

The current internal displacement crisis and its impact upon militancy in North Waziristan Agency

The vulnerability of Temporary Dislocated Persons (TDPs) residing in official, unofficial camps and with the host communities, towards militancy



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Dedication

We dedicate our research work to our friends and family. A special feeling of gratitude to our supervisor, Dr. Riffat Hussain who was a source of inspiration and motivation to us with his consistent supervision and encouragement, made this work possible.

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
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1 LIST OF ACRONYMS

TDPs	Temporary Dislocated Persons
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
NWA	North Waziristan Agency
PA	Political Agent
FR	Frontier Region
FDMA	FATA Disaster Management Authority
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PaRRSA	Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation & Settlement Authority
SAFRON	States & Frontier Regions
ISPR	Inter-Services Public Relations
CCAR	Chief Commissionerate Afghan Refugees
UNHCR	UN-High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
RAPID	Responding for Pakistan's Internally Displaced
SHS	Subjective Happiness Scale

2 MAP OF BANNU AND FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS



Source: (CAMP, 2012)

3 INTRODUCTION

Pakistan, due to its strategic positioning has always been the center of international and regional politics. Borders of Pakistan are attached with Iran, China, India, Afghanistan etc. The neighboring country Afghanistan has remained prone to conflicts and wars over a significant period of time (BBC News, 2013). These conflicts had impacted Pakistan directly as well as indirectly. Especially the Pashtun occupied north-western areas (FATA and KPK) of Pakistan are affected greatly by these wars and conflicts in Afghanistan. Pakistan joined the US-led war in Afghanistan by combating anti-state violent elements. The 9/11 conflict not only resulted in the large scale displacement of Afghanis but also led to the massive disturbance in Pakistan. The internal displacements in Pakistan forced people to move in the relatively safer areas of the country.

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UNOCHA 2004) defines internally displaced people as “Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border”. From this concept, it is crystal clear that a person who voluntarily shift to another place temporarily or permanently for seeking better health, educational facilities or economic opportunities is different from the person who is forced to move in another area. Forced displacement can happen as a result to avoid armed conflicts, natural, man-made and technological disasters. Development projects in an area can also internally displace a person to another area. Most importantly, it eliminates those people from this categorization who are migrants, refugees or who seek asylum (Fisher 2006). According to this definition, people of FATA have been internally displaced as a consequence of increased armed conflicts, terrorism, military operations, militant threats etc. There is a significant number of people who seek shelter due to oppressive militant’s government in their areas. The kidnapping of locals, militant threats and attacks forced them to leave their homes. However, literature has given little attention to this kind of IDPs.

The phenomenon of internally displaced people is quite visible across the world, forcing approximately 28.8 million people to move as a result of armed conflicts and civil wars. The European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO 2013) stated that the consecutive last three floods in the country has majorly affected the most parts of Pakistan. Around 15 million people were forced to move to safer areas during the monsoon floods from 2010 to 2012 (IDMC 2013). 2010 flood resulted in 1900 casualties in addition to 18 million displacements. After one year to this event, monsoon caused massive destruction leaving behind 5.8 million people displaced. 2012 was again marked by the floods displacing 5 million people. USAID (2013) outlined the need of humanitarian assistance to 1.5 million people till this date.

The aggressive armed conflicts and battles between military and anti-state elements and militant groups have caused devastation in Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In 2007, these armed conflicts resulted in displacement of about 3 million people (Ferris & Winthrop 2010). Up till October 2013, around 1 million IDPs are either forced to live in camps or stay with the host families and relatives (OCHA 2013).

The armed conflicts in Pakistan had badly affected the lifestyles of local peoples and have worsened the regional situation through massive displacements. From 2007 to 2009, 550,000 people from FATA are displaced from their areas. The year 2008 is marked by the military operation against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in South Waziristan, resulting in 200,000 people to displace to Tank and Dera Ismail Khan (Said 2012). Similar operation against TTP, in June 2014, has been launched by the military in North Waziristan agency causing displacement of around 300,000 people. After this operation, IDPs are now called as TDPs by the military. Army has established that around 47 % of the infrastructure has been completely destroyed making Miranshah and Mir Ali the most affected areas. (Tribune, 2015).

3.1 NEED OF THE STUDY

The current wave of internal displacements as a result of the military offensive Zarb-e-Azb, amounts to 277,811 families¹ out of which 8,816 (3%) are residing in camps (FDMA, 2014). The rest of the TDPs reside either with host communities or unofficial camps who largely remains

¹ This figure accounts only for the registered families.

unattended by the government authorities. The main and only official camp which is situated in Bakka-khel, is largely a rural areas whereas some out-of-camp areas may present good socio-economic opportunities, adequate housing and shelter is a scarce commodity given the huge TDPs influx. TDPs are experiencing depression, stress and psychological issues. There are chances that in the near future, after their return TDPs, they could become vulnerable towards militancy and exploited by militant organizations exacerbating the overall militancy situation in NWA. Consequently, it defeats the very purpose of operation Zarb-e-Azb i.e. curbing militancy and terrorism in the region. The previous research on TDPs has emphasized the vulnerability assessment of TDPs and no study has linked the vulnerable TDPs to the rise in militancy in the area. Therefore, there is a need to explore the relationship between these two variables. This will provide a different aspect to conduct research studies on TDPs crisis situation in Pakistan.

3.2 SCOPE

The scope of this research is limited to TDPs of the ongoing Zarb-e-Azb operation. Previous researches on TDPs of earlier operations such as operation Rah-e-Rast etc. are only included in the literature review. Also, this research does not cover the resettlement and rehabilitation of TDPs. The return of TDPs is conducted in phases by the government, since all the TDPs have not yet returned to their respective areas, studying rehabilitation may be futile at this point of time.

3.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

To study the importance of vulnerability assessments of the Bannu TDPs.

To study the link between psychological and other issues to the TDPs and apparent rise in militancy in NWA.

To study the gaps in National Policy on TDPs and its implementable rectification.

To study the policy recommendations on how the TDPs crisis can be dealt with more effectively by the govt. and military jointly avoiding any possible institutional clash.

3.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

What's the impact of the current TDP crisis in the wake the current military operation i.e. Zarb-e-Azb, upon militancy in North Waziristan Agency (NWA)?

In what way will the insufficinet socio-economic support (in the camps) affect the TDPs given that they are a vulnerable population?

The people with psychological issues and depression in the TDPs camps more vulnerable to militancy?

3.5 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

H1: Ineffective provision of basic needs such as education, health and economic opportunities to TDPs is aggravating the crisis situation.

H2: TDPs facing pyschological issues and depression are more vulnerable to militancy.

H3: The absence of a National Policy on TDPs i.e. organizational mandates, roles and the subsequent implementation lapses, are exacerbating the sense of relative deprivation in the TDPs.

4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NORTH-WAZIRISTAN AGENCY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Waziristan is an area of Pakistan mostly covered by mountains. It includes Northern Waziristan, Southern Waziristan, Bannu and parts of Tank from Pakistan whereas some parts of Afghanistan are also included such as Gurbuz, Barmal and Janikhel. The total area of Waziristan is more than 15000 sq. km. Waziristan is the southern part of FATA. It is basically a Pashtun dominant area where Pashto is the day to day language spoken. This area is named after a Pashtun tribe known as the Wazir. The population of North Waziristan is estimated to be around 0.6 million however this is not confirm as there has not been any official consensus for a long time.

4.2 GEOGRAPHY

Waziristan is divided into North and South due to administrative purposes even though it is a single unit. It is basically a mountainous region with difficult topography. It is surrounded by different koh-i-Sufaid and Sulaiman from North and the South. These also form the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many of these hills and mountains contain valuable minerals such as Razmak region. The average height of these hills is 1500-2500 m. Shuiar Sar of the Shoidar range is the highest peak of the North Waziristan Agency. There are also many rivers in this region such as Tochi, Kaitu, Kurram, Khaisor, and Shaktue. Tochi pass along the Tochi River has been a source of connection between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tochi valley has fertile land which is widely used for cultivation purposes. Minerals such as copper, manganese, gold, diamond and other common stones are also found in different parts of this region. The climate of this area is also not so different. Cold in winters starting from October upto April where summer start around May upto September. Few rainfall is observed in the region except for Razmak. However some of the ranges also have snowfall in the winter season due to high altitudes.

4.3 PEOPLE OF WAZIRISTAN

The major tribes of North Waziristan consist of Utmanzai, Wazirs and Dawars. There is further division into sub clans and small tribes such as Mehsud and Bangash. South Waziristan also has tribes such as Wazir, Maseed, Burki and Mahsuds. As they have always been rebellious in nature, they prefer to live in a way that they feel safe. Most of these tribal community prefer living in villages surrounded by mountains that forms a fortified settlement. The tribe of Dawar prefer living in compact areas whereas Waziris prefer joint family system in one house called 'kot' and if not possible then they build houses next to one another but on one from another family resides next to them. Kot is basically a fort type structure with high walls made of mud and stones and even a tower in the center. This is an old method still used by the Waziris to help them in conditions of enemy attack. Dawars however like to live by a water body or plain but both of the tribes have a guest room separate from the 'hujra' for outside guest. 'Hujra' is a private area where the families of the tribes reside. They have a custom of even providing weapon to their guest for safety in case there is an attack.

The dress commonly wore by the people is shalwar kameez but they wear a waist coat also. Turban is also wore by most of the people but many also wear caps. The footwear is a sandal traditionally introduced by themselves called 'chupal' or more commonly known as Peshawari chapal nowadays. The women wear heavy lengthy kameez with trousers. As the tribes are very strict regarding their women, they have to wear a cloth over themselves called the burka. Married women are allowed to wear multi colored cloths while unmarried wear simple ones. Women do wear colorful ornaments and rectangular shaped jewelry on different occasions such as Eid or a marriage ceremony. Their frock is made of up to 40m of cloth.

As stated above about the dressing, the people of Waziristan are very strict regarding their women and family. No woman is allowed to leave the premises of their home without the permission of their males. Women are not allowed to meet or even appear in front of outsiders. This is also the reason that women in these areas are not even allowed to cast their vote during elections. Male is considered as the dominant sex and he has to take all the decisions as he deems fit. Women's job is to do the household chores, make food and raise the children.

The tribal people are very fond of meat and beef. Most of their livestock is consumed by themselves. Roasted meat is a common local dish loved by the people. They also like a dish

known as Palawoo in which a goat is fried and served with rice. Wheat and maize is also included in their staple diet. Milk is also consumed a lot by the people.

Due to arid and fertile land, many people of the North Waziristan prefer farming for a living. Wheat, corn, millet and barley are commonly grown here including many seasonal fruits and vegetables also. People have also kept animals for different uses from milk, meat and transport purposes. However people in the Southern part are more troublesome. Instead of making an honest living, there is also a lot of smuggling from across the border. Due to suitable condition of land, many kinds of drugs are also harvested here which are sold on high prices. This makes it easy for the local militants to buy weapons from Afghanistan. Rather than this there is also a lot of timber available and some rare species of wood makes it worth a lot of money. Lastly, another very profitable business for some people in Waziristan is kidnapping and extortion. As the government has appointed a political agent for South Waziristan, so there is very little authority of the government in those areas. Many militants and tribes take advantage of this situation and demand heavy ransom by kidnapping people from different parts of the country and taking them into their areas.

Most of the population is uneducated and there is lack of educational facilities in the region. Majority is labor oriented, farmer or spread in different parts of the country as labors, drivers, clerks etc. many people even immigrate to foreign countries for labor jobs and send revenues back home. People who earn money from smuggling drugs and illegal items have also invested their money in different parts of Pakistan which cannot be traced back to the source due to lack of check and balance in the country. Transport business of cargo and trucks is also owned majorly by these people which benefits them to smuggle other goods as well.

4.4 ADMINISTRATION

The district capital of North Waziristan is Miranshah whereas Wana is the district capital of South Waziristan. The overall in charge of the agency is a political agent who deals the civil and criminal matters as well as revenue cases according Frontier Crimes Regulation as well as Customary Laws. The Jirga system is the most popular method of making decisions where the leaders and elderly people of the tribes make final decision and verdicts. It is a very old method

which has not been interrupted by the government of Pakistan but also the British at their time of rule. To keep the relationship peaceful and stable, the government supports the Jirga system and avoids involvement in their matters. If we recall, Fakir of Ipi also discouraged joining Islamic State of Pakistan during the time of partition however the Jirga decided to join the newly created state. Therefore we can understand the importance and value of Jirga system.

North Waziristan comprises of three sub divisions and nine tehsils. All the sub divisions are administered by Assistant Political Agent. There are three assistant political agents under a political agent who resolve minor cases on their own. Further they help the political agent in different matters of law and order and even act as a link between the tribes and the political agent by fulfilling the communication gap. In the past the government decided to increase the developmental work in the region, therefore Additional Political Agent was appointed who also acted as political agent when the political agent was absent.

Political Tehsildars and Naib Tehsildars were also appointed in each tehsil to observe law and order situation of their areas and manage the tribes. They are responsible to the political agent and manage the cases of protected areas through the rules and regulations of Frontier Crime Regulations. However the cases of unprotected areas are dealt by the Jirga system led by Maliks and Motabars. This system was introduced by the British to act as a source of communication between the tribe and the government. The role of the Maliks is passed onto their children therefore there are no eligibility criteria as the role is inherited. According to a report there are more than 1500 Maliks in the tribal region.

Before the birth of Pakistan or even the arrival of the British, Waziristan was ruled under the authority of the Mughals. Many of the Mughal emperors personally visited the region and received many tributes from the local tribal leaders. The tribes had accepted the rule of the Mughals because they had always depended on them for support in battles. After the downfall of the Mughal Empire, many Sikh leaders tried to rule this area such as Hari Singh Nalwa and Khalsa Army but it was short lived.

At the start of the British rule, the Britain limited their administration to the district of Bannu. It was in 1894 that the British entered North Waziristan and formed an agreement of peace with the local tribes because these tribes had always given a hard time to the British who found it impossible to deal with them with weapons. They were successful in a way that they introduced

many reforms such as land record and revenue administration in the valley of Tochi. North Waziristan was even made into a full-fledged agency by the year 1910.

However in 1919, there was a revolt in which the Afghan tried to invade British India. The British made a peace agreement to avoid further trouble but the tribes of Mehsud and Wazir gave a difficult fight. This is because many of the tribesmen were veterans of the British organized army. Again after a few years in 1936, another problem arose due to a marriage between Hindu girl and a Muslim boy. Fakir of Ipi played the major role in this revolt and gave a crucial time to the British. He even opposed the newly formed Islamic Republic of Pakistan but the Jirga system decided to join Pakistan.

In 1948, Muhammad Ali Jinnah met the local tribal leaders and agreed that Waziristan should be directly taken into administration by the federal rather than any province. Otherwise most of the decisions were dependent on the local Jirga system and government interfered the least until 1952 when more authority was used by the government.

Overall Waziristan did not cause much trouble for Pakistan as the tribes remained calm and peaceful. From time to time there have been minor issues and conflicts but nothing very serious until the time of Soviet-Afghan War. When the Russians planned to gain control of the warm waters, Pakistan had to plan a strategy. It was war between Soviet led Afghan militants with the mujahidin. At this moment Pakistan trained many militants in the madrassa by promoting religious factor to influence people to fight as jihad. Jamat-e-Islami played an important role in this scenario. At the same time Saudi Arabia, US, China and even Taliban played a supportive role.

After the end of the war, Taliban developed many problems with the Afghan government as they had nothing else to do as the war ended. They tried to implement shariah in the region. Peace prevailed after some negotiations with the Talibans and Afghan government which was short lived. The Americans who once saw the Taliban as their friends, now left them stranded on their own. This developed a sense of negativity in the hearts of Taliban who now felt betrayed. All this led to the incident of 9/11 where the whole friendship turned into hostility and rage. It was then that the Taliban were considered as terrorist and US started operation against them. As the US entered Afghanistan, all the mujahids who went to Afghanistan from Pakistan for the Soviet war started to come back to Pakistan.

Most of these mujahids came into different parts of Waziristan where they tried to increase their influence by different means. They started to implement their own authority over the people and to prove their power they even killed many local tribal leaders who resisted against them. It was no later that these mujahids started to work as Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan. After 2001, Pakistan also witnessed many terrorism incidents and lost hundreds of thousands of lives. Due to this reason, Pakistan army was forced to take action. In the period of 54 years after the partition, it was the first time that army entered the valleys of Waziristan. It is from that date uptil now that Pakistan is fighting a war within its own territory. Due to this reason, the area of Waziristan has always been a complicated region. There have been many operations carried out by the Pak Army namely; operation rah e haq, operation zalzala, operation black thunderstorm, operation rah e shahdat and the most recent operation zarb e azb.

4.5 MILITANCY HISTORY

The Al Haqqani Network (AHN) had a unique timeline. In 1978 Jalaluddin Haqqani initially moved to Miranshah AHN had strong footings in NWA as compared to others. In 2001 it became more stanchd to NWA and got settled on permanent basis. Similar to other militant groups, AHN achieved local footings through madrassas and schools and developed miniature bases for military training. Of course, such AHN iron grip areas like Danda Darpa Khel, Saraj Darpa Khel, Tappi, Tolakhel and Khata Kali have been under attack by US for several years.

