Deciphering ISIS/Daesh Ideology and Conflict:
A Critical Discourse Analysis of Dabiq Magazine 2014 – 2016

By:
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Islamabad, Pakistan

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A thesis submitted to the National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad,
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Peace and Conflict Studies

Thesis Supervisor: **Dr. Muhammad Makki**

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2022

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Signature: 

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Dedication

Zoeen, Alyzeh, Muntaha, Ahver

&

Hajra Wasim Janjua

(My beloved family)

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Abstract

The rise and fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been one of the most significant phenomena of the 21st Century. Replicating other extremist organizations, the ideological discourses were propagated using a multitude of platforms including electronic and social media and publications. Dabiq Magazine has been an authentic and signature source of textual and visual literature, published online by ISIS, specifically targeting Western youth. The relationship between the production of such literature by extremist organizations and its discursive implications for the masses around the globe remains unclear. Towards this end, this research is both an investigation into how the extremist organizations formulate their narrative around a particular discourse, through publications and how these discursive inconsistencies and contradictions are managed to their advantage. At the same time, this research is also, fundamentally, an inquiry into the practices and advancement of methodologically driven CDA in examining the terrorism-related literature.

The primary focus of this research is methodological and theoretical, enunciated through a concern with an interface between the methodological principles and theoretical underpinnings in interpreting empirical literature under investigation. In examining fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine, this research develops a form of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to understand the ISIS discourses ideology and conflict. The contributions of this thesis are advanced through the interface between the methodological aspects of CDA, theoretical interpretations, and philosophical underpinnings of contemporary discourse scholars.

The analysis in this thesis develops in two distinct phases. In the initial chapters, methodological, analytical, and theoretical tools are developed and synthesized resulting in the crystallization of multiple themes. The primary data for these themes is collected and collated from all issues of Dabiq Magazines. In the next phase, a detailed examination of each of the selected themes has been conducted, deploying the analytical and methodological tools developed in the initial phase. The CDA of these thematic discourses construes an understanding of the ideology which has historical foundations based on a specific form of interpretation of Islam.

This CDA also explicates how ISIS has made use of and legitimized Islamic text from Quean and Hadith. In so doing, they have transformed their *Salafist Jihadist* ideology and thought of a myopic world vision into the Islamic State's version of *Shari'ah*, which they aspired to deploy

globally. The analysis also deconstructs multiple discourses which have affected the rest of the world as a result of a sudden rise of this extremist violent organization. Some of these discourses have impacted those living in the Middle East while others had a long-lasting impact specifically on the Muslim population around the globe. This analysis concludes that in the absence of a unified response to such organizations, there is a likelihood of repetition of such phenomenon in other parts of the world for political as well as religious reasons.

List of Acronyms

AQI:	Al-Qaeda in Iraq
AQAP:	Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula
CDA:	Critical Discourse Analysis
DA:	Discourse Analysis
Daesh:	Dawlah Islamiah fi Iraq wa-sham
FDA:	Foucauldian Discourse Analysis
ISIS:	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
ISIL:	Islamic State in Iraq and Levant
TTP:	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

List of Key Concepts/Definitions

Hijra:	Migration, derived from the religious tradition.
Bay'ah:	Pledging allegiance.
Jihad:	Struggle, also used for multiple other concepts such as fighting and war.
Hadith:	Sayings of Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him).
Kufr/Kafir	Disbelief/Non-believer.
Quran:	Islamic religious scripture revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him).
Shari'ah:	The Islamic law/jurisprudence.
Daesh:	Dawalah Islamiah fi Iraq wa-Sham, name adopted by Islamic State.
Ribat:	Small fortification built along the frontier used as a temporary retreat by the soldiers/volunteers known as murabitoon.
Jama'ah:	Loosely used as gathering or collection, also used as majority.
Khilafah:	Caliphate also known as *Khilafat*, and the ruler is known as Khaleefa.
Shahad'ah:	Muslims' profession of faith. To bear witness. Generally used as acceptance of oneness of Allah, and acceptance of Islam.
Fiqh:	The theory and philosophy of Islamic law based on Quran and hadith.
Nifaq:	Term used for hypocrites, who accept Islam from their tongue but do not accept Islam from their heart.
Murtad:	Apostate, deserter, turncoat.
Taghut:	Plural Tawaghit, someone whose focus of worship is other than Allah in Islamic terminologies. Also used for someone looking for foreign and strange gods, and idols etc.
Rafidah:	Rejectors, rejectionists, those who refuse.
Fitna:	Used as a variant of strife, conflict, sedition, temptation, trial etc.
Nikayah:	Also spelled as nikaya. Used for local cells in terrorist organizations conducting jihad-an-nikaya, or small scale hurt, kill and injure operations.
Al-Lat:	Name of one among many idols of gods placed in pre-Islamic tradition in Mecca. Al-Lat was widely worshipped in Arabian Peninsula alongside other idols such as Manat and Uzza.
Wilayat:	Governorate or province.
Fatwa:	Islamic decree issued by a qualified Islamic scholar.

افکار جوانوں کے خفی ہوں کہ جلی ہوں
پوشیدہ نہیں مردِ قلندر کی نظر سے

Afkar Jawanon Ke Khafi Hon Ke Jali Hon
Poshida Nahin Mard-e-Qalandar Ki Nazar Se
The thoughts of young both masked and plain
From Qalandar's eyes can't hid remain.

معلوم ہیں مجھ کو ترے احوال کہ میں بھی
مدّت ہوئی گزرا تھا اسی راہ گزر سے

Maloom Hain Mujh Ko Tere Ahwal Ke Main Bhi
Muddat Huwi Guzra Tha Iss Rah Se
I know your states for I too crost,
These tracts in times which now are past.

الفاظ کے پیچوں میں اُلجھتے نہیں دانا
غوّاص کو مطلب ہے صدف سے کہ گہر سے!

Alfaz Ke Pechon Mein Ulajhte Nahin Dana
Ghawwas Ko Matlab Hai Sadaf Se Ke Guhar Se!
The wise 'bout words do not quarrel,
He heeds not shell who seeks the pearl.

پیدا ہے فقط حلقہ ارباب جُنون میں
وہ عقل کہ پا جاتی ہے شُعلے کو شرر سے

Paida Hai Faqat Halq-e-Arbab-e-Junoon Mein
Woh Aqal Ke Pa Jati Hai Shaole ko Sharar Se
Men crazed with love of God possess,
Wit that from spark the flame can guess.

جس معنی پیچیدہ کی تصدیق کرے دل
قیمت میں بہت بڑھ کے ہے تابندہ گہر سے

Jis Maani-e-Pecheeda Ki Tasdeeq Kare Dil
Qeemat Mein Bohat Barh Ke Hai Tabinda Guhar Se
An import complex confirmed by heart,
Is precious more than gems in mart.

یا مردہ ہے یا نزع کی حالت میں گرفتار
جو فلسفہ لکھا نہ گیا خونِ جگر سے

Ya Mudra Hai Ya Nazaa Ki Halat Mein Giraftar
Jo Falsafa Likha Na Gya Khoon-e-Jigar Se
As good as dead is science and art,
Which took not birth from bleeding heart!

Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Zarb-e-Kaleem*

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

The rise and fall of terrorist organizations is a historically recurring phenomenon. During 2013/2014 the world saw the sudden rise of a terrorist organization; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as *Daesh*, ISIS, or ISIL (See, e.g. Eleftheriadou, 2020; Irshad, 2015; Tinnes, 2018; Wright, 2016b). Traditionally such extreme ideological groups tend to spread their ideologies through publications. Social and electronic media has received prominence in the 21st Century for faster transmission of messages in multiple languages and simultaneously on several platforms. Technological advancements have given multiple options to these extreme groups to spread their messages. The publication of brochures and hand-outs have largely been replaced by Twitter handles Facebook accounts and web pages. This raises the possibility of ideologically biased and scrupulously induced literature as an area of inquiry.

Although there is increasing literature regarding the relationship between the publications by extremist organizations, however, the discursive implications of these publications remain unclear. This research delves deep into these publications to understand how the narratives and discourses are formulated targeting multiple themes and how are these themes managed to serve the advantageous purpose of such organizations. At the same time, it is also, fundamentally, an investigation into the practices and advancement of methodologically driven Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in examining the terrorism-related literature.

The primary focus of this research is methodological and theoretical, enunciated through a concern with an interface between the methodological principles and theoretical underpinnings in interpreting empirical literature under investigation. In doing so it develops CDA as a method and theory through a model that becomes useful in analyzing the empirical data.

The next section will outline the research trajectory, significance of the research, and contribution to the field. Finally, this provides the outlined structure of the rest of the research, highlighting the methodological-theoretical coordinates of the investigation.

1.2 Taxonomy of Text in Contemporary Extremist Organizations

The turn of the century brought some of these extreme groups such as Al-Qaeda to the limelight. They started publishing *Inspire* Magazine[1] to spread their ideology and attract new clientele from around the globe (Ambinder, 2010). Although their publications were ridiculed by the Western media for their sloppy text and language and bad reporting (Berger, 2013b), however, it certainly set a trend in using text as means of spreading the ideology, which was later followed by others. Following the suit, *Daesh* launched a magazine titled "Dabiq" which has been available online since June 2014 (Clarion Project, 2016). During the next two years, *Daesh* published a total of fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine, besides a large stock of videos and other materials through the internet.

The ideas, narratives, and discourses of extremist groups have remained a vital segment of scholarly research. As a relatively new and unique phenomenon, *Daesh* also became the subject of research through a variety of analytical underpinnings. The fluid nature of Dabiq Magazine and the absence of a well-defined timeline for its publication made it challenging as a domain of inquiry and analysis. Academicians have analyzed Dabiq Magazine from different angles such as narrative study, statehood, image analysis, and discourse analysis through short papers and a growing number of books. This piling literature has been subjected to interdisciplinary analysis. However, Dabiq Magazine has not been a subject of study through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) specifically in the field of Peace studies. Moreover, philosophy has generally remained absent, while scholars try to analyze the contemporary issues relating to violent non-state actors such as *Daesh*/ISIS.

Rahimi and Riasati (2011) contend that CDA in research methodology is essentially the necessary first step that answers the questions about the relationship between language, society, power, identity, ideology, politics, and culture, by identifying and studying the specific areas such as injustice, inequality, racism, danger, suffering, prejudice and the like. Similarly emphasizing the need to find the explanation of a phenomenon through a philosophical lens, and adding philosophy to CDA, Talib and Fitzgerald (2018b) argue that the synthesis of linguistic and philosophical approaches provides for multi-level nuanced interpretations of

[1] AL-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula started publishing Inspire Magazine in 2010 and published sixteen (16) issues till 2016.

discursive strategies in policy discourse, and where appropriate to be able to develop from these approaches.

In this context, this research will focus on the Islamic State as an extreme ideological group. CDA will not only attend to Islamic State as terrorist organization that has been studied as a phenomenon, rather it will narrow down on its ideology and conflict as discursive constructs, seen through the lens of its publication Dabiq Magazine. Approaching *Daesh* through discursive construction embedded in specific geographical and sociopolitical contexts has obvious implications for the way it becomes the object of this research. This infers that the study will focus on the often-complex relationship between the implementation of extremely harsh policies on one hand, and portraying the organization as a humane caliphate on the other. Additionally, this research will also help to understand how excessive use of online resources has given this organization an added advantage and their conflict but their ideas, narratives, messages, ideology, and discourses can reach a greater number of audiences much faster.

At its strongest point, Islamic State stood over 31000 strong with almost 2600 tanks and hundreds of Humvees, and a variety of robust military arsenal (BBC, 2015). Islamic State declared Caliphate on 1st Ramadan 1435 AH i.e. 28/29th June 2014 (Lamb, 2014). Stern and Berger (2015) argue that *Daesh* has invested a serious amount of effort in improving its propaganda machine and its videos, magazines, and other online activities which is an indicator of the amount of money and talent being poured into the effort.[2] The battle for winning over the local support for *Daesh* has been as important as the real ones on the ground. Citing Abu Muhammad Al Adnani (the official spokesperson of the Islamic State), Bunzel (2015) posits that, "if one wants to get to know the program of the Islamic State, its politics, and its legal opinions, one ought to consult its leaders, its statements, its public addresses, its sources".

Within a few days of the declaration of the Caliphate, Islamic State came out with a colorful and well-composed online magazine named Dabiq. It is also important to note that the group published many other magazines in different languages targeting a specific audience (Zgryziewicz, Grzyb, Fahmy, & Shaheen, 2015). These issues were uploaded at multiple sites in multiple languages around the globe. For this research, the English version of fifteen issues of the magazine has been downloaded (Clarion Project, 2016). After the declaration of the

[2] As an example, between June 2012 and May 2014, Islamic State released four parts of the propaganda video *Salil as-Sawarim* (The clanging of the Swords or the Clash of the Swords). Thematic content such as cinematography, editing, mise-en-scene, lighting, diegetic and non-diegetic sound, genre, and narratology all showed a clear professionalism with millions of views on internet.

Caliphate, one of the major concerns was spreading the message and inviting all 'believers' from around the globe to join the ranks of *Daesh*. An abundance of funds, sufficient argument, and material allowed *Daesh* to publish this magazine by the name of Dabiq (named after the town almost 40 Kilometers northeast of Aleppo in Syria). Although initially, the town of Dabiq was not under *Daesh's* control, the name of the magazine was chosen with relevance to Islamic State's prophesized final apocalypse likely to happen here (Dabiq, 2014). Unlike al-Qaeda's magazine *Inspire*, which has been a target of ridicule for its sloppiness, bad English and grammar, etc. (Berger, 2013), Dabiq Magazine is largely linguistic errors free yet with certain contestable and controversial claims concerning Islamic teachings, Quran, and Hadith, the issues which will be discussed in this research.

1.3 **Research Trajectory and Significance**

One of the significant claims made by *Daesh,* stemming from its origin, is the true representation of (a distinct interpretation of) Islam under their rule. Expanding scholarship posits, that this *Salafi Jihadist* faction of Islam provides the true ideological base for Islamic State and constitutes a very small portion of the theological concurrence with the rest of the Islamic practices in the world (Sageman, 2006, p. 123). As per Rashid (2015, p. 23), *Salafis* constitute a very small 3% of the total Muslim population in the world. They are also known as *Takfiris* because they assume the right to call other Muslims, especially those who do not follow their brand of Islam *Takfiris* or apostates. The same principle has been assumed as a permissible act by ISIS to kill Muslims in large numbers, who also make up the majority of people killed by *Daesh* (Carol, Kareem, Aaron, & Anthony, 2018). Moreover, explaining *Salafism*, Stanley (2005) notes that it is this fundamentalist branch of Sunni Islam, which takes a narrow and rigid approach to interpreting scripture and follows an interpretation of Islam based on the reconstruction of the beliefs and practices of *as-salaf as-solieheen*, the pious predecessors, from the contemporaries of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and two subsequent generations. They only recognize their selective interpretation of Islam and Hadith – the sayings and deeds of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). Egerton (2011) adds that Salafists believe in a unified Islamic State with no place for secularism and strict adherence to a narrow and rigid interpretation of Shari'ah – the Islamic Law. In brief, *Salafi jihadism* has two important facets; strict and narrow interpretation of Islam and Jihad being a Fard 'ayn[3] (Jones, 2014). These claims and the

[3] *Fard 'Ayn* is a personal responsibility of every Muslim like alms giving, Hajj, daily five times prayers etc.

published ideological literature became sufficient sources of scholarly debate and understanding using multiple analytical tools.

Since its inception Islamic state and its publications such as Dabiq Magazine have been subjected to multiple analyses (Droogan & Peattie, 2017; Ingram, 2016a, 2017). The large and growing number of material published by *Daesh,* sometimes out-paces the analysis. Such large volumes of information need organizational efforts and are usually hard at individual levels to analyze. Similarly, *Daesh* has also made excessive use of Islamic references from the Quran and Hadith in all publications of Dabiq Magazine. In the process of deconstruction of these concepts and to know the real 'truth', which, in Nietzsche's words is a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms (Pearson & Large, 1988), this research will expand the understanding of such claims made in the literature.

Many scholars have talked about multiple discourse analysis methods over the years, proposing varying methodological underpinnings in their writings and technique of analysis (Dijk, 2001a; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough, 1989, 1995, 2012; Foucault, 1980b, 1995; Harris, 1952; Janks, 1997).

Similarly, CDA is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in a social and political context"(Dijk, 2001a). Fairclough (1995) defines CDA in the following terms:

> By critical discourse analysis I mean discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events, and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations, and processes; to investigate how such practices, events, and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony (p. 132).

Discourse studies have evolved over the years as a distinct analytical method. Michel Foucault is an important scholar in the field of discourse studies. His emphasis on the 'power' relationship, between 'power and language', 'power and knowledge', and emphasis on 'power' (Foucault, 1972, 1978, 1980b, 1995, 2003) has cornerstone vitality for discourse analysis. Foucault drew his inspiration from Nietzsche, whose philosophy in turn links to Schopenhauer and further to Emanuel Kant.

Through Dabiq Magazine, the focal point of this CDA research solicits understanding and critical analysis of the issues raised by or silenced through this magazine – that is also a valid and relevant "point of entry" (Fairclough, 2012) into the understanding and analysis of ISIS ideology and conflict. For this research, all fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine will remain the focal literature for the CDA.

As mentioned earlier as well, scholars are emphasizing the need to add philosophy both in CDA as well as in the analysis of contemporary issues and disciplines (Casadevall, 2015; Talib & Fitzgerald, 2018b). The absence of philosophy from the Pakistani educational stage is a true yet worrying aspect (Mehsud, 2015; Mughal, 2012). Most universities do not teach philosophy as a discipline and resultantly many students complete their Ph.D. without knowing the philosophy. This research, however, is aimed at producing a balanced blend of CDA and philosophy on the aspects related to the Islamic State and other contemporary extremist ideologies.

The problem of philosophy is further compounded by the fallacies and contrasts between philosophy and religion, such as 'philosophy is anti-religious, humanism is anti-religious; therefore humanism is philosophy (Brownsey, 2018). There is a definite and significant place in the philosophical world, occupied by the philosophy of religion (Meister, nd; Taliaferro, 2013), and Islamic philosophy (Ivry, 2013; Street, 2013). To better understand the ideological lucidity of the Islamic State and augmentation of their disagreements through religious references, this research will also explore these facets of philosophy.

This thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge in multiple ways and adopts a multidisciplinary approach. Without adopting such a blended approach to the issue, it would be hard to understand the promotion of multiple discourses by *Daesh*. Focus on critically analyzing discourses generated by *Daesh* paves way for utilizing the CDA analysis tool that could be replicated for other similar areas of inquiry, something that has not been done in most social science scholarship. Islamic State itself is comparatively a new phenomenon and large gaps exist in scholarly endeavors in exploring the conceptualization, theorization, and research on the discourses generated by this organization, especially through a philosophical lens. As of the commencement of this research, no academic work of significant scholarly importance is being undertaken on *Daesh*, enhancing its desirability in the scholarly/ societal needs and policy development. This research is not only the first step in understanding the *Daesh* ideology and conflict through a combination of philosophy and CDA but effectively paves way for appreciation of such discourses and other similar issues.

Statistical trends and previous research raise the question of whether an extremist organization can promote deep-rooted belief systems, ideologies, and conflict, using modern era tools such as the internet, for online publication of text, videos, and other communications. More importantly, however, it also points to the requirement to understand the need to promote the ideology and conflict through (reasonably well-researched) publications.

1.4 Research Inquiry and Delimitations

To comprehend how the inconsistencies in understanding the theory and practice of the religion of Islam between the Islamic State, and a vast majority of the Muslim population around the world manifest, this research aims to examine the text of Dabiq Magazine where these were originally proposed, described and propagated. In tracing the discursive shifts, which imply the establishment of a "totalitarian identity", segregating humanity into complex and shifting fields of discursive relationship, depicting the followers of the Islamic State as the real Muslims, and the others, who are infidels, apostates, and deserve death (Heck, 2017). The process of elucidating the discursive formation in the text also necessitates going beyond conjectural considerations and making explicit the use of specific language. The observation of these systematic formations that constitute the constantly changing text and context, becomes a vehicle through which this research will endeavor to understand how the ideology is discursively constructed in Islamic State's publications. At this juncture, CDA assumes that language has social effects and the analysis demands a rigorous systematic approach to provide a capacity for transparency through language analysis. The vitality of the methodological approach will enable the examination of discursive processes as they unfold in *Daesh*'s text. Like all other analyses, CDA in this research faces fundamental dilemmas, changing objects of the text, blended identities, transnational extremist organizations, and social institutions, new forms of brutality and exploitation, and more importantly persistently disturbing images and discourses.

Consequently, the main areas of inquiry concerning this thesis focus on the contents of the Dabiq Magazine text for understanding the ideology and conflict of *Daesh*, how this conflict originated and was perpetuated, mostly in Syria and Iraq, and more generally in the rest of the world. Further, this research tends to make explicit *Daesh* text, how their ideology has been expressed and spread through the text, and how such ideological groups can be understood through their text and discourses. Given the violent history of the extremist organizations, their intense combat operations, and expansion over vast swaths of land in Syria and Iraq, how ISIS

was able to achieve this through text and discourses? What made their narrative attractive and which all audience was their main focus, and finally how can these narratives be understood in the contemporary context. This research hence argues that such a methodological approach for analysts adopting the CDA leads to minimizing the risk of following the path of a pre-ideological disposition and avoiding mechanistic responses to an analysis by adopting a few selected themes, which would still be united in the backdrop of the larger text, showing the ideology and conflict of Islamic State. Moreover, adopting such approach aspires to offset some of the ahistoricism in the CDA scholarship. By adopting this reflexive historical approach, the analysis in this research seeks to offer explicit accounts of the religious concord between the theoretical narratives of *Daesh* and the contextual discord in the data that has been used to tell such narratives. This research also examines the Islamic State's dominant discourses in the understanding of what is *Islamic* in these discourses and to what extent. In exploring the historical roots of these discourses, this research delves into *Daesh*'s conception of Islam (See, Chapter 7, for example), the interplay of these concepts in discourses, and contrasting arguments by the Islamic philosophers. This research further enquires how ISIL's discourses will have to reconceptualize and reframe, including the historical and theological constructs, should they need to be understood as *Islamic*.

Finally, as discussed above, CDA is the study of relations between the discourse, power, dominance, social inequality, and the position of discourse analyst in these relationships (van Dijk, 1993), and as posited by Mogashoa (2014) it allows us to understand the value and truthfulness of text, conversation, and relevant documents. The aim of this research is not to generalize the findings or construction of a theory. The primary data set used for this research includes fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine, besides a multitude of supportive secondary sources used for developing a deeper theoretical understanding. Minimal digital counts and graphs have been used to reach the core of the *why* of the inquiry, and not to quantify the data. Acknowledging the vitality and contributions made by a multitude of other research approaches, this research is not a critique of research subjectivity as highlighted by Pedersen (1992). With regards, this research has been planned as objective and unobtrusive (Webb, Campell, Schwart, & Sechrest, 1966), which is without the direct involvement of human beings, focusing mainly on the text, practice, and context as it appears in Dabiq Magazines.

1.5 Organization of the Research

This section provides an outline of the thesis describing how each chapter sets out in the research. The next chapter explains the notion of CDA as a methodology. It also answers the

need for the adoption of CDA as an analytical tool and theory to understand the data texts. This chapter contends that the hybrid and blended forms of communication through text and images are enhanced through technologically advanced methods that characterize the extremist organizations in this modern era.

Chapter 3 explains the detailed method of developing a flexible analytical theoretical tool which will be applied in the ensuing, especially in the analysis chapters. This research tries to enhance the understanding of multiple discourses propagated through publication; this chapter deals with the theoretical underpinnings dealing with the discursive themes which have been analyzed in the subsequent chapters. This chapter also briefly explains the theoretical, philosophical, and analytical scholarship related to the selected themes.

Chapter 4 is a descriptive analysis of the contents of all issues of Dabiq Magazine and results in the crystallization of selected themes for analysis. This chapter also explains the synthesizing of descriptive analysis carried out in this chapter with the method adopted for the selection of the most relevant discursive themes.

Chapter 5 constitutes the text selections from Dabiq Magazine. The entire text of Dabiq Magazine consists of almost 400,000 words and 1095 images. The thematic selections made in Chapter 4, will help to focus on the desired text. The dominant text has been condensed into this chapter to facilitate the analysis in the next chapters.

Chapters 6 to 10 are the analysis of the themes in the light of the analytical tool developed in Chapter 3, CDA methodological approaches as explained in Chapter 2 to understand the discourses and Islamic State's narratives and ideology. This chapter analyzes the theme of *Hijrah* or migration in the context of the Middle East crisis through a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. Theme stigma has been analyzed in Chapter 7 and looks at the stigmatizing practices adopted in Dabiq Magazine by *Daesh*. The next chapter analyzes the Foucauldian knowledge/power in the context of Dabiq Magazine and concludes that, although power relationship exists in all social interactions, and at the very core of the power relationship and constantly provoking it, a fact which is also true in case of Islamic State as well, is the notion of resistance. Chapter 9 is the critical visual analysis using the tools explained in Chapter 3, which have been applied for critical image analyzes. This chapter also signifies the presence of 1095 images in Dabiq Magazine and the need to analyze these images concerning the theme of brutality through imagery. Before the concluding section, Chapter 10 is an analysis

of the notion of statehood in the Islamic State's context. This chapter argues that although *Daesh* was able to carve out a state in large territories of Syria and Iraq, the world community did not accept this ingress as a creation of a state. This chapter also briefly discusses the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Chapter 2 : Critical Discourse Analysis as a Methodology

2.1 Overview

This chapter lays the methodological foundation for this research. It proposes a methodology and framework of analysis that has been applied to the selection of discourses expanded into selected themes. To achieve this, it situates this research in the field of CDA. Moreover, to overcome the limitations associated with a reliance on pre-ideological, theory-informed positions, in this research problematization of ideology and conflict is taken as a point of departure by employing the philosophical-methodological approach in analyzing each theme in the ideological backdrop. "Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in a social and political context"(Dijk, 2001b, p. 117). Similarly, Fairclough (1995) posits: -

> By critical discourse analysis I mean discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events, and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations, and processes; to investigate how such practices, events, and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony (pp. 132-133).

Dijk (2001c, p. 96) argues that CDA is not a "direction of research", nor a sub-discipline of discourse analysis. It is not a method nor a theory that can simply be applied to a social sciences problem. CDA needs to be a critical perspective on doing scholarship with a special focus on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination. One of the vital roles of CDA as a research methodology is that it not only deconstructs the inequalities in society it also explores the means to overcome these inequalities. As argued by Hammersley (1997), CDA intends to do an uphill task of explicating the discursive practice, society as a whole, what is wrong with it, and how it can and should change. Dijk (2003, p. 353) further argues that there is no set formula or a unitary theoretical framework to conduct CDA.

Relatedly, Talib and Fitzgerald (2018a, p. 123) maintain that the "tendency to rely on the preformulated framework has an inbuilt danger of producing an overdetermination of how a particular discursive phenomenon is implicated in particular forms of social and structural inequality as these may be assumed or imposed prior to any analysis taking place". However, since this research is purely academic in nature and there is a need to follow certain guidelines

and existing tools and methodology, therefore, this chapter draws from the previous work of CDA scholars to critically analyze stigma as a discourse in Dabiq Magazine by the Islamic State. Similarly, Hammersley (1997, p. 240) claims that "CDA does not just adopt a critical stance towards research products but also towards the social phenomena it studies. And, as a result, the criteria that guide the criticism in CDA are not only cognitive but also valuational". Frankfurt School's primary aim in critical studies was, to reveal what ideology obscures to aspire the possibility that modern society could be organized in a different and non-oppressive way. Consequently, CDA intends to do an uphill task of explicating the discursive practice, society as a whole, what is wrong with it, and how it can and should change (Hammersley, 1997).

In this vein, Rogers (2004) posits that a considerable amount of discussion and dissension exists on the methodology adopted for CDA in discourse studies. The variation in the methodology occurs due to the purpose of doing CDA, and the definitions of 'critical' and 'discourse'. Since there is no set formula or a unitary methodology for conducting CDA (Dijk, 2003, p. 353), the methodology will depend upon the text, practical research situation, and the issues being researched. The investigation of the discourse-historical approach, for example, tends to look into the historical, political, and organizational text and topics, and the known information about the known historical contextual sources and the socio-political settings in which such events occurred, is integrated into the text under investigation (Wodak, 2001). Since this research tends to make explicit *Daesh* text and how their ideology has been expressed and spread through the text, the next chapter is an analytical review of all fifteen issues to synthesize the relevant themes, which would further be subjected to CDA in the subsequent chapters.

2.2 Data Selections

Most of the information about the Islamic State comes from the media as many aspiring researchers interested in researching the Islamic State, have not been to Syria, Iraq, or areas under Islamic State's control. Therefore, what is known about *Daesh* is through media (social media, internet, western as well as local Middle Eastern TV channels) or whatever is propagated by *Daesh* itself. Therefore, the dearth of information from authentic resources necessitates confining the scope. In the case of this research, the information is available and mostly attributable to *Daesh*. However, the scope continues to be restricted because of the inability to perform fieldwork.

The initial data set for this research consists of fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine, which were released between July 2014 and July 2016. The English language versions of the magazines were chosen for this research, as they are one of the very few sources of data directly attributable to *Daesh* (e.g. Milton, 2016; Sardarnia & Safizadeh, 2017; Vergani & Bliuc, 2015a).

Moreover, while media sources may have the best of intentions to cover a particular social phenomenon or organization, intense time and security constraints, especially about unfamiliar and fluid war zone events, make the information hazy. This results in the degradation of authentic sources and reliance need to be placed on the text from the known official sources (in this case the Islamic State's publications). Simultaneously, in the presence of, what may be termed competing *truths*, dominant narratives tend to become prominent and popular (Smith, 1981; White, 1992). In the absence of authentic official sources emanating from the Islamic State, the scholarship must critically analyze secondary sources and media narratives. Such sources might have their competing agendas and could be biased. The reliance on such sources can create a paradigm, which in this case is could be termed as *anti–Daesh Paradigm*, that legitimizes the official/media account of events, marginalizing the views of the Islamic State itself, characterizing them as violent, terrorists, extremists, irrational and brutal, etc.

There is thus a requirement to know the opinion of the Islamic State itself through their sources. Besides multiple videos, YouTube clippings, handouts, tweets, and internet postings, Dabiq Magazine is an extensive and elaborate source revealing the Islamic State's point of view. Their ideology, conflict, and the way they look at the world have clearly been stated and repeated in multiple issues. Dabiq remained the main source of information generated by the Islamic State, and it has been in publication for over 2 years at the commencement of this research, and 15 issues were already available making it a reliable area of inquiry.

The online posting of these issues was removed from the internet due to security reasons, making it harder to find the material posted by Islamic State beyond a certain period (Stern & Berger, 2015; Zialcita, 2019). When it was being published continually, Dabiq Magazine could be found at the Al-Hayat media center of Islamic State as well as multiple other sites for analysis (Christien, 2016). The fluency and irregular pattern of publication of these magazines made continuous observation and vigil inevitable. In the following paragraphs some of the factors affecting the textual and methodological choices for this research.

First, one of the significant reasons for choosing Dabiq is that the magazine creates a "frame" just like any other media publication, channel, or site, that sends signals to the target audience and to all those who are aspiring members and sympathizers, forcing governments to alter, create and enforce policies necessary to resist such motivations and defections by their youth to the Islamic State. Besides many other problems, these defections further create a burden on the security apparatus, and also modify public opinion against terrorist organizations, and sometimes invoke questions on the media portrayal. Additionally, there is also a need to look at the way the Islamic State itself describes its leaders, sympathizers, and (so-called) *Mujahideen* fighting in their rank and file. Dabiq framing also constitutes *Daesh* ideology and how they have depicted the officials, official policies towards different countries, different sects, religions and those fighting against them, their thought regarding other similar organizations especially Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Arabian Peninsula, but most importantly how Islamic State thinks they are being perceived in different countries with regards to its acceptability and popularity.

Second, the selection of CDA as a methodology and theory for this research also emanated from considering the inclusion of other methods such as interviews, surveys, etc. being highly dependent upon the person who is interpreting and how the information eventually gets interpreted. Survey and interview-based quantitative, as well as qualitative methods, can also lead to problems in remembering what the person who was interviewed said besides other possible flaws in data collection and processing. Accessibility to the respondents for survey/interviews is also challenging. Moreover, the type and amount of the original data are restricted and limited in size, and sometimes people responding tend to exaggerate, or dampen the responses and hesitate to provide the real truth (Pedersen, 1992). The survey/questionnaire methods are good to answer some questions but some questions can't be objectively answered through surveys or other research methods. Consequently, CDA allows for the manifest content analysis of the observable content that can be seen, heard, looked at, as well as latent content analysis highlighting the underlying meaning of the manifest content for a better understanding of the ideology and conflict of a terrorist organization.

Third, related to the above-mentioned aspect of research, using CDA as a methodology also ensures unobtrusive research which is without the direct involvement of human beings (Webb et al., 1966). The exclusion of direct human responses ensures that there is no need to remember what was previously said or what if the responses varied concerning the time. Choosing already

existing data, write-up, speech, images, etc. gives the analysis part of the thesis a great degree of objectivity. Easy access to a lot of information and reduced respondent and memory bias, allows CDA research to answer a lot of questions that otherwise would be unanswerable on the issues at hand.

Fourth, pictures and images form one of the central parts of framing by any media, publication, and communication. Psychologically images have the longest-lasting impact on our memory, they have an emotional flavor to them and can effectively alter the perception of viewers (McCabe & Castel, 2008). Images have an emotional flavor to them and act as icons showing the identity of people, as subjects of the state, good vs bad, ideology, power, change, terror, etc. Islamic State has published thousands of images in its publications. For meaningful research, one odd or few prototypical images cannot solely rely upon analysis, rather there is a need to understand and critically analyze a series of these images. Images have an aesthetic value and they also convey special messages.

Fifth, as the scholarship argues, one of the major aims of any commercial media or publication is to make a reasonable profit from their sales. However, in the case of *Daesh*, publications meant the attraction of western audiences, especially the youth (Ingram, 2016a). For that, they usually post the news or images, etc. which could instantly attract the attention of the viewers. This is often done by putting an interesting image, an attractive headline that draws the reader in and forces them to buy into the content through media sloganeering (Serani, 2011). Although Dabiq Magazine was not a commercial publication and ISIS did not want to make money through this, they certainly wanted a larger western English-speaking audience.

Lastly, the selection of Dabiq as a publication for CDA allows us to conduct a comparative analysis and examination of similar issues appearing in other extremist magazines. For example, the issue of conducting jihad in countries of residence has been labeled as “open source Jihad” by Al Qaeda magazine *Inspire*, giving detailed instructions on how to develop a homemade bomb, cause an accident or burn isolated cars (Inspire, 2013). On the other hand, as mentioned above, Dabiq Magazine primarily wants to attract the attention of its audience and wherever possible, entice them to follow a certain ideology (Cottee, 2017).

2.3 **Conclusion**

This chapter has presented an argument briefly explaining the CDA as a methodological theory and the reasons for resorting to such an approach for the research. Such an approach

that is multifaced and multidisciplinary is appropriate for this research. It examines other approaches that could be adopted for such research and the problems that have been identified in using those approaches. Drawing on how different scholars have argued regarding CDA, looking at it, not as a methodological tool given in a universally adopted framework, but rather as an option to explore new ways of carrying out CDA research.

Given such limitations where no singular pattern or methodological context could be followed, it is necessary to adopt a diverse theoretical-philosophical-methodological approach to understand the data text produced by the Islamic State. In embarking on this theoretical-philosophical methodological approach, the ensuing chapter will discuss the development of the analytical tool. This tool includes a methodological-theoretical framework which will be deployed in the analysis chapters. Consequently, primarily during the analysis of themes through multiple chapters, an artificial separation of theory and method has been avoided in this research.

Chapter 3: Developing a Theoretical, Philosophical Analytical Model

3.1 Overview

This chapter explains the detailed methods for constructing a flexible theoretical, philosophical, and analytical tool through which the principles of CDA will be applied. This model will allow a methodological approach for interpretation of the themes of *Hijrah*, stigma, power, brutality, and statehood/caliphate. The scope of the chapter, therefore, is the creation of an interface between the theoretical concepts, philosophical notions, and methodological principles in interpreting Dabiq text. The explanation of the methodological approach in Foucauldian discourse analysis (Willig, 2013a), augmented by the theoretical and philosophical principles engaging with the empirical text, will formulate the base for understanding each theme individually, in the broader backdrop of the text spread over fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine. This chapter explores Foucault's discourse, related concepts, and analytical approaches that can be synthesized with CDA. This framework underpinning analysis draws on his perspective to understand his insights into how *Daesh* discourses are linked to the legitimization of unjust and unequal practices. Moreover, this chapter sketches the ways of examining the selected themes, linked to the sociological and philosophical notions, to bring out their relevance for CDA, by drawing upon the relationship between language analysis, theory, philosophy, and methodology as the unifying agendas understood in the backdrop of Dabiq text.

3.2 Understanding the Model

Scholarship has enhanced our understanding of multiple social issues through Foucauldian Discourse Analysis such as orientalism, health, sexuality, international order, civilization, security, race, justice, economic progress, globalization, etc. Study of issues from varying disciplines, not only includes textual analysis, but also detailed linguistic analysis and nonverbal communication such as visual communication and analysis. The process of naturalization of visual and textual communication and transforming them into a natural and self-evident phenomenon is the real power of discourse. Discourse analysis is just like the forensic analysis of the communication (Shuy, 2001). This is done by selecting a communication, taking it apart, looking at various building blocks inside, and seeing how it works. There is a slight difference between the textual analysis and discourse analysis, a

portion of this research also constitutes textual analysis, reinforcing the overall discourse analysis.



Figure 3.1 Theoretical Philosophical Analytical Model

Figure 3.1 above shows the analytical model which synthesizes Dabiq Magazine text with theory, and philosophy using CDA methodology. Dabiq Magazine text has been studied and examined repeatedly. The articles presented in the magazine address the themes. These themes continue to reappear in all fifteen issues with varying intensity and rigor meriting attention. The themes were examined, categorized, listed, and analyzed. This model encompasses an analysis of these themes in the backdrop of theory and philosophy, and how the themes interact with the CDA. The continuously recurring interaction is therefore visible in the analysis and discussion chapters of this research. Continuous interaction between the text, and the analytical tools crystalizes into themes, which are then analyzed to understand the Islamic State's ideology and discourses. The data text itself, (as already explained, has been derived from fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine. These themes permeate into multiple discussions, explanations, texts, and images, and are spread over the entire text, onnected in the backdrop of the Islamic State's ideology, narratives, and discourses. Within this setting, this chapter encompasses four central philosophical analytical methods: (1) the dominant guiding principles, multiple interrelated Foucauldian concepts relevant to this research, and permeation of these ideas in those of his contemporaries such as Goffman, and his philosophical *togetherness* with Kant's philosophy; (2) elucidation of philosophical concepts and how these domains interact and overlap, and have been extended for analysis in this research; (3) the synthesis of the first two methods with the CDA approaches adopted for this research; and (4) the related domain which merits inevitable critical analysis in this research

because of extensive (textual) image density – the methodological-theoretical approach towards Critical Visual Analysis (van Leeuwen & Jewitt, 2001).

3.3 Conceptualizing Foucault

The discussion begins with the elucidation of Foucault's notions, the relationship of these concepts with other Goffman and Falk, and philosophical concord with Kantian thought. These concepts and philosophy form the theoretical basis and the primary orientation that form the backdrop for the analysis undertaken in the analytical chapters. Additionally, further synthesis of the philosophical concepts with the Islamic/Quranic philosophy will form part of the next section, followed by a conjunction of these notions with the CDA methodology. The last section is a review of the theories of critical visual analysis and how can this be deployed in the visual analysis chapter.



Figure 3.2 Foucauldian Philosophy and Analytical Concepts

Figure 3.2 above depicts the concepts, which will be examined in this chapter and form part of the analytical tool which will further be subjected to analysis in the ensuing chapters. To understand Foucault's philosophy, and the role of the discourses of hegemony, dominance, and power, it is important to refer to the concords between the ideology and discourse both referring "to pretty much same aspect of social life" (Purvis & Hunt, 1993). The consciousness within a society is borne through language, signs, and communication between people and institutions. These modes of communication allow people to make sense of the social world and have consequences for the direction and character of their (in)actions, referred to both as ideology and discourse in social life. The study of ideology in the 1970s and 80s has been concerned with two vital aspects. The first criticism came from those who argued that the Marxism and

sociological studies have been characterized by an unnecessary "dominant ideology" thesis (e.g. Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 2015, pp. 149-170; Abercrombie & Turner, 1978, p. xvi). Second, some the poststructuralist scholars such as Laclau and Mouffe (1987) contend that instead of focusing on the concepts of hegemony and ideology as social constructs, these concepts should be studied as discursive formations – something which resonates with Foucault's work.

3.2.1 **Foucauldian Discourse**

Discourse has been studied in multiple ways by researchers (David Scott & Morrison, 2006). Foucault talks about discourse as a body of knowledge. He, for example, examined the relationship between knowledge and power and analyzed the discourses historically through what he referred to as genealogy (Foucault, 1972, 1978, 1980a, 1995, 2003). He also showed that it is possible to study and analyze what has been said or communicated on an issue through the examination of values, norms, habits, etc. He aimed to show how these impacted the political decisions related to those who transgressed the social norms. The institutions that Foucault talks about, are complete in their existence. These institutions such as police and prisons (Foucault, 1995), have consequences on people who live their lives under such institutions. This nexus between the creations of an institution coupled with the knowledge followed by power exerted through this knowledge makes this chapter suitable for a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. Foucauldian discourse analysis allows us to conduct critical analysis and a rigorous dissection of discourses in social world rather than application of a single theoretical framework.

3.2.2 **Knowledge/power Nexus**

The notion of knowledge as a corroborative concept in power discourse was philosophized by Foucault (1972, pp. 211-212) through the conception of "Episteme". The segregation of those statements that are acceptable outside scientific knowledge, that may or may not be true. Foucault (1980b, p. 197) defines episteme as "the apparatus which makes possible, separation of not true or false, but of what may from what may not be scientific". To further explain, episteme is the separation of those statements or discursive practices that may not be proved through scientific theory, may still be acceptable as knowledge, although they may be true or false.

