

Human Security in Southeast Asia

Yukiko Nishikawa



Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series

Human Security in Southeast Asia

There is a growing interest in human security in Southeast Asia. This book explores the theoretical and conceptual basis of human security, before focusing on the region itself. It shows how human security has been taken up as a central part of security policy in individual states in Southeast Asia, as well as in the regional security policy within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The book discusses domestic challenges for human security including the insurgencies in southern Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. Transnational security issues such as terrorism, drugs, human trafficking and the situation in Myanmar (Burma) are explored by the author, and the 'ASEAN way' of contrasting the values and approaches of Southeast Asian countries with those in the West is assessed. By focusing on the ongoing changes and efforts to achieve human security in Southeast Asia, this book contributes to theoretical debates on human security as well as regional studies on Southeast Asia.

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Preface

When living in a rather isolated town in Thailand, the issue of human security is not merely an analytical tool for discussion, it concerns everyday life and also the society one belongs to. People's lifestyle and way of living in Thailand show extreme contrasts from those in highly developed urban areas, like in Bangkok, and those in rural areas, even in areas only several miles away from Bangkok. While in urban areas in Thailand, people's way of living may not be so different from those in many capital cities around the world with relatively good access to almost everything necessary in one's life, including education, healthcare, food, and information, this is not always the case outside major cities. The contrasting living conditions, although what I have witnessed may be a narrow contrast, generate diverse security needs. A certain perceived security threat in Bangkok may not be considered as a security threat in a rural village in the country. However, even within Bangkok, what may be considered as a security threat for one person may not be so for another person. Human security, then, depends on the subjective state of mind of each person – not an objective condition of being, as 'security' depends on the perceptions people have of their position in their environment, not on an objective view of that environment. Yet, the difficulties in achieving human security may not necessarily derive from such diverse views and perceptions.

When walking on a main road in a town fifteen miles away from Bangkok, one will experience the situation that motorbikes pass by right next to you from both directions – one from behind and another from the front. One's personal safety when walking on the road is not guaranteed. It is rare to see police officers instruct or guide such motorcyclists towards following traffic rules. It is rare for people who experience such situations to pay attention to the motorbike riders. For them, it is a commonplace occurrence that everyone witnesses on a daily basis. If one's personal safety is a human security issue, perhaps this commonplace occurrence is also a human security concern. This commonplace occurrence begs the question: whose responsibility is it? The motorbike riders, the police, the government, or the people who witness the scene everyday yet do not recognize the problem? I feel the responsibility belongs to all of them.

In the course of explaining the public and private aspects of peacemaking from his long experience as an international mediator, Adam Curle, also known as a scholar in peace studies, points out that in peacemaking, considering only the leaders who have to make momentous political and strategic decisions is not enough, although they would be taking the very important first steps towards re-establishing peace. Adam states that “the consolidation of peace as a peaceful society needs many peaceful people, and peacefulness is a quality of people not driven by violent or desperate feelings”. He contends that this is a very important argument for seeking non-violent methods of changing cruel, or corrupt, unjust, or unequal social structures.

The same may be true for ‘security’ in our society, although I am not ambitious enough to explore the nexus between ‘security’ and ‘peace’. Perhaps, security in armed conflict situations cannot be discussed in the same vein as that in non-armed conflict situations. Yet, I do share Adam’s claim in the course of exploring human security in Southeast Asia. I felt achieving human security requires many people who recognize the security of individuals. Human security relies on the quality in people who feel joint responsibility and participate in the effort. It is beyond addressing government leaders and authorities, such as police and armed forces.

The thoughts that have shaped this book came from everyday experiences, living in Thailand over the years, visiting different part of Southeast Asia, teaching students from Southeast Asian countries, facilitating professional training programmes in the region, and sharing thoughts with people in the region. Coming from a non-Southeast Asian country, it was not possible for me to write this book without help from the people in the region. I thank all who supported me in various ways throughout the years. I especially thank Professor Leszek Buszynski for his support and guidance to write this book. My thanks also go to colleagues, staff, and students of the Office of Human Rights and Social Development in Mahidol University. Scholars who have been working in the peace and conflict studies field in Southeast Asia and from other regions deserve special thanks for giving me inspiration over the years. I thank all respondents and those who supported me during my visits in various parts of the region for interviews, roundtable discussions, seminars, and conferences. Finally, my deep gratitude goes to my parents. Without their understanding and support, I wouldn’t have finished this rather ambitious endeavour.

List of abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and People's Rights
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
AICOHR	ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies Colloquium on Human Rights
AICOHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
APA ASEAN	People's Assembly
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies
ATCAS	Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act
AU	African Union
BNPP	Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani
BRN	Barisan Revolusi Nasional
CACM	Central American Common Market
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCASG	Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CHRC	Cambodian Committee on Human Rights
CHS	Commission on Human Security
CLA	Criminal Law Act
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CPM 43	Civil-Police-Military Task Force 43
CPRGS	Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO	Civil Society Organization

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DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
EC	European Commission
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
EU	European Union
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community
FDFA	Federal Department for Foreign Affairs
GAFTA	Greater Arab Free Trade Area
GAMPAR	Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GUAM	GUAM organization for Democracy and Economic Development
HLP	High Level Panel
HSN	Human Security Network
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ISA	Internal Security Act
JCCCH	Government-MILF Joint Ceasefire Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
MDA	Misuse of Drugs Act
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NHRI	National Human Rights Institutions
NLD	National League for Democracy
NRC	National Reconciliation Commission
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
PAD	People's Alliance for Democracy
PARTA	Pacific Islands Forum
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conference
PPM	Patani People's Movement

PSC	Protracted social conflict
PULO	Pattani United Liberation Front
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPA	Solidarity for Asia People's Advocacy
SAPA-TF-	
AHRSAHA	Task Force-ASEAN and Human Rights
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SBPAC	Southern Border Provincial Administration Center
SBPCC	Southern Border Provinces Coordination Center
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SUHAKAM	Human Rights Commission of Malaysia
SPCPD	Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development
SZOPAD	Special Zone for Peace and Development
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TOR	Terms of References
TWG	Technical Working Group
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	Unasur Union of South American Nations United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US	United States of America
VAP	Vientiane Action Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

Introduction

Why human security now?

Human security is a growing concern around the globe and an evolving concept in the discourse of security. Since the concept was first introduced in the international arena during the 1990s, the idea and its utility have been widely debated in academia and policy circles around the world. The idea has been mentioned on many occasions by international, regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as by various governments.¹ The varied interpretations of the concept along with noticeable disagreements prove the degree to which it has attracted all who debate the notion, its value, and its utility.

Human security principally concerns the security of individuals and communities, in marked contrast to the traditional discourse that emphasizes the security of the 'state', or that of a territory or government. This traditional discourse is by no means irrelevant to human security, given the continued salience of the state in international relations. However, there are mounting debates regarding the purpose of security. The notion of human security proposes a shift in our point of reference, placing people as the focal point of security considerations for both analysis and policy.

Most obviously, human security is endangered during times of armed conflict or war, when people's physical safety is being threatened. Threats to people's security, however, arise not only from missiles, bombs, and bullets but also from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition. This can be witnessed in the living conditions of the millions of refugees and internally displaced persons in Iraq, Afghanistan, occupied Palestinian territories, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Colombia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. War-exacerbated disease and malnutrition caused more deaths than missiles, bombs and bullets do in most of today's armed conflicts (Mack 2005: 7).² Thus, human security is also about the conditions of people's daily living. Even in the absence of actual physical violence, people continue to suffer from fear. Mack points out that people are ruled by fear in highly authoritarian states, emphasizing the increasing level of state repression in half of the developing world over the last 20 years (Mack 2005: 7). In such cases, the question of human security is about more than people's safety and their living conditions; it is about their

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dignity. Furthermore, there are numerous threats to people's physical safety and living conditions even in the absence of armed conflict. These threats include the ravages of natural disasters, fatal diseases, environmental hazards, unemployment, and food shortages, although traditionally these were not considered security concerns. The perspective of human security obviously widens the overall scope of security.

Nevertheless, none of these human security issues are new. Throughout human history these situations caused an untold number of deaths, created harsh living conditions, resulted in physical and psychological humiliations and thus were major threats to human security. Internal wars and rebellions caused an immense number of casualties since ancient times, as seen in the An Shi Rebellion (756–63) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) in China, the Great Paraguayan War (1864–70), and the Russian Civil War (1917–23).³ Moreover, estimates of the number of casualties in the Russian Civil War reveal more deaths by starvation and disease as a result of the war than by engagement in battle.⁴ Similarly, it is estimated that the Taiping Rebellion caused far more civilian than military casualties.⁵

The trends of today's armed conflicts are not far different from those of wars recorded between the 1820s and the 1870s.⁶ Human dignity has likewise been a historic and constant issue. It is said that in many wars and rebellions throughout history, torture and public punishment were deliberately designed to humiliate individuals.⁷ There are also records of famines that caused malnutrition, epidemics, and increased mortality, such as the Great Irish Famine (1846–49), the Bengal Famine (1769–73 and 1943), and the Rajputana Famine in India (1869). Some of these are even considered man-made.⁸ The draught and famine resulting from the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) are said to have caused a decrease of over 60 million people in China's population (Schwede 1972: 3). Historical records confirm that earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, cyclones and hurricanes also left a vast number of casualties, including 4,000,000 deaths resulting from the 1931 China flood, 123,000 from the 1908 earthquake in southern Italy, and 92,000 from the eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia in 1815.⁹

These snapshots in time show the ebb and flow of great human suffering. Undoubtedly, human history is a history of human suffering. Here, a question arises: given this past, why is human security more fiercely debated now than at any time in human history? Some may argue that it is because the increase in the number of internal conflicts and the consequent casualties has contributed to our awareness of human security. However, as seen in the aforementioned figures, history demonstrates the continuous human suffering caused by similar, or even worse, internal conflicts, natural disasters, and state oppression.

It is also important here to note that the number of conflicts does not always tally with the scale of security issues. For example, while the estimated number of deaths as a result of the Taiping Rebellion is said to be around 30 million people, fewer than a hundred died in the civil war that broke out in Switzerland in 1847.¹⁰ Consequently, it is an oversimplification to merely

point to the increase in internal conflicts or casualties when explaining why human security is debated now. This is true although there are likely demographic conditions, such as population growth, to explain the larger number of casualties recently than in the past.¹¹ Likewise, the chances of man-made disasters, including wars and armed conflicts, are increasing due to more frequent human interactions because of a burgeoning world population. The impacts of population growth are obviously larger in a globalized world¹² where events within one state have significant effects on other states and vice versa. A revolution today can become a world war tomorrow, while several states can become one entity. The definition of states and nations is indeed in constant flux, yet the impacts are obviously magnified in a globalized world.

The major reason that human security is debated now is that recent history has more documented evidence, more proof, and more analyses of human security concerns, which theoretically increase our ability to deal with them. There have been far-reaching technological, scientific, and intellectual developments over the last century. Our capacity to record various kinds of human suffering, analyze their causes, and ultimately work on alleviating them has increased significantly. This is evidenced by the existence of immense amounts of data, media resources, academic and policy studies, and publications on various types of human suffering. The information from these sources allows us to create greater possibilities to find appropriate methods and approaches to deal with them in a more systematic manner. Hence, the opportunities to reduce human suffering are obviously greater now than at any time in human history. The effort to challenge some of the human security concerns is, in fact, apparent in the work of international, regional, and sub-regional organizations as well as that of government and non-governmental organizations. Such attempts have been expanding since the end of World War II, as we see in the major international effort under the United Nations (UN) system. The question now is whether such efforts actually help to generate viable measures to achieve human security.

In 2007, we witnessed the plight of people demonstrating in Yangon. It was not surprising that they demonstrated in the face of a rise in fuel and food prices and related deprivations in Myanmar (Burma).¹³ The abhorrent reality is that peaceful demonstrators led by Buddhist monks were suppressed by heavy-handed use of force, resulting in deaths, injuries, and arrests, in what became known as the 'Saffron Revolution'. Yet, real action by its neighbours was slow in coming and constrained due to lack of consensus on who should exert influence over the country's power holders. Any discussion of human security in Southeast Asia today must inevitably address the situation in Myanmar. It surely leads us to a question and we are accordingly faced with a moral dilemma: can any discussion here add value to what should be done? Or will analysis merely add empty rhetoric to the situation? These are indeed questions encountered by many scholars and policy-makers who have attempted to best define and practice human security.

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The answers to these questions depend on us. Human security has been a pressing issue throughout human history. Yet, there are more opportunities to deal with human security concerns today because of our capacity and ability to document and analyze evidence. This book attempts to contribute to such efforts to achieve human security by examining the existing debates and actual policy actions of human security in Southeast Asia. It considers steps that may be necessary to actually put human security into practice in the region. In so doing, it explores whether the idea and the approach of human security can offer viable solutions to some of the problems in the region. The questions addressed in this book will be of utmost interest to scholars, policy-makers, policy circles and perhaps to the people in the region who try to make sense of 'security' in Southeast Asia.

The why and what of human security in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia,¹⁴ consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia, now formulate the third largest regional bloc, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), measured by population, in the world.¹⁵ It is a region of both great diversity and great paradox. Democratic and autocratic regimes often exist side by side, while developed and highly technological urban societies co-exist with rural and developing areas. The development patterns vary significantly with different paces of industrialization and agricultural production. These differences in development illustrate the disparities between the areas where poverty has been reduced and those where it is still pervasive. Food shortages and natural disasters constantly exacerbate such disparities. While communities comprised of different ethnicities and religions live peacefully alongside each other, there are places where people suffer from protracted communal and social conflicts. Abundant criticism has been levelled toward the countries that are too poor to feed their people but at the same time have an overabundance of military resources. There are numerous other examples that reveal the contrasts and contradictions of life in Southeast Asia.

For the lives of the 575 million people in the region who live among such contrasts and contradictions, human security issues have vast relevance.¹⁶ In each country, though to differing degrees, people continue to suffer from poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, malnutrition, communal conflicts, terrorism, crimes, political violence, human rights violations, and social injustice. The effects of these threats in one country often spread to neighbouring countries through the flow of refugees and illegal emigrants with negative consequences on regional security as a whole. Thus, threats to human security are grave and pervasive in Southeast Asia. In addition, serious consequences felt daily in people's living standards as well as in the region's economy brought about by the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, and the 2004 Indian

Ocean Tsunami are still fresh in our minds. There is no doubt that human security is relevant to the lives of Southeast Asian people.

The notion of human security is, however, subject to a variety of interpretations. Regarding Southeast Asia, the emphasis is sometimes on people's safety (e.g. freedom from threats to life such as those caused by armed conflicts), while at other times, it is on people's living conditions (e.g. elimination of poverty and underdevelopment) or dignity (e.g. promotion of human values and rights). This difference in emphasis proves that myriad human security issues exist in the region. This being the case, will the concept of and approach to human security solve the seemingly insurmountable problems in Southeast Asia?

The concept of human security is still in its infancy in Southeast Asian discourse. The levels of awareness as well as interpretations of the concept vary significantly among the region's countries. However, these differences do not negate the fact that there are growing human security considerations in Southeast Asia which remain relevant to future perspectives of each country and the region. In fact, several countries in the region are incorporating human security directly into national action. By the same token, increasing consideration of human security is now shaping a new framework in regional formulas in both Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. For example, ASEAN is taking the lead in formulating people-oriented values and a people-centred approach in its cooperative efforts as expressed in its key documents, including the ASEAN Charter signed in 2007 and the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme. Similarly, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) attempts to promote human security. The leaders of APEC affirmed in the Leaders' Declaration made during the Summit of the APEC Forum in 2007, that "human security is essential to economic growth and prosperity".¹⁷

There is a growing interest in and outlook for human security in Southeast Asia. It is an extraordinary time for us to explore why and how the region has come to focus on human security now. Whether the concept is fully appreciated and reflected in the national and regional policy choices depends on both normative and practical indications of the security discourse in each country and within the region. It is, therefore, essential to study the discourse of human security of each country and the region. Moreover, whether the concept can do something practical beyond being merely verbal and nominal depends on how well the conceptual perspectives are translated into activities and programmes. This is the challenge of moving from the conceptual to the practical. How does the region confront regional and global concerns of human security? How does each country deal with human security issues in its own territory and through regional co-operation? Ultimately, what are the future perspectives of human security in Southeast Asia? These are some of the questions that this book attempts to answer.

The focus of the human security issues addressed in this volume is on violence related to intra-state conflicts, intra-regional security issues, and

human rights situations in Southeast Asia. These are, in fact, the notorious issues that pose enormous challenges for each country and the regional bloc in achieving security. However, this does not mean that human security is narrowly defined in this book, focusing only on people's physical safety and dignity. Instead, the book approaches human security in the broadest sense, addressing other issues related to people's life conditions, such as poverty, health care and employment, all of which form part of human security considerations. These issues are often intrinsically linked with the problems addressed in this book, contributing in certain context to conflicts and human rights situations. Therefore, all aspects of human security must be duly taken into consideration. This point will be clarified in the chapter that follows.

There are a number of publications, both scholarly and policy-related, that focus on human security. Some of them include discussions in the Asian and Southeast Asian contexts. Little empirical research, however, has been done on human security in conjunction with the on-going changes in Southeast Asia. The findings regarding the discourse and policy choices of each country and the region reinforce the analysis of future perspectives of human security in the region. This volume fills the gap between the existing work and the evolving context surrounding human security in Southeast Asia. It is an outcome of studies based on interviews, personal communications, conference findings, roundtable and seminar discussions, and workshop results, as well as secondary materials, including documents both published and unpublished, official and unofficial.¹⁸

Organization of the book

The book consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 establishes the groundwork of conceptual and theoretical debates regarding human security. It illustrates various conceptions of human security as well as debates concerning both the concept's usefulness and its limitations. This groundwork leads to an elucidation of the focus and discourse of human security applied in the book when analyzing human security in Southeast Asia. Chapter 2 explores the relevance of human security to evolving national and regional contexts in Southeast Asia, laying out various on-going changes in relation to human security considerations. First it delineates how the concept of human security came into focus in national and regional policy choices in Southeast Asia. Then it looks at ASEAN's discourse of human security and the relevance of human security in its activities. This is followed by a review of studies on security discourse and the relevance of human security in domestic contexts in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia. From these studies, the chapter attempts to identify the underlying issues to be considered when discussing human security in Southeast Asia. Chapter 3 focuses on some of the human security issues in national contexts. In particular, it looks at violent internal conflicts in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. With an understanding of the discourse and approach of

human security in each country and the region, the chapter examines whether the idea and approach of human security can help to actually resolve internal conflicts in these countries. It thus concerns the utility of human security in the national context. This is followed by a study of human security in the regional context in Chapter 4, which focuses on some of the regional challenges to achieve human security. These include ASEAN's efforts to set up a regional human rights mechanism, the situation in Myanmar, and the handling of transnational issues, such as terrorism, conflict, and trafficking. The chapter considers the actual challenges that the region faces in its effort to achieve human security. Chapter 5 ponders whether the concept and approach of human security are compatible with Southeast Asian values, principles, and practices (sometimes called the ASEAN way). It attempts to examine both the normative and the practical utility of human security in Southeast Asia. Finally, the volume examines whether human security provides a viable solution to some of the problems in Southeast Asia. It concludes by considering future perspectives of human security in the region in a general sense and the specific steps that may be necessary to actually put it into practice in the region.

1 Human security

A new label for old challenges?

The growing focus on human security since the 1990s has engendered considerable debates and fostered several fundamental questions of security debate: security for whom, what threats, protection by who, and with what means security should be achieved? While various conceptions of human security emerge as both tools for academic analysis and means for policy practice as a result of such debates, all concerned agree that the primary goal of human security is to achieve the security of people. Disagreements have emerged regarding the scope of security and the methods that can be used to achieve the security of people. Exploring the debates of the human security concept will illustrate its key components. This chapter, therefore, sets out the genesis of the current human security debates and various distinctive views on the concept of human security. It attempts to examine both normative and practical implications of the concept and explain how the term is interpreted and suggested in this book when exploring human security in Southeast Asia.

Reorienting security?

The concept of 'security' is claimed a 'contested concept' (Kolodziej 2005:18; Baylis 1997: 194). This is partly because 'security' is ambiguous and elastic in its meaning. There is a common view that it implies freedom from 'danger, risk, anxiety, or apprehension' (Smith 2003: 1138). However, there is the serious conceptual (and normative) problem of determining the main focus of enquiry: 'individual', 'state', or 'international' security. The traditional understanding of security in international politics and international theories lies in security for states (Baylis 1997: 194). With the rise of the nation-state, collective strategic security became central in political discourse throughout the twentieth century, being enforced by diplomatic and military formations. As a result, most discussions on security were dominated by the idea of 'national' or 'state' security, particularly during the Cold War period, which was largely defined in militarized terms – protecting national interests and territory from outside (Shani *et al.* 2007: 1). The main interest for both academics and policy-makers tended to be in the military capabilities that their own states should develop in order to deal with the threats that faced them.

In academia, this position was most explicitly expressed by scholars who belong to the school of thought called realism in international relations theory.¹ However, it seems this view is not pervasive in the political thinking in the modern period. According to Rothschild, it is only after 1815 that national or state security became widespread, referring to a collective process, in which the participants are states (Rothschild 1995: 53). The Concert of Europe of 1815 serves as an important stepping stone for the emergence of a collective process of security; the emergence of international governmental organizations and of international law, building a *community* of states.² The Congress of Vienna³ and the Rhine Commission⁴ formed in 1815 are among some of the predecessors of such collective process.

From Roman times until the French Revolution, ‘security’ was an objective of individuals (Rothschild 1995: 53–54). In the past what we call ‘human security’ would therefore have been as dominant in security discourses as in the modern period, although the particular term, ‘human security’, might have not existed. If so, human security discussed today may not be a new kind of knowledge. It is, in a sense, a new terminology that sheds light on the concealed aspect of what ‘security’ was once pursued in the past. Nonetheless, the rationales of the focus on security of individuals in the current debate on human security may have different implications because of international and domestic political and socio-economic contexts in the contemporary world.

Fostering central questions on security: growing human security considerations

Though security of individuals, or human security, has been widely debated only since the 1990s, there were noteworthy international appeals for security of individuals even in the midst of state dominance in international politics and security discourses. The Geneva Conventions with their additional protocols (1864/1944/1977) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), for example, set out normative and legal arguments that support humanitarian principles and seek to protect individuals.

One of the underlying principles in the normative and legal arguments can be traced in ‘human rights’ values primarily focused with the three generations of rights law: civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and collective rights.⁵ The international conventions and principles are binding on states and legitimize international scrutiny of the interaction between the state and people (Kerr 2003: 12). They obviously set the tone for a human-centred approach from normative and legal perspectives. Nonetheless, the correlation between human security and human rights is more complex than it appears. For some, human security and human rights enrich each other (Seidensticker 2002). If human security becomes a national security concern, human rights cannot be neglected ‘in the name of security’ (Seidensticker 2002). The connection between human security and human rights is, then, a corrective to the state-centric approach. It reinforces the normative elements

of security. For others, the connection is a fundamental flaw: if the inclusion of human rights means that state rights – the right to external and internal sovereignty – becomes conditional upon Western formation of human rights, in particular civil and political rights (Kerr 2003: 12), as many critics point out, grave human rights violations can be reasons for justifying military intervention and overriding sovereignty. More recently, there is a debate about balancing human rights to better deal with national security; thereby claiming that human rights laws undermine national security.⁶

Despite such disagreements, the debate regarding the relationship between human security and human rights illustrates possible failures for the state-centric approach in its effort to protect individuals. Above all, the state-centred approach fails to protect people suffering harms, as perpetrated by the state. Kerr points out five such examples: 1) international humanitarian law (IHL);⁷ 2) the establishment of three international tribunals;⁸ 3) the UN resolutions that establish standards for the protection of civilians during internal conflict;⁹ 4) a UN *aide memoire* for ‘consideration of issues pertaining to the protection of civilians during the Security Council’s deliberations of peacekeeping mandates’;¹⁰ and 5) the UN resolutions against terrorism¹¹ (Kerr 2003: 12–13).

A more prominent emphasis on the normative human-centric dimension of security was highlighted in the international arena through several empirical claims laid out in the disarmament and development debate, and critiques of economic development during the 1980s. According to Acharya, the debate over the disarmament-development nexus served as one of the important bases for the human security concept (Acharya 2001: 443–4). In response to the Cold War arms race, various UN forums and the work of several independent commissions, including the report from the Brandt Commission (1980) on international development issues, the Palme Commission on common security (1982), and the report from the Brundtland Commission entitled *Our Common Future* (1987), urged shift the focus of security analysis. The Palme Report, for example, stressed that security must be reconceived with people foremost in mind. It is argued that the stability and well-being of communities and nations rests as much on factors associated with human development, economic growth, and democracy as on acquisition of a weapons arsenal (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). The state security discourse and the realist view on security depict the heavy reliance on military force due to its focus on territorial security and national interests. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), in fact, points out enormous amounts of national wealth and human resources diverted into armaments and armed forces by states while they “fail to protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and environmental hazard” (ICISS 2002: 15).

In the area of development assistance, by the 1980s, there were already huge doubts about the wisdom of growth for its own sake. In many cases,

fast-growing countries showed that the benefits of growth could not be relied on to ‘trickle-down’ to the poor (Allen and Thomas 1997: 456). Where there were marked income inequalities, high growth did not translate into higher incomes for all. Economic development was building enclaves of modernization within developing economies with limited benefits for the majority of the population. Accordingly, throughout the 1980s and beyond, equitable development, social justice, human rights, gender equality, and environmental considerations among other issues, were emphasized in enhancing sustainable human development (Roberts 1984: 6; WCED 1987; Adams 1993: vii; Gore 2000: 795). Gore argues that the key feature of sustainable human development is that “it espouses a different set of values”, which focuses on the nature of people’s lives and participation (Gore 2000: 795).¹² A realization of the importance and necessity of a human-centred approach, to a certain extent, arise from various critiques over the dominant top-down or state-centric approach in the development field.

These normative claims are endorsed as we face continuous severe intra-state or domestic conditions in many developing countries, such as poverty, communal conflicts, and social injustice (Murshed 2002: 388).¹³ Though careful studies are necessary in order to prove the correlation between internal conflict and underdevelopment,¹⁴ violent conflicts in developing countries particularly indicate the necessity to review the existing approach, methods, and management of development and security. Furthermore, the trend of internal conflicts in developing countries show that threats to individuals often come from their state – due to either over-strong or over-weak government.¹⁵ In the former case, state-power in itself could be a threat to individuals through different forms of repression – most prevalent in highly authoritarian states. In the latter case, serious threats occur where neither governmental bodies nor any other legitimate agent are capable of taking responsibility for the management of violence and socio-economic deprivations.

In sum, as we launch into development of the human security concept, there is recognition that even in situations where the existence of the state is not threatened by other states, people’s well-being and dignity, i.e. their survival and welfare, could be in danger from multiple sources of threats – not necessarily limited in military terms by way of aggression from other states. In the worst case scenario, threats come from the state itself. Human security, therefore, apparently sketches four central questions of ‘security’ – security for whom; what threats; and/or protection by whom; and with what means? These questions fundamentally highlight underlying multi-dimensional dialectic elements of security between two referent objects, i.e. the state and people, between internal and external threats to these referent objects, and between the various means for enhancing the security of each. In examining these questions, there is a growing view that emphasizes normative and utilitarian imperatives to protect people, even though the state-centred approach may remain significant in the security discourse. In academia, these are indeed the questions addressed in ‘critical security’ studies, or the

school of thought that challenges the traditional views about the meaning of security.¹⁶

Realism versus ethics? In the relationship between national and human security

Human security puts individuals at the centre of discourse, analysis, and policy, whereas traditional security discourse, i.e. state or national security, places states at the centre. For this reason, human security is often discussed in relation to state or national security (Suhrke 1999; Owen 2004; Amouyel 2006). Nevertheless, the debate does not devote to a simple dichotomy between national versus human security. Rather, the prominent characteristics of security are illustrated in the relationship between them. The relationship is traced in the criticisms that each makes of the other.

On one hand, it is argued that the rapid developments in telecommunications, information technology, and transportation help to trans-nationalize the impact of local problems (Tan and Boutin 2001: 2). Threats to human security, therefore, must be taken into national, regional, and global security considerations. For example, information technology has provided channels for international crime and terrorism, while an outbreak of fatal disease in a village can spark worldwide panic in the age of aviation travel. In other words, the impact of one's security problem is sometimes magnified by intensified transnational interactions in the contemporary world. This is often explained as an effect of 'globalization' force (Tan and Boutin 2001: 2).¹⁷ It is argued that human security is and should be a global, regional and national concern and thus becomes a vital and primary concern in order to achieve 'state' security. On the other hand, an emphasis has been made on state security to achieve human security. Barry Buzan, for example, argued that although states may not be a sufficient condition for individual security and they may even be the main problem, they are certainly a necessary condition for individual security because no other agency can act on behalf of individuals (Seng 2001: 15). In his view, state security remains the necessary condition for the security of the individual.

The central issue of these contrasting claims exists in the very characteristic of 'security' in the exchange between state and its citizens, evidenced since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.¹⁸ The Hobbesian model of state characterizes the exchange of 'security' for its citizens against the legitimate monopoly of violence within its borders.¹⁹ 'State security' in this context stands on the premise that the state fulfils its 'social contract', that is to say it will protect people.²⁰ However, it does not take into account the possibility that the state, as shown today, may partly or completely fail to fulfil its social contract.

There is a globalization force that makes transnational and internal threats more challenging for states.²¹ It highlights the limitations and sometimes failures of states. On one hand, a number of transnational problems have emerged, which cannot be dealt with by any one country, such as environmental

and ecological problems, migration, financial problems, transnational terrorism, and transnational crimes. On the other hand, even internal or domestic problems, such as severe poverty, socio-economic deprivations, internal disturbances, and communal conflicts, have become a serious concern for regional and international security, due to their potentials to cause large-scale movement of refugees and migrations. Security threats to people and those to states have become closer than ever before. This is why human security is becoming a concern for the state's security and vice versa; the failure of human security can threaten a state or regime's security, meaning state security is almost synonymous for human security. The effect of globalization in this sense has a significant bearing in our debates on security.

The difficulties, and limitations for, and the failure, and unwillingness of the state to protect its citizens were the prominent characteristics perceived in various threat contexts in the post-Cold War era. Such threat contexts also illustrated the growing effect of globalization. This observation informs us that achieving national and human security in the era of globalization requires addressing the inseparable and often interdependent relationships between state and its citizens as well as addressing the relationships between states. The concept of human security has prompted us to review the order of 'individual', 'national', and 'international' security in the globalizing world in which the dual processes of integration and fragmentation of states occur, bringing new kinds of risk and danger.²² The changing notion of security reflects the altering international, regional, and national politics and their impacts on individuals, upon whom sovereignty has both positive and negative effects. However, the crucial issue in this context would be to find a fine balance between national and human security considerations, rather than examining which dominates the other.

Key components of human security: what threats?

A significant foundation of human security considerations is laid out, among others, by incorporating empirical insights from disarmament and development attitudes towards the 1990s. The use of the term human security is indeed perceived from the early 1990s (Rothschild 1995; Suhrke 1999: 275; Glasius 2008: 32). However, human security as a distinct notion was introduced in the international arena through a threshold publication, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report* of 1994.

The report is considered as cornerstone publication in that it made the concept widely recognized around the world and set the tone for the succeeding definitions by various scholars and policy-makers. It suggests a new approach regarding 'security' by claiming that "the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly" (UNDP 1994: 22). The report states that "human security is *people-centred*" (UNDP 1994: 23). Two major components of human security are 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' (UNDP 1994: 23–24). It essentially reminds us what Franklin D. Roosevelt

discussed in his ‘Four Freedoms’ speech in 1941.²³ While these two components entail a wide variety of issues, human security, according to the report, centres around two main aspects: “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP 1994: 23). The report further lists seven categories of threats to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP 1994: 24–33).

The components suggested by UNDP demonstrate the need to find a rallying point between development and security. The new conception of security, therefore, had an appeal to both development and security specialists who had keen interests in adopting a broader perspective (Caballero-Anthony 2004: 168). Human security, in fact, became a popular term, being employed by international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as several governments, to frame their security agenda. The human security notion suggested by UNDP was, however, rather criticized as being overly ambitious and all-encompassing and thus resulted in doubts about the feasibility of the operationalization of the concept (Lee 2004: 21; Paris 2001: 88).

Moreover, Shin-Wha Lee has pointed out that the seven elements raised by UNDP made the human security concept hard to distinguish from human development (Lee 2004: 21). The UNDP report notes that human security is narrower than human development (UNDP 1994: 23). Human development is explained as “a process of widening the range of people’s choices”, while human security is meant to be a condition in which people can exercise these choices safely and freely (UNDP 1994: 23). Nevertheless, Lee argues that there seems to be a possible reverse context, where human development is the means through which human security is to be achieved (Lee 2004: 21). Additionally, some countries further criticized the explanation by UNDP for its over-emphasis on security issues that result from underdevelopment.²⁴ In fact, later on, the UN system did not accept the outline by UNDP as a common definition.²⁵

The outline by UNDP and critics on the UNDP’s conception suggest that while there is an agreement and a necessity to expand the notion of security, no consensus exists on what should be included in the human security concept – the kind of situations that should be considered threat to people. An obvious dilemma is that while achieving security for individuals requires expanding the scope of our security discourse, such wide-scope discourses may overload the security agenda – rendering it too ambiguous to put into practice. For this reason, in conceptualizing human security distinctive views have emerged among those who attempted to better define and operationalize the concept.

Bridging or separating? Broad versus narrow conceptions

The distinctive views in defining the human security concept primarily centre on the approaches to security. Human security brings together ‘want’ and

‘fear’ or ‘development’ and ‘security’ dimensions into one framework. Nonetheless, ironically, the two components seem to divide the approach: broad versus narrow.²⁶ Narrow conceptions mainly concern violent threats to individuals, placing ‘freedom from fear’ or freedom from threats to people’s lives, safety, and rights, at the core of consideration (Krause 1998; Mack 2005; Lodgaard 2000; MacFarlane 2004). Broad conceptions include not only violent threats but also such threats as hunger, disease, and natural disasters, or ‘freedom from want’ (Thakur 1997; Bajpai 2000; Leaning and Arie 2000; Alkire 2003). They suggest that human security means something more than safety from violent threats.

Following the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*, many scholarly and policy-oriented writings employ inclusive and broad definitions of human security (Leaning and Arie 2000; Alkire 2003; Suhrke 1999; Thakur 1997; Thakur *et al.* 2000; and Bajpai 2000). Diverse definitions of human security within the broad definitions are further illustrated by minimum and maximum human security ideals (Lee 2004: 22–24). The minimum human security ideals concern the protection of individuals from poverty, natural disasters, forced displacement, and physical and structural violence (or the basic assurance of people’s survival).²⁷ The maximum human security ideals concern people’s access to the basic essentials of life, welfare, and strategies for sustainable civil society (the right to enjoy life to its fullest).²⁸

The foundational idea of the minimum and maximum human security ideals is traced in the explanation of ‘hierarchy of needs’ suggested by Abraham Maslow (Maslow 1971). Maslow considers human beings’ needs to be arranged like a ladder. The most basic needs, at the bottom, are physical – air, water, food, sleep. Then comes safety needs – security, stability – followed by psychological, or social needs – for belonging, love, and acceptance. At the top of the ladder are the self-actualizing needs – the need to fulfill oneself, to become all that one is capable of becoming. Maslow felt that unfulfilled needs lower on the ladder would inhibit the person from climbing to the next step. People who deal with managing the higher needs are what he called self-actualizing people.²⁹ Each level is thus dependent on the previous level. Satisfying higher-level needs requires fulfilment of all the lower levels (Maslow 1971). The lowest levels of Maslow’s hierarchy can be considered as the minimum elements within the broad conceptions of human security; whereas, the highest levels would be comparable to the highest objective of human security.

The broad definitions of human security apparently encompasses a variety of issues, ranging from the protection of the one’s personal safety, to freedom from hunger, poverty, diseases, natural disasters, human rights violations, social injustice, and both direct and indirect violence. In spite of the fact that broadening the conception of security was one of the very reasons why the human security concept was suggested by UNDP, the inclusive definitions were criticized for their all-encompassing feature, which makes it difficult to put the concept into practice, particularly for policy options and applications (Lee 2004: 25).

Reflecting the criticisms towards the broad definitions, the narrow definitions focus on violence. Lodgaard, for example, emphasizes freedom from fear and confined the conception of human security to only the issues related to physical, direct, and personal violence on the individual (Lodgaard 2000).³⁰ Those who prefer the narrow definitions point to the normative success of violence-based human security initiatives (Krause 1998; MacFarlane 2004; Mack 2005). They justify the approach by suggesting, it is their analytic clarity that assures conceptual and policy consequences, achievable because of the narrow focus (MacFarlane 2004; Mack 2005; Thomas and Tow 2002a). For some, therefore, the definition of human security is determined by the feasibility of putting the concept into practice.

The broad conceptions recognize the analytic and normative difficulties that emerge as a result of the broadening security scope. Nevertheless, those who support broad conceptions consider it a necessary consequence of a security paradigm that goes beyond threats to state. (Leaning and Arie 2000; Alkire 2003). Subsequently, the debate between narrow versus broad conceptions cannot be separated from a further discussion with regard to the applicability of the concept. Various human security conceptions are hence explained by the complex balance between these components, 'freedom from fear' versus 'freedom from want', and theoretical and practical applications of the concept.

While the concept of human security necessitates us having a holistic view regarding security, one of the unresolved issues is the means to put it into practice: in what ways can human security be achieved, what exactly needs to be done, and how can such a wide variety of issues be addressed? There are several difficulties when applying human security to practice. As a result of such considerations, 'protection' and 'empowerment' strategies have become central for policy designs and implementation when operationalizing human security.³¹

The Commission on Human Security (CHS) (CHS 2003) suggests 'protection' to shield people from dangers as an effort to develop norms, processes, and institutions to establish minimum levels of human security. 'Empowerment' is defined as ensuring that people have the ability to develop their human potential and participate in decision-making to achieve maximum human security. The report published by the CHS, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*, examines six broad areas that a human security approach would improve: 1) protecting people (civilians) in violent conflict, 2) protecting and empowering people on the move because of conflicts or serious human rights violations, 3) protecting and empowering people in post-conflict situations, 4) addressing economic insecurity, 5) ensuring better health and 6) promoting knowledge through education and public information (CHS 2003).

The protection and empowerment strategies provide more concrete policy choices, although the conception of human security encompasses a number of broad issues. These issues entail, for example, the protection of the

individual's personal safety, and freedom from hunger, poverty, diseases, natural disasters, human rights violations, and conflicts through human development. The equally broad purpose behind (and, potentially, allowing) the concrete policy choices is the achievement of human dignity, including participation in all aspects of social activities. However, difficulties remain when operationalizing it as in reality, there needs some form of inclusive or comprehensive definition of human security.

Government perspectives: politicization or humanitarianism?

Despite the fact that it is difficult to operationalize human security, governments as well as non-governmental and international organizations attempt to put the idea into practice. As previously explored, national/state security and human security are often discussed as contesting or often incompatible notions. There are, however, noteworthy efforts to apply human security by governments and governmental bodies. For example, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, and Japan, among others, incorporate human security components into their foreign policies to promote more universal acceptance of human security.³² Some analysts argue that some of these countries, identified as 'middle powers', such as Japan and Norway, seek to play an active role in the international arena through promoting human security to compensate for their inability to engage in traditional military security affairs (Lam 2006: 145; Soeya 2005). This is, to a certain extent, convinced by the fact that human security components are incorporated into foreign policies. It is difficult to categorically deny the possibility that an aspect to human security may be utilized, if not always, as a diplomatic tool.³³

The empirical claims that stem from the disarmament and development fields indicate that whether it is a developed or developing state, there are possibilities for a state to fail to protect its citizens. However, the focus of state failures tend to be more on those in developing countries. This is illustrated by the fact that human security was more vigorously promoted through such cases as Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Timor Leste. In these contexts, human security was promoted from both normative and political perspectives. Security threats to individuals caused by their own state created massive humanitarian milieus and enhanced the normative dimension of human security. Meanwhile, the same situations created extremely political venues, in which justifications of intervention or the use of force by a group of other states against the state was also said to protect security of the people who were suffering when their government failed to uphold security of individuals (Macrae and Leader 2000; Weiss 1993).

Nevertheless, the approaches of some major donor governments are not identical, even though these governments claim concern for the security of the individual, just like the UNDP. The Canadian and Japanese governments are the two major protagonists. The two governments take distinctive approaches which clearly indicate different conceptions of human security. UNDP tends

to focus on the safety of the individual from freedom of want. Canada, in contrast, targets the “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives ... ” (Canada 2000: 3; Axworthy 1997). More recently, Canada slightly changed their mission statement focus to achieving “freedom from violent threats to people’s rights, safety, or lives ... ” (DFAIT 2006).

Canada centres on the concept of human security as given by the Geneva Convention (Lee 2004: 29). Canada views human security as preventing physical violence against human beings. The approach to actualizing human security is, thus, illustrated by Canada’s definitional focus on violent conflicts and thus conflict prevention and post-conflict assistance. Canada’s approach derives from the consideration that because freedom from fear is one of the most important objectives for governments to achieve for their citizens, sovereignty is in an inexorable state of decline considering the fact that violations to human physical integrity are caused by internal as well as external factors (Canada 2000). It, therefore, employs a narrow interpretation (Greaves 2008: 8).

Japan provides another different definition, taking a middle-way between the UNDP and Canada. It defines human security by embracing both freedom from want and freedom from fear. The approach was once explained by the then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in a policy speech in 1998, where he announced that human security is “a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life, and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats” (Obuchi 1998).³⁴ Japan’s approach emphasizes threats beyond the traditional boundaries of conflict-related contexts in order to see the broader dimensions of threats. It adopts a broader and more development-oriented notion of human security, yet it has not rejected the relevance of conflict prevention and peace-building. This view is clearly seen in the approach by the Commission on Human Security, to which Japan strongly commits.³⁵ The Commission links human security and peace-building (Yamamoto 2004: 12).

The distinctive approaches differentiating Canada and Japan obviously arise from different conceptions of human security. Their conceptions illustrate different priorities in their foreign policies, reflecting domestic and international politics, and each country’s historical legacies. Canada has a tradition of international peacekeeping that connects to its conception of human security centred around physical violence, whereas Japan, with its legacy of history (suspicions of neighbours and constitutional restrictions due to its actions before and during World War II), takes a less military-oriented approach. Although there are distinctive definitions of human security, the attempts to translate human security into practice by these governments are commonly recognized through their funding and operational support for concrete projects, creating forums, and providing a means to promote wider acceptance of human security.

In 1999, Canada and Norway, for example, initiated the creation of a network, the *Human Security Network*, to actualize human security by

identifying concrete projects.³⁶ The network presently includes 13 countries, Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Thailand as permanent members and South Africa as an observer. Since its establishment, the Human Security Network has attempted to apply a human security perspective to challenge such global issues as banning landmines (and thus significantly contributed to the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines), conflict prevention, human rights education, protection of children in armed conflicts, and the struggle against HIV/AIDS.³⁷ It also supported the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague in 2002.³⁸

Japan, expressing a new perspective on human security in its revised Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter of 2003, employs basic policies to support human security through international cooperation.³⁹ It, for example, introduced grant assistance for grassroots human security projects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003). It also established a trust fund for human security within the United Nations in 1999 to support projects implemented by international organizations that address threats from human security perspectives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004).⁴⁰ Japan utilizes its ODA to actualize human security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003a).⁴¹

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), an independent government agency that coordinates ODA for the government of Japan, has set one of its missions as achieving human security, and therefore implements projects from human security perspectives.⁴² It has incorporated the Millennium Development Goals that are grounded in human security into their operations in sector programmes (JICA 2003). Such projects are aimed at “handling threats to people by helping communities to sustain themselves and increase their resilience”.⁴³ As part of such efforts, in addition to traditional development assistance, there is a growing share of support for peace or peace-building projects.⁴⁴ Moreover, the ODA includes assistance to handle and prevent sudden crisis situations, such as natural disasters and the spread of fatal diseases, as perceived from human security perspectives. It therefore attempts to support such projects as peace and post-conflict peace-building efforts and crisis management in addition to traditional development assistance within the framework of human security, as part of its regular practice. Some such examples are seen in several projects implemented in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003) and in Southeast Asia after the 2004 tsunami disaster and after the outbreak of SARS in 2003 (Lam 2006: 149–51).⁴⁵

As explored hitherto, various attempts to operationalize human security have emerged. However, as Canadian and Japanese approaches illustrate, there is neither agreed conception nor method to apply human security. These depend on each organization’s and government’s discourse, preference, and approach of human security. Moreover, at the governmental level, there is limited focus on human security in domestic or internal contexts.⁴⁶ This

is largely because, as previously explored, major contexts of contemporary human insecurity are often internal in nature, or domestic type of crises, in which the state itself involves in causing human sufferings. In such contexts, debates regarding human security tend to focus on possible actions taken by other countries or international/regional organizations, rather than by the government in concern itself, as seen in the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’. The discussion, as a result, turns to be on the premise that ‘intervention’ is inevitable for human security. For this reason, human security is often discussed and practiced either in very political contexts, as realists argue, in the context of inter-state relations or in humanitarian contexts in which humanitarian and human rights principles are promoted by international and non-governmental organizations. One of the missing points of the current discussion on human security in practice would be the effort by the government in concern to apply human security in domestic contexts or within its borders.

The responsibility: whose responsibility and with what means?

As a reaction to the criticisms that the concept of human security is too-broad and all-encompassing, the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ has entered into the debate, with various associated operational considerations.⁴⁷ The idea, as suggested by the ICISS, concerns the protection of people considered ‘at risk’ from the perspective of a ‘state’s’ responsibility to protect.⁴⁸ It focuses on the protection of people in situations of violent conflict. The idea was eventually embraced at the 2005 World Summit and explained as being about protecting vulnerable populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (UN General Assembly 2005: A/60/L.1).⁴⁹ This definition was followed by the Security Council Resolution (1674) regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

The notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ has a similar definitional focus to the narrow definitions of human security that concern mainly the protection of individuals from direct violence and its consequences. The notion employs one of the popular strategies of human security, i.e. ‘protection’. However, there are critical differences between the two concepts. In fact, the report of ICISS, *the Responsibility to Protect*, attempts to distinguish the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ from a broader concept of human security (ICISS 2002: 15). It defines human security as “the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (ICISS 2002: 15).

Because the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ emerged as a response to critics’ dislike of the broad conceptions of human security, the focus of the responsibility to protect is narrower than that of human security. The narrower focus of the notion of the responsibility to protect can be explained using at least two perspectives. First, for the notion of the responsibility to

protect, the scope of security considerations is primarily limited to such threat contexts as “internal war, insurgency, repression, and other man-made crises rather than natural disasters, the ravages of HIV-AIDS, or anything of that kind” (Evans 2008). Gareth Evans, one of the principle architects of the notion of the responsibility to protect, explained the notion in dealing with specific types of mass atrocities.⁵⁰ Second, the operational focus of the responsibility to protect is on state or the ‘state’s responsibility’ – state’s failure – to prevent threats to people, and respond to and compensate for people’s security needs (ICISS 2002: XI).

The focus of the notion of the responsibility to protect is in stark contrast to that of the notion of human security. The human security notion does not necessarily consider states or their failure as sources of a security threat. The notion of the responsibility protect also points to the possibility for the state to cause security threats to people, as seen in such cases as state-led genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The human security concept, rather, urges us to examine all perspectives where the responsibility exists or who has the responsibility. Although the state may have the primary responsibility, the human security concept is not clear about this point; whether the state is the only and sole entity with responsibility. The issue of responsibility – who has the responsibility and with what means the responsibility is fulfilled – is rather ambiguous in the human security notion. This is proved by the strategies to put human security in practice suggested by CHS. The strategies of CHS include not only ‘protection’ but also ‘empowerment’. Although ‘protection’ indicates state’s responsibility, other sources of responsibility must exist in the proposition of ‘empowerment’.

The idea and principles of the responsibility to protect is noticeably based on the premise that should state fail to fulfil its responsibility to protect, it requires a third entity to take action in order to protect the people and prevent further threats. The notion of ‘intervention’ has become, therefore, part of the debate on the responsibility to protect (ICISS 2002: 11). With the notion of the responsibility to protect, grave security threats – in UN terms this includes, such contexts as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes – arise from states’ failure, whether due to inability or unwillingness. These contexts evidently necessitate outsiders intervening to rescue and protect the people. Accordingly, the debate unavoidably leads the discussion of ‘intervention’ or ‘humanitarian intervention’ (ICISS 2002: 1–7).

