Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Ex-Combatants: An Analysis of Rehabilitation in Swat, Pakistan

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NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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in Peace and Conflict Studies

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ISLAMABAD

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
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
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
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
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To the brave people of Swat; to the victims of conflicts and those who are struggling for peace

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assist me in this regard. Muhamad Uzair, PA to Dean at CIPS who always supported me in all administrative matters.

Table of Contents

GLOSSARY

Amir ul Momineen*:* the leader of the Muslims.

Badal: Badal or revenge in English is one of the basic tents in Pashtunwali. It has both positive and negative connotations; i.e. when someone help another person in difficult time then it is obligatory on the second person to do help of that person in his difficult days. And, in negative, the other way round.

Black, Grey and White Militants: The militants when surrendered or arrested then they are passed through a joint interrogation team (JIT). This team categorizes a militant according to his involvement in the conflict. If a combatant is found allegedly involved in terrorist activities and is involved in attacks on civilian, government agencies and destruction of public infrastructure are categorized as 'black'. The 'grey' are the combatants aggressively radicals who had taken guns and had joined the militants' ranks but are not involved in violent activities. And, 'white' are the people who have supported the militants and have been involved in any material or logistic support.

Dar-ul-Uloom: the 'house of Knowledge' in English, refers to religious seminary.

Das-numberi: Das-numberi or the tenth, is a section in criminal law for the criminals in which they are bound to present themselves in police station and they are not allowed to go near to any government facility.

Elder/Mashar: Mashar or elder in English (but not limited to) is the person who has power of and understanding of decision making.

Ex-combatant: The combatant who leave his militant rank(s), arrest or surrender to security forces.

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a belt consists of seven administrative agencies and six FRs (frontier regions), situated at the north-west of Pakistan, bordering with Afghanistan. The border length of FATA with Afghanistan is about 1400 kilometers and called Durand Line.

Ghareeb: Ghareeb is a Pashtu word. It is textual meaning is poor but contextual meaning is weak.

Graduate ex-combatant: An ex-combatant when complete his course at rehabilitation center then he is graduated from that center. The time period of the course is from three to 24 months; depending on the psychological evaluation of a rehabilitee.

Hard Core Militants: Hard-core are the acute militants who are involved in direct clashes with security forces or violent attacks against community and destruction of public infrastructure including, roads, bridges, schools etc. During investigation, this category is formed from the arrested combatants where they are labeled as 'black'.

Imam: Imam is one who is heading prayer in the mosque.

Insurgency: Insurgency have specific objective(s) and clear goals. The insurgent groups are well-organized, having specialized personnel (offices) who work in a systematic way. Insurgents' target population is defined and clear.

Jarga: "is community-based fact-finding and it acts like a modern jury".

Kushunda: 'the expelled-one' in English. Jarga in its jurisdiction may decide *Kushunda* that the offender will leave the community and the area of his residence and will not return home for a specific period or for life.

Lashkar: is a standing body that consists of the volunteers from the community that execute the jurisdiction of the Jarga.

Madrassa: are religious seminaries where Islamic education is given to the students.

Mashal: the lamp/light in English, the name of a rehabilitation center for adult combatants.

Militants: The militants fall in the middle of insurgents and terrorists. Militants have some structure and follow some vague narrative. They also establish some specialized offices but not like insurgents. These offices are just to make their presence in a society. Their target population is also not defined but they make a definition for the population who become barrier in their way; for example, in Swat, militants did not attack mosques as their narrative was establishment of Shariah in Swat.

Mullah or Maulana: the clergy, these are synonyms.

Nanawati: pleading for pardon in English. The Jarga when decide that the offender will seek pardon of his crime he has done.

Non-rehabilitateable: Non-rehabilitatables are those who involved in acute terrorist activities against security forces and civilians. Their punishment became compulsory as if these persons are set free without punishment, this will create distrust and doubt among civilians over security forces.

Nwe Sahar: the 'new dawn' in English, a rehabilitation center in district Bajaur.

Paitham: Paitham and Mashal are the names of single rehabilitation center. *Paitham* is the name of the building where project Mashal is launched. Therefore, mostly local people called it *Paitham* rehabilitation center.

Pashtunwali: is the code of conduct of Pashtuns. In Pashtunwali, every aspect and movement of life is defined and there is specific code for every activity; of marry and grief; of love and enmity.

PATA: Provincial Administered Tribal Areas are administered by the GoKP. These are situated at the north of Pakistan which consists of seven districts.

Qumandaan: The commander of a small armed group or commander at local.

Rastoon: to 'bring back' in English, the name of rehabilitation center located in district Shangla.

Rehabilitation centers: The specified locations, surrounded by walls, for conducting rehabilitation programs for the ex-combatants.

Rehabilitees: is the ex-combatant who is passing through rehabilitation.

Restorative-Jarga: The restorative justice process when conducted in Jarga is termed as restorative-jarga.

Sabawoon: the Dawn in English, the name of juvenile rehabilitation center in Swat.

Salweshti and Shalgon: similar to Lashkar but here number of the executing body is defined; i.e. *salweshti* (forty) or *shalgon* (twenty).

Sareeshta: *Sareeshta* is the local name for peace committee. These peace committees are popularly known as Village Defense Committees (VDCs). The VDCs are formed by the security forces and are responsible for the security of their village. They also perform the duty of espionage for security forces.

Self-integrated: 'self-integrated' are those who do not pass through rehabilitation. They re-join the community without any change in their narratives or approaches.

Soft core militants: Soft-core are the mild combatants who merely supported the militants or their ideology. They were also found in logistic and material support to the militants but they were not involved in any aggression or violent activities against civilians, government or security forces.

Sparlay: The Spring in English, the name of the rehabilitation center for the family members of ex-combatants.

Tablighee Jumaat: The religious group which does not have any criterion for recruitment but people joins this group voluntarily to spread Islam and they consider it is an obligatory duty. This is the largest religious group in Pakistan.

Talibanization: In the local context, Talibanization is perceived and understood as militarization or militancy.

Terrorists: terrorists are those who do not follow any specific ideology or goals. Terrorists also do not have any systematic structure of operation. Their target population also not defined.

Voluntarily Surrendered: The combatant first surrendered to his community or family and then the community brought them to security forces. This type of combatants surrenders without fighting with security forces.

Wali: Wali was the head of princely state.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFIRM: Armed Forces Institute of Rehabilitation and Medicine

CBOs: Community Based Organizations,

CDF: Civil Defense Force

CPR: Civil Powers Regulation

CTD: Counter Terrorism Department

CVE: Counter Violent Extremism

DDR (RR): Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

DRCs: Dispute Resolution Councils

ECP: Election Commission of Pakistan

FARC: (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) (Revolutionary armed Forces of Columbia)

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FGD: Focus Group Discussion

GoKP: Government of Khyber Pashtunkhwa

GoSL: Government of Sri Lanka

IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons

IEDs: Improvised Explosive Devices

IRD: Iqbal-International Institute of Research and Dialogue

JIT: Joint Interrogation Team

KP: Khyber Pashtunkhwa

LeT: Lashkar e Tayyiba

LG: Local Government

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elaam

M19: The 19th of April Movement in Columbia

MML: Milli Muslim League

NACTA: National Counter Terrorism Authority

NAP: National Action Plan

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

NSC: National Security Council

NSD: National Security Division

PARC: Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation centers

PATA: Provincially Administered Tribal Areas

PTC: Parents-Teachers Council

PTSD: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

PVTC: Punjab Vocational Training Council

RJ: Restorative Justice

RRF: Rapid Response Force

SSR: Security Sector Reforms

TDPs: Temporary Displaced Persons

TEVTA: Technical Vocational and Educational Training Authority

TNSM: Tanzim-i-Nifaz-i-Shariati-Muhammadi

TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission

TTP: Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNIDDRS: United Nations Integrated DDR Standards

US: United States

VDCs: Village Defense Committees

WB: World Bank

WHAMs: Winning Hearts and Minds

ABSTRACT

This research is an ethnographic study of the post-conflict rehabilitation program of ex-combatants in district Swat, Pakistan. Based on its findings, this research argues that the inability of the state authorities to channel an adequate rehabilitation program in post-conflict environments might be an ingredient for the re-emergence of conflict. In this study, besides other indicators, reintegration is taken to be one of the basic indicators which shows the success and failure of any rehabilitation program. The research first, provides a theoretical understanding of rehabilitation, and then conceptualizes different concepts related to the area, like; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and rehabilitation distinctly. This conceptualization helps conclude that rehabilitation and reintegration are two distinct concepts but in the process of post-conflict rehabilitation, they overlap one another. The study is further strengthened with ethnography, field observations and key informants' interviews conducted with ex-combatants as well as other relevant stakeholders. The study observes that the rehabilitation program in Swat conducted in a closed environment under surveillance of military may be less fruitful in traditional societies like Swat, where the people follow traditions such as *Pashtunwali*. In such cases the involvement of community in the rehabilitation of ex-combatants is imperative and can yield better results. This involvement is possible when a rehabilitation program is conducted in tandem with local practices and traditions. This research further proposes the utilization of the theory of restorative justice (RJ) as means of achieving this synchrony. The theory of restorative justice (RJ) is compatible with the Pashtuns traditional law, *Pashtunwali*. RJ, just like *Pashtunwali*, allows for the emergence of local solutions by enabling the victims, offenders and local community to sit together to find the solution for the offense caused by the offender.

Key words: *Rehabilitation, reintegration, restorative justice, DDR, Pashtunwali.*

Chapter I

Introduction

Post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration is a process which helps in building peace in post-conflict situations. A rehabilitation program is the direct determinant of prolonged and sustainable peace (Boyce, Koros & Hodgson, 2002). However, such a program and process are always challenging as it involves, other than unbreakable pursuance, identifying and gauging the willingness of ex-combatants to be rehabilitated. The process ends up with more challenges in weak or developing states (Knight, 2008). Keeping in view such challenges and the sensitivity of the process, the United Nations (2006) helps states by designing rehabilitation and reintegration programs, for ex-combatants, which the states can either customize to suit the local contexts, or utilize as it is.

In post-conflict scenarios, the states try to follow the 'soft' or 'smart' counter-terrorism strategies, for the purpose, to win hearts and minds of radicalized and radicalizing individuals by employing non coercive methods (Hoeft, 2015). Rehabilitation of ex-combatants could be one of the approaches of soft-counter-terrorism strategy. States usually adopts individual or collective rehabilitation programs (Aprile et al., 2011). Individual rehabilitation program is that in which an individual is passing through the process to make that individual de-radicalize (Maedl et al., 2010). The individual (combatant) is either surrendered or arrested by the security forces during or in post conflict. While, on the other hand, a collective or organizational rehabilitation is that in which a group collectively passed through the process of rehabilitation after reaching an agreement with the state; for example, in Philippines (Lara, 2012), in mozzmbique (Giustozzi, 2012) and in Columbia (Sanin & Penza, 2012). In case of Swat, as there is no peace agreement signed with the militant group, individual rehabilitation program has been launched in which the surrendered and arrested militants have been provided rehabilitation. Such rehabilitation programs can take different forms. Societies where rehabilitation programs are regulated by the military can be

described as controlled environment. In such a controlled environment all the activities of the persons within that society are under surveillance and controlled. The civil institutions and other national and international humanitarian organizations are limited to work directly in a controlled environment. The controlling authority allows any activity they want. However certain literature suggests that military involvement may in fact further militarize a society, prolonging the process and delaying normalcy in a post-conflict environment (Buzan, 1991). This research views rehabilitation centers in district Swat as a controlled environment, where they fall under the domain of the military. The authorities of these rehabilitation centers put forward the argument that ex-combatants need special care within and outside the centers as their minds can be easily influenced. This can result in a relapse to extremist narratives and ideologies.

This study is focusing on ex-combatants who are either surrendered to the state's or arrested during conflict. This study defines the ex-combatants in Swat who are passing through rehabilitation as 'militants' and not insurgents. This is because; insurgents have specific objective(s) and clear goals. The insurgent groups are well-organized, having specialized personnel (offices) who work in a systematic way. Insurgents' target population is defined and clear. In contrast, another term 'terrorists' are those who do not follow any specific ideology or goals. Terrorists also do not have any systematic structure of operation. Their target population also not defined. The militants, on the other hand, fall in the middle of insurgents and terrorists. Militants have some structure and follow some vague narrative. They also establish some specialized offices but not like insurgents. These offices are just to make their presence in a society. Their target population is also not defined but they make a definition for to target people who become barrier in their way; for example, in Swat, militants did not attack mosques as their narrative was establishment of Shariah (Islamic law) in Swat. An associated term, radicals, are the persons who adopt radical views in opposition to political, social or religious status quo. The radicalization is a process that leads a person to violent extremism. In other words, radicalization is a process that leads to extremism and violent extremism. Radicalization might be different in different context; for example, a study reveals that radicalization in US, (the youth) who are disconnected are more likely to become radicalized towards terrorism (Abrahams, 2017). Similarly, scholars tried to list many drivers and dynamics those makes person or a group radicalized towards violent extremism; Gurr (1970) concept of relative deprivation and the greed theory of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) are among the fundamental drivers towards radicalization and then violent extremism or terrorism. Similarly, in the context of Pakistan, Ahmed & Rafique (2013) and Christine Fair's (2017) are considering religion, poverty and unemployment among the fundamental drivers of radicalization. These all might be true but empirical findings of this research find insecurity, power struggle and band wagoning are the foremost causes towards radicalization and terrorism.

The term 'rehabilitation' itself as a concept possesses multiple definitions and meanings all of which largely depend upon the process and context. The present research employs rehabilitation in the context of 'humane justice system' (Henry, 2006), whereby it acts as a process to redress the complaints of an angry person or group of persons against the state or community. Since, this process offers large-scale applicability in any local context, it can ensure that the grievances of the ordinary local community and ex-combatants alike are addressed adequately. Adequately addressing grievances would mean that such people are not simply penalized for their *deeds* against the state and society, but are provided satisfactory redress for their grievances which could include amongst others, equal economic and socio-political opportunities and increased community participation. The concerned person(s) could then become normal citizens of the respective state. Rehabilitation program allow for gradual normalization and help prevent recidivism in a post-conflict environment (The National Institute of Justice, 2016). Keeping in view the contextual understanding of conflict in Pakistan, the Research Society of International Law defines rehabilitation as a process through which physical, social and psychological measures are enacted in which the rehabilitees are restored to a status in which they no longer have desire or need to participate in activities or groups associated with terrorism (Soofi, 2012).

Rehabilitation for ex-combatants in Swat started soon after the end of the conflict in 2009. At that time, the whole administrative arrangement and management of the district was under control of Pakistan army which was legally recognized by a regulation; known as, The Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011 (The Institute for Social Justice, 2011). This made the army responsible for arranging a rehabilitation program for the ex-combatants in Swat. The program was launched by Pakistan army in a 'controlled' environment where no civilian or national/international organizations were allowed to intervene, unless permitted by Pakistan army. The strict control was based on the need for segregating ex-combatants from the civilian population, since rehabilitating ex-combatants is a sensitive and risky job. Keeping in view the nature of the rehabilitation program of Swat, here the ex-combatants are not only separated for rehabilitation but they are also monitored after reintegration into society. Their movements, gatherings and dealing are under strict surveillance and control. This process of rehabilitation conducted behind high walls and heavily guarded rooms in a controlled environment (Yumna, 2015) can therefore be called 'controlled rehabilitation' which poses a new idea for practitioners and academicians that needs further exploration.

This research seeks to provide answers to the questions raised by rehabilitation in controlled environment. For example, what is the characterization of rehabilitation programs in controlled environment? What are the possible similarities and differences in rehabilitation programs in open environment versus controlled environment? This research has explored the case of Swat in order to develop a contextual understanding of a 'controlled society' which can help the above raised questions. In doing so this research has identified the gaps that are present in existing rehabilitation centers, which fall short of international standards and globally accepted criteria. Post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants is imperative for peace building and is an integral part of post-war societies (Nilsson, 2005, p. 13). Rehabilitation remains the primary concern of any conflict-affected country. Combatants in every society are often identified as 'angry persons', who resorted to militancy to express their grievances and to put an end to their relative deprivation (Cloninger & Leibo, 2017). These combatants were once peaceful citizens and bringing them back into the mainstream should be the priority of every state, since their reintegration into community is essential for a peaceful and progressive society.

Swat in Northern-Western Pakistan offers such a case where local grievances combined with other developments have led to violent mobilization and militancy. The combatants need proper rehabilitation so as to reintegrate into society as normal citizens of the state. This research also aims to provide a working strategy for United Nations to address the concerns of how a state could show its willingness to work in controlled societies and be willing to abide by international law.

The present research contributes in the field of peace and conflict studies, security studies and other relevant disciplines. The existing literature mostly focuses on reintegration of ex-combatants but it ignores how their reintegration will be fruitful without proper rehabilitation and that too in a controlled environment. The study, therefore, focuses on rehabilitation processes of ex-combatants by making their reintegration one of indicators of a successful rehabilitation. The research will further open a window for the researchers and academicians to find new ways and strategies for rehabilitation of ex-combatants in controlled environment where states, who came out of conflicts, are not willing to give an open access to practitioners of peace and development as well as to humanitarian organizations.

1.1. Assumption

Combatants are mostly the 'aggrieved citizens' of a state. Relative deprivation, in addition to political and social inequalities, causes frustration those fueled by (mis)interpretation of religion which in turn leads to aggression. Such was the case in Swat. Post-conflict rehabilitation is important to reintegrate these aggrieved citizens back into society for a constructive nation and state building. As a priority, a state should try to find out the grievances due to which citizens took up arms and should strive to remove their grievances through better rehabilitation processes.

Generally, five challenges are associated with ex-combatants in a post-conflict environment. These are, as pointed out by Ozerdem (2012): a) the society is demilitarized and the militants are demobilized. This is necessary to ensure that those who have been rehabilitated are not influenced again by the militants. b); the society is de-weaponized. Since every conflict brings a lot of small arms into society which provides potential for another conflict in post-conflict environment. Swat was weaponized during Afghan war when plenty of small arms were supplied to locals for the so-called war against Soviet Union. c); It should be made certain that no ex-combatants return to society without rehabilitation. The mind of a non-rehabilitated combatant might retain an inclination towards his previous disposition. If his grievances are not addressed, he may re-join his old group whenever he finds a chance. d); The rehabilitees (beneficiary) must have economic opportunities or financial support. If a rehabilitee does not have an income source, he might be easily attracted by the militants again. e); Ensure that entire community is engaged in rehabilitation process. Failure to engage the local community may create hurdles for the rehabilitee. A rehabilitee may face stigmatization in society and ultimately may re-join his old group.

On the basis of these challenges in the post-conflict scenario, the assumption for this research is: *inability to channel adequate attention towards the rehabilitation of ex-combatants in a post-conflict environment remains an ingredient for the re-emergence of the conflict.*

1.2. Review of the Literature

1.2.1. Contextualization and Background of the Conflict

The 'State of Swat' came into being in 1915 which enjoyed autonomy during British era and was prosperous and progressive in terms of education, communication, tourism and in administration in surrounding area (Rome, 2008). The then State of Swat was surrounded by other powerful states like Dir, Amb and Chitral (Hay, 1934). Presently, Swat district is situated in north of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, surrounded by districts Dir upper and lower, Shangla, Kohistan, Malakand and Chitral. Kohistan and Shangla were previously the territories of the State of Amb (Rome,2008).

Swat became an integral part of Pakistan in 1969 with a special status in the constitution. The region is administered provincially by the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and comes under Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). There were no social, political or administrative problems for the new administrative arrangement as the state was smoothly ruled by the *Wali*[1] since 1915. Institutionalization was already prevailing and with some minor structural reforms, the state of Pakistan kept the existing governance arrangement intact (Nichols, 2001).

The Roots of the conflict in Swat

During Afghan War in 1980s, Swat remained peaceful but some people joined the war as jihadist and on their return, they were celebrated and glorified by the religious political parties as well as by the state. Among the jihadists, Sufi Muhammad remained a renowned person. He was an active member of a religious political party but broke away from it in 1989 and initiated a movement to Islamize Malakand Division, of which Swat is a district. His movement was known as *Tanzim-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi* (TNSM) (Rome, 2016). The movement garnered tremendous support from the local community, and a large number of jihadis who were sent to Afghanistan during 1990s. The movement also penetrated the localities as it called for Shariah laws in Swat and adjacent areas of Malakand Division and FATA. To restore the writ of the state

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[1]Wali is the head of princely state.

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and counter further penetration of the movement, a military operation was launched in 1994 and the movement died for the time being (Nichols, 2001).

When the US and its coalition forces raided Afghanistan in 2001, Sufi Muhammad again raised the call for jihad, and in 2001-2 thousand of jihadists went to Afghanistan to fight against US and its coalition. During that time, no steps were taken by the state to counter Sufi's popularity. Due to his unlawful activities (which included challenging writ of the state) Sufi Muhammad was sent to jail in 2006. But his movement TNSM did not cease in momentum.

Later on, Mullah Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad took on the leadership of TNSM and proved to be more notorious and charismatic than Sufi Muhammad. He announced TNSM's allegiance to *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) in 2007 (Bangash, 2012). By that time, TTP had emerged as the largest anti-Pakistan movement. After 2007, almost all of Swat and adjacent areas of Malakand division were under the control of Fazlullah. His organization introduced its own law of Shariah, own system of justice and punishment and denounced all loyalties with the state of Pakistan. The army and parliament of Pakistan were declared as infidels and he issued _fatwa_ (verdict) of jihad against them (Rome, 2008). The growing popularity of TTP in Swat increasingly challenged the state and its security. Malakand division became a nursery for terrorists and suicide bombers. The state then decided to restore its writ in the region and started military offensive against them in Malakand division in 2009 (Fleischner, 2011).

The violent conflict ended in September 2009; consequently, a number of civilians, security forces personnel and terrorists were killed (Temple-Raston, 2013). Heavy losses were also incurred in infrastructure which was destroyed either by terrorists or by the military during its operation. About three million people were displaced to the settled areas of Khyber Pashtunkhwa. The government restored the IDPs within four months but the infrastructure could not be restored. It was difficult for an economically weak country like Pakistan to speedily restore the infrastructure but it still managed to achieve a negative peace in Swat.

1.2.2.   Understanding Conflict in District Swat

The conflict in Swat may be separated in timelines, but ought to be studied in historical perspective of the Afghan war in 1980s. The overall context of the of the conflict in Swat is different and should be understood separately from the conflicts around the world; although, there is a slight difference in the contexts of conflicts in other parts of Pakistan. The nature of conflicts in Swat, Malakand division of Pakistan and FATA is almost similar and is fought behind one narrative and against singular actor; Taliban.

The context of the conflict is greatly influenced by the local tradition. The local tradition in a Pashtun society is collectively known as *Pashtunwali,* embedded in each and every aspect of Pashtun life; of war and peace, of grief and happiness. Any intervention in Pashtun society; either from state, non-state or from any other NGO, has to be verified by the locals and requires the confidence of Pashtuns under *Pashtunwali.* Here in case of rehabilitation program in Swat, the military intervened in the local setting but ignored the local population and its customs. Building confidence of the local population is imperative in the context of Swat; otherwise, there will always be a threat of societal conflicts, especially in the absence of the security forces.

From a security perspective, the context of Swat is different as the region is closer to Afghanistan where Taliban are still fighting against the US and its coalition. Meanwhile Swat has been home to one of the deadliest terrorist coalitions, the TTP under Mullah Fazlullah, who was later expelled by Pakistani security forces from Swat and subsequently killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan in 2018. The valley of Swat also borders FATA where the security forces are engaged in conflict(s) of similar nature, posed by similar militant groups.

Lastly, the rehabilitation and reintegration programs in Swat are operating in a controlled environment where the military exercises control over all the dealings with militants and ex-combatants, and no other national or international civilian organization is allowed to intervene without a prior permission by the military. This makes the conflict settlement process quite elusive and suspicious. The gaps between the community and ex-combatants in negotiations and other reconciliation processes create distrust and difficulties in confidence building. Therefore, the above arguments make the case of Swat different from the rest of the world.

In Swat, the militants and their narrative were spreading day after another. Pakistan military intervened to counter this spread of militancy in April 2009 and this violent conflict lasted for four months (Fleischner, 2011). At that time that was a negative peace as there was a persistent threat from militants, presence of security forces and dysfunctional civilian businesses. But this phase was termed as post-conflict (Ali, 2009). Along with state institutions, national and international civilian organizations participated in state building activities in this post-conflict phase. The only aspect of peace building that was kept aloof from these civilian organizations was the rehabilitation of ex-combatants. Under Pakistani law activities of NGOs and other humanitarian organizations require a 'No Objection Certificate (NOC)' from interior ministry of Pakistan. Humanitarian organizations including the UN cannot perform their activities directly, as Pakistan is not a signatory of 1951 Convention -which dictates the status of Refugees and related activity or the 1967 Protocol, neither did Pakistan accede to the 1954 convention about the status of stateless persons (UNHCR, 2012). Apart from reconstruction and peace building activities in which civilian organizations were involved, rehabilitation and then reintegration programs for ex-combatants in Swat have largely been administered and managed by the Pakistan Army. For civilian population (who were also the victims of the conflict) a new term was introduced for IDPs (internally displaced persons)[2] by the foreign office of Pakistan, perhaps, for circumventing international involvement in rehabilitation and reintegration programs. The new term was advised as TDPs (temporary dislocated persons) (Ali, 2015). The purpose of this new term seems to be to convey to the international community that these people are temporarily dislocated, not refugees and that the state can re-settle them without involving the international community.

1.3. Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants Program in Swat

Undoubtedly, post conflict peace building is a long and complicated process that needs both power and resources. After the end of the conflict in Swat, a rehabilitation program for ex-combatants commenced under the supervision of the Pakistan military. The military engaged

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[2] The term 'IDPs' is defined by the UN as, "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border".

civilian instructors who had expertise in psychology, religion, vocational and technical training. These civilian instructors followed the guidelines provided by the military to educate the ex-combatants under their care. The financial assistance for these endeavors was provided by the civil government (Rana, 2011). However, this rehabilitation program did not follow a clearly defined policy framework. The program was launched in 2009 in three rehabilitation centers: *Sabawoon*; *Sparlay* and *Mashal*. These rehabilitation centers came to be popularly known as de-radicalization centers (Basit, 2015). No exact figures are available for the number of ex-combatants kept in these centers, nevertheless, a small number of ex-combatants have been rehabilitated.

1.3.1.   From Rehabilitation to Reintegration

As process rehabilitation brings to mind the concept of reintegration however the two are clearly distinctive, even though they crisscross. The existing literature on DDR often discusses these concepts interchangeably as Melissa Lefas and Junko Nozawa (2016) have pointed out. Certain definitions, such as the one by Andy Knight, define reintegration and rehabilitation as two sides of the same coin (Knight, 2008). Anders Nilsson defines reintegration as a "societal process aiming at the economic, political, and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civil society" (Nilsson, 2005, p. 27). Nilsson has not made a clear differentiation between the terms either. The UN, as well, has not distinguished these concepts in its integrated DDR standards, and has stated that DDR is a comprehensive abbreviation for all activities; including, reconciliation, rehabilitation and so on (United Nations, 2006, p. 02). This shows that while the two terms are used separately, literature does not attempt to differentiate between the two clearly.

Reintegration depends largely on how rehabilitation is conducted, and the indicators of successful rehabilitation can be drawn from reintegration. The purpose of rehabilitation is to reintegrate the ex-combatants who have voluntarily surrendered or have been detained during conflict. Though no separate literature on reintegration exists, available literature defines it as a process which starts from disarmament and demobilization of militants and ends with reintegration of these demobilized militants, after they have passed through rehabilitation. The overall purpose of DDR is to reduce the capacity of an armed group so that it may not engage in armed rebellion against the state (Knight, 2012). Reintegration is a protracted process in which the ex-combatants acquire the status of normal citizens, sustainable employment and assistance for a long period

(Knight, 2012, p. 18). In case of Swat, one cannot call the process as DDR program but yet such a DDR process was launched by the security forces with the help of civilian government, but this program has been criticized on the grounds that it is not DDR but only DD, that is, disarmament and demobilization, and pays very little attention to R - reintegration. It because, the Pakistan army disarm and disbanded the militants who either fled away from Swat, surrendered or killed which shows the implementation of 'DD' but not 'R' where majority of the militants have not been reintegrated.

1.3.2.   Understanding the Conditioning of Militancy in District Swat

As discussed earlier, Swat is administered through a provincial administrative setup, PATA, which failed to provide justice and other social services to the locals. Moreover, veterans of Afghan war were glorified by the state which led to their widespread popularity in the area. These social injustices allowed the glorified militants to fill in the gaps left by state authorities; they promised the provision of law and order in return for local support. The alignment of the local TNSM with the TTP, and the organizations steadily increasing support base, allowed the Taliban to gain a strong foothold in the area. Taliban became the popular force of the region as they provided speedy justice which further strengthened their ranks. They also started targeting all those in the society who were perceived as a threat to their power and glory. The incentive of justice provision and the guarantee of power and prestige that came with joining the ranks of the Taliban became the two major reasons for people's involvement in the Taliban movement. During 2006-2008, the Taliban fully controlled the area. They found an opportunity to further increase their outreach by launching their own FM radios in the absence of state-run broadcasting. These radio channels played a vital role in their popularity and strength.

Collectively, all these developments were eased by the lack of proper structural arrangements, mismanagement by the state, bad governance and negligence of the large population. All of these factors contributed to widespread inequality and deprivation which further caused frustration, fueled by (mis)interpretation of religion which ultimately, aggression guised as support to Taliban. Considering such a landscape, the reintegration of ex-combatants and overall normalization of the society becomes an even more pressing problem. Despite State efforts to rehabilitate ex-combatants, the situation in Swat has remained dismal. The lack of progress can

perhaps be understood in light of the administration's failure to understand the local setting, comply with accepted and international DDR standards and the stress on conducting rehabilitation in a controlled environment which remains divorced from the local realities. The inability of the policy makers to consider all these factors remains a hurdle in the success of DDR in Swat.

Although a comprehensive rehabilitation program has been launched in Swat, field work done under the present research indicates considerable gaps in theory and practice. There are cases of recidivism where the rehabilitees have not been well integrated- socially and economically-hence the tendency to re-track their ways back into violent and extremist engagement exist. Similarly, a special project, *Sparlay*, was aimed at the rehabilitation of the family members of ex-combatants; however, the researcher could not find any project with this purpose in the area.

In order to fill these gaps and inform policy, this research has attempted to borrow some lessons from successful rehabilitation programs around the world, including Sri Lanka, Columbia and Nepal where ex-combatants successfully reintegrated into the society. The research has also followed UNDDR Standards (2006) (but in the context of a controlled society) in order to generate an alternative approach that may be employed to better address the rehabilitation in the context of controlled societies such as Swat.

Keeping in view the context of Swat, one major aspect through which ex-combatants could best be reintegrated into society is provision of transitional justice. The promise of providing justice remained one of the reasons for the Taliban's strength in the area. The State must reclaim this domain in order to prevent further rebellion and improve the chances rehabilitation.

Post-conflict rehabilitation in general is also largely associated with the provision of justice to the victims as well as to the offenders. This transitional justice is helpful in winning hearts and minds (WHAMs) of the community as a whole, and the victims/offenders in particular. This research also employs the restorative justice approach as a means to provide fair justice to both victims and offenders. For this study, the offenders are militants and the victims are the civilian population of district Swat. The processes of restorative justice are compared with the local traditional justice system in later chapters of this research. During the field survey, the researcher found that the imposition of any justice system or provision of rewards and penalties seemed to lead to further frustration and dissatisfaction in the community. Involvement of the community in

transitional justice therefore remains imperative. The theoretical approach of restorative justice offers a setting where community involvement can be ensured in tandem with conventional DDR practices to achieve optimum results. Restorative Justice (RJ) is a bottom-up approach which ensures local community involvement in the process. It facilitates dialogue and cooperation by allowing the victim, offender and the community to sit together to reach an agreement for the offender to repair the harm caused, resultantly, encouraging their rehabilitation. A simplified definition of restorative justice provided by the United Nations defines it as "any program that uses restorative processes and seeks to achieve restorative outcomes" (United Nations, 2006). But this definition remains ambiguous and does not clarify the term properly. Tony Marshall (1999) has defined restorative justice as "a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future" (Marshall, 1999). Similarly, John Braithwaite (2003) has provided a very short but comprehensive definition of the term as restoring the balance between victims, offenders and the community.

Related closely is the concept of restorative process, which has been defined by United Nations (2006) as any process in which the victim and the offender, and where appropriate, any other individuals or community members affected by a crime, participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, generally with the help of a facilitator (Nations, 2006). Here, other community members are taken to mean nuclear relatives of the victims and offenders, friends and elders. Braithwaite (2003) has also given a comprehensive definition of the restorative process which states that restorative justice conferences work by inviting victims and supporters (usually family supporters) of the victim to meet with the offender and the people who care most about the offender and most enjoy the offender's respect (usually including both the nuclear and extended family, but not limited to them). The negotiators try to find the causes of the crime and attempt to abate the feelings of those who have been harmed. Then they discuss how that harm might be repaired and any steps that should be taken to prevent reoffending (Braithwaite, 2003).

The ineffectiveness of modern judicial processes to moderate and resolve local issues has caused the people to resort to the customary or traditional practices of justice to deal with the crime

and disorder in society. In this regard, restorative justice offers some welcoming means of resolving disputes (Nations, 2006).

The restorative justice approach is a community-based approach for resolving issues and conflicts, and coincides with the *Pashtunwali*[3] system followed in Swat. This approach has the advantage of being more formal and is internationally recognized, employing it in the social context of Swat as a rehabilitation process can therefore prove to be beneficial.

1.4. Statement of Problem

Strong surveillance and checks are employed in order to monitor the graduates of the rehabilitation centers and prevent them from recidivism. Yet the chances of recidivism remain highly likely in case the rehabilitation programs are not well conducted. The program in Swat remains weak in two crucial aspects. The first area of concern is the lack of oversight by national or international authorities who can evaluate the program and ensure its effectiveness. The second area of concern is that the program does not receive funding from any international humanitarian organizations, except the British High Commission and, for Sabawoon only, UNICE and remains financially weak. A successful rehabilitation program requires evaluation by a third party and funding from outside sources to function properly and provide sustainable results.

Since 2009, a small number of rehabilitees have been released from these centers. Realistic estimates obtained during the present research indicate that thousands of militants were affiliated with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Swat chapter; Yet, the rehabilitation centers have rehabilitated only in hundreds so far, according to an official of rehabilitation center. The fate of the rest of the ex-combatants remains unknown. Questions regarding their rehabilitation and the threat that they may pose to the society also remain unanswered. This research will try to find that how local communities have reacted towards the reintegration of ex-combatants? Considering the resentment of the local community towards the ex-combatants, the state's role in becomes even more imperative to ensure community engagement and networking. It must also be noted that

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[3]*Pashtunwali* is the Pashtun way of life. It is an umbrella term, covering all codes of Pashtun culture and tradition in it. The most relevant codes of Pashtunwali with restorative justice are; *Jarga*, *Nanawati*, *Kushunda*, and *Salweshti*.

existing rehabilitation programs around the world may not fit in the local context of Swat since it is a closed setting that follows traditional laws like the *Pashtunwali*, which follows concepts such as *badal* or revenge which means that the culprit must pay as compensation, whatever the ruling authority decides, unless the culprit seeks an apology from the victim. This apology is called *Nanawati* or seeking apology, and acts as another important component of *Pashtunwali*. This study is also focusing on that how to contextualize the ongoing rehabilitation program for ex-combatants in the context which is defined by *Pashtunwali*?

Similarly, from a security perspective, the context of Swat is different as the region is nearer to Afghanistan where Taliban are still fighting against US and its coalition. The leader of Taliban, Mullah Fazlullah, was expelled by Pakistani security forces from Swat, and was later killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan in 2018. His organization, the TTP, is involved in terrorist activities throughout the country. The valley is also bordering FATA where the security forces are engaged in conflict(s) of similar nature with militant groups.

