science be properly understood if the political demands placed upon the scientists are bracketed out. For Bourdieu, the professional commitments of the intellectuals in a scientific field entail a struggle for autonomous control, or at least for the appearance of autonomy, over the procedures and outcomes of the field; by the same token, the

interests of the dominant class in the outcomes of a scientific field may lead that class to attempt to place conditions on the autonomous behaviour of the intellectuals. The results of these struggles are neither predetermined nor stable, and changes in the scientific field or in the sociopolitical context can produce new relations of force or autonomy. It is because the intellectuals must struggle for their autonomy that their autonomy is 'relative', just as the struggles of ruling groups to establish their hegemony is never definitive.

The idea of a field's relative autonomy should not be confused with the notion of value neutrality, or what Sandra Harding criticizes as objectivism. Objectivism, in Harding's view, produces a 'weak objectivity' with regard to understanding the growth of knowledge. By bracketing out the 'broad, historical social desires, interests, and values' (Harding, 1991, p. 143) in order to arrive at value neutrality, objectivism purports to block the judgmental relativism of interested or 'committed' research, to create the conditions whereby scientists can all agree on objective standards for judging the methods and procedures for justifying research. Harding argues that this is a weak notion because it conceptualizes objectivity both too narrowly and too broadly: too narrowly, in the sense that the social interests peculiar to the social group of scientists (or, considering how science is a model for intellectual production in most fields, of scholars and intellectuals generally) are also bracketed out and unexamined;¹⁵ too broadly, in the sense that not all social values and interests have the same noxious effects on research – some values, such as promoting democracy or justice, even have positive consequences for objectivity. Harding's defence of standpoint epistemologies stems from this need for a 'strong objectivity', that is, one which can examine its own social desires, values and interests.

Strong objectivity, therefore, may be achieved by examining the struggles of intellectuals for the autonomy of their fields, most evidently in the contexts where such struggles are also against the efforts of dominant classes to establish hegemony. At the same time, in a context where hegemony is a transnational force, strong objectivity may help to lay bare the political values, assumptions and interests which structure a scientific field internationally.

By introducing the need to determine the relative autonomy of a scientific field, it becomes possible to begin to refine the concept of the intellectual. 'Neutrality' or 'commitment' with regard to political projects can be interpreted as linked to the distinction that Antonio Gramsci draws between 'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals. First, however, we must clarify exactly who intellectuals are for Gramsci.

Gramsci argues that it is a mistake to consider intellectuals as distinct from 'non-intellectuals': 'There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual activity can be excluded: *homo faber* cannot be separated from *homo sapiens*' (1971, p. 9). 'Non-intellectuals' do not exist. The key to specifying intellectuals as a social grouping lies in understanding the general system of social relations in a given society, in particular, the social division of labour.

The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations. (Ibid., p. 8)

In other words, intellectual activities and groups must be seen in relation to the fundamental classes of a given social formation. 'Traditional intellectuals' are those whose self-assessment is one of independence from the dominant social group, thanks in part to a sense of historical continuity transcending even the most radical social changes. Gramsci cites the ecclesiastics as typical of this category. Because the practices of the traditional intellectuals appear to be independent of the forces which shape society at large, they are the sort of practices that the model of the value neutral intellectual advocates as ideal or standard. Appeals for objectivism are appeals to uphold the apparent separateness of the traditional intellectual from worldly concerns of pressures. The traditional intellectual is, thus, an intellectual of weak objectivity.

On the other hand, as fundamental classes emerge and begin to assert their control over the economic structure of society, members of these classes emerge who can fulfil various necessary intellectual functions for their class, ranging

from the technicians of the production process to the ideologues who give political and moral direction to the class project. These are the 'organic' intellectuals.

The relationships between organic and traditional intellectuals are not predetermined; indeed, as the new intellectuals emerge, they may attempt to link their projects with the historical projects of the traditional intellectuals or use the methods, institutions and even ideas of the traditional intellectuals in order to gain legitimacy, or they may attempt to co-opt the traditional intellectuals into their project to establish hegemony. Thus, organic intellectuals do not automatically overcome weak objectivity. Furthermore, Gramsci suggests that there are degrees of being organic or of connection to the fundamental social class (1971, p. 12). Within these ranges of possibilities, however, it is the function of intellectuals to be the 'functionaries' of the complex of 'superstructures'. This means that intellectuals provide the personnel for both (1) the 'private' organizations of civil society which organize hegemony, and (2) the coercive state apparatus for disciplining the social groups who do not consent to the general direction of social life imposed by the dominant class (Ibid.).

What matters in a Gramscian account, then, is the relation of forces in the social formation; the activities and the ideas of the intellectuals can only be understood within this perspective. As the notion of structuration suggests, intellectuals are both constrained and enabled to act by the habitus and by the patterns of force that constitute the social formation and the field in which they work. This is not to say that the intellectual's commitment to the truth is not important – indeed, Gramsci's insight that we all engage in intellectual activities as *humans* gives the search for truth a particularly liberating character, just as in Marx's notion that a fully autonomous subject could fish, farm and be a critic, in effect abolishing the mental/manual division of labour – nor that what is 'true' about the world, empirically or morally, is epistemologically relative. The point is that our understanding and evaluation of intellectuals must be conditioned by an understanding of both what is possible historically as well as what is necessary morally.

Are intellectuals in the Third World a special case? As explained thus far, Gramsci's theory of the intellectuals appears

to refer to intellectual activity within a *national* social formation. However, Gramsci also suggests that ideas play an important role in organizing international relations:

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 182)

The dissemination of an ideology from a more developed to a less developed country implies that dominant groups in a core country can organize, or attempt to organize, intellectuals in the periphery to participate in their hegemonic project. Irene Gendzier argues forcefully that this was the project of the intellectuals from the USA who promoted modernization theory at home and abroad (Gendzier, 1995).

However, maintaining international hegemony is no more automatic than sustaining it locally. Intellectuals in the periphery can recognize 'alien premises, objects and methods' (Beltrán, 1976) as well as the political projects that promote them. When this recognition on the part of significant political groups leads them to reject the dominant political project, hegemony breaks down and groups or classes that wish to rule must find other means to secure their dominance, or lose it.

Thus, just as the outcomes of the struggle for autonomy in a scientific field are not predetermined, neither is the role of the intellectuals in creating, sustaining or challenging an international hegemonic system. Intellectuals in a peripheral country may serve as the transmission belts for ideas or ideologies originating in the core, they may articulate counter-hegemonic ideologies, or they may remain isolated from the social struggles at hand. The analysis of intellectual practices must attempt to determine which of these roles the intellectuals play in a particular historical moment, and why the intellectuals take the positions that they do. In the situation of a peripheral country, this explanation must include not only the influences flowing from the general system of social relations of the national society, but also, and crucially, it must

include the effects, on both the peripheral system of social relations and on the peripheral intellectuals themselves, of the organization of the transnational hegemonic project originating in the core, and the contributions of the intellectuals in challenging or reproducing transnational hegemony.

2 Origins of the Scientific Study of Mass Communications in Chile: 1958–67

Adopting a ‘scientific’ approach to mass communications in Chile in the late 1950s meant adopting the methods and premises of North American sociology. Not only was the North American approach seen as a way to modernize the study of communications, but North American sociology was part and parcel of the project to modernize Chile. This chapter will examine the sources and consequences for communications scholarship of the North American influence in Chile during this period.

MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In development literature, ‘modernization’ refers to a process of total societal change in which a poor or ‘less-developed’ country becomes more like a rich one. Modernization theory has an explicitly cultural orientation, in that it is concerned with the transformation of the features of ‘traditional’ culture which inhibit acceptance of change in the society. Modernization specifies the cultural and political conditions necessary for economic growth. Thus Daniel Lerner’s (1968) five criteria for modernization encompass economic, political and cultural changes in society, as follows:

- (1) progress towards self-sustained economic growth;
- (2) a degree of public participation in the polity;
- (3) social diffusion of secular-rational norms;
- (4) an increase in social mobility; and
- (5) a transformation of the ‘modal personality’ tending towards greater acquisitiveness or ‘striving’ and towards greater ‘empathy’.

These five criteria for a 'modern' society refer rather explicitly to the characteristics of a modern capitalist society, and somewhat transparently to the ideal self-image of the United States in the post-war period. The modernization process was to be driven by the creation of 'acquisitive' or 'striving' consumers, by the development of a consumer culture, and by the 'self-sustained' and controlled growth of effective demand. In its relations with the war-ravaged countries in Europe and Japan, US hegemony was organized around economic aid and ideological anti-communism; for US hegemony in North–South relations, modernization theory added the values and norms associated with capitalist development.

Many agents and institutions could contribute to the process of modernization, but two stand out: the mass communications media and the intellectuals. With regard to the media, Lerner (1958) postulated links between positive attitudes towards the media and modern attitudes, and claimed that the efficient functioning of modern society depends on the mass media. Inkeles and Smith (1974) and Wilbur Schramm (1964) also stress the importance of the media for the integration of a society, and for cultivating modern attitudes, new values and new life styles. The modern mass communications media were thus the means by which traditional society would acquire modern values, norms and culture.

Modernization theory has displayed an ambivalent attitude towards intellectuals as agents for change. Samuel Huntington (1968) believed that the changes that modernization brings create instability in a society, and favoured relying on strong, and in his view socially neutral, institutions such as the military, whose organizational discipline could be used to contain threats to the system, as the agents of social change. Indeed, Huntington argued that the appropriate response to radical middle-class intellectuals was not political reform, but repression. Edward Shils (1961 and 1972), while recognizing a tendency for intellectuals to be in political opposition to existing regimes, felt that they also played crucial roles in the founding of new nations (see also Brunner and Flisfisch, 1983, ch. 5). Shils devoted much energy to organizing Third World intellectuals to become modernizing, that is, pro-Western, elites, through the Congress for Cultural Freedom (Gendzier, 1995).

Such political activity was not unique to Shils among modernization theorists, and US policy-makers soon adopted modernization as both the ideological keystone for US relations with the Third World and as the framework from which modernizing policies could be derived. Ideologically, modernization theory lent itself quite well to the fundamental anti-communism of US foreign policy, both in its abstraction of the modernizing man (typically, the agent of modernization was conceived as male) as an individualistic entrepreneur and consumer, and in the politics of its major theorists, such as Huntington and Shils.

It also lent itself to the other central motivation of US foreign policy: the promotion of foreign direct investment by US-based capital. The recommendations of modernization theorists explicitly called for the expansion of the capitalist market and policies that would promote the social diffusion of the values and norms thought to be modernizing. The USA would thus promote domestic policies of institutional and administrative reform of the government, as well as agrarian reform, both to attempt to forestall the prospects of revolutionary change from the left, and to create the institutions and conditions that would be favourable for expanded capital investment. Modernization theory reached its political zenith in the co-ordinated policies of the 'Alliance for Progress' under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and Eduardo Frei's 'Revolution in Liberty'.

US GOALS AND THE 'ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS'

The Alliance for Progress was touted from the beginning as a progressive policy to improve the economic and political systems of Latin America. While now it may seem a commonplace to denounce this programme as imperialist, when examined in the context of the general forces tending towards transnationalization in the global political economy such claims may be both substantiated and given some analytical force. It will be examined in the following ways: as part of the increasing influence of the US Government over Chilean policies; as part of the increasing influence of US-based transnational corporations in Chile's economy; and as an effort to establish the

hegemony of the transnational project¹ by either recruiting sympathetic fractions of Chile's ruling class or creating social actors sympathetic to or dependent upon transnationalism.

After the Second World War, the leaders of various Latin American countries looked at the Marshall Plan as a model for policies to address the problems of poverty and economic underdevelopment in the region, and began to put pressure on Washington to consider similar programmes of grants and public aid to assist in the development of the region. The Depression of the 1930s had highlighted the external vulnerability and weakness of the region's economies, and many populist governments adopted nationalistic economic policies based on strategic public investment and regulation to spur import-substituting industrialization. The economic analyses of the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA), among the first such systematic studies in the region, highlighted the role trade and investment patterns had played in creating structural problems in Latin America's economies. As the largest investor and trade partner in the region, as well as the world's strongest economy, the USA was the logical place to turn to request assistance.

Ideologically, representatives of the US government such as Spruille Braden condemned such policies as inimical to the institution of private property (Kolko, 1988, p. 39). Politically, Eisenhower's administration resisted calls for increased aid, in part because he was a fiscal conservative. Thus although he believed that the USA needed to assume the role of world leader in political and economic terms, foreign aid put a strain on the budget which he was resolved to contain. Under the slogan 'trade not aid', the US policy was to make

Latin American governments [...] recognize that the bulk of the capital required for their economic development can best be supplied by private enterprise and that their own self-interest requires the creation of a climate which will attract private investment. (National Security Council, cited in Rabe, 1988, p. 65)

Eisenhower was not opposed to foreign aid in principal; rather it was seen to be necessary only where Communism was seen as a direct threat to US interests. Although the Eisenhower administration did have advocates of increased aid to the

region, both in the form of increased grants and through increasing the role of the Export Import Bank, the policy of relying solely on direct foreign investment by US firms to develop the region did not begin to change until after 1958.

1958 was a watershed, thanks to Vice President Richard Nixon's disastrous visit to the region, the highlight of which was a riot in Caracas in which he was nearly killed. The crisis that the Nixon trip precipitated forced a change in the Administration's policies, forcing a review of the political support and comfort given to the region's dictators, a re-examination of military assistance to the region, and changes in regional economic policies. Douglas Dillon, since 1957 head of the economic section of the State Department, first got the Administration to relax its opposition to commodity agreements which could provide price supports for the notoriously unstable primary exports on which the region depended, and then brought about an inter-American agreement which created the Inter-American Development Bank, for which the United States provided 45 per cent of the initial capitalization (Rabe, 1988, pp. 111–12). Nevertheless, the primary source for development funds for the region was to remain private investment.

The next watershed event affecting US policy towards Latin America was the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Discussion of the causes and consequences of the Cuban Revolution lies beyond the scope of this book; for present purposes, its most important effect was to force policy-makers to find a way to synthesize the more aid-orientated economic policies that emerged after Nixon's Latin America trip with the now intensified politics of anti-communism. The new policy synthesis, which nevertheless did not break sharply from the Eisenhower doctrine, was inaugurated by the newly elected Kennedy Administration as an 'Alliance for Progress'.

The Alliance for Progress intended to dress up the anti-communism of US foreign policy with rhetoric favouring reform in the region. The timing of the announcement of the Alliance highlighted this: 13 May 1961 was one month before the Bay of Pigs invasion. While promising more aid for the region and support for reformist policies in order to forestall more radical demands, the Kennedy administration let the CIA off the leash. However, if the Alliance did not represent a

change in the anti-communism of US foreign policy towards the region, neither did it represent a major departure from the economic policies that the Eisenhower Administration had been pursuing. The amount of aid the US committed for the Alliance never approached the \$20 billion that Secretary Dillon suggested, and in the end Latin American governments paid for 87 per cent of Alliance costs (Kolko, 1988, p. 150).

To put the best face on the Alliance, a showcase was chosen to demonstrate that reform under an elected government could solve the economic and political problems of the region. The country chosen to be the showcase was Chile. Chile had been a prime candidate for the role. It had enjoyed decades of civilian rule; the current administration of Jorge Alessandri was dominated by conservatives but included the Radical Party, which favoured agrarian reform; the business sector had close and growing ties with US interests and the military had been developing stronger ties to the US government. The close links and dependence of Chilean capital on transnational capital, in the form of direct foreign investment by US-based transnationals, and the direct and indirect influence of the US government on Chilean policy-making underscore the imperialist nature of Chile's insertion into the transnational political economy.

In order to appreciate fully the importance of transnational capital in Chile, it must be examined both in terms of its scope and in terms of its strategic location. Until the 1960s, foreign direct investment in Chile was located principally in mining, and copper mining accounted for about 80 per cent of Chilean exports by value (Stallings, 1978, p. 43). Until the 'Chileanization' policy of the Frei administration in 1965, Anaconda and the Kennecott Corporation owned 100 per cent of the stock in the large mines. Under 'Chileanization', the majority ownership of most of the stocks went to the Chilean government, but the transnational corporations retained substantial control over administration and sales.

Furthermore, during the 1960s foreign capital investments in Chile began to increase in industrial production. Stallings points out that foreign investment in industry was concentrated in the largest industrial firms, with oligopoly or monopoly control over their sectors of the economy, and was concentrated in the most dynamic industries: paper, chemicals, rubber, electrical equipment, metal products, and transportation

equipment (Ibid., pp. 43–4). Transnational capital helped to displace decision-making power over economic questions not only through its influential position in the Chilean economy, but also through the vehicle of multilateral and bilateral loans, as Chile incurred a huge foreign debt during the decade of the 1960s (Petras and Morley, 1975, p. 5).

This economic power, expressed in terms of indebtedness and dependence, easily translated into political power in Chile – a striking illustration of the ‘structural power of capital’ (Gill and Law, 1988, ch. 7). Thus many of the firms in the more dynamic and oligopolistic industries had originally been created with public capital under Chile’s public development corporation, CORFO. However, once such companies became profitable, they were sold to the private sector, often at less than book value, and often with money borrowed from the state itself (Stallings, 1978, pp. 48–9). As indicated above, these were precisely the industries which attracted heavy foreign investment throughout the 1960s.

Increasing transnational influence in Chile through the Alliance for Progress period was not a strictly private sector affair. Paul Sigmund, a writer generally sympathetic with the Alliance for Progress, recounts how

When Teodoro Moscoso and Richard Goodwin of the Kennedy administration went on an emergency mission to Santiago in early 1962, they were impressed by the Chilean efforts to carry out a stabilization plan and to increase tax collection, and they recommended an integrated system of assistance through ‘program loans’ that gave balance-of-payments support in quarterly payments, or tranches, on the basis of preestablished performance criteria. Beginning in 1962 with a \$35 million loan, such loans began to go to the Chilean government on a regular basis. They were accompanied by regular reviews of the budget before the release of each quarterly installment, involving the United States closely in Chilean economic policy on a bilateral basis. (Sigmund, 1993, pp. 16–17)

Another form of overt US government efforts to influence Chile’s political system in support of the transnational project was military assistance to and co-ordination with Latin American militaries. Alain Rouquié reports that American

military assistance to Chile, including credit sales, grants and surplus, under the Mutual Security Act (1953-67) amounted to \$131.3 m. Subsequently, under the Foreign Assistance Act (1968-72), this aid amounted to \$38.3 m., for a total of \$169.6 m. during these 20 years (Rouquié, 1987, p. 134). In addition, a total of 4374 Chilean military personnel, out of 61 000 members of the Chilean Armed Forces in 1970, were trained at US facilities between 1950 and 1970: 2553 in the USA, and 1821 at bases outside the USA (Ibid., p. 135). Military Assistance Programs were co-ordinated by SouthCom, in the Panama Canal Zone. The Canal Zone was also at the time home of the US Army School of the Americas where the National Security Doctrine shaped the curriculum for Latin American officers, involving training in counter-insurgency warfare and anti-communist ideology.

It should be emphasized that these figures represent aid to only one country in Latin America during this period. The significance of these figures lies in the USA's overall policy to bring the region's militaries under its hegemony. Friendly relations between the USA and Brazilian militaries developed during the Second World War, when Brazilians participated in the campaigns in Italy. After the Allied victory, the admiration of the Brazilian officers spread to other Latin American nations, and in 1947, a regional defence treaty, the Interamerican Treaty of Mutual Assistance, known as the Rio Pact, formalized the principal of 'collective security in the face of extra-continental aggression' (Rouquié, 1987, pp. 130-1), thus recruiting the Latin American militaries to defend the old imperial concepts of the Monroe Doctrine.

Anticommunist ideology produced the notion of internal subversion as Soviet aggression, especially after the Cuban Revolution. Thus under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 'In emphasizing the "defense of the internal front" against communist subversion and the responsibilities for "civic action" by the armies in order to prevent it, American military aid, beginning in 1962 became more intensive and better institutionalized than before' (Rouquié, 1987, p. 132).

Overt cultivation of influence over economic policy and military doctrine was only one part of the construction of US hegemony. In order to protect this influence from electoral threat, the USA also relied on covert means to influence

elections in Chile, to thwart the threat from the coalitions of the Socialist and Communist parties. Massive covert intervention in the 1964 elections brought about, according to the CIA, a majority victory for Frei. According to the US Senate Staff Report, '[a] total of nearly four million dollars was spent on some fifteen covert action projects, ranging from organizing slum dwellers to passing funds to political parties' during the 1964 election campaign (United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1975, p. 14). The intent of some of these activities may have gone beyond influencing the outcome of the election; for example, organizing slum dwellers would provide a popular base on which Frei's reforms, politically tied to the Alliance for Progress, could be implemented. However, the bulk of the covert operations in 1964 were propaganda activities:

During the first week of intensive propaganda activity (the third week of June, 1964), a CIA-funded propaganda group produced twenty radio spots per day in Santiago and on 44 provincial stations; twelve-minute news broadcasts five times [sic] daily on three Santiago stations and 24 provincial outlets; thousands of cartoons, and much paid press advertising. By the end of June, the group produced 24 daily newscasts in Santiago and the provinces, 26 weekly 'commentary' programs, and distributed 3,000 posters daily. The CIA regards the anti-communist scare campaign as the most effective activity undertaken by the US on behalf of the Christian Democratic candidate [Frei]. (US Senate, 1975, pp. 15-16)

The significance of the CIA propaganda campaign for communications studies will be discussed below.

In sum, during the period under consideration, US-based corporations were increasing their control over strategic sectors of the Chilean economy through direct foreign investments, thus creating a form of capitalism, characterized by transnational co-ordination of both production and exchange, and control over global markets for its goods and services. US foreign policy at this time was to support the expansion of US-based transnational firms, which the US government promoted by encouraging or obliging developing nations,

including Chile, to improve the local conditions for direct foreign investment as the best way to ‘modernize’ their economies. At the same time, these economic policies were increasingly co-ordinated with the political and military policies of anti-communism in the hemisphere, creating an historic bloc that provided the basis for US hegemony in the region.

Developing these imperial relations after the Second World War was a complex and uneven process. Paul Sigmund, a writer critical of the notion of imperialism, tries to show how the peculiarities of Chile’s political system often prevented the USA from directly manipulating political outcomes (Sigmund, 1993). His argument misses the point, however, because the USA did not set out to colonize Chile in the post-Second World War era, rather it sought to recruit allies within Chile’s social formation and state apparatus for a transnational project – and when allies could not be found, to make them – in order to make the transnational project hegemonic. Certainly, political vicissitudes in Chile as well as the USA made this process uneven and subject to continual redefinition. How did Chile receive the transnational influences?

HARMONIZING CHILEAN POLITICS AND US GOALS

Jorge Alessandri was elected president of Chile in 1958, defeating Salvador Allende, the candidate of a leftist coalition, by a narrow margin. Alessandri ran as an independent, although he enjoyed the support of Chile’s traditional right-wing parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. He had strong ties to Chile’s industrialists, from whose ranks he emerged; indeed, Chile’s industrial organization, the Society for the Promotion of Manufacturing (known by its Spanish acronym, SOFOFA, for *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril*), described the Alessandri government as one ‘which the industrialists consider as our own’ (cited in Stallings, 1978, p. 90). With the politically centrist Radical Party weak and the Christian Democrat Party not yet a clearly defined ideological force in Chile, the 1958 elections had been a political contest in which Chile’s class forces had lined up against each other more clearly than in any previous elections. Thus Alessandri’s

government was clearly marked by its class character, including prominent SOFOFA members being named to important economic posts, over the usual placement of professional politicians or technocrats in such ministerial posts.

Alessandri came to office without a detailed economic plan. The plan that emerged involved the deregulation of the economy: lowering taxes and dismantling controls on wages, prices, imports and foreign exchange movements. Alessandri also wanted to remove the government from industry and commerce as much as possible, assuming that the private sector would step in. These policies were intended to achieve stability especially by slowing inflation, and through economic growth. Alessandri had campaigned by speaking in general terms about the need for moral leadership and for fiscal restraint; thus he shared a political affinity with Eisenhower and his administration.

The right-wing alliance behind Alessandri strongly supported the entry of foreign capital and foreign direct investment. While such sentiments were amenable to US preferences, they had domestic roots: foreign capital would help take some of the burden of industrial capital formation off of the domestic capitalists. As Alessandri put it: 'To increase the benefits of all, it is indispensable to create a climate propitious to the entry of important foreign capital which can considerably increase our production, thus avoiding greater sacrifices for the current generation even though we thus lower expectations for future generations' (cited in Stallings, 1978, p. 67).

While at the outset of his administration Alessandri could enjoy support from the political right, from industrialists, and from the US government and transnational capital, his anti-inflationary policies provoked resistance from the left and from organized labour, which culminated in a series of strikes and general strikes which the government met with violent repression. Resistance also came from the Radical Party, which drew most of its support from salaried public sector functionaries whose salaries also suffered from the anti-inflationary programmes. In a clear example of the politics of *transformismo*, this opposition was appeased by incorporating the Radicals into the government.

Support for Alessandri's government waned as his administration was unable to achieve either stability or growth.

Domestic capital investment did not materialize as he had hoped, as investors continued to put money into the safer Savings and Loans and into tax-sheltered agricultural investments. The traditional political right resented the calls for reform in the areas of taxation, administration, and especially agrarian reform. And the USA began to distance itself from Alessandri as he resisted breaking ties with Cuba, arguing legalistically that expelling Cuba from the OAS violated its Charter (Muñoz and Portales, 1991, p. 30). By 1963, as the next presidential campaign got under way, the coalition of forces had begun to favour Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), as the right decided to support the PDC against Allende and the USA began its massive intervention on Frei's behalf.

The Christian Democrat Party won the 1964 elections with a majority of the electorate. The right-wing Liberal and Conservative Parties had decided to support the PDC against Allende, which gave the PDC support cutting across class lines. The PDC itself was a multiclass party, though its base of support came primarily from the petty bourgeois urban professionals and small business owners. These groups gave the PDC government a distinctively technocratic flavour:

While committed to progress, greater equality, and social justice, few felt close to or trusted the working class and most favored an aristocracy of talent and quality in which their own high place and influence were assured. A substantial number had taken advanced degrees, some abroad, in such fields as sociology, economics, and administration.[...] They saw other parties and forces as mired in superficial, politically self-interested approaches to problems, while labor and entrepreneurial groups were seen as self-interested, unimaginative, and overly bureaucratic forces with whom it was neither necessary nor appropriate to negotiate. (Fleet, 1985, pp. 96–7)

These technocratic attitudes were admired by modernization theorists and shared by the policy intellectuals of the Alliance for Progress. The PDC had also been adept organizers among the neglected urban poor, or 'marginals'. Though the unity of this multiclass alliance proved impossible to maintain, at the outset it gave the PDC confidence that it could bring about a 'Revolution in Liberty', or structural reforms of Chile's

economy and society under a 'democratic' (that is, non-marxist) government.

Though US contributions to Frei's election were notorious, and US support for Frei's government was notable – Chile received more aid per capita from 1962 to 1969 than any other Latin American country – Frei was not simply a product of US policy. Frei pursued an independent foreign policy (Muñoz and Portales, 1991), and his programme for a 'Revolution in Liberty' was derived from the Church's social doctrine, social studies of Chile produced by DESAL (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Social para América Latina [Centre for Studies for the Social Development of Latin America], directed by the Jesuit, Father Roger Vekemans) and from the party's own history, emerging in the 1930s as a Christian Falange party disillusioned with the social policies of the Conservative Party.

However, while the 'Revolution in Liberty' was not designed by US policy-makers, it did have strong programmatic affinities with the Alliance for Progress. Alliance goals, as laid out in the Charter of Punta del Este, called for increasing per capita income, eliminating adult illiteracy, economic integration, the construction of low-cost housing, improved income distribution and national investment rates, and extensive agrarian reform (Sigmund, 1993, p. 15). The PDC also proposed 'drastic, massive and rapid' land reform (Angell, 1993, p. 152), expansion of the national market, modernization of industry, and 'immediate improvement in the lot of the poor [and] redistribution of national income' (Fleet, 1985, p. 82).

Improving the lot of the poor was the goal most strongly influenced by DESAL. The Chilean left had strong organizational bases in the organized labour movement, but the urban unemployed and 'marginal' groups were largely unorganized. The programme of 'Promoción Popular,' or Popular Promotion, was intended to organize 'marginals' and provide their organizations with technical, legal and material assistance, as well as to organize a political base for the PDC and institutionalize support for the government among this sector of the population. DESAL's director, Roger Vekemans, was instrumental in organizing international support for the PDC in both Europe and the United States, and also in founding the Catholic University's School of Sociology, which will be discussed below.

The 'Revolution in Liberty' began to experience difficulties in the second half of Frei's administration, as the multiclass alliance that had elected him began to crumble. Pressures on the government to define the pace and depth of reform mounted from the right, from organized labour, and from the increasingly radicalized urban and rural poor. A three way split emerged in the PDC between the *oficialistas* on the right, the *rebeldes* on the left, and the *terceristas* on the centre-left. The intensifying social conflict was also reflected in the University Reform movement in 1967, which brought about important institutional changes that would significantly affect communication scholarship. This period will be discussed in the following chapter.

MASS COMMUNICATIONS SCHOLARSHIP IN CHILE

Histories of the development of social theory in Chile, such as Fuenzalida's (1983) and Brunner's (1988), describe the reception of 'scientific' sociology in the late 1950s and 1960s as, at the outset, a struggle between the modernizing, scientific sociologists and the social theorists who preceded them. Fuenzalida cites the scientific sociologists' concern with the 'pre-sociological' nature of the social 'essayism' of the intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century. A typical example of this sort of social essay is Francisco Antonio Encina's *Nuestra inferioridad económica*, which explains Chile's economic underdevelopment in terms of the 'antinomy [that] exists between the physical endowment of Chile, which is not particularly favorable to agriculture but adequate for industry, and the aptitudes of the Chilean people, who are good at agricultural activities but not at manufacturing' (Fuenzalida, 1983, p. 96). By the 1950s, according to Fuenzalida, Chilean intellectuals had begun to view such social thought as superficial and unsophisticated, without an institutional basis or the scientific tools to remedy its shortcomings.

Brunner (1988) discusses the conflict in terms of the manner in which social theory had been institutionalized in Chile's Universities. As a primarily 'ivory tower' occupation, inheritor of nineteenth-century positivism, the intellectual production of which mainly reproduced the discourses of

sociological evolution and organicity, *sociología de cátedra* or 'professorial sociology' found its main task in codifying the discourse of the discipline. It should be noted that this state of things does not contradict the views of Fuenzalida's informants. This generation of social theorists described by Brunner taught in departments of education, law and philosophy, generally without access to books and publications published abroad: they orientated their debates towards each other's work, providing a rather narrow base on which to build social knowledge. Both sorts of criticism share the common, if implicit, concern that the knowledge produced by such a sociology does not lend itself to practical application for solving concrete social problems, and indeed inhibits the efforts of modernizing elites, as the newer generation of sociologists saw themselves to be.

