

**Resilience of Weak Democracies against Political Agitation for Government
Change: A Case Study of Pakistan**



By

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
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
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
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
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
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my beloved MOTHER who as a single parent has always stood by my side in hot and cold and encouraged me to continue my studies. I also dedicate my dissertation to my late uncle Col. (R) Raja Mukhtar Hussain (Late), who introduced me to the world of wisdom and knowledge at the very early age of my life. I shall never pay back to their great sacrifices and support for my studies.

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ABSTRACT

There are two basic notions related to democratic values. Firstly, a democratic system is designed to deal with national and international conflicts keeping the interests of the people in mind. Secondly, in a democracy a change in the political system is through regular, free and fair elections. However, in nascent or evolving democracies, people become impatient and try to change elected governments through political agitation. In contrast to expectations of organizers of such movements, elected governments despite the weaknesses in the system have withstood such challenges, at least in Pakistan.

This research is a case study of Pakistani political system, which has survived political agitation since the revival of democracy in the second decade of the twenty first century. The questions that have been addressed are: Why are political agitations launched in unstable democratic systems to bring about a change in government? Why even relatively weak governments in the evolving democratic system survived political street protests? How weak governments in a democratic dispensation deal with protests and agitations?

Historically, since 1966, there have been five popular movements against military dictators and unstable democratic systems in Pakistan. Two movements were waged against the military dictators and one succeeded, while none of three movements in the form of street protests could remove the elected governments.

This study is inductive in its approach and assumes that weak government, in a democratic dispensation can sustain street protests in far better manner than military dictatorships. The research ascribes the survivability of a political government even in a struggling democratic system to five major reasons i.e. a strong sense of legitimacy based on the results of seemingly fair and free elections, resilience in face of challenges mounted by non-parliamentary forces, flexible political behaviour that seeks negotiations and engagement to break an impasse, support of political and democratic forces that fear the worst, and a genuine desire not to use force against unarmed protesters as in contrast to dictatorial government's propensity to quell political dissent using disproportionate use of force.

List of Abbreviations

All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC)

Awami National Party (ANP)

All Parties Conference (APC)

Chief Election Commissioner (CEC)

Chief Minister (CM)

Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA)

Chief of Army Staff (COAS)

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Charter of Democracy (CoD)

Center for Systematic Research (CSR)

Democratic Action Committee (DAC)

Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR)

First Information Report (FIR)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)

Inspector General (IG)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs)

Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)

Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)

Jamiat Ullema-i-Islam Fazal-ur-Rahman (JUI-F)

Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)

Majlis Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM)

National Accountability Bureau (NAB)

National Democratic Party (NDP)

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

National Reconciliation Order (NRO)

Nonviolent & Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data (NAVCO)

North West Frontier Province (NWFP)

Operation Fair Play (OPF)

Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT)

Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)

Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)

Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP),

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)

PML-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q)

Prime Minister (PM)

Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)

Pashtoon Tahafuz Movement (PTM)

Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

Pakistan Sarzameen Party (PSP)

Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI)

Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA)

Returning Officers (ROs)

Representation of Peoples Act (ROPA)

Rental Power Plant (RPP)

Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP)

Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)

Tehrik-i-IstiqlalPakistan (TIP)

Tehreek-I-Labaik Ya Rasul Allah (TLYRA)

Terms of References (TORs)

United Nations (UN)

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

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Introduction

Basic Argument of the Study:

Ideally, elected governments should be changed through democratic means, i.e., by holding elections at the end of their specific term or through other constitutional means such as a vote of no confidence in the parliament. However, the ideal world is far different than the reality. Many democracies that are not mature enough witness various unconstitutional attempts to change the elected government before the completion of their term. Military coups are one such unconstitutional attempt to topple elected governments. In the past, military coups successfully removed several political governments. Things have changed with the passage of time. Today, it is difficult to bring about political change through military intervention due to various national and international limitations. The western countries with well-developed democratic systems frown upon military coups. They often let their displeasure known through sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Common citizen, who has discovered the power of using his or her vote also, does not want a return to a rigid and inflexible military rule. However, when legally elected governments fail to deliver, there are street protests and demonstrations. Political parties in opposition build up on this sentiment of discontent and try to pose a challenge against the party in power to bring about its quick demise using non-parliamentary means.

These can be ascribed to structural problems in a democratic system that is still trying to develop and achieve political maturity. The situation is aggravated because of vested political interests and lack of tolerance and forbearance. Francis Fukuyama attributes a modern political system lacking modern social values to its colonial legacy, where imperial masters did not tutor the populace in democratic systems of governance.¹ This failure in governance in Pakistan has led to frequent military interventions. This retracted the process of democracy taking roots in the country.

Unlike military dictatorships, political parties after losing an election are expected to leave the government. The smooth transition of power from one political party to another is the basic essence of a democratic system. The party or parties in the opposition are expected to bide their time until the next elections. They are not expected to resort to public protests to bring down a democratically

¹ Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay* (New York: University of America, 2014), 400.

elected government. This is in sharp contrast to military dictatorships, where people are not allowed to use their vote to choose their political representatives and any political dissent is suppressed with brute force.

Democratically elected governments are expected to govern based on the mandate given to them by the people through the ballot box. Any attempt to dislodge them unconstitutionally is resisted. But being politicians, they have a greater appetite and experience to engage with the protesters without resorting to violence. They are also confident that the western democratic nations and institutions would in most cases support them if they are removed through use of force.

Democratic governments have faced their challenges stoically and through all possible political means. This has been witnessed during the protests and agitation in 1977, 2013, 2014 and 2016. Another movement under the banner of 11 party alliances called the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) has gathered momentum in 2020. This alliance is calling upon the incumbent prime minister to resign and step down. This movement does not form part of this study.

Unlike military regimes, democratically elected governments have public support. Sometimes they have won landslide victories e.g., Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) bagged 15 million votes in general elections held in 2013, while the second largest party in terms of votes Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) won 7.8 million votes.² This confidence of public support provided an embattled elected government several options to deal with such movements in 2014. They did not panic and were able to ride out the storm.

Since, most post-colonial states have experienced prolonged military interventions, political leadership naturally suspects conspiracy behind all popular movements. Hence, they try to portray protests as a plot against democracy. This feeling became more pronounced after the removal of popular leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by General Zia ul Haq. Zia used the public anger and street protests against Bhutto to impose martial law. This incident created a strong perception within public that the military uses protests and populist movements as a tool to oust elected representatives. Naturally, this perception severely dents the credibility of such movements. In

² Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), 'General Elections 2013-National Assembly Turnout', <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/Documents/Downloads/General%20Election%202013/Statistics/National%20Assembly%20Turnout%20Comparison%202008%20&%202013.jpg> (accessed April 3, 2018).

case of Pakistan this factor has enormously helped elected governments to acquire political and moral support from political parties, civil society and general public. During the 2013 and 2014 movements against democratic governments, the civil society and academia were highly concerned about the covert role of the military in political affairs of the country. They were convinced that military and intelligence agencies were managing these movements. Even today, the political leadership of major political parties believes that there was a covert role of intelligence agencies behind those movements. Numerous articles and speeches of politicians in National Assembly demonstrate the fear of a ‘conspiracy’ planned and executed by military against democracy.³ In his statements, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has often alleged that during sit-ins of 2014 an intelligence officer advised him to resign.⁴ Though, the leadership of nonviolent movements time and again tried to clarify that these movements were originally planned and executed by political leadership⁵ but majority of civil society and political parties still do think otherwise.

Political government facing the brunt of populist movements often sought political solutions through negotiations. They can always bank on their previous political experience. This motivation is based on their past experiences as political workers. For instance, Nawaz Sharif, while in power was able to survive protests and demonstrations in 2014 and 2016 clamoring for political change. He himself had been part of lawyers’ movement in 2009 when he resorted to long march to restore the supreme judiciary in the country. Hence, past political experiences help politicians in power to adopt sensible approaches to conflict management. Resultantly, movements do not gain sufficient momentum. Usually, violence provides sustainability, legitimacy and popular reason to demand change of government. Violence provides sympathies of society to such movements. For instance,

³ “Firm stand on Musharraf led to sit-in, trial: Nawaz,” *Dawn*, May 24, 2018, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1409615/firm-stand-on-musharraf-led-to-sit-in-trial-nawaz> (accessed May 24, 2018); Will expose sponsors of PTI, PAT sit-ins: Nawaz, *The Nation*, May 17, 2018. https://nation.com.pk/17-May-2018/will-expose-sponsors-of-pti-pat-sit-ins-nawaz?show=previewutm_medium=Politic?version=amp (accessed May 24, 2018); NA-120 by-poll: “Sit-ins, Panama, Aqama all part of a conspiracy: Maryam,” *Express Tribune*, August 29, 2017. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1494234/na-120-poll-maryam-nawaz-asks-supporters-defeat-pawns/> (accessed May 24, 2018); “Conspiracies Hatched Against PML-N Govt Through Sit-ins: Daniyal,” *Urdu Point*, April 13, 2018, <https://www.urdupoint.com/en/pakistan/conspiracies-hatched-against-pml-n-govt-throu-314876.html> (accessed May 24, 2018).

⁴ “Firm stand on Musharraf led to sit-in, trial: Nawaz,” *Dawn*, May 24, 2018, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1409615/firm-stand-on-musharraf-led-to-sit-in-trial-nawaz> (accessed May 24, 2018).

⁵ “Opp leaders reject Nawaz’s allegations, demand probe,” *Pakistan Today*, May 24, 2018, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/05/23/opp-leaders-reject-nawazs-allegations-demand-probe/> (accessed May 24, 2018).

lawyers' movement gained momentum after May 12, 2007 Karachi carnage, which killed almost 50 people. Unlike elected governments, military dictators often face severe pressure from national and international community when they use coercive means to tackle the political and nonviolent situation. Therefore, the pacifying approach of elected governments to peoples' movements has been proven effective and successful. Even before the deadline of long march in 2014, Nawaz Sharif offered four times for negotiations and political settlement with Pakistan Tehreek-I-Insaaf (PTI). He was also able to patiently handle PTI sit-ins for 126 days. Imran Khan ended his protests when the government formed a judicial commission to investigate about the legitimacy of general elections 2013. During the 2013, 2014 and 2016 protests, 8 people died and 78 were injured, including security personnel. This shows the level of restraint displayed by the elected governments against these movements.

Another factor is support of political parties vis a vis formation of political alliances during such kind of political crisis. This factor did not exist earlier in Pakistani politics till the advent of the 21st century. After going through a troubled decade of political instability, military coup and experiencing exile by the leadership of two major political parties of the country, they had signed the Charter of Democracy (CoD) to support each other during any political crisis.⁶ Therefore, the main political parties supported each other against populist movements during their respective terms. National political leadership supports elected governments during such conflicts as they are also part of the society that believe in military's conspiracies and consider such movements as tactics of political change through unconstitutional means. During 2013 and 2014, both mainstream political parties along with other regional political parties supported the incumbent governments against street protests. This support strengthened the legitimacy of the political governments. During the 2014 sit-ins, the joint session of the National Assembly was perhaps the turning point of the political crisis as almost every political party, except PTI participated in the joint session of the parliament and supported the incumbent government and ostensibly to save the democratic system. International community in general and the US in particular supported the democratic system of the country. This national and international political and democratic support provided confidence to elected governments and negatively affected the populist movements of political change.

⁶ 'Charter of democracy', *Dawn*, May 16, 2006, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/192460> (accessed May 2, 2018).

An additional factor, perhaps the most important among all is related to perceptions of the public about military's role in politics in nascent democracies. These perceptions can substantially increase or decrease the public participation, which is prerequisite for success of any anti-government movement. The foundation of any initiative to remove a government is entirely based on the active participation of the public in the movement for political change. The active participation often occurs when people are convinced that this movement is legitimate and would protect their interests. Hence, the basic principle of political change needs an overwhelming participation of people in protests, sit-ins, etc. The legitimacy of the movement often faces challenges in Pakistan. People's perception about the military's role in such movements create problems of its legitimacy and add constraints, which organizers of these movements face in the wake of this perception. Hence, these above-mentioned factors lead to failure of popular movements against elected governments.

Underlining Reasons for choosing this Case Study

Pakistan's history of over 70 years has witnessed several movements against the incumbent governments. Those movements had various motives such as social, political, economic grievances. These movements had among their ranks not only the common man but also professionals such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, nurses, government servants, farmers and politicians espousing ethnic causes such as those of Mohajirs, Sindhis, Baloch and the Pashtuns. Most of the time, their demands were merely to demand their rights as a particular community. They did not in most cases want a change in government.

However, a movement against a political government or against a dictatorial regime is very different from these focused movements. These politically motivated movements are triggered because the government in power fails to deliver on their promises to create jobs, reduce inflation, and improve law and order situation among other things.

This study has chosen six popular movements in Pakistan including Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's movement against Ayub Khan, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) movement against Bhutto, Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) movements against Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government in 2013 and against Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) government in 2014, and Pakistan

Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) movement against PML-N government in 2014 and 2016. These movements wanted to bring political change in the country.

Effectiveness of the Study

In existing exhaustive scholarly work on the democratic peace theory, strategic nonviolent struggle and the relationship between democracy and conflict, this study is an attempt to create a relationship among afore mentioned theoretical paradigms. Historically, armed conflicts both internal and external have been prominent topics of discussion among academics to understand democratic responses to armed conflicts. Democratic peace theory extensively defines various types of responses. Though, the proponents and supporters of democratic peace theory have extensively worked on various dimensions of external and internal constraints of democracies however, less work has been done on domestic conflicts. Christian Davenport has done work on the repressive behaviour of democracies towards internal armed conflicts; however, unarmed political conflicts have not been highlighted in any other previous studies. Hence, this study will be an attempt to highlight behaviour and responses of flawed democracies towards political unarmed conflicts. In this regard, the study will focus on nonviolent movements for political change. Mainly, domestic nonviolent movements and their interaction with democracies have been ignored by academia for a very long time. Moreover, it does not extend to the sub-categories of democracy. It has not discussed that either the theory works in those societies who are not necessarily considered consolidated democracies. How defective, weak and illiberal democracies react towards domestic nonviolent conflicts? Do all the traits of democratic peace theory apply on behaviour of defective, weak and illiberal democracies during conflicts?

In this backdrop, this study is an attempt to expand the scope of democratic peace theory, and by supporting its basic notion it has further expanded the scope of the conflict and its interaction with democracies. Due to the increased frequency of nonviolent struggle for political change, it has become an undeniable fact that weak democracies often interact with domestic nonviolent political conflicts. However, this study has set two major limitations to discuss the relationship between democracy and nonviolent strategic struggle. On one hand, this study has limited itself to only those movements that have been waged against governments in power – military or elected – and to bring about a political change, while on the other hand it has focused on Pakistani movements

for change in the political system of the country. The overall study revolves around one basic and two secondary questions, i.e.,

Primary Question: Why relatively weak governments in struggling democracies survive political agitation to remove them from power?

Secondary Questions:

1. Why are such movements launched in emerging and imperfect democracies to overthrow an elected government?
2. What is the difference of responses to nonviolent struggle by weak political governments in a nascent democracy as compared to military dictatorships? How has the propensity for using street power to mobilize the masses to remove an elected government affected the political culture of the country?

These questions have been discussed comprehensively in this study through the prisms of democratic peace theory and domestic democratic theory, Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle and Sidney Tarrow's theory of structural opportunities. The theory of structural opportunities will provide foundation of understanding about the reasons of initiating nonviolent movements for political change. Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle will help to understand some points regarding the failure of the movement. Lastly, the theory of democratic peace will help to analyze the measure of democratic governments that enable them to cope with these movements confidently.

The study has tried to prove that weak democracies as compared to non-democracies are strong enough to survive during political upheavals caused by political opponents. The study primarily assumes that defective democracies are able to withstand internal pressures due to the strong sense of legitimacy, flexible behaviour of politicians and democratic institutions, support of national and international democratic community and lack of violent measures to curb the resistance. The study has been divided into two parts. The first part of the study theoretically explains the logic behind democratic triumph in nonviolent conflicts, while the second part of the study discusses two military regimes and three elected governments in Pakistan embroiled in the political struggles to remove them. It explains how the elected governments handled these crises far better than military dictators of the country. It is a fact that in Pakistan's political history, no military dictator could

sustain pressure of a nonviolent strategic struggle, while such movements failed to remove an elected government despite being politically weak. The study has tried to build relationship between democracy and nonviolent conflict, which has not been given due attention in the past.

Methodology

This study is based on a mixed method of research, i.e., qualitative and quantitative research method. However, one chapter is purely dedicated for quantitative study in order to strengthen the argument of the study. The hypothesis generating research method has been adopted to understand the durability of weak governments in an emerging democratic system against popular movements aimed to bring about a change in government outside the parliament. The researcher feels that this is an appropriate research method to understand the conditions of a particular phenomenon.

As mentioned earlier, this case study is based on the political situation within Pakistan. It seeks to find out a direct relationship between popular protests and the resilience of a democratic polity in the country. The study is also based on inductive method, which generalizes the results of particular case to overall phenomenon. This study testifies empirically that elected governments in Pakistan have the propensity to survive political upheavals caused by street protests and demonstrations calling for a change of government.

This study has been defined by variables, such as political legitimacy, mature and nonviolent responses of democratic governments to peoples' movements of political change, inclination towards negotiations and peaceful settlement of political conflicts, and dissemination of perception about military's role in such movements etc. These all variables have been tested through theory of democratic peace. However, two other theories have been complimented to the study. Firstly, the reasons of emergence of such kind of conflicts have been seen through the lens of Sidney Tarrow's theory of structural opportunities. Ideally, democratic governments do not need to be toppled through nonviolent strategic struggle as elections can bring change in a democratic system. However, many political dispensations such as weak-democracies, semi-democracies, defective democracies are prone to internal struggles to remove the government. Since Sidney Tarrow has discussed this phenomenon comprehensively, hence it would be interesting to apply his formula of 'structural opportunities' on Pakistani democracy, which has its flaws. This will considerably answer the question of reasons and logic of such movements. Secondly, the long-term process and

evolution of those movements in Pakistan have been seen through the lens of Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle largely covers questions related to leadership behaviour, response of public, struggle for larger political aspirations etc.

Reactions of government and their outcome have been discussed based on the critical evaluation of democratic peace theory. Do weak democracies behave in accordance with democratic values during such kind of political conflicts? This portion has largely been discussed through democratic peace theory as well as case studies of three elected governments in Pakistan. The in-depth analysis of nonviolent strategic movement against popularly elected governments through the lens of democratic peace theory reveals the fact that no matter what kind of democratic system is operational, i.e., defective democracy, transitional democracy, weak democracy and/or semi democracy, the behaviour of elected governments will remain more or less peaceful and accommodating towards nonviolent conflicts. Resultantly, these democratic governments are able to absorb the pressure of nonviolent collective action far better than non-democratic regimes. This peaceful behaviour does not provide any legitimacy and popular reason to sustain and prolong such kinds of politically motivated nonviolent movements. Resultantly, these movements gradually find no popular space within society to exist.

General Gap in Literature:

Power and politics have always been associated with each other. The role of violence in power and politics has also been a central factor, which has never been ignored. As Hannah Arendt contemplates, violence has always played an important role in politics.⁷ The importance of violence has been so high in academia that no other substitute had been found for discussion except warfare, revolutions, violent military coups, etc. Mao Tse-Tung had believed that power grows out from the barrel of a gun. Hence, violence remained the only medium to change the balance of power at home and abroad for centuries. The 20th century had been revolving around Lenin's prediction, that this century will be the century of wars and revolutions. After two world wars, the world did not witness peace but Cold War.

Even during intrastate conflict, violence, civil wars and use of force remained the most popular and shortest techniques to attain the desired results. Moreover, civil population has long considered

⁷ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harvest Book, 1969), 5.

violent civil resistance as the best form of resistance against foreign occupiers or illegitimate rulers. The term ‘only violence pays’⁸ was the most popular term in various countries due to success of Vietnam and Cuban armed resistance. These successful armed resistance movements promoted violent tendencies among societies to resist violently against foreign occupation and illegitimate rulers. The Afghan Jihad had successfully brought to an end the Soviet Union through violent means. These armed struggle movements further compelled academia to discuss guerrilla warfare and its dynamics and effectiveness.

From Thucydides to Machiavelli, Liddell Hart to Clausewitz strategists described strategies of war, armed conflict and how to physically damage adversaries. In this regard, the general definition associated with strategy is that “strategy is using guns and tanks, manoeuvre soldiers timely and appropriately.”⁹ Due to the overwhelming focus on violence and wars, strategists and academics had introduced numerous types of strategies. However, till 1973 the focus of the strategy was on the armed conflicts and approaches of winning wars through guns and tanks.

Gene Sharp defined strategy for removing unpopular governments through popular movements and introduced the idea of nonviolent struggle. His idea of ‘*strategic nonviolent struggle*’ identified it as a war of ideology, interests and power between two groups, largely between people and ruling class. As Beaufre stated in 1965, that “strategy is always formulated against one or more opponents,”¹⁰ Sharp tried to apply strategic thinking against the powerful ruling class. He tried to merge two schools of thoughts, i.e., nonviolence and strategic school of thought. He also tried to convey that morality should be considered as part of a struggle, not as a whole mean to achieve desired objectives. For him nonviolent struggle is warfare, which has the same objectives as the traditional warfare has. According to Sharp it is a very important principle of a strategic nonviolent struggle to seize the support of the armed forces, paralyse material resources of opponent and lastly to delegitimize political support.¹¹ These means often lead to nonviolent and effective change in society. His idea of strategic nonviolent struggle lately has been adopted by many societies mainly

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, 6.

⁹ Athanassios Platias, “Thucydides on Grand Strategy: Periclean Grand Strategy during the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides: The Classical Theorists of International Relations,” *Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies* 6, no.2 (Autumn 1998), 53-103.

¹⁰ Andre Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 25.

¹¹ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973) 365.

during the colour revolutions in Eastern Europe and Arab spring in the Middle East. His technique and strategy skilfully worked against authoritative regimes. People movements have toppled despots through strategic nonviolent struggle such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Ayub Khan of Pakistan, Zine-al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, etc. However, apart from various authoritarian societies, many weak democracies or transitional democracies have also experienced the same kind of practice to topple elected regimes. However, the result in many societies with same strategies was different, particularly in Pakistan. This study also discusses the strategies that have been adopted by protestors against democratic governments to compel them for resignation.

Scholars have done extensive research on democratic peace theory, nonviolent civil resistance and weak or illiberal democracies that offer structural opportunities for conflicts. Primarily, extensive research on strategic nonviolent struggle and its various dynamics revolve around transformation of a society from dictatorship to democracy, suggesting effective techniques to get rid of authoritarian regimes, effectiveness of strategic nonviolent struggle, etc. Yet little attention has been paid to civil resistance, strategic nonviolent struggle, and civil activism against elected governments in general and movements for political change in weak democracies in particular. Scholars have found a strong relation between peace and democracy. From Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace to Francis Fukuyama's End of History, scholars have tried to prove that democracy creates a peaceful international society and domestically a peaceful relationship between society and state. It believes that the world will not see state repression and civil unrest.

Despite this profound scholarly work, high ideals of democracy, values and principles, democracies have experienced power struggle, protests, resistance movements, and demands for political, social and economic rights. Sidney Tarrow considers it structural opportunities, which open avenues for conflicts in societies.¹² Some democratic societies went further ahead with demands of more freedom for religious, sectarian, ethnic, class and gender rights. However, the response of democratic governments towards such demands varied from country to country. Some were accepted, while others were ignored, leading to social or political conflict. However, scholars have paid more attention to the demands for greater freedom in civic rights within democratic societies, while populist movements bring political change against elected governments has not been discussed. This study intends to fill this academic gap and will discuss movements against

¹² Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7.

democratically elected governments of Pakistan and how the democratic governments with democratic values respond to such kinds of conflicts.

There are two types of conflicts, interstate conflict and intra-state conflict. The intra-state conflicts can assume the shape of armed insurgencies/civil wars or nonviolent dissent for political/economic rights. This study has largely focused on the behaviour of democracies against the nonviolent populist movements. It has found that more or less the behaviour of democracies – weak or strong – is similar to unarmed conflicts. They show restraint to use force against protestors, engage them in complicated negotiation process and make an environment non-conducive to such movements. Resultantly, they outperform against these movements. It is important to mention that democratic peace theory extensively focuses on inter-state conflicts. Likewise, democratic peace theorists discuss dynamics of intra-state armed conflicts. However, unarmed conflicts remain largely unaddressed by democratic peace theorists. This study will fill this gap and expand scope of democratic peace theory.

Organization of the Study

The study has been divided broadly into three parts and an introduction. The first part of the study contains three chapters, while second part contains four chapters, and the last part has two chapters. Introduction of the study establishes basic argument of the study, its significance, describes methodology, and identifies general gap in the literature. The first chapter titled Weak Democracies and the theory of nonviolent civil resistance discusses various aspects of theories of civil resistances, its scope, democracies and nonviolent civil resistance and how these all aspects affect governments of different nature and systems. Furthermore, two theoretical paradigms have been defined including Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle and Sidney Tarrow's theory of structural opportunities and their relationship with Pakistani politics of populist movements. It argues that Pakistan being a defective democracy is prone to conflicts.

Hence, almost every democratic government has witnessed political agitation. PPP governments in 1977 and 2013, and PML-N government in 2014 and 2016 have witnessed a strategic nonviolent struggle for political change, which were more comprehensive and fell into the category of Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent conflict. While discussing the Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle, this study discovers that the above-mentioned movements had adopted some of its

methods to topple the government in power. Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle and Tarrow's theory of structural opportunities provide insight into reasons related to emergence and mobilization of populist movements. No study so far defined the relationship between these two theories and populist movements of Pakistan. The applicability of these theories on Pakistan has also been comprehensively discussed. This is the uniqueness of the study that these theories have been discussed in the context of Pakistan to understand not only reasons of political conflicts, but also the strategic political culture, and the reasons of their failure.

The second chapter of Part-I establishes some basic understandings about the political system, political culture and dynamics of Pakistani politics. It comprehensively discusses the political landscape of the country as well as drivers of political change. Two institutions in Pakistan, i.e., the Pakistan Army and Judiciary are strong enough to topple any democratically elected government. The military has toppled elected governments three times in Pakistan in 1958, 1977 and 1999 respectively, while the judiciary has ousted two Prime Ministers of the country in 2012 and 2017 respectively. Other pressure groups for political change are middle class, youth, changing demographics in society, etc. These groups are actively participating in movements of political change against elected governments of Pakistan. However, these groups are not strong enough to topple a democratic government until and unless they extensively apply Gene Sharp's strategies of political change. Moreover, without the support of the Army or Judiciary – the two powerful institutions of the country – chances for the potential agents of change are remote. The discussion has tried to gain evidence that Pakistan is not a consolidated democracy, it is rather a weak political system, which has always been under the control of the military. Hence, civil-military relations have also been discussed in detail. The introduction also discusses various dimensions of strategic nonviolent struggle, its history and evolution and existing scholarly work.

Chapter three (3) of Part-I explains the theoretical foundations of the study. It primarily discusses theoretical foundation of the study and its relevance to Pakistan. Democratic peace theory claims that due to some structural constraints they try to solve conflicts peacefully. Hence democratic governments often manage to end political conflicts through peaceful means. However, institutional intervention has been witnessed in various countries in order to topple the government in power. For instance, Pakistani military's intervention in 1977 took advantage of political conflict between government and opposition parties. This institutional intervention further testifies

the basic argument of the study that without institutional intervention, people's movements to bring about a political change rarely succeed to achieve their aim until and unless powerful institutions support their struggle. The chapter further explains the reasons of democratic power and its imperatives. This chapter has primarily dedicated to explain the reasons, which originate and accumulate the strength of a democratic regime prior, during and after conflict.

Primarily, four major characteristics have been identified as the foundations of democratic strengths, including democratic legitimacy, political experience, lack of repressive measures and tendencies to solve conflicts through peaceful means. Primarily, Legitimacy and support of national and international democratic forces help weak democracies to strengthen their resilience. Legitimacy primarily comes through winning of general elections with popular support. Hence, a confidence of enjoying public support garners confidence in the face of politically motivated movements. The chapter has also identified that different reactions of governments due to the difference of their power structure shape the conflict's outcome. While discussing the core characteristics of democratic and nondemocratic regimes, this chapter has also elaborated reactions of these two different political systems against nonviolent struggle.

It contemplates that democracies often try to react against these kinds of movements by offering negotiations and some concessions. If compelled, they use limited and controlled coercive measures to break the momentum of these movements. However ultimately, they seek a democratic and peaceful solution of such conflicts. In past 50 years of Pakistan's political history, the three major movements had one way or the other ended up with an agreement or political settlement. Even in the case of PNA movement. The nine political parties alliance against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government, many experts and historians are convinced that an agreement between the conflicting parties had been finalized on July 3, 1977.¹³ These experts also believe that the military had its own political aspirations; therefore, despite the news of finalization of an agreement between the two warring parties, it intervened.

Chapter One (1) of Part-II "Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis" of the study is based on primary data collected through survey from across the country. This chapter argues that the perception of

¹³ Interview with General Faiz Ali Chishti - One of the Co-plotters of 5th July 1977 Martial Law, Interviewed by Farrukh Sohail Goindi, Pakistan Television (PTV), December 16, 2008, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jy8w3sxEUhA> (accessed May 23, 2018).

military's involvement in the political affairs severely dents the credibility of the movements for political change in Pakistan. This damage leads to less participation of the public in such movements, which increases their chances of failure. The chapter argues that the basic principle of peoples' movement in Pakistan for political change is the overwhelming participation of people in protests, sit-ins, etc.

However, due to this strong perception, people seem reluctant to participate in such movements. The chapter argues this point based on the sample of 2600 people, which was collected from different parts of Pakistan. It provides a significant evidence of people's perception about the military's role in people's movements in Pakistan and constraints, which organizers of these movements face in the wake of this perception. In the post Musharraf era, political parties have made their stronghold in different provinces. PML-N and PPP have made their strongholds in Punjab and Sindh provinces respectively, while PTI has a strong base in KPK province. This factor has also curtailed the level of active participation in nonviolent movements, which is evident from the national survey.

Chapter two (2) of Part-II of the study is a comparative analysis of two different nonviolent movements launched in 1966 and 1977 respectively. First movement was led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto against military dictator Ayub Khan. The chapter identifies that it was Bhutto, who introduced strategic nonviolent struggle in Pakistan to bring about a political change. His extensive public outreach helped him to topple a powerful dictator, which was a surprise for the entire country. Moreover, his extensive struggle and awakening cause-conscience' also increased level of public awareness of their rights. However, he also faced similar kind of agitation in 1977 from opposition political parties. The second movement was spearheaded by the PNA, aimed to remove the party in power, i.e., PPP. The chapter also narrates how Ayub and Bhutto reacted differently against these challenges due to their different political experiences and different power structures. Therefore, the results of these two movements were drastically different. Though, in both cases political change did occur, but the manner of ouster from power was entirely different from each other. General Ayub Khan relinquished power and handed over the reins of the government to his Army Commander-in-Chief Yahya Khan. Bhutto did not hand over power to any institution or political party; rather he was ousted through a military coup on July 5, 1977. Had Bhutto not been removed from power through a military putsch, a peaceful settlement would have been made.

Chapter three (3) of Part-II discusses the nonviolent movement launched by PAT in 2013. This was the first movement of the 21st century in Pakistan with the aim of unseating the democratic government in power. This movement failed miserably and was defused through negotiations. In this chapter, it has been discussed how a weak democracy managed to survive pressure piled up by a politico-religious party. It also discusses the reactions of the democratic government to prevent its removal from power through meaningful negotiations with the leadership of protesters. It was able to convince PAT leader Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri to end his protest with a vague document with no significant assurance of implementing it. As a result, PAT dropped the demands of dissolution of provincial and national assemblies, dissolution of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the resignation of Prime Minister and President and change in the existing political system. The chapter highlights the fact that even weak democracies facing internal threats such as bad governance, inflation, terrorism, law and order situation in Karachi, etc. can manage to resolve conflicts exceptionally better as compared to non-democracies. However, this movement had long term impact on Pakistani political culture as the frequency of nonviolent struggle for regime change substantially increased since PAT's movement of political change in 2013.

Chapter four (4) of Part-II discusses three movements that aimed at dislodging elected government of PML-N. It is a unique case in which an elected government in Pakistan's political history had to face such kinds of political upheavals. The government survived despite the agitations on the Constitution Avenue for up to 126 days. The PAT movement in 2013, PTI movements in 2014 and 2016 created severe problems for the elected government. These three movements for political change kept Islamabad paralysed for almost 152 days from 2014 to 2017. The chapter also discusses how, despite extreme and frequent political agitation; an elected government could resolve conflicts amicably through the instrument of negotiations. This chapter also identifies the structural weaknesses, which became reasons of these conflicts, i.e., a weak electoral system and the inefficiency of ECP's election tribunals opened opportunities for different social and political actors to agitate for change. This chapter also narrates reactions of government and controlled repression, which helped it to sustain during the time of crisis.

The chapter provides an insight how democratic leadership remains confident based on political and public legitimacy. The political support of national political parties is another factor, which has been discussed in the chapter as a source of strength for a democratic government. This chapter

also discusses that though defective, democracies that have government with simple majority can sustain a crisis in a far better manner than non-democracies. Hence, the government of PML-N being a stronger democratic government as compared to its predecessor - PPP's government due to a larger majority in the parliament - tackled the three major movements of regime change and completed its five years term.

Third Part of the study titled "Findings and Conclusions" is primarily based on two chapters. Chapter 1 (one) of Part-III highlights various findings of the study. The study finds that weak structure and lack of democratic values in societies often lead towards such kinds of political conflicts. Democracies that are confronted by such kinds of populist politically motivated movements in fact lack many democratic values, such as lack of democratic culture within political parties and the society, the dominance of dynastic politics, lack of political tolerance and constant fear of military intervention. In Pakistan, the lack of democratic values within society has negatively affected the overall democratic system of the country.

The study also finds out that Pakistan's anti-regime movements tried to practice Gene Sharp's theory by adopting some approaches to delegitimize the ruling class. Pakistani social movements have adopted 15 of 198 different methods for securing success in their struggle. These include, sit-ins, lockdowns, staging protests and rallies, boycotts, a failed attempt of non-cooperation/disobedience, targeting centre of gravity the ruling elite, creating anti-regime songs, social media messages, derogatory social media videos, robust national media campaigns, writing slogans on walls and currency notes, limited marches within towns and cities, though it was limited but resignations of government employees, cultural protests and graffiti movement. There are many other Pakistan specific findings as well as findings that can lead towards new ideas of questions related to civil resistance movements.

Chapter two (2) of Part-III informs about the positive impacts of strategic nonviolent struggles on the political culture of Pakistan. This chapter is highly important to gauge some positive impacts of civil resistance on Pakistani political culture. Normally, there is general perception that political agitation and civil resistance lead to anarchy in the country, which is in some cases true. However, in Pakistan it has left many positive impacts too. This chapter has identified several key areas such as social and political spheres, which have been directly affected through political agitation. This

chapter argues that mass mobilization and political awareness has strengthened democracy. These are some positive indicators of strategic nonviolent political movements.

It also argues that these movements have helped in improving political maturity among different political leaders, which will help democracy of Pakistan in the long run. These strategic nonviolent movements for political change have also highlighted various structural weaknesses, which used to be a source of political conflict. Hence, a comprehensive process of political and structural reforms such as the electoral reforms, have taken place in the country. This paved the way towards stronger democratic society. Moreover, these strategic nonviolent movements have also encouraged many social, economic, ethnic, and political interest groups to wage political agitation to demand their genuine rights from the state. Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) is one such example. This movement has garnered wider support among the Pashtuns within few months. It is because of this support that two members of National Assembly of Pakistan, Moshin Dawar and Ali Wazir were elected through this movement in 2018 general elections from erstwhile FATA.¹⁴ The chapter also highlights that the culture of waging such movements also provided a forum to aggrieved segments of society to vent their grievances.

This chapter has discussed that when societies get democratized and experience democracy as a governing system once in a lifetime, they will not be subjugated by the authoritative regimes or dictatorships for a long time. These democratic societies will struggle through nonviolent means to free their society from being ruled by dictators or authoritarian regimes. Moreover, new laws and actions will be introduced in such societies after experiencing authoritarianism, which further strengthen democracy and nurture the political leadership of the country. Overall, chapter narrates that the strategic nonviolent struggle has helped in mass mobilization and public awareness, which are prerequisites for democratization. Hence, democracy and democratic culture will be further strengthened in Pakistan amid the age of mass protests and nonviolent civil resistance.

¹⁴ Staff, "Two PTM leaders make it to NA", *The News*, July 29, 2018. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/347687-two-ptm-leaders-make-it-to-na> (accessed June 09, 2021).

PART-I

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

Chapter 1

Weak Democracy and theory of Nonviolent Civil Resistance: A Literature Review

Some Important Terminologies for Clarity of the Thesis

The term civil resistance is often associated with nonviolent action. According to Gene Sharp, civil resistance is an instrument of nonviolent resistance demand political, social and economic rights. Civil resistance, in his opinion, is usually practiced for pragmatic reasons such as to acquire economic and political rights.¹

Nonviolence is often associated with nonviolent action. According to Gandhi, nonviolence is abstention from violence because of a moral or religious principle. However, Gene Sharp believes nonviolence is not solely linked to religion; rather it can be used as a tactic to gain sympathies in civilized society. He believes people pursuing nonviolent movements neither initiate violence nor retaliate with violence.² The term “nonviolence” should not be used as a synonym for the technique of nonviolent action, because nonviolent action is often practiced for pragmatic reasons and is not necessarily tied to a general belief in abstention from all violence.

Nonviolent action is a technique of conducting protest, resistance, and intervention without physical violence by (a) acts of omission—that is the participants refuse to perform acts which they usually perform, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; (b) acts of commission—that is, the participants perform acts which they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from performing; or (c) a combination of both. The technique includes a multitude of specific methods, which are grouped into three main classes: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.³ Nonviolent action may be used as a technique of waging active struggle and as a sanction to achieve certain objectives in conflicting situations where, in its absence, submission or violence might have been practiced. Considerable variation exists within the technique, including the individual methods applied; the motivation for nonviolent behavior; the

¹ Gene Sharp, “Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle”, (Oxford University Press, London, 2011), 70.

² Ibid, 125.

³ Ibid, 134.

attitude toward the opponents; the objectives of the action; the intended mechanism of change; and the relation of nonviolent action to other techniques of action.⁴

This broad phenomenon of nonviolent action has variously been referred to, in part or in full, by such terms as civil resistance, civilian resistance, nonviolent direct action, nonviolent resistance, passive resistance, and positive action. Civilian struggle indicates the vigorous application of nonviolent action. Nonviolent action is contrasted with violent action or excessive use of force. These are the two main classes of ultimate sanctions. This should not be interpreted as implying that all social and political action can be clearly classed as “violent” or “nonviolent.” There are other broad categories, including simple verbal persuasion, peaceful institutional procedures backed by threat and use of sanctions (violent and nonviolent), and material destruction only.⁵

Strategic nonviolent struggle is conducted in accordance with a well thought out strategy or group of strategies. It is a major movement or campaign intended to move toward, or achieve, the objective(s) of a given strategy, and hence to alter the strategic situation in the country. While the nonviolent struggle itself is a plan to contain a variety of specific, more limited tactical plans to gain smaller objectives that contribute to accomplishing the overall objective of the developed strategy.⁶

Weak democracies and Structural Opportunities:

Many scholars believe that defective democracies are more prone to conflicts.⁷ It has been argued that defective democracies are politically less stable as compared to autocracies and consolidated democracies.⁸ Due to political instability weak democracies are often at the mercy of opportunistic forces⁹ and the survival of the government is always at stake. Weak governments are often

⁴ Gene Sharp, “Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle” 135.

⁵ Ibid, 136.

⁶ Ibid, 188.

⁷ Muller and Weede, “Cross-national Variations in Political Violence,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 624-651; Boswell and Dixon, “Dependency and Rebellion,” *American Sociological Review* 55, no. 4 (1990), 540-559; James Fearon and David D Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003), 75-90.

⁸ Epstein, et al., “Democratic Transitions,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 3 (2006): 551-69; Gates, et al., “Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006), 893-908.

⁹ Ted Robert Gurr, “Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971,” *American Political Science Review* 68, no. 4 (1974), 1482-1504.

threatened or challenged by state institutions – military and judiciary - which results into the turbulent political environment. Due to this, political forces rely more on dynastic politics or limited number of political workers etc because they do not want to trust too many people. Resultantly, the democratic culture, norms, institutions etc. remain relatively weak, which provide opportunity to other institutions or groups to take advantage of the situation. In this stringent political environment, several groups find opportunities to wage their struggle for their collective interests. Sidney Tarrow defines this phenomenon very comprehensively in his theory of structural opportunity.

The overall debate about the relationship between democracies and conflicts largely depends upon democratic variations in different states. Some believe that countries having strong democratic norms are less fallible to internal armed conflicts.¹⁰ On the flip side defective democracies are more prone to internal conflicts.¹¹ Defective democracies often provide structural opportunities to social or political actors to wage unarmed conflicts. In this regard, Sidney Tarrow has given a comprehensive explanation of motivations for social movements in his theory of structural opportunities. According to him, the movements are created when political opportunities open for social actors. A controlled democracy offers many opportunities for collective action to trigger social or political movement.¹² An environment for such action is created because of bad governance and inefficiency to solve social and political problems. The cumulative pain because of common grievances can bring people on the streets. In Tarrow's opinion, collective action is a result of common grievances, objectives, purposes.¹³

Though, defective democracies often face disruptive actions destabilizing the government and the political system, yet there is a positive dimension in this turmoil. According to Sidney Tarrow, collective actions or movements can be blessings in disguise for countries in longer terms. Movements - especially organized ones - engage in a variety of actions. These range from providing 'selective incentives' to members, to building consensus among current or prospective supporters, to lobbying and negotiating with authorities and to challenging cultural codes through

¹⁰ Boswell and William, "Dependency and Rebellion," 540-559.

¹¹ Ibid, 544.

¹² Ibid, 551.

¹³ James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," 80.

new religious or personal practices.¹⁴ Hence, collective action gradually fills structural gaps in weak democracies, which ultimately benefits the democratic system of the country.

There is also an important study related to civic culture titled “The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations” written by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Weber that discusses the civic culture in various countries. The book presents a rationality-activist model of democratic citizenship where active participation of citizens in group activities is largely determined through rationality and cognitive ability of citizens. The authors opine that though various cognitive and parochial factors dominate the civic culture, however, sometimes these citizens act rationally.¹⁵ They believe in parochial societies trust levels are lower, and any such solidarity rarely penetrates political relationships. Therefore, citizens’ “ability to influence the government in time of need – in particular, to create ad hoc political structures to do so – is limited”.¹⁶ This generates a destabilizing incongruence with democratic institutions.¹⁷

The political thought of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe belong to the realm of political philosophy. Their ideas belong to the far left. They both build on Marxist ideas and reshape them. They argue that there is no explanation for why human rights are removed from political debate.¹⁸ There is no justification for why political speech is not subject to the political process. Human rights are largely taken for granted as an important component of the liberal democratic state. But this neglect is a challenge for radical democracy as a comprehensive political theory. There is an implicit assumption of the presence of Western liberal democracy. But this makes it impossible to apply these ideas to nonwestern political environments that struggle to democratize. The theory fails to offer universal concepts applicable beyond their political environment.¹⁹

Radical democracy falls short of a comprehensive theory of democracy but serves as a substantive critique of contemporary democratic practice. Hegemony is the central concept of the theory. It becomes a lens to critique the political system, but also a guide to reshape it. The absence of

¹⁴ James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 81.

¹⁵ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Weber, “*The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*”, (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press: 1963), 339.

¹⁶ Ibid, 361.

¹⁷ Ibid, 364.

¹⁸ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “*Hegemony and Social Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*”, (London: Verso Publications, 1985) 35.

¹⁹ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “*Hegemony and Social Strategy*, 50-51.

violence is not an absence of conflict. Indeed, the essence of politics is conflict. Resolution does not come from compromise and consensus. Public policy emerges from a hegemonic position. Over time, the political opposition is reshaped and transformed into something capable of overtaking the hegemonic position.

Laclau and Mouffe recognize an important contradiction in the neoliberal commitment to liberty and freedom. Neoliberalism seeks to bring about the dissolution of the political process. It is most obvious in economics where the government's role is dramatically reduced. The political process becomes an unnecessary interference. In this manner, the ideological basis of neoliberalism is incompatible with democracy.

The return of the political process becomes the central theme necessary to give socialism a new sense of relevance. But this transformed sense of socialism cannot stand alone.²⁰ It is based in the political process. It is ironic because this transformation does not guarantee an increased role of the state. Rather it brings all forms of social interaction into the domain of public discussion and deliberation. Nothing is beyond the realm of the political process. In contrast, Thatcher had said, "There is no such thing as society." Neoliberalism establishes a divide between the public and the private. But the proponents of neoliberalism give a clear preference to the private over the public. Aspects of public life become redefined as the domain of the private individual until nothing remains. Radical democracy reorients this perspective. Nothing remains private. Everything is political. But in practice this philosophy does not bring about socialism. This mantra reflects what has become known as populism. And in this sense, radical democracy may represent a challenge to liberal democracy.²¹

Strategic Nonviolent Theory:

Conflict is as old as human society. It has taken various shapes depending upon the environment, magnitude and actors involved in it. The term conflict triggers the image of blood, casualties, war, etc. Hence, most of the scholarly work revolves around armed conflicts and their causes, motivations, dynamics, etc. However, the definition of conflict is wider than the perceived perception. According to Oxford Dictionary, the conflict can also be nonviolent, as the basic

²⁰ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, "*Hegemony and Social Strategy*, 58.