The concept of humanitarian intervention is not new. The provision of humanitarian assistance and protection of human rights have become common and have provoked a wide range of debate on global humanitarianism, the idea of global ethics, the protection of human dignity, and the universal idea of human rights.⁵¹ The legitimacy of such actions, particularly with the use of force, has been debated in the international arena as part of various actual crisis situations, particularly during the 1990s, in such cases as Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Timor Leste and others.⁵² However, there were apparent changes within the debate. In an address to the 54th session of

the UN General Assembly in September 1999, then Secretary General Kofi Annan reflected upon ‘the prospects for intervention in the next century’. He stated that it is necessary for international parties to “find a common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity”.

In the concept of the responsibility to protect, several conceptual and operational ambiguities are removed by narrowing the scope and determining who has the responsibility to protect. On the other hand, the human security notion is not necessarily linked with ‘intervention’ as it does not define states as the source of threat or the only organ with the responsibility in all possible cases. For the human security notion, the questions regarding who has the responsibility and with what methods or means should they act are, rather, unaddressed. In other words, conceptual and operational ambiguities of the human security notion arise because the sources of the responsibility to handle security threats are not identified nor addressed. As a result, the human security notion tends to lack the focus of a policy option when transferred from the academic to the reality. These points, i.e. the sources of the responsibility and means for action, are dependent on how ‘human security’ is defined. Identification of these points relies on organizations, policy-makers, or scholars who attempt to define the human security notion. As a result, it is evident that a number of different targets and methods have emerged owing to different conceptions of human security even though all different organizations, policy-makers and scholars share the primary objective of human security; sometimes they all define as the security of people.

Obviously, a comprehensive or inclusive conception of human security makes it difficult to identify a single source of responsibility because the causes and sources of such varieties of security threats are often multiple. This is especially evident when considering the broad scope of security threats – embracing various natures of threat arising from numerous different causes and sources, some of which are not even originally considered as security threats; for example financial, environmental, and food issues. This is why the conceptual ambiguities remain for the human security concept, particularly when employing the broad definitions.

Human security in contemporary crises: the responsibility

The concepts of the responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention highlight highly politicized and extremely humanitarian thinking in contemporary crisis situations. In crisis contexts in the post-Cold War era, growing normative and utilitarian imperatives to provide security of people – humanitarianism – has urged outsiders or third parties to take actions to protect the security of people; whereas, sovereignty, the most fundamental right for all states and considered the unquestionable basis in maintaining an international order since the Peace of Westphalia, challenges it by questioning the legitimacy of such actions. Accordingly, the current debate on human

security, closely connected with these two concepts, tends to be either politicized or humanitarian. It pays less attention to the possibility of achieving security of people through domestic political processes within the state under consideration.

This tendency is largely because, as previously explored, one of the characteristics of the contemporary threat contexts is that states themselves often become the causes of threats to people. In such contexts, it is difficult to consider any solution by the state potentially successful, especially the often slow domestic political processes. For this reason, the concept of human security tends to be discussed together with the notion of 'intervention' and many writings imply the link or indeed link the two notions as indivisible.⁵³ However, the notion of human security should not be necessarily indivisible with the notion of intervention. The concept of human security, under clear analysis, offers no rigid explanation about where the responsibility exists and what methods are needed to handle security threats to people. It only suggests a possible shift of our point of view in security considerations from state to people, which subsequently necessitates reviewing the scope of security.

The notion of human security itself thus does not provide the answers to these questions unless defined by those who attempt to put human security in practice. In other words, subjective assessments on these points (who has the responsibility and what methods are necessary to handle security threats) decide how human security is conceptualized and accordingly how it is applied into practice. The notion of human security is in this sense a double-edged sword – possibly being utilized as a political tool as well as being applied for humanitarian purposes.

The ambiguities arising from the undefined locus of responsibility in the human security concept are illustrated by the two distinctive approaches by Canada and Japan. Canada's effort to put human security in practice, as seen in the ICISS approach, is centred on the issues related to the idea that violent conflicts derive from a state's failure. Accordingly, Canada's effort to promote human security includes such activities as peacekeeping, post-conflict assistance, its support of ICC, and its contribution to the Ottawa Convention. As cited earlier, in defining human security, Canada argues that freedom from fear is one of the most important objectives *for governments* to achieve for their citizens (Canada 2000).⁵⁴ The focus in this context is clearly a state's failure in protection.

In contrast, Japan, using its ODA to operationalize human security, seems to focus on structural problems rather than state's failure or incapability. In fact, projects implemented by JICA from a human security perspective aim at "handling threats to people *by helping communities to sustain themselves and increase their resilience*".⁵⁵ From this explanation, Japan's operational focus seems to be on communities or their weaknesses. In other words, Japan's focus is, among others, on the responsibility of communities. For this reason, a common method in its projects is 'empowerment' to increase communities' resilience.

As illustrated, the existing human security approaches in practice rely on the definitional focus of the responsibility. The notion of the responsibility to protect identifies clearly the responsibility – the ambiguous point of human security. The responsibility to protect focuses on state as the actor with the responsibility to act. Consequently, third-parties may be needed if the state fails, or is incapable, or unwilling to take actions. Although the methods for action – how, when, and with what methods – have not been agreed, the concept of the responsibility to protect sets a target, i.e. state. This increased ability to frame policy choices using the responsibility to protect allows us to understand that the main difficulty in putting into practice the human security concept is the definitional vagueness inherent in the concept. Without a clear knowledge of the target groups, organs, or actors that have the responsibility to prevent threats to people, or to act on and compensate for people's security needs, there will be limitations of the concept when framing policy choices.

Human security: seeking a way out of the impasse?

One of the most significant inputs of the human security concept to modern international and political relations is that it necessitates reviewing and re-identifying security threats from people's perspectives, rather than state's perspectives. It shows the complexity of actual security problems in our society – reflecting an even complex society compounded by a 'smaller' world. The sources of any one security threat are often multiple. One of such examples is the context of violent conflicts. As even the narrowest conceptions of human security take violent conflicts into considerations, using the context will provide a good analytic ground to examine the real contributions of the human security notion, potentials of the human security approach, and limitations of the human security concept.

Human security and violent conflicts

The debates on the human security concept illustrate a major discussion regarding narrow versus broad definitions, and theoretical versus practical applications. Nonetheless, the debate is beyond a simple dichotomy – the broad-versus-narrow categorization, or the development-oriented versus security-oriented approach.⁵⁶ This is largely because actual security problems in society are more complex than these structural debates suggest.

In defining human security, Lee, for example, points out, "it is difficult to rule out the fact that the concept of physical violence needs to somehow include all activities that in some ways damage the physical condition of an individual ... " (Lee 2004: 26). If some of the issues addressed in the context of 'freedom from want' – such as unequal distribution, uneven development, and limited participation – contribute to violent conflict, then attempt to achieve 'freedom from fear' will be ineffective until the problematic conditions related to freedom from want' have been addressed. As described earlier,

in order to prove the correlation between the two components, ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘conflict’, any analyst requires careful examination. Nevertheless, there are some indications that show the link between underdevelopment (or the process of development) and conflict in certain cases (Mack 2005; Azar 1990; Galtung 1996; Human Security Network *et al.* 2005: 25).⁵⁷ For example, the Philippine Human Development Report states that “... deprivation breeds discontent and a sense of injustice, which in turn lead to armed conflict” (Human Security Network *et al.* 2005: 25).

This consideration on the link between underdevelopment and conflict is critical to the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’, whereby threats are addressed in terms of a *state’s failure*. In situations of threat in which a state’s failure must be addressed, the causes of violence are often a mixture of ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. In such cases significant loss of life is actually taking place or is feared because the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope with violence, or satisfy the minimum level of people’s needs. Accordingly, in some cases, it is difficult to separate the root-causes of conflict or violence arising from the problematic conditions related to ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.

Many policy reports and theories of conflict have argued that injustice and deprivations are important ingredients when explaining violence and social conflicts (Burton 1979; Azar 1990; Galtung 1990; Kriesberg 2003; United Nations 2004; Human Development Network *et al.* 2005). The relationships between injustice and violence have been discussed in various theories, including the theory of basic human needs, rights-based approach, the analyses of violence, and justice discourse.⁵⁸ The right-based approach and the theory of justice, for example, confer violent situations as being primarily caused by a deprivation of justice – a lack or abuse of civil, political, economic, social, and sometimes cultural rights. Deprivations of justice often occur under an autocratic regime that does not allow political participation, so that there are no adequate mechanisms and institutions to redress injustice (Schirch 2006: 67–70). Although the approaches and terms are different, all of these theories basically concur that injustice rooted in unsatisfied needs is the root-cause of violence.

Johan Galtung is one of those scholars who emphasized deprivations as vital factors when understanding violence and resolving conflicts. He introduces the theory of violence, a theory that identifies three types of violence (Galtung 1990: 294; Galtung 1996). Galtung explains that violence that we actually can see is ‘direct violence’ (e.g. children are murdered). Apart from direct violence, there are two other types of violence: ‘structural’ and ‘cultural violence’. ‘Structural violence’ is indirect violence that comes from the social structure itself – between humans, between sets of humans (societies), and/or between sets of societies (alliances, regions in the world). According to Galtung, the two major forms of outer structural violence are politics and economics: repression and exploitation, which work on the body and mind but are not necessarily intended (Galtung 1996: 2) (e.g. children die through

poverty). Deprivations of material and access needs are thus considered structural violence. ‘Cultural violence’ is comprised of those aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimate direct or structural violence, such as religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science, and formal science (Galtung 1990: 291) (e.g. whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it). According to Galtung, the legitimization of direct and structural violence by exploiting ethno-religious or other cultural differences can be considered ‘cultural violence’.⁵⁹

Galtung’s theory of violence is comparable to the notion of human security. The seven categories of threat to human security suggested by UNDP in the 1994 *Human Development Report* represent the factors that belong to one of the three types of violence suggested by Galtung. ‘Economic security’, ‘food security’, ‘health security’, and ‘political security’ suggested by UNDP are the same categories Galtung considered and included as part of his idea of ‘structural violence’. ‘Personal security’ in the UNDP’s term (UNDP 1994: 30–31) concerns the actions of about what Galtung explains as ‘direct violence’. Galtung’s theory of ‘cultural violence’ includes some aspects of ‘community security’ as suggested by the UNDP. Though terms are different, the seven categories of threats to human security can be explained within the frame of Galtung’s theory of violence.

For Galtung, direct violence is an event, structural violence is a process with both positive and negative aspects, and cultural violence is an invariant, a performance (Galtung 1990: 294). Galtung creates the image of what he labels a violence triangle, that is, putting each of the three types of violence at a corner of a triangle. He explains that ‘violence can start at a corner in the direct-structural-cultural violence triangle and be easily transmitted to the other corners’ (Galtung 1990: 302). Galtung further argues that a violence triangle can be transformed into a virtuous triangle “by working on all three corners at the same time, not assuming that basic change in one will automatically lead to changes in the other two” (Galtung 1990: 302).

This explanation indicates that these three types of violence are equally weighed or important and thus need to be addressed simultaneously. In other words, insecurity in economic, food, health, or political conditions, for example, can contribute to the generation of violence, transmitting insecurity to, and thus encouraging, direct or cultural violence. While the notion of human security does not explain how the seven categories of threat interact with each other, Galtung’s theory not only identifies three types of violence but also explains the possible relationships between the three types of violence. Galtung’s theory addresses the complexity of the root-causes of violence. Indeed, Galtung’s arguments prove that the components of human security, the seven categories of threat or ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, are often intrinsically linked as the root-causes of violence. Applying Galtung’s explanations, to people’s security, we can surmise that the three types of violence that include the components of both ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ need to be addressed concurrently.

Similar to Galtung's explanation, the complex root-causes of social conflict and their relevance to human security are illustrated in the theory of protracted social conflict (PSC). Edward Azar introduced the idea of PSC as a result of a sustained sequence of studies published from the 1970s (Azar 1990). According to Azar, PSC represents 'the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation', such as have persisted in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, and South Africa (Azar 1991: 93). The term PSC emphasizes that the sources of such conflicts lay predominantly within rather than between states, with four clusters of variables identified as preconditions for their transformation to high levels of intensity.⁶⁰

First, there is the 'communal content', the fact that the 'most useful unit of analysis in PSC situations is the identity group – racial, religious, ethnic cultural and others' (Azar 1986: 31). In the first instance, PSC analysis focuses on identity groups, however defined, noting that it is the relationship between identity groups and states which is at the core of the problem (what Azar calls the "disarticulation between the state and society as a whole") (Azar 1986: 31), and that individual interests and needs are mediated through membership of social groups.⁶¹ Second, Azar identifies deprivation of human needs as the underlying source of PSC.⁶² Azar cites security needs, development needs, political access needs, and identity needs (cultural and religious expression), urging a broader understanding of 'security' than is usual (Azar 1990: 155).⁶³ Third, Azar cites "governance and the state's role" as the critical factor in the satisfaction or frustration of individual and identity group needs (Azar 1990: 10), pointing out that "treating all members of the political community as legally equal citizens is not empirically what happens in most parts of the world, particularly in newer and less stable states where political authority "tends to be monopolized by the dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups" (Azar 1990: 10–11). In this connection, Azar adds how PSCs tend to be concentrated in developing countries which are typically characterized by rapid population growth and limited resource base and also have restricted 'political capacity' often linked to a colonial legacy of weak participatory institutions, a hierarchical tradition of imposed bureaucratic rule from metropolitan centres, and inherited instruments of political repression.⁶⁴ Finally, there is the role of what Azar calls 'international linkage', in particular political-economic relations of economic dependency within the international economic system, and the network of political-military linkages constituting regional and global patterns of clientele and cross-border interest. "Formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced by the patterns of linkage within the international system" (Azar 1990: 10).

Among the four clusters of variables identified as the conditions for the transformation of PSC, the first two clusters are comparable to the seven categories of threat to human security suggested by the UNDP. In particular,

the underlying source of PSC that Azar identifies in the second cluster, deprivations of human needs, are effectively the issues of economics security, food security, health security, personal security, community security, and political security, as phrased in UNDP terms. Azar's explanation of PSC accounts for how complexly these components interrelate with each other and contribute to conflict with the help of deep structural constituents – identity groups in relation to the state. The components of human security suggested by UNDP are considered as the underlying source of PSC, i.e. various kinds of deprivations. Azar indeed emphasizes a broader understanding of 'security' for the management of PSC (Azar 1990: 10).

What definition, whose responsibility, and with what means?

As Galtung's and Azar's theories illustrate, the issues that the human security notion suggests is not a new idea at least when attempting to understand violence and conflicts. In certain cases, the human security approach will enable the highlighting of important underlying sources of violence. From Galtung's and Azar's theories, it is revealed that these underlying sources are often multiple, ranging from economic security to cultural security and that they are complexly interrelated with one another. Removing violence and resolving conflict will require identifying these multiple sources of threat from people's perspectives so that appropriate policy-making can be enacted.

The concept of human security can be a vital tool to identify the underlying sources of violence and conflicts from the people's point of view. In contrast, traditional security approaches that tend to focus only on stopping violence by military means may misidentify a number of these underlying sources of threat due to the focus on the military aspect and the unidirectional approach from a state's point of view. In this sense, there is a great potential for the human security concept to significantly contribute to our understanding on many unresolved and prolonged cases of violence and conflicts from around the world. For these reasons, this book employs an inclusive human security notion in analyzing violent conflicts and human rights situations in Southeast Asia. It is important to recognize the complexity of actual security problems in our society. In many cases of violent conflict, there are numerous causes and they are complexly interlinked with one another. In other words, it is vital to examine the relevance between the problems arising from 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' when understanding violence and conflicts. Without a recognition of the *interdependent* relationships between these two components, (UNDP 1994: 22), the notion itself would have not been developed.

Nevertheless, doubts about the feasibility of implementing the concept remain. As many scholars and policy-makers have pointed out, whereas expanding the scope of security considerations seems to be a pioneering idea that may allow overcoming some of the unresolved security problems, such wide security conceptions may lead not only to redundancy but be

counterproductive in finding integrated solutions to actual security problems. However, this point needs to be examined in a more specific context to identify what exactly causes such redundancy and what prevents finding integrated solutions.

The comparison between the human security notion and the existing theories of conflict/violence elucidate that the human security concept informs us neither how the underlying sources interrelate with each other nor what the key factors are in handling the underlying sources. It is now clear that while the human security notion can be a tool to understand conflicts and violence in certain cases, it is not sufficient in itself due to the lack of clarification regarding the means to handle the problematic conditions that generate violence and conflicts. In order to realistically transform conflict, it is necessary to identify how the underlying sources of conflict are developed and what the critical factors are. Many conflict theories, in fact, attempt to reveal how various sources in a conflict actually interrelate and accordingly turn to violence, and how they can be effectively addressed by identifying the most fundamental factor (Burton 1979; Azar 1990; Galtung 1990; Kriesberg 2003).

From the comparison between the human security notion and the existing theories of violence/conflict, it is clear now why the feasibility of the human security concept is questioned and why it is difficult to operationalize the human security concept in practice. The human security concept does not clarify the connections among the identified security threats or the point of responsibility, i.e. who has the primary responsibility to deal with the identified security threats. These are some of the weaknesses of the concept. These weaknesses, however, seem to also provided some potentials for the concept. Security threats in society and the point of responsibility for handling the security threats can potentially be identified by actors in the society or country. By doing so, 'intervention' will not be an indispensable option to achieve human security.

Human security will not automatically be a signal to outsiders or become a foreign policy tool to impose certain values of those who have power upon the people in the country or society under consideration. This consideration now generates a question: how can threats to human security be handled without external interventions? In order to answer to this question and also for a more realistic debate, there are required deep examinations of human security, the concept and its practice, and understanding of associated actual and potential strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, the following chapters look at the actual situations in Southeast Asia from human security perspectives with the aim of understanding these strengths or potentials as well as highlighting the limitations and ambiguities of the human security concept.

2 Human security in Southeast Asia at a turning point

One of the vital questions when discussing human security in Southeast Asia is that whether countries in Southeast Asia themselves recognize the notion of human security. Since the 1960s, they have undertaken considerable changes in terms of political and social transformations as well as economic growth. However, the region has been at the centre of human security concerns, such as poverty, transnational crimes, refugees, human and drug trafficking, environmental degradation, spread of fatal diseases, political instability, and social injustice. Moreover, even obvious security concerns, including inter-state and internal conflicts, political violence, terrorism, and insurgencies, have overwhelmed the region for decades (Acharya 2007: 16–19; Moon and Chun 2003: 120–21).

Over last several years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emphasized the rhetoric of becoming a ‘people-oriented ASEAN’ and in its attempt to create an ‘ASEAN Community’. The phrase ‘people-oriented ASEAN’ indeed appears in the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Charter) signed during the 13th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in 2007 – the year that marked ASEAN’s fortieth anniversary. The attempt to achieve ‘ASEAN Community’ is now one of the important objectives of ASEAN, as proclaimed in the Charter, which entered into force in December 2008 (ASEAN 2007: 3–5). The emphasis on ‘people-oriented’ ASEAN in its Charter is timely and promising, which increases expectations towards the region’s intention to address some of the longstanding human suffering and human security issues. The question now is whether the notion and approach of human security have come into play in Southeast Asia. This chapter, therefore, explores how the notion of human security has come into the region and how the notion is perceived by individual states and also in the regional context. In so doing, it attempts to examine what human security is really defined as in Southeast Asia.

Has human security become relevant in the security discourse in Southeast Asia?

The 1994 *Human Development Report* points out that ‘security’ had been more closely connected to states than to people when introducing the concept

of human security (UNDP 1994: 22). It is indeed the case in Southeast Asia (Anwar 2003: 536). Of this we can be convinced when we consider the fact that the dominant discourse of security in Southeast Asia reflects realist perspectives of balance of power and self-help (Chunha 2000: 35–36; Hassan 2000: 108; Moon and Chun 2003; Goldstein 2003: 194–97; Crone 1993: 502; Nishikawa 2007: 44). In reality, the number of inter-state wars within the region remains high. According to Acharya, several Southeast Asian countries were near the top of the list of Asia-Pacific nations that fought the most ‘international wars’ between 1946 and 2003 (Acharya 2007: 18).¹ Many of them are conflicts over land and sea territories. The recurrence of violence between Thailand and Cambodia in 2008 over the disputed territory reinforces such realist claims on security in Southeast Asia – struggle for power between states.²

Most security concepts introduced in the region, such as ‘common security’, ‘mutual security’, and ‘cooperative security’, illustrate the state dominant discourse of security in Southeast Asia.³ One of the most widely used security concepts in the region, ‘comprehensive security’ emphasizes a holistic view that includes both military and non-military threats, yet it does so in relation to a *state’s* overall wellbeing (Capie and Evans 2002: 64–75). Despite the acceptance of a comprehensive view on security and the recognition of the relevance of non-military issues in security considerations, the focus was almost exclusively on states. Such state-centric discourse and approach to security are, to a certain extent, explained by the region’s colonial experience and post-colonial state-building. Creating a strong state was sought and perceived as a method to achieve and ensure territorial integrity from ethnic secessionist demands and from insurgencies during the post-colonial period. Thus the solution to security issues lay in economic development (Collins 2005: 129). All national efforts, including educational attainment, political stability, and social harmony, are also said to have aimed at promoting the security of the state (Anwar 2003: 536). For example, the educational promotion of nationalism and the social observance and enforcement of national anthem subservience are often recognized in Southeast Asia.

The concept of national and regional resilience – formally accepted as a primary objective of regional co-operation at the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976 – illustrates the state-centric security approach of the region. The national resilience refers to the security of the nation emerging from the strength of national development (Collins 2005: 129). Thus national resilience entails all aspects of nation building – ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural. Collins explains that by focusing on internal issues and addressing the dangers of subversion, the state remains a viable entity and prevents ethnic separatism from infecting neighbouring states. Consequently, if all states adopted national resilience, they would provide regional stability or regional resilience (Collins 2005: 129). Anwar refers to a statement by an Indonesian General, “the national goal of all ASEAN countries is economic development and increase of the welfare of the people that are considered *sine*

qua non for enhancing national and regional resilience” (Anwar 2000: 82–83). The concept of national and regional resilience is thus similar to the idea of comprehensive security in its multidimensional approach to security. Security is not merely seen in military terms but encompasses a much wider spectrum, including economic, political and social aspects. However, the concept depicts an inward-looking security doctrine and a strong sense of nationalism. According to Anwar, for most of the ASEAN countries, this means “an emphasis on economic development since subversion and other anti-government activities are usually related to social and economic grievances” (Anwar 2000: 83). The idea of national and regional resilience introduced in Southeast Asia assumes that regional strength derives from strong state rather than strong regional institutions (Anwar 2000: 89; Collins 2005: 129).

What provoked human security considerations?

As seen in the development of several security concepts in Southeast Asia, the state-centric approach has its roots in historical, socio-economic, and political contexts in Southeast Asia. The state-centrism is hence not irrelevant when discussing ‘security’ in Southeast Asia today. Since the late 1990s, however, the region began to emphasize people-oriented values, which reminds us of the notion of human security. The ASEAN Charter, for example, promotes a people-oriented ASEAN (Article 1–1, Chapter I) (ASEAN 2007: 3). The origin of this change dates back at the height of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In 1997, ASEAN declared a vision of what it hoped Southeast Asia could become in the ASEAN Vision 2020 (ASEAN 1997).⁴ It was adopted only a few months after the financial crisis had erupted.⁵

In the Vision, ASEAN pledged to create ‘caring societies’ in which, “all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural background”. It states “our nations being governed with the consent and greater participation of the people, with its focus on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the good of the community” (ASEAN 1997). Towards the attainment of the ASEAN Vision 2020, the ASEAN issued the Hanoi Declaration at the Sixth formal Summit in 1998. Together with the Declaration, the ASEAN adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action, a six-year action plan between 1999 and 2004. Former Foreign Minister of Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan, explains,

the Hanoi Plan of Action together with the Hanoi Declaration are landmark documents that chart the course of ASEAN cooperation toward the attainment of the ASEAN leaders’ Vision 2020 ... Underling all the objectives and action plans as set out in the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Declaration and the Hanoi Plan of Action is the emphasis on human-centred development and human security.

(Pitsuwan 2001: 14–15)

The ASEAN Vision 2020 was elaborated in 2004 in the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) 2004–10, a six-year plan designed to initiate ASEAN community building. In VAP, ASEAN emphasizes a ‘people-centred’ ASEAN (ASEAN 2004: 16).⁶ The VAP includes action plans to create an ASEAN Community comprising three pillars: Economic, Security, and Socio-Cultural Community (ASEAN 2004: 3–4).⁷ The idea of a ‘people-centred’ ASEAN was introduced in one of the three pillars of ASEAN Community building, i.e. the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, which is “linked inextricably with the economic and security pillars of the ASEAN Community” (ASEAN 2004: 16). At the Twelfth ASEAN Summit in January 2007, with a slogan of ‘One Caring and Sharing Community’, the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo stated,

We stressed that the ASEAN community we are building shall be a community of peoples caring for and sharing their human, natural and cultural resources and strengths for their common good and mutual benefit.⁸

The catalyst for this change is said to have been transnational challenges faced by the region since 1997 (Acharya 2007: 12). Amitav Acharya identifies four such major events: the Asian financial crisis during and after 1997, the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the consequent terrorist bombings in Southeast Asia since 2001, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, and the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 (Acharya 2007: 22–26).⁹

Of the most significant episode, according to Acharya, was the 1997 financial crisis, which led to increased poverty levels and damaged the social, educational, and numerous other aspects of people’s well-being, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand (Acharya 2007: 22). Indeed, the World Bank described this crisis as “the biggest setback for poverty reduction in East Asia for several decades” (Ching 1999). In fact, in 1998, following the crisis, the human security concept was introduced during a session of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC).¹⁰ Terrorism highlighted the necessity for personal safety and public security measures but these concerns were countered by discussion of the curtailment of civil liberties. The SARS crisis drew attention to the need for better health facilities. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated the cost of SARS in the Asian region to be around US\$60 billion (ADB 2003).¹¹ In addition, according to Saywell and Fowler, the impact of SARS extended to flights to the region, retail sales, and hotel room occupancy rates (Saywell and Fowler 2003).¹² Goh Chok Tong, Singapore’s prime minister at the time, commented that “this crisis is not just a crisis of SARS, it is also a crisis of fear – people fear catching SARS” (cited in Acharya 2007: 32). Similar observations would be made in relation to the outbreak of avian flu.

Even more onerous were the economic costs of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. More significantly, however, the majority of the victims were poor people who lived in villages, slums, and shanty-towns and a vast proportion of

them were children (Acharya 2007: 32–34).¹³ The tsunami put pressure on governments to bring a human dimension to their approach to security, demonstrating as it did the extent to which a regime's security can be undermined by acute crises (Acharya 2007: 23–24). In a statement that confirms how crises such as the 2004 tsunami can stimulate a review of security discourse and a re-examination of human security in Southeast Asia, Surin Pitsuwan, former Foreign Minister of Thailand and current head of ASEAN, put the matter as follows:

... in Southeast Asia today, the so-called non-traditional security issues are becoming traditional security issues. The traditional way of dealing with them is no longer adequate. All the crises we have experienced in the last five years, while the roots may be different, all of them have human security dimensions.

(cited in Acharya 2007: 24–25)

This observation confirms that these crises can stimulate a review of security discourse and a re-examination of human security in Southeast Asia. The emphasis on a 'people-oriented' ASEAN is prominent and it convinces the relevance of human security in regional policy choices. In fact, ideas that are close to the centre to the term human security – the emphasis on the concern for individuals and various attempts to ensure their development – have always featured in various regional activities. In current Southeast Asia, the relevance of human security is noticeable as emphasized 'people-oriented' values and its attempt to establish an ASEAN Community – with not only economic integration but also political-security and socio-cultural aspects.

Discourse of human security in Southeast Asia

In recent years, the relevance of human security to policy choices has become more prominent in regional security contexts in Southeast Asia. However, for most countries in the region, 'human security' is still a new concept although the term human security was introduced at the ASEAN meeting during the 1990s. The level of recognition as well as the discourse of the term varies among the ASEAN member states. This section therefore focuses on the discourse of human security by ASEAN and also by individual states, namely Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Lao PDR. Whereas ASEAN's discourse can be considered as the basis, diverse interpretations are recognized by individual states with reflecting their distinctive domestic contexts.

ASEAN's discourse of human security

Despite ASEAN's emphasis on 'people-oriented' values and a 'people-centred' ASEAN at various occasions since the 1990s, the term 'human

security' has not been widely used in official documents and statements from ASEAN. In fact, the term 'human security' is not included in the ASEAN Charter despite the idea to realize an ASEAN Community is one of the key issues addressed in the Charter and the community building includes various issues relevant to human security. In 2006, one year before the signing of the ASEAN Charter, a group of experienced persons from the region, the so-called eminent persons group, has produced the *Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter* (EPG Report).¹⁴ The EPG Report was produced in order to provide the ASEAN leaders with broad policy guidelines on the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. The EPG Report proposes a number of substantial changes in the structure of ASEAN and adjustments in its traditional practice of decision-making and non-intervention of ASEAN (ASEAN 2006).

The EPG Report addresses 'human security' in explaining one of ASEAN's three key pillars of community building Political-Security Community. The Report points out that an increasing number of transnational challenges and diverse sectors need to be included in regional security co-operation. These include finance, tourism, the environment, disaster management, technology (ICT), counter-terrorism, and health (ASEAN 2006: 11). In this connection, the Report states that "ASEAN has spared no effort to promote human security, notably respect for human rights and international humanitarian law" (ASEAN 2006: 11). Here, the term 'human security' is employed to mean only issues related to human rights and international humanitarian law. It is separated from many other human security issues addressed in the aforementioned transnational challenges. In the EPG Report, the human security dimension falls into ASEAN's community building directive (Collins 2008: 324). The term 'human security' is, however, not included in the ASEAN Charter.

The 1994 *Human Development Report* states that "human security is people-centred." (UNDP 1994: 23). However, while the 'people-centred' dimension of co-operation and organization are emphasized in the EPG Report and other recent statements from ASEAN's ministerial meetings, the term 'human security' is not used in the ASEAN Charter. Furthermore, even though the Charter provides ASEAN's intention to set up a human rights body, no remark is made in this connection with the use of the term 'human security'. By the same token, the Cebu Declaration towards One Caring and Sharing Community addresses ASEAN's people-centred approach, yet 'human security' is not mentioned in this context.¹⁵

In ASEAN's discourse, it seems there are certain negative implications attached to the term 'human security'. The negative implication was proved by an episode in 1998 when the term 'human security' was first brought into the ASEAN dialogue. At the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), there was a proposal from Thailand to adopt a more people-centred approach to development (Capie and Evans 2002: 144). Surin Pitsuwan, then Thai Foreign Minister, proposed to adopt an 'ASEAN-PMC Caucus on Human Security' and this was discussed. Pitsuwan explains,

the objective was to recognize that the social and economic dislocation, poverty, disease, illiteracy, alienation, disorientation among our peoples would surely lead to violence, rebellion, instability and insecurity. All these would impact upon all the achievements that we have made together so far. And these would inevitably threaten the region as a whole.
(cited in Patiyasevi 1998)

While the plan was adopted by ASEAN, its name was changed to the 'ASEAN-PMC Caucus on Social Safety Nets' (Patiyasevi 1998). According to Patiyasevi, some Southeast Asian states are uncomfortable with some aspects of the concept of human security, particularly any mention of human rights (Patiyasevi 1998).

Moreover, the term 'human security' seems to be interpreted indivisible from the notion of 'intervention'. At the ASEAN-PMC in 1998, Surin Pitsuwan also proposed the idea of 'flexible engagement' (Pitsuwan 2008: 3). Surin Pitsuwan explains 'flexible engagement' in connection with the crises that occurred in Bangkok in Thailand, in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines at that time (Pitsuwan 2008: 3). Thailand's suggestion was also made to put collective regional pressure on Myanmar to improve its human rights practice (Anwar 2003: 557). The proposal was apparently against the absolute non-interference principle in ASEAN. The term 'human security' was thus taken as a foreign notion with a negative implication of 'intervention'. Surin Pitsuwan indeed called on the UN to pay more attention to human security and to devise clear rules and mechanisms to enable this global body to act effectively to protect human security (Pitsuwan 1999 and 2000). Looking back the occasion that the term 'human security' was introduced during the ASEAN-PMC for the first time in 1998, Surin Pitsuwan reveals that he was viewed as bringing too much of "an alien concept" into ASEAN language (Pitsuwan 2008: 3). ASEAN members now are generally supportive of the ASEAN Political-Security Community concept (Kuah 2004: 1), although for Surin Pitsuwan, the idea of the ASEAN Political-Security Community is "much more intrusive, aggressive, and alien" to the ASEAN perception than what he suggested, yet rejected, in 1998 – 'flexible engagement' (Pitsuwan 2008: 3).

In Southeast Asia, 'freedom from fear' seems to be considered the primary focus of 'human security', which is viewed as entailing Western universalist connotations epitomized by human rights and international humanitarian law. The concept of human security is then further connected to the notion of intervention. Hence, it is more precise to consider that there are some implicit distinctions in the use of the terms 'people-centred' and 'human security' in ASEAN. In ASEAN's discourse, the expression 'people-centred' is often employed in connection with only certain types of threats, such as disaster, poverty, environmental issues, diseases, transnational crimes, and trafficking. On the other hand, the term 'human security' tends to be used to mean security management for 'freedom from fear' in connection with human

rights and international humanitarian law, which overlaps with traditional security issues such as conflict, insurgency, and violence.¹⁶ Clearly, while favouring a people-centred approach, policy-makers in the region have become wary of ‘freedom from fear’ aspect of human security. The hesitant reaction towards the human security notion by policy-makers in Southeast Asia is hence partly due to their sense that the initial formulation of the concept focused more on ‘freedom from fear’ (Acharya 2007: 21). They worry that it may justify intervention by other countries in response to internal conflicts in which human rights violations are often the causes, symptoms, and consequences of violence.¹⁷ According to Acharya, this is why Southeast Asian governments remain wedded to state security (Acharya 2007: 20), although contrasting reactions can be found within academia and the non-governmental sector.¹⁸ ‘Freedom from want’ and non-traditional types of threats, however, are deemed to be less provocative in the region.

The discourse of human security in Southeast Asia

Whilst ASEAN’s discourse of human security illustrates certain implications that the term ‘human security’ retains, the discourse of human security by individual states will further depict how the human security notion is interpreted in the specific national context of each country. In Southeast Asia, it is Thailand that is considered most in favour of the concept of human security (Lizee 2002: 511). The term was, in fact, introduced by former Thai Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan in the ASEAN context. Overall, human security is gaining recognition particularly by academics and civil society organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. However, the growing emphasis on a people-centred approach in the region and changing socio-economic conditions seem to have led to draw attention towards human security in other countries, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. It is therefore pertinent to explore whether or not the notion of human security is relevant to their policy choices.

Thailand

Thailand has been most actively incorporating human security into national policy actions, with human security becoming part of the country’s national strategy.¹⁹ The government set up the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security in 2002 as a result of a bureaucratic reform from the Ministry Reformation Act 2002. The act was enacted according to the 1997 Constitution that aims to allow more people’s participation and transparency. Thailand is also a member of the Human Security Network (HSN), for which it chaired from 2005 to 2006.²⁰ At the HSN International Symposium held in Bangkok in 2006, Kantathi Suphamongkhon from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand stated, “Our mission is to come up with practical strategies and programs to enhance human security in a sustainable way. This

has been the approach adopted by Thailand”.²¹ Thailand is, thus, a strong advocate of human security. The question now is how the notion is interpreted in its policy action.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains,²²

Thailand shares the view that human security encompasses freedom from want and from fear and protecting people from violent and non-violent acts. Thus, human security is comprehensive in nature and intertwined with human rights and human development. Human rights, human development and human security are mutually reinforcing factors. They are fundamental principles in achieving sustainable human development.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Thailand 2005)

The primary purpose of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security is “to promote social development and create public equity and social justice”.²³ The ministry’s operations are to encourage and develop the quality of life, social security, and family and community institutions.

The interpretation of human security can be observed from the institutional organization as well as various statements by the government. Agencies under the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security include the Department of Social Development and Welfare, the Office of Women’s Affairs and Family Development, and the Office of Children, Youth, the Disadvantaged, Persons with Disabilities and Older Persons.

Along with its institutional structure and activities, the founding ideas behind the ministry’s establishment illustrate Thailand’s focus on the developmental aspect of human security. While its operational focus includes social security, the institutional structure shows that the main focus is social development. The target demonstrates in its operational objectives and organizational structure meet the primary purpose of human security – to protect the people, particularly vulnerable people, such as women, children, and disabled and older people. In fact, according to a scholar, the activities undertaken under the Ministry target the grass-roots level, such as setting up social welfare and education units throughout the country as a forum for community empowerment.²⁴ Much of the activities concerns ‘economic opportunity’ and ‘economic well-being’ of people, particularly in rural areas.²⁵

Another example of Thailand’s discourse on human security can be seen in a conference co-organized by the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security in 2003, in which the main focus was on the non-traditional type of security issues.²⁶ Issues covered included social environment, economic security, health security, and international dimensions, such as transnational crimes, human trafficking, illicit drugs, and illegal migrants. In the context of international dimensions affecting human security in Thailand, the conference addressed human rights, protection, and empowerment. Regarding terrorism, the conference notes “a due consideration of human rights, and people’s participation in policy making and cooperation at various levels”.²⁷

Accordingly, it emphasizes “an appropriate approach to have a balance between state security and people’s security”.

More recently, at the HSN symposium held in 2006, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, explains Thailand’s approach as follows:²⁸

The Royal Thai Government has been pursuing a people-centred development strategy ... We have sought to address non-traditional threats to human security in an integrated manner, involving all stakeholders. We have been successful on a number of fronts, including in the battle against HIV/AIDS, the avian influenza, drugs and human trafficking.

(Special Address at the HSN International Symposium 2006)

Thailand’s interpretation of human security recognizes the two aspects of human security; freedom from want and freedom from fear. The former seems to be the primary focus of its agenda although several statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do address some aspects of freedom from fear, such issues as human rights and social security. The focus on freedom from want is perceivable from its emphasis on people-centred development and practice to support grass-roots activities to enhance ‘economic well-being’. However, when it comes to issues related to freedom from fear, little practice can be seen despite Foreign Minister’s statement to come up with practical strategies to enhance human security. Balancing between state security and people’s security still remains “verbal”, “nominal”, and “very much a governmental perspective” (Muntarbhorn 2007) in the sense that the idea of human security is rarely mentioned when it comes to violence, internal conflicts, and other human rights related issues in the national context. A scholar points out that despite the violent situation in southern Thailand, where ‘social welfare’ in addition to physical violence is a serious concern and thus has relevance to the work by the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, the situation tends to be considered other ministries’ matter, such as those of defense and the interior.²⁹ More fundamentally, political polarization within the country that led to protests and deadly clashes in 2008 was a manifestation of a chasm that exists in the society – pro- and anti-government groups, which inherently cause various negative effects on human security, with undermining certain aspects of people’s freedom from fear and want. There is a huge gap between the ideals of human security and actual practice, which depends on the approach the government chooses to adopt in particular situations.

The Philippines

As the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, said when addressing “a community of peoples caring for” during the ASEAN summit, at the regional level, the Philippine government promotes a people-centred

approach. Scholars from the Philippines commonly consider the government's support of a people-centred approach as understandable since the security of people is not a new issue in the Philippines.³⁰ The 2005 *Philippine Human Development Report* points out that for many Filipinos who live in vulnerable and precarious conditions, what matters most is not the abstract security of a regime or a state but rather the *security of real people*, or *human security* (Human Development Network *et al.* 2005: 1). One scholar also comments:³¹

Human security is not a new issue in the Philippines. Such issues as violence, human rights violations, and poverty have been in the society, so that there has been a recognition of the security of people. It has been an important issue in the Philippines although people may not be familiar with the term 'human security' ...

A further discussion with the scholar revealed that in the Philippines, the term human security is interpreted more closely with violence and human rights situations in the country.³² This is largely because of the longstanding violent situation in the southern Philippines. There has been an escalation of conflict in central Mindanao and this has increased concerns after a decade-long peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which collapsed in 2008. The situation has already led to large numbers displaced individuals amid reports of indiscriminate bombings and human rights violations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.³³ Meanwhile, tensions and insecurity in the region intensifies due to a series of kidnappings and killings of civilians by armed groups. The situation has a great bearing in the discourse of human security in the Philippines. The term 'human security' is more closely connected with freedom from fear, namely violence and related human rights violations. This interpretation can be observed through the use of the term by the government.

The Philippines government employs the term 'human security' in its law that is intended to secure the state and protect people from terrorism: the Human Security Act, which took effect in July 2007 (Republic Act No. 9372).³⁴ It is a law that Congress enacted "to protect life, liberty and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country ... and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations" (sec. 3). The law criminalizes terrorism and allows authorities to arrest terror suspects without warrants and temporarily detain them without charges. Such laws are not unique. After the 9/11 attack in the US in 2001, a number of governments around the world introduced counter-terrorism acts by claiming that national security takes precedence over rights of individuals in certain contexts, such as terrorism, internal turmoil and other emergencies.³⁵ Similar laws were introduced in other countries in the region, particularly after the bomb explosion incidence in Bali, Indonesia in 2002. The Human Security Act appears to aim at securing the state before protecting the people. Days after the law took

effect, concerned citizens and groups voiced opposition, challenging its constitutionality before the Supreme Court.³⁶ A group of lawyers claimed that the Human Security Act is so vague that it can be used against anyone, so sweeping it can be used to curtail the rights of persons merely suspected of terrorism, and so dangerous that, unless repealed, it will destroy the Constitution's Bill of Rights.³⁷ The Act stipulates any action to be taken be based on the government's perspective.

Similar to the ASEAN's discourse on human security, the term human security is employed primarily in the Philippines to mean the management of violence or freedom from fear; whereas a people-centred approach is emphasized in inter-governmental contexts, particularly to handle non-traditional types of security issues, such as transnational crimes, trafficking, natural disasters, and fatal diseases. Terrorism, insurgencies, extremism, and conflicts in the country pose enormous challenges to human security in the Philippines. The Philippine government seems not to be against the idea of human security: in the sense that it recognizes serious threats to people exist within the country both in terms of freedom from want and freedom from fear. The primary focus of human security in the national context is on the aspect of freedom from fear. This aspect is indeed of more imminent concern due to the tensions within the country. In reality, the *Philippine Human Development Report*, which focuses on human security and human development in the Philippines, largely examines armed conflicts in the country. The term human security is connected with the issues related to human rights and the management of violence. This discourse allows us to understand the reason why, despite the very idea of human security being to protect and ensure the security of people, and despite being supported by the government and the people in the Philippines, the term 'human security' is not necessarily employed to mean actions for the benefit of the people in the Filipino society. The term is, in reality, used in a controversial manner by the government, as demonstrated in the wording of the Human Security Act. The discourse of human security in the Philippines reflects the on-going conflict situation in the country and state dominance in decision-making and policy actions, which focuses on the management of violence and the human rights situation.

Indonesia

The notion of human security is, in a sense, not entirely alien in Indonesia in that Indonesia's discourse of security has been based on a comprehensive view. Yet, a major distinction between Indonesia's security discourse and the human security notion is that the focus of security discourse remains on state security rather than people and security of society's members. Together with Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia is one of the countries in the region that introduced the concept of comprehensive security at the height of the Cold War (Caballero-Anthony 2004: 160). Anwar argues that "narrow conceptions

of security emphasizing the importance of military power have been of less use to Indonesians than the more comprehensive notions of security which acknowledge the importance of its economic, social, and political dimensions” (Anwar 1999: 222). Yet, most security concepts introduced in Indonesia are considered as ‘inward-looking in orientation’ aiming at ‘national security’ with particular attention given to economic development (Alagappa 1989; Anwar 1999: 222).

From the Suharto era onward, a *katahanan nasional* (national resilience) was presented as a comprehensive view of security that includes political, economic, socio-cultural, and military aspects. During the New Order government of Suharto (1966–98), as a rule, security was defined as a comprehensive security concept covering whole areas such as ideology, politics, economics, society, culture, defence and security (Muna 2004: 4). According to Emmerson, *katahanan* (resilience) was to be distinguished from *pertahanan* (defence). *Katahanan* was above all a socioeconomic prescription for internal security through development (Emmerson 1996: 38). However, this meant that government policies regarding all these areas should be maintained and supported for the sake of state stability, unity and security. Fostering economic growth, a state could improve public welfare – income, health, education – and a more prosperous society would be less vulnerable to internal subversion of communists on the left or Islamists on the right (Emmerson 1996: 38). Thus *pembangunan* through *katahanan* to *keamanan*, that is, development through resilience to security, has been an underlying approach towards security in Indonesia.

The inward-looking security discourse is largely because in Indonesia, the primary sources of insecurity and instability were thought to derive from internal contexts and to be related to national unity (Anwar 1999: 200–203).³⁸ Anwar explains that Indonesia’s security concerns arise from its geography and the heterogeneity of the population: uniting the numerous islands, with their more than three hundred ethnic groups, each with distinct languages and cultures, under one political, economic, and security system is one of the greatest challenges for the government (Anwar 1999: 200–202). In fact, since its independence, a series of rebellions and independence movements have broken out around the country. The existing tensions within the country, such as communal conflicts in West Papua and Poso in the Central Sulawesi, convince the government that the primary security concerns are national unity and internal stability – an inward-looking national security concern.³⁹

A security discourse centred on the state will thus remain in Indonesia. Even so, it is undeniable that there is an emerging recognition of the importance and relevance of the link between human security and ‘national security’. Rizal Sukma, author of the original ASEAN Security Community concept paper, drawing from the Indonesian experience of economic crisis and social upheaval in 1997–98 that led to the collapse of the Suharto regime, contends that human security and economic-political stability are mutually reinforcing. The former cannot be achieved without the latter, while the

latter might not be sustainable without the fulfilment of the former in a comprehensive manner (Sukma 2000).

In Indonesia, for most of the three decades of Suharto's rule, the armed forces acted against civilians with virtual impunity. This was because of both the institutionalized dysfunction of the legal system and overt government support for their actions. It was also because the New Order built a web of emergency laws that justified the armed forces and intelligence organizations acting in an extra-constitutional way.⁴⁰ These laws dated from the killing of suspected leftists by the armed forces and Islamic youth groups from 1965 to 1968: the events which Suharto manipulated to seize power. According to Anwar, since the fall of Suharto and the onset of *reformasi* (reform), besides domestic political reform, Indonesia put the protection and promotion of human rights on its reform agenda (Anwar 2003: 559). As part of its reform agenda, it produced a five-year National Human Rights Action Plan beginning in September 1998. It has also passed a law for the establishment of a Human Rights Court to try future violators of human rights, and for the establishment of *ad hoc* human rights tribunals to try major human rights violations that took place in the past, including the crimes against humanity perpetrated in Timor Leste in 1999 (Anwar 2003: 554).

Indonesia's current legislature is said to be the first democratic one, chosen in 1999. The legislature has since delivered extensive reforms reflecting the demands of the reform movement for the introduction of strong guarantees of human rights. This was achieved most notably through the new Chapter XA of the Constitution, which introduced the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, almost in its entirety, into Indonesian law. According to Anwar, there has been a major reduction of state-sponsored violence against individuals with the recognition of human rights in Indonesia (Anwar 2003: 554). A seven-fold increase in the number of non-governmental organizations since the fall of Suharto is also an important sign of change in this context (Guan 2004).

The law on the National Social Security System (*Undang-Undang Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional* or SJSN) that became a public law in 2004 (Law No. 40/2004) also may be considered as deriving from certain human security considerations. The key feature of the new law is that it mandates the creation of several social security schemes for citizens: old-age pension, old-age savings, national health insurance, work injury insurance, and death benefits for survivors of deceased workers (Arifianto 2006).⁴¹

These changes reinforce human security in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the longstanding state-centrism is not fading. Religious and ethnic feuds remain unresolved in different parts of the country, in which gross violations of human rights have continued unabated since 1999. In a number of cases, it is reported that the military and the police sent to stop the violence have themselves been drawn into it while members of society also commit human rights violations.⁴² Although the new law on the national social security system is a positive change, the drafting process of the law mirrors the reality: it is more

government-oriented in the sense that no representatives from stakeholders, such as employers' associations and labour unions, were included in the process (Arifianto 2006). Heryanto and Hadiz, while recognizing various changes, contend that the media is liberalized but unprotected, decentralization is taking place yet it is reorganization without empowerment, and in the area of labour, dramatic changes have been evident but there is the legacy of decades of systematic disorganization (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005: 257–64). The persistent legacies of authoritarianism incubate state power and centralized systems.