Similarly, since of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 Al Qaida was required to depart from Afghanistan and eventually it penetrated inWaziristan. Global pressure forced the Pakistani Army as a result responded in October 2003 with hostile action against local (Ahmedzai Wazir) tribe in the adjacent South Waziristan for declining to surrender Al Qaida and Taliban in their authority. (Mahsud, 2012)

In these early years, Locals of NWA state that the cruel means were employed to extrapolate rebellious members which resulted in suppression of the local population. Though, hostile response did created Al Qaida some anxiety and militant groups shifted from South to North Waziristan. Mir Ali and Miranshah are now presumed to hold Al Qaida's external operations and military councils. (Mahsud, 2012)

Soon in September 2005 Pakistan's army realized this movement of militants to NWA and more importance should be given to this area. In the next year, Miranshah agreement was signed between Pakistan government and Taliban groups headed by Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulana Sadiq Noor. Both parties agreed that no attack would be conducted on any party member or asset and Taliban would cease to execute cross border attack in Afghanistan. In response government would not force foreign militants to get legal registration and have permission to stay in the area if only they respected the law. Regrettably, the Taliban side could not keep up to the agreement they continued their cross border attacks and established an analogous administrative system. Little or no resistance by the locals were faced initially by the Taliban as they seemed to have good-intentions and choose support by well-built Islamic argumentation. They were quick and cruel in suppressing the rise of any conflict against the increase of their control. Soon this encouraged others groups to emerge safely in the area. Like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) developed through contacts with AHN. The relationship between the two was of collaboration and to ease AHN to focus on Afghanistan while LeJ planned attacks on Pakistani's soil. In April 2009 Pakistan Karachi police arrested a number of LeJ members who accepted that they managed hiring and recruiting extremists in Karachi and training in Miranshah and adjoining areas. Another example was of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which after facing military operation in SWA mobilized itself to NWA. TTP made their base in NWA and conducted attacks on SWA from here. (Mahsud, 2012)

4.6 POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OVERVIEW

In recent years federal government had achieved a number political success. Such as in August 2011, PPP government passed Political Party Act in FATA. Over the years military operations and strategic interest were in the spotlight and this type of acts or proposals had been unacceptable to the region due to its unstable and ultra-sensitive situation and had no political activity or locals in politics. Now locals can legally take part in elections and get involved with mainstream political parties. Recently Election Commission of Pakistan has recorded 15 percent rise in registered voters in FATA (The Express Tribune, October 18, 2012). The region is also now included in National Finance Commission while one remarkable political success is public endorsement to Pakistani government's decision to stop transporting of NATO supplies after Salala check post attack by NATO. (Mahsud, 2012)

Discontentment and frustration with the government still prevails in FATA especially in NWA as compared to Bajaur as they see insufficient government efforts to handle terrorism in the region and the locals of NWA disappointed with the government more compare to locals of the areas. Maliks (elite class of the region) is blamed for only working on personal interest with the federal government rather the whole community (FRC, Extremism and Radicalization 2012). As for the local government disappointment had been continuously been served from their side. In some situations the common belief prevailed that, Political agents and Maliks, before the militant groups, were already on a compromise with local Mullahs against developing organization such as NGOs. As a result credible leadership failed to emerge and such inadequate trust delegitimizes power of society which has no alternative to reinforce power and its structure. The militant groups took advantage of this power vacuum offering more security and stability. They took charge of tribal society and asserted power through force. Lack of stable political institutions can be deemed as a factor to give space and continuation to militancy. Lack of employment due to economic and business decline has roughly affected the area. With regard to local culture and pressure on men to have dignified livelihood, Suicide rate and depression have increased. As an outcome of not earning to legal means men seek alternatives which are illegal, unethical and dangerous such as membership of terrorist organization. Locals are not happy as the funds allocated to FATA and its regions are not rightfully spent on its development. They demand recreational, sports, entertainment, educational and technological advancements. These gaps again are by filled by an alternative, “militancy” (FRC, Extremism and Radicalization 2012). FATA and its regions are rich in resources which could be rightly used to produce jobs and infrastructure. NWA is high in resources such as minerals but lacks industry and related activities. It has an estimated 36 million tons of copper deposits within a 15 km squared area in Boya Shinkai (valued at many millions of dollars). NWA is ideally located for trade with Afghanistan. Capitalizing on such links would increase economic (Mahsud, 2012) value and image of the region. (Mahsud, 2012)

Militancy also has disturbed Pashtun culture and tradition. It had managed to influence but will not succeed in the long run. Locals are aware of two faced militancy especially when they attack and kidnap locals. This has resulted a declined encouragement and support for militant groups

over the years. NWA locals have awareness regarding negative effects of militant groups and have forced these groups to comply with local norms and values and operate inside the boundary of their culture. For example a single school had not been damaged in NWA by Taliban. One main factor destroying standard of life and rise to militancy is experiencing unjust treatment from FCR, political admin and political agents. Locals who took a stand or who committed a small crime were jailed for years with no contact with their families, some locals lost business contracts to people who had political affiliations. This disproportionate system of justice, equity, opportunity, progress and politics has produced some areas more developed some less. Victims of this system are alienated, insulted, abandoned and compelled to look for justice through other means, again, “militancy” (Mahsud, 2012)

5 LITERATURE REVIEW

5.1 CONCEPT OF TDPs

This section of the study intends to review studies² conducted by various organizations and policy think tanks in the context of people displaced - Internally Displaced Person (IDPs), now called Temporary Displaced Persons (TDPs) – subsequently by military operations and the vulnerability of people, in this entire process, to become militants/insurgents. Also, the impact of basic needs and social protection to the vulnerable population and, in case of provision failure on part of the state, how could this increase the radicalization of the local, tribal, population.

The phenomenon of Internal Displacement is not mere fleeing a war/disaster-hit area. It is important to be realized, even in cases of involuntary displacements, that basic instinct of humans to strive for safety and protection. However in cases of prolonged displacements, the entire situation could be regarded as striving for better economic and otherwise opportunities, contends (Long, 2011). The international humanitarian organization categorized migration of IDPs i.e. fleeing direct threat of persecution, as forced/involuntary and other i.e. no living under the direct threat of persecution, as voluntary. Recently, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have endeavored to manage mixed migration, that is, both voluntary and involuntary migration. (IOM, 2008).

The international community's with refugees' goes back to the 1920s, mindfulness that those displaced people inside of their nations are a matter of worldwide concern just picked up force about 25 years. In the mid-90s, a little group of human rights activists started squeezing the UN Human Rights Commission to take up the issue of IDPs and in 1992 the Human Rights Commission named a Representative of the Secretary General (RSG) on Internally Displaced Persons. Throughout the following six years, Francis Deng, the first RSG, administered the aggregation of existing global law appropriate to IDPs and, on this premise, united driving legitimate specialists to detail the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. In the meantime,

² There are, practically, no studies assessing the link between internal displacement and militancy (in Pakistan). However, the missing link has been identified by some international studies.

helpful organizations pondered the issue of worldwide obligation regarding operational reaction to IDPs. Inside of the course of 10 years, the issue of IDPs was lifted from lack of clarity to the highest point of the worldwide compassionate plan. Post-Cold War clashes and the boundless dislodging they created prompted apprehensions of local flimsiness. Western governments specifically were concerned with the developing quantities of refuge seekers touching base on their fringes in the post-Cold War time. On the off chance that IDPs are helped and ensured in their nations, the contention went, they wouldn't look for passage into European, North American or different countries. More than after 10 years, some are making comparative contentions today concerning Syrian dislodging.

While international humanitarian law, worldwide human rights law and refugee law are all relevant to IDPs, the lawful procurements surely don't have the visibility agreed to different gatherings ensured by these universal instruments. Additionally the assemblage of lawful instruments by Francis Deng in 1995 discovered countless in universal law when it came to IDPs.

The improvement of a regulating structure for IDPs was paralleled by dialogs inside of the worldwide helpful group about how to react to this specific gathering of individuals. In 1990, the UN General Assembly relegated to inhabitant facilitators the capacity of organizing help to IDPs and in 1991, made the post of Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to advance a quicker and sound reaction to crises. The team on IDPs stopped its work in 1997 and in the Secretary-General's 1997 change program, the part of the ERC was reaffirmed as being in charge of guaranteeing that insurance and help of IDPs were tended to. In the mid-2000s, the worldwide philanthropic group attempted to discover fitting methods for reacting to a developing number of inside dislodged people without clear institutional orders. RSG Deng had organized the reinforcing of the institutional construction modeling for IDP security and reaction. To this impact, he recognized three alternatives: make another UN office with obligation regarding IDPs, allocate the assignment of assurance and help of IDPs to a current UN organization (especially UNHCR), or request the organizations cooperate in every circumstance to figure out which office was in the best position to have the capacity to secure and help IDPs.

In 2004, ERC Jan Egeland appointed the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR), somewhat in response to the insufficient global reaction to IDPs in Darfur, Sudan and his appraisal that more

was expected to enhance the worldwide way to deal with interior relocation emergencies. The HRR distinguished the major institutional hole as absence of clear obligation regarding IDPs and suggested that move be made rapidly by the ERC/IASC whereby these bunches were proposed to guarantee a more unsurprising, predictable, and responsible reaction crosswise over emergencies.

The procedure of humanitarian change has reinforced universal reaction to IDPs and has tended to a large portion of the inadequacies recognized in the 2004 study *Protect or Neglect*. There are numerous situations where worldwide endeavors have calmed enduring and kept individuals alive. Some, maybe numerous, IDPs are in an ideal situation than they were in 2004. Yet, there are still an excess of IDPs living in hazardous circumstances with deficient insurance and an excess of living in extended relocation without prospects for tough arrangements. Maybe most alarming, worldwide responsibility of tending to inside displacements is by all accounts lessening. The global framework is plainly over-extended by the quantity of expansive scale, complex emergencies on the planet today (Ferris.E 2014).

Historically, Pakistan has faced chronic issues related to internal displacements of people due to military operations and floods; resettlement and rehabilitation. Effective resettlement has always remained a challenge for economically weak state like Pakistan. More than 2 million people sought refuge in Swabi and Mardan since the military operation in Swat had started. Amongst these, ironically, less than 20% found shelter in refugee camp, remaining proportion sought shelter in host families. Government, tried to reach out formidable majority of IDPs in need of help but failed due to an ongoing power struggle between the District Nazims and the bureaucracy. Astoundingly, to the office bearers of the government some small scale but well-furnished and VIP camps were shown to conceal the ground situation. The local people, who have welcomed the IDPs in their homes, have been thanked by the pre-eminent personalities of the affected area. The IDPs faced many difficulties which are as follows:

5.2 EDUCATION AND HEALTH

The people of the terror-hit areas of Swat valley and FATA, (Bari, 2010) contends, perceives the insurgency threat as associated with lack of education, and women education in particular, that's the response of 51% (female) and 53% (male) from within the IDPs. Taliban bombed almost

over a 100 hundred schools due to the notion, arguably, that increased education compromises the sanctity and orthodoxy of religion; this sense, however, is also prevalent in some tribal areas of the country that is why working of international humanitarian workers and organization is extremely risky. (Harmer, Stoddard, & DiDomenico, 2010)

A number of recent studies have assessed the health situation of displaced persons in Pakistan in general and in KP and Swat in particular. These studies focus primarily on the physical health status of IDPs and the support that is or was available to them. Findings generally suggest that availability of and access to health services have been and continue to be a major problem for IDPs.


On the other hand, (Bari, 2010) maintains that the 58% male and 54% female in the IDPs responds with not much satisfaction regarding health facilities in camps. Also, previously, the areas from which they belong lacked medical facilities such as maternity homes, and also there were imposed certain restrictions by the insurgents on female not to consult a male doctor. The available medical facilities also weren't complemented with mental care and psycho-social facilities. (Irfan, Anwar, Raza, & Qayum, 2011) conducted a survey of 128 family heads which concluded that the recreational facilities and the provided educational facilities for children were relatively better, however, funeral services and space for social gatherings weren't satisfactory; also, the camp administration was responsible to keep the camp population updated, regarding the situation in their respective areas, which they clearly did not.

5.3 SOCIAL PROTECTION AND SAFETY NET

(Hamelian, 2008) as cited in (Shahbaz et al., 2012) purports the need of financial support to food insecure household, especially the ones gone through multiple conflicts. The basic premise of food insecurity derives from decline in household's income. (Gazdar, 2011) refers to the National Social Protection Strategy 2007 while estimating the importance of introducing a social protection program for the affected people to vulnerability and mitigate risk of the possibility of them becoming victims and/or fall prey to militancy.

However, the proportion of social protection received by the less-privileged ones is fairly low and hence, Pakistan doesn't even near to the requirement of international social protection practices (Grosh et al., 2011) as cited in (Shahbaz et al., 2012). However, the graphs below represents a dramatic increase in the social protection system hence the above discussion might seemingly contradict the graphs in some way.

Figure – 1




Source: (ADB, 2012)

Table – 1

Social safety net	Amount disbursed (Rs) (FY 2009/10)	Number of beneficiaries	Outreach
BISP	32 billion	7 million	National
PBM	2.7 billion	1.11 million	National
Zakat	786 million	-	National
Microcredit	21.7 billion	2 million	National
BKAP	1,500 million (total cost)	11,000 trainings	4 districts in KP

Source: (Pakistan, 2011)

Figure – 2



Source: (WDI, 2012)

The primacy of social safety net is underlined by the fact that the entire money earning set up i.e. small businesses such groceries to imports-exports, in the conflict-hit areas is severely damaged and FATA has faced the severe brunt in this regard. Several estimation studies show 80% of the market is affected by insecurity, 70% by military operations and one-third by looting. Above all,

investors and businessmen's access to market is also restricted with increased business cost creating further hurdles. (WFP, 2010)

The IDPs related issues in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), is not much different. Recent studies on post- conflict assessment (Shahbaz et al., 2012) in KP shows that less than 30% of the people who were affected due natural disasters and/or armed conflicts were unable to recover from such multiple shocks. For instance, one study took 24 households out of which only 7 seems to have recovered to some extent from such unfavorable experience. Some of the households cited reasons such as political connections and employment in government, as there only means, an otherwise inadequate, food and other basic aid. Politically influential people were said to have captured significant amount of food and basic need packages, however, the aid, as perceived by the international community to have been playing a prospective role in households' recovery, remains largely contested. (Shah, 2010)

On the other hand, (Waseem, 2011) the international donor agencies have set their priorities for rehabilitation purposes in the conflict hit areas, however, community-based projects are still a rarity and the international organizations, along with clean water, education, health/medial aid, justice and public transport etc. projects needs to identify capacity gaps of the NGOs so to integrate more community participation in their respective institutional framework. (Azam, Saeed, Ullah, Khan, & Aamir, 2009), independently, draws the same conclusion regarding the institutionalized efforts of international organizations.

5.4 ANALYZING RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

5.4.1 Local:

It is evident from the past-conflicts in FATA and KP, whether man-made or a natural disaster, that wherever affected people are displaced to, the respective local community is highly responsive and mostly volunteers for relief activities. From the Swat military operation and floods, when people from Swat were displaced to Mardan, to the recent military operation Zarb-e-Azb, where the people of North Waziristan Agency were displaced to the adjacent settled

District Bannu. The local community in every case strives, though inadvertently for religious and cultural reasons, to increase state's capacity for service delivery in such emergency.

Also, with rather un-institutionalized endeavors of the local community, enormous charities and donations from several Pakistani philanthropist, businessmen and other private organization, ease the pressure on public exchequer and other public resources created by such emergencies.

(IUCN, 2010; PCP, 2009, as cited in Shahbaz et al., 2012).

5.4.2 The state:

The state agencies have identified priority areas in-terms of institutional capacity building and responsiveness to such emergencies such as floods and other conflicts.

- i) Institutional and legal arrangements for disaster risk management
- ii) Hazard and vulnerability assessment
- iii) Training, education and awareness
- iv) Disaster risk management planning
- v) Community and local-level programming
- vi) Multi-hazard early warning systems
- vii) Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development
- viii) Emergency response systems
- ix) Capacity development for post-disaster recovery.

(Dorosh et al., 2010; Geiser and Suleri, 2011; White, 2011, as cited in Shahbaz et al., 2012)

However, studies observed that the working of different agencies involved in emergency situations mostly suffers from lack of co-ordination with various other local level governmental

organization. Hashmi (2014) maintains that the TDPs of Swat are discontented with the settlement and rehabilitation programs of the government. Despite of military's robust efforts to eliminate terrorism from Swat, many terrorists are still seen roaming around the city. This questions the success of the Swat operation. Operation alone cannot yield positive results. Government, through its developmental projects, effective rehabilitation and resettlement schemes should concentrate its focus to integrate the displaced people back to their societies. It should ensure justice, rule of law, educational, business and employment opportunities in order to minimize the effects of their psychological issues faced during forced displacement. If not catered properly, these psychologically disturbed individuals can join militant groups in the future, challenging the status quo of the country. Lessons must be learned from Swat operation and much attention should be given to the proper rehabilitation and settlements of TDPs of Zarb-e-Azb operation.

Many social scientists have tried to explain the reason why people involve in violent and extremist activities. No single theory is enough to explain this phenomenon due to the complexity of the issue. Most of the theories have failed to explain the reason why some people experiencing similar circumstances do not take action, while others do.

What type of countries are more prone to militancy and terrorist activities? Relative deprivation theory suggest that it is not the absolute deprivation but a relative which boosts the violent activities with in an individual. The gap between the individual's expected welfare in contrast to the actual creates frustration which force men to involve in violent activities. This theory has been studied in 56 different countries and the relation of unemployment and education is


established to study their effects on increased terrorist attacks in the country (Richardson, 2011).

This theory is discussed in detail in the analysis and methodology section.

6 METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research is to find out the possible links between the chances of increased militancy and TDPs crisis in North Waziristan Agency. For this purpose, theoretical framework includes set of different dependent and independent variables that need to be tested upon through quantitative and qualitative research methods.

6.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK



Militancy in NWA is dependent upon variables such as depression and frustration among TDPs due to forced displacement, lack of socio-economic support from government and army and non-fulfillment of basic amenities such as health, education, shelter etc., and lastly absence of an effective National Policy on the rights and settlement of TDPs. All these variables are tested through different qualitative and quantitative tools and techniques.

6.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

6.2.1 Population and Sample Size

Mixed method approach is used for the research that includes both the quantitative and qualitative research methods. For the quantitative data, the sample size is set to be 150. The sample size is further divided into three sub categories. First category represents the population that is residing in the military established camp in Bakka Khel. Second, constitutes the TDPs living in camps set up by the NGO, 'Al-khidmat foundation. Third, includes those TDPs who have taken up shelter with the host families.

For, the first category, the main TDPs camp in Bakka Khel, Bannu is visited. Systematic random sampling technique is employed owing to the straight line arrangement of the camps. For the second and third category, simple random technique is applied. The data is collected from both male and female aged 18-50 years.

6.2.2 Quantitative Data Collection

For quantitative data collection, two questionnaires are constructed. The primary questionnaire is formulated for the purpose of connecting the gravity of TDPs crisis with the low levels of available facilities such as health, education, income, security etc. in camps. The questionnaire facilitates to map-out the difference in access to basic services by the TDPs, pre and post displacement. The questions are constructed against the options such as agree, disagree and no response. Some of the questions included in the questionnaire are priority questions with multiple choices. Priority questions are targeted to inquire about the preferences, ideas and expectations of TDPs about Army, Government, NGOs and host families. Second questionnaire is the Subjective Happiness Scale, developed by Lyubomirsky and Lepper, which measures the happiness and life satisfaction levels of individuals at a particular period of time. It is a 4-item scale of subjective happiness. The respondents are asked to rate their happiness levels in general, in comparison to their peers, and to rate their anxiety levels by answering specific characteristics. Upon various re-testing, the scale has been identified as a reliable and valid instrument for

measuring the subjective happiness. This scale is used to draw upon a comparison between the happiness level of TDPs before and after displacement. This scale calculates the degree to which extent TDPs are depressed or satisfied after displacement.

