



H A N D B O O K O F  
**CONFLICT ANALYSIS  
AND RESOLUTION**

Edited by  
Dennis J. D. Sandole, Sean Byrne,  
Ingrid Sandole-Staroste and  
Jessica Senehi

# Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution

This major new handbook comprises cutting-edge essays from leading scholars in the field of conflict analysis and resolution (CAR).

The volume provides a comprehensive overview of the core concepts, theories, approaches, processes, and intervention designs in the field. The central theme is the value of *multidisciplinary* approaches to the analysis and resolution of conflicts. This consists of moving from the study of analytical approaches to understanding the deep-rooted causes of conflict, to third party intervention approaches to preventing or ending violence, and to resolving and transforming conflict.

The book is divided into four main parts:

- Part I Core concepts and theories
- Part II Core approaches
- Part III Core practices
- Part IV Alternative voices and complex intervention designs

The *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* is a benchmark publication with major importance both for current research and for the future of the field. It will be essential reading for all students of conflict resolution, peace and conflict studies, and international relations in general, as well as for practitioners in the field.

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**Edited by Dennis J. D. Sandole,  
Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-  
Staroste and Jessica Senehi**

**Foreword by Dean G. Pruitt**

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## **Dedication**

Sean Byrne and Jessica Senehi dedicate this book to their five-year-old daughter Katie, and Dr. Arthur V. Mauro OC, OM, QC, KSG. Katie Byrne is an energetic, loving, and beautiful child who is a real people's person. We are forever amazed at how Katie works to build bridges and relationships between all people that she encounters on her daily sojourns. Dr. Arthur V. Mauro's generosity, wisdom, and vision made possible the creation of the Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice, the Storytelling for Peacebuilding and Renewing Community (SPARC) Institute, and led to the establishment of Canada's first PhD Program in Peace and Conflict Studies within the Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Manitoba, housed at the Mauro Centre. Dr. Mauro is truly an outstanding person; his passion to create a more peaceful world is truly engaging and inspiring. This book is also dedicated to the memory of Dr. Harold Buchwald QC, OC, founding member of the Mauro Centre Board of Directors.

Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste dedicate this book, with its implicit and explicit problemsolving insights, to their son Timothy John Sandole and his generation, who will inherit a world of unsolved problems resulting from the commissions and omissions of his parents' generation.



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# Foreword

Conflict resolution is both a very old and a very new field. The *practice* of conflict resolution is probably as old as mankind itself. Chimpanzees and bonobos, our closest animal relatives, show it. So why not early man? But *theory and empirical research* in this field are relatively new and still in an early state of development.

In the mid-1950s, when I became interested in conflict resolution, there was no gathered field of scholarship. Most social science disciplines had done some work on this topic; and a branch of mathematics, the theory of games, dealt with strategic interaction. But there was little contact or common identity across disciplines, and you had to do detective work to find the literature.

The beginnings of a separate field can be seen as far back as 1957 with the founding of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, whose editorial board contained representatives from economics, geography, history, international relations, mathematical biology, political science, social psychology, and sociology. But the first scholarly professional organization, the International Association for Conflict Management, and the first training program, the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, are only 25 years old.

The field has grown rapidly in the last 25 years. Every year there are more academic programs, courses, scholars, and students; and trained conflict resolution practitioners have multiplied. Society has finally discovered the field. Still, the discipline, though rich in insights and findings, shows signs of immaturity. Most conflict scholars are still in traditional departments and schools, and there is yet no department of conflict resolution. There is little commonly accepted theory; instead there are competing “schools” of explanation and application. Research is rarely cumulative, and most practice is informed by experience rather than research.

Given the rapid growth of this discipline, it is not surprising that there are already two handbooks. One of them, *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, edited by Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus, was first published in 2000 and had a second edition in 2006. The other, *The Handbook on Conflict Resolution*, edited by Bercovitch, Kremenjuk, and Zartman, will be published in 2008. Both show evidence of the decentralized nature of the field. The first is mainly based on the social psychological tradition of conflict studies; the second relies heavily on the international relations tradition. The two books share only six chapters on the same topic, out of 37 in one and 33 in the other.

The present volume is much more interdisciplinary than the other two, and hence covers more ground. Although most of its chapters are primarily concerned with international and ethno-nationalist conflict, it is by no means harnessed to the field of international

relations. Many other disciplines have important things to say about these topics, including the subfield of peace studies, which is well represented.

A novel approach was taken to developing this volume – one that is appropriate for a field so young and diverse. Rather than assuming an omniscience that nobody has and dividing the field into an inevitably arbitrary set of topics, the editors chose an interdisciplinary group of experts and asked them to write about the phenomena they knew best. In other words, the editors chose an emic rather than an etic approach and let the field develop its own segmentation rather than imposing a conceptual structure from above.

The result is a fascinating set of essays on a wide variety of topics, both theoretical and applied. Each chapter is coherent, covering a major trend or useful new outlook for the field. But the chapters are mostly quite different from each other, reflecting a discipline with many origins and immense scope. Thus, among others, there are chapters on research methods for the study of conflict, causal theories underlying various views of conflict, collective identity, nationalism, culture and conflict, escalation, settlement, peacebuilding, interactions between development and conflict, the impact of international law on conflict, interactive conflict resolution, mediation, violence against women, and early warning signs of intergroup violence. Some chapters present challenging new points of departure for the field; for example, those on the role of generativity needs in conflict, capacity building for disputants who are engaged in conflict resolution, a circumplex model of conflict tactics, and the relevance of empire theory to modern-day conflicts.

There is also much deepening and hence strengthening of the field. Several chapters present critiques of prominent theoretical trends. Others put forward contingency models for choosing conflict resolution tactics, a welcome antidote to the disjointed “schools” approach. And one chapter contains words of wisdom about the need for a holistic outlook which recognizes that all elements of a conflict intervention program interact with each other.

In short, the editors are to be congratulated for putting together a set of chapters that reflect the current state of this diverse field and lay out so many useful paths to the future.

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# Preface

## Introduction

In his compelling account of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides (1951) recounts the sorrowful tale of the Melians, who, in 416 BC, attempted to exercise their right to self-determination in the face of the hegemonic power of Athens after Lacedaemonia (a Spartan ally) withdrew from their island state. Realizing that the Lacedaemonian withdrawal from Melos created a “power vacuum,” Athens sent emissaries to Melos to negotiate the island-state’s accession to Athenian control. Despite persuasive arguments put forward by the Athenian negotiators, for example that the Melians were clearly much weaker than the Athenians, the Melians would have none of it and persevered in defending their right to self-determination. In the end, in classic, narrowly framed *Realpolitik* fashion, based upon the categorical imperative that “the strong do what they can and the weak bear what they must” (ibid.: 331), Athens invaded the island-state, killed all the men, sold the women and children into slavery and occupied Melos with Athenians, thereby extending Athens’s hegemony in the region.

Over 2,000 years later, the self-stimulating/self-perpetuating violent conflict potential of *Realpolitik* is still with us, as is painfully obvious in the counterproductive, self-defeating efforts of the US under President George W. Bush to aspire to global hegemony. So is the need to find more effective means of conflict handling and of conflict resolution, because, to a large extent, the available texts in the field are outdated or otherwise limited by their reliance on support from a single preferred theory or specific approach to “conflict resolution.”

## State of the art

Despite this literature–reality disconnect, there are three interesting studies that approach the topic of the *multidisciplinarity* of conflict analysis and resolution. Sandra Cheldelin, Daniel Druckman, and Larissa Fast’s (2008) *Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention* presents an approach to the analysis and resolution of conflicts, influenced by a multitude of theories and approaches, including John Burton’s basic human needs approach. Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe’s (1993) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* analyzes the many roles played by third parties in conflict analysis and resolution, the ways these interventions complement each other, and how these activities should be coordinated. Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste’s (1987) *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications* appeared at a time when multi-level approaches to various categories of conflict resolution were not common currency in the development of the field.

## The present volume

### *Editors, disciplinary, and audience*

The present volume builds on this small sample. As such, it represents the combined efforts of, among others, the co-directors of Canada's first PhD Program in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Drs. Sean Byrne and Jessica Senehi, and the co-editors of one of the very first books documenting the status of the evolving field of conflict analysis and resolution (*Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications* [1987]), Drs. Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste. Dennis Sandole is also a founder-member of one of the world's first educational institutions awarding the PhD, MSc, and BA/BSc in Conflict Analysis and Resolution: the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University in Fairfax and Arlington, Virginia.

Given our intimate connection with the development of a number of undergraduate and graduate courses on Conflict Analysis and Resolution at ICAR, George Mason University; Department of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (DCAR), Nova Southeastern University; and the new PhD Program in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Manitoba, we recognize the need for a book that makes conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) interesting and relevant to students, policymakers, and conflict resolution practitioners. This book presents the multidisciplinary CAR field within the context of *analysis, intervention design and implementation, prevention, and evaluation*. Emphasis is placed on the multidisciplinary and the micro–macro etiology of conflict as well as multimodal and multilevel intervention and prevention approaches. The central theme of the book is the *value of multi- and interdisciplinary approaches to the analysis and resolution of complex conflicts*. This approach consists of moving from the study of analytical approaches to understanding the deep-rooted causes of conflict to third party intervention approaches to prevent or end violence and resolve conflict. The book concludes with key insights derived from multidisciplinary analyses as well as myriad, applied efforts to transform conflict and to address the deep roots of violence.

Accordingly, among the nearly forty chapters that follow, we present a number of analytical models from the disciplines to understand the *dynamic complexity* of conflict, a number of third party intervention models as well as dynamic transformational peace-building examples to build empowerment at the grassroots. It is a collection of work from pioneers and others who have contributed to the development of the CAR field, working from their own disciplines yet cognizant of the *multidisciplinary* nature of that field.

This volume is a candidate text for members of many disciplines (from international relations to peace studies) and many professions (from diplomats and policymakers to academics and researchers, from business leaders and lawyers to media). Other audiences, including international humanitarian workers, governmental officials, military and law enforcement leaders, and conflict resolution practitioners, will find it useful, too. In general, the book is geared toward undergraduate and graduate students in the social sciences broadly defined.

That is, the book has been targeted toward students in social science programs that emphasize the micro (interpersonal) to macro (international) dimensions of conflict and violence – students who are interested in the myriad of interrelated factors that can be sources of conflict, and intervention into them to prevent violence in the short term and, in the long run, transform conflict. It is our hope that the topics treated in the book will provide guidance for students interested in the analysis and resolution of conflicts. The



increased popularity of the CAR field in undergraduate and graduate schools around the globe, *especially* in the post-9/11 world, make this an auspicious time for a book of this type. Given the number of “competitors” to this volume being published at about the same time (Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus 2006; Bercovitch, Kremenjuk, and Zartman 2008; Webel and Galtung 2007), we are clearly not alone in this firm conviction.

On a personal note, the book represents the kind of text that would have been helpful to us when we were graduate students. We would have liked to have known about several of the topics discussed in this book in terms of *theory building*, *research*, and *practice*. These topics include the micro–macro linkage, the role of various political actors in causing aggression and violence, and the need to end *structural violence* by creating a *positive peace*.

The promise of this volume, as we see it, is a multi- and interdisciplinary, *elicitive* and eclectic approach to theory building, research, and practice that will equip and energize students, policymakers, conflict resolution practitioners, and others, with new knowledge and skills necessary to deal with the *complexity* of ethno-political conflict and violence in the *postmodern world* (Sandole 2007). The CAR field is a multi- and interdisciplinary one because human conflicts, no matter at what level, are about *relationships* (Lederach 1997; Saunders 1999), and relationships have psychological, cultural, religious, economic, social, and other dimensions, as well as historical ones. So, to do justice both to the analysis and resolution of destructive (or potentially destructive) conflicts, we have to deal with *all* of their dimensions, including the historical (but not *only* the historical). Otherwise, we will be complicit in offering a one-dimensional analysis of a complex conflict and in the process, become more a part of the problem than of the solution, especially if the flawed analysis becomes the basis for an equally flawed intervention that ignores all other aspects of the conflict. The CAR field encourages us to step outside of any one “box” to imagine an organic and lasting peace, such that social justice and humanity become the cornerstone of conflict transformation – something that we feel is lacking in today’s complex, multi-problematic world.

### **Structural**

Based on the contributions by the authors, this volume comprises four parts, in addition to this preface and the following chapter introducing the reader to a vision of the CAR field. Following the four parts, there is a conclusion divided into three sections: one is written by Professor Johan Galtung, a pioneer in this field, who makes the critical point that if the road to peace passes through conflict resolution then a transnational, transdisciplinary, and translevel conflictology is a must for peace studies; a second revisits the earlier vision of the CAR field to explore to what extent there is a “goodness of fit” between it and the chapters presented in the volume; and the third concludes the volume with regard to its implications for theory, research, practice, and teaching.

More specifically, Part I of the volume addresses core concepts and theories; Part II delineates core conceptual and methodological approaches; Part III describes core practices and processes; and Part IV explores alternative voices and complex intervention designs. Clearly, despite the analytical distinctions between the four themes of the proposed structure of the volume, the differences between them can be very fluid!

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# Introduction



# Conflict analysis and resolution as a multidiscipline

A work in progress

*Sean Byrne and Jessica Senehi*

## Introduction

Conflict arises in different contexts, and occurs at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, organizational, and international levels. Conflict exists when incompatible goals develop between persons, groups, or nations (Deutsch and Coleman 2000). It is important to pay attention to the origins, development, and life cycle of conflict as well as the factors that lead to conflict escalation and de-escalation, and the attitudes, behaviors, situations, goals, and values that influence individuals' interaction and intervention styles (Rubin *et al.* 1992). The parties choose contending, yielding, withdrawing, inaction, or problemsolving strategies to cope with incompatible goals, emotions, and images of the other that escalate the conflict (*ibid.*). Bargaining, threats, and pressures are used to influence the other party's decisions and behaviors, and either escalate or through third party intervention de-escalate the conflict (Pearson 2001).

Destructive conflicts tend to expand and escalate as competition, poor communication, hostile attitudes, misjudgment, and misperception take hold so that the parties get stuck in a situation that makes no logical sense (Kriesberg 1998). Deutsch and Coleman (2000) argue that the perception of any act is determined by an individual's image of the act and by that person's perception of the context in which the act occurs. When there is a power asymmetry in a relationship, conflict may escalate as the disempowered party seeks to redress grievances against the more powerful party. Thus, as a function of social conflict, power plays an important role in terms of relations and modes of resolution (Boulding 1990a). Third parties with an appropriate intervention process can balance the power and even the playing field.

This chapter explores the nature of the multidiscipline of the conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) field, which studies human conflict and violence. It examines the historical context of the field, a conflict analysis framework, practice, and other voices.

## Historical context of the field

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) emerged before the 1960s when power bargaining games between management and trade unions had resulted in zero-sum solutions. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) provided a balance of power between the rival political and military superpowers in an anarchical international system. Problemsolving workshops by John Burton, Dennis Sandole, Leonard Doob, Ronald Fisher, Herb Kelman, Edward Azar, Chris Mitchell, John Paul

Lederach, and others were a direct response to the arms race and the proliferation of ethnopolitical conflicts. The Vatican mediated the 1984 Beagle Islands dispute between Chile and Argentina, and Adam Curle mediated the 1967–70 conflict between Nigeria and a secessionist Biafra. These unofficial mediators facilitated dialogue among rival ethnic groups to promote understanding of the other's views and of *basic human needs* in order to forge a new openness to build trust and to focus on consensus decisionmaking.

The CAR field has developed in a series of four waves beginning with changing political values during the 1960s when people, opposing their governments, sought participatory democracy and social change. Wave one coincided with the “power to the people” counterculture revolution of the 1960s, and with student unrest unraveling in the struggle for native American rights, the anti-war movement, the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the anti-nuclear movement. ADR emerged as people sought to solve their own problems locally. In 1964, the United States (US) government responded by establishing the Community Relations Service. Also, in 1957, Professor Ken Boulding founded the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and in 1962 Professor Johan Galtung created the *Journal of Peace Research*. The International Peace Research Association (IPRA) was founded in 1965 and in 1973 the University of Bradford created the first School of Peace Studies.

The second wave witnessed the professionalization of the field. The Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) formed in 1972 and eventually merged with Conflict Resolution Network (CREnet) and the Association of Family Mediators (AFM) in 2001 to become the Association of Conflict Resolution (ACR). Divorce mediation and community mediation sought to preserve continuing family relationships and to rebuild neighborhood communities, and university law schools created ADR academic programs in the early 1980s.

In wave three the CAR movement began to explore structural roots of conflict, basic human needs, and the connection between micro and macro levels of intervention. For example, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) was founded in 1981 at George Mason University, establishing a comprehensive multidisciplinary MSc. In 1987, the renamed ICAR created the first CAR doctoral program in North America. In 1992, the Department of Dispute Resolution of Nova Southeastern University offered an MSc in Dispute Resolution. In 1994, then renamed the Department of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, DCAR began to offer a CAR doctoral program. Moreover, in 1984 the USIP was founded, as well as in 1985 the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, and Conflict Resolution Network Canada.

Wave four has culminated in conflict transformation and peace and conflict studies. The MA Program in Conflict Transformation at Eastern Mennonite University emphasizes the transformation of relationships and structures. Canada's first Doctoral Program in Peace and Conflict Studies founded in 2005 at the Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice at St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba, has brought together CAR with peace studies.

The assumption of CAR is that, although each different conflict has unique aspects, there are common theoretical ideas for understanding and responding to them.

## Theory

In seeking to create a comprehensive mapping of CAR theory, the creation of a typology can be understood as the construction of a framework through which conflicts can be

analyzed (Sandole 2003: 37). Formal and middle-range theory focuses on the relationships and interactions between individuals and between the micro, macro, and meso levels of analysis, explaining the socioeconomic and political elements that make up our worlds (Bartos and Wehr 2002). We now consider the role of agency, rationality, structure, system, and group dynamics within a conflict analysis framework in order to best understand the complexity and dynamics of conflicts.

### *Agency*

It is important to understand how individuals construct their socioeconomic and political world by exploring their meaning and motives. For example, Max Weber (1958) believed that we must interpret the meaning of the actor living in the iron cage made up of technocrats in rational organizations embedded in a hierarchy of rational rules where people obey. Simmel (1955) saw society as psychological processes and a web of micro interactions based on exchange. Society is in the minds of people so that structures cannot be analyzed independently of individuals.

Freud (1949) argued that we must know the nature of the human being and so devised a personality structure with an irrational and unconscious *id* that is repressed by the *ego* as the judge and consciousness of the *superego* that seeks to influence the *id*. Freud also devised stages of development of the sexual instinct whereby the individual has to overcome something in each stage. The individual also has defense mechanisms (repression, denial, projection, etc.) to deal with anxiety, fear, and conflict. A threat to the *ego* leads to conflict, and a poorly developed *ego* results in an individual's vulnerability to threats so that the person is not able to cope with conflict-induced anxiety (Erikson 1968). George Herbert Mead (1962) saw the self as structured by language and social experience so that the individual had multiple selves for different kinds of relationships. The self consists of an "I" that responds to the person's milieu, a "me" that reflects the gestures of others, and a "generalized other," which the child takes through stages using play to learn the roles and rules of the structure.

Paulo Freire (1999) and Frantz Fanon (1965) make the point that people need to raise their political consciousness to become aware of the context in which they live and the impact it has on their lives. For example, colonialism and imperialism created great cultural damage as the colonized internalized the colonizer's racist ideology, coming, over time, to accept the mantle of the oppressed (Fanon 1965; Memmi 1975). This process of oppression results in the transgenerational transmission of trauma passed down orally from one generation to the next (Volkan 1998). However, people have agency to act and advocate for their basic human needs (Burton 1990). Suffering and the purification of one's soul leads to personalized self-control and love (*ahimsa*) so that the oppressed can empower and convert the opponent to the truth (Gandhi 1992).

Incompatible goals result when desired future outcomes are different (Fisher 1996; Kelman 1997). For example, the Palestinians desire a Palestinian state whereas the Israelis want to feel secure in their own country. It is important to pay attention to context as the issues and images of the other change over time (Zartman 1995) as boundaries become unclear; shifting identities can result in the escalation of conflict (Rothman 1997). Thus, we need to pay attention to the attitudes, emotions, fears, and misperceptions that arise from conflict over time (Jervis 1976; Volkan 1998). Rational actors also seek to maximize the satisfaction of their interests, wants, personal desires, and objectives.



### **Rationality**

Theory also highlights how individuals rationally calculate their interests and the means to realize them typically at the expense of others. Roberto Michels's (1962) "iron law of oligarchy," for example, illustrates how elites pursue individual gratification in their quest for power resulting in society's being comprised of the leaders and the led. Similarly, the Realist School believes that power is necessary in an anarchical society if the state is to protect the national interest, and to get other states to act as it wants (Morgenthau 1993). Individuals act on their own self-interest to achieve goals (de Mesquita 1981).

Michel Foucault (1979), on the other hand, argues that we need to deconstruct power relations and the grand narrative if we are to understand the interweaving of a multiplicity of narratives that comprise society's story. Human beings are not rational animals, and more often than not base their decisions on emotive or some other cognitive criteria rather than rationality. All individuals are part of an interconnected web of interrelationships that transcends the atomistic rational self-interested agent who is striving to maximize utility-maximizing individual interests. Individuals and their subjective values are not the units of analysis, and often do not function rationally and efficiently. Patterns in sociopolitical structures affect the subjective experience and agency of individuals.

### **Structure**

Marx (1963) believed that individuals are victims of their socioeconomic location in history, suppressing their creativity and leaving them with little choice. According to Marx, structure determines the conscious experience thus limiting each individual's agency. The organization of the economy for the production of goods eventually leads to alienation and objectification as the person is reduced to the level of object and is alienated from her/his identity. Building on Marx's argument that the structure of material relationships has affected the history of human relationships, structural Marxists such as dependency theorists and world systems theorists point to the exploitative relationship that exists between the core first world countries and the peripheral developing countries (Wallerstein 1980). The core invests in overseas markets in the periphery, extracting cheap resources and labor, and saturating these markets with its products.

Similarly, Louis Althusser (1969) argued that the economic structure, state, and ideology take away the autonomy of the individual. In Althusser's three-stories model of economic oppression the economic base controls labor and capital while all conflict arises in the political structure, which includes the legal system and the state, and the ideological structure comprising religious, legal, and political orientations. The autonomy allowed by the economic base in the superstructure (political and ideological levels) is an illusion because it obscures the fact that the real conflict is in the economic base. Paul Bew *et al.* (1979) applied Althusser's framework to the Northern Ireland conflict, drawing the conclusion that the Unionist and Nationalist conflict taking place in the superstructure (state and ideology) prevented a class alliance between Protestants and Catholics. Critical theorists argue that the way ideologies are constructed can dominate the consciousness.

Thus, in neocapitalist society's technologized culture, the media plays a strategic role in creating a mass consumer ideology as people become blind, mindless robots ready to step up to the next better product in the gadget society (Marcuse 1964). The Frankfurt School avers that, as technology becomes more important than the product, people use instrumental reason; critical theory is important to critique culture through the concept

of reason. Feminists also make the critical point that the patriarchal structure excludes women while legitimizing male domination and the political subordination of objectified women (Enloe 2000). The patriarchal war structure constructs social relationships in order to maintain gender inequality and oppression (Sylvester 2002; Tickner 1992).

The state holds a monopoly over the use of violence in society, and devised the social contract with the people by institutionalizing violence with an agreed set of rules and methods that act as a deterrent to limit violence in the community. Institutionalization necessitates the combination of conflict and cooperation because procedures and rules cannot function in the absence of enforcement through sanctions or voluntary obedience. In the international self-help and anarchic international system, small and large, powerless and powerful states mediate conflicts and encourage the disputing parties to provide accurate information so that they can negotiate better (Kleiboer 1998). International institutions, NGOs, non-state actors (Mennonites, Quakers, the Holy See), diplomats, and private individuals mediate a variety of conflicts, and attempt to create a process that institutionalizes a conflict resolution approach to manage international conflicts (Crocker *et al.* 2001). Third parties need to be trustworthy, legitimate, and impartial to be invited into a conflict to persuade parties to search for a common ground, and to facilitate change (Princen 1991). Collective social arrangements or systems are independent of the subjective intentions of individuals.

### **System**

System theorists are of the opinion that individuals are religious and cultural conformists in a shared normative system. For example, Emile Durkheim (1964) contends that society is like a biological organism in which all parts of the system intricately fit together in a fashion similar to that of the human body system. The collective conscience is the ideas and sentiments that are culturally inherited whereby people live by moral rules that are shaped by the society. *Anomic* suicide results during a crisis when the societal norms break down, and individuals with weak ties and relationships commit suicide. With the division of labor the individual is both an active agent and a passive recipient so that the specialization of functions and the development of contracts prevent the spillover of conflict, keeping society intact.

In other words, society comprises collective social arrangements that have logic and direction that are independent of the subjective intentions of its members (Mitrany 1966). Functional interdependence between the members of the European Union (EU) as well as institutionalized norms and procedures have provided for organizational efficiency, continued communication, and a mode of resolution of the conflict interaction process. Similarly, material relations determine cultural ideas, and enter each individual's consciousness through the media and marketing that construct an ideology that cements the control of the power elite (Bourdieu 1993). However, individuals belong to social groups because they have common historical memories, elements of a shared culture, and an attachment to a geographic space.

### **Group dynamics**

Social groups hold desirable traits that enhance their self-esteem, and identity and group boundaries that also reflect the stereotypes that influence encoding and the retrieval of information about other groups (Rose 1972). Individuals strive to maintain a positive

social identity. Membership in a social group enhances the individual's social identity. The person derives a positive social identity based on comparing her/his own group with other social groups (Tajfel 1982). A real or perceived threat to the group causes internal hostility, and is viewed as a threat to the person's notion of self, which produces ingroup solidarity and awareness of ingroup identity resulting in intergroup discrimination (*ibid.*). Thus, ethnocentrism results when a member uses a group's internal attributes to explain socially desirable actions by homogeneous ingroup members and undesirable social actions by members of the outgroup (LeVine and Campbell 1972; Sandole 1998). External conflict functions to mobilize the group and enhance internal cohesion within the group (Cosser 1956; Simmel 1955).

Individual group members rely on cognitive schemata or symbols and cognitive structures that organize information and some segment of past experience (Schank and Abelson 1977). Individuals process new information through their schemata to understand, encode, and decode the information, and to devise a strategy based on past experience. Group norms and values also influence how one group relates to another in an intergroup conflict situation (Rothman 1997). Moreover, external threats and time pressures during a crisis can produce groupthink that prevents a homogenized group from realistically evaluating alternative courses of action as a result of a shared illusion of unanimity, self-censorship, and pressure from ingroup members on those who provide alternative information (Janis 1982).

In contrast, constructive conflict is functional because it works to air problems in a public forum as well as encourage personal and group social change and internal group cohesiveness (Kriesberg 1998). Individuals recognize that there is a problem, experience frustration, see the problem through a different lens, formulate a working solution to the problem, test the solution, and reformulate the problem (Ury *et al.* 1993). A cooperative interactive problemsolving process leads to open communication, recognition of each side's interests, and development of trust (Fisher 1996). Despite the existence of a power asymmetry, a stronger relationship between parties will more likely resolve the conflict (Ross 1993). Bringing the key stakeholders into the process that influence the course of the conflict is critical in addressing position and resource scarcity, and interests to successfully de-escalate the conflict (Byrne 1995). Third parties must pay attention to intragroup tensions, leadership roles and functions, and motivational and attitudinal factors when designing intervention processes (Dukes 1995).

## **Practice**

CAR involves reflexive practice whereby a third party, major power, non-state actor or private individual intervenes with professional expertise, knowledge, and a process to stop violence, and de-escalate conflict (Katz and Lawyer 1992). External and internal third parties work face to face to establish and enforce norms to improve communication, induce and maintain positive motivation, build trust to improve attitudes and the relationship, and diagnose the issues in a creative problemsolving process that addresses subjective (identity, human needs, perception) as well as objective issues (land, money) to expand the resource pie (Bercovitch 1984). This section explores some of the key practice processes in the CAR field such as prenegotiation, negotiation, mediation, and facilitative collaborative problemsolving.

### ***Prerenegotiation***

Conflicting parties consider exploring negotiation if the other party is willing to reciprocate, explore the other party's bargaining range, identify the key stakeholders, consider the cost of continuing the conflict, and create a structure for negotiation (Breslin and Rubin 1993). For example, during the ongoing stalemate between Egypt and Israel, Anwar Sadat was interested in finding a compromise solution while Menachem Begin was in a strong military position. Jimmy Carter had promised the American public cheap oil and a resolution to the Arab–Israeli conflict (Princen 1991). Carter had the power and resources to wring concessions from both leaders, preventing new crises and uncertainties, creating a viable negotiation structure that shaped the Camp David agenda (*ibid.*). Third parties create a milieu conducive to negotiation and identify conditions for mutual reassurance and movement to the table (Kelman 1997).

The power base of the parties determines the representation at the table: can they implement or block a decision; have they the formal authority to make a decision; do they desire a future working relationship based on trust; and do they need other parties to accomplish goals (Gross Stein 1989)? Carpenter and Kennedy (1988), Gray (1989), and Ury *et al.* (1993) raise other important questions about parties and their needs, the substance of the dispute, and the relationships, background, and context of the conflict. Who are the parties and primary stakeholders, how are they organized, and what is their power base? What does each of the parties want? What are the issues, the problem, and the options? What are the data and information needs? What is the history of past and current relationships? What is the history of the conflict? Are there any likely forums for resolving the issues and the problem? Moreover, the parties may consider fractionating the problem when considering the scope of the issues to set the negotiation agenda (Fisher 1996; Kriesberg *et al.* 1989). The parties draft ground rules, and consider the options and the body of data that will satisfy the interests of all parties when setting the agenda. Negotiation is a process that allows parties to communicate with each other in an effort to reach agreement.

### ***Negotiation***

Parties attempt to convert each other to their goals and short- or long-term interests through compromise, moderating bargaining positions to search for superordinate goals (Lewicki *et al.* 1999; Rubin *et al.* 1992). Third parties explore how to overcome obstacles, and break stalemates to forge a political milieu conducive to continuing negotiations, making accommodations, and concluding agreements (Fisher 1996). Powerful third parties can use persuasion, reward, and well-timed concessions to save face for each party, de-escalate the conflict, and get both parties to reach agreement (Lewicki *et al.* 1996; Rubin *et al.* 1992). The US does this in the Arab–Israeli conflict providing economic and military aid to the parties thereby institutionalizing a conflict resolution process. The timing sequence of negotiation and preventing the public from knowing the details of the agreement is crucial to its success.

The method of principled negotiation is useful within the North American context of separating the people from the problem, focusing on interests and not positions, inventing options for mutual gain, and using objective criteria. Fisher *et al.* (1991) insist that the parties must address relationships and the problem independently by listening actively and effectively by being hard on the problem and soft on the people, in effect, looking for the interests behind the positions providing for face-saving and an interdependent search for a common ground to persuade others that the outcome will be fair (Ury 1993). Both parties

agree on the criteria and on the selection of a trusted third party to bridge the negotiation gap (Fisher *et al.* 1991). It is important to know one's best alternative to a negotiated settlement (BATNA) so that a poor agreement is not accepted; therefore, reframing statements clearly to communicate what one intends is critical (*ibid.*). Principled negotiation might not operate effectively within other cross-cultural contexts that use an elicitive process in which identity, gender issues, and power asymmetries exist to prevent personal empowerment (Byrne 2003). Mediation is a future-oriented problemsolving intervention process that encourages the empowerment, mutual recognition, and autonomy of conflictual parties.

### **Mediation**

In complex conflict in which the parties have reached an impasse and the continuation of the conflict will exacerbate tensions, a credible and acceptable mediator can bring the parties to agreement (Moore 1996). The artful mediator collects data, listens to the parties' stories, assists in identifying important issues and interests, and helps develop settlement options (Bolton 1986). The proactive mediator expands issues with focused questions to explore underlying interests and needs by expanding creative possibilities (Duffy *et al.* 1991). Mediators also assist in brainstorming and assessing options, in promoting final bargaining and decisionmaking, and in developing an implementation plan (Hocker and Wilmot 1995). Mediators may end the mediation process to pressure the parties to accept a specific solution (Weeks 1992), taking on the role of process facilitator, resource expander, scapegoat, clarifier, listener, and focuser (Moore 1996).

Inclusive directive mediation is a problemsolving interactive intervention process with a third party who attempts to empower both parties to reach consensus (win-win). The impartial mediator opens up communication in a creative way, addressing needs and maximizing alternatives to promote cooperation by building trust and confidence (Moore 1996). Mediators are keepers of the process, gathering information and identifying issues underlying the conflict using ground rules, skills, and tactics to reframe comments positively, ensuring that the parties understand what is going on (Weeks 1992). Mediators ensure the parties have accurate perceptions of each other, affecting how they perceive the impartiality of the process. Mediators work with the parties changing a conflict from a destructive to a cooperative relationship (Umbreit 1995).

Mediation does not resolve all racial, class, and ethnic problems. Mediation may stifle the opportunity to take an important issue before the courts. For example, if Rosa Parks had gone to mediation the civil rights movement might have been preempted. Mediation confidentiality could also lead to a cover-up. If a sexual harassment case, for example, went to mediation then the perpetrator and management might not be held accountable, and the institution of harassment would continue in that organization. Moreover, where there is a power asymmetry, as in a domestic violence situation, the wife may be more empowered in the courts than in mediation. Mediation may not empower ongoing relationships because it is a one-shot deal addressing the issue at hand and not providing conflict resolution skills for the parties (Schwerin 1995). Moreover, in cross-cultural conflict, how parties see the conflict is radically different. Disputants may feel they are giving up their freedom, fear the unknown, have poor verbal and reasoning skills, hold onto a familiar belief structure, or appear weak to the other party. Cross-cultural mediation needs an elicitive process grounded in a cultural approach to peacemaking such as the insider-partial model (Lederach 1995).

Transformational mediation transforms an individual's character to be morally better through empowerment (self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-respect) and recognition (concern for others), encouraging each party to be responsive, confident, and caring in the relationship (Bush and Folger 1994). Mediators focus on background events and the relationship history of the parties to come to a new understanding of themselves and each other rather than directing them to reach settlement. In contrast, problemsolving processes empower groups to identify a problem, establish criteria to evaluate the root causes, and select a solution.

### ***Facilitative collaborative problemsolving***

Facilitative collaborative problemsolving processes involve representatives of formal decisionmakers, parties affected by potential options, and spoilers who can obstruct an option (Laue 1982). An inclusive process seeks a resolution of the underlying issues by creating and selecting options that all parties support and view as workable (*ibid.*). Facilitators and recorders work with small groups trying to resolve tough problems (Kelman 1997), combining analytical and creative thinking by brainstorming alternatives to generate as many ideas as possible. Facilitators write up ideas on a large pad creating a collective memory to keep the group focused on the task, and to organize the ideas into themes (Doyle and Straus 1982). Facilitators work with groups to generate a problem statement using Occam's razor to keep the process simple, allocating each idea from brainstorming to one of the themes (Schwarz 1994). Facilitators and the group work on each theme separately, bearing in mind whether or not the group influences the issue, collects data about it in a reasonable time, and wants to solve that issue (Gray 1989).

Facilitators get the group to record the real problem by connecting the current state with the desired state in terms of interests and needs (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988). The group discusses each possibility, working with the facilitator to reach consensus about what they want from the solution to the problem. Facilitators then work with the group to analyze the problem creatively by exploring the problem from different perspectives. A spider diagram is used to brainstorm the causes and separate them from the effects. Facilitators use their experience to determine the causes on which to focus to collect data to provide a complete picture (Justice and Jamieson 1999), empowering the group to analyze and interpret the data using graphs and charts to define the problem clearly. Facilitators review the problem and the data to generate ideas for a solution from the group. The group ranks their ideas in the list created by the facilitator, who discusses the ranking and works with the group to agree on a consensual solution.

### **Other voices**

Other voices from peace studies, feminism, anti-war efforts, anthropology, management studies, Mennonite and Quaker religious beliefs, and spiritual healing among indigenous peoples have had an impact on the philosophical roots and interdisciplinary development of CAR. Feminist approaches to the field deconstruct hegemonic patriarchy to guarantee gender equity and relationships and positive social change, recognizing there are interlocking tensions within patriarchy of race, class, gender, and ethnicity (hooks 1990). Other scholars maintain that CAR does not address the structural causes (patriarchy, militarism) of violence against women (Brock-Utne 1985; Taylor and Beinstein Miller 1994).

Groups' cultural worldviews inform how people analyze, process, and practice conflict



resolution. Lederach's (1995) elicitive model illustrates that the outsider is not perceived as the expert by indigenous people because they believe that mutuality in the relationship and in the building of interdependence comes from within the knowledge system of their indigenous culture. "Transcultural storytelling" brings more consciousness to this significant part of our lives as part of a larger process of building peace in our community (Senehi 2000). Moreover, the movement of information, people, ideas, trade, and finance across the global village has escalated cross-cultural conflicts and the necessity of resolving those conflicts creatively and constructively. For example, Galtung (1996) argues persuasively that, until the global community works for *positive peace* or the absence of all direct, cultural, and structural violence, we will remain within a state of *negative peace* or the absence of war.

## Conclusions

In this introductory chapter, we have provided a snapshot of the multidiscipline of CAR, focusing on the development of the field, its rich theory, and alternative framings of practice. Coser (1956) stated that all conflict is functional. It is important to welcome alternative lenses into the peacebuilding process by inviting in the creative approaches of poets, storytellers, artists, and musicians. The core of the CAR field is pulling together all of these multiple perspectives, diverse opinions, and interdisciplinary lenses by, in part, understanding the history of the field, its transdisciplinary origins, and the contribution to theory, practice, and methods to strengthen our knowledge and to acknowledge the field's deep roots. Moreover, voices from minorities, women, children, and the global South are making a critical contribution, and need to be recognized and included so that we can learn how other cultures make peace with justice.

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**Part I**

# **Core concepts and theories**



# 1 The role of identity in conflict

*Celia Cook-Huffman*

## **Introduction**

Identity plays a vital role in social conflict, as it is fundamental to how individuals and collectivities see and understand themselves in conflict. Identities delineate who is “us” and who is “them,” mobilizing individuals and collectives, and providing legitimacy and justification for individual and group aspirations. Identities are themselves created and transformed in processes of social struggle. Understanding how identities impact conflict and conflict processes, and the ways they are constructed within conflicts, informs us about the emergence, escalation, and potential transformation of social conflicts.

For conflict theorists there are enduring questions about identity. Does it exist? If it does, what role does it play in conflicts? When and how is it a factor in the emergence, escalation, and de-escalation of conflicts? Is identity, alone, sufficient to cause conflict, or is it an exacerbating factor contributing to ingroup/outgroup bias? We can document ingroup/outgroup behaviors in conflict. Are they caused by identity or other factors? It is easy to name conflicts – Israel–Palestine, Rwanda, and Northern Ireland – where oppositional identities play a critical role in the intractability of the conflict. The challenge for conflict theorists is to theorize identity without assuming what it is.

It is essential, both for conflict analysis and for intervention and resolution efforts, that theorists adopt an analytical frame that separates the processes of identity making from identity itself. In adopting a focus on identity as process and project interactions, relationships, and patterns of meaning making are revealed, allowing for a more complex analysis of the roles identities play in conflict.

This chapter begins with a brief review of general approaches to the study of identity and then shifts to a review of the literature on identity and conflict. The final section extracts from this review several approaches that may guide future research.

## **Defining identity**

Identities are complex, historically bound, socially constructed, and thus ever moving. They may be transitory in some cases, and rigid and inflexible in others as they are constituted in specific lived realities, bound and shared through story, myth, history, and legend (Black 2003; Wetherell 1996).

Theorists use identity to name a varied set of phenomena. It is used both to classify and to explain a wide range of social experiences and processes and thus functions as an analytical tool and a theoretical concept (Ashmore *et al.* 2001; Gecas 1982; Stryker and Burke 2000; Widdicombe 1998). In its most general usage, identity refers to a sense of a

self, a way individuals know and understand themselves. Identities acquire significance, meaning, and value within specific contexts and cultures and help people understand who they are as individuals, as occupants of particular roles, and as members of specific groups (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Deutsch 1973; Josselson 1987; Northrup 1988; Tajfel 1978; Turner and Oakes 1986; Turner *et al.* 1987; Weigert *et al.* 1986).

Theorists often make a distinction between personal identity, or self-identity, and collective or social identity. Personal identity focuses on an individual's sense of him- or herself as an autonomous, unique person. Social identity refers to the facets of one's self-image that derive from salient group memberships (Stets and Burke 2000).

As a theoretical concept, identity is used to understand various aspects of identification processes and to explain their impact on social relationships and social conflict (Goodwin and Goodwin 1990; Howard 2000; Widdicombe 1998). Within the literature on identity, three key perspectives shape theorizing about the relationship between self and society. The first argues that people use the raw materials of their lives to "make" themselves, thus social identities are projects whereby individuals come to a narrative sense of self by creating an integrated whole of their past, present, and future. Identities are symbols of meanings created from social interactions (Connell 1987).

The second perspective focuses on how identity is constructed within specific relationships and in a particular time and place, and the importance of social comparisons in this process. Researchers study how groups use differences and similarities among and between groups to manage the social implications and consequences of specific categories and how individuals negotiate, reconstitute, and represent identities through talk and interaction (Gecas 1982; Grimshaw 1990; Skevington and Baker 1989; Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Giles 1981; White 1984).

The third perspective focuses on issues of salience. If one assumes people can inhabit a number of identities, the concept of salience allows theorists to explore when and how particular identities become meaningful for individuals and collectives, how people manage the intersection of a number of potentially salient identities, and how individuals negotiate the borders and boundaries of identity categories (Oakes 2002; Reicher 2004; Tajfel 1978).

## **Theorizing identity and conflict**

Identity has emerged as a dominant concept for understanding and analyzing social conflict. From the interpersonal to the international arena, and at various levels along the way, researchers use the concept of identity to understand conflict dynamics and explain behaviors (Rothman and Olson 2001).

### ***The individual and identity***

Much of the literature on conflict and identity focuses on social identities, understandings of the self based on group memberships. There is, however, a distinct literature focused on individual identity issues in conflict. Theorists explore the idea of self-identity and conflict using a variety of concepts including identity needs, face work, and saving face (Folger *et al.* 1993; Wilmot and Hocker 2007).

Individuals have a sense of self, an identity or public image they want others to see. It incorporates particular traits, attributes and skills along with self-descriptions and self-evaluations that together constitute a personal identity. People want to present themselves

and be seen in ways that are congruent with their sense of self (Hogg and Abrams 1988). Typical identity work in conflict includes statements about the kinds of people the parties are and the kinds of relationships they should have (Grimshaw 1990).

When the emergent circumstances of a conflict call into question one's sense of self, the conflict itself shifts. This shift may include changes in the parties' conflict-waging strategies, the emotional response of the parties, parties' perceptions of the issues at stake, and perceptions of self and other. Resolution of the conflict may now require the management and negotiation of identity needs.

Identity issues are at the root of conflict when there is a perception that an interaction challenges or threatens self-image or "face" (Vuchinich 1990). Beyond this, identity threats often lead to increased inflexibility, rigidity, and defensive responses, which in turn escalate or exacerbate conflict. When interactions do not address identity needs, or issues arise that violate, defy, diminish, or threaten them, a variety of responses may result (Goffman 1955). Denial is a typical response. Acknowledging or admitting a threat may feel as if one is conceding that the other's opinion could be right (perhaps I am not as capable as I imagined). Denial of identity threats often results in a rigid focus on alternative issues as the "true" issue, or alternatively the denial that the conflict exists at all, not because issues are unimportant, but because a loss in the conflict would equal a loss of face (Folger *et al.* 1993).

Increases in inflexibility that contribute to stalemate in conflict result from the perception that identity needs and self-image are non-negotiables (*ibid.*). This perception may result when abandoning or conceding a position is perceived as a loss of face (one is weak or uncommitted). Identity may feel non-negotiable if the conflict threatens what Northrup (1988) calls "core constructs" (aspects of self-image that help to organize all other constructs). She argues that deep challenges to core constructs challenge the foundation of one's being, and are thus not negotiable.

Defensive responses to identity challenges also result when conflict behaviors challenge one's sense of autonomy. Brown and Levinson (1978) labeled the desire to resist the imposition of other's will "negative face." If one party perceives a request to be unfair or a challenge to autonomy, a defensive response often follows ("I don't deserve to be treated this way," or "you can't make me"). Alternatively, identity threats may lead to an offensive strategy when individuals want retribution or restitution for a challenge to identity. In some cases, people will make great sacrifices on substantive issues in order to re-establish a positive sense of self, or save face. The desire for retribution may lead to a strategy of attacking the other party's identity to win or re-establish one's own face. An escalatory spiral can emerge quickly as the counterthreat leads to counterattack and identity issues move to the center of the conflict.

Ultimately, once issues of identity become a concern, there is increased likelihood that the resulting perceptions, assumptions, and communication dynamics will transform potentially negotiable issues into intractable conflicts centered on relationship issues and parties' self-image (Northrup 1988).

### ***Collective identities***

As we move from the individual to the group the identity question shifts to social identities. There exists an immense body of work seeking to understand human behavior in collectives, both its positive potential for social change and its capacity for devastation (Coser 1956; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1988; Simmel 1964; Sumner 1906).



Topics at the core of this inquiry include ethnocentrism, selective perception, attribution error, the use of collective identities to justify discrimination and inequality, polarization, enemy imaging, and genocide. How can we understand the extermination of the Jews or the unwillingness of their fellow citizens to defend them? How do we explain genocide in Rwanda, the mass rape of women in war, trafficking of women and children, and violence against homosexuals? Conflict theorists want to enhance our understanding of intergroup conflict by understanding collective attempts to create, define, nurture, and protect key social identities and satisfy identity needs (Byrne 2001; Hewstone and Greenland 2000; Kriesberg 1998; Tajfel and Turner 1979). The following pages review four theoretical approaches to understanding the role of identities in conflict.

### ***Basic human needs***

In the late 1970s, John Burton articulated a theory of intractable conflict. He explained the complex, deep-rooted nature of protracted social conflict by linking individual and group needs to a systems approach to conflict (Burton 1985, 1986, 1987, 1997, 1998; Rubenstein 2001; Sandole 2001). His contention is that human needs fuel conflict when they are unfulfilled. People have essential needs that are universal and non-negotiable. Four of these needs – personal development, security, recognition, and identity – are key to understanding violent social conflict (Burton 1990; Sites 1990).

Rubenstein (2001) argues that over time identity needs became a central theorizing point: when the state system fails to meet identity needs, ethno-national struggles emerge. Because these basic needs are universal and immutable, people will go to great lengths to satisfy them (Burton 1990; Sandole 2001).

Basic human needs theory further argues that, when the denial of human needs is at the root of conflicts, traditional conflict settlement methods often fail. When fundamental needs are at stake, traditional interest-based negotiations focusing on the distribution of resources will be insufficient to resolve the conflict. Because identity needs are perceived to be non-negotiable, they cannot be put on the table to be divided, traded, and exchanged. They are further violated when left unaddressed because they are not acknowledged as issues. This can lead to increased polarization as identity needs become further entangled in the conflict process. Finally, because traditional methods often focus on symptoms rather than causes, they leave unexamined the relationship between structures and needs satisfaction. Because needs are perceived to be incontrovertible and non-negotiable, parties are willing to escalate the conflict, often using extreme measures to force the system to meet their needs (Burton 1990; Rothman and Olson 2001).

### ***Protracted social conflict***

Edward Azar (1986), collaborating with Burton and others, further developed a basic needs explanation of protracted social conflicts. Protracted social conflicts (PSC) result from the denial of basic needs that are fundamentally connected to issues of identity, including the ability to develop a collective identity, to have that identity recognized by others, and to have fair access to the systems and structures that support and define the conditions that allow for the achievement and building of identity (Azar 1986; Azar and Burton 1986; Miall *et al.* 1999; Northrup 1988).

In challenging traditional international relations theory Azar theorized four internal state variables that, when present, heighten the likelihood conflicts will become prolonged

and violent (Azar 1990). First he argued that the focus for understanding conflict dynamics should be on the identity group as the unit of analysis (religious, ethnic, cultural), rather than the state. In many post-colonial societies the structures of the state are dominated by and benefit one communal group or a coalition of groups and are unresponsive to the needs of other groups. This inequality feeds frustration, fragmentation, a lack of system legitimacy, and, ultimately, conflict.

Azar's second variable, focused on intercommunal dynamics, suggests the denial of human needs is a source of conflict. Because basic human needs are expressed collectively, experienced as defining of the self and the group, and perceived to be non-negotiable, the resulting conflict is likely to be forceful, brutal, and, from a traditional IR perspective, irrational (Miall *et al.* 1999).

His third variable is the state's ability to satisfy the collective social needs of citizens. Protracted social conflicts are more likely when dominant groups use the state system to fulfill their interests at the expense of other groups. Elites contribute to the exacerbation of this problem by mobilizing exclusive identities, a process followed by counteridentification on the part of excluded minorities. The result is a political system that has weak legitimacy and little capacity for responding to constituent needs.

Finally, he posits that many emerging states have little resistance to the forces of globalization buffeting them from without. This variable results in domestic institutions focusing more on relations of economic dependency and political-military patronage within the broader international system than on the needs of citizens.

Whether or not these preconditions lead to overt conflict is dependent on three other variables: communal action, state actions, and conflict dynamics. Communal action refers to the formation and mobilization of identity groups. State actions include government actions ranging from domination and subjugation strategies to accommodation and adjustment. Conflict dynamics include escalatory conflict spirals triggered by tit-for-tat responses, attribution error, intergroup development of enemy images, dehumanization, and polarization (Azar 1986; Pruitt and Kim 2004). As the conflict itself feeds the escalation process, parties develop a vested interest in the conflict and assimilate the conflict into their story of self (Northrup 1988).

### ***Theories of ethnic/communal conflict***

Theories of ethnic conflict provide further insight into how communal action is mobilized via collective identity for political purposes. The strength of this theorizing is its exploration of the relationship between contextual factors and the mobilization of identity categories. Because many theorists in this area have problematized the very notion of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, they ask broader questions about the existence and meaning of ethnic or communal identities, and the interaction between identities and conflict contexts.

Theorists start with the assumption that categories of collective identity can be chosen by individuals or groups, imposed by those in positions of authority, or constituted in social interactions. This suggests multiple paths and roles for identity in this type of conflict. Theorists want to understand the processes and mechanisms that shape and define social identities, how and when differentiated identities contribute to the emergence and escalation of violent conflict, and how conflict may serve to mobilize or, in fact, produce social identities (Black 2003; Gross Stein 2001; Reicher 2004). In addition they acknowledge that, although differentiated identities and ingroup/outgroup bias may be sufficient to cause conflicts in the absence of scarce resources, they do not always do so (Reicher 2004).

Situational factors and intragroup dynamics affect the potential for violent intergroup conflict because they aggravate identity concerns (Cavanaugh 2000). For example, social, political or economic uncertainty may cause groups to question the legitimacy and credibility of prevailing social institutions (Frank 1967). This may encourage groups to take steps to provide for their own security. When scarcity exists, particularly in conjunction with relative deprivation, parties often engage in collective action against those perceived to be the cause of the deprivation (Rubenstein 2001). Groups with strong and enduring cultural identities (identities based on common ancestry, a shared language, and a common belief system) have a solid foundation for mobilizing the collective, as do communities that feel they have much to lose. Finally, when group members believe recognizing the “other’s” identity threatens or denies their own identity, violence becomes more likely (Byrne 2001; Gurr 1996).

### ***Social identity and social categorization theories***

Social Identity Theory (SIT), developed by Henri Tajfel (1981) and others (Tajfel and Turner 1979), examines a number of aspects of intergroup conflict. As a theory, it seeks to understand intergroup behavior by exploring how people use social categories to make sense of the world around them (Oakes 2002). SIT argues that in particular contexts the desire for positive intergroup distinctiveness drives the emergence and development of intergroup conflict. The development of this theory focuses directly on how identity concerns and needs shape intergroup competition, conflict, and social change (Tajfel 1981, 1982; Thoits and Virshup 1997). Tajfel (1981) defined social identity as that aspect of one’s self-concept that comes from membership in groups. Individuals need/desire a positive sense of self and thus want their groups to compare favorably with other groups (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Skevington and Baker 1989; Turner and Giles 1981).

Social comparison processes that lead to low standing for one’s own group and/or a negative perception of self as a member can lead to strategies for enhancing the value of the group. When group boundaries are impermeable, attempts to change the group’s status may include strategies that lead to intergroup conflict. Groups may attempt to change the evaluative outcome of the comparison in a number of ways that challenge the status quo. When boundaries are perceived to be illegitimate and changeable, group members may try to change the overall structure itself, seeking to move themselves into a position as a dominant or more highly valued group. Conflict ensues as dominant groups resist threats to their status (Tajfel and Turner 2001; Turner 1982; Turner and Giles 1981).

SIT explores specific behaviors in conflict, including intragroup solidarity, intergroup hostility, ethnocentrism, outgroup bias, why and when intergroup relations lead to conflict and when they do not, how and when weak or latent identities become the motivator of ethnic cleansing, and when and how social identities affect group members’ willingness to engage in collective action (Brown 2000; Hewstone and Greenland 2000; Oakes 2002). Because SIT focuses on the interaction between the individual and the social context it is able to theorize about the processes that lead to identities in flux, and processes that lead to more fixed or stable identities that seem to maintain continuity across time and members (Brown 2000; Hewstone and Greenland 2000; Oakes 2002).

### **The challenges of identity for conflict theorists**

It is clear from the sheer volume of literature on the topic that identity remains a useful and compelling concept for conflict theorists. Research suggests the interaction between

identity and conflict is multifaceted and multilayered. Conflicts are triggered and inflamed by identity concerns and identities are created and transformed in the waging of conflicts. In conflict, identity matters.

At the same time, a number of substantive critiques and persistent questions remain. They press conflict theorists to examine assumptions, expand methodologies, and wade into identity work ready to deal with complexity. The critiques point to new ways to explain the relationships between identity and conflict, and to theorize resolution and transformation strategies that incorporate identity issues.

One of the challenges to using identity as an explanatory category and a theoretical tool is managing the tension between conceptions of identity that are essentialist and static, and those that argue identities are fluid and situationally constituted. "Hard" conceptions of identity emphasize continuity across persons and time, whereas "soft", social constructionist perspectives argue identities are fragmented, multiple, and negotiable (Antaki and Widdicombe 1998; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Goodwin and Goodwin 1990; Reicher 2004). A number of critiques have been leveled against theories that conceptualize identity needs as part of a universal "human nature" because they construct identity as essentialist, decontextualized, and ahistorical (Reimann 2002; Rubenstein 2001).

If one rejects the notion that identity needs are universal, then a series of questions emerge. Do they vary from person to person, from group to group, and/or across time and contexts? If they vary, is there a hierarchy of identity needs? Are some more important or essential than others? Does this hierarchy change again across persons, groups, and time? If there are differences, to what degree are needs divisible? Can conflict agreements meet some identity needs to some degree and be sufficient? Might agreements substitute greater fulfillment of some needs for the lesser fulfillment of others? Peace agreements, for example, might meet recognition and security needs for a minority group by guaranteeing political representation, while at the same time ignoring recognition and security needs for some members of the group by excluding minority women from political participation and by ignoring their health care needs (Mitchell 1990).

A second critique addresses assumptions about universal and shared behaviors believed to be the result of identity needs. Theorizing about collective identities often assumes a sense of sameness or shared attributes; those who belong to a group will experience a subjective and perhaps objective sense of themselves as the same. A further implication is that this sense of sameness will lead to ingroup solidarity, shared ideologies and character, and often collective action (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Cook-Huffman 2000). As the example in the paragraph above illustrates, differences exist within groups. Gender is only one example of internal group divisions that reveal within-group differences that should be recognized, acknowledged, and theorized.

When the focus shifts to intergroup dynamics, a set of assumptions tends to follow outlining expected intergroup behaviors and the linkages between particular behaviors and identity needs. These assumptions may mask or ignore a number of actions that should be exposed and questioned: why and how in a particular context do particular categorizations become relevant and/or available; what makes the categories themselves salient; what comparison dimensions have been invoked; and what meanings have been constructed from the combination of salient categories and particular attributes? What behaviors result from all this work? Theorists should not take for granted who is identified as "self" or as "other." Who is deemed "other," whether they are conceptualized as hostile or friendly, what behaviors are seen as legitimate treatment of the "other" who is an enemy, are all aspects of identity definition processes that need to be examined (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).

The danger lies in conflating a system of identification or categorization with a presumed result, the identity. Some identities are readily available, for labeling, exploring a political reality, or organizing a social movement, yet their existence does not mean they are accurate, correct, widely shared, or important in shaping individual experiences of everyday life. People have a variety of experiences (blended identities, migratory experiences) that mediate their understanding of particular categorizations, which may lead to high identification with the group or to indifference (ibid.).

Reicher (2004) argues that the solution to this problem is adopting a perceptual approach that conceptualizes identities as both processes and products. Theorizing identity work as both product and process also helps to manage the challenge of dealing with soft notions of identity in conflict. Although theorists should avoid projecting permanent, generalized notions of identities, they also have to acknowledge and deal with the fact that in any given moment identities are real and may be experienced as fixed and rigid. The task is to avoid objectifying identity or diminishing identification processes that are no longer transient or malleable, and to explore when and how moving, negotiable categories harden into fixed meanings. If identity is socially constructed, how does one theorize individual agency in the face of powerfully constraining externally derived and applied categories? What are the processes by which limitless choices crystallize into the rigidly focused identities used to mobilize masses to participate in genocide (Black 2003; Northrup 1988)? Thinking of identities as products allows us not only to examine the mechanism of production, but to understand how identities themselves are changed and transformed during conflict.

From the critiques we can posit a series of lessons to guide future work in order to understand more fully the dynamics of identity in conflict. Lesson one is *be careful of reification*. As theorists and practitioners, we can unintentionally reproduce and reinforce particular perceptions of identity, often those that are rigid and inflexible. This happens when categories of practice, categories used in everyday social life, are adopted as categories of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). This may include the use of particular labels to differentiate groups one from another (men and women, Catholics and Protestants) or the use of the term *identity* itself. The task is to explain how particular categories come to be experienced as a common group identity, and when categorization processes lead to the crystallization of a particular identity into a forceful reality. We must avoid conflating the processes of identity formation with the presumption of an extant reality, an identity that already “is.”

The caution against reification leads to a second lesson: *pay attention to voice and power*. Theorists need to interrogate the categories they adopt and the meanings they assume have significance for group members. We need to investigate whom “we” allow to define the attributes of a particular identity category. Accepting definitions of a group created by dominant group members often silences alternative voices. We need to question what voices are silenced, lost in the way analysis is done, in the identity that is privileged, and by the interactions and behaviors deemed important. Even in the most polarized conflicts, cross-cutting identities exist, members who live on the borders between identities, individuals who may be trying to resist or redefine accepted attributes of the group, individuals migrating across categories, and people who are indifferent to dominant characterizations of both self and other. We need to pay attention to them.

Questions about voice and power lead us to the issue of negotiability, a question of particular interest to conflict theorists. Some theorists argue identities are non-negotiable, whereas others argue they are constantly being negotiated. I argue the issue is not whether identity is negotiable, but who benefits from the assertion that it is not negotiable?

The third lesson is *embrace an analytical framework that sees categorization as a project* (Connell 1987; Reicher 2004). Individuals with different identity projects will assert the validity and truth of their version of their identity, and assign to other groups particular identities that suit their needs. The process of becoming “us” is inexorably linked to the creation of “other.” The creation of “other” is dependent on the use of suitable “others” (Reicher 2004). What makes them suitable is whether or not they do the work “we” need them to do. The explanation is revealed by what groups are available for comparison, which are chosen, and what attributes are deemed suitable for differentiation purposes. Understanding identity as a project means recognizing that it is the contingent nature of identities, the fact that their meanings are flexible and can be challenged, changed, and negotiated, that requires they be formulated and presented as self-evident, natural, the way things are supposed to be (ibid.).

If we develop a curiosity about identity as a project then a series of inquiries emerge. Who is invested in particular definitions of an identity and why? What is vested in particular stereotypes and meanings? Where is resistance to change located? When we think about social conflict and the particular agendas of parties, we need to explore when and how particular identities are produced in conflict for particular purposes. Categories change over time. Yet, if at any given point in time they are going to effectively legitimate, support, and reinforce a call to action, they must be presented as fixed and eternal, the true version of who “we” are.

The job of the conflict theorist is to make visible the need of the system to make flexibility invisible, and in doing so expose the identity project. If we do not see identity as contingent, as a project, then we risk participating in the reification of a category and its particular political and power implications. An interrogation of meaning can instead reveal the purposes of a particular social construction, and who is enfranchised or disenfranchised in the process of a particular identity project (Black 2003; Howard 2000; Reicher 2004).

If part of the first lesson is *do not assume the terms of identity*, the next lesson is *do not assume the terms of intergroup relations* (Reicher 2004). If we want to understand how intergroup relations lead to conflict, and how intergroup dynamics impact the processes of conflicts, then we must examine the set of intergroup relations within which people locate their groups and define themselves. Self-categorizations are necessarily connected to characterizations of the other and no set of relationships between categories is identical or constant. The challenge for conflict analysts is to link behavioral outcomes to identification processes. To do this we need to explore how and why the world came to be divided into these particular categories as much as we explore the outcomes of particular categories. How are behavioral choices shaped by categorization choices (for both self and other); how are attributes selected for comparison purposes, and what methods are used to differentiate us from them? Stephen Reicher argues, “wherever we happen to be at present, we will use different versions of identities to try and get to different destinations” (2004: 940). We need to understand those differences to understand identity in conflict.

The final lesson is *use a wider variety of terms*. One way to avoid the traps of reification and presuppositions is to move beyond identification language to more active, process-oriented language. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that identity as a term has been overused and thus has become meaningless. They call for the use of other terms allowing researchers and theorists to deal with the ambiguity of identity. For them, the processes of identification, the development of self-knowledge, self-identity, and modes of self-representation, experiences of making connection to others, and coming to understand oneself as belonging to a collective, are all critical processes for understanding a wide range of



human activities. Rather than beginning our inquiries by positing the existence of ethnic solidarity or an identity group, we need to start by asking questions. In this time and place do political relationships, economic realities, and spatial connections together shape some collective sense of belonging or groupness? Is this belonging connected to an experience of sameness? Could identification with the shared sense of sameness lead to an experience of collective grievance? Rather than expecting *identity* to do the theoretical work alone, we can use alternate language to open up explanations for diverse modes of connectedness and self-understanding, broader notions of self-expression, and other ways of imagining social location (*ibid.*).

Context creates categories, shapes and defines them, yes. However, categories create context, as well, and the interaction between the two phenomena should be a key site for inquiry and theory building (Stryker and Burke 2000). Understanding how social identities are constructed gives conflict theorists a point of departure for theorizing how conflict resolution and transformation processes could be structured to influence meaning making that produces open, interested, differentiated identities that are not oppositional in nature. Highly theorized factors that might cause a shift to a more neutral or open identity include the development of superordinate goals and a sense of a common fate or shared goals (Rothman and Olson 2001; Sherif 1988). Conceptualizing identity as a process, product, and project suggests other situational changes that could produce opportunities for collectives to emphasize different group attributes as defining of the group, to expose identity negotiations, and broaden identity conversations. Internal changes might include shifts in leadership or new goals. External shifts could include changing key comparison groups or the salient attributes used to make comparisons. Such shifts could lead to behavioral changes as the story of “us” must certainly change to account for “new” factors. In turn, new voices may find ways to be heard in the identity-naming debate.

As theorists, we have an obligation to see people as whole beings, complex, multi-identified, and multi-identifiable. Identity research should not support their fragmentation by making alternatives less available to them, making assumptions about categories, and masking meaning making by ignoring micro or macro interactions that structure identity. A problem exists when identity-driven explanations of conflict result in the analyst’s assumptions about the identity structuring its shape and form, rather than members’ experiences defining and informing the category. We need to actively name identification processes and identity projects, asking who is identifying, what is the source of identification, what is the purpose, and what is the outcome? As with Dorothy in the *Wizard of Oz*, there is much to be learned by demystifying the great and powerful voice that dominates definitions of reality. We are in fact obligated to look behind the curtain, to see who else is there, and to reveal the mechanisms used to keep the curtain in place.

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## 2 Encountering nationalism

### The contribution of peace studies and conflict resolution

*Harry Anastasiou*

#### **The historical record: nationalism in the literature**

Since its advent, the phenomenon of nationalism has elicited a diverse array of responses that have defied consensus. Over the years people have viewed and experienced nationalism from very different perspectives. Nationalism's founding fathers, Johann Gottfried Herder and Giuseppe Mazzini, saw nationalism as a divinely ordained, historical force of liberation, destined to lead humanity to universal justice and global peace (Alter 1994). Others interpreted it as a functional, sociocultural phenomenon that unifies people, sustains the cohesion of the national community, defines and clarifies collective values and generates loyalty to the larger whole (Smith 1993). Recently, nationalism is viewed as a legitimate moral and political force securing the rights and independence of people from the onslaught of globalization.

In contrast, others have seen and experienced nationalism as erosive of the human spirit. They have viewed nationalism as an intolerant and destructive historical force; a phenomenon that deeply divides nations and societies; an approach to politics that fosters a culture of collective narcissism and exclusivist notions of belonging; an approach to national and international politics that is power-driven and self-serving, escalating conflicts precipitating both civil and international wars; and as a worldview accommodating the use of force or violence as a premium instrument of national politics, tolerating the loss of human life as a legitimate necessity (Alter 1994). Furthermore, nationalism is viewed as a sinister force contributing to the globalization of conflict, while rendering globalization a conflict-proliferating process.

Traditionally, the nationalism literature has been polarized. However, a more astute approach may suggest that advocates and critics of nationalism reflect two sides of the same coin. Nationalism may thus be understood as a powerful historical phenomenon that is defined by *the unprecedented moral absolutization of the nation, its freedom, its interest, its community, its identity, and its power, in combination with the derivative presumption that its supreme moral status furnishes thereby "the right" to employ all means, including adversarial and lethal means, in the nation's defense, sustenance, advancement, expanding powers, and alleged "destined" historical realization.* Acknowledging such a linkage may help explain the frequently perplexing question of why nationalism has been so appealing and ennobling and simultaneously incredibly dangerous and violent. Specifically the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and generally the numerous conflicts that erupted following the collapse of the Soviet Union drew fresh attention to this likely relationship within the nationalist mind between ethno-national moral values and violent actions.

## Nationalism as a worldview: the power of assumptions

The emerging field of study that is directly concerned with peace and conflict phenomena furnishes numerous theoretical and practical approaches, including Conflict Analysis and Resolution (CAR), in which, as a prerequisite for resolution, inquiry focuses on understanding the structural dynamics of conflict; Conflict Resolution (CR), in which the emphasis is on perspectives, processes, and structures that empower and facilitate the resolution of conflict; and Peace Studies (PS), in which the focus is on understanding and fostering the structural dynamics of peace, in the form of peacebuilding, peace sustenance, and institutionalizing peace in light of elaborations of what constitutes a society and culture of peace.

In attending to the dynamics of protracted conflict, and particularly nationalist conflict, one of the strengths of CAR, CR, and PS lies in their capacity to deconstruct the disputants' visions of the world, policies, and actions, disclosing conflict patterns that bind the rivals to their adversarial relationship, and envision the possibility of peace in light of which to forge proactive perspectives, strategies, and instruments of action.

A suggested hypothesis for understanding why they have tended to be intractable is that, in addition to the objective complexities that have historically permeated them, ethno-nationalist conflicts have been driven by well-configured, all-encompassing, and largely assumed worldviews that intimately associate a set of presumed supreme, ethno-national values and the right to employ force or violence in their name.

The power of perception in conflict-habituated societies has been a central theme in CAR as well as in political psychology (Jervis 1976). However, less work has been done on how unspoken, fundamental assumptions of nationalism determine adversarial perceptions and derivative actions, even beyond the partisan selection of facts that underpin them and the stereotypes that generalize and sustain them.

Having preceded and outlived the ideological polarizations of the Cold War, nationalism has been identified as one of the most powerful and influential forces since the advent of modernity (Alter 1994; Barash and Webel 2002). The power that the idea of *the nation* has had and continues to have over people is perhaps best understood as a derivative of the extraordinary and exaggerated qualities that the nationalist mind elaborates and projects onto the entity referred to as *the nation*. Irrespective of whether they see nationalism as a positive or a negative force, scholars generally acknowledge that in nationalism the nation is placed on the highest pedestal, and viewed as the supreme agency of meaning, collective identity, and moral justification (Alter 1994). One of the powerful ways in which nationalism becomes historically instated is through its presumption that the nation is sacred – an attribute that many liken to a kind of secular equivalent of the church. Smith (1993), an advocate of nationalism, speaks of the nation as being a religion surrogate. This is a stunning assertion, as the characterization may apply equally to nationalisms that have incorporated traditional religion as part of their mental edifice of values (e.g. Serbian, Greek, Hindu, Islamic, Irish Protestant, and Irish Catholic nationalisms) as well as to secular nationalisms that purport to have expunged traditional religion from their mental edifice of values (e.g. Turkish, French, Egyptian, and Syrian nationalisms).

Historically, the attribution of sacredness to the idea of *the nation* has been ritualized in the images of national leaders, in ethnocentric public ceremonies, in master narratives of national heroics and invincibility, in extraordinary achievements and events underscored by a presumed history of national glory, greatness, binding destiny, and even divine election (Smith 1993). Centered on a constructed, aggrandized notion of *the nation*, nationalist

historiography projects a glorified image of the nation into a superlative, primal past, transposed by necessity into a compelling, duty-bound present, and an infinite, grandiose future. It cultivates a monocentric, narcissistic concept of the nation's life-world, a teleological perception of the nation's history and an asymmetrical distribution of positive values and rightness identifying the "good" with one's own nation and the "bad" with that of "the other," particularly of "the enemy other" (Rüsen 2004). In so doing, nationalist historiography presents the nation as an inerrant, eternal political entity, concealing its historical follies and the crucial fact that the nationalist concept of the nation and its objectified derivative, the nation-state, was a historical product of the nineteenth century (Alter 1994).

Thus understood, the nationalist approach to nationhood places the nation in an untouchable "moral realm," beyond question, reproach, and accountability. Sadly, the concept of national sovereignty and self-determination, abstractly asserted as the cornerstone of world order and stability, has in practice been framed and conditioned by nationalism through the presumption that in the final analysis the "right" to pursue policies, devise strategies, and take actions unilaterally supersedes the requirement for bi- or multilateral deliberations (Barash and Webel 2002). From this perspective, the nationalist mind views even international law as subsidiary and secondary to the status of the nation.

Under these conditions, the prospect for international and/or interethnic dialogue, negotiation, or relationship-building becomes highly restrictive, circumstantial, and transient. As attested by the two World Wars, innumerable intra- and interstate wars, anti-colonial revolutions, Cold War proxy wars, the ethnic conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and more recently the Iraq war, the nationalist approach to ethno-national politics has proven to be disastrous in both the intrastate and international arenas.

### **Conflict resolution theories and practice: encountering nationalism**

In the face of nationalist politics, the challenge for PS and CAR scholars as well as for CR facilitators and third party mediators is to conduct analyses, elaborate perspectives, design and structure dialogue and/or negotiation processes, and develop strategies and incentives that sustain focus on the disputants' existential concerns while dissociating these concerns from the respective nationalist frameworks and their absolutist terms of reference in which adversarial perceptions and approaches are embedded. Helpful in pursuing this course of action is Burton's human needs theory followed and reinforced by Fisher and Ury's distinction between "positions" and "interests" (Burton 1990; Fisher and Ury 1991). In this distinction, "positions" refers to the particular unilateral approaches, demands, and finalities that rivals cultivate and aim for in their respective version of what the solution to the conflict ought to be. "Interests" on the other hand refers to the set of existential and mostly legitimated human needs that the positions of each side presumably serve to protect, enhance, and secure.

During the periods preceding and following nationalist conflict, the overall political process becomes forged in a manner that structurally links legitimate human needs and interests to nationalist positions. In other words, vital needs such as security, economic wellbeing, cultural identity, and community become structurally intertwined with nationalist positions derived from notions of moral and/or cultural superiority, unilateral projections of power and grandiosity, a sense of historical destiny and/or divine mission, self-serving justice, and a "we do as we see fit" narcissism, all of which inevitably function

belligerently in relation to “the other.” Legitimate human needs thus become absorbed by, and integrated into, the framework of supra-factual assumptions of the absolute and uncompromising value of the nation, and all its derivative implications.

An example from current world affairs, such as US–Iranian relations, suffices to illustrate this matter. Iranian nationalism views its unwavering insistence on its nuclear program as primarily a matter of national pride, national right, national interest, and national security, which in the nationalist mind are non-negotiable. Iran sees the growth of its nuclear capacity not merely as an energy issue, or a legal right issue, but as a national prestige and prerogative issue, under which economic and national defense concerns are subsumed. Moreover, Iranian nationalism views nuclear power as a means of defending the Muslim religion of which the Iranian nation-state, together with its allies and sympathizers, is the guardian and protector. In its Islamic fundamentalist mode, Iranian nationalism configures all these elements in a manner that inevitably presents the nation of Iran as a moral force, compelled by a moral imperative. In this, the Iranian nation and its state are the ultimate value and reference in terms of which any and all actions may become justified, including the unleashing of force and violence against its enemies, if need be. In Iranian nationalism, the Iranian nation is the embodiment and guardian of all that Allah requires. Hence the arch-enemy of Iran, namely the US, is referred to by Iranian fundamentalist nationalists as “the Great Satan.”

Conversely, American nationalism, particularly in its neoconservative brand, views US national interest and national security in terms of its narcissistic will and its unrivaled strength as *the superpower nation*. Here too, the invariable status of the nation becomes the supreme arbiter and reference of values, truth and meaning. From the perspective of American nationalism, a nuclear Iran is absolutely unacceptable, not merely from the military vantage point or a legal perspective, but more significantly from the “moral” standpoint. As it is typical of all nationalisms, American nationalism perceives its own *nation not only* in terms of its military superiority but also, if not more so, in terms of its presumed moral superiority, which also includes its democratic legacy as well as the Judeo-Christian heritage. Seen as a moral force, the nation and all that is deemed to be its interests inevitably assume a non-negotiable status. Nuclear power in the hands of any enemy nation is thus immoral, by definition. And conversely, nuclear power in America’s hands is viewed as a powerful, strategic instrument in the service of what is good and moral. America’s possession of nuclear weapons, including that of its allies, is thereby viewed as morally justified. As the ultimate embodiment of moral truth, the American nation is thus compelled to use all means at its disposal to subdue enemies such as Iran, because the enemies of the nation are the enemies of what is right and moral. In the perspective of neoconservative, American nationalism, Iran, particularly vis-à-vis its nuclear program – civilian or military, it doesn’t really matter – can only belong to the “Axis of Evil.” And evil must be fought by all means, including the employment of the most powerful weapons available.

Clearly, as long as the above approaches persist, the outcome will be merely a stubborn political impasse, incubating very dangerous consequences, not only for the US and Iran but for the Middle East and the world. Political exchanges vis-à-vis nationalist positions rather than human needs-based interests rarely succeed, because they tend to eclipse and obscure even the legitimate needs they purport to be striving to secure. This is precisely because in positional bargaining the disputants merely assert their unilateral, a priori version of the problem and its solution (Fisher and Ury 1991). And in doing so the relationship to the other is driven at best into a stubborn deadlock and at worst into a vexing, conflict-prone interaction, often spilling over into violence.



In contrast to the above mutually incapacitating perspectives, a proactive, constructive approach to US–Iranian relations that differentiates positions from interests has the potential of initiating a process carrying a two-pronged orientation. That orientation would be to address US concerns about security, terrorism, energy, and regional stability in the Middle East, all of which are legitimate concerns, in a perspective, however, that frees and decouples these concerns from the nationalist presumptions of the “moral superiority” of one’s own national position and the “evil” status of the other that inevitably fossilize US–Iranian relations into intransigent and irreconcilable positions. Similarly, Iranian concerns about security, economic wellbeing, cultural identity, and international isolation, all of which are legitimate concerns, would be addressed in dissociation from the belligerent and absolutist, nationalist positions that frame them. Along such a path, Iran’s nuclear issue, in the context of the Arab–Israeli conflict as well as the problem of nuclear power in the Middle East in general, has a far better chance of a future resolution. (The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations for US dialogue with Iran and Syria approximate CR principles and directives.) The challenge in such an approach is to affect mutual behavioral change via diplomacy, dialogue, acknowledgments, negotiations and relationship-building instead of resorting to regime change and/or regime defiance via threats, coercion, and firepower and/or various forms of covert violence.

By integrating legitimate human needs into its adversarial and exclusivist framework, nationalism, with its array of unexamined assumptions, always tends to alienate the other while eclipsing the legitimacy of any genuine human needs it purports to defend. In contrast to the adversarial narcissism of nationalist communication, *dialogue* as a mediated process of open-ended and uncoerced communication has been asserted and pursued by CAR, PS, and CR theorists and practitioners as a vital path for belligerents to address, understand, and tackle their conflicts. In his work *On Dialogue*, Bohm (2004) notes that any genuine dialogue across lines of conflict induces a tacit suspension of assumptions that opens up new horizons of meaning and interpretation, as the dialogue process inadvertently and/or deliberately fuses perspectives, expands knowledge, synthesizes hitherto scattered and disjointed facts, and conjoins through interaction and exchanges the life-worlds of the parties concerned. Thus understood, dialogue introduces the capacity to free the communicative process from the underlying assumptions of competing nationalist perspectives, creating thereby the conditions for the emergence of new truths, facts, and frameworks as products of mutual, communicative engagement. The dialogic mode of communication is in this sense exceedingly conducive to bringing forward and differentiating legitimate human needs from stalemating positions rooted in nationalist assumptions – a differentiation that is imperative for resolving conflict and securing peace.

By dissociating authentic needs and interests from nationalist frameworks, CAR, PS, and CR bring forward mutuality, reciprocity, parity, and equality as principles of engagement, thus creating the possibility of considering and tackling each side’s legitimate needs and interests within a single perspective, seeking creative resolutions that conjoin and integrate the respective legitimate human needs and interests of the disputants (Fisher and Ury 1991).

### **The use of force or violence with “moral justification”**

In regard to peace and conflict issues, the most problematic aspect of nationalism at both the national and international levels has been its extraordinary capacity to link moral

reasoning and the use of force or violence. In a unique manner, nationalism has historically grounded the right to use force or violence in the moral rationale that the nation is the ultimate collective value and the imperative basis for community, identity, security, and wellbeing (Howard 1994). This configuration of belief and action has made nationalism the greatest legitimizer of the use of force or violence throughout modern and much of post-modern history.

Employing force or violence in the name of *the nation* has been historically manifested in a variety of ways. These have included the founding of nation-states (*Risorgimento* nationalism); the forceful defense of established nation-states from internal and/or external enemies (even Hitler elaborated this argument); the securing of national interests around the globe through conquest and colonization (giving rise to modern imperialism as a by-product of nationalism, not the other way around); the launching of anti-colonial revolutions for the purpose of establishing one's own exclusive, ethno-national state; the pursuit of forceful secession from an existing state for the purpose of establishing one's own ethno-national state (Bosnian Serbs, Turkish Cypriots, Kurds of Turkey); and the justifications for civil wars based on competing models of national values, identity and interest, again in the name of the nation (Spanish and Greek civil wars). Close scrutiny of political history reveals that, from its very birth to its fully developed, institutionalized political cultures in the twentieth century and beyond, nationalism has forged a close association between the idea of the nation as a supreme value and the right to employ force or violence as its legitimate means (Alter 1994). This may explain why, in nationalism, actions that are normally viewed as perverse become moral, actions that are burdened with guilt become honorable, and actions that are death-dealing become heroic (Hedges 2002). As Howard (1994) reminds us, from its historical inception, nationalism has fashioned a close association between the nation, war and violence. The most prominent semiotics of nationalism – ranging from national anthems and national flags to monuments and historiographies – disclose symbols and narratives of war, revolution, heroics, and the shedding of blood as supreme references of national identity, glory, and honor.

As a result of the extraordinary capacity of nationalism to “morally” legitimize force or violence in the name of the nation, nationalist-minded leaders and followers tend to develop high levels of tolerance for the use of lethal means in dealing with conflicts, particularly in confronting identifiable historical “enemies” of the nation. What is even more striking is that nationalists are inclined toward a high level of tolerance for the loss of human life not only among the enemy community but also among their own national community. As nationalism presumes the nation to be sacred, the taking and offering of human life to its service at critical moments in history is viewed not only as legitimate but as a “moral duty.” Hence, according to the nationalist mind, though momentarily inconvenient, the offering and taking of human life for the sake of the nation is ultimately neither a problematic nor a tragic phenomenon but one of “supreme duty” and altruistic “ultimate sacrifice.”

The apogee of this tenet of nationalism is none other than the terrible phenomenon of ethnic cleansing. Conventional thinking assumes that ethnic cleansing has to do with cleansing a territory of people perceived by the perpetrators to be the “illegitimate other.” But, in the first order, ethnic cleansing has to do with a blood ritual by which the perpetrating ethno-national community purifies its collective self by ridding its society (and hence territory), of people it considers as ethno-national impurities living in its midst.



## **Deconstructing the nationalist justification for using force and violence**

Even though it has not yet addressed the phenomenon of nationalism directly and explicitly, the field of CAR, PS, and CR has struggled to develop alternative, non-violent ways of understanding and addressing conflict essentially against the backdrop of the historical legacy of twentieth-century nationalist strife and violence. Nevertheless, CAR as well as CR dialogue and rapprochement processes have demonstrated the capacity to disclose and deconstruct the belligerent and fundamentally alienating relationships that protracted nationalist conflict instates in the culture, perceptions, psyche, and politics of the rival sides.

A key element in CR rapprochement processes and dialogue in both symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts is the focusing of attention on *the human dimension of conflict*. By prioritizing the phenomenon of human suffering resulting from conflict, and helping bring forward within a single perspective the pain and loss of all sides in the conflict, CAR, PS, and CR approaches implicitly question and tacitly erode the “moral” justifications for the use of force or violence against the enemy “other” that the nationalisms of the belligerent sides so “naturally” elaborate. Whether Germans or French, Greeks or Turks, Palestinians or Israelis, Irish Protestants or Catholics, past and present rivals that have engaged each other in CR processes have discovered that their own groups’ pain and suffering was no different from the pain and suffering of their enemy, and that while they have been enemies they have, in effect, shared a human tragedy.

This type of conscientization underscores one of the basic principles of conflict transformation, namely getting rival groups to a point of mutually acknowledging, either implicitly or explicitly, the injury they had inflicted on one another in the course of their conflict. Herein lies the significance of sharing experience-based narratives across ethno-national lines as a means of conflict transformation. Such engagements inevitably initiate a process of potential de-alienation, as each side is put in a position to behold in a new light both the enemy’s and its own actions and plight throughout the course of the conflict. The process carries the potential first step toward deconstructing the nationalist, stereotypical enemy images, superseding them with a sobering realism that the conflict was essentially a confusing and alienating admixture of events and phenomena. Sustained over time, the process eventually reveals that each side has been both victim and perpetrator, bringing to full disclosure that in the conflict-conditioned relationship each side’s heroes have sadly been the other side’s villains.

As CAR, PS, and CR theories and practice create the conditions for each of the belligerent sides to encounter the suffering of the other, the “moral” rationale for the use of violence that nationalism readily furnishes becomes implicitly, and in many cases explicitly, debunked. Lederach’s four principles of “truth,” “mercy,” “justice,” and “peace” as directives for engaging belligerents in conflict transforming processes illustrate this (Lederach 2002). CAR and PS perspectives and CR engagements bring forward the crucial fact that the nature of violence and its impact on society is the same irrespective of the moral rationalizations that nationalism attaches to it. Despite shortcomings, reconciliation processes such as those that took place in the aftermath of World War II in Europe, or in the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, and the citizen peace movement in Cyprus, for example, have constructively induced a humanizing process of conflict transformation. Such a process has always tended to occur at the very juncture when traditional belligerents mastered the courage to confront the demoralizing and dehumanizing nature of violence irrespective of the agent that induced it and the original rationale that “legitimized” it.

Facilitated CR dialogue processes and more so reconciliation processes help parties to encounter what keen observers have identified as the universal laws of violence, namely “sameness,” “reciprocity,” “continuity,” “reproduction,” and “self-justification” (Ellul 1969). CAR, PS, and CR theories and practice assist belligerents in striving beyond the state of unilateral self-victimization and partisan, “moral” justification for one’s own use of violence, by helping them reach the difficult but necessary fact that there is no such thing as “good” violence and “bad” violence, as nationalism presumes. Conflict-transcending processes finally reveal that the idea that “our” violence is “good” and “legitimate,” and that the enemy’s violence is “bad” and “illegitimate,” is a subjective construct incubated under alienating conflict conditions that the nationalist worldview normalizes and sanctifies. This particular outcome that CAR, PS, and CR yield in both theory and practice constitutes one of the most significant contributions toward the demythologization of militancy and predisposition for militancy that nationalism so readily instates and sustains in the societies it affects.

Viewed from a CAR, PS, and CR perspective, the inclination of nationalism to reserve the right to morally justify the use of force or violence compels a renewed assessment of Just War Theory (JWT). JWT reflects the age-long struggle to set some kind of moral constraints and limitations to both the choice for war and the conduct of war. However, nationalism easily usurps this moral aperture of JWT by assuming that as the supreme arbiter of collective values and justification, the nation (in its embodiment either as an existing state or a state to be) has the inalienable “moral right” (even beyond the legal right or legal prohibition) to resort to the use of force or violence whenever it deems it necessary; and, further, that this moral right is a permanent principle derived from the nation’s sovereignty. For nationalists, every war that is presumed necessary for the nation is a priori a “just war.” From this perspective, nationalist leaders and public opinion have been easily able to rationalize even wars of choice by framing and promoting them as wars of moral and practical necessity.

Contrary to the moral rationalizations of nationalism, CAR, PS, and CR reveal that even under the constraints of objective circumstances, if war is inevitably and practically the last resort, one is essentially confronted with none or with the most tragic of options, and not with a moral reason for war and violence. Further, in taking the subjective human factor into account, CAR, PS, and CR divulge that any unavoidability of violent conflict is directly associated with conditions that render human beings unwilling and/or incapable of generating creative, non-lethal, conflict-transcending political options. If by reason of subjective and/or objective conditions there is indeed no choice but to act out of sheer necessity, it essentially means that there is no freedom – that is, there is no freedom of choice. Therefore, far from being moral, the condition of irrevocable necessity underscores not the apogee of moral choice, as nationalism has it, but the fundamental disempowerment from making a moral choice. In this sense, the perspectives and approaches of CAR, PS, and CR bring under critical scrutiny the prevalent rationalization of nationalism that, when the nation has no choice but to turn to force or violence, its actions somehow become morally justified. On the contrary, they suggest that, when war is unavoidable by reason of overwhelming necessity, one is confronted with the supreme point of tragedy not of morality. The absence of choice does not make war and violence less immoral and devastating, but more tragic and enslaving! And this is precisely the profundity of human alienation that must be reckoned with when confronted with the use of force/violence as inevitable. When no choice is within reach, the turn to force or violence is not the most morally excusable but the most lamentable of human conditions.

CAR, PS, and CR theories and practice and the rapprochement processes they initiate in any effective conflict transformation disclose explicitly or tacitly, especially in hindsight, the awesome fact that in protracted violent engagements the moral universe and the moral values it encompasses is neither defended nor instated but is in fact dismantled and shattered. By bringing into a single perspective the injury, scourge, and death that rival sides suffer as well as inflict on each other, CAR, PS and CR processes bring to full visibility the crucial fact that in nationalist engagements each violent action erodes and eventually negates its moral justification (e.g. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commissions). As Hedges (2002) notes, in nationalist conflicts one encounters the collapse and the inversion of the moral universe. Moreover, CAR, PS and CR practice reveal that in the course of the conflict, the practical judgments that each of the belligerent sides is compelled to make, and the kinds of action that each is compelled to take, become increasingly constituted as irrevocable moral dilemmas rather than clear moral choices, as the "realist theory" of nationalism claims.

### **Reframing values and reevaluating actions**

By providing the means and perspectives for deconstructing nationalist conflict and hence nationalist morality, CAR, PS and CR theories and practice subsequently prod the redefinition of moral values regarding peace and conflict thereby compelling a reexamination of the political actions, group interests, security, and identity concerns associated with them. A fundamental principle underlying much of CAR, PS and CR theory and practice is finding ways and means to orient political dialogue, policies, actions, strategies, and institution-building away from adversarial values and beliefs and begin reframing them in relation to conflict-preventive, conflict-resolving and peace-enhancing values and directives (Barash and Webel 2002; Lederach 2002). This principle is rooted not in a utopian world but in the reality-based fact that in doing so, dialogue, policies, actions, strategies, and institution-building will be restructured and redirected in a manner that increases the chances for constructive, practical outcomes.

### **The value of human life relative to the nation**

The demythologization of nationalism's concept of *the nation* as the supreme seat of values and morality goes hand in hand with the demythologization of force or violence in the name of the nation. Moreover, the demythologization of violence or force as a means of addressing ethno-national conflict restores the fundamental sense that human life and life-enhancing relationships are higher in value than nationalism's demand of unconditional loyalty to the nation and its associated claim that the nation is the ultimate ground and guarantor of security and wellbeing.

By questioning such nationalist values, CAR, PS, and CR challenge, facilitate, and assist in reframing national loyalty, security, and national interest in terms of the priority of human life and life-enhancing values and objectives, which as such are inseparable from the value of peace. In this light, CAR, PS, and CR open up the possibility, if not the imperative, of redefining national interest in terms of conciliatory and peace-enhancing politics, whereby interethnic and international relations are premised on equitable and sustainable socio-political and economic development, intergroup and intersocietal integration, stability, wellbeing, and human rights.

## **Freeing the value of justice and democracy from nationalism**

From its historical advent to the present, nationalism has claimed that the pursuit of justice and democracy for the national community is best served by the nation's capacity to unilaterally and self-determinately employ power, even force or violence. The approach that nationalism takes to democracy as primarily and exclusively an intra-ethnic and intranational polity has led to the idea that the use of force or violence in the interest of the nation coincides with the idea that the use of force or violence is consistent with the interest of and/or defense of democracy. The most recent, spectacular illustration of this has been the attempt by American and other neoconservatives to infuse democracy into Iraq and the broader Middle East through the might of the US army – an approach that has precipitated chaos, unrest, and instability in Iraq and beyond. The nationalist interpretation of democracy as a polity that may legitimize the use of force or violence for its pursuit, defense, and expansion is the main historical reason why countries that have been deemed democracies have had no better record in participating and engaging in war and violence than countries that have been deemed non-democracies.

Contrary to the prevalent above-mentioned assumptions that nationalism makes, CAR, PS, and CR approaches disclose and demonstrate that historically the unilateral pursuit of power, particularly hard power, constricts and even undermines the causes of justice and democracy not only for others but also for one's own national community. The values, perspectives, and knowledge elaborated and generated by CAR, PS, and CR forcefully suggest that justice and democracy become amplified and accessible to the mutual benefit of the communities concerned to the degree that they are pursued via peace-seeking perspectives and values, and accompanied and worked out through peace-promoting strategies, actions, and institution-building. Dissociating the pursuit of justice and democracy from the nationalist framework of narcissistic values, assumptions, and beliefs, and associating justice and democracy with peace-promoting values and objectives creates new possibilities for reframing power relations as well as for expanding and securing justice and democracy. There exists a structural linkage between the building of peaceful relationships and the opening up of justice and democracy.

Particularly at the interstate level, the European experiment has strongly confirmed the findings and principle of CAR, PS, and CR (Rifkin 2004). The prioritization of peace, cooperation, conciliatory politics, and the joint management of economic integration over and above nationalism is precisely what led to the emergent stabilizing influence of the EU in post-war Europe. Although the continuing existence of specific democratic deficits within Europe is generally acknowledged, within the EU framework and institutions the privileges and liabilities of power asymmetries have been minimized, democracy has been deepened and expanded at the intersocietal and interstate levels, the rule of law has been both embedded in and raised above nation-states, and human rights have been strengthened as an intra-, inter- and transnational regime.

Nationalism either defies justice and democracy in the name of the nation or constricts democracy to an exclusively intranational/intra-ethnic polity. By contrast, the reframing of democracy and justice in terms of peace values and directives, as CAR, PS, and CR recommend, frees democracy and justice from the strictly ethno-national, psycho-political, and territorial constraints of nationalism. In so doing, the concept of democracy can be elevated, developed, and expanded to an interethnic and international polity as well. Belgium and Switzerland are polyethnic democracies at the national and subnational levels, whereas the EU functions as a democracy at the inter- and transnational levels.

## Expanding community

This antithesis between the nationalist approach to democracy and justice and the peace-grounded approach to democracy and justice carries far-reaching implications for the conceptualization and practice of community. Being ethnocentric and intranational, the nationalist perception of community gravitates toward the polarization of ethnic groups within and between societies by its exclusivist notion of identity and the hard psychopolitical and territorial boundaries it strives to establish between the ethno-national “in-group” and the “out-group.” It brings forward the fact that nationalism’s narcissistically constricted concept of national right, democracy, and justice is accompanied by an equally constricted view of community and identity. CAR, PS, and CR scholars have amply demonstrated that nationalism’s restrictive and mono-ethnic view of community becomes obsessively esoteric and intolerant, particularly under conditions of conflict escalation, tearing apart communities that have been historically, hence naturally, ethnically mixed (Lederach 2002). Nationalists vehemently resist or reject any sense of belonging beyond or complementary to their own ethno-national, ingroup community.

In sharp contrast to this, by directing thought and action toward extending and institutionalizing peace-grounded justice and democracy further than one’s ethno-national community, CAR, PS, and CR values, perspectives, and approaches chart a path for expanding the category of community and identity on two complementary levels: intranationally by forging domestic inclusiveness of subnational identity groups, as well as internationally by forging functional and democratic interstate relations. Developing a culture of peace implies a richer and more sophisticated sense of belonging that sees one’s immediate community and identity as conjoined to, tolerant of, overlapping with, complementary to, and relationally implicated in other ethno-national communities. This perspective becomes especially significant for the interest of peace. Globalization processes pose the unavoidable challenge that, among other types of identity groups, ethno-national groups will be increasingly compelled to come to terms with whether their sense of community, identity and belonging will extend, reach out, and contribute to the stability and wellbeing of an emergent global community, or remain nationalistically self-engaged with narcissistically defined national interests.

The evolving perspectives and cumulative knowledge of CAR, PS, and CR point to the crucial realization that the security and identity of one’s immediate community is best sought and pursued by enriching, complementing, and extending the concept of community to encompass “the other,” at least in part. At the levels of both civil society and formal politics, cross-ethnic and cross-national relationship-building, polyethnic and multinational institution-building, multilateral decision- and policymaking, joint ventures in sustainable development, economic integration through convivial polities, cross-border projects, and cross-ethnic and cross-national cultural projects, exchanges, and engagements are but a few of the perspectives and instruments conducive to enhancing sustainable positive peace.

It is noteworthy that, as the EU has actively pursued many of these paths to peace-building, the European concept of liberty has evolved to mean, among other things, having direct access to and the capacity for participation in multiple communities (Rifkin 2004). This is not to suggest that there are no tensions between identity groups or currents of xenophobia in the EU, but rather that, under conditions of peace and wellbeing, identity formation and sense of community have broadened to encompass multicultural and international configurations (Rüsen 2004). The EU’s last challenge in expanding its

peace-founded notion of community is Turkey, a largely Muslim country. In an era of rising tension between the West and Islamic societies, accepting or rejecting Turkey as a future member of the EU will be the historical litmus test of the European experiment in post-nationalist peace and democracy.

## Revisiting history

As a fruit and a condition of peace, the enhancement, enrichment, and broadening of identity formation and sense of community accompanies and reinforces the possibility of transcending the largely narcissistic and adversarial nationalist constructs of history and the legacy of heroes and villains it sustains and recycles. Nationalist historiographies with their master narratives of ethno-national grandiosity and absoluteness, with their glorification of revolutions, wars, and heroics, and their asymmetrical distribution of all the “good” to one’s own ethno-national community and all the “bad” to the otherness of others, make way for more balanced, reality-based, representative and hence regenerative perspectives of the past.

Contrary to nationalist values and valuations of history, diagnosing the past in terms of CAR and PS criteria, and assessing historical choices in terms of peace-seeking options and possibilities – rather than some presumed, binding ethno-centric teleology – enriches and opens up the understanding of history. Such an approach liberates from the cul-de-sacs of negative past choices, and provides intellectual and cultural resources for envisioning and charting a more humane future in interethnic, intersocietal and international relations. CAR, PS, and CR approaches compel a revisitation of history through polycentric notions of the past, mediated syntheses of different perspectives, an integrated discernment of the positive and negative history of both one’s own community and that of others, and empathic approaches of mourning and forgiveness over past conflicts (Rüsen 2004). Revisiting history in this manner entails the democratization of historical memory and the rehumanization of interethnic and international relationships vis-à-vis a renewed understanding of the past. Especially in an era of globalization, pursuing such an approach to the different national (including ethnic, cultural, and religious) perspectives of stakeholders within or between societies, especially in light of their existential historical experiences, furnishes the conditions for substantive dialogue and political engagements that are conducive to multicultural and multinational wellbeing, peace, and symbiosis.

## Reframing liberty

CAR, PS, and CR theories and practice, and the success stories in conflict transformation and peacebuilding that reflect their principles, reveal new realities that go beyond hitherto conventional thinking. The most fundamental of these are that justice, democracy, and peace are inseparable and intertwined values and practices in any viable and sustainable pursuit of national and international politics, of national and international socio-economic development, and of national and international multicultural symbiosis.

Finally, CAR, PS, and CR approaches and the validation of success stories bring to the fore the unconventional truth that liberty is not a function of nations as absolute entities with absolute rights and sacral attributes – as nationalism would have it. Rather liberty is an essential and ever-evolving function of people, identity groups, societies, and governments to the measure they are capable of building and strengthening *peace-bound, multilevel, communal relationships* on both the intra- and international planes. In this sense, CAR, PS,

and CR lead to a reframing of liberty as a *peace-founded relationship*, not as an abstract principle of justification for resorting to all and any means of action, as nationalism has taught us. The field of CAR, PS, and CR is gradually bringing to crystallization the crucial new realization that it is only as intra- and intersocietal relationships and as interethnic and international relationships become peace-engendering, hence emancipating, that human rights, liberties, democracy, and justice become secured and amplified.

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# 3 Gender relations and conflict transformation among refugee women

*Anna Snyder*

## Introduction

The focus on women as “victims” of war and patriarchal culture has obscured how the long-term social upheaval from ongoing conflict may have also transformed women’s often subordinate gender roles in non-obvious ways. There is little doubt that women often bear a double burden, taking on unaccustomed roles such as head of household and principal income generator because they have lost male family members and experienced displacement arising from conflict. This shift in roles, however, may open up new spaces for women’s agency and leadership within changing family and community structures – at the same time as it destroys. Peace researchers have tended to focus exclusively on the negative impact of war on women, fearful that a discussion of the empowering aspects of conflict for women might support arguments for armed conflict or intervention. Nevertheless, shifting from a focus on victimhood to questions of empowerment may uncover information key to understanding gender and peacebuilding<sup>1</sup> capacities.

Charting the shifting terrain of “women’s ambivalent empowerment” in armed conflict provides the basis for creative strategies to improve women’s position and their capacities for peacebuilding (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2001: 105). Without more understanding of how conflict transforms gender relations, the policies and rhetoric surrounding women’s inclusion at the peace table will continue to have a limited impact. Women peace activists are beginning to call for strengthening grassroots women’s experiences of empowerment during the conflict because male backlash in post-conflict reconstruction often pushes women back to limited roles as men seek to re-establish male power bases (Turshen and Twagiramariya 1998). Such claims heighten the importance of understanding the challenges refugee women and internally displaced women face during conflict.

Studying refugee and internally displaced women’s issues, gender relations, empowerment, and conflict transformation requires combining perspectives from peace and conflict studies, forced migration studies, and international development. This chapter will cover some of the key insights these fields of study offer towards understanding gender relations during armed conflict before examining four case studies that focus on refugee and internally displaced women’s experiences. For the purposes of this study, the theoretical framework for the concept of empowerment has been derived from the development field because empowerment is defined more broadly in international development than in peace and conflict studies. Perry and Schenck (2001) maintain that “peace-making is the ultimate site for development in that it works towards building a stable environment in which to construct a better life for future generations” (cited in Afshar and Eade 2004: 272).



## Gender relations in peace and conflict resolution studies

Initially, gender was marginalized in peace and conflict resolution theory and practice. In fact, not only were women excluded from the settlement process, settlement came at the expense of women, in general (Pankhurst 2003: 157). The field of conflict resolution and peace studies acknowledged gender much later than development studies or international relations (Pankhurst and Pearce 1997). In development, scholars and practitioners found that if gender was taken seriously then development policies tended to be more successful; that is, policies that did not take gender into account were likely to fail (Elson 1995). Gender is a major organizing principle for every aspect of life, shaping everyday routines, relationships, and institutions as well as capacities and vulnerabilities. Focusing on gender uncovers weaknesses in peacebuilding strategies: little consideration for women's needs; marginalization of gender analysis; and few attempts to change discriminatory practices in institutions and in society. Although issues concerning women have gained more recognition in conflict resolution practice through post-conflict policy, women continue to be sidelined at the peace table (Pankhurst 2003).

Nevertheless, over the last twenty-five years, the theory on women and peace has grown significantly. In the 1980s, feminist peace researchers began to raise gender awareness by expanding definitions of and types of violence to include issues that impact women. Birgit Brock-Utne (1989) developed Johan Galtung's concepts of negative and positive peace, distinguishing between organized and unorganized violence, which highlighted violence against women, such as rape, and other gender-specific forms of discrimination. Betty Reardon created new understandings of security based on studies of feminist/women's values that emphasize ethics of care and the interconnectedness of all people and all forms of life, thereby broadening the concept of security beyond national security to the entire human family. Feminist concepts of security focus on the protection of and improvement of the quality of life rather than a military-dependent world security system that is, in itself, a threat to human security (Reardon 1990: 140). In the early 1990s, when the term "culture of peace" began to enter the global discourse, feminist peace researchers shaped the term by maintaining that equality between all women and men as well as full respect for the human rights of women is a prerequisite to a culture of peace (Breines *et al.* 1999).

Feminist international relations contributed to the field by exploring gendered global systems, and investigating the causes of armed conflict using a gendered analysis. Maria Mies, a critic of a global system she maintains is based on patriarchy and accumulation, argues that patriarchy is not only a system of violence but a system of war; in a patriarchal system, society must be permanently conquered, leading to militarization even in peacetime (Mies 2003). Cynthia Enloe emphasizes the importance of understanding how the parallel processes of feminization and masculinization impact militarization before, during, and after armed conflict. "War of all types creates militarized societies, and in many different cultural contexts, militarization is linked to masculinity – not as a socio-biological attribution but rather as 'cultural constructions of manliness'" (Pankhurst 2003: 168). "Masculinized militarism," a set of beliefs and structures, becomes a part of everyday life through everyday, normal societal processes (Enloe 1993: 5). Gendered nationalism facilitates militarism and accentuates facets of masculinity that tend to lead to violence and the marginalization of women (Maitse 2000). Simultaneously, states and/or ethnic groups shape what it means to be feminine in order to mobilize women and men for the nationalist, militarized, and often racialized agenda. Through nationalist narratives, women are targeted as biological and social producers of community and nationhood in what is called "the battle of the cradle" and "the battle of the nursery" (Petersen 1995; Vickers 1993).

Peace researchers documenting the impact of war on women highlight further the gendered aspects of armed conflict (Kumar 2001; Lorentzen and Turpin 1998; Mertus 2000; Meintejes *et al.* 2001; Vickers 1993). For example, women suffer the most casualties in contemporary warfare, in which civilians are considered legitimate targets and make up 90 percent of all casualties. In addition, women and girls make up the majority, four-fifths, of the world's refugees. Women experience gender-specific violence, often becoming targets of increased domestic violence, systematic rape, sex trafficking, and forced prostitution. Because men are killed, wounded, flee, or voluntarily or involuntarily join the military, many women become heads of households, solely responsible for feeding, clothing, finding shelter for, and providing healthcare and educational services for their families, which often include the elderly and infirm. Environmental destruction affects women because of their key roles in agriculture and other activities such as providing water and firewood. Understanding the enormous impact of armed conflict on women has led to greater inclusion of women in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. Moreover, the documentation of rape, including systemized rape, has contributed to the recognition of rape as a war crime under international law. This documentation has also helped delineate theories on the use of rape as a weapon in war.

Increasing interest in and study of women's peacebuilding capacities have broadened the view of women as victims to include a focus on women's agency in armed conflict. Studies reveal that women take on a variety of roles in armed conflict, from joining armies as soldiers, supporting military efforts, and reproducing male children for the war effort on the one hand, to grieving mothers and human rights or peace activists, on the other. Essentialized representations of women as natural peacemakers are complicated by the varied experiences and activities of women in their local settings. The key to gender analysis is to understand both the differences as well as the similarities in women's multiple identities, e.g. racial, ethnic, religious, and social roles. Nevertheless, some women around the globe do choose to organize, lead, and support peace efforts based on their identities as women despite and at times because of male-dominated political arenas. A gendered view of women's conflict resolution reveals advantages to female participation including an ability to integrate experience at the grassroots level into peacebuilding efforts; the awareness of many challenges faced by civilian populations; and a potential to formulate concrete and effective mechanisms for addressing daily realities on the ground (Anderlini 2000).

Research on women's peace organizations shows variance in terms of focus, scope, membership, and strategy. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom focuses on multiple issues from violence against women to reducing military budgets to anti-imperialism and colonialism. Many women's peace organizations are national in scope. The Mothers' Front, a grassroots women's organization with an estimated membership of more than 25,000 women, protested the "disappearance" of nearly 60,000 men specifically in Sri Lanka (Samuel 2001). Membership and recruitment in women's peace organizations often depend on how identity is used strategically and/or on the group's peacebuilding approach. The Union of the Soldiers' Mothers of Russia recruits women who oppose the war in Chechnya and who are simultaneously mothers of Russian soldiers; they focus primarily on human rights violations in the armed forces as a way to mobilize anti-war protest. Choice of strategy is influenced by many factors including the dynamic political context. Initially, the Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency, Bougainville, organized silent marches – a non-violent strategy – to protest the war and the use of rape as a weapon. As the organization developed, the members focused on economic sustainability as well non-violent action (Hakena 2003). On the other hand,

The Jerusalem Link Israel, the Women's Support Network Northern Ireland, and the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace all facilitate dialogue between ethnically, religiously, and politically diverse women identified with warring parties.

## Peacebuilding and gender mainstreaming

Increasingly, peace and conflict literature has reinforced the importance of mainstreaming women into decision-making processes so that they will be included at the peace table (Anderlini 2000; Breines *et al.* 1999; Skjelsbaek and Smith 2001). Studies show that there are two main reasons why women become involved in peacebuilding: (1) they wish to change the very difficult circumstances created for women by armed conflict; and (2) they recognize that peace agreements offer an opportunity to transform society generally and gender relations specifically. Transformation of society during conflict may provide post-conflict opportunities for transformation of gender relations. For example, after the genocide in Rwanda, the absence of men made women more vulnerable in many ways. However, the conflict also opened up a space for women to demand equality under the law and justice for crimes committed against them. The new Rwandan constitution, approved in 2002, has many provisions relating to gender equality, including a 30 percent quota for women's representation in political decisionmaking. Rwanda currently has the highest percentage of women parliamentarians in the world (48 percent in the lower house). In Liberia, where there was an active women's peace movement during the civil war, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the first woman president on the African continent, was elected with the slogan "All the men have failed Liberia; let's try a woman this time" (McCarthy 2005).

United Nations (UN) Resolution 1325, which calls for the inclusion of women in all peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding activities, illustrates the direction of policy development from the mainstreaming perspective. The policy calls for more representation in decisionmaking in all aspects of the peace process; a central position in post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation in their societies; and more humanitarian and human rights protection and participation for refugees, internally displaced and returnee women. An example of the impact of Resolution 1325 is the appointment of a gender consultant in the 2003 Intergovernmental Authority for Development responsible for Somali peace negotiations, resulting in a 12 percent quota of women parliamentarians in the new structure (the women had aimed for 25 percent). Burundi has used Resolution 1325 to monitor peacekeeping activities, e.g. preparing women for elections (McAskie 2006). Nevertheless, according to Ghana's representative at the 2006 UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, "on balance . . . [the UN and Member States] have only paid lip service to the aspirations underpinning this epoch-making resolution and its implementation has been inconsistent, with mixed and varying results" (Effah-Apenteng 2006).

Furthermore, current research shows that, in the few instances where women have been included at the negotiating table, changes at the top or institutional level, although encouraging, are not enough to dramatically alter gender equity at the grassroots level. The most recent literature discusses the importance of women, consciously identifying transformative experiences during armed conflict and building networks of female support around those experiences because in post-conflict settings women tend to experience a backlash as men rebuild male power bases (Afshar and Eade 2004; Meintejes *et al.* 2001). According to the African Women's Anti-War Coalition, "Transformative spaces must be

created before or during the conflict: focusing on gender relations in the aftermath of conflict is often too late" (ibid.: 8). Transformation refers not only to conditions or structures but also to the internal processes of consciousness and/or the creation of words and language that provide women with a sense of their own agency (Meintejes *et al.* 2001).

Different modes of struggle have tended to perpetuate imbalance in power relations. Where women have played active roles in liberation struggles as soldiers, for example in Eritrea and Nicaragua, once the fighting has ended, they are often encouraged to adopt more "traditional roles" and are pushed "back home" (Pettman 1996: 126). In the Palestinian struggle, women are still valued primarily as mothers of Martyrs and as Patriotic Mothers, even though a few women became fighters, some have chosen to be politically active, and many have contributed to the resistance. Although women are needed in the struggle, their participation must be reconciled with the important task of cultural preservation. In the Palestinian struggle, women faced expectations to take on new public roles while the old value systems and their personal roles remained unchanged (Holt 2003: 229).

## **Gender and refugees**

A focus on women's transformative experiences during conflict heightens the importance of understanding women who have become refugees or are internally displaced. Research on women refugees and/or women in armed conflict has tended to document the enormous challenges that women encounter. For the purposes of this chapter, the term *refugees* is defined as people forced to leave their home country because of fear of persecution for specific reasons. An internally displaced person (IDP), on the other hand, is someone who must leave home to flee persecution but who stays within the borders of the home country (Mertus 2000: 5).

Most of the literature raises awareness of the problems that women refugees face specific to their gender with the goal of transforming refugee and IDP assistance policy and implementation (Mertus 2000). For example, for the last fifteen years, the literature on Burmese refugee women has focused almost exclusively on (1) women's struggle to provide basic needs for themselves and their families; (2) the lack of health care and family planning, resulting in high maternal morbidity from childbirth and attempted abortions; (3) rape both by the Burmese military, who use rape as a weapon, and by Thai military, police, and employers who commit rape with impunity; and (4) the high volume of sex trafficking of girls and women (Kachin Women's Association Thailand 2005; Women's League of Burma 2000). Humanitarian assistance continues to overlook gender-specific concerns such as the need for sanitary napkins, security, and privacy issues. In some cases, a lack of gendered policy analysis results in men's acquiring a monopoly over new resources while women lose their traditional sources of income that come from their rights over land and the resources needed to work the land (Koenig 1995).

Gendering forced migration studies (or refugee studies), which is a new field in itself, is quite recent. How private and public gender relations are produced and reinforced focuses research questions on, for example, how nationalist images of home and household play out in the gendered construction of refugee camps (Giles 2004). Central to this theory is the concept that different women experience forced migration differently and will have varied interpretations of their situations. In her study of rural resettlement, Koenig (1995) found that the women who improved their circumstances after resettlement had class positions that allowed them control over material resources and social networks. The older, more developed ethnographic literature on gender and development has influenced

the field of forced migration studies to the extent that empowerment for women is seen as a central issue, not only as gender-appropriate service delivery or humanitarian assistance. Development assistance becomes a potential vehicle for transforming power relations. Empowerment is of particular interest in situations of forced migration where people are temporarily unable to control key aspects of their existence.

## **Defining empowerment**

Malhotra *et al.*'s (2002) study of women's empowerment as a variable in international development shows that although there are many different terms related to the concept of empowerment – such as gender equity – there are common themes throughout the literature such as control, agency, and self-efficacy. Most definitions of empowerment focus on women's ability to make decisions and achieve outcomes that are important to themselves and their families. Gita Sen (1993) defines empowerment as “altering relations of power . . . which constrain women's options and autonomy and adversely affect health and well-being.”

Empowerment is thought to be a process that encompasses progression from one state (gender inequality) to another state (gender equality). This process, however, is a bottom-up rather than top-down progression; in other words, women must be significant actors in the process, not simply recipients of improved outcomes. Further, a fundamental shift in perceptions, that is, an “inner transformation,” is considered essential to the formulation of choices and to the empowerment process (A. Sen 1999; G. Sen 1993; Kabeer 2001). Kabeer's (2001) definition encompasses most of the above themes: “The expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them.”

Feminist peace research has tended to focus discussions of women, peace, and empowerment more narrowly on political action. Feminist and peace literatures share the assumption that social transformation is possible through political action (Forcey 1995). Peacemaking, then, provides the opportunity for social change. Foss (1989) maintains that women's peacemaking efforts are successful to the degree that they inform the audience of the role that gender plays in peace and conflict discourse and to the degree that the peacemaking activities improve women's lives. As mentioned earlier, much of the current literature on women and peace focuses on empowerment through women's equal participation in political decisionmaking.

In this chapter, Kabeer's definition of empowerment is used. The study of peace activities is expanding to include peacebuilding as well as peacemaking. Linking empowerment to narrow conceptions of political action, e.g. mediation, negotiation, and anti-war protests, limits research on the gendered aspects of peacebuilding in the broad sense. As such, a development perspective on empowerment is useful for the theoretical framework. Nevertheless, whether refugee women connect empowerment to political action is of interest.

## **Shifting gender relations in refugee and displaced person camps: four case studies**

Transformation of gender relations in refugee and displaced person camps becomes central to the study of gender in armed conflict when exploring the claim that women's transformative experiences must be developed during armed conflict. However, any discussion

of refugee empowerment must take into account the often overwhelming obstacles men and women face and the ambivalent nature of shifts in gender relations during the refugee experience. The following four case studies will help identify key issues when studying gender relations, empowerment, and peacebuilding capacities: (1) Afghani refugees in Pakistan and Iran; (2) African internally displaced peoples from several countries; (3) El Salvadorian refugees in the 1980s; and (4) Burmese refugees currently on the Thai/Myanmar border. All four examples focus on grassroots activities.

### ***Afghani refugees in Pakistan and Iran***

Much of what actually happens in camps reinforces unequal gender relations because the camps are managed and controlled mainly by refugee men and foreigners (Boelaert *et al.* 1997). One's ethnic or natural culture and practice are to be carefully guarded. "Women, in particular are frequently regarded paternalistically by both women and men as the repository of ethnic culture and heritage – not to mention family honor. They are therefore more likely to be carefully controlled and to control themselves, in the 'private' space of the group or community" (Giles 2004: 91). For example, Afghans fled the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, setting up camps in Pakistan and Iran. Encouraged by their fundamentalist neighbors in Saudi Arabia and Iran, religious fundamentalists who had opposed reforms for women before leaving Afghanistan often attempted to continue traditional practices in the refugee camps. Women who experienced some degree of freedom in the compounds of their villages were confined to refugee camp compounds, making them completely dependent upon international aid where available. Those women who were forced to become self-sufficient were ostracized in the camps (Mertus 2000: 55). NGO workers were kept from communicating with the women, and sometimes suffered physical abuse for giving aid.

### ***African internally displaced***

Nevertheless, studies are showing that the violence of warfare and its consequences – displacement, impoverishment, and demographic imbalance – have changed gender roles at the household level. "This has led in turn to limited increases in women's decision-making power and political participation: however, the ideological bases underpinning gender relations appear to have remained unchanged or have even been reinforced" (El-Bushra 2003: 258). In her study of primarily internally displaced women in Uganda, Sudan, Angola, Mali, and Somalia, El-Bushra found that changes in gender roles included women taking on increased economic responsibilities within the household; greater freedom regarding marriage practices; and some growth in political engagement at the community and national level. Women's economic responsibilities changed because men were no longer able to have access to resources they formerly controlled; displaced in cities, women experienced more income-generating opportunities in urban cash economies; women were exposed to new ways of life and skills; and the proportion of female-headed households grew in some instances to 30 percent as in Sudan and Mali. The increased economic dependence of men on women resulted in a growing respect and more decisionmaking power in the household for women.

As a result of increased economic power, women did experience limited shifts in gendered power structures outside the home. However, women's moderate increase in political roles (Sudan, Uganda) and their involvement in trade as in Angola and Somalia



had little impact on the women's political or organizational influence. El-Bushra's study reinforces the view that there is little connection between local and national processes of policy reform and reconstruction. Further, although she found traditional marriage practices altered in Uganda and Rwanda, allowing some women more freedom to choose, militarization also resulted in the ability of men to force themselves on women at gunpoint, family breakdown, and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.

"Conflict does not appear to have led to shifts in gender identities but rather to growing tensions between people's ideals (of masculinity and femininity) and the practical reality available to them when their lives are restricted by violence, displacement, impoverishment, and personal loss" (El-Bushra 2003: 260). El-Bushra found that the tension between the ideal and reality resulted in increasing levels of stress for men and for women. Instead of transforming gender ideologies, the gap in expectations may serve to reinforce the ideal. However, she concludes that changes in gender consciousness are possible. Both men and women in her study said "things will never be the same again" (El-Bushra 2003: 261) (see Figure 3.1).

### ***El Salvadorian refugees and internally displaced people***

There is some evidence that women's shifting roles in conflict can lead to increased peacebuilding capacity (Thompson and Eade 2002). In refugee camps in Honduras and in internally displaced camps in El Salvador, Salvadorean women in the 1980s learned from NGOs about human rights articulation and reporting. In Honduras, because of lack of traditional authority figures, they also learned about community organization and increasingly took on roles of leadership, thereby gaining experience, providing role models, and challenging old stereotypes. In El Salvador, food, water, and childcare were provided, freeing up women for literacy classes, training, and meetings. Women gained experience with military aggression in leadership positions in the Christian Committee of the Displaced, an organization set up to incorporate the displaced into existing cooperatives. As a result, it was the women, particularly the young women, who organized and led the audacious movement to repopulate conflict zones in El Salvador during the war in high-profile, collective, organized events.

Martha Thompson and Deborah Eade (2002) maintain that the women were able to lead the peacebuilding movement because of women's support groups, access to training and education in the camps, growing confidence gained from active political participation and human rights protection skill building, and manipulation of cultural stereotypes. Young women were chosen as human rights workers initially because they were literate, they could use computers, and they had no children and fewer household responsibilities. In addition, the soldiers did not perceive them as a serious threat. Young women, for example, could pass through military checkpoints with reports documenting human rights violations, which were to be delivered to national and international NGOs. The reports would have been typed up, folded into triangles and braided into the young women's hair, or placed in a basket of fruit on their heads. Over time, the young women developed strong networks of support and leadership skills; 80 percent of the leaders of the National Coordination for Repopulation were women under thirty.

Generally, the women learned that there were advantages to their participation and leadership as women. They were shrewd in exploiting the cultural prejudice that women are less intelligent than men. Further, using their roles as mothers, women successfully negotiated with soldiers to allow truckloads of food critical for the survival of the




Figure 3.1 Gender identities and conflict: a tentative model of possible links.



movement to pass through checkpoints by quietly arguing that mothers had the right to feed their children. Thompson and Eade's study shows some indication of the women's sense of empowerment and how they developed increased peacebuilding capacity generally and, more specifically, human rights protection skills.

### *Women from Burma on the Thai/Myanmar border*

A study of women from Burma living on the Thai/Myanmar border shows how women activists can transform violent spaces into "an enabling environment" (O'Kane 2006: 251). O'Kane documents how women's experiences as refugees, migrant workers, and student activists made them more aware of gender relations. Their heightened awareness led in turn to the formation of women's associations that required conflict resolution and alliance building across ethnic boundaries as well as agreement on political processes.

In an effort to recreate recognizable state-like structures, ethnic groups in the refugee camps assisted women in setting up women's organizations that paralleled state-sponsored women's organizations inside Burma. In Burma, state-sponsored women's organizations were led by wives and relatives of ethnic political leaders and reinforced traditional ethnic roles for women. However, in the process of locating funds and resources to meet the basic needs of newly-arrived refugees, women active in these organizations became increasingly aware of the gendered dimensions of refugee displacement. The women leadership noticed the male control of political and military decisionmaking and weaponry, women's experience of rape and sex abuse, increased domestic violence, and growing maternal and infant mortality. "Paradoxically, through performing welfare duties in line with their traditional gender roles under the intensely pressured conditions of displacement and refugee camps, some women came to question, then challenge, some aspects of traditional gender norms through pursuing non-traditional roles in the community and education" (O'Kane 2006: 237).

Migrant workers faced different challenges in the illegal migrant labor markets. Maintaining social networks and connections that offered some source of protection, particularly access to legal protection, was very difficult. Their vulnerability was heightened by physical isolation from their own communities in their roles as domestic workers and in the sex industry. Loose coalitions of migrant women were the first to begin to respond to the needs of undocumented migrant communities. Migrant women who had gained legal status, for example through marriage, were called on to assist women in sexually, physically, and psychologically abusive situations. In the hospitals and police stations, they heard the same stories over and over again. O'Kane's interviews with migrant women indicate that their growing awareness of gender relations contributed to the establishment of new women's organizations such as the Shan Women's Action Network in 1998.

According to O'Kane's study, student activists who played key leadership roles in organizing the 1988 uprising felt discriminated against on the basis of gender when they reached the Thai/Myanmar borderlands in pursuit of armed struggle. In Burma, the movement's rhetoric supported gender equality. However, once in the borderlands, the male leadership enforced traditional gender roles as the students began to organize an army, the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF). The women were presented with two options: they could become teachers or medics. This shift in gender consciousness led to the formation of the first women's organization in the borderlands, the Burmese Women's Union (BWU). They were concerned that, if they gained democracy, women would not be able to participate in decisionmaking roles if they did not become more active working for women's rights and democracy at the same time.

Eventually, in 2000, the women's activities led to the formation of the Women's League of Burma. Setting up the League required reconciliation across ethnic boundaries and the creation of alliances on women's issues and on political processes. The women activists connected with global women's movements, networking on issues such as trafficking of women. Although the international connection meant renewed opposition from male political leaders, participating in global networks presented many opportunities including the experience of attending UN international and regional conferences, increased funding, educational opportunities, and new strategies from networking with women in other conflict areas. For example, they learned the importance of teaching peace education from women in Eastern Europe. Further, consolidation of the opposition movement's infrastructure in Thailand attracted the interest of the diaspora in China, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, resulting in the return of women with citizenship, which increased the capacity of the movement.

## **Conclusion**

Studying gender relations and conflict transformation among refugee women reveals a few examples of how women's shifting roles contribute to peacebuilding capacities. In El Salvador in the 1980s, the experience of the refugees and internally displaced expanded the ability of the women to make life choices in a limited way. In the Central American context specific to El Salvador, because food and childcare were provided by NGOs or taken care of collectively, some of the women chose to develop leadership, human rights protection, and literacy skills. Together, they began to understand the advantages of their leadership and participation in community affairs as women. Changing gender relations and a sense of empowerment eventually led to the women's leadership in the repopulation of conflict zones, which played a role in the transformation of the civil war.

On the other hand, the women from Burma who are currently on the Thai/Myanmar border made decisions to form separate women's organizations because of a heightened awareness of gender discrimination both within their communities and through armed conflict. Refugees, migrant workers, and student leaders chose to build alliances across ethnic and political boundaries and increase their individual and organizational capacity by networking with global women's campaigns. Concerned that women's equality would not be taken seriously in the future, they developed their own strategies for mainstreaming gender equality in democratic decisionmaking processes. Building mutual support around a desire for gender equity empowered the women to take charge of peacebuilding activities on the border.

In contrast, the study of African internally displaced women illustrated how changing gender relations in armed conflict did not necessarily expand the ability of women to make choices in a significant way although empowerment connected to changing gender roles remained possible. Tension from the disparity between ideal gender roles and the practical reality created opportunities for shifts in gender identities but, El-Bushra noted, few transformative changes had actually taken place. Afghani religious fundamentalists in the 1980s in camps in Pakistan and Iran and the male foreigners managing the camps reinforced unequal gender relations. This example shows how refugee women's behavior was controlled and how women's resistance could be obscured. In all four cases, difficulties ranging from rape and physical abuse to lack of health care and basic necessities were evident as were male attempts to control women's behavior. The challenges most of the refugee and internally displaced faced highlight the ambivalent aspects of empowerment for women in armed conflict.

Attending to the shifting terrain of gender relations and women's empowerment during conflict results in a growing understanding of refugee and displaced persons' peacebuilding capacities. Women's empowerment during conflict will not always lead to their participation in non-violent efforts. However, by using insights from the fields of peace and conflict, forced migration, and international development studies, it becomes clearer how, under certain limited circumstances, women who have been forced to flee their homes find an increased ability to improve their status as women and exercise leadership in their communities. A gendered analysis helps to reconceptualize the role of refugee and displaced women and, potentially, to address common weaknesses in existing peacebuilding strategies. Further research in this area may influence the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming policy at the community or grassroots level.

## Note

- 1 Peacebuilding is a term that continues to be defined in many ways in the field of peace and conflict studies. For the purposes of this chapter, it is used in its broadest sense including many types of peace activities rather than the narrower definition that homes in on post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. Peacemaking, which may also refer to a broad range of peace activities, here refers instead to mediation, negotiation, conciliation, and/or dialogue.

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# 4 Causation as a core concept in conflict analysis

*Daniel Rothbart and Rose Cherubin*

## Introduction

The enormous surge in identity-based conflict has captivated world attention with a new sense of urgency to explain how cycles of violence are fueled by notions of identity and difference. Familiar models of nation-states at war fail to explain the character of such violence and the militant tactics that ensure escalation of hostilities. The demands for vengeance acquire a ferocity that taps into the most violent passions of individuals. This ferocity emanates from a collective fixation on the dangerous Other, a fixation that in turn tends to dominate ingroup identity, and fosters a readiness to address grievances through violent means.

Some conflict analysts argue that the root causes of ethnic conflict rest on the cognitive dissonance among the protagonists, that is, on a struggle between beliefs, behaviors, and environmental conditions as they are and as they should be (cf. Gurr 1993; Sandole 1999: ch. 6; Sandole 2003). Other analysts draw attention to ancient hatreds that simmer under the surface and erupt with explosive rage from the occurrence of minor infractions.<sup>1</sup> Many conflict analysts seek to broaden their perspective by recognizing the impact of multiple causal factors within a hierarchy of levels – systematic, societal, and individual (Levy 1998; Sandole 1999).

In spite of an enormous body of research on identity-based conflict, the precise conception of causality that underpins such research has not been adequately addressed. In fact, conflict theorists are virtually silent on two essential questions: (1) What is the notion of causation that best serves such studies? (2) How can analysts determine that they have in fact discovered the root causes of such violence? We believe that this silence represents a stunning theoretical omission, and a radical incompleteness in the field of conflict analysis. In this chapter, we begin to redress this omission by examining causation in the study of protracted conflict.

Our perspective is unusual for this field: we draw on the rich tradition of philosophical thought on the nature of explanation, causation, and appropriate methods of inquiry. Retrieving notions from ancient Greek thinkers, we offer an original conception of causation that is vital to conflict theory.

On the question of causality many social scientists turn to the writings of logical positivist philosophers, for whom causality reduces to a Humean regularity of occurrences. In this view, the cause of any particular social phenomenon can be explained as a particular case of a lawlike pattern of phenomena. But in philosophical circles there is no unanimity of opinion about the nature of causality appropriate for inquiry into social phenomena. In fact, the problem of causality has plagued thinkers from the days of the ancient Greeks, and still commands the attention of scientists and philosophers today. One essential lesson

from ancient Greek thinkers regains currency in contemporary research: no single conception of causation fits all modes of social scientific inquiry. Different conceptions are suitable for different epistemic purposes and ontological categories.

Launching our study with the recognition of multiple conceptions of causality, we argue that the causes of identity-based conflict are not reducible to material conditions alone, nor to patterns of empirical events. The causes of identity-based violence often include the shared normative commitments of the protagonists' groups, commitments that center on notions of ingroup purity and outgroup vice. Such commitments represent an invocation of formal–telic causation.<sup>2</sup> In cases of identity-based conflict, formal–telic causation is manifested through a combination of mythic narratives, a logicity of action, and a model of group differences. In spite of the outward symbols of fixity and permanence that conflict protagonists ascribe to group differences, the “them–us” duality associated with identity-based conflict is responsive to life's fleeting events and changing conditions. We illustrate these themes through the case of anti-Tutsi narratives by Hutu extremists preceding the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

### **On the root causes of identity-based violence**

A major source of prolonged hostilities in many of the current violent conflicts is the high salience of group identity. Of course, salience of identity has no real-world existence apart from a set of beliefs about how the social world operates, beliefs that are framed through dualities of safe/dangerous, home/foreign, sacred/profane, and evil/virtuous. Even in international criminal tribunals addressing ethnic-based crimes, attempts to identify “objective” factors of ethnicity have been shown to be futile.<sup>3</sup> Salience of identity is a social process of asserting what is, for the faithful, something real, fixed, and sacred (Smith 1996). Certain “basic” ways of knowing and talking primarily work to create, maintain, reproduce, and transform specific modes of societal relationships, to invite certain forms of social exchange, and also to close off others. The symbols of orders and borders bring into “existence” what they convey: they (the symbols) delimit the interior from the exterior, the realm of the sacred from that of the profane, and the homeland from the foreign territory.<sup>4</sup> In many cases storytellers seek to identify sources of violence, disruption, or violation of a moral (cosmic) order that are central to stories of conflict (Jackson 2002: 22).

In spite of the enormous differences in their conflict settings, extremists fighting to preserve their group's identity echo one another disturbingly in their rationale for violence. In religious-based conflicts, such a rationale often privileges notions of a cosmic war between the forces of evil and goodness (Juergensmeyer 2003: 150). Their violent actions represent necessary responses to the threats of the criminal Other. For bin Laden, Jihad is a life struggle against forces of injustice and vice (Moore 2003: 153). Some representatives of Hamas depicted the American incursion in Kuwait in 1990 as a direct attack on the whole of Islamic civilization, representing “another episode in the fight between good and evil” (Juergensmeyer 2003: 57). In another setting, as the alleged leader of the group responsible for the London bombings of 7 July 2005, Mohammad Sidique Khan proclaimed, as his “ethical stance,” that he is a soldier fighting against the governments responsible for “atrocities against my people.” He is engaged in a “war” that “my people” are waging in the streets of London against “your democratically elected governments.”<sup>5</sup> In speaking of his “people,” Sidique Khan was referring not to all people who profess Muslim faith, but to those who share Khan's politico-religious identity.



In the cases of identity-based conflict mentioned above, group differences are framed in axiological terms; that is, grounded in divisions of right and wrong, categories of good and bad, and principles of virtues and vices. High salience of group identity fosters a *Moralpolitik* of difference that is manifested in imperatives to oppose an enemy, convert the contaminated, and act according to the (ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, economic) “laws” of nature. The *Moralpolitik* of difference is characterized as a nexus of mythic narratives, a pre-formed logicity of action, and a teliomorphic model.

## Myth, action, and model

For Aristotle, social and political institutions reflect a society’s responses to the question of how to live well and do well, and reflect its quest to achieve these goals. Toward these ends, each society promotes virtues and conditions that it deems conducive to its ideals and to the flourishing of those it understands to be its members (Salkever 1981: 492). In like fashion, every identity group lives according to its polis-idea, and every polis or polis-idea unites individuals through a blend of politics and axiology. Individual life acquires its meaning from the “wisdom” of a history of a sacred past, and such “wisdom” is propelled forward to visions of an idealized and purposive future. In this respect, the collective identity of a group is inescapably normative, defined and driven by its polis, and manifested in declarations of obligations, expectations, requirements, demands, and rights.

We believe that the Aristotelian theme is novel for conflict analysis. The “roots” of identity-based conflict represent a group’s struggle to realize its ideals, to live according to its normative principles, and to flourish in the face of perceived external threats. For groups with a high salience of identity, identity-based violence is fueled by constructing myths about the Other and, from such myths, rationalizing imperatives for action that often demands revenge, vigilance, and sacrifice. This combination of mythic narrative and imperatives for action is interwoven with models that unify a history of the sacred past and a set of imperatives for action. The nexus of *myth*, *action*, and *model* offers a lens through which dangers are observed, explained, and acted upon, and can become a major catalyst for hostilities among conflicting groups.

## Mythic history

The conflict protagonists in these cases find guidance from tales of past tragedies, sufferings, and acts of injustice. For protagonists such tales tend to solidify in perpetuity the savagery and brutality of the past, offering “insight” to the sources of hostility, solace for the sufferings they must endure, and guidance for actions that must be taken. Through intergenerational storytelling, these episodes are converted to the sacred realm. Every protagonist group venerates militant leaders, sacred grounds, and episodes of extraordinary sacrifice. Certain places, times, and encounters are revered, lifted above the tide of history, and relived through intergenerational storytelling. Ingroup psyche is shaped by stories that have the effect of demonizing the Other as uncivilized, savage, ignorant, and of degenerate character.

The *Moralpolitik* of identity-based conflict exhibits affinities to a kind of religiosity of difference. When threatened by hostile and powerful forces, the ingroup reverts to its sacred realm for “insight” and guidance. To compensate for the finitude and dangers of individual life, mythic history offers solace in the universal and the eternal realm. In its mythic history, a protagonist group privileges episodes that serve as protophenomena of the unjust,



immoral, uncivilized, or possibly inhuman character of the Other. Myths exude the sacred and, for the protagonists of identity-based conflict, the sacred rests on the stereotype of accusation, the guilt, and the apparent responsibility of victims. A nexus of powerful icons, value-laden words, and global models frames this stereotype, and emboldens the ingroup to protect the innocence and purity of the home (Rothbart and Korostelina 2006: ch. 3).

### ***Logicity of action***

Memories of past calamities would be radically incomplete as a motive for violence without a normative vision of the idealized future. A conflict protagonist telling a story about the enemy's criminal deeds shifts attention away from the past and looks towards future possibilities, imagining how the course of events will change through possible actions. In the cases mentioned above, the memories are encased in a pre-formed logicity of action that affirms and enshrines a set of normative decisions. The narrative of inevitable conflict follows from demands for vigilance, obedience, strength, and sacrifice (Frohardt and Temin 2003). In some cases, the story of impending strategic incursion and conquest by the Other establishes the rationale for preemptive attacks against "invaders" as a measure of "self-defense." The application of an axiology of difference to present or future scenarios thus confers a sense of stability to ingroup identity, and consistency (even fairness) in the implementation norms.

For protagonists of identity-based conflicts, mythmaking creates the illusion of historical necessity. Within its collective imagination, certain traumatic encounters occur in mythic time, outside chronological history. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1958) Hannah Arendt shows how totalitarian ideologies can sponsor ingroup identification and violence in their name. Ideologies, she says, are "isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise" (Arendt 1958: 468). An ideology is represented in the logic of an idea, the consequences of the idea, and the workings of the world as understood in accordance with that idea, and the historical "laws" that are derived from it. Racism, for example, is "the belief that there is a [causal] motion inherent in the very idea of race" (ibid.: 469); in other words, the belief that racial differences cause other differences between peoples, without any inquiry into the nature and existence of what is called race. Ideological thinking, Arendt goes on to point out, "proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality" (ibid.: 471). The apparent logical consistency of an ideology is one of the elements that help to make it look "scientific."

As far back as Aristotle (*Metaphysics* Γ3, 1005b5ff), it was clear that science was not possible without a principle of non-contradiction, and that within science nothing contradictory could be considered as true. In real sciences, however, as Arendt suggests, perfect consistency is a goal researchers continually and rigorously seek but do not assume themselves to have found. Extreme consistency to the point of denial of observable evidence, however, is a hallmark of ideology and a sign of the divergence between ideology and science.

Like the ideological thought it mirrors, the logicity of action masquerades as scientific. Ideological thought draws rhetorical power by taking on the appearance of consistency, as if engaging in scientific inquiry. Instead of supporting fundamental causal inquiry, it blocks that inquiry. Even where it includes explicitly religious elements, ideology tends to need the "logic of the idea" to promote the sense of inevitability of violence. What is defective and devastating in the worldviews of agents in violent identity-based conflicts is not only

their cruelty – for history has unfortunately shown that almost any set of beliefs may be interpreted or manipulated to foster cruelty and oppression – but also their thoroughgoing repression of inquiry in favor of unreasoning, arbitrary, and ideologically consistent authority. Where no exploration of what would make a life worth living is possible, the goals on which the agents focus tend to be circumscribed by the conflict itself.

The dangers of appeals to divine authority were well known to the ancient Greeks. They knew that such an appeal leads to prohibitions against calling the divinity's reputed wishes or directives into question. The appeal to the divine derives from an *ontological* claim: that the divine beings have authority and the ability to enforce it because the divine beings are what make the world be the way it is and work the way it does. The divine beings order the world, and for humans to try to deviate from that order is dangerous and ultimately futile. At the same time, when the gods are seen as ultimate arbiters and steerers of what is, any explanation of what is and of what should be can go no further than to mention what is believed about the gods.<sup>6</sup>

### *Teliomorphic modeling*

A consistency characteristic of ideological thought derives in part from the peculiar role of the formal cause in the teliomorphic model. If an outgroup is demonized as evil and destructive, its members are consequently characterized as dangerous. If their alleged danger threatens to contaminate the area of their presence, then it follows that the alleged contaminants must be destroyed. No arguments or observations can demonstrate a causal link between the nature of being an outgroup member and being destructive; no arguments or observations establish that the alleged contamination is fatal to others and ineradicable except by killing the alleged contaminants. The relevant associations, as Arendt notes, are conceived as axiomatic.

Like the reliance of religious militants on divine authority (Rothbart and Korostelina 2006: ch. 3), the commitment to a logical/mythic frame has the effect of cutting off causal inquiry.<sup>7</sup> To give analytical clarity to this study of causality, we employ the notion of a teliomorphic model: an idealized construction of group differences, the formation of which from the mythic/logicality nexus is a major source of identity-based violence.

In Figure 4.1 the process of teliomorphic framing of identity and difference is represented by the symbol ↓, which depicts the application of the frame to accounts of episodes, events, and actions. This figure also stresses the dynamism of such a model, as the symbol ↑ represents the impact of events in mythic time on conceptions of identity and difference. “?” represents an intervention of righteous action, leading to survival, salvation, or possibly




Figure 4.1 Teliomorphic model.

glory. Such a model represents an abstraction of features of the protagonists' narratives.<sup>8</sup> It functions as a model of encounters by providing retrospective replication of a limited range of phenomena. But, in its instrumental function, the teliomorphic model emerges as a model for subsequent understandings, serving as a cognitive guide for storytellers seeking to explain and understand subsequent events. We might say that the teliomorphic model is an analytical instrument for rendering experiences coherent and meaningful.<sup>9</sup>

### **Anti-Tutsi ideology<sup>10</sup>**

Consider the case of anti-Tutsi propaganda spread by Hutu extremists prior to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. In December 1990, the magazine *Kangura* issued an anti-Tutsi declaration and a call to arms for all Hutus. Known as the "Ten Commandments," this declaration had clear overtones of a religious crusade. Although it was originally intended to unite the Hutus behind President Habyarimana and his party, the extremists used the Commandments to fuel Hutus' hysteria and to legitimize a strategy of extermination. The Commandments included references to Tutsis as power-hungry, wicked, and deceitful.

The "logic" of the Ten Commandments juxtaposes "knowledge," based on a pseudo-scientific law of ethnic history, with injunctions for action. Commandments 1, 2, and 4 recount what every Hutu "must know" about Tutsi defects (Semujanga 2003: 196–7). Commandment 1 reads:

Every Muhutu [Hutu man] must know that Umututsikazi [Tutsi woman], wherever she is, works for her Tutsi ethnic group. Therefore, any Muhutu who weds a Mututsikazi, who makes of a Mututsikazi his concubine, who makes of a Mututsikazi his secretary or his Protégé is a traitor.

The injunctions for action conveyed in Commandments 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 establish what every Hutu "must do" for survival (Semujanga 2003: 197). For example, Commandment 9 reads:

Bahutus, whoever they are must be united with, in solidarity with, and preoccupied with their Bahutu Brothers. . . . [Bahutu] must counter Tutsi propaganda. Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.

This Commandment works as a call to eliminate the Tutsi threat. Commandment 8 insists that Hutu must "stop feeling any pity for the Tutsi." Killing Tutsi is necessary since they are enemies of the republic. Commandment 8 comes as a logical conclusion to the narratives of knowledge and action, as if the Commandments state the facts and demand the actions (Semujanga 2003: 199–200): spread Hutu ideology, "counter Tutsi propaganda," and kill them.

A myth of Tutsi origins drew strongly on the idea that the Tutsi are not truly a Rwandan race – they are outsiders who have infiltrated Rwanda and who continue to dissimulate in order to receive more of their quota of jobs as scientifically assigned within the existing Hutu order. Their collective criminality and degeneracy were thus easily essentialized. As one self-proclaimed Hutu killer said (Hatzfeld 2003: 121):

Our Tutsi neighbors, we knew they were guilty of no misdoing, but we thought all Tutsis at fault for our constant troubles. We no longer looked at them one by one; we

no longer stopped to recognize them as they had been, not even as colleagues. They had become a threat greater than all we had experienced together, more important than our way of seeing things in the community. That's how we reasoned and how we killed at the time.