A similar, if not exactly parallel, division emerged in communications studies. Prior to Chile's reception of 'scientific sociology' in its North American form, the *sociólogos de cátedra* argued that social phenomena should be studied as *things*. Communication could find no privileged conceptual position in such a static conception of the social world. The study of communication in Chile lay primarily in the domain of cultural studies. As we shall see, the adoption of structural functionalism as the dominant paradigm in Chilean sociology meant that problems of communication came to occupy a more central place in sociological thinking. The differences between the cultural and sociological approaches are illustrated by the publication in 1958 of three books: Raúl Silva Castro's *Prensa y periodismo en Chile: 1812-1956* [*The Press and Journalism in Chile*] (1958), Israel Drapkin's *Prensa y criminalidad* [*The Press and Crime*] (1958), and *El primer satélite artificial: Sus efectos en la opinión pública* [*The First Satellite: Its Effects on Public Opinion*] by Eduardo Hamuy, Danilo Salcedo and Orlando Sepúlveda (1958).

Raúl Silva Castro was a man of letters, who worked for a time as the Chief of the Chilean Letters section of the National Library. He published extensively on Chilean culture and literature, including bibliographies of Chilean literature, and edited compilations of the writings of various political and literary figures in Chile. *Prensa y periodismo* is a historical account of the development of the press in Chile, specifically

the emergence of a national press or *gran prensa*, and its role in Chile's political history. Much of the book is given over to cataloguing the various newspapers that appeared, however briefly, in Chile during various moments in its political history. There are also detailed chapters describing the foundation and histories of Chile's major newspapers, such as *El Mercurio*. While he provides no explicit analytical or theoretical apparatus for his interpretations, Silva Castro generally takes a decidedly progressive, liberal stance. For example, he discusses Fray Camilo Henríquez, the founder of Chile's first newspaper, the *Aurora de Chile* of 1812, not only in terms of his contributions to journalism, but mainly in terms of his politics, including an encounter with the Inquisition, or his opposition to the death penalty in Chile's first Senate (Silva Castro, 1958, pp. 16–21). Silva Castro devotes to the period of the Civil War in 1891 a chapter entitled 'The Clandestine Press', with descriptions of the repressive measures taken against the press by the dictatorship and the measures taken to combat the censorship.

Guillermo Sunkel (1986, pp. 12–13) points out another significant contribution of this book: it provided the foundation of a line of books about the *gran prensa* in Chile, books which tended to be written by journalists whose careers were tied to the national press. These 'integrated' histories were wholly uncritical, and, as Sunkel points out, were less studies of the Chilean press than they were memoirs, anecdotal histories or celebratory institutional histories. Such an uncritical stance would soon acquire a deeper political significance in the minds of communications scholars. However, at that moment, in the late 1950s and 1960s, the shortcoming of these sorts of books clearly lay in their non-pragmatic and 'unscientific' character, which rendered them less than useful for formulating communications policies for modernization. Here lies the concern shared by the modernizing 'scientific' sociologists.

Israel Drapkin's *Prensa y criminalidad* took a very different approach. Drapkin was an MD, whose main interest was in criminology. As such, Drapkin shared some of the characteristics of the *sociólogos de cátedra*. He was director of the Institute of Criminology of Chile from 1936 to 1959, as well as Professor of Social Pathology and Criminology at the University of Chile from 1950 through 1959. After 1959,

Drapkin was invited to become the founder and director of the Institute of Criminology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, thanks in part to his ongoing professional association with specialized offices on criminology within the United Nations since 1950. Two of Drapkin's students from the Hebrew University described his approach to criminology as 'clinical' (Landau and Sebba, 1977, p. xii), and indeed *Prensa y criminalidad's* main concern is with the influence of the 'yellow' and sensationalist crime press on criminal behaviour.

The book is divided into three sections, dealing respectively with the press, criminal behaviour, and their relation. While Drapkin never explicitly states his theoretical focus with respect to communication, his arguments about the press reflect the influence of North American theories of public opinion; for example, he cites favourably Walter Lippmann in his discussion of the 'mental world' and the 'real world' (Drapkin, 1958, p. 19). Following this paradigm, Drapkin, like the early mass communications scholars in the United States, treats public opinion as a plastic, manipulable entity, and thus the press is seen as a tool for shaping public opinion in desirable or undesirable ways. Sensationalist reports of gruesome crimes can romanticize these crimes, and 'create a climate of indifference before the law, the courts and the forces of public order, and may also influence very suggestible people, inducing them to behave criminally' (Ibid., p. 118). In the United States, this 'hypodermic' model of media influence was already coming under attack by researchers who began to 'behavioralize' media sociology.

However, in spite of Drapkin's reliance on concepts derived from North American sociology, *Prensa y criminalidad* contains very little empirical material, and none at all on Chile itself. Despite the notion that the press can cause deviant behaviour or social disorder, Drapkin resists arguments that the press should be censored. Instead, he exhorts the press, in particular editorial writers, to report on crimes responsibly. Censorship, he argues, is the tool of the 'totalitarian' societies, which consider 'freedom' to be of less importance than the satisfaction of basic human needs (Ibid., p. 60).

Both Fuenzalida and Brunner cite Eduardo Hamuy as a decisive figure in the reception of scientific sociology in Chile. Hamuy was frustrated by Chilean sociology at the outset of

the 1950s, which 'consisted fundamentally of exposition and commentary on the great European sociologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' (Fuenzalida, 1983, p. 98). He decided to attend Columbia University in New York, in order to 'learn about the methods of social research that cannot be learned from books. I wanted to know how to conduct social research; I wanted to work with researchers ...' (cited by Fuenzalida, *ibid.*). Rather than pursue a PhD at Columbia, Hamuy concentrated his efforts on taking courses on research methods and on directing a research project on the conditions of Puerto Ricans in New York.

When he returned to Chile From the United States in 1951, he was named the director of the University of Chile's Institute of Sociological Research, which soon became the Institute of Sociology. Brunner (1988, pp. 220-5) emphasizes the importance of Hamuy's directorship, for not only did it represent a clean break with the previous generation of social theorists in Chile, it also meant the establishment of a firm institutional basis for the professionalization of the discipline. Hamuy saw to it that the institute had its own offices, he expanded its library, especially with books and journals published outside Chile, and acquired equipment such as punch-card sorters for carrying out empirical research. He also brought to the institute a new generation of Chilean sociologists trained abroad, mainly in the United States; among them Danilo Salcedo and Orlando Sepúlveda.

El primer satélite artificial was one of the first books that emerged from the Institute of Sociology under Hamuy's direction. It differs from Silva Castro's and Drapkin's books in two significant respects. First, in terms of methodology: its conclusions are induced from a wealth of poll data collected in Santiago using contemporary polling techniques. Unlike *Prensa y periodismo*, no sweeping political arguments about freedom of expression, or any other political values, emerge. This was typical of functionalist sociology, which erected barriers between politics and social theory. Second, in terms of a surprising finding: while both of the other books assume that the press is the most important source of information and political influence, Hamuy, Salcedo and Sepúlveda found that for important sectors of Santiago's population, the radio had nearly equal influence (1958, pp. 38-9). This latter point

was not elaborated upon in this study, but it does become an important insight in Sepúlveda's subsequent work on the media.

Internal divisions in the Instituto de Sociología in 1960 led to a break between Hamuy and the other founding members, on the one hand, and on the other, the younger members, including Orlando Sepúlveda, who had received doctorates in the United States and Europe under the institute's sponsorship. In an interview with Fuenzalida, Sepúlveda would recall the reasons for this split:

The problem was first a division between the original group [Professors Hamuy, Godoy and Samuel] and the group of the returning assistants [Danilo Salcedo, Guillermo Briones and Orlando Sepúlveda]. We rapidly realized that their knowledge of techniques and procedures in sociology was not solid, that they were no longer the archetypes that had motivated us to quit what we were doing to become sociologists. Besides, we wanted to do research at a certain level and with some degree of autonomy; we did not want to become the technicians at the service of those who held the posts at the institute. (Fuenzalida, 1983, pp. 100–1)

By 1963, the original nucleus had departed and Sepúlveda was the new director of the institute.

In that year, he conducted a new survey on 'Some Patterns of Mass Media Use in Santiago de Chile', with Dr Roy E. Carter, a visiting Fulbright scholar (Carter and Sepúlveda, 1964). The research was funded by the Social Science Research Council, the University of Minnesota Graduate School (Carter's home school), the Chilean Fulbright Commission and the Instituto de Sociología. One of the findings in this study confirmed the insight reported in *El primer satélite artificial*: respondents would describe the press as their major source of information, yet while 9 of 10 had radios in their homes and reported listening to the radio three hours daily, 'only one-half of these men and two-thirds of these women said they had read a newspaper on the day preceding the interview' (Ibid., p. 219). I will return to this point in a moment. Another crucial aspect of this study was 'that we were working with *concepts* from mass communications research that might or might not have validity in Chile: opinion leadership at the peer-group level,

overlapping audiences, self-selection, and other notions that are imbedded in much of our current thinking about the mass media in the United States' (Ibid., p. 216). The fortunes of Chilean media research were, by this point, tied to those of mass media research in the United States in terms of conceptual development, education of personnel, funding for the research, and even the need to publish in a leading North American journal in the field.

In 1966, Sepúlveda presented another paper based upon the 1963 survey and a similar survey realized in Castro, Chiloé, a small, rural town in southern Chile, to a conference at Cornell University (Sepúlveda, 1966). This paper explicitly continues the project begun in the paper written with Roy Carter: to refine the concepts used in communications research with respect to Latin American countries. Simultaneously, Sepúlveda signals the importance of such a project: 'On the one hand, it may contribute to the more effective use of these media in programmes which stimulate change; and on the other, it presents the opportunity to expand or verify certain generalizations accumulated in the field of communications' (Ibid., p. 20). This paper thus ties Chilean communications research not only to the 'dominant paradigm' in the United States, but also to policies for the 'modernization' of Chile. Sepúlveda departs from the 'dominant paradigm' in this article in that he finds no support for the assumptions of the 'two step flow' model of communication, which argues that interpersonal influence outweighs the potential influence of the media. Instead, he finds that the modern mass media, especially the radio, are very effective in promoting social change (in the study under discussion, with respect to health habits) (Ibid., p. 13).

Interestingly, while the proponents of the 'two step flow' model in the United States, notably Lazarsfeld and Berelson, were arguing against the ability of the media to influence social behaviour, the modernization theorists, such as Lerner, Schramm, and Pye, were arguing that the media were indeed effective tools for promoting attitudinal change. However, Sepúlveda's finding is not really a refutation of the 'two step flow' model, his own claim notwithstanding. He states: 'we expected that personal type contacts, not the mass media, would carry the message to the public. The data did not

confirm the prediction, since the radio and the press were the media which informed broad sectors of the public about the programme and its contents' (Sepúlveda 1966, 13). The 'two step flow' model argues that changes in behaviour, not merely information, cannot be attributed solely to the influence of the media. In making this particular point, Sepúlveda has cast his lot with the theory that promises to be practically useful, which understands communications in relation to modernization, rather than with the 'dominant paradigm' within communications research.

The reception of scientific sociology in the University of Chile was thus characterized by the conflicts between the old generation of sociologists and the modernizing group, who perceived in the sociology practiced in the United States a more rigorous, empirical, and sophisticated science; the desire on the part of the new generation for a more modern science in order to make sociology relevant to understanding and solving the contemporary problems of Chile; and the inter-institutional conflicts between the founders of the Instituto de Sociología and their protégés who had been educated in the United States, conflicts which were at least in part over the quality of the work being done at the institute as measured by the standards set in the United States. Yet despite this conflict-riven process and the particular interests and goals of the agents responsible for founding the institute, the result was the reproduction in Chile of what was rapidly becoming the transnational model of sociology and communications studies, and Chile's integration into this transnational system of sociological research and theory production.

While the founding of the Instituto de Sociología was marked by sharp resistance from the old generation of social theorists in the University of Chile's departments of law, education, and philosophy, and by sharp internal divisions between the institute's founding members and the younger scholars who followed them in the early years, the founding of the Catholic University's Escuela de Sociología (School of Sociology) found smoother sailing in its formative years. A number of factors contributed to this different initial experience.

First, the social sciences in the Catholic University were already undergoing a 'modernization' of sorts. The Economics

School was established out of an accord between the Catholic University, the University of Chicago's Department of Economics, and the International Co-operation Administration (later renamed the Agency for International Development). This programme produced the infamous 'Chicago Boys', the free-market economists and technocrats who became prominent in economic policy-making during the military government.

In order to avoid the generational conflict that had slowed the development of the University of Chile's Institute, the Catholic University's School of Sociology was established within the already modernizing Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences. 'Modernizing' these particular schools within the Catholic University meant something slightly different from what it had meant in the University of Chile. The Catholic University was Chile's elite school, with strong ties to traditionalism and Chile's oligarchy. It was also, above all, a Catholic school. Education was seen as an indispensable part of evangelization; the university's role was to educate Christians and to maintain the order and unity of knowledge and faith. If modernization, as the term is usually used, meant increasing secularization and rationalization, then it was eroding the social bases of the authority of the Church. The 'modernization' of the Catholic University was a response to these challenges and a way to keep the Church in a position of public authority. Thus, the 'modernization' of the Catholic University took place within the context of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church.

The second important factor contributing to the smooth and rapid development of the School of Sociology was the personality of the man who became its director shortly after its founding in 1958 and his arrival in Chile from Belgium: Father Roger Vekemans. Brunner characterizes Vekemans as the only director of a school of sociology able to 'blend into a single role his institutional leadership and his intellectual leadership' (1988, p. 248). Thanks in part to his position in the Jesuit order, Vekemans was well connected internationally. He was thus able to recruit young scholars from Belgium, France and Switzerland to offer classes in the School of Sociology when there were still too few trained Chilean sociologists to fill the positions. At the same time, he was able to arrange grants from various North American institutions,

such as the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation,² for many of the school's early activities, including scholarships for Chilean students to attend UCLA for doctoral studies.

While the Catholic University's mode of reception of scientific sociology differed in important respects from that of the University of Chile's, especially in the use of European sociologists, its successful construction of an institutional platform resulted in its integration into the transnational, US-dominated, model of scientific sociology as well. Indeed, the Communications Chair for the School of Sociology was founded and first held in 1963 by Charles Wright, an important functionalist sociologist of communications from the United States. The relatively chaotic reception on the part of the University of Chile made the immediate political consequences of this integration somewhat unclear; this was not the case for the Catholic University. In the first place, Vekemans had important international connections for funding his school. He was often accused of including the CIA among those connections, a charge which Vekemans himself dismissed as a 'myth' (cited in Brunner 1988, p. 282, n. 5); nevertheless, connections with the private foundations such as Ford and Rockefeller which clearly shared the goals of US foreign policy towards the developing world provided one institutional channel through which US political influence could be exerted. In the second place, Vekemans had close connections to the candidacy of Eduardo Frei, which included providing both financial and ideological support (Labarca, 1968). The Catholic University's School of Sociology may not have been used directly as a lever for Frei's campaign, but it did establish both an institutional platform for US influence over actors influential in the campaign and an institution for producing a sociological discourse which supported the PDC's ideology and policies of 'popular promotion' to eliminate 'marginality'.

One study of communications to emerge from the Catholic University in 1966 was Mónica Herrera's 'La comunicación en los sectores marginales' ['Communication in the marginal sectors'] (cited in Munizaga and Rivera, 1983, pp. 120–2). Although this study seems not to have come out of the School of Sociology, but out of the School of Journalism, the influence of the transnational model of sociology is clear. The

study is based on a poll carried out in the slums of Concepción, Chile, to discover patterns of media use, both in terms of which media and for what purposes they are used. The findings, summarily, were that the press was most heavily used, followed by radio, mainly for information and entertainment, but not for educational purposes. The conclusions that follow primarily call for the press to be aware of its influence and to take responsibility for it, as a means of improving the educational function of media use, while at the same time ensuring freedom of expression. Improving the educational function of the media responds to the doctrine of 'popular promotion' to combat 'marginality', while freedom of expression ensures that the changes take place 'democratically'.

Raúl Silva Castro, writing as a cultural historian, understood the press as the *gran prensa*, which he interprets as an expression of Chile's liberal democratic tradition. As Sunkel points out, however, Silva Castro leaves out of his conception of a national press three important types of newspaper which appealed to non-elites: (1) the workers' press which emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century; (2) the sensationalist popular press which emerged in the 1930s; and (3) the political press, especially the leftist press, which also emerged in the 1930s (Sunkel, 1986, p. 13). Israel Drapkin, a criminologist, was influenced by early US studies of public opinion and commits a reification typical of the field: he adopts the 'hypodermic' model of influence, in which the press 'acts' and the public's opinions and behaviours are moulded by its 'actions'.

The scientific study of mass communications developed in Chile within the process of the reception of scientific sociology. This process of reception was conditioned by the establishment by the USA of transnational hegemony over various aspects of Chile's political, economic, and cultural life. The role of culture in particular in this hegemony was in modernizing cultural and communications apparatuses, and in transporting modernization *theory*, with its attendant theories of communication and sociology.

Scientific, that is to say, behavioural, sociology addressed problems of a *methodological* nature: modernizing sociology in Chile meant displacing a particular tradition of social theory, in favour of a sociology with more sophisticated empirical methods. However, it did not address itself to the *theoretical*

problems with communications studies of the time. Thus, the major national press remained the privileged object of study, even when evidence suggested that the radio might be sociologically more important, and 'public opinion' remained highly reified or objectified: an inert 'mass' to be shaped, with more or less difficulty, more or less directly, by the media.

Furthermore, the emphasis on the methodology of the study of communications blinded the scholars to the problems in communication itself during the period, most notably, the massive propaganda campaign directed by the CIA during the 1963–4 presidential campaigns. Indeed, promoting a methodology that studies the effects of communication, while bracketing the communication itself, lent itself both to such political propaganda campaigns, as well as commercial advertising. Thus while these early communication scholars attempted to improve the scientific study of communication because of their own, domestically produced and articulated, criticisms of existing sociological studies in Chile, their efforts had the unintended consequences of reproducing a model of professional scholarship which contributed little to understanding communication in Chile, but quite a lot to reinforcing the USA's construction of transnational hegemony.

As long as the 'mass' could be kept out of national politics in Chile as a determinate actor, no impulses to study the popular classes in Chile as historical political agents could shake the prevailing orthodoxy of scientific sociology. All this would change, however, in the second half of the Frei administration.

3 Challenges to the Chilean Regime and Critical Mass Communication Studies: 1967–73

The year 1967 was a turning point for both Chilean politics and for academic life, for related reasons. The social forces unleashed by the Christian Democrat Party's organizing efforts were overtaking the policies that the Frei administration had been trying to follow, and the three-way conflict between Chilean business and landowners, organized labour and peasants, and the government left the PDC with fewer and fewer allies to turn to. This narrowing of the ground which supported the PDC's policies resulted from the party's understanding of Chilean politics, a cultural logic – or structure of feeling – rooted in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church and in the international Christian Democrat movement. This structure of feeling was based on the PDC's understanding that capitalist development had created societies with overly materialistic value systems and severe inequalities, but it rejected the leftist political tactics of developing the class struggle through political struggle in favour of 'communitarian' politics in which the values of the community would be shaped by Christian values of charity and love. Thus the PDC's political strategy was to attempt to isolate the leftist parties and unions while at the same time attempting to improve social welfare.

The former part of this strategy was pursued through aggressive organizing of peasants in the countryside, in support of the agrarian reform policies, and efforts to organize PDC-controlled labour unions to undermine the leftist independent Central Única de Trabajadores, the CUT. While efforts to organize agrarian unions were fairly successful, they were met by socialist and communist efforts to match the success of

the PDC-controlled unions. This feverish organizing activity helped to escalate the conflict between peasants and landowners in the countryside.

Undermining the CUT would be essential in order to ensure labour's co-operation with the PDC's economic stabilization programme. The Frei government continued to refuse to recognize the bargaining authority of the CUT, like the governments of Alessandri and Ibáñez before it, thus giving the CUT the status of a *de facto* labour organization (Stallings, 1978, p. 103). Instead, the PDC tried unsuccessfully to organize rival labour confederations that could wrest control of the labour movement from the Socialist and Communist Parties. Such tactics ultimately made the PDC appear hostile to organized labour *per se*, and therefore increased the latter's resistance to the Frei governments policies, as well as labour militancy in general. Between 1964 and 1970, total membership in industrial, agricultural and professional unions more than doubled, from 270 542 members to 551 086; the number of workers involved in strikes increased 474 per cent over the same period, from 138 474 workers to 656 170 (Ibid., pp. 246–7).

Agrarian reform was central to carrying out the PDC's social welfare policies; central to the success of agrarian reform was a Constitutional amendment on private property. The Property Rights Amendment, introduced before the Chilean legislature in November 1964, would provide a constitutional basis for legislation necessary for expropriating privately held estates and setting the terms for compensating the former owners. Chile's property-owning class was divided into two large fractions: the agrarian, landowning class which had been the seat of the values of tradition and authority and which was the base of support for the old Conservative party, and an industrial bourgeoisie which enjoyed stronger ties to transnational capital and which had always favoured more liberal economic and trade policies. The Property Rights Amendment was initially seen by both fractions as an attack on the landowning fraction, not affecting the interests of industrialists. Indeed, the industrialists' association, or *gremio*, the SOFOFA, was at first divided over the amendment: while some industrialists opposed granting the state the capacity to expropriate private property, a rebel faction of the SOFOFA supported the amendment as a way to incorporate

the peasantry into the national market, thus helping Chilean industry use its idle capacity.

However, these divisions among the propertied classes would not last long, and just as with the labour movement and the peasantry, the Chilean bourgeoisie closed ranks in the face of escalating social conflict and a government which attempted to mobilize forces it could not control. Despite its initial internal divisions over the amendment, the SOFOFA was pressured both by the agrarian *gremio*, the SNA, and by the economic policies of the Frei government, which included more aggressive tax collection, wage increases, increasing inflation, and an unwillingness to compromise with SOFOFA over the Property Rights Amendment, until in late 1965 the president of the SOFOFA made a speech which expressed the deepening breach with the government, speaking ominously about the poor investment climate (Stallings, 1978, p. 102).

Politically, however, in the face of an increasingly mobilized population, Chile's upper class, represented by the *gremio* organizations in civil society and by the Liberal and Conservative Parties in the legislature, was clearly a minority and had few political resources to draw on to defend its interests. The SOFOFA thus decided on a strategy to pressure the government through public opinion, mounting a \$400 000 propaganda campaign in conjunction with the Confederación de Producción y Comercio (the CPC, or the Confederation of Production and Commerce) and the SNA (Stallings, p. 113). Besides uniting the landowning and industrial fractions of the bourgeoisie, the campaign was intended to build a larger political base for liberal free enterprise policies, by articulating an ideological alliance with the petty bourgeoisie: 'The basic message was that there were 600,000 entrepreneurs, not just 50,000' (Stallings, 1978, p. 113).

The intensification of the domestic social pressures in 1967 led to a serious conflict within the PDC, as it became increasingly clear that the party would not be able to maintain a position above the conflicts it sought to resolve through its 'Revolution in Liberty'. The populist and reformist sectors of the party and its youth movement grew increasingly frustrated with the structural obstacles to reform that legislative politics presented. To make matters worse, the Frei government from the beginning had been overtly dependent on support from

the United States government through the Alliance for Progress and its support in multilateral lending agencies, as well as on direct foreign investment by US-based transnationals. This dependence compromised the PDC with regard to US foreign policy, especially the highly unpopular war against Vietnam. This was politically damaging to the PDC, as its progressive sectors sought to distance themselves from any possible identification with foreign capital, the American Embassy, imperialism and the war in Vietnam (Loveman, 1979, p. 320).

The progressive wing of the PDC brought matters to a head in July 1967, when they were able to win a majority on the executive board of the party. They proposed a programme for carrying out the 'Revolution in Liberty' consisting of the following types of reforms:

- (1) democratic planning of economic and social life,
- (2) rapidly increasing communitarian forms of production,
- (3) extending community control over centers of economic powers and basic activities, (4) restructuring the state to facilitate the process of noncapitalist development, and permitting the active participation of the people in decision making, and (5) defining a statute for private enterprises and foreign capital so that these would be subject to state planning and the political power of the people. (Stallings, 1978, p. 109)

Thus the executive board of the party came to resemble the leftist opposition to the government, and indeed explicitly called for increasing dialogue with the Left. While Frei was able to regain control over the party by 1968, this split illustrates the political problems that resulted from the development of the social forces in Chile during the Frei government described so far. These same social and political struggles would come to bear directly on communications scholarship, as its institutions, the universities, became the site for struggle over the means and directions for modernizing Chile.

THE UNIVERSITY REFORM MOVEMENT

1967 was the year that university students' struggles, reflecting the sharpening conflicts between the various political

forces, culminated in the university reforms which deeply transformed higher education in Chile. This had important ramifications for communications scholarship. However, while the University Reform Movement was primarily the product of domestic political forces, the forces and events which shaped the reforms were complex and had both domestic and transnational sources. As discussed in Chapter 2, Chilean intellectuals in the social sciences played crucial roles in 'modernizing' sociology as a discipline in Chile, but had looked abroad, and especially to the United States, for models for a professional, scientific sociology. Intellectuals and policy-makers in the United States, meanwhile, promoted structural functionalist sociology as a model to be copied abroad.

Yet those Chilean scholars who favoured the 'modernization' or professionalization of the social sciences, along with colleagues in other disciplines who favoured changes in their own fields, tended to be young, somewhat isolated in their departments and relatively powerless before the governing bodies and the *catedráticos*¹ of the universities. In the case of the Catholic University of Chile, the rector, the chancellor, and the governing council (*Consejo Superior*) formed a highly hierarchical governing body, with powers conferred by both civil law and canonical law (Brunner, 1985, p. 299). From 1961 through 1967, the offices of rector and chancellor were both held by Bishop Alfredo Silva, and the other men on the governing council and the vice rectors all had strong ties to highly traditional sectors of the Catholic Church and traditional conservative politics (Brunner, 1985, pp. 268, 299-306).

However, the social and ideological bases of the power of these groups were eroding throughout the 1960s. On the one hand, the policies of modernization in Chile had altered social relations in the countryside, eroding the power base of the agricultural landowners who had been the core of Chile's Conservative Party. On the other, the Catholic Church itself had been undergoing a process of self-examination which had produced the Second Vatican Council and a greater concern for the social role of the Church. Thus those members of the governing boards of the Catholic University who favoured preserving its traditional role found themselves increasingly isolated politically, especially during the Frei government, as well as under increasing pressure from the Church itself to

begin a process of controlled reform of the university. Very similar pressures were operating on the University of Chile as well. Thus by the mid-1960s, the modernizing or professionalizing intellectuals began to have a chance to put pressure on the universities' governing boards to reform the institutions.

Through most of the period discussed in Chapter 2, the professionalizing intellectuals who favoured institutional reform of the universities received their greatest material and ideological support from colleagues and institutions in the United States. This apparent harmony of interests between Chilean intellectuals and the United States suffered an important breach in 1965 which seriously constrained the US's ability to influence the university reform process, when the infamous Project Camelot was exposed.² Project Camelot was an ambitious research project, funded by what at the time was the largest single grant ever provided for a social science research project, originating in the United States Army's Special Operations Research Office (SORO) and supervised, at least formally, by the American University in Washington, DC.³ The stated purpose of Project Camelot as laid out in a 1964 document was

[...] to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world. Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are:

First, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies; *second*, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; and *finally*, to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things. (Horowitz, 1967, pp. 4-5)

To achieve these objectives, SORO set out to recruit social scientists from around the world to do field research in the Third World. One of these social scientists was Johan Galtung, then associated with FLACSO in Chile (Galtung, 1967); another was Hugo G. Nuttini, a naturalized American citizen

originally from Chile and an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Pittsburgh (Horowitz, 1967, pp. 11-12).⁴ Galtung was invited to attend a conference in which the preliminary research design for Project Camelot was to be discussed. He declined the invitation in a letter to the Project Director, Rex Hopper, in which he also expressed serious reservations about the project itself, regarding its design, its manifest counterinsurgency presuppositions, and its links to the US Army. Receiving no reply to his concerns from Hopper, Galtung both discussed and circulated the invitation and the description of the project with Chilean colleagues (Galtung, 1967).

Meanwhile, Nuttini was in Santiago arranging meetings with Chilean academics. On 22 April 1965, in a meeting with the Vice Chancellor of the University of Chile, he was confronted by Professor Edmundo Fuenzalida as to the specific aims of the project and its sponsors (Horowitz, 1967, p. 13). Professor Eduardo Hamuy also publicly repudiated the project at the School of Sociology of the University of Chile (Rodríguez, 1967, p. 229). Shortly afterward, the project came to the attention of both the Chilean Congress and the press. The timing could not have been worse for Camelot: in May of 1965 US troops invaded the Dominican Republic, fueling concerns about imperialist aggression within the hemisphere. Project Camelot was cancelled shortly afterwards.

Nevertheless, Department of Defense-sponsored counterinsurgency research continued to take place both in Chile (Cusack, 1977, p. 107) and in US universities (Brightman and Klare, 1979). However, the counter-insurgency or espionage dimension of Project Camelot was not the only problem that it presented to Chilean scholars. It also underscored their subordinate and vulnerable position, their material and cultural dependency on the fields of the social sciences in North America.

However, awareness of their dependent position would not be sufficient for Chilean intellectuals to transform their dependence; institutional reform would also be necessary. The weakening of the traditional authorities in the universities, the constraining of the United States through the revelations of Project Camelot, and the relative isolation of the professionalizing intellectuals all meant that the

strongest agent for change in the universities would be the students.

The student organizations of the two major Santiago universities were the FECH (Federación de Estudiantes de Chile, or Federation of Chilean Students) of the University of Chile, and the FEUC (Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica, or Catholic University Students Federation) of the Catholic University. By 1967, Christian Democrat students had formed the majority in both student federations for nearly a decade, although Socialists and Communists did enjoy significant support in each and especially in the FECH. Christian Democrat predominance in the student federations, however, did not mean that they could be used as tools of government policy, nor that they were necessarily aligned ideologically with the government. Rather, the significance of the predominance of this relatively new political party in student politics lies with the changing social role of the universities under PDC policies.

PDC policies favoured the expansion of their main social base, Chile's growing middle class, but this was achieved through the expansion of the bureaucracy and the technical apparatus, which were seen as precursors to sustained economic growth. In analysing the expanding educational budgets of the Frei government, Fagen argues that: 'Increasing administrative and technical capacity was viewed as an essential ingredient in national development and modernization – as well as a means for providing middle-class type employment for growing numbers of people (Fagen, 1973, p. 9).