The concept of knowledge/power spans from Foucault's work and the discussion in this section focuses on outlining its use in the analysis of *Daesh*'s text. The objective here is not to examine the power as a phenomenon, instead, the goal is to create an understanding of the notion of knowledge/power (Hall, 2001), how the Islamic State created the forms of subjectification, and how they were manifested in society.

Foucault believed that there is no manifestation of power without the field of knowledge, similarly, no knowledge exists that doesn't constitute and presuppose power relationships. Knowledge power nexus doesn't mean knowledge is power, it rather assumes a relationship in which certain knowledge is produced and others suppressed through power. Hoy (1986, p. 129) adds to the explanation that in Foucault's thought the word 'is' connecting knowledge and power does not show that knowledge leads to power. Knowledge is not achieved before, and is independent of the use, to which it is put in the context of power. For Foucault in knowledge/power, the slash just shows the inseparability of both concepts and there is no point conceptualizing either one without the other, as they are inseparable and power produces knowledge as well as suppresses it.

When Foucault refers to knowledge, facts, and truths produced around a social issue, these are not to be conceived as such in any simple sense, but rather social products linked to the power of a particular profession. This distinct form of knowledge becomes common sense and is accepted as evidence of our knowledge about the world, or in this case society. Foucault (1978, p. 149) explained the "regimes of power" in different knowledge systems, a form of control exercised by a system over an individual, as well as social entities. In the same context, the analysis in this chapter shows the social production of difference, linked to the established regimes of power and knowledge.

Within the broader knowledge/power debate, juridical power is seen by Foucault as the negative hierarchal power, something that deals with the prohibition. His argument focuses on the negativity of juridical power and contends that if the only function of power was to prohibit it, people would not obey it. Power is far more than a negative force whose sole function is to punish, rather it produces things, it produces pleasure, it creates knowledge, produces discourse, and therefore needs to be seen as a productive force that runs through the social body (Foucault, 2006, p. 153).

Bacon (1620, p. 111) in his book *Novum Organum*, argued that an "intimate connection between the knowledge and power" exists, what we now know as the scientific modal of "knowledge is power". Resounding this argument Gutting and Oksala (2018) claim that within the study of human beings, for Foucauldian knowledge-power nexus, the goals of power and goals of knowledge are inseparable, "in knowing we control and in controlling we know". Davidson (1986, p. 221) contends that broadly, Foucault's work spans over 'three domains': analysis of a system of knowledge, of modalities of power, and of self's relationship to itself. For each domain, Foucault employed specific forms of analysis. In Foucauldian discourse analysis power relations enable us to understand, that there is nothing more to power relations beyond their exercise, and that these relations are more or less organized, hierarchal, coordinated clusters of relations (Foucault, 1980b, 1998). The discursive power does not necessarily function to repress individuals, but rather produces them through practices of signification, subjectification, and action (Heller, 1996). Therefore, power in the discourse, unlike the theories of representation, dealing with the signification, does not refer to the things and actions but constitutes actions in themselves that "intervene with the things" (Bogue, 1989, p. 139).
Although Foucault's discourse analysis is void of any specific methodology, his philosophy provides an alternative path of looking at the concept of knowledge/power.

It is also necessary to distinguish power relations from communication which transmits information employing a language, a system of signs, or any other symbolic medium (Foucault, 1982a). At the very heart of the power relationship and constantly provoking it, is the resistance of the *will* and the obstinacy of freedom. Such resistance is present in every relationship which is the true essence of power because, without resistance, power has no meaning. However, the language, words, and system of signs attain a dominant role and become instrumental in exclusionary objectification.

3.2.3 **Power in Foucauldian Conception**

In developing a theoretical analytical framework for understanding 'power behind discourse' and 'power in discourse' as postulated by Fairclough (1989), this section examines Foucault's knowledge/power philosophy and synthesizes it with the CDA. Foucault insisted on not following any specific analytical methodologies and was against any closed types of methodologies (Tamboukou, 1999). Foucault argues that the truth should not be freed from power. Further, he confesses in Dreyfus, Rabinow, and Foucault (1982) that :

> I am fully aware that I have never written anything other than fiction. For all that I would not want to say that they were outside the truth. It seems plausible to me to make fiction work within truth, to introduce truth effects with a fictional discourse, and in some way to make discourse arouse, 'fabricate' something which does not yet exist, thus to fiction something. One 'fictions' history starting from a political reality that renders it true, one 'fictions' a politics that does not yet exist starting from a historical truth (p. 204).

Consequently, truth is defined as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. It has a circular relationship with power, which produces and sustains it and with the effects of power which produce and sustain the truth (Davidson, 1986, p. 221). In power discourse, asking the question of 'how' power is exerted tends to ignore the basic nature and causes of the existence of power, and therefore Foucault (1982a, p. 785) argues that power needs to be inquired about and understood through its three distinct qualities, "origin of the power, its nature, and manifestation of power". This conception of power forms the construct of power as an overlapping triangular relationship between the three domains of power (Foucault, 1982a). The elements in this affiliation are mutually reinforcing reciprocally and these domains use each other as means to an end. Power relation encompasses a field of things, perfected techniques, work, and transformation of the real. Power is exerted over things and Foucauldian power is the question of 'capacity' to modify, use, consume, or destroy. Power is also the measure of the relationship between the individuals and between the groups, and effectively distinguishes the relationship between the individuals. Power, in Foucault's work emphasises the cultural production of difference. Similarly, the communication relationship, constitutes reciprocity, communication through language, signs, or any other symbolic media, which can result in a realm of power as a direct consequence or as an objective (Foucault, 1982a, p. 786). The third aspect of objective capacity means the domination of the means of constraint, inequality, and the action of men on other men, which are also the finalized activities. Power, as it is generally conceived, does not exist till the time it is put to action. It affects the actions of others as an action upon an action, an existing one or the one that might happen in future. Foucault argues that slavery, when a man is chained, is not a function of power, his possibilities are restricted, rather it is a function of 'physical relationship of constrain'.

A significant function of the Foucauldian conception of power is disciplinary control. A specific form of control (such as prison) or punishment is exercised on the individuals who fail or refuse to reach the desired civic standards in a social setting. Foucault (1975, p. 82) argues that modern punishment for the deviant has become gentler, the aim is to "punish less but punish better", to

avoid any revolt in the society and prevent glamourizing the punished. This change in the entire system of punishment is not by the order of, or under the control of a central authority. He also argued that the institutions built to run the social functions in an innocuous manner helped create social power and means of control. As one of the most significant notions in his work, the conception of power by Foucault (1975) is interesting in multiple ways, it provides a sophisticated argument in power discussion, which parts its ways from the conception of ideology, criticizes the hegemonic conception of power or looking at power as some kind of restriction from someone else to the manifestation of an ideology.

The concept of Foucauldian power is articulated at two levels: the empirical and theoretical. Lynch (2011, p. 13) argues that his empirical analysis constitutes a "detailed examination of historically specific modes of power and how these modes emerged out of earlier forms". In this analysis, there is an identification of modern forms of power such as disciplinary power and biopower and premodern form such as sovereign power. Foucault (1998) posits:

> Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised against it […] We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance, and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile, and makes it possible to thwart (pp. 100-101).

By power, Foucault (1998, p. 92) does not mean "a group of institutions and mechanisms to ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state", nor does it mean a "mode of subjugation which in contrast to violence, has the form of rule", and finally, it is also not a "general system of domination exerted by one group over another" whose effects through repeated origins permeates throughout the society. This argument does not mean that other forms of power such as state power (Jessop, 2008), or historically relevant, Marxist power (Jessop, 2012, pp. 3-14), do not exist. Foucault rather finds these forms as the terminal effects of the power relationship. In power discourse, the omnipresence of power in every relationship doesn't mean that it embraces everything, but rather that it comes from everywhere, and "is produced at every moment, from one moment to the next and in every relationship" (Foucault, 1998, p. 93).

Foucault moved away from his contemporaries who emphasized and focused their work on the importance of words. He focused more on power and discourse, but refused to treat power as a central philosophical concept, just like all other concepts occupying vital significance and as a unitary and homogenous thing. Search for a central essence in a philosophical conception of

Foucauldian power would be an effort in futility, however, his concepts are of great value when viewed through generations and geography i.e., genealogy. Although, as mentioned above, he never denied the concept of state power, however, he did ask into question that the only real power is sovereign. Similarly, there are sources of violence other than the state, and power functions differently at multiple levels, and the state is not the sole occupier of power turf.

Foucault's conception is primarily based upon the statements of law and taboo and is highly restrictive and repressive in nature. This understanding of power, deriving from the "monarchic power" (Foucault, 2007, p. 155), and the "concept of right" (Foucault, 1975, p. 10), makes power common sense, acceptable and effective. Such power manifests itself not "by right, but by technique, not by law, but by normalization, not by punishment but by control" (Foucault, 1978, p. 89). For power to exist and manifest as common sense, it must mask at least part of itself. Power is not an institution, not a structure, nor is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a "complex strategical situation" in a particular society (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). However, it is important to note that power in a society needs to be understood as "capillary" and must be analyzed at its extremities (Foucault, 1980b, p. 96), does not come from a single source, is "local, continuous, productive, capillary and exhaustive" (Fraser, 1981, p. 276).

3.2.4 **Power and Subjectivity**

As mentioned above as well, most of the discussion on power is concentrated on its conception as hegemony, whereas Foucauldian philosophy looks at the concept of power as 'diffused and everywhere' (Foucault, 1980b, pp. 200-201). Practices as a consequence of discursive power are adopted and performed by the free subjects who have a range of possibilities of actions. Power, as per Foucault (1982a):

> [is] a total structure brought to bear upon possible action; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless, always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their actions or being capable of action (p. 789).

Hoy (1981, p. 43) contends that without understanding the concept of power, it is impossible to understand what a society is. It would be of little value to study power only as a negative, dominating, and suppressing act. If it was only a repression tool, it would be hard to understand how a subject or society as a whole willingly accepts such domination. For Hoy (1986, p. 129), the knowledge/power concept is a heuristic device and needs to be valued as a tool to study the

history of the sciences of men and society. His concept is neither epistemological nor ontological, since Foucault uses this notion to study the historical social and scientific practices that have been conceptualized as a belief or common sense.

In Foucauldian philosophy, a discourse entails *historical* inquiry or *genealogy*. Such an analysis attends to the *power* mechanisms in diverse ways to understand its manifestation. Moreover, the power discourse is focused on the process of *subjectification*, the physical process of "production of subjects" (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008, p. 91), which is an effective analytical dimension for CDA in power discourse.

Subjectivity allows exploration of subject position and discourse. How a subject is allowed to act out in knowledge/power discourse and what relationship with the 'self' that person has, and willingness to adapt to the subjectivity as common sense. Foucault's work relevant to power has been a study of the history of different modes by which human beings are made subjects (Foucault, 1982a). This work spans three modes of objectification which transform human beings into discursive subjects. The first objectification was achieved through the modes of inquiry that gain the status of sciences and objectives the productive labor. Second has been the study of 'dividing practices', in which the subject is divided from others or within oneself. The third is the study or the way a human being voluntarily turns himself into a subject. Before Foucault's work, the two modes of study of power were legal models, showing the legitimacy of the power, and the institutional model, the answers to which were found in the 'state'. Allen (2010, p. 69) posits that criticizing Foucault, Jürgen Habermas interprets his conception of subjects in discourse as the individual copies that are "mechanically punched out". Although Foucault himself defines power as the capacity to change, this change could be good or bad, and the same definition applies to subjects as well. He also argues that power is everywhere, to which human beings are constantly subjected and are objects of it. This means that power comes from multiple sources and in multiple forms.

Foucault (2006, p. 153) argues that if the power was to be conceptualized only as a negative repressing force, and nothing good was to come out of it, no one would accept it. Therefore, the concept of power traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, and produces discourse that runs through the whole social body. Foucault (1975, p. 136) argues that the subject or body of labour and soldier, etc. could only be brought into the *Man-the-Machine* role, where he acts like a useful docile, workforce, through the creation of suitable knowledge. Such "normalization", rationalization, organization, and homogenization of entire societies is

obtained through adequate knowledge/power nexus. In this vein, it is important to note that Foucault's philosophy is "not intended to tell us what power is, but where to look" (Hoy, 1986, p. 135), therefore there is a need to find the true historical connections of power through traces of knowledge.

Foucault's concept of power also has a lot in common with the theory of ideology. Althusser (1971, p. 133) argues that the knowledge in society is imparted through state institutions such as a church, schools, army, etc. in forms where it ensures the "subjection to the ruling ideology, and mastery of implementation of the ideology". The subjects, therefore, are willing participants of such ideological manifestation. Similarly, Gramsci explains the concept of hegemony (although he used the word *hegemony* only once in the essay) through the class struggle in the society to form a social force with a well-articulated and well understood 'philosophy', and ultimately secure ascendency of such a force (see, for example, Buttigieg, 1975, p. 21; Hall, 1986). In this vein, Foucault's concept of power, just like Althusser's 'ideology' and Gramsci's 'hegemony' infers that the subjects strongly believe in what they agree to do and this gives them a sense of belonging and is a positive factor in their wellbeing.

3.4 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis – Methodological Approach

Drawing from Willig (2013b), a six-stage the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis has been adopted for analyzing themes in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, concerned with the textual and pictorial descriptions of *Daesh* text and focus on the discursive resources in the Islamic State's culture and its implications on those who live in the region. This methodology is concerned with the role of language in the construction of discourse and communication at levels beyond the interpersonal level (Willig, 2013a), and the meaning of the language might permeate beyond the immediate context or the spoken words. From the Foucauldian perspective discourse facilitates, limits, and constrains what can be said, by whom, where, and when (e.g. Parker, 1992), exposing the difficult relationship between discourse, how people feel about it or subjectivity, and material conditions or what they may do – the practice.



Figure 3 3 Six Stages of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (Willig, 2013a)

Capitalizing on the available discursive resources (akin to the discursive economy) in a society, this methodology focuses on the implications of such resources on society. Therefore, this discourse is conceptualized as the "set of instructions or the statements that construct objects and array of subject positions" (Parker, 1994, p. 245). Resultantly, such constructions put forth certain ways of seeing the world and certain ways of being in the world. The subjectivity experience is influenced by the discourse, which offers such subject positions. More specifically related to this research, Foucauldian Discourse Analysis is concerned with the legitimization of the power relationships. Besides, some discourses are so deeply entrenched in the society that they become "common sense" (Willig, 2013a, p. 380) making it difficult to challenge them.

The six-stage analysis includes: (1) the *discursive construction* – constitutes how discursive objects are constructed, which further depends on the research inquiry. The applicability of this stage will vary as this analysis is deployed in the subsequent chapters; (2) stage two is the examination of the Foucauldian understanding of the *discourse*, and how the construction of discursive objects differs between the constructions. This stage of analysis focuses on locating the various discursive constructions of the object within the broader discourses. Relatedly, "non-verbal" communications and practices (such as images or signs) also form part of the discourse and merit examination (Willig, 2013a, p. 388); (3) in the third stage *action orientation*, a closer examination of the discursive context is carried out to understand the deployment of different constructions of the deployed objects. The focus is on the reasons for constructing certain objects in a particular manner, their relationship with other objects constructed differently, and how do they interact with the surrounding text; (4) stage four

concerns with the *positioning* as an inquiry in the subject positions offered within the already located discourses. Davies and Harre (1999, p. 35) contend that the subject position within a discourse identifies "a location for persons within the structure of rights and duties for those who use that repertoire". Briefly, discourses create subjects and objects and result in the creation of positions within networks of (textual) meaning that can be taken up by the speakers; (5) the *practice* stage of analysis is concerned with the relationship between discourse and practice. This necessitates an extensive examination of how discursive constructions and subject positions make available or constrain, open up or close down the opportunities for action. By placing the subjects in a discourse in a particular manner, discourses limit what can be done and what can be said; (6) the final stage six explores the relationship between the discourse and *subjectivity*. Discourses construct social realities and discursive positioning plays a significant role in the process. As postulated by (Davies & Harre, 1999, p. 35), after a person takes a particular position in the discourse, they see the world from "the vintage point of that position and in terms of the particular images, metaphors, storylines, and concepts which are made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned". This final stage, therefore analysis the consequences of taking up a certain position and the subjectivity experience. The choice of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (Willig, 2013a, pp. 378-421) allows for a few things in analyzing as discourse:-

- Foucauldian Discourse Analysis allows us to explore the relationship between language and subjectivity and its implications for discourse. More precisely, in this case, it allows examining how language has benefitted power discourse and allowed *Daesh* discourses in manifesting subjectivity, through individuals, and in a particular religious practice.
- By offering certain subject positions, the Islamic State exercises control over the subjects. Subjects fully understand and present themselves for such positions within a discourse.
- Foucauldian point of view allows and limits certain acts, speech, and positions, and what can be said by whom, when, and where. Further, it allows us to look at the discursive resources available within a discourse (which could be referred to as a discursive economy). In this case, the discourse resources might include convincing the best of the Muslim scholars, engineers, doctors, etc. to perform *Hijrah* to ISIS lands, or it allows its loyalists to return to their home countries and take part in terrorist activities (see, for example, chapter 6).

- Discourse is defined as a set of constructions that creates object and subject positions (Parker, 1994). These positions in turn allow us to see certain ways of seeing the world and certain ways of being in it.
- Foucauldian Discourse Analysis guides us to ascertain/refute the claim that the social reality created through dominant discourse legitimizes certain structures and power relationships. It looks at the historical perspective and sees how these discourses exerted themselves historically and their current relevance.
- It exemplifies institution and discourse. It is not limited to certain words, texts, or speeches, rather goes beyond that to see the creation and sustenance of institutions, which further play a role in discourses. Discourse is not limited to text or speech communication rather its manifestation is seen through institutional control, as a way of articulating, regulating, and living in society. This does not mean that the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis outright discards text, it rather goes beyond the immediate meanings of the text and examines how the discourse is manifested in the society. It also tells us about the way subjects interpret the discourse. Briefly, Foucauldian Discourse Analysis deals with the meanings and context. This means we do not necessarily have to analyze the words and it can be carried out on (any) symbolic/communication systems such as "speech, writing, non-verbal behavior, Braille, Morse code, Semaphores, runes, advertisements, fashion systems, stained glass, architecture, tarot cards, bus tickets, cities, and gardens". (Willig, 2013a).
- Finally, in a discourse, some people are in the dominant position of authority to have access to the 'truth', while others are not. In discourse such knowledge leads to the hierarchy and institutions, eventually leading to positions of dominance as well as resistance by contending actors.

3.5 **Philosophical Concords and Discords**

Knowledge has been questioned as a significant area of inquiry by all philosophers from Socrates, to Locke, Hume, and Kant (Gutting & Oksala, 2018). In the Kantian era, philosophy evolved as the 'critique of knowledge' and his vital epistemological contribution was to signify the notion that the critique that revealed the limits of our knowing power could also reveal necessary conditions for their exercise. In this vein Foucault's critical philosophy focused on behavioral and social sciences and their historical evolution, exposing that these disciplines are the outcome of contingent historical forces and not scientifically grounded truths.

The significance of philosophy in academic writings and CDA cannot be overemphasized. The appreciation of the philosophical approach to a problem is evident in Plato who referred to the philosophy as 'dear delight' (Buchanan, 1948). As rightly pointed out by Thoreau (1854):

> There are nowadays, professors of philosophy but not philosophers. Yet it is admirable to profess because it was once admirable to live. To be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a school, but so to love wisdom as to live according to its dictates, a life of simplicity, independence, magnanimity, and trust. It is to solve some of the problems of life, not only theoretically, but practically (pp. 17-18).

Thoreau's contention is applicable in contemporary academic domains, where philosophy is still a largely underrated discipline (Mughal, 2012). Analysis of the contemporary issues in the light of philosophy helps us understand the underlined causes and streamlines the thought to allow in-depth examination. As mentioned in the introductory section of this research, the examination of the Islamic State's dominant discourses in light of Islamic philosophy, in one of the chapters (See, Chapter 7), signposts the interplay of these concepts in discourses and contrastive *Daesh* practices, and the arguments made by the Islamic philosophers. Within the philosophical domain, Islamic intellectual history follows several central arguments and issues from their origin in theology to the discussion in philosophy, showing the significant Muslim contribution to philosophical thought. Islamic philosophical culture thrived in a variety of fields and the philosophy shaped Islamic thought in later years (Leaman, 2002). Notably, Islamic philosophy is not alone in drawing from religious texts such as Quran and Hadith, Greek philosophy, for example, had an esoteric dimension of Greek religion, and so does the Buddhist philosophy. This relationship between the philosophy and esoteric dimensions of philosophy has a universal resonance, intellectual space within the philosophical domain, and long history in the West, lasting until the German Romantic movement (Nasr, 2006, p. 6).

Within Islamic philosophy, medieval Islamic philosophers were also interested in the establishment of a just Islamic State (Padmanabhan, 2008). The undercurrents of this theme can be found in the writings of many including Ibn Taymiyyah, who has been cited generously in Dabiq Magazine. Echoing Plato's concept of 'Philosopher King' from *The Republic* (Jowett, 1888, pp. lxxvi-lxxvii), these scholars have discussed the concepts of philosopher-king – the true seeker of happiness and justice. On the contrary, Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah feared a weakened Islamic state, resulting in chaos and insecurity, and advocated a powerful ruler. Ibn Taymiyyah argued that "it is obvious that the affairs of the people cannot be in a sound state except with rulers, and even if somebody from among the unjust kings becomes ruler this would be better than there being none" (cf Padmanabhan, 2008, p. 405). Strengthening the notion of change in the society through CDA, the argument made in this research implies that the Islamic philosophical approach promotes an active attitude toward the establishment of just religious order and morality, not only as a matter of private conscience but the inclusion of Islamic society as a whole.

3.5.1 **Theory and Philosophy of Stigma**

Incidentally, the work of Michel Foucault and Goffman broadly overlaps in the time frame of the 1960s and 1970s, however, their approaches to the issue of this power relationship varied to a great extent. Goffman's work was grounded in the American sociological domain, whereas Foucault's work deconstructs the issues surrounding European philosophical experiences, with an understanding of the creation of different forms of knowledge (Parker & Aggleton, 2003).

Scholars also argue that stigma and discrimination not only occur at the individual level as Goffman and Foucault would contend, but rather it exists at the group and institutional levels, thereby creating social and structural inequalities (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Also, stigma is a complex struggle that exists at the center of social life. As contended by Parker and Aggleton (2003), stigma is deployed by 'concrete and identifiable social actors' seeking to legitimize their dominant status within existing structures of social inequality.

Within the contemporary philosophy of stigma, the existence of a "government of individualization" (Foucault, 1982a), is the struggle that asserts the right of an individual to be an individual (), a simultaneous struggle that desires an individual to remain part of the community although through a loss of individuality, or certain individual traits. The question of the study of power remained central to Foucault's writings, although from the subject's point of view (Foucault, 1982a). Foucauldian concept of "dividing practice" whereby the subject is either divided inside or from others, is central to the process of stigmatization. The division between the "mad and sane" and "sick and healthy", explains the concept further.

Pointing to the challenges in the stigma research, Link and Phelan (2001) argue that those social scientists who study stigma are usually not part of that stigmatized group, hence empathy is absent from the researcher's point of view. Such scientists study the phenomenon as an outsider and from the viewpoint of existing theories which are uninformed by the livid experience of the group under study. The result is a misunderstanding of the experience of the people who are stigmatized.

The second challenge to the study of stigma is that mostly it is at the micro-level, i.e., the study of individuals. This adds certain assumptions and preconceived ideas that are assumed to be part of that person and not necessarily given by society (Fine & Asch, 1988). The study of stigma in this research and CDA of stigma as a theme, thus endeavors to address both these challenges.

The earliest recorded English usage of stigma referred to the cluster of wounds corresponding to the wounds of Jesus. The word *stigma* dates its origins back to the Greeks and has the same roots as the verb "to stick" or "to prick", that is to pierce or tattoo since the Greeks used to prick/tattoo their slaves with a mark called stigma (Falk, 2001a; Herek, 2002). The broader research on stigma is multidisciplinary in nature and involves areas of research in disciplines of psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, etc.

Goffman (1963, p. 1) contended that "the Greeks, who were strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier". The literature on stigma is extensive and many scholars do not even provide a concise definition and just resort to the dictionary definition as a mark of disgrace (See for example Hotez, 2008). Most of the authors quote Goffman's definition, "attribute that is deeply discrediting" and it reduces a person from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one" (Goffman, 1963, p. 3).

The manifestation of stigma also refers to the invisible sign of disapproval which allows those who are *inside* a group to draw a line between themselves and those who are *outsiders*. Such a demarcation allows insiders to know what happens to those who deviate from the norms and go against the wishes of the in-group (Falk, 2001a, p. 17). Deviance in itself is a complete study of the violation of social norms, subjecting those who resort to it, to social exclusion. The scholars who have worked on stigma have added multiple social and cultural aspects to it. For example, Ainlay, Becker, and Coleman (1986, p. 80) enlist certain labels of inferiority such as, "fag, nut, hood, nigger, pervert, head, broad, con, lush, moron and crip", which have also made their way into the study of stigma. Many of these labels may have different meanings and connotations in different cultures and social setups, yet they are used as a stigma. Therefore, it may be plausible to add the 'social context' into the process of stigmatization, which has a direct influence on the stigma as a social phenomenon. Within the context of a stigma, there is a relationship between an attribute (mark, such as mental illness) and a stereotype (an undesirable characteristic) based on which the stigmatized gets discriminated against (Goffman, 1963, p. 4).

Falk (2001a, p. 11) also refers to two types of stigma, the 'Existential Stigma' and 'Achieved Stigma'. Existential stigma deals with a condition over which the stigmatized has very little control or was not caused by the stigmatized. Achieved stigma on the other hand deals with the conduct and behavior of the stigmatized and in which that person played a vital role in attaining such a stigma.

The literature on stigma has expanded over the theoretical postulation by Goffman. A lot of work on stigma has been done in the field of health and medicine (see, for example, Corrigan & Penn, 1999; Fife & Wright, 2000; Opala & Boillot, 1996; Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 2000). Multiple scholars have looked at stigma through the lens of social psychology using the socio-cognitive approaches to ascertain how individuals constrict categories and incorporate these categories to formulate stereotypical beliefs. Most of this work has suffered from conceptual limitations, least of all an agreeable definition of stigma (Link & Phelan, 2001).

To exclude the stigmatized from the existing social order, stigma is a socio-cultural phenomenon, which works quite literally at the point of intersection between culture, power, and difference (Talib, 2015). If that is the case, then the study of stigma discourse becomes the examination of subjectivity, the notion of objectification, and the negotiation of the power relationships structuring the social world. Addressing these issues results in the conceptualization of stigma, which is a powerful empirical theme in society. Within the larger context of perpetuating inequality (Talib, 2015), it is important to recognize how an understanding of stigma and discrimination in terms of power and objectification nexus, encourages a focus on the political economy of stigmatization and its links to social exclusion (Parker & Aggleton, 2003).

The concepts of stigma, dehumanization, ethnocentrism, Pseudospeciation, and labeling are not mutually exclusive and are sometimes used as synonyms. For example, the bias against the enemy is seized upon and achieved by indoctrinating people to regard their enemies as subhuman creatures. “Dehumanization, therefore, has a specific function of unleashing aggression in war” (Smith, 2011). What is being denied to others is important to understand dehumanization (Nick, 2006). Similarly, Kelman (1973) perceived that to accord anyone as a human we must accord him identity and community, if these two attributes are absent, the perception will be that of a non-human. Socially and intellectually, we understand and accept society and culture as entities that are powerful enough to isolate and discriminate against its members. Discrimination is considered the prerogative of the powerful and larger group against the suppressed and marginalized or isolated group.

The concept of looking at ‘others’ through the binary vision (‘us’ vs ‘them’) dates back to antiquity. The Aristotle era Greeks divided the people into two categories; themselves and everybody else, considering themselves to be the paragons of civilization and *barbaroi* (barbarians) for others. Aristotle claimed that barbarians were slaves by nature and

incomplete human beings (Smith, 2011, pp. 36-40). Similarly, Smith (2011, p. 26) further argues that dehumanization is aroused, exacerbated, and exploited by propaganda and that human history is full of examples of dehumanizing the enemy through linguistic choices such as rats, mice, pigs, dogs, snakes, and apes.

3.5.2 **Stigma and Discourse**

Theoretically, the concept of stigma is itself stigmatizing (Sayce, 1998). Stigma is used to describe an attribute, whereas it is the language of the relationship between the one who is stigmatizing and the stigmatized. The use of language per se is also instrumental in discourse studies, and Derrida (1974) argues that language has dichotomies, resulting in dichotomies in discourse and social action. These linguistic dichotomies need to be deconstructed (through CDA) to understand the concept of stigma in the context of this extremist group.

Literature also points to the existing linkage between the stereotyping and stigma, between power and stigma, and symbolic power and symbolic stigma (Bourdieu, 1987; Goffman, 1963; Herek, 2002; Major & O'Brien, 2005). Goffman (1963, p. 3) defined stigma as "an attitude that is significantly discrediting" and in the eyes of society, such a person is reduced to a tainted and discounted one. Talking about multiple modes of discrediting an individual, Goffman considers people who suffer from mental illness, possess physical deformities, or follow a particular behaviour that is contrary to the existing norms such as criminal behaviour, homosexuality, etc. as those who possess an "undesirable attribute". Only those attributes are stigmatized that are inconsistent with the stereotypically believed norms of a given type of individual. Goffman (1963, pp. 143-144) further argues that those involved in 'deviant' behaviour, are tangled in some kind of a denial of social order. Such individuals, besides others, include prostitutes, drug addicts, delinquents, criminals, jazz musicians, bohemians, gypsies, carnival workers, hobos, winos, show people, full-time gamblers, beach dwellers and urban unrepentant poor, and such people had spoiled identity. Issues of concern for Goffman were of social change and the social construction of individual realities (Parker & Aggleton, 2003). Moreover, Goffman's theory of stigmatization does not point to attaching a fixed attribute to the individual or a group, who is being stigmatized, rather more importantly it is an ongoing phenomenon of devaluing the relationship.

Extensive theoretical, as well as empirical literature, exist dealing with the processes and results of social exclusion, through cultural as well as national lenses. Link and Phelan (2001) citing multiple studies argue that such exclusion includes, but is not limited to urinary incontinence,

exotic dancing, leprosy, cancer, mental illness, unemployment, welfare beneficiaries, wheelchair users, debtors, and mothers who are lesbians, etc.

3.5.3 **Objectification in Stigma**

Kant (1785, p. 53) argues that a major distinguishing feature that elevates a human above the rest of the creatures is *dignity*, i.e., "inner worth" as opposed to a "relative worth". It is crucial in Kantian philosophy that each person respects humanity in others, as well as humanity in their person. Objectification occurs when a human being, through social means, is made less than human, turned into a thing or commodity, bought and sold. When objectification operationalizes, a person is depersonalized, so that no individuality or integrity is available socially or in what is an extremely circumscribed privacy. Objectification is an injury right to the heart of discrimination against those who can be used as if they are not fully human in social terms; their humanity is hurt by being diminished'.

Considering the division of identities that preliminary analysis entails, subsequent analyzes demonstrate clear linkages between objectification as part of the dehumanization process of decreasing the relative value of 'others' through dehumanizing, downgrading, and modes of devaluation. The underpinning assumption is that the dehumanization process in stigma discourse is the transference of devaluation that in turn produces seclusion for 'others' and exclusivity for 'in-group'. In this respect, stigma essentially constitutes religiously, politically, and socially evidenced stigmatized identities for 'others'. Moreover, the assumption underpinning the analysis of objectification is that for a domain of true, faithful/believers, to be invented, dehumanized subjects of varied categories would first have to be created.

There are three modes of objectification. Foucault (1982a) calls one of the modes of objectification as 'dividing practice'. To understand this, Foucault mentions the isolation of lepers in the Middle Ages, the confinement of the poor, the insane, the vagabonds, the classification of disease and practice of clinical medicine in early 19th Century France, the rise of modern psychiatry and its entry into prisons, hospitals, and clinics, and finally and most relevantly the medicalization, stigmatization, and normalization of sexual deviance in modern Europe (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984, p. 8). The individual is divided either within himself or from others. In this process of social objectification and categorization, human beings are given both social and personal identities. An efficient and diverse application of power and knowledge through text allows, to some extent dominate, and mostly seclude 'others', through an identity formed through this dividing practice.

The second mode of turning human beings into an object is through 'scientific classification'. This mode of objectification arises from the inquiry that gives itself the status of "scientific racism" (see e.g. Fairchild, 1991; Rushton, 1996). The third mode of objectification argued by Foucault (1982b, pp. 208-226) is the "subjectification" of a person. In this mode of objectification, in contrast to the previous two modes, the person is active and willing to be objectified.

Finally, the related concept of subhuman creatures or dehumanizing *others* finds its basis in the firm belief that the subhumans are not human beings. Smith (2011, pp. 10-11) argues that dehumanization is a joint creation of biology, culture, and architecture of the human mind and that all three of these elements need to be considered to fully understand the phenomenon.

3.6 Theory and Methods in Critical Visual Analysis (CVA)

As mentioned above, the normative conception of power and its analysis contribute vitally to the existing knowledge and the way knowledge/power nexus could be useful in the domain of CDA. However, the images necessitate distinct scholarly attention. Referring to the images, Mortensen (2017) contends that appropriating an image often introduces a critically reflective aspect to the image and its reception, arguably the same is true for an analysis that parts its ways from the traditional analytical approaches. Reflecting on this methodology, the reader might disagree because of the multiple contradictory analytical perspectives, few of which have been mentioned above. However, this research concerns the analysis of knowledge/power discourse in the Islamic State's context, with possibilities of constructive critical contestation. The images have evolved and the consequent discourses merit analytical attention. Citing Quéau (1993), Debrix (1999), argues that: -

> We used to move around the image. Now we are moving inside it. A mere glance at the image is no longer satisfactory, and neither is a quick peek with the eye. We now have to enter the image, fuse with it, and then it can take us away in its spiraling vertigo and power (p. 209).

The study of images gained significance immediately after the invention of the camera in the early 19th Century. The popularity of studying photographs, however, took some time, as the scholars developed an increasing interest in the analytical and expressional effects an image could have. Almost a century ago, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy argued that "not he who is without knowledge of writing but rather of photography will be the illiterate of the future" (cf Kaplan, 1995, p. 140). This claim is more pertinent in the 21st Century when images have gained the

significance of a complete language in themselves and are being analyzed and deconstructed through semiotic theory (Eco, 1976), specific grammar and vocabulary (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006), and even philosophy (Iftikhar, 2018c). Looking at the images and enjoying or despising them is no longer sufficient, rather a meaningful analysis demands 'penetrating the image and being one with the image' as desirable attributes (Debrix, 1999, p. 210).

The existence of extensive visual techniques suggests that it is possible to fathom the true meanings and referentiality through contemporary modes of cognition such as logic, science, and text relying primarily on CVA. Techniques of CVA in the discourse, generating high visibility and faster communication, are rather more popular and effective means of making sense of the Islamic State and other similar entities. In the context of images, reality can be reprocessed, reproduced, reinvented, and refigured. Hyper-reality in the theory of semiotics and postmodernism is the inability of the conscious to distinguish reality from a simulation of reality. As poised by (Güney & Güney, 2008), "poststructuralism is a philosophical mode of thought which believes that in the world there is no reality, only 'manufactured reality' constructed by words". In this case, the words mean text and any other form of communication such as images, signs, text, etc. Consequently, simulated reality is the re-construction of 'a reality to a degree that it makes the new reality indistinguishable from 'truth' or pre-existing reality.

This becomes more relevant, especially in the wake of high-tech social interactions and rapid bursts of social media propaganda messages by ISIS. Baudrillard and Glaser (1995, p. 3) contend that hyper-reality is the 'generation of models of real without origin or reality.

3.6.1 **Analytical Theory of Critical Visual Analysis**

The methodology for studying the selected images encompasses a CVA using contemporary tools and visual grammar (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Rose, 2001), and understanding its relevance to the *brutality*, ideology, identity, and conflict of the Islamic State.

To understand why these images were created and promoted, it is desirable to avoid overindulgence and sentimentality in the choice and analysis of these images. It is also important to understand the philosophical underpinnings of sentimentality and *brutality*. Midgley (1979) contends that 'the notion of sentimentality is ill-informed' and the real flaw is a distortion of reality by invoking feelings in the analysis. This could be true both for the Islamic State and the worldwide viewers of these images. By allowing self-proclaimed and self-

understood religious sentiment, vengeance has been promoted by the Islamic State, fulfilling the contemporary definition and criteria of *brutality*. Such *brutality* also invokes a certain inward-looking private notion among the aggressor, which is referred to as the 'Fear of Feeling' (Midgley, 1979). Such fear is overcome through the act of *brutality* against fellow human beings and acts as an assurance of the absence of feeling, and as a catalyst in overcoming this fear. On the other hand, the viewer of these acts and images is looking at and analyzing these through the sentimentality lens, thereby trying to understand these as semiotic brutality. However theoretically, it would be a valid question to ask if such feelings of sentimentality in visual brutality exist as isolated notions, looking privately inward for a human being, or have these concepts prevailed publicly historically and are fully matured and understood, awaiting logical analysis. To answer this question this chapter refers to these notions and in conjunction with other tools identifies means to understand the interplay of these images at multiple levels of analysis.

The semiotic theory supports the evolution of CVA as a distinct area of inquiry, however, lately, CVA has been employing diverse critical, theoretical, and visual tools for image analysis (Aiello, 2006; Barthes, 1977a, 1977b; Berger, 1973; Chandler, 2002; Chouliaraki, 2006; Fiske, 1990; Jewitt, 2014; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Mirzoeff, 1999; O'Halloran et al., 2016; Panofsky, 1955; Rose, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2001, 2008; van Leeuwen & Jewitt, 2001). Recent contributions have also tried to address the philosophical gap in visual deconstruction and CVA (Iftikhar, 2018c). Although multiple semiotics and image analysis theories have been developed by the scholars, Wells (2015, p. 31) posits that one of the major problems in the establishment of photography theory and the discussion surrounding the photographic images is that "photography lies at the cusp of the scientific, the social sciences and humanities". The purpose of such a theory, therefore, entails a combined and multi-disciplinary approach, to explain an image.

The deconstruction of a photograph concerns itself more about its nature and how it acquires meanings, process, and implication of development of such images. Traditionally the theories of photography have focused on two aspects regarding images. On one side scholars developed theoretical notions to ascertain, understand, and discursive deconstruction of the relationship of an image to reality. This aspect is gaining more importance because of the 21st Century technological developments, making it possible to easily alter the images. The second aspect which remained the focus of mostly 20th Century scholars has been an effort to interpret the

images to understand them by reading certain aspects of the images concerning ideology, identity, and other similar notions. However, partial indulgence to the technical aspects has been made for enhanced analysis.

In critical studies, the notion of 'deconstruction' is attributed primarily to Derrida's work (Güney & Güney, 2008). In deconstruction, Derrida argues, "the task is [……] to dismantle [*deconstruire*] the metaphysical and rhetorical structures which are at work in [the text], not to reject or discard them, but to reinscribe them in another way" (Derrida, 1976, p. ixxv). The concept of deconstruction has amply been explained by Silverman (1989, p. 4) positing that Derrida's deconstruction is 'concerned with offering an account of what is going on in the text – not by seeking out its meanings or its parts or its systematic implications – but rather by making off its relations to other text, its contexts, its sub-texts. It means how a text's explicit formulations undermine its implicit or non-explicit aspects. It brings out what the text excludes by showing what it includes. As Derrida (1988, p. 141) contended "deconstruction, in the singular, is not 'inherently' anything at all that might be determinable based on this code and of this criteria. It is "inherently" nothing at all". Supplementing Derrida's argument, Evans (1991, p. 180) reiterates that "deconstruction is always something else", and that it, "does not exist somewhere, pure, proper, self-identical".

In CDA the field of visual analysis is a recent phenomenon and is the result of the contemporary scholarly treatise (cf Aiello, 2006; Blaagaard, Mortensen, & Neumayer, 2017; Boudana, Frosh, & Cohen, 2017; Mortensen, 2015; O'Halloran, 2005; O'Halloran et al., 2016; Prøitz, 2018; Schroeder, 2008). From the social semiotics perspective, this literature is a significant point of reference and is a useful tool for analyzing the images. Images have always been a powerful medium to attract attention and they have the power to affect change (Nohrstedt, 2016; Rothenberger, 2016). Citing Jaar, Debrix (1999, p. 41) contends that "images have an advanced religion; they bury history".

3.6.2 **Text and Images – Analysing Images as Text**

The images from extremist organizations in the 21st Century are mostly taken as the flood of visual metaphors, which are easily transmitted through social media and fetishized as yet another addition to the visual commodities from the 'others', the Middle East region in this case. The reality of these images showing brutality is dwarfed by the dominant war narrative in the west. These images feed into the western logic of dialectical identity through visual

representation, which argues that the war in the Middle East is primarily opposed to the domestic peace in the West – both being desirable.

The deconstruction of the meanings of text events and interactions (in this case text and images), within a specific cultural and situational context, can be achieved through Systemic Functional Theory (Halliday, 1978; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). There are three key tenets of this theory: (1) semiotic systems (including language and images) act as sources of meaning-making; (2) the meanings in the semiotic system can be taken from multiple deducible options, and; (3) the structure of semiotic resources (language and other semiotic resources) is evolved in society to serves the social functions.

Halliday (1978, pp. 128-133) contends that in Systemic Functional Theory these functions are elaborated in terms of metafunctions which can give three types of meanings: (1) ideational meanings are those construed from our experience and knowledge of the world and are also termed as logical meanings; (2) interpersonal meanings for enacting social relations and expressing attitudes, and; (3) textual meanings used for organizing the meanings into an expressive text. Any message used in any form of communication (text, sign or image, etc.) can be explained through one of these three meanings.