Thus, the appeal to principles that make a course of action seem inevitable or necessary also renders inquiry into causes as impossible, unnecessary, and potentially malevolent. The ingroup becomes barricaded within its own frame of group difference, reinforcing an "absolute" separation from what are seen as threats to the ingroup. Contamination is the great fear within a barricaded ethnicity (Jowitt 2001: 28). It is precisely inquiry into empirical causes that disrupts such barricades. If causal inquiry is available, justice cannot be reduced to the will of the strongest. If Tutsis or Jews or Arabs are *defined* as evil and destructive, it follows that they are dangerous. Since their presence is by this definition dangerous to anyone living near them, it follows that survival of the (virtuous) ingroup requires elimination of the threat. In this scenario, there are no arguments or observations that establish that the alleged contaminants' fatal presence is ineradicable other than by killing them. The relevant associations, as Arendt notes, are conceived as axiomatic.

Because ideological thinking relies on the "logic of an idea," it eschews all information from experience except what can be interpreted in conformity with the idea; indeed the experience is not valued for itself, and is secondary to the idea. This is what the Hutu killer reported: he came to ignore his own experience of Tutsi individuals in favor of a received idea about the abstract nature of the Tutsi. He does not seem to have asked *how* the Tutsis had caused problems, how it could be that his individual neighbors had done nothing to harm him but all Tutsis *qua* Tutsi were guilty of harming Hutus, why the neighbors' ethnicity, rather than their individual identities, were responsible for the conflict, or indeed whether the Tutsis were really responsible for the Hutus' problems at all. With such notions of Hutu/Tutsi differences, there is no need for serious inquiry into the genuine character of "our Tutsi neighbors."

### Aristotle's four causes

Reflection on the sources of identity-based conflict demands attention to the multiple notions of causality. The term "cause" is a polyseme in the sciences, given different meanings in different kinds of inquiry.

An understanding of Aristotle's "four causes" illuminates modern investigations of the sources of identity conflicts. These were the four ways, according to Aristotle, in which a thing is said to be a cause (*aitia*), a "why" of something.<sup>11</sup> (a) The first, the "matter," sometimes today called the "material cause," is that out of which something is made, its constituent stuff. (b) The second is the source of motion, rest, or change; it is what sets off an event, or what is responsible for something's coming into being, perishing, moving, or changing. This is sometimes known as the "moving cause" or the "efficient cause." (c) The third kind of cause is something Aristotle variously calls the *eidos* ("form"), the *ousia* (usually "substance" or "being"), the *paradeigma* (pattern), the definition (in the sense of the defining characteristics) or the account of, or *to ti ēn einai* (what it is to be something, sometimes translated as "essence"). This is often referred to as the "formal cause." (d) The last kind of cause is something Aristotle expresses as that for the sake of which something is, happens, or is done. He sometimes refers to it as the *telos*, the end or goal, and it is sometimes called the "final cause" today.

Modern natural and social sciences focus most attention on the first two kinds of causes. These are, after all, the two that are most susceptible to empirical investigations. In the twentieth century, social science researchers studying warring relations among nation-states often invoked efficient cause, focusing on significant events that preceded the effect. For analysis of identity-based conflict it is necessary and fruitful to examine the other two of Aristotle's kinds of cause – the “formal” and the “final” causes. Not only is our account of the causes of violent conflict incomplete without resorting to formal and final causes in teliomorphic models, but indeed our understanding of the material and efficient causes is inadequate without an investigation of the other two.

Aristotle declared in *Physics* B9 that matter “exists by hypothesis.” What he meant is that his “matter” is always matter *of something*, not a self-subsistent entity like modern “matter.” That which is going to count as matter in a given description depends on what one is counting as a particular subject of investigation. In other words, Aristotle acknowledged that there are different ways of identifying “things.” We may then say that a teliomorphic model is one way by which a group might come to identify what “things” are operating in a given situation. The “matter” of the alleged evil that is the subject of the Hutu Ten Commandments would be the living Tutsis. The Spanish Inquisition also imagined a threat – the threat of heresy – and sought to eradicate it; but their model suggested that the souls of the Jews and Muslims were the matter of the problem, and so they sought to kill only those Jews and Muslims that they thought would not really convert.

When we identify a thing, we identify it as a particular kind of thing, or as something having a particular description. This “formula” of what it is to be a thing of a certain kind is what Aristotle would call the “form,” the third kind of cause mentioned above. It is a cause, a why, in this sense: in the case of a wooden table, the form is what makes it a table, as opposed to a chair, or a bed, etc. This form, which it has in common with tables made of other materials, is part of what makes it what it is, namely a wooden table. The form of being a table is what it is to be a table, and is that in virtue of which this assemblage of wood is a table.

In Aristotle's accounts of the development and maintenance of living things, explanation by the formal cause thus involves explanation by the final cause. The form that is appealed to in such explanations always functions partly as goal (Cooper 2004: 110). Formal cause invokes final cause; form invokes goal or end.

This is also true of the teliomorphic processes that work to develop and maintain societies and group identities: the forms invoked always point to a specific outcome. Arendt's “logic of the ideology” becomes implicit. The Hutu radio broadcasts made it seem as though it was obvious that the Tutsis had to be eradicated because of their “form.” The conclusion that they should be eradicated was presented not as a conclusion, but rather as implicit in the description.

### **Formal–telic causation**

Humean causation continues to guide studies of war.<sup>12</sup> But this notion severely hampers inquiry because of its reliance on the principled division between the objectivity of facts, so-called, and the subjectivity of values. In cases where salient identity (ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, economic, class, etc.) is a source of conflict, the resulting hostilities should be explained through an axiology of identity formation, i.e. through the ways in which protagonist groups enliven divisions between virtues and vices, right and wrong, and the sacred and profane. In the minds of conflict protagonists, the presence of the

sacred and the profane is linked to a logic of action that establishes injunctions for the “necessary” responses to the enemy’s deeds.

In the teliomorphic model we have described, the mythic narratives shape ways of thinking, speaking, acting, and evaluating the world. This shaping contributes to a whole “living ideology” (Shotter 1993: ch. 12). The reliance on teliomorphic models of identity-group difference does not rest on a succession of discrete events occurring in chronological time. The sources of identity-based conflict center on its formal and final causes; that is, the axiology of virtues and vices that establish borders and orders of protagonist groups. The mythic narratives render certain experiences sacred and ascribe responsibility, and hence agency, to a targeted group. Yet the efficient cause (seemingly descriptive and non-prescriptive) should be understood additionally as a formal cause of axiological differences.

A teliomorphic model then also invokes final causality; the prefix *teli-* derives from the Greek *telos*, meaning “end” or “goal.” The Hutus of the anti-Tutsi broadcast took as their final cause or goal the eradication, generally through extermination, of Tutsis. They saw this goal as essential for Hutu survival. Similarly, the Nazis took it that their survival required the extermination of Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, homosexuals, mentally or physically disabled people, and dissidents (and other groups later on). They, too, assumed that only then would they attain possession of the homeland they saw as necessary (because it was “theirs”).

In spite of the demonization of Tutsis by Hutu ideologues, several possible goals and courses of action might have been open to them. The mythic narrative might also have provided some political or moral guidance to which goals to pursue and which courses to take. The nature of a conflict, and the possibilities for resolving it, depend in no small part on the goals of the combatants. These goals are themselves shaped partly by the way in which the combatants see themselves, their possibilities, and their opponents, and the formal causes that appear through the mythic narratives.

It is noteworthy that in these cases conflict protagonists often lack a clear vision and conception of a genuinely positive future. Their stated objectives are not only brutal but also self-contradictory and incomplete. It has been observed before that the Nazis had no clear plan for what they would do if they won the war: no plan for how they would rebuild, how people would live, or what institutions and industries would exist. They had also blocked free inquiry, into plans for rebuilding and sustaining life. The Hutus were willing to ravage and poison the land they claimed to desire, if that would drive out or kill Tutsis; they also had no plan for post-war life or rebuilding. Both Nazis and Hutus were willing to kill members of the very groups they claimed to be saving if that meant that they could destroy those they sought to eradicate. In both cases, law and principle – even those articulated by the ruling party – were subjugated to the desires of those in power, so that there was no real law or principle at all (cf. Rosenthal 1987: 213–14).

## Conclusion

The preceding examples of shared goals and actions illustrate the centrality of formal-telic causation in explanations of identity conflict. Nothing in this chapter rules out the importance of scientific inquiry into the material conditions and immediate impulsion of conflict; that is, into its material causes or its efficient causes. But neither material causality nor efficient causality, nor the combination of these alone, can capture the dynamics of identity-based conflict and the protagonists’ struggles over how to live, how to live well,

and how to relate (peacefully or not) with others. A study of high salience of group identity also demands inquiry into a complexity of constructed orders that define the *Moralpolitik* of identity, centering on a sense of common history, shared cultural elements, and vision of a promising future. The following conclusions can be drawn from our analysis.

- 1 Any adequate theory of identity-based conflict relies upon causation as a core concept.
- 2 Following Aristotle, causation has several different forms, and no one form fits all modes of scientific inquiry.
- 3 In generations of identity-based conflict, the constructed differences among protagonist groups can generate (as a formal cause) hostilities, viz., the preset “formula” that such groups fix on their experiences and actions in their relations to the Other.
- 4 Such differences among groups with high salience of identity also have a telic dimension, referring to the axiology of living and flourishing in relation to encounters with outsiders.
- 5 Such an axiology fosters a *Moralpolitik* of identity (ethnic, religious, racial, political, economic, class, social, etc.), juxtaposing an ingroup’s moral commitments with political demands for security, influence, or possible conquest of the outgroup.
- 6 The formal–telic causality of identity-based conflict centers on three kinds of constructions: mythic narratives, logicity of action, and teliomorphic modeling.
- 7 The cycle of violence associated with identity-based conflict can reshape and solidify identities, and in turn these identities constitute a (formal–telic) cause of the hostilities.
- 8 In cases of identity-based conflict, such a nexus creates hermetic borders that place a moral and political frame around “permissible” ways of thinking, ways of knowing, and ways of describing episodes of violence.

As conflicts become protracted, the individuals’ primordial attachment to their group (religious, national, ethnic, racial, political, economic, class, social) is given an aura of absolute truth that tends to overwhelm other social attachments. Inquiry into the plight, suffering, and grief of the Other is completely cut off, as is direct contact with the genuine identity of the Other. The result is a form of cognitive blindness that blocks investigation into the plight, or even the lives, of the Other, since such forms of inquiry can be perceived as tainting the investigator. Lest the investigator contaminate others, the demand to forgo inquiry becomes morally imperative for ingroup identity. Thus inquiry into the causes of the ingroup’s problems is suppressed, as is inquiry into the best goals, the best future, of the community.

## Notes

- 1 See Volkan (1997) on “chosen traumas”; Staub (2001) on “ideology of antagonism”; and Jowitt (2001) on the isolation fostered by “barricaded identity.”
- 2 As we develop in the pages below, a formal–telic cause centers on the forms (and formulas) used for organizing the social/political world into primary categories and processes, as well as the application of these forms in strategies, plans, and projects for attaining the collective good (telos).
- 3 After dismissing various attempts to objectify the differences between Hutus and Tutsi through ethnic, national, and racial indicators, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda ruled that the categories of Hutu and Tutsi identities are not subject to “objective” (etic) definitions (Magnarella 2002: 318).



- 4 For an excellent analysis of the relationship between ethnic identity and religious identity, see Avruch (1982).
- 5 Mohammad Sidique Khan, *Guardian Weekly*, 9–15 September 2005: 12.
- 6 Over a century before Aristotle, the tragic poet Aeschylus explored this problem in his *Eumenides*. In the play, two parties contend in a case that has implications concerning the nature and basis of justice. Aeschylus has the goddess Athena resolve the conflict between the two conflicting appeals to divine will by rearranging the cosmic and political orders. Athena then makes the universe work according to consistent and regular principles, and she makes political justice consistent with the order of the universe. The justice and human flourishing that Athena's reforms promise depend on the presence of recognizable patterns and regularities in the cosmos, for these are needed for the development of such arts as farming and medicine, as well as for the possibility of legal reasoning. Athena's reorganization of cosmic offices is not arbitrary, nor does it appeal to ineffable divine will for justification. Because of these two factors – the presence of observable regularities and the fact that these are fundamental, non-arbitrary, and not based on divine will – Athena's resolution of the conflict makes possible peace, justice, inquiry, and understanding. We argue that these are interdependent.
- 7 All cultures engage in causal inquiry at some level, as is evident from that fact that they have skilled crafts. As Aristotle points out in *Metaphysics* A1, skilled crafts or arts require a grasp of how one thing results in another, and indeed of how to achieve a desired result reliably and efficiently. This involves the ability to explain and teach at least something about how things work. Those explanations must be effective, at least in the sense of having predictive success. Some sort of apparent evidence of the explanation's validity must, therefore, be available. This feature fundamentally challenges the view, often expressed today, that groups who act on a religious ideology either reject or have no experience of reasoned inquiry as a mode of discourse. They have such experience, but may ignore it in certain contexts.
- 8 The notion of a teliomorphic model used here represents a liberal extension of Rom Harré's notion; that is, a model that seeks to improve upon the subject matter being modeled. See his *Principles of Scientific Thinking* (1970: ch. 2).
- 9 A theoretical model should not be confused with a scale model of a physical system. A scale model provides a physical substitute for the terrain, whereas a theoretical model constitutes a conceptual representation. (See Sandole's discussion of models in Chapter 31 of this volume.)
- 10 This section of the chapter is an excerpt from Rothbart and Bartlett (2008).
- 11 See *Physics* B3, 194b20–195a5; B7, 198a15–25; *Metaphysics* A3, 982a25–983b5.
- 12 Following the methodology of Humean science some social scientists conclude that wars are independent random events. For an excellent critical analysis of this conclusion, see Huweling and Kune (1984).

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# 5 The challenge of operationalizing key concepts in conflict resolution theory in international and subnational conflicts

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## Introduction

The conflict resolution field has been lively and productive in articulating key theoretical concepts that help explain the success or failure of initiatives to end violence and resolve underlying disputes. Among these are such well-known notions as power imbalances and rebalancing, third party partiality, hurting stalemates, issue transformation, and action–reaction sequences. Although these present a rich basis for theory building, such theory is not very useful for the practitioner if these theoretical approaches and concepts have not survived rigorous, empirical analysis. No matter how compelling a theory may seem, if we, as a field of conflict resolution researchers, have not provided evidence to support theory, we run the risk of misleading practitioners, students, and scholars alike.

This pitfall seems a particular danger in a field that has been criticized for too frequently proposing one-size-fits-all type models of resolution and where failure to prevent or manage conflict could prove disastrous. By systematically analyzing and testing such models, we can better understand the conditions under which certain approaches are more likely to succeed, thereby guiding practitioners with evidence as opposed to rhetoric. In order to do so, it is imperative that we move beyond anecdotal support for our theoretical claims. Doing so, however, may be particularly challenging as many theoretical assertions in the field entail important operational obstacles in the way of formulating proper tests of their effects.

For one thing, core concepts in the field arise from varied levels of analysis: interpersonal, group, and international conflict situations. For example, despite glib book titles such as *The War between the Tates*, rebalancing power among divorce disputants may be quite different from trying to do so between warring factions in ethno-political warfare. Although we speculate that conflict concepts are roughly interchangeable and applicable from level to level, this may or may not be the case. Certainly it is not the case that they or their effects can be measured uniformly at each level, using the same indicators or metrics. In fact, it is not always clear how one operationalizes or measures these concepts at any level.

It is important nonetheless for scholars to engage in this debate measuring concepts and testing theory in a variety of ways if we are to provide solid evidence for any resolution approach, thus improving our ability to analyze and resolve conflict. In order to facilitate this discussion, in this chapter we discuss some methodological complexities and uncertainties in context as we seek to operationalize certain core concepts in the field. We remain optimistic that given proper caution and specifying appropriate caveats we can devise resourceful approaches to measurement. We offer some operative possibilities, set guidelines for valid and reliable measurement, and present some sample tests.

## Conflict resolution concepts and theory

Among the conflict management concepts amenable to operational tests are certain core elements of a theory of conflict transformation toward stable peace. These elements consist of the framing of the dispute and the issues or positions involved in the role of third party interveners, along with the dynamic changes of power balance that may condition redefined prospects for continued fighting, for negotiations, or for agreement. Let us examine each of these core elements in turn and posit the empirical findings that would help indicate whether they are being fulfilled in practice.

### *Transformation*

Scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution tend to recognize that not all forms of conflict can be considered negative interaction (Rothman and Olson 2001). Conflict can be quite constructive in stimulating interparty communication and problemsolving in a collaborative manner. Conversely, violent interaction, for the most part, tends to be considered destructive conflict and is the focus of much conflict resolution research. As a result, conflict management attempts typically begin with efforts to de-escalate such conflict and shift away from this type of hostile, violent engagement (Bercovitch and Lamare 1993; Bercovitch and Houston 1996, 2000).

In international relations, for example, the idea of dealing mutually with needs is inherent in the classification proposed by Miall (1992) for moving toward “stable peace,” illustrated in Table 5.1. Stable peace requires more than just ceasefires and formal cessation of warfare; it is thought to require reorientation of perceptions so that the parties stop seeing each other as unremitting threats and enemies. According to Hauss (2001), this state could occur if the parties’ awareness and acceptance of each other’s needs are heightened, thus moving the situation from confrontation–capitulation sequences to cooperative problemsolving. Moreover, Hauss (*ibid.*) refers to Herbert Kelman’s assertions, suggesting that this mutual concern leading to sustainable cooperation is precisely what is missing from the Arab–Israeli peace negotiations (Kelman 1996: 503–4). Following a similar line of reasoning, Byrne’s (2001) study of Northern Ireland maintains that the lack of mutual concern especially at the grassroots level is the reason for halting or freezing peace processes at points near agreement or at points of accord without full implementation.

In applying these insights to situations of international and intranational violence, questions of methodology and approach loom large. One might ask: how does one measure concern for self and others? Is it sufficient that the leaders come to accept each other’s legitimacy and come to value each other’s needs, or does it require the involvement of select or broad ranges of elites, or indeed of the mass publics at the grassroots level? How do opposing parties overcome impediments posed by power inequalities (how should one measure these inequalities), temptations to defect from understandings, motives

Table 5.1 Conflict forms

	<i>Concern for others</i>	
<i>Concern for self</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
High	Aggression	Cooperation
Low	Withdrawal	Capitulation

Source: Hauss (2001: 40), adapted from Miall *et al.* (1999: 6).

of revenge and hatred, and cultural clashes? If the democratic peace proposition proves to be empirically robust (skeptics see Henderson 2002), and peace is strongest among like-minded democracies, can we expect sustained dialogue processes to produce results between dissimilar political systems and insecure identity groups (see Saunders 1999)?

One theorist who has attempted to answer such questions in developing transformational approaches is John Paul Lederach. He has tackled the difficult and cutting-edge issues of transforming negotiations across cultures and in divided societies (Lederach 1995: 17). Lederach views transformation as moving through stages in parties' relationships, part of the dialectical process of human interaction. He suggests that parties to an ongoing dispute first campaign for issues of recognition, justice, security, and rights, as well as concrete stakes such as territory, economic and resource access. If they are successful in attracting their adversaries' concern for their positions and demands, a point of potential transformation may have been reached. At this point, creative peacemaking interventions, including forms of mediation and grassroots dialogue, might have sufficient leverage to encourage the parties to focus on jointly beneficial outcomes. Lederach notes, however, that the transformation can happen in varied directions; the conflict can transform the parties, for better or worse, for example eroding their sense of ethics or conditioning their budgetary decisions, or the parties can transform the conflict and their own relationship as in the process of peacemaking.

### ***Intervener partiality***

A related discussion of conflict resolution involves issues of third party partiality. Western views of mediation have tended to see the role of the third party as unbiased and impartial. Third party mediators in this vein are to serve as facilitators in discussions toward agreement rather than actors imposing or influencing resolution. Controversial, given the role of some influential mediators such as the US as brokers arranging incentives for agreement, such an approach also has been criticized as inappropriate for non-Western cultures. Building on their work in Central America, Wehr and Lederach (1991) have suggested that "inside-partial" mediators may have more success in a region, given the cultural environment in which trust and cultural connectedness are valued over a neutral, somewhat detached mediator. Although culture may vary within geographic regions just as easily as it does between them, attempting to apply the Western-developed model uniformly can clearly be problematic, thus providing additional theoretical support for Lederach's elicitive approach.

Lederach (1997) also maintains that varied inputs can catalyze or dampen disputes and violence. He adopts Dugan's (1996) "nested paradigm of conflict foci," which includes in ascending order consideration of (1) the issues at stake; (2) the larger adversarial relationship itself; (3) the immediate "subsystem" or environment in which the conflict takes place; and (4) the larger inputs into the conflict coming from the "system" beyond. Thus, outside pressures can impel the dispute toward escalation or de-escalation (see Sislin and Pearson 2001, as one such input is the supply of arms to the parties).

### ***Power imbalance***

Another factor influencing conflict dynamics concerns what might be termed the balance of power and the parties' awareness of the conflict; Lederach borrows Curle's (1971) categorization along these lines, expressed in Figure 5.1. Here the stages are progression from latent or unconscious.

		<i>Relations</i>		
		<i>Unpeaceful</i>		<i>Peaceful</i>
		<i>Static</i>	<i>Unstable</i>	<i>Dynamic</i>
Power	Balanced		3. Negotiation	4. Sustainable peace
	Unbalanced	1. Education Latent conflict	2. Confrontation	
		Low	High	
		Awareness of conflict		

Source: Curle (1971) as cited by Lederach (1997, p. 65).

*Figure 5.1* Conflict transformation.

With increased awareness comes overt conflict and confrontation, and then, depending upon the key element of rebalancing power, in the broad sense of that term, the line can be crossed toward negotiation (because of the parties’ greater self-assurance), and finally even to peace if relations become stable and predictable though continuing to change. In some sense we might view negotiations as pre-transformation and stable peace as indicative of transformation. Power is important here in that the weaker party with grievances at first cannot effectively be heard. Through increased awareness and “consciousness raising,” confrontation arises and can be either violent or non-violent. The stronger party thus at least becomes aware of these grievances or demands. Even this first confrontation is a measure of initial empowerment for the weaker party, and the power relationship continues to evolve and might be further transformed either through the struggle or through third party intervention (to take part in the conflict or to mediate it).

Lederach’s and Curle’s conception of rebalancing power thus goes beyond merely military or physical power, and means that all parties come to “recognize one another in new ways” (Lederach 1997: 65). Presumably, this can mean recognition through balanced forces, which might relate to Zartman’s (1993) notions of stalemate, or it can mean recognition through transformational dialogue type processes so that each other’s validity is internalized. Zartman has suggested that parties are more likely to settle a conflict through negotiation when they have reached a “mutually hurting stalemate,” or a situation in which neither party is able to make further gains on the battlefield.

Whichever way, the voice of the weaker party is strengthened relative to the strong; negotiations can emerge “if those involved increase the level of awareness of their interdependence through mutual recognition” (Lederach 1997: 65). This means that both sides become convinced they cannot simply impose their will or win victory or eliminate the opponent or its grievances through struggle alone. Finally, if the negotiations lead to restructured relationships that become stabilized, entailing the concept of justice, then sustained peace might be expected (Lederach 1997: 66).

Of course one might wonder whether sustainable peace is not a tautological concept, since, on the surface, sustainable peace is only sustainable as long as it is sustained! Apart from interviews of the parties to determine their degree of reconciliation over time, the

only way to identify such a condition is non-resumption of war relations; and, since the relationship could deteriorate (retransform) again either with changed conditions or new leaders, a peace that is theoretically sustainable might be shown to be unsustainable. In order to better develop confidence in the ability of any one of these theories to explain or predict conflict phenomena, we must first operationalize concepts suggested by the theory, establish testable hypotheses, and subject those hypotheses to systematic reality tests. We now turn our attention to efforts by scholars to provide evidence to support theory.

## Conflict resolution research

Much research has explored the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. Given our preoccupation with violent forms of conflict, we tend to view escalation as shifts from non-violent to violent interactions, or shifts toward an increase in conflict intensity if violence is already present. De-escalation, then, is indicated by decreasing levels of violence, or by a shift from a violent interaction to one that is non-violent. At the international level, we tend to measure a violent conflict's intensity by the number of conflict-related fatalities divided by the number of conflict months, following a measure established by the Correlates of War project (Small and Singer 1982). A similar measure developed by the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo identifies the intensity of armed conflict using a three-category scale (minor, intermediate, major) also depending on the number of fatalities in a given period of time (in this case, per year). It is worth noting the exception. PRIO considered intermediate armed conflict that which reaches over 1,000 fatalities during the course of the conflict, but not more than 1,000 in a given year (a number that defines major war, according to the group). As the intensity of a conflict increases or decreases over time, we can say that a conflict is either escalating or de-escalating. Scholars, however, recognize other indicators of escalation and de-escalation. We might begin to see signs of cooperation among parties to a conflict in the form of either negotiations or improved communication, thus indicating that de-escalation is likely. Conversely, rhetoric may begin to turn increasingly negative, creating a sense of the inevitability of increasing intensity.

As conflict de-escalates and, one hopes, moves from violence to non-violence, we can entertain discussions of stable, if not necessarily a completely just peace. Tension levels may remain high, and the potential of renewed violence may still be a threat. Stable peace characterizes a relationship far removed from violent interaction. Given the difficulties of achieving a negotiated outcome of international disputes, particularly those occurring within a state (see the work of Licklider 1995), understanding the difference between unstable and stable peace seems imperative. Pearson *et al.* (2006), building upon the work of Regan (2002), have suggested that scholars identify peace agreements ending civil wars as those involving an abatement of violence for a period of at least six months. The six-month time frame allows us to distinguish cases of settlement that fall apart before the ink is dry from those that show some staying power. Of course, six months without violence does not indicate much in the way of peace stability. Hartzell *et al.* (2001) and Pearson *et al.* (2006) used the five-year period to conduct hazard rate analyses of civil war settlement duration, suggesting that if a settlement lasted five years it could be considered stable.

Before the relationship between former combatants can be considered peaceful, of course, some sort of resolution to the dispute must be achieved. As indicated earlier, discussions of bringing parties to settlement often involve issues relating to power and power balance. International relations scholars have long discussed power, "power transition," and balance of power as a potential systemic or dyadic cause of war while measuring state

power levels as a function of military power (state military capabilities) or economic power (state gross domestic product or gross national product), or in terms of state alignment with the dominant power structure in the system (see Organski and Kugler 1980).

Operationalizing power, both monadically and dyadically, can pose significant problems, however, when researchers seek to do so at varied levels of analysis. Non-state actors engaged in civil war, for example, do not have easily identifiable militaries, and often their various capabilities can only be guessed. Further, such groups may appear in the traditional sense to be rather weak relative to their opponent, yet their ability to empower themselves using other means may level the playing field. The Viet Cong certainly appeared much less powerful than the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) given the military support and involvement of the US. However, through a combination of guerrilla tactics, organizational skill, external aid, domestic support, and sheer will, the seemingly disadvantaged North Vietnamese defeated the US and toppled the South Vietnamese regime.

In an empirical analysis of 72 civil wars between 1940 and 1992, Walter finds that “When a third party stepped in to guarantee the security of the combatants in the immediate post-treaty transition period, and political or territorial power was guaranteed to the combatants, civil wars almost invariably ended with a successful settlement” (Walter 2002: 161). Thus power sharing and external guarantees, which in a sense empower the insecure parties, seem almost necessary conditions for settlement, without which “combatants almost inevitably walked away from the table and returned to war.”

Walter also found that the war’s duration and a military stalemate, another aspect of power balancing or rebalancing, were highly instrumental in getting the sides to the table in the first place, with mediation, a military stalemate, and non-territorial goals crucial in decisions to reach and sign a bargain. Peace itself, though, depended on outside guarantees and power-sharing pacts (others have questioned the efficacy or necessity of such pacts in stable peace – see Pearson *et al.* 2006). Walter measured the duration in the same way Correlates of War (COW) project researchers have done (i.e. using duration measured in months). Measuring military stalemate proved more complicated. By exploring news archives and historical accounts of each war, she identified situations described by these accounts as “stalemated” or at an “impasse,” thus coding the variable dichotomously when such a situation was identified (Walter 2002: 56).

Complicating analysis further, we note that various forms of external involvement exacerbate rather than abbreviate civil wars. Sislin and Pearson (2001) find that the flow of arms appears to lead most often to escalation and sometimes to stalemates in ongoing conflict. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000: 16) found that military and non-military forms of intervention (Regan 2002) most often seemed associated with longer (extended duration) civil wars; this contradicted earlier findings that interventions tended to shorten them. Regan himself (2002: 71) basically substantiated these findings, although he found that, if the intervention supported one side in the dispute (which might empower it) rather than aiming at neutrality, the war tended to be shortened. In a logistic regression analysis of a rational choice model about negotiated settlements, Mason and Fett (1996) found that the larger the government’s forces the less likely the negotiated settlement, and the longer the conflict’s duration the more likely it was finally to be settled. In the terms of our analysis, this implies that rebalancing or weaker party empowerment had not taken place in the first instance, and that the parties might have convinced each other of the fruitlessness of further combat in the second instance.

The question of negotiations and mediation timing also preoccupies the literature in relation to what we would understand as transformation. Studying “enduring” *international*



rivalries (a different level of analysis) from 1946 to 1992, Greig reveals that short-term mediation successes (agreements that last a short while and then break down) generally come early in a dispute; for meaningful “improvement in the broader rivalry relationship” later interventions are more effective, “after the rivals have experienced the costs of failure of conflictual strategies” (Greig 2001: 715). This might fit with Blainey’s (1988) contention that initially states enter wars optimistic of victory, but over time and with attrition gain a more accurate assessment of each other’s relative power. Zartman (2001) also argues that perception of a mutually hurting stalemate is likely either early or quite late in the conflict, meaning that the most effective time for intervention is either early, before positions have been overly hardened, or late, when exhaustion has set in among the parties. Thus the realization that victory is not possible for either side through confrontation takes time to develop; if such realization were associated with power rebalancing in civil wars, and if the international model applied, the key power shifts evidently would be expected late in the relationship rather than early.

Greig also notes that enduring agreements entail fundamental changes in the parties’ relationships and strategies for dealing with each other, as Lederach would have expected, implying that negotiations go beyond merely dealing with the issues to encompass relational and system improvements. Conceivably this might require regime change, as existing leaders may have been so inculcated in long-term conflict patterns that their replacement is required before full transformation can be addressed. Of course, it can also be argued that existing leaders may have gone through enough hardship and mutual learning processes, establishing knowledge of each other, that they are the best candidates to make major changes in the relationship.

Clearly, studying significant theoretical concepts in the field of conflict resolution is both challenging and necessary to further inform both policy and theory. It is also clear that approaches to studying the complexities of these concepts vary. What follows is an example of how we have chosen to test three theoretical concepts: Dugan’s (1996) “nested paradigm of conflict foci,” Lederach’s (and others’) notion of power rebalancing, and Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate.” Other researchers also have attempted to tackle some of these concepts through empirical tests. Our research should be considered a complementary effort rather than one intended to supplant previous research. We continue to argue that not only should these theoretical concepts be tested and revised appropriately, but they should be measured and tested in a number of ways so that cumulative and comparative findings can be generated. It is at the point where our findings in these various endeavors support one another, i.e. are consistent, that we can have the most confidence in our theory.

## **Sample method and analyses**

Existing civil war studies, such as Walter’s (2002), have tended to aggregate a large number of cases and investigate specifiable indicators in multivariate analyses. Missing in some sense is an in-depth look at the process by which events, and particularly negotiations, unfold and develop, and the stage at which transformations occur. This implies the need for a deeper look at perhaps fewer cases, while still retaining a systematic approach to investigating key variables. Thus, as a suggestive illustration we have opted to examine Licklider’s data on successful conflict mediation/settlement, and compare negotiation processes in seven cases of successful conflict mediation/negotiation and seven corresponding randomly sampled cases of military victories across various regions.



Tracking such phenomena as negotiation agendas and power shifts during the course of conflict is admittedly a labor-intensive process. As a result, we illustrate how that can be done using a comparative case study approach combined with quantitative data gathering on this relatively small set of cases. Although we do aggregate all cases of civil war ending in negotiated settlement during the time period under study (1960–1994), we select a random sample for the seven corresponding cases of military victory for comparison to Licklider’s negotiated settlements. Seven is of course not a statistically significant sample, precluding statistical generalization in a number of analyses. The cases are specified in Table 5.2. Licklider’s data refer to wars from 1945 to 1994. Our source for conflict progress begins in 1960; therefore pre-1960 cases were eliminated from this analysis. Cases were considered to have ended in negotiated settlement if “an end to the violence [is] reached while both sides had significant military capabilities remaining and therefore could have decided to not stop fighting if the terms were unacceptable” (Licklider 1995: 684).

Since Licklider considered negotiated settlements successful if they lasted five years or more, we will assume that a form of at least initial transformation took place in them, if not a complete restructuring of relations; at least the parties moved to negotiations and then to a subsequent sustained peace (though some cases, such as Zimbabwe, achieved success on one set of issues – i.e. independence – but saw violence re-emerge almost immediately on questions of which liberation groups would actually come to power). Military victories might have entailed negotiations as well, but such peace as was achieved came directly from the force of arms and capitulation of one side or another rather than from mutual accommodation. We also consider relationship building in the analysis of agenda foci, as in whether the mutual relationship appeared as part of the formal discussion.

The analysis procedure is to create timelines for each crisis detailing the trends in and occasions for:

- 1 negotiation and mediation attempts;
- 2 agenda setting and foci in the negotiations and mediations, reflecting relationship, subsystem or country, and system or international levels (thus allowing us to test Dugan’s proposition);
- 3 power indicators for conflicting groups and governments, including shifts in personnel, material, resources, and recognition;
- 4 rebalancing in favor of groups, entailing advantages and disadvantages such as military victories or losses and setbacks on the battlefield, diplomatic recognition and support vs. sanctions, resources such as arms, money, trade, aid, and internal support or weakening, including such factors as group consolidation and splintering;

*Table 5.2* Cases under study

<i>Civil wars ending through negotiated settlement</i>	<i>Civil wars ending in military victory</i>
Chad 1980–1987	Algeria 1962–1963
Cyprus 1974	Nicaragua 1978–1979
Dominican Republic 1965	Nigeria 1980–1984
Rhodesia 1972–1980	Pakistan 1973–1977
Sudan 1963–1971	South Yemen 1986–1987
Yemen 1962–1970	Sri Lanka 1971
Zimbabwe 1983–1984	Uganda 1981–1987

Source: Licklider (1995).

- 5 outside or system inputs, including either partisan or neutral (peacemaking) interventions and transfer of resources including arms during the violence.

The primary source for these detailed timelines was *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (online), and the supplementary source, identifying mainly instances of negotiation or mediation, was the *New York Times Index*.

We look at the course or dynamics of the conflicts in terms of power differentials (who is gaining, who is losing in struggles between the authorities and insurgents) how this may reflect some of the other core concepts, and how it might be associated with negotiated settlement as opposed to military victories. Given the difficulties of reliably assessing the magnitude of such shifts, we simply note whether a shift represents an advantage or disadvantage for either conflict party.

Certain key conflict resolution concepts are particularly subject to alternative approaches to measurement because of their inherently slippery connotations. One such classic notion, for example, is Zartman's "hurting stalemate" idea, one that has caught the imagination of analysts because it is so logical in accounting for parties' willingness to negotiate. When we apply the notion to civil or international wars, stalemate becomes difficult to define since it depends in part on whose viewpoint is being assessed. The parties themselves might decide that they cannot defeat the enemy at acceptable cost and hence make the painful decision to negotiate. Or the battlefield conditions might reflect lack of progress for long periods of time (as in World War I trench warfare, or in the Virginia and Pennsylvania campaigns during the US Civil War, in which each side in turn invaded and was effectively repelled). As a third perspective, the researcher might conclude that the parties' power levels are just about even so that no one can expect to prevail in the long run.

In an effort to operationalize and assess the elusive notion of stalemate in this illustrative study, we again utilize the overall power shifts of each of our sample of civil conflicts to determine the comparative power status of each party relative to the other, particularly in terms of territorial control (both qualitatively and quantitatively) at the time of the successfully negotiated cases (i.e. given the various shifts in power, did parties appear to be at relative power parity?).

Turning to agenda-setting theory, we look at the frequency and type of agenda foci in negotiations to determine which levels and types (issue, relationship, subsystem, and system), based on Dugan's (1996) nested paradigm of conflict foci presented earlier, are associated with negotiated settlements vs. military victories. Project sources were explored to determine if negotiations explored issues specific to the conflict ("issue"), how the parties related to and interacted with one another ("relationship"), the environment or parties immediately surrounding the conflict ("subsystem"), and larger system issues ("system"). Related factors such as leadership changes are also noted. Negotiations that preceded the final outcome negotiations or military victory are considered "proto-transformation" events. Ultimately successful negotiations, producing peace agreements lasting the requisite five years and involving agendas reflecting more than the mere treatment of the issues at hand (i.e. entailing work on relationships and subsystem or system arrangements), are considered possible transformation events.

## Findings

Table 5.3, which shows the number of mediated/negotiated conference attempts and talks that dealt with the particular agenda level, indicates that, as expected in the theories dealing

Table 5.3 Level of focus during talks

	<i>Issue</i>	<i>Relationship</i>	<i>Subsystem</i>	<i>System</i>
Military victories	18	4	11	4
Negotiated settlements	71	13	56	40

with conflict transformation, negotiated settlements are characterized by consideration of more agenda foci than military victories. In all categories of the “nested paradigm” of conflict agenda items the findings show stark contrasts between those conflicts that settled and those that did not. In other words, when negotiations did occur in the cases of military victory, they dealt largely with only the immediate issues in dispute or, in a few cases, “subsystem” factors related to conditions in the country itself.

In cases of negotiated settlement, all these factors, perhaps with the exception of working on the relationship, were very much on the table. The lesson appears to be that, for civil war agreements to “take” and “stick” (five-year criteria) short of all-out capitulation by the losing side, the discussion must extend to an array of domains to dampen the conflict potential and the insecurity involved. However, there would be some doubt that genuine transformation took place even in these negotiated settlements since the important relational factors among the parties were relatively seldom addressed.

Moving to a review of the dynamics of power balance and rebalance – that is empowerment of the insurgents or “Group B” in our categorization – in cases that settled through negotiation vs. military dominance, we found somewhat similar patterns, again generally in the expected direction reflecting the need for empowerment. However, as Tables 5.4–5.8 demonstrate, the patterns were somewhat more complicated on the rebalance question than on the level of focus during talks. In raw totals there were 118 distinct power advantages or switches overall (Groups A and B) in the seven cases of military victory, compared with 293 in the seven negotiated settlements, approximately a 2.5:1 difference; given a count of such totals, formal statistical testing becomes practical. Group B advantages alone showed a slightly lower ratio of approximately 2:1; the differences were 3:1 in the case of Group A advantages. Indeed the relationship between Group A advantages and negotiated outcomes is more statistically reliable (0.05 level) than that for Group B advantages. Thus it appears that one or both parties must have experienced a great many tactical advantages, either on the battlefield or in terms of material or diplomatic support, in order to pave the way for negotiated settlements. It is not simply the dissidents who must feel or become empowered, but the status quo forces as well, perhaps even more so. Yet, as Lincoln’s steadfastness in the face of Southern peace feelers showed, the status quo party feeling an advantage might still pursue the war to its ultimate military conclusion if the weaker rebellious side fails to capitulate on key terms.

In this sense, our findings somewhat support but somewhat diverge from Lederach and also from Jackson’s (2000: 335) finding on international conflicts that relative power parity fails to increase negotiation success very much. Although we have not technically measured overall power parity, we have looked dynamically at the turn of advantages from one party to another across an array of power indicators, and find that the advantages themselves appear relatively balanced between warring groups in cases of negotiated settlement in civil wars. The groups evidently have convinced each other of their staying power, a form of stalemate, and also a form of mutual empowerment. The findings vary across cases, however, in that some military victories were by the rebels (e.g. Nicaragua and Uganda), and the patterns of rebel advantages were greatest in these cases.

Table 5.4 Power shifts

	<i>Military victories</i>	<i>Negotiated settlements</i>
Group A advantage	43	122
Group B advantage	75	171

$p = 0.05$  for Group A advantage;  $0.18$  for Group B advantage ( $t$ -tests).

Table 5.5 Diplomatic power advantage shifts

	<i>Military victories</i>	<i>Negotiated settlements</i>
Group A advantage	2	17
Group B advantage	11	25

$p = 0.07$  for Group A advantage;  $0.26$  for Group B advantage ( $t$ -tests).

Table 5.6 Military power advantage shifts

	<i>Military victories</i>	<i>Negotiated settlements</i>
Group A advantage	20	26
Group B advantage	23	39

$p = 0.65$  for Group A advantage;  $0.43$  for Group B advantage ( $t$ -tests).

Table 5.7 Resource power advantage shifts

	<i>Military victories</i>	<i>Negotiated settlements</i>
Group A advantage	15	61
Group B advantage	20	68

$p = 0.02$  for Group A advantage;  $0.14$  for Group B advantage ( $t$ -tests).

Table 5.8 Internal support power advantage shifts

	<i>Military victories</i>	<i>Negotiated settlements</i>
Group A advantage	6	17
Group B advantage	19	38

$p = 0.22$  for Group A advantage;  $0.20$  for Group B advantage ( $t$ -tests).

A strong and statistically significant relationship is seen especially for group resource advantages leading to negotiated outcomes, and particularly for governmental or Group A advantages. Group B advantages in internal political power or diplomatic support seem quite marked in cases of military victory (the impacts of the two rebel victories are pronounced), but also in negotiated settlements. Thus group empowerment does not necessarily mean military empowerment; it means the ability to gain political backing in the country and abroad (something the Confederate States of America, for example, failed to do in 1860–1865), though military empowerment, especially for rebels (albeit not statistically significant) also characterizes many negotiated settlements. Using logistical regression of conflict outcome on group empowerment variables, only one relationship proved statistically significant, at the 0.10 level or better. When governments (Group A) received resource advantages, such as arms shipments, aid, or intervention, the chances of negotiated settlement actually appeared greater. No such clear significant relationship existed for aid to the rebels (Group B), though it came the closest (0.18) of all the analyses.

If we speculate on the hypothesis that regime or leadership changes advance the prospects of negotiated outcomes, the evidence appears negative. In a logistical regression of unconventional regime transfers during the course of the civil wars, there did not appear to be a significant effect on conflict outcome one way or another. Since we are dealing with government and insurgent advantages and power shifts, we might ask whether these lead to victories or significant dominance on the battlefield or to negotiated outcomes favoring the party with most advantages. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 indicate a significant relationship between a particular side's advantages (cumulative number of power advantages during the course of the conflict) and its overall dominance or gains in the final outcome (as assessed in a review of the terms), by either military victory or negotiations.

Thus, in terms of transformation, the evidence points more to domination than to reconciliation in most of these cases. Either by force or through talks, one party seems to come out distinctly on top. According to the Wagner (1993) hypothesis cited by Licklider, negotiated settlements tend not to last and often a return to hostilities occurs because both parties remain viable militarily and politically. Our findings in cases in which the outcomes lasted at least five years show a clear advantage for one side or the other, perhaps even a battlefield victory of sorts prior to successful negotiations; this might mean that the wherewithal for further warfare is not there for one side.

The general pattern of increased accumulation of advantages, taken to indicate greater group empowerment, also tends to fit with Lederach's expectations about paving the way for genuine settlements. However, the pattern was not simply to empower the insurgent or presumptively weaker side, but rather to empower the government side as well, often in a tit-for-tat pattern. Among the types of empowerment that seem especially relevant in this regard are the accumulation of new resources such as arms and foreign military or financial assistance (including intervention), and particularly on the government or status quo side of the fighting. On the rebel side, political gains both at home and abroad, in the form of diplomatic support, appear to characterize both military victories and negotiated settlements, and military gains on the battlefield seem to correspond to negotiated outcomes as well. Thus it is important for rebels to gain legitimacy and staying power in political terms in the country and abroad in order to sustain their conflicts and have a chance for favorable negotiated or battlefield outcomes. In this sense, empowerment is indeed influential.

However, the clearest association of empowerment factors seems to be in conditioning advantages for one side or the other in either the battlefield or negotiated outcomes. Group A dominates the outcome either way if it has the most accumulated advantages;

*Table 5.9* Advantages in military victories considering conflict outcome

	<i>Group A wins</i>	<i>Group B wins</i>
Group A advantages	33	10
Group B advantages	31	44

$\chi^2 = 13.8736, p \geq 0.001.$

*Table 5.10* Advantages in negotiated settlements considering conflict outcome

	<i>Group A prevails</i>	<i>Group B prevails</i>
Group A advantages	77	45
Group B advantage	71	100

$\chi^2 = 13.282, p \geq 0.001.$

Group B does the same if it has the most advantages. There is nothing earthshaking in this discovery, but it tends to veer from the notion of reconciliation one would expect if transformation were taking place.

## Conclusions

The preliminary analysis presented above demonstrates how making key theoretical concepts operational in the field might be accomplished and with what benefit for theory, practice and policy. The discussion and study presented also demonstrate the value in systematic testing. Through this process we can better understand under what circumstances conflict resolution approaches are likely to work, thereby minimizing resolution failure, but also improving conflict resolution theory. Through this process, we can also move the field forward through the accumulation and close comparison of findings across illustrative cases as well as large aggregate data sets.

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# 6 The enemy and the innocent in violent conflicts

*Daniel Rothbart and Karina V. Korostelina*

## Introduction

In protracted violence, non-combatants suffer most. Whether by rape, extreme poverty, displacement, or mass murder, the catastrophe of their suffering represents one of the great crises of our day. The twentieth century has witnessed willful destruction in staggering proportions; it is a century of unimaginable horror.<sup>1</sup> From the perspective of military science non-combatants neither begin nor end war. Their plight has no impact on the dominant forces of war, and their fate is a consequence of the *Realpolitik* of statecraft. They are war's survivors or its collateral damage, like the remains of a bombed city.

We believe that the militarist-oriented framing of warfare perpetuates a fatally flawed portrayal of the sources of conflicts between identity groups (religious, racial, ethnic, or national). Such a portrayal fails to account for three well-documented features of identity conflicts. First, overwhelming evidence shows that the scale of devastation of non-combatant women and children is enormous. The innocents die in far greater numbers than do combatants. Second, non-combatants are often targeted by protagonist groups for strategic or tactical purposes, or just as frequently for vengeance. Third, in many cases, actions taken against non-combatants are linked directly to their relations with the militant enemy. The civilians are viewed as contaminated, and therefore dangerous, because of their bonds with the militant enemy.

In this chapter we explore how the enemy/innocent relationship in protracted conflicts is central to the continuation and ferocity of hostilities. We believe that the spiraling acts of brutality, retaliation, and retribution are causally linked to a repositioning of non-combatants. In addition to asking "Why do militant protagonists engage in a spiral series of attacks and counterattacks against each other?" we ask "Why do militant protagonists address their grievances against the enemy group by inflicting much greater devastation on non-combatants than on their primary opposition?" Our research suggests that answers to the latter question will offer insight into the former.

This chapter represents the first rigorous study that explains the interdependency of the enemy and the innocent (non-combatants) in protracted conflicts. Redressing the radical failing of militarist-oriented explanations of violent conflict, we resort to an unusual model of intergroup relations. Our model centers on the protagonists' normative commitments that typically underpin ways in which the faithful are unified, outgroups are differentiated, and the borders are defined in terms of good/bad, right/wrong, and virtue/vice. These commitments, or unconscious beliefs, define the groups' collective axiology; that is, their normative assumptions about group virtues and vices, right and wrong, and good and bad. In conflict settings, these dualities tend to be essentialized in notions of group differences.



The rationale for control, manipulation, or conquest of the outside group becomes self-evident in the context of such dualities.

Our research has led to four causal hypotheses about the enemy/innocent relationship. Owing to space limitations, we cannot offer adequate empirical support for them within this chapter. Thus, our chapter is more exploratory than demonstrative. We begin by summarizing important studies on the devastation of the innocent in contemporary protracted conflict. We then highlight certain developments in identity studies. We show that, in spite of enormous strides in the field of social identity processes, a gap remains concerning the normative dimension of group affiliation. Our intent is to redress this gap through the four hypotheses about innocent suffering in modern warfare.

## **The devastation of war**

In official statements about combat by military leaders, the suffering of non-combatants is either dismissed as insignificant in relation to military operations or simply ignored. The civilian non-combatants lack any significant causal impact on operations of state-run militaries. Their plight is unworthy of serious attention in scientific studies of warfare, which tends to depict their fate as nothing more than a tragic by-product. We believe that this fosters an analytical blindness with important ethical implications.

We focus on a pivotal question: who dies in contemporary protracted conflict? The evidence shows that civilian non-combatants die in far greater numbers than military combatants. The percentage of deaths of non-combatants greatly exceeds that of legitimate targets in contemporary conflict. The fact of this imbalance is well documented. But the extent of the imbalance is a topic of disagreement among conflict analysts.

Most studies of killing in war center on combatant deaths (legitimate targets for engagement). The widely cited Correlates of War Project, for example, focuses exclusively on deaths among states' armed forces (Singer and Small 1972: 380–3). Ignored in this study is recognition of the deaths of the innocent – those (non-combatant) members of society who perish amid the combat between militant groups. The clear majority of conflict-related deaths in poor countries occurs off the battlefield, as documented in an excellent study by Bethany Lacina and Nile Petter Gleditsch (2005). In the aggregate of protracted conflict today, the total of non-battle deaths far exceeds the total of battle deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005: 148). For example, the figures for the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrate the pattern of disproportional death among non-combatants. Only 6 percent of the total 2.5 million war-related deaths were of combatants. The vast majority of non-combatant deaths were caused by disease induced by the conditions of warfare. Thus, civilians die because they are in the wrong place at the wrong time, and not because they violate rules of war (Nordstrom 2004: 33). Ironically, the least dangerous place to be in most contemporary wars is in the military (Nordstrom 1992: 271).

The devastation to women during protracted conflict demands special attention. Women's bodies have become a battleground of opposing forces.

- In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, over the course of 100 days, an estimated 11 percent of all females – approximately 535,000 – were systematically raped (Survivors Fund 2007).
- Between 1964 and 2003, the yearly aggregate number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees worldwide rose significantly, peaking at 33 million in 2003 (Human Security Centre 2005: 103).

- In recounting the devastation from the recent conflict in Sierra Leone, 89 percent of women surveyed said that they were raped at least once (Physicians for Human Rights 2000).

## **The limitations of social identity theories**

For insight into the nature of group violence in protracted conflict we turn to theories on the formation of group identities. At its core, identity theory examines the origins of social identity and the mechanisms for change. Special attention is given to cognitive and attitudinal aspects of social identity in both ingroup relations and intergroup relations.

Most social identity theories focus on the relationship between individual identity and collective identity. Many theories attend to the tensions, contradictions, and conflicts associated with both social and individual identities (Deschamps and Devos 1998; Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979). For these theories, social identity is shaped by feelings of unity with other people, whereas individual identity stresses the differences among these same people. In cases where individual identity is highly salient, group influences are subordinated to the individual choices, lifestyles, and interpersonal relationships of the members that make up that society. In other settings, social identity is dominant over individual behaviors and lifestyle choices.

One important approach to identity formation gives special attention to how the value-commitments held collectively by a group can underpin the use of violence. V. Gecas emphasizes the role of culture in the development of value-identities and examines how “individuals conceive of themselves in terms of the values they hold” (Gecas 2000: 96). Cognizant of the connection between behavior and culturally approved values, we can see how a person develops a positive self-image tied to value-identity. It is not clear from Gecas’ work how people change their value system through socialization processes and why people with salient social identities are ready to sacrifice their primary values in submission to their social group. We believe that Gecas fails to properly stress the importance of the dynamism of such value-commitments.

Despite important advances in the study of intergroup relations by identity theorists, the impact of collective valuation within and between protagonists groups remains under-examined. While cognitive, emotional, and motivational aspects of identity have received significant attention, normativity as a basis for identity has been completely underestimated. More research is needed to understand how a group relies upon its collective axiology – its set of basic value-commitments – in its readiness to use violence as a means for settling intergroup controversies.

## **Conflict theory as value theory**

For protagonists of identity conflict, the enemy evokes disgusted fascination, constitutes the thing most hated, and possesses a power that extends beyond itself. This fascination leads to questions about the enemy’s character. Who are they? How do they get their resources, their support, and their powers? Where do they come from, what is their place of origin? When will they strike again? Answers to these questions are typically tied to normative judgments that invigorate dualities of good/bad, right/wrong, and virtue/vice. In the face of calamity and times of moral crisis, simplistic notions and categories can comfort the extremist and help determine right and wrong, good and bad, pure and impure. The dangerous Other therefore falls comfortably into the category of someone who is vicious,

wicked, immoral, criminal, uncivilized, reprehensible, diabolic, or depraved. Who “they” are is revealed in their essential flaws; who “we” are is revealed in our essential virtues. As hatreds intensify, observed actions of the Other seal their immorality in perpetuity in the minds of the ingroup. “They” are bad, vicious, or unjust. “We” are morally pure, endowed with virtues that inhere in a birthright connected to a sacred homeland (“from sea to shining sea”), the legacy of a country’s monarchy, and/or a social order established by an approving God.

In this respect, protagonist groups act upon their sense of collective axiology. In seeing the world as a battleground, he or she “knows” that his values are the values of the collective and these values are privileged, sacrosanct, or primordial. The *false consensus effect* refers to the expectation that all outgroup members embrace the same goals, hold similar beliefs about the need for social change, and adopt shared notions of group differences. Research on conservative bias shows that individuals tend to overestimate the number of people who share similar attitudes (Granberg 1987; Holtz and Miller 1985; Wilder 1984).

A collective axiology is a system of value-commitments that determine the right action at the right time for the sake of what is good. Value commitments establish which actions should be prohibited and which actions should be obligatory. Typically, such judgments are rooted in notions of a sacred land or essentialized through laws about the “inevitability” of conflict. Birth in the sacred realm (the homeland) secures one’s virtues, whereas birth in the enemy region confers a stigma that is linked to profane foreign territory. The homeland becomes a sacred realm that offers a bounty of riches for potential conquerors (and that must be protected). Via the collective axiology, ingroup members gain total clarity about who their enemies are, and implicitly accept a polarized view of the world and its possibilities. For protagonists of violence, current malignancies are rooted in the sacred events of the past, events that show the criminality of the dangerous Other.

In religious conflict, acts of retribution are tied to promises of spiritual glory, securing entrance to the holiest regions that are reserved for sacred figures. By demonizing the enemy, the ingroup enhances and elevates its own moral standing, achieving redemption for the acts they are about to commit. Religious militants evoke a disturbing echo of each other through their injunctions for vigilance against the “impurities” of society. Even children can be demonized by their relationship with enemy parents, who presumably exert total influence over them. In many cases of protracted conflict, the entire enemy population is thought to act in lock-step. They are perceived as a totality that follows the same mission and speaks with one voice. Masquerading as virtuous, the innocent Other are perceived as threatening, amoral and evil. In such cases, the boundary between the dangerous Other and the innocent Other is highly permeable, and the perception of both groups almost lacks any moral or political differentiation.

The collective axiology of identity and difference is defined by two factors: axiological balance and collective generality. Axiological balance refers to a kind of parallelism of virtues and vices attributed to groups. When applied to stories about the Other, a balanced axiology fosters positive and negative characterizations. Under some conditions, the members of the outgroup act virtuously; under other conditions, they act viciously. If in possession of a balanced axiology, the faithful adopt a stance of judicious recognition in the “goodness” and “badness” of the Other. Groups with a high degree of axiological balance recognize their own moral failings. In contrast, groups with a low degree of axiological balance correspondingly possess a monolithic depiction of both ingroup and outgroup identities. This tends to foster a “tunnel consciousness” that diminishes capacity for independent thought.

The collective axiology is also defined by collective generality, referring to the ways in which ingroup members categorize the Other, how they simplify, or do not simplify, their essential character. A high level of collective generality is evident in notions of the outgroup as homogeneous, exhibiting unchanging behaviors, committed to long-term fixed beliefs and values, and projecting a wide-ranging, possibly global, scope of influence or power. A low degree of collective generality is manifested in the perception of the outgroup as differentiated, subject to change, manifesting various kinds of behaviors, and relatively limited in scope. Specifically, we offer the following four criteria for determining the collective generality of a particular ingroup:

- 1 homogeneity of perceptions and behaviors of outgroup members;
- 2 long-term stability of the outgroup's beliefs, attitudes, and actions;
- 3 resistance to change in their ideas about the Other;
- 4 perceived scope or range of category of the Other.

For example, adherents of so-called fundamentalist religions tend to rely on a high level of collective generality. This reliance is evident in narratives, common across such groups, which are associated with traditions of an apocalyptic struggle against the cosmic forces of evil.

## **Changing boundaries**

The perspective taken in this chapter stresses the axiology of boundary divisions between protagonist groups. Extremists on both sides of the conflict elevate outgroup evils to the status of an eternal truth. Injunctions for vigilance against the encroachment of such evils are ubiquitous, as are demands for personal sacrifice. In the course of prolonged hostilities, group differences are intensified through accounts of the enemy's demonic character, the demands for action, and the recitations of ingroup virtues and outgroup vices. Furthermore, such dualities spill over to uninvolved groups, weakening the boundary between the enemy Other and the innocent Other. In the course of conflictual relations, non-protagonists are often recast as unjust, dangerous, and therefore malicious. And demands for control, conquest, or possibly elimination of large segments of the population follow.

What exactly is a boundary between social groups? According to Charles Tilly, a boundary is a social space that establishes group cohesion, solidarity, and a sense of uniqueness. The elements of social boundary include distinctive social relations on either side of an intermediate zone, distinctive relations across this zone, and shared representations of the zone itself (Tilly 2005: 132; see also Abbott 1995; Lamont and Molnar 2002).

Of course, the boundary also solidifies images about outsiders. In most conflict settings outsiders are viewed as tainted, degenerate, and possibly dangerous. As new boundaries are formed, demands for "defensive" policies are instituted. Tilly illustrates the imposition of new boundaries in episodes of the genocide of Armenians and Greeks of Anatolia around World War I, the Holocaust of World War II, the deportation of Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and other groups from the former Soviet Union, and the 1990 war in Yugoslavia (Tilly 2005). In each of these cases, Tilly demonstrates how the designation of new boundaries between distinct outgroups leads directly to fear of an external threat, and to policies of expulsion or extermination. For example, the Nazis' Nuremberg Laws of July 1935 identified a Jew as a person with at least 25 percent Jewish ancestry, and strictly prohibited marriage between Jews and non-Jews. Thereafter, throughout the 1930s, Jews were forced

to emigrate, leaving their goods behind. In 1941, the Nazis' systematic killing of Jews, Poles, and Bolsheviks strengthened the border between them and other peoples.

Over the course of a prolonged and brutal conflict, protagonists tend to redefine, and in some cases, eliminate the social and political boundary between the enemy and the innocent. In narratives of enemy/civilian collaboration, civilians are portrayed as acting in concert with the enemy, harboring enemy militants, offering them safe haven, providing them with material support, or celebrating their victories and lamenting their losses. Presumably, the "innocent" take on many of the enemy's negativities in such perceived collaborations. As non-combatants are recast, the battle lines for militant actions are redrawn.

### Positioning of the dangerous Other

Prolongation of conflict recasts non-combatants as acquiring the enemy's vices, whether those vices are real or imaginary. Flaws, compulsions, and obsessions are transferred like a taint from the enemy to their compatriots and fellow conspirators. Such a repositioning of the innocent is represented in the following causal hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The ingroup characterization of the dangerous Other is a causal factor in the positioning of the innocent Other (non-combatants). [H1: In(DO) IO.]

This hypothesis centers a notion of causality. It is a notion of formal–telic causality.<sup>2</sup> The formal–telic conception of causality links an ingroup's sense of essential uniqueness (their form) with aspirations for living well in a promising future (their telos). In this respect, the causal explanation of protracted hostilities centers on the *Moralpolitik* of group difference.

The genocide committed by the Japanese Imperial Army against Chinese civilians in Nanking represents a clear example of H1. For Japanese soldiers, the Chinese soldiers were seen as subhuman, in part because of their "cowardly" retreat and surrender of their military following the Japanese invasion. The Japanese felt justified in extending this characterization of cowardice and sub-humanity from Chinese soldiers to Chinese civilians (the innocent Other). A causal model of malignant repositioning of Chinese soldiers by the Japanese is presented in Figure 6.1.

Chinese men were forced to rape their own children or mothers at gunpoint for the amusement of the Japanese soldiers. Civilians were used as bayonet practice; some were doused with gasoline and burned; others were buried alive or forced to bury their friends and family alive; and many were decapitated. At the end of six weeks of savagery, the Japanese Imperial Army had murdered 300,000 people in Nanking. The examples of warfare mentioned above represent episodes of repositioning the innocent on the basis of their relations, perceived or actual, with the dangerous Other. Such episodes illustrate H1 – that the characterization of the enemy militant has a causal effect on the characterization of the innocent.

### Positioning of non-combatants

But there are other cases in which the enemy/innocent relationship is causally reversed. Rather than the innocent being tainted from their affiliations with the enemy, the




Figure 6.1 Positioning of Chinese soldiers and Chinese civilians.

“innocent” civilians represent the source of the taint and exert malicious influence over the enemy militants. In the minds of conflict protagonists in these cases, the enemy’s actions are presumably driven by relations with civilians. Innocent in name only, women in particular are thought to have a corrupting power over the militants, strategically, tactically, or ideologically. Conflict protagonists are convinced that the “innocents” are living a lie, embracing symbols of purity that represent a façade of their true identity. Of course, the protagonists end up concluding that the degeneracy represented by these collaborators must be exposed to ensure ingroup survival. As the civilians are recast as dangerous, a new set of injunctions are imposed upon the faithful. Vigilance against them intensifies, as do demands for their control, domination, or possibly elimination. This process of repositioning the dangerous Other through its association with the innocent Other can be represented in Hypothesis 2:

*Hypothesis 2:* The ingroup characterization of the innocent Other is a causal factor in the positioning of the Dangerous Other. [H2: In(IO) → DO.]

In relation to H1, H2 reverses the causal arrow, as it were, of the enemy/innocent relationship.

H2 is illustrated in certain race-based conflicts. Racist extremists often demonize the innocents, charging them with covert participation in the enemy's campaigns of conquest, corruption, and murder. The innocent are said to sometimes disguise themselves with the outward signs of purity while engaging in deception and complicity. Their outward demeanor is not genuine and they are untrustworthy. They are said to be driven naturally to conquer, control, or kill. In many ways the so-called "innocent" are perceived as more dangerous than the enemy, who is openly and clearly combative. This "true" identity of the masquerading innocent must be revealed before the members of the ingroup race are devoured by the innocent Other's collaboration with the militants.

Hypothesis 2 is illustrated in the anti-Tutsi propaganda of Hutu extremists preceding the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Newspaper articles and radio broadcasts captivated many Hutus with stories of Tutsi atrocities and plans for conquest. Tutsis were cast as degenerate, criminal, and vicious throughout the public media. They were accused of deviously infiltrating powerful positions of state, economic, and religious institutions, positions that "rightfully" belonged to Hutus. Hutu ideologues included in their anti-Tutsi propaganda stories of the malicious and conspiratorial Tutsi women (Rothbart and Bartlett 2008).

In December 1990, the magazine *Kangura* issued an anti-Tutsi declaration and a call to arms for all Hutus. Known as the "Ten Commandments," this declaration exhibited clear overtones of a religious crusade. Hutu extremists used the Commandments to fuel Hutus' hysteria, to legitimize a strategy of extermination (Semujanga 2003: 196–7).

The ideologues implored Hutus to become aware of the *essential* Tutsi character, as conveyed by the phrase "every Muhutu must know . . ." The other commandments include references to the Tutsi as power-hungry, wicked, and deceitful. Hutu propaganda stated that, as part of the Tutsi campaign of conquest, Tutsi women would try to seduce Hutu men to create hybrid descendants.

A model of the re-positioning of Tutsi women is given in Figure 6.2.

The radio broadcasts at this time depicted the Tutsi as "the enemy," who were driven to violence on a massive scale and seeking the domination of genuine Rwandans (Hutus). These communiqués demanded Hutu vigilance against the Tutsi manipulators to expose their lies, condemn their declarations, and unveil their evil plans (Klinghoffer 1998: 37).

In summary, many cases of innocent suffering find their source in the characterization of the enemy/innocent relationship. In some cases, the taint of the enemy militant transfers to the innocents who appear to be associated with them. This causal relationship is captured in Hypothesis 1 above. In other cases, the taint moves from the innocent to the repositioning of the enemy, as captured by Hypothesis 2. In both cases, to their followers the "realities" of enemy/innocent complicity establish a logic of action that seems unimpeachable, infallible, and virtually sacrosanct. The evidence for the resultant threat becomes "plain for all to see" and the necessity for action transparently clear. No more facts of the matter are needed. To the followers of this thought process, ingroup survival is at stake. The forthcoming, or continued, struggle appears inevitable, and its importance to the faithful immeasurable.




Figure 6.2 Positioning of Tutsi women and Tutsi ethnic group.

### Actions against the innocent

In many conflict settings, the ultimate proof of one's devotion to the collective mission is a willingness to sacrifice the "innocent." Exposing former friends and even family members to authorities can elevate one's status. In this regard retreat from conventional humanitarian moral views of the treatment of non-combatants shows one's devotion to the cause. We often read the following kind of declaration: "Look at what they made us do. They made us destroy, conquer, control, and kill. But we are not criminals, invaders, or murderers." The perceived realities of the peril of this conflict presumably demand extreme sacrifice, including that of non-combatants.



For purposes of our current research project, this theme is captured by the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 3:* The ingroup portrayal of the relations between the dangerous Other and the innocent Other is causally linked to injunctions (commands, orders, directives, proclamations, decrees, or strategies) that target the innocent.

As the “innocents” are exposed for their degeneracy, a formulaic sequence of concepts is forged into a logicity for (violent) action. Injunctions against them are elevated to moralistic truths, and ingroup compliance with these injunctions becomes essential to group survival.

Consider, for example, the deportation of Germans and Crimean Tatars from Crimea in the Ukraine during World War II. The Stalinist totalitarian regime accused these ethnic groups of collaboration with the dangerous Other – the Nazis. Since they were seen as potential enemies who supposedly conspired with compatriots in Nazi Germany, the German population of Crimea endured hardships and devastation at the hands of the ruling regime. In 1938, all German-national schools, districts, and self-regulatory bodies within Crimea were liquidated. At the beginning of the war 50,200 Germans and their families were expelled from their homes; in April 1944, after the liberation of Crimea, 2,230 more Germans were deported.

Crimean Tatars also were accused of conspiring with the Nazis to establish a Crimean Tatar republic under Nazi rule. On 18 May 1944, deportation of the Crimean Tatars began. Between 187,859 and 188,626 people – mostly children and women – were expelled to many regions, such as Uzbek in the Soviet Socialist Republic, Mariisk in the Autonomic Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Gorky, Sverdlovsk, and Kostroma regions. This deportation led to the confiscation of approximately 80,000 houses, 500,000 cattle, 360,000 hectares of land, and 40,000 tons of agricultural provisions. All Crimean Tatars were dismissed from the Red Army and sent to special settlement camps. The total number of deported Crimean Tatars exceeded 200,000, and also included 9,620 Armenians, 12,420 Bulgarians, and 15,040 Greeks.

A total of 228,392 people were exiled from Crimea. Because of horrendous living conditions in their new settlements, the years 1944–1948 saw 44,878 people (approximately 20 percent of the total number of deportees) die of starvation, disease, and exposure. The deportation resulted not only in the destruction of the ethnic education system and an existing national culture, but also in fueled misconceptions about the deported ethnic groups’ treachery, as they were considered to be “second-class” people.

Figure 6.3 depicts a model of the repositioning of Germans and Crimean Tatars.

In 1989, the restrictions regarding the return of all deported ethnic groups from Crimea were nullified. The declaration of the Supreme Council of Crimea, issued on November 14, 1989, stated that previous actions taken against deported ethnic groups constituted criminal activity. At the end of the 1980s, the massive return of the Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Germans, Bulgarians, and Greeks changed the ethnic composition of Crimea.

Nevertheless, regional administrations were not ready to solve the enormous problem of accommodating those who returned. As a result, between 1987 and 1989 the Crimean administration initiated a media campaign to characterize Tatars as Nazi collaborators and traitors. This campaign sought to “condemn radical activists of Tatar nationality.” Intense hostility against repatriated civilians resulted.




Figure 6.3 Positioning of Crimean Tatars and Germans as collaborators.

### The “objects” of combat

The topic of the enemy/innocent relationship represents a critical dimension of state-sponsored wars. Certainly, the devastation of civilians during combat has prompted endless declarations by world leaders for their protection. Lurking behind this humanitarian rhetoric is war’s devastation. Far more non-combatants were killed in state-sponsored wars in the second half of the twentieth century than were legitimate military combatants. Whereas in World War I the ratio of non-combatant to combatant deaths was 1:8, the ratio in the second half of the twentieth was reversed, at appropriately 8:1.

Again, military leaders often explain the occurrence of civilian casualties as “collateral” to the primary forces of warfare. They are cast as unfortunate bystanders. The “War is

Hell” narrative recounts stories of civilians located among, or thrown into, the tumult of warfare, just as they are subject to natural disasters. As in a natural disaster, no state can prevent all the malignancies that are inflicted upon non-combatants. Some of them must (because they will) die in the wake of a military operation. A combat zone is the province of military forces, not of civilians, and the strategic deployment of military forces will have unintended consequences for those lying in their path. Civilian “damage” during a military operation is unavoidable, inevitable, and ultimately acceptable.

General William Sherman appealed to war’s realities in his rationale for the harsh actions of Union soldiers against the population of Georgia – the burning of Atlanta and the forced evacuation of its inhabitants. He declared that “you might as well appeal against the thunderstorm as against these terrible hardships of war” (quoted in Carr 2002: 153).

We believe that the “War is Hell” explanation of civilian casualties is linked to layers upon layers of distortion. Of course, military leaders have always buried information about the suffering of non-combatants at the hands of their military forces, and the “War is Hell” explanation is just another method of dismissing those truths. However, at a deeper level, non-combatants undergo a radical repositioning as a result of such explanations, distorting who “they” are (as innocent noncombatants) and what “they” need for survival. In relation to military operations, the innocent are presumed to be incapable of participating in the tactical decisions that affect their own life or death. When viewed against the backdrop of war, they are cast as passive spectators. In the face of their own devastation, non-combatants are thus disempowered and silenced. Warfare between state-sponsored militaries imposes a radical shift of boundaries between militants and the innocent.

Such a shift is causally relevant to the devastation they experience in war. This shift is captured in the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 4:* In the context of state-sponsored wars, the positioning of the innocent as civilian objects in relation to military forces is a causal factor in the occurrence of civilian casualties, displacement, and disease.

Hypothesis 4 captures a kind of radical reframing of non-combatants that underpins military commands, orders, directives, proclamations, and strategic plans that target the militant enemy. Through these injunctions the innocent are objectified, reduced to instrumental values in relation to the efficient operation of military machinery. This reframing or recasting represents a shift in the boundary between militant enemy and civilian non-combatants, as depicted in Figure 6.4.

This figure does not represent cases in which civilians are intentionally targeted for their alleged complicity and collaboration with the militant enemy. In contrast to the vilification that is so common in racial wars, the “reality of war” rationale implicitly removes the innocents from the sphere of military affairs altogether. Such a removal then relegates the existence of innocent suffering to a status of unreality among military professionals.

Hypothesis 4 is applicable to military tactics in current state-sponsored wars. Rules for civilians to stop and go, speak or be silent, and congregate or separate are linked to military operations such as troop convoys, military checkpoints, and routine operations in urban areas. These rules constitute a *de facto* annulment of the civilians’ capacities for political unity and self-determination. And, as civilians reduce themselves to an elemental existence based on their basic needs for survival, their capacities for political unity and their sense of empowerment to shape their own future are nullified.




Figure 6.4 Positioning of civilians in wars.

In state-sponsored wars, civilian non-combatants are characterized as inert specks, atomized into agentic insignificance by an invading military force. They become isolated, helpless, and vulnerable to decimation. Caught within the tumult of state-sponsored war, they are, in effect, pulverized into isolated atoms of irrelevancy. Their fate lies in the hands, and minds, of military planners, commanders, and their subordinates, and remains unaffected by sentimentality or emotion. It is a fate driven by the militarism of an invading force. Civilians cannot say or do anything that could influence their survival or the survival of those in the private or public sphere. They become completely dependent upon the compassion of others in their naked mere humanity, their bare elementary existence (Arendt 2007: 212).

## Veiled enslavement of the innocent

In this chapter, we launch a new field of inquiry that explains protracted conflicts through a triplet relationship of ingroup protagonists, the militant enemy, and civilian non-combatants. As conflict protagonists direct their psychic energies against the enemy (the thing most hated), they tend to annul or devolve from conventional, legal, and humanitarian rules regarding the treatment of the innocent Other. During combat civilians undergo a radical disempowerment, as if they are totally dominated by the conditions of warfare. They lack the political legitimacy to say or do anything that could influence their survival or the survival of their private sphere. They live “a life unworthy of being lived,” as if they are incurably lost following an illness or an accident (Agamben 1998: 138). The lives of the innocent are neither pure nor demonic, neither sacred nor profane. Their death is not celebratory, their conquest is not glorious, and their removal from a combat zone is no act of sacrifice. They are the victims of a murderous domination that constitutes a major source of protracted conflict associated with modern warfare.

To review, in launching this new field of inquiry, the following causal hypotheses are recommended for further study:

*Hypothesis 1:* The ingroup characterization of the dangerous Other is a causal factor in the positioning of the innocent Other (non-combatants).

*Hypothesis 2:* The ingroup characterization of the innocent Other is a causal factor in the positioning of the dangerous Other.

*Hypothesis 3:* The ingroup portrayal of the relations between the dangerous Other and the innocent Other is causally linked to injunctions (commands, orders, directives, proclamations, decrees, or strategies) that target the innocent.

*Hypothesis 4:* In the context of state-sponsored wars, the positioning of the innocent as civilian objects in relation to military forces is a causal factor in the occurrence of civilian casualties, displacement, and disease.

Throughout this chapter, we have argued that the innocent in warfare are radically disempowered, encased in a shell of non-being, and vulnerable to a wide range of abuses. This disempowerment can extend to the smallest details of individual lives, can atomize them into isolated units, and does alienate them from their own humanity (with respect to their social relationships). Subject to deadly military forces, the innocent are treated as specks in the way of massive instruments of conflict acceleration. They become potential victims of a “natural disaster” that pulverizes individuals in the wake of raw physical power.

## Notes

- 1 For an excellent case study of the sudden calamity facing one victim of terrorism, see Susan Hirsch (2006).
- 2 For an analysis of formal–telic causality see Chapter 4 by D. Rothbart and R. Cherubin in this volume.

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# 7 Identity conflicts

## Models of dynamics and early warning

*Karina V. Korostelina*

### **The dynamics of identity conflicts**

In recent studies of conflict dynamics, the notion of identity-based conflict has attracted considerable attention despite its comparatively short presence in the social sciences. In their pioneering analysis of social conflicts, Burton (1987, 1990) and Azar (1990) described “deep-rooted conflicts” as resting on underlying needs that cannot be compromised. Azar (1990) suggests that the denial of the elements necessary for the development of all people leads to protracted social conflicts (PSCs). He points out that such conflict is not based on the competition around economics and power issues but, instead, “revolves around questions of communal identity” (1991: 93). He also stresses the importance of communal content that rests on the identity of racial, religious, ethnic, and other groups, and reflects the level of responsiveness of major “communal groups” to the needs of other groups in the society. Rothman further develops the concept of identity-based conflict and stresses that these conflicts “are deeply rooted in the underlying individual human needs and values that together constitute people’s social identities, particularly in the context of group affiliations, loyalties, and solidarity” (1997: 6). Fisher (1997) also suggests that the frustration of these basic needs along with a denial of human rights leads to social conflicts.

Numerous studies on the dynamics and sources of identity conflicts have examined the interrelations between interests and identity and have explored the fundamental question: do ethnic and national identities cause political conflict, or do they arise out of political conflict? Two main approaches to conflict and identity posit opposite answers to this dilemma. The primordial approach stresses the role of the salient social identity in provoking intractable, irrational, and affective conflicts and violence. This approach puts emphasis on cultural difference and posits that each ethnic group could be defined in terms of its distinctive artifacts and customs with the elements of irrationality. Shared genes (Van den Berghe 1987), genetic similarity (Rushton 1995), and predisposition to ethnic nepotism (Vanhanen 1999) provide a strong biological basis for ethnocentrism that, complicated by “ancient hatreds,” leads to violent ethnic conflicts. It is clear that this approach underestimates the political and economic motivations, the role of the political elite, and manipulations of public opinion, including perceived threats and redefinition of history.

The instrumentalist approach points out the leading impact of economic and political interests over social identities and describes the conflict dynamics provoked by economic inequalities. Among the factors that lead to ethnic violence, scholars point out “weak states” (state-making as territorial consolidation and institution-building) (Ayoob 1997; Jackson 2004a; Tilly 1975; Zartman 1995); political, economic, social, or territorial

disputes between two or more ethnic communities (Brown 1993); a struggle over rights (Stavenhagen 1991); the role of political and ethnic entrepreneurs in maintenance of 'war economies'; and construction of a discourse of violence that portrays evil enemies and dehumanizes them (Jackson 2004b). This approach overestimates the role of the elite manipulation of the masses and undervalues social movements and mobilization.

Some scholars stress the complexity of interrelations between social identities and interests in their influence on conflict dynamics. Rothman points out the differences between identity and interest conflicts: "all identity conflicts contain interest conflicts; not all interest conflicts contain identity conflicts" (1997: 11). Furthermore, many ignored or unresolved interest-based conflicts can develop into identity conflicts, and involve issues of dignity, identity, pride, and group loyalty. Azar (1990) describes the impact of group identity development and mobilization as well as the formation of political goals of autonomy, secession, and access to power and resources on the dynamics of protracted social conflicts. The role of group identities and interests in conflict dynamics was also analyzed by Kriesberg (2003). He points out that people who share the same identity also believe they share the same fate and interests and think they experience similar deprivation and aggravation caused by another group. A leader can mobilize such constituencies and strengthen their group loyalty to deal with adversaries. Groups establish common goals of changing a social situation and reinforce ingroup support and loyalty to achieve their goals. The clear recognition of intergroup differences and the degree of ingroup differences reinforce the willingness of group members to perceive others as enemies and fight for power and resources.

Social identities, i.e. strong feelings of membership in a specific group (ethnic, national, religious, regional), have existed for centuries, yet have only from time to time resulted in conflict. Consequently, social identities themselves do not arise as a result of conflict between groups, but do have the potential to become more salient and mobilized. Social identities never cause or initiate conflict and should be understood neither as sources nor as consequences of conflict, but as a form of consciousness that entirely changes the dynamic and structure of conflict. Once social identity becomes involved in interest-based or instrumental conflict, it then changes the nature of political or economic conflict in particular ways, making conflict protracted and deep-rooted.

To describe the interrelations between identity and interests I propose the *4-C model* of the dynamic of identity conflicts (Korostelina 2007), which includes four stages: Comparison, Competition, Confrontation, and Counteraction. The model is presented in Figure 7.1.

### **1. Comparison**

In interactive communities people have multiple identities, characterized by different forms, types, and levels of salience. Nevertheless, even in peaceful and cooperative communities, members of ingroups have some negative perceptions of outgroup members, such as derisive and degrading stereotypes, underestimation of outgroup culture, and the attribution of unacceptable or inadmissible behavior. Several factors influence such unfavorable perception of outgroups. First, Brewer's (1991, 2000, 2001) theory of "optimal distinctiveness" suggests that people have both the need for distinction from a group (intercategory contrast) and the need for inclusion in a group (intracategory assimilation). In homogeneous societies with negligible cultural diversity people cannot fully satisfy their need for differentiation and tend to develop loyalties to smaller groups such as region, city,






Figure 7.1 The 4-C model.

or ethnic minority. If distinctions between groups are not significant, people tend to shape these regional or ethnic identities by stressing minor differences (Volkan 1997). Second, since positive social identity is the outcome of favorable social comparisons made between the ingroup and other social groups, members of an ingroup tend to evaluate the outgroup negatively (Brown 2000; Huddy and Virtanen 1995; Jackson *et al.* 1996; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Wright *et al.* 1990). Third, even in a situation of economic and social equality, the relative assessment of ingroup and outgroup leads to the underestimation of the economic and social position of the ingroup and perception of *relative deprivation*, or disadvantage, and negative attitudes toward the outgroup (Davis 1959; Runciman 1966). As a result of relative deprivation, members of disadvantaged groups perceive more discrimination on the level of group identity than on the level of personal identity (Crosby 1984) and have more desire for social change (Kawakami and Dion 1993; Walker and Pettigrew 1984).

Asymmetrical status is the fourth factor of the negative estimation of outgroups. In stratified societies with economic and political inequality, minority groups and groups with low status experience a stronger collective sense of self and more ingroup homogeneity (Ellemers *et al.* 1999; Simon 1992; Simon and Hamilton 1994). Research shows that ingroup bias is stronger among social minorities (i.e. those who may be a numerical majority but are disempowered and discriminated against by minorities in power) and numerical minorities than among majority groups (Brewer and Weber 1994; Ellemers *et al.* 1999; Simon and Hamilton 1994). The history of an intergroup conflict is a fifth factor of negative outgroup perception. If the history of a community contains wars, violence, or conflicts among particular groups, the identities of these groups are more likely to be salient, collective, and mobilized than other social identities within an identity system. Volkan (1997) also explains the tendency to attribute negative characteristics and goals to

an outgroup. According to his theory, members of an ingroup experience problems with the integration of negative and positive features of their group image. These projections “congeal” in the form of reservoirs of negative images that characterize outgroups and *chosen traumas* that stress the outgroup’s negative intentions toward the ingroup.

Consequently, certain negative perceptions of the outgroup exist even in the context of a peaceful cooperative community. Inequality and a history of a conflictual relationship can reshape these unfavorable images. Nevertheless, common and cross-cutting identities, intermarriages, and a culture of peaceful coexistence help to maintain stability and balance within an identity system.

## **2. Competition**

Conflict of interests typically arises between two or more groups who share, or have intentions to share, resources or power. Such conflict can involve issues of the use of or control over land, water, information, access to property or resources, sharing power, or political influence. Usually such conflict occurs between groups that coexist on common territory or in a common community but often have a different status: minority and majority, advantaged and disadvantaged, etc. In situations of competition or conflict, perceived or experienced by the outgroup, a threat will strengthen this negative evaluation and influence the attribution of such stereotypes as aggressiveness, anger, and antagonism.

Studies show that the outgroup threat increases as the perceived competition between groups for resources increases, and as the conflicting groups have more to gain from engaging in the conflict. The realist conflict theory predicts that intergroup prejudice becomes stronger when groups have opposite goals and interests (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hardin 1995; Sherif 1966). It has also been suggested that the outgroup threat leads to more hostility toward the outgroup, which helps justify the conflict and the unfavorable treatment of outgroup members. Situations of competition, proximity, and contact increase, rather than decrease, intergroup hostility (Levine and Campbell 1972). Considerable research evidence supports these premises (e.g. Brewer 2000; Brown 2000; Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966; Sherif and Sherif 1953; Taylor and Moghaddam 1994). In situations of competition between groups, factors such as information failure, credible commitments, and the security dilemma can reshape social identities and provoke identity conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1998). The dilemma arises as a result of people’s perception of uncertainty, mutual suspicion, and fear regarding the other’s intentions towards them.

## **3. Confrontation**

Conflicts of interests will lead to a polarization of community and an increase in the importance of one social identity that (a) best describes adversary groups, (b) was used in previous conflict situations, or (c) is more obvious to people. Leaders of the groups fighting over power and resources employ social identity to mobilize group members to the struggle. The leaders and elite present their economic and political interests as ingroup ones. Social identity is used as a tool to increase group loyalty and readiness to fight for these “group interests.” The leaders choose to employ collective traumas and glories (Volkan 1997) to increase the salience of identity. They are usually real events from the history of the group, but do not always have actual historic significance. They are chosen

because of the current state of relations with other groups and provide “explanations” for poor economic conditions or minority status.

Even if most group members have multiple identities, competition and relative deprivation can make conflict more intense and generate situations where individuals tend to choose one identity among others. Members of different groups with multiple identities feel that their sense of security, identity, and moral authority has been disrupted by conflict, and look for one strong, single identity, which employs ideological myths to provide new security, certainty, and moral authority. One salient identity can replace the entire complex of core identities and will influence the perception of the world. These contradictory identities have a form of mobilized collective identity and contain ideologies and attributed intentions. In a politicized field of intergroup relations, negative evaluations of outgroups lead to taking positions on the goals of the ingroup in relation to outgroups, and hence to defining outgroups as opponents or enemies with aggressive intentions. Finally, only one social identity prevails and replaces the entire complex of multiple identities. This contradictory identity has the form of a mobilized collective identity and contains ideologies and attributed intentions. Research results confirm the role of subjective group membership in shaping political attitudes and behavior (Conover 1988; Miller *et al.* 1981).

#### **4. Counteraction**

Once a society has become divided into antagonistic groups, social identities become a cause of confrontations between groups competing not just for material advantage, but also for the defense of their security, beliefs, values, and worldview that form the basis of ingroup identity. Such identities lead to the perception of the world in terms of “positive We–negative They” and changes in balance and generality of collective axiology.<sup>1</sup> People begin to believe that it is moral and essential to destroy evil Others. Fighting with the outgroup becomes the main goal and condition of individual and ingroup survival.

*The readiness for conflict with the outgroup* (Korostelina 2003, 2005, 2006a) reflects a willingness and eagerness to defend one’s own group in situations of real or perceived threat from other groups; to control and prevent actions by members of other groups that can be potentially dangerous or unpleasant for one’s own group (or can increase the status of the other group); or to punish or take revenge on members of the other group. I suggest that readiness for conflict can have two main components: willingness to defend ingroup goals, safety, values, and ideals and willingness to fight against outgroup goals. The readiness for conflict also depends on support from ingroup members. Ingroup support reflects the expectation that all outgroup members maintain the same goals and aspirations, common perceptions of outgroups, and similar intentions to change the social situation. Thus, ingroup support will increase the willingness to fight for one’s goal and against that of the outgroup.

Consequently, the 4-C model of identity-based conflict provides a basis for the systemic analysis of conflict dynamics that includes economic, political, social, and psychological factors. Ethnic and religious groups living in multicultural communities develop intergroup stereotypes and beliefs. These beliefs can be formed through historical experience and include chosen traumas and glories. They can also be the result of favorable comparisons, prejudice, and attribution errors, where outgroups are perceived as cunning, artful, cruel, mean, and aggressive. In situations of the competition for power or resources, group leaders use these stereotypes and beliefs as well as ingroup loyalties as a tool of group mobilization. These employed identities are connected to economic and political interests,

and they reinforce negative perceptions of outgroup members, attributing aggressive goals to them. Perceived external threat, especially in the circumstance of a lack of information, strengthens these feelings of insecurity among ingroup members. The ingroup identity becomes more salient and mobilized, and finally dominant, influencing the development of the dual “positive We–negative They” perception. In the perception of ingroup members, the outgroup is devalued, dehumanized, and turned into a homogeneous evil. It becomes moral and honorable to take actions against the outgroup and totally destroy it. These actions are, in turn, perceived by the outgroup as threatening, resulting in the development of counteractions, causing a new turn in the spiral of conflict and violence.

Thus, the analysis of the dynamic of identity-based conflicts reveals several groups of factors that contribute to the escalation of violence. The assessment of the system of these factors can provide a substantial ground for early warning and conflict prevention.

### **Early warning model for identity conflicts**

Based on the collection and analysis of specific indicators, early warning systems help to anticipate the escalation of violent conflict, produce best- and worst-case scenarios, and help to develop a basis for decisionmaking and conflict prevention action. The predictors in early warning systems reflect stages of conflict or different spheres of conflict situations. Thus, FAST International (Krummenacher 2006) describes four types of causes: root, proximate, positive intervening, and negative intervening. Other early warning systems are based on the description of different sectors and segments of society and point to political, economic, judicial, legal, social, and cultural as well as military and security issues on different levels: subregional, regional, and geopolitical.

In spite of the advanced level and complexity of these models, social identity is hardly ever presented among the indicators. The 4-C model of the dynamic of conflict presented in this chapter emphasizes the importance of an early warning system based on social identity that complements and enhances existing systems. The following model of early warning for identity conflicts is based on the results of my research during 2000–2006 (Korostelina 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006a–c). The model includes five main groups of factors that are presented in Figure 7.2.

#### ***Identity characteristics***

- 1 *Salience of identity.* As shown above, salient identity provokes actions against other groups and leads to conflict (see also Korostelina 2003, 2006b). The monitoring of identity salience, especially rapid changes in the importance of group membership, can help to predict ingroup members' involvement in conflict.
- 2 *Ingroup primacy,* or the feeling of supremacy of ingroup goals and values over individual goals and values. The primacy of the ingroup (Korostelina 2007) contains several components: (a) predominance of ingroup aims over individual aims, (b) the readiness to forget all internal ingroup conflicts in situations of threat to the ingroup, and (c) the readiness to unite against the outgroup. The higher the level of ingroup primacy for ingroup members, the stronger their willingness to disregard their own goals and values and to follow the behaviors required by the ingroup. Ingroup primacy can increase or decrease the influence of identity salience on the conflict behavior of ingroup members. Thus, it is important to consider the level of ingroup primacy if social identity is not salient.




Figure 7.2 Model of identity-based early warning system.

- 3 *Locus of self-esteem* (Korostelina 2007). In cases of *internal locus for self-esteem*, members of the ingroup are satisfied with their position and proud to be a member of the ingroup, and have a high sense of confidence even if they do not make favorable comparisons between their group and outgroups. They show less conflict intentions and do not consider fighting with other groups. If group members need to use favorable comparisons with outgroups to increase their self-esteem, or do not have the opportunity for the promotion of their culture, cultural development, and/or revival, an *external locus of self-esteem* usually creates a solid basis for conflict intentions, and a readiness to fight with outgroups.
- 4 *Satisfaction with identity functions*. Social identity fulfills five functions: (a) increasing self-esteem; (b) increasing social status; (c) personal safety; (d) group support and protection; and (e) recognition by the ingroup (Korostelina 2003, 2006a). The study of functions of social identities can help to understand the basic needs of a particular group and to develop early warning of triggering events and situations. Thus, if social status is the most important function for ethnic identity, any threat to the status of an ethnic group or its members can provoke negative reactions and conflict activities (Korostelina 2007). If ingroup members attach important functions to a new identity, it develops into a salient identity and can replace other identities that previously fulfilled corresponding functions. However, if a common (national, regional, etc.) identity fulfills main functions including increasing self-esteem and social status, providing personal safety, group support and protection, and recognition by the ingroup,

it significantly reduces the readiness to fight between subgroups (Korostelina 2003, 2006a).

### **Forms and types of identity**

- 5 *Mode of identity meaning.* The meaning of social identity develops on the border between groups and constitutes both the content of group membership and specificity of interrelations with outgroups. Usually, the meaning of social identity is multimodal and contains several components (for more in-depth description see Korostelina 2007). The prevalence of one, or some of them, leads to a different *mode of identity meaning*. If components such as ingroup traditions and values, characteristics of ingroup members, and reverberated identity dominate, identity meaning can be defined as a *depictive mode* (for example, Amish people). *Ideological modes of identity meaning* are characterized by the prevalence of an ideology of ingroup and interrelations with outgroups (political parties). If the history of the ingroup and interrelations with outgroups become the most important component, identity meaning reflects a *historical mode*. Lastly, the dominance of a reverberated identity, outgroup image, and reflection of interrelations with outgroups defines a *relative mode* of identity meaning. A depictive mode of identity meaning has very small implications for conflict whereas other modes of identity meaning can provoke violence based on different motives. Ideological modes of identity meaning can lead to conflict based on ideological differences; historical modes can provoke conflicts based on chosen traumas and history of intergroup violence; and relative modes can cause conflicts based on intergroup prejudice and biases.
- 6 *Forms of identity.* Social identity can have three forms: cultural, reflective, and mobilized (Korostelina 2007). The *cultural form of identity* is based on characteristics of the everyday life of a group that include cuisine and diet; clothes; typical daily routine; songs, music, and dancing; traditions and customs; and even holidays and ways of celebrating or mourning. People live “within” their social identity, follow all ingroup “recommendations and instructions,” but never think deeply about the goals and intentions of their ingroup, or its status and position within society. The *reflected form of identity* includes an advanced understanding of the ingroup’s history and its relationship to outgroups, awareness of the current group’s status and position, and a recognition of its future goals and perspectives. Such an identity also reflects an appreciation of the values and beliefs of the group, an understanding of their roots and sources, as well as the role that the group plays in society. The *mobilized form of identity* rests on an understanding of ingroup identity within the framework of intergroup relations, through ingroup comparisons of position, power, and status. Such ideologization of identity results in the perception of competition between the groups and the incompatibility of goals. Cultural and reflected forms of identity have less impact on conflict behavior than the mobilized form. The main content and meaning of this identity are contradiction and competition between groups.
- 7 *Types of identity.* There are four types of identity (Korostelina 2007). *Positioning identity* reflects identification with a specific category of interpersonal relations, e.g. when a person is not deeply involved in a relationship, does not acquire the norms, values and beliefs that are associated with this position in society. *Dyadic identities* develop when a person describes him- or herself in terms of a particular category and intensely engages in the corresponding interpersonal relations. A *descriptive identity* reflects one’s identification with specific social categories without actual membership in a corresponding group. Persons think and describe themselves in terms of group categories

and consider it an important part of their self-concept; however, they do not participate in group activities and do not share the beliefs, goals, and norms of a group. A *collective identity* forms when persons identify themselves with a group, belong to this group, share the beliefs and values, follow the norms and customs, and show loyalty and deep attachment to group goals and expectations. Dual and collective identities have a very significant effect on a person's values, beliefs, and positions. Descriptive and collective identities influence the perceptions and evaluations of the world in terms of group categories and intergroup relations. Therefore, a collective type of identity that has considerable effect on personal perceptions in the framework of intergroup relations reflects the highest potential for conflict.

- 8 *Type of collective axiology* (for more in-depth analysis see Chapter 6 in this volume by Rothbart and Korostelina). The protracted conflict usually rests on a collective axiology with *low* axiological balance and *high* collective generality. After generations of degrading stories, the ingroup becomes incapable of understanding and perceiving the Other, as the ingroup loses its ability to see the virtues of the Other, to understand their complexities, and to evaluate their decisions. This kind of identity is often associated with extreme forms of nationalism, fascism, racism, and sectarianism.
- 9 *Nature of identity* (ascribed vs. acquired). Acquired social identities have a greater impact on a person's behavior than ascribed ones. In many cases, people who adopt new religious, ethnic, or national identities show stronger devotion to ingroup beliefs, values, and norms than people with ascribed identities.

### ***Types of culture***

- 10 *Individualistic/collectivistic cultures*. For representatives of collectivistic cultures, the strong sense of belonging to an ingroup determines the readiness for conflict behavior, whereas, for representatives of individualistic cultures, individual estimations of a situation carry the strongest impact on the readiness for conflict behavior (Korostelina 2003, 2006c).

### ***Intergroup relations***

- 11 *Intergroup prejudice*. Prejudice has been commonly defined as a negative attitude, or as "antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole or toward an individual because he is a member of that group" (Allport 1954: 9). As shown above, the positive evaluations of ingroups and negative evaluations of outgroups increase the potential for conflict. The majority of studies of social identity provide evidence of a relationship between the salience of identity and attitudes toward outgroups.
- 12 *Outgroup threat*. Studies show that outgroup threats increase intergroup prejudice and lead to more hostility toward the outgroup, which helps justify the conflict and the unfavorable treatment of outgroup members. Usually, the ingroup tends to perceive the outgroup as a threat in several contexts of intergroup relations:
  - (a) unequal economic, cultural, or political positions of ethnic groups (Gellner 1994);
  - (b) different citizenship of ethnic groups (Brubaker 1996);



- (c) memories of former domination by the outgroup, and attribution of the desire for revival of such (Gurr and Harff 1994);
  - (d) perceptions that ingroups have weaker or worse positions than the outgroups (Gurr 1993);
  - (e) limitations of the ingroup's socioeconomic opportunities imposed by outgroups (Gellner 1994);
  - (f) political extremism, violence, and nationalism of outgroups (Hagendoorn *et al.* 1996).
- 13 *Ingroup support.* As shown above, ingroup support reflects the expectation that all the ingroup's members maintain the same goals and aspirations, a common perception of the outgroup, and similar intentions to change the current social situation. If more ingroup members are willing to fight with outgroups, the readiness for conflict will increase. As my research shows, ingroup support has a strong influence on both the readiness to fight for ingroup goals and the readiness to fight against outgroup goals (Korostelina 2007).
- 14 *Relative deprivation.* As discussed above, perceptions of deprivation or disadvantage that are based on comparisons between groups provoke social activity if people recognize that a higher standard of living exists, and that they have the opportunity and ability to achieve that higher standard of living.
- 15 *Security dilemma.* In situations of competition between groups, the security dilemma can reshape social identities and provoke identity conflict. The role of the security dilemma was analyzed in international relations, including the Cold War (Collins 1997; Jervis 1976, 1978; Spear 1996; Wheeler and Booth 1992), as a source for ethnic conflicts (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the rise of nationalism (Van Evera 1999). But the very essence of the security dilemma provides the opportunity to analyze its role in identity conflicts. Groups often perceive that the outgroup gain is automatically ingroup loss, and vice versa. Emotion-laden status competition leads to the increase of the perception of threat.

### ***Nation building and minorities' positions***

- 16 *National identity formation.* Since an almost ubiquitous characteristic of nations is their residence in common territory, many people in new nationalizing states became members of new nations only because they reside within the same borders. As Kelman (1997) points out, the establishment of new states engenders incentives for ethnic homogeneity and thus systematic efforts to marginalize or destroy ethnic "others." Conflict can develop when the identity chosen by an individual is incompatible with the identity imposed by others, or with the social context in which identity is constantly being recreated (Kelman 1982; Stein 1998; Stern 1995).

The readiness of ethnic minorities to fight with majorities in new nation-building states depends on their acquisition of three components of the structure of national identity: (a) salience of national identity, (b) satisfaction by fulfillment of its functions, and (c) adoption of national culture (Korostelina 2005).

- 17 *Concept of national identity.* The meaning of a new national identity can have a significant impact on the readiness for conflict. Research stresses the importance of meaning in both shaping identities and determining conflict or tolerant behavior (Deaux 1993; Gurin *et al.* 1994; Huddy 2001; Simon and Hamilton 1994). One of the central



problems with regard to the process of national identity formation is the interrelation between majority and minority groups, between dominant and small minorities, and between natives and immigrants. The core issue of the national identity concept is the position of ethnic minorities within the nation: whether minorities are oppressed by the majority, or have opportunities for maintaining their ethnic culture. Based on this issue, people can have three different concepts or meanings of national identity: *ethnic*, *multicultural*, and *civic* (Korostelina 2006). The ethnic concept reflects the perception of the nation as having been built around a core ethnic community into which the ethnic minorities should assimilate. The multicultural concept is connected with the view of the nation as multicultural, with equal rights for all ethnic groups and some elements of autonomy and self-governance. The civic concept reflects a perception of citizenship as a contract between the people and the state with regard to both rights and obligations and view on ethnicity as insignificant. The ethnic concept leads to an increasing resistance by ethnic minorities and to intergroup conflict. In some cases (see Korostelina 2006a, 2007) it can decrease the readiness to fight. The multicultural concept usually decreases the potential of conflict between majority and minorities, but can lead to conflicts between minorities. The civic concept decreases the prospect of tensions and violence.

- 18 *Majority/minority position and size*. As was discussed above, minority groups appear to be more prone to bias and show the largest amount of discriminatory behavior. Minority group members are more socially mobile and ready for transformations. Political goals of minorities are connected with the changes in social and political situations and they show higher readiness for conflict. More numerous minorities show higher readiness for conflict.
- 19 *Experience of dominance* (Gurr and Harff 1994). Ethnic, religious, and national groups that have been dominant in the past can try to reclaim their power and supremacy. Previously subordinate groups have a strong potential for conflict based on motives of revenge and revival as well as fear of restoration of outgroup domination (for example, Russians in the republics of the former Soviet Union, Karen in Burma, Tutsis in Rwanda).
- 20 *Transnational affinities* (Lake and Rothchild 1998). Members of the ingroup not only perceive the outgroup in terms of stereotypes, but attribute goals to the outgroup as well. If a minority group has a strong nation-state of the same ethnicity near its border, it can be perceived as a “fifth column” that aims for cultural autonomy or changes of borders. This goal attribution results in the perception of such groups as a threat to the wellbeing and position of the nation.

The twenty factors described above compose the logistic of the identity-based early warning system presented in Figure 7.3.

All factors listed on the left represent different aspects of identity that contribute to the readiness for conflict. Arrows show the specificity of the influence of each factor. To develop complete diagnoses of the conflict it is important to collect information about every identity feature and summarize their impact. Factors on the top have moderating effect. They can increase or decrease the influence of identity factors on the readiness for conflict. Thus, collectivistic cultures are more prone to identity conflicts; however, the presence of a dominant identity in individualistic culture can strongly contribute to the readiness to fight with other groups. The intergroup factors, including prejudice, ingroup support, outgroup threat, relative deprivation, and security dilemma are interconnected

Moderating factors				
Types of culture		Intergroup factors	Social factors	
Collectivistic	Individualistic			Intergroup prejudice Outgroup threat Ingroup support Relative deprivation Security dilemma
	↓ Dominant identity			
	Yes	No		




Figure 7.3 Logistic of identity-based early warning system.

with identity aspects (for example, salience of identity and ingroup support are interrelated, and external locus of self-esteem contributes to the feeling of relative deprivation). Social factors, including a history of domination of one of the groups, transnational or national affinities, minority/majority position and size, and national identity formation, are relatively independent and increase the effect of identity on the readiness for conflict.

Consequently, the dynamics of identity-based conflict presented in the 4-C model include economic, political, social, and psychological factors. Intergroup stereotypes and beliefs, chosen traumas and glories are formed through historical experience, favorable comparisons, prejudice, and attribution errors. These stereotypes and beliefs, connected to economic and political interests, lead to increased ingroup loyalties, negative assessment of outgroup members, and perception of external threat. In the circumstance of a lack of information, the ingroup identity becomes more salient and mobilized, influencing the development of the dual “positive We–negative They” perception. Aggressive actions against the outgroup become moral and honorable. These actions provoke counteractions, contributing to the escalation of violence. The early warning system that is based on the factors of the dynamic of identity-based conflicts includes identity characteristics, forms and types of identity, types of culture, intergroup relations, and characteristics of nations and minorities. This system can be used to predict and prevent the emergence of identity-based conflict as well as stages of its dynamic.

## Note

- 1 For more in-depth analysis of threat narratives connected with dominant identity see Rothbart and Korostelina (2006) and Chapter 6 in this book.

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# 8 Generativity-based conflict

## Maturing microfoundations for conflict theory

*Solon J. Simmons*

“I have nothing to offer except a way of looking at things.”

Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society*

### Introduction

Enough progress has been made in thinking about conflict from the perspective of social identity, that it is time to move that point of view forward by revisiting the psychological underpinnings of identity theory. At its heart, identity-based conflict imagines members of one psychologically integrated group pitted against another in a struggle between “people like us” and “people like them.” In strong forms of the theory, it becomes hard to imagine a world in which ideas not tied to group divisions matter at all – where “we” would begin to think like, fight for, and eventually become one of “them.” Because such cases are common, however, the further development of conflict theory and practice requires a perspective grounded in social psychological science and perhaps clinical practice that is compatible with and explanatory of conflicts based on principled political action toward a cause greater than the self or the reference group. The identity paradigm, for all of its accomplishments, is not well suited to this task even when it can force the square peg of conflict based on values and principles through its round hole of cultural difference and group affiliation.

One place to look for a perspective with building blocks suitable for this task is the theoretical work of Erik Erikson, whose psychoanalytic theory of psychosocial development is itself the source of much identity theory (see Rubenstein 2001). An Eriksonian take on *sequenced turning points in life*, and its alluring short discussion of generativity – the need to be needed and to survive one’s self in the lives of others – helps to ground Burtonian basic human needs in the natural process of human maturation in culture, which could bring Burton (1979, 1997) and Avruch (1998) into theoretical alignment by interweaving a flexible psychological portrait of individual needs at the micro level with an anthropologist’s cultural sensitivity to context and contingency at higher levels. Moreover, since Galtung’s (1969) structural violence must have differential impacts at different points in the life course, an empirical science built on a developmental view would help us to specify the mechanisms through which injustices are built into the rules of the game and the kinds of ills people suffer from lost opportunities at different turning points in their development.

Generativity theory shares with identity theory a sense that a sound understanding of both individual development and cultural variability must be the starting point of conflict analysis. Conflict theory must be attentive to the macro structures and cultural environments, but there is a centrifugal force in the social imagination that imposes a demand for



microfoundations – explanations of individual action and behavior that could plausibly give rise to larger structural and historical regularities (Elster 1985). Given the influence of psychology on the field, the demand for microfoundations in conflict analysis is strong. Burton (1979) recognized that analysis in social science is without foundation if it lacks a notion of needs. Even so, it may not be necessary to artificially separate individual characteristics (needs) and cultural characteristics (values) as Burton attempted in his formulation of needs theory. Erikson's framework (1963) provides a promise: a theory of development predicated on individual adjustment (micro level) to culturally defined means (macro level) of fulfilling universally shared psychosocial ends. If Galtung (1969) and Burton's concerns are viewed carefully through an Eriksonian lens, the result could bring the best elements of psychology, anthropology, and sociology into alignment for the study of complex conflicts in history (Sandole 1999). This Eriksonian promise owes much to his concept of generativity as the major turning point of adulthood that builds on and adds to the fruits of identity integration established earlier in life. Erikson's concern with the generative need to make something of value to leave behind for others becomes important for conflict when the need is denied or becomes a driving force of violent opposition. This process is not well understood within the confines of existing conflict theory and requires new formulations.

### **The identity paradigm**

We must recognize the triumph of the identity paradigm. Its accomplishments are many and varied. In conflict analysis and political science, researchers with various disciplinary commitments have used identity as an organizing concept through which to productively analyze conflicts between groups at a variety of levels including religious, linguistic and ethnic, and partisan, to name a few (see Rothbart and Korostelina 2007). In practical politics, a branch of the intellectual movement promoted what has come to be called "identity politics," a term used to describe a host of new social movements, cast in the mold of either the American civil rights movement or the anti-colonial independence causes. These movements, made new in their contrast with the older ideological class struggles of the industrial era, exposed injustices that were hidden in earlier surges for social justice and have transformed political life across the globe (Lipset and Marks 2000; Evans 1999; Johnston *et al.* 1994). In social psychology, the central importance of self-esteem – identity's currency – was early demonstrated by the heartbreaking doll experiments of Kenneth and Mamie Clark (1947) and in later social science work that demonstrated that differences in self-esteem induced by significant others were consequential for success in life (Sewell *et al.* 1967; Sewell and Hauser 1975). On a theoretical plane, major thinkers have pointed to the ways that movements in quest of recognition based on group membership have become as important as or more important than those struggling for redistribution once were (Fraser and Honneth 2003; Fukuyama 1992; Honneth 1995). Even the ubiquity of the now pejorative phrase "politically correct" points to the rising power of a cultural left striving under the banner of the identity paradigm, which in Richard Rorty's (1999: 81) phrase "has made America a far more civilized place than it was thirty years ago."

In such an environment it is common to suppose that we live in an era in which civilizations clash and cultures war (Huntington 1997; Hunter 1991). In fact, it has become so obvious that a sense of self, of personal belonging and attachment to group, should be of foundational importance that other once obvious bases of division such as class, social rank, property, economy, and even ideology seem now antiquated, implausible, or perhaps



even quaint (Hechter 2004; Pakulski and Waters 1996). Of some circles it may be fair to say that, inverting Marx, they hold that the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of identity struggle. Moreover, it is less common today than it was a generation ago to publicly and confidently suggest that people engage in conflicts because they cleave to rival visions of the common good. Before Daniel Bell wrote his famous obituary to ideology, ideas linked to passion were placed in the first rank of causal importance (Bell 1988; Kristol 1995). When ideas are held to be important today, one often assumes that some lurking group attachment must serve as an explanation for the holding of those ideas. The various lessons of the era following World War II seem to have taught us that Erik Erikson was right: identity crises lie at the heart of social malady.

Although it is more common to cite Tajfel and Turner (1979) or perhaps Muzafer Sherif (1966; Sherif *et al.* 1961) when writing about social identity, the identity diagnosis for today's ills owes as much of its salience and cultural availability to Erikson's efforts to interpret individual behavior in developmental perspective; his formulation of the importance of identity formation as a central stage of psychosocial development and guiding problematic for critical analysis is something of a repressed memory for social identity theory.

We owe the idea of identity crisis to Erikson, but we have largely ignored his complementary concept, generativity. Generativity in an Eriksonian world reflects the need for maturing adults to leave their stamp on the world (Kotre 1984) and builds on identity as it is established in early adulthood. Those identities and the factional loyalties that sustain them, constrain and condition our hopes and visions for the future, but they do not exhaust them. If the problem of identity is concerned with the maintenance of meaningful autobiography amid the vagaries of life, the problem of generativity is to maintain a sense of the meaning of history amid seeming chaos in the course of human events. We may say, troping on C. Wright Mills (1959), that both of these developmental tasks require a fluid sociological imagination that unites biography and history by means of coherent stories of self and structure. In this dialectic, identity processes focus on the self and generativity processes focus on the structure; each minimally requires the other.

## **Stages of development as ongoing life projects**

There is good reason to state that Erikson carries the best in Freud forward into an era that has learned much about cultural relativity and the foibles of reductionism. The most enduring contribution of Erikson's theory is his seasonal view of human development, in which sequenced periods in the life course are recognized as posing life challenges that serve as turning points for personal development. The life course is marked with milestones and, after passing a crucial milestone, life progresses on a track different from before.

Erikson's theory of psychosocial development is a stage theory with a loosely linear structure. It developed from a psychoanalytic practice that placed the burden of development on early and traumatic life experience. The challenges of early childhood are assumed to have causal impact on later life experiences and can explain adult neuroses on the assumption that the adult is a product of the child within. His eight stages build on Freud's psychosexual theory (1962), most notably working in a critically important role for culture and post-childhood experience with extra and differently grounded stages (Erikson 1963). Erikson's eight-stage theory of psychosocial development, as described in his *Childhood and Society*, became duly famous because it provides a clinically informed

way to think about the genesis of personality and satisfaction without losing sight of the differential impact of culture, the innate human capacity for personal growth and the importance of later life experience.

Erikson's triumph was to salvage a humanistic psychology from Freudian pessimism and reductionism with a developmental theory that he called, in the mode of a *littérateur* more than a scientist, the "eight ages of man." Although he may have been working on the model of Shakespeare's Jacques, Erikson (1963) invokes Blake to motivate his theory: "The child's toys and the old man's reasons are the fruits of the two seasons." Each of the eight ages represents a challenge to be faced by the individual at a particular stage of development that then influences future experience.

The eight stages are labeled as follows: (1) basic trust vs. basic mistrust; (2) autonomy vs. shame and doubt; (3) initiative vs. guilt; (4) industry vs. inferiority; (5) identity vs. role confusion; (6) intimacy vs. isolation; (7) generativity vs. stagnation; (8) ego integrity vs. despair. The first four stages are stages mainly of youth, whereas stage five is characteristic of adolescence and stages six to eight of later life. Each step in the development of human personality involves some adaptation to each of the two poles of the given stage. So, for example, a person will pass through stage one with a favorable or unfavorable ratio of basic trust to basic mistrust. This ratio and its particular features has ramifying implications for later stages.

Erikson was careful not to be too formal, linear, or simplistic in his portrait of the developmental pattern of stages, even though his theory may readily lead readers to those hazards. In his view, the stages are better thought of as ever-present and ongoing life projects that interrelate to create a meaningful whole than as stages proper. Identities begin to form as children learn their names. Generativities are present in even the most self-centered adolescents. Life can cross back on itself. As an example, although a child may develop a sound ratio of basic trust to mistrust in infancy, violent traumas later in life may subvert those gains with unpredictable consequences for higher-order personality characteristics such as industry, intimacy, and generativity, whose development tends to peak long after basic trust has been gained. Such is the case with post-traumatic stress disorder that may disrupt the sense of basic trust or ontological security in Ronald Laing's (1960) sense, thereby imperiling gains in other existential life projects: in extreme cases thereby garnering a psychological label such as borderline personality disorder.

It is something of a curiosity, partially explained by Erikson's own emphases, that only crisis at the fifth stage peaking in late adolescence, identity vs. role confusion, is recognized as a viable root of conflict behavior of the future adult. Taken at face value, this implies that identity-based conflict is a psychological manifestation of adolescent frustrations. People fight because they fail to achieve ego integration in environments structured to frustrate that basic human need. Although Erikson's own focus on identity is a clear source of this tendency, his framework hints at a richer way of looking at post-realist conflict from the vantage point of sound micro foundations. If identity crisis *en masse* can lead to conditions of violent conflict between groups, what effects will turning points in adult life have on conflictual behavior? If identity crises cause conflicts, what are the repercussions of generativity crises?

Although it has long been alluring as a concept, there is substantial debate about the precise definition of generativity. Erikson used the words *productivity* and *creativity* in his treatment, while being careful to avoid equating the concept with these. McAdams (2006) emphasizes productivity and caring in his discussion of the idea, whereas others have highlighted its communal and agentic or self-expansive aspects (Kotre 1984). These

interpretations help to flesh out what it is that makes generativity distinct from identity and probably point to aspects of life that are currently encompassed by various forms of identity theory. Even the discussions of alienation in the early Marx – alienation being a kind of absence of identity – show how being separated from the capacity to create something important and then to share it with others violates something essential in human life (Marx and Engels 1970). Generativity points both to something like altruism and to the freedom to be a hunter, fisherman, herdsman, and cultural critic as one's conception of life demands. Some time in the middle of our lives we yearn to live in what Marcuse (1964) would call two dimensions, rather than just one. In this time, an individual seeks to transcend fragmented experience to live some kind of moral community, thereby escaping what Durkheim (1951) called *anomie*. Successful transcendence may take the form of self-actualization in Maslow's (1954) sense, but is better thought of as inter-actualization. The human being recognizes what it is through personal investment in the lives of others. This is not strictly altruism, but rather ego expansion to broader scope.

Many have noted that generativity is quite compatible with self-absorption (McAdams 2006; Kotre 1984). Even an agonistic realist can find something in the idea; one can easily imagine a world of egocentric moguls competing to leave behind a legacy that outpaces the others'. What drives the ego here is the desire to rise above the body and even the self by founding structures for others to inhabit. The fact that both *Kaiser* and *Czar* are titles derived from a single name says something of Caesar's generative accomplishments in a way that underscores the concept's utility for the study of conflict.

Generativity and the complex articulations with which it is compatible provide a conflict theorist with a richer hermeneutic palette than now exists and could help to bring approaches centered on historical narrative and social structure back into alignment with those that focus on personal narrative and social identity. Even more interesting is its promise of uniting needs and culture theories of conflict.

## **Basic human needs in Eriksonian perspective**

John Burton's contribution to conflict theory has had many critics (see Sandole 2006), but his core insight that conflict is comparable to a disease that can be cured by fulfilling the basic human needs of individuals remains compelling (Rubenstein 2001). Combined with Galtung's (1969) conception that social structures do violence by denying certain individuals the means to satisfy their basic needs, the Burtonian model serves as a kind of core paradigm for the anti-realist analysis of conflict of which social identity theory is an example.

Burton's theory is most vulnerable in that it seems both idealistic and arbitrary. In his biting and thoroughgoing dismissal of the Burtonian project, Lewis Coser (1991) attacked these weak spots. He argued that sociologists had long tried to develop a set of core motivations even before the topic became prominent in the field of psychology. One early and influential example was W. I. Thomas's (1924) "four wishes" theory, which he developed to explain the related problem of juvenile delinquency under the broader topic of social disorganization. According to Thomas, young people became delinquents as a problem of adjustment to the social world when they were unable to meet the demands of these four core motivations: wishes for new experience, security, response, and recognition. Coser, on coming across Burton's original list of eight basic needs, quipped that one might as well have nine, ten, or forty for that matter. Furthermore, sociologists of an earlier age had decided that needs theory, varying too much from situation to situation, was a dead end.

Burton had committed the original academic sin – not to be wrong, but to have shown evidence of not having read the largely forgotten social disorganization literature and its accompanying and perhaps whiggish sociological critiques of motivation theory. Whereas sociology may have given up on motivation theory in the 1930s, psychology did not, as the master work of thinkers from Allport (1961) to Maslow (1954) to McClelland (1961) attests.

Of course, Erikson's stage theory (1963) does not escape the problem of theoretical discretion entirely, but provides the theorist with a well-established short list of needs that are tied to a coherent and clinically grounded sense of how human beings develop. It may be useful for conflict theory to think of Erikson's stages as a list of Burton's needs spread unevenly over the life course. It is then easy to see how Galtung's (1969) structural violence can apply differentially across developmental stages to produce injustices of differing kinds. Are conditions such that infants fail to develop a sense of basic trust, or adolescents a sense of self, or young adults productive intimacies, or adults a spirit of caring for future generations? Each of these would entail a different kind of structural violence that undermines the opportunity for natural and healthy development.

The Burton model has faced a more proximate challenge because of its inability to deal with the problem of culture (Avruch and Black 1987). The "ages of man" framework helps to address this problem by re-imagining needs in formal terms, while recognizing that these generic needs will be filled in culturally specific contents. There are ways that we are like all other persons, like some persons, and like no other person (Kluckhohn and Murray 1953). We are all alike in our need to meet certain generic challenges in life. We share means toward meeting those challenges with other members of the various cultures of our daily setting and we find some bits of life that are ours alone to enjoy or regret. To appeal to microfoundations need not imply a return to the rigidities of natural law theory (Rubenstein 1990); instead it merely helps to ground our core assumptions about human nature in explicit terms. Erikson (1963) helps us to see how highly plastic psychological needs are satisfied as they arise in the form of developmental challenges in a normal life course.

Some writers have looked to including a sense of sacred meaning in a Burtonian framework and for good reason (Clark 1990, 1993). From childhood, people yearn for answers to questions about the meaning and purpose of life, and in adulthood they often find them in the practices of creative expression and caring for others. As Durkheim (1984) argued, this group sacredness is the basis of moral life and intelligible human experience. When denied the right to care for the future, to implement cherished plans and to leave something of value behind, humans are rightly drawn to confrontation and causes for social change. Positing a generative need may provide theoretical support toward explaining the success of religion-based conflict resolution techniques such as those articulated by Gopin (1999). When people worship together, they generate together, thereby coping with generativity crises.

## Generativity crisis

Since Erikson (1963) first covered the topic, it has been known that identity crisis *writ large* can pose problems for social integration. Conflict theory has developed this insight in collaboration with parallel developments in recognition theory and in the study of social movements to push identity-based conflict theory forward in impressive ways. It is as yet less clear how crises at the level of generativity would relate to conflicts. If it is granted that

the generative marks off a branch of human experience that is distinct from that covered by identity, then what happens to people when they meet the generative challenge either unfavorably or in a way that encourages violent defiance?

One possible outcome is thoroughly optimistic. In this view, a generative person is more peaceful and other-centered in general than is a stagnant person. Generative individuals will be more likely to care for all others and will be inclined to forgive and forget even when they are wronged. The model here would be the Christian idea of turning the other cheek or the Buddhist sense of the development of loving-kindness. In the optimistic view, it could become a practice of conflict resolvers to cultivate general conditions productive of generativity among all people so that there is a greater tendency to avoid the petty conflicts that bedevil identity-based divisions. Not much different from the lessons commonly drawn from Adorno's seminal research on the authoritarian personality (Adorno *et al.* 1950), scholars and practitioners would strive to alleviate the conditions that contribute to negative psychological functioning and twisted personal growth. The practical vehicle for such a movement might be religious or loosely spiritual with psychological motivations to better adjust populations to historical context.

The more pessimistic view of generativity in relation to conflict allows for a potentially reinforcing effect of generative development. In such a view, if there are forces in the world that lead to the violation of cherished values and plans, one should expect parties to fight bitterly in defense of those violated hopes and dreams. It is no surprise that black power grew after America failed to fulfill King's dream as quickly as many wished. This is the dark side of generativity (Kotre 1984) and fits well with relative deprivation explanations (Gurr 1971). A highly generative party to conflict might be willing to bear humiliations that strike deeply at a sense of self-respect if the fruits of that humiliation promised to release others, in particular others in an imagined future, from the same humiliation. In such modes one will often hear parties invoke their grandchildren more readily than their children; the grandchildren's distance from the speaker implies a quality of the generative ideal. An abstract vision of ideal community makes it possible to bear much that destroys the self and, in many cases, help sufferers to rise above such concerns. This is the essence of ideology (Bell 1988). Erikson might help us to answer Ted Gurr's famous question with the answer that some men (and women) rebel when they lose the idea of the future – when they experience a generativity crisis.

Which of these two views is more compatible with developmental experience is ultimately an empirical question and should not be defined away by appeals to true or holistic conceptions of generativity as compared to false or partial ones. A universalistic generative impulse is perhaps more developed than a particularistic one, but it may be no more human than the latter.

## **Political ideas**

Work in the identity paradigm has a tendency to look inward rather than forward, not only to make the personal political, but to place the personal above the political. It is easy in such an environment to lose touch with the centrality of political ideas or ideology. In a recent controversial book, Walter Benn Michaels (2006: 144) argues that identity, as the concept is used in current discourse, stands in contrast to ideology. Pointing again to a cultural left in the United States, he avers that many “prefer to understand our own political differences as differences in identity rather than ideology, as differences in who we are rather than in what we believe.” His criticism is fairly glib and our sense of who we are is

surely dependent on what we believe as well, but his larger point demonstrates one of the major pitfalls of identity as the only theoretical alternative to political realism.

When an analyst looks to conflict based on deprivations tied to social identity, it is natural to proliferate divisions, to attend to social cleavages, and to ignore broader ideas that can provide meaning to diverse groups and factions, e.g. democracy, Islam, or socialism. Generativity-based conflicts may arise among identity groups, but cannot be resolved by repairing reputations and building self-esteem. A person in a generativity crisis demands a reason to hope and will be satisfied only when there is reason to believe again in a desirable future. As we are all political animals, such a crisis incites the demand for plausible political ideas.

Take the case of the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek. Seymour Martin Lipset (1981) notes in his comments on the meeting of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, from which the “end of ideology” ideas emerged, that Hayek was the lone participant who refused to submit to the anodyne assessment that ideological warfare between economic systems was a thing of the past. Hayek (1944) feared that socialism was a new road to serfdom, which he was dedicated to opposing; the rise of the political power of neoclassical economics owes much to Hayek’s generative and conflictual spirit (Nash 1976). A worldview that recognizes generativity-based conflict is poised to examine political ideas as projections of the future. These will most likely be found where stories are told.

## Supervise the storytellers

Central to any study of generativity and conflict will be a narrative approach to social science. Most of the work that has revived Erikson’s generativity theory of late has recognized how important stories and storytelling are to its development. This work on storytelling is catching on in varied fields in what might be called a narrative return, which builds on “the narrative turn” of the previous generation. A few examples of the resurgence in interest can be found in the sociology of culture (Smith 2003; Tilly 2006), in positioning theory (Harre *et al.* 1998), in narrative facilitation (Winslade and Monk 2000; Cobb 1994), in psychology (McAdams 2006), and in business and marketing (Heath and Heath 2007; Denning 2000).

The “story” construct has not been very popular in social science, perhaps because of its folksy and exoteric appeal. This is ironic given the central role that the great rationalist Plato gives the concept in his foundational work of Western social thought. In Plato’s occasionally chilling discussion of political life in the *Republic*, he warns that, in a stable and virtuous *polis*, it is necessary to supervise the storytellers. If Shakespeare would first kill the lawyers, Plato would first silence the poets. The reasons for this are clear. It is the storytellers who shape us, playing crucial roles in determining which path at each of life’s turning points will be more and which less traveled.

Stories are crucial in establishing a self-concept for young people or in maintaining a coherent autobiography for those who are older. They are also crucial in framing a model for intimate bonding for young and not so young adults; but stories are even more important in defining a person’s interpretation of history, which in the end gives life meaning. Here religious and secular tales are the matrix for what Walter Lippmann (1922) called the “pictures in our heads” that explain to us how the world works and how things come to pass. Historical narratives give form to the ever-emerging stream of content in social life and place them in common context.

The generative science of conflict may demand a view that recognizes narrative



ecologies in which certain stories rise and others fall as groups attempt to influence the watercooler climate of common sense (see Senehi, Chapter 14 in this volume). The stakes of such struggles explain the otherwise curious intensity of religious war and the ominous shadow of propaganda. Narrative science is still in its infancy and distracted by complexity. Productive use of the perspective may well develop in line with psychosocial theory. The lesson of this chapter is that the nature of stories we seek requires that we keep the problem of generativity as firmly in mind as that of identity.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, I have proposed a theory of conflict that draws on Erik Erikson's concept of generativity. A generativity-based view of conflict helps the conflict theorist and the conflict resolution practitioner to think about conflict and its potential resolution in ways that are unlikely to be recognized by an identity-based approach taken alone. Generativity directs our attention to a party's need to be needed and to the powerful consequences of the desire to outlive the self, without losing sight of the effects of the need for individuals to develop a coherent social identity. If identity helps to clarify the effect of adolescent experience on conflict behavior, generativity directs attention to the comparable effect of the experiences of adulthood.

If we approach conflicts only from the perspective of social identity we may miss the crucial importance of Blake's "old man's reasons," which are likely to be laden with generative beliefs, hopes for the future, and justifications for preserving what is good and beautiful in this world. The desire to leave something of value behind may prove more worth dying for, or just voting for, than is the struggle for recognition itself. One need only imagine how different it would be in conflict resolution practice to speak to a party's sense of thwarted magnanimity in contrast to his or her violated self-esteem to get a sense of the value added with generativity-based methods.

By placing the quest for higher meaning in the context of the generative challenge, Erikson's theory provides microfoundations – conceptions plausibly specified at the level of the individual actor – for the conceptualization of the development and defense of such higher meanings. The basic need, in Burton's sense, to find meaning in proliferation is basic, whether meaning is framed in sacred or secular terms. The analyst will find the generative spirit in parties of all ages, not primarily in their stories of self, but instead in their stories of structure. Biography must meet history in the narrative imagination of the analysts as it does with the participants to conflict. We can imagine that it is in these narratives on the generative plane of place, community, and history that the chosen traumas that rend the world, and the visions that might redeem it, will reveal themselves most readily (Volkan 1997).

Generativity-based conflict in such a view is an unexplored territory that could help to solve nagging theoretical difficulties for the field even while promoting more effective practice. Generativity theory, therefore, should serve as a natural complement to both conflict theorists and those in the practice of resolving conflicts who have found social identity to be a useful organizing frame for their work.

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## **Part II**

# **Core approaches**

Conceptual and methodological



# 9 Human agonistes

## Interdisciplinary inquiry into ontological agency and human conflict

*Thomas E. Boudreau*

### Introduction

Human beings exert tremendous amounts of time, energy, and resources in order to enhance their security by attempting to prevent, regulate, or win conflicts with other human beings. Hence, human existence, especially within a group, is inevitably constrained, and often contested (Cosser 1956; Simmel 1955; Sumner 1906). In violent human conflicts, especially those involving ethnic groups or entire nations, participants often have deep convictions that frequently have bloody consequences in organized action (Galtung 1996) concerning contested geographies, historical narratives, moral grievances, religious values, or sometimes even competing cosmologies and gods.

In view of these realities, I will argue four main points. First, human conflicts, especially violent human conflicts, characterized by individuals or groups trying to kill each other, are among the most complex phenomena in the social world. In particular, *contested agencies* of human beings, including violent human conflict, are a central reality of social life (Cosser 1956; Marx 1999; Simmel 1955). As we shall see, the structure/agency analyses of certain social scientists, such as Emile Durkheim (1964) or Anthony Giddens (1984), are incomplete unless the protean element and contribution of human conflict and *contested human agencies* to ensuing social structures are taken fully into account.

Although human conflict and efforts to prevent, regulate, limit, or end “lethal contests” are central features of social life (Miall *et al.* 2005), the study of human conflict and contested human agencies is not yet central to the social sciences (Abbott 2001). This chapter will seek to correct this, at least partially, by arguing that an accurate disciplinary study of human existence in societies is incomplete without an accurate and interdisciplinary understanding of constrained and *contested* human agency.

Second, the chapter argues that, in its *actual existence*, human life or agency is pre-theoretical and ontological; that, in its most basic form, human agency is already immersed, involved, and “thrown” into the world. The term *ontological agency* as “Being in the World” (Heidegger 1962, 1977, 1996) will be developed and used to describe this pre-theoretical and pristine phenomenon. I will specifically argue that human existence and actions are always embedded in an ontological site consisting of unique ecologies, geographies, cultures, and epistemologies that constitute and constrain human agency. Thus the first task in conflict analysis is to examine constrained and contested ontological agency in its unique location and local realism, to use a term borrowed from quantum mechanics. The term “ontological site” refers to the basic ecological preconditions for human agency and actions to occur. Ecology is used in its ancient Greek meaning of *oikos* or “home,” which is the natural dwelling place of ontological agency as “Being in the

World” (Heidegger 1962, 1996). The central premise of ontological agency is that all of human life has two characteristics: first, all human actions are inescapably constrained in a world not of our making and embedded in a unique configuration of geographical, cultural, environmental, and other factors; second, much of human life, as it is actually lived, is intensely local and unique. So, the preliminary challenge is to capture the local realism of ontological agency and how this inevitably shapes and contours any initial interdisciplinary inquiry of violent human conflict. Hence the primary challenge of conflict analysis is “to let the data do the talking” (Polkinghorn 2000) and not impose a priori theoretical constructs upon each unique instance of human beings in violent struggle.

The most appropriate preliminary means of capturing a unique and embedded phenomenon is through *interdisciplinary inquiry* that seeks to “reveal” or “disclose,” not only the thing in itself, but how it is embedded in a complex configuration of interrelationships and causal constructs. Such constellated (Kuhn 1970) or full ground thinking (Boudreau 1998, 2003) and inquiry is a prerequisite for conflict analysis. Hence, the third main task of this chapter is to define interdisciplinary inquiry as an intermediate and a priori level of analysis between pure theory or philosophical speculation and the applied social sciences. What is required is, at least initially, a robust representation of human agency that includes as complete a set of causal constructs possible concerning constrained and contested human existence. This can best be done in a truly interdisciplinary study of *human ecology* – defined as inquiry into human agencies embedded in an “ontological site” consisting of unique ecologies, geographies, cultures, and epistemologies that constitute “Being in the World.”

Fourth, we will conclude that the *case study*, which emphasizes the uniqueness of the phenomenon under study, is the most appropriate preliminary methodology for collecting data in any interdisciplinary inquiry into contested human agencies in violent human conflicts (Yin 2003). Only when this full ground of the local realism of a conflict is fully revealed can theoretical development of violent conflict proceed.

### **Contested human agencies: incidental or inevitable?**

Jean and John Comaroff have called human agency “that abstraction greatly underspecified, often misused, much fetishized these days by social scientists” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 37). “The term agency, variously defined, has become ubiquitous within anthropology and other disciplines” (Ahern 2001: 112). In view of this, Ahern offers “a provisional definition of the concept: Agency refers to the socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (ibid.: 131).

Yet human agency can be defined in a variety of other ways, involving such differing aspects as Nietzsche’s “will,” Skinner’s conditioned behavior, or James’ human praxis, meaning the practical effects of one’s behavior. Part of the problem with human agency is that there are almost as many definitions of human agency as there are scholarly disciplines addressing the phenomenon! For instance, Ahern (ibid.: 128) points out, “philosophers generally argue that agency requires some sort of concomitant mental state” such as “intention” (Davidson 1980; Ferris 2003), “presence of self” (Segal 1991), a “rational point of view,” and a “domain of intentional control” (Rovane 1998).

Social theorists such as Bourdieu (1977) and Giddens (1984) make agency a central concern of their analysis; as we shall shortly see, Giddens’ analysis of agency–structure interplay is the central aspect of his theory of structuralism. We will attempt to refine this theory by postulating *contested* human agencies as a critical source of what Giddens (1991) calls social “constraints.”

Among political scientists, the most notable though often overlooked example of contested human agencies is Graham Allison's third paradigm, the governmental politics model that he uses to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 1971). According to Allison, the various governmental agencies in Washington contest and argue over national priorities and the result is policy as compromise between competing interests. As we shall see, Allison also uses the case study in international affairs.

If they analyze it at all, economists discuss agency solely in terms of individuals trying to maximize their personal utilities or interests (Friedman 1966). The economic individual exists within some type of mythological universe or space, free from any earthly limits, consisting of purely hypothetical Cartesian coordinates, in which living and breathing human beings don't kill or die for poor pay, or no pay at all, police or firefighters don't need to respond to life-threatening emergencies, and teachers are paid simply fabulous sums of money (I'm sorry – the last is a parody within a parody though it sharpens the point.) In short, economics as it is presently construed and taught is often the *last* place we can look for a realistic, let alone accurate, understanding of human agency.

## Defining contested human agencies

What is missing from these various disciplinary definitions of human agency is that it is often profoundly constrained *and violently contested*.

At this point it is useful to define contested human agency or, more accurately, contested human agencies in a preliminary way. By this term, I mean that *human agency in the social world (outside my window) is actively challenged, coerced, controlled, or actually changed and even destroyed in contention with other individuals or groups as they confront a variety of geographies, ecologies, actors, and social structures*. Such contesting of human agency occurs whether human beings are acting in conjunction with or in relative isolation from each other's primary group. These acts and counteracts constitute a dynamic continuum of constraints that actively or passively interfere with, block, threaten, prevent, or destroy one's ability to act. Perhaps more importantly, these acts can often be mapped out and located as part of the ontological site.

These constraints on human agency are not simply social structures, though structures play an important part in contested human agency (Bartos and Wehr 2002). Human agency is contested along a continuum with many markers: the critical and often overlooked critical material or ecological conditions and constraints; regulated social or economic competition; perceived or actual interference from another or others; unregulated competition with other human beings; psychological, social, or physical coercion or conflicts emanating from other agents or social structures (or both); and finally violent human conflicts or "lethal contests" (Tilley *et al.* 2003), either latent or real, the mere preparation for which in current times consumes untold treasures in gold and blood.

In other words, contested (and embedded) human agency is a fundamental reality of social life. It is certainly not the only reality that characterizes human agency, yet it is a basic, indeed fundamental, "unexplicated category in the various forms of structural sociology" (Giddens 1984: 74).

Hence a key source of contested human agency occurs when two or more groups or individuals attempt to "exercise" "that very freedom of action" (as Giddens 1984 states) *against each other*. The presence of such contested human agencies is *prima facie* evidence that a conflict between human beings is occurring. In other words, the issue of "constraints" that both Durkheim and Giddens (Giddens 1972) posit and identify as a critical



problem of (structural) sociology is not simply the result of social structures. These constraints come from competing *human agencies in opposition*, ranging from disagreements and competition through coercion and legal disputes to killings or even genocide. These human agencies in opposition create, after the contest is over, lasting social “imprints” that are significant sources of ensuing social structures.

As such, *human conflicts* are an active source of the “resistance” that often result in, once the contests are completed, the subsequent creation, transformation, or return of the rules as “generalizable procedures” embodied in the social structures (Giddens 1984). Of course, such contests of human agency do not explain all social structures; yet they are a powerful source of the resistance to human agency that indicates deeper social forces at work. In other words, social structures are to a significant degree (that is or should be empirically demonstrable) defined and developed as a result of, or in *anticipation, regulation, or prevention* of, potentially violent contests of human agency. In short, *contested* human agency is one of the significant “causes” of social structure by contributing to the principles and rules that pattern subsequent social behavior.

This is not to say that human agency or social structures are solely defined by conflict. Almost all human beings simultaneously cooperate and conflict with other human beings in the fulfillment of their basic needs; in fact, we can define the phenomenon of human cooperation as progressive mutual fulfillment of human needs and aspirations (Burton 1990). Elements of cooperation are usually present in most human agency because human beings could not exist entirely on their own from birth to death; every human being must have various degrees of human cooperation simply in order to survive. I have described this collective phenomenon elsewhere as the primary basis for a *peace culture*, which is characterized by the vast spheres of human cooperation in all aspects of life in order to fulfill human needs and thus ensure survival (Boudreau 1986, 1991).

It is also critical to point out that contested human agency is often exercised in a *conflict continuum* ranging from “normal” non-violent interpersonal disagreements such as those between parent and child, or ritualized competition such as those in sports, to deadly conflict in which human beings are killed (Coser 1956; Simmel 1955). This continuum of contested human agencies can exist at all levels of the social sphere, both inside and outside one’s own primary group, even within one’s primary family unit. The continuum reflects the degree of cooperation mixed in with conflict. Contested social encounters can be *mixed* with deep elements of cooperation or *zero-sum*, even lethal conflict. Finally, the contested agency can simply be latent, waiting to be born and possibly expand. Much depends, as Heidegger states (1962, 1996), how human beings are “thrown” into existence, into their material, ecological, and cultural circumstances.

Finally, many of the disciplinary definitions of human agency cited by Ahern (2001) seem to presuppose cultural assumptions that are problematic and should be subject to further inquiry. In particular, there is often the cultural presupposition of intense individualism found in the social sciences (Geertz 1979), especially, for example, in economics or psychology. The emphasis on human agency, alone, without reference to its inevitably embedded and constrained nature, is another vivid illustration of the supposed primacy of the human over the natural. This regal role of human agency reflects the cultural value and presupposition of intensely individualistic societies in which individuals are supposed to be masters of their own fate, free from material, social, or ecological constraints. In this sense, the external human agency is anointed as the first cause of social inquiry, with other possible “causes” such as ecological, cultural, or epistemic following somewhere far behind, if acknowledged at all.

In contrast, theory development into human conflict should begin with a multiframed contingent causality that includes ontological agency, rather than an attempt to simplify violent human struggles by using ultimately single source explanations; Occam's razor, perhaps prized by the scholar as a tool, is not always the best principle to guide understanding of, or explanations for, such richly complex and unique phenomena as contested human agencies in violent human conflicts.

So we must dig deeper for an adequate definition of human agency. As noted above, Ahern offers a "provisional definition" of human agency as "the socioculturally mediated capacity to act" (2001: 115). In the next section of the chapter, we will add the word "ecological" to this definition, and define ontological agency as the "ecological and socio-cultural capacity to act." As we shall see, this definition is simply a provisional starting point for the definition and development of the concept of ontological agency as a basic pre-theoretical understanding of human actions, especially contested ones. In short, the reality that human life is constrained and often contested must be taken fully into account as a *constituent condition* of human agency.

### A missing link? Ontological agency

Ontological agency can be understood as "Being in the World" (Heidegger 1962, 1996), encountered through deliberative human action that is always embedded in a unique time, culture, and specific location, described as the ontological site, and constrained by geographical, ecological, social, historical, and other site-specific factors that are often, though not always or inevitably, contested. Violent human conflicts don't occur in abstraction; Foucault (1982) warns about the dangerous tendency of Western modernity to spatialize specific locations in terms of abstract and universal space, as though Cartesian coordinates could characterize all the places and spaces of human life. This is especially true of violent human encounters in which scores of human beings may kill or perish for a few yards or meters of land found on an obscure battlefield.

In view of this, ontological (or ecological) agency can be defined as actual human existence in deliberative actions embedded in the full ground of "Being in the World" (Heidegger 1962, 1996). This is both a modification and an extension of Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* as developed in his classic work *Being and Time*.

There are three fundamental constituent conditions or original features of ontological agency, the first being that ontological agency is always *ecologically embedded* within the world. Ecology is used here in the original Greek meaning of *oikos* or "home." The original home of human agency – as the "dwelling of *Dasein*" or the "bourne of Being" (Heidegger 1962, 1996) – is also a specific time and place embedded within a unique biological environment, geography, culture, and other site-specific factors, or its "local realism." I refer to this original home or dwelling of human beings as the ontological site or original and unique location of a human life.

Unfortunately, the reality that social scientists often study highly abstract theories of human agency in general or human conflict with no reference to culture or geography, whereas military planners pore over and intensely study very specific topographical maps, is a disjointed reminder that human contests always have, at the very least, a unique geographical locality and historical moment.

A second feature of ontological agency is that it is always constrained (Giddens 1984). In the following discussion, the term *ecologically embedded* will refer to the combination of the original ecological, cultural, and other constraints that characterize actual human

beings living within a specific ontological site. As human beings, we do not have complete freedom of action or unlimited options; our behavior and choices are often sharply constrained by the geographical, environmental, cultural conditions that constitute and condition our basic “Being in the World.” In short, ontological agency is always *constrained* in its actual lived conditions, including the embedded ecology or full ground of humans’ daily existence.

