

# **Understanding the Process of Radicalization: A Case Study of Pakistani Madrasa Females**



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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

The escalation of global terrorism in the 21st century has precipitated the increased scrutiny of the Islamic community, with scholars suggesting that the concept of Jihad engenders extremist mentalities, culminating in violent radicalization. This study endeavors to undertake a rigorous, nuanced exploration of the multifaceted factors contributing to the radicalization of religious women in Pakistan, employing a gender-sensitive lens to elucidate the intricate interplay between the development of socio-religious identity, stigmatization arising from liberal sections of society, and the ensuing identity negotiation processes. The researcher posits that the enablers of radicalization operate in a complex interdependent manner, either sequentially or concurrently, necessitating the establishment of an intricate nexus between radicalization, in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation. Employing qualitative research methodologies, this scholarly investigation seeks to discern the extent to which social identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation act as driving forces that impel religiously affiliated Pakistani women towards radicalization. In an effort to gather comprehensive data, the researcher conducted extensive fieldwork, visiting a diverse array of religious institutions and engaging in in-depth interviews with affiliated women. The collected data was subsequently subjected to meticulous transcription, interpretation, and analysis, unveiling a complex tapestry of interconnected factors. The findings reveal that Pakistani women who embrace a religious identity and affiliate with religious institutions experience stigmatization from liberal segments of society, which engenders multifarious forms of discrimination, exclusion, and marginalization across social, educational, and economic domains. Consequently, religiously oriented women grapple with their stigmatized identity, selectively engaging with specific socio-religious environments that foster the adoption of explicit ideologies and threat perceptions, ultimately contributing to their radicalization. This heightened vulnerability renders them susceptible to recruitment by extremist organizations. In light of these findings, the researcher advocates for the implementation of inclusive mechanisms designed to facilitate social cohesion and understanding. By dismantling the stigma surrounding these women and fostering their active, efficacious participation within the societal milieu, it becomes possible to mitigate the factors that contribute to radicalization and promote a more inclusive approach.

**Keywords:** Radicalization, Gender, Stigma, Identity, Religion



## KEY TERMS

The key terms of this research are, gender, radicalization, social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation, this is why the elementary understanding of these terms is significant and in very beginning of this chapter, the researcher endeavors to introduce the reader with these terms so that the investigative study can be made easy to ponder over.

*A. Radicalization:* “radicalization is a dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict and violence, across individuals, groups, and mass publics” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

*B. Social Identity:* “Social identity is the part of the self that is defined by one’s group memberships. This concept describes the conditions under which social identity becomes *more* important than one’s identity as an individual. The theory also specifies the ways in which social identity can influence intergroup behavior” (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

*C. Social Stigma:* “It can be understood as disapproval of, or discrimination against, a person based on perceivable social characteristics. It can be related to culture, gender, race, intelligence and health” (Goffman, 1963).

*D. Identity Negotiation:* It refers to “the exchange of verbal and nonverbal messages between the two or more communicators in maintaining, threatening, or uplifting the various socio-cultural group-based or unique personal-based identity images of the other” (Toomey, 1993).

*E. Identity Construction:* “The shaping of a person’s values, beliefs, practices, discourses, and knowledge; influenced both by cultural systems and by individual actions” (Gee, 2000).

*F. Religious Identity:* Religious identity is a specific type of identity formation. Particularly, “it is the sense of group membership to a religion and the importance of this group membership as it pertains to one's self-concept” (Seul, 1999).

*G. Gender:* Either of the two sexes (male and female), especially when considered with reference to social and cultural differences rather than biological ones.

*H. Feminine:* Having qualities or an appearance traditionally associated with women.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

In late 2000 world, a huge literature has been produced on radicalization and has been argued that religion “Islam” is a source of radicalization. It has been discussed that not merely Muslim men hold radicalized thoughts but their counterpart has also radicalized mentality. This enquiry shines the light upon those sociological, psychological, and economic enablers that push or pull females belonging to religion to the rode of radicalization. Using gender dimensions, the researcher endeavors to explore and to explain the liaison between radicalization and identity prototypes by examining the case of Pakistani religious feminine spheres. Under the particular dissertation, it is overlooked that how from religious motivation to the rode of radicalization the women in Pakistani society travel.

To look over the complete project, the chapter is divided into two sections. Under first section an overview of the study is gone through. Part two discusses research inquiry and main argument, theory building, research design, scope of the study, research questions and objectives, and thesis outline.

### **1.1 A Complete Overview of the Investigative Learning**

This part of introduction highlights that how religious-oriented women in Pakistan travel from religious motivation to the involvement in the process of radicalization. Development of social identity on the bases of religion, stigmatization of religious identity, the process of identity negotiation, indicators of radicalization in Pakistani religious feminine segments, and specific drivers of radicalization that push or pull the religiously identified women to the path of radicalization in Pakistan are the key focus of this section.

#### *1.1.1 Journey from the Religious Motivation to the Engagement into Radicalization Process*

The inquirer asserts that to complete this journey multiple drivers work side by side or in a sequential way. At first, religious motivation helps the feminine segments to espouse religiosity and religious behaviors that further assists to construct socio-religious identity and

the process of us vs. them begins. Secondly, the constructed identity on the bases of religion faces stereotypical behaviors and stigmatization from the modern/liberal parts of society. Thirdly, the religiously identified women use different strategies to manage their stigma and negotiate with their identity. Fourthly, the consequences of stigma become visible and the interplay of power dynamics gets activated and social marginalization, exclusion, discrimination, and socio-economic inequalities are obvious. As a result, the stigmatized women adopt extremist ideologies, roles, and possess some threat perceptions from those to whom they consider the members of out-group (modern/liberals) and the process of radicalization accelerates. This process occasionally has the potential to provide the opportunity to the stigmatized and marginalized feminine spheres to be engaged in violence because the extremist organizations have the opportunity to take benefit of the situation and exploit the circumstances of these women.

#### *1.1.2 Activation of Social Identity: In-group Formation among Pakistani Feminine Segments*

The explicit study highlights that from the beginning in Pakistan, the Muslims have been divided into two groups: liberals and religious. This in-group and out-group formation at one hand, expanded the gap between religious elements and liberal Muslims because of the amity and enmity with west and at other hand, the seeds of hate and dislike have been cultivated for those to whom the religious Muslims considered the members of out-group (liberals) and in this way radicalization accelerated at a large scale in the country. The antagonism of identity between liberal and religious segments gave impact upon Pakistani females likewise.

They fell into two groups, liberal and religious. The liberal females were considered those who began to get modern education in schools, colleges, and universities but religious women were thought to be limited to religious education at home and in Madrasas. The difference between liberal and religiously affiliated women clearly became to be highlighted in dressing, haircut, way of talking, and way of interacting. The liberal women began to stigmatize the religiously identified females as “*Hijabian*”, “*Nakabian*”, “*Burka posh*”, “*Letter box*”, “*Daku*”, and “*Pardahdar Bibi*” (Bartkowski, 2000; Mahmood, 2019). This stigmatization filled the minds of religious women with the sentiments of hate and dislike for liberal/modern females and push them into specific social environment where they could get

self-confirmatory feedback regarding their explicit religious identity (to understand stigmatization and identity negotiation in detail, see chapter two). The liberal Muslim females emerged as confident and assertive because they had access to educational and economic institutions whereas, the women who adhered with their religious traditions, could not get exposure to survive in modern world due to gap between them and systematic institutional life. As a consequence, the religious-oriented women remained away from social, educational, economic, and political spheres.

Furthermore, modern/liberal segments gave negative effect on their life. They could not get economic, social, and political strength and in all fields of mainstream, they could not participate in the progress and development of modern society like liberal females. As an outcome, of their weakness (economically, socially, and politically) led them to radicalized behavior and in some cases they physically joined extremist organizations to improve their standard of life (Spencer, 2015; Windsor, 2020). This project by scrutinizing Pakistani religious feminine spheres, explores that why the religiously motivated females espoused extremist ideas and beliefs? Whether the religiously affiliated women negotiated with their religious identity due to stigmatization and whether this stigmatization and identity negotiation motivated them to indulge in radicalized activities at nonviolent and violent levels?

### *1.1.3 Pakistani Religious Women: Interplay of Identity Prototypes and Radicalization*

Under this piece of research, the researcher makes the argument that in-group and out-group formation occurred between the religious and liberal segments of Pakistani society. This in-group and out-group formation further gave impact upon the life of women and the liberal segments stigmatized the religious feminine sphere, the process of stigmatization led these women to identity negotiation and identity negotiation led to political backwardness, social weakness, educational recession, and economic feebleness. The consequence of all has been that the religious-oriented females get inclined towards radicalized behavior.

Although, all of them who are religious minded, do not participate in violent actions in extremist organizations but it will not be wide of the mark that these women have soft corner for Jihadist groups, they dislike the liberal Muslims, they hesitate to adopt liberal

values and norms, they do not make relation with those to whom they consider as liberal (Bakker and Saren, 2015; Khusnood, Et Al, 2020), and they remain contented in a particular social environment where they are not stigmatized and where they negotiate with their religious identity.

#### *1.1.4 Radicalization: Indicators in Pakistani Religiously Affiliated Females*

The process of stigmatization forces the religious-minded women specifically who are attach with Madrasas to negotiate with their religious identity and this negotiation binds them in the process of in-group formation and aftermath of all, they cannot get equal opportunities in all fields of life, ultimately, they engage in the process of radicalization same in the case of Pakistan (to understand radicalization in detail, read chapter two). There are the indicators that the process of radicalization in Pakistani women, is activated. It is the revealed fact that in 2007, the capital of Pakistan has been struck down by thousands of females, who were linked with a religious institution “Jamia-e-Hafsa.” These religiously stimulated females began to work as lady police force, who has the authority to arrest the people, involved in illegal activities. They kidnap police personnel, massage parlors employees, and also occupied of a government building (children library) with force (Davji, 2008). They threatened the government that if “Shariah” is not enforced in state of Pakistan, they would commit suicide attacks in every corner of the country (Davji, 2008; Rao and Zakar, 2021). They established their own court in which, their leaders Abd-ul-Aziz and Ghasi Abd-ul-Rashid used to give the decisions (Saini, 2009). In fact, these females became a severe threat for the government of that time until and unless through an army operation, the situation was controlled (Rasheed, 2016; Ahmad, et al, 2022). Though, the violent females since that incident did not demonstrate a huge strength but it is perceived that females have their existence in violent activities either directly or indirectly in the country (Bari, 2010; Shahab, 2022).

However, subsequent to the occurrence of “Jamia-e-Hafsa”, no case has been observed related to violent female activities at a large scale, but it is the precision that the females with radicalized thinking are involved in non-violent as well as violent actions with extremist groups in Pakistan (Daraz, et al, 2012; Muzaffar, 2021). These females are highly

motivated and are recruited by extremist organizations in the name of jihad. Like in 2007, Mullah Fazalullah in Swat gave a huge appeal to women to join and to help the cause of Jihad (Wagha, 2014; Lynn, 2020). They as sympathizer, spy, propagandist, lobbyist, facilitator, and trainer are working in the country (Naqvi & Riaz, 2015; Gul, 2018; Hanif, et al, 2021).

Surprisingly, the presence of female suicide bombers has also been noted in Pakistan while their potency is small (Okowita, 2017; Rao and Zakar, 2021). According to current data, eight out of 400 suicide attacks in the post 2001 era have been carried out by violent females in Peshawar and in D.I. Khan (Noor, 2011). In 2005 and respectively in 2010, the security forces arrested some female bombers, who were planning to commit suicide attacks in Swat and Dir district (Wilkey, 2014). These arrests revealed the fact that in Pakistan like Turkey, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and Palestine women suicide cells have been established (Noor, 2011). In June 2013, another wondering attack in Quetta was committed by a female, who targeted the bus of Sardar Bahadur Khan Women University, in which 14 female students were killed (Zafar, 2013). Recently in 2017, a young lady (medical student) named as Norin Laghari, confessed before military forces that she has been prepared for a suicide attack on a church (*Voanews*, April 17, 2017).

Although indicators related to violent activities of Pakistani females are obvious while nonviolent engagement of women in radicalized groups is also undeniable (Omar Asghar Khan Foundation, 2009; Pervez, 2020; Ahmed and Jafri, 2020). Like Al-Huda (Islamic educational institute for women) is developing extremist ideas among women increasingly (Ahmad, 2015). This religious educational institution offers different courses and programs in which women are learnt how to be a good Muslim who is above all other women. She holds a different identity and is more pious than other females (Basit, 2015; Bilal, et al, 2022). Penetration of such thoughts forces particularly young females to be radicalized. Although, these females do not participate in violent operations but they as sympathizers, radicalized teachers, mothers; daughters; and sisters. have their existence across the country. Under this piece of research, the nonviolent aspects of radicalization have been more concentrated because radicalization in most circumstances works nonviolently which leads to violent process (Borum, 2011), the females linked with Al-Huda, however, are not violent but they hold extremist ideas and beliefs which indicates that they are radicalized. The cases of

“Jamia-e-Hafsa”, Al-Huda, and individual case studies of those females who are inspired with ideology of Da’esh; took training; and participated in ground operations as Norin Laghari, makes the argument strong that Pakistani religiously motivated females are adopting extremist ideas and beliefs. The researcher claims in this particular study that radicalized behavior is more vibrant in those women who are attached with religious institutions [Madrasas] or religious groups than those females who are linked to modern institutional system in Pakistan, but the fact cannot be denied that the females students linked with modern institutions and identified them as religious have 0 percent extremist ideas and beliefs.

The researcher in this social inquiry meticulously evaluates that radicalization is amplifying among those Pakistani women who are attached with religious identity because of their marginalization, exclusion, socio-economic inequalities, and educational discrimination. Then the religiously identified females face stigma, they move in a specific social environment where they are penetrated with extremist ideologies, they are taught about the role of a woman in socialization of family, they are enlightened about threat perceptions regarding their Islamic identity from modern/liberal value system, and they are prepared to defend religion from those who are the advocators of liberal way of life. If the process of radicalization is continued in the country then necessarily, there is the existence of some drivers which are pushing or pulling these females towards radicalization. In the coming section, the motivational enablers in Pakistani religious feminine spheres are alluded (to study in detail about the drivers of radicalization, consult chapter two).

#### *1.1.5 Drivers of Radicalization in Pakistani Religiously Identified Women*

As a matter of fact, wherever in the world, radicalization is augmenting either in males or females, some drivers push or pull the people towards violent or nonviolent actions related to radicalization. Like in ‘Black Widows’ of Chechnya and ‘Freedom Birds’ of Sri Lanka, revenge provided energy to women to fight on ground. While Italian and German females engaged in violent actions to change political system (Cunningham, 2007). However, multiple factors of radicalization have been explained by the researchers and scholars and has been explored in chapter 2 (literature review), but the particular focus of this investigative

study is to identify those enablers which are activated in Pakistani religious-oriented females who are linked with religious institutions (Madrasas) or religious groups or simply adopt religious identity. Some of frequent factors are listed below to understand specific case study of Pakistani religious females.

If the case of the religiously motivated females in Pakistan is analyzed, it is found that behind the radicalized views of these females, some dynamics work. These dynamics can be explained as consequences of stigma. As social exclusion, marginalization, discrimination due to the stigmatized identity motivate them towards radicalization. Furthermore, socio-economic inequalities and lack of political opportunities push or pull these women to the process. The selective social environment, strong intimacy and specific religious gatherings are proved supplementary factors to develop extremist ideas and beliefs in these females. The concept of in-group and out-group also exaggerates the extremist ideas and beliefs among Pakistani religious-oriented females (like discussed in chapter 2, the camp of “Imam” [belief] or camp of “*kufar*” [disbelief]). The researcher shows the concerns that the extremist organizations can take advantage of stigmatized identity of religious-minded women of Pakistan. These organizations have the potential to exploit the situation of these females due to the enablers which affect them because of the concept of in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation. To understand and to scrutinize the key elements of this thesis, the next part of this introductory chapter concentrates.

## **1.2 The Key Elements of the Dissertation**

Under this part the investigator shines the light on research inquiry and main argument, theory building, scope of the study, research design, research questions, objective of the project, and thesis outline.

