

**Uses and Abuses of Emotions: Role of Emotions in
Provoking War on Terror**



By :

Sidra

Shabbir

(Registration No: 00000320871)

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies

Centre for International Peace and Stability

National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST)

Islamabad, Pakistan

(2023)

**Uses and Abuses of Emotions: Role of Emotions in
Provoking War on Terror**



By

Sidra Shabbir

(Registration No: 00000320871)

A thesis submitted to the National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad,

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Science in

Peace and Conflict

Studies

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Bakare Najimdeen Ayoola

.

Centre for International Peace and Stability

National University of Sciences & Technology (NUST)

Islamabad, Pakistan

THESIS ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE

Certified that final copy of MS Thesis written by Ms. Sidra Shabbir (Registration No. 00000320871), of Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) has been vetted by undersigned, found complete in all respects as per NUST Statutes/ Regulations/MS Policy, is free of plagiarism, errors, and mistakes and is accepted as partial fulfillment for award of MS degree. It is further certified that necessary amendments as point out by GEC members and foreign/ local evaluators of the scholar have also been incorporated in the said thesis.

Signature: _____

Name of Supervisor: Dr. Bakare Najimdeen Ayoola

Date: 24-08-2023

Signature (HOD): Dr. Imdad Ullah

Date: 24-08-2023

Signature (Dean/ Principal) Dr. Muhammad Makki

Associate Dean
Centre for International Peace and Stability
NUST Institute of Research and Conflict Studies
Islamabad

Date: 24-08-2023

National University of Sciences & Technology

MASTER THESIS WORK

We hereby recommend that the dissertation prepared under our supervision by: (Student Name & Regn No.): Sidra Shabbir Regn No. 00000320871

Titled: Uses and Abuses of Emotions: Role of Emotions in Provoking War or Terror be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of MS PCS degree and awarded grade B+. [Signature] (Initial).

Examination Committee Members

1. Name: Dr Muhammad Makki

Signature: [Signature]

2. Name: Dr Imdad Ullah

Signature: [Signature]

Supervisor's name: Dr Bakare Najimdeen

Signature: [Signature]

Date: 21-8-2023

Ayoola

[Signature]
Head of Department

21-8-2023
Date

COUNTERSIGNED

Date: 21-8-2023

[Signature]
Associate Dean
Center for International Peace and Stability
NUST Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
Islamabad
Dean/Principal


Plagiarism Undertaking

I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled "Uses and Abuses of Emotions: Role of Emotions in Provoking War on Terror" is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/ help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.

I understand the zero-tolerance policy of the HEC and University National University of Sciences and Technology towards plagiarism. Therefore, I as an author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited.

I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after award of MS degree, the University reserves the rights to withdraw/revoke my MS degree and that HEC and the University has the right to publish my name on the HEC/University website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.

Student/Author Signature: _____



Name: Sidra Shabbir

Author's Declaration

I Sidra Shabbir hereby state that my MS thesis titled Uses and Abuses of Emotions: Role of Emotions in Provoking War on Terror is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from this university National University of Sciences and Technology or anywhere else in the country/ world.

At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after I graduate, the university has the right to withdraw my MS degree.

Name of Student: Sidra Shabbir

Date: 24-08-2023

DEDICATION

To my mother, husband and daughter. With their support, prayers and love I have been able to
come this far

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I am immensely grateful to ALLAH ALMIGHTY on the completion of this thesis. This wouldn't have been possible without the guidance and support of my supervisor Dr. Bakare Najimdeen Ayoola. I consider myself blessed to learn and conduct research under his mentorship. His ability to communicate with prompt responses, and timely feedback made the process both enriching and uplifting. I would also like to thank my GEC members for their detailed and constructive feedback on the research, which made the process a huge learning experience.

Abstract

This study aims to problematize the assumptions of post-positivist and post-structuralist theories regarding the productive power of language. It seeks to address certain critical deficiencies in the conceptualization of power within these theoretical paradigms. The existing models of productive power do not account for how some discourses become efficacious while other do not as well as these theories are unable to recognize the intimate interplay of emotions and language in terrorism discourse. This research aims at unfolding how emotions are infused with language to construe the events in specific manner and then contribute to shape emotional responses to the events. This study also endeavors to demonstrate how emotions generated by United States' officials, leaders and policy makers provoked and contributed to war on terror. This by extension explicate the role of emotions in international relations and peace and conflict studies. The discourse-emotion nexus is unfolded with the help of the strategy "interpreting emotions" which extracts emotion terms from the discourse for thematic analysis. The speeches, interviews, statements, remarks and official documents of US leaders, policy makers and officials from September 2001 to December 2004 were selected and date was divided into five main themes such as fear, anger, hate, grief and hostility for an exhaustive investigation. The findings of the study indicate that in the context of war on terror emotions were interpreted in a particular way through discourse to galvanize certain actions. The emotional campaign was orchestrated to validate and promote a range of both international and domestic political initiatives. These include actions such as altering regimes in nations like Iraq, extending military presence to new areas like Afghanistan, bolstering military power and influence, establishing domestic and global surveillance systems, exerting influence over international institutions, and more broadly, upholding and expanding a Western-centric liberal global order.

Keywords: Emotions, Discourse-Emotion Nexus, War on Terror, Fear, Anger, Grief, Hostility, Hate.

Contents

1. Introduction	1
1.1 Statement of Problem	2
1.2 Research Questions	4
1.3 Research Objectives	5
1.4 Research Significance	5
1.5 Overview of Methodology	6
1.6 Overview of Chapters	8
2. From “Emotions Matter” to Emotions in “Constructivist Approaches”	9
2.1 Emotions Matter: First Wave of Emotions Scholarship in IR	10
2.2 Emotions in Constructivist Approaches: Second Wave of Emotion Scholarship in IR	15
2.3 Emotions and Terrorism Research:	19
3. Role of Emotions in Provoking War on Terror	21
3.1 Unfolding Discourse-Emotion Nexus	22
3.2 Analysis of Discourse-Emotion Nexus in the aftermath of 9/11	23
3.2.1 Fear	25
3.2.2 Hate	32
3.2.3 Grief	35
3.2.4 Anger	40
3.2.5 Hostility	44
3.3 Conclusion	48
4. A Reflection on Conclusions	50
4.1 Future Research	53
4.2 Limitations	53
5. Bibliography	54

1. Introduction

The withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan stands as a transformative juncture in contemporary world politics symbolic of the culmination of an intervention that reverberated far beyond its primary objective. The intervention of Afghanistan, marked as cornerstone of the US lead war on terror. initially launched in the aftermath of terrorist attacks of 9/11 in October, 2001 to dismantle the Al-Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the attacks, to dispose Taliban regime that is providing safe heavens to these terrorist groups and to prevent future terrorist attacks. However, the mission's evolution over time and its subsequent entanglements demonstrated the complexities of achieving these ambitions. Importantly, the Afghanistan invasion cast a long shadow, setting a precedent for future interventions, notably the Iraq War, both of which underscored the interconnectedness of global conflicts and the intricacies of addressing asymmetric threats. Mainstream theoretical paradigms have interpreted these incidents including the invasions within diverse theoretical frameworks of international relations. However, role of emotions has always been sidelined while evaluating significant global events like those surround the War on Terror, with dominant approaches focus primarily on power dynamics, neglecting the intricate role of emotions. For instance, realist scholars, such as Mearsheimer, have analyzed these interventions through the lens of power politics, emphasizing the self-interest and strategic calculations of states in an anarchic global system.¹ Liberal perspectives, as discussed by Doyle, have focused on the implications of intervention for the promotion of democracy and human rights, examining the challenges of post-conflict governance and international institution-building.² Constructivist scholars, including Risse, have highlighted how the narrative of the war on terror has influenced collective identities, norms and discourses, state behavior and international cooperation.³ Critical theorists, exemplified by Chomsky, have criticized the ideological

¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 46.

² Michael W. Doyle, "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (2005): 463-466.

³ Thomas Risse, "Narratives and the Making of a European Identity," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 3 (2002): 387.

underpinnings of these actions, uncovering the underlying motivations and political agendas of imperialism to explain it.⁴ However, an emerging body of scholarship demonstrates that emotions are more than peripheral factors. They play a crucial role in shaping perceptions, decisions and actions. Emotions provide a powerful lens for understanding the motivations and consequences of these events.

1.1 Statement of Problem

The discipline of international relations has long been overwhelmed by the mainstream approaches and positivist methodologies. However, new developments in the discipline have posed certain challenges on the widely held beliefs as they have taken into consideration certain phenomena which were overlooked by dominant theories of international relations. One of such prodigies is mentioned by Bleiker and Hutchison a decade ago that it is “surprising” to observe that there is hardly any substantial literature found regarding any approach to analyze the role of emotions in International Relations.⁵ Until late 1990s, the role of emotions in the discipline was like a “strange uncle”, who was invited to all reunions of family but was isolated at the coffee table.⁶ Realism, is considered as the most dominant theoretical paradigm in International Relations and is largely based on human response to “Fear” and “Threat” nonetheless the role of emotions is under-theorized.⁷ On the other hand, role of “Empathy” is sidelined by Neo-liberalism although the whole theory is based on this emotion.⁸ In the same way, constructivists consider “Pride” as a defining factor in international relations but they are unable to theorize it explicitly.⁹ Crawford rightly points

⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003),14.

⁵ Ronald Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, "Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics," *Review of International Studies* 34,no. 1(2008): 115.

⁶ Maeva Clement and Eric Sangar, *Researching Emotions in International Relations* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018),40.

⁷ Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Proposition on Emotions and Emotional Relationship," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (2000): 120.

⁸ Anne-Marie D'Aoust, "Ties that Bind? Engaging Emotions, Governmentality and Neoliberalism: Introduction to the Special Issue," *Global Security* 28, no. 3 (2014): 270.

⁹ Tomas Lindemann, "Interest, Passion, (Non)recognition, and Wars: A Conceptual Essay," *Global Discourse* 4, no.4, (2014) : 485.

out that role of emotions have been subject to denial instead of indifference in international relations. She further argues that instead of under theorizing, each paradigm has over rationalized the role of selected number of emotions while ignoring other altogether. In short, all of the dominant international relations theory comprises some sort of rationalized emotions.¹⁰

Hence, there was a need to build a thorough appraisal regarding limitations of mainstream international relations' scholarship by recognizing the role of emotions as a defining element of these theories. In this regard a number of scholars have instigated research in analyzing role of emotions in the discipline of international relations in their own right.¹¹ These scholars have proved that taking emotions in international relations is worth it because this approach is more responsive to real world problems and fill in the gaps left by dominant IR theories. Many scholars have adopted an interdisciplinary approach to theorize emotions in world politics. For instance, Sasley has picked *intergroup emotion theory* from social psychology¹² and Jeffery has adopted *neuroscientific approach* to study political emotions.¹³ While others emphasized on some specific emotions and their impacts on global politics for example resentment, hate, fear, empathy and pity.¹⁴ However, this scholarship had done little to provide epistemological and methodological clarity to the role of emotions in the discipline of international relations.

We can see the whole discipline of politics and international relations through the prism of power. That is fundamental conceptual anchor and all the debate of the discipline revolves around the very notion. For instance, material power in the realist discussion, institutional power in liberalism, normative power in constructivist terms and linguistic power in post-modernism.¹⁵ However,

¹⁰Yohan Ariffin, "How Emotions Can Explain Outcomes in International Relations," in *Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, ed. Yohan Ariffin, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press , 2016), 15.

¹¹ Ronald Bleiker, "The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory," *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 3 (2001): 523.

¹² Brent E. Sasley, "Theorizing State's Emotions," *International Studies Review* 13, no.3 (2011): 458.

¹³ Renee Jeffery, "The Promise and Problems of the neuroscientific Approach to Emotions," *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 585, doi: 10.1017/S1752971914000311.

¹⁴ J.M. Barbalet, "Social Emotions: Confidence, Trust and Loyalty," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 16, no. 9/10 (1996): 76.

¹⁵ Simon Koschut, "Rethinking productive power through emotions," *International Studies Review* 19, no. 3 (2017): 481.

“post-post-positivists viewed power not in classical terms of brute force but rather as productive of social relations. This productive power concerns discourses, the social processes and systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced and transformed.”¹⁶ Here discourse not only describe pre-existing relations but actively constitute those relations. But this productive power is not merely attributed to language but rather it is infused with other elements and is replicated in domestic as well as foreign policy.

1.2 Research Questions

Stemming from theoretical underpinnings of post-positivist and post-structuralist paradigms this research delves into an exploration of the intricate relationship between emotions and language within the context of the War on Terror. This inquiry begins by examining how emotions are interwoven with language to construct specific narratives of surrounding events, which in turn shape how these events are understood and subsequently emotional responses to them. Furthermore, the investigation seeks to answer how emotions emanating from the discourse produced by United States officials, leaders, and policy makers played a pivotal role in contributing to the trajectory of the War on Terror. A central focus of the study is the examination of the divergent efficacy of discourses in this context, shedding light on why certain instances of discourse hold the power to resonate and influence outcomes, while others remain relatively inert. Ultimately, this research aims to unravel the underlying mechanisms of productive power in the context of the War on Terror, uncovering the ways in which this power manifests, operates, and shapes the discourse and dynamics of this critical geopolitical landscape. Through these explorations, the study seeks to offer a comprehensive understanding of the intricate interplay between emotions, language, power, and the unfolding events within the realm of the War on Terror.

¹⁶ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval, “Power in International Politics,” *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (2005): 55.