As mentioned above, a key constraint is the phenomenon of *contested* human agencies – past, present, ongoing, or potential conflicts – especially violent encounters or conflicts between human beings. Hence, a third characteristic of ontological agency is that it is often fundamentally *contested* in that security is almost always sought from the arbitrary power or influence of other human beings; this is a basic condition of “Being in the World.” As such, contested human agencies – past, present, or anticipated – constitute a protean source of social structures and their transformation. Such contested agencies are a function of the elemental *epistemic encounter*, which can be defined as the basic social encounter or engagement between two or more human beings who are simultaneously active hermeneutical agents that are continually interpreting or reinterpreting, not only their surrounding social context, but also each other in a constant process of social construction, cooperation, competition, and conflict. When contested, these encounters often result in very different interpretations and narratives of the same unique event.

How, then, do we study and understand violent human conflicts characterized by deeply contested human agencies that often occur, first and foremost, in a unique ontological site? This presents a difficult problem because there is an impoverished and abstracted understanding of the ontological site of human agencies in many of the social science disciplines; this is, unfortunately true in the emergent field of conflict analysis and resolution, which already indulges in premature theoretical construction and speculation that is usually discussed in terms of a Cartesian universal space free from any unique geography or topography of a specific conflict. A vivid illustration of this is that a student can read or study literally dozens of books written on conflict resolution and never once encounter an *actual map* of the original ontological site where an actual conflict is being waged! Such theoretical speculations are, I submit, vivid examples of “construct underrepresentation” (Cook and Campbell 1979). To correct this, the study of human conflict, especially violent ones, first requires rigorous *interdisciplinary* inquiry of the original ontological site in which contested human agencies are inevitably located.

## Ontological human agency and interdisciplinary inquiry

The end of our Foundation is the *Knowledge of Causes* and the secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible.

(Bacon 2007: 5, emphasis added)

Interdisciplinary inquiry in the social sciences consists of identifying and locating the embedded ecology of ontological human agency, which is “revealed” and hypothesized in a preliminary way within a specific and unique constellation or matrix of causes or causal constructs that seeks to fully disclose human agency’s actual and unique setting or “local realism.” The word “cause” is used here, as Aristotle intended, in its original Greek meaning of “disclose” or “reveal” (McKeon 1941). In other words, interdisciplinary inquiry has a *revelatory role* that is contingent upon preliminary disclosure of the embedded ecology as

well as the complex configuration of interrelationships of a phenomenon or phenomena and consequent construct validity of a theory. Such a focus on the interrelationships of phenomena, as well as on the phenomenon itself, is a characteristic of social cubism (Byrne and Carter 1996). Building upon this idea, interdisciplinarity seeks to insure the construct validity of possible *causes and their interrelationships identified in a tentative conceptual constellation* concerning a phenomenon or phenomena (Cook and Campbell 1979). As Cook and Campbell state, it is: “our distinct impression that most applied experimental research is much more oriented toward high construct validity of *effects* than of *causes*” (ibid.: 63, emphasis added). One result of this is that a significant threat exists to the construct validity of putative causes since “construct underrepresentation” inevitably occurs, in which “the operations fail . . . to incorporate all the dimensions of the construct” (Cook and Campbell 1979). This is especially a problem with definitions of human agency found within the social sciences in general and the field of conflict analysis and resolution in particular. For instance, until rather recently, many definitions of human action, behavior, or intent found in the Anglo-American social sciences seem to simply assume, or simply ignore, the profound biological constraints and ecological embeddedness of human agency.

To guard against this, interdisciplinary inquiry embodies a contingent causality that can be defined as “a presumed or tentative revelatory hypothesis at an initial or preliminary stage of inquiry.” (See Cook and Campbell 1979 for the beginning of a discussion on contingent causality.) A tentative cause that must first be formulated or revealed is prior to the establishment of a specific cause and effect; as such, contingent cause discloses a possible relationship to be tested and corroborated in its unique ontological site using case studies and “process tracing” (George and McKeown 1985) or, if possible, falsified. At this preliminary stage of inquiry, both corroboration (Quine 2006) and falsification (Popper 1979) are useful, though not always sufficient, to insure the construct validity of a cause in its original ontological site. (To accept Popper’s specific methodology of falsification as a partial procedure to insure the construct validity of causes is not the same as accepting Popper’s entire epistemological argument for “objective knowledge,” with which I have profound disagreements.) Hence, when dealing with the study of human beings, “cause and conjecture” in the sense of identifying “plausible rival hypotheses” (Campbell’s Foreword in Yin 2003) is the first step in constructing a plausible “cause and effect.” This is, I suggest, the original meaning of Aristotle’s famous causal fourfold structure found in his *Physics* (McKeon 1941). The idea that causal structures require a *necessary relationship* or implication between the “cause” and “effect” is a much later development and often attributed to Bacon (1994) or, at the latest, Hume (1955).

The precise initial task of interdisciplinary inquiry, then, is to disclose and reveal a unique phenomenon, such as ontological agency, in the “full ground” (Boudreau 1998) of its embedded ecology and then conjecture concerning its “nested hierarchies” (Campbell 1974; Campbell and Fiske 1959) and plausible “conceptual constellations” (Kuhn 1970). This is, I suggest, a preeminent responsibility of anthropology within the “social sciences” – namely to locate, test, and validate the adequacy of conjectures concerning ontological human agency within the domain of human ecology.

The question then becomes: How are violent human conflicts, which inevitably contain contested and constrained human agencies, best revealed and disclosed in the full ground of their original ontological site? The answer, at least initially, is through the use of a case study methodology that captures as completely as possible the contingent causalities of human agency.

This is certainly not a new idea. Significant research has already been done concerning the conditional, constraining, or contested roles of the ecology (Homer-Dixon 1995, 2001; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Westing 1984), geography (Phillips 2005), and material resources (Klare 2002) in violent human conflict. In his recently published book *Contested Lands*, Sumantra Bose (2007) discusses the importance of contested geographies in violent human conflicts. When considered as part of constitutive elements of the original *ontological site*, each factor contributes to the potential revelatory role of the interrelated causal constructs in such lethal contests. This allows the “data doing to do the talking” in that it is hypothesized that each of these “causes” is contested unless specifically falsified by the actual participants in the conflict.

### **Contested ecologies and geographies: the embedded agency of the ontological site**

In recent times, scholars have pioneered the study of the environment and the role it plays in violent human conflict. During the Vietnam War, Arthur Westing demonstrated conclusively the extraordinarily harmful impact of American bombing and defoliation campaigns during that conflict. Westing’s research was on the *impact* upon the environment of violent human conflict (1984).

More recently, Thomas Homer-Dixon has conducted research that reverses this equation, and examines the role of environmental factors in *causing* violent human conflict. In doing so, Homer-Dixon raises causal issues that are central to interdisciplinary inquiry of the ontological site as well. For instance, in the book entitled *Ecoviolence: Links among Environment, Population and Security*, Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt (1998: 2) raise the possibility of a positive relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflict:

By the year 2025, the world population will be nearly 8 billion. This figure represents an increase of almost 2 billion in just over 20 years. . . . Over 90 percent of the expected growth will take place in developing countries, in which the majority of the population is often dependent on local renewable resources like cropland, forests, and fresh water supplies. . . . What, if any, are the links between this increasing scarcity of renewable resources – or what we call environmental scarcity – and the rise in violent conflict within countries in recent years?

This introduction to their book raises some extremely serious and complex questions. Most importantly, for our purposes, is the problem of how the researcher demonstrates, at least in a preliminary way, that such a relationship *exists* between environmental scarcity and violent conflict.

Homer-Dixon (1995) tries to answer this question in an earlier work entitled, *Strategies for Studying Causation in Complex Ecological Systems*, (hereafter simply referred to as *Strategies*). Homer-Dixon addresses the causal relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict. In doing so, he pursues a method of inquiry that is interdisciplinary in all but actual name. He is, in effect, describing the role of contingent causality in interdisciplinary inquiry, in which both the independent and dependent variables are hypothesized to have a relationship in the *preliminary* stages of research.

## Theory building: process tracing and case studies

Homer-Dixon proceeds to formulate a method, which he describes as “process tracing,” to establish that the hypothesized link between the independent and dependent variables exist. He borrows the term “process tracing” from Alexander George and Timothy McKeown, who observe that “process tracing often involves dropping down one or more levels of analysis to develop a more finely textured and detailed understanding of the causal steps between the independent and dependent variables” (1985: 31). In process tracing, George and McKeown write:

The process of constructing an explanation is much like the construction of a web or network. . . . The growth of the web orients the search for new pieces, just as the growth of a jig-saw puzzle guides the search for pieces that will fit together with what is already assembled.

(ibid.: 74)

Though George and McKeown obviously don’t use the language proposed in this chapter for interdisciplinary inquiry, and might disagree, there is a noted similarity between their concept of the “web” or the “construction of a web or network” and the construction of a constellated causal structure in interdisciplinary inquiry.

The problem then becomes one of accepting or rejecting the subsequent causal hypotheses. George and McKeown (1985), and Homer-Dixon (1995, 2001) posit “process tracing” as a means for making such selections. The key to such a process seems to be a comparison of a *number* of case studies using a correlation analysis in an attempt to determine if the distribution of case studies as hypothesized is significantly different from a distribution that could be expected by chance alone. This is certainly a very useful and positive way in which to establish the possible validity or irrelevance of the results. Stephan Van Evera (1997: 12) elaborates upon other ways besides process tracing to build theory, stating that:

Investigators can use four basic methods to infer theories from case studies: controlled comparison, congruence procedures, process tracing, and the Delphi method. Controlled comparison compares observations across cases to infer theories. Congruence procedure and process tracing deduce theories from observations within cases. The Delphi method consults the views of case participants.

This brings us to the importance of case studies as a preliminary method of investigation in interdisciplinary inquiry and research on violent human conflicts.

## Case studies: capturing the living fire of violent human conflicts

As Robert Yin states, a case study is most appropriate when the researcher “wants to cover contextual conditions – believing that they might be highly pertinent to [the] phenomenon of study” (2003: 11). As argued above, human agency is inevitably embedded in “contextual conditions” within the ontological site, the location and often the source of human conflict. To understand these conflicts in their local realism, the case study is, in the first instance, the preferred methodology of research.



Yin elaborates upon the appropriateness of the case study, defining it in the following terms: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (ibid.: 64). Perhaps the most famous example, which Yin cites, concerning the use of a case study to analyze contesting human agencies is Graham Allison’s *Essence of Decision*, in which Allison uses three differing paradigms or models to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999).

As we have seen, human conflict is, in its first instance, a uniquely local phenomenon, both in time and in space. Furthermore, as argued above, the ontological site is in such conflicts often an extremely complex and contested location consisting of competing geographies, narratives, interests, identities, and gods. Yin’s argument for a case study seems to anticipate this complexity of human conflict, stating that:

The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.

(2003: 46)

Yin is speaking to the central strength of a case study – namely its ability to capture a unique and embedded phenomenon in the inherent complexity of its ontological site. First, he cites the need for multiple sources of evidence, a feature that I describe elsewhere as “multiplex modeling and methodologies” to best understand and differentiate the data between the parties engaged in a unique conflict (Boudreau 2003). In view of this, when dealing with lethal contests between human beings, a good case study should include, at the very least, a dual or multiple identification of the competing geographies (Bose 2007), historical and cultural stories and narratives (Senehi 1996, 2000), selective suffering and grievances (Volkan 1998), issues of justice (Abu-Nimer 1999), and the ultimate objectives of the contesting agents. Second, Yin emphasizes the point that research can be guided in a preliminary stage by “theoretical propositions” or what Campbell describes in the foreword of Yin’s book as “plausible rival hypotheses.”

Elaborating upon these ideas, I emphasize the need in a lethal contest to develop *competing* as well as complementary causal constructs, representing two or more sides’ differing narratives of history and geography in an interdisciplinary causal structure or constellation, in an attempt to disclose and reveal a multiplex phenomenon as complicated as violent human conflict.

Once such a conflict is fully revealed and understood, then experienced interveners and mediators in the field of conflict resolution (Sandole 1998, 2003), including diplomats (Boudreau 1991), scholars (Fisher 1996) and ordinary citizens in track two diplomacy (Montville 1987) can try to use general theories and specific methods (Druckman 2005) to move violent human contests from a joint or multiple “will to power” or clash of wills and contested agencies to a shared and jointly developed “will to empower” each other and thus establish peace, if possible (Brand 1976).

## **Conclusion: toward a philosophy of the unique**

The idea that human agency is embedded in unique ecological, geographical, and cultural conditions is, of course, not new; for instance, Aristotle (1961) always defined human

agency, though he did not use this precise term, within a larger constellation of “causes.” The key point is that these temporal, spatial, ecological, and cultural actualities or inheritances cannot automatically be reduced to a Cartesian sense of time and space without subsequent confirmation (Quine 2006) or falsification (Popper 1979) concerning the *uniqueness* of the geographical (Bose 2007), historical, cultural (Senehi 1996, 2000), and ecological (Homer-Dixon 1995, 2001) localities, “positionalities” (Atkins 2004), and *sui generis* circumstances that surround and suffuse a complex phenomenon such as human agency. This assertion is simply a more recessed refinement of David Hume’s (1955) warnings about the dangers of inductive overgeneralizations. The embedded and unique ontological site should be represented as it actually is, not as theories tell us it should be.

Implications of this analysis include the inclusion of the interdisciplinary study of human agency in which the ecological *constraints* and individual, group, or international *contests* between human beings, especially the causes and effects of human violence against the environment and each other, become a central and a priori form of academic and institutionalized inquiry that precedes the often highly specialized and abstracted disciplinary definitions of human agency in the social sciences. In my judgment, the interdisciplinary term *human ecology* should thus supplant or replace the term *social sciences* in the organization of the university. In turn, anthropology could be the disciplinary locus that best evaluates the *adequacy of human agency* as disclosed and defined in the various disciplines (Smelser 2003). This is especially true when studying the most complex of social phenomena, violent human conflict in which large groups of human beings are systematically trying to kill other human beings.

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# 10 The ethnography of peace education

## Some lessons learned from Palestinian–Jewish integrated education in Israel<sup>★</sup>

*Zvi Bekerman*

### Introduction

From the myriad of theoretical perspectives that support conflict analysis and resolution work and/or activities geared towards coexistence and reconciliation, the cross-cultural encounters approach has been sustained and developed primarily on the basis of somewhat constrained theoretical approaches. These approaches are based on psychological and psychodynamic perspectives related to individual and personality development or, when stressing individual change through intergroup relations, sociological and socio-psychological perspectives. The foundational paradigms that support these underlying perspectives lack critical approaches as well as any reference to educational theorizing. Research in this field has dealt with rather short-term interventions devised for dispute resolution, conflict management, and intergroup encounters. The research methodology frequently utilizes quantitative, positivist perspectives that deal with the manipulation of variables and graphical representations of patterns of relationships but do not necessarily offer insights into the complexities of human activity in general and intergroup encounters in particular. Exceptions are to be found (Desivilya 2004; Hammack 2006; Helman 2002) but these critiques stand and have been recently raised again even from within the psychological literature (Dixon *et al.* 2005).

For the last eight years, I have been researching integrated bilingual Palestinian–Jewish schools in Israel: a laudable and complex long-term educational initiative that I have approached with traditional ethnographic tools. My research has helped me to recognize, yet again, that the human world of activity is complex and forever influenced by changing contexts and historical trajectories, always open to multiple interpretations. In this chapter, I want to share with the reader some of what I have learned throughout the process. The learning has to do with a variety of issues. Some touch upon the paradigmatic perspectives that substantiate the educational approaches (Bekerman 2007); others have to do with discursive practices and still others have to do with the educational/pedagogical strategies implemented in the educational setting. All in all these learnings reveal a complex texture of stakeholders' activities–expectations–interests–conflicts and the need to problematize present understandings of that which is assumed to be central to the activity: identity and culture. Last, but certainly not least, the chapter calls for encouraging ethnographic research in this important area of study.

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Space limitations allow me to include in the manuscript only limited excerpts from the data upon which to build my arguments. Those interested in further details are encouraged to review the multiple studies that have already been published (Bekerman 2002, 2003a,b, 2004, 2005a,b, 2007; Bekerman and Horenczyk 2004; Bekerman and Shhadi 2003). Other researchers who have also written about these schools include Bar-Shalom (2006), Feueruerger (1998), Gavison (2000), and Glazier (2003). Somewhat similar integrated schools in Northern Ireland have also been investigated (Gallagher 2004; McGlynn *et al.* 2004; Montgomery *et al.* 2003; Smith 1999). In the following section, I will offer a short overview of the educational initiative I have studied and its sociopolitical context.

Studies that address issues in broad strokes have a tendency to slip into debatable generalizations. Although I am aware of this danger, I believe the issues raised in this chapter need to be considered even by those initiatives that might not fully fit the patterns discussed. I am well aware that the concerns I will raise follow from my work in the Israeli scene. Still, the concerns raised might also be useful in any critical re-appraisal of similar educational efforts in multiple societies suffering from conflict.

### **The educational setting and its sociohistorical context**

The Jewish–Palestinian conflict remains the most potentially explosive of conflicts in Israel, placing the Jewish majority (80 percent of the population) and the Palestinian (primarily Muslim) minority (20 percent) in a situation plagued with tragedy and suffering. For the most part, Israel as an ethnic democracy (Smooha 1996) has not welcomed the active participation in political, cultural, or social spheres of anyone other than its legitimate invented community (Anderson 1991) of Jews. Israeli Palestinians, though officially offered full rights as citizens, have chronically suffered as a putatively hostile minority with little political representation and a debilitated social, economic, and educational infrastructure (Ghanem 1998).

Though riddled with conflict and social cleavages, Israel must attempt to meet the often competing requirements of a multiethnic national–religious society. The sociopolitical conflicts are reflected in the Israeli educational system, which is divided into separate educational sectors: Non-religious Jewish, Religious National Jewish, Orthodox Jewish, and Arab, all under the umbrella of the Israeli Ministry of Education (Sprinzak *et al.* 2001).

The integrated Palestinian–Jewish educational bilingual initiative was established in Israel in 1997 by the Center for Arab–Jewish Education in Israel with the goal of creating fully egalitarian, bilingual educational environments through the regular use of both Palestinian and Jewish teaching staff and the equal use of Arabic and Hebrew in these environments. The desired product is youth who can both acknowledge and respect one another while at the same time cultivating loyalty to their own cultural heritage. In 1998, two schools were established, one in Jerusalem and the other in Upper Galilee. In 2004, a third school was started in Kafer Karah, the first in a predominantly Palestinian city in the north of Israel. The most recent school opened in Beer-Sheva in 2007. At present, the schools offer classes up to the eighth grade only, but are planning eventually to offer a full cycle of secondary education. The schools serve over 1,400 students in 2008.

The curriculum is the standard curriculum of the state's non-religious Jewish school system, the difference being that both Hebrew and Arabic are used as languages of instruction. The schools employ what has been characterized as a strong additive bilingual approach, which emphasizes symmetry between both languages in all aspects of instruction (Garcia 1997). Two homeroom teachers, one a Palestinian, one a Jew, jointly lead all

classes. These schools, still considered a curiosity in the Israeli educational scene, must pioneer solutions to multiple curricular problems raised by mixing Palestinian and Jewish populations. The problems have to do with cultural and identity borders and with historical discourses and interpretations including those that sustain the present violent conflict.

## Some lessons learned

### *On identity*

Contact hypothesis in its different disguises suggests that intergroup contact might help to alleviate conflict between groups and reduce mutual prejudices (Gaertner *et al.* 1996; Wood and Soleitner 1996). In order for this to be achieved, contact should take place under the conditions of status equality and cooperative interdependence while allowing for both sustained interaction between participants and the potential forming of friendships (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). Recently Hewstone (1996) has carefully analyzed the theoretical bases and possible outcomes of the different “contact” strategies at hand, pointing toward their potential benefit when they allow for an increase in the complexity of intergroup perceptions. Halabi and Sonnenshein (2000) have argued for the need to strengthen group identity and achieve minority empowerment.

A central dilemma that often appears in planned contacts aimed at peace and reconciliation between members of groups in conflict is the problem of identity and identification. Thus, for the most part, in intergroup encounters we can sense negotiations between two poles of identity and identification: (1) a high emphasis on individual identity with a low emphasis on national or ethnic group identification, and (2) a high emphasis on national or ethnic group identity with a low emphasis on individual identity. A few studies have described contact situations as characterized by tension between individual and group identities, and as moving between interpersonal and intergroup interactions (Halabi and Sonnenshein 2000; Suleiman 1997).

The integrated Palestinian–Jewish schools have made a choice regarding these issues. Their choice follows from their understanding that such an educational initiative has a chance for continuity only if it declares itself engaged in peace education while simultaneously being committed to the strengthening of the particular group and the individual identities of its participants. “The curriculum is innovative, bilingual and bicultural – allowing students to strengthen their own identities while better understanding their classmates” ([www.handinhand12.org/TheSchool/Schools.html](http://www.handinhand12.org/TheSchool/Schools.html)). In addition, in interviews we conducted with both the Palestinian and Jewish co-directors of CAJE, they emphasized that a key to the schools’ proper development is to strengthen the ascribed identity of each and every student while also encouraging recognition of the other.

From the over 100 interviews we conducted with parents, it is obvious that their overriding concern regarding the integrated bilingual initiative is that the schools might, in some way, threaten the identity and cultural affiliation of their children. Almost all added, at some point in the interviews, that they expected the schools’ curricula and general functioning to strengthen their children’s identity. An Arab parent explained, “we want our children to get to know about and be sensitive to the other . . . and to be and remain Muslim.” Similarly a Jewish parent referred to the central idea as being to “bring the two peoples together, and for that they have to be strong in their own identities.”

Teachers were no exception, and in the interviews often expressed their responsibility to support and fulfill this goal. As a Jewish teacher put it, “I am not asking to turn the school into a religious school, but I would like to strengthen the Jewish identity of the [Jewish]

kids in school.” Palestinian teachers, worried as they are by the potential influence of the wider context on the Palestinian students, took similar though stronger positions regarding this issue: “the wider context is mostly Jewish . . . Hebrew is everywhere . . . we have to be careful not to allow the weakening of our students’ sense of identity.”

These views expressed themselves in the curricula. After experimenting with teaching religious/cultural issues of concern to all three groups represented in the student body (Muslims, Jews, and Christians) to the whole group together, the schools moved to a segregated approach in which each group learned about its own and about the other groups’ traditions. Similar segregative policies were applied to national ceremonial events at the schools. For example, separate ceremonies were held for the events that correspond in the national Jewish-Israeli calendar to Memorial Day (remembering the fallen soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces) and the *Nakba* (remembering what Palestinians call the Catastrophe of 1948, which ended with the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and the destruction of hundreds of their villages). Even when they so desired, children were not encouraged to attend the other group’s ceremony.

The examples discussed above should not be understood as solely critical. Given the present realities in Israel, it is easy to understand the expressed positions as adaptive necessary steps. What stands behind these positions are multiple contextual issues related to the way Palestinian–Jewish relations have been shaped historically since the beginning of the Zionist settlement in Palestine. From these perspectives, any educational statement that could in any way be construed as blurring identity borders would be considered anathema by hegemonic powers – without which the integrated schools have little chance of survival. That said, a serious consideration of the choices made regarding the emphasis on group identity and its potential influence on peace educational initiatives needs to be undertaken.

### ***On bilingualism***

As is the case in many bilingual programs, the schools studied suffer from a lack of clarity regarding their goals and their target population (Cummins 2000). The Center for Arab–Jewish Education believes the bilingual project will empower the minority group, and support coexistence and reconciliatory efforts. Our data uncovered multiple problems with executing these broad objectives.

As much of the literature on education in multilingual settings shows (Martin-Jones and Heller 1996), the language practices of educational institutions are caught up in the legitimization of power relations among ethno-linguistic groups. Recent studies emphasize the ambivalence reflected in the views and opinions of minority immigrant groups towards bilingual and bicultural education. These studies suggest (Bissoonaath and Offord 2001) that the association of language with high status and prestige influences language use in multilingual societies.

During the first years of our study, teachers experimented with ways to prevent language segregation or compartmentalization into specific disciplines or time slots. Moreover, they continuously tried to assure equality of Arabic and Hebrew in class practice. Our observations showed that in all classrooms, Arabic–Hebrew symmetry was being kept in all the signs, letters, and numbers hanging on the walls, in the books in the classrooms and the library, and on the trilingual computer keyboards (Arabic, Hebrew, and English). The joint Palestinian–Jewish team planned activities, allocating equal amounts of time for instruction in each language irrespective of the subject. In spite of these efforts, symmetry has



not been easy to achieve. Palestinian teachers are fluent in Hebrew whereas their Jewish counterparts have, if any, a very limited knowledge of Arabic. Palestinian teachers, like all Palestinian citizens in Israel, are generally fully bilingual, having grown up in a context that uses Hebrew as the central language of communication. In addition, whereas all the Palestinian teachers in our school had been trained in one of the regular, Israeli, Hebrew-speaking teachers' colleges, Jewish teachers were not expected to know Arabic.

During classes, teachers talked to both groups. The Palestinian teachers, when engaged by or engaging with Jewish students, sought to sustain the conversation in Arabic although they switched into Hebrew when they felt that they were not understood. The Jewish teachers communicated primarily in Hebrew, and more with the Jewish children. When engaged by or engaging with Palestinian children, they generally reverted to Hebrew as the language of communication. The students preferred to turn to the teacher from their own national background. The Palestinian children seemed to turn to the Jewish teacher more than the Jewish children turned to the Palestinian teacher. The teachers encouraged both groups to turn to their peers in the other group when help with either language was necessary. Despite such efforts, relatively little interaction between the children of different national backgrounds occurs. Children, when in their national groups, talked to each other in their mother tongue. When the children were in a mixed group, Hebrew was generally the operative language. Even when the majority of the children were Palestinian, Hebrew was, for the most part, preferred. Jewish children in general spoke less Arabic than the Arab children spoke Hebrew. These facts are not surprising in light of the fact that, whatever the conditions, Palestinians ultimately represent only 20 percent of the Israeli population and are mostly marginalized in the larger Israeli reality.

Children's language capacities reveal that bilingual instruction is more successful among the Palestinian students. Both our observations and recent language assessment tests (Amara 2005; Bekerman and Horenczyk 2004) articulate this and make obvious the fact that, but for a few, well-staged ceremonial events (for descriptions of these see Bekerman 2002, 2003a, b), an ideology based on symmetry would not, in and of itself, be sufficient to achieve the cherished dual bilingual goals as fully as desired. In recent years, the language policy shifted towards an affirmative action approach in support of Arabic. Despite this, Israeli monocultural monolingual policies rendered the bilingual efforts mostly ineffective with regards to the Jewish population at school (at least for now). One Palestinian child succinctly defined the situation in a way that agreed with what most other children had said. We asked her if she spoke better Arabic than Hebrew and she replied with the following: "I speak Arabic better than Hebrew and the Jewish kids speak Hebrew better than me. But my Hebrew is much better than their Arabic." A Jewish student made it clear from her perspective "Learning Arabic is very important. I just do not like studying it." When the schools introduced English lessons into their curriculum, the language instruction was highly successful with both Palestinian and Jewish children. Jewish and Palestinian parents expressed positive feelings towards increasing the time allotted to the English language. In the larger context, where Hebrew is the local/national dominant language and English potentially offers a free pass into a global reality, Arabic risks being completely undermined. Such a context might be too powerful, even for the most well-intentioned bilingual initiatives. We could easily fault the teachers and parents involved in our program. We could blame them for consciously or unconsciously conveying negative messages about the minority language in spite of their overt efforts to create a school environment and a curriculum that represents a balanced bilingual effort. But this would be clutching at straws. If placed anywhere, *blame* should be placed on an adaptive wider

sociopolitical system in which Arabic carries little symbolic power. In Bourdieu's (1991) terms, Hebrew speakers in Israel have more cultural capital in the linguistic market place than those who speak Arabic.

The current Israeli sociopolitical context seems to discourage the teaching and learning of Arabic. Even when the monetary resources are available to create a nearly perfect bilingual environment with declared, across the board, ideological support, bilingualism seems not to be able to take root.

### ***Children view identity differently***

Contemporary studies follow early works (Clark and Clark 1947; Goodman 1952) on children's racial awareness, and seem to suggest that children as young as preschoolers regularly harbor negative attitudes toward members of ethnic or racial groups other than their own (Abbink 1984; Aboud 1987). Nonetheless, prejudice seems to be learned and there is, if any, a small role for genetics. When psychologists talk about the prejudiced personality, its development is explained almost exclusively in environmental terms (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986; Katz and Taylor 1988; Lynch 1987). More recent research has strengthened these perspectives (Aboud 2003; Kowalski 2003); their results indicate that, since young children's positive feelings toward their own group do not necessarily involve or cause negative outgroup attitudes, various factors might differentially influence ingroup and outgroup attitudes.

The following events took place during regular classroom activities. The kindergarten classroom we observed fits the school's aims exceptionally well. It exhibits a rather equal gender balance as well as equal representation between the two national groups as the school aspires to get involved in the bilingual initiative. The two homeroom teachers: a Palestinian who has been working at the school since its inception six years ago, and a Jewish teacher who is new to the school system. Both are accredited teachers. The Palestinian teacher is fully bilingual and the Jewish teacher speaks only Hebrew. In keeping with the school's policy of symmetry in the classroom, almost all educational paraphernalia are to be found in both languages.

In the early morning, when the children arrive, they can be seen playing, painting, or chatting outside in the open or inside according to the weather conditions. At the beginning of the year we had the sense that, though the groups were, for the most part, mixed, they were still organized somewhat along ethnic lines. Later in the year, these lines were totally blurred and gender, more than ethnicity, seemed to be the determinant in the group's organization. It became very clear through our observations that the children, regardless of ethnic affiliation, felt the same affinity to both the Palestinian and the Jewish teachers. Both Jewish and Palestinian kids could be seen approaching and hugging their teachers or attending to their directives. On one of the days of our observations, a replacement assistant arrived and mistakenly called the Palestinian teacher by the wrong name. Most of the kids corrected her in unison. Throughout our observations, we never recorded a single incident that could point in the direction of any ethnic or religious tensions among the children – not even when small disagreements occurred, such as in the case of a discussion about who had been picked first for a game.

Even when theological issues were discussed by young "future philosophers," the alignment around an argument could not be predicted along ethnic or religious lines. Such was the case when Ari, a Jewish boy, asked his friends sitting near him – a Muslim, a Christian, and another Jew – "Who believes in God?" to which he immediately added, "I



do not believe in God because I believe we came from the monkeys.” The Christian boy, Basel, answered in agreement, “Me too, I believe we came from the monkeys, and do not believe in God either.” All the children reacted with agreement to this statement. Many similar events have been recorded which show children not being attentive to ethnic or religious differences in daily interactions. This fact should not be understood as meaning children have no consciousness of their ethnic or religious affiliation. They do have such an awareness and they even play with their identities. In one occasion Olfat and Nadia, two Palestinian girls, were playing together with Noah, a Jewish girl. Olfat told one of the researchers that Noah “is an Arab” to which Noah reacted by saying “she is lying, I’m really Jewish.” After this, they all laughed and continued playing cards undistracted.

In contrast, it is the teachers who mark activities as corresponding to ethnic or religious groups. We got a taste of this inclination from Serin, the Palestinian teacher, who reacted to one of our questions regarding religious festivals and national commemorations by saying, “The Jewish teacher and I try to do everything half and half . . . when we are talking about a Muslim holy day, I myself give the activity . . . when there is a Christian holy day, we try to invite a Christian parent, and, for example, for Hanukkah the Jewish teacher gives the activity . . . . If we are talking about a specific subject that has to do with a specific identity, I prefer it to be taught in the language which represents the theme.”

As the children grew older, we got a sense that ethnic and religious differences were at work in their interactions and yet these differences seemed not to be consequential. In the third grade, toward the end of a math teaching period, our camera is focused on a table around which a group of children sit. Alin, one of the Palestinian girls in the group, is leaning over the table while paying attention to the teacher. To her side sits Moshe, who is now playing with Alin’s eraser. Two Jewish girls and a Palestinian boy sit around the same table and are watching the front where the teacher is explaining some issues to the class. At times, the teacher looks at what Moshe is doing. He continues playing with Alin’s eraser, rubbing it harder and harder on the table until it breaks into two. Alin has not yet seen what has happened though two other children have and have non-verbally indicated their disapproval. The moment Alin turns and sees what has happened, she becomes very upset and tells the teacher about the incident. This brings about a strong recrimination by the teacher. All children join together in recriminating Moshe. The episode is just one of many in which a child belonging to one ethnic group veered from the accepted modes of behavior and committed a transgression against a child belonging to the other group. What is important to mention is that the recriminations never included noticing the ethnic background of the transgressor – as if such an emphasis would be totally irrelevant.

In short, the children at the bilingual schools have a clear sense of belonging to their ethnic groups. However, from our observations this sense of belonging does not imply any rejection of the other group nor is its formation dependent on the denial of the other.

Some could contend that the children’s performance is an adaptive behavior that emerges out of a social context in which they perceive adults as communicating that “here,” at school, we accommodate, we are inclusive, and we are tolerant. Even if this is true, the least that can be stated is that environments that do not call much upon identity to be displayed can be organized and the bilingual school is such an environment at times.

### *Parents’ perspectives*

Our records show that the percentage of the children’s families with academic degrees (at least one of the parents) is relatively high (56 percent for Palestinians and 87 percent

for Jews). These percentages clearly point in the direction that the school attracts a rather “modern”/well-to-do population. This is understandable given that, in order to allow for a fully bilingual curriculum in line with their equity policies, the schools depend on parents’ fees to supplement the coverage they receive from the Ministry of Education, which supports them at a level similar to that of regular segregated schools. In fact, in interviews, several Jewish parents drew attention to the paradox that, although they wanted their children to attend the school in order to be exposed to Palestinian culture, the Palestinians participating were not, in their view “really Arab.” Undoubtedly, this is a prejudiced statement that uncovers the strong connection between class identity and ethnic identity. Palestinians are Palestinians in Israel but they also belong, for the most part, to the unprivileged sectors of society. The connections between class and ethnic identity and their influence on intergroup relations should be further studied. The good relations that exist between the two populations at school could also be attributed to their somewhat similar socioeconomic status.

Parents support such initiatives for various reasons. Jewish parents sometimes join in order to materialize their ideological aspirations albeit under certain constraining conditions. For example, they support bilingualism as long as it does not harm educational excellence. They acknowledge contextual difficulties, and readily agree that, rather than an expectation of bilingualism, they expect their children to develop cultural understanding and recognition. From this perspective, proficiency in Arabic could be a nice additive, but it is not an absolute necessity.

Given Israeli educational policy, the Palestinian population involved in the initiative lacks better educational options. Thus, Palestinian parents see the bilingual school as an excellent opportunity to advance their children’s education, and to pave a path for future opportunities. They can easily justify their choice of school because the school implements an ideology of recognition superior even to those present in the Israeli monolingual Arab segregated school system. For Palestinian parents, bilingualism is not really a concern. The existing structural segregation almost ensures that their children will develop skills in both languages. Furthermore, Jewish children’s success in Arabic is not the school’s first priority. Thus, in a paradoxical sense, the schools’ affirmative action policy favoring the Arabic language might be ideologically commendable, and have the support of Palestinian parents, but it is not necessarily functional.

It is not clear that the parents participating in the initiative are interested in changing the existing power relations in Israel. The Jewish parents, as the majority, although clearly liberally inclined and hopeful in creating more humane and respectful environments for the Palestinian minority, do not necessarily see a need for radical change. The Palestinian parents, who belong to an aspiring middle class, understand the advantages of linguistically empowering their children and facilitating their entrance into the reigning bureaucracy. They keenly adapt to the rules of the game, specifically in a school context that, at least declaratively, stands behind an emancipating option. The participants themselves are Jews and Palestinians raised in a segregated, conflictual context, which cherishes essential aspects of identity and culture. Parents reflect this tension when, together with their aspirations to secure their children within the sphere of reigning elites, they emphasize the need for the educational initiative to foster mutual respect among their children while at the same time strengthening their ethnic pride and affiliation. Without the rhetoric of symmetry and empowerment, these parents might not have sent their children to the schools. However, they still expect the greatest emphasis to be placed on academic achievement. The upwardly mobile parents measure the primary success of the educational effort not according to its

liberatory power, but rather according to its role in developing their children's abilities to attain desirable positions in the bureaucracies of present dominant Western cultural traditions (Giroux and McLaren 1994). And indeed, in terms of academic achievement, the schools seem to fare well. However, we question what results can be expected at the ideological multicultural level.

## Discussion

Ethnographic tools allow us to understand the specific rather than the general in human activity and as such are more suitable if our aim is to uncover the particular meanings or perspectives of interactions in particular settings. In the case of this study, ethnographic tools have helped us to draw a complex picture, one that raises many questions regarding the potential of integrated educational initiatives to help alleviate conflict. The systematic and detailed recording of human activity, in our case that which takes place at the integrated schools, allows us, through detailed analysis, to uncover how the registered and described "goings on" are organized in patterns of social organization and learned cultural principles. It becomes apparent that historical developments and sociopolitical contexts cannot be ignored even when we are interested in understanding "what's going on" within specific initiated interventions geared towards the attainment of peaceful relations. The "doings that get done" show participants in activities, making themselves present to each other as environments for one another's meaningful actions. Moreover, and of utmost importance, are the intricate connections shown among levels of activity in a variety of sites which can be internal or external to the immediate educational setting.

Research has shown that intergroup contact seems generally to promote intergroup acceptance, especially when appropriate conditions for the contact are being met (Byrne 1997; Hewstone *et al.* 2005; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000). Our ongoing research shows the potential benefits of one type of intergroup contact, namely bilingual long-term coeducation, but also sheds light on the complexity and the difficulties facing all parties involved in such an adventurous enterprise. The schools seem to be adopting a purely categorized approach, based on the premise that strengthening ethnic and national identities is the path to achieving its aims. The adoption of a categorized approach needs to be critically considered, and such considerations are, at this point, lacking in the schools' discourse.

Categorization is indeed the perceived solution for parents' fears but not necessarily the direction to be taken if what we are after is serious mutual (group and individual) recognition and respect. Categorization builds on the imposition of pre-accepted categories and, for the most part, limits freedom and adaptation, not to speak of change. Categorization supports political interests that, in Israel, often support the Jewish majority and the inequalities its system has developed. The recategorization strategy, which calls for the development and strengthening of a *common ingroup identity* (Gaertner *et al.* 1993), does not necessarily mean enhancing the perception of common *Israeliness*, which, given present contextual constraints, might be understood as replicating the present sovereign Jewish scheme. Rather, it could be interpreted as the fostering of an overarching civil identity, one whose contents have yet to be renegotiated.

When taking a recategorization path, we need to bear in mind that, up until this point, contact theories have dealt primarily with prejudice reduction and not with overall future interactional societal developments among individuals in groups in conflict. Given this theoretical focus on intergroup relations, we need to consider that the schools – while

acting as if persuaded by these paradigms – deal with living individuals who in their own ways consider both group relations (which, as our study has shown, at times overshadow the initiative's potential) and individual relations.

Schools involve daily activities characterized by high social proximity. As such, they are in need of a much better articulation of the expected outcomes of the interactional societal developments among participating individuals. In fact, schools deal with only individual intergroup relations and therefore need to clarify, or at least delineate the parameters of, their policies regarding this newly created intergroup, individual experience. Articulating these policies can help alleviate many of the tensions felt by all participants in the involved community. In short, we should question if policies that support integration while at the same time encouraging segregation, for the sake of identity/cultural sustainability, can indeed achieve the goals set by the schools. As indicated by Hewstone (1996), the various approaches, such as categorization, decategorization, or recategorization, are likely to lead to different kinds of outcomes. We believe that they may also present program developers and practitioners with different types of challenges and problems.

I have considered complementing contact theories with acculturation theories, in line with the fourfold model delineated by Berry (1990, 1997). But present acculturation models that uncritically show integration or biculturalism to be the preferred option for minority groups coming into contact situations seem to fall into similar traps to the ones described above for contact perspectives, because they rest on reified conceptions of culture and identity, and do not reflect the complexity and potential combinations and outcomes of individual interaction. Rudmin (2003) has successfully posited that the integration construct, while plausible for surface behaviors amenable to codeswitching such as cuisine, language, and music, is not amenable for other, more important and defining aspects of culture, such as religion, sexual norms, cleanliness, and childrearing, that are not open to codeswitching (Rudmin and Ahmadzadeh 2001). In these contexts, biculturalism is limited, if not impossible. Given this, acculturation theory does not seem to allow for much progress regarding what we consider to be the schools' needs in terms of intergroup educational policy articulations.

We should not assume that solutions to these issues can be found in the narrow limits of the schools and their surrounding communities. What undoubtedly need to be addressed are the deeply entrenched paradigmatic perspectives that support the nation-state ideology and its traditional monoculturalism and monolingualism. The nation-state's monologic stance is a product of an epistemology that posits the individual as imprisoned in reified understandings of identity and culture (Bauman 1999; Billig 1995). The psychological and psychodynamic perspectives that traditionally have substantiated intergroup encounter work are a product of similar developments as are, at times, the multicultural and bilingual solutions offered. If a dialogue about the epistemological bases that substantiate these attitudes is not initiated, I doubt whether even the best-intentioned integrated peace educational initiatives will achieve the dream of an equality that allows for and acknowledges sociocultural differences as affirmed in multicultural, bilingual discourse. Even if this dialogue were to take place, we would need to be careful not to be blinded by our own theoretical and ideological constructs. Neither culture nor identity nor language need necessarily be the category through which to organize the world or the only path to a socially just and multicultural society. Moreover, educational institutions need not be the first (nor the only – as they usually are) places in which to achieve cultural or linguistic rights. When chosen for that purpose, educational institutions should be viewed in the wider national/political and communal/cultural contexts in which they have come to function, paying

special attention not to fall back into the reification of unitary groups (ethnic, national, religious, or other). We would do well to remember that in the end it is concrete political and structural changes that help bring an end to human suffering. More ethnographic studies might help us move in this direction.

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# 11 Waging conflicts constructively

*Louis Kriesberg*

## Introduction

The contemporary field of conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) derives from many sources, which contributes to its creativity and its breadth (Kriesberg 2008). Workers in the field utilize theories and research from many traditional academic disciplines, including anthropology, psychology, sociology, geography, political science, history, and economics. Some of them also have experience in various interdisciplinary fields, notably peace studies as well as industrial relations and security studies. The experiences of, and reflections by, persons in religious undertakings, international diplomacy, collective bargaining, and legal proceedings also have contributed to the development of the field. Finally, the field has grown so greatly that many workers in it theorize, engage in research, and create new conflict resolution methods as well as apply familiar methods in new settings, which all contribute to the continuing advancement of the field.

The great range of sources and of current work in the field makes for diverse approaches to it. This chapter stresses a constructive approach, which looks at all stages of conflicts, not being limited to considering only the conflict-settling or resolving phases. It also looks at the way conflicts are waged, the quality of the settlements reached, and the equity of the conditions existing before and after overt contestations; it is not limited to the ending of expressed hostility and antagonism. Many people in the field of CAR adopt much of the constructive approach in their work without identifying their approach that way. They may emphasize their interest in conflict transformation, in conflict outcomes and not only in conflict resolution processes, but also in concerns about justice and long-term peace sustainability.

The meaning of the concept *constructive conflict* and, therefore, how and to what degree conflicts can be waged constructively are matters of considerable discussion (Deutsch 1973; Ramsbotham *et al.* 2005). In the context of CAR thinking, conflicts are waged constructively insofar as adversaries maximize mutual benefits and minimize mutual harms. But not all claims for benefits are to be equally regarded. Some partisans in a conflict may already possess greater power, status, or material benefits than their antagonists, but claim and seek even more (Brockner and Rubin 1985). There is no consensus about the grounds for judging such claims as justified or not. There is, however, considerable consensus about unjustifiable harms, and therefore the concept of constructiveness tends to be used in reference to minimally injurious conflicts. In this chapter, the widely shared understandings of human rights and of basic human needs will provide standards to assess constructiveness. Insofar as the means of fighting cause great damage to members of the opposing sides, the conflicts are regarded as destructively waged. Moreover, the



destructiveness is greater insofar as one side imposes injuries on the other side with little differentiation among the opposing side's adherents. Finally, the destructiveness is greater insofar as the conflict is protracted and impacts many people.

No conflict is wholly constructive or wholly destructive; rather, each varies in several ways along this dimension (Kriesberg 2006). Variation arises from the heterogeneity of each side in a large-scale conflict because each side contains leaders, elites, rival leaders, sub-elites, rank-and-file members, loosely associated sympathizers, and many other groupings that have distinctive losses and benefits. What may seem highly destructive to one group may be substantially constructive for another group, even within the same side of a struggle (Colaresi 2005).

The destructiveness of a conflict is often highly asymmetrical, with one side experiencing little harm while inflicting immense injury upon members of the opposing side. This is especially true of genocidal attacks against a whole people. However, the perpetrators of gross atrocities may also suffer significant damages; many of them feel shame, guilt, and mental trauma as well as experiencing severe retribution by members of the previously injured groups.

Furthermore, variation in constructiveness generally occurs in different stages of a conflict. In this chapter, we will focus on three stages: escalating conflicts, settling conflicts, and recovering afterward. For each stage, we will discuss the strategies that partisans and interveners may pursue that contribute to the constructiveness of the processes of waging, settling, and preventing the recurrence of conflicts and also to the equity of the outcomes.

Constructive processes means more than avoiding destructive elements. The adversaries may utilize non-violent and even non-coercive inducements such as persuasive appeals and promises of future advantages in ways that yield mutual benefits. Furthermore, in constructive conflicts, adversaries tend to recognize each other as legitimate entities, and neither threatens the other's existence. They interact to solve the problem they face together – their conflict – by seeking how best to construct a mutually acceptable outcome (Fisher *et al.* 1991). Consequently, the relationship between adversaries may be generally more beneficial after the conflict has ended than before it erupted.

How a struggle is waged and the terms of its settlement affect subsequent developments; insofar as the benefits are mutual and equitable they are deemed to be constructive. Conversely, conflict outcomes tend to be destructive insofar as one side imposes them unilaterally, with little regard to the interests and needs of most members of the other side. The defeated party then is likely to regard the outcome as oppressive and unjust, requiring redress, and/or as humiliating, requiring revenge. Adjustments are often made after the conflict's termination, sometimes decades or even centuries later.

Conflict outcomes are generally regarded as constructive insofar as the parties view them as mutually acceptable; but who speaks for the parties and in what time frame the outcome is considered complicate the assessment. The interpretations of the interests and needs of the imposed-upon party are not simply those of its proclaimed leaders, particularly if the leaders lack legitimacy. By another criterion, outcomes are constructive insofar as they provide a basis for future relations to be conducted with minimal destructiveness.

This chapter focuses on possible strategies that contribute to waging conflicts constructively, as evidenced by research and experience. The strategies are those undertaken by partisans or by interveners. The partisans may be seeking to change an opponent, or they may be trying to resist an opponent's efforts to adversely change them. The interveners

may be intermediaries seeking to reduce the conflict's destructiveness, or they may be intervening largely to advance their own interests or those of one party in the fight.

Applications of the constructive CAR approach and of the basic CAR methods have expanded greatly, particularly since the early 1980s. These applications, unwitting as well as witting, have contributed to the remarkable decrease in international and domestic wars and other mass violence since the end of the 1980s (Eriksson and Wallenstein 2004; Human Security Centre 2006; Marshall and Gurr 2005; Wallenstein 2002). After the end of the Cold War, the incidence and magnitude of international wars and of civil wars has markedly decreased; this has been true also of violent conflicts between non-state antagonists. Genocides and other mass killings of civilians have also been reduced. Furthermore, combat-related deaths have also declined. International terrorist attacks, however, sharply increased between 2002 and 2005. Also, it is noteworthy that violent conflicts have increasingly been ended by negotiated agreements rather than by one side's defeating the other. These changes are not uniform around the world; during the 1990s mass violence was relatively more widespread in Africa than in other regions, but at the beginning of the twenty-first century it had decreased, while wars and terrorist attacks had increased in South Asia and the Middle East.

How constructive CAR applications may have contributed to the decreases in mass violence will be examined in this chapter. We will also consider how the use or non-use of such methods helps account for the variations in mass violence in different global regions and, over time, at different conflict stages: escalation, de-escalation, and recovery.

## **Escalating conflicts constructively**

Constructive conflict escalations may seem particularly improbable. Escalation is usually understood to mean increasing coercion and injuries inflicted by one side upon another. Nevertheless, escalation can entail relatively little of such destructiveness. This is possible because conflicts can be conducted using non-violent as well as violent coercive inducements, and even by employing non-coercive inducements such as persuasive arguments or promised benefits (Kriesberg 2007b). Various strategies combine such inducements as well as limited violence in diverse ways that change over time. We consider not only strategies that contenders who are challenging a dominant adversary adopt, but also strategies that a dominating party seeking further gains uses against a vulnerable adversary. We will emphasize conflict-waging strategies that are relatively constructive and that tend to foster constructive outcomes, which help overcome the destructive aspects of the earlier relationship and struggle.

To begin, we should recognize that research and experience is growing regarding the application of non-violent action as an escalation strategy that tends to avoid or at least minimize destructiveness. Very influentially, Mohandas Gandhi (1962) developed a principled non-violent strategy that he used to help win India's independence from the British Empire. More secular, pragmatic, and empirically grounded arguments have become the basis for much of the contemporary reasoning about and practice of non-violent methods to wage conflicts constructively. This work provides evidence of how non-violent actions can be effective in achieving improvements in sociopolitical life, and also in resisting aggression (Sharp 2005). Non-violent actions include protest demonstrations, strikes, refusal to comply with oppressive rules, and the formation of alternative or autonomous institutions, reducing dependence on the adversary. Such elements of civil society can then continue to function in sustaining an agreement of accommodation when it is attained.

The reliance on non-violent actions has grown since the early 1980s, as exemplified in South Africa, the Philippines, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Serbia, Ukraine, and Thailand.

Other constructive methods to wage and to end conflicts significantly utilize non-coercive inducements, including persuasion and promised benefits. Members of either contending side can try to persuade their antagonists of the rightness of their cause, and influence the antagonists to believe that they will not suffer by yielding a measure of what they seek. Members of either side may try to frame the conflict so that they and their opponents regard themselves as sharing many common interests and values, which would be increased by cooperation. For example, Nelson Mandela and the other leaders of the African National Congress (ANC), as they struggled to end apartheid and achieve equality for all South Africans in the political process, tried to reassure whites that their individual and collective economic and political rights would be respected and protected (Mandela 1994).

In addition, members of one side may accord opponents decent regard, access to greater opportunities, and shared power and resources. Admittedly, persuasive arguments and proffered benefits are more available to the dominant side in a conflict. They constitute “soft power,” which is varyingly available even to the seemingly weaker entities as well as to the stronger side (Nye 2004). Particular arrangements between adversaries may result in a mutually acceptable coengagement without one side simply coopting the other. The increasingly integrated and interdependent character of the world enhances and diffuses greater soft power capabilities.

The constructive conflict approach also calls attention to the destructive potential of various escalating strategies, whose use should be applied with careful precision or avoided entirely. Challengers with relatively little coercive capability who resort to violent strategies are likely to provoke destructive retaliatory actions, which defeat them (Gamson 1990). Nevertheless, in some circumstances, the challengers’ provocation may be intended to produce an overreaction by the adversary that will win them support and create a revolutionary situation (Debray 1967; Fanon 1966). In the 1960s, this strategy became attractive among those seeking revolutionary change, partly thanks to the success of Fidel Castro and his small revolutionary group, which took power in Cuba in January 1959. The Cuban government forces, under the direction of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, the self-appointed president, had resorted to increasingly harsh and indiscriminate countermeasures against the Castro-led group. Batista thereby antagonized many segments of the Cuban population, became isolated, and abandoned power. After that experience, many government officials learned to avoid indiscriminate repression; they relied more on precise operations and sought to isolate the challengers. For many years, leftist radicals in several countries conducted violent political operations, but they generally failed to produce a revolutionary situation.

In some ways, the September 11, 2001, attacks by Al Qaeda did provoke extraordinary responses by the US government that expanded Al Qaeda’s prominence and reach, and also weakened the US position in the Middle East. Thus, after the seeming success in overthrowing the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the US went on to oust Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq, which, however, provided an opportunity for Al Qaeda to draw fighters to Iraq. Belatedly, the US government closed down its military bases in Saudi Arabia, which addressed a main Al Qaeda grievance. A more measured counterterrorism strategy would probably have been more effective in keeping international support for the United States and isolating Al Qaeda.

Nevertheless, the Al Qaeda reliance on violent attacks on non-combatants as its primary strategy, its insistence on a narrow interpretation of Islam, and its assertion of extreme goals will undoubtedly preclude long-term triumph. Those qualities are opposed by recent globalizing developments. Given its features, Al Qaeda is unlikely to adopt a more constructive approach without a fundamental transformation. Moreover, it is susceptible to being marginalized and diminished by robust counterterrorism strategies based upon a constructive CAR approach.

The difficulties encountered by President George W. Bush and his administration in escalating the struggle against Al Qaeda illustrate two problems that advocates of a constructive conflict approach warn against, and for which they suggest possible solutions. First is the danger of overreaching, of expanding goals too far and too fast, which results in defeats (Kriesberg 2007a). This danger often arises at the moment when victories are won. Recognizing this danger is a step in avoiding it, as is doing a careful analysis of long-term consequences of alternative courses of action. The second danger is entrapment, whereby commitments are heightened in order to make good on past investments of time, money, or lives (Brockner and Rubin 1985). Consequently, a destructive conflict may be perpetuated in the vain hope of making past sacrifices seem worthwhile. Again, recognizing this danger can help protect against it, by setting limits to escalation at an early stage of a conflict or formulating procedures to assess when entrapment may be arising and to avert it.

Interveners can contribute to constructive escalation by utilizing various strategies that can help limit or end destructive escalations. One strategy is to stop the external support that enables adversaries to continue or even intensify a violent struggle. Outside parties, including governments and diaspora groups, often support the armed struggle by the side in a conflict with which they share interests or identities, and therefore halting that aid helps transform a destructive conflict. Thus, the end of the Cold War stopped military and other assistance by the Soviet and American governments to opposing sides in many countries in Central America, Africa, and elsewhere, hastening conflict settlements there.

Furthermore, international organizations, notably the United Nations (UN), can impose arms embargoes or sanctions that help limit conflict escalation or inflict severe burdens on one side, which may help bring about a conflict settlement (Cortright and Lopez 2000, 2002). Such international actions contributed greatly to the transformation of the US–Libyan conflict between the early 1980s and the early 2000s (Kriesberg 2006). Peacekeeping interventions can also help antagonists end a war, domestic or international, with greater assurance that security will be provided and agreements will be implemented. The end of the Cold War enabled the UN to become much more active and effective in such undertakings.

A variety of other strategies relate to intermediary policies conducted by representatives of governments, international governmental organizations, and diverse non-governmental organizations. They may counsel and assist government officials and their challengers to take actions that help prevent destructive escalation of a conflict. Thus, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has the authority to intervene in response to a crisis related to national minority issues that threaten international peace. For example, in the 1990s the HCNM helped avert escalating conflicts and resolve them consistently with international norms by quiet mediation regarding the language and education rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania and the citizenship rights of ethnic Russians in the newly independent Estonia (McMahon 2007; Möller 2007).

## **Settling conflicts constructively**

A constructive ending of a conflict, particularly after it has become highly destructive, depends upon the convergence of many factors, often in an extended sequence of changes. The factors occur within one or more of the adversaries, in their relationship, and in the external environment; they may combine so as to influence adversaries to reduce and even end their hostile acts against each other, and to construct a mutually acceptable accommodation, whether directly negotiated or not.

### ***Internal factors***

Conventional thinking among partisans in a fight generally attributes destructive persistence in a conflict to the enemy's character, asserting that the enemy is aggressive by nature, has evil leaders, or adheres to a hostile ideology. Indeed, internal features of one (or more likely more than one) adversary often hamper a constructive settlement of a conflict. In large-scale conflicts, some groups within each side frequently have a vested interest in the struggle; furthermore many members of each side often believe that any settlement acceptable to the enemy would be unacceptable to them (Crocker *et al.* 2005).

Political ideologies and religious beliefs at times have been used to justify one group's subjugation of another. However, at times, political or religious beliefs also help mobilize resistance to such antagonistic practices. Moreover, the people fighting against oppression may formulate goals that are inclusive and do not threaten to destroy or subjugate their oppressors. This was notably the case in the ANC's struggle against apartheid in South Africa and the Southern Christian Leadership Council's fight for civil rights in the US.

Sociocultural patterns and vested interests of groups within countries and other large-scale entities do not always support aggressive and militant policies, which tend to generate destructive escalations. Particular socialization practices and educational experiences can foster empathy and reliance on non-coercive ways of interacting socially (Ross 1993). There may also be groups with an interest in pursuing strategies of engagement and collaboration with others who are members of adversarial entities; these may be business organizations, professional associations, diaspora communities, or groups sharing religious or ideological beliefs. They are the source of connections that provide channels of influence and bases of leverage, which can bring about changes in one side by members of another side in a conflict. Even in the Soviet–American Cold War such connections were used and had great impact in the transformation of Soviet society and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Kriesberg 1992).

### ***Relational factors***

How adversaries interact and the structure of their relations profoundly affect the way conflicts are transformed and ended. People can have commercial, familial, and other interests and concerns regarding relations with a possible adversary that limit support for policies that would disrupt and damage those connections. Considerable research exists about the relationship between wars and the level of international trade; there is strong evidence that the likelihood of wars is lower between countries with higher levels of trade (Mansfield 1994).

Adversaries having high mutual regard and shared understandings tend to avoid escalating their conflict destructively. If the opponents treat each other as legitimate and

are responsive to each other, then problemsolving modes of conducting their emerging conflicts are likely. This is supported by the well-researched empirical generalization that democratic societies rarely if ever make war on each other (Russett 1995; Russett and Oneal 2001). Democratic dyads are much less likely than non-democratic dyads to engage in any kind of militarized dispute. A plausible explanation of the finding is that the leaders and peoples of democratic societies tend to recognize important common values, shared norms, and common interests. Legitimacy is probably granted to the policies each government pursues, and they have shared understandings about how conflicts are to be managed without recourse to violence or threats of violence.

Developments in the fields of peace research and of conflict resolution demonstrate one way adversarial military postures may be structured to prevent or limit destructive conflicts. Beginning in the 1970s, peace researchers in West Germany, Denmark, and elsewhere examined the military strategies adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and by the Warsaw Pact members. The peace researchers showed how, while purporting to be defensive, each side's military readiness to move forward and carry the war into the other side's territory was naturally regarded by its opponent as threatening. The researchers developed plans for restructuring military forces that would provide effective defense without being provocative. Western peace researchers discussed these ideas in Moscow and they influenced changes in Soviet conduct, resulting in the Cold War's transformation and termination (Dragsdahl 1989; Evangelista 1999).

De-escalation can occur by reframing a conflict so that the goals in a conflict are less antagonistic and a settlement can be more readily reached, a strategy that is salient in the CAR approach. One way such reframing may occur is by increasing the salience of other conflicts, including ones that confront the adversaries with a common enemy or problem. Or one party in a fight may come to think that a new enemy must be given higher priority and try to de-escalate the fight with the former enemy number one. Thus, in the 1970s, when the hostility between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR increased, each downgraded its hostility toward the United States. At the same time, the US government was interested in making some accommodations with the PRC and USSR and have them reduce support to North Vietnam, which might help achieve an "honorable" exit from the war in Vietnam.

A "hurting stalemate" together with the prospect of a better option is a proximate condition for the transition from a protracted destructive conflict toward a mutually agreed upon accommodation (Zartman 1989). In a hurting stalemate, neither side believes it can defeat the adversary in a conflict and the resulting stalemate is painful to sustain. If a way to an acceptable solution seems feasible, exploratory steps may be taken to follow that path. The option may have been long available, but appears newly attractive under the circumstances of a hurting stalemate. Or the option may be newly available thanks to changes within one or more sides or to changes introduced by new parties becoming engaged in the conflict, as occurred when the Republic of Ireland became directly engaged in the British efforts to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland.

At the core of the CAR approach are ideas and evidence about problemsolving negotiation as a process to constructively settle specific disputes. Contributors to the CAR field point to the value of converting a conflict to a shared problem that the adversaries are facing, and separating the person from the problem (Fisher *et al.* 1991). Various strategies have been developed to increase the likelihood that mutually acceptable settlements are reached and implemented. These include constructing possible options acceptable to key



players in the opposing sides. This may entail bringing in additional parties or excluding rejectionist groups in order to undertake negotiations.

Various methods can be employed that help make the negotiations efficient and effective once undertaken. Successful negotiators tend to assess their own underlying interests and priorities and the options they have if they fail to reach an agreement. They try to learn what the other side's interests may be, perhaps underlying their stated positions. Learning is aided by asking questions to discover what those interests may be. They work together to envision solutions that might satisfy at least some of their underlying interests. They also develop procedures to settle future disputes about interpreting the agreements that are reached. If negotiations reach an impasse, a change in the negotiating format may allow progress to be made, by shifting the level of the respective negotiators, by restructuring the agenda, or by including facilitators or mediators.

Negotiation options are certainly conditioned by the goals of the adversaries. Substantive negotiations are not feasible if either side is seeking the other's destruction. Sometimes this has hampered attempts at negotiations between the US government and the North Korean and the Iranian governments, ostensibly about nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and in Iran. During the George W. Bush administrations, there has been some ambiguity about the US goal being regime change in North Korea and Iran or a change in the regime's policy. One side may refuse to enter negotiations when it believes that the would-be negotiating partner seeks its destruction, as has been true at times in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Of course, opposing sides are never unitary, and negotiations may be pursued between some elements or groups from the antagonistic sides that seek a settlement while rejectionists and spoilers try to thwart an agreement. Furthermore, informal explorations may be pursued by intermediaries, as discussed in the next section.

### ***External factors***

The rapidly increasing integration and interconnections in the world affect local, societal, and international conflicts. Major contentious events in almost any locality are becoming more visible to people in much of the rest of the world, and they increasingly affect people elsewhere; all of this expands the role of external factors in each conflict's de-escalation and settlement as well as its eruption and escalation. External intervention is made more likely by the great increase in the number and level of activities of transnational governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Accompanying these structural developments, various norms and conventional understandings support interventions that are intended to advance moral claims and often to limit and stop human rights atrocities.

These developments buttress the argument for the effectiveness of relatively constructive multilateral rather than unilateral policies. Multilateral practices have greater legitimacy and are more likely to be effective because their usage is more likely to employ multidimensional methods and be applied at many levels. Furthermore, a multilateral approach is less likely than a unilateral one to result in violent practices at an early stage of conflict escalation. The increase in negotiated settlements of violent conflicts since the late 1980s is partly explained by the greater international reliance on multilateral practices during that period. Unilateral practices, for example in the 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah eruption of violence, are more often counterproductive for many antagonists.

Mediators can play crucial roles in helping adversaries move toward constructive conflict transformations. They can transmit information between adversaries about each other, indicating what agreements might be reached. Mediators can also provide needed



resources and services to improve the likelihood that agreed-upon settlements will be honored. Mediators may be officials representing governments or international governmental organizations, such as the UN or the OSCE in Europe. Mediators may also be unofficial go-betweens, conducting track two diplomacy (Davies and Kaufman 2002; McDonald 1991). The numbers of national and transnational organizations have been increasing very greatly in recent years, and they provide many intermediary services that help mitigate destructive qualities of conflicts. This growth has resulted in part from the funding by national governments and international governmental organizations of peacebuilding activities and of recovery from the aftermath of mass violence (Fischer 2006).

Increasingly, shared norms about protecting human rights and avoiding gross human rights violations help set standards for settlements that will be regarded as equitable (Babbitt forthcoming). In addition, people increasingly hold norms and have expectations about the importance of popular engagement in settling conflicts; and widespread civil engagement does contribute to the durability of agreements (Saunders 2005).

### **Building peace after destructive conflict**

The character of the relations between the adversaries after their destructive engagement has been transformed or terminated clearly affects the durability of their new accommodation. Too often, the coerced termination of a conflict, even if it is a formally negotiated agreement, sets the stage for renewed struggle in the short term. The accommodations that may contribute to long-term constructive relations have increasingly been examined by workers in the fields of peace studies and of constructive CAR. Thus, accommodations that are regarded as just by the former antagonists tend to be durable. Durability is enhanced insofar as there is a high degree of interdependence between the former adversaries.

One set of strategies that contributes to durable constructive accommodations pertains to developing institutions that foster interdependence, generating vested interests in cooperation, increasing cultural and social interactions, and establishing or raising the salience of superordinate goals. A wide variety of research supports the effectiveness of these strategies. Experiments in social psychology have illustrated that having a common goal can overcome contentions within a group (Sherif 1966). Establishing organizations that fulfill functions for disparate, even contending, entities can set in motion expansions of such organizations as they meet related functions (Mitrany 1966). Consequently, those organizations bind the disparate entities into increasingly close unions, as happened notably in integrating France and Germany and other European countries after World War II (Haas 1958). Other work examines the role of dense interpersonal communications in the development of international security communities (Deutsch *et al.* 1957). Many structural and normative conditions converge to create stable peace among states (Boulding 1978; Kacowicz *et al.* 2000). Those conditions are not static, and constructive strategies can foster them internationally. Similar conditions and strategies apply to building stable peace within countries.

Some strategies are primarily directed at building norms and institutions that provide procedures for managing disputes and redressing grievances. They include training in negotiation and mediation, which is increasingly provided by educational institutions and by transnational NGOs. The promotion of democratic political systems is one of the important approaches in these regards, but the evidence indicates that establishing a well-functioning democracy entails more than holding elections (Lyons 2002; Paris 2004).

Finally, some strategies are particularly relevant in the aftermath of protracted destructive

conflicts in which gross human rights violations have occurred. They notably relate to fostering reconciliation, often understood to include advancing justice, truth, security, and mutual respect (Kriesberg 2004; Lederach 1997). Not all aspects of reconciliation, so conceived, can be advanced at the same time by everyone on all sides of destructive conflict. Different dimensions may be realized over an extended period of time by increasing numbers of people in the opposing camps. The increased recognition of the importance and propriety of reconciliation in recovering from past oppression and destructive conflicts reflects and contributes to the recent global changes noted throughout this chapter.

One set of strategies includes specific ways to advance justice by compensating victims of past injustices, and punishing perpetrators of gross atrocities. Justice is also served by establishing laws and institutions to avoid future injustices, for example by instituting affirmative action programs and laws against discrimination. Adversaries tend to believe different accounts about their relationship and having been victimized by the other; recognizing each other's view of the past and developing a commonly shared truth about the past are important steps toward reconciliation. In recent years, official commissions have been instituted to investigate past atrocities and make public what had happened; sometimes this is part of a process to hold particular perpetrators responsible for specific human rights abuses.

Security is a major aspect of reconciliation. It is a widespread concern for people recovering from earlier oppressive conditions and gross human rights violations. Those persons who suffered abuses need assurances that they are safe from the recurrence of such treatment. There is a serious related issue that poses a dilemma in many circumstances. Members of the country or community that is identified as having committed atrocious acts may themselves be harmed by those who had been victimized. The desire for revenge and retribution is often felt and sometimes acted upon, perpetuating destructive cycles of violence (Scheff 1994). Well-written laws and their implementation in judicial proceedings can help resolve these dilemmas; frequently, external intervention can also be greatly helpful. The final aspect of reconciliation, respect, can be part of a fundamental resolution of the ethical and pragmatic concerns relating to these issues.

The idea of achieving mutual respect among people, even when atrocities have occurred, is a broader concept than the one that is often treated as the primary and fundamental aspect of reconciliation: forgiveness. The concept of forgiveness is particularly important in Christian thought, and sometimes is expressed without requiring apologies. Often, however, forgiveness is regarded as a response to the acknowledgment of wrongs that are regretted with feelings of remorse. Even without such sentiments and actions, people may accept each other's humanity and respect their basic rights.

Various positions along these four dimensions of reconciliation complement each other under particular circumstances, but different combinations of positions are inconsistent in other circumstances. The degree of reconciliation actualized tends to differ at the individual and collective levels and among different groups on each side. Reconciliation is never fully realized for all people for all time.

## **Conclusions**

Conflicts often must be waged in order to win greater justice, safety, or economic wellbeing; but those concerns are likely to suffer if the conflict is waged destructively rather than constructively. There are many ways that conflicts can be fought and ended constructively so as to overcome oppression and injustice and yet avoid producing destructive

counterproductive consequences. Constructive options are more likely to be employed if evidence about them is gathered and awareness of their potential becomes more widespread. The likelihood of their adoption would increase if thoughtful analyses preceded escalatory steps. Frequently, too few options are considered in policy discussions; thus, stark alternatives are often posed: do nothing or take violent or other coercive action.

Knowledge about and experience with waging conflicts constructively are growing and spreading. Moreover, the methods of struggling constructively complement and are congruent with many global events and trends. These convergent developments help account for the notable declines in wars and other forms of mass violence after the end of the 1980s. Awareness of these achievements, however, is still limited.

The increase in terrorist attacks and in wars in South Asia and the Middle East at the outset of the twenty-first century might seem to belie the growing effectiveness of the constructive CAR approach. However, in a way they help to confirm the validity of that approach (Kriesberg 2007b). The disregard of the strategies of that approach has contributed to the current large-scale destructive and counterproductive consequences for many countries and organizations. This suggests that constructive strategies that are congruent to the contemporary world would help avoid disasters and have significant beneficial effects.

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# 12 A social-psychological approach to conflict analysis and resolution\*

*Herbert C. Kelman*

## **Introduction**

The end of the Cold War has changed the character of international conflict, but it has not reduced the prevalence of violent conflict, the human suffering that it causes, or the threat that it poses to the wellbeing and survival of the human species. Thus, during recent years, there has been a proliferation of deadly, deep-rooted conflicts between ethnic and other identity groups within and across nation-states – conflicts often marked by violence against civilians, ethnic cleansing, and genocidal actions. There has also been a rise in terrorism and counterterrorism around the world, undermining the peace and development of established and emerging states.

Psychological theory and research can make useful contributions to the understanding and amelioration of the violent manifestations of international conflict. Indeed, psychological concepts and findings have been used increasingly in the study of international conflict and international relations more generally as well as in the development of new approaches to conflict resolution. This chapter offers a perspective on international conflict that is anchored in social-psychological theory and research and that, in turn, informs the practice of conflict resolution. Social-psychological analysis is designed to complement (and not to replace) approaches based on structural or strategic analysis by providing a special lens for viewing international conflict that brings some of its less explored dimensions into focus.

In this spirit, the chapter begins with a discussion of several propositions about the nature of international conflict that flow from a social-psychological perspective and that have clear implications for conflict resolution. It then describes social-psychological processes characteristic of conflict interaction that contribute to the escalation and perpetuation of conflict and that must be reversed if such conflict is to be resolved. It concludes with a very brief discussion of the implications of this approach for conflict resolution, which are presented in much greater detail in Ronald Fisher's chapter in the present volume.<sup>1</sup>

## **The nature of international conflict**

A social-psychological perspective can expand on and enrich the analysis of international conflict provided by the realist or neorealist schools of international relations or other, more traditional approaches. While acknowledging the importance of objectively anchored

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national interests, it explores the subjective factors that set constraints on rationality. Without denying the primacy of the state in the international system, a social-psychological perspective opens the “black box” of the state as unitary actor and analyzes processes within and between the societies that underlie state action. Fully recognizing the role of power in international relations, it postulates a broader range of influence processes (and, indeed, of definitions of power) that play a role in international politics. And, while affirming the importance of structural factors in determining the course of an international conflict, it conceives of conflict as a dynamic process, shaped by changing realities, interests, and relationships between the conflicting parties.

These observations suggest four general propositions about international conflict that call for social-psychological concepts and data. The four propositions are particularly relevant to existential conflicts between identity groups; that is, conflicts in which the collective identities of the parties are engaged and in which the continued existence of the groups is seen to be at stake. Thus, the propositions apply most directly to ethnic or ideological conflicts, but they also apply to more mundane interstate conflicts insofar as issues of national identity and existence come into play – as they often do.

### ***Conflict as a process driven by collective needs and fears***

According to the first proposition, international conflict is a process driven by collective needs and fears rather than entirely a product of rational calculation of objective national interests on the part of political decision makers. Human needs are often articulated and fulfilled through important collectivities such as the ethnic group, the national group, and the state. Conflict arises when a group is faced with non-fulfillment or threat to the fulfillment of basic needs, including not only material needs such as food, shelter, physical safety, and physical wellbeing but also psychological needs such as identity, security, recognition, autonomy, self-esteem, and a sense of justice (Burton 1988, 1990). Moreover, needs for identity and security and similarly powerful collective needs, as well as the fears and concerns about survival associated with them, contribute heavily to the escalation and perpetuation of conflict once it has started. Even when the conflicting parties have come to the conclusion that it is in their best interest to put an end to the conflict, they resist going to the negotiating table or making the accommodations necessary for the negotiations to move forward out of fear that they will be propelled into concessions that, in the end, will leave their very existence compromised. The fears that drive existential conflicts lie at the heart of the relationship between the conflicting parties, going beyond the cycle of fears resulting from the dynamics of the security dilemma discussed by Jervis (1976).

Collective fears and needs, although more pronounced in ethnic conflicts, play a part in all international conflicts. They combine with objective factors – a state’s resources, the ethnic composition of its population, its access to the sea (or lack thereof), and the like – in determining how different segments of a society perceive state interests and what ultimately becomes the national interest as defined by the dominant elites. Similarly, all conflicts – interstate as well as ethnic – represent a combination of rational and irrational factors, and in each type of conflict the mix may vary from case to case. Some ethnic conflicts may be preponderantly rational, just as some interstate conflicts may be preponderantly irrational. Furthermore, in all international conflicts, the needs and fears of populations are mobilized and often manipulated by the leadership, with varying degrees of demagoguery and cynicism. Even when manipulated, collective needs and fears represent authentic reactions within the population and become the focus of societal action.



They may be linked to individual needs and fears. For example, in highly violent ethnic conflicts, the fear of annihilation of one's group is often tied to a fear of personal annihilation (and for good reason).

The conception of conflict as a process driven by collective needs and fears implies, first and foremost, that conflict resolution – if it is to lead to a stable peace that both sides consider just and to a new relationship that enhances the welfare and development of the two societies – must address the fundamental needs and deepest fears of the populations. From a normative point of view, such a solution can be viewed as the operationalization of justice within a problemsolving approach to conflict resolution. Another implication of a human needs orientation noted by Burton (1988) is that the psychological needs on which it focuses – security, identity, recognition, and the like – are not inherently zero-sum, although they are usually seen as such in deep-rooted conflicts. Thus, it may well be possible to shape an integrative solution that satisfies both sets of needs, which in turn might make it easier to settle issues such as territory and resources through distributive bargaining. Finally, the view of conflict as a process driven by collective needs and fears suggests that conflict resolution must, at some stage, provide for certain processes that take place at the level of individuals and interactions between individuals, for example, taking the other society's perspective – what White (1984) has called “realistic empathy” – as well as creative problemsolving, learning, and insight.

### ***Conflict as an intersocietal process***

Focusing on the needs and fears of the populations in conflict reminds one that international conflict is an intersocietal process, not merely an intergovernmental or interstate phenomenon. The conflict, particularly in the case of protracted ethnic struggles, becomes an inescapable part of daily life for each society and its component elements. Thus, analysis of conflict requires attention, not only to its strategic, military, and diplomatic dimensions, but also to its economic, psychological, cultural, and social-structural dimensions. Interactions along these dimensions, both within and between the conflicting societies, shape the political environment in which governments function and define the political constraints under which they operate.

An intersocietal view of conflict points to the role of internal divisions within each society, which often play a major part in exacerbating or even creating conflicts between the societies. They impose constraints on political leaders pursuing a policy of accommodation, in the form of accusations by opposition elements that the leaders are jeopardizing national existence, as well as in the form of anxieties and doubts within the general population that are both fostered and exploited by the opposition elements. However, the internal divisions may also provide potential levers for change in the direction of conflict resolution by challenging the monolithic image of the enemy that parties in conflict tend to hold and by enabling them to deal with each other in a more differentiated way. They point to the presence of potential partners for negotiation on the other side and thus provide the opportunity for forming pro-negotiation “coalitions across the conflict lines.” To contribute to conflict resolution, any such coalition must necessarily remain an “uneasy coalition,” lest its members lose their credibility and political effectiveness within their respective communities (Kelman 1993).

Another implication of an intersocietal view of conflict is that negotiations and third party efforts should ideally be directed not to mere settlement of the conflict, in the form of a brokered political agreement, but to its resolution. A political agreement may be

adequate for terminating relatively specific, containable interstate disputes, but conflicts that engage the collective identities and existential concerns of the adversaries require a process conducive to structural and attitude change, to reconciliation, and to the transformation of the relationship between the two societies. Finally, an intersocietal analysis of conflict suggests a view of diplomacy as a complex mix of official and unofficial efforts with complementary contributions. The peaceful termination or management of conflict requires binding agreements that can be achieved only at the official level, but many different sectors of the two societies must be involved in creating a favorable environment for negotiating and implementing such agreements.

### ***Conflict as a multifaceted process of mutual influence***

International conflict is best understood as a multifaceted process of mutual influence and not just a contest in the exercise of coercive power. Much of international politics entails a process of mutual influence in which each party seeks to protect and promote its own interests by shaping the behavior of the other party. Conflict occurs when these interests clash; that is, when attainment of one party's interests (and fulfillment of the needs that underlie them) threatens, or is perceived to threaten, the interests (and needs) of the other party. Therefore, in pursuing the conflict, the parties engage in mutual influence, designed to advance their own positions and to block the adversary. Similarly, in conflict resolution, by negotiation or other means, the parties exercise influence to induce the adversary to come to the table, to make concessions, to accept an agreement that meets their interests and needs, and to live up to that agreement. Third parties also exercise influence in conflict situations by backing one party or the other, by mediating between them, or by maneuvering to protect their own interests.

Influence in international conflict typically relies on a mixture of threats and inducements, with the balance often on the side of force and threat of force. Thus, the US–Soviet relationship during the Cold War was predominantly framed in terms of an elaborate theory of deterrence; that is, a form of influence designed to keep the other side from doing what one does not want it to do, as described in important books by Schelling (1963), George and Smoke (1974), and Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (1985). In other conflict relationships, the emphasis may be on compellence, that is a form of influence designed to make the other side do what one wants it to do. Such coercive strategies entail serious costs and risks, and their effects may be severely limited. For example, they are likely to be reciprocated by the other side and lead to escalation of the conflict, and they are unlikely to change behavior to which the other side is committed. Thus, the effective exercise of influence in international conflict requires a broadening of the repertoire of influence strategies, at least to the extent of combining “carrots and sticks,” that is, of supplementing the negative incentives that typically dominate international conflict relationships with positive incentives (e.g. economic benefits, international approval, a general reduction in the level of tension). An example of an approach based on the systematic use of positive incentives is Osgood's (1962) GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension reduction) strategy. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, in his 1977 trip to Jerusalem, undertook a unilateral initiative with the expectation (partly pre-negotiated) of Israeli reciprocation, but – unlike GRIT – he started with a large fundamental concession in the anticipation that negotiations would fill in the intervening steps (Kelman 1985).

Effective use of positive incentives requires more than offering the other party whatever rewards, promises, or confidence-building measures seem to be most readily available. It

requires actions that address the fundamental needs and fears of the other party. Thus, the key to an effective influence strategy based on the exchange of positive incentives is responsiveness to the other party's concerns; that is, actively exploring ways in which each party can help to meet the other's needs and allay its fears, as well as ways in which the parties can help each other to overcome the constraints within their respective societies against taking the actions that each wants the other to take. The advantage of a strategy of responsiveness is that it allows each party to exert influence on the other through positive steps (not threats) that are within its own capacity to take. The process is greatly facilitated by communication between the parties to identify actions that are politically feasible for each party and yet are likely to have an impact on the other.

A key element in an influence strategy based on responsiveness is mutual reassurance, which is particularly critical in any effort to resolve an existential conflict. The negotiation literature suggests that parties are often driven to the table by a "mutually hurting stalemate" (Zartman 1989), which makes negotiations more attractive than continuing the conflict. But parties in existential conflicts are afraid of negotiations, even when the status quo has become increasingly painful and they recognize that a negotiated agreement is in their interest. To advance the negotiating process under such circumstances, it is at least as important to reduce the parties' fears as it is to increase their pain.

Mutual reassurance can take the form of acknowledgments, symbolic gestures, or confidence-building measures. To be maximally effective, such steps need to address the other party's central needs and fears as directly as possible – as illustrated in Sadat's words and actions during his dramatic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 (Kelman 1985). In deep-rooted conflicts, acknowledgment of what was heretofore denied – in the form of recognition of each other's humanity, nationhood, rights, grievances, and interpretation of history – is an important source of reassurance that the other party may indeed be ready to negotiate an agreement that addresses one's own fundamental concerns. By signaling acceptance of the other side's legitimacy, each party reassures the other that negotiations and concessions no longer constitute mortal threats to its security and national existence. By confirming the other side's narrative, each party reassures the other that a compromise does not represent an abandonment of its identity.

An influence strategy based on responsiveness to each other's needs and fears, and on the resulting search for ways in which to reassure and benefit each other, has important advantages from a long-term point of view. It does not merely elicit specific desired behaviors from the other party but can contribute to a creative redefinition of the conflict, joint discovery of mutually satisfactory solutions, and transformation of the relationship between the parties.

### ***Conflict as an interactive process with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic***

The influence strategies employed in a conflict relationship take on special significance in light of the fourth proposition, which views international conflict as an interactive process and not merely a sequence of action and reaction by stable actors. In intense conflict relationships, the natural course of interaction between the parties tends to reinforce and deepen the conflict rather than reduce and resolve it. The interaction is governed by a set of norms and is guided by a set of images that create an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic. This dynamic can be reversed through skillful diplomacy, imaginative leadership, third party intervention, and institutionalized mechanisms for managing and resolving conflict.

But in the absence of such deliberate efforts the spontaneous interaction between the parties is more likely than not to increase distrust, hostility, and the sense of grievance.

The needs and fears of parties engaged in intense conflict impose perceptual and cognitive constraints on their processing of new information, with the resulting tendency to underestimate the occurrence and the possibility of change. The ability to take the role of the other is severely impaired. Dehumanization of the enemy makes it even more difficult to acknowledge and access the other's perspective. Inaccessibility of the other's perspective contributes significantly to some of the psychological barriers to conflict resolution described by Ross and Ward (1995). The dynamics of conflict interaction tend to entrench the parties in their own perspectives on history and justice. Conflicting parties display particularly strong tendencies to find evidence that confirms their negative images of each other and to resist evidence that would seem to disconfirm these images. Thus, interaction not only fails to contribute to a revision of the enemy image but actually helps to reinforce and perpetuate it. Interaction guided by mirror images of a demonic enemy and a virtuous self (Bronfenbrenner 1961; White 1965) creates self-fulfilling prophecies by inducing the parties to engage in the hostile actions they expect from one another.

Self-fulfilling prophecies are also generated by the conflict norms that typically govern the interaction between parties engaged in an intense conflict. Expressions of hostility and distrust toward the enemy are not just spontaneous manifestations of the conflict; they are normatively prescribed behaviors. The assumption of political leaders that their publics' evaluation of them depends on their adherence to these norms influences their tactical and strategic decisions, their approach to negotiations, their public pronouncements, and (ultimately) the ways in which they educate their own publics. For the publics, in turn, adherence to these norms is often taken as an indicator of group loyalty. Thus, the discourse in deep-rooted conflicts is marked by mutual delegitimization and dehumanization. Interaction governed by this set of norms – at both the micro and the macro level – contributes to escalation and perpetuation of the conflict. Parties that systematically treat each other with hostility and distrust are likely to become increasingly hostile and untrustworthy.

The dynamics of conflict interaction create a high probability that opportunities for conflict resolution will be missed. Parties whose interaction is shaped by the norms and images rooted in the history of the conflict are systematically constrained in their capacity to respond to the occurrence and possibility of change. Each party finds it difficult to communicate the changes that have occurred on its own side, to notice the changes that have occurred on the other side, and to explore the possibilities for change that would serve both sides' interests. Therefore, conflict resolution efforts require promotion of a different kind of interaction that is capable of reversing the escalatory and self-perpetuating dynamics of conflict – an interaction conducive to sharing perspectives, differentiating the enemy image, and developing a language of mutual reassurance and a new discourse based on the norms of responsiveness and reciprocity.

## **Psychological processes promoting conflict**

Social-psychological analysis can be particularly helpful in explaining why and how, once a conflict has started, normative and perceptual processes that promote its escalation and perpetuation are set into motion and create or intensify barriers to conflict resolution. By the same token, social-psychological analysis, in helping to identify and understand these barriers, can also suggest ways in which to overcome them.

***Normative processes***

A variety of interaction processes at the mass and elite levels of conflicting societies that influence the evolving course of the conflict are governed by a set of powerful social norms that tend to encourage actions and attitudes conducive to the generation, escalation, and perpetuation of conflict and that tend to inhibit the perception and occurrence of change in the direction of tension reduction and conflict resolution.

*Formation of collective moods*

With periodic shifts in collective mood, public opinion can act as both a resource and a constraint for political leaders in the foreign policy process. In principle, public opinion can provide support for either aggressive or conciliatory policies but, under the prevailing norms in an intense protracted conflict, leaders are more likely to expect – and mobilize – public support for aggressive policies than for conciliatory ones.

Apart from transitory moods, certain pervasive states of consciousness underlie public opinion in a society engulfed in a deep-rooted conflict, reflecting the existential concerns and central national narratives widely shared within the population. In many cases, such as Serbia, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East, historical traumas serve as the points of reference for current events. Although these memories may be manipulated by demagogic leaders, they are part of the people's consciousness and are available for manipulation, as is the associated sense of injustice, abandonment, and vulnerability. The effect of such collective moods is to bring to the fore powerful social norms that support escalatory actions and inhibit moves toward compromise and accommodation.

When fundamental concerns about survival and identity are tapped, national leaders, with full expectation of public support, are far more ready to risk war than to take risks for peace, in line with the proposition derived from prospect theory (see Levy 1992) that people are more willing to take risks to avoid losses than to achieve gains. Any change in the established view of the enemy and of the imperatives of national defense comes to be seen as a threat to the nation's very existence.

*Mobilization of group loyalties*

Public support is an essential resource for political leaders engaged in a conflict relationship, both in ensuring the public's readiness to accept the costs that their policies may entail and in enhancing the credibility of their threats and promises to the other side. The primary means of gaining public support is the mobilization of group loyalties. Arousal of nationalist and patriotic sentiments, particularly in a context of national security and survival, is a powerful tool in garnering public support. It may evoke automatic endorsement of the policies that the leadership defines as necessary and a willingness to make sacrifices that cannot be entirely understood in terms of rational calculations of costs and benefits. The nation generates such powerful identifications and loyalties because it brings together two central psychological dispositions: the need for self-protection and the need for self-transcendence (Kelman 1969, 1997).

Group loyalties can potentially be mobilized in support of conciliatory policies. Political leaders may promote painful compromises and concessions to the adversary on the grounds that the security, wellbeing, integrity, and survival of the nation require such actions. Indeed, leaders with impeccable nationalist credentials, such as Charles de Gaulle,

Yitzhak Rabin, and F. W. de Klerk, are often most effective in leading their populations toward peaceful resolutions of conflicts once they have decided that this approach best serves their national interests. In general, however, group loyalties are more readily available to mobilize support for aggressive policies than for conciliatory ones. Proposals for aggressive actions can more easily rely on the vocabulary of nationalism, which characteristically marks off the ingroup from the outgroup to the detriment of the latter. An appeal to defend the nation against an imminent attack, in particular, is more compelling than an appeal to seize a promising opportunity, as prospect theory might predict. Also, such an appeal elicits a nearly unanimous response among members of the population, whereas an appeal to take advantage of an opportunity for peace holds no attraction to that segment of the population that equates peace with surrender.

Processes of group loyalty create barriers to change in a conflict relationship. Group loyalty requires adherence to the group's norms, which call for a militant, unyielding, and suspicious attitude toward the enemy in an intense conflict. Militancy and intransigence thus become the measures of loyalty. As a result, particularly in situations of perceived national crisis, the militants exercise disproportionate power and often a veto over official actions and policies. They impose severe constraints on the ability of leaders to explore peaceful options. Dissent from the dominant conflict norms becomes defined as an act of disloyalty and is suppressed, further undermining the exploration of peaceful alternatives.

### *Decisionmaking processes*

The way in which decisions are made in a conflict situation tends to inhibit the search for alternatives and the exploration of new possibilities, particularly when decisionmakers are operating in an atmosphere of crisis. These tendencies are by no means inevitable, and there are historical instances of creative decisionmaking in dangerous crisis situations, for example the Cuban missile crisis (see Allison 1971). However, conflict norms do impose serious burdens on the decisionmaking process.

A major source of reluctance to explore new options can be found in the domestic constraints under which decisionmakers labor. In an intense conflict situation, adherence to the conflict norms tends to be seen as the safest course of action. Cautious decisionmakers assume that they are less vulnerable domestically if they stay with the conflict's status quo, adhere to a discourse of hostility and distrust vis-à-vis the other side, or threaten escalatory actions than if they take steps toward accommodation and compromise. The search for alternatives in view of changing realities is also inhibited by institutionalized rigidities in the decisionmaking apparatus. Decisionmakers and their bureaucracies operate within a framework of assumptions about available choices, effective strategies, and constituency expectations – shaped by the prevailing conflict norms – that may make them unaware of the occurrence and possibility of change. Furthermore, they often rely on established procedures and technologies, which are more likely to be geared toward pursuing the conflict – by military and other means – than resolving it.

The microprocesses of action and interaction in crisis decisionmaking further inhibit the exploration of new options. At the level of individual decisionmakers, the stress they experience in situations of crisis, when consequential decisions must be made under severe time pressures, limits the number of alternatives they consider and impels them to settle quickly on the dominant response, which, in intense conflicts, is likely to be aggressive and escalatory (Holsti 1972; Lebow 1987). At the level of decisionmaking groups, crisis



decisionmaking often leads to “groupthink” (Janis 1982), a concurrence-seeking tendency designed to maintain the group’s cohesiveness. Decisionmaking under these circumstances is more likely to produce policies and actions that perpetuate and escalate the conflict than innovative ideas for conflict resolution.

### *Negotiation and bargaining processes*

The norms governing negotiation and bargaining between parties involved in long-standing conflict strongly encourage zero-sum thinking, which equates the enemy’s loss with one’s own gain. Negotiation, even distributive bargaining in its narrowest form, is possible only when the parties define the situation – at least at some level – as a win-win, mixed-motive game in which they have both competitive and cooperative goals. Each party, while pursuing its own interest, must actively seek out ways in which the adversary can also win and appear to be winning. But this is precisely the kind of effort that is discouraged by the conflict norms.

At the micro level, negotiators in an intense conflict tend to evaluate their performance by the forcefulness with which they present their own case and by their effectiveness in resisting compromise. To listen to what the other side needs and to help the other side achieve its goals would violate the conflict norms and might subject the negotiators to criticism from their own constituencies, particularly from the hard-line domestic opposition. At the macro level, the parties tend to pursue an overall outcome that strengthens their own strategic position and weakens that of the adversary, even when they recognize their common interest in negotiating certain specific issues. Such a strategy reduces the other party’s incentive for concluding an agreement and its ability to mobilize public support for whatever agreement is negotiated. Zero-sum thinking at both levels undermines the negotiating process, causing delays, setbacks, and repeated failures.

### *Structural and psychological commitments*

Finally, conflict creates certain commitments that take on a life of their own and contribute to structural changes conducive to the escalation and perpetuation of the conflict (see Rubin *et al.* 1994). Most obviously, in a conflict of long standing, various individuals, groups, and organizations (e.g. military, political, industrial, scholarly) develop a vested interest in maintaining the conflict as a source of profit, power, status, and/or *raison d’être*. Others, although not benefiting from the conflict as such, may have a strong interest in forestalling a compromise solution because it would not address their particular grievances or fulfill their particular aspirations. Vested interests do not necessarily manifest themselves in deliberate attempts to undermine efforts at conflict resolution. They may take indirect and subtle forms such as interpreting ambiguous realities and choosing between uncertain policy alternatives in ways that favor continuation of the conflict.

Vested interests and similar structural commitments to the conflict are bolstered by psychological commitments. People involved in a long-standing and deep-rooted conflict tend to develop a worldview that is built around the conflict and would be threatened by an end to the conflict. Resistance to change is likely to be more pronounced when the cognitive structure or ideology in which the view of the conflict is embedded is more elaborate, because changing this view would have wider ramifications. In an intense conflict, the image of the enemy is often a particularly important part of people’s worldview, with implications for their national identity, view of their own society, and interpretation



of history. This is one reason why images of the enemy, to which I turn next, are highly resistant to change and contribute to the escalatory and self-perpetuating dynamic of conflict.

### ***Perceptual processes***

Perceptual and cognitive processes, that is the ways in which people interpret and organize conflict-related information, play a major role in escalating and perpetuating conflict and create barriers to redefining and resolving the conflict despite changing realities and interests. Two perceptual processes that characterize mutual images of parties in conflict can account for this effect: the formation of mirror images and the resistance of images to contradictory information.

#### *Mirror image formation*

As noted earlier, Bronfenbrenner (1961) and White (1965), social psychologists writing about US–Soviet relations, first noted the formation of mirror images as a characteristic of many conflict relationships. Both parties tend to develop parallel images of the self and the other, except with the values reversed. The core content of mirror images is captured by the good–bad dimension. Each side sees itself as virtuous and peaceful, arming only for defensive reasons and prepared to compromise. The enemy, in contrast, is seen as evil and hostile, arming for aggressive reasons and responsive only to the language of force.

A typical corollary of the good–bad images in protracted conflicts is the view that the other party's aggressiveness is inherent in its nature (e.g. ideology, religion, national character, political system), whereas any signs of aggressiveness on one's own part are entirely reactive and defensive. In the language of attribution theory (Jones and Nisbett 1971), the enemy's aggression is explained in dispositional terms, whereas one's own aggression is explained in situational terms. Another common corollary of the good–bad image, one that derives from the virtuous self-image, is the assumption on each side that the enemy knows very well that "we" are not threatening them. Since its own basic decency and peacefulness, and the provocation to which it has been subjected, are so obvious to each side, it assumes that they must also be obvious to the other side. Apart from such generic features of mirror images, which arise from the dynamics of intergroup conflict across the board, mirror images in any given case may reflect the dynamics of the specific conflict. Thus, ethnic conflicts may be characterized by mutual denial of the other side's national identity accompanied by efforts to delegitimize the other's national movement and claim to nationhood, by mutual fear of national and personal annihilation, by a mutual sense of victimization by the other side, and/or by a mutual view of the other side as a source of one's own humiliation and vulnerability.

The mirror image concept implies that certain symmetries in the parties' reactions arise from the very nature of conflict interaction and that they play an important role in escalating the conflict. There is no assumption that all images of the self and the enemy are mirror images, that images on the two sides are equally inaccurate, or that there is empirical symmetry in the two sides' historical experiences and current situation or moral equivalence in their positions. However, the dynamics of the conflict relationship produce a degree of parallelism in some of the images developed by both participants in that relationship, arising out of the motivational and cognitive contexts in which they operate. At the level of motivation, each side is concerned with "looking good" when blame for the conflict

events is being apportioned. Therefore, political leaders feel a strong need to persuade themselves, their own people, the rest of the world, and future historians that the blame rests with the enemy. Cognitively, each side views the conflict from its own perspective and is convinced that it is acting defensively and with the best intentions (painfully aware of its own needs, fears, historical traumas, grievances, suspicions, and political constraints) and that this is so self-evident that it must be equally clear to the enemy.

Mirror images produce a spiraling effect (exemplified by the classical pattern of an arms race) because each side interprets any hostile action by the other as an indication of aggressive intent against which it must defend itself, while its own reactions – whose defensive nature it assumes to be obvious to the enemy – are taken by the other as signs of aggressive intent. The effect of mirror images is accentuated insofar as the enemy's ideology or national character is perceived to be inherently aggressive and expansionist. In addition to the escalatory effect of mirror images, they tend to make conflicts more intractable because the sharp contrast between the innocent self and the aggressive other makes it difficult to break out of a zero-sum conception of the conflict. However, the concept of mirror images may be a useful tool in conflict resolution. For example, in problemsolving workshops, the parties' discovery that their own actions are perceived differently by the other side and by themselves may open them up to the possibility that the reverse may be true as well. Thus, they may gain access to each other's perspective, insight into the escalatory effects of such two-directional differences in perception, and awareness of the need for mutual reassurance to set a de-escalatory process in motion.

#### *Resistance to contradictory information*

The second feature of conflict images, their high propensity to resisting contradictory information, inhibits the perception of change and the expectation of future change. A great deal of social-psychological theorizing and research has addressed the general phenomenon of the persistence of attitudes and beliefs in the face of new information that, from an outside point of view, challenges their validity, but is somehow neutralized or ignored. Research has focused on several types of mechanisms that account for resistance to contradictory information, including selectivity, consistency, attribution, and the self-fulfilling prophecy.

The concepts of selective exposure, selective perception, and selective recall all point to the fact that people's attitudes help to determine the kind of information that is available to them. People are more likely to seek out and be exposed to information that confirms their existing attitudes and to perceive and remember new information in ways that fit into their pre-existing cognitive framework. The various models of cognitive consistency – e.g. Heider's (1958) theory of cognitive balance and Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance – suggest that, in the interest of maintaining consistency, people tend to screen out information that is incongruent with their existing beliefs and attitudes. Although inconsistent information may also instigate attitude change, it is more likely to be resisted when the existing attitudes are strongly held and have wide ramifications, as is the case with enemy images. Attribution mechanisms, linked to what Ross (1977) called "the fundamental attribution error," also promote confirmation of the original enemy image. Hostile actions by the enemy tend to be attributed dispositionally, providing further evidence of the enemy's inherently aggressive, implacable character, whereas conciliatory actions are explained away as reactions to situational forces, requiring no revision of the original image – a phenomenon observed in research by Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld (1977),

Heradstveit (1981), and Rouhana (1997). Finally, interactions between conflicting parties tend to produce self-fulfilling prophecies by creating conditions that cause one's adversaries to behave in line with one's expectations – to take on the roles in which they have been cast by the other side (Weinstein and Deutschberger 1963) – thereby confirming the parties' original attitudes.

The mechanisms that account for resistance to disconfirming information are particularly powerful in a conflict relationship for several reasons. First, images of the enemy and conflict-related self-images are central aspects of the national consensus; therefore, resistance to disconfirming information is reinforced by strong normative pressures. Second, in a conflict relationship, the opportunities and capacity for taking the perspective of the other side are limited, and this reduces the impact of potentially new information about the varieties, changes, and signs of flexibility in the other side's views. Third, the resistance of enemy images to disconfirmation is magnified by strong beliefs about the unchangeability of the enemy and is reinforced by the view that it is dangerous or even treasonous to propose that the enemy has changed or will change.

Despite all of the reasons why conflict images are particularly resistant to contradictory information, they are not immutable. Social-psychological evidence suggests that they can change, and historical evidence shows that they do change. The challenge for scholars and practitioners of international conflict resolution is to devise the means to overcome their resistance to change.

## **Implications for conflict resolution**

Social-psychological analysis can contribute to international peacemaking by identifying the psychological and social processes that generate and escalate violent conflicts and impede their peaceful resolution, as well as by identifying the conditions and procedures required for breaking and reversing the conflict cycle and setting in motion a process of change in the direction of conflict resolution and reconciliation. Social-psychological principles have also informed the development and application of various unofficial micro-level efforts at conflict resolution, designed to complement official diplomacy in a larger multidimensional peace process. Efforts along these lines were pioneered by John Burton (1969). Ronald Fisher (1997; see also his chapter in the present volume) has summarized and integrated – under the rubric of interactive conflict resolution – the range of models for intervening in protracted conflicts between identity groups based on social-psychological analysis. My own model, interactive problemsolving (Kelman 1998, 2002), and the problemsolving workshops through which it is operationalized belong to this family of approaches.

The implications of social-psychological analysis for the macro process of conflict resolution, as well as for the micro process of problemsolving workshops and related activities, can be summarized by returning briefly to the four propositions about the nature of international conflict spelled out earlier in this chapter. The view of conflict as a process driven by collective needs and fears serves as a reminder that a conflict cannot be genuinely resolved until these needs and fears of the parties are addressed. The view of conflict as an intersocietal process points to the limits of political agreements signed by governments, often under the pressure, or with the mediation, of outside powers or international organizations; suggests a view of diplomacy as a complex array of complementary official and unofficial processes; and helps to counteract the monolithic image that parties in conflict tend to have of each other by encouraging them to attend to what is happening within

the other society and to the diversity of tendencies that it encompasses. The view of conflict as a multifaceted process of mutual influence suggests which strategies and tactics of influence between conflicting parties are most conducive to conflict resolution and to the development of a long-term peaceful relationship.

Finally, the view of conflict as an interactive process with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic suggests that conflict resolution efforts must be designed to counteract and reverse this conflict dynamic. A conflict relationship generates images and norms that entrench the conflict and create barriers to change that inhibit conflict resolution. Therefore, conflict resolution efforts must be geared to discovering the possibilities for change, identifying the conditions for change, and overcoming the resistances to change. Openness to change and reversal of the conflict dynamic depend on the establishment of a new discourse among the parties characterized by a shift in emphasis from power politics and threat of coercion to mutual responsiveness, reciprocity, and invitation to a new relationship.

## Note

- 1 The ideas presented in this chapter are discussed in fuller detail in Kelman (2007). The links between a social-psychological analysis and the resolution of conflict are explored more fully in Kelman and Fisher (2003).

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# 13 Building relational empathy through an interactive design process

*Benjamin J. Broome*

If we are still foolish after so many years to refuse the chance to build a future together, we will remain stuck in the “curse” that is the “Cyprus Problem!” . . . if we’ve become wise enough to take the risk called “peace” and take a step toward each other, life itself will give us opportunities to shape it as we want it to be.

(Sevgul Uludag, 2006: 192)

## Introduction

In October 1994, over twenty years after armed conflict resulted in the geographical and ethnic division of the eastern Mediterranean country of Cyprus, a group of fifteen Turkish Cypriots and fifteen Greek Cypriots set out on an uncertain and risky journey, to collaborate across community lines in developing a strategy for civil society peacebuilding efforts on the island. Although they were not the first to work together across community lines in Cyprus, previous attempts at unofficial diplomacy had been few and limited in scope. In many ways, the members of this group were “pioneers,” entering unexplored territory and facing unknown obstacles.

Restrictions in place at that time forced the group to meet separately for much of its early work, with the consequence that the two community groups sometimes moved in different directions. When they were able to obtain permission to meet together in the buffer zone, they had to work through personality and political differences, internal group tensions (both monocommunal and bicommunal), disagreements over the meaning and wording of statements, and social pressures from the larger society. Throughout their work they faced criticism, sometimes intense, from the media, their colleagues, and at times even their own family members.

When the group first started its work, everyone understood the task would not be easy or simple. The participants’ goal was to create a vision for peacebuilding that could be shared by the two communities, and then develop ways to make that vision a reality. They were working against a widely shared belief that the conflict in Cyprus was based on divergent views of the future, causing some of them to wonder if their goal of creating a vision statement shared by Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots might be a venture destined to fail. Even though they were dedicated to working together collaboratively, their peacebuilding efforts could not be separated from the overall political conflict – many of the same obstacles that had prevented a political agreement for so many years could not be divorced from the group’s deliberations.

This bicommunal group, however, overcame these and other difficulties, persevering to achieve an outcome that had eluded others (including groups in which some of them



had been personally involved) and still eludes the political leaders of the two communities. After reaching consensus on their vision statement, they moved quickly to develop a collaborative action agenda that was designed both to develop a larger core of peacebuilders and to target key segments of Cypriot society. They moved forward with the hope that these early activities would help build a civil society peace movement in Cyprus.

The work of peacebuilding groups such as the one described above provides confirming examples of what has become a consensus in the field of conflict resolution – various approaches to dialogue have an important role to play in the larger work of peacemaking (see Cheldelin *et al.* 2003; Crocker *et al.* 1999; Deutsch and Coleman 2000; Fisher 2005; Kriesberg 2001; Sandole and van der Merwe 1993; Zartman and Rasmussen 1997). Although the work of the dialogue group in Cyprus can be examined from a number of perspectives, it provides an instructive example of how structured dialogue can contribute to developing what I earlier called “relational empathy” (Broome 1993), explicated in a chapter that appeared in Dennis Sandole’s and Hugo van der Merwe’s (1993) influential collection on conflict resolution theory and practice. The prevailing view of empathy at that time was grounded in the traditional psychological approach to understanding, particularly as it had been applied in the therapeutic setting in which one of the actors (the therapist) was faced with the task of understanding the worldview of the other (the patient) and communicating this understanding to that person.<sup>1</sup>

Applications of such an approach to empathy were limited in conflict settings, in which a one-way approach to understanding was insufficient to meet the demands brought by the complexities and constantly evolving dynamics of parties trapped in historical animosities, social divisions, psychological anxieties, and political power issues. To move beyond the established views, it was proposed that empathy should be grounded in a “relational” approach to understanding, with a focus on the “between.” The concept of “relational empathy” emphasizes the co-creation of meaning by participants in an interpersonal or group setting. This process is characterized by a series of constantly evolving approximations, allowing new understandings to emerge, creative approaches to be developed, and innovative ideas to be proposed (Broome 1993).

In this chapter I will use the lens of relational empathy to examine how a particular structured approach to intergroup dialogue was utilized in the work of a Cyprus peacebuilding group to help participants move beyond their individual and communal differences and create a shared interpretive framework within which they could engage in joint activities. This allowed them to develop and implement a set of bicommunal projects that promoted new thinking about the Cyprus conflict and offered alternative possibilities for the future of the island. In discussing this group’s work, I will draw from my role as facilitator for the workshops of this group and from subsequent years in which I worked closely with the group on a number of bicommunal projects.<sup>2</sup> In the following sections I will give a brief overview of the interactive design process that was applied in the nine-month series of meetings of the core bicommunal group described earlier, and afterward I will focus on ways in which the design process and its methodologies “operationalized” the principles of relational empathy, helping the group overcome the constraints of division and move forward with a collective understanding of its goals and ways to achieve them.

## **Building a shared vision**

A strong tradition of intergroup dialogue workshops exists in the field of conflict resolution, including John Burton’s controlled communication (Burton 1969; Sandole 2001),



Leonard Doob's (1981) human relations workshops, Herbert Kelman's (2002) unofficial dialogue initiatives, Edward Azar's (1990) problemsolving forums, Joseph Montville's (1987) track two diplomacy, Ronald Fisher's (1997) interactive conflict resolution workshops, Jay Rothman's (1997) ARIA (Antagonism–Resonance–Invention–Action) framework, Louise Diamond and John McDonald's (1996) multitrack diplomacy, and Harold Saunders's (2003) framework for sustained dialogue. Most of these were developed specifically for application in protracted conflicts and, although these approaches have been both praised and criticized, taken together they have been widely influential in the field of conflict resolution. Although the approach applied in the work of the core peacebuilding group in Cyprus is rooted in systems theory rather than the problemsolving tradition of conflict resolution, it has many characteristics in common with the approaches mentioned above. This section will provide a description of the process and its application in the Cyprus conflict, setting the stage for examining this work using the framework of relational empathy.

### ***Interactive design process***

In developing its collective vision statement and collaborative action agenda, the peacebuilding group in Cyprus<sup>3</sup> utilized a design process known in the literature as “interactive management” (IM).<sup>4</sup> Based on John Warfield's (1994) science of generic design, this process helps groups develop outcomes that integrate contributions from individuals with diverse views, backgrounds, and perspectives. Established as a formal system of design in 1980 after a developmental phase that started in 1974, IM was created to assist groups in dealing with complex issues. The theoretical constructs that inform this process, developed over the course of more than two decades of practice, draw from both behavioral and cognitive sciences, with a strong basis in general systems thinking.

The IM approach carefully delineates content and process roles. Participants take full responsibility for contributing ideas, and the facilitator's role is to choose and implement selected methodologies for generating, clarifying, structuring, interpreting, and amending ideas. Emphasis is given to balancing behavioral and technical demands of group work (Broome and Chen 1992), while honoring design laws concerning variety, parsimony, and saliency (Ashby 1958; Boulding 1966; Miller 1956). IM has been applied in a variety of situations, but its primary application in the field of conflict resolution has been in the Cyprus context (see Broome 1997; 2006).

In a typical workshop, a group of participants who are knowledgeable about the situation engage in (a) developing an understanding of the issues they face, (b) establishing a collective basis for thinking about their future, and (c) producing a framework for effective action. In the process of moving through these phases, group members engage in structured dialogue guided by the implementation of specific methodologies that are matched to the phase of group interaction and the requirements of the situation. The most common methodologies are the *nominal group technique* (Delbeq *et al.* 1975) or NGT, *ideawriting* (Warfield 1994), *interpretive structural modeling* (*ibid.*) or ISM, and *field representation/profile methodologies* (Warfield and Cardenas 1994). NGT and ideawriting are employed for the purpose of generating ideas, which are then structured using ISM and field methodologies.

### ***The Cyprus design workshops***

The core peacebuilding group in Cyprus, during its initial nine-month series of interactive design workshops, progressed through three phases of design work that resulted in several

specific products representing group views. The most important products included: (a) a *problematique* – a graphical structure depicting each group’s view of obstacles confronting peacebuilders in Cyprus, (b) a *vision statement* – a graphical structure representing the joint group’s view of a desirable future for peacebuilding work in Cyprus, and (c) a *collaborative action agenda* – a plan of activities for accomplishing the aims of the group. These phases and their corresponding products are described in more detail in the remainder of this section.

In Phase 1, the participants in each group analyzed the situation surrounding their peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus, using first NGT to identify potential obstacles and then ISM to structure selected obstacles. The group work was conducted in separate (monocommunal) sessions for the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. During this first phase, two questions were used to guide the group work. First, participants in each community were asked: “What are obstacles we must deal with as we engage in our peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus?” Following the generation and clarification of ideas by the group, participants in each community selected a subset of the obstacles from their respective list and explored the interrelationships among these problem statements by using the following relational question: “In building peace in Cyprus, does obstacle A significantly aggravate (negatively influence) obstacle B?” The process allowed the participants to produce an influence structure or “problematique” that showed the group’s consensus on how the more important barriers negatively impact one another.

In Phase 2, the design sessions focused on developing a vision statement that could guide the work of the group in the future. Again, NGT and ISM methodologies were used to facilitate the work of the group. Initially, vision statements were developed separately by each group. Participants were engaged first in proposing characteristics of the desired future. The following guiding question was used for idea generation: “What are desired goals for our peacebuilding efforts during the next decade?” Following idea generation, clarification, and selection of the more important goals, the following relational question was used for developing the influence structure: “In designing the future for peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus, would the accomplishment of goal A significantly support the accomplishment of goal B?” The “support” relationship examines the positive influence that goals can have on one another.

When bicommunal meetings became possible, the two groups met to exchange the goal structures they had developed separately in monocommunal meetings and to construct a collective vision statement. Before meeting together in a bicommunal group, an analysis was conducted to determine the similarities and differences between the two community-based vision statements. The group decided to use the common statements that emerged from this analysis as a starting point for constructing the collective vision statement. To augment these statements, additional goals were generated by the group and structured using ISM with the same relational question as earlier (support relationship). The resulting structure was reviewed carefully by the group, and changes in wording were made to some statements in order to reflect a bicommunal perspective.<sup>5</sup>

In Phase 3, the design sessions focused on developing ideas for activities, programs, and other initiatives that could help make the vision a reality. During this phase, ideawriting was used to generate ideas, and these were organized using field representation and profile representation methodologies. The following stimulus question was used to generate ideas for activities, programs, events, and other initiatives: “What are proposed options for accomplishing the goals from our Vision Statement?” Participants were next engaged in organizing the options into similarity groupings, using the following relational question: “Does Option A belong in the same category with Option B?” The relationship indicated

by the phrase “belong in the same category” can be interpreted as “share significant elements in common,” “address a similar theme,” “have similar qualities,” or “possess similar characteristics.” The titles from the categories were then sequenced according to the order in which participants felt it was most appropriate to make choices from the set of categories. Category titles were considered using the following relational question: “In designing a plan of action, should selections be made from category A before (or at the same time as) selections are made from category B?” The relational question can be interpreted to mean that “choices made from one category will inform choices to be made in another category” or that “choices made from one category will influence choices to be made in another category.”

This field representation, which is a sequenced set of option categories and their individual members, served as the basis for the next step of the design process, in which participants were engaged in systematically selecting items for implementation during the next year. Each category was considered in the order corresponding to the sequence determined earlier, and participants were reminded that choices from categories made later in the sequence might be influenced by choices made from categories previously. The following question guided the selection process: “Which options from category X (one of the categories in the set of options) should be selected for implementation during the next twelve months?” Participants suggested items for consideration and discussed these items by explaining their rationales for favoring their implementation.

Because of the large number of options that needed to be considered, multiple passes were made through the set of options. In round one, items that were considered most desirable to implement during the following twelve months were selected from each category. In round two, participants were asked to take into account the limited size of the group and the scarce resources available for carrying out all the desirable activities. The items selected through this systematic discussion can be viewed as a “collaborative action agenda” for peacebuilding activities, and it served as the primary guide for group efforts during the following twelve months. As a final step in the design process, and as a first step in the implementation of the options, the group organized a gathering to which they invited over 100 individuals whom they had identified as having a possible interest in becoming involved in peacebuilding activities. This event resulted in the formation of teams around twelve of the fifteen projects. Designated project leaders from the core group then worked with the project groups in the implementation of each activity.

Despite the overall achievements outlined above, the Cyprus peacebuilding work that followed did not flow along an unimpeded path. It was affected by a series of serious and potentially fatal pressures, including a policy put in place by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to withhold permissions for most bicomunal gatherings (a “ban” that lasted for over five years). In addition, a set of violent incidents occurred on the island that nearly led to large-scale military confrontations, stopping all bicomunal activities for a period of time. Despite these difficulties, this small group of thirty peacebuilders expanded over a three-year period to involve more than 2,000 people in dozens of projects that brought together members of the two communities for workshops, seminars, training programs, public presentations, media exchanges, artistic and cultural events, and other activities (see Broome 2005 for a more detailed description of these activities).

Although it would be difficult to argue that a full-fledged “peace movement” on the island developed as a result of this group work, their efforts had significant impacts at multiple levels. On the *personal* level, its work helped those who took part in the dialogue to understand the fears, hopes, and concerns of the other community. On the *relational* level,

its work was important in moderating the cycle of mutual blame and accusations that was so ingrained in the public discourse. And on the *societal/structural* level, its ideas influenced policymaking and the official peace process in small but important ways (see Broome and Jakobsson-Hatay 2006). In sum, the nine months of interactive design sessions with the core group in Cyprus set the stage for several years of bicommunal activity that had a lasting impact on relations between the two communities on the island. Although the conflict remains today without an official settlement, the lives of many people have been touched by the work carried out in follow-up activities of the design sessions described in this chapter. Additionally, when a political settlement is reached eventually, its implementation is more likely to be successful because the activities implemented as a result of the dialogue sessions described above have prepared a solid core of individuals for working together and for working through the difficulties they will experience.

## **Building relational empathy**

The work of the peacebuilding group in Cyprus demonstrates how relational empathy can be built in a protracted conflict situation through an interactive design process. The core methodologies used by the group allowed them to engage in a form of structured dialogue that promoted the emergence of a “peace-building culture” within the group and the creation of a shared vision and a collaborative action agenda that was built from convergence of multiple views. This section will use the basic principles of relational empathy to examine some of the characteristics of the group’s process and methodologies that contributed to this result.<sup>6</sup>

### ***Promoting dynamic and provisional understandings***

In order to promote relational empathy across conflict lines, communication must focus on supporting learning rather than seeking the “truth.” Relational understanding requires a certain degree of “playfulness” – rather than seeking “certainty, closure and control” in a conversation, it is helpful to adopt a tentative and experimental approach to meaning (Stewart and Thomas 1986). Understanding is not so much a “product,” but rather a “tensional event” occurring between the communicators (Stewart and Zediker 2000). The group needs to engage in a process that allows understandings to remain open as new information is gained and as new learning develops. The process must permit meanings to evolve in relation to new developments and changing circumstances in the political situation, in societal perceptions, in individual lives of participants, and in relations of those in the group.

In the Cypriot dialogue group, the methodologies used for idea generation and clarification were designed to encourage meanings to remain open to change as the group progressed. The initial turn-taking process used to generate the ideas resulted in a list of barriers to its peacebuilding efforts, displayed in writing on the walls of the workshop room. After hearing and seeing the ideas in front of them, the group went through the step of clarifying those ideas, primarily so that others in the group could understand the intent of the person who proposed the idea. At this stage of the process, no debate about the statements was permitted, and evaluation was not allowed until a later stage of the process. As individuals attempted to explain the meaning of their ideas to others around the table, they found different ways to articulate their thinking, often changing the wording of statements to better communicate their views to the group. Further, the initial idea set proposed by

the group grew larger as the discussion progressed, with individuals offering additional statements stimulated by the contributions of others in the group.

During the structuring phase, ideas were once again subject to change, as they were paired with other ideas in the set, further clarifying their meaning as they were considered in relation to different items in the list to be structured. Through a systematic process of continuous work with the idea set, not only did the form and meaning of ideas change and the number of ideas grow, but the participants themselves adopted more flexible approaches to ideas, becoming more open both to changes in their own positions and to the validity of views with which they did not necessarily agree.

Additionally, in developing their action agenda, the group engaged in an idea generation exercise in which more than 240 possible initiatives were proposed. In the process of selecting items from this list to make up their agenda during the next year, the group examined several alternatives. The availability of such alternatives promoted consideration of a wide range of options before choosing a final agenda. This plan of action could then be modified easily as conditions changed and as the completion of some options resulted in a different set of needs.

The characteristics of these methodologies, when taken together, allowed creative and flexible idea generation and organization, as well as eventual involvement of a wide range of relevant stakeholders. The process promoted *learning through iteration* in that ideas proposed during the early phases of the process were clarified, then related to one another, and used as building blocks for later phases. In this way, learning occurred at a gradual, deliberate pace, with constant opportunities for revision and reinforcement. The result was particularly helpful in such a protracted conflict situation, which calls for methodologies that help break destructive thinking patterns, open new avenues for thinking about the future, and involve a broad cross-section of society.

### ***Bridging differences***

Finding a way to work with differences is crucial to successful conflict resolution. When parties come together around the table, commonalities between them are not always apparent. Although similarity, when it exists, can aid in understanding, it does not serve as the cornerstone for genuine dialogue. As Kelly (1963) points out, even if a person has experienced the same events as another, the two will not necessarily construe them in the same way, and two people can have similar constructions of reality even if they have each been exposed to quite different stimuli. If the third party focuses on building an agreement primarily based on the similarities that can be discovered between opposing sides, it is less likely that key issues dividing the parties will be addressed or dealt with adequately, leaving these to surface in the future, and possibly rekindling the conflict. To create a viable solution, parties have to find a way to incorporate into their agreements the differences that are brought to the table. This demands a level of creativity that may not result from give-and-take bargaining. The challenge is to help a group generate new alternatives that are capable of incorporating a variety of perspectives.

The individuals in the Cyprus peacebuilding group brought with them significant differences in perspectives, views, and positions. In addition to the divergence in community positions and experiences regarding the conflict, they also exhibited a great deal of intracommunity diversity. Within each group, participants were situated in various places along the political spectrum, they disagreed about the meaning of peace and peacebuilding, and they were sometimes at odds because of clashing personality styles. Although at a very

basic level everyone shared a desire for peace and a motivation to come together across the dividing line to engage in dialogue, beneath the surface there were deeper divisions. Simply seeking common ground might not have taken the group very far. It was necessary to “pull back the cover” of the “peacebuilder” label and find a way forward that bridged the differences in assumptions, views, and experiences. The use of dialogic methodologies employed in the design process helped make this possible by moving participants away from the natural tendency to protect, defend, and otherwise hold onto the perceptions and perspectives they brought into the discussions.

The idea-generating methodologies used with the group, both nominal group technique (NGT) and ideawriting, were designed to allow groups to identify all the relevant dimensions of their situation. Although ideas varied widely in their scope and feasibility, they all represented potential contributions from group members. Because ideas were treated as possibilities rather than as final conclusions, participants were able to consider them without stifling creativity by overdue concern for feasibility or realism, leading to a greater diversity of ideas. Additionally, as long as participants had ideas to contribute in response to the guiding question, those ideas were included in the set to be considered. Essentially, the group followed a “no-stopping rule” that allowed new ideas to be added to the list at any time. This gave everyone in the group confidence that his/her ideas would be included, lessening the perceived need to prevent entry into the discussion of ideas they found objectionable. In this way, their idea set reflected the variety that exists within the group, helping participants see the array of perceptions and interests that were in the room.

Finally, it should be noted that the act of seeing a set of ideas on the wall that displays all the views of the group also “accustoms” the participants to differences, normalizing the presence of diversity. Accepting such variety as an inevitable part of the situation can go a long way toward promoting a healthy climate for problemsolving. The process helps change the relationship among the participants in subtle ways, acting in a transformative manner (Bush and Folger 1996; Lederach 1996; Putnam 2004) to affect the conflict in positive ways.

### ***Integrating cognition and affect***

When groups in conflict come together for discussions about the issues that divide them, emotions, especially the anger and hard feelings that individuals have about what happened in the past, often emerge in destructive ways and block progress. Because of their potential to wreck havoc, many groups are hesitant to encourage their expression, trying to keep them submerged and out of the discussion. Although this can sometimes serve as a way to prevent the deliberations from breaking down and allowing the participants to go home with even more hardened attitudes, at some point in the dialogue it is usually necessary to deal with negative emotions. Suppressed feelings can be harmful, both for individuals and for groups. It is usually not the role of problemsolving groups, however, to serve as therapy sessions, at least not in ways that resemble traditional psychotherapy. If for no other reason, few facilitators of dialogue are trained to deal with deep-seated feelings in this manner. What is desirable is a process that allows the expression of hurt, anger, frustration, loss, and other feelings as a natural part of the dialogue process, without becoming the primary focus of the group’s energy. Relational empathy involves arriving at mutual integrative understandings through both affective and cognitive processes. As understanding begins to take place between communicators, they come to know the organization of



each other's worldview or self-view, and this includes feelings and emotions (Duan and Hill 1996).

The methodologies used with the dialogue group in Cyprus were not specifically designed to deal with emotional issues but, perhaps because the expression of emotion is important in the Mediterranean cultural setting, there were often points when the discussion became quite heated and emotionally charged. There are several ways in which they made it possible for the participants to effectively integrate emotions into the dialogue. In part this happened because the methodologies kept the focus on ideas, with facilitated guidance helping to make sure that negative feelings were not directed toward individuals. The steps of the idea-generating procedures asked participants to propose ideas, which were written on paper and posted on the walls. Although the originator of an idea continues to "own" it, this posting on the wall depersonalizes the idea enough to allow the group to focus on the content of the statement and the emotion behind it rather than primarily on the person who proposed it. The statement itself can (and often does) express strong emotional content, thus allowing integration of cognition and affect.

Dealing with emotional issues is also assisted by the turn-taking procedures used in idea generation. Asking for ideas one by one around the table assures participants that they will have a chance to offer their own ideas in turn, releasing some of the pressure to respond immediately to statements of others that trigger their own emotional responses. This delay in response can allow individuals, when they are upset at hearing or seeing something expressed by others, to more thoughtfully compose a response that is directed at the idea rather than at the person who expressed the idea.

Finally, the clarification procedures that are part of the idea-generation process also serve to moderate the negative spirals that often accompany discussion of emotional issues. Before any debate about issues occurs, ideas are first proposed using the turn-taking procedures described earlier, and then one by one they are opened for clarification. At this stage, the person who proposed an idea can elaborate, providing more description of what is behind the statement, including feelings. The other group members are permitted to ask questions for clarification that will help them better understand the idea and what is behind it. Evaluation of the value or worth of the statement, including personal reactions to the statement, is taken up in a later stage. These structured steps that separate idea generation and clarification, while allowing all ideas to be expressed, can function to ensure, but certainly not guarantee, that emotional issues will be dealt with productively, neither suppressed nor allowed to spiral out of control.

### **Building a context for joint action**

A relational approach to empathy emphasizes that meaning is embedded in context, and cannot be divorced from the setting and the circumstances of the encounter. As Stewart reminds us, meanings are "open – fluid, and continuously context-dependent" (1983: 384). Thus, meanings are constantly shifted and determined by the situation, and all interpretation depends to a large extent on factors that surround the event. Nevertheless, it is not unusual for groups in conflict to limit their attention to specific aspects of their situation rather than encompass the larger picture. In fact, it is difficult for groups to develop a holistic, systems view of the problems they face, partly on account of a paucity of methodologies and processes available to help groups produce such an analysis of their situation. Yet, without the larger image, groups can easily take inappropriate actions that will either have little effect on the conflict or else serve to make it worse. Thus, it is very



important when working with groups in conflict to help them obtain a solid grip on the systemic context in which they are operating. Without a functional understanding of the interpretive scheme within which the encounter is situated, both the discussion within the group and the initiatives it pursues will be misplaced.

Several of the methodologies utilized in the design processes with the Cyprus peacebuilders assisted them in viewing their situation as a systemic whole. First, the interpretive structural modeling (ISM) methodology allowed the group to take a representative subset of the obstacles they identified and map them according to a relationship of negative influence. The influence structuring that was conducted with ISM gave participants an opportunity to explore connections and links between ideas in ways that probably would have gone undetected without such work, as well as to develop a representation of the overall situation facing them in their peacebuilding efforts. Generating a structural map of such relationships guided their thinking as they designed potential solutions. By considering how obstacles negatively impact each other, the group was able to understand each item in context of the overall pattern of negative influence surrounding the peacebuilding arena. This allowed the members of the group to see, for example, where they would be able to have the greatest impact and how their work on particular issues could ease some of the other difficulties they faced.

A similar dynamic occurred during the process of building the goal structures, again using the structural modeling methodology. Discussing goals for the future is one of the most difficult ventures for groups in conflict, since in many cases it is the existence of different and often conflicting goals that are at the root cause of the conflict itself. This was initially the case with the Cypriot group, as the monocommunal meetings about goals for the future produced different sets of goals within each community. Even in those cases in which each group held a similar goal, it was often placed at a different position within the overall vision. For example, both groups believed that demilitarization of the island was a goal toward which they should work but, whereas for the Greek Cypriots this was a place to start, it was at the far end of the structure for the Turkish Cypriots. For them, demilitarization was possible only after many other steps had been taken to ensure the security of their community. By considering the goal of demilitarization in relation to the other goals that were proposed, and by moving through this discussion in a guided, systematic fashion using ISM, the two groups eventually found a placement for this goal that satisfied both groups. A similar result occurred for other items that were not initially shared between the groups. Taken by themselves, out of context, many of the individual goals that wound up in the collective structure would be sources of great conflict, possibly blocking progress and preventing forward movement. But placed within a contextual scheme that reflected the variety of the group, seemingly conflicting goals were allowed to coexist, situated within a framework that addressed the needs of both communities.

In addition to ISM, the field representation and profile methodologies helped the group turn the initial list of ideas they had generated through NGT or ideawriting into an organized, meaningful set of categories that reflected the uniqueness of their situation as peacebuilders. Rather than trying to consider a linear list of ideas that would be confusing and overwhelming, they were able to “chunk” the ideas into manageable sets that were within the limits of human cognitive capabilities to digest. And, rather than relying on pre-established categories that may not have applied to their own situation, participants considered the commonality between the ideas they generated and assigned titles that reflected the thread of meaning they perceived as running throughout the items in each category. While the ISM gave them a picture of the interrelationships among a subset of

the obstacles, and later of their proposed goals, the field representation provided them with a view of the entire set of obstacles and goals. This allowed participants to place any specific obstacle or goal within the larger context of possibilities.

The view of the full set of ideas was particularly important during Phase 3 of the process, when participants generated specific project proposals. With over 240 ideas to consider for implementation, it was essential that they be able to organize them into meaningful themes. Additionally, by developing an ordered sequence of categories, their selections could be informed by the choices they had made already in previous categories. This allowed them to build a more meaningful and holistic agenda, potentially capable of affecting various sectors of society at multiple levels, per Lederach's (1997) peacebuilding pyramid.

As well as assisting the group in making choices about their immediate agenda, the field representation and profile exercises were also helpful in designing future activities. These depictions allowed the group to track their own decisionmaking process, in that the profile representation displayed both the options selected by the group for implementation and the options that were not selected. By doing so, those involved directly in constructing the plan of action, as well as those who were not involved directly, could better understand the rationale for selecting a particular option, since the other options that were considered simultaneously were also available for review. Such a representation of the actions that were selected, embedded within the full set of possibilities, also make it easier for the group to design future agendas. The categorized set of ideas was always open to additional items, and as progress was made, the participants could select other initiatives in view of the ones that had already been implemented. This allowed a more strategic positioning of actions during the course of their work.

In sum, the ISM and field/profile representations made it possible for participants to develop a functional understanding of the context in which they were working, and it provided them with an integrated set of outcomes. Ideas proposed by participants were discussed in light of the total set of ideas, and the process directly engaged participants in exploring the links between those ideas. Participants thus learned about the systemic nature of the obstacles they faced, the goals they sought, and the actions they wanted to pursue. In this way, they continuously operated within a holistic contextual framework of potential ways to tackle those problems.

### ***Synthesis of horizons***

In the "classic" approach to negotiating, when parties to a protracted conflict come to the table the goal is to fashion a compromise in which opposing sides move from their original positions toward some "middle ground." When one side or both must "give in" in order for the compromise to be forged, the agreement may not be sustainable. Relational empathy suggests that parties to a conflict can create new alternatives that often meet the needs of each side in the conflict. In some cases, these agreements are even better suited for the future of each side than were their original positions. This synthesis of horizons does not happen often, nor does it occur automatically; it is made possible by a type of dialogic engagement that allows a variety of perspectives to be brought to the table, listened to with respect, and synthesized meaningfully.

Bohm (1996) argues that the goal of dialogue is not to *make common* the different ideas of individuals but rather to make something *in common* – in other words, to *create* something new. This opens additional possibilities for meaning and understanding, in which individual perspectives evolve into a unique shared view of the situation.

As Anastasiou notes, the new world that is created through such a dialogue process “is always far bigger, far more tolerant and far more diverse than the belligerent worlds of former rivals” (2007: 71).

For the Cyprus group, an illustration of this synthesis is their collective vision for peacebuilding efforts on the island. Developing this vision was facilitated by methodologies that helped participants gain greater appreciation and respect for the perspective of the other, while simultaneously creating together an understanding of a future toward which they could all direct their efforts. By constructing together a collective framework for the future, participants were no longer trapped in the incompatible views that defined the past, and they were able to avoid making unsatisfactory compromises that could have led to an eventual breakdown of any agreement they might have negotiated.

The creation of the collective vision statement involved many difficult discussions, in which significant differences in viewpoints were expressed and during which many emotional statements were generated, at times resulting in hard feelings that had to be processed by the group. Both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots developed shared perspectives on issues they originally viewed quite differently, and they developed a deeper understanding of the importance of certain issues to the other community. This shift in perspectives emerged from the individual and group learning that took place during the discussion about individual ideas and their relationship to other ideas.

Although it was a struggle at times, the collective vision statement that resulted from the group’s deliberations resulted in stronger bonds among the group members and a clearer sense of direction both for individuals and for the group as a whole. The completed structure was accepted by the group as representing a vision for which they were willing to commit their time and energy to help make a reality. From this type of dialogic engagement a “third culture” emerged that transcended the original divisive culture of the two communities and gave rise to an inclusive, multivocal culture of understanding, appreciation of differences, and solidarity.

The bicomunal statement of goals shows how *convergence* of viewpoints can occur between the two communities when using an appropriate process, and how this can lead to the *emergence* of shared understandings. Moving successfully along this path of convergence to emergence is the essence of relational empathy. Through an interactive design process such as that described in the previous sections, a group gains the possibility of bridging the most important of the differences that divide them and overcoming barriers that affect their work. Such a result with a single group of civil society peacebuilders is no “silver bullet” for resolving the wider conflict, but it exemplifies the type of work that must be done on a societal scale in order to bring sustainable peace in divided societies. By engaging in a process that promotes relational empathy, a group can, in the words of Sevgul Uludag that were quoted at the beginning of this chapter, “become wise enough to take the risk called ‘peace’ and take a step toward each other,” giving themselves “opportunities to shape [the future] as [they] want it to be” (Uludag 2006: 192).

## **Cautions and limitations**

Although interactive design processes such as those described in this chapter can play an important role in promoting relational empathy, it is important to note that the design process described in previous sections was only one of many variables that allowed the group to produce a successful result.<sup>7</sup> Certainly, without the patience and commitment of the participants the work would have stopped early in the process. Additionally, the

communication skills employed by key group members at crucial points in the process kept it from breaking down or helped it get back on track. A possible contributing factor to the group's success was the very intractability of the conflict itself. Stuck for so long with no forward movement at the political level, the individuals in these design sessions may have been propelled by a sense of determination to step out of the "muck" in which they were mired and, when their own process stalled, something from within nudged them along. Perhaps they were unwilling to find themselves stalled in the same way as their political leaders had been for so many years. In the end, they refused to fall into the same trap as the overall population, and they were able to keep the process alive even through the most difficult of times. Such variables go beyond process and methodologies, and it is difficult to know what combination of factors is responsible for helping the group reach a meaningful result.

It must be acknowledged that creating shared understandings and collaborative peace-building agendas within a particular group may have limited effects outside that group. Even when civil society peacebuilding activities expand to involve larger numbers of individuals and a broad cross-section of a society, they may not spread among enough of the population to significantly change societal perceptions about the other side or about the conflict in general. Additionally, there is never a guarantee that the ideas generated in facilitated citizen groups will "filter up" to the decisionmaking hierarchy in a way that significantly influences negotiations or strategizing at the top level. In addition, those ideas developed by groups for implementation at the citizen level can be either ignored or "shot down" by officials, the media, and others in power positions, making their accomplishment extremely difficult or impossible. This limitation affects any attempt to bring together parties across conflict lines but, if significant time and effort are to be devoted to an ongoing design process, it is hoped that it will have effects beyond the group itself. In this case, the selection of participants becomes very important, and it is to be hoped that it will be done in a way that will maximize the opportunity for influence.

Finally, we should keep in mind that official agreements to bring about an end to conflict between opposing parties, and the implementation of these agreements, is a complex process, influenced by a host of factors and dependent on local, regional, and global political events. Protracted conflicts (Azar 1986, 1990) are the result of a multitude of forces that are multifaceted and diverse, characterized by ever-changing dynamics and often resistant to the most determined efforts of even the best-planned interventions. Scholars have described such situations as deeply rooted (Burton 1987), intense and inescapable (Coleman 1993) enduring (Goertz and Diehl 1993), and intractable (Kriesberg 1998; Kriesberg *et al.* 1989). In most cases they won't "go away" on their own or submit to resolution without "putting up a fight," so to speak. Even in cases when a peace agreement is reached, there are many problems that might derail the peace process in the post-agreement period (Hampson 1996; Stedman *et al.* 2002). Dialogue events, even those taking place on a sustained basis over a long period of time, that broaden to affect large segments of society, and that "feed into" official decisionmaking, should be viewed as only one, although a crucial, part of the "equation" for bringing peace to protracted conflicts.

In sum, peace is not easy to obtain, and dialogue is not a "cure all." But it is an aspect of conflict resolution to which many of us as scholars and practitioners are committed, and that has been the focus of our teaching and research for much of our professional careers. As Pearce and Pearce (2000) argue, dialogue is not something that one can count on just happening on its own. Whereas this implies that structured processes are usually necessary, it is also not possible for the relational quality of dialogue to be guaranteed solely by good

planning or well-tested procedures. Thus, it is important to carefully consider a number of issues, including the culture and nature of the group with which one is working, the context of the conflict, and the potential for impact, before embarking upon a venture using a designed approach to dialogue such as the one described in this chapter.

## **Conclusion**

Although the concept of empathy still receives major attention in the counseling literature (see Duan and Hill 1996; Kirschenbaum and Jourdan 2005), it does not enjoy a prominent role in conflict resolution theory and research (for exceptions, see Bush and Folger 1996; Noce 1999). Nevertheless, it is considered by many scholars and practitioners to be a critical part of the “skill set” of successful negotiators, mediators, and peacebuilders (Goldberg 2005; Lebaron 2003; Malhotra and Liyanage 2005). For the most part, however, empathy is still viewed within a psychological rather than a relational framework. Noce (1999), in discussing empathy in mediation, showed that, for mediators to operate within a relational framework, a paradigm shift is required, moving attention from the individual to the interactional field. Such a shift, which focuses attention on communication within the dialogue setting, could significantly inform discursive practices in problemsolving workshops and could lead to development of new methodologies that actively promote third-culture building. Less emphasis would be placed on identifying “core skills” for mediators, facilitators, and negotiators, and more stress would be given to developing and utilizing procedures that help groups create shared interpretive schemes and collaborative action agendas. Hopefully, this chapter will give added impetus to such a shift toward a relational approach to conflict resolution.

## **Notes**

- 1 In my 1993 chapter, the discussion of relational empathy is targeted primarily at the interpersonal encounter. The present chapter describes group interaction, which has somewhat different dynamics, but to which most of the original concepts are also applicable.
- 2 In 1994, I accepted a Fulbright fellowship to Cyprus, where I lived for two and one-half years, offering a series of structured dialogue sessions for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who were in the early stages of their peacebuilding efforts on the island. What had initially been intended as a nine-month commitment turned into a decade-long effort in which I have facilitated structured dialogue sessions for dozens of bicomunal groups.
- 3 There were nine men and six women in each of the two groups, ages ranging from the mid-twenties to the mid-fifties, with most of the participants in their thirties and early forties. Participants were professionals in various fields, including education (university professors and secondary school teachers), business, counseling, and civil service. Political affiliations ranged from the left/liberal to the right/conservative (including members of the ruling party in each community). For all of them, participation was voluntary and outside the scope of their normal job duties and family responsibilities. The group was self-selected, and everyone understood from the beginning that their participation would require a significant commitment of time. Logistical assistance for making arrangements to meet together in the buffer zone was provided by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission (CFC); in monocommunal meetings, space was arranged at various locations in each community, both with the help of the CFC and by members of the core peacebuilding group.
- 4 The description of interactive management in this section is based on Broome (2006).
- 5 The bicomunal setting in which this collective vision was produced presented numerous challenges. Struggles over wording of goal statements were particularly acute; there were points when the dialogue nearly broke down. The details of constructing the vision statement are described in Broome (2004).

- 6 In examining the results of these design sessions, it is important to point out that my personal involvement with the work being described prevents me from offering a true “outsider’s” perspective. Therefore, the reader must allow for the unavoidable bias that accompanies such analysis. At the same time, my close connection provides an “inside view” that would not be available to a disinterested observer.
- 7 Members of the bicommunal group participated in several conflict resolution workshops during the early 1990s organized by Ron Fisher, Louise Diamond, Diana Chigas, and others. Their experience in these workshops gave them exposure to conflict resolution theory and practice, which I believe was an important element of their overall success in the design sessions and in the expansion of their work that followed.

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# 14 Building peace

## Storytelling to transform conflicts constructively★

*Jessica Senehi*

### Introduction

It is a late July afternoon, and we have been at Tantur, an ecumenical center south of Jerusalem, for an all-day training for facilitators involved in a new peacebuilding project called *Jerusalem Stories Performance Exhibit Dialogue*.

We have been here since 9:30 a.m. In this room, twenty facilitators – half of whom are Palestinian and half of whom are Israeli – talk. The people here, of different ages, have been working for positive social change for a good part of their lives. Throughout the day, they share personal history and insights, joke, argue, discuss, and, for the past half hour or so, it seems they mostly despair.

One wall of the room is glass, leading to a terrace, and overlooking a descending hillside dotted with olive trees. On the hills arising across this valley is the town of Bethlehem, illuminated by the gold hues of the afternoon sun. A blue-green dome sparkles like a jewel among the buildings. Minarets reach skyward. The recently built gray separation wall rings the bottom of the town like an incision.

The facilitators are here to learn about and discuss a new initiative that seeks to bring the stories of real people into a public context. The project involves the production of eight three-hour events, free to the public, each to include (1) a play featuring the real stories of three Palestinians and three Israelis from Jerusalem, (2) an exhibit of twenty-three large photographs of Palestinians and Israelis by the photojournalist Lloyd Wolf, and (3) and small-group discussions among audience members to be held directly after the performance. There will be two productions of the same play: one in Arabic to be held for Palestinian audiences in East Jerusalem, and one in Hebrew to be held for Israeli audiences in West Jerusalem. The exhibit and after-play discussion will accompany all the productions.

The project seeks to create a “virtual dialogue” between Palestinians and Israelis by presenting stories from each side of the conflict while at the same time maintaining a safe distance (Palestinians and Israelis are not meeting face-to-face), and allowing for people to hear the stories in their own language. Other stated goals of the project are to allow for a humanization of the other side, empathy for the suffering on the other side, and recognition of different valid relationships with Jerusalem. That is, it is important to break down

★ I would like to thank Carol Grosman and my co-evaluators of the *Jerusalem Stories Performance Exhibit Dialogues Project*, Maya Kahanoff and Nabil Shibly. Research on this project was supported by a grant from the Canadian Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Fund in honor of Arthur V. Mauro, and a University of Manitoba Research Grant.

the psychological walls separating communities, and – as the facilitator Sami Al-Jundi (2007), who assisted with the project since its inception, put it – “to cross the check-points in our hearts” because the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, including its structural aspects and the need for power sharing, requires a willingness to resolve that can come from a recognition of the experiences of the other side.

In the room at Tantur, a muezzin’s call can be heard from the minaret that rises above Bethlehem’s rooftops, followed, almost immediately, by the singing of a German youth choir in another room of the building; the two sacred melodies beautifully and momentarily coexist in the air.