### *1.2.1 Research Inquiry and Main Argument*

Subsequent to 9/11 incident, an upsurge of terrorism apprehended the world and the phenomenon caught attention of researchers and scholars gigantically. From multiple angles the process of terrorism has been dug out. Most of literature has been produced against Islam by arguing that due to the concept of Jihad, Muslims are getting radicalized and Madrasas



(religious institutions) are giving the lesson to kill Non-Muslims (Non-believers) and Muslims (friends of Non-believers) (Bar, 2008). In late 2000 world, international media and scholarly writings began to link terrorism with Muslims they were stigmatized and stereotyped as ‘radicalized’, ‘extremist’, ‘fundamentalist’, ‘misogynists’, and ‘terrorists’. This process of stigmatization and in-group formation provided energy to the extremist views against modern/liberal value system in Muslim world. The Muslims themselves have been divided into two groups’ liberals and religious (Milton, 2013; Hanif, et al, 2021).

This division of us vs. them augmented the sentiments against those who were considered a threat for Muslim identity by the religious-oriented group (Duara, 2004), while at the other, the concept of Jihad was propagated deleteriously by West. As an aftermath, In-group formation activated in Muslim world and hate against West began to develop. The researcher claims in this exploratory work that the process of in-group formation and out-group also gave effect upon the females of Muslim society.

They were divided ‘us and them’ as well. The women who were flexible in adopting Western/modern values and had access to modern institutional system, were considered as liberal/modern while who were rigid in following their religious/cultural norms and values and moreover, if linked with Madrasas, were thought as religious. The particular study makes the case here that the women linked with Madrasas or any religious group or simply have religious mentality and outlook, they due to their specific identity faced stigmatization as “*Hijabian*”, “*Nakabian*”, “*Burka posh*”, “*Letter box*”, “*Daku*”, and “*Pardahdar bibi*” not only from non-Muslims but also from liberal segments of Muslim society. As a result, these females started to manage their stigma or negotiated with their identity. They began to live in a selective social environment where they could get positive feedback for their identity. Under this investigative learning the researcher also tries to find that how the process of stigmatization and identity negotiation further strengthened the concept of us vs. them in females linked with religious groups and how they kept away from mainstream.

This enquiry exclusively argues that the factors as social marginalization, social exclusion, poor economic condition, and lack of access to the educational; political; and economic opportunities as the consequences of stigmatization and identity negotiation played the role in keeping them away from socio-economic, socio-cultural, and socio-political

activities. In a bunch of literature, it was claimed and stereotyped by many researchers that the females belonging to religious groups are radicalized due to some cases related to female's violent actions like "Lal Masjid" (Red Mosque) but in this particular work, it is endeavored to examine that why some females belonging to religious groups get engaged in the process of radicalization and how the drivers as stigmatization, identity negotiation, and in-group formation lead them to this pathway.

To excavate the phenomenon of radicalization with gender dimension with an examination of Pakistani religious feminine segments, the exclusive project investigates that how in-group formation of these religiously affiliated females, stigmatized religious identity of them by modern/liberal segments of society, and the identity negotiation process push or pull them towards radicalization. The researcher here, argues that on the bases of religion, the females linked with religious groups or institutions in Pakistan establish their own identity and they consider all other as out-group and from out-group they remain away as they are stigmatized by the out-group. As an aftermath, they manage their stigma through different strategies and ultimately, they negotiate with their stigmatized identity and become the victim of social/cultural, political, and economic exclusion. Consequently, they start to dislike and hate the members of out-group (the stigmatizers) and the process of radicalization gets activated. Some of them as Tashfin Malik (a student of Al-Huda who committed on ground acts in U.S.) espouse violent behavior after being radicalized (Claire, ET AL. December 6, 2015).

When in-group formation becomes highly powerful, due to stigmatization and identity negotiation and the enablers like social marginalization and social exclusion, and unequal economic opportunities activate side by side, the behavior of some of females related to Pakistani Madrasas or religious groups befalls extremely rigid and they become ready to be involved in violent activities. The researcher shows her concerns and makes the argument that extremist organizations have the opportunity to take the advantage of their situation and provide them with economic and social opportunities and ultimately, they will be got engaged in the process of violence if precautionary measures will not be introduced.

### **1.3 Theory Building: A Nexus between Identity Framework and Radicalization: An Examination of Pakistani Religious Feminine Spheres**

Subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a debate began that terrorists are produced in Muslim world and Islam (due to the concept of Jihad contributes in this fabrication of terrorism (Bar, 2008). The question has been raised that why Muslims are engaged in acts of terrorism against liberals (west)? One aspect has been dug out in literature on terrorism that among Muslims, radicalized views and beliefs are penetrated by their religious institutions (Madrasas) (Malik, 2008; Shahab, 2022). The Muslims attached with religion began to be stigmatized and stereotyped by West and international media as ‘radicalized’, ‘extremist’, ‘fundamentalist’, ‘misogynists’, and ‘terrorists’ (Chomsky, 2013). This process of stigmatization and in-group formation provided energy to the extremist views against liberal value system (West) in Muslim world. Not only men but women belonging to Islam were charged with radicalization. This specific study at other hand, concerns with those multiple factors linking to identity paradigm that are injecting the genes of radicalization among religiously affiliated women with special reference to Pakistan.

The inquirer highlights that within Islamic society people have been divided into two groups ‘liberals’ and ‘religious’ explicitly in late 2000 world after the wave of terrorism. The Women of Muslim world were also affected by this grouping. The females who had access to the modern institutional life were considered as modern/liberal while, the women who did not have access to any modern institution or just went Madrasas or simply adopted Islamic way to live were ruminated as religious. These religiously motivated women were stigmatized due to their specific religious identity as their male counter-part like “*Daku*” (the robber), “*Burka posh*” (covered with black gown the terminology used in a negative sense), “Letter box”, and “*Hijabian*”. The researcher argues that the process of stigmatization push these females to identity negotiation and their negotiation further strengthened their in-group formation, and in-group formation provided the energy to radicalization (hold extremist views and beliefs) at a large scale and to violent process of radicalization (physically engage in acts of violence) at a small scale. At the other hand, the liberal women were stigmatizers rather to be stigmatized this is why they were less likely to be radicalized. To investigate the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistani religious females, this research builds a nexus between the concept

of ‘social identity (exploring concept from the research of Tajfel and Turner, the concept of ‘stigma’ (taking help from the significant work of Goffman), and ‘Identity negotiation theory’ (gaining support from famous contribution of Swarn and Toomey).

It is argued by the researcher that females belonging to Madrasas or any other religious group or just possess religious affiliation do not contribute in social/cultural, political, and economic development of the country, they restrict themselves to the domestic spheres by making the reason that Islam does not permit them to do so. If in any case, they have to go out with the purpose of earning or study, they prefer a specific social environment for work or education which do not damage their identity, moreover, they are rigid in their behavior, they legitimize violent actions against modern/liberal system, they hold extremist views and beliefs, and they motivate themselves and others for doing Jihad. But this research raises the question that why females linked with religious life in Pakistan adopt a specific, common, and rigid (extremist) behavior and why not females belonging to modern institutional system?

This study makes the claim that as they are stigmatized due to specific religious identity by the modern/liberal segments of Pakistani society, this is why, they do not get equal opportunities in all fields of life, they negotiate with their identity, and they live away from the main stream and like to breathe in selective social environment which supports them in self-confirmatory feedback. Ultimately, the concept of in-group formation highly gets strengthened and they instigate hating with those to whom they considered the members of out-group (the stigmatizers). In this way nonviolent radicalization generates among them. The deleterious sentiments of hate and dislike additionally, selective social environment lead these women to adopt extremist ideas and beliefs and the extremist behavior further guides some of them to the path of violent path of radicalization. The investigator raises the apprehension that the stigmatized and negotiated identity, poor economic condition, social marginalization, social exclusion, unequal socio-economic opportunities, and horizontal inequality of these women have the potential to be exploited by the extremist organizations. By showing them financial incentives, social and political benefits, these groups can recruit these females for nonviolent and violent operations. To understand the liaison between radicalization and identity paradigm with gender dimension by the analysis of Pakistani

females linked with religious segments, this theoretical framework is a combination of social identity [in-group formation], social stigma, and identity negotiation theory.

#### **1.4 Scope of the Research**

There has been a considerable interest among researchers to explore radicalization within identity framework (Peek, 2005; Arena & Arrigo, 2006; Schwartz, Dunkel & Waterman, 2009; Crossett and Spitaletta 2010; Al Raffie, 2013; Harris, et al. 2014; Doosje, et al. 2016; Yusoufzai, & Emmerling, 2017; Lynn, 2020). Many academic writings have been concerned with the process of radicalization in the context of gender (Cunningham, 2007; Knop, 2007; Bari, 2010; Witlox, 2012; Fink, et al. 2013; Jacques & Taylor, 2013; Wagma, 2014; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Spencer, 2015; Pearson, 2016; Okowita, 2017; Gul, 2018; Mahmood, 2019; Windsor, 2020; Brown, 2020; Narozhna, 2021; Khalid and Mukhtar, 2021; Gowrinathan, 2021; Zych and Nasaescu, 2022). Also a great debate is generated to find out the factors of radicalization and a huge literature has been produced that behind the process of radicalization the motivational force is religion specifically Islam (Barber, 1996; Bar, 2008; Hiro, 2012; Allan, et al. 2015; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Kusserow and Pawlak, 2015; Ahmed and Jafri, 2020; Basit and Ahmed, 2021; Zych and Nasaescu, 2022; Huda, 2022). Multiple scholars argued that economic and political motives push or pull people to the road of radicalization (Gurr, 1969; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Krueger & Malečková, 2003; Kimmel, 2003; Abadie, 2006; De Mesquita, 2008; Mitra, 2008; Ali, 2010; Kazmi and Pervez 2011; Enders & Sandler, 2011; Meierrieks, 2012; Orsini, 2012; Choi & Luo, 2013; Ahmed, et al, 2018; Akbar, 2021; Khalid and Mukhtar, 2021; Khalid, 2022). a bunch of research is existed on the recruitment strategies utilized by extremist groups to engage males or females for non-violent as well as for violent operations (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Von Knop, 2007; Cunningham, 2007; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010; Fink et al., 2013; Spencer, 2015; Kusserow and Pawlak, 2015; Allan, et al., 2015; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Berger, 2015; Bloom, 2017; Gul, 2018; Ismail, et al, 2022; Makki and Akash, 2022). A considerable amount of work is available on Madrasas and their educational system in the context of Pakistan (Abbas, 2004; Dalrymple, 2005; Bano, 2007; Blanchard, 2007; Rahman, 2007; Noor, 2008; Davji, 2008; Malik, 2008; Tavernise, 2009; McClure, 2009; Ahmed, 2009; Sajjad, 2009; Saini, 2009; Siddique, 2009; Rana, 2009; Kazmi and Pervez 2011; Fair, 2012;

Khan, 2013; Rasheed, 2016; *Syed, ET AL., 2016*; Fani, 2020; Anjum, 2020; Khusnood, et al, 2020; Suhaib and Adnan, 2020; Hanif, et al, 2021; Ahmad and Shahid, 2022). While, the contribution of this specific research is that it seeks to understand the nexus between radicalization and identity with gender dimension by examining the Pakistani religious feminine spheres.

Although, the process of radicalization has been explored previously with multiple theoretical lenses (Gurr, 1988; Crenshaw, 1988; Crenshaw, 2000; Silke, 2004; Neumann, 2008; McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008; Research report by European Commission Expert Group, 2008; Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010; Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010; Borum, 2011; Pisiou, 2011; Schmid, 2013; Maskaliūnait, 2015; Lynn, 2020; ), whereas, the contribution of this thesis in literature is that it develops a strong link between the three concepts of identity paradigm ‘in-group formation’ by Tajfel and Turner (1979), ‘social stigma’ of Erving Goffman (1963), and ‘Identity negotiation’ of Toomey (1986) and Swann (1987) and claims that these three forces play a great role to push or pull females to the process of radicalization. Under this academic piece, the researcher endeavors to highlight the liaison between the phenomenon of radicalization and stigmatization, identity negotiation, and in-group formation with gender lens by examining the case of Pakistani females belonging to religion, religious institutions (Madrasas), and religious groups. The research exclusively concentrates to scrutinize that how the three concepts of identity paradigm (stigmatization, identity negotiation, and in-group formation) play the role as driving dynamism towards radicalization among Pakistani religious female spheres and how these drivers have the potential to be exploited by the extremist organizations to engage them (religiously identified women) in their activities.

## **1.5 Research Questions**

This research aims to elucidate the phenomenon of female radicalization within identity paradigm with special reference to religious feminine spheres in Pakistan. In doing so, the thesis explores how social identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation (as processes) enables Pakistani religiously affiliated women to the path of radicalization? Furthermore, following sub-research questions were addressed: what are the main socio-

psychological and economic factors that enable the formation of famine socio-religious identity? and, how such religiously-oriented identities negotiate ‘self’ and manage stigmatization?

## **1.6 Objectives of the Enquiry**

The key purpose of this investigative study is to explore the phenomenon of radicalization within identity paradigm by using gender lenses through the explicit case of Pakistani religious feminine sphere.

Under this main goal, the study encompasses the following objectives:

- 1) The research aims to study and evaluate the question of religious motivation and religious in-group formation in Pakistani women.
- 2) This research has the purpose to develop the nexus between the process of social identity, stigma, and identity negotiation in the context of females linked with religious environment in Pakistan.
- 3) Furthermore, based on the analysis of social identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation it illuminates the adoption of extremist views and beliefs by the females belonging to religious segments.
- 4) Not only to highlight the complex dynamics of radicalization but also to specify an apprehension to exploit the situation of stigmatized and negotiated identity of females of religious groups by extremist organizations.
- 5) Such an analysis will not only necessity the inclusive strategies but also suggest a gendered approach in the fight against terrorism and extremism.

## **1.7 Research Design**

To accomplish this dissertation qualitative inquiry has been focused. By availing phenomenological approach, semi-structured interviews were conducted. To acquire generalizability, reliability, validity, and impartiality twenty cities of the four provinces of

Pakistan have been visited physically by the researcher. Sixty interviews have been used to analyze the phenomenon. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, resent to the respondents to confirm the provided information, and utilized through thematic analysis in interpretation and explanation of this particular project.

## **1.8 Thesis Outline**

To understand the liaison between identity prototypes and radicalization through gender lens with special reference to Pakistani religious feminine segments, this study is divided into nine chapters.

### Chapter 1. Introduction

This chapter provides an overall understanding of the whole document to the reader. By highlighting the problem of radicalization due to stigmatization, identity negotiation, and in-group formation among Pakistani religiously motivated women, this chapter supplies the food for thoughts. To look over the complete project, the chapter is divided into two sections. Under first section an overview of the study is gone through. Part two discusses research inquiry and main argument, theory building, research design, scope of the study, research questions and objectives, and thesis outline.

### Chapter 2. Reviewing Literature: Exploration of Existing Research on Radicalization, Social Identity, Stigmatization, and Identity Negotiation

This chapter throws light on the literature produced previously on radicalization, social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation. It is endeavored to denote that prior to this specific research, which aspects of radicalization have been discovered and what themes of theory of social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation have been described. As this social enquiry focuses to explore and to explain the dynamics of radicalization within identity paradigm through gender lens in the context of Pakistani religious feminine spheres, this is the reason that to review the existing literature, is significant. To evaluate and to examine the available research on the key notions, the chapter is divided into five sections. Part one concentrates on radicalization: its theories, models, factors, motivating strategies, and role of gender in this process. To understand theory of social identity: social grouping, cognitive



processes, collective ideologies, de-individuation, minimal group paradigm, entitativity, social networking, threat perception, and linkage of social identity with radicalization are excavated by the researcher in the second section. The third part highlights theory of social stigma: its types, components, consequences, power dynamics, and management strategies. Fourth section of this chapter digs out identity negotiation theory: key dialectical themes, identity-competence outcomes, selective interaction, identity cues, and self-verification. The fifth part reviews religious identities, identity construction, and gee's typology of identity construction and negotiation.

### Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework: Understanding of Applicability and Practicality of Conceptual Underpinnings with the Case

Under this chapter the investigator explicitly tries to look through theoretical lens that how in-group formation, stigmatized identity, and identity negotiation are playing as driving dynamism to lead the females of religious institutions (Madrasas) or religious groups to adopt and espouse extremist ideas and beliefs in Pakistan. To understand the phenomenon and to link the theory with practice, the chapter is divided in to five parts. The first part looks over the journey from religious identity construction to escalation of radicalization with gender lens in the country. Second section seeks to discuss theory of religious identity construction and development of social identity as us vs. them with the case of Pakistani religiously motivated women. In third section, practicality of theory of social stigma in religious-oriented females is evaluated. The fourth part expounds the applicability of identity negotiation among religiously identified women. Section five shines the light on the contribution of all drivers mentioned before in triggering the process of radicalization among Pakistani religious feminine spheres.