Moreover, there is a caution with regard to the human security concept among policy makers in Indonesia. Former Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, for example, pointed out that the increasing international focus on human security has inevitably led to 'humanitarian intervention' in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. He warned about the danger of this intervention if undertaken without clear criteria (Alatas cited in Anwar 2000). The Indonesian government has been positioning itself to be both cautious and aware of 'intervention'. When Thailand proposed the idea of 'flexible engagement' during the 1990s, Indonesia was strongly opposed. In April 2000, the government expressed its view that "As to human rights, we maintain at the international level, human rights must be addressed with full respect for national and territorial integrity, while following the guiding principles of objectivity, impartiality and transparency as set down by the Vienna Conference on Human Rights".⁴³

Human security in the views expressed is essentially connected with the notions of 'human rights' and further 'intervention'. While positive changes are perceived regarding the human rights situation, there are people who address the necessity of human security; the notion of 'intervention' is inevitably drawn from and linked with the human security concept and seems to therefore limit the acceptance of the human security notion in Indonesia. More importantly, at the most fundamental level, in Indonesia, security, development, and human rights have been taken into consideration either from the state's perspectives or to restore 'national security'. After almost ten years of reformation since the fall of Suharto in 1998, some parts of society are indeed able to define their security concerns. However, the definition of security seems to still depend upon who has political resources and power. In this sense, human security in Indonesia is not 'people-oriented' notion or approach. Behind this reality, there are continuous policy-making processes and practices centred on the state and constant discourse of human security by the government that is inevitably connected with the notion of 'human rights' and 'intervention'.

Malaysia and Singapore

Malaysia and Singapore have enjoyed a high level of economic development, yet both governments impose tight political control, particularly through an internal security act. This situation, to a certain extent, explains their

approach to security. Similar to Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have developed their own versions of comprehensive notions of security (Caballero-Anthony 2004: 160). In Malaysia, in 1986, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed declared:

[N]ational security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony. Without these, all the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being overcome by its enemies, whose ambitions can be fulfilled sometimes without firing a single shot.⁴⁴

To Malaysia, national security has meant security from threats such as communist insurgency, radical conflicts in a multi-ethnic society, and economic recession (Caballero-Anthony 2004: 161). In fact, in Malaysia, the discourse and practice of national security has had a long genealogy, rooted in the British period during the internal war against communist insurrection. Many laws associated with national security continued to be employed during the post-colonial period. The 1948 Internal Security Act, which allows detention without trial has been refurbished over time to meet newer challenges of 'national security'.⁴⁵ National security in Malaysia obviously concerns the preservation of political stability and social harmony in its multi-ethnic society. Similar to Indonesia, Malaysia utilizes the notion of national resilience, only with which is it believed that regional security can be attained.

Singapore has maintained a comprehensive view to its security through the concept of 'total defence', which has five constituent elements: psychological, social, economic, civil defence, and military defence (Caballero-Anthony 2004: 161). In Singapore, the Internal Security Act (ISA), Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act (CLA), Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA), and Undesirable Publications Act, for instance, permit arrest and detention of suspects without a warrant or judicial review. Both ISA and the CLA also authorize preventive detention.

Although terminologies and precise definitions may differ, 'security' has been perceived beyond the military dimension in Malaysia and Singapore. It is essentially connected with 'national security' – regime stability and economic development. Johan Saravanamuttu argues that security discourse and practice in Malaysia, especially among the elites and the political class, has remained largely locked within the realms of foreign policy, home affairs, and defence policy under the rubric of 'national security'.⁴⁶ He contends that it may even be the case that various instrumentalities of surveillance and coercion of the state themselves contradict the pursuit of the more enduring forms of human security, or people-centred security. This is particularly true not only in Malaysia but also many countries around the world with the emphasis of combating terrorism in the global and national contexts, especially since September 11 2001.

There seems to be, however, little discourse about human security in Malaysia and Singapore. Saravanamuttu, for example, argues that in his view

and reading of the Malaysian socio-political context, 'human security' as such has yet to enter the lexicon of political discourse.⁴⁷ Similarly, Simon S.C. Tay, chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, argues that in Singapore, there is relatively little discourse about human security from the government and citizens, especially the latter (Tay 2006: 7). Nevertheless, neither country denies the core ideas of human security. In Malaysia, Saravanamuttu observes, human rights as well as environmental and health issues clearly come within the purview of human security discourse and have been concerns of many NGOs and civil actors, although there is little self-consciousness on the part of civil groups to campaign or lobby specifically for the objectives of human security as defined by the UNDP.⁴⁸ The notion of human security has not been made into explicit policy by the government.

Nonetheless, in the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–10), one of the five thrusts aims at improving the standard and sustainability of the quality of life.⁴⁹ Poverty eradication has also been on-going policy of the government since the 1970s.⁵⁰ This means that some of the goals of human security have been mainstreamed into national policy actions in Malaysia. However, Saravanamuttu contends that in Malaysia, both civil society and the government are deeply fragmented along the ethnic fault line, which limits the use and practice of the notion of human security. In Singapore, similar to Malaysia, while the term itself seems to be seldom in use, a number of core ideas of human security feature prominently, such as jobs for each person, economic progress, the rights to education, state management provision of housing, and maintenance of essential social services like medical care. These are supported by and mentioned alongside state management and provision for the poor and disabled, commitment to efforts to achieve racial and religious harmony among the diverse citizens, environmental care, security in the provision for water, clean air, and a green land.⁵¹

In both countries, there are demands and expectations regarding human security even though the term human security is not necessarily in use. There is, in fact, little evidence that 'human security' is openly promoted by the government or civil groups in Malaysia and Singapore, yet its putative acceptance is undeniable. Neither governments deny or reject 'people-oriented' values in the regional context. The Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Syed Hamid Albar, for example, commented in 2003 regarding the proposed ASEAN Peacekeeping Force: "We [ASEAN leaders] agree that it is not our goal to create a military bloc. Our focus for the ASEAN Security Community is on coming up with a caring society and human security" (Kuah 2004: 3). Yet, it is also true that the government has not strongly promoted 'human security'. According to Suravanamuttu, in Malaysia, discussion and campaigns on human security has emanated from non-governmental organizations and civil society forces.⁵²

In Singapore, according to Tay, the government's discourse is partly hinged on opposing aspects of human security to certain aspects of democracy – the government posits human security against democracy by posing such

questions as: Do citizens prefer a safe society or to allow protests in the streets? Do citizens prefer to have jobs and housing or to vote in more opposition? Do citizens want a media who are free to criticize or to have serious and capable people enter politics to serve them? Do citizens want more checks and balances or do they want an effective and fast reaching government (Tay 2006: 9)? In this context, Tay explains that there are emerging signs that Singaporean citizens want to have both democracy and human security, and are moving beyond this trade-off discourse (Tay 2006: 9). Several recent regional events including the tsunami in 2004 highlighted the necessity of 'human security' considerations in realizing the interdependence of states and the responsibility of states to act preventatively. Thus, the growing attention to human security in Singapore derives from the contexts of regional 'interdependence', 'prevention', and 'collective responsibility' (Tay 2006: 10). On the whole, in Malaysia and Singapore, the term 'human security' is, if ever, not commonly used. In this sense, the discourse may be nearly absent. Yet, despite this absence, observers cannot deny the fact that substantial steps and actions are on record as having contributed to human security development and tacit discourse. Interpretation of the actions and results, beyond what may or may not be said, is necessary.

Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam

Little discussion is available about human security with regard to the three countries of Indochina: Cambodia, Vietnam, and Lao PDR. This is partly because such concepts as a people-centred approach and civil society are much less often used, if ever, with respect to these countries. 'Security' remains within the 'traditional' discourse – that is 'state-centric' and military oriented thinking.⁵³ While civil society has been a vital entity for some time now in Cambodia, it has had very vague contours in Vietnam and Lao PDR, where it is usually difficult to distinguish society from the state itself under the strength of the one-party state. The notion of human security has indeed remained literally foreign in these three countries. Pierre P. Lizee explains the reason by postulating that the empowerment of the individual has been often seen as a direct threat to the ideological cantons of the one-party state or to the centralization of power within a small elite (Lizee 2002: 511). Slight changes are, however, perceived in these countries. There has been an extensive reconsideration of past models of development and politics in both Vietnam and Lao PDR. In Cambodia, civil society is now an important social force (Lizee 2002: 511).

The fundamental question of who provides security has been a question in Cambodia throughout its long history of armed conflict, political repression, and poverty. It has slowly developed a positive perception regarding personal security since the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991 to end the war in Cambodia, which raged during the 1980s between the government and a government exile comprised of three Cambodian political factions

(the Funcinpec Party, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front).⁵⁴ The agreement affirms popular sovereignty and calls for special measures to assure protection of human rights. The notion of human security in Cambodia is, without referring to the term 'human security', innately depicted in the efforts of post-conflict reconstruction and its transition towards a form of politics centred on the working of democratic institutions. In this context, a vast institutional reform and the growth of a series of actors in society, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media, with the support of international organizations and the donor community are important dynamics to understand the on-going changes that may be relevant to the entry of 'human security' in Cambodia. According to Pye-Smith, local government reforms have played a significant role in reducing poverty and improving people's welfare. The Royal Government of Cambodia has come to see the reforms as an essential prerequisite for poverty reduction (Pye-Smith 2008: 5–6).⁵⁵

One of the important changes is in the process of opening up all levels of politics to the dynamics of popular representation and accountability. This has been one of the central components of the agenda in Cambodia since the internationally supervised elections in 1993 (Lizee 2002: 516). There were national elections in 1993, 1998 and 2003, and a commune election in 2002. The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative commented that the 2003 election "marked an important step in Cambodia's efforts to establish a multiparty democracy" (UN Doc., A/58/317, 22 Aug. 2003). Local government reforms seem to have significantly helped to defuse conflict between political parties and encourage greater participation in local decision-making. Pye-Smith argues that the reforms created incentives that encouraged the warring factions to work together at the local level, which eventually led to the creation of directly elected commune councils (Pye-Smith 2008: 7). The reforms, now at the second phase, involve devolution of power from the centre to the provincial and district levels to improve the delivery of services and strengthen the state's regulatory functions, particularly over the use of natural resources (Pye-Smith 2008: 7).

Sorpong Peou observes that the level of political violence and intimidation against opposition parties has decreased (Peou 2006: 11). Veronique Salze-Lozac'h reports that while the 2003 elections were overshadowed by intimidation and violence, the 2008 election campaign season has been generally qualified by observers, politicians, and the Cambodian National Election Committee as, for the most part, peaceful (Salze-Lozac'h 2008). The situation thus demonstrates a certain degree of improvement from the suppression and violence of past elections. Although the decrease in violence does not guarantee free and fair elections, such 'improvements' are positive elements. Moreover, though such 'improvements' in many countries in the process of democratization often result from strict political control, in Cambodia, there are the recognized effort of different stakeholders such as political parties, public officials, and civil society in the monitoring and denouncement

of irregularities and in collaboration to ensure a non-violent election (Salze-Lozac'h 2008).

It is also observed that by and large, Cambodian citizens have become increasingly satisfied with improvement in their political rights and civil liberties. A survey conducted in 2003 reports that citizens "are more likely now than in 2000 to report they have freedom of political expression and are less likely to worry about direct coercion or other forms of political repression" (Peou 2006: 11). In September 2006, Prime Minister Hun Sen addressed the establishment of a Cambodian national human rights commission based on the international standards and a civil society working group soon came up with a rough draft law on the establishment of the Cambodian national human rights commission (Hay 2008). There is an optimism that the on-going changes bring about social and political commitment to the construction of the rule of law and representative democracy (Lizee 2002: 521). The effort of demobilization of the armed forces also supports the optimism as it diminishes the power regarding the military in society and increases opportunities to invent more space for civil society. Lizee in fact points out that civil society is now a powerful actor in Cambodia (Lizee 2002: 511).

Nevertheless, pessimism also remains, particularly in the justice sector. The collaborative efforts by the UN and other actors to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to trial started in early 2002 and so far enjoy little success (Human Rights Watch 2009: 232–33). The culture of impunity, which has long prevailed in Cambodia, needs to be addressed in the context. The ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, increases the concerns of observers as it strengthens a reputation for hegemonic politics. Such political activities are described as a threat to democracy, and thus are potentially a threat to the social element in human security development (Peou 2006: 17). Although the regime has achieved legitimacy, it marginalizes political opposition, wearing down donors, and maintaining a lock on power through the military and local government offices (ICG 2000). The government continues to control the media (Human Rights Watch 2009: 230–31). Peou points out that the negative conditions are due to "the presence of socio-economic injustice (evident in the widening inequality among people) and the Cambodian state's extremely limited ability to meet the needs of people" (Peou 2006: 17). The new human rights body still needs to find ways of fitting into the existing institutional settings, in which there are already public human rights institutions that are believed to have little effectiveness in the promotion and protection of human rights (Hay 2008).

It is sensible to consider that both positive and negative signs coincide regarding human security in Cambodia. There are perceivable changes in the construction of the state and social relationships. However, there are still a number of worrisome conditions threatening the realization of human security. There is the high level of human and material destruction caused by the long violent conflict. Various actors with different strategies seem to be working with cross-purposes and are unable to translate their efforts into

overwhelming political influence, although the politics of the past has been contained. It would seem that the growing demands for a reorganization of politics in a new state-society relationship will set the boundaries for the future of the security approach and policy actions that will be taken by Cambodia.

Similar to Cambodia, in Vietnam and Lao PDR, the term 'human security' is new and has not yet been widely recognized.⁵⁶ In Vietnam, several documents by the government betray its traditional discourse on security, such as the report on the *10th National Congress* held in 2006, and the *Political Report of the Central Committee, 8th Tenure, at the 9th National Congress* held in 2001. Kerkvliet points out that Vietnam's leaders say the government is 'of the people, for the people, and by the people', yet the country's political system has only one political party, the Communist Party (VCP). Elections typically have only candidates approved by that party (Kerkvliet 2003: 27). The state-centric security discourse is, in fact, illustrated by various policies and the policy making process itself. The same is true of Lao PDR. Its *Political Report of the VII General Congress to the VIII General Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party*, dated March 2006, shows its discourse of security centred squarely on defence.

Nevertheless, there are evolving contexts and dynamics of change that have considerable impacts on Vietnam's security considerations. In Hanoi, the major security concern seems to have shifted from the traditional problem – defending the sovereignty of the state against military threats – to other kinds.⁵⁷ Elliott, for example, argues that there has been remarkably little evidence of a major focus on military security issues since Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989 and the *modus vivendi* reached with China in 1990 (Elliott 1999: 125).⁵⁸ The agreement on the demarcation of the land border between Vietnam and China in very early 2009 reinforces this view.⁵⁹ The emerging security concern in Hanoi seems to be more on defending the identity of a society against a range of threats, such as economic and cultural.⁶⁰ In the report of the *10th National Congress*, in the course of addressing its homeland security, several new security considerations, such as the protection of 'political economic security' and 'ideological-cultural security' are, among others, included, whereas the report of the *9th National Congress* does not address these issues.⁶¹

This emerging concern is, to a great extent, explained by the proponents of reform in the country. Vietnam is presently implementing a reorganization of the economy, shifting the centre of gravity of economic development from state-controlled enterprises to the private sector – the movement towards a 'socialist orientated market economy'. Its transition towards a market economy since the beginning of *Doi Moi*, or renewal, policy in 1986, its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and new opportunities created by such arrangements as the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the bilateral trade agreement with the US obviously bring a new environment not only economically but also politically and culturally. Lizee considers that a movement

away from centralized government planning agencies in the economic sector will give impetus to more decentralized and society-driven political processes (Lizee 2002: 518). Vietnam has indeed made great strides in terms of the development of regulatory and legal systems (Lizee 2002: 518). For example, in 1995, the National Assembly promulgated the Civil Code of 1995 (revised in 2004) which recognizes the rights of citizens to form formal and informal groups. The government has also made efforts to combat corruption to create a more favourable environment for foreign investments. In this context, the issue of the political opening up, or inclusion of a greater section of society, is a major focus. The notion of 'grassroots democracy' is often put forward in the official discourse of local participation in policy-making.⁶² The VCP promotes popular participation in local governance under the rubric of grassroots democracy, which suggests popular consultation, popular contributions, popular discussion, and popular inspection in local governance.

Its transition towards a market economy in barely two decades affirms Hanoi's concern over changing socio-economic conditions and with the associated flow of different ideological and cultural values as a result of growth and openness.⁶³ Elliott analyzes Hanoi's concern and proposes that they arise from a possible erosion of controls of the current regime in power (Elliott 1999: 126). The concern about the erosion of regime-sanctioned values is, in fact, not peculiar to Vietnam. Many neighbours in the region, more or less, have similar concerns as reflected in their search for an 'Asian' way to development and security. It is, therefore, understandable that security has become increasingly an issue of regime maintenance in the framework of socialism more than a simple question of external aggression. The evolution in Hanoi's security concern is, thus, stipulated in the discourse of 'national' or more precisely 'regime' security. In this sense, Vietnam's security discourse remains 'conventional' – state-centred rather than human-centred.

Even so, surrounding contexts, particularly in relation to Vietnam's accession to the international and regional arena, seem to have necessitated expanding the scope of security. Economic and ideological-cultural security issues have been added to its security agenda (Elliott 1999:127). Although this change may arise from regime security perspectives, there are indications of changes in Vietnam's 'security' consideration. Hanoi's current security concern stems from the close interplay of international, regional and domestic environment, in which security is depicted in connection to the enhancement of further economic development without eroding the bases of socialism. Vietnam's membership of ASEAN is indeed seen as an attempt both to invoke the protective cover of a larger organization and to contribute to a stabilizing interaction of the region, which serves the Vietnamese national security (Elliott 1999: 141; Turley 1996: 183–186).

With an understanding of those changes in Vietnam, a more careful examination will be necessary to assess the relevance of human security. The government has been addressing such issues as healthcare, food security, poverty, natural disaster management, and minority issues at the national

level. For example, the government adopted the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) in 2003. The Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Programme coordinated by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs includes six policies on free health care, tuition fee exemptions, special support to ethnic minorities, support to vulnerable people, housing support and support with production tools. The effort to address these issues, obviously human security concerns, seems to be more prominent in recent years.⁶⁴ These issues are addressed in an attempt to achieve people's welfare or wellbeing.

In Vietnam, it is only in recent years that the attempts to conduct research on human security have started at the national level.⁶⁵ Whether the idea of human security is understood and enacted in the context of relevant elements such as poverty reduction and grassroots democracy, remains to be seen. Yet, most fundamentally, the existing political context under the one party system will significantly limit the achievement of human security in a people-oriented manner. Little improvement is recognized in the area of civil and political rights in reality. If the defined notion of human security highlights the issues related to human rights, it will take further time for Vietnam to fully appreciate the notion of human security in the sense that addressing human rights is still a very sensitive issue, particularly when it comes to freedom of expression and addressing civil and political rights.⁶⁶

Fairly similar situations are recognized in terms of the political context in Lao PDR. Change and pressure for an opening up of the political system in Lao PDR were expected at the time of the deliberations of the Seventh Party Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) held in March 2001 (Lizee 2002: 519). However, there is little indication of reform in Lao PDR in its political realm. Lizee observes that within the LPRP, common political and ideological denominators are probably stronger than points of divergence, or at least that there is a broad consensus in place strong enough to prevent any major change in the structure of power in Vientiane (Lizee 2002: 520). In this sense, in Lao PDR, the current state and society relationship is likely to remain, although international and regional dimensions to the issue of change may bring certain alterations in the economic field. The LPRP traditionally relied on Vietnam in the post-revolutionary period to provide it with both the material means and the ideological underpinnings of its model of development (Lizee 2002: 520). Changes in Hanoi might thus lead reconsideration in Vientiane. Even in this case, the centrality of state to state relations will strengthen the existing power at the top of the hierarchy in Lao PDR.

In response to the questions regarding current security concerns in Lao PDR, the deputy director general from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao PDR explains that although the term 'human security' is not used in any document, Lao PDR has the slogan 'protect and develop a country' and it already contains all the ideas of human security. It was emphasized that in Lao national policies, all elements of human security have been already

included – what element is highlighted depends on the condition at each particular point of time. Therefore, he contends that a people-centred idea has been in place in the country. He adds that the focus of security considerations has changed in Lao PDR between the 1990s and now.⁶⁷ He explains that during the 1990s, political threats, such as border issues, were the main focus. Now, all threats, such as climate change, economic crisis, and infectious diseases, are interlinked. Therefore, he considers that the perception of security in the government has also changed, by recognizing various other issues for consideration apart from traditional security threats.

The comment illustrates the idea that the notion of human security is considered not new from the government's point of view. The scope of security has been reviewed and expanded to include various non-traditional issues in Lao PDR. However, in response to the question concerning a possible way of promoting human security in Lao PDR, it was suggested that human security should be promoted by the government – first addressing issues that are less controversial – particularly with regarding economic and socio-economic sectors and then deal with the more sensitive areas, specifically political rights of the people. It was stated that “giving people more rights before they are well off and well educated will create chaos”.⁶⁸ These comments mirror a view that upholds the state and economy first. This suggests that the right-based politics can only be promoted through an expansion of economic openness. The underlying idea, therefore, largely remains within the state-centric discourse and approach.

It will be inappropriate to consider that human security has no relevance in the three countries in Indochina: Cambodia, Vietnam, and Lao PDR. Although it is too optimistic to expect that a human security approach is fully practiced in these three countries, it is still uncertain how the human security notion is received and interpreted. Some indications of change or actual changes in the state-society relationship – a reorganization of politics through a new state and society relationship – are perceived, particularly in Cambodia and to a lesser extent in Vietnam. The growing civil society in Cambodia seems to have significant implications for a future perspective of human security in the country although there are still a number of conditions that limit human security. In Vietnam, the limitation of a state-endorsed civil society, which has been sponsored, if not created, by the government, and the very idea of democratization within the ideological context in place are likely to restrict of human security in a ‘people-oriented’ manner. Yet, there are profound demands for a reorganization of politics through a new state-society relationship in the three countries.

The failure of success

Human security certainly has relevance to security discourses and policy actions in national and regional contexts in Southeast Asia. In some countries, the relevance is clearly found in national policy actions, while in other

countries, the relevance is implicit, addressing some of the human security issues without necessarily promoting the agenda, ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’, and without using the label of ‘human security’. The emphasis on ‘people-oriented’ values and community building in the ASEAN context can highlight the relevance and growing awareness of human security in Southeast Asia. An exploration on the discourse of human security in the region reveals several unique implications that the term ‘human security’ retains. It also shows the central issues that the notion of human security points to and illuminates in the region.

‘State-oriented’ human security

In general, there are two important implications that the notion of human security assumes. First, the notion addresses the *scope* of security (that is, the question of what constitutes security). It necessitates considering both traditional and non-traditional kinds of security threats. Second, it redefines the main *referent object* of security (that is the question of whose security). Its primary object is people and communities. Here, a question arises: what more specific contributions does the notion make in the Southeast Asian context? In Southeast Asia the first point, i.e. expanding the scope of security, is not new. As seen in the discourse of security in the region, most countries maintain a comprehensive view of security that includes both military and non-military threats in their security agenda. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have adopted a comprehensive view on security long before the 1990s. Even for other countries, including Thailand, the Philippines, and Lao PDR, a comprehensive view now dominates their security discourse. A gradual expansion of the scope of security is recognized in the discourse in Vietnam. The foremost input of the human security notion in the Southeast Asian context is, therefore, found in the second point – that is, defining people/individuals as the main referent object of security.

As explored in the previous chapter, human security, in principle, necessitates reassessing the threats that exist, the specific forms of protection that are needed, the groups or individuals who need protection, and the entity responsible for protecting the relevant individuals. This reassessment must be carried out locally and from the perspective of the most vulnerable people as a precondition to restoring security. Accordingly, if applied, the human security approach may drastically change security management strategies, priorities, and methods because threats for state and those for people are often, if not always, different.

In Southeast Asia, security threats have generally been identified from the perspectives of the state. While the comprehensive view on security, which expanded the scope of security to include non-traditional types of security threats, has dominated in the region, the security problems identified in this context were threats to the *state*. For example, Indonesia’s interpretation of comprehensive security is seen as part of a broader policy of state-building

(Ayooob 1997: 131–132). Similarly, the Malaysian interpretation of comprehensive security illustrates that the state is an ultimate object for security considerations, particularly for political stability, economic success, and social harmony. Human security primarily questions such state-centric identification of threat. The existing approach in the region epitomized by ‘comprehensive security’ and the idea of national and regional resilience seems to be counter-productively working for the adoption of a human security approach. In other words, the practice of comprehensive security contributes to limit the development of a ‘people-oriented’ approach to security in Southeast Asia.

Some of the policy-makers commented that such human security issues as poverty, healthcare, trafficking, and management of natural disasters have been addressed in their national context.⁶⁹ They consider that if the fundamental meaning of human security is the security of individuals, the idea has been practiced in several areas within the existing national policies, such as through poverty reduction, improving education, and providing a better healthcare system. Thus, they do not view human security as a new concept and believe the idea has already been evident in practice. However, in this context, little attention is paid with regard to how these threats were identified, how the policy choice was made, and how policy actions supporting the effort to achieve security of the people were undertaken. The human security claimed to exist in Southeast Asia could be regarded as security of people from the perspective of the state, rather than that from the perspective of the people.

The identified threats from a state’s security perspective may not be necessarily incompatible with the threats identified from the people’s perspective. For example, poverty, poor healthcare, environmental problems, fatal diseases, and human trafficking are considered as threats to human security from both government and people’s perspectives. Many countries in Southeast Asia have been, in fact, addressing these issues in their national actions. Yet, as opposed to with input from the people, the policy actions – priorities, kinds of protection offered, and the methods to handle those threats – are usually decided and designed by the government.

The claim by some policy-makers that human security has been already put in practice in national contexts by addressing certain human security issues mirrors their interpretation of the notion of human security. Here, ‘human security’ is taken in a similar vein with ‘comprehensive security’ because both concepts expand the scope of security, entailing traditional and non-traditional security threats. While there is a critical difference between the two concepts, that is, the main referent object of security, it seems there is a tendency that human security is interpreted similarly with the notion of comprehensive security, particularly when concerned with issues related to ‘freedom from want’. This interpretation partly explains why the term ‘human security’ is not employed in the ASEAN Charter. The term ‘comprehensive security’ is, instead, used in the Charter (Article 1–8, Chapter I). If the two notions are considered in a similar vein, obviously the familiar term already used in the region will be employed.

In such an interpretation, the government identifies security threats and decide actions to handle the security threats to people. The discourse of security by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Lao PDR apparently illustrates this tendency. Although in Thailand, the utilization of human security for the regime's security is less evident, the policy choice and action are either state-oriented or dependent on the approach the government chooses to adopt in particular situation. The ultimate consideration of security, thus, remains on 'state' or 'regime'. 'Human security' can be utilized in certain threat contexts for securing the state or regime. The comment by a government official from Lao PDR introduced earlier shows this tendency: the government takes initiatives to achieve human security, enforcing it upon the people rather than attempting to achieve it in a people-oriented manner.⁷⁰ Here, little opportunity is taken to achieve human security with people's participation or in a collaborative manner between the government and the people. Instead, it was stated that the "people still need education and welfare before having various rights".⁷¹

In the regional context, despite the EPG report that recommends stronger interaction with civil society organizations (CSOs) (paragraph 48), the ASEAN Charter provides no space for civil society to have any input in the decision-making process of ASEAN (Collins 2008: 326). Most fundamentally, the Charter was drafted without public participation. In Thailand, a copy of the final draft of the ASEAN Charter, which was marked 'confidential', had been disseminated through the media before the Charter was officially publicized in November 2007 and several news outlets were reporting that a copy of the draft ASEAN Charter, yet to be signed, had been 'leaked'.⁷² One scholar from Thailand pointed out that if it is a charter of the people, it must be drafted with wide popular participation and thus it could never be 'leaked' or be 'confidential'.⁷³ The Charter, which proclaims 'people-oriented' values, itself, proves that it is far from being a people's charter and ASEAN still remains state-centric in reality.

The existing security approach in both national and regional contexts in Southeast Asia, the state-centric comprehensive security, seems to rather hinder achieving 'people-oriented' human security in practice. The current discourse and approach in Southeast Asia is 'state-oriented' human security. Even though some human security issues are addressed, the identification of threats to human security and decisions for the management of threats are largely dependent on states or those who have political power and resources.

One of the concerns in such 'state-oriented' human security is that the effort to achieve human security in a state-oriented manner can potentially undermine 'security'. This is because 'state-centred' human security may concern only the people or individuals that the state considers part of its nationality. While the fundamental idea of human security is to protect the security of individuals, particularly vulnerable people and communities, 'state-oriented' human security could be for only those who are recognized by the state. If there are people or communities who have contested relationships

with the state in a country or society, security considerations by the state may not include such a group of people or communities. As a result, security of this particular group of people or communities will not be part of human security consideration by the state, resulting in marginalization of the group. In such contexts, certain policies or actions implemented for the achievement of human security by the state may negatively affect communal relationships within a country, causing unequal distribution of resources and opportunities to marginalized groups or communities.

What are the issues?

The underlying issues behind ‘state-oriented’ human security are noticeably related with such notions as ‘participation’, ‘democracy’, and perhaps ‘people’s rights’ or ‘human rights’. These are, in fact, major concerns in many of the economic, social, and political realms in Southeast Asia. Addressing human security will essentially necessitate considering these issues in each society at the most fundamental point. This is because achieving human security requires considering each person’s security – his/her fear and concern. Thus, careful assessment is necessary to identify threats that affect each person and also to examine needed measures to handle the threats. Apparently, participation of the concerned individuals in the process of such assessment is the most sensible way in order to identify threats affecting them.

In Southeast Asia, ‘security’ has been sought on the basis of the decisions made by states. These decisions regarding priorities, strategies, preferences, and methods are usually comprised of interests influenced and controlled by dominant identity groups in each country who usually maintain state power and resources. Hence, in Southeast Asia, security often means securing regime or the dominant groups – their power and resources.

The notion of national and regional resilience emphasized by ASEAN leaders is, in fact, centred on states. This is because the perceived foremost priority for the governments has been to create a strong state – the achievement of ‘state-building’ and ‘economic development’. The ‘ASEAN way’ – the Southeast Asian style of diplomacy or code of conduct – depicts such state security consideration on ‘economic development’ and ‘state-building’.⁷⁴ Accordingly, the state-centrism is evident in security discourse in Southeast Asia, which seems to serve for dominant identity or interest groups in each society.

Any attempt to achieve human security obviously necessitates questioning such state-centric approaches. One of the important issues here is that ‘human security’ concerns both the process, where attempts to restore security of people have been made by all actors in a society, and end state, where threats to the security of people are removed and the situation is constantly reviewed to handle potential threats. As some interviewees claim, poverty reduction, improvement in healthcare and education, and reducing various kinds of risk for people’s security are human security concerns. However, addressing these

issues can be state-driven – identifying threats, priorities, and methods for action by states – and such a state-driven approach has been dominant for long in Southeast Asia as illustrated by the ASEAN way.

Most governments in Southeast Asia have indeed progressed in economic development as a result of state-led developmentalism or state-oriented development despite occasional tides of economic crises. It made possible the achievement of certain levels of poverty reduction and betterment of people's living conditions. The success of economic growth should not be underestimated. However, this success in economic development, to a great extent, promotes the state-oriented approach. Some government officials indeed stated that certain control of civil and political rights of the people are necessary until a certain level of state-building and economic growth is achieved.⁷⁵ This statement illustrates the belief that the success in economic development is possible partly because of the state-led approach. In this sense, the success of state-oriented economic development turns to failure in achieving people's participation and democratic process as there is no realization of a 'people-oriented' approach or considerations on the process of the development. The state-oriented development focuses more on the outcome – the success of a certain level of economic development. The state-oriented approach has enhanced effectiveness by achieving the very objective of economic development – realizing economic growth. Yet, the process has hindered developing the system for public debate and participation in the process of decision-making and implementation due to the state-oriented approach and the narrow focus on the attainment of growth. This is partly because a people-oriented approach is likely to slow down the speed of economic growth. Ironically, the failure of achieving a people-oriented approach is, to a certain extent, explained in the way that the success (economic growth) was made in Southeast Asia.

Achieving human security can be 'state-oriented' and be only a concern of the end-outcome in the same way as the countries in the region did so in economic growth. Similar to the process and approach of economic development, the 'state-oriented' approach to achieve human security, the ultimate objective, is indeed the current form and content of 'human security' claimed by some of the policy-makers in Southeast Asia. If the notion of human security is about the security of people, it must be 'people-oriented'. 'People-oriented' human security is indeed the one that the region aspires to, as proclaimed in the ASEAN Charter. However, as the success is recognized in economic growth as a result of a state-oriented approach, shifting the approach from state-oriented to people-oriented in achieving security may not be straightforward for the countries in Southeast Asia. The failure of success is an ironical fact that the countries in the region need to recognize for the achievement of the human security aspired in the ASEAN Charter.

The explorations in this chapter revealed that there are signs of changes related to the state-society relationship in both national and regional contexts in Southeast Asia. In this connection, there is a growing awareness of human

security and increasing considerations to bring human security dimensions into the evolving contexts, particularly in the ASEAN context. Although such changes are not fast enough and pessimisms still remain high, whether such awareness and consideration of human security bring actual changes in societies in Southeast Asia will depend on whether or not the process as well as the outcome is taken into consideration in achieving human security. The process must be studied within localities with understanding the communal content of each country in the course of addressing actual human security issues. The existing state-centred human security that solely concerns the outcome may possibly undermine 'security' in some of the countries in Southeast Asia. In order to examine 'state-oriented' human security and actual security situation in Southeast Asia, the following chapters explore human security in specific national and regional contexts.

3 Domestic challenges to human security

Security discourse in Southeast Asia illustrates inward-looking security consideration, focusing on internal stability and national unity. This is partly explained by the main priorities for the countries in the region: state-building and economic development. Obviously, the inward-looking security consideration mirrors various security challenges exist within each country. Insurgencies, terrorisms, and political violence frequently experienced in the region are indeed some such challenges.¹ The fundamental problem in these contexts often exists in disagreements among different groups in a society regarding what they perceive ‘threats’ and how they handle the threats. If so, even in some of the countries in Southeast Asia where no obvious violent conflict exists, they may share the similar challenges within their borders because diverse interest groups exist in most countries in the region. This reality is illustrated in the discourse of security in Southeast Asia centred on maintaining internal stability and ideological unity.

Apparently, violent conflicts are a threat to human security – at least threats to personal safety. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, in many cases, the root-causes of such conflicts are multiple and include various elements related to people’s freedom from want – for example, deprivations of socio-economic and cultural rights. Accordingly, in these situations, the two aspects of human security, ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, have significant implications and thus, assumingly, the notion and approach of human security will help to understand these conflicts. The question now is whether or not a people-centred approach – or a human security approach – actually helps to handle internal conflicts in Southeast Asia. This chapter, therefore, explores human security in the context of internal conflicts in the region and identifies the key underlying issues when considering human security in the domestic context of each country.²

Violent internal conflicts in Southeast Asia

Historically, Southeast Asia has experienced some of the worst violence of the twentieth century. For example, the Khmer Rouge killed about one quarter of the population in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.³ In Indonesia,

anti-communist riots which followed the transition from Sukarno to Suharto during the 1960s claimed about 400,000 lives (Schwarz 1999: 20). In Aceh, separatist movements have claimed 2,000 lives (Wessel and Wimhofer 2001). In Timor Leste, post invasion casualties number about 50,000 people were killed outright and 50,000 persons who died from deprivation (Colombijn and Lindblad 2002: 3). This is half the figure of 200,000 deaths which is usually mentioned in the literature (Cribb 2001). In Myanmar, although there is no collated figure, 600,000 internally displaced persons have been recorded as a result of random conflicts (United States Department of State 2003).

According to Mack, there was a modest worldwide decline (10 per cent) in all types of political violence (internal armed conflicts and one-side violence) between 2002 and 2003 (Mack 2005: 67). However, during the same period, in Asia, there was an increase (4 per cent) in the number of political violence cases (Mack 2005: 67–68). The study shows that in Asia, while non-state conflicts (when none of the warring parties is a government) declined, state-based conflicts (between a government and non-state actors) increased during the period (Mack 2005: 28). Moreover, the region (Southeast Asia) also suffered from brutal and far-reaching form of ‘one-sided’ violence (unopposed killing such as politicides and violent assaults on civilians) (Acharya 2007: 18).⁴

Obviously, Southeast Asia has experienced serious challenges in the form of internal conflicts. A number of countries in Southeast Asia were amongst the most conflict prone countries between 1946 and 2003: Myanmar (232 conflict-years), Philippines (86 conflict-years), Republic of Vietnam (36 conflict-years), and Thailand (35 conflict-years) (Mack 2005: 18).⁵ According to Frida Moller and others, in Southeast Asia, between 1993 and 2004, there were fifteen internal conflicts where one group was in conflict with the government over legitimacy or territory (Moller *et al.* 2007: 279–80). These conflicts are fairly asymmetrical, meaning that one party in the conflict, inevitably the rebel group, is significantly smaller than the other party. These conflicts are fought in rural areas and are low in intensity but have a tendency to last a long time (Moller *et al.* 2007: 377). For this reason, the following section focuses on violent internal conflicts in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia in order to explore the utility of human security. The section begins with a brief overview of the conflicts. This is followed by an analysis of the relevance between violence and threats to human security in these cases. The section does not aim to describe every historical detail of the conflicts. Rather, it exclusively explores factors which explain the root-causes of violence in each case.

Southern Thailand

Thailand’s three southernmost provinces, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, have attracted attention over the last few years as a result of increased – almost daily – incidences of violence.⁶ Although the rise of violence in southern Thailand is not a new phenomenon, it has been escalating continuously since

early 2004 (ICG 2006: 17–31). Historically, these provinces, along with the western part of Songkhla, once comprised the independent sultanate of Patani, a prominent Malay-Muslim centre of commerce and Islamic learning. Like other Malay states, including Aceh and Malacca in Indonesia, Patani was an important centre for trade with both China and certain European countries. For several centuries, it fought against Siamese encroachment (Harish, 2006: 50–54) and attempted to retain its Malay-Muslim identity.⁷ In 1902, however, the area was formally incorporated into Thailand, then known as Siam. This act was buttressed by the 1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty, which defined the border between Patani and British Malaya (now Malaysia) and asserted Siamese control over Patani. The former sultanate's history displays a cyclical pattern of determined resistance against Siam both before and after its incorporation into the latter country (Harish 2006: 50–54).

The region's inhabitants are predominately of Malay ethnicity and speak a local Malay dialect.⁸ Many of them have Thai-Malay dual citizenship. Most are Muslim while the majority of Thailand's inhabitants are Buddhist and speak Thai (Barnard and Maier 2004).⁹ The local Malay spoken in southern Thailand is identical to that spoken by the people across the border in the northern Malaysian state of Kelantan, many of whom are family relatives.

In an attempt by the Siamese government to construct a unified Thai nation during the early twentieth century, people in southern provinces were pressured to use the Thai language after 1910. According to Uthai Dulyakasem, there was a concerted attempt to educate the Malays in Thai (Dulyakasem 1991: 141). It was part of an accelerated process of assimilation and centralization of the southern provinces under the Bangkok administration. The accelerated assimilation policy was implemented during King Chulalongkorn's reign (1853–1910) in response to an increasing threat from the British in Malaya (Farouk 1984: 236). The assimilation policy led periodic protests in the region. A major rebellion was staged after the introduction of the Primary Education Act in 1921, which forced Malay children to attend Thai primary schools. In 1932, when the monarchical rule came to an end, Malay participation in the National Assembly and Senate became possible. However, it was short-lived. The assimilation policy was enforced when the military rule of Marshal Phibul Songkhram came into power in 1938. Phibul pursued a policy of enforced assimilation of the various minority cultures into the mainstream Buddhist 'Thai-ness' (Croissant 2005: 23).¹⁰ It was during this time when the name of the country was changed from Siam to Thailand.¹¹ Charnvit Kasetsiri explains that the new name of the country (Thailand) was introduced on the basis of ethnicity (the Thai race was the ruling class) in the context of ultra-nationalism under Phibul (Tumcharoen 2009).¹² The government introduced the *Thai Ratthaniyom* (Thai Customs Decree), which forced all Thai citizens to conform to a set of common cultural norms.

Ruth McVey observes that while the resistance by the Malay-Muslims up to the twentieth century is analyzed through concerns over power, the protests and resistance in the later period were understood in relation to concerns over

ethnic or religious solidarity (McVey 1989: 34). This difference is explained by the distinctive types of Thai control. While the control of the Patani sultanate prior to 1902 was nominal, leaving independent political, economic and cultural structures in place, a series of Thai administrative reforms left little autonomy for the Patani ruler. Furthermore, the local aristocracy was deposed, and bureaucrats and governors were sent from Bangkok to Patani (Islam 1998: 441–56).

During the Second World War, the Malay-Muslims supported the British while the Thais were supportive of the Japanese (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 5). Following the Second World War, when the British granted equal citizenship status to non-Malays in British Malaya, leading to political independence, Malay-Muslims in Thailand demanded integration into the Malay-dominated Malaysia. This was, however, not accepted by Britain and the United States, due to their concerns about the territorial integrity of Thailand. Although during the post-war period there was more conciliatory administration in Thailand, few changes accrued as there was an absence of political participation (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 5).

During the 1950s, there were various efforts to build a movement to promote the Malay-Muslim political agenda through such groups as the United Greater Patani Malays Movement (Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya: GAMPAR) and the Patani People's Movement (PPM), the former leaders of which created the Patani National Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani: BNPP) in 1959 (Aphornsuvan 2004: 1–3). The BNPP is considered the first organized armed group for Patani independence (ICG 2006: 6).¹³ During the 1960s, a relocation policy aimed at bringing Thai-Buddhists from other parts of Thailand to the south was introduced to 'balance up' the racial and religious demography of the southern provinces (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 5).

By 1969, around 160,000 Buddhists had moved into the area (Yegar 2002: 125). The emergence of a number of radical Muslim groups, such as the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) or the National Revolutionary Front, the Patani United Liberation Front (PULO) and the New PULO, manifested as a result of such a policy.¹⁴ According to Farish Noor, between 1968 and 1975, a series of military operations named 'Operation Ramkamhaeng' and the 'Special Anti-Terrorist Campaign' were launched from Bangkok to destroy the networks of the Patani liberation movement (Noor 2004). Following an incident at the end of 1975, which spilled over into the neighbouring state of Kelantan, anti-government rallies in southern Thailand drew attention from the Malaysian Parliament. It is said that this was the beginning of cooperation between Muslims on both sides of the border (Noor 2004).¹⁵ This led to bilateral security cooperation between the Thailand and Malaysian governments aimed at monitoring the border between the two states.

After almost two decades of a campaign against insurgencies in the South, the government started a number of administrative and political initiatives for socio-economic development in the South. In 1981, the new government led

by Prem Tinsulanond overhauled security and governance structures to promote the new goal of political accommodation. In the new administrative system introduced in the South, the Southern Border Provincial Administration Centre (SBPAC), a special unit of the army, police, and Interior Ministry were to serve as a intermediary between Bangkok and local provincial administrations. The Civil–Police–Military Task Force 43 (CPM 43), comprised of civilians, the Prime Minister’s office, the Army, police, anti-riot police, village chiefs, Muslim clerics, teachers and business groups, was created to oversee security in the region, and to work as an advisory body to the policy-making establishment in Bangkok (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 7). Economic and industrial development packages were implemented to develop the south so as to eradicate poverty (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 7). At the political level, democratization was used as a means to allow the Malay-Muslim community to enter parliamentary politics. According to Gunaratna and others, it was hoped that democratization and the consequent Malay-Muslim people’s participation in politics would decrease the radical movement (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 7). The Democratic Party and the New Aspiration Party reinforced their presence in the south and incorporated several Malay-Muslim politicians, providing them with a new public space in national politics (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 7). By the end of the 1980s, violent movements decreased, although sporadic violence continued (Melvin 2007: 17).

After Thaksin Shinawatra came to power in 2001, the government took a dual policy. On the one hand, the government took a hard-line approach to control the violence in the southern provinces. In 2002, the SBPAC was replaced with the Southern Border Provinces Coordination Centre (SBPCC), which gave power to police in the three southern provinces. This change was seen as a manifestation of the centralization of power and corruption (Noor 2004). The Thaksin government launched a harsh nationwide crackdown on the trade of narcotics, known as ‘war on drugs’ (Melvin 2007: 30). According to ICG, in the south, the campaign helped to further destabilize the situation as the police were increasingly aggressive in their policies towards the Malay-Muslim community (ICG 2006: 35–36). During this period, after the September 11 attacks, Thailand has been supportive of US efforts in the war on terror, sending a small contingent of Thai troops to Iraq with the US-led coalition forces.¹⁶ This position was unpopular in much of the south (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 15–16). The government, in response to the increasing violence, also sought to tighten control over the southern provinces through a series of security crackdowns during 2004.¹⁷ It declared the area threatening to national security and the Revolutionary Decree was used despite strong protests from the public.¹⁸ In July 2005, a new special law was passed by the parliament to replace the Revolutionary Decree. The new law gives power to the prime minister to order proactive activities and prohibit the press to release information considered detrimental to national security (Pongsapich 2007: 231). On the other hand, the same government announced the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC)¹⁹ in 2005 to find a

solution to the situation in the south (Prime Minister's Office Order No. 104/2548).²⁰ This action was said to be a response to criticism from the Privy Council (Melvin 2007: 30). Although the Thaksin government initiated establishing the NRC, few recommendations by the NRC were implemented during his term.

From the second term of the Thaksin government, various forms of an anti-Thaksin movement emerged due to lack of transparency and corruption.²¹ Although the ruling party, Thai Rak Thai won more than seventy per cent of the votes in the 2005 election, the second term proved to be viewed as increasingly unacceptable to civil society groups (Pongsapich 2007: 232). In September 2006, at the height of the anti-government rally under the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), an alliance of five networks, including media (Sondhi), academics, labour groups, NGOs, and religious representatives, a military coup was announced. Following the September *coup d'état* in 2006, newly appointed Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont immediately visited the south. He apologized for the past atrocities committed by the Thai state against the Malay-Muslims in the region and pledged to permit space for Islam's Sharia laws. The Prime Minister also set up the 'ad hoc special development zone' in the five southernmost provinces. While this was an atypical gesture when compared with the hard-line previous government approach, there was continued violence in the region throughout the leadership of Surayud and following governments.

The causal factors of violence in southern Thailand

In June 2006, Thailand's National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), which was set up during the Thaksin government to find a long-term solution to the problem in the south, submitted a report outlining the causal factors behind the violence and suggesting ways of alleviating the problems in the region. This report, *Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation*, delineates the complexity of the situation at three levels and recommends a number of actions to resolve the factors behind the violence (NRC 2006: 4–5).²²

First, at the individual level, the report draws attention to unconstrained abuses of administrative power by state authorities. Second, at the structural level, it points to cases of injustice arising from complexly interwoven problems related to the existing judicial process and administrative system, economic weakness, and the education system. Third, from a cultural point of view, the report states that specific religious and ethnic traits particular to the region legitimize the use of violence or persuade considerable numbers of people to accept or agree with the perpetrators of violence. Consequently, the report concludes that ending the violence in the region "requires for the most part political measures between the state and the people" (NRC 2006: 3).

In contrast to the usual emphasis on ethno-religious differences as the root causes of violence, the NRC points to socio-economic and political grievances, particularly in relation to the judicial process and the administrative

system, as the causal factors of the violence in southern Thailand (NRC 2006: 3–4). Problems at the structural level include “poverty, brutal competition for natural resources under pressure from external economic forces, and poor education quality” (NRC 2006: 3). However, the NRC recognizes that these conditions are not unique to the southern provinces. Indeed, such problems exist in much of rural Thailand (NRC 2006: 3). Thus, the violence in the south must be explained by other factors, which the NRC identifies as political grievances: “injustice at the hands of state officials and weaknesses in the judicial process” (NRC 2006: 3).