Defines the image as "a sight which has been recreated or reproduced […..] an appearance, which has been detached from the place and time in which it first made its appearance and preserved – for a moment or a few centuries", Berger (1973, p. 6) contends that every image embodies a way of seeing. Psychologists emphasize the vitality of images in human life by claiming that of all the senses, in a newborn child, the eyes start functioning much earlier as compared to other faculties. Other units of analysis, such as speaking, reading, writing, etc. become fully operational subsequently. Owing to the centrality of the visual analysis in multiple disciplines such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, education, etc. (Banks, 2001, p. 2; Schroeder, 2006, p. 303). CVA offers an interdisciplinary method for understanding and contextualizing social issues through images.

Highlighting the importance of social semiotics and image analysis, Barthes (1980, p. 4) contended that the camera mechanically captures whatever is in front of the lens. To fully comprehend the intention of the photographer, we need words in addition to the image. Chilean photographer Jaar (2016) took Barthes' argument a step ahead by contending that 'you do not take a photograph, you make it. According to the increasing scholarly interest in CVA as means

of contextualizing images, this chapter takes this discussion one step further, by contending that, *we do not take or make photographs, we rather write them*. That is to say that each image has some connotative and some denotative meanings. Also, there is an increasing need for deconstruction of these images in order to understand what these images reveal and what all do they conceal during the revealing process. The division of 'communicative labour' between the words and images in pictorial representation has been explicated by van Leeuwen (2008), and drawing on Berger et. al. (1973) he argues that:

> Words provide the facts, the explanations, the things that 'need to be said in so many words, images provide interpretations, ideologically coloured angles, and they do so not explicitly, but by suggestion, by connotation, by appealing to barely conscious, half-forgotten knowledge (p. 136).

This means that a viewer, by his/her prior knowledge of the world, and the dominant social discourse, needs words to explain the context or the framework, such as where the image comes from, or what they communicate. The image itself is open to any number of interpretations, description and CVA is just one method to deconstruct the meanings out of multiple possibilities.

As mentioned above, contemporary and more specifically 21st Century ontological debate relating to images is evolving and is dynamic and varying in nature. For example, one approach focuses on analyzing the rhetoric of the image about looking or the desire to look (Wells, 2015). This discussion has its premises on models of visual communication, which mostly relate to linguistics, psychoanalysis, and CDA. Adopting this approach allows images to be located and analyzed through poststructuralist analysis to understand the ideology and meanings behind the images.

The trend for documentary photography started in the 19th Century, however, the genre was developed subsequently. Scholars have gone as far as to claim that during the "nineteenth-century almost all photography was what would later be described as documentary" (Wells, 2015, p. 79). A documentary is a form, a genre, tradition, movement, style, and practice that has been in vogue for almost a century now. The genre was first coined by John Grierson in 1926, to describe the power of the film to change the world, a concept that soon gained popularity in photography, subsuming distinct kind of images (Curthoys & Lake, 2005; Wells, 2015). Abigail Solomon-Godeau has been cited by Parsons (2017, p. xiv), claiming that the individual documentary projects speak of open and hidden agendas and it is the responsibility of historians to extract the true meanings out of it. Documentary photography always had a distinct character,

as compared to the other genre such as street photography. While the latter concerns itself with the way people live, the former genre of photography was intended to picture the poor, oppressed, or those who were marginalized. This kind of effort was usually undertaken as a 'reformist project to inspire change', therefore the aim was to be accurate in depicting the plight of the powerless to the powerful (Rose, 2001, p. 20), and socially relates to poststructuralism as postulated by Hansen (2014).

Besides other theoretical aspects, the images analyzed in chapter 9 have also been subjected to the theoretical lens of poststructuralism (Hansen, 2014; Soguk, 1999), and social semiotic theory in the broader domain of CDA (Machin & Mayr, 2012; van Leeuwen, 2008). For image deconstruction, well-developed and refined *visual grammar* has been postulated by Kress and van Leeuwen (2006).

3.6.3 **The Process – The Production, Image, and Audiencing Sites**

The three sites i.e. production site, the image site, and the audiencing site act as points of reference for image analysis (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). In other words, there are three points of orientation that allow image analysis. The production site helps the analysis by understanding the question as to *how* the image was made. This includes the aspects which define the composition such as color, tone, foregrounding, backgrounding, distance and angle, etc. The second, image site, is useful in answering the question as to *what* does an image look like. The third, the audiencing site, answers the question of *how* the image is received and viewed by the audience. This will depend upon their previous knowledge of the world and what is contextually known to them about a specific image or images.

The underlying factors affecting these images and the three sites are modalities, and these include the technological, compositional, and social modalities. These modalities always exist in the backdrop of the image *sites* and are useful tools for image analysis. For example, the Compositional Modality includes the strategies to alter the appeal and look of the content such as color and tone, etc. and this would influence the Production Site. Berger (1973, p. 40) for example, categorized the *European Nudes* as a compositional modality. Similarly as argued by Rose (2001, p. 17) the third kind of social modality, includes social, political, economic, and institutional relations relevant to the image and defines the Imaging Site. Finally, Mirzoeff (1999, p. 2) contends that Technological Modalities include all those devices and instruments which are useful in looking at the images and in enhancing the 'natural vision' such as the internet and TV, etc. and this will have direct relevance to the audiencing Site.

There is an ongoing discussion among the CVA scholars about the applicability and significance of interplay between these sites and modalities for image analysis. For example, talking about the Auteur Theory, Rose (2001, pp. 22-23) posits that due to the production site, images turn out to be what the maker of the images wants them to be, and therefore this is one of the most important sites. On the other hand in *The Death of the Author*, Barthes (1977a, pp. 142-154) argues that the most significant site to understand the images is audiencing site, where the viewers get involved because "a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination". At this site, the viewers can develop a variety of ways to understand and analyze the images, and these variations accrue from their prior knowledge, understanding, and socially diverse considerations of the issues. Güney and Güney (2008) posit that according to poststructuralists, a reader can have an infinite number of thoughts and beliefs influencing the understanding of the text. Consequently, one cannot deny or claim the reader's feelings as false or true. Because of this, no critic can claim to define the *truth* or a specific meaning of a given text. The same argument applies to images as well. Any person audiencing the image can have an infinite number of ways to understand the image and no critic could claim to know the exact *truth* behind the images. This aspect also defines the journey between production and consumption, and how the consumption could indeed be different, than what was intended during the production phase. Therefore, any image could be analyzed using any number of sites and modalities, however for this chapter major emphasis will remain on understanding the images through social modalities at the consumption site.

3.7 Analytical Conceptualization of Statehood Discourse of the Caliphate

Power alone cannot ensure uninterrupted rule (Therborn, 1999), it needs an ideology, which exhibits power, and to exercise this (military or state) power, ideology relies on geography. Islamic State needed to project ideology and for that, they carved out geography within already existing, internationally recognized States of Iraq and Syria (Doyle & Dunning, 2018; Offenhuber, 2018). The philosophy of statehood in contemporary comprehension traces its roots back to Plato (1888), however, its modern manifestation has an intimate linkage to the Treaty of Westphalia (Mingst & Arreguín-Toft, 2017). The notion of sovereignty is understood as *the supreme authority within a territory*. In this description of the state, the concepts of *sovereignty*, *authority*, and *territory* stand out and need further attention. The conception of *authority* as defined by Wolff (1998, p. 4) 'is the right to command and correlatively, the right to be obeyed'. It is important to differentiate authority from power, the latter being the ability to compel compliance through coercion or use of force. The

philosophy of statehood thus entailed the sovereignty within a given territory over which a sovereign leader could enjoy authority. However, the ensuing argument shows that this conception is not as simple as it sounds and involves serious global politics.

Post-Westphalian concepts of 'state sovereignty' and territoriality (Mingst & Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. 240), were major leaps toward resolving multiple conflicts in 1648 and the years following the treaty. Unfortunately, centuries later, the same notions have become 'the major sources of conflict' globally (Crawford, 2007, p. 2). The formulation and deceleration of the state have been a more legalized and organized phenomenon and have been developed in new ways, especially during the last century. For example, in analyzing the state sovereignty in post-colonial South Asia, Waheed (2017, p. 3) contends that this notion provides a "strong safeguard against international interference", and simultaneously allows states to use their authority over domestic issues. Without going into a detailed discussion about the domestic exertion of excessive state authority, and as argued by Iftikhar (2018a), suffices to say that multiple theories, practices, and means exist in international instruments and law to limit the use of excessive force within its territory by the state or a sovereign leader. The concept of sovereignty with its elusive character remains quite ambiguous in its definition and theoretical manifestations (Mishra, 2008). Relatedly, Jackson (2003) posits that despite its problematic nature the concept of sovereignty remains central to the field of international relations. States tend to safeguard their sovereignty jealously and respond to any breach mostly with force.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the development of a multidisciplinary and multifaceted approach to discourse analysis for this research. It explains the theoretical and philosophical approaches adopted in identifying discourses. These discourses are distinct and distinctive in their revelation and demonstration; however, they are conjoined in Dabiq Magazine. Drawing on the discussion on CDA from the previous chapter, and scholarship for opting for a particular analytical methodology, the analytical foundations laid out here will be applied in the ensuing chapters. This chapter proposes that the methodological theoretical approach discussed here will help us to explore and explain the ideology and conflict of the Islamic State. In embarking on this philosophical methodological approach, the next chapters 4 and 5 will lay out the data for all the selected themes. This research hence argues that the challenging methodolog of CDA minimizes the risk of coming from a preconceived ideological disposition and avoids mechanistic analytical responses to describe discursive

practices from the Foucauldian discursive analysis point of view. Further adoption and combination of these approaches also off-sets the challenges of analyzing multidisciplinary discourses by the Islamic State, and an explicit account of the connection between the theoretical narratives in Dabiq Magazine. The next chapter presents detailed methods for constructing the themes from the data text through thematic analysis (See, for example, Alhojailan, 2012; Braun & Clarke, 2012; Tuckett, 2005). Qualitative questioning and thematic analysis are forms of intervention by the very nature of questions asked and the resource-oriented framework which guides the analysis. Such a synthesis integrates the inquiry and action (Patton, 2015). The principles of CDA will apply to these themes in the ensuing chapters.

Chapter 4: Crystallization of Themes in Dabiq Magazine

4.1 Overview

The scope of the chapter is data synthesizing in the text, articulated through a concern with the intersection of all the spatiotemporally recurrent themes appearing in all fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine. The discussion sketches a framework for examining how these semantic categories are interlinked and extend to the sociological theories, to bring out their relevance for CDA.

Keeping this multilevel research framework in the backdrop, this chapter evaluates the entire text of Dabiq Magazines (including text and images) for understanding how the contending social norms have been legitimized by *Daesh*. Themes have been crystalized keeping in view their high frequency, social significance, and the way they have recurringly appeared in all the issues. These themes have been further expanded into the chapter as part of this research.

Islamic State's ideology, when put in the context of recent secular apocalyptic movements, reveals similarities to the elements of shaping contemporary jihadism. The existential dynamics and related ideological and theological constructions driving this apocalyptic movement are the motivation behind naming this magazine Dabiq. The importance of the town named *Dabiq* and *Amaq* in the final Armageddon between believers and non-believers has been central in this choice (see e.g. Kudelin, Matrosov, & Chuprygin, 2016; Segrest, 2016).

4.2 Descriptive Content Analysis of Dabiq Magazine

Descriptive content analysis has been the topic of scholarly attention because of its approach to qualitative research and methodical simplicity. Dịnçer (2018, p. 179) contends that such analysis aims to reveal the patterns or themes, which could be calculated through frequencies and percentages, and the overall case is presented without "detailed inferences". Similarly, Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2013) point to the aim of descriptive analysis as determining the tendencies. The interpretation and syntheses in such analysis are very limited (Çalık & Sözbilir, 2014) and consequently, reaching a definite or in-depth result is very unlikely (Dịnçer, 2018). Foregoing in view, as a part of the chapter in which themes are being shortlisted for subsequent examination, this section presents a descriptive analysis of the contents of the Dabiq Magazine. Zelin (2015a) observes that the "vast majority of official media releases are in Arabic", however, to target the western audience English (Dabiq Magazine language) has been the

second most commonly used language by the Islamic State (Wignell, Tan, O'Halloran, & Lange, 2017). The overarching and main idea in every Dabiq Magazine is mentioned on the cover page in every issue. The caption on the cover page also forms part of the largest article in every issue repeated at other places in the same magazine and subsequent issues as well. One thing common in all Dabiq issues is the presence saying by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi,[4] "The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah's permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq". The Tables of Contents for all the issues have been listed as Appendix A at the end.

4.2.1 **The Return of *Khilafah***

The first issue of Dabiq Magazine coincided with the declaration of the Caliphate by the Islamic State (Dabiq-1, 2014). This periodical explained the causes of the declaration of the state and ideological issues related to 21st Century Islam. *Da'esh* ideology and future thought have been explained briefly. The publication also boasts power and success. A sudden rise of the Islamic State, followed by multiple quick successes, coerced many tribes and villages in Syria and Iraq to pledge allegiance (Arabic word *Bay'ah*) to the self-avowed caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi (e.g. Hall, 2015b; Hashim, 2014; Lamb, 2014; Rashid, 2015; Stern & Berger, 2015; Weiss & Hassan, 2015). Images from many tribes pledging allegiance have been shown in this and subsequent magazines.

The consistently recurring saying of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi (mentioned above) has also been linked to the final Armageddon and the name Dabiq. Similarly, yet another theme that emerges from Dabiq 1 is the boasting and display of power through the article "The Islamic State in the Words of Enemy", explaining in the words of scholars, intelligence officers, media, and world leaders, the sudden rise and expansion of Daesh. This theme continues in every publication of the magazine. The theme of *Hijrah*[5] has also been discussed, highlighting the importance of migrating to Islamic land where the rule of Allah is in vogue. The article on *Imamah* (leadership) also explains the reasons for selection and following Al Baghdadi as a caliph.

[4] A legendry figure in the Islamic State, usually referred as the mastermind of the creation of Daesh (see e.g. Michael, 2007)
[5] *Hijrah* is an Arabic word which means migration. This is the most recurring theme appearing in almost every issue of Dabiq.

4.2.2 **The Flood**

The concept of binary worldview allows terrorist organizations to look at the world as a division between good versus evil, the world of pure versus impure, or the world of Islam versus the world of infidels (cf Hindery, 2003; Jones, 2009; Smith, 2008). The central theme of the 2nd issue of Dabiq focuses on the story of Noah and the great flood, drawing a relationship to the 21st Century and the world (Dabiq-2, 2014). The binary worldview rejects the infidels and glorifies the believers. The articles in the issue also point to the many religious organizations shaping up in the region and the discussion on the inter-organizational alliances and enmities features prominently in this issue. Arbitration between the Islamic State and *Jabath–an–Nasra* (JaN) has also been offered in an article through a process called *Mubahalah*[6] (Islamic way of arbitration). Many articles point to the increasing military might of the Islamic State.

4.2.3 **A Call to *Hijrah***

The central theme for Dabiq Issue 3 has been a call for all devout Muslims from around the globe to migrate and join the Islamic State, which claimed to be the only place where the laws of Allah exit (Dabiq-3, 2014a). A detailed connection has been drawn between this *Hijrah* and the one carried out by Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Madina in 622 C.E. The urgency and emphasis on this call aim at beseeching religious nostalgia amongst the Muslims (Jabareen, 2015). The article "The Islamic State Before al-Malahamah[7]" is a praise for those who have already migrated to Islamic State and others who must migrate before Armageddon. In the words of Al Baghdadi, only those who have migrated to the Islamic State are doing real Jihad and there is no Jihad outside of the Islamic State. An emotional message from James Foley has been given in this magazine ending with a strong message, "I guess, all in all, I just wish I wasn't American". James Foley an American journalist and video reporter was killed by *Daesh* on the refusal of his exchange for Pakistani lady Aafia Siddiqui (Dabiq-3, 2014b). Aafia is currently serving 86 years sentence in the USA on terrorism charges (Shah, 2015), the failed negotiations for this exchange release point to *Daesh* trying to gain sympathy among Pakistanis (Abbas, 2014). It also points to Aafia's links with terrorism-related activities. Towards the end, the magazine provides three email addresses one of them in India, for all those who want to comment, respond, or contribute to Dabiq Magazine.[8] This points to the possibility of

[6] Mubahalah was an event of debate between Christians from Najran and the Holy Prophet.
[7] Malahamah means Armageddon.
[8] dabiq-is@yandex.com, dabiq-is@india.com and dabiq-is@0x300.com

(contextually) the growing influence of the Islamic State and its active allegiance in regions outside Syria and Iraq, the region of their origin.

4.2.4 **The Failed Crusade**

Constant war and the availability of growing pictorial and textual materials allow the technologically adept terrorist organizations to expand propaganda (Ingram, 2016a, 2016b). The fourth issue of Dabiq shows an upbeat tone in expansion and failed attempts by the West to defeat Islamic State. The cover image depicts Saint Peters Square in Rome with the Islamic State's flag on top points to the aspirations of conquering Rome and other Christian territories.[9] The periodical articles challenge the West through the message by Abu Muhammad Al Adnani the official spokesperson of the Islamic State (Tønnessen, 2015), but claim that any attempt to undo *Daesh* is bound to fail. The articles focus on the aggressive attitude and military might of the Islamic State. Repeated attention has been paid to multiple themes in the periodicals, pointing to the kind of ideology that is being portrayed. The frequently repetitive themes such as *Power, Stigma,* and *Hijrah* are the highlights of this issue by, the (mostly anonymous) authors of Dabiq Magazine. Topics of discussion such as slavery under Islamic jurisprudence and Jihad have also been elaborated on in this issue. The clash of civilizations (Baele, Bettiza, Boyd, & Coan, 2019) has been discussed referring to US President Bush and Zarqawi's ideas on the issue of binary worldview (Dabiq-4, 2014). The issue also features an article "Hard Talk" by John Cantlie a British journalist, held by ISIS (Cantlie, 2014). Unlike most of his fellow Islamic State captives, Cantlie has been allowed to live and write and produce documentaries for Islamic State. His articles continued to appear in subsequent issues of Dabiq as well.

4.2.5 **Remaining and Expanding**

The resilience and adaptability (Siyech, 2016) hypothesis of *Daesh* is supported by the publication, and the state-building enterprise appears to be growing in might and clout, as many Iraqi and Syrian towns continue to fall. Dabiq-5 (2014) also reveals the Islamic State's entry into the consolidation stage of its existence and expansion. Deceleration of *Bay'ah* (pledging allegiance) by multiple groups from around the world (cf Byman, 2016; Wood, 2015) including Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, Sinai, Libya, and Algeria certainly give a great boost to Islamic State. The issuance of its distinct "gold" and "silver" currency (Dabiq-5, 2014, pp. 18-19) has been a milestone achievement. Similarly, articles discussing the establishment of the Islamic financial market and the corrupt Western financial system also form part of this issue. Themes

[9] Notably, this aspiration was revealed by replacing Dabiq Magazine with Rumiyah (e.g. Wignell et al., 2017)

of power, theological knowledge (Juergensmeyer, 2018), and *Hijrah* have been reiterated in multiple passages.

4.2.6 **Al Qaeda of Waziristan A Testimony from Within**

In Dabiq-6 (2014/2015) Islamic State makes a direct attempt at expanding its ideology through the publication of a full-length article regarding the Waziristan region of Pakistan. In a quest to win an ideological expansion multiple terrorist organizations have been competing (Styszynski, 2014), to win over the affiliates in softer and relatively ungoverned regions (Khan & Siddiqua, 2018; Mumtaz, 2016). The friction between ISIS and other religious terrorist organizations has been a significant development, with the former trying to take the global lead in controlling the global terrorism activities surpassing Al- Qaida (Zelin, 2014). The article on Waziristan is one link in the chain of events.

The repeated theme of *Hijrah* has been slightly altered by the Islamic State, as the articles in this magazine motivate its loyalists to stay in their countries and conduct attacks. This points to the possibility of hurting the (infidel) West through homegrown terrorism (Chaliand & Blin, 2016; Speckhard, 2015). A more noticeable advancement is the Islamic State's valuable pool of determined recruits from across the globe. These recruits continue to strike targets in their home countries and one can notice an increase in such attacks in France and Belgium (Brisard & Jackson, 2016)in early 2014, and Dabiq-6 (2014/2015) also conceitedly claims responsibility for the Sydney attack. The content description for Dabiq-6 (2014/2015) is attached as Appendix A.

4.2.7 **From Hypocrisy to Apostasy**

The post 9/11 binary world view as declared by Bush, "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists (Hirsh, 2002), has been an inspiration for Islamic State guiding their ideology. The publication of the article emphasizing, "Islam is a religion of the sword, not pacifism" (Dabiq-7, 2015, pp. 20-24), labels those who think of Islam as a religion of peace as "deviants". Prevalence of an anti-religious sentiment and Islamophobia (Akbarzadeh, 2016; Kedikli & Akça, 2018) got strengthened after such claims by ISIS.

Based on the extremist ideology, Islamic State continues to repeat the dominance of faith (Salafism), the need for a revival of the ancient Muslim legacy through *Hijrah*, and the unity of Muslims (Atwan, 2015). The textual and pictorial violence in this issue has been highlighted by the Declaration of war against Japan, and the reasons for the burning alive of Jordanian pilot

Mu'adh Al Kasasbah (Ganor, 2015; Helfont, 2015). has been reasoned with stern warnings to the world in general and Muslim countries in particular. Drawing on the religious scriptures and many other sources including Muslim historiography, Islamic State, and the supreme redeemer have formulated a subjective ontological and epistemological cosmos (Ali, 2015). On the one hand, Dabiq continues to uphold the reconceptualized and reconfigured need for human dignity, while it continues to use crude language to demean/dehumanize and stigmatize its enemies, on the other. The literal application of these linguistic tools has been turned into a violent jihad against the non-believers. Jihad and martyrdom have been glorified by the publication of a series of (mostly obituaries) for those who are killed fighting for ISIS ideology titled, "Among the Believers are Men" (Dabiq-7, 2015, pp. 46-49).

4.2.8 *Shari'ah* Alone Will Rule Africa

By this time Islamic State was facing some serious resistance in Iraq and Syria and had started losing some important towns, however, the scholarship argues that the affiliates of this organization will continue to exist globally (Massé, 2020). The strategic aims of ISIS continue unabetted, as the affiliated terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram in Nigeria continue to pledge allegiance (Siegle & Williams, 2017). The glorification of attacks in Libya and Tunisia and disturbing child soldiers (see, for example, Almohammad, 2018; Nyamutata, 2020) discourse also form part of Dabiq-8 (2015). A detailed and religiously technical discussion has been done on *Irja*[10] in the article "*Irja'* the Most Dangerous *Bid'ah*". Inter-organizational rifts, resulting in breaking away from other similar organizations have been an extensively existential phenomenon. Scholarship posits that Al-Qaeda was the parent organization of ISIS (Celso, 2015), however, scores of small and large religious and political organizations continue to fight a territorial war, recruiting hundreds from around the globe and then returning them as hardened veterans (Byman, 2015). The articles in Dabiq-8 (2015) discuss the departure of the Islamic State from other organizations such as Al Qaeda and Jabhat-an-Nusra (Anzalone, 2016) and blame their nationalistic and pro (Western) democratic leaning in the article titled "The Allies of Al-Qaid'ah in Sham"[11] (Dabiq-8, 2015, pp. 7-11). Further, the appointment of leaders in different governorates (*Wilayat)*[12] around the world reveals the increasing influence. In the

[10] *Irja* has been referred as the delay in acting like a Muslim even after one accepts Islam. Islamic state desires the action on all pillars of Islam to start immediately, some scholars in Islam allow for some delay in complete understanding of religion, before the action starts. *Bid'ah* is an innovation in a religious concept. Usually this is discouraged as a practice.
[11] The articles in same series and title appear in next three issues.
[12] Governorate.

series of articles by John Cantlie[13], the paradigm shift has been highlighted by the author praising (his captives), who further pointed to the existence and expansion of the Islamic State in Western societies' reactive policies. One can observe the ISIS fear in Western societies and politics (Levine, 2018). For example, General John Allan, the commander of coalition forces against ISIS in Iraq, admitted in an interview at Aljazeera (2015), that it might take many years or even decades before ISIS can be defeated and destroyed. The expanding military might/power, besides *Hijrah* and Stigma continue to recur in this issue as well.

4.2.9 **They Plot and Allah Plots**

As mentioned earlier the Islamic State's epistemological assertions draw heavily from the ancient text, scriptures, and earlier Islamic scholarship, and target women for recruitment (Ali, 2015). In Dabiq-9 (2015), Islamic State reiterates the superiority of laws ordained by Allah. The followers of ISIS in the Western countries are being repeatedly advised to conduct"lone-wolf attacks" (Barton, 2015 p. 142), in their home countries. ISIS has been portraying itself as a hybrid organization, pursuing multi-pronged strategies, and calling on its affiliates to fight till the revival of the Islamic caliphate. Other articles continue to defame and stigmatize their enemies using labels such as "dogs" (Dabiq-9, 2015, p. 55). Dabiq continues to make the argument against Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria and the reasons for their separate agendas. Those fighting for Islamic State have been glorified by the virtue and practice of *Ribat*[14]. Islamic State also refutes the claim that it was initially established with the help of the West, non-believers, or some Muslim kingdoms from the Middle East. They propound it as *Shirk*[15] and declare that under no circumstances the state would ally with the tyrant leaders of the Muslim world and the west. Out of the few articles authored by women, Umm Sumayyah argues in favor of sexual slavery under Islamic rule. Her articles on other issues relating to women appear in subsequent Dabiq issues as well. The dehumanization and stigmatizing theme of the enemy women appears in her articles for example US First Lady Michelle Obama, posits, " And who knows, maybe Michelle Obama's price won't even exceed a third of a dinar, and a third of dinar is too much for her!" (Dabiq-9, 2015, p. 49).

[13] One among the earliest four captives of ISIS, the other three including James Foley, Steven Sotloff and Kinji Goto were beheaded (Ubayasiri, 2017).
[14] A small retreat or a fortress built for temporary rest of soldiers before they can go back and resume their duties on the fighting front.
[15] In Arabic it means to equate someone to Allah, a sin that will never be pardoned by Allah.

4.2.10 **The Laws of Allah or the Laws of Men**

Islamic State continues to claim responsibility for the lone-wolf attacks in the West (Shehabat, Mitew, & Alzoubi, 2017) and Dabiq-10 (2015) makes similar claims for simultaneous attacks in Kuwait, France, and Tunisia (Vick, 2015). Related to Pakistan (and Afghanistan), Islamic State issues a detailed *Fatwa*[16] for Khurasan. This Fatwa negates the notion that Mullah Omar or anyone other than Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi has any right to be the caliph or Muslim leader. This Fatwa points to the continuous cyclical relationship between ISIS and many other similar organizations oscillating between conflict-cooperation (Ibrahimi & Akbarzadeh, 2019).

Additionally, this issue invites the devout Muslims from around the globe to perform *Hijrah* to the Islamic State. The article targeting women by Umm Sumayya, advises the women to convince their husbands to join ISIS, failing which the marriage would be annulled. Fresh recruitments in Afghanistan (Khurasan) and allegiance from the Caucasus are some of the highlights of the Islamic State's territorial achievements.

4.2.11 **From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions**

The Battle of Ahzab refers to the Battle in the life of Holy Prophet Mohammad alongside his young forces against a coalition of Meccan tribes. *Daesh* has equated that war with their struggle for survival. The creation of this contextual similarity is an effort to gain sympathies from the target audience favoring ISIS.

The Stigmatization and hatred against Shias are repeated in this issue and the article refers to Imam Mahdi (Shias leader, as per their belief will reappear before the end of times to unify all Muslims) as *Dajjal*[17]. Islamic State's hatred ofShia has been referred to by some scholars as a genocide that is under-represented in the scholarship (Hawley, 2018). Although, Shia and Jews conflict, yet, in a flawed understanding, Islamic State claims a nexus between Jews and Shias (Dabiq-11, 2015a).

Similarly, articles relating to technical reasoning on issues of *Taqlid*[18], and *Wala'* and *Bara'*[19] form part of this issue of Dabiq. In a rather callous depiction of the famous image of Syrian

[16] An official ruling given by a competent Islamic scholar.
[17] False Christ as per Islamic theology likely to appear before the end of times.
[18] To follow. Usually referred as blind following of the peers, elders, forefathers etc. without validation.
[19] Faithfulness and denial. The concept that choice of our love and hatred should be same as that ordered by Allah. We should befriend those whom Allah orders and rest everyone is an enemy.

child Aylan Kurdi (Iftikhar, 2018b), who washed ashore on the Bodrum beech of Turkey(Smith, 2015), Islamic State warns all those trying to flee their territory of fatal consequences.

The article by Umm Sumayyah, advises Muslim women to take care of their jihadi sons and husbands who are part of the Islamic State. In another article, two images of a Norwegian and a Chinese captive appear in this issue as full-page ads, putting them up for sale (Dabiq-11, 2015b). The appearance of contact phone numbers (with Iraq area code) to *purchase* these two individuals as a "limited time offer", shows the stronghold of the Islamic State over the territory.

4.2.12 **Just Terror**

After the longest inter-publication gap of almost 101 days, this issue appears with multiple recurring themes, and a continuation of previous articles by Cantlie, stigmatizing the enemies of ISIS and inviting Muslims to perform *Hijrah* (Dabiq-12, 2015). This issue also claims responsibility for twin-bombing at Beirut (Kareem, 2015), attacks in Paris (Phipps & Rawlinson, 2015), and, the downing of the Russian plane (Topham, Weaver, & Luhn, 2015) as a retaliation for Russian attacks against the Islamic State. The issue is full of routine Islamic State propaganda and pages have been dedicated to boasting about the video releases as the top 10 videos.

The regular article by Umm Sumayyah appears to explain the Muslim women to allow their Jihadi husbands, multiple wives. Repeated themes such as *Hijrah*, Power and knowledge, and stigma form part of this issue.

4.2.13 **The Rafidah[20]: From Ibn Sa'ba[21] to the Dajjal**

Dabiq-13 (2016) contains the title page theme of anti-Shia discussions, throughout the longest article. The foreword praises San Bernardino shooting by a Muslim couple that killed 14 people (Richard, Paloma, & Richard, 2015). The famous British turned "Jihadi John" (Verkaik, 2016) receives a detailed obituary like many others who are killed in the cause of the Islamic State. The issue of *Ihdad* [22] has also been explained to the wives of those who are killed fighting for the Islamic State. The issue contains a detailed interview with Wali of Khurasan (e.g. Ibrahimi & Akbarzadeh, 2019; Waseem, 2016) Hafiz Saeed Khan highlights the territorial expansionist

[20] A pejorative term used for Shia sect of Islam by the Islamic State.
[21] Abdullah Ibn Sa'ba is considered as one of the most controversial figures of Islamic history. He is said to be behind Muslims' division into Shia and Sunni sects.
[22] Mourning the dead husband.

ideology of Islamic State's in the region. The Wali was later killed by a US drone strike on July 26, 2016 (Iftikhar, 2016). Using the demeaning and stigmatizing rhetoric, Dabiq-13 (2016) many articles demean Pakistan, Pakistan Army, and General Hamid Gul, among many Islamic organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

4.2.14 **The *Murtadd* Brotherhood**

The title page and the articles in Dabiq-14 (2016) demean *Ikhwan al Muslimeen* the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Farahat, 2017) as apostates. Quoting references from the leaders of the Brotherhood they have challenged the ideology of the organization and labeled it as un-Islamic. Praise and acceptance of responsibility for the Brussels airport attacks (Rubin, Breeden, & Raghavan, 2016) are part of this issue as an achievement. An article has been dedicated to motivating Daesh followers in the West to kill all those who claim to be Muslim leaders but do not ascribe to the Islamic State's ideology title, "Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West" (Dabiq-14, 2016, pp. 8-17). The motivational letter written by a Bangladeshi citizen Abu Jandal Al Bangali, who migrated to Islamic State merits attention, besides the recurring themes emphasized in the previous issues.

4.2.15 **Breaking the Cross**

The final issue Dabiq-15 (2016) repeats the aspirations to capture the Christian Rome, break the crosses, and replace it with the Islamic rule of law. Unlike the previous issues, the deviants have been labeled as infidels, apostates, and non-Muslims. Additionally, this magazine targets the Christian audience to convert them to Islam (Lakomy, 2019b). By stigmatizing secularism, democracy, and Christianity, the magazine is full of anti-Christian propaganda. The sections on "why we hate you and fight you" reason Islamophobia, hatred, and disrespect for Islam in the west. This final issue of Dabiq prominently features the story of a woman from Finland converting to Islam and her reasons for leaving her country titled, "How I came to Islam" (Dabiq-15, 2016, pp. 36-39).

4.3 **Crystalizing the Themes: Synthesizing Descriptive Analysis with Theme selection and computational Methodological Approaches**

As a distinctive methodology adopted for crystalizing themes, an analysis of the magazines was conducted by repeated textual examination and recording the salient of the recurrent themes. Additionally, data in Portable Document Format (PDF) from all published magazines was converted to clean text documents for computer processing. Although the computer programs

allow processing of the PDF files, however, to eliminate the errors accruing due to the presence of tertiary grammatical and semantic occurrences such as page numbers, page header/footers, and signs/symbols and Arabic words. These clean text documents were then processed using two different computational options, mentioned below.

Firstly, the data was put into Web Frequency Indexer[23], thus obtaining the frequency of each word within a particular Issue of Dabiq, and finally, word frequency in all the 15 issues combined. The idea of temporally spanned clustering of magazines for Word Frequency Indexer was discarded for two reasons; (1) due to irregularity in publication frequency of Dabiq Magazine; and (2) the magazine uses the Islamic Hijri Calendar (Leaman, 2002) and themes continue to permeate into subsequent issues because of irregular publication timelines (see Appendix A).

The results from the Word Frequency Indexer were further processed using an Excel spreadsheet. Many functional words, determiners, conjunctions, prepositions, auxiliary verbs, and qualifiers were deleted (cf Campbell & Pennebaker, 2003; Pennebaker, 2011; Shea, 2015), to reduce clutter in the thematic choice. The resultant data was also processed alphabetically with the frequency mentioned with each word for ease of search and analysis. Words impacting particular themes were then clustered together from all issues of the magazine, and coded under a singular theme. The frequency of these coded words was recorded, and graphs were initiated, which will form part of the theme data chapters. The coding scheme and word clusters were then added for further substantiation of the results.

Secondly, the clean text documents from each magazine were also processed through a different computer program to form the Word Cluster Clouds using Word Cloud.[24] Aimed at gaining two objectives, this data processing was helpful in: (1) by showing the size of a particular word corresponding to the frequency (higher the frequency larger the size of the word in the cloud), it was visually comprehensible to know the dominant visual semantic choices; and (2) it allowed the synthesis of these semantic choices with the similar crystallized choices through the previous three methods i.e. descriptive analysis, repeated examination of all issues of Dabiq Magazine and processing through word Frequency Indexer. Methodologically, such synthesis was instrumental in streamlining themes, while dropping others for CDA. The only limitation of

[23] Computer Program at http://www.lextutor.ca/freq/eng/ , accessed multiple times during the months of June, July and August 2016.
[24] Computer program at http://www.wordclouds.com/#, accessed multiple times during the months of June, July and August 2016.

this process has been the absence of a cloud for combined (all fifteen issues) data analysis, due to the large data size.

To sum it up, all fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine contained a total of 386,987 words permeating into multiple themes. This large corpus has been categorized into themes to methodologically appropriate it with the CDA methodology. Themes including *Hijrah*, *Stigma, Power/knowledge, Brutality*, and *statehood (Caliphate)* have been finally crystallized. These themes, include the text as well as images and will be critically analyzed in the ensuing chapters.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a multifaceted and multidisciplinary approach to critical discourse analysis by crystallizing the themes. It examined the contents of all the issues following the theory of descriptive analysis (e.g. Cohen et al., 2013; Dịnçer, 2018), to reveal the patterns and themes without presenting a detailed inference and analysis. Dabiq text was then processed using multiple computer software to substantiate the findings of the previous analysis. Drawing from the discussion on how CDA could be appropriately adapted for CDA of these themes, multiple approaches were then synthesized, and the final themes were crystallized. Further, a combination of multiple approaches sets out to address the absence of a unified methodology, "direction of research" (Dijk, 2001c, pp. 95-120), and historicism in CDA (Talib, 2015). Data concerning all these themes will be presented in Chapters 6 to 10, and the data analysis chapter will critically analyze the manifestation of these themes.

Chapter 5: Data Text Selections: Dabiq Magazine 2014 – 2016

5.1 Overview

Chapter 5 presents the data texts appearing in the Islamic concept of *Hijrah* or migration (Elmadmad, 2008; Iftikhar, 2017a), recurrence of stigma, projection of power, violence, and brutality, and the statehood. The chapter aims to present the data as to how between 2014 and 2016, *Daesh* has revived and operationalized these ancient religious traditions, and concepts of Islamic statehood and dispensed the power through extensive religious references and the frequent appearance of all the crystallized themes in Dabiq Magazine.

5.2 Theme 1: *Hijrah*

A majority of the Islamic State media releases, in print, video, or soft form are in the Arabic language, however, Dabiq Magazine is the most authentic English language publication associated with Islam (Wignell et al., 2017). The text for *Hijrah* has been taken from Dabiq Magazines published by Daesh between 2014 and 2016. These magazines were thematically analyzed and multiple themes were crystallized for discourse analysis as mentioned in Chapter 4. Theme *Hijrah* is one of the major recurring themes in the Dabiq Magazine generating discourse that influenced the foundations of the Islamic State as an entity, the wars they have waged within the Middle East, and multiple attacks against western targets such as the attack in France and Belgium and other parts of the world.



Graph 5.1: Frequency of Theme *Hijrah* in Dabiq Magazine (2014-2016)

As represented in Graph 5.1 above, is the temporal representation of this recurring theme. Word *Hijrah* appears 286 times in all 15 issues. The cover page for the third issue is entirely focused on *Hijrah*. This theme, due to its complexity and empiricism based on religious text and historical influences, will be analyzed in Chapter 6. While doing the detailed analysis in the latter part of the research, an account of the true context of *Hijrah* will be provided.

5.3 **Theme 2: Stigma**

The labels, name-calling, stigmatizing, branding, slurring, and defaming of other groups, religions, individuals, and virtually everyone not ascribing to the point of view of ISIS, is predominantly a recurring theme in all issues of the magazine. To understand and present for subsequent analysis, the lexical choices made by Islamic State have been combined, categorized and their frequencies have been tabulated. In the first, 'Un-Islamic' category cluster of words and their variants such as *Murtadd*[25], *Shirk*, *Mushrik*[26], *Munafiq*[27], *Kufr*[28], Apostasy, Infidel, pagan, Hypocrite, and all those referred as worshipping Devil, Fire, Grave, Cross, idol, and Cow by the Islamic State. In the second, 'Animals' category, the words used to dehumanize the enemies of ISIS have been mentioned as animals have been placed into this category. The words include Dog, Donkey, Vulture, Sheep, Cow, and Chicken. The third, 'Politico-religious' categorization stigmatizes their enemies on politico-religious grounds the derogatory words used by Dabiq include *Safawi*[29], *Dajjal*[30], Rafidah[31], *Nusayri*[32], Jew, Crusade, and *Al-Lat*[33]. In the fourth category, 'Character/cognition' is the focus of stigma in Dabiq Magazine, and certain pejorative words include Drunkard, Druggy, Filth, Sodomite, Spiteful, Wicked, Lie/Liar, Evil, and Fool. In the final category, the Islamic State to dehumanize their enemies usually supplementing the other categories, and sometimes as a standalone stigma by referring to them as 'Satan, Slave of *Taghut*. The categorized frequency of the stigmatizing labels/words

[25] One who turns back from Islam (Newby, 2002, p. 158).
[26] Polytheist, a person who equates others to Allah (Newby, 2002, p. 160).
[27] Hypocrite (Afandi, 2017).
[28] To conceal, denial of truth, ungrateful to Allah (Newby, 2002, p. 129).
[29] Safavid (Allouche, 1983), used for Iranians in Dabiq text.
[30] The antichrist (Saritoprak, 2003).
[31] Rejectionists (DeLong-Bas, 2017), used to replace word Shia in Dabiq text.
[32] Alawi sect of Shia Islam in Syria (Talhamy, 2010),used for Assad Regime in Dabiq text.
[33] One of the three most venerated deities in pre-Islamic Arabia (Jobling, 2018), amongst 360 others. Newby (2002, p. 130) points that she along with her sister deities *Manat* and *Uzza* were placed in *Ka'bah*. *Hezbollah* a Shia religious group of Lebanon and Syria, has been labelled as *Hezb-al-Lat* in Dabiq text.

occurring in fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazines has been summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below:

Un-Islamic			Politico-Religious	
Murtadd	388		Safawi	111
Apostasy	650		Dajjal	72
Shirk/Infidel	150		Rafidah	202
Mushrik	139		Nusayri	167
Munafiq	33		Jew	284
Kufr/Kafir	521		Crusade	718
Hypocrisy	263		Al-Lat	2
Pagan	97			
Worshipping (Devil, Fire, Grave, Cross, idol, Cow)	65			

Table 5.1: Stigmatizing Labels in Dabiq Magazine 2014-2016

Character/Cognition			Animals Labels	
			Dog	8
Sodomite	44		Donkey	7
Drunkard/Druggy	18		Vulture	1
Filth	35		Sheep	24
Spiteful	37		Chicken	1
Wicked	33		**Others**	
Lie/Liar	145		Satan/Devil	121
Evil	182		Taghut	444
Fool/Clown	39		Slave	155

Table 5.2: Stigmatizing Labels in Dabiq Magazine 2014-2016

5.4 Theme 3: Knowledge/Power

The linguistic choices of Dabiq magazine have been noted to assert power, aggression, and coercion besides the adoption of internet language to entice the youth and affiliates towards a continuous loyalty (Vergani & Bliuc, 2015b). Similarly, Droogan and Peattie (2017) observe that the magazine is engaged in the manipulation of group-level identities, and consistently boasts its power by publishing the accounts of their victories and ideological expansion, besides allegiances from around the globe. The ideological expansion is achieved indirectly by acceptance of *bay'ah*[34], allowing repentance, promises, and slogans of spreading the influence and geography of the Islamic State to appear repeatedly interspersed across all the issues. Similarly, the use of certain derogatory terms and coercive/assertive intentions can be seen in

[34] Pledge allegiance.

almost every issue, used primarily to assert the influence and increasing physical strength of the Islamic State. The magazine with a global outreach certainly transcended national and regional boundaries and served to support the Islamic State's military strategy, fluctuating alliances, and strategic direction.