### Chapter 4. Methodological Understanding: Methods, Approaches, Techniques, and Tools

This chapter discusses the overall methodology to inquire the phenomenon of radicalization within identity paradigm in the context of gender with special reference to Pakistan. Why qualitative research is needed in completion of the thesis, what methods are conducted at ground to collect the information, how sampling techniques are used, what research approaches are utilized, and what analytical tools are availed to understand the social

phenomenon are the subject matter of this specific chapter. To explore and to explain the overall methodology, the chapter is divided into four sections. Part first shines the light on defining methodology, academic context, philosophical understanding, vitality of the qualitative research, and qualitative research approach with focus on phenomenology. The second part describes the data collection methods as secondary data usage; semi-structured and focused interviews; direct observation in field, sampling techniques as snowball; judgmental; stratified, and composition of sampling. In third section, the researcher's role and facing challenges as emotional, ethical, and trust-building are discussed. As well as limitations and data processing are overlooked. Part fourth throws light on data categorization, organization, and data analysis of this particular social inquiry.

#### Chapter 5. Religious Motivation: Social Forces, Strategies, Concepts, and Social/Economic Conditions

In this chapter it is explicitly endeavored to scrutinize that how social forces (family; friends; and neighbors) galvanize women towards religiosity and religious institutions, what particular strategies/ methods are applied to fascinate females to embrace religious mentality, how existing concepts are penetrated in the minds of women to motivate them to have religious ideals and aspirations, why social conditions inside the individual work to engage his/her in religious thoughts and behaviors, and how poverty dynamics stimulate the female segments in Pakistan towards religious views and beliefs and religious institutions / groups. To understand and to analyze the motivation towards religion and religiosity (rigid religious thoughts) the chapter is divided into five sections: in the first section the researcher explores the role of social forces as family; friends; neighbors; and ideal personalities to incline women to adopt religious aspirations and to go to religious institutions. The second part concentrates on different strategies as religious gatherings; online methods; use of social media; and performance of dramas that are applied on females by religious elements to fascinate them to the religious thoughts and views. Under third section the investigator excavates the specific sensitive concepts like care for the life here after; indulgence in sinful life; and representation of devil that motivate women to espouse extremely religious mentality. Part four reveals contribution of social conditions (life incidents/happenings) as second marriage of husband, doubt of magical acts, failure in love stories, incidents of

divorced and widow women, and domestic violence in pulling or pushing females to embrace rigid religious thinking and behaviors. Section five overlooks on the role of poverty dynamics as unavailability of basic necessities and lack of affordability of modern education in inducing feminine spheres to move towards religious institutions.

#### Chapter 6. Stereotypical Behaviors: Socio-Religious Identity, Social Stigma and Identity Negotiation

This chapter endeavors to scrutinize that how religiously motivated women develop their identity and how they differentiate themselves from liberal/modern women in Pakistan, how religious identity of women is stigmatized by liberal/modern parts of Pakistani society, why stigmatized identity is negotiated by religiously affiliated females, and what strategies are applied by religiously motivated women to manage and to negotiate stigmatized identity. To discuss and to reveal the process of us vs. them, stigmatization, and identity negotiation, the chapter is divided into four sections: in first section, the researcher excavates the development of identity on the bases of religion and differentiation in thoughts, outlook, values, norms, beliefs, and objectives between religious and modern feminine groups. Second section highlights the negative labelling and stereotyping of religious-oriented women by liberal segments as harassment, ironic looking and wording, declaring them as backwards and typical mindset, disturbing them in functions, and taunting on their identity by in laws and closed relatives. Under third part the inquirer describes identity negotiation process by stigmatized religious females through selective interaction, self-confirmatory feedbacks, and closed social environment where they get respect, appreciation, and honor for their constructed religious identity. Part four shines the light on stigma management strategies as passing, revealing, or compensatory by which religiously identified women fabricate, conceal, differentiate, normalize or increase positivity for their stigmatized identity.

#### Chapter 7. Consequences of Stigma and Interplay of Power Dynamics: Social Exclusion/Marginalization, Discrimination, and Socio-Economic Inequalities

This explicit chapter concentrates on the practicality of consequences of stigma. The researcher shines the light that how and why religious feminine spheres are socially excluded and marginalized, why government discriminates with religious women/institutions/groups,

why and how religious institutions are considered stigmatized and miserable/pathetic place and based on this stigmatization are sidelined and criticized. In order to understand the socio-economic inequalities of religious-oriented women this chapter as well explicates discrimination in jobs, salaries, food, and unequal standard of life. To scrutinize the applicability of consequences of stigma and interplay of power dynamics in Pakistani feminine spheres, the chapter is divided into five sections: the first part focuses on social exclusion of those women who negotiated with their religious identity. Under second part discrimination with religious-minded females and institutions at governmental level is expounded. The third section describes the financial sources of Madrasas to discern social welfare by the rich of religious institutions through which the population is divided between stigmatizer and stigmatized. Furthermore, based on this division power dynamics of social stigma are clarified. Fourth part argues that the Madrasas are considered and seen as a stigmatized place among social arena. It as well analyzes the thinking of modern/liberal society which discriminates with those institutions that are attached with religious mentality and religion. Section five reveals the unequal economic status of religiously motivated females and religious institutions.

#### Chapter 8. The Pathway to Radicalization: Concepts, Roles, and Threat Perceptions

Under this chapter it is scrutinized that how prevailing concepts as sympathy to violent Islamist organizations; promotion of Jihad against the enemies of Islam; and adoption of aggression for implementing religious value system produce extremist female mindset, why defining women role as brave mother; socialization of children on the way of Mujahidin; and physical/mental involvement of women in Jihad if needed generate extremist thinking among religious feminine elements, what are the developing threat perceptions as contamination of religious values; genocide of Muslims; and abolition of religious identity (Hijab and Pardah) that push or pull religious-oriented women towards the process of radicalization, and whether direct promotion of violent extremism among religiously motivated women and their institutions as gap between Madrasas and worldly life; personal motives; and blame of extremism and terrorism play a role as driving dynamism to push or to pull religious-minded females to the radicalization path. To explore and to explain the phenomenon, the chapter is divided into 4 parts: part first describes concepts that are

prevailed among religiously belonging females which have potential to lead socially excluded and marginalized community to the road of radicalization. In second section the researcher shines the light on the defined roles of religious-minded women in socialization of their children and direct involvement in Jihad. Part third explicitly explicates threat perceptions which push or pull feminine spheres of linking to stigmatized religious identity towards radicalization process. The fourth section reveals direct promotion of violent extremism among religiously identified women and their institutions in Pakistan. Perspective of segregated religious community regarding augmenting radicalization, extremism, and terrorism as well is overlooked.

## Chapter 9. Discussion and Conclusion

In this part of the research the overall analysis of this investigative learning is done. The researcher exclusively evaluates the apprehensions that how the process of radicalization can lead to violent extremism to the religiously identified women. She as well suggests that what interventions are needed to prevent the threat of violent behaviors among religious-oriented females in the country. To conclude and to prescribe the interventions, the chapter is divided into three parts. Part one analyzes the complete dissertation that how women motivate to religious environment, how they construct socio-religious identity, why they face stigma, why they negotiate with their stigmatized identity, how they become the victim of social marginalization; exclusion; and economic discrimination, and why they adopt extremist ideas and beliefs through ideologies, roles, and threat perceptions. Under second section it is expounded that why the apprehensions are knocking the door to enter into the process of violent engagement of Pakistani religious feminine segments, how the potential is existed to move from nonviolent to violent process, and what utilities the extremist organization can take from the situation of Pakistani religious feminine elements. Part third recommends some precautionary measures to engage the marginalized and excluded community in the positive progress of the country and explicates likewise that how gender-based policies can be proved fruitful to include these females in social, educational, cultural, and economic spheres in order to save them from moving to the pathway of radicalization.

## **CHAPTER 2**

# **REVIEWING LITERATURE: EXPLORATION OF EXISTING RESEARCH ON RADICALIZATION, SOCIAL IDENTITY, STIGMATIZATION, AND IDENTITY NEGOTIATION**

In chapter one, a brief introduction of the dissertation has been overviewed. The key variables have been presented using in this social investigation. A little understanding of theory building, the main argument, the gaps in existing literature, research questions, objectives of the research, and thesis outline have been gone through. While this chapter throws light on the literature produced previously on radicalization, social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation. It is endeavored to denote that prior to this specific research, which aspects of radicalization have been discovered and what themes of theory of social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation have been described. As this social enquiry focuses to explore and to explain the dynamics of radicalization within identity paradigm through gender lens in the context of Pakistani religious feminine spheres, this is the reason that to review the existing literature, is significant.

To evaluate and to examine the available research on the key notions, the chapter is divided into five sections. Part one concentrates on radicalization: its theories, models, factors, motivating strategies, and role of gender in this process. To understand theory of social identity: social grouping, cognitive processes, collective ideologies, de-individuation, minimal group paradigm, entitativity, social networking, threat perception, and linkage of social identity with radicalization are excavated by the researcher in the second section. The third part highlights theory of social stigma: its types, components, consequences, power dynamics, and management strategies. Fourth section of this chapter digs out identity negotiation theory: key dialectical themes, identity-competence outcomes, selective interaction, identity cues, and self-verification. The fifth part reviews religious identities, identity construction, and gee's typology of identity construction and negotiation.

## **2.1 Understanding Radicalization**

To explore the phenomenon of radicalization through identity paradigm by using gender lens, this specific research is examining Pakistani feminine sphere associated with religious institutions and groups. Prior to sightsee theoretical underpinnings (social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation), and to dig out the social, psychological, ideological, and economic conditions of the females belonging to religious systematic life, it is substantial to look over the term ‘radicalization.’

### *2.1.1 Defining Radicalization*

Although, the term ‘radicalization’ has been defined by numerous experts on the subject and institutions previously, but a slight difference is existed in all definitions. To understand this term some of highly acceptable definitions and their detail in literature are described below.

The European Commission expert group on radicalization sees radicalization as “socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism (European Commission Expert Group, 2008).” This description explains the whole phenomenon in a brief language. It clarifies that through a proper socialization (consistent training by society), extreme violent ideologies are developed among people and later, these ideologies are manifested in the acts of terrorism. The US Department of Homeland Security sees it as a “process of adopting an extremist belief system, including willingness to support or use violence as a method to effect social change (Homeland Security Institute, 2006).” According to this definition, radicalization as a process works, through which people adopt extremist belief system. This system on the one hand, generates motivation to support violence and on the other, it stimulates people to use or apply violence as a method to bring social change.

The Dutch Security Service (AIVD) describes radicalization as: "Growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order (The Dutch Security Service, 2005).” In the light of this definition, radicalization prepares people to pursue or to support undemocratic means to change society at a large scale. These inequitable

(illegitimate) means have the conflict with society and as well as directly, pose intimidation to democratic order. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee defines radicalization as: “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2012).” This definition illustrates the whole process in a single sentence. A person who has extremist ideology, he at first, supports terrorism and later, he himself, engages in terrorism. The process from beginning to end, that guides him, is called as radicalization.

Wilner and Dubouloz define radicalization as: “radicalization (or radicalization) is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010).” According to this particular definition, radicalization is process that presses an individual or a group to adopt extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations. These ideals and aspirations deny or destroy the contemporary political system, social ideas, and expression of freedom of choice. Ultimately, through this process that individual or group stands against current political and social institutions. Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko in there research, describe radicalization as: “radicalization is a dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict and violence, across individuals, groups, and mass publics (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).” This description argues that radicalization is an aspect of the augmentation of beliefs feelings, and behavior that support intergroup conflict and violence. Both the researchers argue that radicalization works across individual, group, and mass levels.

Currently, Crossett and Spitaletta highlighted psychological and sociological perspective in radicalization. They delineate radicalization as: “The process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism) (Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010).” This definition looks different from the descriptions mentioned above. Although, these authors consider radicalization as a process through which individuals, groups, or mass public bring huge change in society (transformation) by using violence, but differ on the point of legitimation. According to them,



in the process of radicalization, people participate in prevalent political process by legal means just to support or use violence for political objectives. To the political participation via legal means and use of violence for political goals, they call 'radicalism'. By taking the support from above mentioned all definitions, radicalization will be defined as: a process by which a person adopts belief systems which justify the use of violence to effect social change and comes to actively support as well as employ violent means for political purposes. It will not be wrong to write that radicalization is a process, often a slow and gradual one, the final result of which is a person engaging in a violent campaign to effect social change.

Under this work in specific, the researcher after defining radicalization, elucidates that it works as a dynamic process, which leads the individuals and groups to adopt violent behavior and they get engaged in vehement acts. Another considerable argument the researcher builds is that a great number of people does not participates in ground-operations but they hold extremist ideas and beliefs. For case in point, they hate and dislike those to whom they consider the members of out-group, they get pleased when their out-group faces some damage, they do not interact friendly with them, and they have the opinion that the out-group has no right to rule or to have political power. Diminutively, non-violent radicalization has its place at a large scale but the visibility of this phenomenon is little in society. This particular project concentrates more on radicalization as nonviolent process because most of the literature has been developed on violent activities of radicalization and non-violent aspects of this process are still undiscovered.

## **2.2 Radicalization as Violent or Nonviolent**

In contemporary world, it is thought that radicalization exists in violent forms. While, Borum describes, "radicalization can be both violent and nonviolent (Borum, 2011)." Although most academic literature concentrates on violent aspects of radicalization. In fact, most people who have radical ideas do not directly or indirectly, engage in terrorism, while, many terrorists who label them as terrorists, are not deeply ideological and are not 'radicalize' in any conventional sense. "Different pathways and mechanisms operate in different ways for different people at different points in time and perhaps in different contexts (Borum, 2011)." The best available global polling from organizations like Pew and Gallup

suggest that there are tens of millions of Muslims wide-reaching who are sympathetic to 'jihadi aspirations,' but most of them are not involved in violence. However, the literature on radicalization, suggests that there is a sense of urgency and emergency in radicalized population, they do not agree for any type of compromise, they wish to bring undemocratic change, and they consider violent means legitimate to use on soldiers as well as on civilians, for this change. These violent actions are called terrorist activities in lay language, in media, and in literature. The researcher here, argues that when radicalized ideas and beliefs have been developed the individuals strongly tie with their like mindedness group or with that group to which they consider the member. In this way the sense of in-group formation gets activated among people and social identity develops. As a matter of reality, radicalization is not a tree which grow up without water, fertilization, compatible weather, extreme care and futile land. But behind this process, multiple factors work side by side or in a sequential way.

### **2.3 Factors of Radicalization**

Before exploring in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation as the enablers of radicalization among Pakistani religious feminine spheres, it is significant to understand the drivers of radicalization in general. By the research of The European Commission, the drivers favorable to radicalization are, “a strong sense of alienation, perceived injustice or humiliation reinforced by social marginalization, xenophobia and discrimination, limited education or employment possibilities, criminality or psychological problems (European Commission, 2008).” Crossett and Spitaletta in their research, find sixteen risk factors which lead to violent behavior: “Emotional vulnerability; Dissatisfaction with the status quo of political activism; Personal connection to a grievance; Positive (or at least non-negative) view of violence; Perceived benefit of political violence; Social networks; In-group de-legitimization of the out-group; Views on (and histories of) violence; Resources; External support; Perceived threat; Conflict; Humiliation; Competition; Youth; and Resonant narrative (Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010).” Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko excavate that there are 3 levels of radicalization, individual; group; mas/public level: and at these 3 levels, 12 mechanisms work. “‘Individual’: 1) Personal victimization, 2) Political grievance, 3) Joining a radical group the slippery slope, 4) Joining a radical group the power of love, 5) Extremity shift in like-minded groups, ‘Group’: 6) Extreme cohesion under isolation and

threat, 7) Competition for the same base of support, 8) Competition with state power condensation, 9) Within-group competition fashioning, ‘Mass’: 10) Jujitsu politics, 11) Hate, 12) Martyrdom (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008).” Fink, et al., explain in their findings that Some factors are same which drive men and women in the same way towards terrorism, like “grievance about socio-political conditions; grief about the death of a loved one; real or perceived humiliation on a personal, physical, psychological or political level; a fanatical commitment to a religious or ideological belief or beliefs; an intention to derive economic benefits; or a desire to effect radical changes (Fink, et al., 2013).”