The southern Philippines

In 2008, eleven years of negotiations between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippines government failed and renewed fighting ensued. By the middle of October, the fighting had displaced around 390,000 people (ICG 2008b: 1). The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA), scheduled to have been signed in Kuala Lumpur on 5 August 2008, collapsed at the last minute. The breakdown was as a result of a Filipino Supreme Court decision declaring the draft agreement to be unconstitutional.²³

The Muslim population, popularly known as ‘Moros’, constitutes only six per cent of the total population of the Republic of the Philippines but are territorially concentrated in Mindanao located in the southern part of the Philippines (Islam 2003: 193). Muslims remain the majority in five provinces of Mindanao: Maguindanao, Sulu, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, and Tawi Tawi (Gutierrez and Borrás 2004: 2). Most of Mindanao has historically been a separate territory from the Philippines.²⁴ The region consisted of indigenous tribes. The Sultanates of Mindanao allowed the Spanish authority to open businesses during the nineteenth century in northern and northeastern Mindanao. During the Spanish colonial time, large areas of the Muslim south remained untouched (Islam 2003: 197; ICG 2004: 3). In 1906, during the US colonial period, the Moro Province was created and brought under the direct control of Manila. By 1913 Christian and Muslim Filipinos were brought by means of armed force under a single government (Human Development Network *et al.* 2005: 65).

In 1940, the American government abolished the Sultanate completely and the Moro territories were brought under one Filipino administrative system. At the time, an American colonial official-in-charge of Moro affairs defined the Moro issue as a question of

method or form of administration by which the Moros ... can be governed to their best interest ... for their gradual advancement in culture and civilization, so that in the course of a reasonable time they can be admitted into the general government of the Philippine islands as qualified members of a republican national organization.

(Human Development Network *et al.* 2005: 65)

This view illustrates the colonial government's stance on changing the Muslims politically, economically, and socially so that they could adapt to the ways of the more 'civilized' and 'modernized' non-Muslim population of the Philippines (Islam 2003: 198). The colonial government undertook several programmes in the Moro Province, such as the expansion of public works and the construction of schools, hospitals and clinics. The government also introduced a secular system of education, in which non-Muslim teachers were appointed to Moro schools (Islam 2003: 198).

Christian settlement in the region began in the early twentieth century.²⁵ The resettlement was fostered by deliberate policies from the central government in Manila (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005: 1). The declared goal of these resettlement programmes was to increase the country's rice and corn production (Gutierrez and Borrás 2004: 8). The US colonial government encouraged non-Muslims from other parts of the Philippines to settle in the Moro Province. Loans were provided to those settlers who lacked funds, and between 1903 and 1906 the number of acres given to settlers increased from 40 to 200 (Islam 2003: 198). In 1902, a Land Registration Act was passed to determine the extent of private holdings in the country. The public land acts of 1911, 1913, 1914, and 1919 followed. These acts gradually classified all the land in the Philippines as state property, though individuals could apply for private ownership. According to the Act of 1919, a Christian Filipino could apply for the private ownership of up to 24 hectares of land while a non-Christian could request only 10 hectares. Ultimately, the Moros lost ownership of their ancestral lands. Moreover, the government encouraged foreign corporations to operate in Mindanao. As a result, agribusiness owned by transnational corporations flourished in Mindanao. Rich minerals, copper, and coal in the region were exploited by mining corporations (Islam 2003: 199).

Immediately before independence in 1946, the Moro leaders made a request to the US government asking not to be included in independence (Islam 2003: 200). The request was not accepted by the US government. Muslim marginalization and economic and political integration in the south accelerated with independence. Growing numbers of Christians altered land ownership and population patterns.²⁶ According to a study, by 1979, the Moro inhabitants of Mindanao had fallen from 98 per cent during the 1930s to 40 per cent. They owned less than 17 per cent of the property and up to 80 per cent were landless (Bacani 2004: 3). The manner, as well as the scale, of immigration to Mindanao caused economic disparities between Christian settlers and Muslim farmers (Islam 2003: 201). The government steadily provided more opportunities and assistance to settlers from the north.

There were key developments in the situation during the 20-year Marcos presidency (1965–85).²⁷ A series of laws implemented to meet the needs of population resettlement and plantation agriculture legitimized the government's expropriation of traditionally Muslim owned private lands (Islam 2003: 201). The Philippine commonwealth policy of assimilating the Moros into the general Filipino population and continuing migration exacerbated

the situation. Marcos declared martial law in September 1972 which curtailed press freedom and other civil liberties, and closed down Congress and media establishments. He also ordered the arrest of leaders and militant activists (Dolan 1991). Marcos claimed that martial law was the prelude to creating a 'new society' based on new social and political values (Agoncillo 1990: 574–75).

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), founded during the 1960s, turned to the use of force to correct what they perceived as mounting demographic, economic, and cultural marginalization (Dhillon 2006: 167). Resistance to central control and resentment towards the increasing number of Christian settlers, as well as the logging and mining activities, which had become important sources of export earnings, were the driving forces behind the MNLF which was said to represent the interest of Mindanao's Muslim population until the 1990s (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005: 1).²⁸

The MNLF staged an armed resistance in Mindanao against the Marcos martial law regime from 1972 to 1976 under chairperson Nur Misuari.²⁹ By 1976, more than one million inhabitants were displaced with some 100,000 crossing into neighbouring countries, particularly Malaysia, seeking refuge (Bacani 2004: 4). The nature of conflict and the cross border refugees drew international attention, namely the member countries of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). In 1976, diplomatic initiatives by some OIC members gave impetus to the signing of a peace agreement between the Marcos government and the MNLF, known as the Tripoli Agreement. The Agreement called for autonomy in the Muslim south (not independence).³⁰ However, autonomy provision was not implemented by Marcos because it meant carving out 13 provinces from Mindanao which constituted the autonomous region.

Amidst negotiations failures related to the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, the MNLF underwent a structural and philosophical shift (Dhillon 2006: 166), generating two entities: the MNLF and the MILF.³¹ This split is said to derive from differences on various issues: ideological orientation (secular-nationalist vs. Islamic revivalist), leadership styles (centralized vs. consultative), ethnic allegiances (Tausug vs. Maguindanao) as well as political strategy (armed struggle vs. peace negotiation) and objectives (autonomy vs. independence) (Human Development Network *et al.* 2005: 70).³²

It was not until President Corazon Aquino came into power in 1986 that the provision of autonomy was fulfilled in the form of the Jeddah Accord of 1987. The government organized the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, it was created through legislative processes which were "within the framework of this Constitution [the 1987 Philippine Constitution] and the national sovereignty, as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines". Expectedly, only 4 of the 13 provinces, where the Muslims are a majority, decided to join the autonomous region. The MNLF accused the government of violating the Tripoli Agreement and continued its armed struggle.

President Fidel Ramos continued his predecessor's policy and found success with his peace initiative in September 1996 when the MNLF leadership, under Chairman Nur Misuari, signed a peace accord with the government (Jakarta Accord). This was deemed the final and full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. The Agreement provided for the establishment of an interim institution called the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), to be headed by Chairman Misuari. The SPCPD would be responsible for supervising and coordinating development projects in a designated area known as the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). SZOPAD covered all the provinces specified in the Tripoli Agreement. After three years, a plebiscite would again be conducted asking the provinces in the SZOPAD whether they would like to join the 'expanded' autonomous region for the Muslims. However, due in part to the disappointing performance of the SPCPD, only one additional province and one additional city joined the autonomous region (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005: 2).

By the time of President Joseph Estrada's election in 1998, most leading officials of the MNLF had joined the government or were elected local government officials with tacit support from the central administration. Accordingly, the MILF headed by Hashim Salamat emerged as the main opponent to the government.³³ In response to alleged atrocities committed by the MILF, President Estrada declared an 'all-out war policy' in April 2000, mobilizing a large military contingent to capture several MILF camps, including its main headquarters in Camp Abubakar. It, however, failed to crush the MILF which chose to avoid direct confrontation by breaking into smaller groups and hiding in the remote areas of the region.

The administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo initially declared an 'all-out-peace' policy toward the MILF. However, this policy was temporarily abandoned in February 2003 when the military launched another assault on MILF controlled territories in pursuit of 'criminal elements' operating there. By the middle of 2003, peace was again restored when the new and more pragmatic leadership of the MILF under Chairman Murad Ebrahim who succeeded the late Hashim Salamat, forged a ceasefire agreement with the government. Exploratory talks between representatives of the government and the MILF were immediately pursued under the auspices of the Malaysian government. The Government-MILF Joint Ceasefire Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH) was tasked with monitoring any violation of the ceasefire agreement. The exploratory talks welcomed an International Monitoring Team, led by Malaysia, to complement the work of the JCCCH and strengthen the peace process on the ground level. However, in 2008, this process ended in failure.

Indonesia

Indonesia has experienced horrible violence throughout its history. There are several communal conflicts throughout Indonesia. In 1999, hundreds of

people were killed as a result of a recurrence of conflict between indigenous (Dayaks) and migrant (Madurese) people in West Kalimantan. There is also a conflict occurring in Poso in Sulawesi. Seemingly, the conflict in Poso appears like a conflict between Christians and Muslims. However, the conflict is said to be predicated on a power struggle between local elites (S. Jones 2000). A similar conflict is apparent in Ambon (Maluku), where between 4,000 and 10,000 people are said to have died (Aditjondro 2001: 100). In the Malakas, about 4,000 people have been killed in fights between Christians and Muslims and around 500,000 were displaced, according to Indonesian Red Cross figures (S. Jones 2000). There are periodic eruptions of communal conflicts in Lombok, Eastern Bali, in Kupang in West Timor, and in Couchon Pandang in West and East Java. An upsurge of violence in various places in Indonesia has been recognized with the fall of Suharto (S. Jones 2000; Wilson 2006: 266; Colombijn and Lindblad 2002: 2).

The detailed root-causes of these conflicts vary and thus various analyses have emerged. On one hand, there is a view that the upsurge of these conflicts is a result of the fall of Suharto and the fault of the democratization process.³⁴ On the other hand, the increasing number of conflicts is explained as the legacy of an abusive past, rather than the result of a permissive present (S. Jones 2000; Colombijn and Lindblad 2002). In fact, the history of these conflicts reveals that violence had occurred before the 1990s. Since independence, Indonesia has suffered from protracted conflicts. For example, in West Kalimantan, the violence witnessed during the 1990s was the fifth of such tension since 1977.³⁵ In other cases, there were a large number of communal violence outbreaks during the Sukarno period, as well as Suharto period. In this regard, historical elements cannot be ignored. It is more sensible to acknowledge that the current conflicts in many parts of Indonesia drive from a mixture of both contemporary elements and legacies of the past.

In an interview, a scholar from Indonesia pointed out the religious and ethnicity-related sentiments in these conflicts (Jawara 2002). However, the historic roots of religious and ethnicity-related sentiments are highlighted when explaining the current conflicts. Such roots include various Dutch colonial government policies which were implemented in Indonesia and set the stage for many conflicts by means of deterring how the Dutch related to missionary work and the ethnic Chinese (S. Jones 2000; Jawara 2002).³⁶ This condition set during the colonial period is intricately connected to demographics and population transfers. Both Jones and Jawara note how changing population balances among different ethnic and religious groups has led to certain kinds of tensions. For example, in a small town around 60 kilometres from Poso, a Christian area, was established and has remained since the Dutch colonial era. Initially the Christians outnumbered the Muslims (Jawara 2002). The migrants from Bugis, Gorontalo, and Java who are Muslims balanced the ratio. The migrants were economically stronger than the indigenous people, which critically impacted the ownership of land and property (Jawara 2002; World Bank 1988). Jawara points out that there must be a way

to provide (landless) indigenous people with plots of land, similar to resettlers who are given plots of land and aid for some years under the transmigration programme (Jawara 2002; World Bank 1988).

In Ambon, there was a fairly balanced proportion of Ambonese-Christians and Ambonese-Muslims. During the 1970s and 1980s, substantial migration to these areas of Muslims from Sulawesi and elsewhere occurred (S. Jones 2000). As a result of the migration, the population balance shifted and jobs that had traditionally been preserved for the Christian elite were obtained by some of the migrant populations who happened to be Muslims. Jones contends that it led to a situation where Christians themselves felt threatened, which explains a number of episodes occurred in 1998 and 1999 (S. Jones 2000).

The transmigration policies seem to have significant importance when explaining many communal conflicts in Indonesia.³⁷ The Dutch colonial government's first programme was initiated as early as 1905 and by 1930, about 100,000 people had been moved (Bilsborrow 1992: 32). Following independence in 1945, the government under different regimes consistently encouraged migration from the overpopulated inner islands to the outer islands, resulting in the resettlement of about one million people by 1979. Half of this migration occurred during the 1970s via the first two five-year development plans (Repelita I and Repelita II). The scale of transmigration then accelerated in the Repelita III quinquennium (1979–84). Some 366,000 families, or about 1.5 million people, were moved during this short period. The main areas for settling transmigrants included Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Lampung: 62 per cent to Sumatra, 19 per cent to Kalimantan, 14 per cent to Sulawesi and 5 per cent to Irian Jaya (World Bank 1988).³⁸ This resettlement scheme became one of the largest voluntary movements of people last century. Following the large-scale transmigration programme in Repelita III, even more ambitious plans were pursued for Repelitas IV and V, covering, respectively, 1984–89 and 1989–94. Some 500,000 families were to be moved to the outer islands in Repelita IV, and another 250,000 in Repelita V (Bilsborrow 1992: 32).

The policy often meant moving Muslim Javanese into areas where another ethnic group was dominant and this led to competition for land, resources, and eventually for power (S. Jones 2000). Thus, the transmigration policies are complexly interwoven with development policies. Jones proposes that there were areas where logging, mining, and extraction of natural resources in particular were undertaken, which took on an ethnic component when the dominant ethnic group represented by the government happened to be in conflict with the local indigenous population (S. Jones 2000). The Madurese first arrived in the region of West Kalimantan during the 1930s. The numbers increased during the 1970s as a result of the government's transmigration plan.³⁹ In the region, the rainforest was cut down and replaced by palm oil and coconut plantations. The indigenous Dayaks were unable to continue their traditional patterns of agriculture, finding themselves at the bottom of a complex hierarchy of different groups (*The Economist* 1997). The Dayaks demanded greater land rights as they felt that the Madurese had taken

their land, and called for representation in government.⁴⁰ Whereas ethnicities and religions are often at the centre of debate when explaining conflicts in Indonesia, several policies introduced during and after colonial time seem to bear of great importance in understanding the root-causes of these conflicts.

Human security implications in violent internal conflicts in Southeast Asia

The cases of violent conflicts in southern Thailand, southern Philippines, and several parts of Indonesia illustrate some important issues with regard to the root-causes of these conflicts and human security. One question arises: how does ‘human security’ matter in these conflicts? One of the key issues which emerges is people’s sense of threat. This section explores human security implications in these cases through examining the link between people’s feeling of threat and subsequent violence.

Understanding violent conflicts in Southeast Asia: how does human security matter?

To explain the situations in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and several parts of Indonesia from a human security perspective, it is necessary to reassess threats in terms of the local people’s point of view. These conflict cases show that people’s sense of threat derives from various sources from both direct and non-direct violence.⁴¹ In the case of southern Thailand, local people’s sense of threat arises from assimilation policies and government efforts to increase central control which both threaten local people’s ethno-religious identity, traditions, socio-economic opportunities, political participation, and various other rights. As many studies have noted, the southern border provinces constitute one of the poorest regions in Thailand (UNDP 2007; Melvin 2007; Suwannarat, 2006; ICG 2006; Gershman 2002: 69). The NRC report clearly identifies “economic weaknesses that drive villagers towards poverty with no alternatives” (NRC 2006: 4). Thus, the sense of threat experienced by local people is related to a lack of physical and economic access to basic levels of food, water, and healthcare. This condition of unsatisfied material needs is a question of people’s economic, food, and health security, which are among the seven categories presented in the UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report. The problem in southern border provinces may also include issues related to protection from environmental dangers (environmental security) such as pollution and depletion, as the limited material resources make it impossible to prevent environmental hazard. In fact, Amara Pongsapich contends that the situation in southern Thailand demonstrates a threat to human security in a very comprehensive and complicated condition, in which all security aspects, economic, health, education, environment, community, personal, and political, can be observed (Pongsapich 2007: 229).

It is important to note that deprivation related to basic material needs does not itself directly generate violence (Azar 1990: 9). As the NRC report points out, socio-economic grievances are not unique to the southern part of Thailand. Similar grievances can be seen in other regions of the country, yet those regions are not currently involved in violence. According to the NRC, a key problem in the deep south relates to the allocation or distribution of the resources need in order to satisfy basic needs – an issue that the NRC referred to as ‘political grievances’ (NRC 2006: 3). The problem is thus about access – or lack of it – to a society’s superstructure: social institutions such as political authority and the market. The NRC report explains that basic needs include access to social institutions – in other words, effective participation in society.

The Malay-Muslim people of southern Thailand have had little or no access to political and judicial institutions, which is partly a result of the country’s centralized administrative system. In addition, a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) revealed that local authorities and police officers in the region have downplayed politically motivated violence towards the local people. This situation resulted in escalating violence from armed groups (ICG 2006: 35–56). The sources of physical threats which the people in the region face are thus multiple, arising not only from local authorities but also from armed groups. In a situation where people lack access to social, economic, political, and judicial institutions, and where security forces are not held accountable, people’s freedom from political oppression and their enjoyment of basic rights is far from certain. These are just a number of the issues which increase people’s sense of threat. According to the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994: 32–33), access to social institutions is a question of people’s ‘political security’.

Another set of issues arises from the government’s imposition of both the central Thai language and the Buddhist religion upon the Malay-Muslim people through education policies (Yegar 2002: 87–93; Dulyakasem 1991: 141). According to Yegar, the 1921 Compulsory Primary Education Act required all children to attend state primary schools for four years to learn the Thai language. State schools not only taught a secular curriculum in Thai, but also included instructions on Buddhist ethics, with monks often acting as teachers. After 1939, elements of Buddhist practices were imposed on the Malay-Muslim population. Images of the Buddha were placed in all public schools, and Malay-Muslim children were forced to bow before them to demonstrate their patriotism (Yegar 2002: 87–93).

This policy deprived people of their cultural rights, freedom of religious belief, and freedom of expression. These deprivations represent threats to ‘community security’ and identity needs. In reality, although there has been no definitive articulation of demands by local people, the pattern of attacks seen in the region suggest that people’s demands are related to, among other things, the use of the Malay language, the lack of employment opportunities, and the imposed education system (Melvin 2007: 33). In an opinion survey conducted in 2005, researchers identified the ‘real’ needs of the people in the

three southern border provinces. The needs include participation in decision-making, acceptance of cultural diversity, justice and equity, and respect of local identity.⁴²

In the cases of Mindanao and several parts of Indonesia, local people or indigenous people's sense of threat arises from several policies undertaken by the respective government. Similar to the case of southern Thailand, in the southern Philippines, local people or communities have suffered from absolute or relative economic deprivations. According to Gutierrez and Borras, five provinces in Mindanao are among the poorest provinces, and life expectancy and adult literacy are lowest in these provinces (Gutierrez and Borras 2004: 2). In the Human Development Index rankings of Philippine provinces, the five provinces have the least access to education, health, electricity, transport, water, and sanitation services (Gutierrez and Borras 2004: 2). The economic condition or deprivation is, however, not necessarily rooted in the original geographic condition in the region. In terms of economic potential, Mindanao is rich in natural resources. In fact, it was called the 'land of promise' because of its rich natural resources (Islam 2003: 199). Mindanao was indeed seen as a potentially rich colony (Islam 2003: 199). It was strongly believed that Mindanao could not only support the needs of the rest of the archipelago but also, more importantly, it could yield profits for American investment in the Philippines (Makol-Abdul 1997: 314). Thus, the economic deprivation in Mindanao stems from insufficient distribution.

In Mindanao, the commonwealth policy attempted to assimilate the Moros into the national society during the Marcos period. Accordingly, economic deprivation and marginalization of the people in Mindanao are, to a great extent, explained by the commonwealth policy. In order to meet the requirement for population resettlement and plantation agriculture, a series of laws that legitimize the expropriation of traditionally Muslim owned private lands were introduced. It exacerbated the situation. The use of violence against the government is recognized as an attempt to correct the situation. In addition to the privatization, the martial law which the Marcos government applied further curtailed press freedom and other civil liberties. Many cultural, religious, and educational development programmes and policies from the central government were seen to have further heightened the perception of forced assimilation among local people (Tuan 2006: 18).

Dhillon considers that the use of violence in this context is connected to the people's effort to correct what the Moros perceived as mounting demographic, economic, and cultural disadvantages (Dhillon 2006: 167). In other words, such disadvantages contributed to increases in people's sense of threat. Furthermore, a policy of 'Filipinisation' from the administration in Mindanao was undertaken in 1920, under which a large number of Catholic administrators were brought in from outside to administer the Muslim. This was done to transfer control over the affairs in the Moro Province from the Americans to the Filipinos (Islam 2003: 199). And, like the Thai government, it promoted a single language – in this case, English – to be the medium of

instruction in education and government (Tuan 2006: 18). The forced assimilation obviously effected people's economic security, political security, food security, and community security. Personal security certainly becomes a question when force is used to correct the situation.

In several violent conflicts in Indonesia, the relevance between some of the policies introduced by the government and indigenous people's sense of threat may be more apparent. Transmigration caused economic imbalances between indigenous people and migrants. Migrants were said to be economically stronger than indigenous people (Bilsborrow 1992: 34). This is due to the fact that many migrant families were provided free transportation to the site, a small house which was already built, prepared land for farming, subsistence food for one year along with seeds, small trees, chickens or goats, and basic community infrastructure including a primary school, health clinic, mosque, etc. (Bilsborrow 1992: 34).⁴³ In the resettlement programme, the regions including Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Lampung were chosen not only because of low population density but also because of rich natural resources.⁴⁴

Similar to the case of Mindanao, communal conflicts in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya demonstrate that the initial economic condition of these regions did not benefit the local population. In the assessment of the transmigration programme by the World Bank (1988), although there is no data on access to or use of land, income level, and sources of transmigrants, the transmigration policy seems to have increased the sense of insecurity, particularly concerning local people's land ownership and land usage. Bilsborrow explains that the principal goals of the transmigration programme are economic, namely the alleviation of rural poverty and unemployment/underemployment problems in Java (together with Bali, Madura and Lombok, the other much smaller, more densely-populated inner islands). Reducing pressure on Java's land resources was only a secondary goal (Bilsborrow 1992: 26). Bilsborrow further states that,

[g]iven the high proportion of the transmigrants thought to have been landless in Java and the usual thirst for land with secure titles that is typical in low-income, agrarian societies, the expectation of a secure land title is probably a major incentive for people in Java and Bali to register for transmigration with the authorities.

(Bilsborrow 1992: 36–37)

These explanations indicate that land-use, land ownerships, and resource use under the transmigration policy were some of the underlying issues that had significant impacts on indigenous people's sense of threat.

In this context, government support for some transmigrants, such as providing housing and farm land, generated a sense of inequality among the indigenous people. Bilsborrow points out that the principal aims of transmigration with respect to the outer islands are not as prominently positioned as the economic goals in Java. According to Bilsborrow, the principle aims

include increased exploitation of the natural resource base on the one hand and on the other, the promotion of national security and the integration of distant and often distinct lands and peoples into Indonesian society (Bilsborrow 1992: 26). Bilsborrow's explanation illustrates highly centralized policy making and strong central control implemented to maintain a unified state in Indonesia. Economic disparities between migrants and indigenous populations in various parts of Indonesia are, implicitly and explicitly, caused by such policies and central control. In this regard, people's sense of threat arises from various policies which were introduced along with the transmigration policy. Such policies are considered threats to indigenous people's economic security, food security, cultural security, political security, health security, environmental security as well as personal security.

On the whole, people's sense of threat in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines and several parts of Indonesia are related to the deprivation of their needs – whether economic, health-related, environmental, cultural, or political. Such needs are about 'freedom from want', whereas the ongoing violence – whether it be from armed groups or state authorities – is about 'freedom from fear'. As has been displayed, the violence can be explained from a human security perspective, which offers a deeper, more comprehensive analysis of violence.

Threats to human security: the causes, symptoms, and consequences of conflict

The aforementioned cases of violent conflict from Southeast Asia prove that there are intrinsic links between violence and threats to human security. In these cases, a clear connection is revealed between violence and problematic conditions related to 'freedom from fear' in local communities. This is due to the fact that violent conflicts affect people's physical safety. The actual violence, whether caused by armed groups or by the government forces, is obviously a threat to human security. However, in such violent conflict contexts, underlying root-causes can be more precisely explained by identifying problematic situations related to 'freedom from want'. In other words, in many violent conflict cases, people's sense of threat is often closely connected to problematic situations surrounding 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. For long-lasting security, the root-causes must be addressed, for which various underlying issues that increase people's sense of threat must be identified.

Such underlying issues include various grievances caused by policies formulated by the concerned governments. Socio-economic grievances are commonplace in the three southern provinces of Thailand, Mindanao in the Philippines, and Kalimantan and Irian Jaya in Indonesia. In these cases, the governments maintained highly centralized systems, under which most policies were introduced to preserve a unified state. For example, during the early twentieth century, the Thai government applied assimilation policies in an

effort to create a unified Thai state (Farouk 1984: 236).⁴⁵ This policy followed administrative centralization implemented during the nineteenth century.⁴⁶ Through its education policy, the use of Thai language was imposed. In Indonesia, the government imposed an extreme degree of centralized decision-making, particularly over economic issues and transmigration.⁴⁷ Similarly, the Philippine government, adopted a highly centralized colonial policy along with repressive measures (Ringuet 2002: 38; Brown, 1988: 60).⁴⁸ Such centralization policies are well understood as part of state-building attempts in the region. In this context, for these governments, any group that maintains distinctive identity, including language, religion, and the way of living, is considered a threat to 'national security'.

Precise contexts are different among the cases in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and Indonesia but there is a common condition in these cases: deprivations under a highly centralized system. This relationship between deprivation and centralization is substantiated by Edward Azar who was introduced in Chapter 1. Azar states that a contested relationship in the presence of conflicting identity politics is the determining factor in terms of whether or not deprivation will lead to conflict. Azar points to the deprivation of human needs, including development needs, political access needs, and identity needs, as the underlying source of protracted social conflict. However, he emphasizes the importance of 'communal content' or the relationships among different identity groups in a society, particularly between identity groups and the state, when explaining the actual emergence of protracted social conflicts. This is largely because individual interests and needs are mediated through membership within social groups. Deprivations often occur when a dominant group maintains absolute or more access to resources and opportunities.

Centralization creates a condition that justifies exclusion and discrimination when certain identity groups who are often minorities in a society have a contested relationship with the government, which is usually comprised of a dominant identity group in the society. Henceforth, assimilation often means uneven distributions to the minority groups and significantly impacts the socio-economic and political life of marginalized groups. For example, in the case of southern Thailand, the national development plan as well as subsequent projects and economic decisions were developed in Bangkok.⁴⁹ Any person who did not follow the plan and projects were labelled communists. The social impacts of assimilation were illustrated by education policies. All schools had to follow curriculum which was approved in Bangkok. Politically, all governors must have been elected by the Ministry of Interior in Bangkok. There was a highly controlled system that formed a strongly centralized political pattern. Under highly centralized assimilation, decisions are made in a centralized manner, obviously causing unequal distribution of resources to minority groups or communities. As a result, the communal structure is negatively impacted, breeding a sense of minority consciousness and identity among the population that is being assimilated. As is displayed in the cases of

Thailand and the Philippines, in the course of assimilation, oppressive measures were used to control cultural identity through forced education and language policies.

In Indonesia, transmigration is aimed at “the promotion of national security and the integration of distant and often distinct lands and peoples into Indonesian society” (Bilsborrow 1992: 26). This illustrates Indonesia’s primary security consideration which is ‘national security’ or ‘a unified state’, resulting in highly centralized policy-making and implementation. Various grievances are the product of both the transmigration policy and many other development policies introduced by the government, which were designed for ‘national security’.

In many internal armed conflict cases in the Third World, major socio-economic deprivation is attributed to problems in original acquisition of holdings (resource availability) and transfer of holdings (distribution of resources). As the presented cases in Southeast Asia display, although there are two interconnected issues concerning deprivations, namely resource availability and distribution of resources, the emphasis is on the latter, that is, the overall distribution of materials and opportunities.⁵⁰ As previously noted, the first problem, resource availability, alone is not sufficient to explain the upsurge of violence. For example, while southern Thailand has limited available resources, Mindanao, Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Lumpun are rich in natural resources. Yet, in the latter cases, economic conditions were dependent on the government’s distribution of wealth. As a result, marginalized communities hardly benefited from socio-economic development regardless of initial economic conditions and potential. In Thailand, highly nationalistic assimilation policies resulted in the implementation of a centralized distribution pattern. As part of assimilation, cultural rights were exploited through education in both Thailand and the Philippines. Accordingly, deprivations are social, political, cultural, and economic. In the cases mentioned earlier, deprivations – whether economic, social, cultural, or political in form – are evidence of injustices caused by the government based on ‘communal content’⁵¹ rather than problems arising from geographical or natural conditions.

Grievances in these cases similarly derive from centralized decision-making and policies implementations. People’s sense of threat cannot be understood without recognizing the lack of access to both materials and opportunities stemming from centralized decision-making and marginalization. For this reason, violence cannot be effectively addressed without removing problematic conditions related to ‘freedom from want’ as well as ‘freedom from fear’. The underlying issue in the contexts is the relationship between the state and different identity groups. In case of southern Thailand, there is an identity group which is considered as a threat to ‘national security’ by the government. When different identity groups coexist in a society, there will be varied perceptions, preferences, and priorities concerning threat recognition and methods for action to handle the identified threats. In the case of southern Thailand, for example, local people’s sense of threat arises from government

policies whereas for the government, the groups that have distinctive identities and maintain own cultures are a security threat as they may distract national unity. Thus there is a huge gap in threat perceptions.

Different perceptions amongst various identity groups in a society must be identified and reconciled, if necessary, through domestic political processes. This is because the entire political process is a key element of pursuing 'security'. The ways in which such diverse perceptions are reconciled will decide the realization of 'security' in the society. Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) stated that war is "continuation of politics (politik) by other means".⁵² In this sense, war occurs when all hope of achieving a political solution is lost. Political solutions are fundamentally transactions among different actors who have distinctive interests, perceptions, and objectives. Accordingly, in order to manage conflict, continued transactions among various actors in a society (domestic political processes) are necessary. However, under a highly centralized system, as seen in the cases of Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, decisions were made by the government, which is usually made up of dominant identity groups in each country. Marginalized groups had little chance to participate in domestic political processes. This situation gives justifications for the marginalized groups to use violence to correct the disadvantages.

The cases in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines demonstrate that the current security approach (national security and 'state-oriented' human security) in Southeast Asia indeed undermine 'security'. This is because many policies aimed at national security concern 'state-building' and national unity. As a result, most policies undertaken to achieve security in some of the countries in Southeast Asia were introduced in a highly state-centred manner without people's participation. Any policy introduced in a centralized system will not benefit for marginalized groups. Accordingly, in the contexts, the policy aimed at achieving security or human security, ironically, contributes to increasing the chances of violence. In the case of southern Thailand, some of the contributing factors to violence can be identified from the needs of the local people. The needs includes acceptance of cultural diversity, respect of local identity, and justice and equity.⁵³ In the case of the southern Philippines, the use of violence is related to the local people's effort to correct what the Moros perceived as mounting demographic, economic, and cultural disadvantages (Dhillon 2006: 167). Any policy action for human security in these cases requires addressing the needs of the local people and the sources of their perceived threats. For this to happen, participation of the local people and negotiation between the local people and the government are necessary.

The conflicts explored in this chapter illustrate clear relevance between violence and threats to human security in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and several parts of Indonesia. The relevance is explained by the connection between violence and people's sense of threat. The roots of people's sense of threat in these cases are recognized in an intrinsic links

between the two key components of human security, freedom from fear and freedom from want. The link suggests that in order to handle violence, problematic conditions related to 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' must be addressed in these cases in Southeast Asia. This is why these conflicts are seldom resolved solely by way of conventional security management or military methods. As many studies point out, military methods cannot resolve the deeper root-causes of violence.⁵⁴ The cases explored in this chapter show that socio-economic and political grievances, human rights violations, and social injustice are human security concerns. The problematic conditions of human security are not only the consequences of violent conflicts but also symptoms and causes of such conflicts.

Human security: a useful lens for conflict prevention and management?

Assessing internal conflicts from a human security perspective enables a comprehensive analysis of the root-causes of conflicts in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and several parts of Indonesia. Nevertheless, what does this amount to in practice? Some of the existing theories of conflict and violence, in fact, share the idea put forth by the notion of human security: various threats to human security, including injustice and deprivation, are key factors, which must be accounted for when trying to understand conflict and violence. Thus, the human security approach must be utilized when handling internal conflicts, at least, in theory. Theoretical explorations regarding the notion of human security and existing theories of conflict and violence in Chapter 1 revealed that while the human security notion can help us to identify important underlying root-causes of violence, it is not sufficient in itself. This is because the focus of human security is dependent on the definition that each person employs and the methods the human security approach employs to handle the problematic conditions that generate violence and conflicts.

The concerned cases of internal conflicts in Southeast Asia effectively display how understanding conflicts from a human security perspective provides a precise picture of the causes of conflicts. Yet, it does not provide any practical guidance to handle the situation. In order to realistically attain human security, reconciling various threat perceptions and diverse views as to how to handle them is necessary. The process seems to primarily concern the relationship between the government and the people in a society. In fact, in the concerned cases (southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and Indonesia), the relationships between the state and citizens bear of vital importance because state dominance in decision-making and policy actions is present.

State-people or state-society relationships have been at the centre of academic and policy debates, which are aimed at achieving 'good governance', 'sustainable human development', 'social justice', and 'equitable development'. Such issues as 'good governance', 'participation', and 'democracy' are

commonly identified as major obstacles to sustainable human development in Southeast Asia and primarily necessitate reorganizing the roles of, and relationships between, the state and its citizens. The fundamental point of reference here is an appropriate balance of the rights and duties of all participants of a society: the respective roles played by the government and individuals. For Southeast Asia, the primary utility of the human security concept is thus indubitably its potentials to review and reorganize the relationship between the state and the people. However, the cases of violent conflict in the region also suggest that the relationship between the state and its citizens is merely one dimension necessary to address when attempting to achieve 'human security'.

Beyond state versus citizens

The violent conflicts in Southeast Asia realistically illustrate that more diverse actors exist in a society. Furthermore, these actors may have different threat perceptions and utilize distinct approaches to handle threats. One study on local understandings of the identities of perpetrators involved in violent incidents in southern Thailand found that more than 80 per cent of perpetrators were believed to be militants (MacCargo 2006: 7). This suggests that Muslim-on-Muslim violence is the fastest growing category of violent incidents in southern Thailand. While the major focus on the violent situation in southern Thailand depicts the state versus Malay-Muslim relationship, local people's sense of threat cannot be fully understood simply in the context of the state versus Malay-Muslim perspective.

Moreover, political instability since 2006 stemmed from the anti-Thaksin movement, which divided the society in Thailand and this has had prolonged effects on the following governments.⁵⁵ Although few considerations have been given to the link between the political crisis in Bangkok and the situation in the south, the instability in Bangkok has undoubtedly adversely affected the formulation of a consolidated strategy to handle the situation in the south. Violence witnessed in southern Thailand since 2004 reflects domestic political contexts, particularly during and after the Thaksin government (MacCargo 2006a: 41). MacCargo points to competition for power and resources among the various government agencies responsible for security issues in the south (MacCargo 2006a: 41). Police-military rivalry and fragmentation are often recognized as one of the weaknesses of the government strategy (Gunaratna *et al.* 2005: 111).

In the Philippines, while a typical synopsis of the conflict in Mindanao depicts the situation as the government versus Moros, in reality, the context is more complex than it may appear. Schiavo-Campo and Judd point out three major factors that complicate the situation in Mindanao: the first is the vast difference in economic interests among the economic and commercial elite Christians and the majority of Christians, the second factor is chronic conflict among different 'clans' (sometimes erroneously referred to as 'tribes') within

the Muslim population, which generates violence – often drawing in military reaction, and the third factor is ordinary but widespread banditry that confuses both the origin of violent attacks, extortion and kidnapping, and the often indiscriminate response of the Philippine military (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005: 2).

In Indonesia, the Javanese dominance of national politics is obvious (see, for example, Anderson 1972, 1988, 1990; Mulder 1996). In fact, a population study reveals that Javanese and Sundanese remain the two largest ethnic groups in Indonesia in 2000, although the percentage of the Javanese has declined from 47.02 per cent in 1930 to 41.71 per cent in 2000 (Leo *et al.* 2003: 11).⁵⁶ Yet, Wee and Jayasuriya write, “... ethnic politics in Indonesia should not be understood simply in terms of ‘Java versus non-Java’. Different ethno-cultural groups of ‘non-Javanese’ also access power in the country in different ways and to different degrees” (Wee and Jayasuriya 2002: 484). According to Leo and others, non-Javanese parties gained more votes than the Javanese-based parties outside Java in 1999 (Leo *et al.* 2003: 182–83). Leo contends that in theory, the outer islands in Indonesia are the stronghold of non-Javanese-based parties, except three regions, namely North Sumatra, Lampung, and South Sumatra (Leo *et al.* 2003: 183).

The concerned cases in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia confirm that one problem exists in the relationship between the state and its citizens, which has great importance in achieving human security. This is largely because the principle role of a state is to provide ‘security’: it must distribute resources, manage people, adapt and change, and carry on satisfactory and realistic transactions both internally and externally. Nevertheless, diverse views and differences within the state and also among the people must be reconciled. The relationships between different identity or interest groups, as well as the relationship between the government and its citizens, are confronting enormous challenges when achieving human security. Achieving human security requires reviewing and adjusting the relationships and roles of all identity groups in a society. Henceforth, for realistic action, domestic political processes must reflect the significantly diverse views amongst different groups in a society.

The question of ‘governance’ or ‘governing’?

One of the fundamental issues which emerges when trying to achieve human security manifests as a question of ‘governance’. The concept of governance has a deep history in academia. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the concept of governance evolved around debates on ‘state and society’. On one hand, there is the concept of the strong authoritative state of Machiavelli (1469–1526) and Hobbes (1588–1679). On the other hand, there is the role of civil society in the weak states of Locke (1632–1734) and Rousseau (1712–78).⁵⁷ With the growth of market-oriented public policy, governance became a conceptual and analytical tool during the 1980s in examining

how governments manage their societies, polities, and economies with active participation of various social actors. Much debate on ‘governance’ in the past has addressed the effectiveness of governance and looked at ways to improve it.⁵⁸

David W. Leslie explains that ‘governance’ implies structure, an answer to ‘who is authorized to decide ...’ while ‘governing’ implies the way people work within and around those structures of formal authority to get things decided and implemented (Leslie 2003: 4).⁵⁹ Thus, ‘governing’ means the exercise of some degree of influence or power over important decisions. Leslie further clarifies that ‘governance’ involves “some kind of supreme explanatory rationale for how things ought to be”, while ‘governing’ implies that “finding out how things actually work might (via inference) yield explanations for why things work the way they do” (Leslie 2003: 5).⁶⁰ If so, the critical question regarding human security in relation to internal conflicts is related to both ‘governance’ and ‘governing’, yet the issue of ‘governing’ – the way people work to get things decided – must be given priority.

Human security issues can be addressed under certain governance, yet how decisions to deal with human security issues are made – how differences regarding threat recognitions, priorities, and methods to handle threats among actors in a society are dealt with in a governing process – is the most important question for real attainment of human security. However, this does not deny the importance of the form and content of governance. For example, as discussed in the previous chapter, poverty reduction and good health care systems have been addressed in policy actions by most governments in Southeast Asia. Yet, it is clear from the discourse on human security from numerous policy-makers that the way in which priorities and methods to accomplish poverty reduction and health care were selected, are vital issues in regards to the attainment of human security. A number of different actors or identity groups in a society will have different threat perceptions, priorities, strategies, and methods to act on threats when addressing security. Thus, it is apparent that conflicts are inevitable. Such conflicts must be handled through domestic political processes. The key issue here is how security threats, priorities, and methods for action are employed within the structures of formal authority. This is about ‘governing’, rather than ‘governance’.

How diverse perceptions or conflicts among actors – both large and small, both latent and open – are handled is about governing and process. The process used to handle diverse perceptions will determine the attainment of ‘security’. States have to manage disagreements about threat recognitions, priorities, methods to handle them, and also the situation after the threats are handled. This is a continuous process as threats emerge randomly and sporadically. Leslie considers that governing is a means of dealing with issues like these – perhaps not resolving them because the underlying tensions will remain alive beyond a given decision (Leslie 2003: 9). Governing involves balancing the claims of different actors in the society, taking a position which is never permanent and never wholly satisfying to all. Structures, while

necessary, are not sufficient to manage conflict that emerges in societies. For this reason, stable societies require continued transactions among different groups.

Obviously a ‘governing’ process will be more complex in a society where diverse groups coexist, like societies in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the process is more challenging in the globalized world, as actors are more diverse and events are often trans-nationalized. The internal conflicts in Southeast Asia indeed show such complexity, including both diverse actors and the effects of globalization. Some of the security discourses in Southeast Asia illustrate a realization that ‘national security’ cannot be achieved by focusing exclusively on its citizen and events within its borders. Nowadays states need to consider movements of people and goods, and social phenomena in the transnational context, all of which seem to influence their decisions.

Accordingly, the question of ‘governing’ is no longer a simplistic debate on the relationship between state and society. Rather, the debate must account for multi-level and multi-dimensional relationships among different actors in dense formal and informal networks linking local, regional, and state authorities in a society. Jan Kooiman argues that “[g]overnance of modern societies is a mix of all kinds of governing efforts by all manner of social-political actors, public as well as private; occurring between them at different levels, in different governance modes and orders” (Kooiman 2003: 223). Governance must then expand to include governing the totality of interactions, in which various actors participate.

The complexity of conflict is convinced by the fact that there are disagreements in intra-group as well as inter-group contexts. In Southeast Asia, where diverse identity groups exist, this consideration is important when attempting to achieve human security. Henceforth, states have significant tasks in managing diverse views among different groups in order to achieve security. Without understanding the real complexity of actual security threats and addressing the relationships among various actors who have different levels of access to power in the society, human security will never be achieved. Thus, it is necessary to address the relationships among different actors or identity groups in the society, in addition to the relationship between the government and the people. This will be the key issue in governing and domestic political processes.

Resolving internal conflicts in Southeast Asia

It is apparent that achieving human security requires all people in a society to reassess what threats exist, who are affected, how are they affected, what specific kinds of protection is necessary, and by whom will it be provided. The reassessment will reveal the complexity of actual security problems in each society. This is largely because the root-causes of violence are related to the various senses of threat passed by different actors or identity groups in any given society. Governing and domestic political processes must be able to

handle diverse views. Actual security threats are often more complex than they may appear, and may include a number of actors who have different levels of access to power. In this sense, achieving human security is an ambitious undertaking that requires cooperative efforts by all actors within a society.

Overcoming the futility

The internal conflicts in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, and Indonesia discussed in this chapter, clearly show a fundamental problem existing in the relationships among diverse actors throughout the concerned society in general, and between government and the people in particular. For C. Wright Mills, “all politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence” (Mills 1956: 171). Different threat perceptions and approaches must be reconciled through domestic political processes which include all actors in a society. However, decisions are often made by those who have power and resources. In the concerned cases in Southeast Asia, problems in domestic political process derive partly from state-dominance in decision-making and policy implementation. In these cases, states have dominant power, thus local and indigenous people have little or no access to the political process. This problem must be addressed first in order to achieve human security. This is because these relationships determine a society’s ability to secure the minimum level of people’s needs while dealing with internal conflicts.

In internal or domestic conflicts – specifically those in which a government is involved – relationships between the government and different actors within a society are decisive in determining how the question of securing minimum levels of ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ will be approached. The reason for this is that in such conflicts governments often simultaneously fail to prevent threats to people, and to respond to, and compensate for people’s minimum security needs. In other words, the relationships determine what system the society will employ to address the question of securing minimum security needs. The system urges those who have obligations to take action to ensure that people are not deprived of their basic necessities, and to fulfil their duty to protect people from deprivation and to aid them when they have been deprived. Thus, the system is crucial to fulfilling the minimum level of people’s needs. For this reason, the protection of individuals is difficult if relationships among different actors – particularly relationships between governments and other groups – are not first addressed. Therefore, the contribution of human security to deal with actual internal conflicts in Southeast Asia will be limited. This consideration also explains why the root-causes of violence in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines demonstrate inseparable links between two key components of human security – freedom from fear and freedom from want.

Dahl proposes two criteria for stable governments: effectiveness and legitimacy (Dahl 1961). For Dahl, ‘effectiveness’ is about whether government can meet the essential needs of those which they govern while ‘legitimacy’ is about

whether the government is perceived as legitimate, that is, those who govern achieve the consent of the governed. In the modern democratic state, ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ underlie legitimate authority. In this context, Leslie states:

In a democratic context, participation may be the only “legitimate” way to decide, and, no matter the formal, legal, or personal authority of any one person or body, whether the decision was open and subject to “input” may determine its perceived validity.

(Leslie 2003: 14–15)

Here, Leslie argues that legitimacy is not effectiveness: “no one can make decisions that uniformly maximize both legitimacy and effectiveness” (Leslie 2003: 15). For example, some decisions have to be made quickly without consultation if they are to maximize ‘effectiveness’. Yet, this does not mean there is no way to satisfy both legitimacy and effectiveness. Leslie contends ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’ serve both demands and the art of governing consists in balancing effectiveness and legitimacy (Leslie 2003: 15–16). Leslie considers that governing is political – in the best and most fundamental sense of the term – because it requires the building of consent, which is the end result when legitimacy is established (Leslie 2003: 15).

Leslie’s proposition on effectiveness and legitimacy as prerequisite for a stable government supports the idea that the relationships between the government and different actors in a society must be addressed first. The relationships, to a great extent, decide the success or failure of effectiveness and legitimacy. In the concerned regions in Thailand and the Philippines, for example, the governments did not meet the local people’s needs: economic, political, social, and security needs. The problem of ‘effectiveness’ is explained through distinctive threat perceptions principally between government and other groups in a society and also amongst different groups in a society. If recognized threats are different among different actors in a society, particularly between the government and the people, the government is obviously unable to meet the needs of the people. The problem of ‘legitimacy’ derives from various factors: government’s inability to satisfy people’s needs, injustice caused by authorities, centralized decision-making which results in a lack of transparency and accountability, and the lack of people’s participation in the entire process from decision-making to implementation. This is largely related to the relationship between identity groups and states (or what Edward Azar called, “the disarticulation between the state and society as a whole”). In these cases, the governments do not meet the needs of the local people and thus little consent exists from the people to the governments. As a result, there is neither ‘effectiveness’ nor ‘legitimacy’. Reviewing the relationships between the government and other groups in a society is a precondition to restore the society’s system in order to secure people’s minimum security needs and thus to achieve human security.

The necessary turnaround

States have enormous tasks in governing: managing various issues from economics to people's welfare, and dealing with diverse views and opinions among different groups in a society, while balancing its effectiveness and legitimacy. These tasks must be adjusted to reflect the internal and external contexts that impact the security of people. In fact, throughout the history of nation-states, the scope of government's task has been expanding. For example, before 1929, nobody expected government to be able to manage the economic weather, such as curing recessions, yet, since then, every government in every country has promised to cure any potential recession (Drucker 1993: 162).

Globalization apparently contributes to the increase in government's tasks. Sydney Jones states that virtually no conflict is local any longer: conflict instantly becomes a national conflict or at least there is the possibility of drawing in co-religionists or the co-members of ethnic groups from other parts of the country in ways that transform conflicts from being local to being national (S. Jones 2000). Such examples are manifested in Indonesia: in the Malakas, both the Christians and the Muslims can mobilize supporters from far outside Ambon and the Malakas in a way that exacerbates the conflict.⁶¹

The scope of government's task, therefore, must reflect the nature of threats and the contexts that cause such threats. However, there is a growing awareness of the limitations of traditional forms of governing by states, particularly the form of governing dominated by states. For example, Jan Kooiman emphasizes the necessity of reshuffling government tasks and obtaining a greater awareness of the need to interact with other societal actors because of the many limitations of traditional governance by the state, although he adds that this does not mean that traditional government intervention is obsolete (Kooiman 2003: 3–5). Anthony Giddens, in his idea of 'dialogic democracy', emphasizes a strong public sphere where differences are displayed and consensus is not the goal. He considers that "dialogue in a public space provides a means of living along with the other in a relation of mutual tolerance ... " (Giddens 1994: 115). He points to the end of the nation as a homogeneous order.⁶²

Human security considerations urge states to review their form of governing to account for the complexity of security threats to people in a society where various identity groups coexist within the contexts of globalization. It is thus apparent that the ideal way of achieving human security is through active involvement of all actors in a society to reconcile diverse threat perceptions and different views on the methods employed. This requires cooperative efforts by all people within a society. In other words, all groups in a given society must play their roles to achieve 'security'. In this sense, threats to human security are at the heart of the problem in internal conflicts. Without addressing the threats to human security, such conflicts will never be resolved.