²¹ *Ibid*, 50-51.

definition of conflict depicts “a conflict is a serious disagreement between two or more actors”. This disagreement can start with petty matters and evolve into a violent disagreement. The word conflict has been derived from Latin word ‘conflictus’ means ‘collision’. However, there is conflict among scholars over defining conflict at different levels. The nature of conflict also radically changes the definition of the conflict, e.g., conflict is commonly understood as:

- A form of opposition between parties.
- An absence of agreement between parties.
- A way to solve social contradictions.
- A natural process in human social interaction.²²

Coser believes that conflict is a struggle between opponents over values.²³ Schelling considers conflict as part of enhancing ability of bargaining to achieve desired objectives.²⁴ In this regard, Johan Galtung’s definition of conflict is more comprehensive, which says conflict is a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviours are constantly changing and influencing by one another.²⁵ Wall considers it a process in which two or more parties attempt to frustrate the attainment of the other’s goals.²⁶ Hence, opposing values, structure, attitude, behaviours, means to frustrate opponents are some reasons of conflicts.

In case of political conflict, political parties may also use the above-mentioned variables for their political gains. However, there is a sharp divide in political parties’ role in different democratic societies. In consolidated democracies, political parties try to register their protest in democratic institutions, mainly parliament. However, in weak democracies, political parties often seek other platforms to register their protests. They take their protests to the streets. In weak democracies, state institutions often remain in the evolutionary process. Therefore, they react erratically. Their unavailability to move state organs to pay heed to their dissent forces political parties to launch political agitation. The protests of these political parties can be violent or nonviolent. Many scholars feel that nonviolent strategic struggle is a form of conflict, which can escalate to certain

²² Lukin Yu. F., *Management of the Conflicts* (Moscow: Triksta, 2007), 102.

²³ A. L. Coser , *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Free Press, New York, 1956), 12.

²⁴ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 26.

²⁵ Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict* (Oslo: Development and Civilization, International Peace Research Institute, 1996), 36.

²⁶ A. J. Wall, *Negotiation: Theory and Practice* (Glenview, Scoff, Foresman, Illinois, 1985), 48.

levels of violence. It is important to understand the difference between violent and nonviolent struggle.

Nonviolence is defined as a strategy or tactic used for the achievement of political, social and economic objectives. However, some scholars believe that it is a complete philosophy, which can powerfully impact the society. According to the philosophical understanding of nonviolence, it is the lack of desire of an individual or a group to harm or kill another individual or group. However, after extensive literature review, one can conclude that nonviolence is a philosophy that is sometimes adopted by groups to achieve a desired objective. Nonviolence is not a new concept as it can be found in various religions. History reveals that Mahavira (599 BCE–527 BCE), the spiritual leader of Jainism, not only used the word ‘Ahimsa’ for the first time, but also practically displayed this concept by applying it on his own life. He told the world that if one wants enlightenment and eternal satisfaction, one must refrain from violence. Other religions including Hinduism (500BCE)²⁷, Buddhism (400BCE)²⁸ Christianity (1st CE)²⁹ and Islam (600CE)³⁰ have also properly defined the concept of nonviolence and encouraged their followers to follow its precepts. According to Islamic teachings, the concept of nonviolence is as old as humanity. For instance, it is described in the Quran, that Habel (Abel) the son of the first Prophet Adam was killed by his brother Qabeel (Cain), while Qabeel did not resist and did not adopt violence in self defence. So, he was the first human being to practically follow the concept of nonviolence.

However, the concept of nonviolence faded away in later centuries and was replaced with realpolitik. The battle of power within and against empires often involved violence. Machiavellian approach overwhelmed the attitudes of different societies across the globe for a few centuries. In the early half of the 20th century, when states and empires were focusing on strengthening their power through sophisticated weapons to kill more people in less time and with less effort, the world witnessed a new challenging force, which later proved to be more powerful in the next century. In 1905, an Orthodox priest, Georgii Gapon mobilized more than 150,000 workers to

²⁷ Prema Kurien, “Multiculturalism and American Religion: The Case of Hindu Indian Americans,” *Johns Hopkins University Press* 85, no. 2 (2006), 723-741.

²⁸ Charles Prebish, “Cooking the Buddhist Books: The Implications of the New Dating of the Buddha for the History of Early Indian Buddhism,” *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* 15 (2008), 2.

²⁹ E. Glenn Hinson, “*The Church Triumphant: A History of Christianity Up to 1300*,” 223.

³⁰ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2002), 15-19.

march towards the Russian capital for constitutional compensation.³¹ The mass movement became so popular that the autocratic regime was compelled to establish the first elected parliament.³² Hence, this was first movement to use nonviolent means to achieve its objective from an authoritarian regime. With the passage of time the success of this technique coupled with the atrocities of two world wars made the nonviolent concept more popular and rational choice as the success ratio was found twice as successful as compared to violent campaigns.³³

Although, the first half of 20th century witnessed decades' long nonviolent struggle of Gandhi against British Raj, however, the frequency of nonviolent campaigns increased rapidly in the second half of the 20th century.³⁴ During this time, various popular nonviolent campaigns grabbed international attention including nonviolent struggle for civil rights by Martin Luther King and James Bevel's adoption and implementation of Gandhi's nonviolent methods in his struggle to win civil rights for African Americans.³⁵ César Chávez launched a nonviolent campaign in the 1960s to protest against the inhuman treatment of farm workers in California.³⁶ The 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia that saw the overthrow of the Communist government is considered one of the most important nonviolent Revolutions of 20th century.³⁷ Most recently the nonviolent campaigns of Leymah Gbowee and the women of Liberia achieved peace after a 14-years long civil war.³⁸ Existing data reveals that from last decade of Cold War to first decade of 21st century, nonviolent struggle has become a most popular and successful strategy and instrument of political

³¹ Peter Ackerman and Jack Du Vall, *A Force More Powerful* (Palgrave, 2000), 13-61.

³² Ibid, 19.

³³ Out of the 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 to 2006, the latter were able to achieve nearly double partial or full success as compared to the former. For more details see *Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes* (NAVCO), http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/data/navco_1-1_appendix-and-codebook.pdf. (accessed May 17, 2016).

³⁴ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 4.

³⁵ Randy Kryn, *James L. Bevel: The Strategist of the 1960s Civil Rights Movement* (Carlson Publishing Company, 1989), 52-55.

³⁶ Stanley M. Burstein and Richard Shek, "World History Ancient Civilizations", (Holt, Rinhart and Winson Inc, 2005), 154. As Chavez once explained, "Nonviolence is not inaction. It is not for the timid or the weak. It is hard work, it is the patience to win."

³⁷ Miroslav Vaněk and Pavel Mücke, "Velvet Revolutions: An Oral History of Czech Society", (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), 4-11.

³⁸ Chris Graham, "Peace Building Alum Talks Practical App of Nonviolence," *Augusta Free Press*, October 26, 2009.

change, acquiring rights, making constitutional compensations, etc. Nonviolence as a concept and nonviolent struggle are two different concepts.

Prior to Gene Sharp, activists and scholars of nonviolence used to combine the nonviolent struggle as a strategy and as a religious belief. However, Sharp changed the concept of nonviolent struggle and defined it as a strategic maneuvering, which is used as an organized tactic as the conventional war is fought. According to Gene Sharp, nonviolent struggle is a technique of action by which population can resist or protest.³⁹ For Gene Sharp, peaceful struggle is not a religious concept which can be practiced by religious people. It is a realist approach against oppression and violence.

The idea of nonviolence in modern times is often associated with Leo Tolstoy, M.K. Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and Nelson Mandela. Their lives provided fair examples of bringing about social change. However, their struggle has largely been misperceived. Many people including academia consider that nonviolent struggle is a form of belief, and only cowards, people with religious leanings and weak groups in the society wage this kind of struggle against powerful and oppressors. The slogans of human rights and morality in nonviolent movements, make an impression that nonviolent struggle is based on morality. However, morality has been very low priority in realpolitik. On the other hand, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Liddell Hart and Clausewitz are associated with military strategy, warfare, and armed conflict. Their theories can be applied in the civilian sphere as well.

An interesting combination of nonviolence and military strategy has been proposed by Gene Sharp and he termed it as “Strategic nonviolent struggle”. Sharp is the proponent of this theory, who tried to build a relationship between strategy and nonviolent struggle. Later, many scholars including Peter Ackreman, Klugar, Helvey, Ganz and Popovic further defined Sharp’s theory of strategic nonviolent struggle. This combined effort has greatly contributed in defining nonviolent struggle. Sharp has defined 198 methods of nonviolent struggle and advised that wise selection of specific method is very crucial in defining the outcome of the struggle.⁴⁰ Sharp has divided whole nonviolent struggle into three parts, i.e., protests and persuasion, non-cooperation, and lastly

³⁹ Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, 2nd ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1999), 39.

⁴⁰ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of nonviolent action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973), 365.

nonviolent intervention.⁴¹ He believes that it is very important to lay ground for nonviolent struggle. Sharp has given due importance to casting of fear or to control fear so that people may act independently.⁴² In this regard, he coined a term *cause-consciousness*, i.e., publicizing the facts, issues and arguments advanced by the nonviolent struggle group through public meetings, media, publishing of white papers, songs and slogans to provoke public against the rulers, and by offering hope for a better future.⁴³

These strategies are crucial for creating a favourable environment for the nonviolent struggle. For Sharp, the next step is planning the strategy for the struggle itself. He emphasized on investigation, which is largely known in academia as an assessment of surrounding environment.⁴⁴ He has divided the process of formulation of grand strategy into two phases. Firstly, to determine the causes of conflict, list the grievances, formulate desired changes; give widest possible publicity to causes, facts and goals.⁴⁵ Secondly, investigate the opponents, including their objectives, beliefs, background, strengths, weaknesses, supporting institutions and the reason of their support, sources of power, decision making process, allies and foes etc.⁴⁶ These all steps are important in formulating grand strategy. Lack of strategic assessment and lack of knowledge regarding the weaknesses and strengths of the opponent could lead to disaster in nonviolent struggle.

Robert Helvey has tried to further elaborate Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle by comparatively analysing it with classical realists, such as Machiavelli, Liddell Hart, etc.⁴⁷ According to him, there is a clear linkage between Machiavelli's strategies and Sharp's thinking. Liddell Hart had emphasized on the changing nature of artillery as it was the best form of technology at his time. Same is the case with nonviolent struggle as Sharp had defined in his theory that in 21st century computers, social media, mobile apps, television discussions are considered major weapons for nonviolent struggle.⁴⁸ The linkage of technology and war was considered inevitable by many strategists in general and Machiavelli in particular. Proponents of strategic

⁴¹ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 50.

⁴² Ibid, 364.

⁴³ Ibid, 366.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 365.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 365.

⁴⁶ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 365.

⁴⁷ Robert Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about Fundamentals* (Boston: Albert Einstein Institute, 2004), 89.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 89.

nonviolent struggle also feel in the same way and believe that the use of modern technology will help in providing the desired results.

For Machiavelli, a battle must be quick and sharp, which also an important point of strategic nonviolent struggle as defined by Gene Sharp. Though, strategic nonviolent struggle can be decades long, however, Sharp advises leaders of nonviolent struggle to adopt strategy of *annihilation* during their struggle against the status quo. The basic logic behind the quick and sharp result of a battle is that the state has vast resources while the participants in the movement have finite endurance and limited sources. Therefore, it is better to achieve results in a short span of time, otherwise, the morale of the participants will cap, and resources will deplete. Helvey also endorses Machiavelli and Sharp's strategy and believes that planning, coordination and the struggle should be directed towards decisive battle against the pillars of the state.⁴⁹ This debate suggests that any delay can add to the difficulties of the struggle and can demoralise the participants and potential supporters. A stalemate will provide ample time for the government to formulate a counter strategy against the struggle.

However, a prominent strategist of nonviolent struggle Robert Helvey agrees with the Basil Liddell Hart's concept of "indirect approach" to counter the enemy's power. It is similar approach as a strategy of exhaustion as mentioned above. Liddell Hart believes that strategy of limited aim is about waiting for a change in the balance of force.⁵⁰ He also believes that targeting weakest line of opponent's defence can provide strategic advantage.⁵¹ Selection of limited aims and avoiding confrontation with the strong pillars of power can help in exhausting resources of the status quo powers. By agreeing with Liddell Hart, Helvey believes that this strategy can dilute economic and military resources of the state, hence making it vulnerable for a decisive battle.⁵² He further articulates this point and says nonviolent movements are slow to gain momentum and do not have extensive resources to wage a decisive battle. Therefore, it is important to pursue a strategy of exhaustion in the early stage of the movement. This strategy can be changed when the momentum is set for the strategy of annihilation.

⁴⁹ Robert Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about Fundamentals*, 91.

⁵⁰ Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, 3rd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), 335.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 335.

⁵² Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 93.

Furthermore, Robert Helvey argues that strategy alone is nothing without actions and campaigns. In this regard, tactical superiority is also very important during the nonviolent struggle.⁵³ Hence, the raw material of strategy and tactics must be organized and synchronized for the achievement of desired results. For the importance of tactics, the strategic nonviolence theory has also direct relevance with Clausewitz's concept of rapidly changing nature of tactics, and adoption of new tactics in order to win the battle. Sharp and Helvey believe that during the nonviolent struggle leaders must accept changes in the environment which largely influence the desired results. Hence, by giving due importance to influencing factors during struggle, leaders must adopt new tactics in order to get the desired results.⁵⁴

Likewise, realists in general and strategists in particular give extreme importance in forming new alliances before and during the war in order to gain maximum resources as well as to deter the opponent. During the strategic nonviolent struggle, Sharp has tried to convince that the leader can expand their cooperation within territorial lines but beyond ethnic, religious, and nationalist groups. Expansion of cooperation beyond territorial lines on the other hand can be counterproductive as it would provide an excuse to status quo forces to quell anti-government protests. However, in this globalized world, it is near to impossible that multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations and universal or regional organizations do not interfere or play their role in nonviolent struggle. Therefore, it can be argued that by seeking political allies can be counterproductive, but non-political and noncontroversial entities such as international nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN), Amnesty International, Doctors without Borders and journalists can be allies, and can effectively contribute to maligning nonviolent struggle.

Scope of Nonviolent Struggle:

There are various myths about nonviolent struggle and its scope. In general, people believe that nonviolent struggle can only be waged against a foreign occupier. Partially it is true. However, it narrows the scope of the struggle. The world has witnessed numerous nonviolent struggles against democratically elected governments to bring about political change for civil right and for

⁵³ Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 93.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 92; Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 135.

concessions in the constitution, etc. Moreover, it is often believed that nonviolent struggle or mass disobedience is a call for a new social contract between rulers and masses. However, Sharp rejects these stereotypes. For him, a nonviolent struggle can be against an armed group, an institution, against a government or against its policy and sometime against foreign occupiers. The struggle may last for days, weeks and sometimes for years, depending upon the objective and determination of the participants and the organs of the state resisting change.

Those campaigning for change, wage psychological, social, political, and economic warfare with sophisticated nonviolent techniques against the power centers of a particular state or its institutions. The main idea is to disrupt sources and agents of resources through boycotts, sit-ins, strikes and by violating the laws. For Sharp, nonviolent struggle does not require acceptance of a new political doctrine or a new religious belief.⁵⁵ Conventionally, nonviolence is associated with cowards and weak as the nonviolence is a form of avoiding violence. However, Sharp has rejected this notion and argued that ‘nonviolent struggle is based on bravery and discipline.’⁵⁶ Bravery is something beyond the control of a leader. Wise leaders often choose courageous people through the effective selection process.

However, discipline can be injected into participants through training and speeches. Sharp rejects the stereotype that cowardice and nonviolent struggle are directly proportional to each other. He says that ‘cowardice and nonviolence should not mix with each other, because cowardice seeks to avoid the conflict, while nonviolent struggle often invites conflict in the shape of breaching laws and challenging the status quo.’⁵⁷ Nonviolent struggle is not a job of coward people as it requires patience, determination and strong psychological will power to face violent behaviour of the rulers.

Nonviolent struggle is not an easy task to do. It always requires a conducive environment for nourishment. People, who believe that they can start a nonviolent resistance movement in short time, often end up with nothing but regret. That is what happened with Imran Khan’s and PAT’s movement, which were lacking the essence of preparedness. They just waged a nonviolent struggle without homework and training of the participants, which ultimately failed in their movements. Nonviolent resistance always starts with setting up an environment for it. As Gene Sharp says,

⁵⁵ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 40.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 369.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 364.

firstly determine the causes of the conflict, list the grievances, formulate the goals and generate cause-consciousness and justification for the coming conflict.⁵⁸

The term cause-consciousness is not an easy task. It may take time to inject awareness among the people that if they will resist in an organized form, their grievances could be addressed by the authorities. The cause-consciousness requires extensive and concerted efforts by the leadership. The more you invest in it, the more you may win the conflict. It is part of education and training of the people to make them understand about their grievances, so that they are able to counter propaganda against it. Hence, spending more time on setting the ground for nonviolent conflict is a better strategy to achieve desired results. Leaders who do not spend too much time and resource on setting the ground, often fail to achieve desired outcomes from the movement. This is true for any kind of movement, whether it is violent or nonviolent in nature. An environment must be created before launching any kind of struggle by any means. The cadres must be indoctrinated, so that they remain dedicated to the cause, come what may.

Defining Nonviolent Civil Action and People's Movements:

Scholars have presented numerous definitions of nonviolent civil action. These definitions have different scopes for peaceful civil resistance. However, some of the definitions are pertinent and comprehensive in nature. For instance, Sharp defines nonviolent resistance as a 'technique of socio-political action for applying power in a conflict without the use of violence.'⁵⁹ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan defined nonviolent movement as a movement of organized civilian population, using nonviolent resistance methods including boycotts, strikes, sit-ins and protests.⁶⁰ Civil resistance is a method of conflict in which unarmed civilians use a variety of coordinated tactics such as boycotts, strikes, long march etc. in order to attain their desired results without directly physically harming the opponent.

Scholars claim that nonviolent civil resistance movement and campaign are two different concepts. Usually, a movement has a grand strategy and reasonably set popular demands. The movement is based on a series of campaigns against status-quo in order to achieve well-defined objectives. For

⁵⁸ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 365.

⁵⁹ Gene Sharp, "Nonviolent Action," *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, 567.

⁶⁰ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 14.

instance a campaign is a series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a political objective.⁶¹ Campaigns have discernible leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous acts.⁶² Usually leaders of these movements try to establish some legal and moral grounds, which may last from weeks to years for convincing public for protests, sit-ins, strikes, boycotts, etc. Usually, campaigns have distinguishable beginnings and end points, as well as discernible events throughout the campaign.⁶³

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan define that a movement could be identified with five basic components including, a defined leadership, clear and defined objective, defined clear opponents against whom the movement is fought, clear strategy with dominant nonviolent elements in it, and a result-oriented approach. These components distinguish a movement from a mob.⁶⁴ Civil resistance is a method of conflict in which unarmed civilians use a variety of coordinated tactics such as boycotts, strikes, long march etc. in order to attain their desired results without directly physically harming the opponent.

Usually, strategic nonviolent civil resistance is an act of change beyond the usual means, i.e. change occurs without obeying existing laws. Change in the system can occur without elections or constitutional reforms. For instance, people could never witness change in various authoritarian societies through elections, however, it was nonviolent civil resistance which provided them the opportunity to change the system. Hardy Merriman suggests that nonviolent civil resistance is a contest, which provides opportunities to both sides to assert, improve and strengthen their positions in the society and weaken the positions of their opponents. Apparently, it is the contest between strong and weak, which provides an opportunity to the weak to realize their real potential of power. Gene Sharp has identified three categories of nonviolent resistance, i.e., through an act of omission, or an act of commission or a combination of both.⁶⁵ The act of commission means that people engaged in nonviolent civil resistance do what they are not supposed to do, i.e., violate laws. In acts of omission, people do not do what they are supposed to do or are required to do by law, i.e., refusing to obey laws. Usually, nonviolent strategists call it civil disobedience. All these

⁶¹ Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 93.

⁶² Ibid, 94.

⁶³ Ibid, 98.

⁶⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 16.

⁶⁵ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 41.

definitions suggest the changing behaviour patterns of various groups of people within a society. If people change the obedience patterns, the change in system or government becomes inevitable.

Democracies and Nonviolent Action:

History suggests that many popular movements were waged through nonviolent action against authoritarian regimes because there was no other constitutional way to remove them from power. This is why since 1905, majority of nonviolent movements were waged against authoritative regimes. However, the nonviolent action against democratic governments is also becoming popular, which is a recent phenomenon. This is also a very good question for the peace researcher to understand the behaviour of people and why they want to change an elected government while it is already believed to be changed after a fixed term. Perhaps, the overwhelming success against authoritarian regimes encouraged people to opt for nonviolent action against elected governments. History bears the fact that civil resistance for reforms has been waged against democracies in many countries in the 20th century. For instance, the American civil rights movement, environmental protection movement, opposition to war movement etc are some movements against democracies. These movements can be categorized into two parts maintain two altogether different objectives of nonviolent struggle against democracies: first to topple the government; and second to seek some reforms in the constitution. The movement against Morsi's government in Egypt, movement against South Korean government (give the year) and struggle against the corrupt government of Iceland (Give the year) etc. are some recent examples of nonviolent struggle against democratic governments.

Moreover, there are several successful examples of nonviolent movements includes the ones that took place in Ecuador 2000, Argentina 2002, Iceland 2009 and 2016 against elected governments.⁶⁶ One such example is movement in Bolivia.⁶⁷ In 2008, country's eastern departments called for greater autonomy by avoiding sharing natural gas with poorer departments. The government considered it a plot against democratic system. Hence, it decided to act against

⁶⁶ Carlos de la Torre, "Ethnic Movements and Citizenship in Ecuador," *Latin American Research Review* 41, no. 2 (2006), 247-259.

⁶⁷ Simon Romero, "A Crisis Highlights Divisions in Bolivia," *New York Times*, September 14, 2008, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/americas/15bolivia.html?ref=todayspaper> (accessed June 10, 2021).

the departments.⁶⁸ Likewise, the protests against Morsi's government also encouraged the Egyptian military to launch a coup against the democratically elected government in 2013. However, there are numerous examples of unsuccessful movements as well such as Angola 2001, Spain 2011 etc. where protestors could not sustain the struggle against the government.

Scholars have identified three wider dynamics of the failure of nonviolent action against democratic governments. Firstly, the civil resistance in democratic societies has a smaller base of public support and it is more prone to violence.⁶⁹ As the government also has a strong base, hence, the competition is tough. Secondly, it is more dependent on elite allies, i.e., military, the monarchy, judiciary, interest groups and foreign powers. Thirdly, it is less likely to resolve the underlying conflicts within the society. Usually, the democratically elected governments also start public campaigns in order to repel the pressure of nonviolent campaigns. Since, these governments have a strong base in public, hence the democratic and nonviolent counter measures of these types of governments are considered lethal against nonviolent movements. Therefore, these nonviolent movements against democracies do not gain sustainability. Strategically, it is more difficult to topple an elected government in less developed states except with the help of state agents, i.e., military or judiciary.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Simon Romero, "A Crisis Highlights Divisions in Bolivia," *New York Times*, September 14, 2008, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/americas/15bolivia.html?ref=todayspaper> (accessed June 10, 2021).

⁶⁹ Steven, "*Military Coups in the post-cold War Era*," 137-154; Torre, "*Ethnic Movements and Citizenship in Ecuador*," 247-259.

⁷⁰ Steven, "*Military Coups in the post-cold War Era*," 137-154.

Chapter 2

Political Culture and Drivers of Political Change: A Case of Pakistan

Culture of Political Change in Pakistan:

Since 1967, twelve governments have come into power in Pakistan. The military dictator Ayub Khan was sent home by popular political movement of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in late 1960s.¹ First time in the history of Pakistan, elections were held based on adult franchise in 1970. Bhutto became the PM of Pakistan because the military junta refused to hand over power to Sheikh Muj, the leader of the Awami League in the eastern wing. Bhutto was hailed as a popular political leader in the western wing, but he lost credibility, when he was blamed for organized rigging in elections of 1977. A popular movement was launched against him by a nine-party alliance.² Popular pressure mounted against the Bhutto government demanding the promulgation of ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa (The Way of the Holy Prophet) Movement’. Bhutto skilfully resisted street protests, strikes, sit-ins etc. However, the protests acquired a momentum of their own and even the military was affected when army officers refused to fire on the crowds to disperse them.³ Situation was ripe for the Army to step in. General Zia-ul-Haq toppled the Bhutto’s government and ended the popular uprising. Later, he would claim that the coup was initiated in order to stop security defections.⁴

Sometimes, political turmoil has led to presidential intervention, i.e., dismissal of democratic government under article 58-2b of the constitution. This had happened more than once in 1990s. The era of the 1990s was the most turbulent era of Pakistani politics. The article ‘58-2b’ of the 1973 Constitution was the clause under which President of Pakistan had the powers to dismiss a political government. It was introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1985 through a constitutional amendment.⁵ In 1990, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had used this dubious amendment to dismiss People’s Party government,⁶ while in 1993 he himself and the then Prime Minister

¹ Dilip Mukerjee, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power* (Noida, Vikas Pub. House, 1972), 125.

² Muhammad Wasim, “Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan,” in *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, ed. Rajshree Jetly (New Delhi: Routledge, 2009), 197.

³ Nadeem F. Paracha “Uprisings and Downfalls: Attempts at Ousting Pakistani Governments.” *Dawn*, October 30, 2014, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1141343> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁴ Muhammad Wasim, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*, 196.

⁵ Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State* (New York: Routledge 2008), 71.

⁶ Hilary Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of Instability* (London: Routledge 2009), 41.

resigned under pressure of Pakistan Army.⁷ After three years, President Farooq Leghari used Article 58-2b to dismiss People's Party (PPP) government.⁸ Later, Nawaz Sharif was overthrown by the Army in 1999, ending a turbulent democratic decade of the country. Since, both political parties were victims of Article '58-2b', hence; they brought in the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010 and closed the doors of presidential challenge to the democratic system of the country.⁹

After the resignation of Pervez Musharraf in 2008 due to the lawyers' movement, elections were held, and the political process was revived. Major political parties decided to refrain from agitation in order to avoid any political mishap in the future under the Charter of Democracy (CoD) signed May 2006 between PPP and PML-N.¹⁰ However, unlike past the two democratic governments had faced multiple political nonviolent movements within four years. Yet these struggles did not force these governments to resign based on nonviolent struggle.

The phenomenon of nonviolent strategic political struggle is getting popularity in Pakistan in the 21st century as various segments of society have started demanding their rights through protests, sit-ins, boycotts and resignations. Interestingly, nonviolent movements of social and economic rights in Pakistan have seen overwhelming success. Their demands have been acquired sufficient results in the country. For instance, the Lawyers' movement, young doctors' struggle, nurses and lady health workers' strikes, struggle of labour unions in Pakistan, Hazara community's sit-ins in Quetta demanding security from extremists etc. are some of the success stories of nonviolent social or economic struggle, which have acquired their desired results with less cost and more benefit.

On the contrary, waging the political nonviolent struggle has been proved as most expensive, exhaustive and difficult with least desired results. The long march turned sit-ins of Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) in 2013 for political reforms, as well as political campaigns of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) movement to oust prime minister from his office over rigged elections and later for alleged corruption in 2016 could only achieve limited results. This chapter will present case studies the harsh policy of military dictator Ayub Khan to quash political dissent and a more adroit and

⁷ Hilary Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of Instability* (London: Routledge 2009), 47.

⁸ Ali Abbas Hasanie, *Democracy in Pakistan: Crises, Conflicts and Hope for a Change* (Bloomington: Author House, 2013), 4.

⁹ Ali Abbas Hasanie, *Democracy in Pakistan: Crises, Conflicts and Hope for a Change*, 39.

¹⁰ "Text of the Charter of Democracy", *Dawn*, May 16, 2006. <https://www.Dawn.com/news/192460> (accessed January 16, 2018).

flexible position adopted by a skilful politician that was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; to underscore how a political setup dealt with civil resistance, as opposed to a military ruler.

Drivers of Change in Pakistani Politics:

Military:

The political landscape of Pakistan cannot be completed without discussing the role of the military in politics. Undoubtedly, it is the only organized, efficient and empowered institution that enjoys a positive image in common public, particularly when it is not interfering in the business of the state. It has power and ability to change any regime in the country. A number of books and articles have been written to describe its overt and covert role in Pakistani politics.¹¹ Academic terms such as a warrior state, garrison state and praetorian state are often associated with Pakistan due to dominance of the military in political affairs of the country.¹² Military-led oligarchy often not only dictates domestic politics but also deeply influences its foreign policy.¹³ Chaitram Singh and Michael Bailey interestingly summarize the political history of Pakistan. They say that:

Pakistan's political landscape in past few decades has been revolving around electoral democracy and military dictatorship. However, electoral democracies often been an oversight by military. During direct military rule, military curtails civil liberties. Military not necessarily accepts subordination of civil government but also sometimes marks within democratic governments some boundaries according to the wishes of the military. The mechanisms within a constitution exist, which can remove an elected

¹¹ Aqil Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 1-12; Christine C. Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's way of War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 13-16.

¹² T.V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7; Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Pakistan Garrison State: Origins, Evolutions, Consequences, 1947-2011* (Karachi: oxford University Press, 2013), 11; Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan: Civil-military Relations in a Praetorian state*, in R.J May and Viberto Selochan (eds), *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2004), 41.

¹³ *Ibid*, 42.

government whenever civil government exceeds authority. Hence, praetorian democracy as practiced in Pakistan is not transitional rather an end state.¹⁴

Contrary to this academic opinion, military experts believe that external and internal threats and strong institution building has helped the Pakistan Army to acquire this status. Perhaps, the military's role in politics is often overstated. Military neither stay aloof from politics of Pakistan nor does it dominantly manage the political stage. Therefore, the world often sees that during the period of elected democratic governments, the military is often described as either part of the problem or a part of the solution. For instance, during the 1977 political stalemate the military intervened and promised to introduce the Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of Holy Prophet P.B.U.H) in Pakistan. Many people believed that Dr. Qadri's movement in 2013 was supported and financed by Pakistan Army.¹⁵ However, no one can substantially prove this statement.

The 2014 campaigns for political change were perceived as a conspiracy by the military to topple a legitimately elected government. Later, politicians both from ruling party of PML-N and the opposition i.e., PTI and PAT - sought a solution through military commander Gen. Raheel Sharif on August 28, 2014.¹⁶ Hence, the role of the military is often remained in Pakistani politics either negatively or positively. According to many experts, peoples' movements have often been ignited by the military to put pressure on democratically elected governments in order to achieve their own vested interests. They give two recent examples to prove their argument. The 2014 sit-ins according to many was used to put pressure on the PML-N government for trying to improve the relationship with archrival India and for pursuing a high treason case against former military dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf. It is a common opinion that military wanted to weaken the democratic government in order to perpetuate an anti-India foreign policy and to protect its former commander.¹⁷

¹⁴ Chailtram Singh and Michael Bailey, "Praetorian democracy, illiberal but enduring: Pakistan as exemplar", *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 35 (2013), 103 & 124-25.

¹⁵ "The mystery of Tahir ul Qadri," *The Economist*, January 12, 2013.

<https://www.economist.com/banyan/2013/01/12/the-mystery-of-tahir-ul-qadri> (accessed June 8, 2018).

¹⁶ "COAS Raheel Sharif made 'mediator' to end political crisis," *Dawn*, August 28, 2014,

<https://www.Dawn.com/news/1128362> (accessed June 8, 2018).

¹⁷ Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq, "*Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence*" (London and New York: Routledge), 2.

In the sit-ins organized by the religious organization Tehreek Labaik Ya Rasul Allah (TLYRA), the Pakistan Army again played a role as a mediator between the government and the agitators, which provides strength to this line of thinking. In fact, it became party in signing the agreement. These efforts for political change are often perceived to the military inspired phenomenon. This thought damages the credibility of people's movements and lends support to the theory that popular movements cannot topple a democratic government without the consent of the Army.

However, considering military as the only power center in Pakistan is problematic. Singh and Bailey's argument of 'end state' is perhaps too confined and has neglected various ground realities of the Pakistani society, which is now more educated, urbanized and well informed due to social and private electronic media. The middle class has been on the rise. Hence, the ability of manipulating the results of general elections has been significantly curtailed.¹⁸ Ayesha Jalal argues that military's dominance in the politics of Pakistan is due to its image as a saviour of the country.¹⁹ War in Kashmir after a couple of months of independence led to the perception that advanced defence capabilities were inevitable to ward off the Indian threat, which is perceived to be existential in nature.²⁰

Hence, military gradually enhanced its dominance in political, economic and security spheres. Another factor, which became the reason of military's dominance in the politics of Pakistan, was Punjab. It is the breadbasket of Pakistan. It is the most populous province, and a majority of military and civil bureaucracy comes from the Punjab. Hence, this province dominates the political and security affairs of the country. Military-bureaucracy-landed feudal families are the main power centers in Pakistan, who have a very strong nexus to control the country. Even the ongoing fourth spell of democratic rule in Pakistan is observed skeptically at home and abroad due to this imbalance between civil and military influence on political affairs of the country.

Democracy has long fluctuated in Pakistan as the country has experienced four dictatorships and fragile political governments since independence. However, the democratic governments of the country had never felt a serious threat from politically motivated nonviolent civil resistance, rather

¹⁸ Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq, "*Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence*", 7.

¹⁹ Ayesha Jalal, "*The state of Martial Rule: the Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 4-19.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 20-29.

considered a structural dimension, i.e., Supreme Court and Pakistan Army as potential challenges to democracy. Since 1967, after the formation of the first political party in the country, people have witnessed various types of political changes under two different political systems through various sources. The country had witnessed that two dictators, General Ayub Khan²¹ and General Pervez Musharraf²² ousted primarily due to the popular political movements launched against their regimes. Moreover, the national democratic movement during General Zia-ul-Haq's regime also proved as catalyst for democratization of the political culture of the country.²³ However, no elected government ousted since independence in the country based on street protests. Institutional intervention (judiciary and military) and presidential powers remained deciding factors to change the elected government. This has also happened in 1960s and 1970s. The military dictator was compelled to resign due to popular civil resistance movement, but an elected leader refused to do so based on the confidence of his popularity. Hence, the military's intervention remained deciding factor.

Judiciary:

Constitutionally judiciary can disqualify any member of national and provincial assembly based on article 62 and 63. These articles were included in constitution during the reign of military dictator Zia ul Haq. The judiciary as an actor of political change has emerged in Pakistan in last few years. Many scholars consider it the backlash of lawyers' movement of 2007-2009, which restored confidence of judiciary.²⁴ Since October 1954, judiciary has in one way or the other to legalise extra constitutional means and thus ingratiating itself with the ruling elite, through the so-called 'doctrine of necessity'.²⁵ This doctrine was introduced by former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Muhammad Munir in 1954 to validate the use of emergency powers by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. These measures were outside the pale of the prevailing constitution.²⁶ This

²¹ Dilip Mukerjee, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power* (Vikas Pub. House, 1972), 83.

²² Nadeem F. Paracha, "Uprisings and Downfalls: Attempts at Ousting Pakistani Governments," *Dawn News*, October 30, 2014. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1141343> (accessed June 12, 2021)

²³ Emma Duncan, *Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan* (London: Penguin Group, 1989). 105.

²⁴ Advocate Imtiaz Hussain, Lawyer High Court Islamabad and Advocate Muhammad Azam Khan, Lawyer High Court Islamabad interview to the author on May 07, 2018.

²⁵ Imtiaz Omar, *Emergency Powers and Courts in India and Pakistan*, (Hague and London, Kluwer Law International, 2002), 55.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 55.

‘doctrine’ has been used to validate military coups to restore economic or political disorder in the country.²⁷

This law of necessity indirectly had provided a clean chit to military dictators to topple governments based on the assumption that economic or political disorder can harm the country. The decision on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s case led to further consolidate this myth that judiciary was an extended arm of military to undermine civilian rule in the country. However, in a rare act in 1993, SC ruled in favour of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the then ousted Prime Minister of Pakistan.²⁸ In 1993, the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had dismissed the government of Nawaz Sharif.²⁹ However, his government was restored by the SC and invalidated presidential order.³⁰ Apart from this historic decision in political sphere, SC of Pakistan did not remarkably contribute in terms of political change.

However, at the dawn of 21st century with lawyers’ movement a new era of judicial activism started. This era of judicial activism to some extent not only invalidated any role of military in politics but also strictly keeps checks and balances on civil government’s system of governance. Since 2013, the apex court has exercised extraordinary jurisdiction. Though, Constitution of Pakistan under article 175 (3), separates powers of institutions particularly between executive and judiciary, yet article 184 (3) provides judiciary an excuse to resolve any dispute of public interest.³¹ There is a great divide within Pakistani society over the role of judiciary based on these two articles. While civil society and political class are emphasizing on the importance of article 175 (3), the judiciary and many scholars believe that article 184 (3) has provided relief to public in many cases.

²⁷ Imtiaz Omar, ‘*Emergency Powers and Courts in India and Pakistan*’, 56-57.

²⁸ Inam R. Sehri, ‘*Judges & Generals in Pakistan - Volume I*’, (London, Grosvenor House Publishing Limited) 2012, 153-154; Sanjay Dutt, ‘*Inside Pakistan: 52 Years Outlook*’, (New Delhi: A.H.P Publishing Corporation, 2000), 268-70.

²⁹ Ibid, 271.

³⁰ Ibid, 274.

³¹ Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Article 175 (3) says “The Judiciary shall be separated progressively from the Executive” and 184 (3) says “Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II is involved, have the power to make an order of the nature mentioned in the said Article”.

The judiciary has taken *Suo motu* notices on various popular issues ranging from contaminated water to substandard milk, removal of security barriers, barring illegal constructions, etc.³² The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry established a record in taking *Suo motu* notices by starting up 6000 cases before Musharraf ousted him from his post.³³ But after his restoration the high courts too began to shake up a dormant bureaucracy in the provinces with *Suo motu* notices.³⁴ The obiter dicta (off-record remarks of judges) during the hearing a various cases have not only been highly controversial but also create news headlines in Pakistan.

Most importantly, SC has ousted two elected Prime Ministers namely Yousaf Raza Gillani in 2012 and Nawaz Sharif in 2017. These two instances have brought SC of Pakistan into a list of ‘stronger actor of political change’ within the country. The ouster of the two prime ministers has proved that SC can be a greater agent of change as compared to popular street protests. The former government used to argue that judiciary often hatches conspiracies against democracy with the support of the military.³⁵ Many feel that this judicial activism has added another strong actor that can bring political change in the society.³⁶ It is the fact that judicial activism can create a pressure on these elected governments.

Emerging Middle Class:

Throughout Pakistan’s history, military, industrialists, feudal lords and economic elite have remained associated with the central power houses of power politics. Middle class either ignored by the elite or remained aloof from political developments in the country. However, the first decade of the 21st century had witnessed relatively high growth rate. Economic growth at an average around six percent during mid-2000s widely enhanced the size of middle class. In this middle class,

³² Supreme Court of Pakistan, for details see <http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=103> (accessed April 9, 2018).

³³ Khaled Ahmed, “*Sleepwalking to Surrender: Dealing with Terrorism in Pakistan*” (Penguin Random House India: Haryana, 2016), 231.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 233.

³⁵ ‘Nawaz flayed for calling his ouster ‘conspiracy’, *The Nation*, January 15, 2018. <https://nation.com.pk/15-Jan-2018/nawaz-flayed-for-calling-his-ouster-conspiracy?show=blocks?version=amp> (accessed April 9, 2018); ‘JIT a conspiracy against Nawaz: Capt Safdar’, *Express Tribune*, February 1, 2018.

<https://tribune.com.pk/story/1623349/1-jit-conspiracy-nawaz-capt-safdar/> (accessed April 9, 2018)

³⁶ Advocate Imtiaz Hussain, Lawyer High Court Islamabad and Advocate Muhammad Azam Khan, Lawyer High Court Islamabad interview to the author on May 07, 2018.

youth has sufficient ratio, which largely considers status quo as a reason for underdevelopment of Pakistan since independence. According to some estimates there are more than 60 percent people under the age of 25, which played dominating role in general elections of 2018.³⁷ Vibrant media and access to social media has further politically educated the youth, largely in urban areas of the country.

Pakistani economist Durre-e-Nayab has defined the middle-class in Pakistani context. According to her, the middle class is a relative term, which varies from society to society. In case of Pakistan, she defines five indicators and values of those indicators for being a member of the middle class. Firstly, in this context is education. In her opinion, at least a member of a family should have college education.³⁸ Secondly, at least income of one family member should be at twice as much above the poverty line.³⁹ Thirdly, ownership of house with availability of electricity, gas and water for reasonable number of rooms is necessary to fall into the category of middle class.⁴⁰ Fourthly, lifestyle in which one might own 23 consumer items and a motor vehicle and lastly, employment in non-manual occupations are some conditions to be in the middle class in Pakistani society.⁴¹

In 2001-2002, the middle class owned US\$ 208.1 billion of nation's total assets, 53.75 percent of nation's total assets.⁴² This figure rapidly increased in late 2000s and in 2010-2011, the middle class owned US\$ 522.6 billion, i.e., 71.54 percent of nation's total assets.⁴³ This twist in political economy has increased the stakes for the middle class in Pakistani politics. The public is more concerned about government's internal and external policies. Policies that have direct impact on common man's life are often critically evaluated and discussed publicly. Due to viewership-led programmes, the media also attracts new stories of public interest, which further shapes the mindset of middle class.

³⁷ "Pakistan: The Next Generation," The British Council Islamabad, 2009,

www.britishcouncil.pk/sites/britishcouncil.pk/files/next-generation-reprot.pdf (accessed April 2, 2018)

³⁸ Durr-e-Nayab, "Estimating the middle class in Pakistan", *Pakistan Development Review* Vol. 50, No. 1 (2011), 1-28.

³⁹ Ibid, 11.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 18.

⁴¹ Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq, "*Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence*" (London and New York: Routledge), 72.

⁴² Ibid, 82.

⁴³ Ibid, 83.

In short, the world had witnessed that the public in general and middle class in particular has started participating in political affairs of the country enthusiastically, which is unprecedented in history. The 2013 general elections had record turnout, i.e., 60 percent as compared to previous elections, mainly due to active participation of youth and middle class.⁴⁴ However, this turnout dropped more than three per cent in general elections 2018.⁴⁵ Likewise, active participation of middle class in protests and sit-ins mainly in PTI's anti-government campaigns could not have been ignored by scholars and political scientists in the country.⁴⁶ According to some, the middle class mainly from urban areas had not only actively participated in the sit-ins and long marches of PTI and PAT but it had also sufficiently supported these parties logistically and financially.⁴⁷ Hence, the middle class has emerged as a strong determinant in not only political arena of the country but also can play a role in changing elected governments through agitation. This has been demonstrated in the protests and sit-ins of PAT and PTI in 2013 and 2014 respectively.

Urbanisation:

According to the 2017 census, Pakistan has 75.58 million population living in urban areas, which accounts for around 36.4 percent of the total population of the country.⁴⁸ This figure will rise up to 50 percent by 2030.⁴⁹ Moreover, apart from cities, towns are also developing rapidly. Towns are expected to double by 2025.⁵⁰ The major reason for this rapid urbanization is linked to massive migration from rural areas to urban areas mainly for better employment and study opportunities.

⁴⁴ Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), 'General Elections 2013-National Assembly Turnout', <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/Documents/Downloads/General%20Election%202013/Statistics/National%20Assembly%20Turnout%20Comparison%202008%20&%202013.jpg> (accessed April 3, 2018).

⁴⁵ "Voter turnout in 2018 dropped by more than 3%", *Express Tribune*, July 31, 2018, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1770156/1-1770156/> (accessed July 31, 2018).

⁴⁶ Col (R) Muhammad Hanif, Research Fellow Islamabad Policy Research Institute interviewed by the author on March 22, 2018.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, "Block Wise Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population & Housing Census-2017 [As on January 03, 2018]", <http://www.pbscensus.gov.pk/> (accessed April 4, 2018); *Express Tribune*, "6th census findings: 207 million and counting", August 25, 2017. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1490674/57-increase-pakistans-population-19-years-shows-new-census/> (accessed April 4, 2018)

⁴⁹ Shahid Javed Burki, 'Historical Trends in Pakistan's demographics and population policy', in M. Kugelman and R.M. Hataway (eds), *Reaping the Dividend: Overcoming Pakistan's Demographic Challenges* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 67.

⁵⁰ Arif Hasan and Mansoor Raza, *Migration and Small Towns in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 16.

Apart from economic shifts, this sufficient increase in urban population has significant impact on the political culture of the country.

Throughout the world generally and in Pakistan particularly, urban community has radically different interests, stakes and priorities as compared to the rural community. Largely, urban areas do favour those candidates who are relatively less corrupt and can contribute to legislation related to national interest. Their choices remain rational in terms of electing any political candidate from their constituency. National interest remains the priority for urban population. Mainly, policies on economics, exports, law and order, and foreign affairs remain the subject of discussion during the election season in urban areas.