However, the above mentioned factors can influence female likewise male but, a review of existing studies particularly focused on Western women, elucidates following inventory of relevant push and pull factors: “a search for identity; social/cultural exclusion and marginalization; respect for women in the territory of ISIS/Da’esh; protection of Muslim brothers and sisters; threat perception (the Islamic community – Ummah – is being threatened and/or that the West is waging a war against Islam); division of the world into two opposing entities (Two camps in the world either with the camp of “Imam” [belief] or camp of “*kufar*” [disbelief]. No in between); aspiration building and becoming part of a utopian Caliphate (a desire of living in the Caliphate under Sharia law); a sense of adventure; the prospect of marriage; and the desire to be part of something bigger and divine (The European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2016).” Current literature expounds that usually, the extremist groups’ exploit these factors and engage women in violent or nonviolent actions.

## **2.4 Strategies for Engaging Females in Radicalization**

In its study on gender dynamics in ISIS/Da'esh recruitment and propaganda, the Carter Center reveals, how ISIS/Da'esh exploit personal, sociological, and psychological factors and offer women an alternative vision of freedom and empowerment. To recruit females, ISIS/Da'esh portrays Western feminism as “an exclusionary model of emancipation for elite white women at the expense of minority women groups (The Carter Center, 2017).” ISIS/Da’esh stimulates women by telling them that they can become “jihadi brides”. Islam is under threat and by marrying with Mujahedeen, they can increase *Muslim Ummah*. By raising

the children with Islamic “Jihadist” ideology, they can serve Islam in a true way (Kusserow and Patryk, 2015). Another narrative is built by extremist groups to recruit females, is that by joining the group, they can help their brothers and sisters who are involved in Jihad against “*Kufar*” (non-believers). Women agency is told that roles of men and women are not competitive, but complementary and cooperative. By employing phrases like “you are the hope of the Ummah and the Ummah will not rise without your help (Bakker and Seran, 2015),” women are persuaded towards radicalized ideology.

Only ideology and narrative is not used as strategy to recruit females, the extremist organizations also provide economic opportunities to these females. Katharina Von Knop explains that women violent activities are growing for the reason that females are stimulated to engage in political violence and organizations are giving stronger incentives to recruit woman. Another approach utilized by radicalized groups, is, that they provide chance to the women to take revenge from their enemy. The women who were recruited in Sri Lanka and Chechnya, found the opportunity for revenge of the deaths of their loved ones. The extremist groups also offer the females to reclaim their honor. The women who have been raped or humiliated, get involved with these groups and ultimately moved towards violent behavior (Von Knop, 2007). Multiple authors presented models of radicalization that why and how individuals and groups move to the process, this piece of research applies these models to understand and to analyze the radicalized behavior of Pakistani religious feminine segments within identity paradigm.

## **2.5 Models of Radicalization**

This particular dissertation likewise concentrates on some of those models that explain the stages through which a person passes during the process of radicalization, and furthermore, these models are favorable to expound the sociological or psychological factors that influence him or her on each stage.

The first model is Borum’s Pathway: in an FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Borum outlines a prototypic psychological pathway along which an individual develops an ideology that legitimizes terrorism. This model proposes four stages: Stage 1. “it’s not right,” the individual judges his or her condition to be undesirable. Stage 2. “it’s not fair,” the

individual compares his or her condition to the more desirable conditions of others, and judges this inequality as illegitimate and unjust. Stage 3. “it’s your fault.” Once an out group has been targeted as responsible for the illegitimate situation, this out-group is vilified and dehumanized. Stage 4. “You are evil.” people generate negative stereotypes about the out group, and apply these stereotypes to all out-group members. Violence becomes legitimized as it is directed towards an evil group that is wholly responsible for all perceived injustices (Borum, 2003).

The next model under the consideration is, Wiktorowicz’s Theory of Joining Extremist Groups: Wiktorowicz outlines a specific route of radicalization based on an ethnographic case study with members of the Al-Muhajiroun movement. Based in the U.K. He finds out four processes that lead a person either male or female, to join an Islamic extremist group. These four processes are: 1) Cognitive opening, 2) Religious seeking, 3) Frame alignment, and 4) Socialization (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

Furthermore, the model, Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism will also be overlooked. This author makes the case that during the process of radicalization, an individual or group passes through five floors. At the ground floor of the staircase, feelings of deprivation generate. According to him, the initial factor is relative deprivation that push the person on the path of radicalization. People who compare their group to other groups, and perceive that their group is relatively deprived, are likely to move up the staircase. People who experience these feelings of group-based deprivation will be motivated to improve their group’s status. Discontent from the structure leads people to the next floor. On the second floor, discontent is channeled towards a target. Here, instead of focusing on the real causes of injustice, displacement of aggression can occur. On the third floor, radical options are adopted to counter the injustice. Those who continue on the radicalization path reach the fourth floor, where they officially join a terrorist group. Those who reach the fifth and last floor are those who are willing to commit a terrorist act. During this last stage, conformity and obedience are psychological motivations that facilitate violence (Moghaddam, 2005).

The next model, the researcher prefers to understand the dynamics of radicalization in Pakistani religious feminine spheres, is The NYPD’s Radicalization Process: The Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department (NYPD) proposes a four-stage model of

radicalization. In this model, Silber and Bhatt analyze five prominent homegrown terrorist cases in North America and Western Europe. First stage of model is, “Pre-Radicalization” The second stage is, “Self-Identification,” The third stage is, “Indoctrination,” The last stage is, “Jihadization,” on this stage, individuals declare themselves to be “holy warriors or mujahedeen,” and become committed to violent jihad (Silber and Bhatt, 2007).

The last model which can be supportive to identify the sociological and psychological conditions that force or motivate female of Pakistan towards radicalization is, Sageman’s Four Prongs. In contrast to other models depicting stages that occur in a sequential order, Sageman suggests that radicalization emerges from the interplay of four factors. Three of these factors can be considered cognitive, whereas the fourth is a situational factor. First cognitive factor leading to radicalization is a sense of moral outrage, which is the result of perceiving events as moral violations. Another cognitive factor is the frame used to interpret the world. The specific frame used by contemporary Islamist extremists is that the West is waging a “war against Islam.” The literature on Western female radicalization finds out that ISIS/Da’esh recruits females by the strategy that Islam is under threat and by becoming ‘Jihadi brides’ they can increase Muslim ‘Ummah’ in this way, they can play role to protect Islam. The third cognitive factor highlighted by Sageman is a resonance with personal experience. These experiences are personal moral violations, such as discrimination or unemployment. These three cognitive factors can easily reinforce each other. The last factor labeled as, “mobilization through networks,” involves validating and confirming one’s ideas and interpretation of events with other radicalized people (Sageman, 2008).

All models discussed above, converge on the assumption that radicalization is a transformation based on social-psychological processes. All models describe that emotions, cognitions, and social influences that, when operating in the right order and combination, can lead someone to endorse and engage in terrorism. All authors who presented these models, are agreed on three factors that recur most often, are relative deprivation, socialization, and an identity crisis. After looking at definitions, radicalization as a process, factors, and strategies for engaging and recruiting women for the operations of extremist groups, and various models of radicalization, it is essential to excavate the literature on radicalization and its liaison with identity and religion and the role of gender in the phenomenon.

## **2.6 Existing Literature on Radicalization with Special Reference to Gender, Religion, and Identity**

However, previously, the process of radicalization has been dug out with different angles by scholars and researchers. For example, to identify the causes and motivational dynamics of radicalization, a group of experts on radicalization explained that behind the process of radicalization, poverty works and economic factors push or pull the people to this road (Gurr, 1969; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Krueger & Malečková, 2003; Kimmel, 2003; Abadie, 2006; De Mesquita, 2008; Mitra, 2008; Ali, 2010; Kazmi and Pervez 2011; Enders & Sandler, 2011; Meierrieks, 2012; Orsini, 2012; Choi & Luo, 2013; Ahmed, et al, 2018; Akbar, 2021; Khalid and Mukhtar, 2021; Khalid, 2022). Another school of thought has been agreed that religion particularly Islam due to the concept of 'Jihad' stimulates the minds towards radicalization (Barber, 1996; Bar, 2008; Hiro, 2012; Allan, ET AL. 2015; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Kusserow and Pawlak, 2015; Ahmed and Jafri, 2020; Basit and Ahmed, 2021; Zych and Nasaescu, 2022; Huda, 2022). It is also expounded that personal gains and losses force individuals to this way (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010; Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010). A bunch of literature has been produced on identity crisis with the view that the search for identity motivates for adopting radicalized beliefs and ideas to the individuals and groups (Peek, 2005; Arena & Arrigo, 2006; Schwartz, Dunkel & Waterman, 2009; Crossett and Spitaletta 2010; Al Raffie, 2013; Harris, ET AL. 2014; Doosje, ET AL. 2016; Yusoufzai, & Emmerling, 2017; Lynn, 2020). To understand the roots of radicalization, a huge academic work has been produced that from where the seeds of this process are sown.

Some researchers highlighted that family and friends are the primary source which penetrate radicalized ideas and beliefs (Alonso & Reinares, 2006; Sageman, 2008; Silke, 2008; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Kruglanski, ET AL., 2014). Many of the scholars dug out that media particularly social media has a great role to develop radicalized views among individuals and groups (French, 1995; Berkowitz, 2005; Nacos, 2005; Wright, 2008; Geeraerts, 2012; Ravndal, 2013; Koehler, 2014; Holt, ET AL., 2015). A school of thought provided the understanding that educational institutions specifically religious educational institutes engage people in the process of radicalization (Abbas, 2004; Dalrymple, 2005;

Bano, 2007; Blanchard, 2007; Rahman, 2007; Noor, 2008; Davji, 2008; Malik, 2008; Tavernise, 2009; McClure, 2009; Ahmed, 2009; Sajjad, 2009; Saini, 2009; Siddique, 2009; Rana, 2009; Kazmi and Pervez 2011; Fair, 2012; Khan, 2013; Rasheed, 2016; Syed, *ET AL.*, 2016; Fani, 2020; Anjum, 2020; Khusnood, et al, 2020; Suhaib and Adnan, 2020; Hanif, et al, 2021; Ahmad and Shahid, 2022). However, literature has been existed that extremist organizations like Al-Qaida and ISIS/Di'esh supply great incentives (political, economic, social, ideological) to the individuals to get them involved in the acts of violent or non-violent radicalization (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Von Knop, 2007; Cunningham, 2007; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010; Fink *ET AL.*, 2013; Spencer, 2015; Kusserow and Pawlak, 2015; Allan, *ET AL.*, 2015; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Berger, 2015; Bloom, 2017; Gul, 2018; Ismail, et al, 2022; Makki and Akash, 2022). Many of the researchers explored radicalization in context of gender also (Cunningham, 2007; Knop, 2007; Bari, 2010; Witlox, 2012; Fink, *ET AL.* 2013; Jacques & Taylor, 2013; Wagha, 2014; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Spencer, 2015; Pearson, 2016; Okowita, 2017; Gul, 2018; Mahmood, 2019; Windsor, 2020; Brown, 2020; Narozhna, 2021; Khalid and Mukhtar, 2021; Gowrinathan, 2021; Zych and Nasaescu, 2022).

Multiple scholars argued that women have peaceful nature for the reason that they do not engage in radicalized activities (King, 1995; Skjelsbaek, 2001; Charlesworth, 2008). While at the other hand, a group of thinkers found that women as their male counter-part get involved in acts of violent and non-violent radicalization and by nature no human either man or woman is peaceful (Witlox, 2012; Jacques & Taylor, 2013). For instance, women role in political radicalized activities as leader, trainer, facilitator, and ground-operators, in Europe during leftist movements has been explored by many scholars (della Porta, 1995). The violent engagement of Black Widows in Chechnya and Freedom Birds in Sri Lanka has also been excavated by multiple researchers (Cunningham, 2007). Women involvement as mother, wife, daughter, preacher, teacher, fund-raiser, and propagandist, in Al-Qaida, Taliban, and ISIS/Da'esh has been scrutinized in various investigative studies (Bakker and Seran, 2015; Okowita, 2017). Subsequent to understand radicalization in detail, in the next section, the chapter highlights the theory of social identity and its key themes which the researcher applies on the phenomenon of radicalization to understand the enablers of this process among religious-oriented females of Pakistan.



## **2.7 Exploring Social Identity Theory**

It is significant to explore and to dig out the concept of social identity so that the process of in-group formation can be understood and the sociological, psychological and economic factors among females linked with religion, religious institutions, and groups of Pakistan can be analyzed and examined. In fact, when a person is borne, he from the beginning of his life, possesses some membership of a group. That group can be consisted of more than two members and this group can be called as 'family'. This group fulfils his needs regarding food, clothe, shelter, and recognition and he from the group, adopts values, customs, and beliefs which guide him to behave with others in the way as his group does (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Although, he as an individual has his own value, but he is identified with his initial group (family). Social identity theory posits, "Human individuals are able to act as other than and more than just individual persons (Turner, 1991)." As he grows he becomes the member of several groups, for instance, school, cricket team, musical banned, or some other and with these groups, he has strong affiliation and bounding (Turner, 1999). In view of social identity, people live in social groups, these groups can be identified as religious, ethnic/racial, or cultural. Each social group behaves in a specific way and this behavior helps to distinguish that group from other social groups (Harris, et al. 2014).

### *2.7.1 Social Groups*

Social group has a great value in our life and can be defined as "three or more people who share the same social identity, and through group identification and interaction experience a sense of belonging (Hogg, et al. 2007)." These social groups provide people with a source of pride and self-esteem, as well as a social identity that provides a sense of belonging in the world (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social identity theory argues that the members of the group, on continuous bases, attempt to enhance the status of their group and hold prejudicial beliefs about out-groups. Furthermore, people develop an 'us and them' perspective as a consequence of social categorization, which leads to animosity between groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). As in-group and out-group formation takes place and antagonism occurs, the social groups are stereotyped and stigmatized. To manage stigma, the stigmatized groups use some strategies or negotiated with their identity. Social identity theory

explains that to form in-groups, some cognitive Processes work side by side and when a person passes through these process, he strongly ties with his group.

### *2.7.2 Cognitive Processes and In-group Formation*

Social identity explains three cognitive processes and these cognitive processes are social categorization, social identification, and social comparison. By the process of social categorization, individuals are organized into social groups in order to understand the social world. This process enables people to define themselves on the basis of the groups to which they belong. The people tend to define people based on their social categories rather their individual characteristics. Social categorization highlights the similarities of in-group and the differences of out-groups (Turner, et al. 1994). Through the process of social identification, people identify themselves as a member of a social group. They behave in that way as their social group expects from them (Turner, 1987). The process of social comparison allows the people to compare their group with other group in terms of prestige and social standing. In order to maintain self-esteem, people perceive their in-group as having a higher social standing than an out-group (Turner, et al. 1992). This study asserts that although, these cognitive processes play an inordinate role for in-group formation but particularly, social categorization has its own importance. When social and self-categorization work side by side, the social groups become more tied and bound.

However, identifying with social groups is normal human behavior as the individual's social identity is forged by the knowledge that he or she belongs to a social category, or group of individuals, who identify themselves as members of the same social category" (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Stets & Burke, 2000; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Self-categorization involves "recognizing group prototypes that define how people will, and ought to, behave as well as interact with each other (Turner et al., 1987)." Identifying with the in-group enforces group norms and encourages conformity in cognitive processes such as "perceptions, inferences, feelings, behavior and interpersonal interactions (Erikson, 1968; Haslam, et al. 1996; Hogg et al., 2007)." This enquiry finds that self and social categorization plays a great role in making of in-groups and works in different stages and phases and step by step.

### *2.7.3 Steps in Social and Self-categorization*

At first step, Intra-Group Similarities and Intergroup Differences are highlighted: in fact, self-categorization is the cognitive process in which individuals strengthen their social identity by emphasizing intra-group similarities and intergroup differences. Secondly, when differences and similarities become visible and group boundaries are formatted: the discernible dissimilarities and likeness then sharpen group boundaries as well as the meaning systems inherent to the group, and set down group standards for behavior of the members of that social group. At third stage, these group standards become the blueprint for the individual's identity and subsequent behavior and ultimately, the individual is "depersonalized." (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

Fourthly, after setting group standards, the process of depersonalization begins: Self-categorization theory suggests that the adoption of a collective identity by a group member will trump his/her personal, individual identity, as he/she becomes an extension of the collective whole. At fifth phase, self-categorization Festers the Concept of 'Us and them' Mentality: Social identity theory proposes the perceived differentiation of in and out-groups is a result of categorization, fostering an 'us and them' mentality, that may lead to negative attitudes and animosity towards the 'other' (Griffiths & Nesdale, 2006; Onorato & Turner, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, et al. 1992), as well as enhancing self-esteem through in-group favoritism (Houston & Andreopoulou, 2003). Lastly, Interaction with Out-Group is partially or completely finished: For example, religious groups impose restrictions on interactions with non-believers, which encompasses all those outside of the group (Al Raffie, 2013). When individuals socially categorize, identify themselves as a social group, compare this group with other groups, and sacrifice their personalities in the process, definitely, they follow a collective ideology which provides them with the sense of bound, unity, and mutual goals and objectives. in Fact, every social group builds on a collective ideology and this collective ideology increases entitativity within the group and the members demolish their individual personality.