1.3 Research Objectives

The primary aim of this research is to delve into the intricate dimensions of productive power within the context of the War on Terror, aiming to unveil the often-concealed mechanisms through which this form of power operates and exerts influence across the intricate landscape of global politics. In tandem, the study endeavors to decipher the factors that determine the efficacy of specific discourses within the War on Terror, shedding light on why certain narratives garner prominence while others remain marginalized. Furthermore, an essential focus of this research is to unravel the intricate interplay between emotions and language, particularly how emotions are interwoven with linguistic constructs to shape the interpretation of significant events within the War on Terror. This exploration extends to understanding the broader impact of such emotionally infused narratives on public reactions and perceptions. Additionally, the study seeks to scrutinize the impact of specific emotions—such as fear, anger, grief, hate, and hostility—propagated by key figures like United States officials, leaders, and policy makers, on the trajectory and evolution of the War on Terror. By pursuing these research objectives, this study aspires to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of productive power, discourse dynamics, emotional constructs, and their interconnected implications within the complex realm of the War on Terror.

1.4 Research Significance

Post-positivist theories serve as a lens through which the intricate interplay between knowledge and power is scrutinized. These theories assert that productive power serves as a catalyst for the creation of meanings, knowledge, and identities, ultimately influencing the actions undertaken by states. However, it becomes evident that this productive power encounters certain limitations, particularly concerning its reliance on language as the primary tool for generating meanings. Addressing this theoretical gap, the present research offers a paradigm shift by proposing an alternative conduit for productive power: emotions. By incorporating emotions as a medium of analysis, the research aims to enhance the comprehensiveness of inquiries into a myriad of complex issues. This innovative approach not only broadens the scope of productive power but also holds the potential to yield novel insights into the dynamics of global politics.

The introduction of emotions as a facet of productive power paves the way for a nuanced exploration of their role in shaping discourse and influencing decision-making processes. More specifically, the study delves into how certain dominant emotional discourses came to play a pivotal role in driving U.S. intervention in Afghanistan following the cataclysmic events of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. By dissecting the intricate links between emotions, language, and productive power, the research seeks to uncover how emotional constructs can serve as a potent force in motivating state actions. This exploration goes beyond conventional analyses by delving into the often-unexamined realm of emotional undercurrents that can steer the trajectory of international relations.

The significance of this research lies not only in its innovative theoretical framework but also in its potential to shed light on the multifaceted underpinnings of global events. By probing the connection between emotions and productive power, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that drive state behavior. Furthermore, the examination of emotional discourses within the context of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan elucidates the complex web of influences that shape foreign policy decisions. Ultimately, this research holds promise for enriching the discourse surrounding productive power, emotions, and their intersection in the realm of international relations, offering insights that could have far-reaching implications for the study and practice of global politics.

1.5 Overview of Methodology

This thesis employs a **qualitative research design**, which aims to provide an in-depth and comprehensive exploration of the discourse-emotion nexus in the context of the War on Terror. Qualitative methods are particularly well-suited for this study, as they allow for a nuanced examination of emotions within discourses and offer valuable insights into the complexities of this relationship. The research is based on **primary data** that consists of over *100 transcribed interviews, speeches, remarks and statements of United States' leaders and noticeable officials as well as it involves texts of some policy documents in the form of Acts, Congress' resolutions and United Nations resolutions* between the years 2001 to 2003. This primary data provides firsthand insights and perspectives on the role of emotions in shaping discourses and policy decisions during

the War on Terror. The analysis will be assumed as completed or authenticated when adding new texts will generate no new responses beyond those prior developed through the examination of given data.

The selection of data involves **purposeful sampling** as only those documents will be selected that contain statements regarding terrorism, war on terror and following invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The primary emphasis will center on the speeches delivered by President G. W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary Colin L. Powell and some resolutions passed by US Congress and United Nations. The reason behind the focus on the speeches, interviews and statements delivered by these persons is that these are public figures and dominant policy makers. This corpus will then be investigated with the help of a technique known as **discourse analysis** that falls under the broad category of **textual analysis**.

In order to study relationship between emotions and discourse, Koschut has given two strategies as: **Interpreting Emotions and Contextualizing Emotions**. Interpreting emotions is a method that deals with revealing the affective dimension of text within a discourse at micro level whereas contextualizing emotion is a technique that extracts emotions from discourse at macro level across the discourse¹⁷. However, this research is limited to the first method: interpreting emotions. At micro level emotions are transmitted through the language with the help of some **Emotion Terms**. In order to convey emotional meaning a direct reference is established to an emotional feeling. With the help of nouns like love, fear, anger, hate, trust, shame, honor and pride; with the help of verbs like to love, to fear, to hate and to trust; with adverbs for instance horribly, sadly or terribly or adjectives like angry, happy, afraid, hateful, horrified and disgusted. However, it is important to note semantic and lexical variations among different languages as emotions lose their meanings while going through the process of translation from one language to another. The study would consider over 100 texts in any form as mentioned above and would pick emotion terms from that discourse either in the form of nouns, verb, adverb or adjective. The emotions which are going to be analyzed here are: fear, anger, grief, hate and hostility. This approach analyses microstructure

¹⁷Simon Koschut, "Discourse and Emotions in International Relations," *International Studies Review* 19, no. 3 (2017): 482.

of discourse and is concerned with emotionalizing text, words and linguistic utterances. **Thematic analysis** will then be employed to analyze the qualitative data gathered from above sources that means the data will be organized into themes to identify patterns, trends, and emotional responses within the discourses. These themes include fear, anger, hate, grief and hostility. This analytical approach will allow for a deep exploration of emotions diffused through discourses and their implications on public opinion and policy decisions.

1.6 Overview of Chapters

The forthcoming dissertation is structured into four pivotal chapters that collectively contribute to a comprehensive exploration of the role of emotions as agents of influence within the context of war on terror. The initial chapter serves as an introduction, setting the stage for the research endeavor and delineating its objectives. The subsequent chapter encompasses an extensive literature review, delving into the theoretical underpinnings of post-positivist theories, the intricacies of productive power, and the limitations of language as a medium of influence. The third chapter engages in a meticulous analysis, examining how emotions, as an alternative medium of productive power, have contributed to shaping discourses and decisions in the aftermath of significant global events. Finally, the concluding chapter synthesizes the findings, reiterates the research's significance, and offers insights into the broader implications of understanding emotions within the realm of international relations.

2. From “Emotions Matter” to Emotions in “Constructivist Approaches”

The field of social sciences has seen two main turns; first one is ‘discursive turn’, developed in 1980s, which is related to discourse, meanings and power. The second turn emerged recently and known as ‘affective turn’ which is related to emotions, affect, feeling and their role in shaping our behavior, identity, relationships and global politics.¹⁸ Different fields of study have started incorporating emotions in their analysis for instance, psychology, sociology, geography, anthropology and political sciences etc. For instance, a strand from continental philosophy focuses mainly on affective dimension of human beings can be found in the work of Nietzsche¹⁹ and among post-modern scholars Guattari and Deleuze²⁰ have extended their study in affective dimensions. The works of Plutchik²¹, Ekman²² and Tomkins²³ are considered as the evolution in mainstream psychology as they have facilitated analysis of different types of human feelings as well as classification of emotions as primary or secondary. The recent developments in sociology have facilitated our understanding about emotions and how emotions although being internal and individual have implications in social life.²⁴ Similar trends can be seen in the fields of politics and international relation.

¹⁸ Paul Hoggett and Simon Thompson, "Introduction," in *Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies*, by Paul Hoggett and Simon Thompson (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), 12.

¹⁹ Max Scheler, *On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing*, ed. H. Bershady (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

²⁰ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (London: Athlone Press, 1999).

²¹ Robert Plutchik, *Emotions and Life: Perspectives from Psychology, Biology and Evolution* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2002), 55.

²² Paul Ekman, *The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 23.

²³ Sylvan Tomkins, *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness: The Complete Edition* (New York, NY: Springer, 2008), 38.

²⁴ Arlie Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 17.

There is a growing recognition of emotions in international relations scholarship as they play a central and fundamental role in the dynamics of international politics. They are lying at the core of all political phenomena and have wide range of implication from conflict to emergencies, from isolation to cooperation and from war to peace. Emotions and passions are inherent part of global politics and are omnipresent. Jean- Mark Coicaud argues that international relations scholars will never be able to make their analysis robust, accurate and comprehensive unless their analysis has not considered the role of emotions meticulously.²⁵ Erik Ringmar aptly asserts that nothing would be left in international politics if emotions are taken away because they are ubiquitous in the discipline.²⁶ Hence all the mainstream theories are based on some assumptions that incorporate emotions in one way or the other. The discipline has seen two waves of emotion scholarship; first wave when scholars and writers started scientifically studying role of emotions in the outcomes of global politics and their main target was to make it clear that ‘emotions matter’. In the second wave, emotions were studied and analyzed by constructivist and post-modernist theorists in a more systematic and methodologically clear way.

2.1 Emotions Matter: First Wave of Emotions Scholarship in IR

The international relations theories could not systematically analyze emotions until the beginning of twenty-first century.²⁷ Neta C. Crawford, in her seminal work, *The Passion of World Politics*” argued that “emotion is already part of theories of world politics, although it is usually implicit

²⁵ Jean-Mark Coicaud, "The Question of Emotions and Passion in Mainstream International Relations and Beyond," in *Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, ed. Arrifin Yohan, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 23.

²⁶ Erik Ringmar, "Eugene Gendlin and the Feel of international Politics," in *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on Emotional Turn*, ed. Maeva Clement, et al. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 33.

The similar arguments were posed by Ronald Bleiker, Emma Hutchison and Neta C. Crawford, that would be cited in the later part of this paper.

²⁷ Except the paper "Approaching Emotions in International Relations" which was presented by Jonathan Mercer on 25th April, 1996 during a conference. He argued that emotions are ignored by international relations scholars. Jonathan Mercer and Neta C. Crawford both are considered as pioneer of emotion research in International Relations.

and under-theorized”.²⁸ The role of emotions in the discipline was like a “strange uncle”, who was invited to all reunions of family but was isolated at the coffee table.²⁹ This neglect can be attributed to the underlying assumptions of existing theories that create dichotomy between reason and emotion,³⁰ rationality and irrationality, intentional and unintentional, controlled and uncontrolled, cold and hot,³¹ heart and mind.³² For instance Hobbes has identified and classified emotions as “a motion internal to the body”. In his writings there is a questionable opposition between reason and passion.

According to Ariffin some of the mainstream theories believe that emotions interfere with rationality and indeed are considered *irrational* and not worthy to be studied scientifically³³ despite the fact that these theories are already based on emotions. Mercer on the other hand examines relationship between rationality and emotions and divides literature on emotion into four categories: as a source of irrationality, as epiphenomenal, as a strategy for political actors and as essential to rationality.³⁴ There are a number of scholars who debunk this dichotomy and maintain that emotions must be studied in a manner to avoid the trap of regarding them as a source of irrationality. Kenneth Waltz while unfolding ‘first image’ approach also directly suggested that,

²⁸ Neta C. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000: 119.

²⁹ Eric Sangar and Maéva Clément, "Introduction: Methodological Challenges and Opportunities for the Study of Emotions," in *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, by Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 2.

³⁰ Emma Hutchison and Ronald Bleiker, "Introduction: Emotions and World Politics," *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 490.

³¹ Jonathan Mercer, "Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9 (2006): 289.

³² Yohan Ariffin, "Introduction: How Emotions Can Explain Outcomes in International Relations," in *Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, by Jean-Marc Coicaud, Vesselin Popovski, and Yohan Ariffin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1.; Jon Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

³³ Ariffin, “Introduction,” 10.

³⁴ Mercer, "Human nature and the first image," 290

“Men are led not by the precepts of pure reason but by their passions.”³⁵ Hans Morgenthau remarked that "the possibility of constructing, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics is worth exploring," those who investigate "irrational politics" tend to focus on cognitive biases and bounded rationality. Bleiker and Hutchison claim that rationality involves emotion just like thinking involve feeling”.³⁶ For D’Aoust, “governmentality allows us to examine how emotions and rationality actually intermingle”.³⁷ Some international relations scholars consider emotions deeply internal and personal that they cannot be examined robustly.

The methodological concerns associated to the study of emotions arise because they are ‘too elusive’³⁸ and ‘ephemeral’ in nature.³⁹ For Mercer analyzing emotions is difficult because they are hard to define, measure, operationalize and detach from other factors.⁴⁰ Such definitional challenges have also been pointed out by other scholars for instance, Clement and Sangar maintain that feeling, affect and emotions are extremely ‘contesting’ and sometimes ‘particularly fuzzy’.⁴¹ Similarly for Ringmar these notions are terribly confusing.⁴² Crawford highlights another problem associated with the study of emotion in politics that “it is difficult to differentiate ‘genuine’ emotions from their instrumental display” because they are internal and ephemeral.⁴³ However

³⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 24.; Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003), 116.

³⁶ Bleiker, Emma Hutchison and Roland. "Theorizing emotions in world politics." *International Theory, Vol 6, Issue 3*, 2014: 509.

³⁷ Anne-Marie D’Aoust, "Ties that Bind? Engaging Emotions, Governmentality and Neoliberalism: Introduction to the Special Issue," *Global Security* 28, no. 3 (2014): 269.

³⁸ Bleiker and Hutchison, “Introduction: Emotions and world Politics,” 490.

³⁹ Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics,” 118.

⁴⁰Jonathan Mercer, ‘Approaching Emotion in International Politics’, paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, San Diego, California, April 25, 1996, 1.

⁴¹ Eric Sangar and Maéva Clément, "Introduction: Methodological Challenges and Opportunities for the Study of Emotions," in *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, ed. Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 5.

⁴² Here are some of the scholars who tried to address definitional issues associated with emotions. Erik Ringmar, "Eugene Gendlin and the Feel of International Politics," in *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, ed. Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 34.; Ronald Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, "Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics," in *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on Emotional Turn*, ed. Maeva Clement and Eric Sangar (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 328.