Thus while the traditional role of the universities had been to pass on the dominant culture and to train the nation's elite for eventual public and private leadership, a university education was now becoming an essential avenue for social advancement for middle-class students. Furthermore, students in Chile had played an important, autonomous, and often conflictive, role in national politics throughout the century, which along with the changes taking place in the social structure in Chile in the 1960s gave organized students a keen interest in the social and political struggles of the nation.

In 1967, the political, ideological and social conditions of the nation created a conjuncture in which Chilean students began to take decisive actions in favour of reforming the

universities, to make them more relevant to the tasks of reforming society. Politically, the conflict between the Frei government and the more progressive leadership of the Christian Democrat Party over the 'non-capitalist road to development' was reaching a head. Christian Democrat youth organizations and the student movement tended to support the party against the government. Ideologically, it was a moment of increasing agitation. In particular, right-wing political organizations began to search for a new ideological and political identity as their traditional bases eroded, and began to articulate this new identity through anti-communist tirades and attacks on progressive political groups in *El Mercurio*. Lastly, social conflict was accelerating in 1967, with increasing demands for salary increases and measures for social protection coming from newly organized rural workers, culminating in peasant strikes in Molina; increasing land occupations by landless urban dwellers; and the taking and occupation of the Catholic University of Valparaíso (UCV) by its students from June through August 1967 (Brunner, 1985, p. 368).

The success of the UCV students in forcing institutional and administrative reforms strengthened the resolve of students in Santiago to press forward with their own demands for reform. It should be reiterated here, following the discussion in Chapter 2, that modest and gradual institutional reform of the universities was already under way, and the rector of the Catholic University, Bishop Alfredo Silva, was himself in favour of the gradual modernization of the Catholic University over the objections of many of the more conservative members of the governing council. However, student demands for reform went beyond the more modest changes being negotiated at the top of the governing bodies. The student organizations pressed for formalized student and faculty participation in university governance, thus securing the support of the young professionalizing intellectuals,⁵ and other measures, such as open admissions, intended to make the universities more 'relevant' to national life. Many of the most immediate demands of the students, such as the naming of a new rector and new governing bodies, were met in the aftermath of student strikes in both the University of Chile and the Catholic University, and many of the demands for more democratic governance of the universities were also realized.

The university reforms made possible the institutional reorganization of the study of communication in Chile, through the creation of two new centres in the Catholic University and one in the Catholic University of Valparaíso. These were, respectively: the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Nacional, or CEREN (Centre for the Study of the National Reality); the Escuela de Artes de la Comunicación, or EAC (School of Communication Arts); and the Area Comunicación e Ideología, Universidad Católica de Valparaíso (Communication and Ideology Area).

THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL SPACES IN THE INTELLECTUAL FIELD

The reforms of the Chilean universities, taking place in the context of the increasing organization and political consciousness of various social groups in Chile, produced changes in the field of mass communication scholarship and in the relationship between scholarship and society. An intellectual field is more than the accumulated received knowledge of a paradigm; it is the terrain on which intellectuals produce both scholarship and the conditions for the production of knowledge (see Bourdieu, 1975 and 1985). The new institutional spaces for mass communication scholarship which emerged from the University Reform Movement represented changes in the conditions and relations of production of knowledge in Chile. Scholars had to find new strategies for the diffusion and legitimation of their scholarship. In essence, the conditions for the intramural legitimation of scholarship began to change while at the same time extramural legitimation, in other words, outside the university-bound scholarly communities, became increasingly important. These new conditions and relations of intellectual production gave rise to a period in which highly creative and original critical communication scholarship flourished.

CEREN

The theoretical and empirical studies of problems of communication produced at CEREN are those best known outside of

Chile. CEREN was founded in 1969 by young academics at the Catholic University who found common interests in the problems of Chilean society in their discussions and debates during the University Reform. CEREN was to be a centre for the ongoing and systematic analysis of the national conjuncture. Three major principles informed their reflections:

- (1) it was to be a centre for reflection on the future of development in Chile;
- (2) it was to have a markedly interdisciplinary character, including both natural and social scientists; and
- (3) deriving from this interdisciplinary character, Chile was to be studied as a totality, and not merely as a social, economic or political formation (Chonchol, 1969, p. 7).

Within the centre, a group emerged which shared particular interests in ideology, communication and the media. Many of its members were foreign nationals,⁶ including Armand Mattelart (from Belgium), Michèle Mattelart (from France), and Mabel Piccini (from Argentina). The members of this group proved to be adept at addressing their work to intramural and extramural audiences and to collaborating with communications projects emanating from outside the Catholic University inspired by or related to their critiques. Thus, in addition to extensive academic publication in books and in CEREN's journal *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, they also contributed to a weekly news magazine, *Chile Hoy*, and they founded a journal, called *Comunicación y Cultura* which was dedicated to communication scholarship and enjoyed more extensive distribution throughout Latin America. Michèle Mattelart also worked as an adviser to the programming department for the National Television network, and Armand Mattelart and Ariel Dorfman collaborated with the editorial staff for the national publishing house Quimantú. As will be explored below, these labours were practical supports and tests for the scholarly work they were producing in CEREN.

EAC

In contrast to CEREN, which was conceived as a centre for a new kind of academic reflection, EAC was a professional school established for the training of audiovisual communicators and

for encouraging experimental productions in theatre, cinema and television. EAC was also a product of the University Reform Movement – it was a department of the new Vice-rectory for Communications which also administered the Catholic University's television station – and the enthusiasm for promoting experimental productions derived from a desire to find new means of expression for a changing society. Ultimately, EAC hoped to provide the foundations for transforming the national artistic community and communication system through teaching and through its experimental productions.

In 1970, EAC annexed the communications programme which had functioned since 1968 in the School of Sociology of the Catholic University. As a part of EAC, this programme focused on the 'scientific study of audiovisual language, in the perspective of renovation and experimentation' promoted by the school (Munizaga and Rivera, 1983, p. 39). It produced studies in the 'scientific investigation of audiovisual language', utilizing models and concepts derived from structural linguistics and semiology (Ibid., p. 40). Such studies, along with critical reviews of films, theatre productions and television programmes, reporting on various experimental techniques and students' writings appeared in the school's journal, *Revista EAC*.

Area Comunicación e Ideología

This school was created in 1971 at the Catholic University of Valparaíso, well after the student movement for university reform at that school had peaked, by a group of young scholars who came primarily from the School of Sociology in Santiago's Catholic University. It formed a part of the Catholic University of Valparaíso's Institute for Social Sciences and Development. While both CEREN and EAC sought different means to insert their intellectual production into the social and political processes of the nation, the Area Comunicación e Ideología attempted to pursue the development of critical communications scholarship through a much more traditional model of a school. Indeed, this school attracted scholars who had grown weary of the atmosphere of political confrontation that had become an inescapable part

of university life in the Santiago universities (Del Villar, 1991). Thus they did not seek extramural legitimation for their work, nor did they take part in any concrete or practical communications activities. Their writings were circulated in occasional papers and mimeographs, intended to develop more rigorously scientific bases to the field of communication and ideology, concentrating on its theoretical and methodological aspects.

Each of these three institutions – CEREN, EAC and the Area Comunicación e Ideología – established its position in the changing intellectual field and in relation to the political and social situation in Chile according to its analysis of that situation and according to its institutional goals. Their relations to each other and to other scholars producing communication theory and research in Chile, and their intellectual strategies, conflicts and debates can be seen in the work they produced.

CEREN: IDEOLOGY AND DEPENDENCY

For the first issue of CEREN's journal, the *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, Armand Mattelart wrote a critique of Malthus (Armand Mattelart, 1969) which would mark a transition in his own work from demography to the highly original work on social communication for which he is best known. Mattelart found a logical precursor to the concepts governing the policies of modernization and agrarian reform in Chile in the 1960s in Malthus's theory of population. To elucidate these conceptual links, Mattelart makes an 'ideological reading' of Malthus, opening the terrain of ideological analysis on which future research and theory produced at CEREN would be conducted.

The definition of ideology which Mattelart relies on in this article, taken from Adam Schaff, treats ideology as a system of opinions determined by class interests in a project for social development. More sophisticated theories of ideology would be developed in subsequent work; the important step taken here is the treatment of ideology as the 'social conditioning of theory' (Ibid., p. 81).

Malthus's ideological project was to attempt to refute the egalitarian social theories of the day by demonstrating that the law of population increase is a *natural* law, part of a preordained order to which humans and their institutions must conform. This 'naturalizing' of social laws in effect purges politics from social theory, and thus protects the social order itself from critique while it universalizes the particular concept of social order or evolution of society of the dominant class. As the social order itself can only be modified in accordance with universal 'natural' laws, it is up to the individuals of the subordinate classes to mould their personalities to conform to the characteristics of the social order and integrate themselves into the new society (Ibid., pp. 91–2). Malthus's philosophical and juridical arguments make the bourgeois personality into the prototype for the emerging society, to which all others must conform (Ibid., p. 109).

Mattelart's treatment of Malthus as a precursor of bourgeois ideology allows him to link this ideology to functionalist sociology and to the policies of agrarian reform, and from these to the system of imperialism. Functionalism, in the first place, reproduces much of the Malthusian epistemology:

[...] Malthus, despite the obsolete frameworks of his utilitarian metaphysics, is not very far from contemporary North American functionalist sociology, which postulates in the manner of the positivists the neutrality of the concepts of social science and the absolute nature of the abstract empirical datum, but which forgets the implicit epistemological base over which the datum is founded: the recognition of the existing system. [...] The malthusian theory of the regulating function of institutions, of social equilibrium and social placement within the narrow frame of the establishment, as well as the psychologism of its explanations of revolutionary phenomena, marks out in broad terms a functionalist theory 'avant la lettre.' (Ibid., p. 110)

Modernization and agrarian reform policies, deriving from the functionalist vision of social order, carry on this ideological mission: ideologically, they specify that (1) personal interest is the driving force of society; (2) individuals are the 'real' units of society, thus concepts such as class consciousness are blocked from consideration; and (3) this individualism

isolates people in their lives and gives rise to a new social stratum characterized by social apathy and its acceptance of the bourgeois model of integration. Against the methodological individualism of functionalist sociology, Mattelart argues that the imperialist system is diffuse and total, creating motivations which sustain particular attitudes deriving from models of social stratification, models of social mobility, and models of personality installed by the mass communication media (Ibid., p. 116). By juxtaposing this concept of a social totality to the atomistic view of functionalism, Mattelart also introduces the concept of the *latent* content of reality, as opposed to the purely manifest content with which the atomistic view concerns itself. These concepts – society as a totality with both manifest and latent content – provide the basis on which he produces a more elaborated theoretical account of the links between ideology and domination in the introductory chapters to the special issue of the *Cuadernos* which appeared in March of 1970 (Armand Mattelart, 1970a and 1970b).

Mattelart begins the introduction to this special issue by taking up the critique of functionalist sociology and communications research which he had hinted at in the article on Malthus. Communications research is taken to task for its reliance on the manifest content of communication through quantitative methods in content analysis; for its fragmentary approach to social phenomena; and for the inability of its methods (content analysis and analysis of functions) to approach the study of communication from a critical standpoint. Communications research is described as being part of a ‘therapeutic sociology’ (Armand Mattelart, 1970a, p. 18), intended to secure the proper functioning of the dominant order. His critique has four parts:

- (1) Despite the claims of axiological neutrality on the part of functionalists, communication research is inscribed, a priori, in the social *status quo*. For example, the concept of ‘dysfunction’ is always articulated with regard to the existing system, and never as the basis of a different or emerging system.
- (2) Functionalist communications research studies the effects of communication by specifically omitting consideration of the emitter of the messages, and thus failing to consider

communication as a social *relation*. By not investigating the relations between the communicating subjects, effects research gets its results at the cost of ignoring how the social structure itself organizes the effects of communication – an ignorance which, as Mattelart points out, belies functionalism's claims of neutrality.

- (3) Functional analysis is ultimately tautological. By assigning a particular function to a given genre or medium (for example, the function of entertainment), the communications researcher codifies the contents of communication in virtue of this function. Functionalist researchers thus find what they were looking for: they can only explain their findings on the basis of the functions they themselves have assigned.
- (4) By focusing on the motivations of the receiver, explanations of the media suffer from psychological reductionism. The behaviours of social agents are seen through the lens of the psychological characteristics of the actors, which, as Mattelart says, is a rather forgiving attitude towards the social system.

This critique extends that of the previously discussed article not only through its more detailed consideration of the dominant mode of sociological thought; more importantly, it also demonstrates how functionalist sociology itself goes beyond its implicit advocacy of conformity to the bourgeois social order: functionalist sociology is itself a tool for securing conformity.

Against functionalist communications research, Mattelart proposes a method of ideological analysis derived from the structuralism of theorists such as Greimas, Piaget and Barthes. The dualism of latent versus manifest content suggested by the argument of the Malthus article is overcome by extending the concept of 'latent content'. Latent content is not just the hidden side of messages; rather it is defined as the system of meanings which gives the manifest content its sensibility: it 'identifies the structures which give coherence to the message and, in the final analysis, which support the interpretive schema of the mass communications media in a system of social phenomena' (Ibid., p. 23).

Thus, the aim of ideological analysis is not to expose 'bourgeois lies', but to unmask the system of bourgeois rationality

which frames the various operations of the bourgeois system of communication: persuasion, disinformation, possible interpretations, and so on. Ideological analysis thus exposes the strategies which the dominant social order uses to disguise its dominance. Mattelart relies on Roland Barthes' notion of mythology to illustrate this process. Mythologies besiege the social forces capable of challenging the dominant classes by emptying social phenomena of their content, thus naturalizing the system. They accomplish this by two strategies: (1) the strategy of *recuperation*, through which social phenomena which challenge the system are reinvested with meanings which confirm or fortify the system; and (2) the strategy of *dilution*, through which social phenomena are divested of their conflictive meanings and are reintegrated into a background of stereotypical representations (Ibid., pp. 25-6). The effect of both strategies ideologically is to turn social conflict into a force which reinforces the dominant social order. Because mythology universalizes or naturalizes the integrative values which resignify social conflicts, bourgeois ideology is most effective when it operates in the areas of social communication which appear to be politically neutral, uncontaminated or immune from class interests. Class interests as codified in the national press thus remain an area for ideological analysis; however, the notion of mythology provides the foundation for studies of areas of the communication apparatus which do not appear to play an open role in political or ideological conflict, such as the Donald Duck comics.

For Mattelart and his colleagues at CEREN, the communication apparatus entails more than its ideological structure: the analysis of ideological strategies of domination must be inserted into a material analysis of class control over the means of communication. His theoretical account of mass communication in Chile thus continues by describing the structure of power over information and its relation to dependency. Though this discussion did not provide any strikingly new contributions to the debates over dependency, it did provide a solid grounding in a description of imperialist international relations for the theoretical account of the strategies of ideological domination.

Mattelart describes the access to the media in Chile by the various social classes along with the ownership structure of

the major media, demonstrating the access to the various sectors of Chilean society by the few families and corporations which controlled the media. He also highlights the privileged status of these industries with respect to public policy and the ability of the Chilean state to regulate their activities, as demonstrated by their exemption from taxation and from the payments of tariffs or customs duties on machinery or parts for the printing of magazines or newspapers (Armand Mattelart, 1970b, p. 51). Mattelart goes on to analyse the material dependency and the ideological dependency of the Chilean communications apparatus. Material dependency refers to the penetration of capital, publications, transmissions, movies, advertising agencies, music, comic strips and the like produced abroad; ideological dependency refers to the coincidence of the messages transmitted by Chilean sources with models of social development imposed from abroad.

These descriptions of the penetration of foreign (mainly US) capital and ideologies allow Mattelart to make an important political point and an important theoretical point. The political point is that freedom of the press and of expression in Chile, while universal values, are structurally precluded from being enjoyed universally. Thus defence of these values by the owners of the communications apparatus has little to do with the freedom of expression of the Chilean *polis* and everything to do with the protection of the power and privileges of the ruling class. As the political conflict in Chile became increasingly acute over the next three years and its class character increasingly evident, Mattelart and others would return to this point in their studies and denunciations of the seditious activities of the liberal press.

The theoretical point he makes is that the distinction between ideological and material dependency is purely analytical and arbitrary. This idea is the cornerstone for the studies produced in CEREN until its closure by the military government in September 1973. It also provides a crucial theoretical contrast with the studies produced in the other two major centres for the study of communication in Chile during this period, the EAC and the Area Ideología y Comunicación, each of which focused their attention on the structure (semiological or ideological) of the messages transmitted through the communications media in Chile.

Mattelart's theoretical account of ideology and dependency can also be contrasted with that of a colleague in CEREN from the Department of Theology, Jesús Manuel Martínez (Martínez G., 1970). The important difference between Martínez's approach and Mattelart's does not lie in the political or theoretical conclusions each reaches, but rather in their styles of theoretical reflection. Martínez's article is organized around his abstract reflections on the terms of 'communication', 'mass communication,' and 'mass culture' (he discusses the ideas of various writers on the topics of mass communication, such as Lazarsfeld, Lerner, Schramm, or Horkheimer and Adorno or the Venezuelan social theorist Antonio Pasquali), and on the role of the media in the class structure as 'technical intermediaries of social relations' (Ibid., p. 174). In his discussions, he provides no concrete discussions of the politics underlying the concepts he discusses, nor any concrete discussion of the social and political forces in Chile which influence either conceptual development or communications policy.

The difference between this sort of argument and Mattelart's, which incorporates minutely described discussions of the political struggles which colour the choice of concepts and policies with the elaboration of the concepts themselves, is important when considering the influence that these writers would have on the intellectual field and in politics. While Mattelart's arguments are forceful and his writings prolific, factors which certainly contribute to his influence on the field, the arguments are also pointedly political and address themselves directly to the forces and struggles he intends to influence. Martínez's discussions are limited to tracing the various intellectual precursors considered important at the time in Chilean communications scholarship, and seem to have had no echo in politics; Mattelart's arguments, in contrast, provoked heated responses from media entrepreneurs on televised news programmes.⁷

The theoretical account of the mass communications media elaborated by Armand Mattelart in the opening chapters of the special issue of the *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* is applied in the remaining chapters by Armand Mattelart, Mabel Piccini, and Michèle Mattelart, and again in a talk given by Michèle Mattelart published in a later issue of the

Cuadernos. Armand Mattelart's article (1970c) analyses the ideological representation of youth, especially the political movements and nonconformity of the 1960s, in *El Mercurio*; Mabel Piccini (1970) analyses Chilean teen magazines; Michèle Mattelart analyses *fotonovelas* (1970a) and popular music (1970b). Each of these articles provides a structuralist ideological analysis of its object. Armand Mattelart's article provides the most extensive grounding of his analysis in the political events immediately surrounding the ideological representations from the newspaper. The other articles also focus primarily on the ideological representations analysed, and provide an analytical grounding in the conditions of the production and distribution of their specific means of communication (teen magazines, *fotonovelas*, and popular music).

The most extensive work to come out of this first year of intellectual production at CEREN was a book co-written by Armand Mattelart, Carmen Castillo and Leonardo Castillo entitled *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente: La respuesta ideológica de la clase dominante chilena al reformismo* [*The Ideology of Domination in a Dependent Society: The Ideological Response of the Chilean Dominant Class to Reformism*], (1970). This book provides the most complete elaboration and application of the theory and method of structuralist ideological analysis, examining the response of the Chilean landowning class to the agrarian reforms of the Christian Democrat government. The analysis integrates the explanation of the theory with a historical account of the emergence and organization (in the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, or SNA) of the landowners as a political and economic force in Chile, this class's cultural and social influence, its ties to international capital, and the concrete statements of its ideology as read through analyses of editorials on the agrarian reform in *El Mercurio*. The book closes with an analysis of the 'end of ideologies' thesis – the 'end of ideology' signifying the end of political threats to the ideological power of the dominant class. The publication of this book coincided with the election of the Unidad Popular government (September 1970) and its conclusions would prove chilling. The foundation of technocracy lies in the uncontested nature of bourgeois rationality and the purported neutrality of technology and science. In a

technocratic regime, 'ideological' threats to rationality and reason will be overcome through development, understood as a rational process as described by the sociological categories of modernization theory. The book closes by arguing that the likely resolution of the contradictions of reformism would be the repression of any social forces which threatened the traditional sources of power of the dominant class. The outcomes of the political process of the Unidad Popular period, the *coup d'état* in 1973 and the subsequent imposition of a technocratic version of neoliberalism, make these arguments prescient.

The theories of social communications processes and the method of ideological analysis developed by Armand Mattelart and his collaborators at CEREN provide a striking theoretical and political response to the dominant mode of the sociological analysis of communication. They also effectively peel away the veneer of political and ideological neutrality which had provided a cover grounded in a particular conception of democracy for both the media in Chile as well as the dominant methods for their analysis. But this critical theory and the method also had an important blind spot. Content analysis, as a practice associated with functionalism, did not provide any way of discovering or analysing the system of meanings that would make the manifest content intelligible to either the public or to the researcher. The ideological analyses produced at CEREN did elucidate a system of meanings (mythologies), a system produced or determined primarily by the dominant power relations in the social formation (material and ideological dependency). However, this theory in turn does not provide a way of seeing whether these dominant meanings are in fact the meanings produced by subordinate groups in the social formation. Thus, while functionalism was weakened by its psychological reductionism, as Mattelart had demonstrated in his critique, the blind spot of ideological analysis was in the actual readings and uses made of the media and of the representations by actors in the social formation.

This criticism is one which is often made against the Mattelarts. However, two important qualifications must be made. First, they do not simply attribute dominant readings to subordinate groups. Dominant effects were not assumed;

rather, the communications and cultural practices of the subordinate groups were mostly absent from the CEREN analyses at this stage of their theoretical development. However, this untheorized dimension of social communication was in fact already a concern for the researchers at CEREN, in particular for Michèle Mattelart. In her article on popular music (1970b), she begins to examine the tension in the concept of 'popular' between the dominant conception, that of appeal to a mass market, and an emergent conception in which 'popular' means 'of the people'. This tension in the concept of 'popular' opened a variety of directions for further theoretical development. Two of the most important directions had to do with the possibility of reinvesting dominant forms of representation and communication with popular contents, and with the variety of modes of reception. These will be discussed below.

The second qualification has to do with the pace of theoretical development. The practical concerns for critical communication theory in Chile in 1969 and early 1970 were to provide a theory which could replace the politically compromised dominant, functionalist theory and also to provide an analytical tool useful for the political struggles of the progressive popular movement. Thus the theoretical work at CEREN would focus on the social actors closest to the intellectuals producing the theories. The choices of objects for the articles discussed here provide an indication of the immediate political concerns of the CEREN researchers. The emergent political forces at the end of the 1960s were the student movement (thus the analysis of the ideological representations of youth, youth culture and the student movement) and peasants in the agrarian reform movement (thus the book length analysis of the ideological response of the dominant class to reform). Women are the other social group analysed by Michèle Mattelart, extending demographic work she and Armand Mattelart had begun in the 1960s (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1968). The labour movement and the political parties of the left did not yet figure in this stage of CEREN's analysis. The election of the Unidad Popular government in the last months of 1970 would provide the political impetus to change the analytical focus for the communications studies produced by scholars associated with CEREN.

UNIDAD POPULAR: COMMUNICATION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALISM

Until recently, the objectives of research in mass communication informed by political criteria could be summed up under the heading of denunciations, made from individual perspectives, of the ideological content of the 'objective' messages of bourgeois power. Now the task at hand is to put the communications apparatus in the service of the creation and the living of another rationality, indeed of another culture. This perspective – in which new historical coordinates obviously come together – unleashes new questions and is open to unsuspected derivations which overflow the apparently restricted field of mass communication, converting it into a point of support for a reflection on the human practice connotated by the productive mechanisms. Likewise, it permits a glimpse of the demands made urgent by changes in the ensemble of social relations. (Armand Mattelart, 1971b, p. 15)

The electoral victory on 4 September 1970, of the Unidad Popular coalition led by Dr Salvador Allende was a moment of great hope for the Chilean left. For the first time anywhere, a socialist government had been elected to bring about fundamental, revolutionary changes in a society through legal, non-violent means. Although the elections themselves did not represent a large change in the relations between the various social forces in contention in Chile, access to the power of the executive branch of the state did mean that new possibilities and new problems in the transition to socialism would come to the fore. These problems and possibilities would shape the debates about communication and the media in Chile until the coup on 11 September 1973 crushed the Chilean left and shut down almost all critical theory in the country.

The Unidad Popular was the latest incarnation of a popular front of the left parties led by Allende, which also had contested the elections of 1952, 1958 and 1964. Although the increasing enfranchisement of voters increased the total number of votes cast for the left in each election, the percentage of the total won by the FRAP (the popular front in 1964)

was greater than the percentage won by the UP: 39.5 per cent in 1964, 36.3 per cent in 1970 (Loveman, 1979, p. 331). The Unidad Popular won the plurality in part because the centre-right collaboration which secured a majority for Frei in 1964 had fallen apart, highlighting the confusion and the divisions among the conservative forces in Chile.

Disagreements over the best strategy for preventing a Unidad Popular victory in the 1970 elections also divided US interests. Private interests, led by the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT), preferred an aggressive strategy, using contacts with the CIA and the US Ambassador in Chile, intended to provoke an immediate overthrow of Allende (Petras and Morley, 1975, p. 28). In the period between the September elections and the confirmation vote in the Chilean Senate in November the US Government pursued a strategy of economic pressures to convince senators not to elect Allende.⁸ After the PDC convinced the Unidad Popular to sign a series of 'constitutional guarantees' (that is, pledges not to violate the constitution) it voted with the UP bloc to elect Allende president, frustrating the US efforts as well as those of the right.

The nature and extent of the Nixon administration's efforts, along with the private efforts of ITT and the covert actions undertaken by the CIA, first to prevent an Allende victory and then later to disrupt and destabilize the UP government and provoke a coup, have been widely discussed and documented (Petras and Morley, 1975 is an important early evaluation; see also United States Senate, 1973 and 1975). Economic sabotage and political violence plagued Chile throughout the Unidad Popular period, much of which was clearly directed and funded by private and government interests from the United States.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the destabilization campaign was the use of the media to attack Allende and the Unidad Popular government. *El Mercurio* received massive funds from both ITT (United States Senate, 1973, p. 7) and the CIA (United States Senate, 1975, pp. 7-8):⁹

By far, the largest – and probably the most significant – instance of support for a media organization was the money provided to *El Mercurio*, the major Santiago daily,

under pressure during the Allende regime. That support grew out of an existing propaganda project. In 1971 the Station judged that *El Mercurio*, the most important opposition publication, could not survive pressure from the Allende government, including intervention in the newsprint market and the withdrawal of government advertising. The 40 Committee authorized \$700,000 for *El Mercurio* on September 9, 1971, and added another \$965,000 to that authorization on April 11, 1972. A CIA project renewal memorandum concluded that *El Mercurio* and other media outlets supported by the Agency had played an important role in setting the stage for the September 11, 1973, military coup which overthrew Allende. (Ibid., p. 8)

The CIA evidently deemed access to *El Mercurio* a high priority, due in part to carefully cultivated ‘assets’ in the newspaper. These assets allowed the CIA Station in Santiago to generate more than one editorial per day in *El Mercurio* (Ibid., p. 22):

Access to *El Mercurio* had a multiplier effect, since its editorials were read throughout the country on various national radio networks. Moreover, *El Mercurio* was one of the most influential Latin American newspapers, particularly in business circles abroad. A project which placed anti-communist press and radio items was reported in 1970 to reach an audience of well over five million listeners. (Ibid.)

In addition to the media and other campaigns directed by the CIA, the newly elected government also faced a number of difficult political and economic problems stemming from Chile’s dependence on a single export commodity (copper) and foreign control over important sectors of the economy, an inefficient and heavily protected industrial sector suffering from underutilized capacity, sharp social and economic inequalities, frequent balance of payments crises, and uncoordinated but decided resistance from the centre and right-wing parties in the Chilean Congress and from overt sources in the United States. The solutions to these problems were sought in policies such as a stepped-up agrarian reform, increasing control over foreign capital, increased state power through nationalizing strategic firms, increased regulation

and increased public spending on both consumption and investment. Beginning with an article published in the *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* in June of 1971 (Armand Mattelart, 1971a), and further elaborated in a long essay published later that year (Armand Mattelart, 1971b), Armand Mattelart began to reflect on the role of communications in the transition to socialism as it was taking place in Chile.

Building on his earlier work, Mattelart sustains his critique of the bourgeois mode of communication and its ties in Chile to imperialism. Because the bourgeois press had been a weapon against the election of the popular government quite openly during the electoral campaigns,¹⁰ he argues for the continuing usefulness of ideological analyses as a method of illuminating the nature of the reaction in Chile and the right's ideological and political strategies. This method of ideological analysis becomes a dimension of the global analysis of the bourgeois mode of communication which Mattelart and his colleagues had already begun: the verticality of messages in the bourgeois mode of communication, the presumed or induced passivity of the media consumers and the attendant fetishism of the media, the alienation and individualism inherent in the mass media, the problem of freedom of expression secured and defended as a property right, and the problem of imperialism evident in the international dimension of the reaction.

The new issues that Mattelart begins to deal with have to do with the possibility that the development of the class struggle in Chile would permit the bourgeois mode of communication to be replaced, just as the left gained power in the government and began to posit the possibility of replacing the capitalist mode of production. He begins his analysis by discussing the calls for the expropriation of the bourgeois media.

Expropriation of the media was a serious issue, because the right enjoyed oligopolies in all the major media: 82 of 134 radio networks, 45 of 64 periodicals, and the largest circulation dailies, especially *El Mercurio*, were all under proprietary and editorial control of the opposition to the Unidad Popular (Armand Mattelart, 1977, pp. 9, 18). The governing bodies of all four television stations were also aligned with the right. Article 40 of the Unidad Popular's programme acknowledged

that the class struggle would be fought out on the terrain of culture just as it would be at the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy (Gonzalez, 1976, p. 106). Economic policy in the UP programme was based on the explicit assumption that the nationalization of key industries, the ‘commanding heights’, and their transfer to a ‘social area’ would provide a basis for national economic independence and social control over the economy. Furthermore, although the various parties in the coalition continually struggled with each other over priorities and the direction that its political strategy would take, the compromise strategy which emerged from these debates settled on two specific assumptions with direct consequences for media and cultural policy: (1) that the main protagonist in the struggle for socialism would be the UP in the government (rather than a particular vanguard or the people themselves); and (2) that the most pressing immediate objective was to capture the so-called *capas medias*, or middle sectors (rather than the development of the popular forces which already supported the left). The mass media, as large industries with links to the industries of the commanding heights, and as ideological apparatuses which could be used to mobilize public opinion among the middle sectors, would be a natural target for expropriation.¹¹

For Mattelart, however, expropriation of the media was not in itself an adequate plan. To simply take over the bourgeois media would be merely to ‘invert the signs’ of the ideological domination of the popular sectors. The same could be said with respect to cultural dependency: replacing foreign programmes, especially those from the USA, with ‘Chileanized’ programmes could reproduce the same ideological schemes, indeed even in a more camouflaged form (Armand Mattelart 1971a, p. 175). The expropriation of the media would require certain actions and a certain change in consciousness on the part of the workers in the media themselves:

it is in the degree in which the revolutionary forces posit their strategies within their own communications media (those under the control of the government as well as those of the political forces supporting the government) – as well as within the particular activities of each journalist or technician – that they will have the ability to exert the

pressure – beyond mere discursive pressure – to bring about the expropriation. (Ibid.)

