

**The Ambiguities and Dilemmas in the Changing Principles
and Practices of Peacekeeping- Perspectives from Experts and
Soldiers on the Ground**



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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of MS Peace and Conflict Studies

Thesis Supervisor:

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Islamabad
(2021)**

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Beneficent.

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It takes a village to accomplish a research undertaking.

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I begin and end my thanks with a praise for the Almighty, the Absolute Truth (الْحَقُّ), The Illuminator (النُّورُ) - in Whose name I seek wisdom and consciousness, Whose faith instils within me an aspiration for truth and justice, for knowledge and virtue.

اول و آخر فنا، باطن و ظنہر فنا
نقش کفن ہو کہ نو، منزل آخر فنا

ہے مگر اس نقش میں زناہبِ ثباتِ دوام
جس کو کیا ہو کسی مردِ حنڈانے تمام

مردِ حنڈا کا عمل عشق سے صاحبِ نبوغ

عشق ہے اصل حیات، موت ہے اس پر حرام

DEDICATION

I dedicate this humble effort to my nation- May every intellectual endeavor I undertake be in servitude to you, breathe new life into your soul, and serve to exalt your name. To the people of my nation- May you forever remain unbowed and unbent, resilient to the tides of time.

جس میں نہ چوہا تلاب، موت ہے وہ زندگی
روح اُمم کی حیات کشمکشِ انقلاب

ABSTRACT

Peacekeeping is one of the most important tools for conflict management and the most widely employed mechanism for introducing a modicum of stability in highly volatile, conflict-stricken areas of the world. Peacekeepers are mandated to help navigate a country out of a difficult scourge of war and towards the ultimate end of a sustainable peace. In order to ensure the legitimacy and objectivity of what is, in effect, an international military intervention, UN peacekeeping was formed on the bedrock of three foundation principles. These include host states' consent, impartiality, and the minimal use of force for self-defence purposes, as enshrined in the Brahimi Report and Capstone Doctrine. These ideas have acquired an almost constitutional status and continue to be regarded as guiding principles even when the context and dimensions of peacekeeping have changed radically.

Peacekeepers are expected to take actions in the interest of international peace and security, and not in serving the narrow interest of any particular party or state. Impartiality is essential for building a trust between the peacekeepers and all factions of a conflict. Conflict is exacerbated when peacekeepers are viewed by any one side as the “enemy” rather than as impartial mediators working for mutual peace. Peacekeeping practitioners have been traditionally required to use force only to protect themselves, not to win a war for any particular side or to impose any kind of political solution to the conflict. However, with the evolution of peacekeeping into more and more forceful operations- what has been variously regarded in the literature as the era of “multidimensional” peacekeeping or the “robust turn” in peace operations- a growing gap is observed in the doctrine and the actual practice of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions have evolved to have more ambitious mandates and enforcement activities. There is an increasing tolerance for offensive use of force, and a growing distance with the ideal of impartiality.

This research explores the militarization of peacekeeping away from the traditional Chapter 6-consent-based operations, towards missions consisting of more heavily armed soldiers, authorized to use “all necessary means” under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to achieve such goals as the Protection of Civilians (POC) and the particular objectives set out in the mandate. The meaning and understanding of the trinity principles has evolved with the changing nature of peacekeeping, and their relevancy today in the operational environments of robust peace operations is being called into question. In light of the growing gap between the ideational doctrine and the practical conduct of peacekeeping, it is argued that modern robust practices in

Peace Operations engender paternalistic dynamics between the enlightened states of the West and the Third World state recipients of these missions. Peacebuilding practices promoted in such mission equate good governance with democratic, capitalistic norms and privilege Western ideals as universal truths. Excessively robust peacekeeping practices that are flouting the essence of impartiality threaten to raise the spectre of imperialism in the global order of international state relations.

Key Words: Peacekeeping, Peace Operations, Robust Peacekeeping, Impartiality, Use of Force, Consent, Neo-imperialism, Critical Theory, Military Humanitarianism, Military Intervention, Peacekeeping Doctrine, Critical Peace and Conflict Studies, Conflict Resolution.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping is one of the most important tools for conflict management in the arsenal of the United Nations, and the most widely employed and relatively effective mechanism for introducing a modicum of stability in highly volatile, conflict-stricken areas of the world. Peacekeepers are soldiers, police, and civilian personnel deployed from a multitude of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), with the explicit consent of all parties to the conflict. They engage in a variety of burden-sharing activities, such as helping to implement peace agreements, providing mediation and confidence-building measures between hostile parties, providing assistance in creating power-sharing structures, electoral support, and strengthening the rule of law in transitioning states, helping combatants to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate into society, as well as performing a variety of other socio-economic relief tasks. In essence, peacekeepers are mandated to help navigate a country out of a difficult scourge of war and towards the ultimate end of a lasting and sustainable peace. In order to ensure the legitimacy and objectivity of what is, in effect, an international military intervention, UN peacekeeping was formed on the bedrock of three foundation principles- that are often termed as the holy trinity. These include host states' consent, impartiality, and the minimal use of force for self-defence purposes, as enshrined in the Brahimi Report and Capstone Doctrine (United Nations, 2000, 2008). These ideas have acquired an almost constitutional status (Tsagourias, 2006) and continue to be regarded as guiding principles even when the context and dimensions of peacekeeping have changed radically (Karns & Mingst, 2001; Mac Ginty, 2019).

UN peacekeeping operations may only be deployed in a particular state with the consent of all the major parties to the conflict. There is both a moral-legal and a practical necessity to this principle, as it upholds the Westphalian ideal of state sovereignty by intervening in the territory and internal affairs of a state only through their own authorization, thus providing legitimacy and a legal basis for the intervention. It also ensures an environment of unhindered operation for the peacekeepers. Consent is indispensable as both the basis for the formation of and the continued maintenance of a peace operation.

The principle of impartiality has served as a guidance for the conduct of and employment of force by UN peacekeepers. The principle was first articulated by Dag Hammarskjöld in the 1957 report on the United Nations Emergency Force- the first of its kind peacekeeping operation in the Suez Crisis. He argued that the use of force must be 'impartial, in the sense

that it does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interests of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial' (Findlay, 2002a). The Secretary General further elaborated in October 1958, that force may not be employed in order to impose a particular political outcome or to impact the political balance in any conflict (United Nations, 1958). Along with the minimal use of force, and the indispensability of state consent for the constitution of any peacekeeping mission, the principle of impartiality was elevated as the foundational code of conduct for UN peacekeeping. Scholars variously regarded this principle to be the “oxygen” (Tharoor, 1995) or the “lifeblood” (Rajan & et al, 1987) of UN peacekeeping. Peacekeepers are expected to take actions in the interest of international peace and security, and not in serving the narrow interest of any particular party or state. Impartiality is essential for building a trust between the peacekeepers and all factions of a conflict. Conflict is exacerbated when peacekeepers are viewed by any one side as the “enemy” rather than as impartial mediators working for mutual peace.

Peacekeeping practitioners are meant to be “soldiers without enemies” (Fabian, 1971), and have been traditionally required to use force only for their own personal protection, and not to win a war for any particular side or to impose any kind of political solution to the conflict. However, with the evolution of peacekeeping into more and more forceful operations- what has been variously regarded in the literature as the era of “multidimensional” peacekeeping (Howard, 2001) or the “robust turn” (Sartre, 2011) in Peace Operations- a growing gap can be observed in the doctrine and the actual practice of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions have evolved to have more ambitious mandates and enforcement activities. There is an increasing tolerance for offensive use of force, and a growing distance with the ideal of impartiality- as many peacekeeping missions across Africa have attempted to extend state authority and supported state building ambitions of governments that are suffering a popularity crisis or have lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the populace (Peter, 2015), and have thus veered into the uncertain legal territory of effectively becoming a party to the conflict themselves (Maganza, 2020).

1.1. Research Objective

The objective of this research is to explore the militarization of peacekeeping away from the traditional Chapter 6- consent-based operations, towards missions consisting of more heavily armed soldiers, authorized to use “all necessary means” under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to achieve such goals as the Protection of Civilians (POC) and the particular objectives set out in

the mandate. The goal is to understand, in this context, the foundational principles that are meant to serve as a guiding code of conduct for peacekeepers and to explore how effectively these principles are applied in actual practice today. Moreover, through an insight into the world-views of the policy-making elite of the UN, this research seeks to understand how current practices of robust peacekeeping are logically reconciled with the three doctrinal principles.

The research aims to analyse the current scope and meaning of the trinity principles, how their meaning has evolved with the changing nature of peacekeeping, and how relevant they are today in the operational environments of robust peace operations. In light of the growing gap between the ideational doctrine and the practical conduct of peacekeeping (Peter, 2015), the research aims to explore how these principles are understood by the personnel on the ground mandated to “keep the peace”, and how policy-making elites within the UN headquarters have sought to reconcile the essence of these norms and principles with the new requirement of robustness in peacekeeping, and the doctrinal dilemmas this creates. The foundational trinity is routinely subject to redefinition as peacekeeping evolves into operations that are more enforcement oriented and the associated norms are more and more flouted on the ground. This struggle between what kind of conduct the principles were supposed to uphold and what they are slowly coming to imply means that the principles have become wrought with ambiguity. While academics seek to redefine the notion of consent, impartiality, and the employment of force to suit the interventionist peace enforcement operations of the era (Betts, 1994), this research explicitly aims to understand the current relevance of these principles and whether these ideas still hold any importance in the conduct of the personnel on the ground. Thus, it is the objective of this research to understand how peacekeeping personnel understand these principles and how they seek to uphold them in their activities in foreign lands, and whether these principles are left any practical room in the dangerous and unstable, insurgency-ridden operational environments of today.

1.2. Research Questions

- How has the doctrine and principles of peacekeeping evolved to legitimate the interventionist, militaristic humanitarianism that is characteristic of the era of enforcement peacekeeping?
- Is there a growing gap between the theory and actual conduct of peacekeeping?

- Are the intellectual tenets of peacekeeping and the requirements of robust mandates clear and comprehensible enough to effectively shape the behaviour and decision-making of troops?
- How do the peace practitioners understand these principles and to what extent is their decision-making in conflict-stricken environments shaped by these ideals?
- What are the operational difficulties faced by troops in robust missions?
- Are the operations of peacekeepers hampered when grass-roots level consent is absent?
- How is “impartiality” understood by peacekeeping forces and how do they seek to uphold this ideal in volatile situations plagued with conflict and mass civilian casualties?
- What are the attitudes of peacekeepers towards the use of robust force in a UN context?
- What are some of the dilemmas that emerge when peacekeeping practices contradict the foundational principles of peacekeeping?

1.3. Theoretical Framework

This research employs a critical approach to UN peacekeeping and attempts to utilize the Critical Research tradition as credited to the work of Robert Cox and Mark Duffield. The hallmark of the Critical tradition in Peace and Conflict Studies is in the identification of the problem-solving nature of traditional theories, the conduct of peacekeeping, and the wider context of global politics in which these operations are conducted. Critical theorists seek a radical departure from mainstream positive modes of inquiry that take structures, social practices, and the injustices contained therein as an objective reality. Instead, theorists of the critical tradition seek to uncover how these social realities are historically specific and how knowledge practices help to reproduce these dynamics of inequality and oppression. Critical theorists thus stress upon the need for emancipatory knowledge based upon an ethic of liberation from structures and processes of domination (Reus-Smit, 1996).

Peacekeeping missions and Humanitarian Interventions ignore the underlying causes of Third World conflicts and the complex humanitarian emergencies these conflicts breed. Critical theory acknowledges that conflicts requiring a peacekeeping intervention arise in the wider

context of an unjust and iniquitous international political and economic order (Pawlowska, 2005; Pugh, 2005), and these interventions help to support and sustain that very order of world politics. Through the mechanism of peacekeeping, powerful states of the West seek to isolate unruly parts of the world (Hall, 2018) and control their internal politics according to their own moral and political judgements of right and wrong (Barnett, 2016). Rather than being transformative in their approach to dealing with conflict, peacekeeping operations serve a narrow problem-solving purpose of managing the malaise and dysfunctions of the global political economy within a framework of liberal imperialism (Pugh, 2004). Prescriptions and practices that invoke militarized peacekeeping with robust mandates (Ogunrotifa, 2011) as a means of carrying out effective grey-area operations- characterized by the absence of explicit consent and the blurring of impartiality- have the potential of crossing a hazy line that transforms the noble, objective institution of peacekeeping into an imperial practice that allows for the projection of great power influence into the remote areas of the world (Rubinstein, 2010). The arguments of militarily intervening to uphold a theoretically evasive ‘humanitarianism’ as understood and defined by Western powers harkens back to the agenda of imperialism which sought to reshape barbarous civilizations in the political and cultural image of the West (Mckinney, 2016; Miller, 2003).

1.4. Significance

Many scholars have sought to highlight the disjuncture between peacekeeping practices and the norms and principles it is supposed to be based upon. Scholars of the liberal camp argue that ideas of state sovereignty and impartiality should not be understood in such a way so as to be used as a means of straitjacketing peacekeeping practices and curtailing the room of manoeuvre available to peacekeepers in the use of force. Peacekeepers must have freedom of action to effectively tame the politically volatile areas of the world that are a source of instability for world peace. Other scholars, mostly of the critical camp, have argued that peacekeeping of the day needs to urgently go “back to basics” (Tharoor, 1995), incorporate impartiality into their practice once again and forego their trigger-happy conducts, lest the noble ideal of peacekeeping be disparaged as a new and revived imperialism (Cunliffe, 2015; D. N. Gibbs, 1997; Rubinstein, 2008; Schellhaas & Seegers, 2009a). While important UN documents and academic discussions of peacekeeping continue to cite and reaffirm the three principles as the foundational premise of peacekeeping, enforcement peacekeeping operations

more and more routinely engage in activities that cast their relevancy in doubt, making impartiality in particular, an elusive goal. The significance of this research is in adding to the literature on the discrepancy between peacekeeping doctrine and practice by focusing particularly on how these principles are understood by, and how or to what extent, they are upheld by UN peacekeeping personnel. It seeks to explore the minds of the soldiers on the ground, and to understand whether these principles continue to guide peacekeepers in making difficult decisions for the protection of innocent lives in highly precarious contexts. Moreover, through an insight into the world-views of the policy-making elite of the UN, this research seeks to understand how current practices of robust peace operations are logically reconciled with the foundational principles of traditional peacekeeping, and to explore the fallacies and inconsistencies in these arguments.

As UN peacekeeping becomes even more ambitious and expansive in its scope and operations, and successively loses the impartiality and minimal use of force that upheld the sanctity of traditional missions, it is inevitable that images of the bygone era of colonial empires and imperialism are conjured up once again (Cunliffe, 2015; Miller, 2003). Moreover, the lack of an accountability mechanism in determining the sustenance of Protection of Civilians mandates by troop forces makes it difficult to hold the performance of peacekeeping missions accountable and further exacerbates the problem of imperial inaccessibility (Donais & Tanguay, 2021).

1.5. Methodology

This research endeavours to utilize an exploratory, qualitative methodology whereby semi-structured, in-depth interviews with a few willing participants are employed as a means of procuring the primary data needed for this research. Qualitative methodologies like interviews provide a range of benefits, such as a built-in flexibility of questions, more candid responses, and the ability to register non-verbal cues in body language, which allows for a more intricate and intimate experience in data gathering (King et al., 2018). This research has aimed to benefit from the strengths of qualitative research by engaging in interviews with a limited number of participants, and the responses have been detailed through an interpretative analysis. In order to ensure frank and honest responses, and a rich and unreserved discussion on the research matter, the respondents were allowed to remain anonymous.

15 semi structured interviews were conducted with former and active military personnel that have served as peacekeepers in various missions, as well as two separate interviews with experts who have formerly served in important policy making roles in the UN, as military advisor (MILAD) and in the highly respected position of the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG). ‘Expert’ or ‘Elite’ interviewing involves interviews with individuals deemed to possess the relevant knowledge and prestige in the respective field, and a close proximity to power (Lileker, 2003). Elites are individuals who have the capability of exerting influence through their social capitals, social networks, and positions of power within their social structures” (Harvey, 2011). Since the individuals had served as ex-MILAD and ex-SRSG within the UN, they were understood to have influenced the policy-making course of UN peacekeeping and their mandates in some capacity, at their respective terms of service.