6.2.3 Qualitative Data Collection

For qualitative data collection, 11 semi-structured in-depth interviews are conducted from the officials of various government and non-government agencies involved in the planning, resettlement and rehabilitation of TDPs. The purpose of the qualitative data collection is to get the holistic picture by analyzing the TDP crisis situation from the perspective of government and non-governmental officials and to highlight the loop holes in the performance and coordination of different agencies involved. For this purpose, Secretary Relief/Chairman PDMA, Secretary Administration FATA, DG FDMA, official from the Ministry of SAFRON, official from USAID, UNHCR and World Food Program, Faculty of Psychology at NUST, and official from the ISPR were interviewed. Four focus groups discussions are also conducted with the TDPs in a group of 8-12 individuals to gain more in-depth information about their apprehensions and gravity of the crisis situation. Two of the four focus group discussions are conducted with the females, while remaining are conducted with the males. Focus group discussions proved to be helpful in exploring the ideas, perceptions and feelings of TDPs about the Zarb-e-Azb operation, performance of army and government agencies in providing them with basic facilities such as health, education, security, income, and most importantly in highlighting their levels of depression and anxiety due to displacement.

The narrative method was used for analyzing the qualitative data obtained from interviews and focus group discussions. The stories told by the participants play a very vital role in building up the entire analysis. It helps the observer to look at the problem from the perspective of the participants. It deals with the question that how the participants perceive a social phenomenon or human experience. The stories told by each government and non-government organizations helped us in formulating our analysis discourse. These stories mapped out the potential loop holes in each organization's written mandate and actual service delivery. It helped us looking at the TDPs crisis from their point of view and what possible hurdles they experienced while handling the entire crisis situation.

6.2.4 Tools and Techniques

SPSS version 21 is used to analyze the quantitative data. To draw out the links between the dependent and independent variables, the cross tabulation technique is used. Frequency tables are constructed to find out the frequency of people who agree, disagree or give no response to a particular question. For example to identify how many people think that the government service delivery mechanisms are effective and efficient, frequency table can give a clear statistical result in this regard. Furthermore, histograms, pie-charts, bar charts are used to express the data in a consolidated form.

6.3 RESEARCH MODEL

The research design is explanatory model. Shumeli (2010) asserts that the explanatory models is used to find out the correlation between two variables X and Y and on the basis of this correlation and statistical modelling the cause of the problem is identified. Hypothesis are tested and re-tested in an experimental set up which lead to acceptance or rejection of the formulated hypothesis. The research is conducted in phases. First is the quantitative research phase which explores the main research question. The information obtained from the first phase is further explored in the second phase of qualitative research. The purpose of perusing the research in phases is to have a sound knowledge of severity of TDP crisis at first, and then further consolidating the data through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The quantitative research is targeted only on the TDPs. The findings from the feedback of TDPs related to government's response to the crisis situation is further complemented by the qualitative interviews with the government and non-government officials. This model assisted us in understanding the TDPs crisis situation in a more detailed and comprehensive way which aided us to thoroughly analyze its link to militancy in NWA at a later stage of our research.

6.4 RESEARCH APPROACH AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY

Deductive research approach is used to conduct the entire research. According to University of California, deductive approach starts out with the construction of hypothesis or general statement and through valid reasoning conclusion is drawn out on the basis of a theory (Bradford 2015). Our research is conducted through construction of three hypothesis statements. The hypothesis

statements are tested on the basis of two reliable theories on terrorism i.e. relative deprivation theory and frustration-aggression theory. The TDPs crisis situation is first understood through questionnaires, focus group discussions and interviews and the findings are tested by these theories in order to find out the correlation between the TDPs crisis situation with the prospective increase/decrease in militancy in NWA.

(Gurr, 1970) effectively explained the causes of collective violence and terrorism through his theory of relative deprivation. According to Gurr's theory, every individual wants to fulfill his needs and wants and deprivation is experienced when there is a discrepancy in individual's value expectations and their value capabilities. There is a prominent gap between what individual perceive to be rightfully entitled to and what he actually receives in reality. The concepts of fairness, justness, and equity are attached to the phenomenon of rightful entitlement. When individuals don't achieve what they aspired to achieve, they fell prey to frustration. This frustration builds up over a period of time and transforms into aggression. Gur defined the concept of frustration to be obstruction in one's attainment of goal, and aggression is the reactionary force behind this frustration. Individuals may be deprived of their basic rights, service entitlements by biased government policies, favoring one group of individuals at the cost of others. Such government policies and actions make individuals feel alienated and they might end up in to activities such as collective violence, terrorism, crimes etc. Gur's theories of frustration-aggression and relative deprivation are connected in this manner. Davies, in- line with Gurr's thoughts, argues that violent activities are often more visible when there is a reversal in gratification of basic needs. The theories of relative deprivation and frustration-aggression are helpful in studying the phenomenon of TDPs crisis and its connectivity to the militancy in NWA. TDPs were forced to leave their homes in the wake of ongoing operation Zarb-e-Azb. The infrastructure has been demolished, houses are destroyed and economic activities have come to halt in NWA. People are facing extreme depression and frustration due to loss of their jobs, businesses, livestock, and means of livelihood. People are deprived of their basic needs such as health, education, jobs, businesses which is contributing in development of frustration and depression among them. Government's response towards the TDPs crisis situation may attenuate or elevate this frustration in the longer run. This frustration may build up into collective violence actions such as militancy and terrorism.

7 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

This section will analyze the vulnerability of TDPs through thorough study of the quality of the service provision in the camps and host families. For this purpose, two questionnaires are constructed. One is the primary questionnaire which will assess the availability of basic needs such as health, education, security, income etc. pre and post displacement. The second questionnaire is the Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS), which will identify the level of satisfaction and happiness of TDPs pre and post displacement. The difference between pre and post happiness level will indicate the depression and frustration leading to aggressive activities in the future.

7.1 PRIMARY QUESTIONNAIRES

Zarb-e-Azb operation has displaced a huge number of people from their homes. It is important to know the views of TDPs about the operation and how they perceive the efforts of Army in normalizing the situation in their areas. The information is vital for assessing their vulnerability to militant activities in the longer run. For instance, if some considerable fraction of people believe that the operation has contributed only in destroying their homes and livelihoods and has failed to achieve the stated goals of curbing terrorism in their areas, this might transform into frustration and anger against the Army, which in a longer run might take the form of vengeance through increased participation in extremist activities. When respondents were inquired about the performance of Army in Zarb-e-Azb operation, 71% of the respondents praised the performance of Army in handling the entire operation. On the other hand, 16% of TDPs were not satisfied with the operation's results so far. It is important to mention that the almost half of the respondents among the above stated 71% TDPs voted in favor of army because they relied upon the information provided to them through media. They asserted that the positive image display of Army's performance in Zarb-e-Azb over media has increased their hopes, but the actual results will be more visible to them after their return to their homes.

Table-2: Army has succeeded in normalizing the security situation in your area

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree	107	71.3	71.3	71.3
Disagree	24	16.0	16.0	87.3
no response	19	12.7	12.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Ho: Gender and army has succeeded in normalizing the security situation in your area are not associated

H1: Gender and army has succeeded in normalizing the security situation in your area are associated

Table-3: gender * Army has succeeded in normalizing the security situation in your area Cross tabulation

Count

		Army has succeeded in normalizing the security situation in your area			Total
		Agree	disagree	no response	
Gender	M	48	15	14	77
	F	59	9	5	73
Total		107	24	19	150

Table-4: Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.792 ^a	2	.034

Likelihood Ratio	6.981	2	.030
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.674	1	.010
N of Valid Cases	150		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.25.

Since the significant value is less than 0.05, so we reject Ho. Gender and army has succeeded in normalizing the situation are associated.

Women seemed more optimistic about the performance of the Army as compared to the men. 59 females voted in favor of army as compared to the 48 male respondents. Females expressed that they were threatened by the militants for going to schools and in their opinion the Army is performing exceptionally well in clearing their areas from the influence of such militant groups. On the other hand, generally male respondents were of the opinion that the situation will be clearer once they will return to their homes.

The 35% of respondents rest their hopes in Army, while 28% saw local Jirga playing an important role in bringing peace in their areas. 26% of the TDPs were of the view that the local government is responsible for bringing peace. TDPs mostly females were unaware of the distinction between the Army and the local government. For them, Army is tantamount to the government and there is no difference in the roles of these two crucial entities. As little as, 7% of the respondents believed that the combined efforts of political parties can promise the change and peace in their areas. 4% of the respondents were completely hopeless, as they see no actor potential enough to bring peace in their areas.

Table-5: Who can bring peace in your area

	Frequenc y	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Military	52	34.7	34.7	34.7
local Jirga	42	28.0	28.0	62.7

political parties	10	6.7	6.7	69.3
Government	39	26.0	26.0	95.3
None	7	4.7	4.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

TDPs are ready to go back to their areas if security is ensured by the military.89% of the TDPs are willing to go back to their areas as opposed to only 9% who are not willing. Respondents said that there is no substitute for their own homes and they are just waiting for military’s call for their return.

Table-6: You are ready to go back to your area at this point of time

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree	134	89.3	89.3	89.3
Disagree	14	9.3	9.3	98.7
no response	2	1.3	1.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Most of the TDPs seemed optimistic about the post operation situation in their areas. They believe that after seeing through the eyes of media, they are quite hopeful that the endeavors of army can normalize the crisis situation. 69% of the respondents believed that their life after Zarb-e-Azb will be peaceful and safe. Contrarily, 21% of the respondents were quite hopeless about the pose-operation situation. They were of the view that the performance of Army is exaggerated by the media and they will come to know of the situation once they’ll return.

Table-7: You think your life after Zarb-e-Azb operation will be peaceful and safe


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree	104	69.3	69.3	69.3
Disagree	31	20.7	20.7	90.0
no response	15	10.0	10.0	100.0

Total	150	100.0	100.0	
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7.1.1 Health and Sanitation

The basic facilities like health and sanitation systems are important to be analyzed to assess the vulnerability levels of the TDPs. The impact of low levels of service provision will be more on the people for whom the services like health and education were better provided prior to the displacement. The health facilities available at camps are unsatisfactory for some TDPs, while satisfactory for others. People residing with host families in Shamsi Kheil village were satisfied with the health facilities provided to them by the government in addition to the available medical facilities in the village itself. The TDPs residing in the main Bakka Khel camp and in Al-khidmat foundation camps were generally dissatisfied with the maternal health care facilities. According to them, no effective measures have been taken by the government for the provision of effective children and maternal health care facilities. The scarcity of medicines in the camps is causing problems for the TDPs. When TDPs were asked to compare the health facilities available pre and post displacement,

Figure-3:



From the above figures, it is clear that the respondents felt that the health facilities available at their home towns were better than the facilities available in the camps. Most of the pregnant women reported that they are unable to find any medical assistance in the camps and the availability of medicines depends solely upon an individual's good fortune. Also, their male counterparts do not allow them to be treated by the male doctors in the camp. The medical units are established in Bakka Khel, but failed to treat the chronic diseases due to unavailability of required infrastructure. Thus, mostly patients are referred to Bannu or Peshawar for further treatment which adds to their already aggravated problems. On the other hand, Al-khidmat camp do not have the facility of any medical unit .71% TDPs reported that the health facilities provided to them are inadequate, while 26% of TDPs, belonging to the host families, are satisfied with the provision of health services. 76% respondents believed that the health facilities in their areas were adequate. In contrast, 26% evaluated the provision of health facilities in their home towns negatively.

One of the significant issue that the TDPs are facing in the camps is the absence of sanitation system. All the respondents were highly frustrated with the non-availability of proper bathrooms and sewage systems. Females reported that due to unhygienic environment, they are becoming more vulnerable to skin diseases. Females are generally more distressed with this situation, since they are unable to use the bathrooms which are located at a distance from their camps. One of the female respondent reported

“ The bathrooms are located far away from the camps. Our male counterparts don't allow us to use them because they think that it violates our privacy.”

On the other hand, most of the male respondents maintained that they are not very habitual of using the bathrooms even in their homes, so the lack of sanitation system does not affect them much.

Ho: Gender and proper sanitation system and sewage treatment near camps are not related

H1: Gender and proper sanitation system and sewage treatment near camps are related

Table-8: gender * There is a proper sanitation system and sewage treatment near camps Cross tabulation

Count

		There is a proper sanitation system and sewage treatment near camps			Total
		Agree	Disagree	no response	
Gender	M	36	37	4	77
	F	10	44	19	73
Total		46	81	23	150

Table-9: Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.994 ^a	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	26.730	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	24.764	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	150		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.19.

Since the significant value is less than 0.05

So we reject Ho. Hence Gender and sanitation and sewage treatment near camps are associated.

From the above cross-tab table it is indicated that the sanitation problem is more sensitive for women than for men. 44 females reported that the sanitation and sewage systems are poor which is creating serious problems for them as compared to the 37 male respondents. 36 male

respondents seemed satisfied with the available sanitation and sewage systems near the camps against the mere number of 10 female respondents.

7.1.2 Livelihood

After the displacement, all the livelihood means of the TDPs are over. They are solely dependent upon the cash received from the government. Their income levels are sharply declined which is fueling anger and depression among them. They feel that they are being alienated and government's response in catering to their economic needs is highly in-effective.

Table-10: Government's response to cater to your economic needs is ineffective

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Agree	99	66.0	66.0	66.0
Disagree	48	32.0	32.0	98.0
no response	3	2.0	2.0	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

66% of the respondents felt that the government is not pro-active in meeting their economic needs. They are experiencing psychological issues due to the sudden decline in their earnings. TDPs residing with the host families are satisfied with the government's actions to provide them with food and income. These people represent 32% of the entire sample size. They are more contented with the environment which is tantamount to their homes. Food availability is ample for them and they are satisfied with the cash grants from the government. One of the respondent said

“We are happy with the food and cash transfer system of the government. We store all the food items and we are lucky that we don't have to pay any rent which saves any additional expenses. Also, the host families make us feel that as if we were at our homes. But, despite of all that, we are still depressed and we want to go to our homes as soon as possible.”

The respondents in the camps were of the view that the cash grants are not continuous. They are encountering disruptions because sometimes they receive 8k while other time they are entitled to only 7k monthly. They have also encountered the situation when they didn't receive any grant for two continuous months. They also pointed out the factor of inequality in cash entitlements.

When we analyze the means of livelihood of people before displacement, all of them derived their incomes through five broad categories i.e. businessman, drivers, laborers, teachers, and farmers. 99% of the females had no occupation and was solely dependent upon their male counterparts for income generation. The remaining 1% are engaged in income generation through sewing, embroidery, and labor work.

Ho: Gender and occupation are not associated

H1: Gender and occupation are associated

Table-11: gender * occupation Cross tabulation

Count

		Occupation					Total	
		no occupation	Businessman	Laborer	Driver	Teacher		Farmer
Gender	M	2	31	26	11	3	4	77
	F	68	2	1	0	2	0	73
Total		70	33	27	11	5	4	150

Table-12: Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	126.045 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	159.300	5	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	69.185	1	.000

N of Valid Cases	150		
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
a. 4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.95.

Since the significant value is less than 0.05, so we reject Ho. Gender and occupation are associated

From the above figure it is clear that most of the TDPs, 31 in total, were businessmen prior to displacement. These were small scale businesses generating not more than 40k monthly. A few among these businessmen were earning around 40k-80k monthly.

The comparison of the pre and post income levels suggest a sharp decline in the income of TDPs after displacement. Following figures draws out the comparison between pre and post displacement income levels. Previously, only 29% of the respondents were earning less than 10k, but soon after the displacement this percentage has increased up to 84%. As, after displacement all the means of earnings are over, the TDPs are solely dependent upon the cash received from the government which amounts to approx. 10k monthly.

Figure-4:




When inquired that do you feel poorer than before, 122 respondents out of 150 agreed, while only 24 respondents disagreed. These 24 respondents belonged to the TDPs living with host

families. They said that the prior to displacement they had more expenses and income levels were less than 10k, but after displacement they are receiving cash and food from the government and have no additional expenses which makes them feel economically better than before.

Low socio-economic status, particularly when assessed by indices of material standard of living, is consistently associated with a higher prevalence of depression in cross-sectional studies (Lorant et al., 2003). According to this research, population with income less than 10k after displacement is more vulnerable to increased depression and frustration. According to frustration-aggression theory, feeling of deprivation triggers aggressive actions due to the long-term build-up of internal frustration. Such individuals are more likely to commit violent and extremist actions in response to the continuous experience of relative deprivation.

Figure-5:



Majority of the TDPs were happy with the registration process which make them entitled to the food and cash grants. 89% of the respondents agreed that the registration process is effective and efficient as compared to only 11% who disagreed.

Table- 13 The registration process is effective and efficient


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	133	88.7	88.7
	Disagree	16	10.7	99.3
	no response	1	.7	100.0
	Total	150	100.0	100.0

7.1.3 Education

Educational infrastructure such as schools, colleges etc. is demolished in NWA due to the ongoing operation. The primary level education is available in the camps for both boys and girls. Primary level education in Bakka Khel camp is provided to the girls in a vocational center constructed for the purpose of engaging the women population in skilled activities such as sewing, embroidery etc. A separate school for boys is also situated in the camp which only provides primary education. The educational facilities in host communities in Shamsi Kheil village are very limited. The schools are incapable of enrolling a large number of TDPs due to weak infrastructure and non-availability of qualified teachers. Also, the lack of proper documentation hinders the school enrollment of the children. The TDPs residing in the camps established by Al-khidmat foundation reported that the school situated near the camp is only meant for the provision of the primary level education to the children. No middle and secondary level educational facilities are available which is contributing in building up frustration, especially among males.

When the educational facilities pre and post displacements were compared, interesting results were found;

Figure-6:



77% of the respondents felt that the post displacement educational facilities were available for both girls and boys at the primary level. 10% of the respondents said that the educational facilities are provided only to the girls, while 11 % of the respondents believed that primary level education is only available to the boys.

Pre-displacement results revealed that the educational facilities were more for men than for the women.57% of the respondents asserted that the education is only available to men in their areas, while 21% reported that the education was provided both to the men and women at equal levels.