If, as Mattelart had argued so forcefully, the bourgeois mode of communication is based on the manipulation of a relatively passive mass of media consumers (through fetishism and verticality of communication), then the transition would require a new mode of communication, in short, a cultural revolution. In the context of the question of the expropriation of the media, this means that the political and professional practices of journalists, technicians and other workers in the media would have to shift away from the defence of professional privileges. In a speech to the first conference of leftist journalists given on 13 April 1971, Allende himself had supported the development of a leftist journalists' front to combat the campaign of sedition carried out in the right's press, but this front would operate in the journalists' own professional organization (Colegio de Periodistas) (Allende, 1983). The problem with this conception of the professional status of journalists is that it reinforces the division of labour between information or culture producers and consumers. Mattelart criticizes this conception of 'representative journalism', or professional journalists representing their constituencies, as a form of alienation (Armand Mattelart, 1971b, pp. 96–7).¹²

For Mattelart, the most urgent task for cultural policy was to shift the struggle away from the effort on the part of sympathetic professionals to confront the bourgeoisie on the terrain of 'freedom of expression', a problematic bourgeois conception as he had demonstrated before, and towards the development of the ideological power and capacities of the people themselves. Media policy in the transition to socialism must be based on returning speech to the people.

Mattelart proposes several ideas about what it means to 'return speech to the people'. In the first place, he suggests that it is necessary to take control over the dynamic of information and culture from the dominant class (Armand Mattelart, 1971a, p. 180). With respect to the news, for example, he argues that news items must be linked to the self-generated initiatives of the popular sectors in the overall political process, initiatives such as voluntary work days, the creation of popularly controlled industries or new agricultural unities,

or the creation of linkages between different social actors. This change in the content of the news is important because it helps to break down the notion that newsworthy events occur in a reality over which the reader has no control:

[Bourgeois forms of news] provide the audience with a set of facts taken from a reality which defines itself as ephemeral, transitory and conjunctural and which does not provide the contextuality of the news event, that is, the elements of judgement which allow the reader to internalize the news in a cumulating line of active knowledge. In effect, in order to fulfill its mission of formation [of consciousness], the news should take the readers out of their passivity as consumers of information, and become a diagnostic element for action. (Ibid., p. 183)

Overcoming passivity in the news process is central to the overall goal of making the people into the protagonists of the social and political process.

For the people to become protagonists, Mattelart continues, the working classes must become the emitters of their own news and discuss the news that circulates. Thus workers need, under their own control and at their disposition, media of communication which circulate through the areas of their own social practices. Mattelart suggests the formation of 'information cells'.

Rather than disseminating a consciousness raising publication established by functionaries of an agrarian institute, for example, the peasants themselves can make this material, integrating into their creative project the whole concrete problematic of the dominated groups, that is, realizing an encounter of the community of interests of the working classes. In order to avoid becoming a utopian suggestion, such a project requires an infrastructure. The identification of the interests of the dominated groups cannot happen without some process of knowledge. What is the school for the workers? Basically, their class organizations. Each sector, each factory, each farm constitutes the only site where the analysis and discussion of the news can reside, and where such information cells can be created. These information cells can only be the extension of the organs of

participation for the masses, or more specifically, their form of participation and influence in ideological power. (Ibid., p. 186).

At this stage of the political struggle in Chile, however, the concrete organizations of popular power which could become both the protagonists of the social and political process and the bases for popular communication had not fully emerged. And the priorities set by the Unidad Popular government did not favour the promotion of such entities. They would only emerge later, in response to the offensive of the right.

REACTION: THE RIGHT REORGANIZES

The political crisis that came to the surface in 1967 during Frei's administration had divided the tacit coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Partido Nacional, and this coalition had not managed to reconstitute itself in time to block the election of Allende in 1970. The PN had proposed to have the Congress name Alessandri, who polled second in the 1970 elections, president, at which point he would resign and call for new elections in which Frei would have been eligible to run and presumably win. More moderate elements of the PDC, however, fearing both the extreme right's calls for a coup to block Allende and the possibility that the left would resist the Alessandri formula, instead gave their support in the Congress to Allende in exchange for his agreeing to a list of 'Constitutional Guarantees'.

Thus the first year of the Unidad Popular government was characterized by euphoria on the left, accompanied by a certain amount of progress towards meeting the goals laid out in the Basic Programme as idle industrial capacity was put to work and salaries were adjusted, and by confusion and division among the opposition to the UP. The dominant class concentrated on obstructing the popular government politically, impeaching Allende's ministers, refusing to pass UP legislation, and attempting to use ambiguous provisions in the Constitution to block the intervention or expropriation of industries marked for inclusion in the Area of Social Property. The economic reaction of the bourgeoisie was

initially uncoordinated. Industrialists were not passive before the expropriations; they fled the country, taking as much of their money with them as possible.

More committed opponents, however, began to take more decisive actions. Economic sabotage, not mere capital flight, had begun at both the national and international levels.¹³ This began to provoke responses on the part of the supporters of the UP. In one notable case in April 1971, Amador Yarur, the owner of a large textile plant and a member of one of the most powerful financial groups, had his factory taken over by the workers protesting at his economic sabotage and his refusal to deal with non-company unions (Stallings, 1978, p. 136). This factory was not among those intended for the Area of Social Property at that time, yet the workers demanded that the government take it over. After three days, the government gave in.

This event marked the beginning of the end of the public consensus within the UP about the nature of the transition to socialism. Allende, backed by the Communist Party, still favoured a moderate approach to nationalizations in the hopes of continuing to improve the economic conditions of the people and thus winning over the *capas medias*. But a significant portion of Allende's Socialist Party favoured accelerating the process. Allende was able to keep the government together, but soon other workers began to follow the example of the Yarur textile workers, occupying their plants and demanding that they be taken into the Area of Social Property. The June 1972 occupation of a food-processing plant which was not slated to be nationalized at all, located in a working-class suburb of Santiago, created a significant conflict with the government, and the workers of the geographic area around the plant organized the first of the *cordones industriales*, or industrial cordons, the working class's key collective agencies pushing the government to the left.

Armand and Michèle Mattelart, along with other colleagues at CEREN, continued to critique the UP's communications and cultural policies in terms of the effort to win over the middle sectors, rather than developing the forces of the left (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1972, reprinted in English in Armand Mattelart, 1980; see also Ossa, 1972). The government had taken over a bankrupt publishing plant, formerly

known as Zig-Zag, and renamed it Quimantú. Quimantú continued to print many of the magazines and comics that it had in the past, but it was also beginning to publish similar magazines, following many of the same genres such as magazines for women, youth, sports fans, and the like, but with orientations sympathetic to the UP's programmes. As these competed with the bourgeois press, the strategy was clearly to use these magazines to spread a leftist ideology in competition with the bourgeois ideology of the traditional 'genre' magazines. The Mattelarts reiterated their earlier criticisms of this strategy, pointing out that it reproduces the very division of the popular forces into categories designed for markets, alienating and demobilizing the readers.

As conflict over policy began to plague the UP, the right began to regroup. A signal event in the reorganization of the right was the election of Rolando Sáenz on 2 June 1971, to the office of president of the industrialists' *gremio*, the SOFOFA. Sáenz understood the need of the Chilean bourgeoisie to broaden its base among the petty bourgeoisie – precisely the *capas medias* that the Allende wing of the Socialist Party and other moderates in the UP were trying to win over. Under his leadership, the SOFOFA not only strengthened its ties with other bourgeois *gremios*, such as the agriculturalists' SNA, but a new organization was also created, the National Front for Private Property or FRENAP (Frente Nacional del Area Privada), which tied together the economic interests of both large and small private property-owners. Sáenz spoke at the inaugural event of the FRENAP, but afterwards the SOFOFA played its role behind the scenes, letting the petty bourgeois *gremios* do the more public work so that the organization could avoid the appearance of pitting the large bourgeoisie against the workers (Stallings, 1978, pp. 138–9).

Right-wing opposition was finally sufficiently consolidated to force a crisis in October 1972, during the 'bosses' strike', also known, somewhat misleadingly, as the transport strike. On the evening of 12 October the truck drivers' *gremio* declared a strike, parking their vehicles across the roads leading to Santiago. The transport industry in Chile was highly decentralized, most businesses owning between one and three trucks, and thus the drivers' *gremio* was a typical petty

bourgeois *gremio*. However, the overall 'gremialist' strategy of the strike became clear very quickly: the bourgeoisie intended to set off a general strike, shutting down the whole economy.

Within 48 hours, the truckers had been joined by the retail merchants' *gremio*, so that the majority of stores (including food stores) were closed throughout the country. In addition, the professional *gremios* (including doctors) ordered their members to stop working, and the SOFOFA called on its members to institute lockouts in their factories. (Ibid., p. 141)

While the UP had been neglecting the elaboration of a communication and cultural strategy for the transition, as the Mattelarts and their colleagues at CEREN had been pointing out, the same was not true of the right. As Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini (1973) pointed out, the election of a popular government represented a crisis for the bourgeoisie and their communication strategy had to change, from political demobilization and the 'naturalization' of the bourgeois order (which now appeared in crisis), to careful political mobilization against a class enemy. Borrowing from Lenin, although with a very different social referent, they refer to the new bourgeois strategy as a 'mass line':

the target audience of this information practice begins to be more precisely defined according to its specific interests within a social scale, thus conferring upon it a much more active sensibility. It is possible to detect at least two lines of agitation: one around a vast and inorganic front: the consumer, the housewife, etc., all of which are incited with a repertory emanating from the 'specter of totalitarian marxism.' The other line tends to constitute a more organic front and centers on the agitation of the *gremios*, students, businesses, and professional associations. (Mattelart and Piccini, 1973, p. 256)

The 'mass line' of the Chilean bourgeoisie had three distinct ideological threads.

- (1) The press agitated its public around the idea that the UP represented a direct threat to the 'people's' economic interests, linking the expropriations of industries and of

- large landholdings to economic chaos, rationing programmes, and shortages, and producing fear of expropriation among even the smallest enterprises.
- (2) The press blamed the UP for the climate of violence (including the violence perpetrated by the right) and the rupture of democratic norms in politics (despite the UP's explicit commitment to effect the transition within the constitutional framework).
 - (3) The press denounced supposed threats to freedom of expression, in part in defence of their accustomed forms of professional and political identity, and in part to open an ideological defence for their seditious campaign. (Ibid., pp. 257–8)

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE REACTION

At about the same time as the bosses' strike, the Inter-American Press Association held a convention in Santiago. This meeting provided an occasion for the international press to converge on Chile at the same time as the bourgeois press in Chile was denouncing supposed threats to its freedom of expression. Armand Mattelart, along with Daniel Waksman, reviewed the IAPA meeting in an article appearing in a Chilean news magazine (Armand Mattelart and Waksman, 1972). The article points out that the IAPA represented not journalists, but businessmen, the owners of the press. Mattelart and Waksman go on to discuss the concentration of ownership of the North American press, the 'one-way flow' of information from the USA to the Third World, the interlocking interests of press corporations, high-technology communications, especially satellites, the paper industry, advertising agencies, and roles of the local 'creole' representatives of these industries in sustaining the press as an international cultural industry.

The significance of the confluence of the bosses' strike and the IAPA meeting in Santiago was brought into even sharper relief as suspicions of the extent of the participation of agents from the USA in destabilizing the UP government was also coming to light. Jack Anderson's columns denouncing ITT's role in the 1970 elections had just been published. Suspicions about the role of the CIA would not be confirmed until after

the coup; nevertheless, such suspicions abounded and were entirely justified. First, the CIA's 'assets' in *El Mercurio*, mentioned above, probably helped to elaborate the 'mass line' or gremialist ideology;¹⁴ and second, the CIA funnelled around US\$8 m. into the country – estimated by Stallings to have been worth around US\$40 m. after being exchanged on the black market – much of which certainly went to support the bosses' strike (Stallings, 1978, pp. 140–1).

The reactionary forces being brought to bear against Chile in this period were clearly broader and more systematic than the domestic political and economic forces marshalled by the Chilean bourgeoisie. Armand Mattelart's earlier efforts to theorize the relationships between the ideology of a dependent bourgeoisie and the political economic structures of imperialism were further developed as the struggle in Chile intensified. His research into the global political economic structure of the communications and cultural industries appeared in three lengthy studies that appeared between 1972 and 1973: *Agresión desde el espacio: cultura y napalm en la era de los satélites* [*Aggression from Space: Culture and Napalm in the Era of Satellites*], which appeared in Chile in 1972; 'La industria cultural no es una industria ligera: hace la fase superior del monopolismo cultural' ['The Culture Industry is not a Light Industry: Towards the Highest Stage of Cultural Monopolism'], published in Havana in 1973; and 'El imperialismo en busca de la contrarrevolución cultural – "Plaza Sesamo": prólogo a la telerepresión del año 2000' ['Imperialism in Search of the Cultural Counter-Revolution – 'Sesame Street': Prologue to Telerepression in the Year 2000'], published in Chile in July 1973. Each of these works explores the totalizing structure of global capitalism, as transnational industries interlock with each other, with the military and its demand for technological innovation, and with a technocratic ideology which 'naturalizes' the whole system. The fragmentation of everyday life and the invisibility of the whole system, themes present in Mattelart's work from the beginning, are explored in the context of the logic of the production and circulation of commodities.

In launching his product onto the market, the producer gives or assigns to us a unique code for reading and deciphering

the commodities we buy or hope to buy. And this limited code not only confers meaning on the object we consume, but also endows all of our existence with a univocal signified. For the majority of the dominated, the meetings they have every now and again with Westinghouse or Textron are only enjoyed within the confines of the supermarket or of family intimacy. Others who are dominated, such as the Vietnamese people, keep these appointments through the mortar shells produced by the same corporations. Both encounters are partial realities lived by the world; they need to be reunified in order to demonstrate the repressive character of the products. The mine does not reveal more than the refrigerator, and the hair dryer no more than the detonator. We must read both products to understand one or the other, to describe the ways of keeping quiet and of repressing which in the end are one and the same. (Armand Mattelart, 1984, p. 9)

Thus the economic links between the industries which produce diverse products defines a system which is both a political economic system, monopoly capitalism, and a semiological and ideological system. The extent of the impact of the ideological system is vast:

The whole world knows it, or at least intuits it. Each year, two hundred and forty million people see Walt Disney movies, each week one hundred million enjoy his television programs, eight hundred million read one of his books or magazines, fifty million listen to his records or dance to his beat, eighty million buy artifacts produced under his license, one hundred fifty million read his comic strips in magazines or Sunday supplements, eighty million attend the projection of his educational short movies in classrooms, churches or workplaces, and more than fifteen million spend vacations or weekends in his artificial paradises. (Armand Mattelart, 1973, p. 146)

From this massive presence of the vision of the cultural industries in the everyday lives of so many people comes the need to provide an analysis of the ideology of this industry, evident in its popularly consumed products.

The choice of the Disney comics for such an analysis was occasioned not only by the sheer magnitude of their presence on the Chilean market, but also because their audience was primarily children, whose views about themselves and their place in the world are still in the process of becoming systematic. 'The process of the socialization of this small human constitutes a crucial point in the central nervous system of any society: there, attitudes are generated and pre-rational suppositions are conditioned, permitting the child to integrate itself, comfortable, functioning, enthusiastic, into the status quo' (Dorfman, 1971, pp. 223–4). In *How to Read Donald Duck* (Dorfman and Mattelart, 1979 and 1984), which is probably his most widely read work, Armand Mattelart and his co-author Ariel Dorfman reconstruct the ideological universe of Disney as seen in the children's comics sold in Chile. Their closely argued and well-documented reading reveals, against the protestations of the 'innocence' of the Disney universe, an international division of labour, in which the Third World 'naturally' and happily provides its raw materials, which it neither knows how to use nor knows their value, to the more technologically sophisticated residents of Duckberg; in which the people of the Third World are infantile 'noble savages' residing in Utopias without work or workers, from which all conflict must be banned; in which only the primary and tertiary sectors of the economy operate; and in which, curiously, there are almost no women. The Disney ideology also introduces and reinforces the centrality of individualism, linking his universe neatly with the dominant bourgeois ideology in a dependent country:

It is this discrepancy between the social-economic base of the life of the individual reader, and the character of the collective vision concerning this base which poses the problem. It gives Disney effective power of penetration into the dependent countries because he offers individual goals at the expense of the collective needs. [...] Underdeveloped people take the comics, at second hand, as instruction in the way they are supposed to live and relate to the foreign power center. (Dorfman and Mattelart, 1984, p. 98)

While these works are important contributions to the development of the theory of cultural imperialism as it stood in

the early 1970s, and indeed still provide a corrective lens on the fragmentary experience of the culture of global capitalism, they are often criticized for their totalizing vision, which observers from outside the Chilean context of 1970–3 have often criticized for leaving no room for resistance. However, their full importance can only be appreciated when they are seen as theoretical and political interventions in Chilean politics during the UP period. The various scholars associated with the CEREN were also participants in the various cultural and communications initiative undertaken by both the UP government and the people themselves in this period. As Dorfman and Mattelart put it, ‘We do not want to be like the scientist who takes his umbrella with him to go study the rain’ (Ibid., p. 25).

From the early critiques of the functionalist school of communication as a therapeutic approach for integrating Chile into the imperialist system; to the analysis of the bourgeois mode of communication and its manifestations in the press reporting of the agrarian reform under Frei; to the analysis of the structure of dependency in Chilean communications; to the analysis of the press’s role in the ideological struggle to constitute social agents, such as youth; to the critiques of the leftist press and the UP’s communications policies; the Mattelarts and their colleagues at CEREN had argued forcefully for an approach to culture and communication that would break with the dominant mode of communication. The political effort to try to win over the *capas medias*, to modify the capitalist relations of production without breaking decisively with them, to attempt to overcome dependency but not imperialism – all characteristic of the UP strategy – were, in this view, doomed to fail. The fault lay in not recognizing the systematic nature of capitalism’s reaction to the Chilean experiment: the reaction was not simply a matter of conspiracies between agents of imperialism and the Chilean bourgeoisie, although clearly such conspiracies existed in abundance; it was rather in the nature of the imperialist system, the total political, economic and ideological structure, to reproduce Chile’s subordinate status. With respect to communication, for the left to continue to operate using a vertically-orientated, professionally qualified communications apparatus, ‘inverting the signs’ of the bourgeois apparatus without changing its

structures, simply reproduced the system itself, on terms on which the left was bound to lose.

POPULAR COMMUNICATION INITIATIVES UNDER UNIDAD POPULAR

What forms would the alternative mode of communications take? The working class, or the people, had been posited as the protagonists of their own history in principle by the left in Chile, but what concrete forms would the class agents assume? Armand Mattelart's proposal to create 'information cells' on the basis of the working class's own organizations would be a step towards an alternative mode of communication, but at a moment where the various organizations claiming to speak for the working class were divided and struggling to control the revolutionary process, where would the people go to find their own voices?

The Chilean working class expressing itself was not a new phenomenon in the 1970s. Working-class militancy had been a central theme of Chilean history throughout the twentieth century, a fact which had not escaped the notice of Chilean historians, for example in the works of Julio César Jobet, Amunátegui Solar, Luis Vitale, Hernán Ramírez and others, and was not completely absent in Chilean communication studies. Osvaldo Arias Escobedo's history of the proletarian press in Chile from 1900 through 1930 (Arias Escobedo, 1970) provided a detailed account of the hundreds of workers' newspapers linked to the various ideological currents of the labour movement in the early twentieth century. This historical study provided no analysis of the contemporary conditions in Chile, nor did it attempt explicitly to draw lessons applicable to the conjuncture in 1970.

Published as part of a co-operative cultural effort between the CUT (Chile's labour confederation) and the provincial branch of the University of Chile in Chillán, this book mainly provides detailed descriptions of the political orientations, ownership, production information (the printers), publication dates and the main objectives of the many workers' papers of the period. There is very little theoretical self-consciousness in this work, other than a brief effort to explain the differences

between the workers' press and the mass press owned and operated by the Chilean bourgeoisie.

This [workers'] journalism does not aim to compete with the bourgeois press; its creation and its objectives are different from those pursued by entrepreneurs and the economic groups motivated fundamentally by profit and the system which protects and increases profits. The workers' press fills the vacuum left by the so called serious objective press in our days as it informs about the problems, events, injustices and repression which befall the working class. Furthermore, the newspaper is, for the worker, a medium of ideological orientation, a nucleus of organization, a theoretical combattant, an agitator in social struggle, and a propagandist for solutions and objectives for his class. (Ibid., p. 15)

This distinction between mass and class communication also provided Arias with a way of discussing the difficulties faced by the workers' press. The obstacles to the regular appearance of the workers' papers and their often short duration as regular papers derived from the unsteady nature of their financing (typically workers' papers were of necessity commodities which had to circulate in a capitalist market) and the lack of worker-journalists who could provide both the production and analytical skills necessary for the regular production of workers' papers (Ibid., pp. 177–8). Furthermore, in the period of this study, the working class and its organizations enjoyed steady growth in term of both size and militancy which supported an increasing number of workers' papers; however, newspapers critical of the government would disappear under military government of Carlos Ibáñez in 1927, as the labour movement itself and the parties which represented it fragmented (Ibid., p. 193).

After 1967, however, the working class and other popular sectors, such as the *pobladores*, had become increasingly assertive and conscious of their collective identities and power. By the time of the bosses' strike in October 1972, several industrial cordons had already been organized, and were joining with other local groups – mothers' centres, neighbourhood councils, peasant unions, student associations – to form *comandos comunales* to co-ordinate tasks to resist the strike in

their own geographical areas (Stallings, 1978, p. 142). These self-created organizations were not under the control of either the parties of the UP nor the MIR, nor were they under the control of the CUT. Moreover, they began to provide a political impetus to the sectors of the UP which wished to abandon the moderate stance taken by the Communists and by Allende, to negotiate with the opposition, and to take over their own factories to increase the Area of Social Property from below. The industrial cordons and the *comandos* were the nascent organizational manifestation of the popular sectors' taking consciousness of their problems and their power and becoming the protagonists of their history, despite the efforts of the UP government to bring them to heel (Santa Lucia, 1976, p. 141).

The industrial cordons produced several important communications initiatives. The efforts of the workers, technicians and journalists of the University of Chile's television station, Canal 9, to wrest control of the station from its conservative management were supported by the Cordon Mapocho Cordillera, which also included the state's publishing house Quimantú (Ibid., p. 163). In the southern city of Concepción, after a bitter internal conflict, the journalists and workers of the newspaper *El Sur* took over the plant and for two weeks produced their own paper, *Surazo* (Oñate, 1973; for an account of the events given from the perspective of 'gremialismo' or 'freedom of expression' – the freedom of the owners of *El Sur*, to be sure – see also MacHale, 1973, pp. 5–6). And, as more industrial cordons were organized, many began to publish their own papers, some using 'worker correspondents' and others set up by militant journalists involved in teaching worker correspondents.¹⁵ Armand Mattelart had begun a systematic study of these experiences of self-expression in the industrial cordons, but his work was cut short by the coup. (Interviews he conducted with workers from the cordons and examples of the cordons' papers are included in Armand Mattelart, 1980, pp. 186–227.)

The other dimension of a democratic form of communication proposed by the Mattelarts was in democratizing reception. Democratizing reception was proposed in the article discussed above, 'Continuity and Discontinuity in Communication' (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1972, p. 114). The sense

given to the concept here referred to the distribution of communications, in particular, the distribution of magazines in kiosks. In line with the thrust of the argument of the article, the Mattelarts examine the form of distribution as it affects the consumption of the press, especially in terms of the way that kiosks, the site for the sales of magazines, reproduce the vertical mode of communication and the power of the bourgeois press. These sites were easily overwhelmed by the increased production of magazines from publishers tied to the dominant class,¹⁶ which, in addition, were able to bring pressure to bear on the kiosk-owners who carried leftist literature or government publications by threatening them with boycotts. Furthermore, to compete in the magazine market, popular magazines had to adopt the mode of presentation of the bourgeois press (use of colour printing, for example), which tended to drive up the costs of production and therefore the price of the products.

In an article reporting on research on the reception of television in a selection of townships, Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini give the concept of reception a more complex meaning (Mattelart and Piccini, 1977; Michèle Mattelart, 1983 is a summarized version of this article, in English).

To promote the expression of a popular culture necessarily entails a critical analysis of the material conditions which control cultural production and the totality of the circuits through which a determined distribution and circulation of the products of thought are ordered hierarchically. But at the same time, it requires examining the seeds of the new cultural practices emerging among the people through their social practice: the expressive forms, the language and the specific demands which a potentially revolutionary class produces in a specific moment of its historical development. And, in relation to this, the modalities with which this sector decodes, expropriates and judges, through a *class code*, the products of bourgeois culture. (Michèle Mattelart and Piccini, 1977, p. 47, emphasis in original)

This study provides a subtle analysis of the different codes used in different geographical locales in Santiago among the working class to make sense of what they saw on television, as well as the different ways of using television. Viewers from

townships with greater political activity or a history of militancy had very different relationships with their televisions and with the contents of the programmes than those from more *ad hoc* townships. In effect, political struggle had articulated collective subjects in various fronts of the class conflict in Chile, including in the cultural front. Democratizing reception would mean, among other things, activating the creative capacities of these collective subjects in their production of culture.

What is at needed here is a minimal organization of publics through the amplification of the channels of participation which permit the recovery of the *productive dimension of the consumer*, the consumer's specific needs and interests in the process of the production of the news, entertainment, and mass culture. The *spectators* must have the possibility of criticizing or negating – in reference to their revolutionary perspective – the objects which the cultural apparatus promotes, in the last instance to negate their character as *crystallized products* at the service of social inertia. (Ibid., pp. 50–1, emphases in original)

It is interesting to note that these investigations took place in 1971, before the bosses' strike and the more assertive mobilizations of the working class in the industrial cordons. Events appear to have overtaken these original reception studies of Mattelart and Piccini, and the coup cut off any possibility of re-examining their initial findings.

However, the most important point about the initiatives in popular communication is that the popular sectors in fact gave a concrete expression and a social content to the postulates about democratic forms of communication elaborated by the Mattelarts and their colleagues at CEREN. Their scholarship, in both its research and theory dimensions, and their political commitments not only cross-fertilized each other, they also found a resonance in Chile's political reality that helped them to produce some of the most strikingly original and important scholarship in the field of mass communication anywhere. The scholarship produced at CEREN broke with both the theoretical precursors in communications theory and research (that is, the dominant functionalist approaches) and with the dominant modes and methods of

scholarly production and legitimation. Although their research was published in scholarly publications, the dialogue they conducted about their findings was only partly with other scholars. More importantly, it was also conducted with the social subjects who in turn provided the social and historical experience this scholarship attempted to study.

ANOTHER FORM OF SCHOLARSHIP UNDER THE UP: THE EAC

Although the work done at CEREN has been the most influential outside of Chile (the coup would ensure that similar work would be nearly impossible inside Chile, not only because the CEREN was closed but also because repression destroyed the public space in which socially articulate subjects could communicate), other communications scholarship was being done in Chile and deserves consideration. Functionalism, although discredited by the experience of Project Camelot, continued to guide the research agendas of some scholars (see, for example, Böker, 1971). Quimantú, in its popular series of books, published a history of Chilean cinema (Ossa, 1971) and a book on journalism (Taufic, 1973).

However, the most important scholarly work on communications, outside of the studies realized at CEREN, was produced at the School of the Arts of Communication, of the Universidad Católica, EAC. The work done at EAC is important for a variety of reasons. First, while CEREN researchers tended to focus their attention on the press and print media, scholars at EAC began to study other media which were becoming enormously influential in Chile, notably radio and television. Second, although CEREN was shut down immediately after the coup, EAC survived for a short time as an institutional space (although it was also subject to the repression and to institutional reorganization, as will be discussed in the next chapter). And finally, many of the scholars associated with EAC were able either to remain in Chile or to return after the initial period of severe repression, becoming leading figures in communications theory and research during the dictatorship. Thus much of the knowledge and experience accumulated at EAC, although less well known or influential

than that of CEREN outside of Chile, would prove to be very influential as the field was reconstructed under the dictatorship.

There are certain basic similarities between the concerns of the scholars at EAC and those of CEREN. Semiology and structural linguistics provided important methodological contributions to both; and in both cases, these methodological tools were brought to bear on the question of ideology.¹⁷ The differences between the two schools, however, are more important than the similarities.

EAC was a professional school. Its institutional objective was 'to educate audiovisual communicators and to produce experimental productions in this area, capable of expressing a changing society more exactly' (Munizaga and Rivera, 1983, p. 39). The notion of promoting increasing professionalism in communications, therefore, played an important role in their analyses. In her study of radio in Chile, Rina Alcalay points out that the development of the technological base for radio in Chile was not matched by the development of a creative use of the technology, or the development of the creative aspect of the products. The reasons she cites for this underdevelopment lie in 'the lack of professionalism in radio, a medium which remains at the level of a craft, based on amateurism and commercialism, rather than a more professional level based on scientific and systematic preparation (Alcalay, 1972, p. 54).' The reforms she proposes are, crucially, legislative reforms: that radio professionals be required to have a higher level of preparation in their fields as well as in social communication (*Ibid.*, pp. 54–5).

The contrast with CEREN here is striking. Where the conclusions drawn by the Mattelarts and their colleagues indicate that professionalization contributes to the alienation of speech from the people, Alcalay finds that lack of professionalism prevents the medium from realizing its creative potential. Where Alcalay looks to the government to act to resolve the problem she identifies, the work associated with CEREN advocates greater involvement of the people in the communications process. These differences reflect the increasing split on the Chilean left in the waning years of the UP government over the question of how to bring about social transformation.

Another crucial difference between these two schools lies in their definitions and uses of the concept 'ideology'.

Giselle Munizaga, in a discussion of ideology in cinema, does not provide an explicit definition of the term. Rather she deduces her concept from the character of cinema as a 'social language'. She uses this notion to distinguish the cinematic work as a cultural good from material goods, which satisfy organic needs.¹⁸ Films are certainly products of particular systems of production which leave traces of their ideology – for example, the Hollywood system encodes a film with a different sort of ideology from that of a home movie – but it is not the industrial level at which ideology is experienced.