#### *2.7.4 Collective Ideology; Entitativity; De-individuation*

Social identity theory explicates that collective ideologies give “a sense of identity, endorse a set of moral values, encourage loyalty to communal groups, and provide meaning to existential issues (May, 1991).” A collective ideology supplies a dynamic social system in which all the members of the group are interdependent and possess shared beliefs. Collective environment of these groups “fosters the social, temporal, attachment and moral aspects of group membership that present the ideology as an undisputed truth (Orsini, 2012).” Strong identification with a group’s ideology, as well as associated practices, can promote “the belief of ideological and cultural superiority (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010).” When collective ideology gets activated, the sense of entitativity emerges and the social groups become single coherent and like-minded.

As a matter of fact, entitativity is the “degree to which members of a group are perceived as a single coherent social group (Hogg, 2005).” The concept of entitativity is based on the principles of proximity, similarity, organization, and common fate (Campbell, 1958). Social groups with collective ideologies and high levels of entitativity supply members with a strong sense of identity and shared purpose. The social groups are considered highly entitative when they have following characteristics, “internal homogeneity and behavioral consistency, frequent as well as intense interaction between members, significance of membership, clear internal structure, and shared fate and goals (Brewer, 1999; Hamilton, et al. 2004; Haslam, et al. 2004; Hogg, 2005; Spencer-Rodgers, et al. 2007; Yzerbyt, et al. 1998).” The researcher argues that when cognitive processes get activated, collective ideologies are developed, and the sense of entitativity emerges in social groups, collective identity takes place, whereby, people replace their individual identification with collective identity, and for their losses and gains, they consider their group responsible.

Social identity theory views self-depersonalization or de-individuation as an essential process in which players come to see themselves as a collective or joint unit, to feel a sense of weakness of being together in the same situation facing the same problem (Turner, 1987). Brewer also describes the significance of collective identity as a social identity where ‘I become we’ (Brewer, 1991). Klandermans and de Weerd differentiate the interconnected concepts of collective identity and social identity. According to them, “collective identity is

established through cognition shared by members of single group, while social identity concerns with cognition of a single individual about his or her membership in one or more group (Klandermans and de Weerd, 2000).” Through the lack of recognition of their individuality, “members engage in the depersonalization and de-individuation of the self and come to think of themselves in terms of group values and expectations (Cliff, 2006).” When I become we, anti-normative and disinhibited behaviors emerge.

The concept of de-individuation argues that psychological state of self-evaluation is decreased and members of the group involve in anti-normative and disinhibited behaviors (Postmes & Spears, 1998). These behaviors lead the members to moral disengagement and sense of lack of responsibility is cultivated among them. This concept also explains that for violent behavior, individuals do not take responsibility and anticipate their group as liable for the behavior (Bandura, 1990). This study presents the argument that from developing collective ideology to the emergence of collective identity, networks contribute significantly in social groups and support the process of in-group formation.

#### *2.7.5 Social Networks and Perception Building*

Social identity theory asserts that to build an identity or to form the groups on the bases of identity, social networks play a great role. These networks can be formal as institutions (Madrasas) or informal (Ijtimas held by religious groups). However, in a globalized world networks get involved more in identity formation process and in-group formation. Because, online networks are supplementary factor for people to identify with their group. The thoughts of individuals are changed and modified through networks. Some theorists argue that networks provide “sites in which group identities may be subject to negotiation (Deaux et al. 2003).” Networks are also used to build pressure upon the members. This implies individuals may also respond to contextual, network pressures through the “expansion and modification of identity definitions over time (Deaux et al. 2003),” if a member wishes to modify his identity, he feels pressure from his group that he will be seen with detestation by the group and its members. Besides social networks, perception building plays a great role to develop collective identity and to establish strong bound with the group.

Perception is a key term in both theories, and in practice of social identity. Perception is shaped by systems of meaning that constitute the groups, networks and broader social categories in which individuals belong. Social identity theory highlights the role of perception in establishing identity and in-group formation (Al Raffie, 2013). In analyzing the threat perceptions, which have the potential to lead Pakistani religious women to the role of nonviolent and in some cases of violent radicalization, a reality comes to us that perception regarding liberals (west) provided the opportunity to the religious feminine segments for building a separate identity on the bases of religion. The researcher makes the case that perception of threat works particularly and actively in the process of in-group formation.

Social identity theory indicates that if a group perceives threat to its identity, it becomes more coherent and cohesive. Among Muslims a perception developed that Islam is under threat from West, this is why, the Muslims should protect the religion from contamination. For this purpose, they should be strictly attached with their religious norms and values in order to save Islamic identity.

However, a primary assumption in terrorism studies is that a perception of threat to Islam has triggered the identity crises in Muslim youth. In exploring the factors which contribute for in-group formation of Muslims, it becomes obvious that Muslim scholars and leaders felt threat to Islam from West this is why, they tried to maintain strong Islamic identity among Muslims. When Self-perception is triggered and social comparison is activated minimal group paradigm takes place.

#### *2.7.6 Minimal Group Paradigm*

Tajfel presents the concept of minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1972). According to this concept, intergroup conflict occurs when self-perceived categorization and social comparison are linked with each other. In-group similarities and out-group differences are visible. “These real or self-perceived differences are based on attitude, behavioral norms, beliefs, or values (Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).” These differences and similarities lead to a practice of stereotyping, discrimination, and prejudice which may shape intergroup conflict (Brewer, 2001; Rothman, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In our society, many social groups based on distinct categories are stigmatized and consequently,

behavior of society towards a stereotyped group becomes changed (Crocker and Major, 1989).

## **2.8 Explaining Theory of Social Stigma**

To expound and analyze the process of radicalization in Pakistani female associated with religion, religious institutions, and groups it is important to explore the theory of stigma because the researcher makes the case that the process of stigmatization leads the females linked with religious identity to the road of radicalization. Under the current study it is tried to investigate that how the stigmatization is done by liberal/modern segments in Pakistan of those females who are belonging to religion simply, religious institutions, or religious groups. For this purpose, this research is focusing on the theoretical bases of social stigma first presented by Goffman in 1963.

In plain words, stigma can be understood as disapproval of, or discrimination against, a person based on perceivable social characteristics. It can be related to culture, gender, race, intelligence and health. Stigma is a Greek word which refers to a type of marking or the tattoo that used to cut or burned into the skin of criminals, slaves, or traitors in order to visibly identify them as blemished or morally polluted persons. Later, these individuals were avoided particularly in public places (Goffman, 1969). The people who are stigmatized usually feel different and devalued by others. Stigma may also be described as a label that associates a person to a set of unwanted characteristics that form a stereotype. When society categorizes individuals into certain groups the labeled person is subjected to status loss and discrimination (Jacoby, et al. 2005). Stigma may affect the behavior of those who are stigmatized.

Those who are stereotyped often start to act in ways that there stigmatizes expect of them. It not only changes their behavior, but it also shapes their emotions and beliefs (Brenda and Laurie, 2005). Members of stigmatized social groups often face prejudice that causes depression (Cox, et al. 2012). These stigmas put a person's social identity in threatening situations, such as low self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989). Members of stigmatized groups start to become aware that they are not being treated the same way and know they are likely

being discriminated. The key theorists of social stigma who contributed in its literature are: Durkheim, Gerhard, Goffman, Jones et al., Stafford and Scott, and Watkins and Jacoby.

Gerhard Falk argues, “All societies will always stigmatize some conditions and some behaviors because doing so provides for group solidarity by delineating outsiders from insiders (Falk, 2001).” Falk describes stigma based on two categories: existential stigma and achieved stigma: He defines existential stigma as “stigma deriving from a condition which the target of the stigma either did not cause or over which he has little control.” He explains Achieved Stigma as “stigma that is earned because of conduct and/or because they contributed heavily to attaining the stigma in question (Falk, 2001).”

Although, the concept of stigma as social phenomenon is first, described by French sociologist Émile Durkheim in 1895. He found that if a crime is associated with an individual, throughout his life, people stereotype him because of that crime (Durkheim, 1981). The full-fledged theory of socially stigmatized identity has been explored by Erving Goffman in 1963. He is considered as one of the most influential sociologists of the twentieth century. Goffman described stigma as “a phenomenon whereby an individual with an attribute which is deeply discredited by his/her society is rejected as a result of the attribute (Goffman, 1963).” He saw stigma as a process by which the reaction of others spoils normal identity (Goffman, 1963). In Goffman's theory of social stigma, a stigma is an attribute, behavior, or reputation which is socially discrediting in a particular way. It causes an individual to be mentally classified by others in an undesirable, rejected stereotype rather than in an accepted, normal one. After exploring the concept of stigma by Goffman, the other theorists further elucidate the term.

Jones et al, see Goffman's attribute as “being a distinct condition or characteristic defined by a social environment in that it marks a person as contaminated or spoiled (Jones et al. 1984).” Stafford and Scott highlight the term as “a characteristic of a person that is contrary to a norm of a social unit (Stafford and Scott, 1986).” According to Watkins and Jacoby, a stigmatized individual as “someone being identified as different (Watkins and Jacoby, 2007).” Crocker et al. make the point, “stigmatized individuals possess some attributes, or characteristics, that convey a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context (Crocker et al. 1998).” It means that such “a physical or social attribute



devalues an individual's identity and hence disqualifies the individual from full social acceptance (Goffman, 1963)." It also highlights the association of an individual with a stigmatized group or places that defines the "individuals 'potential culpability as he is stigmatized (Makki, 2015)." The theory of stigma argues that there are two categories of groups: one group always remains stigmatizer while the other is considered stigmatized. It is important to explain who are stigmatized and who are stigmatizer.

The stigmatized are those who are ostracized, devalued, scorned, shunned and ignored. They face discrimination in the realms of employment and housing (Bordieri and Drehmer, 1986). Perceived prejudice and discrimination is also associated with negative physical and mental health outcomes (Williams, et al. 2003). Those who perceive themselves to be members of a stigmatized group, whether it is obvious to those around them or not, often experience psychological distress and many view themselves contemptuously (Heatherton, et al. 2000).

At the other hand, stigmatizers are those who stereotype or stigmatize some individual or group. From the perspective of the stigmatizer, stigmatization involves threat, aversion and sometimes the depersonalization of others into stereotypic caricatures (Goffman, 1963). Stigmatizing others can serve several functions for an individual, including, "self-esteem enhancement, control enhancement, and anxiety buffering, through downward-comparison or comparing oneself to less fortunate others can increase one's own subjective sense of well-being and therefore boost one's self-esteem (Heatherton, et al. 2000)." Social stigma is a enrich process whereby multiple forms of this process, can be observed.

### *2.8.1 Types of Stigmas*

Campbell and Deacon explore the theory of stigma by differentiating the theory into various types (Campbell and Deacon, 2006). The first kind of stigma is overt or external deformities: The examples of this types involve leprosy, clubfoot, cleft lip or palate and muscular dystrophy. The second form is known deviations in personal traits: Being perceived rightly or wrongly, as weak willed, domineering or having unnatural passions, treacherous or rigid beliefs, and being dishonest, e.g., mental disorders, imprisonment, addiction, homosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts and radical political behavior. Third type is

called as tribal stigma: Affiliation with a specific nationality, religion, or race that constitute a deviation from the normative, i.e. being African American, or being of Arab descent in the United States after the 9/11 attacks (Campbell and Deacon, 2006).

### *2.8.2 Components of Stigma: Link and Phelan Stigmatization Model*

Bruce Link and Jo Phelan argue that stigma exists when four specific components congregate. The first component is individuals differentiate and label human variations. Secondly, prevailing cultural beliefs tie those labeled to adverse attributes. Thirdly, labeled individuals are placed in distinguished groups that serve to establish a sense of disconnection between "us" and "them". Fourthly, labeled individuals experience "status loss and discrimination" which leads to unequal circumstances (Link and Phelan, 2001).

In the model of Link and Phelan, stigmatization is also conditional with "access to social, economic, and political power (Makki, 2015)" that allows the "identification of differences, construction of stereotypes, the separation of labeled persons into distinct groups, and the full execution of disapproval, rejection, exclusion, and discrimination (Makki, 2015)." Subsequently, in this model, the term stigma is applied when labeling, stereotyping, disconnection, status loss, and discrimination all exist within a power situation that facilitates stigma to occur.

*Differentiation and Labeling:* According to this model, differentiation and labeling is a social process through which human differences are identified with the objective to label individuals and groups. There are two primary factors to examine when considering the extent to which this process is a social one: The first issue is that significant oversimplification is needed to create groups. The broad groups of black and white, homosexual and heterosexual, the sane and the mentally ill; and young and old are all examples of this. Secondly, the differences that are socially judged to be relevant differ vastly according to time and place. An example of this is the emphasis that was put on the size of the forehead and faces of individuals in the late 19th century which was believed to be a measure of a person's criminal nature (Link and Phelan, 2001).

*Linking to Stereotypes:* The second component of this model centers on the linking of labeled differences with stereotypes. Goffman's work made this aspect of stigma prominent and it has remained so ever since. This process of applying certain stereotypes to differentiated groups of individuals has attracted a large amount of attention and research in recent decades.

*Us and Them:* Thirdly, linking negative attributes to groups facilitates separation into "us" and "them". Seeing the labeled group as fundamentally different causes stereotyping with little hesitation. "Us" and "them" implies that the labeled group is slightly less human in nature and at the extreme not human at all (Makki, 2015). At this extreme, the most horrific events occur.

*Disadvantage:* The fourth component of stigmatization in this model includes "status loss and discrimination". Many definitions of stigma do not include this aspect, however, these authors believe that this loss occurs inherently as individuals are "labeled, set apart, and linked to undesirable characteristics (Link and Phelan, 2001)." The members of the labeled groups are subsequently disadvantaged in the most common group of life chances including income, education, mental well-being, housing status, health, and medical treatment. Hence, stigmatization by the majorities, the powerful, or the "superior" leads to the minorities, the powerless, and the "inferior". Whereby the stigmatized individuals become disadvantaged due to the ideology created by "the self," which is the opposing force to "the other." As a result, the others become socially excluded and those in power reason the exclusion based on the original characteristics that led to the stigma (Frosh, 2002). This investigative work finds that when any individual or social group is stigmatized, some damageable consequences occur.

### *2.8.3 The Consequences of Stigma*

As mentioned before that when any individual or some group is differentiated, stereotyped, considered as excluded, and discriminated on the bases of stigmatized identity, some consequences come in front. These consequences can be social or political exclusion, economic inequality, or adoption of extremist ideas or beliefs, or in some cases, the consequences can be more horrific like escalation of violent behavior and sometimes, the

stigmatized individual or group can commit the acts of terrorism. According to Link and Phelan, the immediate consequence of someone being discredited or devalued is a loss in social status, “undesirable characteristics that reduce his or her status in the eyes of stigmatizers (Link and Phelan, 2001).” In this way, categorized social hierarchies escort to discrimination because the normal beliefs not only justify the devalue-ness of the identity, but also isolate them to protect the tidily ordered (Douglas, 1966).

As an aftermath, the victim of stigmatization appears as the most “disadvantaged owing to restricted or denied access to social and economic capital (income, education, well-being, housing, health, and mental/psychological health) (Druss et al., 2000).” “Restricted access to socio-economic capital is likely to result in wider horizontal inequalities between so-called normal and the stigmatized (Makki, 2015).” This can be later, an increase in the “rate of crime, drug use, alcoholism, unhygienic living conditions, unemployment, heavy dependence on social welfare, or poor individual health (Harvey, 1996).”