Keeping in view the unique aspects of rehabilitation in Swat, this research will first attempt to draw upon internationally employed rehabilitation programs, and borrow from their best practices. In this controlled context this research will try to the answer to the question that how military led and controlled rehabilitation program are affecting the effectiveness of the program? In doing so, the research will attempt to provide a functional rehabilitation framework that draws upon two different systems of rehabilitation, relevant to both the local and international context.

1.5.   Research Questions

This research seeks to provide answers to the questions raised by rehabilitation in controlled environment. Hence, (1) What are the characteristics of rehabilitation programs in controlled environment? (2) How effective are the rehabilitation programs in a controlled environment? (3) How effective and what are the possibilities of having a civilian-led rehabilitation for ex-combatants?

1.6. Research Outline

The introductive chapter is followed by a thematic literature review. The second chapter of this dissertation will examine existing literature on rehabilitation and reintegration and provide an analysis of the known rehabilitation programs around the world. This review will assist in identifying the gaps in rehabilitation program in Swat. On the basis of this available literature and the primary data collected from the field, the researcher will attempt to provide answers to the questions raised in the research.

Chapter three will illustrate the research method and methodology that are involved in researching controlled societies. The chapter will explain the methods and strategies employed for the collection and interpretation of data, with specific reference to controlled societies.

The fourth chapter of this research will introduce rehabilitation programs being conducted across Pakistan. The purpose of this overview is to supply an understanding of the various rehabilitation programs being conducted across Pakistan, meanwhile also elucidating how the case of Swat differs from the rest of the country. The chapter also clarifies the share and space that has been given to NGOs for conducting their activities in this rehabilitation circle.

The fifth chapter is an exploration and a detailed description of rehabilitation program in Swat in the light of collected data from the field. This chapter will answer some vital questions related to the functioning of rehabilitation program in Swat.

The sixth chapter will analyze reintegration on the basis of data collected from the field. Reintegration is employed as an indicator through which the researcher has tried to analyze the level of success of rehabilitation program in Swat.

The seventh chapter provides an answer to a major question of this dissertation. It explores how rehabilitation of ex-combatants should be conducted in controlled societies. This chapter tries to give an alternative approach to rehabilitation in the light of data collected from the field. In this chapter, the theory of restorative justice is proved to be compatible with the local justice system which is prevailing in the areas since unknown history.

Chapter eight acts as the concluding chapter for the research.

Chapter II

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This chapter envisages the definition of "rehabilitation", as a concept and as a process, and other related concepts from the vast literature on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). These concepts have in turn been defined in the context of Swat which highlights the need to establish clear distinction and differentiation between rehabilitation and reintegration.

Post-conflict rehabilitation is not a simple process but a complex strategy. It encompasses several programs, policies and strategies. It is a long process and involves not only the government machinery but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national and international humanitarian and multilateral organizations. Rehabilitation is also not limited to reintegration or restoration of ex-combatants and reconstruction of buildings and society, rather it should be taken in broader perspective, as a transition from an old structure of governance to a new, modern, democratic and more pluralistic society; a transition towards a society where not only ex-combatants but all segments can join together for nation-building (Janzen, 2014).

The fundamental objective of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), and its expanded programs and researches is to unite the detached persons with their community by demilitarizing them (Janzen, 2014). These detached persons are the "angry groups" of community who have taken up arms against the state or authorities. Cloninger and Leibo (2017) describe them as the groups motivated by ethnic or religious strife or by socioeconomic injustices prevailing in society, or due to political marginalization by the state or the power holders within society. This DDR process is considered the most effective tool in post-cold war, which can bring these angry citizens back to their homes and reintegrate them into the mainstream (Janzen, 2014). DDR is a long and complicated process which covers a number of areas and issues in post conflict

environment including reinsertion, rehabilitation, reconstruction, resettlement, reintegration and many more.

> The field of DDR is littered with several overlapping terminologies which result in a conflation of stages and cross-cutting mandates. Taxonomy hence demands that the various and overlapping R's (namely Reinsertion, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Resettlement) be clarified, to impart preciseness to the concept of reinsertion in terms of timing, scope and the nature of activities involved (Ozerdem & Podder, 2008).

The purpose of this research is to understand the concept of rehabilitation which could not be understood without a thorough study of DDR. This research highlights the lines between the three R's in broader DDR (RR). The three R's are reinsertion, rehabilitation and reintegration. In this study, the focus is given to the latter two; rehabilitation and reintegration. The DDR literature has extensively discussed the reinsertion phase and has given much importance to it but the researcher maintains that this is a terminological issue in the existing literature which is confusing reinsertion with rehabilitation.

Reinsertion is like a 'first aid' given to the ex-combatants in military internment centers for a very short span of time, from four to six weeks. During this stage, educational, psychological and vocational trainings are not given to the detainees. These detainees are then shifted to specialized centers where assistance of the civilian experts is employed for educational, psychological and vocational trainings (Özerdem & Podder, 2008). These well-equipped and sophisticated centers are called 'rehabilitation centers'. The time span in these centers varies anywhere from three to twelve months or even two years, in some cases. This time span is decided by the psychiatrist after the psychological assessment of ex-combatants, to ascertain whether they are fit to reintegrate into society (Buxton, 2008).

The DDR literature at times also inter-mixes all these three R's: reinsertion, rehabilitation and reintegration. The scholars and practitioners either name the pre-integration phase as reinsertion, omit rehabilitation or include the educational, psychological and vocational trainings in reintegration phase, which is again, a part of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is embedded in reinsertion and reintegration, but should be understood and studied in a separate spectrum.

2.1. Conflict

Prior to identifying a post-conflict environment, it is necessary to define and understand conflict in the context of Swat. A general definition of conflict propounds an opposition in beliefs and approaches between individuals or groups. Some scholars have defined conflict as an event that leads to physical or structural violence which often results in the breakdown of normal life (Miller, 2005). Most of the definitions exemplify an element of strife, struggle or collision, which is why conflict is distinguished from competition. Simply understood, conflict is the use of incompatible means to a goal (Horowitz, 1985, p. 95). For the present study, conflict has been defined as, "a process that begins when one party perceives that another party has negatively affected or is about to negatively affect something that the first party cares about" (Leao, 2018).

2.2. Post-conflict

There is disagreement among scholars and practitioners of peace and conflict studies to specify 'post' of a conflict. There might be a cold (negative) peace when combatants are defeated but the threat perception exists for a long time until the community does not start its normal social, political and economic activities. These activities often come with the building of institutions and infrastructure in a post conflict scenario (Brown, Langer & Stewart 2011). Graham Brown et al (2011) suggested the peace milestones as: 1) End of violence and hostilities; 2) Drafting peace agreement between the actors of the conflict; 3) Launching DDR; 4) Restoration of refugees and IDPs; 5) Establishing functional state intuitions; 6) Achieving reconciliation and social integration and; 7) Restoration of economy. This approach is called Process Oriented Approach to post conflict environment (Brown et al, 2011). In the case of Swat, the militants who were defeated in 2009 and the IDPs have been returned to their homes, a report revealed that 90% of IDPs have been returned to homes till August 2009 (Shaheen, 2009). State institutions are functional and other reconstruction measures have been initiated, however there is a lack of proper rehabilitation and reintegration even so, the phase can be called 'post conflict' in Swat.

In contemporary conflicts, the era of post conflict starts when state's security agencies enter the conflict area and announce their victory over militants and state institutions initiate reconstruction and developmental programs in the wake. The processes of reconciliation, mediation and transitional justice are among the activities in post-conflict environment (Mundy, 2014). In case of Swat, the military offensive against the militants started in May 2009 and lasted for four months, where the insurgents were either eliminated or disbanded by the security forces, which then announced victory over militants (Ali, 2009). This phase in Swat is called post conflict where normal life has been restored to a great extent.

Practitioners and academicians define post-conflict as transition processes but more specifically, the transition from war to peace, also accompanied by democratization, decentralization and market liberalization (Brown, Langer & Stewart, 2011). In post-conflict scenarios, the international community tries to achieve these goals through the processes of peace building, reconciliation, rehabilitation and reintegration. In a post-conflict environment, rehabilitation of ex-combatants and then reintegration is required as it paves the way for further post-conflict peace building activities (Ball, 2006).

2.3. Understanding the Closed and Controlled Environment in the Context of Rehabilitation Centers

While discussing types of societies, sociologists broadly categorize them into two; "open" and "closed" societies. This division is on the basis of social classes within the society. An 'open' society is the society in which an individual has freedom to choose his class; to go up the ladder to a higher social class or move down to a lower social class (Popper, 2011). On the other hand, a 'closed' society is a society in which an individual's social status is assigned at his birth and cannot be changed throughout his life; for example, caste of an individual in which he cannot move up or down (Popper, 2011). These definitions can be expanded to economic dimensions; a good example of an 'open' society is the liberal society in which there is economic liberalization, whereas in a 'closed' society, the economy is nationalized (James & Lawson, 2001).

A third type of society that resonates with the present discussion is a 'society of control' (Deleuze, 1992). The society of control is the society in which individuals are closely watched and all their actions are monitored. They are bound by different rules and regulations, and in the case of violation they might be liable to punishment (Crain, 2013). This society of rules and regulations was first termed by Michel Foucault as "disciplinary society" (Deleuze, 1992). Foucault (1975) gave the examples of schools, hospitals, prisons, family, armed forces and factories etc. where the people live in discipline under the rules and regulations of their respective society. This disciplinary society expanded its domain of authority whereby it started following the individual even outside of this society; this new evolved society then became a 'society of control' (Deleuze, 1992). In a society of control "they are paying attention to everything we do, so much as they can, but they don't really want us to think about it, they rather want us to accept it as an unconscious reality and not to worry" (Crain, 2013). This idea of 'society of control' is well explained by George Orwell in his masterpiece novel, '1984' in which he draws the phrase "The Big Brother is Watching You" (Orwell, 1948, p. 3).

The concept of 'controlled environment' is quite different from the above discussed societies. It is the society in which the individuals' contacts and communications are controlled by an authority. This society is not disciplinary nor does it follow any special rules and regulations. Unlike society of control, in controlled environment the authority wants individuals to know that they are being following and on violation they would be punished. After a thorough study and understanding this study have taken the example of rehabilitation centers in Swat as a controlled environment. Ex-combatants are the individuals in this society whose actions and interactions are controlled by the Pakistan army, and no civilian organization is allowed to work directly with them (Khan, 2015). The ex-combatants, when released from centers, are under surveillance and they are not allowed to move freely or to keep contacts with anyone without prior permission. The 'Big Brother is Watching You' dominates the social discourse and, keeping this fear in their consciousness, the graduates (released from the centers) are scared to keep any contacts or move towards cities within the country without prior permission. However, in Foucault's disciplinary society an individual is bound by rules and regulations while in Deleuze's society of control-as identified previously- the individual is not restrained from keeping contacts or restrained from movement but he is simply under surveillance. In controlled society, although instructors are civilians and the monetary and other material assistance is received from government or from other

civilian organizations, but the whole text and context is under control of an authority. The civilian instructors teach only that text which provides by the controlling authority. On the other hand, the overall context of controlled society is militarized through military controlled cells, guarded by military personnel, controlled extra-curricular activities and the ethics and concept of good and bad is codified by the controlling authority within the boundaries of the society. In a controlled society, the interference of national and international humanitarian and other civilian organizations is checked unless permitted by the controlling authority who controls that society. The authorities of rehabilitation centers, who supports this controlled status, argue that ex-combatants, as the newly re-integrated graduates of rehabilitation, need special care so that their already malleable minds are not influenced again by the extremist narratives floating around in the society. Some of the critiques are of the view that Pakistan military only administer these rehabilitation centers in Swat and the instructors are civilians. The researcher argues that in the conscious of, at least, the rehabilitees the whole system is in control of military; for example, bringing an ex-combatant to the rehabilitation center, taking them to homes, weekly attendance and surveillance all are under the supervision of military. A good example is the concept of 'surrender' which is used only for those who surrender to military and not for 'self-integrated[4]' combatants.

2.4. The Concept of DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a concept developed in post-Cold War era in the form of 'Boutros-Ghali's' report to the United Nations (UN) in June 1992. The report is popularly known as 'agenda for peace'.[5] The agenda for peace conceptualizes peace building in a post-conflict environment and thus over the years has evolved to become the benchmark for the DDR process (Knight, 2008). Desmond Molloy (2017) drafted a detailed account of the development of theory and practice of DDR which states that the concept grew out of the confidence building measures (CBMs) in mid-1980s and early 1990s. CBMs since then became an aspect of DDR (Molloy, 2017, p-37). The history of DDR could be traced in 1980s and

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[4] self-integrated', combatants who resettled in society without passing through rehabilitation. They re-join the community without any change in their narratives or approaches.
[5] The whole report can be found at http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm

before 1980s, "the disarmament and demobilization activities were exclusively conceived by and for military establishments and shaped by the geo-political imperatives" (Muggah, 2009). The first formal DDR operation was launched in Namibia in 1989-1990 (Muggah, 2009). Brahimi Report (2000) fully acknowledged the link between peace-building, peacekeeping and socioeconomic development along with establishment of funds for DDR (Knight, 2008). As per UNIDDR (United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) standards, DDR refers to;

> A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods (United Nations, 2006).

DDR is a concept that lapped together a number of post-conflict activities in post conflict environment; namely, disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, rehabilitation, reconciliation, reconstruction and reintegration (United Nations, 2006). Scholars, such as Molloy, suggest that "DDR is a concept which places weapons beyond use, in the context of improving community security through social and economic investment in the community" (Molloy(b), 2008). The purpose of DDR is to reduce the capacity of an armed group so that it may not engage in armed rebellion against the state (Knight M. , 2012). Similarly, DDR as defined by Ball (2006) is, (a)Demilitarization of official and unofficial armed groups by controlling and reducing the possession and use of arms, disbanding non-state armed groups, reducing the size of state security services, and, (b) Assisting former combatants to reintegrate into civilian life (Ball, 2006). DDR can therefore be viewed as five stages process: weapon surrender, assembly, discharges, short to medium term reinsertion and long-term reintegration (Ball, 2006).

Whether DDR is a concept or process depends on the situation. It is a concept when it is discussed in academia and a process when it is implemented. UN has defined the themes within DDR to which majority of the literature agrees, in which disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or

barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized which is called reinsertion. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. Reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year, while reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development. Re-integration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance (United Nations, 2006, p. 02).

The definition and approach to DDR is changing with changing circumstances. For example, in Afghanistan, DDR is more inclined towards the security sector instead of the social, political or economic sectors. The process took on three stages in Afghanistan, where it first envisioned confidence building with the community and combatants, so that they could be prepared for negotiations. The second stage involves demobilization of the combatants, their weapon registration and provision of guarantee for their security and movements. The third stage envisages the provision of vocational, literary and agricultural trainings to ex-combatants as well as to the community (Bahman & Torjesen, 2012). The whole process of DDR in Afghanistan revolves around the first two stages where the main focus has been to convince ex-combatants for negotiation, demobilization and reconciliation. The third stage is the community development and recovery, which can be categorized as reintegration phase, but this has very limited focus.

The multiple aspects of DDR cannot be followed simultaneously in every situation. Agreement and willingness of the locals (especially ex-combatants) is a pre-requisite while implementing DDR. Even so instances exist where this was not followed, such as in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the non-state armed group, the Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), was never invited for peace or ceasefire agreement and was forced to disarm and demobilize by the Congolese army (Shepherd, 2012). In DRC the DDR was

implemented through a military technical approach in which the non-state actors were not considered a part of the process (Shepherd, 2012).

The case of Sudan also presents an example of an unsuccessful DDR process. DDR in Sudan could not generate desired results as neither the government nor the non-state actors were serious about the process (Giustozzi, 2012, p. 15). While in Philippines, the peace agreement between government of Philippines and Moro non-state armed group was successfully signed. Unfortunately, it only included reconstruction and rehabilitation but not disarmament and demobilization. This failure to curb armament later challenged the security of the Philippines (Lara, 2012). In Columbia, DDR has been implemented in ongoing conflict (World-Bank, 2008), quite similar to Afghanistan where the conflict is still ongoing (Torjesen, 2012). In Sri Lanka, the DDR process has been fully conducted by the government of Sri Lanka according to the UNIDDRS (2006) with the assistance from international community. For example, in Sri Lanka, the rehabilitation program consists of 'six+1' model, first stage of which is recreational, where combatants are allowed to participate in extra-curricular activities; the second stage is social and cultural rehabilitation; the third stage is spiritual and religious engagement; the fourth stage is vocational training; fifth is educational; the sixth stage is psycho-social and the seventh stage is community engagement (Dharmawardhane, 2013). This process covers almost each and every aspect of rehabilitation and is considered a successful rehabilitation program, because of the fact that through this program all ex-combatants of LTTE, who were either surrendered or arrested, have been reintegrated into the society and no terrorist incident has occurred since. Most of the ex-cadres are now running their own businesses and participate in political processes through association with different political parties and groups (Martin, 2017 and Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 2009).

More than sixty DDR programs have been launched by the UN and WB around the world through their sister or regional organizations, but all of these have some basic dissimilarities with one another (Giustozzi, 2012 and Shepherd, 2012). In Columbia, nationally adopted DDR practices have successfully reintegrated M19 paramilitary, and are successfully dealing with the armed cadres of FARC. The government machinery is functional despite the ongoing conflict. The DDR has been implemented through proper institutionalization and has followed a policy of appeasement of the paramilitary forces (Sanin & Penza, 2012).

The DDR process is evolving and has incorporated many new aspects with the passage of time and pressing need. The traditional DDR was limited to D-D and R i.e. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (Greene et al, 2008). At the dawn of 21st century, the demobilization phase was subdivided, and reinsertion was added to provide a transitional assistance to ex-combatants, and to bridge the gap between demobilization and broader reintegration (Greene et al, 2008). This phase is also called second generation of DDR (Molloy(b), 2008).

Third generation of DDRRR started in 2002 with the addition of more 'Rs' i.e. repatriation, reinsertion and rehabilitation (Shepherd, 2012). Up till now, the actors involved in implementing DDR have remained the UN, WB or their sponsored agencies in collaboration with host governments. The local community was not involved in the process. The next generation DDR is advocating for the involvement of the local community. Before implementing DDR projects, it is necessary to understand the social and political context of the locale and the "approach should serve to identify the differences in social dynamics" (López & Andreouli, 2015). The political process should have precedence over DDR (Muggah, 2009). "Every DDR was expected to be responsive to local context, a sequenced intervention was determined to be essential fixture of the war-to-peace transition" (López & Andreouli, 2015) and for this purpose, the UN and other donor agencies are trying to develop a mechanism in which the DDR could be locally owned by the host state (Molloy(b), 2008). When an armed group is transformed into a political party, building a favorable relationship with the respective community is mandatory, as observed in Mozambique and various other Latin American countries (Giustozzi, 2012).

In most cases the non-state actors or ex-combatants are harbored and abetted to negotiate with state or security forces, hence, the 'fourth generation' peace building theorists argue for a wider role of the civil society in the DDR process (Giustozzi, 2012). The next generation is also looking out, as described by Antonio Giustozzi (2012), for neo-liberal and developmental approaches. The former approach stresses on strengthening finances of ex-combatants in order to absolve them from worry to 'reintegrate into poverty' once again, while the latter stresses on addressing root causes of the conflict that require structural changes in society.

2.5. Theorizing Rehabilitation

2.5.1. Rehabilitation as a Concept

Rehabilitation is a vast program and possesses different meanings and interpretations in various institutions, organizations, and fields of studies. It is meanings also vary depending upon the context of its application, and the field within which it is being examined (McPherson et al, 2015). Rehabilitation has been emphasized in clinical and medical studies where the subjects have either been suffering from psychological or physical ailments. Thus, one might associate this term's application more to medical/clinical field of study instead of any other field (Robinson & Crow, 2009). Even historically, the concept of rehabilitation was employed for treating mentally or physically battered people who, if left unattended, would be a burden on other people or the society at large (McPherson et al, 2015). In medical sciences rehabilitation means "the restoration of an individual to his fullest physical, mental and social capabilities" (Villalba, 2011). In medical (or disabled) rehabilitation there are two major objectives: "reduce dependency, increase function, and help disables reintegrate into their lives and communities and reduce the burden on society that the return of so many "dependent" and disabled young men brought" (McPherson et al, 2015).

Criminologists and scholars of criminal justice have also discussed the concept of rehabilitation in their studies, with a particular focus on penal systems around the globe (Robinson & Crow, 2009). Social Rehabilitation from criminologists' perspective can be defined as a process by which the offender takes his or her place in society. Social rehabilitation is both a backwards and forwards looking concept for offenders: just as the social context is important to an understanding of offending, so it is important to understanding the processes of desistance and rehabilitation (Robinson & Crow, 2009,124-125). There are other areas in the physical sciences where rehabilitation is required and applied; for example, rehabilitation of concrete surfaces (Blaschko & Zilch, 1998); rehabilitation of burned soil surface (Parsons, 2003); rehabilitation of children in sports-related concussion (Gagnon et al, 2009) and rehabilitation of river and fish populations (Pretty et al, 2003). Similarly, in War studies, rehabilitation of mentally distorted soldiers and civilians (Medeiros, 2007) and rehabilitation of the landless, rehabilitation of displace

persons (Thukral, 1996). Further, human rights activists are advocating "rights-based thinking for the assessment and treatment of offenders" (Tony, 2011).

However, this study focuses on rehabilitation of ex-combatants in post-conflict areas geared at enabling these men to re-join their communities as acceptable and socially fit characters. To place the discussion in perspective, a broad, dictionary definition of rehabilitation may prove useful. The Oxford Dictionary defines the term rehabilitation, as "… the action of restoring someone to health or normal life through training and therapy after imprisonment, addiction, or illness" (Oxford, 2016). This dictionary meaning exposes us to the many dimensions of rehabilitation, which does not only require the 'subject' to be rehabilitated, but also cooperation from the community where the subject is expected to be reintegrated or reunited. Yet, it is paramount to understand the underpinnings and ultimate objective of rehabilitation, which is to prevent 'Recidivism' (Justice, 2016). Rehabilitation, in other words, is the management of, and dealing with, the consequences of protracted conflict (Pante, 2006), so that the conflict is virtually reduced from repeating itself and the actors of conflict are potentially discouraged from returning to their old ways.

The idea of rehabilitation of offenders got popularity in late 20th century, where scholars and practitioners alike advocated that offenders also be treated as members of the community, with the right to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society as normal citizens (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013). Therefore, rehabilitation should be defined not only from the victim's perspective (society at large) but also from the offender's perspective (ex-combatants in this case). The aim of the rehabilitation process is to ensure the restoration of offenders into their normal lives, and redress for the grievances that lead them to militancy in the first place. The Research Society of International Law concludes that rehabilitation is a process through which physical, social and psychological measures are enacted in which the ex-combatants are restored to a status in which they no longer have desire or need to participate in activities or groups associated with terrorism (Soofi, 2012).

As discussed earlier, rehabilitation can be multifaceted; for example, mental, psychological and physical rehabilitation, but for the purpose of this study, the term has been defined in the context of post-conflict rehabilitation of ex-combatants, whereby it is a process through which the hatred developed in the minds of angry person or group of persons against the state or community

is washed out. This process also redresses the grievances of ex-combatants and enables concerned authorities to reintegrate them to a status where they could live a normal life-like the other citizens of the state -by provision of equal opportunities to earn, live and prosper.

Since, these ex-combatants have willingly or unwillingly committed crimes during the conflict; they are normally viewed as offenders by the common people. The difference between them and the common criminal is that these men were convinced to be in service of some higher objective and ideological righteousness (Robinson & Crow, 2009). Hence, their rehabilitation would require more stress on psychological as well as ideological aspect than that of a common offender of society.

In post conflict scenario, the success of a rehabilitation program depends on reintegration of ex-combatants, and empirical studies have proven that rehabilitation has reduced the chances of recidivism and yields better results in comparison with simply punishing the offenders (Ward and Maruna, 2007). The combatants are members of the community and they should be treated on humanitarian grounds, and should be rehabilitated as normal citizens of a state (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013). Any conflict leaves a deep impact on the community in which the conflict arises (Pante, 2006). In these circumstances the Liberals think that retribution or punishment will escalate grievances; especially, of the ex-combatants, for which they had originally picked up arms. They are also of the view that imprisonment leads to victimization of offenders (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013). The purpose of rehabilitation should be promoting human good (Ward and Maruna, 2007). On the other hand, "retributivism essentially describes the principle that wrongdoers should be punished because they deserve it, by virtue of the wrong that they have done" (Robinson & Crow, 2009, p. 7). Cullen and Gilbert (2013) continue;

> The conservatives are convinced that rehabilitation leads to the coddling of criminals and thus lowers the costs or pains of crime. From their vantage, this undermines the deterrent and protective powers of our criminal justice system and results in a higher crime rate. The conservatives thus conclude that society's futile efforts to treat criminals in a more humane manner are fostered at the expense of the increased victimization of good, innocent citizens; it is time that we ceased worrying about the criminals and started worrying about society (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013, p. 8).

Practitioners and academicians are divided in two groups over rehabilitation, which debate whether to punish the offender or to rehabilitate him into society as a peaceful citizen. This research builds on the argument of Henry (2006) which states that before punishing the offender it is necessary to identify the contextual causes of the crime. As pointed out earlier, the combatants

in a conflict are usually influenced by some external agendas and they are merely the 'puppets' of external or internal agents, hence, if they surrender to the state's authority then they should not be treated as militants but should be rehabilitated on humanitarian grounds (Robinson & Crow, 2009). Findings of the present research also fall in line with this argument as interactions with ex-combatants revealed that the ex-combatants were brain washed with religious ideology, which in combination with the negligence of state authorities compelled these ex-combatants to choose militancy. Following the post-conflict phase in Swat, these ex-combatants have surrendered and are repentant over their past choices. Rehabilitation should therefore be employed as the next logical step, which can help normalize the ex-combatants and reintegrate them into their society (Ward and Maruna, 2007). Another argument that supports rehabilitation in the case of Swat follows that most of these ex-combatants have unemployed and dependent family members such as wives and children etc. Punishing a single combatant may well translate into punishing entire family. This may further fuel grievances and criminal activity in the area. A humane justice system and approach would therefore call for the rehabilitation of ex-combatants (Henry, 2006). A restorative justice system approach, in addition to rehabilitation, can offer better chances of providing justice and ensuring community involvement, while setting grounds for a sustainable approach that also takes away from the burden on the correctional and judicial apparatus of the state.

2.5.2. Rehabilitation as a Process

In practice rehabilitation is synonymous with reintegration. However, a profound study of DDR reveals that they are in fact, two distinct components of post conflict peace building. The fundamental difference between the two is that rehabilitation (in the context of the post-conflict environment) is the process in which the ex-combatants are equipped with skills to survive in society such as, schooling, training etc. augmented by counseling, all of which are mostly conducted inside specialized centers. Reintegration, on the other hand, is the outcome of what is learnt in the process and its expression in society. When we try to define rehabilitation, we take it as a process through which ex-combatants are reintegrated into society. This simple definition distinguishes both the terms, and indicates that one is the 'process' and the other is the 'outcome'. The ultimate purpose of rehabilitation program is to reintegrate the war-torn society into its

original shape. For further clarification, it is necessary to find out how reintegration is defined and what its purposes are in the existing literature.

Much of the literature does not discuss reintegration separately. Most of the data on reintegration could be found in the literature of DDR. In the UN Approach to DDR, it is clearly stated that DDR cannot prevent violence or resolve the conflict but it provides an environment in which other post- conflict peace building initiatives can easily proceed (United Nations, 2006). When we try to discover how reintegration is defined within DDR, we realize that it is the process through which an ex-combatant procures civilian status. It is a social and economic process in which ex-combatants acquire sustainable employment in communities at the local level (Knight M. , 2012, p. 18).

Anders Nilsson (2005, p. 27) defined reintegration as, "Reintegration is seen as a societal process aiming at the economic, political, and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civil society". It is a long process and the ex-combatants usually require long term assistance. United Nations defines and elaborates the post-conflict processes and places disarmament at the top; proceeds towards demobilization; then reinsertion and at last reintegration. Reinsertion is the short-term assistance given to ex-combatants during demobilization, before the long-term process of reintegration. It helps to "deal with the security problems by providing ex-combatants with an alternative to the ways of making a living" (United Nations, 2006).

> Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance (United Nations, 2006, p. 03).

By this definition it can be concluded that reintegration is an outcome which starts after rehabilitation. Reintegration is the further assistance given to the rehabilitees after graduation from rehabilitation program. The literature also reveals that both the concepts are different but it does define them separately. This distinction is clarified in the UN integrated DDR Standards while defining reintegration. The document states in the pre-text that:

> The UN shall use the concept and abbreviation 'DDR' as a comprehensive term that includes related activities, such as repatriation, rehabilitation, reconciliation and so on, that aim to achieve reintegration. These activities should therefore make part of the overall concept as well as planning of reintegration processes, where necessary (United Nations, 2006, p. 02).

It becomes quite clear from this statement that reintegration, rehabilitation and related concepts are different activities conducted for peace building in post-conflict environments. This also reveals that reintegration is a broader concept that encompasses rehabilitation along with other concepts i.e. reconciliation, security sector reforms, repatriation and so on. But, after examining the literature on rehabilitation and reintegration, it can be concluded that rehabilitation is a broader framework/term than reintegration. Reintegration should operate under rehabilitation. The reason is that rehabilitation comes before reintegration in post-conflict peace building. It is rehabilitation that paves the way for other post-conflict peace building activities.

Maivel and Andreouli quote Nussio (2011a) as stating "Reintegration program involve economic, psychosocial, educational and vocational assistance to help former combatants and their dependents to become socially and economically engaged" (López & Andreouli, 2015). This definition is incomplete as the word "engaged" is improperly placed in the definition; it should be replaced with the word 'reintegrated'. A study conducted on the DDR program in Afghanistan by the Center for Peace Studies, University of Tromso, defined reintegration as the process in which the fighters "change their status from 'combatants' to 'civilians' and altering violent activities and adopt the way which is sanctioned positively by the community" (Bahman & Torjesen, 2012). This definition, again, confuses the concepts of rehabilitation with reintegration as it does not make a clear distinction between them.

The objectives of DDR demand that it is carried out to build confidence between the actors of the conflict and the community, to prevent possibilities of future conflict and to provide grounds for reconstruction, social capital and reconciliation (UNDP, 2005). In the objectives of DDR, only "R" is focused upon. When a combatant is disarmed and demobilized, he is given proper schooling and training to work for peace building in society as a normal citizen. This sentence reveals two concepts. The first, schooling and training, is 'rehabilitation' while work for peace building as normal citizen is 'reintegration'.

In the literature on DDR, the DDR process is disarmament, demobilization of the combatants and then reintegration of these combatants into society. Rehabilitation remains a grey area as this literature does not tell us how these combatants are to be reintegrated. The literature also establishes that they have been through a process. The immediate process after demobilization is 'reinsertion' and 'rehabilitation'. This is the most important phase of DDR which has been

constantly ignored and has been given very little attention under DDR, although it should have been a priority in DDR.

Following immediately after demobilization, 'reinsertion' precedes rehabilitation, which is an instant response to restore the war-torn society. UN defines reinsertion as "the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. It is a form of transitional assistance to help meet the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families" (United Nations, 2006). This assistance is given in the demobilization phase when the detainees are in military internment centers.

Özerdem and Podder (2008) are of the view that reinsertion is traditionally considered a part of the reintegration phase and was labeled as resettlement and rehabilitation, although, it is a separate stage during the demobilization phase. In the post-conflict environment when institutions and infrastructure have been destroyed, the international as well as national security agencies adopt a policy of 'winning hearts and minds', with the aim to pave the way for promoting peace building processes. Reinsertion is the phase in which it is trying to win the hearts and minds, especially of ex-combatants. This is similar as 'first-aid' given to demobilized ex-combatants. It is a transitional assistance given to ex-combatants and their families during demobilization which includes the allowances like food, shelter, clothes, medicine, short term employment skills, and education and necessary tools. This period could be extended up to one year (United Nations, 2006, p. 02). This explanation of UN in IDDRS-2006 confuses reinsertion with rehabilitation. During demobilization, the ex-combatants are detained in military internment centers where they are investigated and are given immediate assistance. This takes anywhere from four weeks to six months. It may not be possible during this period to provide education as well as vocational trainings to the detainees. This educational and vocational training phase needs time, resources, the equipment and experts, which are difficult to provide in internment centers. This phase should differ from rehabilitation which starts when the detainees (ex-combatants) are shifted from military custody to specialized centers. These specialized centers are called rehabilitation centers where rehabilitation process is conducted to enable the reintegration of the detainees into society.

2.6. Conclusion

The fundamental thesis of this chapter is to highlight the blurred line between rehabilitation and reintegration. The concepts are confusing in existing literature. It is also concluded that rehabilitation precedes reintegration which is not a process itself but an outcome of rehabilitation.

This chapter discussed the major themes of the present research and defined those themes in the context of the present study. One of the interesting themes is 'controlled society' which is a new idea in the field of peace and conflict studies and needs further exploration.

The later part of this chapter discusses international DDR and its compatibility with Swat. It is shown that the international process cannot be followed in totality. There should be an understanding for every context of a conflict. UN should contextually define DDR in its literature.

Research Methodology

This qualitative research has employed *Ethnography* to understand post-conflict scenario, particularly rehabilitation in Swat, a district of Pakistan. This chapter is a detailed account of the methodological approach of conducting research in '*Controlled Environment*'. This chapter is a "confessional tales"[6] of the research methodology and method of post-conflict rehabilitation in Swat (Giulianotti, 1995). The chapter has supplied some new tools and methods for conducting research in a controlled environment. The chapter explains how the researcher gathered the data in a sensitive environment and how he made use of the ethnographic experiences. Since this research covered some sensitive issues, therefore, this chapter not only looks at the logistical and ethical issues but also the difficulties incurred reaching the relevant people/respondents, whether they were locals or from the armed forces. This chapter also attempts to explain how the researcher overcame those ethical issues. The significance of the research methodology is also explained in this chapter. Towards its conclusion, this chapter explains the tools and instruments used for gathering and interpreting data collected in the field.

The post-conflict environment of Swat provides a unique example of a 'closed setting' in the form of rehabilitation centers and the rehabilitation programs they offer, which aim to influence the behavior of the individuals (ex-combatants) previously engaged in conflict. In this regard, the research has employed an institutional analysis framework and a sociological framework to understand the relationship between the rehabilitation centers in Swat and their inhabitants; the governance structure of the rehabilitation centers that how these centers are managed and to understand how the centers have affected and shaped the behavior of the ex-combatants.

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[6] There are many ways to write ethnographic research; e.g. realist tales, impressionist tales, structural, post-structural, advocacy tales and many others. Amongst these, confessional tales, is a method of writing ethnographic research in which the researcher explains that how research is conducted.

3.1. Ethnographic Experiences in Swat

3.1.1. Why Ethnography?

Ethnography and participant observation are sometimes synonyms, but further inquiry informs us that ethnography is wider in its scope and meaning. Ethnography is a "term that refers to both a method and writing product of that method" in social sciences and participatory observation of a setting (Bryman, 2012, p. 31). In an ethnographic research the researcher is a participant observer as well as "uses non-observational methods and sources", like, interviews and documents (Bryman, 2012, p. 466). By its definition, ethnographic research is a long time and resource consuming methodology which deals with "social interactions, behaviors and perceptions that occur within social setting" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). This is why it is difficult for a Masters or Graduate student to conduct full ethnographic study of a setting. A student usually studies only a particular aspect of a given setting. Studying a particular aspect of a social setting is termed "micro-ethnography"[7] (Wolcott, 1990). However, it must be said that within the body of ethnography research, there is what is generally referred to as 'interactive inductive study' (Bryman, 2012, p. 447), which unlike participant observation that requires some sort of participation – action on the part of the researcher, in 'interactive inductive study', the researcher is directly having interaction with the subject. In this case, studying ex-combatants through participant observation in the rehabilitation center was difficult, due to lack of accessibility into the centers, however, the researcher had a micro-ethnographic study through 'interactive inductive study'. The researcher did not only spent enough time with the graduates of the rehabilitation centers in their community, but interacted with them closely, created some degree of familiarity, and that enable the ex-combatants to be at ease in offering researcher the necessary information used for this study.