We should not forget that the capacity of a work for creating consciousness is intimately united to its cathectic force and its artistic quality. By cathectic force, we mean all the pleasurable signification emanating from the work, its capacity to produce an emotional attraction, an identification through feelings. The artistic quality refers to the capacity to project significations, to express unknown facets not made part of the language of social practice, to reveal the world, to unveil experience. Both aspects, the cathectic and the artistic, constitute a totality along with the ideological aspect of a cinematic work. (Munizaga, 1972, p. 59)

Munizaga appears here to be making an argument against economic reductionism. She does this by separating the educative or ideological aspect of the work of cinema from its economic aspects: 'we must study and understand not its potentiality for consumption in an economic market, but rather its potentiality for ideological signification among the distinct social groups in distinct historical circumstances' (Ibid.). The contrast with Armand Mattelart's work (especially 1984) is again striking. For Mattelart, it is the character of cultural products as commodities, produced and circulated in a system dominated by huge capitalist enterprises, which determines their ideological character and effects. Mattelart integrates meaning and material production in his analysis. To avoid economic reductionism, Munizaga separates meaning from material production; the consequence for her concept of ideology was that it was social, but apparently neutral with respect to social conflicts. In contrast, Mattelart avoided reductionism by emphasizing the political activity of the subjects in the whole process.

In some ways, the study of ideology in imported television series written by Consuelo Morel, Fernando Ossandón, and Valerio Fuenzalida (1973) comes closer to the CEREN approach. Like the studies in the 1970 special issue of CEREN's *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, this article provides close ideological readings of several episodes of the programmes 'Bonanza' and 'The FBI'. It opens with detailed theoretical and methodological discussions of the semiology of television. The latter is divided into a discussion of the semiology of the filmic image, involving considerations on the contributions of Metz, Eco and Pasolini, and a discussion on the semiology of narrative, focusing on the work of Greimas (also an influential figure in Mattelart's work).

For these writers, ideology is understood as the 'values' encoded in the television 'message' (or, less confusingly, the television text). For each episode, they combine an analysis of the structure of the television image with an actantial analysis of the narrative, from which they derive ideological readings revealing the encoded social values. However, as in Munizaga's work, as well as in contrast to Mattelart, these social values appear to be unmotivated, or at least isolated from the social processes which produce them, rather than in social *relation*, or more precisely, encoded through social *conflict*: 'significations, that is, the nucleus of social communication, are in the *message*, and not in the emitter or receiver' (Morel *et al.*, 1973, p. 59, emphasis in the original). In this view, ideology can only be seen as the *circulation* of meanings, not their production.

However, the work at EAC could also be seen to be beginning to provide certain correctives to the theoretical framework elaborated at CEREN. The concern of the latter with the struggle of the people for access to culture reveals what is perhaps too singular a conception of culture: that there is a dominant culture, determined by the relations of domination in the society, which enters into crisis when the system of domination is threatened. The insights of Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini into the plurality of interpretations of television among Chile's popular sectors were in the end subordinated to the political need to help the working class elaborate a mode of communication suitable for its political liberation. At EAC, in particular in Giselle Munizaga's insistence on the

importance of cathexis in culture, the first steps were being taken towards a theory of popular culture not as a secondary or derived form of culture but as the cultural practices, however contradictory, of the people themselves.

Objections to the work of CEREN or EAC notwithstanding, the period from 1967 to 1973 was one of tremendous theoretical creativity, in particular among scholars sympathetic with and committed to the transformation of Chilean society. In this period, challenges to transnational hegemony became acute. The role of culture in the construction and maintenance of the transnational hegemony became evident thanks in part to the work of scholars with various political commitments providing analyses of the cultural mechanisms of domination, both in communications practices and in scholarship itself. The emergence of critical forms of scholarship was a result of the struggles for intellectual autonomy, but it should be noted that this professional autonomy was itself determined by the emergent social subjects putting the old structures of domination into crisis: autonomy came from commitment to popular struggles. The political crisis affected Chilean society as a whole, and the divisions that emerged among the left also divided communications scholarship, putting, on the one side, CEREN and its efforts to promote the cultural and communicative power of the popular sectors, and on the other, EAC with its commitment to raising the professional standards of communicators, to better serve the process of transforming Chile.

On 11 September 1973, all the forces, intellectual and popular, striving for this transformation were abolished, repressed, or destroyed. The *coup d'état* not only destroyed the Unidad Popular government, it also shut down all public spaces in which efforts to create a new Chile were being made. As the left was banned from public life, the hope for the democratic transformation of Chile by the popular forces was abolished.

4 Repression and Resistance: 1973–90

The policy of excluding the left from public life in Chile extended to the universities, which, while by no means dominated by the left, had been a vibrant source of leftist political thought and activity since the University Reform movement in 1967. Under the military regime, the social sciences suffered massive expulsions of students and dismissals of professors, with the notable exception of the orthodox or 'neoliberal' schools of economics associated with the Chicago Boys.

Repression affected the study of mass communication in various ways. The military mistrusted social theory in general, and codified this mistrust, at least with regard to critical or leftist social theory, in Article VIII of the Constitution of 1980.¹ One of the first acts of the Military Junta, on 2 October 1973, was to intervene in the universities and designate 'delegated rectors' with sweeping powers for restructuring and regulating the universities. These new and powerful delegated rectors immediately set out to purge the universities of faculty, administrative staff and students associated with the left or considered to be hostile to the military government. According to Garretón and Pozo (cited in Brunner, 1986, p. 42), around 25 per cent of the professors, 10 to 15 per cent of the non-academic personnel and 15 to 18 per cent of the students (more than 20 000) were expelled.

Brunner (1986) describes the global effect of the intervention thus: loss of the autonomy of the universities, suppression of pluralism and free discussion, continual purging, more rigidity in curriculum development and a reduction of university financing. To bring about these effects, the military relied on:

direct mechanisms of censorship such as the expulsion of professors who dissent from the official policies, control over bibliographies and publications, sanction of dissident students, discrimination in pay and promotions, the presence of agents of the security forces in classrooms, the prohibition

against collecting poll or interview data without previous authorization, etc. (Garretón, 1981, p. 17)

The customary practices for producing social science knowledge in the universities clearly were no longer possible. Even for those few critical scholars who were able to remain in the universities, neither the intramural – in classrooms, in discussions among colleagues – nor the extramural – through field research and publication – forms of legitimation of critical scholarship would be possible.

Through repression in the universities, the Junta intended to drive the left out of both civic and scholarly life. Although the rationale for intervening in the universities would soon be to make them more 'efficient' and to organize scholarly work along the lines of the market, the immediate effect of the interventions was to increase state power inside the universities. Daniel Levy argues that with regard to appointments policy, academic policy concerning both participation and content, and financial policy, there was 'little evidence of a market approach to institutional autonomy, competition, or private-sector choice producing desired leadership' (1986a, p. 104); rather, the military government pursued political control over the universities through increased state power (p. 119). Elsewhere, Levy (1986b, p. 76) describes this as a 'neutron bomb policy – not destroying most structures even while brutally assaulting most personnel as well as programs.'

The concrete consequences of these global policies were devastating. Various schools within the three major universities were closed outright. CEREN, one of the principal sources for critical scholarship in communications, was closed and 23 professors were fired (Garretón, 1981, p. 88). The repression forced some of the most respected communications scholars in Chile – Armand and Michèle Mattelart, Mabel Piccini, Ariel Dorfman – to flee into exile.

EAC suffered a slower death. In 1975, it was transformed into a School of Theatre, Cinema and Television, and the Communications department was eliminated. By 1977, the Cinema and Television areas were also closed.

The university centres which survived the repression did continue to fulfil the traditional roles of educating communication professionals and researching problems in communication

within the limits that the military rector and the political situation of the country permitted. Some of the personnel from the very reduced School of Theatre were able to pursue research projects independently of the Catholic University through their association with CENECA, one of the private research centres which will be discussed below. However, the presence of the delegated rector clearly made critical scholarship much less feasible in the universities.

By way of example, the military intervention in the Catholic University suspended ongoing research projects, including survey research on the reception of television programmes in Chile's rural areas (Hurtado, 1991). These early reception studies, along with Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini's research conducted in 1971 (Mattelart and Piccini, 1977), anticipated reception theory as applied to the media in Western Europe and the United States by several years (see for example Morley, 1980), and represented a potential breakthrough in the theory of ideology, which was cut short by the repression.

The repression affected not only the institutions for communications scholarship and the ongoing research, it also disrupted the personal lives of many Chilean scholars. In addition to the Mattelarts, Ariel Dorfman and many others who fled or were forced into exile, Fernando Ossandón had to flee to Peru, where he finished his master's thesis, an ideological critique of *El Mercurio's* role in the repression of the early years of the military government (Ossandón, 1986). Eduardo Santa Cruz spent several years unable to find work in a university or in the field of communication. He made his living tending parked cars for tips (Santa Cruz, 1991). Carlos Ochsenius was detained and tortured by the military for his membership in the Socialist Party.

FROM NATIONAL SECURITY TO NEOLIBERALISM

As the initial repressive phase of military rule began to wind down, a struggle over the future shape and direction of Chilean society surfaced within the conservative and reactionary forces supporting the military. While some members of the military, along with Christian Democrats who had supported the coup but favoured a rapid return of civilian rule,

preferred to see the state resume its role as a protagonist of development, others favoured a more radical reorganization of Chilean society. The social forces and agents that supported the reorganization of Chilean society had been developing since the 1950s, when the University of Chicago and the Catholic University in Santiago began a series of academic exchanges which established a school of economics in Chile which became closely identified with the neoliberal theories of the University of Chicago. The graduates of the Catholic University's School of Economics, adherents of the neoliberal theories, remained on the margins of political life before 1973. Until the coup, they continued teaching in the School of Economics, and developed contacts with and wrote editorials for *El Mercurio*. After the coup, the Chicago Boys began to have more influence both in business circles and in the government. In particular, economic groups with ties to finance found these ideas attractive. Pinochet himself found the general distrust of politics expressed as a preference for technocracy and the disciplining of social life under the economic 'shock treatments' ideologically appealing (Collins and Lear, 1995, pp. 29–30, 44).

Analysing neoliberalism is important for understanding Chilean politics because Chile has been one of the principal national laboratories for neoliberal reforms. Neoliberalism needs to be analysed in two dimensions: as an accumulation strategy and as a hegemonic project. According to Bob Jessop (1983, p. 91), the purpose of an 'accumulation strategy' is to define a specific economic growth model complete with its various extra-economic preconditions, and to outline the general strategy appropriate to its realization. John Williamson's influential analysis of the stabilization and market-orientated reforms associated with neoliberal economics, describing these reforms as the 'Washington consensus', details 10 essential reforms intended to control inflation and restore macro-economic stability and growth: 'fiscal discipline, public expenditure priorities, tax reform, financial liberalization, unified exchange rates, trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and respect for property rights' (Williamson, 1990).

One of the most important extra-economic preconditions implied by these reforms is a reduced role for the state in

regulating the economy. The state, in the view of neoliberals, only distorts the capacity of the market to allocate efficiently all economic resources in an economic system. The distortions resulting from state intervention produce inflationary pressures as demand outpaces the ability of firms to supply goods and services and as the state protects inefficient firms from the pressures which competition to meet local demand brings to bear. Thus fiscal discipline, prioritization of public expenditures, and tax reform all reduce the capacity of the state to intervene in the economy. Financial liberalization, unification of exchange rates, and trade liberalization, opening the national market to competition from foreign firms, all remove the state's capacity to protect national economic resources. Privatization, deregulation, and the reliance on foreign direct investment all remove the state from participation in economic activities. Establishing a regime for the protection of property rights is the only reform which foresees a positive role for the state, but tellingly, this role is that of the 'night-watchman' state.

The implementation of the neoliberal shock treatments, starting in April 1975, began a series of rapid boom and bust cycles in the Chilean economy. Chile underwent two major depressions in less than 10 years as the government applied the neoliberal formulas. The shocks and busts were borne primarily by the poor and working classes, who had seen their organizations for collective self-defence, especially trade unions and leftist parties, repressed or eliminated, and by professionals and the petty bourgeoisie whose economic position had become more vulnerable under conditions of externally open markets. The boom cycles were characterized not by an expanding productive base in Chile, but rather by inexpensive consumer goods available with cheap credit, goods such as video cassette players, portable video recorders, and televisions.

THE CREATION OF PRIVATE RESEARCH CENTRES

The most immediate problem for the former university-based scholars was how to survive and continue doing critical

scholarly work, and especially how to link that work with the efforts to overthrow the military regime and restore democracy to Chile. The solutions to these problems that they found, as well as the problems presented by the dictatorship and the resistance to it, shaped the critical studies in mass communication over this whole period.

The most important solution these scholars developed was the institutional reorganization of social science scholarship, through the founding of private research centres, independent of the universities. Several factors contributed to the establishment of private research centres. In the first place, Chile already had several institutes independent of the universities dedicated to researching and, to a lesser extent, teaching in the social sciences. Two of the most important were the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, FLACSO, which was funded by UNESCO, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, or ECLA (also known by its Spanish acronym, CEPAL). Perhaps due to their international prestige, neither of these institutes was shut down or subjected to direct intervention by the military government. Prior to the military government, these institutes had made policy recommendations to various Latin American governments based upon the research they produced, and thus had established international reputations for their scholarly and political work. For the many Chilean intellectuals who wished to use their abilities as scholars to influence political parties or social movements to oppose the military government, FLACSO and ECLA would serve as models for a new form of institutionalization.

Another factor in the creation of the private research institutes was the availability of trained scholars on the job market. The closing of the university-based schools and institutes dried up the demand for professional researchers and teachers, flooding the market with the people who had previously worked inside the universities. Repression in the media also restricted professional opportunities outside the academic milieu for people trained in the field.

The availability of project money, especially research grant money from abroad, also contributed to the creation of the institutes (Brunner and Barrios, 1987). Research Foundations, both publicly and privately funded, in the United States,

Europe and Canada provided vital funding in support of research, conference organization, and publication of documents and books produced in the private institutes.

Given the military's intervention in the universities and closing of various social science schools, why did the military government tolerate the private research centres? One explanation could be that the free market economic policies and ideology of the military government created an opening for the existence of these private institutes. Levy discusses the efforts to privatize the universities after 1981 – an effort which generally failed due both to economic circumstances and also to resistance from various quarters, notably the military delegated rector (Levy, 1986b, p. 81) – which sparked a proliferation of private *educational*² institutes. However, the military's commitment to neoliberalism as an ideological project is not in itself a sufficiently strong explanation for its tolerance of intellectuals who had previously been subject to loss of university employment and personal repression on *ideological* grounds.

Brunner and Barrios (1987, pp. 152–4) offer a slightly different explanation for the survival of the private research institutes in the face of the military: the systematic repression of these institutes was simply not worth the trouble. They did not, in general, confer degrees; rather, they were organized like think tanks. Thus, unlike an educational institute which may influence as many people as it can recruit as students, the ideas, debates and documents of the private research centres circulated primarily inside the institutes themselves, among the intellectuals working in the institutes. Furthermore, the institutes emerged after the first wave of repression. To shut down the institutes would only have brought unwanted criticism from foreign embassies and international human rights groups, at a time when the military government was attempting to normalize and legitimate military rule, both domestically and abroad.

Thus, with personnel and financial resources available, and with the tolerance of the military government (and in spite of the vigilance of its security apparatus), Chilean social sciences were able to find a niche in which some scholars could continue their work. But what were the consequences of this institutional reorganization for the scholarly work itself?

THE PRIVATE RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND THE FIELD OF COMMUNICATIONS

The three institutes for which issues in communications were the central themes of research and theory during this period were ILET, the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (or Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies); CENECA, Centro de Indagación y Expresión Cultural y Artística (or Centre for Research and Cultural and Artistic Expression); and ECO, Educación y Comunicaciones (Education and Communication). Each institute has its own particular thematic, methodological and political orientations. These orientations were conditioned by the skills and interests of the institutes's affiliated scholars, Chile's political conjunctures, including the scholars's views or analyses of the political problems and possibilities confronting Chile, and also by the forces which condition the development of any academic field: the state of theoretical debates, the availability of funding for research projects, and the availability of methods for legitimizing and enhancing the prestige of the scholars or their ideas.

ILET

ILET is an international non-governmental organization founded in Mexico in December 1975. It moved its headquarters to Santiago in early 1981. Fernando Reyes Matta had been a minister in Salvador Allende's government who ended up in Mexico where, along with Juan Somavía, he founded ILET to study transnational phenomena in their economic, political and cultural dimensions. He had been investigating the notion that international communications, especially the news, worked in much the same way as dependency theory argues that the flow of goods and services between centre and periphery countries works: that the periphery exports raw material, or 'raw' information in the form of sensational, newsworthy events, and imports elaborated goods, or news copy, from the centre (Reyes Matta, 1977). This thesis was to form one of the core arguments for the demands from the Third World for a 'New International Information and Communications Order' in UNESCO, and

for the research supporting the report of the MacBride Commission, on which Reyes Matta served.

ILET has two divisions, one which studies the modern transnational corporation, and the other which studies communications problems, particularly in the underdeveloped world. The Communications and Development division was composed of areas in Democratization of Communications, New Communications Technologies and Investigation-Action in Alternative Communication. Both divisions have led projects in teaching and training of social, student and workers's organizations (Lladser, 1986, p. 219).

In 1978, ILET and FLACSO formed a co-operative agreement for research and publication, which helped to shape the work done by ILET in Chile once it had moved. This work would focus on the following themes:

- (1) interpretive analyses of the historical relation in Chile established between the popular press and the development of political parties and the state;
- (2) studies of the role of the press in Santiago, in various conjunctures between 1970 and 1973;
- (3) economic analyses of the Chilean press and of the transnational penetration of the national press; and
- (4) contributions to an economic theory of communications (Munizaga and Rivera, 1983, p. 44).

ILET has also devoted research and publications resources to a project on Latin American women and communications, comprising both alternative communications networks and analyses of women's media and commercial media directed at Latin American women (Lladser, 1986, pp. 219, 225).

CENECA

CENECA was founded in Santiago as a non-profit corporation in 1977 by individuals formerly associated with EAC. Many of its members continued to work for a time with the School of Theatre in the Catholic University after EAC was closed, making CENECA the only private institute with personnel still affiliated with the university. Its purpose was to study popular culture in Chile (and to explore the concept of 'popular') as well as to provide support for popular cultural

activities such as street theatre, *peñas folklóricas*, and so on. Carlos Catalán, for a time the director of CENECA, is considered to have been one of the important figures in the debates about popular culture in Chile in the period of the military dictatorship for his particular uses of the theories of Antonio Gramsci. Researchers affiliated with CENECA produced a variety of studies, focusing on topics ranging from the legal framework governing the operation of the major media (press, radio and television), to semiological analyses of the discourses of authoritarianism, to techniques for training people from the poor or 'popular' classes in the active reception of media, especially television, messages. This last theme also contributed to CENECA's orientation towards *investigación-acción*, or action research, intended not only to produce scholarly knowledge about phenomena of the popular sectors but also to promote the activities of the popular sectors to inform and entertain themselves, outside the authoritarian cultural projects.

ECO

ECO was founded in Santiago in 1979, as a centre for the promotion, development and investigation of popular culture, including popular education, popular communication and popular religion. It is an associated member of the World Association of Christian Communication (WACC). ECO's communications department studies and supports popular communications initiatives, based on the notion of popular communication elaborated by the Jesuit priest Gilberto Giménez in his 1978 article, 'Notas para una teoría de la comunicación popular' ('Notes for a theory of popular communication', reprinted in Giménez, 1984). Giménez is concerned with the nature of the popular sectors of society, and with the ways that educated people have of communicating with them, clearly an important issue in evangelization. Following his reading of Gramsci, he defines the social category of 'the people' as: "the set of subaltern and instrumental classes," subjected to the political and economic domination of the hegemonic classes within a particular society' (Ibid., p. 8). The subordinate position of the popular classes in society deprives them of both the means of cultural self-defence and self-definition and the media of cultural expression available to

the hegemonic classes, and thus produces a dominated kind of culture and communications. However, the solution to this social subordination cannot be found in the attitudes of those who seek to elevate the cultural level of the people from outside their experience. It is rather a matter of discovering and critically supporting the people's own cultural and communications initiatives, in the manner of Paolo Freire's pedagogy.

ECO's efforts in the field of communications follow this model rather closely. Where ILET followed the development of the 'alternative' major media (press and radio against the dictatorship), and CENECA searched for spaces within the given national culture for methods of producing an oppositional culture, ECO was concerned with supporting the development of the 'other' or 'Lilliputian' experiences which sprang from within the popular classes and which contributed to the rearticulation of the popular movement (Ossandón, 1981 and 1988). These efforts led to the organization of the Popular Press Network ('Red de la Prensa Popular') in 1984, which collected and circulated as many as 70 bulletins and newsletters, many of which were homemade.

ECO did more than to serve as a clearinghouse for these small publications; because of their ephemeral and precarious nature, especially under the conditions of states of emergency or states of siege, ECO also collected the *experiences* of the small presses so that the organizational lessons would not be lost. Thus, in addition to the internally published research materials they produced, they also produced videos and slide shows on experiences in popular communications, on the 'popular communicator' and on the uses of the 'micromedia' available to poor people in both rural and urban areas. These efforts were clearly directed toward the formation and education of 'organic intellectuals' for the popular classes, as they re-emerged into the national political scene in the protests against the military regime throughout the 1980s.

THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP

The initial repressive phase after the coup lasted approximately two years, and was driven primarily by the military's

establishing of a National Security State in Chile. The reformation of Chile was conceived as the 'rooting out of the cancer of marxism'; no new models for reconstituting hegemony had been consolidated yet. During this period, at least two such models contended for dominance in the military government. One strategy, backed by members of the PDC and their allies in the armed forces, foresaw a relatively swift return to civilian rule and a return to a state-led development programme. The other strategy was articulated by the Universidad Católica economists who had been trained at the University of Chicago or under Chicago-trained teachers, the Chicago Boys. This strategy foresaw a radical restructuring of Chile's economy and society, in order to establish the conditions necessary for the government to withdraw from the economy and allow market forces to drive development. With inflation still at very high levels in 1975, Pinochet finally opted for the Chicago Boys and their proposed shock treatment to discipline the economy.

The goals of establishing a National Security state and a free market economy in Chile were in some ways contradictory, and in other ways complementary. This duality was evident in the communications system. On the one hand, control over the communications apparatuses was a key element of the military's control over Chile; among the first targets for bombardment on 11 September 1973, were the radio stations sympathetic to the UP government (Baltra 1988, 67). Measures ranging from prior censorship to suspension of publication to intimidation and murder of journalists were taken throughout the period of the military regime (see Baltra, 1988, for an extensive description and discussion of restrictions on the media under the military government). Thus despite the reigning free market or neoliberal ideology and the wholesale privatization of public enterprises, the military government steadfastly refused to privatize the television networks.

On the other hand, repression and economic restructuring were also mutually reinforcing. While no sector of Chilean society was immune from the repression, labour clearly bore the brunt. Labour also bore most of the costs of market reform. The destruction of the popular organizations and the repression of the labour unions and leftist political parties deprived

labour of its capacity to resist the neoliberal strategy collectively and openly.

The consolidation of the hegemony of the Chicago Boys also appeared in the communications system. Under the two previous governments, the Chicago Boys had no influence over economic policy or access to the government; they instead bided their time teaching in the Economics Department of the Universidad Católica and writing editorials for *El Mercurio*. Not too coincidentally, *El Mercurio* was one of only two newspapers allowed to continue publishing in the immediate aftermath of the coup (although both papers were subject to prior censorship; Baltra, 1988, 10). The closing of the leftist media and the detention, disappearance, exile or unemployment of leftist journalists meant, in part, that no challenges to neoliberalism would come from the leftist press. As the Chicago Boys began to gain the upper hand in the government, the media linked to the PDC also began to have more serious problems: its daily, *La Prensa*, went out of business in 1974, and the weekly *Ercilla* was sold and its editors and journalistic staff resigned in 1976 (Ibid., pp. 13–15). Thus neoliberalism would go relatively unchallenged in the media from the centrist parties, as well as from the left, at least during the initial phase of its implementation.

The complementarity of repressive politics and the liberalization of the economy had profound impacts on the whole communication system in Chile. Although the state intervened directly in the system, the media which continued to exist became increasingly commercial in their orientation. The content of advertisements remained tightly regulated, but the rules governing the amounts and uses of advertising were greatly relaxed. As the economy contracted during the shock treatments of the 1970s, the audience/market also contracted provoking more intense competition between media and channels for advertising revenues. And as imports were liberalized, the prices of electronic goods, especially radios, televisions, and videocassette recorders, came down considerably and made such goods more affordable (Munizaga and Rivera, 1983, pp. 20–1).

In addition to the transformations of the spaces in which communications scholarship was conducted (that is, the closing of the university departments and the opening of private

centres) and the transformations of the communications system (including both the imposition of the neoliberal model and the repressive social conditions among communicating subjects), theoretical or paradigmatic changes in the field of communications studies internationally had an important influence on the development of the field in Chile during this period. The demands for a 'New International Information and Communications Order', which produced the influential MacBride Report (International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 1980) set a new agenda for critical communications scholarship in the Third World. International debate began to focus increasingly on the nature of national communication systems and on the policies which regulate them and which might transform them. Catalán and Sunkel (1991, pp. 9–10) characterize this political moment as the moment of national communication policies, emerging 'in the context of the dictatorships in Latin America and linked to the proposals for a new international communications order'.

The study of the communication system in Chile, as it developed in the private research centres, re-examined the system as it had developed until 1973 (Gutiérrez, Munizaga and Riquelme, 1985), as well as re-examining the debates about the media during the previous governments (Riquelme, 1984).³ Studies of the changes in the system under the military government addressed themselves more specifically to policy. Munizaga's (1981b) study of communications policy under the dictatorship examines changes in the communications system from the perspective of the societal changes imposed by the dictatorship, and links these analytically to the policies of 'gagging' and surveillance in the regime's communications policies. Catalán and Munizaga (1986) focused on the cultural policies of the regime. Their purpose was to describe and criticize the 'nationalist–foundational' cultural project of the military government, and its purported failure in light of the re-emergence of dissident movements during the protests of the 1980s.

In a paper summarizing some of her research from the early 1980s, Munizaga discusses the cultural changes that resulted from the political and economic transformations imposed by the military regime (Munizaga, 1984). Her concern here is with

the atomization of civil society and the resulting closing of spaces for communication. This is linked to the disarticulation of the political axis in social discourse. With the breaking of the 'state of compromise',⁴ the dialogue between the state and society, realized through the political parties and the vast network of social organizations, was replaced by a monologue on the part of the state, which terrorizes the citizens and legitimates its terror on the basis of the terror and the fear it produces of a return to the previous conditions.

While most of these studies were primarily descriptive, there were also a few self-consciously theoretical reappraisals of the Chilean communications system that emerged in the dictatorship. The studies of the international flow of information, which had influenced the calls for a New International Information and Communications Order, were influenced by dependency theory and produced economic analyses of communication which examined the penetration of multinational capital into the local markets for media, news or entertainment. Taking a very different approach to the economic analysis of communication, Diego Portales (1981a) has contributed to the understanding of the media as enterprises with specific roles to play in the global process of the circulation and accumulation of capital. He argues that in a dependent capitalist country such as Chile, the ideological notion of 'freedom of expression' as freedom of the owners of the major media to use their property as they wish, without state regulation, is the outcome of the dependent industrialization of the media. He sees the homogenization of the communications industry in Chile, especially after 1973, as the result not only of the political exclusion of opposition media, but also, and particularly, as the result of economic forces which concentrated increasingly more economic power and property into the hands of the powerful economic groups. Freedom of expression understood as the political right of citizens to express opinions freely exists in inverse proportion to the concentration of economic power; ultimately, oligopolistic media power destabilizes and blocks democracy. The inevitable conclusion is that freedom of expression requires the elimination of economic power over the communication industry, a conclusion that retains the radical and anti-capitalist qualities that characterized the analyses from the period prior to the coup.

However, in contrast to the work done by scholars associated with CEREN prior to the coup, Portales suggests that the alternative to the incorporation of the communications system into the transnational industrial system is not to attempt to replace 'vertical' models of communication with 'horizontal' ones. The problem is that excluded social groups relying on more primitive, 'hand-made' media distributed through horizontal circuits produce marginal communications. The communications system needs to retain its industrial character with respect to both production and circulation so that democratic policies can establish their own hegemony; the alternative nature of the system comes from removing it from the vicissitudes of the market and encouraging access to the media for the socially, politically and economically excluded groups.

One other work which deals with the Chilean communication system, conceived somewhat differently, in a theoretically self-conscious way is Giselle Munizaga's semiological analysis of Pinochet's public discourse (Munizaga, 1988). This book is taken from a longer study undertaken with Gonzalo de la Maza and Carlos Ochsenius begun in 1976, published in Argentina in 1983, and finally updated and published in Chile around the time of the 1988 plebiscite.

The communication system studied here is a discursive formation, a myth articulated by Pinochet about Chile, the conflicts of its past, and the harmonious future that the military government offers. The hegemony of the military government is a given in this study; the political purpose of the research is to take apart the myth, exposing the methods by which it is constructed and articulated, and, on the eve of the plebiscite, provide the tools needed for the interpellation of other subjectivities against those articulated by the regime. Pinochet's discourse is analysed using Greimas' actantial model, revealing a fairly simple and typically authoritarian mythical discourse in which 'good' and 'bad' Chileans are clearly identified, 'bad' Chileans further identified with international communism (and thus with foreign forces, against Chile) and chaos, and the military is absolved from all costs born in the march to the future, all sacrifices being necessary for the well-being of future Chileans.

Munizaga warns the sceptical reader that it is too easy to dismiss this simplistic discourse.

We conduct this [analytical] exercise because we believe that before the exhaustingly redundant repetition of the pinochetista rhetoric, many of us have lost the capacity to perceive its effects. Its real and penetrating presence has become almost invisible for us. We reject the words of Pinochet because they are obvious, minimizing their effects.

But on the other hand, many had appropriated, consciously or unconsciously, the authoritarian discourse. I am not speaking only of politicians of the government. In families, in universities, in the working world, too often we resort to dictatorial forms to signify authority and order. (Munizaga, 1988, pp. 17–18)

The epigraph to the book illustrates the point. It is a quote from a woman living in one of Santiago's poor townships, taken from the opposition newspaper *La Época* in July 1988:

I am in favor of this government, because there is order. The main thing is that they get us work, because they talk a lot but do little, and now that we are moving to another stage, my nerves are shot, because I know that another 11 of September is coming and I have brothers and sons. You notice it because there is a lot of *Sí* and a lot of *No* and a lot of controversy. And the things I have seen, I wouldn't want them to happen to the person I hated the most. I saw when they took people at night and they never appeared again. So now it hurts me, especially for my oldest son. (Ibid., p. 11)

This passage illustrates Munizaga's point very clearly: the woman from the township fears a return, not to the 'chaos' of the Unidad Popular period, but the very tangible turmoil of the repression unleashed by the coup. However, her response to her fears is to fall back on the authoritarian form imposed by the dictatorship by being in favour of a government of which she seems otherwise very critical.