In a series of articles appearing in every Dabiq Magazine "In the Words of Enemy" special clippings from world leaders and influential personalities have been quoted and analyzed to show the physical power and spreading influence of Daesh around the globe. Similarly, "operations by Islamic State" give the reader an update on all the areas captured and operations conducted by ISIS. Although they have lost ground and battles on multiple occasions, not even once have they admitted defeat or the loss, which is a classic character of robust propaganda and has been used historically (Bytwerk, 1978).

The themes of power and knowledge to legitimize the power, span, and prevail in the background of all other themes. By so doing, the Islamic State legitimizes its actions and discourses. Looking at the theme of knowledge coupled with power, for this research, however, the primary focus is not the validation/falsification of *Daesh* claims based on a religious text, references, names, hadith, Quranic Verses (whether or not taken out of context), the followers of a particular sect, imam, or a religious figure, scholar or any other ideas based on religious grounds. However, a large number of Quranic citations (over 700), besides references from Islamic history, and Hadith have been used to promote jihadist ideology. Some of these references have been the 'cut-and-paste' versions 'cherry-picked' have been appropriated with the argument. In Dabiq Magazine Quran has been used in an "atomistic, truncated, and tailored manner to bolster the religious legitimacy (Frissen, Toguslu, Van Ostaeyen, & d'Haenens, 2018). The development of an argument based on a belief system or religious citation makes for excellent propaganda material in favor of the Islamic State and gives a clear edge to writers in putting across a well-developed logical thought, more than sufficient to satiate the rhetorical believers. This religious textual and historical knowledge certainly gives the Islamic State great power accrued through knowledge. As mentioned in Appendix A (the tables of contents for all magazines), Dabiq Magazine repeatedly focuses on the theological justification in inspiring its followers for violence, and the organization also promotes a sense of belonging and gives meaning to the society envisioned by the Islamic State. ISIS also establishes a common enemy in the west and Muslim apostates across the world referring to them as taghut. Finally, many articles also centralize the theme of inspiration and empowering individual violent actions

(Welch, 2018). Similarly, to add an inspirational aspect to the publications and to target a Western audience, a British prisoner held by Daesh named John Cantlie (Dabiq-5, 2014; Dabiq-6, 2014/2015; Dabiq-7, 2015), has written multiple articles on different issues of Dabiq. He was also part of multiple documentaries for the Islamic State (Galvan-Alvarez, 2018), and his words coupled with propaganda make engaging articles.

5.5 Theme 4: Brutality

A sizable scholarship argues that pictures and videos are the major sources of ISIS propaganda. Baele, Boyd, and Coan (2019) argue that ISIS released 1278 unique and fully edited videos between Dec 2014 and January 2017. Another report by Winter (2015) claims the release of more than 14,500 single photographs and 1787 fully edited, formally arranged image-based reports. Similarly, Milton (2016) posits that between January 2015 and July 2016, ISIS released 875 videos. Resultantly, Zelin (2015a) concludes that images/photos are quantitatively the most important output of the propaganda strategy and the photo reports form 63% to 78% of the ISIS publications (however, Winter (2015) arrives at 61%). Such a high ratio of image articles and photographs merits a critical visual analysis. Consequently, 1095 images (Tan, O'Halloran, Wignell, Chai, & Lange, 2018), from Dabiq Magazine have been selected for examination in this research in the analysis chapter.

5.6 Theme 5: Statehood (Caliphate)

ISIS has been expanding its geographical area of influence and creating new geo-strategic zones to spread its ideology. The achievement of these transformations has largely been the result of the collaboration with the regional terrorist organizations. Pakistan has not been the key focus of Dabiq Magazine, but due to the expansion of the Islamic State's ideological outreach, the entire Greater Middle Eastern region (cf Güney & Gökcan, 2010; Zahid, 2020) and the periphery has been marred by terrorism. The prevalence of terrorism in Pakistan in the same spatiotemporal frame made it vulnerable to the adoption of *Daesh's* ideology. "Pakistan" has been mentioned as a direct reference in multiple places in Dabiq Magazine as shown in Graph 5.2 below.



Graph 5.2: References to Pakistan in Dabiq Magazine (2014-2016)

In the regional context, ISIS declared the Khurasan region as a governorate or *Wilayat* (Lavoix, 2017), and has been part of early publications of Dabiq Magazine. The frequency of discussion about this region is shown in graph 5.3 below and will be part of the statehood analysis in this research.



Graph 5.3: References to Khurasan in Dabiq Magazine (2014-2016)

5.7 **Summary**

To explore the subtle complexities of recurring themes and how the Islamic State has threaded the publication through different issues, this chapter employed the data selection on the themes that have been crystallized in the previous chapter. These themes are instrumental in understanding the ISIS ideology and the causes for their conflict with other organizations, countries, the West, and all those not ascribing to their brand of religious society. The themes will be subjected to a fluid three-level fluid and interactional grid to examine their interconnection, intersection, and deconstruction. United at the same background i.e., Dabiq Magazine, these themes are of particular salience to understanding the rapid dispensation of ideological and religious domains by the Islamic State across the globe. The data in this chapter indicates how quickly this organization adapted to the changing environment and in certain cases, the immediate response to the international developments was published in the next issue (Iftikhar, 2018b). As the further analysis will indicate, this also reveals the organizational ability to keep a keen eye on the military and geopolitical developments across the world and adopt the changes.

Chapter 6: Analysis – Theme *Hijrah*

6.1 Overview

This chapter aims to examine how between 2014 and 2016, *Daesh* has revived and operationalized this ancient religious tradition of migration known as *Hijrah* (cf Elmadmad, 2008; Iftikhar, 2017a), and what impact did it have on Middle Eastern Refugee discourse. Also, to create relatively new knowledge, how can we conduct a discourse analysis of *Hijrah* discourse within the given context. Finally, what kind of assumptions does this methodology (Foucauldian Discourse Analysis) make about the world we live in, concerning *Hijrah*?
Such an analysis is important to understand how the ideologizing work is influenced through the discourse of *Hijrah* taking into account the political, economic, demographic, and social factors, besides the historicity and evolution of *Hijrah,* were capitalized by *Daesh* discourse. Moreover, the absence of ideological response both by the Muslim and non-Muslim countries created a crisis, shifting the traditional global response of "state responsibility" to "individual accountability" (Verkaik, 2016), which further facilitated ISIS in attracting fighters. This allowed ISIS to create reality through discourse and subjects through ideology. Resultantly, the philosophical position taken here for discourse analysis is based on relativist ontology and interpretivist epistemology, which assumes that reality as we know it, is constructed intersubjectively through the meanings and understandings developed socially and experientially (Bryman, 2012). As explained in Chapter 3 (see section 3.4), Foucauldian Discourse Analysis will be used as the analytical tool for this chapter.

The word *Hijrah* and its derivatives have appeared 286 times in all fifteen issues of Dabiq. Besides expanding the traditional religious concepts of *Hijrah*, ISIS has added to the authenticity and legality of this discourse by using religious text (cf Gambhir, 2014; Toguslu, 2019; Welch, 2018) including the Quran and Hadith, and publication of testimonials from fighters, martyrs and affiliates from around the world.

For this analysis, all fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine were studied with a focus on *Hijrah* as it appeared in each issue. (The text for *Hijrah* has been taken from Dabiq Magazines published by Daesh between 2014 and 2016, as explained in Chapter 5). The relevant excerpts were then taken for the text concerning this theme. Consequently, a crucial starting point for the analysis was Foucault's work on discursive construction (Olsson, 2007). While a discourse (*Hijrah* in

this case) can be conceptualized as an abstract, theoretical construction, Foucault highlighted that all the discourses are inextricably tied to a particular context in the sociohistorical domain and cannot be understood in isolation. For Foucault, there is "no universal understanding that is beyond history and society". (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984, p. 4). Using the discursive construction *Hijrah* discourse, this theme has been analyzed in six stages.

6.2 Stages – Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

6.2.1 Discursive Constructions

In this stage, the construction of discursive objects was carried out through the identification of relevant passages of text. Identified in Chapters 4 and 5, and informed by the research questions, this research considers *Hijrah* as the discursive object. The text was analyzed to find out the approaches in the construction of *Hijrah* as a discourse. *Hijrah* as a discursive object has been seen and examined not as a keyword, but rather as the inclusion of implicit and explicit references to it. The absence of *Hijrah* as a direct reference in the text also reveals the discursive object, since it has a direct bearing on promoting and explaining the allied religious concepts such as *Jihad* (See Section 1.3)*, Bay'ah, Imamah*, (See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1), and caliphate, besides knowledge/power (Foucault, 1980b). Therefore, the shared meanings are equally important when looking at lexical comparability. For example, *Hijrah* has been linked to *Bay'ah* and *Bay'ah* has further been linked to *Jihad*, at instances without mentioning the discursive object *Hijrah*. Instances of linking *Hijrah* directly to *Jihad* can also be noticed while in other occurrences, *Bay'ah* has been mentioned as a sufficient reason and natural course for *Jihad*. This complex, and intertwined lexical and conceptual conjuration was deciphered through this analysis. As a first step, in this stage of analysis, the textual contribution will be mentioned that has helped create *Hijrah* as the discursive object. *Hijrah* has been referred to in multiple ways and behaves diversely throughout the text. Islamic State's conceptualization of *Hijrah* has been explained as an act of moving from the infidel lands to the land where *Shari'ah* law is the only acceptable law that is Islamic State (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 24). *Hijrah* has also been defined as something that is a religious obligation and promoted as something that has been a prophetic ritual and tradition(Dabiq-3, 2014b, p. 10). It has also been applied as a historical reference however, in contradiction to the overarching desire for devout Muslims from around the world to migrate to Islamic State, it has also been (correctly) admitted by *Daesh* that *Hijrah* was performed and ended by Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) (Dabiq-3, 2014a, p. 11).

Hijrah as per *Daesh* is an irreversible process and anyone who goes back to his native land after performing *Hijrah* stands expelled from the religion of Islam (Dabiq-11, 2015a, p. 23). Dabiq's text lays out the plan of action, Islamic State stated very clearly the reasons and aspired outcomes of performing *Hijrah*. remained linked to *Bay'ah* and *Jihad.* Moreover, the ideology of *Hijrah* has been glorified as it was conducted not only by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) but by the prophets of almost all the monotheist religions (Iftikhar, 2017a). It is also obligatory for those who migrate to perform *Bay'ah*, to fulfill further obligations.

In Foucauldian conception of a society (which Islamic State) is formulated through text, discourses, individuals, ideas, and institutions, with each "node" having a varying degree of impact, on the overall discourse (of *Hijrah*). Therefore, the discourse is tied to society and is seen in the same context. The discourse explicitly targets the people from specific professions such as doctors, scholars, engineers, and other professionals to come to Islamic State to fulfill the needs of such professionals, facilitating the smooth functioning of the state (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 11). *Hijrah* is something that the Islamic State fears, will be resisted by the infidel states around the globe, therefore, it is obligatory on the aspiring Muslims to keep their intentions secret and if needed they could deceive others to fulfill this act (Dabiq-3, 2014a, p. 33). Therefore, it is possible and encouraged that anyone who wants to perform *Hijrah* could conceal, deceive, and cheat in fulfillment of this obligation. As an extension of the discourse, those who cannot perform *Hijrah* to Islamic State, and find appropriate opportunities to kill or cause violence in their home countries are encouraged to do so (Dabiq-7, 2015, p. 51), and have been referred to as "an opportunity for noble deeds" (Dabiq-11, 2015a, p. 54). Finally, *Hijrah* has been something like a building block, to help *Da'esh* in process of revival of the age-old tradition of the establishment of one Islamic caliphate, with a single caliph, *Amir-ul-Momineen* also referred to as *Imam* (Dabiq-1, 2014; Dabiq-3, 2014a; Dabiq-4, 2014; Dabiq-7, 2015).

6.2.2 **Discourse in *Hijrah***

After examining all the instances of the text in Dabiq Magazine that contributed to the discursive construction of *Hijrah*, differences between all the constructions were identified. This helped in locating various discursive constructions of *Hijrah* (object), within the wider discourse of *Hijrah*. These variations are understood as multiple strings, strands, or fragments of the same dominant discursive object – *Hijrah*. For example, in Dabiq Magazine, multiple ways of constructing this object can be distinctly identified. *Hijrah* has been proposed as a prophetic concept to invite maximum believers to follow the footsteps of Prophet Ibrahim (Dabiq-1,

2014), it has also been coupled with the concepts of *Bay'ah* and Jihad (Dabiq-1, 2014; Dabiq-3, 2014a; Dabiq-6, 2014/2015; Dabiq-7, 2015; Dabiq-9, 2015; Dabiq-11, 2015a; Dabiq-12, 2015; Dabiq-13, 2016).

Hijrah has also been constructed through motivational speeches, and texts and hyped with the help of martyr statements and final wills, *Daesh* leaders, and glorious acts of terrorism by a small group of devout young men and women in the non-Islamic lands (Dabiq-3, 2014a; Dabiq-4, 2014; Dabiq-13, 2016; Dabiq-14, 2016).

Discussion on *Dar-al-Harb* and *Dar-al-Islam* has also been used for the construction of this discursive object to explain the religiosity of the concept (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 36). Going back to the home country is not permissible after *Hijrah* has been performed and, anyone committing this "sin" and such a person becomes a *Murtadd* (Dabiq-11, 2015a, p. 23). The resistance to such a return to the Western lands serves two purposes for ISIS.

Extract 6.1: Reward for *Hijrah*

Line	Extract
1	"Are you not aware that Islam wipes out all previous sins? And that *hijrah* wipes
2	out all previous sins? And that hajj wipes out all previous sins?"
3	Therefore, every Muslim professional who delayed his jihad in the past under the
4	pretense of studying *Shari'ah*, medicine, or engineering, etc., claiming he would
5	contribute to Islam later with his expertise, should now make his number one
6	priority to repent and answer the call to *hijrah*, especially after the establishment
7	of *Khilafah*. This *Khilafah* is more in need than ever before for experts,
8	professionals, and specialists, who can help contribute to strengthening its structure
9	and tending to the needs of their Muslim brothers. Otherwise, his claims will
10	become greater proof against him on Judgment Day (Dabiq-3, 2014a, pp. 23-26).

Extract 6.1 above shows the Islamic State in immediate need of Muslim professionals to perform *Hijrah*. A specific Hadith has been chosen from *Sahih Bukhari*, claiming that all the previous sins will be wiped out should one decide to migrate to the Islamic State (Lines 1 and 2). On the one hand, *Hijrah* as a discourse convinces devout followers to migrate to Islamic State, thereby increasing their numbers and fighting strength, besides provision of professionals such as doctors and engineers (Kaneva & Stanton, 2020) and more specifically for non-violent roles – women (Peresin & Cervone, 2015) as migrants. Whereas, on the other hand, this argument also refutes (albeit not necessarily true) the claims by many scholars that the attacks in Europe (cf Cragin, 2017; Götsch, 2016), are conducted by such returnees, who are considered a threat on arrival at the European borders, instead of the victims of war displacement (Allsopp, 2017). This dichotomy played out well for ISIS and the refugee discourse out of Syria and Iraq was marred by suspicion, trouble, and resistance.

Relatedly, those unable to perform *Hijrah* received specific instructions to kill the non-Muslims as well as Muslims by targeting markets, and places of worship as well as Muslim *Imams* in the West (Dabiq-1, 2014; Dabiq-3, 2014c; Dabiq-7, 2015; Dabiq-11, 2015a; Dabiq-13, 2016; Dabiq-15, 2016). The case of Islamophobia (Green, 2015), resulting in shame and disgrace to Muslims around the globe including their second-rated-citizen status in infidel lands has been capitalized through *Hijrah* discourse (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 9). The fact that as a result of 9/11 Muslims have been subject to humiliation and have been marginalized has been propagated as a cause enough for all Muslims to perform *Hijrah* to the Islamic State. As per Dabiq Magazine, the genesis of *Daesh* itself, the deceleration of the caliphate, and the motivation for *Hijrah* is a reason to glorify the Islamic way of life, make Muslims proud of their present and past, and provide them with an opportunity to live freely in lands where laws of Allah are supreme. This discourse is aimed at bringing back the dignity, might, rights, and leadership of Muslims through Islamic State (Dabiq-1, 2014, pp. 6-11). Resultantly the *Hijrah* discourse has been constructed in multiple ways. Two strands within the dominant discursive object *Hijrah* can be identified. First, the fulfillment of religious duty by the devout Muslims, is something that is linked to other important Islamic concepts of *Bay'ah* and *Jihad*. ISIS believes that people are willing to invest their time, money, status, and resources in the cause of *Hijrah*, along with *Bay'ah* and *Jihad*. Also, the aspiration of the re-enactment of a unitary, historically traditional Islamic caliphate with a single caliph and *Imam* is dominant in the discourse. To achieve superior religious fulfillment, through this subjectivity, the strand of religious "romanticism" discourse (van den Aakster, 2020; Yeung, 2015). Secondly, *Hijrah* has been understood as a dangerous terrorist movement, something that has been resisted by the West by preventing the Islamic State's affiliates (Curtis et al., 2016) from performing *Hijrah.* However, as a response *Daesh* motivated the loyalists to partially fulfill their religious obligations and carry out attacks in the West, thereby serving the ISIS interests from afar, initiating an anxiety discourse (Crawley, 2016; Greenhill, 2016). This strand of *Hijrah* discourse adversely affected the refugees trying to migrate out of Syria and Iraq.

6.2.3 **Action Orientation**

In this stage, a closer and detailed examination of the context, within which different discursive constructions are formulated, is conducted. This also includes the analysis of gains made by *Daesh* through this discursive construction at a particular spatio-temporal context, within that text, its functions at that stage, and its relationship with the surrounding text. This helped create a better understanding of the action orientation of talk and text in Dabiq Magazine. For

example, initially, *Daesh* wanted to establish legitimacy and its territorial control and expansion, both in size and population. It tried to achieve this object by motivating others to perform *Hijrah*, and by spreading this message through all its communicative engagements (Dawson & Amarasingam, 2017). Subsequently, *Daesh* also capitalized on those affiliates who were residents of Western (mostly non-Islamic) countries, and their expediency to the greater cause of inflicting harm in their native lands and against the people. They initiated a new strand within the existing *Hijrah* discourse, by asking the aspiring *Muhajirs* to perform individual or small-group acts of terrorism in their native lands what they called *Nakaya*[35] operations (Dabiq-10, 2015; Dabiq-13, 2016). The action orientation stage allows for assessment as to what all these discursive constructions and strands are capable of achieving within the larger *Hijrah* discourse.

Extract 6.2: Urgent Call for *Hijrah*

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4 5 6	Rush to perform *Hijrah* (emigration) to the land of Islam, where the *Shari'ah* is in a full application. *Hijrah* is the sign of both one's love for unity and his adherence to the Sunnah of Allah's messenger. This was reiterated as a direct order from Amirul Muminin, who said, "O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing *Hijrah* to the Islamic State then let him do so because *Hijrah* to the land of Islam is Obligatory" (Dabiq-15, 2016, p. 27).

Extract 6.2 has been taken from the last issue; Dabiq 15 (emphasis added). This text is yet another desperate call for all Muslims to migrate to the Islamic State (See Lines 5-6). Contextually, this was the time when the Islamic State had started facing defeats and was losing territory to the coalition forces. Soon after the publication of this issue, the Media spokesperson Al Adnani was killed (Wright, 2016a), and Dabiq Magazine production got disrupted.[36] In this stage, an examination of the abovementioned two strands of *Hijrah* discourse has been presented to ascertain how these strands have been deployed, and what was gained by the Islamic State in especially constructing these strands at that particular stage of text, and the life history of ISIS. Its functions and role in the surrounding text and related concepts (such as *Bay'ah* and *Jihad* etc.) have also been explained. All these actions form part of the action orientation of *Hijrah* and the text through which it has been utilized.

[35] Small scale operations to hurt the enemy.
[36] Although, continuing the Islamic State's tradition of online propaganda, new magazine titled Rumiyah was launched in Sep 2016 (Mahzam, 2017).

6.2.3.1 ***Religious Romanticism Strand in Hijrah Discourse***

Hijrah is a concept dating back to the earliest days of Islam. Prophet Mohammad migrated from persecution at Mecca to Yathrib, which later came to be known as Madinah. The concept of *Hijrah* (migration or forced migration) involving *Mohajirun* (refugees or migrants) takes its roots in Judaism and Christian traditions. The traditions regarding "aliens" and "sojourners" existed in the Arabian Peninsula long before the arrival of Islam (Elmadmad, 2008). Incidentally, Prophets of the three monotheist Abrahamic religions; Judaism, Christianity, and Islam including Prophets Ibrahim, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammad underwent *Hijrah* (Padilla & Phan, 2014). These pivotal acts of divine obedience took Prophet Ibrahim from Haran to Canaan, Moses from Egypt to Madian, Jesus from Galilee to Jerusalem, and Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Yathrib (Madinah). Even before Prophet Mohammad left Mecca for Madinah, a group of Muslims left Mecca for Abyssinia – a Christian land, to avoid persecution on religious grounds by their fellow countrymen. The sanctity of *Hijrah* in Islam is celebrated and is taken seriously. The date when Prophet Mohammad started his *Hijrah* gained so much importance that the Islamic calendar starts on that day. First-year of *Hijri* was 622 CE and Prophet started the journey on 12 September 622 CE (Shamsi, 1984).

Hijrah theory provides special protection and rights to asylum seekers and refugees. In its true essence, it arguably could be more advanced and better than the modern age refugee conventions and laws. The word *Hijrah* is derived from the Arabic word *Hajarah* which means to part ways, abandon, to break ties with someone, to leave, or to migrate (Alkhuli, 1989; Elmadmad, 2008). In stark contrast to modern refugee laws, the theory of *Hijrah* grants the right to every human being to grant asylum and to seek asylum without explanation of the reason, intention, or repercussions. In the Quran, the word *Hijrah* and its derivatives have been mentioned 27 times and its *Shari'ah* meanings are to migrate in the path of Allah (Munir, 2011).

There is a serious disagreement amongst the Muslim scholars on the core issue of *Hijrah*. Some of them argue that Muslims should not opt for *Hijrah* without a genuine excuse. They further contend that the only genuine reason for a Muslim to perform *Hijrah* stems from the restrictions and bans imposed on Islamic practices in the lands they abode. This argument also continues to make those Muslims accountable, who prefer to live a luxurious life in countries where they cannot practice Islam in true letter and spirit such as in Western countries. This logic has been used as exploitation and a strong argument by ISIS against those who continue to stay in those lands and do not decide to perform *Hijrah*. Another set of Islamic scholars declare *Hijrah* as a

human right and leave the decision to the best judgment of individuals, whether they want to stay in such lands or prefer to perform *Hijrah* in a place where *Shari'ah* Laws exist. Here one can view a serious difference in Dabiq's text and ISIS has completely refuted the idea of *Hijrah* as an individual choice. They argue that *Hijrah* is a religious obligation and has remained so all along with religious history. They have referred to *Hijrah* by Prophet Ibrahim as an example that was followed by multiple other Prophets.

Hijrah was considered a command in earlier days of Islam and everyone was obliged to perform *Hijrah*. *Bay'ah* was the process to pledge allegiance to Prophet Mohammad's hands and a promise to undergo *Hijrah* as a result of this allegiance. These two were delinked after the conquest of Mecca when the Prophet (PBUH) said that there is no *Hijrah* after the conquest (Zaman, 2004). Therefore, *Jihad* remained the only obligation under *Bay'ah*. This gives birth to a new issue, that is, is *Jihad* a compulsion (especially after *Hijrah*) and how would it be seen. *Jihad* has been a collective compulsion in offense and an individual duty during defense (Lewis, 1992). There is a unanimous agreement amongst all Sunni schools of thought including Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi that this delinking is not a *carte blanche* for Muslims. It meant that *Bay'ah* could be administered without *Hijrah* and this moderation on the issue of *Hijrah* gave a much easier option on *Jihad*, making it a collective responsibility during offense yet an individual duty during the defense. ISIS, however still sticks to the notion that both *Hijrah* and *Jihad* are compulsions and Muslims are duty-bound to perform these solemn acts (Dabiq1). They also promote the notion that if for some reason a person is unable to perform *Hijrah,* the best service by that person for ISIS would be to conduct small attacks and kill as many infidels as possible.

Many Muslim scholars argue that the true Islamic way of life is possible in Islamic lands or where *Shari'ah* Law exists calling it *Dar-al-Islam* or land of peace. Under this pretext, *Daesh* argues that in the present-day and age, lands under their control are the only *Dar-al-Islam,* and the rest of every country is religiously illegitimate. They also argue that as per Islamic tradition only one caliph is acceptable for all Muslims and in this case, he is Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Any place where there is no Shari'ah law is the abode of war or *Dar-al-Harb, Dar-al-Kufr,* or *Dar-al-Shirk.* This complex linguistic web has been a source of constant debate throughout Islamic history, leaving the average Muslim undecided on actually where is it best for Muslims to reside and under what circumstances should they perform *Hijrah*. This issue continues to be another point of exploitation by ISIL. Consequent to this undecided stance by Muslims, multiple

Western authors have argued that through this approach, Muslims tend to retain an insular and exclusive lifestyle and that this situation could easily be challenged through modern international law(Lewis, 1992). *Khawarij* have all along declared territories where there is no *Shari'ah* as *Dar-ul-Kufr* and *Daesh* have followed the suit. During and after the 12th Century many Muslim areas, especially in the Islamic west went under Christian control and the debate surrounding the requirement for *Hijrah* ensued. The majority of the Islamic scholars called on Muslims from such areas to perform *Hijrah*, while many others opposed the notion. The logic behind allowing Muslims to stay in Christian lands was that it was a religious duty to stay behind if it could serve the cause of Islam better (Masud, 1986). It also needs to be mentioned here that in the 12th Century and later, the cause of *Hijrah* was solely connected to the concepts of Dar-*al-Islam* and *Dar-al-Harb*, and not to the concepts of *Jihad* and *Bay'ah*. The concept of *Hijrah* and *Jihad* remained interlinked in prior centuries; all those who were duty-bound to undergo *Hijrah* were also obliged to conduct *Jihad* against such lands.

Similarly, any land ruled by a Muslim ruler was considered *Dar-al-Islam*. To prevent any uprising against such rulers and to promote unity, no *Hijrah* was allowed from such lands, even if the ruler was a tyrant, and cruel towards the Muslim subjects, thereby effectively barring Muslims to perform a 'Reverse *Hijrah'* from *Dar-al-Islam* to *Dar-al-Harb*. This point will be analyzed through the current discourse generated by Daesh on the issue of *Hijrah*. They argue that although the living conditions in ISIS lands are not ideal, Muslims residing there should continue to live there, more so others from around the globe should also perform *Hijrah* to Syria(Dabiq3). However, the classic Muslim historians argued against such *Hijrah,* under the pretext of the hadith in which Prophet Mohammad had asked Muslims to stop *Hijrah* after the conquest of Mecca; *la hijrata ba'd al fat'hi* (Zaman, 2004).

The declaration of lands as *Dar-al-Islam* or *Dar-al-Harb* includes three types of countries; first, those where Muslims are rare and are minorities were declared *Dar-al-Harb*, secondly, those countries where Muslims were present in large numbers but rulers were non-Muslims, such countries were also declared *Dar-al-Harb*; and therefore, the only place that was labeled *Dar-al-Islam* was the country ruled by a Muslim ruler (Masud, 1986). In the context of this discourse, this gives rise to a new debate, as to who all should be considered as (true and practicing) Muslim rulers and how many Islamic countries today would fulfill the criteria to be declared as *Dar-al-Islam*. Referring again to *Daesh* exploitation, they have given a lineage of their self-avowed caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi linking it to Prophet Mohammad, to prove his

nobility (Dabiq7; Dabiq10). They have also argued that presently there is only one *Dar-al-Islam*, the land ruled by the caliph (Dabiq2).

A further extension of this debate links to some serious questions mentioned above. Such as, what happens if a Muslim ruler is a tyrant, and the lives of Muslims under such a ruler become untenable for example under Hajjaj Bin Yusuf, forcing Muslims to perform reverse *Hijrah* to non-Muslim lands such as Malabar in India at that time (El Fadl, 1994). Similarly, during the reign of al-Mahdi (775-785 CE) and Harun al Rasheed (786 – 809 CE) and in the 11th Century, areas including Sicily and other Muslim lands were lost to Christians. The debate over the *Hijrah* again had two opposing poles, with one set of scholars and jurists advocating the concept of Islam and *Dar-al-Islam* as unitary, while others arguing that the dynamism in the concept of *Hijrah* needed to be seen in the context of infringement upon fulfillment of religious duties. If such duties could be fulfilled in lands other than those ruled by Muslims they could continue residing there. The latter argument was also considered a logical solution for new converts residing in non-Muslim lands. Therefore the concept of a third type *Dar-al-Sulh* or *Dar-al-Ahd* (house of truce or house of the pact) was formed and argued under the pretext that Prophet Mohammad allowed some new converted Muslims to migrate to Ethiopia, which was a Christian land(Lewis, 1992). Within this argument, the delinking of *Jihad* from *Hijrah* was an inbuilt notion. However, Daesh has not delinked *Hijrah* from *Bay'ah* or *Jihad* and has argued that all these are individual obligations. It is important to note here, that the religious romanticism for these men, women, girls, and families was the 'life of *jihad'* or the 'death of *Shahadah* (martyrdom)'. Dabiq Magazine focusing on *Hijrah* says in clear words, that "Islamic State is at war against *Kafir* states and anyone performing *Hijrah* should expect to perform *Jihad"* (Dabiq3). Sequentially, *Daesh* asked its followers to perform *Bay'ah* (pledge of allegiance), followed by *Hijrah* (migration in the cause of Allah to Islamic lands) to culminate at *Jihad* (fighting in the cause of Allah). Religious romanticism has been further signified by linking Prophet Ibrahim's *Hijrah* to Syria as the real and most desirable *Hijrah* before the day of judgement to be performed by the best of the people and those failing to do so would be the worst of the people.

6.2.3.2 *Anxiety and Fear Strand in Hijrah Discourse*

Starting from very early publications, *Daesh* laid special emphasis on the theme of *Hijrah* resulting in fear and anxiety around the globe, especially among the nations whose citizens started the migration to ISIS-controlled lands. This anxiety was further reinforced by the

published threats made by ISIS inspiring its affiliates to conduct attacks in the West (cf Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015; Shane & Hubbard, 2014).



Figure 6.1: Foreign Fighters – Migrations to Syria (Adopted from Post, 2015; Zamuruev, 2015)

Figure 6.1 above shows the number of migrants who migrated to join ISIS within the first six months of the deceleration of the caliphate (Post, 2015; Zamuruev, 2015). Anxiety as action orientation in countries neighboring *Daesh* or the rest of the world is mostly based on the expansionist desires (El Damanhoury, 2020; Smith et al., 2016) of *Daesh* through *Bay'ah*, and the increase in the number of the governorates, influencing regions from Libya to Khurasan and from *Qawqaz* (Caucuses) to Yemen, Sudan and Somalia. As a newly constituted organization and a self-avowed caliphate, they needed to gather support both for their legitimacy and for their defence. The foremost desire of the Islamic State visible through this discourse has been that of *Bay'ah* or pledge of allegiance and loyalty to their caliph Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi (Dabiq-1, 2014).

As mentioned above, the word *Hijrah* as a discourse and its derivatives appears 286 times in all 15 Issues, whereas *Bay'ah* and its derivatives have appeared 216 times and *Jihad* has been mentioned 734 times. Combined, all three have been used to find legitimacy and prove themselves as an authentic and most religious Islamic state (Hamming, 2016), and to generate a

robust discourse. Ever since the emergence of the Islamic State in June 2014, the call for *Hijrah* as a theme has fluctuated in its appearance and appeal.

Hijrah discourse also extends its appeal by the creation of a binary worldview. And motivating the followers to perform *Hijrah* because of the two existing camps in the world; the camp of Islam and the camp of *Kufr*[37] and no third camp (Dabiq-1, 2014). ISIS has provided multiple legal arguments for this obligation by extensive reference to Quran and Hadith. Discourse allows certain knowledge/power (Foucault, 1980b), to gain legality. The declaration of the Islamic State through the Quranic verse, "all lands belong to Allah and he allows its inheritance to anyone whom He wills" (Quran-7:128), as a sufficient reason to create a new state and own the land, and the argument favoring *Hijrah* as an Islamic duty undertaken by the father of believers Ibrahim, have been repeated to convince the devout affiliates to migrate.

The legitimacy of the persona of leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi (Hashim, 2014) as an inspiring and rightfully deserving caliph has also been established and reinforced through the fact that he performed *Hijrah* followed by *Jihad*, and therefore, he is the legal heir and rightful imam to deserve *Bay'ah* from followers. *Hijrah* has also been strengthened through coarticulation with concepts of *Jama'ah* (unity), *Sam* (listening), *Ta'ah* (obedience), and *Jihad*. *Hijrah* has been romanticized as a truly Islamic and inspiring concept that has helped revive the age-old tradition of the concept of modern-day *Khilafah* (Dabiq-1, 2014). The attraction for believers from around the globe through *Hijrah* has, therefore, been created right from the declaration of the Islamic State as a caliphate. *Daesh* has taken a different approach in linking *Jihad* to *Hijrah* by saying that, *Hijrah* needs to be practiced in the lands where *Jihad* can be conducted and "where they could operate without the fear of a powerful police state" (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 36). This reverses the traditional Islamic order of preference where *Hijrah* is the priority if Muslims can't practice their faith freely and after they migrate, they could continue *Jihad* where needed. A preparatory stage before *Hijrah* has been mentioned as guideline for all those performing *Hijrah* and for those falling for this discourse, *Daesh* continues to motivate them to rush to the Islamic state with parents, siblings, spouses and children.

Within the larger *Hijrah* discourse, the concept of *Bay'ah* has also been prioritized higher than the *Hijrah* itself. Under the circumstances when immediate *Hijrah* is not possible, ISIS sympathizers need to organize a *Bay'ah* from their home towns. The concept of *Bay'ah* taking precedence over the concept of *Hijrah* shows the significance of the need for them to expand

[37] Disbelief

their influence and presence, boost their numbers, and build on their strength. This created a great degree of panic and anxiety amongst nations whose citizens, new Muslim converts, and even young girls opted for *Hijrah* (Bennhold, 2015).

In a contrast to the traditional *Hijrah*, *Daesh* desired all believers to perform *Hijrah* in Syria alone. However, after realizing that it may not be possible for everyone to perform *Hijrah* in Syria and that even without *Hijrah* their followers could serve their cause, they re-prioritized *Bay'ah* above *Hijrah* and subsequently *Jihad* above *Hijrah* (Dabiq-14, 2016). That meant that there is no need for those who have already performed *Bay'ah* to perform *Hijrah*, they could rather serve *Daesh's* cause better by conducting attacks in their home countries, especially in the West. This had a direct impact on the sincerity of those refugees who were genuinely the target of the 'push factor' after the start of the Civil War in Syria. Every Middle Eastern refugee who tried to enter Europe was doubted and calls from multiple political and official quarters banning such entries have further deteriorated the situation.

While on one hand, *Daesh* was calling its followers to perform the sacred act of *Hijrah* to Islamic State, they were also exerting tremendous pressure more precisely 'push' on Syrians and Iraqis. Widespread brutality, coercive *Bay'ah*, enforced *Jihad* through strict implementation of *Shari'ah*, and a protracted civil war, made the lives of millions in Syria and Iraq untenable, - a 'push factor' that forced millions to become refugees. Some of these refugees moved to neighboring Muslim countries such as Jordan and Lebanon and a majority ended up in Turkey. These single vector journeys can be categorized as *Hijrah* since the destination lands were also Muslim countries. Subsequently, millions of these refugees moved into or tried to move to Europe performing reverse *Hijrah*.

In a three-pronged strategy, firstly *Daesh* allured their followers to perform *Hijrah en masse* with their spouses, children, siblings, and parents. Secondly, they resisted outwards movement to keep *Daesh* lands populated, and finally, in the process, they forced millions into refugee status by performing 'Reverse *Hijrah*'. *Daesh* did not miss any opportunity to hinder or resist the 'Reverse *Hijrah'* which can best be understood through the case of Aylan Kurdi - the child who was washed ashore dead, mourned by the world yet capitalized by *Daesh* through an article published in (Dabiq-11, 2015a). The climax of these two discursive strands within the *Hijrah* discourse convinced thousands to perform *Hijrah* to Islamic State to take part in *Jihad.* Scores decided to stay back in Europe and participate in *Daesh*-sponsored and claimed terrorism.

6.2.4 **Positioning in *Hijrah* Discourse**

After completion of the identifying construction of the discursive object and its spread in the *Hijrah* discourse, the next step is to examine the subjective positions offered by the discursive construction. Poststructuralism[38] allows for the recognition of the constitutive force of discourse and force of discursive practices, simultaneously allowing people to exercise choice concerning these practices (Harre & Langenhove, 1999). Discourse allows the creation of an object (*Hijrah*) as well as subjects (those performing *Hijrah*). Roles assigned within a discourse are possible to be conducted without subjectivity, while a particular subject position has direct implications for subjectivity (Willig, 2013a). Therefore, when a person takes a subjective position in a discourse, the only reference point through which that person sees the world is that vintage point or position occupied. Poststructuralism in the case of *Hijrah* discourse includes constitutive forces spread over, the promise of revival of a dignified status for Muslims (which was considered absent at present before the birth of the Islamic State). It also allows for the movement of *Daesh* loyalists from and back to (for example) Europe and other parts of the world something that could be capitalized on by *Daesh.* Moreover, it also creates an aura of fear, anxiety, and panic for enemies of ISIS, and finally, it allows Islamic State to build on its strength and manpower, and aspire for recognition. At the same time, it allows the subjects of this discourse (who decide to perform *Hijrah* as practice) to make choices as highly motivated rational actors. These choices include first, the decision itself about whether or not to take such a drastic step and opt for *Hijrah*, "Jihadi brides" (Dearden, 2016a; Jaffer, 2015) being a case in point. The roles assigned through this discursive positioning are different from the subject position itself. For example, a subject might have positioned him/herself to perform *Hijrah*, and yet not opt for the role of motivating others to follow in their footsteps. A direct implication of taking a subject position is, that the role has to be performed subsequently (such as *Jihad* and *Ribat* etc.) even more forcefully after experiencing the position. Once a subject decides to take this position, usually there is no turning back to 'normal life', especially after the subject have moved to Islamic State.

[38] Theory of Poststructuralism has some interesting parallels to the positioning as discussed in this Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. The recognition of the force of discursive practices, the way in which people are positioned through these practices and the way in which the individual's subjectivity is generated through the learning and use of certain discursive practices are commensurate with this analysis (cf Davies, 1991).

On one side, state authorities in their native lands would implicate them for breaking the law and joining the enemy ranks. While on the other hand, ISIS makes it extremely hard for anyone to abandon their lands without their consent (Dabiq-11, 2015c), while others yet, might decide to stay behind in *Daesh* lands by choice (cf Gerges, 2014; Kalyvas, 2015). It is important to mention that a role by the subject could be performed even without taking up a position, for example recruiting for ISIS or motivating others online, without actually acting out the position that is without physically performing *Hijrah*. The announcement of *Bay'ah* itself is a provocative step and contributes towards creating alarm at the state level, yet another example where the position of *Hijrah* has not yet been occupied but the desired consequences have to some extent been achieved.

6.2.5 **Practice in *Hijrah* Discourse**

The stage after the identification of discourse objects, subjects, and their positioning presents how a particular discourse will be practiced in Foucauldian discourse analysis. How opportunities for *action* by the subjects are made (un)available, as explained above, depends on the discursive construction and subject positions (Willig, 2013a). For example, in the case of *Hijrah* discourse, if a French youth pledges allegiance to *Da'esh*, this act opens up some possibilities for the *Daesh*, on which they can capitalize. Indirectly such an allegiance gives *Daesh* liberty and freedom of action within Europe and elsewhere. As seen in multiple cases, this person could move into Syria relatively easily and slip back to Europe without raising much alarm. By positioning different subjects at different positions, *Daesh* gained an advantage in action through *Hijrah* discourse. Such actions within a discourse, on one hand, allow the creation of further discourses and on the other, they help legitimize certain practices. In the case of *Hijrah* discourse, the movement of such individuals, who are native citizens from Western nations, back and forth, allowed the generation of a new discourse of fear. Nations around the world feared that such individuals would travel to *Daesh* lands, get trained, or make attack plans and move back to their native lands, to conduct homegrown terrorist attacks. This (legitimate) fear discourse allowed Europeans to resist refugees (Cragin, 2017; Crawford, 2007; Crawley, 2016; Dearden, 2016b; Galvan-Alvarez, 2018), even at the cost of violating the Refugees Convention (Iftikhar, 2017b; UNGA, 1951).

To further elaborate on the impact of *Hijrah* as practice, an examination of the plight of Middle Eastern refugees shows that for those refugees who were forced out of their homes due to the creation and expansion of the Islamic State, many were allowed to settle in refugee camps, in

countries surrounding Iraq and Syria and even in Turkey and some European nations. For these refugees, UNHCR has identified three durable solutions (Van Hear, 2014). The best choice is voluntary repatriation; the second is local integration; and finally, limited opportunity for third-country resettlement. More often than not, a situation arises when none of this happens and refugees are warehoused for years if not decades (Smith, 2004). In the case of Middle Eastern refugees, many countries had elaborate preparations to warehouse these refugees but due to collective EU decisions, the plans changed (Delman, 2016).