Ho: Gender and pre-displacement educational facilities are not associated

H1: Gender and pre-displacement educational facilities are associated

Table-14: gender * Educational facilities pre-displacement are better for Cross tabulation

Count

	Educational facilities pre-displacement are better for			Total
	M	F	Both	

Gender	M	37	2	38	77
	F	54	3	16	73
Total		91	5	54	150

Table-15: Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.241 ^a	2	.002
Likelihood Ratio	12.518	2	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.698	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	150		

a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.43.

Since the significant value is less than 0.05, so we reject Ho. Gender and Pre-displacement educational facilities are associated.

More females reported that the educational facilities were better for men than women in their areas. 54 women as compared to 37 men maintained that the male population has greater educational opportunities available in their areas. 38 men out of the total of 77 responded that the education, in their areas, is available for both the genders without any disparity. Female respondents were of the view that they were constantly being threatened by the terrorists for going to schools. Due to this, they experienced continuous fear and depression. They are more satisfied in the camps in this regard as girls are allowed to attain education, even if it is of primary level.

7.1.4 Security

The focus group discussions with the TDPs unraveled the difficulties they faced during the displacement. The respondents asserted that they were informed only three days before the operation, to evacuate their areas. One of the respondent responded;

“The deadlines for evacuation kept on changing for the past many months. So this time, when we were told only three days prior to the operation that we have to leave our homes, we didn’t take this deadline seriously. We thought it was similar to the previous deadlines and this situation created confusion.”

People, after leaving everything behind, when arrived the set location, they found nothing but an open ground with no installation of any camp. The camps at Bakka Khel were installed approx. two months after the displacement and people were left with no other option than to stay with their relatives. While some respondents with no relatives in nearby places were caught in a much difficult situation of staying in open grounds.

39% of the respondents considered living as tenants to be the most secure and safe option, while 35% respondents ranked camps to be the safest. Only 26% of the respondents believed that people residing with host families are safe. People in camps said that they are all living like a community bonded with brotherhood and love. One of the female respondents said that

“We all live here with peace and love. We respect each other and we have no fear of crimes in camp.”

69% respondents disagreed that the camps are prone to increasing crimes like robbery and rape etc. 16% respondents agreed, owing to some personal incidents of robbery.

Table-16: People are safe in

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Camps	52	34.7	34.7	34.7
host families	39	26.0	26.0	60.7
Tenants	59	39.3	39.3	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Table-17: Camps are vulnerable to increasing crimes like robbery, rape etc.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree	24	16.0	16.0	16.0
Valid Disagree	104	69.3	69.3	85.3
Valid no response	22	14.7	14.7	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

7.1.5 Justice System


When inquired about the effectivity of local Jirga, 54% respondents see local Jirga as an effective tool for dispensing justice. 39% of TDPs rated local Jirga as an ineffective tool characterized by nepotism and favoring the rich.

Table-18: Local Jirga is effective in dispensing justice and resolving conflicts

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Agree	82	54.7	54.7	54.7
Valid Disagree	59	39.3	39.3	94.0
Valid no response	9	6.0	6.0	100.0
Total	150	100.0	100.0	

Unions are ineffective in voicing the concerns for 38% respondents, while 39% respondents said that unions are productive in representing their concerns. Most of the respondents viewed unions nothing else than a medium of elite to show case their power and authority. This situation is creating frustration among the TDPs and they feel helpless and alienated. 97 respondents out of 150 feel alienated after displacement. While 52 of the respondents feel that they are surrounded by their own people, community and tribesmen in camps, making them less alienated than the former.


Figure-7:



From the above discussion it is clear that the TDPs in the camps are not satisfied with the service delivery of government. They are discontented with the food and cash grants from the government. The health facilities provided in the camps are not adequate making TDPs prone to many skin diseases. People are quite distressed with their decreased income levels i.e. 10k monthly income. This economic depression is a cause of mental stress for TDPs. 39% of the TDPs rated Jirga as an ineffective tool for dispensing justice. The educational facilities available in the camps are only of primary level. Absence of middle and secondary education is contributing to the academic loss of the young generation.

7.1.6 Psychological Issues

Figure-8:



People after displacement are mentally disturbed and frustrated because of being away from their homes. All means of livelihood are destroyed in their areas and they feel that they have become poorer than before. This feeling of being poor instills frustration and make a person vulnerable to psychological diseases. Shut businesses, lost jobs, less incomes than before, absence of basic amenities etc. are contributing towards multiplication of anger and frustration.

The 83% of respondents feel frustrated and psychologically disturbed. All of these respondents emphasized the importance of a home. One of the respondents said:

“ All we need right now is to return to our homes. Even if these camps were fully equipped with all the basic necessities, still it would not have lessened our mental stress i.e. being away from our homes.”

The 16% of the respondents feel that they are happy with the host families, having no fear of bomb blasts and threats.

“One of the respondents from the focus group discussions said that we have no means, but if given the opportunity, we will surely take revenge from the authorities who are responsible for our misery.”

This clearly depicts the severe intensity of frustration and stress faced by the TDPs.

The people of NWA experienced continuous terror and fear due to the presence of militant groups and their associated militancy activities in their areas. Women were given threats on going to schools by terrorists. Ongoing terrorist activities and suicide bombing has left the people of NWA in tremor. When inquired about the pre-displacement frustration, 42% of the respondents claimed that they felt stress and psychological issues due to the increased terrorists attacks and militancy in their areas. They asserted that the terrorism has engulfed their peace and mental satisfaction. On the other hand, 56% of the respondents were of the view that they were happy in their homes. They had jobs, enough income to feed their family, businesses, and most of all their own home. One of the respondent said:

‘‘We had no issues with Taliban. Some of the Taliban were good and they caused no harm to us. We want to go back to our homes. No terrorist, but only innocent people are dying in this operation and we are the ones suffering from the operation’’.

This section of the society still depicts the soft corner for Taliban and held government and military responsible for their increased mental tensions and frustration. If this ideology continues, it can create potential new terrorists in the future, challenging the status quo of the country.

7.2 SUBJECTIVE HAPPINESS SCALE (SHS)

A great many people regard happiness to be essential for a satisfied life. To attain the desired level of satisfaction and happiness in life is the supreme objective of many societies (Diener et al.2003).The definition of happiness suggested by Diener and colleagues is widely regarded as valid among the scholars. Their definition of subjective happiness highlights three main elements: negative influences, positive influence and life satisfaction levels. (Diener et al.1999). So, these three indicators are correlated, and when combined together they calculate a single dimension closely associated to happiness, based upon individual’s personal life incidents and experiences. This subjectivist approach outlines the importance of self-reporting mechanisms for knowing the individual’s happiness level. Most of the individuals are able to express their degrees of happiness or unhappiness. This degree of happiness is not based on the daily bases or


monetary incidents. Rather, it based on long term serious experiences that build over a time and frames the satisfaction or dissatisfaction towards life. Most importantly, authors have recognized that people with similar happiness level might differ in their hedonic patterns since it is not just an arithmetic summation of the recent incidents (Lyubomirsky et al.2005).

So, in response to this, Lyubomirsky and Lepper proposed the need for a comprehensive approach that includes an individual's chronic happiness level. For this purpose, Lyubomirsky and Lepper constructed Subjective Happiness Scale in order to effectively measure the overall subjective happiness of an individual. This scales provides the subjective happiness and rate a person as happy or unhappy. This scale has shown greater internal consistency across different age and cultures. This characteristic is proved by 14 subsamples from Russia and United States. The scale through repeated experimentation has termed to be valid (.52 to .72) and reliable from 3 weeks ($r = .61$) to 1 year (.55).

The SHS is a 4-thing instrument appraised on a 1–7 Likert-sort scale that measures worldwide subjective satisfaction by implies of proclamations with which members either self-rate themselves or contrast themselves with others. Two things ask for the people to depict themselves utilizing either total valuation criteria of their lives or else valuation criteria concerning others, while the other two things present brief depictions of upbeat or despondent people and the interviewees are requested that demonstrate the extent to which these explanations fit them (Extremera, Berrocal, 2013).


SHS was used to find out the happiness level of the TDPs and how much happy they rate them before and after displacement. When asked about their general life satisfaction, 44% of the respondents ranked their life satisfaction at 6 points on Likert scale, indicating their life satisfaction levels to be quite at a higher level. If we compare this result from post displacement perspective, the scores indicate a sharp decline in the general life satisfaction levels i.e. 83% people scoring less than average points of 4.5. This clearly depicts their post displacement frustration and stress. 17% of the respondents have recorded above average score i.e. above 4.5. These respondents belonged to the TDPs living with the host families. They are contented with their post displacement life since they are attaining every basic necessity, no additional expenses, along with no fear of terrorism and suicide attacks.

Figure-9:




When asked to compare their happiness level with their peers, 89% reported above average score pre displacement, against the post displacement above average scores of 17% respondents. Most of the respondents feel that they have become poorer than their peers and this has severely affected their life satisfaction post displacement.

Figure-10:




When inquired about the characteristic that whether they remain happy regardless of the circumstances and incidents, 76% of the individuals' scores were less than 4 depicting that they can't stay happy anymore due to the displacement. The event of displacement and connected aggravated problems have left a great impact on their personalities. Pre-displacement results show a higher scores: 75% individuals scoring more than average. The respondents claimed that though their area is plagued with terrorism and militancy, still they were happier in their homes despite of militancy activities. For them, having one's own home, businesses and adequate income are significant factors in determining one's life satisfaction.

Figure-11:



TDPs were asked whether they remain unhappy without experiencing depression. 54% of the respondents responded with above average scores. They said they are unhappy without being depressed. Depression is not only the cause for signifying the unhappiness in an individual. There are individuals who remain unhappy without being a victim to depression. While only 26% of the individuals have reported pre-displacement higher scores. So displacement has clearly changed the personality makeup of different individuals. This shows that how an external impactful event can transform the habits and mental makeup of an individual.

Figure-12:



7.3 RESULTS AND FINDINGS

From the above results, it is clear that the basic necessities are not provided by the government and non-government organizations up to the mark. The respondents felt that the health facilities available at their home towns were better than the facilities available in the camps. 71% TDPs reported that the health facilities provided to them are inadequate, while 26% of TDPs, belonging to the host families, are satisfied with the provision of health services. 76% respondents believed that the health facilities in their areas were adequate. In contrast, 26% evaluated the provision of health facilities in their home towns negatively. All the respondents were highly frustrated with the non-availability of proper bathrooms and sewage systems. Females reported that due to unhygienic environment, they are becoming more vulnerable to skin diseases. Females are generally more distressed with this situation, since they are unable to use the bathrooms which

are located at a distance from their camps. On the other hand, TDPs with host families were satisfied with the sewage and sanitation systems as these facilities were similar to their homes. 66% of the respondents felt that the government is not pro-active in meeting their economic needs. They are experiencing psychological issues due to the sudden decline in their earnings. Previously, only 29% of the respondents were earning less than 10k, but soon after the displacement this percentage has increased up to 84%. As, after displacement all the means of earnings are over, the TDPs are solely dependent upon the cash received from the government which amounts to approx. 10k monthly. TDPs residing with the host families are satisfied with the government's actions to provide them with food and income. These people represent 32% of the entire sample size. They are more contented with the environment which is tantamount to their homes. 122 out of 150 felt poor while the remaining belonged to TDPs living with the host families, who consider themselves wealthier than before.

Educational infrastructure such as schools, colleges etc. is demolished in NWA due to the ongoing operation. The TDPs residing in the camps established by Al-khidmat foundation reported that the school situated near the camp is only meant for the provision of the primary level education to the children. No middle and secondary level educational facilities are available which is contributing in building up frustration, especially among males. While, the educational facilities available to host families are similar to the ones available in their areas.

On the basis of the above discussion, it is clear that TDPs in the camps are experiencing relative deprivation of basic necessities as compared to the TDPs living with the host families.

Relative Deprivation theory suggests that the difference between the expected and real achieved welfare induces individuals to indulge in political violence. Ted Robert Gurr explains the political violence in *Why Men Rebel* (1970) by saying:

“Relative deprivation' is the term... used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence.

Relative deprivation is also experienced by individuals who rate their welfare to be inferior as compared to others. Deprivation can be experienced in terms of basic needs such as food, protection, income, education, health, justice etc. According to this theory TDPs are more vulnerable to militancy, since they are continuously experiencing lack of basic amenities and services in the camps. They have lost their means of livelihood and 90% of the respondents

responded that they have become poorer than before. So, in the light of relative deprivation theory, we accept the following hypothesis:

H1: Ineffective provision of basic needs such as education, health and economic opportunities to TDPs is aggravating the crisis situation.

However, the TDPs living with the host families are satisfied with the government's service delivery systems. They are getting ample food and cash grants with an environment tantamount to their homes. They bear no additional expenses such as rents etc. The basic needs for them such as health facilities, food, income, sanitation, education etc. are similar pre and post displacement. Since they are not experiencing a deprivation in basic needs. So according to the relative deprivation theory, we will reject the above mentioned hypothesis for the TDPs living with the host families.

The psychological conditions of TDPs after displacement suggested increased level of frustration and depression among them. The 83% of respondents feel frustrated and psychologically disturbed post displacement in contrast to 42% pre-displacement. Subjective happiness scale suggested that the TDPs are psychologically disturbed after displacement. 89% of the respondents felt that they were happier than their peers pre-displacement. While 17% of the respondents recorded above average score post- displacement. 44% of the respondents ranked their life satisfaction at 6 points on Likert scale, indicating their life satisfaction levels to be quite at a higher level. If we compare this result from post displacement perspective, the scores indicate a sharp decline in the general life satisfaction levels i.e. 83% people scoring less than average points of 4.5. This clearly depicts their post displacement frustration and stress.

When inquired about the characteristic that whether they remain happy regardless of the circumstances and incidents, 76% of the individuals' scores were less than 4 depicting that they can't stay happy anymore due to the displacement.

The Subjective Happiness Scale indicates that after displacement the happiness levels of TDPs have declined, fueling anger and frustration among them with the passage of time. The relative deprivation of basic necessities such as adequate health, food, income, sanitation systems, education, justice etc. are the cause of frustration. If not dealt properly there is an increased chances that this frustration might end up into supporting and joining militant activities in NWA. This theory suggests that people who experience ever increasing frustration and stress might get involve into terrorist and violent activities. According to this theory, TDPs are facing

psychological issues and extreme depression. They are getting distressed with the crisis situation with each passing day. They have lost their jobs, their livelihoods, their loved ones. Now they have nothing else to loose. This feeling may support them to indulge in violent activities to take vengeance from the authorities who in their opinion are responsible for creating problems for them. So, frustration-aggression theory proves that people with psychological issues and depression are more vulnerable to militancy. So, we accept the following hypothesis:

H2: TDPs facing pyschological issues and depression are more vulnerable to militancy.

8 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

This section will evaluate the performance of the government and non-government organizations in dealing with the TDPs crisis situation. The on-paper mandate of the organizations is evaluated against the actual implementations of organizational programs. The prevalent gap between TDPs expectations from these organizations and their actual service delivery will suggest that the crisis will aggravate further in the future leading to increase in militancy in NWA.

H3: The absence of a National Policy on TDPs i.e. organizational mandates, roles and the subsequent implementation lapses, are exacerbating the sense of relative deprivation in the TDPs.

8.1 UNDERSTANDING THE DEVISED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The contextual perspective of the hypothesis merits the understanding of the Relative Deprivation theory leading to Frustration-Aggression theory. (Tilly, 1971) review of Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (1970) contends that the difference between perceived and actual welfare activities [by the state] give rise to collective frustration and disillusionment. The aforementioned theoretical framework attempts to explain the difference between the affected people who perceive the welfare activities provided to as inferior in relative terms i.e. they are being treated as second class citizens. Relative deprivation, previously, has been used to explain terrorist activities, along with violence having political motivations. The politically motivated violence, according to Ted Gurr, as a manifestation of dissent on community or regional level is a consequence of Relative Deprivation; the basis of his argument is entirely psycho-social. He writes

“Relative deprivation' is the term... used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence. The primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism... the anger induced by frustration... is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities.” (Gurr, 1970)

However, Ted Gurr was not the first one to identify the link between aggression and frustration; John Dollard in 1939, and later reformulated by (Berkowitz, 1989), postulated the link that frustration follows expression of aggression or aggressive behaviors altogether.

The hypothesis we proposed, maintains that the inefficient service delivery mechanisms to the displaced people in official camps, and minimal services to the unregistered people residing in the unofficial camps and host families, would further alienate the vulnerable population towards militancy. It could arguably be proposed that uncontrollable militancy situation in the tribal belt, as evident from the failure of several military operations to root out militancy in the recent past, could be the expression of collective discontent of the local population, hence contributing to the exacerbation of the militancy situation overall in the region.

The empirical examination of the theory pertains to the measurement of the trust deficit between the state institutions and the displaced people along with their levels of satisfaction with the basic service provision within the TDPs camp. The people residing outside the camps, that is, unofficial camps and with the host families, were interviewed and their levels of satisfaction with the state institutions were assessed. The vulnerable population also comprised of qualified and educated individuals, who clearly show sign of frustration relative more prominent than the population who didn't expect employment opportunities from the state. The study analyze social factors i.e. social gatherings with their friends and family and education after the displacement, and economic variable i.e. unemployment and dismal financial conditions, may be insightful in the dynamic of militancy in the North Waziristan agency.

8.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE ISSUE OF MILITANCY

For a diverse and institutionally impartial opinion, we interviewed some non-governmental officials/observers of the entire internal displacement crisis. In our interview with Riaz Khan, Peshawar's Bureau Chief of 'The Nation' daily newspaper, the militancy issue was contextualized in the historical perspective of Pak-Afghan relations and the issue of Durand Line, along-with the role of Pakistani govt. in the creation of the Taliban and their subsequent govt. in Afghanistan.

Mr. Khan was apprehensive of the fact that Pakistan is leading to an increased *Punjabisation*³ and a subsequent increase in issues such as Islamic insurgency and/or ethnic insurgency. By *Punjabisation*. According to him, the entire militancy issue has ingrained roots in socio-economic disparity and exclusion of specific classes from the basic structure of the state. Also, the inefficiencies of the state i.e. lack of provision of basic services, shortcomings in the rehabilitation and repatriation process, and the subsequent trust-deficit between the local/displaced people and the state, have the potential to escalate into a graver threat such as increase in terrorism. Furthermore, majority of the Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns and strictly comply with the Pashtun cultural norms/codes i.e. *pukhtunwali*⁴, which is the prime reason why Pashtuns are relatively more inclined towards sympathizing with the Taliban than others, he said.