In the internal conflict cases in Southeast Asia, the absolute dominance of states must be addressed first, whereas a discord existing among the people

that also limits a cooperative approach to achieve human security needs to be recognized. Human security does, however, help to identify the root-causes of conflicts. Accordingly, human security has a potential to ameliorate internal conflicts in the concerned, and perhaps other, cases in Southeast Asia. However, for this to happen, the underlying order of the relationships in society must be thoroughly studied in the context of threat recognition and protection, without which the minimum levels of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' will not be achieved. This reality is substantiated by the fact that much of human security practice focuses on 'empowerment' and 'protection' – concepts that are about relationships between states and its citizens in a society, which are defined through domestic political processes.

Since societies differ from each other in many ways, the relationships between different actors within them will never be identical, and neither will the reconciliation process. As explored, details within the discourse of security vary amongst the countries of Southeast Asia. Thus, a human security approach must be integrated into the values and social context of each country or society, which are dependent on various factors, such as history, political system, socio-economic conditions, and the relationships amongst different identity groups in the society. Therefore, specific contexts and the precise relationships among different actors in the society – the fluidity of power and influence – must be studied in order to achieve human security. Thus, there will be no universal formula to achieve human security. Leslie, in fact, points out that

governing is a dynamic, evolving form of work, and it is highly contingent on the circumstances and cultures of particular settings in which it is done. What works in one time and place may or may not work again in another.

(Leslie 2003: 31)

Dahl also argues on this point that active involvement of individuals and groups varies from issue to issue and from episode to episode (Dahl 1961). Human security considerations must be, then, contextualized in the local governing processes that are unique in each society.

4 Regional challenges to human security

National sovereignty has been and will remain an essential value in security considerations in Southeast Asia, and thus states, rather than people, continue to be at the centre of the security discourse. Yet, it is obvious that national sovereignty as a value is being contested in the current era of globalization. ASEAN's emphasis on people-oriented values and a people-centred approach, as discussed in Chapter 2, necessitates shifting the main referent object of security from the state to the people. Efforts to achieve a people-oriented approach and human security can be seen in various attempts undertaken by ASEAN, which pledged in its Charter to become a 'people-oriented' association and to effectively respond to "all forms of threats, transnational crimes and trans-boundary challenges" (ASEAN 2007: Article 1–8, Chapter 1).

Human security issues are, in fact, relevant to all three pillars of the ASEAN Community – Economic, Socio-Cultural, and Security. The Economic Community focuses on, among other things, narrowing the development gap within the region by helping new members in the areas of poverty, literacy, and health (Morada 2006: 68). The priorities of the Socio-Cultural Community are health, labour, environment, social welfare, gender issues, disaster management, and the harnessing of information and communication technology. The Security Community targets human security issues, such as the promotion of human rights, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction. ASEAN will continue to be an important platform for shaping common views and identifying areas of cooperation needed to achieve human security in Southeast Asia.

The present chapter explores the fundamental challenges that ASEAN countries currently face in attempting to achieve human security in the regional context. As discussed in Chapter 2, the discourses of ASEAN and some member states on human security are closely linked to human rights and international humanitarian law. Since the 1990s when ASEAN achieved a membership of ten countries, more attention has been paid to its potential to ameliorate the longstanding human suffering resulting from conflict, transnational crimes, and human rights violations in the region. Exploring how ASEAN tackles these issues will illustrate the challenges the region faces in its attempt to achieve human security. On the one hand, there is an

on-going effort to establish an ASEAN human rights body that symbolizes the achievement of a people-centred ASEAN. Yet on the other hand, ASEAN has been criticized for having taken little tangible action regarding the situation in Myanmar, where human rights violations run rampant. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the association's efforts to set up an ASEAN human rights body, address the situation in Myanmar, and handle transnational problems.

The challenges of promoting and protecting human rights in Southeast Asia

As is true of many countries in other regions, most countries in Southeast Asia have drawn criticism for human rights violations which, though varied in scope and type, obviously constitute threats to human security. These violations occur in cross-border contexts as well as internally. The lack of common forums to discuss human rights issues as well as enforcement machinery to address violations has been the main obstacle to advancing human rights in Southeast Asia. Hence, many welcome ASEAN's stated intention in 2007 to establish a human rights body in the ASEAN Charter (Article 14). This effort is consistent with ASEAN's emphasis on a people-centred approach. However, in the ASEAN context, whether it can actually resolve human rights situations is reminiscent of the question of whether the term 'people-oriented values' has real meaning.

A human rights mechanism is long overdue in Southeast Asia, where abundant cases of human rights violations affect the security of the people on a daily basis. While governments within Southeast Asia have different views on human rights, there is nevertheless broad consensus on these issues seen in the discourse on human security, particularly when collective response to pressures from outside the region is called for. This section explores the implications of ASEAN's effort to establish a human rights body. The intent is not to assess the human rights records of governments, but rather to analyze regional processes in protecting and promoting human rights to achieve the ultimate goal of human security.

Discourse of human rights in ASEAN

Until recently, ASEAN had little to say or do in the area of human rights (Thio 1999: 1). Acharya argues that ASEAN states have long regarded human rights as an issue directed against them (Acharya 1995: 167). Nonetheless, as explored in previous chapters, the composition of ASEAN underwent changes during the 1990s with the acceptance of new members, and its areas of cooperation have also evolved.

In 1967, at the time of ASEAN's inception, no statement regarding human rights or even the term 'human rights' was included in its founding document, the ASEAN Declaration of 1967, also known as the Bangkok Declaration.

The Declaration set forth seven objectives and the association established agreements among its members to collaborate in economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative fields. The promotion of trade and economic development has always been paramount in its objectives. With no mention of human rights in the Declaration, ASEAN nations did not feel compelled to cooperate in this area.

From a positive perspective, the Declaration does not deny human rights. One of its objectives was “... to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter”. An argument could be made that because the UN Charter declares the universal promotion and protection of human rights, the ASEAN Declaration could be interpreted as implicitly affirming the same in Southeast Asia. However, the latter does not provide any ground to substantiate such a stance, nor does it outline any course of action by which ASEAN would pursue human rights.

The term ‘human rights’ appeared for the first time in the 1978 Joint Declaration of ASEAN-European Commission (EC) Ministerial Meeting. In this Declaration, ASEAN stated that “cooperation with EC will serve its people by promoting social justice and human rights”.¹ Although some issues relevant to human rights, such as those mentioned in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) of 1976, are included in several ASEAN documents before the 1990s, little active engagement to promote and protect human rights could be perceived on the part of ASEAN² up to this point in time.

It was in the 1990 that a collective agenda on human rights in ASEAN gradually began to take shape. There was more frequent use of the term ‘human rights’ in a range of the Association’s documents, including joint communiqués, declarations, and statements. In 1991, ASEAN expressed its view regarding human rights in the Joint Communiqué of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur.³ This document stated: “They [ASEAN member-states] agreed that while human rights are universal in character, implementation in the national context should remain within the competence and responsibility of each country, having regard for the complex variety of economic, social and cultural realities ...”⁴ ASEAN’s discourse on human rights is clearly expressed here. While ASEAN accepts that these are basic rights, the upholding and promoting of them depends on each country’s constitution, available resources, systems employed, and the standard adopted in each country. This discourse has been repeated at numerous occasions since then. For example, at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993, the Foreign Minister of Singapore emphasized that “universal recognition of the idea of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the reality of diversity”.⁵

There are three key principles that underlie ASEAN’s discourse on human rights. These principles, as stated in the TAC of 1976 and reaffirmed in

the ASEAN Charter, are the following: 1) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN member-states, 2) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states, and 3) respect for the rights of every member-state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, and coercion. These principles make clear that any effort by ASEAN to promote and protect human rights will not challenge the national sovereignty of its member-states.

ASEAN's discourse on human rights is further explained in a few other behavioural norms that the member-states traditionally maintain. First, priority is placed on collective benefits over individual rights. As Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, stated in 1993, "the society has always been more important than the individual. I think that is what saved Asia from greater misery" (Vatikiotis 1996: 96). Moreover, some ASEAN member-states emphasize national security and economic development to the extent that they take precedence over individual rights. Second, with regard to human rights, many ASEAN governments prefer advocating economic, social, and cultural rights rather than civil and political rights.⁶ Underlying this is ASEAN's *prioritizing* of economic development and social order. Accordingly, there has been a trade-off discourse among these different aspects of human rights. ASEAN member-states typically emphasize economic growth first and political freedom next. These attitudes were often asserted/professed by some of ASEAN's leaders, particularly those from Singapore and Malaysia, in promoting 'Asian values'. The idea of Asian values drew attention during the 1990s, when Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew were prime ministers of Malaysia and Singapore, respectively. The idea of Asian values stresses the existence of a unique set of institutions and political ideologies that reflect the region's culture and history.⁷ They emphasize the uniqueness of Asian societies, which are group-oriented rather than individual-oriented, and value duty to the community over individual rights. These societies favour consensus-seeking and a deferential respect for public officials and institutions in the interests of public harmony (Thio 1999: 2). The implications of 'Asian values' thus challenge the universalist pretensions of human rights and criticize human rights as an ethnocentric imposition.

Similarly, in 2006, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen stated, "many Asian countries advocate state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. No state can dictate and make judgement on another about human rights. Foreign policy should not be linked to human rights".⁸ The Prime Minister further stated that "there is no such thing as a universality and international standard. Each country has its own standard".⁹ Consequently, in the ASEAN context, the promotion and protection of human rights are effective on condition that they do not violate the principle of non-interference, the idea of collective advantages, and the economy-first approach. Thus, in reality, ASEAN's stance towards the universality of human rights appears to be, at best, ambivalent.

The tension between human rights principles and other principles important in the Southeast Asian context of non-interference has been most obvious in the case of Myanmar. In response to growing pressure from Europe and the US, ASEAN members have been mired in disagreement among themselves regarding the principles of non-interference, protecting human rights, the nature of these rights (whether they are universal or individual), and the trade-off between economic growth and political freedom. This reality explains why ASEAN has yet to develop a clear policy or agenda for cooperation on human rights.

Development of a human rights agenda in ASEAN

ASEAN countries' foot-dragging approach to human rights is in sharp contrast with various other world areas that have regional inter-governmental commissions established under human rights charters. Such regional charters incorporate the principles of due process and fair trial provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).¹⁰ There are also regional courts on human rights in Europe and the Americas; and in Africa a regional court known as the African Court on Human and People's Rights had its first sitting in July 2006. Asia as a region, however, has no such commissions and no such courts. In stark contrast to the 'Asian values' concept, which highlights the existence of certain common values in Asia, the region has not established an instrument in the area of human rights. This situation has thus been a long-standing concern to the UN (OHRSD 2008: i).

However, the issue of establishing such a mechanism in Asia has been under discussion. The World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993 served as an impetus for further discussion on establishing a regional human rights mechanism in Southeast Asia. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action reiterate, "... the need to consider the possibility of establishing regional and sub-regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights where they do not already exist" (paragraph 37).¹¹ While the address had little impact on actually establishing such a mechanism in Asia, it did generate further discussions in ASEAN.

That same year the ASEAN member-states – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – took part at the April Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights in Bangkok, and at the June World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. In the Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in July 1993, foreign ministers of the member-states announced their collective view concerning human rights. They affirmed ASEAN's commitment to, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration, welcoming the international consensus achieved during the World Conference on Human Rights. They stressed that "ASEAN recognizes that human rights are interrelated and indivisible ... It agrees that ASEAN

should consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights".¹² The member-states emphasized that the promotion and protection of human rights should not be politicized (paragraph 16). Furthermore, the Joint Communiqué stated: "The Foreign Ministers reviewed with satisfaction the considerable and continuing progress of ASEAN in freeing its peoples from fear and want, enabling them to live in dignity". It stressed that the violations of basic human rights must be redressed and should not be tolerated under any pretext (paragraph 18).

However, such statements amounted to no more than rhetoric; in the years that followed, no concrete proposal was made and the issue of human rights disappeared from subsequent ASEAN joint communiqués. ASEAN cooperation focused on other issues after the realignment of ASEAN with new members: Vietnam (1995), Lao PDR, Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). Termsak Chalermpananupap, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN, felt that the disappearance of statements on human rights in ASEAN was partly because of increased political diversity following the inclusion of the new members (Chalermpananupap 2008). Moreover, the 1997 financial crisis created new and serious challenges for the region. Pressing issues for ASEAN at that time were re-establishing economic stability and narrowing the development gaps within the region. Indeed, the ASEAN Vision 2020 adopted in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, while emphasizing 'a community of caring societies', did not include any direct reference to human rights.¹³ Admittedly, in its very essence, the Vision 2020 includes principles of human rights, such as non-discrimination and respect for human welfare and dignity.¹⁴ However, the absence of a direct address on human rights indicates that some ASEAN members still had reservations over the use of the term.

In 1998, coinciding with the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ASEAN proposed a programme that addresses several issues on human rights in the Hanoi Plan of Action, a five-year action plan extending from 1999 to 2004.¹⁵ The programme, however, never progressed beyond rhetoric.¹⁶ A more genuine commitment by ASEAN on promoting human rights and measures to establish a human rights mechanism was made in the policy document of the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) adopted in 2004, the first seven-year master plan for building the ASEAN Community. In the VAP, cooperation on human rights was part of the political development in the ASEAN Political-Security Community. The VAP includes formulating and adopting a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish a network among existing human rights mechanisms; establishing a network of cooperation among existing national human rights mechanisms in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand; promoting education and public awareness on human rights; for the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers; and establishing an ASEAN commission to promote and protect the rights of women and children.

The terms used in the VAP, such as ‘formulation’, ‘establishment’, and ‘elaboration’, express a stronger sense of commitment than the terms previously employed. ASEAN earlier had used the term ‘consider’ (OHRSD 2008: 4).¹⁷ There are thus perceivable changes in ASEAN’s attitudes toward action on improving human rights.

It was only in 2007 that ASEAN’s commitment to promote and protect human rights was proven through the creation of the ASEAN Charter. In addition to Article 14, which affirms the establishment of a human rights body, the Charter addresses the promotion and protection of human rights in three different sections: its preamble, purpose, and principles. The Charter was created despite the fact that the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report stated only that

the EPG discussed the possibility of setting up of an ASEAN human rights mechanism, and noted that this worthy idea should be pursued further, especially in clarifying how such a regional mechanism can contribute to ensuring the respect for and protection of human rights of every individual in every Member State.

(ASEAN 2006: 22)

It is evident that the development of a regional agenda for cooperation on this issue by ASEAN has slowly begun to take root.

Indeed, ASEAN has begun to embark on a plan of action through functional cooperation to promote and protect the rights of women, children, and migrant workers. At the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Philippines, in January 2007, the leaders of ten ASEAN member-states signed the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers.¹⁸ This agreement led to the creation of the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the Cebu Declaration in 2007 during the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore.¹⁹ One of the important tasks assigned to the committee was developing an ASEAN legal instrument for protecting and promoting the rights of migrant workers (Chalermpananupap 2008).

Similarly, the ASEAN Committee on Women and the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Social Welfare and Development have worked to establish the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Right of Women and Children. Drafting of the terms for the proposed commission started in 2009 (Chalermpananupap 2008). This process has the advantage of providing a shared platform through the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), of which all ten ASEAN member-states are parties.

The discussion on establishing a regional human rights mechanism has been going on for over a decade. Thus, as Professor Tommy Koh, Chairman of the High Level Task Force of ASEAN and Ambassador-at-Large of Singapore, noted in 2008, the inclusion of Article 14 in the ASEAN Charter

regarding the establishment of a human rights body was not a ‘miracle’.²⁰ However, it can be seen as a ‘miracle’, given that many member-states of ASEAN had not favoured including the article in the Charter.²¹ Their reluctance is apparent in that no tangible time frame for establishing an ASEAN human rights body was set at the time of signing the ASEAN Charter. In fact, there was little agreement regarding the form and content of the human rights body at that time and relatively little sense of its value. The general lack of interest in setting up a human rights mechanism can perhaps be seen in the fact that, unlike the ASEAN Community, which is referred to with a capital C, in Article 14, it is referred to using only lower-case letters, i.e. an ASEAN ‘h’uman ‘r’ights body. The term ‘body’ also implies that it has no specific name. A member of the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (notice the capitalization of Working Group) revealed that the name, ASEAN Human Rights ‘Commission’ had been proposed during the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter, but the proposal was turned down by some members.²²

The development of a human rights agenda in the regional context was accompanied by the creation of national human rights commissions in some ASEAN member-states. Before 1993, only two of the member-states, Indonesia and the Philippines, had established such commissions. At the time of writing, there are four: Malaysia and Thailand inaugurated their national human rights commissions in 1999 and 2001, respectively.²³ Cambodia is following suit and has been working to establish such an institution since 2006, when Prime Minister Hun Sen expressed strong support for the idea (Olszewski 2008).²⁴ This is a critical step towards establishing a network of cooperation among existing national human rights mechanisms outlined in the agenda of the ASEAN Political-Security Community.

Civil society groups and stakeholders

The establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism by civil society groups in the inter-governmental context started earlier. Since the time of the Vienna Declaration of 1993, civil society groups have been active in establishing regional and sub-regional human rights mechanisms in Southeast Asia. Several major groups have been monitoring and advocating for the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body. Some groups have been influential in shaping the debates on regional human rights mechanisms. These groups include, among others, the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies Colloquium on Human Rights (hereafter referred as AICOHR);²⁵ the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (hereafter referred as the Working Group),²⁶ a network of four national human rights institutions (hereafter referred as NHRIs) comprised of representatives from four ASEAN member-states that have already set up a national human rights institution (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand);²⁷ and the Solidarity for Asia People’s Advocacy Working

Group on ASEAN (hereafter referred as SAPA).²⁸ Among these four influential human rights organizations, only the Working Group is identified as ‘stakeholder’ in ASEAN in the ASEAN Charter (Annex 2 in the ASEAN Charter).

The Working Group has been meeting with ASEAN leaders at the annual Ministerial Meeting since 1997. In 2000, it submitted a working document, titled ‘Draft Agreement for the Establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Commission’, to the Ministerial Meeting for consideration.²⁹ Since 2001, it has been organizing annual workshops on an ASEAN regional human rights mechanism together with ASEAN governments and the existing national human rights commissions in the region.³⁰ ASEAN’s address on human rights in 1998 coincided not only with the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but also with ASEAN’s recognition of the existence and the contributions of the Working Group.

When ASEAN declared its intention to draft a Charter, civil society groups at the regional and national levels began to view the association as an arena through which they could pursue their objectives of promoting and protecting human rights at the regional level.³¹ Throughout 2006–7, some of the groups sought to influence the drafting process by making submissions on the three pillars of the ASEAN Community – the Economic Community, Political-Security Community, and Socio-Cultural Community – to the Eminent Persons Group and the High Level Task Force.³² The aforementioned groups have also organized various activities to call for inputs from, and raise awareness among, civil society organizations in the region.³³

Civil society groups have been urging ASEAN leaders to treat them like partners and set up a communications channel to truly uphold the spirit of a people-oriented ASEAN Charter.³⁴ Since the intention to establish an ASEAN human rights body was first stated in the ASEAN Charter, the form and content of the body have been discussed in ASEAN. Most of the important decision-making in ASEAN, however, occurs at ministerial meetings and summits, which are generally behind closed doors.³⁵ This practice was acknowledged during the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter. Some government officials in the region, including Deputy Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Chitriya Pinthong, support the call for greater inclusivity. In her keynote address during the eighth workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights in Bangkok on 14–15 July 2009, Chitriya noted that while ASEAN had increasingly paid attention to the issue of rights and fundamental freedom among ASEAN people, it had not taken such an approach from the beginning of its inception.³⁶ She urged civil society organizations to continue to involve themselves in the process of establishing the ASEAN human rights body.

Civil society groups were finally able to become involved in the process in 2008, when they had their first meeting with ASEAN leaders in Manila. They met again during the 14th ASEAN Summit in 2009. Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva called the meeting “one major success of the 14th ASEAN

Summit”, while recognizing that it “might not have been completely satisfactory for both sides” (Thavevong 2009).³⁷ In this context, many observers were surprised to hear positive responses from Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet, who welcomed the idea of involving the ASEAN leaders and civil society in the ASEAN framework.

After the meeting Rafendi Djamin, the convener of the SAPA Task Force-ASEAN and Human Rights (SAPA TF-AHR), expressed frustration with the High Level Panel because the civil society representatives were denied a copy of the terms of reference (TOR) before their meeting.³⁸ Some ASEAN member-states argued that subjecting the draft to public scrutiny would create more problems.³⁹ Although the 15 January 2009 draft TOR includes several remarks on ‘dialogue and consultation’ from various stakeholders including civil society organizations, it was labelled ‘confidential’ and actually had not been revealed to stakeholders.⁴⁰

It is worth noting that although the views and claims made by civil society groups are similar and unified when encountering ASEAN leaders, these groups, because of their diverse interests, may not necessarily share unified positions among themselves. The relationships among the groups and individuals working in these organizations are complex and some individuals work with several organizations simultaneously. For example, one of the members of the Working Group is also a member of the High Level Panel, which consists of representatives from some ASEAN member countries charged with drafting the TOR for the ASEAN human rights body.⁴¹ The same person may also be involved in work for his/her country’s national human rights commission. Thus, although identified as a ‘civil society’ organization, the Working Group is an example of one that includes some individuals who are employed by their national government.

Local and grass-roots actors are often identified as ‘track-three’ level actors, while the ‘track-one’ level refers to top-level international, regional, and state actors. ‘Track-two’ consists of middle-level actors, such as international NGOs, academics, and private businesses.⁴² In Southeast Asia, however, the lines between the three societal levels are not clear-cut. Some civil society organizations are comprised of members who are not only local and grass-roots actors, but also academics who are often involved in international, regional, and national activities. As a scholar from Thailand puts it, whether there is a track-three in Southeast Asia is questionable; rather ‘track-one-and-a-half’ appears to describe the dominance of track-one actors in civil society in Southeast Asia more accurately.⁴³

The comment of a representative of a donor organization based in Bangkok who had observed several meetings of the Working Group sees this arrangement in positive terms:⁴⁴

Some of the key individuals who are influential in the area of human rights in the region are taking multiple responsibilities. They are involved in human-rights-related work at both governmental and civil society

levels. By doing so, they will have multiple networks necessary to reconcile diverse differences among stakeholders. Such networks also allow them to deliver the voice of civil society to the higher level. Indeed, the most influential organizations working for the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body is the Working Group, which includes some individuals who are working in both government and civil society organizations. Multiple connections with leaders at the higher level and civil society groups are necessary in any attempt to find a common ground among stakeholders in Southeast Asia.

Towards an ASEAN human rights mechanism

In 2009, much progress was made to launch an ASEAN human rights body. The first draft of the TOR was presented by the HLP to the ASEAN foreign ministers for comments during the 14th ASEAN Summit held in Hua Hin, Thailand from 27 February to 1 March 2009.⁴⁵ The final TOR of the ASEAN human rights body was endorsed by the ASEAN foreign ministers at the 42nd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phuket, Thailand on 19–20 July 2009. It was agreed that the name of the body would be the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICOHR).⁴⁶

Several agreements regarding this body were made in the early stages of drafting the TOR.⁴⁷ First, it was agreed that the ASEAN human rights body would be an inter-governmental organization. Second, it would not have an accusatory approach. This means that it would not function in a naming and shaming manner. Third, each ASEAN state was to send one member. In this context the question arises as to whether a member would act in his/her own capacity or represent the government. Fourth, the body would uphold ASEAN's traditional principles. Fifth, the body would take into account the different histories and circumstances of member-states. Sixth, the body would represent ASEAN in international forums.

However, there were also disagreements among member-states regarding the draft TOR. Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda felt that there should be more provisions in the reference to protect human rights, adding that the body should have “monitoring, dissemination and education, and advisory services functions” (Budianto 2009). On the other hand, some ASEAN member-states preferred less intrusion. For example, the Singapore Institute of International Affairs gave its own restrictive interpretation of the draft as follows,

According to the draft TOR, the human rights body would not be given fact-finding or investigative roles. It would not have the power to prosecute violations. The final TOR indeed stresses a “constructive and non-confrontational approach and cooperation” to enhance promotion and protection of human rights (principle 2.5). It is considered an apparent

rejection of calls by international watchdogs for the 10-nation grouping to take a more aggressive stand against abuse within member-states.⁴⁸

In March 2009, George Yeo, the Singapore Minister for Foreign Affairs, explained two distinctive views concerning the ASEAN human rights body among ASEAN member-states: while some preferred a less-intrusive body to prevent interference from outside the region and NGOs, others preferred to set up a credible human rights body to address the issue in their own terms.⁴⁹ Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-large for the Government of Singapore and Director of the Singapore Institute of Policy Studies, explained that ASEAN members are divided into three groups. The first group consists of champions of human rights. They are the four countries that already have national human rights commissions, namely the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The second group consists of countries that are not ‘enthusiastic’, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The last group, made up of Brunei and Singapore, is not associated with either camp, but instead is trying to bridge the gap between the other two.⁵⁰ Yeo contended that reconciling and incorporating all ministers’ comments would not be easy, as the comments by foreign ministers reflected the diversity of ASEAN. He added: “This diversity is a political reality that cannot be wished away”.⁵¹

Recognition of this diversity and political reality is shared by several other leaders in the region. In 2008, Raymond Lim, Singapore’s Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, stipulated three criteria for establishing an ASEAN human rights body. First, the body must recognize the political history and policy of established ASEAN tradition. Second, the body can only be achieved through an evolutionary approach. Third, no artificial deadline should be given just for the sake of setting one.⁵² At a meeting with civil society groups in 2009, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan also said that the scope of power of the human rights body could always evolve, adding that the “members should not be too ambitious” for the time being (Budianto 2009). The idea is reflected in the final TOR, which adopted “an evolutionary approach that contributes to the development of human rights norms and standards in ASEAN” (Terms of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights : principles 2.5).

At the time the TOR was being drafted, the HLP was left with several difficult questions that reflect points of disagreement among its members.⁵³ The first is the question of whether the proposed human rights body should be equipped with monitoring and/or investigative power. If it is not, then how the body would fulfil its protective function? Second, how can the principle of non-interference in internal affairs be reconciled with the protection of rights? Third, how can the rights of individuals be balanced with those of the state when they are in conflict? Fourth, how are human rights defined in the ASEAN context? How would ASEAN’s definition of human rights differ from that of the international community? Fifth, who should be on the board

of members – all member-states or only some ASEAN member-states – that is, the formula of ‘ASEAN minus X’.⁵⁴

These points of disagreement signal the dilemma that ASEAN states encounter. As long as they wish to preserve the region’s long-maintained values or principles, a human rights body would ultimately be ineffective in achieving its goals if it lacks the power to enforce compliance. Resolving the dilemma requires ASEAN states to review their approaches in order to balance the ‘ASEAN way’ with more proactive strategies to bring about transparency and social justice, principles more valued by those outside the region. The process of establishing a human rights body obliged ASEAN leaders to confront these dilemmas and probe for answers to the questions that they have been ignoring while prioritizing state-building and economic development.

The final TOR clearly demonstrates ASEAN’s traditional principles, including non-interference (TOR 2.1), consensus and consultation in decision-making (TOR 5.1), and recognition of the diversity of member-states (TOR 1.4). The TOR states the key principles of ASEAN: “respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN member-states (TOR 2.1-a), “non interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states” (TOR 2.1-b), and “respect for the right of every member state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion” (TOR 2.1-c). TOR supports the discourse on human rights in Southeast Asia while at the same time reflecting the ASEAN way. It essentially does not offer any answer to the question that has divided member-states, i.e. how can the rights of individuals be balanced with the rights of the state.

A bumpy road?

It is evident that ASEAN’s effort to achieve any agreement on human rights will be a difficult one. In the Southeast Asian context, such difficulties are explained from three perspectives. First, it is no secret that there are disparate views and stances among the leaders of ASEAN, particularly regarding human rights and sovereignty. This reality, however, does not deny the existence of intra-mural consensus and a regional position on human rights values as expressed by various ASEAN declarations and statements. This was pointed out by Vitit Muntabhorn, a member of the HLP, at the Eighth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights held in Bangkok on 14–15 July 2009. He discussed the political nature of ASEAN’s origins and stated that from a human rights perspective, “there was more diversity in an imputed unity within ASEAN”.⁵⁵

Second, there is distrust between ASEAN leaders and civil society. Kavi Chongkittavorn, the assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN from 1993 to 1994, pointed this out, calling it “an ugly scar on the ASEAN’s psyche”.⁵⁶ NGOs and civil society groups have appealed to ASEAN for more space for civil society and for participation in the entire process of setting up an

ASEAN human rights body in order to achieve an effective human rights body and a people-oriented ASEAN.

Third, although solidarity among civil society groups can be observed when they challenge ASEAN leaders' top-down approach, these groups themselves and the individuals working in them also have diverse views and interests. The divisions among individuals from civil society organizations do not necessarily reflect their own governments' positions.⁵⁷

In the ASEAN context, there is much discussion of the large gap between norm-recognition and norm-compliance among ASEAN member-states as seen in such treaties as CEDAW and CRC. Not all member-states appear willing to have an independent and powerful supervisory human rights body in their own backyard (Linton 2008: 490). The reluctance may, to a certain extent, arise from the diverse state-society relationships in ASEAN. In some countries in the region, such as Thailand and the Philippines, civil society has gained substantial democratic space for dialogue and advocacy, while in other countries such space has been almost non-existent. The members' positions reflect their domestic context and, hence, they are often divided in their views on the function of a human rights body. This diversity is observed not only among ASEAN leaders but also among civil society groups and individuals.

This diversity, what the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, George Yeo called, 'a political reality'⁵⁸ is the crux of the challenges that ASEAN faces in establishing its human rights body. Reconciling such differences arising from distinctive political, economic, and social contexts – not only among the states, but also among the diverse groups in each country, and between the state and civil society – remains a remote goal at present.

Despite various disagreements among the member-states regarding the form and content of the human rights body, the silver lining is that ASEAN continues to maintain an open channel for dialogue with representatives from civil society groups. On 22 February 2009, at the Fourth ASEAN Civil Society Conference held in Bangkok, Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan told civil society groups, "We [ASEAN] want to hear from you. How can you participate? ... we have to go on a long journey together".⁵⁹ His address signifies hope of at least a modest attempt to include the people's participation in ASEAN's decision-making process, although this initiative might often be stemmed by the association's concern over its image.

In the past, advocacy of human rights, particularly civil and political rights, had been seen by some Asian states as detrimental to economic growth (Cumaraswamy 2007: 10). While this view may still be held by some policy-makers in the region, there are also signs of change in the views of some ASEAN member-states, as seen in the frequent use of the term 'human rights' in various ASEAN documents since the 1990s. Furthermore, despite intra-mural differences among member-states, the establishment of a human rights body is underway. This is a big step for ASEAN, considering the fact that the term 'human rights' was not even used in its founding document. Nevertheless, there are still thorny issues to address within ASEAN, within each

state's civil society, and between ASEAN leaders and the people in the region. The ultimate goal of achieving human security in Southeast Asia will rely, to a large extent, on the relationships among all actors – leaders, different identity groups, and diverse stakeholders.

The initial reticence in developing a human rights agenda in ASEAN has been dispelled. Human rights issues will, nevertheless, remain a divisive issue in ASEAN and may limit its effort to achieve “a genuinely people-oriented community”.⁶⁰ The association's position on human rights has developed reactively in response to the accusations on human rights abuse, particularly from the West (Acharya 1995: 179). But the calls by civil society groups for their voices to be heard and to participate in the process of setting up a human rights body make it impossible for ASEAN to continue to defend its indifference and its preference of state over individual rights. ASEAN needs to develop a credible approach to handle human rights issues in a regional context, where these issues cross national borders and become pressing concerns that only regional cooperation can resolve and stabilize.

Myanmar: a challenge for the people-centred ASEAN?

Perhaps no other situation highlights ASEAN's role in providing a tangible approach to human security than the situation in Myanmar. Conditions there have drawn widespread attention from around the world. The prospects of ASEAN's approach to human security will, to a large extent, be borne out in its attitudes towards Myanmar. What is the association's position regarding the situation in Myanmar while ASEAN is attempting to achieve ‘a community of caring societies’. How are the people-oriented values and people-centred approach that ASEAN emphasizes in the course of achieving the ASEAN Community manifested in the situation in Myanmar? These are some of the questions explored in the next section, which begins with an exploration of the context of human security in Myanmar and its underlying issues. This is followed by an examination of ASEAN's commitment to the situation in Myanmar with the goal of examining its approach to human security.

Threats to human security: conflicts, poverty, and natural disasters

Myanmar has been ruled by its military since 1962. When it gained independence in 1948 as the Union of Burma, it was a thriving economically rich state, and the world's leading exporter of rice (CIA 2008). However, throughout its history, including a brief democratic period during the 1950s, it was plagued by armed conflicts internally (ICG 2008c: 2). While many governments have faced insurgencies at one point of time or another, Myanmar is the world's most conflict-prone country in its record of insurgencies between 1946 and 2003 (Mack 2005: 27).⁶¹ Obviously, in such situations, people's living conditions, such as access to health care and education, as well as their

physical safety are in a state of uncertainty.⁶² In dealing with its internal insurgencies, the country channelled most of its resources into supporting the military, rather than social development (ICG 2008c: 2).

Scholars and policy-makers, whether they support a broad or a narrow conception of human security, agree that the situation in Myanmar poses serious threats to human security. The sources of threats are multiple, ranging from physical violence to psychological oppression. In September 2007, monks, along with some of the general public protested against the military junta in the face of a rise in fuel and food prices in Yangon.⁶³ The demonstration was cracked down with the use of brute force by the junta. Official reports only cited 15 fatalities but independent estimates are larger (ICG 2008c: 1).

Scenarios like this, however, are not new in Myanmar. In September 1988, army units cracked down on tens of thousands of demonstrators in what is known as 8888 Uprising. The name derives from the fact that the protest, which began earlier that year, swelled to critical numbers encompassing people from all walks of life, on 8 August 1988. In response, the junta set up the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September and by the month's end restored order after killing an estimated 10,000 people. In the first parliamentary election organized by the junta in 1990, an opposition coalition, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won. SLORC, however, refused to transfer power but instead carried out large-scale arrests of opposition politicians and activists, including Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD who had been under house arrest since July 1989.

Another stark example of Myanmar governance could be seen in the junta's handling of Cyclone Nargis, which struck the Ayeyarwady Delta in southwest Myanmar in 2008. The storm caused over 100,000 deaths and total devastation to homes, farmlands, and livestock.⁶⁴

The government initially responded by disregarding victims, imposing restrictions on international relief agencies, and proceeding with local elections, shocking the world. Some considered its response a 'crime against humanity' (ICG 2008d: 2). There is no doubt that the situation arising from the natural disaster and government inaction was a human security concern.

Obviously, the junta's interpretation of 'national security' refers to the security of the state of Myanmar, and that of the regime and the *Tatmadaw* (military) (Hangzo 2009: 2). Pau Hangzo explains that the junta's state nationalism is defined by the three national causes: non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of national sovereignty (Hangzo 2009: 2). Military leaders have thus often used 'national security' to justify their oppression against their own people, victimizing them under the justification of 'national security'.

A government principally has the responsibility of protecting its citizens. More precisely, it is supposed to prevent threats to people and respond to people's security needs in order to provide both freedom from fear and freedom from want (Nishikawa 2009: 230). As Rosemary Foot points out:

There has been a reasonably widespread understanding that ... governments were expected to protect individual human rights ... A state's reputation no longer rested on its ability to exercise authority over territory and the population that resided within it, but it now also embraced the idea of "sovereignty as responsibility".

(Foot 2005: 291)

The military junta in Myanmar obviously fails in its responsibility to provide security to its people; in fact, it is often perceived as quite the opposite – the antithesis of state responsibility. The ruling body that is involved in armed struggle with other groups within its borders is often unable to satisfy its people's minimum needs – both developmental and security needs. The responsibility of the government was again questioned in the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis – its responsibility to respond to people's security needs. The military junta's initial response to the devastating situation resulting from the cyclone received global outcry and criticism. Above and beyond the concerns about military oppression and use of indiscriminate violence against its people, the failure of an appropriate response by the junta, causing more loss and damage, now fell in the spotlight. What began as a non-political threat – a natural disaster – became a highly political issue that posed a threat to individuals and communities because of the political context.

This situation in Myanmar shows that in order to achieve human security, a society must first possess political legitimacy. Political legitimacy enables the society to take necessary measures to satisfy people's security needs to achieve both 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. Political legitimacy also creates a functional system in which people abide by the security measures taken by the government, including the police and army. Political legitimacy requires mutual political commitments by both the government and the people governed.⁶⁵ Dolf Sternberger explains: "Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right" (Sternberger 1968: p. 244). The key issues in achieving human security are thus the human responses that are determined in the political context in each society. The situation in Myanmar demonstrates that 'the people' is not a single entity, for the military junta is involved in multiple armed struggles with several ethnic groups. Political legitimacy, therefore, must involve political commitments by all groups in a society.

ASEAN's engagement

ASEAN's policy toward Myanmar has evolved since its inception in 1967. Its stance during the first two decades was one of disassociation after Myanmar's refusal to join the association.⁶⁶ This stance was replaced by 'flexible engagement' or 'constructive engagement' since the beginning of 1990s.⁶⁷ The change in the relationship at that time was triggered by the shift in Thai

policy priorities. In the early 1990s, Thailand's regional concerns were more about economics than security, which then-Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan referred to as the "change from battlefield to market place".

In 1994, Thai Foreign Minister Prasong Soonsiri invited Burmese Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw to attend the ASEAN meeting in Bangkok as an observer (Zaw 2001: 42). The following year, Myanmar made a gesture of interest in joining ASEAN, including voicing its intention to accede to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).⁶⁸ In 1996, Myanmar became an official observer of ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This set the stage for Myanmar to become a member the following year. Despite some member countries' reluctance to admit Myanmar into the ASEAN fold, the support from three influential members – Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore – eventually saw Myanmar admitted.

The terms, 'flexible engagement' or 'constructive engagement' of Myanmar have been commonly used, but never defined in ASEAN. A Singaporean newspaper, *The Straits Times*, suggested in 1992 that 'constructive engagement' means "gentle persuasion and quiet diplomacy to prod the regime [in Myanmar] into political liberalization" (Acharya 1995: 175). *The Straits Times* also cited a comment by an Indonesian foreign ministry official that "we are telling them [the Myanmar regime] very quietly, in a Southeast Asian way, without any fanfare, without any public statements: 'Look, you are in trouble, let us help you. But you have to change, you cannot continue like this'". Indonesia thus refrained from taking steps against the Myanmar junta, "which would embarrass and isolate them" (cited in Acharya 1995: 175).⁶⁹

From these views on 'constructive engagement', it is possible to infer that the rationale behind this policy is to engage and create ties with Myanmar rather than to ignore and isolate it. The policy of constructive engagement, however, has never made its goals as obvious as the rationale. Instead, many analysts observe that ASEAN utilized 'constructive engagement' and the inclusion of Myanmar in its umbrella as a vehicle for various economic, security, and political interests that ASEAN and its member-states pursue (Acharya 1995: 175–78; Zaw 2001: 50–51; ICG 2008c: 11). Leszek Buszynski, for example, explains that when the policy was introduced by the Thai government of Chatichai Choonhavan, constructive engagement was designed "to bridge a gap between particular Thai interests in Myanmar on the one hand, and Western condemnation of SLORC on the other" (Buszynski 1998: 293–94). The shift that triggered the change in the relationship between ASEAN and Myanmar derived partly from Thailand's economic interests in Myanmar.

In terms of economics, ASEAN's approach supports business interests and allows for the maintenance of Myanmar's commitment to trade and investment liberalization. Acharya points out that ASEAN–Myanmar economic links since 1988 included fishing rights for Thailand in Myanmar waters valued at seventy US dollars a month per ton. In addition, there are

investments by Singapore in oil, automobiles, timber products; by Malaysia in the hotel business; and by Thailand in breweries, hotels, road construction, and a department store (Acharya 1995: 175). Moreover, although denied by the Singaporean government, there were military sales by Singapore to Myanmar consisting of mortars, rockets, and ammunition, in addition to training of Myanmar army officers by the Malaysian Air Force (Acharya 1995: 175).

It is widely recognized that there are strong connections between ruling Southeast Asian governments and businesses engaged in natural resource industries in Myanmar (Zaw 2001: 50). Thailand especially has been involved in lumber and energy deals, such as the Yadana pipeline, one of the biggest foreign investment projects in Myanmar. A Thai academic once criticized ASEAN's approach to Myanmar and listed the names of Thai business people who have vested interests in Myanmar.⁷⁰ And as Marvin Ott states, "... much of the impetus for constructive engagement comes from the perception of burgeoning economic opportunities in Burma" (Ott 1998: 79). Part of ASEAN's interest in Myanmar was its hope that it would develop into a market to absorb ASEAN exports (Zaw 2001: 50). This, in turn, would reduce Myanmar's reliance on other countries, particularly China. According to one report, China has been the largest source of economic assistance to Myanmar, offering 1.4 billion US dollars and 2 billion US dollars in weaponry to the ruling junta since 1988 (Lum *et al.* 2008: 6).⁷¹ Ang Cheng Guan observes that Myanmar–China relations continued to strengthen after 1997⁷² while Myanmar's relationship with Thailand has remained problematic⁷³ (Guan 2001: 476). Following the imposition of US trade sanctions against Myanmar in 2003, China's influence on Myanmar has been increasing.

The economic, security, and political interests seen in ASEAN's approach to Myanmar are closely interconnected. Zaw suggests that the primary security and political priority of constructive engagement was to offer Myanmar an alternative that would stave off China's growing influence in the region (Zaw 2001: 51). Guan also contends that the admission of Myanmar into ASEAN is related to a strategic necessity to "wean Yangon away from the tightening embrace of Beijing" (Guan 2001: 475). ASEAN has been concerned about Myanmar's complete reliance on China because of the latter's growing influence and future expansion in Southeast Asia through its economic, political, and military clout (Guan 2001: 475). In fact, ICG reports that China's interests in Myanmar are both strategic and economic (ICG 2008c: 8). China has been intensifying its naval cooperation with Myanmar and is interested in obtaining a naval base on Myanmar's western seaboard that allows access to the Indian Ocean, where it wants to establish a strong presence (Guan 2001: 474; ICG 2008c: 8). Consequently, ASEAN's concern over Myanmar's reliance on China is related to the latter's overall influence in Southeast Asia, as well as to the region's stability and security.

ASEAN in a sense has succeeded in opening alternative channels for Myanmar, although it has failed to draw Myanmar away from China's

influence. ASEAN's approach to Myanmar's domestic affairs is consistent with the ASEAN principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member-states. This approach also excludes imposing economic sanctions on Myanmar and allows other member-states to maintain economic and military links with it. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir once advocated such links as a means of supporting economic reform in Myanmar (Acharya 1995: 175).

ASEAN's constructive engagement approach can be seen as reactive in its rejection of what it sees as Western condescension and its efforts to counter China's influence over Myanmar. Buszynski argues that ASEAN used the term "as a defence against its dialogue partners, especially the US and the EU, which had proposed that pressure be brought to bear upon SLORC" (Buszynski 1998: 294). This approach is indeed evidenced by the fact that ASEAN member-states are seldom united on measures regarding the situation in Myanmar unless they encounter pressure from other countries. Zaw feels that "ASEAN's resistance to international calls to put pressure on Burma has revealed the basically reactionary nature of the organization" (Zaw 2001: 52).

ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan's explanation of 'flexible engagement' illustrates the nature of ASEAN's policy regarding the situation in Myanmar. In his 1998 statement, Surin questioned whether it was time for ASEAN to modify its strict principle of non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.⁷⁴ In this statement, Surin argued that

a more flexible approach to political and social issues within ASEAN will also lead to greater support from other countries, which, in turn, will help to make up for the loss of the "clout" as a result of the economic crisis.⁷⁵

While Surin emphasized the importance of ASEAN's core principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, he called for more flexibility in members to express their views and, if necessary, to provide advice on the policies pursued in each country. He stated, "the economic crisis in the region has led to a loss of ASEAN's 'best bargaining power' in its dealings with other regions". This suggests that the idea of flexible engagement was motivated by the desire to enhance regional economic and business opportunities at that time. Although the context of the crisis is different, the idea of constructive engagement concerning the current situation in Myanmar also includes considerations of economic and investment opportunities.

The challenge for human security in ASEAN

The human rights situation in Myanmar has not changed for nearly two decades. What has changed now is Myanmar's presence in ASEAN's 'one caring and sharing' community enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, which has served as a guideline for compliance since December 2008. The Charter lays

out both the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states (Article 2–2–e) and that of respect for fundamental freedoms and the promotion and protection of human rights (Article 2–2–i). Myanmar’s divergence from the latter is a sensitive issue. Whether ASEAN can bring about any change to the situation in Myanmar to create a ‘community of caring society’ will, to a large extent, depend on how ASEAN member-states handle the tension between the two principles.

In 1998, when Surin Pitsuwan, who was at that time the Thai Foreign Minister, proposed ‘flexible engagement’, he highlighted the tension between ASEAN’s absolute non-interference principle and the economic crises in some member-states. This tension affects the regional economy and security, thereby reducing investment from other countries, particularly from Europe and the US.⁷⁶ At that time, even though the situation did not concern human rights, but rather economic crises (Pitsuwan 2008: 3), Surin’s suggestion of flexible engagement in internal affairs was rejected by other ASEAN leaders.

Member-states are divided in their opinions on issues related to human rights. While new members, including Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia, are not supportive of taking any action, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are more eager to review ASEAN’s existing approach in certain contexts. A similar division among the member-states exists concerning the function of the ASEAN human rights body.

The divided reactions within ASEAN concerning the situation in Myanmar can be seen in the way ASEAN’s statements regarding the situation in Myanmar were made in the past. For example, the ASEAN Chairperson on 18 May 2009 issued a statement calling for the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who faced trial on charges of violating the terms of her house arrest after an American man swam to her lakeside prison home in early May. According to a Bangkok-based newspaper, *The Nation*, the initial draft statement prepared by Indonesia was supported by the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei, while Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia were not supportive, although there was no outright rejection on their part.⁷⁷ The statement urged Myanmar to abide by the terms of the ASEAN Charter, which implicitly obliges members to protect and respect human rights.⁷⁸ ASEAN officials could not reach a consensus over the draft statement despite talks among ASEAN envoys in Yangon. *The Nation* reported that some of the new members (Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia) viewed the draft statement as criticism of Myanmar and the call for Suu Kyi’s release as violation of the ASEAN non-intervention principle.⁷⁹ In fact, only Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines officially condemned the junta’s actions. The Thai Chairperson issued the statement on behalf of ASEAN nevertheless.

A similar situation occurred in September 2007 when Singapore issued the Chairman’s statement on behalf of ASEAN regarding the crackdown on demonstrators by the Myanmar junta. ICG reports that the responses of ASEAN members to the crackdown “have remained as diverse as before,

hampering anything beyond lowest common denominator action” (ICG 2008c: 11). While the Philippines was most critical of the crackdown, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Lao PDR remained silent (ICG 2008c: 11).

These episodes illustrate the existing and continuing divisions within ASEAN. The divided positions among members seem to limit the generation of tangible actions by ASEAN in response to the situation in Myanmar. In fact, in ICG’s analysis, “it remains improbable that ASEAN as an association would be able to agree on more pro-active action on Myanmar” and any step in that direction will likely be up to individual members, or a small group (ICG 2008c: 12). The only consensus among member-states is that it is better to have Myanmar ‘inside the tent’ than to ostracize it. This status relieves ASEAN of its concern that Myanmar’s reliance on China may reduce some of the ASEAN members’ economic and business opportunities in Myanmar. Keeping Myanmar in ASEAN also allows ASEAN to maintain its stance not to follow the US and Europe in imposing sanctions. In fact after the 2007 crackdown, leaders from Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, while concerned over the violence and the pressure from Western partners, nevertheless asserted that sanctions on Myanmar would result in Chinese and Indian domination in the region (ICG 2008c: 11).