This research is qualitative in nature as it explores the post-conflict rehabilitation efforts in Swat. Since a quantitative study may prove difficult and risky in sensitive areas, a qualitative research with more fluid and liberal perimeters was adopted by the researcher. The researcher opted for qualitative study with an ethnographic lens. The researcher opted for ethnography in order to explore the administrative arrangements, nature and methodology of rehabilitation

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[7] This study uses the term 'ethnography' instead of 'micro-ethnography'.

programs in Swat and the rest of the country. This research design proved efficacious in meeting the research requirements.

There are some fundamental issues in conducting ethnographic research in societies like Swat; one is the social setting of the area, i.e. a closed or open setting (Bryman, 2012). The society in Swat is relatively 'closed'. Another distinction is the setting is public or non-public (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). The non-public settings are the disciplined societies (Deleuze, 1992), like schools, organizations, armed forces, factories etc. In case of this research, the rehabilitation centers are focused, this falls under disciplinary societies or non-public settings. For the researcher it was difficult to choose between a covert observation/study and an overt participation, in such a closed environment. Initially the researcher tried covert participation to get information from the key-informants but that was a risky job. Covert participation, as Alan Bryman (2012, p.436) explains, has its own advantages. It will provide original information of a setting, as the key-informants will not adjust their behavior for being under research or observation in whatsoever manner. But, in a closed setting, which is a sensitive setting too, there is a life risk for the researcher as well as for the key-informants. Covert participation could be revealed at any time, and the researcher could be labeled as a spy of any foreign agency in the eyes of both the community and security forces. In a covert participation the researcher also cannot ask questions relevant to his research from the key-informants as they may become suspicious (Bryman, 2012, p- 439). Therefore, the present researcher opted for an overt participation. Overt participation means when the researcher explains his purpose of visit, not to everybody in the field but only to the person(s) whose help is required in the research; those are the key-informants as well as the guides who take the researcher into the field. With an overt participation and after having established a trusted relationship, the researcher was able to take notes and record interviews openly in front of key-informants.

There were other challenges specific to the area of study i.e. Swat. One of these was the tradition and culture of Swat known as *Pashtunwali,* which distinguishes it from other areas in many aspects. One challenge posed by this culture was the difficulty in engaging with the female population, who also formed a part of the research sample. As part of *Pashtunwali*, women are not

allowed to move freely outside their homes without being accompanied by a man (*mahram*[8]), and even so, they only interact with nuclear relatives. Therefore, interviewing the female sample proved nearly impossible. Another difficulty was the identification of potential militants, who became indistinguishable from the civilians, when they moved about freely in the area. They could harm both the interviewee and the interviewer. The area of Swat also hosts a large population of security forces, who do not allow any researcher, or the presence or movement of outsiders (non-locals) in the area.

However, due to the researcher being a local of the area, these factors did not pose any significant problems. Yet the sensitive nature of the topic and stigma attached to it, led to even familiar locals and key informant becoming hesitant to share information. The relevant government offices also seemed to fear the security risks attached with the research, and as a result did not allow access to sensitive information and rehabilitation centers. However, opting for an ethnographic research, proved beneficial in certain ways. First, it was easier for the researcher to move about and live within the society under research; being a local it was relatively easy for the researcher to understand the context, locale and overall culture under research. Second, any sensitive research required some personal interpretations of people, geography, social, and political culture, and the conflict itself by the researchers. Understanding these phenomena is not possible without adopting an ethnographic research methodology. Third, a researcher cannot expect that he will receive answer(s) to every question from the respondents. Ethnography, therefore, acted as a strategy through which the researcher was able to observe and interpret the social realities as they unfold before him. In order to supplement the responses gathered during field work, the researcher was able to consult documents and conduct interviews. Possessing knowledge and understanding of the land, people, language and customs of the area under study, allowed the present researcher to conduct a thorough research.

3.1.2. Developing Questionnaire

The tools used for data collection comprise of questionnaires, focus group discussions (FGDs), interviews and personal observations. The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions. The questions asked from the graduates of rehabilitation centers included inquiry

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[8] Mahram is a term used in Shariah (Islamic law) for the person(s) with whom a woman cannot marry; for example, father, brother, brother-in-law, father-in-law and some others.

about general information about the rehabilitation centers; the type of education and vocational training imparted; information regarding post rehabilitation income sources; respondents' social assimilation; respondents' views about the conflict; the behavior of community and attitudes towards respondents post conflict and other questions of similar nature. On the basis of these questions, the researcher was able to analyze rehabilitation centers and their effectiveness. Gauging the effectiveness of the rehabilitation centers allowed the researcher to understand the degree of the respondents' reintegration in their society pots conflict.

Four focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with the community members. The number of participants varied from 5 to 8. The questions asked during FGDs were about the participants' views regarding combatants, rehabilitation centers and post-conflict developments in rehabilitation and reintegration. The questions also included inquiring how the participants found these graduates after rehabilitation and how engaged and assimilated these graduates were in their society in the participants' view. Similar to questions asked from the other sample size, these FGD questions allowed the researcher to gauge the success of the rehabilitation programs

Relevant stakeholders formed another part of the sample for the research. This sample comprised of three types of stakeholders: government officials, NGO practitioners and community members. The officials were asked questions about rehabilitation centers and related processes, while the latter two stakeholders were asked questions about the graduates of rehabilitation centers, the graduates they were familiar with, as well as their perceptions about rehabilitation and reintegration in general.

Developing questionnaires is one of the most important and difficult phases while conducting ethnographic research. A researcher cannot ask each and every question in his pre-made or ready-made questionnaire. The questionnaire for this research was adaptive. Certain questions had to be amended in order to thwart suspicion of the interviews and ensure their cooperation (Gay, Mills & Airasian, 2012, p-389). It allowed the researcher to adapt the questions keeping in view the terrain, society, social norms, security arrangement and sensitivity. For this study, a single questionnaire couldn't work. The researcher divided the target population into four groups. These included ex-combatants; community members; nuclear family members; and women. The stakeholders (key-informants) were also divided into four groups, i.e. the staff at rehabilitation centers; governmental officials (civil bureaucrats and military officers) who were

directly or indirectly involved in dealings with ex-combatants; the academia and the NGOs, and civil society personnel relevant to rehabilitation and reintegration. Four different questionnaires were developed for the first category of target population; questionnaire for ex-combatants, for community members, for nuclear family and for women. Four different questionnaires were developed for the second category, the key-informants. However, all these questionnaires were adaptive; this allowed the researcher to adjust the questions according to the situation and collect relevant data.

3.1.3. Developing Contacts with Ex-Combatants and Community Members

The population sample for the research comprised mainly of the ex-combatants who had graduated from rehabilitation centers and reintegrated into the society. They were identified and approached through 'snow-ball' method. The sample size consists of 45 interviews in which 30 interviews were recorded while the rest were not due to ethical considerations. Amongst the 45 interviews, 22 interviews have been conducted from graduates (ex-combatants) of the rehabilitation centers at Swat, while 23 have been conducted from direct and indirect stakeholders including, military officials, rehabilitation centers' officials, community members and the practitioners working in different Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and NGOs. The stations of interviews were Swat for ex-combatants, while interviews from other stakeholders were conducted in different cities of Pakistan. The interviewees' names have been coded anonymously with the objective that they may not get harmed physically or mentally.

Identifying and locating the graduates (ex-combatants) of rehabilitation centers was the first major hurdle in the research. These graduates were found through the researcher's personal contacts with the community members and then by adopting the snow-ball method. The second problem after the initial identification of the graduates was the difficulty in establishing contact as these graduates were kept under strict surveillance. If discovered in contact with an outsider/unknown person, the graduates were summoned at the security forces check post for an investigation. Therefore, a majority of the 'identified' graduates were not ready to give any interview. To overcome this, the researcher established contacts with the graduates' trusted friends and family members, who then put the researcher through to the graduates (Bryman, 2012, p-435). Up to five visits had to be made-usually to the respondent's home- to obtain a single interview

from both the graduates and ordinary community members alike, as most of them were not comfortable outside their homes, especially to talk about the sensitive topics of extremism, militancy, and rehabilitation (of ex-combatants) etc. The sampling was neither random nor targeted but 'convenient sample'.[9] Because locating respondents for random sampling was difficult, the researcher conducted interviews with every graduate and every community member who had information regarding rehabilitation or rehabilitation centers, regardless of their age group or profession.

3.1.4. Official Permission

Obtaining official permission for establishing contact with ex-combatants proved very difficult. The researcher sought help from the university which sent out several letters to officials concerned with rehabilitation activities in Swat. The first letter was sent to the army commander in Swat, who redirected the researcher to the Provincial Home Department. However, upon visiting the Home Department, the researcher was refused permission to visit the concerned rehabilitation centers as matters related to militancy and radicalization are highly confidential. After multiple rejections-from both military and civilian sources- the researcher chose to directly contact the graduates of rehabilitation centers. In addition to graduates from juvenile and adult rehabilitation centers, the researcher also made contact with family members of such graduates and ex-combatants. This method proved more fruitful as the respondents were more comfortable speaking to the interviewer from the comfort of their homes. The inside stories of the concerned rehabilitation centers were drawn from the stories of these graduates, as well as from administrators and instructors of these rehabilitation centers. The researcher did not rely solely on these respondents, but interviewed the community members and nuclear families of these graduates as to confirm the information given by the earlier strata.

None of the interviewees were willing to become known. None of them were willing to either sign a consent form, or publish anything with their name. Their names and other details were therefore kept anonymous and ordered according to pseudonyms. These pseudonyms have been ordered as 'Respondent # 1; Respondent # 2, and so on. A similar problem was with the recording

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[9] This idea of 'convenient sample' is given by Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani, Chairman Gallup Pakistan.

of interview data (Gay, Mills & Airasian, 2012, p-21). The respondents did not feel comfortable with their voices being recorded, due to which very small number audios/videos were collected during the course of the research.

3.1.5. Emotional and Ethical Issues

An ethnographic research always poses ethical challenges. Considering this and the researcher's personal affiliation with the area and community, the research proved especially difficult (Gay, Mills & Airasian, 2012, p-22). Since, the Swat conflict also affected the researcher directly and indirectly. personal bias posed a challenge at every stage of data collection. In order to minimize this personal bias, the researcher engaged in extensive field work, interviews and focus group discussions. The researcher also chose overt participation in the research setting instead of covert participation, which also allowed the researcher to work with free conscience (Bryman, 2012, p-441). This also helped minimize ethical issues as the key-informants were well aware of the researcher's intentions and objectives. The researcher approached convinces key-informants for interviews in a polite manner and made multiple visits to secure their cooperation. During this two-year field work, 45 ex-combatants were visited by the researcher, amongst whom 23 agreed to provide interviews and share information while the rest 22 were observed and noted in informal discussions. The researcher did not object to the abusive language which they used during interview. Nor did the respondents abstain from providing irrelevant details during interview, which lengthened interview sessions and consumed a lot of time during transcription of the interviews.

In addition, research in a sensitive area such as Swat came with its own risks and dangers. Amongst these, especially dangerous was the risk involved with being falsely accused of being part of international intelligence agencies. To avoid being falsely suspected the researcher opted for an overt participation. Due to the heavy traditional influences and practices in Swat, the researcher also incurred some difficulties in engaging the female respondents. In order to overcome this, the researcher employed the help of local associates who helped gather interview data from the female respondents. The accuracy and reliability of research data was ensured through the collection of audio recordings.

3.1.6. Access and Sensitivity

A researcher conducting ethnography in a sensitive area must try to blend with the local setting. A researcher must also be very careful of the local language/accent, customs and clothing etc. Being a local of the research area proved beneficial for the researcher and he was able to conduct research without arousing suspicion.

In addition to taking care of appearance, the researcher also had to be careful while identifying research respondents. Considering the sensitive nature of the research, and the fact that Swat is an indigenous area, where the locals may not always possess reliable information, research respondents had to be selected very carefully (Gay, Mills & Airasian, 2012). Similarly, since tradition plays a very important role in Swat, most of the information was obtained from local elders who had been personally involved in most of the peace processes related to the conflict.

3.2. The Field

An ethnographic researcher should first set indicators for his study. He should have information about the language, culture, tradition, natural settings, climate and environment of the area he plans to research. A researcher must try to guess as much information about his respondents as he can without being overly intrusive (Gay, Mills & Airasian, 2012, p-25). Details related to the respondent's appearance and environment should also be observed carefully. The researcher must also be able to recognize fear, hesitance etc. by paying attention to the respondent's facial expressions. At last, the researcher must ensure that the observations he has noted are neutral and do not include his personal attachments, feelings or biases. Emotional attachments with the respondent(s) can often de-track the research and lead to inaccurate findings and conclusions (Creswell, 2006, p-35).

During the 24 months of field work the researcher visited the field area (district Swat), 30 extensive visits to different areas were also conducted during this time span i.e. November 2016 to December 2018. The sensitivity and difficulties were so high that only seven out of thirty visits were successful; the researcher was only able to interview ex-combatants and other key informants

during these seven visits. Similarly, in order to meet ethical requirements during the research, the researcher also had to show respect for local customs, which revere the local elders. Therefore, in addition to enjoying the respect of their communities, these elders also tended to possess the most information (Abdallah, Resetarits & Umir, 2011). However, these respondents were not always helpful. Many of interviews initially intended to span around 20 minutes, eventually exceeded more than two hours as the researcher could not reject the non-required (irrelevant) discussions of the elders during the interviews.

There were many occasions where the comments made by the respondents were inappropriate (e.g., the use of abusive language against the army or the state, or Taliban) however, the researcher had to make sure that he was not reactive in any manner. He had to maintain his composure during the interviews, and at times, even agree with respondents when they passed any unpleasant comment.

3.3. Interview Setting

Selection of the interview venue/setting must also be made very carefully by the researcher so as not to compromise his personal safety or the safety of the respondent (Abdallah, Resetarits & Umir, 2011). Giving priority to the respondent's choice with regards to the interview setting can help put the respondent at ease and remove unnecessary suspicion about the interviewer's intentions and motives. Also, a researcher should choose the place where he/she can ask questions without any fear and interference.

A story from the field; a guide in the field called a graduate of rehabilitation center at his home but the researcher insisted to visit the place of graduate's choice. The guide made phone call to rehabilitee for a meeting but did not explain the purpose of the researcher's visit. The rehabilitee was running a shop at the area of Khwazakhela. When researcher arrived at his shop, he offered tea and was very nice in his dealings with the researcher. But when the purpose of visit explained to him, he refused to give any interview. The researcher only could do what an ethnographer would have done, noted his dealings with other people and surrounding environment in which he was currently doing his business. Similar situations have happened many times.

As observed during the research, the rehabilitees were highly reluctant to talk about their past or present. Every unknown man was considered suspicious and every suspicious man was considered an agent of the intelligence agencies.

Once during field visits, the researcher approached three rehabilitees who were busy in the construction of their home. Initially, the researcher preferred not to interrupt them as they could easily refuse to give any interview. Nevertheless, the researcher took part in their activity and remained with them till the conclusion of their work. This not only helped the researcher win their trust, but also provided the researcher an opportunity to observe the respondents in their natural setting (Abdallah, Resetarits & Umir, 2011). Similarly, in the Pashtun society it is considered customary for a guest to take some gifts before visiting his / her host as sign of respect and reciprocal goodwill. Thus, the researcher also followed this practice and small gifts were taken for them. Being careful of such details allowed the researcher to win the trust of his respondents and they were more willing to share information.

3.4. Significance of the Methodology

In most case studies it is very difficult to follow the existing procedure(s) of research methodology, as the exiting procedures have often been developed in a different context. Peace and Conflict Studies is a nascent discipline and there is room for new knowledge and experiences. The social context always influences research procedures and therefore, a researcher must alter his pre-planned procedure according to the social setting. Apart from social context, a researcher must also be knowledgeable about the context and nature of the conflict, in case he is studying a particular conflict. The present research adds to peace and conflict research as it explores a new form of social setting, i.e. controlled societies. Such a setting comes with its own unique challenges and obstacles. In the case of the present research, approaches and methods were altered to suit the setting in order to ensure optimum data collection.

The Swat, district of Pakistan, is dominated by ethnic Pashtuns who have established norms and traditions distinct from other societies, known as *Pashtunwali*. This acts as a code of life and governs the laws to be followed by all members of the society during times of both peace and war. In addition, the recent conflict created mistrust and fear in the society, especially about topics

related to militancy and extremism. This as mentioned earlier, was overcome by the researcher by utilizing knowledge of the area and local contact. The methodology employed allowed to the researcher to adapt according to the situation and obtain research data. This methodology demonstrates the effectiveness of utilizing personal associations and contacts for the purpose of data gathering

3.5. Data collection

This study primarily depends upon primary data. Few sources of secondary data are available about rehabilitation program of ex-combatants in Swat. Although, much have been written on de-radicalization and counterterrorism strategies in the rest of the country. Offices of concerned departments and NGOs were visited for interviews and for requesting other relevant information. For updated policies and reports about rehabilitation and relevant development, daily newspapers were monitored. Governmental documents and other independent sources were also utilized as secondary data.

3.6. Data processing and analysis

Both descriptive and interpretative approaches were employed during research. Both the primary and secondary data were carefully accorded descriptive analysis and verifiable interpretation. During field visits, all the surroundings and happenings were observed and noted properly and interpreted accordingly. Direct questions asked from respondents were especially helpful for understanding the whole phenomenon of re-habilitation and re-integration of ex-combatants in society. Due to respondents' reluctance and ethical concerns, pseudonyms were assigned to respondents. These pseudo-names are denoted as respondent # 1, 2, 3… and so on.

3.7. Limitations

The researcher could not get access to rehabilitation centers in Swat. Information about these centers has been derived from interviews conducted during the field work: from military officials, administrators of rehabilitation centers and from graduates of these centers. The researcher also faced obstacles in contacting relevant respondents due to the nature of the research topic and the area. However, this research has not only drawn considerable information from ex-combatant who had graduated from these centers, but also from serving officers of these centers and community members. There are two types of ex-combatants, i.e. hard-core and soft-core[10]. This research is limited to soft-core combatants only. It is because of the fact that only soft-core combatants had passed through rehabilitation and the hardcore are under the custody of law enforcement agencies and are not directed to rehabilitation centers.

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[10] Soft-core are the mild combatants who merely supported the militants or their ideology. They were also found in logistic and material support to the militants but they were not involved in any aggression or violent activities against civilians, government or security forces. The hard-core are acute combatants and are arrested during conflict with security forces or during search operations by the security forces.

Chapter IV

Overview of Rehabilitation Programs in Pakistan

In chapter two, the research tried to differentiate rehabilitation from reintegration under the broader concept of DDR. The preceding discussion defines rehabilitation as the process where education, vocational and psychological trainings are imparted to the ex-combatants for the purpose of reintegrating them into society, while reintegration is the yield of the rehabilitation process, i.e. it is the expression of the skills and knowledge learnt during the rehabilitation process, in the society. Thus, the former is a process and the latter an outcome of the process. This chapter will attempt to discuss the civil military cooperation in Pakistan in rehabilitation programs running throughout the country in addition to other related and complementary programs, which include de-radicalization and counter-extremism programs. The logic behind putting this chapter here, just before the rehabilitation program in Swat, is to make an understanding of the reader about rehabilitation around the country.

The chapter discussing an overview of the civil-military relationship in Pakistan with a special focus on district Swat. This chapter will also attempt to understand and analyze rehabilitation and reintegration in controlled environment. This understanding of controlled environment will be regarded under the broader framework of the present research which establishes controlled environments as areas which have been placed under strict surveillance and control, generally and especially, in the case of Pakistan, of security forces or the military. Civilian organizations are not permitted to do their activities with regard to DDR. Such societies are usually characterized by the preeminence of the security forces (Rafique & Ahmed, 2013).

4.1. Understanding Civil-Military Cooperation in Swat

Civilian and military cooperation have, now, become a core issue for the armed forces as well as for civilian aid agencies in most of the countries around the world (Biorzoska & Eharhart, 2008). Both the civilian and military workers in a post-conflict environment having diverse approaches to peace building and there are many examples where both of them are difficult to unite over an issue.

> Their organizational structures are incompatible; their organizational cultures conflict, and even if the goal of promoting post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction is shared by these sets of actors, their interim objectives and their methods of achieving them also differ. Soldiers are supposed to stabilize the situation, if necessary, through the use of military force while the civilian workers improve the life standard of local population (Biorzoska & Eharhart, 2008).

This is also a reality that cooperation between these two sets of workers cannot be segregated in post-conflict environment. The military stabilizes the fragile situation while the civilian further expand and consolidate the peace building activities (Kasselmann, 2012). The problematic situation created in post-conflict when civilian aid is used for the purpose to achieve military objectives (Greenwood & Balachandran, 2014). The scholars and practitioners are agreed that civil military interaction is necessary in every post-conflict but they are also raising the questions that who should lead the situation. For example, they should work parallel as a single team or in subordination to any one; i.e. the military or civilian actors take the lead. These two sets of workers should work together in the field or they should keep distance while doing their duties. And, the non-military task should be done by the civilian workers or it is also conducted by the military in a post-conflict (Franke, 2006). But, this is also believed that military stabilizes the issue/conflict while civilian workers are peace dividends, therefore, the non-military task should independently manage by the civilian without interference of military but military should provide their cooperation.

On the other hand, some scholars also suggest that civilian-military cooperation/interaction is also depends on the situation. If the situation is tough then there will be difficulties for civilian workers to conduct their activities (Franke, 2006). They are of the view that in a post-conflict environment the lead should be given to the military and civilian workers should remain subordinate (Franke, 2006). The midway should be that that both sets of workers should work in

coordination; they should inform one another about their activities, movements, objectives, intentions and approaches (Kasselmann, 2012). The civilian projects should be dealt by the civilian experts and military should not interfere in any way; although, both civilian and military should firmly follow the policy of 'no-harm' (Biorzoska & Eharhart, 2008). There should be a forum where both sets of workers should conduct dialogues over crises prevention, security and peace building and this forum should be provided by both government and non-government organizations (Biorzoska & Eharhart, 2008). Mutual understanding for both military troops and civilian aid workers is imperative before going to the field where they implement any project (Kasselmann, 2012).

In Pakistan, the civil-military relationship has many afflictions and consolations since the birth of the country. The country has faced a number of Martial Laws while blaming the civilian government failure for its poor governance. The growing popularity of military in Pakistani society is because of the role it played in the last two decades when the country hit by the natural disasters as well as armed conflicts and instability which provided an opportunity for military to play a dual role; i.e. as aid agency and military expeditions respectively (Greenwood & Balachandran, 2014). In a report, published in an Islamabad based think tank, it is said, "the governments in Pakistan have less to fear from any external army than from their own" (PILDAT, 2017). It is because the domain for intervention and policy making is shrinking for civilian government while military is extended its outreach; for example, the developmental and peace building projects in Balochistan, erstwhile FATA and other conflict affected districts of Pakistan; including district Swat (PILDAT, 2017). The military put forth the argument that working in sensitive areas; especially, those are affected by terrorism, is risky for the lives of civilian workers. This subordination of civilian agencies begun with 2005 earthquake where military intervene for disaster response to 'win hearts and minds' of the public (Greenwood & Balachandran, 2014). This subordination continued over civilian aid workers in militancy hit areas where military tightly controlled the access and, consequently, the civilian agencies had left no choice but work in collaboration with military (Greenwood & Balachandran, 2014).This dominance role of military continued during the displacement due to military operations in Swat and erstwhile FATA where the access was controlled to the affected areas.

The subordination of civilian workers and agencies further strengthened with a regulation, The Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011, passed by the then government that legally empowered the military administration over civil and political (The Institute for Social Justice, 2011). Along with military activities the military also launched different projects which are falling under civilian domain; for example, reconstruction, dialogues, rehabilitation and reintegration in all conflict affected areas. District Swat is one of the conflicts affected areas where, beside other reconstruction projects, military launched rehabilitation programs for ex-combatants; namely, Sabawoon, Mashal and Sparly. The civil-military coordination in this rehabilitation program is also confusing. A military officer was denying any assistance from civilian government while, on the other hand, an officer of the civilian government was revealing that the whole expenditure of this rehabilitation program is bearing by the GoKP. In another occasion when the researcher seeking permission to access to the rehabilitation centers the request was denied by the military at rehabilitation centers that civil government is having the authority to give permission, but the civil government responses were in other way round. It is observed and concluded by the researcher that majority of the post-conflict activities; especially, any deal with militants or ex-combatants, are in control of military. Hence, the environment is termed as controlled environment and the rehabilitation centers are termed as controlled society.

Controlled societies and environment are observable in the case of Pakistan, where rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs for ex-combatants are underway in every province, but these are administered and managed by either the military or police department (Khan, 2015). In Swat, neither NGOs nor the police department is permitted to contribute to, or manage rehabilitation program for ex-combatants. Despite the country being open to national and international NGOs, the latter are only allowed to run de-radicalization programs. While these NGOs can work on de-radicalization of society, it is illicit for them to engage in the rehabilitation or reintegration of ex-combatants. Each aspect of interaction with ex-combatants is under the domain of the state through its security agencies. NGOs and other civilian organizations are only allowed to conduct soft activities in society (indirect engagement with ex-combatants) for example, engaging civilian in reconciliation and peace building, material assistance and other infrastructural development. This indirect engagement of civilian organizations is necessary as it helps in reintegration of ex-combatants. In military run rehabilitation programs, the community's contact with rehabilitees is restricted. The country's central counterterrorism institution, NACTA,

also recognizes this gap and states that "securitized response by security officials is deemed short-term and at the expense of long-term sustainable reforms that may benefit the prisoners and community in the long run. Peer to peer radicalization remains neglected in Pakistan" (NACTA, 2018). Therefore, it is necessary to review de-radicalization programs and projects run throughout the country by the government. This chapter will also review certain prominent non-governmental and semi-governmental organizations working on de-radicalization in Pakistan. This short overview will help provide an understanding of civil-military cooperation in the context of the present research.

Pakistan is a country facing many-types of conflicts. Majority of the conflicts are ethnic or religion based. In most cases, the conflicts are clandestine but in some parts of the country, they have manifested in the form of militancy or terrorism. In all of these conflicts the actors are mostly the aggrieved citizens who fight for their inclusion and demand redress to their grievances. These grievances range from religious and ethnic to other material and resource centric grievances. In order to resolve such conflicts, there is a need to first redress the grievances of the aggrieved citizens, and then to rehabilitate those who engaged in militancy against the state. For this purpose, the state needs a comprehensive national rehabilitation policy but both literature and field work of the researcher reveals that the country is lacking a clear and comprehensive policy for rehabilitation and reintegration. Therefore, there is need for a comprehensive and home grown[11] rehabilitation and reintegration program, while keeping in view, the different contexts of the conflicts, and social and cultural differences in Pakistan. The case of Sri Lanka may be observed as an example, where the national policy recommends following a contextually driven rehabilitation and reintegration program instead of following international approaches (Ratnayake, 2012).

Government of Pakistan does not yet realize the need of a comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration framework, which is evident from the manner in which rehabilitation programs in the country are run; all of them lack knowledge of the local context of the conflicts, social and

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[11] As stated earlier in this chapter, Pakistan suffers from different types of conflicts in different parts of the country. Since the grievances underlying every conflict are different, the rehabilitation policy should be driven by the type of grievances it seeks to address for different types of ex-combatants.
The term 'home grown' rehabilitation implies that the state should design rehabilitation programs to suit the domestic (home) context and not depend solely on international standards of rehabilitation.

cultural sensitivities and formally agreed policy frameworks. The policies drawn by the country are mostly security oriented (securitized) and not geared at searching for the solutions. For example, the policy of National Action Plan (NAP) and the institution National Counter-terrorism Authority (NACTA) both cover the security dimension and do not pay much attention to addressing the grievances that have fueled the conflict.

However, the state's willingness to adopt an approach of de-radicalization is evident from its efforts to mainstream previously militant groups by transforming them into political parties. An example of such a transition was apparent when the rebranded Milli Muslim League (MML) under Hafiz Saeed, the head of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) contested election in Punjab, in 2017 (Marwat, 2017). Despite this being an evident political solution, there is still reluctance to allow militant groups into mainstream politics. Moreover, the procedures to mainstream these extremist groups in the politics of the country are still lacking. The MML is not yet registered as political party with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the Interior Ministry has refused to provide it permission to be a political party (Pakistan Observer, 2017). The MML has been denied registration repeatedly, but Pakistan must learn from other countries that once had to contend with similar experiences, for instance Central America where, the transition and transformation of an armed group (opposition) to electoral opposition was witnessed (Allison, 2006).

4.2. DDR in Swat Context

As highlighted earlier, international DDR is difficult to implement in its pure form in Swat. The nature and context of the Swat conflict is different from that of other conflicts around the world. Therefore, it is not necessary to strictly follow the standards framed by the UN in its integrated DDR standards (United Nations, 2006). One of the main characteristics, due to which the Swat rehabilitation and reintegration program is different, is that the government implemented DDRR in Swat without a comprehensive peace agreement with combatants, while international DDR requires an agreement with combatants before implementation of DDR. Secondly, the administration and management in Swat rests with the state's security agencies, that is the Pakistan Army, while in international DDR these responsibilities rest with UN, civilian government or other humanitarian agencies. Thirdly, the financial support of international DDR is the responsibility of

the UN or international community, while in Swat the financing of the program is done by the government of Pakistan. Lastly, security, political and fiscal stabilization and reconciliation are the priorities of international DDR but in Swat, the priority is given to security and political stability. Therefore, in Swat, the DDRR program is targeted at the individual combatant while collective demobilization of combatant groups is mandatory under international DDR. This makes the concept clear that there is no DDR have been followed in Swat but its components have been followed separately; i.e. disarmament and demobilization were conducted simultaneously followed by rehabilitation and reintegration. The scholars and practitioners of international DDR also suggest that a successful reintegration needs comprehensive or collective transition of the armed group to a political party, rather than individual transition -as in the case of Swat- which can leave room for the latter to re-join their ex-group (Patino, Grabe & Gracia-Duran 2012, p. 43).

The international standards of DDR may be followed where the international community intervenes in the process but if a state conducts its DDRR program by itself then the standards are rarely followed and are mostly adaptive; something similar was observed in Columbia (World-Bank, 2008). The question that arises here is whether a country should follow the international standards of DDR set by the UN, or whether it should set its own. The international DDR and security sector reforms (SSR), have failed to present a comprehensive approach that could suit the local context of a conflict. "The conventional DDR and SSR are biased and state-centric and fail to reflect the real pictures of contemporary conflicts and peace building processes" (Giessmann & Dudouet, 2012, p. 30). In these conventional DDR and SSR processes, the militants are treated as mere culprits.

One of the necessary pre-conditions of rehabilitation and reintegration is to spread a message in the society that these combatants are our own people and have some grievances which are going to be addressed by the State. Through this strategy, the common citizenry will psychologically and sociologically become ready to accept them back into society. In Swat, on the contrary, there is a clear message that these militants are the agents of foreign intelligence agencies and enemies of the state, and are sabotaging the peace of the land. This makes rehabilitation and then reintegration, complicated. How can a society accept those people into the mainstream who have been declared the enemies of the state? They are treated as an enemy and the phrase 'common enemy, I am going to rehabilitate you' rightly fits here. The existing approaches to DDR and SSR

are therefore fortifying the old structures, and block the way for transformation (Giessmann & Dudouet, 2012, p. 31); transformation from old structures to pluralistic and democratic structures, where all democratic norms are valued. A successful reintegration needs a humanitarian approach to DDR and SSR; especially, in DDR, the 'R' should be abbreviated for rehabilitation instead of reintegration.

> The growing popularity of implementing DDR programs throughout the world has been accompanied by a burgeoning field of research to determine whether or not these programs are successful in accomplishing their goals. We know from the research that the challenges are many, but we still lack understanding of the first-hand experience of the ex-combatants—their personal perspectives on their challenges and what they do to address or overcome them (Janzen, 2014).

DDR, as the name reveals, stands for disarmament and demobilization of the militants while SSR is to sustain the disarmament and demobilization status of the ex-combatants. The UN needs to re-visit its integrated DDR standards, and more focus needs to be given to the humanitarian aspect instead of security. This humanitarian aspect is rehabilitation before reintegration, where a proper rehabilitation guarantees security as well as the prevention of recidivism.

Nilsson (2005) pointed to three basic challenges which are faced by a post conflict society, that are also true for Swat: first, ex-combatants are usually a threat to post conflict societies; second, the civilians are angry at ex-combatants as the latter have committed atrocities against the former and; third, the socially weak or marginalized ex-combatants will need special attention in the post-conflict reintegrated environment (Nilsson, 2005, p. 3), and the fourth challenge is the stigmatization of ex-combatants.

Field work indicated that most research respondents did not agree with official policies in post-conflict Swat. In fact, Swat rehabilitation strategy has been criticized on the grounds that it focuses only on those ex-combatants who are arrested by the security forces and ignored who have not been apprehended or those who voluntarily surrendered. The second ground for criticism is that these rehabilitation projects have been conducted in compartments where the environment is oppressive and does not provide a conducive atmosphere for someone who was aggrieved for one way or another. Third, reintegration in a cell is not considered rehabilitation; rather a detainee looks at it as retribution for an act of defiance against state authorities, for which he has now been reduced to the status of a petty criminal. Fourth, the rehabilitation program in Swat discriminates

between what it specifies as hard-core and soft-core militants. Hardcore combatants are those who had actively participated in the conflict. While soft-core are mild-militants who were merely radicalized by the extremist narratives, and had only provided moral and material support but were not physically involved in fighting. The Swat rehabilitation program aims at reforming and rehabilitating the soft-core militants and forsakes the hard-core fighters. Logically a successful rehabilitation strategy should cover everyone. If a certain group is ignored or kept out of the rehab program, the possibility of relapse to violence is more likely.

In a majority of reintegration programs, including Swat, the names of the former militants are entered into police records and they remain under active surveillance by the secret police and intelligence agencies for a considerable period of time before the authorities eventually lose interest in them. This strategy can be detrimental and overbearing for those who had participated in what they considered as a legitimate struggle against the state. An offender who has been set free but is under surveillance lives under constant fear of being apprehended again even for a minor infringement of law which may pale in comparison to the original sin (Spiked-online, 2013). Surveillance is one of the aspects of security. These combatants are followed so that they may not challenge the security again, which shows that the focus is on the first two components of DDRR, where security sector is a concern while the latter, RR, focuses on the humanitarian aspect, which is not the priority.

4.3. Government Run Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs

A Pakistani official claimed that his country has the world's largest rehabilitation program, at least in terms of numbers of countrywide rehabilitation centers. It has also been claimed that Pakistani experts were invited by the Saudi Arabia government to help in the improvement of the Saudi rehabilitation centers.[12] In Pakistan, a number of rehabilitation programs are operational in the provinces of Khyber Pashtunkhwa (KP), Sind, Punjab, and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but all of these rehabilitation programs are not organized within a single national policy framework and are functioning independently.

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[12] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, station Swat, April 2, 2017.