According to UNHCR, some governments will not want to give full rights (to refugees) because they fear that if the first 10,000 are allowed another 30,000 will arrive (Agalawatta, 2004). Middle Eastern refugees have been a 'product of war', and this catastrophe has been triggered and hastened by all classic ingredients. Civil war, belligerent government, genocidal and violent non-state actors, international intervention, and more importantly *Hijrah*. Some Daesh loyalists moved to Syria after getting convinced that the *Hijrah* was the right and a noble obligation. Unfortunately, others who were trying to flee Syria and Iraq, running away from the war zone to save lives and their families were labeled as performing *Hijrah* by Western media (Spencer, 2015). At collective levels, governments around the globe manage the entire population of refugees making selections in whom to take or refuse the refugee status (Canada, 2016). This is helping the overall refugee issue to some extent but much more needs to be done especially by the nations that have the resources but lack the will to accommodate these refugees. As a starting point, efforts to bring an end to the Syrian Civil war might be a good starting point. State-level geopolitics has caused immense damage at the individual level and this needs to end.

Other than opening up opportunities, the discursive practice also closes down a few possibilities. For example, personal details including names, nationalities, addresses, and family contact information of 22000 of the ISIS *Jihadis* were leaked to German media on the Turkish-Syrian border (Rising, 2016). These pages were answers to 23 personal questions asked to the arriving *Jihadis*. The leakage of this information has a theory attached to it, which states that this information was leaked on purpose by *Daesh*. This practice effectively shut the return doors for these loyalists, forcing them to perform *Jihad* after *Hijrah* to death (Jay Akbar & Robinson, 2016).

6.2.6 **Subjectivity in *Hijrah* Discourse**

This final stage allows the discourse to ascertain what all can be said, felt, thought, and experienced from subjective positions within the larger discourse. For example, a teenage girl

from the UK performing her religious duty of *Hijrah*, and becoming a "Jihadi bride" (Jacoby, 2015; Martini, 2018) is fulfilling the desired effect of this discourse and she would feel less guilty about doing this because of her subjectivity. This means that the roles of a person in discourse are determined by the position of subjectivity, the way that person sees the world through the lens of discourse *Hijrah*, and the way of being in that world. After deliberately opting for a subject position within *Hijrah* discourse, travel documents of these fighters have been destroyed, thereby completely ending the possibility of traveling back to their native lands and finalizing their role as lifetime *Jihadi* for *Daesh*. On the other hand, western media reports showed hundreds of fighters returning to their native lands (Batchelor, 2016; Macguire, 2016). *Daesh* will probably not ascribe to these claims. However, there has been an action-oriented response to the *Hijrah* discourse since the subjects of this discourse changed their subjectivity. For example, Swedish authorities, who claim that the cost of reintegrating a returning Jihadi into society is less than abandoning them (Dearden, 2016b), decided to reintegrate them back into society.

6.3 **(Re)prioritizing *Hijrah* and *Jihad***

Hijrah as a concept has also been utilized in generating and sustaining other strands of the same discourse and promotion of allied concepts of *Bay'ah* and *Jihad*.



Figure 6.2: *Hijrah* Prioritized by ISIS (Adopted from Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 38)

To meet the immediate requirements of fighters and ideological legitimacy, Islamic State prioritized and re-prioritized *Hijrah*. The process of fulfillment of this concept (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 38) involves performing *Hijrah* (and/or *Bay'ah*) leading to the formulation of *Jama'ah.* Since the organization is at war therefore the third and higher priority is Jihad against those Islamic countries that do not ascribe to the ISIS ideology. The next higher step is *Tamkin* (religious and

spiritual self-development) culminating at the highest attainable ideological concept of achieving the caliphate.

Extract 6.3: Ascending to the Highest achievement - Jihad

Line	Extract
1 2 3	… jihad would be based upon *Hijrah*, *bay'ah, sam'* (listening), *ta'ah* (obedience), and *i'dad* (training), leading to ribat and *qital* (fighting), then *Khilafah* or *shahadah* (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 35).

Islamic State prioritized Jihad by promoting the ultimate goal, of a higher and more rewarding outcome of *Shaha'dah*. As shown in the Extract above, the first step is *Hijrah*, followed by *Bay'ah*. Or if one realizes that *Hijrah* won't be possible (immediately), then *Bay'ah* is enough from the native lands. The next step is *Sam* (listening) and *Ta'ah* (obedience) (Line 1). This is an important step with implications for both *Hijrah* and *Bay'ah*, (preferably both or whichever is possible). So, if someone has performed *Hijrah* and *Bay'ah*, it is prudent that one listens to the orders from the caliphate and obeys those orders. These orders would usually be to perform *Jihad* (or any act of terrorism, killings, etc.). The next step is *I'dad* (training) (Line 2). When loyalists from around the globe would perform *Hijrah*, it is expected that they may not be trained or fully ready for *Jihad*, hence the next step of *I'dad*. The ensuing step directly deals with *Jihad* is *Ribat* (retreat) and *Qital* (fighting and killing). The ultimate triumph is thus *Khilafah*, or reward of *Shaha'dah* (martyrdom). Either way, the self-actualization stage of this process is either *Khilafah* or *Shaha'dah*.

6.4 Conclusion

Foucauldian Discourse Analysis in this chapter has been instrumental in enhancing the understanding, of how the *Hijrah* discourse has been manifested by the Islamic State. The six-stage analysis revealed the success and challenges of attracting the youth, elderly, families, young women, and children from close and afar, to migrate to *Daesh*-controlled land in Syria and Iraq. The practice of this discourse has been deadly, and sometimes, fatal (Perešin, 2015), and escape has been equally dangerous (Dabiq-11, 2015c; Iftikhar, 2018b).

Hijrah discourse has been highly influential in inspiring some affiliates to migrate (Dabiq-15, 2016, pp. 36-39), along with their families from the West (Dabiq-12, 2015, p. 56), to the larger Muslim world. In an analysis of 190 countries with 103 of them as the countries of origin for 33,815 foreign fighters arriving in aid of ISIS, Pokalova (2019), finds that more fighters come from countries with higher Human Development Index, unemployment rates, youth percentage, population size, percentages of Muslims, migration levels, internal penetration of terrorist

groups/cells. The effect of these variables has been inconsistent in the majority of Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Although Neumann (2015a) noted that the fighters from Western Europe accounted for one-fifth of all those who migrated to join ISIS.

In *Hijrah* discourse, we observed that in-depth knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, *Fiqh*, Hadith, and the Quran has been an advantage to *Daesh*. Utilizing this knowledge, they were able to establish themselves as an institution. This institution became self-sustaining, self-defending with expansionist designs. Through the use of multiple channels of communication and media (social and print media), they used that knowledge to their advantage. They were able to generate multiple discourses, one of which was around *Hijrah.* Through this discourse, they were able to muster multiple subjects and subject positions. Creation of these subjects and using them accrue desired outcomes were then normalized. For example, *Hijrah* to *Daesh* lands was considered the norm ('truth') by their loyalists from around the globe. Action orientation of the discourse and subsequent positioning show how *Daesh* exerted power through and on its subjects. This excessive control obtained through discourse is the true essence of the Foucauldian concept of knowledge/power (Foucault, 1980b).

Dabiq Magazine highlighted the voice of a self-avowed caliph, who tried to instigate Muslims against the West, asking them to Perform *Hijrah* to the lands under the control of ISIS (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 7). Many in the Muslim world as well as from other parts of the world migrated to Syria to take part in Jihad and be part of the Islamic State. At one point. the reported number of those who migrated crossed 31,000 (Gene, Julie, & Swati, 2014; Sciutto, Crawford, & Carter, 2014). This was the result of an effective media campaign and publications including Dabiq Magazine (Majid, 2018). The next chapter further examines the propaganda effects of Dabiq Magazine and tries to understand another important discourse – stigma, through which *Daesh* successfully spread its ideology to the target audience.

Chapter 7: Analysis – Theme Stigma

7.1 Overview

This chapter is a synthesis of the philosophical and theoretical aspects explained in Chapter 3 (See section 3.4), the crystallization of this theme in Chapter 4, and data presented in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3). The combination of the theory and practice concerning Dabiq Magazine and its CDA is presented in this chapter. In so doing, the previously discussed theoretical underpinnings, and explanation of this concept has been analyzed in the ensuing sections. This chapter also points to the presence and repeated use of dehumanizing and infrahumanization language (Haslam, 2015; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014), that marked the ideology and the conflict of the Islamic State. Following the theory and CDA methodological guidelines from Chapter 3, this chapter explains how *Daesh* through Dabiq Magazine has utilized this theme (i.e., stigma), as a discourse within the text and in the larger terrorism discourse. The binary world view (Lakomy, 2020), which facilitated the propaganda using the "name-calling" device (Sproule, 2001), besides a host of other stigmatizing practices (Varvin, 2017), to support the narrative of the Western wars during the 21st Century (Steuter & Wills, 2009).

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (1937) in the bulletin of *Propaganda Analysis*, claimed that we fail to recognize propaganda when we see it, and consequently, we are fooled by it. The (un-named) author categorized the propaganda tools into seven categories including; name-calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, card-stacking, plain-folk, and band-wagoning. The focal device for this chapter is stigma, which means to attach unattractive labels "to those individuals, groups, nations, races, policies, practices, beliefs, and ideals which he would have us condemn and reject" (1937), and the author used "heretics" and "communist" as the examples of stigmatizing names, which were likely to be used without clarification or analysis. Dehumanization is the primary function of propaganda and is appropriately exploited through literature (Smith, 2011, p. 26). Labeling, stigmatizing, and dehumanizing have been part of modern warfare. Dower (1986) contends that "during the WW II the Japanese labeled their enemies as demons (oni), devils (Kichiku), spirits (Akki and Akuma), monsters (Kaibutsu), and hairy twisted-nosed savages, Chinese were labeled bugs or animals (Chancorro) and Americans were labeled as misguided dogs (Mei-ri-ken).

Stigma has been excessively employed by ISIS in Dabiq Magazine and the use of such dehumanizing language will help us understand why Daesh needed to resort to such discursive language and how has it played out in the overall publication scheme of Dabiq Magazine.

CDA in this chapter focuses on stigma through a two-tiered analysis: (1) As argued by Dabiq Magazine, Muslims were stigmatized around the globe and had tainted identity, prestige, dignity, and honor in the West (Dabiq-1, 2014), therefore they needed a territory to live where they could practice their distinct version of the religion (Abbadi, 2017) with honor, dignity and under the *Shari'ah* law, for which Islamic State has been projected as the only suitable place; (2) stigma and labeling is considered a serious cultural and religious issue, Islamic State through the publication of 15 Issues of Dabiq Magazine used derogatory, dehumanizing and demeaning labels, words and slangs to stigmatize their enemies. The analysis in this chapter shows that on one side this allowed *Daesh* to demean their enemies through counter-stigmatizing, and on the other side allowed them to muster, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, *symbolic power* (Bourdieu, 1987).

7.2 Historicity and Philosophy of Stigma

The argument that Muslims have been structurally marginalized and that the Islamic State (or *Daesh*/ISIS) is the messiah of Islam and Muslims, was propagated through Dabiq Magazine starting from its first issue (Dabiq-1, 2014). ISIS effectively capitalized on the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and stigmatization of Muslims around the globe, and the call demanding *Hijrah was* not only advertised through Dabiq Magazine rather through other media, internet, and social media channels.

The anti-Muslim stigmatization and marginalization argument played out as a strong motivation for many to perform *Hijrah*. Resultantly, theme stigma merits deconstruction and analysis, to know the text of this extremist group and to ascertain how theme Stigma has been played out by *Daesh*. As mentioned in previous chapters as well, for analysis the data being used contains fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine which were issued by the Islamic State between July 5, 2014, to July 31, 2016 (Tan et al., 2018).

This chapter explains the labeling of the other, based upon the creation of 'othering' (cf Creutz-Kämppi, 2008; Hoewe, 2012), 'out-group' (Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001; Hoewe, 2014), through stigma, a topic raising volatile issues of power, race, history, and

culture. The chapter aspires to deconstruct what Dabiq tells about all those who differ from Islamic State's ideology, and the Islamic State's relationship with others including masses, religious organizations, factions, other Muslim and non-Muslim countries, populations, leaders, sects, ethnicities, and religions.

To understand the real essence of the problem and to find the answers to the questions surrounding stigma, it is important to know the philosophical foundations of the morality of stigma (Martz, 2004). Therefore, this text examines the philosophical position of the ideology of *Daesh* concerning its enemies, to understand if these values are compatible with mainstream Islam and theological philosophy. In so doing this section will attempt to explain two aspects: (1) answer the question of 'why' philosophy; and (2) (in)validation of stigmatization by *Daesh* through an Islamic philosophical perspective.

The discussion includes many Islamic scholars and philosophers (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5), some of them have been controversial figures in political Islam (Sewag, 2016). The distinct interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, and rejection of some aspects of classical Islamic tradition influence contemporary ultra-conservative ideologies including Wahabism, (Schwartz, 2007), Salafism, and Jihadism (Moghadam, 2008), which have been the subjects of intense debate over the centuries. *Daesh* found solace in repeated references to many of these scholars, and their radical thought in almost all fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine.

It is therefore prudent to look at the work of the Islamic State in Dabiq Magazine through the lens of Islamic philosophy. Such an approach will help deconstruct stigmatization by Islamic State and will allow a better explanation of their ideology. Although in stark contrast to the Islamic ethical teaching and philosophy, Dabiq Magazine makes excessive use of historic religious references to denounce the founding work of Mu'tazilites[39] (Dabiq-1, 2014; Dabiq-2, 2014; Dabiq-4, 2014).

7.3 The discourse of stigma in Dabiq Magazine: Structural Critical Analysis

To develop a detailed analytical orientation, in which the objectification of the 'others', devaluation, dehumanization, and labeling converge, this section of the chapter examines the

[39] A confluence of Greek and Islamic philosophical though that was prospered during the 3rd Century *Hijri*. The philosophy is called "rationalism", and is based on three fundamental principles of oneness of God, human freedom of action and creation of Quran (Campanini, 2012). Mu'tazilite rationalism held that the values of human and divine action are knowable in principle by natural human reason (Hourani, 1976).

categories for analyzing the devaluation dimension of the language of Dabiq Magazine. More specifically, the devaluation assumptions that are embedded in stigmatizing labels.

Theme stigma here deals with the objectification of the subjects, as 'others' who are shaped and have been identified through discursive formations and transformations. This objectification formed through Dabiq Magazine was distributed online in multiple languages, to create knowledge, a new understanding of the enemy, and a new sense of the far-reaching relationship of power (Feder, 2011b; Rouse, 2005).

It is essential to attend to the data on the interactional occurrences of multiple dehumanizing labels, and how have they been organized concerning other similar linguistic occurrences. Intertextuality, interdiscursive analysis, and linguistic and semiotic analysis through excerpts from Dabiq Magazine will ensue here.

In the case of stigma, the language attains a dominant role and becomes instrumental in exclusionary objectification. Stigmatizing in Dabiq is widespread and its repetitive nature sometimes makes it sound like the figure of speech. In the ensuing paragraphs, text from Dabiq Magazine will be discussed showing the labeling of the 'others' by *Daesh*. Therefore, this practice is the mode of manipulation that combines the mediation of faith and the practice of exclusion, usually in the spatial, social, religious, and political sense. The dividing practice in the case of *Daesh* stigmatization works as modes of classification, control, and containment through a distinctive tradition of (mostly) religious rhetoric.

7.3.1 **Politico-Religious Stigma**

According to the data presented in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3), *Daesh* has used Dabiq Magazine and other media and publication channels to serve their ideology, harm their enemies physically and psychologically, and stigmatize them.



Graph 7.1: Representation of Politico-Religious Stigma

Graph 7.1 above, shows the use of dehumanizing words in all fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine. These words (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3), have been used against the enemies such as Shias, the Iranian regime, the Syrian regime, the Israeli regime, etc. The category includes the use of stigmatizing and derogatory words from a religious point of view as well as those words which have targeted political affiliation (especially with the religious association). Stigmatizing label *safawi*[40], has been used pejoratively by Dabiq Magazine, referring to the Shias from Iran (Siegel, Tucker, Nagler, & Bonneau, 2017). The genealogical deconstruction of the word reveals that there are multiple schools of thought behind this word. One lineage argues that the word has been derived from the Safavid Sunni Muslim Sufi order (Hossein, 1974), whose founder Sheikh Safi al-Din (1252-1334), was a Sufi master of Kurdish lineage from Northwestern Iran. Kamal (2006, p. 24) citing Percy Sykes, presents yet another account of the Safavid dynasty, tracing its lineage to Musa al-Kazim (745-799), the 7th Shia Imam of the Twelver Shias. It is however not clear if the Shia genealogy of the order was given by Safi al-Din or was a later fabrication. The third set of scholars argues that the word refers to the Safavid Dynasty who ruled Persian lands from 1501 to 1736 CE. Streusand (2011, pp. 135-139) argues that the Safavid empire had more of a religious impact rather than political influence such as the one exerted by their contemporaries, the Ottomans, and Mughals. This argument shows that the revival of Twelvers in Iran occurred during their reign. Islamic State, has excessively referred to Shias (especially from Iran) as Safawis and defines them as the 'political cult' of the Twelver Shias (Arjomand, 1981; Dabiq-13, 2016, p. 13).

Scholars such as Laub (2017), contend that *Daesh* has projected itself as 'the defender of Sunnis and vanguard of the struggle against Shias everywhere. In Dabiq Magazine they have referred to Shias with multiple stigmatizing labels such as Safawi, which has been used for, specifically targeting, and annoying the Iranians.

Extract 7.1: Degrading the enemy - 'Us' vs 'them'

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4	This was most evident in Iraq as the lions of Islamic State chased the filthy Safawis out of numerous towns and cities, forcing them to flee all the way to Baghdad in spite of their numbers, and the billions spent on them by the crusaders on weapons and training (Dabiq-4, 2014, p. 18).

[40] Referring to Iranian regime as the decedents of Safavid Dynasty. Before Safavid rule most Iranians were Sunni Muslims (cf Arjomand, 1981).

The extract above shows a combination of superior self-labeling and stigmatizing others based on confounding and contradictory claims. The sign of bravery 'lion' has been combined to show the strength and bravery of Islamic State fighters, while the word 'filthy' has been added to add disgust to Safawi Shias. They have also been accused in this extract of getting aid from Crusaders (Christians), however, to prove this claim, no evidence is available. The only link between the Western Christians can be seen in Iraq, where American forces, primarily helped the Shia sect and removed all Baathist, pro-Saddam Sunnis from positions of authority (cf Arraf, 2018; Galbraith, 2007; Yousefi, 2009). Iraqi Shias also have a direct link with Iranian Shias, who have been labeled as Safawis in Dabiq Magazine. However, Iraqi Shias have been careful not to let these two alliances be misconstrued. Contrary to Dabiq's claims, there is no direct evidence of Iranian Shias getting any military or financial aid from Western Christians, referred to in the extract as crusaders.

The stigmatization through the word Safawi is also sometimes referred to as *Sahiyyu Safawi* (Zionist-Safawid), to link Shia to a suggestion that there is an Israeli-Iranian conspiracy against the Sunni Middle Eastern Muslims (Siegel, 2017, p. 160). Iranian Shias have also been referred to as Majus in the text to equate Iranian Shias to the pre-Islamic faith of Zoroastrianism (Dabiq-9, 2015; Dabiq-10, 2015; Dabiq-11, 2015a).

Subordinate categories of stigmatizing words and their variants include words such as *Murtadd*, *Shirk* or *Mushri*, *Munafiq*, *Kufr*, Satan, and *Taghut* (plural *Tawaghit*), *Al-Lat*, Apostasy, Infidel, pagan, and Hypocrite. This category also includes those who have been stigmatized as worshipping Devil, Fire, Grave, Cross, idol, Cow, etc. Words with a mix of religious as well as political shades such as Safawi, *Dajjal*, Rafidah, *Nusayri*, Jew, and Crusade/Crusader have also been placed in this category.

Extract 7.2: Defining Munafiq and Murtad

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4 5 6	The person who calls himself a "Muslim" but unapologetically commits blatant kufr is not a munafiq (hypocrite), as some mistakenly claim. Rather, he is a murtad (apostate). The difference between nifaq (hypocrisy) and riddah is that a munafiq conceals his kufr and openly manifests Islam, quickly apologizing if ever his cover is blown. The murtad, on the other hand, openly commits his kufr after ascribing to Islam (Dabiq-14, 2016, p. 8).

Extract 7.2 above explains the conceptual segregation between *Munafiq* and *Murtadd*, two words that have been repeatedly used for stigmatizing in Dabiq Magazine. The philosophy of *Nifaq* (hypocrisy) has been explained in the Quran in multiple instances for example *Soorah*

Al-Munafiqun; Quran 9:67; 8:49; 4:140; 9:64; 4:145 etc. Although the punishment for such deeds as *Nifaq* and *Irteda* (apostasy) is serious and multiple Islamic States have capital punishment especially for later (Baker, 2018; Cook & Islam, 2006). However, since Islamic State does not ascribe to the 'man-made laws' prevailing in Islamic countries, therefore, they preferred to form the laws as per their understanding of the Islamic *Shari'ah*, and prescribed the death penalty for any such act, besides labeling them through these words. It is important to note that although the crime of apostasy is to be treated as treason to the state and society, the sentence must be executed by the sword of Imam or his lieutenants, and other ways of putting to death such as burning, drowning, flying, impaling or breaking the bones are not admissible (Peters & Gert, 1976). However, Islamic State has on multiple instances engaged in cruel punishments which are contrary to Islamic *Shari'ah* for example burning of the Jordanian pilot and the killing of a man by throwing him down from a multi-story building Dabiq-7 (2015, pp. 4-43).

Dabiq Magazine (2016, pp. 64-65) stigmatizes Hindus by using words such as filthy, cow-worshipping religion. The surrounding text also includes words and references to 'atheists', '*Taghut'*, '*Murtadd'*, 'secular', and 'filthy pagans'. Textually targeting the rulers and people of Bangladesh, also precedes the aspired regional ideological expansionism of the Islamic State, by displaying their enemies as a threat to Islam. Relatedly, an interview with Abu Jandal al-Bangali was published by the Islamic State. He was an ISIS fighter who was later killed fighting for the State. He has amply been glorified however, a reference to his father has been made as to the "*Murtadd* officer of the *Taghut* forces who was killed in 2009" Dabiq-14 (2016, pp. 50-51). Such ethical violations against the parents are against the well-known Islamic piety and tradition (Rozario, 2011).



Graph 7.2: Representation of Social Stigma in Dabiq Magazine

As shown in Graph 7.2 above, *Daesh* has related several undesirable negative social attributes within certain religions –to draw and enforce the 'us' vs 'them' ideology through dehumanizing. To stigmatize the enemies based on socially disparaging language, the words placed in this category include Drunkard, Druggy, Filth, Sodomite, Spiteful, Wicked, Lie/Liar, Evil, Fool, and Slave. Most of these crimes were punished very harshly by the Islamic State and will be discussed in the visualization impact in the next chapters.

7.3.2 **Infrahumanization – Animal Labels as Stigma**

Dabiq Magazine has used similar slurs to dehumanize enemies of the Islamic State. The stigmatizing words used by *Daesh* include Dog, Donkey, Vulture, Sheep, Cow, and Chicken. Graph 7.3 below shows the reference to stigma referring to or equating the enemies to some lower species of animals in Dabiq Magazine. Although such labels are few and far between, a detailed discussion on these will ensue in subsequent paras.



Graph 7.3: Representation of Animal Labels as Stigma

As shown in Graph 7.3 above, in Dabiq text, for example, the word 'dog' has been used seven (7) times, to objectify the enemy as a mark of disdain. Dabiq-4 (2014, p. 8) highlights the word dog in an argument regarding arms being supplied to the enemies of *Daesh* by saying, "send arms and equipment to your agents and dogs". This label has been published with the background showing American military corpses inside an aircraft. The American military was aiding Syrian rebels (cf McKelvey, 2015; Schmitt & Pol'y, 2014; Totten, 2012), and the weapons supplied to these rebels were either bought or as claimed by Dabiq, won by fighters of the Islamic state. The use of words such as 'your', 'them', and 'you' for the enemy creates the agency of 'other'. Words such as 'us' and 'our' have been associated with divine help by mentioning the word 'Allah', as a source of help for the Islamic State in

capturing these weapons. This also objectifies the 'other' like dogs, used as a culturally dehumanizing notion. In this context, the next few paragraphs explain the actual Islamic narrative that does not grade a dog as a disparaging animal.

The cultural trajectory of objectifying others as 'dogs' has its origins among some Muslims who consider dogs to be ritually impure and this objectification is intended to show disgust towards the enemy. Deconstructing (Abbadi, 2017) the objectification of the enemy as 'dog' by Islamic State, through hermeneutical philosophy, rather complicates the issue and goes contrary to its intended dehumanizing outcome. Quran refers to the word 'dog' five times in three verses and two different *Soorahs*, but not once with disgust or hatred. For example, *Soorah Al-A'raaf* (7:176):

> And if we had willed, we could have elevated him thereby, but he adhered [instead] to the earth and followed his own desire. So, his example is like that of the dog: if you chase him, he pants, or if you leave him, he [still] pants. This is the example of the people who denied Our signs. So, relate the stories that perhaps they will give thought.

Also, *Soorah Al-Kahf* (18:18):

> And you would think them awake, while they were asleep. And We turned them to the right and to the left, while their dog stretched his forelegs at the entrance. If you had looked at them, you would have turned from them in flight and been filled by them with terror.

Again, in *Soorah Al-Kahf* (18:22):

> They will say there were three, the fourth of them being their dog; and they will say there were five, the sixth of them being their dog – guessing at the unseen; and they will say there were seven, and the eighth of them was their dog. Say [O Muhammad], 'my Lord is the most knowing of their number. None knows except a few. So do not argue about them except with an obvious argument and do not inquire them among [the speculators] from anyone'.

The above-mentioned verses from the Quran, (the only ones talking about dogs in the Quran) do not objectify dogs as disgusting or disdainful animals. Therefore, these verses serve as a counter-argument to the religious understanding and projection of the issue by the Islamic State. Moreover, name-calling (or stigma) itself is a legally agreed upon prohibited (*Haram*) act (al-Sajdi, 2003) when combined with the Islamic philosophical and ethical morality (Omar, 2016), the entire notion of stigmatization under the Islamic philosophy gets negated.

Dehumanizing objectification has been urged repeatedly by ISIS, to equate their enemies to socially and in some cases culturally despised animals (Tlili, 2018). However, when an

individual willingly allows such objectification, as explicated by Foucault (1982b), the text also reveals animal labels for glorifying the 'in-group', for example as shown in Extract 7.1 below:

Extract 7.3: Stigmatizing the Enemies

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4	Wilayat al-Falujah continues to witness frequent and intense battles between the lions of the Islamic State and the safawi dogs of the crusaders. Just recently, the mujahidin succeeded in cleansing the Shuhada' neighborhood in Saqlawiyyah, driving out the safawi army in a humiliating defeat (Dabiq-4, 2014).

Extract 7.3 above is a vivid example of the signification of 'us' vs 'them', 'right' vs 'wrong' labeling. 'Lion' as a (superior) symbol of bravery, has been associated with the 'mujahideen' of the Islamic State. 'Mujahideen' is an honorary label and a salutation, and associating this to the fighters of the Islamic State is intended at elevating their status.

7.3.3 **Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity within Stigma**

The recurring stigma text in Dabiq Magazine has historicity and draws on multiple references to early and classic Islamic era philosophers.

Extract 7.4: Segregating and Othering the Enemy - *Rafidah*

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	In addition to that, he tried to convince everyone to force every apostate group present in Iraq into an all-out war with Ahlus Sunnah. So, he targeted the Iraqi apostate forces (army, police, and intelligence), the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and militias). And the Kurdish secularists (Barzani and Talabani partisans. In his speech titled "Hadha Bayanullin-Nasi wa li Yundharu Bih" (This is a Deceleration for the people that They may Be Warned by it), he threatened war on any Sunni tribe, party, or assembly that would support the crusaders Dabiq-1 (2014, p. 36).

Extract 7.4 above refers to the founder of the Islamic State Abu Musab al Zarqawi (e.g. Michael, 2007). The text is creating otherness by implicating the enemies at all multiple levels of engagement. It also reveals the core ideology of the Islamic State, contextualized by creating otherness and stigmatizing. The text has four major functions that merit analytical attention: (1) creation of otherness through aggressive and hegemonic language; (2) targeting everyone not ascribing to *Daesh* ideology, regardless of the religion or sectarian denominations; (3) stigmatizing Christians and threatening their supporters; and (4) the intertextuality[41] (See for exampleFairclough, 2000; Prentice & Barker, 2017) of specifically

[41] "The intertextual analysis maps the text on to the social network of orders of discourse – it identifies genres and discourses that the text draws upon, and the ways they are articulated together" (Fairclough, 2000, p. 170).

stigmatizing Shia sect. The (2) and (3) have some 'object' as targets: ideology and Christians. Similarly (1) and (4) refer to the processes or tools i.e., hegemonic language and intertextuality. To attain the first function, words such as force, all-out war, targeted, partisans, warned, and threatened, make the text more aggressive. The choice of such violent language sets the tone for laying out some of the significant aspects of *Daesh* ideology, and their worldview. The names of the authors are missing in the majority of the articles, making it harder to conduct an individual-level analysis of the linguistic trends in Dabiq. However, as argued by Nawka et al. (2012), excessive use of stigmatizing language is attributed to mentally ill perpetrators, which in absence of individual knowledge of authors shows the general tendency in this terrorist organization.

To attain the next two meanings of this text, hostile language is an indicator of their ideological differences, and perceived animosity towards every group (Sunni, Shia, and non-Muslims) who do not ascribe to their brand of Islam. They also claim to be the sole claimants of being *Ahle Sunnah*[42], and any group opposing, resisting, and warring against Daesh has been labeled 'apostate'.

Sunnis have been cautioned against supporting the coalition forces -'crusaders'. Throughout their publications, 'crusaders' has been added to the text as a disparaging slur against the 'Western, Christians and their forces. Dabiq Magazine implicates Kurds for their secularist approach. Although, as argued by McDowall (2004, p. 10) almost "75% of Kurds are also from the Sunni sect of Islam", although they have been labeled as enemies of the Islamic State, due to their secularist approach.

The fourth and final function of this text is stigmatizing the Shia sect of Islam through a heavily loaded disparaging slur *Rafidah*. This word has a long and well-debated history. The literal meanings are, 'an army of a military force which has deserted its leader' or 'deserters' or 'traitors' (Friedlaender, 1908). Contrary to *Mu'tazilites* (explained above), Shia Muslims never label themselves as *Rafidah* (plural *Rawafidh*). It is an offensive slur or a stigma referred to as *nomen odiosum* (a hateful nickname). The polemical nature of *Rafidah* is directly linked to the mental state of the person using it. The deconstructed historicity of the word shows multiple sects of Islam using it to demean the other group. As expounded by

[42] Literal meanings 'Worthy keepers of Prophet's tradition'.

Friedlaender (1908), Twelver Shiites who believe in twelve Imams[43], use this nickname to stigmatize those who gave precedence to those other than Ali in the Caliphate after the Prophet (referring to those who elected Abu Bakr and Omar). The second category using *Rafidah* as a stigmatizing label is that of Zaidi Shias who believe in five Imams.[44] As per the Zaidi Shias, *Rafidah* are those who abandoned Zeid's Caliphate in 122 Hijri, and started a different stream of transferring the leadership (*Imamat*) to Imam Bakir, and abandoned Zedi's leadership.

The third category constitutes Sunnis who label *Rafidah* as those who abandoned the Caliphates of Abu Bakr and Omar. The interesting yet contradictory historicity of the *Rafidah* as a pejorative appellation was adopted by those against whom it was directed. Kohlberg (1979) explains this adaptation by those who sided with Prophet Moses in 'rejecting the evil' in the face of Pharaoh. However, the term *Rafidah* has been used excessively in Dabiq referring to Shias as stigmatizing sarcasm. For example, "the hands of the mujahidin soaked in the blood of the filthy *Nusayriyyah* are a testament to the jihad of the Islamic State against Bashar and his minions" (Dabiq-2, 2014, p. 42). This assertion targets the Alawi Shias from Sham, the sect of President Bashar al Assad. This label has been used disparagingly, 167 times in all fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine to show hatred against this group.

The genealogical historicity of *Nusayri* traces its roots back to the 9th Century. This offshoot of the Shia sect was founded by Abu Shuayb Mohammad ibn Nusayr al Nimiri, and they believe in the first ten Imams of Shi'ism. Siegel (2017, p. 60) that this sect referring to Alawites is not divinely inspired as it follows a man rather than a God. For his religious deviance Nusayr was excommunicated twice (Friedman, 2010, p. 8). The first time, when he claimed that he was the prophet sent by al-Hadi (to whom he attributed divinity), and the second time after the death of Imam Hasan al-Askari, when Ibn Nusayr claimed to be the Imam's *bab*[45] (his intimate messenger). Citing Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th Century firebrand Islamic scholar, Pipes (1990, p. 163) and Moubayed (2015, p. 29) contend that "Nusayri are greater infidels than the Jews and Christians", the argument was also reiterated by one of the

[43] Ali, Hassan, Hussein, Zein Al Abdin Ali, Mohammad Al Bakir, Jafar As Sadiq, Musa Kazim, Ali Al Raza, Mohammad At Taqqi, Ali An Naqqi, Hassan Askari, Mohammad Al Mahdi
[44] Ali, Hassan, Hussein, Zein and Zeid.
[45] Literal meanings door.

modern-day Egyptian Islamic scholars Yusuf Al Qaradawi, as an instigation for Sunnis of Middle East to fight against Bashar Al Assad (Spencer, 2013).

Multiple Fatwas also exist declaring Nuysyris as the non-Muslim heretics outside Islam. It wasn't until the early 1970s (and the rise of Pan-Arabism) that the addicts were issued accepting them as Shia Muslims (Talhamy, 2010). Dabiq Magazine, as already mentioned has excessively used this word to refer to Assad and his forces and to stigmatize them.

Extract 7.5: Glorifying and Ideologizing *Fitna*

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	In short, he strived to create as much chaos as possible with the means permitted by the Shari'ah using attacks sometimes referred to as operations of "nikayah" (injury) that focus on causing the enemy death, injury, and damage. With chaos, he intended to prevent any taghut regime from ever achieving a degree of stability that would enable it to reach a status quo similar to that existing in the Muslim lands ruled for decades by tawaghit. Such a status quo – consisting of powerful intelligence and security agencies – allowed the tawaghit to crush the Islamic movement that tried to only slightly raise its head and whisper its creed (Dabiq-1, 2014).

This extract 7.5 above explicates the Islamic State's ideology of *fitna*[46] through *nihayah* operations, following the footsteps of Zarqawi (Lines 1 and 2). Besides using stigmatizing words such as *Taghut* in the text, the argument that the *Shari'ah* allows the creation of chaos and *fitna*, is unsubstantiated and has been elaborately refuted by multiple scholars (cf Jackson, 1999; Shishkina & Issaev, 2017). Talking about the theory of offensive Jihad, Shah (2013), argues that the aggressive teachings of Syed Qutub, [follower of Ibn Taymiyyah, he was also declared a philosopher of terror (Berman, 2003)] and other similar scholars fail to stand up to Quranic scrutiny. There is no provision for creating chaos in *Shari'ah* to cause injury or death to the enemy. More specifically one Muslim is not allowed to wage such operations against another Muslim, to create space for their own political or territorial gains. The significant stigmatizing word used here is *Taghut* (plural *Tawaghit*), which appears almost 444 times in Dabiq Magazine (See Chapter 5, Table 5.2), mostly referring to rulers of the Muslim countries. The word *Taghut* and its derivatives (Abdul-Wahid, 2013; Mutahhari, 1985) appear ten times in the Quran in nine different verses.

The philosophy refers to *Taghut* as false deities, oppressive, helper of Satan, transgressor, oppressor, diabolic deviant from goodness, imbecile, a statue of Roman emperors, statue of

[46] Chaos

rulers in general, and everything that is worshipped besides Allah such as graves, trees, human beings, animals, fire, etc. The slur *Taghut* also refers to something or someone who is obeyed and followed in the absence of obedience to Allah, one who claims to know unseen, apart from Allah (cf Figueira, 2011, pp. 121-142; Khatab, 2006, pp. 35, 49-50; Taleghani, 1982, pp. 80-82).

Dabiq Magazine refers to almost every country of the Islamic world following *Taghutism*, offering an alternative to Muslims in the shape of the Islamic State. However, the ideology of offensive *Jihad* as seen in this excerpt and Dabiq text in general does not help *Daesh* to add strength to their argument. Their interpretation of Islamic traditions and enforcement of chaos under the guise of Islamic *Shari'ah*, criticizes Tawaghit of the 21st Century, whinging limits on the expansion of such violent organizations.

As mentioned above, Islamic State also targeted multiple religious organizations, especially targeting Shia such as Hizballah from Lebanon (Wege, 1994). Referring to the attacks carried out by *Daesh* in Lebanon, Dabiq refers to Hizballah, "Burj al-Barajinah located in the southern suburb of Beirut, a Hizbul-Lat stronghold, and detonated it on a gathering of Rafidi mushrikin [….] killing more than 40 Rafidah […..] May Allah accept our istishhadi[47] brother amongst the shuhada" (Dabiq-12, 2015, pp. 27-28), uses offensive language including words such as 'Hizbul-Lat', 'Rafidi Mushrikin'[48], 'Murtaddin'[49], and 'istishhadi'[50] etc.

The use of Hizbul-Lat, is a serious allegation and a stigmatizing label. The genealogy of the word Al-Lat reveals the word used as one of the female idols in pre-Islamic Arabia. The name Al-Lat appears mostly alongside Manat and al-Uzza (Berkey, 2003, p. 42; Hawting, 1999, p. 130). During the time of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and even before that, these three were the female idols, Al-Lat being the goddess of war, combat, and fertility. These three female idols; Lat, Manat, and Uzza, were also referred to as Allah's daughters, which necessitates hermeneutical reference. This allegation (of these three goddesses being divine daughters) has been refuted explicitly, "have you considered Al-Lat and Al-Uzza? And Manat, the other third. It is for you the males, and Him the females. That indeed is a division most unfair Quran" (*An-Najm*, 53: 19-22).

[47] Martyr (Banat & Ajarma, 2017).
[48] One who turns back from Islam.
[49] Person who equates others to Allah. The process is called Shirk.
[50] Associated to martyrdom attained through suicide bombing. Literal meanings 'to call witness'.

These verses deny the Creator having any offspring. However, these names remained stigmatizing slurs in Arab culture. There are multiple etymologies mentioned in Islamic hermeneutics about Al-Lat. Al-Lat has been mentioned as a white stone with inscriptions on it. There was a house built around it with curtains, servants, and a courtyard, to rival *Ka'aba*, and the people of *Taif* specifically the tribe of *Thaqif* used to worship Al-Lat and boast about its possession (Ibn-e-Kathir, 2006, pp. 384-386). The second explanation for Al-Lat is that the name has been feminized from the name Allah. Ibn-e-Kathir also provides a third explanation mentioning Al-Lat as the name of a person who used to mix barley mash with water and offer it to pilgrims in the pre-Islamic times. When he died, people started worshipping him. It is therefore obvious that the word has an offensive connotation and has remained stigmatized throughout Islamic history. Reference to Hezbollah as Hizbal-Lat reveals that *Daesh* possesses enormous hatred against Shias, as this stigma not only throws the stigmatized out of the circle of Islam, but rather makes blasphemous infidels, worthy of death (Zelin & Smyth, 2014).

7.4 Stigma Discourse in Dabiq – A Critical Reflection

Dehumanization/infrahumanization, and stigmatizing are socially repugnant concepts (Falk, 2001b; Goffman, 1963; Haslam, 2015; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). However, analysis of Dabiq's text reveals a discourse around stigma visible in all fifteen issues. The assumption by Hammersley (1997) that CDA relies solely on the grand sociological theory involving two parties – the 'oppressor' and the 'oppressed' and that there is only one relationship between them – domination, has to a serious degree been challenged in this chapter. The relationship of *Daesh* with the rest of the world is dynamic, is constantly updating, and can broadly be summarized into three categories. First, it is the relationship between the State (in this case Syria and Iraq) and ISIS. In this relationship, millions of individuals from Syria and Iraq were oppressed and the extremist group Islamic State is the oppressor. The oppressor has mostly dominated and claimed the territory out of the states' ownership and has tried to carve a society with a significantly different ideology.

Second, this is a relationship between an organization that claims to be the sole flag-bearer of a specific religious ideology – *Shari'ah,* and anyone from any part of the world regardless of the geographical location can claim the membership. Laliwala (2005, p. 130) quoting Abu'l Kalam Azad, argues that religion (Islam) should be defined as *Deen*[51] and not as *Shari'ah*,

[51] Literal meanings creed or religion

because there could be a difference of opinion on different provisions of *Shari'ah* but there can be no difference regarding *Deen*, as it contains general principles of religion. The imposition of a specific version of *Shari'ah* per se, in a territory, is a relationship of dominance, however, the impact of this dominance tends to wither away as the virtual outreach instead of geography defines the territory. For example, Islamic State did announce multiple *Walayats* (governorates), spread way outside their political control. Such a relationship, therefore, tends to be dynamic, conditional, and fragile.

The third kind of relationship, which is much more complex and multi-layered, exists between this group (that has itself been labeled as 'extremist' by the rest of the world), and the rest of the world which controls a dominant discourse against this extremist group. From the Islamic State's point of view, they are oppressed and the rest of the world are oppressors. However, the rest of the world, by labeling this group as violent and extremist, claims that this is an oppressive group, and those within the territorial claim of this state are oppressed and need to be helped.

Within these three kinds of relationships exists a society experiencing dichotomous and contending discourses. The social territory carved out by *Daesh*, is coerced, oppressed, and violated if seen through dominant global discourse. The same society has been portrayed in Dabiq Magazine, as an ideal place for living through Islamic *Shari'ah* and the best place for practicing the religion, when seen through *Daesh* discourse.