Discrimination with stigmatized person/group or discrimination with a stigmatized place can result in socio-economic inequalities and disadvantage location. First, “discrimination is performed at a structural level and can be observed even where a stigmatiser is denying, hindering, or reluctantly allowing access to both social and economic capital, particularly in the shape of social sanctions, such as social gatherings or more formal representation in local councils (Makki, 2015).” Noticing such normal behavior can be used to identify discrimination against a particular identity as a possible cause of socio-economic inequalities. Second, “the discrimination of a place may occur, in that such a place is viewed as a disadvantaged location (Makki, 2015).” Hence, a place itself becomes a site of powerlessness or a location of structural discrimination.

Another consequence of stigma is that the self-esteem is damaged of stigmatized persons or groups. Members of stigmatized groups may have lower self-esteem than those of no stigmatized groups (Crocker, & Major, 1989). However, stigma does not occur in isolation because the phenomenon is reliant on a relationship shaped by power.

#### *2.8.4 Power Dynamics and Stigmatization*

Goffman argues that “to understand stigma it is important to understand the relationship developed and influenced by stigma rather than merely focusing on its attributes (Goffman, 1963).” More specifically, Link and Phelan expound in brief, “stigma is entirely dependent on social, economic and political power—it takes power to stigmatize and that the amount of stigma that people experience will be profoundly shaped by the relative power of the stigmatized and the stigmatiser (Link and Phelan, 2001).” They also propose that the process of stigmatization (labelling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination) described before, cannot occur or be performed in the absence of a power situation (Link and Phelan, 2001).

Similarly, Yang et al. highlight the importance of power to explain the concept of stigma as a “process ‘in which social, political, and economic dimensions catalyze and influence how an individual is to be treated (Yang et al. 2007).” By discussing above mentioned literature, two key elements emerge regarding the role of power in the process of stigmatization. First, “an imbalance of power exists between stigmatizer and stigmatized favoring the stigmatizer to whom power provides the ability to label, discriminate, and bracket individuals in a setting that is stigmatized (Makki, 2015).” While, on the other, because of socio-economic and cultural constraints the stigmatized has less, or no, power to challenge the dominant discourse. A second element is the question of “whose cognition or reasoning will prevail, especially when a stigmatized identity challenges, resists, or reacts to stigmatization (Makki, 2015).”

Link and Phelan argue that this social power ultimately decides whose cognition will dominate in the socio-economic and political realm (Link and Phelan, 2001). The authors further elaborate that, “in a scenario where individuals resist stigmatization, direct or structural discrimination would be performed (including a direct reminder of someone being discredited or devalued) (Link and Phelan, 2001).” The reason for such behavior, Makki argues, is “to strengthen and sustain the power that is being challenged by the stigmatized (Makki, 2015).”

On the bases of this discussion, two results of this power interplay can be recognized. First, whereas further discrimination and marginalization will be performed by the stigmatizer (at both the structural and the personal level), the stigmatizer is now permitted to delegitimize or disregard that identity's concerns or claims regarding any socio-economic change (Makki, 2015). Second, the stigmatizer has to posture extremely against or firmly oppose the narrative of the stigmatized (Makki, 2015). This research highlights that when stigma occupies the minds of stigmatized individual or group, then they try to manage their stigma. For this purpose, they apply different strategies which are explored in detail below.

### *2.8.5 Stigma Management Strategies*

To understand the managing strategies of stigma, first, it is important to highlight that there can be visible as well as invisible stigma. Every visible stigma first remains hidden. The stigmatized usually during invisibility stage try to manage stigma with different strategies while if stigma becomes visible the strategies can be separate from those which were applied to manage invisible stigma. Visible stigma can be defined as characteristics such as race, age, gender, physical disabilities, or deformities, whereas, invisible stigmas refer to characteristics such as sexual orientation, gender identity, religious affiliation, early pregnancy, certain diseases, or mental illnesses. The stigmatized use different strategies to manage visible stigma or invisible stigma.

#### *a. Invisible Stigma Management strategies:*

Individuals possessing invisible stigmas can choose either passing or revealing strategies in order to manage their identities when interacting with others. Passing strategies involve strategies that do not disclose the invisible stigma to others, including fabrication, concealment, and discretion. Revealing strategies involve identity management strategies that seek to disclose or reveal the invisible stigmas to others, such as signaling, normalizing, and differentiating.

Passing can be defined as “a cultural performance whereby one member of a defined social group masquerades as another in order to enjoy the privileges afforded to the dominant group (Leary, 1999).” The term passing refers to a “deliberate attempt by the stigmatized

individual to conceal those attributes that convey valuelessness (Goffman, 1963).” This helps the individual to present a spoiled self during social interaction (*Conyers and Kennedy 1963*).

The first strategy of passing for managing invisible stigma is fabrication: This strategy involves purposefully presenting false information about oneself in order to hide one's invisible stigma. Goffman reveals how stigmatized individuals process and manipulate information or, in other words, mask or conceal their negative attributes as a form of stigma management (Goffman, 1963). In practice, the individual does not introduce him as being from a specific place or as a member of a stigmatized group (Makki, 2015). In view of the fact that revealing such information directly stimulates an antagonistic behavior of normal, so a stigmatized person hides any detail which either devalues his identity or associates him with a stigmatized place or category.

Secondly, the stigmatized individuals or groups apply concealment under passing: It involves taking preventative measures to keep others from discovering personal characteristics for fear that may reveal an individual's invisible stigma (Herek, 1996). Goffman convincingly explains that a stigmatized identity conceals their stigma and “belittlement through dividing their world into a large group to whom he tells nothing, and a small group to whom he tells all and upon whose help he then relies (Goffman, 1963).”

The third strategy of passing availed to manage invisible stigma, is discretion: The discretion strategy is subtly different from the concealment strategy as it involves an individual avoiding questions or revealing information that is exclusively related to his invisible stigma (Herek, 1996). Discretion is not as active of a passing strategy as the other two strategies, but it does involve interpersonal elusiveness and speaking in ambiguous language when the conversation threatens to potentially reveal one's stigmatized identity (Chrobot, 2001).

Opposite to passing strategies, revealing strategies are signaling, normalizing, and differentiating. Revealing can be defined as a person chooses to unveil his stigma to other, in return, he expects that the others will also reveal their stigma in front of him.

Its first strategy is Signaling: it involves avoiding complete disclosure of one's invisible stigma to his familiars (Conyers and Kennedy 1963). First, indicators are sent to other regarding stigma by the stigmatized and it is tried to know that the other belongs to this stigmatized identity and how he will react if the stigmatized identity is disclosed.

Secondly, normalizing strategy is applied to manage invisible stigma under revealing: it involves revealing one's invisible stigma, but then minimizing its significance as to appear just as normal as everyone else (Clair, 2005). Goffman refers to normalization as an effort on the part of a stigmatized individual to present himself as an ordinary person (Goffman, 1963).

Thirdly, for invisible stigma management under revealing, the stigmatized individuals or groups use differentiating: it is consisted of not only revealing one's invisible stigma, but also emphasizing it and how it differentiates one from others. People who use this strategy try to eliminate unfair judgment by presenting their identity as equally acceptable when compared to others (Clair, 2005). This strategy refers to the way the stigmatized attempt to differentiate themselves from other stigmatized individuals or groups by tending to stratify their own (Goffman, 1963). This exemplifies “the process of differentiation within in-group by creating us and them by members of the same social category (Makki, 2015).”

While previous research has also built significantly on Goffman's arguments, more recently, Hannem and Bruckert (2012) assert that this in-group differentiation creates hierarchies to define the stigmatized and the less stigmatized. This is a kind of social boycott which may help to place the spoiled self in the sphere of normal. Hence, when an identity is stereotyped, labelled, and generalized according to “a specific social category (category-based on certain negative attributes), a pervasive and desperate in-group attempt is needed to differentiate oneself from those who have been marked as a socio-cultural risk by the normal in protecting a sense of self and self-worth (Hannem & Bruckert, 2012).” Although, the strategy of selective social networking falls between passing and revealing strategies.

By applying this strategy, the stigmatized neither disclose the stigma from every one, nor secrete from every one. This strategy refers to “how stigmatized individuals engage in various social situations where their main objective is to build a careful social network (Makki, 2015).” Goffman describes this relationship building or selective social interaction as



a path that a stigmatized individual adopts to deal with the notion of stigma (Goffman, 1963). This involves establishing those networks which support a stigmatized identity by selecting associations, developing personalized support groups, and creating a social network (Anderson Snow & Cress, 1994; Becker, 1981).

The question is raised here that why the stigmatized individuals or groups establish these networks? “Within such networks, a stigmatized individual ‘s self-esteem is shielded from comparison with those who are non-stigmatized and thus, from being reminded of being someone who is devalued (Crocker & Major, 1989; Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984).” The chance of stigmatization is hence, to a great extent minimized.

Goffman for the reason, argues, “stigmatized individuals inhabit worlds split between those who know and those who do not (Goffman, 1963).” “The individual who is known about by others may or may not know that he is known about by them; they in turn may or may not know that he knows or doesn’t know of their knowing about him. Further, while believing that they do not know about him, nonetheless he can never be sure. Also, if he knows they know about him, he must, in some measure at least, know about them; but if he does not know that they know about him, he may or may not know about them in regards to other matters (Makki, 2015).”

*b. Visible Stigma Management Strategies:*

Visible stigma management is very different from the management of invisible stigmas. However, when invisible stigmas shift along the continuum from being completely invisible to completely visible, they begin to operate in ways that are similar to visible stigmas. In other words, once an invisible stigma becomes visible (by wearing clothes or markers that identify one's self, or by being 'out' by others), that stigma can then be managed in similar ways as visible stigmas. In order to manage visible stigmas (or stigmas that have been made apparent to others), targets must engage in compensatory strategies, including acknowledgement, providing individuating information, and increased positivity.

These strategies are used to pre-emptively reduce interpersonal discrimination that can occur as a result of an explicitly apparent stigma. To manage visible stigma, the

stigmatized individuals or groups use compensatory strategies. When women believe that their writing will be evaluated by a sexist grader, they attempt to portray themselves as having non-traditional gender roles (Kaiser, 2001). Similarly, when black individuals are informed that they will be interacting with somebody who is a racist, they disclosed more information to their interaction partners.

The first strategy for managing visible stigma is, acknowledgement: Several studies expound that people with visible stigmas engage in the compensatory strategy of acknowledgement, referring to the act of openly addressing one's stigma. This strategy has been shown to be effective in improving perceptions of people with visible stigmas (Hebl, 2005). For instance, individuals with visible physical disabilities are less likely to be viewed with disdain, pity, or contempt when they explicitly acknowledged their physical disability (Davis, 1961). Secondly individuating Information is used to manage visible stigma: Some individuals with visible stigmas also adopt the compensatory strategy of providing individuating information to their interaction partners. This information allows the interaction partner to evaluate the target on an individual level rather than as a product of their stigma. The last Compensatory strategy applied for managing visible stigma, is increased positivity: Some individuals with visible stigmas choose to use the compensatory strategy of increased positivity in order to manage their identities. These individuals change their verbal, para-verbal, and nonverbal behaviors to increase the positivity and likeability of their interactions with others. As an example, black students tend to demonstrate behaviors that are more engaging and likeable during the interaction when told that their interaction partners are prejudiced (Shelton, et al. 2005). This enquiry makes the case that when stigma begins to give psychological and social impact, the people manage their stigma by different strategies, when these strategies (passing or revealing), have to be applied, the stigmatized individuals or groups negotiate their stigmatized identity.

## **2.9 Reviewing Theory of Identity Negotiation**

When females in Pakistan who are attached with religion, religious institutions, or religious groups stigmatized or stereotyped by other segments, they try to manage their stigma, but their social environment remains stable, this is why, they negotiate with their

stigmatized identity. To understand and to explore the process of identity negotiation of these females, this research is relied on identity negotiation theory of Swann who presented this theory in detail in 1987. In fact, the original seed of the Identity Negotiation Theory were cultivated by Stella Ting-Toomey in 1986 in the form of a chapter in an edited book by William B. Gudykunst.

In this chapter the Toomey emphasizes the importance of “affirming both sociocultural group membership and personal identity issues in developing quality intergroup-interpersonal relationships (Toomey, 1986).” The main argument presented by Toomey stresses the significance of validating both “group membership identity salience and personal identity salience issues to develop quality relationships and not to the exclusion of emphasizing personal-based identity issues alone (Toomey, 1993).” The term identity in the Identity Negotiation Theory (INT) refers to an individual’s multifaceted identities of cultural, ethnic, religious, social class, gender, sexual orientation, professional, family/relational role, and personal image(s) based on self-reflection and other-categorization social construction processes (Swann, et al. 1987). According to social identity theory, social (or socio-cultural) identities can include ethnic membership identity, social class identity, to family role issues, and personal identities can include any unique attributes that we associate with our individuated self in comparison to those of others. Hence, each individual’s composite identity has group membership, relational role, and individual self-reflexive implications (Turner, et al. 1992). Individuals mostly acquired their composite identity through socio-cultural conditioning process, individual lived experiences, and the repeated intergroup and interpersonal interaction experiences.

The term negotiation in the identity negotiation theory refers to the exchange of verbal and nonverbal messages between the two or more communicators in maintaining, threatening, or uplifting the various socio-cultural group-based or unique personal-based identity images of the other (Toomey, 1993). It will not be wrong to write that identity negotiation refers to the processes through which people reach agreements regarding "who is who" in their relationships (Swann, et al. 1987). Once these agreements are reached, people are expected to remain faithful to the identities they have agreed to assume. The process of identity negotiation thus establishes what people can expect of one another (Toomey, 1999).

Identity negotiation thus provides the interpersonal "glue" that holds relationships together (Swann, et al. 1982).

The idea that identities are negotiated originated in the sociological literature during the middle of the 20th century. A leading figure in this movement was Goffman who asserted that the first order of business in social interaction is establishing a "working consensus" or agreement regarding the roles each person will assume in the interaction (Goffman, 1959). Weinstein and Deutschberger in 1964 and later McCall and Simmons in 1966 built on this work by elaborating the interpersonal processes that unfold after interaction partners reach an initial working consensus. Within psychology, these ideas were elaborated by Secord and Backman in 1965 and Schlenker in 1985.

The actual phrase "identity negotiation" was introduced by Swann who emphasized the tension between two competing processes in social interaction, behavioral confirmation and self-verification (Swann, 1987). Behavioral confirmation occurs when one person (the "perceiver") encourages another person (the "target") to behave in ways that confirm the expectancies of the perceiver (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Snyder & Klein, 2005; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). Self-verification occurs when the "target" persuades the "perceiver" to behave in a manner that verifies the targets firmly held self-views or identities (Swann, 1983; 1996).

When the expectancies of perceivers clash with the self-views of targets, a "battle of wills" may occur (Swann & Ely, 1984). Such "battles" can range from short-lived, mild disagreements that are quickly and easily solved to highly pitched confrontations that are combative and contentious. The identity negotiation process seems to favor self-verification, which means that people tend to develop expectancies that are congruent with the self-views of target persons (Major, Cozzarelli, Testa, & McFarlin, 1988); McNulty & Swann, 1994; Swann, Milton, & Polzer, 2000; Swann & Ely, 1984). Groups also benefit when there is congruence among group members. When people maintain stable images of themselves, other members of the organization can count on them to "be" the same person day in and day out and the identity negotiation process can unfold automatically (Swann and Junior, 1985). This can free people to devote their conscious attention to the work at hand, which may explain why researchers have found that "groups characterized by high levels of congruence

perform better (Swann et al. 1987).” During exploration process of identity negotiation perspective, the researcher came to know that this concept is based on some dialectical themes and competence and desired outcomes.

### *2.9.1 Identity Negotiation Theory: Boundary-Crossing Identity Dialectical Themes, Competence and Desired Outcomes*

In identity negotiation theory, the five boundary-crossing identity dialectical themes can be found. Firstly, Identity security- vulnerability: it means, the individuals or groups wish to have no threat to their negotiated identity from out-groups. Second dialectical theme is inclusion differentiation: the people want to be included in social/cultural environment with their negotiated identity and they do not desire to be differentiated on the bases of some stigmatized identity with which they have negotiated. Thirdly, predictability-unpredictability: it signifies the individuals like to live in a predictable social environment which supports their negotiated identity. The fourth theme of identity negotiation is connection-autonomy: it denotes that people feel contented in those social circles which see their negotiated identity with respect and with these social circles, the people have strong emotional bounds. Fifthly, identity consistency-change across time: it refers to the attachment of the individuals or groups with negotiated identity and it is difficult for the people to change their negotiated identity (Toomey, 2013). Besides cross-boundaries dialectical themes, identity negotiation theory possesses some competence and desire outcomes.