Questions are raised about the project: How many stories should be included in the play? Are the stories too heavy? There are just six stories, and no solutions proposed, and is that too disheartening? What does it mean to hear the story of a Palestinian man told in Hebrew by an Israeli actor, or the story of an Israeli mother told in Arabic by a Palestinian actress? How were the stories chosen? Does the balance of stories in the play belie an imbalance of power in the conflict? *How will people respond in the discussion?*

One facilitator says that he has become discouraged in his peacebuilding work, but he feels that this approach is something new. He has questions, but he wants to try it.

*Jerusalem Stories* Performance Exhibit Dialogue is an ongoing project developed by Carol Grosman, who has worked on this project full-time since November 2002. This is an innovative conflict resolution or peacebuilding approach that draws on storytelling, and brings together in a working relationship both artists and peacebuilders. It is among a number of emerging peacebuilding efforts that draw on storytelling as an important element of their approach. These new methodologies raise a lot of questions, particularly about how they fit within existing understandings of the conflict and conflict resolution.

The goal of this chapter is to provide some theoretical context within the conflict resolution field for understanding these projects. It is based on research over ten years, including in-depth interviews with more than fifty storytellers. First, a definition of storytelling is provided. Second, a theoretical background on storytelling and its significance for conflict resolution is reviewed, and the possibility for story-based approaches to get at some of the key dilemmas within the conflict resolution field is discussed. Finally, the potential significance of the storytelling *process* for empowerment and inclusion is examined.

## What is storytelling?

A basic definition of storytelling is someone telling someone else that something happened (Smith 1981). We are immersed in stories we are told and that we tell ourselves. History and religious teachings are often in the form of stories. Stories explain the birth of nations. We learn stories through the authoritative discourses of mass media, the academy, and literature. Stories are told in our families, in the workplace, and in the different settings of our lives. Stories may be conveyed in different media, such as films, books, television, or radio. Or storytelling can specifically refer to the oral (or signed) relating of a story, which is a social interaction (Ryan 1995). Stories have entertained people throughout time in the form of spoken word in front of a fire or at the hearthside, or a film consumed in a Cineplex with popcorn and Coke. Through these processes of storytelling and story reception, how we view the world is always being formed, reproduced, negotiated, resisted, or changed.

Stories may be fictional tales or they may relate personal experiences or group history, but all stories and other narratives are never pure fact or fiction. Even a fairy tale may be

used to express something that the teller sees as true. Meanwhile, narratives of personal or group experience are constructed and interpretive. Historical accounts are selected, framed, and used. Although the relationship between narrative and truth is complex, not all narratives are equal; they may be evaluated, and some deemed better than others (Haraway 1989). Different persons may respond to a narrative differently; their “reading” may accept, reject, or negotiate with the “text” by reframing it in some way (Bobo 1996). Within a particular social context, meaning is negotiated through narratives, and certain versions will not have currency with the group and will not be circulated (Myerhoff 1992; Urban 1991).

Storytelling, of course, is not inherently good or peaceful. Narratives may intensify social cleavages when they privilege some cultures while silencing others; when they generate or reproduce prejudicial and enemy images of other groups; and when they mask inequalities and injustice, inflame negative emotions, and misrepresent society (*destructive storytelling*). Or narratives may enhance peace when they involve a dialogue characterized by shared power; when they engender mutual recognition; and when they promote consciousness raising, serve to resist domination, or teach conflict resolution strategies (*constructive storytelling*).

## Theoretical background

Storytelling is a universal way human beings deal with knowledge. Stories have a point; they exert moral pressure. Power is always at play: Who participates in telling stories? In whose interests is the storytelling? How are social relations among groups portrayed in the text? Stories are about what should be in order to shape thought and action to bring that about. Storytellers often invoke the past to comment on problems and needs in the present in order to affect the future (e.g. Consentino 1982; Scheub 1996; Tonkin 1992).

Social conflicts are complex. Conflict here is broadly conceived to include intercommunal conflicts; identity-based conflicts in society and even in organizations; regional conflicts; and social divisions based on understandings of race, gender, class, religion, sexual, and other identities. Increasingly, conflict analysis and resolution theory and practice recognizes the complexity of conflicts, permeating and playing out in multiple dimensions of social life, and with multiple causes and abetting factors (e.g. Byrne and Carter 1996; Kriesberg 2003; Sandole 1999). Thus, social conflicts are seen to typically include both tangible (structural) and intangible (psychocultural) dimensions.

In fact, story and social structure are interrelated. Even though group history and personal narratives may be formulated in the interests of the narrator, certain events and experiences will still be acknowledged. One cannot conclude that there are no structural bases of conflict (for example, social inequalities), or that social constructed ideas (for example, gender or race) do not have material consequences. Rather, the production of meaning is an important process in social life that in intractable conflicts can have high stakes. It is the role of storytelling in the production of meaning – and access to that process – that is the focus here.

## Knowledge

Foucault (1972) compellingly argued that power precedes knowledge. Power relations between and within societies are reflected in what are seen as more legitimate or politically powerful discourses. When only those in power have access to producing knowledge,

authoritative discourses may serve the interests of power rather than truth. As a result, cultural knowledge and history may exclude or misrepresent whole groups of people, and collective trauma may remain unacknowledged and unhealed. Throughout the world, indigenous peoples have experienced the appropriation of intellectual property, as well as the exclusion, dismissal, or erasure of their knowledge systems, beliefs, languages, values, and historical record (e.g. Ewen 1994).

In a peaceful society, all persons have access to processes for developing knowledge, and research goals serve the interests of all groups. When there is peace, all feel their story is told and heard. Because storytelling is accessible, story-based interventions and projects can be a means for facilitating more voices into the public transcript. Storytelling as the spoken narrative of life experience has given a voice of resistance to whole groups otherwise excluded from the “authoritative” discourse of First World journalism, academic, and literature.

Groups sharing a certain difficult situation or set of experiences may literally establish a community base, power base, and knowledge base through sharing their stories (Plummer 1995). This knowledge, embraced and shared by group members through storytelling and a desilencing of their experience, empowers people to address previously “latent” problems and conflicts. Such mobilization, once begun, leads to groups’ understanding their problems in increasingly complex ways because, once people begin to articulate their story, they also begin to develop it and base action on it. For example, in the US, when migrant workers began to mobilize in the Midwest in the 1970s, they originally saw their conflict as being with farmers, but then began to understand the role of corporations and legal structures in this social conflict (Barger and Reza 1994).

A dilemma: while practitioners seek to develop predictable intervention models and best practices, it is critical that conflict resolution practitioners do not reproduce colonial, oppressive, or coercive relationships in their interventions by excluding the people who are being helped and their knowledge from the process. For this and other reasons, it is necessary to include local knowledge in the application of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, or post-conflict development projects (e.g. Lederach 1995; Scott 1995; Senehi 2000). Importantly, indigenous methods of conflict resolution must be recognized within our field, and points of synergy with other models, if possible, may need to be developed (Tuso 1999). Allowing a role for storytelling within the design of an intervention may be a way to begin to address these concerns.

### ***Identity***

When political debates about present needs become associated with symbols and narratives of national identity, they become harder to challenge (Horowitz 1985). Because political domination depends on culturally defined social difference, high literature is used by dominant classes to make social difference appear natural or justified (e.g. Gugelberger and Kearney 1991; Said 1993). A community’s folk stories can encode highly negative images of the enemy (Snyder 1978; Volkan 1996, 1998). Minority groups may be stereotyped in film, television, books, and other media portrayals. When there is social inequality among groups in a society, disempowered groups may not have access to dominant and powerful media of cultural production, and in this way their identity within the wider community is made invisible.

On the other hand, including all groups in cultural production promotes mutual recognition and shared power. Because the process of listening to a story involves walking

in the narrator's shoes and because stories translate well across cultures – even across cultural divides and in the context of social conflicts – stories can promote understanding of another person or culture. The goal of mutual recognition is not intended to refer to a universalizing view in which one party embraces another party as essentially the same as the self. Rather, the concept of mutual recognition encompasses a willingness of parties to engage in dialogue, which must include a struggle to articulate and examine differences. Perhaps, more important, it may be seen as recognition that both parties are within the same moral community of those entitled to fair outcomes and fair treatments within one's scope of justice (Deutsch 2000).

Citizen-diplomats come together across profound divides in order to understand social conflicts through interpersonal conversations – whether in the context of “dialogue,” “study circles,” “public conversations,” “problemsolving workshops,” or other encounters. Such interventions involve personal storytelling that may make a political impact. Harold Saunders (1999) argues that the Israeli–Palestinian peace process of 1992–1993 would not have been possible without interpersonal dialogue directed at addressing conflict issues as well as everyday intergroup interactions involving “countless Israelis and Palestinians” over the preceding twenty years.

The dilemma here is balancing diversity and unity. Stories may be a way to get at this challenge by allowing experience-based stories to coexist sensibly even if the stories are expressed by people from different standpoints, and with different political, religious, or philosophical perspectives. Grosman's play *Jerusalem Stories* (2007) seeks to bring stories together to create a recognition that there has been suffering on each side. Also, multiple identities overlap in the play, providing alternative sources of identification with the characters: family role identity, occupational identity, age, class, and gender.

### **Socialization**

Stories encode and transmit everyday understandings of conflict and what to do about it. Processes of socialization may glorify and/or justify violence or recruit military volunteers, child soldiers, and martyrs. Modern educational institutions may deny identity needs in ways that are exclusionary. Education curricula may omit the achievements and perspectives of certain groups of people. Textbooks may misrepresent history or the experience of particular groups. Sometimes public education is a harsh means for resocializing indigenous peoples and immigrants.

Storytelling, which is a significant means of socializing children across cultures, can play an important role in peace education and empowering young people to be peacemakers themselves (Senehi and Byrne 2006). When youth from areas experiencing intercommunal conflicts hear each other's stories, as well as the stories of people from other intercommunal conflicts, they realize how much people on both sides of the conflict have suffered, and that they are not the only ones suffering from this social problem and trauma, and they become motivated to work for change and peace (Helsing *et al.* 2006). This is significant, as young people are the citizens and leaders of tomorrow.

A dilemma here is continuity versus change. In some cases, cultural survival may depend on social adaptation. Cultural survival may involve a constant negotiation between capitulation and resistance in interactions with surrounding cultures. Cultures conflict, interact, evolve, and overlap, defying categorization.

### **Emotions**

Intergroup conflicts and violence are fueled by powerful emotions of fear, mistrust, anger, hatred, and grief, as well as self-loathing. In conflict, emotions may get in the way of addressing a problem or conflict cautiously and morally. Leaders may tap into intense emotions – for example, the love, grief, and anger associated with the violent death of a loved one – in order to foment hatred. Unacknowledged collective trauma (and all the emotions subsumed therein) is an obstacle to a traumatized group's healing and intergroup rapprochement (Brooks 1999).

Stories simultaneously engage mind and heart. Through storytelling and other cultural and social rituals, information and argument is conveyed, but gains added power through the emotional impact of the story that is sensed and felt by the participants (Urban 1991). Storytelling – interpersonally or in the context of truth commissions or dialogue groups – can be a means of facing history and healing in the aftermath of intercommunal violence (e.g. Bar-On 2000; Belton 1999; Minow 1998; Saunders 1999). Storytelling in a safe place, such as a home, among persons who share a common hardship or experience of oppression, can be an occasion when their perspectives, silenced elsewhere, become prominent, and they are able to comment upon, interpret, strategize about, and heal from their difficulties (hooks 1990). This can be both emotionally comforting and a form of resistance.

Stories' ability to touch the heart makes them a powerful tool for social change (Henderson 1996). Gandhi argued that to encourage personal transformation in others “you must not merely satisfy reason, but you must move the heart also” (cited in Barash 1991: 560). Because of their emotional impact, stories exert moral pressure.

Storytelling connects people in ways that bring affirmation and pleasure, and this is a critical resource in the often painful, despairing, and fatiguing efforts to bring peace and social change where it is most needed. The professional US storyteller Bill Harley (1996) stated that even more profound than stories' role in education or protest is the “joy” experienced in the storytelling interaction. This builds bonds of community among people as they share laughter and tears. Also, storytelling may promote joyful and playful interactions that are a critical resource for peacemaking as well as healing from trauma. Often, peacemaking processes move forward during the time between negotiation sessions when parties share stories about their families, personal interests, or playfully share their games or art forms (e.g. Mitchell 2000; Savir 1998; Schirch 2005). Clowns Without Borders help comfort young people in the aftermath of recent violence.

The dilemma is how to embrace and learn from our emotions (Greenspan 2003) without being hijacked by them (Goleman 1995). Although destructive storytelling may inflame emotions, storytelling can also promote empathy and moral inspiration. In fact, human rights movements have been effective first through the articulation of a narrative, not only for themselves, but also for others, often expressed to a global audience through film or story – for example, Alan Paton's *Cry, the Beloved Country*, an international bestseller, published in 1948, regarding racial oppression in South Africa (Schaeffer and Smith 2004). As movements develop and social change occurs over decades, stories become increasingly disseminated, diverse, and complex.

### **Morality**

Conflicts framed in moral terms are particularly difficult to resolve. When the opposing party is viewed as immoral, this affects the willingness to resolve and choices regarding



how a particular conflict will be addressed. On the other hand, a moral vision is often what compels persons to serve in conflict as intermediaries, to advocate for the disempowered, and to facilitate the voice of the unheard or oppressed, often in the face of physical threat and at great personal cost.

Stories, even personal stories, always imply how things should be. All religions encompass a body of stories that encode understandings of right and wrong. Across cultures, folktales demonstrate the consequences of acting immorally, and the rewards of moral action. Robert Coles (1989) argues that stories evoke a moral imagination that calls persons to question their assumptions and make choices motivated by unselfish ends. John Paul Lederach (2005) argues that the arts are a critical way for peacebuilders to call on a moral imagination that allows for an understanding of complexity, paradox, indigenous knowledge, and relationships that is critical for taking the field of conflict analysis and resolution – or “conflict transformation” – to the next level.

There are two related dilemmas: first, how to address value conflicts, especially those identified with different cultures; and second, how to talk about values without religious proselytizing. In their workshops, the storytellers January Kiefer (1995) and Blake Travis (1995) present an unresolved dilemma as a basis for group discussion. Forum theater also presents social situations, but then invites audience members to come onstage and take the place of actors, and take different actions to see how that will affect the subsequent actions and interactions in the play (Boal 1985). Based on research in Bosnia-Herzegovina from September 2000 through December 2001, Craig Zelizer found an important role for the arts-based process in helping raise awareness of the impending danger of violence, calling for peace, and “keeping the war on the world’s conscience” (2003: 72).

Value conflicts, also, are one of the most difficult types of conflicts to both talk about and address. Stories are a means to engage with moral knowledge – often through example or metaphor – that is indirect and acceptable across cultures and in interreligious or secular contexts, and that is elicitive and proscriptive rather than prescriptive. This can also allow for addressing controversial cultural practices in a way that allows those external to a culture to recognize that culture’s own internal movements for change, so that would-be interveners can potentially serve as external allies rather than, even unintentionally, reproducing colonial relations with an implication that one culture is morally or otherwise superior to another.

### ***Time and memory***

Time, memory, and history are significant in intergroup conflicts because the conflict is often framed as being about past events that have been unjust or that have disrupted relationships. Memories of past conflict, violence, and injustice are passed from generation to generation (Volkan 1996). Conflicts may involve a claim to a glorious, or at least a different, past. Post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation may involve coming to terms with and healing from the past.

Stories, as narrative, have a dimension of time that mimics the dimension of time in life, and are how experience is best articulated. Stories also disrupt the experience of the linearity of time. Often, when people listen to stories, it is as if time stands still. Hours of listening, film viewing, or novel reading can seem like only a few moments. Through stories, people time-travel; they visit the past, reliving their “glory days” or remembering a lost loved one. Narrative invokes the past to comment on the present in order to envision

and shape the future (Scheub 1996; Tonkin 1992). The past, present, and future mutually determine one another as parts of a whole (Carr 1986).

The dilemma here is how to deal with the complexity of social violence, and the competing demands of justice versus mercy, retributive justice versus restorative justice, and honoring the past versus moving forward. Healing circles, victim–offender mediation, and truth and reconciliation commissions – grounded in the telling of personal stories – allow the stories of victims, offenders, and other community members to share in making sense of crime and violence in a way that may potentially allow for personal and social healing, improved relationships within the community, an opportunity for communities to identify and address root or structural problems in their society, and for individuals and communities to be accountable as well (e.g. Pranis *et al.* 2003). In Belfast, Healing through Remembering is an organization that seeks to archive stories and narratives from people who wish to tell their experiences of the conflict in Northern Ireland (Community Relations Council 2002). Although the nature of these processes needs to be continuously examined and evaluated, it is clear that a space for personal storytelling can create a platform that allows for the development of more complexity within the public consciousness about what has happened in their society and what is needed to move forward.

### **Geography**

Many intergroup conflicts involve overlapping claims for sovereignty over a particular territory. Conflicts occur between indigenous people and settlers, and between waves of settlers to a region, all of whom over time develop powerful ties to place. Arguably, such conflict bases are especially resistant – if not wholly resistant – to anything but a zero-sum outcome (Agnew 1989). Often, different cultural worldviews may reflect vastly different ways of understanding the environment, nature, and animals, causing or exacerbating intense values conflicts on these issues.

Geography (so tangible) and stories (so intangible) at first may seem unrelated. But stories are often tied to geographic places that have cultural and symbolic significance for individuals and particular communities (e.g. Lane 1988). Particular locations figure prominently in religious, national, and historical narratives.

The dilemma here: is it possible to legitimate different connections to geographical locations? The *Jerusalem Stories* project described at the beginning of the chapter seeks to tell the stories of “different valid relationships to Jerusalem.” Is it possible for story-based projects to expand possibilities beyond a zero-sum outcome on conflicts in which land is a primary issue?

### **The storytelling process: empowerment, inclusion, flexibility**

Storytelling is part of the social construction of meaning, but it is also a type of process. This section relates especially to the spoken (or signed) relating of a story, for which the teller and listeners are physically present, and which is a social interaction (Ryan 1995). Many aspects of the storytelling process contribute to its ability to promote inclusion and empowerment. Further, because of its flexibility and form, storytelling allows for what James Scott (1995) calls *metis*, that is the importance that intervention projects be implemented slowly, gradually, grounded in local knowledge, and able to shift and adapt when necessary.

### ***Storytelling is low-tech***

The instrument of storytelling is the voice and body of the storyteller, and so storytelling exists in all human cultures. Because no costly equipment or special training is required, story-based projects for peacebuilding can be conducted regardless of economic constraints. Storytelling has been a means of resistance even in the restricted conditions of imprisonment or slavery; as James Scott puts it, “short of killing its bearer, the human voice is irrepressible” (1990: 163).

### ***Everybody gets it***

Although understanding stories across cultures may be incomplete, stories do translate fairly well across cultures. In the context of conflict, the fewer the impediments to understanding, the better. Everyone can be involved in a story-based intervention on a relatively equal footing.

### ***The skills are easy to acquire***

Although some storytellers are better than others, and even earn a living as professional performers, everyone can tell a story, and stories are often compelling in themselves no matter who is the teller. It is usually feasible to implement story-based projects because it is reasonable to expect that people will be able to tell stories even if they have not done that very self-consciously in the past. This promotes inclusion in the project.

### ***Awareness-of-self-in-context***

Personal storytelling done in groups can be a means of consciousness raising and community building among people whose lives may be shaped in similar ways by social conditions. For youth in conflict zones, getting together to share experiences has been an effective way to reflect critically on one’s own experience and culture (Helsing *et al.* 2006). For others, having a space to tell stories led persons to develop a clearer sense of their own values and to work to promote those values through storytelling (Senehi 2000, 2002; Senehi and Byrne 2006).

### ***Openness***

Storytelling is a means through which the storyteller opens up to listeners, but the degree of openness can be controlled. Storytelling can range from selecting a classic fable that distances the teller from the message to crafting an autobiographical narrative. Story-based peacebuilding projects can be designed to allow for a gradual, and thus safer, entry into the process of getting to know others.

### ***A safe environment***

Storytellers can be intentional about creating an environment where the participants in their storytelling activities feel safe. Storytellers may model inclusion and respect through a highly participatory storytelling style. Storytellers may also seek to create a safe world

through the lessons of inclusion, interdependence, and respect that they incorporate into their storytelling.

### ***The teller is accessible***

When the storyteller is physically present for a spoken word event, the storyteller's accessibility creates an opportunity for exchange and relationship between the teller and participants in the storytelling event. If the position of storyteller is a position of leadership and power, audience members have access to that power. Storytellers define good storytelling in large part by the relationship that is developed with the audience.

### ***Shared experience***

Storytelling builds community because it is a shared experience. Storytelling can be a pleasurable activity in which community members participate. The fact that storytelling can be pleasurable and fascinating promotes inclusivity because more people will want to be involved, to participate, and to collaborate in such projects.

### ***Storytelling is intimate***

Storytelling is an intimate experience that is shared simultaneously. Those involved in storytelling laugh together, share tears together, unconsciously hold their breath together when they want to hear more, creating the silence that happens when people are listening closely. As a social interaction, involving emotions, storytelling creates feelings and sensations that can be felt in the body. When someone responds to another's story in a verbal or visceral way, this affects relationships.

### ***Co-creation***

Storytelling is seen by tellers as co-creation because spoken word does not come with pictures, and listeners have to visualize the story and fill in the details themselves. Also, much storytelling – both traditional and contemporary styles – involves forms of audience participation. Because the teller is able to easily adapt the storytelling performance in response to the audience, an element of unpredictability may enter into the storytelling experience, as neither the teller nor listener has total control.

### ***Elicitive teaching***

Although stories may bring up issues in an effort to create social change, storytelling for peacebuilding must not be prescriptive or didactic, which objectifies the receiver(s) of the story. Rather, storytelling must remain collaborative, non-coercive, dialogic, and intersubjective. For example, Carol Grosman, the developer of *Jerusalem Stories*, is frequently asked what she is trying to say with her production. She insists that she is not trying to get across a particular message, but simply putting the stories out there so people can hear them, and to provide a context for a virtual dialogue during hostilities.

## Conclusion

On Wednesday 25 July, the first *Jerusalem Stories* Performance Exhibit Dialogue, the Arabic production, was held at the American Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem, a hotel that has been visited by numerous heads of state and movie stars for nearly a century. Stairs to the second floor led up to an open area, where the Lloyd Wolf photographs were exhibited. Off this open area was the entrance to a large room where the performances were held. The room was packed almost to capacity with the sixty people who attended the performance, including young people and adults, women and men, and two of the Palestinians whose stories were featured in the play.

After the performance, most of the audience stayed for discussion, which took place on an expansive terrace that overlooked the hotel's courtyard, and was decorated with beautiful plants and flowering shrubs. A long table was elegantly laid out with china, and coffee, tea, water, grapes, and cookies. Arranged on the courtyard were three circles of about twelve chairs each, well spread out from each other. A fourth seating area was made up of a magnificent inlaid wood couch and two chairs, upholstered in a deep red material, and a number of chairs. One of the persons whose story was told in the play sat on the wooden couch under the arbor with other members of his family, including two older children. He said that it was important that people heard his story. Ten other people had joined them, including men and women. They talked.

A week later, the fourth performance of *Jerusalem Stories*, in Hebrew, with a different actor and actress, was held in a synagogue in West Jerusalem. About 100 people attended, including one of the persons whose story was included in the play. In a conversation a few days earlier, he had said it was important to him that his story be told.

In the coming weeks more performances were held, reaching an audience of more than 600 people. A large majority of the audience members who answered surveys said they felt this project should continue and the play should be seen by others. *Jerusalem Stories* Performance Exhibit Dialogue is only one project in a larger program that seeks to disseminate the stories of Jerusalemites through a newspaper series and books, and to take the exhibit and play on tour internationally, potentially reaching tens of thousands of people.

The ultimate argument of this chapter is that an important part of peacebuilding would be to infuse civil society with different innovative story-based projects. Future tasks are to evaluate such projects, examine and critique the risks involved, and provide diverse models of best practices. Taking a major step toward including evaluation in this type of intervention, Carol Grosman has established a team of evaluators for the *Jerusalem Stories* Performance Exhibit Dialogue, which includes myself, Maya Kahanoff, and Nabil Shibly, to provide feedback and analysis of the project, and this evaluation is in process at the time of this writing. It is important to interrogate how we use stories. See Senehi (2002) for a discussion on “destructive storytelling” and Shuman (2007) for a discussion on “using other people's stories.”

Stories have been used in societies throughout time and in many ways and for many reasons, including for purposes of mediation, diplomacy, cross-cultural relationship building, social activism, and social change (e.g. Cruikshank 1998; Hale 1998; Scheub 1998). Because culture – as transmitted through story – contains shared knowledge that everyone buys into, and also because culture – as transmitted through story – can be reinterpreted, reframed, and resisted by individual tellers, storytelling has the potential to get at the intersection between structure and human agency. Not only can story-based interventions be grounded in the real stories of people, but they can also be brought into a public context,

thereby entering the public transcript and impacting shared knowledge. Further, they may be disseminated through more mass media, such as theater, newspapers, films, and books. In these ways, story-based projects have the potential to empower individuals and groups, and to bridge the personal and political.

Storytelling is an important resource to all who intervene in conflicts and build peace in various ways throughout the world, including mediators, diplomats, health care workers, NGO and INGO workers, and social workers. Storytelling is also an important resource for peace education across the disciplines and in every grade level. In order to develop these opportunities, and in order to identify and minimize the risks involved, it is necessary to provide opportunities for storytellers and peacebuilders to connect.

Toward this end the Arthur V. Mauro Centre at St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba, established a global initiative on Storytelling for Peace and Renewing Community (SPARC). A SPARC Summer Institute brings storytellers doing innovative work to teach college courses to graduate students. As part of this initiative, the Winnipeg International Storytelling Festival: Storytelling on the Path to Peace was established to celebrate the art of storytelling and also to bring together storyteller-peacebuilders from throughout the world to offer workshops on innovative practices for a diversity of practitioners. The Festival encompasses a School Program that provides "StoryShows" (storytelling performances) and "StoryShops" (storytelling workshops) to school students from each grade level, K–12, reaching more than 4,000 students in its second year.

Throughout time and across cultures, people have gathered in circles – all equidistant from the center, as the Abenaki storyteller Joseph Bruchac (1995) often points out – to talk about important matters and to tell stories. Again, the argument of this chapter is simple: storytelling has a critical role in peacebuilding and deep democracy, and spaces and models need to be created to facilitate that. This is a matter for everyone to consider, even architects, because arguably good physical spaces for public storytelling are diminishing. At stake is individual and community empowerment in making sense of the past, addressing present problems, and articulating a vision of the future in order to make that happen. This is especially critical for violence prevention; for healing, justice, and peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict, violence, and trauma; and for finding the way out of present conflict and confusion.

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# 15 A capacity-building approach to conflict resolution

*Allan Edward Barsky*

## Introduction

When theorists and practitioners think of conflict resolution (CR), they often envision the parties in conflict being brought together to engage in some type of dialogue. When people are willing and ready to meet and discuss their differences, bringing them together makes sense. Often, however, people embroiled in conflict do not want to meet. They may feel too angry, scared, distrusting, or depressed to engage in any form of collaborative conflict resolution (Wilmot and Hocker 2007). They may also lack the resources to engage effectively, even if they are motivated to meet. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the capacity-building approach to CR, an approach designed specifically to prepare parties, enhancing their motivation, skills, and resources so they can interact in CR processes more constructively (Barsky 2007). A capacity-building approach can be used as a prelude to a full range of collaborative CR processes, including negotiation, mediation, family group conferencing, healing circles, and public discussions. It may be used with one, some, or all of the parties involved in the conflict. In some cases, the process of building capacity in just one party leads to successful resolution of the conflict, with little or no need for further professional intervention.

Although the term *capacity-building approach* is relatively new to the field of CR, the basic tenets of this approach have been used and developed under different names, including premediation, trust-building, and conflict assessment. Irving and Benjamin (2002) popularized the term “premediation” to describe processes a mediator could use to prepare clients for working more productively once they met together for mediation. Given the therapeutic bent of their mediation model, Irving and Benjamin’s premediation approach focuses on helping people work through emotional issues that may inhibit their ability to act rationally and focus on the problems that need to be resolved. Premediation may also include teaching each party communication and negotiation skills, raising their awareness of dysfunctional patterns of interacting, and coaching them on how to interact more effectively in the future.

A similar pre-CR process is called *trust building*. Trust building entails various strategies designed to help both parties overcome fears, suspicions, and wariness, enabling them to engage more collaboratively (Menkel-Meadow *et al.* 2005). To help parties build trust, capacity-building practitioners can coach them on how to act in more trustworthy ways, for instance by opening new avenues of communication, by acting reliably, or by making symbolic gestures toward peace and reconciliation. Once parties have built trust, they can participate more effectively in mediation or other collaborative CR processes.

*Conflict assessment* refers to the initial, exploratory stage of a CR process in which one or more CR professionals help the parties analyze the nature of a conflict. Conflict assessment

may be used to help parties prepare for negotiation, mediation, or other processes. Conflict assessment also helps CR professionals determine which types of further CR processes could be useful. Conflict assessment typically includes identifying the key stakeholders, determining key issues in dispute, analyzing the feasibility of different CR strategies, and designing a plan for work (Bean *et al.* 2007).

A capacity-building approach (CBA) differs from other pre-CR approaches in terms of its breadth. CBA is designed to enhance a party's ability to resolve conflicts by addressing all realms of their being: physical, psychological, social, and spiritual. The CBA practitioner begins by helping a party assess strengths and limitations in being able to deal effectively with the other party.<sup>1</sup> The CBA practitioner then helps the party identify ways to develop CR capacity – cultivating strengths and fostering capacities where limitations have been identified. To illustrate the holistic nature of CBA, consider the following scenario:

Shawn is the 16-year-old son of Marsha, a devoutly religious woman whose husband died in a car accident four years ago. Marsha recently discovered Shawn had been involved in a sexual relationship with another young man. Given her religious convictions against homosexuality, she told Shawn that he had to refrain from any further homosexual activity and go for pastoral counseling. A heated argument ensued. Marsha told Shawn that he had to leave home so he would not infect his younger brothers and sisters with his sick and sinful behavior. Shawn took to the streets and has been sleeping in parks and youth shelters.

Because Shawn is under 18, this scenario raises child protection concerns. The family might be identified by protective services through a report by teachers, relatives, shelter workers, street outreach counselors, or others who may be concerned about Shawn's welfare. Protective services might be inclined to bring Shawn and Marsha together so they can work through their differences and ensure Shawn's welfare and safety. The protective services worker might have training in social work, mental health, or case management. The protective services worker might also engage the services of a child protection mediator, an independent party to help everyone work through the conflict (Barsky 1997; Center for Policy Research 2002; Ministry of the Attorney General, British Columbia 2007). But what if Shawn does not want to meet with his mother? Even if he does agree to meet with her, how productive will the meeting be given the current stresses and challenges that Shawn is experiencing? Rather than bringing Shawn and Marsha together right away, the protection worker assigns a CBA practitioner to work with Shawn. The CBA practitioner uses CBA to help Shawn build capacity so he can engage more effectively in any further dealings with Marsha. The following analysis demonstrates how Shawn and the CBA practitioner can assess and develop his physical, psychological, social, and spiritual capacities. A separate CBA practitioner could also work with Marsha. For brevity's sake, the following examples focus on helping Shawn.

### **Assessing and building physical capacity**

As any parent can tell you, young children are more likely to whine, fight, and have tantrums when they are tired or hungry (Koch 2003). If a parent wants to have a more reasoned discussion with a child, it is better to wait until the child has had sufficient sleep and food. Actually, people of all ages can engage more constructively in conflict resolution when they are well rested and well fed. In theoretical terms, Maslow's (1987) hierarchy

of needs suggests that people have a sequence of needs, ranging from more basic needs for survival such as physiological and safety needs to higher needs such as love, belonging, esteem, and self-actualization. A person's attention, motivation, and actions tend to focus on satisfying basic needs first, making it difficult or impossible for a person to focus on higher needs unless and until the more basic needs have been satisfied.

Although many CR approaches are designed to help people achieve higher needs, few focus on helping people satisfy their most basic physical needs. A transformative approach (Bush and Folger 2005), for instance, helps people achieve empowerment and recognition, which may fit with belonging, esteem, and self-actualization needs. Similarly, a narrative approach (Winslade and Monk 2000) helps people reconstruct their realities, which tends to fit with higher-level esteem and self-actualization needs. If a person lacks the basic necessities of physical health and safety, how can CR professionals expect that person to participate fully in processes designed to satisfy higher order needs?

In other words, most CR processes assume the parties come into the process having their basic needs already met. To ensure that each party is truly prepared to engage in CR approaches aimed at higher needs, CBA suggests assessing the person's physical needs, resources available to satisfy those needs, and the challenges the person has in fulfilling them. Physical needs include food, water, air, sleep, medical care, shelter, and freedom from physical harm. Socioeconomic status and poverty are primary determinants of whether a person is able to satisfy basic physical needs. Environmental stresses, such as pollution and crime, may also affect a person's ability to satisfy these needs.

The CBA practitioner helps Shawn assess his physical needs and capacity to meet these needs. Shawn has been living on the street, indicating he is facing several risk factors. He lacks adequate housing and financial resources, making it difficult to have sufficient sleep, food, and safety. He is following a sustenance lifestyle, living hour to hour and day to day in terms of where he will find his next meal or place to sleep. Although meeting with his mother might be desirable, doing so while he feels tired, hungry, and afraid for his life makes it difficult for him to participate fully and effectively. Simply put, he has more immediate concerns.

When a client has difficulty meeting basic physical needs, a CBA practitioner may feel inclined to offer the client money, food, shelter, or other resources to satisfy these needs. Rather than simply giving the client such resources – out of one's own pocket or from charity – the CBA practitioner can help the client explore ways of satisfying his or her own needs. Although Shawn lacks basic resources, he has somehow found ways to survive on his own, perhaps finding refuge at youth shelters or taking odd jobs to pay for food. The CBA practitioner may assist Shawn by helping him identify more stable sources of housing, food, and so on. The CBA practitioner empowers Shawn by building on his strengths, providing encouragement and support, teaching him self-advocacy skills, and linking him with resources necessary to fulfill his physical needs (Kirst-Ashman and Hull 2006). When Shawn meets with his mother, he will be in a better position to focus on higher-order issues, for instance the rejection from his mother, how he will deal with the conflict between his sexuality and his mother's belief system, and what type of relationship they may have in the future. He will not simply acquiesce to living with her, on her conditions, because he has no other options for meeting his basic needs.

Physical, psychological, and social pain are often interconnected (MacDonald and Leary 2005). Shawn feels hurt and abandoned by his mother's rejection. As a result, he may experience physical pain, such as headaches, stomach aches, and nausea. These physical symptoms make it harder for Shawn to re-engage with his mother. By helping Shawn find

relief for his physical pain, the CBA practitioner also makes it easier for Shawn to resolve conflicts with his mother. Alternatively, the practitioner may need to help Shawn address the psychological and social pain, as described below, before the physical distress can be alleviated.

### **Assessing and building psychological capacity**

Whereas many methods of CR ignore the physical capacities of the parties entering their processes, most methods of CR do take psychological capacity into account (Beck and Frost 2006). For instance, when determining whether potential clients are appropriate for mediation, family group conferencing, or other processes, CR practitioners screen for mental capacity concerns such as uncontrolled substance abuse, mental illness, and dementia. Most CR literature refers to “mental capacity” rather than “psychological capacity.” This chapter uses the term *psychological capacity* because it has broader connotations. Whereas mental capacity is often used as a legal term to distinguish who is permitted legally to enter into contracts or other legal processes, psychological capacity connotes a broader range of factors. For example, whereas a psychological trait such as “shyness” affects a person’s capacity to participate in CR, shyness itself would not be a barrier to legal recognition of mental capacity.

When CR practitioners assess that a client lacks the mental capacity required for participating in their CR processes, many simply deny the client CR services, perhaps referring them elsewhere. CBA does not look at psychological capacity as an either/or dichotomy, but rather as a continuum. CBA begins with the premise that each individual has a constellation of psychological traits, conditions, strengths, and challenges that can help and/or limit the person’s ability to participate effectively in CR processes. The role of the CBA practitioner is to help the client build on psychological strengths, and deal with psychological challenges.

Psychological theory and research identify a vast range of psychological processes that can affect a person’s capacity to deal with conflict and conflict resolution. Some of the more serious psychological conditions include substance abuse and addiction, major psychiatric disorders (e.g. depression or schizophrenia), personality disorders (e.g. narcissistic, borderline, or social anxiety disorder), and cognitive abilities (e.g. thought disorders and brain injury) (Boyan and Termini 2005; Eddy 2003). Clients with these conditions may require referrals for psychotherapy, psychotropic medication, or other forms of treatment.

As a youth living on the street, Shawn has started to abuse alcohol and drugs as a way of coping with the stress and uncertainty in his life. Until he can gain control of his substance abuse behavior, his capacity to participate in CR may be compromised by problems in rational thinking, impulse control, and memory. Even if Shawn is not ready to forgo drugs altogether, the CBA practitioner can assist Shawn with ways to minimize the effects of his drug use (e.g. by moderating his use, not using before a CR session, switching to less harmful drugs) (Futerman *et al.* 2005).

Given the space limitations of this chapter, it is not possible to explore the full spectrum of psychological capacities that could be addressed within CBA. The following analysis provides three examples of psychological processes that are pertinent for virtually any CR situation: self-efficacy, resilience, and emotional intelligence.

Self-efficacy refers to a person’s sense of his or her capacity to accomplish a certain mission or task (Bandura 1997). Research on self-efficacy suggests that people with high self-efficacy are better able to engage collaboratively with others (Fernandez-Ballesteros *et*

*al.* 2002). People with low self-efficacy tend to avoid conflict rather than engage constructively (Desivilya and Eizen 2005). People with low self-efficacy tend to have problems with self-control. They act on impulses that seem to satisfy short-term wishes rather than behave in ways that take others' needs into account, which would help themselves in the longer term (Dewitte and De Cremer 2001). They may also resort to passive-aggressive behaviors in an effort to mask their sense of weakness. Accordingly, CBA practitioners can help clients participate more effectively in CR by helping them build stronger senses of self-efficacy.

As a teen just coming to terms with his own sexuality, Shawn faces a number of challenges to his self-efficacy. Adolescence is typically a time of developing a sense of personal identity, including sexual identity and similarity to or difference from one's parents. Given the negativity of Shawn's first coming out experience with his mother, he feels confused and self-doubting. He may avoid contact with his mother, or put on airs of strength if forced to meet her. Poor impulse control may lead him to say hurtful things to his mother that he may later regret. To help him respond more constructively, the CBA practitioner could help Shawn build his self-efficacy, for instance by helping him through the psychological stages of coming out, by linking him with others who have successfully made the transition, and by helping him replace negative images and stereotypes of gays with more positive images and examples (Van Wormer *et al.* 2000).

Resilience refers to the capacity of a person to respond positively despite experiencing stressful events (Bonanno 2004). Initially, resilience theory focused on the ability of certain children to develop positively even though they had endured extremely dysfunctional upbringings (e.g. having alcoholic, physically abusive, or sexually abusive parents). Empirical research has identified a number of protective factors that help people cope, and adapt positively when confronted with stress. These protective factors include possessing good problemsolving skills, a sense of humor, an easygoing temperament, hope, and creative thinking (Alvord and Grados 2005; Ong *et al.* 2006). Because resilience and protective factors are related to responses to stress, they can be applied to coping with conflict situations. In other words, to help a client prepare for participation in a CR process, a CBA practitioner can help the client build resilience. The practitioner helps the client assess which protective factors the client possesses and which ones the client could develop. The practitioner then helps the client enhance existing protective factors and foster ones that are missing.

Initially, Shawn feels despondent. His father is dead. His mother rejects him. He has no home. He has few job skills or prospects. Yet the CBA practitioner can help Shawn identify resilience factors, for instance the problemsolving skills that have allowed Shawn to survive on the streets thus far. He has been able to find temporary housing and he has managed to avoid becoming the victim of violent crime. As regards his sexual orientation, Shawn seems quite dour. Without negating his feelings, the CBA practitioner helps Shawn explore a more lighthearted view of his situation. "Ten years from now, do you think that you will be able to look back on any of this and laugh?" After a long pause, Shawn admits that "it was sort of funny the way my mother asked if being gay meant that I wanted to be a girl and dress up in women's clothes." Eventually, he begins to realize that he does not have to remain so grim. He can take a difficult situation and find the humor in it. In subsequent sessions, the CBA practitioner helps Shawn build creative thinking skills, hope, and other protective factors, thus preparing him to participate more effectively in future CR processes with his mother.

Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to a person's relative "ability to validly reason with



emotions and to use emotions to enhance thought” (Mayer 2005). EI includes the abilities to accurately perceive, identify, understand, access, and reflectively regulate emotions, both in the self and in others (Matthews *et al.* 2006; Moss *et al.* 2006). Whereas some CR models focus on engaging parties in rational problemsolving processes, others explicitly help parties use their emotions more effectively as they negotiate (Fisher and Shapiro 2005). Although CR processes can help people manage their emotions when the parties meet, the advantage of CBA is that it can be used to enhance each party’s EI prior to bringing parties together, in a private and more controlled environment.

Shawn presents himself as self-absorbed. He is so consumed with his own hurt, fear, and anger that he has no empathy for his mother’s situation. If Shawn were to meet his mother at this point, he would have great difficulty appreciating her points, or even giving his full attention when she speaks. The CBA practitioner prepares Shawn by conducting a role-reversal exercise with Shawn. The practitioner plays Shawn and Shawn plays his mother. They re-enact one of their arguments, so Shawn gains a better understanding of Marsha’s perspective. He begins to realize that, whereas he has had several years to process his being gay, discovering his sexuality came as a complete shock to his mother. More importantly, Shawn begins to learn strategies to build his EI, learning how to empathize with his mother’s feelings and how to manage his own feelings and responses. In other words, he has learned how to mediate his own emotions.

### **Assessing and building social capacity**

Social capacity may be defined as the support that a person may access from family, friends, neighbors, schools, employers, cultural communities, and other social systems. Social capacity depends on the availability of support, as well as the person’s ability to make use of support. Family members may offer moral support or financial resources, for instance, but if the person is too proud to accept help then the person’s social capacity is diminished. Further, social systems may offer both positive support and negative support (Kirst-Ashman and Hull 2006). Negative support may include discrimination, unreasonable expectations, or other dysfunctional patterns of relationships. A CBA practitioner can prepare parties for CR by building their social capacities (Bowen *et al.* 2003).

As with psychological capacity, one aspect of social capacity is resilience. From a social perspective, enhancing resilience requires building positive support systems. Building protective factors in families reduces conflict and problem behaviors of children. Ensuring that a child has a good relationship with at least one caring and competent adult, whether or not that adult is a family member, enhances the child’s ability to cope with conflict, loss, and other forms of stress (Alvord and Grados 2005; Kumpfer and Alvarado 2003).

Being emotionally and physically cut off from his mother and other family members, Shawn’s ability to cope with conflict is compromised. The CBA practitioner could link Shawn with a caring adult, such as a teacher in an alternative school program, a volunteer from a big brother program, or a supportive social worker in a residential facility for street youth. The practitioner could also explore whether Shawn already has a supportive relationship that he could build upon. Perhaps Shawn has an older cousin or sports coach who could offer guidance and nurture. This person could also participate alongside Shawn in subsequent CR processes, to provide moral support.

Social capacity building also requires developing community capacity (Bogenschneider 1996; Saegert 2006). Community resources may include formal and informal support groups, advocacy groups, cultural groups, peer groups, and so on. These resources may



offer tangible support (money, housing, food), as well as intangible support (caring, guidance, structure). Once again, the presence of resources is not sufficient. The CBA practitioner should help clients make appropriate use of the resources.

Shawn grew up going to church and feeling connected with the entire church community. Since starting to come to terms with his sexual orientation, however, he has felt alienated by the church's stance on homosexuality. He questions his identification with the church, and does not feel that he can approach clergy or other parishioners for help. The CBA practitioner could help Shawn decide whether he wants to try to repair this relationship or to explore alternatives. Shawn decides to join a church that embraces gay congregants. The church offers him a sense of belonging and respect making him feel more confident when addressing his mother over their conflict.

Building social capacity could include fostering better interpersonal skills, such as communication, assertiveness, and etiquette. Communication skills include both speaking and listening. Shawn, for instance, speaks clearly, but does he know how to listen actively (Kirst-Ashman and Hull 2006)? The CBA practitioner could help Shawn practice listening skills, such as paraphrasing and reflecting feeling to show empathy to others, or using body language in a manner that conveys interest and concern. In terms of assertiveness, does Shawn know how to convey his interests firmly but respectfully and without putting the other person on the defensive? The practitioner could videotape role-plays with Shawn and provide him with feedback on how to address conflict directly, without becoming aggressive. In terms of etiquette, does Shawn convey good manners and politeness? The CBA could help Shawn identify the norms of communication expected by his mother. Whereas she may view a direct confrontation from her son as rude or demeaning, she may be more amenable to a less direct approach. For instance, rather than telling his mother that she has no right to judge him, Shawn could ask, "Could you help me understand what it might take for you to accept me?" The practitioner coaches Shawn on how to raise issues in a gentler manner, allowing his mother to save face and respond more positively. Shawn can use his newly acquired social skills to negotiate more effectively with his mother. He can also use these skills to pursue a more spiritual connection with his mother, as described below.

### **Assessing and building spiritual capacity**

Spiritual capacity refers to a person's sense of meaning and place in life. Spirituality may be expressed through religious beliefs and practices, but religion is not the only manner in which spirituality may be expressed. People may express spirituality through meaningful work, family relationships, helping others, promoting social justice, protecting the environment, creating art, or whatever else provides them with a sense of purpose (Frankl 1946). Spiritual capacity provides people with strength to cope with conflict, loss, and other forms of stress (Kirst-Ashman and Hull 2006). Spiritual capacity provides people with not only the ability to cope with stress but the ability to grow from it. Thus, a CBA practitioner can help a client prepare for more effective CR by fostering spiritual capacity.

Transformative mediation, healing circles, and a number of other models of CR recognize the spiritual component of managing conflict. Some view conflict as a threat to spirituality, as people in conflict tend to focus on self-interest and material concerns rather than relationships, values, and other more spiritual concerns (Bush and Folger 2005; Cloke 2005). Spirituality can be used within CR processes to foster meaningful connections, to heal pain, and to promote personal growth and self-actualization. When people experience

traumatic conflicts such as terrorist attacks or war, they may feel inclined to respond with vengeance and violence. Spirituality helps people reject such inclinations and respond in a manner that promotes peace or other important values. Rather than try to avenge the murder of a loved one by seeking retribution, one could make meaning of the death by promoting non-violence. Spirituality promotes dialogue and healing rather than reprisal and destruction (Fuentes 2004).

Although spirituality may be fostered within a CR process, CBA enhances a party's spiritual capacity prior to engaging directly with the other party. Although it would be inappropriate to impose a particular form of spirituality on clients, it is certainly ethical and useful to help clients explore their spirituality and consider ways of developing even stronger connections with spirituality. To help a client explore current and potential spiritual capacity, a CBA practitioner could ask:

- What types of goals and ambitions give your life a sense of meaning?
- How has religion or spirituality helped you deal with conflict or challenges in the past?
- What meaning do you take from the current conflict?
- How can you take what seems like a very sad, angry, or hurtful experience and turn it into a challenge that gives you a sense of hope, purpose, inspiration, or meaningful direction?

Having been rejected by his most important family members and friends, Shawn feels a sense of anomie or malaise. He has little energy or motivation to get up in the morning, never mind having the strength or impetus to work through the conflict with his mother. He has even contemplated suicide. The CBA practitioner helps Shawn understand how being committed to a meaningful purpose can help him cope with various stresses in his life (Bonanno 2004). The practitioner validates Shawn's feelings, and then assesses Shawn's spiritual capacity. Shawn notes how family has always given his life meaning, which explains why rejection by his mother has had such a profound effect. The CBA practitioner helps Shawn understand that the recent break in his relationship with his mother is not necessarily permanent. In fact, if they can work through their current conflict, the spiritual connection between them may grow stronger than ever. Shawn commits himself to doing whatever he can to make CR with his mother work. His sense of purpose is reinforced by the physical, psychological, and social capacities that he and the CBA practitioner have also developed. His basic needs have been met, he is feeling better about himself, and he has the support of new friends. He now sees resolving conflict and healing the relationship with his mother as both possible and vitally important.

### **Advantages and challenges of a capacity-building approach**

When compared with other CR approaches, CBA offers a number of advantages:

- 1 CBA allows a practitioner to work with one party. In many conflicts, the helping agent has access only to one side because the other is too angry, distrustful, or otherwise unwilling to make use of professional assistance. CBA may be used independently, regardless of whether the other party is willing and able to engage.
- 2 CBA does not require neutrality or impartiality. When CR professionals such as mediators or arbitrators work with both parties, they must remain impartial. CBA,

like advocacy, does not depend on impartiality. The practitioner builds trust by offering empathy, support, hope, education, insight, and linkage to resources.

- 3 CBA is not mutually exclusive of other CR processes. CBA can be used to prepare parties for other processes.
- 4 CBA offers a holistic approach to assessment and intervention. Each party receives an individualized process that builds on strengths and rectifies challenges in all realms (physical, psychological, social, and spiritual).

As with all holistic approaches to assessment and intervention, the broad scope of CBA is not only an advantage but also a challenge. A practitioner would need to have a broad, generalist background in order to be able to assess and intervene in all realms of the client's life (Kirst-Ashman and Hull 2006). The practitioner could work with specialists, referring the client to physicians, psychologists, social workers, pastoral counselors, or other professionals as needed.

CBA leaves open the question of what aspects of capacity should be explored and strengthened, and in what order. The practitioner could prioritize according to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, ensuring that more basic needs and capacities are satisfied before going onto higher ones. The practitioner should also assess which areas have been impeding effective CR and which areas to target to have the greatest impact on future CR. Finally, the practitioner should consider the client's motivation, allowing the client to help determine which areas of capacity to strengthen.

A final concern is whether CBA can truly be deemed conflict resolution. Given its breadth, does it not go beyond CR into the practice of psychology or social work? Further, CBA may be limited to helping one side of a conflict; doesn't conflict resolution require engagement of both parties in a conflict? And what do you call a practitioner who uses CBA – a coach, an advocate, a therapist, a sponsor? The answer to these concerns lies in the definition of CR and the focus of the intervention. If CR is broadly defined to include any intervention aimed at helping people manage conflict, then it does not matter how broad CBA is. Conflict is a complex social phenomenon that may require a complex assessment and intervention plan. Conflict resolution, therefore, may require generalist practitioners, not just specialists in a particular mode of conflict resolution. Although many conflicts may require the help of CR specialists such as lawyers, mediators, and arbitrators, generalists may also be able to contribute. As for what to call a CBA practitioner, that depends. The practitioner could use the designation "CBA practitioner," regardless of the practitioner's professional background, for example social work or psychology. Given the stigma that some people attach to mental health, however, practitioners might want to adopt more welcoming terms, such as CR coach or advocate. Since CBA does not depend on a particular professional identification, the name is not as important as the principles behind the name: providing holistic assessments and interventions; focusing on strengths rather than problems or weaknesses, and preparing parties by building their physical, psychological, social, and spiritual capacities.

At its most basic level, a capacity-building approach to conflict resolution helps people resolve a particular conflict. CBA may also help people resolve their conflict without the need for more expensive or more adversarial processes. By building people's capacities to manage conflict, however, CBA goes much further. CBA helps people deal more effectively with any future conflicts, offering skills, knowledge, insight, and other resources that can help them in a range of circumstances. At its best, CBA goes beyond helping people resolve conflicts without violence. CBA empowers people to work toward JustPeace, a future that comprises both peace and social justice (Lederach n.d.).

## Note

- 1 For simplicity, the examples in this chapter focus on a two-party conflict, though CBA may also be used with multiparty conflicts.

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# 16 Gender mainstreaming

## A valuable tool in building sustainable peace<sup>1</sup>

*Ingrid Sandole-Staroste*

[G]ender equality [is a] global public good whose benefits are shared by all and monopolized by no one . . . . When women move forward . . . the world moves forward. Unfortunately, the same applies in reverse: setbacks . . . impose costs for all.

Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary General  
for Disarmament Affairs, 8 November 2002

### Introduction

The concept of *gender mainstreaming* has promise for the field of conflict analysis and resolution. Gendered individuals are engaged in the practice of conflict resolution, which can be effective only if the impact of gender is recognized. A gender perspective allows both women's and men's voices to be heard, which, in turn, makes it possible to imagine and to build a better future for *all* humans. We know from experience, now backed up by a growing body of literature, that sustainable peace, security, and development cannot be achieved if only one gender is included in decisionmaking processes. Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa (2001: 38) noted that "Allowing men who plan wars to plan peace is a bad habit," because it disregards women's experiences and knowledge, both of which are relevant to decisionmaking processes before, during, and after war. With regard to this, the former Prime Minister of Bosnia, Haris Silajdzic, commented, "If we'd [had] women around the table, there would have been no war; women think long and hard before they send their children out to kill other people's children" (Initiative for Inclusive Security 2006).

In this chapter I will explore the tool – *gender mainstreaming* – that ensures that both women's and men's voices are heard in all decisionmaking processes at all levels. I will provide examples of the practice and outcome of gender mainstreaming; consider its shortcomings; and propose that the concept and practice of gender mainstreaming is an indispensable tool for conflict analysis and resolution.

### The roots of gender mainstreaming

The concept of *gender mainstreaming* is the product of the worldwide women's movement traceable to the UN conferences in Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1980), and Nairobi (1985), where women developed recommendations, for primarily male-dominated governments, on how to empower women and to improve their situation globally. When those recommendations were largely ignored, a new strategy was developed in 1995 at the UN Beijing conference and named *gender mainstreaming*. Gender mainstreaming emphasizes *gender*, not *women*. It stresses that:



Both sexes and the relations between them are involved: men also have a gender and do not constitute the general human norm; . . . those relations between the sexes [are] in principle . . . viewed as subject to change. Biological differences between the sexes are not accepted as legitimizing social differences between them. Social and cultural gender-related roles for men and women are seen as the result of historical development and being open to political manipulation.

(Stiegler 2001: 9)

The principle of gender mainstreaming recognizes that gender relations are an essential aspect of any (conflict) situation, and that conflict, particularly violent conflict, changes gender relations in profound ways. Yet gender relations are all too often ignored in the resolution of conflicts. The processes that establish sustainable peace, security, and development often marginalize or exclude women.<sup>2</sup> Gender mainstreaming makes that fact visible and reveals how and why conflicts impact women's and men's lives in different ways (Baksh *et al.* 2005).

Intellectually, gender mainstreaming is the product of feminist theory and practice, which have long recognized that gender roles and identities are shaped by local, national, and, increasingly, global contexts. Feminist theory and practice value diversity and deeply respect the differences that are necessarily reflected in the questions feminists formulate, the analyses they attempt, and the solutions they suggest. Feminists generally agree that, in any investigative process, the power relations between women and men must be addressed.<sup>3</sup> There must be an earnest attempt to understand the issues not only from the vantage point of men, but also from that of women. Although feminists are critical on behalf of women, they seek to produce a better world for all humans. Any attempt at analyzing and solving conflicts, therefore, must ensure that women participate equally in this process, are given equal space at the negotiation table, and receive equal resources to make their voices heard.

As Swanee Hunt (2004) has documented in her book, *This Was Not Our War*, it is not a lack of interest or ability on the part of women that excludes them from war- and peacemaking, but the deliberate efforts by men who hold leadership (and less influential) positions. The reasons why women are excluded from decisionmaking processes are complex, but research indicates that women who occupy leadership roles are perceived as threatening because their mere presence disrupts male solidarity, thereby undermining the privileges that come with male power (Johnson 2005: 122, 189). They call into question the perceived and actual gender order not only in the public, but also in the private sphere.

Experience and research show that women's actions in any (conflict) situation rarely fit the traditional gender stereotype. Women are not only victims of male aggression, they are also active participants in their communities and societies during times of peace and war (Baksh *et al.* 2005; Sta. Maria 2002). Yet, when ceasefire is declared and armed conflict ceases, politicians, scholars, and other professionals are all too often unaware of women's presence. They fail to notice women's less privileged positions, the importance of the issues women want addressed, and the contributions they make, and, if they notice, they often dismiss women's demands.

There is often an assumption that "normal" gender relations will resume once hostilities cease, although that is rarely an option. During armed conflicts, many men are killed and surviving family members are displaced or have fled their countries to seek security elsewhere. About 13 million refugees and 25–30 million displaced people in refugee camps around the world bear witness to that. As the UN General Assembly notes, "women and children constitute the majority of refugees and displaced persons in most areas" (Martin 2004: 1, 147).



Thus, the burden of rebuilding peaceful lives for themselves, their families, and communities falls disproportionately to women.

### **UN Security Council Resolution 1325**

Gender mainstreaming gained visibility when UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security was adopted on 31 October 2000. The resolution focused attention on women trapped in war and their marginalization and exclusion in peacebuilding processes. Its adoption “reaffirm[ed] the linkages between peace, development and gender equality” (King 2003: 3). Resolution 1325 mandates that all participants involved in negotiating an end to armed conflict ensure that women play an equal part in peacebuilding processes, and “recognize the ‘special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction’” (Farr 2003: 26). Resolution 1325 is also an acknowledgment by the international community of “the enormous potential contribution of women as stake holders of peace, disarmament and conflict prevention” (Heyzer 2003: 5). In that sense, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is an influential tool for advancing international peace and security. It recognizes the importance of women’s visibility and actions “in national and regional instruments and in bi- and multilateral organizations” (Farr 2003: 32; OSAGI 2007).<sup>4</sup>

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 also draws attention to the wide and persistent gap that exists between the rhetoric of the importance of a gender perspective and its lack of realization “on the ground.” For example, although “[t]he importance of gender to conflict prevention and early warning has been recognized . . . concrete measures to improve the flow of early warning information from and about women have not been put in place” (Hill 2003: 23). The gathering and analysis of data on early warning indicators would require that “fact-finding missions to areas of potential conflict . . . routinely include gender expertise and consultations with women’s organizations” (ibid.). In theory, a gender perspective in decisionmaking processes is rational because it has wide-ranging implications for peace and security. However, in practice, the political will to employ it is lagging behind (Sharapov 2005).

### **The goal of gender mainstreaming**

The ultimate goal of gender mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality in all areas of life. Proponents realized that, unless this strategy is implemented, women will remain stuck in the role of petitioner, pleading to have their demands met (Stiegler 2001: 7; OSAGI 2007). Therefore, they resolved that *any* public action, including peacebuilding, needs to be scrutinized for its reflection of and impact on gender, and questions in this regard need to be consistently asked and answered. In peacebuilding processes and post-conflict reconstruction, these questions take on a particular urgency because the social fabric of communities and countries is shattered and the status quo of gender relations undermined. Women and men have to negotiate their public and private relationships anew. Consequently, the profound changes in gender relations ought to be an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of peacebuilding and other policymaking processes and programs.

One important principle of gender mainstreaming is that “equal opportunity between men and women can only be achieved if this objective is pursued in all areas of policy,”

and applied to all organizational decisionmaking processes (Stiegler 2001: 7). In practice, gender mainstreaming is a top-down process and involves

the reorganization, improvement, development and evaluation of decision-making processes . . . . The goal of gender mainstreaming is to make the perspective of gender relations part of all decision-making processes and enable all such processes to be used to ensure the equal treatment of men and women.

(*ibid.*: 8)

The intention of gender mainstreaming is to mandate organizations to pay attention to gender relations in their decisionmaking and policy implementation processes, and to seriously and openly consider how policies impact women's and men's lives differently. The gendered aspects are rendered visible when gender mainstreaming is an integral part of decisionmaking because women participate as equal partners with men, which allows them to step out of their role of petitioner and address their objectives directly.

When gender mainstreaming is an integral part of decisionmaking processes, it is given the same importance as costs (Stiegler 2001: 8). In all organizations, the concern for costs shapes decisionmaking at all levels. All decisionmakers are keenly aware of costs, and their knowledge on the issue is fairly sophisticated. "[T]he issue of gender relations becomes . . . important in exactly the same way that the question of costs plays a major role in all decision-making processes . . . . Gender related issues become an integral part of the thinking, decision-making and actions taken by all those involved" (*ibid.*). When gender relations are taken as seriously as costs, then a radical shift has taken place in the thinking and action of decisionmakers. When gender relations are accepted as foundational in the same way as costs in decisionmaking processes, then "old attributions lose their validity and are replaced by new viewpoints" (*ibid.*: 10). For example, it is:

No Longer

[that w]omen are being oversensitive when they criticize the dominant values and norms.

Rather,

[t]he dominant values and norms are scrutinized and modified in terms of gender specific considerations.

No Longer

[that w]omen have specific problems.

Rather,

[s]ocially determined circumstances place women in difficult situations and positions.

No Longer

[that w]omen have specific interests based on gender.

Rather,

[s]pecific interests of women are reflexes to living conditions (e.g., intense cohabitation

with small children) which fall to women as the female sex. Men would have the same interests if they were to share women's living conditions.

(*ibid.*)

Employing gender mainstreaming directs attention to the *conditions* that affect women and men differently, calling for different responses and resolutions. It also reveals that women often hold leadership roles within their community and are a stabilizing influence because people trust them (Hunt 2005). For example, Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, noted that, "After the genocide, women rolled up their sleeves and began making society work again" (Initiative for Inclusive Security 2006).<sup>5</sup>

## **The practice of gender mainstreaming**

### *Human rights institutions at the UN*

United Nations (UN) bodies and other international governmental organizations (IGOs) as well as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have made a formal commitment to employ gender mainstreaming. For example, to obtain resources from the EU Structural Fund, applicants must demonstrate that their project includes a description of gender relations, along with measures of the impact of their work on gender relations. Projects that meet those requirements are favored in the allocation of funds. Linking funding priorities and "gender mainstreaming processes has proven to be highly effective in making the gender-related features of government-supported measures transparent and controllable" (Stiegler 2001: 21).<sup>6</sup> Subtle and not so subtle shifts and changes in decisionmaking processes and outcomes have occurred. In this regard, Rachael Lorna Johnstone (2006) examined the commitment to and effectiveness of gender mainstreaming in decisionmaking processes of several UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies.<sup>7</sup> The role of these treaty bodies is to ascertain to what extent states comply with the legally binding obligations they assumed as signatories to treaties, and to advise them on how to fulfill their obligations. Johnstone (*ibid.*: 7) found that treaty bodies include general elements of gender mainstreaming in their written and verbal communication with state parties, by (1) giving equal consideration to women's human rights and treating them as central issues; (2) interpreting treaties in a gender-sensitive manner; (3) asking gender-sensitive questions of state parties; and (4) considering the equal enjoyment of rights.

Although the inclusion of general elements on gender mainstreaming has not immediately led to dramatic shifts in how women's human rights are implemented, it has had real consequences over time. Gender mainstreaming allows individuals who work on behalf of treaty bodies to formulate effective questions. This has led to better educated and prepared committees who raise awareness in state institutions "who may have been ignorantly, rather than deliberately, complicit" (Johnstone 2006: 7). The same has been true for NGOs and grassroots organizations. A common language has been created that allows all parties to engage more meaningfully in the discourse about what women's human rights actually mean in peacebuilding processes (*ibid.*). As Johnstone points out, "The treaty bodies cannot alone guarantee the rights of women and men, but they can [and do] . . . speed up the process." Not only has the rhetoric of treaty bodies changed, but also the content and interpretation of human rights law (*ibid.*: 9).<sup>8</sup>

Despite the positive changes, there are still shortcomings. Female participation on committees remains inadequate. For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has eighteen committee members, of which four are female. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has eighteen committee members and only three are women (Johnstone 2006: 9, 11).

### *InterAction's Commission on the Advancement of Women (CAW)*

InterAction's Commission on the Advancement of Women (CAW), an NGO based in Washington, DC, and the African Centre for Human Development (ACHD) in Accra, Ghana, provide further examples of the practice and outcome of gender mainstreaming.<sup>9</sup> Assisting various communities to defuse tension so that they could "grow and develop in equitable and sustainable ways," CAW found that it was possible to promote gender equality despite the widely held perception that African "[c]ulture, customs and traditions are wholly tied to gender roles and relations and solidly resistant to change" (Morris 2001: v). Gender mainstreaming was successfully employed in various projects, in part because it identified and built on the positive aspects of local customs and culture, thereby transforming negative gender relations in such a way that inclusive, participatory, co-creative processes evolved.<sup>10</sup> The various projects speak to the success of CAW's Gender Integration Framework, which consists of "four important and interdependent elements" that are necessary for making gender relations an integral part of the organizational decisionmaking processes (ibid.: vi):

#### *Political Will*

Evidenced when top-level leadership publicly support gender integration, effectively communicate the organization's commitment to gender equity, commit staff time and financial resources, and institute needed policies and procedures.

#### *Technical Capacity*

Evidenced in increased staff skills in gender analysis, adoption of new systems for gender disaggregated data, and the development of gender sensitive tools and procedures for programs and projects.

#### *Accountability*

Evidenced in institutional incentives and mandates that encourage and reinforce gender sensitive behaviors by individuals and within the organization as a whole.

#### *Organizational Culture*

Evidenced in a gender-balanced staff, a gender sensitive governance structure, and the equal valuing of women and men's working styles.

The African Centre for Human Development (ACHD) in Ghana, employed CAW's Gender Integration Framework in their work in northeast Ghana's Volta region, home to various tribes and ethnic groups and large numbers of Muslims. Poverty is widespread and most of the income is derived from subsistence agriculture and micro enterprise. The culture is deeply patriarchal; hence important decisions are made by men. Women appear to have little say even though women make up 55 percent of the population and perform

most of the work on the farms. To bring them into the decisionmaking processes was fraught with tension, but a necessary condition for eradicating poverty and for building peaceful and sustainable development.

Members of ACHD began their work by seeking a deeper understanding of the gendered aspects of daily lives in these communities. They discovered that, although men made important decisions, women were charged with translating those decisions into practice “for and on behalf of the community,” and tradition accorded selected women the right to appoint the Chief of the village (Morris 2001: 19–20).

Also, women and men had a deep understanding about gender relationships, a keen sense of justice, and an appreciation for new knowledge. That opened up space for discussions about “the changing roles of women and men within their community.” The support of Chiefs and Queen Mothers<sup>11</sup> was crucial for success, as traditional values and behavior patterns had to be reassessed and rearranged with “patience and tact” (ibid.: 19–20).

With the assistance of ACHD, community leaders entered into a process that was guided by the four components of the Gender Integration Framework. Once community leaders had publicly committed resources for instituting policies and processes, transformative change took hold, involving the following steps: (1) building up women’s confidence by articulating the importance of their contributions to their communities; (2) bringing together traditional women leaders, “Queen Mothers,” to deepen their understanding about the potential of social change for their communities; (3) organizing “a group of core women leaders [and training them] as ‘Torch Bearers’ within their communities”; (4) soliciting the support of men; (5) arranging meetings between local political leaders, “Torch Bearers,” and men’s support groups; (6) “translat[ing] all the above into women being elected to the local assembly” (Morris 2001: 21).

Small group meetings at the village level allowed women to identify the causes of the problems that they and their men faced, and to define what differences existed and why. This allowed women to gain an understanding of the connection between the problems they faced and “their non-involvement in decision-making at all levels of society.” Their wish to change this presented a monumental obstacle, as change would inevitably incur the “anger [of] their menfolk” (ibid.: 22).

To meet this challenge, the role of the Queen Mothers was critical. As the “custodians of important social traditions” they have the power to break with traditional customs and norms to bring about positive change (Morris 2001: 22–3). They came together and chose a leader “who . . . represented them in dialogue with the local authorities” to increase women’s involvement in community governance (ibid.: 23). Simultaneously, village women democratically selected female representatives – Torch Bearers – and entrusted them with representing the interests of all women (ibid.). Torch Bearers and Queen Mothers developed strategies for actions such as winning the support of “male opinion leaders, chiefs, and other influential men in the community” (ibid.).

ACHD, mindful of locating their work within the values and norms of the community, succeeded in conveying the message to men that women’s involvement “enhance[s] . . . family wealth,” corresponding to the traditional saying that “two heads are better than one, no matter how big that one head is” (Morris 2001: 24). Village men understood that ACHD’s work was intended not to diminish their roles, but rather to help them “take on more responsibility as the head of [their] family” because, “If a fish starts to get rotten, it begins from the head.” Supporting their wives was necessary “if men as head of the family did not want to see their families disintegrate” (ibid.). Once men understood that their status would not be diminished, they engaged in lively debates about the gender division

of labor, issues of fairness, and the importance of women's contribution to their families, communities, and society. They agreed that women's contributions were as crucial as men's if their families, communities, and society were to thrive peacefully.

The project was successful, in part because "all innovative ingenuity and persuasive force was used" (Morris 2001: 25) and in part because the four interdependent elements of CAW's Gender Integration Framework were successfully employed. One important outcome was that women stepped into the local political arena. Twenty became candidates for the local district assembly elections, and ten of them were elected (*ibid.*: 26).

## Challenges to gender mainstreaming

The practice of gender mainstreaming has resulted in remarkable gains for women as illustrated above and as others have documented (Hannan 2001; Morris 2001; Stiegler 2001; InterAction's Commission on the Advancement of Women and the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction 2004; James-Sebro *et al.* 2005; Baksh *et al.* 2005; Jacobsson 2007).<sup>12</sup> Gender mainstreaming strategies, together with other interventions designed to promote gender equality and women's empowerment, placed women's human rights at the center of national and international debates. There have been high expectations of what can be achieved, but there has also been caution that gender mainstreaming agendas are being coopted or even taken over by state and other actors (Subrahmanian 2004; Whitbread 2004; Kelly 2005). And, despite many successes, there have also been stunning failures to put in practice what has been eloquently spelled out in theory.

Because gender mainstreaming is a top-down strategy, its effectiveness depends on political will, that is, on top-level leadership to publicly support gender integration and to communicate the organization's commitment to gender equality, commit staff time, financial resources, and to set up needed policies and procedures of accountability whereby all staff at all levels are held accountable to meet the goals and implement the strategy.<sup>13</sup> The "capacity to work on gender equality issues does not materialize 'automatically'" (United Nations 2002: 26);<sup>14</sup> and Kiril Sharapov's (2005: 99) research findings on the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) demonstrate the fact. Unless political will and "capacity" to work on gender equality is fully in place, the outcome is unsatisfactory. Respondents overwhelmingly expressed dissatisfaction with "UNMIK gender mainstreaming policies and its poor record of compliance with Resolution 1325" (*ibid.*: 102).<sup>15</sup>

The tension between theory and practice of gender mainstreaming is palpable in many international institutions including the United Nations, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Addressing the World Bank's efforts to institute gender mainstreaming practices, the Executive Director of the Association for Women's Rights in Development notes that "the gender mainstreaming agenda has been lost for lack of political will and understanding . . . despite good intentions and impressive visions on paper." She observes that "you can't just add women and stir . . . change must be much more transformative." She critiques the World Bank for not defining women's and men's needs as different and for operating on the mistaken assumptions that trade liberalization will lead to sustainable peace, justice, development, and a reduction in poverty (Clift 2004). In her opinion, transformative change can be achieved only if the World Bank provides countries with real incentives to address gender disparities and not only defines gender mainstreaming as a "desirable" strategy, but makes it *mandatory* and *binding*. Carolyn

Hannan of the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, in her evaluation of the World Bank's efforts to integrate gender mainstreaming, notes that areas,

particularly those related to macro-economics, are ones where there is still a problematic lack of awareness and consensus on the importance of gender perspectives. Much work remains to be done in terms of developing the arguments, collecting the data and supporting the development of awareness, commitment and capacity of staff working in these areas.

. . . one key challenge . . . is the need to move the attention to gender perspectives out of the human development areas of the work of the Bank, i.e., health, education, agriculture, to all sectors and all projects, including in areas where gender perspectives are not normally considered, for example, in investment projects.

(United Nations 2002)

In a similar vein, the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI) acknowledges that instituting gender mainstreaming has been

a long, slow process requiring inputs on many fronts over a long period of time . . . [and a] number of persistent constraints [remain] . . . including conceptual confusion, inadequate understanding of the linkages between gender perspectives and different areas of the work of the United Nations and gaps in capacity to address gender perspectives once identified . . . The lack of understanding of "HOW" gender perspectives can be identified and addressed remains one of the most serious constraints.

(United Nations 2002: vi)

In a recently published report the OECD's (2007) evaluation of current gender-mainstreaming policies presents a decidedly mixed picture. In its examination of issues such as staffing, budgets, and practices and processes designed to promote gender equality, twenty-six member agencies (twenty-seven responded to the survey) reported that, although they have strong gender policies in place, staffing and budgets are inadequate, and accountability procedures are lacking. There is also a shortage of gender advisors, and lack of gender training for staff. Available resources and procedures to implement policies fully and effectively are lagging behind gender mainstreaming rhetoric.

A report by the OSCE (2004) draws similar conclusions. The goals outlined in the *2000 Action Plan for Gender Issues* have not been met. "There are shortcomings . . . [throughout the OSCE and within participating States] especially in the fields of training, management, and recruitment, and the overall practice of gender-mainstreaming." Women are under-represented particularly at senior and policymaking levels. The OSCE has failed to reach its goals as spelled out at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, when the Heads of State had declared that "the full and equal exercise by women of their human rights is essential to achieve a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic OSCE area" (OSCE 2004: 1). The current state of the practice of gender mainstreaming in these organizations underscores the existing gap between rhetoric and performance "on the ground." Attempts to close the gap are complicated by the fact that different countries and different policy domains support different models of gender equality (Rees 2005). De Waal (2006: 210, 212) argues that gender equality can be achieved only if it is defined as "equality of outcome"; that is, gender mainstreaming must be practiced and implemented, and its progress monitored and evaluated in such a way that it meets the following objectives:



- *parity* (equal representation and participation of women and men);
- *equality* (equal access, control, opportunities, rewards, and benefits for women and men);
- *equity* (the ratio of participation, access, opportunities, rewards, and benefits according to needs or concerns of women and men; women's empowerment; and transformation of gender relations);
- *empowerment* (cognitive, behavioral, and affective changes to increase levels of equality and empowerment of women in relation to men);
- *transformation* (transforming the gender order; changing existing distribution of resources and responsibilities to create balanced gender relations).

For gender mainstreaming to be successful depends not only on political will, but also on conceptual clarity, an adequate understanding of the different models of gender equality, and a clear definition of expected outcomes.

### **Gender mainstreaming: a valuable tool in conflict analysis and resolution**

Let me reiterate the obvious. Gender relations are an essential part of *any* conflict situation. It has been amply documented that conflict, particularly violent conflict, impacts and changes gender relations in profound ways, and so do the solutions that are being developed and implemented. The field of conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) does not ignore gender relations and most scholars do not dispute that gender relations must be addressed. They agree that women and men should participate equally in conflict resolution processes. They support the idea that women and men should have equal or equitable access to resources, control, opportunities, rewards, and benefits. However, the *taken for granted* stance that gender must *always* be addressed if sustainable peace, inclusive security, and development are to be achieved is still lacking. Gender is all too often understood to mean "women" (men are assumed not to have a gender) and it is mostly left to feminists and other female scholars to address gender relations.

To be sure, feminist research has found its way into the mainstream CAR literature. For example, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (2005: 266) included a chapter in their book in which they propose four steps (based on Pankhurst's and Pearce's 1997 work) to ensure that feminist thinking is included in scholarly disciplines. Similarly, Ho-Won Jeong (2000) included a chapter, "Feminist Understandings of Violence," in his book, showing the multidimensionality of gender including its institutional characteristics and individual attributes and behaviors. Still, a survey of the conflict analysis and resolution literature invokes Stiegler's (2001) metaphor: if the field of CAR and the many scholarly disciplines on which it draws represent the strands of a braid, then feminist scholarship represents the bow at the end of the braid. In other words, feminist scholarship is not an integral part of the field. Like a bow, it is "added on." Because of its marginalized status, it is not well understood how feminism participates in power relations generally and in CAR in particular.

A further example of the impact of excluding feminist thought is provided by an influential thinker in the field of conflict analysis and resolution, John Burton (1990, 1997). His writings on human needs reveal the assumption that male experience constitutes human experience. He defines *human needs* as universal: "ontological" needs that transcend race, class, culture, and gender. As I have written elsewhere (Sandole-Staroste 1992: 9), his understanding of human needs may reflect a masculine understanding, rendering invisible

the gendered power structure allowing it to go unchallenged. For example, Burton writes that “[e]mpirical evidence suggests that a paramount need being satisfied by [those who are] violent is the *need for recognition* as an individual or group. Individuals in society have always employed whatever means are currently available to them to attain recognition and identity” (1997: 10, emphasis added).

To refer to “individuals” or “groups” without considering the gender of the individuals or of the group members who predominantly engage in violence has implications: the proposed solutions will most likely be less effective. It has been abundantly documented that males, at all levels, are most often the perpetrators of violence. When Burton (1997: 10) refers to *family violence*, for example, he renders invisible the gender of the *humans* who commit most *family violence* in a quest to satisfy their apparently *inherent need for recognition and identity*. For example, “[i]n 1997, more than 300 women were victims of honor killings in just one Pakistan province. In 1998, some 200 women were victims of acid attacks in Bangladesh. [And e]very year 5000 women in India are killed over dowry arguments” (Goodman 2000). By not gendering *humans* who are engaged in violent behavior, we fail to *see* that something other than an inherent human need is being fulfilled.

Predominantly male violence against women cannot be sufficiently explained by the *human need* for recognition and identity; any explanation must also include a critical examination of the gendered power structures and of how the constructed ideals of manhood and masculinity are connected to dominance, control, and violence. It may, indeed, be the case that *human needs* are the products of gender, culture, race, class, age, and global location (Avruch and Black 1987: 94–5). “To relegate gender to a less influential level, denies the constitutive role [it] plays in the development and actions of the individual” (Sandole-Staroste 1992: 9).

Burton (1990: 3) argues that human needs must be addressed in order to solve and *prevent* conflicts, so that the conditions that create an environment of conflict can be eliminated and, more importantly, conditions that create cooperative relationships can be promoted. It would seem logical, therefore, that in order to realize those objectives it is essential to have an understanding of “gender as a form of power, and power in its gendered form,” especially since conflict environments, particularly of violent conflicts, are characterized by *both* gender and power (MacKinnon 1989: xi).

In this regard, Noeleen Heyzer (2003: 5) notes, “violence against women, once an unfortunate side-effect, is now a deliberate part of many . . . armed conflicts” impacting women’s and men’s, girls’ and boys’ lives profoundly and in different ways. She writes:

I have been to Bosnia where women described abduction, rape camps and forced impregnation, and to Rwanda where women had been gang raped and purposely infected with HIV/AIDS . . . Stories like these have been repeated again and again, in different languages, in different surroundings: [Columbia], East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Guatemala. Only the sorrow and the pain were the same.<sup>16</sup>

(*ibid.*: 5–6)

Accordingly, gender mainstreaming is a powerful and indispensable *tool* for making visible and addressing the gendered aspects of violent conflict, for eliminating the conditions that create an environment of conflict, and for building cooperative relationships. Gender mainstreaming ought to be an essential part of designing, implementing, monitoring, and

evaluating conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and policymaking processes at all levels. It can not be taken for granted that the needs of women *and* men, girls *and* boys are addressed when the concept of *human needs* is invoked. The experiences and voices of both genders must be explicitly and consciously included. *Human* needs for security, for example, must be defined and evaluated in terms of the particular needs of women *and* men, girls *and* boys. As Moser (2005: 575) points out, if the goal is to ensure equality of outcome, then it must be recognized “that women and men have different needs and priorities, and that women and men should ‘experience equal conditions for realizing their full human rights, and have the opportunity to contribute to and benefit from national, political, economic, social and cultural development’.”

## Conclusion

Gender mainstreaming – as a concept, principle, and practice – has proven to be both successful and inadequate. It has been successful in building sustainable peace, security, and development when conceptual clarity, a clear definition of expected outcomes, an adequate understanding of the different models of gender equality, and political will were present; it has been inadequate, or has failed, when those elements were insufficiently present or absent. In the field of conflict analysis and resolution, therefore, gender mainstreaming can be an effective tool only if the leaders in the field consciously and explicitly include it as an integral part in an effort to transform decisionmaking processes at all levels. If the leaders in the field of CAR *and* policymakers show the political will – support gender mainstreaming, communicate that support effectively, and secure resources for instituting it – then *human* needs will be addressed and *human* rights will be implemented. It will enhance the odds for achieving sustainable and just peace, security, and development. Thus, gender mainstreaming, despite its shortcomings, is an indispensable tool for resolving deep-rooted conflict, and its significance ought to be at the center of the conversation in the CAR community. Only then will the field be able to make a real difference in the post-9/11 world.

## Notes

- 1 I want to thank Marcella Ridlen Ray and Dennis Sandole for reading the first draft of this chapter and for their thoughtful comments.
- 2 A female field worker from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) involved in peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina told me that, in theory, the OSCE subscribes to *gender mainstreaming* in all its actions, but in practice no one really pays attention (personal communication, Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Arlington, VA, 11 July 2006).
- 3 With regard to this, see for example Boulding (1976, 1990, 2001); Bullbeck (1998); de Beauvoir (1974); Enloe (2000); Flax (1990); Marx *et al.* (2000); Humm (1992); Jaggar and Struhl (1978); Rosen (2000).
- 4 Gender mainstreaming is practiced with various degrees of success in UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); Human Rights Committee (HRC); Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); Committee Against Torture (CAT); Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); and Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (see Johnstone 2006). Other multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the G8, the Organization of American States

- (OAS), the African Union (AU), and the World Bank have passed gender-related resolutions ([www.womenwagingpeace.net](http://www.womenwagingpeace.net)).
- 5 In Northern Ireland, women stayed at the negotiation table when their male colleagues walked out. They proved to be skilled negotiators bridging “ethnic, religious, political, and cultural divides.” This was the case “during the peace talks that led to the Good Friday Agreement . . . [when] Monica McWilliams and other members of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition . . . focused on mutual concerns and shared vision, enabling the dialogue to continue and trust to be rekindled” (Hunt 2005).
  - 6 Gender mainstreaming has been “practised most intensely and has the longest-standing tradition” in the arena of international development cooperation (Stiegler 2001: 21).
  - 7 Johnstone (2006: 6–7) included the following UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); Human Rights Committee (HRC); Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); Committee Against Torture (CAT); Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); and Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
  - 8 In this regard, see Kelly (2005: 471), who notes that “several commentaries especially within . . . law . . . argue that the ‘gendering of human rights discourse’ represents a mainstreaming success.” Also, see Charlesworth *et al.* (1991) and Conaway (2006).
  - 9 Other examples of good practices in gender mainstreaming are documented in InterAction-CAW and IIRR (2004), James-Sebro *et al.* (2005), and UNCP (2007).
  - 10 The six countries in which the projects were located were Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Morris 2001: v).
  - 11 Kathleen Fallon’s (2003) research provides historical insights into the roles of Queen Mothers in Ghana.
  - 12 “Some peacekeeping operations . . . have . . . achieved success in gender mainstreaming sufficient to be held up as examples of good practice. Central to success have been programmes to involve local women in . . . the political process in their countries. Half of the civilian peace keepers in Namibia were women and they played an important role in reaching out to Namibian rural women” (Baksh *et al.* 2005: 72). In this regard, see also Jacobsson (2007).
  - 13 In this regard, see also Dodhia and Johnson (2005).
  - 14 In this regard, see also Cook and Winslow (2007).
  - 15 “UNMIK is one of the first UN peacekeeping missions to incorporate a special department responsible for operationalising gender mainstreaming policies in regional post-conflict reconstruction and development” (Sharapov 2005: 99).
  - 16 Heyzer (2003: 6) notes that, “while women are sometimes complicit in war, they are almost completely absent in the decisions to go to war – or in the appropriation of funds that make weapons and war possible.”

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# 17 Culture theory, culture clash, and the practice of conflict resolution<sup>1</sup>

*Kevin Avruch*

## **Introduction: theories of culture and conflict resolution practice**

Culture is a notoriously difficult concept, the subject of hundreds of different technical definitions over the past hundred years, and bearer of much political baggage handed down to us from its original usages in the nineteenth century. Elsewhere (Avruch 1998: 6–9; 2003a) I have written about these definitions and usages in some detail. In this chapter I wish to concentrate upon a particular culture theory, one that comes to us from the influential work of the political scientist Samuel Huntington. But the point of the chapter is not simply to critique Huntington’s theory of culture from a theoretical point of view. In the social sciences generally, but especially in those social sciences (such as conflict resolution) that come attached to a strong social activist agenda, theory is connected to practice in very important, and often unrecognized, ways. In the case of conflict resolution, theory itself comes in at least two varieties. First, there is the underlying social theory of conflict – conflict theory for short – that must be considered. Conflict can be understood as a deviant or aberrant feature of social systems, as in most varieties of functionalism, or an intrinsic and necessary part, as in Marxian social theories.

Second, there is theory about the nature of culture and its relation to conflict, as well as its role in conflict resolution. I have written much about culture and conflict in the past, relying on a broadly interpretive theory of culture. The focus of this chapter, however, is on a different conception of culture entirely: Samuel Huntington’s theory of culture, epitomized in what he called (Huntington 1993, 1996) – and is now widely called – “the Clash of Civilizations.” Before turning to examine Huntington’s theory in depth, let us briefly consider theories of conflict and conflict resolution that in the main lacked a coherent theory of culture.

## **Conflict theory and practice without culture**

The absence of the culture concept in early sorts of conflict resolution theory and practice was easy to explain. The dominant international relations (IR) theories of the times were realist or neorealist, focused on the behavior of states as maximizing rational actors and privileging power, usually reduced to the barest attributes of coercion or force, as the *sine qua non* of motivation and dynamics.<sup>2</sup> In the face of such conceptions, culture – not easily correlated to individual states and not, like power, easily expressed in simple scalar nominal or ordinal units (e.g. number of missiles, displacement of nuclear subs) – was effaced (Black and Avruch 1993: 380–2). Alongside IR, the other important academic input to



the field of conflict resolution in those days came from varieties of social psychologists who presumed, given the biological and evolutionary similarities of human brains and neurological functioning, that people everywhere thought and reasoned in the same way. Strengthening this, and influenced by early economic and game-theoretic approaches, was the presumption that the “same way” could be described largely by rational choice theory. Once again culture, stressing difference, “disappeared” in the face of assumptions of psychological uniformity.

On the practice end of things, considerations of culture’s impact were minimal because so much of conflict management or resolution practice was limited at the time to monocultural settings (e.g. labor–management relations in the US or UK) or, more importantly, to monocultural practitioners. It would be some time before culturally sensitive practitioners worked self-consciously and mindfully in other cultural settings (e.g. Lederach 1991 in Central America), or cultural “others” entered the field and enriched its conceptions of practice by way of their own understandings and insights (e.g. Abu-Nimer 2003), including an outright appreciation for the efficacy of “indigenous” conflict resolution practices (e.g. Hamdesa Tusso’s and other chapters in Zartman 2000).

Beyond this, there was at work an ideological dimension to culture’s exclusion. Especially among those who worked to resolve the most difficult social conflicts, involving identity groups – ethnic, racial, national, often with deadly violence – there was the sense that cultural differences were in fact part of the root problem, that which had to be overcome (in part by invoking transidentity and universalizing notions, such as shared “basic human needs”). Any theory, such as culture, that stressed the importance of attending to difference was to be viewed as, at best, unhelpful and, at worse, a step backwards, playing into the hands of the disputants or their politically motivated leaders.

A particular take on culture did arise from applied social science conducted during World War II, a tradition of so-called national character studies, which conflated culture with nationality and linked the latter to individual personality traits (culture is nationality writ large), relying largely on Freudian or developmental personality theories.<sup>3</sup> Occasionally one could find national character work or conceptions cited even by arch-realists (e.g. Morgenthau and Thompson 1985: 151), but mostly this work fell out of favor in social science by the 1950s, and was never of much influence in theorizing social conflict or conflict resolution (but see the discussion of Patai, below). In any case, even as Peter Black and I bemoaned the neglect of culture in early conflict resolution theory and practice resulting from the dominance of state and power paradigms of realist or neorealist IR (Black and Avruch 1993), or criticized its effacement due to the universalizing biogenetics of basic human needs (Avruch and Black 1987), or rational choice theory (Avruch and Black 1990), we also felt that the extant uses of culture, as in national character work, seemed theoretically thin and inadequate – and, in any case, of not much use or influence in broader conflict theory.

### **Culture is totalizing, culture is primordial**

The end of the Cold War, however, brought a revived concept of culture onto the scene, mostly shorn of Freudian overtones, and challenging even the conceptual dominance of the state (though not of power) as the main actor in neorealist IR. Moreover, this view of culture was explicitly connected to explanations of social conflict and prescriptions for conflict management – if not resolution. And, unlike national character theory, it has proved influential in American policymaking circles. This view of culture is best

represented by Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations paradigm (Huntington 1993, 1996). The outline of this theory is widely and well known. It has predecessors in Toynbee and Spengler, in both the substance of his argument and the degree of pessimism in his predictions. A civilization, according to Huntington (1993: 24), "is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species." Seven major civilizations are identified: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American "and possibly," as an eighth, African. From the very beginning, Huntington made it clear that he was not using the idea of "clash" metaphorically. He was proposing a strong theory – strong in the positivist's predictive sense – of social conflict. "The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics," he wrote in the earlier influential essay, which preceded the book and appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. "The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future" (ibid.: 22).

The critical response to Huntington's thesis was almost as vigorous as the thesis itself, and came from many quarters: anthropology (Gusterson 2005), area specialists (Bieber 1993), cultural studies (White 1994), conflict resolution (Rubenstein and Crocker 1994), and political science (Ajami 1993), to cite just a few examples. Among other things, critics cited the weakness of Huntington's definition of civilization or the misalignment of its scale (Japan, a single nation-state, as equivalent to more than one billion Muslims worldwide); his misreading of the evidence in recent history (many pointed to the more frequent – and deadly – occurrence of conflict within civilizations than between them); his maligning of Islam ("Islam's borders are bloody" [1996: 256]); his simplification of global dynamics (as in the phrase "the West vs. the Rest"); and his ethnocentrism – his brief for the uniqueness and superiority of Western civilization.

Some critics spoke of Huntington's theory explicitly as a result of and a response to the end of the Cold War and the loss of the West's main ideological rival, the Soviet Union. In 1989–1990 the ideological battle between East and West appeared over and done with. But world peace or a new world order (under a beneficent *pax Americana*) did not materialize. Throughout the early and mid-1990s, deadly ethnic conflicts rent societies, states fell apart or into civil war, concentration camps reappeared in Europe and genocide in Africa. In the Middle East, existing conflicts remained as intractable as ever, and new ones soon emerged. The UN proved impotent in Bosnia and criminally negligent in Rwanda; and the US proved a failed humanitarian and conflict resolutionist third party in *Black Hawk Down* Somalia. Pessimism seemed appropriate, and a new collection of adversaries, this one linguistic, racial, ethnic, national, or religious – civilizational or cultural – seemed to be the cause of it all. Huntington's clash of civilizations epitomized these post-Cold War times perfectly, and provided policymakers (as we shall see) with a blueprint for (re)action.

Huntington's conception of civilization also epitomizes most of the inadequate conceptions of culture that Black and I pointed to. For one thing, the vastness of scale of, say, Islamic civilization, had the effect of homogenizing important and obvious cultural-historical differences among societies as different as Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia. For another, the imputation of strong and long-lasting political alliances among states due to the natural "kin feeling" of shared civilization flew in the face of much evidence to the contrary. More Muslims died in the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran – estimates range up to 1.5 million – than in any modern encounter with the West. Shared Islam was insufficient to keep West and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) united. These civilizational units were portrayed as stable entities acting with a logic of their own, their vast and sociologically/ethnically/linguistically diverse populations acting as if they were undifferentiated

(and somewhat robotic) masses. To this list one can add the sense of timelessness, or ahistoricism.

In fact, the idea that these units somehow exist “out of time,” and now face us, and one another, in guises virtually unchanged since their ancient beginnings – that they are *primordial* – is to be found in several conceptions of the place of culture in post-Cold War times. A good example is Robert Kaplan’s work, and particularly his book *Balkan Ghosts* (1993; 2nd edn. 1996), which presents the entire region to readers as “the last remnants of Europeans’ tribal mentality . . . locked into a past where ethnic loyalties and violence reign, a timeless place that is both a great producer and exporter of evil to the rest of Europe” (Bringa 2005: 61). The resonances here are remarkable: not just timelessness and locked-in lack of change, but psychic evolution is invoked: an older stratum of European Mentality from which Belgians, French, and Germans presumably evolved that nevertheless survives deep in the brains of residents of the Balkans. Completing the picture of Dantesque primordial violence there is export-quality Evil. And Kaplan’s book *was* read. One of the readers of *Balkan Ghosts* in 1993 was President Clinton, and reading the account of ancient and intractable hatreds and feuds influenced him, it is said, to refrain from committing American forces to Bosnia in 1993 (*ibid.*).<sup>4</sup>

Even older national character conceptions of culture – as in Raphael Patai’s *The Arab Mind*, first published in 1973 – found a new audience. The book was featured in Edward Said’s (1978) seminal attack on Orientalism. It was likewise dismissed by most area specialists or scholars of the Middle East – ethnographers in particular, who had the most lived experience on the ground. In their view *The Arab Mind* is a throwback to dubious national character studies, one published two decades after that tradition’s heyday.

But Patai’s book, we are told, “continued to be read in diplomatic and military circles.” It was reissued in 2001 with a new introduction by the director of Middle East Studies at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, and is regularly taught there.<sup>5</sup> Seymour Hersh, in his 24 May 2004 article in *The New Yorker* on the roots of the Abu Ghraib torture scandal, writes that he was told that *The Arab Mind*, with its analysis of Arab attitudes towards sexuality, shame, and humiliation, became “the bible of the neo-cons on Arab behavior.” Its “findings” were apparently integrated into the interrogation routines – which we now know included sexual torture and humiliation – carried out at Abu Ghraib.

I do not mean to imply that Patai, who died in 1996, ever intended his work to be used as an instruction manual for torturers, any more than Kaplan wanted his *Balkan Ghosts* somehow to be responsibly connected to the atrocities of Srebrenica.<sup>6</sup> These are issues around the uses of social science knowledge by political and military actors – the subject of another essay entirely. What I want to underline here is the nature of the knowledge, specifically the portrayal of culture, that Huntington, Kaplan, and Patai’s works all feature. In all these works “culture” is essentialized and totalized, reified and stripped of internal complexity or sociological diversity, removed from time (history) or projected backward into some unchanging (and usually dangerous or savage or unevolved) primordial past. And in all these cases, as well, the works proved themselves influential in certain political, policymaking, or intelligence-gathering circles – despite their dismissal by area specialists or scholars. “There is nothing so useful,” Kurt Lewin (1951) famously remarked, “as a good theory.” It is the uses to which theory is put that concerns us here. What understandings of social conflict, and which practices of conflict resolution, are implied by this conception of culture?

## Conflict theory in a totalized and primordial world

The first thing to be said about Huntington's theory (elaborated in some ways by Kaplan's primordializing of history and Patai's homogenizing of mind) is that it *is*, fundamentally, a theory of social conflict. He does not intend the idea of "clash" metaphorically. Like realism and neorealism, it is also fundamentally a theory espousing the importance of power: "Culture," he writes, "follows power" (1996: 310). Unlike the neorealists, however, who steered clear of issues of morality or values – except to bemoan leaders or states who foolishly invoked them, usually to the detriment of their country's national interests – Huntington engages morality and values as central to the dynamics of the clash. Specifically, he emphasizes the uniqueness of the "cultural core" of the West, including its "central component, Christianity," and what he comes to epitomize as "the American Creed . . . liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property" (1996: 305).

The great dynamic of modern history, Huntington contends, is the interaction between modernization and Westernization. In the course of its own history, the West (epitomized eventually by its "core country," the United States) modernized and developed its unique Western "cultural core." But modernization does not imply, as once was assumed, Westernization. Japan successfully modernized without becoming Western. The rest of the world is modernizing in important ways – mostly technological and military – but remaining "traditional" in other ways, for instance in supporting non-democratic forms of governance and in favoring collectivism or communalism over individualism, with a concomitant mistrust of ideas of individual liberty. The military and technological modernization of the other civilizations, particularly Asian but increasingly Muslim as well, together with a West that "no longer has the economic or demographic dynamism required to impose its will on other societies" (1996: 310), means that Western hegemony is decreasing, while Asian and Muslim ("Confucian and Islamic") civilizations are economically, demographically and militarily on the rise. The groundwork for future and fateful civilizational clashes lies in a global arena characterized by power shifts and the uncertainties of changing hierarchies.

Interestingly, the first conflict or clash is not between civilizations but, so far as the West and the US are concerned, *within* them. Here Huntington (1996: 305) takes "multiculturalists" and other sorts of liberals to task, for weakening the integrity of the American Creed by seeking to dilute it with a deadly mixture of political correctness, cultural relativism, and the unabashed welcoming of unassimilable immigrants (particularly Muslims in Western Europe and Hispanics in the US). They also deny or denigrate the virtues of a common American culture while promoting "racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings." While Huntington's critique of the "multicultural" liberal left does not partake of the animus displayed by such recent conservative polemicists as Dinesh D'Souza (2007) – who, like the Reverend Jerry Falwell, also blames the liberal left for the 9/11 tragedy – it does point to the value conflicts that characterize current American political discourse.

Finally, if one momentarily takes Huntington's notion of civilizational conflict, and especially his depiction of a Western "cultural core" and "the American Creed," as ethnography and not "theory" (that is, if one understands it to be a true *ethnotheory* of conflict) – a valid description of how certain neoconservative Western "natives" (a few of them more than a little politically influential) view the world – then attention to general conflict theory unsurprisingly leads us to the idea of images and imaging, enemy images and

mirror images in particular (Boulding 1956; White 1965; Kelman 1997: 222–6). Edward Said (1978) wrote of the way the West “orientalized” the Other, referring mainly to Islamic societies and cultures and the sorts of depictional inadequacies of culture mentioned above. It is not surprising that symmetrical perceptual processes can be found in the form of “Occidentalism” by members of the Rest (Carrier 1995; Buruma and Margalit 2005). Occidentalism features the same homogenizing, totalizing, and essentializing view of culture and civilization as does its Western “mirror-imaging” counterpart. Together, Orientalism and Occidentalism form what Bruno Latour (1993) has called a “symmetrical anthropology.” Moreover, if Occidentalism is as influential a worldview “out there” as “the West versus the Rest” is for guardians of the American Creed, then in effect it makes the Clash of Civilizations symmetrical – and also, crucially, a potentially self-fulfilling prophecy.<sup>7</sup>

These are the ways in which Huntington’s understanding of culture, as a mega-concept called civilization, implies a theory of social (indeed, global) conflict. Theories of conflict also entail associated ethnotheories of conflict resolution, and associated (ethno)practices as well. What sorts of *conflict resolution* does the Clash of Civilizations imply?

### **Conflict resolution in the Clash of Civilizations**

Theories are practical, to echo Lewin, precisely because they can specify, prescribe, or justify modes of *practice*, action in the world. Take the postulates of neorealism as a theory of nation-state conflict. In an essentially amoral universe of autonomous states seeking rationally to maximize national interests through the arts of deploying power, it may not be useful to think of “conflict resolution” at all in the sense that many in the field do. Pruitt and Kim (2004: 190–1) identify a continuum of problemsolving outcomes, from “conflict management,” dealing mostly with procedures to de-escalate conflict or prevent further escalation, through “conflict settlement,” which goes beyond procedural matters to take up substantive ones dealing “with enough of the issues that parties are willing to give up their . . . struggle,” to what they call “conflict resolution, an agreement in which most or all of the issues are cleared up.” A similar continuum is offered by Ramsbotham *et al.*, who include an even more radical construal of conflict resolution favored by a new generation of specialists, one that strives to go beyond mere resolution to what they call “conflict transformation,” whereby the very relationships among the contesting parties are changed, and the “underlying tasks of structural and cultural peacebuilding” are engaged (Ramsbotham *et al.* 2005: 29). Thus, transformation of “conflictual relationships requires healing trauma, addressing the roots of the conflict, and pursuing justice” (Schirch 2006: 78). These are strong requirements, indeed.

Now consider what “conflict resolution” looks like in a realist’s world. Given the postulates of realist (neorealist) conflict theory, it is easy to imagine a neorealist practice built around the *management* of conflicts between states, and even their occasional *settlement* (though most settlements are rarely taken to be final and definitive). In an imagined world where real or perceived power imbalances have the potential to unsettle the status quo state system, stable balances of power, achieved through real alliances or such shared or recognized perceptions as the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction (or other forms of deterrence), are the surest means of managing potential conflicts. The idea of “containment” of dangerous or threatening states also becomes a practical goal. On the other hand, *resolution* of conflicts, outside the state of affairs that might follow war and the unambiguous defeat and unconditional surrender of an enemy – Nazism or Japanese

imperial militarism in 1945 – or follows “regime change” of other sorts, is more difficult to imagine as a practice flowing logically out of realism. Meanwhile, conflict *transformation*, concerned with reconciling relationships, trauma, healing, and justice, is unimaginable as a mode of practice (statecraft, diplomacy, warfighting) given the theory’s postulates of amoral, maximizing, interest- and power-seeking states.<sup>8</sup>

What sorts of practice can be associated with Huntington’s clash of civilizations understanding of culture? Both Huntington and realists/neorealists make power fundamental to their thinking. But, whereas morality and values are at best irrelevant to realism, they are central to Huntington’s definition of a civilization’s “cultural core.” For realists, national interests are the unchanging center in a changing global environment: Achieving, conserving, *maximizing* them are the *sine qua non* of successful statecraft. Morality and values can only get in the way.<sup>9</sup> For Huntington, values (as in “tradition”) are central and perduring. Satisfying or being true to them – which may also mean actively resisting the imposition of alien values or traditions – and to other “kin countries” who share them, are key civilizational goals.

In fact, Huntington’s prescriptions for managing conflict are more nuanced than some of his harshest critics imply. In the earlier (1993) *Foreign Affairs* essay (as in the later and more elaborate 1996 book), he distinguishes shorter from longer term approaches. Both are oriented toward a longer-term historical view that features a decline in the West’s power (economic and military strength) vis-à-vis the Rest (especially vis-à-vis a potential Confucian–Islamic alliance). Given this concern with power, the short-term approaches most closely resemble realist or neorealist ideas in practice: nurture alliances with countries within (Western) civilization, or encourage cooperation with those civilizations normatively – “genealogically” – closer to the West (Slavic–Orthodox ones, for example). Some prescriptions look like classic conflict management cum preventive diplomacy: “prevent escalation of local inter-civilizational conflicts into major inter-civilizational wars.” A few might raise an eyebrow or two among some residents of the Rest: “limit expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states.” And some might appear to the Rest (and some of us in the West) as downright neocolonial and straightforwardly Machiavellian: “exploit differences and conflict among Confucian and Islamic states” (1993: 49). As with realists, conflict management is possible and extolled; conflict settlement rarer, and conflict resolution, not so likely.

The longer term modalities of practice suggested by the Clash are more interesting, nuanced, and often overlooked by Huntington’s critics. Civilizational differences based upon core values or traditions will not go away or, for that matter, change very much. (Here is where culture’s “timelessness” enters strongly.) The West is modern and “Western.” The Rest are unevenly modernizing (mostly in technology and military areas), and not very Western – Confucian and Islamic civilizations aggressively un-Western. And the power of the West is in decline. Therefore the long-term prescription for managing (intercivilizational) conflict, though it will certainly require the West to maintain sufficient power to protect its interests, will also require *accommodation*. Huntington (1993: 49) continues: “It will also, however, require the West to develop a profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations.”

In the elaboration of this argument in the book (1996) a few important changes from the 1993 essay are evident. First, in a list of conflict management and accommodative steps the West should follow, the straightforward Machiavellian tactic of encouraging or sowing



division and conflict within rival civilizations is now nowhere to be found (1996: 312). It is replaced by an opposite admonition, what Huntington calls the “abstention rule.” This rule holds “that core states abstain from intervention in conflicts in other civilizations is the first requirement of peace in a multicivilizational, multipolar world” (ibid.: 316). He would agree with realists who have argued that the neoconservative drive to export democracy through armed invasion and forceful regime change, as the US is attempting in the Middle East, is misguided. But agreement in this regard stems from different sources. Realists might feel that such a use of American treasure and blood along with the intensification of anti-American attitudes and alliances that ensue are clearly not in our national interest. Huntington would more likely say that the “American Creed” is quite simply unexportable – and any attempt to do so “is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world” (ibid.: 312). Many of Huntington’s more liberal or progressive critics – or conservative supporters of the “West versus the Rest” thesis, for that matter – underestimate his strong opposition to an American Empire or imperial interventions, most especially in their hypermoralizing (“bring democracy, freedom and liberty to all!”) manifestations (ibid.: 310).

Yet he is no simple isolationist, another possible reaction to a multicivilizational world that some conservative thinkers adopt. In his book Huntington elaborates on the notion, raised in his essay, of searching for mutual understanding and “commonalities” among civilizations. In another curiously nuanced argument, he reiterates his condemnation of “multiculturalists” operating *within* the West (as noted above), whose celebration of non-Western values or traditions as examples to be appreciated by the West, or even for the West to emulate, has the effect of weakening Western identity and solidarity. But this is later balanced by the necessity to realize that, viewed as a whole, the global civilizational *system* is by definition “multicultural.” That is the whole point of theorizing vast and perduring civilizational blocs that will not go away because of globalizing capitalism. (Indeed, such globalization, now viewed by some among the Rest as “penetration,” is another reason to resent and resist the West – another source of conflict.) “In a multicivilizational world,” he writes, “the constructive course is to renounce universalism, accept diversity, and seek commonalities” (1996: 318). Huntington here is not a Cold Warrior prescribing a conflict management policy based upon *containment* of the Other, à la George Kennan’s “long telegram” and the Truman Doctrine; nor is he an isolationist suggesting a fortress mentality and retreat from the global system of civilizations. Searching for commonalities implies an engagement with the Rest (though “keep your powder dry”).

Although he does not call for it explicitly, one way to understand Huntington’s search for commonalities is by invoking the idea of “dialogue.” The former president of Iran, Mohammed Khatami, reacting explicitly to Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, offered the idea of a “dialogue of civilizations,” in a speech before the United Nations. For its part, the UN voted in November of 1998 to make 2001 the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. It, too, did so explicitly in reaction to Huntington’s formulation: in voting for a year devoted to dialogue, the “assembly rejected the notion of a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ which is based on the notion that inter-civilizational understanding is impossible. The General Assembly expressed its firm determination to facilitate just such a dialogue . . . through an active exchange of ideas, visions and aspirations.”<sup>10</sup> And 2001 did witness a major UNESCO conference on dialogue held in Japan, and a number of workshops organized by the United Nations University (in Tokyo), on dialogue in science, ethics, education, and the media. According to the UN’s website, all occurred before or during the summer of 2001. All occurred before September 11.



Some would argue that given the events of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror – to many the bloody embodiment of Huntington's Clash – such dialogue is called for now more than ever. At the local and community levels dialogue has been used to bring together ethnically and religiously diverse members of a multicultural Northern Virginia community to address some of the fears, uncertainties, and prejudices that have arisen in the post-9/11 world (Cheldelin 2006). Dialogue has been used in other parts of the US, sometimes framed as “public conversations,” to explore many of these same issues.<sup>11</sup> Dialogue has established itself among some conflict resolution practitioners as a technique or tool different from negotiation, mediation, ADR, problemsolving workshops, and so on. It is especially suited for conflicts involving deeply held values or contentious issues of morality – abortion, capital punishment, gay rights – and even in some land use and development disputes (Maiese 2003).

Nevertheless, there are problems with envisioning dialogue as the full antidote to civilizational clash. First, dialogue presupposes the agency of individuals. At the level of civilizations clashing, agency is rare. Instead, one gets the sense of demographically huge, culturally monolithic blocs, or creeds or core values, colliding. It is hard to sustain a place for mutually engaged and agentic individuals within the terms of Huntington's mega-formulation. Second, there is the problem, pointed out by critics but also recognized by many who advocate dialogue, presented by power imbalances among participants. It is hard to imagine such imbalances not intruding on “civilizational dialogue,” since power asymmetry is intrinsic to the structure of the international system of states, as well as central to the conflict dynamic of Huntington's theory of civilizations. “Latin America” or “Africa” (to speak momentarily in Huntington's coagulating voice) certainly would not feel they could enter a dialogue with North Americans as equals. “Islam” and “China” both feel the iron grip of imperial and colonial history degradingly around their throats. It would be difficult, in any case, to keep power or histories of oppression outside the dialogue room.

Finally, there is the question of what dialogues accomplish – a question raised mainly by its critics. In the end, dialogue is about talk and exchange of ideas, mutual learning and the sharing of understanding, the gaining of trust and the creation of empathy. This is no small thing, but it seems some distance from conceptions of conflict resolution or transformation that imply *changing* existing structures of disparities and inequities, resource extraction or distribution, capital and human flows. These comprise the “systems of inequality,” as those might say who criticize Huntington's search for commonalities from a conflict resolution perspective, “that make social life around the globe a struggle for individual and group survival – systems that feed the illusion that either one civilization or another must be dominant” (Rubenstein and Crocker 1994: 128). The challenge for dialogue is to confront power. (To be fair, I think this remains the challenge for all of conflict resolution!) The challenge for dialogue, if cultural conflict is conceived in mega-civilizational terms, is how a practice focused on individual voices (on *talk*) can effect systemic – indeed, *global* systemic – change.

## **Conflict theory and practice among the clash of civilizations**

Although the critique of dialogue is substantial, nevertheless the search for commonalities is not to be dismissed. After all, the shared understanding of common *interests* – the desire to avoid mutually assured destruction – functioned as a partial conflict management device during the Cold War. Given the limitations of intercultural dialogue when

culture is conceived as civilization, the theory of conflict that precipitates from the Clash of Civilizations resembles in the end nothing so much as realism, and thus the conflict resolution practices resemble realism's as well: contain, deter, discomfit your enemies, maintain hegemony if possible; if not, balance power through alliances at all events. Along with realism, Huntington disdains US foreign interventions with moralizing rationales, such as spreading democracy and freedom. If anything, he goes further than many realists by calling such intervention, "the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict" in the world today (1996: 312). Thus, the line that supposedly helped keep the US out of efforts to prevent a fragmenting Yugoslavia (with its "ancient tribal hatreds") from complete dissolution in the early 1990s – "we don't have a dog in that fight" – summarizes a large part of both realist and Huntington's foreign policy prescriptions.<sup>12</sup> In this sense, the more hardheaded and Machiavellian prescriptions outlined in Huntington's 1993 essay may be closer to "practical truth" than the search for commonalities in his 1996 book. The practices suggested by both realism and Huntington resemble conflict *management* at best. Resolution, on the other hand, is doubtful, and transformation is a chimera. The key difference is that realism presumes a world with rational actors seeking to maximize recognized utilities. In the Clash of Civilizations, rationality is replaced by assuming the predominance among actors – at least those in the Rest, if not the West – of the non-rational calculi of pre-modern (fundamentalist or primordial) religious belief and "blood and belonging" ethnic nationalism.

In all this, what is noteworthy to conflict theorists – if also disheartening – is how sturdily Huntington's "inadequate ideas" about culture (Avruch 1998) have withstood the critiques of so many accomplished scholars from across the social sciences. These scholars have attacked the theory from any number of possible points, including its empirical – historical and evidentiary – base. To maliciously paraphrase Lewin, "There's nothing so practical as a bad theory." It almost does not seem to matter whether Huntington's theory of culture is social-scientifically valid or not: ethnic conflict, conditioned on complex and interacting factors of economy and politics, shifting social identities or self-interested leadership and "ethnic entrepreneurs," is now reduced to ancient tribal hatreds. Some homogeneous, supra-historical, and geographical entity called "the Arab Mind" is now taught to aspiring diplomats and in military colleges. In all these cases, the *players* have adopted these ideas – both in the West and, judging by jihadists and others, in some significant parts of the Rest as well. These ideas have become part of an overarching ethnotheory of conflict, with associated ethnopraxes, in Avruch and Black's (1991) original sense of the terms. In the Clash of Civilizations view of things, Orientalism has gone far beyond the literary and artistic productions that were the focus of much of Said's (1978) original critique; and, in its symmetrical anthropology, Occidentalism has gone far beyond resistance to Coca-Cola and Disney.

We are once again back to the impacted and protean nature of the idea of culture itself. What do the ivory-tower experts know anyway – historians, anthropologists, social scientists or area scholars of all kinds? To think of cultures, as the Clash of Civilization model of the world does, as stable, homogeneous, undifferentiated, enduring, essential and totalizing entities, is a masterwork of cognitive simplification, of perceptual miserliness in the face of a very complex world. In this view, culture is not an analytical concept at all, but a heuristic or schema by which men and women, some of them influential and with immense power (or weaponry) at their disposal, "reason" their way through the world. This understanding of culture has other uses in the world. It is also a very powerful discourse and politically motivating ideology. On the one hand, it directs us (as it did Toynbee and Spengler: good

Hegelians) to see cultures in idealist terms as stable “norms and values,” and away from seeing culture in terms of materialist issues, connected to social change, as resource and capital flows – and away from perceiving inequality and empire. On the other hand, it makes conflict between and among cultures appear primordial and inevitable. Certainly it appears that way to many people worldwide today. Why should this be so?

Especially since the tragedy of 9/11 and the tragedies that have followed in its wake, one could argue that Huntington got something profoundly right: the tendency for global conflict in the post-Cold War era to be understood by many in the discourse of civilizational clash, and for contending parties on all sides, in fact, to mobilize around this idea. One might say that Huntington’s original analysis in 1993 was prescient. But the many evidentiary problems with the theory pointed out by numerous critics, particularly as evident in the empirical and historical record, belie the validity of the theory, and suggest another interpretation of its apparent prescience. For if the theory of civilizational clash is an ethnotheory, a heuristic for understanding global conflict, then, as heuristics do, it will guide the behavior, actions, and reactions of all the parties who use it to reason their way through complex (and threatening) events. If it is *the* heuristic utilized by the elite – political leaders and their ministers and secretaries of defense, media and pundits, religious leaders and others who mold public opinion – then their decisions and actions, capable of producing real effects in the world, will be shaped by its prescriptions. And, finally, if this heuristic is effectively “symmetrical” in its distribution, so that the images among contending parties in different civilizations are mirror images, then a theory of civilizational clash will produce responses, political and military actions, appropriate to the theory. Such policies and responses will produce a particular state of global affairs and international relations. Rather than predicting the state of the world and global conflict, the Clash of Civilizations helps to bring it about.

### **“Civilizations” in conflict? An alternative approach to culture and conflict resolution**

An alternative to thinking of the world as beset by inevitable conflict between unchanging and monolithic civilizations has to begin with a reassessment of culture – in effect, to decouple the notion of culture from the mega-concept called civilization. It also demands a far more nuanced theory of culture, one that is more attentive to history and ethnography – to social change and the power of “locality” – and far less imperious with respect to claims of causality.

The apparent monolithic character of any civilization, its homogeneity and coherence, as any historian will tell you, disappears as one examines more closely the dynamics of historical change – population movements, wars, revolutions, counterrevolutions, religious reforms, and religious syncretisms – which combine to bring about social change. Culture, as a far more localized and historically contingent concept, is a better way to “look inside” so-called civilizations. Of course, culture is also a concept constructed by scholars. But, compared with civilization, culture has two main advantages. First, when attached to social groups it covers much, much less ground – demographically, geographically, and historically – than does civilization; and second, partly because of its sensitivity to more localized settings, it is far more sensitive to social dynamics, including socially based variation (as within “subcultures”) and historical change.

But, for conflict resolution theory and practice, the concept of culture required to improve upon Huntington is not one that merely reduces the scope of what civilization

refers to, achieving simply a reduction in scale. For it is possible to have a scaled-down version of civilization called culture and still reproduce civilization's main conceptual inadequacies: ideas of homogeneity and historically enduring stability – an essentialized and reified entity capable of action. What we need is a different conceptualization of culture entirely (e.g. Avruch 1991, 1998, 2003a,b, 2004). Such a concept of culture is focused closely on the understandings of the world by historically *situated* individuals, and the images, encodements, schemas and symbols – passed down from generations past (“tradition” or “custom”) or formulated by individuals or their contemporaries in the crucible of immediate lived experience and exigency (Avruch 1998: 16–21) – with which they make meaning, reason, feel, and act.<sup>13</sup>

Compared with civilization, such a nuanced theory of culture has several advantages for advancing a coherent notion of conflict resolution. First, ideas of social transformation and change are intrinsic to the definition. Ideas of timelessness and centuries-spanning stability cannot be sustained in a definition of culture that requires it to be responsive and adaptive to its environment and constituted by the cumulative social practice of situated individuals. Second, situated individuals, even within a culturally constituted social grouping, are not all identical. Culture is sociologically and psychologically “distributed” among group members, and thus it is inconceivable to think of individual actors as social robots, all subscribing to the same creed, value sets, or morality, all moving along the same behavioral assembly lines. Third, culture conceived in this way – with socially diverse individuals in potentially changing social systems, who may in fact be “bearers” of multiple cultural identities – means we can think of it as something different from simply a label, a way of naming certain ethnic, religious, or national groups. Rather than referring to mostly static and monolithic social entities, like civilizations, this conception of culture orients us to see complexity and dynamism as inherent social qualities. Put differently, we see culture as contingent, emergent, contestable, and contested. Thus, we can see the social, political, and moral conflicts that are “inside” cultures, and we are less apt to uncritically accept any one public version of it – from political platform to fatwa – as authoritatively or eternally representative or true. Fourth, this way of understanding culture helps us to think of it as providing the social and cognitive contexts for behavior, but drains it of the “necessity” also to be causal. This means we ought no longer to think of culture – cultural *differences*, to be precise – as the main causes of social conflict. Culture does not cause conflict. It is, however, the lens through which the causes of conflict are ultimately refracted (Avruch and Black 1993; Avruch 1998). The main causes themselves are more likely to be sought and understood in the “systems of inequality,” global and local, to which Rubenstein and Crocker (1994), and so many others, have referred.

Fifth, and finally, understanding culture in this way rather than as a mega-concept called civilization allows us to re-engage the most conflict resolution-friendly response to global conflict that Huntington did in fact propose – a “profound understanding” of other cultures, accommodation to difference, and a search for commonalities. Whatever its limitations, as noted earlier, the promise and hope of dialogue and similar intercultural encounters ought not to be jettisoned too quickly. And by locating culture with historically (and thus politically, religiously, and economically) situated individuals it is possible to conceive a more realistic sense of dialogue – or any other conflict resolution technique, such as problemsolving workshops – in the search for commonalities. By basing the definition of culture on the notion of shared understandings – cognitions, schemas, symbols – by members *within* social groups, it makes the search for commonalities, or shared understanding, *across* social groups or cultural divides, more sensible.

Such an approach even helps us to reframe the apparent “timelessness” of culture. The past may be relevant to parties in the present not because culture is changeless or primordial but because the past exists in and informs the present – helping to shape and change it – as one more schema available to actors striving to make sense of their world. Perhaps, as Huntington suggests, we should begin by striving to “understand” the others. In his first major address to the American people after 9/11 President Bush declared, “This crusade, this war on terrorism, is gonna take awhile.”<sup>14</sup> A few days later, in his State of the Union Address, the president – apparently in an impromptu aside – again used the word “crusade” to describe the coming campaign and (what some now call) the Global War on Terror. The response in the Arab and Muslim world was immediate and – given *their* historical consciousness (images, encodements, schemas, symbols) – understandably hostile. They understood what “crusade” implied. A serious engagement with culture would mean that an American president understood this – at least this – too.

## Notes

- 1 I thank my colleagues Sandy Cheldelin, Marc Gopin, Nadim Rouhana, Richard Rubenstein, and Dennis Sandole for their comments, and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste for her fine editorial eye.
- 2 The differences between classically “realist” (from Morgenthau and Thompson 1985) and “neorealist” theories (from Waltz 1979) are of course important ones, but both in the end treated culture in much the same way, as unimportant, and I shall therefore use the terms interchangeably.
- 3 See Avruch (1998: 31–5) for a detailed discussion and critique of this work.
- 4 Kaplan himself claims this influence in the preface to the second edition of the book (1996: x). Secretary of State Warren Christopher also referred to “centuries old” hatreds that convinced him that American or NATO intervention earlier in the 1990s would have been futile.
- 5 In the words of Dale Eickelman, a senior and widely respected Middle East anthropologist, Patai can at best be assigned in introductory classes and read as “an anti-text to indicate the pitfalls of using psychological projections to elicit the characteristics of society and nation.” Another anthropologist, Sondra Hale, said, “He can no longer be taken seriously.” The quotes from Eickelman and Hale and information on the continued use of the book and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School are found in Qureshi (2004).
- 6 Kaplan says almost as much – that he wrote “a travel book” not a “policy work” – in the preface to the second edition of the book (1996: x).
- 7 See Sandole (2005) for a discussion of the George W. Bush presidency’s contribution to this state of affairs.
- 8 An important point as well is that realism makes states the main actors; individuals hardly count, and individual “agency” of any sort is hard to find. This contrasts sharply with conflict transformation theory and practice.
- 9 Hence Lord Palmerston, famously: “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.” Huntington, in contrast, speaks to the power of “kin-country” feelings between intracivilizational states – in effect maintaining an alliance through a sort of “kinship sentimentality” becomes a (national) interest. He might well claim that Palmerston spoke dismissively only of friends and allies – not of kin!
- 10 Text found at the UN website: [www.unu.edu/dialogue](http://www.unu.edu/dialogue). A speech by President Khatami in September 2000 before the UN, laying out his idea of civilizational dialogue, can be found at [www.unesco.org/dialogue2001/en/khatami.htm](http://www.unesco.org/dialogue2001/en/khatami.htm). Among other things, it can be read as an explicit rebuttal of Huntington’s interpretation of Islamic civilization.
- 11 See, for example, the Public Conversations Project, at <http://publicconversations.org>, the Public Dialogue Consortium, at [www.publicdialogue.org](http://www.publicdialogue.org), and various projects undertaken by the NGO Search for Common Ground, at [www.sfcg.org](http://www.sfcg.org).
- 12 This is ascribed to then Secretary of State James Baker, advising President George H. W. Bush in 1991.

13 This conception of culture owes much to Bourdieu's (1977, 1990) notion of *habitus*.

14 See CNN.com report entitled "Bush Vows to Rid World of Evil-Doers," 15 September 2001. <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism/>. The State of the Union Address took place on 20 September 2001. The use of "crusade" in the speech was reported as impromptu by the press; it does not appear in the official transcript of the speech. For a report by the British press on its use and Arab reaction see [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/09/23/wbush23.xml](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/09/23/wbush23.xml). (Both sites accessed 5 February 2007.)

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# 18 Conflict resolution

## The missing link between liberal international relations theory and realistic practice

*Nimet Beriker*

This chapter aims at incorporating the operational capabilities of the field of conflict resolution as part of liberal international relations (IR) practice, and offers a model that incorporates conceptual and practical aspects of liberal approaches to IR, alongside conventional *Realpolitik* practices. The model is relevant for both analysts (academics, consultants) and “real world” decisionmakers and practitioners, based on the following observations:

- Traditionally, the practice of IR has been confined within the limits of security studies discourse, which offers limited options to practitioners of international relations. Foreign policy officials often perceive the conflict resolution field as a “new age” movement not having much relevance to the conduct of real world issues.
- The lack of operational coherence in liberal approaches often causes a “default” use of realist tools in the making and execution of day-to-day foreign policies, even in situations in which joint interests can be increased through cooperation.
- The current state of the literature in conflict resolution makes it possible to create synthesis between studies of IR and the field of conflict resolution.
- The rapidly changing world necessitates systematic frameworks that capture activities and practices of foreign policy behavior of states in order to understand and formulate foreign policies vis-à-vis quickly emerging new international situations, and then to communicate these options to a wider audience.
- A lack of comprehensive typologies for analysts often causes misdiagnosis about situations, which results in suboptimal foreign policy outcomes.

### The issue areas

The above observations address two major issue areas. The first conceptual cleavage is related to the *theory and practice divide* in international affairs. It would not be wrong to assert that in practice IR students and foreign policy executives (e.g. decisionmakers, diplomats, presidents) belong to different epistemic communities and cross-fertilization between these two worlds is often challenging (Bercovitch *et al.* 2005; Groom 1984) (see Chapter 30 in this volume by Dennis Sandole). That said, theory is an essential tool of statecraft (Walt 2005). In other words, foreign policy practices could be translated into theoretical frameworks and, in turn, they could be used as operational frameworks for further experiences.<sup>1</sup> This communication, however, is more “natural” with some disciplinary foundations, such as the realist paradigm, and more problematic with some others, e.g. the liberal paradigm. For example, according to Morgenthau (in Schellenberg 1982), the father of the realist theory in IR, the practice of diplomacy should consist of actions used to defend

national security, consisting of the integrity of the national territory and institutions. For that reason, Morgenthau states that the four fundamental rules of diplomacy are:

- 1 Diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit.
- 2 The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with adequate power.
- 3 Diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations.
- 4 Nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them.

(ibid.: 164)

Traces of Morgenthau's guidance can be found in many contemporary books on diplomacy and in foreign policy practices. However, it is very hard to quote a liberal IR theorist on the conduct of foreign policy, mainly because, at the conceptual level, the liberal paradigm does not provide daily practical tools for managing the day-to-day business of diplomacy. Whereas decisionmakers find themselves at ease in strategizing foreign policies by taking into consideration principles of realist approaches, such as threats, crises, and strategic alliances, they are not well-enough equipped to add new concepts to their daily policy formulations. In many instances, this produces foreign policy strategies that are identical to national security strategies.

The above argument is also in line with Rapoport's "first order learning" argument. In this view, when problems occur, they are addressed by reference to the "default values," which are based on commonly used assumptions and become regarded as immutable. "Orderly and creative transformation of social systems, however, depends upon a capacity for second-order learning, which requires a willingness and capacity for challenging assumptions" (Miall *et al.* 2000: 48). Hopmann (2001) makes a similar observation by addressing bargaining and problemsolving approaches to international negotiations. He claims that:

since most senior diplomats were trained during the period when the realist paradigm was dominant in the field of international relations, it is likely that whatever theoretical analysis of negotiations they might have encountered would have been heavily laden with the content of bargaining theory. Believing it to be valid, along with the realist perspective to which it is closely related conceptually, they have tended to negotiate as if bargaining constituted the only appropriate approach to international negotiations.

(ibid.: 22)

The second issue area addressed by the aforementioned observations is related to *conceptual limitations in formulating liberal foreign policy practice*. The realist and liberal approaches to IR differ from each other in terms of their ability to provide concrete policy tools to policymakers and diplomats in their daily conduct of foreign relations. Whereas the abstract realist theory of IR provides the immediate "concrete tools" to execute daily foreign policies in the form of threat, commitment, ultimatum, strategic alliance, and sanctions, the liberal paradigm seems to offer another set of "abstract frameworks," namely multilateralism, economic interdependence, relative gains, soft power, democratic peace, and security communities that can only be implemented in the form of medium- or long-term policy. Lack of operational coherence in liberal approaches often results in default use of realist tools in the making and execution of foreign policies, even in situations in which joint interests can be increased through cooperation.<sup>2</sup>

In a neighboring field, that of conflict resolution, different intellectual efforts are made to operationalize international actors' peaceful acts or involvements in an attempt to capture variations in international actors' conflict resolution styles.

### **The field of conflict resolution and conduct of foreign policy**

Since the mid-1990s and early 2000s, several conceptual frameworks have been introduced to illustrate different uses of conflict resolution strategies in a changing world. Michael Lund's (1996) framework for preventive diplomacy is a comprehensive typology that introduces policies and instruments for preventing violent conflicts. Military approaches, non-military approaches, and development and governance approaches are three broad conceptual categories in which different policy options are elaborated. Lederach (1997) offered approaches that could be used for sustainable reconciliation in divided societies, focusing on actors and approaches to peacebuilding. Similarly, Stern and Druckman (2000) presented a framework for strategies and tools for conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era. In this approach, power politics, conflict transformation, structural prevention, and normative change are elaborated as strategies of conflict resolution together with tools that feature these strategies.

One observation regarding the above efforts is that they concentrate on the operationalization of conflict resolution approaches and activities without integrating them with mainstream international relations literature. In other words, the conceptualization of conflict resolution practice is elaborated in isolation from theoretical and practical instruments that classical IR literature offers; therefore, conflict resolution has not been considered as part and parcel of state interactions and conduct of foreign relations.

There are some exceptions to the aforementioned observations. Groom (1988) in his earlier work articulated the role of the strategist, the conflict researcher, and the peace researcher, in terms of their main approaches to the study of conflicts: the realist, world society, and structuralist paradigms of international relations. Another attempt is Hopmann's (2001) work, which laid out principles of two perspectives of international negotiation, namely problemsolving and bargaining. Hopmann's categorization illustrates different interaction patterns between states and draws a connection between these approaches and two competing paradigms of international relations: liberalism and realism. Similarly, Kriesberg (2002), who emphasizes convergences between security studies and peace studies, claims that, during the Cold War, security studies emphasized military relations concerning nuclear deterrence. Analysts working in peace studies examined peace movement organizations, the role of mass media, and processes of socialization. In the post-Cold War era, the two domains moved much closer towards each other. Kriesberg sees "early warning" and preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding as new subfields that cut across the domains of security and peace studies. Eralp and Beriker (2005) employed the third party intervention literature of the conflict resolution field to analyze EU foreign policy behavior on the Cyprus issue. In this work, third party roles, structural interventions, and conflict transformation are treated as foreign policy tools that are available to international actors, alongside classical security-based foreign policy measures.

As stated before, this chapter investigates the theoretical and practical bases of foreign policy conduct, examining the contributions of the conflict resolution field in the execution of foreign policy goals, and introduces a classification scheme and a model (Foreign

Policy Circumplex, FPC). Accordingly, the following section introduces major conceptual dimensions and analytical divides of the FPC.

## Foreign policy circumplex

Foreign policy outputs of international actors are often defined within the confines of the international relations field, and instruments of foreign policy are elaborated in contexts in which the actor is a party to a problem. However, in many instances international actors adopt a third party role to execute their foreign policy objectives. Box 18.1 offers a typology that defines and describes instruments of partisan and third party foreign policy roles of international actors.

Based on the instruments presented in Box 18.1, Figure 18.1 introduces a model called the *Foreign Policy Circumplex* (FPC), integrating foreign policy instruments of decisionmakers (as a party or third party) in a continuum ranging from cooperation to competition. The FPC has both analytical and diagnostic value. The model has practical value in that it can serve as a toolbox for foreign policymakers and diplomats when deciding on certain courses of action. It can also serve analysts of international relations, journalists and academics, as a basis for conduct post hoc analysis of foreign policy behaviors of international actors. Another value of the FPC regarding theory is the depiction of the underlying theoretical and disciplinary foundations of each action in an attempt to reconnect theory and practice of international relations. In the next section, I describe in greater detail major analytical divides of, and the types of instruments in, the FPC.

## Cooperation versus competition divides

Competition and cooperation are one of the major analytical dimensions of the model (the vertical axis of the FPC). They are two courses of actions that a party can choose in dealing with other actors. Conditions for cooperation and competition have been one of the most studied issue areas in the social sciences. In the field of social psychology, Morton Deutsch and David Johnston (Deutsch and Coleman 2000) emphasize two basic ideas in understanding processes involved in cooperation and competition and the factors that contribute to developing a cooperative or competitive relationship. One is related to the type of interdependence that exists among goals, and the other to the type of action taken by the people involved. In this approach, cooperative orientation and reframing are two concepts that are emphasized and elaborated.

The field of international relations looks at the same phenomena in relation to three levels of analysis: individual, national, and structural systemic (Waltz 1959). In this tradition, the Prisoner's Dilemma is the construct used the most to depict the "mixed motives" structure and options of the parties in interactions in which both cooperation and competition are available strategic options. For the realists in international relations, international behavior represents a prisoner's dilemma that prevents cooperation except in rare cases such as the formation of alliances. In this tradition, the international system is anarchic, there is no central authority capable of creating order, and constant competition among states is the only order of the international system. In this view, peace and cooperation are seen as an absence of war (Stein 1990). For liberals, cooperation is possible through the monitoring mechanism of international institutions, facilitated information flows, and learning. Conflict is costly when international actors fail to choose to cooperate because of shortsightedness and misperception. The rational paradigm portrays cooperation and

## **Box 18.1 Instruments of foreign policy: partisan versus third party roles. A typology**

### ***I Third party roles***

#### ***A Transformative intervention***

Actor intervenes in order to transform the dysfunctional relationship among the conflicting parties, with the aim of creating common intellectual and value space among the parties.

##### **A1 FACILITATIVE MEDIATION**

Actor mediates with the aim of helping parties find their own solutions. It can be in the form of facilitating exchange of information and problemsolving processes, and achieved by introducing new resources for the conflict system, and enhancing trust among the parties.

##### **A2 INTERACTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

States indirectly sponsor or help to organize unofficial third party assisted, small-group problemsolving initiatives in order to solve their differences in informal confidential settings.

##### **A3 CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINING**

A skill-building exercise conducted by third parties with the aim of preparing participants to be more effective in dealing with their differences.

##### **A4 POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION**

Actors initiate or support social rehabilitation efforts in the conflict-torn nation.

### ***B Structural intervention***

Actor intervenes as a third party, and carries out activities designed to change the incentive structure of the disputing parties with an expectation that they would lead the parties to change their conflict behavior.

##### **B1 POSITIVE INCENTIVES**

Actor as a third party offers financial and/or political rewards to the disputing parties with the aim of changing its conflict behavior.

##### **B2 PEACEBUILDING, PEACEKEEPING**

Helping the parties to build and develop democratic institutions such as electoral systems, financial reforms, and constitution writing with the belief that democratic processes will eliminate the structural causes of the conflict. Sending peace forces to contain the dispute.

## B3 INITIATING BILATERAL COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS

Actor helps the conflicting parties to foster their bilateral cooperative programs mostly in low-politics areas such as culture, business, education, and sports. (Multitrack framework.)

## B4 NEGATIVE INCENTIVES

Actor withdraws economic and/or political rewards from the conflicting parties – or from one of the conflicting parties – with the expectation to change the parties' behavior, and the course of the conflict.

## B5 POWER MEDIATION

Third parties impose a solution on a conflict in order to enhance their national or institutional interests. Pressing the conflicting parties to reach an agreement through the use of force or competitive tactics.

## B6 MILITARY INTERVENTION

Actor militarily intervenes to stop or change the course of an already existing conflict.

**II *Partisan roles****C Problemsolving diplomacy*

Actor is a party to an ongoing conflict, and decides to change the existing competitive course of action into cooperation.

## C1 UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS/GESTURES

Actor initiates a concession, or offers an olive branch to the “enemy” with the aim of de-escalating the tension and setting a cooperative tone to the interactions.

## C2 PROBLEMSOLVING NEGOTIATIONS

Declaring, initiating or actively taking part in a negotiation process that seeks to reach efficient and mutually beneficial agreements.

## C3 COOPERATION WITH A MEDIATOR

Actor accepts the assistance of a mediator in the conflict. The state, as a party to the conflict, actively seeks for a third party to start or assist in a peace process.

## C4 EXCHANGING VISITS

Enhanced frequent interactions and diplomatic visits between the conflicting states while the tension between international actors continues.

C5 AGREEMENTS

Signing agreements on soft issues or to terminate conflict.

C6 POSITIVE COMMITMENTS

Actor expresses its cooperative stand on policy issues.

*D Traditional diplomacy*

Actor achieves its national interests by adapting a win–lose perspective to foreign policy.

D1 THREATS, WARNINGS, AND PUNISHMENTS

Actor issues threats and warnings to reiterate its firmness regarding an issue or position. State takes action and punishes the other party.

D2 COMMITMENTS

Actor reiterates its commitments to the already existing competitive positions or opinions.

D3 ACCUSATION AND BLAMING

Condemning the other party for its actions, positions, and attitudes. Expressing disagreement.

D4 ARMAMENT

Building up arms technology or increasing the quality and the number of weapons.

D5 STRATEGIC COALITIONS

Forming military alliances with like-minded states to preserve and enhance the state's power.

D6 MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

Actor sends its troops to achieve its strategic goals.

D7 LEADERSHIP

Taking initiatives or offering collaboration to build an international coalition to act collectively on world issues.

D8 REWARDS AND PRAISING

Actor uses “carrots” to change or maintain the other party's position in accordance with its own preferences. Actors express their satisfaction with an already existing development or outcome.






Figure 18.1 Foreign policy circumplex.

competition as products of choice and circumstance and treats strategic interaction as a level of analysis. Payoffs, perceptions, and decision criteria interact to lead the actor to make a strategic choice. In the normative tradition, however, peace is the norm.

In international interactions decisionmakers very often have to choose between cooperative and competitive courses of actions. As Figure 18.1 shows, cooperative orientation to foreign policy is supported by a set of foreign policy instruments (top half of the FPC). Instruments of the field of conflict resolution and most of the practices of peace and diplomatic studies fall into this category. A competitive approach to international relations, however, employs power-based instruments (bottom half of the FPC). Coercive diplomacy and strategic studies constitute disciplinary foundations of such orientation.

## Partisan roles versus third party intervener roles

The horizontal axis of FPC shows two major roles that international actors could adopt in a course of action. Partisan roles and third party roles constitute one of the major analytical divides of the model.

### *Partisan roles*

An actor becomes a party when s/he has a direct stake in a relationship with an “other” and takes a series of actions – ranging from mild to aggressive – to achieve his/her goals (right half of the FPC). In other words, the actor adopts a partisan role to deal with a situation in which his/her direct interests are challenged. Bilateral contacts are the simplest formats of such relations. At the international level, bilateral relations could be conducted through the use of classical diplomatic tools. In this context, issuing threats, warnings and punishments (D1), commitments (D2), accusations and blaming (D3), and taking leadership (D7) are foreign policy instruments that are widely used, especially with adversaries. The early stages of the current US–Iran relationship bear examples of such activities. In January 2002, President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union Address, placed the Islamic Republic of Iran in the “axis of evil” along with North Korea and Iraq (Office of the Press Secretary 2002). On a similar note, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned Iran that “If the regime does so [maintains its current course], it will incur only great costs. We and our European partners agree that path will lead to international isolation and progressively stronger political and economic sanctions” (BBC News 2006).

In an international environment in which military strategic concerns dominate decisionmaking processes, the party could decide to take actions by increasing its military capabilities (D4), building strategic coalitions (D5), and invading other territories (D6). US policy in Iraq contains a number of excellent examples of such activities.<sup>3</sup>

At the cooperative end of such bilateral diplomacy, exchanging visits (C4), agreements (C5), positive commitments (C6), and rewards and praising (D8) may be cited as foreign policy instruments. Examples of the employment of these foreign policy instruments can be found in current US–British relations. With regard to the war on terror, the military intervention in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq, the leaders of the two countries have exchanged numerous visits, and on many occasions have praised the special historical ties that the two countries have. In November 2001, President Bush explicitly stated that the United States had no better friend in the world than Great Britain (CNN 2001).

Problemsolving diplomacy is a special type of bilateral interaction employed when a party wants to end an already existing animosity. Unilateral gestures (C1), initiating problemsolving negotiations (C2), asking for third party assistance, and cooperating with a third party (C3) are types of actions geared to improve existing hostile relationships. Examples of such foreign policy behavior can be generated from recent Turkish–Greek relations and the Cyprus conflict. The Turkish–Greek rapprochement began when a major earthquake hit Turkey in August 1999. The earthquake allowed both governments to make face-saving gestures and initiate high-level official visits. Similarly, in January 2005, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met with the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in Davos to ask the Secretary-General to revive his “good will mission” to find a solution in Cyprus (Turks.US 2005). President Tassos Papadopoulos welcomed the initiative and announced that the Greek Cypriots were willing to start negotiations under UN auspices (*Southeast European Times* 2005).

### *Third party roles*

In order to achieve their foreign policy goals international actors often adopt third party roles to shape their environments and influence other actors. Actors may decide to intervene in others' conflicting interactions in order to facilitate the communication process, or to change the structure of the conflict environment (left half of the FPC). In this context two types of third party intervention strategies are defined.

The first are interventions related to conflict transformation and third party involvement concerning conflict prevention. Conflict transformation is described as "the effort to reach accommodation between parties in conflict through interactive processes that lead to reconciling tensions, redefining interests, or finding common ground" (Stern and Druckman 2000: 5). They are mechanisms used to transform dysfunctional relationships among parties and aim at creating common intellectual and value space among the parties. In this context, third party involvement in the form of facilitative mediation (A1), problemsolving workshops (track two diplomacy) (A2), training in conflict resolution (A3), and post-conflict rehabilitation (A4), are the tools available for international actors. These initiatives require a non-partisan third party role in the conflicts and are designed to deal with trust and perception related matters that cripple relationships. So far, numerous track two efforts and conflict resolution trainings have been made within the context of US foreign policy as regards to the Israeli–Palestinian, South African, Northern Irish, and Cyprus conflicts.<sup>4</sup>

Third party interventions related to structural prevention make up the second set of intervention behavior. "Structural prevention involves creating organizations or institutionalized systems of laws and rules that establish and strengthen non-violent channels for adjudicating inter-group disputes, accommodating conflicting interests, and transforming conflicts by finding common ground" (Stern and Druckman 2000: 6). In this approach, "the propensity of violence is diminished by democratization, demilitarization, de-alignment, socioeconomic development, and expansion of human rights, humanitarian law, and socio-cultural openness" (Clements 2002: 83). Interventions related to structural prevention are designed to change the incentive structure of the parties with an expectation that they would lead the parties to change their conflict behavior (left quadrant of the FPC). Therefore, issuing economic and political incentives (B1), e.g. investing in socioeconomic development, institution building, and sociocultural openness, is a form of political and economic structural intervention. The European Union (EU) demonstrated an interesting performance in this regard. In relation to its policies toward the newly emerging democracies, the EU initiated Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), Action for Rehabilitating the Economy in South Eastern Europe (PHARE), and PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programs (PDTP) (van Tongeren *et al.* 2002; Ackerman 2003).