On the contrary, local politics, ethnicity, sects and caste, remain the central points of voting in rural areas. Mainly, their affiliations remain more or less unchangeable due to the rural culture. People consider it disrespectful to change local political loyalties. Hence, it is difficult to witness a sufficient change in rural politics. However, things are improving with the passage of time in rural areas as well. Yet, the powerful feudal elite in rural areas dominate the rural politics. This group of powerful politicians mainly from South Punjab often changes political loyalties before every general election. Mainly, these people have a strong nexus with the military, hence their support for any political party often be considered the support of the military. Resultantly, the democratic culture in rural areas of the country has remained more or less weak. However, the urban public has tendency of actively participating in electoral politics and agitating for their rights. Therefore, during the sit-ins of PTI in 2014, urban population of Punjab and KPK participated with the aim of bringing change in the existing political system.

The Urban population of Pakistan can easily get tired of the status quo if their interests are not properly served. They have tendency of changing political loyalties if their economic grievances are not addressed. Therefore, unlike rural constituencies, many new faces emerge from urban constituencies in every general election. This pattern can be observed in Karachi, Islamabad, Quetta, and other major cities of Pakistan. Moreover, the protest and blockade of major urban centers like Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi can have drastic impacts on national politics than the protests in rural areas. Therefore, this urban population can create a significant impact by using disruptive, but nonviolent methods to pressurize government to secure their

interests. In 2014, PTI mobilized urban population against the ruling party, PML-N to create pressure on democratic government.

Education:

Education remains a sector that has been largely ignored by successive governments. Pakistan has the second largest numbers of out of school age children in the world. The latest United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report on the state of education in Pakistan suggests how the country is mishandling the education emergency. However, this situation is far better than previous years. In fact, as the Pakistani society has witnessed increased urbanization, the quality and quantity of education has also sufficiently improved as compared to the past. The boom in the services sector has helped in proliferation of education institutions mainly in urban areas. Likewise, rural areas have also improved in terms of private educational institutions. Currently, the services sector has a lion's share in Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), i.e., 59 per cent, while the agriculture sector has lost its space in the national economy.⁵¹

Table: Growth of Private and Public Education Institutions in Pakistan

S. No	Level	Type	1999-2000	2007-08	Change %
1	Primary	Private	14,748	17,250	17
		Public	131,779	139,342	6
		Total	146,527	156,592	7
2	Middle	Private	12,550	24,847	98
		Public	12,085	15,982	32
		Total	24,635	40,829	66
3	High	Private	5940	14,053	137
		Public	8509	9911	16
		Total	14449	23,964	66
4	Total (1-3)	Private	33,238	56,150	69
		Public	152,373	165,235	8

⁵¹ Prof. Dr. Ather Maqsood Ahmed, 'Tapping potential sectors of Growth', IPRI-HSF National Conference on Roadmap for Economic Growth of Pakistan, October 22-23, 2014; <http://www.ipripak.org/ipri-hsf-national-conference-roadmap-for-economic-growth-of-pakistan/> (accessed April 5, 2018).

		Total	185,611	221,385	19
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Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, obtained from National Educational Management Information System of Academy of Educations Planning and Management, www.aepam.edu.pk, accessed April 4, 2018

This increased quality and quantity in education institutions has led to a proliferation of ideas and awareness about the political rights of the people. In rural areas, people used to get scared from police, courts and other government institutions. However, now they demand their rights, such as right to protection, right to justice, right to access to better social services. This growing education has provided them a sense to question their representatives in national and provincial assemblies. Media and anti-status quo forces have provided them platforms to ventilate their anger. Hence, it is common belief that the majority of educated public was participating in the recent sit-ins of PTI. Hence, this educated class can become a source of change in future in Pakistan.

Youth:

Another important factor for social and political change is the demographic composition the Pakistani society. The Pakistani population doubled during 1975-2015.⁵² During these years, young population less than 30 years increased by 60 percent. This young population has largely access to information mediums including internet, media and education institutions. This young population, unlike their forefathers is more informed about their rights. Unfortunately, this segment of society is not satisfied with the current rate of GDP growth and bad governance. The larger portion of youth is dissatisfied with the political leadership and holds it responsible for their lack of development.⁵³ A recent study shows that most of the youth between 15 to 29 years is more interested in politics and considers that their vote can make a difference.⁵⁴ This youth bulge has the potential to become a source of change in the country. Firstly, it is more politicized as compared to the past due to the enhanced role of social and electronic media. Secondly, the youth want a better future. Thirdly, any slogan of change can inspire them to agitate for change. These are the major reasons that the leadership of all political parties in Pakistan has been trying to motivate and convince youth of the country to be active member of their respective parties.

⁵² Muhammad Farooq (et. all), 'Consequences of youth bulge in Pakistan', *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* Vol. 22, No. 5 (2014), 216-222.

⁵³ S. Iqbal, 'Exploring political attitude among education youth: A study at University of Sargodha, *Asian Journal for Social Sciences and Humanities*, Vol. 3, (2012), 375-382.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 379.

Collective Pressure of Social Actors:

The bottom line of the whole discussion is that apart from the Army and the SC in Pakistan, no other social and political actor alone has the power to change a government. In past two dictators had been removed from power because of political agitations against them from all segments of society. World has seen that peaceful and orderly removal of two dictators had taken place mainly from political parties, national parliament, media and civil society. The army remained either neutral or played a positive role during the change in dictatorial regimes, which made the democratic process possible in the country. Hence, civil society, media, parliament and political parties collectively has power in Pakistan to topple a authoritative regime – but not the democratic government. It is very important to understand the role of these above mentioned four actors of political change.

Civil society has been actively engaged in mounting protests during authoritative regimes. They remained united in developing strategies to enhance the cost of the rule for dictators. However, they have been divided during protests against democratically elected governments. Basically, the lawyers had been very active to create pressure on the government through boycotting the court. These lawyers also had political loyalties.⁵⁵ Interestingly, political parties support their factions within various bar councils. Resultantly, the regime change movements against democratically elected government do not acquire comprehensive support of this powerful institution.⁵⁶ The loyalties of political parties divide their strength. Secondly, the perception based on historic evidence about the military's role in politics also prevents many from support these strategic nonviolent activities for political change in Pakistan. Civil society in general and lawyers in particular are suspicious of these movements because they suspect military's hand behind them. Hence, they try to either stay away from them or support the democratic process.

Likewise, political parties have played an active role in toppling dictators through nonviolent civil resistance. Generals Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf were compelled to relinquish power because of political activism. Though, those dictators in one way or the other, tried to ban or control political parties by creating new political parties and restricting mainstream political leadership to

⁵⁵ Advocate Imtiaz Hussain, Lawyer High Court Islamabad and Advocate Muhammad Azam Khan, Lawyer High Court Islamabad interview to the author on May 07, 2018.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

actively participate in politics. Yet ultimately, they proved to be the major challenge to their dictatorial regimes. However, when it comes to strategic nonviolent struggle against an elected government, political parties like civil society seem divided. Resultantly, political parties often do support democratic governments as compared to dictatorships amid any movement for political change. For instance, during the sit-ins of PAT and PTI, mainstream political parties PML-N, PPP along with MQM, JUI-F, ANP and other political parties supported each other within and beyond the parliament. Resultantly, the democratic governments acquired sufficient legitimacy from these political forces to withstand the pressure built up by the protestors.

Similarly, the media have also witnessed similar kind of challenges as the civil society and political parties face during the movement for political change against elected governments. Media has been divided during the strategic nonviolent struggle against elected governments. Mainly, the threat perception in the case of a dictator is higher than a democratic government. Media has had a turbulent history during dictatorships. Media outlets were banned, and journalists faced repression from dictators – mainly from Zia ul Haq, while elected governments cannot be paralleled with dictators for curbing freedom of speech. Hence, antagonistic behaviour towards dictators and likeness of democracy encourages media to support democratic governments during periods of acute political upheavals. It tends to provide a better image of democracy and criticizes the military's role in politics and conspiracy against a democratic government surface on television discussions and newspapers from time to time. Hence, these three major social actors do not find unity and sufficient confidence to participate in movements against democratically elected governments. Resultantly, elected governments have more chances of surviving popular political agitations as compared to dictators.

Is Pakistan a Weak Democracy?

There are competing narratives about Pakistan's political system. The country has experienced several types of political systems such as the Westminster form of parliamentary democracy, presidential system and military dictatorship. The democratic governments were predominantly referred as hybrid regimes and transitional democratic governments, due to the extraordinary influence of the military in political affairs in the country. Since 2008, Pakistan has once again transformed into a democratic country and third consecutive general elections have held in July

2018. However, both political governments of PPP and PML-N faced various problems and lived in constant fear of being removed from power.

To understand Pakistan's current political system, it is important to first understand the difference between hybrid and defective democracy. Fareed Zakaria and O'Donnell believe that hybrid regimes are flawed democracies or illiberal democracies.⁵⁷ Democracies such as 'Delegative' democracies etc. are considered as hybrid regimes through the lens of Fareed Zakaria and O'Donnell.⁵⁸ The second opinion about the hybrid regime by many scholars mainly Schedler and Cassani is that these regimes are effectively authoritarian regimes in nature and have very few democratic characteristics.⁵⁹ Though they do hold elections but these elections are often rigged or controversial. The third school of thought led by Bogaards, Mohseni, Gilbert, Adeney and Wigell considers hybrid regime as a separate category of the political system and believes that hybrid regimes are neither democracy nor authoritarian rule.⁶⁰ Hence, they recommend that hybrid regimes should be considered as separate case studies.⁶¹

Steven Levitski has defined hybrid regime by using four filters. Firstly, elections are prerequisite for any modern democratic regime.⁶² Secondly, universal right to vote is allowed in democracies.⁶³ Thirdly, the citizen has the right to criticize the government, he has freedom of association, freedom of press and his civil liberties are protected.⁶⁴ Lastly, elected representatives have the real power to rule the country.⁶⁵ Levitski uses these four filters to provide the idea that holding regular elections itself doesn't mean that the country has achieved democracy. Rather, a robust

⁵⁷ Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 76, no. 6 (1997): 22–43; G. O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), 55–69.

⁵⁸ M. Bogaards, "How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism," *Democratization* 16, no. 2 (2009), 399–423.

⁵⁹ A. Cassani, "Hybrid What? Partial Consensus and Persistent Divergences in the Analysis of Hybrid Regimes" *International Political Science Review* Vol. 35, no. 5 (2014), 542–558.

⁶⁰ Schedler, A. "The Menu of Manipulation." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002), 36–50, Schedler, A. "The logic of electoral authoritarianism." In *Electoral Authoritarianism: the Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, edited by A. Schedler, 1–23. Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006; Wigell, M. "Mapping 'Hybrid Regimes': Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics." *Democratization* 15, no. 2 (2008), 230–250;

⁶¹ Gilbert, L., and P. Mohseni. "Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46, no. 3 (2011), 270–297.

⁶² Steven Levitsky and L. Way, '*Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War: Problems of International Politics*', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-97.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 97.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 91.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 96.

combination of above mentioned four traits would convert a state into a modern democracy. Levitski argues that in hybrid system of government, people enjoy less freedom of speech and political parties do not get equal space to contest elections.⁶⁶ Journalists, politicians, and civil society are often harassed, spied or arrested by the powerful institution – mainly army - in order to suppress the dissent.

The defective democratic system is relatively easy and straightforward to understand as compared to a hybrid political system. A defective democracy refers to a state where democracy and democratic process does not function properly and actual powers laid down in the hands of the military.⁶⁷ Armed forces consider it their right to intervene, if they perceive the civilian government is incompetent or weak.⁶⁸ These kinds of states are plagued with tense civil-military relations and military coups. Many third world countries fall in this category. In contrast to this straightforward definition of defective democracy, a hybrid state is a combination of both democracy and authoritarianism. The concept of a hybrid regime is relatively new as compared to the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism.

In Pakistan, it is highly controversial and complicated to categorize Pakistan as a hybrid state. The hybrid system of government does not entirely apply in Pakistan. However, some of these characteristics exist in Pakistan's political system and society. Though, Pakistan has the minimal level of democratic process commonly known as the right to vote. There is also a fair degree of freedom of expression, freedom of association and right to information; however, some basic ingredients of the democratic process are threatened by state institutions, individuals and political parties. For instance, print and electronic media are not allowed to criticize judiciary and military. It cannot openly start debate related to the nuclear program of Pakistan and Kashmir policy of the country. There are certain 'red lines' for journalists and academia. Likewise, religious and ethnic movements in the country do not get their due share in mainstream media such as PTM, TLP etc. However, media is free to highlight issues of bad governance and malpractices in government. Moreover, it also regularly highlights social and political issues. Hence, freedom of expression

⁶⁶ Steven Levitsky and L. Way, '*Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, 95.

⁶⁷ Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflict" *In Constitutionalism and Democracy*, edited by J. Elster and R. Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 59–83.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 61.

exists in the country, but it has been managed through strict control and overseen by state institutions such as Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), etc.

The right to vote is written in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, but this right has been manipulated, controlled and managed by elite in various areas of the country. Rural feudal lords and urban oligarchs use money, power and influence to control 'right to vote'. Over the years, they have developed a 'patron-client' relationship with the poor in rural and urban areas of the country. Unfortunately, elections are largely contested on local politics, caste, ethnicity, sect, etc. The majority of people are elected due to their electoral legacy. The powerful dominate the political scene in Pakistan. Common man needs political support to get his basic rights such as access to justice, etc. Institutions, particularly police will not address public grievances until and unless they have the support of the powerful segments of society. Hence access to basic rights is subject to the will of the political elite. However, things have improved substantially in urban areas as well as in some rural areas. Electronic media have played a dominating role in creating social awareness among the masses.

Till 2008, Pakistan was an authoritarian state under the rule of a military dictator General Pervez Musharraf. Though, constitutionally there was a parliament and general elections were held in 2002, however, the real power was held by General Musharraf. Things changed after general elections in 2008. General Musharraf was forced to resign due to the collective pressure of parliament, civil society, public and media. Later, Pakistan witnessed a unique combination of civil and authoritative rule. Though, the parliament completed its term twice, no prime minister has allowed to complete his term in office. Two of them were ousted by the Supreme Court (SC), while severe checks and balances on the freedom of speech have been imposed.⁶⁹ Moreover, there are serious concerns about the pre- and post- poll rigging, which were echoed by various political parties in 2013 and 2018 general elections. A high-level inquiry commission was formed to check the organized rigging in general elections of 2013. It could not prove allegations of 'organized

⁶⁹ Human Rights Council, 'Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights', United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), June 10, 2015, <https://content.bytesforall.pk/sites/default/files/Pakistan-FoE-under-threat.pdf> (accessed April 9, 2018).

rigging' in general elections 2013.⁷⁰ Yet, the judicial commission alluded to electoral malpractices.⁷¹

Levistky's third filter regarding the modern democracies, i.e., right to assemble and protest for rights has also been frequently witnessed in Pakistan. However, the government has evolved a strategy to indirectly suppress this right to protest and right to information through the media blackout. After 2016, every major politically or ethnically motivated movement has been banned from the national media by the government. Tehreek-I-Labaik Ya Rasul Allah (TLYRA) and Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) are glaring examples of this mainstream media blackout. These movements have been criticizing state institutions, incumbent government and demanding their rights. However, this media blackout has largely suppressed their voices, gathering and other activities have gone unnoticed. Likewise, the judiciary has banned the mainstream political leader and former Prime Minister of the country Nawaz Sharif to contest elections, which has been a severe setback for his party. This has led to political defections within PML-N as many powerful politicians have joined other political parties.

Moreover, the fourth largest political party Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has also been made operationally dysfunctional since March 2015.⁷² The founder and leader of MQM, Altaf Hussain has been living in the UK for the past 26 years was the source of unity for its party members. However, there are serious allegations over Altaf Hussain and his party members for misusing power and using illegal means to collect funds, harass or kill defiant people, promote fear against political opponents, etc. Altaf Hussain, his followers and loyal party office bearers have been banned from national electronic and print media and barred from political activities in Karachi. Therefore, MQM had to rename itself as MQM-Pakistan (MQM-P). Farooq Sattar emerged as its new leader; however, he could not prove to be as dynamic and strong as Altaf Hussain. Hence, many political workers and party leaders either joined other parties or formed anti-Farooq Sattar bloc within the MQM-P.

⁷⁰ Final Report of the General Elections-2013 Inquiry Commission 2015, <https://www.scribd.com/doc/272379162/FINAL-REPORT-OF-THE-GENERAL-ELECTIONS-2013> (accessed April 9, 2018).

⁷¹ Ibid, 14.

⁷² 'Rangers raid MQM headquarters Nine-Zero, take two leaders into custody', *Express Tribune*, July 15, 2015. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/922417/rangers-raid-mqm-headquarters-nine-zero-again-take-leaders-into-custody/> (accessed April 9, 2018).

Farooq Sattar has accused the military establishment of threatening to arrest MQM workers.⁷³ Many have been forced to join the newly established ‘government’ sponsored Pakistan Sarzameen Party (PSP).⁷⁴ MQM-P is not allowed to open political offices in many areas of Karachi. Resultantly, a gap has been intentionally created between political workers of MQM and the public in order to engineer the political landscape of urban areas of Sind. On the other hand, many political parties have been enjoying the freedom to protest, freedom to speak, freedom to hold rallies and organize large public gatherings. Media enthusiastically covers the activities of these mainstream political parties.

Hence, it is difficult to determine the political situation in Pakistan. On the one hand, it has restrictions – overt and covert – while on the other hand freedoms and democratic practices. However, the above-mentioned discussion confirms that Pakistan has a hybrid system of government with more democratic leanings. Therefore, the society, politicians and institutions mainly parliament are all rapidly moving towards a consolidated democracy. Hence, Fareed Zakaria and O’Donnell’s definition of hybrid regime, i.e., a weak or flawed and defective democratic state fits into the current state of political affairs of the country. This is a continuous process and hopefully the country will likely make more strides in the future to strengthen its democratic culture and democratic institutions. However, this depends upon the powerful drivers of change in the Pakistani politics.

Pakistan: A Weak democracy offering Structural Opportunities

Pakistan has never been politically stable and has witnessed severe institutional interventions. Democracy has not been able to consolidate in the country. The country has experienced four military interventions, while the democratic governments in the 1990s were not able to complete their terms. Through the indiscriminate use of article 58(2) B that was introduced in the

⁷³ ‘MQM-P leader Farooq Sattar quits politics’, *Samaa TV*, November 9, 2017, <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2017/11/farooq-sattar-blasts-mustafa-kamal-presser-says-mqm-stay/> (accessed April 9, 2018); ‘Kamal ‘spills the beans’ in scathing rejoinder to Farooq Sattar’, *Express Tribune*, November 11, 2017, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1555519/1-establishment-helped-mqm-p-pp-alliance-take-place-says-mustafa-kamal/> (accessed April 9, 2018); ‘Sattar asks CJ, COAS to take notice of ‘forced’ switches to PSP’, *The News*, April 16, 2018, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/304914-sattar-asks-cj-coas-to-take-notice-of-forced-switches-to-pp> (accessed April 16, 2018).

⁷⁴ Zubair Ashraf ‘Sattar asks CJ, COAS to take notice of ‘forced’ switches to PSP’, *The News*, April 16, 2018, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/304914-sattar-asks-cj-coas-to-take-notice-of-forced-switches-to-pp> (accessed June 13, 2021).

constitution by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1985. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) established in late 1960s which later sought agitation as a mean to come into power. Later, the two mainstream political parties – PPP and Pakistan Muslim League (PML) – remained in power during the turbulent political environment during 1990s. Corruption, nepotism, dynastic politics, seeking the powerful urban and rural elite has become the major characteristics of Pakistani politics and eroded the credibility of the politicians.

Parliamentary democracy after the eastern wing broke away in 1971. The new leader of divided Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was able to get political consensus to introduce a new constitution in 1973. Bhutto adopted a very centralized system of ruling and brooked no political dissent within the party and national politics. The emergence of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan was an opportunity for political forces to strengthen civil institutions, however, this did not happen. There was political discontent and Bhutto called for early election in 1977.⁷⁵ The PP returned to power with an exaggerated landslide. The opposition parties cried foul and alleged an organized rigging.⁷⁶ They gave vent to their feelings through street protests. Although Bhutto was meeting with the opposition to defuse the crisis, Army moved in deposed him. General Zia rule with an iron hand until he died in a mysterious air crash. General elections were held and after 11 years of military rule, democracy had once again restored in. There was intermittent civilian rule until due to acute civil-military rift, there was another military coup and Gen Musharraf came power in 1999.

After the successful lawyers' movement General Musharraf was forced to resign and elections were held in 2008. Pakistani nation got another opportunity to revive democracy and build a strong political democratic system. The political parties failed to rise to the occasion and two major political parties, i.e., PPP and PML-N made it a game of political musical chairs. An utter lack of accountability led to public discontent and distrust. Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) availed this opportunity and were able to develop support among the masses. It emerged as the third major political party in 2013 general elections.

⁷⁵ Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 87; Lawrence Ziring, "March 1977 Elections in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* (May 1977), 60-80.

⁷⁶ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: between Mosque and Military* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 85; Ghafoor Ahmed, *Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya [And then came martial law]* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1986), 35.

Since 2008, Pakistan has been witnessing several types of social movements due to various reasons compounded by weak democratic institutions. It is indeed an interesting study of political movements have been waged by different segments of society during this period of weak democratic governments after ending of almost a decade long martial law in the country.

Movement for the restoration of the judiciary in 2009 was based on structural opportunity, which was created by newly democratic government by refusing to restore the judiciary,⁷⁷ which was sacked by former dictator in 2007. Likewise, many social movements by interest groups emerged after witnessing the appeasing attitude of political leadership towards social movements due to political constraints. Hence, the young democracy witnessed several movements from interest groups, such as young doctors' struggle, nurses and lady health workers' strikes, struggle of labour unions, etc. The weak government of PPP could not provide security to Hazara community, resultantly hundreds of them were killed during the tenure of PPP (2008-2013).⁷⁸ Government's inaction to provide them security provided a solid reason and structural opportunity to the Hazara community in Quetta, to wage nonviolent struggle to demand state protection. Hence, a weak democratic government provided various structural opportunities to social, ethnic, and political groups to rise and demand their legitimate rights.

During its five years of government, PPP could not establish the strong institution of an election commission. As mentioned above that reconciliatory policy of two major political parties created a public discontent against them. On the contrary, these political parties signed 18th Amendment, which designated right to the leader of the house and opposition leader to select a person as Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Chairman, National Accountability Bureau (NAB).⁷⁹ This amendment further strengthened the perception that both political parties want to enjoy power without proper accountability. These developments provided an opportunity to PAT to agitate for reforms in the country prior to general elections in 2013. After general elections of 2013, the weak election commission of Pakistan and due to weak democratic system led to another movement by two political parties PAT and PTI in 2014. PAT waged the movement for accountability of people

⁷⁷ Jane Perlez, "Pakistan Leader Backs Down and Reinstates Top Judge," *The New York Times*, March 15, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/world/asia/16pstan.html> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁷⁸ Mobeen Azhar, "Hell on Earth: Inside Quetta's Hazara Community," *BBC*, May 01, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22248500> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁷⁹ The Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, ACT NO. X of 2010, April 19, 2010, <https://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/18th-amendment-2010/> (accessed December 24, 2017).

who were involved in the murder of PAT's works and PTI campaigned against organized electoral rigging during general elections of 2013.

Though, the three-judge inquiry commission rejected the PTI allegations of systematic rigging during the 2013 elections, it did however, print out lapses by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). The report was made public in July 2015. However, it was the structural opportunity which was availed by two political parties. Likewise, as it happens in weak democracies, nepotism and corruption continued to threaten to derail democracy in the country. The Panama Paper's leaks accused former Prime Minister and his family of corruption and the establishment of safe tax heavens through offshore companies.⁸⁰ As flawed democracies lack rule of law, this major corruption scandal could not secure fair response by parliament and supreme judiciary. The Supreme Court considered the PTI petition as frivolous.⁸¹ PTI found another structural opportunity to wage a nonviolent struggle for political change. Hence, Pakistan being a weak or a transitional democracy often provides several structural reasons to many social, ethnic, religious and political groups to wage social movements.

Strategic Nonviolent Theory and Pakistani Movements:

As defined above Sharp has given much emphasis to *cause-consciousness*, as the primary ingredient in setting the ground for nonviolent struggle.⁸² In the context of Pakistani social movements, the degree of awakening of public consciousness has been varying from case to case e.g. Bhutto spent almost two years to prepare the ground for his popular movement to dislodge Ayub Khan from power.⁸³ He raised compelling issues that helped him to gain the support of the masses.⁸⁴ He travelled several times by rail from Rawalpindi to Lahore and addressed numerous gatherings. Ayub Khan's long rule, the Tashkent Declaration, inflation, lack of inclusiveness in economic development, etc helped Bhutto to garner popular support.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Panama Papers-The Power Players, *International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)*, April. 21, 2016. <https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/the-power-players/> (accessed June 25, 2018).

⁸¹ SC returns PTI's 'frivolous' petition, *Dawn*, August 31, 2016; SC dismisses PTI's frivolous petition, *Daily Times*, August 31, 2016.

⁸² Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 365.

⁸³ Philip Edward Jones, *The Pakistan People's Party: Rise to Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 103.

⁸⁴ Nikhat Ekbal, *Great Muslims of Undivided India* (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2009), 126.

⁸⁵ Jones, *The Pakistan People's Party*, 103.

Contrary to Ayub Khan, Bhutto had faced a spontaneous movement, which had spent less time for preparation. When Bhutto came into power, his high-handed attitude created a strong antipathy against him, which used by his opponents to mobilize protesters against him. Movement against Bhutto by Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had spent less time on awakening *cause-consciousness*. In fact, rigged elections and subsequently, hard approach to deal with protestors triggered the subsequent events. Likewise, the PAT's movement for electoral reforms was seriously lacking the *cause-consciousness* ingredient, therefore, PAT leadership could not mobilize massive public support in 2013. Anti-government movements of 2014 by PTI and PAT adopted different approaches. Again, PAT did not spend much time on creating *cause-consciousness*, while PTI had spent almost one year to prepare the mind-set of the people for launching a popular movement against the PML-N's government.

Sharp has defined 198 methods of nonviolent struggle and advised that wise selection of specific method is very crucial in defining the outcome of the struggle.⁸⁶ However, in Pakistani political context, most of the movements in 20th century heavily relied on lockdowns, strikes, protests, etc. During the anti-Ayub Khan's movement some students used degrading and disrespectful slogans to humiliate the President. However, the advent of 21st century led to the application of another form of protests, i.e., sit-ins in front of major government institutions – parliament, Prime Minister and Chief Minister Offices – which became a popular trend in recent years. Overall, Pakistani social and populist movements have adopted 15 out of 198 different methods for securing success in their struggle. These include, sit-ins, lockdowns, staging protests and rallies, boycotts, a failed attempt of non-cooperation/disobedience, targeting centre of gravity of the ruling elite through exposing their corruption, creating anti-government songs, social media messages, videos, robust national media campaigns, writing slogans on currency notes and walls, limited marches within towns and cities, though it was limited but resignations of government employees, cultural protests and graffiti movement.

It is important to understand that any movement that is not based on the correct strategic assessment and lack of knowledge regarding the weaknesses and strengths of the opponent can lead to a disaster.⁸⁷ Bhutto was an intelligent political person. His stint in the government had

⁸⁶ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 365.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 365.

helped him understand the strength and weaknesses of the system. Although he did not entirely ignore his networks within the power elite; he decided. He decided to arouse the sentiments of the people against Ayub Khan. In this he was largely successful. Ayub Khan was not a politician. His power source was the Army, which was not able to retrieve the situation for him from the politically savvy and wily Bhutto.⁸⁸

When it was Bhutto's turn to face the wrath of the people, his opponents wisely to choose to exploit his weaknesses. The anti-Bhutto movement focused on his secular credentials. Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) used the religious card. His irreligious sentiments, his fondness for the drink and women were all used to discredit him. In 2013, PAT used lack of electoral reforms as its movement's strength and foundation. Corruption and nepotism were major weaknesses that were not targeted by PAT. Therefore, the movement could not gain momentum. The combined struggle of PAT and PTI to topple the government failed to gain sufficient momentum. Both parties concentrated heavily on sit-ins in front of parliament, which did not seriously affect the PML-N government.

Role of media – electronic and social – in Pakistani politics increased significantly in the 21st century. There are social media cells of different political parties that try to change perceptions of the Pakistani public. In case of social movements, the 21st century has given a new hope to many groups to raise their voice through social media. PTI has effectively used social media prior, during and after its movement against the government to legitimize its struggle. The government could not tackle this issue due to lack of experience of handling cyber dissent. However, it had passed a bill after two years of active social media activism, which barred political dissent. Yet, the implementation of this law is still considered weak. Furthermore, competition among private media houses for ratings and coverage of everything related to political movements has given them more coverage than they could hope for. This is a new phenomenon, and it will have long term impact on Pakistani movements in future.

Though, strategic nonviolent struggle can be decades long, however, Sharp advises leaders of nonviolent struggle to adopt strategy of *annihilation* during their struggle against the status quo forces. Pakistan's nonviolent struggles have been varied in terms of their duration. Bhutto spent

⁸⁸ Rafi Raza, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan: 1967-1977* (Karachi: University Press, 1997), 3.

two years on cause-consciousness while it took him a few months to topple Ayub Khan.⁸⁹ The anti-Bhutto movement on the other hand just took four months to gather critical mass before the institutional intervention. Due to effective strategies and tools, i.e., organizing strikes and rallies against governments can endure for months. In Pakistan sit-ins and long marches have become popular and are considered as better strategies to wage nonviolent movements. In this regard, massive resources are required to sustain movements. Hence, the strategy of annihilation has become inevitable for success in Pakistani politics. This was witnessed in case 2013 PAT movement for electoral reforms, PTI and PAT's struggle during 2014 and PTI's struggle during 2016. After four days of sit-ins, PAT's leadership and participants became low on resources and were satisfied by political morsels thrown at them to beat a hasty face-saving exit. The PTI sit-ins in 2014 were more successful and lasted for 126 days until they also got a chance to exit with a whimper due to the APS massacre in Peshawar.

Sharp's idea of seeking international support cannot become a significant factor for regime change in the country. In Pakistani culture, seeking support from international community often invites public anger. However, governments often do seek support from the international community. Moreover, governments also try to link such political dissent with foreign involvement. Therefore, largely every movement since 1966 tried to either avoid seeking international support or dissociated itself with international powers. Since, social movements rely heavily on peoples' support; hence, it is strategically not possible to annoy the public sentiment for the gaining limited support of any international country or group. Governments often used propaganda against social movements by the involvement of a 'foreign hand'.⁹⁰

However, they often rely on or pursue to gain international support, particularly from friendly countries in order to consolidate their power. Bhutto alleged that the US was behind the movement to dislodge his government. PML-N sought support of China during the 2014 sit-ins and used the visit of Chinese President as its major achievement. Later, the government tried to construct a narrative that these movements were attempts of sabotaging China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This corridor has been considered as a hope for revitalizing of Pakistan's economy. Therefore, it was an effort to gain public support and sympathies. Moreover, it was also an attempt

⁸⁹ Jones, *The Pakistan People's Party*, 103.

⁹⁰ Sani Hussain Panhwar, "The Pakistan Papers," *Executive Intelligence Review* (January 1979): 3, 8 and 18.

to create an impression that these sit-ins were staged by western countries to sabotage CPEC. Such kinds of attempt often create problems of perceptions in Pakistan for political movements.

Chapter 3

Democracy and Civil Resistance: A Theoretical Framework

Introduction:

Effectiveness of democracy against internal and external armed conflicts, and structural explanations of this effectiveness have been a popular discussion of ‘democratic peace theorists’ since 1795. Immanuel Kant’s idea that democracies tend to believe in peaceful co-existence and are less prone to war¹ has become very popular in international relations since the end of the Cold War. Democratic Peace theory has evolved one of the most important theories to understand the behaviour of democratic states during the time of crisis. Though, the theory primarily discusses the attitude of democracies during the time of conflict escalation, however, it also comprehensively discusses the behaviour of democratic governments to internal armed conflicts. The theory also gives a structural explanation of this peaceful tendency of democratic governments. Primarily, this study focuses on literature that explains the internal dimension of democratic behaviour towards unarmed conflict. The democratic peace theorists give no importance to unarmed conflicts, which have gradually become an important part of the culture in some societies. Hence, this study will seek to expand the scope of the democratic peace theory through incorporating the behaviour and effectiveness of democracies during unarmed political conflicts popularly known as the nonviolent civil resistance. This study narrows down its scope to only unarmed conflicts which tried to change democratically elected governments. This chapter will largely focus on the theoretic understandings of democratic triumph under the democratic peace theory. Primarily, this study aims to explain why a people’s movement often fails to change a democratically elected government. Pakistan’s democratic governments have shown more resilience to withstand against internal pressures as compared to non-democracies. Overall, this chapter is an attempt to set a theoretic ground for the next chapters.

Democracy:

The word democracy is so widely used that many perceptions have been born out of the word and sometimes it can be misused or misunderstood. The origin of democracy was basically around

¹ Hans Reiss, ed., *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 100.

approx. 2500 years ago.² It started out in ancient Greece, where the people who resided in Athens no longer wanted to follow the ways of autocratic government (which meant that a small group/one man belonging from the system is only allowed to make decisions on behalf of the entire people). Autocratic government once made a decision won't allow any citizen to have a say in that matter and must obey its decision. Democracy is derived from the Greek word "Demos" that means people.³ This means that supreme power in a running the office of the government is vested in the people of that state. There are two ways that democracy can be implemented 1) People directly can use this power 2) Some elected persons (agents of public) are elected by the people of the state to make decision on their behalf.⁴ Although, Athens may had been the first democratic city state, but it was not a fine democracy. A category of people was not allowed a seat in the parliament or express their opinion. This included foreigners, women, slaves/free slaves.⁵

There is consensus among informed circles that the core characteristic of democracy is that people are allowed to elect their own leaders through a system of adult franchise. Secondly, tolerance, compromise and cooperation are exercised by the democratic societies. There is no place of intolerance and impatience in such societies as it is a root of evil and causes many disturbances in a peaceful society. Thirdly, protecting human rights is one of the most important and main characteristics of any democratic government. Human rights include 1) the freedom of speech 2) the freedom of pursuing any religion 3) right to participate in political affairs 4) the right to life 5) right to participate and organize freely in any economic and cultural activity. In a democracy, citizens have the right to vote when they are of age without anyone's objection and interference. Lastly, democracy is all about fair and free individual rights to all citizens of the state.

Democratic Peace Theory:

Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) proposes the argument that democracies are less prone to war. Since its inception, several levels of analysis have been conducted on this notion. According to the dyadic level of analysis, it is almost widely accepted that two democracies have never fought with

² Sue Vander Hook, *Exploring World Governments: Democracy* (Minnesota: ABDO Publishing Company, 2011), 13.

³ John G. Zumbrennen, *Silence and Democracy: Athenian Politics in Thucydides' History* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 4.

⁴ Ibid, 1.

⁵ Ibid, 3.

each other.⁶ They have developed this argument based on empirical evidence. No evidence of armed conflict between two democracies has been reported so far. The reasons of less chances of war between democracies are compelling enough in qualitative analysis, which strengthened the debate of democratic peace theory.⁷ In monadic level of analysis of democratic peace theory, it is suggested that democracies often fight with non-democratic regimes due to excessive provocative actions by non-democracies, threat to sovereignty, etc. In this analysis, scholars tend to blame non-democracies for war or armed conflict against any democratic state.⁸ However, scholars are more divided over the argument presented by the monadic school of thought as sometimes, democracies have fought with non-democracies without any provocations, e.g. the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

At the internal level of analysis in democratic peace theory, democracies are supposed to be more accommodating and softer towards dissent and opposition, which reduces the risk of armed conflict within a democratic country. Due to the inclusiveness of democratic system, groups – ethnic and religious - find avenues to present their grievances and protect their interests. Democratic institutions fairly contribute for prevention of internal armed conflicts.⁹ Therefore, as compared to non-democracies, democracies find internal conflict less lethal.¹⁰ The popular notion has also been accepted by many scholars that democratic governments make use of less violence against civilians.¹¹ Many believe that democracies tend to be less aggressive in internal armed conflicts.¹² The lack of aggression and inclination towards an accommodative approach helps in managing conflict or the perception of the public in favour of democratic government. On the other

⁶ Jack Levy, “The Causes of War,” in *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, eds., Philip E Tetlock et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 270.

⁷ Zeev Maoz and Russett Bruce, “Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability,” *International Interactions* 18 no. 3 (1992), 245-267.

⁸ Melvin Small and David Singer, “The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965,” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 no. 4 (1976), 50-69; Erich Weede, “Democracy and War Involvement,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 no. 4 (1984), 649-664.

⁹ Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Severity of Civil War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 no. 2 (2006), 276-289.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 281.

¹¹ Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, “One-sided Violence against Civilians in War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44 no. 2 (2007), 233-246.

¹² Christian Davenport and David A Armstrong, “Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights,” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 no. 3 (2007), 538-554; Micheal Colaresi and Sabine Carey, “To kill or to Protect,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 no. 1 (2008), 39-67.

hand, scholars also believe that rebellious groups use more aggressive methods in democracies to achieve their objectives.¹³

For some scholars internal armed conflicts in consolidated democracies are less likely, while hybrid states or weak democracies face internal armed and unarmed political conflicts.¹⁴ Buhaug in 2006 had also agreed that weak democracies are prone to internal armed conflicts.¹⁵ He further argues that those armed conflicts in democratic countries often rely on territory and resource distribution. However, the debate sums up that, democracies do not fight with each other, while they do not experience internal armed conflicts due to the government structure. There are several explanations of the lower risks of internal armed conflicts, while the less probability of conflict escalation due to structure of democratic governments.¹⁶

There are numerous explanations of why democracies refrain from violence, war, conflict escalation, etc. Firstly, there are normative explanations for lesser tendencies towards violence by democracies. The culture, perceptions and practices of democracies often lead to peaceful resolution of conflicts. These norms often get externalize between two democratic states.¹⁷ The democratic norms of compromising, reciprocity, political contest often encourage a culture of co-existence, healthy debate and negative outcomes of many conflicts both internally and externally. On the other hand, if any hawkish element tries to imply violent methods against any internal and external group or country, the democratic system becomes the primary constraint against such ambitions. In this regard, legislative constraints often ensure the protection of the interests of the citizens.¹⁸ Parliamentarians of opposition parties often discourage such initiatives. Since, the

¹³ Eck and Hultman, "One-sided Violence against Civilians in War," *Journal of Peace Research*, 2007, Vol. 44, Issue 2, 233-246.

¹⁴ Terry Boswell and William J Dixon, "Dependency and Rebellion," *American Sociological Review* 55 no. 4 (1990), 540-559; James Fearon, and David D Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90; Edward N Muller and Erich Weede, "Cross-National Variations in Political Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 4 (1990), 624-651.

¹⁵ Halvard Buhaug, "Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (2006), 691-708.

¹⁶ Eck and Hultman, "One-sided Violence Against Civilians in War," 233-246; Colaresi and Carey, "To Kill or to Protect," 39-67.

¹⁷ Carol Ember and Bruce M Russett, "Peace between Participatory Polities," *World Politics* 44, no. 4 (1992), 573-599.

¹⁸ Seung-Whan Choi, "Legislative Constraints: A Path to Peace?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 3 (2010), 438-470.

debate often remains in the public domain; the public gets the chance to hear two sides of arguments, which helps to ward off any probability of conflict escalation.

Another explanation related to this theory is that democracies have the ability to resolve the conflict. Fearon argues that the cost of escalation is higher, the leadership and institutions of state start signalling in order to resolve conflict.¹⁹ In this regard, the audience costs often play a vital role. The cost of audience, if war erupts, often becomes a suffering for a leader.²⁰ He or she cannot go against the wishes of people, otherwise, he or she would not be able to return to power in next general elections. That is why democracies avoid conflicts and in the case of conflict, they often remain quick to come out of it. Schultz and Prins have also suggested that the instances of positively engaging with political opponents are higher in democracies as compared to autocracies.²¹

This audience cost is highly linked to the re-election of same leader. According to Michael Tomz, audience cost refers to domestic price a leader would pay due to his/her international policies.²² It can also be true in terms of domestic policies. It is almost a consensus among scholars that democratic elections often become a deterrent factor, which prevents from using coercive measures against political dissent.²³ Further, the ability to form alliances in democratic societies is also impressive.²⁴ Hence, the mobilization and seeking support often either prevents conflict escalation or it leads to the creations of deterrence, ultimately leading towards the resolution of conflict. Gartzk argue that democracies may fail to disagree sufficiently on an international level against the popular belief in protection of human rights.²⁵ As world often condemns the violence against human beings, it is difficult for democracies to stay isolated in this globalized world. Due

¹⁹ James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49 No. 3 (1995), 379-414.

²⁰ James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1993), 577-592.

²¹ Brandon Prins, "Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs," *Journal of Peace Research* 40 no. 1 (2003), 67-84; Kenneth Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?" *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999), 233-266.

²² Micheal Tomz, 'Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach', *International Organizations*, Vol 61 (Fall 2007), 821-840.

²³ Bueno de Mesquita, et al. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 4 (1999), 791-807.

²⁴ Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986), 1151-1169; Arvid Raknerud and Håvard Hegre, "The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence for the Democratic Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 4 (1997), 385-404.

²⁵ Erik A Gartzke, "Kant We All Just Get Along?" *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 1 (1998), 1-27.

to mutual interests the escalation of conflict or use of coercive measures against citizens is less likely for democracies.²⁶

Domestic Democratic Peace Theory:

Another comprehensive and most relevant explanation to this study has offered by Davenport. He coined the term “Domestic Democratic Peace”, which refers to less enthusiasm of democracies towards violence and restrictions against political conflicts at home.²⁷ To explain his argument, Davenport has offered two structural explanations. Firstly, the decrease in violence by democracies is due to accountability of public who elect leaders.²⁸ Citizens in the electoral constituencies are the real powerhouses that elect a ruler in democracies. These rulers require confidence of citizens or their constituencies after every fixed term – mostly after four or five years – to get back into the power corridors. People can either accept or refuse to accept any politicians after completion of a specified term. Therefore, they cannot use violent measures that affect their popularity in the mass population. Davenport calls it the ‘voice’ of public that put constraints for adoption of violent measures against political opponents.²⁹ In this process, politicians rather offer more liberties and concessions to public rather adding political restrictions in the country.

Davenport’s second structural explanation is linked with the electoral process. Davenport has referred it a competitive process that enables masses to keep checks and balances on the government’s activities.³⁰ Political leaders of opposition and political parties from the government camp often keep such checks and balances in democracies that limit government’s ability of violence. Davenport has explained this phenomenon as ‘Veto’.³¹ Discussion, negotiation and compromise are more favourable as compared to repression and repressive means in democracies. Further, it is difficult to implement such measures as in the process of implementation democratic leadership fears to lose legitimacy and earn anger of public. Hence, Veto and Voice both decrease the state repression in internal conflicts.³² Democracy is seen as a system of peaceful resolution of

²⁶ Joanne Gowa, “The Democratic Peace after the Cold War,” *Economics & Politics* 23, no. 2 (2011), 153-171.

²⁷ Christian Davenport, “*State Repression and Domestic Democratic Peace*”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 23.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 111-129.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 118.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 120.

³¹ *Ibid*, 24 and 122-133.

³² Christian Davenport, “*State Repression and Domestic Democratic Peace*”, 25.

conflicts among rival social groups through consensus.³³ Hence, citizens often find many avenues to address their grievances. Democracies provide effective platforms to strike mutually beneficial bargains.

Davenport has also gauged the behaviour of democracies towards three types of conflicts, i.e., violent dissent, civil war and interstate war.³⁴ Davenport argues that:

During violent dissent (riots and guerrilla warfare), Competition/Participation is more effective at reducing repression than Executive Constraints; in fact, the influence of the former is so powerful that there is very little explanatory power added when both aspects of democracy are considered together. By contrast, during civil war, Competition/Participation and Executive Constraints are about equal in their ability to reduce repression when viewed individually, but both democratic characteristics taken together have a much greater impact than either viewed individually..... Political Integrity is supported in Competition/Participation.³⁵

However, he has neither covered the nonviolent movements for political change and level of democracies that also affect the political stability. Davenport's idea of 'veto' and 'voice' that limit the ability of a democratic government's adoption of coercive measure to suppress political dissent create negative impact against nonviolent movements for political change. Likewise, democratic peace theory's structural and normative explanations also further improve the quality of democratic responses towards a nonviolent movement. Pakistan is one of the prime examples of application of this theory, where democratic governments regardless of their weaknesses effectively responded towards such kinds of movements.

Pakistan's Nonviolent Movements and Democratic Peace Theory:

Theorists have discussed major tendencies of democracies in situations of external conflicts. However, they have largely neglected the response of democratic governments towards unarmed conflicts within the society. The democratic peace theory can also be applied to the unarmed conflicts within the country. In Pakistan's context, the sharp distinction in response is discernible,

³³ Havard Hegre, "Democracy and Armed Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014), 159-172.

³⁴ Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Domestic Democratic Peace", 31.

³⁵ Ibid, 32.

when a democratic government is in power. Political governments are accommodating towards political dissent and opposition. This approach has helped to defuse several political agitations. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had negotiated with PNA leadership for almost four months and accepted all their demands except one, i.e., his resignation.³⁶ He had shown remarkable flexibility, which is rare in authoritative regimes.

Likewise, the PPP government did not react with force to nonviolent protests and sit-ins of PAT in 2013. In fact, they reacted positively to their demands and within 45 minutes they were ready to negotiate with PAT's leadership. They had accepted all demands of PAT with vague promises. The PML-N government also negotiated with PTI and PAT for almost 106 days during their protests in front of parliament. Prior to the long march of PTI in 2014, PM Nawaz Sharif had offered negotiations with PTI and accepted all their demands except his resignation.³⁷ All episodes reinforce the notion that democracies are highly accommodating and flexible in nature and can resolve political crises through negotiations.