Competence identity outcomes are included: firstly, feeling of being understood, secondly, the feeling of being respected, and thirdly, feeling of being affirmatively valued (Toomey, In T.A. Karis & K. Killian, 2009). Desired Outcomes consist: mutual identity understanding, mutual identity respect, and conjoint identity valuation and satisfaction (Toomey, In S. Littlejohn and K. Foss, 2009). Identity negotiation theory argues that human beings need self-confirmatory feedback which provides them with satisfaction that they are valuable and respectable.

### *2.9.2 Self-Confirmatory Feedback*

This concept explains that people want to take positive feedback from their interaction partners for their identity with which they have negotiated (Swann and Junior, 1984). For this purpose, they use self-confirmatory strategies. Individuals are expected to think and behave in ways that endorse the survival of their self-conceptions, regardless of whether the self-conception happens to be positive or negative (Swann, et al. 1987). Although there are surely painful results associated with verifying negative self-conceptions and the current research proves that failing to verify them can have more painful consequences both epistemically and pragmatically. Recent studies support the idea that people work to verify their self-conceptions by striving to obtain self-confirmatory feedback from others (Swann and Junior, 1983). It will not be wrong to write that self-confirmatory feedback is like a basic need of life.

From many years, biologists and ecologists are noticing, “every living organism inhabits a niche or opportunity structure that routinely satisfies its needs and desires (cf. Clarke, 1954; Odum, 1963; E. O. Wilson, 1974).” This rule is also applied on human beings. In real, people seem to be active in seeking to ensure that their ‘opportunity structures’ satisfy their desire for self-confirmatory feedback (McCall & Simmons, 1966). In their quest for a self-confirmatory opportunity structure, people usually use three strategies: Firstly, they strategically choose interaction partners and social settings. Secondly, they display identity cues. Thirdly, they adopt interaction strategies that evoke self-confirmatory responses (Swann, et al. 1986). This social enquiry explains that for seeking self-confirmatory feedback the people adopt selective interaction so that their negotiated identity can be valued and respected.

### *2.9.3 Selective Interaction*

Previously mentioned all the strategies of self-confirmatory feedback have one thing in common: the people interact with specific and selective people or social environment which positively evaluate their identities. As discussing stigma management strategies, it was highlighted that selective social networks are established to manage stigma. Here the research has the aim to explore that why people like to live in a specific social gathering which

provides self-confirmatory positive feedback to their negotiated stigmatized identity. The identity negotiation researchers since many years are observing that people seek out social contexts which provide them with self-confirmatory feedback.

For example, Pervin and Rubin explore, “students are less likely to drop out and are happier in college if it has qualities that are compatible with their views (Pervin and Rubin, 1967).” Swann and Pelham also excavate in their study, a highly reliable tendency for people to prefer their ideal friends and intimates to see them as they saw themselves (Swann and Pelham, 1987). Hence, people who have positive self-conceptions preferred others to view them favorably, while, the people who have negative conceptions of themselves preferred others to view them relatively unfavorably (Swann, et al. 1988). Further support for the selective interaction hypothesis comes from a field investigation of college roommates by Swann and Pelham in 1987, when they found, “that individuals who found themselves in relationships in which their roommate's appraisal was incongruent with their self-conceptions were more likely to plan to change roommates than were those in congruent relationships (Swann and Pelham, 1987).” If people once negotiate their identity, then to change or to modify the negotiated identity becomes complex and intricate course of action for them.

#### *2.9.4 Changing Negotiating Identity as a Complicated Process*

If in some case, an individual or a group wishes to alter its negotiated identity, it has to face difficulty for it because changing negotiated identity is a complex process. For instance, Therapists often fail to alter the views of their clients, even after months of intensive therapy (Swann, et al. 1985). In addition, Block; Costa & McCrae explain that self-conceptions and related psychological structures remain stable over periods as long as 35 years (Block, 1981; Costa & McCrae, 1980).

For changing negotiated identity, the social environment in which the target resides, must support new self-views and novel identity. The research on selective interaction highlights that people are inclined to enter relationships with individuals who see them as they see themselves (Swann, et al. 1981). This means that even if targets are amenable to changing their self-view, the change process may be undermined by the target's friends and intimates (Swann& Predmore, 1985).

Suppose, for instance, an extremely talented person who, for whatever reason faces an abusive parent, he will develop as a negative view of himself. A therapist tries to deal with this problem by establishing a supportive relationship with the client and encourages him to concentrate on his many talents. Although this technique produces quick improvements in the client's self-view, such improvements can be completely undone when the client returns home to a spouse who showers him with abuse. Hence, once the individuals establish relationships with partners who see them as they see themselves, these partners are liable to reinforce the identities that have been negotiated, even if these identities are negative and at some level the person wishes to dominate them (Swann, et al. 1987). It seems then that people with negative self-views sometimes work both to maintain and to improve their self-views, at once pushing and pulling themselves into a standstill. In this study the researcher also finds that when people negotiate their identity, they begin to highlight their negotiated identity with different cues to develop social relations.

#### *2.9.5 Identity Cues*

Displaying Identity Cues Another way that people can succeed in laying claim to a particular identity is by looking the part. To be effective, identity cues must meet two criteria: First, they must be under the individual's control, and second, they must characteristically evoke desired responses from others (Swann, 1981). People's physical appearance represents one group of identity cues.

For instance, the dressing of an individual tells others whether he is liberal or conservative, wealthy or destitute, easygoing or meticulous, prudish or promiscuous. Similarly, through the skillful use of cosmetics and wigs, people can project dramatically different identities to onlookers. Even body posture is used to communicate various identities to others (Toomey, 1999). Given sufficient motivation, people actually modify their body structure to convey particular identities to others. Self-perceived athletes, for example, may diet and lift weights to ensure that their physiques elicit the reactions they desire. Aging individuals who wish to maintain their youthful appearance may take more drastic steps (Swann, et al. 1988).



A key benefit of the identity negotiation framework is that it unambiguously acknowledges the influence of personal characteristics like goals, agendas, and life histories and social structural variables as norms, roles, and social conventions on the nature and outcome of social interaction (Swann, et al. 1980). This relatively unrestrained perspective leads to insights that cannot be reached from either a person logical or a social context alone. In fact, identity cues play an important role to display the negotiated identity. This investigative work explores that religious identities if face stigmatization, these identities are negotiated by the people because the process of in-group formation gets activated due to religious affiliation and strong intimacy with religion. In the next section of this chapter the religious identities are excavated and discussed in detail.

## **2.10 Religious Identities: Construction and Negotiation**

After discussing in detail that how in-group formation takes place, how specific identities are stigmatized, how stigmatized population manages its stigma, how people or groups negotiate their existing identity, specifically, in this section, it is overlooked that what is religious identity? How this identity is constructed and negotiated? Because in particular, this research is concerned with those Pakistani females who are linked with religious systematic life. The term ‘religious identity’ to refer to the identification of an individual with a religious tradition was first introduced by Hans Mol in 1976/1979 and later expounded by Seul in 1999. These scholars make the case that because “religions rest on metaphysical and ethical beliefs drawn from a shared religious tradition, they form a key influence on an individual’s perspectives of themselves and the world (Mol, 1976/1979 and Seul, 1999).” Seul finds that “religion provides the strongest kind of identity for individuals and groups (Seul, 1999).” Religious norms and values are communicated through texts and practices and because of their appeal to the transcendent they have a greater influence on people than other kinds of influences.

### *2.10.1 Religious Identity: A Psychological or Sociological Concept*

From many years, a debate among researchers and scholars has been begun that the religious identity is either a psychological concept or anthropological/cultural or sociological.

Markstrom-Adams & Smith, Hunsberger et al. Rymarz & Graham, Bertram-Troost et al., and Armet argue that religious identity development or formation is a psychological process (Markstrom-Adams & Smith, 1996; Hunsberger et al., 2001; & Armet, 2009). While a group of researchers considers that the religious identity construction is a socially located process (stberg, 2000; Zine, 2001; Peek, 2005). The people who believe in religious identity as a psychological process, they use adolescent identity development theory of the Freudian psychologist Erikson who gave this concept in 1968.

Marcia emphasizes on the psychological content of Erikson theory and argues, “Adolescence as a crucial time in the human life-cycle consisting of a psychosocial identity crisis whereby identity diffusion is overcome by adolescents’ growing occupational and ideological commitment (Marcia, 1966).” According to Marcia, there are four basic identity statuses through which adolescents may progress in order to achieve a coherent self-image and healthy psychological unity (Erikson, 1958). First identity status is foreclosure: that a choice of identity is made but without exploration. Secondly, diffusion: no identity is formed and there has been no exploration. The third identity status is moratorium: no identity has been formed, but exploration has taken place. Fourthly, identity achievement: identity has been formed after exploration has taken place.

In contrast to studies which consider religious identity with psychological view, some researchers conceptualize religious identity on cultural anthropology and symbolic interactionism and concepts related to role-performance (Goffman, 1959) and boundary maintenance (Barth, 1969). Research conducted upon Muslim children or adolescents in Western societies and educational institutions highlights that religious identity is a sociological concept and the researchers investigate that cultural and social processes impact and constitute religious identities (Moulin, 2013).

Several studies explore that Rather than as a hierarchy of psychological statuses, or individuals’ commitment to fixed, beliefs and practices, religious identities are constructed or shaped by socio-political processes and phenomena. Zine and Peek excavate that religious identities can be constructed in response to society’s representation of religious adolescents’ traditions as part of a process of “role-performance” (Zine, 2001 and Peek, 2005). The scholars interpret this process as one necessary to maintain ethnic and religious identities

either as shifting boundaries between groups (Jacobson, 1997), or in order to preserve religious beliefs and practices (Zine, 2001; Peek, 2005).

### *2.10.2 Religious Identity Construction and Negotiation (Gee's Typology)*

As discussed before, the term 'identity negotiation' was originated in social psychology by Swann in 1987. His terminology and a similar concept of negotiation as a socially located process of identity construction, has been appropriated and further developed by identity theorists interested in issues of political and cultural representation. Scholars in the field of cultural studies interested in issues surrounding race and ethnicity in particular, as Hall conceptualizes identity as a negotiated process (Hall, 1997). Gee gives further theoretical insight into "how such identity processes are conceptualized in school settings, and how they can be recognized as relating to different systems of authority (Gee, 2000)." 'Identity' can be defined as 'what kind of person' someone is recognized as, or presents themselves as, in a given circumstance (Gee, 2000).

Gee suggests that there is fourfold typology of identity that is defined by different sources of socially constructed power: first, nature-identity; "from a state in nature". Second, institution-identity; "a position within institutions". Thirdly, discourse-identity; "individual character traits as recognized in the dialogue or discourse of individuals, such as being charismatic". Fourthly, affinity-identity; "shared in the practice of affinity groups" (Gee, 2000).

Gee presents the example of African American to validate his identity typology. According to him, African American can have Institutional identity "because social and educational institutions may ascribe certain positions to African American students, for example, by direct discrimination or institutional racism", it can also be understood as a Nature identity "when considered in a racial or biological sense", African American identity can be recognized and represented in the way people talk and act in dialogue as a Discourse, it can be explored as Affinity-identity "by performing practices or holding beliefs that show an affinity with other African Americans (Gee, 2000)." All of these kinds of identity rely upon social and historical systems of representation and recognition (Discourses), but an

individual has some agency in terms of which kind of identity they may seek to be recognized as, perform or emphasize.

In fact, religious identity is constructed by individuals and their social context, “this is done by individuals drawing from, endorsing, or opposing, established religious traditions, their systems of representation and forms of recognition (Moulin, 2013).” The use of symbols to construct and negotiate religious identity boundaries can be an important part of this process (Jacobson, 1997; Ajrouch, 2004). A pertinent visible example of this, is the decision of Muslim women to wear or not wear Hijab in diaspora contexts (Read & Bartkowski, 2000; Haw, 2011).

The researcher discusses in the particular work that the religiously affiliated female differentiate them from those women who get modern customs and norms or adopt liberal (western) institutional life. The women belonging to religion, religious institutions, or religious groups construct their identity on the bases of religion, (strong influence) this is the reason, they cannot change their identity even they are stigmatized by society. To cope their stereotyped identity, these females try to manage their stigma and for the management, they negotiate with their identity to acquire self-confirmatory feedback for their constructed and negotiated identity. As the consequence of stigmatized negotiated identity, they face political marginalization, social exclusion, psychological depression, and unequal economic status. They themselves remain away from modern social, political, economic, and educational system and like to live in a particular social environment (in-group) which provides them satisfaction, respect, and regard. As an aftermath, in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation work in a cyclical way and force the religiously identified women to adopt extremist ideas and beliefs and ultimately, they are stimulated towards nonviolent and in some cases to violent radicalization. In next chapter, the researcher endeavors to examine the phenomenon of radicalization among Pakistani religious-oriented women by applying theoretical groundings as social identity; to understand in-group formation, social stigma; to analyze stereotyping of religious identity, and identity negotiation; to explore social environment which supplies these females the fuel to ignite extremist ideas and beliefs.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING OF APPLICABILITY AND PRACTICALITY OF CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS WITH THE CASE**

Subsequent to review the available literature produced on radicalization, social identity, social stigma, identity negotiation, and religious identity construction, the applicability of these theoretical underpinnings are examined with special reference to Pakistani religious feminine segments. In previous chapter, the researcher profoundly explored the process of radicalization as definitions; motivational factors; strategies; and models, social identity as cognitive processes; social grouping; entitativity; collective ideology; self-categorization; social networking; threat perception; and minimal group paradigm, social stigma as types of stigma; consequences of stigma; model of stigma; power dynamics; and management strategies, identity negotiation as selective interaction; self-verification; self-confirmatory feedback; and identity cues. Here, the investigator explicitly tries to look through theoretical lens that how in-group' formation, stigmatized identity, and identity negotiation are playing as driving dynamism to lead the females of religious institutions (Madrasas) or religious groups to adopt and espouse radicalized ideas and beliefs in Pakistan.

To understand the phenomenon and to link the theory with practice, the chapter is divided in to five parts. The first part looks over the journey from religious identity construction to escalation of radicalization with gender lens in the country. Second section seeks to discuss theory of religious identity construction and development of social identity as us vs. them with the case of Pakistani religiously motivated women. In third section, practicality of theory of social stigma in religious-oriented females is evaluated. The fourth part expounds the applicability of identity negotiation among religiously identified women. Section five shines the light on the contribution of all drivers mentioned before in triggering the process of nonviolent and in some cases to violent operations belonging to radicalization among Pakistani religious feminine spheres.

### **3.1 Religious-Oriented Women: Journey from Religious Identity Construction to the Process of Radicalization**

It is argued that females belonging to religious institutions (Madrasas) do not contribute in social/cultural, political, and economic development of the country, they restrict themselves to the domestic spheres by making the reason that Islam does not permit them to do so. If in any case, they have to go out with the purpose of earning or study, they prefer a specific social environment for work or education which does not damage their identity, moreover, they are rigid in their behavior, they legitimize violent actions against nonbelievers, they hold extremist views and beliefs, and they motivate themselves and others for doing Jihad. This research raises the question that why these females adopt a specific, common, and rigid (radicalized) behavior? To solve this query, the particular case is scrutinized by theoretical lens of social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation.

The researcher makes the case that religious-oriented females either belong to religious institutions (Madrasas) or religious groups, engage in adverse relations with those who are not linked with these institutions or groups because in their view, the women who get modern education or work with men are irreverent and away from Islam. They also hold negative image about those men who allow their daughters, sisters, or wives to get co-education or work with male staff. While on the other hand, these females are considered backward and conservative in other Pakistani modern circles and whole Pakistani society left them unchanged and underdeveloped. Not only this, they are stereotyped, stigmatized, and negatively attributed with religion. As an aftermath, these females negotiate with their stigmatized identity and restrict themselves in maintaining relations with those who have no religious background. In making friendship or in doing marriage, they prefer that the friend or spouse should be religious as they are. Consequently, they are kept away from modern educational, political, economic, and cultural opportunities. This study makes the case that as they do not get equal opportunities because of stigmatized and negotiated identity in all fields of life, they are engaged in the process of nonviolent or in some cases to violent operations belonging to radicalization, as they hold violent ideologies, they define women role in the time of Jihad, and they espouse various threat perceptions from the modern/liberal (western) culture regarding their constructed religious identity. The inquirer asserts that constructive,

inclusive, and progressive interventions must be introduced in order to prevent the activation of violent process of radicalization in the country. However, the rudimentary perseverance of this exploratory work is to find the answers that how females belonging to simply religious identity or religious institutions or groups are stigmatized or stereotyped by modern/liberal segments of Pakistani society? Why they negotiate with their stigmatized identity? How their negotiated religious identity and what drivers as a consequence of stigmatized identity help them to move towards the road of radicalization?