Similarly, withdrawing rewards, e.g. imposing embargoes and hindering economic and political (B3) development, is a punitive form of structural intervention. In using punitive and integrative sets of actions, the actor, generally, has a clear idea about who is right and who is wrong and what type of outcome is desired. Therefore, the intervener attempts to change the incentive systems of the conflict environment accordingly. For example, in April 2006, the European Union, which traditionally sided with the Palestinian authority in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, cut off direct aid payments to the Hamas-led Palestinian government because of its refusal to renounce violence and to recognize Israel (*International Herald Tribune* 2006). Sending peacebuilding and peacekeeping forces (B2), initiating

bilateral cooperative programs (B3), and engaging in power mediation (B5), are other forms of third party interventions geared to changing the social structure of conflict. The US involvement in the Bosnian war in 1994–1995 is an example of power mediation, since the US changed the power structure in the field through the NATO air strikes, and then offered its mediation service to the parties (Beriker 1995). Current peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Lebanon are examples of humanitarian third party engagements. Similarly, the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) developed in 2004, is a practice to start bilateral cooperative programs with EU's neighbors to build a zone of stability and security. In this program, the implementation of the reforms is supported through various forms of EU-funded financial and technical assistance.

The most competitive (i.e. confrontational) form of third party involvement is military intervention (B6). The actor takes this action when s/he aims at changing the strategic balances in favor of one of the conflicting parties. Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 to end the violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and to empower the Turkish community qualifies as an example of such foreign policy conduct.

## **Disciplinary foundations of foreign policy outputs**

A third major analytical divide of the FPC is related to the disciplinary foundations of the foreign policy instruments. The next section presents epistemic foundations of four neighboring disciplines: conflict resolution, peace studies, diplomatic studies, and security studies. The four quadrants of the FPC in Figure 18.1 illustrate disciplinary divides.

### ***Conflict resolution***

The field of conflict resolution in its broader sense involves studies that deal with social conflict. The field has developed over the years as a natural consequence of many tasks that academics and practitioners have sought to accomplish as a reaction to their changing social environments (Kriesberg 2001). Conflict resolution is not a homogeneous field in terms of its assumptions, issues, and methodologies (Mitchell 1994; Tidwell 1998; Kriesberg 1997). That said, some general observations can be made to describe basic features of this approach. First, the field is interested in both structural and perceptual factors affecting conflict systems. One understanding in this regard is that parties are bound to their perceptual frames in evaluating their interactions with their opponents. Therefore, all conflicts can be reframed given that the perceptions of parties change. Second, the field treats social conflicts and conflict resolution techniques as dynamic processes. In this context, it is also suggested that third parties can have crucial roles in conflict transformation. In other words, third parties may help conflicting parties to reach mutually satisfactory outcomes in cases where parties cannot reach an agreement through their own efforts. A third characteristic is that all parties to the conflict affect the relationships. The field does not take a partisan attitude to conflict situations. In other words, instead of attributing the cause of the conflict to the other side's characteristics, the field is interested in what parties can do to influence the conflict process. In this context, the role of third parties constitutes an important part. The field is interested in conflicts at all levels of human interaction, e.g. interpersonal, intergroup, and international, with the understanding that conflicts are subjective phenomena. Therefore, in order to help the parties to find their own solutions, intelligent analyses of conflicts have to be made, and creative intervention designs have to be developed to enhance trust between the parties and to overcome

prejudices and stereotypes that hinder problemsolving processes. The role of the third parties often involves attempts to help disputants to reframe the conflict situation in such a way that mutually acceptable creative solutions are reached. Among the major conceptual and practical contributions of the conflict resolution field are integrative bargaining, problemsolving workshops, conflict assessment frameworks, stages and dynamics of conflict, and third party intervention (see top quadrant of FPC).

### ***Peace studies***

Peace studies, on the other hand, are interested in the structural aspects of peace in conflict situations. The positive peace tradition started with the realization that the causes of war were related to oppressive economic and social conditions (Jeong 2000). Similarly, concern for human rights, gender inequalities, and environmental deprivation became an integral part of the peace research tradition. Peace studies take a normative stand to research and practice. Change and social justice are two main motivations that drive peace researchers to conduct their investigations. In that sense, the researcher is, at the same time, an activist, and a party to the conflicts. The abolition of war and violent structures are the policy goals. The resolution of the conflicts can only be achieved by restoring justice and eliminating structural inequalities underlying conflict situations. Interventions should be made to redress economic, political, and social inequalities. Direct and structural violence, cultural violence, negative and positive peace, prisoner's dilemma, stable peace and culture of peace are the concepts and method of peace studies. They were introduced by such prominent scholars of the field as Johan Galtung (1985, 1990), Anatol Rapoport (1960), Kenneth Boulding (1978), and Elise Boulding (1992). Understanding war and violence from a feminist view as well as environmental concerns are other particular issues of the peace research tradition.

The field of peace studies is interested in structural preventions and interventions that are related to conflict transformation. The field adopts a critical and constructive approach to the social sciences, and peace research is an applied and normative discipline with a strong commitment to social change. Structural inequalities are the main concerns for peace researchers. Therefore, amelioration or deterioration of conflict structures can make a difference in the incentive systems of the parties, which, in turn, may affect their conflict behavior. Creating awareness about the structural constraints on individuals (through peace education, peace activism) and intervening to change the structures (i.e. issuing political and economic incentives, peacemaking) are among the basic peace studies practices (see left quadrant of FPC).

### ***Diplomatic studies***

The literature on diplomacy rarely makes a connection between international relations theory and the practice of international relations (Steiner 2004). The discussion of diplomacy is somewhat marginal in international relations theory. Diplomacy "exists" within IR theory, but is rarely analyzed or extensively explored. The current body of literature on diplomacy supports this argument. The emphasis of the existing work on diplomacy is generally confined to the historical account of the profession, description of the institutions, and the listings of diplomatic skills (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995; Berridge 1995; Marshall 1997; Freeman 1997). More specialized literature on diplomacy comprises different types of diplomacy such as preventive diplomacy (Lund 1996), coercive diplomacy

(George 1991), and multitrack diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald 1996). This latter work is more analytic than the former, and identifies different conceptual components of diplomatic activity. That said, in this body of knowledge, the connecting link between international relations theory and diplomacy is still missing. The practical implications of this literature are related to the actor's proper use of rules and procedures and diplomatic maneuvers to protect national interests and gain advantage in political, economic, and military matters (right quadrant of FPC).

### ***Security studies***

Traditionally, the field of security studies takes nation-states as the unit of analysis. The statist assumptions of security studies define the field as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force" (Walt 1991: 211–39). In this context, the field is primarily confined within the intellectual preoccupation of the survivability of states and regimes. Following the developments in world politics, security studies went through different stages (Prins 1998). In the early stages of security studies, theoretical developments in nuclear deterrence, concepts of rationality, arms control, crisis management, and limited war were introduced. Later, criticisms were raised, and attempts were made to come up with an emancipated, that is conceptually richer, interdisciplinary and inclusive definition of security studies (Kolodziej 1992). In this context, the expanding scope of security threats included population growth, environmental degradation, energy shortages, drug trafficking, transnational crime, and the destruction of indigenous cultures. Following 9/11, terrorism ranked at the top of the security agenda. Be that as it may, the intellectual search has continued for a non-military, non-statist conception of security, and human agency has been explored as the referent for security (Bilgin 2002) The concept of *human security* is about protecting individuals and communities from any form of violence including hunger, disease, natural disasters, and terrorism.

As mentioned before, traditionally security studies are about statist, violent, military, zero-sum practices. As Groom (1988: 83) points out, war and violent coercive activities are at the extreme end of security studies and in the domain of strategic studies. Strategy "is concerned with the manipulation and application of threats either to preserve or change the status quo." In this tradition, decisionmakers often use the term *national security strategy* interchangeably with *foreign policy*<sup>5</sup> (bottom quadrant of FPC).

### **Conclusion**

This chapter introduced a framework and a model for articulating the foreign policy behavior of international actors and the analytical and practical tools that the conflict resolution field and peace studies traditions offer. For this purpose, operational capabilities of the field of conflict resolution, peace studies, and diplomatic studies has been incorporated as part of liberal international relations practice. This aim stemmed from the observation that the practice of IR has been confined within the limits of security studies discourse, which offers limited options to IR practitioners. Therefore, in this chapter, it is claimed that the field of conflict resolution together with its neighboring fields, the peace studies and diplomacy fields, could provide concrete tools for daily formulation and execution of liberal foreign policy.

Achieving national goals through cooperation is mainly a premise of the liberal paradigm of international relations. For liberals, cooperation is possible through the monitoring

mechanism of international institutions, facilitated information flows, and learning. In the FPC cooperative orientation is represented by the instruments of the fields of peace studies, conflict resolution, and diplomatic studies. Activities presented in these categories, such as facilitative mediation, problemsolving negotiations, interactive conflict resolution, cooperation with a mediator, initiating bilateral cooperative programs, exchanging visits, offering conflict resolution training, post-conflict reconstruction, unilateral gestures, peacebuilding, positive incentives, agreements, positive commitments, and rewards and praise are presented as instruments of liberal policymaking. In terms of third party roles, the liberal paradigm is mostly interested in constructive engagements (structural or transformative) in which actors adopt either partisan or non-partisan roles.

At the competitive end, diplomatic studies and security studies are the two fields mostly concerned with procedural and strategic dimensions of foreign policy behavior. The difference between peacetime diplomacy and coercive diplomacy can be explained by the dual presence of diplomatic studies in both the cooperative and competitive realms.

At a practical level, the FPC emancipates the foreign policy toolboxes of the decision-makers. It highlights the importance of constructive third party roles in international relations and formulates this role as part of the diplomatic practice. The FPC helps to bridge the theory/practice rift in international relations and locates the field of conflict resolution as an essential foreign policy tool for real-world practices. In terms of theory and research, the heuristic value of the FPC needs to be further analyzed by conducting comparative case studies. Similarly, future research may concentrate on the relationship between liberal foreign policy tools (the top and left quadrants of the FPC) and the existing partial theories of international relations such as democratic peace, regime theory, soft power, and security communities.

## Notes

- 1 For further details on experiential learning, see Cheldelin *et al.* (2003).
- 2 For a detailed debate on the relationship between theory and policy in international relations, see Walt (2005) and Palmer and Morgan (2006).
- 3 The invasion of Iraq began on 20 March 2003, with the aim of “disarming Iraq, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free Iraqi people” (Office of the Press Secretary 2003). The United States supplied the majority of the invading forces. Supporters of the invasion included a coalition force from more than 35 countries.
- 4 Among other initiatives, conflict resolution and training workshops were held in Cyprus by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, and conducted by the Cyprus Consortium, a group that consists of the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy, the Conflict Management Group of Harvard University, and the National Training Laboratory based in Virginia (Broome 1998). Similarly, the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea, the Organization of Inter-Tajik Dialogue, and the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE are some engagements in which scholars have acted as peacemakers (Aall 2002). The initiative taken by the Norwegian Institute for Social Science (FAFO) and in their contribution to the Oslo Accords is another example of peace processes started by scholar-practitioners.
- 5 Labeling the EU’s foreign policy principles as “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” may contain similar inherent premises.

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# 19 Understanding the conflict–development nexus and the contribution of development cooperation to peacebuilding<sup>1</sup>

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## **Introduction**

The recognition of the international community that conflict, peace, security, and development are closely linked was a dramatic change, which was initiated by the discussions in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide 1994. Since the late 1990s, there has also been a growing body of research analyzing the nexus between conflict, peace, security, and development often referred to as the “conflict–development” or “security–development” nexus. Most of this research can be seen as a response to, or an analysis of, the practitioner debate, or existing research has been reinterpreted in this perspective. Quite a few studies look into causal relationships between issues such as poverty, inequality, and natural resources and the likelihood that these factors cause or exacerbate armed violence. Other research deals with the specific contribution of development cooperation to peacebuilding, often making policy or operational recommendations. And other studies put specific development-relevant themes such as demobilization or security sector reform on the post-conflict agenda.

The objective of this chapter is to give an overview of the different debates dealing with the nexus between conflict, security, peace, and development/international cooperation by unpacking the different discourses. These refer to the analysis of (a) the causes of armed conflicts in development countries (Tschirgi 2005, 2006), (b) the development community’s discourse on conflict and peace (Uvin 2002; Paffenholz 2005a,b), and (c) policy implications, i.e. the influence of various research and practitioner debates on the practice of development cooperation in countries suffering or having suffered from armed conflict.

In sum, this chapter demonstrates that development policies should be an integral part of the conflict resolution/peacebuilding agenda. However, so far the transfer from research to policy has largely ignored the complexity of development policies in conflict situations and the contribution of development to peacebuilding. I come to the conclusion that some of the research results have been embraced by practitioners, while others have not found their way into policy and field operations. The reasons for this are not always linked to the fact that policy community prefers research results that present simple messages, which fit the existing system. The research community, too, has contributed to deficiencies in transfer from research to policy, because complex problems call for multidisciplinary, quantitative, and qualitative research approaches and results that are translated appropriately into understandable messages (see Chapter 30 by Dennis Sandole in this volume).

In order to explain the nexus between the aforementioned themes, the next section provides a brief outline of the fields, conflict analysis/peacebuilding and development/

international cooperation. The third section presents the different research debates about development-relevant causes of armed conflicts and the evolution of the practitioner debate about the relations among conflict, peace, and development. The fourth section presents the contribution of development to conflict resolution and peacebuilding from a research as well as from a practitioner perspective. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and presents both the mutual learning that has taken place in both fields and the challenges that lie ahead.

In the following discussion the terms *conflict analysis*, *conflict resolution*, and simply *peacebuilding* are used when referring to the peace and conflict field. It does not distinguish between *peace* and *security*. When *conflict* is used, violent or armed forms of conflict are implied. The text refers to development as a research field or phenomenon, or to development or international cooperation as the practitioner field that responds to the challenges presented by underdevelopment. *Aid* refers to public and private development assistance.

## Understanding development and cooperation

The following gives a short overview of the evolution of the fields of development and cooperation to provide a basis for understanding the conflict–development nexus.

Although the evolution of the field began with the independence of the former European colonies in the 1950s and 1960s, its origins go back to the European idea of industrial and societal progress in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. European models of growth and progress were transferred to the South. The support for the newly independent ex-colonial states was seen as a continuation of the “white man’s burden” and the “mission.”

Research about the causes of underdevelopment in the South can be seen as a response to these historical developments. For decades, the research debate was separated into two dominant schools of thought: modernization and dependency (So 1990). Whereas the modernization school primarily saw underdevelopment as caused by domestic factors within countries in the South, the dependency school focused on external dependencies represented by the Southern elite and their Northern counterparts. These theories provided therefore diametrically opposed answers to the problem of underdevelopment and strategies to deal with it.

During the Cold War, development cooperation also functioned as a strategy to win allies in the competition between the two antagonist political blocs. The level of development aid was often calculated on the basis of political interests, and mostly justified in terms of economic and technical progress. The face of development cooperation has substantially changed over the decades as a result of different conceptual understandings of underdevelopment and poverty. In the 1950s and 1960s, the lack of financial and technical resources was seen as the key source of underdevelopment and resulting poverty. During the 1970s the debate focused on a new international economic order. The 1980s were marked by dire economic problems in most countries of the South. A key response became the macrostructural adjustment programmes initiated by the World Bank or the IMF. In the 1990s, the political dimension of aid was characterized by a focus on good governance and democratization as a means to create a suitable political environment for economic reform. Moreover, so-called “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers” (PRSPs) were introduced as a basis to support governments in effective policy planning and implementation. These approaches continued into the new millennium with the focus on “aid effectiveness” (OECD 2002). This debate is based on the hypothesis that aid is effective only when recipient countries adopt sound policies and nurture effective

institutions (Burnside and Dollar 2000; OECD 2005). In 2000, the international community established the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a global response to address poverty. This was a response to the fact that despite impressive growth rates and achievements in development in some countries, especially in Asia, the overall level of poverty had not been substantially reduced. In some regions, principally Africa, poverty rates had increased. Therefore the international community agreed that, until 2015, concrete steps should be undertaken: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary school enrolment; promote gender equality and empowerment of women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and establish global partnerships for development. The MDGs serve as an overall orientation of policies and programs for all development donors and agencies. They do not, however, provide answers about how to achieve these goals.

In sum, the core focus of development research and cooperation has not changed: the search for answers to underdevelopment and poverty reduction continues to be the main objective. What has changed is the understanding of the underlying causes and, consequently, the strategies to address them. So, it seems that what is needed is a better understanding of the context in which development takes place. In this regard, the study of armed conflict is becoming an essential context variable for development.

## **The nexus between conflict and development**

The nexus between conflict and development can be approached in different ways: first, by unpacking the different research discourses that analyze causes of armed conflicts in the South (Tschirgi 2005, 2006); second, by analyzing the development community's discourse on the issue (Uvin 2002; Paffenholz 2005a,b); and third, by analyzing the operational consequences, i.e. the influence of the various research and practitioner debates on development practice. The following discussion outlines these different debates.

### *The research debate*

The research debate can be divided into four categories. The first comprises metastudies on the transformative nature of conflict and thus its meaning for development. The second body of research is composed of econometric studies that examine quantitative, macrocomparative variables to determine the influence of conflict on development and vice versa. The third body of literature encompasses qualitative, inductive area studies (seldom comparative), trying to identify patterns of causal linkages between development and conflict. The fourth type of research is of a reflective nature, not based on empirical data, and often has as its center of analysis people in developing countries and their reasons for participating or acting within armed conflict situations.

Unfortunately, only a few attempts have been made to merge these different approaches. Moreover, the transfer of the different research debates into policy is extremely selective. Andrew Mack (2002) lists a number of reasons for this deficit, such as the lack of interaction between econometric and area studies, the use of different databases and coding methods within econometric research, and the poor "translation" of research results into understandable policy recommendations.

The following discussion aims to bring these different debates together. This challenge has been methodologically approached by identifying common themes discussed

within the four categories which could serve as the basis for a more synergetic body of knowledge.

*Modernization, globalization, and the transformation of societies as a source of conflict*

Authors such as O’Donnell *et al.* (1986) identify “revolution” as the first stage of democratization, in which groups exert pressure on authoritarian governments. This “revolution stage” is often accompanied by violence as a means of system transformation. Statistics of armed conflicts confirm the finding that most armed conflicts in the South can be categorized as anti-regime fights (Uppsala Conflict Database: [www.pcr.uu.se/database](http://www.pcr.uu.se/database)).

Mark Duffield (2002) argues that the international development community constructs a view of conflict in the South that is dominated by “center/periphery.” In Duffield’s (2002: 1052) words, “center/borderland” distinctions are those in which the center takes up responsibility for or the burden of supporting a social reconstruction of the “barbarity, excess and irrationality” in the “borderlands,” providing the justification to intervene. This intervention is, however, only a continuation of the “white man’s burden” logic of colonialism and development cooperation. Duffield (*ibid.*) sees the risk of aid being driven by interventionist national agendas as being in agreement with the realist school of international relations (Morgenthau 1960; Waltz 1979). What is necessary, in Duffield’s view, is a shift in the analysis of war in the South to an understanding of its causes. War in the South is a reaction to the transition and, thus, not a “failure of modernization.” On the contrary, it is a reaction to the pressure for modernization in the form of “reflexive modernization” (Duffield 2002: 1055). These new forms might not be compatible with Western liberal ideas, but can also be effective, as Chabal and Daloz (1999) analyze in their book *Africa Works*.

*Economic growth, income, and conflict*

Collier and colleagues (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2002; Collier *et al.* 2003) suggest that economic growth has a direct positive effect on violence reduction, and also an indirect effect as it fosters income that positively correlates with violence reduction. All other things being equal, as gross national product (GNP) per capita rises, incidents of domestic war decrease. Interestingly, per capita growth has increased in almost every country in the South during the last fifty years, though the number of armed conflicts in the South also rose until the early 1990s (Mack 2002: 521). Obviously, a more differentiated analysis is required. Gates (2002: 10), for example, found that economic growth generates political instability and an increased risk of armed conflict in very poor economies, but decreases this risk in richer economies.

*Poverty and conflict*

Since 1990, more than 50 percent of all conflict-prone countries have been low income, or least developing countries. Two-thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence (Collier *et al.* 2003). Collier and colleagues talk about a “poverty–conflict trap” as poverty undermines prospects for peace and armed conflict undermines prospects for development (Collier *et al.* 2003; Stewart 2003).



They found that the lower the GNP per capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict (Collier *et al.* 2003). Other research does not find such a clear correlation: Goodhand (2003) rejects a monocausal linkage between poverty and armed conflict and identifies a complex set of case-specific variables that causes armed conflict. Research conducted by the International Peace Academy on the security–development nexus confirms his findings (Tschirgi 2006).

### *Inequality and conflict*

Research on inequality as a cause of conflict is not consistently presented in the literature: Stewart (2008) argues that “horizontal inequality” – by which she refers to unequal access of groups to economic, political, and social resources – is a cause of conflict. She also argues that economic growth policies may inadvertently exacerbate these horizontal inequalities. Her research findings are supported by case study research in countries such as Nepal and Sri Lanka (Murshed 2002).

Cramer (2003), on the other hand, does not see such a clear cause–effect relation between inequality and conflict, and opts for a more nuanced and context-specific analysis. He argues that economic inequality is a critical factor that can cause armed conflict. However, it seems not at all clear whether inequality causes conflict. As reliable data are insufficient, he recommends more caution in making direct monocausal linkages between inequality and conflict.

### *Resources and conflict*

There has been a growing amount of research on the causal link between resources and conflict. At least two main discussions can be distinguished in this regard. The first is research about natural resources and conflict that examines the causal linkages between different types of natural resources and the likelihood that these factors cause armed conflicts. These studies can often be found under the term “environmental security” or “environmental peace.” The second, newer research can be found under the label of “war economy.” It examines economic factors that cause or prolong armed conflicts.

### *Environmental security*

The following main arguments can be found within the “environmental security/peace” research debate. Territory, water, and food can be resources that are worth fighting for (Holsti 1991; Gleditsch 2007: 179–180; Serfati 2006; Sachs 2005). A number of models have been developed to demonstrate the causal linkage between environmental conflicts and insecurity (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Baechler 1999). However, some studies contradict the thesis of clear causal linkages between environmental degradation and armed conflict (Theisen 2006; de Soysa 2002; Binningsbo *et al.* 2006). The majority of research in this domain, therefore, concludes that environmental factors can cause conflict. However, whether or not an environmental conflict passes the threshold of violence depends largely on a government’s environmental policy, as there seems to be a positive correlation between democratic forms of governance and a constructive handling of environmental conflicts (Baechler 1999; Gleditsch 2007: 195).



### *The “war economy” debate*

The so called “war economy” debate starts with the hypothesis that economic factors play an important role in armed conflict, both as causes and as driving factors prolonging violence (Berdal and Malone 2000; Malone and Nietschke 2005; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). This hypothesis is based on the understanding that war is an alternative system for generating profit, power, and protection, rather than a Clausewitzian “continuation of politics by other means.” Economic calculations drive the conflict parties to indulge in an economy of war (Berdal and Malone 2000). In this understanding, armed violence is a rational behavior of a ‘homo oeconomicus’ in a particular context (Keen 1998, 2000; Duffield 2002).

The econometric research conducted by a study group at the World Bank under the auspices of Paul Collier (Collier *et al.* 2003) has gained a lot of attention in policy circles and academia. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) introduced the differentiation between armed conflicts caused by “greed” (i.e. economic factors) or grievances (i.e. sociopolitical factors). Their main finding is that a moderate to high resource-dependency of a country, measured in terms of primary commodity exports as part of GNP, is correlated with a higher risk of armed conflict.

Many quantitative researchers contradict Collier’s findings on methodological grounds and point to shortcomings in his usage of time series data. Fearon and Laitin (2000, cited in Mack 2002: 520), for example – using a dataset with broader coverage than Collier and Hoeffler – found almost no evidence for the causal linkage between economic factors and conflict. Qualitative researchers criticize Collier for a “rebel” bias in his works. Collier’s research focuses on “greed” only as it relates to non-state armed groups, thereby leaving aside resource conflicts caused by state actors (Ballentine and Nietschke 2005).

### *Demography and conflict*

Only a small portion of development research as well as conflict research examines demographic factors influencing the likelihood of armed conflict (Cincotta 2004, 2005).<sup>2</sup> Researchers found that the likelihood of armed violence increases when countries find themselves in a demographic transition from a society characterized by short life expectancy and large family size to a society composed of small families with long life expectancy. Countries in the early phases of their demographic transition have experienced a risk of an outbreak of armed conflict that was more than ten times higher than the risk faced by countries in the transition’s later phases (Cincotta *et al.* 2003). However, the statistical likelihood of armed conflict decreases consistently as countries’ birth rates decline, suggesting that, for most states, the demographic transition promotes a “soft landing.” In this regard, Urdal (2006) finds that the existence of “youth bulges” – too many young adult males in a society – are associated with the likelihood of armed conflict; he found statistical evidence that societies with large numbers of young adult males (fifteen to twenty-nine years of age) are more prone to violence.

However, all researchers come to the same overall conclusion: demographic factors do not present a monocausal explanation of armed conflict, but when coupled with other relevant factors they present complex challenges to state institutions and political leaders that may lead to collective violence on the local or national level (Tschirgi 2005, 2006; Gleditsch 2007: 189).

*Education and conflict*

Both in development as well as in peace research and practice, there is a shared understanding about the importance of education for a number of key factors such as economic growth, income, or democracy. However, for a long time there had been little evidence of the causal linkage between education and conflict.

From the late 1990s onwards, attention progressively shifted from seeing armed conflict as an obstacle to education to an awareness that education can also contribute to conflict. Studies on the possible linkage between education and violence investigated the effects of contents and processes of schooling on armed conflict, as the former can exacerbate social and intergroup divisions (Tawil 1997; Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Salmi 2000). Davies (2004, 2005) comes to the conclusion that education in general contributes more to conflict than to peace. She found that the reality in schools in the North as well as in the South is dominated by an education system that enhances difference, mistrust, fear, and the acceptance of aggression. A research project undertaken by the International Bureau of Education assessed curriculum policies in seven countries following armed intergroup conflicts and came to similar conclusions (Tawil and Harley 2004; *Palestine–Israel Journal* 2001).

*Aid and conflict*

Research conducted in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda (Uvin 1998) found that the aid system can inadvertently exacerbate existing conflict lines, as it did in Rwanda. In her research Anderson (1999) and her team identified a number of negative effects of aid on conflict that can stem from the transfer of resources through aid. We also find that aid sends out implicit ethical messages that have negative effects on people in conflict zones. For example, when it comes to armed conflict, only the international aid workers will be evacuated and not the local population, which implies different people are valued differently (*ibid.*).

Whereas the research of Anderson and her colleagues does not question the aid system as such, other researchers go further: Duffield (2002) argues that donors are mainly driven by a “realist” national agenda and use aid resource allocation as a political instrument. His argument is supported by statistical evidence that, for example, loan allocations by the World Bank and the IMF favor countries of the South that have a seat on the Security Council (Dreher *et al.* 2006). Bastian (2003), in an analysis of donor support to conflict-ridden Sri Lanka after the ceasefire agreement in 2001, comes to the conclusion that the macroeconomic donor-driven agenda supported the recurrence of violence. Paris (2004) comes to similar conclusions in a comparative study of eleven post-conflict countries, i.e. that the rapid introduction of a liberal market economy system was the main cause of instability in all these countries. In his analysis of the aid system in pre-genocide Rwanda, Uvin (1998: 232–8) concludes that the aid community had not only been ignorant of the mounting radicalization of society and politics, but also supported this radicalization through the support for the political institutions that were tied to this process.

*The practitioner debate*

As indicated earlier, the Rwanda crisis of 1994 was the main starting point for the majority of the development practitioner community to reflect on its role in countries affected

by armed conflict. There is now a growing body of research assessing and analyzing this practitioner debate (Paffenholz 2005a,b).

Since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, debates about conflict, peace, and development have intensified and developed in different directions. The early exchanges centered on the possibilities of preventing another situation like Rwanda from happening. This turned the political early warning discourse virtually into an industry (Rupesinghe and Kuroda 1992). At the beginning of this debate, it was assumed that within a couple of years quantitative methods would be available to precisely predict upcoming political violence and, thereby, create the possibility for early action. Development donors started funding early warning research, projects and mechanisms. However, these hopes did not materialize, because it became clear that quantitative early warning alone will not be able to preempt political violence, and that lack of political will to engage in early action, not lack of information, was the main problem.

Thus, the early warning debate lost its momentum and was absorbed into the general debate about prevention culminating in the UN Secretary General's report on *Preventing Armed Conflict* (United Nations 2001).

The discourse continued with a focus on reducing the negative effects of aid on conflict; this was manifested in the “Do no harm” debate (Anderson 1999). The early reflections in the mid-1990s on this issue went in three directions. The first addressed the need to gain a better understanding of the nature and functioning of armed conflict. This was the starting point for the coming together of the peace and development communities: development actors were in need of conflict analysis, which led to the introduction of analytical approaches from conflict analysis (Barash and Webel 2002; Wallensteen 2002), which were quickly transformed into user-friendly toolboxes (Fisher *et al.* 2000). A new epistemological conflict/development community started to grow: on the side of donors more and more conflict units were established, and are represented in the Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation Network of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. The members of the network meet twice a year and exchange the latest insights in the field. A number of official guidelines have been developed (OECD/DAC 2001) that form the basis for many bi- and multilateral agencies' strategies on conflict, peace, and development. NGOs, too, have grouped themselves into different networks, the “Do no harm” network being the best known.

Other studies examined the consequences of armed conflict especially with regard to security aspects such as disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration of ex-combatants or the issue of landmines. This debate has meanwhile been absorbed into the discourse about human security. The debate found its way into research from the practitioner discourse that was first mentioned in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. The research debate about human security is characterized by a growing body of literature (Owen 2004) either advocating a narrow understanding of the concept by focusing on violent threats only (Krause 2004; Mack 2002; Macfarlane 2004) or supporting a wider understanding of security by taking into account the social, cultural, and structural context of human insecurity and a society's ability to counter it (Hampson and Hay 2002; Alkire 2003).

Yet another direction of the early reflections focused on the role of development with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Development actors first claimed that measures for poverty reduction and, thus, almost all development activities per se are a contribution to peacebuilding in the long run (Collier *et al.* 2003). Later, it became evident

that poverty reduction alone does not automatically lead to more peaceful societies. From the end of the 1990s the newly formed epistemological conflict/development community further explored assessment procedures, methods, and tools to find development-oriented answers to working in conflict areas. From 1996 onwards, Mary B. Anderson (1999) and her team developed the Local Capacities for Peace Approach (better known as “Do no harm”) with a planning matrix and checklists for finding out the potential effects of aid projects on conflict and peace. The ‘Do no harm’ understanding has developed into a principle for a new understanding of aid work in conflict zones. Critics point to the fact that the “Do no harm” debate has been successful because it is taking place within the range of development practice and does not challenge its very functioning (Weiss and Collins 1996; Uvin 2002) or that it focuses on the project level and thus leaves out the critical macropolitical questions (Paffenholz 2005a; Paffenholz and Reychler 2005).

Kenneth Bush (1998) developed a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodology comparable to environmental or gender impact assessments; as in the case of other assessment tools, PCIA was also designed for project-level interventions. Kenneth Bush’s research triggered an intensive debate about PCIA possibilities and limitations (Bush 1998; Leonhardt 2002; Austin *et al.* 2003; Bloomfield *et al.* 2005) that can be currently found under the label of “conflict-sensitive” development as a catch-all term for addressing policies, methods, and tools for working in conflict zones (Paffenholz and Reychler 2007).

### **The contribution of development research and practice to conflict resolution/peacebuilding: selective policy transfer**

Most of the debate about contributions of development research and cooperation to peacebuilding can be seen as a response to the research and practitioner debate about the conflict–development nexus as presented in the third section of this paper. However, some of the above-mentioned debates have been taken up more than others, and new debates have arisen as well. The following discussion provides an overview of the major existing strategies.

On the macropolitical level, we do not find much conceptual thinking about the consequences of globalization and modernization for peacebuilding. Macro policy interventions are based on the hypothesis that the introduction of liberal market economies will contribute to both peace and development. Critical research is hardly taken into consideration here (Paris 2004).

The debates on natural resources as a source of conflict and on so-called “war economies” have become part of the international community’s response manual for armed conflicts. The Kimberly Process of international certification of diamonds is seen as a major contribution to shrinking the incomes of conflict parties. Many problems, however, prevail in this area: first, other natural resources such as oil or drugs are not so easy to regulate owing to specificities of exploitation and production. Second, processes such as Kimberly ignore the fact that in most cases the government is one of the parties to the conflict. It is rare for state or government revenues to be subject to this type of control (Ballentine and Nietschke 2005).

The debate about “peace conditionality” (Boyce 2002) – making use of aid as an incentive for progress in the peace process – has found its way into donor guidelines. Boyce (*ibid.*: 1025) notes that the net impact of aid depends, first, on whether the donors embrace peacebuilding as their overriding aim, and, second, on how effectively their assistance

serves that aim. Peace conditionality has not functioned well in places such as Bosnia or Sri Lanka. Boyce lists a number of reasons such as the lack of donor coherence due to different policy interests.

On a more operational level, research about inequality as a source of conflict is very much included in the “Do no harm” response of donors and agencies. In practice, most donors and agencies do have “Do no harm” or “conflict sensitivity” guidelines for their operational work. Only rarely, however, has this led to macro development policies reflecting equal and fair regional and other distributions of aid resource allocations, as these are often influenced by different factors such as access or government policies. Moreover, this debate ignores those conflicts that are not based on inequalities.

Recent comparative studies on post-conflict development responses and their effects on peace and human development show that development and peacebuilding must be firmly integrated, not just linked to each other as previously assumed. For example, Rosser (2006) and colleagues identified the ability of governments and their donors to include the political context in developmental policies and programs as the main factor for successful turnarounds in conflict-affected fragile states. A meta-evaluation of UN-supported post-conflict policies and programs in seven countries came to the conclusion that the international community has successfully managed to stabilize peace agreements; however, it has not adequately addressed the structural causes of conflict. Four to ten years after the wars ended this has led, in all researched countries, to a low level of human security. According to the study, this is due to the lack of a developmental underpinning of newly created institutions. As a consequence, the study recommends integrating development issues into peacebuilding as early as possible.

## Conclusion and challenges

The review of literature about the conflict–development nexus shows that there does not exist a monocausal developmental variable that causes armed conflict or helps support more peaceful transitions. There are many different variables that, when combined, foster violence. When the violence actually occurs, however, it seems to be context-specific.

Research has also confirmed the important role of a country’s government within the development and peacebuilding process.

In conclusion, what are the challenges that lie ahead when further pursuing the linkage between the two fields?

- 1 There is a need for interdisciplinary research and joint research endeavors between quantitative and qualitative research approaches.
- 2 As a result the research–policy transfer has to be better organized to avoid the monopolization of practitioner discourses by those who are able and willing to “translate” research findings into policy and operations.
- 3 More “translators” have to be educated in the research field. Also the exchange between research and practice needs to be organized in a more fluid way. For example, as long as *only* the number of articles in reviewed journals makes a researcher “accepted,” we will never come closer to “translation.”
- 4 The conflict lens within development practice risks being nothing but another operational donor “mainstreaming” topic next to gender and/or environment. But the peaceful constitution of countries is a highly political matter that requires political answers also. Therefore, there is a need to put peacebuilding at the forefront of

macroeconomic and political development agendas while always critically analyzing the possible backlashes against interventionist policies.

- 5 Macro policy development interventions in fragile and conflict contexts, be they through National Poverty Reduction Programs or other macro interventions, should not only be based on solid analysis, but also link this analysis with implementation in a systematic way (Paffenholz and Reychler 2007).
- 6 There is a need for donors to start taking the issue of coherent policies seriously and stop linking their development policies to national agendas or hide behind their mandates of “neutrality” that never exist in reality.
- 7 After all, donors should not only claim but put into practice the “ownership” of peace and development processes to responsible governments and people within countries suffering from armed violence.

What can be learned from these findings and challenges discussed above is the need for the conflict analysis/peacebuilding research and practitioner field to understand that development policies should be an integral part of the conflict resolution/peacebuilding agenda. Development policies and resources cannot only be incentives for peace processes but do, and should, constitute a critical policy and operational dimension in support of preventing, managing, resolving, and stabilizing armed conflict when applied in a coherent and peace-oriented manner that reaches far beyond “Do no harm.” For the development community it must also be clear that peacebuilding cannot be simply added to the existing menu of development policy and operational choices, leaving all else unchanged.

## Notes

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- 2 A summary of these findings can be found in the environmental change and security reports (Cincotta 2004, 2005).

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# 20 Evaluation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding

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## Introduction

Conducting evaluation is rarely a favorite activity for those engaged in conflict resolution and peacebuilding work (hereafter CR/PB). It takes time, consumes scarce resources, requires a relatively high degree of expertise, and can result in evaluation results that are already self-evident or do not capture the nuances of conflict transformation work. Yet there are good reasons to bring evaluation to the forefront of the field of CR/PB. First, evaluation is an essential instrument for monitoring and improving upon existing initiatives. Without solid evaluation, practitioners would lack the ability to understand “what went wrong,” and scholars would lack the ability to build a body of theory about the causes of and remedies to social conflicts. Second, as the number of non-governmental and international organizations involved in peacebuilding activities increases, so too does the call for greater accountability on the part of these organizations. Finally, evaluation is an almost universal obligation when it comes to fulfilling the terms of conflict management grants given by public and private donors.

In recent years scholars have answered the call for evaluation in CR/PB work in a number of ways. Some have offered new approaches to conceptualizing the meaning of success in conflict resolution interventions, reconciliation initiatives, and other peacebuilding efforts (Mitchell 1993; d’Estree *et al.* 2001; Ross 2004; Rouhana 2000). Others have highlighted particular case studies in an effort to demonstrate the conditions and contexts that lead to “more-or-less successful” outcomes (Douma and Klem 2004; Lieberfeld 2002). Still others have outlined specific questions or frameworks that could be usefully applied to CR/PB activities (Anderson and Olson 2003; Church and Shouldice 2002, 2003; NPI-Africa 2002; Paffenholz and Reychler 2005, 2007). Despite this impressive body of work, many practitioners in the CR/PB field remain skeptical about the overall merits and usability of traditional evaluation to their work. Some have argued that the complexity of CR/PB work makes outcome and impact evaluation nearly impossible to conduct, and that traditional program evaluation tools are incapable of measuring the kinds of intangible changes that occur during conflict resolution initiatives (Anderson and Olson 2003).

The purpose of this chapter is to examine this debate, to examine the difficulties and possibilities of applying program and policy evaluation frameworks, methodologies and tools to CR/PB work, and to illustrate how traditional program and policy evaluation can be effectively used and/or modified and adapted to CR/PB assessment frameworks. The chapter proceeds in three sections: a general overview of the concept of evaluation as it is applied to the field of CR/PB; a review of the state of the art in evaluation frameworks and methodologies now being used in the field; and a discussion of various challenges currently confronting CR/PB practitioners.

## Understanding the concept of evaluation

Before discussing evaluation in CR/PB, we take a look at the concept of evaluation in general. A widely agreed definition of evaluation is provided by Rossi *et al.* (1999: 16): “an evaluation is a systematic assessment of policies, programs, or institutions with respect to their conception and implementation as well as the impact and utilization of their results.” In scientific research, policy evaluation is an established discipline, which is concerned with the effects of public policies (Rossi *et al.* 1999; Bussmann 1997). Evaluation is also well established in the fields of development and humanitarian action.

An evaluation can have a number of different and simultaneous objectives including: reviewing and judging current status in order to improve interventions; controlling processes and procedures for purposes of accountability; assessing and documenting what has been achieved; identifying lessons learned for use in future interventions. Evaluations can occur at any time during the implementation process. Usually, however, evaluations are conducted in the middle of an intervention (mid-term review) or at the end (*ex post* evaluation). Evaluations of long-term, complex programs or institutions can also take place periodically, starting shortly after the beginning of the implementation process, in order to further direct the intervention and allow for any necessary adjustments in course.

Essentially, there are two types of evaluations, formative and summative. Formative evaluations seek insight into ways to improve the intervention in question and focus on process, whereas summative evaluations assess and judge the intervention’s quality and success in meeting its objectives and focus on outcome.

Over the past few years, participatory and utilization-focused evaluation processes have become widespread. These processes involve primary stakeholders in the evaluation process, and emphasize the importance of stakeholders’ ability to use the results for future improvement (Patton 1997). This approach reflects an orientation to evaluation that defines success in terms of how well the results can be used by those involved in the intervention. The participation of primary stakeholders in the evaluation process not only optimizes the use and acceptance of the results, but also contributes to joint institutional learning.

Evaluation research and practice draws on a set of criteria that are used in order to direct assessment. Each evaluation criterion includes a number of questions and issues to be explored and addressed by the evaluator(s). These questions can be answered through the evaluators’ application of different evaluation methods. Often there exists a set of “standard criteria,” so called on account of their use by most stakeholders in evaluation. For example, the OECD criteria and the European Commission’s additional criteria are well known and widely used for the evaluation of development programs. Criteria to be used for a particular evaluation are decided upon when those involved in the planning of an evaluation stipulate which issues should be evaluated. In general, the criteria of “relevance” (the significance of the intervention for its set goals and donor policies), “effectiveness” (changes an intervention has achieved with respect to its immediate environment), “impact” (changes an intervention has achieved with respect to its larger context), and “efficiency” (cost-effectiveness) are used in evaluating all types of interventions. Additional criteria used for development evaluations include “sustainability,” “coordination,” and “coherence,” and the criteria of “coverage,” “protection,” and “participation” are often applied in humanitarian evaluations. “Participation” is a criterion that assesses whether beneficiaries of interventions have been sufficiently involved in the implementation process.

The following prerequisites are necessary before one can adequately conduct an evaluation (Paffenholz and Reychler 2007: 42).

- 1 Clear and measurable objectives must be defined for the intervention. If the objectives are too vague, an accurate assessment will not be possible.
- 2 A baseline study must be conducted prior to the intervention so that a before/after comparison can be made as part of the evaluation. According to the OECD/DAC Glossary (OECD/DAC 2002), a baseline study is an analysis describing the situation prior to an intervention, against which progress can be assessed.
- 3 Results chains and indicators are best to assess the results of the intervention as a means to understand and verify the underlying hypotheses of change due to an intervention.

What methods will be used for an evaluation depends first and foremost upon the objective of the evaluation in question and the data to be analyzed. It also depends on the level of scientific rigor that is to be applied to an evaluation, and the size of the available budget. Whereas some methods (e.g. large-*N* studies and experiments) are better suited for generalization, testing, and “explaining,” others do not lead the way to generalization, but are useful for understanding special cases and their idiosyncrasies. Evaluation studies using multiple methods reveal more effective and triangulated results.<sup>1</sup>

The range of methodological approaches used for evaluation can be grouped along two key dimensions based on a conventional distinction in social science research.<sup>2</sup> The first dimension is whether the evaluator is seeking to analyze the effects of an intervention (i.e. the changes accomplished through the intervention) through *etic* measures (as defined by the outsider evaluator) or *emic* measures (as defined by the insiders to the program or policy). There are examples of evaluation studies adopting either approach that we further elaborate in the “state of the art” section. Druckman (2005) provides a useful typology of methodologies along these two dimensions. *Etic* and *emic* approaches can be both qualitative and quantitative. For example, whereas the structured-focused comparison method is *etic* and qualitative, experiments, surveys, or aggregate case comparisons are *etic* and quantitative. *Etic* approaches to evaluation research often use surveys, experiments, and focused comparisons (or aggregate case comparisons), whereas *emic* approaches use interviews, focus groups, and participant observation in order to explore the “insider” view.

In sum, evaluation is a complex methodological endeavor, especially if the goal is impact assessment. An intervention’s impact is determined by examining the larger changes initiated by the intervention within the general context, changes that often occur only after a longer time has passed. To attribute these changes to the intervention in question is often difficult as there may be many other reasons why certain changes have occurred. Such attribution problems are common in impact assessment and are referred to as the “attribution gap.”

## Evaluation in peacebuilding

The issue of evaluation has only recently entered the field of CR/PB. This delay has to do with the evolution of the field as such. In the mid-1990s we witnessed a rapid increase in peacebuilding activities by a variety of actors ranging from international and regional organization to academic institutions, foundations, civil society groups, social movements, business groups, and the media. Consequently, a decade later the field felt sufficiently

matured to reflect on its own learning. Parallel to these learning efforts, a debate about professionalization in CR/PB has recently emerged. It is in the context of these different developments that the evaluation debate gained momentum in CR/PB.

Evaluation in peacebuilding is needed to respond to a set of interrelated needs and purposes. First, the results of the evaluation of single CR/PB interventions provide the intervening actors and stakeholders with information on how to improve the intervention. Second, evaluations of CR/PB interventions help strengthen the accountability of the intervening organization vis-à-vis its respective constituencies and donors. Fourth, evaluations can support a culture of reflection and learning. Fifth, evaluations enhance the general learning in the CR/PB field. Finally, evaluations help practitioners and scholars refine their theories about the causes and dynamics of conflict, thus enabling them to refine their approaches to CR/PB.

### ***Resistance and current trends***

Despite these benefits, peacebuilding actors have often resisted evaluation for a number of reasons. Some in the field fear that the essential goals and values of peacebuilding can simply not be measured – in line with Albert Einstein’s quote, “not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.”

In the same vein goes the argument that peacebuilding evaluations also differ from other evaluations in terms of their specific context of armed conflicts and peace processes, which are incredibly complex social and political phenomena. Peacebuilding processes are also intensely vulnerable, making them difficult to assess in the short run; ultimately, only sustainable peacebuilding counts as success. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate whether current interventions are on the right road to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding.

Peace researchers also argue that the current debate over evaluation misses the mark as serious research on the effects of peacebuilding interventions is more important than conducting evaluations. This argument is often based on a misperception of evaluation and is due, in part, to the blurry distinction between evaluation and research. Many wrongly equate evaluation with poorly conducted evaluations reliant on rushed processes. Indeed, there is a danger that many evaluations are implemented in a quick and rushed manner; however, this does not discredit the concept of evaluation as such.

In sum, peacebuilding interventions have some special characteristics that need to be taken into account for evaluation purposes. How these specifics can be addressed and incorporated into evaluation designs has been the subject of a research and practitioner discourse that started in the beginning of the new millennium. In the next section, we discuss these recent developments and the current state of the art.

### **State of the art: overview of ideas, concepts and frameworks**

Although generic frameworks that can be used for evaluating peacebuilding initiatives are rare, there has been an increasing amount of research on the evaluation of peacebuilding recently. The existing scholarly work in this area can be divided into four categories, none of which is mutually exclusive: first, “lessons learned” studies, mainly commissioned by donor agencies; second, research-oriented case studies (single or comparative) that provide an in-depth study of a single or multiple peacebuilding initiatives; third, studies suggesting key questions for and/or reflection about evaluation in peacebuilding; fourth, overall frameworks and methodologies suggested for the evaluation of peacebuilding initiatives.



In the following paragraphs we give examples of the existing work on evaluation in each of these categories. We then present a typology of several evaluation frameworks that have contributed to research on evaluation of peacebuilding. Our goal in presenting such a typology is to better compare these studies, approaches, and frameworks and understand where they stand in terms of the program and policy evaluation literature. This overview is by no means a fully exhaustive one, but rather is based on a sample of evaluation studies.

### ***Lessons learned studies***

During recent years, a number of studies have been published to document lessons learned from peacebuilding initiatives. In some of these studies, the focus is on a specific country or region in which the donor organization has funded peacebuilding work. In others, different programs are analyzed from an organizational learning perspective. The motivation behind these publications is often the requirement to report lessons learned by the donor agencies, or accumulation of knowledge, or keeping archival and organizational records. Regardless of the motivation, these kinds of studies have made an important contribution to the development of CR/PB evaluation. They not only serve as a guideline for other practitioners, but also contribute to the formation of a database for further research.

A recent example of this type of research is a study prepared by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (Sorensen *et al.* 2000). This report synthesizes lessons learned in peacebuilding projects drawn from a number of other “lessons learned” studies conducted by several donor agencies, such as USAID and UNDP. Other prominent examples of “lessons learned” evaluation studies have been the Mott Foundation study for their peace and conflict resolution projects in former communist countries (see Mayer *et al.* 1999); the German Development Cooperation study concerning projects in more than fifty countries (see Paffenholz and Brede 2004); the Joint Utstein Study (Smith 2003); and the Reflecting on Peace Practices (RPP) report (Anderson and Olson 2003).

In sum, evaluation studies undertaken in a “lessons learned” format often recommend practical suggestions that can be adopted by other practitioners and donor agencies. Many of the “lessons” concern how the organization can be more effective in designing and conducting future peacebuilding initiatives. Although making an important contribution to practice, such evaluation studies have often neglected to carry out a systematic assessment of participants’ and locals’ (emic) view of the initiative, focusing instead on the (etic) views of organizers.

### ***Research-oriented case studies***

A second type of evaluation in peacebuilding is research-oriented case studies, often focusing on outcomes and impacts or their process contributions, either of a single country/initiative or of several initiatives in a comparative perspective. This type of evaluation is, in general, research oriented and designed to build or test theory. Case studies use a variety of methods, and can be either emic or etic in their approach to research. For example, whereas Anderson and Olson (2003) adopted an emic approach to develop criteria for what is effective in peace practices based on the reflections and conceptualizations of practitioners, Maoz (2004) used criteria found in the literature on intergroup relations and attitude change to evaluate the effects of the Israeli–Palestinian coexistence initiatives. Furthermore, whereas some of these studies are descriptive and focus on the idiosyncratic aspects of a particular conflict or initiative,<sup>3</sup> others prefer comparative case study designs



(Çuhadar 2004; Fisher 2005; Lund 2002; Susskind *et al.* 1999); and still others combine surveys and experiments to test the applicability of certain theoretical frameworks in specific peacebuilding cases (Atieh *et al.* 2005; Maoz 2004; Rosen 2006; Ohanyan and Lewis 2005; Cuhadar-Gurkaynak and Genc 2006).

Finally, some research-oriented case studies are interested in impact and outcome at the micro (Maoz 2004; Malhotra and Liyanage 2005) and/or macro levels (Lieberfeld 2002), whereas others concentrate on documenting and describing the process from a theoretical point of view (Kelman 2005). It should also be mentioned that most of the research-oriented studies focus on the evaluation of dialogue, peace education initiatives, and to some extent CR training.

### **Key questions/reflection studies**

The third type of evaluation study in peacebuilding offers key questions for and/or reflection about evaluation. Even though some of these studies are referred to as overall frameworks, they are different from overall frameworks, although they can be used in combination with them. Rather than measurement indicators or standard evaluation criteria, these studies provide a list of questions that could serve as a guideline for those who plan and design CR/PB initiatives or those who evaluate them. Examples of such evaluation studies are Church and Shouldice (2002), the RPP initiative, and Fast and Neufeld's work (2005).

A prominent example of an evaluation study of this type is the Church and Shouldice study (2002: 26–7). In this study, the authors provide guiding questions structured around three themes: goals and assumptions behind the CR initiatives; process accountability with regard to the operationalization of the peacebuilding initiative; and the range of results from the initiative in the short and long terms. The authors then formulate a useful set of questions for each theme. For instance, the category “goals and assumptions” lists questions that help the practitioners to reflect on the appropriateness of the intervention (e.g. intervention strategy, activities), theoretical analysis (e.g. the theory of change adopted by the practitioner), and strategic review (e.g. whether the organization is doing what it says it is doing).

Another prominent study conducted in this tradition is the guidebook prepared by the RPP project (Anderson and Olson 2003; CDA 2004). It is hard to categorize the RPP study into only one of the four categories we discuss here, since it has elements that reflect all of the four categories. It can be considered a research-oriented comparative case study; a study conducted with a “lessons learned” objective; a guideline that provides questions for reflection; and even an overall framework to some extent because it offers several effectiveness criteria and a general methodology that can be used especially for formative evaluation. Still, we mention it in this section because the core of the framework (at least in its current form) offers guiding questions derived from the comparative case research on peace NGOs. These guiding questions urge the peace practitioners to consider key elements of effectiveness in their program design and they include whether the change generated by the initiative was fast enough, sustained, large enough, and linked to other levels (Anderson and Olson 2003: 16). The framework delineates a planning process based on the notion of “theory of change,” which practitioners can use when they are planning peace programs. In this sense, it can be used as a formative evaluation tool even though the research part of the study was conducted as an *ex post* summative evaluation.

Evaluation studies conducted in this style are useful especially in encouraging

practitioners to engage in reflective practice. In addition, they can be used in combination with overall evaluation frameworks that we discuss in the following paragraphs. However, they are not adequate per se since they do not suggest indicators or methodologies for practitioners or evaluators.

### ***Overall frameworks and methodologies studies***

A fourth type of evaluation study formulates general frameworks. These studies often aim at introducing methodologies and/or criteria/indicators for the assessment of peacebuilding initiatives. Some of these frameworks focus on particular peacebuilding initiatives (d'Estree *et al.* 2001); others develop generic frameworks, such as action evaluation, that can be used as an overall methodology regardless of the type of peacebuilding activity (Ross and Rothman 1999; Paffenholz and Reychler 2007). For instance, a 2005 thematic issue of the *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* (2:2) focuses on evaluation and gathers together a collection of articles that include both general and more specific approaches to peacebuilding evaluation, as well as a few integrated approaches to development/peacebuilding evaluations. Here we also find proposals on how to merge the essential values of the CR/PB field with strategy-oriented processes and methods. A number of US-based NGOs have published guidelines for monitoring and evaluating NGO conflict transformation programs (Church and Rogers 2006).

Some prominent examples in this category are a recent book by Paffenholz and Reychler (2007), which includes guidelines for the evaluation process; a methodological reference based on the "Aid for Peace" framework and evaluation criteria as used in policy, development, and humanitarian work; and many tools and examples from field testing. Another evaluation framework has been offered by Rothman and Friedman (2002) and Ross and Rothman (1999) in their "action evaluation" approach. This framework applies an organizational action research paradigm to the conflict resolution interventions. It focuses on goal setting and goal fulfillment at the organizational level as important components that influence the effectiveness of conflict resolution initiatives. Ross and Rothman (1999) established a computer-based interactive process that helps stakeholders in the initiative to clarify their organizational goals and priorities as they implement their activities. In this sense, the framework is a planning approach that is more appropriate at early stages of project development. Although the framework is a significant contribution for organizations at the goal-setting stage, it does not address impact assessment or suggest indicators by which to measure impacts.

Two evaluation frameworks by d'Estree and her colleagues suggested a combination of evaluation methodologies and criteria and indicators for assessment. The frameworks can be used for both formative and summative evaluation. One of these frameworks concerns evaluation of environmental conflict resolution (ECR) initiatives (d'Estree and Colby 2000), whereas the other is concerned specifically with the evaluation of interactive conflict resolution (ICR) workshops (d'Estree *et al.* 2001). D'Estree and Colby's (2000) framework on ECR initiatives developed categories and criteria that are appropriate for such initiatives as well as a guidebook that can be used by evaluators. Assessment criteria were developed for each of the following categories: outcome reached, process quality, outcome quality, relationship of parties to outcome, relationship between parties, and social capital. The guidebook was intended to be used as a tool for standardized case assessment, research and evaluation strategy, organizational framework, and education. Similarly, the d'Estree *et al.* (2001) evaluation framework for ICR suggested categories and assessment criteria for the

following: changes in representation (referring to cognitive changes in the participants), changes in relations, foundations for transfer, and foundations for outcome/implementation. These categories and criteria tried to capture both micro- and macro-level changes that occur as a result of ICR workshops.

Table 20.1 lists several of the evaluation studies discussed so far and compares them in terms of the key evaluation concepts that we introduced early on in this chapter. We realize that this table includes only a sample and is not exhaustive. Our purpose is to show the variety of evaluation approaches that exist in CR/PB.

## **Reflections and challenges**

We now review several distinct challenges that confront CR/PB practitioners as they seek to evaluate their work. These challenges include articulating a theory of change at the outset of CR/PB work, overcoming the “attribution gap,” reconciling the evaluation preferences of donors with those of “local” stakeholders, and collecting data in conflict zones. We briefly reflect on each of these challenges below.

### *Theories of change*

All attempts to intervene in conflict situations begin with a set of assumptions about the nature of the conflict, the factors that keep it from being resolved, and the means by which it can be transformed. Conflict scholars refer to these assumptions as a “theory of change” and argue that they are foundational to the design of all CR/PB efforts. Theories of change serve as an implicit result chain that predicts how an initiative’s activities proceed through a series of steps to a desired outcome (Weiss 1998).

All evaluation specialists are in agreement that articulating a theory of change, i.e. making it explicit in the planning phase, is an essential step in helping CR/PB managers understand what they are doing, why they are doing it, and how they can determine whether or not their objectives have been achieved once the activity has been concluded. Yet this task often proves to be quite difficult. Conflict analysis is a notoriously complex undertaking full of competing propositions about the forces that cause conflicts to emerge and the means through which these forces can be transformed. As a result, theories of change are rarely articulated at the outset of CR/PB work as CM/PB practitioners struggle to connect the theories they hold to the activities they conduct. To rectify this problem, three steps are necessary.

First, practitioners should always explicitly articulate the general beliefs they hold about the conflict with which they are dealing before designing specific project activities. These beliefs could be categorized in the following way: (1) beliefs about the underlying roots/bases of the conflict being investigated (where it “comes from”); (2) assumptions about how these bases of the conflict are causally linked; (3) beliefs about the conditions under which these root causes can be transformed (in either a positive or a negative direction); and (4) beliefs about what kinds of programmatic interventions bring about what kind of transformations.

Second, CR/PB practitioners need to be able to articulate how the impact of their work will transfer from the micro to the macro level; that is, describe how the effects (outcomes and impacts) that any given initiative may have on individual participants will channel their way “up” to broader societal institutions, narratives, and practices (Anderson and Olson 2003; Çuhadar 2004; Fisher 2005; Mitchell 1993; Ross and Rothman, 1999;

Table 20.1 A typology of evaluation studies

	Objective	Timing	Type	Any standard/criteria developed?	Evaluator	Level of evaluation	Type of peace-building intervention
Action evaluation framework (Ross and Rothman 1999)	Review and judge current status to improve	Mid-term or <i>ex ante</i>	Formative, participatory	No	Insiders with the help of an outsider	Micro	Not specified
Reflecting on peace practice (Anderson and Olson 2002)	Identify lessons learned	<i>Ex post</i>	Summative, formative	Some	Outsider	Macro	All kinds of initiatives
Paffenholz evaluation framework (Paffenholz and Reychler 2007)	Review and judge current status to improve and walk user through process and application	All stages (baseline, mid-term, and <i>ex post</i> )	Summative, formative, participatory	Yes	Insider or outsider	All levels	All kinds of initiatives
Environmental conflict resolution evaluation (d'Estree and Colby 2000)	Assess and document what has been achieved; develop criteria and indicators for evaluation	All stages (baseline, mid-term, and <i>ex post</i> )	Formative and summative	Yes	Insider or outsider	Micro and macro	Environmental conflict resolution initiatives
Peace education evaluation (Abraham Fund and IPCRI sponsored initiatives in Israel; Maoz 2000, 2004)	Assess and document what has been achieved, identify lessons learned	<i>Ex post</i>	Summative	Yes	Outsider	Micro	Peace education/coexistence initiatives
D'Estree <i>et al.</i> evaluation framework (d'Estree <i>et al.</i> 2001)	Develop criteria and indicators for evaluation	All stages (baseline, mid-term, and <i>ex post</i> )	Formative and summative	Yes	Insider or outsider	Micro, meso, and macro	Interactive conflict resolution

Rouhana 2000; Paffenholz and Reychler 2007). For instance, how do initiatives that target attitudinal or behavioral changes at the individual level get transferred to those outside the group who were not involved in the activity? How does the strengthening of local civil society institutions in post-conflict zones lead to the creation of societies that are more resistant to the re-emergence of destructive conflict? Theories of change able to lay out these transfer processes will facilitate the design of appropriate indicators of change at the *micro*, *meso*, and *macro* levels (Mitchell 1993).

Third, theories of change in CR/PB work should take into account the “stage” of the conflict that is being addressed (see Susan Allen Nan’s Chapter 27 in this volume). The impact of CR/PB initiatives is likely to vary depending on whether the initiative takes place at the emergence phase of the conflict, the escalation phase, the pinnacle of the conflict, the de-escalation phase, or the post-conflict reconciliation stage. At each of these stages, a different set of psychological and material dynamics are at play, each of which interacts with the CR/PB initiatives in different ways. Part of building a theory of change in the intervention’s planning phase, therefore, involves consciously selecting activities that one theorizes are most likely to be successful at the present stage of the conflict. So, for instance, traditional peacekeeping interventions may make more sense at an acute phase of a conflict than at the escalation phase (Fisher and Keashly 1991). Similarly, establishing truth and reconciliation commissions may make more sense at the post-conflict stage than at other stages.

### ***Addressing the attribution gap***

A second fundamental challenge of CR/PB evaluation involves finding a way to attribute the activities that were carried out by the CR/PB practitioner to the change that is observed. This so-called “attribution gap,” discussed earlier, is familiar to anyone who conducts evaluation (Rossi *et al.* 1999). Nonetheless, it is perhaps amplified in conflict settings where multiple stakeholders, with multiple interests and conflict perspectives, interact in a crisis environment. Unlike a controlled laboratory experiment, where it is easy to assess how changing one variable changes the overall environment, conflict zones are messy places where a multitude of uncontrollable external variables constantly impact the dynamics on the ground. Under these circumstances, the impact of particular CR/PB activities is difficult to see against the backdrop of large external forces playing upon the conflict. For instance, economic hardships, shifting regional political alliances, leadership transitions, or even the activities of diaspora communities thousands of miles away can directly or indirectly impact the ability of the CR/PB initiative to meet its objectives. Similarly, months of work getting different ethnic groups to sit down together for a confidence-building dialogue could be lost after only one day of violence between external members of those groups in areas far away from the dialogue. When analyzing initiative success, therefore, evaluators face the daunting challenge of needing to “control” for the impact of external variables on the success of the initiative.

Controlling for external variables is even more difficult in regions where multiple organizations are conducting different initiatives, involving different populations and activities, at the same time. How can the analyst identify macro-level impacts of one particular initiative when other initiatives, with different objects, participants and activities, are being conducted simultaneously? In many cases, the answer to these questions may be “one cannot.” At times, it may be true that conflict phenomena are so complex that we can never know with certainty that correlations between specific initiatives and an overall

reduction of conflict are anything but spurious (see Dennis Sandole's Chapter 30 in this volume). This does not, however, mean that evaluation should be abandoned. On the contrary, practitioners might instead seek to limit claims about the impacts of particular CR/PB activities to those that can be validated through carefully designed evaluative methods. They might also give more attention to conducting baseline studies prior to initiating CR/PB initiatives so that initiative impacts are rendered visible. Further, they should develop novel approaches to conceptualizing indicators of change, and donors and implementers can then join hands and commission public opinion polls able to capture these change indicators.

### ***Reconciling the evaluation preferences of donors with those of local stakeholders***

A third challenge to CR/PB evaluation concerns the importance of including local voices in the evaluation process. A report by Anderson and Olson (2003), for instance, notes that a significant difference exists between the perceived goals of donors, practitioners, and target populations when it comes to evaluation. On the one hand, the donor community has been characterized as pursuing an evaluation agenda that is driven by goals such as efficiency, timeliness, sustainability, and coherence, and based on the establishment of pre-determined and verifiable indicators of change (Hoffman 2001). On the other hand, these kinds of indicators may stand in sharp contrast to the needs and interests of the stakeholders involved in the activity. For these individuals, quantitative measures of the initiative's success and the goals of efficiency may be secondary to more immediate needs, such as ceasing hostility, providing safe havens for refugees, or delivering essential services.

Fortunately, there has been an upsurge in "user-driven" or participatory approaches across the CR/PB spectrum. These approaches emphasize the involvement of stakeholders in the construction of evaluation designs, the creation of success indicators, and the modification of the initiative's goals over the life of the activity. This tends to create a more "organic" assessment of problems and needs, and makes practitioners more accountable to the community at which the initiative is targeted (Bock 2001). Participatory approaches to CR/PB evaluation also help to overcome the challenge of devising culturally appropriate evaluation models and debunk the myth that evaluation is a Western practice that misses the nuances of the cultural variation across conflict zones.

### ***Difficulties of data collection in conflict zones***

Finally, many conflict zones are not dangerous places, but many others are. In these areas, such as Kashmir, Darfur, or the West Bank and Gaza, conducting interviews and collecting data with which to evaluate initiatives may be problematic, or impossible. In some cases CR/PB personnel may be available to answer questions and talk about initiative impacts but the stakeholders who are affected by these changes are not. Here the risk is that CR/PB practitioners might present a more optimistic picture of what has been accomplished than would the stakeholders who are affected by the intervention. If evaluators are unable or unwilling to traverse insecure territory, bringing participants/stakeholders together in a neutral location outside the immediate conflict area may be a good option for capturing critical evaluation data. Another option can be to commission data collection to local groups that might have easier access or to rely on the results of self-evaluation by involved stakeholders (Paffenholz and Reyhler 2007). Depending on the quality of the data, success indicators need to be limited to those that can be assessed.

## Conclusion

The call for more rigorous evaluation in the CR/PB field will only intensify over the years to come. Official donor evaluation guidelines, greater professionalization of the field, growing numbers of organizations doing CR/PB work, and calls for greater accountability are now transforming the way that CR/PB practitioners approach the assessment of their work. Adapting to this new reality, however, does not have to be unpleasant. Despite misgivings about the time, resources, and complexity of evaluation, renewed attention to evaluation has several benefits: it forces practitioners to translate their sometimes vaguely held theories of change into concrete plans for implementation; it directs attention to the attribution gap and ways to overcome it; it strengthens the connection between CR/PB theory and practice; and it encourages practitioners to find new indicators of conflict transformation that demonstrate the central role that civil society groups, educational institutions, NGOs, and other CR/PB organizations now play in conflict transformation.

The rich array of evaluation ideas, concepts, cases, and frameworks reviewed in this chapter indicate that those involved in evaluating CR/PB work have made tremendous strides over a short period of time in charting a path forward. Collectively, this work shows that practitioners now have many good choices when it comes to capturing the results of their work. It also suggests that evaluation can become a natural and automatic part of CR/PB planning, implementation, review, and adjustment. Indeed, so much CR/PB work of such variety is now being conducted in every corner of the world that it is, perhaps for the first time, now possible to outline the conditions and context that make CR/PB work more or less successful. Evaluation is the key to unlocking these secrets and to building a more professional field that is rigorous both in theory and in application.

## Notes

- 1 See Dennis Sandole's Chapter 30 in this volume on "Critical Systemic Inquiry." See also Druckman and Stern (2000) and Druckman (2005). For an application see Cuhadar-Gurkaynak and Genc (2006).
- 2 See Druckman (2005) for an overview of a range of methods used in conflict resolution.
- 3 See Agha *et al.* (2003) on the Arab–Israeli conflict; Kelman 2005 on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; Paffenholz (2005, [2003] 2006) on the Life and Peace Institute's work in Somalia; Voorhees (2002) on the Dartmouth process.

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**Part III**

# **Core practices**

Processes



# 21 Conflict transformation

## Reasons to be modest

*Stephen Ryan*

### Introduction

The past decade of peace and conflict research has witnessed a significant growth in the use of the term *transformation*. Indeed Galtung (1996) has now pushed this concept center stage by defining peace as non-violent and creative conflict transformation. As presented by its advocates, it is an optimistic, radical, and egalitarian idea that views conflict as a dynamic source of positive change, and promises to take peace and conflict research into new and exciting directions at the dawn of a new century. The concept merits serious attention, for contained within it are interesting ideas about how to respond to destructive conflict. So it is no longer good enough to dismiss it as “utopian.” Yet that does not mean that real problems do not exist, as attempts to transform Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo demonstrate.

This chapter will examine the origins of the transformation idea in contemporary peace and conflict research. Then it will set out the core features of the concept. This will be followed by an examination of some issues that might lead us to adopt a modest approach to the idea of transformation. These are: a lack of normative consensus about what needs to be transformed; serious problems that have arisen with the application of the dominant liberal paradigm to destructive conflicts; debates about the level that transformation work has to address (actors or structures); the danger that the idea might provoke a backlash; a concern that transformation thinking could become, in Popper’s words, “utopian engineering”; the difficulty of combining external intervention with respect for local cultures; and the poorly defined nature of the concept.

### The development of the transformation approach

A number of factors influenced the growth of interest in conflict transformation. The end of the Cold War opened up new opportunities for positive international involvement in a number of previously protracted violent conflicts such as Namibia, Cambodia, Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa. This encouraged the comparative study of how societies coming out of conflict could build peace (Darby and MacGinty 2000). In 1992, the former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (2002) identified “post-conflict peacebuilding” as an important task for the UN. The organization has further developed this work to the point that it has now established a Peacebuilding Commission. Just as peacekeeping may be viewed as the UN’s most significant contribution to international peace and security during the first fifty years of its life, peacebuilding might become the UN’s most significant peace and security role in the next

fifty years. There are now a number of excellent studies of international peacebuilding that have identified potential transformation strategies as well as criticisms of how this work has been carried out to date (Jeong 2005; Pugh 2000).

However, it was not just the fact of the Cold War's end that stimulated interest in transformation. The manner of its termination was also significant, especially the role played by the non-violent revolutions that swept away illegitimate regimes in central and eastern Europe. This promoted optimism about the chances of positive change. Since then non-violent revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Lebanon may also have stimulated an interest in conflict transformation. Certainly, both Miall (2006) and Francis (2002) have identified the link between the success of non-violent direct action and the growing interest in the idea of transformation.

Nonetheless, as the 1990s progressed, it became clear that the end of the Cold War also had a darker side. As ethno-nationalism filled the ideological void, we witnessed the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia and a number of bitter ethnic struggles in parts of the former Soviet Union. Some of these produced complex emergencies, which, together with the return of genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda, increased pressures for interventions to stop mass murder (see for example Hoffmann 1996; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996). They also raised the question about what to do when the humanitarian emergency was over. The conflicts that proliferated in the 1990s were not traditional interstate wars, in which peace could be conceptualized as a return to the status quo ante with mutual respect for territorial integrity. They were what Kaldor (1999) termed "new wars," and, faced with such intrastate violence, peace thinking had to be amended because the parties to a conflict were often condemned to live together after the violence ceased. Therefore, more emphasis had to be placed on rebuilding weak states, on promoting respect for human rights, and on post-violence peacebuilding.

### **Key features of the transformation approach**

In the peace and conflict literature there is a broad consensus on what transformation means, even if individual writers may emphasize different elements. One of the first to use the term was Curle (1990). In the following five years other important contributions were made by, *inter alia*, Bush and Folger (1994), Galtung (1996), Lederach (1995), Rupesinghe (1995), and Vayrynen (1991). This was followed by works by Francis (2002) and by a number of writers who have contributed to an evolving online resource created by the Berghof Institute (n.d.).

The first feature of transformation is that it aims for deep and profound changes in conflict situations that go beyond the limitations of traditional approaches. Galtung has used the term "transcendence" (Galtung 1996: 96). Lederach talks about getting to the "epicentre" (Lederach 2003: 31). Francis (2002: 40) wants the transformation approach to recognize and address the limitations of existing resolution approaches, and the Berghof Institute (n.d.) talks about addressing the root causes of conflict. Therefore transformation moves beyond the immediate issues to look at the broader environment within which violent conflict takes place. Consequently, Lederach states that we should view the "presenting issues" as a window onto a web of interactions at a number of levels (Lederach 2003: 48–9). Galtung talks about expanding the conflict from immediate issues to underlying problems and is, of course, best known for his insistence that "direct violence" has to locate within a broader context of "structural" and "cultural" violence (Galtung 1997: 10).

Most, if not all, of the transformation supporters emphasize the importance of working



at the grassroots level, sometimes referred to as building local capacity (see for example Prendergast and Plumb 2002). One reason for this is because the idea of a forced transformation seems to be an oxymoron. Another is that there is no “one size fits all” solution to violent conflict. Post-war Iraq is not the same as post-war Germany. Account has to be taken of local variations and needs. Francis has done the most systematic work on this issue, insisting that imposed solutions will not work (Francis 2002: 8). She has produced a categorization of how people power can work at different stages of conflict: the latent, confrontational, violent, and post-violence stages. The focus on grassroots empowerment also leads to an interest in the role of NGOs and a desire to strengthen civil society in post-violence settlements. Interesting examples here would include the 1994 Assembly of Civil Society in Guatemala (Burgerman 2005) and the Civic Forum, created as part of the Belfast Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland ([www.civicforumni.org](http://www.civicforumni.org)).

Finally, many writers point out that transformation will take time. Volkan (1997: 226) criticizes what he has called the “instant coffee approach,” and Galtung (1997: 16) believes that people need some time to get used to the idea of deep change. However, it can be difficult to elicit long-term thinking from policymakers, who often find it hard to think beyond the next election, and the short-term syndrome seems to bedevil many peace processes. This is a charge often made about the Dayton Peace Process, in which the United States’ involvement seemed to have been spurred on by an impending presidential election and lacked adequate strategic goals (see for example Donais 2005). It is also a complaint about US planning for a post-Saddam Iraq, about which Pentagon predictions now appear to be naïve and over-confident. Short-term thinking is always going to be a major hurdle for transformers.

These seem to be the main characteristics of conflict transformation, which is best thought of not in terms of a single characteristic, but as a cluster of features (Reimann 2006). If implemented successfully they will change the rules of the game in the political, economic, and social spheres, and will cause people to have a fundamental change of perception of their place in the world and the individuals and groups they come into contact with. These are ambitious goals, and so it is not surprising that certain problems and concerns attend attempts to apply the transformation idea in the real world. It is to these that we can now turn.

## **Conflict transformation: problem areas**

Despite the attractiveness of the transformation idea it may be suggested that we need to be cautious about its implementation for a number of reasons.

### ***Lack of normative consensus***

The idea of transformation seems to imply a normative judgment about what is wrong with the status quo and what needs to be changed. It may be no accident that the upsurge of thinking about transformation has coincided with the return of normative theory in the study of world politics. However, there are several traditions of normative thinking and no agreement about the answers to key questions. Indeed, one major study argues that one of the benefits of studying normative theory is that it makes us aware that we are living in a world where individuals and communities have competing ends (Doyle 1997).

The idea of transformation is embedded in a number of important peace traditions; it is just that each tradition will, in Galtung’s terminology, offer a different diagnosis and

therapy for violence (Galtung *et al.* 2002). The Christian tradition will emphasize the healing power of forgiveness and reconciliation. Marxists will focus on class revolution as liberation. Liberals believe in the peaceful nature of democracies and in “peace through trade” whereas feminists aim for post-patriarchal societies. So in any conflict situation what is the problem? Is it lack of spirituality, capitalism, undemocratic regimes, or masculinity, or is it all or none of these things?

There seems little doubt that liberalism is the dominant normative tradition in contemporary world society. One recent study has referred to the liberal “peacebuilding consensus” characterized by universalistic assumptions and the call for “deep intervention” (Richmond 2005). This is an interventionist and militaristic liberalism that rejects the more cautious, non-interventionist ethos of previous eras (Williams 2006). One result is the creation of international peacebuilding projects in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), East Timor, Cambodia, and most recently Iraq and Afghanistan. In all cases the dominant discourse of transformation has been based on liberal principles of democratization and economic freedom. The problems created by that sort of intervention are well documented by critics such as Rieff (2005), Chandler (2002), and Paris (2004). Some would even describe this sort of behavior not as conflict transformation but as neo-imperialism.

However, liberal internationalism is just one peace tradition, and if we introduce alternative perspectives we can also begin to see the weaknesses of this approach. The Marxist approach points to the violence inherent in capitalism, the exploitative nature of the free market, and the limited impact of human rights reforms that are not matched by an end to economic injustice. They might also call into question the idea of compatible interests between elites and the grassroots, which challenges Lederach’s influential idea of the conflict pyramid, part of an attempt to integrate strategic approaches to conflict resolution (Lederach 1997). Here Lederach identifies a middle level of society that can act as a bridge between elites and the grassroots when working for peace. But Marxists might question if these three levels are mutually compatible and suggests that mobilization of the grassroots should lead to more conflict with elites.

The feminist transformation literature challenges the masculine nature of much of the liberal canon, and points out how liberal revolutions do not always bring freedom and justice for women, at least in the short term. In central and eastern Europe, the end of communism led to a reduction of the number of women in parliament in nearly all states (Enloe 2004). Feminists might also point out that liberalization can result in the feminization of poverty, through, for example, International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment policies.

Religious approaches might argue that liberalism is based on superficial optimism and lacks a full appreciation of the darker side of human nature (Niebuhr in Brown 1986). A recent study by Chappell (2004) has argued that the successes of the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s was not really due to liberalism at all, but was a reaction to liberalism’s failure to end segregation in the southern states. He argues that the activists who challenged this system were not inspired by liberal thinking, which had been characterized by caution, expediency, and self-doubt. Rather, many who supported the civil rights movement did so because they were inspired by a prophetic tradition that drew on a deep faith in God.

The existence of competing normative traditions may complicate conflict transformation work. Yet it also offers opportunities for new combinations of ideas. The unlikely combination of Christianity and Marxism resulted in liberation theology, and Habermas’s critical theory has been depicted as a synthesis of Marxist and liberal approaches (Pusey

1987). In the future, some of the most interesting ideas about transformation may emerge out of the tensions between competing traditions of thought.

### *Doubts about the dominant paradigm*

In addition to concerns about transformation's normative dimensions a number of serious issues have been raised in reaction to attempts to apply "liberal peace" ideas to conflict zones. These issues are based around misgivings about rapid liberalization in the political and economic fields and the impact that this can have on societies coming out of destructive conflict. There are few, if any, advocates of transformation that oppose the goal of creating democratic societies. However, there are a number of issues related to democratization that need to be addressed. The first of these is the sovereignty question. In societies where different groups want to belong to different sovereign jurisdictions, as in Kosovo, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka, it can be hard to develop a sense that building a democratic state should be regarded as a win-win project that can attract general support. How can people work together to build a common future when there are fundamental disagreements over final status constitutional questions? One way to deal with this conflict is to allow the exercise of self-determination, but this can result in problems such as stranded minorities and disputed frontiers, and may just reproduce the state-nation conflict because when one nation becomes independent it may start oppressing its own minorities. One response to these dangers is to encourage creative thinking about autonomy arrangements short of secession (Hannum 1990).

Another issue is the speed of change. If democratization is pushed too quickly it may provoke destructive conflict, not peace. This has led Snyder (2000) to call for the international community to weave a strong safety net to support liberalization. Paris (2004), maybe the most influential critic of current peacebuilding practice, has called for a modified Wilsonian approach that offers a positive alternative to authoritarian government or partition. He has proposed the principle of "institutionalization before liberalization," which is based on six principles: wait for conditions to be ripe for elections; create an electoral system that rewards moderation; promote good civil society; control hate speech; implement conflict reducing economic policies; and rebuild effective state institutions.

Marshall and Gurr (2005) have also suggested that radical or revolutionary transformation rarely, if ever, produces stable democratic government. They use the term *anocracies* to describe states that are neither purely democratic nor purely authoritarian. Many of these are trying to make the transition from authoritarian government to a democratic one, but the empirical data suggests this is not easy and that anocracies are highly unstable, though it does seem that their rate of failure is decreasing.

Like democratization, development has the potential to trigger conflicts as well as transform them. Economic reconstruction is not a neutral undertaking, but is a political act that is often a continuation of war by other means (Cramer 2006). This was as true of the Marshall Plan as it is of current coalition policy in Iraq. In the current economic order it is also inevitable that such reconstruction will be based around Western theories of development promoted by bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank, which may promote resistance from indigenous communities.

The track record of international attempts to promote democracy and stability through conventional free-market thinking appears to be, at best, mixed and there are some serious studies that challenge the conventional wisdom about the link between Western models of development and peace. Perhaps the most interesting of these is found in the analysis by

Uvin (1998) of the aid industry in Rwanda. He notes that the most disturbing aspect was that up to the onset of the 1994 genocide Rwanda was held up as a model of development by the donor community. Another frequent theme in the critical analyses of liberalization is its link to corruption (Cramer 2006; Donais 2005). In Bosnia alone Fischer (n.d.) has claimed that over \$1 billion in international aid has been embezzled; and Bolongaita (2005) claims that in Azerbaijan bribes were paid by people wanting to sit on the country's anti-corruption commission.

This is not to write off development as a transformation strategy. Gellner (1997) has claimed that generalized affluence might be the best protection against nationalist-inspired violence in the modern world. However, it could be that the peaceful consequences of development will not appear automatically. Therefore, several analysts have proposed adding something to make it an effective peace tool. Examples would include "ethno-development" (Stavenhagen 1990), "development diplomacy" (Azar 1990), and the idea of an ethnic conflict impact assessment for aid projects in divided societies (Esman 1997). Uvin has called for recognition that all development aid is political, and argues it should be defined more broadly to address problems of structural violence.

### *The levels of analysis issue*

Transformation ideas range from the personal to the global. Some focus on changing the hearts and minds of individual and local community actors either through spiritual change or by creating intersubjective understanding through storytelling or other tools of communication (Senehi 2002). Of special interest here is Rorty's (1989) idea that "sentimental education" is a way to reduce cruel behavior. However, others prefer to promote change at the structural level by changing political and economic edifices. In fact writers have identified a number of levels for transformation work. Vayrynen (1991) believes there are four key areas: actor transformation, issue transformation, rules/norms transformation, and structural transformation. Miall (2006), on the other hand, has identified five types of transformation: context, structure, actor, issue, and personal. Interestingly, neither seems to believe that culture needs a category to itself.

One area where there has been a noticeable tension is between working at the level of actors and at that of structures. We can illustrate this by looking at one criticism of actor-centered approaches and one criticism of the structural change approach. In Northern Ireland much grassroots peacebuilding work is directed at the idea of interpersonal reconciliation, and many of these projects are inspired by a religious viewpoint. Here significant emphasis will be placed on forgiveness, mutual understanding and other strategies aimed at individuals. However, Ruane and Todd (1991) believe that these approaches, which they label as "cultural," subjectivize a conflict that is really caused by objective and structural factors.

On the other hand Assefa (1993, 2001), looking at African conflicts, believes that structural change will not be effective unless it is accompanied by actor-centered approaches that can promote better relations between people. He claims that one of the most important aspects of the reconciliation approach is its self-reflective element that moves us away from accusing the other side to an acknowledgment of the wrongs we have inflicted on others. Another form of actor-centered approach is championed by Kaufman (2000), who wants peace strategies to focus on "preferences" that would require a stronger socio-psychological approach.

### *Provoking a backlash*

The idea of transformation implies not only the creation of something new, but also the sweeping away of something old. Yet what about those who value the status quo and fear significant change? Transformation may be depicted as a positive-sum process, and in the long term this may be true. However, in the short term it not hard to see how the opponents of change will be able to depict transformation as a win-lose process, and if such a view takes root it is capable of producing a fierce backlash. Two examples can be used to illustrate this danger.

The more serious example is Rwanda, where the 1994 genocide was triggered not by a war but by the Arusha peace process, which some, especially those in the "Hutu Power" movement, were able to depict as a threat to the interests and very existence of the Hutu community. The other is Northern Ireland, where there has been a strong Unionist backlash against the Belfast Agreement. Here the party most associated with the anti-Agreement stance, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which has always depicted the peace process as a surrender process, has witnessed a surge of support at the cost of the pro-Agreement Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). This seems to indicate growing opposition in the pro-British Protestant community to the terms of the 1998 peace deal. One manifestation of this was an increase in intercommunal violence in what have been termed "interface areas" after 1998. Here one is reminded of E. H. Carr's influential opposition to the "utopian" approach to international politics in the interwar era, when he argued that there could be no harmony of interests in politics because there would be fundamental disagreements between groups who supported the status quo and groups who opposed it (Carr 1962).

Furthermore, societies coming out of conflict may contain individuals who have experienced trauma and alienation and hold to a strong sense of victimhood. What they may crave is stability and security. In such situations might an emphasis on "transformation" strike a wrong note? Victims often find it hard to "let go of the past" and as society changes they feel even more alienated and isolated. What may therefore be needed is more attention to what might be called "transformation management," in which thought can be given to what needs to be done with these two groups of people, the victims and the opponents of deep change. The disastrous consequences of a failure to do this were all too clear in Rwanda.

### *The slide to utopian engineering*

It was Karl Popper (1961), more than any other writer of the twentieth century, who alerted us to the dangers of messianic and moralistic leaders who were inspired by ideologies that made them believe that they had ready-made solutions to social problems. Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot were all social transformers. In the course of a sustained critique of "historicism," Popper took aim at what he famously termed "utopian engineering," something he regarded as both irrational and dangerous. In part this was because utopian engineers were incapable of learning from their own mistakes since they had to be opposed to anyone who challenged their Plan, which did not allow for the possibility of error. To counter the perils of utopian engineering, Popper commends "piecemeal engineering," which does not propose redesigning society as a whole and offers a form of positive change that allows us to learn from our mistakes. It could be argued that Popper has a rather unattractive depiction of utopian engineers. Gandhi, for example, was committed to fundamental

social change, but should he be placed in the same category as Stalin? Nonetheless, at the very least, Popper should make us more sensitive to the tyrannical elements that may exist within some transformation approaches, and he is right to remind us not to undervalue incremental change.

A good example of the more pragmatic approach is Amos Oz's idea of "peace not love" (Oz 2006). Applied to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Oz's argument is that this conflict is fundamentally about territory and, like a divorce (never a happy experience), issues can be resolved through compromise without any fundamental change of heart on both sides. This can be aided by common sense, imagination and a commitment to justice, but it does not require each side to suddenly start loving the other.

There are echoes of Popper in the work of Scott (1998) on failed large-scale schemes to improve the human condition. He wants to replace transformative visions inspired by what he terms "high modernism" with practical knowledge that can only come from practice. This draws on a classical Greek idea he terms *mētis*, which is more likely to result in an effective and decentralized approach able to draw on the experiences of those who are engaged in the project.

### ***Respecting local culture versus strong external involvement***

Respecting and empowering local actors in situations of conflict can be praiseworthy principles to follow. Yet despite the emphasis on respect for indigenous groups, does not the claim that we are seeking to transform societies imply a certain intolerance of local beliefs and insensitivity to other ways of life? This is a frequent criticism of the crusading liberal approach that often seems to have no qualms about disrupting local cultures in the name of democracy and development. Of course, we should not be blind to unattractive aspects of local cultures. Identities are also forged out of fear and opposition to outgroups. British identity, to take one example, has tended to have strong anti-French and anti-Catholic elements. Furthermore, can one retain a commitment to respect local cultures when they show a stubborn support for narrow and conflict-provoking ideas such as ethno-nationalism? This is precisely the dilemma in Bosnia. Here an international presence committed to the development of liberal transformation is being frustrated by the readiness of local electorates to vote into office politicians who want to frustrate these worthy liberal goals. This creates a paradoxical situation in which the UN-appointed High Representative has to act in a more dictatorial way in order to promote democracy.

So what is to be done when the values of indigenous cultures clash with the values of donors and the wider international community? Local responses to violent conflict such as the *Loya Jirga* in Afghanistan, the *shir* in Somalia, the *gagaca* courts and *ingando* in Rwanda, or the *moots* in Liberia may be acclaimed by some in the West, but they may also exclude social groups such as women or may be used to endorse an unjust status quo. Nor should we assume that indigenous groups always agree on the way forward. So if there are competing perspectives within a conflict (for example, over the role of *shar'ia* law), how can outsiders intervene without violating the principle of respect for all groups? In fact, the appropriate choice of local partners for transformation is both a vital and difficult issue.

Making the wrong choice of competing local partners can have serious long-term consequences, as happened in Afghanistan. Here the United States decided to work with the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban. However, these new US allies were, at best, only marginally better than the Taliban when it came to issues such as human rights, commitment to democracy, and the empowerment of women (Rogers 2004). Given that the



United States wanted a quick and easy victory in Afghanistan that reduced the risks to US personnel, the reliance on the Northern Alliance is understandable, but it was a decision that did very little to enhance the chances of a democratic, peaceful, and just society.

### *A concept in need of further elaboration*

The concept of transformation does seem to lack precision and clarity. What does it really mean? It seems clear that there is no single transformation strategy (Ryan 2007), though this might come as something of a shock to supporters of the dominant paradigm of liberal internationalism. What counts as transformation will vary from case to case. Context may not be everything, but it is an important factor in determining the way strategies are described. The holding of the first free and fair election in post-apartheid South Africa deserves to be called transformation, whereas a number of elections held around the same time in established liberal democracies would not deserve this description.

For Mitchell (2002) the concept of conflict transformation is just too vague and lacks clarity. He has called on supporters of the idea to add precision by specifying what existing qualities in an adversarial relationship need to be changed and how such changes are to be implemented. Four areas, in particular, require attention: how do we move to exchanges that are balanced, interdependent, consonant, and legitimized? Mitchell also argues that the transformation approach tends to exaggerate the differences between itself and other traditions. Some who might be called problemsolvers, facilitators, or resolvers did recognize the need for significant structural change; therefore exaggerated claims about innovation and originality need to be challenged. Kanisin (2003) agrees with this analysis, and calls for greater “consilience of knowledge.” He believes that some texts promoting the transformation idea have polarized the debate about peace in an untenable manner. The Bush and Folger transformative mediation approach, for example, although it places recognition as a central feature of its approach, might be accused of, itself, failing to grant proper recognition to the alternative approach it dismisses as “problem-solving.” By exaggerating its own claims to uniqueness, transformation advocates might be undervaluing the importance of other approaches to peace.

There also seem to be some underdeveloped issues in the transformation literature. One of these is the relationship between transformation and coercion. Of the various normative peace traditions discussed here, only the Marxists seem prepared to endorse the idea of violent transformation. Yet even Marxists support only certain types of violence, and offer the happy ending of a peaceful world. Still the question remains whether a rejection of violence in pursuit of social justice is too restrictive. Was Nelson Mandela wrong to refuse to condemn the violence carried out by the ANC? Is Oz (2005) correct to argue that sometimes “evil” has to be confronted by force? The debate about the legitimacy of violence is one found in many societies. Famous examples would include the Southern Christian Leadership Conference vs. the Black Panthers in the US in the 1960s; Camus vs. Sartre in France in the 1950s over the Algerian war of independence; and the SDLP vs. Sinn Fein during the “Troubles” in Ireland. Perhaps because the concept of transformation emerged so strongly from peace research there has been a tendency to regard violence as evidence of failure. However, it also seems clear that violence may sometimes be necessary – to stop genocide or to block attempts by warlords to disrupt humanitarian missions or peace processes. Therefore, there needs to be a more systematic debate about the desirability of using violence in exceptional cases of transformation.

Another issue that arises from the ill-defined nature of transformation is knowing



when to stop. Here there is a danger of long-termism. Galtung (1996) has suggested that transformation is a never-ending process, but this seems to demand too much. But when do we know we can stop trying to transform? There are few helpful indicators here. We can illustrate this with a common problem in the study of intercommunal conflicts. There are a number of ways of trying to build peaceful and democratic multinational societies. Lijphart (1977) has proposed that the Westminster model be replaced with a consociational approach, whereas others suggest that this form of democracy could be a misguided compromise with an unsatisfactory status quo and does not do enough to encourage interethnic cooperation (Horowitz 2000). Snyder (2000) points out that supporters of competing approaches to democracy can always find examples to support their own preference, but there appears to be no definitive answer to which approach is best.

## Conclusion

Because the concept of conflict transformation covers so many different ideas and strategies, it is not possible to be simply for or against the idea. A much more discriminatory approach is called for. Wholesale endorsement is unattractive, not least because some of the approaches encompassed within the transformation concept are contradictory. Blanket condemnation would mean rejecting important ideas about how to deal with violent conflict. The transformation concept is less a grand plan than a repertoire of responses.

Nonetheless, when it comes to praxis, caution is required because the approach has to balance a number of competing pressures, and balancing is always something that needs care and prudence. It also seems to require, in the words of Camus, that great defender of modesty in politics, the capacity to say yes and no at the same time (Camus 2006: x). In this chapter, some areas where tensions and balancing are needed have been identified and include the tension between external involvement and the need to respect indigenous cultures, the need to deal with the past whilst at the same time trying to build a new future, developing long-term strategic thinking whilst accommodating the short-term perspectives of the political elite, the need to promote positive change without causing strong opposition from those who value the status quo, and the need to balance objective and subjective strategies. None of this is easy, but a capacity to develop an honest and open dialogue between all points of view seems to be an important starting point.

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## 22 Mediation frames/justice games

*Andrew Woolford and R. S. Ratner*

### **Introduction**

It is commonplace for legal practitioners to speak of litigation as a dance or battle (Gilson and Mnookin 1994; Mason 1999). However, critics of adversarialism have called into question the nature of the formal legal game (Menkel-Meadow 1996). In particular, litigation practices have been denounced for exacerbating differences between litigants (Susskind and Ozawa 1985: 145), promoting zero-sum solutions (Gordon 2000: 378), failing to address issues underlying conflict (Bush and Folger 1994), doing little to advance the future relationship of the parties in dispute (Susskind and Ozawa 1985), and being costly and inefficient.

Limitations such as these have led some to suggest that the juridical field requires a major shift to take us from the competitive world of adjudication to the conciliatory harmony of mediation – a dispute resolution procedure through which a third party assists disputants in arriving at a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict(s). With the proliferation of social justice movements in the 1960s, mediation was embraced by activists who saw it as a means to empower disputants to reclaim ownership of their disputes from an unfair court system (Hedeén and Coy 2000). But in recent times mediation has become more formalized, and has entered the societal mainstream (Bellman 1998). It is now employed to settle disputes ranging from schoolyard disagreements to human rights claims. The expansion of mediation in the legal and non-legal arenas has led some to conclude that mediation's "time has come" (Miller 1994), whereas others fear that its cooption or corruption by the formal justice system is inevitable, or at least cause for grave concern (Abel 1982; Harrington and Merry 1988).

In this chapter we examine three mediation types: transformative, facilitative, and evaluative. Our observations and general argument are based on fifteen in-depth interviews with mediators of the three types conducted in Vancouver, British Columbia, in March–April 2002, followed by several interviews with local mediators, instructors, and trainers. In developing our argument, we have found the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Pierre Bourdieu, and Erving Goffman useful for assessing the respective games and frames that characterize these mediation types, and for identifying the various framing errors or game disruptions that might occur to limit the effectiveness of a specific mediation type. More generally, these mediation types will be situated in the juridical field to assess their relationship to and likely impact upon formal legal practices. This will lead to a discussion of the potential drift from transformative and facilitative forms of mediation to an evaluative stance that contributes to the reproduction and revalorization of the structures of the formal legal system.

## Games and frames

The different types of mediation – evaluative, facilitative, and transformative – can be conceptualized as specific forms of language games. Wittgenstein (1994) uses the term “language game” to demonstrate that words do not have meaning in and of themselves; rather, words are intelligible only within a linguistic context that provides a constitutive grammar for determining meaning. Within this context the practical usage of words allows individuals to make intelligible statements at crucial moments. Language can thus be understood as a system of rules that shape and are reproduced by the actions of individuals participating in the language game (Glock 1996). The rules of a language game do not so much determine the various moves made by the participants in the game as provide a guide for admissible actions in terms of initiating a move, or reactions in terms of responding to a move made by another. However, an actor’s relationship to the rules of the game is not one of interpreting the rules and devising an appropriate action but instead involves an implicit understanding of the requirements of the game, which provides the actor with a feel for the game or, in the best case scenario, a mastery that demonstrates the actor’s proficiency.

The utility of this concept for the discussion of the practical application of various types of mediation lies in the manner in which Wittgenstein elaborates the relational properties of the language game. Actors engaged in an actual context of communication work in tandem with or in opposition to one another in establishing the outcome of their interaction. When understood as a language game, it is clear that mediation attempts to insert a third party, the mediator, into the interaction to encourage the parties to follow the explicit and implicit rules of the game. Thus, a discursive context is devised to influence the participants to engage in interactions through which their dispute is addressed in a conciliatory manner.

Wittgenstein’s concept, although helpful for assessing the internal dynamics of mediation games, does not provide a ready means for examining the broader context in which mediation games are situated nor does it offer insight into the forms of social power that operate within mediation games and help explain differing levels of competence within language games. For these elements, Bourdieu’s sociological explication of Wittgenstein’s philosophical model is instructive.

The grounding concept of Bourdieu’s theoretical corpus is that of the “field.” It is within a field of social activity, such as art or law, that a market defined by its own valuational structure exists, and it is in accordance with a field that actors seek the symbolic and material awards associated with a display of competence (Bourdieu 1984, 1991). Depending on an actor’s class position – a position Bourdieu defines not by virtue of position in the relations of production but rather with respect to a shared system of dispositions, or *habitus* (Bourdieu 1990) – the actor’s feel for the game within the market relations of a specific field will vary, with those endowed with greater quantities of the forms of capital deemed valuable within the field (e.g. economic, symbolic, or cultural capital) more capable of transmitting an aura of competence. Thus, within a specific game or market situation actors come pre-equipped with differing amounts of capital, depending upon their position(s) in the structural arrangements of society (e.g. level of education, occupation), and, based on these factors, are predisposed toward certain practices (i.e. a class *habitus*). The valuational rules of the market ascribe these practices with differing levels of profitability within the field, allowing some actors to feel more at home on their appointed terrain.

These concepts relate to our understanding of mediation in two ways. First, in relation

to the dominant legal game of adversarial litigation, mediation can be understood as a subfield in which the proponents of mediation endeavor to establish a market relatively autonomous from the juridical field's prevailing valuational structures, one that emphasizes the profitability of conciliation and compromise. Through mediation, new rules of interaction are implemented that influence participants to make adaptations in order to demonstrate forms of competence distinct from those typically exhibited in the juridical field.

Second, mediation can be assessed in relation to its position within the juridical field (Bourdieu 1987). Here, mediation appears as a force competing for the monopoly of legitimate naming within the field, seeking to reconstitute the field of law in non-adversarial terms, and thereby transforming the legal habitus. Dezalay (1994: 155) has examined alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices in this light and concludes that formal legal practices, such as adjudication, in fact receive a "profit of distinction" rather than a challenge through the existence of ADR since, in systems where formal and informal practices exist side by side, processes of alternative dispute resolution are typically used for legal conflicts that are considered to be less serious. This practice tends to revalorize traditional practices that then become reserved for conflicts considered important, such as those of constitutional status.

To examine the struggle occurring in the juridical field and the "meaning work" performed by actors in attempts to define the nature of this field, the concept of *frames* will be utilized. Erving Goffman (1974: 21) describes frames as "schemata of interpretation" that are employed to construct a particular definition of the situation. His work has been adopted by social movements scholars who use the term to understand the meanings actors attach to their involvement in collective action, the manner in which these meanings are amplified and extended to impact a broader audience, and the generative master frames that operate as a touchstone for opinion and action formation (Carroll and Ratner 1996; Snow and Benford 1988). In this chapter, the frames mobilized by actors engaged in various types of mediation will be delineated to assess their level of resonance within the legal field and the risk that these mediation frames bear of being encroached upon or muted by the master frames of the juridical field. Moreover, we will examine how these mediation frames also serve to reinforce the formal legal game of the juridical field.

## **Types of mediation games/frames**

Most mediators express preferences for particular forms of mediation that are based on various motivating justice frames; our focus is on language games and justice frames animating transformative, facilitative, and evaluative mediation (see Table 22.1).

### ***Evaluative mediation***

In evaluative mediation the pragmatic goal is to end a disruptive conflict by bringing the disputants to a mutually agreeable resolution. For this reason, the conceptual frame guiding evaluative mediation is best described as *utilitarian* since it values dispute resolution processes that demand less time and material investment than formal legal practices, and that provide solutions that hasten the return to a normal state of affairs between the disputing parties. In this sense, evaluative mediation is *congruent with the legal status quo*, and supplements the formal legal system by providing efficient settlement opportunities to ease court backlogs. Based on this utilitarian justice framing, evaluative mediators typically

Table 22.1 Mediation types

	<i>Evaluative</i>	<i>Facilitative</i>	<i>Transformative</i>
Conceptual frame	Utilitarian	Prosocial	Substantive
Relation to the juridical field	Integral (accepting legal status quo)	Reformist (humanizing the justice system)	Oppositional (challenging societal values)
Elements of the mediation game	<p><i>Mediator basic assumption</i> Human capacity for rational communication</p> <p><i>Mediator style</i> Directive Managerial</p> <p><i>Mediator interventions</i> Encourage focused dialogue Advice Caucus Reality check Examples/precedents</p>	<p><i>Mediator basic assumption</i> Human capacity for interest conciliation</p> <p><i>Mediator style</i> Neutral Collaborative</p> <p><i>Mediator interventions</i> Encourage respectful dialogue Focus on common interests Reframe Paraphrase Open questions Summarize Caucus</p>	<p><i>Mediator basic assumption</i> Human capacity for value creation</p> <p><i>Mediator style</i> Expanding Empowering</p> <p><i>Mediator interventions</i> Promote open dialogue Enhance disputant capacities Encourage alternatives</p>
Errors	<p>Exacerbating flashpoints Value-laden language Disrespect</p>	<p>Demonstrating bias Directiveness Chastizing Closed questions Patronizing or condescending</p>	<p>Taking control from parties Stifling creativity Imposing alternatives</p>
Outcomes/goals	“Realistic” settlement Time and cost savings	“Fair” agreement that meets parties’ needs Satisfaction	“Novel” resolution Enhance/transform relationships New possibilities/expectations
Common mediation sites	Commercial Personal injury Construction Labor	Small claims Divorce Neighborhood	Family Restorative justice



operate on the assumption of a *human capacity for rational communication* within the juridical field, through which it is expected that parties will work toward a realistic resolution of their conflict.

Commercial mediation is the example *par excellence* of evaluative mediation since parties engaged in this type of mediation typically seek mechanisms whereby they can avoid the costly posturing and strategic interactions that characterize formal legal proceedings. Also, businesses increasingly prefer confidential mediation processes for resolving their disputes as a way to keep corporate matters out of the public spotlight. However, they usually select mediators who have expertise in the area of concern (e.g. construction law) and who can provide information on potential litigation outcomes if the case were to proceed to court. After hearing each party tell their side of the story, and if the disputants are unwilling to move towards a reasonable settlement, an evaluative mediator would most likely *caucus* individually with them and their respective lawyers. In this private setting, the mediator would attempt to ascertain what each party would minimally accept in a settlement. The mediator might even offer a *reality check*, informing either disputant that, based on the presented evidence, a judge would probably rule against her or him. Through interactive tools such as these, the mediator would seek to bring the disputants to realize the wisdom of reaching settlement rather than pursuing these matters in the courts. Thus, the operative logic of the evaluative mediation game is explicit, with the *mediator directing the parties* to accept a utilitarian rationality toward their conflict rather than harboring a costly grudge. The disputants would participate competently in this mediation game by bracketing the emotions attached to the conflict, subduing their feelings, and realizing their common interests in avoiding a protracted legal dispute.

To bring the disputants toward this point of the evaluative mediation game, however, the mediator must be careful not to say or do anything that ignites underlying emotional issues or that is perceived by the parties to be a form of *disrespect*. Instead, the mediator must *focus the parties on the issue at hand*. If the mediator mistakenly touches off a *flashpoint*, s/he needs to calm the parties and refocus them on the ultimate goal of reaching a *realistic settlement*.

### **Facilitative mediation**

Facilitative mediators concentrate on the *processual* dimensions of justice and seek to foster creativity and communicative openness amongst the disputants. This entails the application of various techniques, such as *summarizing*, *reframing*, and private *caucusing*, all of which serve to orient the disputants to the process requirements of *interest-based* negotiations, which are based upon joint problemsolving rather than positional wrangling. It is believed that this approach is more efficient and cost-effective than negotiations or court proceedings carried out through the courts. It also prioritizes *disputant satisfaction* with the process rather than dwelling on settlement rates. In this manner, facilitative mediation is intended as a means to *reform and humanize* the formal justice system by emphasizing client contentedness and participation. The assumption guiding facilitative mediators in this reformist quest is that disputants have a *capacity for interest conciliation* that provides them with the flexibility necessary to reach a compromise.

Identifying the disputants' *common interests* is achieved through a series of "moves" or "influence techniques" (Gilson and Mnookin 1994). For example, at the beginning of a facilitative mediation session Party A might state her position very strongly, and in a non-conciliatory fashion. Upon hearing this, the mediator would be likely to restate Party A's

position in a neutral fashion to emphasize her interests. This “re-framing” (Picard 1998) is part of the mediator’s attempt to instruct both disputants in the rules of the mediation game. Here, Party A learns quickly that taking a positional stance is not acceptable and, ideally, she will attempt to demonstrate her newly acquired competence by phrasing further statements in terms similar to those used by the mediator.

Curtis (1987) notes that the language game sets out rules for the hearer as well as the speaker. Thus, one can expect that, upon hearing the reframed statement, Party B will gain a sense of what an appropriate response would be. If the mediator does not intervene and rephrase Party A’s statement quickly enough, however, it is likely that Party B will respond to her positional statement with a positional statement of his own. But, if the mediator is successful in reframing Party A’s statement, then Party B is confronted with the neutralized statement and must instead reorient his action toward it.

In sum, the success of facilitative mediation depends on the mediator’s ability to encourage the parties to develop a “feel for the facilitative game.” This feel for the game, however, can be disrupted if breaches occur in the mediator’s performance. The mediator must *avoid appearing biased* and *must not be perceived to be directing* or come across as *condescending or paternalistic* to the parties. If any of these impressions are given, one or both of the parties is likely to interpret mediation as an imposed solution rather than as a *fair settlement that meets the needs of both parties*.

### ***Transformative mediation***

Generally speaking, a conceptual frame predicated on *substantive* goals informs transformative mediation. This is not to say that *procedural* concerns are unimportant to practitioners of transformative mediation – they clearly are, as both empowerment of the disputants and recognition of the opposing party are encouraged by the mediator (Bush and Folger 1994, 2005). However, the mediator also brings to the process certain preconceptions about the nature of conflict and the ideal goals of conflict resolution. In particular, the mediator assumes that there exists a *human capacity for value creation* that allows individuals to rise above their current state of being. Conflict is thought to narrow the respective purviews of disputants, leading disputants to become “weak and selfish,” unwilling to consider the needs of the opposing party (Bush and Folger 1994). Transformative mediations address conflict by encouraging moral growth in each disputant, inviting them to metamorphose into caring and strong people able to see both sides of the issue. In ideal circumstances, this moral growth does not stop with the parties to the dispute, but spreads throughout the community and society as individuals learn to practice “compassionate strength” in all of their relationships (ibid.: 229). Thus, transformative mediation is *oppositional* to the dominant legal culture because it challenges pervasive adversarialism with human values of compassion and empathy.

For a transformative mediator, forging an agreement between two disputants would be secondary to providing them a forum in which they might come to new realizations about themselves and their conflict through *open dialogue*. Transformative mediators typically shy away from describing the transformative mediation game as a method. Instead, they claim to foster an environment in which each party is treated with respect and their *individual capacities are enhanced* to allow them to play an active role in reaching settlement. Transformative mediators seek to decipher the interaction between the disputants as it unfolds and, based on this, to proactively respond to this context. For example, after hearing each disputant relate their version of the conflict, the transformative mediator may

choose to *tell a story* of her own that demonstrates an important shared value. Alternatively, the mediator may say nothing if she feels the disputants are working their way toward a resolution simply based on retelling the events before an attentive third party. What matters, primarily, is not how the process unfolds but rather that the parties recognize the importance of peaceable human relationships and seek to model positive and constructive communication skills in their future relationships. Transformative mediators believe that this message will be most strongly internalized by the parties if they take ownership of the conflict and design their own *novel resolution*. As they learn to solve this particular problem, they will take this experience and knowledge with them into their everyday lives. For this reason, it is important that transformative mediators *neither take control* of the mediation process *nor stifle creativity within it*. These actions will hinder the moral development and confidence of the disputants. Thus, if the mediator hopes to have the parties resolve their dispute, rediscover basic human values, and develop proactive dispute resolution skills, it is necessary that she subtly impart the implicit instructions of the transformative mediation game so that disputants internalize and enact them.

## Reconfiguring the juridical field

The internal dynamics of evaluative, facilitative, and transformative mediation games play out in the broader legal game of the juridical field. The juridical field, along with the totality of social forces in which it is situated, has an impact on the unfolding of these mediation games, which in turn influence the extent to which mediators are able to fully operationalize the rules of their respective games. Conversely, these mediation games also attempt to influence both the legal game of the juridical field and, as is the case with transformative mediation, the broader social milieu. The objective, in this latter regard, is to reconfigure the juridical field or the social milieu in a manner that expedites, humanizes, or transforms the execution of juridical practices, and perhaps improves human relationships. Given the interconnection of games to the juridical field and to the social milieu, it is insufficient simply to detail the idealized inner workings of various mediation games; an effort must be made to understand how these games play out in a broader context.

### Legal reproduction

The paradoxical challenge faced by mediators is one of sustaining the implicit logic of their games both within and against the overdetermining logic of the juridical field. The adversarial legal game within the juridical field is invested with legitimacy, because the practices that constitute this game and the resolutions that the game offers carry the impression of being both neutrally founded (evolved naturally and historically through their rational application) and universal (representative of the trans-subjective values of a particular community). Given the perceived legitimacy of the legal game, it can be expected that facilitative and transformative mediation games will drift toward evaluative practices that are more similar to the overarching legal game.

First, the tendency of drift can result from the professional struggles currently being played out in the juridical field (Dezalay 1994). With the contemporary resurgence of informal practices and the rising popularity of mediation, a large number of non-lawyers have entered the dispute resolution market, offering services characterized by a valuational structure different from that guiding the legal game. Initially, lawyers and judges rejected mediation and other ADR practices, arguing that they are not sufficiently rigorous to

protect clients or to ensure the carriage of justice. But in recent years this resistance has subsided, and more and more lawyers and judges are billing themselves as mediators. With *their* entry into the informal realm of mediation, lawyers and judges have contributed toward a drift toward evaluative norms. These legal professionals have spearheaded debates about the appropriate training standards and qualifications for mediators, arguing that mediation must be harmonized with the overarching logic of the juridical field. Since lawyers are the agents conversant in the rules of the legal game, they often view themselves as the parties best able to provide mediation services within the juridical context in order to ensure that parties in mediation reach legally enforceable agreements that do not transgress established judicial principles. In addition, legal professionals receive their training from and are immersed in the formal legal system. Habituated to the evaluative nature of the legal game of this system, they are reluctant to place the resolution of a dispute entirely in the disputants' hands. Moreover, they confront an ethical dilemma in actual mediation situations where discussions verge on legal issues – do they inform the parties of the legal ramifications of their decisions or do they empower them to come to their own creative settlements? Finally, even non-lawyer mediators may become tempted to give legal advice in order to demonstrate their familiarity with formal legal practices and to project an aura of competency.

Second, mediation games are increasingly burdened by settlement expectations placed on mediators. For example, when mandatory mediation programs are implemented, minimum settlement rates are required. In British Columbia, small claims construction mediations in some court registries are accompanied by expectations of an 85 percent satisfaction rate and a 50 percent settlement rate, and this is to be accomplished within a single, two-hour mediation session. The rules of small claims mediation in British Columbia forbid mediators from providing disputants with legal advice; nonetheless, mediators in this context are inclined to be more directive with clients in settling disputes in order to meet these requirements. Settlement expectations, however, are not only present in the mandatory context. Even in voluntary mediations, in which mediators are contracted by private parties paying upward of \$200 per hour, mediators may feel the weight of settlement expectations because their services have been sold as an efficient path to dispute resolution.

Third, it can be expected that mediators will begin to see a number of similar cases because most mediators focus their practice on specific sites (e.g. family, construction). The challenge facing facilitative and transformative mediators in these circumstances is to allow their respective mediation games to unfold naturally, resisting the temptation to expedite the game by invoking informal precedents for settlement. The drift toward evaluative mediation can be particularly pressing in mediations centered on monetary issues. In British Columbia, personal injury disputes constitute the majority of mediations. The province's sole provider of basic automobile insurance, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC), has embraced mediation, but uses it as a forum in which to settle with plaintiffs without incurring the expenses of a legal battle. In mediation, ICBC typically tables, and rarely goes beyond one-quarter more than its lowest offer, making these mediations largely predictable and leaving the mediator in more of an evaluative position because the options for settlement are so narrowly defined.

These issues relate to a fourth way in which mediation games drift toward evaluative practices. With repeat usage, the "magic" of mediation begins to wane, and the participants start to interpret the rules of the mediation game in a strategic fashion. When this occurs, mediation loses its collaborative dimension and shifts back toward adversarial norms.

As the notion of language game suggests, participation in mediation requires an implicit understanding of what is expected. When this understanding evolves into a strategic interpretation, the tendency is then to manipulate the rules to serve self-interest rather than remain within the contours of the game. In mediation, this strategic shift often begins through the participation of lawyers who attempt to use the mediation game for purposes such as “early discovery” to prepare for trial, or as a credibility test for whether a particular disputant would present well to a jury. In addition, it is not uncommon for lawyers or disputants to attempt to “capture” the mediator in order to bring him or her over to their side. Strategic interactions such as these interfere with the administration of a facilitative or transformative mediation game, and require mediators to take more interventionist and directive stances to protect their mediation ploys from cooption.

In essence, it becomes increasingly difficult for facilitative and transformative mediation games to sustain their reformist or oppositional goals, not to mention their client-centered values; instead, the tendency is for these mediation games to evolve toward evaluative standards and to supplement the logic of the formal legal game.

### ***Systems reproduction***

The section above details the manner in which evaluative, facilitative, and transformative forms of mediation are internally affected by their position in relation to the legal game of the juridical field. However, these mediation forms also influence the operation of the legal game by revalorizing the rule of law and by providing a structural correction to the failings and inefficiencies of the formal legal system.

As noted earlier, the discourse of justice is replaced in mediation games by a discourse of satisfaction that achieves a sense of participatory fairness and produces a sense of relief in avoiding the frustration and uncertainty of the courts. Mediation relieves disputants of this anxiety through the construction of a safe environment, sparing disputants the inconsistencies, tribulations, and adversarialism of the formal legal system. This sense of satisfaction, however, does not equate with a critique of the substantive and procedural norms of the juridical system. Instead, parties who pass through mediation might feel that their faith in the juridical system has been restored, because it has provided them with a less cumbersome means to settle their dispute and mitigates their feelings of tension. Thus, mediation games potentially serve to siphon off criticisms of the legal game.

The siphoning effect of mediation extends its benefits to the structural operation of the legal game. As Dezalay (1994) suggests, the transfer of cases to mediation provides the legal system with a “profit of distinction” because legal resources are directed toward important cases with broad implications or toward cases involving parties who can afford the time and costs of the formal legal system. Thus, the value of law is not diminished, but rather maintained through a reworking of the legal system that dedicates formal legal practices to cases of higher prestige. In addition, the formal legal system profits from the removal of less justiciable cases that might expose the arbitrariness of the courts. With these threats removed, and justice resources directed to “higher end” conflicts, the status quo of the juridical field is revalidated rather than undermined.

### ***Discursive reproduction***

In a neoliberal regulatory context, the value of any new program is evaluated primarily in cost–benefit terms; however, this is not to say that an increased neoliberal reliance

on mediation will be necessarily devoid of social intent. Part of the distinctive neoliberal “justice game” is a rationality of governance, or “governmentality” (Foucault 1991), that involves the diffusion of regulatory and control mechanisms in localities beyond the limits of the state (see Miller and Rose 1990; Rose 1993). Through techniques managed by local experts and professionals, neoliberal governance ideally becomes less a matter of state imposition and more a matter of individual choice as individuals become “responsibilized” to govern themselves through their own freedom (Burchell 1993). In this sense, less formal procedures such as mediation can serve as a “technique of self,” beckoning individuals to construct their identities in a positive and non-conflictive manner amenable to neoliberal rule (Pavlich 1996). This fabrication of non-conflictive selves assists in the rational management of a population, priming it for the flexibility and certainty demands of global capital.

Responsibilization through mediation, however, occurs not only in cases diverted from the formal legal system. The non-threatening procedures of mediation allow parties who might not otherwise make use of the courts to participate in the legal system. Also, negotiations that might have occurred between parties prior to trial may now take place before a mediator at a mandatory mediation. Events such as these constitute an extension of the reach of law whereby disputes that may have been resolved or left unresolved at the margins of the legal field are now brought within the orbit of the reconfigured formal legal system. Therefore, mediation has the potential to expand the force of law and governmentality more broadly throughout society, further entrenching rather than retracting the hegemonic justice game. In this manner, it helps reproduce the discursive logic of neoliberal governance by inculcating in a broader array of individuals a responsibilized philosophy of self-sufficiency that prepares them for consensual participation in the new status quo.

Thus, the reconfiguration of the legal field through mediation is more unitary than the different types of mediation game would suggest, given the drift toward evaluative standards that prove complementary to the overarching legal game. The evaluative mode serves to reaffirm the juridical field by addressing some of the deficiencies of the legal game of formal juridical practice. This adjustment not only contributes to ensuring the efficiency of the legal system and revalorizing it in the eyes of its participants, it also helps the juridical field adapt to the macro-level societal changes that have been spawned by economic globalization, including the ascendancy of a neoliberal justice game, thus ensuring the continued relevance of the juridical field’s legal game and solidifying its contribution to the maintenance of hegemonic norms.

### **Securing the hegemonic game**

In the context of the emerging global hegemonic game, the juridical field, with its cumbersome and inflexible processes, risks becoming anachronistic. However, the advent of mediation has presented an opportunity for the development of an adaptive strategy to meet the efficiency and responsibilizing demands of neoliberalism. These mediation games, if their humanizing and oppositional tendencies are appropriately constrained, help to ensure that the juridical field maintains its fundamental role in the reproduction of the broader social sphere. For this to happen, however, the democratic and participatory elements of these mediation games need to be mobilized in a manner that affirms the hegemonic neoliberal justice game.

Mediators themselves play a critical role in the cooption of mediation games toward the



reproduction of the juridical field. This is not because they are dupes of the hegemonic power; rather, they are embedded within this field in a manner that leads them to view it as established common sense. Now that legal professionals have embraced mediation, they tend to view it as a functional component of the juridical field, rather than a challenge to its legitimacy. However, this explanation does not account for the willing participation of non-lawyer mediators within the confines of the overarching justice games. But it should be noted that many non-lawyer mediators come from professions that are within or in close proximity to the juridical field (e.g. probation officers, social workers, and adjusters). More importantly, the pervasiveness of the juridical field has inculcated the norms and practices of legal games into every person's daily life (Ewick and Silbey 1998). For this reason, the norms of the juridical field serve as the basis for much of an individual's private reasoning in relation to disputes.

Mechanisms also exist to compel assimilation to the norms of the legal game should habituation fail or require reinforcement. First, mediator training programs instill in trainees a sense of the need to maintain a realistic relationship to the legal game. This training might range from promoting an evaluative or legalistic understanding of mediation to issuing warnings of the risk faced by mediators who stray too far from legal norms (e.g. liability). Second, the increased participation of lawyers within mediation games serves to monitor the activities of non-lawyer mediators. If a non-lawyer mediator were to subvert or transgress the norms of the legal game, a disputant's lawyer might intervene to reinforce the normative conception or sanction the mediator by withdrawing from the mediation game. Third, non-lawyer mediators face economic constraints on their activities. Like all mediators, they are subject to the expectations of mediation consumers, and, within a competitive professional field, are unlikely to jeopardize their business through taking an oppositional stance toward the legal game or by framing the mediation game in a manner too contrary to the dominant logic of the juridical field.

Through these mechanisms and the general force of habituation, mediators come to view conflict, and, in particular, seemingly intractable conflict as rife with problems. With this basic understanding, the fatal error that mediators seek to avoid is that of igniting an intractable dispute that prevents settlement and client satisfaction. However, there is perhaps a subliminal reason for mediators to avoid broaching such conflicts – the resolutions to the problems raised by these conflicts seem unrealistic based on the mediator's lived experience. The immediate concerns of disputants (e.g. moving forward with their lives, receiving reasonable compensation) can be met in the limited timeframe of a mediation game, whereas larger social justice issues of power appear unresolvable. Therefore, the responsabilizing and non-conflictual force of the mediation game does, in effect, draw parties away from challenging the hegemonic justice frame as they are led toward solutions that resonate with the status quo. Thus, success in the mediation game can be more trenchantly defined as the framing of the dispute in a manner whereby larger contestatory questions are bracketed, a systems-maintaining solution is reached, and the parties leave the process feeling reasonably satisfied and empowered to the extent that they believe they played a salient role in forging an agreement.

If the disputes brought into mediation games were permitted to fester, dominant legal games and the hegemonic order would be challenged to the extent that these disputes might expose the arbitrariness of the juridical and the longstanding power imbalances that it reinforces, which arise symptomatically in the mediator's cathartic space. In this sense, we understand the juridical field not as autonomous, but rather as a site situated within the totality of objective power relations and that plays an integral role in maintaining those



relations. Through such palliative options as mediation, the juridical field induces consent from those subject to and participating in these relations.

This raises the question of whether mediation can re-establish a social justice motif and move its horizons beyond the reproduction of the juridical field. One possibility may lie in a grassroots embrace of the values of transformative justice through which communities enmeshed by neoliberal strategies of responsabilization redeploy localized practices such as mediation in ways that pose significant challenges to the status quo. This might involve employing mediation in a transformative fashion beyond the gaze of the state in hopes of reconfiguring local values toward issues of social justice. However, this strategy is unlikely to pierce the layer of inculcated values that undergird the hegemonic justice game. It resembles, in Gramsci's (1971) terminology, a "war of position" without a "war of movement"; that is, an attempt to change the cultural patterns of civil society without developing a movement capable of challenging entrenched power structures. A second possibility would be to accept the limited rewards attainable within the current practice of mediation games. Indeed, these practices do at times provide a selective humanizing of the legal game, even if the dominant tendency within the field is toward more evaluative and directive mediative practice. For some, personal rewards may be achieved in the mediation context, providing them with a positive outlook on a relationship that they previously did not possess. But such rewards are temporary and isolated in their impact, reflecting, to borrow from Gramsci once again, little more than a "passive revolution" – i.e. elements of change that appear transformative, yet do little to modify the long-term structural conditions of society or the life course trajectories of people. A final possibility for mediation relies on the political sagacity of those in the upper echelons of the social order who command the power to validate norms and values other than those of the hegemonic game, and who can redistribute resources in a manner that makes it possible for the employment of mediation games in a truly transformative sense. Especially in these neoliberal times, however, this option seems decidedly remote, and, like the other possibilities, creates immodest hopes for what mediation is programmed to achieve.

In sum, as performed in its current modes, mediation clearly resonates with the imperatives of the juridical field, and provides further ballast to the hegemonic justice game. Without significant loosening of the interrogatory restraints that mediators themselves impose through their selective framing of prudently truncated discourses, mediation can take credit only as a pacificatory and temporizing force, not as a harbinger of social justice.

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## 23 Interactive conflict resolution

### Dialogue, conflict analysis, and problemsolving★

*Ronald J. Fisher*

#### Introduction

The practice of interactive conflict resolution (ICR) in the forms of dialogue, conflict analysis, and problemsolving between representatives of adversaries is a social innovation of relatively recent origin (Fisher 1997). Historically, a determination by a higher authority and the threat or use of force have been the predominant methods of dealing with intense differences, especially competition over scarce resources among individuals, groups, or nations. At the same time, the intervention of a trusted mediator has a long and pervasive history in assisting conflicting parties to achieve a settlement through negotiation (Mitchell and Webb 1988; Moore 2003). Similarly, third parties who serve simply a communication function, as in good offices or conciliation, have been a part of many societies and cultures. In the latter part of the twentieth century, the development of the field of conflict resolution as an outgrowth of Western social science brought forward conflict analysis and problemsolving as methods of addressing intense and destructive conflicts. In line with the ethos of democratic functioning and an emphasis on human relations, ICR challenges the parties to voluntarily deal with their differences in a respectful and cooperative manner, working toward outcomes that are mutually beneficial and self-sustaining over the longer term. In order to institute such processes and accomplish such outcomes, the assistance of a trusted and skilled intermediary is often required, especially when the conflict has escalated to a high level of intensity and intractability with significant costs and injuries to the parties.

In the international sphere, the dominating influence of the Cold War in the second half of the twentieth century persuaded many theoreticians and practitioners alike to downplay the significance or even the applicability of conflict resolution approaches. Likewise, there was an overemphasis on great power relations and the use or threat of force to manage international conflicts. What was neglected during this period was the many enduring conflicts, mostly in the Third World, that were not primarily over ideology, or even resources, but over issues of identity, recognition, and justice – and the power to achieve these. Edward Azar (1990) coined the term *protracted social conflict* to identify these longstanding and bitter conflicts that erupted into violence periodically and seemed impervious to resolution. More recently, Ted Robert Gurr (1993) has identified these as “ethnopolitical conflicts” in which minorities are typically placed in a disadvantaged economic and political position by

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governing majorities, and thus engage in collective protest or rebellion leading to civil war in order to seek redress for their grievances. In the wake of the Cold War, many of these enduring rivalries gained greater attention, while at the same time new ethnic flashpoints ignited with the dissolution of the Soviet empire and its control function (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1995). The significant difficulty of managing these intense and seemingly intractable conflicts has increased interest in the innovative, problemsolving methods of conflict resolution.

As a result of these and other forces, third party approaches for dialogue, conflict analysis, and problemsolving have become popular in the 1990s and up to the present. Added to the small band of academics who pioneered such methods, non-governmental organizations and units of regional intergovernmental organizations are now engaged in these types of practices. Unfortunately, unlike academics, practitioners tend not to write about their work, and a significant amount of this evolving practice experience is not available for conceptualization and evaluation. Thus, it is important to construct forums for sharing best practices, to document applications and to engage in comparative case analyses of interventions. Concurrently, a theory of practice needs to evolve alongside the actual work, so that others can learn from innovators' experiences and, collectively, the field of conflict resolution can work to improve its provision of services.

## Questions of definition and nomenclature

Each innovation in the practice of dialogue, conflict analysis, and problemsolving seemed to bring its own label and definition as the field developed. John Burton (1969), acknowledged as the creator of the problemsolving workshop, first termed his methodology as "controlled communication" to denote the importance of the third party creating a non-threatening atmosphere, so that representatives of the parties to a conflict could analyze their misperceptions and then explore ways for resolving the conflict through functional cooperation. The role of the third party was deemed similar to that of the non-directive helper, that is to be facilitative and supportive, and was enacted through behaviors such as asking questions, seeking clarifications, challenging misperceptions, and explaining processes of interaction. The last behavior was linked to a broader function of the third party – that of bringing concepts and theories from social science that might be useful to the participants in analyzing and understanding their conflict. Later in the work of Burton and his colleagues, the term "problem solving" was introduced to help distinguish this new third party method from the processes of traditional diplomatic negotiation, including, one presumes, mediation (de Reuck 1974). Eventually, Burton (1990) came to use the term "facilitated conflict resolution" to refer to the workshop approach and its complementary activities. Joseph Montville built on Burton's conception of the problemsolving workshop to create his approach of *track two diplomacy* to distinguish these public or unofficial methods of conflict resolution from those of official, "track one diplomacy" (Davidson and Montville 1981–1982). To his initial definition of track two as unofficial, non-structured interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations directed toward conflict resolution, Montville (1987) added interactions to develop strategies, affect public opinion, or mobilize resources to aid resolution. In his later work, Montville (2006) has emphasized the healing function of track two interactions in order to overcome an intergroup history of trauma and victimization through processes of contrition and reconciliation.

Herbert Kelman (this volume), who was introduced to the method by Burton, uses the term “interactive problemsolving” and has built up a considerable theory of practice with application primarily to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Edward Azar (1990), who worked with both Burton and Kelman, used the term “problem-solving forum” to identify the methodology, which he drew mainly from Burton. Following the innovative work of Richard Walton (1969) at the interpersonal level, I have used the term “third party consultation” to emphasize the knowledge, skill, and relationship requirements of the intervener who moves into the challenging cauldron of conflict. Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks (1996), who worked with Burton from the early days, have brought forward the term “collaborative, analytical problem solving” to denote the essential elements of the method. Other scholar practitioners have emphasized the dialogue aspect of the work, as opposed to problemsolving. Richard Chasin and Margaret Herzig (1993) speak of “facilitating dialogue.” Paul Hare (1982) has linked dialogue to “consensus building” as practiced by the Quakers and followers of Gandhi, thus providing a group context and a philosophical or religious basis. Harold Saunders (1999) speaks of “sustained dialogue” as the essential core of a *public peace process*. Others use the term “facilitated dialogue” or more generally and simply “facilitation.”

All of the above terms capture important features of ICR, giving emphasis to some characteristics over others. However, there can also be some important differences underlying the use of various terms. There can, for example, be dialogue simply for dialogue’s sake, that is to increase understanding and reestablish harmony by removing misunderstanding. There can be dialogue that leads to deeper analysis, probing the dynamics of the relationship and the underlying causes of the conflict. There can also be, for example, an emphasis on practical problemsolving with little conflict analysis through the introduction of relevant social science knowledge. More extensive documentation of applications and comparative analysis of detailed procedures would enable the field to determine what terms typically denote what predominant strategies and techniques. Until then, we are destined to live with a certain amount of confusion, and thereby some unfortunate difficulty in communicating our methodology to the world.

In 1990, the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age (later the Center for Psychology and Social Change), affiliated with the Harvard Medical School, organized a workshop on the current state of practice in the emerging domain of applied conflict resolution. With facilitation provided by Richard and Laura Chasin, Margaret Herzig, Paula Gutlove and other colleagues of the Center, the workshop engaged twenty-five of the leading practitioners in the field (including John Burton, Herbert Kelman, Christopher Mitchell, Harold Saunders, John Marks) to assess the current state of “dialogue facilitation” and discuss directions for continued development. One of the predominant issues was the question of how to label and define the field; in response to a call for action, I volunteered to write a concept paper in an attempt to accomplish that task. The result was the term *interactive conflict resolution*, defined in the first instance as involving small-group, problemsolving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third party of social scientist-practitioners (Fisher 1993). Realizing that this definition was restricted to the methodology pioneered by Burton and Kelman, I later added a broader definition that could include a diverse array of interventions: facilitated face-to-face activities in communication, training, education, or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problemsolving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner that addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice, and equality

(Fisher 1997). The term *interactive conflict resolution* (ICR) was chosen to be inclusive of the array of developing methods, and to connote that the basic principles of conflict resolution are being operationalized in an interactive (i.e. face-to-face) and dynamic fashion. It continues to be my belief that such processes require the facilitation of a neutral third party when conflict intensity is moderate to high.

## Description of the practice

The field of conflict resolution evolved in large part as an alternative to existing methods of dispute resolution, which typically took authoritative or adversarial approaches to achieving settlement with their attendant costs. In contrast to judgmental or coercive methods, conflict resolution calls for the voluntary participation and mutual agreement of parties to produce self-sustaining agreements and improved relations. The assumption is that only the parties can effectively resolve their dispute, and in so doing also improve their relationship in ways that will render the outcomes sustainable until conditions change. With the realization that most conflicts are mixed-motive situations, conflict resolution works to increase the cooperative aspects, while recognizing that competitive elements will require a firm and yet conciliatory combination of strategies. Conflict resolution thus refers both to a process that is participative and collaborative, leading to de-escalation and reconciliation toward a sustainable future, and to outcomes that are mutually beneficial and supported by relationship qualities of trust and respect. ICR, although a multidisciplinary expression, also evidences some assumptions that are essentially social-psychological in character (Fisher 1997; Kelman and Fisher 2003). Conflict is seen as rooted in real incompatibilities, but is always a mix of objective and subjective elements, with the latter increasing in importance and effect as the conflict escalates. Thus, subjective elements, such as misperceptions and unwitting commitments, need to be addressed as do relationship qualities, such as trust and respect, for lasting resolution to occur. From a social systems perspective, changes need to occur at the individual level in perceptions, attitudes, and so on, and these outcomes need to be transferred to the group and intergroup levels through decisionmaking and policymaking that change the orientations and strategies of the parties in addressing their conflict.

Within the conflict resolution context, ICR provides a quiet, neutral, low risk forum for influential but unofficial representatives of parties to come together and engage in frank discussion and sustained analysis with the guidance and facilitation of an impartial and skilled third party. Some later applications have involved officials as representatives, but operating in an unofficial and off-the-record capacity (sometimes called “track one-and-one half diplomacy”). In either case, the method requires that subjective elements of the conflict are discussed along with the objective or structural factors. The third party therefore requires a broad range of human relations skills to bring the parties into productive confrontation, wherein they directly address the issues separating them and probe for deeper understanding of interests, values, and needs (Fisher 2006). This type of analysis can be accomplished only in a non-adversarial, non-committal, face-to-face manner, in which interaction is facilitated and at times controlled by the third party toward the authentic and synchronized exchange of information, including intentions, attitudes, strategies, reactions, and effects. The method notes that a certain amount of differentiation (i.e. exchange of perceptions, analysis of interaction patterns, exploration of options) is required before moving to integration (i.e. development of alternatives, decisionmaking, recommendations for policy). Thus, the third party must be sensitive to the flow and



the stages that constitute the problemsolving process and to the mechanisms by which attitudes and relationships change. The objectives of the method typically include some degree of cognitive and behavioral adjustments, initially among the participants, followed by the creation of mutually acceptable principles or actions supporting de-escalation and resolution that one hopes will be transferred to the interaction of the parties themselves.

One way of capturing the strategies of ICR is through the articulation of the core functions that the intermediary provides as delineated in my model of third party consultation, which was initially based on the work of Burton and others (Fisher 1972). The techniques or specific behaviors of the third party are also in part captured by the tactics identified in the model, which are the means to bring the strategies or functions into practice. The first function, of inducing positive motivation for conflict resolution, is relevant both before and during workshops, and is brought to life through tactics such as encouraging problemsolving, maintaining optimum tension, and balancing situational power. The pervasive function of improving communication is central to all forms of ICR, and, in the dialogue or problemsolving workshop, is operationalized through tactics such as empathizing, summarizing, and asking for clarification. A function that varies depending on the form of the workshop is that of diagnosing the conflict. In dialogue work, diagnosis is largely through the analysis of the perspectives of the parties and is brought about through a full and open exchange of information. In problemsolving workshops of the Burton or Kelman type, diagnosis calls on the third party to provide conceptual information on conflict etiology and escalation, which helps the participants better understand their shared problem. In either case, tactics, such as providing feedback to participants or processing an interaction that has occurred, are essential to the third party role. In the diagnostic function lies a good part of the uniqueness of ICR, in that human relations thinking and social science knowledge are now available to parties in order for them to better understand the nature of their interaction and its deficiencies that have fed the conflict. The final strategic function of regulating the interaction is necessary for the third party to institute and maintain the non-adversarial, dialogic and analytic problemsolving atmosphere. One important tactic is to control disruptive or disrespectful behaviors that would feed antagonism and fuel hostile interactions. Another is to keep the discussion on the agenda of the workshop, while allowing adequate flexibility for exploratory thinking. Finally, the third party requires sensitivity to the phases of the process, and needs to monitor and pace progress toward the desired outcomes.

The array of skills required to enter into the challenging arena of intergroup conflict is highly demanding (Fisher 2006), and is a good reason to work in third party *teams* wherein individual skills combine to produce a higher level of effectiveness. Regardless of disciplinary education, third party facilitators require the qualities and skills of professional practitioners, including integrity, self-confidence, self-awareness, genuineness, and a combination of caring with a degree of detachment. To facilitate productive confrontation in dialogue or problemsolving interactions, the third party requires a host of interpersonal, group, and intergroup skills. The usual prescribed behavioral skills for the professional helper are relevant: communication skills such as empathic listening and the giving and receiving of feedback. At the group level, the third party needs the capacities of a facilitative leader, who is able to understand group dynamics and to stimulate and manage group discussion based on that understanding. Skills in the problemsolving process are also necessary to be able to move from diagnosis through the creation of alternative solutions, to the choice of alternatives and the development of action plans required for implementation. Working at the level of intergroup relations places additional skill requirements



on the facilitator to be able to manage difficult interactions and confrontations among representatives who are putting their identities on the line. This requires the ability to design and implement constructive interchanges and to control disruptive interactions in a highly charged emotional field. The challenge is to use each interaction as an opportunity for joint learning about the relationship and to move toward intergroup problemsolving in an effective manner.

## **Contributions to a theory of practice**

The development of theory in ICR has been a sporadic and largely unconnected process, as different theorists have brought forward their attempts to capture the essence of facilitating dialogue, conflict analysis, and problemsolving, often without attention to the contributions of others. Some theorists have drawn from cultures or organizations that employ dialogue as a step toward reaching decisions by consensus in accord with the principles of conflict resolution. Paul Hare (1982, 1989), for example, describes how the followers of Mahatma Gandhi and members of the Society of Friends (Quakers) engage in interactions that promote dialogue and consensus. In the latter collectivity, members are asked to come to meetings with an open mind, and to listen carefully and respectfully in order to gain new information and insights.

Other theorists have developed their ideas inductively, drawing on their experience in facilitating dialogue sessions in order to produce principles and procedures for practice. Louis Kriesberg, Richard Schwartz, and their colleagues developed the Syracuse (New York) Area Middle East Dialogue between American Jews and Arabs a step at a time, building their theory of practice and the scope of their work as they went (Schwartz 1989). They began with an initial set of assumptions (for example, members of the two groups need to be relatively equal in status), and after three years of work were able to articulate procedures covering the selection of participants (for example, participants must have a significant identification with the primary parties, that is the Israeli and Palestinian peoples), the process of the dialogue (for example, no interruptions and equal air time for the two sides), and the content of the discussions (for example, sharing information from participants' backgrounds and working toward consensus statements on the Middle East conflict, which might be useful to US policymakers).

The work of Richard Chasin and his colleagues is an example of scholar-practitioners drawing their ideas of practice initially from a professional field and then further developing them on the basis of experience. As family therapists, this group of dialogue facilitators saw the importance of leading antagonists away from polarized debate and deadlock toward authentic dialogue and mutual understanding (Chasin and Herzig 1993). Applying their approach to a variety of intense conflicts on public issues (e.g. abortion) and political stalemates (e.g. the Cold War), led to the development of simple yet sophisticated procedures that prepare the way for dialogue and ensure that interaction will be respectful and constructive. Their theory of practice is now available in the form of guides for carrying out dialogue and other resources produced by their current organization ([www.public-conversations.org](http://www.public-conversations.org)).

The contributions of various dialogue theorists can be captured in a succinct set of goals, norms, and guidelines that delineate the nature of the process and the means to achieve the desired outcome of deep, mutual understanding (Fisher 1999). The goals of dialogue are simply to increase shared knowledge and to build understanding and trust, elements that are critical to any further movement toward conflict resolution. The norms

of dialogue call for open and genuine expression focusing on concerns and feelings as well as ideas. Furthermore, the interaction must be respectful and attentive, and there needs to be a willingness to look for commonalities as well as differences. To institute the norms and achieve the goals, guidelines call for participants to speak from personal experience and to refrain from rhetorical or abstract statements. Essentially, participants are asked to speak in order to inform and educate, rather than to persuade or deter, and to listen in order to understand and learn, rather than to refute and argue. Obviously, these guidelines run counter to the typical behavior expressed by antagonists in intense conflict, and are particularly difficult to institute in highly escalated ethnopolitical conflicts in which each party sees its identity, if not its very existence, as threatened. Nonetheless, dialogue facilitators have demonstrated that respectful and beneficial interactions can be engendered with careful preparation and skillful handling, and that the outcomes of such interactions are a first step toward mutually acceptable moves to de-escalate and resolve the conflict or to promote reconciliation and peacebuilding.

In the domain of conflict analysis and problemsolving, Burton's early work described what the method involved and clearly delineated it from traditional practices in conflict management, such as mediation and arbitration. However, it was some time later that he articulated a set of "rules" to govern the complete process of organizing, managing, and following up on the provision of a series of problemsolving workshops (Burton 1987). These rules constitute a set of dos and don'ts governing the methodological and ethical elements of the third party facilitator's behavior, and are the most explicit and concrete prescriptions available in the literature. Burton maintained that the delicate nature of facilitated conflict resolution did not invite the pragmatic and flexible application of the rules, and that changes should be made only with prior and careful consideration. A more flexible and adaptive approach is offered by two of Burton's protégés, Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, in their *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach* (1996), which provides guidelines for practice covering the phases of carrying out a problemsolving workshop, from diagnosing the situation and contacting the parties to assessing the workshop and planning for future collaboration. Throughout, the *Handbook* provides a rationale for the utility of problemsolving, identifies its unique nature and advantages, and engages the reader in considering options for moving forward at each step, while also providing the authors' best judgment about the most effective choice in the situation. It is, therefore, a valuable resource for getting the student or developing professional into the mindset of the scholar-practitioner as one deals with the many challenges and dilemmas involved in the role and the method.