THE MEDIA IN THE AUTHORITARIAN COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Reflections on the communications system as a whole comprised a relatively small part of the field under the dictatorship.

Most of the research and theory was conducted with respect to particular media. The two most important media for Chilean scholars were the press and television; a few of the studies of other media will also be discussed here.

Studies of the Press

The study of Chile's press represents an important continuity in Chilean mass communications scholarship. As discussed in the previous chapters, this scholarship focused mainly on the *gran prensa*, or major newspapers, particularly *El Mercurio*. Critique of the ideological function and role of *El Mercurio* remained an important task for critical communications scholarship after the coup too; however, certain theoretical and methodological innovations began to appear in this period. Scholars working in Chile, as well as Chilean scholars in exile in the early years of the dictatorship, began to formulate a criticism of earlier critical approaches, particularly of the work of Armand Mattelart prior to 1973. In their view, Mattelart had tended to ascribe the ideology he described through his structural analyses too directly to particular class interests. What was needed instead was an analysis of the *productive* role of ideologies, an analysis of how they came to articulate class interests and class subjects.

Two important theoretical innovations in Chile were used to address this issue. Claudio Durán used psychoanalytic concepts such as displacement, condensation, metonymy, metaphor, and repetition to describe the processes by which *El Mercurio* created a climate of fear during the Unidad Popular period. His analysis is less concerned with ideology *per se*; it addresses itself rather to the issue of political propaganda. Durán examines the relationship between journalistic texts and the unconscious symbols and fantasies mobilized by apparently non-political discourses, such as the reporting of crimes, and graphic images in spatial juxtaposition with political discourses. (Durán and Rockman, 1986; see also Durán and Urzúa, 1978).⁵

The other innovation in the study of the press derived from the reception of the work of Antonio Gramsci, and its influence on critical intellectuals in Chile. In particular, Chilean scholars began to investigate the function of *El Mercurio* as a 'party' – that is, an institution organizing the political interests

of the dominant classes – and as a collective intellectual (Sunkel, 1986, p. 21). With respect to the first point, Fernando Ossandón's study of *El Mercurio* examines the hypothesis that:

El Mercurio has behaved historically as part of what Gramsci calls the 'intellectual general staff of the organic party of the dominant bloc,' which without belonging to any of the recognizable class fractions acts as an independent leading force, above all parties. *El Mercurio* attributes its independence from direct political factions to a consistent history as an organ of the liberal press. We find that this argument is only an ideological postulate which attempts to cover its class commitments. Thus, the 'mercurial' visions of reality attempt to give body to 'the' thinking of the bourgeoisie and 'the' task of defending capitalism as such. Its opinions are addressed (in a refined editorial language) to leading personalities and authorities. Its information seeks to nourish the decisions of the disaggregated, disperse bases of the whole class, outside of the fractions to which they might belong or the concrete political representative they might obey. (Ossandón, 1986, pp. 116–17)

The leadership that *El Mercurio* is able to provide derives from its independence from any particular party of the right; thus although Ossandón finds that the paper subordinates itself to the military government and to Pinochet (especially with regard to reporting on repression), it enjoys an important degree of autonomy on the ideological plane (Ibid., p. 125).

These themes are also taken up, and developed in greater detail, by Guillermo Sunkel (1983). His concerns extend the idea of *El Mercurio* as an intellectual leader to an analysis of the particular ideological project which the paper promoted from 1969 onward. *El Mercurio* is owned by one of Chile's largest economic groups, linked to the Edwards family. This group had large portions of its capital invested in Chilean industry, much of which was nationalized during the Unidad Popular period. Under these circumstances, the group shifted its capital to the financial sector. The importance of this shift lay in the role *El Mercurio* would soon play in 'educating', in Sunkel's term, the Chilean ruling class about the need to abandon the state-led development model that had guided development in Chile since the 1930s, in favour of the neoliberal

model promoted by the Chicago Boys. While neoliberalism would force inefficient Chilean industries to 'modernize' or go out of business, an economically painful choice for both industrialists and the people they employed, the tremendous liquidity in international financial markets in the 1970s ensured that finance capitalists could 'modernize' somewhat more comfortably.

To understand how the interests of this particular fraction became hegemonic, Sunkel re-examines the concept of ideology, and *El Mercurio's* role as a collective organic intellectual of the bourgeoisie.⁶ Many studies of *El Mercurio*, following the analyses of Armand Mattelart, had focused on editorials. Sunkel, following Durán, examines 'information texts' on the front page as well, and elaborates on the 'division of labour' between informing and interpreting. This division not only separates the editorial writers from the editors who lay out the front pages, or the editorial pages themselves from the news pages, but also separates the readers. The editorials are directed specifically at personnel of the government or organizations of the dominant class, and promote a consciously elaborated ideology: 'Political discourse appears subordinated to the function of the education of diverse social sectors, in order to adapt their behavior for the neoliberal model and convert both into effective policies' (Ibid., p. 121). Front pages, however, are orientated toward the articulation of an 'unconscious collective': less coherent or rational, the ideological strategies here provide a 'vulgarization' of neoliberalism, through a part of the paper with greater 'ideological irradiation' (Ibid., p. 126).

While Sunkel studies this 'division of labour' within a single newspaper, Gutiérrez and Warnken (1986) direct their analysis towards the market segmentation between *El Mercurio*, as an elite paper, and the 'popular' paper *La Tercera de la Hora*. Their particular interest is in the representation of workers and *pobladores* in the two papers. Like Sunkel, they also study both editorials and the 'editorial line' in the news reporting; they found this especially important in studying *La Tercera*. Unlike Sunkel, however, they found that *El Mercurio's* directive role gave it a more technocratic character, discussing workers, for example, as a 'labour factor' in the productive system (Gutiérrez and Warnken, 1986, p. 32), while *La Tercera*

appealed more directly to middle and lower sectors, having less of a 'directive' function than a 'reflective' one.

This distinction between *El Mercurio* as an elite paper and *La Tercera* as a 'popular' paper points to a relatively neglected area of the press: the mass commercial press, sometimes called the tabloid press. The study of this sector of the press raises important theoretical issues regarding popular culture and the politics of the popular sectors, themes which will be discussed below. There are two notable studies of the press in Chile which address mass circulation dailies. Guillermo Sunkel's *Razón y pasión en la prensa popular* [*Reason and Passion in the Popular Press*] (1985) examines the historical forms of representation of the popular sectors of both leftist (that is, associated with left political parties) and commercial 'popular' papers, with a view towards understanding the discursive role this press should play in a transition to democracy. Eduardo Santa Cruz's *Análisis histórico del periodismo chileno* [*Historical Analysis of Chilean Journalism*] (1988) provides an ambitious synthesis of the history of journalism during the successive phases of development in Chile, including both the popular press and the *gran prensa*. Both works share the view that the recovery of the memory of communication during the democratic period would be crucial for designing and implementing communications policies for a transition to democracy, and both consciously avoid an uncritical recovery of that experience.

Television in Chile

Of all the media in Chile during the dictatorship, television received the most scholarly interest. There are several reasons for this, having to do with the peculiarities of Chile's experience of television. In the first place, television is widely available in Chile. By 1988, Chile had more television sets per capita, and the highest percentage of homes with televisions, of any Latin American country; it was also one of the few countries in Latin America at the time for which television broadcasting covered the whole national territory (Fuenzalida, 1988, p. 49). At a conference on television in Santiago in 1985, a social worker working in the townships would point out that, 'in whichever township, however humble it might

be, many things could be lacking but there is always at least a black and white television' (Sanhueza, 1987, p. 92).

Second, Chile developed a unique television broadcasting system. Television broadcasts began in Chile in the late 1950s in the universities, in experiments carried out in the engineering schools of the Universidad de Chile, the Universidad Católica, and the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso (Portales, 1987, p. 83). At about the same time, private interests in radio and the press were advocating privately-owned commercial television. However, various political actors tended to oppose private broadcasting. According to Fuenzalida, centrist and leftist political parties were concerned that private enterprise in Chile would tend to use television to support the right, while the Catholic Church feared the possible cultural and ethical effects of commercial television (1988, p. 50). At the same time, many of these same interests feared a state-controlled television system, which might concentrate control over the medium in the hands of whichever party controlled the government at any given time. Allowing the socially and culturally prestigious universities to control television was seen as the best compromise.

In 1969, the Frei government created a national television network, Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN), using microwave transmitters to transmit programmes to substations over the whole national territory. This network competed with the university channels, which were broadcasting a mix of educational, entertainment, news, and both domestically produced and imported programmes. To avoid the appearance of being a tool of the government, an independent board of directors, with a pluralist administrative structure consisting of representatives from the parliament, the executive, and television professionals, administered TVN (*Ibid.*, p. 51).

The Chilean parliament passed a law formalizing university and state control over television, known as the 'Hamilton Law' after the Christian Democrat legislator who proposed it, in 1970. This law also consolidated Chilean television's role as an institution of public service. Article I of the law begins:

Television as a medium of diffusion must serve to communicate and to integrate the nation; to diffuse the knowledge

of basic national problems and to obtain the participation of all Chileans in the great initiatives undertaken to resolve them; to affirm national values, the cultural and moral values, the dignity and respect of the rights of the person and of the family; to promote education and the development of culture in all its forms; to inform objectively about the national and international situations; and to provide healthy entertainment, caring for the spiritual and intellectual development of children and of youth. (cited in Portales, 1987, p. 105)

The Hamilton Law established a mixed form of financing for Chilean television, permitting private advertising and supplementing those revenues with government contributions. The latter were intended to alleviate any bias that could result from dependence on private sources. Commercial advertising was also strictly regulated: only six minutes per hour were permitted, and never during a programme, only before or after. Advertisers were also prohibited from attempting to influence programme content (Fuenzalida, 1988, p. 51).

Within two years of the passing of the Hamilton Law, ideological and political conflict in the various television channels had escalated to the point that any pretence of pluralism in the direction of the stations had vanished. The Universidad de Chile channel had split into two stations, with the personnel sympathetic to the Allende government forming a new station; the Universidad Católica station was divided between the production crew, which was generally sympathetic to the Unidad Popular, and the station's Christian Democrat administration, which committed the station's programming to the struggle against the government (Catalán, 1988, pp. 53–4).

When the military seized power on 11 September 1973, one of their first tasks was to take direct control of all broadcast media. By October 1973, the military government had changed the administration of all television stations. The Junta abolished the board of directors for TVN and reorganized the CNT, the National Television Council, removing all representatives not directly answerable to the military. The delegated rectors imposed upon the universities by the Junta also brought the university channels under direct military control. In the first two years of the dictatorship, television was an

instrument in the hands of the military government to continue the ideological war and to attempt to legitimate the military's seizure of power (Portales, 1987, p. 92).

These unique circumstances, along with the lack of studies of television as a communications apparatus, meant that much fundamental research needed to be done. In 1981, Giselle Munizaga wrote a primarily descriptive study of the juridical-legal framework for television in Chile and of the tensions she assumed would spring from conflict between the authoritarian form of control over television and the increasingly commercial form of production (Munizaga, 1981a).

In 1983, María de la Luz Hurtado began a more general study of the history of Chilean television. Influenced by the Italian media scholar Giovanni Cesareo's notion of television as a communications apparatus, comprising a socially global system of production, circulation and consumption, Hurtado studied television with respect to its sociocultural functions, to the types of organic relations it establishes with groups with social power, and to the circumstances which explain television's options, its conformation, its crises and its transformations (Hurtado, 1989, p. 11). Her intent, as with the historical studies of the press from the 1980s, was to recover the experience of television communications under democracy, when the state and the universities, the institutions with direct control over television, were more pluralistic and when there was a great deal of creativity and energy on the part of the producers and administrators of the medium (Ibid., see also Hurtado, 1987).

Programming content under the dictatorship was another area in which fundamental research was lacking. Manuel Alcides Jofré provided a short review of the research and more impressionistic work that had been done with respect to the amount of United States-produced content in Chilean programming. He included not only full programmes that originated in the USA, but also advertising spots and portions of programmes, such as reports on news programmes, that had been produced there. He found that while there were a lot of foreign programmes on Chilean television, many were European or Latin American, and the relative amount of US programming was less than most observers had claimed.

However, Jofré's more interesting argument had to do with the quality of US programming:

We must consider the relation between the US produced material and the domestic material in these terms: the official discourse of domestic programming has been frequently more monological, vertical, and repressive than the US productions, which at other times have been characterized as imperialist or colonialist. Under the conditions of Chile in the last several years, US programming has often appeared as a relief, somewhat more flexible and open than the domestic programmes. (Jofré, 1987, p. 21)

Although this observation does not take into consideration some of the more serious claims of cultural imperialism, especially with respect to the economic structure of the capacity to communicate and its implications for access to mass media, it does raise an important issue about the quality of programming under authoritarian control of Chilean television.

With respect to the possibilities for reforming the television system in Chile, Valerio Fuenzalida's proposals set a policy agenda among Chilean communications scholars (Fuenzalida, 1985). Building on conceptions he derives from Liberation Theology, in particular the Puebla document, Fuenzalida defines democratization of communications in terms of participation. There are two types of reform he proposes that are intended to increase effective and efficient social control over television.

First, he proposes to return administrative control over the television system to a modified version of the National Television Council, the administrative body that had regulated television before 1973. The most important modification he proposes is to increase the representation of social movements such as women, youth, workers and peasants, professionals, and the like. In a later study, he proposes which social sectors should be represented on the basis of a survey of social scientists, communications researchers, leaders of social organizations, political leaders, former television executives, professionals working with non-governmental organizations, and private executives in audio/visual businesses (Hermosilla and Fuenzalida, 1987, pp. 17–18).

The second type of reform he proposes is relevant to programming. He argues that new production technologies make it both feasible and more economical to separate production for television from programming. To this end, he suggests improving television's links with other cultural apparatuses in Chile, such as theatre, music, or cinema, and the decentralization, or more specifically the regionalization, of production. To this end, he argues that regional universities have the cultural and technical infrastructures to assume this task, and that the historical role played by the universities in Chilean television provides a justification for this institutional role.

The debate on reforming television after a return to democracy was given another turn by Diego Portales. Influenced by Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, as well as by the economic theories of Joseph Schumpeter, Portales argues that whatever democratizing reforms are to be undertaken must also be economically feasible, given technological infrastructures, the impresarial skills of people in the television business, and the technical skills of the producers. Thus he studies the television system in Chile from the perspective of 'the mediations established by the industrial structure and the practices and strategies of the businessmen and cultural producers over creative activity' (Portales, 1985, p. 6). Thus in addition to improving the social participation, or access, in television, Portales argues that the capacity to communicate must also be developed.

Portales extends these considerations in a later study in which he examines the obstacles to innovation in Latin American television, comparing the Chilean experience with those of Mexico and Argentina (Portales, 1987). Building on the argument he made with respect to the press (Portales, 1981a), he argues here that the equation of freedom of expression with unfettered entrepreneurial activity in the market runs into the problem of monopoly, which is both undemocratic because it restricts access to the communications system, and an obstacle to innovation, thus producing formulaic programming as well as obstacles to reforming the system.

Later, as director of TVN, the National Television Network, Portales would attempt to implement some of the reforms discussed here, in particular the regionalization of production in the news. This was in part an effort to give the regions

more presence on television, at least within their own areas, thus attempting to begin to balance Santiago's cultural, as well as political and demographic, weight in Chile. One of the obstacles he came up against in this was the resistance on the part of viewers in the regions to these efforts. Many preferred not to lose the air time given to Santiago's news, even when it had an entirely local content, arguing that Santiago was more important than a provincial city or town (Portales, 1991).⁷

The notion of social participation in the administration of and production for television, elaborated by Fuenzalida and later experienced by Portales, remained too abstract. What was needed was a more concrete idea of the real television practices of diverse social groups, and an idea of the real demands for television various groups would make. In a study reminiscent in some ways of the television reception study done by Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini a decade earlier, Augusto Góngora (1985) researched the influence of television on both unorganized people and people organized into various self-help groups or social movements in Santiago townships. His open-ended interviews with the *pobladores* focused on eight substantive areas: the everyday relations with the television, the amount of information they had about television, their conception of the medium, whether they watched particular programmes or just 'watched TV', their interpretations of news programmes, the news itself, their expectations, and the demands they had for television (Ibid., p. 95). Although he found that organized *pobladores* were not the only ones to be critical of television, they were more likely to have sophisticated critiques. They were also likely to watch less television than the unorganized. Most notably, they also had more clearly elaborated demands for social participation in the regulation of television and for more educational and cultural programming.

The influence of levels of organization on critical reception of television was an important idea behind the project 'Education for the Active Reception of Television', initiated in CENECA in 1982. María Elena Herмосilla, Paula Edwards and Valerio Fuenzalida were the protagonists behind this project at the beginning. Their aim was to train 'monitors' for community, school, or church-based organizations to educate

their communities about how television communicates. CENECA ran programmes for educating poor children, young students, and women's groups (Hermosilla and Fuenzalida, 1989; Edwards, Cortes and Hermosilla, 1987). One important source for this experience was in North American research on children and television, and the roles played by parents in mediating television's effects (Fuenzalida, 1984).⁸ Their pedagogy had to be orientated to the limited resources available to *pobladores*, so they adapted 'ludic' techniques from the popular theatre training undertaken at CENECA for both building group confidence and for illustrating concepts such as genre or stereotyping (Hermosilla and Fuenzalida, 1989; Ochsenius, 1991).

Organized and conducted through the period of protests and popular mobilization in Chile, in the eyes of their organizers and participants these workshops contributed directly to the democratization of communications for the longed-for return to democracy in Chile. The workshops were also a step towards giving the notion of social participation in television a critical content. This point is important, as was illustrated by a study of Chile's most successful television programme, 'Sábados Gigantes', the day-long Saturday variety show hosted by Mario Kreutzberger, known as 'Don Francisco' (Altamirano, 1987). Altamirano points out that 'Sábados Gigantes' already entails a great deal of social participation in television, through contests, letters, on-air telephone calls, interviews, and philanthropic campaigns. Furthermore, Don Francisco enjoys great popularity among Chile's lower middle class and its poor, in great part because he has remained resolutely independent of the government and the administration of the network that carries his show, as well as because he has not hesitated to criticize Chile's rich for their lack of solidarity with the less fortunate. However, as Altamirano points out, this 'democratic' popularity is at the same time authoritarian: the kind of person who can participate on the show is very carefully controlled to preserve the happy, amusing atmosphere on the show; the social problems addressed are not the kinds of problems that Don Francisco cannot solve; and the very structure of philanthropic solutions to personal or social catastrophes reinforces dependency and relies on emotional blackmail. Don Francisco is able to promote social participation in television,

even under an authoritarian political context, because of the nature of the ideological space he creates.

Television's ideological space was also studied with regard to the news programmes under the dictatorship. Two major political events provided the occasions for close readings of the news, intended to understand the practical ideological strategies of the military government and possible counter-strategies: the national protests in July 1986 (in which soldiers doused Carmen Gloria Quintana and Rodrigo Rojas with kerosene and set them on fire; Rojas died of his injuries) (Portales and Egaña, 1987), and the visit of the Pope to Chile in April, 1987 (Portales, Hirmas, Altamirano and Egaña, 1988). Understanding these strategies and counterstrategies became extremely important because of the role that television would play in the 1988 plebiscite.

Access to television was seen by the Concertación as one minimum necessary condition for the plebiscite to be fair. Government propaganda on television had intensified in preparation for the plebiscite. 'From January to August of 1988, a total of 7302 spots were telecast. They averaged 912 per month, totaling 109 hours of broadcast time. As there was no access to television, the opposition could not broadcast any message of its own' (Hirmas, 1993, p. 85). At the same time, the government assured the opposition that both sides would have access to television. The government-controlled National Television Council established a programme for access for both campaigns beginning on 5 September, one month before the elections. Each side was to have one 15-minute segment, or *franja*, transmitted between 10.45 pm and 11.15 pm nightly and between 12.00 noon and 12.30 pm on weekends. These time slots were evidently intended to reduce the audience to a minimum; however, the *franjas* consistently enjoyed Chile's largest television audiences (Ibid., 86).

The presence of opposition politicians and views in a televised space free from government control began to legitimize the opposition presence in the public at times not associated with the urban protests. Government opponents began wearing campaign buttons in the month before the plebiscite, while regime supporters kept a low profile (Ibid., p. 92). The *franjas* also changed television, opening it up to debate and dialogue after the military had maintained tight control over

content for 15 years. Television was beginning its rehabilitation as a political space.

‘ALTERNATIVE’ AND ‘POPULAR’ COMMUNICATIONS

The roles and functioning of the media, either those controlled directly by the government or those implicated in its project, could only form part of the study of the media during this period, as most of the scholars studying communication were committed to recovering democracy. Furthermore, the social movements in Chile were beginning to mobilize against the military regime. The recession that shook Chile's economy in 1982 began to create doubts within the hegemonic bloc about the military's capacity to manage the economy. Both large and small entrepreneurs openly questioned the military's application of the neoliberal accumulation strategy, as the recession seriously damaged their economic capacities and exposed their extreme levels of debt (Campero, 1991, p. 134).

After years of repression and economic turmoil for the popular classes, a protest movement emerged from the townships in early 1983. The demands of the protesters were not restricted to the bread and butter demands of an economically besieged population, but notably included demands for an immediate return to democratic rule. While the protests took different forms and had differing levels of organization (Schneider, 1991), their shared characteristic was that they were *public* expressions of political demands. Discontent and unrest moved people to bring politics back out into public spaces: into the streets, the plazas, meeting halls and schools (Alfredo Rodríguez, 1983).

Open defiance of the military, even in the face of severe repression, encouraged the political opposition. Signs that the former supporters of the regime were defecting to the opposition opened up the question of what sort of regime would follow Pinochet. However, although the hegemonic bloc was beginning to come apart, political divisions amongst the opposition, as well as weakened ties between parties and their supposed social bases prevented the opposition from defeating Pinochet politically. Five years of political impasse

resulted, with continual states of exception, increasingly violent responses to the protests and an escalation of violence against the regime. The hegemony of neoliberalism was reasserted under a 'pragmatic' programme implemented in 1985, making concessions to debt-laden businesses and undervaluing the peso to help promote exports, but the strength of the opposition meant that the bloc could not remain stable under military government.

In addition to this domestic context, internationally the notions of 'alternative' and 'popular' communication had also begun to appear on research and policy agendas, both as military rule ended for other governments in the region, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia, and as demands for a New International Information and Communication Order, or NIICO, had become prominent in international fora. The domestic context for Chile at the beginning of the decade was characterized by the import 'boom' financed by foreign lending and the efforts by Pinochet to normalize his rule through the 1980 plebiscite in which a new Constitution was approved. The apparent disarray of the opposition parties in the wake of this plebiscite, along with legal loopholes in the laws regulating the press, gave the government the confidence to allow a small opposition press to establish itself in the form of small, restricted circulation magazines which later would become weeklies distributed publicly in kiosks.

Although the term 'alternative communication' enjoyed a great deal of currency internationally, as a concept it was not well defined. At a 1983 conference in Mexico organized by ILET, Diego Portales suggested a first approximation to the concept. Alternative communication, he argued, was alternative to the dominant mode of communication: on the one hand, transnational communication, the 'free flow of information', freedom of expression as freedom of enterprise, domination by monopolies or the state over access to capital, technology, and sources of finance; on the other hand, proposals like the NIICO, the right to communicate, and democratization of communications. 'Alternative' thus meant alternative to the transnational capitalist model of communication (Portales, 1983, p. 59).

The practitioners of 'alternative communication' would also have to find a way to link their practices to the social sectors

opposed to the dominant transnational model of communication, that is, to the popular movements. This would entail a critique of the prevailing models of alternative media. The strategy of the opposition media – to use the media to conquer political spaces and build movements for taking state power – was limited by the need to compete in the market with the dominant media. On the other hand, the difficulty of extending these models to the ‘macro-social’ level, or to society as a whole, condemned the opposition to the media, that is, the critique of the authoritarian character of the dominant media based on the rich experiences of horizontal communication in certain social sectors, to marginality (Ibid., pp. 62–3).

Thus there are at least three requirements for democratic communication:

- (1) a sufficiently strong social movement that adopts the communication project as its own;
- (2) some form of articulation between vertical ‘mass’ communications media and the horizontal ‘popular’ forms of communication; and
- (3) increasing social control over the process of communication, guaranteeing plurality and quality.

From the perspective of the practitioners of alternative communication, the crucial conclusion to be drawn is that democratic communication requires that all sectors of society enjoy freedom of expression through access to the *major* media (radio, television, press, video and film), their representation being defined as autonomous presence in these media. Reyes Matta points out that even within the authoritarian context, alternative, democratic communications exist and even thrive, as in the examples of Argentine rock music during the dictatorship, or the opposition press in Chile, and that such examples underline the innovative force of alternative communications (Reyes Matta, 1983, pp. 26–7).

Rebeca Araya, however, expressed doubts about whether the alternative media had found a way to break out of their traditional communications roles, a break that would be necessary in order to build new links with their publics. Her concern was that the media, alternative or not, maintained a notion of the receiver of their information as a passive receptacle. The closure of the press was seen by the media in terms of the

harm done to journalists, the owners of the media, or printers, but rarely in terms of the harm done to the receivers, who too often were seen as mere passive spectators, rather than as protagonists of the act of communicating (Araya, 1984).

One alternative communications experience in Chile stands out for not falling into this pattern: the independent production of videos. Portable video cameras and recorders became widely available in Chile during the import boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Their use, however, was not restricted to the recording of domestic events and television programmes. Augusto Góngora relates an anecdote from one of the national days of protest, in which among the clashes with police and amid the teargas bombs, a strange tricycle with a wooden platform on top circulated through the crowd. Three students, about 15 years-old, were on the tricycle: one pedalling, one navigating, and one taping the events on the street. After the protest, the three returned to their school with their tape, where they showed and discussed it with their fellow students (Góngora, 1985, p. 66).

The increasing availability of relatively inexpensive video equipment led to a variety of experiments in independent video production (Ulloa, 1985). The distribution of independently produced videos, as well as of pirated copies of movies, appeared as a viable alternative system for television communication. This alternative communication challenged fundamental assumptions about television, such as the separation in function and in capacities of producers and consumers of television programming. Not coincidentally, the experiments in active reception and independent production and distribution corresponded with the emergence of the protest movement.

Yéssica Ulloa identifies a variety of genres among the independent videos produced in Chile up until 1985: from documentaries about protest and urban and rural organizations, to recordings of meetings and fora, to music videos and recordings of concerts, to video art. A variety of social groups were represented in all aspects of the video communication process, from production to exhibition. She thus identifies four social functions for independent video: criticism of the dominant model of television, incitement for social change, creation of an identity and sense of belonging to an alternative

social referent, and incitement to greater participation in community life (Ibid., pp. 42–3).

This sort of experience, of people inventing ways of documenting their lives and cultures and communicating their experiences with one another, brought the debates about 'alternative communication' to an impasse. While most of the writings on the alternative press recognize the importance of articulating the communications and political projects with popular subjects, most ended up taking the composition or identity of the popular subject for granted. Closer examination of the popular sectors, however, revealed complex and vibrant experiences, as well as communications projects protagonized from within the popular classes themselves. Such examination provoked a rethinking of the concept of popular culture.

In his work on the popular press discussed above, Guillermo Sunkel criticizes the 'simplification of a heterogenous and multifaceted reality of the popular world' by marxism, or more accurately, the marxism predominant in leftist discourses in Chile in the 1960s (Sunkel, 1985, p. 33). The romanticized and one-dimensional view of 'popular' as the working class, he argues, left certain popular sectors unrepresented (such as women, youth, homeless, retired and handicapped people, the indigent, and so on), and other sectors with their representation repressed (prostitutes, alcoholics, drug addicts, homosexuals). Basing his observations on the work of Nestor García Canclini (see García Canclini, 1993; originally published in Spanish in, 1982), Sunkel proposes understanding popular culture as a space where labour, family and communication practices organized by the capitalist system interconnect with the practices and forms of thought which the popular sectors create for themselves in order to conceive and manifest their reality and their subordinate position in production, circulation, and consumption (cited in Sunkel, 1985, p. 22). Popular culture is a contradictory site which could not be adequately represented by the 'heroic' conception of the working class.

Sunkel's interest lay in examining the representation of the popular sectors, and the idea of 'the popular', in the mass circulation press. He leaves aside the actual cultural matrices of the popular sectors. Fernando Ossandón, in contrast, begins his work on popular communication by addressing popular culture directly (Ossandón, 1981). Like Sunkel, he sees popular

culture as a site of contradictory practices and ideas: domination co-exists with the struggle for freedom, fatalism co-exists with resistance. These contradictions are produced, in part, by the relation of the popular sectors with the mass media, which especially under the military regime in Chile interpellate the popular subject as isolated, fragmentary, individual, and atomized. It is therefore not sufficient to propose 'giving voice to the people'; popular communications projects must interpellate a collective popular subject.

Another issue raised by Ossandón is the historical division between popular media and the media that came to represent the popular sectors between the 1930s and 1973, tied usually to political parties. This is the question of the 'organicity' of the communicators,⁹ and it found resonance in the contemporary debates about the alternative opposition press. Ossandón does not argue against the existence of an opposition mass circulation press; rather he is interested in the development of a viable popular press emanating from the popular sectors themselves.

This small or 'micromedia' press had been developing in Chile under the dictatorship beginning around 1975.¹⁰ The re-emergence of university student and trade union bulletins was documented by Giselle Munizaga (1981c). She observed that these publications appeared to have as their first priority the need to communicate, to establish contact between members of particular communities; problems of production, circulation and finance would arise later, and give these micromedia a precarious existence. She also observed that the Catholic Church played a significant role in providing an alternative communications space, not only in the mass media it controlled, but also in the bulletins it published with regard to human rights abuses and other immediate political concerns. The institutional support of the Church could resolve some of the problems faced by the micromedia.