Col. Salahud Din Ayubi, ISPR's Director, while giving historically to the militancy issue in Pakistan, he said that the tribal people, from the very beginning, are groomed in an environment of tribal conflicts/battles that impact the entire society socially. Subsequently, less literacy rates and reliance upon informal (black) economy, that is, smuggling (import/export) of weapons within and without the country, drug lords smuggling drugs etc., produce criminals in the said tribal society. Also, the aforementioned commercial and trade activities happen with the connivance of the local tribal chiefs, who create safe havens for the criminals to keep the economy running and protect their vested interests. The army is trying to dismantle the same network of drug lord, smugglers and their respective safe havens, the official said. He further contended that the aforementioned phenomenon was also exacerbated by the Afghan-Soviet war in 1980s, which enabled the entire phenomenon of militancy to evolve into the phenomenon of the Taliban. The official also associated the Afghan border issues and hostile relations with Afghanistan as one of the significant factor in the insurgency situation faced by Pakistan, however, he pointed out the unwillingness of the US-Afghan forces to fence the volatile Afghan border by referring to a Pak-Afghan-NATO forces joint check-post initiative to secure the Duran Line, however, due to inadequate security measures on the Afghan side of the border leading to

³ The overwhelming majority of the Punjab province in almost every govt. institution of the country translating into an exclusive policy decisions at the national level. Also, it can be taken in the context of an exclusive approach towards governance that have the potential to alienate the excluded classes i.e. Pakhtuns, Balochis and Seraikis, primarily.

⁴ As the Pashtun culture is proudly called by the local people. This term is inherently nationalistic and political.

increase in cross-border attacks incidents happened rendered the entire initiative as a futile exercise (globalsecurity, 2014) (Firdous, 2011) (Reporter, 2011) (Butt, 2015).

8.3 ANALYZING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TDPs

The research questionnaire formed incorporated some aspect of psychological assessment of the TDPs, complemented with an interview from the Psychology Professor at the NUST School of Social Sciences & Humanities, Ms. Irum Abrar Awan, where she asserted upon the importance of primary data in interpreting the vulnerability of the TDPs towards militancy. She related the internationally recognized rights with ‘Maslow Hierarchy of Needs’ and underlined the primacy of Physiological or basic needs of an individual. The failure of recognition and protection of the internationally recognized rights may lead to a sense of deprivation in the affected people, however, the psychological damaged caused varies from individual to individual depending upon the Coping Mechanisms e.g. how does a particular loss and socially (or otherwise) inferior treatment perceived by an individual and how does he/she subsequently cope-up with the situation. Hence, the relation of ‘Coping Mechanisms’ and ‘Maslow Hierarchy of needs’ in Psychological terms is of relevance in the context of militancy. (Ms. Irum Abrar Awan, Interview. 9th June, 2015)

8.4 ROLE & MANDATE OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION & HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

8.4.1 FATA Secretariat:

8.4.1.1 Establishment:

Until 2002, FATA section under the NWFP Planning & Development (P&D) used to decide about the development planning in the tribal areas. FATA

Secretariat was formed during that time and it was headed by Secretary FATA.

But it was not until 2006 that the establishment of Civil Secretariat FATA took place and was granted decision making functions. It comprised of an Additional Chief Secretary along with four secretaries and ten directorates. In 2012, the FATA secretariat was reformed and some new departments like ‘social sectors department’ and ‘production and livelihood development department’ were introduced. (FATA Secretariat, 2015)

8.4.1.2 Coordination & Organizational structure:

The coordinating role between Federal and provincial government and FATA Secretariat is performed by Governor’s Secretariat of KPK.

Departments under FATA Secretariat:

Following are the six departments under FATA Secretariat:

1. Finance Department
2. Planning & Development Department
3. Law & Order Department
4. Administration, Infrastructure & Coordination Department
5. Social Sectors Department
6. Production & Livelihood Development Department.

8.4.1.3 Services:

The departments under the FATA Secretariat are responsible for the provisioning of services to the public with the help of the concerning directorates. The Directorate of Projects (DoP) and FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) function independently.

Line directorates are responsible for the provisioning of several services for instance; social welfare, fisheries, education, roads development, dairy development, agriculture, health etc. (FATA Secretariat, 2015)

8.4.2 PDMA-PaRRSA:

8.4.2.1 Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA):

The PDMA is an institution established at the provincial level to form a system in order to deal with the natural or manmade calamities and disasters or accidents.

8.4.2.1.1 Establishment of PDMA:


PDMA was established as a result earthquake of October 8, 2005. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) took steps to form an institution at the provincial and local level with enhanced capabilities to respond and cope with the disasters and calamities. The National Disaster Management Ordinance provided the base for the establishment of Provincial Disaster management Authority (PDMA) and commission (PDMC) for immediate response and assistance to the disaster stricken areas and mitigate the risk of fatalities in those areas.

Both institutions work parallel to come up with a system of handling disasters in the best possible way. Before that, Provincial Relief Commissionerate took care of the relief work and rehabilitation programs in such events. Now, PDMA is responsible for performing all the functions that were previously performed by the Provincial Relief Commissionerate. (PDMA, 2013)

8.4.2.1.2 Functions of PDMA:

The basic function of PDMA KPK is to manage disastrous events and the formulation of policies regarding disaster risk management, mitigation and preparedness against such events. Also, to communicate and coordinate with all parties involved, in case of any hazardous event. It deals with the rehabilitation and management of Internally Displaced Persons into the provisional camps and their permanent settlements afterwards. It also facilitates and deals with all the donors. (PDMA, 2013)

8.4.2.1.3 Organogram of PDMA:



Source: (PDMA, 2015)

8.4.2.2 PaRRSA:

8.4.2.2.1 Creation, Objective & Functions:

PaRRSA is abbreviated as Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority. PaRRSA was created in July 2009 under the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Initially, it was aimed for reconstruction & rehabilitation in Malakand Division and then its scope was extended to the rest of the province in 2012. Its core objective is to plan and coordinate overall rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement projects in the province. It also facilitates local and global development partners. It is responsible for the monitoring of reconstruction and rehab work done by the agencies.

It also executes all the projects put forward by different rehab and reconstruction agencies. It provides a nexus between the agencies and the provincial government and works as a bridge between different related organizations. It gets approvals from related authorities and provincial government so that the construction and rehab programs do not get delayed and the progress do not come to a halt. (PDMA, 2015)

8.4.2.2.2 Projects under PaRSSA:

Completed:

1. Peace and Development Programme-UNDP (US \$25m)
2. Early Recovery Agriculture Livelihood Project- (US \$10m)
3. Machinery & Equipment donated by China (Rs. 546.338 m)
4. Livelihood Projects (USAID) Firms Project - US\$5.25 m
5. Livelihood Projects (USAID) Entrepreneurs Project - US\$5.9 m
6. UAE Pakistan Assistance Programme (UPAP Phase-I)
7. Reconstruction of Militancy / Flood Damaged Schools by Partners / NGOs


Ongoing projects:

1. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Reconstruction Program USAID funded
2. Progress of Schools (US\$ 50 M)
3. 57 Flood / Militancy Damaged Schools
4. Progress of Fully/Partially Damaged Health Facilities and Malakand Health Services Plan - (US\$ 6.048 M)
5. Malakand Health Services Plan (MHSP)
6. Water Supply Schemes Buner & Swat - US\$ 3 M
7. Restoration of flood damaged Infrastructure (US\$ 20.039 Million)
8. Housing Uniform Assistance Subsidy Project US\$ 65 Million

Upcoming Projects:

1. Construction of Infrastructure for Malakand Region Project US\$72 m (SDF)
2. Abu Dahbi Fund for Development (ADFD) US \$200 million
3. Integrated Natural Resource Management

8.4.2.2.3 Organogram:



Source: (PDMA, 2015)

8.4.3 FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA):

FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) is a Federal Government Organization, which deals with all kinds of Disasters whether natural or man-made in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. It is supervised by and reports to FATA Disaster Management Commission (FDMC), which devises all the policies, guidelines and reviews and approves different disaster management plans and measures put forward by different departments in the FDMA.


8.4.3.1 Objectives and Functions:

FDMA's basic objective is to perform activities that relates to all four stages of Disaster Management Spectrum. Its basic objective involves disaster risk management and responding to emergencies and performing immediate recovery in FATA. (FDMA, About Us: FDMA, 2014)

It also performs several functions such as:

- Coordinates the assessment and disaster management plans with other stakeholders in FATA
- Devise plan and agenda for disaster management both pre- and post-disaster.
- Oversee and assess vulnerabilities and susceptibilities that may lead to a disaster or may cause havoc in the crisis situation or may cause hindrances in such situation.
- Formulates SOPs and assign roles to different agencies and departments regarding disaster management.
- Provide expertise and assistance to different departments and agencies to develop action plan and framework.
- Spread awareness among the general public and conduct training and workshops regarding risk mitigation and responding to crisis situation.
- Perform tasks and goals assigned by the FDMC
- Respond to emergencies through the FATA Emergency Operation Centre (FEOC)

8.4.3.2 Organogram:



Source: (FDMA, 2014)

8.4.4 RAPID Fund USAID:

8.4.4.1 Establishment:

RAPID (Responding to Pakistan's Internally Displaced) is a funding mechanism that was established in September 2009 under a cooperative agreement between Concern Worldwide and USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

8.4.4.2 Objective, Role & Progress:

It was designed to respond quickly to the urgent needs of people affected by disasters in Pakistan. Phase one of the RAPID fund began in August 2009 and was successfully completed in September 2013. It supported more than three million people affected by disasters in Pakistan. RAPID Fund assists USAID to respond quickly to imminent crises by reimbursement of small sized funds and packages to local Pakistani NGOs and hence, helping them helping the effected population according to their local needs and building up the on the work and projects already done by them in the far flung areas.

Since establishing the RAPID Fund, USAID has donated nearly \$18 million in order to carry out or bolster numerous activities that would benefit an estimated 2.6 million disaster and flood stricken people in Pakistan, which includes a huge number of women population. This fund has been utilized to provide health, education, shelter, sanitation, water, and to provide infrastructure and create economic opportunities so that they could earn their livelihood and do not dependent on aid solely. Several small businesses have been started by these people with the help of the cash grants disbursed by RAPID fund. The overall direct beneficiaries of this fund are more than 100,000 people. (Concern Worldwide, 2013)

8.4.5 UNHCR Pakistan:

United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees in Pakistan is the UN refugee agency that supports and protects refuges all over Pakistan and assists their repatriation.

8.4.5.1 Objective, Role and Progress:

Pakistani government looked weak in providing feasible solutions to TDPs since the number of TDPs were increasing every day, so it had to seek help from UN and local NGOs. Moreover a thorough project was needed in order to bridge the gap between government's response and TDPs' demands. (UNHCR, 2015)

The government of Pakistan made an official solicitation to the UN office and other international organization in Pakistan to help the government in their existing help to thousands of internally displaced persons (TDPs) and their families dislocated from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), to integrate the needs of the recently expatriate persons from North Waziristan Agency. The Humanitarian country team (HCT) agree to the government's solicitation and a preliminary response plan (PRP) was premeditated on 8th July 2014, the preliminary response plan (PRP) advices to accompaniment the national response, by helping the government on a specific issue. (UNHCR, 2015)

UNHCR's major objective in Pakistan is to achieve lasting solutions for one of the largest and prolonged refugee situations in the world. Pakistan continues to host approximately 1.7 million refugees. Most are from not even Pakistan and continue to live in the refugee camps. Since March 2002, due to UNHCR's efforts, the repatriation of about 3.7 million registered Afghan refugees from Pakistan was made possible. UNHCR is working in collaboration with the government of Pakistan for the past three decades when the soviet invasion of Afghanistan started. Since then, the Ministry of State and Frontier region (SAFFRON) has been a key partner with the UNHCR Pakistan and collaborates and coordinates with them. Together they carried out several projects and strategies regarding the refugee management and their repatriation.

UNHCR determines the refugee status under its mandate for asylum-seekers, due to the absence of national refugee legal framework. The decision on the refugee status is accepted by Pakistan and it allows the asylum seekers to remain in the country as long no better long term solution is in sight. (UNHCR, 2015)

UNHCR Supports for TDPs incorporates keeping up IDP camps and ensuring their privileges comprising by assisting the Government's cataloguing processes, lawful guide, and supervision. UNHCR urges the Government to receive an IDP strategy that fits in with worldwide benchmarks. UNHCR keeps on driving helpful endeavors concentrated on assurance, sanctuary. In light of a statelessness study led in 2014, UNHCR will, with pertinent government partners, recognize conceivable arrangements and guarantee that troubled populaces can practice their fundamental constitutional rights and admittance administrations. Majority of the internally

displaced persons (76%) live in rented homes, about 7% with their kinsfolks and 5% with host families, whereas 12% are living in unplanned settlements e.g. school buildings, according to the Rapid protection cluster assessment, the departure of these internally displaced persons (TDPs) from North Waziristan happened in just one week. These figures demonstrates an evidence of the extent of the displacement, and the surprising and critical nature of requirements obliging reaction.

In an interview with an official of UNHCR, he revealed:

“The very first week of our work to this crisis delineated the holes in the planning and effort to internally displaced persons (TDPs) within registration and missing of the important administration in locations, a humanitarian basic was needed to help government’s strategy to help to manage the problems of internally displaced persons (TDPs).”

For arrangement purposes, UNHCR has been utilizing the earlier Cluster Response planning number of 6 individuals for each family but in accord to government statements the size of an average family for North Waziristan Agency populace is ten to eleven people. World Food Program and UNHCR in collaboration with local NGOs are steering a quick inspection to define the average size of a household. Supplementary funds for support requirements might be vital if this higher than normal size of a household that is confirmed. This conclusive effort will ease the authorities to sort out feasible solutions to counter IDP crises.

We observed that there are numerous TDPs specifically lower classes, for example, female headed families have been avoided from the Government's enrollment and consequently the cash grants because of details, for example, the absence of a Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC). UNHCR is trying to solve these issues through the foundation of Grievance Desks. This very conundrum cannot resolved until traditional context of the area is kept in consideration. However, government has to make a proper strategy to counter these issues from grass root level.

Few of the Strategies and main activities of UNHCR are:

1. Bridge the gap between humanitarian stakeholders and government pundits through proper exchange of information with government.
2. Access and security are crucial requirements for a successful and convenient reaction. The Humanitarian group is setting up a helpful center point in Bannu to diminish security dangers connected with incessant patrolling.
3. UNHCR leads three of the 11 Clusters - Protection, Emergency Shelter/Non-Food Items (NFIs), and Camp Coordination/Camp Management (CCCM).

Meanwhile UNHCR endeavors to find a better possible solution to the issue. Pakistan government has taken steps to complement UNHCR's efforts by extending Afghan refugees' proof of Registration (PoR) cards until the end of 2015, issued birth certificates for 800,000 Afghan refugee children, provided land for several refugee villages, and given refugees access to public schools and health clinics.

8.4.5.2 *Functioning & Coordination:*

The security situation in Pakistan does not make a very suitable environment for the agencies and NGOs and the organization are very much vulnerable to threats especially in the northern areas. UNHCR collaborates with the security agencies in Pakistan to make sure to counter security issues for humanitarian agencies working in the area.

We observed that there is a need for UNHCR to enhance a local management and coordination and communication with important government counterparts, at federal and provincial levels. This includes engagement with: the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR), the National Database and Registration Authority, the Ministry of Interior, the FATA Disaster Management Authority, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, the Commissionerates for Afghan Refugees (CARs), the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities and relevant line ministries.

UNHCR also faces access-related problems and difficulty in evaluating the work on ground due to difficulties of getting "No Objection Certification" from the government and too much

involvement of military in the operational area of UNHCR. Hence we observe that army needs to give more room to international NGOs like UNHCR to perform their work and government needs to review its procedure of giving “No Objection Certification” so that international organization could focus more on solving issues of vulnerable people of North Waziristan rather than spending more time dealing with Army and government doing complicated paper work.

UNHCR should build synergies with other stakeholders for the following objectives; the care and maintenance programmes, the RAHA initiative and the wider involvement of One-UN interventions. UNHCR encouraged UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, the Government and other partners to work in collaboration with each other to achieve mutual goals.

8.4.6 World Food Programme (WFP):

8.4.6.1 Objectives, functions & Role:

WFP is the food aid agency of the United Nations system. Food aid is a program that helps promote food security, which can be described as access of all people to the food needed for a nutritious and healthy lifestyle, at all times. The orientation of the policies that governs the use of WFP is towards the eventual eradication poverty and hunger all over the world. The long term objective of this kind of program must be the eradication of the requirement for food aid.

WFP intervenes in a targeted way to help improve the lives of those who suffer from food deprivation and shortage due to the fact that they failed to produce the sufficient amount of food or have no ability to obtain food otherwise.

WFP performs the following functions:

- use food aid to back socio-economic development;
- meet refugee and other emergency food needs
- Support world food security according to the recommendations of the UN

Following are the strategies and policies that administer World Food Programme' activities around the world:

- to reduce fatalities due to food and starvation in refugee or any other crisis situations;
- To improve food security levels and provide wholesome and nutritious food to those who are prone to food shortage.
- Provide infrastructure to overcome the food shortage and increase yield and food management and storage system. WFP seeks to provide different sort of related services such as advice, logistic support and information, offices, and support to countries in creating their own food aid programs. (WFP, 2015)

WFP help supplements the government's work to increase food security among the susceptible people and offer all kind of support in making policies which would help the government to deal with food security. WFP plays a crucial role in making most of the national strategies regarding food security in Pakistan. WFP help the government in projects related to community resilience building, disaster risk reduction and disaster risk management and WFP also provide help with the projects which would make the nation sustainable in the long term to deal with disaster management problems. WFP main goal is to strengthen the government projects and support the goals of the millennium development goals. WFP targeted 3.2 million recipients in 2014. WFP's programs support producers in Pakistan in improving the quantity and quality of food products. It also focuses on increasing awareness and food safety standards as well as create employment. (WFP, 2015)

WFP through its relief operations for years have been working to improve nutrition and food security in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA), and support the government's initiatives in building social consistency amongst the most insecure districts for FATA. In the third quarter of 2014 huge population displacement occurred from North Waziristan Agency (NWA). Particular activities contain life-saving food assistance to TDPs from FATA, WFP and partners have been giving relief good packages monthly to NWA families and WFP was the very first and for some time the only UN organization helping these TDPs form North Waziristan Agency.