Two of the interviews conducted were face to face, while the rest were conducted over telephonic communication due to geographical distances between researcher and respondent. On average, the interviews lasted for about 40 to 50 minutes. These interviews were recorded, with full disclosure to all participants, and were objectively transcribed at a later stage. The interview respondents varied in their ranks, with officers ranging from Captains and Majors, to Brigadiers and Generals. This allowed an insight into the attitudes and worldviews of officers along all steps of the chain of command. 4 of these officers interviewed are currently serving as Force Commanders of important ongoing UN missions. The researcher drafted a questionnaire to be administered to veteran peacekeeping personnel, in order to try to ascertain how the theoretically ambiguous peacekeeping principles are understood by the actual personnel mandated to “keep the peace” in conflict and post-conflict zones, whether these dichotomous principles raise any moral dilemmas in the minds of these personnel, and how they seek to uphold them in their operations to maintain the sanctity and legitimacy of peacekeeping. The questionnaire tried to ascertain the day to day decision making dilemmas faced by peacekeepers in the absence of well-defined rules of engagements and standards of procedures, especially in the context of the appropriate circumstances for a resort to force. The interview process provided a glimpse into the operational, psychological, and moral dilemmas and challenges facing peacekeepers deployed in foreign lands far from home and familiar cultural environments.

The information shared by the research respondents was taken at face value, and assumed to be true for each participants’ experience at the time of his/her service. No particular effort was made in verifying and corroborating the information shared, except for a few facts and incidents

that peacekeepers reported. Many of the insights and experiences shared are reflected in the literature reviewed throughout the research.

Along with this primary data, the research also employed secondary data resources. The secondary analysis allows the researcher to review existing literature and data on the subject matter, available through books, research articles, and academic papers written by peace scholars on the subject. Moreover, the research has incorporated information from the publicly available high-level reports and summary studies on peace operations published by the United Nations.

Interview responses have been interpreted through a thematic analysis, which seeks to identify and categorize patterns or themes within data, thus helping to manage and compress large sets of raw data into quantifiable common themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis thus acts as ‘a data reduction and analysis strategy by which qualitative data are segmented, categorized, summarized, and reconstructed in a way that captures the important concepts within the data set’ (Ayres, 2012).

1.6. Research Limitations

Some of the hurdles experienced during the data-gathering course of this research included the difficulty in finding willing participants for interviews, due to military personnel being reticent and unwilling, and hesitant in participating in verbal interview interactions on the grounds of security-related concerns. Moreover, since some of the interviewees were deployed in their respective mission areas at the time of the conduction of interviews, online interactions over telephonic mediums were riddled with various degrees of distortion. The researcher has endeavored to accurately and objectively transcribe all responses, and pursue the data-gathering according to all relevant research ethics.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW – THE CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING

The International Peace Academy defines Peacekeeping as “the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using a multinational force of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace” (I. Rikhye, 1974).

Peacekeeping, as traditionally conceived, involves the application of non-enforcement military measures. Peacekeeping activities are supposed to be distinct from enforcement under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which falls within the ambit of conflict suppression and regulation of the disputing parties through coercive means.

“The ‘weapons’ used by the peacekeeper in achieving his objectives are those of negotiation, mediation, quiet diplomacy, tact and the patience of Job - not the self-loading rifle.” (I. J. Rikhye, 1983)

Boutros Ghali, in his An Agenda for Peace report, defined peacekeeping as “the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving military or police personnel and frequently civilians as well” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). He differentiated peacekeeping from other related international conflict management tools. These include preventive diplomacy, which involves early safeguard measures to prevent the eruption of disputes between parties, to mitigate the effects of already existing disputes from erupting into full-blown conflicts, or to limit the spread of intra-state conflicts to a regional or an international scale when they do occur. Peacemaking involves the use of pacific measures such as arbitration, negotiation, mediation, and conciliation to bring belligerent parties to a peaceful settlement. Lastly, peacebuilding involves the transformation of the cultural and structural conditions that generate destructive conflict and aims for the strengthening of politico-legal and socio-economic institutions that promote peace and avoid a recurrence of hostilities. These terms are, however, hardly as neatly confined in practice as this classification suggests, and peacekeeping missions on the ground are continuously engaged in peacemaking efforts to maintain negotiations and uphold ceasefires between belligerents alongside peacebuilding activities to perpetuate the conditions for a lasting and sustainable peace. The subsequent “Capstone Doctrine” published by the UN acknowledges that the boundaries between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and early peacebuilding activities are increasingly

blurred and rarely are Peace Operations limited in performing any one particular task. Moreover, the Robust Peacekeeping of the new millennium also frequently employs force at the operational level for defense of the peacekeeping personnel and the mandate.

In terms of its role and functions, peacekeeping has never been adequately defined in all the decades of its practice, nor is this activity based on a coherent doctrine or theoretical underpinning. It is believed that this lack of a precise definition is a deliberate exercise for practical purposes, so as not to impose a straitjacket on the concept and allow it a flexibility that allows the UN Secretariat to subsume different Peace Operations founded on a variety of mandates with different goals and objectives under this wide umbrella term. The conceptual and doctrinal aspects have always followed practical experience on ground, and thus peacekeeping is continuously in evolve in response to the evolving nature of conflict. Consequentially, peacekeeping missions have ranged from the interpositionary, buffer style “traditional” observation missions of the Cold War to the increasingly complex “multi-dimensional” missions in the new century (Goulding, 2009). These missions have been tasked with functions as wide ranging as engaging in electoral monitoring, assuming transitional state authority, performing stabilization functions for host governments, disarming combatants and helping them to demobilize and reintegrate into society, performing counter-insurgency operations, and a multitude of other post-conflict reconstruction, state-building, and peacebuilding activities.

Any analysis of peacekeeping is complicated by the fact that there is no universally agreed upon definition of the term. The idea was never even mentioned in all the articles of the UN Charter, but in fact emerged as a largely improvised, ad hoc response to the crises of the Cold War world, that later acquired a permanent basis in the practice and politics of the UN. Under this operational term have been conducted operations such as the monitoring of ceasefires and the separation of military factions, as in Kashmir, Suez, Cyprus, and between Eritrea and Ethiopia, as well as state-building activities as in Namibia, or missions involving the deliverance of humanitarian aid in midst of violent civil strife, as in Bosnia and Somalia. Peacekeeping operations have evolved to engender missions much greater in size, scope, and mandated tasks from the traditional missions that pioneered the idea, and this has made it that much more difficult to arrive at a common definition that fully encompasses all the myriad of activities undertaken by the UN under the label of Peace Support Operations (PSOs or POs).

2.1. The Innovative Origins of Peacekeeping

The idea of peacekeeping was born as a child of necessity. The constraints of the global ideological rivalry during the Cold War meant that the mechanism of collective security- as envisioned by the architects of the United Nations system- was largely deadlocked. Strategic calculations along with irreconcilable national interests of the two superpowers meant that the members of the UNSC were stuck in an inability to arrive at political consensus, thus resulting in constant inaction in the face of threats to international peace and security. Unwilling to stand by idly as war and bloodshed raged across different areas of the world, especially in the newly independent and as yet unstable states of the decolonized world, the UN Secretariat developed the novel and modest institution of peacekeeping out of expediency as the UN's response to the "scourge of war". Even after the end of the ideological struggle, UN peacekeeping remained the most widely employed instrument of containing violent conflict and contributing towards its resolution in the post-Cold War world. Peacekeepers would help create enabling and conducive environments for peace in war-torn regions by lending their moral authority, objective weight, and peaceful intent to a conflict, thus representing the collective will of the UN and the international community.

The UN is often credited with the innovation of peacekeeping practice. However, like much of its charter and general architecture, the UN drew inspiration from several early operations conducted by its predecessor, the League of Nations. These operations can be considered the early pioneers of what would later come to be regarded as peacekeeping. For political purposes, there is a general tendency to emphasize the differences between the earlier League of Nations and its successor organization, to disassociate from the weakness and ultimate failure of the League in its primary objective of preventing another world war. In 1945 when the UN was being forged from the ashes of WW2, its forefathers tried to distance itself from the discredited League which was tainted with failure, and instead presented the organization as a historically unique of its kind. This was necessary if the politicians of the world, skeptical of the viability and attainability of ideas like multilateralism and collective security, and hardened by war and loss, were to be persuaded to become a part of the new system. Yet in hindsight, it is clear that the League of Nations served as the blueprint model for the UN in its ideals, many of its practices, its foundational *raison d'être*, and in the crafting of its organizational structure.

The League of Nations in its early years provided valuable mediation in border disputes between neighboring states such as Yugoslavia and Albania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and Finland and Sweden. It launched international missions that served as historical templates for future peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN. One such international force was deployed in

the Saar region, which was a disputed territory between France and Germany. After the War and the defeat of the Axis powers, the German controlled Saar territory was removed from the political control of Berlin and placed under international administration until a popular referendum would decide its political future (Macqueen, 2011). This mission was a de facto forerunner to the peacekeeping missions which saw the UN assume transitional authority of a state, such as in Papua New Guinea in 1962 (Matheson, 2001), and in Timor-Leste and Kosovo- the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), both initiated in 1999 (Stahn, 2001). A similar administrative and security policing mission was also launched in the free city of Danzig (modern day Gdansk in Poland) which was removed from German control (Wilde, 2001). A look back on such activities demonstrates that the idea of peacekeeping predates the formation of the United Nations.

Collective Security lay at the heart of the ideological framework of both the League and the subsequent UN. The architects of both the institutions envisioned an international society whereby the security of one state was the concern of all the states in the system. These states would engage in multilateral responses to threats or actual breaches of peace anywhere in the world, under the authority of a world organization. The UN established a permanent system of collective security orchestrated by the Security Council, which would comprise of the Allied superpowers (at the time; the US, the UK, the USSR, and perhaps China) managing the security of the world through their role as global policemen. National security and by extension, international security would become the collective responsibility of the international community working through the framework of the new global organisation. The Collective Security ambitions were codified and given a legal-constitutional basis in the Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Article 39 embodied the responsibility of the UNSC in identifying aggressors of peace and determining when a collective security response was required. Articles 40, 41, and 42 set forth the escalating series of retaliatory tools available to the UNSC in enforcing its will, starting with 'provisional measures' such as demands for troop withdrawals and cessation of hostility, to more substantive but still non-military measures outlined in Article 41, such as economic sanctions, embargoes, and diplomatic boycotts. Lastly, Article 42 presented the authority of the UNSC to authorize military troops consisting of "air, land, and sea" forces to enforce a return to international peace.

The enforcement agenda envisioned under the ideal of collective security, from its inception, found itself a hostage to the limitations of a bipolar world. It soon became evident that such a

political distribution of power at the world stage was incompatible with collective security operationalized on superpower consensus. The glacial bipolarity of an ideologically divided world was infertile grounds for cooperation among the UNSC members, the vital prerequisite for invoking the collective security powers of the UN. Where ideological differences served as the lens through which the US and USSR viewed all international crises, there was no possibility of the objective evaluation of conflicts and agreements on a collective response. The UN was faced with the threat of fading into obscurity as an ineffective body, like its predecessor. To ensure political survival and relevancy, the UN had to invent a new role for itself in the management of international peace and stability as its original role became deadlocked. In this situation, the UN drew from earlier experiences of the League in authorizing military personnel for the modest role of observational and monitoring tasks in the aftermath of crises. This activity- starting from unarmed military observers and then moving to lightly armed troops, and further culminating in much more robust military deployments in the new century- came to acquire a permanent feature in the practice and politics of the UN “peace operations”. Thus, the UN was successful in carving out a new identity and a new role for itself in managing conflicts through the practice of peacekeeping, which involved military interventions in the wake of conflict in peaceful form and intent, rather than a coercive intervention for enforcement.

UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-61) famously commented that although the term ‘peacekeeping’ was never explicitly described in the UN Charter, it could be conceptualized as a “Chapter 6 and a half” activity, falling ‘somewhere between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully (outlined in Chapter VI), and more forceful, less “consent-based” action (Chapter VII), on the other’ (Karlsrud, 2019).

2.2. Peacekeeping Doctrine- “The Holy Trinity”

The scope of the term “peacekeeping operations” has significantly broadened. As a consequence, it is increasingly difficult to forge an international consensus on just how to define what sort of activity peacekeeping is- as to define is to limit its potential and restrict its activities. Most of the peace support operations being authorized by the UNSC today fall in the conceptual “grey area” between strictly traditional peacekeeping and military enforcement against an explicitly identified aggressor as stipulated in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. According to John Ruggie, these operations are ill-defined and “have wandered about in a conceptual void.” (Ruggie, 1996)

Despite the conceptual and doctrinal ambiguity of the institution, it is nevertheless a reality that expectations around the practice of peacekeeping- accumulated through experiences of missions conducted over six decades- have led to a shared understanding within international society in regards to the basic character of peacekeeping. This consensus has centred on the three foundational norms often referred to as “the holy trinity” of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping operations are supposed to be based on three fundamental guiding principles. These are; host state’s consent, impartiality of conduct, and minimal use of force for self-defence. Peacekeeping missions can not be established within the territory of a sovereign state without the consent of the host government and the main parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping personnel must remain impartial in their practice, favouring neither side of the party among the disputants and precluding from influencing the course of conflict or imposing solutions to the political problems. Peacekeeping troops are “soldiers without enemies” (Rhoads, 2016), they are supposed to consist of lightly armed personnel authorized to use force only in self-defence, and not for coercive or offensive purposes. Moreover, peacekeeping troops are composed of military contingents from voluntary contributions by different states, ideally neutral small and middle powers. Peacekeeping personnel serve under the authority of the Secretary General and the military commanders of the mission, and not of their national chains of command.

The principle of host state’s consent raises the dilemma of whether sovereignties of states should be prioritized over the human security of its populace (Latif, 2010; Mehta, 2006). In recent times, robust operations and international peace interventions have increasingly been authorized based on a tenuous consent at best, granted by host authorities under immense international pressure to avoid the otherwise unappealing prospect of a full-blown military intervention. There is also the dilemma of who is entitled to authorize consent. The concept of consent is relatively straight-forward in the context of interstate conflicts where the respective governments of the two states, taken to be the legitimate representatives of the populace in each territory, are the ones to authorize a peacekeeping mission. In the context of intra-state conflicts in failed states, it is much more complicated to ascertain whether all different factions to a conflict consent to the deployment of peace forces in the territory of a fragmented state, where different parties enjoy legitimacy in different parts of the state. Moreover, the international law bias towards state governments as interlocutors of consent is problematic in the context of civil wars where government authority may be seriously challenged by competing parties. Bringing insurgent parties with secessionist motivations or anti-government sentiments into the agreement, however, could be seen as the international community granting *de facto*

recognition to such actors, thus interfering politically into the domestic affairs of a state. Enjoying consent from all actors to a conflict, whether state actors or paramilitaries and insurgents, is politically prudent in that it instils a greater legitimacy and efficiency to the operation (Johnstone, 2011). Grass-roots level support for peacekeeping forces greatly facilitates their operation in alien territories and lack of consent by local actors' spells disaster for any peacekeeping mission (Mersiades, 2005; Roberts, 1997).

The central importance of impartiality as an intrinsic element of peacekeeping is based on the idea that peacekeepers are not at war and therefore have no political enemies. In their aim to bring stability and peace to a fragmented and polarized society, even the most recalcitrant and belligerent factions have to be engaged with to achieve this purpose. Hence, the troops must not use force in a way that strengthens the cause or might of any one group, while harming other factions, while performing their role as an unbiased protector of peace.

The concept of impartiality has been muddled in ambiguities since its inception and earlier interpretations equated it with the idea of neutrality (Yamashita, 2008). This has been taken to mean the imperative of maintaining an uninterested status and an equal distance from all warring factions, such that one does not influence the course of conflict or disturbs the power balance in favour of one party or the other (Vohra, 1996). It conjures an image of the peacekeeper as an entity stationed to contain a lid on violent manifestations of conflict rather than as a figure present to solve political problems (Levine, 2011). Concomitantly, with this limited understanding of impartiality the use of force principle was also limited to only for the purpose of self-defence. Such a conceptual marriage between impartiality and neutrality was unproblematic in the early days of traditional peacekeeping when the activities of troops were limited to border control, monitoring of ceasefires, and manning buffer zones between belligerent states. But the changing nature of warfare and its culmination in the horrors of Srebrenica and Rwanda- the inaction of UN troops in the face of genocide, war crimes, and horrifying atrocities committed against innocent civilians (UN, 1999a; UN Doc, 1999)- provided an impetus for redefining the mandates of peace operations. In the 1990s, there was a growing urge to articulate that impartiality and neutrality are not synonymous and to distinguish between the two ideas in the redefinition of more robust peacekeeping mandates geared towards the necessity of 'Protection of Civilians'. There was a need for a rationale to legitimate peacekeepers having a freer hand in the use of force without appearing to be partial to any sides in the conflict. Once limited in its scope and based firmly on the consent of all parties, peacekeeping operations were now regularly authorized with mandates boasting

Chapter VII enforcement powers for their successful implementation, and charged with penalizing powers to keep the peace and protect civilians from the face of harm (Reike, 2016). Anything short of this would amount to what the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations denounced as ‘neutrality in the face of evil’ (Council, 2000). Peacekeepers are now expected to identify and protect the victims.