Herbert Kelman has made continuing contributions to the theory of practice in ICR, starting by describing the major characteristics of the problemsolving workshop based on the innovative interventions of John Burton and Leonard Doob (Kelman 1972). In concert initially with his colleague Stephen Cohen, he articulated and elaborated the method of "interactive problem solving" by which the third party induces norms of respectful and analytical small-group interaction between influentials representing the conflicting parties (Kelman and Cohen 1979). Kelman has applied his approach primarily to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the theory of practice he has developed has wide applicability to ethnopolitical and international conflicts in general (Kelman 1992). In part, this is because his method is anchored in a social-psychological analysis that emphasizes the importance of connecting individual factors to institutional processes and of recognizing the central role of interaction in conflict development and expression between groups and nations (see Kelman's Chapter 12 in this volume).

Harold Saunders is a practitioner of both official and unofficial diplomacy and has synthesized his practice experience into several scholarly works that stand at the forefront of interactive methods. In the wake of a distinguished diplomatic career, Saunders took part in the Dartmouth Conference and, in 1981, began co-chairing a task force on managing regional conflicts, which analyzed how the superpower relationship was expressed through such disputes, and which ultimately contributed to the new political thinking that transformed the Soviet Union and ended the Cold War. Based on this experience, Saunders and his later Soviet co-chair articulated a “public peace process” consisting of a number of stages of interaction by which conflicting parties can transform their relationship to one of respect and cooperation (Chufrin and Saunders 1993). Along with colleague Randa Slim and others, Saunders applied the Dartmouth task force process to the civil war in the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan, with indications of a number of positive transfer effects to the official negotiations that ended the conflict and to the development of civil society and reconciliation in the country (Saunders 2005; Slim and Saunders 1996). A comprehensive theory of the practice of “sustained dialogue” covering principles, stages, and methods has been articulated and applied to race relations in the US as well as ethno-political and international conflicts elsewhere (Saunders 1999).

Jay Rothman is a scholar-practitioner who has effectively applied the ideas of the problemsolving approach to the prenegotiation process as well as the wider ongoing interaction between conflicting parties. His work on prenegotiation shows the importance of considering attitudinal and relationship factors before the antagonists attempt to deal with the difficult substantive issues. Rothman’s (1992) systematic model includes the stages of framing the issues, inventing integrative options, and structuring the process and substance of negotiations, and demonstrates how open and exploratory discussions can be used to increase the probability of eventual agreement. Subsequently, Rothman (1997) has articulated a comprehensive framework for addressing seemingly intractable identity-based conflicts through dialogue, analysis, and problemsolving. The four stages of the “ARIA” framework (Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, and Action) provide a roadmap for a facilitation team to engage the representatives of the parties in an increasingly reflective and cooperative process that has the potential to transform their relationship and bring about joint action to address their differences.

## Synthesis and conclusion

There is a clear need for the documentation and conceptualization of ICR interventions so that a body of knowledge and theory can be developed to guide further practice. Within this enterprise, there is also a need for terminological distillation to capture the essence of interactive methods and the variation among different methods. In this vein, for example, it is to be noted that *dialogue* is often used to mean more than what the traditional definition of dialogue entails. Perhaps this is because dialogue – the respectful exchange of information, the clarification of differences, and the creation of shared meaning – flows naturally into conflict analysis: the deeper probing of causes and dynamics beneath the espoused issues. Conflict analysis then flows naturally into problemsolving: the creative search for innovative directions and the development and choice of options to address the issues. Given that these three methods are overlapping and often occur simultaneously in the same intervention, it is not surprising that the conceptual representations of practice often mix them as well. Nonetheless, it would be useful for practitioners to be more precise about what they are doing and not doing in their interventions, and for theoreticians

to distinguish different approaches and to describe the main contours and trajectories of each.

There appears to be some degree of relationship between the three interrelated methods and the typical identity of participants and the requisite skill set of the third party facilitator. Dialogue appears to be more common at the grassroots level, with members or leaders of conflicting communities who can influence public opinion in some fashion. The primary requisite skills for the facilitator lie in the domain of improving communication and regulating the interaction as necessary – two of the functions identified in the model of third party consultation. In conflict analysis, the intervention is more likely to include mid-level influential persons who can have some effects on the political discourse and public opinion within and between their groups. For this form of intervention, the third party must do more than facilitate dialogue. The team must bring a host of analytical skills to the interaction in order to apply concepts from conflict resolution and related areas to the analysis of the conflict: the diagnostic function in the model of third party consultation. In addition, the third party must also be able to identify when a dynamic or characteristic of the relationship between the parties is being played out in the workshop interaction. This type of intervention as identified by Kelman (1992) can be a powerful learning tool in helping the participants see how their behavior mirrors the reality of the conflict. To move into problemsolving, the necessary participants are usually high-level influential individuals or officials in an unofficial capacity who have access to the leadership of their groups, or are in fact members of the leadership circle. These individuals are in a position to take the perceptual changes and innovative alternatives produced in the workshop and bring them to bear on policymaking. The third party in this situation requires all of the skills of dialogue and conflict analysis, and also needs to be able to induce problemsolving motivation and pace the phases of problemsolving (as identified in the third party consultation model). Furthermore, the team needs substantive knowledge in areas relevant to the problemsolving focus, whether this is joint community projects, electoral systems, or constitutional mechanisms.

To gain a valid and representative picture of current practice in the field, practitioners need the resources and opportunities to write about their work, to indicate what principles, strategies, and skills led to processes and outcomes in the desired direction. Documented cases of intervention need to be collected and analyzed in a comparative fashion so that conclusions can be drawn about the implementation and effectiveness of the method (Fisher 2005). It will then be possible for theoreticians to mine this body of information so that similarities can be induced toward a consensual theory of practice. At the same time, important differences among methods and styles of implementation can be determined so that a nuanced understanding of the variety of ICR interventions can be developed. In these ways, the field can contribute to a world in which conflict is resolved through consensus rather than managed through coercion.

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# 24 Mediation and international conflict resolution

## Analyzing structure and behavior★

*Jacob Bercovitch*

### Introduction

All societies and systems of relationships experience conflict, and have to learn how to live with it and manage it. Although conflicts have many potential benefits, they can also be destructive and entail high costs for all concerned. Hence, the need to manage, terminate or resolve conflicts. As Byrne and Senéhi note in the Introduction to this volume, we are keen to know more about the practice of conflict resolution in which parties to a conflict, or an outsider with knowledge or resources, help to change the conflict, and do so in a peaceful manner. There are many peaceful ways of managing conflicts. The more traditional ways are listed in Article 33 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, which enumerates such peaceful methods as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resorts to regional agencies or arrangements.

All conflicts can be peacefully dealt with by direct negotiation between the conflicting parties; various forms of mediation, good offices, and conciliation; and binding forms of third party intervention (e.g. arbitration and adjudication). Each of these methods has its own characteristics, strengths, and disadvantages, and each may be suited to different conflicts. I do not think that we can advocate one generic method of conflict resolution for all conflicts. Here, I wish to explore mediation, understand its unique features, show how it works, appreciate who can undertake mediation activities and the problems mediators typically encounter, and assess how mediation can contribute to resolving conflicts and preventing their escalation in the international environment of the twenty-first century.

### Mediation: definitions and approaches

#### *Definitions*

Mediation is a useful way of dealing with conflicts that are complex or intractable. But what exactly is it and what do mediators do? For many years, the study of mediation has suffered from conceptual imprecision. Practitioners of mediation, in the domestic or international arena, were keen to sustain its image as a mysterious practice, akin to some art form, taking place behind closed doors. Scholars of mediation, on the other hand, did not think their field of study was susceptible to a systematic analysis. In short, neither group believed that

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it could discern patterns of behavior in mediation's various forms, or that any generalizations could be made about the practice in general.

The prevalent agnosticism toward analysis is exemplified in the observations of two noted American practitioners. Arthur Meyer, himself an experienced mediator, commenting on the role of mediators, notes that

the task of the mediator is not an easy one. The sea that he sails is only roughly charted, and its changing contours are not clearly discernible. He has no science of navigation, no fund inherited from the experience of others. He is a solitary artist recognizing at most a few guiding stars, and depending on his personal powers of divination.

(Meyer 1960: 160)

William Simkin, an equally respected practitioner of mediation, comments in a slightly more prosaic but no less emphatic fashion that "the variables are so many that it would be an exercise in futility to describe typical mediator behavior with respect to sequence, timing or the use or non-use of the various functions theoretically available" (Simkin 1971: 118).

Such an approach all but dooms any serious study of mediation. We have to look at other scholars to see how they approach the problem of definition. Oran Young, for instance, looks at what mediators purport to do, and offers a definition of mediation as "any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship, and therefore to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself" (Young 1967: 34). Other definitions of mediation focus on neutrality and impartiality. Bingham defines mediation as the "assistance of a 'neutral' third party to a negotiation" (Bingham 1985: 5). Folberg and Taylor see mediation "as the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs" (Folberg and Taylor 1984: 7). Moore draws attention to the process of mediation and the neutrality of a mediator by defining mediation as "the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute" (Moore 1986: 14). Finally, Spencer and Yang see mediation as "the assistance of a third party not involved in the dispute, who may be of a unique status that gives him or her certain authority with the disputants; or perhaps an outsider who may be regarded by them as a suitably neutral go-between" (Spencer and Yang 1993: 195).

These definitions exemplify the scope of mediation. Mediation is a complex activity; it may take place in conflicts between states, within states, between groups of states, between organizations, and between individuals. Mediators enter a conflict to help parties in conflict achieve a better outcome. Once in a conflict, mediators may use a wide variety of behaviors to achieve this objective. Some mediators make suggestions for a settlement, others refrain from doing so. Some mediators are interested in achieving a compromise, others are not. We should also note that some mediators may be neutral, others are decidedly not. The former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the Middle East; Presidents Carter and Clinton at Camp David; the former British and Russian Foreign Secretaries, Robin Cook

and Yevgeny Primakov, or US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, all mediating in Kosovo; Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice shuttling to and fro in the Middle East; or the Chinese in North Korea – these, as well as many other mediators, may or may not have been neutral in mediating their different conflicts, but that was hardly the most notable feature of their performance.

The reality of international mediation is that of a complex and dynamic interaction between mediators, who have resources and an interest in the conflict or its outcome, and the protagonists or their representatives. The most helpful approach to mediation links it to negotiation, but at the same time emphasizes its unique features and conditions. The parameters of such an approach were established by Carl Stevens and Thomas Schelling. Stevens states that

mediation, like other social phenomena, is susceptible to systematic analysis. The key to analysis is in recognizing that where mediation is employed it is an integral part of the bargaining process. . . . [A]n analysis of mediation is not possible except in the context of general analysis of bargaining negotiations.

(1963: 123)

In a similar vein, Schelling (1960: 22) notes that a mediator “is probably best viewed as an element in the communication arrangements, or as a third party with a payoff structure of his own.”

In any given conflict mediators may change, their role may be redefined, issues may alter, indeed even the parties involved in the conflict may and often do change. Mediators may intervene early in a conflict in an attempt to prevent it, or later on when fatalities have already reached high levels. A comprehensive definition seems to be a primary requisite for understanding this complex reality. Mediation is here defined as a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.

This may be a broad definition, but it is one that can be generally and widely applied. It forces us to recognize, as surely we must, that any mediation situation comprises (a) parties in conflict, (b) a mediator, (c) a process of mediation, and (d) the context of mediation. All these elements are important in mediation. Together they determine its nature, quality, and effectiveness, as well as why some mediation efforts succeed while others fail.

Mediation is, at least structurally, the continuation of negotiations by other means. Mediation differs from other accommodative strategies such as negotiation (which is dyadic rather than triadic in structure) and arbitration (which has a strong binding character). What mediators do in their efforts to resolve a conflict may depend, to some extent, on who they are and what resources and competencies they can bring to bear. Ultimately, though, their efforts depend on who the parties are, the context of the conflict, what is at stake, and the nature of their interaction. “Mediation,” as Stulberg so rightly notes, “is a procedure predicated upon the process of negotiation” (1981: 87). Mediation is, above all, adaptive and responsive. It extends the process of negotiation to reflect different parties, different possibilities, and a different situation. To assume otherwise is to mistake wishful thinking for reality.

***How to study mediation?***

The literature on international mediation is truly interdisciplinary. It has attracted many scholars and reflects great diversity in terms of approaches, disciplines, and perspectives (see Kolb and Rubin 1991). These approaches range from purely scholarly studies through policy implications to the reflections of experienced mediators. Here I want to suggest a threefold typology of approaches that have dominated the study of mediation.

- 1 The first group of studies can be described as broadly *normative* and it is devoted to offering advice on what constitutes best practice in conflict management in real-world situations (e.g. Fisher and Ury 1981). These studies, mostly developed by scholars associated with the Program on Negotiation at Harvard University, generate books and manuals on how ideal mediators and negotiators *should* behave, what constitutes good negotiation or mediation, and how conflicts – serious or otherwise – can be resolved.
- 2 There is a large body of studies on mediation that is broadly *prescriptive* in nature. These are studies that are based on explicit theoretical notions and a generic conception of conflict resolution. Scholars who have made great strides within this tradition prescribe how mediators (or more precisely, third parties) should behave in any given conflict if they are to be genuinely successful. Many of these studies use a variety of interaction and problemsolving techniques to combine political action with scientific experimentation and contribute to the development of a set of rules that can apply to all (not just international) conflicts. Some of this research (Burton 1969, 1972, 1984; Doob 1971; Fisher 1983; Kelman 1992; Walton 1969) has generated valuable insights, but much of it is still in a pioneering phase, and proper evaluation of results remains difficult.
- 3 The third set of studies, which I call *descriptive*, is based on actual descriptions and empirical examinations of mediation cases. These studies seek to develop theories and to offer general guidelines through detailed description of a particular case of international mediation (e.g. Ott 1972; Rubin 1981), laboratory and experimental approaches to mediation (e.g. Bartunek *et al.* 1975; Rubin 1980) to discover how parties and mediators behave in controlled circumstances, or the use of the contingency framework that relies on large-scale systematic research on thousands of cases of international mediation. I am particularly keen to emphasize this approach, as it can actually test propositions about effective mediation (e.g. Bercovitch and Rubin 1992; Touval and Zartman 1985). The contingency approach has its roots in the social-psychological theories of negotiation developed by Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) and modified by Druckman (1977). This is the approach that I believe can yield the most significant insights on mediation.

The contingency approach provides a framework that permits a systematic analysis of the underlying structures and conditions that shape conflict events, and complex relationships of the conflict management process. It takes into consideration the individual influences of personal, role, situational, goal, interactional, and outcome variables (Bercovitch 1984; Bercovitch and Houston 2000; Fisher and Keashley 1991; Gochman 1993; Keashly and Fisher 1996) as well as their interactive effects within the context, process, and outcome of conflict management (Bercovitch and Houston 2000). The contingency approach makes it clear that nothing about a particular mediation is random. Mediation is affected by many features and attributes of the parties, the context, and the issues involved (Assefa 1987).

## **Motives for mediation**

Why does mediation even take place? The process is time-consuming, involves risks and uncertainty, and may, and often does, result in failure. Besides, not every actor can afford or has the credibility and time to mediate. So, why mediate? Why would parties in conflict be prepared to relinquish control over aspects of their conflict management experience, and why, come to that, would a third party be willing to intervene in a serious conflict that has defied many attempts at resolution? There are, I believe, a number of compelling reasons for initiating and taking part in a serious mediation effort.

Mediation has become almost as common as conflict itself. It is carried out daily by such actors as private individuals, government officials, religious figures, regional, non-governmental, and international organizations, ad hoc groupings, and states of all sizes. Each of these mediators brings to the mediation situation their own interests, perceptions, and resources. Each of them may adopt behavior that ranges from the very passive, through the facilitative, to the highly active. The form and character of mediation in a particular international conflict are determined by the context of both the international system and the conflict itself (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001; Touval 1985; Kolb 1989a,b), the issues, the parties involved, and the identity of the mediator. The importance of this interdependence can hardly be overemphasized.

But why would a mediator wish to intervene in other people's conflicts, and why, for that matter, would states in conflict (or parties in dispute) accept a mediator? Thus, one of the crucial themes in the mediation literature is the motivation of parties to seek assistance, and the motivation of the mediators to mediate. The parties' motivation and commitment to accept and engage in mediation undoubtedly affect the outcome of mediation. Effective mediation requires consent, high motivation, political will, and active participation. Traditional approaches to mediation assume that conflict parties and a mediator share one reason for initiating mediation: a desire to reduce, abate, or terminate a conflict. To this end, both sides may invest considerable personnel, time, and resources in the mediation. This shared humanitarian interest may be a genuine reason in some cases of mediation, but normally this interest intertwines with other motivations.

The motives of mediators and of parties seeking mediation often differ. For analytical purposes it is useful to look at mediator motives and parties' motivations separately.

### ***Mediator motivation***

Different mediators have different motives for intervening in a conflict. When the mediator is an unofficial individual (e.g. Adam Curle in the Nigeria–Biafra conflict in 1967–1970, or President Carter in North Korea in 1994), the motives for initiating mediation may include a desire to (a) be instrumental in changing the course of a longstanding or escalating conflict, (b) gain access to major political leaders and open channels of communication, (c) put into practice a set of ideas on conflict management, and (d) spread one's own ideas and thus enhance personal stature and professional status. The presence of one or more of these motives (which may be conscious or subconscious) in an opportune situation provides a very strong rationale for an individual to initiate unofficial mediation.<sup>1</sup>

Where a mediator is an official representative of a government or an organization, as is often the case, another set of motives may prevail. Such persons initiate mediation because (a) they have a clear mandate to intervene in disputes (e.g. the Charters of the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization of American States each contain an explicit

clause mandating that their members seek mediation in regional disputes), (b) they may want to do something about a conflict whose continuance could adversely affect their own political interests, (c) they may be directly requested by one or both parties to mediate, (d) they may wish to preserve intact a structure of which they are a part (e.g. the frequent mediation attempts by the United States in disputes between Greece and Turkey, two valued NATO member-states), or (e) they may see mediation as a way of extending and enhancing their own influence by becoming indispensable to the parties in conflict, or by gaining the gratitude (and presumably the political goodwill) of one or both protagonists (e.g. the frequent efforts by the United States to mediate the Arab–Israeli conflict).

Mediators are political actors; they engage in mediation and expend resources because they expect to resolve a conflict and gain something from it (see Greig 2005). For many actors, mediation is a policy instrument through which they can pursue some of their interests without arousing too much opposition (Touval 1992a). The relationship between a mediator and disputants is thus never entirely devoid of political interest. To overlook this aspect is to miss an important element in the dynamics of mediation.

### ***Parties' motivation***

Adversaries in conflict have a number of motives for desiring mediation: (a) mediation may help them reduce the risks of an escalating conflict and get them closer to a settlement; (b) each party may embrace mediation in the expectation that the mediator will nudge or influence the other party toward their position; (c) both parties may see mediation as a public expression of their commitment to an international norm of peaceful conflict management; (d) they may want an outsider to take much of the blame should their efforts fail; or (e) they may desire mediation because a mediator can be used to monitor, verify, and guarantee any eventual agreement. One way or another, parties in conflict – and a mediator – have compelling reasons for accepting, initiating, or desiring mediation.

Whether we are studying ethnic, internal, or international conflict, we should resist the tendency to think of mediation as a totally exogenous input, as a unique role or a distinct humanitarian response to conflict in which a well-meaning actor, motivated only by altruism, is keen to resolve a conflict. A mediator, through the very act of mediating, becomes an actor in a conflictual relationship. This relationship involves interests, costs, and potential rewards, and exemplifies certain roles and strategies. A mediator's role, at any one time, is part of this broad interaction. To be effective, mediators' roles must reflect and be congruent with that interaction. This is how mediation should be seen, studied, and considered in international relations.

### **What do mediators do when they mediate?**

What is it that mediators actually do when they enter a conflict? Like many questions about mediation, the answer to this one is far from simple or obvious. Clearly, we must clarify what we mean by mediation behavior, and how best to interpret it. There are various ways in which mediator activities can be identified and accounted for. Much of the early debate about mediation behavior was confused and ambiguous (Burton and Dukes 1990: 26). Traditional research and explanations of mediators' activities were shrouded in terms such as “neutrality,” “voluntary,” “concessions,” and “impartiality,” which describe the expectations associated with the practice of mediation, but obscure any understanding of its processes.

Alternatively, mediator activities were organized conceptually to describe mediator behavior in terms of various preordained roles and tactics (Gulliver 1979) or phases (Folberg and Taylor 1984; Mitchell 1981; Moore 1986) that govern mediator intervention behavior. Although these may be interesting classifications, they bring us no closer to understanding the underlying dynamics of the mediation process and the reality of the changing nature of a conflict (Bercovitch and Rubin 1992: 103).

Mediation revolves around the choice of strategic behaviors that mediators believe will facilitate the type of outcome they seek to achieve in the conflict management process.

As such, mediation is not an "art" that is highly idiosyncratic, based on intuitive insights, and resistant to systematic analysis (Meyer 1960); it is rather a coherent and planned activity. Consequently, it is possible to explain and understand a mediator's behavior in terms of the identification and conceptualization of various roles, tactics, processes, and strategies that can be exercised in the practice of mediation.

### **Mediation strategies**

The most useful way of describing and interpreting mediator behavior is to conceptualize their activities in terms of broad strategies. Although the analysis of the roles and stages of mediator behavior provides perfectly valid and feasible explanations of single cases, the categorization of mediation behavior into broad strategies is the most practical and useful option when studying a large number of conflicts. This approach provides a simple yet logical structure within which the extensive inventory of mediator behavior can be organized and understood.

For our purposes, the most useful taxonomy of mediator behavior that can be applied to international mediation analysis is based on the identification of three fundamental mediator strategies along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention. These are (a) communication-facilitation, (b) procedural, and (c) directive strategies.<sup>2</sup> These strategies are based on assumptions derived from Sheppard's (1984) taxonomy of mediator behavior that focuses on the content, process and procedural aspects of conflict management.

- 1 *Communication-facilitation strategies* describe mediator behavior at the low end of the intervention spectrum. Here a mediator typically adopts a fairly passive role, channeling information to the parties, facilitating cooperation but exhibiting little control over the more formal process or substance of mediation. Norway's mediation role in the Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO of 1993 exemplifies this approach.
- 2 *Procedural strategies* enable a mediator to exert a more formal control over the mediation process with respect to the environment of the mediation. Here a mediator may determine structural aspects of the meetings, and control constituency influences, media publicity, the distribution of information, and the situational powers of the parties' resources and communication processes. New Zealand's efforts in the Bougainville conflict in 1995, when it brought both parties to a military camp in New Zealand, exemplify this form of mediation.
- 3 *Directive strategies* are the most powerful form of intervention. Here a mediator affects the content and substance of the bargaining process by providing incentives for the parties to negotiate or by issuing ultimatums. Directive strategies deal directly with and aim to change the way issues are framed and the behavior associated with them. Richard Holbrooke's (1998) efforts at Dayton to end the Bosnian war in 1995 are typical of this approach.



Although mediators have a wide array of tactical choices at their disposal, there is no suggestion here that they may use any of the strategies they wish with the corresponding tactics in any conflict they intervene. Clearly, there are some conflicts that will show greater amenability to some forms of mediation behavior, and, of course, there will be mediators who will feel more comfortable with, or have the resources and determination to implement, one strategy rather than another. Analyzing which strategies and which tactics work in which conflicts has been a dominant, if inconclusive, theme of mediation research.<sup>3</sup>

Can we, in any way, link strategies to outcomes? Few studies attempt to assess the effectiveness of different strategies. Those that do so have found that the strategies at each end of the intervention spectrum appear to dominate actual mediator intervention in international conflicts (Bercovitch and Houston 1996). Further analyses of mediation revealed that, whereas communication-facilitation strategies are the most frequently utilized by international mediators, directive strategies appear to be the most successful (e.g. Bercovitch and Houston 1996; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Wilkenfeld *et al.* 2003).

The choice of a strategy in any situation is clearly affected by, *inter alia*, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the context of the conflict. Mediators adapt their style of intervention to meet the requirements of the situation, and we think that certain styles or strategies of mediation will be generally more effective in certain situations. An intense conflict with high fatalities may require more intense interventions than a low-level conflict (see Rubin 1980; Hiltrop 1989). The costs of no agreement in the former are dangerously high. If mediators are involved in such a conflict, they will use any stick or carrot at their disposal to nudge the parties toward a zone of agreement.

### ***Factors affecting the choice of a strategy***

A number of factors exercise an influence on the choice of a mediation strategy, and on its potential for success. Amongst the most important factors are the following:

*Conflict intensity* is recognized as a major factor affecting the nature of conflict management, and any evolving pattern of mediation. But how exactly does the intensity of a conflict influence the implementation of a particular mediation strategy? Conflict intensity usually refers to such factors as the severity of conflict, the level of hostilities, the number of fatalities, the level of anger and intensity of feeling, the types of issues at stake, and the strength of the parties' negative perceptions (Kressel and Pruitt 1989). When conflict intensity is low, Rubin (1980: 389) suggests that the parties are concerned with "mending their own fences" and do not want third party intrusion. Mediators' behavior in such cases may simply involve being a catalyst for negotiations, in which case the least invasive form of intervention would be used. In contrast to that, in high-intensity conflicts mediators are keen to prevent further escalation and do so by adopting more active forms of intervention. High-intensity conflicts are more associated with higher levels of mediation involvement (see Bercovitch and Gartner 2006).

*Previous relationship* can be examined to gauge how past experiences of conflict and conflict management affect current behavior and determine choice of mediation strategy. Any social relationship is affected by previous experiences between the same parties. Similarly, any current conflict management is affected by previous conflict management efforts and any learning that may have taken place.<sup>4</sup> The past does, indeed, cast a shadow on the present (see Sandole 1999). Repeated mediation efforts by the same mediator may establish some norms of interaction and, to a large extent, determine what each party may expect



and how it should behave. In an environment of risk and uncertainty, mediators may use information from previous efforts, or build on any rapport they may have had with the parties. Here I want to suggest that previous conflict experience and mediation may exert a strong influence on the choice of a current strategy. Previous mediation efforts can establish norms and a certain rapport between the parties, and these can affect their current disposition and behavior.

*Mediator identity* describes the official position of a mediator. This will clearly affect the choice of a strategy. At the most basic level, some mediators have the potential to utilize resources and use leverage and influence; others can rely only on their legitimacy or reputation. Who the mediator is determines to a large extent what a mediator can do. Some mediators have the full range of resources and thus the full range of strategies available to them. Others (individual mediators, NGOs) can only use communication strategies, as they simply do not have access to expensive resources.

*Mediation initiation* plays an important role. Although mediation is ultimately a voluntary process, it may be initiated, i.e. suggested, appealed for, or offered, by the disputants, the mediator, or various other concerned parties. What a mediator can do, as well as the legitimacy and authority of its mediation, are to some extent determined by who initiates the process and the timing of mediation in terms of the conflict phases and the state of the parties' current negotiations.

These factors may determine the acceptability of a specific mediator, and the role, bounds, and expectations within which a mediator may manage the conflict, and the type of strategies employed (Kolb 1983; Raiffa 1982). The initiation and acceptance of mediation create a motivational dynamic and levels of commitment and expectations that have a great influence on how the whole process unfolds and how a mediator behaves.

*The mediation environment* is an important dimension that may influence mediation behavior and choice of strategies. The choice of mediation environment may be determined by the demands of the parties; by their powers, resources and goals, and their willingness to negotiate; by the extent of constituency and media pressures; or by a mediator's strategy to control a particular conflict situation. In turn, the specific environment in which mediation takes place may determine the type of behavior a mediator employs. As such, the mediation environment, with the various opportunities and constraints that it provides, may be a powerful factor in understanding the dynamics of mediation behavior. An ideal mediation environment will support rather than hinder parties' conflict management efforts and interactions, and provide the mediator with opportunities to manage and control the whole process (Touval 1982).

The structure imposed on mediation by the environment provides opportunities for both parties and the mediator to be empowered, to manage their conflict competently and productively, and to avoid or mend any dysfunctional behavior that may regress the parties' mediation efforts. The physical context of the mediation event establishes the bounds that dictate, and perhaps constrain, the ability of the parties and the mediator to express their status, authority, power, leverage, and assertiveness, and how their efforts are represented to external constituencies, media, and international audiences. A mediation environment may also determine the situational powers of the participants, their proximity, and social interactions. Clearly, a party's legitimacy, standing, and integrity are integral characteristics that must be protected and maintained if mediation is to be successful. These factors are dependent on the nature and urgency of the dispute being managed.

Mediation behavior and choice of strategies cannot be foreordained or prescribed in advance. They are part of the overall structure of a mediation event and context. Mediators

choose strategies that are available, feasible, permissible, and likely to achieve a desired outcome. Mediation behavior is adaptable; it reflects to a large extent the context in which it takes place. I have highlighted some of the important contextual dimensions that may have an impact on mediation behavior and outcomes. We ignore these at our peril.

### ***What is success?***

How do we know that mediation has been successful or not? How can we evaluate its impact? Was the Dayton Agreement a success? And if so, why? Was the Oslo Agreement a success? Are we looking only for a change effected as a result of mediation, or for a specific kind of change? And how do we assess change in the context of social relations? There will be as many answers to these questions as there are commentators. And yet, we have to be able to answer this most fundamental of questions. Too often, it seems that success or failure is assumed, postulated or defined on a case-by-case basis, and usually in an arbitrary and poorly reasoned manner. We need to engage in a more comprehensive discussion of what is success, what is a failure, and how to recognize them.<sup>5</sup>

Because international mediation is not a uniform practice, it seems futile to draw up one set of criteria to cover all possible constructs of success. Individual mediators, for instance, may adopt communication-facilitating strategies, and be more concerned with the quality of interaction and the creation of a better environment for conflict management. Mediating states, on the other hand, may seek to achieve more than just a change in interactions, desiring a real change in behavior. Different objectives give rise to different meanings of success in mediation. Here I wish to suggest two broad criteria, subjective and objective, to assess the effects and consequences of mediation in international conflicts.

### ***Subjective ideas***

Subjective ideas relate to parties' or mediators' perception that mediation has achieved its goals and a change has taken place. Using this perspective, we can suggest that mediation can be said to be successful when the parties feel, or express, satisfaction with the process or outcome of mediation, or when the outcome is seen as fair, efficient, or effective (Susskind and Cruickshank 1987).

Fairness is an intangible abstraction. One cannot define fairness so stringently that it will not still be interpreted differently by different people, much like success itself. However, we do recognize that, whatever it may be, fairness suggests to most people an even-handedness of procedure and equitability of outcome, that is clearly indicative of some conception of "success." Sheppard (1984) presents a number of concrete indicators of fairness that serve to assuage concerns regarding the threat of abstraction. Levels of process neutrality, disputant control, equitability, consistency of results, and consistency with accepted norms are all relatively easily observed. Susskind and Cruickshank (1987), meanwhile, present similar indicators of fairness (e.g. improvement of procedure and institution of precedent, access to information and opportunity for expression), which provide reasonably concrete conceptions of fairness. However, although there are certain observable indices of fairness, both Sheppard (1984) and Susskind and Cruickshank (1987) talk about the importance of "perceived fairness" in proceedings. Indicators of fairness mean little to parties in conflict if they themselves do not think the proceedings are fair. This "perception of unfairness," justified or not, is often more crucial than any concrete measures of success.

In some respects, participant satisfaction seems like a better indicator of success. If parties

in mediation are satisfied with the process or outcome, they are more likely to perceive it as a success and, as Sheppard (1984) indicates, more likely to be committed to it. This, in turn, produces other relevant dimensions of success, such as stability, which are more likely to be achieved. Sheppard identifies a number of measurable indicators, with regard to both process (privacy, level of involvement) and outcome (benefit, commitment).

However, as with fairness, parties' satisfaction is a largely perceptual and very personal quality. Satisfaction is often deemed an almost emotional response to the achievement of a goal or attainment of some requirement. Clearly, the sorts of goals taken into account by those involved in conflict are personal in nature, and formed by the specific configuration of their personality, environment, values, expectations, etc. This is neither unexpected nor unusual. Although satisfaction is both a very personal and a very subjective quality, it does not mean that mediators should abandon their quest to achieve outcomes that "satisfy" the parties. Outcomes that are "satisfactory" are more likely to be longer lasting, and less likely to be breached by repeated conflict.

Another possible indication of mediation success is the quality of effectiveness. Effectiveness is a measure of results achieved, change brought about, or new forms of behavior agreed to. Successful mediation is about achieving some change. For a mediation effort to be deemed successful, it must have some (positive) impact or *effect* on the conflict. The kind of change I am talking about relates to moving from violent to non-violent behavior, signing an agreement, accepting a ceasefire or a settlement, agreeing to a UN peacekeeping force, or any such measures. If any of these have occurred as a result of mediation, mediation may be said to have been effective, and thus successful.

The fourth subjective criterion, efficiency, is primarily focused on the procedural and temporal dimension of conflict management. Efficiency addresses such issues as the cost of conflict management, resources devoted to it, and timeliness and disruptiveness of the undertaking. In some respects, this may seem extraneous. If a mediation episode is effective in other ways, does efficiency matter? Once again, it must be stressed that conflict and its management do not occur in a vacuum. Costs racked up in order to accrue benefits may be such that those benefits lose their sheen. Susskind and Cruickshank give efficiency the most weight. They suggest that "Fairness is not enough. A fair agreement is not acceptable if it takes an inordinately long time to achieve or if it costs several times what it should have" (1987: 27). An agreement may not be all that elegant but, if it is achieved within a reasonably short time without entangling too many people in it, there is much to be said for it.

Fairness of mediation, satisfaction with its performance, or improvement in the overall climate of the parties' relationship cannot be easily demonstrated, but they are undoubtedly consequences of successful mediation. They are subjective because they depend on the perceptions of the parties in conflict. Even if a conflict remains unresolved, mediation – in any guise – can do much to change the way the disputants feel about each other and lead, however indirectly, to both a long-term improvement in the parties' relationship and a resolution of the conflict.

### **Objective ideas**

Objective ideas in the study of mediation offer a totally different perspective. Objective ideas rely on empirical indicators that can be observed and demonstrated. Thus, one can consider a particular mediation successful when violence has abated, fatalities are reduced, conflict intensity has lessened, or a cessation of violent behavior and the opening of some

dialogue between the parties have been achieved. Or one can call mediation successful when a formal and binding agreement that settles the conflict's issues has been signed. These are "real" changes that one may observe, and whose significance one may evaluate.

Thinking of the relationship between mediation and objective criteria of success is a relatively straightforward task. Here success can be gauged in terms of the months during which both parties observe a ceasefire; reduced number of fatalities following mediation; acceptance of UN peacekeeping forces; or any other measures that demonstrably affect the extent and seriousness of a conflict. On the face of it, objective criteria seem to offer a perfectly valid way to assess the impact, consequences, and effectiveness of international mediation.

However, it would be unwise to rely solely on objective criteria. Different mediators, and indeed different parties in conflict, have different goals in mind when they enter conflict management. Changing behavior could well be only one amongst many other objectives. Some international mediators may focus on the substance of interactions; others may focus on its climate, setting, and decisionmaking norms. These goals cannot always be evaluated easily. Mediation should ideally be evaluated in terms of the criteria that are significant to each of the participants in the process. Thus, the questions of whether or not mediation works, or how best to evaluate it, can only be answered by finding out as much as we can about each party's goals and objectives, as well as by learning to ascertain when positive change has taken place.

## **Conclusion**

International conflict and conflict management have become subjects for systematic analysis. Scholarly tracts and practitioners' reflections have helped to institutionalize the field and enhance the individual and collective capacity to manage conflicts. The risks, costs, and tragedies of conflicts in the latter part of the twentieth century have finally forced us to search for better ways to resolve them. The traditional reliance on power or avoidance is as far from being an optimal way of dealing with conflict as it is outdated. Negotiation and mediation are at last beginning to emerge as the most appropriate responses to conflict in its myriad forms and to the challenge of building a more peaceful world. Negotiation and mediation do not just happen. They are social roles subject to many influences; and, like other roles, they can be learned and improved.

The shared quest for learning the principles and practices of mediation can make sense only if it is conducted within some kind of an intellectual framework, one that can explain the logic and reasoning behind this method of conflict management, in which the mediator is neither directly part of a conflict nor totally removed from it. This chapter has sought to provide a way of thinking about mediation, its structure, its context and its consequences.

The approach taken here embodies my conviction that mediation is an aspect of the broader process of conflict management, in which all parties have interests and are prepared to expend resources to achieve these, and that mediation involves the intertwining of interests, resources, and positions in an attempt to influence outcomes. This relationship is critical for analyzing the dynamics of conflict and assessing the prospects of successful mediation. I have tried to unravel many aspects of this relationship and point out their influence on mediation. I do not assume that my analysis is exhaustive, but I believe that the presentation here adequately integrates many findings that have a bearing on conflict resolution and provides answers to the basic question of mediation research: when should

one mediate and how? To suggest that every conflict can be mediated really ignores the basic structure and logic of the supply and demand of mediation.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of an ever-increasing number of ethnic and internal conflicts provide many opportunities for a significant expansion in the use of mediation as an instrument of conflict resolution. The old techniques of power and deterrence seem decreasingly relevant for dealing with the problems and conflicts confronting us in the twentieth century. Mediation may well offer the most coherent and effective response to these issues. To ensure that it can also be successful, we need to develop a better understanding of the process and offer consistent guidelines to the many actors involved in its use. This effort is still evolving, and many different fields and disciplines can contribute to its development. In this chapter, I have tried to take a few tentative steps in that direction. The challenge confronting us all is to recognize the diversity, strengths, and limitations of mediation, and then use its most effective range of tools where appropriate. Given the amount of destruction resulting from today's conflicts and tomorrow's potential crises, this is one challenge we cannot afford to ignore.

## Notes

- 1 On mediators' motives and dilemmas, see Terris and Maoz (2005).
- 2 Discussions of these can be found in Bercovitch and Rubin (1992), Bercovitch and Wells (1993), and Bercovitch *et al.* (1991).
- 3 For an interesting example of this research, see Beardsley *et al.* (2005).
- 4 On the role of learning in conflict management, see Leng (2000).
- 5 For a fuller discussion of these, see Bercovitch (2006) and Chapter 20 in this volume, by Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, Bruce Dayton, and Thania Paffelholz on "Evaluation in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding."

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## 25 Ethical and gendered dilemmas of moving from emergency response to development in “failed” states

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### **Dilemmas of illicit economies for post-conflict development**

Moving from emergency response to development is crucial for putting states recovering from war on a path to a sustainable program of reconstruction. However, in the field, providers face numerous difficulties as they work with the local population and authorities to navigate this transition. Challenges include the nature of the political economy of war and its implications for post-war development. As Carolyn Nordstrom (2004) and other scholars have documented, war economies involve illicit actors and the economic activity of “shadow sovereigns” that structure the context of post-war development. There is a growing body of research that examines the complex arena of actors involved and how they are networked. The mix of actors spans governments of developing countries, Western governments, intergovernmental organizations and donors, INGOs and NGOs, corporate actors, and both state and private militaries and rebel forces.

Typically, this literature focuses on the activities of governments, international organizations, and Western INGOs (e.g. Haug 2001; Macrae 2001; Nordstrom 2004; Prendergast 1996; Weiss 1994). Some works focus on their common or opposing agendas or stakes in obtaining monetary and human resources (Reno 1998; Richards 1996). Duffield, for example, mainly looks at NGOs, donor governments, multilateral agencies, military establishments, the corporate sector, and academics as the ones that need to come together to pursue liberal peace, although he admits that some private companies directly profit from conflicts through clandestine networks (2001: 52, 62).

However the reality of post-conflict situations is that INGOs and illicit actors are often the major players, and often have more power on the ground. In addition, the transition period is fraught with difficulties especially for women and girls – a fact that has received little attention from policymakers and scholars alike. Violence against women and especially girls does not end with the post-conflict phase and may even increase. Furthermore, their needs are often not addressed in the initial DDR programs (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), leaving them vulnerable to, or with few options outside, the illicit networks (e.g. sex trafficking).

Thus, as countries progress from conflict to development, the assumption that the economy moves from a non-state controlled political economy of war to a state-controlled plan of economic development has to be rethought (Nordstrom 2004: 114). The post-war economy more often develops out of the shadows of the illicit networks that funded the warring parties. Control of extra-state markets not only provides opportunities for substantial profits for the black-marketeers but is also the only means of development for people who have few alternatives to survive. Wartime profiteers emerge as powerful

players in the post-war political and economic transitions of society (ibid.: 201). States end up “captured” in these criminal networks, leading to a “symbiosis between politicians and criminals: the criminals provide money and help to mobilize political support for the politicians; the politicians provide protection, information and support for the criminals” (Williams 2002: 177). Collusion operates at the highest levels, with state officials directly partnering with the criminal organizations (ibid.).

There are a number of reasons for the lack of adequate analysis and policy responses for dealing with these challenges to transition in post-conflict states. First, there is a need to call for “historicizing representations of ‘failed state’” as a part of the “cold war annexation of the social sciences,” along with the 1980s structural adjustment programs, downsizing of the state apparatus, and 1990s push for democratization that removed political control of the economy in post-colonial states (Bilgin and Morton 2002: 64–5). Indeed, much of the literature that focuses on failed states does not make reference to the historical processes through which such failure ensued. The implication is that “these failures were caused by the intrinsic characteristics of these states, without reflecting upon their colonial background and/or their peripheral position in the global politico-economic structures” (ibid.: 66). There is also an “international pathologization” of postconflict societies, with the blame for the failed state pinned on its own “dysfunctional” population, whereas the role of the international community rescuing the victims is framed as functional and legitimate (Hughes and Pupavac 2005).

Sierra Leone is a relevant example. The origins of its “shadow state foundations” reach all the way back to the early colonial period when British administrators made accommodations with local rulers to maintain tranquility to avoid “unpleasant inquiries from superiors” (Nyerges 2001: 828). The collapse of Sierra Leone in the early 1990s was wrapped in this colonial legacy along with deeply entrenched neopatrimonial rule and clientelism, and aggravated by competition between these relationships and the export-led growth policies imposed on it by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s and early 1990s (Bøas 2001). Then President Momoh used foreign investment to enrich himself and his allies while marginalizing domestic foes. Instead of improving Sierra Leone’s dismal economic performance, the strategy further fragmented internal conflicts and the state, opening the door to one of the most brutal civil wars (Reno 1995). As the violence drew to a close in 2001, the mass production and distribution of small arms and drugs and smuggling of diamonds came to dominate much of the economy, and provide means for survival when there were few alternatives (Bright 2001). Even the agricultural sector collapsed, not only because of the war, but also because of the movement of workers into the mines to exploit diamond mining and smuggling operations that were part of the war economy. Sierra Leone was left importing basic foodstuffs, including rice, when it had previously been a rice-exporting country (Koroma 2003).

African states, like other weak post-colonial states, are not removed from the global economy, but “shed light on a new organization of global capital that exploits commercial opportunities previously out of reach, and does so from a stance in which the exercise of political authority is almost indistinguishable from private commercial operations” (Reno 1998: 13). Rulers of the weakest states are the most consistent in destroying remaining state institutions while, from the outside, creditors, foreign firms, and some officials of the strong states participate in or strongly support such attempts (ibid.: 6). In short, “foreign firms become important internal political actors, helping to shape factional struggles and consolidate the power of particular groups” (Reno 2004: 608). Extremely weak sovereign rulers, in their turn, use corporate partners to appropriate the advantages of an international

commercial order to weather local anarchy, while many officials in powerful states tacitly recognize that foreign investment is a useful tool for conducting relations with effectively stateless regions and authorities and for managing disorder in these regions (*ibid.*). Duffield's (2001: 13) analysis of these "new wars" also supports Reno's account of the symbiotic relationships that emerge between international organizations (IOs), NGOs, militaries, and the business sector. He argues that for NGOs, specifically, it becomes difficult to separate their development and humanitarian activities from the North's security regime (*ibid.*: 16). Although many NGOs attempt to maintain their independence from Western security interests, they may still find that their ability to work in some countries is dependent on the security levels set by larger donors, governments, and IOs as much as their failure to take action to provide peacekeeping and building missions in some countries.

In this context a collapsing or failed state can actually be understood as an economically successful strategy, if only for a minority of the stakeholders, although the networks of patronage reach far and wide into the society. The underground causes of the long Chechen "no war no peace" provide a case in point. For Moscow the main objective is to preserve the lack of order. Chaos is commercially profitable, while thousands of lives are expended over control or ownership of oil wells. This is what the war is really about (Politkovskaya 2003: 172–3). Likewise, the wars in eastern Congo have been sustained by outside economic interests and internal players linked through illicit networks, including gold, diamonds, and gun smuggling (Amnesty International 2005; Emizet 2000; Human Rights Watch 2005a; Montague 2002; Nest *et al.* 2005).

The symbiotic use of foreign investment is probably the cheapest indirect means of managing disorder in collapsing states. However the effect of these strategies is to reinforce *de jure* state sovereignty, while further undermining the actual control of local authorities and governments over the state (Reno 2004: 614). Capturing the state through illicit trade has a downward spiraling effect on the erosion of state sovereignty and capacity because opportunities and mechanisms for tax collection may nearly evaporate. This has spawned new state strategies that shift the burden of taxation or tax collection on the humanitarian workers and operations. For example, INGOs operating in Sierra Leone have been forced to collect taxes from private companies when they purchased goods and to pay the minimum benefits to staff set by the government. Local tax authorities have conducted audits, and organizations that failed to comply with the regulations suffered significant fines. In addition, a government policy that INGOs constantly lobbied state officials to change required NGOs to pay annually the equivalent of \$1,000 per expatriate worker per organization. Although the tax amount was different, a similar situation has existed in Russia regarding registration and foreign work permits. Practices related to tax collection in Sierra Leone have forced some larger companies to report at least some of their income. But the larger part of goods INGOs have purchased from local producers is still not reported. At the same time, the origin of goods and the process by which they are brought into the country are still largely left in the shadows. It seems that even licit actors, such as INGOs that are large financial stakeholders in emergency assistance and reconstruction, are influenced by and dependent on illicit trade within the country, or the two are at least interrelated (Nordstrom 2004).

The capture of the state by formal and illicit business leaders and networks involves a complex set of social roles. "The various spheres of legal and non-legal production and distribution work together to create interlocking grids of exchange and control. Roles themselves – the positions any given person holds in society – are often complex and

multifaceted: a state actor can also function as a non-state actor, a sock manufacturer, a black-marketeer” (Nordstrom 2004: 94). Illicit and licit networks are more interconnected than conventional economic and political analysis has suggested. Such complexities raise ethical dilemmas for humanitarian and development NGOs wishing to establish partnerships with state authorities or the private sector without also implicating themselves in illicit trade. For these reasons,

security and justice must be addressed early on to ensure the further success of the [post-conflict administration and reconstruction] operation. If the international administrators choose early on to emphasize a set of “attractive” investments in economic production and civil society, this assistance is likely to end up in the pockets of individual leaders of transnational groups – both inside and outside the government – that maintain a stake in continued instability.

(Baskin 2003: 169)

International humanitarian operations also become significant business opportunities in countries moving on from civil war, turning humanitarian assistance into a vital part of the local political economy (Duffield 2001: 79). The UN plays a major role in this activity, spending millions of dollars on equipment, hard- and software, vehicles and salaries for international and local staff, and housing (Nordstrom 2004: 202–3). The presence of the UN mission can be a windfall for businesses that are able to benefit from the economic opportunities it generates. However, higher international salaries and the demand on local housing inflate the local economy, and raise rents and prices beyond the reach of the local poor. The disparities of relative wealth between the staff in the international mission and local poor also invite invidious comparisons that work against building good working relations with the host community (Bright 2001). The Sierra Leone case illustrates the overwhelming power of the international community vis-à-vis the government, which becomes a beneficiary to and subject of the former’s agenda and demands (*ibid.*). In Sierra Leone, as in many other countries with UN missions, women in particular, but also girls and men, become involved in informal sectors of the economy associated with peacekeeping, including sex trade and trafficking (Higate and Henry 2004).

While poor countries continue being dependent on financial aid from the West and support from INGOs, private as well as unofficial investments do not grow as fast because of unstable political conditions in the region, lack of legislation, and stable local governments. Corrin makes this point with respect to Kosovo, but notes that depressed economic regeneration is not unique to it. She argues that “there is a need to intensify efforts to create a predictable and fair business environment, to fight corruption and crime, or the alternative markets developed in the chaotic aftermath of war become standardized and inward investment is blocked” (2000: 92). According to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, among other responsibilities partner countries are responsible for working along with donors “to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable assessments of performance, transparency and accountability of country systems” (High Level Forum 2005). But the UN considers only the licit sector of the economy, and sometimes this represents merely 10 percent of a country’s economy (Nordstrom 2004: 230–3).

Designing a reconstruction program to address a narrow sector of society or a niche is a strategy that has its advantages. For example, the INGOs War Child and the Right to Play both focus their intervention on children’s needs and creating safe spaces to promote their social development. However, such programs also have faced questions in Sierra Leone

regarding whether they should focus only on these needs when the children also lacked schooling opportunities that the post-conflict state was unable to provide. In such cases, INGOs must debate not only whether to develop programs outside their own specialization but also whether offering educational services lifts responsibility from the state to do so, when the objective of post-conflict reconstruction is to rehabilitate such state functioning. Pressures that INGOs face to expand their services in these ways stem in part from local community expectations and deceptions, given their size and resources, especially in a resource-starved environment (Bright 2001). But the large size of many organizations, combined with multiple bureaucracy levels, does not leave room for proper analysis, either on the overall political, economic, and social level, or on specific sectors requiring long-term policy development (Duffield 2001: 262–3). For such reasons, Macrae, recalling the words of a health minister, urges the humanitarian community to be modest in objectives and set priorities according to actual needs (2001: 172).

There is also a constant push within the humanitarian community to follow the best practices doctrine, to expand, and to secure funding for new projects. However, if INGOs were country- or area-specific, this might solve a large number of problems. Although INGOs are not policy-deciding actors as much as governments and IOs, the scaling down, or at least not scaling up, of INGOs' projects would have a chance of helping workers to better understand the political, economic, and social context and the links between actors on the scene, and to develop long-term solutions for specific operational sectors and communities.

In sum, the evidence suggests it is hard to separate the interests and profits of local and Western governments, the private sector, IOs, and INGOs from the illicit sector, which coexists with or in all of those actors, fuelling or settling conflicts between them during the conflict and afterwards (Nordstrom 2004). These connections link the richest areas of the world with the poorest communities for the benefit of the richest and at the cost of survival for the poorest (*ibid.*). "If we believe in local economy in countries, then countries that absorb Sierra Leonean minerals or Liberian timber [or Chechen oil] must accept some responsibility for the social damage that results from patterns of resource extraction from which their own economies have benefited" (Richards 1996: 164). Admitting to such responsibility implies the willingness to create long-term solutions and to work for the increased cooperation between all actors involved.

### **Ethical issues at stake**

The end of the Cold War ushered in an unprecedented expansion in the scope and efforts of humanitarian NGOs. This was partly a function of the evaporation of superpower competition and the withdrawal of US and Soviet support for former client states. As states such as Somalia and Afghanistan began to collapse, the erosion of central authority and control over the monopoly of force was accompanied by the fragmenting of warring factions. Humanitarian INGOs often found themselves working practically alone in complex and dangerous situations, in the line of fire, or at risk of being kidnapped, while even greater expectations were placed on their capacity to make a difference. By the end of the 1990s the close relationship between warring parties, the political economy of violence, and the rise of illicit markets raised new concerns about the ethical foundations of humanitarian action and possibilities or constraints on them to assist victimized communities to move from a reliance on emergency assistance to development.

### *Neutrality versus advocacy*

At the end of the Cold War the immediate ethical concern at hand centered on how IOs and INGOs could carry out their programs while remaining neutral or impartial and detached (Anderson 1999; Prendergast 1996: 40). However, they were increasingly challenged to bring direct relief and development to bear on, and design their programs to contribute to, the protection of human rights and conflict resolution while trying to keep the delivery of aid and service from further intensifying the conflict (Haug 2001: 2–3; Leatherman *et al.* 1999). In the midst of inadequate international mechanisms and tools to respond to the new wars of the post-Cold War era, the concept of “a neutral humanitarianism able to stand above politics became increasingly strained” (Duffield 2001: 79). The realization emerged that aid is generally anything but neutral.

An alternative to detachment or impartiality is advocacy. However, in addition to dealing with issues of conflict early warning, prevention, and resolution, advocacy has also focused on other types of policies ranging from human rights to economic development. For advocacy to be effective, key players in the international community need to take consistent stands and share responsibility for promoting solutions. Yet NGOs typically have not formed alliances with organizations outside the NGO sector, although this has changed recently as Redd Barna’s and Save the Children’s advocacy work with civil society institutions illustrates (Haug 2001). There are many reasons that cooperation and joint goal or standard setting among international donors and agencies is important. Without it, for example, local stakeholders are encouraged to “forum shop” to establish ties with actors most sympathetic to their own interests and positions. Nevertheless, there is a tendency within the international community to pass the buck where responsibility for advocacy is concerned. For example, Haug notes that

studies among displaced people have shown that they think foreign agencies should play a role in terms of advocacy for peace. Some of the local NGOs also state that they think that the foreign NGOs are in a position to play an advocacy role in relation to the situation for internally displaced people and that they should do so. Among the foreign NGOs there is a tendency to say that the UN is in a better position to play an advocacy role than they are. In other words, the responsibility for advocacy and more confrontational politics is pushed over to other organizations.

(2001: 10–11)

Some larger INGOs approach advocacy by developing reporting mechanisms based on widely accepted international law or conventions, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the majority of governments have signed. “The objective of this reporting is not only to assess the government’s performance, but it is also to build knowledge which can provide a basis for further action by both NGOs and the government” (*ibid.*: 14). However, most INGOs do not make their reporting public, but work instead through informal channels. Alternatively, non-profit agencies may regularly brief their own embassies and foreign ministries, as Haug reports in the case of Sri Lanka (*ibid.*: 14).

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is somewhat of an exception because, unlike most INGOs, it has developed explicit criteria concerning when to take information into the public domain. The threshold for doing so is met only when the ICRC has been a direct witness, when a clear breach of humanitarian law has taken place, and then only when the violation is serious and repeated. Furthermore, the ICRC



intervention must not risk harming the victims (Haug 2001: 14). Human Rights Watch (HRW) also regularly issues reports, makes detailed recommendations, and does not desist from imposing considerable responsibility on local governments. For example, an HRW report on West Africa (2005b), which includes interviews with ex-combatants, presents policy recommendations to the governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria and to the ECOWAS, African Union, UN Security Council, UN Military Missions and other UN bodies (DPKO, UNDP), World Bank and others involved in the design, management, and evaluation of disarmament exercises, and ICRC (Bøas 2001). Although other INGOs or local NGOs were not included and little information in the report assesses their roles, HRW's recommendations place considerable responsibility on local governments to work towards a variety of goals ranging from eliminating corruption and providing good governance to stopping the support of armed groups and ensuring the protection of refugees.

### ***Dilemmas of sustainability of aid***

The sustainability of development aid is also difficult to ensure because of the kinds of effects that international policies have on local conditions. Relief cannot become sustainable if public institutions themselves remain poorly financed (Macrae 2001). In addition, if the international community withholds legitimacy from a country, as happened with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the first years after it declared independence, this also affects the type of aid provided and the resources and international institutions to which the country can turn. Whether development aid proves sustainable is also partly a function of how governments are or are not included in the planning process. In Uganda and Cambodia, two out of the three countries studied by Macrae, the governments had no influence on planning for rehabilitation because the decisions were "driven by the donor capital," and yet "the consequences were left with the respective governments" (*ibid.*: 150).

The choice of the communities supported by the INGOs is far from neutral in the aftermath of conflicts, either. For example, after the end of the war in Sierra Leone, the western area of the country was the one mainly targeted for humanitarian aid (Keen 2005: 303). By 2005 a number of INGOs started working through local partners in Freetown while also implementing their programs in other parts of the country. But there were still areas and communities that remain untouched in Freetown as well as upcountry. Initially, the Freetown-centered aid distribution influenced more people to migrate into the already overpopulated capital. Subsequent efforts seem to make the return of people to their homes possible. At the same time, some areas have proved quite hard to reach, making the coverage of these areas with humanitarian assistance more difficult.

Simultaneously, some border communities may take advantage of humanitarian operations by using different identity cards to maximize their access to assistance. For example, during his field trip to Sierra Leone, Paul Richards (1996) discovered that, even during the war, a village on the border of Sierra Leone and Liberia was receiving cement, roofing sheets, and flour for the bakery from Monrovia, which was more accessible than Freetown. "Residents seemed to have identity cards for both countries. In effect, they were citizens of two states, or perhaps (in their hearts) of neither," which is not surprising given the lack of investment in their community (*ibid.*: 129).



### ***Internal accountability and transparency***

The internal accountability of NGOs and their transparency may also have an impact on the transition from emergency response to sustainable development (Prendergast 1996: 42). Internal accountability concerns the importance of sharing INGOs' operational information with all stakeholders involved. Transparency, however, refers to openness in acts and the methods that are used. Although most NGOs see the issues of accountability and transparency as important and often reinforced by their internal policies, one challenge INGOs face is to develop closer relationships with smaller and local organizations or groups that often act as representatives of these communities and provide understanding of the local issues.

Prendergast, for example, has argued for the importance of prioritizing engagement and capacity building with authorities and civil institutions (1996: 92). He notes that "external control and local capacity building in emergency situations [and moreover after the conflict] are not mutually exclusive. Speed and accountability are two elements that need to be balanced when trying to maximize capacity building" (*ibid.*: 109–10). Almost ten years after the publication of his book, many countries, IOs and donors came together and developed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which specifies the responsibility of these groups to support the development of civil institutions in partner countries (Sierra Leone did not participate). Among the responsibilities, donors committed themselves to "respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it" and "align their analytic and financial support with partners' capacity development objectives and strategies, make effective use of existing capacities and harmonize support for capacity development accordingly" (High Level Forum 2005: 4–5).

Whereas this Declaration encompasses noble aims, one difficulty often faced relates to the internal structures of INGOs and the interactions of their expatriate staff with national staff. In the majority of cases, local employees live very different lives from their international colleagues, are less trusted, and have difficulty attaining positions higher than those of middle-level staff. For example, all senior members in the Special Court in Sierra Leone are international because Sierra Leoneans are not trusted to administer justice (Keen 2005: 319). In addition, although the option of delivering aid through local community networks has gained much more support and was implemented in a number of countries by many INGOs, it has its disadvantages because the same groups of people often seem to benefit from the aid; and at times those benefiting may have little incentive to move from emergency to development. Describing the situation in Chechnya, Politkovskaya notes that "on the surface things are now improving: hospitals have been opened and reequipped, Chechnya received its own budget" (2003: 173). In reality, however, "the overwhelming majority of the new Chechen officials, who arose in the close contact with military strive to keep things in the 'no war no peace zone'" (*ibid.*: 174). The funds are dealt with on a fifty-fifty basis whether it is payments for children, funds to rebuild buildings destroyed during the bombings, or humanitarian aid and medicines later being sold in the market (*ibid.*: 176).

### ***Procurement strategies***

Purchasing goods and supplies also poses ethical dilemmas for INGOs attempting the transition from emergency to development assistance. One of the simplest examples to highlight the interaction between the INGOs and illicit markets is the decision to

purchase goods in the country of operation as long as they are available (whether these goods are meant for distribution to local communities or for the operations). Policies on procurement strategies are found everywhere from INGOs' manuals to UNHCR procurement guidelines, because it is believed that locally purchased goods are cheaper and better known in the country. In addition, local purchasing develops the local economy (UNHCR 2001: 4).

It is rare, however, for INGOs to check how these goods were obtained and brought into the country, to determine whether taxes were paid on them, or to ascertain who gets the profit from such purchases. Duffield and Prendergast highlight positive and negative sides of this process, mentioning that, among other benefits, it "stimulates local production and trade infrastructures, provides faster response" (1994: 146). But local purchases can entail higher costs and excessive merchant profits. In some sectors, it is nearly impossible to separate the licit from the illicit market. Transportation is a particularly poignant example, since "tubing" for flowers can also be "tubing" for guns (Nordstrom 2004). In Sierra Leone, for example, private military companies such as Executive Outcomes dominated illicit markets, promoting their deadly expertise to the state, substate groups, and international entities as well. They also exercised control over diamond mines and concessions (Keen 2005: 151–2).

In the case of Sierra Leone, although it is clear that some of the new post-war economic activity can be attributed to spin-off from the presence of the international community, UN, donor countries, and various transnational NGOs, much of the wealth stems from "illicit diamond exports and other forms of corruption in government" (Grant 2004: 6). In the long term, the lack of willingness of the international community to address corruption will serve to undermine efforts to promote sustainable transitions from emergency response to development. Corruption drives both foreign donors and foreign investors away from the country. The problem is that eliminating corruption is often not in the interest of a majority of the players, local and international. As long as this remains the case, projects to reconstruct war-torn societies like Sierra Leone or Chechnya will merely remain on the surface.

## **Gender and reconstruction**

Until recently, research and policymaking on post-conflict recovery have not given much attention to the impact of war and the consequences for women and girls in particular.

Among relief practitioners, the issue of gender has often been seen as a secondary priority and postponed to the development phase. Academics have failed to incorporate a gender perspective, as they have relied in their analysis on gender-blind theories and conceptualizations of war to peace transitions.

(Sorensen 1999: 26)

Nevertheless, during recent conflicts around the world 70 percent of the casualties are non-combatants, mostly women and children. Rape, abduction, humiliation, forced pregnancy, sexual abuse, and forced slavery are among the ways that women's bodies have become part of the battleground. Sexual violence has been used as a strategy of war in conflicts ranging from the partition of India to more recent wars in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone (Baines 2003, 2005; Handrahan 2004: 437; Physicians for Human Rights 2002).

The perilous situation of women does not end with the signing of a peace treaty, as the post-conflict period may pose a greater threat than the war, when women are at risk of being trafficked or forced into prostitution or face increases in domestic violence as men reassert control, engage in honor killings, and commit gang rape (Handrahan 2004: 434).

The landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 passed in October 2000 helped draw attention within policymaking circles to the gendered nature of violence, particularly as concerns women during and after conflict. With the exception of a few key scholarly works (Cockburn and Zarkov 2002; Mazurana *et al.* 2005; Moser and Clark 2001), feminist practitioners have led the analysis of gender in the post-conflict phase. They have challenged policymakers to deliver on 1325 to ensure that women are treated not simply as victims of violence but also as agents of peacemaking who need to be at the table in the peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction planning and implementation (International Alert 2002; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Despite this new emphasis, DDR programs have been slow to incorporate aid to women and girls. For example, although girls made up nearly one-third of the child soldiers in Sierra Leone, only 8 percent were included in DDR programs. One reason is that they often did not have guns (Keen 2005: 287). Women and girls may also avoid demobilization camps and thus lose the support provided because of the social stigma attached to being documented as part of the armed forces.

Because gender plays a key role in defining people's entitlements and access to resources in society in general, and affects their social mobility, the effects of displacement and disintegration of communities may affect women more than men. During conflict women are often forced to take on more responsibilities (in addition to housekeeping and other peacetime economic activities) to support the survival of the household, including petty trading and networking regionally to supply and sell scarce, precious, or illegal commodities. At the same time, they remain responsible for the care of children, elders, and the disabled in their immediate and extended families and local communities. However, women find it difficult to defend their position in the informal sectors during reconstruction even while their caregiving burdens remain high (Sorensen 1999: 27). Furthermore, many of them may be reluctant to return to a subservient domestic role in the aftermath of conflict after having assumed much more responsibility beyond the household (Keen 2005: 315). In Nepal, the absence of men in the villages forced women to cross over the gendered division of labor and assume responsibilities for duties once taboo, such as ploughing and thatching roofs or serving in village councils (Manchanda 2005: 4739).

Also, women face difficulties in war's aftermath for the sexual violence they have suffered. Typically, they should bear this in silence because admitting it can bring shame on the family, and lead to honor killings, to socially condoned suicide, or to abandonment by their husbands or male relatives. Since women often lack entitlement or access to family property and assets, banishment forces women to the margins of the society and into illicit sectors such as prostitution and sex trafficking. Unlike men, women are not typically honored for the wounds they have suffered during war, and the veil of secrecy that surrounds their suffering also means they will receive little medical attention or psychological counseling to recover (Handrahan 2004: 435).

Furthermore, problems related to the performance of the court system can be mentioned among the factors that limit effective social sanctions of post-conflict violence. For example, in Sierra Leone, "insufficient numbers of judges, magistrates, public defenders, and prosecutors continue to result in huge back-logs, and those charged with criminal offenses spend months and in some cases years in pretrial detention" (Human Rights Watch 2005b). The lack of respective legislation also means that many cases, including

those related to domestic violence, are not reviewed by magistrates. Thus, even though the war is over, the changes in the lives of women are insignificant because of extreme poverty, low support from IOs/INGOs for women, and lack of funding for AIDS treatment for women (Henry 2005).

The culture of peacekeeping also presents gendered challenges for assisting societies recovering from war to make a transition from receiving emergency response to development. Peacekeeping missions are staffed mostly by men who form an “‘international fraternity’ – the community of decisionmakers and experts who arrive after a conflict on a mission of ‘good will’” (Handrahan 2004: 433). They are cast in the role of rescuers or saviors, and they typically command far more economic resources and status than local males, whose failure is, effectively, the reason for the peacekeepers’ presence. The international fraternity of males brings with them their own gender ideas and norms; they may impose them on the local population or they may develop norms of behavior that differ drastically from the codes they follow in their own countries. As Handrahan explains, “while gender may be only one concern for women, it is a pivotal one, since women’s fundamental human rights and dignity are often caught in the middle of multiple male power struggles played out as identity norms” (ibid.: 434).

There have been many reports of sexual exploitation of women and children by male UN peacekeepers and other representatives of the international community (Handrahan 2004: 436; Corrin 2000: 83). In Sierra Leone, the level of prostitution rose while the age of the “Kolonkos,” as the young girls involved in prostitution are called, also dropped precipitously. Bright (2001) explains this as something that must be “expected whenever men are plunged far from home into the ambiguities and uncertainties of a war–no-war situation that is not theirs; their conduct changes to levels of permissiveness that would never have been imagined at home.” Efforts to address these forms of exploitation tend to criminalize victims rather than the offenders (Corrin 2000: 84).

INGO programs that move assistance from the emergency to the development stage should design programs of support for women that give them alternatives to these types of exploitative relationships and activities. The failure of the international community to consider gender mainstreaming in its programs stems not so much from a lack of awareness of these problems, but rather “its *inability* to consider *its own* patriarchy and the damage this does within international development paradigms” (Handrahan 2004: 436). For example, a UNHCR project in Afghanistan providing assistance for Afghan refugees did not include any Afghan women, though they were the majority of refugees, because of the concern that local men would object, although there is evidence that supports that women included in other projects met with no resistance. At best, national plans of reconstruction that receive international support generally consider gender as an afterthought rather than thinking of the gender nature of the violence, the increase of women in poverty, and women-headed households (Manchanda 2005: 4738–40). However, gendered aspects of reconstruction need to include plans that address the impact of violence on both men and women, including on men’s dignity and pride and on women’s efforts to assist men to recover, even while women are themselves the more vulnerable (Rabrenovic and Roskos 2001: 50).

Many local women are actually ahead of the international community in developing their own strategies and programs to overcome war and begin community building in the aftermath of violence. There are examples in many conflicts around the world of the emergence of alternative female-based alliances, often reaching across the dividing lines of ethnicity, race, or class. Examples include the Mano River Union Women’s Network for

Peace in Africa (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002), Peruvian women (Coral Cordero 2001), Rwanda (Baines 2003), Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir (Manchanda 2005: 4741), and the former Yugoslavia (Kumar 2001: 69). Manchanda argues that

women's peace activism tends to get obscured by the fact that women's language of support and resistance flows from their cultural experience of being disempowered – that is protest strategies that use symbols of motherhood, mourning or ritual cursing. However, by taking them into the public arena, women politicize and transform them.

(2005: 4740)

Supporting such groups of women in the aftermath of conflict is important not least because often “networks of women are the only ones that can survive devastation of civil society in civil war” (Rabrenovic and Roskos 2001: 49).

## **Conclusions**

For most of us the very definition of emergency response and development is an academic topic. Although the importance of the topic for the academy is not under debate, the topic is a far more vital question for people affected by a conflict, and living and working in unsafe environments without access to the very basics. For these people policy decisions on how health, education, judicial, or any other sector is going to look in their country tomorrow are just as important as the food delivered to them to survive today.

Therefore, consistent discussion and research to create better ways of supporting communities recovering from violent conflict are crucial. Even though INGOs have a relatively long history of helping communities around the world, INGOs' history and experience are shorter than corporations (trade), governments, international organizations, and illicit networks. Presently, while working in quickly changing political, economic, social, and technological environments, INGOs have become significant actors on a global level and within these networks.

However, INGOs are not working alone: they carry out their work in a networked system that spans governments, IOs, military groups, and corporations. All these actors work in the shadows of both licit and illicit economic and political interests. Taking into account all the links that connect the interests and profits of local and Western governments, the private sector, IOs, INGOs, and the illicit sector should become a priority in INGOs' policy development. This is essential if INGOs are to develop effective policies to assist societies in transition from emergency assistance to sustainable and licit development. In this context, we suggest that INGOs consider scaling down their organizations' operations, and develop more country-specific expertise to understand how they can ensure that their operations reinforce the formal and informal economies while avoiding decisions that fortify illicit forces and accelerate the dismantling of the state and its authority. This is a difficult but important challenge for INGOs, and more research and policy development of effective strategies would be a welcome step forward.

INGOs are currently facing numerous ethical issues in the field across policy domains concerning neutrality, impartiality, advocacy, procurement issues, and choice of communities to work with. None of these concerns stand alone, but rather they are often interrelated and have an impact on the efficacy of INGOs' programs for shifting from emergency to development. A significant number of them are adding advocacy to their

projects; all organizations define neutrality, impartiality, accountability, and transparency in their policy documents, and are faced with choices about where to implement their projects and from whom to purchase goods. However, this chapter suggests that INGOs have to pay particular attention when making these decisions and be able to see the results in a long-term perspective as well seeing short-term implications on the transition to a stable and durable reconstruction of society.

The gender aspect of the relief to development transition is gradually receiving more, if still inadequate, attention. It seems there is limited research exploring how relief and development projects and policies address concerns of women and girls affected by violent conflict. There is even less data on this subject in the field. Despite the recent emphasis on gender that the UN has given in the context of Security Council Resolution 1325 adopted in 2000, evidence still indicates that women and girls are less likely to be included in the design of DDR projects. At the same time, some women actively participate in the development of their communities directly or through local or international organizations and these networks provide important channels for supporting their needs. The shift from emergency response to development should encompass a gendered awareness of the increased risk of violence against women and girls in this phase, and promote strategies to facilitate their recuperation and reintegration into society and the formal economy.

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# 26 Memory retrieval and truth recovery

*Paul Arthur*

## Introduction

We start with the very simple proposition that a peace agreement is only one element in a larger process that may not alter the basic nature of a long and profoundly bitter conflict. It is particularly challenging for political leadership to recognize that, with changing needs and priorities, interests must be redefined and revised and that they need to engage in a newly institutionalized and accelerated joint learning process (Rothstein 1999). They should realize, too, that the creation of new structures and new arrangements may not be a sufficient condition for settling with the past; and that relationships between victim/survivor and perpetrator need to be addressed (Asmal 1992).

In that respect, one of the most difficult problems confronting any society coming out of intense conflict is that of truth recovery and memory retrieval. We shall see that these concepts are problematic in their own right and that they may hinder the business of reconciliation – itself a contested concept (Payne 2004). This chapter shall explore many of the problems confronted in dealing with the past, from the conceptual to the practical. It will do so through an examination of a continuum that runs from silence and/or forgetting to a consideration of knowledge and acknowledgment and on to the validity and utility of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. In addition it will explore the role and responsibilities of all the agencies involved in this process.

## Context

The twentieth century has been described as the century of “man-made mass death” (Wyschogrod 1983). Examples are not hard to find – the dead of the two World Wars, the Holocaust, Soviet gulags, the Cultural Revolution, Cambodia. In current conflicts it has been estimated that for every soldier killed there are eight civilian casualties; and some authors claim that as many as 90 percent of all casualties are civilians (Hamber in Biggar 2003). All have left horrible legacies and there has been no consistent pattern in dealing with these hurts. For a period it was assumed that developments towards the end of the last century had overcome this bitter past. The evolution and enlargement of “Europe” from the Coal and Steel Community to the European Union (EU) was hailed as an international model of conflict resolution that settled the rivalries of historic enmities and that relegated ethnic conflict to a sideshow (e.g. see Hume 1998) – a low-level communal conflict in Northern Ireland and the Basque problem were considered to be embarrassing exceptions to the rule.

Geopolitically, the collapse of communism as an aggressive international ideology and

the end of apartheid and the removal of South Africa's pariah status were meant to herald a New World Order centered round the one remaining hegemonic power, the United States. Tentative new arrangements suggested a new form of governance. There was some evidence that conventional diplomacy may have had less to offer than previously imagined. The United Nations displayed a greater capacity for intervening in ethnic disputes with the Secretary-General relying on no fewer than twenty-five special/personal representatives, as of 28 January 1997, with interventions in complex emergencies and in disputes *within* states (Vance and Hamburg 1997). The effects of the information revolution have been noted at a time when the number of societies in transition was unprecedented and when the globalization of issues was blurring the separation between foreign affairs and domestic politics.

This called for the practice of a new kind of diplomacy so that "policies and negotiated agreements will succeed only if they have the support of publics at home and abroad" (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 1996). This borrowed from Joseph Nye's (2004) concept of "soft power" – the "ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others," which "strengthens American diplomacy through attraction rather than coercion." It acknowledged, too, the role of NGOs and Eminent Persons Groups (EPGs). External actors could have a role to play in depoliticizing extremely contentious issues and could be an enormous asset in assisting countries to make the transition out of conflict. In fact, in many ways NGOs and EPGs could do things better than government: "They foster a flexible style that encourages innovation . . . They offer the world a winning combination of . . . professional skills, a wealth of experience, fresh perspectives, and enormous good will" (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 1996).

We could reflect as well on what is known as the "Norwegian model" (Hanssen-Bauer 2005) with its tradition of humanitarian cooperation between voluntary organizations, academic circles, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Oslo process concerned with conflict in the Israel/Palestine region in which the "many mutual provocations and acts of violence in the field did not derail the efforts of the secret negotiators as they did the official channel in the field" (Egeland 1994). On a larger scale the former Norwegian prime minister, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, proposed at the fifty-first session of the UN General Assembly the establishment of a Fund for Preventive Action at the UN that would facilitate immediate deployment of first-class expertise for proactive diplomacy.

What all of the above have in common is that they are about mechanisms to get to the point of agreement. They do not deal with transitions and they do not offer solutions to deal with the past. One such purported solution has been the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Apparently, we have been living in a confessional age. Priscilla Hayner (1995) has detected no fewer than fifteen truth commissions – predominantly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America – in the two decades after 1974. Although she asserts that "truth commissions can play a critical role in a country struggling to come to terms with a history of massive human rights crimes" (Hayner 1995) we shall see that the record is not always so positive (Weschler 1990). Nevertheless we have to pay due respect to Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as the model to be desired. And it may be that the last century will also be noted "as one that created international human rights tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, and public and private institutions to advance human rights" (Minow 2003).

Despite these innovative examples of good practice and the brief shining moment of the New World Order, a new barbarism has been conceived that ranges across continents

from the former Yugoslavia to Sri Lanka to Rwanda and Sudan. An alleged “clash of civilizations” has taken the place of the Cold War (Huntington 1996), and bipolarity has given way to a misconceived and misjudged hegemony (Soderberg 2005) and to a fourth generation of warfare (Boot 2006). Transitional societies and transitional justice present new challenges, and there are no clear new pathways.

Indeed we need to recognize that truth telling, “justice seeking and reconciliation are inherently political processes heavily influenced by conflicting interests and access to resources.” Moreover:

In designing transitional justice mechanisms, policymakers and practitioners engage in a complex moral calculus unguided by scientific principles yielding definitive proof of their ultimate benefits or harms. In this calculus, the needs of individuals must be balanced against the society’s larger short- and long-term goals. Ideally, transitional justice mechanisms will have the effect of minimizing harm to individual survivors while maximizing the achievement of society’s goals.

(Barsalou 2005: 9)

There may also be a psychological dimension where we have to traverse the difficult terrain of the *egoism of victimization* that characterizes traumatized national groups (Mack 1990) and an individual propensity for “victimhood” – “the political economy of helplessness” (O’Malley 1990). The latter may belong to a new Romantic age that is anti-rational, sentimental, and communitarian. One commentator worried that it “becomes questionable when a cultural, ethnic, religious, or national community bases its communal identity almost entirely on the sentimental solidarity of remembered victimhood” (Buruma 1999). That, he asserted, could lead to historical myopia. And it could become an obstacle in the quest for peace because “the tendency to identify authenticity in communal suffering actually impedes understanding among people. For feelings can only be expressed, not discussed or argued about.” In short, “the steady substitution of political argument in public life with the soothing rhetoric of healing is disturbing” (ibid.).

## Memory

Memory has been likened to the unofficial sense of history in that we never ask our memories to line up rationally and that it effects an order not sequential but agglutinative (Donoghue 1991). It can belong to the world of Buruma’s sentimental solidarity. It has to be understood in relation to history:

There is no people, no nation, no identity without memory, and no democracy without a free memory . . . Memory and history have adjacent, connected but not identical, objectives. Memory is an existential work, history must also inform life and collective life but the priority imperative is of scientific truth.

(Le Goff, cited in Errera 1999: 8)

We need to make the distinction between individuals “who may have only little conscious choice in their ability to remember or forget certain events or experiences” and collectivities that can choose (as we shall see later) what is publicly remembered and what is forgotten (Forsberg 2003: 69).

To take but one example of the complexity of memory: the killing of thirteen civil

rights marchers in Derry/Londonderry in Northern Ireland in January of 1972 by British troops, in what was known as “Bloody Sunday,” produced an *official memory* in a Public Inquiry commissioned by the British government and headed by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery. His report exonerated the army and became the conventional establishment view of what had happened on that day – the conventional wisdom, that is, until another British government established another inquiry in 1998 on the basis that new evidence had come to light.

Much of that evidence had been furnished through an “extraordinarily subtle regenerative and potent politics of memory developed by the Bloody Sunday Initiative” (Dawson 2005), a grassroots organization formed and led by close relatives of the dead, and one that had broadened the constituency participating in the commemoration to include even those opposed to the IRA campaign of violence. They were engaging in an oppositional narrative, a *counter* or an “anthropological” *memory* that crossed generations and involved some who had not even been born when Bloody Sunday happened. They exemplified *postmemory* that characterized “the experience of those who grew up dominated by narratives that preceded their birth . . . the stories of the previous generation” (Hirsch 1997). In contrast to Hirsch’s work on Holocaust families, Bloody Sunday was experienced “less as a burden than as a largely positive identification with a living, current struggle for peace, truth and justice” (Dawson 2005).

The IRA and its supporters made use of the events of Bloody Sunday. But it was part of a much larger project – no less than to claim the mantle of true revolutionaries who had removed Ireland from British tutelage. This Irish republican project entails “the development of an *anticipatory memory* capable of projecting future images of liberation drawn from the past” (Kearney 1988). It was millenarian.

## Silence, forgetting, and remembering

It is this complex moral calculus that we need to keep in mind in settling with the past. We need to distinguish between individual and collective memory – to acknowledge indeed that there “may be no other memory than the memory of wounds” (Milosz 1980); and to recognize that societies are capable of appropriating historical trauma for political purposes. We need to consider the role of communication and of the ubiquity of victimhood. We need to be aware that, although a political society craves a true knowledge of its past, the past must not become “the only, or the main, value” (Errera 1999). We need to consider whether or not the law is an imperfect vehicle for getting at the truth of historical injustices by looking at the record of TRCs. To ask the question *should we remember?* implies a choice that is beyond some people’s experience: “Remembering is not an option – it is a daily torture, a voice inside the head that has no on/off switch and no volume control” (Smyth 1998).

Lack of communication can be the property of a society without empathy, and can lead to having the wrong cognitive framework, “which is what happens if you prematurely close in on an understanding. There are no correct understandings but there are very bad ones” (Arthur 1998: 103). Communication “entails recognition of the other, and the ‘awareness of being separate and different from and strange to one another’ opens up potentials of creative search for dialogue and for understanding the other . . . Reaching common ground is not necessarily a product of similar opinions” (Sofer 1997: 181). Consider, for example, the case of South Africa between 1990 and 1994, that is those dates from the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the unbanning of the ANC and other organizations

to the holding of democratic elections. During this time many “forums” were set up as temporary structures that gathered together the broadest possible range of stakeholders.

One such forum which met for three three-day workshops at the Mont Fleur conference center outside Cape Town in 1992 settled for scenario stories: “The essence of scenario development conversation deals with what *might* happen, not what *should* happen . . . the process is ‘only’ about telling stories, not about making commitments. This allows people to discuss almost anything, even taboo subjects.” It was not about formal negotiation but about the one subject all the participants had in common – the future of South Africa. Some of their conversations were relevant to the formal negotiations that were going on simultaneously. What was important was that the process allowed for constructive, choice-eliciting, inclusive and holistic, and open and informal conversations. The project has been described as “the gentle art of re-perceiving.” It was about establishing networks and understandings and ultimately changing hardened positions: “The Mont Fleur exercise demonstrated a new way for a society in conflict to approach the future. The informal, indirect scenario approach is different from and complementary to negotiation. Scenarios are a promising tool for public consensus building” (Centre for Generative Leadership 1996: 5–7).

At a more informal (and individual) level we can call on art, on literature and on storytelling as a means of sustaining our ability to deal with the past. In relation to Ireland, Seamus Heaney used his Nobel Laureate lecture, “Crediting Poetry” (1995) to highlight a massacre in 1976 that was redeemed by an act of transcendence, to assert that art can rise to the occasion. He could well have been reflecting on W. H. Auden’s belief that through art “we are able to break bread with the dead, and without communion with the dead a fully human life is impossible” (cited in Schell 2000: 162). Or we could call on Toni Morrison’s *Beloved* (1988: 190) – a horrifying account of the impact of slavery in the US:

very few had died in bed . . . and none that he knew of . . . had lived a livable life. Even the educated colored; the long school people, the doctors, the teachers, the paper-writers and business men had a hard row to hoe. In addition to having to use their heads to get ahead, they had the weight of the whole race sitting there. You needed two heads for that.

And, finally, on the impact of the Holocaust on early Zionists: “for two thousand years we have borne everything in silence, but here, in our own land, we shall not put up with a new exile, our honor shall not be trampled underfoot” (Oz 2003: 105).

So, there is a fine balance between remembering and forgetting. Remembering may not always produce the truth. One problem is the tendency for perpetrators to “create ‘vital lies’ – euphemisms and stories that diminish their roles in violence” (Payne 2004: 117). A second is that we might be forced to contemplate the *unthinkable*: “The unthinkable is that which one cannot conceive within the range of possible alternatives, that which perverts all answers because it defies the terms under which the questions were phrased” (Trouillot 1995: 106). The author had in mind the slave-led Haitian Revolution (1791–1804), but one could apply it to virtually any society coming out of an intense conflict. In terms of Ireland, one could cite British security policy in the nineteenth century as an example of the unthinkable: “If therefore the enforcement of the law provoked disorder, as it appeared to do in Ireland, the fault lay in English eyes not with the law but with the people” (Townshend 1983: 83). A third reason may be much more mundane – it does not require a conspiracy, nor even a political consensus, but its roots are structural. In finding

the space for certain facts, the writer is engaged in an act of exclusion: “As sources fill the historical landscape with their facts, they reduce the room for other facts” (Trouillot 1995: 26–7).

One strategy has been that of “knowing forgetting” (as a form of remembering) so that we may not be weighed down utterly by the burden of the past (Elshtain 2003). Bonhoeffer (1997) goes so far as to speak of the capacity to forget as a gift of grace. But it has to be remembered that failure to remember can impose unacceptable costs in ethical terms if we ignore collective injustice and cruelty; indeed it may stoke fires of resentment and revenge (Minow 2003: 98). In that case it might be useful to revert to legal institutions that can offer “armatures for memory, and frames for the kinds of acknowledgement that prevent both forgetting and vengeance” (ibid.: 99).

So a starting point might be to ask: can the past be left behind? It is a theme developed in a recent history of Europe since 1945 (Judt 2005), where it is asserted that “the first postwar Europe was built upon a deliberate *mismemory* – upon forgetting as a way of life. Since 1989 Europe has been constructed instead upon a compensatory surplus of memory; institutionalized public remembering as the very foundation of collective identity.” Further it has been argued that

this continental amnesia became one of Europe’s attractions. Not a few nations wanted to “escape out of history and into Europe” . . . Only in the 1960s, when that amnesia had done its healing work (at least, for the compromised postwar political classes), did a revision of history begin to break through.

(Ascherson 2005)

One finds similar examples of amnesia from individual states. Selective amnesia was also evident in Guatemala. When the truth commission concluded that 93 percent of human rights violations could be attributed to the army and only 3 percent to the guerrillas, neither side displayed an interest in having these cases exposed. The treatment in the literature of the mid-nineteenth-century Irish famine until fairly recent times is an example of the need for erasure because some facts are too embarrassing. It has been treated scantily and much of the treatment that has been given has included great simplification (Toibin and Ferriter 2001).

The evolution of the Israeli state provides a fascinating case of forgetting *and* remembering through the appropriation of historical trauma for political purposes. It is caught in a recent Israeli memoir: “Anyway, our faces here are turned towards the future, not the past, and if we do have to rake up the past, surely we have enough uplifting Hebrew history from biblical times and the Hasmoneans” (Oz 2003: 14). Zertal (2005) detects a change in Israeli society in the years of the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann (1960–62) in which a process begins that replaces the silence and denial regarding the Holocaust. She remarks that, in a 220-page textbook of Jewish history published in 1948, one page was devoted to the Holocaust compared with ten pages on the Napoleonic wars. A Holocaust Remembrance Day became mandatory in 1959, but was not adopted universally. It was the Eichmann trial that changed the face of Israel psychologically and revolutionized Israeli’s self-perception. Zertal (ibid.) carefully traces this growth in the ideological weight of the Holocaust for internal Israeli politics, beginning with Ben-Gurion, that was not challenged adequately until an article by a survivor of Auschwitz appeared in *Ha’aretz* in 1988.

A complementary question would be to ask: why not leave the past behind? There can be perfectly understandable reasons why people insist on remembering. It is a way



of avoiding oblivion. A Guatemalan human rights activist provides one reason: “The war created fear, a lack of communication, a lack of confidence, an inability to resolve conflicts. You can’t reconcile with the living if you can’t reconcile with the dead” (Canby 1999: 248). The inmates of Majdanek concentration camp produced another:

Should our murderers be victorious, should they write the history of this war . . . their every word will be taken for gospel. Or they might wipe out our memory altogether as if we had never existed . . . But if we write the history of the period . . . we’ll have the thankless job of proving to a reluctant world that we are Abel, the murdered brother.  
(Wyschogrod 1983: 126)

Remembering and forgetting, then, carry their own health warnings. Memory is multi-faceted and manipulable. It is traumatic and capable of political appropriation. But lack of it can lead to oblivion. Perhaps the best we can expect is that we acknowledge that the “past is one of those issues that can only be dealt with when it has become less important, and this occurs when the past is about the past and not about determining the future” (Bland 2006: 17). It was the South African TRC that reminded us in the most dramatic way possible that “the most difficult task of all . . . is to remember and forget – not in the sense of collective amnesia, but in an altogether different way: as a release from the full weight and burden of the past” (Elshtain 2003: 61–2).

## **Moving forward**

This section will assert that there is no universal panacea in the vital exercises of truth recovery and memory retrieval; that we have to pay attention to the culturally specific and to the politically dynamic in any given context; and that it may be more conducive to think in terms of incrementalism and the role of process. It will do so through a cursory examination of a particular case study by drawing some lessons that may be applicable generally. Finally, it will look briefly at the experience of traditional justice mechanisms in the context of international tribunals.

In November 2004, an all-party body in the British parliament, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC 2005), announced an enquiry into ways of “dealing with Northern Ireland’s past.” The terms of the enquiry were to examine “the experience of efforts in other jurisdictions to move forward from a history of division and conflict, on a basis as widely acceptable as possible to affected communities and individuals who have suffered from violence.” Since it was assumed that a general election would be called within a matter of months in the United Kingdom, NIAC decided to concentrate on those most affected by the conflict, the victims and survivors, and those groups that represented them. Between 20 January and 9 March 2005, the Committee heard from over sixty victims and survivors, representatives of victims’ groups and human rights organizations, and paid three informal visits to Belfast to see the work of trauma groups on the ground, as well as receiving 103 pieces of written evidence. This section will explore the evidence from this exercise to explore the practicalities of truth recovery and memory retrieval.

The last public session of the NIAC was held on 9 March 2005, when it heard from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy, who spoke of his experience of consultations in South Africa: “If we were to have something along the lines of, but not the same because it has to be tailored to Northern Ireland, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission we would have to have two things occurring: one is political progress and,

secondly, consensus on it. I was not convinced that we could get either” (NIAC 2005: 243). The Committee concurred:

We accept the view of those who have told us of the importance of an “official” version of history and truth which might be a key feature of any truth recovery commission. But the Northern Ireland communities must be fully ready and able to accept and share that official version of historical truth, and it is our view, based on the evidence we have been given, that this stage has yet to be reached.

(*ibid.*: 1, 14)

Instead, the exercise revealed that there was no common agreement on how we define victim/survivor/perpetrator. There was fundamental disagreement on the role of the state as an independent arbitrator on judging the past, and there was no agreement on whether there are any circumstances under which there could be amnesty for perpetrators; and there were differing views on the role of funding victims’ groups. The report had been prepared against a backcloth of more than 1800 unsolved murders during the previous thirty years; and the approach to the past during this transitional period has been described as being ad hoc and piecemeal. This was the nearest that the authorities had come to establishing a unitary centralized mechanism for publicly re-examining the conflict. In fact “[E]xplicit acknowledgement of failure has been rare, though in some cases . . . the scale of change recommended contains an implicit narrative of institutional failure” (Bell *et al.* 2004: 315).

This raises the issue of agency and the prospect that exposure creates profound discomfort for the state itself:

There is some (albeit limited) acknowledgement of the “bad apple” phenomena, which would allow that state officials and institutions may have at certain times behaved inappropriately or outside the law. However, no systematic conclusions are sought and in fact are vigorously denied. This means that when institutional reform processes commence there is a persistent tension between the need for transformative change, propelled by internal political communities, and the fear that in doing so the state’s narrative of its own behaviour will be compromised.

(Campbell and Ni Aolain 2005: 205)

Consider the converse: writing about the extremist tradition in Ireland one commentator notes that

what matters is not what happened but how it is remembered. And that, precisely, is what the IRA is now fighting for. Its struggle is for control of the memory of the Northern Ireland conflict. Its weapons are lies, evasions and strategic ambiguities. Its aim is to reshape the memory of a vicious and sordidly sectarian campaign of mass murder into the afterglow of a glorious struggle for liberation.

(O’Toole 2005)

In dealing with the past, Irish republicans had to confront some of their own specters. During the period when the IRA was renouncing violence it was being challenged, ironically on specific criminal acts. It had to think the *unthinkable*. Its response was to place its actions in historical perspective. The president of its political wing, Gerry Adams, told its

annual conference in 2005: “We refuse to criminalize those who broke the law in pursuit of legitimate political objectives”. And in a seminar in New York he claimed that “what our opponents are trying to do is to retrospectively criminalize a struggle.” But the new peace dispensation offered another way: “Do I think at the moment . . . that breaking the law or armed actions are an option? No, I don’t. And why is that my view? Because there is an *alternative*” (Council on Foreign Relations 2005: 8).

So truth recovery and memory retrieval present huge obstacles for many agencies, particularly if they have not prepared the ground. We have noted that, previously, the official accounting of the past was patchy and contentious. The Widgery Inquiry, the original official examination of Bloody Sunday, was mired in controversy. Its successor, the Saville Inquiry, established in 1998 by the then prime minister, Tony Blair, had not reported by 2007, and had cost about £200 million with no guarantee that it would unearth the essential truth of the events of that day. It was left to others – journalists and NGOs – to produce some accounting of the past that had the potential to move the process forward. BBC Northern Ireland produced a series entitled *Legacy*, broadcast each day for a year at the end of the main news programme, each episode a three-minute account from a different survivor’s perspective of the impact of the conflict on their lives. It was a form of catharsis that reached a wide audience and thereby humanized the conflict. Four journalists published a book whose title was self-explanatory: *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children who Died as a Result of the Troubles in Northern Ireland* (McKittrick et al. 1999). Given that it was a more permanent record its impact was huge. Finally an NGO (Healing through Remembering) produced a report, *Making Peace with the Past: Options for Truth Recovery Regarding the Conflict in and about Northern Ireland*, that has the potential to make a very positive contribution to dealing with the past.

### **Memorialization**

Although some local communities had produced their own memorials to commemorate their dead, there was little in the way of official memorialization in Northern Ireland. The Tower Museum in Derry opened in 1992 with the aim of making a “contribution to cross-community mutual understanding and reconciliation.” It is the only museum in Northern Ireland to give space to the conflict in its permanent exhibition, mainly represented in a film of the history (Crooke 2001: 126). A more recent proposal, in the wake of the decommissioning of IRA weapons, has been the suggestion for an International Centre for Conflict Transformation (ICCT) on the site of a former prison and internment camp. Although the idea had been generated by former Republican prisoners it has not been rejected by their opponents on the basis “that it will be neutral, inclusive and constructive” (Casey 2007).

Memorialization serves many purposes and takes many forms. Baxter (2005) differentiates between constructed sites (museums, monuments, etc), found sites (killing fields, concentration camps, etc.), and activities (parading in commemoration of specific historic events, etc.). It represents “a powerful arena of contested memory and the formation of new national, community and ethnic identities.” A classic example of the transformative character of memorialization in terms of site *and* speech was Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address (Wills 1992). On the other hand, memorialization can be utilized (and brutalized) by totalitarian regimes and as monuments to the “victor” (Ascherson 2004) at the expense of marginalized groups and ordinary citizens. And it can be gruesome: “In some of the Killing Fields memorials in Cambodia, tour guides will assist visitors in digging up

remains, such as bone fragments and teeth” (Baxter 2005: 6). This example deals with the immediate aftermath of conflict to convey the “scale of the genocide . . . but do[es] not generally engage in analysis of the roots of the conflict or in efforts to hold perpetrators accountable” (ibid.).

Memorials may be very specific by choosing a relatively narrow, coherent story that visitors can comprehend. The US Holocaust Museum and Memorial in Washington, DC, is a case in point (Baxter 2005). Or as the Triad of Peace Sites in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Okinawa demonstrate they can send out divergent messages that illustrate that public memory is “the product of a continuous process of selecting, conserving and rebuilding the past in order to forge collective identity” (Caroli 2005). Caroli cites the French scholar Maurice Halbwachs to the effect that the past is not conserved but is reconstructed and, hence, that collective memory is not a simple resurrection or a revival of the past, but is essentially a reconstruction of the past to function in the present. A more contentious reconstruction of the past *and* future has been the activity of parading in Northern Ireland, which has been described as “expressions of culture, displays of faith and acts of domination . . . intimately linked to the wider political domain” (Jarman 1997: 59). It was calculated that in 1995 there were 3,500 parades in Northern Ireland with loyalist outnumbering republican parades by about nine to one. The former celebrated the victory of the Protestant monarch William of Orange at the Battle of the Boyne on 12 July 1690 and were considered to “complete a circle between the past and the present, and thus make the future certain [through] the recurrent celebration of martial heroes and military victories.” In this context, memory “becomes less a means of conserving a distinct lineal history than a generator of meaning” (ibid.: 124).

Again, we have identified that yet another strategy – memorialization – carries its own health warning. It has a propensity to play a positive role in a transitional period in the context of genuinely wide consultation and one that avoids triumphalism. It needs to be reflective and to be conscious of its place in the greater scheme of reconciliation.

### ***Localism and internationalism***

We have alluded already to the fact that, in the last century, the advancement of human rights was assisted by NGOs, the creation of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and international human rights tribunals. This section will look briefly at the merits of this approach through two case studies: Rwanda and northern Uganda, where a system of following the requirements of international law sits (uneasily) alongside an indigenous culture of forgiveness.

For the past two decades a war has been fought in Uganda between the government of President Museveni and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. It has led to the widespread abuse of the population of northern Uganda including murder, defilement, rape, torture, and the use of child soldiers. About 1.8 million people have been relocated into internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Since 2004, the International Criminal Court (ICC), at the invitation of the Ugandan government, has been investigating crimes committed in the region. The ICC, however, is distrusted by large segments of the local population and some international organizations. They fear that the ICC may not be able to investigate atrocities carried out by the army and the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), also because its remit does not cover the entirety of the war. One consequence has been to threaten the current Juba Peace Talks with the possibil-

ity of a return to war as the Acholi tribe try to rebuild their society through justice and reconciliation mechanisms.

The Acholi are known for their culture of forgiveness based on a restorative and rehabilitative system. They practice a mediated process that brings together families and clans for “truth telling, discussion of reparations and ultimately forgiveness” (Conway 2007). The best known practice is the ceremony of *Mato Oput*, which literally means “drinking the bitter fruit,” whereby the perpetrator and the victim’s family share a bitter root drink. The gesture symbolizes the recalling of the crime and the burying of bitterness. But problems arise because “no one is sure exactly how far the practices can be adapted to address crimes against humanity and genocide”; and because the status of cultural ceremonies has been undermined by the longevity of the conflict. In these circumstances, it has been suggested that a hybrid system “should develop that takes into account the requirements of international law to prosecute leaders of the LRA and to incorporate the Acholi culture of forgiveness by allowing for reconciliation ceremonies for other LRA members” (ibid.).

The same dilemma emerges in the case of Rwanda. One commentary by Babu Ayindo on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda “suggests that Western notions of criminal justice undermine the commitment to communal reconciliation that lies at the heart of most traditional African justice systems, which aim to reintegrate both the offender and the victim into society” (Villa-Vicencio 2003: 239). How possible is that in a country where one million people were killed in one hundred days; and where the Tutsi wanted justice above all else, whereas the Hutu sought democracy above all else? Indeed, one expert group in 1996 felt that genocide should not be dealt with by the *gacaca* but by the state and that the guilty should be executed. The objective of *gacaca* is praiseworthy in that it “is not to determine guilt or to apply state law in a coherent and consistent manner (as one expects from state courts of law) but to restore harmony and social order in a given society, and to reincorporate the person who was the source of disorder” (Vandeginste 2003: 269–70).

*Gacaca* raises issues about conflict resolution strategies “that appear to work in interpersonal relations, but [have] yet to venture very far in the international community” (Forsberg 2003). It is an area that needs much more research. For the moment, this much can be said. The international community can do three things: “put pressure on the state in question, give advice and resources, and be exemplary in their own ways of dealing with a difficult past” (Forsberg 2003: 80–1). The record suggests that the international community has not been exemplary, and that it is caught in the eternal conundrum of choosing between the political demand of making peace and the moral claims of doing justice (Biggar 2003: 13).

A starting point might be to consider the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a model for dealing with transitional justice. It is, however, not without its faults. There is an apparent lack of a comprehensive reparations program for apartheid victims; there is tension between a top-down and bottom-up approach (van der Merwe 2003: 107); it has not tackled properly the issue of horizontal violence (Hamber 2003: 167); and it made no claims to be comprehensive. On the other hand the South African TRC “most remarkably indicated the possibility of making public the names and conduct of human rights violators without unleashing vigilante revenge against them” (Minow 2003: 94). In addition it has helped reassure direct and indirect victims that the political future will not be a repeat of the past. As Asmal *et al.* put it:

In these early years of consolidating democracy, there must be a galvanizing and self-critical vision of the goals of our society. And such a vision in turn requires a

clear-sighted . . . grasp of what was wrong in the past . . . An important goal of the [Truth and Reconciliation] commission is to act as a catalyst for swift and thorough disclosure of past horrors, in order to . . . end . . . the steady and corrosive drip of past pathologies into the new order.

(Biggar 2003: fn. 11, 20–1)

In short, truth recovery and memory retrieval is about making possible a future. One South African scholar said that “[R]econciliation is the work of many lifetimes” (Elshtain 2003: 59). It is about process and South Africa may be the place to begin:

If reconciliation is seen not as simply resolving particular ruptures in relationships that need repair, but rather as a process of building a society’s capacity to reconstruct relationships in an ongoing way, the TRC may be seen as a starting point in the creation of a new culture of storytelling, and articulation of values and needs by groups at all levels of society.

(van der Merwe 2003: 119)

## Conclusion

A final health warning is in order. There is no simple panacea. Coming out of the past is culturally and politically specific. Three factors are relevant in choosing a particular strategy: “political circumstances, the nature of the problems and knowledge about how to deal with them, and the need to identify with democratic states” (Elshtain 2003: 58). But even that is to simplify. The thrust of this chapter has been to explain that there is no quick fix. Individual and collective memory does not adapt easily to a fixed formula. It is valid to suggest that, in certain circumstances, we should not remember unless and until we are convinced that the past is not about determining the future. Equally, it is a simplification to say that we “should draw a line in the sand.” The past needs to be reviewed because it has the capacity to be resurrected in a malign manner.

There may be a *via media*. Small constructive steps can lead to greater understanding. A more benign scenario can be constructed through the art of storytelling to a more general consideration of the role of the arts in reconciliation. That represents the Gandhian ideal of lighting one candle.

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# 27 Shifting from coherent toward holistic peace processes

*Susan Allen Nan*

## **Introduction**

The conflict resolution field is moving from a paradigm of coherent peace processes, which seek to fit various “pieces of peace” together, to a paradigm of holistic peace processes, which seek a whole peace indivisible into separate parts. To present this shift in the conflict resolution field, this chapter reviews both the development of the literature on building overall peace processes through contingent application of particular conflict resolution interventions in various combinations and at various stages in the peace process, and also the more recent literature that encourages viewing these complex phenomena more dynamically as holistic peace processes.

First, this chapter considers the development of the contingency approach to conflict analysis and resolution. The contingency approach, simply put, seeks to apply particular types of conflict resolution interventions to conflicts, contingent upon the stages, timing, or sequencing within that peace process. Thus, typologies of conflict resolution activities are requisite to the full development of the contingency approach. These are reviewed. In addition, the chapter reviews the literature on sequencing, stages, and timing analyses, which are also components of the contingency approach. If certain types of conflict resolution activities are to be applied in the most complementary sequences, at the most appropriate stages, and with the best timing, coordination is requisite to a successful contingency approach. Thus, the literature on conflict resolution coordination is reviewed as the logical outgrowth of the development of the contingency approach.

The chapter concludes with an exploration of the concept of holistic peace processes as a further development in conflict resolution theory. The concept of holistic peace processes implies that building peace is more than taking care of a series of interrelated separate “pieces of peace” that fit together in a coherent manner. The properties of a whole peace process cannot be determined by the sum of the pieces. Rather, the whole peace process and the pieces of peace mutually influence each other. An understanding of holistic peace processes implies that the search for a predictably successful formula for set sequences and combinations of interventions for set stages of conflict will continue to be frustrated by the dynamism of conflicts and peace processes. In addition, coordination by outside intervenors is limited by that dynamism, and requires more attunement to “on the ground” developments in peace processes than to prescriptive recipes for peace.

## **Contingency approaches to conflict analysis and resolution**

A contingency approach to third party intervention matches the type of intervention to the characteristics of the conflict, which may be situational or structural (Fisher and Keashly

1991). This approach is based on an understanding of conflict as escalating, de-escalating, and acquiring different characteristics over time. The contingency approach hypothesizes that at certain stages, or in certain situations, particular conflict resolution actions and roles are more effective in positively influencing the conflict process.

In an insightful unpublished paper, Ilana Shapiro (1994) outlines the diversity within the key elements of a contingency approach, the frameworks of conflict characteristics, and the frameworks of intervention types. She distinguishes those contingency approaches that focus the conflict characteristics around static features (e.g. Potapchuk and Carlson 1987; Sheppard 1984) from the contingency approaches (e.g. Fisher and Keashly 1991; Kriesberg 1991) that see dynamics and stages as central conflict characteristics.

The contingency approach was utilized more widely and earlier within organizational and small-group conflict resolution research. One of the earliest contingency models is Glasl's (1982) model of multiple approaches, which is effective for different situations within nine stages of conflict. Another early example is Blair Sheppard's (1984) influential argument for a general framework of conflict intervention procedures, criteria for choosing these procedures, and some discussion of the conflict characteristics that are relevant to the study of procedures. Sheppard brought an explicit contingency approach to the study of conflict resolution early in the development of this approach, and others have built on his contribution.

For example, Potapchuk and Carlson (1987) also hypothesize that specific conflict resolution activities are more effective for specific conflict situations, and that it is possible to predict which strategies are more likely to result in agreement. They build on Sheppard's framework to link conflict resolution techniques to both the stages of and the relationships within conflicts. In addition, these community conflict resolvers introduced the idea that the intervenor must work with the conflict parties to analyze the conflict situation, and choose together an appropriate initial conflict resolution process. Potapchuk and Carlson outline a progression in community conflict in which the conflict resolution processes change from conciliation, through mediation, to facilitation as the conflict climate and relationships evolve.

This chapter focuses more on intergroup conflict than organizational conflict and thus neglects further consideration of some of the contingency-related organizational conflict resolution literature. Nevertheless, cross-fertilization within the literature focused on various conflict contexts, as documented above, has enriched all areas of the field.

Fisher and Keashly (1991) are the leading researchers within the contingency approach to intergroup conflict resolution. They describe, for example, conflict resolution activities and the conflict in Cyprus by employing an explicit contingency model. Their joint 1991 article highlights the fundamental, but often overlooked, idea that two different conflict resolution activities could combine to move a conflict toward resolution. They match their parsimonious typology of conflict resolution activities (conciliation, pure mediation, consultation, power mediation, arbitration, and peacekeeping) with four stages of conflict (discussion, polarization, segregation, and destruction) to illustrate how sequences of appropriate interventions can de-escalate a conflict. The conflict in Cyprus provides an extensive example of the applied framework in which the authors highlight the potential of consultation combined with mediation to de-escalate protracted intergroup conflicts. They call this positive combination *complementarity*.

Keashly and Fisher (1996) build on their complementarity work by considering related empirical research and anecdotal evidence in the context of their conceptual framework. For example, Prein (1984) provides Keashly and Fisher with empirical evidence for the

complementarity of mediation and consultation. This finding indicates that consultation is more effective in situations of miscommunication and mistrust, but that mediation is more effective in situations dominated by substantive issues. In their research, Keashly and Fisher (1996) classify the remaining empirical studies into intergroup conflict simulations that test specific pieces of the framework, and case studies that retrospectively apply the framework to a specific conflict. Taken together, these simulations and case studies suggest that problemsolving conflict resolution activities are effective as pre-negotiation, and in providing a basis for official negotiations and agreements. Keashly and Fisher conclude by acknowledging that further empirical research is necessary to test the overall framework further.

Keashly and Fisher (1996) provoke thoughtful critiques in the same volume, edited by Bercovitch. Webb and his colleagues (1996) argue that the contingency model presented by Keashly and Fisher “oversimplifies real-world situations in such a way as to require considerable modification of their conclusions” (Webb *et al.* 1996: 171). They argue that the contexts of international conflicts significantly differ from each other in ways that the organizational conflicts that sparked the contingency approach may not. Citing the complexity of international conflicts, they discourage strict adherence to the contingency framework formulae. Rather, they persuasively suggest that conceptual frameworks must be flexible and contextually relevant to reflect the specificities of international conflicts and the rapid shifts in dynamics such conflicts exhibit on multiple conflict levels. Webb and his colleagues criticize Keashly and Fisher’s framework as being too rough in its differentiation of conflict resolution activities, and too simplistic with its four-stage model. In addition, they are pessimistic about revised attempts at contingency approaches having any impact on practice. They question the practicality of the approach and the implications that Keashly and Fisher claim it will have for coordination and sequencing of interventions. Webb *et al.* argue that such coordination is politically not feasible, and that to believe such coordination possible is to suppose an international authority and control that are impossible. They illustrate these critiques of Keashly and Fisher’s model with a case study of the mediating activities in Yugoslavia as seen through that model, and as borne out in time. Webb *et al.* conclude: “What this combination of strategic and psychological levels, ambiguity, complexity of motives, and so on implies for the mediation process is that rather than restricting it to particular kinds of intervention, care should be taken to maintain all kinds of intervention at all times” (*ibid.*: 183).

My (Nan 1999) search for complementary and contradictory combinations of interventions sought to respond to Webb *et al.*’s pleas to maintain all types of intervention at all times by identifying more specific guidance. The world lacks the conflict resolution resources to maintain all types of intervention at all times, but clearly many interventions do take place simultaneously and/or in sequence. My focused comparative case study of three post-Soviet sovereignty conflicts found that there was indeed a strong complementarity between track one and a half diplomacy, in the form of long-term, unofficial facilitated joint analysis amongst negotiators, and track one official negotiations. Track one and a half diplomacy refers to unofficial conflict resolution efforts involving senior officials from the conflict who participate in their personal capacities, not as official representatives of the parties to the conflict. Track one and a half diplomacy, when proceeding prior to and during the official negotiations, offered substantive, procedural, and relational contributions to the official negotiations. Other findings were not remarkably distinct from Webb *et al.*’s conclusion that we should “maintain all kinds of intervention at all times” (Webb *et al.* 1996: 183). More elaborate and more flexible contingency models better address Webb *et al.*’s critiques.

John Paul Lederach (1997), for example, shares Webb *et al.*'s view of conflict as multifaceted, complex, and changing over time. Yet Lederach connects many frameworks together to describe multiple aspects of conflict and conflict resolution. Lederach's approach includes contingency elements in which he not only presents clear typologies of resolution activities (adapted from Mitchell 1988, described below), but also matches these with conceptual frameworks of conflict actors, time range, stages, and even coordination between conflict resolution efforts. Lederach links, for example, the conflict resolution roles and functions that others have listed with stages of conflict escalation and resolution in which those functions may be most useful. His delineation of grassroots, mid-range, and top leadership into different groups to work within conflict resolution efforts highlights more of the complexity of intergroup conflict than Keashly and Fisher's simpler and earlier model, which Webb *et al.* critiqued. However, the additional complexity of Lederach's multifaceted model would make contingency research from that perspective all the more complex in comparison with the relative parsimony of Keashly and Fisher's approach.

Mitchell (1988) adds another factor of multiple conflict resolution activities that is relevant to a contingency approach. He describes goals that motivate intervenors, and notes that not only adversaries but also third parties engage in analysis of the "relative costs and benefits of adopting one strategy rather than another" (*ibid.*: 48). This implies that contingency considerations should include not only the range of possible actions and an assessment of the conflict situation, but also an assessment of the intervenor's range of realistic options and preferences.

Bloomfield (1997) advanced the contingency approach to intergroup conflict further by thoughtfully and constructively criticizing Fisher and Keashly's model and proposing improvements. Bloomfield notes that a contingency framework must be flexible in order to consider contextually relevant variables. He illustrates this through his case study of peacemaking strategies in Northern Ireland. In addition Bloomfield takes the significant step of considering complementary peacemaking efforts.

This brief review of work considering contingency approaches illustrates that there is support for the intuitive hypothesis that the contingent application of conflict resolution efforts is likely to be more successful than generic application of conflict resolution efforts. Substantial research has found that certain mediating actions are more effective at certain stages of conflicts (Kriesberg and Thorson 1991; Fisher and Keashly 1991). However, beyond a few limited studies such as mine (Nan 1999), empirical research has failed to comprehensively consider the cumulative and interactive effects of sets of multiple interventions, or the influence that some interventions may have on the contingent application of others. That may be because conflict resolution apparently cannot be captured accurately by models that are parsimonious enough to be useful. However, conflict resolution theorists have gallantly tried to develop useful typologies of conflict resolution activities, and frameworks of peace process sequencing, stages, and timing. The futility of these attempts points to the need for a new paradigm of peace processes. A rough sketch of that emerging paradigm is introduced after a presentation of literature focused on typologies of conflict resolution activities, frameworks of sequencing, stages, and timing, and coordination of conflict resolution activities.

### ***Typologies of conflict resolution activities***

A typology of conflict resolution activities is an integral part of any contingency framework that matches appropriate conflict resolution efforts to appropriate conflict characteristics.

Just as Webb *et al.* (1996) raised questions about the basis on which conflict characteristics are categorized for a contingency approach, this review of different ways of distinguishing conflict resolution activities raises questions about which classification method is the most useful for a contingency approach that focuses on intergroup conflict. The variety of typologies presented in the conflict resolution literature suggests that multiple typologies may be useful. Each typology highlights a different aspect of conflict resolution. A combination of several typologies of conflict resolution activities may more fully consider the variety of aspects of interventions that are relevant to the decisions involved in contingently applying conflict resolution approaches. These intervention aspects center around the goals of conflict resolution efforts, and consist of the conflict arena acted upon; the function of intervention in the conflict; the level at which the conflict is affected; and the process employed. Where the goals of conflict resolution efforts focus on specific problems identified in the conflict situation, complementary interventions may aim at different specific problems amongst the multiple problems present in complex conflicts.

Diamond and McDonald (1993) present a conceptual framework and theory of the types of conflict resolution activities that fall along one of nine tracks they identify as integral to multitrack diplomacy:

- track 1: governmental;
- track 2: professional conflict resolution;
- track 3: business;
- track 4: private citizen;
- track 5: research and education;
- track 6: activism;
- track 7: religious;
- track 8: funding;
- track 9: public opinion.

These nine tracks are distinguished from each other by both the arena of the conflict involved (e.g. official governmental or business or social attitudes) and by the actors that are appropriate for each track (e.g. government officials, private citizens, business people). This framework reflects more of the variety of activities and actors that together form a systemic approach to peacemaking by clarifying tracks that are hidden by the more usual distinction between track one (governmental) and track two (non-governmental) conflict resolution activities.

In addition, Fisher's (1986) work clarifies approaches that would be hidden by the more popular terminology clustering all conflict resolution together. Grouping all conflict resolution activities together as "conflict resolution" does not allow a distinction to be drawn between different types of potentially complementary or contradictory conflict resolution initiatives. In an earlier article, Fisher distinguishes third party consultation and problemsolving approaches from other efforts for de-escalating international conflict. He draws distinctions based on the process employed. He describes the general process model included in this broad consultation and problemsolving category of conflict resolution activities as "a small group discussion method in which an impartial team of facilitators improves communication and institutes dialogue between the antagonists" (*ibid.*: 18).

Elsewhere, Fisher (1993) distinguishes broader categories of conflict resolution activities (peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking) not on the basis of process primarily, but also on the basis of their overall goals. Again, he works to clarify a set of activities that



are overlooked by the more usual distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking. These overlooked activities are the set of activities that form peacebuilding. Fisher (*ibid.*: 247) defines peacebuilding as “interactive and developmental activities to improve the relationship and address basic needs.”

Mari Fitzduff (1993) presents a related typology of approaches to community conflict resolution work that also focuses on the goals of activities as the distinguishing variable. She distinguishes between two major approaches that include thirteen narrower categories of work to improve community relations. The larger categories are focused and contextual work. Focused work explicitly addresses negative aspects of community relations directly, and contextual work addresses the broader context of the system in which negative community relations develop. Focused community relations work includes:

- mutual understanding work;
- anti-sectarian work;
- anti-intimidation work;
- cultural traditions work;
- justice and rights work;
- political options work;
- interchurch work;
- conflict resolution work.

Fitzduff (1993) divides the more contextual community relations work into:

- community development;
- trusted and accessible security forces;
- pluralist environments;
- targeting social need;
- training in critical thinking.

In contrast to the above approaches that emphasize either the process being used or the goal of the intervention, Kriesberg (1996a) and Mitchell (1993) offer typologies that focus on the functions fulfilled by conflict resolvers. Kriesberg outlines twelve “mediating activities” that include specific functions that mediators perform:

- selecting issues;
- selecting parties;
- providing good offices;
- communicating each side’s views;
- reframing conflict as a problem;
- suggesting new options;
- raising costs of failing to de-escalate;
- adding resources for settlement;
- helping to create parity;
- building trust and credibility;
- fostering reconciliation;
- legitimizing and helping to implement a proposal or agreement.



Kriesberg's (1996a) activities resonate with the intermediary roles and functions Mitchell (1993) outlined. These functions include:

- explorer;
- convenor;
- decoupler;
- unifier;
- ensembler;
- envisioner;
- guarantor;
- facilitator;
- legitimizer;
- enhancer;
- monitor;
- enforcer;
- reconciler.

These one-word role descriptions summarize longer explanations of the tasks and functions of these roles. Even considering these longer task and function descriptions, Mitchell's framework does not include the trust-building activity that Kriesberg lists; and Kriesberg's mediation-focused framework does not include the unifier, monitor, and enforcer functions that Mitchell describes. Taken together, however, these frameworks provide a fairly broad overview of not the goals or processes, but the functions of conflict resolution activities.

Within this variety of activity, no intervenors or parties can undertake all possible strategies for affecting the course of a conflict. Further, each individual or institution is situated with particular abilities and constraints. Clearly, various conflict resolvers can, and do, play different roles in their attempts to resolve communal conflict, as illustrated by Mitchell's (1993) outline of intermediary roles and functions described above. Mitchell also argues for the necessity of multiple intervenors and multiple intervention roles in conflict. The thirteen roles in mediation processes that he lists must often, but not always, be played by different actors. For example, the intervenor who "enhances the negotiating skills of a guerrilla leadership or the administrative structure of a secessionist movement almost certainly disqualifies itself from enacting any future role in the mediation process" (*ibid.*: 146). Kriesberg focuses more on conflict resolution processes than on the mediators themselves. His work acknowledges that the actor who performs these mediating processes can vary. "The services may be provided by a person, group, or organization playing the role of a mediator, or by a quasi-mediator, social entity not so designated, who may be a member of one of the adversaries" (1996a: 19).

Typologies of multiple conflict resolution activities are linked to understanding conflict as multifaceted in a way that allows various activities to act on aspects of the conflict and move it towards resolution. Such multifaceted analyses consider the development of intergroup conflict as determined by multiple variables, though some practitioners address one set of these variables, whereas other practitioners turn towards other sets of variables. The analyses reviewed above see intermediaries and their activities as spanning a broad spectrum in large group conflicts. Kriesberg (1991) notes that resolution of a conflict is never attributable to a single causal variable. "Consequently, no mediating activity can be the sufficient cause for the movement. However, it may be a necessary contributing

factor” (ibid.: 26; see also Sandole 1999). Within the contingency approach, the multiple conflict resolution activities may be seen as multiple influences in large conflict resolution processes.

### ***Sequencing, stages, and timing***

Sequencing, stages, and timing also form an integral part of an overall contingency framework. For each contingency approach, practitioners must consider when the particular conflict resolution activities outlined above should be employed. Another important question is how the practicalities and politics of conflict resolution work in practice. These practicalities may limit possibilities for actual contingent employment of conflict resolution activities.

Considering the ideas of sequencing, stages, and timing in relation to intergroup conflict, Kelman (1982) examines the pre-negotiation process as a stage in conflict resolution that should precede negotiation. In articulating the concept of a pre-negotiation process, Kelman clarifies that one set of activities can build communication skills and relationships that will be integral to an effective negotiation process. One intervention can pave the way for another. It should also be noted that one intervention might also ruin any chance of success in a particular year for another intervention. For example, dramatically decreased trust as the result of negative interactions could temporarily close the door to more positive interactions.

Kleiboer and t’Hart (1995) survey numerous approaches to the timing of conflict resolution activities and relate the various approaches to timing to larger conceptions of the nature of conflict resolution. According to Kleiboer and t’Hart, those who see mediation as power brokerage see timing of mediations as closely linked to the “ripeness” of events on the battlefield. On the other hand, those who see mediation as re-establishing social relationships conceive of a comprehensive intervention in which mediation is more loosely linked to battlefield developments, and the “ripe” moment is the moment when both parties want to talk. In addition, Mitchell (1995) presents a similarly comprehensive review of notions of “ripeness” or good timing for mediations, and outlines four models encompassed within the literature.

Finally, the contingency approach recognizes that conflict should not be assumed to follow exactly any pure type model of conflict dynamics. Kriesberg (1996a) argues that concepts of stages in intergroup conflict are useful if not used too rigidly in analysis. Although he cites a basic pattern of conflict emergence, escalation, de-escalation, and settlement, Kriesberg emphasizes that “the point of noting a sequence is to emphasize that conflicts evolve and mediation is likely to take different forms at different stages in their evolution” (ibid.: 222).

### ***Coordination of conflict resolution activities***

The contingency approach, with its emphasis on matching conflict resolution interventions to peace process characteristics such as sequencing, stages, and timing, established the basis for considering coordination of conflict resolution activities to best realize the benefits of contingent conflict resolution intervention planning and implementation.

Kriesberg’s (1996b) work also forms a significant part of the early literature on coordination of conflict resolution efforts in intergroup conflict. With regard to complementarity, Kriesberg considers specific ways in which interventions can contradict or complement

each other. He provides examples of various interactions, including overloading the adversaries' attentiveness; conveying competing expectations; intermediaries acting to undercut one another's policies; and intermediaries pursuing incompatible policies. On the positive side of interactive interventions, he notes sequential supplementary work in which one intervention paves the way for another; and contemporaneous supplementary work in which various interventions reinforce work at different levels of the conflict. These areas of potential complementarity, as well as areas of potentially contradictory interactive effects, point to the importance of coordinated attempts to increase complementarity (*ibid.*).

Lederach (1997) also described coordination as a logical and necessary step arising from a conception of multiple useful conflict resolution roles. Like Kriesberg (1996b), he argues for

the conceptual recognition of the validity of various components [of conflict resolution] and a means of finding more explicit points of contact and coordination among them, so that the contribution of each can be maximized and the uniqueness of each perspective integrated in an overall strategy for conflict transformation.

(Lederach 1997: 66).

More recent conflict resolution literature has considered "the challenges of and opportunities for coordination . . . [such as] differences in organizational mission, culture, resources, strategies, and operation" (Nan and Strimling 2006: 2). Many scholar-practitioners have considered the interactions involved in coordination as negotiations of sorts. Two case studies of coordination focus on the community-building aspects of those negotiations (Garb and Nan 2006; Hackley *et al.* 2006). Other literature considers coordination specifically between track one (official) and track two (unofficial) diplomacy (Fisher 2006; Strimling 2006; Hemmer *et al.* 2006).

The conflict resolution literature has all but reached a consensus that appropriate coordination constitutes an important asset in most peace process contexts. Indeed, significant figures in the field have argued for more institutionalization of coordination (Babbitt 2006; Kelman 2006) and recommend ways that funders could better support coordination (Greenberg 2006).

## **Toward holistic peace processes**

Despite the significant interest in and development of the contingency approach to conflict resolution, and related interest in coordination, the contingency approach has not managed to fine-tune specific prescriptive guidelines for conflict resolution practitioners. Throughout the contingency literature, particularly the empirical research, the "messiness" of conflict continued to challenge the development of parsimonious theory. But, as these attempts to fine-tune guidelines progressed, strands of research emerged, suggesting the emergence of a new paradigm. Instead of seeking to build coherent peace processes, in which the pieces fit appropriately together with each other and the conflict dynamics, these strands of research consider holistic peace processes in which elements of the whole appear, no matter how one tries to separate "a piece of the peace." These strands of research are eclectic, but share an implicitly holistic analysis.

For example, Louise Diamond (1994) describes the process of conflict transformation as an heroic journey, in which conflicts exist in a systems setting such that any change in one area is felt throughout the system. Indeed, in the systemic process of discovery

Diamond describes, the very process of seeking conflict resolution is a process of both individual and social transformation. Diamond describes a five-step process for transforming conflict (the source, the quest, the test, the shift, and the renewal), but emphasizes that these stages are not linear. Rather, “what happens in each directly affects what may happen in the others” (*ibid.*: 19).

Further, Dennis Sandole (1998, 2007: ch. 2) utilizes metaphors of pillars to delineate three aspects of conflict for analytical purposes. Pillar one deals with the conflict, pillar two the causes and conditions of the conflict, and pillar three the intervention into the conflict. All three of these pillars are, presumably, inseparable parts of one whole structure, such that a shift in any one of them (pillar one or two) produces shifts in others (pillar three).

John Paul Lederach (2005: 5) highlights the moral imagination that must permeate throughout the conflict resolution process. Conflict resolution, in addressing one or several or all aspects of the conflict, requires an awareness of the present realities and those that could be brought forth through encouragement. Lederach writes:

The moral imagination requires the capacity to imagine ourselves in a web of relationships that includes our enemies; the ability to sustain a paradoxical curiosity that embraces complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity; the fundamental belief in and pursuit of the creative act; and the acceptance of the inherent risk of stepping into the mystery of the unknown that lies beyond the far too familiar landscape of violence.

Accordingly, holistic peace processes are evoked by reference to a web of relationships, embracing complexity, and the mystery of the unknown.

Daniel Bowling and David Hoffman (2003), along with their colleagues, also consider capacities and abilities that are useful for conflict resolution. However, they focus specifically on the qualities of the mediator that can help “bring peace into the room.” Their analysis suggests that subtle dimensions of the mediator’s engagement with the parties may influence the potential for conflict resolution. Their analysis is not, however, amenable to separating “pieces of peace” and considering them in isolation. The mediator’s engagement with the parties occurs only in relationship with the parties.

Kenneth Cloke presents another strand of theory that resonates with the holistic peace processes concept. He writes, “Every conflict is holographic and systemic, so that each part contains and recapitulates the whole” (2006: 44). Cloke’s analysis is based primarily on interpersonal, community, and organizational conflict resolution experience; each issue in a conflict is a doorway into potential transformation of the whole conflict. This holographic nature of conflict explains why apparently insignificant interventions can catalyze larger shifts towards resolution. Again, in Cloke’s explanation, the intervention on one issue cannot be considered appropriately in isolation from the whole of the conflict. Cloke also describes the interconnectedness of thinking, feeling, sensation, and intention within conflict and conflict resolution.

Building on Goldberg’s (2005) focus on the role of values in conflict resolution practice, Goldberg and Blancke (2007) also present an understanding of interconnectedness within conflict resolution. Goldberg and Blancke develop a model of mediation they refer to as wisdom mediation. Wisdom mediation draws on interconnected somatic, emotional, cognitive, and spiritual ways of knowing to more holistically engage in conflict resolution.

The emerging paradigm of holistic peace processes resonates with shifts toward holistic ways of knowing, found in many areas of study. Lincoln and Guba (1985: 51) note the

growing recognition of the inseparability of knower and known within fields as diverse as “physics, chemistry, brain theory, ecology, evolution, mathematics, philosophy, politics, psychology, linguistics, religion, consciousness, and the arts.”

Finally, consider Abdul Aziz Said’s (2006: 1) call for “moving beyond ‘pieces of peace’ to total peace.” Said describes the necessity of reorienting international relations towards an understanding that sees the whole of existence contained in the parts. He presents such an approach as the “best – and perhaps only – hope for transcending separateness and encouraging universal solidarity.”

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have reviewed conflict resolution theory that focuses on building strong overall peace processes through a synergy of multiple conflict resolution processes applied in a contingent manner. Whereas much literature, including my own earlier work, has focused on connecting “pieces of peace” together into strong overall peace processes, in this chapter I emphasize the potential benefits of developing the concept of holistic peace processes. I argue that many previous theory-building efforts, including my own, were misguided in their attempts to identify clear causal links between specific types of conflict resolution efforts in specific types of conflict contexts with predictable outcomes. More holistic approaches to peace processes recognize the inherent wholeness of a peace process, in which changes seemingly focused on one area create reverberations throughout the whole process. The concept of holistic peace processes promises to advance understanding of conflict and conflict resolution further by discarding the mechanistic metaphor implicit in the contingency approach and making room for the “art and soul of peacebuilding” (Lederach 2005). Empirical research should explore further the potential practical implications of the holistic peace process concept.

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# 28 Law and legal processes in resolving international conflicts

*Michelle Gallant*

## Introduction

Law casts its shadow on virtually all areas of human conflict. The dissolution of marriage and the resolution of familial obligations and property rights upon the breakdown of personal relationships occur against the backdrop of a legal framework. Conflicts with a state over access to public resources or the rights of defendants in a criminal trial are regulated and resolved within the context of constitutionally binding legal norms and domestic human rights instruments. Tensions between competing corporate enterprises over injury to financial interests or access to markets are determined in accordance with the legal principles that govern contracts and commercial affairs. Law exerts its force in almost all areas where interests collide and some form of conflict ensues.

Law casts no less a shadow on international affairs although its influence and relevance in this sphere tend to be most keenly challenged. The cacophony of critics who deride the utility of the international legal apparatus resonates around the globe. From trade to war to attaching criminal liability to heads of states, law stands accused of affording little value to the resolution of international discord.

Accusations stem chiefly from a persistent belief, that when law confronts the formidable power of individual sovereign nations, it is law that must concede. It is the dictates of powerful players, not the dictates of law, that reigns supreme in the international milieu.

There is some validity to this accusation. Law does, at times, yield to power. But the converse is equally true: power does, with considerable regularity, respect law. Even when state actions do not conform to a rule of law, law frames the conflict, and structures the analysis of its underlying dynamics. Though law may not always determine a particular outcome, it has more than a mere vestige of relevance to the resolution of international conflicts.

This chapter seeks to demonstrate how the shadow of law informs international conflicts. The first part sketches certain broad themes of law and legal process as they manifest in the global sphere. Organized around a discussion of the regulation of the use of force, a context in which legal norms attract disdain, the second part illustrates the capacity of law and legal process to shape and moderate warfare. Rather than a robust defense of international legal order, this chapter gently rebukes the myopic claim that law contributes little to the mitigation of interstate conflicts.

## Law and legal process

To speak of international law is to speak of a complex dynamic system whose central task is to organize relationships between sovereign states (Simpson 2001). It is a system whose

political dimensions are more pronounced than any equivalent domestic rule of law. No doubt financial power, the ability to engage the services of the best and the brightest team of advocates, plays a role in the resolution of conflicts within a domestic order. Similar influences animate international conflict resolution, particularly given that an impressive, influential capacity resides in but a few states.

But, at the domestic and the international level, law is more than mere politics. As an institution, law necessarily reflects the political realities of the environment within which it occurs, its content and application heavily influenced by influential actors. At the same time, law strives to restrain and to regulate politics. Law struggles to create a state of global governance that reflects the norms of justice that best represent the interests of most of the international participants most of the time.

It is equally reductionist to equate law with a collection of legal texts, a set of global governance edicts. International law necessarily embodies substantive rules, a core constituent element of any legal conflict resolution mechanism. Importantly, it comprises, like domestic systems, global legal processes, procedural spaces within which rules evolve and are debated, assessed, and applied to international disagreements (Higgins 1994).

The substantive content of law regulates international conflicts in several ways. At an obvious and decidedly elementary level, the existence of norms introduces an element of order into an otherwise chaotic world. International law permits some measure of ordered interaction between states. Without law, collisions between states would invariably be the rule rather than the exception. Law prevents the eruption of international conflicts by offering a medium for harmonious ordering of economic, political, and social interactions between sovereign states (Higgins 1994: 1).

This mundane organizational function of global norms tends to be overlooked. Collisions between international aircraft and the coordination of global telecommunications as well as access to tax revenues and rights to the products of the high seas are all organized through international agreements. Although states may disagree with an interpretation of law as it applies to a discrete dispute, a vast portion of international norms is devoted to the coordination of affairs that transcend national boundaries, the potential for conflict diminished by the presence of a legal order.

When collisions amongst state interests do occur, legal norms frame the analysis and allow legitimacy to be discerned. Law provides tangible known standards against which the rightness or wrongness of individual state action can be assessed. Legitimacy flows from the apparent agreement between legal norms and the actions or claims of state actors. Conformity with law confers legitimacy. Without a set of basic global norms of conduct, all state action would be neither legitimate nor illegitimate, neither right nor wrong. Militarism, for example, the theory that the use of force is always justified, would prevail were there no set of international rules that regulated the use of a state's military capacity (Charles 2005: 124). Chronic invasions of the territory of another state would be neither just nor unjust, neither lawful nor unlawful, without some legal framework that prohibited military interventions and delineated the conditions under which it proved acceptable. At the domestic level, it is the existence of law that permits the lawful characters to be distinguished from the outlaws. At the international level, the fact of norms permits the characterization of state actors as international pariahs or as law-abiding members of an international community.

Whether the system actually succeeds in tangibly attending to illegitimate actions, to deviations from the international rules of order, is a different question. The complaint that law fails to adequately contain aberrant state conduct is most adroitly pressed when law

rankles the interests of powerful states. Yet it is the very presence of law that discloses this illegitimacy problem: law, the fact of external standards, helps to reveal the disjuncture between power and law. Applying global criminal laws, trade rules, or any other global rules in a systematic and fair fashion presents a challenge for the international order. A system has at least some modest relevance when it renders visible radical departures from the known rules.

Although rules constitute a foundational core of a legal conflict resolution mechanism, they are of little value without some system of adjudication, some forum within which the rules can be discerned, debated and applied to discrete disputes. The international apparatus provides a number of conflict resolution venues: the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Security Council, international courts, and other, more regional, procedural arenas.

Processing venues are a constituent element of any legal enterprise. Appropriate dispute processing either enhances or detracts from legitimacy. An allegation acquires credence when a third party forum assesses and adjudicates upon its merits. Vetting a controversy through an intermediary either confirms or reduces the taint of self-interest: the charge, for example, that a state is creatively reshaping legal norms to suit its own self-interested ends. The verdict of a processing venue, a broader more inclusive setting, has more authority than the urgings of a signal actor.

States invariably claim that they are acting in accordance with international norms. Like a plaintiff in the domestic context, they present their claim in the most advantageous manner, arguing, and marshaling the evidence if necessary, to substantiate their case. Conflict resolution anticipates this posturing. It is the forum's task, its processing function, to discern the precise content of the legal rules and whether the claim satisfies the threshold principles of global order.

Legal processing serves another critical function. Processing enables a fuller analysis of the dynamics that underlie an international disagreement. The historical, economic or political underpinnings of a putative claim to right are exposed through processing. Claims may be challenged, contrary arguments presented and disputed, and states called to formally defend or refute contradictory evidence.

Whereas a political component informs all international conflicts, it is through processing and through the application of legal norms within an international forum that political undertones become lucidly perceptible. Some measure of processing, however modest, formally challenges states to defend their actions along conventional principles of law. Conflict processing, at times, exposes the explosive and controversial aspects of state actions, and gives them global prominence. Evidence is examined and disputed, perspectives presented and contradicted, the political distilled from the principle, when conflicts contend with the forces of rigorous global legal processing.

Legal conflict processing does not always result in a legal resolution of a dilemma or the imposition of a solution on the disputing parties. Its role, more often than not, is more subtle or indirect. Processing can be considered a form of dialogue or structured international negotiation that is framed by law. States may recant their original positions or opt for a negotiated settlement when processing reveals the weight of negative opinion that a particular course of action provokes. Legal processing evinces its value as a medium of organized multiparty dialogue on how best to resolve, in the absence of an authoritative legal verdict, a particular conflict.

Finally, some degree of conflict processing may be a requisite ingredient of an organized global response to a breach of international law. The United Nations Security Council,

for example, considers the legitimacy of competing claims of a breach of international peace prior to the authorization of any retaliatory actions (Charter Article 41). Chapter VII action, a collective response – either economic or military – to the violent rending of global peace, requires the prior consent of the Security Council. This ensures that some degree of analysis, negotiation, and discussion precedes a collective response. Moreover, this venue prioritizes arguably less violent responses such as economic sanctions rather than military responses (Charter Articles 41 and 42) although sanctions are not bereft of their own violent ramifications (Weiss *et al.* 1997).

International norms and international processing spaces clearly contribute to the resolution of interstate disputes. They are equally clearly not devoid of deficiencies. To a degree, the norms reflect the imperatives of dominant states and dominant voices within those states (Knop 1993; Koskenniemi 1990). Evolving norms, for example, tend to favor the expansionist empires of the nineteenth century rather than colonial peoples or indigenous populations (Anghie 1999). And it would be somewhat disingenuous to describe international processing forums as neutral venues untouched by the nuances of history and politics. For many years, the structure of the United Nations Security Council, a relic of World War II, has been strongly condemned as decidedly unrepresentative of the geo-political context of modern international affairs; the need for structural reforms is a constant and recurrent item on the United Nations agenda (Slaughter 2006). Nor is access to conflict processing by international courts unproblematic. The international court of justice has jurisdiction to interpret and apply the norms of international law (Statute of the International Court of Justice Article 36). Yet, in the main, the disputing parties must agree to have their conflict evaluated by the international body. This procedural prerequisite can prevent access to this adjudicatory body, leaving the underlying substantive legal issues unresolved.

Structural reforms would certainly minimize allegations of partiality and enhance the fairness of the conflict processing system. The system flexes and mutates in response to different pressures, developments, and criticisms, aspiring towards the evolution of an apparatus that best reflects the perspectives and interests of a broad spectrum of states.

Yet again, fault-lines and imperfections in a legal system do not mandate its dismantling; some rule of law adds some value to the resolution of conflicts, and is generally preferable to no rule at all.

With rules that define the parameters of conflict resolution and processes through which law can be applied to individual disagreements, the international legal apparatus would prove a tribute to form over substance were it to fail to generate compliance. A structure whose rules are continuously flouted and whose processing venues generate decisions that are ignored offers little prospect of contributing to any effective reduction of international tensions.

As a conflict resolution system, international law distinguishes itself from domestic rule though the absence of a coercive compliance mechanism, an international policing body capable of pressuring recalcitrant states into conformity with global norms. In certain circumstances, such as the regulation of the use of force, distinct enforcement powers exist. In general, coercive compliance is not a defining characteristic of the international conflict resolution model.

Despite this apparent weakness, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time” (Henkin 1979: 47). Most states comply most of the time with the dictates of the global order. This is no less true of disputes related to war than to disputes over rights to natural resources

or to respect for human rights norms. Most states abide by rules of international law. Compliance with legal imperatives is the rule, not the exception.

Without rehearsing the wealth of rationales offered to explain this compliance ethic (Franck 1988; Koh 1996: 194–205), several aspects of international regulation warrant mention. First, compliance without coercion stands as an attribute, not a deficiency, of a legal system. A model of order that relies on consensual observance rather than threat of sanction constitutes a preferred regulatory model.

Second, consensual compliance derives, in part, from the nature of the formation of international rules. States participate in the formation of, and consent to be bound by, international norms. Modern convention-based norms result from negotiations between sovereign states. Potential terms are debated and discussed in multiple rounds of negotiation. After this lengthy and arduous process, the final content of law reflects the agreed consensus of all participants. Once consensus is reached and the text finalized, individual states must formally consent to be bound by the new norm, consciously choosing to surrender an element of their sovereignty in favor of submission to a global norm.

Unlike domestic regulation, a weighty participatory aspect shapes the formation of norms. In democratic states, the capacity to make law is conferred on an elected legislative body, a law-making process that introduces an element of alienation between the governed and the law. Participants elect law-makers but do not directly contribute to the content of law. In the international sphere, the connection between law and the governed is more intimate. There is no delegation of the law-making function. It is the governed who create the law. Legal content is determined by the very participants to whom the law will apply. Participation in the formation of global norms helps to cultivate a compliance ethic.

Finally, in a realm where influential actors regularly jostle with their less influential counterparts, there is at least one compelling reason for the powerful states to comply with international regulation. States are poorly placed to call others to abide by a rule of law when they refuse to apply the same norms to themselves. Canada's moral authority to condemn Iran or North Korea as rogue violators of law has no authenticity if Canada regularly exhibits contempt for the same rules. The compliance ethic disappears when the putative rogue merely imitates other more powerful actors.

## **Law and the regulation of the use of force**

No system of legal norms and processes, however perfectly crafted, can completely eliminate warfare. Ideological, political, ethnic, and economic tensions animate an imperfect world and invariably cause sovereign actors to resort to the use of force. Yet there are at least three discrete ways in which law and legal process aspire to regulate this form of violence: the regulation of the use of force, the regulation of the conditions of warfare, and, of late, the imposition of criminal liability on those who commence an unlawful war, or who commit crimes during the commission of hostilities. Each serves to demonstrate the relevance of international norms to the resolution of conflict.

### ***The prohibition on the use of force***

Modern international law prohibits states from using force in their international affairs (Charter Article 2(4)). By virtue of this prohibition, law establishes that, a priori, any use of force amongst states is illegitimate, a violation of the agreed global norms. At the same time, international law prescribes certain exceptions to this outright prohibition. Force is

justified, according to law, as an act of individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack (Charter Article 52). Equally, force is justified when it receives the explicit sanction of the United Nations Security Council (Charter Chapter VII), a power identified as the collective use of force. An emergent doctrine, a third, yet highly contested, exception to the prohibition is the principle of humanitarian intervention (Ajaj 1993; Brownlie and Apperley 2000; Cohn 2004; Greenwood 2000; Henkin 1999).

Clearly, law provides a concrete framework within which to analyze the legality of military intervention. Deviations from the express prohibition are acknowledged as legitimate only when they meet the justificatory rationales of the international regime. Without this legal context, it would be impossible to contend that the recent interventions into Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo were legal or illegal. There would be no external standards against which to assess the correctness, the legitimacy, of these incursions.