WFP gets most of the merchandises for its food support from the local market hence the local market gets a boost as well. Pakistan supports the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) partnership method which brings together resources and people required to increasingly magnify the nutrition-specific involvements as well as cross sectional approaches that are nutrition delicate. The food packages contained flour, sugar, cooking oil, rice, salt, medicines, water purification tablets and some other essential edible goods. Lakki Marwat and FR Bannu are the distributional points established by WFP and another point in Dera Ismail khan would be functional soon. WFP delivers the food packages through local NGOs which they call implementing Partners (IPs). IPs are responsible for the distribution and delivery of food packages to the needy families. WFP is dependent on government statistics on number of families that required assistance for food. The statistics are given to WFP and the it provides food assistance accordingly, that is one area where WFP can do more work and send their own teams to evaluate the ground realities and do research on number of family that required food assistance or any other kind of assistance related to health because at times government research cannot much reliable and it tends to miss many important areas in which the vulnerable people need desperate help hence many needy families are ignored while delivering food packages. Like we absorb while our research that there is need to gather more information on the areas of TDPs in hosting families so that funds can be assigned to delivers necessity facilities to them. There is also a need of constant supply of medicines to meet with the increasing affliction of TDPs and health services need consolidation. (WFP, 2015)

Another problem we observed was that many families complaint about the packages being opened and few food items being missing, and we could not see a proper structure by WFP to make sure the food packages are delivered to deserving families and there are no proper methods by WFP that we could observe to evaluate the performance of Implementing Partners and to keep a check and balance on them. Hence there is a need for WFP to come up with a proper structure to evaluate the performance of IPs and to check whether food packages are being delivered to the deserving families as they are supposed to be delivered.

8.4.6.2 Strategic Plan:

WFP's Strategic Plan for 2014-2017 provides the layout for WFP's operations and its agenda regarding achieving a world without hunger and starvation. It focuses on WFP's food assistance programmes for the poor especially women and children.

The framework puts forward four objectives:

1. Protect lives and livelihoods in crisis situations;
2. Promote food security and provide economic opportunities in crisis stricken areas;
3. Support people to increase their food production and overcome food shortage.
4. Reduce under nutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger

8.4.6.3 Coordination:

WFP is the largest agency providing food assistance in Pakistan and has been closely collaborating with the Government of Pakistan at both federal and provincial levels so that it can issues like food insecurity and shortage. WFP partners Ministry of National Food Security and Research for the provision of adequate food to all Pakistanis.

WFP Pakistan coordinates with the Government, public institutions, other UN agencies, NGOs and donors. WFP along with FAO undertakes Food Security Cluster. WFP leads the Information and Communications Technology working group and also leads the Strategic Priority Area.

One of the challenges WFP faces is an easy and safe access to the operational areas because of the difficulties for national and international staff in obtaining government travel clearance certificate, and because of that it is difficult for WFP to evaluate the performance of IPs hence government needs to work on providing safe access to international organizations like WFP so that they would be able to do their jobs more effectively or help WFP to evaluate the performance of IPs, to make sure that the help is provided to the vulnerable and deserving people.

8.4.7 USAID:

US Agency for International Development is a US agency that strives to eliminate global poverty and reduce conflict in order to empower democratic societies and assist them to realize their potential.


8.4.7.1 Objective, Functions and Coordination:

USAID funded the “Federally Administration Tribal Areas (FATA) Institutional Strengthening project (FISP)” It is a \$17.96 million dollars funded project to help three Federally Administration Tribal Areas’ institution which are accountable for development and governance, namely, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor’s Secretariat, the Federally Administration Tribal Areas Secretariat (FS) and the Federally Administration Tribal Areas Development Authority (FDA). The work started in August 2011 and shall finish till September 2016. The Federally Administration Tribal Areas Secretariat is the fundamental part of FATA administration, which works in seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions, the Federally Administration Tribal Areas Secretariat has 6 departments and it is accountable for public services in FATA. The Federally Administration Tribal Areas Development Authority (FDA) works on specific development projects under the government. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor’s Secretariat helps the provincial governor in coordinating the government mechanism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administration Tribal Areas. USAID aim is to strengthen the Pakistani government’s institutions and structure to make the state capable to deal with future problems and make it more sustainable. (USAID, 2015)

USAID wants to make help Pakistan in making their institutions stable and sustainable and help the government in providing basic services to the vulnerable people. Supplementary fund if \$9.3 million has been announced by the United States Embassy to help the Pakistani government to provide water, health, livelihood and sanitation requirements of the TDPs from FATA. And additional fund of \$7 million dollars by the United States’ government will be given to UNICEF Pakistan to improve water, sanitation, health and hygiene services for the internally displaced

persons (TDPs) from Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) and also to safeguard the health of livestock with the residual of funds. USAID works differently than other organizations in Pakistan in a way that it helps the governments and other institutions in providing services to the people unlike other organizations which provide services directly to the people. \$8 million for the internally displaced persons (TDPs) from Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) in food aid was announced by the US on June 26, 2014. \$60 million in food aid to Pakistan has been provided by USAID from October 2013 to July 2014. . We observe that USAID approach is much better as it is helping Pakistani institutions to become capable of dealing with issues themselves in future and it is helping the government to become self-sustainable. Nonetheless we observe that USAID has no proper structure to evaluate the government's performance and to check whether the funded money is properly used or not by the Pakistan's government hence we perceive that USAID could work on their methods for monitoring and evaluation to make sure the funded money is being used that way it is supposed to be, for that purpose USAID could involvement third party or have their own representative working with the government to ensure that the required work is properly done.

8.4.7.2 Organogram:



Source: (USAID, 2015)

8.4.8 Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON):

The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) is a federal ministry in Pakistan. The ministry is headed by the Minister for States and Frontier Regions.

8.4.8.1 Establishment

Army operation Zarb-e-Azb was started against terrorists on 15th of June in North Waziristan agency of FATA that caused in an impermanent movement and displacement of persons from North Waziristan agency of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) to inoffensive places.

The government of Pakistan allocated the duty of making essential reintegration prearrangement of internally displaced persons to SAFRON (the ministry of states and Frontier regions). National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was also involved by the government to help SAFRON delivering the necessary services to the temporary displaced persons and help them adjust in their new temporary safe areas.

8.4.8.2 Objective:

The main responsibilities of the ministry are to deal with issue of tribal areas of Pakistan Frontier Regions of Pakistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. SAFRON (the ministry of States and Frontier Regions) was chosen as the principal Ministry at federal level to deal with the crises of internally displaced persons and requirements of needy people of North Waziristan Agency of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Afghan Chief Minister was selected to make a procedural working team in Islamabad and in making it the provincial partners of Nation Disaster Management Authority was helping the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), FDMA and Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) are the provincial associates of National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). FDMA delivers the government assistance at the provincial level for the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) regions, whereas pertinent District Commissioners and Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) assist the government for the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa districts.

8.4.8.3 Why it was needed

Although the government of Pakistan has all the required resources but regarding the issue of internally placed persons from North Waziristan Agency of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) has not been able to successfully muster the community to assist and support the incursion of the temporary displaced persons as compare to how the government could mobilize the public during floods of 2010 and earthquake of 2005. Secondly SAFRON has not been very efficient in delivering funds on time to Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) and FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) due to the bureaucratic layers of the

system and involvement of too many authorities in dealing with a single problem regarding goods and services delivery to internally displaced persons of FATA.

8.4.8.4 Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees:

8.4.8.5 Establishment

In 1979 to deal with the influx of Afghan Refugees into Pakistan an Office of Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees was established at Federal level declaring it as an attached department of Ministry of SAFRON.

The main functions of that office are to deal the issue of Afghan refugees and coordinate with international agencies specially UNHCR. There is a Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees in each Province and having the Chief Commissionerate based in Islamabad. (SAFRON, 2013)

8.4.8.6 Role in Crisis Management and Progress:

SAFRON's involvement in dealing with the crises of internal displaced people from North Waziristan and details of fund allocation by SAFRON is given below:

8.4.8.6.1 North Waziristan:

Total influx/ Registration

- Families : 132,048
- Individuals: 924,336

Verification NADRA

- Data Share: 128,446
- Data Verified: 103,688

Distribution points have been established at sports complex Bannu, Govt College Mamash Khel, Teacher Training Institute Ghoria Wala, Durrani College, Bannu, D.I Khan and Lakki.

8.4.8.6.1.1 ALLOCATION OF FUNDS

Rs.11,550.191 Million have been sectioned by the government for the relief operations to SAFRON, the amount having been transferred to FDMA.

The initial cash disbursement was carried out at Saidgi Registration Point. On its closure (w.e.f. 09-07-2014), the subsequent cash disbursement was carried out at the Sports Complex, Bannu. Rs. 352.092 Million have been divided and distributed amongst 29,341 families. (12,000 per family) till 6th July, 2014.

As per report of ZONG/FDMA, Rs. 7365.56 M has been electronically disbursed till 29.04.2015.

8.4.8.6.1.2 CAMPS

- Currently, the Bakka Khel Camp at Bannu resides 3,282 families comprising of 19,147 individuals in it.

8.4.8.6.1.3 RELIEF ASSISTANCE IN KIND (GOVERNMENT)

- In order to cater for the need of food security till the end of June 2015, PASSCO has released further 70,000 MT of wheat to WFP.
- 607,340 food baskets from various different sources have been distributed amongst the needy so far.
- Food packages have been distributed by the WFP among 76,350 verified families of NWA since 16.03.2015.

8.4.8.6.1.4 HEALTH-WASH-EDUCATION

- Health department KPK, has been assisting in the healthcare of TDPs. Four mobile hospitals have been deployed by FDMA equipped with male and female doctors. 115,261 children have been vaccinated with polio vaccines so far, 83 doctors and health workers have been attached to Bannu by FATA Secretariat.
- All CDPs (composite distribution points) have health care facilities available.
- Up until now, 324,493 patients have been treated so far for various diseases and ailments.
- Field hospital at Khalifa Gul Nawaz Hospital Bannu has been operating well with support of PIMS Islamabad.
- Regarding animals, vaccination of 115,724 animals and 312,662 poultry has been carried out. Treatment of 95,214 animals has also been carried out.

8.4.8.6.1.5 DONORS/ UN CONTRIBUTIONS

- A total of 37,663 NFI kits from various sources have been distributed so far.
- The county team of United Nations has been sensitized to expand their current TDPs operation to NWA TDPs.
- US \$ 25 Million, pledged by the UAE government have been utilized for the distribution of 8,963 food baskets by the Army.
- UNHCR has donated 300 family sized tents for Bakka Khel Camp.
- For providing relief, WHO, UNICEF and UNHCR have established 6 centers in Bannu.
- The Chinese government has given 4000 Metric Tons of relief goods which have been distributed by FDMA.

8.4.8.6.1.6 COORDINATION ASPECTS

- A delegation of Ambassadors and other foreign dignitaries led by the Minister for SAFRON visited Miran Shah and Mir Ali- NWA on 18.01.2015.

8.4.8.6.2 B) KHYBER AGENCY


- **Total Influx/Registration**
 - Families: 176,396
- **Verification Status**
 - Data shared with NADRA: 176,396
 - Data verified by NADRA: 97,367
 - Data under for verification is under process.

8.4.8.6.3 C) REPATRIATION

- i. BARA KHYBER AGENCY : 29,836 (Verified returned)
- ii. SOUTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY: 7,379
- iii. NORTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY: 505

TOTAL UP TILL 14.05.15: 37,720* families (SAFRON, 2013)

8.4.8.7 Organogram:



Sources: (SAFRON, 2013)

8.5 SHORTCOMINGS IN THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

8.5.1 Legal issues pertaining to Temporary Dislocated Persons (TDPs)

The internal displacements, over the past decade, was rather a recurrent phenomenon, which merits integration into the policy framework at national and/or regional levels. The in-existent policy framework in this regard does not entitle the internally displaced people to the humanitarian and/or relief activities by the government. Similarly, the govt. in this case is not legally liable to provide any services to affected people/families. The recent name change from Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to Temporary Dislocated Persons (TDPs) is a significant evidence in this regard, which relieves the govt. from the responsibility of recognizing and subsequent protection of internationally recognized IDPs rights such as right to basic humanitarian assistance (food, shelter, medicine), the right to be protected from physical violence, the right to education, freedom of movement and residence, political rights such as the right to participate in public affairs and the right to participate in economic activities along with other basic human rights (UNHCR, 1998), whereas the name TDP re-brand the crisis as temporary occurrence meaning that the international agencies cannot intervene directly, and the govt. can fall short of the expected international standards without being accounted for the aforementioned shortcomings.

The start of the interview phase was marked by our interview with Mr. Habibullah Khattak, who has served for more than 5 years as Additional Chief Secretary (FATA) and now advising to the Assessment Strengthening Program (ASP) – a USAID project – on institutional capacity building in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). He was of the opinion that IDPs or TDPs of different areas should be dealt with differently considering the respective demographic factors in planning and other humanitarian activities. He opined:

“The people of SWA are inherently migratory in nature, say, they have one home in their native town and one elsewhere such Peshawar or Karachi, so they will spend the summers in their native home and winter in big cities [their second

home] and same goes for Khyber Agency as well, you'll usually find roaming around [Peshawar]. However, the people of NWA are different, they don't come out their homes [migrate] in such a way and their commuting to large cities is considerably less." (Habibullah Khattak, Interview. May 5th, 2015)

The discussion pertained to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as not a uniform region as it is considered in some circles, which implies cultural, social and other demographic differences that demand different treatment from the government, as evident from the interview that the people of North Waziristan Agency (NWA) are not used to migration and this entire process of internal displacements might affect them more adversely and alienate them differently than the TDPs of South Waziristan Agency (SWA) or Khyber Agency.

Arguably, the comparison of the current relief and rehabilitation activities to the previous IDPs of Swat and Kurram Agency provided by the govt., and special attention to the current TDPs may, however, impact negatively the IDPs of previous conflicts that are still be struggling with their rehabilitation (Hough, 2015). However, legal status of the IDPs, in international terms, is superior and recognized relative to the TDPs which is considered an anomaly to the international standards by some in the non-governmental sectors (Ali, 2015). Nonetheless, the basic service provision to the current TDPs is relatively better if compared with the previous IDPs.

Also, a senior official of the FDMA⁵, when asked about the name change from IDPs to TDPs, responded candidly that IDPs have some recognized rights world-wide and due to the limited institutional capacity and other administrative issues and shortcomings, the govt. cannot possibly ensure the protection of those respective rights. However, according to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR)⁶, the name change from IDPs to TDPs pertained to regulate the involvement of international organizations in the domestic humanitarian crisis of Pakistan due to 'national security concerns' within the context of recent alleged involvement of some non-governmental organizations in other than humanitarian activities (Yusufzai, Khan, & Bruton, 2015) (Shah & Cassidy, 2012) (pt, 2012). Hence, the overly cautious approach and related problem in adopting to the newly created quasi-legal framework for the affected people of NWA, is inherently a time-consuming phenomenon, as maintained by the senior ISPR official.

⁵ FATA Disaster Management Authority

⁶ The Pakistan Army's Public Relations agency.

8.5.2 Administrative issues & lack of coordination among the institutions involved

The organization having the mandate of dealing with the Crisis in FATA is only the FDMA. However, institutional shortcomings in FATA merits the administrative and logistical support of other governmental and non-governmental organizations. Also, the administrative authority was marred by some jurisdictional issues, such as, the region where the current military operation is going-on come under the jurisdiction of FATA and therefore, to be subsequently dealt with by the FDMA. But the influx of TDPs was directed towards District Bannu⁷ of KPK, due to security reasons and less-required logistical support because of its geographical accessibility, and therefore to be dealt with by Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA)-KPK. The current location of the Camp is in the Frontier Region (FR)⁸ Bannu i.e. Bakka Khel, which involves jurisdictional overlap between the FDMA and PDMA, along with district administration being the outlier of the process. The earlier mentioned FDMA said on this occasion:

“The area finalized, initially, for TDPs camp was near the Bakka Khel Bridge [a few kilometer towards Bannu from Bakka Khel, which comes under the administrative jurisdiction of District Bannu. However, the situation was yet to be sorted out before we got orders that the camp be established in Bakka khel, FR Bannu.” (Senior Official FDMA, Interview. May 4th, 2015).

He further maintained:

“The FDMA is doing all it can. We provided monthly stipends since July [the start of military operation]. We are planning to give cash to people with 6-months free food supplies, rebuilding infrastructure and other initiatives [projects] that have the potential to revive the local economy are planned to be undertaken at the earliest. We are providing all what our institutional capacity is allowing us to.” (Anonymous, Interview. 4th May, 2015)

⁷ The administrative division of districts is: Tribal Agencies and Settled Districts. Also, Bannu conveniently accessible and adjacent Settled District.

⁸ Frontier Regions (FR) are the buffer areas, usually 30-40 km, between a settled District and a tribal agency, governed by an Assistant Political Agent (APA) who reports to the administrative head of the settled district, which in this case is the Deputy Commissioner (DC) Bannu.

The overlap in administrative jurisdiction of various govt. organizations and subsequent lack of coordination between FDMA, PDMA, the respective District Administration and the military, is further exacerbating issues such as implementation lapses and limited institutional capacity. However, a PDMA official dismissed the notion of lack of coordination between the FDMA and PDMA, and asserted:

“We gave the FDMA administrative and institutional support to make it stand on its feet; support in-terms of finances, human resource, logistics etc. Initially, there were some problems but that phase is long gone and now we have handed over the project entirely to the FDMA.” (Rasheed, Interview. 5th May, 2015)

The lack of coordination among the govt. institutions involved is the derivative of inexistence of coordination mechanisms between the federal and the provincial govt. because, according to the ISPR, the issue carries a significant political mileage and consequently, the displaced people has to suffer at the end. The ISPR official said that the extensive scrutiny before the registration process is meant to provide them with safe neighborhoods within the Camp, and relevant ‘administrative problems’ are unavoidable in this regard. Also, the military faces the apprehension of militants may have migrated under the cover of TDPs. Apparently, it is expected that the shortcomings in the basic services are to be compensated in the rehabilitation activities because the military claims that the rehabilitation activities in South Waziristan Agency (SWA) were successful and NWA is follow the same course.