⁴³ Crawford, *The Passion of World Politics*, 118.

there are a number of scholars⁴⁴ who debunk the ideas associated to emotions for instance, Mattern tellingly indicates that “emotions are in fact no more and no less fuzzy than many other well-established and much studied phenomena in international relations, such as interests, identity, ideology or even anarchy”.⁴⁵ Bleiker and Hutchison admit that the research would still be insightful even if an unobservable phenomenon is taken into consideration.⁴⁶ The dominant theories of international relations are based on certain assumptions which are highly biased about emotions hence; there was a need to build a thorough appraisal regarding limitations of mainstream international relations’ scholarship by recognizing the role of emotions as a defining element of these theories.

Although the dominant theories in international relations pivoted around emotions yet they discredited the need to study them thoroughly. While sharing her experience of being convinced about the role of emotions in international relations, Mattern raised two concerns; firstly, she recognizes the role of emotions in shaping world politics as well as our knowledge about that. Secondly, she highlights the need of focusing on affect theoretically. She boldly argues that, “IR rests on an emotional epistemology”.⁴⁷ For instance, realism apparently never theorized emotions

⁴⁴ See for instance, Thien, Deborah. "After or beyond Feeling? A Consideration of Affect and Emotion in Geography ." *Wiley on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers, Vol 37, No. 4, 2005: 450-454*; Bleiker, Ronald, and Emma Hutchison. "Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics." In *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on Emotional Turn*, by Maeva Clement and Eric Sangar, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018,327; Linder, Evelin G. " Emotion and Conflict: Why It Is Important to Understand How Emotions Affect Conflict and How Conflict Affects Emotions." In *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, by Peter Coleman, Morton Deutsch and Eric Marcus, 268-293. San Francisco: jossey-Bass Publishers, 2006;

⁴⁵ Janice Bially Mattern, "On Being Convinced: An Emotional Epistemology of International Relations," *International Theory*, Vol. 6, Issue 3, November 2014: 592.; Ronald Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, "Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics," in *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on Emotional Turn*, by Maeva Clement and Eric Sangar, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 327.

Mattern quotes Stein, why IR scholars wring their hands so over the ‘fuzziness’ of emotion even as we reconcile ourselves to, or even embrace, similar fuzziness on the discipline’s core concepts.”

Janice G. Stein, "Conference on the Practice Turn in International Relations," Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, November 21-22, 2008, 21-22.

⁴⁶ Bleiker and Hutchison, Introduction: Emotions and World Politics, 117.

⁴⁷ Mattern, On being Convinced, 589.

however the whole paradigm is based on the greed, honor and above all fear.⁴⁸ Indeed, fear was the key feature of Thucydides' Peloponnesian war.⁴⁹ Hobbes takes several emotions into account, for instance, grief, envy, contempt, love, honor, desire and compassion. Fear is truly significant for his analysis of politics. The state of nature presented by Hobbes was dominated by fear, a fear of war, this fear brought people from state of nature to social contract: "The Passions that incline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodius living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them".⁵⁰ This social contract brought people from war to peace, from fear to hope, from contempt to honor and from envy to compassion. Hence, from Morgenthau to Waltz and from Thucydides to Hobbes; anger and fear remained key features of political realism.⁵¹ Quincy Wright arguments that mutual fear is a cause of war, and that fear of war prompts citizens to keep even undesirable rulers in power.⁵² Waltz argues that "a self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power."⁵³ Among scholars of world politics, fear has translated into a belief in the fact of insecurity. Harold Lasswell, one of the last international relations theorists to write extensively about emotion and "emotional insecurities," echoes the conventional wisdom that passions are biologically based and uncontrollable, and previews the frustration-aggression hypothesis.⁵⁴ In addition to realism other international relations theories are also dependent on emotions for instance trust forms the basis of whole liberalists' paradigm where they seek cooperation in international order.⁵⁵

⁴⁸ Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics," in *International Security* 24, no. 4 (2000): 126.

⁴⁹ Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984) :290.

⁵⁰ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Penguin, 1986), 118.

⁵¹ Emma Hutchison and Ronald Blieker, "Theorizing Emotions in World Politics," in *International Relations Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 499.

⁵² Quincy Wright, *A Study of War. Second Edition with a Commentary on War since 1942* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press [1942] 1965), 1562, 1222.

⁵³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 118.

⁵⁴ Harold Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 57.

⁵⁵ Hutchison, "Theorizing Emotions," 501.

Scholars have lately turned their attentions towards emotional aspects of liberal theories which were mostly disregarded by mainstream scholarship whether adherent to this paradigm or against it. Cheryl Hall for instance asserts that the liberal phenomenon keeps emotions out of its analysis of international politics which is “neither feasible nor desirable”.⁵⁶ She further argues that regarding political emotions in liberal theories as “opposed to justice and reason” is wrong. For her emotions like love, trust and empathy have contributed to liberation and cooperation but attracted little attention as compared to other emotions like fear and hate that further war and repression.⁵⁷ She brilliantly analyzes the role of *eros* (another word for passion for her) in the work of Plato from Republic to Symposium and Phaedrus. Martha Nussbaum asserts that considering aggressive and fascist societies as emotional is “both dangerous and mistaken” and there is a need to think of emotions like empathy, love, sympathy and compassion in liberal societies which is overlooked by most of the political thinkers.⁵⁸ Some of the contemporary political thinkers for instance, Kingston, Ferry,⁵⁹ Hall and Gray⁶⁰ have started analyzing emotional basis of entire liberal paradigm.⁶¹ With the development of emotion research in international relations, scholars in the field started examining emotions under the post-positivist and constructivist approaches.

2.2 Emotions in Constructivist Approaches: Second Wave of Emotion Scholarship in IR

Different constructivist theories tend to address emotions through slightly different lenses. Social constructivism for instance deals with emotions as “cultural products that owe their purpose and

⁵⁶ Cheryl Hall, *The Trouble with Passion: Political Theory beyond the Reign of Reason* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 3.

⁵⁷ Hall, *The Trouble with Passion*, 28-29.

⁵⁸ Martha C. Nussbaum, *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 2.

⁵⁹ Leonard Ferry and Rebecca Kingston, “Introduction: The Emotions and the History of Political Thought,” in *Bringing the Passions Back In: The Emotions in Political Theory*, ed. Leonard Ferry and Rebecca Kingston (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), 3.

⁶⁰ John Gray, *Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age* (London: Routledge, 1995), 65, 4-5.

⁶¹ Susan James, “The Politics of Emotion: Liberalism and Cognitivism,” in *Political Philosophy*, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 231.

meanings to socially acquired feeling rules”.⁶² Koschut argues that these theories are based on certain common ontological and epistemological assumptions that distinguish them from other emotional theories based on biological and conventional phenomena which focus on “subjective ontology of emotions”. Social constructivists emphasize more on “representative articulation and communication of emotions” than “inner phenomenological expressions of emotions”.⁶³ This does not mean that they deny these inner thoughts and feelings but they talk less about these phenomenological perceptions and underscore the common social pattern inside and outside groups. Instead of dealing with subjectivity of emotions, the constructivist theories are based on an ontology of emotions that is concerned with their *inter-subjectivity*. This social ontology of emotions is followed by a social epistemology of emotions concerned with “shared meaning systems” where discourse, emotions and power relations interplay.⁶⁴ There is reciprocity in the relations between emotions and socially constructed meanings and relations where emotions are product of these socio-cultural meanings and knowledge on one hand and simultaneously producing knowledge, perceptions, beliefs and meanings which shape the world affairs. Psychological constructivism focuses more on biological factors involved in the emergence of emotions.

According to psychological constructivists emotions are caused by ambiguous bodily and external sensations for instance auditory, visual and tactile. They also believe in the role of cultural and social factor in development of emotions⁶⁵ however their focus remains in “primitive

⁶² Simon Koschut, “Communitarian Emotions in International Relations: Constructing Emotional Words,” in *Methodology and Emotion in International Relations: Parsing the Passions*, ed. Eric Van Rythoven and Mira Sucharov (Oxon: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2019) 79. Also see L. Abu-Lughod and C. A. Lutz, *Language and Politics of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); J. R. Arvill, “A Constructivist View of Emotions,” in *Emotion: Theory, Research and Experience Vol 1* eds R. Plutchik and H. Kellerman (New York: Academic Press, 1980); J. Coulter, *The Social Construction of Mind* (London: Macmillan, 1979); A.R. Hochschild, “Emotion Work, Feeling Rules and Social Structure,” *American Journal for Sociology* 85 (3), 553.

⁶³ Koschut, “Communitarian Emotions in IR,” 79.

⁶⁴ Koschut, “Communitarian Emotions in IR,” 78.

⁶⁵ See for instance, M. Boiger and B. Mesquita, “The Construction of Emotion in Interactions, Relationships, and Cultures,” *Emotion Review* 4 (2012): 221.

psychological processes” having biological basis.⁶⁶ They argue that human body causes emotions but they do not ontologically reduce emotions to mere bodily factors.⁶⁷ Psychological constructivists while examining the convoluted relationship between brain (an observer independent category) and mind (an observer-dependent category), offer an anti-reductionist approach to study emotions. Mercer argues that identity, emotions and consciousness are phenomenon which are material and social, mental and biological and signifies emergent characteristics of groups and individuals. For him psychologist, biologists, and international relations scholars can make progress when only they study the interaction and relationship between parts of a system “rather than reducing the whole to its parts.”⁶⁸ In addition to constructivism, post-modern school of thought has also addressed emotions in their own ways.

Post-structuralists criticize the common way of viewing the world that is based on a belief that ‘truth’ is out there and accepts ‘knowledge’ as given. Post-structuralism debunks the idea that there is any objective reality and investigate how certain “beliefs” and “truth” work in order to enhance the power and domination of some segments within the sphere of international relations. This approach questions the likelihood of establishing universal truth and generalized laws on the account of their claim that it is not likely that there exists a world which does not depend our interpretation. Post-structuralism blatantly questions any theory which believes in objective reality because it underscores that knowledge and reality are subjective phenomena which are not discovered but produced. The proponents of this approach argue that “truth” is accepted because certain elements in society i-e elites produce and disseminate it. They do so by manipulating certain discourses. Michael Foucault for instance asserts that, “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements... [and] is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it”.⁶⁹ The discourse reinforce and reiterate the power of this

⁶⁶ W. A. Cunningham, “Introduction to Special Section: Psychological Constructivism,” *Emotion Review* 5, no. 4 (2013): 333.

⁶⁷ Jonathan Mercer, “Psychological Constructivism’: Comment on Iver Neumann’s International Relations as a Social Science”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 2014, Vol. 43(1) 355.

⁶⁸ Mercer, “Psychological constructivism”, 358.

⁶⁹ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, ed. Colin Gordon (Harlow: Longman, 1980), 133.

elite and these discourses have power to shape knowledge, perception, opinions and relations in the world. Post-structuralists believe that language is the source of production and dissemination of these discourses. Constructivist and post-structural approaches in international relations often underscore the significance of discourse and language in the construction of knowledge, identity, reality and power relations. However, these theories mostly neglect the “discursive exercise of power”⁷⁰ which is embedded in collective emotions that supports and reproduces identities and social discourses at global level. The analysis of emotions as an additional category in unfolding inter-subjectivity broadens the scope of constructivist discourse analysis. This emotions-based analysis of discourse theorizes how socially and discursively embedded nature of emotions reinforces certain patterns of political power. Along with different psychological approaches that explore the relationship between emotions and process of decision making, there are social constructivist approaches that contextualize language and emotions in global politics.⁷¹ Ty Solomon’s ground breaking work has taken this analysis to another level by providing a framework to understand the infusion of emotion in language and its impact on the production of knowledge, reality and power relations.⁷² Another research strand has also studied the relationship between power and emotions and their impact on international politics.⁷³ Simon Koschut has divided this

⁷⁰ Simon Koschut, “The power of (emotion) words: on the importance of emotions for social constructivist discourse analysis in IR,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 2017, 1.

⁷¹ See for instance, Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (2000): 115.; Andrew Ross, "Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (2006): 212.; Andrew Ross, *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).; Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, "Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics," *Review of International Studies* 34 (2008): 115.; Khaled Fattah and Karin M. Fierke, "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 1 (2009):73.; Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (New York: Routledge, 2005).; Karin M. Fierke, *Political Self Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).; Todd H. Hall, "Sympathetic States: Explaining the Russian and Chinese Responses to September 11," *Political Science Quarterly* 127, no. 3 (2012): 400.

⁷² Ty Solomon, "The Affective Underpinnings of Soft Power," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2014): 741.

⁷³ For instance, Andrew Linklater, "Process Sociology and International Relations," *Sociological Review* 59, no. 1 (2004): 48; Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).; Reinhard Wolf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition," *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (2011): 105–42.; Mathias

research into two broad strands: one that recognizes the role of emotions in language but does not talk of their impact on power and status. The other strand considers the “emotionality of status” but ignores emotional manifestations in discourse.⁷⁴ Ty Solomon debunks the post-modernist’ claim that language does the work of production and it is the only medium of productive power on two grounds. First, it is clear that language produces meanings and identities but these elements are not a product of merely language but emotions and language are induced with language to do the work of production. Second, “It is not only discourse that does the work of production because if this were the case then every discourse would have been equally powerful and hegemonic but that is not the case some discourses become more efficacious than the other.”⁷⁵ Despite their divergent claims they are broadly on the same platform about relationship between emotion and discourse and their implications on status and power relations.

2.3 Emotions and Terrorism Research:

Since the beginning of twenty-first century the scholars of international relations have been trying to understand the vexing part of emotions being played in international politics. The tendency of conflicts shifted from inter-state to intra-state and dramatic attack on United States’ World Trade Centre and the pentagon commonly known as 9/11 attacks provided the basis of affective turn in terrorism research. Different scholars have given the account of relationship between emotions and terrorism through different perspectives for instance, Fattah and Fierke have provided conceptual framework of betrayal and humiliation and how these emotions paved the way to associate Islam with terrorism on one hand and instigated war on terror on the other.⁷⁶ Loseke on the other hand has examined the emotional codes used by then American President George W.