In the context of UN operations whose mandates militarily extend beyond merely the supervision of peace agreements made by the different parties to a particular conflict, robust peacekeeping by its very nature can no longer be neutral (Boulden, 2015; Nascimento, 2018). Thus, there has been an attempt to redefine impartiality to mean complete loyalty and adherence to the objectives of the peacekeeping mandate. A significant effort has been made in the academic circle to free the notion of impartiality from the constraints of neutrality. As Dominick Donald argues, while a neutral observer is passive and abstains from a conflict on the basis of an absence of any decided personal views, an impartial being is much more active and forms a fair and just judgement of the circumstances, acting independently where deemed necessary (Donald, 2002a) without prejudice, bias, or with the intent taking sides (Ruggie, 1997). Thus, modern interpretations require more proactive conduct rooted in independent judgement, for upholding ambitious mandates and for the protection of civilians (Donald, 2002b). Peacekeeper impartiality now requires unbiased support for those who assist the peace process and opposition towards those who try to obstruct it.

The recent evolutions and innovations in UN peacekeeping practice has meant that these operations are straying farther and farther from the core principles (Ahmed et al., 2007). There has been a notable expansion in the scale and magnitude of activities that peacekeepers are now mandated to undertake, along with the fact that peacekeepers are now frequently deployed in situations where there is “no peace to keep” (UN, 1999b). Peacekeepers in the post-Cold War world frequently find themselves in hostile situations immediately after the end of a civil war or even in cases where an intra-state civil strife is in progress. This has led to operational practices regarding the use of force that have went well beyond the traditional limits; transforming the nature and limits of peacekeeping, along with having negative repercussions for the perceived legitimacy of such missions.

New practices of robust peacekeeping have harkened an increased toleration for the use of offensive force to bring about military outcomes (Goulding, 2009). The self-defence criteria for the use of force has been conceptually stretched to include the protection of non-

combatants, as well as for the defence of the mandate authorized by the UNSC. Moreover, the increasing involvement of civilian experts in peacekeeping has meant that the military arm of peacekeeping missions is often compelled to employ force to protect the civilian components.

2.3. Protection of Civilians

In the conflicts of the modern world, unarmed and helpless civilians account for the vast majority of casualties. This has placed greater imperative on UN peace personnel to protect the vulnerable in conflict-affected situations and to prioritize civilian protective functions in all peacekeeping operations.

POC has become a major facet of peacekeeping, firmly rooted within the discourse and vocabulary of peace support operations. The UN experienced dramatic failures in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, and other misadventures where unarmed civilians became targets of ethnic cleansing and genocidal killings in the presence of passive peacekeepers. These instances have helped to create historical precedents and accumulated knowledge that has firmly grounded the “Protection of Civilians” norm as a given goal to be pursued by peacekeepers in all operations. Wherever peacekeepers witness war crimes and human rights abuses against unarmed civilians, they should be presumed to be authorized to stop it (Williams, 2010). Failure to act amounts to complicity with violence and abuse. Moreover, the POC norm is believed to be fully consonant with the three guiding principles of peacekeeping. Considerations of impartial conduct and minimal use of force should never serve as an excuse for an inability to protect civilians within the limits of the physical capabilities and areas of operation of a peacekeeping force.

Peacekeeping mandates with POC elements are usually authorized with Chapter 7 powers to use all necessary means, including lethal force, to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.(DPO, 2020) POC efforts by peacekeepers are not meant to supplant but to supplement the host state’s ability to protect its populace. Where government forces themselves engage in violence against masses, or where they are unable or unwilling to protect vulnerable populations, the peace troops may act independently to achieve this agenda.

The POC agenda is closely interlinked with other human rights-oriented specialized resolutions within the UNSC, such as those related to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (UNSC, 2000), children and armed conflict (CAAC) (*Strengthening Protection for Children in Armed Conflict*, 2009; UNSC, 2005), conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and the wider human rights, child protection, and the women, peace, and security framework (DPKO, 2019).

Doctrinal Evolutions in Peace Support Operations

2.4. An Agenda for Peace

The permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council convened a special meeting asking the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to formulate a report of recommendations for strengthening the institution of peacekeeping. In response, he published the Agenda for Peace in 1992 that made several suggestive guidelines for peace practitioners. The report argued that peace personnel are frequently being deployed in situations where the main stakeholders in the conflict are not honestly committed to the peace process.

“Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance.”

(Secretary-General, 1992)

The report sought to distinguish between the operational and doctrinal character of peacekeeping and enforcement and proposed the establishment of peace enforcement units for the purpose of carrying out mandates in complex environments. These would be more heavily armed than regular peace-keeping troops and would undergo comprehensive preparatory training before deployment.

In the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace published in 1995, Boutros-Ghali emphasized that peacekeeping and the use of force for enforcement are not reconcilable under the same set of techniques and ethos. These ideas cannot be understood as continuing nodes on a spectrum, permitting straightforward transition from one activity to the other. It is highly dangerous to expect peacekeeping troops to use force beyond what their composition, armament, and logistical capabilities allow. To blur the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement- two undertakings that follow from different political and military logics- can risk undermining the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation and can put the lives of personnel in unsolicited danger. Peacekeeping forces should thus engage in activities that conform to the three traditional principles, and only perform military tasks to the extent that these principles allow. The mandates of peacekeeping operations should be clearly distinct from the mandates given

to interventions authorized under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Thus, the Supplement Report adopted a constrictive and limited stance towards the use of force by peacekeepers.

2.5. An Impetus for Reform- The Brahimi Report

In trying to keep pace with the multitude of peacekeeping burdens thrust upon the organization in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the UN experienced some embarrassing failures in the 1990s that threatened to tarnish the reputation and legitimacy of the UN as a guarantor of universal human rights and protector of international peace and security. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was determined not to repeat these failures and to draw valuable lessons from its setbacks. He convened a high-level independent inquiry consisting of a group of experts and chaired by the former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, after whom the “Brahimi Report” was informally named. The “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” was published in August 2000, and it offered valuable critique on the conduct of Peace Operations, making frank and achievable recommendations for reform.

The Brahimi report reaffirmed that consent by the parties to a conflict, neutrality/impartiality, and use of force only in self-defence “remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping”. However, the report acknowledged the difficulty that POs experience in obtaining and maintaining consent where all the parties to a conflict cannot be easily identified, or when consent is withdrawn or politically manipulated by the parties. In this case, the report argued that even in situations of precarious consent, peacekeepers- once deployed- must be able to carry out their mandate successfully. Modern PSOs are exceedingly complex and go well beyond merely observation and monitoring in the spectrum of duties assigned to them and the hostile environments they operate in. In such a context, the rules of use of force should be robust enough to allow peacekeepers the ability to act within their capacity to halt violence against civilians within their areas of deployment.

“There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.” (Council, 2000)

The military personnel “must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components, and the mission’s mandate”. For multidimensional peacekeeping in complex operational environments to be effective, there should be a will to use force where necessary to maintain a

stable and secure environment in which lasting peace can be created. The Rules of Engagement (ROEs) should be robust enough to allow a freedom of maneuver to peacekeeping troops so that they may respond to deadly assault against them or the people they are duty-bound to protect. The minimal use of force norm should not force troops to “cede the initiative to their attackers”. The standard code of conduct for the armed peacekeeping personnel should not be “neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time,” but rather impartiality or “adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles.” Impartiality cannot amount to being reluctant to distinguish between victim and aggressor and hesitation in protecting the victims of abuse.(Swope, 2011)

“Where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best-case result in ineffectiveness and in the worse may amount to complicity with evil.”

The Brahimi Report has served to strengthen the conceptual distinction between neutrality and impartiality(Hikaru, n.d.). Being neutral meant that the peacekeepers were not allowed to meddle in the situation in any way lest they become a party to the conflict themselves, and this principle could only be assured with restricting the use of force to self-defense. In contrast to neutrality, impartiality requires employing an even handed and unbiased approach towards the treatment of all sides of the conflict in the implementation of the terms of the mandate. This idea enables troops to take firm military action against obstructions in discharging their duties, widening the range of potential action available to peacekeepers.

The report argues for bigger and better armed UN forces with strong financial backing that can serve as a credible deterrent threat to spoilers of peace. Peacekeepers armed with the will and capacity towards military offensives should be granted clear authorizations for the use of force in the interest of defending their mandates. These mandates, according to the Report, must be clearly defined and credible, and based on a set of practical and achievable goals. The report further argues for strengthening the UN’s capacity for rapid deployment of troops to profit from intervention in the ripe stages of a post-conflict environment (Durch et al., 2003).

2.6. The Capstone Doctrine

Throughout the decades of its operation, UN PKOs have largely relied on an unwritten and uncodified body of norms and principles, along with practical experiences from previous missions, to guide their conduct in peace operations. The “United Nations Peace Operations:

Principles and Guidelines”, published in 2008 by the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), is the first thorough attempt by the UN to integrate the multitude of operational directives, ROEs, SOPs, and other guidelines issued over the years and the multitude of experiences acquired during the history of peace missions abroad into an overarching document that can serve as the doctrinal foundation for UN Peacekeeping.

The doctrine reasserts the central importance of the three basic principles; consent, impartiality, and use of force for self-defense and defense of the mandate. While the nature, scope, and practice of POs have evolved significantly over the years, the report affirms that these principles continue to distinguish the institution of peacekeeping from other international tools of conflict management, and serve as a compass or navigation guide for peace practitioners in the field.

Host state consent displays a willingness by the local parties to adhere to the peace process and their commitment to the peacekeeping mission deployed to assist that process. It helps to guarantee a basic freedom of movement and action for personnel to carry out their mandates. Any operation based on lack of consent risks becoming itself a party to the conflict and veering towards enforcement, which is intrinsically different from the role of peacekeepers. Here, the doctrine makes a notable distinction between robust peacekeeping, which often involves the use of force at the tactical or operational level to discharge mandated tasks more effectively, and enforcement action which is based on the identification of an aggressor to the peace- a clear opposition target- and functions with force at the strategic level (*United Nations Peacekeeping Operations- Principles and Guidelines*, 2008). Such operations neither require consent of the party that is being militarily targeted neither pretends to be impartial in treating all parties with equality and restraint. In contrast, while multi-dimensional peace operations often use force for dispensing their duties, this is done with the consent of the host authorities and force is employed while maintaining impartiality of conduct.

The report acknowledges the unreliability of host state consent easily translating to the local level particularly in volatile states where many small paramilitaries, armed factions, local spoilers, and anarchic militarized gangs obstruct peacekeeping activities. Peace personnel may be required, in the extreme case, to use force to deal with obstructions to their activities by such groups.

Impartiality necessitates that peacekeeping troops must not be prejudiced towards any particular side. Impartial conduct is necessary for a peacekeeping mission to be perceived as

legitimate and to ensure the consent and cooperation of the main stakeholders. But the report upholds the distinction between neutral and impartial behavior and argues that the need to be impartial and even-handed in treatment towards all parties cannot be a justification for inaction or an unjustifiable passivity in the face of war crimes and peace obstructions. An impartial peacekeeper is like an umpire that penalizes infractions on all sides.

The idea of self-defense has expanded to include forceful resistance and robust postures to deter attempts to disrupt the mission activities, undermine the mandate, or to protect the lives of civilian non-combatants at risk. Robust peacekeeping involves forceful conduct at the tactical level with host consent, as distinguished from enforcement under Chapter 7. However, the report also harkens back to the Hammarskjoldian tradition in arguing that force should be employed with restraint and as a last resort, only after alternative peaceful means of persuasion and negotiation have been exhausted. The aim is to deter obstacles and spoilers off the peace process, and not to impose a military defeat. Force should be used to achieve precise outcomes, and should be employed in a proportionate and appropriate fashion, within the limit of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect. Once the desired objective is achieved, peacekeepers should seek to de-escalate the situation and to promptly return to non-violent means of persuasion.

The capstone doctrine further identifies three crucial ingredients for mission success: legitimacy, credibility, and local ownership. Peacekeeping missions derive their legitimacy from the moral and legal weight of the UN and its Security Council mandates in international law. Legitimacy can be tarnished if peace personnel are seen to be serving interests of national or regional parties, or the great powers of the UNSC. A lasting peace depends on local ownership and civil participation of the peace process, and strengthening the capacity of host government to assume responsibility of law, order, and security. Peacekeeping operations must meet the expectations of local populations and must not engage in harmful and exploitative practices themselves, so as to remain credible in the eyes of the hosts (de Coning et al., 2008).

2.7. The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)

Following the footsteps of Boutros Ghali, many UN Secretary Generals have sought to convene panels of experts and outside authoritative voices to review the workings, successes, and failures of the peacekeeping institution, in hopes that they may offer fresh insights and innovative thinking. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon wished to initiate such a discussion on

adapting UN peacekeeping to new challenges and requirements, and overcoming failures due to institutional overstretch, and thus the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (in short: HIPPO) was established in 2014.

The UN system was struggling with growing demands for peacekeeping operations with robust mandates and high expectations, but equipped with highly constrained resource capacities and facing complex and hostile operating environments. In this context, the HIPPO report offered not only valuable proposals on how peacekeeping should adapt to new demands, but also warned on the essential limits of the enterprise.

The HIPPO report offered radical visions on a role for UN peacekeeping that was less militarized and more politically oriented. In a departure from established wisdom that peacekeeping needs to be more forceful to be more effective, the HIPPO report carved out a mantle for the UN that was more focused towards prevention than enforcement. Negotiating political solutions must be prioritized over militarizing peacekeeping- an institution that has outer limits on the kind of activities it can perform if it is to retain its essential impartial character, and military counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in volatile environments cannot be one of them. Such tasks remain beyond the purview of UN peacekeeping and compromise the value of maintaining the UN as a third-party actor with no stake in the conflict. (Andersen, 2018)

Enforcement tasks- intended to neutralize or defeat an aggressor designated as an enemy of the mission- risk damaging the impartial image of the UN. To be seen as being associated with war-fighting is to put the reputation of the UN, and the lives of the personnel, at risk. Such tasks should be engaged by parallel forces and a clear distinction of roles between these enforcement forces and the peacekeeping personnel should be maintained. The HIPPO Report repeatedly emphasizes the importance of strengthening the political, rather than the military aspect of peacekeeping to find lasting and transformative solutions for conflict.

3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NORMS AND PRACTICES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

It is the purpose of this chapter to briefly examine some of the key peacekeeping missions in the UN's history that helped establish, modify, revise, and renew the basic tenets and associated norms of Peacekeeping.

3.1. UNEF- The Model

The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first foray of the United Nations into the hitherto largely unexplored institution of multilateral peacekeeping. UNEF-I was deployed in the Middle East in response to the Suez Crisis, whereby the Egyptian President Nasser had nationalized the strategic Suez Canal and provoked a tripartite British, French, and Israeli invasion into his territory in retaliation. In a situation unique to UNEF-I, the mission was convened not by the Security Council, but by the more democratic General Assembly under the ambit of the "Uniting for Peace" mechanism- which allows for a legal transference of issues of international peace and security to the UNGA in a case where the UNSC has been deadlocked to inaction by the exercise of a veto (France and Britain, two parties involved in the dispute in personal capacity, were permanent veto members of the UNSC). The mission was a first of its kind. Although the UN had previously deployed unarmed military observer missions (UN Truce Supervision Organization or UNTSO in Palestine in 1948 and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan or UNMOGIP in the disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir in 1949)- UNEF-I was the first instance of the deployment of armed military troops under the UN umbrella in the territory of a sovereign state. As such, the mission was monumental in serving as a blueprint for subsequent experiences with peacekeeping and in the creation of a legal precedent for certain norms, principles, and rules of engagement that would serve as the foundational essence of traditional peacekeeping.

UNEF-I -operational from 1956 to 1967- was tasked with the monitoring of the ceasefire between the belligerent parties and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian territory. Dag Hammarskjöld, the then Secretary General of the UNSC, proposed a force comprising of contingents from a myriad of willing troop contributing countries (TCCs) serving under an independent UN chief of command and answerable ultimately to the UN Secretariat. Notably, Hammarskjöld advised that troops for the force be recruited from UN member states other than the P5 in a hope to secure a dispassionate and objective appearance for the mission. Middle

powers thus provided the bulk of the contingents, a practice that would become routine in subsequent peacekeeping. The force was 6000 strong at its peak, comprising troops from Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Finland, Sweden, among others. It was officially mandated to supervise a smooth withdrawal of French and British forces and to maintain law and order in these territories in the interim, before returning them to Egypt's sovereign control. It was also to monitor the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip back to the Israeli border.