There are a number of rehabilitation projects of similar nature in Swat running under the supervision of Pakistan Army. Similar programs in Malakand division and FATA include, *Rastoon* (to bring back), a rehabilitation center which was established in Shangla, Malakand division, adjacent to Swat, but the center has stopped functioning due to lack of financial resources. Apart from this, there is a rehabilitation program for North Waziristan at Mir Ali; rehabilitation program for South Waziristan at Wana; Khyber rehabilitation program at Bara and *Nwe Sahar* (new dawn) rehabilitation program at Khar, Bajaur (Khan, 2015). It is revealed during an inquiry at the office that the program in Bajaur is no more functional due to limited resources.[13] The Khyber and North Waziristan rehabilitation programs are successfully functioning and have a success story of helping large numbers of ex-combatants to reintegrate into society. An official of Bara rehabilitation program revealed that only Bara rehabilitation center has rehabilitated 500 hundred ex-combatants since 2012.[14] While reviewing literature on rehabilitation and reintegration programs in Pakistan, the researcher found different projects with names like, *Sabawoon*, *Mashal*, *Sparlay*, *Rastoon*, *Nwe Sahar* and *Heila* (Khan, 2016 ; Khan , 2015). Upon field visit, only *Sabawoon*, *Mashal* and *Rastoon were* found functional, though the rest might not have been implemented, or might have stopped functioning due to shortage of funds and other resources.

The institutions and programs developed after the 2009 military operation in Swat, were for the purpose of counterterrorism and de-radicalization in the society. The need for de-radicalization was realized as there were thousands of terrorists and various terrorist groups active in Pakistan. Abdul Basit (2015) framed Pakistan's counter radicalization and violent extremism initiatives in the manner: i) De-Radicalization: which includes; Swat Program and Punjab Program. ii) Counter-Radicalization: this includes; Madrassa Reforms, National-International Security Policy 2014, National Action Plan 2014, Counter Terrorism Operations and Pakistan Protection Act 2014.

The above captions include both hard- and soft-core measures to counter extremism and terrorism. The hard-core measures are purely conducted by the state security agencies, the military and in some cases like in Punjab, the police. In term of soft measures, both government and NGOs having active participation.

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[13]Respondent # 3, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017
[14] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, station Swat, April 2, 2017.

It is a common view amongst government officials and practitioners of peace and conflict studies that extremists' narratives are deeply rooted and have penetrated into the society, and it is very difficult to point out who is a terrorist. The whole society cannot be rehabilitated in rehabilitation centers. For this, the whole society needs to have a comprehensive program of de-radicalization (Basit, 2015). While NGOs have initiated research organizations and programs geared at de-radicalization of the society and provincial police department is equally focusing on de-radicalization of ex-combatants, the government has not drafted any comprehensive national de-radicalization or rehabilitation strategy for ex-combatants, but has simply developed some institutions and policy for counterterrorism. The institutions and programs developed are as follows:

4.3.1. Counter Terrorism Department (CTD)

Every province has its own counter terrorism department (CTD), run by the police department of each province. The researcher tried to access CTD in each province, but could not get enough information. While Sindh's CTD offers certain degree of information, the CTD in Baluchistan and KP are relatively dysfunctional. Only Punjab CTD has run a successful rehabilitation and de-radicalization program but it has also gone dormant after 2016 (Rafique & Ahmed, 2013).

Detailed information from CTD Punjab obtained by the researcher during an interview with an official[15] of the same department, and based on an unpublished document of the department, certain issues and viewpoints were clearly enunciated.

Motivations

According to the department, terrorists are different from ordinary criminals and some are driven by ideology with actual grievances and religious causes that suit their cause. Some individual join terrorist group to temporarily escape conviction, but with passage of time, they become permanent members of the groups with the objective of fulfilling their material or spiritual needs. Sometimes they have no way out and consider violence a necessary compulsion for

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[15] Respondent # 18, in-person interview, station Islamabad, December 21, 2017.

survival. Apart from hard core terrorists, there are facilitators and supporters who easily become victims of the terrorist groups.

All terrorists cannot be captured, detained, eliminated or prevented from pursuing militancy. They cannot be convicted for many reasons, particularly in a religiously sensitive society. In such a scenario, conducting de-radicalization and rehabilitation efforts are imperative. The document reveals that with the withdrawal of US/ISAF forces from Afghanistan, a large number of militants will become jobless. There are scores of homegrown militants who have learnt nothing but to fight and to kill. Therefore, to prevent of these homegrown militants from joining terrorist groups, de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration is essential (Basit, 2015).

Approved Counter-terrorism Strategy

To avoid incidents of terrorism, government of Punjab approved a counterterrorism strategy on 31st July 2010, which revamped the counter terrorism department (CTD) and was mandated to fight terrorism in all its manifestations (Manan, 2010). New functions included collecting actionable information, registration of cases, investigation, surveillance of militant outfits and madrassas, and de-radicalization of former militants and jihadists. Along with these came the approved counterterrorism strategy, improvement of capacity of law enforcement agencies, identified areas of strategic interventions (social sector reforms) and a de-radicalization committee under Punjab Security board, headed by Chief Minister of Punjab (Manan, 2010).

De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization Plans

The CTD Punjab is working under three components;

1. De-radicalization and vocational training programs for former militants/jihadists.
2. De-radicalization for imprisoned militants in jails.
3. Counter-radicalization of Madrassa students.

The de-radicalization and counter-radicalization program is worked out in collaboration with Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA). Duration of each course and training is three months. The course contents are; technical/vocational training, religious discourse, ethical contents and psychological counseling. The expenditure of these three months on each trainee is Rs. 60,000 which includes a stipend to support his family during training,

transportation and training expenses. There is no post training financial aid but interest free loan of up to Rs. 50,000 for running a small business. CTD is responsible for monitoring post training activities as well as assessing their recidivism (Ahmed, 2013).

The three months training program consists of two modules; the first module consists of technical/vocational training provided by TEVTA, and the second module consists of religious and psychological training by religious scholars and psychiatrists. Religious scholars of *Tablighee Jumaat* have been engaged to provide teaching of moderate Islam. Punjab Social Welfare department is taken on board to give lectures on ethical values. The chaperons of CTD sit regularly in each course and evaluate the improvement of the rehabilitees.

Since the commencement of this program until July 2012, three batches have completed this course successfully with a total number of 311 participants. As part of training, the trainees were promised an interest free loan, though the loan was not provided on time, they were eventually approved by the government of Punjab.

Future Plans

The 1st component of de-radicalization was completed in July 2012, in which 311 participants were given technical and psychological trainings. The first component of the program was lacking as there were financial constraints and the beneficiaries of the program, both madrassa students and imprisoned militants, were given training together in one-time frame. Due to limited success, CTD realized that the program should be divided into two components; for imprisoned militants as well as for the students of madrassas.

2nd Component (de-radicalization of prison population)

A substantial number of terrorists are confined in prisons; mostly in Lahore and Rawalpindi. CTD Punjab is planning to extend de-radicalization program to these prisons. For this purpose, psychologists, educationists and religious scholars will visit prisons to assess terrorist population. The family members of these terrorists will also be engaged in this program. The module for this program is currently being developed.[16]

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[16]Note: no further information is available about the status of the program

3rd Component (Counter-radicalization for madrassas students)

Currently, there are 11023 registered and unregistered madrassas in Punjab that house thousands of students. CTD Punjab in collaboration with TEVTA and Punjab Vocational Training Council (PVTC), has planned to extend vocational training programs to all such madrassas. The purpose of these programs is to enable madrassas students to easily find jobs after the completion of their madrassa education. This intervention is very important as the madrassa students are living in a closed religious environment. Initially the programs have been aimed at major madrassas of the province but will be further extended to other, smaller madrassas as well. It is hoped that these madrassas will be gradually brought under mainstream education[17] (Basit, 2015).

4.3.2. NACTA

National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) is a relatively nascent organization. It was established in 2009, but was not functional until 2013, when the act was passed by the National Assembly regarding the official establishment of NACTA. Unfortunately, during its initial years, NACTA was greatly lacking in human resource. In 2015 it only had four officials, including the national coordinator. Due to this it was unable to function properly. But since 2016, substantial steps have been taken by the government in terms of its finances and human resource. Currently, there are about 60 personnel at officer ranks serving in NACTA, a significant improvement.

NACTA is mandated and concerned with the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants in civilian life. Not much has been done practically, and most developments remain confined to paperwork.[18] NACTA has no operational force or Rapid Response Force (RRF). NACTA does not have any unit at the provincial level either. NACTA had initially planned separate operational units and RRF at provincial level, but it was later decided that provincial police and the units of army in that locality-being the first responder-will act as the operational units of NACTA. This was decided because it was difficult for NACTA to sustain a separate force. Moreover, it was impractical to keep the force on standby at all times, since there was the possibility of terrorist activities all across the country. The unpredictable frequency of terrorist

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[17]Note: no further information is available about the status of the program, but TEVTA is doing its job very well around the country and is not limited to madrassas.

[18] Respondent # 20, in-person interview, Islamabad, 21 December, 2017

incidents and budget constraints also made it impractical to maintain a separate force. So, it was decided to designate nearby units of police and army as the RRF of NACTA. Local provincial authorities and setups in each province were also made to share the responsibility for this immediate response.

The province of Punjab has a robust setup of counterterrorism apparatus (Basit, 2015), which includes a counterterrorism force as well. Most of the other provinces have their own counterterrorism units, though weak in terms of financial and human resources. Punjab is the leading province in counterterrorism apparatus followed by Sind, Pashtunkhwa and then Baluchistan.[19] NACTA only plays a theoretical role; i.e. coordination, advising and policymaking. The provinces-with their existing facilities- can play a more important role than NACTA with regards to rehabilitation. The researcher personally feels that provinces are more relevant departments for rehabilitation and reintegration.[20]

None of the de-radicalization programs running in Swat, Punjab or elsewhere around the country, are under the authority of NACTA which are supposed to be under its authority. They are independent and get support from provincial funds. However, these local run programs provide all information to NACTA when needed. NACTA even do not play our advisory role in provincial rehabilitation programs, responded by the interviewee. The recent report (2018) of NACTA realizes the need for rehabilitation program but there is no synchronized strategy formulated even in this report. The rehabilitation program is almost ignored in NACTA (NACTA, 2018). The most popular counterterrorism policy, National Action Plan (NAP), is also not monitored or implemented by NACTA but by the National Security Division (NSD). NACTA is supporting NSD in terms of information and advising. NAP is a 20 points policy but rehabilitation is not mentioned in it. However, it mentioned that steps are to be taken for 'counter-narratives' which means NAP has de-radicalization program.[21]

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[19] Respondent # 18, in-person interview, Islamabad, 21 December, 2017
[20] Respondent # 20, in-person interview, Islamabad, 21 December, 2017
[21] ibid

4.3.3. NSD

National Security Division (NSD) was established in 2014 by the National Security Council (NSC) of Pakistan that oversees the overall security of the country. This division is responsible for formulating national security policy as well as collaborating with international partners on national security issues (Haroon, 2018). National Action Plan (NAP), the country's most popular policy, was drafted in December 2014 after the Army Public School attack that claimed the lives of 140 children. Further detail on structure and function of this department is not available.

4.3.4. AFIRM

At national level, Armed Forces Institute of Rehabilitation and Medicine (AFIRM), Rawalpindi, is involved in rehabilitating soldiers and civilians suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder or PTSD (ISPR, 2013). This includes for instance, children who had witnessed the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar. Currently, this institute is treating more than three thousand patients. The center also provides prosthetic limbs to those who have been handicapped during the fighting. Unlike any other rehabilitation centers in the country, this center is self-sustaining for its needs and does not depend on financial aid or other assistance from any organization other than the Army.[22] AFIRM is looking for rehabilitation to health or physique, and not vocational or psychological rehabilitation of ex-combatants.

4.3.5. TEVTA

Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) is a national institution established under an Act in 2013. The motives behind launching this program are to prevent radicalization of young generation in the country by providing them technical and vocational education through which they may engage in small business activities, since employment and financial stability have been known to reduce the chances of radicalization. This institution manages and regulates all technical and vocational training programs around the country.

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[22] Brig. Sher Akber, in-person interview, Islamabad, August 27, 2017

Established in 2013, the purpose behind this institution is to reduce unemployment among the young citizens of Pakistan so that they may not be affected and manipulated by the radical narratives of terrorists (TVETA, 2016). This program is not specifically meant for DDR but its functions have led to the reduction and elimination of radicalization from the society.

4.4. Semi and Non-Governmental De-Radicalization Programs

There are a number of semi-governmental or non-governmental organization that are running de-radicalization programs throughout the country but as mentioned earlier, these are working with the general community and are not directly interacting with militants or ex-combatants. These institutes do not organize programs on rehabilitation or reintegration of ex-combatants, but they are playing a vital role in de-radicalization. These organizations are working on different aspects which help in de-radicalization but the popular slogans they have are to change the exiting schools and madrassas curricula, and to take initiatives for 'peace education' (Minhas, 2018). To them, educating the community about peace and providing them new techniques of conflict resolution could prevent radical and extremist minds within the society from joining violent groups. Unfortunately, most of the NGOs working in Pakistan that were receiving funds from foreign countries or donor organizations have been banned by the government due to security reasons. However, there are still many organizations performing their activities on the premise of the No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from interior ministry of Pakistan. All organizations cannot be mentioned here, but some prominent among them are;

Iqbal-International Institute for Research and Dialogue (IRD) became an autonomous part of International Islamic University, Islamabad (IIUI) in 2008. Besides IRD, IIUI has another school with the name of *Da'awah* Academy. Both IRD and *Da'awah* Academy are conducting multiple programs including organizing conferences, workshops and seminars. These two sister institutes of IIU invite prominent religious scholars and educationists around the country and abroad in their programs. The themes of these programs include critical thinking, de-radicalization, sectarian and religious harmony, co-existence, and many themes more of relevance to the debate of conflict and causes of religious conflicts. They also organize different programs in which people from different religious and sectarian backgrounds are invited to find a way for harmony, co-

existence and de-radicalization. Their focus is not the ex-combatants but society at large. According to the IRD website, the institute "has organized intensive courses on topics such as "Media and Ethics" and "Critical Thinking" we have established collaborative relationships with academic institutions, think tanks, and civil society groups. Through our outreach programs we hold public lectures and seminars in district headquarters throughout Pakistan collaborating with local academic and civil society organizations. The Institute has also launched a series of publications in order to reach out to a wider public" (IRD, 2018).

As part of the contribution of NGOs to the de-radicalization programs, Hum Pakistani Foundation, a Lahore based national NGO, headed by a leading clinical and neuro-physiologist, Dr. Fereeha Paracha funds and assists the project *Sabawoon* (new dawn) in Swat. This organization is an umbrella of almost 20 sub-organizations. Currently, this looks after almost every psychological rehabilitation program around the country including *Sabawoon* (Seymour, 2011). During a conference, Dr. Paracha stated that by 2011, 180 juveniles were rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. These juveniles were involved in serious terrorist activities. Some of them were suicide bombers. In a news article, Julie McCarthy noted that this rehabilitation program is financed by the UNICEF (Mccarthy, 2011). But in interviews with the official representatives of *Sabawoon*, it was revealed that no such funding is available and Pakistan Army has been financing all these rehabilitation projects.

A similar de-radicalization program is *Tolana*, which means 'gathering', run by Paiman Alumni Trust, an NGO. *Tolana* is a strategy to neutralize the extremist tendencies in youth as well as in their families through community mobilization, active citizenship and social cohesion. One of the co-founder of Paiman Alumni Trust is a leading peace activist Mussarat Qadeem (Paiman, 2017). During 2014-16, Paiman also conducted programs for rehabilitation of juvenile ex-combatants and ran a center in Islamabad, but was later banned by the security forces due to security issues. The Paiman Alumni Trust now conducts programs on 'peace education based in Karachi and Peshawar (Minhas, 2018). Besides these, there are some other NGOs which are indirectly working on de-radicalization of society, but all of them are not involved with ex-combatants and their rehabilitation or de-radicalization.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter is an introduction of the later chapters which focus on rehabilitation and reintegration programs running in Swat. Here we tried to highlight different institutions and programs functioning in Pakistan for the main purpose of de-radicalization and counter violent extremism (CVE), either under the auspices of the state or by NGOs. The broader objective of all these programs is to de-radicalize the extremist behaviors of the sympathizers of terrorist or extremist groups in society by giving them education on peace building, harmonious co-existence, and pluralism. In this overview the researcher also found that there is no clear and comprehensive national policy for rehabilitation of ex-combatants through which they could be rehabilitated and reintegrated into the society. However, there are programs on provincial basis such as the CTD under the provincial police authority, but these programs have not been taken seriously by the government. All of these programs became dysfunctional due to insufficient funds and resources as well as scarce interest by the government. The comprehensive rehabilitation program is underway in district Swat, where a number of projects are running to rehabilitate the ex-combatants. The next chapter provides a detailed account of these projects namely, *Sabawoon*, *Mashal* and *Sparlay*.

Chapter V

Drivers of Extremism and Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants in District Swat

Countries that have overcome conflicts are endeavoring to formulate policy framework to meet the challenges of post conflict environment. Among other policies, policies and strategies for rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants have been given prime importance (López & Andreouli, 2015; Knight, 2008). The case of Pakistan however is different. The state has developed counterterrorism institutions and policies but there is no national policy framework for rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants. At best, the strategies for rehabilitation are being drafted by the military commanders at the local level according to the situation and will of the commander (Ahmed, 2013). Similar is the case of district Swat where no documented policy for the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants exists. This chapter explains the context and nature of the post-conflict rehabilitation in Swat. The chapter is written in light of primary data, collected from the field in the form of interviews. The available data concerning rehabilitation program and processes in Swat is deficient to describe these rehabilitation projects. Therefore, an extensive field work and personal observations were required to analyze these projects. The following discussion is based on the themes derived from the data collected during fieldwork by the researcher. The chapter, first contextualizes the conflict through categorization of militants and then elaborates the conceptual ideas, the types of ex-combatant's rehabilitation centers established on the basis of types of ex-combatants.

5.1. Contextualizing the Rehabilitation Program

Prior to entering into discussion about rehabilitation in Swat, it is necessary to understand the context of the conflict – the space and time period of the conflict. Understanding these dynamics is necessary to reach a comprehensive understanding of rehabilitation. The introductory chapter of this research provides these contextual details to enable an understanding of the

historical background of the area, as well as of the conflict. The current chapter focuses exclusively on the dynamics and drivers which dragged the locals into Talibanization or militancy. Based on an ethnographic research approach, the chapter explains the dynamics and drivers of radical and extremist tendency of the militancy. The findings from the ethnographic exercise are validated with the interviews from the locals, stakeholders and with actors of the conflict. These actors included both militants who are now ex-combatants, as well as personnel of the security agencies.

5.2. Theme 1: Understanding Militancy/Talibanization in the Context of Swat

Generally, in academia, governmental and in humanitarian organizations the drivers of militancy in Swat is based on the prominent rational choice approaches which included; low ratio of education; underdevelopment; unemployment; greed, and religiosity (for example; Ahmed & Rafique, 2013). For example, the greed versus grievances hypothesis to explain violent conflicts might be considered among the drivers but these are also not in the instant drivers of conflict in district Swat rather they fuel the conflict (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007). In contrast, Gurr (1970) concept of relative deprivation is among the fundamental causes discussed in this study with the title 'power struggle' in society. These drivers are universal and are associated with almost every conflict around the world. In the context of Swat, these drivers might be true to some extent but they are not fundamental. For their convenience the stakeholders generalized these drivers for Swat too, but, an in-depth understanding of the conflict in Swat is revealing some different drivers.

The greed theory of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) might not fit in the context of Swat. As discussed earlier that institutionalization was already prevailing when the then state of Swat became integral part of Pakistan (Nichols, 2001). The education ratio (male individuals) in Swat remained better as compare to other districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province (ASER-Pakistan, 2011). The female education ratio is low in district Swat but here the women are not that much important in the conflict as women were not actively involved in the conflict (Fair, 2017; NCHD, 2013); although, women have provided financial assistance to the militants in the form of donations, the logic behind this donation which is debatable (Khan, 2016). A renowned college,

Jehanzeb College, was established in 1952 long before the accession of Swat with Pakistan (Jehanzeb-College, 2019). There were a number of schools and hospitals in throughout the state before its accession, so, the people were educated like in the rest of the country and are in higher positions in military, bureaucracy and other institutions of the country (Rome, 2008). Therefore, it is baseless to say that lack of education or ignorance was one of the fundamental causes of the conflict in Swat.

Similarly, further, according to the greed theory of Paul Collier and Hoeffler (2004) that poverty or unemployment provides fighting manpower to the rebel group. Employing this greed hypothesis in the context of Swat needs some explanation about the land and businesses of the people. The land of Swat is known for its beauty and a home for tourists. The tourists around the world used to come and stayed there for months. The anthropological evidences show that the people of Swat are friendly, peace loving and having soft and acceptive nature. This land has produced a number of Pashto singers as well as film and drama actors and actresses who have contributed a lot to Pashto literature and culture. The handicrafts of district Swat are popular in every market of the country as well as outside country (Orakzi, 2011). In an interview it is revealed that before the onset of conflict there were 450 small woolen industries in Swat, and, another research quotes that before the onset of conflict, 18000 women in Swat were engaged in cosmetic industry only (Khan(b), 2016). The fruits of the land are much popular throughout the country. Majority of the people's businesses were associated with hoteling, agriculture and handicrafts. The poverty rate in Swat was negligible. This is true that all these businesses have been vanished with the conflict. Nonetheless, this is also injustice to say that underdevelopment or unemployment was among the fundamental drivers of the conflict in Swat.

Religiosity is considered a foremost fundamental among the drivers for conflict in Swat (For example; Ahmed & Rafique, 2013 and Azam & Fatima, 2017). This study gives a negligible space for religiosity as driver for conflict in Swat. In the similar study of greed and Grievance of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) grievance is considered most appealing factor for internal conflict or civil war because of religious divisions (sectarianism) and inequality in the expression of religion. In case of Swat there is no religious diversity and overwhelming majority belongs to a single religion and sect and other religion or sects are negligible; even not visible. This is true that religion is used to fuel the conflict and because of religious narrative and slogans of the militants, they

were financed by the people through charities and contributions donations (Orakzi, 2011). But these charities and contributions donations were not for the militants' militancy but as religious contributions for the construction of Madrassa. This study found that religion has played a minute role at latent stage of the conflict where some religious narratives were used as rhetoric but soon these narratives become weak and disappeared completely from the society (for example; Glazzard, Sasha & Emily, 2015).

The drivers of militancy might have a long list and they all might be true for many conflicts; for example, Schmid (2013) has listed a number of drivers for radicalization those lead to extremism and militancy. These drivers also have some foots in the case of Swat but they cannot be fundamental in case of Swat. Following drivers and dynamics are concluded by the researcher during an extensive ethnography in district Swat.

The following discussion provides an understanding of who the militants were and how the locals joined the militancy. An expression that emerged from the discussion was that the militancy in Swat was not for any specific cause or narrative. People joined the militant group on the basis of their own interests. Professor Sultan-e-Room was of the view that there was no specific ideology that dragged the people into militancy in Swat. Some were compelled by militants to join militancy , some were on parole, others were fighting to get power in society and some got engaged in it to secure life and livelihood for their families.[23] Thus, the following reveals a distinct explanation of 'Talibanization' in Swat; this term is different for different conflicts and should not always be taken in its universal understanding. In the local context, Talibanization is perceived and understood as militarization or militancy.

A respondent even claimed that a majority of the militants were non-local. Locals, on the other hand, were either killed during the onset of the conflict or put in military jails.[24] He continued that a person will join militancy if he has grievances against the state and community. Ideologically these militants were not religious extremist. Majority of these militants comprised of drug sellers and drug addicts or persons of low-reputation in the society. A small number of *Madrassas*

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[23] Professor Sultan e Room, in-person interview, Swat, July 24, 2017.
[24] Respondent # 04, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017.

students were involved. There were certainly some *Mullahs* or clerics who led this militancy, but they were involved in crimes since before the onset of the militancy.[25]

An example of personal grievance against the authorities was of Hussain Shah Qail, who was frustrated with the local elites. His younger brother committed suicide due to atrocities perpetrated against them or their family by the elite. Qail did not support any violent movement but he strongly supported Pervez, a Taliban commander who expelled those elites from the area. Qail believed that those elites were responsible for the atrocities to his family and death of his brother.[26]

One elder/political activist of Khwazakhela revealed that the Taliban in Swat were not "Swati-Taliban[27]". They were brought to the land. Locally, Tanzim-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), or, (organization for establishment of the law of the Prophet Mohammad) supported and joined them but they were scarce in number. Fazlullah group was not created with the purpose of picking up guns or adopting violent ways to achieve their goals. It was a peaceful movement to work for the release of Sufi Muhammad. Later on, he was joined by these outsiders who hijacked him and his group. The local people joined militancy to get salaries. Some were culprits and were on the wanted list of the police. It was an opportunity for them to keep their selves secure from police raids. Some joined the group to take revenge against the powerful people in society. In the last phase, when military operation was about to be launched, Talibanization had become a fashion where youth joined in plenty. Majority of the people sent their family members to join Taliban just to secure their families. If the military operation would not have started in 2009, one respondent said, "I was planning to send one of my family members to join Taliban as it was the need of those days".[28]

Another community member was of the opinion that these militants in Swat are not 'militants' as they have not been indoctrinated. They are not supporting any ideology but only engage in violence to secure their personal interests; these people therefore do not need any rehabilitation or reintegration. Personal enmities were cited as one of the major reasons of joining

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[25] ibid
[26] Hussain Shah Qail, Skype-interview, Islamabad, September 08, 2017.
[27] Swati-Taliban is the term used for the people who joined Taliban ranks from within the district Swat.
[28] Respondent #05, In-Person Interview, Mingora, July 23, 2017.

militancy. There were social conflicts within the community; of land, with uncles, cousins and other relatives. The weak joined militancy to get revenge from the erstwhile strong elites. A respondent further stated that as long as the military or other security forces remains present in the area, they would be safe, but could never socially intermingle with the community, because the community does not want to be associated with these ex-combatants in any way. These ex-militants according to the respondents would have to face the consequences of their actions, anytime the military left the area.[29]

Speaking about the motivation behind the militancy, an ex-militant added that the conflict was not a struggle to bring Shariah or Islamic law to the land, but was a treacherous game initiated by the state. "We were forthright people and were unaware of the political whims and therefore joined this movement. We had apologized for our mistakes and surrendered to the security forces but are still suffering from the stigmatization and severe allegations. In this conflict in Swat, mostly innocents are arrested."[30]

A resident of Mingora, while explaining the reasons behind the increasing support for Taliban stated that before the military intervention in Swat, most of the people joined Taliban to secure their families and honor. On one side were the security forces and on the other, the Taliban, but the resolve of the Taliban was stronger than security forces. Local residents thought that these Taliban might be supported by the state, so people joined them. One of the respondent's neighbors was among them and would implore him regularly to join Taliban. If the operation was not launched in 2009 against these Taliban, every individual in Swat would be in the ranks of Taliban. However, the people now complain about the government having delayed timely action against the Taliban.[31]

One local school teacher said that government was not serious about halting Taliban penetration into Swat. They could have been stopped when Fazlullah started transmission of militancy through his radio. "Fazlullah became self-proclaimed Amir-ul-Momineen (the leader of Muslims). He attracted the people when he was patrolling on horseback with many horses moving behind him. During that time no sensible person, even I, did not have any sympathy for Taliban as

[29] Respondent # 17, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017
[30] Respondent # 08, in-person interview, Mingora, February 02, 2018
[31] Dr. Ihsan, in-person interview, Mingora, February 04, 2018

we know that behind every opportunity there is a crime." He added that Mullah Fazlullah was a common laborer and his coming into power overnight was quite questionable; the whole process seemed very ambiguous from the beginning. [32] Initially, even educated people supported him and his movement, but when he declared the Pakistan military as infidels, in addition to the religious people who do not announce Jihad, the public stepped back.[33] Actually, "Taliban were liar. Many times, they spoke lies. Once, when Pakistan Army entered Swat, they announced that NATO forces have attacked the land. It was for the purpose to achieve the local sympathies. However, when people came to know the reality then they realized that Taliban are liar".[34]

A female gynecologist revealed a similar story of her nephew joining militancy. Her nephew was in his teenage when he was abducted by the security forces on charge of his involvement with Taliban. He remained with Taliban for some time. He was with Taliban as a suicide bomber. Her nephew was around 13 years of age and the family members were unaware of his activities with Taliban. The motivation behind joining militancy was to get power and glory in society. Since the Taliban had power, and people were scared of them, her nephew decided to join them. He was not indoctrinated on the basis of religion as he seldom practiced religion. A boy of 13 years has nothing to do with religion and knows nothing about religion. The reason in his case was hunger for power and band-wagoning; it became a trend of sorts as people joined Taliban in a large number.[35] In most cases at the onset of conflict, families were not aware of the involvement of their youngsters in terrorists' activities; otherwise, these families could have brought their youngsters back home. But when Taliban became the sole powerful force of the land, these families could not ask for their youngsters back. Also, these families felt a sense of safety with a family a member being a part of the Taliban.

In light of the above discussion, the researcher found five major categories of militants on the basis of different dynamics behind joining militancy. While there is a plethora of academic work on the drivers of extremism or reasons for joining militancy, which includes illiteracy, poverty, religious extremism etc., based on an ethnographical approach and data collected from

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[32] Kamal, in-person interview, Peshawar, August 03, 2017.

[33] Kamal, in-person interview, Peshawar, August 03, 2017

[34] Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Swat, August 08, 2017.

[35] Dr. Nazakat, in-person interview, Qamber, February 04, 2017.

the field, this research identifies: 1) Religiosity; 2) Unemployment; 3) Power struggle; 4) Issues of security and; 5) Band-wagoning as fundamental reasons.

1) Religiosity

The first category is traced back to Afghan war. The veterans of the war were glorified by the state as well as by the society. They lived with a unique and visible life style, with pride, wearing special coats. These veterans were called "*Qumandaan*" or commanders and they loved to be called with this name. In Swat and the rest of Malakand division, majority of the members of TNSM, headed by Sufi Muhammad and then Mullah Fazlullah, were veterans of the Afghan war. They were respected in society as they were the 'Ghazis[36]' of Jihad against Soviet Union. After 9/11 and US attack on Afghanistan, these veterans again stepped into fight (Jihad - Holy war) against the US. In the first phase, the people wholeheartedly joined them and supported them physically, economically and morally (Guardian, 2001). The conflict began in Swat when these veterans issued verdict against Pakistan's alliance with the US. With this announcement, they lost the local popular support but got vigorous support of the religious community of the society, mostly madrassas. These veterans then became 'targeted persons' and were easily traced by the unknown intelligence agencies to exploit them for their own interests.[37] This formed the first category of militants of this research. At first, religious sentiments dragged 'targeted people' to Talibanization, who then became the leaders.

2) Unemployment

These veterans later entered in collusion with the foreign intelligence agencies who offered money and other facilities, and hijacked them against Pakistan army. The veterans followed the "unemployed" youth of the society (majority of the respondents agreed to this phenomenon). The unemployed youth was readily available in society. In return for joining the militant outfit, the unemployed received monthly cash from the leaders of the militants.

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[36] Ghazi is the survivor of Jihad; those who fought jihad and were not martyred are called Ghazis.
[37] Respondent # 17, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017

3) Power struggle

After targeting the unemployed segment, these militants then followed the weak class of the society. The militants promised them power over the 'respected class' of the society. The weak in this case were the 'excluded', who were in search of an identity and inclusion in society. There are certain communities in the Pashtun society, who have lived there for centuries and yet are not considered a part of the Pashtun nation. The Pashtun are respected and considered superior to other communities. These communities include *Mian*, *Mullah*, *Nayee*, *Akhunzada* and many others. Collectively they are known as "*Ghareeb*[38]" and/ or, "religious functionaries". These *Ghareeb* joined militant group as an opportunity to rise in the society. These fault line gave way to a power struggle within society that was cleverly exploited by the militants. The researcher categorized this category as 'power-struggle' that roughly constituted about one third of the total militants.

4) Issues of security

The fourth category, according to the researcher's findings, is of great significance. When the unemployed and excluded joined militants, they started killing every person who they considered a threat, started demanding money, ransom and other contributions in the form of men, shelter, food and clothing. The militants then held power and authority throughout the valley. They demanded protection money from the locals. In case the people were unable to pay protection money, they were told to send a member of their family as contribution to their ranks. The locals were coerced to accept one of the two options. Those who could not offer money, chose to join Taliban. Those who joined the Taliban were safe and were not bound to pay. Meanwhile being a part of the Taliban ranks, they also gained power in the society. This is categorized as 'issue of security', that constituted roughly about half of the total militants in Swat.

5) Band-wagoning

When the entire atmosphere of Swat valley was dominated by Taliban who controlled the 'justice' and 'punishment' system, the youngsters of the society could not remain impartial. Youth started to join militancy as fashion. The Taliban roamed free bearing arms without restriction, this

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[38]Ghareeb is Pashtu word. It is textual meaning is poor but contextual meaning is weak.

attracted the younger population. This was a form of 'band-wagoning' where none of youths could stop themselves from joining militancy.

5.3. Financial Support to Militants

When questions were asked about financial sources of the militants, a respondent said that there were hidden hands who supported militants in Swat and at the beginning, militants were paid on monthly basis. They made announcements for contribution from the people through radios and in mosques. They called for contributions in bazaars and other places of gatherings. The purpose behind this contribution was, obviously, to strengthen movement but most importantly, this contribution helped them in gaining popularity and eased their penetration into society. When Taliban started collecting contributions in bazaars, the first contribution was made by their own people but secretly. It was just to provoke the common people for contribution. They even contributed in *lacs*.[39]

An important point to note is the way in which they prompted the people for contributions. In Khwazakhela bazaar, they collected charity on a daily basis. A commander of militants would make the announcement that "O people! We are collecting charity for Shariah." The first contributor to the charity box was always unknown to the locals. Actually, they were their own people to motivate and emotionally blackmail the common people for contributions.[40]

Females contributed a lot in Swat militancy to Mullah Fazlullah. "I had seen two beds full of jewels at Taliban Markaz. Taliban demanded contributions not for their personal use but to serve Din (Islam). As through radio, they were called for Islamic law and contribution for madrassa, initiated by Mullah Fazlullah", stated one respondent.[41]

No doubt, women contributed a lot. Such women are now facing stigmatization. They are told, "*da staso ka'ali di os dazeegi*", which means, "your jewelry is now firing". These women are embarrassed of their actions, saying that they thought they were contributing to build mosques and

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[39] Respondent # 02, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 25, 2017
[40] Respondent # 17, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017
[41] Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Swat, August 08, 2017

not for terrorist activities. Now mostly women in Swat are scared of any contribution even to a mosque which is obligatory in our religion.[42]

Theme 2: Pre-Rehabilitation Phase; Preparing for Rehabilitation

5.4. Categorization of Detainees

5.4.1. Arrests and Voluntary Surrenders

There were two broad types of detainees in the custody of security forces', those who had been arrested and those had voluntarily surrendered. The first were arrested during the fight with security forces or in search operations, while the latter were handed over by the community or family, or were people who surrendered themselves to security forces. In the second case, the role of community cannot be ignored in rehabilitation process. The combatant first surrendered to his community or family and then the community brought them to security forces. Usually, the surrendered are detained for very limited time and then released. A military official dealing with ex-combatants revealed that there are separate programs for civilians (non-combatant), such as vocational trainings, whereas for ex-combatants there is a de-radicalization program. The ex-combatant who surrendered to the army passes through de-radicalization program but the arrested does not[43]. At first, an ex-combatant goes through psychological assessment where he is categorized as black, grey or white. Depending on his involvement, he passes through de-radicalization process accordingly. He is given different vocational and skill development trainings at the center. De-radicalization process might be from six months to two years, depending on the assessment of the Psychiatrists at the center.[44]

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[42] Respondent # 12, in-person interview, Mingora, February 05, 2018
[43] This revelation of army officer provides further clarification between Black and Grey; i.e. those combatants who had arrested in a fight are fall under Black category while those who surrendered voluntarily are fall under Grey. The Grey are passing through rehabilitation and not Black.
[44] Lt. Col. Atif, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 08, 2018

5.4.2. Black, Grey and White Militants

These sub-categories are formed during initial investigations of the arrested or surrendered combatants. The investigation normally ranges from six to fifteen days in security forces' cells which are called internment centers. In initial investigation, if a combatant is found allegedly involved in terrorist activities, and is involved in attacks on civilian, government agencies and destruction of public infrastructure, he is categorized as 'black'. Such combatants are imprisoned in internment centers, jails in retribution, or whatever is decided by the authority. This category is not sent to rehabilitation center as their punishment is mandatory to satisfy the civilians who demand accountability. If they are set free without any punishment, distrust in the state will develop among the normal citizens.[45]

The 'grey' combatants are the aggressively radical category, who had taken up arms and had joined the militants' ranks, but were not involved in violent activities. They are the staunch followers of the militants' narratives. This type of combatants is sent to rehabilitation centers.