The challenge is to discern the precise contours of this lucid analytic structure when actual events test its capacity to discriminate. When military forces intervened in Iraq in the early 1990s, consensus congealed around the legitimacy of this action. The United Nations Security Council deliberated upon Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait and, through reasonably clear language, authorized a collective military response. Whether the United States-led coalition's intervention into Afghanistan in October 2001 conformed to the tenets of international law proved decidedly contentious (Byers 2002; Franck 2001). The coalition advanced two principal claims: that intervention was justified by previous Security Council authority and that it was justified as an act of self-defense. Although the parameters of the arguments fell within the justificatory frameworks, it was a difficult fit (Byers 2002; Cohn 2004). Although the doctrine of self-defense did not require a specific attack against a state – and Afghanistan quite clearly had not attacked any other state – the doctrine did acknowledge a limited pre-emptive right when an attack was imminent. The imminence of a putative terrorist-related assault orchestrated by non-state actors with the complicity of the Afghanistan Taliban regime proved less tenable.

Law equally shadowed the March 2003 military intervention into Iraq. Again, self-defense arose as a potential justification, the claim that Saddam Hussein was amassing weapons of mass destruction to place at the disposal of terrorist actors. At the time, this justification proved, at best, suspect. Uncertainty informed the other justification, the claim of the prior authority of the Security Council (Murphy 2004). A series of Security Council resolutions, the bulk of which flowed from the September 2001 events in the United States, firmly spoke to the need to address terrorism, and to confront states that sponsored terrorism. Earlier, the 1991 resolution had authorized collective action against Iraq. Whether these sanctioned an assault against Iraq in 2003 proved controversial (*ibid.*; Sands 2005: 174–204). International law framed the conflict but its actual dictates, whether the track of resolutions constituted express authority by the Security Council, were unclear. The quest for legitimacy under international law once again proved ambiguous.

Legal dispute processing equally shaped the events of 2003. Initially, the coalition seeking to take concrete military action against Iraq appeared to solicit a new Security Council declaration authorizing intervention. Debates in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the Security Council exposed the politics of intervention. Germany and France viciously opposed the action, suggesting that imperialist ideals and economic self-interest underpinned the request. Processing questioned the evidence marshaled in support of the “imminence” of a state-sponsored terrorist attack, disclosing inconsistencies, flaws and, possibly, attempts to mislead the international community (Murphy 2004).

It was humanitarian intervention, not self-defense or Security Council authority, that



tested the international legal framework governing the use of force in 1999. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces sought to justify their intervention into the Kosovo region of Serbia as humanitarian intervention. Whereas the United Nations Charter articulates collective action to confront a breach of international peace, no provisions clearly acknowledge that humanitarian intervention constitutes an exception to the prohibition on the use of force. NATO claimed that international law, the right to intervene to halt, or deter, alleged gross abuses of human rights, justified a form of humanitarian intervention (Gray 2004: 37–45). Again, the analytic legal framework shaped the analysis. Again, its actual dictates proved controversial (Brownlie and Apperley 2000; Greenwood 2000). A subsequent resolution confirmed the role of peacekeepers in the Kosovo region but did not confirm the legitimacy of the prior bombing campaign (UNSC Resolution 1247).

Conflict processing and law played another, slightly different, role in the Kosovo crisis. Upon the commencement of the NATO incursions, Yugoslavia sought to establish the unlawful nature of the exercise by resort to an external institution, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Yugoslavia asked the court to discern whether the action conformed with the principles of law (Gray 2004: 45). Unfortunately, the procedural prerequisites of international law precluded that determination. Canada, amongst others who were charged by Yugoslavia as violating international norms, refused to concede to the jurisdiction of the Court (Gray and Evans 2000). The substantive merits of the complaint, whether the NATO forces broke international law, were not determined by the Court. However, in ruminating on the procedural question, the Court did manage to indicate its concern that the intervention did not accord with the principles of international law (Gray 2004: 44–5).

On the one hand, it is a testament to the failure of the international legal system that the inability to discern legality did not prevent the military actions. On the other, law framed the analysis of legality. Moreover, Canada and its co-defendants' refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the international court undermines their moral authority to call others to account. Reliance on a procedural mechanism to preclude adjudication on the substantive merits of an allegation of a breach of law diminishes the defendant states' authority to call others to account before international conflict-processing bodies.

Perhaps more importantly than the question of legitimacy, the legal problem that revealed itself in the context of Kosovo acknowledged a more fundamental problem of international law. Falling in the wake of the abject failure of the international community to intervene in Rwanda in 1994 and the consequent deaths of upward of 800,000 in three short months, Kosovo disclosed the preoccupation of international law with interstate, rather than intrastate, conflicts. International norms are primarily concerned with the regulation of actions between states, not actions within states. The concept of state sovereignty militates against military intervention into the domestic affairs of a sovereign actor. Kosovo and Rwanda demonstrated that, in international law and in international conflict-processing, state sovereignty must give way to the protection of the individual. Marking the dynamic relationship between law, international peace, and the security of the individual, a new international doctrine that acknowledges the primacy of the protection of individuals – the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine – has materialized (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). If accepted and incorporated into international law, the doctrine would provide for a structured military response to alleged interstate human rights abuses that is organized around concrete principles of law and process.



### ***Humanizing war and imposing accountability***

Law and legal process aspire to restrict the use of force. Acknowledging that war persists, international law has long sought to reduce the violence associated with warfare and, of late, sought to impose liability on agents who engage in unlawful warfare. Each introduces an element of law to the resolution of violent conflicts.

International norms seek to inject an element of civility into the conduct of warfare. During the occurrence of warfare, law establishes the minimum lawful parameters within which the hostilities must occur (Dinstein 2004). Unlawful war does not preclude their application: they govern lawful and unlawful exertions of force alike.

In general, law affords a measure of protection to military actors and to civilians. Civilians, for example, are not a lawful military target (Dinstein 2004: 113–40). Prisoners of war receive a minimum level of justice (*ibid.*: 27–50). They cannot, for example, be abused by their captors. Nor can they be held to account under domestic law for deaths that occur in the ordinary course of military operations. Moreover, if their status as prisoners of war is disputed, law requires that they be brought before a quasi-adjudicatory body so that their status may be determined (*ibid.*: 47–50).

Law, then, strives to constrain the violence associated with the use of force. It holds states to minimum standards of conduct, protecting human agents from egregious violence that might otherwise transpire in the course of warfare. In the context of the Kosovo interventions in 1999 and the violence between Israel and Lebanon during the summer of 2006, adherence to these standards became a matter of debate. To a more pronounced degree, the application of these minimum tenets informed the legitimacy of the spiriting of prisoners taken in the Afghanistan and Iraq (2003) conflicts to a tiny enclave on the tip of Cuba and to other clandestine destinations in parts of Europe (Sands 2005: 143–73). In vociferous dispute processing, the treatment of prisoners was investigated in accordance with the basic procedural and substantive edicts mandated by global rules. Although international law did not prevent the abuse of prisoners, law and legal processing shed light on the actions and exposed putative violations of international norms.

Law and legal process seeks to regulate the use of force in international relations. Law and legal process seeks to civilize the conduct of warfare. A nascent institution of law, the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), seeks to address war through the imposition of criminal liability (Rome Statute 1998). Declared warfare is not the exclusive preserve of this third pillar of law's contribution to conflict resolution. However, violent interstate conflicts, as well as violent intrastate conflicts, provide the common state of affairs in which the most heinous of criminal acts are liable to occur.

The creation of a permanent ICC represents a significant achievement in international law. The institution formalizes, and has jurisdiction over, international criminal offenses, attending to the most egregious manifestations of criminality: genocide, war crimes, the crime of aggression, and crimes against humanity. Effectively, it creates an international code of conduct from which no state, under any circumstances, may derogate.

The non-derogation aspect underscores a critical relationship between global criminal norms and domestic regulation. States, sovereign within their own territorial boundaries, are reasonably free to enact regulatory regimes that correspond to their own national exigencies. For the most part, states can implement legal requirements best suited to effective domestic ordering within their own territories. States are not free, however, to derogate from the minimal content of international criminal norms. Domestic norms cannot contravene the global criminal edicts, cannot render lawful that which international law

determines to be criminal activity. Global criminal norms intercede to deny any deviations from the minimum standard and, through the establishment of an ICC, stand poised to hold state actors accountable for any putative derogation.

Most importantly, as part of a legal conflict resolution mechanism, the formalization of criminal norms and the vesting of adjudicatory responsibility in the permanent ICC acknowledges that sovereign authority cannot shield individual political actors from criminal liability. The decision to unlawfully engage in a war – the crime of aggression – or the decision to orchestrate gross violations of rights – genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity – attract individual criminal liability. Traditionally, it has proved difficult to hold political figures responsible for criminal acts that occurred during their tenure. The formalization of global criminal norms reduces this difficulty. Potential personal criminal liability is now a central feature of warfare, and trumps domestic attempts to achieve a degree of immunity.

Perhaps most importantly, a permanent international criminal tribunal attempts to separate the political dimension of conflict processing from the legal dimension. The criminal trials that followed World War II and, indeed, the trial of Slobodan Milosevic following the violence in the former Yugoslavia invite the accusation that victors, the powerful, shape post-war, or interwar, concepts of justice. It is a potent indictment of international law that only Milosevic faced criminal accountability for violence and deaths occasioned during the conflicts in Kosovo, the tribunal before which he was held to account having been created to attend to atrocities committed by political leaders and agents of the former Yugoslavia (Mandel 2004). The permanency of an ICC enhances the perception that post-conflict criminal responsibility is not contingent upon the conflict outcome.

Attempting to sever criminal law and criminal legal processing from its political undercurrents presents inherent difficulties. The crime of aggression, the commencement of an unlawful war, necessarily anticipates the prior question of the legality of a particular conflict. Although law and legal processing frames the analysis, the legality of warfare, in any given context, remains controversial. Attaching criminal responsibility to an arena fraught with controversy evokes fear that the imposition of criminal liability will become a political, not a legal, tool. Resistance to this potential consequence has resulted in the crime of aggression remaining undefined in international law (Rome Statute Article 5 1(d)).

Finally, the history of the formalization of global criminal norms deserves some modest mention given its relationship to the residual political dimension of a permanent criminal court. Whereas then-President Bill Clinton initially endorsed the institution, President George W. Bush subsequently withdrew the United States' consent, claiming, in part, that the final terms did not sufficiently accommodate US interests. It subsequently engaged in a concerted campaign to undermine the institution's fundamental tenets as they might apply to Americans (Sands 2005: 47–9). In fact, the United States' full participation in the formation of the instrument heavily informs the final content of the statute creating the ICC. Much of the proposed content was revised to accommodate US concerns (Broomhall 2001). In essence, having so heavily determined the ultimate legal substance of the jurisdiction of the permanent court, in refusing to endorse its terms the US underscored the political, as opposed to legal, character of its denunciation.

Law and legal process shape the resolution of international conflict. Sometimes law concedes to power. Sometimes law and legal process manage to illuminate the problem that state power poses. Law and legal process regularly provide the analytic context for the international discussions and negotiations. Domestic criminal norms prohibit murder yet murder persists. No one would discount the relevance of the criminal legal system. Law

informs and resists warfare. No more can be expected nor can the relevance of the law be readily dismissed.

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## **Part IV**

# **Alternative voices and complex intervention designs**



## 29 Restorative processes of peace and healing within the governing structures of the *Rotinoshonni* “Longhouse People”

Brian Rice

### Introduction: the arrival of the colonists

As the English colonists arrived and settled at places along the Atlantic Coast that they named James Town and Plymouth Rock, they encountered Algonquian-speaking peoples with customs previously unknown to them. In spite of having no persons of authority governing their lives, these people seemed to have some type of order in their societies. Unlike in England, where leaders inherited the right to rule, here leaders were chosen from within the society and could easily be removed if they didn't do the will of the people. An example is the *Lenapé* who inhabited the area of what is now New Jersey: “A chief dare not venture, compel, or punish anyone as in that case he would immediately be forsaken by the whole tribe. The chief must endeavor to rule over his people by calm reasoning and friendly exhortations” (Newell 1965: 21).

### The *Rotinoshonni* influence on the colonists

However, it was not the Algonquin peoples along the Atlantic east coast who would be most influential in transforming the English colonial understanding of governance. Rather, it was an alignment of Iroquoian-speaking peoples who referred to themselves as *Rotinoshonni*, “They Who Built the Extended House,” who lived further in the interior, west of where two rivers met, and starting in the valley between mountains known to them as *Tonanontché*, a “River between Hills”. They became known at first as the League of Five Nations and later as the Six Nations Confederacy. In 1753 after attending a conference with representatives of the Six Nations Confederacy, Benjamin Franklin, a founding father of the future American republic, would write about them:

It would be a strange thing if Six Nations of ignorant Savages should be able to form such a scheme for such a union and be able to execute it in such a manner as it has subsisted for ages and appears indissoluble and yet a like union should be impracticable for ten or a dozen colonies.

(Johansen 1988: 41)

Previously in the year 1744, after he was invited by representatives of the English colonies to help end their disputes among themselves, a leader of the Six Nations Confederacy named Canassatego advised:

Our wise forefathers established a union and amity between the Five Nations. This has made us formidable. This has given us great weight and authority with our



neighboring nations. We are a powerful confederacy, and by your observing the same methods as our wise forefathers have taken, you will acquire much strength and power; therefore what ever befalls you, do not fall out with one another.

(Johansen 1988: 40)

Although most of the indigenous societies throughout the northeast of the Americas governed themselves in a similar democratic fashion to the Rotinonshonni, cultural differences did exist. In 1747, not long after Canassatego's speech, Cadwallader Colden, Governor of the colony of New York, wrote about the leaders within the League:

Each nation is an absolute republic by its self, governed in all public affairs of war and peace by the sachems or Old Men, whose authority and power is gained by and consists wholly in the opinion the rest of the Nation have of their wisdom and integrity. They never execute their resolutions by compulsion or force upon any of their people. Honour and esteem are their principal rewards, as shame and being despised are their punishments. They have certain customs which they observe in their public affairs with other nations, and in their private affairs among themselves, which it is scandalous for anyone not to observe, and draw after them public or private resentment when they are broke. Their generals and captains obtain their authority likewise by the general opinion of their courage and conduct, and lose it by their failure in those virtues.

(Colden 1922: xx)

The original five nations that made up the Rotinonshonni were the *Kenienke:haka* (Mohawk) "Flint People"; the *Oneota:haka* (Oneida) "Standing Stone People"; the *Onontaka:haka* (Onondaga) "People of the Hills"; the *Kaokwa:haka* (Cayuga) "Mucky Lake People"; and the *Sonontowa:haka* (Seneca) "People of the Hill." Later, the *Scaroon* (Tuscarora) "People of the Hemp Shirt" would join them after fleeing their homeland around 1722 after coming into conflict with the English in North Carolina.

In the next section I move from the analytical discussion with which I opened this chapter to a storytelling style to describe *Kaianeréko:wa*, "The Great Way of Peace."

## The great way of peace and reconciliation

How had these five nations that made up a league become so influential that even the powerful English colonists would hold them and their institutions in such esteem? So much so that, when the colonists first broke away from the hold that the English Crown had over them, they would adopt their dress during the Boston tea party.

To understand how this occurred, it is important to understand the story of how the Iroquois Confederacy came together. At a time long prior to the coming of the English colonists, the Rotinonshonni were divided and in a perpetual state of warfare with one another. Blood feuds and ritual cannibalism had permeated throughout their societies. These were considered dark times by the people as they were said to not be able to walk along the trails for fear of being accosted and killed. Through the intervention of a mystical person known as the *Dekanawita*, "Two Streams Parallel," who became known as the Peacemaker, along with his companion *Aionwá:tha*, "He Stayed Awake," and a woman of peace named *Tskonsasa*, "Face Round Like a Cat," who lived along a war trail, they were able to end the violence among them by restoring the minds of the war chiefs from

violence to peace. They would do this through the laws and institutions they would create together known as the *Kaianeréko:wa*, “The Great Way of Peace.”

In some of the oral traditions, the Peacemaker had been born a *Wendat*, “Islander,” near Eagle Hill on the Bay of Quinté on the North Shore of *Kanontar:io*, “Beautiful Lake.” In other traditions he was born a *Kenienké:haka*, “Flint Person.” Regardless, the message that was brought consisted of living at peace with one another through having a good mind as a result of being righteous with others. Peace would result in an unstoppable power that others would want to emulate or become a part of, resulting in an indissoluble union. This would be known as extending the rafters of the longhouse of one family to allow others, if they wished, to join the Great Peace. Once people’s minds had grasped the goodness that came from living in peace with one another and they began to perform righteous acts, others would want to follow by example.

In order for this to happen, there had to be a means to end the anger and suffering that existed between the people within the disputing nations which had resulted in a never-ending series of revenge killings. The transformation into a peaceful society from one of war began to occur with the intercession of a young boy and his playmates while they were learning games of war. While only about twelve years old, a young Peacemaker, in this case from the *Wendat*, “Islander,” nation, was able to convince the boys that, if they began to work together towards peace, they would begin to live in a way they had never known. They would be without fear, sadness, and anger. They would be more powerful in peace than at any time when they were at war.

Meanwhile some of the older people were listening to him relay his message as the other boys sat around and listened. They informed the principal war chief who ran the village that a young boy seemed wise beyond his years. The elders had remembered a time when people could walk the trails without fear. They asked themselves how it was that the words of a young boy could remind them of a better time. The war chief called for the young boy, and in front of him the Peacemaker explained his message of peace. He explained that righteous living could occur only when their intentions were for the good of all. In order for this to happen they would need to be of the good mind. Once this happened, like a ball rolling in the snow, it would get larger as more people attached themselves to it. The end result would be a power few of them had ever known.

The war chief was convinced by the boy and accepted the message of peace. He then told his people to put their weapons away. The war chief then asked the Peacemaker, now that the weapons were put away, what about those nations who were still armed in the south who might attack their defenseless villages? How would they now be able to defend themselves? The young Peacemaker explained that he still had a lot of work to do. He would visit those nations still at war and convince them that they were better off living in peace.

Being the first to hear his message, the young boys would grow to be wise beyond their years and be held in esteem by their people from time immemorial. They would meet the Peacemaker only one last time when they were older. As keepers of three sacred ceremonies, the drum dance, the personal song, and the great feather dance, they would be reminded of a fourth, the peach stone game, which was first played at the beginning of the creation of the world. Years later, *Adar:io*, a leader of the *Wendat*, explained:

There are a thousand of us in one village, and you see that we love one another like brethren, that our generals and presidents of the council have no more power than any other, that detraction and quarreling were never among us and in fine, that everyone

is his own master and does as he pleases, without being accountable to another or censured by his neighbor.

(Newell 1965: 25)

Even though the war chief had accepted the message of the Peacemaker, he was reluctant to join in a union with others who had caused him and his people such grief. This frustrated the Peacemaker. As he grew older, he traveled with his grandmother and mother, back to the place of his birth where the eagles flew over the hill. Once there, he began his journey across Kanontar:io, "The Beautiful Lake," to the land inhabited by five powerful warring nations. Along the shoreline hiding in the bushes was a Kenienké:haka, "Flint Person," named Torewadar:io, "He Does Everything Right." Torewadar:io saw that the Peacemaker was not armed, and asked him where he was going. The Peacemaker explained that he had a message that needed to be heard by the warring nations. Torewadar:io told the Peacemaker that he should not walk along the trails because there were warriors, some of whom were cannibals who ate the hearts of men. These warriors were sorcerers who were empowered by the killing of others. The Peacemaker told Torewadar:io that they were the ones he was looking for.

The Peacemaker began walking along the trail toward the west. There he met one of the warriors who ate the hearts of those he killed in order to capture the life-giving spirit that remained in the body for three days after death. The power that came from killing another person could make a warrior even more powerful, but was unpredictable and was fed by more killing. Eventually the warrior and his own spirit could be consumed after his own death.

Before introducing himself to the warrior, the Peacemaker climbed on top of the warrior's lodge, from where his face was reflected in the water, and emanated a brilliance that was hard to behold. The warrior looked into the vessel, saw the reflection of the Peacemaker, and in his vanity immediately wondered if it was his own. The third time he looked, he realized that a person like himself could never radiate such beauty and peace. As he looked and saw the compassionate face gazing back at him, he began to feel remorse for the life he had lived.

It was then that the Peacemaker arrived to lift his spirits. He told him that if he put away his weapons he could become like the person he saw in the reflection. The Peacemaker explained there would be a time when those like himself would be selected to form a union of minds and intervene on other people's behalf when they were in conflict or distress. He told him that one of the qualities expected of those who would be chosen was generosity. Cadwallader Colden, Governor of New York, would write of the Rotinonshonni:

Their great men, both sachems and captains, are generally poorer than the common people, for they affect to give away and distribute all the presents or plunder they get in their treaties or war, so as to leave nothing to themselves. If they should once be suspected of selfishness, they would grow mean in the opinion of their country-men, and would consequently lose their authority.

(Colden 1922: xx)

The Peacemaker told the warrior that those selected must treat the people with the awareness of the buck deer that looks after the does and fawns. Those of good mind would wear the antlers of the deer when they were in council as a reminder of their responsibilities to the people.

He told him that the Rotinonshonni would have leaders that responded to the decisions of the people. These men would be called *Royaner*, “He of the Good Mind,” and the women *Otiyaner*, “She of the Good Mind.” However, it would be the women who would confer the titles of the *Royaner* just as they did with the homes and the lands. The women were the ones who had the consensus of the people. They would choose, from among the different clan families, the best male representative of the people to speak for them in council. If the representatives did not do the will of the people after having been given three warnings by the women, they were dismissed from the governing council. It was up to the women to ensure that the voice of the people was heard.

The warrior then put down his weapons and inquired when this would happen. The Peacemaker replied that before it could happen he must visit a woman who lived on the war trail that divided the nations from the east, west, north, and south near the great falls of *Onagara*, “Niagara.” It was the woman who lived on the war trail who was the example that the future *Otiyaner* would follow.

The woman the Peacemaker mentioned was named *Tskonsasa*, “Face Round Like a Cat.” Whenever a warrior was being chased by another group of warriors, if he could make it to *Tskonsasa*’s lodge, he would be given refuge and food. All of the surrounding nations had decided that *Tskonsasa* and her people, the *Kakwako*, would be considered to be living in a neutral territory where no conflict would be allowed. This had been an important step toward peace, but had not been enough. Their main village was *Keinuké*, on the south bank of the river that led to the falls. At *Tskonsasa*’s lodge in the village of *Keinuké*, a bear skin was hung between the two disputing factions, and *Tskonsasa* would try to resolve the dispute without allowing violence to occur.

When the Peacemaker arrived at *Tskonsasa*’s lodge, he told her his message of how peace, power, and righteous living could be achieved by having a good mind. He said that a great nation was about to be born out of five, and that he would need her skills in order for this to happen. He informed her that there would be a time when she would be called to help the *Otiyaner*, also known as clan mothers, to choose the future leaders. *Tskonsasa* listened to the Peacemaker’s message and informed him that she would be there when he needed her help to choose the *Royaner*. The Peacemaker then left towards the east.

After following the shores of *Kanontar:io*, “Beautiful Lake,” to the east, along the south side of a river, the Peacemaker came to a large waterfall named *Cohoes*, “Place of the Falling Canoes.” The falls had got its name when a young *Kenienké:haka* woman accidentally went over the falls in a canoe and perished. It was also close to where the two rivers, the river of the *Kenienké:haka*, “Flint People,” and the river of the *Mahican*, “Wolf People,” met, the destination of which was the Atlantic Ocean. The *Mahican* had been ancient enemies of the *Kenienké:haka*, and it was at *Cohoes* Fall that the two nations set the boundaries of their territories.

It was by the falls that the Peacemaker sat down to rest. He lit a fire and waited. About a mile away was a *Kenienké:haka* village made up of warriors. They were the most easterly *Kenienké:haka* village and guarded against any attack from that direction. The Great War Chief of the village was informed of the fire by one of the warriors. It was common in those days for someone to light a fire near a village before entering so that the villagers would not be alarmed. The Great War Chief sent two warriors to see who was so bold as to light the fire. They approached the Peacemaker and asked him who he was and why he had camped so close to a village at war. The Peacemaker calmly informed them that he had come to deliver a message and a proposition to the Great War Chief.

The village was the same one that *Torewadar:io*, “He Does Everything Right,” came

from. After meeting the Peacemaker on the shores of Kanontar:io, he had returned to his village and told the war chiefs about the strange man who would one day visit them. Listening in was an assistant war chief. Being afraid for the future of his three daughters, he had waited for a time when the violence would stop, and had hoped that Torewadar:io's words were true. Sometimes he stayed up all night thinking about it.

The Peacemaker was brought in front of the Great War Chief and his two assistants, and was asked to explain why he had come. The Peacemaker answered that, if the war chiefs put down their feuding with one another and aligned in peace, they would be stronger than ever. He said that it would be like a ball of snow that rolled down a hill. As a snowball set in motion becomes larger as it is rolled, once the processes of peace were set in motion, it would expand as more people accepted it. Only by having a good mind and positive actions by being a righteous person could the power of peace prevail.

The Great War Chief told the Peacemaker he would accept the message of peace if the Peacemaker passed a test. He told two warriors to take the Peacemaker to Cohoes Falls and to place him on a branch that overhung the ledge of a cliff. They were then to cut the branch. If the Peacemaker survived the fall, the Great War Chief would accept the message of peace. After placing him on a branch and then cutting it down, the two warriors left believing that the Peacemaker had been killed. The next day a warrior ran to the Great War Chief and told him that someone had lit a fire near the falls. Once again the two warriors ran to see who it was. When they arrived, they discovered the Peacemaker sitting by the fire smoking a pipe. They brought the Peacemaker to the Great War Chief, whereupon he accepted the message of peace, power, and righteousness through the good mind. The Peacemaker told them that this was the beginning, and now the sun was beginning to shine over the horizon and the darkness was being lifted.

He told the Great War Chief to gather the people and his two assistants. Once that was done, he said that from now on the war chiefs would be among the wisest of the people, and they were never to go to war but rather to work for peace. They would be known as Royaner, "He of the Good Mind." He would choose the first three, and at a later time the woman of peace who lived on the war trail would work with the eldest and wisest women of the villages, the clan mothers, to name six more Royaner from the Kenienké:haka villages.

The Peacemaker knew that without the women involved the peace could never last. The women were the ones who looked after the children and the land when the men hunted or went to council. They could not travel like the men, but their voice would be paramount in the decisions of the people. This was something that the English colonists would not grasp even after forming their union, until hundreds of years later. It was said that, among the Rotinonshonni, women had no fear of spousal abuse or of being violated. Mary Jemison, after spending sixty-eight years with the *Sonontowa:haka*, "People of the Mountain," in the eighteenth century would later write that she knew of no cases in which a woman had been taken and defiled (Newell 1965: 27). Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Matilda Joslyn Gage, who shared leadership roles in the National Women's Suffrage Association in the nineteenth century in Seneca Falls, New York, would use Rotinonshonni women as their role models in their fight for women's right to vote, thus helping to begin the modern-day feminist movement (Wagner 1992: 14).

The Peacemaker continued by telling the Great War Chief and his two assistants that they would be given new names along with their new title as Royaner. These names would be carried on by others after they died so they would be remembered forever. Those who followed and took the name would have to live up to the same standards as the first

Royaner by working to keep the peace. He said to the Great War Chief that from now on he would be called *Takarihokenh*, "He Was of Two Minds." That was because he had been ambivalent about the Great Peace. Next he turned to the assistant war chief and told him he would take the name Ayenwatha, "He Stayed Awake." This was because he had believed and trusted in the words of Torewadar:io, and had waited for the Peacemaker's arrival. He told the other war chief that he would take the name *Shadékariwa:tih*, "Two Equal Things," because he could have gone either way after he first spoke about the peace. The Peacemaker then told them to make preparations to travel west because in order for this mission to be complete others would have to accept the message of peace.

The Peacemaker had been able to bring two nations, the Wendat and the Kenienké:haka, to accept the message of peace, power, and righteousness by having a good mind. However, there was still a lot of grief and anger left. The healing that would need to take place in order for the peace to last had yet to occur.

Ayenwatha had been one of the most avid believers in the message of the Peacemaker. He was sure that, now that there was peace among the Kenienké:haka, he no longer had anything to fear for his three daughters. One day his eldest daughter became ill and died. This brought Ayenwatha feelings of regret he had not known since his wife had died years before. As he started to gain his happiness back, his second daughter fell ill and died. Once again, this put Ayenwatha into feelings of despair.

The community decided to play a game of *Tewaartonh* lacrosse, "Little Brother of War." The game was played as a means to bring happiness during times of distress. It was also played as a means of resolving disputes in a non-violent way rather than by war. It was a rough game, and sometimes players were injured or even killed; nonetheless, it was better than whole villages killing one another. As the teams began to play, Ayenwatha's spirits began to lift. His youngest surviving daughter decided to cross the field to get the players some water. Just then the ball was thrown her way, and, as they were running, the players were distracted by a strange purple bird in the sky. The players knocked into the young girl, killing her. This broke the spirit of Ayenwatha. He asked himself, why, now that he had started to lead a good life, did this happen to him? Ayenwatha left the village and began living in isolation, not wanting to talk to anyone.

One day Ayenwatha was fiddling around with some elderberries and some twigs from the bushes. He began to bead the elderberries onto the twigs he had pulled from the bushes. He then set up a little bipod on two sides, and put a stick between them. He put one of his beaded twigs over the bipods and said to himself that, if anyone was suffering from grief as he was, he would take a deer cloth and wipe the tears away so that they would be able to see the light of the sun again; for, when we are in grief, our eyes are closed and all we see is darkness. Next he took another one of the twigs and placed it over the stick, and said that if anyone suffered from grief he would unblock the obstructions in his ears. That is because, when we suffer from grief, we are not able to hear the words of those who try and heal us. Finally, he took another twig and placed it over the stick and said that if anyone was suffering from grief he would clear his throat. That is because whenever someone suffers from grief their throat is so clogged up they cannot even speak.

Suddenly the Peacemaker appeared. He took the three twigs and set them down one at a time as Ayenwatha had done and repeated the same words he had spoken. Hearing the Peacemaker's words, Ayenwatha started to feel better. The Peacemaker told Ayenwatha that he had shown him the way that we could heal the grief of the people and become unified: that it would always take two people to open the eyes, ears, and throat of those suffering. This would be known as condolence, and these would be the three kind things that



would be done in order to restore someone from their grief. The Peacemaker then said he would add to the condolence in time, and that each young person should have a consoling friend to help them when they were grieving. The Peacemaker explained to Ayenwatha that, since he was such a great man of ideas, he would be the voice for the Peacemaker, and together they would create the laws of peace. This is what had been missing in the Peacemaker's message. There had to be a way that people could heal once the violence had stopped. The Peacemaker then said, "Let us return to the village, and gather the people for we must now together bring the message of peace to the warring nations to the west. The sun is getting brighter, and like a ball of snow it is getting larger as more are beginning to grasp the message of peace."

West of the Kenienké:haka lived the *Oneota:haka*, "Standing Stone People." They inhabited a region that led to a lake in the north and a river that ran into Kanontar:io, "Beautiful Lake." Their main village was called *Kanowahalé*, "Head on a Pole." Surrounding the village was a large cornfield. The Peacemaker sent Ayenwatha as his emissary to the Oneota:haka. Unarmed and trusting in the process of peace, Ayenwatha approached the large field of corn guarded by two Oneota:haka warriors. One of the warriors saw Ayenwatha, approaching and told him to stop. He took out a quiver and placed it on his bow. Ayenwatha was not afraid. He explained that he had come as an emissary of peace on behalf of the Kenienké:haka and a Peacemaker who had a great message to tell them.

The Oneota:haka warriors, seeing that Ayenwatha was not armed, brought him to the small lodge they had set up, and fed him. Ayenwatha told them to go back to their war chief and tell him that tomorrow the Kenienké:haka would be coming with a Peacemaker and they would not be bearing their arms. The warriors told Ayenwatha to remain in their lodge overnight and they would consult with their war chief and return in the morning. That night, as Ayenwatha was resting, the Peacemaker arrived. Meanwhile the two warriors were in a council with the war chief of the village. The Peacemaker told the two warriors that he hoped the message of peace would travel fast, and that there would be a time when he could look through the forest clearing and see the fires of peace burning in all of the villages.

As dawn began to appear, the war chief began to bead up an eagle feather and told one of the warriors to present it to Ayenwatha and to show him a sign of peace in return once it was accepted. The warrior then met Ayenwatha, the Peacemaker, and the Kenienké:haka representatives at the edge of the woods by the cornfield. Ayenwatha took the feather from him and told him about the three kind things that had happened between the Peacemaker and himself when he was in pain. He taught the three kind things to the warrior, and then told him to go back to the war chief and to teach him to recite them when he approached them at the edge of the woods.

That day as the Kenienké:haka approached the wood's edge, they sang the ancient *hai hai*, sung when the *Rotiskerenke:té* men, "They Carry the Bones on Their Back," carried the bones of the dead before burying them. Like the bones that never atrophy in the ground, it was the responsibility of the *Rotiskerenke:te* to carry the knowledge songs and ceremonies of the ancestors.

When the Oneota:haka and their war chief met the Kenienké:haka representatives, the war chief recited the three kind things he had been taught in order to take away any pain or misfortune that had occurred to them. Ayenwatha reciprocated with the three kind things, taking away any pain or anger that the war chief and his people may have felt towards the Kenienké:haka for past deeds. The Peacemaker told them that from now on, when these two nations met in the future, this was how it would be done. He then told



the one that bore the quiver that he would now work for peace and would be known as *Odatsheteh*, "Quiver Bearer." Next he told the guardian of the cornfields that he would be called *Kanonkwenyotoh*, "Looks after the Corn." Finally, he looked at the war chief and said that, from now on, he would be able to look through the opening and see the fires of peace beginning to burn, and would therefore be known as *Teyohhakwentah*, "Opening through the Woods." He said that from now on it was their duty to work for peace. He told the representatives of both nations that whenever they lost one of the Royaner they would meet this way to take away each other's pain and losses, and lift up each other's spirits. This would be called a big condolence. When a clan mother died, a small condolence would be held in her village. At some point in time, they would meet together in the council house of the grieving nation where a new Royaner or Otiyaner would be officially recognized to replace the person lost. The Peacemaker explained that, because the Kenienké:haka were the first to accept the message of peace, they would be *Akatu:neh*, "Father's Kinsmen," and the Oneota:haka, "Standing Stone People," their *Kheya:tawenh*, "Our Offspring," and they would look after one another as family. In the future, another six would be chosen by the eldest women of the different clans.

The Peacemaker told them that the sun was getting brighter as more accepted the message of peace. It was now almost at the height of midday. Still, they would need to travel west to convince the other nations at war to accept the great peace. Not far from the Oneota:haka villages was *Kanata:kowa*, "Great Village," of the Onontaka:haka, "People of the Mountains." There resided a fierce shaman and war chief whose mind was so twisted that people described him as having snakes coming from his head. He knew that something was about to happen, and, while sitting on a large stone that looked like a phallus, he used to yell out *Asokanee*, "Is It Time?"

The Peacemaker told the representatives that their peace was not yet powerful enough to convince this war chief and his people of a better way. They would have to travel to the south, and then north of the Onontaka:haka, to approach the people who lived west of them, known as the *Kaokwa:haka*, "Mucky Lake People." And so the representatives of the two nations along with *Ayenwatha* and the Peacemaker began to travel west.

As they bypassed the *Kanata:kowa* village, they turned and arrived on the north side of a lake where there was a salt lick and many marshes. The *Kaokwa:haka* had all their canoes lined up along the lake at the edge of the woods. As they came to the edge of the woods singing the *hai hai*, they met the war chief of the *Kaokwa:haka*. The Peacemaker began to tell his message of peace and about the three kind things when the war chief stopped him. The war chief said he had already heard from his messengers that the Peacemaker would be coming, and even before he arrived had decided that he would accept the message of peace. He told the Peacemaker and the others that emissaries had been sent to the war chief on the south side of the lake, and he would be arriving tomorrow. That night they rested, and the next day the war chief arrived with many of his people. He took out a big pipe and smoked it with all who were there, and said that all along the lake the fires lit for peace could be seen.

The Peacemaker said to the two war chiefs that now that they had joined in peace the sun was getting brighter as the darkness from war and violence was dimming. He said to the first war chief that he would be named *Tékaheyoh*, "He Looks Both Ways," because his eyes were open to peace even before they arrived. Then he pointed to the next war chief from the south and said that he would be called *Tsinontaweronh*, "He Comes on his Knees," because he came with such humility that they did not have to come and get him. The Peacemaker then told the representatives that eight more would be named by

the Otiyaner, and that they should take their time and look for the best persons who could uphold the great peace between them. They would sit with the Oneota:haka as *Kheyatawenh*, “Our Offspring,” or nephews. He explained that when others wanted to be adopted into the peace they would be the adopting nation and the Oneota:haka would be the door through which they would enter.

The Peacemaker said the peace was almost powerful enough to confront the shaman and war chief at Kanata:kowa village. Before they did this, they would need the powerful Sonontowa:haka onside. The Sonontowa:haka lived to the west of the Kaokwa:haka near a great lake through a range of mountains. They received their name from a great mountain in the center of their territory. Ayenwatha was sent once again as the emissary. Upon his arrival, he met the war chief who guarded the village on the west side of a great lake. He informed him about the Peacemaker’s message and the protocols that were being developed for peace. He told him that representatives of the Kaokwa:haka, Oneota:haka, and Kenienké:haka were waiting for his people to come. They would be at the Kaokwa:haka village where the canoes were all lined up.

The Sonontowa:haka warrior said that he would bring the message back to his people but could not guarantee anything. Ayenwatha and the war chief departed from one another. The war chief sent runners to three other war chiefs about Ayenwatha’s message. Only one, who lived in the closest village, responded. The two others said they would wait to see what happened. As the two Sonontowa:haka war chiefs gathered their warriors and came to the woods edge, they were greeted by Ayenwatha, the Peacemaker, and the others. The Peacemaker told Tekaheyoh of the Kaokwa:haka that, since they were the *Kayantowenh* nephews, they should be the ones to condole with their *Akatu:neh*, “Father’s Kinsmen,” the *Sonontowa:haka*, for their losses. However, they would still need the two war chiefs who lived further west to accept the message of peace before this could occur. He told the first war chief that he would be named *Skaniatar:io*, “Beautiful Lake,” because that was where they met. Then he told the next war chief that he would be called *Satekaronias*, “Skies of Equal Length,” because his vision for the future was so great. Anyone who followed and took their name would have to do so with the same conviction towards peace. He said the clan mothers and the woman, Tsakonsasa, would choose and name six others.

The Peacemaker said they were now ready to travel to Kanata:kowa village. While Ayenwatha was visiting the Sonontowa:haka, he had asked that they send runners for the women of peace who lived on the war trail to come to the lake where the Onontaka:haka had their great village. So they waited until Tsakonsasa arrived. Once she came they walked to the south side of the lake where the Onontaka:haka warriors were waiting with their great war chief and shaman on the other side of the lake.

After the Peacemaker and the others crossed in their canoes, they surrounded the great war chief and his warriors. With the four nations now allied, they could have wiped out the great war chief and his warriors. Instead Ayenwatha began to speak, and his words were such that he soothed the temper of the great war chief. Next Tsakonsasa rubbed the anger from his body, and then they combed the snakes from his head, and he became sane. The Peacemaker then told the Great Shaman that he would be known as *Tatodaho*, “Entangled.” After *Tatodaho* had been calmed down, he was still not ready to accept the Great Way of Peace. The Peacemaker told him that if he accepted the message of peace and put down his weapons he would sit with the *Akatu:neh*, “Father’s Kinsmen,” and he would be the final voice in any decisions that the confederated peoples made. He then said that *Tatodaho* would be cut off from the clan mothers, and be the only one selected by all of the people themselves. Then suddenly all of the warriors began to sing the song of peace.

Finally the last two Sonontowa:haka war chiefs arrived with their people, and were greeted with the new protocols of healing at the edge of the woods. The Peacemaker told them that they would be the keepers of the western door, and if anyone wanted to sit under the great tree of peace from the south and the west they would have to travel up the roots of the Great White Pine that was being planted at Kanata:kowa village. The Kenienké:haka would be the doorkeepers of the east and north. He then told all of the warriors that, as he lifted the Great White Pine, they were to take their weapons and throw them in the chasm below. They would follow the streams under the roots, never to appear again to be used against one another. He then said that all who wanted to come and sit under the Great Tree of Peace could do so if they were willing to come unarmed and with a good mind.

## **Conclusion**

In time there would be another thirty-nine Royaner selected and named by Tsakonsasa and the Otiyaner, making fifty in all. These first actions that involved the Peacemaker, Ayenwatha, and Tsakonsasa would lay the foundations of the restorative processes of peace for the five later six nations and eventually influence the union of the thirteen colonies and the American democratic charter.

These were not the only things that the Rotinonshonni influenced. They were among the first people to have all of their laws and rights established in a constitution, which was called the *Kaianéré:kowa*, “The Great Way of Peace.” By 1774 Benjamin Franklin’s articles of confederation appeared. Finally, in 1787 a Constitutional Convention was called and the first constitution was written for the newly created American Republic (Burton 1988: 45).

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# 30 Critical systematic inquiry in conflict analysis and resolution

An essential bridge between theory and practice

*Dennis J. D. Sandole*

## Introduction

Implicit in this chapter is the assumption of a fundamental “two-culture problem” (or even *conflict*) between (a) *academics* or *theorists* in peace and conflict studies and (b) *practitioners* of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, including governmental policymakers as well as governmental *and* non-governmental interveners in complex conflict situations. Each occupies a polar terminal point on a gradient (or “bridge of fire”) linking (but also separating) the (a) *philosophical/theoretical* and (b) *empirical/observable* domains of inquiry. It is further assumed that each is ideologically predisposed *not* to cross over to interact and collaborate with the other, even though both conflict/conflict resolution *theorists* and conflict resolution *practitioners/policymakers* would benefit from *communicating, cooperating, coordinating, and collaborating* with one another (see Nan 2004).

As is true for *complex* conflict processes in general, there are also tensions among the actors on *each end* of the gradient (e.g. between *academic* conflict theorists and *academic* conflict resolution theorists, or between governmental *policymakers* and non-governmental conflict resolution *practitioners*).

The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to managing at least part of this problem, by addressing *research* as the “essential bridge” between conflict/conflict resolution *theory* and conflict resolution *practice/policymaking*. The underlying assumption is that research allows conflict, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding analysts to apply theory to practice/policy and, in turn, for practitioners and policymakers to *feed the results of practice* back to theory for reinforcement, refinement, or refutation and replacement in part or in whole.

## Framing research as critical systematic inquiry

Research or “critical systematic inquiry” can be framed as a WHAT–WHY–HOW *reconstructed logic* (Kaplan 1964: ch. 1), which can be diagrammed as follows:

- I WHAT: Problem in need of solution.
  - A General theme.
  - B Specific question(s).
    - 1 Units and levels of analysis.
    - 2 Access to research.
    - 3 Ethical issues.
- II WHY: Justification.
  - A Theoretical/scientific justification.
  - B Practical justification.

## III HOW: The conduct of inquiry.

- A Type of study.
- B Theoretical setting.
- C Operational setting.
- D “Theory revisited.”

**What**

As the initial element of an extended journey into the *context of discovery*, the WHAT usually begins as a theme (e.g. “terrorism”) and is then reframed as a question or set of related questions: “Why did the nineteen young men responsible for 9/11 conduct the attacks?” (“Why do they hate us?”) “Are such attacks likely to happen again?” “What can we do to prevent further attacks?”

After specifying the “problem in need of solution,” the researcher then delimits the *units of analysis* (the “legitimate” actors, e.g. particular individuals, Muslims, Hindus, Jews, Christians) and the *levels of analysis* at which their behavior will be examined (e.g. intrapsychic, interpersonal, individual–societal, etc.). Subsequently, the researcher details to what extent there is “access to the problem”; i.e.:

- Is there a literature on the research problem?
- Are there people relevant to the problem who could be consulted or interviewed (e.g. Arabs, Muslims, recruiters/trainers of terrorists [potential “martyrs”], terrorism and counterterrorism experts)?
- Are there behavioral processes relevant to the problem that could be observed (e.g. certain religious gatherings, websites)?
- Are there “legitimate” research methods than can be used to study the problem (e.g. survey techniques, data processing and analysis procedures)?

Finally under the WHAT, researchers should explore the potential ethical issues which their project might entail, especially if they intend to move beyond the Archival Setting and include “human subjects” in their studies (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: ch. 4). If human subjects are involved, one issue is how to protect their privacy: through *anonymity* (in which not even the researchers know the participants’ identities) or *confidentiality* (in which researchers know, but demonstrate a credible commitment not to reveal names)? A related issue is how to protect the safety of the respondents (and, in some cases, the researchers themselves). Associated with this is the need to obtain participants’ *informed consent*, which requires acceptable responses to the following questions:

- To what extent are the participants *competent* (i.e. able to process the information)?
- To what extent can they *comprehend* researchers’ instructions?
- To what extent are they *volunteering* to participate in the project?
- To what extent have they been provided with *full information* on the project?<sup>1</sup>

Although these ethical requirements have been deemed necessary for the protection of research participants, there tends to be a tension between (a) providing full information and (b) maintaining the integrity of the project, as revealing “too much” information could influence participants’ responses to research stimuli. This is a never-ending challenge for researchers.

## Why

One conducts critical systematic inquiry in order to advance either (a) a *theoretical/scientific* and/or (b) a *practical* agenda. Under “theoretical/scientific justification,” research can be conducted for at least two reasons:

- 1 to explore an issue about which little, if anything, is known (an *exploratory study*);
- 2 to explore an issue about which there *is* knowledge, in order to add to it, either (a) to further refine its descriptive richness (a *descriptive study*) or (b) to enhance extant knowledge about the conditions under which a particular causal relationship occurs (a *causal study*).

Under “practical justification,” research can be conducted for at least three reasons:

- 1 to explore whether or not a need exists for “something new” – e.g. a new hospital, school, form of peacekeeping, form of governance (a *needs assessment*);
- 2 if such a need does exist, then exploring optimal means for satisfying the need (a *costs-benefits assessment*);
- 3 once the “new thing” has been operating for some time, conducting an evaluation of how well it has been performing (an *evaluation study*). If it has not been performing well, then, in addition, identifying the reasons why, and how these factors might be addressed (Selltiz *et al.* 1959: 4–5, 26–8).

## How

There are basically four parts to the HOW: (1) *type of study*; (2) *theoretical setting*; (3) *operational setting*; and (4) “*theory revisited*.” We have already implied “type of study” under the WHY:

### *Type of study*

Conflict research can be subsumed under at least four types of study:

- 1 an *exploratory study*: the conduct of research on an issue about which little, if anything, is known (e.g. the impact of global warming on political conflict);
- 2 a *descriptive study*: the conduct of research on an issue about which there is knowledge in order to add to its descriptive precision (e.g. generating further insight on the elements of an effective peacebuilding mechanism);
- 3 a *causal study*: the conduct of research on an issue about which there is knowledge in order to add to its causal precision (e.g. generating further insight on the conditions under which a certain known relationship tends to occur, such as frustration–aggression);
- 4 an *evaluation study*: the conduct of research on a “new” mechanism, system, procedure, process, or anything else to assess how well it has been doing under various conditions (e.g. determining how well a new peacebuilding mechanism has been dealing with the frustration–aggression dynamics of disenfranchised, “delegitimized” minority groups whose rage has exploded into acts of terrorism against dominant majority groups [Sprinzak 1991]).

### Theoretical setting

The “theoretical setting” includes: (a) concepts, (b) hypotheses, (c) models, and (d) theories (*writ small*).

*Concepts* are the basic building blocks of thought, perception, and language; “mini-models” that allow us to capture bits and pieces of “reality,” without which we would not be able to perceive, think, or speak of them at all. The concept of “concepts” is so basic that it is often difficult to address; e.g. do we “perceive” concepts *or* the “realities” that correspond to them?

The problem with concepts does not disappear once we have identified concepts from multiple disciplines that we need to incorporate into our study in order to “capture the complexity” of *complex* conflicts (Sandole 1999). We then have to cross the “bridge of fire” and explore how we can *measure* realities corresponding to those concepts – how we can *operationally define* them. For example, although I can *conceptually* define structural violence (Galtung 1969, 1996), I may not be sure about how to *operationally* define it. And operationally define it I must if I want to explore whether *more or less of X* (structural violence) leads to *more or less of Y* (political violence).

*Hypotheses* are tentative solutions to research problems, which are characterized by predicted relationships between concepts that are measurable and, therefore, can be measured in turn, generating *variables* in the process (i.e. “measured concepts”). Hypotheses include, among others, descriptive and causal, and research and null types of propositions.

A *descriptive hypothesis* posits a relationship between two variables (e.g. “frustration” and “aggression”; Dollard *et al.* 1939) without specifying cause. This is what *correlation coefficients* reveal: descriptions of relations between two variables. By contrast, *causal hypotheses* do specify the causal connection. In order for causality to be demonstrated, however, not only must a correlation (covariation) be demonstrated to exist between two variables, but the apparent “causal” variable (the *independent variable*) must be measured and entered into the relational system *before* the apparent “caused” variable (the *dependent variable*). Further, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables must be tested to determine whether or not it is *spurious*, i.e. influenced by yet another variable that has not yet been identified and included in the relational system. The test for spuriousness can be conducted via the computation of *partial correlation coefficients*. These explore the relationship between any two variables while “controlling” for the impact of other variables in a *multivariate* instead of a *bivariate* (two-variable) system (Sandole 1999: ch. 4–5).

Causal as well as descriptive hypotheses clearly make the case for the use of quantitative data. That is, in order to demonstrate covariation or correlation – that two variables “move” in either the same (+) or opposite (–) direction – there must be some way to *measure* them. This is part of crossing the “bridge of fire”! Quantitative data become “statistical data” when they are subjected to computations to produce bivariate correlation coefficients (for simple descriptive hypotheses) and partial correlation coefficients (for causal hypotheses), plus measures of whether such coefficients are *statistically significant* or not.

The distinction between *research hypotheses* ( $H_1$ ) and *null hypotheses* ( $H_0$ ) can be conceptually challenging. “Research hypotheses” are the propositions that we normally think of when we think about hypotheses, or about those that we may want to test (e.g. “There is a relationship between Frustration and Aggression” or “Frustration *does* cause Aggression”). By contrast, “null hypotheses” are *negations* of research hypotheses (e.g. “There is *no* relationship between Frustration and Aggression” or “Frustration *does not* cause Aggression”).



What is the point of this distinction? Why would anyone want to use the negation (the null hypothesis) of what one really wants to test (the research hypothesis)?

One response to this question is that merely testing the research hypothesis ( $H_1$ ), say by the computation of *bivariate* correlation coefficients between any independent and dependent variable, may yield a *spurious relationship* that researchers are unaware of (unless they incorporate additional potential independent variables into their analysis and compute partial correlation coefficients to test for such). By reframing  $H_1$  as  $H_0$ , researchers become explicitly sensitized to the possibility that their preferred hypothesis ( $H_1$ ) may be invalid. Moreover, whether a test of the X–Y relationship generates a negative or a positive result, researchers would know that they would have to move beyond simple bivariate correlation coefficients into the realm of multivariate partial correlations (Sandole 1999: ch. 4–5).

Testing for spurious relationships highlights the distinction between *verification* and *falsification* (Kuhn 1970; Popper 1963). Whereas a research hypothesis ( $H_1$ ) tends to be tested by the researcher seeking *confirmation* of the predicted relationship between independent and dependent variables, a null hypothesis formulation of the predicted X–Y relationship makes the researcher sensitive to the option of *disconfirmation*. Moving from verification to falsification involves a bit of a “paradigm shift,” as our normal tendency is to find evidence of “hits” rather than “misses.” Kuhn suggests that we should do *both* (1970: 146–7) – e.g. endeavor to disconfirm *as well as* confirm  $H_1$  – which is certainly compatible with a “mixed methods” orientation to research (Brewer and Hunter 2006).

There is another complication with hypotheses that presents challenges: when researchers deal with statistical data, they will be confronted with the opportunity to specify a “comfort zone” within which they can accept or reject null hypotheses. These are known as *significance levels*: e.g. various criteria of confidence that a researcher has, in fact, found a *non-spurious* relationship between independent and dependent variables.

For example, when computing bivariate correlation or partial correlation coefficients, we can specify acceptance/rejection of the findings at the 0.05, 0.01, 0.001, or other significance levels. If we accept a finding at the 0.05 level, this means that in one out of twenty cases ( $1/20 = 0.05$ ) the predicted relationship does *not* correspond to what “exists in nature”; contrariwise, in nineteen out of twenty cases, the observed relationship *does* correspond to what exists in nature and is, therefore, *not* due to chance. If we accept a finding at the 0.01 level, this means that in one out of a hundred cases ( $1/100 = 0.01$ ), the observed relationship does not correspond to what exists in nature; contrariwise, in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases, it does. And if we accept at the 0.001 level, this means that in 1 out of 1,000 cases ( $1/1000 = 0.001$ ), the predicted relationship does not correspond to what exists in nature; alternatively, in 999 out of 1,000 cases, it does. Clearly, the 0.001 level is the most narrow of the three *standard* criteria and, therefore, the most rigorous about what constitutes “truth” emanating from a hypothesis-testing enterprise.

This difference in size of the comfort zone – 0.05, 0.01, 0.001, or any other level – introduces what is by far the most abstract challenge in the empirical research domain: Type I and Type II errors. *Type I errors* are committed when the researcher erroneously rejects the *null hypothesis* when it is actually true, in effect producing a “false positive.” The selected significance level is the “probability of making a type I error [which, again,] can be set at any level [e.g. 0.05, 0.01, 0.001]” (Blalock 1960: 123). By contrast, *Type II errors* are committed when the *null hypothesis* is erroneously accepted when it is, in fact, false. Type II errors involve the “logical fallacy of affirming the consequent”; e.g. of assuming that, because a predicted consequence of a theory is false (the “antecedent”), the theory itself must also be false (the “consequent”) (ibid.: 92–5; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: 438).<sup>2</sup>

Against the background of this dynamic interaction between Type I and Type II errors, it is theoretically as well as methodologically challenging to contemplate that a finding that is not “valid” at the 0.001 level might be valid at the 0.01 and certainly at the 0.05 level. Accordingly, “flexibility” seems to be in order here, rather than an effort to be “too rigorous” or “too scientific” and, in the process, short-sighted: throwing the baby (an otherwise valid finding) out with the bathwater (rejection at too narrow a significance level)! What is critical here is to employ the “mixed methods” approach, seeking *triangulation* among all the results generated and at various levels of statistical significance (Brewer and Hunter 2006). Further, as Goode and Hatt pointed out over half a century ago:

Since all research conclusions are based upon probabilities, the question may arise, just how accurate should the data be? With *what margins of error* should the statistics be accepted? The answer must be found in . . . a *standard* body of techniques for calculating the *margins of tolerance* for rejecting or accepting an individual [hypothesis]. . . . the *limits of error* must be determined by the *consequences of the action* to be based upon the research. The “action” may be the rejection or acceptance of a hypothesis, and in this case there must be a prior judgment as to the accuracy needed [e.g. 0.05, 0.01, 0.001]. . . . Since the researcher who is helping to plan action is making predictions about the future, it is useful for him to have a clear understanding of these possibilities when he recommends one program over another.

(1952: 374–5, emphasis added)

As researchers explore the implications for action of certain findings, they might find certain *models* useful. Models are descriptions of some subject matter that can be delimited via different formats:

- *physical models* (e.g. miniature Union and Confederate soldiers on a map of Gettysburg, 1–3 July 1863);
- *pictorial models* (e.g. an organizational chart of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe);
- *verbal models* (e.g. Hans Morgenthau’s Six Principles of Political Realism, 1973: ch. 1);
- *mathematical models* (e.g. Lewis F. Richardson’s arms race equations, 1939, 1960);
- *simulational models* (e.g. historic re-enactments of the Battle of Gettysburg, 1–3 July 1863).

Whereas models *describe* a subject matter, *theories* “writ small” *explain* them or what goes on in them. *Theories* “writ small” are part of, at the “meta level,” *theories* “writ large,” which traverse a descriptive–explanatory, inductive–deductive continuum of “conceptual maturity” inclusive of concepts, typologies, frameworks, hypotheses, and models as well as theories “writ small” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: ch. 2).

There are basically two types of theory “writ small”: (1) *concatenated theories*, which have an “inductive core” and (2) *hierarchical theories*, which have a “deductive core” (Kaplan 1964: 298–9). The essential difference is that, whereas both types provide a basis for description, explanation, and prediction, only the hierarchical type of theory involves relationships in which some are *deductively* derived from others. In effect, therefore, hierarchical theories are more “mature” than concatenated theories.<sup>3</sup>

Examples of both types of theory “writ small” can be found throughout the social science literature. For example, a “linked” concatenated theory can be found in my seven-step journey leading to an outbreak of violent conflict in which a third party might be called upon to try to turn the chaotic situation around (Sandole 1993, 1999: 128–9). By contrast, political realism (*Realpolitik*) provides an example of a hierarchical theory, replete with a powerful (but often counterproductive) basis for prediction (Vasquez 1993).

### *Operational setting*

The essential difference between the theoretical and operational settings is, again, that they occupy polar opposite positions on the fabled “bridge of fire.” Many researchers (and, indeed, practitioners *and* policymakers) simply do not cross from the theoretical side – where we all, perforce, begin – to the operational side to explore the validity of their assumptions. Without crossing the “bridge of fire,” however, we will never be able to take the concepts revealed by our theoretical schema as potentially useful and translate them into measurable and measured concepts (variables) that may be impacting significant realities dealing with various dimensions of the “Global Problematique” (e.g. global warming, population growth, WMD proliferation, failed states, terrorism). In other words, we will never know *for sure* whether we are right or wrong about what makes certain systems “tick.” And, if we are wrong, then we are more a part of the problem than of the solution!

So, how might a crossing of the “bridge” be attempted? What might it look like?

Basically, for our purposes, that “journey” comprises a number of phases, including:

- data sources;
- data collection;
- data processing;
- data analysis.

*Data sources* breaks down into:

- archival setting;
- natural setting:
  - surveys (and sampling)
  - field studies
  - field experiments;
- artificial setting:
  - experiments
  - simulation.

Just as all researchers tend to begin on the theoretical side of the “bridge of fire,” so they all tend to begin in the library or elsewhere in the “archival setting” (e.g. published and unpublished documents, film, audio records, artworks) to determine what, if anything, has already been done on their selected topic. As Charles Sanders Peirce reminds us, “There is only one place from which we ever can start and that is from where we are” (cited in Kaplan 1964: 86) and “where we are” has been well documented in the archival setting!

Although many researchers begin and end their research journeys in the archival setting, quite a few venture out to generate their own data in the natural and/or artificial settings (where, needless to say, they encounter human subjects, thereby raising the aforementioned ethical issues under the WHAT).

In the natural setting, we can conduct surveys (which involve sampling), field studies, and field experiments. Surveys are attempts to capture the beliefs, opinions, attitudes, values, and other *cognitive, evaluative, and affective* aspects (Boulding 1956) of members of select racial, ethnic, national, religious, class, professional, regional, gender, and other groups (*populations*), either to say something about a particular group itself (e.g. American women), or about it in comparison with other groups (American women vs. men) (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: ch. 10).

Surveys involve *survey design* as well as *sampling design*, which determine how researchers structure their view of the select group(s) as well as how they plan to select individuals from the group(s) to study, respectively. Under “survey design” (Campbell and Katona 1953), researchers can select:

- *contrasting samples*, in which a researcher plans to compare members of two or more groups with regard to a certain variable (e.g. NATO and Soviet successor states with regard to how their policymakers perceived the genocidal implosion of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s: Sandole 2007);
- *successive cross sections*, in which the researcher plans to study different members of one or more particular groups over time to explore the impact of certain “before–after” events on select perceptions and behaviors (e.g. NATO vs. former Soviet policymakers’ views toward NATO *before* and *after* NATO’s interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999: Sandole 2007);
- *panel studies*, in which researchers study exactly the same members of a select group *over time* to explore, in depth, trends in the behavior of a select variable and what independent variables connect with what dependent variables in various ways (e.g. the famous Framingham, Massachusetts, Heart Study: [www.framingham.com/heart/](http://www.framingham.com/heart/); Stein 2007).

“Sampling design” comprises probability and non-probability sampling. Under probability sampling, the options include: (a) *simple random sampling*, in which researchers select members of a certain group for their sample on the basis of computer-generated *random numbers* (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: App. D); (b) *systematic random sampling*, in which researchers select the very first person on the basis of random numbers, and then all subsequent members of the population on the basis of the “*sampling fraction*” or “*sampling interval*” (the desired number of people in the sample as a proportion of the total number in the population);<sup>4</sup> (c) *stratified sampling*, in which researchers try to capture the various subgroups in the population (e.g., in *proportional stratified sampling*, the proportions of the American electorate made up of African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, European Americans, etc.); and (d) *cluster sampling*, a multistage process in which, in large social settings, researchers select, on the basis of random numbers, a few “clusters” of a region where members of a given population might be located (e.g. Chinese Americans), and then survey a simple random or systematic random sample of the heads of households in those clusters (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: ch. 8).

Under non-probability sampling, researchers can select (a) *convenience sampling*, in which, for instance, standing outside an exit to a city’s subway system, they can approach anyone who is “conveniently” available as they leave the subway exit to ask for their opinions on George Bush’s foreign policies; (b) *quota sampling*, in which researchers might do the same thing, but try to capture an equal number of women as well as men, African Americans as well as European Americans; and (c) *purposive (judgment) sampling*, in which researchers

try to get as many people as they can from an area that is believed to be “typical” of the entire population (e.g. the New Hampshire primary and Iowa caucus with regard to how Americans are likely to vote in presidential elections).

The essential difference between probability sampling and non-probability sampling is that, in the former, estimates can be made, within certain *confidence intervals*, that the smaller sample is *representative* of the larger population from which the sample has been drawn; that one can *generalize* from the sample findings to inferences about the entire population. This assumption cannot be made in non-probability samples, in which researchers can talk only about the people they have actually studied.

Surveys are clearly useful in exploring the perceptions, beliefs, and values of parties in conflict as a basis for determining what, if anything, can be done about those conflicts. In recent years, following the devastating attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequent launching of President Bush’s “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), surveys, such as those conducted by the *Pew Global Attitudes Project* (<http://pewglobal.org/>), have also been useful in measuring perceptions in the Arab and Muslim worlds toward the US and others in the West, as one means for determining to what extent Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 1996) “Clash of Civilizations” is more than a contentious concept.<sup>5</sup> Surveys are, quite simply, relevant to conflict analysis and resolution, plus evaluation of third party interventions and other policies, as bases of possible necessary revision of underlying theories.

In *field studies*, the researcher, as either a *covert* “complete participant” or an *overt* “participant observer,” studies a certain group to explore, for example, its styles of governance, educational systems, family lives, recruitment into certain roles, members’ responses to stress, worldviews, and the like, either to learn about aspects of the group itself, or for purposes of comparison with other groups (e.g. the extent to which violence is a male-dominated behavior) (Wrangham and Peterson 1996; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: ch. 12). Field studies are ideal for generating data on the *ethnoconflict theories* underlying *ethnoconflict praxes* of select groups (Avruch and Black 1993; Avruch 1998).

Whereas researchers in *field study* settings strive to avoid “contaminating” the environments within which they are observing structures and practices – to avoid contaminating those as well – in *field experiments*, they strive to actively manipulate select independent variables to explore their impact on certain dependent variables. Perhaps the most illustrious examples of the use of field experiments in conflict analysis *and* resolution are those conducted by Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif (Sherif 1967). In contrived “boys’ camps” settings, the Sherifs investigated the impact of frustration on aggression, plus the impact of “superordinate goals” – goals that no one actor can achieve on their own but only by cooperating with others – in undermining frustration-based aggression, with profound implications for “real-world” conflict resolution.

The essential difference between *field experiments* and *laboratory experiments* is that, in the latter, participants definitely know that they are involved in an experiment, although they might not know all the details. By contrast, in field experiments, the subjects are meant not to know that they are even involved in experimental activities. In the Sherif experiments, for example:

Since the knowledge that one is a “research subject” and is being observed constantly has definite effects on behavior, the subjects were not aware that data were being collected or that the sequence of events was experimentally planned.

(1967: 73)

In addition to ethical concerns, this raises the issue of experimenters' *control* of the process, which is nearly total in laboratory experiments and less so in field experiments. The more control, the more likely the experimenter can determine the impact of select independent variables on certain dependent variables. There is a downside here as well: the more control and the less "realistic" the process, the less externally generalizable the results. Nevertheless, experimentally generated findings can be useful as *hypotheses* for testing in other settings (Rapoport 1964: ch. 13–14; Sandole 1999: 186–9).

This raises the issue of external vs. internal validity: results generated by projects in the natural setting tend to involve less control but to have more *external validity*; i.e. they may be generalizable beyond the observations on the sample studied. By contrast, results generated by experiments and simulations in the artificial setting involve more control, but are less generalizable externally. On the other hand, they have more *internal validity*; i.e. it is much easier to determine the impact of changes in select independent variables on changes in dependent variables (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: ch. 5).

The final element in the artificial setting is *simulations*. The primary difference between them and experiments is that experiments (field and laboratory) are operations performed directly on the subject matter (e.g. real live humans), whereas simulations are operations performed on some *model* of a corresponding subject matter, such as the international system. Nevertheless, these conceptual differences tend to become blurred in practice (Sandole 1999: ch. 3).

*Data collection* includes content analysis for archival data, and, for researcher-generated data, (a) questionnaires, (b) interviews, and (c) observation.

*Content analysis* involves at least two major phases: (1) coding and (2) scaling. Under *coding*, the researcher examines existing text (including information recorded in response to questionnaires and interviews) to identify *themes* that may be common as well as dissimilar across multiple units of analysis. By contrast, under *scaling*, the researcher determines *to what extent* any unit of analysis is recorded on the select theme. Hence, coding allows the researcher to determine, through a content analysis of, for example, Serb and Croat newspapers, whether Serbs are showing hostility *or* friendship to Croats, and vice versa (*nominal* level of measurement). Scaling, on the other hand, allows the researcher to determine whether the hostility or friendship is, for instance, low, medium, or high (*ordinal* level of measurement) (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: ch. 7 and 13–14).

One of the great studies of the causes of World War I involved creative use of content analysis. In the 1960s, Robert North and his students at Stanford University analyzed "the internal and international communications . . . authored by the key decision makers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, England, Russia, and Serbia in the six-week period prior to the outbreak of war, June 28 and August 4, 1914" (Zinnes 1968: 87, emphasis added). The dataset comprised more than 5,000 "cognitive and affective perceptions" (Holsti *et al.* 1968: 136; Zinnes 1968: 89). The objective of the exercise was to explore the *perceptions* of the principals and not just the "objective" events that the principals unleashed (e.g. mobilization for war). Among the revelatory findings were:

- If feelings of anxiety, fear, threat, and injury are great enough, even perceptions of military inferiority may *not* be enough to deter a nation from going to war.
- Excessive involvement in emotionally charged crises can lead to *overperception* of threat.
- Excessive involvement in emotionally charged crises can also lead to *overreaction* to the overperceived threat (Zinnes *et al.* 1961; Holsti *et al.* 1968).



*Questionnaires* and *interviews* are usually associated with surveys. The essential difference is that, in the use of questionnaires, research participants respond, on paper or online, to the same questions, with the same wording, and in the same order. By contrast, in interviews, participants respond “one-on-one” to questions put to them “in person” by the researcher, who records the responses manually or electronically (Sandole 2007). Interview questions may follow the least flexible format of all: the same questions with the same wording and in the same order (*schedule-structured interviews*). Alternatively, instead of pre-set questions, the format may be characterized by questions (and possible reframings of questions) reflecting the same general themes, which are explored in the same order (*non-schedule-structured [focused] interviews*). Finally, questions may follow the most flexible format, with no consistent thematic or sequencing pattern at all (*non-structured [non-directive] interviews*) (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: 213–18).

No matter how flexible or inflexible the question format in interviews, responses may be either closed-ended and/or open-ended (as they also are on questionnaires). In the *closed-ended* response format, according to one version of the *Likert Scale*, respondents are asked to respond to certain statements by indicating strong agreement (SA), agreement (A), mixed feelings (MF), disagreement (D), or strong disagreement (SD) (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: 422–4). By contrast, in the *open-ended* format, respondents are asked to respond to select questions by “waxing lyrical.” This is when the researcher then has to use content analysis to explore for themes and the like. Although closed-ended responses are easier to “code” and “scale” than responses to open-ended questions, the latter are veritable “goldmines” of respondents’ views, beliefs, values, and emotions regarding particular issues. Nevertheless, these “nuggets” often remain difficult to reveal, requiring “successive scannings” of responses, sometimes by more than one analyst (*ibid.*: ch. 11; Sandole 2007).

*Observation* is usually associated with field studies, field experiments, and laboratory experiments (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: ch. 9). As in interviews, the format may be more or less structured (less or more flexible). On the more structured side, we have the *Bales Interaction Process Analysis* (IPA) system (*ibid.*: 194). One of the critical aspects of observation is not to contaminate the process with “intrusive” observation, lest the researcher inadvertently unleash the “Hawthorne Effect” (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939) – the social science equivalent of Werner Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle in quantum mechanics – whereby the researcher may influence respondents’ behavior (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: 198–200, 240–3; Benjamin 1990).

*Data processing* includes, among other things, levels of data measurement, most of which have already been mentioned, such as: (a) nominal, (b) ordinal, and (c) interval levels of data measurement.

At the *nominal level*, the researcher “codes” his or her data into “either/or” discrete, mutually exclusive categories; e.g. male *or* female; Irish Catholic *or* Irish Protestant; Greek-Cypriot *or* Turkish-Cypriot; Palestinian Muslim *or* Christian *or* Israeli Jewish; hostility *or* friendship; pro-reconciliation *or* anti-reconciliation. “Scaling” then involves attempting to measure within some of those discrete themes *the extent* to which units of analysis inhabit a particular theme; e.g. “high,” “low,” or “medium” on friendship or hostility.

The *interval level* is where many social scientists would like to be, because then they can say not only that, for instance, X is more or less hostile than Y, but also “by how much more” (e.g. the US spends more per capita on the military than the Russian Federation, by x millions of dollars).



As can be seen, *data processing* provides researchers with opportunities to render their data more accessible to various techniques of *data analysis*, which is the next-to-final phase of our journey under operational setting.

*Data analysis* is undertaken for at least three reasons, one being to reveal *trends* in the behavior of select variables over time (e.g. beyond some critical threshold in the dynamics of a particular conflict, the conflict may become *self-stimulating/self-perpetuating*) (Sandole 1999). *The Human Security Report*, for example, reports that:

By 2003, there were 40 percent fewer conflicts than in 1992. The deadliest conflicts – those with 1,000 or more battle-deaths – fell by some 80 percent. The number of genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians also dropped by 80 percent, while core human rights abuses have declined in five out of six regions of the developing world since the mid-1990s. *International terrorism is the only type of political violence that has increased*. Although the death toll has jumped sharply over the past three years, terrorists kill only a fraction of the number who die in wars.

(*Human Security Report 2005*, emphasis added)

Second, data analysis may be conducted to explore for *differences* in the behavior of some variable as expressed by different individuals or members of different groups (e.g. a comparison of the views of NATO, former Soviet, central European, former Yugoslav, and neutral and non-aligned members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe concerning the “lessons” of the genocidal implosion of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s; Sandole 2007: ch. 7). Whether “differences” are assessed to be “significant” or not may depend on “non-statistical” (e.g. the emergence of certain patterns) as well as “statistical” criteria (e.g. whether findings fall within the 0.05, 0.01, 0.001, or other significance levels) (Sandole 1999).

Third, the researcher may conduct data analysis to explore for *relationships* between independent and dependent variables within or between groups, often via the computation of *correlation coefficients*, *partial correlation coefficients*, and/or *regression coefficients*. Correlation coefficients enable the researcher to determine whether a relationship between two variables exists or not; and if so, in what direction (+ or –), plus how strong it is (between 0 and 1). By contrast, regression coefficients enable the researcher to predict the behavior of a select dependent variable from known values on certain independent variables and, under certain circumstances, to *rank-order* independent variables in terms of their relative degrees of potency in influencing the behavior of the dependent variable (Sandole 1999: ch. 4–5).

With results of analysis in hand regarding trends, differences, and/or relationships, researchers are then ready to identify bases for *validating* their findings.

### *Theory revisited*

If researchers have determined that, for example, during the genocidal unraveling of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Serbs were more genocidal than Croats or Bosniaks, and that Croats were more genocidal than Bosniaks, the question to be answered is “Why?” This involves a return to the “theoretical setting” to identify bases for *interpreting* these findings (Sandole 1999: ch. 6–8).

## Conclusion

Many years ago, John W. Burton made the following prescient comment about the relevance of conflict analysis to conflict resolution:

Before disputing parties can come together and usefully ask each other what the strife is about and what agreements are to be made, *an analysis of conflict has to be made on an academic plane with all the objectivity of science*. The initial responsibility devolves upon the scientist in the field of *peace theory*, and *no useful progress on the political level can be expected until theories are formulated, made public and widely accepted*.

(Burton 1962: 188, cited in Dunn 2004: 49, emphasis added)

More recently, in the wake of 9/11, Richard Jackson proposed that “Terrorism is a *complex problem*; it will require a *complex solution* based on clear thinking, *informed analysis* and realistic assessment” (2005: 4, emphasis added). One interesting connection between Burton and Jackson is that, if the conflicts of forty years ago were not then subjected to a “scientific analysis” as a basis for effective conflict resolution, then, left “untreated,” they might have escalated to acts of terrorism forty years later.

Considering that US President George W. Bush’s “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) has been fairly *counterproductive* in its overall impact (Sheehan 2007), one wonders whether, and if so, to what extent:

- “informed analyses” have been conducted of pressing problems underlying seemingly intractable conflicts;
- appropriate theories have been developed by academic and other researchers as a basis for *multitrack interventions* into those conflicts (Diamond and McDonald 1996);
- such theories have been made public, debated, and widely accepted;
- the policymaking community has responded to whatever academic wisdom there is on conflict analysis and resolution (CAR).

Despite the debacle that the GWOT has become, it is gratifying to report some noteworthy developments in the *theory–practice–theory* nexus that capture these four conditions to some extent. The primary development agency of the world’s sole surviving superpower, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and that of the dominant global actor, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have both recently taken steps to *mainstream* conflict analysis into their development work in order to explicitly link *development* with effective *conflict resolution*. For USAID, this has resulted in the *Conflict Assessment Framework* (CAF) and for UNDP, the *Conflict-related Development Analysis* (CDA).

Andrew Natsios, former head of USAID, has remarked about the CAF that:

USAID will seek to directly address the sources of conflict using development, transition and humanitarian assistance programming. One tool that will assist us is the *Conflict Assessment Framework*. This document provides a framework that will assist Missions to map out destabilizing patterns and trends, both long and short term, leading to recommendations about possible points of intervention using our assistance resources.

(2004, emphasis added)

Further:

Conflict assessments are *diagnostic tools* that are designed to help Missions:

- (1) Identify and prioritize the causes and consequences of violence and instability that are most important in a given country context;
- (2) Understand how existing development programs *interact* with factors linked to violence; and
- (3) Determine where development and humanitarian assistance can most effectively support local efforts to manage conflict and build peace . . .

Conflict assessments are intended to highlight areas of concern and can help development programs begin to address institutional weakness or destabilizing trends before they reach a critical stage.

(*ibid.*, emphasis added)

Apropos of the UN Development Programme's CDA:

CDA is an *analytic tool* targeted at UNDP practitioners and other development agencies working in conflict prone and affected situations. In particular, it was designed as a practical tool to better understand the linkages between development and conflict, with a view to increasing the impact of development on conflict.

The CDA has been developed, with a view to contributing to the further *mainstreaming of conflict prevention* into UNDP's strategy development and programming. In this sense, it aims to integrate *conflict assessment* into existing programming tools and procedures at *all levels*, including . . . planning cycles . . . . Alternatively, the CDA can be used in country settings, where there is an opportunity to build a consensus around key conflict areas.

(UNDP 2003, emphasis added)

So, the “good news” is that the “two-culture problem” (or *conflict*) between theorists and practitioners with which we began this chapter has been managed to *some extent*. Academic “wisdom” has been used to generate bases for reflective, effective conflict analysis, resolution, and evaluation in the discourse, objectives, and *conflict assessments* of appropriate development agencies at the global (UNDP) and national levels (USAID).

Nevertheless, considering that, at the highest levels of the US government since 9/11, ideology has trumped “reality” on multiple fronts, including global climate change (Sandole 2006), we clearly have a long way to go before a critical threshold can be reached in the metaphorical journey across the “bridge of fire” – before we can become more a part of the solution than of the problem!<sup>6</sup>

## Notes

- 1 In the US, prior to starting their research, researchers working with or for institutions such as universities have to submit their research proposals to human subjects review boards (HSRBs) to ensure compliance with these and other issues (CFR 2005).
- 2 There is an inverse relationship between Type I and Type II errors; i.e. “the smaller the risk of a type I error, the greater the probability of a type II error” (Blalock 1960: 124; Selltiz *et al.* 1959: 414–22).

- 3 See Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias's (2000: 32–9) distinction between inductive *conceptual frameworks* and deductive *theoretical systems*.
- 4 For example, a sampling fraction of 1/100 would mean that the sample size would be one-hundredth of the size of the population; hence, from a population of 1,000, the sample would include 10 subjects. In *systematic random sampling*, researchers would select each one-hundredth person from the population of 1,000 to develop their sample of 10.
- 5 See, in this volume, Kevin Avruch's Chapter 17 on "Culture Theory, Culture Clash, and the Practice of Conflict Resolution."
- 6 See Thania Paffenholz's Chapter 19 in this volume on "Understanding the Conflict-Development Nexus and the Contribution of Development Cooperation to Peacebuilding."

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# 31 From diagnosis to treatment

## Toward new shared principles for Israeli–Palestinian peacebuilding★

*Walid Salem and Edy Kaufman*

### Introduction

This chapter synthesizes research and evaluations of peacebuilding work among Israelis and Palestinians since the beginnings of the Oslo peace process in 1993. It incorporates interviews with activists from both sides, as well as personal experiences of the authors. Therefore, the chapter’s generalizations, conclusions, and recommendations are inductively arrived at and specific to this case study. Nonetheless, they may be relevant to other ethnopolitical or identity-driven contemporary conflicts

Given the inability of the Israeli and Palestinian ruling elites to move decisively out of the current impasse, priority should be given to an enlargement of the ranks of the peace camp by attracting as many components of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), professional groups, social movements, charitable associations, intellectuals, and artists as possible (Hassassian and Kaufman 1999). The guiding principles that we suggest are shared values of human rights and the desire for democracy and peace. We must forge a link between the currently introverted peace and justice camp and the larger sphere of civil society (Kaufman and Hassassian 1998). For, in the absence of government action, it becomes the province of the public to affect the course of events to bring about a just and lasting peace (Hassassian and Kaufman 2002).

The challenge is to seize the opportunities and channel efforts into proactive work for a two-state solution, which has consistent support by approximately 70 percent in both societies. We have closely witnessed the Oslo peace process and subsequent attempts to achieve a final status peace treaty (Clinton parameters, Geneva Initiative, Ayalon/Nusseibeh Agreement, the Saudi and Arab League’s Initiative). These processes, however, have enjoyed only limited success (Enderlin 2003). But they have produced substantial inroads in thinking in both societies – intellectual groundwork that may yet provide the springboard for a lasting peace agreement.

For years, both sides have agreed on a vague interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 calling for a just and lasting peace. But Israelis have been stressing “lasting” in terms of security, and the Palestinians “just” in terms of recognition of their grievances.

★ This chapter was prepared for presentation at the Bringing Peace Together (BPT) Project conference held in Jerusalem on 20 May 2006. BPT is a project dating from 2001 aimed at bringing together the different Israeli and Palestinian movements in order to exchange visions and experiences. BPT is funded by the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) in the Netherlands. We are grateful to Rina Shapira and Arjun Sethi, and to Jessica Senehi and Sean Byrne of the Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice who assisted us in revising and editing this chapter.




As much as these two locutions may appear to be at odds with each other, as a practical matter they have been translated in numerous track two diplomacy meetings into concrete and detailed peace plans. Can we find a wide common ground that could translate such efforts into a dynamic process that can revamp meaningful peace negotiations and ensure trust-building among the two societies at large? No less important, can we produce a code of conduct that will encourage cooperation within Palestinian and Israeli communities, which is essential for transforming their shared universal principles of human rights, democracy, and peace into a common experience?

This chapter is structured in three sequential parts, employing terminology borrowed from the medical profession when dealing with an alarming situation. First is a diagnosis of “what went wrong” in the existing relationship between Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilding organizations; this covers the Oslo process from 1993, the failed 2000 Camp David summit meeting, and the subsequent militarized Intifada. Second, in a prognosis toward “an uncertain future,” it summarizes the stumbling blocks impeding forward movement in the peace process: macro events that limit the top-down stimulation of peacebuilding cooperation. Third, focus is placed on the need to find remedies to address problem root causes, as opposed to symptoms. We examine peacebuilding interactions between the two civil societies (as illustrated in Figure 31.1) within the wider context of their overall actions. Rather than stressing the upward impact on official negotiations (e.g. track two diplomacy) or analyzing shortcomings in people-to-people activities (e.g. peace education), we focus in depth on the constraints on the full development of the relationships between people like us both, usually of middle class, highly educated cosmopolitan people sharing similar universal values. We develop a set of guiding principles to promote civil societies’ constructive cooperation and to assist the peace and justice camp in particular (see Figure 31.2). Such guidelines could be a basis for a negotiated consensus document that could transcend today’s meager number of cross-community ties, expanding them into a broader spectrum of intercommunication enlarging the involvement of civil societies of both nations. Eventually, when common ground has been established, the main challenge will be execution of the fourth stage of our planned course of action, the inculcation of these universally accepted normative values.

We recommend a spectrum of building blocks for the hundreds of NGOs, professional associations, social movements, and charitable organizations already now actively at work in their respective Palestinian and Israeli communities (Hammami 1995). It is to be hoped that they will all eventually enjoy opportunities to share in a joint effort at peacebuilding over the next two decades. However, now is the time for organizations already schooled in peacebuilding to further the peace process and to make their voices heard.

### **Introspection in retrospect: what went wrong?**

Before joining a chorus of self-criticism, we must remind ourselves that peacebuilders in both civil societies have already made major contributions to advancing mutual recognition, and to limiting the effects of some gross human rights violations. Further, they have provided creative ideas that further the resolution of a number of permanent status issues (e.g. Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders, settlements, water), and that foster movement from an untenable status quo to confidence-building measures (e.g. prisoner release, non-violent action, limiting the damaging effect of checkpoints in the Occupied Territories).



On the Peace NGOs Forum website there is information about 135 organizations. Other lists are available from a recent UNESCO Mapping of Peace Organizations report; and in the Appendix of Kaufman *et al.* (2006).

Figure 31.1 Peacebuilding interactions between Palestine and Israel.

Meanwhile, peacebuilders work within an occupier/occupied relationship and a hostile environment. Violence breeds counterviolence: this vicious cycle makes peace work extremely difficult and often physically dangerous. When civilians are targeted, the resulting trauma becomes a fact of life. Such vulnerability generates feelings of uncertainty, threat, and stress, which leads to an accumulation of reciprocal hostility. Sadly, peace work has enjoyed far less success at reducing the gulf between Palestinian and Israeli than destructive action has at creating it. This is not altogether surprising: do we not learn early in childhood that it is considerably more difficult to assemble building blocks into a recognizable whole than it is to casually demolish what was so carefully assembled?

The following propositions are based on a thorough analysis of several critical studies and post-facto evaluations of NGO cooperation in the past and studies that have highlighted many of the current obstacles (Hassassian and Kaufman 1999, 2002; Kaufman and Hassassian 1998; Kaufman *et al.* 2006). We move from the more general propositions affecting society at large to those more specifically related to achieving a just peace. Many considerations are asymmetric. Therefore, some matters of concern in one community may not find resonance in the other. We specify the group, either Israeli or Palestinian, to which the concern applies.

The transition from what was essentially a confrontation between Zionist and Palestinian national movements to what is now primarily a religious conflict points to an inherent difficulty: members of secular liberal democratic blocs have yet to develop a requisite common vocabulary to facilitate communication with devout individuals on either side. The texts of the three monotheistic religions are replete with well-known injunctions that encourage peace, non-violence, and tolerance (Gopin 2002). Yet the agents of secular democratic civil society are often ignorant, either willfully or for want of education, of these religiously inspired imperatives, thus precluding their incorporation into peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, liberal democrats have mostly seen religion as a threat to secular peace activism instead of dealing with the challenge of reaching the religious believers, and addressing them on the basis of their faiths' teachings about peace, tolerance, and non-violence.

An important ongoing concern is that the region's youth, a numerically large and actively engaged sector of society, is overrepresented among both victims and perpetrators of violent conflict. Despite this, over the years, a significant minority of young Palestinians has participated in joint activities with like-minded Israelis. A few have continued to work for peace with their Israeli and other Middle Eastern peers, even in the face of increasingly difficult circumstances. However, many have become frustrated by intermittent border closures, daily killings, and an overall absence of any hope for their future. On the other side, only a few young Israelis continue to participate in joint activities, active participation still predominantly being in the hands of older Israelis. Meanwhile, many young Israelis gravitate to the nationalist right of the Israeli political spectrum.

Many on both sides support a "land for peace" solution based broadly along the pre-1967 lines with mutually agreed border rectifications, no doubt a step toward a lasting resolution of our conflict. However, the same public is adamant in its preference for violence as an appropriate response to aggressive acts by the other. Thus, the main challenge is the backtracking from a long-term shared vision into the present. Further, we must provide answers to the question: how do we move from the here-and-now toward a desirable future, and break the ongoing cycle of violence? Various recent polls demonstrate that public opinion on the one hand supports a two-state solution while at the same time supporting punitive strategies. This points to a significant shortcoming in peace work. Although peace activists have contributed to the public acceptance of a two-state solution, they have been unable to overcome, or at least diminish, calls for retaliation.

Most Israelis rationalize their violence against the Palestinians as being no more than a justifiable reaction to threats to their citizens' security. Conversely, Palestinians valorize violent activity as being legitimately responsive to a protracted, repressive occupation (Kaufman 1993). That such a strategy might objectively be a right or wrong choice in ending the occupation is largely beside the point. The lack of progress in official Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and the shift in the priorities of some politicians and even some peace activists from how to make peace to how to stop the war, is blatant. This factor has generated a prevailing pessimism and a pragmatic shift from pursuing reconciliation to tacitly encouraging separation. Indeed, in significant circles in the Israeli peace camp, this has become an acceptable strategy. Meanwhile their Palestinian counterparts have become increasingly frustrated with this new approach to conflict management that postpones statehood and brings into question the validity of the Palestinian right to self-determination.

Typically, Israelis cite concrete acts of violence, such as the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by an extremist paramilitary group. Palestinians insist that violence includes "structural violence," such as the expansion of settlements and the building of the separation

barrier, affecting the integrity of Arab East Jerusalem. Constraints on access to health care, food supplies, employment opportunities, and decent shelter exacerbate the suffering and deprivation of the entire population now under occupation. This has resulted in premature death, reduced life expectancy, and post-traumatic stress disorders. Whereas Palestinians blame the occupation, Israelis as a whole avoid facing such unpleasant realities, preferring to attribute the cause to the “other’s” violence.

Even Israelis who recognize the damage of reciprocal violence are often unable to see that Palestinians pay with greater numbers of casualties, if only because of the efficiency of Israeli army attacks. For example, many Israelis compared their victims with the Lebanese in the Summer 2006 war while tending to ignore the fact that more than 500 Palestinians, mostly innocent civilians, were killed in the Gaza Strip following the kidnapping of one Israeli soldier. This asymmetry is interpreted differently within the respective Israeli and Palestinian contexts. Palestinians, defining themselves as victims, emphasize the prevailing inequality between the occupied (Palestinians) and the occupier (Israel), and seek international solidarity and withdrawal, if only to redress the negative power balance. Israelis feel uneasy about calling for international intervention for the resolution of the conflict, preferring to see themselves as a small state surrounded by hostile Arab and Islamic regimes and masses.

We must recognize that existing asymmetries provide more freedom of action and means to implement ideas on the Israeli side, in contrast to Palestinians under occupation and domestic turmoil. These differences place a higher burden on the side of the occupier’s civil society. Therefore, a major social responsibility for peace work resides in the Israeli camp. Simultaneously, a measure of sensitivity is required so that such undertakings will not be perceived as paternalistic or autocratic.

Different perceptions of asymmetry produce different realities (Rouhana and Bar-Tal 1998). Most Israelis conduct their daily lives oblivious to the occupation. Most Palestinians daily confront the impediments and ordeals of the occupation’s restrictions to their freedom of movement and living conditions. The recently erected separation barrier or Apartheid Wall, roadblocks, and checkpoints (i.e. structural violence) prohibit West Bank and Gaza Palestinians from meeting Israelis in Israel. For the same reason, Israelis are not allowed to meet Palestinians on their own turf. As a result, most peace activities of Israelis are now confined to interaction with Palestinians from East Jerusalem. Ineffective, humiliating requests by Israeli NGOs for individual “single day” access permits, instead of a global campaign for pressurizing the Israeli government to guarantee an unrestricted policy for peacebuilding, have produced insignificant results.

Israeli civil society activists find themselves in a post–nation–building phase in an established state functioning under democratic rules of the game. Not unexpectedly, many potential peacebuilders today prefer the individual pursuit of happiness and better living standards to the rigors of promoting intercommunity reconciliation (Kriesberg 2002). By contrast, Palestinians remain saddled with the task of constructing a state from scratch and a national ethos that restricts individual freedom of action. Frustration related to lack of personal advancement further alienates them and discourages interaction with Israeli counterparts, persons visibly enjoying a much higher standard of living.

Some joint initiatives have enjoyed considerable support in both communities – for example, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon Accord, the Geneva Initiative, and field actions against the occupation. However, generally both Palestinians and Israelis saw these initiatives to be declaratory in nature and largely devoid of popular participation. Given that general perception, it follows that the importance of building bridges was not fully understood,

appreciated, or even tacitly rejected by most government leaders. People-to-people programs, even when officially endorsed for a short period, never became normative. On the Palestinian side, public exposure was limited, participant names remained undisclosed, and often meetings were held abroad. Thus insufficient media coverage was not the only reason for the general ignorance concerning the scope of these activities. Participants also failed to widely promote the “good news” message that concluded such activities. The lesson here is to concentrate more on projects that are more publicly oriented rather than inward-looking.

Palestinian peace groups can be criticized for their failure to advocate effectively with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) for their peace projects or to create public support for their work. The same criticism applies to Israeli peace groups. Nonetheless, Palestinian peace groups should be credited for the large amount of media and public relations work performed on issues relating to criticism of the second Intifada’s militarization, chaos on the streets, violation of human rights, and the courage of a few in the face of anti-normalization, boycotting discourse (Salem 2005). The failure of peace organizations’ advocacy contrasts with the at least moderate successes of human rights organizations’ efforts in advocating democracy and monitoring human rights violations. Importantly, the lack of intrasocietal cooperation between human rights and peace/conflict resolution NGOs in both societies remains to be overcome. Whereas the expectations of Israelis for cooperation focused the dialogue on professional, educational, humanitarian, or academic topics, the expectations of Palestinians were fixed at the political level, seeking changes to their currently intolerable sociopolitical reality.

Israelis want a permanent status solution that meets Israeli security needs; Palestinians want a permanent status solution that brings, at least, a sense of justice. Palestinian activists seek a political outcome that assures security for both sides instead of the current one-sided security regime. Without a permanent status solution, Israelis accept minimalist conflict management whereas Palestinians believe such an approach is no more than a recipe for continued occupation, one conducted at the expense of their rights.

Establishing joint Israeli–Palestinian organizations could demonstrate that Palestinian–Jewish coexistence is not merely a slogan, but also as a relationship grounded in reality. However, only sustained and trustworthy relationships can endure the rigors of confrontational times. Because binational cooperation is a prerequisite for their continued existence as NGOs, such organizations have both a greater role to play and better built-in prospects of surviving such difficult moments. Yet, sadly, there are few such common enterprises, a number of which are in financial or organizational crisis.

Civil society organizations on both sides have often failed to understand and appreciate the dilemmas of peace-oriented organizations and individuals endeavoring to work across the national divide. We need to respect alternative priorities, and take into consideration concerns of marginalization faced by peacebuilding groups from opponents within their own constituencies. The minuscule population segment actually involved in peace work, in contrast to the large and vibrant Palestinian and Israeli civil societies, testifies to the majority’s preference for looking inward and the commensurate failure to adopt an out-reach posture.

Normalization (*Tatbie’a*) has been defined among Palestinians as the process of building open and reciprocal relations with Israel in all fields, including the political, economic, social, cultural, and educational realms. Palestinians are divided in their stances vis-à-vis normalization. Supporters see it as a process to integrate Israel into the larger Middle East community of nations or to restructure Israel through a bottom-up peace process.

Many others, however, oppose normalization if only because it implies a willingness to accept, and perhaps legitimize, past injustices experienced in the course of occupation. Thus, they hold that ending occupation must be a precondition for normal relations with Israelis. This anti-normalization stance has led to such Palestinian initiatives as the boycott of Israeli academics (understood as an act of non-violence against occupation), which has brought a great deal of unwanted pressure on those Palestinians willing to cooperate across the ethnic divide (Salem 2005).

Among mainstream Israelis, there is the growing idea of, in so many words, “getting rid of the Palestinians.” By putting them behind the wall, “they will be there, and we will be here, and we will not have to see or interact with them any more.” This separatist idea is gaining popularity in Israeli public opinion, even among heretofore peace activists. This idea is a mirror opposite of the “humanization of the other” and likewise opposed to a basic human security principle, one that presupposes that everyone should enjoy unencumbered access to all citizens’ rights.

Reciprocity, the idea of holding both sides of the conflict responsible and accountable for their actions, is frequently the focus of Israeli liberals who are critical of unconditional solidarity efforts with Palestinians. However, this quest for reciprocity is often most evident in its negative form, blaming the other for beginning the cycle of violence and hence relieving themselves of any obligation to initiate a process of change. The insularity of most concerned Israelis is what often blocks any proactive peace commitment. It transcends any “lack of knowledge” of Palestinian suffering and, in addition, precludes internalizing the Palestinian situation, which would require as a response taking commensurate corrective action (what is termed “act-knowledge” similar to acknowledgment).

On the Israeli side, peace groups are severely limited by the middle- and upper-class nature of their membership, which has tended to deter other social organizations from supporting this work. Further, given its predominantly Ashkenazi membership, the Israeli peace movement remains vague about the need to incorporate a Middle Eastern identity as a significant aspect of its goal agenda (Bar-On 1996). The general lack of enthusiasm for Arab culture and language has been an obstacle to the perception of Israel as an integral part of the region into which it ostensibly wants to be popularly accepted. Simultaneously, we need to be wary of the claim that, unless Israeli society becomes more overtly Middle Eastern, there can be no peace. Although peace can be fostered by such a trend, it is by no means contingent upon achieving it.

One related problem is the limited effect of efforts to connect the cost of militarism and occupation to the increasing hardships of the welfare system within Israel and the impoverishment of large segments of society. On the Palestinian side, a few organizations have increased training in non-violent action as an alternative, but they still need to develop a corpus of dominant non-violent strategies, and, within it, a major campaign that includes the PNA, grassroots organizations, NGOs, the media, influential leaders, international participation, and the Palestinians of the diaspora. This campaign needs to succeed at least in minimal cases in order to develop the belief and confidence in reliance on non-violence as an effective tool to counter violence.

Shared gender identities can be a strong bond for continuous cooperation. Despite some ups and downs, the few women’s peace and justice organizations are more likely to have continued to cooperate within the general decrease in the level of joint activities during the second Intifada.

Work with university students, schoolchildren, and their teachers is an important aspect that has been relatively neglected in the last years since the Intifada Al Aqsa. Development



and production of Palestinian educational textbooks began in earnest after the formation of the PNA. It is important to note that the new curriculum generally includes textbooks that focus more generically on tolerance, civil rights, and other civic issues. The polarized debate focuses on the still negative image toward Israel and Zionism, but one needs to take into account that daily realities inevitably trump textual terminology. A traumatic personal experience at a checkpoint can condition a child far more than a book's positive description of Jews as prospective good neighbors. We need to recognize that books alone are not a remedy when there is a gap between the promised peace and the daily reality of an ugly confrontation with the "other." This reality often proves stronger than the text, and teachers themselves, as the socializing elements, may feel the same sense of victimhood as their pupils (Caplan 1999). Hence, there must be a focus on human rights education, peer mediation, and conflict-transformation programs in the classroom, along with changes in the lives of Palestinians. A personal transformation may grow into an eventual acceptance of a new relationship between Palestinians and Israelis. This process needs greater encouragement from peace organizations than is presently the case, rather than being limited to monitoring by Jewish groups averse to Palestinian rights.

Those Israelis who believe in solidarity with the Palestinians continue their supportive activities in the absence of much needed intensive parallel work with Israeli public opinion. A commensurate latter effort is essential to the realization of any two-state solution. On the other hand, those who believe in project-driven, professional joint activities, continue their work, but likewise fail to advocate for change in public opinion in both societies. A third group chooses to continue working for healing, reconciliation and forgiveness, reaching out to schools or smaller, marginal groups in both societies. Still a fourth group tries to recruit the grassroots, and to reorganize mass movements in support of peace, based on a two-state solution, but these movements are likewise marginalized.

On the Palestinian side, there are several types of restrictions to cooperation. For example, there are those who favor a two-state solution immediately and without any gradualism, if only to physically separate each side from the other. This group is not interested in cooperation in the near future, a prescription that leaves the door open alternatively to future reconsideration or, equally likely, to backsliding. The majority within the skeleton Palestinian peace-oriented organizations consists of those who think that it is still possible to have joint activities. Israelis often want to externalize and publicize the joint activities, whereas Palestinians mostly want to minimize publicity, thinking that the time for exposure to the public is still not ripe. They think that some factions might use this type of publicity as an argument that everything is fine between Israelis and Palestinians and, therefore, that there is no occupation and no suffering on the ground. For many, it may be acceptable that Israelis come to participate in solidarity activities with them. It is possible to have joint non-violent actions against occupation, but other activities will be considered as normalization activities. Finally there is the Palestinian group that believes that normal joint activities can take place only after peace is reached and two states have been established for the two peoples; this despite the evident truth that there is good reason for both sides to struggle non-violently and separately for an end to the occupation, after which reconciliation becomes a reasonable prospect.

In summary, we can imagine a wide highway, the road to peace, in which cars of different models, sizes, and power are running in parallel lanes at different speeds, all toward the same destination. Facing them is a bulldozer, driven mostly by strongly committed and determined religious fanatics, which has successfully derailed many cars, and risks causing permanent damage to the peace road. The bulldozer drivers do not respect the



traffic regulations and they are destructive and dangerous. Those of us who are driving in the same direction forward are faced with a serious question of how to avoid collision with the bulldozer, as we all maneuver along the road without hurting and bumping into one another.

### **Prognosis: stumbling blocks toward an uncertain future**

Many peace activists seem confused when confronting the stumbling blocks in the way ahead. In this section, we identify eight stumbling blocks to peacebuilding.

- 1 *Mutual legitimacy is not prevailing.* Each side's position towards the "other" and their collective rights to the same land is an issue rife with problems when it comes to the Israeli recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination in the remaining 22 percent of their historic land, namely within the pre-1967 borders; or Hamas's rejection of Israel as a Jewish state of any size. A significant number of polarized misperceptions need to be addressed constructively by the peace and justice camp.
- 2 *National security trumps human security.* Each side still conceives security as a zero-sum game; any increase in security for one side must occur at the expense of the other. The thinking is that one side's security can be increased through killing and punishing the other side's people, or through the building of walls that separate "us" from "them." This situation is aggravated when targeted killings become normative, and state-sponsored terror affects lives of innocent civilians. This issue is most salient when the cessation of terrorism is presented as a precondition to any movement towards peace instead of developing peace negotiations and confidence building measures that could, in turn, lead to the ending of terrorism.
- 3 *Statehood is delayed.* Democracy and reform have often been presented as preconditions for Palestinian statehood, but the Hamas parliamentary victory has not been recognized. This implies that democracy building can occur in the absence of freedom, a condition further restricted by an oppressive occupation.
- 4 *Conflict is managed rather than transformed.* These last two stumbling blocks lead to a fourth, which is giving priority to conflict management that sustains moderating occupation at the expense of conflict transformation. One of the models of this conflict management approach was trying, without negotiating, to secure a long-term ceasefire with the Hamas/Fatah government as a condition for an Israeli partial withdrawal from the West Bank. But, when the Hamas government became ostracized and confined to Gaza, the Kadimah-led government stopped speaking about an Israeli unilateral or negotiated pullout. Other models include getting to a final status declaratory agreement rapidly while leaving the implementation of it to a later stage when the Palestinian violence stops. Finally, there are all the models for small cosmetic steps on the ground such as the symbolic lifting of a few checkpoints and the release of a small number of prisoners.
- 5 *Religiosity serves conflict rather than peace.* Both sides have failed to develop a strategy for the encouragement of the moderation and the democratization on the part of the Islamists. The religiosity of a large segment in both societies does not need to express itself in antagonism toward the other faith but in humane behavior toward all human beings. Leading such an effort presents a real challenge but also presents an opportunity to increase public support for an inclusive peace process.
- 6 *The global community marginalizes the conflict.* Upon analysis of the conflicts in Iraq,

Darfur, Lebanon, and others in the region, some observers began to think that the status of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has become marginal, and therefore, it can be safely neglected or at least postponed for several years. This viewpoint is now at least temporarily redressed by the worldwide and regional attendance to the Annapolis Peace Conference of November 2007, but the translation of its overall goals into resolutions to the pending permanent status issues remains to be seen.

- 7 *Palestinians' democratic resources are not fully recognized.* Ongoing Palestinian internal armed clashes can be interpreted as organic evidence that Palestinians cannot run a Palestinian state. This perception is reinforced by the tragic distancing between Gaza and the West Bank, each area ruled by competing political elites separated by two contending worldviews. Rather, these clashes should be recognized as major political rifts to be bridged instead of constituting evidence that Palestinians are inherently unable to govern themselves. There is a body of concerned Palestinian citizens with a deep adherence to democratic values who may emerge with a new generational leadership.
- 8 *The interlocutor is questioned.* Over two decades of PLO willingness to negotiate unconditionally, most of the Israeli leadership heightened popular Israeli skepticism about the very existence of a partner on the other side. And at this time, while Prime Minister Olmert is reviving his partnership with Chairman Abu Mazen, the construction of the security barrier or Apartheid Wall and settlements continues in the West Bank while people are fully aware that no one in Fatah's moderate leadership can agree to such unilateral imposed facts on Palestinian land.

Since the 2006 Lebanon war, a still popular interpretation in Israel is that constant withdrawals or concrete concessions are inefficient and, in many cases, counterproductive. Many Israelis think that the sudden removal of all troops from Lebanon encouraged Hezbollah's establishment of new strongholds and soon thereafter these sites began to pummel the north with rockets and mortar rounds. Also they see that, after the pullout, Qassam rocket attacks, originating in Gaza, began to fall on the south. As the cycle of violence continues, the Israeli right wing has experienced an increase in public support, which advocates only the use of force in the reconstruction of Israel's capacity to deter its enemies and "teach them a lesson."

This thinking ignores the need to share responsibility for the outcome of Lebanon's withdrawal not being accompanied or followed by a peace agreement that solves the few outstanding issues with Lebanon. It ignores, as well, that the pullout was from inside Gaza only, keeping the Gazans effectively caged and disconnected from their West Bank brothers and sisters.

### **Civil society in search for common ground: ground rules for peacebuilding**

This section is also inspired by the tradition of physicians and health care workers, who, over the centuries, have developed ethical codes that are observed at all times, including times of emergency. Concern for the lives of the wounded, the sick, or for those in life-threatening situations is universal and transcends community borders. There is a deep-rooted sense of inherent justice in providing equal treatment and respect for the ill in hospital environments. Even at this time of violent confrontations, the Palestinians have appreciated the medical treatment granted to them by Israel, and Palestinian physicians


have been willing to cooperate, putting their humanitarian values above political consideration. The challenge is to expand such a code of conduct into one in which the general populace participates in the promotion of peace as members of organized groups in society. We genuinely believe that most of our fellow citizens are keen to find a peaceful resolution to our conflict. However, it is likewise incontrovertible that they do not see themselves playing any affirmative roles in advancing such a goal.

Although it would be easier, perhaps, to envision peace being imposed by higher authorities, the lack of progress in official negotiations effectively puts an increased burden on ordinary citizens to take the initiative in building peace in our own habitat, asking ourselves what can be done by our own organization or association. We have used the term *sectorial peace*, with the understanding that we are referring to small steps that can be undertaken within our own society and/or across the divide with associations that share similar professional or other characteristics with our own. Once we have identified what our own functional groups could modestly do for peace, there could be a concomitant requirement to generate ground rules for cooperation, a set of principles providing a framework facilitating the translation of social responsibility into action. One possibility open to those of us who have had privileged access to higher education and who can affect important sectors of our communities is to develop a formula for combining professional work with an overall adherence to the seemingly shared commitment to human rights, democracy, and peace values.

There is a need to (1) come to some consensus about the realistic and yet daring effort to engage most civil society organizations in peace-oriented activities and (2) develop some ground rules for effective cooperation in support of the now much reduced peace and justice camp bodies functioning both within Palestinian and Israeli communities and across the divide that separates them (see Figure 31.2). The names of the NGOs are for illustration purposes and are not a complete list.

In reference to (1) above, we propose some minimal guidelines to govern the peace work of civil society organizations at large, with specific illustrative examples to be fleshed out first by the members of a given profession, gender, or other affinity group, and, thereafter, in conjunction with comparable entities across the national divide. Normally, it should be possible to encourage the board and members of such organizations to discuss the notion of a “vision statement,” namely what they can do themselves within the confines of their own institutions to advance peace in accordance with their own tools and ethical principles. An excellent example is the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which for decades has had a Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility and, within it, an extremely active human rights program. If so inclined, such organizations should determine to what extent they might be willing to cooperate with the “other” in specific operational areas. Within wider civil society circles, more or less vibrant and sizable social movements and NGOs exist, but only a minority of them focus on a just end of war and amity as a primary or even secondary goal. As one can see in Figure 31.2, the peace and justice camp on both sides comprises a rather modest fraction of the larger civil society sphere.

Before suggesting guidelines for groups within this inner circle, it may be worth explaining their positioning: a more comprehensive list is published in the last part of our joint book (Kaufman *et al.* 2006). We can paint a real picture of a peace camp as a special place with dwellings of different sizes, and shapes: some tents with radical or utopian tendencies, others down to earth, some conventional looking, others less so. This metaphor, more appropriate for the Israeli side, was used in an article published two decades



**Peace and justice camp Israel:**

Adalaha; Peace Now; Making Peace, Machsom [Checkpoint] Watch; Peace Child Israel; Neve Shalom/Wahat Al Salam; The Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF); Peres Peace Center; Yesh Gvul; Israel's Council for Israeli/Palestinian Peace; Interfaith Encounter Association; Gush Shalom ('The Peace Bloc'); Courage to Refuse; Bat Shalom

**Peace and justice camp Palestine:**

Panorama, the Palestinian Center for Community Development and Democracy; Peace and Democracy Forum; Palestinian Center for Research and Cultural Dialogue; The Palestinian Center for Alternative Solutions; Palestinian Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation; Middle East Non Violence and Democracy (MEND); Library on Wheels for Non-Violence and Peace; International Peace and Cooperation Center; Holyland Trust

**Peace and justice camp Israel/Palestine:**

Tantur; Chefs for Peace; The Family Forum/Parents Circle; Palestine/Israel Journal; Middle East Citizens Assembly (MECA); Israel/Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI); Coalition for Women for Just Peace; Bringing Peace Together; Geneva Peace Initiative, Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME); Friends of the Earth Middle East; One Voice; Palestinian Center for Peace and Cooperation; ALLMEP, Alliance for Middle East Peace; Alternative Information Center; Combatants for Peace; People's Campaign for Peace and Democracy (Ayalon/Nusseibeh Initiative)

Figure 31.2 Civil society groups.

ago in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* mentioning tents built by women, lawyers, humanitarians, religious people, ethnic groups, professionals, and other groups (Kaufman 1988: 66–80). However, there is an asymmetry justified not only by the large number of Jews in comparison with Arabs, but also given the greater freedom for mobilization within Israel. Hence, one may find more tents dedicated explicitly to the advancement of peace. Many among them act separately from those of Palestinians and very few work across the divide. We also have tents of Arab citizens of Israel, which express solidarity, together with a few Jewish groups with the Palestinian cause. But since then some tents have fallen or deteriorated while only a few others were added in the last decade (e.g. Chefs for Peace, which is a group of committed Israeli and Palestinian cooks; the Bereaved Families Forum, which brings together the close relatives of those killed by the “others”). On the Palestinian side there is a “just peace” camp that stresses human rights, democracy, and transparency. Among all of them we find hardly any tents that carry the term “peace” alone in their title, and a few more using “conflict resolution,” working predominantly inside the Palestinian society, but to a certain extent with Israeli counterparts. A few Palestinian peace activists have opted to work hand in hand with Israeli counterparts in one organization such as the Israeli/Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) and the *Palestine/Israel Journal*. During the Oslo process there were more peace tents, sadly reduced now to a very few. All in all, we find fewer individuals committed to sharing joint tents. And not many NGOs wish to join in action campaigns.

As much as we are looking for a unifying code of behavior, we should nonetheless stress the benefits of diversity and of making the best of realities on the ground as we find them. Varying perspectives have contributed to ideological or strategic differences within the peace forces on both sides. These different preferences are often genuine. Some groups demand an understanding of the root causes of the conflict, whereas others call for strategies that focus on consensual criteria for resolving that conflict. Some focus on research, whereas others anticipate immediate action. It should be recognized that there are some who put greater emphasis on means (non-violence, human rights protection) whereas others prefer to concentrate on ends (peace planning, research on final status issues). There are also those who prefer to work on a unicultural basis rather than jointly, those more interested in affecting policy (track two), and those oriented toward working with the masses (people-to-people) (Agha *et al.* 2003). So too there are more radical groups who focus more on solidarity with the weaker side, and there are those who are moving on a slower path, incrementally exploring dialogue in hopes that it may eventually translate into action. Pluralism may thus prove to be a positive fact of life, providing room for a variety of perspectives in the peace camp. Peace activists often develop consensus more effectively when working face-to-face with a small nucleus of people rather than in large hierarchical structures. Consequently, such NGOs are limited in what they can achieve, given restrictions of scope. Therefore, the more groups the better as long as they positively cooperate more than they negatively compete with each other. Above all, it is essential to understand, formulate, and endorse a commitment to accept the pluralistic nature of the movements.

How does one limit the perimeters of the smaller “peace and justice” and larger “civil societies” circles? How does one increase the overlap, while accepting that full congruence will never be achieved? Later in this section we have gathered from interviews and an analysis of previous documents an inventory of principles for cooperation. A good idea, perhaps, is to create a peace menu from which the different components of the peace and justice camp can pick and choose the relevant items. It includes, perhaps, more the

goals than the practice of many of the small and larger tents within it. After reading many evaluations of people-to-people activities (Kahanoff *et al.* 2007), we have collated a compendium that includes a significant number of practical and principled ideas for peace work. The suggested differentiated set of ground rules, based on many shared universal values, is intended to show how to translate them into our own lives, with an objective of concrete implementation. Although not necessarily agreeing on all points, we understand that the propositions are normally not mutually exclusive. We posit that agreeing on a wide minimal common denominator can be a fertile ground for growing into a more committed and action-oriented stage.

### ***For civil society cooperation (general)***

As a starting point, we can provide some suggestions. But, as a practical matter, each civil society organization should engage in development of its own agenda, one consonant with a shared vision of its peace-oriented tasks. The guidelines to be submitted for discussion to all civil society organizations should be more limited and generalized, obviously, than those that commit those NGOs that identify themselves as members of the peace and justice camp. Some of the few all embracing common principles could be:

- 1 Each civil society organization should brainstorm on the question of how it can best advance peace within its own mandate and ethical principles, and then share this with similar organizations in the other's society.
- 2 Once a shared peace vision of our organization is built, we should translate it into concrete initiatives and disseminate them among our own members and society at large.
- 3 We all stand firm in our support for freedom of thought, freedom of opinion and of expression. Hence, we all defend the principles of pluralism and cooperation among different schools of thought and approaches, and between different approaches of action.
- 4 We all agree to defend the right to work with or independent from official bodies. We will defend our own and our colleagues' independence of thought against any attempts to isolate them from the official bodies.
- 5 Such freedom of expression should not include any right to personal defamation or incitement to violence. We should challenge together and separately the expressions of prejudice and stereotyping.
- 6 We denounce all types of violence against innocent civilians, and we defend the right of the other side to act non-violently. And we all show solidarity with the other side against attacks on its innocent civilians.
- 7 In our own work, we endeavor to be factual and objective rather than rely on generalities, and undertake to improve systematically our understanding of the "other." Eventually, we should strive to translate such knowledge into an appeal to "act-knowledge," a *sui generis* expression coined to mean moving from just knowing to acknowledging, internalizing our social responsibility to engage in redressing injustices.
- 8 We all support all levels of dialogue with like-minded organizations of the other side as necessary conditions for mutual understanding. However, dialogue should be not an end in itself but, rather, a first step in the development of concrete actions that can help build peace at the grassroots level (e.g. people-to-people dialogue should aspire

to extend beyond getting to know one another, however beneficial that first step might be).

- 9 When working together, we agree to defend equality in our relationships, and reject patronizing, controlling, maneuvering, and subordinating. We agree that trust building between organizational staff and participants is an essential first step in the cooperation process.
- 10 Whereas many criticize fragmentation as inherently contrary to the principle of cooperation, we respect those organizations that opt to work separately within and across the divide in support of principles that are comprehended within this document.
- 11 We must ensure that our peace work is truly inclusive, particularly with regard to gender. Women as individuals as well as in organizations have demonstrated a strong commitment to non-violence and dialogue. We should recognize that, in order to provide access that can guarantee equality, there is an urgent need to promote fair channels for women's participation in civic society.
- 12 We all recognize the humanity of the "other(s)," their attachments to this land, and their concern over the voicelessness, the fears, the needs, and the motivation of this currently all too silent majority.
- 13 We will review and systematically confirm the accuracy of our facts, while using our collective vision as a guide in that direction. We will initiate, encourage and/or endorse peace initiatives and disseminate information about them.

#### ***For the peace/justice camp cooperation (specific)***

In addition to the above list applicable to civil society organizations at large, there may be a higher level of commitment by those organizations that have dedicated all or a significant part of their action to peacebuilding. As mentioned earlier, this longer menu was drawn from documents and discussions with many peace activists. In addition to the wider set of principles mentioned the following complementary goals selected from different projects, dialogues and writings could be included:

- 1 We endorse the right of self-determination for all nations. In our case, we need to reaffirm the principles behind the two-state solution, including ending the occupation that impedes the fulfillment of this aspiration.
- 2 Adherence to the principle of freedom of association implies a concomitant requirement that we should stand up against the closure of civil society institutions, often as a result of political motives.
- 3 We all defend the right of citizens from both sides for dignified life that at the least addresses basic tangible and intangible needs.
- 4 Our objection to racist and discriminatory statements and laws should be the natural outgrowth of our understanding of the universality of rights, a cornerstone for civil society organizations.
- 5 We should not confine our actions to influencing the ruling elites, but direct our main efforts towards the grassroots within our organizations and our respective societies at large.
- 6 We understand that joint cooperation needs to be based on the principles of reciprocity, dignity, tolerance, and mutual respect; that, in the pursuit of such principles, we should avoid all forms of harassment, exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, and any abuse in violation of ethical commitments to fairness and justice.



- 7 We recognize the existing asymmetries between occupier and occupied as well as the need to bridge the gap. We should stress in our work that the ties are to be based not on dominance but on equality, mutual assistance, and solidarity.
- 8 We engage in separate or parallel activities within the respective societies rather than exclusively in full joint cooperation with the “other” as an integral and important part of the overall peacebuilding drive. For effective promotion of intercommunal cooperation, it is necessary first to complement it with dialogue within each society and across the entire spectrum of social actors, including those marginalized in previous such processes. At the same time, no negative energy and criticism should be expended against those Israelis and Palestinians who are committed to working together.
- 9 We should in each society seek legitimacy both from our constituencies and from our government, because this provides guarantees for freedom of action. In education work, for example, this legitimacy may be gained by working through the Ministry of Education.
- 10 We acknowledge the human suffering of both our peoples, promise to work toward redressing injustices, and commit ourselves to working toward mutual forgiveness.
- 11 We are committed to the promotion of non-violence within our own societies while accepting the legitimacy of the struggle against occupation and dominance.
- 12 We value and encourage wide participation, social openness, and the willingness to cooperate with a diverse range of people having differing opinions.
- 13 We recognize the difficulties in the history of our relationship with each other. Nonetheless, and in spite of this history, we are committed to addressing the problems inherent in the power asymmetry now prevailing between occupier and occupied. At the same time, we anticipate that expectations of reciprocity in such areas as violence against innocent civilians will be fulfilled.
- 14 We promote constructive competition but at the same time will act against isolation, hearsay, and conspiracies against fellow peacebuilders.
- 15 We are committed to working together in order to discuss openly to try and resolve areas of disagreement now dividing so many of us, such as: (1) the issue of the Palestinian refugees’ right of return; (2) the issue of recognition of Israel’s right to exist, in conjunction with the collective right of the Palestinians to exist in this land; (3) the concept of security in light of the building of the security barrier/wall, the targeted killings, and the closure and prohibitions on the rights of the Palestinians’ freedom of movement; (4) acknowledgment of the high incidence of “structural violence” inherent in the occupiers’ policies; (5) the distinction between terrorism and legitimate resistance; (6) more specific to our current debate, the cause and effect of military occupation.

## Conclusions

The importance of consensus building from within, and of the reaching out of the peace and justice movement, should be self-evident to sober-minded analysts. As spelled out in Figure 31.1, most peacebuilding efforts have been either targeted vertically upwards to influence policymakers or projected downwards focusing on people-to-people and other activities, intending to make an impact on public opinion. At present, the priority now appears to be horizontal action. The remains of the peace-and-justice camp has now moved into a cooperative rather than competitive mood. Expanding the peace and

justice movement to encompass a wider segment of both civil societies can be feasible if a minimalist strategy is pursued. Our protracted conflict is not only a government-versus-government confrontation, but also has within it complex and deep-rooted nation-versus-nation negative feelings, leading to a mutual lack of trust. Should we fail to expand it, the small but committed peace and justice movement is likely to continue to be overshadowed by acts of extremists. Avoiding the return to the previous inward-directed protest of the type that does not connect misery and suffering is a needed paradigm shift from violent conflict to negotiation.

In view of all that has happened, we can amend the former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's one-sided aphorism "The Palestinian leadership have never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity" and include the Israeli leadership in the same sarcastic expression. The latest episodes of the Fatah split that opened the door to the Hamas government, and Kadimah's launching of the Lebanon War and abandoning its own unilateral withdrawal schemes, qualify as legitimate additions to the historian Barbara Tuchman's (1985) list of tragic mistakes. She states that one of the criteria for such a listing is that such policy "has been perceived as counter-productive in its own time, not merely by hindsight" or post-facto by later generations (*ibid.*: 5). It has been the case most of the time that individuals or groups within the peace and justice camp have cautioned their respective regimes to avoid shortsighted and rash decisions. Furthermore, in the post-Oslo situation, on the one hand the expectations of Palestinians for their wellbeing and independence and of Israelis for their security grew while, on the other hand, the reality saw their objective and subjective situations deteriorate. In such a situation, when the "relative deprivation gap" foreseen by Ted Gurr (1970) expanded immensely, it was only to be expected that people would rebel against a concession imposed from above. However, because of fear of the "other," people are reluctant to antagonize authorities that, at the same time, lack those leadership qualities essential for ending the occupation and implementing a viable two-state solution. Facing such a vacuum, whether civil society organizations can grow to play such a role remains to be seen.

Whereas these guiding principles can thrive in the context of shared values of human rights, democracy, and peace as common denominators, we still need to translate expected realistic dialogue into action in a way that can overcome the mentioned current obstacles. If we can all agree to minimal and realistic ground rules for engagement with each other, we can widen the peace and justice camps within the larger civil society spheres. We need to strengthen this link between the currently introverted and moribund peace and justice camp and the still vibrant civil society sphere, making that effort a priority, this notwithstanding the importance of the upward efforts to affect policy and a concurrent commitment to involve the public at large in support of a just and lasting peace built on the two-states solution. Although the political nature of the principles that govern cooperation within the peace and justice camp may be more salient, we should nonetheless strive to expand the acceptance and understanding of such positions to all civil society organizations. This may be seen as a naïve and unattainable goal, given that one is first appealing to them to define their own peace vocation, based on their specific ethical principles. But engaging in a gradual process to revamp and expand the peace camp into a mass movement should be seen as the final objective, even as small steps in that direction are being taken.

We are not alone, and coalitions are being built within and across the divide. Even if limited resources have been a source of friction, lobbying donors to expand the pie before slicing it can be done if a new horizon is shown. Information should be shared and work divided among the many organizations seeking support. In short, this joint endeavor must

be recognized as a work in progress. Its efficacy requires the integration of the comments of active members in the peace and conflict resolution organizations on both sides, as well as incorporation of a feedback process involving those same organizations. Particularly importantly, each community's youthful peace activists must be encouraged to greater participation. They are the hope of the future but, to date, far too many have been relegated, or have relegated themselves, to the fringes of most peace and conflict resolution organizations.

Although acknowledging the separate and often adversarial narratives of the past, we sense that, once a common ground for cooperation is established, disagreements about the present can be bridged. There is already a large number of consensual innovative and outside-the-box ideas. Expanding the numbers of people dealing with them and acting upon them with their peers, even in a modest way, can and must be done. We fervently wish that the main message in this chapter will be disseminated among a wide variety of civil society associations and social movements, and strengthen those of us already committed to spreading the idea of peace beyond the realm of the "usual suspects." This time we have focused not on what *they* should or could do, but on what *we* can and should do. It is in our hands, hearts and minds to act according to shared principles to bring about the peace that for so long has eluded the people of Israel and Palestine.

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# 32 Strategies for the prevention, management, and/or resolution of (ethnic) crisis and conflict

The case of the Balkans

*Mitja Žagar*

## Acronyms and abbreviations

BSEC	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CEI	Central European Initiative
CoE	Council of Europe
ECs	European Communities
EEC	European Economic Community (until 1992)
EU	European Union
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SDCoE	Special Delegation of Council of Europe Advisors on Minorities
SECI	Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
SEECF	South-East European Cooperation Process
SP	Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WEU	Western European Union

## Introduction

The tragic wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s took the international community by surprise. They shocked the international public with their ferocity, intensity and brutality. Although the images on TV appeared distant, these wars were happening in Europe, on “our doorsteps” at a time of optimism when the “Cold War” and bipolar division of the world ended. Media coverage of the “Yugoslav crisis” not only shaped the reaction of the public, but also conditioned the reactions of the international community and its key players.

Under pressure from the public, shocked by TV coverage, the international community was forced to intervene in the Yugoslav crisis when the war broke out. However, rather than studying and evaluating the situation and recent developments in the Balkans, the international community – once again – decided to use an “old stereotype” of the Balkans as a major trouble spot. Consequently, the international community and its main actors did not have a precise picture and understanding of the situation and developments that would have been necessary to develop adequate strategies and responses. Additionally, it seemed that appropriate and effective international mechanisms (including mechanisms

and measures for early detection and warning of crises and conflicts) were lacking as well. (see Sandole 1999, 2007). Although the Yugoslav crisis was recognized as an immanent threat to international peace and stability, international actions and measures were often inadequate or late in responding to unfolding developments on the ground. Often, these responses were described as “too little – too late.” Owing to the absence of a coherent strategy, international responses often lacked consistency.

Had early warning mechanisms been in place, they could have detected the role the media played in generating and shaping the Yugoslav crisis by spreading “hate speech” and nationalist rhetoric (mis)used for political mobilization along ethnic lines. TV broadcasting was instrumental in this context, especially in Serbia. Fears of such practices were expressed in different parts of Yugoslavia and appeared in some press commentaries. However, relevant decisionmakers in the country and abroad did not pay attention to these early warnings. Consequently, no adequate measures and actions were taken to prevent the ensuing tragic developments.

Furthermore, missing, indecisive, and sometimes contradictory signals and reactions by the international community were interpreted differently by various domestic actors, contributing to the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis. In a way, the situation was a side effect of dramatic developments in the international community at the time. The end of bipolarity and the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union attracted central attention, whereas Yugoslavia no longer seemed that important for the international community.

This chapter explores strategies, policies, measures, and activities aimed at the preservation and strengthening of peace, and the management and resolution of crises and conflicts. Using the Balkans and the Yugoslav crisis as a case study, special attention is paid to de-escalating conflicts that are transitioning into violence, terminating wars and hostilities, restoring and preserving peace, and post-conflict development, rebuilding of cooperation and rehabilitation of multiethnic societies, and the role of the international community in these activities.

The central hypothesis is that the lack of a coherent and elaborated strategy for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, plus absence of adequate coordination and cooperation in the international community (including among others the UN, EEC/EU/ECs, and the great powers), played an important role in the escalation and development of the “Yugoslav crisis” (e.g. Sandole 2007).

The analysis of the Yugoslav crisis shows that the international community was caught off guard. Obviously it was not prepared to deal with such a major crisis. Although the Yugoslav crisis was evident for several years, the international community did not detect it and/or did not realize the role that international factors played in it. Indeed, the international community failed to develop and implement effective preventive measures. Furthermore, contradictory international responses and signals contributed to the escalation of the crisis. The reactions of the international community demonstrated that it had hardly any knowledge and understanding of the region and of its history, culture, and diverse societies. Additionally, adequate strategies and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts were missing at the national and almost all relevant subnational levels of the former Yugoslavia.

The international community did not adequately implement experiences and existing knowledge in peacemaking and conflict resolution. Therefore, my second hypothesis is that the systematic use of existing frameworks, models, methods, and techniques for the regulation and management of diversity and ethnic relations, and for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts within a global international strategy

(which was also lacking), would have improved the situation and contributed to a more successful management of the crisis. Of course, these tools would have to be adequately accommodated to the specificity of the region and individual societies and to the specific nature of conflicts that were perceived as ethnic conflicts.

Analyzing the Balkans, this chapter attempts to develop a basic framework and some key elements of an integral, coherent, and elaborate strategy for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, paying special attention to diversity management. This theoretical model was developed in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Its aim was to create a global framework for successful coordination of relevant actors that could contribute to de-escalation of crises and conflicts and could improve the situation and outcomes in the Balkans in the long run. Actors included local communities and government, civic societies and especially NGOs, public and private institutions, regions and states, with their administrations and governments, which should work in concert with international organizations and community. The framework was designed in a hope that such a model could be useful also in other cases, but only when adequately adjusted to reflect the particular situation and environment.

### **The Yugoslav crisis, some international responses to it, and its aftermath**

Studying the Yugoslav crisis and its aftermath, I realize that this historic process and its segments are far more complex and multidimensional than one would have guessed even from reading the most complex and interdisciplinary scholarly literature. In addition to considering different combinations of domestic and external factors that have determined individual events and historic epochs, one should examine the interplay of these events and epochs, and their interaction with other relevant contemporary and interwoven processes and events, from the local and micro to the global and universal levels. Even for a single event it might be difficult to establish all relevant factual information, the actors, and their actual sequence of influence. However, knowing some history and key characteristics, and recognizing trends of developments in countries and communities, by analyzing current processes it might be possible to establish a general picture and overall situation in a certain historic time and predict likely consequences. One would expect that this would be the approach of crisis and conflict managers and conflict resolution practitioners. However, having been involved in diverse activities and attempts, and studying the work and behavior of different organizations, institutions, and countries that were intervening in Yugoslavia, I noticed the absence of adequate knowledge and information on the country and its various parts, their histories, and current situations and processes. Even more shocking was the lack of a coherent strategy and defined common goals of what should be achieved by a concerted effort. An appropriate institutional framework, useful in facilitating effective intervention into a specific situation and/or environment, was also missing.

Speaking of the Yugoslav crisis, I always stressed that it was the result of a complex combination and interplay of numerous and various domestic and external factors (see Sandole 1999, 2007). Consequently, it might be useful to discuss the following causal factors and narratives.

Initially, the main sources and factors underlying the Yugoslav crisis were predominantly internal. Their common denominator was the inability of the regime to respond effectively to different problems and a growing economic, social, and political crisis. A certain gap between (a) the normative framework and official declarations and (b) the actual



situation exists in every society. However, a problem becomes serious when a system is no longer able to respond to indications of a growing gap, and when its interventions do not influence the actual situation and reduce or resolve detected problems. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Yugoslav regime was able to intervene successfully when crises escalated with the introduction of reforms and transformation of the existing political system through constitutional amendments. However, in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the system failed. Unable to build the necessary consensus and to mobilize relevant institutions and all parts of the country for the elaboration of key common interests and their realization, the system was paralyzed and its institutions blocked. Consequently, the inability of the system to cope adequately with the emerging crises and problems contributed to their escalation (e.g. Klemenčič and Žagar 2004: 199–217).

Social crisis was escalating in the context of an ongoing power struggle within the Yugoslav regime. Although President Josip Broz Tito had died in 1980, the true power struggle did not start until the second half of the 1980s. Previously, it was thought that through a (bureaucratic) system of collective leadership the system would be able to replace the role of its late charismatic leader. However, the system lacked adequate centripetal forces and failed to mobilize resources, population, and institutions. Consequently, it was unable to respond to challenges and meet the expectations of the people. As the crisis deepened, the holder of political power monopoly, the League of Communists, was unable to exercise its constitutionally established monopoly. By the late 1980s, the Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milošević realized that the hunting season for power in Yugoslavia was open, and decided to capture it through his populist and nationalistic politics. He wanted to reverse democratization by restoring and strengthening the monopoly of the communist party, its domination over the system and its institutions, and by responding to problems and crises through centralization of the system. The intensity of negative responses and opposition from other parts of Yugoslavia surprised him. The internal struggle, opposition, and inability to act led to the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, while the system was becoming ever more paralyzed. Simultaneously, democratization was progressing – with different intensity and speed in different parts of the country.

The federal Yugoslav government of Prime Minister Ante Marković reacted by introducing reforms, including reforms of the political system that were introducing political pluralism. Such reforms were welcomed by the West, which often saw the formal introduction of democracy and a multiparty system as a “magic cure” for all problems. A lesson to be drawn from the Yugoslav experience, however, is that the formal introduction of democracy is not enough. Furthermore, it can even exacerbate problems and contribute to the escalation of crises and conflicts if the circumstances and characteristics of a specific environment are not taken into account. Democratization in each country needs to take into account the country’s specific history, situation, circumstances, ethnic and social makeup of its population, current conditions of ethnic relations, different existing needs and interests, etc. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many, including several civil society activists, believed that the formal introduction of democracy and a multiparty political system could transform the system and Yugoslavia into a truly democratic society. They did not take into account the existing differences between republics and the fact that there was no adequate social and political basis or infrastructure for multiparty democracy in most parts of the country. Historic experiences in developed democracies show that democratization is a complex social process that takes a long time, often involving several generations. A functioning democracy requires the formal existence and functioning of democratic institutions and a developed democratic political culture. In

Yugoslavia, democracy was not well established before World War II, and after the war political monism was introduced, although there were some efforts at democratization. Intense democratization in Slovenia, which was then leading the way started only in the 1980s. In this respect, Yugoslavia was not very different from other former communist countries. In environments where political monism existed for a long time, there were only a few democratic political experiences, and most politicians were politically socialized in a totalitarian system within the former ruling party. There was no tradition of support for competing political parties, which lacked traditional and stable social, political, and ideological bases of support. Most people were unfamiliar with the political ideologies traditionally found in democratic polities. Under such conditions, political leaders and parties desperately searched for a way to bring about successful political mobilization of people.

The introduction of political pluralism in an ethnically plural environment without democratic traditions can lead to divisions along ethnic lines, as politicians and parties use ethnic identification of people for their political purposes. This happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and other parts of the country. Nationalism and nationalistic policies were used to mobilize ethnic political support and to frame new national interests and politics, consequently contributing to problems in ethnic relations and to the escalation of crisis and conflicts in Yugoslavia and its different parts, especially in the ethnically more plural and diverse republics. Nationalistic policies were among the key generators of wars (e.g. Roshwald 2006: 126–34).

Democratization in multiethnic societies where a democratic culture is not developed requires transitional mechanisms that contribute to prevention of direct political confrontation along ethnic lines. The international community could help by encouraging power sharing during the transitional phase, and should insist on the introduction of such mechanisms to ensure ethnic equality and adequate protection of minorities.

The lack of adequate formal and informal mechanisms and strategies for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts at all levels (local, republic, subnational, national, and international) contributed to the escalation of crisis and disintegration of Yugoslavia. Internally, the absence of such mechanisms was a consequence of the Yugoslav communist ideology that claimed that Yugoslavia was a “non-conflict” society where the introduction of (socialist) self-management and implications of self-management for all spheres of life would resolve all major conflicts, including social, class, and ethnic conflicts. Consequently, the constitutional and legal system did not include any formal mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. When conflicts appeared, they were resolved in an informal way – if necessary, by a direct intervention from President Tito. With Tito’s death and the dissolution of the League of Communists, however, informal mechanisms for the management and resolution disappeared as well.

The Yugoslav crisis showed the inability of the international community to manage such crises. Furthermore, the international community, especially the West, with their mixed signals, shifting position(s), and activities contributed to the confusion and the escalation of crises and conflicts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mixed international signals were interpreted as support from the international community for their cause by all sides within Yugoslavia. The federal prime minister, Ante Marković, believed that the international community supported economic and political reforms leading to a market economy and democratization of the country. The democratic opposition and reformist political leaders in the republics (especially in Slovenia and Croatia) expected that the international community would do everything to protect and stimulate democratization and development of

a multiparty political system. Unitarists, including Slobodan Milošević, thought that the international community would support their policy even if they chose military intervention to preserve the existing political arrangements, territorial integrity, and unity of the country.

When the crisis escalated, the international community failed to intervene and prevent its further escalation and transformation into violent conflicts that grew into tragic wars. Consequently, the lack of a coherent strategy and the inability of the international community to react in time contributed to the dreadful death toll. The international community failed to intervene in Croatia in time and waited until several thousand people were killed and hundreds of thousands had been driven from their homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other regions. To a large extent, the same tactics were repeated in Kosovo. It seemed that the international community forgot to use the most important rule of conflict management and resolution: the earlier a conflict is detected and the lower its intensity, the easier it is to prevent or resolve it. In retrospect, we can detect several signals and warnings of the coming escalation of conflicts in Yugoslavia. The main indicators of the worsening ethnic conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia were, among others: signs of growing differences and conflicts among federal units in different spheres of life; the lack of communication between federal units, and between federal units and the federation; misperceptions and lack of information in individual environments on developments in other parts of Yugoslavia; growing intolerance and hate speech in the media; political mobilization along ethnic lines; upsurging nationalism(s) in different parts of the country and elaboration of nationalistic programs arguing for exclusion or domination; lack of communication and cooperation in economic and other fields; and absence of common interests. A specific sign of a growing crisis was claims for increasing autonomy and independence by federal units that demanded decentralized reforms of the federation because they were unhappy with Milošević's demands for recentralization and re-establishment of the political monopoly of the communist regime. These political and ideological differences and conflicts were transformed into ethnic conflicts, when nationalism was used for the political mobilization of people along ethnic lines.

If mechanisms for the detection of signs and indicators of escalating crises and conflicts had been in place before the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis, the international community, especially European countries, could have undertaken preventive measures and developed adequate alternative strategies for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. I would argue that the best preventive strategy in the late 1980s would have been an accelerated process of integration of the former Yugoslavia into the European Community.

Without a comprehensive and operational international strategy, international actions and measures were mostly (delayed) reactions to developments on the ground. However, the international community was instrumental in ending the war and in determining some post-conflict arrangements by providing a legal framework especially through the UN Security Council resolutions, Dayton Accords, and Rambouillet agreement.

When the war ended in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia retrieved its previously occupied territories, the international community faced new challenges. What should it do to help undo the tragic consequences of nationalism-driven policies, ethnic cleansing, and recent wars that had destroyed multiethnic societies? If the international community was to be credible in a post-conflict situation and in the prevention of such and similar unacceptable practices in the future, it had – at least formally – to reject any gains resulting from such practices and to establish an international tribunal to prosecute perpetrators

of such atrocities. The report of the Special Delegation of Council of Europe Advisors on Minorities identified the rehabilitation of multiethnic society as the most important task in environments where a traditional multiethnic society had been seriously damaged or destroyed. It was obvious that such a difficult, costly, and long-term task would be impossible without the engagement and assistance of the international community, which was also expected to become instrumental in stimulating and developing the necessary political will. Consequently, the report of the Special Delegation indicated that the promotion and development of multicultural societies and democratic citizenship should be key elements of a general strategy that would require specific country-adjusted programs (SDCoE 2000).

In the Balkans the international community has not been very successful at executing these tasks. It has not managed to establish and develop adequate international mechanisms and strategies for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, which could be employed preventively to combat and reduce the socially destructive power of nationalism and nationalist policies. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) was an attempt to address the problems of the region in a new and holistic way that was at least partially successful.<sup>1</sup>

### ***The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP): expectations and results***

Recognizing that the existing international organizations and mechanisms had not proven very successful in addressing the crisis in the Balkans, the EU initiated the SP to strengthen countries in southeastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights, and economic prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the whole region.

Three Working Tables were established to deal with (1) democratization and human rights; (2) economic reconstruction, development, and cooperation; and (3) security issues. The Working Tables were divided into task forces that coordinated a number of projects and initiatives carried out by different implementing agencies (including NGOs, private companies, and international organizations) and funded by donors that stipulated their support at funding conferences. However, from the very beginning, insufficient funding was one of the main problems of the SP.

The SP was an attempt to address holistically the problem of peace and stability in the war-torn Balkans. It appeared that the international community had finally recognized that peace and stability could only be sustainable if the region reached a certain level of social and economic development that would offer people there the prospect of a normal and good life. Such a prospect requires high standards of human rights, including rights of minorities, and a functioning democracy. To realize these central goals signatory states pledged to cooperate “towards preserving the multinational and multiethnic diversity of countries in the region, and protecting minorities.” To achieve these goals the SP (1999) states that

Working Table 1 on democratisation and human rights . . . will address:

- i democratisation and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities; free and independent media; civil society building; rule of law and law enforcement; institution building; efficient administration and good governance; development of common rules of conduct on border related questions; other related questions of interest to the participants;

- ii refugee issues, including protection and return of refugees and displaced persons.

I consider these issues important from the perspective of the management of diversity and for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts in the region. I was happy to see that many relevant actors – the governments of the countries of the region; other countries and international organizations; scholarly, research, and educational institutions; NGOs, private companies, etc. – decided to take part in the activities of all three Working Tables and their Task Forces. Especially important were hundreds of projects and programs that addressed specific issues in individual countries and/or in the region.

Not surprisingly, countries of the region participated in those projects and activities and invested high hopes in the SP, especially its economic and developmental programs and projects. Although the SP, its projects and programs have contributed to the improvement of the situation, the SP has not met the high expectations of the region, its states, and people. Often the countries of the region expressed their interests and needs and suggested certain policies, but other member states and international organizations did not pay adequate attention to these requests and proposals.<sup>2</sup>

Although I was aware that the actual funding would not be sufficient, I did not expect that the interest of potential donors and the international community would dry up so quickly. Consequently, several important and successful projects were ended because of a lack of funding, sometimes before they were able to produce the expected results or impact the situation to the expected extent. There was successful cooperation of different international organizations and institutions within the context of several programs and activities that created new synergies. However, much of the rivalry and envy among different organizations and their staff continued to exist.

### **Alternative approaches and elements of the global international strategy for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts**

Living through and studying the crisis and tragic wars in Yugoslavia, I studied reasons for the failures of the regime, for the problems that the successor states encountered, and for the inability of the international community to successfully prevent, manage, and resolve the escalation of crises and conflicts. I wondered how the diversities and asymmetries that exist in almost all modern societies could be managed successfully. I searched for ideologies and practices that would be able to regulate and manage diversities and asymmetries in peaceful and democratic ways, based on the recognition, respect, and integration of diversity; promotion of tolerance, coexistence, and cooperation; equal rights; active and voluntary integration; and social equality of all individuals and distinct communities in any given society.

I studied all available literature on conflict resolution and on conflict management in an attempt to determine which methods and techniques could have been applied to the Yugoslav crises. Doing research, some practical work, counseling, and teaching, I experimented with different approaches, methods, and techniques. Sometimes, I tried to use combinations of different approaches, methods, and techniques that, theoretically, were considered inconsistent and/or incompatible. Frequently, I was able get some positive results that otherwise seemed impossible. Simultaneously, I was developing a theoretical

model and strategy for the regulation and management of diversity and ethnic relations in plural societies, including a model for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. In this process, using my experiences I tried to combine theory and practice, different approaches, methods, and techniques. When I presented these attempts to my colleagues, reactions were mostly positive and their comments helped me to develop the model and strategy further. I used some elements of this model while working with the SP, CoE, and OSCE, especially as analytical tools.

Recognizing that conflicts, as consequences of the existence of different interests, are normal phenomena in a plural and diverse society and not a deviant situation, we need to develop adequate and (one hopes) democratic mechanisms for the prevention of their escalation, especially for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. However, regimes and ruling elites fear conflicts, which they see as possible threats to social stability and their role in society, because of their potential consequences for the existence of the prevailing political systems. Consequently, educational systems and political socialization embed the fear of conflicts in our mind and conscience, ignoring their potentially positive dimensions.