In the formation of the UNEF-I force, the UN was basically inventing the wheel. It had no prior legal frameworks to draw experience from, and thus Hammarskjöld was aware that he was in the delicate position of laying the groundwork for the norms and procedures that would become the model for UN peacekeeping. He made significant and repeated efforts to express that it was not the purpose of the force to influence the military/ political equilibrium in the conflict in favor of any one party or the other. It would be a mission comprising of 'soldiers without enemies', a symbolic force of peace, rather than of military enforcement. In the absence of a legal authorization to engage in offensive action, the troops would be lightly armed to ensure the minimum requirement of self-defense of the personnel.

The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observer corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it was stationed; nor, moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions... (UN, 1956)

This was a rudimentary articulation of the norm of impartiality, and the concomitant principle of minimal use of force in self-defense would subsequently be fleshed out as the tenure of the mission went on. These principles, along with the necessity of host state consent for the deployment of a mission, would come to be regarded as the 'foundational trinity' of peacekeeping.

'The use of military force by the United Nations other than that under Chapter VII of the Charter requires the consent of the States in which the force is to operate . . . It must, furthermore, be impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interests of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial. (UN, 1957)

Restraint in the use of force was an entirely new way of operation for the military men forming the UNEF. In their national service, these soldiers had been taught and trained to press the trigger at the slightest provocation. Soldiers are instructed to fight and to win wars. The UNEF was a completely different operational environment, one that required restraint and discipline, and the use of persuasion and diplomatic tact over offensive action (Findlay, 2002b). The mandate required the soldier to prevent fighting in all circumstances, and to employ force only in the last resort of protecting his body and life (UN, 1967c).

UNEF was to act as a buffer force between the British-French and Egyptian troops, supervising their withdrawal from Port Said and the Suez Canal area. There were a few early incidents of UN troops opening fire in self-defense. On 14th December 1956 in Port Said, a Norwegian jeep patrol was fired upon and hand-grenades were thrown, and fire was returned by the troops. Israeli forces took much longer to withdraw, conducting phased withdrawal and achieving full retreat behind the armistice by 1st March 1957. UNEF was to temporarily administer the Gaza Strip to replace the departing Israeli forces until it could be safely transferred back to Egyptian control. This task was to prove controversial, and result in incidents that greatly helped develop the evolving use of force doctrine for the mission. Presence of the UN forces in administrative positions and suggestions by the international community that Gaza be placed under international UN control stirred up fears among the Egyptians that the UN forces were here to stay. This resulted in instances of violent riots against the troops. In one such demonstration, the forces responded with the use of tear gas and firing of rifles and machine guns in the air to disperse the crowd (Findlay, 2002b). A young Arab man was struck by a bullet in ricochet and later died. With rising anti-UN sentiment, there was a danger that the troops would have to use increasing force in self-defense in response to agitated attacks, creating further emotional outcry from the masses. This would jeopardize the UNEF's integrity and create a legitimacy deficit for the troops, endangering the whole ethos of the mission. An Egyptian governor was appointed to control the territory and the host government thus relieved the peacekeeping mission of its first brief experience with civil administration- a task that the UN would routinely engage in, in the decades to come.

UNEF's main task was the patrolling of the 59 km long Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) to prevent infiltrations and the possibility of a large-scale military incursion by the Egyptian or Israeli military. In its role of manning the border, UNEF was given detailed written instructions on the appropriate circumstances for the use of force. The instructions prohibited UN forces from opening fire unless fired upon, and also proscribed the use of warning shots in daylight

hours. During nighttime, warning shots may be fired on the approach of unknown persons observed by patrols or observation post guards, but only after verbal warnings are issued and ignored. The force commander on several occasions expressed desire for greater freedom in the use of force to prevent infiltrations. Requests were issued that the UNEF forces be allowed to fire at individuals who refused to halt when challenged in the prohibited zone at night. Other propositions made by the commander and troops implored the demarcation of stretches of land about 500 yards around the borders and camps using barbed fences, landmines, and signs-warning that any breach would result in the use of fatal force against the infiltrators. However, such extended authorizations of force against civilians without government consent would have endangered the very essence of impartial conduct that Hammarskjöld had envisioned for the mission.

Infiltrations remained the norm and the disagreements between the UN Secretariat and the UNEF personnel on the extents and limits of the use of force remained. On 17 June 1957 an Arab was observed approaching the Gaza Strip from the Israeli side. UNEF patrols fired a warning shot after which the man threw an apparent hand grenade. The man was killed as the UN soldiers opened fire (*UNEF Situation Report, 17 June 1957, UN Archives UNEF 1292, n.d.*). The next day, a UNEF patrol battalion observed six men less than 500 meters off the ADL approaching its direction. When warned to halt they converged in the direction of the patrol and threw a knife in their direction. As the troop opened fire, two of the Arabs were killed (*UNEF Situation Report, 18 June 1957, UN Archives UNEF 1312., n.d.*). Further clarifications of the UNEF use-of-force instructions articulated again the need to fire only in self-defense and the illegality of initiating offensive action. Individuals loitering around the UNEF installations in a suspicious manner should be detained and handed over to local police authorities. Resorting to fire should be avoided unless the person is armed and deemed an immediate threat to UNEF personnel. Whenever force is employed, it should not exceed the amount warranted by the situation at hand. The principle of minimum use of force shall always be upheld (UNEF Headquarters, 1958).

UNEF-I was concluded on May 1967, when the UAR foreign minister asked Secretary General U Thant to withdraw UN troops from the territory. This was immediately followed by the outbreak of war between Egypt and Israel. The Secretary General was widely criticized for terminating the mission prematurely by caving into Egyptian demands. U Thant countered that the nature of the mission demanded the evacuation of all forces once consent was withdrawn.

‘The consent of the host country’, he said, ‘is a basic principle which has applied to all United Nations peacekeeping operations’ (UN, 1967a). The mission had been based:

entirely on its acceptance by the governing authority of the territory on which it ... It is a fact beyond dispute that neither UNEF nor any other United Nations peacekeeping operation thus far undertaken would have been permitted to enter the territory involved if there had been any suspicion that it had the right to remain there against the will of the governing authority (UN, 1967b).

UNEF was widely celebrated as a peacekeeping success. Through its decade long operations, it had rooted the principles of consent, impartiality, and the use of force for self-defense as the fundamental ethos of peacekeeping, setting precedents that would be followed- or attempted to in good faith- for decades to come. UNEF I fulfilled its mandate largely without resorting to unreasonable force and held up to the exacting standards and requirements of the mission, enabling it to carry out its duty with the minimum of friction or local resistance.

3.2. Close Encounters with Peace Enforcement- The UN in the Congo

The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) saw the peacekeepers engage in armed clashes with one of the local parties to the conflict, stray dangerously far from the established tenets of Hammarskjoldian peacekeeping, came extremely close to a first UN experience with peace enforcement, all while lacking the appropriate military power and the authority of Chapter 7 of the Charter for it to classify as a true exercise in “enforcement”. The Security Council authorized the use of force for motives beyond what can today be neatly considered peacekeeping, but UN officials till the termination of the mission maintained that they were operating strictly in self-defense- stretching and overstretching the definition to justify their questionable conduct. The mission raised several doubts about the clarity of the mandate and whether it had been transgressed, and the extent to which the UN could legitimately interfere in the internal affairs of a state based on tenuous consent. ONUC was, in size and scope, the grandest exercise the UN had engaged in till date. At its peak, the force numbered over 20,000 and drew contingents from over 28 UN member countries.

In 1959, amid rising nationalist sentiment, Belgium had to hastily withdraw from its colony. Two figures were highly important in the nationalist struggle. Kasavubu, a Bakongo, represented the interests of the largest ethnic faction in Congo and emerged as the president of the new state. Patrice Lumumba, a charismatic pan-Africanist, became the premier. In the

economically prosperous southern mining state of Katanga, Moïse Tshombe was appointed as political governor and would later spearhead a secessionist movement against the state. Just days after officially gaining independence, the Force Publique- which would transform into the national army of the state (ANC)- mutinied against the continued presence of Belgian officers in the army's chain of command. This triggered mass violence and disorder throughout the capital, Leopoldville, which later spread nation-wide as Congolese engaged in looting and killing of European civilians. Belgian troops still present in the territory quickly deployed all over the country to protect white civilians. Amid this environment of generalized chaos, Tshombe unilaterally declared Katanga, the economic base of the Congo, as an independent state on 11 July, 1960- adding another dimension to the already multi-layered crisis.

Kasavubu and Lumumba jointly approached the UN for intervention in controlling the territorial integrity of the state against external aggression and internal secessionist struggles. The ONUC was established, from 1960-1964, in a two-phase operation which was mandated initially to restore law and order in the state but would gradually acquire the more ambitious task of preventing civil war. ONUC was guided to use force in the last resort after exhausting all peaceful means, and even then, to use force in moderation for the sole purpose of self-defense, and not in initiating military offensives or trying to enforce particular outcomes in solving internal political problems(UN, 1960).

“The UN Force in the Congo is a peace force. It carries arms in order to lend weight to its authority and as a deterrent, but these arms may be used only in self-defence . . . The UN Force is in no sense an occupying force. It seeks only to help achieve security in which government and administration can function effectively.” (UN Archives, 1960)

While the ONUC's initial use-of-force policy showcased a direct descendance from the relatively simpler UNEF mission, it would soon prove highly inadequate when armed rebels and hostile government troops threatened the lightly armed peacekeepers, abetted by an environment of dubious consent. The mission was formed in response to a request by the host government, but it soon became clear to them that the UN forces were not commissioned to use offensive force to expel Belgian troops and the foreign mercenaries propagating Katangan secessions. This resulted in an implied withdrawal of consent signified by government-orchestrated attacks on UN personnel.

Political and ideological differences between Kasavubu and Lumumba soon came to the fore and threw the government in a state of disarray as each attempted to politically dismiss his opponent and assume power. UN forces engaged with Kasavubu due to the tactical advantage of his local power base and control of transport and communication in the capital, granting him de facto legitimacy and drawing ire from the foreign backers of Lumumba who accused the UN of partiality. Mobutu, the army chief of staff, attempted to resolve the government impasse by what was effectively a military coup. Kasavubu saw political advantage in colluding with Mobutu, and this terminally undermined Lumumba's political position, who had to seek UN protection. He was later captured and killed by ANC factions while an impotent UN looked on. African states (Egypt, Mali, Morocco etc) withdrew their troops and their political support of the ONUC mission in response.

A new and more robust mandate allowed ONUC to "take all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo" ("Security Council Resolution S/RES/161," n.d.). This resolution did not explicitly authorize putting a forceful end to Katangan secession however, deemed as an internal political matter beyond UN jurisdiction. In August 1961, Operation 'Rumpunch' was launched to arrest foreign mercenaries and Belgian military officials aiding the Katangan movement. ONUC forces seized control of key installations in the Katangan capital of Elisabethville, such as the airport, post office, gendarmerie headquarters, and arrested European officers. In another operation that would drive the peacekeeping effort to a 'mission creep' into the enforcement realm, ONUC personnel used excessive force to arrest ministers of the Katangan government. 'Operation Morthor' would severely compromise the impartiality of the mission. En route Rhodesia to negotiate a ceasefire with Tshombe, Hammarskjöld died in an air crash.

Another UNSC resolution authorized vigorous action and the use of force to eliminate the foreign paramilitaries and mercenaries in Katanga in a bid to eliminate the foreign support for secession (*Security Council Resolution S/RES/169*, 1961). There was still a reluctance to order suppression of the secessionist struggle directly and explicitly, as such a move would unequivocally be an act of peace enforcement. However, the actions undertaken by UN forces under this resolution were disparaged as attempts to subdue Katangan self-determination through the 'back door' of self-defense. Operations conducted by the troops and authorized by the UN Secretariat were indistinguishable in tactics from standard military campaigns. On 14th January 1963, Tshombe officially declared the end of Katanga's secession and a ceasefire. A

return of some measure of stability under a unified central government created grounds for the completion of the ONUC mandate.

3.3. “Defense of the Mandate”

UNEF-II, deployed in the Sinai to help implement ceasefire between Israel and Egypt after their 1973 war and to restore the status quo ante, was a relatively simple mission requiring only classic interpositional peacekeeping. However, it would prove significant in its further expansion of the concept of use-of-force for peacekeepers, a development that was copied by all subsequent operations. The Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, articulated that the self-defense concept would include- beyond the narrow notion of defense of the lives of peacekeepers- the right to resist forceful attempts to prevent the peacekeepers from discharging their duty as explicated in the mandate provided to it by the UNSC. This was an attempt to strengthen the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces on the assumption that the ‘force only in self-defense’ idea was too weak to be meaningful. Critics argued that this formulation only lowered the barriers to enforcement, as there was little to distinguish the right to use force in defense of a mandate from essentially enforcing it in the first place(White, 1990). Despite valid criticisms, the “defense of the mandate” idea has permanently subsumed under the widened notion of self-defense in the UN use-of-force doctrine.

3.4. An Attempted Peace Enforcement in Somalia

Somalian politics was characterized by extreme fragmentation underpinned by clan-based loyalties, which pulled the country into deadly violence that was temporarily halted with the 1969 military coup by General Siad Barre. However, Barre’s defeat resumed the disintegration of Somalia. The pragmatic alliance of opposition parties broke apart due to having little in common once the collective objective of ousting the dictator had been achieved. Power struggles between Farah Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) and rival clans plunged the state into an internecine civil war.

The UNISOM-I operation failed in its purpose of distributing humanitarian aid to poverty and famine-stricken populations amid conflict, and was thus replaced by the more effective, US-led multinational mission known as UNITAF. UNITAF was considered a success due to successfully employing both deterrence and use of force to achieve some measure of normality in Somalia, but it shied away from engaging in systematic and comprehensive disarmament as a precursor to reconciliation among the warring parties- out of fear of becoming deeply

embroiled- despite repeated pleas by the Secretary General. Without the necessary foreground of disarmament of belligerent factions, UNISOM-II found itself engaging in the civil war and crossing the tricky line between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, and compromised its impartiality and legitimacy in the process.

The United Task Force arrived on the port-city of Mogadishu in such an overwhelming show of force that it faced little local resistance in securing key sites. UNITAF was established under Resolution 794, which permitted a Chapter 7 authorization (for the first time in an intra-state conflict) in recognizing a threat to international peace and security and the necessity of using all possible means (a euphemism for unconstrained force) to establish a secure environment for conducting humanitarian relief. But the US had engaged in a limited and time-bound commitment, a “surgical humanitarian strike”, intended to open supply routes and allow transit of food and aid, and to leave the dirty work for the UN. Disarmament, according to UNITAF, did not include the objective in their interpretation of “establish a secure environment”. The force instead, spent time and resources on providing escorts and protection to humanitarian convoys, managing the general levels of violence, and staging the transfer to the UN force. Analysts believed that UNITAF’s success despite largely avoiding force paradoxically owed to the deterrent effect created by its strong appearance, military ability, and clearly communicated intent not to shy away from force where it needed to be employed. The failure of peacekeeping lies in its hesitancy in employing force, which ultimately creates more casualties on all sides(Hirsch & Oakley, 1995). The mission was being touted as a model to be aspired for future peacekeeping, or perhaps the prototype for a multilateral peace enforcement. Its failure to disarm the warlords, however, meant that it set up the subsequent UN mission for failure, and the normalcy and relative peace it had ‘created’ was a temporary illusion. The UN would now have to confront belligerents who had temporarily stowed away their weapons to wait out the US forces’ departure, only to then return to their violent aims.

It was hoped that the follow up mission would be a traditional peacekeeping mission inheriting a relatively secure operational environment from UNITAF, but this had not been the case. What followed was thus the first UN mission explicitly mandated under Chapter 7 and authorized to use force beyond self-defense, to achieve disarmament, continue the humanitarian relief project, engage in institution building, and monitor and enforce the cessation of hostilities and prevent any resumption of violence. The USA provided UNISOM-II with a Quick Reaction Force with air support, but was to only be employed for quick combats or rescue operations of

a limited time period rather than routine operations, and remained largely under US troop control and outside the UN chain of command.

On 5 June, 1993 after a weapons inspection at a site nearby the propaganda-spewing Radio Mogadishu station, an ambush by Aideed's forces resulted in a showdown with UN forces that caused the death of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers and over 60 wounded (UN, 1994). This unfortunate incident was instrumental in changing the nature of peacekeeping in Somalia, from largely a humanitarian relief effort turning into an all-out vengeful war against Aideed and his faction (Yamin, 2019). A UNSC resolution called for the perpetrators of the attack on UN personnel to be brought to trial and punishment using all necessary means (UN, 1993). The UNISOM and particularly the US forces now engaged in offensive attacks on SNA forces, essentially declaring war against a local faction- irredeemably compromising consent or any pretence of impartiality with it. This act of demonization, the identification of a clear 'enemy', and the resultant military offensive would prove disastrously counterproductive- turning the UN forces into neocolonialists in the eyes of the locals and Aideed into a national persecuted hero. In one such offensive campaign- planned unilaterally by US forces and without consultation with UNISOM-II - two US Blackhawk helicopters were shot down and the subsequent rescue missions resulted in the deaths of eighteen American soldiers (O'Neill & Rees, 2005) (as well as other national soldiers, and hundreds of Somalis, but the fatalities incurred by American troops became highly media-sensationalized). The US administration issued orders for the withdrawal of all US troops by March amid rising public and congressional outcry for US casualties, and other troop contributing contingents soon followed. Governments who had authorized the peace enforcement in Somalia suddenly had no more taste for it. The peace operation was steadily downsized and eventually abandoned.