Albert, Barry Buzan, and Michael Zürn, eds., *Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Thazha V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, *Status in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁷⁴ Koschut, “Power of Emotion Words”, 2.

⁷⁵ Simon Koschut, Todd H. Hall, Reinhard Wolf, Ty Solomon, Emma Hutchison, and Roland Bleiker, "Discourse and Emotions in International Relations," *International Studies Review* 19, no. 3 (2017): 481.

⁷⁶ Khaled Fattah and Karin M. Fierke, "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 1 (2009): 67.

Bush that formulated a story which criminalized certain actors and victimize the others to justify war on terror.⁷⁷ Hutchison and Bleiker have used impact of hatred and fear on war on terror.⁷⁸ Ross has used the term “affective identity” to relate the link between affect and identity and its impact on war on terror.⁷⁹ Hence, different scholars have given their arguments differently but all of them suggested a strong correlation between emotions and war on terror.

⁷⁷ Donileen R. Loseke, “Examining Emotions as Discourse: Emotion Codes and Presidential Speeches Justifying War,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 50 (2009): 497.

⁷⁸ Emma Hutchison and Ronald Bleiker, "Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics," *Review of International Studies* (2008): 115.

⁷⁹ Andrew Ross, "Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions," *European Journal of International Relations* (2006): 210.

3. Role of Emotions in Provoking War on Terror

The incident of September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States has unprecedented significance in the modern world history having far reaching impacts on international politics. The global security landscape had a major shift as US initiated war on terror and invaded Afghanistan to eliminate terrorist networks allegedly responsible for the attacks. However, such interventions rose serious questions against the United States for its legitimacy to take such unilateral actions and challenging the sovereignty of weaker states. These attacks adversely impacted the psychological and emotional states of effected individuals and societies evoking feelings of fear, resentment, anxiety, despair, anger and hatred. Lerner and Sadler claimed that the whole response including initiation and continuation of war on terror has emotional basis.⁸⁰ In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a myriad of emotions was experienced by people. Smith has enlist the statistics of public opinion polls that state, “approximately 65% of Americans expressed feelings of anger, 27% reported experiencing worry, and 22% indicated feelings of shame in the weeks that followed the tragic events”.⁸¹ The legitimacy of war on terror was “constructed” on emotional grounds by US officials and other world leaders by establishing such a narrative that victimized certain group of people and criminalized the other through emotion laden discourse.

The study aims at unfolding how certain discourse, produced especially by the United States, triggered certain emotions which shaped public opinion and garnered support for military intervention and counter terrorism measures. For instance, those attacks fueled strong emotions of fear and sense of insecurity from potential attack that was leveraged to legitimize their military interventions and pre-emptive actions. Furthermore, the narrative of victimhood was made and

⁸⁰ J. S. Lerner, D. A. Small, and G. Lowenstein, "Heart strings and purse strings: Carry-over effects of emotions on economic transactions," *Psychological Science* 15 (2004): 337; M. S. Sadler, M. Lineberger, J. Correll, and B. Park, "Emotions, attributions, and policy endorsements in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 27 (2005): 249

⁸¹ T. W. Smith, K. A. Rasinski, and M. Toce, *America Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks* (Chicago: NORC, 2001).

circulated that the US and its allies are affectees of horrific act of terrorism and deliberate attacking of innocent civilians. This narrative stimulated emotions like sympathy, humility, empathy, anger and resentment which elicited support from officials, policy makers and public as well as international community, emphasizing the moral legitimacy of the military interventions. The study intends to unveil how emotions were the key factor in producing certain discourses and how some political actors capitalized on emotions and justified certain actions. This relationship between emotions, discourse and productive power regarding war on terror is an unexplored terrain in the field of politics and international relations. Although there have been some methodological challenges associated with the study of emotions however recent developments in the field is filling this gap.

3.1 Unfolding Discourse-Emotion Nexus

The second wave of emotion research in international relations goes beyond the “emotion matters approach” and explores the methodological tools used to analyze emotions. Different scholars have employed or suggested certain methods to bring emotions under rigorous research practices. However, all of these methods fall under the broader category of *discourse analysis*,⁸² a critical approach that illustrates relationship between social and textual processes and how this relationship has deep rooted impact on the way one thinks or acts in the world.⁸³ Discourse analysis underscores the importance of knowledge-power nexus as a part of critical theorizing. This study on the other hand intends to unfold the *discourse-emotion nexus* by using textual and verbal analysis without denying the importance of visual and non-verbal dimensions as different scholars have focused on these dimensions in spelling emotions out of a discourse. Simon Koschut has suggested discourse analysis for the identification of affective dimension of discourse.⁸⁴ He

⁸² Kreles for instance has used the method of narrative analysis in his systematic analysis of emotions which falls under the broader category of discourse analysis. Narrative analysis deals with the stories that are narrated by interviewee and interviewer or interpreter interprets those stories in order to attain certain meaning and information.

Jochen Kreles, "Emotions and Narrative Analysis: A Methodological Approach," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 41, no. 2 (2011): 182.

⁸³ Jim George, *Discourse of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 191.

⁸⁴ Simon Koschut et al., "Discourse and Emotions in International Relations," *International Studies Review* 19, no. 3 (September 2017): 481, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix033>.

focused only on the textual dimension of discourse since such approach underscores how emotions are created, experienced, expressed and communicated through the language.

3.2 Analysis of Discourse-Emotion Nexus in the aftermath of 9/11

Researching the War on Terror through the lens of emotions can provide valuable insights into the psychological impact of this complex and ongoing conflict. The events of September 11, 2001, changed the course of history and left an indelible mark on the global landscape. On that day, a group of 19 hijackers, purportedly linked to Al-Qaeda, orchestrated a series of attacks on U.S. soil, resulting in destruction and loss of life. Four commercial airliners were used as weapons, with the World Trade Center towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. being the primary targets. These attacks resulted in the loss of nearly 3,000 lives and caused extensive destruction. The collapse of the World Trade Center towers, iconic symbols of American commerce, and the attack on the Pentagon, the center of American defense operations, had a profound impact on the nation and the world, revealing vulnerabilities in even highly fortified institutions.⁸⁵

This research maintains that the enormity and emotional impact of the 9/11 attacks provided a convenient pretext for the U.S. government to pursue its long-standing geopolitical objectives. According to this viewpoint, the attacks were used to rally public support and generate a perceived moral imperative for military action. This narrative suggests that the U.S. capitalized on the fear and anger evoked by 9/11 to shape public opinion and build a case for intervention, framing it as necessary for national security and the global fight against terrorism. The shock and horror experienced by Americans and the global community were harnessed to construct a narrative of righteous retaliation and a moral imperative to confront terrorism. By invoking the emotional resonance of 9/11, the government framed its subsequent military interventions as necessary responses to the perceived threat, effectively justifying their actions in the eyes of the public. In

⁸⁵ Here is the whole report of “Pew Research Centre” indicating the magnitude of lost in the terrorist attacks. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>

October 2001, the U.S. launched a military campaign, known as “Operation Enduring Freedom”, with the aim of dismantling Al-Qaeda's infrastructure, removing the Taliban from power, and bringing those responsible for the attacks to justice. This presence not only allowed for the projection of power but also secured control over strategic resources, particularly oil, in an area of geopolitical importance.

Furthermore, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was a military campaign led by the United States and its coalition partners that aimed to remove Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. The decision to initiate this operation involved the strategic utilization of emotions to garner public support and justify military intervention. Emotions such as fear, anger, and a desire for justice were capitalized on to start Operation Iraqi Freedom. The aftermath of the September 11 attacks created a heightened sense of vulnerability and a pervasive fear of future terrorist threats. This emotional climate was utilized by political leaders to link Iraq to the broader narrative of the war on terror. The discourse surrounding Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its potential connection to terrorist organizations played a significant role in evoking emotions and justifying military action. Political figures and media outlets emphasized the imminent threat posed by Iraq, creating a perception of Iraq as a hostile regime and a direct threat to U.S. national security. Public statements and speeches by political leaders, including President George W. Bush and other administration officials, employed emotional appeals to evoke a sense of urgency and rally support for military intervention. The discourse highlighted the need to prevent future attacks, protect American lives, and seek justice for perceived acts of aggression. Furthermore, the discourse surrounding the liberation of the Iraqi people and the promotion of democracy served to evoke emotions of compassion, solidarity, and a desire for freedom. It aimed to create a narrative that positioned the military intervention as a noble and humanitarian endeavor, appealing to American ideals and values. The strategic utilization of emotions through discourse played a crucial role in mobilizing public sentiment and generating support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The evocation of emotions such as fear, anger, and compassion contributed to the framing of Iraq as a hostile regime and justified the military intervention in the eyes of the public.

The subsequent part of the study will examine the data divided into the themes as: fear, hatred, anger, grief and hostility and unfold how emotions produced certain discourses and those

discourses paved the way for certain actions. the study also highlights the how these discourses give rise to emotions. Hence, this nexus will be reflected upon with the help of speeches, documents, remarks, public statements of US officials and leaders.

3.2.1 Fear

The initial response to the 9/11 attacks in the United States was marked by a pervasive atmosphere of fear that gripped the nation.⁸⁶ For instance President Bush said in one of his address, “I know many citizens have fears tonight....”⁸⁷ On another occasion he said, “I know many Americans feel fear today....”⁸⁸ Vice-president also highlighted the fear with his remarks as, “No one becomes safer by living in a state of generalized undirected fear.”⁸⁹ The press briefing by Karen Hughes also directs towards fear as, “.....families who fear that their relatives may have been victims of one of these attacks.”⁹⁰The shocking nature of the attacks, with commercial airliners being turned into weapons and prominent symbols of American power being targeted, evoked a profound sense of vulnerability and uncertainty among the American public. Fear became a dominant emotion, permeating society and influencing individual and collective behavior. In the aftermath of the attacks, fear manifested itself in various ways. Fear serves as the fundamental foundation for understanding the intricate aftermath of 9/11.⁹¹People became hyper-vigilant, continuously looking for signs of potential threats in their surrounds. Heightened security measures, such as increased police presence, stricter airport screenings, and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, reinforced the atmosphere of fear and served as constant reminders of the perceived ongoing danger. The media played a significant role in amplifying and perpetuating fear. The relentless coverage of the attacks and their aftermath, often accompanied by distressing

⁸⁷ President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

⁸⁸ President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, The Treaty Room of the White House, Washington, D.C., October 7, 2001.

⁸⁹ Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks on Receiving the International Republican Institute's 2001 Freedom Award, October 23, 2001.

⁹⁰ Karen Hughes, Press Briefing on the September 11, 2001 Attack on America, September 11, 2001.

⁹¹ Mark S. Hamm, "The US PATRIOT Act and the Politics of Fear," in *Cultural Criminology Unleashed*, ed. Jeff Ferrell K. H. (London: Glasshouse Press, 2004), 290.

images and personal stories of victims, intensified the emotional impact on the public. News outlets frequently highlighted potential future threats, fostering a climate of apprehension and exacerbating the sense of fear.

Political leaders and government officials strategically tapped into this fear to shape public opinion and justify their policy decisions. They emphasized the gravity of the danger posed by terrorism, portraying it as an existential menace that required immediate and decisive action. Altheide puts it as, “The politics of fear relied on terrorism as a constant threat that can never be defeated.” He continues as, “The term ‘terrorism’ is used to encompass an idea as well as a tactic or method. Like the Mafia, it was everywhere and nowhere, all-powerful, but invisible”.⁹² This notion can be consolidated by a claim made by President Bush, “Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime”.⁹³ This fear-based narrative served to unite the nation and rally support for military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, under the guise of national security and the prevention of future attacks. It is important to note that fear can be a powerful tool in influencing public sentiment and garnering support for policy objectives. For Altheide decision makers use and propagate audiences’ convictions and presumptions regarding fear, risk, and apprehension in order to attain specific objectives.⁹⁴ In the context of the war on terror, fear created a sense of urgency and the perception that extraordinary measures were necessary to safeguard the nation. This emotional manipulation, whether intentional or not, resulted in a collective mindset that prioritized security over civil liberties and fueled public consent for military action.

The data collected to analyze fear supports the argument of the research as the speeches, official documents, interviews and remarks of US President, Vice President, secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor and other leaders were laden with emotion terms. Fear was used 86 times in these documents in mainly two themes; firstly, with respect to the invasion of Afghanistan. Secondly, with respect to intervening Iraq.

“Freedom and fear are at war”

⁹² David L. Altheide, "Notes Towards a Politics of Fear," *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media* 1,no. 1 (2003): 47.

⁹³ President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Nation, September 20, 2001.

⁹⁴ Altheide, "Politics of Fear," 40.

*George W. Bush*⁹⁵

After 9/11 there was a dominant theme in the speeches, statements and remarks of the then president of US, George W. Bush as he created dichotomy between fear and freedom. The statement encapsulated President Bush's belief that the attacks were not just acts of terrorism but also threats to the fundamental values of freedom and democracy that the United States represents. By framing the situation as a conflict between freedom and fear, President Bush aimed to convey the seriousness of the threat and the need for a strong response. The binary opposition created by him also carried a symbolic message, positioning the United States as a champion of freedom and portraying the enemy as a force driven by fear and extremism. It aimed to rally both domestic and international support by framing the conflict as a moral imperative to defend freedom and democracy against those who sought to undermine them.