The District Administration at Bannu, though the FDMA was not admitting it, had a very limited role. The military, on the other hand, had an increased role in administration of camps and dealing with law & order situation. The situation observed on ground one of hostility between the military and the civilian bureaucracy, which was perceived to have a negative impact upon the overall situation of the TDPs. Also, lack of coordination between the civilian and military authorities even on the district levels. A senior official of the Distric Administration rather frustratingly said:

“Go and see the Jalozai⁹ camp, which is run entirely by the civilian administration and compare it with the Bakka Khel camp. The people there are much more happier. Here, the military

⁹ A camp for the internally displaced people of Khyber Agency (FATA), in District Nowshera, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

[people] don't even consider us human beings, let alone those residing in camps" (Anonymous, Interview. March 16th, 2015)

Moreover, the Govt. is trying to overcome the previous lack of coordination with the military to conduct the rehabilitation activities in order to address the previously existing shortcomings in the process of evacuation, resettlement and basic service provision to the TDPs. The govt. is expected to provide the required administrative and otherwise support to the military in completing the rehabilitation activities successfully. Responding to a question concerning the basic services provision to TDPs, the official said that the services provided by the govt. and the army, are to the maximum capacity and the services are relatively better from those provided to the previous IDPs. When asked the issue of re-locating the Camp to FR Bannu after the consensus of establishing it near the Bannu city, the official responded that the respective issue is legally complex. However, he said, there has been a lack of plan in the beginning:

“If I am to blame someone, I'll blame the federal government – The govt. had no strategy starting from evacuation to resettling the TDPs in Bannu; they could have delegated tasks to different institutions and, for whatever reason, if they fail to come up with a strategy, we have intervene according to the demands of the situation because, after all, the people of that [particular] area [i.e. NWA] would suffer. They are Pakistanis and Pakistanis should not suffer from delay in some [policy] decision” (Colonel Salahud Din Ayubi, Interview. 19th June, 2015)

8.5.3 Trust deficit between the people and authorities

The focus groups discussions at the Camp showed visible pattern of trust deficit between the people and the state institutions. The distressful situation of the evacuation of people from NWA as narrated by people in the Camp was manifestation of frustration and aggression with the state institutions and insurgents equally. The people said in unison:

“We have been humiliated without showing respect for our culture and traditions, and we will restore the sanctity of our traditions and avenge the deaths our loved ones. Whoever is

responsible for whatever has happened us, they will certainly be brought to justice very soon.” (Focus Group Discussions, 17th March, 2015)

The focus group discussions also highlighted the fact that the TDPs were skeptical about the role of the Council of the Tribal Elders and the respective local administration about informing the people only three days before the operation was started. A lady, in the discussion, said that her family wanted to move before a week given the uncertainty in the area, however, her family couldn't leave NWA due to the imposition of curfew for the 7-days; and it was lifted only three days before the operation. When asked about the role of the recently formed TDPs Union in the Camp, people were observed to be even oblivious of its creation let alone its objectives and functions. Alongside, there were some areas in the NWA that were 'cleared' by the army, however, remote presence of militants were still reported and casualties as a result of some skirmishes have happened during the course of the operation, which have made the prevailing situation more precarious and made the returnees reluctant to return to their hometowns (news-report, 2015). Also, there were some reported migrations to Afghanistan, which the Afghan govt. allegedly encouraged. In this context, the issue of militancy and state's inefficiency in providing the basic services may become multifold. (Ahmed, 2014) (More IDPs return from Afghanistan, 2014) (Aleem, 2014)

Responding to a question on the return of TDPs, the FDMA official said:

“Relief to the affected people is on the basis of whether the areas has been notified as 'conflict-hit zone' by the govt. If the military declares an area as 'cleared', we have to de-notify the area right away and help the TDPs return, they are, then no more entitled to the Camp relief.” (Senior Official of FDMA, Interview. 4th May, 2015)

8.5.4 Relative deprevation within the TDPs and between the previous IDPs and current TDPs

Another important thing observed during the field trip was that responses of the people residing in offical camp, Bakka Khel, varied in the presence and absence of camp administration i.e. military officials. People seems to feel disoriented and confused because there has been

incidents, in the past, where either the military or the insurgents used see them as a threat. As we observed, and the district administration endorsed, that the public perception about the military controlling the law & order and other administrative activities is not encouraging. Even public offices such office of the commissioner, deputy commissioner and district courts are not accessible to the general public which could very escalate the problem further. However, some other sources in the district administration contended that in emergency situations, an institution such the military requires to act with utmost vigilance which can be termed as public unfriendly attitude.

The issue of discrimination between the previous IDPs and the recently displaced people due to military operation, in-terms of basic facilities and service provision. He opined that the vulnerability towards militancy of the currently affected people, no doubt, should be assessed. However, the previously vulnerable population i.e. IDPs from previous military operations, who were displaced from native towns/villages keeping in mind their tribal socio-cultural sensitivity, might be relatively more at-risk and vulnerable towards militancy then the current population.

8.5.5 Conclusion

The categorization of the internally displaced people on the basis of their geography¹⁰, as noted in the interviews, is critically important pertaining to a policy decision¹¹. The fact that there are inherent demographic and other socio-economic differences in the Tribal people makes the entire argument of vulnerability towards militancy multifold i.e. people who are less educated, not used to migration and above all culturally sensitive to such displacements and leaving their native town, implies a missing *geo-demographic* policy as well. We, as a group of researchers, are apprehensive of the fact that the state agencies, and rightfully so, claims a limited institutional capacity and apparently, in implied expressions, give the notion that their institutional responsibility ends where there institutional capacity ends. As per our observation, the limited

¹⁰ The people migrated from Khyber Agency will have a different mindset and needs as compare to that of SWA or NWA and so on.

¹¹ Policy decisions regarding the officially registered migrants only, makes the unregistered migrants that are residing outside the camps i.e. in unofficial camps and with the host communities, a potentially vulnerable population in-terms of militancy. Hence, an inclusive policy decision, on part of the govt., is over-due.

institutional capacity argument is justified, however, not sufficient given the threat of militancy and anti-state sentiment in the migrated people. The people having no or less education, a persistent trust-deficit between the locals and the state institutions, socially and legally excluded from the basic structure of the state, should not be expected to comprehensively or otherwise understand the under-capacity of the state institutions. The efforts of the state agencies are, nevertheless, appreciable, however, not sufficient.

8.6 HYPOTHESIS ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION

In the context of the devised theoretical framework of “Relative Deprivation” leading to “Frustration-Aggression” accounting for political violence and terrorism, the above analysis pertaining to field trips, focus group discussions and various phases of interviews, we, hereby, conclude that the validity of the proposed hypothesis (H3) i.e. Inefficiencies on part of the state in the provision of basic service delivery creates a sense of deprivation in the people migrated due to the current military offensive, further alienating them and, hence, their subsequent vulnerability towards terrorism and militancy is accepted.

9 LIMITATION OF STUDY

The following are some of the limitations of the research study:

1. TDPs were divided into only two classes i.e. one living in camps and second living with host families or tenants. TDPs living as tenants couldn't be included in the study because most of them were unregistered, not confined at one location i.e. living in different places, hence, they were not easily accessible.
2. The language barrier created difficulties while collecting data. External researchers were hired to facilitate the data collection process which may have led to some biasness on part of the external researchers.
3. The female population of the sample size was completely illiterate. It was difficult for the interviewers to make questions comprehensible to them.
4. The responses varied greatly in the presence of military around the respondents. Since, the camps in Bakka Khel were dominated by the military presence, the answers may not depict the true preferences of the respondents due to fear or strong military influence.
5. The post return situation of TDPs could not be assessed as the process of rehabilitation was started later-on. Since all the TDPs did not return at once, it was difficult to identify and access those TDPs who have and have not returned due to fragile security situation in NWA. Also, it was futile to assess the rehabilitation programs of government before the completion of the return process of all the TDPs.

10 RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendation provided here attempts to facilitate the decision makers' in-terms of informed policy decisions pertaining to internationally recognized civil and political rights of the internally displaced people. Also, the basic service provision and improvement in the service delivery mechanisms to cater to the social needs in-terms of health and education, to persuasively address the extreme ideological tendencies of the TDPs. The TDPs are vulnerable to the threat of militancy relatively more than any other population and further alienation of the TDPs could attract them towards militancy and other anti-state activities, thus, providing them an outlet for expression of their frustration and aggression against the state institutions.

10.1 INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

The govt. and international donors should focus upon institutional building in the public sector to improve service delivery mechanism in-terms of responsiveness towards general public. The issue of lack of institutional capacities and creating institutions after conflicts and disasters e.g. creation of disaster management authorities after the 2005 earthquake, be transformed into a proactive approach in building govt. institutions. The USAID initiative in collaboration with the FATA Secretariat i.e. FATA Assessment Strengthening Program, should include the strengthening of informal institutions such as the Jirga (Council of Tribal Elders), which provides a quasi-judicial system and the local residents endorse its credibility. Assessment studies and strategies be devised by the policymakers beforehand to re-structure the Jirga system i.e. *Sarkari*, *Olas* and *Sakhsi* Jirga, in order to provide them with more democratic institutions that could be included in the formal institutional set up then. Formal institutions would include separate commissions such Right to Information and Right to Services Commissions preceded by pertinent legislations relating to FATA as a separate province or extension or a separate legal status that could provide a legal framework in setting up such commissions to ensure institutional transparency and accountability Because compare to other urban cities of Pakistan i.e. Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar, the people of FATA cannot invoking their rights in a Court of law etc. Also, the creation of FATA Tribunal, another quasi-judicial system, where the local people can challenge decisions of the Political Agents, is overwhelmingly bureaucratic in its orientations

comprising of three members¹². Hence, the Tribunal is practically ineffective in issuing verdicts against the PAs decisions due to the executive nature of the tribunal.

Moreover, the Jirga system and the tribal elders have collective¹³ and territorial responsibility¹⁴ under the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR) 1901, through which the council of the tribal elders, in the supervision of the respective Political Agent, listen to the problems of the local people in case of land and criminal dispute among the tribes; also the Jirga have the discretion to form a tribal militia (lashkar) to prevent militants from inhabiting the region again. The institution of Jirga is largely disturbed by the insurgency and military operations, subsequently the vacuum between the people and the state institutions along-with increasing trust deficit. Hence, international donors' initiatives should focus upon both formal and informal institutional building accompanied by extensive awareness campaigns regarding the utility of the respective institutions.

10.2 DURAND LINE (AFGHAN BORDER) ISSUE

The issue of the volatile Pak-Afghan border historically connects the unwillingness of fencing the border mostly to the unrecognition of Durand Line as international border by the Afghan govt. There's no formal ratification or agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan upon the said issue because the respective issue is politically sensitive for the Afghan govt. The joint check posts initiative by the Pak-Army, as discussed by the ISPR official (see the interviews section), was rendered unproductive because the indigenous consent was not incorporated. A dialogue, between the tribal elders and the State institutions should be convened, before any such initiative. Also, some local people were reported to have migrated to Afghanistan from NWA as a result of the current military offensive, which shows the social connectivity of the tribes across the border. Hence, any initiative to fence the Durand Line would have cross-border implications, which implies the importance of taking the social (informal) institutions on-board by the State institutions.

¹² Two members are retired bureaucrats and one is from the judiciary.

¹³ In case of involvement of a member of any tribe in anti-state conflicts and criminal activities, the entire tribe is responsible for the crime committed by its member and the tribal elder is responsible for producing the respective criminal.

¹⁴ Every tribal elder has a territory assigned to him by the State and in case of any anti-state and/or other criminal activities, the tribal chief is answerable to the Political Agent.

The trust-deficit between the two governments have significant importance in the historical context, which needs to be address diplomatically. More strategic bilateral agreements and dialogues is required on the issue between the two govt. and among the tribes residing on both sides of the border.

10.3 POLICY FRAMEWORK REGARDING INTERNAL DISPLACEMENTS (IDPs OR TDPs)

The policy decisions on the national and regional levels should give due considerations to the importance and volatility of the tribal region, along-with the nature of the War i.e. War against Terror overshadowed by guerilla warfare, that is being fought against the insurgents. The conflicts along the insecure Pak-Afghan border may escalate in future as well, hence, there should be a permanent and comprehensive policy framework that pertains to the legal status, provision of basic services and other civil and political rights, with an appropriate strategy that defines the role of every single relevant organizations and coordination between the federal and provincial govt. and most importantly between the civilian and military institutions.

Preferentially, the civilian and military institutions should proactively be oriented to prevent the internal displacements from occurring, the following measures should be taken:

- Early identification of the threats
- Closed continued assessment and anticipation
- Monitoring of risks
- Adopting appropriate responses

However, in the short-run, the civilian govt. should take a more proactive role and broad structural plan for security and support of internally displaced persons in Pakistan. Individuals facing additional weaknesses on account of their age, gender, religious belief, health conditions and physical and mental disabilities should be duly facilitated.

The strategies and policies regarding assessing and responding to the requirements of the internally displaced persons must be according to the recognized international human rights. Moreover, the recent name change from IDPs to TDPs may be taken in the perspective of national security as regulating the involvement of international humanitarian organizations and

faith-based organizations, however, the regulations may not be oriented to discourage the international relief activities altogether. Also, the concerns of credible international observers be addressed to manifest willingness on part of the State institutions to work cordially with the international community.

Furthermore, statistics regarding the TDPs must be representative of the categorized on the basis of gender and age and effective assessment of needs be conducted indiscriminately on the basis the aforementioned categorization for all the internally displaced persons, inclusive of people residing in unofficial camps and with the host communities.

10.4 CIVIL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS' PROTECTION

Human Rights are the universally recognized rights that is beyond the legal status of a person be that an IDP or a TDP. The inappropriate consideration of the said rights in the treatment of state institutions towards displaced people within and without the camps is leading to complex human rights situation in the country. Implementation of international human rights is of prime importance in the context of institutional strengthening and promotion of a positive image internationally. Also, incorporating the ideals of international human rights into the policy decisions pertaining to TDPs and subsequent awareness regarding their rights protecting them legally in case of any violation(s). Furthermore, in order to adopt inclusive approach towards informed policy-making, the accessibility to justice must be ensured in order to ingrain accountability institutional mechanisms, especially in disaster management institutions. Also, humanitarian concerns should be appropriately considered such that it is not overridden by the military objectives pertinent to the military offensive.

Moreover, platforms such the TDPs association, established to convey the concerns and other problems of the people residing in the Camp, to higher authorities, be made more effective with the support of the State's institutions. Also, issues such as the TDPs right to vote and subsequent protection of such rights (given that the local govt. elections have been conducted without their participation) be raised at the said platform.

10.5 REHABILITATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

In order to make the rehabilitation process smooth and stop relapse of relocation, the government must resuscitate economic prospects for the displaced persons. The economic infrastructure must be rebuilt and job opportunities must be provided to the affected people upon their return.

Generally, the economic opportunities provided in that region are male dominated, where the female population constitutes a significant portion of the overall population, hence, an inclusive economic policy approach, less gender specific orientation, be devised. Moreover, support programs must also be started to help the needy people in order to support them integrating back into their societies both socially and economically.

The Compensation program that is already in the offing regarding rehabilitation of the TDPs that includes, infrastructure development and compensation packages, should be implemented in the context of policy decision considering previous implementation gaps and institutional lapses.

With the help of NGOs, civil society and other public donations, government can help and support the families who are willingly going back to their villages, encouraging in the process those who might not wish to return back. The security situation in NWA has gravely affected the local economy so the economy ought to be built from scratches where many families who went back are facing difficulties and requiring adequate support from the govt., with initiatives such as micro-financing and provision of interest free loans by the govt. and provide the relevant institutional infrastructure in-terms of skill development in industries such handicraft products, in order to jump start the local economy.


Heads of local NGOs are said to have reported with frustration and anxiety that TDPs do not want construction of permanent schools and other amenities. Their comfort level is compromised and are only concerned to return to their businesses, homes and fields, any action to ensure their survival must be escorted with lucid indicators that the administration is dedicated to reconstruct a local economy. With no noteworthy improvement and economic ventures, conflict hit areas could likely evolve into one more division of an undocumented war-economy, counting warlords activities, arms production and smuggling, drugs, kidnapping, human trafficking, and most importantly jihad that mobilizes the markets of FATA and areas of KPK. This scandalous behavior originated in the tribal belt in 2007-2008, as the militants increased military, economic and political control. The existing economic calamity in the conflict

areas, if not sufficiently tackled, will speed up the process. If the people are sent home, but the jihadi economy is still in one piece, any developments and struggles will turn out to be a failure. As a result it will breed more extremism and rampant criminality. They are provided with basic services without any other significant self-sustaining initiatives¹⁵, making the TDPs economically worse off. They should be provided with different economic resources to encourage other businessmen residing in the camp¹⁶. Providing them with such entrepreneurial chances will not only have a positive impact on the TDPs and utilize their energy positively preventing the phenomenon of ‘frustration-aggression’ to an extent but also provide them with significant business acumen to contribute to the revitalization of the economic infrastructure back in NWA. Also, the economic set up of the region has been damaged to almost an irrecoverable extent, hence, the situation merits the protection of natural resources in the region that could be utilized in the revitalization of the local economy. Effectively managed and supervised exploitation of natural resources could support the economic and environmental sustainability of the tribal region, furthering the peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives.

¹⁵ There’s an entire market established by the military in the Bakka Khel TDPs Camp for the Camp residents to continue with their previous economic activities, however, the initiative has not encouraged people to set-up shops due to alleged favoritism and bureaucratic hurdles.

¹⁶ There are a few businessmen residing in the camps who see the ‘market-building’ initiatives in the Camp as a futile exercise.

Figure – 13



Source: (UNEP, 2009)

The government must immediately devise a rebuilding framework together with involvement of local community, country wide businesses and industries, agencies such as Tourism and environmental protection agencies, federal government and international NGOs. A stable economy and protection of natural resources (sustainable environment) is a lifeline and a key factor of revitalizing any region, along-with law enforcement in that region and directing it towards development and progressiveness. A steady economy involving multiple stakeholders, their interest and its pursuance with small, medium and large scale businesses and organization is not only a healthy sign but a symbol of democracy. As interest and benefit of the community at large and the region is pursued and worked upon. Such as creating jobs at multiple levels, private

ownerships, trade etc. Islamabad and the international community must without delay begin preparation of development schemes to follow the military operation, with an extraordinary focus on renovation the once animated tourism, agricultural and horticultural sectors. Significant to the farm revival so that labor can do the work will be providing access to credit and public investment for reconstructing infrastructure – from irrigation to farm to market to roads to watershed administration and marketing support.