Lessons from Somalia highlighted the difficulty with engaging UN troops in a peace enforcement commitment where TCCs are unwilling to shoulder the burden of heavy casualties for a conflict outside their immediate state interest. The US domination of the mission and excessive use of force also drew criticism as the whole exercise was judged a cover for US imperialism. It highlighted the necessity of engaging in political rather than purely military solutions to conflicts in states with disintegrating authority. The hybrid nature of the mission caused problems as humanitarian efforts were derailed by military operations. Peace enforcement activities and the resultant loss of legitimacy in the eyes of locals hampered UN efforts in humanitarian assistance as all foreign elements come to be regarded suspiciously by the locals. More than anything, it revealed the ill-defined nature of "peace enforcement" and

the inconsistency of trying to uphold classic peacekeeping norms while acting under Chapter 7.

3.5. Inaction in the Face of Genocide- Bosnia and Rwanda

The end of the Cold War and the resultant greater freedom of the Security Council allowed the UN to engage in increasingly more complex missions across the globe. These efforts produced some peacekeeping successes, while others would go down in history as monumental failures. Two such missions- UNPROFOR in Bosnia and UNAMIR in Rwanda- would forever occupy a shameful blot on the history of peacekeeping and highlighted the need for a redefinition of impartiality and more robust use of force in the face of gruesome crimes against humanity.

In 1992, with the ideological glue of communism and threat of Soviet invasion no longer present to forcefully hold the state together, ethnic and religious differences in the Yugoslav resulted in the most brutal civil wars in the continent- culminating in the successive breakup of the state into seven autonomous countries. Bosnia housed a complex ethno-religious demography comprising of majority Bosnian Muslims, Orthodox Christian Serbs, and a small minority of Croats. In the aspiration of a 'greater Serbia', Milosevic and other Serbian nationalists launched a campaign of war and violence when Bosnia declared its independence from Yugoslavia.

UNPROFOR was established (*Security Council Resolution S/RES/776*, 1992) for the delivery of essential aid supplies to civilians in besieged areas isolated from the rest of the country by conflict and Serbian blockades. UNPROFOR employed ground force in self-defense when harassed or obstructed in their humanitarian mission, and in upholding freedom of movement and was occasionally supplemented by airpower from NATO forces acting under UN authorization. The troops routinely found their paths physically obstructed, laid with mines, and exposed to open fire by non-cooperative parties. Bosnian Serbs remained highly suspicious of the UN's humanitarian practices as displaying partiality towards and strengthening the cause of Bosnian Muslims. The mandate would have allowed the use of force in such situations, but the troops mostly engaged in engineering and negotiation tactics to secure transit across blocked routes for humanitarian traffic. Excessive force would have ignited running hostilities and provoked more frequent confrontations with aggressive factions, making successive delivery operations more difficult to carry out. It would also further risk the lives of soldiers and necessitate forceful self-defense in a vicious catch-22 situation. Some contingents

intervened with force to protect civilians from massacres and senseless killings, although not explicitly mandated to do so, or given the necessary firepower to comprehensively implement protection of civilians. This was an idea that would eventually gain merit within the UN, and become an essential part of almost every UN peacekeeping operation authorized, as a result of failures like Bosnia.

UNPROFOR was successively equipped with chapter 7 authorizations, but these would prove to be empty threats by the UNSC. UNPROFOR had been intrusively placed in the midst of a vicious civil war but equipped with lightly armed weapons, and a need to uphold impartiality in delivering its humanitarian mandate. The resolve displayed in Council Resolutions was completely unmatched by situation on the ground. A UNPROFOR soldier remarked in an interview 'Are these people out of their minds? What do they want me to do?' Then, 'You finally figured out what they wanted you to do, but they didn't provide the resources (Prager, 1995). Despite the NATO airpower at their disposal, UN commanders were largely unwilling to make use of it either in tactical support to ground operations or in punitive strikes in response to daily artillery attacks and mortar shelling by Serbs. A number of NATO countries were also providing ground troops to UNPROFOR, and would be liable to risk due to the indiscriminate nature of air attacks and to the threat of increasing Serb assaults in response. Reluctance to use air and ground force only strengthened the resolve of extremist-Serbs who now felt free to continue their ethnic cleansing without any fear of an impotent and indecisive UNPROFOR responding in kind.

It was this sense of impunity that allowed the Serb army to march into the UN-protected Sarajevo safe area in 1995- without any fear of resistance from the Dutch contingent deployed to ensure the safety of the scared and helpless civilians who had sought refuge there. The troops effectively did nothing as the entire (almost 8000) male population of the town was rounded up and subjected to a horrible massacre.

NATO was finally propelled to action and an intense campaign of sustained airstrikes brought the conflict parties to the negotiating table, and the Dayton Accords were brokered and implementation guaranteed by the subsequent NATO dominated Implementation Force (IFOR). But the legacy of Srebrenica would continue to represent one of the greatest failures of peacekeeping.

A similar passivity was on display in the UNAMIR mission to Rwanda. This time it was due to a lack of will by the UNSC members to act decisively to halt humanitarian atrocities. In the

aftermath of the collapse of the Arusha Peace accords, by using the allegedly self-orchestrated aircraft crash of Rwandan President Habyarimana as the spark, the Hutu population initiated a pre-meditated campaign of mass genocide against the Tutsi population, even not sparing moderate Hutus in the process. This resulted in the resumption of the civil war as RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) troops from the demilitarized zone in the north approached Kigali and militarily engaged the adversaries among the ongoing largescale anarchic massacre of huge swathes of the population. While some of the troops like the Belgian contingents had been needlessly docile to the tragedy unfolding before them, other troops showed bravery in working within their capacity to protect thousands of Rwandan people, providing humanitarian assistance, and in evacuating foreign nationals from the territory.

The UNAMIR force commander, Romeo Dallaire, had issued repeated warnings to the Secretariat based on preemptive intel that Hutu extremists were stockpiling weapons and drafting lists of Tutsis in preparation for a massacre, but these went unheeded. The commander suspected an attack to kill Belgian soldiers to provoke their withdrawal and the collapse of the UN mission. The Secretariat shamefully failed to prepare for the worst-case scenario and denied authorization to Dallaire to seize the weapon caches. At the onset of genocide, Dallaire again requested for the authorization to protect civilians by force and additional troops under a new mandate. In the midst of chaos, instead of strengthening the arm of UNAMIR with more heavily armed contingents, instead the Belgium government withdrew its troops and the UNSC voted to downsize the mission from its 2000 strength down to a meagre 250. Rwanda was thus another mission the UN would forever struggle to escape the horrific legacy of and to ensure that 'never again' would the UN fail humanity so shamefully.

3.6. “Protection of Civilians” in Sierra Leone

More than its successes, it was the missions that were deemed to have failed that offered the most impetus for the development and modification of the principles and norms that have shaped peacekeeping conduct for successive missions.

UNAMSIL was deployed to help implement the Lomé Agreement of 1999 between the warring parties of Sierra Leone. President Ahmad Kabbah signed the peace deal with the insurgent Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh. The terms of the agreement guaranteed that Sankoh would be brought into the new coalition government in exchange for demobilizing and disarming his rebel supporters. The peace agreement had been signed due to

external pressure and not due to any reconciliatory sentiments by the adversaries. Initially the US and British forces, advocates and architects of the Lomé agreement, refused to lend their military arm to UNAMSIL. The resultant UN force was too weak- in strength and resolve- to counter the obstructions and assaults by the rebels who had begun to renege on their commitment. The UN forces suffered hostile confrontations and instances of mass abduction, and used surprisingly little force in response, even for self-defense. The situation only took a turn for the better as the UNAMSIL's strength and morale was boosted by the deployment of a British Joint force, involving troops, airpower, and naval forces(Macqueen, 2006). Now UNAMSIL engaged in robust operations to ensure the security of the personnel and the freedom of movement to implement its mandate. As the RUF became militarily weak, faced a much more forceful and robust UNSAMIL (also increased in strength to 16000), and lost its foreign backing, it agreed to negotiate and the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the government and RUF in 2000. The RUF agreed to cooperate with UNAMSIL in disarmament and demobilization, and agreed to not resist the deployment of the troops throughout the country for the supervision of the ceasefire. As 45000 rebels were disarmed by 2002, and government troops were deployed along borders, UNAMSIL' only task remained was monitoring the election which saw Kabbah reelected and peace restored to the state.

UNAMSIL had invited considerable criticisms for trying to peacefully engage with the intractable Sankoh in an attempt to retain impartiality towards the belligerent parties, and not adopting a more forceful posture instead. Despite shying away from deploying offensive and even defensive force on numerous occasions, UNAMSIL's lasting legacy to the institution of peacekeeping would be in its innovations in the rules of engagement (ROE) regarding force. The UNAMSIL mandate allowed peacekeepers to respond forcefully in response to hostile action against personnel or any perceived 'intent' for such, rather than waiting to return fire only when fired upon (UN, 2000). This highlighted a turn away from traditional peacekeeping towards more robust operations that allowed preemptive responses to threats of attack (UN, 2001).

Most notably, the UNAMSIL was mandated to "afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence"(UN, 1999c). The 'protection of civilians' norm would become a regular feature of most subsequent peace operations deployed in difficult environments of civil strife characterized by the risk of humanitarian emergencies. The POC mandate allows for the use of all means, up to and including deadly force, to ensure the protection of civilians under imminent threat of violence. The UN was determined not to repeat a Rwanda or a Srebrenica,

and thus the POC mandate would significantly expand the understanding of appropriate circumstances for the use of force by peacekeepers and completely alter the norm of impartiality to preclude any passive inertia and neutrality in the face of crimes against humanity.

3.7. Stabilization Mandates, Neutralization Goals, and Peace Enforcement Authorities in UN Missions

The need for more proactivity in the defense of UN troops and personnel, and for the protection of civilians against evasive threats like militias, gangsters, armed insurgents, organized crime, and terrorist attacks, has resulted in more robust peacekeeping mandates in the recent years.

In 2013, the UNSC passed a resolution authorizing the addition of a ‘Force Intervention Brigade’, which would operate alongside the conventional MONUSCO forces in the DRC. Tasked with the goals of ‘neutralization’ and ‘disarmament’ of rebel factions and other spoilers, it had a mandate that allowed for an authorization for “all necessary means” for this purpose (UN, 2013a). The FIB was an explicitly offensive force that clearly identified enemies of the government authority, particularly the M23 and other militias, as enemies of the missions and liable to targeted offensive operations.

The mandate for the FIB stipulated that this was a force established “on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping’. However, most states of the Global South and members within the UNSC were wary about the potentials for abuse of this force and its implications for impartiality of peacekeeping and the safety of troops. China and Russia expressed vocal concerns, arguing that what is once the exception can threaten to become unacknowledged standard practice. A senior UN official remarked that the UNSC was “careful to say it was not a precedent, but every time you say that, that’s exactly what you’re making.” (Kulish & Sengupta, n.d.)

In the same year, the UNSC passed a resolution allowing MINUSMA to operate “in support of the transitional authorities of Mali”, in order to stabilize and secure important areas of civilian habitation and to deter and actively prevent the return of insurgent elements to these areas (UN, 2013b). Facing asymmetric threats such as liberation movements, insurgent groups and organised crime, the mandate of the MINUSMA mission in Mali has been made exceptionally robust to counter the difficult operational environment imbued with a myriad of threats from all fronts (Gauthier Vela, 2021).

Muslim forces (Seleka) and Christian populations (anti-Balakas) have been pitted against each other in active hostilities in Central African Republic. In 2014, the UN forces equipped MINUSCA with a stabilization mandate in a country where the state has faced serious challenges in extending its authority even to cover the capital Bangui, and where frequent coups have entrenched the instability in the political structures of the country.

By extending their support to governmental authorities in regaining control over state territory, identifying and clearly articulating specific enemies, and tasking UN forces to use all means necessary to neutralize, disarm, and militarily subjugate these clearly named targets, stabilization missions have over-stretched the bounds and limitations of traditional peacekeeping (Longobardo, 2020). Moreover, as the perceived impartiality of peacekeepers is compromised because of robust actions, UN troops and agencies are likely to become more endangered, inviting retaliatory attacks from rebels.

The need for robust peacekeeping has allowed for new technologies and armament capabilities to infiltrate UN missions. In order to effectively counter the insurgent threat in Mali, the UN has employed an unprecedented capability for comprehensive intelligence, in the form of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), which includes tactical intelligence officers from such countries as Sweden, Norway, and Netherlands (Rietjens & de Waard, 2017). Peacekeepers have long relied on vibrant networks of human intelligence for their operations, but new trends have engendered equipping missions with well-trained and specialized intelligence personnel, along with such technologies as aerial surveillance drones. MINUSMA has seen a large contribution of Western forces to the troop, motivated by a desire to combat terrorism and stem migration flows to Europe. These forces have also brought advanced technologies and important capabilities to the mission. These troops have shown a reluctance to paint the armoured transport helicopters, planes, and other mobile vehicles in the white color symbolic of UN vehicles. This scenario has raised fears in some that the UN is “going green”, or turning essentially into a combat military force (Karlsrud, 2015a).

4. PEACEKEEPING IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

This research has attempted to gauge the operational environment in the new robust peacekeeping missions of the current era through interviews with armed officers of various ranks, with experience of serving in different peacekeeping missions abroad. There was a particular attempt to focus on interviewing officers with on-ground experience of robust peacekeeping missions, particularly the missions in South Sudan (UNMISS), Mali (MINUSMA), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), and Central African Republic (MINUSCA). However, in order to understand the evolutionary transformation in peacekeeping operations and to compare and contrast the experiences of peacekeepers serving under different kinds of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 mandates, a few officers from traditional, Chapter 6 missions were also consulted for their insight, namely veterans from the now defunct UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL), as well as the still ongoing UN missions in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Middle East (UNTSO). The interview questionnaire was designed with the aim of gaining insight from these officers on the nature of the threat environment they had or were currently facing, their level of clarity regarding the trinity principles, and the ways in which they implemented the principles of consent, impartiality, and the use of force in their particular missions.

4.1. A Changing Operational Environment in Peacekeeping Missions

The responses regarding the level of threat in their particular deployment areas varied from participant to participant according to the specific mission they were deployed in. A Force Commander in Mali described the nature of “360-degree threat” facing troops and soldiers deployed there, with all types of terrorist armed groups and warring factions fighting one another and using violent and extreme tactics for fighting the Malian government and security institutions, even targeting peacekeepers. At the time of conversation, the Force Commander described two incidents that had taken place just a few weeks before. There was an incident of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) hitting a peacekeepers convoy, and another incident of rebels ambushing one of the units escorting a convoy, causing casualties in the process. The FC acknowledged the harsh realities of the peacekeeping environment in Mali and affirmed that this was an entirely different way of doing peacekeeping, a far cry from the traditional missions requiring peacekeepers to act as buffers between two warring state armies. The respondent made explicit references to a new era for peacekeeping with new type of actors-

small armed groups and terrorist groups using asymmetric tactics and blending seamlessly into the local population. These changes in the operational environment placed additional burdens and requirements to the equipment and capabilities, and the level of training required of peacekeepers. Since the threat is coming from rebel armed groups that use small firearms, mortars, and machine guns, rather than an organized military with tanks and artillery, so peacekeepers need to be equipped accordingly, with flexible and robust assets such as a Mobile Task Force. In gist, more robust means were required and are being employed to deal with the new and evolved nature of threat facing peacekeepers in this mission.

The MINUSMA operation in Mali, in the face of rising organized crime and a deteriorating security situation (UNSG, 2022), has adapted to make use of more robust techniques and equipment, in particular the Mobile Task Force to supplement the activities of the conventional infantry ground forces, as well as airborne capabilities such as armed helicopters and reconnaissance vehicles. The Mobile task force is a particularly robust means for operations and is capable of rapid deployment to places where there are indicators for imminent attacks and violence, or which have seen recent outbursts of brutality and instability. It has the capacity to both prevent instances of violent eruptions, and to swiftly react to any such outbreaks in highly unstable security environments (Swedish Armed Forces, 2020). Mali remains one of the most dangerous operational environments for peacekeepers, with regular instances of attacks against UN personnel resulting in casualties (UN Press Release, 2022).