By framing the conflict in such terms, he presented a stark contrast between these two ideas and positioned them as opposing forces in the context of the war on terror. The dichotomy suggests that freedom and fear are mutually exclusive and incompatible, implying that the presence of fear hinders the realization of freedom. President Bush's intention was likely to emphasize the importance of preserving and defending freedom by highlighting the threat posed by fear and terrorism. However, it is worth noting that dichotomous framing can be criticized for oversimplifying complex issues and neglecting nuanced perspectives. The reality of the war on terror is more complex than a simple opposition between freedom and fear. They contend that such dichotomies can lead to a narrow understanding of the multifaceted challenges and potential trade-offs involved in responding to acts of terrorism. For instance, Altheide comments, "Fear is considered a crime and terrorism, whereas police and military are symbolically joined as guardians and protectors. The politics of fear with a national or international justification is more symbolically compelling than "mere crime in the streets".⁹⁶ By emphasizing the war between freedom and fear, he sought to galvanize support for the United States' response, which included

⁹⁵ President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Nation, United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

⁹⁶ David L. Altheide, "Notes Towards a Politics of Fear," *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media* 1, no. 1 (2003): 54.

military action against terrorist networks and the enactment of measures aimed at enhancing national security.

On another occasion, Bush highlighted similar contrast between world of progress and world of fear, “*We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress*”.⁹⁷ This dichotomy falls under the same theme mentioned above however, it underscores the gravity of the situation and to frame the choice faced by the international community in the context of the war on terror. By presenting fear and progress as opposing forces, he aimed to convey that surrendering to fear would impede global progress, while embracing progress would require confronting and overcoming fear. This dichotomy serves several purposes within the broader discourse surrounding the war on terror. Firstly, it evokes emotions of fear, highlighting the perceived threats and dangers posed by terrorism. By emphasizing the potential consequences of submitting to fear, such as hindering progress and stifling advancements, President Bush sought to evoke a sense of urgency and rally support for decisive action against terrorism. Additionally, the dichotomy positions progress as the desired outcome and implies that progress can only be achieved by actively confronting and overcoming fear. This narrative aims to generate a sense of determination, resilience, and unity among the international community, promoting a shared commitment to combat terrorism and uphold the values of progress, freedom, and security. By presenting the choice in such stark terms, President Bush sought to galvanize public opinion and secure support for the administration's policies, including military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The framing of fear versus progress allows for a simplified narrative that appeals to people's aspirations for a better future while also invoking emotions of concern and the need for action.

Furthermore, President Bush capitalized on fear to justify the invasion of Iraq and the broader Iraq War. One way he did this was by highlighting the plight of citizens in the Middle East, emphasizing their experience of living in a state of death and fear under oppressive regimes like Saddam Hussein's. President Bush's statement that "The citizens of the Middle East have lived in the midst of death and fear" served to evoke empathy and solidarity with those suffering under repressive

⁹⁷George W. Bush, Remarks on the First Anniversary of the 9/11 Attacks, September 11, 2002.

regimes.⁹⁸ By emphasizing the fear and suffering of the people, he aimed to generate support for military intervention in Iraq, portraying it as a necessary step to liberate the Iraqi population from oppression and establish a more democratic and secure future.

President Bush's portrayal of the situation in Iraq oversimplified the complexities of the region and used fear as a means to garner support for a controversial military campaign. Former Vice President of America Al Gore has enlisted some clues that support the argument of this research for instance he asserts, "For everything there is a season, including the realm of political tactics driven by fear. Here's another hint: the fear-driven strategy indeed operated as a means to redirect the focus of the American populace and shift attention away from persistent domestic concerns, such as the economy. In retrospect, the White House had begun to experience genuine unease about economic matters during the summer of 2002. Consequently, a change of topic became imperative".⁹⁹ The claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was a major justification used by the Bush administration to garner support for the invasion of Iraq. However, it is important to note that the presence of WMDs in Iraq has been widely disputed and ultimately proven to be inaccurate. Al Gore puts it as, "The so-called intelligence concerning the threat posed by Iraq was stretched beyond recognition, distorted and misrepresented".¹⁰⁰ The Bush administration, primarily through the public statements of officials in his address hinted at the threat emanating from alleged presence of WMDs in Iraq. Secretary of State, Colin Powell while addressing UN Security Council uttered, "It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making biological agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward, as they are supposed to, with the information about these kinds of capabilities? Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. And dry agent of this type is the most

⁹⁸ President George W. Bush, "Middle East Peace Process," speech, The Rose Garden of the White House, Washington, D.C., June 24, 2002.

⁹⁹ Al Gore, "The Politics of Fear," *Social Research* 71, no. 4 (2004): 780.

¹⁰⁰ AL Gore, "The Politics of Fear," 780.

lethal form for human beings”.¹⁰¹ Hence, his allegation posed a direct threat to regional and global security, necessitating immediate action.

However, the assertions made by the Bush administration were challenged by various actors. For Instance, the French government, led by President Jacques Chirac, voiced skepticism about the presence of WMDs in Iraq and expressed reservations about the military intervention. France, along with Germany, called for further diplomatic efforts and inspections to ascertain the veracity of the claims before resorting to military action.¹⁰² The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations body responsible for monitoring nuclear activities, also expressed doubts about Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, and his team conducted inspections in Iraq and reported their findings to the UN Security Council. They stated that while Iraq had not fully cooperated with inspections, there was no concrete evidence to support the claims of an active WMD program.¹⁰³ This discrepancy between the claims made by the Bush administration and the actual findings regarding WMDs became a subject of intense scrutiny and criticism. The inaccurate information about WMDs in Iraq has been widely regarded as a significant intelligence failure and a controversial aspect of the decision to invade. It raised questions about the manipulation of intelligence and the use of fear as a tool to justify military action. As Al Gore underscored the same phenomenon, “The so-called intelligence concerning the threat posed by Iraq was stretched beyond recognition, distorted and misrepresented.”¹⁰⁴

Therefore, fear emerged as a significant factor influencing the narrative surrounding the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions. The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks instilled a sense of fear, vulnerability, and insecurity, not just within the borders of the United States, but on a global scale as well. The Bush administration capitalized on this fear, utilizing it to justify and mobilize support for military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Al Gore comments that, the use of fear for

¹⁰¹ Colin Powell, "US Secretary of State's Address to the United Nations Security Council," speech, United Nations, New York, February 5, 2003.

¹⁰² French President Jacques Chirac, "France and Germany Unite Against Iraq War," *The Guardian*, January 22, 2003.

¹⁰³ "UN inspectors found no evidence of prohibited weapons programs as of the 18 March withdrawal." Hans Blix, statement at the Security Council, 4768th Meeting, May 6, 2003, press release SC/7777

¹⁰⁴ AL Gore, "The Politics of Fear," 780.

political purposes was intentional.¹⁰⁵ Fear was translated into discourse through various means, including public speeches, media narratives, and policy statements. President Bush and other officials repeatedly emphasized the potential threats posed by terrorism, WMDs, and the need to confront these dangers head-on. The language used in these discourses invoked fear, portraying the enemy as a menacing force that could inflict further harm if not confronted decisively. This fear-based discourse served to rally public opinion, generate support from domestic and international audiences, and legitimize the subsequent military actions. It portrayed the invasions as essential actions aimed at safeguarding national security, upholding freedom, and establishing stability in regions troubled by terrorism and authoritarianism. The narrative also honored the 9/11 victims, emphasizing that a lack of commitment to the Iraq War would result in additional American casualties.¹⁰⁶ The discourses generated in response to the events of 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq not only shaped public perception but also produced a ripple effect of emotions that further reinforced the narrative and justifications. These discourses strategically employed rhetoric to evoke and amplify emotions such as fear, anger, and a sense of vulnerability, effectively mobilizing public sentiment and garnering support for military interventions.

Hence, fear serves a significant political purpose by effectively associating terrorism with nonconformity, deviant behavior, and criminal activities, thus elevating them to the status of perceived threats.¹⁰⁷ The dynamics of fear-driven politics have shifted the perception of terrorism

¹⁰⁵ Al Gore, "Politics of Fear," 785.

He further comments that, "How could our precious nation have become so uncharacteristically vulnerable to what became such an effective use of fear to manipulate our politics? After all, it is a serious indictment of our political discourse that almost three-quarters of all Americans were so easily led to believe, falsely, that Saddam Hussein was personally responsible for the attacks of September 11. It is an indictment of the healthy functioning of our democracy that nearly half of all Americans still believe, falsely, that most of the hijackers on September 11 were Iraqis. It is also an indictment of the way our democracy is presently operating that more than 40 percent were so easily convinced that Iraq did in fact have nuclear weapons. When David Kay said, "we were all wrong," he was speaking for the administration and the intelligence community, and the national security experts. But he could just as easily have been speaking for the entire country."

¹⁰⁶ Altheide, David L. 2006. "Terrorism and the Politics of Fear." *Cultural Studies-Critical Methodologies*, Volume 6 Number 4 415-439.

¹⁰⁷ Magnus Hörnqvist, "The Birth of Public Order Policy," *Race and Class* 46, no. 1 (2004): 46.

from being a mere tactic to becoming a global state of affairs. The importance of terrorism rhetoric stems from its ability to operate across multiple dimensions, effectively acknowledging and imposing various forms of human suffering.¹⁰⁸ Altheide asserts that, “the propaganda of terrorism is constructing the politics of fear”.¹⁰⁹

3.2.2 Hate

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there was a widespread sentiment among Americans, as articulated by President George W. Bush, “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber — a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms — our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”¹¹⁰ This sentiment fueled a discourse around hate and its translation into actions within the context of the war on terror. By emphasizing the democratic values and freedoms cherished by the United States, such as freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, President Bush sought to contrast the American way of life with the perceived grievances and ideologies of the attackers. He presented the democratic government and its institutions as a symbol of what the terrorists despised, positioning the United States as a target due to its embodiment of those values.

The emotion term hate is used in discourse produced by US leaders in order to address the root causes of terrorism. President Bush states, “Following September 11th, these pledges are even more important. In our struggle against hateful groups that exploit poverty and despair, we must offer an alternative of opportunity and hope.”¹¹¹ After the 9/11 attacks, there was an increased recognition that addressing the underlying factors that contribute to the growth of terrorism was crucial. By referring to “hateful groups that exploit poverty and despair,” President Bush acknowledged that poverty, social inequality, and a lack of opportunities can create an

¹⁰⁸ Giroux, H. A. 2003. *The Abandoned Generation: Democracy Beyond the Culture of Fear*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 45.

¹⁰⁹ Altheide, “Notes Towards a Politics of Fear,” 52.

¹¹⁰ George W. Bush, “Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,” speech presented at United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

¹¹¹ George W. Bush, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” speech presented at United Nations Headquarters, New York, November 10, 2001.

environment conducive to the recruitment and radicalization of individuals by extremist organizations. In this statement, Bush proposed that offering an alternative based on "opportunity and hope" would be a key strategy to counter the influence of such groups. By addressing the socioeconomic factors that contribute to vulnerability and discontent, the aim was to undermine the appeal of extremist ideologies and provide individuals with alternatives to violence and radicalization. This perspective reflects a broader understanding that military force alone cannot eliminate terrorism and that addressing the underlying grievances and socioeconomic conditions is essential. By advocating for an approach that combines security measures with efforts to promote development, education, and the protection of human rights, President Bush sought to foster a long-term solution to counter the influence of hate-driven groups. It is important to note that this statement reflects a specific policy approach and strategy put forth by the Bush administration in response to the war on terror. While the intention was to present a comprehensive and proactive approach, the effectiveness and implementation of such strategies remain subject to debate. The use of rhetoric that highlights the need for addressing root causes and providing alternatives to hate-driven ideologies can provide insights into the political discourse surrounding the war on terror and the strategies employed to combat terrorism beyond military means.

Furthermore, the then Vice President of the United States of America also used the term hate in order to reveal the ideology of attackers that they hate American people and whatever they possess as he states, "Well, I think he seriously misreads the American people. I think the--I mean, you have to ask yourself, why somebody would do what he does. Why is someone so motivated? Obviously, he's filled with hate for the United States and for everything we stand for..."¹¹² Cheney was highlighting the motivations of terrorists and their animosity towards the United States. His remark suggests that he questioned why individuals would engage in acts of terrorism and posited that their actions stemmed from a strong hatred for the United States and its principles. Being closely involved in the decision-making process his statement weighs a lot.

Moreover, Governor George E. Pataki puts values of American as a cause of resentment among terrorists that made them audacious enough to attack America as he proclaims, "We pray, also, for

¹¹² Dick Cheney, interview by Tim Russert, *Meet the Press* (Camp David, Maryland, September 8, 2002).

this great nation of ours, a nation that is free, a nation that is strong, a nation that is united in grief. For we know that the freedom we cherish as Americans which hundreds of thousands of Americans paid for with their lives exposes us to the wicked, murderous, cowardly forces of hate.”¹¹³The whole acts of terrorism were regarded as the “forces of hate” and certain adjectives were used to demonize these forces. The passage is highlighting the connection between freedom and the exposure to hateful forces, it can be interpreted as an acknowledgment that the values and freedoms cherished by Americans come with inherent vulnerabilities. The language used emphasizes the strength, unity, and resilience of the nation, while also recognizing the existence of wicked and cowardly forces driven by hate.

Hence, the emotion of hate, directed towards the United States, was translated into discourse through public speeches, media narratives, and political rhetoric. President Bush and other officials framed the attacks as acts of hatred towards American values, freedom, and way of life. This discourse aimed to create a collective sense of outrage, foster national unity, and solidify support for military action. The narrative surrounding hate served as a rallying point, defining a clear enemy and a justification for the subsequent actions taken in the war on terror. It portrayed the fight against terrorism as a necessary response to combat the hate-driven ideology that sought to harm and undermine the United States and its allies.

This discourse of hate served to evoke a sense of collective anger and outrage among Americans. It created a narrative that framed the war on terror as a necessary response to combat the hatred and violence directed towards the nation. By associating the enemy with hate, the discourse effectively positioned the United States as a victim and justified the need for military action. One example of the translation of hate into actions is the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The Taliban, who provided a safe haven for Al-Qaeda, were presented as the embodiment of hate and the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. The discourse surrounding hate played a pivotal role in garnering support for the military intervention, framing it as a necessary step to confront and eliminate those who harbored such intense animosity towards the United States.