The third category is called 'white'. They are the people who have supported the militants and have been involved in any material or logistic support. This category is set free within a week as in most of the cases they were compelled by the militants to do so.

5.4.3. Hard-Core and Soft-Core Militants

The combatants when arrested or surrendered passed through psychological examination and inquiries by the intelligence agencies. A military official revealed that two steps are involved in this assessment: initial interrogation which is done when a combatant is arrested and then brought forth for a Joint Interrogation Team (JIT). The JIT consists of all civil and military security agencies those are intelligence, military and Police.[46] Hard-core are the acute militants who were involved in direct clashes with security forces, or violent attacks against community and in destruction of public infrastructure including, roads, bridges, schools etc. During investigation, this category is formed from the arrested combatants where they are labeled as 'black'.

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[45] Respondent # 3, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017
[46] Respondent # 3, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017

Consequently, they are sent to internment centers or prisons as they are considered threat to the state, as well as to general public. During psychological assessment they are declared as 'non-rehabilitateable'[47] and needing punishment. In an interview with an official of a rehabilitation center, it was revealed that they have both hard-core and soft-core ex-militants. They are treated according to the degree of destruction they have caused. Ex-combatants who come voluntarily are put in a center. Those who are arrested are sent to jail for some period as punishment and then on completion of their punishment, are brought back to the center for rehabilitation.

The soft-core are those who voluntarily surrendered to security forces or to the community and those, when arrested are found less involved in violent acts against the security forces or community. They are categorized as 'grey' or 'white'. Both grey and white are mild militants but the difference is that white are only the radicalized category, having been affected by the militants' narrative, while the grey are those found involved in some activities with the militants. The white are set free after initial investigation, whereas the grey are sent to rehabilitation centers for rehabilitation.

A community elder opined that "it is the black category which is like a snake and is supposed to be killed. If you leave the black alive, he might bite a person in any other place. He further added that this categorization is totally wrong. The military has kept the white in the black category and vice versa. There are cases they have seen here in Swat when former Taliban who slaughtered the people are now declared clean by the security forces and have been brought back into society. On the contrary, there are people who were only influenced by the militant's narrative but they are suffering in Black category. In this case we met many times with high military officials and suggested they should re-visit their criterion of categorization of militants." He further added that they suggested to the authorities that the JIT should constitute a committee at every village. The committees should include a relative of the ex-militant, *Mullah*/cleric of that village, *Nazim* of the area, policeman and other political worker. This committee can help assess the extent of involvement of the person and type of punishment that should be given.[48] This statement of the respondent was seconded by Dr. Arshad Ali, who added that white militants are those who joined

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[47] Non-rehabilitatables are those who involved in acute terrorist activities against security forces and civilians. Their punishment became compulsory as if these persons are set free without punishment, this will create distrust and doubt among civilians over security forces.
[48] Respondent # 05, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017.

Taliban just to protect their families. When Taliban were in power in Swat, they kidnapped people for ransom and killed some people as revenge of communal enmity. So, to protect their families from kidnapping and to balance the power with their rival community, they joined Taliban. They were not the ideological or political supporters of Taliban but they just wanted to protect themselves.[49] Dr. Arshad shares the story of one of his friends:

> *He was a government servant and was a staunch opponent of Taliban. He was embarrassed, disrespected and beaten by Taliban many times. Once he was looted when taking some luggage home from bazaar. Gradually, his whole village was going to join Taliban. He realized that the only way to protect himself and his family from humiliation is to join Taliban and he did so for his survival. Later, this person became a commander, moved to Peshawar and then to Khyber agency. Till that time, he was in contact with me through mobile phone. He visited me several times when I was at Malakand University hostel. Once I told him to leave this militancy. He replied that you don't know how powerful we are. We control the Khyber and will proceed soon to the whole Pakistan. He also added that I cannot surrender as I know my fate and know the army how severely they kill Taliban. For the last four years he did not contact me, either he is killed or might be in Afghanistan.* [50]

5.5. Internment Centers

These are temporary investigation cells established in almost every security forces' cantonment. The combatants when arrested are brought here for initial investigation. Here the categorization is decided for the combatants. If they are Black, they are sent to jails and dealt according to the laws of the land, Grey are sent to rehabilitation centers and White are set free.

5.6. Need for Rehabilitation

An in-depth interview was conducted with the co-founder of *Sabawoon* rehabilitation center, psychiatric Dr. Mumtazuddin. He was inquired about the necessity of rehabilitating the ex-

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[49] Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017.
[50] ibid

combatants and the methods that could be used in the process. Dr. Mumtaz replied that in the far-flung areas of Swat, people are living in miserable conditions and lack basic facilities. In those circumstances when there is little quality education and the environment is dominated by radicalized narrative of Taliban, it is obvious that these people will join militancy. The children were called for religious education and their parents were told that they will be provided food, shelter and clothes and, sometimes monthly stipend. The poor parents did not resist the offer and sent their children to those madrassas where these children were exploited for terrorism by the Taliban. They (Taliban) admitted children of age between 10 to 18 years and not those who were older than 18 years. Taliban thought that those above 18 years may not be exploited easily.[51]

When security forces raided these madrassas and detained the students, it was found that these students were divided in three groups on the basis of their ages: 9 to 12 years, 12 to 15 years and 15 to 18 years. These groups were kept separate in separate madrassas by Taliban. The first group, from 9 to 12 years was being prepared to strengthen their narrative (ideological force) in community. The second group from 12 to 15 years was meant for preparing suicide bombers and third group was the passionate and excited group; they too were being prepared as suicide bombers.[52] This strategy of grouping was very successful for the militants and within a span of almost two years Taliban strengthened their hold in Swat.

At the end of the military operation when security forces cleared the whole area from militants, they found these madrassas in far-flung areas of the Swat valley. These camps (madrassas) were running with the name of "Dar-ul-Uloom". There were different numbers of students in those camps i.e., 15, 20 and so on. Initially 84 students were recovered by the security forces from those madrassas. It was decided first that these juveniles will be sent to Mardan, nearby district of KP, for de-radicalization but due to security threat in urban city, Swat was decided for their rehabilitation training. Resultantly, *Sabawoon* was established at Peeran, Malakand division and later on, another rehabilitation center of similar nature, *Rastoon* was established in Shangla district. It was not directly under the supervision of Dr. Farooq but was a daughter organization of *Sabawoon*. *Rastoon* was established for radicalized people of district Shangla at the main Swat-Shangla road. With the passage of time, community or Village Defense Committee (VDC) was

[51] Professor Mumtazuddin, in-person interview, Mardan, November 08, 2017.
[52] ibid

also involved in this program. This community pointed out the affected families of their locality and requested military to arrange rehabilitation programs for them.[53]

5.7. Sketching Out the Rehabilitation Centers in Swat

As defined in previous chapters, rehabilitation centers are the centers where the ex-combatants are rehabilitated and from where they are reintegrated into the community as normal citizens. Pakistan army initiated rehabilitation program in 2009, after the end of violent conflict in Swat. An army official commented on civil-military relationship in conducting rehabilitation that there is coordination in documents (on paper), but very little in reality. The government is supposed to provide all overheads for the rehabilitation center but there are no such funds. Even the National Action Plan (NAP) - the most popular counter-terrorism strategy- does not mention rehabilitation centers or budget for them. Actually, rehabilitation is the responsibility of civil government. The military's job is to demobilize the combatant and if arrested, to hand him over to the police for further procedure. But neither the military nor the civil government is serious. This should be taken seriously and the rehabilitation responsibility should be purely under civil government.[54] However, another official of a rehabilitation center responded that civil government is providing financial and material assistance and even providing eight teachers to this center. Officially these programs come under the jurisdiction of provincial government.[55]

Other than the government rehabilitation centers, there is no NGO-run rehabilitation center in Swat, and the three known rehabilitation centers are running under the supervision of Pakistan army. These are; *Mashal* (the light), *Sabawoon* (the dawn) and *Sparlay* (the spring). The names are given in Pashtu language due to the Pashtun population residing in Swat. Project *Sabawoon* focuses on juveniles, Project *Mashal* concentrates on adult captives, and Project *Sparlay* is for the family members of detained persons (Rana, 2011). During researcher's field visits, the graduates and key informants found were from the *Sabawoon* and *Mashal* centers, and there was no evidence of the existence of *Sparlay* rehabilitation center. The researcher visited the sites of the first two

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[53] ibid
[54] Respondent # 03, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017
[55] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

(but was not allowed to enter). One respondent stated that there are rehabilitation programs, *Mashal*, at *Paithom* hotel in Wali Bagh, Mingora and *Sabawoon* is in Peerano, Malakand, but he did not know *Sparlay* or any other program.[56] A community member upon inquiry about rehabilitation centers, responded that when the army raided and cleared the area of militants, they arrested some hardcore militants. However, there were militants who were compelled to join militancy, or had joined for their own security and surrendered willingly. Among these mild militants, there were also juveniles who were rehabilitated at the military compounds in every village. These were not formal rehabilitation centers but small centers at different villages. The duration of the stay was different, extending from 20 days to six months. They were released after a psychological assessment. Such informal centers were also present in army units under unit commanders.[57] The researcher could not find the types of centers described by Respondent # 11; however, the researcher did come across internment centers in every military compound, where an initial interrogation of up to 30 days is conducted.

5.7.1. Types of Rehabilitation centers

5.7.1.1. Sabawoon

At *Sabawoon,* only juveniles are rehabilitated. When interviewed, the founding member of *Sabawoon* rehabilitation center, Dr. Mumtazuddin, revealed that before 2009 there was no strategy of de-radicalization throughout Pakistan. When Pakistan army detained 84 juveniles in Swat, it realized the need for their de-radicalization. Security forces got the assistance of Dr. Farooq, a well-known psychiatrist who was later killed by terrorists in 2010, and established *Sabawoon* for juvenile detainees at Peerano, Malakand division.[58]

5.7.1.2. Mashal

Azam and Fatima (2017) have conducted a detailed study of Mashal center. The detainees at this center are adults. When a combatant is captured, two steps are involved in the process of

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[56] Dr. Ihsan, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[57] Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Peshawar, August 03, 2017
[58] Professor Mumtazuddin, in-person interview, Mardan, November 08, 2017

categorization; he is first passed through an initial interrogation. In the second step, he is sent to a joint interrogation team (JIT). The JIT includes all security agencies' personnel (both civil and military) including, intelligence, military and police. At this stage he is declared black, grey or white. If he is found to be a black combatant i.e. acute, involved in serious activities against the civilians, government or security forces, he is kept in internment center, or sent to criminal court according to the nature of his involvement. If the combatant is 'grey' i.e. involved in ideological or logistical support of militants, he is sent to rehabilitation center (*Mashal*) where he is to undergo the rehabilitation processes. In third stage, the 'white' category, the detainee is released without any further investigation or detention.[59]

Mashal is also known as *Paitham* which was an institution of the federal government for vocational trainings. During the conflict, the center was raided and destroyed by the militants. Later on, the center was recaptured by the security forces and developed into a rehabilitation center *Mashal*. The center is supposed to rehabilitate ex-combatants over the age of 18. The center also provides psychological, technical and vocational trainings to the rehabilitees similar to that of TEVTA.[60] Another branch of this center was established at Barikot. The arrested were given different trainings; from psychological to professional including, tailoring, carpentry, knowledge about running a shop and doing business.[61] Due to the comparatively lower number of militants in the area, no rehabilitation center was formed by the military in Khwazakhela, Swat. Paitham is the only rehabilitation center in Mingora, Swat. In Paitham, they impart contemporary education, patriotism and technical and vocational trainings. The rehabilitees are also taught courses in agriculture, carpentry, electrical training, tailoring, motorbike mechanics, computer etc. Paitham tries to mold rehabilitees into good citizens.[62]

5.7.1.3. Sparlay

Sparlay or spring in English is the most important rehabilitation center, where the family members of ex-combatants have to be de-radicalized and trained with the aim to provide a peaceful and de-radicalized environment to rehabilitees. In Swat, this center was suggested but was not

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[59] Respondent # 03, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017

[60] Professor Mumtazuddin, in-person interview, Mardan, November 08, 2017

[61]AnwerAnjum, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017

[62] Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017

established, might be, due to deficiency of resources. During interviews with ex-combatants it was lamented that during their stay at internment centers and then rehabilitation centers for years, their families were not looked after by the government.[63]

5.8. Administration and Staff

Rehabilitation centers in Swat are managed and administered by Pakistan Army, while majority of the instructors inside these centers are civilians. Military hired the services of civilian experts in their respective fields including, psychiatrists, school teachers, vocational and technical trainers and religious scholars. A staff member revealed that the overall administration is in control of military but civilian staff is independent inside the center. The security set up is very tight, especially since it is a military installment, as revealed by Shams Mohmand. He is a senior journalist, who visited *Sabawoon* where he interviewed the staff as well as the rehabilitees.[64] It took him two months to get permission through proper channel. "I found only juveniles at *Sabawoon*. I was received by the administrator and then met with whole staff; walked all around in the center. The building and classrooms were similar to our educational institutions. No wall chalking, television, cinema hall or similar things were seen at these centers. The role of cleric and psychiatric is appreciable. The way they were teaching was amazing".[65] Another official revealed that the teaching staff is local and has been sent by the civil government which is paying their salaries too. Currently, there are eight teachers at this center. The time span of each rehabilitee is from three to six to twelve months, depending upon the degree of his rehabilitation, as decided during his psychological assessment.[66]

5.9. Theme 3: Understanding the Process of Rehabilitation

The researcher found two functional centers in Swat; *Sabawoon* and *Mashal*, for juvenile and adult ex-combatants respectively. Details regarding the processes at these centers have been

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[63] Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, May 01, 2017
[64] Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017
[65] ibid
[66] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

gathered from interviews with ex-combatants, community members, administrative and teaching staff, and personal observations of the researcher. The daily timetable, as explained by an official of *Mashal*, follows an assembly parade session in the morning, where army personnel also participate. Then a session of religious scholars commences, followed by tea break after which they proceed for vocational trainings. After the completion of these, they are allowed a quick nap, which is followed by psychological interactions with psychologists and psychiatrists. Psychiatrists ask different questions to asses them. A rehabilitee is judged in every aspect and unless he is found free from his previous narratives, he remains in the rehabilitation center.[67]

5.9.1. Psychological assessment

Upon the arrest or surrender of a combatant, he is first assessed by the military in order to gauge the extent of his involvement in militancy, which is then followed by an assessment by a psychologist. The intensity and need for therapy are determined in these assessments. At this stage, the detainee is assessed and the assigned the length of stay, and type of educational and vocational training according to his psychological standing. Ex-combatants who have surrendered voluntarily are put in the center, where as those who were arrested are sent to jail for a certain period of time, before they are admitted to the center. A rehabilitee is judged at every movement in the center, and, tests are conducted after every three months to see if he is trained vocationally, psychologically and religiously in enough measure to be reintegrated into society. The authorities have a module for this assessment which allows them to assess the areas where the detainees are showing improvement and the areas where they are still lacking. Certain ex-combatants having been brought in the very beginning are still being monitored in the centers, while others have been released in as little as three months upon showing signs of improvement.[68]

5.9.2. Schooling/Education/Curriculum

There is formal schooling program for juveniles at *Sabawoon* affiliated with the local Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE). A primary school was launched at the

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[67] Respondent # 22, in-person interview, Mingora, August 03, 2017
[68] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

center *Sabawoon.*[69] "Yes there are juvenile whose age is above fifteen and they cannot read and write so the center provides vocational trainings to them. We purely taught formal school courses to juveniles. We have juveniles who are currently appearing in Board exams. We also provide them financial support in getting admissions in schools".[70] The timetable at the center is like a regular school, with classes in the morning and vocational trainings in afternoon. This timetable however, was only followed when these rehabilitees were in separate buildings, but after a decrease in the number of rehabilitees, and due to a deficiency of instructors, this timetable is no longer followed.[71] "I also asked", says Shams Mohmand, "whether you teach similar courses to all". They replied that generally they are conducting similar courses in a class but when they feel that a particular student is not getting with the class and needs more attention in a separate class then the administration arrange special class of half an hour for him.[72] For juveniles, the center has arranged special classes where government teachers from schools and colleges come and teach them. Currently the centers have nearly 30 juveniles that are taught courses of grade 7th, 8th and 9th, similar to a formal school.[73] A lady, while speaking about her juvenile cousin, stated that he was schooled at a rehabilitation center, where he spent almost three years. He studied secondary school (SSC) at rehabilitation center and completed his higher secondary school (HSSC) at home.[74]

When interviewed, a graduate of *Mashal* center revealed that there was no formal schooling at this center, "although I have heard that at other juvenile centers (*Sabawoon*) they are taught non-religious courses. We were taught Pakistan Studies course at the center. We were also given lectures about social and economic stability. These lectures were given by the visiting teachers; the experts from outside. There was a regular teaching staff too and classes were regular. There were classes of Dar-s-Quran and Hadith[75] on regular basis, speech competition, sports in the evening. We were provided enough independence at the center."[76]

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[69] Professor Mumtazuddin, in-person interview, Mardan, November 08, 2017
[70] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[71] ibid
[72] Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017
[73] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[74] Dr. Nazakat, in-person interview, Qambar, February 04, 2018
[75] Dar-s-Quran and Hadith are the religious scriptures.
[76] Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017

5.9.3. Physical Training

The rehabilitees were woken up early in the morning and their day would start with a tough exercise. After enough exercise, an 'assembly parade' of the rehabilitees was held in the ground of the rehabilitation center. These assemblies would comprise of the national anthem and a collective prayer. A short physical exercise during assembly parade was given by the physical trainer (PT) who would always be an Army Officer. After the assembly, the juvenile rehabilitees were taught different courses similar to ordinary schools, whereas the adult detainees were given vocational training. The clock 13:00 pm would mark the time for a lunch break. After lunch and some rest, all the rehabilitees were allowed to play a game of their choice. Usually, only two sports activities were there i.e. cricket and football.[77]

5.9.4. Religious Training

A collective class comprising of all rehabilitees would to be held in the morning, where the Holy Quran was recited and translated by the religious scholar with some interpretations. After assembly, the detainees participated in the recitation and memorization of six *Kalmas*[78], and the memorization and translation of last 10 chapters of Quran. Memorization and translations of verses from the Quran that discuss Jihad and peace were also narrated. These verses of jihad and peace once misinterpreted by Taliban against the state and Pakistani army were interpreted by the religious scholars in line with their original meanings.[79] One official stated "we have cases in which the detainees were unaware of prayers, Quran recitation, Jihad and other basics of Islam. They were unaware of *Shariah*, the Islamic law. They have severe punishments in their minds for not offering prayers. After passing some time in this center, their concepts are now changed about the rewards and punishments in Islam. Now those radicalized persons are moderated, singing songs and even dancing, delivering speeches and play at the stage in front of us without any hesitation.

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[77] Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, May 01, 2017
[78] Some obligatory versus in Islam.
[79] Respondent # 23, in-person interview, Mingora, August 04, 2017

We called different signers at the center. We involved them in extracurricular activities."[80] "Yes, there were musical nights on weekly basis", says a graduate of *Mashal.*[81]

5.9.5. Psychological Training

Arespondent stated that "in Paitham, they impart contemporary education and patriotism, technical and vocational trainings are given. In fact, in Paitham, a good citizen is prepared."[82] One graduate added "We were taught Pakistan studies, history of the developed nations especially Switzerland and biographies of national heroes.[83] Every morning we sung national anthem and recited *Dua'a* (pray)". With a graduate of Mashal, Janan, revealed that in the morning he was given physical exercise, followed by memorization of six *Kalmas,*[84] last 10 *Surah*[85] of Quran, and translation of those versus in Quran which refer to Jihad and peace. He was also taught the ideology of Pakistan and the national anthem, *Dua'a* and was provided with short stories and history books. The books included history of Switzerland and other successful nations.[86] An official revealed those psychological tests are conducted after every three months. These are used to analyze the rehabilitees capacity to re-enter and reintegrate into society. The official further went on to state "we check the combatant in a special module prepared for this purpose through which his assessment is done in every aspect and it tried to ascertain in what aspects he has improved or where he is weak. We also have combatants who have been brought in the beginning when this center was launched and are still here".[87]

5.9.6. Vocational Training

There is no formal education for adults, but vocational trainings like those of Electrician, plumber, auto-mechanic and carpenter are provided. The vocational trainings are given to the rehabilitees below 50 years of age. Those who have crossed 50 are provided with training of

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[80] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[81] Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, May 01, 2017
[82] Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017
[83] Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017
[84] Religious versus
[85] *Surah* are the chapters in Quran
[86] Respondent # 23, in-person interview, Mingora, August 04, 2017
[87] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

farming and other related fields.[88] They are also taught agriculture classes, carpentry, electrician skills, tailoring, including courses for motorbike mechanics, computers etc.[89] Every rehabilitee is subjected to psychological interactions with psychologists on daily basis. Psychiatrists ask different questions to asses them. They are judged in every aspect and unless they are purged of their previous narratives, they remain in the rehabilitation center.[90] A graduate of *Mashal* center who was running his shop, said,

> *"We were given different types of vocational trainings at the center; including, tailoring, welding, electrician, honey-production etc. I participated in electrician's training which proved very beneficial for me as I am running this electrician shop on the basis of that training I got at the center. I got first position in this training course and was awarded ten thousand rupees. We were given certificates, recognized in every institution where required. We are now legally certified in those specific courses. The vocational trainings were different for different detainees on the basis of their educational background. Those who were literate were also given computer coaching. Overall, the vocational trainings given at the center helped in running small businesses."[91]*

However, another graduate of *Mashal* revealed that "only three skills of carpentering, tailoring and electrician were taught at this center. We were allowed to choose among them. I personally learnt carpentering."[92]

5.9.7. Community Engagement

Community engagement is the basic component of every rehabilitation program. Through this process, a relationship and trust are developed between the community and ex-combatants. Community engagement is not only to bring community at rehabilitation center but the rehabilitees should also be taken to the community, as was done in Sri Lankan rehabilitation program. In Sri Lanka, the ex-combatants were given many round trips around the south and participated in many events. They also made a visit to Sri Lankan parliament and other government offices, Air Port

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[88]ibid
[89] Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017
[90] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[91] Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017
[92] Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, May 01, 2017

and gardens. During these trips they interacted with different communities and religious figures. The community warmly welcomed these ex-combatants (GoSL, 2013, pp. 39-40).

On the other hand, in Swat, only nuclear family members were allowed to meet rehabilitees, but that also followed a formal procedure. An applicant would first seek permission from home ministry of KP. The ministry would then refer the application to the concerned commander who would further refer it to the in-charge of the respective center.[93] This made for a very long and a complicated process. The researcher himself followed this procedure to get access to rehabilitation centers but failed to get any permission.

The official of *Mashal* rehabilitation center revealed that "before releasing a rehabilitee, it is first confirmed from the community that the man will not create any problem for community. We also seek acceptance from *Sareeshta*.[94] If *Sareeshta* accepts or rejects a rehabilitee, we act upon their decision."[95]

Another official however provided that "we do not call family members at the center, because, the rehabilitees are visiting their homes on every second weekend; including, juveniles, adults and old rehabilitees. Therefore, there is no need to invite family members to the center. At the center, we support a rehabilitee in every aspect to re-adjust to the society."[96]

A community elder revealed that when a combatant is arrested, he is kept in unknown place by the military. No one knows his location or the family to which he belongs. When he goes through the specific inquiries in army's internment center, then army make calls to his family to tell them about his whereabouts. And, so, they may come and meet him. Only the nuclear family is allowed to meet, maximum, once in a week. No other community member or family members are called until the last stages of rehabilitation, when army confirms that the person is now rehabilitated.[97]

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[93] Respondent # 03, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017
[94]*Sareeshta* is the local name for peace committee. These peace committees are popularly known as Village Defense Committees (VDCs). The VDCs are formed by the security forces and are responsible for the security of their village. They also perform the duty of espionage for security forces.
[95] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[96] Respondent # 24, in-person interview, Mingora, April 22, 2017
[97] Respondent # 04, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017

A graduate, ex-combatant, of *Mashal* rehabilitation center, while recalling his personal experience stated that "there was a ban on every civilian entrance in the center but in some cases I met with my family members three times during my three months stay at the center. We were also allowed to make a call at home once in a week. We were not allowed to visit bazaar or even go outside the center."[98]

One military official opined that a rehabilitee would not be a threat to the community as he didn't fight against community, but against the Army. De-weaponizing the area would also ensure that no rehabilitees would be harmed in the absence of the Army.[99] A majority of the local community however, believed that these militants were the source of conflict and loss, and communal conflict may be born in the absence of the Army.

Rehabilitation Program for Women

Every DDR or rehabilitation program around the world has a specific portion for female ex-combatants (Detraz, 2012, p. 84 ; Hudson, 2005). In Colombia, the female ex-combatants of M19 insurgents group started their political struggle by appearing with the slogan "Women nothing is possible without you*"* (Patino et al., 2012). Versa Grabe, who herself was an ex-commander of M19, quoted Pizaroo-the leader of M19 women wing and who later became a political leader- as saying "if we know how to manage household budget, we would also be able to manage that of the nation" (Grabe, 2004). They were called the "*Women of April*" in order to encourage the role of women as promoters of peace (Patino et al., 2012, p. 52). Because of their political participation, the issues of women in Colombia like health, education and children care etc., appeared in reinsertion programs. This significant leadership role of women was helped achieve win-win outcomes; not only for ex- militants but for those women who were psychologically affected by the conflict. However, in Swat the case is different. Here the social context is different which makes the nature of the conflict different. Women in Swat did not actively participate in conflict. The social context in Swat compelled women to live with these militants as mothers, daughters and wives. Most of the women in Swat are unaware of the conflict; its dynamics and even the

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[98] Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017
[99] Maj. Jawad Saleem, in-person interview, Islamabad, January o8, 2018

actors who were involved. The social context also does not allow women to be rehabilitated at a center away from their home. A woman cannot live outside her family unless she is a guest for a day or two.

A military official revealed that, "women are radicalized and supported militants morally and logistically. They stayed with militants as mothers, wives and sisters. Women have donated their jewels, clothes and even their children to the militants. Unfortunately, we do not have any rehabilitation center or any other source to rehabilitate or de-radicalize them. NGOs are making some efforts to provide general relief to women including vocational and technical trainings in Swat. This is good to a large extent. Army is doing well in their personal capacity but it is not included in the overall policy of army to run any program for them."[100]

An official at a rehabilitation center mentioned that they have skill development programs at the center but not proper rehabilitation program. "We have launched multiple vocational centers in different villages. Our main target is those women who remained with militants in any capacity. We have female psychiatrists at the center. They conducted visits to the villages and to the suspected homes where an affected woman is living. In numeric terms, these female psychiatrists have conducted 1500 visits from 2010 to 2017. These women could not be brought at the center because of the cultural sensitivity. So, as the males are trained, females are similarly trained. These suspected women are called at a specific point (to a house) in a village where they are given collective trainings and awareness sessions. We have proper female vocational centers in every Tehsil. Some females have been kept under proper watch and given special assistance as our psychiatrist found them allegedly involved in conflict".[101]

A community elder shared that in Swat, females were not so radicalized that they would pick up weapons. "I will tell about my home. If I was not listening to 'Mullah Radio'[102] my mother, sisters and wife declared me infidel. I used to watch television and my mother and other females of my family were listening to Mullah Radio. They quarreled with me many a times. The female contributions were much higher than men in Swat. These contributions were in the form of jewels,

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[100] Respondent # 03, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017
[101] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[102] FM radio was launched by the militants that played a vital role in popularity of militancy and its narratives. I will discuss the role of this radio in detail later in this research.

cash or clothes. One of the fundamental reasons for penetration of militancy was the female listeners of Mullah Radio. However, women were not involved in any violent activity. I also confirm that there is no rehabilitation center for female but there are vocational centers where they are given different vocational and technical trainings.''[103]

Another respondent, while speaking about female involvement stated that, "no female, in my knowledge, is arrested by security forces under the alleged involvement in terrorism. No doubt, females contributed a lot. Those females who contributed are now facing stigmatization; like, "*da staso ka'ali di, os dazeegi*", which means, 'That is your jewelry which is thundering now'. These females are now feeling embarrassed of their contributions. They are embarrassed that we had contributed for building mosques and madrassas but militants used our contributions for terrorist activities. Now the situation is such that females are not paying donations even to a mosque which is obligatory in our religion. They realized that this destruction happened due to their support and contributions to militants. During this conflict their children died, their houses were demolished, businesses stopped and they became IDPs; the women who had never seen the areas outside of Swat lived in tents.[104]

A senior Swat based journalist said that, "women in Swat are honest. They do not have exposure to national or international media or forums. Since 1994, we were trying to launch a radio station in Swat that could provide some information to the locals about national and international political and social developments but nobody payed heed to our voice. No electronic media was there in Swat. When Fazlullah launched his FM radio in 2007, it filled the gap. Fazlullah started targeting females of Swat in his sermons and affected them by his rhetoric speeches. Even my wife, who has done Master degree but even then, she also became the follower of Mullah Radio." Fayaz narrated a story of a female suicide bomber: *The first female suicide bomber was the wife of my friend, Shahid. She sent me a letter and asked to publish the letter. The letter was a call for Jihad for women. She wrote in the letter that she is a Fidai (word used for suicide bomber). I request all my sisters of Swat to become martyr of Islam. Later, Shahid, her husband, was arrested by security forces and the lady quit Taliban and started to search for the release of her husband. Once she called me and was begging for release of her husband. She was crying on the phone, saying that she has a little child at home who needs his father. After her call, I tried and confirmed from a military officer that Shahid has been killed during*

[103]AnwerAnjum, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017
[104] Respondent # 12, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018

an encounter. I called back to Shahid's wife to inform her not to run to any office, he is no more. She did not believe my words. After four months when I inquired about her, I was told that she has married a military person; the military person whom I contacted to help her in release of her husband.[105]

Women of Swat are straightforward and their minds can be molded in any way very easily. Another respondent, in agreement to this, stated that they were influenced by the rhetoric speeches of Fazlullah but not radicalized. Females contributed charity in the form of jewel, clothes, cash and other material. They do not need any rehabilitation as they were not radicalized.[106] But it is true that all women in Swat were psychologically affected by losing houses, businesses and most importantly, relatives. In this case they need psychological treatment or rehabilitation.

When a community elder was asked whether females were radicalized, he replied, "I am partially agreeing with you that females were radicalized. At my home my father banned listening to radio. The Mullah at radio was very eloquent and attractive in his speeches. The people of Swat were wholeheartedly listening to the sermons of Fazlullah. In the beginning, the radio transmitted religious sermons and translation of Quran but with the passage of time the transmissions turned around. The people used to listen to this radio for information regarding who is killed; where and why someone was killed. Taliban used to air the names of those who were in their target and, therefore, people started listening to the radio that whether their relative names are in the target list of Taliban or not? The punishment was open and was announced on radio, like, O, you! You are speaking against Taliban so be ready for consequences. Or, O, you! You are not in good terms with XYZ, be good with him or we are coming for you. To elevate his place in society, Fazlullah, first worked out on females and attracted them towards Jihad with his rhetoric speeches. These females were even supporting Taliban until the military operation started. However, the support from females got weak when they started slaughtering people. Due to scarce education, females were greatly influenced." Another respondent revealed a similar story, "My sister-in-law was very much affected. Once she handed over some money and jewels for contribution to Taliban's fund but I did not add it to that fund. Later on, after military intervention, when I asked my sister-in-

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[105]Fayaz Zafar, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017
[106] Respondent 12, in-person interview, Mingora, February 08, 2018

law that I had not added your contribution to Taliban fund, she praised me and said you have done well, means, she was no more their supporter".[107]

Women were psychologically tortured by Taliban in Swat. They were very harsh and disrespectful to women. In this connection a respondent narrates "Once, women were passing through Taliban's check point, they humiliated a woman and her husband for not wearing the *burqa* (traditional veil), the woman was in *Shawl-veil*. They humiliated even me many times. They were inspecting clothes collar that it's made English-shirt style or the style they recommended. They also used to check trousers of men and if it was found below the toe, the person would be punished. If one was not wearing cap on his head, his hair was cut on the spot".[108] This was the peak of humiliation for local people and, therefore, Taliban lost their popularity and support in Swat.

A female Gynecologist shared her experience and interactions with women who have lost their husbands in the conflict. She said that. "Women are depressed and psychological patients. Many men from my village went for jihad in Afghanistan. Majority of them did not come back to their homes. They are killed during clashes with Afghan and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The tragedy is that their wives are still waiting for them at homes. They cannot marry anyone as per our religious obligations. They are waiting for almost 15 years for their husbands. Their lives are destroyed. They are in psychological depression. They have deficiency of money and other daily necessities."[109]

Another respondent shared a similar experience, "these women are not politically aware enough; they cast their vote in 2013 elections for the first time in history of my locality. They did not know who to cast their vote for. These women are experts in handicraft and their handicrafts are very popular throughout the country. The handicraft centers became dysfunctional during conflict. There is no assistance by the government to make functional their handicraft industry, but they do not have any other way to earn so they started their handicraft business on self-help basis."

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[107] Respondent # 09, in-person interview, Mingora, February o4, 2018
[108] Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Peshawar, August 03, 2017
[109] Respondent 12, in-person interview, Mingora, February 08, 2018

The rehabilitation of those women or families who remained with militants is necessary. Focus should be given to the economic aspect of rehabilitation, and attention should be given to psycho-social reintegration as the women and children passed through trauma, and now they need rehabilitation to come out of that trauma. The NGOs should get involved in female rehabilitation, particularly Awrat Foundation or similar NGOs who give priority to women should be engaged. They should run income generating programs so that in addition to economic gains, their trauma can be healed. Women rehabilitation and restoration should be one of the components of peace agreement. The local NGOs have small groups, community-based organization, CBOs, they have presence in villages, and they form female leaders and encourage their participation. Such measures for female rehabilitation are important at village level or at school level.[110]

5.10. Post-Rehabilitation Assistance

The officials state that the rehabilitees are provided a variety of skills. One official commented, "We provided them with computers, sewing machines etc. according to their skills and we have also provided tool kit, full of necessary tools so that he could run his own business when he goes back into society. We do not support them financially, although, there are some cases in which the center provided assistance i.e., we have constructed homes for some ex-combatants. We provided all these supports from this center".[111] A graduate of *Mashal* when asked about support from the center or assistance from any other institution proclaimed that non-provision of financial or material support to the graduates of this center is among the basic deficiencies. No cash or material is extended to anybody after release from the center. He went on to say that "initially, we were promised that they will start businesses for us and will support us in finding jobs but, later, they didn't provide for any assistance."[112]

A community elder responded to this question in negative, and further said that he had made a similar inquiry from the officials (regarding the support to be provided for business and finance to the rehabilitees). The officials replied that they were trying their best to support the

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[110] Respondent 12, in-person interview, Mingora, February 08, 2018

[111] Respondent # 24, in-person interview, Mingora, April 22, 2017
[112] Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017

rehabilitees, but the elder could not find any evidence of this.[113] In Sri Lanka, after receiving vocational trainings at the PARCs (Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers), multiple job fairs were organized in different cities in which personnel from the public corporate sector were invited. They hired graduates of these PARCs and now living financial stable lives[114] (BCGR, 2017).