Islamic State *has* challenged the existing norms, violated the norms by carving out a territory for its state within existing and recognized borders of other states, and claimed a caliphate and statehood, yet it has not been accepted as a state by the rest of the world, since it violated the internationally recognized norms of statehood and Westphalian sovereignty. Within its own claimed territory, the organization claims to perform certain basic functions of a state, such as the provision of health, education, basic services, passport, currency, and other citizen services. Despite all of this the illegality of its existence dominated the global discourse. There is thus an ongoing war between this group and the rest of the world and within this framework, ISIS seeks vengeance through stigma.

7.5 **Conclusion**

To conclude, in this chapter stigma discourse has been analyzed focusing on the text from all fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine. *Daesh* itself has been a stigmatized organization, labeled

as extremists, brutal, and radicals, who propagated a violent ideology. Dabiq Magazine, however, claims that Muslims all over the world are stigmatized. To seek vengeance and to put up a show of resistance, they resorted to excessive offensive philological choices, to counter-stigmatize their enemies.

In stigmatizing their enemies, *Daesh* has adopted multiple strategies of repetitive nature. Regardless of the caste, creed, color, religion, and sect, they have stigmatized their enemies using disparaging and derogatory text. Their philological choices are generally offensive and the absence of the author's name from most of the articles makes it harder to carry out an individual level of analysis. Using dehumanizing language, Islamic State has created a dichotomy between its words and action. As explained in the philosophy section, Islamic philosophy and hermeneutics forbid stigma as discourse. There is no provision for calling others by offensive nicknames. Islamic State boasts to be the sole organization following the true teachings of Islam; however, stigmatizing Muslims and non-Muslims alike simply refutes their claim.

The use of historically referenced and generally loaded text shows the possession of excessive knowledge of Islamic tradition, jurisprudence, and *Shari'ah*. The span of stigmatizing terms throughout fifteen publications shows their ideological consistency of hatred for their enemies. They have demarcated the boundaries between themselves and 'others' by adopting the notion of binary vision in the very first issue of Dabiq Magazine, and thereafter the tone and tenor have not deviated.

In the quest to gain symbolic power, *Daesh* has resorted to stigmatization. To understand the manifestation of the Islamic State's power, the next chapter will focus on the theme of power in Dabiq Magazine as seen through the philosophical lens and historicity of power.

Chapter 8: Analysis: Theme – Foucauldian Knowledge/Power

8.1 Overview

This chapter is an examination and a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) of the concept of knowledge/power and how its manifestation can be understood in the context of Dabiq Magazine. The underpinnings of Foucauldian knowledge/power as a textual practice are spread in all the Islamic State media productions. This chapter also exemplifies that the Foucauldian power is omnipresent in a tripartite relationship between the Islamic State, the society, and the global audience. As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), and argued by many scholars (See, e.g. Hall, 2001; Waitt, 2016), the discourse of knowledge/power makes the ideological concepts matters of common sense for the subjects, thereby motivating the subjects to perform certain functions in discourse. The methodology of the FDA as drawn by Willig (2013b), has been mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4) and applied in examining Chapter 6. This chapter draws on the same model to understand the ever-present concept of power in Dabiq text and how certain practices ensued in the implementation of the Islamic State's ideology and conflict.

This analysis encompasses the manifestation of discursive power by *Daesh*. This analysis is concerned with the textual descriptions of the social aspects depicted in Dabiq Magazine and focuses on the discursive resources in Islamic State's culture and its implications for the subjects. This analysis further includes the examination of Foucauldian philosophical underpinnings intersecting with Dabiq Magazine, including a satiating discussion (under the relevant sections) about observation and monitoring of its subjects by the Islamic State, power resistance and subjectivity, knowledge/power, and discourse in ISIS, power in Islamic State's governmentality and its ideology and hegemony.

8.2 Stages of the FDA



Figure 8.1: Stages of Foucauldian Discouse Analysis Knowledge/Power

Figure 1 above is an explanation of the FDA, showing multiple concepts and their intersection with Dabiq Magazine and the Foucauldian philosophy of knowledge/power. This model shows the salient of the six-stage analysis related more specifically to this chapter, and the concepts being analyzed at each stage have been identified here.

8.2.1 **Discursive Constructions**

This stage of the FDA explains how discursive objects are constructed. The focal selection of these objects depends upon the research questions. The dominant questions in this chapter are the discursive knowledge/power, how it appears in Dabiq Magazine and how it impact lived experiences of society. Therefore, our discursive object would be knowledge/power. One way to construct discursive knowledge/power (for example), has been the self-praise and salutations for the self-avowed caliph and his top lieutenants. Dabiq-1 (2014, pp. 4-21), refers to the top leadership in the newly formed caliphate, with a lot of reverence as *hafidhahullah*[52], and *Rahimahullah*[53]. Such salutations, besides being a mark of cultural respect, also exhibit a certain kind of privileged knowledge/power enjoyed by some people because of their status within the Islamic State (while others yet have been excessively stigmatized through crude language, see Chapter 7 for example). Additionally, this means that the construction of a powerful agent of the caliphate deserves obligatory respect through such prayer for every instance of reference made to him.

8.2.2 **Discourse**

Foucault argues that power is present in all social relations, starting at the family level and going high in the social order. Delving into history, Foucault (1975) argues that some sections of society were classified as sick, criminal, and insane so that they could be placed under surveillance, by the state or government. Such observation was coded as discourse, a terrain of thought, a system of knowledge, and specific use of language that allowed few things to be said and disallowed few others. Different methodologies of discursive construction within the knowledge/power discourse are being mentioned below with specific relevance to *Daesh*.

8.2.2.1 ***Social differentiation in Discourse***

Social differentiation (Lemaine, 1974) in discourse prefers one to act upon others, or in the case of ISIS, individual disparity due to religious status, dominance and privileges within institutions

[52] Literal meanings ‘may Allah protect him’.
[53] Literal meanings ‘may Allah have mercy on him’

for people such as the commander of a force, and power to make decisions based upon the knowledge. *Daesh* has utilized these attributes to spread their ideology, spread propaganda in Dabiq Magazine. In continuation of the above-mentioned example, Dabiq-11 (2015c, p. 38) refers to a dead soldier (not a well-known ISIS leader) as "may Allah accept him". This is a striking manifestation of the knowledge/power hierarchy in *Daesh* ranks.

8.2.2.2 ***Institutionalization***

Another way to ensure a valuable discursive construction is by the institutionalization of certain rituals, traditions, and actions – all some forms of power manifestation. For example, Dabiq-2 (2014, p. 38) articulates the disbursement of the "caring for the orphans" through the distribution of *Ghanimah*[54] among them. This is a humane function and is aimed at institutionalizing the system of sharing wealth within the society (Zaman, 2018). However, in stark contrast, Dabiq-7 (2015, p. 42) refers to the "clamping down on sexual deviance, by throwing a 65 years old man off the roof, indicating the extreme form of institutional justice dispensation. These two contrasting ideological institutional functions show the strict implementation of the law, both in the reward and punishment domains.

8.2.2.3 ***The Discursive Rationalization***

The rationalization of knowledge/power as per the given situation is effective discursive construction. The power relationship is rooted in the social fabric of society and is visible in everyday relationships. For example:

Extract 8.1: Rationalizing and legalizing Polygyny

Line	Extract
1	What's strange is that the Jews and Christians taunt the Muslims with respect to
2	polygyny, yet if they were to look into their own books, they would've known that
3	it was something present in their religion, for it is stated in their books that Yaqub
4	had two wives and two concubines, and that Dawud had number of wives and
5	concubines as mentioned in 2 Samuel [5"13] and 1 Samuel [25"42-44]. They also
6	stated that Sulayman had 700 wives and 300 concubines (Dabiq-12, 2015, pp. 19-
7	20).

Extract 8.1 above shows the discursive construction of polygyny (Line 2), discourse in Dabiq text. The discourse of rationalization of polygyny under *Daesh* was instituted through an article by a woman author in Dabiq Magazine. The patriarchal nature of the household structures allowing multiple marriages and encouraging husbands to marry more than once is just one

[54] Literal meanings 'war booty'

method of the power/knowledge discourse manifestation. The reference to multiple Prophets (Lines 4-6), has been made to emphasize the normalcy of the discourse, and how, in Foucauldian analysis, particular knowledge becomes common sense (Waitt, 2010).

8.2.3 **Action Orientation**

This stage of FDA focuses on the discursive construction at a particular moment in a specific discourse, oriented towards action. The question answered through this stage is why a particular discursive construction is happening within knowledge/power discourse in this particular text or at this particular place in Dabiq Magazine. Action orientation focuses on the analysis of the gains made through placing certain knowledge/power manifestations at a particular point in the Dabiq text. The claim that "in burning the crusader pilot alive and burying him under a pile of debris, the Islamic State carried out a just form of retaliation" as a response to the killing of ISIS subjects (Dabiq-7, 2015, pp. 6-8).

Figure 8.2: The charred Body of the Jordanian Pilot (Dabiq-7, 2015, p. 8)

Figure 8.2 above shows the image of the charred body of Moaz Al Kasasbeh, the Jordanian pilot whose plane was shot down by *Daesh*, and he was burned alive (Jackson & Kuenzli, 2018). By burning the pilot, *Daesh* was able to send a violent message about brutality to the rest of the world. Subsequent criticism and retaliation against the Islamic State's burning of pilots resulted in an explanation offered in the surrounding text (Randall, 2018). The rebuttal article or the reactive action orientation, in Dabiq Magazine, contains an argument substantiated with the help of historical as well as Quranic references. Spreading fear and terror is well achieved by displaying such events through videos and publications. The ultimate aim is the manifestation of

knowledge/power discourse which originated from the physical dimension, but was made common sense through the combination of knowledge with power to justify action orientation. The action in Daesh discourse is oriented towards Foucauldian concept of governmentality and its functional manifestation.

ISIS finds itself in an isolated and chaotic situation, making it hard to retain loyalties and ensure stable governance. This sub-section examines the notion of Foucauldian governmentality and how can this be conceptualized in the context of the Islamic State. Within the realm of *Daesh* governmentality, it can be argued that there was a duality in power discourse. The centralized caliphate on one hand also constituted the coercive relationship within its territorial domain and with the enemies of the caliphate from outside. On the other hand, it was a suppression of the religious dissidence inside the Islamic State and about those Muslims living elsewhere, whose attention was necessary for *Daesh* to enhance its clientele. It is at the intersection of these two dichotomies that *Daesh's* text tackles the problems that came with serious intensity, of how to rule, how would the subjects desire to be ruled, how strictly, and by what methods should this rule be legitimized and promulgated. The problematic answers to these questions brought the sovereignty of the caliphate to stand in the relation of singular externality to those living in the region, i.e., the governments of Syria and Iraq, besides a coalition of multiple nations from the rest of the world, and many small and large local religious organizations and alliances.

Islamic State has tried to fulfill all three Foucauldian aspects of governmentality (Foucault, 1991). Self-governance or the verification of character of the self-avowed caliph was contextualized as an honorable person with noble lineage. Reference to his name has been made with great respect in Dabiq-1 (2014, p. 21) calling him 'Amirul-Mu'minin Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (hafidahullah)' and 'Khalifah of the Muslims Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Baghdadi (hafidahullah)' (Dabiq-5, 2014, p. 22), etc. Multiple authors outside the Islamic State as well went to great lengths to explain the traits, character, and legitimacy of his caliph-ship (See for example Atwan, 2015; Cockburn, 2016b; Dyer, 2015; Hall, 2015a; Lister, 2015b; Mann, 2017; Moore, 2015; Phillips, 2016; Stern & Berger, 2015). After ensuring that sufficient propagation has been made of the high character of the caliph, Islamic State desired a similar degree of motivation and abidance of strict religious laws. In this regard, the following excerpt explains certain functions of the governmentality, such as provision of security, collection (although coercive) of *Zakah*[55], prerequisites of an Islamic caliph, and religious monism (Anthony,

[55] Islamic taxation (See for exampe Barizah, Rahim, & Rahman, 2007)

Hermans, & Sterkens, 2005; Chaplin, 2008), or advocacy for the absence of religious pluralism (See for example Chaves & Gorski, 2001; Harris, 2002).

Extract 8.2: Foucauldian Governmentality in Islamic State

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	This reality of the Caliphate is confirmed by many things, the people living under its governance, for one. For the first time in years, Muslims are living in security and their businesses are doing roaring trade. The *zakah* system has been up and running, taking a percentage of the peoples' wealth and dispersing it to the poor […] There is only one sect here, Sunni Islam, and the Caliph can only be from one tribe, Quraysh. Here in the Caliphate, there is no room for pluralism (Dabiq-12, 2015, p. 47).

Extract 8.2 above shows two statements excerpted from one of the articles published in Dabiq Magazine. The author goes to great lengths to praise *Daesh*, the system of governance, and how the West is praising the Islamic State as a reality. The author has made certain claims such as a denial of the presence of any other sects and the claim of Caliphate for Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi (Lines 5-6) because he claimed to be from the Quraysh tribe of Holy Prophet Mohammad. These and many other claims have been refuted by multiple scholars and have no scientific evidence. Such claims are communicated as truth supporting the power and to perpetuate the cycle, the same power is used to create more truths (cf Mumby & Stohl, 1991). The following concepts are drawn from Bujaki, Gaudet, and Iuliano (2017) to explain the governmentality in ISIS.



Figure 8.3: Governmentality in ISIS

Figure 8.3 above synthesizes three distinct practices in *Daesh*: governmentality, subjects, and identity. The territorial conquest of *Daesh* involved the systematic control over the indigenous people's identity – physical and ideological – who were perceived as 'religiously' infantile and vulnerable, and yet capable of rising against the caliphate if their raw impulses were left unchecked in the absence of a religious social contract. The time corresponds to the publication of Dabiq Magazine, i.e., between June 2014 and July 2016. The three overarching vertices of the triangle are governmentality which influences both the subjects and their identities. Subjectivity and identities do not influence the governmentality, therefore, the unidirectional arrow depicts the flow. The trajectories of economy, religiosity, and safety and security remain flat and fluctuate between the subjects and their identities. The time signifies the dynamic nature of the subject positions and identity creation, as it varies depending upon the contextual temporality. Dabiq's literature links all three of these concepts in the knowledge/power discourse.

While performing the disciplinary functions of governmentality, ISIS has employed ancient and extreme religious practices such as stoning (See, e.g. Alasti, 2007; Kusha & Ammar, 2014; Matthews, 2010; Terman, 2010). Dabiq-2 (2014, p. 36) shows the stoning of an adulteress by the Islamic State. Such incidents have been repeatedly recorded in Dabiq Magazine and served as deterrence for everyone, ensuring highly controlled patriarchal structures of a religious society. Such manifestation of juridical power fulfills an important function of Foucauldian governmentality. In the related concept of sovereignty, Foucault (1975, p. 49) saw the sovereign power "as terroristic, creating the arena of terror not only to punish, rather display the terror to be seen with eyes for belief as a cosmological model or as a philosophico-moral ideal". Ironically, the analysis of the Islamic State's model of governmentality through Dabiq Magazine shows resounding similarities with these ideals.

Dabiq's text tends to replicate the ideals of a modern western state, and the argument that obedience is a law and obedience to the law is the law itself, making sovereignty and juridical power inseparable (Weinrib, 1982). The laws must be followed for the common benefit. The common good is the abidance of the law, therefore there is a perpetual relationship between the law and its obedience to ensure the larger common good, and sustenance of sovereignty. There is a desire for the unquestioned sovereignty of the ruler (caliph in this case) on the land. In the case of *Daesh*, it is the divine right of one person to be the caliph, which in this case was bestowed on Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, because of his claimed kinship lineage to the Prophet

(PBUH) of Islam. In this regard, the economic aspects of the governmentality in the Dabiq text reveal the issuance of the state currency. The 6th issue of Dabiq Magazine contains an article referring to the western economic meltdown and fall of the dollar as a vehicle currency (Dabiq-6, 2014/2015, p. 59). The argument has been made that paper currency is of little value and the centuries-old system of bartering through gold is a safe and futuristic way to follow. Minting own money and billions of dollars worth of cash held by the Islamic State ensured the fulfillment of this second function of governmentality and financial sustainability for this terrorist organization. For claiming an estimated worth of almost $ 2 Billion in 2014 and $ 4.5 Billion in 2015, *Daesh* has been labeled the "richest terrorist organization in history" (Hosken, 2015, p. 251). Such economic freedom gives any government substantial leverage over the subjects and allows for the purchase of a substantial amount of material and non-material inclusion and loyalty.

This concept of governmentality by Foucault (1991, pp. 87-104) also posits that in modern state systems, governments create the identities of their subjects as *visible and rational*, therefore governable. The questions of how to govern oneself, others, be governed and by whom, the answers to which can be found in Dabiq and other *Daesh* publications. Within the Westphalian notion of state and its acceptability, Islamic State found itself embroiled in multiple dilemmas. On one side they needed to make the land livable by 'friendly' governance, simultaneously they needed to ensure the strict juridical following of their version of *Shari'ah*. They continued to fight the enemies within territories under their governance who were constantly changing loyalties and realigning themselves with other religious groups. Simultaneously ISIS needed to fight off the larger enemies attacking them from outside such as the coalition under the US umbrella and the Syrian regime etc. These dilemmas also included the implementation of well-understood and practiced norms of 'statehood' which entailed territory, population, and a steady government. For example, Dabiq-1 (2014, pp. 8-9) gives the "glad tidings" to the Muslims around the world on the establishment of a caliphate. To ensure effective governance the Muslim religious sentiments were aroused by the deceleration of the "caliphate". This caliphate fulfilled multiple responsibilities, such as acting as a political entity controlling a territory, a religious entity fulfilling the religious obligations, juridical functions ensuring conformity to *Shari'ah* through the subjects, handling the force relations within its territory, and finally seeking allegiances from around the globe as the function of the true caliphate with a direct blood lineage to Prophet Mohammad. This multiplicity, when seen through a broader global perspective, also served as a Clausewitzian relationship between the strategy and politics, or

more appropriately “war as a continuation of policy through other means” (Clausewitz, 2007, pp. 252-258).

The development of rationality through governmentality may not be successful every time and might get resisted, transformed, and reclaimed (Scott, 1998, pp. 117-130). If governmentality is at play in every sphere of life, it might face challenges. In the hindsight, the same failure was observed in the case of *Daesh*, in the shape of refugees performing reverse *Hijrah* or abandoning the Islamic State and the outbreak of multiple breakaways and splinter groups from *Daesh*.

Power discourse in Dabiq's text manifests in multiple ways through the Islamic State’s governmentality. First, through rationalizing and signifying subjects, *Daesh* was able to glorify the acts of their subjects. In almost all issues of Dabiq Magazine-specific sections have been devoted to self-glorification and individual aggrandizement in articles titled “Islamic State In the Words of the Enemy” and “Among the Believers are Men” (Dabiq-1, 2014; Dabiq-8, 2015). Secondly, inculcating the notion of the governance of *self*, this included the personal conduct and ritualization of the theologically pious acts of *Jihad*, *Hijrah*, *Bay’ah,* etc. Finally, through refugee movements and breakaway groups who decided to part ways from the self-avowed caliphate.

The aggression and violence in *Daesh's* discourse have been prominent, for example, the claim that “we will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women” (Dabiq-4, 2014, p. 5), is intended at spreading the fear and pronounce the violent ideology. The ideology seeks the implementation of Islamic laws and offers a space where people would be allowed to lead their lives as per the given truth. The effect of fear and ideological appeal has been celebrated in the Dabiq text. For example the conversion of a Finnish woman and her migration to ISIS land in the article titled “how I came to Islam” (Dabiq-15, 2016, p. 36). Besides multiple young women moved from the west to ISIS-controlled lands referred to as Jihadi brides (Milton & Dodwell, 2018).

8.2.3.1 ***Observation/Monitoring in ISIS Society***

The omnipresence of power in the Islamic State is ensured through constant observation of the subjects. The adequacy of observation by *Daesh*, which can effectively be equated to the subjectification ensuring self-discipline, has been ensured through the use of multiple techniques, technologies, and methods. Foucault has almost pathologized the relationship

between observation and subjectivity, as he was aware of the aggression involved in any unidirectional observation (Foucault, 1975). This one-sided observation, when applied by the Islamic State, proved to be very effective and ensured an extremely harsh dispensation of punishment.

Resultantly, the first and a significant function in Islamic State's disciplining of its subjects have been through 'observation', which was performed by the commanders on the front line and police and in day to day social life, for example, *Khansa Brigade* (women police units) to monitor the activities of women (Cook & Vale, 2018, p. 24). By the creation of knowledge in the shape of videos, documentaries, and magazines, for example, the Arabic publication entitled *Women in the Islamic State Manifesto and Case Study*, the 'normalization' of performance of such duties was ensured, fulfilling the second technique of controlling the society and individuals. The third function of 'examination' in the Islamic State was performed by random inspections and censuring the deviant behaviour. For example, Dabiq-2 (2014, p. 33) mentions the capturing of large numbers of guns and drugs, etc. in the town of Halab in Syria, obtained through examination. The image claims the busting of a drug pedaling ring, but visible items show a majority of weapons and some books in the English language, besides some cell phones. One can only imagine some drugs in two sacks in the image. There is no scientific way to ascertain the validity of the claims made by *Daesh* regarding this claim; however, presumably owning English language books is presumed as a crime. Examination as a technique of control, visible through this image is highly ritualized and has 'hierarchical observation' and 'normalizing judgment' inbuilt in the mechanism and is an appropriate example of power/knowledge. As argued by Foucault (1975, pp. 184-185), it combines the "deployment of force and establishment of truth", and it "manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as the objects and objectification of those who are subjected".

8.2.4 **Positioning**

As mentioned in previous chapters, Davies and Harre (1999, p. 35) argue that subject positioning in discourse incorporates both conceptual repertoire and a location for an individual in the structure of rights and duties for those who use the repertoire. When a subject takes up a position, for example in the case of ISIS that of a Jihadi bride, she inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position. Such positioning in terms of the episteme could be images, metaphor, storyline, rules, concepts, etc., which are made through that discourse. Eventually, an individual doesn't emerge out of social interaction as a fixed end product, but as

one who is constituted and reconstituted through various discursive practices in which that individual participates.

Positioning might ignore individuals and place them in a particular position to promote the larger interest of a specific group in totality. Foucault argues that these individualization practices and totalization procedures are the strength of the state and are implemented through crafty political structures. The strength of the modern-day state is also an aggregation of the religious influence through 'pastoral power' endowed in pastors by the practice of Christianity (Foucault, 1982a, p. 783). He further contends that Christianity is the only religion to allow such unconstrained power. The traditional church also embodied a special form of political power in an emperor. Both pastor and the emperor were stripped of their power as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia (Mingst & Arreguín-Toft, 2017, pp. 23-24). The Foucauldian explanation of pastoral power aims at individual salvation in the world hereafter, no other religion bestows such power on human beings. There are certain striking similarities between the pastoral power and the positioning of caliphate power in the Islamic State's context. In pastoral power, those at the top are always willing to sacrifice their lives for the salvation of their followers, something which is visible in *Daesh*. Islamic State's pastoral power, looks after not only the community but each individual for the entire life cycle, something that has been glorified in multiple issues of Dabiq Magazine under the series of articles titled 'Among the Believers are Men'.

Finally, a compelling observation exists regarding the knowledge about the subjects, their innermost secrets, and exploring their mind and souls. Religion has been used by *Daesh* to motivate and attract devout Muslims from around the world to the Islamic State. Thousands of males, females, teenagers, and even families performed *Hijrah*. Such *Hijrah* was the result of agreeing with the Islamic State's eschatological ideology. Such an understanding of the subjects implies the knowledge of conscience and the ability to redirect it to position oneself in a particular situation.

Islamic State took this concept of ecclesiastical power and transformed it ideologically to conceptualize it as a historically religious truth – the Islamic notion of the caliphate. Echoing the Foucauldian pastoral power, the Islamic State took upon itself to ensure the salvation of its subjects in this world as an assured way to salvation in the world hereafter, achieved through *Jihad*, *Bay'ah,* and positioning of its subjects in a desirable manner. The religious concept of martyrdom was transformed into the Islamic State's way of *Jihad* and the result was the

ultimate salvation. Glorifying such martyrs through publications and videos perpetuated the desire of emulating those who already died during *Jihad*.

Dabiq-4 (2014, p. 28) reveals yet another humane function of ISIS, providing an elderly home, housing, and feeding the elderly. Although such positioning of the elderly as a practice is culturally Western in nature, this has been projected as an effort to demonstrate the state performing its duty. This is also a shift from the individualization of power to institutionalizing it. As mentioned above, Islamic State also adopted other state functions such as issuing currency, policing women through the *Nisa Brigade*, issuing birth certificates, providing necessities of life such as health and water supply, and maintaining an army to defend its territory.

Similarly, Islamic State also positioned itself by making crafty use of the knowledge about its subjects in two ways. First, in globalizing their cause and establishing arbitrary governorates (*Wilayah*) around the globe as their protectorates with a nominated individual as the governor of every *Walayat*. This allowed Islamic State to globalize its virtual presence and added to its strength quantitatively. Second, enhancing the analytical role of distantly positioned loyalists through the production of specific knowledge. Such knowledge was produced through online videos, magazines, and extensive use of published material (Atwan, 2015; Stern & Berger, 2015; Weiss & Hassan, 2015). This function ensured that Islamic State virtually, yet effectively communicates with subjects positioned around the globe.

8.2.5 **Practice**

This stage of analysis allows how the discursive constructions and positioning open up and close down certain possibilities of actions by the subjects in knowledge/power discourse. By placing the subject at a particular position, power discourse constrains what can be said and done. Taking the example of *Bay'ah* from Dabiq-1 (2014, p. 15), one can find repeated references to the administering of pledges from the close and afar territories. Traditionally this is supposed to be a voluntary act, however, in this case, the performance of *Bay'ah* could be under duress. In both cases, this practice is the subjugation of allegiance, usually to the new victorious masters. The text of Dabiq Magazine has been crafted to show the ideology and practices of *Daesh*, which show this organization as a humane governance mechanism that cares about the subject, on one hand, but strict implementation of (a more customized version) of

Shari'ah on the other. These practices function to attract recruits from around the globe, yet keeping the subjects fearful against any violations of the law.

Power relations in a discursive practice are intentional, the subjects in a discourse add to the power and operate in conformity with the intended outcomes (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). The subject may produce particular text, but this text will be within the bounds of discursive practice, the regime of truth, and permissible episteme. As an example, for centuries people have been moving in and out of Syria for multiple reasons, mostly trade and business, however, in past few years if one finds a family crossing the Syrian border (for example to Turkey), there is an exceeding possibility that the family would be displaced/refugee. Therefore, it is not the process of moving to/from Syria, but rather the dominant war discourse, that subjects these people as refugees. Foucault argues that we can only know things if there are meanings attached to them – a discourse, and not the things in themselves.

In the above-mentioned example, the meanings are attached to the cross-border movement of the people which is part of the war discourse in Syria. Subjects like refugees and in the Foucauldian example of "madness", "punishment" and "sexuality", only exist meaningfully within the discourse about them (Hall, 2001, p. 73). With this broader understanding of the discourse, drawing from Hall (1997, p. 45), the knowledge/power discourse in the text of Dabiq magazine and chaos in the Middle East, includes the elements referred to in the ensuing paragraphs.

Existence of statements about controlling, coercing, threatening, and physically harming people, gives us a certain kind of knowledge about power. For example, a standardized message repeated in all the issues of Dabiq Magazine is Zarqawi's statement, "the spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah's permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq" (See e.g., Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 2). This and many other threatening statements appear repeatedly in *Daesh* publications as an element of power.

The rules prescribe certain ways of talking about the way *Daesh* looks at Islam, and a distinct version of an Islamic ideology, explaining the way people should lead their lives, conduct themselves, and behave being the subjects of the Islamic State. For example (Dabiq-3, 2014a, p. 33) contains an article "Advice for those embarking upon *Hijrah*", published as general guidelines and rules of what to expect for those aspiring to join the Islamic State. These rules also include what is 'say-able' and 'thinkable' about the Islamic State, its dominant agents, such as the self-avowed caliph, Jihad and the fighters or *Mujahideen*, etc. and the code of conduct for

life publicized through this and multiple other Fatwas by the Islamic State (Revkin, 2016, p. 22).

The third element is the presence of certain deviant objects of power discourse. In this case, such objects could include a different religion, belief, or sect. The example from chapter 7 analyzing stigma, would include those who are targeted as objects of this knowledge/power discourse, and who personify this discourse with the non-*Daesh* attributes such as *Rafidah, Kafir, Satin,* etc. Similarly, the existence and interdiscursivity of knowledge about the discourse of power, and the way this knowledge was constructed at the time, manifests itself in diverse ways in other discourses, such as *Hijrah* and stigma. Knowledge power has been present in those discourses as well and is equally applicable in this analysis. Explanation of how the knowledge about the dominant power discourse and *Hijrah* or Stigma discourses, acquired authority, a sense of embodying the 'truth' about it; constituting the 'truth of the matter' at that specific historical moment (Hall, 2001, p. 73). Such truths were constructed in publications and all communications through extensive use of Quranic references, Hadith, and other historical and scholarly accounts (See for example Ford, 2016; Mihaylov, 2017).

Yet another important element is the practice within the institutions for dealing with the subjects. Performing the functions of the Westphalian state system to gain legitimacy, for example, Dabiq-5 (2014, p. 19) – issuance of the state currency, and Dabiq-4 (2014, p. 29) – the establishment of hospitals and provision of health facilities, clearly showcase the classic functions of Islamic State as a modern state. Dabiq Magazine depicts multiple instances of roles of state institutions as hospitals, currency, issuance of birth certificates, etc. ensuring implementation of legitimacy through the legal framework and reward and punishment. The projection of state functions reveals the propaganda. For example, the caption for the treatment of a child by a doctor shows a child with cancer, which may or may not be true.

The final element is the acknowledgment that within the dominant war discourse, a different discourse or *episteme* will ensue at another historical moment, displacing the previous one, opening up new discursive formations and producing instead the new conceptions of power and authority and the 'truth' to legitimize such a discourse. This also means discourse is dynamic and new discourses might replace the existing ones. The use of knowledge and its desirable interpretation has been made in multiple places to make an argument in Dabiq Magazine. For example, Dabiq-11 (2015c, p. 12) shows a person reciting the Quran. The magazine is full of references from the Quran and Hadith and pictures of people reciting the Quran. Such pictures

could serve multiple purposes. First that the eternal salvation is in recitation and obeying the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah, which would consequently entail obedience to Islamic State laws. Secondly, the *Shari'ah* imposed by Islamic State needs to be followed by everyone as it is the truth and historical arguments in Dabiq Magazine are testimony to this. Thirdly it also explains the kind of institutional division of knowledge, for example, in the case of Islamic States, it includes the Quran, Hadith, Islamic Jurisprudence, economic system, etc. which shows the materiality of knowledge as an instance of power. Finally, it also lays down the rules and *practices* through which certain objects, concepts, and strategies are formed in *Daesh* discourse.

8.2.6 **Subjectivity**

The subject in discourse is not a *thing* per se, rather it is a *position* maintained within the structure of force (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008, p. 94), such a position could be a mother, father, soldier, Jihadi bride, and a commander, etc. For example, in the case of the Islamic State, as has been mentioned in previous chapters as well, almost 70,000 males and females moved from around the world to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside *Daesh*. Volunteerism is only one way to look at their actions, as they left their homes purposefully to perform specific duties and knowingly subjected themselves to the brutal conditions of the war zone.

Within the regime of Foucauldian power/knowledge, physical violence and coercion progressively give way to 'subjectification', which is not achieved through physical force, but rather by the production of 'confirming subjects' and docile bodies' (Richard & Aggelton, 2003). The religious narrative used by *Daesh* to attract people from all walks of life, and from around the globe through the operationalization of *Hijrah*, has been an effort in conformity with voluntary subjectivity.

Within the subjectivity argument, a Jihadi who is fighting against or for Islamic State is the object of his commander's power. But if he decides to defect taking many along and forming a splinter group, he subjects his commander to the collective power of defection. By occupying a comparatively lower or insignificant subject position in the new group, he becomes the object of the power of the new group. This fluid nature of power is exhibited in Foucault's conception of power and the Islamic State's livid experiences.

For the production of the *docile bodies or subjects*, two new forms of power i.e. disciplinary power and bio-power remained Foucault's focus. The explanation of these two concepts were the subjects of his work in *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*, in which he explained the training and tuning of human bodies to docility. The aim of this discipline is not

to repress or punish the subjects, it rather drills them, trains them, and 'normalizes' them (Foucault, 1975, pp. 183-189). Similarly, *docile subjects* of the Islamic State are being observed day and night for their practices, participation in *Jihad*, marriages, and other ecclesiastical duties and this surveillance is not to force them to do the right thing, but rather instill this feeling of rendering their services as a subject for the larger 'religious cause' voluntarily.

As per Foucault, there are two meanings of the subject, subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by conscience or self-knowledge. The subjects of the Islamic State fall under both categories. They are subjects of *Daesh* through (physical and psychological control) achieved under coercion and violence, and subjects tied to their own identity as the rest of the world looks at them as the 'terrorists', 'Islamists' and 'Muslims' etc.

Every instance and practice of knowledge/power manifestation and subjectivity is likely to face resistance. The resistance against the grand power (the sum of all the power) can be categorized into three forms. First, this resistance is against domination such as ethnic, social, and religious. Such domination and subjectivity are hierarchal, multi-layered, recurring, and are found in the larger domains of economic, social, and structural exploitation. For example, in this case, the sudden and violent creation of the Islamic State as a practice. Foucault's second form of resistance to subjectivity comes from those exploited individuals who are separated from what they produce. Such exploitation mostly relates to economic dominance including loss of a job, forced removal from the home, exclusion from the cultivation of land for resource extraction, and developmental projects such as dams, roads, buildings, etc. are all examples of such form of subjectivity. Residents of Syria and Iraq have experienced such subjectivity practices in one form or the other. The third form of resistance is against the domination that ties an individual to himself or paves way for forceful submission to others. In the case of the Islamic State, individuals were subjected to both restrictions and submission.

Resistance as a practice against subjectivity in power discourse can exist in isolation or a group form. In Islamic State, from the individual perspective, group resistance is visible in the form of 'Reverse *Hijrah'* (Iftikhar, 2017a), performed by those who decided to migrate away from this land to Europe and elsewhere. Criticism and resistance also prevail in the role of religion as the form of creating subjectivity by forcing the followers to strictly adhere to certain religious rituals and obligations such as *Jihad* in the case of *Daesh* (Dabiq-10, 2015, p. 15). Such religious obligations, to a great extent, have been 'misconstrued and misinterpreted' by *Daesh* to suit their ideology (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 80).

Finally, in the subjectivity argument, multiple articles appear in Dabiq Magazine written by women. However, there is a noticeable absence of women's pictorial depiction in the magazine or in any media interactions. Therefore, the conclusion is that the absence of a specific text from discourse and practice also tells us a lot about the way an object is being constructed, and practices are promoted (Willig, 2013b, p. 385).

8.2.6.1 ***Power – Resistance and Subjectivity in ISIS***

Foucault (1961, p. 224) contends that "as soon as there is a power relationship, there is the possibility of resistance". However there is an almost universal consensus regarding the interpretation of subjectivity among the scholars (Heller, 1996), that the subjects do not exercise power as they are the passive objects of power (Heller, 1996). The subjects are created through power relations and are little more than the mechanically punchedout individual copies (Habermas, 1987). Consequently, it is not possible for the subjectivity that is opposed to the core interest of power, or *subversive subjectivities* (Balbus, 1985) to exist. In the case of *Daesh*, the power analysis reveals a hierarchal presence of power and resistance. The emergence of the Islamic State itself is a consequence of an existing power structure. The power domain in most of the Middle East constituted an unusual state-citizen relationship, in which a minority has been ruling the majority (Haklai, 2000; Kumaraswamy, 2003; Weitz, 2015), both in Syria, where the Shia Alawi minority's Bashar Assad is the ruler and in Iraq where Saddam Hussain from Sunni minority ruled the Shia majority country for decades. The resistance within this power structure existed all along and exhibited itself during the Arab Spring. Without shifting the focus away from the power-resistance nexus, it can be argued that the rise and initial acceptability of the Islamic State itself resonate with the existing resistance. This allowed ISIS to gain an initial foothold and ground.

It is also significant to note the *Hijrah* discourse, which was successful in attracting thousands from around the world. This discourse was made possible through extensive social, electronic, and print media campaigns, and Dabiq Magazine is one such publication. By creating this Foucauldian knowledge/power (Foucault, 1978, p. 143) nexus, the Islamic State was successful in mustering significant military might, thereby shifting the physical power to their advantage. This power also encompassed resistance from the ethnic, social, and religious minorities, who were suppressed through the creation of common-sense knowledge by ISIS.

Foucauldian philosophy of power can be understood comprehensively by looking at the hierarchal organizational structure of *Daesh*. Imagining the self-avowed caliph (Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi) at the top of a pyramid, his important lieutenants (such as media spokesperson Abu Muhammad Al Adnani, etc.) in the middle of the pyramid and all those living as subjects in the territories controlled by *Daesh* at the bottom of the pyramid. This is the traditional power relationship layout, with maximum power held at the top by the caliph, who issues edicts and his commanders execute them. Foucault argues that within this pyramid power exists in every relationship, even building from the bottom. Refugees moving out of *Daesh*-controlled lands depict a bottom-up power and are considered a threat and a worrying trend for Islamic State. Such refugee movements are immediately noticed, a fact which is visible in the publication of the article, convincing Muslims not to try moving out of *Darul-Islam*[56] to *Darul-Kufr*[57] (Dabiq-11, 2015c, pp. 22-23). Although the argument is also questionable and has been amply covered in previous chapters of this research and in multiple research papers (Iftikhar, 2017a, 2018b). It serves one of the most significant functions of power, which is to instill fear in the hearts of subjects. Multiple studies show that fear is the most cunning manifestation of power, as it can change rapidly in response to the actions of those who try to free themselves from the functions of fear. ISIS has been terrorizing the societies in their immediate control and afar. For example, Dabiq-11 (2015c, p. 23) shows a vehicle transporting the body of Aylan Kurdi, the child who died during the refugee journey from Turkey to Greece (Iftikhar, 2018b), and the major function of the images and surrounding text is to instill fear among the viewers. Dabiq published an article focused on spreading the fear of moving out from Islamic State lands. Publication of this article to spread fear is also the recognition of resistance power possessed by the refugees, and millions of Syrians and Iraqis who became internally displaced, a symbolic power possessed by the visibly powerless.

Another noteworthy aspect of this concern over power distribution or power–resistance relationship is that every individual must be observed and coerced not to abandon. Observation operates in significant ways within this power relationship. The subjects behave in a particular and desirable manner, as per the orders of the Islamic State and teachings of *Shari'ah* (as perceived by *Daesh*), not because the caliph is everywhere, but because of the fear of observation, which synthesizes a direct relationship with the Foucauldian disciplinary power.

[56] Literal meanings home of Islam/peace.
[57] Literal meanings home of nonbelievers.

The understanding of multiple sources, forms, and diffusion of power have a direct bearing on how one looks at freedom, a concept, which is so often rendered to subjugation by power. For example, if power is conceived as a singular dominant philosophical concept, aspired freedom would have to be limited and constrained per this conception of power. Those seeking freedom from a particular form of power exerted by ISIS, might not know the future forms that power could take, and therefore might restrict their own choices.

On the contrary, those conceptualizing power through Foucauldian philosophy might find their desire for a multiplicity of freedom that is more encompassing (Koopman, 2017). Episteme in Foucauldian conception refers to the presence of a state of knowledge, a discursive practice, across multiple texts, and periods, human conduct, and institutions within a society. Episteme is the order, apparatus, or structure that is present behind multiple discursive practices, patterns, and conducts, yet the inbuilt unity in this concept is absent, therefore Jasinski (2001, p. 218) refers to it as a 'decentered center'. The philosophy of episteme is of special concern for this research as Dabiq Magazine is a manifestation of such knowledge spread across time and space, and previous chapters have amply demonstrated the presence of knowledge that allows certain ways of seeing the world and certain ways of being in the world through social practices (Willig, 2013b, p. 380). For the same reason, discourse is often implicated in the exercise of power.

Dabiq Magazine published multiple articles in this and subsequent issues talking about the declaration of the caliphate (Dabiq-1, 2014, p. 6), laws or Fatwas, and how Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi is the true caliphate. Based on the caliphate discourse, validating its existence, and arguing for its legitimacy, such claims have no empirical evidence and are not acceptable in contemporary international relations. The creation of the Islamic State itself, from within pre-existing Westphalian state systems namely Syria and Iraq, is the most germane example of Foucauldian episteme.

Explaining the Foucauldian discursive philosophy Laclau and Mouffe (1990, p. 100) argue that his claim that "nothing in this world exists outside the discourse", which is not a denial of the physical presence of certain objects and objective realities. It is rather an assertion that every social configuration is meaningful. Consequently, this also means that the question about discourse is not about the physical presence of the things, but rather where the meanings come from. Just to substantiate this argument of meaningful depiction, the presence of children images carrying weapons (Dabiq-10, 2015, p. 14) or standing next to a killed person (Dabiq-8,

2015, p. 20), in Dabiq Magazine has multiple connotations. From the Islamic State's cultural point of view, it could be an effort to portray these children as brave and well trained to handle weapons, whereas the normative social understanding of these images is the use of children as soldiers. Psychologically such children are exposed to severe violence, resultantly, as the studies have revealed, that they commit worst kind of atrocities. Schauer and Elbert (2010, pp. 311-312) contend that such exposure to "chronic traumatic stress during development leaves these children with mental and related physical ill-health". Besides depriving child soldiers of normal and healthy development, mostly these children cannot fully reintegrate back into normal society. Depiction of these children in a specific manner in Dabiq Magazine is, therefore, not show random messages, and rather is part of the fine-tuned power discourse.

Grounded in the indistinguishable process of interpretation and interaction, the reflexivity in knowledge/power discourse analysis means how this notion appropriates itself in Dabiq Magazine and how would this communicate with the readers.