One research participant with experience of serving as a Military Observer (MILOB) in DRC in 2010 shared that movements of armed troops for the purpose of protection of civilians, convoys, and for the protection of the force itself, were quite frequent, in the regions of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. He also described having heard rumors of an incident where a Jordanian military observer was burned by rebel forces, an incident that has been verified through publications by credible news sources (ReliefWeb, 2007). Contingents moving from one area to another require armed protection, and this has been corroborated as being the case by officers currently deployed in the MONUSCO mission as well. Peacekeepers have described a few incidents of exchange of fires in incidents where rebel elements had attacked a civilian settlement. Respondents described incidents of looting of UN camps due to the camps being obvious lucrative targets for gangsters and criminals.

A respondent deployed in CAR shared that rebellious forces often stay hidden in the thick vegetation of the country, not coming down to habited places frequently, and that there is rarely

any direct confrontation with peacekeeping forces. Moreover, another officer added that the Seleka and anti-Balaka forces mostly fight amongst themselves, but do not frequently harm civilians directly, and UN forces intervene only to mitigate situations and to maintain law and order, not to physically or forcefully put an end to the outbreaks of fighting. The Seleka forces are offensive in nature and attack if you encroach upon their territories, but otherwise remain hidden in the jungle covers. In the UNMISS, a respondent shared that UN convoys moving from one place to another, known to have insurgent or terrorist elements, require convoy protection from the local government forces to protect from attacks against UN personnel. Most respondents described a relatively stable environment in their area of operations at the specific time of their deployments, but it is pertinent to note that these missions have been sites of scores of peacekeeper casualties at different periods in time, as well as militia attacks on villages and civilian inhabitants, and tragic civilian massacres (“ U.N. Worker Killed in Attack on Peacekeeping Convoy in Mali,” 2021; “CAR: Up to 100 Civilians Shot and Burnt Alive as UN Peacekeepers Leave Posts in Alindao,” 2018; “Mali: Army, UN Fail to Stop Massacre- Second Militia Attack on Ogossagou Village Killed at Least 35,” 2020; Adam Day, 2017).

4.2. Attitude of Peacekeepers towards the Use of Force

In a comprehensive report published in December 2017, General Santos Cruz attempted to comprehend the gap between expectations, clear legal authorizations, and the reality of the attitudes and conducts of peacekeeping forces regarding the use of force. He identified a consistent spike in fatalities incurred by uniformed UN personnel- using credible, internally reported data of the UN- and sought to analyze the causes and the way forward in missions with a high-threat environment(Cruz, 2017). The General identified a “Chapter VI Syndrome” that grips the psyches of Troop Contributing Countries and their forces. He identified that despite a completely changed nature of threat in peace operations, and clear legal authorizations for the use of “all necessary means” for the protection of their lives, associated personnel, and UN installments, peacekeepers continue to be risk-averse and display passive inaction. He encouraged TCCs to acknowledge and adapt to the new reality of Peace Operations, one that no longer offers natural protection to blue helmets, because the enemy on the other side is composed of armed groups, rebellious militias, and gangster factions, unbound by such symbolic and legal considerations. He urged the TCCs to change their mindsets, and to encourage more proactiveness and initiative in their troops’ conducts, lest they wish to consciously send their soldiers into harm’s way.

The interactions with different officers for the purpose of this research displayed that the “Chapter VI syndrome” highlighted by the Santos Cruz report is very much prevalent in the thought processes and worldviews of officers of the Pakistan Army. This could be explained by the fact that most officers interviewed for this research had been deployed in relatively stable areas or periods of the mission, and had not personally encountered any instances of a direct violent attack by rebellious factions on their own or other units deployed by their side during their one-year long tenures. One respondent deployed in CAR supported this analysis when he remarked that the forces deployed in the sector East, where the insurgency is at its peak, have been attacked a few times and would probably not think twice in opening fire and responding in kind to forceful attacks. But officers alongside him in the Bangassou prefecture are more restrained, largely due to being deployed in a more stable area of the country.

Interactions with Pakistani peacekeepers displayed a consistent apprehensiveness regarding the use of excessive force in peacekeeping operations, and they emphasized the defensive nature of peacekeeping and the mandates provided to them, even while serving in missions that clearly have Chapter 7 authorities for the use of force for defense of the self and the mandate, and for the protection of civilians. This research finding clearly displays that the pace of evolutions of the norms of peacekeeping in the legal and theoretical domain has not matched with a similar pace in the change of mindsets, attitudes, and practices, in the practical domain. Several research respondents remarked on the necessity for peacekeepers to remain “passive”, and emphasized the difference between peacekeepers and peace enforcers. Three respondents remarked that troops from different TCCs display different levels of aggressiveness. One remarked that Rwandan and Moroccan troops are usually more proactive and aggressive, while a Force Commander remarked that soldiers from Chad are “peacekeeping fighters”, have a proactive attitude and lack any hesitancy to act, whereas Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian contingents are often more passive. An officer remarked that for the African forces, it is more of a familiar environment, while South Asian forces are deployed thousands of miles away in a foreign operational area, thus explaining their passiveness. This finding broadly corroborates the results of previous researches.

Respondents implicitly and explicitly mentioned that the potential political consequences and the high personal repercussions of such incidents as a misfire, an accidental death of a civilian, or any such misconduct allegation promotes hesitancy in the conduct of peacekeepers when it comes to using force. Being answerable to civilian chains of command was another cited factor. Most Pakistani respondents shared being highly cognizant of the fact that they were

representing the good image of their nation during their UN tenures, another element that promotes cautiousness in their conduct. One peculiar finding of this research was that almost all Pakistani interviewees serving in peacekeeping missions that have Chapter 7 use of force authorities for certain goals, confidently asserted that their mandates and ROEs clearly prohibited them to use force outside of self-defense.

When asked about their general views on whether peacekeepers should be equipped with more liberal and robust legal authorizations for the use of force, almost all of the respondents emphasized the counter-productivity of the use of force in a peacekeeping context. Out of 10 of the officers that were asked to share their view on the matter, 8 officers emphasized that this should not be the case, with different explanations for their viewpoint. One officer argued that the symbolic and cognitive effect of simply the presence of the blue helmets, perceived as neutral parties with no bias towards any or the other faction, was enough to achieve most UN objectives and excessive use of force would compromise that perception of the peacekeepers among the locals. He remarked, “Even a single bullet fired is counterproductive to the years you have spent trying to broker peace in the region”. Another officer made a similar argument, that excessive use of force by the blue berets would result in a loss of popular support, peacekeepers being seen by locals as the enemy, and resultantly damaging the mandate. Three respondents remarked that overwhelming authorizations for the use of force by peacekeepers should be discouraged because no matter how much they are trained in pre-deployment cadres to restrain themselves; military personnel and troops remain trigger-happy by their very nature and years of combat training outside of UN contexts, and thus force can be misused and abused by militaries. Another respondent argued that if there is liberal use of force, the burden of responsibility following a skirmish, a forceful handling of a particular situation, or any offensive activity, will lie with the forces. He mentioned that minimal use of force rules were a means to protect the forces from getting too embroiled in the complicated security environment of mission areas. One serving peacekeeper remarked that a peacekeeper’s life is worth less than the civilians he/she is there to protect, and liberal use of force rules risk increasing civilian casualties. Another interviewee replied that insurgencies require political solutions and use of force, in itself, cannot achieve that. Peacekeeping forces should just be one tool in the UN’s kit, and their purpose should be curtailed to enabling a secure environment for and facilitating the work of other civilian UN agencies and humanitarian bodies. Increasing the firepower of or the physical number of troops will not help achieve the desired political end. However, this respondent also acknowledged that use of force should sometimes be

allowed in confronting rebel groups that endanger the lives of peacekeepers. Another participant repeatedly emphasized that use of force should be a last resort, after other channels of dialogue and engagement have been exhausted. Even in interactions with rebellious forces, he repeated that hearing and pacifying their grievances should precede any use of force. A Commander deployed in the mission in Mali, however, emphasized the need for robust means for the protection of the force. As previously mentioned, Mali has been the site of scores of peacekeeper casualties over the years.

4.3. The Nature of Consent in Peacekeeping Operations

Consent at both the governmental level and at the local level is incredibly important for peacekeeping missions because it is this basic element that separates peacekeeping forces from military invaders. Moreover, it is a practical necessity for peacekeepers to be able to perform their day-to-day duties effectively. While governmental consent is a prerequisite for the deployment of a mission in any state territory, it need not always translate to consent at the grass-roots level. A Unit Commanding Officer deployed in Congo described how troops would face protests that could quickly turn violent whenever peacekeepers failed to respond to any untoward incident of civilians being killed by rebel forces. Incidents of stone-pelting were common, due to which some brigades had grilled their windows for protection. Civilians armed with sticks and stones, lighting fires and blocking roads to protest against the UN forces, in response to incidents where the UN forces failed to act proactively to a threat to civilians, were a common phenomenon as confirmed by two other officers deployed in MONUSCO. Another common incident of hostility by locals was in response to hit and run cases and road accidents causing a cattle or herd animal to be killed. All officers having experience of serving in the DRC shared accidental killing of animals by UN vehicles a common operational challenge, and while some said that locals were usually appeased by a compensation in dollars, one officer described such an incident having incited an aggressive protest against UN forces. He describes having diffused the situation with dialogue and negotiation through locally employed UN interpreters, but acknowledges that the situation was a high-risk one and had the potential to turn ugly if the locals could not have been appeased and it had led to an altercation. The UN forces were equipped with riot control gears for the worst-case scenario. Another officer in Congo notes that there was a latent feeling of resentment among the local masses against UN forces, due to a perception that the UN was not doing enough to solve their problems, was prolonging the conflict in order to exploit the country's vast swathes of natural resources, and

that these are external forces that have come to subjugate them. However, he remarks that the resentment did not turn into active reluctance towards peacekeepers, due to the dependency of the poverty-stricken masses on the material benefits, wage opportunities, and humanitarian assistance that the UN would provide.

One respondent describes gaining the support of the locals being incumbent on respecting local customs. During the school hours of the day, the national anthem of the DRC would play, and all local vehicles on the roads would stop for the anthem. UN forces would display the same sensitivity and deference to this tradition. If any UN vehicle violated this custom, the masses would quickly turn hostile towards them.

Aside from these few accounts, 90% of the respondents shared that they faced permissive attitudes from locals, ranging from a dispassionate acceptance to perceptible support. Most interviewees remarked that the locals consented to and were happy with their deployment. Years of war fatigue, along with the food, health, and social insecurity that locals were experiencing, meant that peacekeepers were a welcome change for them. Pakistani officers shared a highly favourable acceptance from locals in most missions, due to their culture of going out of their way to establish good communication and a positive rapport with local people. Especially officers deployed in Sudan shared a highly positive response from the locals towards their troops, due to the history between the two countries, past deployments, and the shared Muslim bond. Locals would actively request that Pakistani troops be deployed in their villages. One officer describes an alarming situation where an Arabic Muslim was killed in Sudan, and about 2000 fully armed individuals from the community gathered for revenge. African Muslims, out of fear of the incoming mob, started throwing their children over the fences to the UN team site near their village, in hopes for protection. The officer shares that it took about 36 hours of constant negotiations to pacify the mob, but the crisis was averted through diplomatic tact and not a single bullet fired.

There was a common narrative of discernable pride from Pakistani respondents towards what they described as the extraordinary humanitarian conduct of Pakistani troops in mission areas. Many respondents shared similar sentiments that Pakistani troops go over and above their mandates to help the local populations and establish good relations with them. Six of the officers interviewed mentioned that they routinely organized recreational and cultural activities for positive interactions with the locals, such as having football and volleyball matches, or staging festivals for celebrating their national holidays. Other respondents shared engaging in

duties beyond their mandates for the benefit of the population, such as helping to build wells, mending broken bridges, setting up medical camps, renovating places of worship, distributing excessive food to the poor people of the area, donating stationary and books to local schools, and even giving away money for charity from their own pockets. The motivations described for such actions were various, such as a basic human empathy and humanitarian sentiment to do good, to establish a positive environment with the locals, out of religious motivations, or for the positive image-building of the Pakistani nation. Several interview respondents mentioned a conscious effort towards “winning hearts and minds” of the local population. One respondent articulately noted that “the cognitive effect you would achieve from the smallest acts of kindness was often quite significant”. It also had practical benefits of establishing a high level of support and a strong network of human intelligence. According to one officer, “The War on Terror experience had taught us that in counter-insurgency operations, center of gravity is local support”. Another echoed the sentiment, “People are the most important commodity in a conflict zone. So, it is the population which you have to protect, enable, and support”.

4.4. Implementing Protection of Civilians

While a Force Commander interviewed acknowledged that theoretically the mandate provided for the authority to conduct offensive or preventive activities for the purpose of protecting civilians from attacks and killings, such activities do not happen too often. Most other interview respondents agreed that peacekeepers don’t engage in the use of force for the Protection of Civilians, but rather create a secure environment through the show of force. “Protection through presence” and establishing security through credible deterrence, are the means through which peacekeepers achieve protection of civilians. Moreover, the UN establishes camps for IDPs and threatened populations that soldiers can physically guard and protect. Respondents identified a variety of activities performed by peacekeepers on a daily basis in the context of Protection of Civilians. UN forces provide route and convoy protection to secure road routes around an area. Most rebellious forces retreat from areas where they know peacekeeping forces have a presence.

There is a three-tiered approach to the protection of civilians. The first encompasses protection through dialogue and engagement. This involves mediation and outreach through engaging in villages, being there, and talking to people. This has important cognitive and material benefits of adding to the perceived and actual security of the environment. The second tier involves physical protection, to physically protect people under threat by whatever means necessary.

Lastly, establishing a protective environment through presence, capacity building, aiding the national security forces, and so on. Peacekeepers perform regular patrolling and that helps in creating a protective environment, and encourages engagement with the civilian population. Temporary operating bases (TOBs) are established in vulnerable areas that have suffered attacks or are under a credible threat of attack and through their preemptive deployment, they bring security to villages around the area. A dilemma often encountered by peacekeepers in their POC duties is weighing and assessing the reliability of intel. There are warnings or indications that there might be a threat somewhere, but due to the lack of resources and manpower, peacekeepers cannot jump to act on every threat. They must weigh the credibility, possibility, and reliability of the information they receive. Interview respondents shared that they often have a robust network of intelligence based on information relayed by locals and notables that the peacekeepers are in touch with.

Most respondents affirmed that within their deployment experience, peacekeepers engaged in defensive as opposed to offensive use of force, and the show of force for deterrence as opposed to the actual use of force.

4.5. Humanitarian Access in Remote and Unstable Areas

One interviewee described his experience as a UN peacekeeper in these words, “Peacekeeping is not a futile activity. It is quite a good activity, because by virtue of your presence in those areas, you enable many other humanitarian organizations and NGOs to work, which, if you hadn’t been deployed, they might not be able to come to those areas”. Peacekeepers, through the modicum of stability just their mere presence creates in war-torn, insurgency prone remote areas, allow for a humanitarian space to be created. Many humanitarian bodies of the UN, who would not be able to deliver their aid and services to these populations otherwise, are able to come and work in these mission areas because of the security and freedom of movement that peacekeepers provide for their operations. Even if peacekeeping missions do not achieve enough in improving the overall security environment of a state, even if rebel or governmental forces renege on their peace agreements, even if a peacekeeping force leaves a state no closer to sustainable peace than how it found it, the services of honest men and women dispensing their duties selflessly in these dangerous environments are not in vain. The physical presence of peacekeepers makes a difference. While civilians might still be attacked and killed, populations are more secure than they would have been otherwise. There is a comfort that peacekeepers provide by their presence to innocent civilians, the faintest of hopes that if things

go south, there is someone who will come and try to protect them. And in the non-military department, UN peacekeepers achieve applaudable results in opening up the doors of access and freedom of action to humanitarian agencies in these hostile and unfavorable climates.

5. THE DILEMMAS OF EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION

The “Robust turn” in Peacekeeping emerged as a response to the failures of inaction of the UN in the most brutal humanitarian tragedies of the modern era, namely the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica. As barbaric crimes against humanity motivated by racial, ethnic, and religious hatreds were committed against innocent men, women, and children, UN peacekeeping troops stationed in the areas became passive witnesses to these atrocious human rights violations. There was an urgent need to look inwards, and assess the failures and weaknesses of the UN organization- a recognized beacon for the protection of human rights and liberties across the globe- in the face of its embarrassing failure to implement its basic reason d’etre. The reason for failure was simple- peacekeepers had neither the manpower, nor the armamental strength and capacity, to live up to the herculean tasks expected of them. Put simply, there were not “robust enough” to effectively discharge their mandated duties and protect civilians from massacres and genocides in some of the most unstable war zones of the world. Robust peacekeeping was thus conceived as the natural next-step in the evolution of peacekeeping, a practical necessity for the demands of post-Cold War conflicts. Peacekeepers required better mechanisms to protect themselves and civilian populations. As mandates for future became more and more robust, and practical dilemmas for their implementation came to fore, it soon became apparent that while necessary, robust peacekeeping was often not politically acceptable or operationally viable (Tardy, 2011). UN peacekeeping missions have perennially suffered from the problems of inconsistent availability of personnel, and weak political support for missions in terms of resources and troop contributions, a problem only exacerbated by the new robust criteria of operation. Moreover, there was a doctrinal strain in trying to reconcile the need for robustness with the three basic principles of peacekeeping(Boulden, n.d.).