5.11. Monitoring/Surveillance

To prevent recidivism, a monitoring mechanism is also needed, apart from engaging ex-combatants in different services. This though, becomes an issue when ex-combatants come to know that they are being followed by the state security agencies. It may be more prudent however, to adopt alternative strategies of accomplishing this; Sri Lanka offers a very good example. A Sri Lankan military officer revealed in an interview that these ex-combatants would continue to feel imprisoned although they are out of prisons. They will also lose trust in government and will feel psychologically inferior to other citizens, or feel like second-citizens. In this regard, the government has adopted an interesting policy by engaging these ex-combatants in Civil Defense Force (CDF). They are now guardians of their villages. This civil defense force is also used for agriculture projects and other social development projects. One objective to keep these rehabilitees in CDF was to keep a tab on them. The government is not directly monitoring or spying on them but through this way of CDF the aim is achieved. This is a strategy through which the ex-combatants may not feel that they are under surveillance. The case of Swat is different because any contact outside of center (with suspicious people), may lead to recidivism, due to which intelligence agencies had to keep tabs on the graduates. However, doing so in a subtler way, for instance by following the example of Sri Lanka, may prove to be more beneficial.[115]

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[113] Respondent # 26, in-person interview, Peshawar, July 27, 2017
[114] Brigadier Jayanath (SL), in-person interview, Islamabad, November 12, 2017
[115] Brigadier Jayanath (SL), in-person interview, Islamabad, November 12, 2017

5.13. Conclusion

After analyzing the interviews from the field, one can fairly argue there are five categories of militants on the basis of the motives for joining militancy. These are; 1) Religiosity, 2) Unemployment, 3) Power struggle, 4) the issue of security and, 5) Band-wagoning. The rehabilitation given at the rehabilitation centers was similar for all. No distinction is made to redress the relevant grievances of ex-combatants. This also poses difficulties in reintegration. Since, the rehabilitation processes were similar and all detainees passed through a similar process, it may be called a 'controlled processes'. Rehabilitation in controlled societies with controlled processes may be named as 'Controlled Rehabilitation'. The controlled rehabilitation is not a negative term or process in which the rehabilitation is not carried out, but is an example of controlled societies. Here, the access of civilian and humanitarian organizations is checked, so the societies do not have proper funding and other resources for proper rehabilitation. The state then arranges this program in its available funding and resources. A state that comes out of conflict faces multiple challenges. It may not have enough money and resources, so controlled rehabilitation may not do well. If a state has enough resources, then controlled rehabilitation is better than the rehabilitation conducted by international actors, provided it is conducted properly with proper support and evaluation by any third party. In controlled rehabilitation, the state knows the nature of the conflict, and the context of the conflict, better than third parties. International actors will apply the same criteria everywhere as drafted by the United Nations in its integrated DDR, which may prove unsuitable.

<center>**Chapter VI**</center>

<center># From Rehabilitation to Reintegration</center>

This chapter seeks to investigate the reintegration of the ex-combatants who have returned to society after being through the process of rehabilitation. The chapter looks the reaction of the locals towards rehabilitees and their acceptance into society. the chapter also discusses the stigmatization of the newly reintegrated rehabilitees as well as their chances of recidivism. Analyzing rehabilitation will allow us to recognize the success level of rehabilitation in Swat, and help identify the gaps. This knowledge can then be used to identify the type of rehabilitation that can be effective in controlled societies. The chapter will also analyze different aspects of reintegration separately, in order to aid in this understanding.

Such an analysis can help to understand the process of reintegration in the context of a unique, controlled society like Swat, which offers an unprecedented example of post-conflict reintegration. The case of Swat offers new insights into the challenges and raises new questions with regards to the effectiveness of rehabilitation and reintegration. This chapter hopes to shed light on all of these diverse features of post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration in the case of Swat.

> *We came out of darkness, a life of sorrows and death. Now we got a new life, new hopes*
> *and a light in our lives."-a graduate of Sabawoon.* [116]

A distinct type of rehabilitation program was launched in Swat valley by the state, to reintegrate the people of the valley who were once involved in militant activities. This program in Swat has been further divided in three projects, i.e. *Sabawoon*, *Sparlay* and *Mashal*. These projects have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter. The existing literature reveals that Swat

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[116]Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017

rehabilitation program successfully achieved the goals of reintegration of ex-combatants. These claims are made on the basis of the number of ex-combatants who have graduated from rehabilitation centers. However, verifiable data, providing such information does not exist (Afridi, 2016). In Swat, nearly 200 juveniles have been rehabilitated in *Sabawoon* center only (McCarthy, 2015). According to a news report published in 2011, through the *Mashal* center, a total of 32 persons have been rehabilitated, graduated, and reintegrated into the society (McCarthy, 2015). A recent document shows that more than 2500 ex-combatants have been rehabilitated so far from different rehabilitation centers, among which 200 belongs to the *Sabawoon* center only (Basit, 2015). During the researcher's field interviews, the officials of rehabilitation centers claimed a 99% success rate, but due to the absence of independent evaluation, these statistics cannot be substantiated (Khan, 2015). Additionally, there is no source available, which could precisely tell the number of ex-combatants in these rehabilitation centers.

However, it is worth mentioning that mere graduation from these rehabilitation centers should least be considered as a defining criterion to determine the success of the program. Instead, the success and failure can be better determined by the quality of the rehabilitation and final reintegration of these ex-combatants into the society. Reintegration cannot be measured quantitatively; however certain qualitative benchmarks and criteria can help ascertain the degree of success of the rehabilitation program. The following section will elaborate on some of these benchmarks and criteria.

Theme 4: Post-Rehabilitation Phase

6.1. Social Integration

As discussed in previous chapters, the purpose of rehabilitation is to reintegrate ex-combatants into society. The foremost component of reintegration is social integration that dramatically decreases crime rate (Griffiths et. al, 2007). If an ex-combatant achieves social integration, then the rest of the components of reintegration could be easily achieved. In Swat, during field visits, the researcher found divergent opinions and stories about the reintegration of

rehabilitees[117] into the society. The researcher found that majority of the community members were not willing to accept these rehabilitees back to the society, as these ex-combatants committed grave wrongs against their respective communities. A respondent from the military however, was of the opinion that a rehabilitee will constitute no threat to the community, as his fight was not against the community but the army. He further admitted that a rehabilitee would pose no threat to the community since the area has been de-weaponized; the rehabilitee's personal safety would also be guaranteed in the presence of the army.[118] Meanwhile, the army continued to offer protection to the ex-combatants, to allay them of fear, probably against community aggression. Undoubtedly, majority of the local community members share a common position that the militants were responsible for all the losses encountered by the community[119] and, they too, agreed with the military officer that as long as the military is around, the rehabilitees are safe. However, if military vacates this area, the threat of communal conflicts will surface.[120]

Despite these statements, the researcher met many graduates of the rehabilitation centers, who were living a normal life in community. The assertion of living a normal life is premised on the researcher's observation and interaction with community members who confirmed the normal life of the ex-combatants. Besides, rehabilitees who have tribal associations and strong family backgrounds, have been rehabilitated without any difficulties, but those who do not have such backgrounds face problems in reintegration. In other words, *Ghareebs* (the non-Pashtun, weak class in society) is facing difficulties in reintegration.

6.2. Reaction of People towards Rehabilitees

When the relatives of rehabilitees were inquired about their social lives and social relationships, they shared their experiences and observations with the researcher. A respondent believes her nephew lives a normal life, often gossiping with cousins, but he has very less interaction with other people in society and mostly remains silent. She added that among the

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[117] A rehabilitee is the graduate of rehabilitation center.
[118] Lt. Col. Atif, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 08, 2018.
[119] Dr. Ihsan, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[120] Respondent # 05, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017

cousins, her son is one of his friends.[121] A successful example of reintegration is Janan, who was personally interviewed by the researcher. He married after his release and is living a happy life with his family. His father-in-law lives in Karachi, and was aware of Janan's previous life; he did not oppose to the marriage since Janan has been successfully de-radicalized and integrated into his neighborhood and society. His neighborhood is happy with him and he is doing his daily businesses without any issue. There is no stigmatization or curse on him.[122] A similar case was shared by a community member where his cousin recently married a girl of his village. He added that his cousin had no issue in the community and he is not wanted by the security forces for his past.[123]

While there are success stories of rehabilitees, there are stories that paint a different image. In this backdrop, not all rehabilitees easily find succor, there are many whose reintegration suffers setbacks. For instance, certain rehabilitees, upon their release, remain cut-off from the society, interacting only with fellow rehabilitees or jail-mates. One such example is of a rehabilitee from Mingora who was expelled from home by his family upon allegations of being in contact with the ex-combatants. His family complained that he possessed a radical mindset despite rehabilitation. A respondent at Mingora shared the experiences from his time with ex-combatants, he expressed that once he asked an ex-combatant's father about his son but he started to abuse him and finally said he has been disowned. The same is true of another rehabilitee, Ibraheem, who also harbors optimistic feelings for militancy in spite of rehabilitation.[124]

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An elder expressed disappointment with the rehabilitation process. One of his relative joined the Taliban and was involved in plundering and destruction of Hujra[125] of a local chairman and VDC member in Khwazakhela. When he was brought back to the community by the security forces after rehabilitation, the chairman was reluctant to accept him back into society. He complained that the person had destroyed his Hujra and embarrassed him. He expressed in his

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[121] Dr. Nazakat, in-person interview, Qambar, February 04, 2018
[122] Respondent # 23, in-person interview, Mingora, August 04, 2017
[123] Shaukat Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017
[124]Respondent # 9, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[125] ?

concern in the following words "how can I bear and let him into the community". The respondent worried that reintegration of these ex-combatants in society would be very difficult.[126]

It is often true that those who return to society are not accepted by the community. Reintegration of ex-combatants also leads to the polarization of the society; on one side lies the ex-combatants (often with extremist views), and on the other side is the moderate population. Given the magnitude and psychological consequences of the ex-combatants' actions, the moderates displayed an unforgiving tendency. One community member responded in a vengeful tone, "My father died, when we were displaced during military operation. We could not burry him in our native village. Why is my father buried outside Swat? I will never ever forgive them (ex-combatants)".[127] Similar expressions are common among the people within the community.

A senior journalist revealed an incident he witnessed when an old man in the market attacked and slapped a person even though he was accompanied by military personnel. Upon inquiry, it was revealed that the same person was once a Taliban commander, but now he has been rehabilitated and reintegrated. When the old man was queried for his action, he replied, "How can a person, who destroyed my home walk freely in the market. I cannot bear it".[128] Such an instance is indicative of how tough the path to reintegration can be for the rehabilitees.

An elderly person narrated the story of an ex-combatant who lives in Bandagai. He went through rehabilitation but he was not welcomed by villagers to stay in the village. The rehabilitee lodged a complaint against the villagers to the military. The military threatened the villagers, stating that they would all be sent to the internment center if they do not allow him to stay. The villagers finally succumbed to the pressure and he was allowed to live in the village. After such incidents, the villagers often express doubt and raise questions about the role of the military vis-à-vis the ex-combatants; they are disheartened and wonder why the ex-combatants are given precedence over them. However, it may be more beneficial for everyone if the community tries to accommodate the rehabilitees instead of disowning them.[129] Similar questions about life after rehabilitation were asked from the rehabilitees and they responded that community is not willing

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[126]Respondent # 02, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 25, 2017

[127]Respondent # 02, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 25, 2017

[128] Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017

[129]Respondent # 17, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017

to accept them as normal community members in society. The community is dubious of their previous life with the militants, and they are faced with several stigmas. On one hand, the community harbors sentiments against them and on the other hand they face humiliation coming from the military; they are often waylaid at the military check posts. An elder and social activist responded that society is hasty while dealing with these ex-combatants. Society should assist these ex-combatants as society knows that they were innocent and were arrested without any reason (just had soft corner with Taliban). Those who were culprits have escaped. These rehabilitees are angry at the state, as the latter did not give any assistance to them. The assistance could be moral, social, political and even material. The problem is here in our society too. Within the community, the political workers or those who are on good terms with security forces, are working as spies for security forces. They included members of VDCs who pointed out and accused innocent people as militants before the military just to avenge their personal grievance.[130]

A respondent was of the opinion that the community should accept them (the rehabilitees), after rehabilitation to prevent them from recidivism. The community should change its behavior toward them because it was due to the social behavior of the community that pushed them towards militancy (the poor and grieved became part of militancy), in the first place. The rehabilitees are no more people with extremist tendencies and the community should not consider them militants anymore. They have been punished by the state and have passed through the rehabilitation process. The community should accept them, now that they are good and normal citizens.[131] When asked about how the community should accept them, the respondent replied that one should not discuss their previous life of militancy. They should not be reminded that they were once militants. They should be accepted with an open heart, and should be accepted into social gatherings. They should be completely forgiven, even if they have committed crimes against their community in the past. The community should realize that they have been punished enough by the state. Along with social acceptance, they should be kept busy in daily businesses.[132]Here, the question will raise that how a community will accept such people with open heart when they are responsible for the destruction

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[130] Respondent # 8, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[131] Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017
[132] ibid

of the community? The community needs some awareness and engagements program to make them prepared for a positive behavior towards ex-combatants.

6.3. Vocational and Technical Trainings: Views and Opinions of Public and Rehabilitees

While reviewing the available data on rehabilitation, the researcher found that the component 'vocational and technical trainings' is one of the four basic components required for any rehabilitation program while the other three are social integration, religious and psychological education. As discussed in the previous chapter, vocational and technical trainings are provided to ex-combatants at every center according to their needs and interests. This section provides an account of the trainings given at the centers. The respondents in this section are the graduates of *Sabawoon* and *Mashal* rehabilitation centers, as well as community members such as relatives, friends or nuclear family members who are in direct contact with the graduates of these rehabilitation centers.

6.3.1. Views of the Rehabilitees

A graduate of *Mashal* rehabilitation center, who now owns a shop, when interviewed stated that he got electrician's training at the center and is now earning livelihood as an electrician. He said that he got first position in the training course and was awarded ten thousand rupees by the center. He revealed that they were awarded certificates after completion of the training, and with the certificate they became a certified and recognized electrician, eligible to apply in any institution. "We are now legally certified in those specific courses we attended at the center", said the graduate. The vocational trainings were different for different trainees on the basis of their educational background. Those who were literate were also given computer coaching. Overall the vocational trainings offered at the center helped in running small businesses.[133] One respondent however, criticized the lack of financial or material support from the center to graduates. Initially, there were promises made by the center to assist these graduates for start-up businesses, and provision of support for finding jobs, but upon release they didn't grant any assistance to the

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[133] Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017

graduates.[134] Another graduate of the same center, *Mashal*, revealed that they do not have enough money to start any business with the training they completed at the center. Most of the rehabilitees are unemployed or involved in mere labor with very low wages.[135]

During one of the field visits, the researcher also came across cases where the graduates were not given any vocational or technical training, or were not using their acquired vocation for daily earning. One such case is of 'Janan', who remained for two months in *Mashal* rehabilitation center but was not given any training. Another graduate revealed that there were only three types of vocational trainings given to the rehabilitees at the center i.e. carpentry, electrical skills and tailoring. "I have learned carpentering", the respondent said, but "now I am driving taxi as I do not have money to run my own shop. No assistance has been given to me; neither financial nor material".[136]

6.3.2. Community Perception

Supporting the above view of the former rehabilitees, an official of *Mashal* rehabilitation center said that their center provides computer skills, welding skills, carpentering, tailoring etc., and at the same time the center also provides computers, sewing machines and a toolkit that contains tools according to the skill a rehabilitee learned at the center. He added that the authorities have realized that these graduates are financially weak and provision of these tools will be helpful in running their own businesses when they returned to the society. The center does not support them financially as it lacks funds, but in some cases, they are supported by the center i.e., the centers have constructed homes for some ex-combatants.[137]

The community members appreciated the rehabilitation projects but at the same time they also opined that three or maximum of six months training will not enable an ex-combatant to find a job in such competitive environment where the university degree holders are unemployed in society. A Swat based senior journalist commented on the topic and pointed out that these rehabilitees do not get any support or assistance in running businesses or finding jobs, and with

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[134] ibid
[135] Respondent # 08, in-person interview, Mingora, February 02, 2018
[136] Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, May 01, 2017
[137] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

these short-term trainings, no institution welcomes them, as other experienced people are readily available in society. "I have never come across a rehabilitee running a business with the training he has gotten at rehabilitation center."[138]

From the above discussion about the vocational and technical trainings, it can be inferred that mere provision of trainings to ex-combatants at rehabilitation center is not be sufficient for reintegration into society. They need special financial and material assistance, as well as moral support in getting employment in society. This can only be done when these rehabilitation centers receive enough funds from government, as was done by the Saudi Arabian government which provided jobs, houses, and other assistance to over 4000 rehabilitees (Rafique & Ahmed, 2013). In as much as this is encouraging, the question is between surplus fund and non-surplus fund nations, hence the big difference between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. One way to ensure that integration is not just a matter of policy or mere short durational course at the centers, what government and local communities should do, is setting up places specially meant for the rehabilitees to put into practice whatever knowledge they have acquired from the center. Effort should be made to assist them to produce quality products and engage in qualitative vocational work which will not only captivate the public, but reduce the stigma, and crush the perception that ex-combatants are good for nothing.

6.4. Post-release Assistance

As mentioned earlier, providing vocational technical trainings will not be fruitful unless the rehabilitees are provided financial and material assistance, and moral support. Assistance after release plays a key role in reintegration of rehabilitees, as it is helpful in running businesses and finding jobs which provide financial stability to ex-combatants and hence, ensure better integration into society.

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[138]Fayaz Zafar, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017

A study of *Mashal* rehabilitation center was conducted by independent researchers, in which they interviewed 47 beneficiaries. The study suggests that the center is providing one-time financial and material assistance to the trainees (Azam & Fatima, 2017).

A Swat based journalist, revealed that some of the beneficiaries were provided financial and material assistance on completion of course at the rehabilitation center. He further added, "Some, I know, have been given auto-rikshaws and to some, the center extended assistance in running small shops. These beneficiaries were not given money in cash but assisted with material. I think they were sponsored by NGOs through the channel of security forces".[139] He continued that those who were provided assistance are running their own businesses and living peaceful lives. There is no threat of recidivism.[140] This statement is seconded by another respondent, who added that the assistance is provided by the donor agencies, mostly USAID and FID through Pakistan army.[141]

A military officer who was engaged in a rehabilitation program, stressed that there should be post-release assistance for a better reintegration. Unfortunately, these graduates are not given any assistance after their release from rehabilitation center. They should provide independent jobs, assistance in businesses, and security of life and honor. Otherwise, rehabilitation is of no meaning.[142] Another non-military official of *Mashal* rehabilitation center also realized the need of post-release assistance, and he confirmed that the center supported these graduates in every aspect to re-adjust in society. He further added that if they are not supported in initiating their businesses and finding jobs, they may be followed by the extremist groups may recede toward their old tendencies.[143]

In an interview, a graduate of *Mashal* rehabilitation center who had training in electrical work, delivered a very satisfied feedback with the overall procedure and official conduct at the center, as well as with the training he received. However, he complained about the non-availability of financial or material support to the graduates of this center. He added that auto-rikshaws were

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[139]Anwar Anjum, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 25, 2017.
[140] ibid
[141] Fayaz Zafar, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017
[142]Respondent # 3, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017
[143]Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

provided to some graduates but not to everyone. "On Papers, the rehabilitation center is very good but in reality, it does not provide any financial or material support".[144]

A resident of Matta, Swat said that the rehabilitees whom he knew, were not given any post-release assistance or maybe they are not sharing such information with the community, but he believed there was no assistance. He further claimed that previously Taliban were paying these ex-combatants, if the ex-combatants find it hard to live without such support, they should be provided every assistance and support to prevent recidivism. The respondent believed that when a person is engaged in business or in a job, he cannot be inclined towards a crime.[145]

Another graduate of *Mashal* totally rejected the claims that the center is providing assistance or support. He complained, "Neither economic assistance nor material support is extended to us. There was a ceremony arranged at the center when we were released. Prior to the photo session that included high military and civil officials, we were provided new clothes, shoes, and caps. To our surprise, when the ceremony ended, the new clothes, shoes and caps were collected from us and we were set free with those old clothes. That was most embarrassing moment for me".[146]

A community elder shared information about his relative, Shan, who graduated from a rehabilitation center but did not receive any cash or loan by the center. The only good done to him by the security forces was that his home was not destroyed, although the houses of the militants are destroyed as punishment. Shan's father was a veteran of Afghan war. His father was also arrested by the security forces. Both were set free later, and currently run small shops at their village.[147]

Nisar Malik, a DDR expert, valued the post-release assistance and support and said that the ex-combatants should be sent to the local industries or house-hold industries for skill development. He was of the view that this would allow them to develop the necessary skills for earning a living. He further added that the government must provide those toolkits and other necessities to start their own small businesses. Providing vocational training and entrepreneurship to them is

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[144] Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017

[145] Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Peshawar, August 03, 2017

[146] Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, May 01, 2017

[147] Respondent # 17, in-person interview, Khawazakhela, July 24, 2017

imperative. The graduates of the rehabilitation centers should be granted interest free loans from banks so that they can initiate their businesses when they return to society. Those who have completed vocational trainings should be given loans through banks.[148]

Post-release assistance and support always plays a vital role in re-settling of ex-combatants back into society. In Swat, there have been rehabilitees of rehabilitation programs but there are complaints that they are not fully supported to reintegrate into the society. A successful reintegration needs every possible support from the government, as well as from community.

6.5. Recidivism

Since this chapter is focuses on reintegration, it is necessary to discuss the chances of ex-combatants re-joining their ex-groups. In this regard, some community members were optimistic and they saw no chances of recidivism. They opined that militarization of the society has now ended; people are now well aware of what is good and what is bad. They held the belief that if a militant came back to the society after rehabilitation, he would not find any radical incentive that could attract him to militancy. Because, the militants who were moving freely in society were disbanded and demobilized by the security forces. They felt that their society had become open and accommodating. However, further measures are needed to prevent chances of recidivism if any.

The government should keep a check over hate speech and hate literature in society for a better and peaceful environment. The rehabilitees should be restricted to visit old places where they fell victim to militancy including madrassas.[149] Another contributing factor to militancy in Swat was the presence of drug sellers and smugglers, who exploited the youngsters for their personal interests. Engaging in such activity led the youth to adopt unlawful practices and they became habitual of illegal earnings. Such youth later resorted to militancy to keep up a steady stream of income for their needs, opined another respondent.

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[148] Nisar Malik, in-person interview, Islamabad, December 25, 2016
[149] Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017

An official of *Mashal* rehabilitation center was confident of a rehabilitee being unable to re-join his previous group. The official stated that, "At the time of his release, an agreement is signed with him. First, he takes an oath that he will not repeat the same crime again. He is also bound to provide two guarantors from his family or community. In the guarantee oath, he also agrees that if he resumed his previous criminal activities, he is liable to give one million rupees to security forces and his two houses will be destroyed as penalty. Lastly, when he is found in similar criminal activities, the security forces have the right to shoot him at sight." The official further said that when two rehabilitees of same center were caught re-establishing contact with militant groups in Afghanistan, they were re-arrested.[150]

The researcher tried to find possibilities of recidivism in a graduate of *Mashal*, however upon dialogue the graduate replied, "I am worker of a religious political party which is struggling for Islamic law in Pakistan. I have realized that change can only be brought through political struggle. I will continue my struggle through the political platform".[151] This shows that political engagement is very important in the prevention of recidivism; political participation provides hope to the political worker and he becomes confident of being able to achieve any aim through the political party's platform.

While speaking about recidivism, a senior journalist shared his experiences of visiting rehabilitation centers. He stated that there would be no chances of recidivism in the graduates of *Sabawoon,* but more so in *Paitham* (*Mashal*).[152] He explained that in addition to conducting the rehabilitation process very well, *Sabawoon* had the advantage of housing juveniles, whose minds were easier to mold due to their malleability. On the other hand, *Paitham* was home to adult ex-combatants whose psychological treatment was more difficult as compared to the juveniles. They could however, be prevented from recidivism by providing enough post-release assistance and support. He further stressed on the need for the de-radicalization of the whole society; if a rehabilitee was sent back to a society with extremist tendencies, it would take no time for him to re-join his ex-group.[153] However, this notion of radicalization of society was negated by a

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[150]Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[151]Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017
[152]*Paitham* and Mashal are the names of single rehabilitation center. *Paitham* is the name of the building where project Mashal is launched. Therefore, mostly local people called it *Paitham* rehabilitant center.
[153]Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017

professor who had been observing all the developments in his village. He commented that no one could promote hate speech or distribute hate literature (leading to radicalization of the society) in the presence of the Army because of the strict controls. He added, "I have never seen or observed any person who could produce such hate literature or deliver hate speech. Even loudspeaker is banned in most of mosques. Having hate related literature and speech was quite the order of the day during the Taliban reign but given the current political and security arrangement people will never ever accept any speech or literature which spread extremism or militancy. Militancy is totally rejected now. Even madrassas are under observation and people are also under close surveillance. The people are now very careful in sending their children to madrassas. If a cleric is found to be teaching extremism in his madrassah, people withdraw their children from such madrassas".[154]

The above discussion indicates the lack of the possibility of recidivism, and points towards the successes of rehabilitation and reintegration. However, field visits did uncover certain cases of recidivism. One respondent narrated the examples of two *Mashal* graduates who resorted back to their old activities after rehabilitation, and were subsequently killed in a military operation in North Waziristan. Such incidents, in addition to examples highlighted above, raise certain questions about the performance and outcomes of rehabilitation programs.

6.6. Surveillance/Monitoring

Post-release surveillance or monitoring was found to be the most debated topic during the field work. There were two divergent opinions about surveillance and its contribution to reintegration in post-release environment. The process of surveillance is synergistic effort between the rehabilitation authorities, security forces and the local community. It involves the cooperation of both military and civilian actors and stakeholders.

A rehabilitee is monitored by Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies after his release into society. When a rehabilitee completes his training at rehabilitation center and is cleared by the psychologists, he is first presented to the army commander of his area of belonging.. The community members, elders of the community or Village Defense Committee (VDC) members

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[154]Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017

are called to the army center and the rehabilitee is handed over to them. These community members are given instructions on how to deal with the rehabilitee. After this initial step, the rehabilitee is set free in society but he is bound to ensure his attendance at the Army center or nearby police station, initially, once in a week and then once a month and so on. He has to ensure his attendance whenever he is called by the security forces. He is also not allowed to leave the area without getting prior permission from the concerned army commander.[155] This surveillance lasts up to two years following release of the rehabilitee from the rehabilitation center.

An official of *Mashal* center revealed that they have their own monitoring team at the center. When a rehabilitee has completed his training and released into society, the center keeps his telephone and other contact numbers. The center regularly follows him through cell phone by calling him and asking him about his whereabouts. The graduates are also bound to make weekly and then monthly attendance at the center. If a rehabilitee misses his weekly or monthly visit, the monitoring team at the center visits his home and asks for the reason(s) for his absenteeism. Special permission is needed if a rehabilitee wants to visit another city or go out of the country. He will explain his purpose of visit, period of stay and whenever he comes back, he is bound to appear at the nearby army center or police station.[156]

Other respondents revealed similar patterns of surveillance and stated that there is a strong follow up system when rehabilitees are released into society.[157] Their activities and social gatherings are under surveillance at least for a year.[158] When interviewed, an ex-combatant said, "I am not in any surveillance".[159] Another ex-combatant said, "I was unaware that I am under surveillance but when I went to Mardan (another district) I realized that I was followed. When I came back home I was called at the center and was asked about my visit".[160] Janan, a rehabilitee, who has to visit his nearby army check post every week, added that he is free to go to any city around the country, but he has to get permission from security forces.[161]

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[155]Lt. Col. Atif, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 08, 2018.
[156]Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[157]Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017
[158] Dr. Ihsan, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[159]Respondent # 8, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[160]Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, May 01, 2017
[161] Respondent # 23, in-person interview, Matta, August 04, 2017

The officials of security forces, and the experts on DDR consider surveillance and monitoring mandatory for keeping law and order. A DDR expert proposed that all soft-core, anti-state actors should be monitored properly; while those who surrendered voluntarily (also self-integrated) should be frequently surveyed to observe signs of recidivism.[162] He added that post-release monitoring of ex-combatants should be conducted on regular basis and explained, "I have observed that some ex-combatants sell their provided kits and other material after completion of their course and rejoin their ex-groups. They should be monitored regularly and patrolling is needed in some specific areas".[163] The officials of the rehabilitation centers argued that in addition to establishing contact themselves, rehabilitees may be approached by their old associates if they are left unchecked. The society is still full of extremists' narratives and their volatile minds could easily be attracted to their old ways.

6.7. Surveillance in the Eyes of Community

The community members, the families of ex-combatants and some stakeholders have very different perceptions about surveillance. They are of the view that these people should be provided an open atmosphere after release, and should be set free to live with their families and siblings, with the aim to re-build their family, social and political lives.[164] An elder commented that this regular attendance, checks and requirement of permission when they want to leave their area and so on, turns these ex-combatants into permanent employees of the security forces, and they will not let them live as free citizens for the rest of their lives.[165]

The rehabilitees themselves feel stigmatized due to this surveillance. They are now fed up with visiting the security forces and police stations, and they feel themselves still in detention. A Swat based political activist said that these rehabilitees are also enlisted in *Das Numberi* (section 10).[166] Under this section they have to mark their attendance regularly. Initially, these attendances

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[162] Nisar Malik, in-person interview, Islamabad, December 25, 2016

[163] ibid

[164] Adeel Ahmed Shah, in-person interview, Mingora, May 04, 2017

[165] Respondent # 10, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017

[166] Das-numberi or the tenth, is a section in criminal law for the criminals in which they are bound to present themselves in police station and they are not allowed to go near to any government facility.

were taken by the military but the responsibility was later given to the police. "In my view", he added, "a person should not be compelled to such an extent where he may wish to re-join his ex-group. This surveillance has snatched their freedom and personal liberty and this is wrong and unjust."[167]

Another example of stigmatization was revealed by a respondent whose family member is a graduate of rehabilitation. She remarked that her family did not have to face problems due to the graduates' previous activities, though in the event of a terrorist incident, the graduate himself has to face scrutiny. He is kept in custody by the security forces for two or three days. She disproved of the way the army acted without prior information or permission. [168]

In post conflict Swat, the issue of target killing by the unknown people was at its peak. The community members postulated that the culprits are the 'self-integrated' combatants who resettled in society without passing through rehabilitation. They go unnoticed by security forces and have the same extremist mindset as before. They are the real threat to the security in the future. The community also complained about the negligence of security agencies in checking and monitoring these self-integrated combatants. When this problem was brought before an official, he replied that these self-integrated persons are under the notice of intelligence agencies. He further said, "I don't think that they will pose any threat to security as they are only a few in numbers and they are also limited to specific areas/homes. We did not face any issue from them in past two and a half year. We are also informed by the intelligence agencies of their entrance into the society and they are also watched with special check. Yes, we have similar cases in which the militants surrendered without passing through proper procedure of security forces but inversely, they helped us very much in rehabilitation, in pointing out militants, in surrendering of militants and bringing them to the center". [169] These self- combatants, according to officials, also serve as detectives by providing information about improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other chemical weapons and the places where these weapons were stored. They do not visit the rehabilitation centers, but are in regular contact with the army. They are declared clear by the security forces . [170]

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[167] Respondent # 2, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017
[168] Respondent 12, in-person interview, Qambar, February 04, 2018
[169] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[170] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

Opposing views exist in Swat about the surveillance of rehabilitees. While the community and other stakeholders appreciate the monitoring of these rehabilitees, the rehabilitees and their families consider it a type of detention. They are psychologically detained by the security forces. Unannounced raids of their houses also serve to stigmatize them within their community. Surveillance therefore makes reintegration doubtful. It is again, a component of imposed rehabilitation and reintegration. A successful rehabilitation ought to be one where there is no need of monitoring during reintegration phase.

6.8. Condition of Rehabilitees in Community

The interviewees were asked about the general condition of ex-combatants after release from rehabilitation center. They shared the stories of their relatives, neighbors or friends who remained part of militant groups. Some ex-combatants were also inquired about their lives after re-joining the society. There were both good and bad aspects in the process of rehabilitation and reintegration. Majority of the respondents were optimistic and were of the opinion that the program is fruitful, but needs expansion to accommodate maximum number of ex-combatants as well as their families. They also agreed that the state should give special attention after release by providing them moral, financial and material assistance. Some of the themes emerging from the interviewee's responses are as under.

6.9. Employment and Public Acceptance

An elder indicated that those ex-combatants who have started businesses are living peacefully; he said "as far as I know, none of them are involved in any unlawful activities".[171] But they faced a different problem following their release from the rehabilitation center; they were arrested by CTD (counter terrorism department) and were charged with different allegations. Then they were sent to jail and released only through proper judicial procedure. The ex-combatants became very frustrated. They were being ostracized despite having spent years in internment

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[171]Respondent # 02, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 25, 2017

centers. A number of ex-combatants revealed their situation in the following words, "We were declared clear by the security forces and now there should no further allegations and arrests. This also shows a lack of coordination between civilian and military department or police and military as if a person is declared clear by security forces then he should not be teased with further inquiries and punishment."[172] This shows that there is still a trust deficit between the ex-combatants and security forces. A particular incident was indicative of this, in 2013 elections, all these rehabilitated ex-combatants were re-arrested by local Police.[173]

An official while explaining the situation observed that, "These ex-combatants cannot be reintegrated through teachings, trainings or discussions. Psychological training is also not sufficient unless they are provided with practical skills as well as business opportunities. For how long state will monitor them, just for a specific period; but after that they will find their way out for earning daily bread and that earning could be their old militant groups."[174]

A rehabilitee of *Mashal* was approached at his electrician shop which he opened after getting electrician training at the rehabilitation center. He informed the interviewer that he was very happy and felt himself secure with his job. He further added, "I know that these rehabilitation centers receive lots of money for ex-combatants from government as well as from NGOs. I have requested them many times to support us in our businesses but we receive un-satisfactory responses from the authorities. We do not demand property or large amount of money but a little assistance in developing small businesses".[175] In similar line, another rehabilitee voiced that he had three school going children and he did not have enough money to pay for their schooling. He stated that although he received vocational training at the center, he did not have enough money to start any business with that training. He expressed worry over his children's school fee and future.

Another rehabilitee living in Mingora at a friend's house, away from his village, said that he could not go back to his house until complete peace was restored; although he had his own house and land in Taghwaan, he could not go there. He cried, "The whole village is open and

[172] ibid

[173] Respondent # 13, in-person interview, Kabal (Swat), May 2, 2017

[174] Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017

[175]Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017

peaceful for everyone but not for me. When I make plan to go there the people of the community, especially VDC members, making complaints against me that they are scared of me. I am declared 'clear' in the documents by security forces but actually the community is not allowing me to stay at my own home".[176]

One of the ex-combatants cried while narrating his story of how he trained in carpentering at the center but instead had to drive a taxi to earn daily bread for his children. He spent two years in prison and then six months in a rehabilitation center. During this period, his family borrowed money from relatives to buy daily bread for children. Upon his release, he was trying to pay them back. He complained that he did not have money to start his own business of carpentering. He requested that in the absence of government assistance, there should at least be a program for the rehabilitees to obtain bank loans for small businesses. [177]

A resident of Mingora shared the post-release condition of his five relatives who graduated from rehabilitation centers. He said that two of them were unemployed and did not have a job; the other two have been sent abroad by their families for labor and send money back home. One of them recently married his cousin but his wife lived in Swat and security forces did not allow her to go to her husband. The husband cannot come home either, since he is on the security forces' watch list. The respondent further revealed, "This person, I know, was mentally sharp and smart. The fifth rehabilitee, I know, is living at his home with family as his family is economically sound, so, he does not need any job or profession".[178]

A community member shared information about his friend who was a barber before joining Taliban. He was rehabilitated and returned to his old occupation. The interviewee added, "I met him recently and found him happy without any worries. Although, he is going to ensure his attendance at nearby security forces check post on weekly basis."[179]

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[176]Respondent # 8, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[177] Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, July 01, 2017
[178]Respondent # 9, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[179]Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Peshawar, August 03, 2017

Overall, the condition of the rehabilitees was found good but the only problem is the lack of post-release assistance and support, as a result of which, they are facing difficulties in running their own businesses and jobs.