The inclusiveness of citizens in participatory politics and the provision of avenues to discuss their grievances make internal conflicts less lethal.³⁸ This notion of democratic peace theory in context of Pakistani political and social movements is also deeply rooted in Pakistani political culture. Other political parties try to defuse the political crises through negotiations between the two warring parties. This is often known as *Jirga* (a committee of notable leaders for conflict resolution). It is a very popular type of conflict resolution method among individuals and groups in north-western parts of the country. In Pakistan's political history movements to topple an elected government fizzled out because their demands were met through negotiations. Anti-Bhutto movement was almost concluded in an agreement, which they were about to sign when the military intervened. PAT's struggle in 2013 and PTI's movement 2014 also ended through agreements with the democratic governments, respectively. The factor of violence was less as the public anger was restrained as compared to people's reaction against autocratic regimes. Parliament, media, public gatherings, etc often become avenues provided by democracies to vent the public anger.

³⁶ Bhutto negotiates with PNA, *The Pakistan Times*, June 16, 1977, 1.

³⁷ PM's talks offer rejected out of hand, *The Nation*, August 10, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-10/page-1/detail-2> (accessed December 12, 2017).

³⁸ Bethany Lacina, "Explaining the Severity of Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 2 (2006), 276-289.

Resultantly, the democratic regimes have witnessed very limited violence during unarmed conflicts.

Another explanation related to this theory is within a democracy, the government and the protesters are willing to end a conflict after genuine demands of the latter are met. Bhutto entered negotiations with PNA and signalled of solving the conflict with mutual consensus. Likewise, the PPP government in 2013 responded positively prior and during the conflict in 2013. The PML-N government accepted all demands of PTI prior to the conflict escalation, in order to deescalate the situation. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signalled several times for resolution of conflict through dialogue. In this regard, four days prior to the conflict, he offered PTI Chairman, Imran Khan for negotiations during a meeting in the National Security Conference.³⁹ Such kinds of flexibilities often help democracies to deescalate tensions between two rival parties. If not, at least they develop a positive image of government among public and negatively affect the credibility of movement's organizers.

Democratic peace theorists have strong belief in the abilities of democratic rulers and political parties in government. They believe that the ability to form alliances in democratic countries and leaders is also impressive during conflicts.⁴⁰ Pakistan's history of nonviolent civil resistance against the democratic leadership often witnessed the same situation. Unlike Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was more charismatic and relied less on political alliances, the PPP and PML-N governments sought each other's support during the political upheavals of 2013 and 2014, respectively. PPP had sought political and moral support of Awami National Party (ANP) PML-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Jamiat Ullema-i-Islam Fazal-ur-Rahman (JUI-F) etc. to legitimize its rule in 2013 during PAT's sit-ins. Moreover, PML-N and its allied parties had also supported PPP government and expected the completion of its tenure.

Likewise, prior to conflict escalation in 2014, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had interacted with PPP Co-Chairman Asif Ali Zardari to seek his support during the unarmed

³⁹ "PM's talks offer rejected out of hand," *The Nation*, August 10, 2014. <https://nation.com.pk/10-Aug-2014/pm-s-talks-offer-rejected-out-of-hand> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁴⁰ Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986), 1151-1169; Raknerud and Hegre, "The Hazard of War," 385-404.

conflict.⁴¹ During 2014 nonviolent conflict, the PML-N government sought support of other parliamentary parties through extensive negotiations. The PML-N government called for a joint session of parliament, which helped them to legitimize their rule and isolate protestors politically. As democratic peace theorists contemplate the mobilization of support during conflicts often either prevents conflict escalation or leads to creation of deterrence. Pakistan's nonviolent conflicts against democracies have also witnessed the same response of democratic governments, which later became a major challenge of sustainability for those movements.

Due to interlinked interests between democracies the escalation of conflict in democracies is often discouraged by the international community.⁴² This is also true in conflict between elected government and rival political parties. The opposition political parties want to change the government but keep the system alive. Therefore, the world has witnessed that democracies in Pakistan have often shown restraint in using force against peaceful protests. From Bhutto's case that was toppled through military intervention, democracies including PPP and PML-N governments had often sought international support for their international legitimacy. In this regard, due to weak democracy and national geo-political dynamics the country sought support from authoritative regimes including Saudi Arabia and China, respectively. During the unarmed political conflicts of PNA movement against Bhutto, a Saudi diplomat bridged the trust deficit, while China's role in terms of political stability has often been considered significant for de-escalation of tensions during 2014 anti-government protests.

Strategic Logic of Democratic Triumph

The argument that democratic governments can handle a political crisis in a better manner and without resorting to violence as compared to authoritative regimes can further be elaborated by understanding the two different political systems and their behaviours. Mainly the different approaches of dealing with civil resistance by democratic governments and authoritative regimes add strengths to elected governments and weaknesses to authoritative regimes, respectively. Therefore, it is important to introduce a pattern of different responses by two political systems against civil resistance of regime change. As mentioned earlier, following the steps of democratic

⁴¹ "Nawaz seeks support of PPP Co-Chairman Zardari," *The Nation*, August 06, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-06/page-1/detail-0> (accessed December 27, 2017).

⁴² Joanne Gowa, "The Democratic Peace after the Cold War," *Economics & Politics* 23, no. 2 (2011), 153-171.

peace theory, democracies tend to solve their issues through negotiations and consensus. Democracies react against populist movements through negotiations, political and economic concessions. Democracies, on the other hand, use repression as their last resort. They try to use various other means, including offers of political concessions, etc.

On the other hand, authoritative regimes are repressive when dealing with civil unrest. The measures adopted by authoritative regimes are oppressive and include physical, economic and mental oppression. However, authoritative regimes consider political concessions as ‘surrender’. Therefore, they often remain reluctant for entering a negotiation process with civil resistance activists. Moreover, this portion will further strengthen the argument with various instances of two different approaches of different political systems.

Often the nonviolent action has been observed against authoritarian regimes; however, the nonviolent action against democratic governments is also becoming a popular activity across the world in recent years. The overwhelming success against authoritarian regimes encouraged people to opt for nonviolent action against democratically elected governments.⁴³ History bears the fact that civil resistance for reforms has been waged for past 70 years against democracies in many countries, e.g. in the US there was the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, the environmental protection movement in the 20th and 21st centuries, opposition to war movement in 2003 before the Iraq War etc. are some movements against policies of democratic governments.

However, a relatively new this phenomenon has emerged recently in various parts of the world. Mainly, these movements have shaped themselves as movements that demands for political change. The movement against Morsi’s government in Egypt 2013, movement against South Korean government in 2016-17 and the struggle against alleged corruption of Iceland government 2016 are some recent examples, where democratic governments were toppled through civil resistance movements. However, there are several successful examples of movements such as Ecuador 2000, Argentina 2002, Iceland 2009 and 2016 against the democratic governments.⁴⁴ Likewise, the protests against Morsi’s government also encouraged military to coup against

⁴³ Adrian Karatnycky, et.al., *How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy* (New York: Freedom House, 2005), 11-14.

⁴⁴ Steven Barracca, “Military Coups in the Post-cold War Era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela,” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no.1 (2007), 137-154; Carlos de la Torre, “Ethnic Movements and Citizenship in Ecuador,” *Latin American Research Review* 41, no. 2 (2006), 247-259.

democratically elected government of Egypt in 2013. However, there are numerous examples of unsuccessful movements, such as Angola 2001, Spain 2011 etc, Pakistan 2012-2014, where protesters could not develop requisite momentum which is necessary for change the government.

There are three wider dynamics of the failure of nonviolent action against democratic governments. Firstly, the civil resistance in democratic societies has a smaller base of public support and it is more prone to violence.⁴⁵ As the government has also strong base in public, hence, it is difficult that the movement could get a broader space in public support until and unless it thoroughly delegitimizes the incumbent government. Secondly, it is more dependent on elite allies, i.e., military, the monarchy, judiciary, interest groups and foreign powers. Thus, many of these institutions do not support civil resistance against a democratic government. Thirdly, the democratically elected governments also start counter-campaigns in order to repel the pressure of nonviolent campaigns. Since, these governments have a strong base in the public as they are equally popular, the democratic measures by the government effectively manage to break the momentum of the movement. Therefore, these movements against democracies find difficulty to gain momentum and lack sustainability. Resultantly, in strategic terms, it is more difficult to topple such governments in democratically less developed states except with the help of state agents, i.e., military and judicial.⁴⁶

These two different approaches change the entire outlook of the movements. Movements in authoritative regimes often feel more collective anger and public enthusiasm while in the case of democratic governments, these movements gradually dry out with the passage of time. A comparison of three phased reaction of two different political systems towards civil resistance is as follows in the table 1.

⁴⁵ Barracca, “*Military Coups in the Post-cold War Era*,” 137-154; Torre, “*Ethnic Movements and Citizenship in Ecuador*,” 247-259.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 247-259.

Three Phase Reactions of Two different Systems to Civil Resistance Movements		
Phases	Non-Democracies	Democracies
First Phase	Discriminate	Indiscriminate
	Stick Policy for Leadership Carrot Policy for the Public	Carrot Policy for Leadership Carrot Policy for the Public
Second Phase	Discriminate	Discriminate
	Carrot Policy for Leadership Stick Policy for Activists	Stick Policy for Leadership Carrot Policy for the Public
Third Phase	Indiscriminate (Repression)	Indiscriminate (Peaceful Settlement)
	Stick Policy for Leadership Stick Policy for Activists	Carrot Policy for Leadership Carrot Policy for the Public

(This table is established by the author to explain the varying responses of governments based on their varying political systems)

Response of Non-democracies to Political Agitation for Change:

Responses, behaviours of rulers on dissent are utterly different in authoritative regimes and democracies. Dissent in authoritarian regimes is considered as an act of treason as dictators often have a fear of losing control of power. There were numerous instances in the past when despots or authoritative regimes reacted against civil resistance. These responses are offering us a pattern to understand the reactions of authoritative regimes. This pattern is entirely different from democratic responses, resultantly; the results are also utterly different from what we have seen in democratic triumphs.

Authoritative regimes often deny the power to the people and offer little political concessions to those who do not belong to the elite. Hence, there are increased chances of civil war in authoritative regimes. An authoritative regime is radically opposite to a democratic government. It tends to control through excesses and the instruments of the state. Often military enjoys unlimited powers during authoritative regimes as the dictators require power to control people through coercive measures. Though, authoritative regimes do not allow openness, yet many societies have provided with limited openness. Saudi Arabia is gradually opening up its social barriers in order to prolong

its rule.⁴⁷ However, it does not mean that they will allow political dissent within the country. The case of openness varies from society to society. Highly centralisation of power is the basic trait of authoritative regimes.⁴⁸ Only the elite can enjoy freedoms in a despotic regime. The politics and incentives are given to very few. Often traditionalism and patriotism are used as slogans to sustain the rule of dictators. Manipulative politics are practiced. Either modernisation or traditionalism is used to win maintain credibility and popularity of rulers. Religion or an ideology is often used to secure support and serve the interests of the rulers.⁴⁹

The foremost attitude of an authoritarian state is to limit the political process, restrict political parties and control elections. Some authoritarian states may allow elections, but these are controlled, and people are given limited choices. Patriotism and ideological fundamentalism are often carried out in authoritative countries.⁵⁰ People have little or no say in the decision-making process. Freedom of expression is often restricted or banned in many authoritarian societies. Despots use force and coercion to ensure political uniformity and obedience.⁵¹

Mass media and the judiciary are also controlled and strictly scrutinized by the authorities, leaving little space for marketplace of ideas. Individual rights and have no place on the regime's agenda. Rather, the interest of the state carries more weight. In this regard, the broader definition of state interest helps authorities to keep further checks and balances on public debate and rallies. Manipulations, suppressions and coercion constitute the basis of the power of the rulers. Suppression and coercive means are used to crush the dissent and political opposition.⁵² Moreover, the institutions are often used for personal gains and accumulation or consolidation of power. Dictators use the propaganda of national security, ideology, religion and other tactics to continue

⁴⁷ Benn Hubbard, "Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive," *The New York Times*, September 26, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html>; (accessed October 30, 2017); Martin Chulov, "I Will Return Saudi Arabia to Moderate Islam, Says Crown Prince," *The Guardian*, October 24, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince> (accessed October 30, 2017).

⁴⁸ Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000 (originally published in 1975)), 65; Svoblik, Milan W. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (April 2009), 477-494.

⁴⁹ Natasha M. Ezrow, and Erica Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders* (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 81.

⁵⁰ Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Milan W. Svoblik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 477-494.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 479.

⁵² *Ibid*, 482.

in power. This massive propaganda helps them to establish and prolong their legitimacy to rule the country. Hence, the legitimacy is not established, rather it is created by the dictators in authoritative societies.

Usually, authoritative regimes use ‘stick-carrot-stick’ policy to deal against civil resistance. The first reaction usually remains widespread crackdown, injecting fear of the ruling authority in the minds of the common public. The idea to control public through fear is short lived. Repression often backfires and can strengthen the civil resistance movement. Firstly, dictators react with repression on the leadership and frontline activists. This repression might be multidimensional including physical, psychological and economical while at the same time offering various concessions to public in order to confine the public support for the leadership of the movement. Perhaps most recent and invaluable instance is Saudi Arabia.

During Arab Spring and after it, Saudi Arabia not only provided various types of concessions to the public such as fifty percent subsidy on every daily use commodity and allowing women to drive cars.⁵³ On the other hand, prominent Shia scholar, Nimr-al-Nimr was hanged, and Saudi Royal authorities made an example out of him to prevent political dissent.⁵⁴ The same pattern has been observed in the case of the Iranian revolution. Shah of Iran exiled Ayotullah Rohullah Khomeini and started a white revolution to improve the living standards of the public.⁵⁵ Hence, in the first phase of the movement authoritative regimes use the stick against the opposition leadership to drive fear and later carrot to win the sympathies of the public.

In the second phase, the opposition is offered of various types of concessions. Primarily, the idea behind offering concessions for leadership is to provide a face-saving solution for both parties, as it happened in the case of Lawyers’ movement in Pakistan. In 2007, the lawyers’ movement against Musharraf had successfully won the support of the public. Then suddenly Musharraf offered the

⁵³ Benn Hubbard, “Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive,” *The New York Times*, September 26, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html> (accessed October 30, 2017); Martin Chulov, “I Will Return Saudi Arabia to Moderate Islam, Says Crown Prince,” *The Guardian*, October 24, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince>. (accessed October 30, 2017).

⁵⁴ David G. Graham, “Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr and the Forgotten Shiites of Saudi Arabia,” *The Atlantic*, January 05, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/nimr-al-nimr-saudi-arabia-shiites/422670/>. (accessed October 25, 2017).

⁵⁵ Fereydoun Hoveyda, *Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution: The Shah and the Ayatollah* (London: Praeger, 2003), 92.

National Reconciliation Order (NRO) to the political leadership of mainstream party to acquire their support and prolong his rule.⁵⁶ In this phase, the public does not get too much from the ruling authority, rather, it is often a testing time of leadership qualities of the movement to either accept concessions of ruler or keep resisting against the rule.

The Third Phase is the most fierce, violent and repressive phase of any civil movement against a dictator. After exhausting all other options, i.e., ‘stick and carrot’ vs ‘carrot and stick’ policies, dictators unleash massive indiscriminate repression to suppress the movement. The logic behind the use of force to quell a protest movement is to inject the fear of regime in the common public as well as in the leadership of the movement. Shah of Iran in 1979, unleashed indiscriminate force against the revolutionaries, resultantly thousands of people, including children and women either died or were injured.⁵⁷ Likewise, President Ferdinand Marcos of Philippines used indiscriminate repressive measures during his last days in power to suppress the people’s power.⁵⁸

Repression Backfires:

Often repression is used by rulers, against protesters and their leaders. This is an extreme measure to suppress the masses through aggressive means.⁵⁹ Usually it is the last option by status quo forces. Sometimes repression is also used to cover up incompetence of the government.⁶⁰ The agents of repression are power pillars such as security forces, bureaucracy, legislators, the judiciary and state-controlled media.⁶¹ During any crisis, state institutions are used to maintain the status quo. These pillars of power have at stakes their jobs, economic and social incentives.⁶² They want to demonstrate their loyalty to rulers to preserve the status of the elite. Those in the position of authority have been often brainwashed by the rulers in order to perpetuate their rule. Therefore, they believe in the legitimacy of rulers and try to defend that legitimacy through violence. Usually,

⁵⁶ PILDAT, “National Reconciliation Ordinance – NRO 2007: Analysis and the Impact on the General Elections,” 2007, 14-15, <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/NROPaper.pdf> (accessed October 30, 2017).

⁵⁷ Alidad Mafinezam and Aria Mehrabi, *Iran and Its Place among Nations* (London: Praeger, 2008), 38.

⁵⁸ William H. Overholt, “The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos,” *Asian Survey* 26, no. 11 (November 1986), 1137-1163.

⁵⁹ Sergei M. Guriev and Daniel Treisman, “How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression,” *CEPR Discussion* paper no. DP10454 (March 2015), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572452> (accessed October 30, 2017).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 35.

⁶² Ibid, 37.

these power centres are most privileged people of the system. Hence, they try to maintain the system so that it may maintain perks and privileges of these pillars of power. However, there is a school of thought who believes that these pillars of power often brainwashed by the status quo or rulers in order to strengthen the power. For this purpose, special courses and training is offered to these people.

There are various forms of repression such as psychological repression, economic and social repression, physical repression, etc. Dictatorships do not only rely on physical repression alone. Over the years, various new types of counterstrategies against nonviolent movements have been invented by brutal autocratic regimes. They also used psychological tools such as blaming foreigners and outsiders in supporting these movements. Illegitimate laws, practices, censorship, disinformation and surveillance are used to reinforce their grip on power.⁶³ Sometimes, they provoke participants of movements for violent actions.

Repression can either suppress a movement or backfire. For instance, in Tiananmen Square the movement was,⁶⁴ while Jalianwala Bagh massacre further strengthened nonviolent civil resistance against the British Raj.⁶⁵ Francisco, Koopmans, and Rasler argue that regime crackdowns lead to increase in mobilization and resistance.⁶⁶ Erica Chenoweth on the other hand established that repression of the government is witnessed differently towards nonviolent and violent campaigns.⁶⁷ If the movement uses violence and government responds in a similar manner, mobilization at large scale will not be possible. However, according to an empirical case study of Erica Chenoweth, repression increases the likelihood of success of nonviolent campaign. She claims that 35 percent

⁶³ Frida Ghitis, "When All Else Fails, Blame the U.S.," *CNN*, March 2012,

<http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/03/opinion/ghitis-iran-russia/index.html> (accessed October 31, 2017).

⁶⁴ Teresa Wright, *The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 8.

⁶⁵ Lion M. G. Agrawal, *Freedom Fighters of India* (Delhi: Isha Books, 2008), 58; Yaqoob Khan Bangash, "Jallianwala Bagh: The Turning Point," *The Express Tribune*, February 12, 2014,

<https://tribune.com.pk/story/670406/jallianwala-bagh-the-turning-point/>. (accessed October 31, 2017).

⁶⁶ Ruud Koopmans, "The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989," *American Sociological Review* 58, no. 5 (October 1993), 637-58; Ronald Francisco, "After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 9, no. 2 (June 2004), 107-26; Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 1 (February 2004), 132-52.

⁶⁷ Francisco, "After the Massacre," 107-26; Koopmans, "The Dynamics of Protest Waves," 637-658; Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," 132-152.

campaigns failed due to repression by the regime, while 65 percent succeeded and further strengthened internally and obtained popularity and sympathy among the population.⁶⁸

Repression can increase external support, reduces internal differences and create differences among opponents.⁶⁹ It gives an additional argument for participants of the movement to increase public anger against the authorities. Moreover, repression often leads to atrocities and often backfires. Women and children often become victims of repression, which increases the level of sympathies for the movement among neutrals and the international community. This public anger does not linger on the rule and people keep criticising the authorities for repression against women and unarmed civilians.

Democratic Responses to Civil Resistance:

Democratic governments on the other hand tackle civil resistance and political dissent entirely different from dictators. In this regard, they offer negotiations with leadership and give concessions to the common public. They do not use violence as it can be detrimental to their political future. Hence, the first phase of movement in democratic governments often witnesses policies of concessions and offers for negotiations and peaceful settlement of disputes. If the government does not find any appropriate solution of the problem through negotiations, then democratic governments continue to offer incentives to dissuade the dissent in the public. However, they use controlled repressive measures against selected leadership of the movement in the second phase. That was witnessed in case of Pakistan's 2014 massive nonviolent movements on August 30, 2014, as well as in October 2016. The government tried to arrest the leadership of these movements and applied controlled violence against the leadership and active members of the movement. However, the general public remained immune from the repression of the government.

In the third phase, governments again try to convince leadership as well as the public at large through various incentives. In this regard, they accept the demands of people and try to defuse public pressure. They also try to show good-will through gestures such as tacking back some of cases lodged against leadership and releasing political activists from jails. However, these elected

⁶⁸ Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 25.

⁶⁹Ibid, 47.

governments do not resort to any coercive measure. The only measures that they adopt are to limit the movement of the leadership.

Using legitimacy Against Political Agitation:

Legitimacy has been generally defined of two types, i.e., vertical and horizontal. Vertical legitimacy establishes the connection between the public and the rulers. The horizontal legitimacy refers to the nature of the community being ruled.⁷⁰ It has often been witnessed that the democratic governments have both types of legitimacy, to build a strong and deep connection with the public. Resultantly, they get the requisite support during any social crisis. From Tahrir square to Kiev, world has witnessed that governments can only exercise their power through the will of their people. Recognition and compliance of the masses help governments to function properly, and support of masses is inevitable to enforce official laws and policies.⁷¹

The level of legitimacy fluctuates from society to society due to various reasons. However, it should not be as low as we had seen during Arab Spring, where people collectively rejected their leaderships and challenged their right to rule. Lower level of legitimacy leads to more challenges for the rulers. In many ways, the Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set not only himself on fire, but also ignited a popular revolt against his country's government. This spark is now recognized as the beginning of a popular regional revolt.

It is fact that democratic governments have more popularity and legitimacy among masses as compared to dictators who often remain popular among the elite of the nation.⁷² This sense of strong legitimacy inculcates confidence among democratic government to control the anger of the people. Legitimacy is inherently subjective and must be constantly re-earned.⁷³ Hence, the concept of constant re-earning of legitimacy leads to softer approach of political governments towards their opponents and public at large.

⁷⁰ Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, *"The State, War, and the State of War"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 87; M. J. Vinod and Meena Deshpande, *Contemporary Political Theory* (Delhi: Ashoke K. Gosh, 2013), 160.

⁷¹ Gene Sharp, *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19.

⁷² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 211.

⁷³ Eline Severs and Alexander Mattelaer, "A Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy? It's About Legitimation, Stupid!" *European Policy Brief*, no. 21 (March 2014), 1.

Though there is no hard and fast rule to measure political legitimacy, however, there are several indicators, including increased levels of political participation, active support of governments in public, absence of protests, etc. These indicators are largely present in many democratic governments, which install self-confidence and their ability to govern. Resultantly, democratic governments can effectively tackle civil resistance. As Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe suggest, trust in public and vice versa reduces the cost of politics.⁷⁴ Higher level of political trust also helps in improving political efficiency as compared to societies with lower levels of trust.⁷⁵ Hence, legitimacy is the basic ingredient, which helps democratic governments to effectively tackle civil resistance with confidence.

Political Process, Past Experiences and Mature Behaviour of Political Leaders:

As highlighted in the previous chapter, as per democratic peace theory “due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to intensify conflicts”.⁷⁶ In this complex and long term, political leadership nurtures with the civil resistance strategies against dictatorships and for the protection of their political or economic rights. Apart from institutional explanations and the fear of losing broader public support, the experience of political leadership refrains it to use coercive measures against civil resistance. Rather, they maintain priority to tackle the issue through negotiations. I would rather consider it as the primary obstacle in using force against civil resistance. Likewise, there are two major obstacles, which do not allow political leaders to oppress mass movements, including institutional explanations and fear of losing broader public space.⁷⁷ Moreover, the confidence of legitimacy along with the democratic nature of less violence prevents the democratic governments to use oppression against civil resistance activists.⁷⁸ Usually, the violence remains a final option to create deterrence against the civil resistance.

⁷⁴ Marc Hooghe and SofieMarien, “A Comparative Analysis of the Relation between Political Trust and Forms of Political Participation in Europe,” *European Societies* 15, no. 1 (2013), 131-152.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 137.

⁷⁶ Barbara Farnham, “The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (September 2003), 395-415.

⁷⁷ Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” *International Security* 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009), 9-51.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 39.

Political leaders often remain in a process of political manoeuvring and develop a relationship with the public. Moreover, during this political process, they often get involved in certain kinds of debates, criticism and hear the difference of opinion, not only from the opposition but also from the public. Moreover, many leaders often remain part of waging nonviolent civil resistance struggle against their political rivals for the protection of their political and economic interests.

This experience gives them a clear edge against an authoritative leadership. During their struggle and resistance, they not only learn different strategies to topple the regimes, but also get familiar with the counter strategies and weaknesses which can be used against civil resistance. Imagine the different responses of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan. Hosni Mubarak was a military dictator and was not the product of a political system. On the contrary, Nawaz Sharif was a politician and understood the rough and tumble of politics. He had been part of a movement for restoration of judiciary. He knew how to draw crowds and win votes. The different background also highly affected their response to political dissent inside and outside the parliament.

In response to popular protests against his regime in 2011, Hosni Mubarak came down very harshly on the protestors. Thousands of them were either shot or detained by using of indiscriminate force.⁷⁹ The mental, physical and economic crackdown was the first and perhaps the only counter strategy he used against protestors at Tahrir Square. By blaming the protesters as conspirators and abettors of foreign powers, he unleashed massive forces, which led to deadly clashes.⁸⁰ He did not engage in any political negotiations. On the contrary, Nawaz Sharif used the policy of appeasement with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in 2014. Prior to the long march, he offered to negotiate with Imran Khan. Later, he did not use coercive measures during the whole month of August.⁸¹ Rather, he offered many concessions as well as accepted almost every demand of PTI during the

⁷⁹ Peter Beaumont and Jack Shenker, "Egypt's Day of Fury: Cairo in Flames as Cities become Battlegrounds," *The Guardian*, January 28, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/28/egypt-cairo-protesters-defy-curfew-elbaradei-mubarak>; (accessed October 31, 2017); Patrick Martin, "Egypt's Mubarak Imposes Curfew After Day of Protests Rocks Regime," *The Globe and Mail*, <https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/egypts-mubarak-imposes-curfew-after-day-of-protests-rocks-regime/article579375/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&> (accessed October 31, 2017).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ "Azadi March: Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Agrees to Meet PTI Chief Imran Khan," August 20, 2014, *Daily News Agency (DNA)*, <https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiFwILbwJrXAhUCXRQKHZJjCe8QFgg0MAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dnaindia.com%2Fworld%2Freport-azadi-march-pakistani-prime-minister-nawaz-sharif-agrees-to-meet-pti-chief-imran-khan-2012200&usg=AOvVaw34B1zAW7U56N2sQ70GUVBB> (accessed October 31, 2017).

negotiation process. Even the midnight of August 30-31, 2014, he had allowed a minimum use of force to repel the protesters from Parliament and Prime Minister House, leading to minimum loss of lives and injuries to only a few.⁸² The behavioural comparison of two leaders of different backgrounds in the same age of political awakening draws a sharp contrast. Resultantly, the democratic leader remained in the office, while Dictator Hosni Mubarak had no choice but to resign.

Institutional Obstacles:

In democracy, no one is above the law. The executive and legislature and other institutions of the state can be held accountable. Freedom of speech encourages press to keep scrutiny in the public interest. There are various forms of institutional obstacles, which prevent government using oppressive measures.⁸³ Lack of oppression by the government against protesters creates many obstacles in the civil resistance activists' strategies. It has been often witnessed that the oppression provides momentum, sympathy and popularity in public for the movement. Lack of oppression snatches this chance from the civil resistance activists. Likewise, the institutional obstacles also compel the leadership or executive to agree with some demands of the protestors. This behaviour of accommodation under institutional pressure does not escalate the situation beyond a threshold. Similarly, in democracies there are various platforms which have been used during a crisis for de-escalation of the issue. In this regard, perhaps judiciary is the most important platform, which had not only helped in solving crisis, but has also established a balance between the executive powers and peoples' wishes.

Hosni Mubarak did not require any permission from the parliament or any other constitutional body to use coercive measures against the people in Tahrir Square.⁸⁴ He used this option and suppressed the protesters with a heavy hand. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif consulted the parliament and his cabinet.⁸⁵ He could take all political parties on board to decide how to handle

⁸² Zaheerul Hassan, "Pakistan Political Crisis: Who Lost and Who Won?," *Pakistan Tribune*, September 08, 2014, <http://paktribune.com/articles/Pakistan-Political-Crisis-Who-lost-and-who-won+-243208.html> (accessed October 31, 2017).

⁸³ Alexander B. Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *International Security* 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009), 9-51.

⁸⁴ Elizabeth Dickinson, "Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Hosni Mubarak," *Foreign Policy*, February 04, 2011. 13.

⁸⁵ "PM Summons Joint Session of Parliament," *Dawn*, August 31, 2014, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1129008> (accessed October 31, 2017).

the protesters of 2014. His reluctance of using coercive measures de-escalated the situation and created panic within the movement activists and leadership. The latter was aware of the fact that without some of their protesters laying down their lives, the movement would not be able to gain momentum.⁸⁶

Moreover, as discussed above, democracies have various institutions which can de-escalate the situation. In this regard, two examples are very important to highlight. Firstly, during the Iranian Green Movement, after using various measures, including soft and hard approaches, the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei publicly appealed to call off protests on June 19, 2009. According to many Middle Eastern experts, this was the major obstruction to the movement which ultimately helped the government of Ahmadinejad to continue his tenure.⁸⁷ Likewise, during the second phase of PTI's regime change movement in 2016, it called for the lockdown of Pakistan's capital. The government reacted swiftly and blocked all major roads connecting Islamabad from other cities, particularly Peshawar. The Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) came in to handle the situation.⁸⁸ It ordered to end the road blockage and asked both parties to refrain from agitation. The decision of the court helped end the PTI movement in October 2016.

Better Counterstrategies:

As mentioned above, participation of political leaders in the democratic process educates them to solve civic problems and counter civil resistance. They have remained in the process of demonstrations during their political career, and they understand their dynamics. For instance, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif had waged a civil resistance movement in 2009 to restore judiciary,⁸⁹ resultantly; he knew how to calm down the situation when his government faced the same kind of popular movement. In this regard, the first and foremost reaction of any democratic government is offering some concessions. Largely, the concessions part contains the political and economic

⁸⁶ "Telephonic conversation surfaces between Imran, Alvi over PTV attack", *The News*, March 27, 2015, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/2789-telephonic-conversation-surfaces-between-imran-alvi-over-ptv-attack> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁸⁷ Haroon Siddique, "Iran elections: Khamenei Warns Protesters to Stay Off Streets," *The Guardian*, June 19, 2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/19/iran-elections-ayatollah-ali-khamenei> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁸⁸ Naveed Siddiqui, "Supreme Court Asks PTI, Govt for ToRs to Form Panamagate Commission," *Dawn*, November 01, 2016 <https://www.dawn.com/news/1293597> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁸⁹ Zahid Shahab Ahmad and Maria J. Stephan, "Fighting for the Rule of Law: Civil Resistance and the Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan," *Democratization* 17, no. 3 (2010), 492-513.

concessions, which helps in reducing the public anger towards the incumbent government. For instance, at the start of regime change movement of PTI, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had offered to establish a judicial commission to probe electoral fraud.⁹⁰ This gesture fulfilled the demands of the protesters and became the solution provider instead of the agitator.

As democracy accepts pluralism, free debate over the countermeasures against any armed/unarmed conflict helps in making good strategies for political leadership. Those in power can come up with better solutions to tackle the civil resistance movement. In this regard, largely democracies remain more accommodating in nature. During any kind of civil resistance, offers for negotiations remain the central point of democratic government's counterstrategy. Sometimes it works directly, when the movement leaders and activists accept it and call off the protests. However, sometimes it has indirect long-term impact. In this case, though the leadership and activists of civil resistance do not accept the offers, the public gets a positive message from the democratic government, and it negatively affects the popularity of the movement. For instance, during the 2014 anti-government social movement, PTI and PML-N carried out several meetings and negotiated about various options for the solution of the political crisis.⁹¹

There are different types of political negotiations. The leaders of the protest are caught in a dilemma. They want to negotiate but are at the risk of losing their high moral ground. The best art of their movement is the persistence to not compromise on their state political position during the negotiation process. In fact, negotiations always make proof that the struggle is nonviolent and both sides are seeking a peaceful solution of the conflict. One must keep in mind that the most important objectives must not be compromised during the negotiations. Compromises can be made on lesser points. For instance, during the regime change movement of PTI in 2014, PML-N government had extensively negotiated for the peaceful disperse of protestors.⁹² Eventually, both

⁹⁰ "Nawaz Calls on SC to form Judicial Commission to Probe Rigging Allegations," *The Express Tribune*, August 12, 2014, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/747628/live-pm-nawazs-address-to-the-nation-begins/> (accessed October 31, 2017).

⁹¹ "Negotiations Explained: What PTI Wants, and What PML-N Says," *Dawn*, September 05, 2014 <https://www.dawn.com/news/1130061> (accessed June 13, 2021); "PM Assigns Ishaq Dar to Negotiate With PTI," *Dawn*, December 02, 2014 <https://www.dawn.com/news/114811> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁹² "Negotiations Explained: What PTI Wants, and What PML-N Says," *Dawn*, September 05, 2014 <https://www.dawn.com/news/1130061> (accessed June 13, 2021).


agreed to form a judicial commission in order to probe the election rigging. The outcome was highly balanced as both parties were agreed to it and each pronounced victory.

Figure 1 on the next page describes the strategy and tactics of nonviolent anti-government movements in Pakistan in 2014. It shows how Pakistani political movements followed Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle to achieve their political objectives. On the other hand, following the democratic peace theory, these two figures clearly demonstrate that democratic governments are capable in developing counterstrategies. The strategic model of PTI's nonviolent campaign comprises three levels, i.e., grand strategy, strategy, and tactics. PTI wanted to topple the PML-N government and form their own. They thought that this was only possible through street protests because they lacked a parliamentary majority to move a vote of no-confidence against the government. In this regard, they relied on a two-prong strategy, firstly to increase the cost of status quo and secondly by delegitimizing the government through universally disgrace the leadership of the ruling party. As Sharp describes in his theory that power is not a tangible thing and usually it is based on the consent of people, which is known as legitimacy.⁹³ Hence, by following Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle, PTI tried to delegitimize ruling party by targeting centre of gravity. This strategy was divided into eight tactical options, i.e., sit-ins, lockdowns, protests, targeting centre of gravity, public trial, use of social media, delegitimizing ruling party and filing petitions etc.

Figure 1: Vertical Strategic Model of PTI's Nonviolent Struggle⁹⁴

⁹³ Sharp, *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle*, 19.

⁹⁴ This strategic model is largely based on the overall discourse analysis of the PTI's movement.




Source: Developed by Author of the Study

Figure 2 of the chapter shows that how the PML-N government tried to counter the PTI movement. The government was never short of ideas to counter political crisis, which helped it to consolidate their power and legitimacy in the country. It focused on maintaining its grip on the government, which was its overarching framework of its grand strategy. The strategies of the ruling party were essentially reactionary in nature. Every strategy and tactic of PTI were countered through a proportionate strategy and tactic. For this purpose, it adopted five major categories, i.e., road blockade, arrests, launch of a mud slugging campaigns against leadership of PTI, showcasing development projects through advertisements and the formation of political alliances, etc.

Figure 2: Vertical Counter-strategic Model of PML-N⁹⁵

⁹⁵ This strategic model is largely based on the overall reaction of PMLN’s government against PTI’s t antigovernment movement.



Source: Developed by Author of the Study

PART-II

**QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
ANALYSIS**

Chapter 1

Perceptions of Pakistani Citizens about Peoples Movements in Pakistan: An Empirical Analysis

Introduction:

This chapter is meant to understand the public perceptions about people's movements for political change in Pakistan and its impact on the outcomes of such movements. The survey was conducted in two months of time across the country and people were asked eight questions related to the thesis. The first question was asked about public's awareness of people's movements. The second question was related to their participation in any one or more than one movement for political change in the country. The third question was related to public perception about the resolution of the crisis. The public was asked to tell who maintained better crisis management skills, i.e., democratic governments or military dictators. Fourth question was related to the legitimacy of 'means' that have been adopted by some political parties to bring political change in the country. Fifth question was specific in nature. It referred to the legitimacy of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) movement in 1977. Sixth question was related to legitimacy of Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) movement in 2013, while seventh and eighth questions were directed towards the legitimacy of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf's (PTI's) movement for political change in 2014 and 2016.

The foundation of the people's movement is entirely based on the active participation of the general public in the movement for political change. Public often actively participates when people are convinced that this movement is just and would protect their interests. Hence, the basic principle of people's movement in Pakistan for political change is overwhelming participation of people in protests, sit-ins, etc. However, there is a general gap in the context of Pakistan. It has been observed that the legitimacy of movement often faced challenges in Pakistan. The role of the military in political affairs of the country has been often discussed by the intelligentsia, media and civil society, but there is no significant empirical evidence available to understand its detrimental impact on the people's movements of the country. Therefore, the sample of 2600 people from different parts of Pakistan will provide significant evidence of people's perceptions about the military's role in people's movements and constraints, which organizers of these movements face in the wake of this perception.

Perceptions and their Impact on Conflicts:

Perceptions play very important role in various national and international security issues. State and non-state actors use perception management for their respective interests. Perceptions often either create conducive environment for conflict resolution or stimulate tensions between the two conflicting parties. According to the Oxford dictionary, perception is the way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted. The globalization has drastic impacts on shaping perceptions of individuals and groups, but the basic ingredients of perception management have been discussed by different experts in detail in the 20th century.

Perception is one of the strong and significant variables. People leave their comfort zones and join movements because they perceive that they are participating in a just cause. However, if movements fail to modify perceptions of public, then movements cannot mobilize people and remain unable to build requisite moments against government. As Erica Chenoweth has said that a popular movement requires 5 to 10 percent of active participation of total population of a country for success,¹ I have observed and determined through data that PTI movement could not garner support of people in such a large number. The perception development is a long-term process, which evolves according to an external environment of an individual. There are two schools of thought related to perception development. First school of thought is constructivist, who believes that external environment has the least to do with perception development of an individual.

They believe emotions, motivations and expectations often affect the perceptions of an individual.² The second school of thought led by George Herbert Mead believes that external environment has long term impact on the perception of individuals. George Mead has developed a theory of '*Socialisation and Interaction*'. He argues that external environment such as culture, history and company, parents and teachers make a stronger impact on an individual's perception.³ Furthermore, the theory 'Social Construction and Reality' of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann also extensively explains the impact of society on an individual's thinking and

¹ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 9.

² Gordon Allport, '*Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality*', (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 7.

³ Charles W. Morris ed, *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934), 68-75.

behaviour.⁴ They believe that reality is sociologically constructed, and that the sociology of knowledge must analyse the process in which it occurs.⁵

Most post-colonial states have faced military coups and high levels of military interference after independence. Society has been encouraged to believe that each such movements are foreign sponsored. Therefore, a sharp division occurs between the public perception and political leadership's desire. In case of Pakistan this factor has enormously helped governments in power to acquire political and moral support from political parties, civil society and general public. During the 2013 and 2014 movements against a democratic government, civil society and academia were highly concerned about the covert role of military behind this activity. Numerous articles and speeches of politicians in the National Assembly and in public demonstrated the fear of a 'conspiracy' planned by the deep state against democracy.

For instance, Chief Minister Punjab the younger brother of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that sit-ins of 2014 were conspiracy against democracy and the elected government.⁶ Senior politician and former President of PTI Javed Hashmi also alleged that the sit-ins were part of a conspiracy supported by the remove an elected government through a judicial coup.⁷ Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had also hinted about a conspiracy to topple his government.⁸ Though, PTI leadership was at pains to explain that these movements were originally planned by political leadership but not many believed them. Therefore, political parties in general and PPP in particular supported PML-N during the sit-ins. Former President of Pakistan and Co-chairman of PPP said time and again that they were trying to save democracy by supporting PML-N.⁹

⁴ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the sociology of knowledge*, (Penguin Books: Penguin University 1966), 65.

⁵ Ibid, 13.

⁶ 'Stance reiterated: Shahbaz says sit-ins were part of conspiracy against nation', February 28, 2015. *Express Tribune*, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/845431/stance-reiterated-shahbaz-says-sit-ins-were-part-of-conspiracy-against-nation/> (accessed October 30, 2017).

⁷ 'Hashmi wants `scriptwriters` of PTI's 2014 sit-in exposed', *Dawn*, February 1, 2017, https://epaper.Dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=02_01_2017_003_006 (accessed October 30, 2017).

⁸ 'PML-N sees clean chit for Imran as `double standard`', *Dawn*, December 16, 2017, https://epaper.Dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=16_12_2017_001_005, (accessed May 5, 2018).

⁹ 'Tried to save Nawaz repeatedly but he stabbed us in back: Zardari', *The News*, April 8, 2018, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/301953-tried-to-save-nawaz-repeatedly-but-he-stabbed-us-in-back-zardari>; (accessed May 5, 2018); 'Zardari saved democracy by convincing Nawaz not to resign: Khursheed Shah', *Pakistan Today* April 7, 2017, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/04/07/zardari-saved-democracy-by-convincing-nawaz-not-to-resign-khursheed-shah/> (accessed May 5, 2018).

Not only politicians, academia and journalists too had strong perception that military instigated PTI and PAT against the incumbent government. To prove their argument, they offer several reasons such as strained relations between the military and incumbent government over foreign policy of the country towards India. Nawaz Sharif wanted to normalize relations with India and military had reservations to it.¹⁰ For this purpose Nawaz Sharif attended the sworn in ceremony of Narendra Modi in 2014.¹¹ Modi is considered a villain in Pakistan because of his actions in Kashmir and his persecution of Muslims elsewhere in India.¹² Likewise, during the sit-ins, PTI decided to boycott Geo TV and Jang Group and alleged that the media house was working for the Sharif government. Critics believe that military had strained relations with Jang Group and Geo TV because of allegations of an agencies supported assassination attempt against their anchor Hamid Mir.¹³ Hence, rumours of a ‘soft coup’ (means controlling power from backdoors) has been a regular feature in Islamabad.¹⁴

Scholars and commentators on the political affairs of Pakistan have always been critical about the interference of military in Pakistani politics. Moreover, the political parties have always been apprehensive about the behind-the-scenes interference of the military in the national affairs. After the removal of Bhutto PPP had expressed their concerns about military’s meddling in politics. Ever since the PTI agitation began, PML-N had also started speaking against the military’s alleged role in government affairs, foreign policy and security affairs. These accusations by of military interference in political affairs have become loud and unambiguous during the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) against the PTI government in 2020.

Undoubtedly, the history of Pakistan is plagued with direct and indirect interference of the military in politics. This has been comprehensively discussed in the previous earlier in the study. This interference has deep impact on the perceptions of individuals, civil society, media, and political parties. The main argument of the chapter is that the above-mentioned perception about the

¹⁰ Khaled Ahmed, *Sleepwalking to Surrender: Dealing with Terrorism in Pakistan* (Penguin Random House India: Haryana, 2016), 62.

¹¹ Ibid, 67.

¹² Col (R) Muhammad Hanif, Research Fellow Islamabad Policy Research Institute in discussion with the author on March 22, 2018.

¹³ Khaled Ahmed, *Sleepwalking to Surrender*, 63.

¹⁴ Ibid, 64.

military and its tactics to pressurize elected governments has been proved detrimental to peoples' movements in Pakistan.

Methodology of the Chapter:

The chapter based on quantitative section would further provide empirical evidence to the main argument of the study.

Aim/Objective of the Survey:

- This survey was conducted to understand the public perceptions about people's movements for political change in Pakistan and its impact on the outcomes of such movements.
- Variables such as region, education, gender, age had an impact on general perception of Pakistani public.

Short Questionnaire:

- To get maximum responses, the questionnaire of the survey kept short with closed ended questions.
- To minimize the subjectivity, author tried to ask only closed ended questions.

Sampling:

The people selected to participate in the sample were selected randomly from all parts of the country. Hence, they had an equal chance of being selected. People from four provinces were given equal chance because reliance on a single province would have damaged the entire credibility of the survey. A sample of 2600 citizens of Pakistan has been collected from across the country and asked their opinion based on the questionnaire. This sample varies in terms of education. Illiterate, graduates, undergraduates, PhD students, academics, researchers, etc. have participated in the survey. Moreover, the survey has carefully considered the regional parity and political affiliations of the citizens. Moreover, the study also tries to create gender parity and keeps in mind the age of the sample. Likewise, the survey was also conducted in different cities of Punjab, Sind, KPK and Balochistan, otherwise, the results of the survey would have been tilted to a single party's favour.

The ratio of sampling has been allotted as per the significance of the region. The sample for four provinces, including Punjab, Sind, KPK and Balochistan has been divided equally (500 each),

while the equal sample ratio has been allotted to other important regions such as Islamabad, FATA and Azad Kashmir (200 each). Interestingly, this was the time of general elections 2018. Therefore, robust political activities helped in collecting the samples. People freely and enthusiastically provided their viewpoint about the movements of PNA, PAT and PTI.