Ossandón shared the view that institutional support would be critical in the development of a popular press. The NGO with which he is associated, ECO, has played a seminal role in promoting the popular press. For Ossandón, the first task facing the promotion of popular communication is to provide:

an impulse for an alternative popular communication on the basis of assuring the continuity of the existing experiences,

multiplying and unifying them into a perspective for the construction of the people as an historical subject. [...] Popular culture is a great reservoir of moral and social forces which need to be shared, intercommunicated, to return to the people their self confidence. (Ossandón, 1981, pp. 15–16)

To this end, ECO organized in 1984 a meeting of participants in popular communications projects in order to promote a dialogue among them, to share experiences and criticisms (ECO, 1984). Besides the perennial problem of financing their projects, the participants also identified problems regarding the involvement of their communities in the communications projects, suggesting a variety of ways that closer co-operation between readers and publishers could be developed, and problems of the isolation and lack of time or interest in reading the popular press could be overcome. One of the concrete measures taken at the end of the conference was the organization of a Popular Press Network (Red de Prensa Popular), which would act as a clearinghouse for the various organizations producing bulletins, pamphlets, newsletters and the like. On the eve of the 1988 plebiscite the Network was still active, assisting in the circulation of at least ninety bulletins, as well as a higher number of pamphlets, posters, and newsletters. Their impact remained local, tied to the emerging or organized social actors, with print runs ranging from as few as 100 issues to as many as 2000 in the case of Church and larger trade union sponsored publications (Ossandón, 1988, p. 42).

Sustaining these popular communications initiatives requires mobilized social subjects who incorporate these communications strategies into their political or cultural projects. The plebiscite in 1988 was a moment of great social mobilization. The role of television in the plebiscite has already been discussed, and in fact it has been the medium the political effects of which has been studied most, both in Chile and by outside observers. However, the role of the popular press, although relatively invisible in scholarship, was also crucial. Ossandón pointed out that 1988 was a year of great, if uneven, activity in the popular press. The popular press was used in its communities to engage in civic education, to build support for the NO campaign, and to denounce fraud in the

elections. The increased activity of this press also created opportunities for increased articulation of sectoral demands and, in the cultural realm, for commemorating symbolic dates in the popular world; thus in May 1988, the month associated with labour activism, more than 50 bulletins appeared, although many also disappeared afterwards (Ibid.).

Despite the efforts of ECO and the Popular Press Network, precariousness remained the greatest weakness of popular communications initiatives. In the end, these initiatives will need to meet the larger goal of creating a popular subject that can be the agent of its own history, that is, a subject that writes its own history, in order to overcome this problem.

THE POLITICAL AND PROFESSIONAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY RULE ON COMMUNICATIONS SCHOLARSHIP

The split in the field of communications studies in the previous period between professionalizing intellectuals, for example those associated with EAC, and those concerned with developing popular communications practices, such as those associated with CEREN, continued into the struggle against the dictatorship, although it was partially resolved by the need for co-operation and political unity amongst the intellectuals working in Chile at the time. One concern from the earlier period of critical scholarship that practically disappeared from the field, especially in the 1980s, was the concern with the international dimensions of communications problems in Chile. The structuration of the field in this period in a way which would occlude this international dimension was driven by various forces. In the first place, the immediate political exigencies – the day-to-day tactical struggles – of the protests and other struggles against the dictatorship tended to turn the attention of the intellectuals inward. Second, and related to this point, some writers have begun to examine the problems of political identity among leftist intellectuals under the dictatorship.¹¹ These studies examine the individual, often personal, pressures on intellectuals and militants that tended to focus their attentions on immediate problems, and thus could have contributed to the exclusion of the seemingly

more remote international forces that had a bearing on the Chilean communications system.

Third, the educational efforts, both popular and professional, focused on developing the communications skills of Chilean agents, and tended also to turn away from theoretical or political critiques of transnational forces.¹² Finally, although the popular and professional strands were to cooperate in the 1980s, the popular communications projects were junior partners in these struggles, as the professionalizing efforts were better funded, enjoyed more stable institutions, and were ideologically more in tune with the 'renovation' of socialism as the decade wore on.

The exclusion of international issues from communications studies and other social sciences is symptomatic of the transformation of intellectual life and these fields in Chile under the dictatorship. One writer in English who has discussed these issues is James Petras (1990; see also Petras and Morley, 1992). Petras provides a structural marxist critique of Latin America's intellectuals, particularly those of the Southern Cone countries, and their changing political and theoretical commitments.

Petras's argument rests on the dependence of the private research institutes on funding from abroad, which allowed North American and European foundations to play a determining role in the development of social science scholarship. He describes a coalescence of the economic interests of the liberal and social democratic philanthropic foundations with those of intellectuals returning from exile, where they had grown accustomed to a higher standard of living than was available upon their return. Petras goes on to argue that the returning exiles also brought back 'post-marxist' intellectual trends picked up in the liberal or social democratic countries where they had spent their exiles, currents which effectively deradicalized Latin American social theory and made it palatable to the foundations.

Petras' structuralist explanation cannot account for the variety of work and of political commitments displayed by the scholars. Nor is it concerned with their survival strategies both as professional scholars and often as ways of avoiding detention. The Chilean writer who has written most extensively on the private research centres, José Joaquín Brunner,

offers an alternative view. He is concerned with the professional status and integrity of the scholars who formed the private research institutes. While acknowledging the central importance of the external foundations as often the sole source of financing, Brunner points out that the interests and needs of the scholars and the funders were not always the same. The scholars had to find ways of 'negotiating' with the funding agencies, by opening lines of investigation favoured by the funding agency to research one's own interests, by building up one's reputation in the field as a competent and responsible scholar, and by developing contacts or 'resource relations' (Brunner and Barrios, 1987, p. 157). Such strategies allowed certain scholars a role in determining the research agenda in Chile somewhat independently of the foundations, as well as in making demands in changing the manner of funding to permit more autonomy for the private research institutes.

Brunner and Petras agree that the scholarship funded by external foundations was affected by this relationship. However, their interpretations of this effect highlight the shortcomings of both positions. For Brunner, the influence of funding short-term projects and competition for scarce funding resources created a tendency to produce primarily empirical research, at the expense of longer-term theoretical reflection. Brunner describes here a strictly professional or academic effect. The difficulty that springs from Brunner's argument is that it lends itself to a corporatist view of scholarly interests, as if these interests were entirely separate from the interests of the citizens who wish to recover democracy – a notion that if true would lend ironic support to Petras's claims. Thus while Brunner is concerned with analysing the interior of the field, he does not examine the variety of political forces which limit its autonomy.

On the other hand, for Petras the effect of the dependency on external funding was to deradicalize the scholars and tie them to the political project of imperialism. But Petras's argument does not advance beyond an essentially functionalist denunciation of the alleged change in the intellectuals's critical position;¹³ nor does it explore the reasons why these intellectuals might have made the choices that they did; nor does it examine the work that social science intellectuals in these

countries have done. Petras thus paints all of the so-called 'institutional' intellectuals with an overly broad brush. Such an analysis not only cannot explain why the intellectuals made the theoretical and political choices that they did, it also provides neither a way to foresee future changes in their attitudes and commitments, nor a compelling moral argument for adapting a radical stance now, nor a political argument for how such a change could be made.

Thus, Brunner's and Petras's positions reach impasses: by focusing exclusively on the professional dimension of scholarly practices in Chile, Brunner's analysis tends to neglect the political consequences of the professional choices made by the scholars. Petras, on the other hand, by ignoring the professional dimension, neither recognizes the variety of professional and political responses to the repression, nor does he allow that there may have been real and important constraints on the political possibilities available to the scholars.

A more nuanced analysis of the field incorporates both the professional and political dimension in its understanding of the intellectuals as social and political agents struggling for their autonomy. We may thus acknowledge many of Petras's criticisms, but we must have a better understanding of why the intellectuals have taken the routes that they have. For example, we may acknowledge that many of the scholars working in the private research institutes have retreated from a sustained marxist critique of Chilean society not for reasons of science, that is, because the theory fails on some account, but because the global consequences of the repression in the universities and in Chile's national political and social reality destroyed both the social and institutional bases for sustaining such a political critique.

The establishment of the private research centres, with international financial support from corporate or governmental philanthropies, helped to provide new institutional bases, and the emergence of the protest movement helped to provide a new social impetus for communications research under the dictatorship. But these circumstances, as well as the social, economic and political context of Chile under Pinochet, were inevitably different from those of the Frei and Allende years. The commitment on the part of some scholars to supporting the development of the popular media and communications

practices suggests that the possibility of critical scholarship is always present; however, the marginality of the institutions supporting such scholarship and the political demobilization that took place after the transition to civilian rule indicate that like the popular communications they study, such research programmes were at risk of being overwhelmed by the same political and cultural forces transforming Chile in the context of neoliberal hegemony in the global political economy.

5 Conclusion: Present and Future in Chilean Communications Studies

The central object of inquiry for an intellectual history is the set of ideas that were produced in a given period. Once we specify that ideas are produced, the inquiry must also be open to the ways in which the ideas are produced, by whom, and under what sort of conditions. People who produce ideas are intellectuals. Intellectuals, however, are not a predetermined or given social category. To understand fully the production of ideas, we must specify the social and cultural roles that intellectuals play, the kinds of relations they have with the most important social groups and the structures of political and economic power, and the circumstances which condition their options and choices with respect to their fields.

A scholarly field, in other words, is more than the principal ideas which identify it. It also includes the practices and rituals through which intellectuals produce and legitimate their ideas, it includes the institutions which link intellectuals to each other and to the forms of material and discursive power in the social formation, and, most evidently in the social sciences, it includes the social phenomena that are studied, measured, or theorized, and the forces they bring to bear on the society as a whole.

The linkages between intellectual history and the domestic and international forces producing transnational hegemony discussed in this book have illustrated the ways in which culture and the international political economy interact and produce each other. When the sociological study of mass communication first came to Chile in the late 1950s, the scholars who dominated social thought in Chile were traditional intellectuals, as Antonio Gramsci used the term. They fulfilled their cultural function within Chile's two dominant universities, where the elites and the public and private functionaries were educated.

Chile itself was beginning to experience important social and economic changes, most notably in the efforts to 'modernize' the country and in the expansion of the means of mass communication, especially the development of television. The scholars who challenged the dominance of the traditional intellectuals found that the intellectual tools they had inherited could not explain the changes they saw nor guide their efforts to bring about changes. As the United States had emerged from the Second World War as the unchallenged hegemonic power in the Americas and had set for itself the goal of guiding the development of the Latin American nations, Chilean scholars looked to North American institutions to find the intellectual tools they needed. Personal and institutional connections grew and implanted in the Chilean universities a sophisticated functionalist sociology, discursively rooted in objectivity but lending itself to a policy orientation. Early studies of Chilean mass communication applied the theories developed in United States' universities, defining an international division of scholarly labour.

This model of intellectual production would soon enter into a terminal crisis. It did not take long for Chilean scholars to recognize their subordinate position in the international division of labour, a position which resembled the ways in which Chile itself was linked to the international political economy. With the revelation of Project Camelot, which underscored the political and military nature of Chile's and the intellectuals' subordination, the situation became intolerable.

While frustration with the given state of affairs can explain why functionalism fell out of fashion in the Chilean institutes, other political, economic, and cultural forces developing in Chile must be taken into account to understand the emerging field in communications scholarship. The efforts to develop Chile economically unleashed social forces which neither the government nor the dominant classes in Chile could control. These forces came to bear directly on the universities as institutions of intellectual production in the form of the University Reform movement. The blatantly imperialist character of the USA's interventions in the Chilean economy, politics, and scholarship made the rejection of North American scholarship possible; the emergence of social forces 'from below' also challenged the institutional reproduction of Chile's dominant

class. Thus, the critique of functionalism in social theory and the critique of the traditional roles of intellectuals and universities made each other possible.

Critical theories were at first borrowed from abroad: the structuralist variant of marxism which had become predominant in Europe by the mid-1960s was brought to Chile by visiting European scholars. Similarly, structural linguistics and semiology, which at the time were also being used to develop a critique of capitalist societies both in Europe and in Latin America, were influential theoretical and methodological imports.

The institutionalization of these new approaches to communication in Chile produced an interesting division, which ultimately reflected the split that emerged on the left over the nature and pace of the transition to socialism. One approach, institutionalized in the Centre for the Study of the National Reality, the CEREN, opted both politically and theoretically for linking itself directly with the emergent social forces, with 'giving speech to the people'. This entailed two areas for theory, research, and intervention. First, these scholars developed a thorough critique and rejection of the communications practices of imperialism, which were making themselves felt with increasing force as the left gained strength, and of the communications practices of the dominant class in Chile. Second, they provided practical and theoretical support to the nascent communications practices being developed among the more militant popular sectors. The other emergent approach, institutionalized in the School of Arts and Communication, the EAC, opted instead for a more professionally-orientated type of intellectual production, to improve the quality of the forms of expression for a new society. As these schools developed, the ideas produced became increasingly and strikingly original in each. The urgency lent to intellectual production by the political conflict in the country gave an impetus to young scholars to open their field in new and creative directions.

In spite of the clear differences between these two approaches, there was much in common between them, notably the influence of marxism and of semiology. The differences could have been the basis of a scientific debate, clarifying many of the vexing questions for mass communications

studies: the nature of ideology, the capacities and roles of the receivers, the historicity of modes of communication. Before the terms and terrain for such a debate could be defined, however, the second phase in Chilean communications research was terminated by the force of arms. The dominant modes of intellectual production were discredited and the emergent forms were brutally repressed. In 1973 the field of communications studies perfectly illustrated Gramsci's description of crises: the old was dying, the new could not be born.

The crisis in 1973 manifested itself to the intellectuals both professionally and personally. For those who could remain in Chile, the institutions which had supported communications research disappeared or were severely restricted. The popular communications practices which had been the emergent object of inquiry had become practically impossible, as the popular communicating subjects were terrorized into silence. The dimensions of the defeat of the Chilean left were such that, in both the aspirations of the putschists and the fears of the left, it seemed that 90 years of Chilean history had been abolished. Whereas prior to 11 September 1973, many scholars were developing a new sense of their organic connection to an emergent social force, after that date they were isolated and vulnerable.

For the two forms of theory that were emerging at the end of the second phase, the consequences of the repression were different. The leading scholars associated with CEREN were all forced to flee Chile; Armand and Michèle Mattelart went to France, Mabel Piccini went to Mexico, Ariel Dorfman went to the United States. For the scholars at EAC, on the other hand, the repression had different consequences which would influence the field as it re-emerged in the late 1970s. While some were forced to flee – Fernando Ossandón finished his master's degree in Peru, for example – and others were expelled or 'exonerated' from the Catholic University, many were able to stay in Chile, and a few remained in the Catholic University. This meant that the 'professional' model for communications research, as it had been developing in EAC, would be the more influential model in the private research centers. Nevertheless, the influence of the Mattelarts' work would continue to be felt as the need to critique the communication practices of the military regime and its class

supporters and to discover and support the efforts to find democratic spaces in communication became parts of a political project of opposition to the dictatorship. At least in communication theory, the development of professional communications skills and knowledge would have to be articulated with the development of popular communicating subjects who could push forward an opposition political strategy.

With the emergence of the protest movement of the 1980s, the political and social dimensions of the field of communications studies in Chile changed. The idea that winning democratic spaces in the mass media would be crucial in a transition to democracy and the idea that democratic communications requires a popular subject able to express itself were articulated by the scholars working in each area as mutually reinforcing ideas. Because the protests began to make the possibility of a return to democracy look more realistic, ideas such as democratic communication, whatever form it would take, became more salient as well. For a variety of personal, professional, or theoretical reasons, certain scholars dedicated themselves to the study of the mass media in Chile, while others worked on studying and supporting popular communications initiatives. However, despite the acknowledgments by scholars within each approach of the importance of their opposites' contributions, this effectively created a division of scholarly labour.

Historical events, rather than the relative strengths or merits of the approaches, determined that the mass media approach would become the predominant one. The inability of the popular mobilizations to bring Pinochet down, and the escalating repression that the government used to suppress the protests, meant that the political opposition had to look for a new strategy to defeat the dictatorship. Leftist intellectuals co-ordinated their efforts with those of the Christian Democrat Party and of the sectors of the right that favoured a return to civilian rule to work out a strategy that could unite most of the opposition around a common activity – defeating Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite.¹ The media, and in particular television, played a central role in this strategy. Techniques, themes, even video materials developed in the popular sectors in opposition to the military government were incorporated into the mass media strategy. Pinochet lost the plebiscite

and his candidate lost the presidential bid, and the opposition had finally achieved its goal.

This brief summary of the argument of this book demonstrates the fluid interactions between the changing political conjunctures in Chile, the communication and cultural contexts, and the activities of a specific group of intellectuals. In order to develop a discussion of the implications of these interactions, we need to return to a question first posed in the introduction: why Chile? In the introduction, the concepts of standpoint epistemologies and strong objectivity were brought in to show how writing a history from the 'margins' of political and social structures makes more evident the ways in which dominant theories dominate, by enabling researchers 'to detect the social mechanisms through which power relations are made to appear obviously natural and necessary' (Harding 1992, 584). In the case of the science of communications and its reception in Chile, theories developed in North American and European universities were originally applied in peripheral countries, establishing a hierarchical division of scholarly labour in which Chilean scholars occupied the margins. Such a division of scholarly labour was inherently unstable, however, as Chilean researchers working in the particular social, political and economic contexts found it necessary to critique the received orthodoxies. In other words, starting from their own realities the Chilean scholars quickly uncovered their subordinate position in the field of communication, and set out to change the field in order to end their subordination. Thus no functionalist account of intellectuals, whether it sees the essential role of the intellectuals as reproducing or transforming society, can grasp the political dynamics of scholarly work done in the social sciences in the periphery. Intellectuals are social agents who produce ideas, although not in conditions of their choosing: they produce ideas in fields which are in turn structured by both immediate and mediated agencies which operate not only in the contexts of the debates in the field, but also in larger political economic, social, and cultural contexts.

And in the case of social thought in Chile, the critiques of subordinate intellectuals did not remain marginal to the field. Armand Mattelart's work in Chile has been enormously influential in critical communications scholarship, and *How to*

Read Donald Duck continues to appear in numerous languages and regions throughout the world. The 'ferment in the field'² caused by the consolidation of critical communications theories in North America and Europe in many ways followed in the footsteps of the work done in Chile over a decade earlier. However, to take but one example, the 'consumption' in North America of the concept of cultural imperialism, even in the hands of capable and committed critical scholars, took much of the sting out of the concept. The concept ran aground in the North American context because it was used to attempt to explain the alleged passivity of the masses before the overwhelming ideological power of capitalism; it was not hard for sceptics to find numerous instances and manners in which the receivers of the media's messages were anything but passive. This particular insight would hardly have constituted a critique in the original Chilean context, where the concept and theories of cultural imperialism did not assume passivity, but were deployed as weapons in the struggle against imperialism.³

Thus communications theories, like other social theories or other cultural products, require accounting for the producers as well. We must ask what the political and social roles of the scholars who produce theories and research are, in terms of the contributions their reflections or critiques make on the communications process – in the sense described by Anthony Giddens as the double hermeneutic – as well as their contributions in enabling others to communicate. We have studied communications scholarship, as opposed to the media or popular culture or some specific practice of social communication, because of the contributions of scholars to the development of the forms of social communications; the Chilean case is important because by examining it we can see how scholars in a subordinate social formation, as producers of subaltern and dependent forms of culture, have resisted domination and participated in political struggles for emancipation. Scholarship is a special part of culture, because it is the institutionalized form of reflection, reproduction and transformation of various cultural forms and practices. Understanding culture requires understanding the producers of culture, including scholars.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA AFTER THE TRANSITION

What is the future for communications scholarship in Chile, and how will it be tied into the development of Chilean culture and politics and Chile's ongoing insertion into the international political economy? The importance of this question lies in the role of culture in maintaining or struggling against the hegemony of neoliberalism as it has been consolidated after the transition to civilian rule in Chile. The electoral victories of the Chilean opposition and the transition to civilian rule have had important consequences for Chilean politics and communications. In the first place, the plebiscite and the *franjas* began to narrow the political field. The plebiscite effectively reduced the immediate political question to 'yes or no?' It also represented an open acceptance of the Constitutional regime imposed by the military: the transition to civilian rule would have to take place on Pinochet's terms. The political activity of citizens was thus redefined, from protagonists articulating their own demands in public spaces, to voters making a 'free', but predetermined choice.

Furthermore, using television as the site for political mobilization meant that the people, as political protagonists, were removed from the streets and sent back into living rooms in front of television screens, from public space back to private. The proliferation of information, investigative, and debate shows after the transition, taken by many as signs of the democratic contribution of television, in fact served to ratify this second consequence. The result of these consequences is a limited form of democracy, democracy as a spectator sport, a form consistent with the preservation of the pragmatic revision of the neoliberal model under a reconstituted hegemony, led now by the Christian Democrats.

Two interrelated processes regarding television and its relation to politics and society began to unfold under the dictatorship and have continued under civilian rule: the abandonment of the public service model for television, and the subsequent identification of democracy in public communication with an expanded market for channels and programmes. Although the military had been unwilling to release its control over programming, the decision to end mixed financing in favour of commercial advertising removed one of the most

effective avenues through which the public service model had been sustained. This effectively put television at the service of the commercial advertisers, for even though programme content would remain for a while an instrument of the military, the broadcasters had to produce audiences or they would not be able to raise finances and thus continue broadcasting.

Once Pinochet turned over control of the executive branch to the elected civilian government, the final barrier to a completely commercial model for television was gone: the government would no longer use television as a tool for military propaganda and a greater variety of programmes could be made available. The change in government also allowed the expansion of the technical capacities for television broadcasting. In addition to an increased variety of VHF channels, Chile by then had television broadcast by cable and by satellite, as well as having granted 170 concessions for UHF broadcasting (which as of 1993 were not yet on the air; Brunner and Catalán 1993, 6). The expanded technical capacity had dramatically increased the supply of programmes: total broadcast time in Chile increased from 20 000 hours per year in 1990 to 49 000 in 1992 (*Ibid.*, p. 7).

Brunner and Catalán describe this increase in the supply of television programmes as a contribution to Chile's democratization. They argue that the proliferation of programme choices allows Chilean audiences to break their dependence on one or two dominant channels and find programmes more suited to the plural, culturally diverse demands of a culturally and geographically segmented audience (*Ibid.*, p. 9). The freedom that follows the years of dictatorship is the freedom of the consumer to choose in an open market. In this formula, audience segmentation equals democratization.

Second, they claim that television is contributing to the opening of Chile in symbolic and cultural terms, as well as increasing the flow of images that help to link Chile with the rest of the world (*Ibid.*, p. 7). This understanding of the global flow of televised images is a direct descendent of McLuhan's 'global village' metaphor, which assumed that the development of communications technologies would by itself increase democracy around the world. At the global level, such a view is related to the revisiting of the 'end of ideologies' thesis from the 1950s and 1960s, now understood in the

context of transnational neoliberal hegemony as the ‘end of history’ – the ideological foundations of which had been demonstrated and critiqued by Armand Mattelart nearly 25 years before Brunner and Catalán wrote. It is also related more immediately to the more optimistic assessments of the *franjas* for the plebiscite. In his analysis, for example, Steve Wiley-Crofts concludes that the ‘success of the opposition discourse was in articulating the “No” at the level of meaning. Its power was in the discursive construction of a new collective identity that had the force to generate social mobilization on a massive scale’ (Wiley-Crofts, 1991, p. 248).

The troubling conception of politics implicit in these McLuhanesque views is that public political participation is constrained within the institutional spaces defined by the mass media – which are now thoroughly transnationalized in Chile. Wiley-Crofts has inverted the order in which identity formation and televised discourse occurred in Chile: the ‘No’ campaign on television only took place for one month before the elections; the mass movement against the dictatorship had been on the streets for five years. To treat the television campaign as a cause of the transition reifies the campaign. This reified vision of culture has important consequences for conceptions of hegemony, for it makes hegemony appear as an automatic consequence of predominance in the media. Culture, in this view, appears to produce itself and thus is not the site of social struggles, and hegemony appears as a static state, or as the political resignation of the dupes of the system. As I have stressed above, understanding culture requires understanding it as a product, in a system characterized by struggles for control of the productive processes. In this light, a more realistic assessment of the campaign is that of María Eugenia Hirmas:

But to attribute the victory to television fails to recognize most people’s living conditions and the level of discontent with the Pinochet regime. It also ignores such factors as the groundwork laid by political parties before the vote, the influence of social organizations, and the political maturity that Chilean people had acquired over the years. (1993, p. 94)

After the transition to civilian rule, the critique of television has been taken up by Chile’s right, while the response

of intellectuals of the left has been either defensive or detached. Porvenir de Chile (Chile's Future), a private, conservative think tank also noted for its role in the censorship of Martin Scorsese's 'The Last Temptation of Christ' in Chile,⁴ published a critique of television in Chile in 1995. The book decried both the quantity of television – they point out that children in Chile watch an average of three hours of television a day, which Porvenir de Chile characterizes as an 'addiction' – and the quality, especially denouncing programmes imported from the USA, such as 'The Simpsons' and 'Beavis and Butthead'. These imports, they claim in arguments identical to those of the religious right in the USA, undermine 'family values' and thus the moral foundations of the nation. Dependence on television derives from the 'easy pleasures of uncontrolled imagination, from sex, violence, and drugs', and the desire to find magical solutions to life's problems.

The response to these arguments by the book's reviewer in *La Época*, the more progressive of Chile's daily newspapers, was one of bemusement, as if a cartoon could undermine the nation (Ramírez, 1995, p. B6). The contrast with the arguments and reception of *How to Read Donald Duck* could hardly be more striking. The response to the banning of 'The Last Temptation of Christ' was more vocal. Various groups in Chile decried the censorship, and after the Supreme Court upheld the banning of the film, many organized screenings in protest ('Supreme court upholds ban on Last Temptation', 1997; 'Anti-censorship group to show banned film', 1997). However, this latter response, while necessary in the face of censorship, remains a rear-guard action, not one likely to increase the communicative and political capacities of Chile's popular subjects or anti-systemic movements.

The global convergence of conservative thought is hardly surprising in the context of transnational neoliberal hegemony. At the same time, the retreat or hiatus of critical theories of communication in Chile has taken place in the context of an effective deradicalization of communication theory internationally.⁵ James D. Halloran points out that after the initial impetus for situating communication research as a 'public concern, policy-oriented and firmly tied to democratic developmental requirements' (1994, p. 165), especially in international fora such as UNESCO sponsored conferences in the 1970s,

an organized and systematic reaction on the part of communications industries and notably on the part of the Reagan and Thatcher governments set out to undermine the institutions, like UNESCO, which supported critical research and theory. Questions concerning the 'right to communicate' were displaced in favour of 'more concrete', if never defined, research problems. Stephen Gill's notion of 'disciplinary neoliberalism' highlights the links between the global political economic changes taking place at this time and the organization of knowledge producing activities. However, as Gill correctly emphasizes, disciplinary practices such as: 'mechanisms of surveillance may be more intensive and important for the reproduction of the neoliberal transnational historic bloc amongst its ruling classes and elites, than among subordinate elements in society' (Gill, 1995, p. 416).

POLITICAL AGENCY IN CHILE AFTER THE TRANSITION: HEGEMONY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF COUNTER-HEGEMONY

A particular conception of political agency was set in motion by the plebiscite: the role of the people was to make a selection between predetermined choices. This version of agency is ratified by the model of communication encoded in the commercial broadcast system, which requires a strict separation between the producers of news, information and entertainment, and their consumers. The 'agency' of the latter is also constrained to making predetermined choices. This view is strikingly distant from the ideas of popular communication developed in Chile under the dictatorship, which assumed or cultivated highly decentralized producers of information, as in the independent video experiments, as well as active audiences collectively producing their own 'readings' of television. In both cases, the barrier between producers and consumers of information in the communication process was challenged or erased.

The dominant view of the communication process, and the restrictive view of communicative agency that it presupposes, is not only consistent with the limited form of democracy that came with civilian rule in Chile, it is also entirely consistent

with the hegemonic project of neoliberalism. While neoliberals claim that the state must be reduced to increase the realm of freedom as expressed in the market, an implicit expansion of the state takes place as institutions of civil society take on state functions. Television in Chile after the dictatorship demonstrates this process. Television assists in social surveillance, through audience measurement which is needed to set the prices for commercial time on the air. It also performs an indoctrination function, helping to define a consensus about political roles, as occurred during the plebiscite. Finally, television plays an important role in regulating political behaviour, by removing politics from public space to the private space in which television is consumed.

Thus, those communications scholars who advocated the opening of democratic spaces in the mass media in many cases unwittingly contributed to the consolidation of the neoliberal project in Chile. This is not because there should be no democratic spaces in the mass media. Indeed, for scholars such as Diego Portales and Valerio Fuenzalida, who went on under the civilian government of Patricio Aylwin to work in the administration of the National Television network, or Paulina Domínguez, who worked with the acclaimed educational programming in the Universidad Católica's 'Teleduc' programme (see Domínguez, 1993), the opportunity to attempt to transform the ways in which television is used could not have been found outside of the television networks, nor within them under the dictatorship. Nor is it to accuse these scholars of 'bad faith': the commitments of communications scholars to democratizing Chilean politics and communication have been amply demonstrated. Rather, events in Chile dictated that a choice be made between defeating the dictatorship in the plebiscite or remaining in the impasse that the failure of the protests to end military rule had created. Accepting the hegemony of neoliberalism has been the cost of ending military rule. Defeating neoliberalism will require the re-emergence of the popular social subject with an alternative project and the force to push it through.

With the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony under civilian rule, what became of the popular subject, the people themselves in their efforts to communicate and articulate their own political project? A recent report by Marjorie Agosín

on the arpillera workshops is perhaps instructive. Arpilleras are the hand-sewn tapestries produced by Chilean women to depict the conditions in the country under the dictatorship, to protest the repression of which they or members of their families had been victims, and to provide income. They could be seen as a paradigmatic case of adapting cultural resources and informal sector activities to a project of political resistance. As many as 32 arpillera workshops existed during the dictatorship; however, with the consolidation of civilian rule and a decreasing interest in human rights both in Chile and among international agencies, all of these workshops have closed. The few women who continue to produce arpilleras are unable to sustain themselves economically with their production (Agosín, 1994).

Repression, fear of unemployment, and economic restructuring have all led to dramatic changes in the lives of working people in Latin America over the last twenty years. In Chile, the repression in the years following the coup fell particularly hard on workers, according to the findings of the Rettig Commission (Collins and Lear, 1995, p. 70). Organized labour activities were considered 'communist', and labour leaders and organizers were fired, exiled or killed. A new Labour Code was implemented in 1979, which imposed severe restrictions on union activities including organizing, negotiation, fund raising and striking, and which freed management to adopt increasingly flexible strategies with regard to labour, including dismissals en masse and at will, a longer working day, diminished overtime pay and allowing increased use of temporary workers who by law could not be organized. The effect of these reforms was to make labour negotiations into discussions among individuals, giving management a free hand in imposing whatever conditions it deemed appropriate. Most of the provisions of the 1979 Labour Code remain in force today. While the CUT, Chile's labour confederation, has regained a political presence in the transition to civilian rule, by 1993 only 13.1 per cent of Chile's work force was unionized, a decrease from 14.5 per cent in 1991 (Collins and Lear, 1995, p. 264).