6.10. Stigmatization

Stigmatization of rehabilitees is one of the fundamental hurdles in reintegration. These rehabilitees are known to everyone in the community. In some cases, the researcher found that people abhor the idea of keeping any relationship with them or giving them employment. However, in most cases, they reintegrate by getting married and setting up their own businesses

A military official said that stigmatization is not a big issue. He added, "This is actually exaggerated by the Taliban as they threatened all the surrendered, even killed some of them so that other Taliban may not be surrendered."[180] Yet, there are many songs and poems that are popularized in the community, through which these ex-combatants have been degraded. Beside songs and poems, there are proper names associated with these ex-combatants that are used to harass and embarrass them. Some of the names are; *Salender* means surrendered; *Saleety* means the 'tagged one'; *Tasleem bibi* a lady name for the surrendered and many more. The females who supported militancy by making contributions are stigmatized with the phrase, "*da staso kaali di, os dazeegi*", means, 'this is your jewel which fires'.

When asked about the community's behavior, the rehabilitees complained that they are discriminated in society. People are scared to keep any relationship with them. The military also degrades them by calling them at military check posts. "I cannot go to my own home as community does not allow me to stay at my home", complained one of the ex-combatants.[181] Another respondent also complained of security forces' attitude and unannounced raids at the house of one of her cousins who was an ex-combatant. This she revealed happened every time a terrorist incident took place.[182]

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[180]Lt. Col. Atif, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 08, 2018.
[181]Respondent # 8, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[182]Respondent # 12, in-person interview, Qambar, February 04, 2018

When the researcher asked an official about the approaches and response to this situation, the official replied, "we do receive reports of stigmas but we are doing our best at the rehabilitation center to prepare these rehabilitees to face this stigmatization. We explain to them that the word *Salender* is actually surrendered, which means you are taking oath to obey state and security forces. There should be no embarrassment in it, as first of all we all have surrendered to God and then to state, because, this is your own government and your own army. We educate them enough at the center that they could face these stigmas in society."[183]

The community elders and experts are of the view that in order to control this stigmatization and to provide a better environment for reintegration, no one should discuss the militant life of these ex-combatants. They should not be reminded that they were once militants. They should be accepted with an open heart, especially in social gatherings. They should be completely forgiven for the losses they have caused. The society should realize that they have been punished by the state. Moreover, they should be kept busy in businesses. If these rehabilitees are doing their own businesses, they will have very little connection with the people of the society. These rehabilitees should also show respect towards society and apologize for whatever wrong they have done. However, if they still carry the germs of militancy, then the society will never accept them back.[184]

6.11. Institutional Support

Coordination among state institutions, along with support from national NGOs and humanitarian organization is imperative for improved reintegration. This coordination existed in every successful rehabilitation program around the world, for example in Sri Lanka (BCGR, 2016), Nepal (Dahal, 2006) and in Colombia (López & Andreouli, 2015). The Columbia Agency for Reintegration (ARC) is coordinating with other institutions (public and private sectors) to provide space for rehabilitees for better reintegration (López & Andreouli, 2015). In Swat, the responsibility of the rehabilitation projects lies principally on the shoulders of Pakistan army,

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[183]Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[184] Lt. Col. Atif, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 08, 2018.
[184] Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017
[184] Dr. Ihsan, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[184] Nisar Malik, in-person interview, Islamabad, December 25, 2016

though the army receives financial support from the government of Khyber Pashtunkhwa (KP). Yet there is very limited coordination with other institutions and organizations who could provide financial as well as material support. The support of private organizations and factories is necessary as these organizations can accommodate the rehabilitees after completion of technical and vocational training at rehabilitation centers. The Pakistan Technical and Vocational Education Training Authority (TVETA) is doing a good job in this regard, but TVETA is not part of the rehabilitation program and does not specifically focus on ex-combatants. Although, it is a good initiative for the whole society, as it offers trainings to the youth and enables them to launch their own businesses, which in turn is very helpful in de-radicalization of the society as a whole, and youth in particular. TEVTA is sponsored by National Vocational and Technical Training Commission (NAVTTC) in collaboration with international governments and national NGOs.[185] In Colombia, the rehabilitees are welcomed in all enterprises and local businesses by the people, while in Swat the community is reluctant about any dealing or business with ex-combatants even if they are rehabilitated.[186]But this inclusion is an important factor in rehabilitation as "the different forms of institutional support evident in the rehabilitees' social context were highlighted as a valuable contributing factor for successful reintegration" (López & Andreouli, 2015). A majority of the rehabilitees interviewed for the present research were jobless, and only a small number who had the support of their nuclear families were able to earn a living through for example driving a taxi and working as electricians and shopkeepers. The majority however, was either jobless or worked as cheap labor.

> The institutional support perceived by being socially engaged as members of families, students, workers, participants of a program, volunteers, active neighbors, etc., not only contributes to the formation of a safety net of relationships from which the participants can seek and also offer support, but also facilitates the reaffirmation of their civilian identity and the opportunities for recognition as citizens, rather than ex-combatants, by diverse sectors of society (López & Andreouli, 2015).

A good example of such institutional support in Swat is the support of Hum Pakistani Foundation, an NGO, which provides its services at *Sabawoon* rehabilitation center (McCarthy, 2015). However, this organization does not enjoy independence to conduct rehabilitation program on its own, but is directed by the security forces.

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[185]Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017
[186]Respondent # 8, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018

6.12. Community Perception about Rehabilitation and Rehabilitees

The researcher tried to interpret the overall perceptions regarding the rehabilitation processes, rehabilitees and their reintegration into the society in Swat. The overall response was not welcoming. Most of them perceived rehabilitation programs for adult ex-combatants as a wastage of time and resources. They believed that these militants were mature and had consciously joined the militancy. They were consciously involved in plundering and killing of the community members and even if government trained them for months and kept them in detention is for years, they would remain the same extremists.[187] Conversely, a friend of Janan, a rehabilitee, revealed that Janan was very rigid in his behavior and openly criticized the state and its institutions but after rehabilitation he became very kind and nice in his dealings. Rehabilitation gave Janan a new life. Otherwise, he would have been enlisted in "black" militants, as his other friends who did not surrender to the security forces were facing the consequences.[188]

A rehabilitee expressed, "I was kept in internment center for three years by the security forces without any contact with the outside environment or my family. I was always thinking of taking revenge of these three years in detention. But, when I was shifted to rehabilitation center, here I understood the situation. I understood that detention was a punishment that I should bear as I had disobeyed the state and the community. Here, passing six months with military in a friendly environment, I came to know that this is our own military that is serving us. My thirst for revenge is now changed to cooperation at rehabilitation center. I will say that this rehabilitation program is doing a great job in reintegrating ex-combatants".[189]

Some respondents were suspicious of rehabilitation programs and considered the rehabilitees permanent employees of the security agencies. According to such respondents, rehabilitation was a resource center for future proxies.[190] Another community member revealed that he did not know the inside story of rehabilitation centers, but knew that the rehabilitees were well-known in the community. The majority of the people in the community were dissatisfied with

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[187] Respondent # 16, in-person interview, Peshawar, July 27, 2017
[188] Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Peshawar, August 03, 2017
[189]Respondent # 07, in-person interview, Googdara, May 03, 2017
[190] Respondent # 10, in-person interview, Mingora, May 08, 2017

the processes of rehabilitation as they did not see these ex-combatants being rehabilitated. "The persons I know, their behavior is same even after rehabilitation and their mindset and approaches are same as before. How a person could be rehabilitated when you put him in jail for years and then ask him for rehabilitation? For the time being he might agree but will always wait for the right time and opportunity to be avenged", revealed a respondent.[191]

Similar comments were observed while interviewing a community member at Mingora. Those released rarely interacted with the general public in society but only with the people with whom they had spent time in jail or rehabilitation center. He added, "One of them, as I know, his family is still angry with him and he does not have contacts with his own family. Family complained that even after rehabilitation, he still has the same feelings as he had before". [192] Another rehabilitee, Ibraheem, also displayed the same feelings without any change after rehabilitation. [193]

The respondents argued that Taliban in Swat had no concern with Shariah or Islamic law for the land, but were seeking their own interests. Personal enmity was one of the major reasons for joining Taliban. There were social conflicts within the community, especially of land, with uncles, cousins and other relatives. The weaker joined militancy to take revenge. In the post-conflict environment, none of them would have any issues unless they had killed someone. But these ex-combatants would only remain safe in the presence of the military. [194] Some members of the community saw these rehabilitees in a different perspective. One of them expressed, "Let me say frankly, these rehabilitees are now spying for security forces. They are given more respect than any other member of this community. Their voices are heard and acted upon by the military. Their difficulties and hardships are resolved by the military within no time".[195]

A researcher and analyst on peace and conflict in Pakistan expressed that Pakistani military personnel have similar ideology as Taliban (ex-combatants). "We should look at the grassroots as this (Jihad) narrative was constructed by military, trained by military and now again the same institution is rehabilitating them. This is an irony. A narrative could be defeated with counter-

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[191]Respondent # 9, in-person interview, Mingora, April 02, 2018
[192] Respondent # 27, in-person interview, Mingora, February 03, 2018
[193] Respondent # 27, in-person interview, Mingora, February 03, 2018
[194]Respondent # 10, in-person interview, Mingora, May 08, 2017
[195] Respondent # 17, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017

narrative. I am worried about how these ex-combatants could be rehabilitated with similar ideology. Army in the current process of rehabilitation is collecting gun from these ex-combatants by giving them another."[196] A similar story was noted when the researcher interviewing a rehabilitee. He was saying that he had committed a big sin while fighting against his own army but, now, "I realized that I was wrong". He added that he will fight along side army for the country[197]. This behavior of rehabilitees reveals that they are not de-radicalized as they still have love for guns. There is no de-militarization of the detainees has occurred during rehabilitation. This can be said that this rehabilitation is only a transformation from one from to another.

A successful reintegration also minimizes and eradicates instances of terrorism, as in the case of Sri Lanka, where after implementation of rehabilitation program in 2010, only two terrorism related incidents were noted. On the other hand, in Swat the issue of target killing of the community elders and VDC members is on its peak. Countless civilians have been targeted and killed by unknown assassins. There is a state of insecurity and threat. The issue of missing persons is at its height, and the presence of security forces and their check posts is anything but a sound indicator of in-effective reintegration.

In this rehabilitation process, military should be removed from the post-conflict areas where rehabilitation program is launched. In Swat, the Police could easily control the situation but it was not allowed. Military intervention caused escalation of the conflict in Swat. Military intervened and gained control of all powers of the land; of the judiciary, policing and even economic. The social fabric is broken through this intervention and now military doesn't have any alternative. The whole conflict has been securitized. The check-posts are established to control violence, but it has become evident that check-posts maximize violence; like, the emergence of Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM).[198] In the case of Swat, the best solution is the traditional bottom-up approach to rehabilitation, involvement of the community through elected bodies and empowerment of the police. The Police are the ultimate force that could bring peace into society. Military is not trained enough to deal with civilian but police. [199]

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[196] Mehran Wazir, in-person interview, Islamabad, November 16, 2017

[197] Respondent # 23, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 26, 2017

[198] Dr. Husnul Amin, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 02, 2018.

[199] ibid

6.13. Conclusion

In this chapter, the researcher tried to explore reintegration in controlled societies. Swat was presented as a case study for a controlled society. The actual purpose of this chapter was not to explore reintegration in its essence, but to ascertain it as a fundamental indicator through which one can find the degree of success of rehabilitation. The discussion of this chapter began with the social integration of ex-combatants which is considered fundamental in any reintegration program. The researcher found divergent responses, both from the community as well as from the ex-combatants. The discussion then proceeded towards the second most important component, which was to understand income generation resources on the basis of vocational and technical trainings that rehabilitees received at rehabilitation centers. Majority of the respondents agreed that they were given vocational trainings, but they were not satisfied with the post-release assistance and support as most of the ex-combatants had got vocational trainings but due to lack of resources, they were unable to run their own businesses.

The researcher also found that majority of the respondents agreed that there are no chances of recidivism; however, grievances are still there. The cases of recidivism were also found in Swat which is again, a question mark on the process of rehabilitation. Stigmatization in the society is an issue and a barrier to social integration, which the rehabilitation centers leave unattended. The study also found that rehabilitation in controlled society is better if it follows the international standards. In Swat, the international standards could not be followed since the centers were unable bear the expenses of the program, and the graduates were re-united into society without any support. Without income generation sources, these ex-combatants are also vulnerable to recidivism.

A missing component in the rehabilitation of Swat and other international programs is the lack of political awareness and political training. The ex-combatants who joined any political party after rehabilitation were found more assimilated. The political party provided them a platform for hope to achieve their goals through non-violent means. As revealed by the community in Swat, there is a threat of communal enmities and conflicts. These rehabilitees are re-united by the security forces but not reintegrated. The local community was not involved in any capacity of

rehabilitation. Considering the resentment of the community against the ex-combatants, leaving the community out of the settlement process may create more fault lines for future conflict.

The overall effort of Pakistan army in rehabilitation is appreciable. However, the program did not provide fruitful reintegration. The community, experts and the graduates of this rehabilitation program were of the opinion that this program could be more fruitful if it was run by the civilian government. Some suggested that no government institution should interfere in rehabilitation program, but the community itself should do this job while the government provides the financial and material support to the community.

The upcoming chapter discusses an alternative approach to rehabilitation which involves the community. In the chapter, an approach is suggested whereby '*Pashtunwali'* is made compatible with the 'restorative justice' approach. Through this, the government involvement is minimized while community shoulders the whole responsibility of rehabilitation. An ex-combatant has to go back to the community after rehabilitation, which makes the latter's role is imperative in rehabilitation. This approach also has the advantage of being less expensive and more appealing.

Chapter VII

Alternative Approach to Rehabilitation in a Controlled Environment

This chapter will try to provide an alternative approach to rehabilitation in controlled environment like Swat. The researcher recognized the need for this approach after studying the existing approach to rehabilitation implemented in Swat. Research revealed that there is no policy framework or uniformity in the rehabilitation program implemented in Swat. Rehabilitation in Swat follows a mixed approach which incorporates features of different approaches around the world, mostly components are from UNIDDR 2006. After analyzing the nature and context of the society vis-à-vis the conflict in Swat, the researcher arrived at the conclusion that the existing approach of rehabilitation is not suitable for the nature and context of Swat conflict. The case of Swat is unique and hence contextually incompatible with the approaches adopted elsewhere around the world.

One unique feature of rehabilitation in Swat is the way in which it is administered. The administrative responsibilities lie with the Pakistan army. This has led to rehabilitation becoming the exclusive domain of the military, which impedes and prevents access for both data gathering, and evaluation by any third party or any civilian organization. The researcher also found that these centers are not enough to accommodate a large number of ex-combatants. One other peculiarity was the ease with which 'self-integrated'[200] ex-combatants were mixing in, with the rest of the society. This can compromise future security by allowing dangerous militants to roam freely in the society. Though, this might appear somewhat alarmist, but ex-combatants who have not been rehabilitated properly can be lured and recruited by militant organizations again. The researcher also found that there were financial problems that prevented the rehabilitees from fully reintegrating into society; there was little or no financial support for the graduates of these centers

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[200] 'self-integrated', combatants who resettled in society without passing through rehabilitation. They re-join the community without any change in their narratives or approaches.

to open their own small-scale businesses, or opportunities to further improve the skills acquired at rehabilitation centers following their rehabilitation.

Furthermore, a large number of extremists and radicals have been moving un-noticed in society. These people also need rehabilitation as they can easily influence the newly reintegrated graduates. In addition, the researcher observed in interviews with the locals, that the community was not fully satisfied with the rehabilitation program; they still considered the ex-combatants their enemies, premised on the nature of havocs they had perpetuated during militancy. The involvement of the community, as suggested above, will give ownership of the program and allow the community to forge a bond with the ex-combatants. The rehabilitees also voiced complaints about feeling ostracized by the community; they faced stigmatization and discrimination, particularly in labor market.

Keeping in view these drawbacks and characterizing the existing centers, the need for a pragmatic alternative approach is imperative. The government also recognizes this need for a more pragmatic, and convenient program. In this context, an alternative approach which is less expensive should be adopted for easy implementation

The existing approach to rehabilitation in Swat is also criticized on the grounds that it is securitized and heavily under the grip of the security agencies. In Swat, the main concern of the rehabilitation program is to establish security and very little space is given to the humanitarian dimension. For example, the surveillance of ex-combatants and the formation of Village Defense Committees (VDCs) are purely security measures. Further, the ex-combatants have been disarmed and demobilized, but very little attention has been paid to their rehabilitation and reintegration in Swat.

While rehabilitation is imperative and requires certain degree of hardcore measures, it must not be disconnected from the humanitarian aspect. After all, the aim of rehabilitation is to heal the community by providing a chance for reconciliation and reintegration, both of which are essentially humanitarian efforts. The role of civil institutions and organizations therefore, cannot be downplayed; the civilians are critical stakeholders who can best assume responsibility and implement the humanitarian aspects of any rehabilitation program.

More importantly, given the context and nature of the Swat society, a community-based approach that integrates local values and traditions into the rehabilitation program will be more

fulfilling. The traditional methods of negotiation and conflict resolution must not merely be integrated, but enforced properly to a large extent so that they can be brought at par with the modern approach of 'restorative justice'. The traditional method followed in Swat is known as *Pashtunwali* which is a code of conduct of Pashtuns. The norms of *Pashtunwali* have been strictly followed by the Pashtuns throughout their history, and this is true for the Pashtuns of Swat as well. The new laws and rules for negotiations, conflict resolution, and peace building are complicated and confusing to the local people who are grappling to intersect the centuries old traditional law and the new approach.[201] Restorative Justice (RJ) is a somewhat modern concept of resolving conflicts peacefully and constructively. Unlike the former, the traditional model is a bottom-up approach which involves the community in the process. The traditional model provides the opportunity for the victim, offender, and the community to sit together to heal their wounds, to repair the harm caused by the offender and to reach an agreement, while encouraging their rehabilitation.

7.1 Measures taken by Khyber Pashtunkhwa Government

In contemporary times, the international community and humanitarian organizations stress the need for bottom-up or community-based approaches to almost every issue as the best possible way to resolve societal issues, ranging from health to business, to peace and conflict (Khasnabis, et al., 2010). It is a new idea to conduct the rehabilitation of ex-combatants through a community-based approach or in other words, through civilian agency. But critics of this community based approach are of the view that rehabilitation of ex-combatants is a risky job and therefore, security forces or military is a suitable institution to carry out rehabilitation and then reintegration.[202] However, most of the studies reveal that rehabilitation and reintegration programs under the military have not been yielding more positive results, as witnessed in Afghanistan (Bahman & Torjesen, 2012) and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Shepherd, 2012). On the other hand, the cases where civilians are taken on board in the process of rehabilitation and reintegration are considered relatively more successful. Closest to this assertion are the Columbian (Sanin & Penza,

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[201]Dr. Husnul Amin, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 02, 2018

[202]Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

2012) and Sri Lankan (Dharmawardhane, 2013) rehabilitation programs respectively. This does not mean that the military has not done its job at rehabilitation or reintegration, but the problem is that most military rehabilitation trainings are provided in specialized centers. Community members have close to zero, or very limited access to the centers, as military does not only securitize the facilities but equally assumes the whole rehabilitation process, mainly from a military perspective and reduces it to a military engagement. This traditional approach to rehabilitation under the military is also criticized on the grounds that rehabilitation is not possible in a fenced cell which is surrounded by the military with guns. The extremist narrative cannot be made liberal in a militarized way.[203]

In a militarized environment, the community is not allowed to interact with rehabilitees at the centers and they are isolated from the community; such a situation of isolation further creates gaps and remains unable to address the grievances of the community. So, the need for community involvement in rehabilitation and reintegration is imperative. The success and failures of any rehabilitation program is measured by the extent to which ex-combatants reintegrate into the community. This reveals the importance of community in rehabilitation process. It is only when a community agrees and accepts an ex-combatant back into its folds, or in other words, allows the reintegration of ex-combatants into the society, can a rehabilitation program be declared successful. This underscores the importance of community involvement in the rehabilitation process.

This importance of community involvement was realized by the Government of Khyber Pashtunkhwa (GoKP), as it realized that the Pashtun society has an established traditional system known as *Pashtunwali* which could be utilized for different purposes. This strategy could save the government time and resources, and minimize the job of police and judiciary. Following are some of the programs initiated by GoKP to involve the community. These examples are less relevant to the topic of the thesis that is, rehabilitation and reintegration, but the purpose of highlighting these activities of the GoKP is to show that these practices of community involvement are not new to the province.

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[203] Mehran Wazir, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 18, 2018

In this regard, Dispute Resolution Councils (DRCs) program has been introduced by KP Police in the province for the purpose of conflict and dispute resolution at the community level. Every police station is to have a DRC comprising 21 members from the community. These include elders, retired civil and military officers, educationists, lawyers and other professionals. Their mandate includes resolving disputes in a friendly environment, fact finding and the responsibility to assist police investigation (KP Police, 2014). In the context of these DRCs, the document says;

> The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, characterized by '*Pashtunwali*' code, has preserved its traditions and culture for centuries. These cultural values, today, find themselves woven in its social fabric. The tradition of resolving disputes amicably through the intervention of 'elders' has been age old and quite a revered one. However, the infestation of militancy and terrorism in this area not only disrupted the law and order situation but also destroyed a strong tradition of dispute resolution through reconciliation. With a mission to revive this revered tradition of dispute resolution through restorative justice, KP Police has taken this initiative of Dispute Resolution Council (KP Police, 2014).

These councils are only allowed to follow the cases referred to them by the police. Hence, they are controlled by the police. Presently, these DRCs are only playing the role of conflict resolution committees, while rehabilitation and reintegration are out of their domain. Research and support are needed to expand their scope to rehabilitation and reintegration.

In this chain, Parents-Teachers Council (PTC) (also known as school management committees) is another body introduced by the KP government in the province. PTC is an elected body comprising of eight members. Five of the eight are elected from the vicinity of school, two are nominated by the elected five and the last council member is the principal of the schools, who usually serves as secretary of the council (Nasir et al., 2013). The purpose of PTC is to involve parents in the education of their children; to keep them informed about their children's progress and activities. This council is also very helpful in providing safety and protection to children at schools, homes and playgrounds (Hussain & Naz, 2013). This council engages the parents in the schooling of their children and they are able to follow the activities and movements of their children. The introduction of PTC has yielded positive results as it extends responsibility not only to ministry of education and teachers, but to the parents as well. The PTC is formed in every village. The committee is responsible to report any developmental work at school if needed such

as construction of walls, rooms, and improving sanitation etc. These committees can also report a complaint against any teacher to higher official.[204]

The purpose behind highlighting the above examples was to demonstrate that the notion of citizen participation is already prevailing in KP province in many programs other than rehabilitation and reintegration. In above cases, the policy makers have realized that the nature and structure of the society in Pashtuns dominated regions could easily be administered if the locals are involved according to their tradition. Councils and committees are the modern names for the centuries old *Jarga*, a prominent code in *Pashtunwali*. It is not necessary that the above mentioned DRCs or PTCs should constitute as rehabilitation committees, but the purpose was to show that these committees are successful in their respective domains. Rehabilitation and reintegration can benefit from committees or councils of similar nature.

7.2. Why a Community Based Approach?

Launching a successful rehabilitation and reintegration program in controlled environment is very difficult, especially where the assistance from international communities and donor agencies is limited. The states that have recently come out of conflicts cannot provide and mobilize the required resources for a complete rehabilitation and reintegration program (UNDP, 2007). In this case, the nature of the society ought to be understood. In societies like Swat, this community-based approach is more likely to be successful because the traditional norms and values are respected and followed. This approach can be easily managed by the community members with less resources and expenditure. Rehabilitation is also considered a part of transitional justice, in which the victims as well as offenders are provided justice to address their grievances.

The concept of community is a conflicting concept among the practitioners and academicians of peace and conflict studies. Basia Spalek (2012) defined "Community as a concept that encompasses both individual and group identities and dynamics that are influencing and being influenced by these. Community might be taken as a space of belonging, consisting of one or more of a combination of geographical, imaginative, emotional, political and other ties" (Spalek, 2012, p. 30). Thus, community is a space where individual and group identities are influenced, felt,

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[204] Baz Muhammad, in-person interview, Mardan, September 13, 2017

expressed and contested. Some scholars define community as, "a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings" (Cobigo et al, 2016). United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) provides a comprehensive definition in its operations book (2008) which says, "Community" can be described as a group of people that recognizes itself or is recognized by outsiders as sharing common cultural, religious or other social features, backgrounds and interests, and that forms a collective identity with shared goals". However, in this research, the term 'community' is taken to mean the people living in a specific geographical location with similar norms, values, language and identity. This simple definition does not go into deeper detail, but only specifies a frame of reference for this research.

Involvement of a community in post conflict development, rehabilitation and reintegration is imperative. One thing worth noting is that the involvement of community in rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants is only to engage with the 'angry-men' of the community. In other words, the community can deal only with militants and not with non-state actors[205]/terrorists who are outsiders. Most of the militants in Swat are people from the society and without involving the community, the process of their rehabilitation and reintegration cannot yield fruitful results. The state institutions should first adopt the policy of 'winning hearts and minds' of the community, as this strategy is always adopted by the militants who need to strengthen their roots in community (Spalek, 2012, p. 32). The state institutions have to break the bond between the society and militants as there are a number of sympathizers and followers of militants' narratives within the society. Since the militants are part of the community and have to return to their respective community following rehabilitation, the community-based approach to rehabilitation and reintegration becomes essential.

One another debate is highly concern among the practitioners and academia of peace and confict studies which revolve around 'failed reintegration' and they have raised the question that whether attention for reintegration should be given primarily to individual ex-combatants who pose a threat to the security, or to the society as a whole, or to both simultaneously (Oluwaniyi,

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[205] Kledja Mulaj (2008) defines non-state actors are persons or groups who are not belonging to the state where they conduct violent activities. The actors who conduct violent activities within their states are state actors as they belong to that state.

2018). It must however be noted, that both individual and community reintegration is imperative for peace-building and development in post-conflict societies (Oluwaniyi, 2018). Because in a conflict, both the individual and community suffer equally, and there is need to address grievances of both. An ongoing project of World Bank (WB) focuses on reintegration of individual ex-combatants in Central African Republic, and argues that individual reintegration reduces threat to overall security of society (World Bank, 2018). However, the countries that prioritize individual ex-combatants over the whole community end up with failed reintegration because the community gets disappointed by the way the ex-combatants are privileged over it. If the community is not taken into confidence, it harbors misgiving towards the acceptance of the ex-combatants back into the society; meanwhile less attention is given to the overall society, social issue and revitalization of social capital (Oluwaniyi, 2018).

Societies that prioritize individuals over community in reintegration, as a consequence, also give freedom to gangs and criminal groups who get involved in crimes, kidnapping, and drug trafficking and illicit weapons as observed in Angola, DRC and Liberia (Oluwaniyi, 2018). In post-conflict scenarios, since the societies are destabilized by the conflict, community-based reintegration is essential to strengthen and consolidate the community and to assist the ex-combatants back into a peaceful and improved community. Oluwaniyi (2018) confesses that the approaches in which the individual and community are reintegrated have been successfully applied in Niger Delta, where the ex-combatants passed through proper rehabilitation, following the process of reconciliation between the community and the ex-combatants which is followed by a community development program for ex-combatants.

The above debate questions whether reintegration should be centered around ex-combatants, or community or both. However, this research argues to not only focus reintegration or reintegrate the community, but also to empower the community to do the job as an agency of rehabilitation and reintegration. Engagement of the community in rehabilitation and reintegration will also play a role in de-radicalization of the whole community. The "greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long run is always rooted in the local people and their culture" (Leaderach, 1997). Buzan and Waever (2003) has also stressed on the utility of conflict management through indigenous ways; they state that in contemporary conflicts the state is the referent object, but scholars agree that all the conflicts arise within the society, and should be resolved within the society. Keeping the society in focus as a referent object, the conflicts should be managed through

the indigenous way. Further, despite increasing westernization of the world and its formal and rational-legal approaches to conflict management, indigenous values are not only relevant but most suitable in many cases (Adebayo et al., 2014). Resolving conflicts and other post-conflict issues through indigenous ways is encouraged by the UN too. In most of the countries, people have been dissatisfied and frustrated by the formal judiciary or justice system; as a result, there has been an increasing preference for the customary or traditional practices of justice to deal with the crime and disorder in society. In this line, restorative justice offers some welcoming means of resolving disputes and other post conflict issues (United Nations, 2006).

7.3. Some Alternative Suggestions from the Community and Respondents

The community can be engaged in a number of ways in post-conflict peace building. Certain suggestions to engage the community in the rehabilitation process are as follows.

7.3.1. Rehabilitation based on Punjab CTD Program

Majority of the stakeholders based in cities, working in different research centers, NGOs and some in the field of journalism preferred the Punjab model for rehabilitation program. The Punjab Police counter terrorism department has launched de-radicalization and rehabilitation program throughout the province which focuses on members of different extremist groups in Punjab as well as the extremists in detention in different jails of Punjab.[206] The program showed very fruitful results, but due to financial constraints the program became dormant. This program involves the police department in collaboration with the community members, instead of the military.

In Swat, there is also a possibility to run such a program but again, the program needs a huge budget and could face a similar fate as in the program in Punjab.[207] Though most programs rely on international donor assistance, it is not always readily available. In case the international

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[206] Respondent # 18, in-person interview, station Islamabad, December 21, 2017.
[207] Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017

assistance is not forthcoming, harnessing community resources would be the other avenue, if not the only option.[208]

7.3.2. Appointment of Psychologists

Appointment of Psychologists at schools is one of the most appealing and pertinent suggestions from the community. There should be, at least one psychologist at every school, and a counseling center at every village. The proponents of this idea hold that as the whole society is somewhat radicalized due to extended conflict and religious extremism is deep rooted in the society. The State has not regulated the madrassas and mosques and therefore, they are free to deliver speeches about whatever they want. To counter this issue, the psychologists will assess the students at schools as well as the radical persons in the community by the counselor.[209] Upon the discovery of extremist or radical behaviors, those affected can be persuaded and rehabilitated easily. The counseling center at the village will look after the village and will provide counseling to the frustrated youth and aggrieved persons of the community. These psychologists and counseling centers at the village level should be regulated by the Ministry of Education as the education department is respected and considered non-political.[210]

7.3.3. Rehabilitation through Family

This is a successful idea presented by the community members, as well as the ex-combatants in Swat. Rehabilitation through the families of extremists is most relevant to the community-based rehabilitation; easy and less expensive. In favor of family-based rehabilitation, an ex-combatant said that they have degraded and disrespected their elders and if they had originally respected and listened to their elders, there would have been no conflict, extremism and or radicalization. He added that elders always talked about peace and would instruct people to stay away of this Talibanization, but many did not yield to their counsel. Most of the elders were killed just because they were against extremism, and were dissuading youth from militant ranks.[211] A

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[208] Respondent # 3, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017
[209] Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017
[210] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[211] Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017

community member revealed that de-radicalization could be possible through families of ex-combatants only. They are more attentive to the caution of their parents.[212]

A story of family-based de-radicalization/rehabilitation

> *Nazir Ahmed was at commander rank in Taliban. The villagers were called upon by the security forces and told that if Nazir does not surrender, forces will take action against him and consequently, the whole village could be at risk. The villagers forced his family through a Jarga to bring Nazir back. His family was involved in businesses and doing government jobs. His family members including his father and uncle, followed him to bring him back to the village. He was convinced as well as threatened that to take his wife and children with him and leave the village permanently. He could not take children with him and ultimately surrendered first to his family and then to security forces. He spent some days in jail and was later released after submitting some fine to the state. Nazir is now running a shop in Peshawar.*[213]

In a society however, not every family has enough awareness to prevent their members from joining militants' ranks. The researcher came across a number of similar stories in Swat. This family-based de-radicalization strategy could be improved by providing proper trainings and awareness sessions. These trainings can cover topics revolving around; how to distance children/youngsters from radicalization, what type of news, discussions, gatherings and programs should be arranged to help in healing ex-combatants, radicalized persons and to keep the rest of the youth away so that they may not join the militants again etc. Such discussions and knowledge sharing can boost efforts at rehabilitation. During a Focus Group Discussion (FDG), a participant told the story of his son;

> *My son was studying in a madrassa in near my home. None of the madrassa staff was involved in any extremism and comprised of law-abiding citizens. My son used to come home every Friday. But then he did not come home for two consecutive weekends. When I inquired at madrassa, I was told that he was not in madrassa for the last two weeks. I came to know that one of his teachers has affiliations with militants. We followed that teacher and, after requesting and coercion, he revealed that he is in militants' training center. We rushed there and found that he was ready for a suicide attack. We rescued him and brought him back home. Then, the elders of the village expelled the teacher from madrassa and from the village too.*"[214]

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[212]Dr. Ihsan, in-person interview, Mingora, February 04, 2018
[213] Nazir Ahmed, in-person interview, Peshawar, June 14, 2017
[214] Respondent #21, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), Qamber, August 08, 2017

This story reveals two approaches; family-based and community-based approaches. In the first, family was involved in convincing their son to bring him back home while the community (*Jarga*) was involved in expelling the convicted teacher from madrassa and from the village. Interfering in madrassa is a very difficult job but when community intervenes collectively, it becomes easy.

7.3.4. Rehabilitation and Reintegration through Local Elected Bodies

In an FGD, a respondent disclosed that due to emergence of newly developed institutionalization, the traditional intuitions like *Pashtunwali* in this case, have been weakened. That may be because rehabilitation through *Pashtunwali* might not be appealing for this generation. Yet such local approaches are highly relevant in area like Swat.

The Government of Khyber Pashtunkhwa (GoKP) has already implemented Local Government (LG) system in the province (GoKP, 2013). The basic unit of this local government is Village Council. This village council is responsible for developmental work in the village. The best way of utilization of this elected village council is to extend its domain of power. Its powers should be extended to Community Policing and to some extent; it should enjoy the power of magistrate. Through this method, these local bodies can keep a check on their respective villages. These local bodies are elected bodies, so there are limited chances to be dominated by specific people of the community. These local bodies should also be empowered to impose emergency in some situations.[215]

Through this mechanism, these local bodies can keep an eye on radicalization and extremism in the community. These bodies, if provided the above powers, can play a vital role in rehabilitation and reintegration because, these bodies are representatives of the community and can convince or compel someone to either do something, or refrain from it. These councils could be termed '*Jarga*' in order to thwart suspicion and placate satisfy local communities.

The above discussion suggests a bottom-up approach which demands maximum participation from the community. Some respondents suggested a more bottom-up, family-based

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[215] Dr. Husnul Amin, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), Islamabad, January 02, 2018

approach in which the nuclear family of an ex-combatant could play a vital role in rehabilitation and reintegration.

The following discussion has been concluded in the light of the above discussion, which suggests that both restorative justice and *Pashtunwali* (modern and traditional approaches, respectively) are compatible to accommodate the voices of the community, while providing some space for state institutions. The following discussion will first explain RJ, and then a combined account of RJ and *Pashtunwali* will be drawn.

7.4. Restorative Justice

The management of the consequences of conflict has a long history (Pante, 2006) and thus restorative justice is as old as the history of conflicts, and has subsisted in different forms and processes in the course of law (Garkawe, 1999). Restorative justice subsisted throughout history. It is a complex term and cannot be defined precisely with a singular definition (Garkawe, 1999). Although, scholars and professionals have tried to give a definition which could nearly explain the term. A simplified definition of restorative justice drawn by the United Nations is, "any program that uses restorative processes and seeks to achieve restorative outcomes" (United Nations, 2006). But this is still ambiguous and does not clarify the term properly. Tony Marshall (1999) defined restorative justice as it, "is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future". John Braithwaite (2003) provided a very short but comprehensive definition of the term as "restoring the balance between victims, offenders and the community". These definitions clarify the actual meaning and purpose of restorative justice which reveals that there must be two parties; victim and offender must be included in the negotiation process in the presence of the members of the community, to find a way to heal grievances of both victim and offender. The community members play a vital role which will be discussed in the later part of this chapter.