However, it was difficult to collect data from females in KPK, FATA and Balochistan. Though, 43 percent females participated in the survey. The ratio from Punjab, Sind and Islamabad was very high, while only 15 percent females from KPK, 6 percent of Balochistan and 1 percent females from FATA participated in the survey. Some political parties are highly popular in certain parts of the country. For example, PPP has a stronghold in Sind province, PML-N enjoys overwhelming popularity in Punjab and PTI in KPK province. This study examines the varying responses at inter-provincial level keeping in mind the popularity of a particular political party.

Survey Method:

The survey has been carried out by the author through two methods. The author sent emails to various correspondents, which was the easiest way of conducting a survey. The respondents were targeted, and their response was largely higher due to the respondents already knowing about author's research. However, other sources were also used including directly interviewing the respondents. Samples from Islamabad, Punjab and Sind have been collected personally, while samples from KPK, Balochistan, FATA and Azad Kashmir have been collected through different students and friends of respective regions.

Descriptive Status of Participants:

Table 1: Descriptive Stats

** Numbers are stated in form of percentage.*

Participants' PROFILE			
Age of Participants		Highest Education	
18-25	5.30	Undergraduate	10
25-30	14.56	Postgraduate	27.49
30+	80.14	MPhil/PhD	5.34
		Matriculation	27.17
		Less than Matriculation	30
Gender Breakup		Schooling Type	
Male	56.21	Madrasa	7.19
Female	43.79	Formal Schooling	76.98
		Both	15.83


Region Wise Level of Awareness:

Overall, the political culture of Pakistan varies from region to region. Surrounding environment, historic baggage and overall distance from the center differently develop perceptions of the people. Their fears, priorities, likes and dislikes are different in nature. This has also been reflected in results of the survey. In this regard, Punjab and KPK emerged as more vibrant provinces in terms of their awareness of people's movements in the country. These two provinces have direct proximity to Islamabad. Therefore, the public of these two provinces has been remained part of these movements and witnessed their rise and fall. Overall, 91 percent from Punjab, 83 percent from Sind, 90 percent of KPK respondents knew about the history of people's movements in Pakistan.

Likewise, Azad Kashmir and Islamabad had also the high ratio in terms of awareness of their political history. Azad Kashmir had 87 percent and Islamabad had a 94 percent ratio in terms of awareness of the history of these movements. Since, people of Islamabad had felt the brunt of this politics of agitation and it directly affected their lives, therefore, they were aware of movements of the 21st century. Least ratio of awareness was found in Balochistan and FATA. There overall count was 71 percent and 68 percent, respectively. These two regions are far away from the center

and the literacy rate in these regions is also lesser as compared to other regions, therefore, they have little knowledge of historical events. The results of the survey are as under:

Table 1: Level of Awareness




Region Wise Ratio of Participation:

The ratio of participation also varies from region to region. This is mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, regions directly linked with the center provide easier access for people to travel and enter Islamabad as mobilization from remote regions such as Balochistan, FATA and Sind would be difficult as well as extra resource consuming. Therefore, political parties prefer to collect people from Punjab and KPK. Secondly, the history also shows that political parties who launched movements against elected governments had a strong base in Punjab and KPK. Therefore, those parties relied on the mobilization of people from Punjab and KPK. There are various movements that had been launched from Sind and especially from Karachi in 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

However, those movements were largely ethnic and religiously motivated. Since this study focuses on the movements for political change, therefore, the study did not discuss those movements. The results of the survey show that 42 percent people from Punjab, 46 percent people from KPK and 31 percent from FATA actively participated in one or two movements against elected governments. Only 2 percent from Balochistan, 4 percent people from Sind, 8 percent from Azad

Kashmir and 12 percent from Islamabad participated in these movements. The results are as follow:

Table 3: Ratio of Participation



2.5: Who Resolved the Political crisis better?

Overall, there was consensus among the general public that elected governments respond relatively better as compared to dictators. In this regard, 87 percent respondents of Punjab, 79 percent of KPK, 68 percent of Azad Kashmir appreciated expertise of elected governments to resolve such political crisis. Likewise, majority of Sind (94 percent) Islamabad (92 percent) Balochistan (91 percent) and FATA (57 percent) appreciated the role of elected governments against such movements. Moreover, most people supported the reaction of PPP government in 2013 against PAT’s long march and sit-ins for reforms. The second most popular government in terms of handling the political crisis was PML-N’s government in 2014 and 2016. However, Ayub and Bhutto remained the unpopular leaders in terms of handling political pressure. However, the low ratio of appreciation in FATA is directly linked with PTM movement and government’s response to it i.e., media blackout, etc. The details of responses are as follows:

Table 4: Who Resolved political crisis better?** Numbers are stated in form of*


Punjab		Balochistan	
Ayub Khan	-	Ayub Khan	-
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	01	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	-
PPP Government 2013	87	PPP Government 2013	91
PML-N Government 2014	04	PML-N Government 2014	03
PML-N Government 2016	08	PML-N Government 2016	06
Sind		FATA	
Ayub Khan	-	Ayub Khan	02
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	45	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	13
PPP Government 2013	48	PPP Government 2013	57
PML-N Government 2014	03	PML-N Government 2014	26
PML-N Government 2016	04	PML-N Government 2016	02
KPK		Azad Kashmir	
Ayub Khan	00	Ayub Khan	-
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	11	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	10
PPP Government 2013	79	PPP Government 2013	68
PML-N Government 2014	05	PML-N Government 2014	07
PML-N Government 2016	05	PML-N Government 2016	15
Islamabad			
Ayub Khan	-		
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	02		
PPP Government 2013	92		
PML-N Government 2014	02		
PML-N Government 2016	04		

Popularity of People's Movements against Elected Governments

It was also asked from people about the level of popularity of these movements against elected governments. The answer was almost comprehensively in favour of elected governments. The majority believes that the movements against elected governments are not legitimate, and these movements are organized and run by the military to keep pressure on elected governments for their interests. In this regard, 61 percent from Punjab, 57 percent from Sind, 47 percent from

Balochistan, 56 percent from Islamabad and 61 percent from Azad Kashmir respondents categorized these movements as illegitimate. However, this ratio was high in KPK and FATA due to popularity of PTI and PTM movement. Therefore, 87 percent people from KPK and 85 percent people from FATA considered these movements as legitimate.


Table 5: Popularity of People’s Movements against Elected Governments



Region Wise Perceptions of PNA’s movement:

PNA’s movement has been considered across Pakistan except KPK, as a movement that was engineered by military against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government. Many respondents had opined that Bhutto was a dynamic politician. He drifted away from Western alliance by pulling out the country from SEATO and CENTO. He was vocal for Islamic alliance as well as improved relationship with the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the US used the Pakistan military to overthrow him. Therefore, most of the public does not consider the PNA’s movement a legitimate struggle. 100 percent public from Sind, 97 percent from Punjab, 89 percent people from Balochistan, 88 percent from Islamabad, 91 percent from Azad Kashmir, 83 percent from FATA and 79 percent from KPK believed that the movement was supported by the military in order to overthrow Bhutto. Only few percent people believe that this movement was organized by PNA itself. The details of the results are as follows:


Table 6: Region Wise Perceptions of PNA movement:



Region Wise Perceptions about PAT’s Movement

The popularity of the PAT’s movement was the lowest among all under discussion movements due to various reasons such as its lack of popular demand and strong labeling of its alleged nexus with the military. Therefore, most of the public considered this movement as initiated and supported by military. However, it has some following within Punjab, where 38 percent people considered this movement as a legitimate movement organized by Minhaj organization. Other regions such as Sind, KPK, Balochistan, Azad Kashmir, FATA, and Islamabad had view that this movement was supported by military. The results of this question are as follows:

Table 7: Region Wise Perceptions about PAT Movement



2.9: Region Wise perception of PTI's Movement in 2014 and 2016

The perception of PTI's mass movement in 2014 and 2016 was slightly positive as compared to two movements. People from Punjab, KPK and FATA were highly positive and considered these movements as legitimate movements were launched by PTI. However, people from Sind, Balochistan, Islamabad, and Azad Kashmir had believe that these movements were either launched by the military or they were only restricted to PTI workers. The public in general was not convinced that these two movements were people's movements. The results of the survey are as follows:

Table 8: Region Wise perception of PTI Movement in 2014





Table 9: Region Wise Perception of PTI Movement in 2016



Findings:

The primary objective of this exhaustive survey was to understand the ratio of participation, level of awareness of the general public about people's movements in Pakistan and reasons of their failure against elected governments. Overall, the survey has testified the main argument of the study that in flawed democracies people try to find conspiracies in every movement against the elected governments. This has been evident in three movements of PNA, PAT and PTI. The major findings of the survey are as under: -

- The street protests in Pakistan lack legitimacy due to a strong perception that these have been instigated by the military against a government that is not listening to it.
- Another interesting finding of the survey is that the people's movements have not been able to develop their legitimacy across the country. They had either confined to one or two provinces, while the rest of the country did not support their demands of political change. For instance, KPK and FATA regions were very supportive and provided human resource to PTI for political change in 2014 and 2016, while Punjab was divided on the issue. However, Sind, Balochistan, Azad Kashmir and Islamabad were not considering their demand as legitimate and showed less participation in the movement.
- The popularity of people's movements also varies according to regions. KPK and FATA believe that these movements for political change are vital, while the majority of Punjab, Sind, Balochistan, Azad Kashmir and Islamabad do not believe in this kind of struggle. Therefore, most people do not actively participate in these movements.
- The general public appreciated responses of elected governments against such movements. They believe that democratic governments respond comparatively better than military dictators. They were happy with the response of PPP's government against PAT's movement in 2013. There was consensus that Ayub Khan being a military dictator could have handled the political crisis better.
- The public's response to PTI's movements against PML-N shows that though the public was divided, but overall, these movements had a larger acceptance in society, which created severe pressure against the elected government. However, the results also depict that PTI could not develop consensus among the masses in Punjab, Sindh, Azad Kashmir,

Balochistan, and Islamabad against PML-N's government. Resultantly, if failed to achieve its desired objective, i.e., to change the elected government and reelections in the country.

6.10: Questionnaire:

Closed ended Questions:

1. Do you know the history of people's movements against elected governments?
Yes No
2. Did you ever participate in any movements against the elected government?
Yes No
3. In your opinion who tends to resolve the political crisis better?
 Democratic Governments Military Dictators
4. Do political parties use sit-ins, lockdowns and other means to bring political change in the country? Yes No
5. How do you categorize Pakistan National Alliance (PNA's) movement for re-election against the PPP government in 1977? Legitimate Illegitimate, If illegitimate, why is it so?
a) Supported by military establishment b) Unpopular demand c) For personal Political gains d) Other, please specify _____
6. How do you categorize Pakistan Awami Tehreek's (PAT's) movement for electoral reforms in 2013 against the PPP government? Legitimate Illegitimate, if illegitimate, why is it so?
a) Supported by military establishment b) Unpopular demand c) For personal Political gains d) Other, please specify _____
7. How do you categorize Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf's (PTI's) movement for political change in 2014 against PML-N government? Legitimate Illegitimate, if illegitimate, why is it so?
a) Supported by military establishment b) Unpopular Demand c) For personal political gains d) Other, please specify _____
8. How do you categorize Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf's (PTI's) movement for the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the wake of offshore companies' scandal in 2016? Legitimate Illegitimate, if illegitimate, why is it so?
a) Supported by military establishment b) Unpopular demand c) For personal Political gains
d) Other, please specify _____

Chapter 2

Political Protests in Pakistan during 1960s and 1970s

Introduction:

This chapter describes the details of two civil resistance movements against a dictator and an elected government. Primarily, this chapter argues that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the architect of civil resistance movement against Ayub Khan, and describes how, lack of dictatorial regime's tendency towards negotiating process and inclination towards suppression helped Mr. Bhutto to build momentum against Ayub Khan and ultimately oust him from power. The chapter also describes details of PNA's movement against Bhutto and how despite having authoritarian tendencies, Bhutto engaged leadership of the movement for a peaceful settlement through dialogue. It is fact that Bhutto was ousted, but it was not because of PNA's movement, rather Military's intervention that overthrew him from premiership. The chapter also presents a comparison between tendencies, behaviour and approaches of two largely different political systems and how the weak democratic system able to sustain in the public pressure. The chapter also identifies that the dictator's reliance remains highly concentrated, not more than one or two institutions, while general public remains alien to the entire government's decisions. On the contrary, the weak democratic systems and leadership often rely on multiple factors, including people's power and trust. The chapter also unfolds comprehensive and to some extent cumbersome negotiation process of 1977 PNA's movement against Mr. Bhutto. Though, many other movements including students' movement, religious movement, etc took place during this period. However, the emphasis of this chapter on these two movements is primarily the objective of these two movements, i.e., ouster of government from power.

The chapter identifies that it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who introduced strategic nonviolent struggle in Pakistan to bring about political change through nonviolent means. His extensive public outreach helped him to topple a powerful dictator, which was a surprise for the entire country. Moreover, his extensive struggle and awakening cause-conscience also increased level of public awareness of their rights. However, he also faced similar kind of agitation in 1977 from opposition political parties. This second movement was spearheaded by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a group of nine political parties to remove the party in power, i.e., Pakistan People's Party

(PPP). The chapter also narrates how the two leaders Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reacted differently against these movements due to their different political experiences and different power structures. Therefore, the results of these two movements were drastically different. Though, in both cases political change did occur, but the manner of ouster from power was entirely different from each other. General Ayub Khan relinquished his power and handed over the reins of the government to his Army Commander-in-Chief Yahya Khan. Bhutto did not hand over power to any institution or political party; rather he was ousted through a military coup on July 5, 1977. If not, there is strong belief by many scholars and politicians that a peaceful settlement could have been made.

Emergence of Bhutto:

The first time in history of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan suspended the constitution on 27th October 1958. According to Hassan Askari Rizvi, Ayub Khan's intervention became possible due to the:

Breakdown of the political system, government's overwhelming reliance on military for maintaining public law and order, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, high prestige of the military among the public, self-images of the military elite as the guardian of national integrity and finally the external influences notably the U.S. encouragement and the contagious effects upon the military elite of the coups occurring in Egypt (July 1952), Iraq (July 1958) and Burma (September 1958)."¹

This coup changed the political dynamics of Pakistan and enhanced the Army's role in the national political arena. The country witnessed a flourishing urban oligarchy, which later dominated national politics.² During Ayub's era, the decision-making remained limited to a few people and 22 industrialist families enjoyed the fruits of economic liberalisation.³ It also helped bureaucracy to act as masters, rather than servants of the people.

¹ Hassan A. Rizvi, *The Military and Politic in Pakistan* (Lahore: Progressive Publisher, 1974), 53.

² Ibid, 53.

³ Ibid 55.

Ayub Khan ruled for almost eleven years. During his tenure, he achieved remarkable progress in many domestic and international affairs. The agricultural revolution, development of local governance system, strict price control management, helped in achieving good governance and elevation of living standards of common public.⁴ On international front, he had developed good relations with the US, while he defended country from Indian aggression in 1965. Hence, he became the strongest person in the country with his remarkable achievements. Nobody could even think to stand against him during those years. Even Fatima Jinnah (the sister of the founding father of the nation) lost presidential election against him in 1964 due to dubious electoral system of 'Basic Democrats'.⁵ However, unlike other politicians, Bhutto's unprecedented campaign acquired large popular support and led to ouster of Ayub Khan in 1968.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a highly popular leader due to his fiery speeches against the regime and some popular slogans for the improvement of living standards of common public. He was a well-educated person who had attended University of California and University of Oxford. His father Sir Shahnawaz wanted his son to follow a career in politics. In his letters the father used to tell his son about political developments in the country.⁶ Hence, after a brief career as a lawyer, young Zulfiqar decided to join politics. His first assignment in the government was to represent his country as the chairman of the delegation to the UN Conference on the Law of the Seas in April 1958 under the President Iskander Mirza.⁷

To show his gratitude to Iskander Mirza, he compared his mentor with the founding father of Pakistan. This servitude smacked of sycophancy. But Bhutto found this an appropriate tool to ingratiate himself with the government in power. He soon found favour with Gen Ayub Khan, the first military ruler of the country and became a minister after on 27th October 1958. He fawningly compared his benefactor to Salahuddin, Kemal Attaturk, and Abraham Lincoln.⁸

He soon became the virtual Prime Minister of the country. Bhutto had a charismatic personality and could rouse public sentiments. During the 1965 War, he promised in a public gathering that

⁴ Muhammad Anwar and Ebad Baig, *Pakistan: Time for Change* (Bloomington: Author House, 2013), 22.

⁵ Although, those elections are considered controversial, due to various reasons, yet he had managed to manipulate the bureaucracy and politicians in his favour.

⁶ Rafi Raza, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan: 1967-1977* (Karachi, University Press, 1997), 1.

⁷ Ibid, 7.

⁸ Ibid, 9.

he would ensure to wage a ‘thousand years war’ against India.⁹ Such hyperbole helped him to become popular among masses, particularly among the students in Punjab, Sind and KPK (then NWFP).

His image as a patriot and savior of Pakistan was burnished after he trashed the Tashkent declaration of 1966.¹⁰ He criticized Ayub Khan for selling out the country. He resigned as Foreign Minister and organized a successful movement against the president. Ayub Khan had the support of the Army, the strongest and most influential institution of the country. His speech during 1965 war and role as Commander in Chief had enhanced his public image. His good grip on state affairs had provided sufficient support among the intelligentsia and the elite. The constitution of 1956 was a presidential constitution. It gave Ayub Khan an extraordinary control on all matters of state. Therefore, there was no political dissent against him. Hence, it was a brave decision of Bhutto to launch an anti-Ayub Movement.

Introducing Political Agitation in Pakistan:

After resigning from the post, he went through train from Rawalpindi to Lahore.¹¹ Being a member of an elite family and former foreign minister, he could travel by air. But this was part of his strategy to come closer with the masses. During his train journey, he spoke about “disloyalty” of Ayub Khan with the nation on every railway station.¹² He kept promising that he would reveal the facts of Tashkent Declaration and how had Ayub Khan stabbed the nation on the back. He used to promise that he would wage a ‘thousand years war’ against India once he came into power.¹³ He had chosen ‘patriotism’ as a weapon against Ayub Khan through such provocative statements. Later often used by right wing parties and the military against politicians from the 1980s to till date. His strategy worked and the public considered him a hero of the nation, who will protect the national interest at any cost in front of India, the US, and other hostile forces. At that time, the nation had witnessed a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. Therefore, a fear of Indian

⁹ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 93.

¹⁰ Tashkent peace talks between Ayub Khan and the Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, held under the auspices of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in January 1966.

¹¹ Philip Edward Jones, *The Pakistan People's Party: Rise to Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 103.

¹² Nikhat Ekbal, *Great Muslims of Undivided India* (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2009), 126.

¹³ Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 93.

aggression and bad memories of war had strongly affected the nation. Therefore, the masses remained receptive of Bhutto's message.

After preparing the ground for launching his movement through eroding Ayub's legitimacy, Mr. Bhutto adopted another strategy. He started meeting with politicians, students, labour leaders and businessmen of West Pakistan. This time he decided to talk beyond 'disloyalty' of Ayub Khan. In this phase, he talked about the rights of the people and asked them to stand against the repression of Ayub Khan.¹⁴ The aim was to diminish development activities and present him as a villain and one who did not have any love for the common people. Through fiery rhetoric, he used to compare the rights of the people with Western public and promised to give those rights once he would come into power.¹⁵

Meanwhile, during his meetings with politicians in general and with the Nawab of Kalabagh, who was the Governor of West Pakistan, in particular, he felt the need to establish his own political party in order to organize his struggle against Ayub Khan.¹⁶ Ayub Khan was late in reading the challenge posed by Bhutto. Being a dictator, he could not assume that people's power was far stronger than that of the state institutions. Initially, Ayub Khan took some coercive measures to inflict fear among leaders of the movement. Policemen in plain-clothes had started harassing politicians who met with Bhutto.¹⁷ Bhutto was told to restrict his activities, but he kept meeting with public at his residence *70 Clifton, Karachi* which became the hub of politics for Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in later years.

The establishment of PPP got a rousing response from the masses. The groundwork of Bhutto provided him rich political dividends. Politicians, students, labour and most surprisingly women started joining PPP throughout West Pakistan. This time the threat was serious, which could challenge Ayub Khan's regime. Therefore, the reaction of Ayub Khan was also vigorous. The regime decided to vigorously attack Bhutto's nationalist credentials. Press, Assembly and Army

¹⁴ Sani Panhwar, "Speech at a Public Meeting at Mirpur Khas, February 18, 1968," *Awakening the People: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches 1966 – 1969* By ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO (2006), 76.

<http://bhutto.org/Acrobat/Awakening%20the%20people.pdf>. (accessed December 18, 2017)

¹⁵ Ibid 78.

¹⁶ Raza, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan*, 3.

¹⁷ Ibid, 5.

Units were major targets of Ayub's regime in order to dent the Bhutto's popularity.¹⁸ In this regard, Bhutto's property in Bombay became the major source of allegations by Ayub Khan.

His dual nationality (Indian and Pakistani), which Bhutto had given up in 1958 also became a subject of controversy.¹⁹ News was placed in national dailies like the *Dawn* to allude to Bhutto's links with India²⁰ Bhutto was labelled as an Indian agent and a security risk. However, such allegations could not put a brake on the momentum gained by Bhutto.

Bhutto was able to project himself as the new and young face of Pakistani leadership.²¹ He promised that he would improve the quality of life of the common man. Ayub Khan's government was shaken by the Bhutto's resignation as Foreign Minister, intensification of Bengali nationalism, and the demise of West Pakistan's Governor, Malik Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh, etc.²² By the mid of January 1968, Ayub Khan's regime used repressive measures to control the public unrest.²³ These measures backfired. Student demonstrations were enhancing the cost of ruling the country. They were confident that they had found their leader in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto skillfully used the energies of the students against Ayub Khan. He used them as his political asset against Ayub's regime and established their unions at district and local levels to widen his struggle against Ayub Khan.²⁴ Labour unions were formed to mobilize the poor classes in the country. Labour unions had traditionally been helpful in pressing of rights of the people. As discussed above that labour and poor were upset on Ayub Khan's economic policies that favoured the rich classes. Bhutto further highlighted those grievances as well as organized them under labour unions, which later played significant role in damaging national economy and compelling Ayub Khan to resign.

Women were also an integral part of Bhutto's movement. This was first time in 20 years after 1947 that women participated in such a large number during any political process. The participation of this segment of society largely shaped Bhutto's political struggle. He had promised women that he

¹⁸ Raza, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan*, 9.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 16.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 24.

²¹ *Ibid* 83.

²² Amir Mohammad Khan also known by some as Nawab of Kalabagh was a prominent feudal lord, politician and the seventh chief of Kalabagh, in Mianwali District of northwestern Punjab, Pakistan. He was considered a loyalist to Ayub Khan and had strong public base due to his political background.

²³ Laurent Gayer, *Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 57.

²⁴ Raza, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan*, 6.

would ensure their due rights. Addressing women workers on 29 January 1968 at Lahore, he declared: “We will offer the women of this country their proper place without prejudice. The place you are given today is by chauvinistic male courtesy.”²⁵ His outreach was also to professionals, particularly to lawyers. Bhutto sought support of their community, which later became a significant political asset for him. To peasants he promised that he would snatch land from landlords and would distribute it among the landless.²⁶ These promises lifted the hopes of the depressed segments of society, which had been neglected by Ayub Khan. These variables helped Bhutto to gather mass public against Ayub Khan.

Repressive Measures of President Ayub Khan backfired:

Repression is perhaps the first and foremost reaction of any dictator when he is confronted with the specific movement of regime change. Although, Ayub Khan resorted to limited repression but that too backfired. The public anger particularly among peasants, labour, students, lawyers and politicians had a snowball effect. Plain-cloth policemen used to threaten those politicians who met Bhutto at his residence. Likewise, the regime was reluctant to lift national emergency imposed during the 1965 war. During a state of emergency, political gatherings were not allowed, and dissidents were imprisoned particularly the students and politicians who had defied the government.

On November 1, regime’s repression entered the next phase, when police in Dera Ismail Khan opened fire on students and used tear gas in order to disperse the crowd in a public gathering which Bhutto was addressing.²⁷ Section 144 was imposed by the local authorities to control the students and the public. However, the situation went out of control. Later Bhutto went to the Hayat Sherpao’s village and addressed Frontier Party Convention, however, local authorities attempted to arrest him, which triggered more processions and rallies in his favour.²⁸ However, these two incidents from November 1 to November 6 neither dampened public fervour nor gave a clue to regime of how to deal with the evolving situation. On November 7, police killed a student in

²⁵ Panhwar, *Awakening the People*, 67.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 51-73.

²⁷ Panhwar, *Awakening the People*, 299.

²⁸ Section 144 is a provision in the Pakistan Penal Code by which the Government can ban any assembly of more than five persons in a public place.

Rawalpindi who was part of the rally in support of Bhutto.²⁹ Almost in entire Punjab simultaneous protests were broken out. Meanwhile, Bhutto kept travelling through rail from Rawalpindi to Lahore and kept motivating his workers to continue their protests against Ayub Khan's regime.

Though the agitation was nonviolent in nature and protestors did not kill or injure any police personnel, yet the destruction of public property was witnessed in every urban area. The strategy of destroying public property was severely damaged for the institutional support of Ayub Khan. Unlike public, institutions mainly the judiciary, the Army and civil bureaucracy were supportive of the regime. The destruction of public property enhanced the cost of ruling a defiant public. The Bhutto strategy was succeeding. Therefore, the erosion of institutional support had started in mid-November. Commander-in-Chief General Yahya Khan did not accept Ayub Khan's idea of limited martial law in three major cities of the country –Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi – to suppress the agitation.³⁰ Yahya's unsupportive behaviour led to security defiance and compelled Ayub Khan to change his approach. Hence, Ayub radically changed his approach and decided to deal with the issue politically.

Unsuccessful Negotiations:

For the next few months, a series of negotiations between Ayub Khan's regime and opposition parties were held. Ayub Khan appointed Khwaja Shahbuddin as the focal person to negotiate with the opposition parties, mainly Democratic Action Committee (DAC).³¹ It was an eight-party opposition alliance against Ayub Khan. Khwaja Shahbuddin met with the convener of DAC, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. Later, Ayub Khan also met with Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and offered a roundtable conference in order to end this political crisis.³² However, DAC refused to participate in the round table conference and demanded the lifting of emergency imposed during the 1965 war. Ayub Khan accepted this demand and lifted the emergency.³³

Contrary to some of the other politicians, Bhutto was not in the mood to negotiate with Ayub Khan. Though, the roundtable conference was held on March 10, Bhutto did not participate in it. Rather,

²⁹ Panhwar, *Awakening the People*, 300.

³⁰ Altaf Gauhar, "Pakistan - Ayub Khan's Abdication," *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (January 1985): 123.

³¹ Raza, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan*, 12.

³² Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and offered a roundtable conference, March 14, 1969, *Dawn* (Karachi) 2.

³³ *Ibid*, 2.

he kept focusing on increasing momentum of his civil resistance against the regime. Though the roundtable conference was not result oriented, but Ayub Khan offered more political concessions. In his concluding speech in roundtable conference, he said:

I would move the National Assembly to make the necessary amendments to the existing constitution to convert it into a federal parliamentary system without disturbing the basis of parity and the existing distribution of powers between the centre and the provinces. Until such time as the directly elected representatives of the people had had an opportunity to decide these matters.³⁴

However, Ayub Khan's desire of ending disorder and collectively fighting against the political agitators was not fulfilled. Rather, the demand for handing over power to the politicians further increased. It was clear that Ayub Khan had lost his nerve and no appetite for confrontation. The regime was also facing dilemma that who handed over power - Politicians, professionals, or Army? Initially he decided to hand over powers to Commander-in-Chief, General Yahya Khan but later tried to change his decision.³⁵ But it was too late, as Yahya Khan had made up his mind to become Ayub Khan's successor. He dismissed of Ayub Khan's idea of handing over powers to politicians and said:

I cannot worry about the niceties of law when the country is burning; if Martial Law was not imposed immediately, the integrity of the armed forces will be severely undermined, allowing some madcap in the army to intervene.³⁶

Hence, on March 25, 1969, Ayub Khan after ruling the country about 11 years, decided to resign, and handed over rein to Yahya Khan, who became Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and abrogated the 1962 Constitution.

Political Agitation against Bhutto:

Bhutto is perhaps the strongest democrat in Pakistan's history so far. He was a reformist who reformed the country's political, economic and social sectors. His huge popularity gave him a

³⁴ Gauhar, "Pakistan - Ayub Khan's Abdication," 125.

³⁵ Ibid, 123.

³⁶ Ibid, 126.

strong sense of legitimacy. He became intolerant to opposition political parties. Due to his unique stature as a politician and popularity, his sense of legitimacy became strongest and he started intolerance to opposition political parties.³⁷ On the one hand, he used his energy and charismatic leadership in economic and social reforms, which brought many fruits for poor, mainly land reforms and nationalization of education, health and industry.

On the other hand, he behaved undemocratically towards his opponents. He dismissed the provincial governments of opposition parties in Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan respectively and imprisoned the leaders of National Awami Party and Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam (JUI).³⁸ During his tenure two dozen mainstream politicians were murdered, which severely dented his legitimacy.³⁹ It is worth discussing here that once Bhutto had come into power, he became an autocrat. He would brook no dissent from within the party and from other parties in power in the Frontier and Balochistan provinces. Bhutto thought wrongly that an Army that had been humiliated in 1971 would dare revolt against him. His time was up in 1977 and several forces aligned against him. The political and undemocratic forces were able to topple him.

His contributions in social development sector are frequently cited by his party to cash on his legacy. He was the pioneer of social mobilization in Pakistan. The socio-economic and constitutional injustices were brought to the limelight by him during the 1970 elections. He broke the pattern of traditional politics, which revolved around urban oligarchs and rural feudal class. Many new politicians were selected by him who contested elections under the PPP's banner and won in 1970. He introduced a parliamentary form of democracy in 1973 constitutions. However, apart from his contributions he committed mistakes, which provided opportunities to his political adversaries. He behaved rudely against his political rivals while offering concessions to the public during his tenure from 1971 to 1977. In January 1977, there were competing views about general elections in the country a legitimacy of Bhutto's government. Bhutto himself believed that he was

³⁷ Zia-ul-Haq's government has issued a white paper in four volumes, covering various aspects of the performance of the Bhutto regime See White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. I, II, III, IV, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, January, 1979 Also see White Paper on the Misuse of Media. Government of Pakistan, August 1978. William Richter also briefly mentions the style of Bhutto regime, through the focus of the articles is "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs* 51, no. 3 (Fall 1978) 15.

³⁸ Hassan A. Rizvi, *The Military and Politic in Pakistan* (Lahore: Progressive Publisher, 1974), 251.

³⁹ "Torture Claims in India and Pakistan," *Far Eastern Economic Review* June 13, 1977, 13-29.

still the most popular leader in the country; he could win general elections without any major constraint. This was not entirely true.

In the first week of January 1977, Bhutto announced general elections on March 7 and 10⁴⁰. Bhutto hoped that the unexpected announcement of early elections will shorten the time for the political opposition to unite against him. However, he had miscalculated the political mood in the country.⁴¹ Though, the opposition was divided with radically different ideologies, yet they somehow managed to form a grand alliance against him within two days after the announcement of general elections.⁴² There were nine political parties who formed grand alliance namely Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against Bhutto. These anti-Bhutto forces included Muslim League (ML) Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), National Democratic Party (NDP), Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), Khaksars, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal-i-Pakistan (TIP) and All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.

As Bhutto's opposition and agitation against Ayub Khan unexpectedly gained momentum, the PNA's struggle against a democratic government also gained enormous momentum. Although, PNA had gathered more public support as compared to PPP, yet independent observers, researchers and political pundits were of the view that PPP would be able to secure victory in general elections, despite losing some seats. People also expected a stronger opposition to enable more checks and balances during next five years. However, the results were highly unexpected as PPP claimed winning a strong two third majority (155 seats out of 200).⁴³ PNA instantly rejected these results and demanded re-election of all National Assembly seats. The history was making it. This was the start of nonviolent struggle of PNA for regime change against a democratically elected government.⁴⁴ The situation worsened as the party in power refused to entertain the opposition's demand for re-election.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), 87; Lawrence Ziring, "March 1977 Elections in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* (May 1977): 60-80.

⁴¹ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 85; Ghafoor Ahmed, *Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya [And then came martial law]* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1986), 181; Niazi, *Last Days of Premier Bhutto*, 12.

⁴² Raza, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan*, 231.

⁴³ PNA for regime change against a democratically elected government, *The Pakistan Times*, March 10, 1977, 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 3.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 3.

Independent observers believed that though rigging and discrepancies took place at some seats, yet, Bhutto had won with simple majority. However, PNA did not accept this notion, rather their resistance gradually increased. Sajjad Ahmad Jan, Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) stated that he could not prevent substantial rigging in elections. Such statements further escalated the tensions between both parties.⁴⁶ Reexamination of two dozen constituencies by the Election Commission of Pakistan led to conclusion that elections on almost half of seats were rigged.⁴⁷ Mr. Sajjad Ahmad Jan had also suggested re-election on all seats of the National Assembly.⁴⁸ He not only unseated 6 PPP National Assembly members, but also announced that he would reexamine results of more than 80 seats.⁴⁹

Offering Negotiations:

Initially, Bhutto had very complex strategy to deal with the opposition parties that had risen in revolt. On one hand, he sent Sajjad Ahmad Jan abroad on medical leave. Jan had been deputed to probe the electoral rigging.⁵⁰ He then offered to negotiate with the leaders of PNA.⁵¹ Publicly, he kept denouncing PNA's claims and insisted that elections were free and fair. PNA did not accept Bhutto's offer of negotiation and demanded his resignation and re-elections in all constituencies. Ironically, Bhutto had created the same situation for Ayub Khan not more than 9 years before. PNA called for boycott of provincial assembly elections, which was an overwhelming success. The writ of the government had been successfully challenged. Meanwhile, PNA kept its focus on agitation in the urban areas of Sindh. Gradually, this agitation became popular in urban areas of Punjab.

After 9th April, the movement spread to Sindh, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and urban centers of Punjab. Within a few days, the government decided to impose curfew in major cities of Sindh, Punjab and NWFP.⁵² Though, the movement had political objectives, yet gradually it took over religious connotation. The religious colour of the movement helped PNA to augment its

⁴⁶ Walter Schwarz, "Why Bhutto's Power is Crumbling," *The Guardian* (London), May 1, 1977, 5; *Daily Millat* (Karachi), June 13, 1977, 4.

⁴⁷ "Opposition Demands Reexamination of Two Dozen Constituencies," *The Pakistan Times*, June 23, 1977, 1.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 2.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 2.

⁵⁰ "Opposition Demands Reexamination of Two Dozen Constituencies," *The Pakistan Times*, June 23, 1977, 1.

⁵¹ "Bhutto Offers Talks," *Daily Millat* (Karachi), June 13, 1977, 1.

⁵² Salamat Ali, "Bhutto Weathers Storm," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 6, 1977, 57.

support base; hence, they decided to name it “Tehreek-i-Nizam-i-Mustafa” (Movement for a Religious System). Pakistan is a Muslim majority country and religion often plays a dominant role in politics. Therefore, this slogan helped PNA to enhance its public support. PNA started claiming that their objective was to establish a system practiced by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). It helped PNA to expand its support base in rural areas of Punjab and NWFP.

The next strategy of the PNA was to call for a wheel jam strike of public transport, which was also used by Bhutto against Ayub Khan in the late 1960s. A wheel jam strike can harm the economy and enhances the cost of governance. It was again an overwhelming success of the PNA as trains, intercity buses, industries, educational and health institutions remained shut down completely for one day, which hurt the government.⁵³ The initial strategy of containing PNA’s movement failed miserably. The eroding legitimacy of Bhutto compelled him to adopt another strategy. Bhutto decided to impose ‘partial martial law’ in Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi.⁵⁴ Through presidential proclamation, Bhutto followed the path of Ayub Khan and suspended constitutional rights of the citizens and announced that the offenders of the emergency will be tried in military courts.⁵⁵

The anxiety of Bhutto was clearly manifested through his decisions, which became catalyst for military rule in the country. He started rapidly changing his decisions. On the one hand, he imposed partial martial law and proclaimed emergency in the country, while on the other hand, he offered PNA leaders alternatives such as:

the formation of special tribunal in order to investigate the allegations of rigging: re-election of provincial assemblies and the holding of new general elections in case the opposition wins the provincial elections, special announcement regarding the enforcement of Shariat laws within six months, immediate prohibition on the use of Alcohol, gambling and night clubs and holding of a nationwide referendum whether people want him as a Prime Minister or not.⁵⁶

This policy of Bhutto clearly defines that how carrot and stick policy can go side by side under a democratic government. Though he had changed his behaviour, yet his democratic leanings

⁵³ Salamat Ali, “Bhutto Weathers Storm,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 6, 1977, 58.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 60.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 61.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 62.

compelled him to solve the issue through negotiations and carrot policy, while on the other hand, his experience with Ayub Khan and feudal leanings compelled him to use the stick policy. This strategy of ‘carrot and stick’ did not work as PNA leadership entirely rejected these alternative options. They could sense that their struggle would oust Bhutto. On April 29th Bhutto alleged that there was an international conspiracy against him and PNA was a mean towards that end.⁵⁷ He blamed the US for wanting to topple his government.⁵⁸ This blame game failed to resonate with the public. Frequency of protests, sit-ins, roadblocks etc, did not decrease with such allegations.

Interestingly, the role of foreign actors in de-escalation of the situation was highly important. In this regard, Saudi Ambassador Raizul Khatib, the Saudi Envoy to Pakistan offered to start negotiations between the two parties.⁵⁹ Perhaps this was the catalyst in terms of starting a result-oriented negotiation process between the two rival parties. Another factor which compelled both parties to start a negotiation process was the loss of lives and properties during the three months protests. According to some estimates, more than 300 people were killed while more than 20,000 arrested by the security forces.⁶⁰ Perhaps, the military had also decided to be softened its stance towards the protestors.

Only 7 years before, the military had been involved in a bloody civil war in East Pakistan. They knew that suppressing their own countrymen with bullets could have catastrophic results. Moreover, the fear of defections from security forces had also compelled military to refrain from excessive use of force. Three Brigadiers defied the orders of their corps commanders to open fire on protesters.⁶¹ All three were sacked. There was frustration and resentment among military circles that their arms were being used against their own people. Moreover, the economy of the country was suffering badly. During three months of protests and agitation, sit-ins and wheel jam protests, Pakistan suffered losses to the tune of US\$730 million.⁶² In order to arrest this mayhem both parties decided to sit for negotiations.

⁵⁷ Salamat Ali, “Bhutto Weathers Storm,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 6, 1977, 62.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 63.

⁵⁹ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 85.

⁶⁰ “Torture Claims in India and Pakistan,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 13, 1977, 12.

⁶¹ Tahir Amin, “1977 Coup d’etat in Pakistan,” *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* XXVIII, no. 2 (2007), 31-52.

⁶² *Ibid*, 44.

The negotiation process started on 3rd June 1977, and it took 13 days to reach an interim agreement. On June 16, 1977, both parties reached an agreement that fresh elections would be held, while PNA did not press for Bhutto's resignation.⁶³ The agreement was also comprehensively addressed the terms and conditions of fresh elections to improve their impartiality. In this regard, appointment of provincial governors and termination of national and provincial assemblies was to take place in consultation with PNA. Likewise, a committee to supervise elections and election commission's appointments were to be made in consultation of the PNA as per the 16 June agreement. It was also decided that a two-member sub-committee will work on details of these major conclusions.⁶⁴ This was a success of a democratic government against civil resistance. As compared to Ayub Khan, the democratic government had managed to resolve the issue through negotiations with the political opposition.

However, in early days of July Bhutto went on a long visit of the Middle East, which created confusion among many sections of society. In this utter confusion, the military decided to overthrow the Bhutto's government. Operation Fair Play (OPF) was the code name of July 5, 1977, military coup by Zia ul Haq. The coup was bloodless, and no tangible resistance was witnessed. It pre-empted any chances of a political settlement.⁶⁵ The Army claims that it was the political stalemate which compelled it to intervene.⁶⁶ It is widely believed that a political settlement had been achieved before the Army intervened.⁶⁷

Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Comparative Analysis

In both cases, the political forces used social factors to force a change at the top. Bhutto built upon the grievances of labour, students, peasants against Ayub Khan's policies. PN used to religion to topple Bhutto. However, the results were utterly different from the perceived expectations. Ayub Khan could not stand in front of political forces and resigned, while Bhutto rejected the notion of resignation in the wake of civil resistance. It was a matter of perceived legitimacy which provided him the courage to reject such a demand. His primary argument was that he cannot resign because

⁶³ "Bhutto and PNA close to agreement," *The Pakistan Times*, June 16, 1977, 2.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 2.

⁶⁵ Khalid Mahmud Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, 1977- 1988* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 72.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 72.

⁶⁷ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 85; Ahmed, *Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya [And then came martial law]*, 51-59.

a few thousand people are bent on rejecting the choice of millions. On the contrary, Ayub Khan could not claim this high moral ground as he had no electoral base among the masses. He knew that he manipulated the electoral system and did not get the popular vote.

Secondly, the two civil resistance movements against different types of governments also experienced repression and application of carrot and stick policies. It is evident that, both types of governments, whether democratic or nondemocratic did not want to see erosion of their legitimacy. Hence, they reacted strictly in order to create deterrence for prolonging their rule. However, the situation in both cases was also different as the frequency of violence and frequency of negotiations was highly different. Ayub Khan did not interact with his opposition until the last few months of his rule. On the other hand, the Bhutto had also used repression as a mean to end the movement. Their repression backfired. However, Bhutto's offers as well as meetings with the PNA leadership were more than Ayub Khan's, showing that he was flexible enough to negotiate. His tendencies to accept all demands of the opposition accept his resignation also shows that political governments can engage with the opposition to resolve their differences.

Lastly, the results of both movements were the same. Ayub Khan as well as of Bhutto lost out. But overall, the nature of their removal was entirely different. In case of Ayub Khan, he stepped down and handed over the executive powers to Commander-in-Chief Yahya Khan. In case of Bhutto, he resisted and almost solved the issue, but was ousted through a military coup. Bhutto had agreed to hold fresh elections because he was confident that public will support him. Ayub Khan could not hold elections as he knew that he would lose. His power was residing primarily on institutional support. On the contrary, Bhutto's decision of holding fresh elections was his trust over public support. He had hoped that he could win elections. Hence, his power was relying on people's support. It can also be said that a dictator will be perished in the aftermath of a civil resistance movement, but a democrat can regain his position as premier of the country through fresh elections, etc.

Chapter 3

Dealing with Political Agitation in the 21st Century: Weak Government but Effective Responses

Introduction:

This chapter discusses the nonviolent movement launched by Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) in 2013. PAT's movement was the first movement of the 21st century in Pakistan with the aim of unseating the democratic government in power. This movement failed miserably and was defused through negotiations. In this chapter, it has been discussed how a weak democracy managed to survive pressure piled up by a politico-religious party. It also discusses the reactions of the democratic government to prevent its removal from power through meaningful negotiations with the leadership of protesters. It was able to convince PAT leader Dr. Tahir-UL-Qadri to end his protest with a vague document with no significant assurance of implementing it. As a result, PAT dropped the demands of dissolution of provincial and national assemblies, dissolution of the Elections Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the resignation of Prime Minister and President and change in the existing political system. The chapter highlights the fact that even weak democracies facing internal threats such as bad governance, inflation, terrorism, law and order situation in Karachi, etc can manage to resolve conflicts exceptionally better as compared to non-democracies.

However, this movement had long term impact on Pakistani political culture as the frequency of nonviolent struggle for regime change substantially increased since PAT's movement of political change in 2013. The basic reason for detailed study of this movement is because it was launched with the objective of ousting PPP's government from power. Though, many other movements including movement for the restoration of the Chief Justice and movement for protection of the Hazara community were waged during the similar time frame. However, these movements were largely confined to interests of a single community or interest group. Therefore, these movements could be considered as civil resistance movements with socially motivated objectives, while only politically motivated movements with objective of ouster of government have been studied in this dissertation.

Background:

The first decade of the 21st century witnessed the return to civilian rule. Musharraf's military rule was ended in August 2008 by the lawyer's movement to restore the Chief Justice ensured that Musharraf had to quit and general elections were held in 2008. At the same time, the Hazara community in Quetta also resorted to public protests the killing of their tribesmen. From 2013 to 2016 three major civil resistance movements had virtually paralysed the capital of Pakistan for almost 152 days. Pakistan Awami Tehreek's (PAT's) sit-ins in 2013 for electoral reforms under the slogan of "Save the state, not politics" (Siyasat Nahi Riyasat Bachao), Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf's (PTI's) movements against electoral rigging and corruption of the ruling family in 2014 and 2016 respectively tested the nerves of the government in power.

In general elections of 2008, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) established a coalition government. However, throughout its five years tenure, the government faced brewing challenges including scourge of terrorism, bad governance and economic meltdown. In the last few months of its tenure, PPP government was compelled to deal with the first politically motivated campaign of civil resistance for political change in 21st century. However, a weak elected government politically solved the crisis.