The situation in Myanmar puts pressure on ASEAN to confront the question of how to reconcile the principle of non-interference with internal problems of its member-states, particularly problems related to human rights. The tension arising from this question has become more prominent after these two principles were laid out in the ASEAN Charter, which all ASEAN members are expected to abide by. However, the divisions within ASEAN are not as simple as they may appear; for example, they cannot be explained simply as alignments of old versus new members. Each country’s position on the situation in Myanmar seems to depend on the calculation of economic, security, and political interests by ruling stakeholders, which are diverse. As was mentioned, the consensus among ASEAN member-states emerges when external factors are encountered, such as the growing influence of China and pressures from the US, Europe, and other Asian states. In this sense, constructive engagement does not derive from a concrete implication of actual engagement in domestic affairs in the intra-regional context. Michael Vatikiotis, in fact, points out that “it [ASEAN] has offered these states [member-states] the security to defend their political interests against external pressure” (Vatikiotis 1996: 178).

While ASEAN has served as a forum, a vehicle for economic cooperation, and a coalition of strategic and political interests, it has never offered any policy or tangible course of action to resolve regional problems, such as conflicts, human rights violations, or terrorism. Nor has it taken any action to resolve matters even when conflicts occur between ASEAN member-states. Although regional organizations in some parts of the world may undertake a collective approach to prevent, manage, and resolve problems, ASEAN seems to take an alternative approach.

Actual ‘engagement’ in the situation in Myanmar would be indeed difficult for ASEAN partly because of the disparate positions among the member-states regarding non-interference and human rights. Beyond this, as Vatikiotis points out, ASEAN does not constitute a union of interests and thus will not act as an organization to enforce political interests across borders (Vatikiotis 1996: 178).⁸⁰ Given that many ASEAN countries are a far cry from true democracies, Vatikiotis may be accurate in his observation that “ASEAN has served the political interests of ruling elites in Southeast Asia well” (Vatikiotis 1996: 178–79). The ‘ASEAN way’ emphasized by politicians in the region seems to serve those who possess resources and power. ASEAN’s practice of consensus and consultation, non-intervention, non-formal and non-contractual relationships, and its bilateral rather than multilateral approach in intra-regional relationships, all work well as long as there is no real imperative to enforce action.

A human security situation that aims to promote the security of the most vulnerable people is thus a challenge to the claims to power of many ASEAN members. The emphasis on ‘people-oriented’ values and the ASEAN Community cannot be achieved without reviewing the distinctive ‘ASEAN way’, for global conditions may no longer allow ASEAN to survive as a loose coalition of interest groups. The international community is advocating for a more proactive approach to bring transparency and social justice to global society. Thus the actual challenge for ASEAN in dealing with Myanmar is not merely to counter the leadership problem in Myanmar that ASEAN leaders claim needs to be resolved, but to challenge all leaders in ASEAN, which maintains a state-oriented approach. Achieving human security in Southeast Asia thus requires challenging the claims to power of the ruling elites of many of ASEAN’s members, especially those in Myanmar.

ASEAN and the management of transnational issues

The need to understand ASEAN’s distinctive way of handling intra-regional issues is obvious. Its member-states’ method of addressing these issues must be kept in mind when examining ASEAN’s perspective on human security. This section, therefore, explores ASEAN’s approach to intra-regional security issues and examines its perspectives on human security.

ASEAN’s cooperation in challenging transnational issues has been part of its regional agenda since the time it was established. Transnational crime, trafficking, and acts of terrorism are not new in the region. Therefore, one of the fundamental ASEAN principles in the Bangkok Declaration includes “strengthening the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations” (Bangkok Declaration 1967).

Challenging transnational issues is part of the agenda in the ASEAN Charter. One of the purposes proclaimed in the ASEAN Charter is “To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and transboundary

challenges” (ASEAN 2007: Article 1–8). The ASEAN Political-Security Community is charged with the task of working with member-states to take a comprehensive, people-oriented approach to promote security in the region.⁸¹

ASEAN’s challenge to transnational issues and inter-state conflicts

ASEAN began to tackle transnational crime cooperatively in the early 1970s⁸² with the rise in drug-related crimes in the region. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976 recognized the need for “intensification of cooperation among member states and with international bodies to prevent and eradicate narcotics abuse and the illegal trafficking in drugs”. Since then, ASEAN has been engaging in the effort to create a drug-free ASEAN.⁸³

The scope of transnational issues was eventually expanded to include issues such as terrorism, new types of drug abuse and trafficking, money-laundering activities, and arms smuggling.⁸⁴ During the Cold War, various militant groups posed enormous challenges to the internal stability of several countries. More recently, terrorism was also addressed under the rubric of transnational crime.⁸⁵ Acts of terrorism have been a major concern for some of the countries in the region, particularly Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.⁸⁶

Major steps for further cooperation to combat transnational issues in ASEAN were taken particularly in the 1990s after ASEAN began to recognize the new forms of security challenges generated by the evolving regional security environment. The first and second Informal Summits in 1996 and 1997 repeatedly emphasized regional cooperation to handle transnational issues. The ASEAN Vision 2020 adopted at the Second Informal Summit envisioned rules of behaviour and cooperative measures to deal with transnational issues. At the Third ASEAN Informal Summit in Manila in November 1999, member-states reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate in ASEAN’s handling of transnational issues, such as those related to the environment, transboundary haze, transnational crime, narcotics, immigration, and legal matters.⁸⁷ Cooperation in handling transnational issues was also discussed at a series of ASEAN Ministerial Meetings during the 1990s.⁸⁸

ASEAN member-states signed the Declaration on Transnational Crime in 1997.⁸⁹ The Declaration established the basic framework for regional cooperation in fighting transnational crime by outlining several initiatives.⁹⁰ Since then, regular meetings to address the problem have been organized, such as the ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime and the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime. The framework for regional cooperation affirmed in the 1997 Declaration was further concretized in the ASEAN Plan of Action adopted in 1999⁹¹ and finalized as the Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action adopted in 2002 at the Annual Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime.

Eight priority areas are included in the Work Programme: illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking, sea-piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering,

terrorism, economic crime, and cyber crime.⁹² The key programme activities listed in the Work Programme include compiling and exchanging domestic legislation on the different areas of transnational crimes, compilation of focal points, establishing a database, and preparation of studies from both individual country and regional standpoints.⁹³ In the course of such efforts, ASEAN organized several activities, including workshops on trafficking, terrorism, and sea-piracy.⁹⁴

However, the situation of transnational problems in Southeast Asia was further exacerbated by the rise of militant extremism during the 1990s (Chalk *et al.* 2009: xiii). After the Bali bomb blasts on 12 October 2002, combating terrorism has become and remained an imminent issue for the region (Gershman 2002: 60). In the effort to counter terrorism, ASEAN members expressed a common position and their willingness to work together in several joint declarations, in addition to the effort embedded in ASEAN's cooperation in transnational issues. Some of the agreements are expressed in the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism issued in November 2001 and a second Declaration on Terrorism signed at the ASEAN Summit in November 2002.⁹⁵ Numerous other declarations were signed by ASEAN member-states after the terrorist attacks in Bali in 2002 and Jakarta in 2003 (Emmers 2007: 12).

The blueprint of the ASEAN Political-Security Community consolidates the attempts to respond to transnational threats. Based on the eight priority areas identified in the Work Programme to Implement the Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, the blueprint identifies several activities. These include the ratification of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters among the member-states, the enhancement of cooperation to combat human trafficking, the enforcement of the capacity of criminal justice systems, and others.⁹⁶ The blueprint also agrees to intensify ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts and ratify and implement the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism.

ASEAN's mechanism to handle intra-regional inter-state conflict

Inter-state conflicts in Southeast Asia have been also concerns in the region since the time of ASEAN's establishment. The number of inter-state conflicts has been high.⁹⁷ Most of them are prolonged and have an economic basis; they include disputes over borders, water boundaries, and territory (Nishikawa 2007: 49). Examples of such conflicts include the Sabah dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia, the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, the overlapping claims to the 20-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) between Brunei and Vietnam, and several overlapping claims of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands by Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

Peaceful settlement of disputes has been emphasized in ASEAN throughout its history. A formal mechanism to handle such intra-regional disputes

was developed in the TAC of 1976. Key ASEAN documents that refer to the rules of procedure enshrined in the TAC include the ASEAN Vision 2020, the 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (known as the Bali Concord II), the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme, and the ASEAN Charter (Article 24). The blueprint of the ASEAN Political-Security Community promotes conflict resolution, pacific settlement of disputes, and post-conflict peace-building in ASEAN's attempt to achieve "a cohesive, peaceful and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security".⁹⁸

The TAC affirms the commitment to the "settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means" and the "renunciation of threat or use of force". It states a plan to establish a 'High Council' to settle disputes through regional processes (Article 14). The High Council is empowered by TAC "to recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good office, mediation, inquiry or conciliation". However, the High Council has never been convened. The Rules of Procedure of the High Council that defines the actual mechanism for dispute settlement were established only in 2001.⁹⁹ According to these rules, "All decisions of the High Council shall be taken by consensus ... " (Rule 19). The High Council undertakes the procedure for dispute settlement "by written communication through diplomatic channels" (Rule 7) upon "receipt of the written confirmation from all the parties" to the dispute (Rule 8). These rules are consistent with some of the key principles of ASEAN affirmed in the ASEAN Charter.

The dispute settlement mechanism addressed in the ASEAN Charter is guided by TAC and its rules of procedure (Article 24–2). In case of an unresolved dispute under the High Council, the dispute is referred to the ASEAN Summit (Article 26). The ASEAN Summit is also the final reference point in cases of non-compliance with recommendations or decisions resulting from the dispute settlement mechanism (Article 27). The blueprint of the ASEAN Political-Security Community reaffirms the commitment to the rules of procedures provided by the TAC and stresses strengthening the existing procedures for pacific settlement of disputes. The process and procedures founded in TAC, therefore, are the basis of ASEAN's approach to handling inter-state conflicts in the region.

ASEAN's way of challenging transnational issues and inter-state conflicts

ASEAN offers a collective venue to form a common position and develop concerted approaches among the member-states to address transnational issues and inter-state conflicts in the region. Various declarations and statements on transnational issues by ASEAN reflect common views and priority areas agreed upon by member-states. Measures for the management of conflicts in the region are laid out in the TAC. However, in actual practice, ASEAN has failed to take any concrete action to enforce the agreed plans of action. Most statements and declarations issued by ASEAN are non-binding in nature and even for some binding norms, the final decision to address the

compliance depends on consensus among member-states. Hence, in reality, the lack of the rule of law in ASEAN restricts its ability to implement and enforce its decisions.

A look at the counter-terrorism efforts undertaken in the region and actual management of conflicts within the region by ASEAN illustrates its limited functionality. For example, while ASEAN opens a venue for information sharing and cooperation to counter terrorism in the region, in practice, bilateral and trilateral arrangements among member-states have more practical effects. This situation is illustrated in the examples that follow. Singapore and Malaysia exchanged information during and after their respective arrests of suspected militants in December 2001. The information was also shared by Indonesia (Emmers 2007: 8). Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines began joint naval interdiction operation in 2001 and foreign ministers from the three countries signed a comprehensive agreement to facilitate counter-terrorism cooperation and inter-operability (Collins 2005: 139). The Philippines and Malaysia also worked cooperatively in 2002 in order to deport Nur Misuari, leader of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to face trial in the Philippines. In 2007, Singapore and Indonesia signed an Extradition Treaty that allows both countries to hand over suspects to each other. Trilaterally, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines signed the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures in May 2002.¹⁰⁰

Some moves toward ‘cooperative security’ were made in ASEAN to counter terrorism in Southeast Asia in the midst of the US-led ‘war on terrorism’. However, there was scepticism about the degree of regional anti-terrorism cooperation (Stubbs 2004: 4). Not even an issue as critical as the international effort to fight terrorism can unify ASEAN. As Sheldon Simon points out, many Southeast Asian countries are hesitant to share sensitive information on domestic matters as it could “embarrass or challenge the political positions of ruling elites” (Simon 2006: 101). Thus, in practice, bilateral and trilateral arrangements may be appropriate methods for cooperation to handle such issues as terrorism and crimes in Southeast Asia.

Similar to the management of terrorism in Southeast Asia, ASEAN acts as an umbrella body for individual member-states’ attempts to manage disputes, rather than as a firm collective body that undertakes and imposes collective action (Nishikawa 2007: 49). Although ASEAN has been developing mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes, in reality, the association in many conflict cases did not take direct action to resolve the dispute. The role played by ASEAN during disputes is often merely that of providing a forum for consensus building, offering an opportunity for members to convey their attitudes toward disputes that have developed on either a bilateral or multi-lateral basis. Although the High Council was established, it cannot act without consensus among the member-states. A number of cases come to mind: Indonesia broke the impasse in both the Sabah and Spratly Islands disputes;¹⁰¹ During the Indonesia–Singapore Crisis of 1968, Malaysia played a key role in diffusing the tension between the two countries.

Mely Caballero-Anthony observes that ASEAN did not set out to resolve any conflict at its inception (Caballero-Anthony 2002: 534). Nor has it resolved any conflict since then, even one between ASEAN member-states. In practice, individual countries initiate discussions with ASEAN assisting by helping to develop a common position. According to Rodolfo Severino, a former ASEAN Secretary-General, disputes in Southeast Asia have historically been settled informally with outside parties roped in to mediate.¹⁰²

A recent example is the Thai–Cambodia border dispute on the controversial area around the Preah Vihear Temple, an eleventh-century-built Hindu temple over which both countries have historically claimed sovereignty, where the case was not brought to ASEAN for resolution through its High Council.¹⁰³ Although the ASEAN Charter stipulates formal mechanisms for dispute settlement enshrined in TAC and its rules of procedure, the members in dispute have to agree to bring the case before ASEAN. This procedure limits the utility of the High Council. The Thai–Cambodia case demonstrates the limited effectiveness of the TAC and ASEAN as a conflict-resolution body. In this case, Thailand prefers to settle the dispute outside the TAC terms and, in fact, expressed its wish to resolve the problem in a bilateral way.¹⁰⁴

Considering the nature of inter-state conflicts in Southeast Asia – most of which have an economic basis – it may be appropriate for bilateral mechanisms and processes to be instituted to address security concerns between member-states (Caballero-Anthony 1998: 47). The multilateral approach that requires consensus among member-states would be, in reality, not viable to resolve such conflicts. While the ASEAN Charter addresses the issue of compliance, any unresolved dispute, after all, relies on the annual ASEAN Summit, in which the long tradition of non-interference, consensus, and consultation has been maintained. Consequently, timely and tangible arrangements are difficult and thus rest on other entities. ASEAN is not equipped with the mechanisms and enforcement tools to act practically on conflicts. This reality is illustrated by member-states' reaction to the idea of 'flexible engagement' suggested by Thailand in 1998. The suggestion did not find acceptance among the majority of ASEAN governments. Indonesia also turned down ASEAN's calls for an ASEAN peacekeeping force (Wain 2004). ASEAN member states seem to prefer informal and less intrusive approaches when dealing with conflict. Laurence Henry, in fact, observes that the ASEAN legal order is subject to fluctuating interpretations of a political character carried out principally by member-states, which leads to unique and very individualized solutions (Henry 2007: 864).

Whereas ASEAN offers a common venue to form a collective position among member-states, the actual management of transnational issues and inter-state conflicts relies on individual member-states' bilateral or trilateral arrangements and actions. This does not mean ASEAN's effort is obsolete. As a regional organization, ASEAN's common principles and norms have been central in guiding individual states' methods and approaches to the handling of disputes (Nishikawa 2007: 50) and terrorism in Southeast Asia. Whereas

many conflicts in Southeast Asia are prolonged and the fight against terrorism has so far seldom brought immediate success, all-out wars have been avoided. ASEAN's principles, including consensus, consultation, and non-confrontational approaches, have assisted in maintaining a degree of stability in the region, often in circumstances where matters might otherwise have escalated. Although the web of bilateral and trilateral arrangements enables ASEAN to enforce actions, such actions are, at the most fundamental level, grounded on the common position shaped in the ASEAN process. Without such an underlying common position, bilateral or trilateral arrangements may not be possible. In this sense, ASEAN's role should not be underestimated. While actual effects are the results of individual member-states' arrangements, such arrangements seemed to be guided by rules and procedures shaped in ASEAN.

In sum, while the major ASEAN principles and norms have been guiding the member-states' attitudes and approaches in handling transnational issues and inter-state conflicts, the individual actions taken by states have been enhancing existing regional norms and contributing to the formation and strengthening of other related principles. ASEAN member-states' way of handling security issues has been based on certain principles, including consensus, consultation, an informal and bilateral style, and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other members. The approach is unique compared to those in many other regions that prefer a more direct, confrontational and legal approach, such as the one in Europe and the Americas.

Evaluations of ASEAN's role and capability in dealing with intra-regional security issues vary considerably. For example, some assessments value ASEAN's management of disputes (Narine 1998; Snitwongse 1998) while others point to its inability to handle disputes (Leifer 1999; Caballero-Anthony 2002). These different assessments are partly explained by the underlying assumptions and expectations towards regional bodies. Although it is often assumed that regional organizations take collective action to prevent, manage, and resolve security issues, ASEAN does not function as a collective enforcement body. It often simply offers a venue for consensus-building. Individual member-states take actions on the basis of the consensus made in the ASEAN context. ASEAN's – and its members' way of handling regional issues – is unique in the world.

Achieving human security, then, requires methods and approaches that are compatible with 'the ASEAN way'. Although there are abundant security issues that necessitate collective efforts, ASEAN states' actions are, at the most fundamental level, based on several key principles and behavioural norms, some of which are expressed in the ASEAN Charter. As manifested ASEAN's intention to become a people-oriented association, the ASEAN way may be undertaking a change. It is crucial now to examine the compatibility of human security with the principles and behavioural norms that are part of 'the ASEAN way'.

5 The ASEAN way and human security

The 'ASEAN Way' is now in revolution! It is not fast enough but changing.¹

For the countries of Southeast Asia, where the state has been central in security discourse, the human security concept contrasts markedly with the region's principles and practice – the ASEAN way – which uphold a commitment to the idea of state sovereignty. The central question, then, is whether human security is compatible with the ASEAN way. Though the idea of human security offers an alternative frame of analysis and is potentially useful as a way of handling some of the longstanding problems in Southeast Asia, such as violence and conflict, it also has the potential to be nothing more than an empty slogan. ASEAN's emphasis on 'people-oriented' values demonstrates ASEAN's interests in human security. Yet, whether or not the human security approach can be translated into practice will be dependent on the compatibility with Southeast Asian regional modality. In order to examine the compatibility of human security with the ASEAN way, it is necessary to review the basic principles in security discourse and actual security management in Southeast Asia characterized by the ASEAN way. Moreover, it is also vital to grasp the changes perceived in the ASEAN context. For example, the signing of the Charter is a noteworthy change for the region not only because it formalized the establishment of ASEAN with a legal personality, but it also establishes a rules-based approach, which is markedly in contrast to the region's longstanding non-codified approach. As explored in Chapter 2, though to different extent, ASEAN and many countries in Southeast Asia have been undergoing changes. Thus, it is sensible to consider that the ASEAN way may be undergoing some alterations. This chapter explores the compatibility of the ASEAN way with the notion of human security and examines both normative and practical utility of human security in the region. The section begins with exploring the ASEAN way and identifies the vital areas of action that decide the way the ASEAN member-states handle security issues. The examination will allow us to consider the future prospects of human security in Southeast Asia.

The ASEAN way and security in Southeast Asia

The ASEAN way is said to be a style of diplomacy or code of conduct that has evolved in intra-ASEAN relations (Capie and Evans 2002: 14). The existence of the ASEAN way is not universally accepted.² However, despite criticism on the claims of a distinctive Asian approach or culture, the idea and characteristics of the ASEAN way has been debated in academia and policy circles particularly since the 1990s. According to Capie and Evans, the origins of the ASEAN way date back even before the creation of the ASEAN in 1967 (Capie and Evans 2002: 14). The origins are found in the way that the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), the short-lived predecessor of ASEAN's, worked in the region (Solidum 1981: 136). The founders of the ASA declared in 1961 that problems in the region should be resolved using "Asian solutions that contain Asian values" (Solidum 1981: 136). Solidum points out the use of low-key diplomacy as the most important values. Furthermore, some of the current political practices characterized as the ASEAN way seems to derive from the practices that the countries in Southeast Asia had even before the colonial period.

While the historical roots of the ASEAN way show its fundamental characteristics, the prominent features of the ASEAN way are recognized in contrast to non-Asian diplomacy and inter-state relationships. Similar to many other ASEAN's policies, the ASEAN way is said to be developed reactively in countering various pressures and criticisms from outside the region. The norms identified in the ASEAN way are, in fact, in contrast to a Western style of diplomacy which some Asians regard as a formalistic and legalistic approach. Alan Dupont observes that the ASEAN way represents the conscious rejection by Asian leaders of what they perceive to be imported Western notions of diplomacy and multilateralism (Dupont 1996: 13–15).

Several scholars commonly identify the key norms of the ASEAN way as a preference for informality and a non-legalistic approach (Levine 2007; Nishikawa 2007; Capie and Evans 2002: 14; Collins 2005: 133). Both ASEAN member-states' behaviour and the distribution of ASEAN's institutional resources are indications of ASEAN's preference for informality (Capie and Evans 2002: 16–17). ASEAN members use consultative processes, which operate through dialogue and non-binding commitments, rather than legalistic formula and codified rules. Indeed, over 40 years, ASEAN did not draw up any formal charter. ASEAN's decisions generally take the form of declarations, plans of action and memorandums of agreement, and are thus legally non-binding. Some of these acts and declarations can be qualified as non-conventional concerted agreements or 'gentlemen's agreements', which have legal effect without being legally binding. Apart from the ambiguity linked to their legal nature, there is the relative uncertainty regarding their author(s) or the person(s) to whom they should be attributed: organization and/or member-states (Henry 2007: 866). The consultative processes by the small

number of elite ASEAN leaders in their personalistic relations enable them to maintain informality.

ASEAN's minimum institutional resources also reflect its preference for informality. The ASEAN Secretariat has limited roles and a modest bureaucratic apparatus. The ASEAN Secretariat was also said to be a functional organ and not a political one, in which there is no representative from each member-state (Henry 2007: 862), and its administrative apparatus is comprised of merely 177 officials. This is far smaller than that in the EU, in which there are as many as 21,000 officials (Henry 2007: 862). Although the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) led the Secretariat to evolve since 1992 (Henry 2007: 862), the number of officials in the Secretariat and the mandate of the Secretary General of ASEAN still shows it has limited roles. The Secretary-General of ASEAN was originally appointed for a two-year term by foreign ministers, to whom he was accountable, by rotation. From 1992, the mandate of the Secretary General increased to three, and then five years, with the possibility of reappointment; the role was also accorded ministerial status (Henry 2007: 862).

ASEAN's preference for informality partly derives from its members' pre-colonial political and social practices. The pre-colonial political culture and systems in most ASEAN member-states have developed non-formal and non-contractual relationships (Wolters 1982) ruled by small elite circles underpinned by patronage networks. Busse argues that despite the establishment of formal political institutions and legal frameworks in the process of modernization, the result was not a bureaucratic system; rather, personalistic and informal patterns of rule that had dominated the political culture and system in these countries continued to persist (Busse 1999: 48). As a result, both internal and external political arrangements were based on the rule of a small number of leaders, whose successful management of personal power relationships with local rulers (for domestic matters) and with a small number of leaders of other states (for regional matters) determined their country's future direction. In fact, public debate and criticism surrounding policies remained very rare in most Southeast Asian politics. Given the strong reliance on personal rule, the more formal and legalistic grounds typical of rational bureaucracies did not take root in Southeast Asian political practices.

Another element of the ASEAN way is the use of consensus and consultation. The use of consultation and consensus is clearly stated in the ASEAN Charter (Article 20). 'Consensus' in ASEAN is, however, distinguished from 'unanimity'. It was explained as finding a way of "moving forward by establishing what seems to have broad support".³ ASEAN often uses the decision-making style of 'ten minus X', which is sometimes referred as 'flexible consensus'. Michael Antolic observes that ASEAN often uses ambiguous language that allows "participants to reach common standards, and subsequently, to hold their own interpretation of so-called common standards" (Antolic 1990: 157). Some critics have pointed out this approach as a form of accommodation (Haas 1966: 95).

The most well-known element of the ASEAN way is the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states. ASEAN members place a great deal of importance on the preservation of sovereignty. Thus, the principle is often considered as a key aspect of the ASEAN way (Capie and Evans 2002: 20). Its importance is shown in the fact that the principle of non-interference is enshrined in all ASEAN's key documents, including the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the ASEAN Charter 1997. However, the principle received criticisms in encountering such situations as Cambodia and Timor Leste during the 1990s. Despite grave concern expressed by UN and other regions, ASEAN maintained its stance of non-interference in these cases.

The elements often identified as the ASEAN way – a preference for informality, the use of consensus and consultation, and the principle of non-interference – work in tandem: consensus and consultation allow agreements without any binding legal document to be made; operating on consensus also limits interference in another member-state's internal matters; consultative processes and personalistic discussions dominate bilateral talks among the small number of elites of ASEAN, which manifest a great deal of informality in its conduct.

Some of the elements of the ASEAN way date back longer in history than ASEAN itself. Many fundamental political and social habits, particularly informality, bilateral style and elite politics, originate in the practices in pre-colonial times, whereas other principles such as the non-interference principle were incorporated into ASEAN's practice as a result of colonialism and imperialism. These general characteristics of the ASEAN way are well recognized in ASEAN member-states' attitudes toward intra-regional relationships. How does the 'ASEAN way' affect ASEAN's approach to security issues? Is the ASEAN way compatible with human security? We shall explore these questions in the next section.

ASEAN's approach to security

As explored in Chapter 2, 'security' in Southeast Asian countries is primarily linked with state-building and economic development. ASEAN was designed to be an association of states engaged in state-building. Economic development in each member-state was considered important to achieve 'security'. It was thought that without every member achieving internal security, regional security – in terms of national and regional resilience – is not possible. The perceived threats to security are, therefore, internal in nature, entailing socio-economic, as well as political security (i.e. comprehensive security), and those that negatively affect state-building and economic development, such as communist insurgencies and ethnic and religious secessions. The security consideration primarily aimed at state-building and economic development partly explains why collective security arrangements have never been

developed in Southeast Asia (Simon 1998: 196). The fundamental principles to security now enshrined in the ASEAN Charter – ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘national and regional resilience’ – evidently illustrates ASEAN’s approach to security.

The notion of ‘national security’ was commonly emphasized to promote internal integrity and restrain any element that threatens national unity within each country. The emphasis on national unity was justified in the course of state-building and economic development. State-building during the Cold War contributed to strengthening this norm. Ideological divisions manifested in communist uprisings within each country fostered enormous challenges for national security, national unity and economic development in Southeast Asia. The region was placed in a volatile position during the Cold War, facing pressures from both the US and the Soviet Union. Respecting the norm of sovereignty therefore provided a degree of protection from external threats (Busse 1999: 47) and continues to influence the attitudes and approaches of member-states towards regional order.

Protection of sovereignty, the region’s first and foremost principle, was thus a necessary condition for achieving ‘security’ for countries in Southeast Asia. Despite the emphasis on humanitarian considerations in the international arena during the 1990s through such cases as Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, leading to an erosion of state sovereignty, ASEAN states have continued to emphasize this traditional concept (Ayooob 1995). However, what characterizes the ASEAN way in this context is that the authority and power of the state have been remarkably promoted even within the regional context. Both inter-state behaviour in security management, such as the management of inter-state conflicts and transboundary crimes in the region, and decision-making style in the member-states do not allow ASEAN to enforce its collective decisions in each member’s national context.

As explored in Chapter 4, in ASEAN’s security management, individual states are decisive for both decision-making and implementation of their decisions even on intra-regional matters. The ASEAN way gives authority and power to states for decision-making and for the enforcement of its decisions, rather than transferring such authority and power to the collective body. In many regional organizations, decisions are made by a majority-vote system, by which a regional body can pursue its collective decisions with majority approval, surpassing minority states’ disagreement. Moreover, not having any binding legal framework, or any form of regional enforcement mechanism in ASEAN, compliance of decisions depends on each member’s capacity and responsibility even after consensus is achieved at ASEAN’s level. As explored in the previous chapter, ASEAN members’ way of handling transnational issues and intra-regional conflicts shows that ASEAN’s role in actual security management is limited. Individual states, in reality, take actions and make security arrangements even when issues are largely regional matters.

In sum, ASEAN’s informal and non-codified consensus and consultation style restricts ASEAN power to surpass state. Instead, ASEAN enforces the

authority of the state through its cooperation. David Capie and Paul Evans aptly describe “ASEAN [as] an example of ‘sovereign-enhancing regionalism’ where most decision-making powers continue to reside in the various national capitals” (Capie and Evans 2002: 15). ASEAN’s decision-making style and inter-state behaviour does not merely contribute to state-centrism, but beyond that, they empower states. No entity supersedes the state’s power in Southeast Asia in the intra-regional context. This state-empowering character of ASEAN is illustrated in its institutional structure and the nature of the organization. The following section, thus, explores the organizational nature of ASEAN.

The organizational nature of ASEAN

The organizational characteristics of ASEAN and also the use of institutional resources within ASEAN illustrate its state-centric approach and state-empowerment. ASEAN is an inter-governmental organization, which has distinctive characteristics when compared to supranational organizations. While some other regional organizations aspire to have supranational characteristics, such as the EU, ASEAN retains the characteristics of an inter-governmental organization.

In principle, in supranational organizations, power is often transferred to an authority broader than the governments of member-states (Weiler 1981). As discussed in the previous section, ASEAN obviously does not operate on such a principle. This is largely because in ASEAN, none of the political organs has its own defined sphere of competence, or decision-making power in the legal sense of the term (Henry 2007: 861). Until 1976, the only decision-making organ was the Council of Ministers (Ministerial Meeting), in which the ministers of foreign affairs met once a year. Since 1976, annual summits allowed the council to take coordinated political positions driven by heads of state and government. Laurence Henry argues that although ASEAN is now more of a political organization than a technical one, technically, ministerial councils meet regularly in a certain number of key sectors of ASEAN cooperation. Of all the councils of ministers, a special place has been carved out for the Council of Ministers of the Economy institutionalized in 1976 (Henry 2007: 861).⁴ This institutional structure shows, in part, that economic interests of each country are of great importance in the political and socio-cultural spheres of ASEAN’s cooperation.

ASEAN’s financial system is also inter-governmental in nature. ASEAN possesses a fund for financing projects since 1969. In practice, spending is allocated in the budget of each member-state’s ministry of foreign affairs and the national banks place these sums at the disposal of the fund (Henry 2007: 868). ASEAN has very limited financial autonomy over the fund though, which “is in line with its limited autonomy in relation to its member-states” (Henry 2007: 868). In addition, although ASEAN possesses the fund, member-states still cover an important part of ASEAN’s running costs, such as their own expenses in personnel and operations.

The inter-governmental nature of ASEAN is most clearly manifested in the process of decision-making. All the decisions of the institutions of ASEAN are taken by consensus (Henry 2007: 867). In many supranational multilateral settings such as the EU, decisions are taken by majority votes. The majority-vote system obliges a non-agreeing member-state to implement a decision that is supported by the majority.⁵ On the other hand, the decision-making in ASEAN is based on consultation and consensus, as stated as a basic principle in the ASEAN Charter (Article 20). In cases of non-compliance and when consensus is not achieved, the matter is referred to the ASEAN Summit (Article 20). Thus, ASEAN's decisions are less likely to intrude member-state's positions.

Moreover, in ASEAN, the decision-making style and behavioural norms of placing higher priority on states than on the regional body limits the interests of citizens. The interests of citizens are often not taken up in ASEAN. This is markedly in contrast to the EU. The European Parliament is directly elected by citizens of Europe and is an expression of the supranational character of the Union (Henry 2007: 861). The representation of the interests of individuals in ASEAN is usually done by NGOs and civil society groups accredited with ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter includes a list of accredited civil society organizations (Annex 2). However, Henry points out that the majority of such organizations are professional federations or associations originating from the world of business, with the most influential and long-standing being the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the ASEAN Business Forum (Henry 2007: 862). Accordingly, each country's national interests continue to be influential in activities in non-governmental sectors.

The institutional structure of ASEAN does not possess the characteristics of a supranational organization. ASEAN indeed does not aim to be a supranational entity. The ASEAN members stressed from the outset that they wanted an inter-governmental and not a supranational organization (Zweifel 2006: 171; Collins 2005: 128). This stance seems to be still valid. In 2009, Termsak Chalermpanupap, the Director of Political and Security Cooperation of the ASEAN Secretariat, stated that ASEAN is not a supranational body which can sanction members.⁶ Many principles of ASEAN stated in its Charter, as well as institutional, legal and financial arrangements are in contrast to the features of supranational organizations. ASEAN's consensus-based decision-making allows members to maintain the characteristics of an inter-governmental organization. Although some changes are recognized in ASEAN in the course of strengthening its institutional settings to achieve the ASEAN Community, the principles laid out in the ASEAN Charter, in essence, confirms ASEAN's stance to remain as an inter-governmental entity. This stance is strengthened by some of the principles that characterize the ASEAN way, such as the principles of non-interference, supreme priority on sovereignty, consensus and consultation. These characteristics of ASEAN affirm ASEAN's approach that gives supreme power to the sovereignty of states and further empowers states through various habitually applied

principles. It is partly because ASEAN's security considerations are principally to secure each member-state's development to allow regional competence to be strengthened, as explained in the principles of resilience and comprehensive security. What characterizes the ASEAN way is illustrated in the organizational nature of ASEAN. ASEAN's state-centrism is, in this sense, deeply rooted in both principle and practice.

The deciding factors of the ASEAN way

The ASEAN way essentially lays out the order of the relationships between the state and people. Thus, in any context related to security, the ASEAN way – the hierarchical order of the relationships dominated by states – will be innately applied. As explored in Chapter 4, the current people-centred approach in ASEAN – ASEAN leaders' concerns and actions for the security of people – is 'state-oriented'. This is largely because the identified security threats are from the state's perspectives, rather than people's perspectives. The identified threats may happen to be consistent between ASEAN leaders and the people on certain issues at a particular time. However, it is not always the case, and security problems are multiple and diversified in terms of nature and impacts partly because of globalization. In the current practice, both the process of decision-making and implementation of decisions are dominantly done by states. Although we see greater emphasis placed on 'people-oriented' values, the changes recognized in ASEAN are still limited in actual practice.

The order of the relationships, to a certain extent, explains the vulnerability of the ASEAN way in security management. The ASEAN way is particularly vulnerable when encountering intra-state security problems. It is largely because of the huge gap in threat recognitions between the state and its people. In such context, the state fails to protect individuals or its citizens. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, no entity exists to stop the suffering caused by the state when states have supreme power.

The vulnerability of the ASEAN way is particularly explained in the two behavioural areas: ASEAN's decision-making and inter-state behaviour. As explored in Chapter 4, the management of transnational issues and conflicts in ASEAN is ruled by these two areas of action. ASEAN's decision-making requires time for consensus-building, which limits prompt decisions for timely action on one hand. On the other hand, ASEAN's principle of inter-state behaviour – non-interference – limits ASEAN's role in cases of intra-state security problem. As a result, ASEAN plays an insignificant role when handling internal security problems of its members. The vulnerability was evident, for instance, in Timor Leste, when a 'domestic' dispute (from the Indonesian perspective) came to be seen as an international issue in which Indonesia's views concerning its sovereignty and territorial integrity were superseded by concerns of a wider community. Despite long-standing awareness of such 'internal' conflicts, regional initiatives and actions to resolve them have been very limited. The same attitude to the situation in Myanmar

is seen among member-states. ASEAN member-states have no consensus regarding 'engagement' to the situation in Myanmar but they agree that Myanmar should be a member of ASEAN. Similarly, member-states pay only lip-service to their concerns over internal conflicts in the region, such as southern Thailand and southern Philippines, and fail to collectively address these issues in ASEAN, even though their consequences impact on regional security. This explains why several internal conflicts are prolonged and remain without any prospects of resolution in Southeast Asia despite ASEAN's emphasis on "One Caring and Sharing Community" (ASEAN 2007: Preamble in the ASEAN Charter).

The two areas of action – non-interference and the consensus and consultation style of decision-making – reinforce one another. The consensus and consultation styles make it possible to avoid intervening in other members' internal matter, for instance, in human rights situations and internal conflicts. Similarly, a commitment to non-interference had been maintained as a result of the practice of consultation and consensus. A prominent feature of ASEAN was that it retained these principles on the basis of shared understanding among member-states over 40 years. ASEAN states could comply with these practices without being codified or formally promulgated before the ASEAN Charter was introduced in 2007. This was possible largely because of the Southeast Asian political culture created by small elite circles, which are underpinned by patronage networks, and which in turn, maintained informality.

In this context, the ASEAN way, in particular, the two areas of actions – non-interference and the decision-making style, has been utilized to support elites as they seek to consolidate positions of power and generate legitimacy of their regimes. In fact, in the ASEAN context, the principle of non-interference does not mean that member-states are indifferent to one another (Collins 2005: 138). Instead, the member-states or state elites aid other elites by utilizing the principle of non-interference. For example, the member-states refrain from publicly criticizing one another. This is most obviously seen in ASEAN's attitudes towards Myanmar. Alan Collins states that non-interference coupled with the ASEAN way of consultation and consensus decision-making, which create the perception of public unity by not shaming another member, have been the principle means by which ASEAN leaders have assisted each other's pursuit of security in the course of state-building (Collins 2005: 139). ASEAN members supported Indonesia's position when Indonesia annexed East Timor, while the annexation was met with a hostile resolution in the UN General Assembly in 1975. Another example is ASEAN members' lack of response to the military crackdown in Thailand in 1992. ASEAN members also assist each other in their internal conflicts through both military and political support. Collins points out that Indonesia provided military transport aircraft to assist the Marcos regime in the Philippines in its conflict against communist insurgents (Collins 2005: 138). Similarly, Malaysia and Thailand had a bilateral defence cooperation arrangement to help fight

insurgency movements. Also, in spite of strained relations between Malaysia and Thailand due to activities of the Communist Party of Malaya operating out of Thailand and Muslim separatists in southern Thailand operating from Malaysia, Thailand granted Malaysia the right to pursue guerrillas across the border (Acharya 2001a: 60). During the crisis situation in Cambodia, ASEAN member-states, namely Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore, opposed India's proposal to leave the Cambodian seat vacant at the UN.⁷ Although Cambodia was not a member of ASEAN at that time, throughout UN sessions, from 1979 to 1982, ASEAN member-states blocked India's motion and ensured Cambodian seat at the UN.

Vital concerns remain in the claims of the ASEAN way, particularly by some of the ASEAN leaders, in that the citizens' security is threatened by their very own state. States have been known to engage in brutal acts against its own citizens without ASEAN being able, and willing, to addressing these issues because it is bound by the principle of non-interference. In such cases, ASEAN can do little to address such acts unless consensus is made among the member-states. Alan Collins points out that in practice it means that state elites could engage in what were often brutal policies against their own people with the knowledge that their neighbours would not interfere and thus political stability was achieved for the regime by removing alternative sources for the people's loyalty (Collins 2005: 130). In fact, some of the state elites who emphasized 'national resilience' in the course of state-building emphasized the ASEAN way, particularly non-interference and the decision-making style of consensus and consultation.

The two areas that characterize the ASEAN way and that have been maintained among the elite leaders – the decision-making style and inter-state behaviour – are the deciding factors when handling security problems in practice. These decisive factors indicate that ASEAN 'manages' security problems, rather than 'resolves' them. For this reason, quite opposite assessments regarding ASEAN's role as a regional body exist: for some scholars, the ASEAN way contributes to avoiding intra-regional wars, whereas for others, the ASEAN way has never solved any security problem existing in the region.

On the basis of the discussion in this section, one might argue that the key issue for the attainment of 'security' in Southeast Asia is, among others, to review the two areas of action – inter-state behaviour and the decision-making style – that have been maintained and utilized by elite ASEAN leaders. It necessitates ASEAN and its member-states to review the supreme positioning of the state in the process of decision-making and in ASEAN's inter-state relationships.

Compatible or incompatible? Human security and the ASEAN way

ASEAN's fundamental approach to security, that is, national and regional resilience, and comprehensive security, reflects the history as well as political and economic contexts in Southeast Asia. The approach is strengthening, and

is also supported by, several principles that ASEAN members maintain in their intra-regional relations and security management. Thus, ASEAN's fundamental approach to security and members' behavioural norms that place the highest emphasis on the state sovereignty have a significant importance to the examination of ASEAN's perspectives on human security. Whether or not human security is achieved in the region largely depends on the notion's compatibility with ASEAN's fundamental approach or the ASEAN way.

As explored in Chapter 2, ASEAN's interpretation of human security exemplifies the divided reactions over the human security concept among policymakers in Southeast Asia. The notion of human security shares similarities with comprehensive security. Both concepts broadened the scope of security in Asia. Indeed, as Acharya argues, "in an important sense, the existence of the prior notion of comprehensive security facilitates the acceptance of the emerging idea of human security in Asia" (Acharya 2001: 11). In Southeast Asia, expanding the scope of security is not new. ASEAN's fundamental approach to security – comprehensive security and national resilience – has already expanded the scope of security to include various types of security issues, such as economic, financial, environmental, and socio-cultural issues.

The notion of 'freedom from want' in human security seems to be consistent with ASEAN's approach and the preferred dimension in Southeast Asia. The region's historical partiality towards development is sometimes referred to as 'developmentalism' (Abbott 2002). This concept is expressed as 'development as freedom' by Amartya Sen, co-chair of the Human Security Commission (cited in Acharya 2007: 21). Economic development has been a major means for achieving domestic stability in Southeast Asia (Caballero-Anthony 2004: 161). The notion of national resilience also supports the notion of 'freedom from want' in achieving human security from the national development perspective. Moreover, given the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, which triggered the concept of human security in the region, the preference for 'freedom from want' is understandable. ASEAN's approach of 'comprehensive security' and 'national and regional resilience' is consistent with the 'freedom from want' aspect of human security. Therefore, there is an aspect of human security that is compatible with the values and security context of Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, there are also reasons for the limited acceptance of the human security concept in Southeast Asia. First, policymakers in the region tend to consider 'freedom from fear' as the primary focus of human security. As explored in Chapter 2, ASEAN's discourse of human security is closely connected with the 'freedom from fear' aspect of human security, specifically 'human rights' and 'international humanitarian law'. In many ASEAN's official document including the ASEAN Charter, the term, 'human security', is not employed. The Report of the Eminent Persons Group to ASEAN Leaders (EPG Report) clearly shows that in ASEAN's discourse, human security is considered in connection with human rights and international

humanitarian law. ASEAN's interpretation of human security reflects some of the initial Western connotations of the concept, which are rooted in a universalist approach – namely, protection of human rights and human dignity. These connotations seem to be further linked with intervention or humanitarian intervention. The notion of human security, accordingly, leads to concerns of 'intervention' in internal affairs, which tend to be connected with human rights and internal conflict situations in each country in the region. Within ASEAN, 'flexible engagement' has been debated since the 1990s, yet, as discussed in Chapter 4, no agreement exists among member-states regarding whether ASEAN should open the way for 'engagement' in another member's internal affairs. Some of the member-states obviously detest the idea while others are more amenable to considering some degree of engagement in internal affairs in certain critical contexts. Second, a key component of human security is the unaddressed aspect of security discourse in Southeast Asia – the main referent object, which has been unquestionably the 'state'. Historically, the main referent object has not been reassessed either in theory or in practice in the region. Both 'comprehensive security' and 'national and regional resilience' are centred on the security of the state. The idea of national resilience, in particular, suggests that the security of the state is dependent on people's loyalty to the state (Collins 2005: 129). The reassessment of the main referent object seems to be linked to the idea of the 'responsibility to protect', particularly in relation to governments. This interpretation partly explains the reason why some of the ASEAN leaders are wary about the notion of human security, which is, in principle, centred on the people. As a result, human security brings to mind intervention. Consequently, the idea and approach of human security are considered 'foreign' and increase scepticism in some ASEAN member-states.

Given both compatible and incompatible elements of human security in the Southeast Asian context, the question now is whether or not human security is compatible with Southeast Asian values and the ASEAN way. It does seem compatible with the practices of certain ASEAN countries, particularly with regard to some of the issues related to 'freedom from want' and non-traditional security issues, including improving education and healthcare, disaster management, poverty reduction, and dealing with environmental problems. ASEAN's traditional approach of putting priority on economic development and comprehensive approach to security are consistent with the aspect 'freedom from want' of human security. As introduced in Chapter 2, some of the ASEAN leaders, in fact, claimed that many countries in ASEAN have been applying human security without necessarily using the term as seen in such policies as poverty reduction, improving healthcare and education systems, and addressing environmental problems.⁸ These issues are considered part of security issues in ASEAN's comprehensive approach to security. Through cooperation in ASEAN, much effort has been made to achieve 'freedom from want' in human security in member-states as part of their national policies.

Nevertheless, incompatibilities still arise when threats are related to 'freedom from fear'. As there is no reference to the term 'human security' in the ASEAN Charter, the concept is still viewed with scepticism in the region because of some of its implications on human rights and humanitarian law. Thus, ASEAN countries' reactions to human security have been, and will continue to be, varied, depending on the threat encountered in each case and context. Reactions will vary between those cases in which threat recognition by government are compatible with those by other groups within society, on one hand, and those in which they are incompatible, on the other. The threat recognition of governments and other groups are more likely to coincide particularly on issues related to the 'freedom from want' aspect of human security in cases of natural disasters, fatal diseases, poverty and human trafficking. In the management of these issues, policymakers in the region will promote human security with support from donor countries, develop 'protection' mechanisms and introduce 'empowerment' schemes. An example of this can be seen in the aftermath of the tsunami in 2004. The affected areas in Indonesia and Thailand swiftly introduced a warning system and developed training strategies as part of human security enhancement, with financial and technical support from major donor countries.⁹ However, there will be cases in which threat recognition by different groups in a society are likely to diverge, particularly in relation to internal conflicts involving human rights and human dignity. In such cases, a government's threat recognition is bound to clash with that of local social groups, particularly if the government's domestic political legitimacy, that is, the right of the government to rule, is an issue.

ASEAN's adaptation of a people-centred approach is illustrated in its Charter's articulation of a unified vision and identity, as well as in its stated attempts to set up an ASEAN human rights body, to establish an ASEAN Community, and to set up dispute-settlement mechanisms. The current people-centred approach, however, largely reflects the ASEAN way, that is, conditioned by the decisions of states without the participation of different groups of society. As seen in the case of Thailand, although the government promotes human security, whether or not a people-centred approach is applied depends on the government's decision and varies from case to case. Human security requires threat assessment and management from the perspective of the concerned people and thus both process and outcome are critical in evaluating whether or not a people-centred approach and human security is achieved. As the ASEAN way lays out the order of relationships between states and people, it limits the application of human security in that notion's current form.

Nevertheless, there is an ongoing effort to bring human security into the ASEAN way. For example, ASEAN's promotion of 'people-oriented' values and 'caring society' and its attempt to achieve the ASEAN Community are some examples of the changes. The emphasis on a people-centred approach is in contrast to its previous approach. ASEAN states have become more

tolerable towards discussing regional and certain national political and security affairs, which was rare throughout the 1970s and 1980s partly because of the political contexts in the region (Wanandi 1979: 12; Sopicie *et al.* 1987; Collins 2005: 128).¹⁰ ASEAN members' discussion on, for example, the establishment of a human rights body was non-existent in the 1970s and 1980s. Even introducing the Charter itself is a big step for the region. Having a Charter is not a new idea for ASEAN. In the early 1970s, the five founding member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) did consider developing a constitutional document to formalize the establishment of ASEAN (ASEAN 2007: 7). However, the discussion did not result in a legal entity at that time. Changes in ASEAN are, thus, evident.