10.6 SOCIO-CULTURAL NEEDS

The internally displaced persons from a certain region and community must be accommodated in one area in order to give them a chance to uphold their cultural values and norms and cultural connections and bonds. Also, in order to successfully mobilize the community to assist and support the temporary displaced persons, it is essential to understand the cultural values and tradition of TDPs in order to enhance the understanding of the social demographics in the internally displaced persons cultural context. Also, promotion of cultural and sports activities in collaboration with the local media, the govt. should provide the vulnerable population especially the children. Different sports facilities can be a source of healthy entertainment. Providing such sources of entertainment will enable them to enjoy life and try to minimize their memories of the hardships they faced. This can also act as coping mechanism in psychological terms and could lead to a boost in economic activities in the area.

10.7 BASIC SERVICE PROVISION

Provision of basic services and service delivery mechanisms of the state institutions, in general, is a significant measure in assessing the quality of the relief/humanitarian activities. The TDPs, in the evacuation process, were, initially, subject to an extensive process of registration, which was executed successfully, however, remote locations of registration points made accessibility an issue. The first priority of registration must be to help and assist the internally displaced people and cater their needs and requirements, which should not solely focus on men, but household headed by female should also be incorporated in the process and their needs and voices must also be heard. The government must ensure that all the displaced people have their computerized National Identity Card so that they could freely exercise their basic human rights. Displaced persons who do not have their Identity Card must not be denied from registration but the state

agencies must provide services at the registration points or camp area, where people could apply for their computerized identity cards. Complaints procedure and grievances registration system must be accessible to the displaced persons and they should have an easy access to officials who are taking care of their needs and complaints.

Services such as provision of basic housing and shelter, adequate water & sanitation facilities, especially, washrooms for females is an issue that needs due consideration of Camp administration. The female interviewed, as mentioned earlier, that their males do not allow them to use washrooms that are located at a distance from the camps due to cultural sensitivities, hence, they created temporary arrangements for themselves inside the camps, which in turn create a hygiene issue that could easily result in lethal epidemics.

Regarding education within the Camp, there must be a systematic evaluation of the syllabus incorporating values such as law-abiding citizenship, moral and ethical values, contextual interpretation of the Holy Qu'ran, respect for state law and humanity, in order to inculcate a sense of tolerance and persuasion in terms of overcoming the extremist tendencies in the next generation. The children and youth, who make a significant portion of the entire population in the TDPs, can be persuasively educated to stop them from adopting or being attracted towards militancy given the adequate institutional framework in NWA upon their return.

10.8 PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT AND CARE

People who are made to leave their native areas and are displaced often go through severe mental conditions, hence, it is recommended to take good care with equal consideration given to their psychological needs. State agencies must provide psychological help to the affected people especially at the time of displacement as well as after when they return to their native areas so that the people could integrate into a post-conflict society and lead normal lives in order to rebuild what they lost due to the conflict. Specific assistance must be given to the mental needs of women and children. However, career and psychological counseling is proposed in the policy framework keeping in view the prevalent extremist ideologies that the youth of NWA are significantly prone towards.

Moreover, there is a vital need to build psycho-social support services for militancy-affected areas and for joint organizing to put together such services into all TDPs crisis-dealing programs.

This was the consensus emerged at a seminar on psychosocial interventions and disaster response. A study undertaken by Rozan in March 2011, titled 'Improving Psychosocial Support Services for Disaster-affected Communities in Pakistan: A Needs Analysis and Review in KP and FATA (Imran, 2011), highlighted existing psycho-social concerns of men, women, youth and children including pressure, apprehension, sorrow, need for solitude, irritation due to sluggish speed of rehabilitation, insecurity about the future and how these factors impact the ability of communities to rebuild their lives in the post-conflict NWA. The study exposed that not only are psycho-social schemes inadequate in number, many are vertical projects dealing with mental health needs or are social community actions that do not sufficiently meet the community's psychological requirements. It emphasizes that this task has to be incorporated and involvement has to take in hand both dynamics. Given that lots of populace affected by the IDP crisis does not essentially require focused psychiatric or psychological services, mental health-focused models must also enlarge their work to take in some social and development activities either by structuring the ability and capacity of one's own staff (NGO) or by working together with different NGOs who provide social hold up (Tribune, 2011). Additionally key recommendations are the requirement for developing and empowering based projects with communities at large on gender and rights, the requirement to address issues of gender based violence, bring in work with boys and men as part of psychosocial interference as well as constructing staff capacities in psychosocial issues and programming etc. The idea of psychosocial hold up is as varied and broad as the communities in which it is functionalized. Partnership between diverse organizations with different levels of knowledge – such as psychological support, social support, community development, gender and human rights – accessibility and understanding are key to efficiently meet the psychosocial requirements of a militancy affected community. The NGOs and governments have to make efforts together to build up strategies to understand, manage and access finances for psychosocial hold up. Needless to say that most of TDPs suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychological disorders, which is a serious problem for the government that needs attention because such people are vulnerable to different negative externalities as the losses of the TDPs so far are significant and they have nothing more to lose. Therefore proper psychological sessions should be conducted for these people especially young blood and women. If this is not done then we

will have a handicap generation which will have its own impacts. So psychological assistance is very important to build confidence and hope in these depressed people.

10.9 WOMEN EMPOWERMENT AND SPECIAL GENDER RELATED SERVICES

The representation of women in the social-cultural institutions such as Jirga, be included in the policy and decision making framework in order to ensure more effective dispensation of justice in women related issues decided by the Jirga. There exists a tradition of asking the elderly women of the tribe in issues related to the feminine gender, however, inclusive approach requires to be adopted in-terms of including other age groups and economic classes as well. Also, further comprehension and much needed legal framework is required be devised pertaining to women empowerment and decision making in the Jirga.

Also, the role of internally displaced women must integrated into the decision making process and access to security and safety must be ensured. Their specific needs and risks on account of gender must be met and assistance gaps evaluated and addressed. Satisfactory measures to facilitate female-headed families in particular, should be taken. There must be providence of an enabling environment in camps to allow women to speak up for their protection and assistance concerns. There is an urgent need incorporate principles of gender equality in humanitarian action in Pakistan.

Women are an important part in this entire scenario. There should be special education and health opportunities for the women and awareness should be created in them regarding different household issues and how they can support and keep their families together. They can be even given entrepreneurial and vocational training such as handicrafts manufacturing. Basically these women should be empowered as they can support and play a big part in bringing the change.

Moreover, the safety of displaced children must be the ensured, especially to those children who are separated from their families during the relocation. State agencies must provide education to the children upon their return and ensure the displaced children are protected from any kind of sexual abuse and trafficking.

11 CONCLUSION

Zarb-e-Azb operation has displaced around more than 300,000 families from their homes. Camps are plagued with ineffective government service delivery, poor sanitation and health facilities, lack of educational opportunities for the youth, absence of economic opportunities, poor security and protection systems etc. These problems, when combined together, contribute in inculcating the feelings of relative deprivation. When TDPs compare themselves with the rest of the citizens, they feel that they are being oppressed by the unfair policies of the government. Government agencies are marked with lack of coordination, acute funds, absence of institutional capacity, no clear goals and duplication of roles. Such government agencies have failed to provide the basic necessities to TDPs, making them vulnerable to increased frustration. If not catered properly, this frustration might take the shape of violent and aggressive activities. This questions the purpose of military operation i.e. curbing terrorism. There is a need to find out the answers to certain questions. On what parameters does the army rate an operation as successful or unsuccessful? Massive killings of terrorists by the army is enough to explain the success story of an operation? The efforts must be concentrated towards the effective rehabilitation of TDPs because they can become a potential threat to the country in the future in response to the inequality, inequity and discrepancies in delivery of services. The success of an operation is attached to the effective resettlement of the TDPs. Killing potential terrorists alone is not enough, efforts must be couple with the developmental projects, effective service delivery mechanisms, provision of justice, rule of law, freedom of expression and right to a better living.

12 APPENDIX

12.1 HAPPINESS AND ITS DETERMINANTS SURVEY

Disclaimer: This survey is a project of School of Social Sciences & Humanities (S3H), National University of Science and Technology (NUST) Islamabad, Pakistan.

The purpose of the survey is to study how happiness and well-being are influenced by the conditions of our lives and communities. Your data will not be used for research purposes if you are under the age of 19.

THIS SURVEY WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL AND ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THE RESPONDENT WILL BE KEPT SAFE.

For further information you can contact any of the researchers as follows: Syed Abdullah (bp10syedabdullah@nbs.edu.pk) , Asad Ali (saas_akhss@yahoo.com) , Bilal Hassan (bilalhasaan91@hotmail.com) , Dawood Inam (dawoodinam@gmail.com) , Ammad Zaheer (ammad.zaheer140@gmail.com) , Nihaal Raza (nihaalraza@yahoo.com) and supervisor Dr. Riffat Hussain at: Tel (direct): +92 51 9085 3651 | email: dr.riffat@s3h.nust.edu.pk

Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS)

For each of the following statements and/or questions, please circle the point on the scale that you feel is most appropriate in describing you*.

In general i consider myself:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not a happy person very happy person

Compared to most of my peers, I consider myself:*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
less happy more happy

Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the most out of everything.*_To what extent does this characterization describe you?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all to a great extent

Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not depressed, they never seem as happy as they might be.*_To what extent does this characterization describe you?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all to a great deal

PRIMARY QUESTIONNAIRE

NUST SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES & HUMANITIES



Disclaimer: This questionnaire is used for the purpose of final year project of School of Social Sciences & Humanities (S3H), National University of Science and Technology (NUST) Islamabad, Pakistan. The purpose of this research is to study the security implication of the IDPs crisis on peace and stability of Pakistan. Your data will not be used for research purposes if you are under the age of 19. THIS SURVEY WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL AND ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THE RESPONDENT WILL BE KEPT SAFE.

For further information you can contact any of the researchers as follows: Syed Abdullah (bp10syedabdullah@nbs.edu.pk), Asad Ali (saas_akhss@yahoo.com), Bilal Hassan (bilalhasaan91@hotmail.com), Dawood Inam (dawoodinam@gmail.com), Ammad Zaheer (ammad.zaheer140@gmail.com), Nihaal Raza (nihaalraza@yahoo.com)
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انتباہ: سوال نامہ ہذا نیشنل یونیورسٹی آف سائنس اینڈ ٹیکنالوجی اسلام آباد کے منصوبہ سماجی علوم اور ہیومنٹیری کے آخری سال کے لیے تیار کیا گیا ہے۔ اس تحقیق کا مقصد آئی۔ ڈی۔ پیٹر (نقل مکان کرنے والے افراد) کے بحران اور ان کو لاحق سیکورٹی معمولات کے امن و استحکام کے بارے میں ہے۔ اگر آپ کی عمر اٹھارہ سال سے کم ہے تو آپ کا ڈیٹا تحقیقی مقاصد کے لیے استعمال نہیں کیا جائے گا۔ سروے کی معلومات کو خفیہ اور محفوظ رکھا جائے گا۔ مزید معلومات کے لیے مندرجہ ذیل محققین میں سے کسی سے بھی رابطہ کر سکتے ہیں۔

NAME (OPTIONAL)

Agency:

Age:

Gender:

Male/ Female

Educational

Qualification:

Occupation:

No. of economically dependent family members:

Number of financially dependent members having an age of:
children 10:

Male above 55:

Female above 50:

Age: (a) 18-25 (c) 25-35 (d) 35-45 (e) 45+

Income Category: Before Displacement : (a) Less than 10k (b) 10k-20k
(c) 20k-40k (d) 40k-80k (e) 80k-100k
(f) 100k+

After Displacement : (a) Less than 10k (b) 10k-20k
(c) 20k-40k (d) 40k-80k (e) 80k-100k
(f) 100k+

No. of economically dependent family members: (a) 1-3 (b) 3-6 (c) 6-9 (d) 9+

No. of financially dependent members having an age of: (a) 1-5 (b) 5+
(a) 1-5 (b) 5+
(a) 1-5 (b) 5+

POLITICAL/ SECURITY		سیاسی / سیکورٹی ادارے
<p>*Who can bring peace in your area:</p> <p>a) Military</p> <p>b) Local Jirga</p> <p>c) Political parties</p> <p>d) Government</p>		<p>کون ہے جو آپ کے علاقہ میں امن لاسکتا ہے؟</p> <p>(ا) فوج</p> <p>(ب) مقامی جرگہ</p> <p>(ج) سیاسی جماعتیں</p> <p>(د) حکومت</p>
<p>Army has succeeded in normalizing the security situation in your area.</p>	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	<p>فوج آپ کے علاقہ میں سیکورٹی کی صورتحال کو معمول پر لانے میں کامیاب ہوئی ہے۔</p>
<p>You are ready to go back to your areas at this point in time.</p>	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	<p>آپ اس وقت اپنے علاقوں میں واپس جانے کے لیے تیار ہیں۔</p>
<p>You think your life after operation Zarb-e-Azb will be peaceful and safe.</p>	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	<p>آپ کو لگتا ہے کہ آپ کی زندگی ضرب عضب آپریشن کے بعد آجکی زندگی محفوظ اور پر امن ہوگی۔</p>
<p>Government's response to cater to your economic needs is ineffective.</p>	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	<p>حکومتی اقدام آجکی اقتصادی ضروریات کو پورا کرنے کے لیے غیر موثر ہے کیا۔</p>
<p>The registration process is effective and efficient</p>	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	<p>رجسٹریشن کا عمل موثر اور فائدہ مند ہے۔</p>
<p>You are satisfied with the rehabilitation programs of the:</p> <p>a) Government</p> <p>b) NGOs</p>	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	<p>آپ ----- کی بحالی اقدامات سے مطمئن ہیں:</p> <p>(ا) حکومت</p> <p>(ب) NGOs</p>
<p>*People are safe in:</p> <p>a) Camps</p> <p>b) Host families</p> <p>c) Tenants</p>		<p>لوگ محفوظ ہیں:</p> <p>(ا) کیمپس</p> <p>(ب) میزبان خاندانوں کیساتھ</p> <p>(ج) کرایہ کے گھروں میں</p>

You think people will be able to live a normal and healthy life again after they return.	۱- ہاں Agree ۲- نہیں Disagree ۳- کوئی جواب نہیں No Response	آپ کو لگتا ہے کہ لوگ دوبارہ واپسی کے بعد معمول کی اور صحت مندانہ زندگی گزار سکیں گے۔
Union is effective in voicing your concerns.	۱- ہاں Agree ۲- نہیں Disagree ۳- کوئی جواب نہیں No Response	آپ کے خدشات کے اظہار کے لیے یونین مؤثر ثابت ہوئی ہے
SERVICE DELIVERY		خدمات کی فراہمی
Government's cash and food transfer system is efficient and effective.	۱- ہاں Agree ۲- نہیں Disagree ۳- کوئی جواب نہیں No Response	گورنمنٹ کی طرف سے رقم اور کھانے کی فراہمی کا نظام مؤثر اور فائدہ مند ہے۔
Health facilities available at your home town were adequate prior to displacement and operation.	۱- ہاں Agree ۲- نہیں Disagree ۳- کوئی جواب نہیں No Response	نقل مکان اور آپریشن سے پہلے دستیاب طبی سہولیات بہتر تھیں۔
*Educational facilities post displacement are better for a) Men only b) Women only c) Both		نقل مکانی کرنے والوں کے لیے تعلیمی سہولیات بہتر ہیں: ۱) صرف مردوں کیلئے ب) صرف خواتین کیلئے ج) دونوں کیلئے
*Educational facilities were better pre-displacement for a) Men b) Women c) Both		نقل مکانی سے قبل تعلیمی سہولیات بہتر تھیں: ۱) صرف مردوں کیلئے ب) صرف خواتین کیلئے ج) دونوں کیلئے
The children and maternal health care facilities are adequate in the camps.	۱- ہاں Agree ۲- نہیں Disagree ۳- کوئی جواب نہیں No Response	بچوں اور ماؤں کے بچپوں میں دی گئی طبی سہولیات کافی ہیں۔

There is a proper sanitation system and sewage treatment near camps.	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	ٹکاسن آب کا نظام کیچوں کے نزدیک مناسب ہے۔
You are more vulnerable to serious diseases in the camp.	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	کیچوں میں خطرناک بیماریوں کا خطرہ لاحق رہتا ہے۔
LAW AND ORDER		اسن وامان
Camps are vulnerable to increasing crimes like robbery, rapes etc.	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	کیچوں میں چوری، عصمت دری جیسے جرائم کا خطرہ لاحق رہتا ہے۔
Local jirga is effective in dispensing justice and resolving conflicts.	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	مقامی جرگہ مقامی تنازعات کے حل اور انصاف کے لیے مؤثر ہے۔
ECONOMIC		معاشی صورت حال
You feel that you have become poorer than before.	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	آپ کو لگتا ہے کہ معاشی حالات پہلے سے زیادہ خراب ہیں۔
PSYCHOLOGICAL		ذہنی طور پر
You feel frustrated, mentally and psychologically disturbed post displacement.	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	آپ نقل۔کافی کے بعد ذہنی طور پر زیادہ پریشان اور مایوس ہیں۔
You felt frustrated, mentally and psychologically disturbed prior to displacement.	<p>۱۔ ہاں Agree</p> <p>۲۔ نہیں Disagree</p> <p>۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں</p> <p>No Response</p>	آپ نقل۔کافی سے پہلے زیادہ ذہنی طور پر پریشان اور مایوس ہیں۔

SOCIAL		سماجی
Your social life and gatherings such as marriage ceremonies, Eid festivals, funerals etc. are affected.	۱۔ ہاں Agree ۲۔ نہیں Disagree ۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں No Response	آپ کی سماجی زندگی جیسے کہ شادی کی تقریبات، عید کے تہواروں اور تہفین جیسے عوامل سے متاثر ہیں۔
You feel alienated and helpless.	۱۔ ہاں Agree ۲۔ نہیں Disagree ۳۔ کوئی جواب نہیں No Response	میں اپنے آپ کو اکیلا اور بے یار و مددگار محسوس کرتا ہوں۔
GENERAL		جنرل
*How do you think you are most affected by the operation a) Psychologically b) Physically c) Socially d) Economically		آپ کیا سوچتے ہیں آپ بہت زیادہ آپریشن سے متاثر ہوئے ہیں: (ا) نفسیاتی طور پر (ب) جسمانی طور پر (ج) سماجی طور پر (د) معاشی طور پر
*priority questions		*اہم سوالات

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