Weak Elected Governments: Prone to Conflicts

It was the first term of a democratic government after 9 years of dictatorship. The government was formed through a coalition of different political parties. PPP led coalition government had faced brewing conflicts such as rampant corruption, internal political rift, increased frequency of terrorism, etc.¹ It had won 124 seats out of 342 in the National Assembly, while it had required 178 seats to sustain in power. Therefore, it had entered different political alliances with various political parties, such as Jamiat Ullama-e-Islam Fazal Ur Rahman (JUI-F), PML-Q, MQM, Awami National Party (ANP) etc. Due to coalition government, the PPP had to compromise on various national issues particularly on the security situation in Karachi. The civil-military relationship was also uncomfortable due to various national and international issues. The Mumbai terror attacks in

¹ "PPP Government has Ruined Pakistan: Nawaz Sharif," *Express Tribune*, October 12, 2011, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/272392/ppp-government-has-ruined-pakistan-nawaz-sharif/> (accessed December 31, 2017); Ismail Khan, "Pakistan Most Terror-hit Nation," *Dawn*, February 23, 2014, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1088864> (accessed December 31, 2017).

2008 and subsequent response of the federal government led to rifts between civil and military leadership. The PPP led coalition government tried to bring Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under the Interior Ministry, which was opposed by the military.

Furthermore, the US unilateral strike in Abbottabad and killing of Osama Bin Laden led to a major foreign affairs challenge for Pakistan. The Memo-gate scandal was the trigger point, which paved the different ways and approaches of civil and military leaderships. Allegedly, the PPP government sought the US help against the Pakistan Army in case of a military coup. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani and ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha went to the Supreme Court as well as the PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif authored a petition to investigate the issue. Hence, the government was facing numerous internal and external challenges even though it was weaker as compared to the military regime of Pervez Musharraf. It had accepted the demands of long march participants in 2009 for restoration of judiciary, the demands of Hazara community in 2012-13 for their security. The overall strategy of the government was reconciliation and restraint from violence, which is basic trait of any democratic government as per democratic peace theory. Hence, the stage was set for politically motivated interest groups to attempt a political change in the country. However, developments in the next few days unfolded surprising results.

Setting the Ground:

Often Pakistani democratic governments in three to four years do become weaker in terms of legitimacy due to their bad governance and different internal or external issues. This is an overall political culture of the country, which is evident from the history. General elections were scheduled to be held in May 2013 and PPP led coalition government was touching the lowest ebb in its popularity when PAT decided to 'change the existing system' of the country. The public were more concerned with the corruption, nepotism and bad governance of the incumbent government. Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri anticipated this opportunity and public anger against the elected government and decided to mobilize his workers. Qadri as the head of a religious party had thousands of workers and their families who were at his beck and call. He thought that apart from his dedicated workers, the general public will also respond to his call against the incumbent government. However, he miscalculated the entire political situation. Perhaps, the public did not want to derail the democratic system through a quasi-revolution. The initial response of the PAT political

gathering was encouraging. At Minar-e-Pakistan on 23rd December a massive gathering of public was held.

In his speech at Minar-e-Pakistan, Qadri announced that the existing political, legal and economic systems did not meet the demands of Pakistani nation.² This was his first speech after arriving in Pakistan after almost eight years from Canada. Qadri had a long history of the religious institution building. He had founded Minhaj-ul-Quran seminary in 1981, which later expanded across Pakistan. Minhaj-ul-Quran chain in Pakistan had made him popular and provided him many devoted followers who are essential for such kinds of movements. He also started his political career in the late 1980s and founded a political party Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT).³ Since then he had been elected as Member of National Assembly for two times but resigned in 2004 due to Musharraf's ineffective counter-terrorism policy.⁴ During his self-exile he wrote exhaustively on various religious and political issues. Particularly his Fatwa on terrorism was one of the most popular and comprehensive work which was widely appreciated by international community for his moderate version of Islam.⁵ He was invited to numerous conferences, seminars and universities around the world for discussions on political Islam.

His return, five months prior to election and his struggle for electoral reforms was dubious in nature. If he had joined the electoral group one or two years before general elections, it could have given him much better results. Some considered it an international conspiracy, while government thought that it might be a ploy of the military establishment to disrupt the democratic process. However, Qadri in his first speech rejected all such conspiracies.⁶ He said on oath that no domestic or foreign agency, power or government funded or supported him in holding the mega event. Rather, it was the desire of the people that the system must change or reformed according to desires

² "Speech of Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri," *Minhaj-ul-Quran International*, December 23, 2012, <http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/19824/Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadris-Full-Speech-at-Minar-e-Pakistan-Lahore-23rd-December-2012.html> (accessed December 31, 2017).

³ Megan O'Toole and Ali Khan, "Tahirul-Qadri: A Political 'Enigma'," *Al-Jazeera*, October 22, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/10/tahir-ul-qadri-political-enigma-pakistan-2014102271530973245.html>, (accessed December 28, 2017).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "Sheikh Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri's Struggle Against Radicalism in Islam," *United States Institute of Peace (USIP)*, November 10, 2010, <https://www.usip.org/events/sheikh-dr-muhammad-tahir-ul-qadris-struggle-against-radicalism-islam>. (accessed December 28, 2017).

⁶ "Pak Crisis Deepens: PM Arrest Ordered as Rally Shakes Capital," *Arab News*, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 45 (January 16, 2013), 2.

of the people.⁷ He also gave a deadline to the federal government to reform the system, otherwise he would mobilise public against it.⁸ Due to limited time, he wanted to rush things.

Though, he did not mention a change in the government, he threatened that if his reform agenda will not meet, he would take things into his own hands. Indirectly, he had conveyed that he wanted a change in government by one based on ‘national consensus under his supervision’.⁹ That is why he used the slogan ‘Save the state, not politics to change the system. He said his purpose was to bring about reforms in the electoral system before the polls were conducted. The government was not going to accept his demands based on one speech, so he decided to wage a full-fledged political movement against the incumbent government with the aim of toppling it if possible.

Strategizing Political Struggle and March to Islamabad:

He adopted various approaches to put pressure on the PPP-led coalition government, e.g., he challenged the formation of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) in Supreme Court (SC) and pressed for political reform. In his petition in SC, he prayed that the formation of ECP was against the Article 213 of the constitution. According to Article 213 the recommendation of ECP members must be based on the parliamentary committee hearings, which were missed in the formation of ECP. However, his petition was dismissed by the SC, and he lost the legal battle. However, he was more hopeful that he could win his struggle on the political front. Hence, he started his long march, which he claimed comprised of four million people. However, he could not muster more than 50,000 supporters.¹⁰

As Sharp suggests, that for setting a stage a movement needs to develop *cause-conscience* among the masses.¹¹ In this strategy, leadership often raises significant issues, which can be detrimental for the existing regime. In the previous chapter, it has been discussed how Bhutto raised awareness against the alleged misdeeds of Ayub Khan for almost two years. Following the same, Dr. Qadri

⁷ “Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri's Full Speech.” *Minhaj-ul-Quran International*, December 23, 2012. <http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/19824/Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadris-Full-Speech-at-Minar-e-Pakistan-Lahore-23rd-December-2012.html> (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Francis Elliott and Aoun Sahi, “Cleric’s ‘Million Man March’ Attracts 50,000 Pakistani Protesters,” *The Sunday Times*, January 14, 2013, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/cleric-million-man-march-attracts-50000-pakistani-protesters-r9v7dwvfxk0>. (accessed December 31, 2017).

¹¹ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1973), 365.

questioned the efficacy of the existing system of the country and claimed that it was meant for only one percent of the country. For him, 99 percent of the population was underprivileged. He criticised that 70 per cent of Pakistani lawmakers did not pay their taxes.¹² His primary target was the political elite of the country, but wisely he chose not to criticise the judiciary and Army during his speeches. That is why he only mentioned the lawmakers and laws which were meant to protect the elite and the 18th Amendment which gave permission to any politician to become Prime Minister as many times as one wanted. Indirectly, this amendment was favouring Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the leader of Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) who previously remained on Pakistan's premiership for two times. Dr. Qadri thought that the stage was set to upset the government in power. However, it was too early to launch a movement against any government. Gene Sharp says that it requires months and years to awake the conscience of the people.¹³ Qadri wanted to do it in only 20 days, so he announced to stage a long march against the government, if his demands were not met.¹⁴ Later, it proved to be a flop.

Dr. Tahirul Qadri tried to raise funds. Females donated their jewellery for the coming revolution.¹⁵ At the start of long march, PAT collected dozens of trucks loaded with food items, camps, gas cylinders, etc.¹⁶ These resources were enough for a few days of the movement. His religious followers were in the forefront of this collection effort. The ratio of funding by the common masses was low. However, the resources were enough to stay a few days in Islamabad.

As Gene Sharp contemplates that the motivation of the participants must be increased with different means, the PAT leadership thought rather optimistically that the long march would be able to topple the government once it will reach Islamabad.¹⁷ Dr. Qadri tried to portray himself as

¹² "Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri's Full Speech." *Minhaj-ul-Quran International*, December 23, 2012. <http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/19824/Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadris-Full-Speech-at-Minar-e-Pakistan-Lahore-23rd-December-2012.html> (accessed December 31, 2017).

¹³ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 365.

¹⁴ "Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri's Full Speech." *Minhaj-ul-Quran International*, December 23, 2012. <http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/19824/Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadris-Full-Speech-at-Minar-e-Pakistan-Lahore-23rd-December-2012.html> (accessed December 31, 2017).

¹⁵ "Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri Establishes Fund for Islamabad March, Donates Family Jewelry," *Minhaj-ul-Quran International*, December 30, 2012, <http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/19988/Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadri-establishes-fund-for-Islamabad-march-donates-family-jewelry-about-14-January-Awami-March-to-Islamabad.html>; (accessed December 31, 2017); Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri, "Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri Donating All Jewelry & Gold of His Family to Fund 14th January Long March ARY NEWS," <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6TVu4lpb3B0>. (accessed December 31, 2017).

¹⁶ Iqtidar Gilani, "Go Long the Marchers," *The Nation*, January 14, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-14/page-1/detail-4>. (accessed December 31, 2017).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

a visionary leader who would change the fate of the country. He deplored that Pakistan had enough resources to be a self-sufficient country, but due to bad governance the people had been denied the fruits of economic development. Similar hopes and promises were made by Bhutto during his struggle against Ayub Khan. Bhutto had other factors in his favour such as an extremely charismatic personality while Dr. Qadri lacked such factors.

Sit-in in Islamabad:

Unlike the expectations of Dr. Qadri, PPP government did not try to stop the long march. The marchers entered Islamabad excitedly expecting the government to collapse on their arrival. They spent a cold night under an open sky, hoping that the next day would be the ‘day of judgment’ for the ruling elite.¹⁸ Despite the media hype, no significant development took place on first day of sit-ins. Dr. Qadri hoped during his first speech that about one million people would soon join the protesters.¹⁹ He blamed that the government has made sure through various coercive means that the ranks of the protesters may not swell.²⁰ Dr. Qadri was unable to convince people to join his cause. He gave only nine hours deadline to the government to dissolve the national and provincial assemblies of the country. The government refused to budge. Qadri had reached at the dead end. He kept on giving deadlines, but nothing happened.²¹

The second day of sit-ins brought immense excitement for the participants and leadership when the Supreme Court of Pakistan announced its verdict in Rental Power Plants case.²² The Supreme Court ordered the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to arrest those involved in the fraud of rental power plants. It was not directly linked with the then Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf. Yet, the PAT leadership and the media tried to give the impression that the Supreme Court has ordered to arrest the PM. Qadri started calling Ashraf as ‘former Prime Minister’ of the ‘ex-government’. According to Sharp a few tactical achievements may encourage the participants often provide motivation to participants and attract many neutrals to join the movement, PAT’s

¹⁸ Abrar Saeed and Javaid-ur-Rahman, “Qadri Heralds ‘End of Time for Rulers’,” *The Nation*, January 15, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-15/page-1/detail-0>. (accessed December 31, 2017).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Mirza Aslam Baig, “The End of Time for Rulers!” *The Nation*, January 17, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-17/page-7/detail-0> (accessed December 31, 2017).

²² “SC Orders Prime Minister’s Arrest,” *The Nation*, January 16, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-16/page-1/detail-0> (accessed December 31, 2017).

movement had also faced the same situation in the post Supreme Court verdict. Participants of the sit-ins were shocked by this development.²³ They started chanting slogans of ‘*Inqelab*’ (revolution) and considered it their victory. Meanwhile, Dr. Qadri portrayed that this development took place because of his struggle that the Prime Minister had been accused in the Rental Power Plant (RPP) case. On the other hand, his religious followers believed that this was a miracle of Dr. Qadri and more miracles were about to happen.

This development partially compelled the government to negotiate with protesters. The government gave signals of negotiations through high-ranking officials. Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf conditionally showed his desire to negotiate with Dr. Qadri. He said that government was ready to negotiate but was not willing to accept any unconstitutional demand.²⁴ Dr. Qadri did not respond positively to PM’s offer, hoping that the government would succumb to public pressure. In response to Prime Minister’s offer of negotiations, Dr. Qadri gave 24 hours of deadline to PPP led coalition government.²⁵ Afterwards, the government did not offer any negotiations as the political parties including opposition parties decided to support PPP led coalition government.²⁶ The ignorance of government over demands of Dr. Qadri and no further development desired by him took place during next two days. Hence, the excitement of crowd and their motivation did not last long as the rain and harsh weather dampened the spirits of the protesters who were out in the open sky. Though, he would speak every evening to the protesters hoping for the government to fall and had no further plans to convert his desire into reality.

Ever Changing demands:

According to Gene Sharp, leaders should not give frequent deadlines and should refrain from changing their demands.²⁷ In case of PAT’s movement, Dr. Qadri frequently gave deadlines as well as kept changing his demands. On January 11 during a press conference, he demanded to

²³ Javaid-ur-Rahman, “Well Begun Half Done,” *The Nation*, January 16, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-16/page-1/detail-1> (accessed December 31, 2017).

²⁴ “PM, Leaders Close Ranks for Democracy,” *The Nation*, January 16, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-16/page-1/detail-2> (accessed December 31, 2017).

²⁵ Javaid-ur-Rahman, “Qadri Gives 24-hour Ultimatum for Implementing Agenda,” *The Nation*, January 17, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-17/page-1/detail-3> (accessed December 31, 2017).

²⁶ Sajid Zia, “Opp Unites Against Qadri’s Long March,” *The Nation*, January 17, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-17/page-1/detail-4> (accessed December 31, 2017).

²⁷ Khawar Ghumman and Syed Irfan Raza, “A Grand Spectacle in Islamabad,” *Dawn*, January 15, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/779097/a-grand-spectacle-in-islamabad> (accessed December 31, 2017).

change the system of the country.²⁸ On January 12, he sought the dissolution of Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commission of Pakistan.²⁹ He alleged that CEC and Election Commission of Pakistan were not transparent and predicted that they would not be able to hold general elections impartially as per Constitution and Representation of People Act 1976.³⁰ On January 15, he sought dissolution of provincial and national assemblies. On January 17, he radically changed his demands and started praising democracy and democratic system.³¹ These abruptly changing demands not only confused participants of the sit-ins, but also provided no room to press for a single or a set of demands.

Reactions of Government:

Although the government was criticized due to its inability to react against PAT, but it remained silent. President of Pakistan and co-Chairman of PPP Asif Ali Zardari left for Karachi.³² Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf did not speak, and no press release was issued from his office for first few days.³³ However, according to some reports Prime Minister directed the district administration to look after children and women in the crowd, which shows the benign streak of an elected leader. The interior minister Rahman Malik on the other hand kept threatening strict measures, while the Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira kept criticising Dr. Qadri for his demands.³⁴ Primarily, the two ministers had divided their jobs between each other. The interior minister Rahman Malik dealt with the protesters and leadership of PAT while the information minister Qamar Zaman Kaira worked to degrade and counter the narrative of Dr. Qadri. This strategy worked according to the desires of PPP.

As discussed in chapter 2, in the second phase, democratic governments often react against the leadership by abandoning the appeasement policy. Therefore, registering cases against the PAT chief Tahirul Qadri was the first reaction of the government in order to create deterrence. The First

²⁸ Khawar Ghumman and Syed Irfan Raza, "A Grand Spectacle in Islamabad," *Dawn*, January 15, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/779097/a-grand-spectacle-in-islamabad> (accessed December 31, 2017).

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² "President Zardari Extends Stay in Karachi," *Dawn*, January 15, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/779099> (accessed December 31, 2017)

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ "Govt Slams Qadri for 'Extra-constitutional' Demands," *Express Tribune*, January 16, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/494125/govt-slams-qadri-for-extra-constitutional-demands/>. (accessed December 31, 2017).

Information Report (FIR) was stringent in nature and covered charges such as murder attempts, interfering in governmental matters, snatching, and disturbing peace, etc.³⁵ However, it could not create deterrence, and rather it further escalated tensions between the government and the protestors. At tactical level, police clashed briefly with stone throwers and protestors brandishing sticks, shooting into the air and firing tear gas. Eight officers and few protestors were injured. The measures were controlled and measured. No harsh measures were used to disperse the crowd.³⁶ To contain the political cost, the government blamed the protestors for instigating the clashes as the police tried to arrest their leader Dr. Qadri. Another factor of restraint was the fear of the government that this might lead to end of political alliances with its two political allies, PML-Q and MQM.³⁷ These two political parties had a soft corner for Dr. Qadri and his workers. Hence, the democratic structure as defined by democratic peace theory, refrained PPP government to use violence against protestors.

Moreover, the government did not try to put constraints in the logistics of the movement. Contrary to methods adopted by dictators in past, the democratic government did not try to stop food items, transportation means, etc. to make things easier for the participants at the start of the long march. It was January, the coldest month of the year in Islamabad and the protestors required food, blankets, warm clothes, etc. to sustain the cold at nights. Moreover, the mobile phone services remained closed in the sit-in's venue.³⁸ It was very difficult for protestors particularly women and children to communicate with their families back in their hometowns. This issue discouraged the protestors on one hand; while on the other hand, it increased the concerns of PAT leadership to decide quickly.³⁹ Hence, Dr. Qadri started showing flexibility in his speeches.⁴⁰

³⁵ Kaswar Klasra, "Case Filed Against Qadri," *The Nation*, January 17, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-17/page-3/detail-3> (accessed December 31, 2017).

³⁶ Syed Irfan Raza, "Zardari Rules Out Operation," *Dawn*, January 17, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/779325/zardari-rules-out-operation%20January%2017,%202013> (accessed December 31, 2017).

³⁷ Senator Rehman Malik, interview to the author on July 12, 2018. He was the interior minister during Dr. Qadri's movement against PPP government.

³⁸ Asad Kharal and Zahid Gishkori, "Long March: In the Name of Security, Mobile Services Suspended," *The Express Tribune*, January 13, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/493420/long-march-in-the-name-of-security-mobile-services-suspended/> (accessed December 31, 2017).

³⁹ Senator Rehman Malik, interview to the author on July 12, 2018. He was the interior minister during Dr. Qadri's movement against PPP government.

⁴⁰ "Face Saving' Agreement Ends Qadri's Long March," *The Nation*, January 18, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-18/page-2/detail-4> (accessed December 31, 2017).

Through the media, leadership of PAT and some workers showed concerns about the potential use of force by government against Dr. Qadri, yet the government did not use any force to disperse the crowd. In fact, President Asif Ali Zardari ruled out any operation against people taking part in Dr Tahirul Qadri's sit-in.⁴¹ This was a high-profile assurance, which gave satisfaction to many segments of society. However, the leadership of PAT as well as critics of government did not accept such assurances. In this regard, Dr. Qadri kept motivated his followers to remain alert of an external threat. However, gradually he had nothing to use as motivation for protesters.

The reaction of PPP led coalition government was highly mature. It was appreciated by civil society, media, and intelligentsia and overall people of the country. It showed an unprecedented restraint during the whole crisis. Initially, it tried to disperse or stop the protestors entering the capital. It erected containers at the entrance of Islamabad as well as on major highways of the city. However, it did not stop the protesters from entering the capital. The government did not show any anger. Rather, one allied party of the government PML-Q facilitated the protesters by providing them different eatables during their march towards Islamabad, which was unexpectedly too slow and reached in more than 38 hours.⁴²

The initial language of anger by the Interior Minister Rahman Malik did not bring desirable results; rather it further escalated tensions between protesters and government. Hence, the government changed its strategy and showed complete silences, facilitated protestors, allowed people and supporters of Dr. Qadri in Islamabad to provide food items to their fellow workers at the protest venue. However, the government had tried to stop the protestors entering into Islamabad's Red Zone Area, which is highly sensitive in nature due to the presence of high-profile government buildings and diplomatic missions. Dr. Qadri insisted on entering into Red Zone of Islamabad and gradually he moved from Blue Area to Red Zone.⁴³ However, except a single brief clash between

⁴¹ Syed Irfan Raza, "Zardari Rules Out Operation," *Dawn*, January 17, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/779325/zardari-rules-out-operation%20January%2017,%202013> (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁴² Abrar Saeed and Javaid-Ur-Rahman, "Qadri heralds 'end of time for rulers'," *The Nation*, January 15, 2013. <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-15/page-1/detail-0> (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁴³ Javaid-ur-Rahman, "Well Begun Half Done," *The Nation*, January 16, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-16/page-1/detail-1> (accessed December 31, 2017).

security forces and protesters, the crowd was allowed to move further in D-Chowk with the consent of the Interior Minister.⁴⁴

Interestingly, Dr. Qadri was considering his gradual move towards Red Zone and Constitution Avenue as his victory. However, he had committed a strategic mistake by entering Red Zone of the city. History bears the fact that any protest, which entered Red Zone gradually, lost its steam and provided government relief and reduced the cost of containing a protest. Red Zone is primarily an area of highly influential buildings covered with hills from one side, a home of thousands of government employees who come daily from the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi to attend government offices. Hence, entering Red Zone provides a relief to government officials as the concentration of deployment remains in this brief area, while the whole city and entire country runs smoothly. Hence, the government can afford to neglect such sit-ins in Red Zone for a few weeks. It has also been observed that after a few days of escalated tensions, government offices in Red Zone often reopen without any resistance from protestors.

On the contrary, sit-ins at crossroads of twin cities (Faizabad Chowk) have proved highly effective in nature as it is located on a major choke point and blocks the movement of traffic. In this regard, sit-ins of Majlis Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM) in support of Hazara community during 2012-13 and the episode of Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA) sit-ins in November 2017 proved more effective as compared to sit-ins of PAT and PTI in Red Zone of Islamabad.⁴⁵ These two sit-ins virtually paralyzed two cities and created extreme difficulties for the governments in power. Hence, strategically choosing Faizabad Chowk as compared to Red Zone was more appropriate for building pressure on government, which Dr. Qadri failed to do.

Moreover, government tried to use officials, such as Inspector General (IG) Islamabad Police, Rangers' Officials, Commissioner Islamabad, etc. to convince Dr. Qadri to show restraint in terms of trying to enter the Red Zone. They offered him alternative venues for staging protests; however, Dr. Qadri did not accept these offers. During this period of highly uncertain security situation when

⁴⁴ "Qadri Allowed to Address Long Marchers at D-Chowk," *Dunya News*, January 15, 2013, <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/154183-Qadri-allowed-to-address-long-marchers-at-D-Chowk>. (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁴⁵ Arsalan Altaf, "Tehreek-e-Labbaik Calls Off Islamabad Sit-in After Govt Accepts Demands," *The Express Tribune*, November 27, 2017, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1569581/1-khadim-hussain-rizvi-calls-off-faizabad-sit-law-minister-resigns/> (accessed December 31, 2017).

suicide attacks were frequent, the government tried to warn Dr. Qadri and his followers that terrorist threat could not be ruled out. To prevent any untoward incident, the police and rangers were deployed to protect Dr. Qadri's container.⁴⁶ The government was apprehended that due to his Fatwa on Terrorism, Dr. Qadri was under severe threat from terrorists. Therefore, not only during his stay in Islamabad, but Government also tried to give security cover to protestors. In this regard, more than 10,000 security personnel were deployed enroute from Lahore to Islamabad.⁴⁷ However, Dr. Qadri ignored all such warnings from the government. Rather, he kept insisting that his followers will take over the parliament, Prime Minister and Presidential houses.⁴⁸

Despite government's immense restrained, clashes did erupt when protestors tried to replace government security personals with their own security volunteers near Dr. Qadri's container. He believed that the official security deployment was made to arrest him,⁴⁹ while Rahman Malik insisted that deployment of security forces at the cleric's container was for his own safety.⁵⁰ Few tear-gas shells were fired by the Islamabad Police in order to control the situation and dispersed the crowd.

In response, the protesters used stones as against the police. In this brief clash, only one policeman was injured while no protestor injured during this clash, which shows the high level of restraint by the police. According to some reports, some gunshots were also heard during the brief clash. Interior Minister Rahman Malik reacted swiftly and denied reports about security forces firing against the protesters. He also sought a report from Commissioner Islamabad and confirmed that the security forces were not allowed to fire on protestors.⁵¹ Apart from this brief episode, no clash was reported between officials and protesters. This had helped PPP government to achieve the

⁴⁶ "Capital Quiet, But Uneasy Tehrik Workers Take Up Security Duty Kaira Rejects Demands: Qadri 'Revolution' March Paralyzes Islamabad," *Dawn*, January 15, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/778845/%E2%80%A2capital-quiet-but-uneasy-%E2%80%A2tehrlik-workers-take-up-security-duty-%E2%80%A2kaira-rejects-demands-qadri-revolution-march-paralyzes-islamabad> (accessed January 1, 2018).

⁴⁷ "Rs50m Spent on Long March Security," *Dawn*, January 19, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/779839>. (accessed January 01, 2018).

⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

⁴⁹ "Pakistan Government Seeks End to Cleric Qadri's Protest," *BBC*, January 16, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21053432>. accessed January 1, 2018,

⁵⁰ Declan Walsh, "Pakistan Says Preacher and Crowd at Risk," *The New York Times*, January 16, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/world/asia/pakistan-rejects-preachers-politics-and-says-he-is-at-risk.html>. accessed January 01, 2018,

⁵¹ "Pakistani Forces Fire in the Air at Islamabad Protests," *Minhaj-ul-Quran International*, January 15, 2013, <http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/20531/Pakistani-forces-fire-air-Islamabad-protests.html> (accessed January 1, 2018).

support of other political forces and institutions. Resultantly, no defiance was reported during the protest. Hence, the institutional legitimacy of PPP government was sustained.

As discussed above, the weather was another severe challenge apart from democratic restraint against protestors. January remains the coldest month of the year in Pakistan. On the fourth day during the sit-ins rain made the weather further harsh for protestors. Dr. Qadri himself was living in a container, while the common protestors were facing the hard weather, which further created problems for protestors. It was also a raising concern for the leadership of the movement. The motivation of protestors was gradually decreasing due to frequent deadlines with no results, harsh weather and lack of food/shelter etc. Hence, Dr. Qadri decided to enter into an agreement with the government.

As Micheal Doyle argues that democracies do act effectively during conflicts and effectively form new alliances,⁵² the elected government of PPP did not show any hesitation in finding new political partners at national level. In this regard, the Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf telephoned opposition leaders Nawaz Sharif, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party leader, Mehmood Khan Achakzai, ANP leader Asfandiyar Wali Khan, MQM leader Altaf Hussain and PML-Q President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and sought their moral and political support in this conflict.⁵³ All democratic forces decided to support democratic system, which was indirectly a moral victory of the PPP government.

Political parties decided to stay away from PAT movement. Initially, Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), an urban Sindh based political party decided to support the movement; however, they withdrew their support once the protesters entered Islamabad. Likewise, Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) also supported PPP government.⁵⁴ In this regard, PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif dispelled all rumours through his press conference with other political leaders mainly Jamiat Ullema-i-Islam –Fazal-ur-Rahman (JUI-F), Jamat-e-Islami (JI) Mahmood Khan Achakzai.⁵⁵ He said that all political forces support the democratic process and elections should be held on time.

⁵² Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-1169.

⁵³ "PM, Leaders Close Ranks for Democracy," *The Nation*, January 16, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-16/page-1/detail-2> (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ "PM, Leaders Close Ranks for Democracy," *The Nation*, January 16, 2013, https://nation.com.pk/sitemap_2013-01-16.xml (accessed June 13, 2021).

On the other hand, PTI also tried to remain neutral during the sit-ins. It neither supported nor criticised Dr. Qadri's demands. Dr. Qadri's calculations regarding support from other political parties proved wrong and morally rejuvenated the PPP government's legitimacy.

PPP government also tried to seek support of the international community in general and the US in particular. Democracies do support democracies during conflicts. As democratic peace theory contemplates that democracies often form alliances effectively.⁵⁶ In this regard, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar during her visit of the US tried to seek support of Americans.⁵⁷ During her stay in the US she termed Minhajul Quran International (MQI) chief Dr Tahirul Qadri's demands "preposterous and unconstitutional" and said the cleric meant "no good".⁵⁸ It is unclear whether international community in general and the US particular supported the PPP government or not, yet it is clear that the international community overtly supported the democratic process and desired for the continuation of this process in Pakistan.⁵⁹ Hence, the international environment helped PPP led coalition government to sustain the domestic pressure.

Institutional Legitimacy of PPP Government:

The legitimacy of the government was well supported by the judiciary and the army. Judiciary warned Dr. Qadri not to interfere in the affairs of the state and the election process.⁶⁰ The Pakistan Army also stayed away from the political crisis and did not become a party in it.⁶¹ Resultantly, the confidence of government increased significantly. It is important to mention that in Pakistan's political context as well as in weak democracies that the role of Army in political conflicts can influence its outcome. Hence, the PPP government declared confidently that the government will complete its term and the elections will be postponed. Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, Syed Khurshid Shah said that "elections will be taking place in the first week of May 2013".⁶² Media

⁵⁶ Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," 1151-1169.

⁵⁷ "Malik Urges Qadri to Vacate D-Chowk by Thursday," *Express Tribune*, January 16, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/495116/malik-urges-qadri-to-vacate-d-chowk-by-wednesday-night/> (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁵⁸ "Qadri is a Dual National, Means No Good: Khar," *Express Tribune*, January 16, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/494740/qadri-is-a-dual-national-means-no-good-khar/> (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁵⁹ "US Calls for Pakistan to Resolve All Internal Issues," *The Nation*, January 17, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-17/page-2/detail-3> (accessed January 1, 2018).

⁶⁰ Baig, "The End of Time for Rulers!"

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Military Coups in the Post-Cold War era, *The Nation*, January 17, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-17/page-1/detail-0> (accessed December 31, 2017).

also played a mature role in this conflict and the PPP led coalition government did not use any coercive measure to stop media coverage. This act of government encouraged the media to portray a soft picture of the government. Media as a strong pillar of the society gave a fair coverage to both parties of the conflict. Resultantly, the public got to hear both points of views prior, during and after this conflict. The viewing public could make independent assessments without any bias.

Islamabad Long March Declaration 2013:

From December 23 to January 16, Dr. Qadri frequently changed his demands, but overall, he wanted to topple the elected government. On January 17, he totally changed his stance after five hours of negotiations and accepted the existing system and termed the Islamabad Declaration as “Democratic Revolution”. He hoped that this would be beginning of a revolution. He left the protest venue with this vague declaration. Based on promises and without the exact date of dissolution of provincial and national assemblies he announced an end his sit-in.

Interestingly, after first two days government did not contact Dr. Qadri for negotiations. On January 17, Dr. Qadri himself offered to negotiate with the government.⁶³ His tone was highly accommodative; however, he gave a very short deadline of 45 minutes for talks.⁶⁴ The PPP led government reacted positively to demand of negotiations, which shows that democratic governments are often remain ready for negotiation with their opponents. The government sent an inclusive team including representatives of allied political parties such as PMLQ, ANP and MQM. In this team Afrasiab Khattak, Farooq Sattar, Qamar Zaman Kaira, Amin Fahim, Mushahid Hussain Syed, Babar Ghauri, Syed Khursheed Shah and Farooq H. Naek, led by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, came and started their negotiations with PAT chief Dr. Qadri. It was a wise decision of the government to take all allied political parties on board. Moreover, the presence of other political parties was also including PML-Q and MQM also helped in inking a final agreement within very short span of time.

The negotiation process was brief and within five hours of negotiations Dr. Qadri announced that both parties have reached on an agreement, which will be signed by Prime Minister. Protestors

⁶³ “Long March Ends: Tahir-ul-Qadri, Govt Agree on Terms for Electoral Reforms,” *Express Tribune*, January 17, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/495303/another-deadline-qadri-gives-90-minutes-to-government/> (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

burst into festivities to hear the news of agreement between their leader and government. It showed the impact of fatigue was showing on the protestors. The brief negotiation process also showed that Dr. Qadri had accepted his defeat and was willing to sign an agreement to save his face.⁶⁵ The declaration was signed by Prime Minister and 10 members of PPP led coalition government and PAT chief Dr. Qadri. The declaration was brief in nature and only had five points, with vague language and without any deadlines. The agreement is as follows:⁶⁶

- The treasury benches in complete consensus with PAT would propose the names of two honest and impartial persons for appointment as caretaker prime minister.
- The National Assembly shall be dissolved at any time before March 16, 2013 (due date), so that the elections may take place within 90 days.
- One month will be given for scrutiny of nomination papers for the purpose of pre-clearance of the candidates under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution so that the eligibility of the candidates is determined by the Election Commission of Pakistan.
- No candidate will be allowed to start the election campaign until pre-clearance on his/her eligibility is given by the ECP.
- The law minister would convene a meeting with a team of lawyers comprising S.M. Zafar, Wasim Sajjad, Aitzaz Ahsan, Farogh Nasim, Latif Afridi, Dr Khalid Ranjha and Humayun Ahsan to discuss the issue of dissolution of the Election Commission of Pakistan.

Fairly, it was the success of the elected government to convince Dr. Qadri to end his sit-ins with a weak document with no clear assurances of implementation on the agreement. He had dropped his demands of dissolution of provincial and national assemblies, dissolution of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the resignation of Prime Minister and President and change of the existing political system. The document did not mention about the national government, which was Dr. Qadri's prime desire and main slogan during the movement, i.e. "Save the State not

⁶⁵ "Face Saving' Agreement Ends Qadri's Long March," *The Nation*, January 18, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2013-01-18/page-2/detail-4>. (accessed December 31, 2017).

⁶⁶ "Full Text: Islamabad Long March Declaration", *Express Tribune*, January 18, 2013. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/495649/full-text-islamabad-long-march-declaration/> (accessed December 31, 2017).

politics”.⁶⁷ Hence, PAT’s struggle failed miserably against a democratic government and Dr. Qadri left the sit-in venue, without any concrete success.

⁶⁷ “Islamabad Sit-In Ends: A Revolution that did not Happen,” *Dawn*, January 17, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/779551/govt-team-qadri-sign-declaration-authenticated-by-prime-minister-islamabad-sit-in-ends-a-revolution-that-did-not-happen> (accessed December 31, 2017).

Chapter 4

Democracies of Simple Majority: Too Strong to deal with Three Movements

Introduction:

This chapter discusses three movements that aimed at dislodging elected government of PML-N. It is a unique case in which an elected government in Pakistan's political history had to face such kinds of political upheavals on regular basis. The government survived despite the agitations on the Constitution Avenue for up to 126 days. The movement of PAT in 2014, PTI in 2014, PTI in 2016 created severe problems for the elected government. These three movements for regime change kept Islamabad paralysed for almost 152 days from 2014 to 2017. The chapter also discusses how, despite extreme and frequent political agitation; an elected government could resolve conflicts amicably through the instrument of negotiations. This chapter also identifies the structural weaknesses, which became reasons of these conflicts, i.e., a weak electoral system, the inefficiency of ECP's election tribunals, which open opportunities for different social and political actors to agitate for change. This chapter also narrates reactions of government and controlled repression, which helped it to sustain during the time of crisis. The chapter provides an insight how democratic leadership remains confident based on political and public legitimacy. The political support of national political parties is another factor, which has been discussed in the chapter as a source of strength for a democratic government. This chapter also discusses that though defective, democracies that have government with simple majority can sustain a crisis in a far better manner than non-democracies. Hence, the government of PML-N being a stronger democratic government as compared to its predecessor - PPP's government due to a larger majority in the parliament - tackled the three major movements of regime change and completed its five years term.

Background:

In the previous chapter it was discussed how a weak coalition government maturely handled protests meant to derail the democratic system restored after a long period of dictatorship. After four months of PAT's protests, the first successful democratic transition had taken place and PML-N formed its government. Unlike, PPP's government, they had larger mandate and clear majority

in the National and Punjab Assemblies. It had acquired 15 million votes, which is almost 33 percent of the total population polled.¹ Likewise, as compared to PPP, PML-N had acquired 162 seats, while 19 independent candidates had joined PML-N after the election. After adding women and minority seats, PML-N has 188 National Assembly seats.² Hence, it had an overwhelming majority in National Assembly leading to less reliance on other political forces. However, many other parties such as JUI-F, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), PML-Functional, Balochistan National Party (BNP) and PML-Zia joined PML-N government. Hence, this government was more stable than the previous government.

However, their period in power also witnessed a lot of political troublesome that threatened to remove them from power. The year 2014 was perhaps the grimmest year for the PML-N as two simultaneous and popular movements by PTI and PAT threatened the government in power. Another movement was launched by PTI in 2016. However, the PML-N government survived these political threats quite successfully and completed its tenure. This chapter will discuss these three movements and responses of an elected government against these movements. This chapter will demonstrate the competing objectives of PTI and PAT against PML-N, while following the Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle and Democratic Peace theory, respectively.

The legacy that Continues: Weak Democracy and Structural Opportunities

As discussed by Sidney Tarrow structural opportunities often lead to collective action,³ the case of Pakistan's electoral system also falls under the same category. The electoral system in Pakistan has long been criticized since 1977 general elections.⁴ From 1970 to 2013 the losing parties had

¹ List of All Constituencies, "General Election May 11, 2013," *Election Commission of Pakistan*, <https://ecp.gov.pk/ResultDetails.aspx?EleId=3&Election=General%20Election%2011%20May%202013> (accessed January 4, 2018).

² "Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Seat Distribution," *National Assembly of Pakistan*, http://www.na.gov.pk/en/members_listing.php?party=101 (accessed January 2, 2018).

³ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5.

⁴ "As Pakistan Goes to Polls: Rigging and the Elections," *Dawn*, May 08, 2013, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/812664> (accessed January 2, 2018); *PILDAT*, "The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan's Transition from Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy Under Rule of Law 1970-2013," August 2013, http://gallup.com.pk/bb_old_site/election/First10GeneralElectionsofPakistan_August2013.pdf; (accessed January 2, 2018) *Citizens' Group on Electoral Process (CGE)*, "A Dispassionate Analysis of How Elections are Stolen & Will of the People is Defeated: Reflection of Electoral History of Pakistan 1970-2008," *PILDAT*, January 2008, <http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/elections/HowElectionsStolen.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2018).

blamed the military for allowing rigging and stealing peoples' mandate.⁵ Some had blamed military for tempering with the election results⁶ while others blamed the political parties in equal manner.⁷ The general consensus is that the electoral results can be manipulated and votes can be bought with power, money and other means, making it difficult for public to elect according to their desires. Furthermore, lack of implementation on the electoral laws and lack of accountability of breaching those laws is often witnessed in many cases.

Therefore, the assumption of 'rigged elections' 'stolen mandate' 'controlled democracy' has often been heard after many general elections. This has been witnessed in 1977, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008 and 2013. Apart from two general elections, i.e., 1977 and 2013, these accusations have lessened with the passage of time.⁸ General elections 1977 and 2013 led to popular movements against democratic governments. Tehreek-i-Nizam-e-Mustafa movement led to institutional intervention and military rolled back the entire democratic system, which has been comprehensively discussed in chapter 4 of the study. However, the alleged rigging of 2013 and subsequent movement against a democratic government became one of the strongest movements in the political history of Pakistan. Perhaps, the democratic system of the country would keep experiencing such kinds of movements in future due to the structural opportunity of weak electoral system of the country as the PML-N government experienced the movement in August 2014.

Setting the Ground:

The international observers, particularly from the European Union observing teams marked 2013 general elections as satisfactory due to various reasons such as improvement in ECP's stronghold, increased number of women turnout and smooth polling process in two major provinces Punjab and Sind.⁹ Unlike international observers, the main political parties, including PTI and PPP alleged rigging and complained mismanagement in elections, which created a general perception that elections were not impartial. PPP's Co-Chairman and former President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari

⁵ *Citizens' Group on Electoral Process (CGE)*, "A Dispassionate Analysis of How Elections are Stolen & Will of the People is Defeated: Reflection of Electoral History of Pakistan 1970-2008," *PILDAT*, January 2008, 40-43, <http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/elections/HowElectionsStolen.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2018).

⁶ *Ibid*, 40-43.

⁷ *Ibid*, 40-43.

⁸ *Ibid*, 40-43.

⁹ 'Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission', Commonwealth Secretariat, May 11, 2013.

<http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/project/documents/Pakistan%20General%20Elections%202013%20Commonwealth%20Observer%20Mission%20Report.pdf> (accessed July 6, 2018).

blamed Returning Officers (ROs) for rigging in Punjab province.¹⁰ However, due to poor performance of his party in their tenure led to little hopes for PPP to win in Punjab. Likewise, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) was not satisfied with the election process and asked for the probe.¹¹ PTI was most vocal in claiming that rigging had taken place in Punjab and on majority of national and provincial constituencies. PTI had also organized rallies and sit-ins mainly in Karachi and Lahore to register their protest against rigged elections.

However, they could not build momentum on their agitation and gradually ended their sit-ins in both cities. However unintentionally, following the Sharp's approach of cause-conscience Imran Khan, the Chairman of PTI tried to convince the public about the lack of legitimacy of PML-N government. After one month of general elections, he addressed the National Assembly and spoke about the rigging in general elections of 2013.¹² During his speech, he demanded the investigation and reopening of four seats of the National Assembly.¹³ However, the government did not accept his demand. Later, he repeated his demand on many other occasions, but government utterly ignored his demand. Since June 19, 2013, to April 2014, Imran Khan tried to convince public, political leaders and intelligentsia that general elections of 2013 had been massively rigged and PML-N did not have the legitimacy to rule on the country. Gradually, his political rhetoric gained traction with media, public and the intelligentsia.

Meanwhile several issues such as soured civil-military relations, lack of progress in energy security, unpopular budget of 2013-14, etc. led to creation of set of grievances in some segments of society and the powerful institution of the military. The civil-military relation was the major factor among others that created an environment of against the government, which encouraged political parties to agitate. The trial of former Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf under Article 6 of Pakistan's constitution of 1973, for high treason case,¹⁴ was the source of confrontation between military and civil leadership. The murder attempt of renowned journalist Hamid Mir and

¹⁰ Khalid Qayyum, "Elections 2013: Zardari Blames ROs for PPP's Defeat in Punjab," *The Express Tribune*, May 20, 2013, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/551779/elections-2013-zardari-blames-ros-for-ppps-defeat-in-punjab/> (accessed January 2, 2018).

¹¹ "PTI, JI Blame Rivals for Rigging in 2013 Polls," *Samaa TV*, April 29, 2015, <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2015/04/pti-ji-blame-rivals-for-rigging-in-2013-polls/> (accessed January 2, 2018).

¹² "Imran Khan Speech in National Assembly on 19 June 2013, FULL Speech," *Youtube*, June 19, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLU2Xd6abfA>, (accessed January 2, 2018).

¹³ *Ibid*.

¹⁴ "Food for Thought Mian Sahib," *The Nation*, August 02, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-02/page-7/detail-7> (accessed January 2, 2018).

Geo TV's allegations against Director General Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), premier intelligence agency of Pakistan, and support of this allegation by information Minister Pervez Rashid were two major incidents, which created a trust deficit between civil and military leadership.¹⁵ However, these are the major conspiracies which often surfaced on political scene of Pakistan, yet the role of Pakistan Army in internal politics cannot be denied.

Another, major factor of the helping and facilitating these movements to bring down the elected government was the role of electronic and social media. Numerous videos of rigging, mismanagement, etc. were widely circulated, which further helped Imran Khan to awaken the cause-conscience in the public. Due to massive outreach to social and private electronic media, gradually some segments of society got convinced that rigging did take place in general elections. However, Imran Khan tried to allege interim government of Punjab and the leadership of PML-N. He tried to build his case that the rigging was organized and planned to give an election victory to PML-N.¹⁶

From June 19, 2013, to May 2014, Imran Khan conducted numerous press conferences and organized various public gatherings and frequently repeated his stance of rigged elections of 2013. Gradually, he also started demanding the probe of general elections, particularly in four constituencies of Lahore and Sialkot. The demand intensified, while the government did not take serious notice of his extensive public outreach. In the early days of May 2013, he announced a massive public gathering in Islamabad on 11th May to mark the first anniversary of general elections 2013. Initially, the government was reluctant to give permission of this gathering; however, later it allowed PTI to hold a political gathering in Islamabad. During his speech on May 11, Imran Khan demanded a probe into electoral rigging and warned that he could launch a movement struggle against the government.¹⁷ He gave one month notice to the government to

¹⁵ "Food for Thought Mian Sahib," *The Nation*, August 02, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-02/page-7/detail-7> (accessed January 2, 2018).

¹⁶ "Imran Claims 2013 Polls 'Biggest Fraud' in Pakistan's History," *Dawn*, June 08, 2014, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1111216> (accessed January 2, 2018).