Two experts in the field of peacekeeping were approached to share their insight regarding the nature of Peace Operations today and the various political, doctrinal, and ethical dilemmas they create. These individuals had served in the UN in various important capacities over the years, being appointed as heads of the mission in important peace operations and in influential policy-influencing roles in the UN HQs, as Military Advisor and Special Representative to the Secretary General. These individuals, through their years of experience in the UN, and through their first-hand role in shaping the mandates, policies, and operations of peacekeeping missions, were incredibly important as an insider’s viewpoint into the worldview of the elite structure at the UN Headquarters.

5.1. Peacekeeping or Waging War? Use of Force Dilemmas

The experts shared valuable insight into why issuing robust legal authorizations for the use of force were necessary in the modern context of civil wars and insurgencies as operational backdrops for peacekeeping troops. The ex-SRSG remarked on the necessity of a legal sanction or license for peacekeepers to use lethal force, because they were being placed in environments where civilians are under immense threat and the UN forces are routinely criticized for their passivity when they fail to prevent massacres and ruthless killings. The soldiers and officers deployed on the ground should have a clear understanding of their legal limitations and bounds. Having a legal authority for the right to kill is extremely important, he emphasized, for peacekeeping forces operating under the blue emblem of the UN, an organization meant for peace and human rights. The protection of these very rights is sometimes incumbent on using force to stop atrocities, and thus having a legal backing to use this kind of lethal force is necessary for peacekeepers. The individual mentioned that he was instrumental in advocating and campaigning for the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade with an offensive mandate, to TCCs who were reluctant to grant this authorization on the grounds that it was against the spirit and character, as well as the purpose of peacekeeping. However, he stressed on the singular and exceptional nature of the FIB, and that its activities were beyond any association with normal peacekeeping conduct.

Through citing the Cruz Report, the interviewee respondent cited the risk aversiveness and hesitancy in conduct of peacekeepers, due to their attitudes having been inculcated with the traditional culture of peacekeeping. He argued that the ROEs of classic militaries like the NATO forces emphasize restraint, because these are bellicose armies engaging in war operations or crisis management. Peacekeepers, on the other hand, are equipped with ROEs that tell them not to hesitate and to use “all necessary means” where required, in order to change their mindset of use-of-force only for defense, and to motivate them to proactive action where civilian endangerment required them to be more dynamic and bold. So, the problem was not an excessive use of force by peacekeepers, but in fact the opposite- a lack of proper initiative and proactiveness. He argued that TCCs are often unwilling to engage their troops in operations that look like war. “But, from time to time, you should do something that looks like war”, because the nature of peacekeeping has changed drastically, as well as the stakeholders. Peacekeepers now deploy in volatile conflicts and confront informal militias and bandits rather than institutionalized militaries. While some activities and operations may look like the UN

forces are waging war, in reality they are not there to achieve a Clausewitz-esque military victory, but to create the necessary preconditions for a political solution. He also pointed towards important UN reports like the “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace” and the “HIPPO Report” that identified, within the UN bureaucracy, an acknowledgement of the practical difficulties of implementing robustness through peacekeepers that are not properly prepared to implement it, and the need to move towards more prevention and politics.

The respondent mentioned that the HIPPO report is meant to re-emphasize a distinction between peacekeeping missions and peace enforcement, distancing peacekeepers from excessive use of force, and encouraging an outsourcing of peace enforcement to regional bodies like the African Union. Such outsourcing would allow bodies like the AU to enforce peace and establish a peace agreement, and allow for subsequent peacekeeping missions to benefit from the relatively stable environment created. He commented on the difficulty of obtaining viable peace deals in conflicts in Africa, and the issue of rebel groups and even governments routinely reneging on their commitments. Rebel leaders like the self-styled General Darassa benefit from conditions of instability, because they can implement the law of the AK47. They are not equipped or literate enough to take on the responsibility of the power-sharing they so often demand.

The second respondent, a retired Military Advisor in the UN, echoed the sentiment that there is a reluctance among peacekeepers to use force. He describes an incident where use of force in Mali by some peacekeepers resulted in the death of civilians, and prompted a thorough UN inquiry into the matter. Inquiries were held on why force had been employed, and whether it could have been avoided, and such inquiries scare officers who wish to protect their skins and also the repute of their country. Robust mandates are thus rarely implemented as one would wish or the UN would hope, because peacekeepers shy away from it. He further remarked that while use of force rules are especially robust for the protection of troops and defense of the civilian population, these rules are essentially under the overarching restrictions of the three principles which have never been neglected by the UN. “So, on the one hand, the UN is authorizing the use of force and on the other hand, it is also limiting the use of force with these principles”. Peacekeepers do not have a free will to act as they wish, there are always certain restrictions built in within the ROEs. He argued that these principles are still very relevant and applicable, even in robust missions such as in CAR and Mali. When commenting on the FIB in Congo, he remarked that it was a push from AU countries for more effective POC but ended up largely as a failed experiment. When there was a demand to deploy a similar force in Mali,

it was strongly opposed, because the FIB had failed to deliver the results for which it was constituted.

5.2. The Dilemmas of Impartial Conduct

In May 2000, 500 blue helmets were held hostages in Sierra Leone. In August 2003, the UN HQ in Baghdad was bombed, causing many casualties, prominently that of Sergio de Mello. The expert respondent cites these two incidents to highlight that there is a general trend whereby peacekeepers are being targeted because of the rising perception that the UN is impartial. Important stakeholders within different states identify the UN forces as an enemy because these forces have been brought to these territories on the request of the governments these stakeholders are fighting. They perceive UN forces to be on the side of the government and partial to its interests. This is a significant challenge for the UN today. It is expounded by the fact that for their freedom of movement and effective operations, peacekeeping missions are required to develop positive relationships with the incumbent governments. It becomes a challenge for UN missions to work in tandem with the government, while simultaneously denouncing the human rights related crimes committed by government forces. The respondent comments that it is because the UN is impartial that it is facing difficulty with all the stakeholders. He cites Bangui as an example, where the sitting government is fueling demonstrations against the UN mission, while the opposition is saying that the mission is too close to the government. The armed groups are complaining that the UN is not paying enough attention to their demands and grievances. It is a complex challenge for UN forces, because they are required to use force against rebel groups in response to their crimes against humanity and brutal killing of civilians, while simultaneously engaging them in negotiations.

5.3. Mindfulness and Expediency in Accepting Troop Contributions

Dag Hammarskjold and Lester Pearson, when laying the groundworks for peacekeeping operations, proscribed the acceptance of troop contributions from the Permanent Five. The rationale behind this stipulation was that the major powers in the Security Council would likely have some vested interests in the conflicts and thus would be unable to put aside their geopolitical interests. Accepting the P5 as TCCs would thus open a door for them to further their own interests in conflicts around the globe. By the same logic, countries sharing direct borders or having geographical proximity with the host nation in question were also not accepted as TCCs because of the impossibility for them to maintain their impartiality in a

conflict they have stakes in. Peacekeeping has come a long way since the Hammarskjoldian era, and the zeitgeist has changed completely. Now, African states form the major bulk of the troops deployed in African missions, a reality summed up by the normative expression, “African solutions to African problems”. Both respondents agreed that while the logic behind the earlier principles was commendable, the demands and realities of the new era of peacekeeping necessitate this change in conduct. The respondent rightly points out that the first encroachments to this principle were by the British when they deployed their forces in Cyprus, and the French in 1978 when they deployed in Lebanon, a state they had long friendly relations and a history of colonial interactions with. So, the principle was attacked by the very states in charge of protecting and upholding it. When it comes to conflicts in Africa, it is not only expediency that has brought about this practice (since most states outside of the countries in Africa are not often willing to send their troops to the unfamiliar and hostile environments there), but also a political prudence. Troops from African states understand the dynamics of the conflicts in Africa better than soldiers from any other region can. They understand the language, the population, the cultures and customs, and the overall dynamics of the conflict much better than forces from outside Africa. While African forces are not always as well trained and well equipped as European and Asian armies, their overall grasp of the situation makes them more suitable. There are drawbacks to their deployment, such as their increased aggressiveness and comfortability in the environment, and the practice has been a mixed bag in terms of success or failure. But it has become a well-established practice and is unlikely to change.

Section II- Discussion and Analysis

5.4. The Practical Viability and Operational Hazards of Robust Peacekeeping

Robust peacekeeping involves a new generation of peace operations with a renewed commitment, as well as legal and practical capacity, to use force for the implementation of the mandate and for POC. It is a strategy to equip forces with the necessary equipment and legal authorization so that they may signal a credible intent to deter and neutralize threats to the implementation of their mandated duties.

While robust postures are touted as a means for peacekeepers to better protect themselves and other UN personnel, and for the defense of endangered civilians, they have the potential to achieve counter-productive results in the long haul. Robust postures and activities may end up further harming the very people these actions are aspiring to protect. By increasing the risk of collateral damage- the casualties that are incurred when civilians are unintentionally caught in the line of fire or mistaken as enemy targets- robust means can further jeopardize the security of civilian populations. Also, by conducting more operations meant to ‘neutralize’ rebels and spoilers of peace, UN personnel invite themselves to become targets of retaliation. The symbolic markers of the UN, such as the blue berets, the white jeeps, and the prominently hoisted UN flag, have long been thought to be a source of natural protection for peacekeeping forces. As UN forces suffer reputational damage due to their robust conduct, these markers are likely to transform into easily identifiable iconographs for launching vengeful attacks and retaliatory assaults. If UN peacekeepers are perceived as biased and enemies by rebel groups and host populations, they effectively lose their special immunity that peacekeepers have always enjoyed due to their accepted impartiality. In Mali, where the UN is expressly working in support of and in close tandem with the government, terrorist groups have gone on record to pinpoint UN as enemies and legitimate targets for attacks (Diallo & Diarra, 2015). IEDs, roadside bombings of US convoys, and suicide attacks against peacekeepers in Mali are common, as was corroborated by one interview respondent. Moreover, the civilian arm of peacekeeping missions and the associated humanitarian bodies are also likely to become easy targets of misplaced aggression due to the activities of troops.

Food relief and health assistance NGOs work effectively in conflict areas through the creation of a humanitarian space- unfettered access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance based on the agencies’ complete neutrality and independence. Such agencies can be “painted with the same brush”, as common enemies, because of the activities of the military wing of peacekeeping missions, thus damaging the humanitarian space that is essential to their operations. Rebel forces perceive different bodies and agencies of the UN as representing the same monolithic international community; thus, loss of impartiality and acceptance of peacekeeping forces means that the duties of these associated bodies are also negatively impacted. It becomes difficult for relief agencies to distance themselves from the military arm of the integrated mission within which they are jointly embedded.

Robust postures also negatively impact the overarching political process. Rebellious resistance and insurgencies, no matter how violent, are often based on genuine grievances against

government bodies for discriminatorily excluding communities from the power-sharing structures and the economic gains of a particular nation. Resolving these problems in the long run and bringing genuine and sustainable peace to the area requires creating power-sharing agreements based on a participatory political process. Rebel groups need to be politically engaged with and pacified in order to create long term viable solutions. Using coercive means to neutralize rebels and forcefully disarming combatants is counter-productive to parallel UN efforts to engage with rebel warring parties on the negotiating table. Stabilization-focused missions make clear choices about winners and losers regarding the political spoils. The UN is deeply involved in deciding who, on the one hand, are legitimate political actors to be included in dialogue and transitional power-sharing agreements, and on the other hand, who is labelled an illegitimate spoiler to be excluded from the political settlement (Tull, 2018). In Congo, for example, President Kabila and his supportive faction is considered a key partner in the political process, while the M23 are docketed as spoilers and enemies of the mission, to be subdued militarily. Peace obtained through such exclusionary practices is unlikely to sustain and will reproduce the root causes of the conflict. Local governments that see political gains in cooperating with UN forces to militarily defeat rebels are unlikely to prioritize building embracive and inclusive political institutions.

Another political consequence of robust operations is a decline in troop contributions from countries that would be uninclined to send their soldiers in missions with a high risk of violence, and resultant injuries and fatalities. The incentive of troops to go out of their way to engage in offensive action or active combat to protect civilians in a foreign country is already low. Missions that guarantee a higher risk of fatalities are unlikely to garner much support for resource and troop contributions from TCCs outside of Africa (Karlsrud, 2015b). Robust missions also place additional requirements on the equipment and level of training required of the contributed forces.

Thus, a host of unintended and counterproductive consequences are likely to follow from the employment of robust force in peacekeeping (Hunt, 2017).

- A loss of popular support and grass-roots level consent due to perceived partiality in the conduct of forces.

- Increased retaliatory attacks by hostile elements, further endangering the lives of peacekeepers, and “soft” targets such as humanitarian agencies and civilian UN personnel.
- Conflict escalation by rebels in reaction to perceiving peacekeepers as a partial party to the conflict, further deteriorating the security environment.
- Increased civilian casualties through collateral damage from robust operations.
- Loss of international political support for such missions and decreased troop contributions.

5.5. The Doctrinal Strains of Robust Peacekeeping

Robust Peacekeeping encompasses a conceptually dangerous grey-area between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement. In promoting robust postures in peacekeeping missions, the UN continues to grapple with the dichotomy of reconciling its role as a protector of human rights and liberties with the employment of coercive means to do so (Tardy, 2007). Robust peacekeeping missions put particular stress over the three basic principles of peacekeeping- consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force in self-defense.

Policy-makers have been careful to emphasize that the use of force in robust operations is for a defensive purpose and pursued with impartiality (not neutrality). By proscribing the use of force to a tactical or operational level, officials in the UN emphasize that it is an activity distinct in character from peace enforcement, which involves the use of force at the strategic level against clearly defined enemies. On paper, this distinction serves to highlight that through pursuing force impartially- in an even-handed manner against any party that stands in the way of implementing the mandate- robust means of employing force are compatible and consistent with the trinity principles. In reality, however, robust postures are less than impartial, and the use of armed helicopters and missiles goes against the principle of proportionate and appropriate force as per requirement. Lines of impartiality are frequently blurred when stabilization operations require peacekeeping forces to work for the support and benefit of sitting governments. In 2011, peacekeepers were authorized to launch offensive operations against members of the defense forces loyal to President Gbagbo. This was done on the pretext to stop and prevent gruesome attacks by these factions on civilians, but it crossed the already

blurred lines of impartiality by implicitly picking a side, that of the political aspirant Alassane Ouattara. Through adopting a political strategy equivalent to using force on a strategic level against an identified enemy, it muddled the lines between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The Force Intervention Brigade, explicitly authorized to ‘neutralize and disarm’ NSAs identified as a threat to state authority, is another important case in point. The force is authorized to partner with the incumbent governmental authorities, and extend support to one armed group (the FARDC) over others (mainly the M23).

5.6. The Neo-Colonial Implications of Robust Peacekeeping

The more the robust a mission is, the more invasive it is in the internal affairs of a host country, thus damaging the sovereignty of the state. Robust missions engender more intrusive military interventions and more explicit coercive techniques. At the 2010 session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the EU group of countries were set against the Non-Aligned Movement in a debate for robustness. The European nations were advocating for increased robustness as a solution for the lack of effectiveness of POs, while the NAM countries were apprehensiveness about its implications. The NAM states assumed robustness to be unaligned with the trinity norms of peacekeeping, and an additional source of threat to the sovereignty of the Global South. It is argued that robust means may be misused and abused, and cause dangerous mission creeps towards peace enforcement. An analogy was implied between robustness, regarded as a new tool for domination over third world states, and a new expression of neo-colonialism.

Due to the legacy of Western colonial empires, for many states and populations in the third world, peacekeeping operations inevitably raise specters of neo-imperialism (Miller, 2003). Colonial enterprises were military interventions conducted by great powers in an attempt to reimagine the political and economic machineries of the subject states upon Western blueprints, and were based upon humanitarian motives of assistance. While they may not be as sinister in design, modern stability-oriented robust peace operations share these commonalities with these bygone imperial adventures. Multilateral military interventions under the auspices of the UN are often perceived by critics as a humanitarian pretext for the projection of great power influence in third world states.