¹¹³ George E. Pataki, "Statement from Governor George E. Pataki," press release, September 11, 2001.

Similarly, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was justified, at least in part, by associating Saddam Hussein's regime with hate-driven ideologies and the potential to support terrorist groups as President Bush claims, "The terrorists know. They know that a vibrant, successful democracy at the heart of the Middle East will discredit their radical ideology of hate."¹¹⁴ The discourse portrayed Iraq as a breeding ground for hatred and extremism, despite the absence of any direct link between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks. By invoking the feeling of hate, the discourse had the intention of eliciting public support for the invasion. This discourse of hate was strategically employed to manipulate public sentiment and generate support for military interventions by US officials. The lack of concrete evidence linking Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, suggesting that the association of hate with Iraq was a distortion used to justify the invasion.

3.2.3 Grief

Grief, which arises from the profound and painful experience of a significant loss, is widely acknowledged as a universal phenomenon.¹¹⁵ The exploration of grief holds significant importance as it pertains to the emotional and psychological impact of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terror. Grief is a complex emotion that arises in response to loss, and in the case of 9/11, it encompasses the loss of innocent lives, national security, and a sense of collective safety. Understanding the importance of grief involves examining its role in shaping individual and collective responses to traumatic events. The 9/11 attacks elicited widespread grief among the American people and resonated globally, as people from various nations mourned the loss of life and the attack on fundamental values. Grief can be seen as a powerful emotional catalyst that mobilizes individuals and communities, creating a shared sense of loss and the need for justice or resolution. Analyzing the impact of grief allows for an exploration of the ways in which it was harnessed or channeled by political leaders and institutions to shape public opinion and policy decisions. Furthermore, studying grief can shed light on the long-term consequences and aftermath of traumatic events. It encompasses not only the immediate emotional response but also the process

¹¹⁴ President George W. Bush, "Address to the Republican National Convention," speech presented at Madison Square Garden, New York, September 2, 2004.

¹¹⁵ Leeat Granek, "Mourning Sickness: The Politicizations of Grief," *Review of General Psychology* 18, no. 2 (2014): 61-68.

of healing, resilience, and collective memory. By examining the collective grief experienced in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, you can gain insights into how it influenced the discourse surrounding the war on terror and the subsequent policies implemented by the United States and other nations. In short it allows us to analyze ‘politicization of grief’.¹¹⁶

In reference to this study the use of emotion term grief can be classified into three main categories: firstly, it was used as an emotional response of loss and as a consequence of traumatic event. Secondly, it was used as a strong emotional catalyst that channelized the sense of loss and mobilized individual’s need for justice. Thirdly, it was used to draw a contrast between some negative and positive emotions.

Grief served as a prominent and immediate emotional response to the events of 9/11, not only among the American people but also among world leaders who expressed solidarity and condolences. In their speeches and public addresses, including those of President George W. Bush, grief was acknowledged as a collective and shared experience, reflecting the profound impact of the attacks. Some instances of extensive use of emotion term are enlisted here:

“We are here in the middle hour of our grief. So many have suffered so great a loss, and today we express our nation’s sorrow....”¹¹⁷

“We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.”¹¹⁸

“We will remember every family that lives in grief....”¹¹⁹

“We meet one year and one day after a terrorist attack brought grief to my country, and brought grief to many citizens of our world.”¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Granek, “Mourning Sickness,”62.

¹¹⁷ President George W. Bush, "National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service," speech presented at The National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., September 14, 2001.

¹¹⁸ George W. Bush, "Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress," speech presented at United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

¹¹⁹ George W. Bush, "Address to the United Nations General Assembly," speech presented at United Nations Headquarters, New York, New York, November 10, 2001.

¹²⁰ George W. Bush, "Address to the United Nations General Assembly," speech presented at United Nations Headquarters, New York, New York, September 12, 2002.

“We pray, also, for this great nation of ours, a nation that is free, a nation that is strong, a nation that is united in grief.”¹²¹

President Bush, in his speeches following 9/11, expressed empathy and acknowledged the pain and loss experienced by the American people. He spoke of the collective grief and mourning, emphasizing the need for unity and resilience in the face of tragedy. Bush's speeches often invoked emotional imagery, such as mentioning the names of victims or describing the devastation caused by the attacks. This approach aimed to connect with the emotions of the audience, fostering a sense of national grief and emphasizing the gravity of the situation. Similarly, world leaders from various nations also conveyed their condolences and shared in the grief of the American people. They expressed solidarity and support, recognizing the immense loss suffered by the United States and the global significance of the attacks. Their speeches often echoed themes of unity, resilience, and the need for international cooperation in the face of terrorism. The speeches of world leaders in response to 9/11 reflected the immediate emotional response of grief, acknowledging the tragedy and its impact on individuals, families, and nations. They emphasized the shared sense of loss and the importance of standing together in the face of terrorism. These speeches not only conveyed condolences but also served as a means of connecting with the emotions of their own citizens and conveying a united front against terrorism.

President George W. Bush and other world leaders highlighted a contrast between negative emotions (grief, tragedy, and hatred) and positive emotions (goodness, remembrance, and love). “Grief and tragedy and hatred are only for a time. Goodness, remembrance, and love have no end.”¹²² It acknowledges that negative emotions are temporary and associated with challenging times, while positive emotions are enduring and have no bounds. The use of this contrast underscores the transformative power of positive emotions in overcoming the negative emotions associated with grief and tragedy. It suggests that while grief and hatred may be prevalent in the immediate aftermath of a tragedy, they can be transcended by embracing and nurturing positive emotions. This contrast between negative and positive emotions serves multiple purposes. First, it

¹²¹ Governor George E. Pataki, "Statement from Governor George E. Pataki," press release, September 11, 2001.

¹²² George W. Bush, "Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress," speech presented at United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

acknowledges the reality of negative emotions and validates the experiences of grief and tragedy felt by individuals and communities. This empathetic acknowledgment helps to foster a sense of unity and support among the affected population. Secondly, by emphasizing the enduring nature of positive emotions, leaders seek to inspire hope and resilience. They encourage individuals and communities to focus on the virtues of goodness, remembrance, and love as a means of healing and moving forward. This emphasis on positive emotions aims to uplift and motivate people during times of adversity. Analyzing this contrast in emotional tones allows for a deeper understanding of the strategies employed by leaders to shape public sentiment and promote a sense of unity in the aftermath of a tragedy. It sheds light on the role of positive emotions in healing, fostering resilience, and cultivating a collective response to acts of terror. Furthermore, exploring the contrast between negative and positive emotions can provide insights into the ways in which emotional discourse is utilized to navigate the complexities of grief, tragedy, and the process of recovery. It allows for a nuanced examination of how leaders tap into these contrasting emotions to influence public perception and justify policy decisions related to the war on terror. The anger felt by the American people was fueled by a sense of injustice and a desire for accountability. Butler argues that, “In the United States, Memorial Days are often characterized by the political exploitation of collective grief to rationalize military actions.”¹²³

Grief is also used to reflect a shift in emotional response from grief to anger and a subsequent determination to seek justice in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the nation experienced profound grief as it grappled with the loss of innocent lives and the devastation caused. However, this grief gradually transformed into anger as the magnitude of the attacks and the deliberate targeting of civilians became clear. The emotion term ‘grief’ was used in the most powerful sense and in the sense, which supports the argument of this study was when president Bush asserted that, “Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.”¹²⁴ The statement highlights this transition from grief to anger, signifying a collective resolve to act.

¹²³ Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (London, UK: Verso Press, 2009), 43.

¹²⁴ ADDRESS TO THE JOINT SESSION OF THE 107TH CONGRESS
UNITED STATES CAPITOL WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 20, 2001

It acknowledges the emotional journey that the nation has undergone, from mourning the loss to seeking retribution. The mention of justice emphasizes the importance of holding those responsible for the attacks accountable and ensuring that they face the consequences of their actions. The mention of justice in the statement serves as a powerful rhetorical tool. It invokes a sense of moral righteousness and the need to hold those responsible for the attacks accountable. This emotional appeal to justice can be seen as a means of justifying military actions and policy decisions that followed, such as the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent military interventions in the Middle East. Granek while enlisting types of “Mourning Sickness”, identified that mourning sickness type II, proposes that the politicization of grief involves the deliberate manipulation of personal and collective mourning to advance nationalist and military agendas. This manipulation encompasses not only the overt associations drawn between loss, grief, and the validation of military interventions, but also involves differentiating between lives deemed deserving of mourning and those regarded as insignificant and unmournable.¹²⁵

The phrase "bringing enemies to justice" conveys the idea of using legal methods to hold accountable those directly responsible for planning and executing the 9/11 attacks. It underscores the significance of thorough investigations, evidence collection, and conducting trials within a legal framework. This approach is consistent with international law and due process, aiming to ensure that the culprits face legal repercussions for their actions. On the contrary, the expression "bringing justice to our enemies" suggests a more active stance, wherein the United States directly engages in actions to neutralize and combat those held responsible for the attacks. This might involve military operations, intelligence strategies, and other initiatives aimed at preventing future attacks and dismantling terrorist networks. This approach reflects a readiness to confront adversaries head-on, employing preemptive and protective measures to safeguard national security and prevent further harm.

By analyzing the statements, you can delve into the ways in which emotions were capitalized on to shape public opinion, justify military interventions, and garner support for the broader objectives

¹²⁵ Geanek, Mourning Sickness, 61.

of the war on terror. It provides insights into the emotional discourse employed by political leaders to frame the narrative and legitimize the actions taken in response to the 9/11 attacks.

3.2.4 Anger

The 9/11 attacks evoked a profound emotional response, particularly anger, as evident in the speeches and statements of American and global leaders. Anger has ‘subjective phenomenological attributes’ and in this sense can be defined as, “The emotional state comprises a range of feelings with varying intensities, ranging from mild irritation or annoyance to profound fury and rage”.¹²⁶

This emotional state served as a potent catalyst, mobilizing public sentiment, rationalizing policy decisions, and fostering unity against terrorism. Leaders skillfully acknowledged and channeled the prevailing anger, forging a bond with their constituents and assuring them of decisive action. The deployment of anger rhetoric aimed to elicit a shared sense of resolve and fortitude among the people, denouncing the attackers and justifying consequential policy measures. Furthermore, the strategic use of anger served to validate enhanced security protocols, intelligence operations, and military engagements. This examination of anger discourse sheds light on the interplay between emotions, political rhetoric, and the socio-political ramifications following acts of terrorism, contributing to a nuanced understanding of the emotional dimensions underlying the post-9/11 landscape.

The use of emotion term anger can be classified into three categories. Firstly, it was used by American and other world leaders as an initial response to the attacks which was mixed with fear and grief. Secondly, it was used as a driving force to create strong determination to take actions against preparators. Thirdly, it was used in order to condemn the system prevailing in the Middle East which is enhancing resentment and anger among the people living there who as a revenge get involve in the terrorist activities.

¹²⁶ C. D. Spielberger, G. Jacobs, S. Russell, and R. S. Crane, "Assessment of Anger: The State-Trait Anger Scale," in *Advances in Personality Assessment*, ed. J. N. Butcher and C. D. Spielberger, vol. 2 (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1983), 160.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President recognizes the anger among the people of America by stating, "I want to let you know there is a quiet anger in America that really is real."¹²⁷ On another occasion he detailed, "The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness and a quiet, unyielding anger."¹²⁸ President Bush's statement regarding the emotional response of disbelief, sadness, and anger conveys the significance of anger as an emotion in shaping the collective response of taking immediate action against people. By acknowledging the presence of anger, Bush sought to validate and give voice to the intense emotional reaction experienced by the American people and emphasize its role in galvanizing action. The images of airplanes crashing into buildings, fires raging, and iconic structures collapsing evoked a profound sense of disbelief, as the magnitude of the tragedy was difficult to comprehend. The enormity of the loss and the deliberate nature of the attacks stirred feelings of sadness and grief. However, it was the presence of anger, described as "quiet" and "unyielding," that emerged as a powerful emotional force in the aftermath of the attacks. Anger, in this context, represents a response to the injustice and brutality of the terrorist acts, as well as a determination to seek justice and prevent future occurrences. It serves as a catalyst for action, fueling the resolve to confront and defeat those responsible for the attacks. Sadler et al. claims, "Individuals whose primary emotional response was anger after those attacks displayed strong conviction that terrorists were responsible for the attacks and believed that the United States should take with intense military action to address the unprecedented transgression"¹²⁹. Hence, by acknowledging the anger felt by the American people, President Bush aimed to validate their emotional state and provide a collective outlet for their outrage.

The importance of anger lies in its ability to mobilize individuals and communities towards a common cause. It serves as a rallying cry for unity, fortitude, and a steadfast commitment to

¹²⁷President George W. Bush, "September 11, 2001: Attack on America: Remarks by the President in Telephone Conversation with New York Mayor Giuliani and New York Governor Pataki," September 13, 2001.

¹²⁸ President George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," delivered on September 11, 2001.