¹⁷ "Imran Khan Jalsa (rally protest D Chowk Islamabad) 11th May 2014," *YouTube*, May 11, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dvlqc0XFhpM> (accessed January 2, 2018).

answer his four questions related to 2013 general elections. However, the government categorically ignored his demands and did not respond officially.¹⁸

After one month, Imran Khan announced that he would organize a long march against the rigged elections of 2013. Meanwhile, Imran Khan kept increasing his political pressure by organizing major and minor rallies against the government. Following the strategic nonviolent struggle theory of Gene Sharp, he announced that the public should gather in front of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) every Friday and register protest against massive rigging in general elections and inability of ECP to take necessary measures to control it.¹⁹ After this announcement, thousands of protesters used to gather in front of the ECP building for registering their protests.²⁰ This kind of protests took place five times in front of ECP building. It was another factor, which not only trained workers of PTI for demonstrations but it also created a social awareness against rigging.²¹

Meanwhile, Imran Khan alleged the ruling elite particularly the Sharif Family were to blame for many issues related to slow socio-economic development, youth unemployment, exclusiveness in infrastructure development, alleged corruption, bad governance, etc.²² He tried to portray Nawaz Sharif as a corrupt politician who had been stealing the people's will in every general election. Meanwhile, PTI also tried to gather different political forces. In this regard, PTI's first tier of leadership Shah Mehmood Qureshi (vice chairman of PTI) and Javed Hashmi (former President of PTI) tried to convince other political forces to join hands against the incumbent government.²³ However, PTI could not convince any significant political party to form an alliance against the elected government. However, the momentum for waging a nonviolent struggle was rapidly building in favour of PTI.

¹⁸ "Food for Thought, MianSahb," *The Nation*, August 02, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-02/page-7/detail-7> (accessed January 2, 2018).

¹⁹ "Can Sharif Take on All his Opponents?" *The Nation*, May 26, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-05-26/page-2/detail-0>; accessed January 4, 2018, "Imran Slams Imran Again," *The Nation*, May 20, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-05-20/page-6/detail-4> (accessed January 4, 2018).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² "PTI Activists, Police Clash in Front of ECP Office," *The Nation*, May 17, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-05-17/page-2/detail-3> (accessed January 4, 2018).

²³ "PTI Delays Faisalabad Show for Two Days," *The Nation*, May 15, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-05-15/page-2/detail-5>. (accessed January 4, 2018).

Mixed Initial Reaction of the Elected Government:

The reaction of the elected government against PTI's protest was mixed in nature. Initially, it ignored his demands and did not respond to his public outreach. However, gradually the government felt threatened by the growing momentum of PTI's massive public appeal and decided to respond against Imran Khan's allegations after the announcement of long march. Several federal ministers and the Prime Minister gave statements and described these protests and long marches as 'anarchic political tactic' to destabilize the country.²⁴ The counter narrative of the PML-N government was based on two major points. Firstly, they tried to portray PTI's protests as a conspiracy against democracy and development of the country. Secondly, they chose to present legal hurdles, which did not allow them to accept of PTI demands. The government said that according to the law and the Constitution, the Election Tribunals could only order, verification of the votes and their recounting. Section 46 of the Representation of Peoples Act (ROPA) 1976 envisages that a tribunal may order inspection of any counted ballot papers or opening of packets of counterfoils and certificates.²⁵ Hence, the government could not order the probe and investigation of any constituency.

Another interesting issue as discussed in chapter 2 (figure 1) move of the government was to put pressure on Imran Khan through legal means. In this regard, the government contacted individuals who had been criticised by Imran Khan during his public gatherings. Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar, the son of former Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary filed a case against Imran Khan for his disqualification from National Assembly.²⁶ This was a politically motivated case in order to damage Imran Khan's political rhetoric against the incumbent government. However, this move did not work out as per the desires of the government.

Meanwhile, as democracies tend to solve issues through dialogue, PML-N government generously offered to PTI chief Imran Khan for negotiations. This was another effort of PML-N government to settle the issue. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif used to initiate many development projects in

²⁴ "Two Wrongs," *The Nation*, July 17, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-07-17/page-6/detail-0>. (accessed January 4, 2018).

²⁵ "PTI's Demand for Thumb Impression Might Bear no Fruit," *The Nation*, June 28, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Islamabad/2014-06-28/page-2/detail-1> (accessed January 4, 2018).

²⁶ "Arsalan Moves for Imran's Disqualification as MNA," *The Nation*, July 08, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-07-08/page-3/detail-6> (accessed January 4, 2018).

order to portray that such development projects are because of PML-N government. Hence, PML-N tried to convince public that the government was trying to build the country, while PTI was sabotaging this development process.²⁷ During these months he initiated three power projects, i.e., Jamshoro power project, Rahim Yar Khan, Sahiwal, Muzaffargarh, Jhang, etc to prove his point.²⁸ Federal ministers also tried to portray Nawaz Sharif as the symbol of development and Imran Khan as the symbol of political agitation and instability.

However, four days prior to long march, in a national security committee meeting Nawaz Sharif offered talks to Imran Khan. The momentum of a PTI's movement was at its peak and the Prime Minister could feel a major challenge to his government. Riding high on the crest of public support therefore, he offered for negotiations, which was categorically rejected by Imran Khan.²⁹ For the next one week the democratic government softened its tone and kept trying to convince the PTI chief to refrain from the long march. In this regard, they reached out to JI chief Siraj-ul-Haq and asked him to mediate between the two warring parties. However, JI chief could not stop Imran Khan from his long march. However, during the meeting between Siraj-ul-Haq and Imran Khan, the latter assured former that the struggle will remain nonviolent.³⁰

Lastly, one day prior to long march, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif unexpectedly accepted all demands made by Imran Khan including formulation of a judicial commission to inquire about the alleged rigging in elections. Clearly, the government's response to a political leader and its party was following the policy of appeasement. However, the government's response to Dr. Qadri was radically different. They never made such generous offers to Dr. Qadri prior to his long march. This approach shows that democrats often do maintain appeasing policies towards only democrats. This approach has also been highlighted in the literature that democracies remain relatively softer towards democracies as compared to non-democracies. Largely, the government had assessed that Imran Khan and Dr. Qadri needed different treatment. In their calculation Khan had greater public appeal as compared to Qadri. The power base of Qadri was restricted to his Minhaj followers,

²⁷ "PM Invites Imran to Talks," *The Nation*, May 10, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-05-10/page-1/detail-0> (accessed January 4, 2018).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ "PM's Talks Offer Rejected Out of Hand," *The Nation*, August 10, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-10/page-1/detail-2> (accessed January 4, 2018).

³⁰ Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) chief Sirajul Haq failed to convince Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) chairman Imran Khan to abandon his Azadi March, *Dawn News*, August 11, 2014. <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1124692> (accessed July 8, 2018).

while Khan had been able to mobilize the youth. Khan's political power was more vibrant and had the potential to cause major damage to the government. Hence, Khan had to be treated with more respect.

Escalation at Model Town: A Misadventure

The overall impression of democracies is that they do not escalate conflicts; rather, they try to manage conflicts. The Model Town incident can be a blot on any government, democratic or undemocratic. It was mismanaged by the Punjab government and its aftermath continued to haunt till their last days in power. The government had a point of view that since Dr. Qadri had no vote bank, so he could be handled roughly. The clashes in Model Town led to the death of 14 people and more than 83 were injured on July 16, 2018.³¹ This mismanagement (often described by Dr. Qadri as oppression) escalated conflict to an undesirable level. Almost all political forces of the country condemned this unfortunate event. It had negative fallout. The government was subjected to severe criticism by all political forces.³²

It gave an excuse to PAT and PTI to demand resignation of PML-N Punjab government. They were able to extract the resignation of the Law Minister of Punjab Province.³³ PAT had alleged that Chief Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Law Minister of Punjab, Rana Sana Ullah are responsible for these killings. PAT had claimed that Rana Sana Ullah had issued direct orders to the police to act against PAT's workers when they resist against removal of the barriers and blocks around the Minhaj-ul-Quran Secretariat.³⁴ However, it could not satisfy the families of victims.

Moreover, the government tried to heal the wounds of the victims by offering compensation to their families. Furthermore, it reached out to the Ulema and Mashaikh (clerics and religious scholars) to gain their traction within the religious elite of the society.³⁵ Dr. Qadri belongs to Barelvi sect of Islam and enjoys religious vote bank in this school of thought. In this context, the government tried to present a message to public that the majority of Barelvi Ulema did not support

³¹ Ashraf Javed, "Battle 'Stop Qadri' Kills Eight," *The Nation*, June 18, 2014, <https://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-06-18/page-1/detail-0> (accessed January 2, 2018).

³² Ibid.

³³ "Sana's Resignation Reflects Gravity of Situation," *The Nation*, June 21, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Islamabad/2014-06-21/page-2/detail-1> (accessed January 4, 2018).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ "PML-N to Contact Ulema, Mashaikh Against PTI, PAT Protests," *The Nation*, July 11, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-07-11/page-5/detail-4> (accessed January 4, 2018).

democracy and nonviolence. This strategy was adopted as an effort to neutralize the religious vote bank. However, a significant counter-narrative against Dr. Qadri and Model Town escalation could not develop. Dr. Qadri drew political mileage out of this carnage. Since Model Town's tragic incident, Dr. Qadri has never put it on the back burner. Rather, he has been pursuing this case until today and trying to pile political pressure on PML-N Punjab leadership neither the federal nor the provincial governments toppled as a result of it. Overall, the Model Town escalation caused a lot of force and gave it a lot of ammunition to agitation.

Strategizing Struggle: Parallel Sit-ins

The overall environment was conducive for mounting a vigorous political movement. PTI's one-year long struggle of the awakening conscience of the public against the organized rigging had created an environment of delegitimizing the incumbent government. Model Town's tragedy had led to public anger. Lack of accountability against the culprits of Model Town tragedy and inability of registering First Information Report (FIR) had created an atmosphere for agitation. The consistent cause-conscience created by Imran Khan had developed a feeling against PML-N as a corrupt, manipulative, oppressive ruling elite, concerned only with furthering their own interests.

There was apparently no overt coordination between PTI and PAT to join forces. They happened to be at the same time at the same place together on 14 August. As discussed before the ultimate objective of both parties was to topple the government in Islamabad because it had rigged elections and shot and killed almost 100 people in Model Town Lahore. PTI named it Azadi March (Freedom March) and PAT named its *Inqelab March* (Revolution March). It was indeed a difficult phase for the elected government to handle two marches simultaneously. Perhaps, that is why PML-N government and Prime Minister publicly tried to negotiate with PTI, while ignoring PAT. Interestingly, Dr. Qadri had no clear plan if government was toppled. Hence, there was growing concerns within civil society, intelligentsia and bureaucracy about his plan if government toppled in the wake of his protests. PTI was confident that they would be able to force the resignation of the Prime Minister and the new elections would bring PTI to power and Imran Khan would become

the Prime Minister of the country.³⁶ PTI had much wider support in civil society, the intelligentsia and bureaucracy as compared to PAT.

Another interesting debate was about the capacity and sustainability of these protests. It was clear that due to religious motivation and anger due to the Model Town incident and better organization, PAT workers could manage to sit-ins of longer duration. As compared to previous sit-in protests in Islamabad during the month of January, the weather was also favourable for long term sit-ins. Contrary to PAT workers, though PTI had spent enough time on cause-conscience and had eroded the credibility of the PML-N government, yet they were not well organized. Hence, it was less likely that the PTI would be able to sustain a long protest movement. Therefore, it was a hope and confidence in government circles that they could manage the pressure for one or two weeks.

As far as the logistics are concerned, both parties had tried hard to strategize their movements. Imran Khan had ordered PTI MNAs and MPs to bring public from across the country. On the other hand, the PAT chief had organized his followers by inviting students, teachers, and administration from all Minhaj-ul-Quran branches. The long marchers travelled very slowly and reached in Islamabad in 40 hours.³⁷ Though, there are different claims related to attendance of participants in both long marches. Yet, a careful figure represents somewhere between 100,000 to 125,000 participants in both protests. However, after four to five days of sit-ins the number of participants decreased substantially. According to official estimates, PTI's participants were between 30000, while PAT had participants about 32000.³⁸ However, these are the estimates of those participants who were present at the sit-in venue for the first 24 hours. The participation of the public used to increase manifold during the speeches of PTI Chief in the evening. After 31st August clashes between protestors and security forces the number of participants further decreased, which was a positive sign for the government and a source of concern for the leadership of PTI and PAT. PTI

³⁶ "Today is Decisive Day: Imran," *The Nation*, August 17, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-17/page-1/detail-0> (accessed January 4, 2018).

³⁷ "Day 1: Hours later, PTI's 'Azadi' March Still Far from Islamabad," *Dawn*, August 15, 2014, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1125273> (accessed January 3, 2018).

³⁸ Asad Kharal, "Numbers: Who had Biggest March of Them All?" *Express Tribune*, August 20, 2014, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/750991/numbers-who-had-biggest-march-of-them-all/> (accessed January 3, 2018).

chief Imran Khan was very annoyed with the organizers and instructed his party MPs from Rawalpindi to gather at least 200 people from every union council during his evening address.³⁹

PTI leader tried to up the anti-government struggle by calling for ‘civil disobedience’ movement against the PML-N government.⁴⁰ Imran Khan encouraged people to stop paying taxes, utility bills and general sales taxes. This was indeed an extreme step against the incumbent government. However, he had not psychologically prepared his followers for this extreme measure. Though, the idea was to enhance the cost of rule, but it was an abrupt decision, which could not be effectively carried through. As a result, the idea of civil disobedience miserably failed within a few days. It had also provided enough material for the government to criticize the ongoing protests. Government used it effectively against protests and tried to label their protests as a conspiracy against Pakistan.

As the political situation worsened both the government and the opposition parties sought the help of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif to resolve the conflict.⁴¹ It was a sure sign that the political parties found themselves unable to contain the crisis. It also proved that the Army was stronger than national political system. The government enacted Article 245 in Islamabad, which gave military and paramilitary forces more powers to protect the specific places, buildings etc. Hence, Army had been allowed to enter the fray. Interestingly, Imran Khan and Dr. Qadri agreed to the mediation of COAS and met with him separately. They negotiated with him for few hours and gave the impression that the Army Chief had given them some understanding.

Apparently, COAS assured them that their grievances will be attended by the civil administration, particularly about the registering FIR against the killing of 14 people in Model Town. However, there was no clear solution for PTI’s demands presented in the meeting. After meeting with the COAS, both parties decided to move into the Red Zone. PAT marched towards the Parliament, while PTI also followed PAT,⁴² which rang alarm bells and strengthened the common view that this was being done because of the Army’s support. However, no one could prove the relationship

³⁹ Aamir Yasin, “Imran Khan Unhappy with Azadi March Attendance,” *Dawn*, September 04, 2014, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1129792> (accessed January 3, 2018).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ “Imran Calls for Civil Disobedience,” *The Nation*, August 18, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-18/page-1/detail-2> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁴² *Ibid.*

between protestors and the Army. March towards Red Zone heightened the tensions between protestors and the government.

The Prime Minister moved out of the Red Zone and stayed in Lahore during the month of August and September 2014. Both parties repeated the same mistake committed by PAT during its previous protest. They had moved into the Red Zone and were bottled up. The government was able to contain the protesters in the Red Zone and ensure a stalemate. As discussed in the previous chapter how Red Zone served as the “death trap” for the protesters. It also provided a solid reason to government to use coercive means to disperse the crowd. However, the government showed restraint and offered negotiations.

Interestingly, both parties PTI and PAT accepted the government’s offer of negotiations.⁴³ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif formed two separate committees to negotiate with both parties. Committees were formed based on those people who were enjoying good relations with protesting parties. The negotiations took place for almost the whole night of 21st August 2014 and ended on a deadlock on the negotiation of PM’s resignation.⁴⁴ The government refused to budge. However, other three demands, including formation of judicial commission, opening of four constituencies, registering FIR of Model Town incidents were accepted by the government.⁴⁵

This deadlock led to suspension of the negotiations by PTI on August 22nd, 2014.⁴⁶ On 23rd August, PTI submitted resignations of 34 PTI members of the National Assembly to speaker National Assembly.⁴⁷ Moreover, it also threatened that PTI lawmakers from the provincial assemblies could also give resignations in coming days. The response of the government was a mixed affair. There was some confidence that these resignations could not make a substantial difference and ECP could arrange for by-elections. Another school of thought was concerned about this political development as it could further weaken the credibility of the government. However, the later school of thought was in the minority and the government; therefore, government did not take

⁴³ “Talks Lube Capital’s Stiffened Milieu,” *The Nation*, August 21, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-21/page-1/detail-2> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

resignations of PTI seriously.⁴⁸ For the next five days, both government and protestors negotiated with each other, but the deadlock on the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif continued. Meanwhile, PTI chairman consistently showed his resolve to continue sit-ins until the PM resigns from his seat.⁴⁹ Hence, the stalemate continued for the next one week.

Controlled Escalation

On 30th August PTI and PAT marched towards the PM Secretariat, which was the threshold of government's restraint. The government, which had shown restraint for past two weeks, decided to take controlled action. Three people were killed and over 550 injured.⁵⁰ The PML-N government was extra cautious about using force against protestors after the Model Town incident. Hence, rubber bullets, tear gas, water cannon, clubs and stones were used to disperse protestors from PM secretariat.⁵¹ More than one hundred protestors were also kidnapped during that night.⁵²

PTI tried to spread the protest to different cities of the country. In this regard, the major show of strength was in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). PTI KPK chapter protested in Peshawar condemning the oppressive measures which were used against the peaceful protestors.⁵³ Likewise, the PTI Lahore chapter staged sit-ins in front of Governor House.⁵⁴ However, these sit-ins and protests were short-lived and ended within two and three days, respectively. Resultantly, PTI had to solely rely on the protests staged in the federal capital. The clashes were short-lived as the government again decided to use restraint as its policy to handle the situation.

⁴⁸ "Talks Lube Capital's Stiffened Milieu," *The Nation*, August 21, 2014. <https://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-21/page-2> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁴⁹ "Imran Asks PM to Resign for 30 Days," *The Nation*, August 24, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-08-24/page-4/detail-0> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁵⁰ "Pakistan Protesters Storm Secretariat, PTV Office," *The Hindu*, September 01, 2014, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/pakistan-antigovernment-protesters-head-to-prime-minister-nawaz-sharifs-house/article6369095.ece> (accessed January 03, 2018).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² "PTI Stages Rally in Peshawar Against Govt," *The Nation*, September 01, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-09-01/page-4/detail-7> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ "PTI Holds Protest Outside Punjab Governor's House," *The Nation*, September 02, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-09-02/page-2/detail-2> (accessed January 4, 2018).

Negotiate and Negotiate: A Democratic Approach

After brief clashes on the night of 30th and 31st August, PTI and PAT again consolidated their protests and people gathered again in D-Chowk, who had earlier dispersed due to use of force by security forces. PTI and PAT leadership was determined that they could still topple the government.⁵⁵ They reiterated their objective and showed their firm resolve and determination to remove the government. Meanwhile, the government's committees again started their negotiation process separately with PTI and PAT. The negotiations between PTI and the government were more exhaustive and comprehensive. Almost 12 rounds of talks took place between two parties in one week on the demands of PTI.⁵⁶ The government showed more patience with PTI as compared to PAT, because of its popularity and because it appeared to be a legitimate political force. The government did not negotiate with PAT for two days. Moreover, their negotiation process always remained relatively brief as compared to negotiation process between PTI and the government committee. Hence, there were less chances of any agreement between PAT and government.

The exhaustive negotiations between PTI and the government also did not break the ice. Lists of final demands from both parties were shared during their 12th round of talks.⁵⁷ However, the deadlock over the resignation of PM continued the negotiations. The government was unwilling to accept this demand of PM's resignation. The head of the government's committee and Finance Minister, Ishaq Dar categorically called PM's resignation's demand as nonnegotiable. However, he informed that the other demands were generally negotiable, and majority of demands were accepted by the committee. PTI's demands, including the formation of an independent judicial commission were accepted. Due to these extensive and comprehensive talks spanning over the few weeks led to scarcity of funds for PTI. It had started facing difficulties in maintaining the momentum of its protests. Therefore, PTI decided to end the negotiation process considering it a tactic to exhaust their protests. A final list of demands was given to the government the negotiations were broken off.

⁵⁵ "PTI Chief Reveals Balochistan Rigging," *The Nation*, September 08, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-09-08/page-2/detail-3> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁵⁶ "PTI Shows Conditional Flexibility on PM's Resignation Demand," *The Nation*, September 09, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-09-09/page-1/detail-4> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Re-strategize the Movement and Government's approach:

With every passing day momentum of protests was petering out and the participation was shrinking. As Erica Chenoweth deplors that violence in nonviolent struggle often backfires for protestors. In this regard, she opines that violent episode reduce the level of participants as the peaceful participants often remain in the majority.⁵⁸ The participation level in both protests reduced considerably. This was highly discouraging for the leadership of the protestors. By the end of September 2014, the momentum of the protests was virtually dead. Although, PTI was beating the drums every night with a speech of their chairman, supporters were gradually leaving the protest venue.

In the third week of September 2014, PTI decided to internationalize their movement by staging protests in front of the United Nations (UN) and tried to humiliate PM Nawaz Sharif during his visit to the US.⁵⁹ Moreover, PTI had also decided to stage a protest in the citadel of PML-N leadership in Raiwind, Lahore.⁶⁰ PTI had also decided to revitalize their campaign by organizing rallies in different cities. All these actions were mean to regain the lost momentum. PTI had also organized a protest in Lahore to showcase their political power. From this protest, the momentum of the protests and confidence of PTI leadership was revived. PTI leadership also tried to gain the sympathies of the common workers by addressing their issues.⁶¹

Meanwhile PML-N published a white paper against KPK government of PTI.⁶² It was politically damaging as it carried significant reports of mismanagement in development projects by PTI's provincial government. The PTI leadership rejected the white paper was a pack of lies and devoid of facts.⁶³ However, the third week of October brought a breath of fresh air for PTI after almost 45

⁵⁸ Eric Stoner, "Participation is Everything — A Conversation with Erica Chenoweth," *Waging Nonviolence*, July 14, 2012, <https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/participation-is-everything-a-conversation-with-erica-chenoweth/>; accessed January 3, 2018, Jack Duvall, "Why Violence Undermines Protests," *International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC)*, July 27, 2017, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/violence-undermines-protest/ (accessed January 3, 2018).

⁵⁹ "PTI Plans Protest in Front of UN Office During PM's Visit," *The Nation*, September 21, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-09-21/page-4/detail-0> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁶⁰ "Imran Khan Steals Punjab's Heart," *The Nation*, September 29, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-09-29/page-1/detail-3> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁶¹ "Imran Calls for Greater Respect to Women," *The Nation*, October 02, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-10-02/page-3/detail-7> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁶² "PTI Terms N White Paper Pack of Lies," *The Nation*, October 04, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-10-04/page-2/detail-6> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁶³ Ibid.

days of lost momentum. On October 17, 2014, PTI backed independent candidate won by-election against their renegade MNA Javed Hashmi in NA-149.⁶⁴ PTI had achieved a major victory, and much was made about it during their speeches and TV programs. After this victory, Imran Khan announced that the next year will be the year of general elections and party workers must start their preparations for those elections.⁶⁵

Stalemate and PAT's departure:

For the next 40 days the war of words continued between PTI and government. Imran Khan seemed highly determined that he would continue his protests and sit-ins until the PM resigned from the office.⁶⁶ However, he had lowered his expectations of removing the government. That is why he was now insisting on the resignation of PM asking him to go on a leave for 30 days from his office.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, Dr. Qadri was so disappointed from the overall progress of his protests and sit-ins that he decided to leave the D-Chowk (sit-ins venue) on October 20, 2014.⁶⁸ After 66 days of protests PAT had decided to end their protests. As a matter of face-saving Dr. Tahir ul Qadri said that the protests will now be held across Pakistan,⁶⁹ however, nothing substantial witnessed from PAT in the next few months. The PML-N government claimed victory and asked PTI to end their protests as well. As the PTI experienced an acute lack of resource, the government decided to prohibit sit-ins in Red Zones through presidential ordinance.⁷⁰

However, following Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle, Imran Khan did two things to sustain and regain the momentum of the movement. Firstly, he sent a four-member team to the US and Europe for fund raising.⁷¹ Secondly, he gave a new deadline for a series of protests. In this regard, he gave the deadline of November 30 and asked his party workers and party

⁶⁴ "PTI Bowls Out Ex-champ," *The Nation*, October 17, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-10-17/page-1/detail-3> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁶⁵ "Imran Sees Elections Next Year," *The Nation*, October 18, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-10-18/page-1/detail-3> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁶⁶ "Imran Strengthening, Not Ending, Sit-in," *The Nation*, October 25, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-10-25/page-1/detail-5> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ "Qadri Announces the End to Islamabad Sit-ins," *Dawn*, October 21, 2014, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1139440> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

members to join for a final showdown.⁷² Initially, no one took his deadline seriously, however slowly and gradually momentum began to build for the next round of agitation in next two weeks.

On 30th November, Imran Khan announced his next strategy during the presence of a large gathering. This time he chose the strategy of dispersed and widespread protests. In this regard, he announced that he would shut down three major cities and on December 16, PTI will jam whole country until the PM Nawaz Sharif resigned.⁷³ Those three cities include Lahore, Karachi and Faisalabad. In this regard, he chose Lahore as his first destination of protest, Faisalabad and Karachi would follow.⁷⁴ Lahore and Faisalabad were paralysed on the call of PTI in early December. Hence, the momentum again shifted in its favour. However, Karachi's show of power was relatively weak. Meanwhile, government and PTI once again decided to negotiate and talks again started between the two parties. Two rounds of talks held till December 16, 2014.⁷⁵ PML-N also launched a movement to seek public support. In this regard, it organized rallies and seminars in support of PM Nawaz Sharif. This was an effective counterstrategy. Several rallies in favour of PML-N were organized in Lahore and Faisalabad to throw the opponents, the government was still strong.

On December 16, a tragic incident took place in Peshawar. Terrorists broke into Army Public School Peshawar and killed 146 children between the ages of 7 to 15. This shook the whole nation. It was one of the gravest terrorist incidents in the history of the country. Hence, the PM Nawaz Sharif invited all political forces to unite against terrorism. PTI also positively responded to his call and participated in the All-Parties Conference (APC). On the evening of 17th December, PTI announced the end of sit-ins arguing that this was a time of national crisis and it wanted to give time to the government to respond to the crisis.⁷⁶ Hence, 126 days of protests ended without any meaningful outcome for PTI.

⁷² "Ordinance in the Offing to Bar Protesters," *The Nation*, November 03, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-11-03/page-3/detail-3> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁷³ "Imran Threatens to Paralyse Pakistan on 16th," *The Nation*, December 01, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-12-01/page-1/detail-4> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ "Imran Warns of Plan-D if JC not Formed," *The Nation*, December 16, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-12-16/page-1/detail-2> (accessed January 4, 2018).

⁷⁶ "Again, a Winning Strategy by the Captain," *The Nation*, December 18, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-12-18/page-5/detail-0> (accessed January 4, 2018).

There are competing narratives related to calling off sit-ins by PTI after 126 days. PTI believes that it was the need of the hour to end the political crisis and give a fair chance to government to fight against terrorism.⁷⁷ Perhaps, it was also a physiological and moral pressure of public on PTI leadership to end the protest in the larger national interest. Some also believe that perhaps it was the Army who wanted to end this political crisis in the wake of APS attacks. Hence, they played their role as the Army used to do in past to end the political crisis. Contrary to such kinds of narratives, the ruling party tried to portray that PTI used the APS Peshawar incident as a face saving and ended their sit-ins.

Another narrative about the ending of PTI's sit-ins is supportive to democratic peace theory. According to some reports, PM Nawaz Sharif warmly met with the PTI's leadership during the APC in Peshawar, which was unexpected. PM's softer approach towards PTI's leadership during the meeting, perhaps encouraged them to reciprocate in the same manner. However overall, the gesture of PM Nawaz Sharif to PTI's decision was encouraging, which shows that the political leaders do encourage peaceful resolve of the conflicts. PM Nawaz Sharif not only welcomed PTI's decision, but he also ensured that the formation of a commission to complete the inquiry on alleged rigging in general elections of 2013. Resultantly, a judicial commission was formed which did not find any evidence of organized rigging in general elections 2013. However, it did highlight major discrepancies, which would again trigger a new conflict in the next election 2018.

Weak Democracy and Structural Opportunity:

The end of PTI protests on the rigging and subsequent results of the judicial commission in favour of PML-N government were highly encouraging for the incumbent government and discouraging for PTI. Therefore, PTI as a political force was at its lowest ebb of popularity, while the PML-N was enjoying the strong moral and political legitimacy. After 15 months of calm political situation, on April 3, 2016 another unexpected issue erupted, that shaken the political stability in the country. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) revealed details of tax haven and offshore entities of more than 214,488, including the firms of Pakistani first family PM Nawaz and

⁷⁷ Shafqat Mehmood, PTI's Information Secretary and Member National Assembly (MNA), now a federal minister in Imran Khan's government, in discussion with the author, December 29, 2017; Mian Mehmoodur Rashid (Opposition Lead Punjab Assembly of PTI from 2013-2018), now provincial minister in Punjab Government in discussion with the author, December 29, 2017; Faisal Javed Khan (Additional Secretary Information of PTI), now Senator of PTI in discussion with the author, December 23, 2017.

his sons'.⁷⁸ According to ICIJ, eight companies were linked with the PM Nawaz and his family, including his sons, daughter and brother (CM Punjab Shahbaz Sharif).⁷⁹ This gave a chance to PTI to start another anti-government movement.

Gradually, the ICIJ revelations were started dubbing as 'Panama Leaks', which created grim challenges for the government. PTI got another chance to blame Nawaz Sharif and his family for massive corruption. PTI chairman Imran Khan happily claimed that 'the leaks are God sent' and demanded immediate action from government institutions.⁸⁰ The first family's reaction was spontaneous, that these allegations of ICIJ are distortion of information.⁸¹ The next day on April 5, PM Nawaz Sharif addressed the nation and announced investigation of ICIJ allegations while denying the charges against himself and his family.⁸² However, neither media nor PTI was pacified. The crisis gradually swelled into another movement against the incumbent government.

For consolidated democracies, the future of the Panama Leaks case might have had different results. However, being a weak democracy revolving around dynastic politics, Panama Leaks case had an entirely different future. Pakistan's democracy is plagued with dynastic politics, which leads towards a strong alliance of urban oligarchs and rural feudal with two major families, Bhuttos and Sharifs. These two families have elected three times and two generations have occupied these two political parties. These families are considered as the center of gravities for these two parties. Being majority parties in the country, these two families have been in the position to appoint their favourite individuals as heads of state institutions dealing with accountability issues. These institutions include National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), etc. The heads of these institutions are supposed to oversee financial, administrative and elections related matters. The lack of accountability of the two powerful political families, i.e., Bhuttos and Sharifs led to public uproar

⁷⁸ Hasham Cheema, "Panama Papers Leaked; Sharif Family under Spotlight," *Dawn*, April 3, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1316531> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ "The Leaks are God Sent' Says Imran Khan," *Dawn*, April 4, 2016. dawn.com/news/1251233 (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁸¹ Maryam Nawaz, "Sharif Family's Official Response to Distortion of Information Given in Panama Leaks," *Twitter*, April 4, 2016, https://twitter.com/MaryamNSharif/status/717001109320114176/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.Dawn.com%2Fnews%2F1316531 (accessed January 8, 2018).

⁸² "PM Nawaz Sharif Address to Nation Over Panama Leak Documents," *Youtube*, April 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ywJbDFrTP7Y> (accessed January 8, 2018).

particularly in Punjab and KPK provinces. PTI gradually convinced public that these institutions will not be able to take appropriate action on ICIJ revelations due to PM Nawaz Sharif's political influence. PTI's political campaign and media's criticism gradually inflamed public opinion. Hence, structural weaknesses once again provided an opportunity for PTI to mobilize its support base. Hence, for next 6 months, PTI tried to mobilize public following Gene Sharp's method of cause-conscience awakening.

Reactions of Government:

The reaction of the government towards the Panama Leaks was highly democratic and accommodative. Nawaz Sharif addressed the nation twice for two months and tried to clarify his position in parliament. He also offered to establish a judicial commission and invited the opposition to formulate the Terms of References (TORs). However, some scholars believe that these acts were deceptive in nature. They believe that there was nothing democratic in Nawaz Sharif's attitude. He was concerned and he wanted a way out of the mess that had been created due to his overseas properties.⁸³ Whatever the reasons, these measures were accommodative in nature and were aimed at conflict resolution through pacific means.

Due to the results of previous sit-ins, ruling party was confident that it would be able to ride the storm. As a starter, the top leadership of PML-N unleashed a counter-narrative against the PTI leadership through portraying it as a party of corrupt elites. In this regard, they targeted different individuals who had been active members of PTI, including Jahangir Tareen, the party's Secretary General and Aleem Khan a powerful businessman from Lahore. A mudslinging campaign had been launched to direct the attention of the masses.

Nawaz Sharif offered himself for any kind of probe and his party portrayed this approach as an undeniable proof of his innocence. He also assured during his second televised address to the nation that he would resign, if proven guilty.⁸⁴ In this regard, PM Nawaz formed a parliamentary

⁸³ Shafqat Mehmood (Information Secretary and Member National Assembly (MNA) of PTI) now a federal minister in Imran Khan's government, in discussion with the author, December 29, 2017; Mian Mehmoodur Rashid (Opposition Lead Punjab Assembly of PTI from 2013-2018), now provincial minister in Punjab Government in discussion with the author, December 29, 2017; Faisal Javed Khan (Additional Secretary Information of PTI), now Senator of PTI in discussion with the author, December 23, 2017.

⁸⁴ "Will Resign and Go Home if Proven Guilty, Vows PM Nawaz Sharif," *Youtube*, April 22, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RIZ1R-cJn0> (accessed January 8, 2018).

committee headed by Finance Minister Ishaq Dar to formulate TORs for probe of Panama Leaks. Ironically, Ishaq Dar himself was allegedly behind this corruption as being Chartered Accountant (CA), he had a wider knowledge of such safe tax havens. Hence, there was a trust deficit in opposition parties on the government's sincerity. According to PTI, the formulated TORs were highly ambiguous and wider in scope, which could take decades to probe the offshore companies.⁸⁵ Mainly the TORs of the government's parliamentary committee formulated as below:⁸⁶

1. To examine information relating to involvement of Pakistani citizens, persons of Pakistani origin and legal entities in offshore companies in Panama or in any other country.
2. The involvement of former and present holders of public office in writing off their own bank loans or those of their immediate family members through political influence.
3. Transfer from Pakistan of funds which have originated from corruption, commissions or kickbacks, and to determine whether, in any case referred to above, any law for the time being in force in Pakistan has been infringed.

PTI categorically rejected these TORs, while other political parties were unclear of how to respond. Most of them particularly PPP, the second largest political party wanted the matter to be resolved in the parliament. However, after a few days, the rest of the opposition also rejected the TORs and demanded that these be formulated in consultation with the opposition. Within one week, there was a demand for the resignation of the PM. PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto demanded his resignation on May 01, 2016, until the probe completes. Moreover, this time the opposition parties were apparently united on this issue. In this regard, opposition parties announced their TORs. They had emphasized on initiating the inquiry into offshore holdings, starting with the Sharif family. The TORs of opposition parties are as follows:⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Shafqat Mehmood (Information Secretary and Member National Assembly (MNA) of PTI) now a federal minister in Imran Khan's government, in discussion with the author, December 29, 2017; Mian Mehmoodur Rashid (Opposition Lead Punjab Assembly of PTI from 2013-2018), now provincial minister in Punjab Government in discussion with the author, December 29, 2017; Faisal Javed Khan (Additional Secretary Information of PTI), now Senator of PTI in discussion with the author, December 23, 2017.

⁸⁶ "How Pakistan's Panama Papers probe unfolded", *Dawn*, April 16, 2016, updated on July 7, 2018, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1316531> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

1. Whether a respondent, by concealing the ownership and source of income through which the properties were purchased has committed corrupt and illegal practices under the elections/tax laws.
2. A special law titled “Panama Papers (inquiry and Trial) Act 2016” should be passed to facilitate the investigation into the assets, both foreign and domestic, of the prime minister. The law shall be formed with the consensus of the opposition parties.
3. A special commission should be formed, headed by Chief Justice and comprising two other SC judges nominated by him.
4. The procedure of the inquiry shall be fully inquisitorial in character. The commission should complete its inquiry in relation to the prime minister and his family in three months.

The government did not accept these TORs and considered them as person specific and prejudicial in nature.⁸⁸ As political tensions intensified, the Army started playing its role as a pacifier. The COAS, General Raheel Sharif suggested that PM Nawaz Sharif to resolve the issue peacefully. On the other hand, the Supreme Court (SC) rejected to intervene in the political issue. In response to the government’s request, SC said “Formation of a commission of inquiry under the Pakistan Commission of Inquiry Act 1956 (Act VI of 1956), looking to its limited scope, will result in the constitution of a toothless commission, which will serve no useful purpose, except giving a bad name to it,”⁸⁹ which further confused with the existing situation. Furthermore, the registrar of SC said that “the ToRs of the proposed commission are so “wide and open” that “it may take years” for the commission to conclude proceedings.

Setting the Ground:

The PTI leadership tried to convince public that Nawaz Sharif and the family had looted and plundered the country and its resources. They were wasting public money on their personal lavish lifestyle. Their businesses had been flourishing through the support of black money, nepotism, misuse of power, etc. PTI leadership tried to establish a strong narrative against corruption, which gradually gained traction with the media and the civil society. Imran Khan had managed to succeed

⁸⁸ Tariq Fazal Chaudhary (Federal Minister Capital Administration and Development Division (CAD) of PML-N), in discussion author, December 16, 2017.

⁸⁹ “CJP declines to form 'toothless commission' on Panama leaks”, *Dawn*, May 13, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1258127> (accessed June 13, 2021).

with his political rhetoric. Meanwhile, he also tried to put pressure on Nawaz Sharif for the formulation of a judicial commission to probe allegations against him under the supervision of the Chief Justice of Pakistan.⁹⁰ The government wanted to form a judicial commission comprising former Supreme Court judges.⁹¹

PTI not only vigorously started public campaigns to educate people regarding Panama Leaks and highlighted the case in the media. By the mid of June, the Panama Leaks case became the most famous and important political issue, which overwhelmed many other issues including the economy and security of the country. Meanwhile, there was a stalemate between the opposition and government in the formulation of TORs and to break it, PTI filed a petition in SC against the PM on June 24, 2016. The number of people in political gatherings of PTI began to increase. The public wanted the eradication of corruption. Intelligentsia, civil society and powerful institution (Pakistan Army) were also in favour of corruption free and better governed Pakistan.⁹² A massive drive of an anti-corruption campaign started by PTI gained momentum.

Though, government wanted to continue negotiation process,⁹³ but opposition ended further deliberations.⁹⁴ However, there was a wide divide among opposition parties over the future course of action. The PPP and other political parties wanted to protest in parliament, while PTI wanted to resort to street protest. The PML-N worried that PTI was in hurry to topple the government.⁹⁵ Their apprehensions were not far wrong when PTI declared the lockdown of the capital.

In this regard, PTI tried to build momentum by criticizing accountability institutions as well as highlighted corruption. Meanwhile, JI and PTI filed separate petitions for probe of Panama Leaks and seeking disqualification of PM Nawaz Sharif on August 24 and August 29, respectively. Moreover, for the next one-month PTI tried to build momentum through highlighting corruption

⁹⁰ “Khan Wants CJP to Head Commission,” *Dawn*, April 10, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1316531> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁹¹ “Five Ex-SC Judges Refuse to Lead Inquiry,” *Dawn*, April 13, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1316531> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁹² Kamran Yousaf, “Lack of governance initiatives worries army”, *The Express Tribune*, November 11, 2015, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/989082/lack-of-governance-initiatives-worries-army/> (accessed January 17, 2018).

⁹³ Tariq Fazal Chaudhary (Federal Minister Capital Administration and Development Division (CAD) of PML-N), in discussion with the author, December 16, 2017.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Tariq Fazal Chaudhary (Federal Minister Capital Administration and Development Division (CAD) of PML-N), in discussion with the author, December 16, 2017.

of the ruling elite and their influence on accountability institutions. After one month of deliberations with party members as well as building momentum against the government, Imran Khan, PTI chairman announced to lock down Islamabad until the resignation of PM Nawaz Sharif.

On October 20, 10 days prior to lock down deadline SC accepted the PTI's petition against PM Nawaz Sharif. Interestingly, both parties to the conflict, i.e., PTI and government welcomed this development. PM Nawaz hoped that PTI should wait for SC decision and end the upcoming lockdown. Yet PTI was determined to lock down Islamabad, which confirmed their intentions of toppling the government. Perhaps, PTI was expecting the similar type of leniency from the government during the lockdown attempt, as it had shown in 2014 by allowing two rallies to enter Islamabad. However, this time government took preemptive action and was aggressive as compared to the past.

Government's Aggressive posture:

It had adopted a comprehensive approach to stop massive public gathering in the capital. There can be two major reasons of this aggressive approach. Firstly, unlike in 2014 there was no 'Model Town' incident, which could put pressure on the government. Secondly, perhaps the government had sensed that there will be less public participation in the upcoming lockdown.⁹⁶ Hence, they tried to further reduce public participation by not allowing a substantial gathering in Islamabad on the given day. After initial exhaustive negotiations on the formulation of ToRs, the government concluded that the objective of the lockdown was neither the accountability of Panama Leaks nor the resignation of Nawaz Sharif,⁹⁷ rather, it was bent on to toppling the government.⁹⁸ Hence, it was decided to obstruct large public gatherings through road blockades, arrests of third tier of PTI leadership as well as house arrests of PTI leadership at Bani Gala. According to some media reports, over 100 PTI members were arrested one week prior to protest.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Tariq Fazal Chaudhary (Federal Minister Capital Administration and Development Division (CAD) of PML-N), in discussion with the author, December 16, 2017.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ "Over 100 PTI Workers Arrested in Islamabad Crackdown," October 27, 2016, *The News*, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/160339-Police-descend-on-PTI-gathering-many-arrested> (accessed January 8, 2018).

Major arteries leading from Punjab to Islamabad were blocked. Interior Minister Ch. Nisar Ali Khan was clear in his strategy that ‘Even if your enemy says that he wants to come to your home, you open your doors for hospitality, but if someone says that he wants to occupy your house, then what will be your reaction?’¹⁰⁰ However, the government showed restraint in using sheer force against protesters coming from KPK to Islamabad. Only tear gas and batons were used to disperse the crowd.¹⁰¹ Therefore, no one killed during the two days long skirmishes between PTI activists and security forces. The government was able to obstruct the mass gathering in Islamabad. A few hundred people could gather in front of Bani Gala (residence of Imran Khan), which discouraged and disappointed the PTI leadership. Moreover, the government successfully obstructed people from KPK, which was the backbone of PTI protests in 2014.¹⁰²

End of Conflict:

Due to government’s anticipatory reaction, twin cities (Islamabad and Rawalpindi) remained paralysed for almost one week due to excessive road blockades, the presence of police and paramilitary forces, etc. Mobile phone service also remained suspended in many sectors of Islamabad. The major entry points of Islamabad remained closed, and police tried to obstruct PTI supporters from entering the city. From October 30 to November 01, PTI could not gather sufficient people to paralyse the capital. On November 01, the Supreme Court during the hearing of the Panama Leaks case remarked that both parties should remain peaceful and end their extreme positions. In this backdrop, Imran Khan abruptly ended the lockdown attempt of Islamabad during his speech with a few hundred people at Bani Gala.¹⁰³ PTI used remarks of Chief Justice of Supreme Court to make a face-saving exit and declared victory for themselves.

¹⁰⁰ “Choudhary Nisar Ali Khan Media Talk,” *Youtube*, November 01, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=49bp5v-DR94>, (accessed January 8, 2018); “Interior Minister Choudhary Nisar Ali Khan Press Conference in Islamabad,” *Times of Islamabad*, November 01, 2016, <https://timesofislamabad.com/01-Nov-2016/interior-minister-ch-nisar-ali-khan-press-conference-in-islamabad>, (accessed January 8, 2018).

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ “Imran Khan Exclusive Media Talk in Bani Gala,” *Youtube*, November 01, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5yuLDZ5WmY> (accessed January 8, 2018).

A Victory for the Elected Government:

The decision to call off the lockdown was a victory of the elected government. However, PTI still does not accept that it was a come down.¹⁰⁴ The fact is that this retreat happened because PTI could not gather more than a few thousand people from across the country. The ruling party, PML-N also shares this view.¹⁰⁵ The government's preemptive strategy to stop people from KPK entering Islamabad, arrests of local PTI leaders in all major districts of Punjab and house arrest of PTI leadership in Bani Gala also paid off. PTI's boycott of parliament due to persistently failing in by-elections did not serve their purpose because parliamentary support was lacking. To celebrate their defeat as victory, the PTI leadership observed the 2nd of November as Youm-e-Tashakur (Day of celebration). The government allowed PTI workers to gather for their celebrations on November 2 and did not create any hurdles.