The rhetoric of 'people-oriented' values is one of the most prominent elements recognized in the Charter. The emphasis is consistent with ASEAN's efforts to establish the ASEAN Community and a human rights body. The ASEAN Charter evidently expresses ASEAN's intention to be a 'people-oriented' association. The same charter, however, codified several principles that ASEAN leaders have maintained since ASEAN's establishment. Some of the traditional principles may serve to limit ASEAN's new approach. This is largely because of the characteristics of two areas of ASEAN's behavioural norms: inter-state behaviour and decision-making. Human security in Southeast Asia is, thus, dependent on how well the ongoing changes translate 'people-oriented' values into behavioural norms.

Human security versus the ASEAN way: are conflicts inevitable in Southeast Asia?

Both positive and negative potentials are recognized concerning the applicability and utility of a human security approach in Southeast Asia. One of the important implications of the human security notion in the Southeast Asian context is the focus on human security, that is, on people rather than states. The ASEAN way which places the highest priority on the state and its sovereignty is markedly in contrast to the notion of human security. Does it mean that conflicts, particularly internal ones, are inevitable in Southeast Asia?

There are several likely conditions for internal instability that increase the chances of internal conflict in Southeast Asia. First, in Southeast Asia, the chasm regarding threat recognition among different actors – particularly by the government and other groups in society – is wide when it comes to internal and traditional security issues. This chasm can be seen in the efforts of most governments to consolidate domestic political legitimacy, even for countries where there is no apparent violent conflict. The most obvious of such situations are seen in the violent situations in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines, several parts of Indonesia and Myanmar. In these contexts, there is a huge gap in the perceived threats between the state and its people. Second, in addition to the first point, violence in Southeast Asia has a

long history, which exacerbates the current situation in that past incidents of injustice are neither addressed nor resolved, and continuous injustice exacerbates a sense of despair and doubt among the country's people. Such conflicts are asymmetric: one of the parties, obviously the state, has dominant power in terms of resource and capacity. Consequently, there is greater incentive for the non-state party to resort to violence to correct grievances. The case of southern Thailand demonstrates that the varied and changing events of history must be taken into account. Collective political action is thus necessary to achieve security. Effective political solutions must address the violence in the country's past, present and future.¹¹

As explored in Chapter 3 and on the basis of the discussion in the previous sections, one might argue that human security will help us identify the factors that can potentially become the causes of social instability through a reassessment of threats from the perspectives of different actors of a society. It will also help gain an accurate picture of the complex root-causes of conflicts. As a result, if applied, a human security approach will help to increase the chances to handle the potential and the existing conditions that negatively affect 'security' in each society. However, there are reasons that Southeast Asian countries are unlikely to apply a people-oriented human security approach.

First, policymakers are still wary of the liberal interventionist connotations of the concept of human security. Their wariness is evidenced by the fact that the term has not been included in the ASEAN Charter, which emphasizes 'comprehensive security' rather than human security in addressing all forms of threats. The concept has not been localized in the region, particularly with regard to 'freedom from fear'. For example, even in regional discussions to set up a human rights body, the term 'human security' has not been employed, despite ASEAN's emphasis on 'one caring and sharing community'. In contrast, 'freedom from want' has been well embedded in the context and practice of Southeast Asia. ASEAN has contextualized 'freedom from want' well into the promotion of a 'people-centred' approach. However, ASEAN's efforts on achieving 'freedom from want' still come from a 'state-oriented' approach. As such, there is a long road ahead of realizing 'people-oriented' values and genuine human security in Southeast Asia.

Second, where a government's legitimacy is in question, tension results from the differences in what is deemed to be threats among various actors. The relationships that already exist between these various actors – particularly the disarticulation between the state and society as a whole – make it difficult to reconcile their differences. The ASEAN way, which manifests a state-centric approach, to a great extent, limits the applicability of human security in a people-oriented manner in Southeast Asia, particularly in the case of internal security problems. The ASEAN way frames the order of the relationships largely in favour of states. If the identified threats are different among various groups within a society, particularly between the government and other groups, relationships between such groups must be first addressed.

As discussed in Chapter 3, these relationships determine what system the society has in place for addressing the question of securing minimum human security needs.

In Southeast Asia, policymakers often argue that state security need not be incompatible with human security, in the sense that the former is a precondition for the latter (Acharya 2007: 21–22). Yet, there are areas of tension between the two. Unless the differences in threat recognitions are reconciled, identified threats will not be addressed and violence is likely to remain as an option for some groups in the society. Without reviewing the principles of the ASEAN way and how these principles limit states' actions in achieving human security in their own countries in practice, internal unrests and conflicts are likely to remain a persistent problem in Southeast Asia.

Normative and practical implications of human security and the ASEAN way

A human security approach has a significant input in the Southeast Asian context. The notion offers an alternative frame of viewing 'security' in the existing security discourse and approach dominated by states in the region, where relationships between different identity groups are complex and permeates all aspects of social life. This reality includes the way in which access to power is differentiated by social categories based on gender, class, ethnicity, religion, among others. For this reason, the notion of human security has both positive and negative potentials in Southeast Asia. While the notion of human security may encourage the review of existing approach and security discourse in Southeast Asian societies, it can also be viewed as merely advocating for counter-regional or universalist policies – like the promotion of human rights and humanitarian principles – with a different label.

The very nature of the notion is, however, 'security', which, in reality, cannot be achieved either by the state alone or by its people alone. Security must be a concern for all members of a society, irrespective of their status, gender, ethnicity and religion. The responsibility for 'security' in a society must rest on all people in the society because, as Kolodziej suggests, security embraces various exchanges between humans and their agents – states, international organizations, corporations and associations (Kolodziej 2005: 24). The issues that threaten 'security' in a society are multiple, as the human security notion suggests, deriving from issues related to 'freedom from want' as well as 'freedom from fear'. All actors in a society must interact to handle various kinds of threats, be they internal or external. Security cannot be granted only by some actors of the society, such as the state, or actors from outside the society.

In explaining the state and domestic order, Kolodziej states that the security issues posed by the relations between the state and civil society revolve around the power of the state to invade the civil and human rights of individuals, and groups over which it exercises its sovereign authority and material

power. Obviously, the state has a decisive impact on the security of individuals within the territories over which it exercises its power, and on international security. For this reason, responsibilities by both the state and the civil society are decisive for security in a society. While the state has the responsibility with coercive power to protect the security of individuals as well as its territory, it needs to keep coercive power accountable and limit it, and allow civil society to have relations and exchanges free from state intervention or oversight by its several coercive agencies – military, police and civil bureaucracies – which is vital to harnessing the capacity of individuals and groups within civil society. Freedom from coercive directions and intrusive oversight by the state, which are prerequisites of legitimate popular rule, has effects on civil liberties (Kolodziej 2005: 34). Kolodziej considers that people's freedoms, including those of speech, assembly, petition and religion guaranteed by liberal democracies, include the right to join with others to capture the coercive power of the state through free and fair election (Kolodziej 2005: 34). It is here that citizens' social responsibility exists.

In his speech in 1970, Olof Palme, Chairman of the Palme Commission, emphasized the importance of freedom and social responsibility.¹² Palme states: "Democratic freedom requires solidarity among the people". He also points out that a society must have a comprehensive solidarity – the ability to recognize the conditions of other people, a feeling of joint responsibility and participation. Without comprehensive solidarity, Palme considers, sooner or later, society will fall apart into egoistical interests. While freedoms are often threatened under oppressive states, it is also not a rare case in Southeast Asia to witness the members of society lacking the feeling of joint responsibility and comprehensive solidarity. In some cases, the people themselves are torn apart by varied interests. The ASEAN way has not been challenged in such comprehensive solidarity by members of Southeast Asian societies, although there are emerging signs of solidarity among some civil society groups, such as the ASEAN People's Assembly.

Human security calls for the active involvement of all members of a society to jointly find a fine balance between national security and human security, as well as between national security and international security. At each point in human history, one or some of these levels of security become the focus of our debates, depending on the global context and the trend at that point in time. However, our firm recognition is that 'security' requires participation at all levels. The achievement of security requires cooperative efforts by all actors at all levels of a society, equal participation in decision-making, transparent and accountable processes and good decision-making. As many scholars point out, the notion of human security itself may have little innovative and explicit input in the sense that these issues have been emphasized in various efforts to achieve, for example, 'sustainable development', 'democracy', 'good governance', and the promotion of human rights. Achieving human security cannot rely solely on some actors in the society or other entities from outside the society. The actors outside the society concerned, such as

international or regional organizations, can support the effort, but the actual achievement depends on the members of the society. Human security is achievable only when all members of a society aspire the security of individuals and work in mutual consent and cooperation for it. It cannot be enforced by either the state or a certain group outside the society. Human security is, thus, an ambitious undertaking that requires cooperative, rather than competitive, efforts with readiness by all members of the society to act.

Practical implications of human security in Southeast Asia

In the context of Southeast Asia, the most fundamental principle – the ASEAN way – needs to be reviewed first and foremost in order to reassess the order of the relationships between the state and the people. ‘Protection’ and ‘empowerment’ strategies in order to achieve human security are useful and perhaps necessary. However, protection and empowerment themselves do not grant the establishment of cooperative relationships between those who are supposed to protect the people and those who are empowered. Thus, it is vital to find a way to develop the relationships between the two. Achieving this will be decisive in realizing human security in practice.

In the effort to achieve such relationships, negotiations will be necessary. Various decisions made in elite circles in Southeast Asia are closely connected with the economic and business interests of each country. Thus, any effort to achieve human security will require balancing economic/business interests and the people’s needs. ASEAN needs to live up to its claim of being ‘people-oriented’ and promote wide popular participation – of various stakeholders and including its most vulnerable members of society – in both decision-making and implementation.

The overall limitation of resources and the existing social disparities between those who have and those who do not in Southeast Asian societies require careful identification of policy priorities to meet the needs of the most vulnerable people. Without transparency in deciding policy choices and priorities, human security for the most vulnerable populations will not be achievable. In long term, if the process of policymaking is not participatory and transparent, the political legitimacy of a government will also be questioned.

However, such process may be time-consuming. In certain situations, satisfying people’s needs may affect the economic and business opportunities of a country. It was pointed out that the ASEAN way has been maintained by an elite circle partly to secure certain economic and business interests of the elites of ASEAN countries and the region. The ASEAN way, in other words, served to protect their economic and business interests by enhancing economic development in national and regional contexts. For this reason, negotiations or dialogues are crucial among the members of each society for finding a balance between national and regional economic/business interests and the needs of the people.

The changes in emphasis towards people-oriented values in ASEAN are important in that, without such a vision, the security of the people, which is often, if not always, considered counter-productive when achieving the security of state, may not be viewed as one of its priorities in its pursuit of economic development and national security. Reviewing the ASEAN way, particularly its behavioural norms related to inter-state behaviour and decision-making is thus imminent for ASEAN, especially when considering that ‘legitimacy’ and ‘effectiveness’ of the state, are important criteria for a stable government, as discussed in Chapter 3 (Leslie 2003: 15). Vitit Muntarbhorn, at the Eighth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights held in Bangkok on 14–15 July 2009, pointed out correctly that the way ahead is for ASEAN to develop into an inter-people’s organization, and not just be an inter-executive association.¹³

Conclusion

Achieving security has been one of the great challenges throughout human history. There are numerous discussions of the term in both academic and policy circles. Many scholars have attempted to develop concepts that take into account its various dimensions – international and regional, state and human, external and internal – as well as issues related to peace, order and justice. While the debates on security have had a different focus and approach at various times, the narrowly-defined military aspect of security focusing on states has long been at the centre of the debates, particularly during the Cold War. It is obvious that we live in a world where internal and transnational security threats of both military and non-military aspects interact in complex ways. Although the context changes constantly, the state remains the vital actor in achieving security; and we have seen that the absence of state also causes serious security problems, as the situation in Somalia demonstrates. We are aware that sovereignty has both positive and negative impacts, in which politics persists. Yet, during the 1990s, we witnessed growing support for normative and practical imperatives to restore the security of individuals.

The focus on individuals in security considerations inevitably necessitates expanding the concept's scope, to include both military and non-military aspects or physical and non-physical threats. There are a number of actual and potential threats to individuals: physical, psychological, and material concerns, such as war, conflict, terrorism, environmental hazards, food shortages, and economic crises. As a result, conceptual debates on human security must also entail practical or operational feasibility, i.e. how to achieve a wide scope of security in practice, ranging from violent conflicts to poverty. The security centred on individuals reminds us that threats to individuals are more varied and numerous but not necessarily the same as threats to the state.

The major difficulty in achieving human security, however, may not necessarily derive from diverse kinds of threats or the nature of security problems. The Human Security Centre defines human security as “protecting individuals and communities from any form of political violence”.¹ The key issue here revolves around the word ‘political’. There are certain types of violence,

like natural disasters, that are not political; however, legitimate violence – in the form of police and security measures – can follow from robust political processes (Bulloch 2008: 591). For instance, it is possible to politicize natural disasters. Of critical concern here are *human responses* at the time of threats to individuals and communities rather than violence itself or forms of violence that emerge from nature. Human security requires that people consider the political context from which threats to individuals and communities occur. This is why broad definitions of human security obscure the political processes that should determine the character of human responses to such threats. Human security, then, depends on political responses to such threats. To achieve human security, a society must have a base of political legitimacy upon which police and security measures can be distinguished from illegitimate acts of violence. These conditions will guarantee responses to such threats as famine, natural disasters, and fatal diseases as well as physical violence. Human security can be achieved only in the establishment of political responses to various threats to individuals and communities, where structures of authority are legitimate, accountable, and comprised of political commitments. In other words, achieving human security requires a commitment to systems of political legitimacy and accountability.

This is largely because achieving human security requires reconciling differences between different identities and interest groups regarding perceived security threats and methods. The differences must be reconciled through domestic political processes. Each country must have unique relationships with each of the diverse interest groups with which it interacts. Thus, reconciling differences requires grasping the fluidity of the power and influence of different actors that affect the political processes. The governing process concerns not only the actions of government in the policy-making process, but also those of citizens, both individually and organized in various associations. It also involves the way groups and communities within a society organize to make and implement decisions on security matters. As Dahl proposes, the government must meet the essential needs of the governed (i.e. it must be effective), and it must be perceived as legitimate. That is why, by whatever cultural standards, those who govern must achieve the consent of the governed (Dahl 1961 cited in Leslie 2003: 11). Historically, the consent may have been largely religious (the divine right of kings) or economic (feudalism), and perhaps more coerced than earned. In the modern state, it is fundamentally procedural. Elections and the processes of transparency and accountability underlie legitimate authority in the modern democratic state.

Thus, security is a special kind of politics in the sense that it concerns dealing with differences over the preferences, interests, values, and necessities of interdependent actors and their agents. The latter include states, international organizations, regional organizations, corporations, among others. Each agent has its aims and priorities. They are sometimes compatible with those of humans, while at other times they become incompatible. Furthermore, various interest groups in both categories of people – within

civil society or the government – have further diverse preferences. Whenever actors threaten or use force to get what they want from each other, security emerges as a central concern. Human security requires prioritizing the security aims, needs, and preferences of individuals or humans before those of any other agent. Yet, to achieve security, interactions between humans and their agents as well as within each agent and among the people are necessary. For this reason, in achieving human security, the interactions by different social actors must be studied within the locality in order to understand the power relationships among those whose decisions affect political processes.

The reality of human security in Southeast Asia

The relevance of human security to the countries in Southeast Asia can be seen in the fact that people in the region, in one way or another, suffer from problems related to freedom from fear and freedom from want. There are abundant threats to human security, including poverty, the spread of fatal diseases, conflicts, violence, and natural disasters. In many parts of the region, people's minimum security needs – freedom from fear and freedom from want – are not guaranteed.

This is not to say that governments in Southeast Asia have been negligent in their attempt to achieve human security. They have, on the whole, been active in trying to meet their citizens' basic human needs by pursuing economic development. Many governments have succeeded in reducing the level of poverty and improving human development through programmes in poverty alleviation, healthcare, and education. They have also set up early warning systems to prevent large number of deaths from natural disasters and made housing more accessible to the poorer segments in society. Improved commitments to protect and promote human rights have generated some improvements in civil and political rights and enhanced freedom of the people in some of the Southeast Asian countries.

Nevertheless, the approach employed in the context of addressing human security issues in many Southeast Asian countries is state oriented. This is largely because threat identifications and the actual management of security threats are in the hands of governments without much involvement of the people concerned. Indeed, one scholar from Thailand stated that there is no system in any Southeast Asian country where the public can express their views, nor is there a place or mechanism in ASEAN's complex bureaucratic system where one can lodge a complaint.² The current approach in the region, then, is one of state-oriented human security.

In most countries in Southeast Asia, the political process is subject to the state; thus, domestic political legitimacy has been in question. The state-oriented approach obviously results in decisions preferred by the state or government. State-oriented human security undermines human security in some of the region's countries, promoting the marginalization of certain

groups that the state does not consider to be among its citizens. The situations in southern Thailand, Mindanao, and some parts of Indonesia are manifestations of problems resulting from the state-oriented approach. These cases demonstrate that conflicts occur not only because of problems related to freedom from fear but also because of those related to freedom from want. Although the link between violence and the problems related to people's freedom from want is complex, there is evidence that threats to human security, including the problematic condition of freedom from want, are the causes as well as the symptoms and consequences of conflict.

However, the actual threats to human security in these contexts cannot be fully understood in simplistic explanations of the situation, such as the state versus people. The existence of various identity and interest groups in each society in Southeast Asia fosters enormous challenges to human security. People often suffer from violence caused by insurgents as well as that caused by the state or state authorities, such as military and the police. Moreover, conflicts often occur within civil society or within the government. For example, in civil society, some people are not interested in achieving human security while others are often divided when faced with diverse interests and beliefs. In Indonesia, for example, both the government and elements of civil society, such as the NGOs, have been helpless in the face of new social challenges after the fall of Suharto; these include religious and ethnic feuds "with their long and twisted roots" (Anwar 2003: 554). Similarly, the political crisis in Thailand since the 2006 *coup d'état* shows deep and complex social divisions while a wide gap exists between the government and the people regarding threat perceptions and security approaches. In these contexts, diverse threat recognitions by different interest groups must be reconciled through political processes. However, in Southeast Asia, the state's extreme dominance in the process makes it difficult to reconcile differences.

The ASEAN way emphasized by some leaders in the region clearly illustrates the highest regard accorded to states in all activities in the region. State-centrism is evident in ASEAN's own organizational nature and structure. In actual security management, even in cases of transnational issues, most actions undertaken in Southeast Asia are dependent on individual states rather than ASEAN as a collective body. This is largely because ASEAN does not function as an enforcement body and is not equipped with any enforcement tools, such as a regional peacekeeping body. However, this reality does not negate the fact that ASEAN plays certain roles in shaping common views among the member-states. Consequently, the current emphasis on people-oriented values in the regional context must contend with the tensions between the long-standing ASEAN way centred on state and the growing focus on people-centred values. This dilemma is clearly illustrated in ASEAN's effort to set up a regional human rights body in response to increasing pressures from the world countered by its traditional way of operating. Decision-making based on consensus and inter-state behaviour strictly based on sovereignty offer few tangible measures to deal with rights abuses.

To achieve sustainable and people-oriented human security, ideally, all actors in a country or society must cooperate in examining their security threats, identifying both the responsible organ to handle the threats, and the means to do so. The process requires interactions and perhaps negotiations among the actors as threat perceptions often diverge. Human security thus involves not only the outcome of efforts to meet people's security needs but also the entire process required in such attempts. Without considering the process, any attempt to achieve human security becomes state-oriented, that is, from the perspective of the dominant identity or interest group in the society. Such state-oriented human security, then, increases the chances of conflict, as marginalized groups, having no place for negotiation, often resort to violence to correct the situation, as we see in the situation in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. This reality suggests that the ASEAN way or the existing state-centric approach must be reviewed. Otherwise, the current approach to human security in Southeast Asia will continue to undermine security.

Who is responsible for human security?

Achieving human security does not necessarily require third-party involvements if it can be done through domestic political processes. Most current debates on human security, however, are based on the premise that there is little possibility to achieve human security through domestic political processes. The reason is partly because of the characteristics of contemporary crisis contexts, i.e. threats caused by the state, such as state-involved violence, internal war, and state oppression. Thus, the notion of human security is held to be inseparable from intervention. Indeed, the discourse of human security in Southeast Asia is illustrated in the connection between human security and intervention. Nonetheless, it is, after all, the members, including the state and the people, in the concerned society who must attain security. Regardless of the nature and contexts of threats, security cannot be achieved without the efforts of the members of society.

Human security will not be provided by the government for its citizenry, unlike democratic framework within which it operates. Instead, all members of society are responsible for it. One of the important features of the human security approach is the role of the people. Security in a society requires interactions among the actors in that society, including the people, the state, and various people's associations. Achieving human security requires partnerships among non-governmental sectors and business groups, by which civil society may sometimes temper the exercise of state power. In many cases in the past, the state itself became the major cause of human insecurity. Such situations require people's advocacy role for mitigation. People's action with regard to the state will function as a system to sustainably organize people-oriented security in the society.

Looking back at the security discourse before 1815, in the political thought of the modern period, even though individual security was dominant, the

security discourse was that of the relationship between the individual and the state (Rothschild 1995: 54–55). In other words, according to the political thought in the modern period, individual security can only be achieved through a collective or political process. The human security notion of our time, however, tends to be discussed according to two extremes: imposing relations that are only tenuously political or those that are of non-political character. In the former case, i.e. the political context, the discussion is based on the premise that the security of an individual in one country is to be achieved through the agency of a state (or a sub-state group or a supra-state organization) in another country. In the latter case, i.e. non-political, the assumption is that the individual who is suffering from violence does not know whom to ask for protection and has no political recourse if the protection is not provided. Humanitarian policies during the 1990s de-politicized procedures of emergency relief, thereby subverting the local politics, which constitutes the only consistent source of continuing security. Our growing recognition of the interconnectedness between the security of state and that of people led to a dialectic frame of thinking in the human security debate, i.e. extremely political or extremely normative and utilitarian perspectives. However, such processes of external involvement are not the only option for human security. Human security is about the kind of security that requires interactions among the members of the society.

The issue here is about an appropriate balance of the rights and duties of all participants in a society, government and individuals alike. Regional as well as international organizations thus must have space to support efforts by a society's members to achieve the various levels of security – human, national, regional, and international. These are inseparable in the contemporary world. The involvement by regional or international actors may be thought of as a subversive or revolutionary role; if it is successful, there will inevitably be a period of turbulence. This turbulence, however, can be justified on the grounds that it is a necessary stage in which a structure of internal politics can be established, one in which national and human security eventually prevail. Such support should not be considered in either the political or humanitarian context but should be regarded as an effort to find ways of making the change as non-violent as possible.

This is why human security does not merely address the responsibilities of governments, such as the notion of responsibility to protect, although governments are primary organs for protecting people's security. States play a critical role in achieving security. However, the responsibilities of people and communities must be also addressed. The people and communities are supposed to assess their threats and sometimes need to ask for protection from the state. The responsibilities of people and communities – to recognize threats and to seek necessary measures to handle them – determine whether the society can have functional protection mechanisms when threats appear. As Olof Palme points out in his address on 'democratic freedom', people may sometimes need to demonstrate "comprehensive solidarity, the ability to

recognize the conditions of other people, a feeling of joint responsibility and participation”.³

This suggests that in achieving human security, three key issues must be addressed. First, a government’s responsibilities to prevent and respond to security threats, and achieve people’s minimum security needs must be addressed. In current practice, the responsibility of the state is addressed in an effort to promote ‘protection’. Second, human security needs to address people’s responsibilities to identify their security needs, seek measures necessary to handle the identified security needs, and appeal for protection if necessary. In current practice, this is addressed in the effort for empowerment. Third, human security requires mutual effort by all members of a society, including the government and the people, to negotiate diverse threats and different views on approaches to handle them. In order to do so, members of society need to recognize the security of individuals and aspire to achieving it.

What is least discussed in the current human security approach is this third point. As a result of the many intra-state crises witnessed during the 1990s, we tend to view the issue as one of sovereignty versus humanitarianism. The latter concept, based on the universal nature of our common humanity, justifies humanitarian intervention, i.e. actions taken across borders in certain contexts, sometimes with the use of force (Annan 1999). This frame of thinking seems to have dominated our considerations. By contrast, in the political thought of the modern period the security of individuals was considered in relation to the state (Rothschild 1995: 55). The current debate misses an examination of how to build sound relationships among diverse interest and identity groups, including those between individuals and the state, i.e. internal politics. Consequently, the practice of achieving human security lacks strategies to re-establish cooperative relationships among the members of a society.

In Southeast Asia, the third point, above all, is critical in that the majority of governments do not have channels for debating and making decisions with the members of society. Political systems in Southeast Asia throughout the course of history have been oblivious to human security as emphasized by the ASEAN way. In such situations, there is little opportunity to review and reconsider the ASEAN way and to re-examine the political processes between the state and other interest and identity groups. Nevertheless, there are ongoing changes to review the main referent of security in the course of establishing an ASEAN Community that entails all aspects of cooperation, i.e. economic, political-security, and socio-cultural. ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan stated in his address at the ASEAN People’s Forum in February 2009, “... we [ASEAN and the people] have to go on a long journey together ...” It is a step forward, yet, further changes are necessary to develop a social mechanism to achieve human security. This kind of security is about the channels to bridge various identity and interest groups, including the state, in each society.

What steps are necessary for human security in Southeast Asia?

Collective political processes are necessary to achieve any kind of security. It is unrealistic to expect quick changes. The difficulty in realizing a people-oriented approach is apparent in Southeast Asia, where throughout history states have been dominant in almost all activities in both national and regional contexts. Further understanding and continuous effort to sustain positive transformation of systems, values, and thinking about human security will be necessary. As we see in the case of Vietnam, elements of human security exist within its security considerations without using the term 'human security'. Further awareness and recognition of human security may be witnessed in unique local contexts, each with its own terminology, in some parts of Southeast Asia.

The effort to develop a clear definition of human security is an on-going process in Southeast Asia. Various definitions have appeared which, while helpful, have not succeeded in clarifying the situation or offering a feasible explanation of the concept. This indicates how difficult it is to define the concept. In fact, Sadako Ogata, one of the co-chairs of the Commission on Human Security, stated that the term human security means everything and nothing at the same time (Ogata 1999 and 2001). The difficulty in defining human security and putting it into operation is understandable. The conception and applicability of human security rest largely on how well the notion is taken into local contexts and recognized by the members of a society, in order to find a fine balance between human and national security in both internal and external threat contexts. For this reason, there will be no universal single method or strategy to achieve human security.

For many countries in Southeast Asia, human security implies revising existing state-dominance in all aspects of governing. It will necessitate a fundamental reordering of both the relationship between state and society and that among different identity and interest groups. In this context, one of the challenges, although less discussed, in achieving human security in Southeast Asia may be what Surichai Wangaeo, a political scientist at Chulalongkorn University, calls a 'value crisis', in which the members of society, including the state and civil society groups, succumb to selfish interests and fail to consider the most fundamental issue in our life: how to live together as 'human beings'.⁴ Surichai points out the problem that exists in each person who cannot consider security of others in living together in a society. Human security must be the most fundamental issue for human beings, which should take precedence over any other issue. However, in many situations, the individuals as well as the state tend to overlook this basic consideration in the face of selfish interests. As Michael Walzer rightly pointed out, civil society often becomes a 'realm of conflict' whereby inequalities between groups are reinforced as opposing interests compete for recognition and resources (Walzer 2002: 39).

This consideration suggests that human security is about the society one belongs to and the quality of the society is determined by the members of

society, both the state and the people alike, who are responsible for it. Human security, then, depends not only on the quality of the state but also the quality of the members – whether or not the members of the society are concerned with the security of individuals and act to achieve it. Each person must recognize the security of others, as well as own security, in the society he/she belongs to, which enable the members of the society to prevent, react, and seek for help, when necessary, to handle emerging or actual security threats. While the quality of the state has a significant and determining effect in achieving human security, the quality of the members is equally important when finding ways of changing unjust social structures and maintaining positive changes.

If this is the case, then the 2007 demonstration led by Buddhist monks in Yangon was the effort by people who recognized the conditions of others and felt joint responsibility for their security. We witnessed comprehensive solidarity of the people in Myanmar who attempted to establish a structure of internal politics that would eventually contribute to ‘security’ in their society. The use of force by the military junta against the peaceful demonstrators would have offered sufficient justifications for ASEAN to support the peaceful demonstrators’ effort. Such support would not have been considered either political or humanitarian ‘intervention’. It would have been support for all members of the society in Myanmar, both the state and the people, in order for them to recognize the security of the people and review the rights and duties of all actors in the society. It would have been consistent with ASEAN’s emphasis on ‘one caring and sharing society’ and ‘people-oriented’ ASEAN and it could be the new ASEAN way that supports ‘people-oriented’ values.

Critics of human security claim that the concept has limited usefulness because of its inapplicability; it is impossible to deal with all the issues that it encompasses because there are too many of them. However, security threats to individuals are multiple. Human security considerations remind us of the complex contexts that affect security in a society in the contemporary world. In Southeast Asia, the existing order of the relationships among the members of society is clearly depicted in the ASEAN way. The dominance of states in the relationships therefore needs to be reviewed. This will be the prerequisite to achieve human security in Southeast Asia. Despite the growing emphasis on a people-centred approach, ASEAN’s efforts still lack the wide popular participation that a people-oriented approach requires. This deficiency appears to be a serious drawback for the attainment of security in the region and the achievement of people-oriented values in ASEAN. A human security approach with wide popular participation may be a necessary tool, first of all, to review the ASEAN way itself. However, while a revision addressing the quality of the state is a critical step in the attempt to achieve human security in Southeast Asia, it is not sufficient in itself. Achieving security in a society also requires addressing the quality of the society’s members. The members are supposed to acknowledge the security of individuals and actually take responsibility for it. They must take action when they recognize threats to

human security, point out the threat, and together with other members of the society, find ways to improve the situation. The recognition of human security and actual effort by the members of the society are important when changing problematic social conditions (systems and structure) in a society.

The utility of the human security concept in Southeast Asian societies in practice depends on whether or not the strategic focus of the effort to achieve it can go beyond the existing framework. The operational focus needs to include not only protection and empowerment schemes but also strategies to bridge the gaps between various identity and interest groups in general and the one between the state and the people in particular. Such strategies enhance the opportunities for the members to cooperate in countering any kind of threat as part of their responsibility. People of this quality will then turn a crisis situation into an opportunity and the society will be resistant to any kind of threat. It is here, that security can be sustainably granted and a community of ASEAN people not distracted by self-interests can emerge. The future of the on-going effort to achieve an ASEAN Community and a people-oriented ASEAN, in this sense, depends on every person in Southeast Asia and their aspiration for human security. In this way human security will continue to be relevant and vital in Southeast Asia.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 For example, at the Millennium Summit of 2000, former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan declared the need to promote human security. The adoption of a human security concept was proposed by the *Barcelona Report of the Study Group on European Security Capabilities* to European Union High Representatives for Common Foreign and Security Policy on 15 September 2004. See, the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities (2004a and 2004b). The UN Economic Commission for Africa expressed its support initiatives enhancing human security. See, Dzimba (2001). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Programme of Action proposed the adoption of a 'new approach to security' in 1993, which emphasizes the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security. See, SADC (1993). The countries that have introduced human security in their policies include Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Japan.
- 2 Mack, in reference to the definition suggested by the Uppsala/PRIOD dataset, counted only 'state-based' conflicts: armed disputes in which control over government and/or territory is contested, in which at least one of the warring parties is a state, and which result in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. The category, 'battle-related deaths', includes not only combatants but also civilians caught in the crossfire.
- 3 Statistics on wars and conflicts have been a subject of controversy because of disagreements on starting and ending years, the number of deaths, distinctions between civilians and combatants, and also between battle-related and non-battle-related deaths (such as those caused by war-exacerbated diseases and epidemics). These varying points are often subjectively defined by different authors or sources of data. Yet, rough estimates are available on some of the major wars and conflicts in history. The numbers cited here are some of the examples. The author does not support a particular source or suggest the particular numbers cited here. Although statistics are cited here, it is beyond the focus of this book to discuss the validity of data on wars and conflicts. The estimated casualties in these cases are: 33–36,000,000 in the An Shi Rebellion, 20,000,000 in the Taiping Rebellion, 304,000 in the Great Paraguayan War, and 800,000 in the Russian Civil War. For the data on the An Shi Rebellion, see Sorokin (1967). For the number of casualties in the Taiping Rebellion, see, *Britannica Concise*, available online: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/580815/Taiping-Rebellion> (accessed 30 October 2008). For the data on the Russian Civil War, see, Mawdsley (2008). The numbers cited here are cross-referenced with the following source: <http://www.onwar.com> (accessed 30 October 2008). The source offers the starting

- and ending years of wars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries together with death tolls in combat and related losses.
- 4 Data on most wars and conflicts do not allow for distinctions between civilian and combatant deaths to be made consistently and thus have been a subject of controversy. However, there are some statistics that attempt to estimate battle-related and non-battle-related deaths. According to Mawdsley, it is estimated that in the Russian Civil War around 800,000 people were killed in action, whereas around 8,000,000 people were killed by disease. See Mawdsley (2008).
 - 5 Available online: <http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/cl800s/yr50/ftaiping1851.htm> (accessed 31 October 2008).
 - 6 Available online: <http://www.onwar.com> (accessed 31 October 2008).
 - 7 Wyatt-Brown (2006) for example provides example acts of humiliation in various wars and conflicts.
 - 8 The Great Irish Famine (1846–49), the Bengal Famine in India (1943), and the famine in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph Stalin are referred to as ‘man-made’. See Scholastic Library Publishing (2006).
 - 9 The world’s worst natural disasters are seen in the article: ‘The world’s worst natural disasters’, CBCnews.ca, 13 May 2008. Available online: <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/05/08/f-natural-disasters-history.html> (accessed 30 October 2008).
 - 10 See the Complete Education Resource Centre (n.d.). In the following data source, the same civil war is said to have been ‘almost bloodless’. Available online: <http://www.onwar.com> (accessed 31 October 2008).
 - 11 In the UN Report (2004), population growth is illustrated since 1750 and estimated up to 2150. The population in the report is as follows; 791 million in 1750, 978 million in 1800, 1,262 million in 1850, 1,650 million in 1900, 2,521 million in 1950, 5,978 million in 1999, 8,909 million in 2050, and 9,746 million in 2150. See, UN (2004).
 - 12 Globalization here means ‘a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power’. Cited from Held *et al.* (1999) p. 16.
 - 13 The name of the country Myanmar/Burma is still controversial. However, this book uses the official English name for the country, the Union of Myanmar (hereafter simply Myanmar), as applied by the UN and most governments other than those of the United States (US), Canada, and some countries in Europe. This is neither a political statement nor a judgement on the right of the military rulers to change the name.
 - 14 In this book, the term ‘Southeast Asia’ is employed to mean ten countries that are the current members of the ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Timor Leste, currently an observer in ASEAN, is not included in the discussion in this book. Throughout this book, the names of the country commonly used in ASEAN documents are employed rather than their official names.
 - 15 This is in comparison with the other 15 regional blocs, including the African Union (AU), Central American Common Market (CACM), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), European Union (EU), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Pacific Islands Forum (PARTA), South Asian

- Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Union of South American Nations (Unasur).
- 16 The population number is the total of the ten ASEAN member countries as of July 2007. The number is based on the database released by ASEAN. The database is available online: <http://www.aseansec.org/13100.html> (accessed 15 July 2008).
 - 17 The 2007 Leaders' Declaration was issued during the fifteenth APEC economic leaders' meeting, entitled '*Strengthening Our Community, Building a Sustainable Future*' held in Sydney, Australia on 9 September 2007. The full declaration is available online: http://www.apec.org/content/apec/leaders_declarations/2007.html (accessed 5 August 2008).
 - 18 Comments and opinions obtained through interviews and personal communiqué are anonymously referred to in this book as requested by interviewees and other individuals.

1 Human security: a new label for old challenges?

- 1 Although it is not exclusive, realism most explicitly expresses this view. Realism, also known as political realism, in the context of international relations, encompasses a variety of theories and approaches, all of which share an idea that states are primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security, rather than ideals or ethics.
- 2 The Concert of Europe, also known as the 'Congress System', was the result of a custom, following the era of Napoleon and the French Revolution, adopted by the old great powers of Europe of meeting from time to time in an International Conference, or Congress, in order to plan a solution by mutual agreement, whenever some problems arose that threatened peace between European nations.
- 3 The Congress of Vienna was a conference of ambassadors of European states held in Vienna. It aimed at redrawing the continent's political map and settling the many other issues arising from the French Revolutionary Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. See, Peterson (1945) p. 544.
- 4 The Rhine Commission, based in Strasbourg, functions to encourage European prosperity by guaranteeing a high level of security for navigation of the Rhine. The Commission's authority comes from agreements made at the Congress of Vienna. See, O'Brien (2000) p. 59. O'Brien argues that "arguably the first attempt to allocate political authority in a tiered regime comprising sovereign states and an intergovernmental body dates to the creation of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine in 1815".
- 5 The three generations of rights law, have been formalized, for example, in the 1945 United Nations Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1993 Vienna Declarations, and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
- 6 This claim is often perceived in the contemporary debate on terrorism. This is featured in the debate on human rights and anti-terrorism measures in the UK. The UK government has suggested that human rights laws undermine national security: in relation to the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCAS) 2001. See, Cameron (2006). See also House of Lords judgment, *A and other v. SSHD*, 16.12.04 commenting upon the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCAS) 2001. The debate is compiled in the following report. House of Lords, House of Commons and Joint Committee on Human Rights (2004) *Review of Counter Terrorism Power: Eighteenth Report of Session 2003-4*, HL Paper 158, HC 713, London: House of Lords and House of Commons, The Stationery Office Limited.

- 7 IHL attempts to protect people who are no longer participants in the hostilities in wartime. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 are the principle instruments of humanitarian law.
- 8 The two tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
- 9 UN Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/6) on 15 March 2002. Online. Available HTTP: ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/288/93/IMG/N0228893.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 2 March 2007)
- 10 The *aide memoire* states that 'most frequently civilians are caught in circumstances of dire need where a peacekeeping operation has not been established. Such situations may require the urgent attention by the Council'. It includes several areas for consideration, such as access to vulnerable people, separation of civilians and armed elements, justice and reconciliation, law and order, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation, small arms and mine action, effects on women and children, and others. See UN Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/6).
- 11 There are many UN General Assembly resolutions. They include A/RES/54/164 and A/RES/48/122. In the resolution, A/RES/48/122, the General Assembly expressed its view that it was 'seriously concerned at the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by terrorist groups'. The resolution 'unequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, as activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening the territorial integrity and security of State, destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, undermining pluralistic civil society and having adverse consequences on the economic and social development of States'. See, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r122.htm> (accessed 3 August 2007).
- 12 Gore argues this in contrast to the approach characterized in the Washington Consensus, which focuses on the promotion of the gross domestic products (GDP) growth and a top-down approach.
- 13 By the same token, it is described that more than ninety per cent of conflicts that occurred between 1999 and 2000 were in developing countries. See, <http://www.isanet.org/archive/npg.html> (accessed 3 March 2008). For more details regarding armed conflicts during the 1990s, see, Wallesteen and Margareta (2000).
- 14 For example, Human Development Network *et al.* argues that '... average income (or equivalently average expenditure) does not by itself predict the incidence of armed conflict'. The manner by which incomes affect the occurrence of armed conflict is a complex one and reflects the interaction of ideology, organization, and real grievances'. See Human Development Network *et al.* (2005) p. 29.
- 15 Edward Azar, for example, states, 'most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs'. See Azar (1990), p. 10. Ramsbotham raises human rights abuse by governments in explaining the contexts of humanitarian intervention in 1990–95 and highlights especially over-weak governments. See Ramsbotham (1997) p. 445.
- 16 Critical security studies consists of alternatives for security studies to that offered by the mainstream. It is explicit in its rejection of realism but it does not add up to an alternative theory. There are variations of critical security studies. For example, the work of Keith Krause and Michael Williams questions the focus of traditional security studies on the state, and re-examines prevailing claims about security. Alternatively, the Welsh School focuses on the goal of human emancipation. It considers that emancipation should logically be given precedence in our thinking about security over the mainstream themes of power and order. For

- more details about critical security studies, see, for example, Krause (1998); Krause and Williams (eds) (1997); Booth (1991); Ayoob (1995); Linklater (1990); and W. Jones (1995). The Copenhagen School has also asked some similar questions. The focus of the Copenhagen School is 'securitization' studies, which aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and under what conditions (i.e. what explains successful securitization). Buzan added political, economic, societal and ecological security sectors and labelled the individual as the 'irreducible base unit' in any discussion about security. However, for Buzan, individuals could not be the referent object for the analysis of international security, which has to be the state for three reasons: it is the state that had to cope with the sub-state, state, international security problematic; the state is the primary agent for the alleviation of insecurity; and the state was the dominant actor in the international political system. In a series of publications, Buzan developed the notion of 'societal security' as the most effective way of understanding the emerging security agenda in post-Cold War Europe. For more details about the Copenhagen School, see, Buzan (1991).
- 17 Jan Aart Scholte explains globalization and its effects on states, such as transboundary pollution, migration, money transfers, communication, computer data flows and others. See, Scholte (1997) pp. 19–22. Tan and Boutin also have a similar view. See Tan and Boutin (2001) Chapter 1–3.
 - 18 The Peace treaties of Westphalia launched a states-system. It is a framework of governance, which provided a general way to formulate, implement, monitor and enforce social rules. At the core of this mode of governance stood the principles of statehood and sovereignty. This modern state was a centralized, formally organized public authority apparatus that enjoyed a legal monopoly over the means of armed violence in the area of its jurisdiction. The Westphalian state was sovereign, that is, it exercised comprehensive, supreme, unqualified, and exclusive control over its designated territorial domain.
 - 19 According to Thomas Hobbes and canonical theory, without society, we would live in a 'state of nature', where all of us will have unlimited natural freedom. In other words, anyone in the state of nature can do anything he likes, but this also means that anyone can do anything he likes to anyone else. To avoid this, free men by a social contract establish a political community, i.e. civil society in which each gains civil rights in return for subjecting to civil law or to political authority: a government.
 - 20 Social contract theory, nearly as old as philosophy itself, is the view that a person's moral and/or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement between them to form society. There are variations of social contract theories. The philosophers who developed the theories include, Socrates, Thomas Hobbes, John Lock, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Rawls, and David Gauthier. For more details on social contract, see, for example, Gauthier (1986), Hampton (1986), Kavka (1986), Rousseau (1987), and Rawls (1993).
 - 21 The transnational nature of threats is often discussed in globalization debates. See, for example, Tan and Boutin (2001) Chapter 1–3. The internal nature of threats is discussed in contemporary conflict trends. See, for example, Mack (2005).
 - 22 The process of integration is seen, for example, in Europe, whereas the process of fragmentation is seen in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
 - 23 In 1941, Roosevelt discussed the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of religion and worship, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear.
 - 24 According to Lee, Canada primarily criticized UNDP's definition.
 - 25 The UNDP outline was rejected at the Copenhagen Summit on Social Development in 1995, and was never used again by the UN. See, Lee (2004) p. 22).

- 26 The following article concisely illustrates the literature; Owen (2004), Lee (2004).
- 27 Thakur and Bajpai, for example, limit criteria in their broad definitions. Thakur included threats to those that present a crisis scenario, such as floods, famine and massive refugee flows. Bajpai includes only threats with identifiable human agents. See, Thakur (1997) and Bajpai (2000).
- 28 For example, Leaning and Arie, and Alkire employ such maximum human security conceptions. Leaning includes the social, psychological, political, and economic aspects of vulnerability. Alkire includes all critical and pervasive threats to the vital core consistent with long-term flourishing. See, Leaning and Arie (2000) and Alkire (2003).
- 29 Initially, Maslow categorized five levels of human needs. However, he later differentiated the need for self-actualization by adding two sublevels prior to true self-actualization (cognitive needs and aesthetic needs) and finally a level above self-actualization called self-transcendence. See, Maslow (1971; 1998).
- 30 Lodgaard's conception of human security is considered as too narrow by some.
- 31 For example, Suhkre introduces a 'human security regime' that is designed to protect categories of extremely vulnerable persons. See Suhkre (1999) pp. 273–75. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), for example, employs community empowerment programmes to further human security by targeting people at grass-roots level in developing countries for the betterment of their livelihood and welfare. See, JICA (2003).
- 32 For the approach by Switzerland, see, The Federal Department for Foreign Affairs (FDFA) (2008). For Norway, see, Obi (n.d.) and Petersen (2005). For Canada, see, Canada (2000). For Japan, see, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2005).
- 33 For example, at a news conference, UN ambassador of Japan, Oshima, implied the limit of Japan's human security policy as a diplomatic tool for enhancement of Japan's status in the international community. See, Sankei-Shinbun (2007).
- 34 Japan's *Diplomatic Bluebook* first introduced human security as a pillar of its foreign policy in 1999.
- 35 The Commission on Human Security is co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, who is now president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Noble laureate Amartya Sen. It states that "the objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment". Sadako Ogata was special representative of the prime minister on Afghanistan assistance. For more details about the Commission on Human Security, see, <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport> (accessed 14 July 2007).
- 36 The network was formally launched at a ministerial meeting in Norway in 1999. See, <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php> (accessed 12 August 2008).
- 37 See, <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php> (accessed 12 August 2008).
- 38 For more details about ICC, see, ICC (2002).
- 39 In 1999 alone, Japan's total overseas development assistance amounted to 15.385 billion US dollars. See JICA (n.d.).
- 40 Japan contributes the largest trust fund within the United Nations. The total amount of the contribution is 227 million US dollars.
- 41 For example, there are projects to cope with natural disasters in Central Vietnam. The projects aim at promoting 'human security and community resilience'. These projects are part of its promotion of human security because they attempt to reduce threats to people and empower people to sustain themselves. Information obtained through interview with a project formulation advisor of the JICA, Hanoi Office, in Vietnam (interview conducted on 21 August 2008). JICA is implementing projects as part of Japan's ODA.

- 42 JICA is chartered with assistance for economic and social growth in developing countries and the promotion of international cooperation. For more information about JICA, see, <http://www.jica.go.jp> (accessed 12 August 2008). JICA has set itself four major missions. Achieving human security is its fourth mission. For more details about JICA's mission see, <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/mission/> (accessed 12 August 2008).
- 43 This point was confirmed through an interview with a project formulation advisor of the JICA, Hanoi, Vietnam. (Interview conducted on 21 August 2008.)
- 44 Fukushima argues, "Cognizant of the criticism that Japanese discussions of human security are merely rhetorical, the notion has departed from its traditional approach to ODA and, under the new concept of consolidation of peace, has entered uncharted territory in providing assistance to conflict-ridden areas prior to the conclusion of a peace accord". See, Fukushima (2004).
- 45 Though not clearly stated, Japan offered large financial support in these occasions while conceiving security and threats in terms of human security. Japan also expanded its peace-building and peace-making diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Aceh and Mindanao).
- 46 There is information that Canada has undertaken a major human security programme both domestically and externally. However, the former is not well-known.
- 47 There are different discourses on the 'responsibility to protect'. The idea was first suggested by the ICISS in 2001.
- 48 The work of ICISS was mainly sponsored by the Canadian government as a response to the request by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to establish principles and processes for using coercive action to protect people in danger. See, ICISS (2002).
- 49 The idea is obviously connected with international crimes as defined in the Roma Statute of the ICC.
- 50 Gareth Evans is president of the International Crisis Group (ICG) and a former Australian Foreign Minister.
- 51 See, Annan (1999) and also Kofi Annan's statement to the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 24 April 2003.
- 52 The following book provides concrete explanation regarding humanitarian intervention with various case studies. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996).
- 53 For example, in the Millennium Report to the General Assembly in 2000, Kofi Annan stated the dilemma and addressed the challenge: '... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offered every precept of our common humanity?.'
- 54 Italics by author.
- 55 An interview comment with a project formulation advisor of the JICA, Hanoi, Vietnam. (Interview conducted on 21 August 2008.) Italics by author.
- 56 For example, Winslow and Eriksen look instead to the social and cultural contexts in which people experience insecurity and how this is dealt with through social institutions. Similarly, Hampson points out that vulnerability is both broad in nature and structurally dependent, and that if we are to mitigate human insecurity, we must address not only the threats, but also society's ability to counter them. Both Hampson and Winslow & Eriksen hint at Amartya Sen's 'capacity approach' to human security. See, Sen (1990) and Sen (1992).
- 57 The following book offers comprehensive explanations on contemporary conflicts; Ramsbotham *et al.* (2005).
- 58 For different approaches, the following book includes a brief review; Mertus and Helsing (eds) (2006).
- 59 Galtung also says, "cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel right, or at least not wrong". Galtung (1990) p. 291.