8.3 **Conclusion**

This chapter has focused on the analysis of knowledge/power as it manifests in Dabiq Magazine. It explained some of the relevant and vital Foucauldian philosophical concepts as a logical progression of the analytical tool developed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3). The subsequent analysis is a Foucauldian explanation of the discourse of knowledge/power concerning the Islamic State as seen in Dabiq Magazine. This chapter focused on Foucault's work on power and its analytical utility in the prevailing discourse in the Middle East surrounding ISIS. Looking at the sudden rise of ISIS in the Middle East from the Foucauldian lens does not imply the study of the phenomena of power per se, the objective, instead, is to understand the phenomenon of different discourses by which people are made "willing subjects" (Foucault, 1982a, p. 777), as seen in previous chapters such as *Hijrah* and Stigma discourse. Such forms of subjectification, in stigma discourse, are discursively entangled and progress through the relation of power (Foucault, 1982a, p. 778). The concept of power/knowledge spans Foucault's entire work (Feder, 2011a, p. 55), however, this chapter endeavored to deconstruct the knowledge/power grids that allowed *Daesh* to disseminate their version of Islam through multiple discourses, more specifically through Dabiq Magazine, as legitimized knowledge.

As mentioned in this chapter conceptual power has been a subject of extensive analysis with varying methodologies. The most frequently traversed path in this context has been to analyze power as a unidirectional and hierarchal manifestation of physical might, suppressing the

weaker entities. The analysis in this chapter, however, shows that true to the Foucauldian argument, power exists everywhere, and comes from everywhere, with capillaries allowing its passage from top to bottom and from the bottom going up.

Similarly, with the help of multiple excerpts from Dabiq Magazine, this analysis also answers the questions such as how discursive power could exist, and by what means could such power be exercised, making innovative use of historical and religious knowledge. The explanation in this chapter also substantiates that power relations are primarily the outcome of their exercise, as these relations tend to be organized, coordinated, and hierarchal clusters of relations (Foucault, 1980b, 1988).

This chapter also shows that power doesn't necessarily repress individuals, rather it produces them through the rituals of practices, signification, rationalization, subjectification, and action within a discourse. This analysis also distinguishes the power relations from the relationship of communication, which transmit information employing language, a system of signs, or other symbolic mediums (Foucault, 1982a). At the very core of the power relationship and constantly provoking it, a fact which is also true in the case of the Islamic State as well as the notion of resistance. Resistance has been visible in every aspect analyzed and almost every excerpt explained in the chapter. However, as this analysis shows, in Dabiq Magazine the language, text, context, images, and other means of depiction are the principal means of understanding the discourse of knowledge/power.

The notion of governmentality as explained in this chapter signifies the creation of willing subjects and specific forms of identity for these subjects. The subjectivity and identity render the subjects to unidirectional control with the least resistance. The accumulation of excessive power at one point (in this case the caliphate), exposes the subjects to extreme forms of brutality. Dabiq Magazine reveals violence and brutality through the use of over one thousand images – most of them violent. The following Chapter 9 is the Critical Visual Analysis of these images to understand the role of images in the ISIS ideology.

Chapter 9: A Critical Visual Analysis (CVA) of Dabiq Magazine: Micro–Meso–Macro Levels of *Brutality* by *Daesh*

9.1 Overview

Dabiq Magazine is part of the propaganda literature which encompasses power, brutality, and statehood, besides the ideology[58] and identity of *Daesh*. Literature on visual analysis has discussed the war images from a peace journalism perspective (Neumann & Fahmy, 2012), content analysis from the perspective of the "master war narrative", and a comparative analysis of events of 9/11 and the Afghan war covered by the English and Arabic newspapers (Fahmy, 2010). The presence of 1095 images in Dabiq Magazine (Tan et al., 2018), merits a visual analysis of these images, through discursive deconstruction, to understand *Daesh's* ideology and conflict. Therefore, the scope of this chapter is primarily the interpretation of selected images from Dabiq Magazine, and their deconstruction to understand the discursive permeation at micro-meso-macro levels of interactions (See Chapter 3, Section 3.6). This multi-level research framework draws upon a relationship between the visual analysis using visual grammar (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001, 2006) and the underpinnings of the theory of semiotics (Thibault, 1991), intending to explicate how analytically observable violent images serve to legitimize brutality in *Daesh* discourse.

These images are also a rich source of visual information about the 'identity' of *Daesh* as an excommunicate *takfiry*[59] terrorist organization. More interestingly, and contrary to the common belief, von Sikorski, Schmuck, Matthes, and Binder (2017) argue that images published by ISIS not only promoted "moral sensitivity", but enhanced "desire for anti-ISIS interventions", and eudaimonic motivations". Moreover, within the broader domain of this research i.e., CDA of Dabiq Magazine, ignoring these images would leave a lot of researchable gaps. Therefore, relying upon the social semiotics as an 'intervention in theory and practice of semiotics' (Thibault, 1991, p. 4), this chapter reflects on the importance of visual deconstruction of ideological, religious, and sectarian underpinnings globally spread by the contemporary terrorist

[58] In his research ideology has been defined as the framework for organizing the social cognitions shared by the members of a social group, organization, or institution. Ideology constitutes the set of socially constructed meanings or norms that become embedded and naturalized in the culture to the extent that they become invisible or common sense (Aiello, 2006; Dijk, 1995) .

[59] Here the term *Takfir* refers to 'a theological declaration that a Muslim has become an apostate or a person is an infidel or an act or idea constitutes a disbelief in Islam' (Hassan, 2017).

organizations. Many images used in Dabiq Magazine can best be described as violent, using an extreme degree of force, while others can be termed as brutal.[60]

The addition of theoretical and perspectival innovation in Dabiq images makes the study of these images interesting and challenging. It is by following such rigorous techniques that both ideology and identity (and ideology as identity) have been spread and can be understood. The simulation strategy of ISIS seeks to invite the eye of international observers through intense, frequent, and thoroughly professional propaganda, making it vital to understand the discursive meanings behind the images appearing in Dabiq Magazine.

Zelin (2015b) argues that most of the official media releases by ISIS have been in the Arabic language. Targeting non-Arabic speaking audiences, they have also relied upon several other languages for their publications and social media updates. For the western audience, English has been the lingua franca. He further argues that in their propaganda *Daesh* has placed heavy reliance on visual communications, and an accumulative 88% have been visual including 63% pictures and 20% videos, and 5% infographics and maps, etc. Such heavy reliance on this mode of communication necessitates a Critical Visual Analysis (CVA) to expand the understanding of their ideology.

The brutal images, showing both own as well as enemy violence, strengthen the ideology of justice for all (an aspect which will be further elaborated on in ensuing sections); and some of the images in Dabiq Magazine gained iconic value (Mortensen, 2017) and were extensively republished and recontextualized (Iftikhar, 2018b) over the internet and social media adding to their circulation (Tan et al., 2018) and visibility. This further helped promote Islamic State's identity and ideology around the globe.

The reinterpretation, recontextualization, and reproduction of brutal images, such as those produced by *Daesh*, is a common phenomenon of social concern (Tan et al., 2018). Extremist groups such as ISIS do not hesitate to adopt images from popular media to promote their ideology and identity (Iftikhar, 2018c), and this is true for multiple Dabiq Magazine images as well. This chapter concludes that the Islamic State tends to portray itself as victors, capable, and virtuous, and renders the enemies as non-believers, vanquished, incapable, unjust, and tyrannical. The sections discuss the proliferation of *Daesh* ideology and identity at micro-meso-

[60] Violent images are result of use of extreme degree of force, whereas brutality has been used in the sense of viciousness, ruthlessness or cruelty.

macro levels of interactions. Before the conclusion, the final section discusses the reflexivity in brutality.

9.2 Contextualizing (Brutal) Images in Dabiq

The primary data set for this research consists of fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine. These magazines contain several articles as well as the pictorial depiction of ISIS victories, gains and losses, activities, promotion of religious, economic, social, and cultural ideology, and a multitude of other activities propagating their image as a state, caliphate, and a technologically savvy lethal force. Dabiq Magazine is one of the very few original data sets, attributed directly to *Daesh* (Milton, 2016; Safizadeh, 2017; Vergani & Bliuc, 2015a).

For this research, all issues of Dabiq Magazine were downloaded and screenshot image files were cataloged, each image was allotted distinct identification labels. Out of 1095 images, in total 43 (forty-three) were categorized for this segment of the research as most brutal, graphic, and violent. The selection criteria also included the intended audience of the brutality targeted by brutality. The theme of brutality/violence remained the dominant synthesizing criteria for the selection of these images, and most of the selected brutal images clearly showed death, and in a few cases, the victim subsequently got killed or was executed. Initially, the superordinate categories were created as per the image environment, caption, surrounding text, and contextual meanings. These images were then subcategorized according to their significance at micro, meso, and macro-levels. This subcategorization created data sets of 11 (eleven) images for micro-level of analysis, 14 (fourteen) images for meso-level, and 18 (eighteen) images for macro-level analysis. The emergent image categorization relied more on the experiential discursive meanings in image selection. Unlike the classic semiotic analysis, image components relating to the interpersonal meaning such as color, foreground, background, gaze, angle, shot distance, etc. remained dormant in the creation of categories of the images. This three-leveled analysis has been developed as interlaced and helps us to understand/unfold *brutality*.

9.3 Poststructuralism in Dabiq Images

Poststructuralism, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6), is a philosophical mode of thought which believes that in the world there is no reality, only ‘manufactured reality’ constructed by the text. This text could be in the shape of images, hence, the deconstruction in this chapter intends to bring out the marginality (Dumont, 2008), supplementality (Kalua, 2019; Lazarus, 2011), and undecidability (Dillon, 1999, 2000) of the images in Dabiq Magazine. In this case, they will probably bury the erstwhile history of the Middle East, and create new realities and

truths about the social, cultural, religious, and power aspects. As previously mentioned, the images selected as the text for this chapter have been taken from fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazines, published online by *Daesh* between July 5, 2014, and July 31, 2016. Most of these images fall under the genre of documentary photography (Becker, 1995). The theoretical deconstruction of the selected data images appearing in Dabiq Magazine relates to the genre of documentary photography showing the relationship between relatively weak to the powerful. This relationship can be viewed by communicating both ways between the terrorist organization and the rest of the world

The images in Dabiq Magazine contain both visual aspects (photographs) as well as textual captions and explanations, and the combination of more than one mode of communication is also a subject of multimodal analysis (O'Halloran, 2005, pp. 20 - 21), however, further discussion on the multimodality of the images is not part of this chapter. Having discussed a few of the theoretical aspects, the next subsection discusses philosophical aspects of brutality and how do they intersect with the imagery as produced by *Daesh* in Dabiq Magazine.

9.4 Analysis: Micro–Meso–Macro Levels of Analysis in *Daesh* Brutality

Arguably, *Daesh* has unleashed a new era of brutality, showing innovation in human indignation, killing, and misery. Scholarship argues that all human beings are not violent, and historically most soldiers have been reluctant warriors (cf Collins, 2008; Grossman, 1996; Marshall, 1947; Miller, 2000). Based upon these arguments, this CVA assumes that the ISIS affiliates were mostly violent. This assumption removes the human factor from the images and serves to avoid overindulgence and sentimentality in the analysis.

The brutality committed by *Daesh* has been the subject of discussion ever since its appearance on the world stage. Many scholars such as Atwan (2015, pp. 148-149); Cockburn (2016a, p. 310); Griffin (2016, p. 12); Hall (2015b, pp. 6-12); Lister (2015a, pp. 10-32); Stern and Berger (2015, p. 18), etc. contend that *Daesh* is one of the most brutal and violent organizations in the world history. They substantiate their claim using horror stories emanating from the region through popular media reports, eyewitness accounts coming from the refugees or escapees, and ISIS media networks, videos, and online images. These acts of brutality are not limited to the locals *Daesh* followed an elaborate and well-planned strategy of propaganda warfare, ensuring regular video, audio, and print publications (Zelin, 2015b).

As already mentioned, there is a large corpus of images published by *Daesh* (Tan et al., 2018), and Dabiq Magazine contains multiple brutal images. Collins (2008, p. 1) signifies violence (brutality) as "horrible and heroic, disgusting and exciting, the most condemned and glorified of human acts". Violence could range from a slap on the face to a much larger and lethal war between two groups. There is an ongoing argument between those who claim that brutal images such as those published by Dabiq Magazine could be shown on popular media and those against the idea. To add to this discussion, by removing such brutal images from screens and publications, unfortunately, only the images and not the cause of these images, namely war could be removed from our memory. Such an approach creates a dichotomy between the ethically unpresentable (brutal images) and the unimaginable (brutality through war). Since ethically we do not condone such images, the question remains, could we be asked by the states to condone war? The visual analysis of these images is therefore the part of understanding human misery as a consequence of war.

Halliday (1978) postulated the Systemic Functional Theory, which can help us understand the deconstruction of the meanings of the text events and interactions, in this case, text and images (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). The three major aspects of this theory include (1) semiotic systems (including language and images) act as a source of meaning-making; (2) the meanings in the semiotic system can be taken from multiple options available, and; (3) the structure of the semiotic resources (language and other semiotic resources) is evolved in a society to serve the social functions. As mentioned in the theoretical section of this chapter, Halliday (1978, pp. 128-133) contends that language and semiotic resources perform social functions in society. Such functions have been explicated through ideational, interpersonal, and textual meanings. Any form of communication can be explained in several ways using these meanings. In consonance with the sites and modalities, referred to above, this sub-section of the chapter endeavours to deconstruct the brutal images through three levels of analysis.

Looking at brutal images, in itself has psychological effects. Some parts of these images have been pixelated to blur them from view and memory. In one of the studies explaining the trauma disorders caused by looking at violent images, Feinstein (2006) focused on 116 journalists who were routinely dealing with the graphic war images. He concluded that repetitive exposure to such images makes the journalists vulnerable to psychological injuries including, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The images understudy for this chapter have two distinct characteristics: (1) these images are brutal and graphic, as they explicitly show violence

directly and visibly; and (2) these images are also 'images of violence', as they show/explain the violence committed by one person/organization against others, all of whom are now dead.

As mentioned in the methodology above, this section is a CVA of the images from Dabiq Magazine, deconstructed through the theoretical underpinnings. The synthesis of these images at varying levels is vital in understanding the proliferation of the Islamic State's ideology and identity. To understand the relevance of these images to the theory of brutality, the analysis includes the deconstruction (Derrida, 1976) of the images at the micro (interpersonal and intra-group level), meso (inter-group and intra-polity level), and macro (inter-polity level). In the CVA of Dabiq Magazine, the micro-level of analysis focuses on violent images of individuals. These captures include both friendly as well as images of enemies of the Islamic State. This analysis tries to unravel the 'image's mystery' and inherently addresses the poststructuralist's observation of advancing 'sense of text's mystery' (Mousley, 2000, p. 74), showing who has been signified as the foregrounded focus of the image, and what does the understanding of the inherent instability of the signified reveals. The analysis explains what all has been 'revealed' by these images and in the process what all has been 'concealed' and why. Similarly, intra-polity means the two groups of similar stature, size, or strength. Owing to their fluid nature, it is hard to know the exact strength of these terrorist groups, their ideology, and social impact, however, Meso Level looks at these organizations through Dabiq Magazine and what degree of concern they raise for the Islamic State, consequently drawing their wrath in the shape of brutal images. Therefore, the meso-level analysis shows the middle tier interactive captures, whereby *Daesh* communicates brutality against the organizations of comparable stature and size. Finally, the Macro Level analysis shows the brutality through images focused on larger entities and nations. It is a collection of images that depict the brutality against nationalities, soldiers, groups, and individuals from around the globe. It is also possible to carry out the CVA of each of these images separately, however, these levels of analysis have been created to facilitate the understanding of the Islamic State's broader ideology and its implications regionally and globally.

9.4.1 **Micro Level (Inter-personal and intra-group)**

This sub-section is an analysis of selected images showing brutality at the micro-level. All the images categorized below are those of individuals in two ways. The first set contains the images of the individuals who were part of the Islamic State and were killed in action. The second set of images showing intra-group brutality is mostly the images showing the subjects of the

Islamic State. Arguably, *Daesh* did not need a justification for publishing brutal images, however, as Sontag (2003, p. 52) posits 'the camera is the eye of the history' and this is an effective way to preserve history. Through these images, the history of chaos in the Middle East in the past few years has been conserved.



Figure 9.1: Signifying own as a Hero through violent Images[61] - Micro-Level

Figure 9.1 above shows a few images of the dead ISIS soldiers/operatives. Although the images are graphic, however, the addition of surrounding text signifies the persona and the stature of these fighters. For example, attached to the image of Abu Omar Al Baghdadi (top image), who was the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2006 (Atwan, 2015), is a statement glorifying the blood of those who died in the cause of caliphate. On one side, the text exemplifies the sacrifices of the Islamic State to gain sympathy, because these 'heroes' were killed by the enemies of ISIS.

On the other hand, this is also an invitation for the loyalists and those who believe(d) in the Islamic State's ideology and aspired to join and be part of the struggle/jihad. Theoretically, at the production site, these images were intended to send a message of hearo's death and

[61] All the images have been pixelated for ethical reasons.

glorification through martyrdom. At the imaging site, these images are visibly brutal (which is the compositional modality for all such images) and at the audiencing site, these images are received in two different ways. For the affiliates of ISIS, these images are effective and reassuring, as they are promised heaven after martyrdom. But for the rest of the world, these images show death which, ethically, may not be a very satisfying gaze.

The image of the dead soldier (lower right) from Dabiq-1 (2014, p. 16) shows the salutation 'Rehimahullah'[62], something that has been excessively used in Dabiq text for glorifying those who died in the cause of the Islamic State. Publication of such images also reveals that *Daesh* is not hesitant to promote an image of the organization which is visibly brutal and uses graphic imagery to muster support and gain sympathy. The accompanying text also stigmatizes the enemy, in this case, Safawi[63] forces, as the cause of the death of this ISIS fighter. The use of stigmatizing labels such as 'safawi', 'rafidi', and 'taghut' etc. has been discussed in the previous chapter explaining their etymology and current usage. The absence of human dignity and respect for the dead including their colleagues is part of the brutal discourse of the organization.

In essence, these images are brutal, gross, and violent, however, their publication in Dabiq Magazine has glorified the heroes of ISIS. Ethically these should not have been part of the popular media view. The glorification through these images achieves two purposes. First that those fighting alongside Islamic State are not afraid of death and second, they are not afraid to talk about or *show off* death. Resultantly the message conveyed to the rest of the world is that the outcome of brutality i.e., death may be a frightening phenomenon for a normal person, but not for ISIS.

[62] Literal meanings 'may blessings of be upon him'
[63] As mentioned in the previous chapters, Safawi is a reference to Iranian Shias

Enforcement of *Shari'ah*. Dabiq Issue 14, p. 9.

The apocalyptic view. Dabiq Issue 7,



Enforcement of *Shari'ah*. Dabiq Issue 1, p. 45

Killed for the crime of sodomy. Dabiq Issue 15, p. 79.

Man thrown from tall building for sexual dieviance. Dabiq Issue 7, pp. 42-43

A Zaniah (female adultress) stoned to death in Al Raqqa. Dabiq Issue 7, p. 43

Enforcement of *Shari'ah*. Dabiq Issue 15, p.80

Figure 9.2: Glorifying Brutality: Justice for all – Micro Level

Figure 9.2 above shows the pictorial manifestation of intra-group brutality. The implementation of strict laws and the notion of justice for all have also been portrayed through these images. These images appear in multiple issues of Dabiq Magazine and the message is a clear ideology:

propagation and execution of strict *Shari'ah* and self-professed religious laws against anyone not ascribing to their ideology. These images also send a terrorizing message to the rest of the world showing the extreme degree of implementation of a specific form of legal governance. Killing the enemy operatives, shooting and killing the highway robbers, stoning to death as a punishment for the adulteress and adulterer, or pushing down to death, a chair bound and blind-folded man, from a tall building as a punishment, are all the depictions of novelty in brutality occurring in *Daesh* ideology. Pushing someone down from a tall building as punishment for sodomy is not part of traditional Islamic jurisprudence and scholarship, and is a terrorizing innovation construed by the ISIS enforcement mechanism.

Deconstruction of one segment of these images, for example stoning to death, reveals many inconsistencies between the traditional Islamic thought and the *Daesh* ideology. Stoning to death, lapidation, or *Rajm*[64], as a form of punishment is primarily a tradition in Abrahamic religions including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Alasti, 2007; Kusha & Ammar, 2014; Matthews, 2010). In Christian discourse, long before the advent of Islam, Saint Stephan was killed through lapidation and is referred to as the perfect martyr (Matthews, 2010). Similarly, in Judaism stoning was one of the four penalties used in cases like idolatry, adultery, sodomy, etc. The Holy Quran prescribes one hundred lashes for the one accused of adultery. More significantly, those who accuse a man or a woman of such a crime must bring four eyewitnesses, failing which the accuser will receive eighty lashes (Al-Nur 24:2 – 6). There are certainly some hadiths that do advocate lapidation as a punishment. ISIS has selectively applied these laws and added novelty in execution, successfully terrorizing the masses and the rest of the world.

Malešević (2013) posits that historically, the violence inflicted on family members or close friends usually elicits a much stronger response as compared to an unknown harmed individual. This argument may be true in the case of ISIS, as long as the violence was carried out by another group or polity. The (mis)treatment of own group members using a similar or more severe methodology, to uphold the rule of law, is, however, contradictory to this claim. The applicability of the theory of poststructuralism is visible through violence by the powerful members of this organization against the weak and those who transgressed a specific version of *Shari'ah* law.

[64] Arabic word for stoning to death

Referring to the image sites and modalities, it is noteworthy that the production and publication of these images have been done extremely professionally. The compositional modality for these images is the dominant theme of this chapter *Brutality*. Instantaneous capture of a specific historical moment, foregrounding, and angles have all been chosen very carefully. The combined effect of all these images communicates to the viewers through the manifestation of brutality at a micro inter-personal or intra-group level. The accompanying text adds to the projected argument and talks to the viewers about the glorious identity and conservative ideology of ISIS. The second set of images also depicts the intra-group brutality and is a message for the viewers that ISIS is serious in the implementation of its version of the strict Islamic code, and does not shy away from admitting its brutal manifestation.

9.4.2 **Meso Level (Inter-group and intra-polity)**

Numerous instances of offensive and hate text can be found in *Daesh* publications directed against other organizations and groups fighting ISIS such as *Jowlani Front, Jabath An-Nasra,* Sunni *Sahwah,* etc. (Dabiq-7, 2015; Dabiq-9, 2015; Dabiq-10, 2015). In this sub-section, meso-level brutality has been deconstructed through the analysis of brutal images targeting individuals from another religious or social group /organization of similar or smaller stature/size. These images intersect with the above-mentioned micro-level analysis and strengthen the idea that ISIS had no difficulty in reconciling the brutality and violence against anyone in their ordinary everyday pursuits and publications.

Theoretically, violence is closely associated with social status and one tends to respond more severely in the case of a victim being a member of the same status, class, group, ethnicity, age, and even gender (provided these divisions do not intersect with the social interpersonal bonds). In this vein, one can notice the presence of extreme brutality and its public spectre in seventeenth-century France, where public torture and punishment for the lower classes and deviants at the hands of the aristocracy was an everyday phenomenon and a conversational norm (De Tocqueville, [1840] 2000; Foucault, 1975).

Besides Foucault and De Tocqueville, multiple historical writings also reveal a much more violent and brutal pre-enlightenment European experience. Organized violence was the primary method of demarcation of inter-group boundaries and inferior groups were routinely punished by the superior (Brown, 2010; Muchembled, 2011; Spierenburg, 2008). However, over the past few centuries, the reduction of public display of such violence has been instrumental in the

recession of brutality in the modern mind. Resultantly now, during the 21st Century, we find images on social media and Dabiq Magazine shocking and terrorizing.

Figure 9.3: Inter-Group and Intra-Polity Violent Images – Meso Level



Figure 9.3 above portrays the images of brutality and consequent death inflicted by *Daesh* upon their enemies such as the *Al-Badr* group and *Sahwah* soldiers etc. As mentioned in previous chapters, *Daesh* has a brutal methodology of dealing with those not ascribing to their ideology. Their textual and visual discourses openly advocate violence against rival groups. Such

unflinching violence and crude display of inhumane treatment have theoretical intersections with the pre-enlightenment era as explained in the preceding paragraphs. Such violence shows revenge, especially when accompanied by the text labeling the target as Rafidi or safawi etc. to degrade the enemy. It also acts as a tool for spreading terror and sets ISIS apart from contemporary and known terrorist organizations in recent memory for its extreme and novel adaptation of brutality.

The production site encompasses a clear theme of showing ISIS as a very powerful organization that has a clear edge over rival organizations in the region. Ideologically and referring to the social modality, these images have exhibited their ideology of ruthlessness towards their enemies. At the audiencing site, these images send a clear message to the enemies of the Islamic State that there is no mercy for Shias and everyone else who does not ascribe to their version of religion.



Figure 9.4: Soldiers from other groups killed by *Daesh* – Meso Level

Figure 9.4 above depicts the intentional proliferation of violence and stigma against anyone who stood in the way of the Islamic State's expansion of ideology and control. Dabiq Magazine communicates visual as well as textually stigmatizing slurs, especially against Shias. As mentioned in the previous chapter as well, Zarqawi's ideology specifically targeted Shias. The images of self-flagellation during Ashura by the Shias have been the focus of serious criticism as shown in Figure 6 above. Further glorification has been sought through the imagery of dead belonging to the Shia sect and Sahwah forces in Syria and Iraq. At the production site, these images are composed to exhibit power in men and material held by ISIS and to stigmatize the Shia community who beat themselves during Ashura as a religious ritual. At the audiencing site, the common viewer certainly tends to agree to the pictorial representation of what has been depicted especially against Shia Islam.

9.4.3 **Macro Level (Inter-polity)**

This subsection categorizes selected brutal human images portraying those who have an external origin, and were neither Islamic State subjects nor from another religious or ethnic organization. This category includes larger entities such as all the neighboring countries and those from the armies of the coalition, or ISIS-sponsored/claimed attacks in distant countries. The crafty and excessive use of these graphic images in *Daesh* publications aspires to seek worldwide recognition and attention through these acts of brutality. An alternate yet plausible way to look at the manifestation of violence by *Daesh* would be to focus on the idea of this organization as a self-proclaimed 'state'. Referring to the 'war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs', Tilly (1985, p. 169) argues that the increase in global violence and rise in destructive capabilities of the war are the result of great powers supplying arms to the poor countries. In this vein, it is no secret that the USA supplied weapons to at least one faction, the 'moderate rabbles', to seek their support for overthrowing Assad's regime in Syria (Michaels, 2017). These weapons were stolen, purchased, or snatched by ISIS, however, very little credible information is available about the fact that ISIS had hundreds of tanks in its inventory (Dabiq-4, 2014; Phillips, 2016). Such enormity of war machinery, coupled with thousands of active fighters, morally elevated ISIS to a much-yearned level of a self-avowed caliphate, and perform functions of a state. The organization exerted this power through brutality and spreading terror.

Dead children as a result of Syrian Regime attack Dabiq Issue 1, p. 42; Issue

Nausayri (Syrian) soldiers executed Dabiq Issue 3, p. 20.

Syrian base attached exposing the head of a dead soldier Dabiq Issue 3, p. 20.

Peshmerga soldiers killed Dabiq Issue 4, p. 26

Egyptians executed. Dabiq Issue 5, p. 23



ISIS operatives (lions) killed in Tunis Dabiq Issue 8, p. 18

A Syrian soldier shortly before execution Dabiq Issue 12, p. 29

A Child soldier after executing the enemy Dabiq Issue 8, p. 20

Figure 9.5: Visualizing Brutality at Macro-Level

Figure 9.5 above shows the images of attacks on ISIS territories and resultant revenge. Through these images, *Daesh* claims that this violence was conducted against the civilians living in their territories, and the revenge was the capture of the town Raqqa which became the Islamic State's

capital. Other images depict the performance of judge, jury, and execution functions by the ISIS operatives including child soldiers as visible in one of the images above. *Daesh* also claimed responsibility for multiple operations across the globe. In one of the images, two dead persons were claimed by ISIS as their loyalists who got killed in Tunis.

There is no denying the fact that war produces senseless and irrational activities. In the case of *Daesh,* these activities have mostly been driven by the sadistic impulses or animalistic savagery of this organization. ISIS ensured the complete subjugation and pacification of those living under their control, simultaneously they had the cumulative concentration of coercive power claiming the status of caliphate and statehood.

As mentioned above, the historical displacement of punishment in time and space from the public spectacle, had rich implications. As Giddens (1985, p. 188) argues that to maintain the social control over the masses and the deviant, the state transferred the 'sanctioning capacities' from the 'manifest use of violence to the pervasive use of administrative power in sustaining its rule'. The erstwhile executions conducted under state orders were traditionally moved in time and space, to late night or early morning instead of broad daylight. Resultantly such punishments became a phenomenon one could probably hear about rather than witness, the main reason we now get terrorized by witnessing it through *Daesh* publications, videos, and images. In this context, Islamic State demanded that the locals holding arms should throw away their weapons and repent so the caliphate provides them safety (Dabiq-12, 2015, p. 16). It is also important to mention here that as projected in Dabiq Magazine, ISIS did perform certain functions of a state such as the provision of hospitals, water, sanitation services, birth certificates, currency coins, etc.

At the production site, these images show the hubris of the Islamic State, which has remained a serious local and global threat since 2014. At the imaging site, for example, the long shot of a child soldier holding a gun with a dead person at his feet has a serious professional composition. At the audience site, the viewer tends to be afraid of the images and use of the word 'lion' in the text which symbolizes bravery, fearlessness, and power.

Children in Daesh controlled lands killed by air attack. and vengeance by pilot burning Dabiq Issue 7, pp. 6-8.



Steven Stoloff a US journalist beheaded Dabiq Issue 1, p. 42; Issue 4, pp. 49-50



French and Chinese prisoners executed for non payment of ransom Dabiq Issue

Iraqi soldiers killed Dabiq Issue 14, p. 22

Bus attack in Cairo Dabiq Issue 15, p. 23

A slaughter in Iraq Dabiq Issue 15, p. 81

Restaurant attack in Bangladesh Dabiq Issue 15, p. 42

Figure 9.6: Violence by *Daesh* at Inter-Polity Level

In Figure 9.6 above the element of brutal violence and revenge continue to appear concurrently. In the top two images, on left, the children can be seen who died because of an air attack on ISIS localities. Resultantly, in the next image, the captured Jordanian pilot was burned to death

to replicate the punishment. The proliferation of terrorism through this macro level is visible in the execution, beheading, and torture of foreigners including soldiers and journalists such as those from the US and China, and France, who were executed mostly due to non-payment of ransom.

The visual meanings or 'signification' of these images can be understood through connotation and denotation and myth as postulated by Barthes (1972, pp. 109-121; 1977a, pp. 15-51). Denotations are the visible meanings, or as Aiello (2006) refers to 'what is represented in the image'. The connotation is the symbolic or ideological meaning of the image. Barthes' myth appears as the ideological concepts that are evoked by a specific sign, or a 'culture's way of conceptualizing or understanding, or way of thinking about something (Fiske, 1990, p. 88). Myth has also been defined by Chandler (2002, p. 144) as the 'dominant ideologies of our time'.

The culturally and historically variable concepts of punishment as deterrence and punishment as terrorism can best be explained through the concept of mythological signification. The larger ideological concept behind these images appearing at the macro level of engagement shows: (1) *Daesh* is focused on vengeance as a quid pro quo; (2) they are not hesitant to project brutal and graphic images to send a clear message about the brutal ideology of the organization; (3) their aspiration to remain, expand and perform all functions of a modern state (caliphate) is resolute and visible through these images; and (4) the terror must be shown globally to spread their brutal ideology by showing the images of both the victor and the vanquished. Such spread of their ideology wins them 'oppressed and marginalized' loyalists, who could help attack far lands.

At the production site, these images tend to show ISIS as the victim of aggression by the rest of the world, and the forces who killed children in the areas controlled by the Islamic State. Resultantly, ISIS took revenge by burning the Jordanian pilot and by spreading their ideology and terror in the West and the rest of the world. The imaging site for some of these images is bloody and brutal and at the audiencing site, one tends to get a terrifying message. Conclusively, ISIS has no problem in the production of such images (and videos) extremely professionally and then publishing them online to be viewed by a large number of audiences around the globe.

9.5 **Reflexivity in Image Brutality**

Zienkowski (2017) argues that to understand the context, language use, and social power in the discourse, reflexivity is a way to comprehend the main issue around which the field is established. The reflexivity in the case of the Islamic State, and the images published by them, would entail our ability to act interpretively on the potentially interpretive behaviour of this excommunicated organization. Deconstruction of the notion of reflexivity involves a dual process of interaction and interpretation. Within the larger brutality discourse, this entails understanding how these graphic images communicate with the viewer and at the micro-meso-macro-levels with each other. As argued by Mortensen (2017), contextual appropriation of images introduces a critically reflective dimension to the reception of such images. Reflecting on these images, one can notice multiple contradictory ideas about the publication, utility, and fallout of these and other images on analysts, scholars, and journalists etc. All these images, categorized at micro-meso-macro levels of analysis are reflective of brutal and violent discourse manifested under ISIS watch. The realities of war, in this case, the Middle East war, however, are far detached from what one can notice in these images or movies. As Hedges (2002) notes:

> The myth of war entices us with the allure of heroism. But the images of war handed to us even when they are graphic, leave out the one essential element of war – fear [……] the visual and audio effects of films, the battlefield description in books, make the experience appear real. In fact, the experience is sterile. We are safe. We do not smell rotting flesh, hear the cries of agony, or see before us blood and entrails seeping out of bodies [……...] It takes the experience of fear and the chaos of battle, the deafening and disturbing noise, to wake us up (p.60).

Reflecting upon the sympathy with the victims of these images, it would be prudent to understand that, we do not become inured because of the number of violent images that we are exposed to, but rather the passivity of our nature. The distance between the far-away sufferers and viewers, in this case, is large enough to shadow the sympathy that we might have towards the victims. This greater visual and actual distance also makes us feel that, blamelessly enough, we are not accomplices to this cause of suffering. Although to a certain extent we might be a party to the roots of this violence against humanity. Especially when such brutality is, directly or indirectly, facilitated by the state functions ordered by our elected governments. Such functions, for example supplying arms to a particular side, could be counterproductive. The meager sense of Our sympathy proclaims our innocence and impotence. Resultantly the feeling of guilt is enhanced by the blessings of our detachment from violence and suffering against humanity. Citing Schopenhauer, Iftikhar (2018c) argues that ‘what is genuinely significant in

the historical subject is not in fact what is individual, not the particular event as such, but rather what is universal in it, the aspect of the idea of humanity that expresses itself through it'.

9.6 Conclusion

This chapter employed a methodological technique of critical analysis for images published in Dabiq Magazine. Critical Visual Analysis has a well-established theoretical and grammatical niche in CDA. Within the larger theory of CDA, multiple authors have contributed to the theoretical, philosophical, and methodological advances in the field of CVA and social semiotics (Aiello, 2006).

More than one thousand images appear in fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine, meriting analytical attention. The true meanings and ideological underpinnings of an image, and referentiality through the modes of contemporary understanding make this analysis wholesome. Applying micro-meso-macro modes of examination, this analysis synthesized the images based upon their ideological approach, target enemy, and the audience. Although an image will be viewed by everyone who accesses the magazine at the audiencing site, however, as explained in this chapter, personal knowledge, and the worldview of the viewer become dominant in interpreting the images. The categorization of Dabiq images in different tiers, on one hand, exposes the ideological brutality of this excommunicate organization, and leaves the audience baffled, vying for comprehension of this well-organized violence by an organization ruling the land.

The Islamic State follows a distinct and extreme form of *Shari'ah*, not practiced or acceptable anywhere else in the world. The military might, and knowledge/power (as explained in Chapter 8), allows ISIS to exercise extreme forms of juridical implementation. The resultant effect is the commemoration of revealing a particular ideology and self-identification to that ideology. For the subjects of the state (those living in *Daesh*-occupied lands), this is a question of complicity and survival. They must abide by the extreme forms of laws being implemented to survive a situation where others suffered, or many die. The publication of death images of the ISIS heroes is a commemoration of the martyrs, a message for the audience who were invited to perform *Hijrah* (see Chapter 6), that their sacrifices will not be forgotten and they will be honoured.

Those who survived the ISIS rule, lived during this time intensely, in a constant state of obsessive anticipation of fear, violence, brutality, and death, lasting through the tenure of a self-avowed caliphate. Those at the top hierarchy declared Islamic State to be a well-governed territory with a population, and system of an institutional organization akin to any other state in

the world. The world community did not accept this argument and the organization was not allowed in the comity of international states, nor accepted by any country. In this vein, the next, Chapter 10, is an analysis of the notion of statehood as claimed by *Daesh*, enhancing the understanding of the contemporary system of state and why the Islamic State was not admitted or recognized as a ‘state’.

Chapter 10: Analysis – Statehood (Caliphate)

10.1 Overview

This chapter focuses on often complex relationships between the way *Daesh* portrays itself as a humane and rather idealistic Islamic Caliphate on one hand, and its brutal treatment of those who oppose its ideology, on the other. ISIS has tried to create an image of a state that blends the concepts of a "modern nation-State" (Wimmera & Feinstein, 2010) into the traditional Islamic concept of a caliphate (Bunzel, 2015). Societies and governments around the world have been responding to these claims and their efforts mostly focused on damage control and prevention of their youth to be radicalized through ISIS electronic, print, and social media campaigns. However, there is a need to understand Islamic State's aspirations and expansionist designs to deconstruct its ideology[65] and to take steps to limit its ideological expansion, especially in the regions which have been marred by the conflict for past many decades, such as the Khurasan[66] region. This chapter intends to accomplish that through the CDA of Dabiq Magazine as data text.

In doing so, the applicability of philosophical and theoretical aspects of statehood and aspired territorial and ideological expansionism will be analyzed by deconstructing Dabiq Magazine text. In so doing, the concepts in Chapter 3 (Section 3.7), and the data in Chapter 5 (Section 5.6) have been synthesized in the ensuing paragraphs. This chapter aspires to understand the expansionist designs of the Islamic State and how their influence in the Khurasan region can be analyzed and possibly eliminated. The CDA of ISIS discourse in Khurasan, "openly professes strong commitments to change and suggest corrections" (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). Therefore, to achieve this, the chapter primarily deals with three issues: (1) the philosophy of statehood and status of the Islamic State; (2) territorial and ideological expansionism discussing philosophy, theory, and practice in Islamic State's Wilayat Khurasan and; (3) some response options and the way forward.

[65] Ideology has been extensively analyzed in discourse studies and has been subject of constructivist theories of language, for example Barthes (1977a); Fairclough (1992); Volosinov (1929) etc. In his research ideology has been defined as the framework for organizing the social cognitions shared by the members of a social group, organization, or institution. Ideology constitutes the set of socially constructed meanings or norms that become embedded and naturalized in the culture to the extent that they become invisible or common sense (Aiello, 2006; Dijk, 1995).

[66] The word has been spelled both as Khurasan and Khurasan in the existing literature and in this research. The region includes parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

10.2 **Philosophy of Statehood and Status of the Islamic State**

Arguably the death of leader Abu Bakr was a serious jolt to the organization and it has been defeated in large part in Syria and Iraq. Although the scholarship argues that traditionally, such organizations and their ideologies do not give up easily (Ali, 2020), however, with there are very few pockets of their known existence (Press, 2019). It is, therefore, appropriate to analyze their status as a 'state', by measuring it against the existing notions of statehood and the philosophy behind it.

It is important to note here that the post-Westphalian concept of state sovereignty draws primarily on European experiences (Mingst & Arreguín-Toft, 2017). Before the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Europeans had colonized the Western hemisphere and one of the aims of the treaty was to allow retention of the territorial control of the colonized lands through state supremacy. The membership in this concept of the *state as a unitary and sovereign actor* was a privilege extended primarily by the European experience, and as argued by Clapham (1999), continues to remain so even now.

It is interesting to note that in the case of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan during the 1990s, a quasi-recognition was granted by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE (Rashid, 2008, p. 59), and arguably by many in the West as well. Despite US support to many "moderate rebels" in Syria who became part of ISIS (Henningsen, 2016), not a single country around the globe recognized ISIS as a state. It is, therefore, illogical for the Islamic State to enjoy sovereignty in its territory. The response to eliminate *Daesh* has been an atypical mix of humanitarian intervention (Scheffer, 1992; Welsh, 2004), Syrian regime change (Sharif, 2018), interests of the neighboring Middle Eastern countries, and global security concerns of the USA and NATO (Pearson & Sanders, 2019). Conclusively, to grant or not to grant the privileged status of statehood continues to be an exclusive domain, owned and extended by the powerful nations.[67] Regardless of the international criticism, Islamic State declared a caliphate in 2014. They had acquired sizable territory by force and forcing certain laws and *Shari'ah*, something that might not have been acceptable by the world community, yet it had its presence in the areas controlled by *Daesh*.

[67] This is purely an academic argument and points to a question of inequality, privilege and status segregation on the ideas of statehood, sovereignty and territoriality. The author is not advocating the grant of such status to ISIS or any other excommunicate organization.

Dabiq-1 (2014, pp. 6-7) projected the deceleration of the "caliphate" by *Daesh*. Before looking into their aspirations to get recognized by the rest of the world as a 'state', there is a need to understand the Islamic notion of the caliphate. This form of governance has been widely discussed in the literature by Muslim scholars and by Western authors (cf Luciani, 1990; Willis, 2010). There is no doubt that this was the tradition of the initial Islamic style of governance, which continued to the end of WW–I when finally, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. Dabiq Magazine has excessive references made to the Quran and Hadith (Boutz, Benninger, & Lancaster, 2019). Therefore, contrary to the claims made by the Islamic State (Dabiq-1, 2014), there is no mention of the style of governance for Muslims in the Quran. The deceleration of the caliphate by the organization, and ironically labelling itself as the *Islamic State*, is a political effort to portray itself as the sole bearer of Islamic tradition, law, and governance. Strengthening the same argument. Akyol (2013, p. 25), posits that "the Qur'an was also noticeably silent on the issue of stoning adulterers, punishing drinkers, or killing those who abandon or "insult" Islam. Nor was there mention of an 'Islamic State', a 'global caliphate' or the "religious police". ISIS has cited multiple reasons for declaring a caliphate (Dabiq-1, 2014, pp. 20-25). While the latent function may be to revive the lost glory of Islamic empires of yesteryears, the primary manifest function is to provide a state and land where Muslims could lead their lives under the *Shari'ah*, and as per (their version as revealed in Dabiq Magazine) of Islamic way of life. Additionally, Dabiq-1 (2014, p. 7) claims that the caliphate will ensure "dignity, might, rights and leadership" exclusively for Muslims.