¹²⁹ Melody S. Sadler, et al., "Emotions, Attributions, and Policy Endorsement in the September 11th Terrorist Attacks," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* (2005): 250.

upholding the values and principles that were attacked. The emotional intensity of anger can be channeled into positive action, such as the pursuit of justice, the strengthening of national security, and the protection of fundamental freedoms. However, sometimes the response goes beyond the real offense. Lerner et al. said, "Individuals experiencing anger were more prone to attributing an individual's actions as the cause of another person's injuries and were inclined to advocate for punishment of the offender."¹³⁰ By highlighting the role of anger, President Bush aimed to harness this potent emotion as a driving force behind the subsequent actions taken in response to the attacks. It served as a motivation for policies and initiatives aimed at dismantling terrorist networks, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and promoting international cooperation in the global fight against terrorism. In the broader context of understanding the importance of anger as an emotion, it is crucial to recognize its transformative power when harnessed effectively. While anger can be a destructive force if left unchecked, its constructive manifestation can lead to positive change, resilience, and a steadfast commitment to protecting the values and principles under attack. For instance, Lerner et al. found that anger's impact on punitiveness may extend to influencing unrelated justice decisions if the individual responsible for the initial injustice remains unpunished.¹³¹

Furthermore, Grief and anger are deeply intertwined emotions that often arise in response to tragic events. The grief experienced by the American people in the wake of the 9/11 attacks was a natural and profound response to the loss of innocent lives and the assault on the nation's security and values. However, it was the accompanying anger that provided a sense of purpose, determination, and a collective rallying cry for action. Anger, in this context, represents a reaction to the sense of injustice, violation, and vulnerability inflicted by the attacks. It serves as a catalyst for unity and mobilization, galvanizing the nation to come together and respond decisively. The US government strategically utilized the emotions of grief and anger to advance their agenda of waging war on terror as President Bush expresses his resolution, "And in our grief and anger we have found our

¹³⁰ J. S. Lerner, et al., "Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 24 (1998): 565.

¹³¹ Lerner et al, "Sober Second Thought,"567

mission and our moment.”¹³² By emphasizing the significance of anger, Bush aimed to mobilize public sentiment and generate support for military actions and policies that would serve their broader geopolitical objectives. Skitka et al. argued that anger requires immediate and intense retribution as compared to other emotions as she asserts that anger was linked to heightened out-group derogation and confrontational reactions, as evidenced by individuals reporting statements like "we should just nuke them" in response to the attacks. Moreover, anger indirectly correlated with decreased political tolerance toward Arab Americans and other groups.¹³³ Furthermore, within this viewpoint, the phrase "our mission and our moment" can be seen as a strategic narrative constructed to align the public's emotional response with the government's policy objectives. By presenting the war on terror as a necessary mission and a defining moment in American history, the government sought to reinforce the notion that military intervention and the pursuit of justice were essential responses to the perceived threat of terrorism. From this perspective, the statement implies that the government capitalized on the emotions of grief and anger to garner public backing for their military interventions, increased surveillance measures, and the erosion of certain civil liberties. It suggests that the emotional climate following the 9/11 attacks was skillfully manipulated to shape public opinion, justify the war on terror, and consolidate power.

Moreover, the third context in which anger was used is about the Middle East. President Bush expressed his feelings as, “¹ As long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny and despair and anger, it will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the safety of America and our friends.”¹³⁴ The statement by President Bush reflects the government's narrative that the Middle East, characterized by conditions of tyranny, despair, and anger, posed a persistent threat to American security and the well-being of its allies. The emphasis on emotions in this context aligns with the understanding that emotions play a significant role in shaping political discourse and mobilizing public opinion. The United States strategically employed emotional appeals to create a

¹³² George W. Bush, "Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress," speech presented at United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

¹³³ L. J. Skitka, et al., "Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following September 11, 2001: An Integrative Approach," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30 (2004): 746.

¹³⁴ President George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress, Second Session," speech presented at United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2004.

sense of urgency and foster public support for its military intervention in Iraq. By framing the Middle East as a breeding ground for hostile individuals and movements that pose a direct threat to American interests, the government sought to rationalize its decision to invade Iraq as a necessary measure to address this perceived danger.

3.2.5 Hostility

In the context of producing discourse and influencing actions, “hostility” plays a significant role in shaping political narratives and policy decisions. Buss defines hostility as, “an attitude involving the expression of disliking and negatively evaluating others”.¹³⁵ One key aspect of hostility is its ability to fuel emotional responses, such as anger and indignation. These emotions can be powerful drivers of public opinion, mobilizing support for certain actions or policies. Political leaders often tap into this sense of hostility to construct narratives that portray the targeted entity as a threat to national interests, security, or values. McCraie propose that the anxiety and hostility arise as emotional reactions to either the actual experience or the anticipation of psychological distress.¹³⁶ Hostility can be instrumental in producing and shaping discourse by framing the narrative around conflict and opposition. It sets the stage for an “us versus them” dichotomy, reinforcing a sense of identity and shared resolve. Richard Jackson in his seminal work underscores the same phenomenon about discourse although he has not recognized the role of emotions in it however, the process of “creating enemies” through discourse was aptly discussed the same notion as claimed by this research. He writes, “One of the most important functions of the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is to construct and maintain national identity, primarily through the articulation of a contrasting, negative ‘others’ who defines the Western ‘self’ through negation.”¹³⁷ Hence, discourse influenced by hostility tends to emphasize differences, highlight grievances, and create a narrative that justifies acting against the perceived adversary.

Additionally, hostility can construct the language and rhetoric used in political discourse. It may include the use of intense and confrontational language, demonization of the opponent, or the

¹³⁵ Buss, A. H. (1961). *The psychology of aggression*. New York: Wiley

¹³⁶ E. J. McCraie, "Depression, Anxiety and Hostility," *Psychiatric Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (1971): 117.

¹³⁷ Richard Jackson, "Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse," *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 420.

portrayal of the opponent as an existential threat. In terms of actions, hostility can compel policymakers to adopt more aggressive or confrontational strategies. It is more intense emotions that demands diminishing the value and intentions of others, anticipating them as potential wrongdoers, viewing relationships in opposition, and possessing a willingness to cause harm or witness harm befall others.¹³⁸ It can shape policy decisions that prioritize security, defense, or even military interventions. When there is widespread hostility, it can create an environment where finding peaceful solutions takes and showing dominance or get revenge become priority.

The way ‘hostility’ is employed in the discourse supports the argument of this research for instance, President Bush declared, “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”¹³⁹The term "hostile regime" implies a strong and confrontational stance towards nations that are perceived to harbor or support terrorist activities. In this context, hostility serves multiple purposes. Firstly, it establishes a clear dichotomy between the United States and nations that are associated with terrorism. By categorizing these nations as "hostile," it creates a sense of opposition, emphasizing the perceived threat they pose to American interests and security. Secondly, the use of the term "hostile regime" also conveys a message of determination and resolve. It signals that the United States is prepared to take assertive measures against nations that are seen as facilitating or condoning terrorism. Thirdly, this rhetoric aims to evoke a sense of unity and determination among the American public and international allies in confronting the perceived threat. Finally, by labelling nations as "hostile regimes," the statement implies potential consequences for those nations. It indicates that the United States could contemplate different measures, including economic penalties, diplomatic isolation, or even military involvement, to deal with what is perceived as a threat. This language creates a framework for policy decisions that prioritize security and taking a proactive stance against terrorism. Jackson also underscore this ability of discourse, “discourse normalizes and legitimizes a restricted set of coercive and punitive counter-

¹³⁸ T. W. Smith, "Concepts and Methods in the Study of Anger, Hostility, and Health," in *Anger, Hostility, and the Heart*, eds. A. W. Siegman and T. W. Smith (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994), 25.

¹³⁹ George W. Bush, "Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress," speech presented at United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

terrorism strategies, whilst simultaneously making non-violent alternatives such as dialogue, compromise and reform appear inconceivable and nonsensical....by demonizing them as fanatics and essentializing them as violent, irrational, savage and fanatical...’’¹⁴⁰

On another occasion President Bush gave a stance in an assertive and strong manner regarding nations that are perceived to violate the principle of not harboring or supporting terrorism, “Those nations that violate this principle will be regarded as hostile regimes. They have been warned, they are being watched, and they will be held to account.”¹⁴¹ It communicates a clear message that such nations will face consequences for their actions. The phrase "hostile regimes" in this context refers to nations that are seen as actively supporting or harboring terrorists. It suggests that these nations pose a direct threat to U.S. national security and the international community. By labelling them as "hostile regimes," the United States signals a readiness to adopt a confrontational approach in dealing with these nations. The statement also conveys a sense of warning and vigilance. The notion that these nations have been warned and are being watched suggests that their actions are closely monitored and that the United States is prepared to act if necessary. This serves as a deterrent, signaling to these nations that their activities will not go unnoticed and that there will be accountability for any involvement in supporting terrorism. Furthermore, the phrase "held to account" underscores the intention to pursue justice and ensure that those responsible for supporting terrorism face consequences. It implies a commitment to taking legal, diplomatic, or potentially military actions to hold these nations accountable for their actions. This reinforces the notion that the United States will actively pursue its interests and protect its security by targeting those nations perceived as posing a threat. The remarks of President Bush on the first anniversary of 9/11 reinforce the same notion, “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”¹⁴² It suggests that the United States perceives these nations not only as facilitating terrorism but also as actively working

¹⁴⁰ Jackson, “constructing enemies”, 421.

¹⁴¹ President George W. Bush, "Address at The Citadel," speech presented at The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, December 11, 2001.

¹⁴² President George W. Bush, "Remarks on the First Anniversary of the 9/11 Attacks," September 11, 2002.

against its interests and values. By openly declaring this policy, the United States aims to dissuade nations from providing safe havens to terrorists or assisting them in any way.

The emotion term “hostility” when studied under the context of justifying a war on Iraq, approves the argument of the research in more prevailing manner. George W. Bush asserted that Iraq is flaunting its hostility against US in order support terrorism¹⁴³. This statement reflects a specific perspective on the actions and intentions of Iraq in relation to the United States. It suggests that Iraq's behavior is characterized by a deliberate display of hostility and active support for terrorist activities. This statement can be seen as a part of the discourse employed to frame Iraq as a hostile entity and justify the U.S. intervention in the region. By accusing Iraq of openly displaying hostility and supporting terrorism, it creates a narrative that portrays Iraq as a direct threat to American interests and security. The notion of Iraq flaunting its hostility suggests a deliberate and intentional act of defiance, projecting an image of Iraq as an aggressor. This characterization aims to evoke emotions of anger, fear, and concern among the American public and the international community. By linking Iraq to terrorism, the statement strengthens the narrative that the United States is engaged in a necessary and justifiable fight against terrorism, positioning Iraq as a target in this broader campaign. This perspective on discourse directs our focus towards its utilization as a ‘political technology in the hegemonic projects of various agents, such as state elites.’¹⁴⁴

The Vice-President Dick Cheney in his address to Veterans of Foreign Wars national convention spoke about hostility of Saddam Hussain and expressed his willingness to invade Iraq. He quoted former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as, "The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action." And then he said, “If the United States could have preempted 9/11, we would have, no question. Should we be able to prevent another, much more devastating attack, we will, no

¹⁴³ President George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress," speech presented at The United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2002.

¹⁴⁴ Jackson, “Constructing Enemies”, 421.

question. This nation will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes.”¹⁴⁵ His statement reflects the rhetoric employed to evoke emotions and build public support for preemptive action. The mention of the imminence of WMD proliferation and the associated dangers aims to trigger emotions of fear, apprehension, and a sense of urgency. By highlighting the potential catastrophic consequences, the discourse seeks to emphasize the seriousness of the threat and justify preemptive actions to protect national security. The assertion that if the United States could have preempted 9/11, it would have, further reinforces the idea that proactive measures are necessary. It appeals to emotions such as regret, anger, and a desire for prevention, aiming to generate support for preemptive action against perceived threats. The use of phrases such as "much more devastating attack" underscores the potential severity of future threats. By framing the discourse in terms of preventing a more catastrophic event, it amplifies emotions of fear and concern among the public. This framing is intended to rally support for pre-emptive action and justify the ongoing engagement in the war on terror.

3.3 Conclusion

Incidents such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks triggered intense emotions, with far-reaching and significant consequences.¹⁴⁶ The analysis of political discourse clearly illustrates how officials and leaders in United States frequently employ the language of emotion to validate and promote a range of both international and domestic political initiatives. These include actions such as altering regimes in nations like Iraq, extending military presence to new areas like Afghanistan, bolstering military power and influence, establishing domestic and global surveillance systems, exerting influence over international institutions and processes, and more broadly, upholding and expanding a Western-centric liberal global order. The prevalence of narratives centered around emotions like fear, anger, grief, hate and hostility in contemporary political speeches indicates that

¹⁴⁵ Vice President Dick Cheney, "Addresses Veterans of Foreign Wars," August 26, 2002. <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0208/26/se.01.html>

¹⁴⁶ J. S. Lerner, et al., "Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carry-Over Effects of Emotions on Economic Transactions," *Psychological Science* 15 (2004): 337; M. S. Sadler, et al., "Emotions, Attributions, and Policy Endorsements in Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 27 (2005): 249.

this discourse is systematically employed as a strategic political tool. Furthermore, there is a reciprocal relationship between emotion and discourse. The discourses generated strategically evoke and intensify these emotions to mobilize support and validate aggressive actions. Anger serves as a catalyst for seeking justice and retribution, while fear amplifies the perceived threats and urgency of action. Hate reinforces the dichotomy between "us" and "them," further legitimizing military interventions. Grief generates a collective sense of loss and solidarity, fostering a narrative of resilience and determination. Hostility is utilized to portray adversaries as inherently dangerous, justifying pre-emptive measures. By analyzing this intricate interplay between emotion and discourse, this chapter uncovers the deliberate manipulation of emotions to shape public sentiment and advance geopolitical objectives.