The literature shows convincingly that social conflicts and their escalation could be successfully prevented, managed, and/or resolved in a democratic way within the institutions of the political system. The same is true for ethnic conflict, although they are a very specific type of social conflict. Consequently, their specific emotional energy (charge), conditioned by the nature and intensity of ethnic identification and identities, should be considered. For that reason, it would be useful to develop a new ideology and conceptual framework for multiethnic societies, based on the principles of tolerance, coexistence, and cooperation. Such a new ideology of cooperation would replace, or at least complement, the currently prevailing ideologies of competition.

Processes of international integration and evolution of the existing model of nation-states could lead to a certain erosion of sovereignty. However, these are unlikely to result in a generally accepted concept of multiethnic states. Alternative solutions must be sought. The promotion of multiculturalism/interculturalism, advocated by the CoE and EU, could prove useful. Multiculturalism/interculturalism could contribute to a more tolerant society and, in time, develop a positive perception of ethnic and cultural diversity. Rather than a problem, ethnic and cultural diversity should be seen as a comparative advantage. Consequently, new types of inclusive collective identities should develop as the basis for European integration and common European identities (Žagar 2003).

The capacity of the international community to handle crises would improve if it recognized that the most productive way to prevent escalation and to facilitate resolution of potential international crises is through the inclusion of troubled regions in international cooperation and integration. Such an approach has already proved successful. For example, inclusion in NATO, the process of the eastern enlargement of the EU, and even the promise of a possible future inclusion in these processes, have stimulated democratic reforms in the countries of central, eastern, and southeastern Europe, which contributed to stability, improved security, and peace in these regions and in Europe at large (e.g. Mayhew 1998: 185–8). This has proved true with regard to Bulgaria's and Romania's EU membership in 2007. Preventive activities of the international community have also proved useful in Macedonia (e.g. Gabrič 2006; Marko 2006).

In my view, the most effective strategy for the resolution of crises and conflicts in the western Balkans would be the inclusion of the countries concerned and the whole region in Euro-Atlantic and European integration processes. However, specific programs and



strategies for peace and stability in individual countries would still be necessary to address specific problems and situations. Although it might be extremely difficult for them to meet required criteria, all countries in the region aspire to become EU members (e.g. Brinar and Svetličič 1999). They are keen to meet the criteria defined by the EU as the minimal requirements for their successful accession. In this context, the very existence of proclaimed standards, the emerging EU policy on ethnic relations, the protection of national and other minorities, and multiculturalism/interculturalism are important contributions to the promotion of multiethnic societies and improvement of ethnic relations. Nevertheless, this role of the EU can be successful only if it elaborates a long-term strategy for the accession of these countries and follows it closely. This way, by enabling faster social development and a better life for people, the EU can offer a viable alternative to traditional exclusive and aggressive nationalism in the countries of southeastern Europe.

Existing international legal standards, especially the conventions of the Council of Europe, the Copenhagen criteria, and potential EU requirements for the protection of minorities, could improve national legislation on the protection of minorities in the Balkan countries. Considering the gap between the normative regulation of human rights and the actual situation, however, normative reforms and formal inclusion in integration processes might have only a limited impact, if their implementation is not monitored constantly.

Previous sections showed how the lack of a coherent global international strategy could have contributed to the generation and escalation of a crisis or conflicts or, at least, to a less successful crisis and conflict management. Although it is impossible to prove that the extensive and coordinated use of existing frameworks, models, methods, techniques, and approaches for peace restoration, peacemaking, and peacekeeping and/or for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts could have reduced the intensity of Yugoslav crises and conflicts, it seems likely that it could have reduced their tragic consequences. The literature on peacemaking and conflict resolution and the research reports that I studied while developing the theoretical model and international strategy<sup>3</sup> present viable theories and many successful cases that support such a conclusion.

Considering their influence on the development of my theoretical model and strategies, I shall single out especially the ARI Conflict Resolution Framework for the resolution of ethnic and regional conflict developed by Rothman (1992: 64–5), and the books written by Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (1999) and edited by Zartman and Rasmussen (1997).

My theoretical model of the integral international strategy for the management of diversity, prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, schematically presented in Table 32.1 combines several approaches, levels, and measures that are organized into a continuous process (within which all phases could and should run simultaneously and as interwoven processes). This process and all measures and activities within it should be monitored and evaluated constantly and, based on the evaluation, should be updated and developed. This process is designed so that it combines, coordinates, and integrates activities and measures for diversity management; for peace promotion, peacemaking, and peacekeeping; and for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. It is designed to manage diversities and asymmetries in a peaceful and democratic way, thereby preventing possible escalations of crises and conflicts that could endanger stability and peace. In addition to the management of diversity and prevention measures, it includes activities and measures for the management and resolution of crises and conflicts that could be activated if diversity management and preventive measures do not prevent escalation of conflicts. In this context, such radical measures as an international (military)



Table 32.1 Theoretical model of the integral global strategy for the management of diversity and for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts (“Strategy EEIB + 4 Ps + ARIME Framework”)

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*INTEGRAL GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY (including the necessary international infrastructure) that includes defined (1) general goals; (2) specific approaches and goals; (3) institutional and organizational framework; (4) actors and their roles – IN THE FOLLOWING FIELDS:*

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PERMANENT MEASURES ENSURING STABILITY AND PEACE:

prevention, cure, and rehabilitation

Phase I: PREVENTION and EARLY DETECTION

*Activities:* visits by and employment of international observers, monitoring and early detection mechanisms, counseling, stimulation and promotion of negotiations of adversary sides, peace core activities, traditional peacekeeping activities, the ARIME Framework activities (conflict prevention, management, and resolution activities/programs), democratic institution building, “promotion of normal life and cooperation”

Phase II: PEACEMAKING

*Activities:* international (military) intervention to stop fighting, negotiations of adversary sides, truce, keeping apart of adversary sides, disarming of warring troops, traditional peacekeeping activities, the ARIME Framework activities, democratic institution building

Phase III: PEACEKEEPING

*Activities:* international troops employed as a buffer, control of terms of the truce, keeping conflicting sides apart, disarming of the warring troops, policing, traditional peacekeeping activities, the ARIME Framework activities, democratic institution building

Phase IV: POLICING

*Activities:* international policing activities, international advisors, the ARIME Framework activities, democratic institution building including “restoration and promotion of normal life and cooperation”

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“ARIME” Framework based on Rothman (1992).

intervention could be used to stop an ongoing war or massive violations of human rights (e.g. genocide in Rwanda in April 1994). This requires clearly regulated rules for the implementation of different measures, and defined rules for decisionmaking. The model is designed in such a way that it requires its organization and coordination at *all* levels – from local, regional, and subnational to national, international (including supranational, e.g. the EU), and global levels.

This integral international strategy would require an international infrastructure capable of making necessary decisions, implementing adopted measures, and realizing different activities. This infrastructure would include mechanisms for diversity management, early

1. *ECONOMY* (economic and social development)
2. *EDUCATION AND TRAINING* (permanent, lifelong process)
3. *INSTITUTION BUILDING, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS*: development and strengthening of democratic political and social institutions, democratization

THE “ARIME” CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK

*Framing*: conflict analysis and approaches

<i>Adversarial (antagonism)</i>	<i>Reflexive</i>	<i>Integrative</i>	<i>Combined – process-based: monitoring and evaluation as permanent process</i>
<i>Definition</i>			
D 1: Blaming (THEM) Factual	D 2: Introspection (US) Contextual	D 3: Relational (WE) Interactive	D 4: Partnership and common interests (PARTNERS) Interactive, cooperation
<i>Causes</i>			
C 1: Interests Competition/ disposition	C 2: Values Negative experiences	C 3: Needs Situation	C 4: Rules, criteria Monitoring and evaluation Common interests

*Management and (re)solving*: conflict management and resolution strategies

<i>Distributive bargaining</i>	<i>Reflexivity</i>	<i>Integrative bargaining</i>	<i>Transformation, cooperation, monitoring, and evaluation</i>
<i>Alternatives</i>			
A 1: Zero-sum Exclusive	A 2: Aspirations Internal	A 3: Positive sum Internal	A 4: Positive sum Cooperative, inclusive
<i>Implementation</i>			
I 1: Coercive	I 2: Buy-in (Internally)	I 3: Mutual aid (Preferably cooperation)	I 4: Inclusive, cooperative Monitoring and evaluation as permanent process

detection and warning mechanisms, mechanisms for the prevention of crises and conflicts, mechanisms for the management and resolution of crises and conflicts, and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that would constantly monitor and evaluate all measures and activities and their effectiveness. To a large extent such an international infrastructure already exists, but is not being properly regulated, organized, integrated, and coordinated. Nevertheless, certain additional mechanisms are necessary and precise rules for the implementation and functioning of these mechanisms are needed, including rules for decisionmaking. These developments depend on the readiness, interests, and available resources of all key actors involved and would require their consensus and concerted efforts.

Regarding international structures and infrastructure, the UN, especially the Security Council, can play a central role. However, other international and regional governmental organizations (e.g. OSCE, CoE, EU, NATO, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations (e.g. Amnesty International, international professional associations) should be included as well. Regional governmental and non-governmental organizations could be important for the early detection of warning signals that can indicate the possibility of the escalation of crises and conflicts. This should give the international community the necessary time to implement preventive measures and activities. Permanent monitoring, prevention, and simultaneous evaluation of the effectiveness of these measures and activities should be key components for the development of the specific strategy and necessary measures in every case.

This international infrastructure might require a new coordinating body, possibly within the UN structure or as an independent international organization with a special status with the UN and with other participating international organizations. Three main types of functions and activities of such a body could be envisaged: (1) diversity management and the prevention of crises and conflicts (“preventive functions”); (2) management and resolution of crises and conflicts (“curative functions”); and (3) measures for confidence building, reconstruction, and development after a conflict (“rehabilitation”). Among others, the preventive functions would include the coordination of early detection and warning as well as monitoring activities, their evaluation, permanent reporting to the UN Secretary General, Security Council, General Assembly and to all other participating international and regional organizations; preparation of proposals for the Security Council’s decisions on necessary measures and activities; and the coordination of the implementation of adopted measures and actions. If a crisis or conflict escalates, the coordinating body would undertake and coordinate (curative) measures and activities for its management and resolution. These measures and activities could include direct international involvement for the prevention of armed conflicts and fighting, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and diverse measures, projects, and activities for the management and resolution of conflicts. “Rehabilitative functions” would include measures, programs, projects, and activities for confidence building, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development in societies devastated by the escalated crisis and/or conflict.

Such integral (international) strategies, coordinated by the coordinating body, would most likely require long-term involvement in specific cases and would be very costly given the specific nature of ethnic and other protracted conflicts that the international community is facing. However, the engagement of substantial financial and other resources for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts is far less costly than the tragic consequences of escalated crises, violent conflicts, and wars.

The international infrastructure could be designed in such a way that the UN Security Council would adopt key political and military decisions. If the Security Council could not make the necessary decisions, the coordinating body should be entitled to request the necessary political decision from the UN General Assembly according to the procedure established by the resolution “United for Peace.” The coordinating body should be given the necessary authority to implement adopted decisions, and coordinate respective international activities. It should be authorized to take certain decisions on “curative activities,” including dispatching international assistance to countries and regions affected by crises or/and conflicts, and to coordinate the necessary activities (e.g., economic, social, educational). In this context, it should have the right to subcontract to institutions and agencies necessary for the realization of these activities.

The existence of such an international infrastructure could have reduced many problems that the international community encountered during the Yugoslav crisis. Among other tasks, the coordinating body could have coordinated the development of an integral strategy. Although different views would still have existed, the international community would have been able to detect them and develop a compromise scenario acceptable to most of the actors involved. This could have decreased the confusion created by mixed signals sent by the international community and different countries. These signals were interpreted in different ways in different parts of Yugoslavia, which contributed to further escalation of the crisis. Additionally, such a mechanism would have resolved many problems regarding decisions on international interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (e.g. Buckley 2000). Rules of procedure and specified criteria would mean that such a decision should always be made by the UN Security Council and be carried out under the auspices of the UN regardless of the agencies involved (e.g. NATO).

Obviously, preventive measures and strategies were either missing or ineffective in the Yugoslav crisis. This led to the escalation of the crisis, which transformed into armed conflicts. As a result, the focus of the integral international strategy changed. The international community had to stop the war, but it lacked the necessary coherent long-term strategy. Most of the time, it reacted to tragic developments in the territory. When, finally, the international community acted to stop the war, there was still no integrated international strategy for the resolution of the crisis. In its continued absence, it is to be feared that the fighting would resume if the international troops withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina and/or Kosovo.

As the schematic presentation of the theoretical model of the integral international strategy in Table 32.1 indicates, such a strategy must encompass long-term activities in the following key areas:

- 1 economy – focusing especially on economic and social development that ensures a decent and acceptable living and future perspective for people, which also includes planning and managing of migration and integration of immigrants;
- 2 education and training – including formal and informal education and training at all levels and in all spheres; education and training should be viewed as a lifelong process and permanent activity that enables people to cope with social and technological change and development;
- 3 institution building, democracy, and human rights – requiring the stable functioning of democratic institutions, permanent institution building, and the promotion of the highest standards of human rights, including special rights of minorities.

Given the situation in the Balkans, focusing on the economy, education, and training as key factors for capacity building and improving of social capital, and on institution building, democratization, and promotion of human rights, could be considered a necessary investment in the future and the basis for long-term peace and stability in the region and globally. Although we might expect the international community to pay special attention to the regions that are perceived as possible “trouble spots,” such a global strategy, and specific region-adjusted strategies, are useful for all parts of the world, including those that are not considered problems.

The global strategy and specific strategies, which should consider specific and common characteristics of respective environments, should define and specify:

- 1 general goals, especially long-term goals;
- 2 specific approaches and goals, derived from general, long-term goals and adjusted to specific circumstances and needs;
- 3 institutional and organizational frameworks;
- 4 relevant actors, their relations and cooperation, and their roles regarding general and specific goals in all relevant fields.

Table 32.1 indicates measures to ensure permanent stability and peace, and activities that can contribute to managing diversity and preventing, managing, and/or resolving crises and conflicts. Although – to use a medical analogy – these activities and measures can be defined as predominantly preventive, curative, and/or rehabilitative, they should be observed as a permanent and interwoven process in which all phases should be going on permanently and simultaneously, in combinations that are best adjusted to the specific situations, circumstances, and needs of the respective environments.

Among the predominantly preventive activities we could list those designed to prevent conflicts and their escalation. These include the development of communication channels; early detection of conflicts and their escalation through early warning mechanisms; stable and balanced economic development, welfare, equality, and justice; the development and functioning of democratic institutions; diversity management and promoting diversities as comparative advantages; measures and activities for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, including mechanisms for consultation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration; a permanent process for defining and developing common interests, equal cooperation, and compromise building; if necessary, employment of third parties, neutral observers, counselors, negotiators, and mediators; and the coordination of all measures and activities.

At the same time as preventive activities and measures for ensuring peace and stability are being implemented, we would expect that, among others, the following curative measures and activities are being undertaken as well: continuation of all relevant measures and activities from the previous phase; specific measures for the management, pacification, and resolution of escalating conflicts; in case of transformation of conflicts into violent ones, activities and intervention for the cessation of violence, implementation of a truce, separation of conflicting sides (enemies), disarmament, and other peacemaking activities and measures; deployment and employment of international military and police forces and other peacekeeping measures and activities; assistance in negotiations; promotion of common interests and awareness of diversities as comparative advantages; and promotion of tolerance, peaceful and equal coexistence, and cooperation.

Ideally, adequate predominantly rehabilitative measures should be implemented simultaneously with preventive and curative ones. They include, among others, the continuation of all relevant measures and activities from the previous phases; policing, especially the employment of international police forces; monitoring of cessations of violence, truces, and disarmament; promotion of tolerance, peaceful and equal coexistence, and cooperation; strategies, programs, measures, and activities for rebuilding and long-term development.

The left side of Table 32.1 indicates the possible role of the international community in stability and peace-ensuring measures (four Ps):

- prevention;
- peacemaking;
- peacekeeping;
- policing.

Ideally, preventive measures can avert the escalation of crisis and the transformation of conflicts into violent conflicts. They can include different international activities such as visits by and employment of international observers, the establishment of monitoring mechanisms, counseling, Peace Corps activities, and traditional peacekeeping activities. The use of preventive measures requires consensus and acceptance by respective national governments. If these preventive measures are successful, there is usually no need to introduce other measures and activities. Unfortunately, this was not the case during the Yugoslav crisis, although the international community had some success in using preventive measures in Macedonia (see for example Marko 2006; Sokalski 2003).

When preventive measures prove insufficient, other measures need to be introduced. In cases of escalated and violent conflicts, these measures usually involve the participation of international troops. Peacemaking is a relatively new instrument of the international community that might be necessary for stopping hostilities after an armed conflict has commenced. Ideally, international peacemaking troops are employed in a territory by invitation, or at least by consensus of the respective national government(s). The international intervention might be needed if there are gross human rights violations or humanitarian crises in a certain country and the government concerned does not agree to the employment of international peacemaking troops. According to the proposed international infrastructure, only the UN Security Council can initiate an international military intervention, if all criteria and procedures are fully observed. An international intervention was needed in Bosnia-Herzegovina to stop the war and atrocities. Additionally, the government in Sarajevo had asked for the international involvement. However, the lack of an adequate international infrastructure and of resolution by the international community caused the delay and loss in human lives. If an international infrastructure, defined criteria, and rules of procedure had existed, and a decision had been made by the UN Security Council, there would have been no doubts and disagreements about the international military intervention in Kosovo (e.g. Buckley 2000).

When the fighting stops, peacekeeping might be required to prevent future hostilities. Traditional peacekeeping was introduced upon request, or agreement, by the relevant government(s) after a truce had been put in place. In this role, usually employed in a buffer zone, peacekeepers control the terms of the truce and keep conflicting sides apart. Traditional peacekeeping has been transformed in recent years and includes several additional activities that can contribute to the actual restoration of peace after a war. These new activities include engaging international troops in different conflict resolution projects. Sometimes these activities include international policing (see phase IV in Table 32.1).

The lower right side of Table 32.1 presents the “ARIME” conflict management and resolution framework or simply the “ARIME Framework.” As mentioned, it is based on the “ARI Conflict Management Framework” for ethnic and regional conflicts developed by Rothman (1992: 64–65) “as a vehicle for structuring conflict management training workshops for young Arab and Jewish leaders in Israel.” The “ARIME Framework” should also be understood as an instrument that enables the analysis of conflict management policies and activities, and as a tool for planning prenegotiation and negotiation processes, and measures and actions for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. It integrates adversarial, reflective, integrative, and combined process-based approaches to crisis and conflict management and resolution, with the aim of optimizing the outcomes. Permanent monitoring and evaluation require the participation of all sides, and often the involvement of a third party that can act in different capacities that might include acting as a channel of communication, facilitator, negotiator, or mediator. The content, goals, criteria, procedure, and processes for facilitation, negotiation, monitoring, and evaluation must

be agreed upon by all involved sides and by the third party. They establish a framework for equal cooperation of all participants that must agree which approach, or combination of approaches, will be used. All activities should be subject to permanent monitoring and evaluation. For the Balkans, diverse third parties would be involved. In some cases, especially at local and other micro levels, NGOs and other civil society actors might prove to be the most acceptable and successful, whereas at the national and international level the international community, especially international organizations and sometimes influential states, would make the most successful third parties.

## Conclusion

Pluralist, diverse, and asymmetrical societies need to manage diversity and to prevent, manage, and resolve crises and conflicts if they want to be successful, peaceful, and stable in the long run. Consequently, every pluralist society has to develop adequate and effective mechanisms and procedures for diversity management and for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, thereby preventing their destructive force and using their potentially positive, creative energy for successful development. These mechanisms and procedures have to be permanently developed and updated in order to correspond to the changing reality. On the other hand, inadequate mechanisms and procedures for the management and resolution of conflicts can be likely sources of new crises and conflicts. Crises and conflicts that are not handled properly can contribute to the escalation of conflicts that – especially if they transform into violent conflicts – could result in social instability, possibly in a war. This was what happened in the former Yugoslavia.

The international community, with its measures, activities, and interventions, can, no doubt, play a role in the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts in individual countries, but it can also contribute to the escalation of crises and conflicts – as was the case with the Yugoslav crisis.

We could confirm the central hypothesis that the lack of a coherent and elaborated international strategy for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts contributed to the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis. The absence of such a strategy resulted in several inadequate and delayed reactions by the international community. Consequently, the international community failed to implement adequate preventive measures and did not react in time to stop the fighting and prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity (including “ethnic cleansing”). Moreover, the subsequent international intervention was not followed up by activities and measures necessary for confidence building, rehabilitation of ethnic diversity, and adequate and equal integration in these divided societies. For these reasons the fear remains that, with the withdrawal of the international community and forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, crises and conflicts there might escalate again, in which case even the resumption of the fighting is not impossible.

On the other hand, the second hypothesis – that the systematic use of existing frameworks, models, methods, and techniques for the regulation and management of diversity and ethnic relations, and for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts within the global international strategy could have improved the situation and contributed to a more successful management of the crisis – cannot be confirmed conclusively. However, I am still of the view that these frameworks, models, methods, and techniques, if appropriately adopted, would have improved the situation. Hence the theoretical model and integral international strategy that are presented in this chapter. If nothing else, they are useful tools for a more effective analysis of specific situations and developments in diverse environments.



From a historic perspective, we can describe the world at the turn of the millennium as a period of technological progress, transition and global transformation, integration and disintegration, globalization and regionalization. My hope is that these developments will be recorded as reflecting a period of liberation, human rights, including rights of minorities, and successful democratization. However, considering contemporary developments, this period can also be described as a period of turbulence, crises, social and ethnic conflict, revolutions, wars, and diverse armed conflicts. All these processes, developments, and events shape the international community and all modern societies. They also determine the developments in science – including peace, conflict (management and resolution), ethnic, and international relations studies. I can only hope that these developments help to lay the foundations for successful peaceful prevention, management and resolution of international and other crises and conflicts in the future. There is, therefore, a need for more research of the kind presented in this chapter.

## Notes

- 1 See SP (1999). Initiated by the EU, this document was signed at the international conference at the closing of Germany's presidency of the EU. In attendance were: foreign ministers of the Member States of the European Union; the European Commission; the foreign ministers of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Hungary, Japan, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, (the former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia, Turkey, and the United States of America; the OSCE Chairman in Office and the Representative of the Council of Europe representing the participants; representatives of the United Nations, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, WEU, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Investment Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, acting within their competencies, representing the facilitating States, as well as the Representatives of the Royaumont process, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECF).
- 2 For example, all countries of the region and many NGOs agreed that activities and programs regarding institutional reforms, capacity and institution building, good governance, and promotion of democratic (participatory) citizenship were some of the most important activities in the field of democracy and human rights (positively – directly and indirectly – impacting security and peace and social/economic development). However, other SP member states did not did not support these proposals, and, as a result, they were voted down.
- 3 See for example Azar and Burton (1986); Burton (1984, 1990, 1996); Burton and Dukes (1990); Gurr (2000); Mastenbroek (1995); Ross and Rothman (1999).

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# 33 The perception of economic assistance in Northern Ireland and its role in the peace process\*

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## Introduction

Economic assistance fits in with the general civil society approach to conflict resolution and transformational politics (Galtung *et al.* 2002; Sandole 1999). In post-conflict societies, economic assistance may be important in empowering the grassroots within ethno-political groups to redress structural inequalities, promote contact, and build support for peace processes and for participatory democracy (Byrne 2001). Within the context of the Northern Ireland (NI) peacebuilding process, economic assistance from the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the European Union (EU) Peace I fund attempts to tackle structural inequalities, bridge the sectarian wall, and transform the civic culture by drawing grassroots support for the peace process (Byrne and Irvin 2001, 2002). This chapter focuses on public awareness of the contribution of external aid toward one's own community's economic development, the contribution of cross-community projects to peace, and its effectiveness toward the reduction of violence and in building the peace dividend. Very considerable economic resources have been committed to resolving the conflict, yet we have little empirical evidence of their impact (McGarry and O'Leary 1995, 2007).

The data is from a NI public opinion survey conducted in August 1997 by Ulster Marketing, whom we commissioned to assess the public perceptions of the impact of both funds. A representative sample of 610 adults (18+) were interviewed from 6 to 8 August 1997 by fully trained and experienced interviewers. All interviewing was carried out face-to-face at fifty sampling points selected at random throughout NI. The sample was controlled by gender, age, class, and religion, and yielded motorists, housewives and/or heads of households, and city and rural residents. Interviews were normally in the respondent's home. All questionnaires from the survey were manually edited, and the data was keyed directly to the computer, with a full verification of data editing on the computer.

The following section discusses external economic aid and ethnic conflict transformation. We then present an overview of the data with respect to gender, age group, economic class, and political affiliation.

## Economic assistance and ethnic conflict transformation

Ethnocentrism, us vs. them, group identity, segregation, economic underdevelopment, and access to power fuel protracted ethnopolitical conflicts (Boudreau 2003; Pearson 2001). Economic and political oppression serve to reinforce destructive stories and enemy images that heighten group insecurity and intergroup tensions (Senehi and Byrne 2006).

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A peace dividend through foreign economic assistance could be an important aspect of a peace process (Lederach 1997, 2005). However, economic development is not a panacea but may have merit as part of an overall transformational intervention peace process (Kaufman 2001; Ryan 2007). In the words of Stephen Ryan, “economic development, like democratization, may result in either a reduction or an intensification of intercommunal conflict, and all too frequently it may feed group egotism not reduce it” (1996: 226).

Socioeconomic inequality and political exclusion were integral to the formation of NI during the 1920s when populist Unionist policies increased Catholic alienation as rising unemployment rified the subordinated Nationalist community, preventing a working-class alliance (Bew *et al.* 1979, 1995). Any real or perceived redistribution of economic resources or political power was regarded as “a fundamental threat to the national sovereignty of the dominant ethnic group” (Maney 2005: 6). Fear of change strengthened group identity boundaries and escalated the conflict as NICRA marchers took to the streets to demand redress of Nationalist grievances. The modernization policy of the NI Prime Minister, Terrence O’Neil, came too late as Loyalist counterdemonstrators attacked NICRA marchers and the political climate spiraled into ultimate chaos (Wright 1987). “Concessions [were] viewed as betraying the nation and even as surrendering to the enemy” (Maney *et al.* 2006: 193). British troops brought onto the streets in 1969 to restore order came under attack from the Provisional IRA.

NI’s economy is arguably the most subsidized and public sector dependent in Western Europe (Dixon 2001, 2007). However, from 1970 onward British economic policy sought to stabilize the political situation in NI rather than to resolve the underlying roots of the conflict (Bew and Patterson 1985). Poverty, unemployment, and sectarianism left Loyalist and Republican working-class males feeling alienated and distrustful of the British government, providing new recruits for rival paramilitary groups (Irvin 1999).

External economic assistance from EU Peace I and the IFI has sought to empower the grassroots, reduce certainty, reduce structural inequalities, and shore up the peace process (Byrne and Ayulo 1998). The conflict disrupted the normal daily lives of many of NI’s citizens. Thus, the aim of both funding agencies is to address the legacy of the conflict by promoting social inclusion and reconciliation, and by boosting economic growth and advancing socioeconomic and rural regeneration in a sustainable way to consolidate the NI peace process (Byrne 2007; Irvin and Byrne 2002). However, the peace through development approach has met with mixed results in NI (Byrne and Irvin 2001, 2002). The results from our public opinion survey are now highlighted.

### **Importance of EU Peace I and IFI funded projects to one’s own community’s economic development**

We now turn to the respondents’ perception of the importance of both the IFI and the EU Peace I fund to one’s community’s economic development. According to Table 33.1, on aggregate about 67 percent of the respondents perceive a positive role for both funds in funding their community’s economic development.

Table 33.2 indicates that the Chi-square is not significant. There is no statistically significant difference in the distribution of perception of the importance of both funds across different classes. That is to say the perceived importance of projects funded by both funds on one’s own community’s economic development is independent of economic class.

Table 33.1 Distribution of perceived importance of IFI and EU Peace I fund on community economic development

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Very important	205	33.72
Fairly important	205	33.72
Neither important nor unimportant	37	6.09
Fairly unimportant	19	3.13
Very unimportant	3	0.49
Don't know/no reply	139	22.86
Total	608	100.00

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Table 33.2 Chi-square test of distribution of perceived importance of IFI and EU Peace I funded projects on community economic development by class

<i>Class</i>	<i>Very important</i>	<i>Fairly important</i>	<i>Neither important nor unimportant</i>	<i>Fairly unimportant</i>	<i>Very unimportant</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
ABC1	85	105	18	6	2	51	267
C2	49	36	7	7	0	30	129
DE	71	64	12	6	1	58	212
Total	205	205	37	19	3	139	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2(10) = 13.3210; p = 0.206$ .

Table 33.3 reports the Chi-square test for the gender distribution of perceived importance of projects funded by both funds on one's own community's economic development. On aggregate females are more likely to perceive the importance. Table 33.3 also shows that males are more likely to have a negative attitude toward the role of projects funded by both funds to one's own community's economic development. Note that we are able to interpret the cells because of the low *p*-value.

Table 33.4 shows that there is a stark difference across political parties on the perceived importance of projects funded by both funds for one's own community's economic development. This is reinforced by the multivariate analysis in Table 33.4.

The probability of perceiving the importance of projects funded by both funds to one's own community's economic development is lower for the supporters of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) than for other respondents. Apart from these two variables the coefficients of the other variables included in the ordered probit are not significant. More interestingly, there is no significant statistical association between the perception of the importance of projects funded by both funds on one's own community's development and economic class.

Our multivariate analysis tends to support the assertion that the perceptions of Catholics tend to be more favorable, in contrast with Protestants, to the role projects funded by both funds play in the development of their communities. Table 33.5 also suggests that age has a positive and significant association with the perception of the importance of projects

Table 33.3 Distribution of perceived importance of IFI and EU Peace I funded projects on community economic development by gender

	<i>Very important</i>	<i>Fairly important</i>	<i>Neither important not unimportant</i>	<i>Fairly unimportant</i>	<i>Very unimportant</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
Male	105	84	21	14	2	57	283
Female	100	121	16	5	1	82	325
Total	205	205	37	19	3	139	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2(5) = 13.7328; p = 0.017$ .

Table 33.4 Distribution of perceived importance of IFI and EU Peace I funded projects on community economic development by political party

	<i>Very fair</i>	<i>Quite fair</i>	<i>Neither fair nor unfair</i>	<i>Not very fair</i>	<i>Not fair</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
Ulster Unionist Party	28	50	8	7	0	30	123
Democratic Unionist Party	12	20	2	3	0	11	48
Alliance	14	12	4	1	0	6	37
Progressive Unionist	11	8	1	1	0	1	22
Ulster Democratic Party	7	3	1	0	0	8	19
UK Unionist (UKUP)	2	2	1	0	0	1	6
Conservative	4	2	0	0	0	6	12
SDLP	52	24	4	3	1	17	101
Sinn Fein	17	17	2	2	0	8	46
Women's Coalition	0	4	0	0	0	1	5
Undecided/not sure	26	23	2	0	0	19	70
Would not vote	24	36	12	2	2	29	105
No reply	8	4	0	0	0	2	14
Total	205	205	37	19	3	139	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

$\chi^2$  was also calculated without "don't know" responses and the results are similar.

Table 33.5 Ordered logit. (dependent variable = importance of IFI and EU Peace I funded projects on own community's economic development)

Variable	Coefficient	Standard error	z	p >  z	95% confidence	Interval
UUP	0.20435	0.212888	0.96	0.337	-0.2129023	0.621602
DUP	-0.14978	0.286784	-0.52	0.601	-0.7118649	0.412308
ALLIANCE	-0.35497	0.328158	-1.08	0.279	-0.99815	0.288207
PUP	-1.10276	0.416841	-2.65	0.008	-1.919755	-0.28577
UDP	0.226322	0.477511	0.47	0.636	-0.7095829	1.162227
UKUP	-0.29081	0.724427	-0.4	0.688	-1.71066	1.129043
CONSERVATIVE	0.316407	0.61542	0.51	0.607	-0.8897935	1.522607
SDLP	-0.85935	0.243302	-3.53	0	-1.33621	-0.38248
SINN FEIN	-0.26641	0.308626	-0.86	0.388	-0.871309	0.338483
WOMAN COAL	-0.28058	0.784	-0.36	0.72	-1.817191	1.256032
GENDER	-0.23413	0.153864	-1.52	0.128	-0.5356991	0.067436
ABC1DUMMY	-0.08708	0.201543	-0.43	0.666	-0.4820972	0.307938
DEDUMMY	-0.1541	0.214956	-0.72	0.473	-0.5754042	0.267208
AGE	-0.01559	0.004412	-3.53	0	-0.0242376	-0.00694
CATHOLIC	-0.80515	0.46187	-1.74	0.081	-1.710403	0.100095
PROTESTANT	0.358206	0.460195	0.78	0.436	-0.5437594	1.260171
_CUT1	-2.29877	0.389488	(ANCILLARY PARAMETERS)			
_CUT2	-0.74521	0.377737				
_CUT3	-0.46143	0.377871				
_CUT4	-0.36817	0.378169				

Ordered logit estimates; Number of obs = 608; LR chi<sup>2</sup>(16) = 46.19; p > chi<sup>2</sup> = 0.0001; Log likelihood = -766.50106; Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> = 0.0292.

continued overleaf



Table 33.5 (continued) Ordered logit. (dependent variable = importance of IFI and EU Peace I funded projects on own community's economic development)

Variable	dy/dx	Standard error	z	p-Value	x-Bar	95% confidence	Interval
UUP	0.20435	0.21289	0.96	0.337	-0.2129	0.621602	0.202303
DUP	-0.14978	0.28678	-0.52	0.601	-0.71187	0.412308	0.078947
ALLIANCE	-0.35497	0.32816	-1.08	0.279	-0.99815	0.288207	0.060855
PUP	-1.10276	0.41684	-2.65	0.008	-1.91975	-0.28577	0.036184
UDP	0.226322	0.47751	0.47	0.636	-0.70958	1.16223	0.03125
UKUP	-0.29081	0.72443	-0.4	0.688	-1.71066	1.12904	0.009868
CONSERVATIVE	0.316407	0.61542	0.51	0.607	-0.88979	1.52261	0.019737
SDLP	-0.85935	0.2433	-3.53	0	-1.33621	-0.38248	0.166118
SINN FEIN	-0.26641	0.30863	-0.86	0.388	-0.87131	0.338483	0.075658
WOMAN COAL	-0.28058	0.784	-0.36	0.72	-1.81719	1.25603	0.008224
GENDER	-0.23413	0.15386	-1.52	0.128	-0.5357	0.067435	0.465461
ABCIDUMMY	-0.08708	0.20154	-0.43	0.666	-0.4821	0.307938	0.439145
DEDUMMY	-0.1541	0.21496	-0.72	0.473	-0.5754	0.267207	0.348684
AGE	-0.01559	0.00441	-3.53	0	-0.02424	-0.00694	41.7796
CATHOLIC	-0.80515	0.46187	-1.74	0.081	-1.7104	0.100095	1.37993
PROTESTANT	0.358206	0.46019	0.78	0.436	-0.54376	1.26017	1.37993

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Marginal effects after ordered logit  $y = \text{Linear prediction (cut points excluded) (predict, XB)} = -1.6557926$ .

\* dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

funded by both funds to one's own community's development. The older a person is the higher the probability that the person is going to recognize the importance.

We have also looked at the determinants of the economic situation of a person three years before the survey to shed light on any possible link between economic growth and political party membership, assuming that the economic situation of an individual could be used as a proxy for economic growth. Besides, even though the dependent variable is a categorical variable, we have estimated the model using ordinary least square. This is not a problem because the interest is not on the size of the parameters to be estimated or the direction of correlation.

Table 33.6 reports the regression model for the economic situation of individuals the last three years before the survey. The regression output indicates that the variables age, class (ABC1), and relation included in the model are statistically significant. One's perceived economic situation seems to have a positive correlation with age. Thus, we would normally expect the economic situation of a person to be positively correlated with age. Also with age we would normally expect people to save, and improve their situation by making some investment in themselves such as short-term training, which can enhance their productivity. Further, the economic situation of the last three years before the survey was taken is negatively related to the ABC1 economic class.

What is more striking is that the relationship that a person has with the funding agency has a positive and significant correlation with her/his economic situation, suggesting, perhaps, some form of favoritism or positive spillovers from such projects in terms of either the allocation of aid or employment or some form of corruption, which would need a separate treatment with appropriate techniques.

## **Contribution of cross-community projects to peace**

We now examine the perceived contribution of cross-community projects to peace. The Chi-square test in Table 33.7 reports that the perceived contribution of cross-community projects toward peace is not similar across gender, as more females than males recognize that cross-community projects have positively contributed toward peace. This suggests, perhaps, that women are more contact-oriented and hence more pro-peace oriented than men.

According to the Chi-square in Table 33.8 the perceived contribution of economic assistance from both funds to peace is not independent of economic class. Respondents from the ABC1 class are more likely to perceive the positive contribution of economic assistance from both funds toward peace and reconciliation. Table 33.8 also depicts that respondents from the DE class are less likely to perceive the importance of cross-community projects toward peace and reconciliation.

As reported in Table 33.9 the  $p$ -value of the Chi-square is less than 0.05 so that we can interpret the values in the contingency table. A larger number of Protestants than Catholics perceive the contribution of cross-community projects toward peace and reconciliation.

Table 33.10 indicates that the  $p$ -value is almost 0, which suggests that we can interpret the cells. There is a stark difference between the perceptions of the respondents in the different political parties toward the contribution of economic assistance to peace. For example, Table 33.10 shows that supporters of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) are more likely to perceive a positive contribution of economic assistance from both funds toward peace than the supporters of other political parties. All the other cells can be interpreted likewise.

Table 33.6 Regression model for economic situation of individuals last three years before the survey

Variable	dy/dx	Standard error	z	p-Value	x-Bar	95% confidence	Internal
RELATION*	-0.1741799	0.05636	-3.09	0.002	-0.284641	-0.063718	5.25329
DC*	0.2436552	0.21968	1.11	0.267	-0.186915	0.674225	0.174342
PARTY*	-0.3054634	0.39468	-0.77	0.439	-1.07902	0.468093	0.037829
COMDEV*	0.3394739	0.22049	1.54	0.124	-0.092676	0.771624	0.148026
CHURCH*	0.2751895	0.28782	0.96	0.339	-0.288936	0.839315	0.082237
GENDER*	0.0533883	0.16539	0.32	0.747	-0.27077	0.377547	0.465461
UUP*	-0.2140172	0.22286	-0.96	0.337	-0.650819	0.222784	0.202303
DUP*	-0.143678	0.3236	-0.44	0.657	-0.777918	0.490562	0.078947
ALLIANCE*	0.0223202	0.3791	0.06	0.953	-0.720703	0.765344	0.060855
PUP*	-0.6062786	0.55136	-1.1	0.272	-1.68692	0.474365	0.036184
UDP*	-0.3614235	0.47488	-0.76	0.447	-1.29218	0.569332	0.03125
UKUP*	-0.2667006	0.69295	-0.38	0.7	-1.62486	1.09146	0.009868
CONSER~E	0.2507559	1.15901	0.22	0.829	-2.02085	2.52237	0.019737
SDLP*	-0.0986243	0.25185	-0.39	0.695	-0.592243	0.394994	0.166118
SINN FEIN*	0.0039644	0.27182	0.01	0.988	-0.528798	0.536727	0.075658
WOMAN	-0.2899704	0.93702	-0.31	0.757	-2.12649	1.54655	0.008224
COAL*							
ABC1DU~Y*	0.629129	0.19184	3.28	0.001	0.25313	1.00513	0.439145
C2DUMMY*	0.2288054	0.22623	1.01	0.312	-0.21459	0.672201	0.212171
AGEI*	-0.0101652	0.00455	-2.23	0.025	-0.019082	-0.001248	41.7796

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Marginal effects after ordered logit; y = Linear prediction (cut points excluded) (predict, xb) = 0.9888979.

\* dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

Table 33.7 Chi-square test of distribution of perceived contribution of IFI and EU Peace I economic assistance to peace by gender

Sex	Yes helped	Make no difference	Don't know	Total
Male	143	102	38	283
Female	170	94	61	325
Total	313	196	99	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2$  (2) = 5.1222;  $p$  = 0.077.

Table 33.8 Chi-square test of distribution of perceived contribution of IFI and EU Peace I economic assistance to peace by class

Class	Yes helped	Make no difference	Don't know	Total
ABC1	158	72	37	267
C2	65	43	21	129
DE	90	81	41	212
Total	313	196	99	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2$  (2) = 10.7878;  $p$  = 0.005.

Table 33.9 Chi-square test of distribution of perceived contribution of IFI and EU Peace I economic assistance to peace by religion

Religion	Yes helped	Make no difference	Don't know	Total
Protestant	181	136	60	377
Catholic	122	51	37	210
Other/refused	10	9	2	21
Total	313	196	99	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2$  (2) = 9.1700;  $p$  = 0.001.

Table 33.10 Chi-square test of distribution of perceived contribution of IFI and EU Peace I economic assistance to peace by political party

<i>First preference vote</i>	<i>Yes help</i>	<i>Make no difference</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
Ulster Unionist Party	62	47	14	123
Democratic Unionist Party	13	26	9	48
Alliance	26	6	5	37
Progressive Unionist	4	11	7	22
Ulster Democratic Party	13	5	1	19
UK Unionist (UKUP)	2	2	2	6
Conservative	7	4	1	12
SDLP	62	23	16	101
Sinn Fein	23	16	7	46
Women's Coalition	4	1	0	5
Undecided/not sure	38	15	17	70
Would not vote	52	34	19	105
No reply	7	6	1	14
Total	313	196	99	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2$  (12) = 36.3476;  $p$  = 0.000.

Table 33.11 Ordered logit, dependent variable contribution of aid on peace

Variable	dy/dx	Standard error	z	p-value	x-Bar	95% confidence	Interval
RELATION	-0.0565022	0.015176	-3.7	0	5.21218	-0.08625	-0.02676
GENDER*	-0.0884819	0.045889	-1.92	0.055	0.481336	-0.17842	0.001459
UUP*	-0.0911489	0.064404	-1.43	0.152	0.214145	-0.21738	0.03508
DUP*	-0.3132409	0.086491	-3.41	0.001	0.076621	-0.48276	-0.14372
ALLIANCE*	0.1474225	0.088809	1.49	0.137	0.062868	-0.02664	0.321484
PUP*	-0.3777677	0.122677	-2.64	0.008	0.02947	-0.61821	-0.13733
UDP*	0.1078387	0.114468	0.87	0.382	0.035363	-0.11693	0.332607
UKUP*	-0.0602493	0.262132	-0.23	0.815	0.007859	-0.57402	0.45352
CONSERVATIVE*	0.0159162	0.152566	0.1	0.917	0.021611	-0.28311	0.314941
SDLP*	0.0698614	0.066484	1.02	0.307	0.166994	-0.06044	0.200167
SINN FEIN*	-0.0677305	0.09292	-0.74	0.459	0.076621	-0.24985	0.11439
WOMAN	-0.026076	0.247629	-0.11	0.915	0.009823	-0.51142	0.459268
COALITION*							
CATHOLIC	-0.0563435	0.157602	-0.36	0.721	1.38703	-0.36524	0.252551
PROTESTANT	0.0551265	0.156922	0.35	0.725	1.38703	-0.25243	0.362687
ABC1DUMMY*	0.1414913	0.050666	2.75	0.006	0.451866	0.042188	0.240794
C2DUMMY*	0.0539048	0.059932	0.88	0.376	0.212181	-0.06356	0.171369
AGE	-0.0007114	0.001299	-0.55	0.584	41.8153	-0.00326	0.001835
Observed probability		0.614931					
Predicted probability		0.626332	(at x-bar)				

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Logit regression, reporting marginal effects; Number of observations = 509; LR chi<sup>2</sup> (17) = 61.04;  $p > \text{chi}^2 = 0.0000$ ; Log likelihood = -308.72354; Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> = 0.0900.

\* dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

We now present the multivariate analysis. Before discussing the results in Table 33.11 we need to explain the construction of the dependent variable that was derived from an answer to the question “do you think that community projects have helped to bring peace?” The response categories were “yes,” “no,” or “I don’t know.” The “I don’t know” options were excluded from the regression analysis so that the estimated model is a non-linear probability model. Some of the implications from the regression analysis are now outlined.

The variable “Relation” in Table 33.11 is a dummy variable that assumes 1 if a person has a relationship with any funding agency, and 0 otherwise. The relationship of a respondent to the funding agencies has a negative effect on the perception of the contribution of community projects to peace. The closer a respondent is to the funding agency the less she/he feels it is going to contribute to peace. Table 33.11 also shows that the supporters of PUP and the now defunct Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are less likely to perceive the importance of cross-community projects toward building peace. Further, one’s membership of ABC1 class relative to DE class increases the probability of one perceiving that the project makes a positive contribution toward peace.

### **Perceived effect of the IFI and EU Peace I fund on the reduction of violence**

In the Chi-square tests we employ all three responses, “yes”, “no,” and “I don’t know,” to gauge the impact of both funds in reducing violence. In the regression analysis we exclude the “I don’t know” responses. The Chi-square test in Table 33.12 suggests that there is a statistically significant difference among males and females in their perception of the effect of both funds on the reduction of violence. Of the 608 study participants, 138 respondents had no opinion. Women are more likely to be unable to determine the effect of both funds on the reduction of violence, suggesting they may be less aware of the roles of projects funded by both funds in de-escalating violence.

The Chi-square test in Table 33.13 suggests that there is a statistically significant difference among different economic strata in the respondents’ perceptions toward the effect of both funds on the reduction of violence. More specifically, individuals in the ABC1 class are more likely to perceive that economic assistance has no effect on the reduction of violence. At the same time, Table 33.13 shows that there are many individuals from the ABC1 class who perceive the effect of these funds to be positive in reducing violence. By and large, since the number of respondents from the ABC1 class is higher in each response category the interpretation of findings is less attractive.

According to the Chi-square test in Table 33.14 there is a statistically significant difference among followers of different religions in their perception of the effect of both funds on the reduction of violence. Protestants are more likely to perceive that economic assistance from both funds has no effect on the reduction of violence, subject to the qualification of all things remaining the same. Catholics are likely to rate the effect of economic assistance from both funds on the reduction of violence more favorably than non-Catholics.

The Chi-square test in Table 33.15 suggests that there is a statistically significant difference across political party affiliations in the perception toward the effect of both funds on the reduction of violence. On aggregate the supporters of the UUP are more likely to perceive that the economic assistance from both funds has not made any impact on the level of violence in NI. With the exception of Sinn Fein (SF) supporters, the other cells in Table 34.15 can be interpreted likewise.



Table 33.12 Perception of effect of IFI and EU Peace I fund on violence by gender

Sex	Yes helped	Made no difference	Don't know	Total
Male	64	168	51	283
Female	66	172	87	325
Total	130	340	138	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2$  (2) = 5.2779;  $p$  = 0.037.

Table 33.13 Perception of effect of IFI and EU Peace I fund on violence by class

Class	Yes helped	Made no difference	Don't know	Total
ABC1	71	146	50	267
C2	25	77	27	129
DE	34	117	61	212
Total	130	340	138	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2$  (2) = 54.0313;  $p$  = 0.071.

Table 33.14 Perception of effect of IFI and EU Peace I fund on violence by religion

Religion	Yes helped	Made no difference	Don't know	Total
Protestant	49	244	84	377
Catholic	79	84	47	210
Other/refused	2	12	7	21
Total	130	340	138	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2$  (2) = 54.0313;  $p$  = 0.000.

Table 33.15 Perception of effect of IFI and EU Peace I fund on violence by political party

<i>Preference vote</i>	<i>Yes helped</i>	<i>Made no difference</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
Ulster Unionist Party	18	77	28	123
Democratic Unionist Party	4	37	7	48
Alliance	5	26	6	37
Progressive Unionist	1	10	11	22
Unionist Democratic Party	2	15	2	19
UK Unionist (UKUP)	0	6	0	6
Conservative	4	7	1	12
SDLP	39	42	20	101
Sinn Fein	21	12	13	46
Women's Coalition	2	2	1	5
Undecided/not sure	14	38	18	70
Would not vote	17	60	28	105
No reply	3	8	3	14
Total	130	340	138	608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

Pearson  $\chi^2$  (12) = 59.5360;  $p$  = 0.000.

Table 33.16 Probit model for perception of effect of IFI and EU Peace I fund on violence

<i>V</i> ariable	$dy/dx$	<i>Std. error</i>	$z$	<i>p</i> -Value	<i>x</i> -Bar	95% confidence	<i>Interval</i>
GENDER*	0.1105395	0.0667323	1.65	0.1	0.429104	-0.02025	0.241333
UUP*	-0.0628729	0.0952931	-0.65	0.513	0.171642	-0.24964	0.123898
DUP*	-0.0887303	0.1588691	-0.55	0.584	0.041045	-0.40011	0.222647
ALLIANCE*	0.0095383	0.1661984	0.06	0.954	0.041045	-0.3162	0.335281
PUP*	-0.4203663	0.0940688	-2.39	0.017	0.044776	-0.60474	-0.236
UDP*	-0.0045172	0.2558937	-0.02	0.986	0.014925	-0.50606	0.497025
CONSERVATIVE*	0.3682718	0.1650017	1.6	0.11	0.018657	0.044874	0.691669
SDLP*	0.1977455	0.0865845	2.21	0.027	0.220149	0.028043	0.367448
SINN FEIN*	0.1934163	0.1015853	1.82	0.069	0.126866	-0.00569	0.39252
WOMAN	0.2330374	0.2635917	0.8	0.426	0.011194	-0.28359	0.749668
COALITION*							
PROTESTANT	-0.0420192	0.2048592	-0.21	0.837	1.4403	-0.44354	0.359497
ABC1DUMMY*	0.2266638	0.0716789	3.08	0.002	0.451493	0.086176	0.367152
C2DUMMY*	0.0938193	0.0906588	1.03	0.304	0.19403	-0.08387	0.271507
CATHOLIC	-0.0509992	0.2052635	-0.25	0.804	1.45149	-0.45331	0.35131
Observed probability		0.4850746					
Predicted probability		0.4780937	(at x-bar)				

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey.

\*  $dy/dx$  is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

In Table 33.16 we estimate a probit model for the perceived contribution of both funds' economic assistance on the reduction of violence. The dependent variable is a binary outcome, which assumes 0 if the response is "no," and 1 if the response is "yes." The probit equation in Table 33.16 indicates that not all of the factors included in the regression analysis have a significant effect on the perceived impact of economic assistance in reducing violence in NI.

All things being equal, the probability of a male respondent perceiving a positive role for both funds economic assistance to reduce violence is higher by 11 percent than for a female counterpart. Further, the probability of a person from the ABC1 class in perceiving a positive role of both funds economic assistance in mitigating violence is higher than for a person from the DE class. The respondents who would vote for the SDLP are more likely to perceive a positive role of both funds on the reduction of violence than other respondents. The probability of rating the impact of both funds on the reduction of violence is negatively associated with PUP political affiliation.

## Discussion

Overall, the data suggests that economic assistance skillfully administered may play a pivotal role in nurturing a milieu conducive to the political rather than violent transformation of conflict. Interestingly, more males are aware of the distribution of funds, and perceive it as fairer, than females. Yet more females than males recognize the importance of cross-community projects in contributing toward peace but not in determining the effects of the funds on the reduction of violence. With regards to access to and knowledge of the funding agencies, more men are in positions of power and privilege in society than women, who must be empowered to take on more leadership roles in society to build a culture of peace.

Clearly, the respondents recognized the link between prosperity and the fact that peace is the end of the long war (Byrne and Irvin 2001, 2002). The role of economic assistance coupled with the cooperative partnership of both governments and the international community that resulted in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) is critical to building peace over the long term (Byrne 2002; Wilford 2000).

However, the GFA is not a panacea for an immediate political solution (Arthur 2000). The GFA "is neither a solution to the Irish question nor a blueprint for government, it is a framework to build consensus" (Cox 1999: 66). In fact the recent DUP-SF political agreement may mark the beginning of a new era of consensus politics in NI. The 108-member Assembly took its seats on 8 May 2007 with Ian Paisley of the DUP and Martin McGuinness of SF nominated as first minister and deputy first minister, respectively. The people in NI have welcomed the new Belfast Assembly. However, devolution is based on policing people apart. The politics of consensus reinforces segregation by insisting that both communities must be represented by politicians who compete for their own community against the other over limited resources. It is important to remember that it was elite power sharing that eventually led to the fragmentation and collapse of the fragile political structures that existed in both Cyprus and Lebanon (Byrne 2007; Wright 1987).

However, in 2005, the GDP per capita of NI was only 80 percent of that of the UK (Aughey 2005). The trend of decline, evidenced in the growth rate of real GDP, productivity, and earnings, suggests that there is no positive correlation between the influx of funds and the performance of NI's economy. The economic assistance from both funds has created jobs and has promoted peace and reconciliation through the various employment

and cross-community contact programs sponsored by the funds (Coakley 2002). The introduction of these programs correlates with a falling unemployment rate, a competitive performance in exports, and continued support for expenditure in health and education (Morrisey and Smyth 2002). In fact the impact of both of these funds on the political process may be negative as they might have had an adverse effect by further alienating already isolated Unionists (Aughey 2000; Dixon 2001).

Honaker (2005) used available data to estimate the separate unemployment rates for Protestants and Catholics, and found that unemployment leads to perceptions of economic discrimination and is a significant causal mechanism for the intensity of conflict in NI. Catholics remain twice as likely to be long-term unemployed as Protestants. Currently, Republicans have traded the long war for the opportunity to co-govern NI, and to address human rights, policing, prisoner release, equality, poverty, exclusion, and unemployment, which had marginalized Nationalists (Byrne *et al.* 2006; Irvin and Byrne 2002). In this study, we found that twice as many Catholics perceived the funded projects as very important to their community's economic development. Catholics, in particular, were excluded, alienated, and marginalized by the political process, and lacked material advantage. Moreover, it is within the SF bloc that we notice the greatest belief in the positive role of the funding agencies in addressing economic grievances, disadvantage, and in reducing violence.

This finding is in contrast to the traditionally privileged Unionist community, albeit comprising the professional and skilled classes, where there is less support for the role of economic assistance in providing better economic opportunities and in reducing the level of violence. The Unionist-Loyalist bloc ranks the Provisional IRA as the net beneficiary of the Troubles (Dowds *et al.* 2005).

## Conclusions

Even though the contribution of both funding agencies in financial terms is dwarfed by that coming from the British government, they are important as part of the engagement of civil society in a multitrack intervention peace process (Byrne 2001; MacGinty 2003). The data clearly indicates that the respondents support the work of both funding agencies in economically empowering the disadvantaged within both communities. Properly targeted economic assistance is providing both communities with human and material resources that are building self-confidence, and increasing self-esteem and self-efficacy in support of a political rather than violent process in NI (Byrne and Irvin 2001, 2002).

The new seismic political shifts taking shape in NI's politics suggests that both communities, especially the Unionist majority and Irish Republicans, have taken major leaps of faith to transform the conflict. The GFA also brought Loyalists and Republicans in from the cold, reformed the police to become a more representative body dealing with Loyalist parades along the Ormeau and Garvaghy Roads, and brought Unionists and Nationalists to the negotiating table and into a devolved power-sharing government (Cox *et al.* 2000). Are these changes genuine attempts by the parties to resolve the conflict or just pragmatic politics? Guelke argues that "if fundamental change could occur in apartheid South Africa, of all places, through negotiation and without revolution, how could Republicans sustain the argument that it was impossible in NI?" (2000: 259). In addition, Brendan O'Leary cautions that the Unionist calculus suggests "only by being generous now could they reconcile Nationalists to the Union and protect themselves against possible seismic shifts in the balance of demographic power" (1999: 643).

The decline of traditional Unionism is best portrayed by the collapse of the UUP over the past five years while Unionists voted for the more reactionary DUP out of a sense of frustration with the current peace process. Instead of pursuing Irish independence SF has opted for parity of esteem with Unionists, and for equitable treatment and respect within NI. SF will wait for the demographic shift in its favor in order to pursue its long-term objective of an independent all-Ireland state. Even though the politics of consensus can be difficult and could freeze sectarian politics, the DUP–SF political deal will stick partly because of the old adage that it takes the extreme parties to make an effective peace deal. The rejectionists that are left on each side are now probably too weak to bring down the Agreement. Egotism and short-term political expediency are at work.

However, some potential problems might be: First, who will replace Ian Paisley as leader of the DUP, and what impact will this have on the peace process? Second, how will the Unionists react to SF's electoral ambitions in Eire especially if it holds the balance of power in Dail Eireann? Third, eventually, when it has the population numbers, will SF pursue the self-determination referendum stipulated in the GFA? How will the powerful DUP react? Fourth, in the short term, economic rather than political problems may become the most important threat to the peace process because NI's people are now comfortable with the peace process and the associated economic boom. What will happen if NI's economy begins to go into decline? Finally, can the spoilers, the Real IRA and the Orange Defenders, take down the Belfast Assembly by ratcheting up the violence (Darby 2001)? The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) recently announced they will continue to seek peace but refuse to decommission any of their weapons.

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# 34 Conflict resolution in an age of empire

## New challenges to an emerging field

*Richard E. Rubenstein*

### **Introduction: a conflict among conflict theorists**

The field of conflict resolution emerged in the post-World War II period as part of an effort to imagine and establish an international order not dominated by the old “realities” of imperialism and aggressive nationalism. From the outset, however, its theory and practice reflected an implicit ambiguity about the relationship of conflict resolution concepts and techniques to existing structures of coercive power. Would the new discipline function, in effect, as an *adjunct* to power-based institutions, attempt to moderate their use of force in the same way, say, that mediation and other techniques of “alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) sought to ameliorate existing judicial systems? Or would it attempt to create *alternatives* to such institutions – systems of thought and action intended to render obsolete not only war but coercive diplomacy and power-political decisionmaking as well?

This issue remained largely latent during the decades of the Cold War, when the prevailing trend among conflict theorists was what one might call an enlightened realism. For all but a few dissenting thinkers, the question was not whether to fight the Cold War, but how to keep it from escalating to the level of a nuclear exchange. On a more general plane, the attempt to establish a “science” of conflict, reflected in the pages of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, relied upon models of social scientific reasoning and research that followed established disciplines such as political science, sociology, economics, and social psychology in treating relationships of domination and subordination as “givens,” and thus instantiating them (Crocker 2006; see also Foucault 2001; Miall *et al.* 2005). Whereas a small number of scholar-activists offered radical critiques of power-based decisionmaking, and advocated collaborative problemsolving processes as an alternative (Curle 1971; Burton 1979, 1990, 1997; Boulding 1990; Galtung 1996), strategic calculation, illustrated and epitomized by the vogue of game theory, was the dominant mode of conflict theory during the era of international bipolarity (see for example Schelling [1962] 2006; Rapoport 1974).

For the strategic calculators, the main line of distinction ran between negotiation, whether based on perceived power or not, and military conflict. Their motto might well have been Winston Churchill’s 1954 observation that “It is better to jaw, jaw than to war, war.” For their opponents, on the other hand, the relevant dichotomy distinguished exercises of coercive power (e.g. “negotiation from strength”) that seemed to sustain existing structures and cultures of violence from alternative practices that they believed held out the promise of transforming these systems (Dunn 2004, 2005). During the 1980s and 1990s, the balance within the profession shifted somewhat in favor of the “post-power” forces, as peace studies programs influenced by opposition to the US war in Indochina were

established in some 200 colleges and universities, and graduate institutions critical of older approaches to conflict resolution were founded at Harvard, George Mason, Maryland, Syracuse, Notre Dame, American, Eastern Mennonite, and a dozen other universities.<sup>1</sup> But the issue reappeared with new urgency at the end of the Cold War, when the rise of the United States as the world's sole military superpower, together with the increasing professionalization of conflict resolution as a field of study and practice, focused new attention on the discipline's relationship to global structures of power.

### **The US government “converts” to conflict resolution – or does it?**

In 2004 and 2005, a dramatic change took place in the attitude of American foreign policy officials toward the emerging profession. For decades, conflict scholars had attempted without much success to persuade policymakers to consider a range of conceptual and practical alternatives to coercive diplomacy and war making. Now, however, with the United States conducting an ill-defined “war on terror” around the globe and American troops bogged down in costly shooting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, members of the George W. Bush administration began to demonstrate a new interest in the vocabulary and methods of conflict resolution.

In July 2004, the US Department of State established an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” According to the new agency's leaders, “Experience shows that managing conflict, particularly internal conflict, is not a passing phenomenon. It has become a mainstream part of our foreign policy.” Proclaiming the need for systematic “conflict transformation planning” by joint military–civilian task forces, the CRS mission statement declared:

Until now, the international community has undertaken stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, recreating the tools and relationships each time a crisis arises. If we are going to ensure that countries are set on a sustainable path towards peace, democracy and a market economy, we need new, institutionalized foreign policy tools – tools that can influence the choices countries and people make about the nature of their economies, their political systems, their security, indeed, in some cases about the very social fabric of a nation.<sup>2</sup>

CRS proposed to use the “tools” of conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) to help reconstruct and stabilize areas such as Kosovo, Somalia, and Iraq along lines acceptable to US policymakers and business interests, a prospect viewed with enthusiasm by some conflict specialists and suspicion by others. Would this new initiative open the door, as some hoped, to the incremental transformation of US foreign policy in a less coercive direction? Or would it produce a cooptation of conflict resolution professionals similar to the cooptation of much of the intellectual and scientific community by the federal government in the early years of the Cold War (Kuklick 2006)? In the case of CRS, the discussion was largely rendered moot by the refusal of those conducting the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to yield authority to any new agency. While bureaucratic infighting slowed the development of this initiative, however, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) was far more successful in establishing its new Office for Conflict Management

and Mitigation (CMM), whose mission was “to integrate or ‘mainstream’ best practices of conflict management into more traditional development sectors” in order “to strengthen moderate voices and rebuild ties between divided communities” (USAID 2007).

With \$400 million in initial funding and additional monies in the pipeline, CMM has engaged in a wide variety of activities ranging from humanitarian relief and development planning to counterterrorist initiatives, many of them employing conflict resolution professionals and non-governmental institutions either as direct contractors or as members of teams led by private development corporations. For a number of reasons, the CMM program proved attractive to many in the conflict resolution community. In part, this reflected USAID’s reputation for relative independence from the foreign policy “establishment” and the hope that conflict specialists might use this new opportunity to persuade influential policymakers to accept understandings of conflict and resolution long advocated in the field. As the agency director, Elisabeth Kvitashvili, stated, “We are *the* change agent for USAID” (Kvitashvili 2006). In part, too, it reflected a significant shift in the availability of funds for conflict resolution research. The development of this new source of federal funding coincided with a marked slowdown in private foundation support for conflict resolution research and projects. “Where funding for conflict resolution is concerned,” stated one well-known specialist, “Uncle Sam is now pretty much the only game in town.”

Meanwhile, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a federally funded agency established in 1984 “to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide,” has seen its permanent staff and budget increase greatly since 2001. USIP, which played an important role in assisting US negotiators during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, has been promised a permanent home on Washington’s National Mall and has opened an office in the Green Zone of Baghdad in order to mediate ethnic and religious conflicts in Iraq under the aegis of the American–British military occupation (see [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)). Of all US government agencies, this institution has the closest ties to conflict resolution specialists, to whom it offers much-needed project grants, research fellowships, internships, publishing opportunities, and invitations to participate in conferences and workshops. Once again, these benefits, proffered by a staff that includes well-respected figures in the world of conflict resolution, have generated uneasiness on the part of some putative beneficiaries.

Clearly, USIP seeks to link the emerging profession of conflict analysis and resolution to the American government and to harmonize its aims and methods with those of US foreign policy. Does this activity offer conflict specialists an opportunity to alter the still-prevailing realist paradigm, as some scholars believe, and to wean America’s rulers away from their addiction to coercive power? Or will the experts be used to provide the American Empire with a more sophisticated, cost-effective arsenal of “hard,” “soft,” and “smart” power weapons (Nye 2005) in order to extend and prolong its hegemony? One’s response requires an analysis of the new global order, which the academy has just begun to undertake, and which is long overdue among scholars of conflict analysis and resolution.

### The “I-word”: twilight of a taboo

After a long period of relative silence, the study of empire, fueled by the perception that the United States has succeeded to the role once played by the European imperial powers, is again acceptable in some academic and journalistic circles, although for either political or heuristic reasons such research is often framed in terms of “globalization.”<sup>3</sup> As a field

of inquiry, the topic was first broached during the Enlightenment by thinkers drawn to Roman history both for the examples it provided of “Republican virtue” and for the lessons to be drawn from Rome’s decline and fall (see for example Gibbon [1776] 1993). During the nineteenth century, historians working in various imperial centers celebrated their adventurous countrymen’s heroic achievements and “civilizing missions,” whereas, early in the twentieth century, imperialism was treated as a topic for critical economic and social analysis by Liberals such as Hobson ([1902] 1988) and Schumpeter ([1919] 1951) and by Marxists such as Lenin ([1916] 1969) and Luxemburg ([1913] 2003). The Marxist critique was renewed and revised during the 1960s and 1970s (see for example Wallerstein 1974; Magdoff 1978), but the subject did not attract broader interest until the end of the Cold War brought America to a position of “unipolar” global leadership. Michael Doyle’s *Empires* (1986) was a harbinger of the new interest in empire building and its discontents; Paul Kennedy’s *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* appeared three years later, and publications on the subject have increased steadily since the turn of the new century.

Many of these works negatively assess the effects of imperialism both on subject nations and on the imperial metropolis (e.g. Falk 1999; Hardt and Negri 2001; Harvey 2003; Bush 2006), whereas others assert the need for an imperial or neo-imperial source of global order, and the advisability or inevitability of the United States exerting that authority (e.g. Huntington 2002; Kagan 2003; Ferguson 2004, 2006). The scholars critical of imperialism generally assume that empires foment more frequent and intense violent conflicts than those they prevent or resolve, whereas analysts more favorable to empires emphasize their creative role in preventing or managing conflicts, and thus in establishing a *pax Romana* or *Britannica*. As we shall see, analysts of both camps have compared older and newer patterns of imperialism (see Bush 2006: 8–42; Ferguson 2006) and discussed the relationship of “postmodern” globalization to early modern and modern structures of international domination (Hardt and Negri 2001; Hopkins 2002). But few have offered any systematic consideration of the role of empires in generating violent conflicts or in preventing or resolving them.

This lacuna also afflicts scholarship in our own discipline, where, with some exceptions (notably Miall *et al.* 2005), one still finds relatively little work illuminating how the world system is structured, how it is developing, and what this structure and development imply for contemporary conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. In the United States, scholars are finally beginning to overcome a taboo that confined serious discussions of imperialism and its discontents to the farther reaches of the political universe. The very use of the “I-word” was long discredited by its association with Marxist and Leninist thought, and, until the rise of the neoconservative movement, by the reluctance of mainstream or conservative scholars to defend the idea of imperial order. At least since Woodrow Wilson’s time, America’s “bipartisan” foreign policy was premised on the assumption that the United States, itself a product of anti-imperialist rebellion, represented a world power of a new type – a liberating force that would help other nations cast off the yoke of European colonialism in favor of self-determination and democracy. Many academics skeptical of such claims tended to be historians (e.g. Williams 2006) or political economists (e.g. Chossudovsky 2003), two disciplines still underrepresented among conflict scholars. The old taboo is now losing its potency, however, opening the door to the consideration of questions of undoubted interest to conflict studies specialists.<sup>4</sup>

Five issues seem particularly germane, in view of conflict resolution’s focus on dealing with destructive social conflicts by assisting conflicting parties to identify and eliminate their underlying causes:

First, *how shall we understand the current structure and dynamics of global power in their relationship to prior world systems?* Do we inhabit an imperial or neo-imperial system, and is the United States “the new Rome” (see for example Murphy 2007)? Is the current global situation unique, and, if so, what are its salient characteristics from the point of view of conflict analysis and resolution?

Second, *to what extent are empires generators of violent conflict, including structural and cultural violence?* Are anti-imperial rebellions and wars to suppress them, interimperial struggles and wars to prosecute them, inevitable under imperial rule? Are racism, cultural chauvinism, and the obsolescence of democratic values natural by-products of imperial/neo-imperial systems?

Third, *to what extent do empires function as preventers, managers, or resolvers of conflict?* Do they deter conflicts within the empire by force or the threat of force? Are they effective mediators of conflicts between themselves and subject states, between competitive subject states, and/or between themselves and would-be competitors?

Fourth, *what forms of global organization might serve as practical alternatives to the imperial model?* Does a reformed United Nations hold promise of becoming such a model? Are other “world society” models feasible?

Finally, *what are the implications of these answers for the theory of conflict and the practice of conflict resolution?* Should conflict analysts and resolvers attempt to work within the present system to reform or humanize it? Should they seek to play the role of an “inside/outside” pressure group on government? Or should they attempt to remain independent of all global power centers?

## The contemporary world system: issues for conflict analysis and resolution

Most research to date has focused on the first issue noted above: the nature of the current world system. In this regard, one can distinguish four main schools of thought, depending upon whether the analyst emphasizes continuity or discontinuity between colonial and post-colonial forms of global organization, and whether this continuity or discontinuity is evaluated negatively or positively. For ease of classification (and keeping in mind the inevitable distortions that such typologies produce), one can label these the schools of *Critical Continuity* (CC), *Less Critical Continuity* (LCC), *Critical Discontinuity* (CD), and *Less Critical Discontinuity* (LCD). Schematically:

	Continuity	Discontinuity
Critical	CC	CD
Less critical	LCC	LCD

The CC position is articulated by analysts such as Bush (2006: 7), who writes,

My fundamental premise is that imperialism is one of the most influential forces which has shaped, and is still shaping, the world. There was no sharp hiatus as the colonized moved to independence with decolonization, and the colonial and postcolonial world

must be conceptualized as seamless. How else can we explain what is happening in the Middle East, except in reference to the ebb and flow of differing imperial interests?

For Bush, as for Magdoff (1978), Mittleman (2000), and others, the movement from older to new imperialisms is essentially “seamless” because, despite the shift from formal colonialism to independence, the reality of *domination* of subject peoples by hegemonic powers, as well as the specific modes of domination, are historically continuous. These modes of domination include “divide and conquer” techniques of political intervention; imperial control of local economies and patterns of economic development and trade; military aid to forces friendly to the imperial hegemon; wars to suppress rebellious or overly independent forces; political and religious “missionary work” to promote the imperialists’ most prized cultural values; and threats, violence, and power-based negotiations aimed at limiting the power of would-be imperial competitors. On the other hand, for LCC thinkers who emphasize imperialism’s order-maintaining and culturally ameliorating features and the inability of international organizations to play an equivalent role, continuity is not only a reality but also a desideratum. Terming the United States “an empire . . . that dare not speak its name,” Ferguson (2004: 317; 2006) urges the US to assume the necessary burdens that the Old World empires can no longer afford to bear.

On the discontinuity side of the matrix, by contrast, one finds CD theorists such as Hardt and Negri (2001), who assert that globalization has outrun the old pattern of imperial domination by specific nations. In their view, the postmodern Empire is now a self-sustaining global network based on the great private corporations and other capitalist power centers – a new form of totalizing and networked “sovereignty” not limited to the state, although subject to future challenges by the someday-to-be-organized “multitude.” In some ways, this view recapitulates the theory of “ultra imperialism” offered early in the twentieth century by the German socialist Karl Kautsky. According to Kautsky, capitalism had spawned a global cartel whose organization and activities were setting the stage for the advent of a peaceful, non-competitive world order (see Kraus 1978). Lenin’s rejoinder that “ultra imperialism is ultra nonsense,” and that continuing struggles for the “division and redivision of the world” ([1919] 1969: 87) would generate savage global warfare, sparked a debate that continues to this day.

On one side are LCD approaches that view the recent transformation of global institutions either as post-imperialist and essentially benign (e.g. Friedman 2000), or as benign in themselves, but generating maleficent, retrograde threats to Western identities and interests (Huntington 2002; Kagan 2003). Theorists taking this general position appear to agree implicitly or explicitly with Fukuyama’s (2006) premise that liberal capitalism is the last historically progressive global movement. Opposing this perspective are those who interpret the “new imperialism” as a system of domination that incorporates and even intensifies the most violent and oppressive tendencies of older systems (e.g. Harvey 2003; Dean and Passavant 2003). Critics such as Galtung have remarked that, although this “darker” view seems correct, periods of imperial hegemony have become progressively shorter in duration, raising the likelihood that the contemporary American Empire will be extremely short-lived (see also Wallerstein 1998).

These debates have important implications, obviously, for the theory and practice of conflict resolution. But the second and third topics noted earlier may be of greater immediate interest to conflict scholars. Assuming that the current world system displays some of the characteristics, at least, of earlier imperial systems, what can we say about the tendency of such systems to generate violent conflicts and their ability to prevent, manage, or resolve



them? What light might this analysis throw on our original inquiry about the relationship of the emerging discipline to neo-imperial power?

## Conflict generation

Since the first ancient empires appeared in Mesopotamia almost three millennia ago, imperialism has been associated with cycles of violent rebellion by subject peoples and violent repression by imperial forces. Indeed, the appearance of this new form of international organization under the Assyrians and Babylonians, refined and rationalized by the Persians, inspired the biblical prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Isaiah of Babylon to imagine a world without boundaries, but governed by the law of peace and justice rather than the right of the strongest to rule (Rubenstein 2006). Subsequent prophets, including the founders of Christianity, further developed the ideal of universal government and the critique of imperial violence, going so far as to imagine an imminent stage of history in which a universal *imperium* would be governed directly by God (Horsley 2002; Crossan 2007). At various times, beginning with the reign of the Persian emperor Cyrus the Great, efforts were made to solve this problem within the context of imperialism by developing indirect methods of rule based more on consent than on force. Despite these pacific intentions, however, rebellion and repression invariably recurred on a massive scale, often accompanied by a rapid growth of executive power in the imperial metropolis.

One can say much the same about imperial expansion and the ideal of universal peace. For expanding empires, violence and the threat of violence were essential to establish their dominion over independent peoples or those formerly ruled by other imperial masters. Once hegemonic, however, every empire found itself endangered not only by internal rebellion, but also by “barbarian” invasions, rising costs of defense, and new threats mounted by imperialist competitors (Kennedy 1989). So long as empire was less than universal, competitive empires struggled for regional or global supremacy, and large-scale violent conflicts remained endemic. From Caligula to Hitler, therefore, imperialists claiming to be peacemakers dreamed of universal, permanent rule. Their legacy, for the most part, was universal violence. Two world wars in the twentieth century conducted by clashing empires succeeded in killing more than 70 million human beings, most of them civilians. Nevertheless, the emergence of the United States as the world’s dominant military power after the Cold War revived the hope, especially among neoconservative thinkers, that the US might finally realize the seductive vision of benevolent, all-powerful global hegemony.<sup>5</sup>

After the attacks on American and European targets by extreme Islamist militants beginning in September 2001, those conducting America’s “war on terror” seemed largely unaware that these assaults conformed to familiar patterns of anti-imperial rebellion (see for example Kegley 2002). This may be one reason why the subsequent invasion of Iraq by the US and Britain, which followed equally well-established patterns of imperialist intervention, vastly increased the number of local insurgents joining in attempts to expel the occupiers, as well as the number of anti-Western terrorists active in other nations. As consciousness grew that both the Western parties to the “war on terror” and their opponents were playing roles scripted for them, as it were, by the dynamics of imperial expansion, one began to hear increasingly articulate defenses of empire by conservatives such as Niall Ferguson (2006), who argued that an imperial system, properly constructed, managed, and financed, was needed to prevent and manage local and regional conflicts that would otherwise produce global chaos. After all, hadn’t Rome given the world the *pax Romana*? Hadn’t

the Gregorian Popes mediated conflicts between Europe's princes during four centuries of Roman Catholic hegemony? Didn't British and French rule bring a measure of order, civilization, and conflict management to regions of the earth formerly torn apart by perpetual tribal and religious warfare? And, some would add, didn't President Jimmy Carter of the United States mediate the only peace agreement reached in the Middle East since 1948 by bringing together two American client states, Egypt and Israel, at Camp David, Maryland, and subjecting them to a full range of neo-imperial pressures and rewards?

Initially, the view that strong empires were needed to resolve otherwise intractable local conflicts was associated with neoconservative thinkers. More recently, a number of centrist and liberal commentators have suggested that "soft power" – i.e. an *imperium* using military force only as a last resort, and preferring multilateral action, where possible, to unilateral intervention – might provide a method of institutionalizing conflict resolution. Because the field of conflict studies is only now beginning to focus on empire, there has been very little research to date exploring either the specific ways in which empires generate and perpetuate conflict or the nature, advantages, and limitations of imperial conflict management.<sup>6</sup> Such research is needed, among other reasons, to help answer the question posed in the first part of this essay: *can* conflict analysts and resolvers practice their trade and achieve their goals under the rubric of the new imperial order? Or will activities designed to reform the current structure of international power succeed only in giving imperial domination, with its inevitable violence, a more human face?

### **Conflict resolution and empire: the practical need for a principled discussion**

So marked are the differences of political commitments, perceptions, and styles among colleagues even in the relatively collegial field of conflict analysis and resolution that it is clearly unrealistic to expect them to reach consensus on issues as complex and controversial as those addressed here. Academic freedom, as well as freedom *tout court*, guarantees the right of any researcher or practitioner to work with the institution of his or her choice under the circumstances or conditions that seem justifiable to her or him. Even so, I would argue that the existence (as I believe) of a contemporary neo-imperial system dominated by the United States raises several "red flags" that conflict specialists may want to consider before agreeing to do work under US auspices, or, for that matter, at the behest of any other governmental or private organization. I will focus on three questions that might guide scholars and activists in our profession in considering whether or not to accept grant funds, enter into contractual relations, or accept employment with government agencies or private contractors involved in the conduct of foreign policy.

First, *to what extent does my work as a conflict analyst and resolver require that I remain – and be seen to remain – independent of the government?* If I intend to serve as a third party intervenor in conflicts in which, for example, the US is a party or has taken sides, the general principle of intervenor non-partisanship should bar me from working under US auspices on those cases, and may also dissuade me from undertaking other work that might identify me as a direct or indirect agent of the American government.<sup>7</sup> The question of when the United States or any other state is a party to a conflict may be complex. When those currently working in Iraq for US government agencies attempt to resolve conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims or between Kurds and Turkmen, are they functioning essentially as independent, non-partisan intervenors? I would argue that they are not, since their employment by the government tends to limit the *parties* brought into any conflict

resolution process, the *analyses* of the conflict's root causes, and the *range of options* for conflict resolution open to discussion by the parties. In my opinion, conflict specialists ought not to accept any arrangement that inhibits them from considering the full range of possible conflict causes and remedies.

A countervailing argument may be made, of course, by those who consider US hegemony either a beneficent force or a necessary evil in certain regions, and who believe that, without direct American involvement (both coercive and mediatory), conflicts there will not be prevented or resolved. This returns us to the questions raised above concerning the effectiveness of mediation and the balance of conflict management and conflict generation in an imperial or neo-imperial system. One wants to know whether assisting imperial agencies to manage a particular dispute will create the conditions for wider, more intense conflicts, as occurred, for example, when British and French management of interethnic struggles in Nigeria and Rwanda set the stage for genocidal wars against favored groups in the post-colonial stage. Or will conflict resolution under imperial auspices be conducive to a broad, long-lasting peace, as some have argued was the case in British India? My own reading of history leads me to believe that strengthening an imperial system virtually always increases intergroup violence over the long term, and often in the short term as well. This is because conflict management by powerful outsiders tends to deprive the conflicting parties of autonomous choice, shortcuts the analysis of their basic needs, and demands truncated "solutions" that protect the narrow interests of the imperial elite. Further research that pays attention to structural as well as direct violence will very likely shed more light on these issues.

Second, *to what extent does my entering into close relations with the government as a researcher, practitioner, consultant, or employee give me a realistic opportunity to make significant changes in official policies and policy perspectives?* Conversely, to what extent do these relations serve imperial interests either by serving as "window dressing" for continuing violence or by increasing the efficiency and subtlety of the system's operations? Again, these questions are not easy to answer in particular cases, since conflict specialists may disagree about what constitutes significant change in the existing system, or whether they are exerting more influence on policymakers than the system is exerting on them. On the one hand, one does not want to deny the possibility of altering oppressive institutions or contributing to a transformation of official thinking by working from within. On the other hand, many conflict professionals seem to believe, almost as a matter of faith, that if one "comes to the table" of power with good intentions, well-developed facilitation skills, and sufficient energy, one can be useful without being used.<sup>8</sup> This tendency toward naïve overestimation of the powers of "agency," as compared with the absorptive capacities of the "system" and the tenacity of its power-fixated managers, is certainly not decreased by the substantial increases in government-supplied opportunities for employment and funding noted earlier. Again, one's response to this question may depend upon how one characterizes the existing system – how protean, malleable, or "post-modern" it is – another topic for much-needed discussion by members of the conflict resolution community.

Third, *to what extent does government support of my research or action projects come with overt or covert "strings" attached?* There seems little doubt that, whatever the nature of the present world system, the US government and other governments, international organizations, and private foundations sometimes grant support to worthwhile projects without attaching onerous or deforming limiting conditions. Interestingly, in the field of conflict studies, such "no strings" support was often forthcoming for projects involving conflict resolution in relatively peripheral nations or regions in which the United States did not have a strong

interest and had not taken sides in local conflicts. Surely, if accepting unconditioned support does not compromise one's reputation for independence, a strong case can be made that it may do more good than harm.

Difficulties often occur, however, when conflict resolvers apply for support or when the government solicits their assistance in particular regions in which it does have an interest. Then, research or action funds may be given only to groups or teams led by "responsible" parties; the right to publish the results of one's research may be curtailed or denied; access may be given to information or key persons involved in a conflict only on certain conditions; one may be required to share information with certain government agencies, etc. A researcher or practitioner may decide to accept such support, strings and all, but this action will raise all the questions about independence and system maintenance discussed earlier. I have seen professional colleagues strongly influenced by the argument that working under official auspices, whatever limitations may be imposed, gives one the opportunity to save or improve lives. The question begged by such reasoning is whether the price of short-term peacemaking is likely to be escalated violence in the longer term. My own bias, pending the results of further research on this topic, is to assume an inverse relationship between the presence of limiting conditions and the potential effectiveness of our work as conflict analysts and resolvers.

### **A brief concluding note**

It is time for conflict specialists to drive the last stake through the heart of the "I-word" taboo and to incorporate the topic of empire, together with the related issue of "agent-system" relations, as appropriate subjects for research, teaching, and discussion in our discipline. To fail to do this allows us to be pulled willy-nilly into the empire's gravitational field, and tempts us to lose track of the principles and values that originally motivated most of us to become conflict resolution advocates and practitioners. Moreover, to the extent that we do *not* debate such issues openly and collegially, they become the fuel for mere "political prejudices" – positions that are considered personal, non-researchable, and beyond rational discussion.

The benefits of incorporating empire studies in our research seem undeniable. To undertake to analyze the contemporary world system and its implications for our field gives conflict scholars an opportunity to make important contributions to an area of thought currently dominated by analysts with little expertise in the analysis and handling of serious social conflicts. Equally important, it gives us the chance to propose practical alternatives to the current neo-imperial system, and to take up the challenge of imagining a humane world order in which autonomous identity groups and social communities are empowered to analyze and resolve their own conflicts. The question of whether conflict resolution will become an adjunct to existing power-based systems or a method of replacing them remains to be answered. Our colleagues in other disciplines, many of whom are struggling with these "post-imperial" issues, badly need our input.

Finally, paying appropriate attention to the implicit politics of our practice as conflict resolvers seems to me to be necessary medicine in an atmosphere suffused by power. Our field's perspectives on the causes and dynamics of conflict, and the methods of restructuring systems to eliminate or mitigate those causes, have the potential to transform people's thinking and behavior about violent and potentially violent social conflicts. Many of us would like these views to be far more influential among the public and in policymaking circles than they are at present. How this can be accomplished without surrendering the

vision of a world liberated from the false “realities” of coercive power is surely a topic worth collective study and renewed conversation.

In my own workplace, George Mason University’s Institution for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), we have made initial efforts to address some of these problems. A course in “Conflict and Empire” is now offered as an elective in the graduate curriculum. A student–faculty working group on Conflict Resolution and Public Policy has organized several conferences and workshops for conflict resolution scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, including one on “Conflict Resolution and the Disengagement of Foreign Forces from Iraq” (November 2006) and another, with Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation, on “Partnering for Peace: Transatlantic Concepts for Conflict Resolution in Public Policy” (October 2007). The ICAR faculty has held lively discussions of the issues involved in deciding whether and under what circumstances to accept government funds or employment. And many faculty members are attempting to clarify and publicize their ideas on the relevance of conflict resolution concepts and practices to current issues of public policy.<sup>9</sup> These are modest first steps in a direction that one hopes our field will find important, interesting, and constructive.

## Notes

- 1 See Dugan (1996) for a perceptive description of this development.
- 2 See also remarks of the then Coordinator, Carlos Pascual (2005).
- 3 See for example the debate in the Letters to the Editor column of the *Financial Times* (August 2007).
- 4 A good example of new general interest in the formerly tabooed topic is Murphy (2007).
- 5 See for example the writings of William Kristol and others associated with the Project for the New American Century ([www.newamericancentury.org](http://www.newamericancentury.org)).
- 6 For an early attempt at such theorization using empirical methods and an idiosyncratic definition of empire, see Maoz (1984).
- 7 Indeed, several colleagues have testified that, in practicing conflict resolution in sensitive political environments, their identification as US agents would clearly have terminated the work and could have endangered their lives.
- 8 In Arthur Koestler’s (1987) terms, political thinking among some conflict resolution specialists leans more toward the model of the “yogi” than that of the “commissar.”
- 9 See, for example, articles and videotaped interviews with ICAR faculty members in ICAR (2007).

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# Conclusions



# 35 Toward a conflictology

## The quest for transdisciplinarity

*Johan Galtung*

If the road to peace passes through conflict resolution then a transnational, transdisciplinary and translevel conflictology is a must for peace studies. The subject of this chapter is how that problem was explored in the late 1950s and some subsequent developments. Interlevel isomorphism plays a major role in this approach.

### **Introduction: uni-, bi-, multi-, inter-, and transnationalism**

Three ideas starting with *trans*, meaning going beyond, guided efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to develop conflict and peace research: transnationalism, transdisciplinarity and translevelism. The first *trans* opened for the others. Transnationalism was easily conceptualized. What the world did not need was one more effort to view the contradiction between conflict and peace from the narrow perspective of one's own nation, "conflict" meaning danger to its security and "peace" meaning an opportunity to promote that nation's interest. At the very least we should listen to the concepts and theories emanating from the two Cold War camps, in other words be binational, or biregional, bibloc, whatever, as opposed to the ubiquitous uninational, -regional, -bloc.

An early twenty-first-century example is the conceptualization of "terrorism" without exploring its considerably bigger twin brother, "state terrorism." What they have in common is massive killing of civilians for political purposes, guided by a feeble-minded hypothesis: the victims will turn against their leaders/system to be spared the horrors of violence. The experience, however, whether in Nazi Germany, militarist Japan, or Serbia–New York/Washington–Afghanistan–Iraq–Somalia is that they turn against the (state) terrorists instead. How long do we have to wait for the first comparative study of the psychology of fighter-bomber pilots and suicide-belt carriers? And comparing them with uniformed fighting against uniformed in a war, a *guerra*, and civilians fighting against uniformed in a *guerrilla*? There are four modes of violent conflict behavior. To focus on only one of them, "terrorism," is like limiting health studies to contagious diseases.

Later on this was expanded to view any conflict from all sides of all conflict borders, not only the geographical and cultural borders of states/regions and nations/civilizations, but any fault-line, gender, generation, race, class (economic, military, political, cultural) – with strong warnings against assuming only one fault-line at work, such as "identity," and only two parties – beyond the trap of dualism to multilateralism.

Thus, efforts to analyze the aforementioned major conflicts in terms of only two parties are doomed to fail. Conflicts with only two parties hardly exist outside the writings of some theoretician. And that also rules out the unfortunate term "third parties," connoting, as it does, only two parties to the conflict. That it may be in somebody's interest to

conceptualize a conflict down to two parties, because it fits some “us vs. them” scheme, is another matter.

Easy and obvious. More problematic was the step to transnationalism. A stepping-stone was internationalism because it connotes the relational, the *inter*. The world is not merely a set of nations, but also a set of their relations, bilateral and multilateral. *Transnational* takes in this and more, the *sui generis*, of its own kind, of the global, the international governmental organizations (IGOs, among them the United Nations), the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and the transnational corporations (TNCs). We referred to them all as the big international non-governmental organizations or BINGOs. From this angle one could accommodate not only nations, groups, and blocs, but also their relations and the supernational stratum, the global. A problem was the misnomer “international relations” for a discipline that explores relations between states rather than between nations; another was “regional studies,” which makes the interregional opaque.

Peace research was conceived as having no father- or motherland, as having the world as its state and humanity as its nation. In this there was no ideological commitment to any world government, but a strong commitment away from any uni-state/nation, uni-gender, and uni-class etc. perspective to view the world. The commitment to peace implied analyses that might deviate considerably from those of governments of states, and, more problematic, also from the cultural assumptions, including the deep culture assumptions, of one’s own nation and even civilization; this has been a major concern for this author for the last thirty years.

Intellectually this was not particularly a problem. Most researchers, perhaps not from the superpower US, are familiar with bistate or multistate angles; many researchers, perhaps particularly from the multinational US, are familiar with binational and multinational angles. Inter- and trans- perspectives presuppose more training and reflection, however.

There are prices to be paid for viewing conflict and peace from above, like viewing biota using general biology as a lens, not, say, ichthyology (the study of fishes) and primatology. The implications for funding etc. are obvious: governmental institutions will not be expected to finance analyses legitimizing neither their stand in a conflict nor their ideas of using peace to serve their national interests as opposed to that of other nations, nature, human interests, and world interests. United Nations organizations, IGOs, INGOs, and TNCs could be more accommodating, and there is also the possibility of financing research and mediation by workshops on research and mediation.

The political implications are more pervasive, however. Who are the users? Obviously the organizations mentioned under trans, but they are weak relative to those mentioned under uni-, bi-, and multi-. Again inter- may serve as a stepping stone: in a conflict between states A and B or nations X and Y there will be demand for knowledge of X–Y and A–B relations, never reducible to X-, Y-, A-, and B-ology. Inter- will sprout in the crevices.

This is educationally challenging. The difficulty of thinking of changing relationships – not only people, states, and nations – should not be underestimated. To many, to save a marriage on the rocks is to change one or both parties, not to co-create a new relation. And yet the relations hold most keys to resolution.

### **Uni-, bi-, multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinarity**

Much has been said about this, but most of the research and practice in the field is still unmistakably unidisciplinary, reflecting the training (PhD particularly) of the author of

a talk/article/book. The step to bi- and multi- is easily taken, however, in a panel/article/book with dual or multiple authorship, with two or more disciplines represented. More problematic is the inter- perspective that presupposes excursions into the disciplinary turf of other disciplines, fetching data, theories, and insights, not to mention the trans- perspective that would go beyond any disciplinary perspective. And yet that is the road.

So why is it not traveled more frequently? One reason is disturbingly obvious: academic careers are still essentially unidisciplinary, the discipline being that defined by the education phase of the career. Bi- and multi- invite double or multiple authorship and the difficulty of identifying the merits of any individual's contribution.

Inter- and trans- exacerbate the problem because the author is not only on his or her own turf as a diploma-carrying citizen. Who is s/he? Aspersion may even be cast on the bidisciplinary of lack of loyalty, bordering on treason, to the discipline. Does s/he find our paradigms inadequate? If s/he does not like it here, why not leave us and be disciplined by somebody else? The parallels to nation-state, and to bisexuality, are obvious.

The answer is equally obvious: generate a new discipline by progressing from inter- to trans-, like the child of a binational family becoming a world citizen. "Irenology" is a possible name; *eirene* = peace. "Polemology" is not; *polemos* = struggle. "Conflictology" is one, so is "peace research" or peace studies.

Given this, why not simply stick to the discipline of one's training (with some eager beavers collecting more PhDs) and engage in friendly bi- and multi- cooperation through dialogue rather than any debate to establish one's own discipline as the most legitimate holder of paradigms to accommodate "conflict" and "peace"? The answer, of course, depends on how those two terms are conceptualized; and on basic assumptions, if any, of the disciplines lining up to provide a base for such studies. We shall start with the second approach: assumptions.

It is easy, and important, to caricature the disciplines. Thus, to the extent that economics is based on an assumption that market competition turns self-benefit into benefit for all, we have an interesting hypothesis: let parties in a conflict try to maximize their goal-attainment and it will benefit them all, provided there is a mechanism corresponding to the market. And that is where the problem enters: *Homo economicus* is endowed with a level of rationality and knowledge, including foresight, not found in conflict in general. Moreover, there is an assumption that the existing context operates to the benefit of all in the best of all worlds, as opposed to the assumption of transcending that context, creating new realities to accommodate legitimate goals, transforming the conflict.

Take political science, to many a front-runner carrying conflict and peace studies. The German term *Staatswissenschaft*, the science of the state, is much too narrow and territorial even if substate and suprastate units are added. Major fault-lines between genders, generations, races, and civilizations are missing and should have been there from the beginning, not added as afterthoughts by importing some sociology and anthropology.

Take international relations (IR): in spite of the misnomer, a better front-runner because of "inter-," even if missing "trans-." But where is intergender, interciviliation, neither of them reducible to territory? Conflict and peace can be accommodated only at the unacceptable price of reduction to territorialism. But the inter- perspective is worth retaining, and so is the perspective on power – remunerative, coercive, normative, and decisional – as a relation that may have to be modified. However, inter- can also be carried too far; power includes intra-. Relational power has a grip only if a party is weak on self-reliance, fearlessness, identity, and autonomy.

Take history, take anthropology. Both are problematic because of the insistence that

no general insight can be derived from studying the specifics of individual cases. Dense descriptions preclude generalizations. But conflict and peace studies, like disease and health studies, are driven by the search for general insights, not only for deeper understanding of singular cases, weaving complex causal chains through time in history, and elaborate functional links through space in anthropology.

Take sociology, take psychology. If *Homo economicus* is out to maximize (material) self-benefit, *Homo politicus* to maximize power, also at the state level, *Homo historicus* to maximize meaning, and *Homo anthropologicus* to maximize cultural conformity, then what are *Homo sociologicus* and *Homo psychologicus* aiming at?

As they are currently constructed the disciplines seem headed for some retirement home, with any discomfort from rank deficit and disequilibrium in the structure eliminated, in peace, including the inner peace with past and present, with both Id and Superego satisfied, and with no cognitive dissonances or incomplete *Gestalts*.

### The problems of positivism and statism

As mentioned, those who seek peace by solving conflicts between (sociology), and within (psychology), will find much. But there are problems. There is something conformist in these constructions: adjusting to the existing context rather than challenging that context. And this actually applies to all the sciences, born as they are out of an empiricism that uses data – the past, that which already was and still is – as the final word in disputes about “truth.” And only the past produces data.

This asymmetry of using the past as arbiter is a very dramatic position. So is a position in favor of adjustment, as opposed to challenge and change. A less dramatic position would be more symmetric, paying due respect both to past empirical reality and to future potential reality. But that is not what we have.

All these sciences are children of the Enlightenment, based on the positively existing, trying to read its laws so that they can become Laws rather than trying to divine these laws from the Divinity, the Creator, guessing His mind. But, in that dichotomy between the positively existing and the not existing, something was lost: the potentially existing, the negatively non-existing, the possible new realities. The maybe.

And these sciences are also children of the Westphalian state system. Politology focuses on the state, economics on national economies, history on national histories, sociology on society = country, and psychology on the level of adjustment to state/nation/country/society. Anthropology is the exception, venturing into the exotic, the alien *ethnos* rather than the familiar *demos*, each anthropologist claiming his or her own *ethnos*, being a staunch defender of the *emic* as opposed to the *etic*. In short, there is much to learn, and also much to unlearn. Humanity is now leaving Westphalian statism, for regionalism, localism, and globalism. New worlds, new concepts, new theories.

All these social sciences will have to liberate themselves from the straitjacket of empiricism and include the potential, opening for positive, not only positivist, economics, politology, IR, sociology, psychology, for counterfactual history of what might have happened and the anthropology of what may come to be.

And these social sciences will have to liberate themselves from the nation-state focus. To take an example from psychology: exposure to two or more cultures with conflicting norms may be a problem. But how about the boredom of one culture only? How about the conflict between conflict and no conflict at all?

Or, take democracy and human rights. The state is the major object of people-control as



well as duty-bearer for rights (people being the right-holders). What happens when states disappear? How can both ideas be carried by the UN, by IGOs, INGOs, and TNCs?

Take the national interest focus on growth of national economies, like the focus on the security of the nation-state. Economists have to make visible how growth is obtained at the expense of other nations, nature's interest in self-reproduction, the human interest in need-satisfaction, the world interest. IR people have to do the same. Tall orders for both.

How about built-in assumptions of positivism and statism in conflictology and peace studies, such as drives toward dissolution of conflict and its possible solution – resolution as opposed to “conflict as a way of life”? A major point made was that conflict affects us all; for that reason conflict management belongs to us all. But the tendency has been for the leaders of any organization, big or small, “to show a smooth surface, to protect the rank and file from conflict and difficulty” (Galtung 1978: 506). A rather obvious expression of elite interest is “law and order,” predictable, orderly people, likewise in the family, at school, at work, and at leisure.

But does this not also apply to the search for peace as the search for pacification? Certainly, but there is also a needs-based assumption in peace studies: violence is harm, harm is suffering, the Buddhist *dukkha*, whether caused by the acts of commission of direct, personal violence or by the normal flow of patterned interaction as indirect, structural violence based on acts of omission. Peace means reduction of suffering.

But *dukkha* has a twin concept, *sukha*, fulfillment. It makes us look at conflict as a source of human fulfillment, as a challenge no mediator is entitled to take away from the parties (although s/he may help a little), not only a danger; and at peace as fulfillment, not only absence of suffering, in other words as positive, not only negative peace. The origin of “positive peace” was in the late 1950s search for a name to give to the X appearing in statements like “peace is more than the absence of violence, it is also X,” pronounced by many. The term “positive peace” was inspired by Marie Jahoda (1958). Conflicts may have to be solved, but in such a way that the opportunity to use the conflict energy to create something, a new reality, is not lost. Correspondingly for peace: violence has to be avoided, negative peace has to be ushered in, making full use of the idea of a positive peace based on a positive coupling between actors in such joint projects as love, and communities among states.

That perspective points away from the social sciences with their empiricism bordering on positivism and their statist bias. A focus on creating new realities points to engineering and architecture as models; and a focus on recreating past realities, by restoring what was, points to the health sciences – with the warning that they easily freeze into dogmatic school medicine focused mainly on negative health and little on the positive health of creating new realities for body, mind, and spirit. No doubt there is something threatening in “new realities” and the underlying creativity, hence the need for norms of non-violence.

The conclusion is *je prends mon bien ou je le trouve*, I pick what I need where I find it. For example, from economics the cooperative element in the competitive, from political science the focus on legitimacy and how power works, from IR a sense of inter-, from history a sense of causality and singularism, from anthropology a sense of (dys)functional interconnection and the cultural framework, from sociology a sense of interaction and structure, and from psychology the linkage between outer and inner peace.

But if we want to build a transdisciplinary conflictology how is it possible to learn all that? Only if we know what to look for. A major or a PhD in one or two sciences, regardless of which, is a good beginning for picking what we want with a well thought-through

balance between enthusiasm and skepticism. The same applies to nation-state belonging. Neither blind acceptance nor wholesale rejection brings us anywhere. *Yin/yang*.

One or two, how about the others? There are two excellent methods at our disposal and both come with no excuse for not making use of them. They do not exclude each other.

First, find a dialogue partner from another discipline and ask, what is new, what is up, and how do you approach a problem like —? A good partner will challenge you the same way, and the joint project will invariably enrich both of you.

Second, get a good dictionary/encyclopedia, such as the Penguin dictionary of X-ology or A-ography. Start anywhere or at your focus of interest that day. Follow the leads, the links, or do the computer version of the same. Take notes. The theoretical and practical problems of conflict and peace respect no state or disciplinary border. Explore them as they are; don't discipline them into some straitjacket.

### The polarization and integration of the social sciences

However, polarized by the niches assigned to them in the intellectual landscapes the social sciences are badly in need of bi-, multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary integration. Thus, some of them focus on units, and others on systems of units, being more relational. Some focus on individuals, and others on collectivities, giving rise to a fourfold table (Galtung 1975, 1979).

The word *focus* is important; they have generally a broader global reach in the vast intellectual territories referred to in this section. But as a rule of thumb Table 35.1 has validity. The psychologist has the individual as a black box to be explored, the social psychologist the relations between them, the sociologist the society, and in the fourth cell are the inter- approaches, maybe less crystallized. Intersociety is curiously missing as opposed to internation (also weak, except as cultural anthropology, particularly focused on the primitive–modern interface) and interstate (strong, as IR), and intereconomy (also strong, as trade and transaction studies).

Look at Table 35.1, the first in a set of three exercises in polarization of human insight, keeping apart what obviously belongs together. As many point out, reality, the total human condition, does not come divided into compartments. Of course the individual matters in the collective and vice versa, and at both the unit and system levels. Such walls will collapse. A similar classification of “everything” is Ken Wilber’s (2000a) four quadrants using individual/collective and interior/exterior. Interior/individual is “intentional”, exterior/individual is “behavior,” interior/collective is “cultural,” and exterior/collective is “social” (systems). As can be seen from Table 35.1, interior/exterior, or inner/outer, are important aspects of individual and collective, but even more important is the relational, the inter-. In terms of the A–B–C triangle in this essay (see below) A and B are Wilber’s interior/exterior, at any level. But C, the contradiction, the relational, is missing, not highlighted

Table 35.1 Level vs. unit/relation focus

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Relation/structure</i>
Individual level	Psychology	Social psychology
Collective level	Sociology	?
	Anthropology	Internation
	Politology	Interstate
	Economics	Intereconomy

in Wilber’s classification; in line with the lack of relational theory and practice in US geopolitics. But then Wilber is classifying modes of human existence and Table 35.1 is classifying social sciences. Wilber’s (2000b, 2001) pretensions are enormous.

Let us now bring in time and space for the same type of exercise (Table 35.2), and distinguish between close and distant in both of them, noting that close in time is also called “present” and distant is called “past”(Wilber 2000a: 18).

Division of labor, one may say; but there are differences of some political significance. Both sociology and anthropology focus on the normative basis in society, but the science of what is close focuses on how individuals act to achieve goals, and the science of the distant on how they behave steered by norms and culture like animals by drives and “instincts.” And there is a distinction between written and oral cultures, so the past of the close and of the distant are approached differently. Whereas history to a large extent is the tale of strong individuals who break rather than follow norms, archaeology will tend to focus on what artifacts reveal of (stereo)typical behavior. Four very different worlds, four different ways of being human, emerge.

And yet this is the same humanity, only constructed differently by diligent intelligent social scientists who mainly follow the culture of their societies (read disciplines), sometimes breaking them, like the Annals tradition bringing sociology into history. How can this diabolical design to keep knowledges apart have been so successful – because, in fact, not much insight is seeping through those walls? Even if all four are in the same building they gravitate toward their own, relating more to fellow disciplinarians far away, using IT, than having lunch with people from other fields. This cannot possibly last.

A third exercise in the polarization handed down to us (Table 35.3) is based on a more philosophical distinction than individual vs. collective, unit vs. relation and distant vs. close in space and time. One has been mentioned already, the distinction between singularizing and generalizing science, or, as it is often called, between idiographic and nomothetic. And the other has also been referred to, between causally and functionally connected facts, or, as it is often termed, between synchronic and diachronic. Again we get four combinations (Wilber 2000a: 27).

Again, one may ask the wrong question – what is the best approach? – and then the right question – why is the bottom cell to the right so empty? The former is the wrong question because there are good arguments for all approaches. Of course the denser the description the more singular the case, and some laws, regularities, or invariances can be found to hold in a number of societies simply by keeping the number of variables low. And of course societies hang together by one part feeding into the other and being fed by it; the

Table 35.2 Time vs. space, close vs. distant

	<i>Close</i>	<i>Distant</i>
Present	Sociology	Anthropology
Past	History	Archaeology

Table 35.3 Synchronic vs. diachronic, idiographic vs. nomothetic

	<i>Idiographic</i>	<i>Nomothetic</i>
Synchronic	Anthropology	Sociology
Diachronic	History	? (Macro-history)

deals being equal, unequal, or flagrantly unequal. And events are linked in causal chains with one as the sufficient, if not necessary, condition for the next.

But why so little diachronic-nomothetic activity; the arena of the masters – of Ssu-Ma Ch'ien, Augustine, Ibn Khaldun, Vico, Adam Smith, Comte, Herbert Spencer, Pareto, Hegel, Marx, Gramsci, Weber, Spengler, Sorokin, Toynbee, Sarkar, Teilhard de Chardin, to mention a few (Galtung 1996, 2000; Galtung and Inayatullah 1997: ch. 2)? Maybe because much is needed to qualify; but that does not mean that the field is closed. More will come.

But none of them focused on conflict and peace in general. They all picked up on some special cases: Khaldun his famous four-generation theory with the erosion of *asabiyah* (solidarity, *esprit de corps*); Smith regulated competition; Hegel dialectics and the search for transcendence in the synthesis; Marx the contradictions between modes and means of production and owners and non-owners; Toynbee, like Khaldun, the system's capacity to respond to challenges; Sarkar the circulation of military–intellectual–commercial elites and their relation to people in general.

There is much to draw upon, but the lesser fry in the other cells seem more bent upon disconfirming them with some specific cases under their command than on learning from the masters; and then maybe more from the general pattern of their thinking than from the singular cases. Moreover, the masters could also have learnt more from each other; but masters rarely do.

Looking now at the three tables, going beyond the obvious but somewhat trite conclusion that all twelve combinations are important: once again, how about conflict and peace studies? They are both relational, “inter-” as pointed out, which does not mean that some units may not be better equipped to engage in creative conflict resolution and positive peace than others. We need all the insight we can get, and there is the argument that there is more new insight to be fetched from the distant than from the close simply because it is less explored. And there is an argument for the diachronic approach, like that used in health studies, architecture, and engineering. If we want to obtain some effect then we must produce the sufficient causes that bring it about. And if we want to avoid some effect then we must eliminate necessary causes. Both are known as rationality, irresistible in the longer run.

Obviously, we are now also saying that interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary sciences have a major role to play in bridging the gaps between legitimate, but one-sided, approaches. Fields such as peace, development, and environmental studies – the three main goals of the UN – women's and black studies focused on the conditions for parity, all have to pick what they need from many disciplines, thereby disciplining them into integration in the vast intellectual territories mapped by the three tables, like bringing continents together into one world.

Conflictology enters here as a key auxiliary to peace studies, like, for instance, cooperation studies. Let us look at the three tables again, working from first principles to arrive at what we would like conflictology to be like.

Table 35.1: it has to be both intra- and inter- as there may be conflicts both within and between. And obviously it has to span levels, at the very least individual vs. collective.

Table 35.2: as mentioned, draw on the distant in space and time, like the handling of the traditional–modern interface so often studied in history, and then on the distant just because there is so much to learn beyond literate Western societies.

Table 35.3: particularly useful is the diachronic-nomothetic combination, because it is causally oriented and generalizing. There is much to learn and much to be used,

particularly by combining the masters, such as asking what Marx and Sorokin could learn from each other and both from Khaldun and Toynbee (Galtung and Inayatullah 1997).

In other words, some points in these spaces may be more useful than others, at the same time as they can be bridged, also integrating sciences by creating new ones. The next sections will explore how this was done, and how it can be improved.

**A-disciplinarity: mathematics as an approach**

In the preceding section a six-dimensional space based on six dichotomies – individual/collective, unit/relation (or intra-/inter-), distant/close time, distant/close space, synchronic/diachronic, and idiographic/nomothetic – was used to define the intellectual territory of the social sciences. There are such factual referents as events, processes, and permanents to all these terms and concepts. The social sciences occupy different niches, with overlaps and empty spaces, in that territory.

Mathematics differs from this by not having any factual referent. Inspired by facts and more or less mirroring facts, mathematics stands on its own feet as a formal, not factual, science, hence it is a-disciplinary from the point of view of factual sciences, being form, not content, like a-sexual to uni-, bi-, multi-, inter-, and trans-sexual to build on that metaphor.

That raises the question of whether pure form can mirror phenomena in different niches in the space spanned by the six dichotomies, bridging them by revealing similarity in form. To explore that question, a map of the forms stored and developed in mathematics can be useful, again based on two dichotomies (Table 35.4).

Calculus is used for macro (human level) and mega (celestial) mechanics, and some other physical phenomena, statistics for biology (such as human demography and agriculture), algebra for discrete phenomena, and the fourth cell for the micromechanics of subatomic phenomena. Some phenomena are constructed to fit mathematics, not vice versa.

How does this serve as a guide for social sciences in general, and conflict and peace studies in particular? The argument can be made that, in the intellectual territory covered more or less well by the social sciences, continuous variables are few and far between. Economists point to price in monetary units and quantity of any commodity in numerical and physical units (weight, length, area, volume, and time) and, using mechanics as an icon, relate the two with demand and supply functions. Introduce quality and subjective utility and continuity is no longer there. In the same vein, social physics, such as relating interaction frequency to physical distance, is possible, but has not produced very interesting insights.

Moreover, whereas conditions can be specified so that regularities show up as lines and curves, planes and surfaces, this is rarely the case for social phenomena. They cannot be squeezed into deterministic relations predicting the values on one variable with precision from the value on the other(s). Diagrams show clouds of points rather than lines, curves, etc. Phenomena are stochastic, pointing to the bottom right cell as the not very hospitable “home” of social phenomena.

Table 35.4 A user’s guide to mathematics

	<i>Deterministic</i>	<i>Stochastic</i>
Continuous variables	Calculus	Statistics
Discrete variables	Algebra	Probability

However, if we give up one condition in Table 35.4 we get the statistics of creative bi- and multivariate analyses, as with a time series with two variables, for example growth and distribution, using bivariate diachronic analysis. If we give up the other condition we get a lot out of algebra as structural analysis, defining a structure  $S$  as a set of elements,  $E$ , related by a set of relations,  $\{R, S\} = \{E, R\}$ . And that leads us to isomorphism, same structure, a major tool for exploring similarities among disparate phenomena from different levels of social organization.

## The conceptualization of conflict and its resolution

Conceptualization is the first test of unidisciplinarity versus the other possibilities. From perusing the wealth of theories and data fifty years ago, three trends emerged in the conceptualization of conflict: one picking up hatred, one picking up violence, and one, more abstract, picking up incompatibility, contradiction. In other words, the inside, the outside, and the in-between of actors; the attitude, the behavior, the contradiction; A–B–C, giving rise to an A–B–C triangle keeping the three apart as points, yet together in a triangle.

Unit-oriented researchers will pick up A and B, and C will be picked up by relationists; individual-oriented researchers will pick up individual humans including leaders/representatives of collectivities whereas the collectivity-oriented will pick up communities of individuals (states, nations), or communities of such communities (regions, civilizations). Freud was mainly intra-oriented at the individual level and Marx at the societal level, both seeing the conflicts of their concern as the primary cause for conflicts elsewhere, everywhere. Human, all too human.

Philosophically, phenomenologists would be only A-oriented, behaviorists only B-oriented and dialecticians only C-oriented. The stand in favor of a triangular conceptualization, Conflict = A + B + C, favored an eclectic, multidisciplinary position. At the individual level this combines the inner person of the psychologist, the outer person of the behaviorist (the judiciary, the police, and the military), and the relational-structural aspects of the social psychologist-sociologist. At the collective level: the inner state, the outer behavior and the total web of relations in the world structure. Holistic.

The definition developed for conflict was based on the incompatibility = mutual exclusion perspective. “Conflict is said to exist in an action-system if two or more values are pursued and they are perceived as incompatible or mutually exclusive” (Galtung 1958: 9).

“Goals” was later on substituted for “values” to allow for interests as defined by the structures, in addition to the values defined by collective or individual cultures. And, for the same reason, “parties” was added to “actors” to include positions in structures without, necessarily, any perceptions of values to be pursued or avoided.

A distinction was then made between latent and manifest-level conflict dependent on whether the perception is there, conscious or subconscious, but “no relevant overt action has ensued,” or “relevant overt actions have ensued”; identifying “the manifest level with the conflict-behavior, and the latent level with the conflict-sentiment. The first can be observed, the second can, by definition, only be inferred” (Galtung 1958: 9).

“Attitude” was later substituted for “sentiment” to allow for the cognitive in addition to the emotional aspect of the latency. The three corners of the triangle were there, but appeared in print as a triangle for the first time in 1971 (Galtung 1980a: 90).

Any single-minded A-, B-, or C-only approach misfires. A and B alone catch conflict dynamics, both inner and outer aspects, but reduce analysis and resolution to dynamics.

Dynamics is important, but its softening, even its turning peaceful, has a taste of pacification; the standard US mistake, as in the Middle East. Turning it around yields the standard Soviet mistake, which was a single-minded focus on capital vs. labor, accumulating the hatred and violence that ultimately backfired and undid the Soviet state.

To say “A + B + C” is to say “take them all into account,” but not necessarily with equal weight. A conflict may start in the C corner and spread, as a cancer metastasizes, or start in a mind filled with hatred and/or a body conditioned to violence that will search and find a contradiction, incompatible goal-states, to hitch on to. But by and large the assumption was that the contradiction was the root and the A and B were secondary. In Norwegian C is *rotten*, A and B *rotet*; the root versus the disorder. It doesn’t always work that well – nor do A, B, and C reproduce the A–B–C recipe outside English. We know a lot about what happens to A and B as conflict dynamics, summarized as polarization-dehumanization and escalation, and the need for depolarization-humanization and de-escalation; in other words, for peacebuilding.

But a key mistake is to confuse A- and B-oriented peacebuilding with resolution. The latter requires C-orientation, calling for empathic understanding of the goals of the parties, in turn calling for a willingness to assume that all parties have some valid points – a key pillar of democracy. Bad news when polarization and dehumanization of the Other have become cornerstones in the culture, tempered by the good news that to start with it is sufficient if the mediator has that assumption.

Mediation is explored in Webel and Galtung’s (2007) *Transcend and Transform* and other places; the point made here is only that a definition of conflict that comfortably accommodates the inside, the outside, and the in-between of parties at all levels has to span many disciplines and regions in the intellectual space. Excessively unidisciplinary academic cultures, inside a generally dualist and manichean culture, will produce a conflictology very weak on resolution. Those two conditions coexist in the United States today. Thus, the approach to US–Iraq relations is predictable. Hawks: win. Doves: pull out. No resolution, not even the concept thereof.

**Uni-, bi-, multi-, inter-, and translevel conflictology**

Persons are a complex system with intrapersonal components such as cognitions and emotions that interact, constituting persons that interact, constituting groups that interact, constituting societies that interact as states and nations, constituting regions and civilizations that interact, constituting – not worlds, but one world, Planet Earth. The continuation is not “constituting worlds that interact, constituting planetary systems . . .” So far.

A multilevel, Chinese boxes, matrushka or Russian doll human condition.  
See Table 35.5.

Table 35.5 Ten domains for conflict genesis/dynamics/resolution

	<i>Person</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>Society</i> <i>State</i> <i>Nation</i>	<i>Region</i> <i>Civilization</i>	<i>World</i>
Intra- conflict	[1]	[3]	[5]	[7]	[9]
Inter- conflict	[2]	[4]	[6]	[8]	[10]
	Micro	Meso	Macro	Mega	



[1]–[6] were in the original version from 1958 when the author had mainly been working in sociology (groups, societies) and some psychology (persons) (Galtung 1958: 9). The others were added as the interests expanded into political science for “state,” and into anthropology for “culture (‘nation’)”; then into IR, in the sense of interstate and international relations, and indeed in the sense of interregion and interciviliation – regions being mega-states, and civilizations being mega-nations – relations. The terms *micro*, *meso*, *macro*, *mega* were added accordingly later.

That all raises a basic question: what happened to *intra*-? And what happens to the conflicts within persons, groups, states/nations, regions/civilizations? The *dilemma*, being torn between and among goals, pushed and pulled, and knowing neither in nor out?

The answer to be explored was formulated as a definition. A conflict is an intrasystem conflict if it is contained within a system and within each subsystem of the system. A conflict is an intersystem conflict if it is between two or more systems, and not within the systems (Galtung 1958: 7).

And the proposition to be developed was that true intrasystem conflicts, dilemmas found everywhere, were “not stable, but would either be solved or lead to an inter-system conflict one type lower.” Examples of such dilemmas: for so many French in 1940, the choice between anti-Jewish/socialist and anti-German, and for so many in the whole world today, pro-growth or pro-distribution, were of this type. Thus, “an intra-group conflict will lead to an inter-person conflict and in turn to group formation and an inter-group conflict (the typical community conflict), and an intra-society conflict will lead to an inter-group conflict and in turn to an inter-society conflict (the formation of the US)” (Galtung 1958: 10).

The general propositions are [3]@ [2]@ [4], [5]@ [4]@ [6], and [7]@ [6]@ [8]. The next in line, [9]@ [8]@ [10] is today empirically void but is as good a theory as any of the emergence of a multiplanetary system: a region (e.g. the US) leaves for Mars or Venus. Today this is (social) science fiction but tomorrow?

These are not iron laws, however. Expanding the conflict horizon from the dilemma to the *trilemma* yields compromise, a sometimes adequate way out; expanding to the Buddhist *tetralemma* yields the both–and and the neither–nor as ways out of a dilemma and can take the more advanced forms of creating new realities as negative or positive transcendencies. Combining the *trilemma* and the *tetralemma* we get the *pentalemma*, the five–point outcome horizon the present author uses often in theory and in the practice of mediation (e.g. Galtung 2004; Galtung *et al.* 2002; Webel and Galtung 2007).

What happens if no such dilemma solution acceptable to the house – divided against itself but still one house – is found? The answer is that it continues as two houses, heading either for the *pentalemma* outcomes, or for apathy, a gradual outer or inner paralysis that takes the form of inaction or depression (unipolar), with occasional outbursts of manic behavior (bipolar), often violent.

Thus, if the US today (spring 2008) is beset by the lesser dilemma of stay in vs. pull out of Iraq and the bigger dilemma of US Empire vs. Let Go, the predictions would be both increasing polarization inside the US and apathy, depression, and manic depression, with some “surges” or worse, unless, that is, conflict resolution should come on top of conflict dynamics.

The proposition of intrasystem conflict instability is the conflict dynamics proposition that polarization will prevail over resolution. One condition for that proposition would be a very limited space for possible outcomes, down to two: one or the other; and if one is Self then often down to one: Self over Other. No Us, the positive transcendence, the joint project.

Then the left-hand side of Table 35.5: intraperson dilemmas, accounting for more than 90 percent of world literature, the arts, psychology, and everyday/night human concerns? The polarization hypothesis is empirically void in the sense that the “split personality” is a metaphor, a science fiction, not two persons. But the metaphor reflects a dualist approach to conflict that makes us think in terms of “homunculi” using our inside as a battlefield, whether in terms of the literary Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Freud’s Id and Superego, or some biochemical balance or lack thereof. Maybe one day we shall develop more holistic, more *sui generis* ideas for intraperson and the other intras.

We have been overflying the intellectual territory of Table 35.5, using isomorphism from mathematics as a heuristic. We hypothesize corresponding elements and corresponding relations, and then launch the isomorphism hypothesis, that “corresponding relations relate corresponding elements.” If one way of overcoming a trauma – in the victim, and in the perpetrator for causing the trauma – in a relation between persons is a joint project, like the bar addict husband and the wife left alone running a bar together, creating some kind of *us*, then it may also work between two countries, contesting an area, as a binational zone becoming an economic zone, or for countries recently at war constituting a European Community. And maybe also for regions at odds with each other launching a joint project, a revised UN in which none has more veto than others, meaning nobody is above anybody else. Not that equality guarantees peace. But inequality for sure guarantees non-peace.

It also works for intraperson dilemmas as an hypothesis. “Work vs. fun on Sundays” as a dilemma elicits flat compromises dividing Sundays into time zones, but also the both-and fusion into work-fun or fun-work, one being the other. For Freud, Ego was the battlefield for the homunculi Id and Superego. Maybe they could also fuse, as when love and sex create an equitable *we*, and – if there are more than two persons involved – maybe as a *ménage à trois, quatre . . .*? For creativity the sky is the limit.

We are driven at all levels by the scripts in deep A, *deep* (individual and collective) *cultures*, deep B, *deep behavior, needs-directed*, and deep C, *deep structures*. A deep triangle that is neglected at considerable risk: robust, but not unchangeable. We can all travel the dilemma/trilemma/tetralemma/pentalemma road. Deep cultures and structures do not determine conflict outcomes but certainly condition them.

Translevel conflictology not only covers the whole field of Table 35.5, but uses level-free prime concepts such as conflict, incompatibility/contradiction, transformation/resolution, actors/parties, structure/culture, attitudes/behavior. The last pair should not be confused with attitude/behavior of a No. 1 – the Leader – a major error committed within very individualist-/verticality-/authoritarian-oriented deep cultures such as that of the US, and that of diplomacy culture in general. The trap is obvious: bribing or hanging one person is the way out.

Unilevel conflictology would focus on one column, dwelling on the specificities: psychology on [1]+[2]+sub-[1], sociology/politology/anthropology/economics on [3]+[4], IR on [5]+[6] and some [7]+[8]+[9], with [10] left unattended. Bilevel would take in two columns, and multilevel several, usually neighbors. Interlevel will explore causalities. Translevel conflictology feeds on level-free terms and creative isomorphisms. An example is game theory, applicable to any type of actor, but ridden by too many assumptions (rationality, measurable, finite and comparable utilities, etc.) to become a general conflictology.

Finally, by causality we actually mean all four Aristotelian types, not only efficient, but also material, formal, and final. Bilateral if-then relations can be hypothesized and confirmed or disconfirmed within and between any cell(s) in Table 35.5, and linked together in multilateral chains, cycles, spirals, any form. A family of trilateral causal chains (such as

[3]⊗[2]⊗[4]) was explored above. But chains should not all start in the same cell (cause reductionism), end in the same cell (effect reductionism), or pass through the same cell (intervening variable reductionism). Basic human needs are more problematic than needs that are *conditio sine qua non*, that without which life is not worth living; they are insulting needs: violence, direct and/or structural. That makes needs non-negotiable (Galtung 1980b). But the ways of satisfying these are negotiable. Linkages to peace and conflict theory were explored in the 1970s. As with the isomorphism approach, all cells are *sui generis*, singularities, and all have similarities, generalities, and linkages to each other. And with that conclusion a conflictology was born.

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## 36 Revisiting the CAR field

*Sean Byrne and Jessica Senehi*

Conflicts are complex, and social conflicts play themselves out on multiple, interlocking planes: geographically, in the economic system, in politics, linguistically, in educational access and curricula, in religion, in cultural production, and even in recreational activities (see Byrne and Senehi in the introduction to this volume). Given this, human agency is always embedded in an “ontological site” consisting of unique ecologies, geographies, cultures, and epistemologies (see Boudreau, Ch. 9). The interdisciplinarity, creativity, and breadth of the field impact how conflicts are waged, the quality and equity of the settlements reached in terms of justice and a long-term sustainable peace (see Kriesberg, Ch. 11). For example, liberal international relations and CAR can offer an innovative typology to creatively critique and formulate foreign policies (see Beriker, Ch. 18). Moreover, the transfer of research analyzing the nexus between conflict, peace, security and development, on the one hand and policymaking on the other, must account for the contribution of development to peacebuilding, not just to conflict analysis (see Paffenholz, Ch. 19).

Galtung (in the conclusions to this volume) a founder of this field, points us in the direction of relating a conflictology or general theory of conflict that is transdisciplinary and captures reflexive practice as well as theory building. Practitioners, or scholar-practitioners in the field, need to be familiar with a taxonomy of theoretical perspectives and worldviews that makes numerous theoretical lenses distinct (see Sandole 1998). The changing historical context of contemporary CAR has critical implications for its ontological and epistemological foundations as well as the various methodological traditions that inform the field (see Boudreau, Ch. 9; Sandole, Ch. 30).

CAR spent the last twenty years explaining and justifying what the field is in terms of theory building, research and practice. The holistic and organic CAR field has accelerated and burgeoned, become more visible, and produced many fine practitioners working at many levels in society as well as new undergraduate and graduate academic programs creating a common language among our graduates, who are conducting practice at diverse multiple levels and points in our communities.

### **A quantum leap for CAR**

In the blink of a cosmic clock, CAR evolved from a beginning as a “fad, fantasy, or field” and made a bold quantum leap forward as a three-dimensional mosaic of scholars and practitioners throughout the world with a constellation of ideas and diversity of approaches, disciplinary roots, and topic areas. These are not schisms that need to be resolved so much as they speak to the complexity, breadth, and depth needed to apply and take account of macrology–micrology tensions, and that address conflict dynamics and the goal of peace. Yet a number of key concerns and dilemmas continue to challenge the field. In the following pages we explore ten of these issues.

- 1 Multiculturalism or diversity within unity is not easy. Culture is dynamic, always changing. We are socialized to see the world through historical, cultural and gendered images and metaphors to be empathetic and loving or conflictual (see Broome, Ch. 13). People's culture encompasses repetitive patterns of human behavior whereas cultures of peace comprise the content, substance, and conditions of peace (see Avruch, Ch. 17). Stephen Ryan (Ch. 21) points to the tensions and balancing that are evident and important to the core features of the transformation idea in CAR, especially as they relate to praxis, epistemology, and indigenous cultures, the next quantum leap.
- 2 CAR needs to take local indigenous cultures and knowledge into account, being open toward local indigenous ways of doing things. Practitioners are developing expertise and universal standards while acknowledging individual cultures with which they want to share. Indigenous traditional knowledge reveals a great understanding of shared origins of life, integrity of ecological systems, and bonds of kinship with non-human species (Burrowes 1996). Indigenous peoples' spiritual and cultural identities and economic survival are tied to the land (Lyons 2007). Indigenous peacemaking comprises restorative and healing processes of peace that empower all citizens as participants in the process (see Rice, Ch. 29). Traditional conflict resolution structures are closely bound up with the cultural, religious, socioeconomic, and political realities of indigenous communities (Irani and Funk 1998). Indigenous conflict resolution emphasizes the resolution of conflicts amicably through councils of elders, clan mothers, and local cultural rituals such as the *palaver* (Tuso 1999). These peacemaking structures become effective and legitimate over time in preserving an indigenous community's way of life. Moreover, storytelling can assist with the process of meaning making and by the creation of shared stories that are co-constructed to make room for multiple points of view within them (Senehi 2002).
- 3 Women's, children's, and youth's peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts need to be brought more centrally into the field. Although lived experiences reflect diverse backgrounds and skills, women's aspirations and knowledge are frequently neglected or omitted in the scholarship literature on social conflicts (see Sandole-Staroste, Ch. 16). Women's voices are often left out of the negotiation process even as they are active at the grassroots level in peacebuilding activities. Many women's grassroots organizations have used informal and creative ways to bring women's issues into the negotiation process (see Leatherman and Griffin, Ch. 25). Moreover, displaced and refugee women's voices must be built into peacebuilding strategies as equal partners with men as they also contribute to peacebuilding capacities (see Snyder, Ch. 3). INGOs in the field work with their licit external and internal actors and this realization has to be built into INGO policy development especially as it relates to women and children affected by violent conflict (see Leatherman and Griffin, Ch. 25).

Conflict impacts women, youth, and the web of interdependent relations that remain embedded in their everyday lives. Yet their mosaic of survival and peacemaking stories as well as their lived experiences remain marginal in the politics and policymaking circles (Beah 2007). War creates conditions of homelessness, poverty, famine, and disease, to which children and youth are especially vulnerable. Children and youth lose their parents and other family members, and are witnesses of torture and murder. A militarized masculinity facilitates the violations of youth and children's rights as they are press-ganged into militias (Enloe 2007). Today's children and youth are tomorrow's world citizens, and these events will shape the future in unforeseeable ways (Byrne 1997). Youth must have creative outlets for their voices and talents.

A focus on including young people in the peace process as equal partners can teach us about the causes of wars and political conflicts and about the processes of conflict resolution (Senehi and Byrne 2006). Young people are active subjects in their own lives, shaping and recreating the political and socioeconomic world around them (see Bekerman, Ch. 10). Youth are economic, social, and political agents expressing themselves through working for peace, music, art, and even violence. Thus, intergroup contact in integrated school settings must address the epistemological bases that acknowledge sociocultural group differences if the contact experience is to be fruitful for the students (*ibid.*).

- 4 Processes of authentic dialogue are building bridges within coexistence projects. Interaction in dialogue groups, problemsolving workshops, and other creative and safe spaces can impact the attitudes and perceptions of groups embroiled in conflict leading to changes in perceptions and ultimately, in the case of middle-tier elites, change at the policy level (see Fisher, Ch. 23; Kelman, Ch. 12). Authentic dialogue can reframe the absolutist nature of nationalism that defines intergroup and international relations into peace-bound and peace-founded relationships (see Anastasiou, Ch. 2). Fostering interreligious dialogue is important in promoting principles of peace, understanding, knowledge, compassion, tolerance, and forgiveness (Abu Nimer 2003). In addition, human and economic development assistance is a long-term peacebuilding strategy to prevent violence (see Byrne *et al.*, Ch. 33; Çuhadar Gürkaynak *et al.*, Ch. 20).

Consequently, transformational processes must be forged that move people away from the resolution of the issues to the restoration and rebuilding of relationships (see Arthur, Ch. 26), addressing identity (see Cook-Huffman, Ch. 1), and exploring creative mechanisms that encourage the sustainable transformation of conflict toward constructive and peaceful outcomes (see Ryan, Ch. 21). As Salem and Kaufman point out in their chapter, there is little faith or hope at the moment within the Israeli and Palestinian grassroots that civil society can revamp the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. What needs to be done to change these perceptions and to build a sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians (Kaufman *et al.* 2006)? A coherent and holistic peace process is made up of various combinations of many CAR interventions that complement each other to build “peace by pieces” (see Allen Nan, Ch. 27).

- 5 CAR must give equal attention to subjective issues such as identity, fear, and misperception as well as objective criteria such as land, resources, and elite powersharing in the diagnostic phase of dispute systems design processes. International legal processes and law are also shaping the resolution of international and ethnic conflicts (see Gallant, Ch. 28; Žagar, Ch. 32). Increasingly, people with different identities are coming together to study, work, and live. The CAR field needs to include in its analysis social group members’ experiences that define and inform identity in a complex multi-identified and multi-identifiable world (see Cook-Huffman, Ch. 1). We need to pay attention to a “formal teliomorphic causation of identity” or form of consciousness (see Korostelina, Ch. 7) to fully comprehend how it fuels identity-based conflicts (see Rothbart and Korostelina, Ch. 6), especially how “collective value commitments” become a source of retaliation and revenge (see Rothbart and Cherubin, Ch. 4). Memory and post-traumatic stress symptoms are related to attitudes of intolerance, hatred, fear, and despair that prevent social unity and reconciliation (see Arthur, Ch. 26). We need to explore the mechanisms that support sustainable transformation of conflict toward constructive and peaceful outcomes in order to avoid the experience of victimology (see Ryan, Ch. 21).



- 6 Religion plays an important role in peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts in addressing ethnic and social conflict. CAR must embrace the complex roles of a multiplicity of diverse religious traditions in contemporary ethnic and social conflicts. After 9/11, religious extremism and conflict between religious communities escalated (Smock 2002), while religious leaders and organizations build interfaith organizations to be active peacemakers in promoting understanding and religious tolerance (Gopin 2002). Interreligious dialogue and solidarity movements are impacting the field as people reach out to each other to embrace diversity and to have an agreeable dialogue built on trust for people to find solace and healing in interreligious solidarity (Omar 2007).
- 7 The human rights approach (justpeace), which emphasizes compassion, tolerance, forgiveness, reconciliation, and healing, is also impacting practice and scholarship within the field. Certainly, the denial of human rights works against the goals of justice, peace, and human security. Human rights are also essential to the analysis and resolution of the roots of conflict because, when human rights are violated, violent conflict and torture tend to follow (see Rothbart and Cherubin, Ch. 4). The analysis of protracted and intractable conflicts must include “generativity” or the basic human need to provide for future generations if we are to understand different group ideas about justice, hope for the future, and the common good (see Simmons, Ch. 8).
- 8 Reflexive praxis has practitioners analyzing complex conflicts through multidimensional lenses to design appropriate intervention processes so that they can intervene more effectively in social conflicts and, as scholars, develop better theory. Systems and structures involve stakeholders with different goals, interests, power, and worldviews. We need to be able to identify the parties, issues, relationships, and source of conflict, and focus on the human and emotional aspects of conflict, which includes the influence of anger, gender, class, religion, and culture (see Korostelina, Ch. 7). Identifying sources of conflict may not be a simple task when the causes are embedded in an institution’s structure and operating systems (see Rubenstein, Ch. 34). Consequently, if the rules, roles, or responsibilities are designed to produce conflict then resolving these conflicts often requires some structural or systemic changes, which may produce unintended and non-obvious consequences (see Kriesberg, Ch. 11). It is important that practitioners evaluate and assess how theory and practice work or collide when dealing with complex problems in human systems and structures in our interdisciplinary approach to practice and theory building (see Sandole, Ch. 30; Woolford and Ratner, Ch. 22). For example, defining key theoretical concepts such as transformation may lead to confusion both in theory building and in praxis (see Ryan, Ch. 21).

The reflexive practitioner, or what Bill Warters calls the *pracademic* or *practitioner-academic*, informs reflexive praxis. For example, Pearson and Olson Lounsbury (Ch. 5) demonstrate the critical point of making practitioners’ key theoretical concepts operational in the field to benefit theory and practice. When, before conflict resolution, practitioners use a capacity-building approach with one party that addresses all realms of their being then they can effectively participate in conflict resolution processes when the parties are brought together (see Barsky, Ch. 15). A structural and contingency approach to mediation is needed (see Bercovitch, Ch. 24). However, mediation, in its directive and evaluative frames, upholds a hegemonic justice rather than a social justice game that is reformist and oppositional (see Woolford and Ratner, Ch. 22).



In Chapter 34 Rubenstein raises an important question that CAR scholars and practitioners must recognize the relationship of government power structures to the field. Practitioners also need to identify the distinguishing characteristics of numerous theories and how, as practitioners, they can translate such identification into more informed and effective practice (see Barsky, Ch. 15). Thus, academic research can build a bridge between CAR academics and practitioners in a process of reflexive praxis (see Sandole, Ch. 30).

- 9 The creative arts and humanities such as storytelling also inform practice and theory building in the field. Cultural production has an important potential as part of the process of conflict escalation or de-escalation (Senehi 1996). Art forms are among the most compelling ways that communities reproduce and articulate shared cultural knowledge about a conflict, and about a group's sense of the values of the other (Senehi 2000). Looking at creativity gets at the relationship between sociocultural structures and how individuals and groups can potentially alter these by building community consensus around important ideas that can lead to collective action (see Senehi). A storytelling intervention project is an organic "serendipitous scaffold" or catalyzing ecological, transcultural, generative, unpredictable, and fully alive platform that creates many conversations, relationships, purposes, meaning, and possibilities that transcend time and space, as it is an excuse that creates opportunities for unintended consequences that allow for engaging people in a creative process (see Senehi, Ch. 14).
- 10 Ecological security needs to be tied into the philosophical roots, theories, and practices of the CAR field (see Çuhadar Gürkaynak *et al.*, Ch. 20). Deep ecology is rooted in the idea of interconnectedness and cycles of life that is a holistic view that values all forms of life in which humans are "physically, biologically and spiritually part of the earth" (Burrowes 1996: 145). Ecological security regards the "ecological, political, economic, social, and psychological circumstances necessary for all individuals and identity groups, as well as the earth and its entire species, to satisfy their needs, to live in harmony, and to survive indefinitely" (*ibid.*: 149). Human activities are causing environmental change on a massive scale throughout the world as our biodiversity declines at an alarming rate (Lyons 2007). There are diverse communities pursuing peaceful ways of sharing natural resources and working toward sustainable ecosystems. Environmental conflict analysis and resolution provides a problemsolving process that brings together multiparty stakeholders in a conflict to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement through negotiation, mediation, or facilitation on their own terms (O'Leary and Bingham 2003).

## Conclusions

Non-violence is a powerful and effective approach to social change, which seeks to transform society to forge a fair, just and peaceful world. The mass civil disobedience of Gandhi's *satyagraha* and the direct actions of social movements such as Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the civil rights and women's movements, and the disability rights movements are examples of non-violence in action. The CAR field empowers individuals and communities to non-violently transform the world through non-violent direct action and thus contribute to building a culture of peace and a just and peaceful world (Sharp 2005).

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# Epilogue

## Implications for theory, research, practice, and teaching

*Dennis J. D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste*

### Introduction

Even a cursory reading of the chapters making up this volume strikes the reader with their collective complexity. No matter how aesthetically appealing the concept of parsimony or emotionally compelling the *primacy of the single-factor thesis* might be, many variables may be involved in driving any particular conflict.

### Challenges

The challenge, therefore, for those interested in further development of theory is two-fold: (1) to identify from this volume factors and combinations of factors that could play a role in a conflict situation, exploring trends and shifts in trends, their sequences, and levels of explanatory potency (Sandole 1999, 2007); plus (2) to identify various approaches to practice in which third parties can more effectively deal with the factors driving any particular conflict situation, whether the third parties' objective is, *proactively*, to prevent violent conflict or, *reactively*, to manage, settle, resolve and/or transform conflict.

The challenge for *teaching* is to explore pedagogical approaches to capturing the complexity of conflict situations, especially those that make little or no sense within traditional security paradigms. The objective would be to enhance the role of *theory* in explaining or understanding complex conflict and the role of *research* in further developing appropriate theory, applying theory to practice, and evaluating its use as a basis for practice.

### Contrast with the “competition”

The *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* is not an exhaustive survey of the conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) field. The four co-editors identified CAR relevant people, not all of whom were able to participate and help shape this volume and, by implication, the CAR field itself. We invited those who were willing and able to work on the volume, to contribute a chapter about some “core” concept, theory, approach, process – including core voices that tended to go unheard – and complex intervention design models. The result is what readers now have before them.

By contrast, the more *deductive Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (Bercovitch *et al.* 2008), a “competitor” volume being published at roughly the same time, involved the three co-editors identifying relevant components of CR, identifying specialists who could write chapters on those components, and then inviting select specialists to do so. Despite some textual and other overlap between the Sage and Routledge volumes – Jacob

Bercovitch, Louis Kriesberg, and Dean Pruitt appear in both volumes – they are very different, focusing on different aspects of the overall CAR field. One result is that, to capture something approaching the “totality” of that field, we would have to examine *both* the Sage and Routledge volumes.

Accordingly, the ultimate theory, research, practice, and teaching challenge for members of the CAR field would be to combine these handbooks, plus others (e.g. Deutsch *et al.* 2006), into a CAR Handbook Library that collectively provides more of a “representative sample” than do any of its constituent parts alone. By teaching with this Enhanced CAR Library, we would, in effect, be closer to the “core” aspects of the reality of human relationships at *all* levels, fractures of which lead to the kinds of complex conflicts that the various chapters in the books have addressed. So framed, the CAR field would represent more a part of the solution than of the problem addressed by the various chapters.

## Policy

Imagine think tanks around the world composed of bright young graduates of CAR programs at George Mason University, University of Manitoba, NOVA Southeastern University, American University, Georgetown University, and elsewhere (e.g. the Universities of Bradford, Canterbury, and Lancaster in the UK; Sabanci University in Turkey; Uppsala University in Sweden; Universiti Sains Malaysia [USM] in Malaysia). Having been educated and trained in terms of the Enhanced CAR Library, they would most likely use it as a basis for causal and policy analysis in order to make appropriate policy recommendations with regard to, among others, the Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya, southern Thailand, southern Philippines, Darfur, Sunni–Shia, Western–Islamic “civilizational,” and other conflicts.

Could the use of the Enhanced CAR Library really make a difference in efforts to do something positive about any of these conflict situations, including in Afghanistan and Iraq? One thing seems fairly certain: analysts using the Library would probably know more about any particular conflict than most specialists who have read only one of the constituent volumes. They would know more about what to do in shaping violence prevention and conflict management, settlement, resolution, and/or transformation options with regard to that conflict. Needless to say, there remain significant problems that might prevent the Library from having its potential impact. For example, in the face of complexity, there are individual tendencies toward cognitive overload and a preference for simplicity. Complexity also reinforces the probability of breakdown in interorganizational (intercultural) communication, reducing the likelihood of problemsolving solutions reaching the grassroots. In addition, there is the ubiquitous absence of “political will” (Sandole 1999: 189–92); witness current debates on global warming and Darfur.

## An intervention design

Using the insights contained just in this Routledge Handbook, could we design and implement a more effective intervention into, say, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict – a major driver of regional and global conflict and terrorism? We would say, “Emphatically, yes!” We will, however, leave it to others and another opportunity to spell out what that design and its modalities of implementation might look like.

That opportunity was further developed at the 49th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (ISA), which took place in San Francisco, California, during 26–29

March 2008, as part of the Panel on “Conflict Analysis and Resolution (CAR): Where Do We Go From Here in Research, Theory, and Practice in the Post-Bush Era?” ([www.isanet.org/sanfran2008/2007/04/convention\\_prog.html](http://www.isanet.org/sanfran2008/2007/04/convention_prog.html)). This is appropriate, as it was at an earlier ISA meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii, that two of the four co-editors dreamed up the idea that eventually developed into this historic volume.

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