7.4.1. History of RJ

The present rehabilitation centers around the world are actually reformative centers, initiated in 19th century, in which the state called the reformatory to rehabilitate the offenders in a semi-military regime (Campbell, 2005). The reformatories introduced educational and vocational trainings and the prisoners could be released earlier based on their conduct. The reformatories also introduced classification of the prisoners (Campbell, 2005). In Swat, this reformatory strategy is adopted in rehabilitation centers. The centers provide educational and vocational trainings, and the prisoners have been divided into hard-core and soft-core. But, later on, the reformatories advocated punishment for prisoners and ultimately, retribution re-emerged (Campbell, 2005).

The second concept, restorative Justice, evolved in 1970s to correct some weaknesses in criminal law in the formal legal system, based on retributive justice for the rehabilitation of criminals to reintegrate them into the society. Currently, there are numerous rehabilitation programs running around the world but restorative justice is wider in its scope than criminal law (Zehr, 2009). The advocates of RJ are of the view that formal-legal system is mainly concerned with the offender and neglects the victim (O'Hara & Robbins, 2009). On the contrary, restorative justice engages all parties in the processes i.e. victim, offender and community. Evidences suggest that restorative justice empower the victims, offenders and communities to engage in the processes, and to formulate public response to the offense. This process strengthens public trust over the justice system, and may reduce even re-offense rate (Gabbay, 2005). Usually, the restorative justice processes are conducted as conferences.

"Disrespect begets disrespect", says Howard Zehr (1995). Restorative conferences provide respect not only to the victims but to the offenders as well. In these conferences the nuclear family of the offender is also present so that an offender may not feel himself lonely. In isolation he might feel shame over his actions and may not wish to rejoin his community. The restorative conferences give maximum opportunity to an offender to express his views and explanations of the crime he has committed. This process gives respect to offender; ultimately, empowering him by not excluding him in the negotiation process. He is not ignored on the basis of wealth, race or sex.

This empowerment to the criminal as well as to the victim makes them responsible persons and they try to resolve the issue in a constructive manner (López et.al, 2015).

There are several examples around the world where criminal law has been replaced with restorative justice. Majority of the countries are trying to make restorative justice processes a formal procedure dealing with criminals. New Zealand was the first to set up the state-run victim compensation fund in 1963, then the United States initiated her first compensation program in California in 1965 (Bright, 2018). The program was further extended to most of the European countries including, the Netherland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Ireland, France, the United Kingdom and Norway (Bright, 2018). In Australia, the Canberra and the North NSW Youth Conferences were found more successful, where the victims and offenders found more time to express and share their views than in prisons (López et.al, 2015 ; Garkawe, 1999).

In Africa and Asia, the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (2003), the Peruvian TRC (2003), and the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (2005), were authorized to find the root causes and legacies of the conflicts and their works were specified to peace building and post conflict rehabilitation (Friedman, 2013). Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed added that during 1996-7 blasts in Cairo, Egypt, many people died. The authorities imprisoned the leaders of the known extremist groups. Those groups had spread violent literature in the country which leads to the promotion of an extremist narrative in the population. In prisons, they were given non-violent education by the professors of Al-Azhar University. When they were released, they revised their ideology and started publishing non-violent literature. That has been considered a successful rehabilitation program.[216] Currently, most of the countries have shifted their attention to a more participatory approach to rehabilitation and reintegration, by admitting the deficiencies of paternalistic[217] reintegration programs which include the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Philippines, and Colombia (López et.al, 2015). These participatory approaches guarantee the engagement of ex-combatants, receptive community members, local and national stakeholders such as, elders and religious figures (Buxton, 2008).

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[216] Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed, comments in a conference, Islamabad, July 21, 2016
[217] The system, principle, or practice of managing or governing individuals in the manner of a father dealing benevolently and often intrusively with his children.

7.4.2. Restorative Processes

Restorative process is defined by United Nations as, "any process in which the victim and the offender, and where appropriate, any other individuals or community members affected by a crime, participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, generally with the help of a facilitator" (United Nations, 2006, p.9). The other community members mean nuclear relatives of the victims and offenders, friends and elders. Braithwaite (2003) has given a comprehensive definition to the restorative process as;

> Restorative justice conferences work by inviting victims and supporters (usually family supporters) of the victim to meet with the offender and the people who care most about the offender and most enjoy the offender's respect (usually including both the nuclear and extended family, but not limited to them). Within this negotiation, the consequences of the crime, drawing out the feelings of those who have been harmed. Then they discuss how that harm might be repaired and any step that should be taken to prevent reoffending (Braithwaite, 2003).

Restorative justice is viewed from a theoretical lens when it comes to its practical application. Most of the stakeholders are of the view that if an offender cannot be compensated then restorative justice for rehabilitation and reintegration will not be successful.[218] Implementation of restorative justice might be difficult in the countries where indigenous society or traditional laws are hardly followed. But in Swat, the people still follow their traditional law, norms and values and therefore, restorative justice can be utilized as it involves the community. Involvement of the community in post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration is like the vertebral column that sustains social, economic and political aspects of the society (López et.al, 2015). Majority of the population in Swat is Pashtun and follows the Pashtun code of life '*Pashtunwali'*. Most of the principles of restorative justice are similar to *Pashtunwali*. Howard Zehr (2009), Professor of Restorative Justice, pointed out three main principles of restorative justice; restoration, accountability and engagement;

- Repair the damage caused by the offender (restoration)
- Encourages proper responsibility for addressing needs and repairing the harm (accountability);

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[218] Anwer Anjum, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017

- Involvement of the victims including the community in restorative process (engagement).

7.5. Reparation and Compensation in Restorative Justice in the Context of Swat

The consent of both parties is necessary to bring them to negotiations or conferences (Gabbay, 2005). The agreement, upon conclusion may "include reparation, restitution and community services, the purpose of community services, to fulfill the individual and collective needs and responsibilities of the parties, achieving reintegration of the victims and offenders" (United Nations, 2006).

Reparation as apology

Apology is one the basic tenets of restorative justice. Before entering in negotiations, both the parties consent that victim will give pardon, and offender will be forgiven.

Monetary Restitution

Monetary restitution has remained the popular culture of restorative justice. The offender has to pay money for the harm he inflicted, either in cash or any other form, as decided in negotiations, to the victim.

Reparation as Community Services

During the negotiations if it is decided that offender will do community services or he will provide services to the victim, then this penalty is awarded to the offender in case the offender is unable to restitute the victim.

Compensation by the State

The method of compensation by the state to the victims and offenders has been adopted by most of the countries around the world (Bright, 2018 ; Garkawe, 1999 ; Friedman, 2013). They have established different institutions and arrange conferences for restorative justice. It is the responsibility of modern nation states to care for its citizens. The state is for the individual, as liberals believe, and should do whatever citizens' feel is feasible. The purpose of rehabilitation in prisons is to assist the ex-combatants in rehabilitation. Similarly, the state should assist the offender to compensate the victims for the harm done by the offender.

Pakistan is already assisting the victims for their losses in the conflict. State is receiving assistance from international donors, and it further distributes that assistance among the victims in the form of aid. Now, if the state wants to strengthen restorative justice, the state should encourage its adoption, and compensate the victims as decided during Jarga. There should be formulation of policy and allocation of special 'compensation fund' through which the government can compensate the victims and offenders of conflicts. The policy should clearly mention the eligibility on the basis of the nature of the conflict.[219] The communal conflicts should not be included in this compensation fund, since the resources may be scarce. Through this fund, the government will compensate the economic, social and political losses of the victims as well as offenders.

7.6. Pashtunwali and Restorative Justice

Pashtunwali is the Pashtun way of life. It is an umbrella term, covering all codes and values of Pashtun culture in it. The most relevant codes of *Pashtunwali* with restorative justice are; *Jarga, Nanawati, Kushunda, and Lashkar or Salweshti.* Jarga as defined by Gohar (2014) "is community-based fact-finding and it acts like a modern jury. It intervenes to halt violence, identify the issues, and resolve them through mediation or arbitration and further works for reconciliation and rehabilitation" (Gohar, 2014).

There are different types of *Jargas* but the working principles are same. *Jarga* is usually called at the consent of both parties, who are present in the processes. *Jarga* listens to the claims of both parties and then decides in the light of Pashtun codes. Similar rules are followed in the process of restorative justice, in which the parties and the community sit together to resolve the conflict and rehabilitate the victim and offender. Usually, the *Jarga* members are from the same area (from vicinity of victim and offender) but may be called from other areas and tribes too. The only difference in restorative conference and Jarga is that in the former, the parties to the conflict come to an agreement, while there is simultaneous arbitration and mediation in *Jarga*.

Formation of Jarga

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[219] Fazal Saeed, in-person interview, Islamabad, June 23, 2017

Traditional *Jarga* is formed by the elders of the village or tribe. While constituting a Jarga under the restorative justice approach, it must be made sure that the Jarga includes members of the community (village); one member from the nuclear family of ex-combatant; *Mullah/Imam* of the mosque of that village; Nazim of the area or village councilor; a police officer of the respective police station; members of the nuclear families of victim, and two or three elders of the community.[220] This body should be called a modern name, 'committee' or a traditional name '*Jarga*' or with the name, as described by John P. Leaderach (1997), 'peace constituency'. But the contextual meaning of the body may be best represented by the name, 'Restorative Jarga'.

This committee (Restorative-Jarga) will investigate the ex-combatant with regards to his involvement in militancy, and check what losses he has caused to a family, community or state. This *Jarga* will decide which category (white, black and grey) the ex-combatant should be grouped under, and how to compensate or punish the ex-combatant. This Restorative-Jarga will better understand the grievances of ex-combatants, as well as his crime, as members of his community.[221]

The logic behind recruiting the above members of the community in Restorative-Jarga is that the family members of ex-combatant must be taken on board so that he is not discriminated, and his grievances are listened to and fully addressed by the community. Imam/cleric of the village often commands enormous respect, and his words are valued in the Pashtun society, and he is well aware of the community. Therefore, his presence is mandatory. His presence is also necessary if the Restorative-Jarga needs religious guidance and reference in some cases. The presence of a police officer is required to execute the decision taken by the Jarga, and in addition, to act as a witness that the ex-combatant is rehabilitated. The other members are necessary to symbolize community participation and assure the community that the offender has been punished.

The procedure in a Jarga

When Jarga sits, its jurisdictions can be *Nanawati* or *Kushunda* (only in case of rehabilitation), the details are as under;

Nanawati: pleading or pardon in English. The Jarga decides that the offender will seek pardon for his crime. The offender is bound to follow Jarga jurisdiction and will plead for an apology. Then

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[220]Fayaz Zafar, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017
[221] Anwer Anjum, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017

it depends on victims to accept or reject his apology, but usually it is accepted as a tradition, and the offender is accompanied by the elders of the community when he seeks apology. Under *Nanawati* the offender goes to the victim's home to seek an apology or the offender enters the grave when a relative of the victim has dies; the offender stays there till he is forgiven. In extreme cases, the offender sends women to the victim's home to seek an apology. If none of these methods are adopted, the offender follows the decision of the Jarga.[222] It's jurisdiction may be in the form of money or land. When victim agrees to pardon the offender, the entire community is called for a public eating and the expenses are usually borne by the offender. This way, the victim and offender are reconciled and reintegrated through indigenous customs.

This tradition of *Nanawati* can be utilized in restorative justice and can be turned into a formal procedure for rehabilitation and reintegration, as the apology is also one of the principles of restorative justice.

An instance of successful *Nanawati* from South Waziristan;

> *The youngsters had beaten a member of Taliban. Taliban came and took many youngsters of the tribe in their custody for nearly three days and maltreated them. The tribe was agitated and wanted to take Badal (revenge) from Taliban. Other tribes of the area realized that the conflict may escalate to a more violent scale. They intervened and formed a Jarga of 120 members. The jurisdiction of Jarga was that Taliban will follow the code of Nanawati (will seek apology for their act) and will compensate 12 buffalos to the victims. As a result, the conflict was resolved and the victims were rehabilitated.[223]*

Kushunda: 'the expelled-one' in English. Jarga in its jurisdiction may decide *Kushunda*, instead of *Nanawati*, which compels the offender to leave the community, the area of his residence and not to return home for a specific period, or for life. This way the rest of the family (of the offender) retains its honor and safety. Following the current rehabilitation strategy in Swat, when an offender is not under the control of security forces, his family members are arrested. By turning an offender *Kushunda*, the rest of the family will remain safe and the victim is also satisfied.

A story from Bajaur Agency;

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[222] Mehran Wazir, in-person interview, Islamabad, July 25, 2016
[223] Mehran Wazir, in-person interview, Islamabad, July 25, 2016

Nisar Khan is a Kushunda living in Islamabad since 2012. There was a 70 years old enmity between two tribes in district Bajaur. A number of people were killed from both sides. In 2012, Jarga resolved the enmity and decided to make one person of the tribe Kushunda for its offense against the other. Nisar Khan, of the offender's tribe was made Kushunda to satisfy the victim tribe as its member was killed. Now, Nisar Khan is living in Islamabad and the tribes are living in peace in Bajaur.[224]

Through this method, the ex-combatant can be brought forth in front of the community during restorative justice process. The 'restorative Jarga' will decide the nature of crime as well as the punishment. The ex-combatant will be made *Kushunda* and will be expelled from the area. The rest of his family and the community will live in peace. In Swat, as revealed during the field survey, there is fear of communal conflicts as the Pashtun do not forget their enemy and always seek *Badal* (revenge). The community is now silent due to the presence of security forces in the area, but as soon as the security forces leave the area, the community will seek revenge from those rehabilitated ex-combatants who have done wrong against the community.

Salweshti or Lashkar:

Salweshti 'or the forty' in English, is a standing body that consists of the volunteers from the community that execute the jurisdiction of the Jarga. The strength of *Salweshti* is different in some Pashtun areas. In the North, it called *Shalgon*, that is a body of twenty men. *Lashkar* 'Tribal Militia in English' is a tradition-based fighting force which consists of the volunteer tribesmen. Such force defends the community against foreign aggressors, or curbs the intra-tribe malefactors. Thus, it is very difficult for an offender(s) to violate the *Jarga's* decision. Jarga represents the entire community, and if its verdict is violated, it means the individual offender or an offending tribe, becomes the enemy of the whole community.

While following restorative justice, this standing force can be replaced by the police of the locality. As suggested earlier, the 'Restorative Jarga' should include a police officer. The police officer will execute the decision taken during restorative process.

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[224] Nisar Khan, in-person meeting, Islamabad, March 08, 2017

7.7. Discussion

A conflict leaves a deep impact on the community where it arises. Sometimes, the case of post-conflict rehabilitation becomes very difficult, especially in stimulating the people to start dealing with their own problems (Pante, 2006). The restorative justice approach to rehabilitation offers the most feasible solution for reintegration of the ex-combatants and victims into society. The most appealing principle of restorative justice is the engagement of community or civilians. During armed conflict, the combatants who come from the community, can be easily rehabilitated and be reintegrated into society in a dignified way if restorative justice is adopted.

In the context of Swat, the major critiques on this approach hold that restorative justice deals with the conflicts between individuals while the conflict in Swat was between the individual and state.[225] This approach, like all other rehabilitation approaches, is concerned with and reintegration of ex-combatants back into the society. If the society does not agree to accept them, the results of the rehabilitation program will not be productive. Secondly, in this Restorative Jarga the community is doing job of the state. It eases the burden on state institutions by addressing grievances of both victim and offender and providing speedy justice, in a less expensive way, which can also help to reduce burden on economy.

Another critique is related to security; the threat to the ex-combatants who have surrendered, and threat to the community members.[226] Formation of restorative Jarga and implementation of its decisions are impossible without the support of state institutions. These institutions will provide security, as well as financial assistance to this local body. Moreover, the Pashtun society has already established the concept of *lashkar*[227] or civil militia that could be utilized in Restorative Jarga processes and decisions.

The imbalance in the civil-military power relationship in Swat with respect to counter terrorism and reintegration is creating barriers in formulating a sound policy. Civil Powers

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[225]Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017
[226]Respondent # 15, in-person interview, Peshawar, April 02, 2017
[227] Lashkar or civil militia is the volunteer force composed of community members that executes the Jarga decision.

Regulations 2011 and National Action Plan 2014, are the strategies that dominated military interference over civil and political institutions. In restorative justice, the local community is involved to rehabilitate the offender. Thus, empowerment of local bodies will promote balance between the civil and military authorities, and encourage restorative justice processes.

Formal and informal dialogue with the radicalized and extremist minded people in community can counter the narratives they have developed. Formal dialogue is recognized by government as well as official representatives. Whereas informal dialogue includes the discussions in academia, media, bazaars, *hujras,* mosques and other forums of social gathering. Moreover, these dialogues should address the different types of extremist narratives, and should not be limited to a specific group of militants.[228] The extremists' narratives have spread through the dominant discourse in society and must be countered through new narratives (or counter narratives). Prisons or rehabilitation centers are not long term solutions; engaging communities in generating constructive dialogue offers a longer term remedy to extremism and radicalization.

In addition to dialogue, inclusion in the community can be encouraged through different formal and informal approaches. "The ex-combatants' participation in informal groups of friends, sports, work, volunteering and associations are experienced as valuable networks that serve the purposes of reintegration, (re)identification with non-violent groups (or the normal civilians) and so facilitate spaces for civic participation" (López et.al, 2015).

7.8. Conclusion

"Resilience at national level is influenced by what is happening at the global and community level of society" (Lundy, 2014). Most conflicts are born at the societal level. Such conflicts are best managed through indigenous ways of conflict management, rehabilitation and reintegration. Academicians and practitioners of peace and conflict studies have worked tremendously on conflict resolution and its management at the societal level, but very little

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[228] Dr. Qibla Ayaz, conference discussion, Islamabad, July 21, 2016

attention has been paid to rehabilitation and reintegration in this regard. Restorative justice can be one of the best and easiest ways of rehabilitation at societal level.

The research institutions and other stakeholders of peace and conflict studies need to work on indigenous solutions of post-conflict rehabilitation. Every society has its distinct features; norms, values and traditions, which are often embedded with solutions for conflict management and rehabilitation. Acknowledging and mobilizing such indigenous mechanisms can not only yield better results for conflict resolution, but also lessen the burden of conflict management and post-conflict management from the state institutions and resources.

With regards to the post-conflict management in Swat, most of the experts were in favor of a community-based approach to rehabilitation. Yet, the researcher received diverse opinions regarding this approach. Some argued that the ex-combatants pose a permanent threat to society and cannot be controlled by the community; only a powerful authority such as the military can keep them in check. This perception was shaped largely due to the ability of terrorists to target influential individuals in the society (a number of whom were killed due to personal animosity). However, this research advocates the use of traditional practices in tandem with other approaches, in order to combine the best features of the two to achieve optimum results.

The community-based approach discussed in this chapter accommodates traditional institution under a contemporary approach. However, this approach comes with certain challenges. In the case of Swat, such an approach challenges the authority of the security agencies and reduces their jurisdiction of interference in public affairs. Another challenge comes with the unprecedented nature of such a program. Details with regards to the nature and structure of the program may require some time, and trial and error. Last but not the least, it will require the best efforts of all stakeholders and authorities involved. This process may face challenges, but further research and practice can help streamline this approach.

Chapter VIII

Discussion and Conclusion

This study began by identifying the problem of conducting the rehabilitation of ex-combatants in controlled environment. The research was premised on the assumption that if rehabilitation is not conducted properly, there is a possibility of reemergence of the conflict. In order to understand how rehabilitation may be conducted in controlled societies, and the implications of the failure of such, the researcher observed the rehabilitation program in district Swat, Pakistan. The objective of this research was to explore the rehabilitation program in Swat valley, as well as to come up with a comprehensive approach to rehabilitation in controlled environment. Reintegration of ex-combatants was taken as one of the fundamental indicators to analyze rehabilitation, which allowed the researcher to analyze the extent of the ex-combatant's re-assimilation into society. Therefore, reintegration is thoroughly discussed with rehabilitation in this study. The introductive chapter of this dissertation includes a short background of the problem, assumption, objectives and research questions. The chapter also establishes the significance of the study.

The next (second) chapter of this dissertation is about the theoretical and conceptual understanding of different terminologies and concepts. The society of Swat is dominated by ethnic Pashtuns who have a distinct traditional set up known as *Pashtunwali*. In this traditional code, beside many other distinct values, there is a unique status for women, who are not allowed to move alone or to meet any non-relative man. This society is also administered by the government of Pakistan with special laws where state constitution is not fully applied. The whole region is provincially administered and is known as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). When the military intervened to wipeout militancy, it introduced its own rules and regulations, known as Action in Aid (Civil Power Regulations) in which most of the tenets of PATA law were abrogated. This regulation allows a constant check on different developmental projects, persons and movements. In this environment the military has conducted a rehabilitation program, where the ex-combatants are rehabilitated within institutional walls, without any contact with the community,

and are under strict surveillance after release. Therefore, the researcher termed the rehabilitation centers as 'controlled society' and the whole society as 'controlled environment'; on the basis of the above discussed controlled traditional and constitutional laws, rules and regulations.

This same chapter further discusses theoretical understanding of rehabilitation and defines the concept in the context of Swat. Following this, the researcher has tried to differentiate the concepts of rehabilitation and reintegration. The definitions of these concepts have been under the bigger concept, DDR. In the beginning, a debate has been raised to define the concept of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) which has been found to be different in different contexts. It is then concluded that there could not be a single agreed DDR program in every conflict or post-conflict environment. The structure of society, and nature of the conflict matter a lot while implementing DDR, and these structures and nature have often caused variations in DDR definition. The definition of DDR was necessary to reach suitable definitions for the two confusing terms; rehabilitation and reintegration.

In DDR literature, the terms rehabilitation and reintegration overlap and they have not been separated from one another. In this chapter on the other hand, both have been discussed and differentiated. This debate concludes that rehabilitation is a *process* that enables an ex-combatant to reintegrate into society, the latter being an *outcome* of the process. Reintegration is dependent on rehabilitation. If rehabilitation is conducted well, the outcome, reintegration, will be successful and vice versa. The last part of the second chapter discusses DDR in the context of Swat, the case study of this research. It was found that the international DDR standards are followed to some extent, but there are many loopholes which indicate that international DDR standards are not compatible in the context of Swat society. The nature of conflict in Swat is also different from other conflicts around the world. The terrain of Swat also plays a vital role in defining DDR and other post-conflict developments.

A detailed account is given on research methodology in chapter three. As the research is an ethnographic study of post-conflict rehabilitation program in district Swat, therefore, the researcher has drawn a detailed account of ethnographic experiences in Swat. These ethnographic experiences in post-conflict environment are contributions to the field of ethnography, as well as to peace and conflict studies. The chapter explains why the researcher opted for ethnography, how the researcher collected the data and accessed primary data, and the reasons for choosing particular

interview respondents and strata for this research. The number of respondents and their division is discussed in detail. The chapter also reveals how the data is interpreted and what tools of peace and conflict studies have been used to analyze the data.

Before discussing rehabilitation program running in district Swat, it was deemed necessary to provide a brief understanding of the other rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs in Pakistan. To serve this purpose, the fourth chapter of this dissertation provides an overview of rehabilitation programs around the country. In this chapter, the researcher shed light on all the governmental institutions as well as NGOs conducting rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs. It was found that rehabilitation of ex-combatants is conducted by the state security agencies only, and no NGO is allowed to conduct any program related to ex-combatants. The NGOs only work on soft-measures such as de-radicalization and counter-extremism programs and trainings in society. In this overview the researcher found that Pakistan does not have a national program or policy framework for rehabilitation and reintegration. However, certain national counter-terrorism institutions and policies were developed during the last decade. The most prominent counter-terrorism institution is National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), while the most popular counter-terrorism policy enacted is National Action Plan (NAP). Though absent at the national level, there are set ups for rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants at the provincial level. A successful de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration program is run in the province of Punjab under the supervision of Punjab Police. This program is administered and managed by the counter-terrorism department (CTD) of Punjab Police. It was revealed during research that all provinces of Pakistan have similar programs, but none of them were found functional. The major reason for their dysfunction is non-provision of budget by the provincial governments. The program in Punjab has also become dormant due to the unavailability of funds.

Chapter five draws a detailed account of the rehabilitation program in Swat. The chapter begins with a brief historical background of the conflict and its dynamics. The question of why the locals joined militancy is answered; in addition to the reasons for joining militancy, details of the types of people who joined militancy are also provided. On the basis of data collected from the field, as well as personal observation of the researcher, five categories of the militants were found. This categorization was made on the basis of different dynamics behind joining militancy, which included religiosity, unemployment, power struggle, issue of security and band-wagoning.

Religiosity contributed to the inflation of militancy by glorifying the veterans of the Afghan war, who were then able to garner popular support and sow the initial seeds of militancy in the society. Unemployment in the region, especially of the youth, paved the way for militancy; Taliban were able to fill their ranks by promising people basic necessities and income for living, in return for providing them manpower. Power struggle in the region left people vying for strength and control which was ensured if a member of a family was a part of the militants. Opposing tribes and families began sending their men to join the Taliban, in order to increase their strength vis-à-vis one another. This power struggle resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of militants. The issue of security also worked out in the favor of the Taliban, who demanded either volunteers or donations. Failure to provide either one resulted in severe consequences for the people. Since a majority of the people in Swat could not provide donations, they were forced instead to join militants' ranks to secure their lives, families and property. Band-wagoning was yet another factor that led to the rapid growth of militancy in Swat. The social standing, power and supremacy that came with being a militant, attracted the youth especially. It became a fashion to join Taliban, and their ranks swelled rapidly.

Following this, the chapter conceptualizes the rehabilitation program and the need for it; a detailed account of the types and categorization of detainees is also provided. The militants who were arrested by the security forces during conflict or surrendered voluntarily were divided into different categories by the authorities. The militants were first divided into two broad categories, hard-core and soft-core, or into three broader categories named white, grey and black. It was found that rehabilitation was extended only to soft-core militants i.e. white and grey. Further study revealed that actual rehabilitation was provided to grey militants only. The white militants were set free as they were merely the supporters of the militants' narratives. The grey militants were involved in some militancy and also provided some ideological and material support to militants, but were not involved in physical conflicts with security forces. The hard-core or black militants were either killed during conflict, left the area, or were persecuted according to the land law upon arrest.

This chapter further investigated the different types of rehabilitation centers. There are three categories of rehabilitation centers in Swat; *Sabawoon* which rehabilitates juvenile ex-combatants, *Mashal* which deals with adult ex-combatants and *Sparlay* which focuses on

rehabilitation of families of the ex-combatants. The rehabilitation given at the rehabilitation centers however, was similar for all. No distinction was made to redress the relevant grievances of ex-combatants (this later lead to difficulties in reintegration). Hence, the rehabilitation process was similar across centers, and all detainees were passed through a similar process which in other words could be called a 'controlled processes'. Such rehabilitation in controlled societies, with controlled processes can be named 'controlled rehabilitation'. Controlled rehabilitation is not a negative term which implies that rehabilitation is not conducted, but implies a controlled society where the access of civilian and humanitarian organizations is tightly monitored and checked. The state law enforcement agencies are often at the forefront and better understand the nature and the context of the conflict. A disadvantage of this isolation however, is that such controlled societies do not have proper funding and other resources for proper rehabilitation. The state then arranges this program with the modest available funding and resources, since a state that has passed through conflict is often strained in terms of resources. Because of this, controlled rehabilitation may not be fruitful. Controlled rehabilitation therefore is prudent only when states have enough resources. In addition, appropriate evaluation and monitoring of such a form of rehabilitation by a third party is also essential for its success.

Another gap in the rehabilitation program of Swat was identified as the absence of female rehabilitation. During the ethnographic study spanning over more than three years, the researcher did not find any rehabilitation center for women in Swat. Every DDR or rehabilitation program around the world has a specific portion and provisions for female ex-combatants. However, in Swat the case was different. The difference in the social context rendered the nature of the conflict different. Women in Swat did not actively participate in conflict, since the women in Pashtun culture remain at home. But on the other hand, the same Pashtun social context compelled women to live with these militants as mothers, daughters and wives. Yet the social context does not allow women to be rehabilitated at a center away from their home.

This absence of female rehabilitees was also brought about by the lack of female combatants; since women did not actively participate in militant activities, none of them were arrested. Nevertheless, women did participate indirectly by contributing jewels, cash and in some cases, even their children. The women who made such contributions now face stigmatization in their community where retorts such as "*da staso kaali di, os dazeegi*", i.e., 'this is yours jewel

which fires' are hurled at them. Though they do not require rehabilitation or de-radicalization, they were indeed psychologically affected due to the loss of their homes, businesses and relatives. In this case, they do require psychological treatment or rehabilitation.

By disclosing the above mentioned evidence, the chapter discusses rehabilitation in detail. In order to gauge the success of the rehabilitation centers, the researcher attempted to evaluate the extent of reintegration of the ex-combatants, back into their communities. Reintegration has been used as an indicator to understand and analyze rehabilitation in Swat. Therefore, the next chapter (chapter six) discusses reintegration in controlled societies.

The researcher attempted to identify the major aspects and features of reintegration in the local communities in Swat. The major aspects included social integration, technical and vocational trainings, assistance for rehabilitees, recidivism, monitoring and stigmatization. The researcher analyzed these aspects thoroughly and found some divergent responses from the community as well as from the graduates of rehabilitation centers.

Social integration is a decisive aspect of rehabilitation that indicates the success and failure of any rehabilitation program. In Swat, it was observed that the rehabilitees were not socially assimilated properly. There were two barriers found in social integration; no assistance from government in assisting rehabilitees and less interest of the community to accept these rehabilitees back. The graduates were facing stigmatization. In most cases, the community was hesitant in keeping any relationship with these rehabilitees. This was because the rehabilitees (ex-combatants) were considered enemies of the community since they were largely responsible for all of the community losses. An in-depth study revealed that the community was not engaged in the rehabilitation processes, so their grievances remained unaddressed. Therefore, the grievances and resentment between the community and ex-combatants were not redressed. Also, considering the way in which these ex-combatants are treated by the state, the community members are right to consider them enemies instead of community members. Regardless, community engagement is imperative for social integration. The state must convince the communities to view these ex-combatants as 'angry-men' who must be returned to the society.

In addition to dialogue, economic soundness is also necessary for social integration. The graduates are provided technical and vocational trainings, but they are not supported in terms of employment

or initiating businesses. Stigmatization by the community also hampers their chances at finding employment locally; most of them are either turned away or provided menially paying jobs, and struggle to make ends meet.

Additionally, the post-rehabilitation phase offers other challenges. One of these was the constant strict surveillance and monitoring. A large number of the graduates complained about excessive monitoring and surveillance. All of their movements, meeting and gatherings were kept under check. Though this surveillance is beneficial to keep an eye on the newly reintegrated ex-combatants, and can help prevent recidivism, it can create barriers in their social integration. The graduates also complained about the weekly attendance system and unannounced home visits and searches by the security forces. Terrorist incidents anywhere in the country also prompt unannounced arrests. Such incidents, the ex-combatants stated, raise suspicion and lead to further stigmatization.

An analysis of primary data and community responses, lead the present research to develop an alternative 'community-based' approach to rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants. In response to questions regarding the nature and type of rehabilitation, most respondents suggested an approach of community involvement. Within the broader framework of community-based rehabilitation and reintegration, certain respondents suggested a family-based approach whereby the nuclear family remains the sole actor for de-radicalization and rehabilitation. Some respondents suggested proper institutionalization for the exiting approach, as run by the Punjab police, known as counter-terrorism department (CTD). Other suggestions included rehabilitation and reintegration through local elected bodies. Yet another suggestion was that of excluding the military from the rehabilitation process. Instead an approach of mobilizing the police was suggested. The police in collaboration with locally elected bodies, was deemed as one viable source for rehabilitation and reintegration. These suggestions make some convincing arguments, nonetheless they require extensive research and exploration.

In light of these findings, the present research suggests an alternative approach which combines the local tradition of '*Pashtunwali'*, and the internationally accepted approach of Restorative Justice. Both of these approaches have many similarities in their processes and jurisdictions. Restorative justice suggests that the offender and victim be brought together for negotiations in the presence of the community. This process provides justice to the victim, offender

and community. Similarly, in *Pashtunwali*, a code of conduct of Pashtuns, a *Jarga* composed of the community members is entrusted with deciding cases in the presence of the victim and offender.

This combination of Restorative Justice and *Pashtunwali* is necessary to address both traditional and contemporary approaches to rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants. The new local body formed under this approach can be called 'Restorative-Jarga'. Restorative-Jarga will have representation from every segment of the community including Nazim of the area or village councilor, Imam (clergy of mosque) of the village, member from every kin, police officer of the police station in vicinity, and elders if needed. The nuclear family members of the victim and offender are compulsory in this composition. This committee (Restorative-Jarga) will investigate the ex-combatant, the extent of the offender's involvement in militancy and the harm caused to the community or state. This Restorative-Jarga can also decide which category (white, black and grey) the ex-combatant should be grouped under, or the punishment deserved. This Restorative-Jarga can make better decisions since it comprises of the community itself.

Codes other than *Jarga* in *Pashtunwali* are most relevant and applicable in this restorative approach. These include *Nanawati, Kushunda, and lashkar.* The jurisdiction of Restorative-Jarga may include all or some of these codes on a case by case basis. Under restorative justice, the offender's punishment can be reparation as apology, monetary restitution, reparation as community services and, or, compensation by the state. These decisions can also be a part of Restorative-Jarga. Apart from these, the Restorative-Jarga could ask the offender for *Nanawati* which is pleading for apology; to become *Kushunda* i.e. ask the offender to leave the area for the sake of preventing communal conflict; if the offender does not agree to abide by the decision taken by restorative-Jarga, he is forced to comply through *Qaumi Lashkar* (civil militia). *Lashkar* has its own glorified history in Pashtun culture. This traditional *lashkar* should be re-structured in Restorative-Jarga and the responsibility of implementation should be given to Police Department of the respective vicinity, with some volunteers from the community. The Community Police are necessary to keep the process community-based at all times.

For a well-organized and a strengthened Restorative-Jarga a compensation fund at the community, as well as state level is required to compensate victims on behalf of offenders. Majority of the offenders do not have the means to provide restitute, which necessitates the

development of such a compensation fund. There should also be a visible policy for allocation of this 'compensation fund', that can dictate the criterion of eligibility for getting this fund. This eligibility should be given on the basis of the nature of the conflict. Communal conflicts should not be eligible for compensation. Through this fund, the government should compensate the economic, social and political losses of the victims as well as offenders. Beside government allocated fund to the compensation fund, charities from the community could be an easy way to contribute to this fund.

This research provides interesting insights into the culture of Swat and offers new avenues of exploration with respect to rehabilitation. The theory of restorative justice provides an alternative to the currently employed methods of rehabilitation and reintegration in Swat, and offers solutions which may be much more compatible in the context of Swat, than previous attempts. A similar attempt can be done other societies like Swat. Apart from this there are other avenues which are not the main objectives, however, during conducting this research the areas found for further research are; social integration and social rejection which need further research. Another important theme is the effectiveness of these rehabilitation centers vis-à-vis recidivism; i.e. how do we measure recidivism? This research opened an avenue for further research. There is another interesting debate of 'controlled environment' in the context of rehabilitation vis-à-vis the military approach of 'winning hearts and minds' also known as WHAMs. Further research needed that to what extent these opposite approaches are achieving basic objectives for peace building. How this opposing approaches could be in 'humane' way? Similarly, there is a greater need to understand the deradicalization and rehabilitation from gender perspective. Lastly, there is a need to explore the potential role of 'Restorative Jarga' as a social setting and its role in the rehabilitation or reintegration of ex-combatants.

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