- 60 There are a number of conflict theories and it is not aimed at claiming that Azar's analysis explains all conflicts around the world, nor that he was alone in pointing to the significance of mobilized identities, exclusionist ideologies, fragile and authoritarian governance and disputed sovereignty as chief sources of major armed conflict. However, it offers a framework for the analysis of prevailing patterns of contemporary internal conflicts and their relevance to human security.
- 61 Azar links the disjunction between state and society in many parts of the world to a colonial legacy which artificially imposed European ideas of territorial statehood onto 'a multitude of communal groups' on the principle of 'divide and rule'. As a result, in many post-colonial multi-communal societies the state machinery comes to be "dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society", which "strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict". Azar (1990) p. 7.
- 62 Azar explains: "Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict". Azar (1990) p. 9.
- 63 Precisely, Azar links this to an equally broad understanding of 'development' and 'political access'. He states:

Reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying protracted conflict leads one to conclude that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term.

- 64 Azar explains: "In most protracted social conflict-laden countries, political capacity is limited by a rigid or fragile authority structure which prevents the state from responding to, and meeting, the needs of various constituents". Azar (1990) p. 10–11.

2 Human security in Southeast Asia at a turning point

- 1 According to Acharya, these countries include, Thailand (six wars), Democratic Republic of Vietnam (five wars), and Republic of Vietnam (four wars). See, Acharya (2007) p. 18. Unresolved inter-state conflicts in the region include: the Sabah dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia; border dispute between Thailand and Malaysia; claims over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea involving Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam; the territorial dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over Pulau Batu Putih; the boundary dispute between Indonesia and Vietnam on the demarcation line on the continental shelf in the South China Sea; Malaysia and Indonesia over Ambalat island in the Sulawesi sea; Vietnam and Cambodia over land and maritime areas; Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple on their disputed border; and Brunei and Vietnam over the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
- 2 Thailand and Cambodia exchanged diplomatic and physical fire over the disputed border in 2008. Thai and Cambodian soldiers have regularly confronted each other over the 900-year-old ruined temple of Preah Vihear on their disputed border. Since July 2008, the two countries have ranged hundreds of troops and artillery against one another. Troops from both countries again fought heavy gun battles in April 2009.
- 3 For the concepts of common and cooperative security, see, Dewitt (1994).

- 4 The entire document is available HTTP: <http://www.asean.org/1143.htm> (accessed 12 October 2007).
- 5 The Vision 2020 was adopted on 15 December 1997 at the 2nd Informal ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The financial crisis had erupted in July 1997.
- 6 The VAP was issued on 29 November 2004 for the Tenth ASEAN Summit.
- 7 ASEAN Security Community was later renamed as the 'ASEAN Political-Security Community'.
- 8 Chairperson's statement at the 12th ASEAN summit held in Cebu Philippines, titled "One Caring and Sharing Community" issued on 13 January 2007. The statement is available HTTP: <http://www.aseansec.org/19280.htm> (accessed 15 October 2007). The slogan is also introduced in the preamble of the ASEAN Charter.
- 9 Several scholars consider that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is an important trigger event for the change. These scholars include, Caballero-Anthony (2004) p. 169; Evans (2004) p. 269.
- 10 This was an occasion at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) Session on 28 July 1998 in the Philippines that the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan proposed to set up an ASEAN-PMC Caucus on Human Security.
- 11 World Health Organization (WHO) calculates the cost of SARS to the region to be US\$30 billion. See, WHO (2003).
- 12 Saywell and Fowler explain, air travel arrivals had dropped by half in the first week of April, retail sales dropped by almost 50 per cent in the same period, and hotel room occupancy rates have fallen by 10–20 per cent.
- 13 The number of estimated casualties in the Tsunami is available in Acharya (2007) pp. 32–34.
- 14 The EPG consisted primarily of retired governmental officials who cannot make decisions on behalf of ASEAN. However, it consisted of experienced figures, so that findings were likely to be influential. The members of EPG is available HTTP: <http://www.aseansec.org/ACP-Bio-EPG.pdf>(accessed 10 October 2007)
- 15 The declaration is available HTTP: <http://www.asean.org/19254.htm> (accessed 12 September 2007).
- 16 'Traditional security issues' here refer to issues related to the traditional military concept of security – the use and threat of using military force to secure. The term is used in contrast with 'non-traditional security issues' that entail a number of issues, which were not necessarily included in security agenda before, such as environment, food, and economy.
- 17 For further discussion, see, Thomas and Ron (2007).
- 18 In both academia and grass-roots, the idea of human security seems to receive applause, both aspects of human security: 'freedom from want' or 'freedom from fear'. NGOs and activists use the term in such contexts as the ASEAN People's Assembly (APA). For more detail about APA and human security, see, Caballero-Anthony (2004) pp. 178–83. For another instance, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, held a conference titled *Mainstreaming human security: the Asian contribution*, on 4–5 October 2007, where region's academics and researchers discussed on various issues related to human security. Also scholars gathered to launch the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the *International Conference on Preventing Mass Atrocities: Asian Perspectives on R2P*, organized by Chulalongkorn University on 20 February 2008 in Bangkok, Thailand.
- 19 From an interview with a scholar in Chulalongkorn University conducted in Bangkok on 28 August 2008.
- 20 HSN comprises of 12 member countries and one observer country. See, Human Security Centre (2005), available HTTP: <http://www.mfa.go.th/web/406.php> (accessed 2 March 2007).

- 21 Special address by Kantathi Suphamongkhon at HSN International Symposium on Building and Synergizing Partnership for Global Human Security and Development held on 31 May 2006 at Dusit Thani, Bangkok, Thailand. Available HTTP: <http://www.mfa.go.th/web/1839.php?id=16487> (accessed 10 December 2008).
- 22 See, 'Human rights promotion in Thailand' available HTTP: <http://www.mfa.go.th/web/24.php> (accessed 10 December 2007).
- 23 The Ministry's vision, mission and strategies are available at: <http://www.m-society.go.th/en/index.php> (accessed 14 November 2007).
- 24 From an interview with a scholar in Chulalongkorn University conducted in Bangkok on 28 August 2008.
- 25 From an interview with a scholar in Chulalongkorn University conducted in Bangkok on 28 August 2008.
- 26 The conference entitled the 2003 Year-End Conference on 'Human Security' was held in Chon Buri on 29–30 November 2003. The report of the conference is available HTTP: http://www.info.tdri.or.th/ye_03/YESumReport.pdf (accessed 14 November 2007).
- 27 Cited from the conference report.
- 28 Special address by Kantathi Suphamongkhon at HSN International Symposium on Building and Synergizing Partnership for Global Human Security and Development held on 31 May 2006 at Dusit Thani, Bangkok, Thailand. Available HTTP: <http://www.mfa.go.th/web/1839.php?id=16487> (accessed 10 December 2008).
- 29 From an interview with a scholar in Chulalongkorn University conducted in Bangkok on 28 August 2008. The ministries and agencies considered relevant to the situation in the South include the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defence, the Provincial Administration Department, the Ministry of Interior, the Royal Thai Police, and the Cabinet Secretariat.
- 30 Interview comments with scholars from three universities in the Philippines. Interviews conducted in May 2008.
- 31 Comments by a scholar and attorney from the University of San Agustin, Philippines. An interview conducted in Bangkok on 21 May 2008.
- 32 A discussion with a scholar and attorney from the University of San Agustin, Philippines in Bangkok on 21 May 2008.
- 33 The number of displaced people is estimated at 600,000 from August 2008. See, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), available HTTP: <http://www.internal-displacement.org> (accessed 12 October 2008). Human Rights Watch estimates the number of displaced people as 500,000. See, Human Rights Watch (2009) p. 301.
- 34 The Philippines enacted the Human Security Act of 2001. The House of the Representatives approved on the third reading House Bill No. 4839, otherwise known as the 'Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005' in April 2006. The Senate of the Philippines approved on the third reading Senate Bill No. 2137 otherwise known as the 'Human Security Act of 2007'. The entire act is available HTTP: http://www.senate.gov.ph/republic_acts/ra%209372.pdf (accessed 14 November 2007).
- 35 See, for example, the UK government's view. The UK government has suggested that human rights laws undermine national security, regarding the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCAS) 2001.
- 36 *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 18 July 2007.
- 37 See, Blancaflor, Ricardo 'Human Security Act: Anti-terror council rebuts FLAG claims', in the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 29 July 2007.
- 38 Anwar explains that although Jakarta does not as a rule fear conventional attacks from outside, the government is concerned about possible unfriendly activities in Indonesian waters from hostile foreign elements. These unfriendly

- activities can take various forms, such as smuggling, piracy, poaching from Indonesian fisheries and encroachment on the relatively untapped wealth of Indonesia's extensive territorial waters. See, Anwar (1999) p. 200.
- 39 Both Poso and Papua have seen periodic violence. In Papua, clashes between pro-independence supporters and government forces are reported periodically. If rising tensions are not effectively managed, further violence is predicted between Muslim and Christian communities. See, ICG (2008). In Poso, serious violence has had a ten-year history between Christian and Muslim. See ICG (2008a).
- 40 The emergency laws include; the Dutch-inherited Law on State of Emergency (known as 'UU SOB' – *De Regeling op de staat van Oorlog en Beled*) revoked in 1959; Law on the State of Emergency 1959 (*Perpu No.23/Prp/1959 tentang Keadaan Bahaya*) replacing the UU SOB and revoked during Habibie's government; and the Subversion Law (*Undang-Undang No.11/Pnps/1963 tentang Pemberantasan Tindakan Subversi*) revoked during Habibie's government.
- 41 The law was endorsed by the Indonesian House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, or DPR) on 28 September 2004 and became a public law on 19 October. The law also means that the existing social security programmes in Indonesia would be expanded to cover not only civil servants and private formal sector workers but would eventually cover all Indonesia citizens. The law mandates that within the next two to three decades social security coverage in Indonesia should be expanded to the informal sector, the unemployed and the poor.
- 42 See, ICG (2008a). See, also, Human Rights Watch (2009) p. 259.
- 43 This is the view expressed by Foreign Minister, Alwi Shihab, at the Non-aligned Summit in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2000. Available HTTP: http://www.indonesia.nl/database/200400_1.html (accessed 12 August 2007).
- 44 Key note address of Mahathir Mohamed at the first ISIS National Conference on Security in August 1986. Cited in *ISIS Focus*, p. 16.
- 45 Malaysia uses the Internal Security Act (ISA) to indefinitely detain, without charge or trial, individuals deemed by officials to threaten Malaysia's national security. The ISA was enacted under Article 149 of the Malaysian Constitution, which allows for a law so enacted to be legal even if it contravenes various other constitutional provisions that guarantee liberty of the subject under Article 5. For more explanation, see, Loh (2005) pp. 183–88.
- 46 See, paper presented by Johan Saravanamuttu at the 25th Anniversary Conference on Democracy and Human Security in Southeast Asia organized by the Institute of Security and International Studies, held in Bangkok on 27–28 October 2006. Available HTTP: <http://www.isisthailand.polsci.chula.ac.th/englishpubs.htm> (accessed 15 November 2008).
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 See, Saravanamuttu (2006) op.cit.
- 49 The plan targets, among others, better health, housing and urban services, and environmental stewardship. These are some aspects of human security. See, Economic Planning Unit (2006) Chapter 20–22.
- 50 According to the *Ninth Malaysia Plan* (2006), the overall poverty level in Malaysia in 2004 is 5.4 per cent and hardcore poverty is at 1.2 per cent. See, *ibid.* Chapter 16.
- 51 See, Tay (2006) op. cit.
- 52 According to Saravanamuttu, the most direct advocacy of the notion of human security has been by two NGOs in Malaysia; the Third World Network and the Consumer Association of Penang. The two organizations provided the national focal points for the Social Watch 2004 report on Malaysia entitled *Development at Any Cost*, which stresses the importance of having a human security agenda for Malaysia. See, Saravanamuttu (2006) op. cit.

- 53 In both Vietnam and Lao PDR, interviewees highlighted their traditional discourse. This was evident from an interview on 20 August 2008 in Hanoi and 19 October 2008 in Bangkok.
- 54 See, United Nations, *Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict*, Paris, 23 October 1991.
- 55 Pye-Smith states, in 1993, when the first multi-party elections were held, 47 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line; by 2004, the figure had fallen to 35 per cent. See, Pye-Smith (2008) p. 5.
- 56 From comments by a professor in the Faculty of Law, Hanoi National University: interviewed on 20 August 2008 in Hanoi. A similar comment was also provided by the director of the National Institute for Science and Technology Policy and Strategy Studies. Interviewed on 21 August 2008 in Hanoi. Also, a similar comment by Deputy Director General, ASEAN from Lao PDR in response to a questionnaire (1 December 2008).
- 57 This does not mean that the defence of territory is no longer Vietnam's security concern. It remains of concern, particularly in relation to the South China Sea and also in the sense that it has ongoing or unsettled disputes with neighbouring countries, which are mostly border and sea territories. Thus geopolitics still matters. See, Amar and Nguyen (2005).
- 58 Turley, by the same token, argues, "... Vietnam today is more secure from military attack and insurgency than at any time since the Vietnamese Communist Party began its armed struggle for power in 1941". See Turley (1996) p. 188.
- 59 It is reported that on 2 January 2009, Vietnam and China announced a consensus regarding the demarcation of the land border. It took almost 35 years since Hanoi and Beijing began discussing their boundaries and nearly a decade since the two signed a framework agreement on land border. The process of demarcating the entire inland frontier between the two states has now been officially completed. For more details, see the report by the BBC news, available HTTP: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7806991.stm> (accessed 7 January 2009).
- 60 Elliott express this situation as follows: "In the post-Cold War environment questions of identity are more important than ever, because now it is not Vietnam's body that is at risk, but its soul". See, Elliott (1999) p. 126.
- 61 See Communist Party of Vietnam (2006) p. 56 and Communist Party of Vietnam (2001) p. 27.
- 62 The Vietnamese government issued Decree 29/1998/ND-CP in May 1998 (the grassroots democracy decree), later amended by Decree 79/2003/ND-CP in July 2003, which is an effort aimed at reinforcing the rights of the people at the commune and village levels to participate in local government affairs. For more details on the decree, see, Duong (2004).
- 63 For more details concerning Vietnam's socio-economic development, see, Joint Donor Report to the Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting (2007) and The World Bank in Vietnam (2007).
- 64 Comment by a project formulation advisor of the JICA. (Interview conducted on 21 August, 2008.)
- 65 From an interview comment by a scholar in a national university in Hanoi. (Interview conducted on 20 August 2008 in Hanoi.)
- 66 Comment by a scholar of a national university in Vietnam. (Interview conducted on 20 August 2008 in Hanoi.)
- 67 Comments obtained through a questionnaire (October 2008). He has responded to the questionnaire in his personal capacity.
- 68 From comments in a questionnaire (October 2008).
- 69 Interviewees from Lao PDR, Vietnam, and Thailand commonly raised this point.

- 70 The comment was cited earlier: “giving people more rights before they are well off and well educated will create chaos”. A comment in response to a questionnaire (October 2008).
- 71 A comment in response to a questionnaire (October 2008).
- 72 See, ‘ASEAN Charter leaked to media’, 12 November 2007, available online: http://morewhat.com/joomla/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1084 (accessed 12 December 2007).
- 73 A comment by a professor from Chulalongkorn University at the International Conference on Preventing Mass Atrocities: Asian Perspectives on R2P, organized by Chulalongkorn University on 20 February 2008 in Bangkok, Thailand.
- 74 For more details regarding the ASEAN way, see, Capie and Evans (2002) pp. 14–27; Levine (ed.) (2007).
- 75 See, comments by a government official from Lao PDR introduced earlier.

3 Domestic challenges to human security

- 1 Insurgencies, terrorism, and political violence are not merely internal security threats. They are, in fact, regional concerns given the fact that their impacts on regional security are evidently large due to both actual and potential refugee flows, arms circulation, and spill-over. However, the analysis in this chapter is limited within national contexts.
- 2 Although some may consider the cases of conflict referred to in this chapter to be ‘insurgencies’ or ‘armed resistance’ rather than ‘internal conflicts’, the author considers that there is a conflict behind all insurgencies and armed resistance. Thus, the term ‘internal conflict’ is a broader term than insurgency or armed resistance that involves elements of insurgency and armed resistance.
- 3 See, Yale University Cambodian Genocide Program. Available HTTP: <http://www.yale.edu/cgp/> (accessed 2 March 2006).
- 4 One-side violence is usually distinguished from armed conflicts because it involves the slaughter of defenceless civilians rather than combatants.
- 5 A country can be involved in two or more conflicts in a given year. Thus the circulation counts more than one conflict-year for each calendar year.
- 6 The current spelling of ‘Pattani’ (with two ‘t’s) is the transliteration of the Thai name for the province. ‘Patani’ with one ‘t’ is the Malay spelling.
- 7 For details concerning the origins of the conflict, see, Harish (2006) pp. 50–54. Also, for the history of Southern Thailand, the following works are helpful: Farouk (1984); Ibrahim (1985); Haemindra (1976) and also (1977).
- 8 The language is called ‘Jawi’ by Thais.
- 9 However, there are many Muslims throughout Thailand, covering the regions of the deep South (Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani), the upper South (Nakhon Si Thammarat, Songkhla, Phuket, Krabi, Phangnga, Ranong, Trang, and Satun), the central plains (Bangkok, Ayutthaya and others), the North (Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, and the Northeast (Khon Kaen, Kalasin, Sakon Nakhon, and Ubon Thani). Imtiyaz Yusuf conducted a survey on Islam in Thailand, which offers an in-depth analysis on Muslim religious and cultural traditions in Thailand. See, Yusuf (2007).
- 10 However, according to Harish, Phibul did not seek to religiously convert the Malays to Buddhism. See, Harish (2006), p. 52.
- 11 The name of Thailand was officially introduced in 1939. It was renamed Siam from 1945 to 1949. It was again renamed Thailand.
- 12 Charnvit explains in an interview that Siam was renamed as Thailand in the spur of the moment when Phibul’s government was taking sides with the Axis forces during the early years of World War II. Influenced by ultra-nationalism in Europe and Japan, military authoritarianism was considered necessary in times

- of war. The government at the time believed Siam was a place where inhabitants were a mixed-up bunch of different ethnic groups who might not have been governed very easily in times of war. Accordingly, for fear that the country may be disintegrated, the strong nationalist policy was implemented. In this context, according to Charnvit, some people in Thailand looked down upon others with racial or ethnic biases. Charnvit also commented that in the old Siam, the people had co-existed and spontaneously welcomed diversities. See, Tumcharoen (2009).
- 13 The original leaders of the BNPP were mostly members of the traditional Patani Malay elite, and religious functionaries like the *ulemas* and *imams* of mosques and madrasas in the region.
 - 14 The objectives of these groups were to establish an independent Islamic state in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. These groups, however, have different ideological orientation and did not foster any unity amongst themselves. See, May (1992) pp. 403–4. The BRN, formed in 1963, focused on political organization, particularly in religious schools, rather than on guerrilla activities. See, ICG (2006) p. 8. The PULO, emerged in 1968 and became the largest of the separatist movements. The PULO occupied the political middle ground between the BNPP and BRN. See ICG (2006) pp. 11–12
 - 15 In December 1975, Thai security forces killed five Pattani youths. See, Noor (2004).
 - 16 In March 2003, the Thai Prime Minister said: “Thailand and the US are allies. When the US requests help from us, we respond. It is a gesture of hospitality”. See, Ehrlich (2003).
 - 17 In early 2004, a large number of weapons were reported stolen from different locations in a well organized manner. In April, Muslims were suppressed by military personnel, leading to a number of deaths. In October, approximately 3,000 Muslims gathered in front of Takbai police station, and were subdued by the military. The incidence left 1,300 victims arrested and transported by military trucks to the holding centre in the next province. In the process, 79 people were reported dead due to crowdedness and lack of air. See, NRC (2006) pp. 43–44. During the year, a number of incidents were reported that were carried out by insurgents while many incidents, may have been carried out by authorities, politicians, investors and others.
 - 18 In Thailand, all laws are legislated in statutes or codes. At the statutory level, the laws in Thailand are divided into Code, Act, and Emergency Decree. Apart from the Code, Acts, and Emergency Decree, there are also laws promulgated by the *coup d'état* bodies. These laws were often named as a Revolutionary Decree, National Executive Order or the like, and most had the same hierarchy as those of the Acts.
 - 19 Comprised of 48 members, the NRC was appointed by the Royal Thai government, under Prime Minister’s Office Order No. 104/2548 of 28 March 2005, “to find a long-term solution to the problem, in order to bring about true reconciliation, peace and justice”. Its report was originally published in Thai. See, NRC (2006) p. 11.
 - 20 On 28 March 2005, the Prime Minister issued Prime Minister’s Office Order No. 104/2548 setting up the 48 member NRC.
 - 21 The term ‘Thaksin regime’ was coined to connote that the Thaksin government was composed of ministers from the business sector. As a result of business connections (privately owned media), the cabinet was said to have control over all government media. Moreover, civil society groups, including academics, demanded transparency from conflict of interest in large infrastructure projects.
 - 22 The report was originally published in Thai.
 - 23 For details regarding the decision by the Supreme Court, see ICG (2008b) pp. 11–13.

- 24 The term 'Moro' was first used by the Spanish who began colonizing the archipelago during the sixteenth century to designate the Muslim population of the islands.
- 25 The first known settlers were a batch of 50 people from Cebu who were provided initial capital, farm tools, and an assurance that they would eventually own the homesteads. See, Rodil (1994) p. 37.
- 26 For details regarding land situations, see, Gutierrez and Borrás (2004).
- 27 The Jabitah massacre, also known as the Corregidor massacre, is an incident which occurred on 18 March 1968. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) massacred at least 28 Moro Muslim recruits under their supervision.
- 28 Human Development Network *et al.* also notes that the MNLF was, and continue to be, recognized as "the sole legitimate representative of Muslims in Southern Philippines" by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). See, Human Development Network *et al.* (2005) pp. 67–70.
- 29 According to ICG, The MNLF central committee was based in Libya from 1974–75 and Libyan weapons supplies were smuggled through the eastern Malaysian state of Sabah until late 1975.
- 30 The full Toripoli Agreement is available HTTP: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/philippines/tripoli_12231976.html (accessed 2 February 2009).
- 31 Dhillon explains the shift partly was attributable to the global resurgence of Islam during the 1980s and local demands. According to Dhillon, the MILF drew inspiration from Islamic ideology. See, Dhillon (2006) p. 168.
- 32 Until 1997, the MILF shied away in order not to complicate the government negotiations with the MNLF. In December 1993, Salamat Hashim (MILF) issued a statement that "the MILF is maintaining a consistent policy towards the peace process. We will reject any attempt by the Philippine government to open separate negotiations with the MILF unless the government and MNLF talk is finally concluded". See, Lingga (2006) p. 154.
- 33 The Moros have benefited from the support of the Organization of Islamic Conferences, and have maintained close relations with Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia. According to Schiavo-Campo and Judd, however, MILF relations with the small terrorist (and largely criminal) group Abu Sayyaf and the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah have been sporadic and loose, and in the context of the on-going peace discussions the MILF has distanced itself completely from those organizations. See, Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2005) p. 2.
- 34 For example, Douglas Wilson contends that "the fragmentation of the centralized state and the resulting rivalry between groups seeking economic and political power at the national level, and control over resources at the local level have both been central factors" in the proliferation of violence. See, Wilson (2006) p. 266.
- 35 For more information regarding the conflict in West Kalimantan, see the following site: <http://american.edu/TED/ice/kaliman.htm> (accessed 12 January 2009).
- 36 Nordholt also points out the historical roots of violence in Indonesia. He looks at the use of violence by the colonial government and the legacy. See, Nordholt (2002).
- 37 For the transmigration policy and its impact, see, World Bank (1994a and 1994b).
- 38 Information about transmigration in each province in Indonesia is available in the following report. See, Bilborrow (1992) p. 40.
- 39 See, <http://american.edu/TED/ice/kaliman.htm> (accessed 12 January 2009).
- 40 See, <http://american.edu/TED/ice/kaliman.htm> (accessed 12 January 2009).
- 41 Here, direct and non-direct violence means what Johan Galtung explained in his work: Galtung (1990). Non-direct violence includes both 'structural' and 'cultural' violence in his idea of violence.

- 42 A survey conducted by the College of Islamic Studies, Prince Songkla University and Yala Islamic College, with the Office of the Permanent Security, Ministry of Interior. Report on 'The Real Needs of People in the 3 southern Border Provinces' (2005). The survey obtained comments and opinions from 2,730 people in southern Thailand.
- 43 It was expected that for several years the migrants would mostly grow subsistence crops, and then expand their production and cash incomes in later years. See, Bilsborrow (1992) p. 34.
- 44 See, <http://american.edu/TED/ice/kaliman.htm> (accessed 12 January 2009).
- 45 The acceleration of the assimilation policy was made during King Chulalongkorn's reign during which there was an increasing threat from the British in Malaya.
- 46 The model of administration aimed at centralized control over a limited set of administrative task.
- 47 The migration policy began in 1905, and by 1930 around 100,000 people had moved to other islands; 600,000 people were relocated to plantations in Java for labour needs. In 1979–84, a more ambitious programme costing US\$2.3 billion moved 1.5 million people. In the most recent 1984–89 plan, a goal of 3.1 million were to be relocated but due to budgetary restrictions only 150,000 families have moved. The main social issue addresses the domination of other people by Javanese, not only in numbers but also cultural differences. Some observers say the real reason for migration is political in that it ensures the boundaries and geographic integrity of Indonesia. See, Maloney (1987).
- 48 During the 1950s and 1960s, the government brought Christian settlers to Mindanao as part of its policy of 'diluting' the Moro community. This reduced the proportion of Moro in regional population of Mindanao.
- 49 This section refers to comments by a speaker in the session on southern Thailand at the Summer Institute in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Asia Pacific Transitional Justice and Peace-building held in Bangkok on 11–24 May 2008.
- 50 Here the author does not deny the problem of resource availability. The lack of resource is an important factor in explaining violence in many developing countries. Yet, the author emphasizes that this initial hard condition is likely to lead towards conditions for violence as often distribution becomes unequal.
- 51 The 'communal content' of a state is characterized by multi-communal composition whose members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity characteristics.
- 52 This is a well-known phrase by Clausewitz in his work *On War* originally written in German. It was written mostly after the Napoleonic wars between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife in 1832. See, Clausewitz (2007).
- 53 A survey conducted by the College of Islamic Studies, Prince Songkla University and Yala Islamic College, with the Office of the Permanent Security, Ministry of Interior. Report on 'The Real Needs of People in the 3 southern Border Provinces' (2005). The survey obtained comments and opinions from 2,730 people in southern Thailand.
- 54 For example, John Gershman has emphasized the problems facing attempts to solve terrorism in Southeast Asia by military methods owing to the nature of the underlying root-causes. See, Gershman (2002).
- 55 On 5 December 2006, *Matichon Daily* published three main movements as follows: Pro-Thaksin movements, anti-Thaksin movements, and anti-coup groups. The pro- and anti-government movements further affected following governments. Starting in May 2008, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) staged protests in Bangkok and other cities to express opposition to the government. The PAD accused the Samak and Somchai government of corruption, abuse of power, and being unpatriotic. Protestors blocked roads and traffic in Bangkok, in

- some cases for months at a time. Pro-government groups often violently attacked PAD rallies while police stood by. See Human Rights Watch (2009) p. 316.
- 56 The study shows the number of Javanese about 19 million in 1930 while 53 million in 2000. It is about 32–49 percentage points in 1930 and 26.30 percentage points in 2000.
- 57 Machiavelli believed that the ruler should be the sole authority determining every aspect of the people and he should put in effect a policy that would only serve his best interest. See, Machiavelli (1999). Rousseau, outlining the basis for a legitimate political order within a framework of classical republicanism, views that by joining together into civil society through the social contract and abandoning their claims of natural right, individuals can both preserve themselves and remain free. This is because submission to the authority of the general will of the people as a whole guarantees that individuals will not be subordinated to the wills of others and ensures that they behave themselves because they are, collectively, the authors of the law. See, Bertram (2003).
- 58 For example, ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’ have been increasingly used in development literature. Major donor organizations, such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, address the issue of ‘governance’ in their attempts to achieve sustainable human development. The definitions of governance used in these organizations vary – some of them include both ‘governance’ and ‘governing’ elements in the term ‘governance’. See, UNDP (n.d.); ADB (1995); Kaufman and Kraay (n.d.).
- 59 Jan Kooiman also provides useful definitions of ‘governance’ and ‘governing’. See Kooiman (2003).
- 60 Leslie, in reference to the work by Robert Dahl, argues that, in order to get to the end point, that is governance, “understanding how it works and the forces that shape the behaviour of those who govern give us the soundest analytical platform from which to begin”. This is because structures are simply a means to an end, and not an end in themselves. The fluidity of power and influence is as important as formal delegated authority, although formal delegated authority cannot be overlooked. How a governing process deals with the most fundamental differences which exist or emerge in societies is essential to any assessment of its effectiveness. See, Leslie (2003) p. 3.
- 61 S. Jones explains in this context that the communications revolution is a factor that has been very important, particularly with e-mail and cellular phones in Indonesia.
- 62 Giddens explains: “The potential for dialogic democracy is ... carried in the spread of social reflexivity as a condition both of day-to-day activities and the persistence of larger forms of collective organization. Second, dialogic democracy is not necessarily oriented to the achieving of consensus. Just as the theorists of deliberative democracy argue, the most ‘political’ of issues, inside and outside the formal political sphere, are precisely those which are likely to remain essentially contested. Dialogic democracy presumes only that dialogue in a public space provides a means of living along with the other in a relation of mutual tolerance – whether that ‘other’ be an individual or a global community of religious believers”. See, Giddens (1994) p. 115.

4 Regional challenges to human security

- 1 The Declaration is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/1030.htm> (accessed 10 March 2008).
- 2 Although there are numerous mentions on the issues relevant to human rights in ASEAN’s documents during the 1990s, no functional cooperation on human rights is recognized in ASEAN.

- 3 The Joint communiqué is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/956.htm> (accessed 20 March 2008).
- 4 The same view was expressed again in the Joint Communiqué of the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Manila in 1992. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/1167.htm> (accessed 20 March 2008).
- 5 See Sen (1997) p. 9.
- 6 Comment obtained from a member of the Working Group (Bangkok, May 2007).
- 7 For more details about Asian values, see, De Barry (2000).
- 8 Statement made at the meeting with the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (the Working Group) in September 2006.
- 9 This information was obtained from a conversation with a member of the Working Group.
- 10 In Europe, the Council of Europe is responsible for the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. In Africa, there is the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), which is a quasi-judicial organ of the African Union. The African Charter on Human and People's Rights is the region's principle human rights instrument. In the Americas, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is the inter-American system for the promotion and protection of human rights.
- 11 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action is available online. See, [http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument) (accessed 10 March 2006).
- 12 See, the Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 23–24 July 1993, para 16–18. The entire document is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/2009.htm> (accessed 10 March 2008).
- 13 The ASEAN Vision 2020 is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm> (accessed 10 March 2008).
- 14 ASEAN Vision 2020 for example states:

We see vibrant and open ASEAN societies consistent with their respective national identities, where all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural background ... We envision our nations being governed with the consent and greater participation of the people with its focus on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the good of the community.

- 15 For example, it includes the establishment of a centre for the exchange of human rights information within ASEAN.
- 16 It is reported that only about two-thirds of the activities in the Hanoi Plan of Action was accomplished as of 2004. See, OHRSD (2008) p. 4.
- 17 For example, the Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1993 states that “ASEAN should also *consider* the establishment of an appropriate regional human rights mechanism” (italics added). The Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. Available online: <http://www.aseansec.org/2009.htm> (accessed 10 March 2008).
- 18 The Declaration is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/19264.htm> (accessed 20 March 2008).
- 19 The statement of the establishment of the ASEAN Committee is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/20768.htm> (accessed 2 March 2009). The Committee is comprised of one senior representative from each of the ten ASEAN member-states and a representative from the ASEAN Secretariat.
- 20 A statement delivered by Tommy Koh at the 7th Workshop on ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism held in Singapore on 12–13 June 2008. The information is obtained from a member of the Working Group.

- 21 Comments obtained from a member of the Working Group.
- 22 This information was obtained from a member of the Working Group (May 2009).
- 23 The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) was established by parliament under the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999, Act 597. The Act was gazetted on 9 September 1999. The inaugural meeting of SUHAKAM was held on 24 April 2000. For more information on SUHAKAM, see, <http://www.suhakam.org.my/en/index.asp> (accessed 10 March 2008). The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Thailand was constituted in July 2001 under the Human Rights Protection Act of 1999. For more information on NHRC, see, <http://www.nhrc.or.th/index.php?lang=EN> (accessed 10 March 2008).
- 24 The Cambodian Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism and the government-run Cambodian Committee on Human Rights (CHRC) held a regional conference in December 2008 to establish Cambodia's national human rights institution.
- 25 The AICOHR is an annual platform organized by the national member of the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). It has held annual meetings since 1993. The AICOHR does not conclude or recommend what can or cannot be used for submission to the ASEAN. It has provided the initial venue for human rights defenders and government officials to meet and discuss about human rights.
- 26 The Working Group is a coalition of national working groups comprising representatives of government institutions, parliamentary human rights committees, national human rights institutions, the academics, and NGOs set up in 1995. It was formed in a loosely structured entity working on a voluntary basis. It convenes two events annually – the Workshop on ASEAN Regional Human Rights Mechanism (since 2001) and the Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN (since 2005). The Working Group holds meetings of the ASEAN senior officials in every ASEAN ministerial meeting. For more information on the Working Group, see, <http://www.aseanhrmech.org/> (accessed 1 April 2009).
- 27 The national human rights institutions (NHRIs) have set up their network and regularly meet in the ASEAN NHRIs Forum. Since its formation in 2007, four meetings have been held. While the 4th Consultative Meeting and Conference in Manila, Philippines was held in January 2008, its Technical Working Group (TWG) meeting was held in April 2008, which resulted in the terms of reference (TOR) for the ASEAN Human Rights Commission.
- 28 The SAPA is a network of Asian national and regional NGOs and people's organization operating at regional (and international) level. For more information on SAPA, see, <http://www.asiasapa.org> (accessed 1 April 2009).
- 29 This information was obtained from a member of the Working Groups (May 2008).
- 30 There are four National Human Rights Commissions in the region: the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The details of the workshop discussions are available on the website of the Working Group. See, <http://www.aseanhrmech.org/> (accessed 1 May 2008).
- 31 From a memo distributed at the ASEAN People's Forum at Chulalongkorn University on 21 February 2009.
- 32 From a memo distributed at the ASEAN People's Forum at Chulalongkorn University on 21 February 2009.
- 33 Such activities include workshops and roundtable discussion by the Working Group and regional orientation, consultation, and strategy meetings led by SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights. This information is obtained

- through a memo distributed at the ASEAN People's Forum held in Chulalongkorn University in February 2009.
- 34 See, the following article on ASEAN Summit; 'Treat us as partners: civil-society groups', *The Nation*, 1 March 2009.
 - 35 The highest decision-making organ is the ASEAN Summit and Informal Summit, where ASEAN leaders lay down the directions and initiatives of ASEAN. There are policy guideline organs: ASEAN Economic Ministers, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, and ASEAN Financial Ministers Meeting.
 - 36 From the summary of the proceedings. Eighth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, Bangkok, Thailand, 14–15 July 2009.
 - 37 However, this process was uneasy. The meeting was almost cancelled when Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein and his Cambodian counterpart Hun Sen expressed their view to refuse to attend if two prominent activists from Myanmar and Cambodia were allowed to be in the meeting. The two representatives from civil society groups, as a result, withdrew and met with the ASEAN chair – Abhisit Vejjajiva – separately.
 - 38 See, http://www.forum-asia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2121&Itemid=129 (accessed 1 April 2009).
 - 39 See, <http://www.siiainline.org/?q=programmes/insights/asean-human-rights-body-%E2%80%9Ctoothless%E2%80%9D-entity> (accessed 20 March 2009).
 - 40 The draft TOR is available online: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/12882981/Draft-of-ASEAN-Human-Right-Body> (accessed 4 May 2009).
 - 41 The High Level Panel (HLP) was set up during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in July 2008.
 - 42 The idea of track-one to three is well developed in conflict studies in discussing various efforts required to transform conflicts in different societal levels. For more description on the idea, see, for example, Ramsbotham *et al.* (2005) pp. 25–26.
 - 43 A comment by a scholar from Chulalongkorn University at the International Conference on Preventing Mass Atrocities: Asian Perspectives on R2P, organized by Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok on 20 February 2009.
 - 44 Comment obtained in Bangkok on 1 May 2009. The interviewee also commented that the only group that can be considered as a 'civil society' organization is the SAPA.
 - 45 The first draft of the TOR of an ASEAN Human Body is the outcome of eight meetings of the HLP that had been held since July 2008. During the eighth meeting on 13–14 February 2009 in Luang Prabang, Lao PDR, the HLP has completed the first draft of the TOR.
 - 46 The Commission was established at the ASEAN Summit in October 2009.
 - 47 Information obtained from a member of the Working Group (May 2009).
 - 48 See 'ASEAN human rights body: "Toothless" entity?' available online: <http://www.siiainline.org/?q=programmes/insights/asean-human-rights-body-%E2%80%9Ctoothless%E2%80%9D-entity> (accessed 20 March 2009).
 - 49 See, <http://maruahsg.wordpress.com/2009/03/24/mfa-reply-on-asean-human-rights-body> (accessed 30 April 2009).
 - 50 Statement delivered at the 7th Workshop on ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism held on 12–13 June 2008 in Singapore. Information obtained from a member of the Working Group (May 2009).
 - 51 The entire response from George Yeo is available online. See, <http://maruahsg.wordpress.com/2009/03/24/mfa-reply-on-asean-human-rights-body> (accessed 30 April 2009).
 - 52 From his statement delivered during the opening of the 7th Workshop on ASEAN Human Rights Mechanisms held on 12–13 June 2008 in Singapore. Information was obtained from a member of the Working Group.

- 53 These are questions raised at the discussion during the 14th ASEAN Summit (May 2009).
- 54 In the ASEAN Charter, the ‘ASEAN minus X’ formula is limited to economic matters. See Article 21, paragraph 2 of the ASEAN Charter.
- 55 See ‘Summary of Proceedings’, of the Eighth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights held in Bangkok, Thailand on 14–15 July 2009. Available HTTP: <http://www.aseanhrmech.org> (accessed 5 August 2009).
- 56 Kavi’s comment before the meeting between ASEAN leaders and civil society groups during the 14th ASEAN Summit in Thailand 2009. See, McDermid and Kaewsangthong (2009).
- 57 Comment obtained from an interview with a representative of a donor organization based in Bangkok. Interview conducted on 1 May 2009.
- 58 George Yeo’s comment in response to a parliamentary question concerning the ASEAN human rights body. See, <http://maruahsg.wordpress.com/2009/03/24/mfa-reply-on-asean-human-rights-body> (accessed 30 April 2009).
- 59 Part of the speech is available online. See, <http://www.apf2008.org/node/106> (accessed 20 March 2009).
- 60 The expression ‘a genuinely people-oriented community’ was used in the Chairman’s statement of the 14th ASEAN Summit in Thailand on 28 February–1 March 2009. The statement is available online: <http://www.aseansec.org/22328.htm> (accessed 15 March 2009).
- 61 ICG also states that “a civil war in Burma is now one of the longest running armed conflicts in the world”. See, ICG (2008c) p. 1.
- 62 For example, the 2007/2008 *Human Development Report* gives Myanmar a rank of 132 out of 177 countries measured by the human development index. See, UNDP (2007a) p. 236.
- 63 For more details about the demonstration in 2007, see, ICG (2008c).
- 64 Nargis struck Myanmar on 2 May 2008. The number of affected cited here is based on the data by the International Crisis Group. See ICG (2008d).
- 65 See Sternberger (1968) p. 244.
- 66 Kavi Chongkittavorn notes: “At that time, Rangoon said that it did not want to join ASEAN, which was seen as an imperialist organization given its policy of neutrality”. See, Chongkittavorn (1997) p. 23.
- 67 Different terms are used by different authors when explaining ASEAN’s engagement in the Myanmar issue. The term, ‘constructive engagement’ is now commonly recognized. For details on the relevant context on ‘constructive engagement’ and ‘flexible engagement’, see, Capie and Evans (2002) pp. 92–97.
- 68 Vietnam had done this before it joined ASEAN.
- 69 *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 26 August 1992, p. 27.
- 70 See, ‘Full marks for foreign policy’, *The Nation*, 18 March 1992, p. A6.
- 71 Guan also argues that China is the main supplier of Myanmar military. All weaponry and equipment used in Myanmar are from China. See, Guan (2001) p. 474.
- 72 According to Guan, one clear indication of the close ties between Myanmar and China was the granting of a newspaper permit in 1998 to publish the *Myanmar Morning Post* in Chinese. See, Guan (2001) p. 475.
- 73 Thailand has a problem with Myanmar over the trafficking of narcotics and the civil war between the Myanmar military and the Shan in eastern and southeast Myanmar, which borders Thailand.
- 74 For more information about the statement, see, the following news article, available online: ‘Thailand calls for “flexible engagement” in ASEAN’ 29 June 1998, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_1998_June_29/ai_50189293 (accessed 20 May 2007).
- 75 Ibid.

- 76 Surin discussed 'constructive engagement' in connection with the crisis in Bangkok, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines at the time in the economic crisis context. See, Pitsuwan (2008) p. 3.
- 77 See, 'Thailand and ASEAN sharpen their policy on Burma', *The Nation*, Opinion, 21 May 2009.
- 78 See, *Ibid.*
- 79 See, *Ibid.*
- 80 Vatikiotis states that ASEAN members' political interests tend to be rooted in a firm conviction in the strength of the state, and the subordination of society to the state. See, Vatikiotis (1996) p. 178.
- 81 The blueprint is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/22337.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2009).
- 82 See, the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime adopted in 1999. The entire document is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/16133.htm> (accessed 2 February 2009).
- 83 At the Fifth ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok in December 1995, ASEAN leaders decided that "ASEAN shall further enhance cooperative efforts against drug abuse and illicit trafficking with special emphasis being given to demand reducing programs and information exchange and dissemination, with the aim of creating a drug-free ASEAN".
- 84 *Ibid.*
- 85 See, for example, the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime issued on 20 December 1997 as a result of the first ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime held in Manila. The Declaration is available online: <http://www.aseansec.org/5640.htm> (accessed 2 March 2009).
- 86 For terrorism in these three countries, the following works are useful. Chalk *et al.* (2009) and Emmers (2007).
- 87 For more details on each issue, see, <http://www.aseansec.org/9733.htm> (accessed 10 March 2009). Also, ASEAN annual report 2002–2003 focuses on transnational issues in its Chapter 4. The report is available online: <http://www.aseansec.org/ar03.htm> (accessed 1 March 2009).
- 88 See, the statements issued at the 29th (1996), 30th (1997) and 31st (1998) ASEAN Ministerial Meetings. Available online: <http://www.asean.org>
- 89 The Declaration is available online: <http://www.aseansec.org/5640.htm> (accessed 10 March 2009).
- 90 For more details concerning the initiatives, see, <http://www.aseansec.org/5640.htm> (accessed 10 March 2009).
- 91 The Plan of Action is available online. <http://www.aseansec.org/5640.htm> (accessed 10 March 2009).
- 92 See, the ASEAN annual report 2002–3, Chapter 4.
- 93 *Ibid.* pp. 106–7.
- 94 *Ibid.* p. 107.
- 95 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, 5 November 2001. Available online: <http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm> (accessed 10 March 2009). Declaration on Terrorism by the Eighth ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, 3 November 2002. Available online: <http://www.aseansec.org/13154.htm> (accessed 10 March 2009).
- 96 See, the blueprint of the ASEAN Political-Security Community. Available online: <http://www.asean.org>
- 97 According to Mack, several Southeast Asian countries were near the top of the list of Asia-Pacific nations that fought the most 'international wars' between 1946 and 2003. Although the data include conflicts between Southeast Asian states and other countries outside the region, it includes a number of conflicts between the states within the region. See, Mack (2005) p. 26.

- 98 The expression is used in the blueprint in its section B.
- 99 The Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the TAC is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/3639.htm> (accessed 2 March 2009).
- 100 The entire agreement is available online. See, <http://www.aseansec.org/17346.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2009).
- 101 The Sabah dispute was a territorial wrangle between the Philippines and Malaysia over territory in the northern part of the island of Borneo. The Spratly Islands are a group of more than 600 reefs, islets, atolls, cays and islands in the South China Sea between the Philippines, China, Malaysia and Vietnam. The small islands are claimed or occupied by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The dispute is the result of overlapping sovereignty claims to various islands thought to possess substantial natural resources, including oil, natural gas and seafood.
- 102 See, http://khmernz.blogspot.com/2008_07_24_archive.html (accessed 1 March 2009).
- 103 According to Caballero-Anthony, Cambodia has agreed to use ASEAN, but Thailand has said no. See, CAAI News Media, July 2008. Available online: http://khmernz.blogspot.com/2008_07_24_archive.html (accessed 1 March 2009).
- 104 Thailand expressed its wish in response to the UN Security Council at the request of Cambodia. See, http://khmernz.blogspot.com/2008_07_24_archive.html (accessed 1 March 2009).

5 The ASEAN way and human security

- 1 Comment by a speaker at the *International Conference on Preventing Mass Atrocities: Asian Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect*, held at Four Seasons Hotel in Bangkok on 20 February 2008, co-organized by the Asia-Pacific Centre for R2P, Australia, the Institute for Global Policy, New York, and Chulalongkorn University, Thailand.
- 2 The critics include those by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). It dismisses claims of the ASEAN way or Asian way as 'ethnic chic'. See, Segal (1995) p. 107.
- 3 The explanation was made by former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. See, *The Straits Times*, 13 November 1994 (p. 17).
- 4 According to Henry, since 1976, the role of the Council of Ministers of the Economy grew since the signature of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). See, Henry (2007) p. 861.
- 5 Joseph H.H. Weiler explains this situation as supranationalism and explains two distinctive types of supranationalism. See, Weiler (1981).
- 6 From the statement made during the Eighth workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights held in Bangkok on 14–15 July 2009.
- 7 See, <http://www.ri.sch.edu.sg/d2d/aseanway/Review%20-%20CaseStudy3.html> (accessed 2 March 2009).
- 8 For example, comments by a scholar in Vietnam and government officials from Lao PDR introduced in Chapter 2.
- 9 For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), one of the leading promoters of human security, helped Thailand to set up a tsunami early warning system by providing training to Thai officials.
- 10 It was the time of conflict and disturbance during the 1970s in Southeast Asia, when the so-called *konfrontasi* between Indonesia and Malaysia and the crisis between Malaysia and the Philippines affect regional relations. Increasing political and security uncertainty during this time was advanced by Indonesia's political change and the flow of the Cold War. At the fundamental level, the Southeast Asia was divided into three: non-communist Southeast Asia,

communist Indochina, and isolated Burma. See Chongkittavorn (1997). During this time Southeast Asian states were all undertaking state-building. In order to achieve state-building, non-interference was preferred among the policymakers. See, Collins (2005) p. 128. Alan Collins, for example, argues that the ASEAN has provided a security function from the beginning but it was implicit. By the same token, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia stated that “you will agree with me that in its first 20 years, the main thrust of ASEAN has been political ... We should remember that it was political problems between us as neighbours that first brought us together”. This statement was made at the conference on ASEAN economic cooperation in 1987. See, Soviee *et al.* (1987).

11 See, Arendt (1970).

12 See, <http://www.brandt21forum.info>(accessed 21 March 2009).

13 See ‘Summary of Proceedings’, of the Eighth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights held in Bangkok, Thailand on 14–15 July 2009. Available HTTP: <http://www.aseanhrmech.org> (accessed 5 August 2009).

Conclusion

- 1 See Human Security Centre, Simon Fraser University. Available online: <http://www.humansecurityreport.info/content/view/24/59> (accessed 10 March 2008).
- 2 From the statement made in a workshop at the ASEAN People’s Forum held at Chulalongkorn University, 21 February 2009.
- 3 See, <http://www.brandt21forum.info> (accessed 21 March 2009).
- 4 From comments made by Surichai Wangaeo from Chulalongkorn University at the ASEAN’s People’s Forum held at Chulalongkorn University, 21 February 2009.

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