Both colonial legacies and peacekeeping dynamics encompass paternalistic dynamics, understood as ‘the attempt by one actor to substitute his judgement for another’s on the grounds that it is in the latter’s best interests or welfare’ (Barnett, 2016). Paternalistic interactions engender structurally unequal relations between agents and subjects, as is the case in the interaction of security council members and peacekeeping coalitions with the host nation, as well as the militarily equipped peacekeepers with the hapless, agency-stricken locals at the grass-roots level. Interveners come bearing arms and hold a position of power, politically and economically. Moreover, they are endowed with the knowledge and practical solutions that they deem superior, and the legal authority and physical capacity to enforce the will of the international community upon the poor and impoverished locals. These interveners are prepared to use brute force for the purpose of peace and humanitarianism, an idea which is a juxtaposition in terms. Moreover, they put increasing stress on the sovereignty of third world states by practically intervening in their internal political, economic, and social affairs. Peacekeeping has been reproducing earlier practices of imperial policing by placing the concerns of international powers above those of the indigenous population in areas where these missions take place.

5.7. Peacekeeping as a Mechanism for Distraction- Shifting Blame from the International to the Local

Conflicts in Africa are portrayed in the Western Media as barbarous wars fueled by perennial tribal cleavages and ancient ethnic hatreds. There is a conscious discursive effort in academic literature to separate the “new wars” of the post-Cold War era from the “old wars” of Europe (Mello, 2010). The new wars are characterized by state failures, breakdown of socio-political orders, the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians and the creation of displaced populations, and gratuitous and senseless levels of violence. The discourse is largely motivated by a need to do something, to acknowledge that there is a “responsibility to protect”(A. J. Bellamy, 2008; Chomsky, 2008). The conflicts acquire an international dimension through fueling the refugee crisis and becoming breeding grounds for terrorism, a fact that adds to the urgency of international involvement. Most analyses, however, fail to account for the Western capitalist ambitions that often add fuel to fire and prolong these disputes into long over-drawn wars. Many African states are rich in mineral wealth and natural resources, and local governments, militias, and foreign troops struggle for control over these lucrative resources. Interference of foreign powers manifests as proxy support to various warlords, tribal leaders, rebel groups, or

government figures, as a means to control the market of raw materials. Major powers are motivated to use the structures of the UNSC to sanction military intervention in the form of peacekeeping missions, to protect their vital interest or to perpetuate the status quo. Various scholars have analyzed how external stakes in capturing or protecting vital trade markets motivates most peacekeeping enterprises in Africa (Damboeck, 2012; D. Gibbs, 2007; Mckinney, n.d.; Neack, 1995; Schorah, 2016).

A particular focus on internal causes of conflict- state failure, political mobilization of ethnic sentiments, etc.- allows Western states to intervene as peacebuilders, motivated by a humanitarian desire to reimagine the failing political and economic structures of the host state along democratic, capitalist lines(Schellhaas & Seegers, 2009b). Conflict Resolution is thus intricately woven with the need to create modern, liberal, and capitalist societies. This current of thought is reflected in both the theoretical domain, such as with the development discourse and modernization theory, and in the practical domain, through policies such as the Washington consensus. Since the great powers are unwilling to put their own soldiers to harm's way (A. Bellamy & Williams, 2009), they send a multinational assortment of UN troops to areas where the P5 have capitalist and neo-liberal interests(Duffield, 2001). There is a critical silence within the corridors of the Security Council in the great powers' own roles in perpetuating these conflicts, and peacekeeping missions are used as an appropriate humanitarian cover to disguise interest-based interventions. Modifying governance structures and creating essential institutional capacities has become synonymous with building peace and a major feature of the mandated goals of peacekeeping missions(Richmond, 2004). However, it is conveniently ignored that peacebuilding practices that emphasize market deregulation and liberal political structures reproduce the malignant capitalist relations that have bred the conflicts in the first place, allowing Western powers to absolve themselves of the guilt by shifting the blame for the root causes of these wars to local incapacities.

6. CONCLUSION

Peacekeeping operations are most generally analyzed in academic literature through the theoretical lens of idealism, and celebrated for their potential in bringing stability to war-torn lands, and for creating humanitarian space in the remote areas of the world, for the poverty and war-stricken populations that are in the direst need of humanitarian assistance. However, international peacekeeping practices are, more often than not, grounded in unfortunate political realities and power dynamics. There is often a strong geo-political component to the interventions authorized by the Security Council, vested national interests of its permanent members at play, and the ideological composition of the body often decides the legal nature and force composition of these operations. Most unfortunately, there is a deafening silence and a lack of reflexive debate within the convening bodies of the Council on the role of the historical colonialist expeditions of the Western powers, and the ongoing socioeconomic divides and contradictions associated with global Capitalism that these states continue to uphold, in breeding and perpetuating the protracted violent conflicts in the Global South that necessitate peacekeeping operations in the first place.

Peacekeeping missions achieve noble goals, however limited, and the men and women who devote their services to this institution often do so with the utmost pride and the purest of intentions. But one should be wary of the influence of unquestioned humanitarian rationales, for it was the noblest of intentions and the most humane of arguments that have justified some of the most repulsive relationships of dominance and subjugation between states and cultures. When the European civilizations ventured across the seas to Asia and Africa in search of new outposts for empire, and new markets for unfettered capitalism, aside from the political and economic motivation, there was a genuine desire to bring cultural, religious, and political Enlightenment to these lands. The *Mission civilisatrice* in the French narrative or the White Man's Burden for the British was an ethical-religious rationale for the military interventions of the colonial era. There is much the same potential for the humanitarian and political rationales of International Peacekeeping to conceal sinister neo-imperialist designs of the Western powers, and thus the institution and its evolving practices require continuous reflexive thought to retain and refine the noble principles that this institutionalized practice has the potential to achieve. The character and practices of peacekeeping today are much different than they were when the foundational stones of this institution were laid. Peacekeeping today looks less and less like the symbolic and lightly armed force envisioned by Lester Pearson and Dag

Hammarskjöld, and more and more like coalitions of heavily armed foreign troops in indigenous lands, inevitably evoking the specters of colonialism. As peacekeeping missions evolve to have heavier military footprints in the lands they deploy in, it remains pertinent to continuously analyze, critique, and reflect on who peacekeeping is for, and whose interests it serves.

The nature of warfare has changed tremendously, with peacekeeping forces confronting asymmetrical, insurgent, and at times terroristic elements, instead of traditional state armies. Rebel and insurgent groups are difficult to identify due to their ability to seamlessly merge into the local population. They do not have superior firepower and arms but use guerrilla tactics and techniques for their operations, and often are unconstrained by the moral authority of such legal frameworks as the law of Armed conflict- using deadly methods for shock value, inducting women and child soldiers, and propping human shields. All these factors make such elements a far more dangerous threat to the life of civilians and peacekeepers alike, than traditional armies. It is unreasonable to ask the UN to idly stand-by as civilians become the primary targets of the new wars of the post-Cold War era. It is necessary to equip troops with the capability to use reasonable and proportionate force, where required, to protect their own lives and the lives of innocent civilians caught in the crosshairs of violent political and communal conflicts. But robust authorizations for the use of force are a fine line, and peacekeeping missions with robust mandates should not find themselves embroiled in the conflict and arguably becoming party to it, conducting operations for the capturing of a warlord, engaging in counter-insurgency, antagonizing SAGs or NSAs, or slowly slipping down the spectrum to war.

While participating in UN missions is a source of pride, prestige, and vital economic benefits for countries from the Global South, troop contributing countries should be wary of contributing personnel and resources to missions that have doubtful mandates and broad legal authorizations, disguising interest-based invasion as neutral intervention. Enforcement operations are very often propped up on a verge of a slippery slope to war, and a historical overview has uncovered that many UN operations have been notorious for a mission creep that propelled their operational activities into questionable grey areas.

The colonial legacy has left lasting impacts on the collective psyche of the Global South. Implementers of the international will through peacekeeping missions must take into consideration the inherent and well-founded distrust that most populations across the former

colonial world hold against Western powers and foreign armies. The multinational, multiracial, and multicultural composition of peacekeeping armies does not negate the fact that these forces serve the mandated goals stipulated by a Council composed of five of the world's superpowers, of whom three are states that were colonizing Asian lands and engaged in the lucrative scramble for Africa till less than a century ago. Moreover, the fact that the force is often composed largely of Asian and African soldiers does not negate the power asymmetry that still exists between the impoverished, uneducated, and helpless masses, and the educated and militarily trained soldiers with the legal authority of international law at their disposal.

The developed states of the West have always perceived their enlightenment and economic and technological progress to mean that they can better understand, and are in a better position to fix, the problems of far off lands with cultures and traditional societal bases starkly different from their own modern, capitalist societies. Whether through their historical colonial interactions, their Modernization and Development discourses, their Washington Consensus-esque policies for structural adjustment, or through the Stabilization and Peacebuilding projects for reform, normalization, and democratization in conflict-affected states, the West has always tried to repaint the East in its own image. There is a dynamic of assumed superiority in the way the Western states perceive institutional reforms along democratic and capitalist lines to be the answer to the conflicts and instability in the Eastern world. These practices perpetuate the instability in these lands, and open their vast natural resources to the Western markets through unlawful exploitation or through unequal terms of trade in open markets.

The drafters of peacekeeping missions thus have the difficult job of striving to achieve the delicate balance of empowering local institutions without being perceived as trying to run the country's body politic. An initial first step in doing so is by realizing the need to do away with pre-assumed solutions to local problems and to stop applying Western models as universal templates for good governance and institutionalism. Although such efforts are based on the best intentions to help and assist, they often end up overriding the preferences and authority of the very people they claim to help, 'for their own good'. There is a prevalent wariness in particularly the Arab and African world where masses are suspicious of foreign elements engaging in a neo-imperialist effort to control their natural endowments. Peace operations should be time bound, with credible guarantees of withdrawal, so as not to perpetuate the perception of Peacekeeping as an imperial adventure with long-term economic exploitation as a goal. The civilian aspects of the mission should work more prudently to develop local governing capacities. There should be a conscious effort to prefer and incorporate socio-

political structures grounded in the traditional customs of these cultures, over particularly Western counterparts, into institution building exercises.

Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that democratic models of governance enshrined in Western-imposed constitutions ignore the cultural and religious practices and traditions that are deeply rooted in the fabric of these societies, and do not take into consideration the tribal and ethnic-based indigenous political culture that exists in these lands. Attempts to mold non-Western societies to mirror the political cultures and institutional infrastructures of Western governmentality are rarely ever successful, and are insensitive and culturally offensive. The civilian component of peacekeeping missions should be sensitive, sensible, and tactful in working closely with local actors, empowering them, and using their traditional wisdom to identify and integrate socio-political practices and structures into the newly formed political structure. Policy-makers should also engage in strengthening the capacities of local actors to carry out the non-military components of peacekeeping operations themselves.

The HIPPO report is a step in the right direction towards strengthening the political and mediatory arm of peacekeeping over the military arm. It has engendered a much-needed pushback towards increasing militarization of peacekeeping operations and a necessary shifting of focus towards impartiality in engendering sustainable political solutions over legal maneuvers for the excessive use of force to generate stability.

It is perhaps too idealistic of a proclamation, but if broader and more honest efforts towards reforms are to be pursued, the peacekeeping institution should be made the legal purview of the more democratic and inclusive General Assembly as opposed to the narrow and power-centric Security Council. The UN has long served as little more than a sanctioning mechanism for the whims and wishes of the permanent five, led by the unipolar and supreme US. At the very least, the UN should be extremely cautious in outsourcing operations to Western led regional organizations or multinational alliances led by major powers with vested interests in a conflict, such as the French in Rwanda, the NATO led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the US led misadventures in Haiti and Somalia. Unilateral military operations that are dominated by major powers under the legal authority of Chap 8 of the UN Charter- which require the UN to effectively relinquish its operational control- should be especially discouraged. Major powers having special interests in any dispute at hand might have the resources that the UN lacks, but cannot exercise the impartial restraint that is critical of peace

operations. The UN's financial dependence on major donors and its lack of exclusive military and logistical capabilities have long constrained the independent hand of the UN's Secretariat, making the UN a perpetually passive acceptor of the dictates of its Security Council. Such dependence and a lack of military capability independently and exclusively under the purview of the Secretary General, has favored the designs of major powers in retaining their dominance within the institution and using the UN as a legitimizing rubber stamp for their militaristic designs. Any possibility of the revival of the Military Staff Committee or the establishment of a permanent UN military force is unrealistic. Expecting the permanent five great powers to work collectively and honestly for the peace and security of the world, putting aside their own narrow interests and working for the will and betterment of the people who are suffering from war and food, health, and social insecurities, is perhaps even more naïve. But there are possibilities to work within the system of UN peacekeeping, to acknowledge the vagaries of power politics that will always plague the institution, and to work within these confines and unfortunate realities towards a system that is more oriented towards empowering the capacities of the relatively impotent subject nations. But to do so requires first to question the uncontested internationalist and humanitarian rationales espoused to exalt the institution of peacekeeping above critical reproach. Sinister realities of international power are often gilded in palatable garbs of humanitarianism to exercise control over states and populations. The humanitarian intent of such enterprises might serve a self-deceiving purpose, or might be genuinely pursued in good and honest faith. But military interventions that isolate themselves from local populations, view indigenous societies as little more than tabula rasas to impose pre-conceived templates of good governance upon, and privilege "universal truths" over local wisdom, are unlikely to be anything more than military interventions in a humanitarian garb. Peacekeeping is a noble cause, and one that can achieve noble goals, if it consciously works to not reproduce paternalistic relations, and works towards empowering local people to engender their own indigenous solutions and political structures.

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Appendix

Questionnaire for Research Interviews

- Mission Area
- Period of Deployment
- Rank at the time of Deployment
- Gender

Q1. How clear and comprehensive were the Rules of Engagement and the SOPs for the use of force that were provided to you for the mission?

- Peacekeepers often complain of ambiguities in the mandate regarding the appropriate instances for the use of force. Would you say that your experience has been similar?

Q2. Have there been any instances where you have had to act on the basis of judgements of your own conscience? / What instances could there be where you think you would have had to act on the basis of judgements of your own conscience?

- What situations do you think might arise where it could be difficult to judge whether force should be applied?

Q3. How adequate do you judge the armament and logistical capabilities that were provided to you for the dispensation of a robust mandate?

Q4. How frequent are instances of offensive use of force by peacekeepers for the protection of civilians or any other stated goal of the mandate?

Q5. How difficult or easy is it to evaluate when civilians are under an “imminent threat” and require protection?

Q6. How important, do you think, are liberal authorizations for the use of force in ensuring an effective implementation of the mandate and protection of civilians?

Q7. Are there, if any, guidelines or limitations on the use of force from the command structures of your home country for the use of robust force abroad?

Q8. How often, if at all, are you faced with instances of a lack of grass-roots level consent for operational activities?

- Do such instances make it more difficult for you to discharge your duties?

Q9. How do you distinguish between civilians requiring protection and rebels identified in the mandate as spoilers of peace and targets for counter-insurgency operation?

Q10. Were you and your troops always in agreement with the identification of certain parties to the conflict as “rebels”, or “enemies of the mission” by the UN, or did you at any stage feel differently?

Q11. Do your religious and cultural sentiments, subconsciously or intentionally, ever serve to bias you towards a particular people in certain missions?

- Has your decision-making regarding the use of force ever been influenced or affected by your home government’s foreign policy disposition towards a particular group of the warring faction?

Questionnaire for Elite Interviews

Q1. How important, do you think, are liberal authorizations for the use of force in ensuring an effective implementation of the mandate and protection of civilians?

- In your opinion, is having a forceful mandate in peacekeeping operations not counter-productive?

Q2. How would you judge the impartiality of peacekeeping missions that are mandated to stabilize, support, and work in tandem with the government of host states against rebellious factions?

- Would you say that it is possible to maintain the traditional understanding of impartiality in the civil conflicts of the day?

Q3. Would you say that UN peacekeeping missions are excessively and unfairly biased towards governments that may be unpopular or engaged in war crimes?

Q4. According to you, are peacekeeping missions in civil conflicts as inclusive in engaging all the parties to the conflict as they ought to be?

Q5. What is your assessment on the recent trend of deploying Peace Operations in areas where there is not a fully sound political peace process underway?

- Reference: The Brahimi Report urged the importance of resisting deployments in areas where there is “no peace to keep”. Similarly, it explicitly defined peacekeeping as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, **where fighting has been halted**, and to **assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.**”

Q6. How do you judge the evolution of peacekeeping missions over the decades, towards the recent trend of deploying robust missions with stabilization mandates, counter-insurgency elements, and a strong POC criteria?

- Experiences of the respondent at the leadership position
- Policy recommendations