To sum up, PML-N face three major protests to topple them during their term in office. PAT kept demanding resignation of Chief Minister Punjab over Model Town tragic incident until the last day of PML-N in power. However, these all movements failed miserably. The failure of these movements to unseat elected government authenticates the primary assumption of this study. Firstly, elected government survived the threats due to its political legitimacy. To counter the political protests, PML-N also organized massive rallies. It goes to their credit that since 2014 PML-N has won all six by-elections held in Punjab and won the local government elections held in the province.¹⁰⁶

This further increased their hold on power and helped them complete their term in office. The confidence among many PML-N workers and leaders showed that they had been able to master the art of surviving street protests.¹⁰⁷ Secondly, this also supports Gene Sharp's idea regarding

¹⁰⁴ Shafqat Mehmood (Information Secretary and Member National Assembly (MNA) of PTI) now a federal minister in Imran Khan's government, in discussion with the author, December 29, 2017; Mian Mehmoodur Rashid (Opposition Lead Punjab Assembly of PTI from 2013-2018), now provincial minister in Punjab Government in discussion with the author, December 29, 2017; Faisal Javed Khan (Additional Secretary Information of PTI), now Senator of PTI in discussion with the author, December 23, 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Tariq Fazal Chaudhary (Federal Minister Capital Administration and Development Division (CAD) of PML-N), in discussion with the author, December 16, 2017

¹⁰⁶ Ibid; Ahmad Noorani, "PTI Lost All Six By-elections after Dharna," *The News*, August 17, 2015, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/56846-pti-lost-all-six-by-elections-after-dharna> (accessed January 8, 2018).

¹⁰⁷ Tariq Fazal Chaudhary (Federal Minister Capital Administration and Development Division (CAD) of PML-N), in discussion with the author, December 16, 2017.

repression, which has resulted in the undoing of authoritarian governments. Elected governments were more accommodative to political opposition. They offered all kinds of negotiations, including to defuse political tensions and peacefully resolve the differences, leaving little space and logic for political opponents to agitate.

PART-III

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 1

Findings

This section has been divided into two major subsections for further clarity of the reader/reviewer. Firstly, what are the main conclusions of this study for Pakistan specific civil resistance movements? Secondly, what are findings that can be explored further and how they can contribute for the future discourse of civil resistance literature?

Findings related to Pakistan's Specific Civil Resistance Movements:

The study of civil resistance movements against democracies generally lack legitimacy due to the strong perception among the Pakistani public that these are not genuinely for the people and by the people, rather Pakistan military often uses such movements as its tactic to keep pressure on the elected governments in Pakistan. This perception/theory has been strongly propagated not only by media and scholars, but also by those governments who dealt with these movements. Nawaz Sharif has repeatedly claimed that the 2014 movement of PTI had the support of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) but he could not substantiate his claims. However, a perception was created that took the wind out of the sails of the protest movements against an elected government.

Another interesting finding of the study is that the no politically motivated movements to change elected governments remain largely confined to a single province or to best at two provinces. Hence, they lack comprehensive presentation of entire Pakistani population. The rest of the country did not support their demands of political change. For instance, KPK and FATA regions were very highly charged during the PTI sit-ins in 2014 but Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Azad Kashmir and Islamabad did not support PTI's demand of an amateur political change. In fact, people from Sind, Balochistan, Azad Kashmir and Islamabad did not participate in the movement, which substantially reduced the numbers of movement leading to its ultimate failure.

The study has highlighted those defective democracies are stronger than non-democracies against strategic nonviolent struggle due to various reasons. The study primarily assumes that defective democracies can sustain pressure of civil resistance far better than nondemocratic regimes, due to the strong sense of legitimacy, flexible behaviour of politicians and democratic institutions,

support of national and international democratic community, lack of strategic skills to pressurize governments, robust marketplace of ideas and lack of violent measures to curb the resistance. Hence the study has been divided into two parts.

The first part of the study is theoretically explaining the logic behind democratic triumph in nonviolent conflicts, while the second part of the study discusses three democratic governments of Pakistan who had been engaged in internal nonviolent conflicts and dealt against those nonviolent struggles exceptionally far better than military dictators of the country. Therefore, throughout Pakistan's political history no military dictator could sustain pressure of a nonviolent strategic struggle, while such politically motivated nonviolent movements failed to acquire the desired results against democratic governments until and unless military remains neutral. The study has tried to build relationship between democracy and nonviolent conflict, which has been neglected by academia for a very long time.

It is an interesting pattern in the civil resistance movements of Pakistan against dictators viz a viz elected government that the civil resistance movements to overthrow dictators in Pakistan are often spontaneous and dictators remain unprepared to handle such defiance. This has been witnessed in the cases of Generals Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf. However, contrary to Gene Sharp's idea, these movements did not spend much time on the preparation and setting the ground for their activities. This means a movement against dictator perhaps requires lesser preparation time for cause-conscience. Rather brewing mistrust among public against these dictators helped these movements to gain maximum sympathies of the public within less time.

However, movements against elected governments – weak or strong – require sufficient time to prepare ground for success because unlike dictatorial regimes, democratic governments enjoy public trust. Against democracies, the political legitimacy, lack of political violence and perceptions of conspiracy are key constraints against such movements. It also means that abruptly or spontaneous movements against democracies fail without creating any sufficient impact on the government's legitimacy. In fact, these movements do not able to put pressure on governments. They were easily able to solve such crisis within few days. A glaring example of unpreparedness and failure has also been discussed in the case of PAT's movement in 2013 against PPP government.

The study has taken three democratic government's tenures to strengthen the argument that democracies against nonviolent civil resistance are stronger as compared to non-democracies. In this regard, this study has identified that the culture of popular protest to remove a military regime was introduced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1966. It has also found that since the first strategic nonviolent struggle by Bhutto, culture of nonviolent struggle has gradually evolved in past 50 years. Increased urbanization, use of social media, improved literacy and globalization has enhanced the outreach of political parties. Despite these improved mediums of communication and outreach, democratic governments are still stronger than military dictators against nonviolent strategic movements. No democratic government of Pakistan has ever resigned due to a nonviolent strategic struggle.

The study has also found that the recent three successive attempts for political change in the country through nonviolent civil resistance have failed. This has further encouraged the incumbent democratic governments of Pakistan. The idea has prevailed in the country that these movements will ultimately fail to succeed against democratic governments. Therefore, the already engrained confidence of legitimacy and public support among leaders has further enhanced. Therefore, the incumbent PTI government has repeatedly offered opposition political parties to wage a nonviolent campaign against his government. He also offered them that he would facilitate the protesters with refreshments and logistics. However, despite his repeated instigating calls the opposition parties seems reluctant to wage such kind of movement because the chances of success are limited against a democratic government.

This study has highlighted some positive impacts of strategic nonviolent struggles in Pakistan. It has identified several key areas such in the social and political spheres, which have been directly affected by the strategic nonviolent struggle. Overall, this study has argued that mass mobilization, political awareness, strengthened democracy are some positive indicators of strategic nonviolent struggle. It has also proved that these movements have helped in improving political maturity among different political leaders, which will help strengthening democracy of Pakistan in the long run. These strategic nonviolent movements for regime change have also highlighted various structural weaknesses in the country, which used to be a source of political conflicts. Hence, a comprehensive reform process is in the process, including electoral reforms, which has paved the way towards consolidating the democratic society. Moreover, these strategic nonviolent

movements have also encouraged many social, economic, ethnic and political interest groups to wage a nonviolent struggle for their respective rights. The study also highlights that the culture of waging such movements has also provided a forum to aggrieved segments of the society. Furthermore, they have also improved the socialization of political entities of two provinces Punjab and KPK.

The study has found that weak democracies such as Pakistan often face severe challenges from state institutions and society. Most of the times weak democratic governments in third world countries generally and in Pakistan particularly fight for their existence throughout their mandated term. However, society at large cannot change these elected governments without the support of institutions. Civil resistance for regime change has been generally perceived in third world and particularly in Pakistan as a military's tactic for a change in government. It is perceived that the military cannot directly change regime due to changing nature of Pakistani society. Therefore, civil resistance will remain a force that will keep brewing challenges for democratic governments. Perhaps, the first and foremost issue will again emerge legitimacy of general elections 2018.

This study has highlighted some positive impacts of strategic nonviolent struggles in Pakistan. It has identified several key areas such as social and political, which have been directly affected by the strategic nonviolent struggle. Overall, this study has argued that mass mobilization, political awareness, strengthened democracy are some positive indicators of strategic nonviolent struggle. It has also proved that these movements have helped in improving political maturity among different political leaders, which will help strengthening democracy of Pakistan in the long run. These strategic nonviolent movements for regime change have also highlighted various structural weaknesses in the country, which used to be a source of political conflicts.

Hence, a comprehensive reform process undergoing in the country, particularly the electoral reforms, which pave the way towards a strong democratic society of the country. Moreover, these strategic nonviolent movements have also encouraged many social, economic, ethnic and political interest groups to protest for their respective rights. The study also highlights that the culture of these waging such movements has also provided a forum to aggrieved societies to vent out their political grievances. Furthermore, they have also improved the socialization of political entities of two provinces Punjab and KPK.

Findings/contributions for Future Discourse of Civil Resistances:

This study has found that democracies in any form – weak, strong, transitional, and mature – contain relatively stronger democratic values and higher moral grounds as compared to authoritative regimes. This assumption leads them not to solely rely on the use of force against protesters, civil rights activists, etc. They do follow the democratic norms that compel them to find political and peaceful settlement of the dispute. Likewise, institutions also work in accordance with democratic values under the democratic leadership. Resultantly, no use of force or controlled use of force with less lethal weapons has been witnessed in many cases. Moreover, most of their demands except the resignation of the government fulfilled during the course of their protests. Their grievances often addressed by the democratic governments without any hesitation. Hence, protestors and leadership of the movements do not find sufficient reason to prolong their nonviolent action for regime change.

This study has also formulated a pattern of strategic responses by two different political systems against civil resistance movements. It has found that how two different systems respond through entirely different approaches against civil resistance, which ultimately produce different results of the movements. The study has found a strong connection between responses of the government and outcomes of the movements. It has also tested and extended the democratic peace theory and proved that democracies have norms of compromise and cooperation that prevent conflict escalation. Hence, the study found a lack of aggression and lack of indiscriminate repression from elected governments against civil resistance movements.

It has also found that, all determinants of democratic peace theory, including practical political experience, institutional obstacles, democratic norms, social and political pressures and legitimacy have a strong impact on the internal nonviolent conflicts in democracies. The study has also identified that apart from other factors, perhaps, repression is one of the major factors which help movements' activists to use against the rulers and democracies often use repression as a limited option. Hence, this study had helped in verifying the basic assumption of the thesis that due to above mentioned factors democracies are harder to topple through civil resistance movements as compared to non-democracies.

Moreover, the study has also found a strong relationship between weak democracies and nonviolent conflicts. This study has also contributed to existing scholarly work on the democratic peace theory, strategic nonviolent struggle and the relationship between democracy and conflicts. This study has also explored a strong relationship among above mentioned theoretical paradigms. Weak democracies often provide structural opportunities to people for collective action. In this regard, the study has proved that nonviolent strategic struggle movements often try to strategize their movements by following the Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle. However, this study found that democracies effectively resist against such strategic nonviolent struggle movements by following the theory of democratic peace. The study has also expanded the scope of democratic peace theory to nonviolent conflicts. It has tried to discuss and prove that nonviolent conflicts in democratic societies are also equally important and challenging to democratic governments as violent conflicts can be. Hence, it has highlighted the importance of strategic nonviolent struggle in academia.

The study identifies that the leadership of the movement must not only focus on the internal weaknesses but also try to hit the strength of the opponents, which are known as 'pillars of power'. The debate of quality vs quantity, role of gender in nonviolent action, role of media in this form of conflict, cost and benefits associated with this conflict etc. are largely major contributing factors impacting the movement in either way. All forms of modern communication tools are essential in shaping people's mind for the struggle and alternative plans, philosophy and policies can further strengthen the nonviolent action against the status quo. The role of external actors is also highly important during the execution of the resistance against the government. The study highlighted some challenges to nonviolent action, which can be removed with appropriate strategic planning and tactics. The overall analysis of the nonviolent action says that it is not an easy task to wage nonviolent struggle against the powerful, but if properly managed, it can be proven as the most useful technique to dismantle the status quo.

Moreover, the study has also found a strong relationship between weak democracies and nonviolent conflicts. This study has also contributed to existing scholarly work on the democratic peace theory, strategic nonviolent struggle and the relationship between democracy and conflicts. This study has also explored a strong relationship among above mentioned theoretical paradigms. Weak democracies often provide structural opportunities to people for collective action. In this

regard, the study has proved that nonviolent strategic struggle movements often try to strategize their movements by following the Gene Sharp's theory of strategic nonviolent struggle. However, this study found that democracies effectively resist against such strategic nonviolent struggle movements by following the theory of democratic peace. The study has also expanded the scope of democratic peace theory to nonviolent conflicts. It has tried to discuss and prove that nonviolent conflicts in democratic societies are also equally important and challenging to democratic governments as violent conflicts can be. Hence, it has highlighted the importance of strategic nonviolent struggle in academia.

In the context of Pakistani social movements, the degree of the awakening consciousness of the public has been varying from case to case. In case of Bhutto's struggle against Ayub Khan, he spent almost two years in preparing the ground for his struggle against Ayub Khan. He kept discussing different compelling issues, which helped him to gain support and erode of Ayub Khan's support and legitimacy among different institutions as well as in public. He travelled several times on rail from Rawalpindi to Lahore and addressed numerous gatherings. The incumbency factor also helped Bhutto as many grievances had piled up during those ten years of Ayub Khan's regime such as Tashkent Declaration, inflation, lack of inclusiveness in economic development, etc. Bhutto himself faced a spontaneous movement, which needed less time to build up. In fact, rigged elections and subsequently, hard approach to deal with protestors triggered the subsequent events.

Likewise, PAT's movement for electoral reforms seriously lacked the *cause-consciousness* ingredient, therefore, its leadership could not mobilize massive public support in 2013. Anti-democratic regime movements of 2014 by PTI and PAT had different approaches. Again, PAT did not spend much of its time on *cause-consciousness*, while PTI spent almost one year to set the ground to wage a social movement against the elected government. Hence, there is no direct relationship found between success and failure of nonviolent struggle and awakening of *cause-consciousness* in the context of Pakistani politics.

The study has found that Pakistan's anti-regime movements tried to practice Gene Sharp's theory by adopting some approaches to delegitimize the ruling class. Pakistani social movements have adopted 15 of 198 different methods for securing success in their struggle. These include, sit-ins, lockdowns, staging protests and rallies, boycotts, a failed attempt of non-

cooperation/disobedience, targeting centre of gravity the ruling elite, creating anti-regime songs, social media messages, derogatory social media videos, robust national media campaigns, writing slogans on walls and currency notes, limited marches within towns and cities, though it was limited but resignations of government employees, cultural protests and graffiti movement.

Sharp has defined 198 methods of nonviolent struggle and advised that wise selection of specific method is very crucial in defining the outcome of the struggle. However, in Pakistani political context, most of the movements in 20th century heavily relied on lockdowns, strikes, protests, etc. During the anti-Ayub Khan's movement some students used degrading and disrespectful slogans to humiliate Ayub Khan. However, the advent of 21st century led to the application of another form of protests, i.e., sit-ins in front of major government institutions – parliament, Prime Minister and Chief Minister Offices – which became a popular trend in recent years.

The study has also found that Sharp's idea of seeking international support cannot become a significant factor for regime change in the country. Therefore, largely every movement since 1966 tried to avoid seeking international support. In Pakistani culture, seeking support from international community often invites public anger. Since, social movements rely heavily on peoples' support; hence, it is strategically not possible to annoy the general public for gaining limited support of any international country or group. However, governments often used propaganda against social movements by alleging such movements as foreign conspiracy.¹ Bhutto alleged the US, as a conspirator of anti-Bhutto movement. PML-N sought support of China during the 2014 sit-ins and used the visit of Chinese President as its major achievement. Later, the government tried to build a narrative that these movements were attempts of sabotaging China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This corridor is considered as 'game changer' and revitalize to Pakistan's economy. Therefore, it was an effort to gain public support and sympathies.

This study has also established the fact that nonviolent civil resistance positively contributed to democracy and democratic culture. The study based on quantitative evidence provided with qualitative analysis including case study of Pakistan and arguments sums up the debate that it is highly unlikely for democratic societies to give up democracy as their political system. Apart from other reasons, nonviolent civil resistance has proved to be the major reason and deterrent factor

¹ Sani Hussain Panhwar, "The Pakistan Papers," *Executive Intelligence Review* (January 1979): 3, 8 and 18.

for consolidation of democracy in many societies. The study has also found that democracy can be suspended, or a new system can be imposed on democratic societies for some time, yet the people will ultimately demand democracy as it happened in Pakistan during military dictatorships. Moreover, based on the existing literature and discussion of the study, it can be assumed that the frequency of military coups has reduced, and democratic societies are getting mature with the passage of time.

Likewise, the study has also found that those societies which have experienced suspension of democracy do take measures to curb future military interventions in political matters. In this regard, Pakistan has been presented as a case study for such structural and social reforms, which will avoid future military intervention. These structural measures include economic, social and political measures. Moreover, the study has found that democratic system is highly receptive in nature, and it can easily adopt modifications in it according to different cultures, traditions, etc. Hence, it will likely continue as a political system without any radical replacement as it happened in past with kingship, empires, communism, etc.

It is also found that weak structure and lack of democratic values in societies often lead towards such kinds of political conflicts. Democracies that are confronted by such kinds of populist politically motivated movements in fact lack many democratic values, such as lack of democratic culture within political parties and the society, the dominance of dynastic politics, lack of political tolerance and constant fear of military intervention. In Pakistan, the lack of democratic values within society has negatively affected the overall democratic system of the country. Currently, dynastic politics is stronger, and the younger generation of ruling families is gradually acquiring hold of power within PML-N and PPP.

However, these strategic movements, regular media campaigns and overall changing nature of Pakistani society has gradually changed the mindset of many Pakistanis. Currently, most of the youth considers dynastic politics as a negative trend and detrimental to future of Pakistan's democracy. In this regard, strategic movements of 2013 and 2014 educated many people expressed their discontent with dynastic politics. Yet, the change in political culture from dynastic politics of meritocracy will take time to prevail in the society.

The study has found that the lack of incumbency factor also effectively played its role in favour of democratic governments during the protests. In 2013, many public and political parties rejected the change of government and system because general elections had only been held earlier that year. In 2014, media, civil society, scholars and public at large had seen a transition of power and they were convinced that this elected government needs time to address issues of public interest. Therefore, most people did not participate in sit-ins of 2013 and 2014. The presence of a ruler or a single political party for an indefinite period leads to hopelessness for public. Unlike democratic governments, it is easier for leadership of people's movements to convince the general public against such kinds of dictators and rulers that have been ruling for a very long time.

The study has found that political leadership and society intentionally or unintentionally try to find a conspiracy behind such movements due to their previous experiences of military intervention and influence in politics. Therefore, a sharp division takes place in public and political leadership during these movements, which severely erodes the credibility of the movement. In case of Pakistan this factor has enormously helped democratic governments to acquire political and moral support from political parties, civil society and general public. During the 2013 and 2014 massive movements against democratic governments, civil society and academia were highly concerned about the covert role of the military in political affairs of the country. Numerous articles and speeches of politicians in National Assembly demonstrated their fear of a 'conspiracy' planned and executed by the military against democracy. Though, the leadership of nonviolent movements time and again tried to clarify that these movements were originally planned by political leadership, but majority of civil society and political parties still do think otherwise.

The study has also discussed and discovered that despite lack of democratic values, these governments do behave extremely differently from military dictators. They always seek a political solution of such conflicts and believe that negotiations can end any stalemate. Mainly this is motivation based on their past experiences as political workers. For instance, Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan dealt with massive protests through political means in 2014. He himself had been part of lawyers' movement in 2009 when he opted for the long march to restore the supreme judiciary in the country. Hence, political experiences of democrats reduced the level of their ego and change their approaches of conflict management. Even before the deadline of long march in 2014, the Prime Minister four times offered negotiations and political settlement. Later,

the elected government responded positively after 126 days of sit-ins, when Imran Khan ended sit-ins, the government formed a judicial commission to investigate about the legitimacy of general elections 2013.

The study has highlighted that support of political leadership by other political parties during any political crisis, which was not the case before the advent of the 21st century. After going through a troubled decade of political instability, military coup and experiencing the exile of the leadership of two major political parties signed Charter of Democracy (CoD) in order to support each other during any political crisis. National political leadership supports elected governments during such conflicts as they are also part of the society that believe in military's conspiracies and consider such movements as tactics of regime change. During 2013 and 2014, both mainstream political parties along with other minor political parties supported the elected governments in times of political turbulence. This support further strengthened the legitimacy of democratic governments. During the 2014 massive sit-ins, joint session of the National Assembly was perhaps the turning point of the political crisis as almost every political party, except PTI participated in the joint session and supported the democratic government and democratic system. This national and international political and democratic support provides confidence to elected governments and negatively effects civil resistance.

Unlike military dictators, elected governments do resort to political settlement and avoid any physical confrontation with such movements. Resultantly, movements do not get significant reason to gain momentum. Usually, violence provides sustainability, legitimate and popular reason to demand for change of government. Violence attracts sympathies of society and majority condemns such kinds of acts. Therefore, military dictators often face severe pressure from national and international community when they use coercive measures to tackle the situation. Democratic peace theory comprehensively discussed reasons of this pacifying approach of elected governments.

The study has expanded the scope of democratic peace theory, and by supporting democratic peace theory's basic notion it has further expanded the scope of conflict and its interaction with democracies. Due to increased frequency of nonviolent struggle for regime change, it has become undeniable fact that weak democracies often interact with domestic nonviolent political conflicts. However, this study has set two major limitations to discuss the relationship between democracy

and nonviolent strategic struggle. This study has limited itself to only those movements that have been waged against the elected governments and their results mainly in 21st century.

Overall, the study has covered the debate of scholars on various important issues ranging from definitions of nonviolent action, its characteristics and components, the relationship between conflict and weak democracy, etc. This debate has tried to deconstruct various ‘academic and social mis-constructions’ about nonviolent action and nonviolent discipline. The study has concluded that nonviolent discipline is much more effective than strikes and boycotts. It is warfare against the oppressor, which requires strategic planning, tactical formation and thorough homework. The study also concludes that strategic nonviolent struggle is a long-term process, which requires patience, consistency, and devotion to the grand objective. Moreover, this process should be inclusive, and all segments of society feel righteousness about the struggle. It is known as setting up the counter legitimacy of the struggle.

Chapter 2

Political Agitation for Political Change and its Impact on Pakistani Political Culture

Introduction:

Since 2007, the frequency of agitated and heated politics accelerated in the country. Lawyers' movement 2007 was the first movement amongst many, which emerged as a pioneer movement of a new political culture in the country. Since lawyers' movement, sit-ins have become a popular trend and are being emulated by major political and religious groups to resist their protest, voice their grievances and present the demands without resorting to aggression for achieving these aims. Long March for restoration of judiciary in 2009, sit-ins with body bags by Hazara community for their security in 2012-13, sit-ins for electoral reforms by Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) 2013, long march, sit-ins, lockdown of cities by Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) 2014 and 2016 subsequently, and most recent sit-ins in 2014 and 2016 by Tehrik-e-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA) 2017, have directly impacted on the politics of the country as well as compelled governments to think how to deal effectively against such kind of protests. The culture of street protests and agitation has been adopted by political parties, interest groups, governments and the overall political culture to register their demands. In this backdrop, this chapter will attempt to understand impacts of nonviolent people's movements on Pakistan's national politics and political trends. This chapter primarily assumes that increased frequency of nonviolent struggle has augmented culture of direct participation of public in Pakistani politics and it has also helped in consolidating democratic culture in the country by raising political awareness among masses. The chapter will largely revolve around the question, how nonviolent people's movements impacted the political culture of Pakistan.

Civil Resistance and Democracy:

Apart from many factors which have been defined by Huntington,¹ perhaps, one of the most important factors for the spread of democracy and deterrent to military intervention is civil resistance. There are almost eight significant studies, which have emphasized on the important role

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 188. He has discussed many factors for introducing democracy in the country including economic wealth, high levels of education and literacy, strong middle class, elite desire for democracy, etc.

of civil resistance in the 21st century. A study of Karatnycky and Ackerman has analysed 67 successful political transitions from 1972 to 2005. According to this study, nonviolent civil resistance has led to a durable and sustainable democracy in those countries.² Generally, the mass movements based on nonviolent actions often become a mass scale awareness tool, which helped in pacing up democratization process of the country. The same study as mentioned above quantifies that civil resistance has four times more prospects as compared to using other tools for democratization in the society.³

The civil resistance movements have also shown extraordinary results in strengthening democratic rule in the country. According to the study of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan over quantitative analysis of 323 violent and nonviolent movements from 1900 to 2006, the probability of a successful transition of power and consolidation of democracy is higher than violent movements.⁴ Even the failure of a civil resistance movement helps in democratization of society. In case of Pakistan, the world has witnessed that three nonviolent resistance movements against an elected government only served to strengthen democracy in the country. The detailed impact of those movements in Pakistan's context will be discussed in the next chapter. Likewise, Maciej Bartkowski calculates the chances of democratic outcome of failed civil resistance movements up to 35 percent.⁵

A study by Bethke and Pinckney of 101 regimes quantified that quality of democracy and democratic transitions improve significantly if the society has ever experienced civil resistance movement.⁶ The frequency of nonviolent campaigns has increased rapidly in the second half of the 20th century.⁷ Hence, the democracy has also spread in the same period. The frequency of civil resistance movements generally has been increased manifold in the 21st century. Numerous civic

² Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, "How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy," *Freedom House*, 2005; <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/How%20Freedom%20is%20Won.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2017).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2011) 14.

⁵ Maciej Bartkowski, "Do Civil Resistance Movements Advance Democratization?," *International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC)*, September 27, 2017, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/civil-resistance-movements-advance-democratization/ (accessed September 26, 2017).

⁶ Felix S. Bethke and Jonathan Pinckney, "*Nonviolent Resistance and Quality of Democracy*," (working paper, University of Gothenburg, July 2016), <https://www.v-dem.net/files/45/Users%20Working%20Paper%203.pdf> (accessed September 27, 2017).

⁷ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 4.

rights movements continue in various parts of the world demanding social and economic rights. Hence, it is more likely that democracy will further strengthen in the future where civil resistance movements are active.

Pakistan: Future of Democracy in Age of Civil Resistance

Historically, civil activism by labour unions, student unions, opposition political parties and many other segments of society have been witnessed in the country. The toppling of a dictator Ayub Khan in the late 1960s was the direct result of political opposition and student groups' nonviolent agitation.⁸ In the past five decades, the country has witnessed civil resistance ranging from civil disobedience against General Zia-ul-Haq to movements for freedom of the press, student movements to women's movements for their rights, trade union movements to Balochistan's struggle for rights. Lastly, struggle of civil society and political parties is significant in consolidating democratic culture in the country.⁹

In past few years, the civil society of the country has strengthened in all spheres of life. Generally, it had been focusing on human rights, women's rights, minorities' rights, etc. However, it has started taking participation in the democratic process since 2007.¹⁰ This has led to not only revival of democracy in the country, but also prevented it from another episode of 'suspension of democracy'. In fact, lawyers' movement played a vital role in relocation of civil society's focus from human rights to ruling system of the country. Hence, the country's democracy has revived several times.

Later, the political parties also tried to prevent any new episode of 'suspension of democracy' through enacting new laws. The 18th Amendment and Charter of Democracy (CoD) between two major political parties paved the way forward towards the consolidation of democracy in the country. Article 58/2(b) was abolished, and presidential powers were restricted in the 18th constitutional amendment. These current developments along with the role of media have led to unprecedented mass political participation in the country. All these developments have restrained

⁸ Nadeem F. Paracha, "Uprisings and Downfalls: Attempts at Ousting Pakistani Governments." *Dawn*, October 30, 2014. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1141343> (accessed June 13, 2021).

⁹ Aslam Khwaja, *People's Movements in Pakistan* (Karachi: Kitab Publishers Karachi, February 2017) 63.

¹⁰ Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Maria J. Stephan, "Fighting for the Rule of Law: Civil Resistance and the Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan," *Democratization* 17, no. 3 (May 2010): 492-513.

military to suspend democracy in the country. Furthermore, the active participation of youth and middle class in politics will likely consolidate the democratic culture and democratic rule in the country.

Impact on Pakistani Politics:

Redesigning Political Culture:

Primarily, nonviolent civil resistance movements often shape the political and social fabric of the society. Therefore, such movements are often labeled as anti-status quo. Tarrow believes that mass movements mount challenges through disruptive direct action against elites, authorities, other groups or cultural codes.¹¹ In case of Pakistan, recent people's movements have radically changed the political fabric of the country. The politics of Pakistan used to be divided among rightists, leftists, and center rightists and center leftists' political parties, who used to play their ethnic cards to attract voters. Elections used to be contested based on different developmental projects in Pakistan in 1990s and early 2000s. However, street protests have changed how politics is done in the country. Currently, all political parties are trying to portray themselves as progressive parties who can improve governance and economic conditions of the country. The debates of different political entities often conclude for provision of better social services for Pakistani public.

Likewise, these movements have also raised the level of participation from middle and upper middle classes. Social, print and electronic media along with increased urbanization have facilitated these middle and upper middle classes to actively participate and demand for their due rights from the political elite. Hence, an accommodative political culture has been broadened in recent years for citizens of the country, which has promoted culture of inclusiveness. Major political parties such as Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI), Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and many others have tried to adopt different techniques to broaden their vote bank. These include membership campaigns, registration campaigns, provision of tickets to youth and upper middle-class candidates, etc.

Sidney Tarrow has pointed out that people join social movements in response to political opportunities and then, through collective action, create new ones.¹² In Pakistani context, the media

¹¹ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5.

¹² *Ibid*, 18.

has witnessed that the public participation has been substantially increased in these movements. In the lawyers' movement, thousands of people gathered for a long march in 2009, however, this figure increased up to 50,000 in PAT protest in 2013. In 2014, this figure further increased to more than 100,000. Hence, these figures show that the number of people has increased in Pakistan who believed that street protest is a good way to register their voice. Moreover, many other segments of society such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, nurses, lady health workers, public sector employees, etc have also started their campaigns for social and economic rights. Hence, a culture of more political participation has increased and widened in scope in the country.

Mass mobilization and political awareness:

Marc Morjé Howard and Meir R. Walters sees a strong relationship between mass mobilization and democratization. They opine that barrier to democratization are barriers to mobilization.¹³ Those barriers include maintenance of the status quo through foreign support, various societal actors, which Gene Sharp defines as pillars of power, etc. Mass mobilization often dismantles these barriers and paves the way towards democratization. Popular uprisings and protests not only dismantle existing pillars of power, but also increase awareness related to civic rights, which helps for democratic societies in the long run. This manifestation of dissent affirms the people's political engagement,¹⁴ which leads towards mass mobilization.

Mass mobilization has practically facilitated to political awareness to the general public in Pakistan. This public awareness has not only strengthened democratic norms in the country but has also added stricter public checks and balances on governance issues. Sidney Tarrow has suggested that the collective action often comes from collective objective. Over the years, Pakistani politics has been witnessing a growing concern among many segments of society against corruption and bad governance. Though, these two major issues remained the primary factors for general elections in 2013, however, less public did not witness any structural reform or evidence of curbing this element. Although, the media had been highlighting corruption and bad governance at various levels of society, yet the public itself did not take any collective measure to obstruct this

¹³ Marc Morjé Howard and Meir R. Walters, "Explaining the Unexpected: Political Science and the Surprises of 1989 and 2011," *Perspectives on Politics* June 12, 2014, 394-408; Marc Morjé Howard and Meir R. Walters, "Response to Eva Bellin, Ellen Lust, and Marc Lynch," *Perspectives on Politics* June 12, 2014): 417-419.

¹⁴ Mehwish Moulvi, "The Sit-in Trend," *Daily Times*, January 10, 2018. <https://dailytimes.com.pk/writer/mawish-moulvi/> (accessed June 13, 2021).

vicious cycle of corruption and power in the past. However, mass mobilization in 2014, which was primarily against the weak electoral system, had also highlighted corruption of the ruling elite. Furthermore, Panama Leaks case led to mass mobilization by PTI against the corruption of the ruling elite. Though, these movements failed as per the desires of PTI leadership, yet these two episodes had injected political awareness among masses particularly against the corruption and bad governance.

Political maturity:

Peaceful protests and demonstrations depict the political maturity of society and politicians.¹⁵ It also generates and increases political activities as well as level of patience in society. Throughout history, peaceful protests and demonstrations have played significant role in political maturity and development. According to Teddy Taylor, the US has consistently experienced peaceful protests, which is an effective way to express grievances, hopes and aspirations.¹⁶ The culture of waging such movements provides an additional forum to aggrieved segments of society to vent out their political grievances, which reduces aggression from within the society. During sit-ins and post sit-ins period, Pakistan has conducted eight by-elections.¹⁷ Previously, many constituencies used to experience fights between political workers. These all by-elections significantly remained peaceful as compared to previous elections. It is significant political development, which is primarily due to nonviolent civil resistance in the country.

According to Gene Sharp, power always exists under the umbrella of legitimacy. It is the duty of movement leaders to target the legitimacy of rulers and try to establish their counter legitimacy for the success of nonviolent struggle. During protest and sit-ins in Pakistan, PTI had tried to erode the legitimacy of a democratic government of PML-N through various means such as highlighting corruption and bad governance of the ruling elite. In this backdrop, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif tried to sustain PML-N's legitimacy through various social and economic concessions, which ultimately benefitted common people. For instance, despite the recommendations by Oil

¹⁵ Shirin Ebadi, "Protests are Sign of Political Maturity," *Deutsche Welle*, July 13, 2009, <http://www.dw.com/en/iran-protests-are-a-sign-of-political-maturity/a-4476113> (accessed January 10, 2018).

¹⁶ Teddy B. Taylor, "Peaceful Protests: True Reflection of Democracy," *The National*, May 19, 2010, <http://www.thenational.com.pg/peaceful-protests-true-reflection-of-democracy/> (accessed January 10, 2018).

¹⁷ *Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)*, "By-elections," <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/> (accessed January 10, 2018).

and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), the PML-N government did not increase oil prices, which ultimately benefitted the common public.

Likewise, many developmental projects were launched during the protests and sit-ins. He had also visited flood-hit areas in Sialkot and spoke in public and criticized the protesters in order to rejuvenate PML-N's legitimacy. Targeting youth for attracting into respective political camps was the major leap in the political culture of Pakistan. Laptops distribution, special business loans for youth on lower interest rates, scholarships, etc. were some payoffs for Pakistani youth in the aftermath of increased political pressure on ruling elite due to civil resistance by PTI and PAT.

These protests and sit-ins have also injected political maturity in political leadership. During the protest and four months long sit-ins, the negotiation process between the two rival parties did not stop despite the heightened tensions. The PAT sit-ins of 2013, PTI sit-ins of 2014 and lockdown attempt of Islamabad in 2016, and Tehreek-i-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA) sit-ins of 2017 ended with a politically negotiated agreement. These agreements have shown the inclination of democratic government towards negotiations and peaceful settlement of political conflicts. Moreover, the political leadership has shown restraint in using coercive measures against protesters, which gave a message of peace and coexistence in society.

Structural Reforms:

Gene Sharp opines that usually, strategic nonviolent civil resistance is an act of change beyond the usual means, i.e., change occurs without the obeying existing laws.¹⁸ Change in the system can occur without elections or constitutional reforms.¹⁹ For instance, people could never witness change in various authoritarian societies through elections, however, it was nonviolent civil resistance which provided them the opportunity to change or reform their political system. Hence, strategic nonviolent struggle encourages and increases the pace of reforms in the system. In case of Pakistan, these strategic nonviolent movements for a change in the government have also highlighted various structural weaknesses, which used to be a source of political conflict. Hence, a process of comprehensive reforms has started in the country, particularly the electoral reforms, which paved the way towards strong democratic society and democratic system in Pakistan. Due

¹⁸ Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, 366.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 368.

to political pressure and increased checks and balances, Pakistan government had formed the electoral reforms committee in 2015, which announced election bill 2017 by amending or adding nine major electoral laws.²⁰ In the absence of strategic nonviolent struggle, these amendments might had taken time. However, these struggles have not only created awareness among public for better electoral system, but they also compelled government to prioritize the electoral reforms.

Moreover, since independence of Pakistan, police department has not seen sufficient reforms. However, two major factors particularly terrorism and nonviolent struggle movements have compelled political authorities to revitalize police force in the country. In case of nonviolent struggle movements, the police force remained naïve in controlling public during these conflicts. Since, all protests and long marches have been started from Lahore and ended in Islamabad, the federal and provincial governments decided to establish an anti-riot force to cater those protests.²¹ Hence, these nonviolent struggles have compelled government to take certain measures for structural reforms as predicted by Sidney Tarrow.

Encouraging Socio-economic and ethnic Communities:

Interestingly, Sidney Tarrow had also predicted that the importance of this political culture is that, once a cycle begins, the costs of collective action are lowered for other actors.²² Hence, these strategic nonviolent movements have encouraged many social, economic, ethnic and political interest groups to wage a nonviolent struggle for their respective rights. As predicted Sidney Tarrow, the cost of collective action has been highly low for them, while they have been able to get desired results from democratic governments. For instance, young doctors have been encouraged to wage nonviolent struggle by using Gene Sharp's approach, i.e., "act of commission"²³ for several times.²⁴ Act of commission is defined by Gene Sharp as an act of doing

²⁰ "Electoral Reforms Committee Approves 'Election Bill 2017' With Dissenting Notes," July 20, 2017, *Daily Pakistan*, <https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/pakistan/electoral-reforms-committee-approves-election-bill-2017-with-dissenting-notes/> (accessed January 10, 2018).

²¹ "Lahore Police Inducts New Anti-riot Squad," October 23, 2011, *Pakistan Today*, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/10/23/lahore-police-inducts-new-anti-riot-squad/> (accessed January 10, 2018); "Capital Police Establishing Anti-riot Unit," *Dawn*, October 14, 2014, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1137866> (accessed January 10, 2018).

²² Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8.

²³ Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 41.

²⁴ "Young Doctors Association Calls Off Strike after 15-day Standoff," *Dawn*, August 15, 2017, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1351694> (accessed January 10, 2018).

something which is prohibited by law. Resultantly, they have been able to secure better pay packages and job structure in government hospitals.²⁵ Likewise, teachers in KP and Sindh have also used collective action as an approach for their rights,²⁶ which they acquired through nonviolent struggle. Many other groups such as employees of public sector corporations, nurses, lady health workers, oil tanker owners, etc. have been encouraged to protest for their economic and social rights in the country.

People from Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) used to rely on politicians for structural reforms in their respective area, which had been neglected by the federal government since its inception. FATA had not been part of any other province, neither federal law was applied in the area. However, after witnessing the above mentioned strategic nonviolent struggle of many socioeconomic groups, people from FATA had also decided to wage nonviolent struggle against Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). This movements later known as ‘Pashtun Protection Movement (also the “Pashtun Tahafuz Movement”, or PTM), which staged sit-ins in various important cities of Pakistan. Two years long struggle by various segments of FATA society helped it to secure FATA reforms in 2018.

Negative Impact:

Sidney Tarrow believes that changes in the political opportunity and structure create incentives for collective actions.²⁷ Following the passing of election bill 2017 in the National Assembly, a controversy created an opportunity for a conflict in the country. Electoral reform bill 2017 had amended the oath of candidates affecting the previous oath of finality of prophet hood (Khatm-i-Naboowat).²⁸ Though, sectarian politics is declining with the passage of time from Pakistan, yet the recent political opportunities have encouraged a particular sect to politically organize itself. The successful sit-ins at Faizabad, by TLYRA has shown that they have public support and

²⁵ “Young Doctors Association Calls Off Strike after 15-day Standoff,” *Dawn*, August 15, 2017. <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1351694> (accessed January 10, 2018).

²⁶ “NTS Teachers’ Strike Called Off,” *Express Tribune*, January 9, 2018. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1603695/1-nts-teachers-strike-called-off/> (accessed January 10, 2018); “Teachers Absent from Classes in State-run Colleges Across KP,” *Geo TV*, October 10, 2017, <https://www.geo.tv/latest/161966-teachers-absent-from-classes-in-state-run-colleges-across-kp> (accessed January 10, 2018).

²⁷ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7.

²⁸ “‘Clerical Error’ that Affected Khatm-i-Naboowat Laws to be Fixed: Ayaz Sadiq,” October 4, 2017, *Dawn*, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1361665> (accessed January 10, 2018).

determination to the Pakistani politics. The government had reversed its decision prior to nonviolent struggle as it wanted to end another conflict,²⁹ which shows tendencies of democratic governments' peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, TLYRA later registered itself as a political party in the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). Since its registration as a political party, TLYRA has unexpectedly bagged thousands of votes in two constituencies without any exhaustive electoral campaign. In NA 120 Lahore and PP 20 Chakwal, it had secured third position, respectively.³⁰ Due to strategic nonviolent struggle a new political force has stirred up in the country, which will influence many constituencies in next general elections 2018 based on sectarian politics, which is detrimental for democratic system of the country.

Stability, Instability Paradox of Democracy:

There is a general misconception that strategic nonviolent struggle has increased political instability in Pakistan. Mainly the proponents of this narrative are the representatives of the government. In past PML-N had waged a nonviolent struggle in collaboration with lawyers for restoration of judiciary against PPP government. Likewise, PPP had faced PAT's struggle in 2013, yet it has been rallying around PAT to wage another nonviolent struggle against Punjab government. Hence, it seems biased and limited opinion of establishing relationship between strategic nonviolent struggle and political instability. Likewise, apart from numerous politicians, one school of thought from academia also believes in relationship between political instability and economic performance. Hibbs, Gupta, Alesina & Perotti believe that generally, sit-ins, lockdowns, strikes, boycotts, etc are seen through pessimists' lenses.³¹ Pessimists often consider above mentioned approaches for the acquisition of political rights as political instability. Perhaps, nonviolent struggle may lead to political instability for a short span of time; however, ultimately

²⁹ "NA Passes Bill to Restore Khatm-i-Naboowat Declaration to Original Form in Elections Act 2017," October 5, 2017, *Dawn*, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1361873> (accessed January 10, 2018).

³⁰ "Chakwal PP-20: PML-N Candidate Wins By-election," January 10, 2018, *Business Recorder* <https://www.brecorder.com/2018/01/10/391840/chakwal-pp-20-pml-n-candidate-wins-by-election/>; (accessed January 10, 2018); Muhammad Suleman, "Contemporary Wave of Barelvi Extremism," *Daily Times*, September 27, 2017, <https://dailytimes.com.pk/115150/contemporary-wave-of-barelvi-extremism/> (accessed January 10, 2018).

³¹ D. A Hibbs, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," *American Political Science Review* 71, 4 (1977), 1467-1487; D. K. Gupta, "Political Psychology and Neoclassical Theory of Economic Growth: The possibilities and Implications of an Attempted Resynthesis," *Political Psychology* 8, 4(1987): 637-665; A. Alesina, et al., "Political Instability and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Growth* 1, no. 2 (1996), 189-211.

it generates democratic process and democratic activities, which helps in strengthening the democratic system.

In case of Pakistan, it is institutional intervention generally and judicial activism, which has created political instability in the country. Two Prime Ministers have been ousted so far from the governments of PPP and PML-N each. Moreover, the frequent “Suo motu” actions of former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary had virtually paralysed the executive during the PPP government. Hence, protests have not been the reason of political instability. Furthermore, this political activism and culture of active politics has created deterrence against those institutions or segments of societies who wanted to replace the democratic system either through technocrat government or a military coup. These strategic nonviolent struggles have politically trained public in order to unite them politically against any attempt to derail the democratic system. During nonviolent struggle, PTI had time and again clarified that it will not support any unconstitutional measure to topple the government.³² Likewise, the joint session of Pakistan’s parliament, all political forces shored up support for government and democratic system.³³

Economic Losses:

However, there can be economic costs of strategic nonviolent struggle. Scholars have consensus that there is direct relationship between agitated politics and low public and private investment.³⁴ However, it is planned activity to inflict harm to national economy to create pressure on government. Gene Sharp calls it ‘cost of illegitimate rule’, which can be enhanced through various measures such as strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc.³⁵ Hence, the PTI and PAT nonviolent protests incurred almost \$6 billion loss to Pakistan’s economy. Likewise, PTI chief Imran Khan had shown pleasure over the refusal of International Monetary Fund (IMF) to visit Pakistan during the uncertain security situation.³⁶ Many economic experts including President Chamber of

³² “PTI Will Not Support Unconstitutional Measures, SC Told,” September 15, 2014, *Dawn*, <https://www.Dawn.com/news/1132125> (accessed January 10, 2018).

³³ “Pakistan Crisis: Parliament Holds Emergency Meeting,” *BBC*, September 2, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29024477> (accessed January 10, 2018).

³⁴ S. H. Ali, et al., “Relationship between Political Instability and Domestic Private Investment in Pakistan: A Time Series Analysis,” *Pakistan Business Review* 15, no. 1 (2013), 1-26.

³⁵ Gene Sharp, *Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 20.

³⁶ Dawood Mamoon, et al., “Political Instability and Lessons for Pakistan: Case Study of 2014 PTI Sit in/Protests,” *Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences* 4, no. 1 (March 2017), 27-37.

Commerce and Industry Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mr. Zahidullah Shinwari and Acting President Islamabad Chambers of Commerce Mirza Muhammad Ali considered those protests as harmful for not only macro-economy of the country but also for private investment. Moreover, many public investments delayed during these nonviolent struggles. Three heads of states including China, Sri Lanka and Maldives postponed their visits to Pakistan due to protests in the country. Hence, there is almost a consensus that these protests were harmful for economic stability. However, the better political decisions, political awakening and good governance due to agitated politics can be effective substitutes for short term economic losses.

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