Along with the loss of their collective bargaining powers, Chilean workers have faced unprecedented levels of unemployment since 1975. For most of the period of military rule,

unemployment in Chile averaged around 20 per cent of the work force, dropping only to 17 per cent during the 'miracle' years of 1980–1, and reaching as high as 35 per cent after the crash in 1982 (Ibid., p. 85). Other than the 'workfare' Minimum Employment Program (PEM) and Occupational Program for Heads of Households (POJH), employing 12.5 per cent of the work force and paying as little as US\$30 per month, no welfare 'safety net' could provide economic security to unemployed Chileans.

A notable consequence of the weakening of the organizations that represent labour and the difficult economic circumstances that affect the Chileans left behind in the neoliberal reform of the economy has been the growth of the informal economy. Various social and economic consequences can be attributed to the growth of the informal sector. Informal sector labour relations are constituted differently than the traditional, Fordist factory labour:

Undeclared, unprotected labor; small units of production; networks rather than socialized labor processes; homework rather than factories; unstable relations of production; multiple intermediaries between workers and capital; segmentation of labor along age, gender, and ethnic lines; dependence of the job upon the absence of legal control – all these are factors that [...] are contributing to the de-collectivization of the labor process and to the reversal of the material conditions that historically allowed the emergence of the labor movement as an organized force. (Castells and Portes, 1989, p. 31)

The social and economic costs of informalization and neoliberal economic restructuring can be seen as increasing social disorder and anomie. In her study of the restructuring of the Chilean economy, Schneider (1993) also found that long working hours, uncertainty about future employment, and the shift in social relations of employment from relations of colleagues and co-workers to relations with potential clients and competition with other service providers as the economy became more 'flexible', had alienating consequences for family life as well as reducing the amount of non-work related social contact.

The anomic results described by Schneider show how changes in the material conditions and social relations can

affect the 'ways of life' of the people who live in the changing conditions. However, it is clearly wrong to treat the subordinate classes in Chile as hapless victims for whom the impact of external forces is more important in their collective identities than their own capacity for social self-production and reproduction. The anomie described above occurs in circumstances when the prominent feature of social life is the loss of the cultural forces or resources which people use to define their communities and collective identities. In these circumstances, however, new ways of life emerge in terms of the habits, the customs, the values and the popular memories possessed by the dominated classes as they forge new collective identities and produce new practices of collective identification and agency.

The emergence of the anti-Pinochet protest movements in the 1980s indicated the potential for a counter-hegemonic project developing among the popular sectors. In effect, repression under the military government had closed off collective expression in the public spaces. People retreated to private spaces: their homes, churches, campuses, folk music clubs. Alfredo Rodríguez describes the ways in which the spaces of everyday life were used to gradually organize and finally convene the massive protests of the 1980s:

In this sense, [the protests] are an effort to recuperate the public space, the space of politics, surging from the spaces of everyday life: the house, the alley, the street, the poor suburb, the work place, the university, all united by the clanging of empty pots. In the face of the deployment of terror, of the violence of military power, civil society arises in the protests, united by sound. (1983, p. 74)

The fact that protests and alternative popular communications strategies emerged under military rule, when they were subject to direct repression, indicate that the popular sectors do have cultural resources to resist hegemony. It remains to be seen whether scholars, such as those associated with ECO and CENECA, will be able to continue to research and support the emergence of Chile's popular classes as political protagonists, a condition which would favour the development of radical theories and scholarship. The need for a return to critical theory in communication, that is, the need to return

to the project of 'giving speech to the people', is highlighted by the ongoing proliferation or survival of people's movements globally, especially human rights groups, indigenous people's movements, environmentalists, and a resurgent labour movement. The potential for such movements to coalesce into an 'anti-systemic challenge' represents the possibility of alternative modes of development, of political articulation, and of social organization (Stavenhagen, 1997). However, this potential and this possibility depend on the capacities of popular social agents to develop their own media and modes of communication, as well as on their ability to appropriate the technologies that are already a part of their daily lives. Thus, for example, media education must be extended beyond developing knowledge of the various techniques of the media and even beyond the development of the critical capacities of the people; it must also encompass the practical development of the communication capacities, of the uses of the media, and of the ability to create media on the part of these various popular movements. Such an educational task will require both the social recovery of the historical and theoretical knowledge of popular and alternative communications in Chile, and the ongoing development of critical theory.

The tendency of the proliferating university-based centres to concentrate on the professionalizing of the mass media, coupled with the tendency of foreign funding for the private research centres to dry up after the transition to civilian rule,⁶ do not indicate a promising future for critical scholarship, at least in the short run. The intellectuals in Chile have generally found more success linking themselves to the government and the consolidation of civilian control of the state, while the dispersal of the popular forces after the transition has diminished the social space in which critical scholarship can develop.

However, the ongoing consolidation of neoliberal hegemony in Chile should not be viewed as 'the end of history', for as the history of communications scholarship in Chile has shown us, hegemony is fragile. Neoliberalism may currently enjoy a transnational hegemony, but the subordinate classes in Chile have too rich a culture and history of struggle and resistance to assume that neoliberal transformations will be an ongoing 'passive revolution'. The maintenance of the transnational

hegemony of neoliberalism requires, in part, our own ongoing ignorance of the everyday struggles of peripheral, subordinate groups and classes throughout the world. Our understanding of the processes of cultural production and of social communication can help remedy this ignorance, as our reflections on the various social processes of resistance enable the communication and the resistance of others.

The underlying theme of this study has been that hegemony is not imposed by the international system, the state, or by other remote, impersonal powers. It is rather constituted in the social struggles between dominant classes and subaltern classes. Hegemony, in E. P. Thompson's metaphor, is a 'force field'. The dominant poles of the field along with the dominated poles define political and cultural spaces in which social agents struggle and come into being: 'The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making' (Thompson, 1966, p. 9). Thompson goes on to argue that the concepts used in these social struggles also come from history: thus when the nascent working class in England struggled against the determination of food prices by market forces, they appealed to 'moral economy', in this case the older patrician notions of 'just prices' (Thompson, 1993).

The same processes apply to the intellectuals as a social group. Their identity as a definite social group, or 'caste' in Gramsci's view (1971, p. 104), has been determined by the professionalization of their fields in Chile, a process itself driven by global political economic forces. At the same time, these forces have made the positions of the intellectuals vulnerable, not only in periods of crisis, such as in 1973, but even in times of relative stability and consensus, such as today. The firing in late 1994 of Jorge Navarrete from his position as director of the National Television Network (TVN), despite the improved ratings for the network as a whole and in particular its consistently higher ratings in news programming, highlights the limits of professionalism ('Ouster of TV boss causes tension', 1994, p. 3).⁷ Ongoing threats to the intellectuals' professional autonomy could create the conditions in which they had previously come to question their assigned role in social reproduction, and coupled with re-emergent popular forces this could reignite the radicalism of Chile's intellectuals. Present conditions, even when

apparently stable, indicate that hegemony is less the condition for consent, than the condition for struggle (Roseberry 1994, p. 360).

Thus while the hegemony of neoliberalism, both domestically in Chile and transnationally, seems for the moment to be assured, this is hardly a counsel of despair. Neoliberalism is only the most recent accumulation project which has been developed in response to the economic and political crises affecting capitalism since the 1970s. In securing its hegemony, states in the developing countries, just as those in the core, have worsened the conditions of the subaltern classes and assured that the crises will be ongoing. The ongoing struggles over hegemony make Marx's words continue to ring true:

These are signs of the times, not to be hidden by purple mantles or black cassocks. They do not signify that tomorrow a miracle will occur. They do show that, within the ruling classes themselves, the foreboding is emerging that society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and constantly engaged in a process of change. (Marx, 1977, p. 73)

Notes

Preface

1. A relatively small, but important, body of literature has examined the role of scholarship in articulating policies of domination. Recent and outstanding examples include Gendzier 1995, and Berger 1995.

1 Introduction

1. This book is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
2. In addition to the scientific controversies and debates that a writer hopes will come to bear on innovative social analyses, the book has also been the subject of political controversy. Disney attempted to prevent first the publishing and next the importing of the English language version of the book. John Shelton Lawrence's full account of the legal battles affecting the English version appears as an appendix to the International General Edition of *How to Read Donald Duck* (Dorfman and Mattelart, 1984).
3. See especially Petras and Morley (1992), Puryear (1994), and Castañeda (1993).
4. This is not a novel concern for social theory. Georg Lukács identified the problem as one of remaining within bourgeois conceptions of history:

As a result of its incapacity to understand history, the contemplative attitude of the bourgeoisie became polarised into two extremes: on the one hand, there were the 'great individuals' viewed as the autocratic makers of history, on the other hand, there were the 'natural laws' of the historical environment. They both turn out to be equally impotent – whether they are separated or working together – when challenged to produce an interpretation of the present in all its radical novelty' (1971, p. 158).

5. Nick Witheford (1994) develops this point more thoroughly, Drawing on Antonio Negri's notion of the socialized worker and on Raniero Panzieri's critique of technology, Witheford argues that the point of the chapter on machinery in Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, is to show that capitalism resorts to technological innovation as a 'weapon' to contain working-class autonomy, increasing the proportion of dead labour (constant capital) over living labour (variable capital). The implication, then, is that the autonomous social processes of communication are confronted in social struggle by the various forms of information technology (not limited to computers, but all information delivery technologies) developed and deployed to subsume the creative capacities that inhere in labour.

6. The development of these information and communication technologies is a process driven by complex and conflictive social forces. On the one hand, they can be seen as enhancing the capacity for surveillance in a global system, in a sort of Foucauldian nightmare of a global panopticon. Martin Hewson (1994) criticizes this notion of surveillance as a misuse of Foucault, and emphasizes instead the constitutive power of surveillance for a global political economy. Hewson argues that: 'all these capacities of surveillance depend on expertise of a reflexive or self-monitoring kind, which means that the spread of this modern form of governance would not be possible without the enhanced capabilities of the governed themselves' (1994, p. 77). Perhaps because he focuses more on governance in the global political economy than on resistance, Hewson does not draw out the implications of these enhanced capabilities for challenging or undermining hegemony. That surveillance, as Hewson understands it, can be turned back on the dominant agents – or even outstrip their capabilities for rule using communications technologies – is amply demonstrated by the growth of the use of the Internet by solidarity groups. An early assessment of the use of the Internet in solidarity with the Zapatistas can be found in Deedee Halleck (1994). Harry Cleaver (1998) develops the implications of the Internet for anti-hegemonic struggles more thoroughly, examining the homologies between the decentralized nature of the Net and the organizational structure of the Zapatistas, their solidarity networks, and the emerging international resistance to neoliberalism inspired by the struggles in Chiapas. He also gives a sober assessment of the problems associated with differential access to computers – as he points out, Subcomandante Marcos was not linked to the Internet via laptop computer and cellular telephone, rather the EZLN communiqués had to be carried by hand through the military lines, and uploaded by sympathizers with access to computers – and he points out that access by itself does not produce political collaboration and solidarity. In a similar vein, Eric Lee recommends establishing an electronic early warning network for trade union rights modelled after Amnesty International's urgent action networks. But his informal poll of 15 major trade union web sites found that they: 'are doing a very spotty job of covering trade union rights issues' (Lee, 1998). Clearly, the political uses of communications technologies depend on the nature and the evolving capacities of the social agents who attempt to incorporate them into their strategies or deploy them in their tactics.
7. The relationship between international finance capital and communications technologies has been obvious at least since the advent of international news agencies. Paul Julius Reuter first used carrier pigeons to complete the telegraph links that were interrupted by the English Channel so that investors in England could have news of the Continental stock exchanges – the rest, one could say, is history. In addition, finance capital has long operated transnationally. The contrast between the portfolio investments of the 'coupon clippers' whom Lenin satirized, who invested only for a return on their investments,

and foreign direct investment, in which controlling interests of foreign firms are acquired and the firms are integrated into a transnational corporation, illustrates the possibility of a dominant transnational class formation which appeared less likely in Lenin's day. Through foreign direct investment, production relations are also transnationalized – and thus so are classes.

08. Sometimes, however, such criticisms are misplaced. *Mass Communication and American Empire* is principally a critique of the changing nature of the projection of American power abroad, owing to changes in the American political economy after the Second World War. When it does discuss cultural changes abroad, the discussion is carefully framed to refer to actual changes in communications systems, such as changes in or the development of broadcast policies in the Third World which reflect US preferences. Such arguments refer to policies for cultural industries or activities; they do not reduce culture to politics.
09. This is the usual criticism of *How to Read Donald Duck*. However, it is clear that Mattelart was also sharply critical of functionalism in media studies, warning against the 'counter-fascination with power' (Mattelart, 1979, p. 58). His colleagues at CEREN, including Michèle Mattelart, had embarked on path-breaking studies of the reception of foreign television programs in the slums of Santiago when their research was cut short by the coup. Thus while the criticism of reductionism can be made to hold for *How to Read Donald Duck*, to do so requires reading the book out of the context in which it was produced. The work of the Mattelarts and their colleagues at CEREN will be examined in detail in Chapter 3.
10. See, for example, Wendt (1987) or Carlsnaes (1992), or see especially Axford (1995) for an extensive discussion of the relevance of the agent–structure problem for international theory.
11. Giddens' point about structures not being 'external' to the agents who actualize the structures is not, on its face, anti-materialist. Indeed, he is careful to refer to their material existence, 'as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices'. However, as Raymond Williams points out (1977, pp. 17–19), to frame the question as one of 'externality' or 'internality' creates conundrums. Are social practices 'internal' to the individual? Similarly with respect to culture: a reader may produce alternative readings of a given text, according to a variety of circumstances, yet the text itself evidently has an existence 'external' to and independent of the individual reader. The important point is not the location – external or internal to the individual – of structures or of culture, but rather the idea that both are real, and that they are both the products of worldly human agents and the conditions necessary for those agents to have meaningful social relations.
12. An elegant statement of this thesis may be found, not surprisingly, in Marx:

Men (sic) make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by

themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. (1980, p. 97)

This passage is often interpreted as placing greater emphasis on the constraining forces in structures than on their enabling characteristics, but Marx's constant analysis of the proletariat as an historical revolutionary subject clearly suggests that he was sensitive to the 'duality of structure'. I am indebted to Professor Diane Waldman for pointing out the similarities between Giddens' and Marx's concepts to me.

13. Bourdieu uses the term 'social capital' in the article cited above. In later work, he refines the terms and uses 'cultural capital' to refer to the authority and capacities of scholars in a scientific field, typically, though not necessarily, gained through the education system. (See Bourdieu, 1985, pp. 53–4.)
14. See also Ringer (1990) for a discussion of the scientific field in intellectual history.
15. As Harding writes: 'If the community of 'qualified' researchers and critics systematically excludes, for example, all African Americans and women of all races, and if the larger culture is stratified by race and gender and lacks powerful critiques of this stratification, it is not plausible to imagine that racist and sexist interests and values would be identified within a community of scientists composed entirely of people who benefit – intentionally or not – from institutional racism and sexism.' (Harding, 1991, p. 143)

2 Origins of the Scientific Study of Mass Communications in Chile: 1958–67

01. By 'transnational project', I mean an historical and evolving transnational political economic project, entailing both the promotion of private investment by US-based corporations in Latin America and elsewhere and an anti-communist foreign policy that sought to recruit the state apparatus of Latin American countries in pursuing the foreign policy objectives defined in Washington.
02. One of the crucial contributions of the support from the Rockefeller Foundation was the arrival in Chile, in 1962, of a young demographer from Belgium, Armand Mattelart, as a Visiting Fellow at the Catholic University. The invitation of Mattelart was symptomatic of the tolerance for theoretical heterodoxy during this initial stage of the School of Sociology. Mattelart would become the leading figure in critical communications research in Chile by the end of the decade, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

3 Challenges to the Chilean Regime and Critical Mass Communications Studies: 1967–73

01. Strictly speaking, a *cátedra* is a professorship. What Brunner (1988) calls the 'sociology of the professors' (*sociología de cátedra*) was the

traditional model of sociology in the universities in Chile, in which the discipline was seen in terms of the 'great books', or the precursors of sociological thought, and as a part of the general cultural formation of students. To this was opposed the professional or 'modernizing' model of the discipline, in which sociology was understood in a more pragmatic way, orientated towards applied research and practical solutions to sociological problems. See the discussion in Chapter 2 of the conflicts between the modernizing and the traditional intellectuals in Chilean sociology.

2. The revelation of Project Camelot cost the United States, as well as many North American academics, the prestige and trust of Chilean scholars and students, which limited the USA's ability to influence the process of university reform openly. This also created an opening in the intellectual field which facilitated the development of alternative approaches to communications, approaches sharply critical of the structural functionalism which had come to predominate under the US-inspired model of the professionalization of the social sciences. However, we cannot infer from this that the USA lost its influence either over the Chilean political process in general or over the processes of communication in particular. As revealed to the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (United States Senate, 1975), the Frei and Allende administrations were periods of intense covert activity by the CIA station in Santiago. Crucially, these covert operations emphasized propaganda activities, especially through developing 'assets' in and contributing millions of dollars to *El Mercurio*. These 'assets' allowed the CIA station to generate an average of one editorial per day in the newspaper, editorials which enjoyed a 'multiplier effect' by being read on radio stations friendly to *El Mercurio's* line. As will be discussed below, the critique of US imperialism, covert as well as manifest, both in the media and in the social formation in general, would become a crucial aspect of the critical communication scholarship which emerged during this period.
3. Irving Louis Horowitz points out that no one from the university seems to have been in a position to criticize, oppose, defend or otherwise take responsibility for the project, and further argues that the supervisory role 'appears to have begun and ended with the 20 percent commission a university receives as expense funds on most federal grants' (1967, p. 24), thus providing a sort of academic 'camouflage' for the army's project.
4. Apparently there was some controversy over Nuttini's relation to Project Camelot. Horowitz asserts that he was not an employee or staff member of the project, although he had been 'asked to report on the possibilities of gaining the cooperation of professional personnel with Project Camelot' (Horowitz, 1967, p. 12). Nuttini certainly represented himself to Chilean scholars as having the authority to make proposals to the Chileans. It seems likely that the project director, Rex Hopper, distanced himself and Project Camelot from Nuttini once the scandal broke.

05. An important exception was the Catholic University's School of Economics, discussed in Chapter 2. The ideological proclivities of the students and faculty of this school seem to have been shaped by the predominance of neoclassical economic theory, itself a product of the close relation between the school and the University of Chicago. During the conflicts on the Catholic University campuses, this school was aligned more with the conservative reaction to the Reform Movement as articulated in *El Mercurio*, which later became a leading proponent for the economic policies developed by the School of Economics and its graduates.
06. Munizaga and Rivera (1983, p. 38) state that all the members of this group were foreigners, yet at least one of their prominent collaborators, Ariel Dorfman, was Chilean.
07. The incident referred to involved the owner of a chain of radio stations describing Mattelart's work as 'marxist fiction' on a televised forum. The incident was reported by Martínez in defense of Mattelart, as demonstrating the intellectual underdevelopment of the Chilean bourgeoisie (Martínez G., 1970, p. 185). Again, the political contrast with Mattelart is striking: Mattelart consistently treated the Chilean bourgeoisie as strategically sophisticated and conscious of both their class interests and the ideological tools at their disposal.
08. This came to be known as the 'Alessandri formula'. The idea was to convince Christian Democrats and the right to elect the second-place candidate, Jorge Alessandri, who would then resign and call new elections for which Eduardo Frei would be eligible to be a candidate, thus presumably returning him to the presidency for another six years and blocking the Unidad Popular victory.
09. According to the United States Senate, total covert expenditures on propaganda techniques between 1963 and 1973 in Chile came to \$12.3 m., of which \$4.3 m. went to the mass media. By comparison, money spent influencing Chilean institutions such as labour, student, peasants, women, and private sector organizations in the same period came to only \$900 000 (United States Senate, 1975, p. 7; figures rounded in source to nearest \$100 000).
10. According to the US Senate report on covert action in Chile, 'many of the assets involved in the anti-Allende campaign became so visible that their usefulness was limited thereafter. Several of them left Chile' (1975, p. 23).
11. It is worth noting in passing that no such expropriations took place under the Unidad Popular government. In radio, the state licensed the use of band width, and in certain instances did not renew these concessions to some broadcasters, granting them instead to the CUT, the Socialist Party, and other new voices. 'However, it should be pointed out that the acquisition of radios by sectors of the left was not the result of a struggle, nor of an intensification of struggles inside the ideological apparatus of radio. This was neither an expropriation nor a confiscation' (Armand Mattelart, 1977, p. 10).
12. Later, in an interview with *Cahiers du Cinema*, Mattelart pointed out that the defense of professionalism created a form of bureaucratization

- of the struggle in culture, where 'red experts' assumed that the only way for dominated classes to reach consciousness was through the same learning procedures the professionals had passed through (Armand Mattelart, 1977, p. 38). In any case, the commission created at the conference of left journalists was fraught with divisions between the various parties, most of which already had organs or bodies for agitation which they would not subordinate to another organization (Ibid., p. 30).
13. After failing to prevent Allende's election by the Chilean senate, Nixon and Kissinger decided to apply economic pressure on Chile – to 'make the economy scream' in Nixon's words. Chile's extreme dependency on trade with the United States, as well as the build up of aid during the Frei administration, made Chile economically vulnerable (see Cusack, 1977, pp. 101–19). Seymour Hersh cites National Security Decision Memorandum 93, in which Nixon ordered that four steps be taken against Chile economically: (1) to exclude finance assistance or guarantees for United States private investment in Chile; (2) to terminate, to the extent possible, existing financing arrangements; (3) to 'bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions' to limit credit and finance in Chile; and (4) and to make US private businesses 'aware of the concern with which the United States Government views the Government of Chile and the restrictive nature of the policies which the United States Government intends to follow' (Hersh, 1982, p. 57).
 14. Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini (1973) make no mention of the CIA, but they do discuss the content of some of the editorials:

during the years 1971 and 1972, each month *El Mercurio* directed various editorials to the professional associations and to the small business and transport gremios. [...] The fact that 'gremial power' was elaborated well before the transport strike in October is confirmed neatly in an editorial in *El Mercurio* from January, 1972: 'Today the tide is turning. The individualism of the small farmer or small businessman has broken under the urgency of building solidarity.' (pp. 256–7)
 15. Armand Mattelart points out that the efforts of professionals to train worker correspondents became a topic of intense dispute in some cordons. Many workers were extremely dissatisfied with the left press, and rejected the 'technical' or 'journalism school' modes of expression that journalists used as being inauthentic to the workers' own modes of expression (Mattelart, 1980, pp. 189–91).
 16. 'Between August and December of 1971, the number of magazines available in the kiosks increased from 49 to 81' (Armand and Michèle Mattelart, 1972, p. 114).
 17. In spite of the common influence of semiology and the common concern with ideology, it is striking how the scholars of these two schools virtually never cite each other's work. It would be tempting to attribute this to the 'one-way flow of information', since publications in both schools cite foreign scholars liberally, but such an explanation

verges on absurdity when taking into consideration the fact that both schools were part of the Universidad Católica, in Santiago. Furthermore, it is clear that there were important differences in the interpretations of ideology in these schools, disagreements which can easily be seen as an implicit dialogue, as will be discussed below. The explanation offered by many of the scholars I interviewed in Santiago for the apparent lack of communication between the schools was the fact that CEREN was organized primarily as a research centre, while EAC was a professional school. However, given the involvement of scholars from CEREN in practical communications efforts and the research done in EAC, I find this response to be, perhaps, circumspect. I can offer no better explanation, however, except perhaps that the intensity of political conflict among the different sectors of the left between 1970 and 1973, coupled with the evident need to preserve a common political front, led different scholars on the left to avoid directly criticizing each other's work.

18. This distinction is very difficult to sustain. Cultural goods are no less 'material' than other sorts of commodities.

4 Repression and Resistance: 1973–90

01. Article VIII reads in part:

Every act of persons or groups intended to propagate doctrines which threaten the family, propose violence or a conception of society, of the State or of the juridical order, of a totalitarian character or based upon class struggle, is illicit and contrary to the institutional order of the Republic.

Organizations and political movements or parties which by their goals or by the activities of their members work towards these goals are unconstitutional[...].

In addition to other sanctions established by the Constitution or law, people who are found in contravention of this Article may not hold public office, whether popularly elected or not, for a period of ten years [after having been found in contravention]. Neither may they be rectors or directors in educational establishments nor exercise teaching functions in them; nor may they be owners, directors or administrators of any social medium of communication nor realize any function regarding the emission or diffusion of information or opinion; nor may they be the directors of organizations of a political or educational character, nor neighborhood, professional, business, labor, student or guild organizations, for a period of ten years.

02. Levy does not discuss the private *research* institutes that are the concern of this chapter.
03. This focus on the historical development of communication systems also figures prominently in studies of particular media, as will be seen below.

04. 'State of compromise', or *estado de compromiso*, is a concept used by Chilean social theorists to describe the situation in Chile between the 1930s and 1973, in which no social group had sufficient power to impose its project on the society without compromising with other contending groups.
05. Another very important work done in this vein is Fred Landis's (1981) study of the use of psychological warfare techniques in *El Mercurio*. Building on the evidence of CIA involvement in the campaign to undermine Allende's government, Landis demonstrates the use of particular propaganda techniques to concrete political ends by the CIA, in the pages of *El Mercurio*. His study is not examined in more depth here because although many Chilean scholars were aware of it, few seem to have been influenced by it. In general, the imperialist dimension of the ideology of *El Mercurio* was much less of a concern for Chilean intellectuals after 1973.
06. It is important to reiterate the role played by Universidad Católica-educated economists in setting *El Mercurio's* editorial policy. The newspaper played a leading role in promoting neoliberal economic reform from the beginning of the military government. For a more detailed discussion of neoliberalism's rise in Chile, in addition to the discussion above, see also Vergara (1985), and Collins and Lear (1995).
07. Portales's arguments about the industrial system need to be augmented here by the notion that the television habits of viewers, as well as those of producers, play a role in the television system.
08. A contrasting approach to the study of the effects of television on the development of the moral capacities of children, based on Piaget's model of moral development and disaggregating television into specific children's programmes produced in Chile, was developed by Paulina Domínguez (1985).
09. The assumption that the party press, for being 'vertical' or 'vanguardist', was not therefore organic seems to be shared by Sunkel. However, as Santa Cruz points out, the parties and their organs did not spring from the void; they were the creation of the popular, working-class movements in Chile (Santa Cruz, 1985, p. 25).
10. Of course, the various bulletins and papers elaborated in the industrial cordons in 1972 and 1973 would also fall under this description, but all had disappeared with the coup.
11. For three very different accounts, see Le Saux (1986); Vidal (1991); Hite (1996).
12. An important exception to this tendency existed in ILET's sponsorship of a feminist press network, Fempress, which collected and reproduced news reports mainly from around Latin America. However, this practical experience of communications in the women's movement in Chile and around the region had little effect on the study of communications in Chile.
13. 'Alleged' change in position, because many of the prominent intellectuals whom Petras appears to criticize were not in fact supporters of the popular initiatives during the Allende years. It is important to remember that the Unidad Popular coalition was itself divided over

the issues surrounding popular power, insurrection, and the importance of proceeding through legal means to achieve socialism. Furthermore, although many of the intellectuals associated with the research centres that focused on communications problems had been identified with the left, many of the other research centres that enjoyed philanthropic support were associated with the PDC, and not with the left.

5 Conclusion: Present and Future in Chilean Communications Studies

1. Jeffrey Puryear describes the role of the CIS, a consortium of Socialist, Conservative, and Christian Democrat think tanks, in developing this strategy (1994, pp. 138–50).
2. ‘Ferment in the Field’ was the title given to a special issue of the Annenberg School’s *Journal of Communication* in 1983, in which proponents of critical communications scholarship debated with proponents of the ‘dominant paradigm’ through 35 essays appraising the problems confronting the field.
3. This differing set of initial assumptions, along with the differing political and institutional contexts in which they were produced, goes a long way towards explaining the differing and even contradictory interpretations of Dorfman and Mattelart’s book outside Latin America.
4. ‘The Last Temptation of Christ’ was scheduled to be aired on television in 1996. Porvenir de Chile was not the only conservative group opposed to its broadcast; *La Nación* published an open letter to Eduardo Frei, President of Chile, from the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property, calling on him to continue the ban on the film (“‘Last Temptation’ controversy continues”, 1997). Originally banned in 1988 by the Film Classification Council, the film was reviewed again and approved in November, 1996. This led Porvenir de Chile to file a lawsuit, claiming that the film was offensive to the person of Jesus Christ and to Christians. The Court of Appeals upheld the ban in January, 1997, and the Supreme Court upheld the ban in June of that year.
5. See Nicholas Garnham (1995) for a discussion of the changes in analytical focus in media studies and the nature of media intellectuals under the waning of critical media studies and the waxing of more pragmatic studies.
6. Paulina Domínguez (1998) confirms the perceptions that (1) the non-governmental research centres tended to lose personnel to government positions as foreign funding for their activities dried up, and (2) that a number of new schools or departments of journalism were created within the new universities, such as the Universidad Diego Portales, the Universidad Andrés Bello, the Universidad Finis Terrae, the Universidad Gabriela Mistral, and the Universidad De Los Andes. To this, she added the observation the funding for research into communications in Chile is also scarce, despite the existence of

offices or areas for the study of communication in the National Council for Television (CNT), for which both Diego Portales and Valerio Fuenzalida continue to work, and in the Ministerio Secretario General de Gobierno, for which José Joaquín Brunner is now minister and in which Carlos Catalán participates. Catalán also writes occasionally for the Arts and Letters section of *El Mercurio*.

7. Navarrete, a member of the Christian Democrat Party, was dismissed by TVN's governing board under pressure from the board's right-wing members. Their criticism centred on Navarrete's allowing the broadcast of programmes which, in their view, undermined social and family values. One of the programmes to which they had strongly reacted was a televised interview with Michael Townley, former agent of the Chilean secret police (DINA) and participant in the assassination of Orlando Letelier. The program had originally been scheduled for broadcast during a 'sweeps week' but was pulled, apparently after a direct intervention from President Eduardo Frei. It was broadcast later, making the whole episode a serious embarrassment for the government. Similarly, the La Red television network fired Ms Bailey, the hostess of the evening programme 'Noche Serena', apparently for being too critical of the Court of Appeal's decision to ban the film 'The Last Temptation of Christ' ('"Last Temptation" controversy continues', 1997). Critical space in the commercial media can be opened, but it is politically fragile and discursively constrained. This fragility highlights the need for alternative and popular communications media, with critical spaces from which the hegemonic pressures that structure the commercial media can be contested.

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