Extract 10.1: Caliphate as a Necessity

Line	Extract
1	The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace,
2	being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people,
3	after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come for them to
4	rise. The time has come for the Ummah of Muhammad (Sallallahu 'Alayhi wa
5	Sallam) to wake up from its sleep, remove the garments of dishonor, and shake off
6	the dust of humiliation and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has
7	gone, and the dawn of honor has emerged anew. The sun of jihad has risen. The
8	glad tidings of good are shining. Triumph looms on the horizon. The signs of
9	victory have appeared (Dabiq-1, 2014, pp. 8-9).

Excerpt 10.1 above, has been clipped from the *Daesh* media spokesperson's speech on the deceleration of the Islamic State. While giving the glad tidings (Line 8), to the Muslims he also invites them to Jihad as the 'un of jihad (Line 7). had risen as a sign of victory for the Muslims. Despite multiple global threats, Islamic State claimed and declared multiple victories in already shaken and war-torn towns in Syria and Iraq.

In response to the above mentioned legal argument made by Crawford (2007) and Willoughby (1896), the Islamic State and its deceleration of the caliphate remain the 'matter of fact' and would only become the 'matter of law', provided comity of nations provides it with the recognized status, which it did not. For example, President Obama refused to accept it as a state, least of all as an Islamic State (BBC, 2014). It would remain a matter of fact, especially in the absence of any credible trails supporting their financial, military arsenal, supplies of arms and ammunition, food and rations, vehicles and fuel, communications, publications, and electronic and social media activities. Ironically, since the rest of the world and world organizations refused to recognize it, a very little legal argument can be made towards their sovereignty and accountability under their local culture of violence. Instead, the coalition of many countries used force (land and air) to counter *Daesh* expansion. But the question remains how far can their ideology be contained or eliminated by the use of force. The next section deals with the notion of territorial and ideological expansionist aspirations of ISIS and how its understanding can be enhanced through a theoretical lens.

10.3 Territorial and Ideological Expansionism – Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Islamic State's *Wilayat* Khurasan

As it has been explained in the previous chapters that territorial and ideological expansion has been the main focus of ISIS operations since its deceleration of the caliphate in June 2014. Islamic State's apocalyptic aspirations were not limited to the territory under their control but spanned across the globe. Dabiq Magazine spells out in clear words the hope and desire of their expansionism when they claim that, "we will conquer Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted" (Dabiq-4, 2014, p. 5). Almost 24 centuries ago, Thucydides argued in his treatise, "it is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not desire" (Strassler, 1996, p. 282; Thucydides, 1951, p. 266). With increasing victories, war bounty becomes abundant, sedentary cultures sets in and effeminacy ensues, making the fighters coward and lazy. Many aspire to become war leaders and in the process, some of them try to eliminate the competition. The ruler prevents them from doing that, however, many competent leaders are killed in this process. Middle and low-level leaders replace the great leaders and the centralized control tends to weaken. Consequently, the far regions tend to accumulate independent control and slowly detach themselves from the central control, giving rise to the new dynasties.

Equating Islamic State's expansion to the above chronology, the expansion of their dynasty, authority, and ideology can be witnessed throughout the Greater Middle East, Asia, and Africa in the shape of hundreds of religious groups, and their affiliates in the Western world.

As a precursor to joining the Caliphate, *Bay'ah* (Dabiq-5, 2014, p. 22) was performed continuously by many the small and large groups, pledging allegiance to ISIS. Some of these groups belonged to Iraq and Syria, while others were from far-off lands such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran (referred to as Khurasan), Africa, and Europe. This symbolic gesture gave these groups a feeling of closeness to the caliph and caliphate, and a certain pride by association besides some sense of security.

Their expansion continued and they spread their influence through allegiance and religious groups from other parts of the world continued to perform *Bay'ah* to ISIS leaders. Referring to the culminating argument of victorious forces falling into the senility and complacency trap might not be exactly true for ISIS, because they remained actively involved in fighting all along.

10.3.1 **Defections, Splintering, and Affiliations**

In the regions of Syria and Iraq, ISIS experienced resistance and many operatives defected, and multiple affiliates splintered off into a variety of breakaway groups, such as the Free Syrian Army, Jabath-an-Nasrah, Army of Conquest, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Dabiq-10, 2015, p. 68). Such splintering forced ISIS to fight on multiple fronts against a variety of enemies, both domestic and foreign (or near and far), physically and ideologically. ISIS stayed engaged on all fronts throughout the years of its existence, which possibly is coming to an end during 2019 (Loveluck, 2019).

Despite the effective narrative, ISIS had a steady stream of defectors. One can find stories of murder, torture, and inhumane treatment from such defectors, usually giving narratives such as (1) ISIS is more interested in fighting and brutality against Sunni Muslims; (2) ISIS is corrupt and most of their practices are un-Islamic; (3) life under *Daesh* is harsh, punishing, brutal and disappointing (Neumann, 2015b; Todenhöfer, 2016).

Two articles published in Dabiq-6 (2014/2015) entitled "The Qa'idah of Adh-Dahawahiri, Al-Hariri, and An-Nadhari, and the Absent Yemeni Wisdom" (pp. 16-25) and "Al-Qa'idah of Waziristan – A Testimony from Within" (pp. 40-55), shows a simmering tension between the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda (AQ) under the new leadership after Osama Bin Laden's death (Gollwitzer et al., 2014). The issues discussed intend to attract the members of AQ and inspire

them to join ISIS through *Bay'ah* from afar or *Hijrah*. Ironically, at that time Pakistan and Afghanistan were marred by the presence of scores of such small and large terrorist organizations. Most of these organizations aspired to be noticed as a powerful entity and considered it a preferable option to associate their name with that of ISIS[68]. For the reasons of recognition and fame, and in certain cases to showcase power through association (Hagberg, 1984), many of these groups declared *Bay'ah* to the caliphate. The regions mentioned above may not be necessarily true because of the very heavy deployment by Pakistan Army, however, there is no independently reliable evidence for *Daesh* to support such claims. The regional association with ISIS in large numbers may well be exaggerated, and such numbers are hard to account for and claim, however, there was a presence of ISIS loyalists in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan (Fayyaz, 2017). Pakistani authorities vehemently denied the presence and declared 'zero tolerance' for any ISIS affiliates (APP, 2015).

10.3.2 **Khurasan – Historicity of (non) Religious Significance**

Historically the term Khurasan is derived from "Farsi word *Khor* which means Sun and *Asan* or *Ayan* means the place where it comes from" and Khurasan included the entire Afghanistan, most of Central Asia, and North and East of present-day Iran (Mojtahedzadeh, 2006, p. 161). Historically Khurasan area expanded and included present-day Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, parts of North Eastern Iran, Afghanistan, and portions of contemporary Pakistan. The Sasanian Dynasty, which was the last Persian Dynasty before the advent of Islam, established this region comprising large territory which retained most of its contiguity even after a victory by Islamic forces in 651– 652 CE. In the 9th Century the greater Khurasan was divided into Afghanistan and Russian parts besides Khurasan province which remained the largest province of Iran till 2002. The 10th Century Iranian poet Rudaki Samarqandi called Khurasan the place where the sun comes from. Khurasan has been referred to in *Ibn Battuta Travels of Asia and Africa* and he has mentioned four cities that were then included in the Province of Khurasan i.e. Herat and Naysabur (Nishapur) which were inhabited while the other two cities of Balk and Merv were in ruins (Ross & Power, 1929). In 2002 Province of Khurasan was divided into three smaller provinces by Iranians; North Khurasan, South Khurasan, and Razavi Khurasan.

[68] Response by multiple scholars to a question by the author asked during 'Roundtable on de-radicalization' held at Center for International Peace and Stability on 27 Apr 2015, http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Schools/NIPCONS/nipcons-institutions/CIPS/News/Pages/Roundtable-on-De-radicalization-23rd-April,2015.aspx

There is a controversial Hadith also related to Khurasan. The hadith is related to the authority of Thawban that the Holy Prophet Mohammad said, "if you see the black banners coming from the direction of Khurasan, then go to them, even if you have to crawl, because among them will be Allah's Caliph the Mahdi" (Athamina, 1989; Mahood & Rane, 2017; Soufan, 2011, pp. 12-14 & 348-419).[69] The Hadith has been distorted and applied out of context initially by Al Qaeda and subsequently by *Daesh* to forward their agenda to claim legitimacy for the organization and its black flag, referring to it as the *Flag of Tauhid* (Dabiq-3, 2014a, pp. 15-22).

Extract 10.2: The Deceleration of *Wilayat* Khurasan

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4 5	The consultations saw the nomination of Hafidh Sa'id Khan for the position of Wali of Khurasan, who then went on to lead all those present in the pledging bay'ah to Khalifah Ibrahim al-Qureshi. This was followed by an announcement from the Islamic State officially declaring its expansion to Khurasan and its recognition as a new wilayah (Dabiq-7, 2015, p. 34).

Extract 10.2 above shows the deceleration of the Khurasan region as a Wilayat by ISIS(Nolan & Shiloach, 2015). This statement has multiple noticeable aspects: (1) in response to the Bay'ah from the Khurasan region, the media spokesperson from ISIS made this deceleration; (2) the statement mentions the geographical spread of the region which ISIS believes to be part of Khurasan; (3) the statement was preceded by indicating the existence of serious problems in the region, whereby a multitude of the terrorist organizations were operating in this region, each with its interest, targets, and enemies. Islamic State invited all these organizations to come under one banner and put aside all differences – something they were not practicing in Syria and Iraq. As mentioned earlier as well, *Daesh* was busy fighting many groups and organizations, regardless of their sect/faction, as long as they were not eliminated or they did not succumb to *Daesh* ideology; (4) the name of Iran, a country which practically owns the provinces of present-day Khurasan, has not been mentioned in the statement. While looking for the "implicit and explicit references" to the text in a discourse, special attention needs to be paid to the aspects which have *not* been mentioned Willig (2013c, p. 385). The fact that particular information is missing, tells us a lot about the way the text has been constructed. In this case, Dabiq Magazine has missed mentioning Iran, which has proved to be a formidable enemy for *Daesh*. Although animosity against Shia Islam is at the core of the Islamic State's ideology, however, they did not hope to get any affiliations from that part of the region. Moreover, Iran

[69] Also related by al-Hakim (8572), Ahmad (22387), Ibn Majah (4084) and Mustadrak al Hakim Hadeeth (8578).

had a very strict anti-*Daesh* policy which ensured that no such affiliations are shown toward the caliphate from Iran (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2015).

10.3.3 **A Fatwa for *Wilayat* Khurasan**

Dabiq Magazine published a Fatwa related to Khurasan. (Dabiq-10, 2015, pp. 18-24) The Fatwa starts with a question asked by someone from Afghanistan, requesting clarification regarding the status of the caliph in the Muslim world, and who needs to be followed by the Muslims as a caliph; Mullah Omer in Afghanistan or Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. In response to a question asked ISIS had to publish a Fatwa relating to Khurasan, explaining that the only legitimate ruler of all the Muslims was the person declared as a caliph by the Islamic State and not the local commanders such as Mullah Omer in Afghanistan (Dabiq-10, 2015, pp. 16-24).

Agrama (2010) posits that the Fatwa is not a religious obligation, people do obtain Fatwa multiple times to gain a desirable answer and the absence of the implementation authority makes a Fatwa a matter of choice and not a compulsion. The understanding of the difference between Fatwa and the laws made by a government, explains that the former has a coercive nature, whereas the latter does not. The need for Fatwa for Khurasan was felt due to the importance of the region and because the Islamic State was not finding a desirable foothold in the Afghan provinces of Farah, Helmand, Nangarhar, and Zabul (Azami, 2015). Taliban sent a clear message to Islamic State by constituting a special force to counter and eliminate the presence of ISIS anywhere in Afghanistan.

Extract 10.3: A Fatwa Against Second Caliph

Line	Extract
1 2 3 4	There will be Khilafah upon the prophetic methodology", and the hadith narrated by Hudhayfah, "Stick to the Jama'ah of the Muslims and their imam" and the hadith, "if bay'ah is given to two khulafa, then kill the second of the two" (Dabiq-10, 2015, p. 19),

Extract 10.3 above shows multiple Hadiths from *Sahih Muslim* (nd, pp. 113-205) as part of the Fatwa issued against the Amir of Afghanistan. The overriding argument behind this Fatwa draws on a citation of this text and customary references. Technically, it could be claimed that this fatwa is actually against the self-avowed caliph Abu Bakr. One of the Hadiths mentioned in the extract clearly states that Muslims need to follow the existing caliph and if another caliph claims this position, he needs to be killed. In this case, Mulla Omer was declared the "Amir-ul-Momineen or leader of the faithful" in 1996 in the Emirate of Afghanistan (Rashid, 2002, p. 44). He did not claim authority over any territory outside Afghanistan, nor did he invite/incite Muslims to perform *Bay'ah* on his hands. This Fatwa tries to refute his authority over the entire

Muslim community by explaining that Mullah Omar had limited geographical ambitions restricted mostly to Afghanistan and the region. The further argument states that such a narrow approach does not suit the caliph of the Muslim community which is spread around the globe. Moreover, Mullah Omar had declared that he will maintain cordial and friendly relations with his neighbors, which, again as per the Fatwa, is contrary to the dignity of a caliph of Muslims to have any such concessions offered to the non-believers, Shias, and even the *Taghut*[70] regimes such as Pakistan. The third argument made in the Fatwa draws a kinship lineage of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi to Prophet Mohammad and argues in the light of the Hadith that the real caliph must only belong to the Quraysh tribe.

The Ideological deconstruction of Fatwa reveals three important aspects of ISIS thought: (1) the modern concept of nationalism, statehood, democracy, and international relations between the states are meaningless for Islamic State ideology. They only believe in their version of *Shari'ah* and its laws. Such laws proclaim Abu Bakr as the only and the true caliph of the Muslims, and all Muslims need to pledge allegiance only to him. If they fail to do so, they are the enemies of the Islamic State; (2) it is important not only to declare non-believers as the enemies but rather pronounce such decelerations, followed by action against them. Showing any sign of friendship or efforts to develop cordial relationships with such regimes are the signs of weakness and are beyond the ideological mandate of the Islamic State. The clear orders command all Muslims to leave no territory where infidels could survive or live side by side with the Muslims; and (3) Islamic State does need regional leaders and people like Mullah Omar to control the governorates or *Wilayat* Khurasan in this case, however, to earn this legitimacy and tacit stamp of approval from the ISIS central, Mullah Omar needs to perform *Bay'ah* at the hands of the caliph. The Fatwa was an effort to solidify the status of Khurasan as the territory under the Islamic State's control. This also drew a clear line between those who are followers of Mullah Omer and those who were *Daesh* loyalists.

10.3.4 **Points of Departure in Khurasan**

For the past many years multiple terrorist organizations have been operating in the Khurasan region, and reference to these organizations frequently appears in mainstream Dabiq Magazine and Islamic State's discourse. The basic ideological differences between these organizations reveal the mutual relationship to be uncomfortable at best and of violent animosity at worst. The founding father of the Islamic State Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi had pledged allegiance to Osama

[70] Literal meanings 'Tyrant'.

Bin Laden, albeit reluctantly as claimed by some authors, and mostly "operated independently" as he assumed command of Al Qaida in Iraq (Atwan, 2015, pp. 47-48). The point of departure between the two organizations set in earlier on due to ideological differences between them. Osama Bin Laden fought against the presence of Americans and other Western fighters in the Middle East, whereas Al Zarqawi declared Shia Muslims as apostates and created a crack within the Muslim community, something despised by Al Qaeda leadership.

These two articles, published almost two years apart, discuss the ideology which differentiates Islamic State from other religious organizations. Some of the focal underpinnings include:

(1) Islamic State is the rightful caliphate for Muslims across the world and other organizations should either pledge allegiance to the caliph or they are the enemies;

(2) Al Qaida has changed its ideology after Osama's death and Al Zawahiri is a non-deserving and incompetent leader with a deviant ideology;

(3) Al Qaida leadership in the region is inaccessible to the low-level operatives and is elusive of their problems and ground realities. Resultantly it is losing control and ground in the region;

(4) all Muslims in the region need to abandon all other organizations and fall under the Islamic State's banner, performing *Bay'ah* through Wali of Khurasan;

(5) the laws being followed by regional organizations such as tribal Jirga and by the Taliban leadership are manmade and not the true *Shari'ah* laws as envisioned by ISIS. All manmade laws need to be abandoned and in favor of the *Shari'ah*;

(6) Pakistan army is *Taghut* army, aiding Americans in the fight against the regional Muslims, this makes them the enemies of Islam and *Daesh*;

(7) regional governments are imparting secular education to the children which is against the Islamic State's teachings;

(8) the Khurasan region continued to face serious resistance and threat of existence from the Pakistan Army, Afghan and Pakistan intelligence, and even the Taliban, which (as per ISIS) makes all of them the enemies of Allah;

(9) Pakistan's intelligence, ISI, and General Hamid Gul[71] hired Taliban leadership to spread their specific agenda, prevent Islamic State to take roots in the region, and to avert spreading their ISIS influence (Dabiq-13, 2016);

(10) most of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) clientele has joined the Islamic State and those who did not are the enemies of the Islamic State;

(11) Pakistani government and the army is not serious about liberating Kashmir and the organizations operating in Kashmir such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba etc. are all deviant as per caliphate standards, with limited nationalist aspirations; and

(12) ISIS is finding it hard to establish a foothold in Afghanistan due to the presence of a large number of Taliban, Shia, Afghan intelligence, and Western armies, all of whom are sworn enemies of *Daesh*. There is thus an urgent need for Muslims to perform *Hijrah* to Khurasan so that they could support the expansionist cause of the Islamic State.

10.4 Khurasan/Pakistan – Aspirations, Reality, and Retort

Khurasan region remained a lesser priority for ISIS, especially during its initial years. North Africa and primarily Sahel region, besides Rome, instead, was the main area of focus. This was expounded by *Daesh* in an article *Reflections on Final Crusade*, published in Dabiq Magazine (Dabiq-4, 2014, pp. 32-44). Similar claims were also made at other places by Dabiq Magazine for example, "Algeria, Libya, and Sinai are strategically near each other making it possible to expand further" (Dabiq-5, 2014, p. 32). This shows that they were looking for large clientele in regions that were already destabilized due to ongoing civil wars. Khurasan region had a resemblance to those regions, however, the presence of American and NATO forces, inside Afghanistan and rather a large presence of Pakistan Army on the bordering regions, made it harder for their aspirations to fully materialize.

Cooke and Sanderson (2016) argue that violent extremists need local support for the expansion of their operations and ideology. Such support could come from the civilian population, such as the rise of *Sahwah* from the Sunni Iraqi population (Benraad, 2017), or the governmental institutions or its agents (Cooke & Sanderson, 2016). Unfortunately, the Khurasan region has witnessed unrest, terrorism, war, and the presence of small and large extremists for the past many decades. Therefore, the emergence of ISIS or self-declared *Wilayat* Khurasan by the *Daesh* was certainly undesirable news, and it was not received with any special fervor from the locals. It

[71] Word '*Murtad'* (one who was born Muslim but abandons it) has been used for General Hamid Gul as a stigmatizing label.

would, however, not be an overstatement to say that some of the unnoticed organizations did claim to align themselves with the ISIL to seek attention (Dabiq-13, 2016; Khan, 2015). While the stance of the Pakistan Army and the government was that of a 'zero tolerance' (APP, 2015), one cannot deny the presence of graffiti in some places in Pakistan in favour of *Daesh* (Online, 2014), simultaneously anti-ISIS graffiti in Pakistan was also reported (Editor, 2014). In short, *Daesh* could not make any significant or attractive mark in Pakistan with few followers (Craig, 2015), many loyalists were often caught by the intelligence agencies (Gabol & Khan, 2017) and treated under the strict law.

In Pakistan, a more inert approach to deal with this issue has been to ignore it. Organizations or individuals desirous to link themselves to *Daesh* aspired to do that for popularity and desire to get noticed. Relatedly, sometimes paying too much attention and creating media hype proves counterproductive and yields unexpected results, and Tehrik–i–Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a case in point. Mentioning the group's name repeatedly by the media ended up making them prominent and converted the organization into a hurting reality. Echoing their narrative repeatedly makes it a reality or gives it importance and a desirable audience. A similar mistake was committed by Americans while dealing with the Al Qaeda magazine *Inspire* that comes out of Yemen. The contents of the magazine were of a very low standard, and the magazine gained popularity for spreading training on bomb manufacturing and IEDs. Few aspiring bombers in the west were also associated with the magazine, and the issue was hyped up by media as well as intelligence agencies, thus making *Inspire* a popular read amongst terrorists (Berger, 2013a).

A rather more offensive approach by Pakistan would be to nip the problem in the bud with a heavy hand and to eliminate the threat on its first occurrence. This would be hard to achieve in solitude and close collaboration on the issue would be necessary between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Only a unified response can thwart the establishment of a sizable foothold by *Daesh* in Khurasan. Islamic organizations in all three countries would be more than willing to join the Islamic State, as it loses ground and battle in Syria and Iraq and is trying to find ideological refuge in other soft regions.

As mentioned earlier, Shia majority country Iran owns provinces of present-day Khurasan, and ISIS has declared Shias as their top priority enemies. The security of Iran is also threatened by multiple organizations such as Jundullah, Mujahideen–e–Khalq, and Jeysh–al–Adl, etc. Iran on its part laid out a comprehensive and detailed anti-ISIS policy (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2015). A unified media–government response in Iran includes downplaying the presence of any ISIL

elements in areas within Iran. They not only restrained its presence and advances through media and government policy but also got actively involved in removing any presence of *Daesh* closer to its borders with Iraq. Esfandiary and Tabatabai (2015) also posit that through effective employment of Quds force under General Qassem Soleimani, both inside Iraq as well as Syria they have been able to make good sense of *Daesh* motivations and respond correspondingly.

Pakistan and Iran are two formidable enemies of the Islamic State in Khurasan and their loyalists. Stability and cooperation between the two countries can yield peace. Stability in Iran – the Pakistan relationship also means an improved security environment in the greater Khurasan region which includes Afghanistan and Central Asia. Marginalized by Shia hostile Arab neighbors, Iran finds a comparatively comfortable neighbourhood in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. A survey by PEW Research shows Iran is viewed most favourably in the world by Pakistan at 57%, trailed by Ghana, Lebanon, and Russia (Zainulbhai & Wike, 2015). Elements of *Daesh* trying to establish a foothold in Khurasan have thus far faced reasonably tough resistance in the region. There have been multiple clashes between Taliban and *Daesh* loyalists in Afghanistan. A warning letter was sent from Taliban leaders to *Daesh* advising them to refrain from expanding its influence in the region.

The third, and mostly the weakest link, in the *Daesh* expansion equation in Khurasan is Afghanistan. The world is familiar with the long and unending history of wars in Afghanistan. The tribal nature of society makes it harder for a central government to exercise effective control. The situation is further compounded by the presence of narcotics, drugs, weapons, and the absence of communication infrastructure. Local warlords have, for decades, been supported by the international community to fulfill their agendas. In one of the most recent developments, President Trump has shown willingness toward a more inclusive government in Afghanistan which could give more space to the Taliban in Kabul (Tanzeem, 2019). As mentioned above, the Taliban have sworn enemies of the ISIS elements. Pakistan has a strong working relationship with the Taliban and this relationship is likely to foster a joint strategy to deal with the remnants of *Daesh* in Khurasan. As the political situation improves for the Taliban in Afghanistan, it would be the right move for a three-party strategy formulated by Iran – Pakistan – Afghanistan, to deal with the Islamic State.

10.5 **Conclusion**

This chapter provides an account of the waning glory of *Daesh* through Dabiq Magazine text. This magazine has been a well-planned propaganda material that contains a significant amount of information regarding *Daesh*, including political, religious, moral, economic, and social

thoughts of an excommunicated organization. Throughout the life cycle of the organization, they have displayed a remarkable ability to spread their propaganda using a variety of sources, languages, and media to attract a diverse audience from around the globe (Lakomy, 2018, 2019a). Dabiq Magazine has been one of the most authentic sources attributed to *Daesh* (Milton, 2016; Safizadeh, 2017; Vergani & Bliuc, 2015a). Besides a chronological account of events, Dabiq Magazine contains dedicated sections for updates regarding glory and gains made by ISIS. These victories usually came in the shape of territorial gains (Dabiq-5, 2014), also in the shape of *bay'ah* or pledging of allegiance from conquered regions and far-flung lands such as Africa, Asia, and other parts of the globe (Dabiq-1, 2014; Dabiq-2, 2014). Such allegiances emboldened ISIS central and falling into the illogical fallacy trap, they declared multiple *Wilayah*. Their desire to expand their territorial control and geographical influence included ambitions of controlling and ultimately ruling the entire world. To strengthen such assertions ISIS claimed responsibility for attacks in multiple cities around the world including Brussels, Sydney, Paris, etc. (Dabiq-14, 2016).

Pakistan has been excessively engaged in eradicating terrorism on multiple fronts for past almost four decades. Army has been forced to deploy on Indian as well as Afghan borders besides multiple domestic challenges including Baluchistan, Karachi, TTP, etc. Pakistani foreign policy is on a tight rope as far as the balancing act between its geographical compulsions neighbouring Shia Iran, troubled Afghanistan, and geopolitical imperatives from a more "demanding" Middle Eastern Sunni Arab allies. To complicate the problems there are more than 200 religious organizations operational in Pakistan (Rana, 2014). In event of ISIS gaining a slight foothold, the majority of these organizations would be happy and willing to pledge allegiance to the self-proclaimed caliph and create a highly undesirable security situation for Pakistan. Government agencies have been on the mission actively and at least three people were arrested who were publishing and distributing pro-Islamic State pamphlets (Report, 2015).

Pakistan also needs to further shrink space for TTP which has found safe refuge in Afghanistan. Most of the senior TTP leadership pledged allegiance to ISIS by sending them the message, "we are with you, we will provide you with fighters and with every possible support" (Aljazeera, 2014). Their aspirations may not be a possible reality but their intermittent attacks on Pakistani soil are a clear manifestation of their intentions.

With an aggressive preventive policy and a vibrant security sector, Pakistan needs to stay alert without inducing panic at the national level. ISIS expansion is overplayed by media propaganda. Ultimately an effective response to the ISIS problem in Khurasan resides in a three-pronged

strategy. First and foremost, diplomatic channels need to be utilized more effectively between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to ensure all three countries remain on the same page. Secondly, the military, as well as intelligence agencies need to coordinate their efforts and be papered to pre-empt any desire by Islamic State to expand in Khurasan. Finally, in close collaboration with mass media (including social media, print as well as other electronic media) a powerful counter-narrative needs to be developed to effectively suppress any propagation by ISIS loyalists in the region. A unified proactive and potent response is the only option for the region if it has to prevent this menace from making any headway.

Chapter 11: Conclusion

The primary scope of this thesis has been theoretical and methodological; concerning the synthesis of the theoretical concepts and methodological principles in understanding and interpreting Dabiq Magazine as an empirical material published by a *Daesh*. The theoretical-methodological approach provided a significant domain for synthesizing the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and philosophy in explaining the contemporary text, context, and discourses.

CDA ties itself to the word and deed, theory and method, to a normative, explicitly political inquiry, into social, ideological, and cultural power (cf Luke, 2002). Such attributes allowed an approach in the conduct of this research that sets out to deconstruct and interrupt the ideological commonsense, everyday language usage, and categorization of discursive power manifested by the Islamic State and other small and large groups. If one must follow the relationship between ideology and language as posited by Volosinov (1929), one has to believe that everything ideological possesses meanings; it represents, depicts, or stands for something lying 'outside itself' – a sign. Without signs, there is no ideology. Acceptance of this assumption guided the CDA in this research to look for these signs. Signs in the shape of text, words, and images, but more significantly, look for the absence, or silence of these signs. Because, it is the absence of these signs that signify discourse (Spikes, 1992). As rightly pointed out by Luke (2002, p. 100), "CDA involves a principled and transparent shunting back and forth between the microanalysis of text using varied tools of linguistics, semiotics, and literary analysis and macroanalysis of social formations, institutions and power relations that these texts and index construct". The only recognizable methodology in CDA is thus an orchestrated recursive analytical movement between the text and the context.

This concluding section reflects on the specific aims of the research and its theoretical and methodological contribution to the field of CDA, besides briefly presenting the central argument and findings of the thesis. This is also a recognition that multiple methodological approaches and models developed in this thesis and used for analysis in the subsequent chapters pay off as the combination of these approaches may be of utility to the researchers in examining the discourses, text, and images. Some of the philosophical-methodological innovations for this research are instrumental in understanding the contextualization and shaping of the discourses, and how these discourses legitimized power, stigma, violence, and

brutality. These discourses also institutionalized the manifestation of the extreme forms of repression and violence against the most helpless civilians, many of whom left their homes, became refugees, and fled to save their lives. Ironically, others died in the process of migration away from the land controlled by *Daesh*, while many others got ideologically enticed and moved to these lands as ISIS affiliates (Benmelech & Klor, 2020). The ideological resonance was powerful enough to attract many families including women to perform the sacred ritual of *Hijrah* to the Islamic State (Perešin, 2015).

The specific aim of the research was to examine how the discourse-driven texts can function as a mechanism for the initiation of multiple ideological and thematic discourses. How do these discourses then occupy certain central positionalities in the society, and how in the backdrop of power, do these discourses further the ideology– all of these in form of the published text. In so doing, this research made methodological and theoretical contributions simultaneously, by critically analyzing these discourses, as an outcome of the crystallization of multiple themes spanned over two years of text production. These discourses produced and perpetuated marginalization, and fostered a distinct ideological following.

This thesis set out to describe the relationship between the language, text, and discourse, and composite formulation of ideology through ISIS text and to examine how brutality and violence and the manifestation of power are communicated in discourse. The main contribution of this thesis has been a synthesis of Foucauldian critical perspectives on discourses of power, *Hijrah,* and stigma, with an consolidation of contemporary theoretical and classical philosophical functions. The aim of this methodological approach was twofold: to synthesize various analytical ideological concepts; and frame the textual analysis within the wider domain of CDA, by suggesting methods for analyzing all these discourses, uniting in the backdrop of fifteen issues of Dabiq Magazine.

The repeated attention to all issues of Dabiq Magazine at micro-level – on words, images, articles, their repetition in other issues, and absence due to contextual constraints set the tone for the crystallization of dominant themes. These themes were then analyzed using a blend of CDA-theory and philosophy in understanding the macro-level outcomes in the shape of discourses, ideological assertions, and global implications. The data short-listed crystallized themes were subjected to innovative variants of analysis techniques utilizing the analytical tool developed in the initial parts of this thesis. Scholarship has highlighted a large number of such themes, however, due to spatio-temporal constraints, and intensity and domination of

the themes, the selected themes were analytically examined, associations developed with other themes, and synthesized with the data corpus.

Dabiq text has been used by the Islamic State to create an extreme form of knowledge/power by the Islamic State. This research posits that power is everywhere and comes from everywhere, so in this sense, it is not an agency or a structure (Foucault, 1998). Instead, the Foucauldian conception of power/knowledge argues that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, understanding, and truth. This knowledge, in this case, is then made common sense by adding distinct religious interpretations and making it the 'truth'. In perpetuating specific forms of truth, power and dominance were ensured by ISIS. This power allowed Daesh to impose extreme forms of social brutality. The dominant features of this arrangement have been summarized as (1) the need for implementation of self-created *Shari'ah* laws; (2) the desire of justice for all regardless of in-group affiliations; (3) the proliferation of a specific version of Islam, where only ISIS is on the right path and rest everyone is deviant, apostate and non-believer; (4) drawing on the historic functions of statehood, muster enough military power and then punish the marginalized and segregated; and (5) making appropriate use of human psyche, spreading the ideology and identity through excessive use of images.

Knowledge/power discourse permeates into almost every capillary in the social fabric of ISIS society. Resultantly all discourse such as *Hijrah*, stigma, and brutality, not to mention the deceleration of the caliphate itself, drew on the knowledge/power and events manifested around it. The invitation to the most violent piece of land occupied by ISIL attracted thousands of migrants from around the globe, who preferred migration in the middle of war along with their families, women, the elderly, and children (Ali, 2015). Such was the power of *Hijrah* discourse. Similarly, the common-sense stigmatization in every society is a manifestation of power from a bigger or more powerful segment of society against the marginalized, weak, and the 'other' (cf Buchowski, 2006; Goffman, 1963; Powell, 2008). However, it was this knowledge/power that paved the way for ISIS to stigmatize 'others'. The crude anger exhibited in Dabiq Magazine is a sign of frustration on one hand, and an effort to dehumanize the enemies of the Islamic State, on the other. This unusual adoption of a specific language form in Dabiq Magazine is to infrahumanize the enemies regardless of their size, political and religious affiliations, or social denominations. Again, a function of knowledge/power manifestation. Thus the discursive knowledge/power does not necessarily

function to repress individuals, but rather to produce them through practices of signification, subjectification, and action (Heller, 1996).

Daesh's publications also accrued significant power out of the discourse of visual representations. The possession of the gaze about Syria and Iraq, and in some cases even the rest of the world is visible in these images. The control over the 'truth' about the realities in these societies allowed Islamic State to reveal and conceal what they desired. Theoretically, the images also invite the viewers to seek and see the 'truth' and reality through their depiction, continue to view the world through everyday consumption of these images and resist movement beyond these. Empowered by their visual stratagem, *Daesh* perversely controlled the gaze and brazenly announced the revenge against the 'other' world, both physically and through these images. Arguably, the very nature of war could also entice the participants to display bravery, and selflessness and simultaneously seek glory, sympathy, and signification through the publication of such graphic images. This also acts as a tool of terror and gives a feeling of the ugly realities of war. Lastly, the deconstruction of selected graphic/violent images from Dabiq Magazine is the depiction of virtually exporting organized brutality. Since Islamic State had an advanced control and stature of a fully developed social organization, they also had sufficient means of communication, transport, exchanges, technology, logistics, literacy, and professional input in their publications, they could fight a modern war using innovation and novelty. Dabiq Magazine is only one of the multitudes of propaganda tools used by *Daesh* to promote their ideology and identity.

This research also points to media techniques employed by the Islamic State in spreading the ideology and conflict. Creating a hyper-reality, employing both true and fake events in media propaganda, and publication of brutal and violent images in Dabiq Magazine, served two purposes for the Islamic State: (1) creation of a persona of an excommunicate organization that portrays itself as just, pious, capable, simultaneously portrays others as apostates, weak and tyrannical; (2) promotion of a distinct ideology as aesthetically pleasing enterprise based on solid foundations and principles of justice for all, through rapid and massive publication and distribution of professionally edited images, videos and other social media informatics. The imagery analytical concerns in the research were examined using the Critical Visual Analysis tool as the theoretical framework, explaining certain aspects of the theory of semiotics (Thibault, 1991), the relationship between the text and images, and the continuity of the significance of the theory of poststructuralism in images. The image analysis found that the

publication of these images performed the function of terrorism as well as the spreading of ideology.

To sum it all up, human nature is not properly equipped for violence, we need a coercive push and ideological conviction of such terrorist organizations enabling us to inflict and justify violence. Resisting global efforts to eradicate brutality, ISIS opened doors for manifestation and proliferation of violence and perpetuated violence through infrastructural and ideological might as a terrorist organization. In using CDA as a methodological tool to understand the discourses in Dabiq Magazine, this research reiterates that CDA, like all other social inquiries, faces fundamental dilemmas: constantly varying and emerging objects of the study, a blend of identities, transnational organizations, and social formation, innovative means of exploitation and suppression resulting in persistently troubling material and discourse conditions. CDA must continue to contend with blended and synthesized forms of representation, identity, ideology, and flow of discursive characters. These will continue to necessitate innovative blends of analytical techniques and social theories. Besides ideology critique, new forms of text and productive uses of power must be the focus of 21st Century CDA scholarship.

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Appendix A: Dabiq Magazine

Issue	Cover Title (date/pages) and Contents
1	***The Return of Khilafah (Ramadan 1435, 5 Jul 14, pp. 26)***
	Dabiq Magazine
	Khilafah Declared
	Islamic State Reports
	Imamah is from the Millah of Ibrahim
	The Islamic State in the Words of Enemy
	Feature: From Hijrah to Khilafah
	Islamic State News
2	***The Flood (Ramadan 1435, 27 Jul 14, pp. 22)***
	Foreword
	It's Either the Islamic State of the Flood
	Islamic State Reports
	Feature: The Flood of the Mubahalah
	The Islamic State in the Words of Enemy
	Islamic State News
3	***A Call to Hijrah (Shawwal 1435, 10 Sep 14, pp. 45)***
	Foreword
	The Islamic State Before al-Malahamah
	Islamic State Reports
	Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity
	The Islamic State in the Words of Enemy
	Foley's Blood is on Obama's Hands
	The complete Message from Foley
4	***The Failed Crusade (Dhul-Hajjah 1435, 11 Oct 14, pp. 31)***
	Foreword
	Indeed Your Lord I Ever Watchful
	My Provision Was Placed For Me In The Shade Of My Spear
	The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour
	Islamic State Reports
	Reflections on the Final Crusade
	In The Words Of Enemy
	A Message From Sotloff
	Hard Talk – John Cantlie

Issue	Cover Title (date/pages) and Contents

5	***Remaining and Expanding (Muharram 1436, 21 Nov 14, pp 41)***
	Foreword
	Yahya: Lessons from a Shahid
	Islamic State Reports
	Hikmah
	Remaining and Expanding
	In The Words of Enemy
	If Cantlie were the US President Today – John Cantlie
6	***Al Qa'idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within (Rabi' Al-Awwal 1436, 29 Dec 14, pp. 38)***
	Foreword
	Advise for the Soldiers of the Islamic State
	The Qa'idah of Adh-Dahawhiri, Al-Hariri and An-Nadhari, and the Absent Yemni Wisdom
	Islamic State Reports
	Al-Qaedah of Waziristan - A Testimony from Within
	In The Words of Enemy
	Meltdown – John Cantlie
7	***From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone (Rabi'Al-Akhir 1436, 12 Feb 2015, pp.45)***
	Foreword
	The Burning of Murtadd Pilot
	Advise for the Leaders of Islamic State
	From the Pages of History
	Islam is the Religion of Sword not Pacifism
	Responding to the Doubts
	Islamic State Reports
	Among the Believers are Men
	To our Sisters – Umm Basir al Muhajirah
	In The Words of Enemy
	The Extinction of Gray zone
	The Good example of Abu Bakr Al Ifriqi
	Interview with Abu Umar Al Baljiki
	The Anger Factory – John Cantlie

Issue	**Cover Title (date/pages) and Contents**

Issue	Cover Title (date/pages) and Contents
10	***The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men (Ramadan 1436, 13 Jul 15, pp, 53)***
	Foreword
	The Allies of Al Qa'idah in Sham – Part III
	Tawhid and our Duty to our Parents
	A Fatwa for Khurasan
	From Pages of History
	American Kurdistan
	The Qawqazi Caravan Gains Pace
	Hikmah
	Among the Believers are Men
	From Our Sisters
	The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men
	In The Words of Enemy
	Interview with Abu Samir Al Urduni
11	***From the Battles of Al-Ahzāb to the War of Coalitions (Dhul Qa'Dah 1436, 9 Sep 15, pp. 27)***
	Foreword
	The Allies of Al Qa'idah in Sham – Part 4
	The Evil of Division and Taqlid
	The "Mahdi" of the Rafidah – The Dajjal
	Wala' and Bara' Versus American Racism
	The Danger of Abandoning Darul Islam
	From Pages of History
	Islamic State Reports
	Hikmah
	Among the Believers are Men
	To our Sisters: A Jihad without Fighting
	From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions
	In The Words of Enemy
	Interview with Abul Mughirah Al Qahtani

Issue	Cover Title (date/pages) and Contents

12	***Just Terror (Safar 1437, 18 Nov 15, pp. 101)***
	Foreword
	The Allies of Al Qa'idah in Yemen
	Advice to the Mujahideen: Listen and Obey
	The Allies of Al Qa'idah in Sham – The End
	From the Pages of History: Baqiyah
	To our Sisters: Two, Three or Four
	Hikmah
	Military Operations of the Islamic State
	And as far the Blessings of your Lord, then Mention it
	O You who have Believed, Protect Yourself and Your Families from Fire
	The Revival of Jihad in Bengal
	You Think They are Together, But Their Hearts are Divided
	Paradigm Shift Part II- John Cantlie
	In The Words of Enemy
	Among the Believers are Men
	Interview with Abu Muharib al Sumali
	Special
13	***The Rafidah from Ibn Saba' to the Dajjal (Rabi'Al-Akhir 1437, 19 Jan 16, pp. 62)***
	Foreword
	Kill the Imams of Kufr
	From the Pages of History: The Safawiyah
	Military Reports
	Hikmah
	Among the Believers are Men
	Do they not then Reflect on Qur'an
	The Rafidah from Ibn Saba to the Dajjal
	In The Words of Enemy
	Interview with the Wali of Khurasan

Issue	Cover Title (date/pages) and Contents
14	***The Murtadd Brotherhood (Rajab 1437, 13 Apr 16, pp. 85)***
	Foreword
	The Knights of Shahadah in Belgium
	Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West
	Do they not then Reflect on Qur'an
	Operations
	From the Pages of History
	Among the Believers are Men
	The Blood of Shame
	In The Words of Enemy
	Interview
15	***Break the Cross (Shawwal 1437, 31 Jul 16, pp. 109)***
	Foreword
	Contemplate the Creation
	From the Pages of History
	The Fitrah of Mankind
	Words of Sincere Advice
	Why We Hate you and Why We Fight You
	Wisdom
	How I came to Islam
	Operation
	Break the Cross
	Interview
	Among the Believers are Men
	In The Words of Enemy
	By the Sword