4. A Reflection on Conclusions

This research has addressed a critical gap in post-positivist analyses of the war on terror through incorporating emotions as a central element. By recognizing the significance of emotions in shaping human behavior, decision-making processes, and responses to terrorism, this study has unveiled a deeper understanding of the motivations and complexities surrounding terrorism and counterterrorism efforts. This research demonstrates the connection between emotions, language, and representations of terrorism. It reveals the emotional aspects that influence the development and validation of counterterrorism strategies, as well as public perceptions of terrorism threats. By centering on emotions, this research has provided a more intricate and comprehensive exploration of the varied methods through which actors engage in and influence the War on Terror. The discourse-emotion nexus has played a crucial role in this research by providing a comprehensive conceptual framework to explore the implications of emotions in the War on Terror. Using discourse analysis as a lens, this study has examined how language and narratives influence emotional reactions to terrorism across individual, societal, and state levels. Through discourse analysis, the study has uncovered how particular portrayals and interpretations of terrorism trigger distinct emotional responses among different stakeholders, subsequently impacting their actions, choices, and policy measures. Through examining the emotional dimensions within the discourse surrounding the War on Terror, this research has highlighted how emotions construct meaning and identities through discourse as well as galvanize certain actions. Emotions can be both driving forces and outcomes of discourse, leading to the reinforcement or contestation of dominant narratives. The discourse-emotion nexus has provided a deeper understanding of the complex interplay between emotions and language, exposing how emotions become entangled in the construction, perpetuation, and contestation of terrorism discourses. Moreover, the discourse-emotion nexus has allowed for a nuanced examination of the power dynamics at play. The emotional responses elicited through specific discourses can influence public opinion, policymaking, and counterterrorism measures. By identifying emotional triggers within discourses, this research has shed light on the role of emotions in legitimizing or challenging particular policy responses to terrorism. The discourse-emotion nexus emphasizes that language is

not merely a neutral means of communication but a powerful tool used to shape narratives and influence emotions. In the context of the War on Terror, discourses constructed by US leaders and policymakers have strategically infused emotions such as fear, anger, grief, and patriotism to shape public perception and elicit specific emotional responses.

The thematic analysis employed in this study has yielded certain outcomes. The first theme addressed in the study is 'fear,' which indicates that when emphasized in discourse, it evokes a sense of insecurity that stimulates a need for protection and immediate action. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, fear became a dominant emotion, and political leaders adeptly harnessed and intensified it through persuasive discursive strategies. By framing the perceived threats as imminent and pervasive, they evoked a deep sense of vulnerability and insecurity among the public. The study has depicted that US leaders and officials have capitalized on fear to justify interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The former Vice President of America asserts, "the use of fear for political purposes was intentional".¹⁴⁷ For Altheide decision makers use and propagate audiences' convictions and presumptions regarding fear, risk, and apprehension in order to attain specific objectives.¹⁴⁸ Al Gore summarizes and underscores the outcome of the whole theme as, "Terrorism is the ultimate misuse of fear for political ends."¹⁴⁹ The second theme of the research was 'Hate'. Its prevalence in the discourse highlights "us vs them" dichotomy and a need to take intense retribution. Third theme employed in the research has underscored the interplay of grief with discourse that encompasses, "politicization of grief" which involves, "the deliberate manipulation of personal and collective mourning to advance nationalist and military agendas."¹⁵⁰ The emotion term 'grief' in the context of war in terror has also been intentionally utilized to legitimize political and military objectives. The fourth theme in which the study has been conducted was 'anger'. US leaders, policy makers and officials skillfully acknowledged and channeled the prevailing anger, forging a bond with their constituents and assuring them of

¹⁴⁷ Al Gore, "The Politics of Fear," *Social Research* 71, no. 4 (2004): 780.

¹⁴⁸ David L. Altheide, "Notes Towards a Politics of Fear," *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media* 1, no. 1 (2003): 40.

¹⁴⁹ Al Gore, "The Politics of Fear," 780.

¹⁵⁰ Leeat Granek, "Mourning Sickness: The Politicizations of Grief," *Review of General Psychology* 18, no. 2 (2014): 62.

decisive action. Furthermore, the strategic use of anger served to validate enhanced security protocols, intelligence operations, and military engagements. Sadler et al. claims, "Individuals whose primary emotional response was anger after those attacks displayed strong conviction that terrorists were responsible for the attacks and believed that the United States should take with intense military action to address the unprecedented transgression".¹⁵¹ Finally this thematic analysis involved hostility which was emanated through discourse produced by US politicians and officials. Hostility can be instrumental in producing and shaping discourse by framing the narrative around conflict and opposition. It sets the stage for an "us versus them" dichotomy, reinforcing a sense of identity and shared resolve. The purpose of strategic use of hostility in the discourse was to justify illegitimate, aggressive and intense counter measures against terrorist.

The objective of this research is not to deny the terrorism threat and it does not assert that the only purpose of using emotive language was to legitimize certain interventions. Rather, the aim of this research is to recognize how emotions were imbued within discourses in the context of war on terror and all the dominant discourses at that time had an emotional tendency which somehow paved the way of certain actions. It also deals with the ways certain emotions were interpreted through discourses to galvanize support of public as well as to trigger more emotions in order to reify an existential threat among the people of America and other countries through which need to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq was promoted and justified. The emotion laden discourse, produced by US government and exacerbated by their media, exhibits uses and abuses of emotions. This study explores the utilization of terrorism by President George W. Bush and his administration to advance their political agenda. The United States' political landscape has been subject to distortion through the amplification of fear, hostility, and animosity towards Iraq, which appears to be greatly disproportionate to the actual threat posed by the nation. The emotional campaign was strategically orchestrated to pave the way for the invasion of Iraq, precisely timed to coincide with the commencement of the 2002 midterm election campaign. Moreover, this

¹⁵¹ Melody S. Sadler, et al., "Emotions, Attributions, and Policy Endorsement in the September 11th Terrorist Attacks," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* (2005): 250.

research delves into a multitude of issues surrounding the war on terror, notably focusing on the government's political exploitation of emotions, policymakers' responses to visible crises, and role of discourse in instigating fear, hatred, anger and hostility within society.

4.1 Future Research

The findings of this research can also serve as a blueprint for future research in this field. The implication of emotion in discourse can further unfold the complexities involved in terrorism research especially by incorporating different perspectives and view points. This research has employed exhaustive analysis in five themes; fear, anger, grief, hostility and hate however there are other emotional themes like sympathy, trust, empathy and resentments that still need to be explored. the recognition of emotion can assist in reconceptualizing concepts involved in peace and conflict studies like human security, conflict resolution, peace building and mediation.

4.2 Limitations

The thesis has employed one strategy to analyze emotions i-e interpreting emotions. The other two strategies suggested by Koschut, contextualizing emotions and historicizing emotions,¹⁵² are beyond the scope of this research.

¹⁵² Simon Koschut, "Discourse and Emotions in International Relations," *International Studies Review*, 2017: 2.

5. Bibliography

Altheide, David L. 2003. "Notes Towards a Politics of Fear." *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media* 1 (1): 37-54.

Altheide, David L. 2006. "Terrorism and the Politics of Fear." *Cultural Studies-Critical Methodologies* 6, no. 4: 415-439.

Ahmed, Sara. 2004. *The Cultural Politics of Emotions*. New York: Routledge.

Albert, Mathias, Barry Buzan, and Michael Zürn, eds. 2013. *Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ariffin, Yohan. 2016. "Introduction: How Emotions Can Explain Outcomes in International Relations." In *Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, edited by Jean-Marc Coicaud, Vesselin Popovski, and Yohan Ariffin, 1-19. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Averill, James. 1989. "A Constructionist View of Emotion." In *Emotions, Theory, Research and Experience*, edited by Robert Plutchik and Henry Kellerman, 305-339. New York: Academic Press.

Barbalet, J. M. 1996. "Social Emotions: Confidence, Trust and Loyalty." *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*: 75-96.

Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duval. 2005. "Power in International Politics." *International Organizations* 59 (1): 55.

Bleiker, Ronald, and Emma Hutchison. 2018. "Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics." In *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on Emotional Turn*, edited by Maeva Clement and Eric Sangar, 325-342. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bleiker, Ronald, and Emma Hutchison. 2014. "Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics." *Review of International Studies* 40 (1): 115-135.

Bleiker, Emma Hutchison, and Roland. 2014. "Theorizing Emotions in World Politics." *International Theory* 6 (3): 491-514.

Buss, A.H. 1961. *The Psychology of Aggression*. New York: Wiley.

Bush, George W. 2001. "Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress United States Capitol Washington, D.C. September 20."

Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cheryl Hall. 2005. *The Trouble with Passion: Political Theory beyond the Reign of Reason*. New York: Routledge.

Clement, Maeva, and Eric Sangar. 2018. *Researching Emotions in International Relations*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Coicaud, Jean Marc. 2014. "Emotion and Passion in the Discipline of International Relations." *Japanese Journal of Political Science*: 485-513.

Coulter, J. 1979. *The Social Construction of Mind*. London: Macmillan.

Crawford, Neta C. 2006. "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships." *International Security* 24 (4): 116-156.

Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari. 1999. *A Thousand Plateaus*. London: Athlone Press.

D'Aoust, Anne-Marie. 2014. "Ties that Bind? Engaging Emotions, Governmentality and Neoliberalism: Introduction to the Special Issue." *Global Security* 28 (3): 267-276.

Ekman, P. 1994. *The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fattah, Khaled, and Karin M. Fierke. 2009. "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East." *European Journal of International Relations* 15 (1): 67-93.

Fierke, Karin M. 2013. *Political Self-Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*. Edited by Colin Gordon. Harlow: Longman.

Giroux, Henry A. 2003. *The Abandoned Generation: Democracy Beyond the Culture of Fear*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gore, Al. 2004. "The Politics of Fear." *Social Research* 71 (4): 779-798.

Granek, Leeat. 2014. "Mourning Sickness: The Politicizations of Grief." *Review of General Psychology* 18 (2): 61-68.

Hamm, Mark S. 2004. "The US PATRIOT Act and the Politics of Fear." In *Cultural Criminology Unleashed*, edited by Keith Hayward, Wayne Morrison, Mike Presdee Jeff Ferrell, 288-299. London: Glasshouse Press.

Hansen, Lene. 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London: Routledge.

Harre, Rom. 1986. "An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint." In *The Social Construction of Emotions*, edited by Rom Harre, 2-14. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hochschild, A. R. 1983. *The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hoggett, Paul, and Simon Thompson. 2012. *Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Hornqvist, Magnus. 2004. "The Birth of Public Order Policy." *Race and Class* 46: 30-52.

Hutchison, Emma, and Ronald Bleiker. 2014. "Introduction: Emotions and World Politics." *International Theory* 6 (3): 490-491.

Jackson, Richard. 2007. "Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse." *Government and Opposition* 42 (3): 394-426.

Jeffery, Renee. 2014. "The Promise and Problems of the Neuroscientific Approach to Emotions." *International Theory*: 584-589.

Koschut, Simon. 2017. "Discourse and Emotions in International Relations." *International Studies Review*: 1-27.

Lerner, J. S., J. H. Goldberg, and P. E. Tetlock. 1998. "Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 24: 563-574.

Lindemann. 2014. "Interest, Passion, (Non)recognition, and Wars: A Conceptual Essay." *Global Discourse*: 483-496.

Linder, Evelin G. 2006. "Emotion and Conflict: Why It Is Important to Understand How Emotions Affect Conflict and How Conflict Affects Emotions." In *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, edited by Peter Coleman, Morton Deutsch, and Eric Marcus, 268-293. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Linklater, Andrew. 2004. "Process Sociology and International Relations." *Sociological Review* 59 (1): 48-64.

Linklater, Andrew. 2011. *The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Martha C. Nussbaum. 2013. *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Mattern, Janice Bially. 2005. *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force*. New York: Routledge.

Mattern, Bially. 2008. "The Concept of Power and the (Un)discipline of International Relations." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford University Press.

Mercer, Jonathan. 2006. "Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9: 288-303.

Popovski, Vesselin. 2016. "Emotions and International Law." In *Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, edited by Yohan Ariffin, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Vesselin Popovski, 184-203. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Ringmar, Erik. 2008. "Eugene Gendlin and the Feel of International Politics." In *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, edited by Maeva Clement and Eric Sangar, 33-50. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ross, Andrew. 2014. *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sasley, Brent E. 2011. "Theorizing State's Emotions." *International Studies Review*: 452-476.
- Scheler, M. 1992. *On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing*. Edited by H. Bershady. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Skitka, Linda J., Christopher W. Bauman, Nicholas P. Aramovich, and G. Scott Morgan. 2006. "Confrontational and Preventative Policy Responses to Terrorism: Anger Wants a Fight and Fear Wants 'Them' to Go Away." *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 28 (4): 375-384.
- Skitka, L. J., C. W. Bauman, and E. Mullen. 2004. "Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following September 11, 2001: An Integrative Approach." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30: 743-756.
- Smith, T. W. 1994. "Concepts and Methods in the Study of Anger, Hostility, and Health." In *Anger, Hostility, and the Heart*, edited by A. W. Siegman and T. W. Smith, 23-42. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Smith, T. W., K. A. Rasinski, and M. Toce. 2001. *America Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks*. Chicago: NORC.
- Spielberger, C. D., G. Jacobs, J. S. Russell, and R. S. Crane. 1983. "Assessment of Anger: The State-Trait Anger Scale." In *Advances in Personality Assessment*, vol. 2, edited by J. N. Butcher and C. D. Spielberger. Hillside, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Stephan, Walter G., and Krystina Finlay. 1999. "The Role of Empathy in Improving Intergroup Relations." *Journal of Social Issues* 55 (4): 729-743.
- Thien, Deborah. 2005. "After or Beyond Feeling? A Consideration of Affect and Emotion in Geography." *Wiley on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society* 37 (4): 450-454.

Tomkins, S. 2008. *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness: The Complete Edition*. New York, NY: Springer.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wolf, Reinhard. 2013. "Resentment in International Relations." In *Status Claims, Recognition and Emotions in IR*, 1-18. Mainz: ECPR.

Wolf, Reinhard. 2018. "Political Emotions as Public Processes: Analyzing Transnational Resseniments in Discourse." In *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, 231-254. Switzerland: Palgrave Studies in International Relations.

Wolf, R. 2011. "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition." *International Theory* 3 (1): 105-142.