### **3.2 Construction of Socio-Religious Identity and the Process of Us vs. Them**

This section highlights construction of religious identity, activation of the process of us vs. them, religious social grouping in Pakistan, activation of cognitive processes among Pakistani religious-oriented women, religion as Collective ideology and source of entitativity, development of social networks, and minimal group paradigm.

#### *3.2.1 Emergence of the Sense of Us vs. Them*

In post-colonial world, the sense of in-group formation got activated among Muslims and Islamic society and it was divided into religious (the people who have rigidity in religious thoughts and remained away from modern system) and liberals (the people who depicted flexibility in their religious values and norms and got ready to adopt modern systematic life) (Milton, 2013). The religious group began to hate liberal (Westernized) thoughts because it considered west as the antagonist to Islam and argued that Islamic values are contaminated by U.S. and Europe (Khitab, 2006). While on the other hand, liberals were in favor of having friendly relations with West. This study makes the case that the concept of in-group formation also gave impact on the females of Muslim world and they divided into religious and liberals too.

The women who linked with modern institutional life fell under the category of liberals while, the females who affiliated with religious institutions and religious groups were considered as religious-oriented. When in-group formation has been strengthened among liberal and religious Muslim females, the process of stigmatization occurred, the liberal women began to stigmatize the religious feminine sphere and as an aftermath, these females

negotiated with their identity to manage their stigma. This identity negotiation, consequences of stigma, and power dynamics led these women to the path of radicalization.

### *3.2.2 Practicality of Social Identity: Division of Religious and Modern Women*

Social identity theory presents the concept of social grouping and in-group and out-group as reviewed in previous chapter. The researcher here makes the case that females who are linked with liberal identity and have some association with modern educational system (colleges and universities) and the females who are affiliated with religious identity and possess link with religious institutions (Madrasas) or religious groups are considered two separate groups because of their specific environment in which they reside. The researcher finds that the women belonging to modern education, are not bound very strongly with their group as they experience the bounding with many social groups like sports, music, cultural activities, educational organizations, and work place. Moreover, no influential force motivates them to be adhere with the group. While at the other, feminine spheres of religious system have resilient connection with their group because at the one hand, they do not have much social groups to be attached and on the other, they have religion as a powerful source which is activated to tie them with the group.

### *3.2.3 Religious Social Grouping in Pakistan*

The first concept of social identity carried in revisiting the literature to explain the phenomenon was social group. The researcher highlights that in Pakistan, multiple social groups, built on the bases of religion are working and these groups provide the females with sense of pride and self-esteem, and belongingness (social groups supply the members with self-esteem and sense of belongingness). These groups penetrate among the members that if they will adhere with the group, they will go straightly to “*Jannah*” (heaven/paradise). And the group will show the right path and path of ALLAH ALMIGHTY. By linking with the particular religious group, they are respected not in the temporary world but also here after. The researcher claims that Al-Huda, Dawat-e-Islami, and female Wing of Jamaat-e-Islami are some example of this kind of grouping in Pakistan. In addition, many religious institutions (Madrasas) provide the females to be attached with the social groups like Diobandi religious institutions (Madaris) emphasize to join Jamad-e-Islami, Vahabis prefer to be linked with Al-



Huda International System , whereas, Brailvis love to belong to Dawat-E-Islami. As literature on social identity suggests that cognition processes have a great significance in building social groups and in the process of understanding of us vs. them, same in the case of religiously motivated female in Pakistan is observed.

#### *3.2.4 Activation of Cognitive Processes among Pakistani Religious-Oriented Women*

The theory of social identity highlights three cognitive processes that help to define social identity and work to divide the groups between ‘us vs. them’. As in literature review it has been described that the cognitive processes are social categorization, social identification, and social comparison and this social enquiry argues that these processes are denoted in Pakistani religious-minded female who are specifically affiliated with Madrasas or religious groups. These females are socially categorized and stigmatized as *Pardahdar* women, they are considered as conservative, and they are thought to be lived in the age of 1400 years ago. While these women categorized themselves as they are most pious, respectable, and reverent (social categorization claims that the explicit group categorizes and differentiates itself from all other social groups because of some attributes). These females identify them with their religious institution/group and behave in the same way as their institution/group expects from them (social identification describes that the members behave in the same way as the group expects from them to be behaved). For example, they wear *Hijab*, *Burka*, and they do not talk to *Naamahram*. When they compare their religious group with liberals, they develop the view that their group is better because ALLAH ALMIGHTY is happy with their group and liberals are far away from the blessings of GOD. While the modern women of Pakistani society, when compare themselves with these religiously motivated females, they find that they are better as they have no limitations of *Pardah* and they have the excess to all the fields of life, like sports, music, and go out of the home any time without any *Naamahram*’ (social comparison indicates that the group compares itself with the other groups existed in society and finds that it is the best among all groups and the members should feel pride to be the part of exclusive group). The researcher discusses that social and self-categorization, identification, and comparison are the motivational forces to push or pull the religiously affiliated women of Pakistani society towards radicalization as these cognitive process help them to embrace violent ideologies, roles, and threat perceptions from the modern world. As

Silber and Bhatt denote that self-identification (search for identity and willingness to be recognized) is a driving dynamism towards radicalization (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). However, behind the process of radicalization, a collective ideology galvanizes the members of the specific group, which strengthens the bounds with the group and penetrates among them the genes of radicalization. In the case of Pakistani religiously affiliated females, the name of religion (Islam) as a collective ideology is activated.

### *3.2.5 Religion as Collective Ideology and Source of Entitativity: Penetration of Radicalized Thoughts among Pakistani Religious-Minded Females*

The religion (Islam) as collective ideology forces the religious groups to be highly entitative. Through collective dogma of Islam, the women linked with religious institutions (Madrasas) or groups share values, norms, customs, traditions, thoughts, goals, vision, and way of life. More than this, they have the same view of the world, they think alike, look alike, and even communicate alike (social identity theory alludes that behind any social group collective ideology work, this ideology motivates the members to share ideas, beliefs, views, and thoughts). The literature on radicalization also shines the light that collective ideology has a great viability to attract the people to adopt extremist views and beliefs. For example, Silber and Bhatt point out indoctrination and Jihadization as the key factors of radicalization (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). The ideology provides the members some frames to interpret the world and this frame alignment further develops the collective ideology as “west has intention to remove Islamic norms and values,” “the Muslims will be dominated by Jews,” and “Islam is under threat” (Victorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 2008). It is as well indicated that to engage particularly women to the process of radicalization, the extremist groups utilize ideologies or narratives as the strategy of recruitment (Van knop, 2007). The researcher signifies that the radicalized females of Sawat were motivated by the ideology of implementing ‘Sharia’ by Mullah Fazal-ullah and Sufi Muhammad.

The women of Pakistani religious groups like Al-Huda or female wing of Jamaat-e-Islami are also considered extremely entitative (the concept of entitativity explains that the members of the particular group are strongly ties with each other likewise with the norms, values, and behaviors of their group). Collective ideology and entitativity when work to

gather, the members of the group adopt a collective identity and forget their individual personality. The researcher expounds that females who are associated with Madrasas or with any religious group justify the use violence in the form of Jihad and they themselves become ready to engage in violent activities because their individual identity is abolished by these religious institutions (Madrasas) or groups. Through the development of collective identity and strong group ties, social networks play a vital and very important role to push or pull the women to adopt radicalized thoughts and beliefs.

### *3.2.6 Development of Social Networks: Motivation towards Nonviolent Radicalization*

The literature on social identity suggests that the groups build social networks and these networks are the key element for the process of in-group formation. These social networks bring a great changing in thoughts of individuals for instance, many females who never saw Hijab in their family, but when they begin go in “Ijtima” (informal religious gathering) they start to wear that. These social networks not only change thinking and remove individual identity but also put pressure upon the members not to be altered the existing collective identity. Like, a female who is belonged to a Madrasa if tries to remove her *Burka*, she knows that she will be criticized by her group members. Due to this pressure, she never endeavors to leave her *Burka* (social networks help to configure a new identity and abstain to alter existing identity). This social investigation highlights that through social networks, the religious institutions or religious groups stimulate the women of Pakistani society to the rode of radicalization by penetrating violent ideological perspectives, role of women in Jihad, and threat perceptions regarding their religious identity. In religious formal gatherings (Ijtimas), lessons of violence are delivered in the name of Jihad and the females with their simple and religious mentality adopt extremist ideas and beliefs and further communicate and persuade to their sons, husbands, and brothers to participate in Jihad. Sageman elucidates, “three cognitive factors [sense of moral outrage; using of frames to interpret the world; personal experiences] are activated among individuals, they are mobilized towards the path of radicalization through networks” (Sageman, 2008). This dissertation argues that when social networks give their influence, the minimal group paradigm takes place.

### *3.2.7 Minimal Group Paradigm: Justification and Legitimization of Violence*

As highlighted previously that this concept was first explored by Tajfel and according to this concept, group differences and similarities become visible and self-created perceptions about out-group threaten the collective identity of in-group. The researcher argues that similarities in the behavior of the females associated with religion or religious institutions (Madrasas) and religious groups and their difference from those women who are linked with modern systematic life is very unambiguous. For example, they put Hijab, say greetings in a specific way, and abstain from maintain relations with men. While the women who are attached with schools, colleges, and universities, are frequent in building relations with men and women, their dresses are designed with many stiles, and their hair cut can be found of different type. Moreover, the females related to religious groups remain limited to develop sociable liaison with those women to whom they consider modern/liberal because they have a perception that if they fall in amity with them, their religious identity will be abolished and they will be kept away of Islam. Hence, a minimal group paradigm brings about a conflicted relation between traditional/religious females and modern social feminine segments of Pakistani society. Ultimately, minimal group paradigm brings about stereotypical behaviors and social stigma regarding religious identity of the women who are associated with religious groups/organizations or religious institutions (Madrasas). When the females belonging to Madrasas or religious groups, or just possess religious identity are stigmatized, negatively labeled, and stereotyped by those who are not affiliated with the religious identity/institutions/groups. As a consequence of stigmatization, religious-oriented women instigate to live in a particular social environment where they are motivated to involve in the process of radicalization. (To understand in detail social groups, cognitive processes, collective ideology, entitativity, de-individuation, social networks, perception building, and minimal group paradigm read chapter 2 literature review)

### **3.3 Social Stigma and Radicalization: The Case of Pakistani Religiously Identified Women**

The females linked with religious mentality and behaviors, have stigmatized identity and deleteriously attributed with their outlook and way of life style for the reason that they

keep them away from modern/liberal life. The literature on social stigma alludes that when stigma occurs, compulsorily, there is the existence of stigmatized and stigmatizer. This specific enquiry highlights that Pakistani females associated with religion or religious institutions/groups are stigmatized while modern/liberal feminine segments of society is fallen under the category of stigmatizer. The females affiliated with religious identity, face stigma and are labeled as “*Moulvinain*” (female religious preachers), “*Dakianoos*” (backward and underdeveloped), and “*Pardahdar bibian*” (the women who cover their body from head to foot), and “*Pak daman*” (wholly and untouched by men who are not in blood relation). Campbell and Deacon describe that social stigma does not exist only in one form, but it has multiple kinds (to understand the types of social stigma, read chapter 2 in detail).

### *3.3.1 Campbell and Deacon’s Types of Stigma: Existence in Religiously Affiliated Pakistani Females*

The researcher finds that the stigmatized identity of these religious-minded females has different types as Campbell and Deacon suggest that social stigma can be differentiated into various kinds like overt or external deformities, known deviations in personal traits, and tribal stigma.

This specific study argues that all these forms are contemporaneous in stigmatized identity of the feminine sphere belonging to religious institutions/groups. For example, overt or external deformities are existed in outlook and dress appearance of the women adhered with the particular religious’ identity. As a consequence, they are negatively labeled due to their specific outlook. Known deviations in personal traits is also observable in these women, as they take rigid stand for religious values, beliefs, behaviors, threat perceptions, violent ideologies, and defining role of women in Islam and resultantly, they face stigmatization and stereotyping by modern/liberal segments. Tribal stigma as well is visible in the behavior of these women, because they with emphasis identify themselves with religion and as an aftermath, they are negatively labeled by modern/liberal society. The components of stigma explained by Link and Phelan are likewise elucidated in Pakistani females linked with religion, religious institutions (Madrasas), and religious groups (consult literature review for further study of the components of stigma presented by Link and Phelan).

### *3.3.2 Link and Phelan's Components of Stigma: The Case of Religious-Oriented Feminine Elements*

Link and Phelan expound four components of social stigma: Differentiation and Labeling; Linking to Stereotypes; Us and Them; and Disadvantage (detail is available in literature review). This investigative study highlights that If the behavior of Pakistani women associated with religious values/institutions/groups is analyzed, it is viewed that all the four components of stigma presented by Link and Phelan have their existence. These females can be differentiated on the bases of their specific religious thoughts, education, and outlook. They are stereotyped due to their specific constructed identity. On the bases of religion and affiliation with religious institutions and particular groups, they are engaged in the process of in-group formation and other society views them as a separate group also (us vs. them). And the most important, they are discriminated in social, educational, economic, and political realm. They are seen as they are unqualified for office job particularly. As a consequence, they remain separate from main stream, they avoid to go unfamiliar environment and become the victim of those religious leaders and scholars who push or pull these females by cultivating explicit ideologies, role of women, and threat perceptions to the way of radicalization and in some cases to escalation of violence.

### *3.3.3 Consequences of Social Stigma: Sociological Conditions of Religiously Associated Females*

If the case of female in Pakistani religious setting, is thoroughly observed, it is understood that these females are discriminated in social, political, educational, and economic spheres due to stigmatized identity and as a consequence, they remain limited to a specific religious based life and they adopt those extremist views and beliefs which their religious teachers, friends, or the other members of their institutions or groups penetrate in their minds. Their economic condition is incompatible with those who get education in modern schools, colleges, and universities. The religious teachers who give their services in the religious institutions (Madrasas), either they have no pay or if have in some case, that is to less to fulfil the basic needs of their life. Mostly, their salary is generated from social welfare "Zakat", as theory of social stigma suggests that the stigmatized people meet with their basic necessities

by funds of welfare. Their political cultural and economic conditions are exploited sometimes by those groups which are engaged in acts of violence.

These groups provide them opportunity to improve their life style. As in the previous chapter it has been elucidated that according to Moghaddam staircase to terrorism, among radicalized people feelings of deprivation at the ground floor generate and this deprivation leads them to the next floor where aggression (violent aspects of radicalization) occur (Moghaddam, 2005). Similarly, Sageman clarifies that ‘resonance with personal experience (unemployment, and social or political discrimination/marginalization) is a cognitive factor which mobilizes the people towards the radicalized actions (Sageman, 2008). Borum likewise signifies that someone or some group before moving to adopt violent behaviors linking to the process of radicalization, it compares its current status (social; political; economic) with others and when it judges that “it’s not right”, “it’s not fair”, it declare the other individual or group as “evil” and gets engaged in violent acts. Above mentioned all theorists support the key argument of this particular dissertation that consequences of stigmatized and negotiated identity are the basic factors which lead the religious-oriented Pakistani women to the process of radicalization. The literature on social stigma and particularly Goffman as well indicates that in actual, powerful segments of society fall under the category of stigmatizer while powerless are stigmatized.

### *3.3.4 Power Dynamics and Stigmatization: Understanding of Religious-Oriented Women*

Other than Goffman, Link and Phelan explore that stigma is dependent on social, political, and economic power (to read power dynamics, go through chapter 2). The researcher asserts that power dynamics have a vital role in the development of stigmatized identity of the female associated with religion, religious institutions or religious groups. Although, Madrasas related to females have a strong social/religious influence in Pakistani women at grass route level, but it is not claimed that these religious institutes (Madrasas) provide females the opportunity to social/cultural, economic, and political and other fields of life. Those who run media in the country are modern/liberal, those who prevail in economic sphere have no link with these Madrasas, those who activate political machinery are unaware of Madrasa environment, and those who study in modern education system consider

religiously-affiliated women as backward and underdeveloped. Moreover, there is a huge gap between have and have not (Gur, 1969). As told before that the women who are teach or study in these religious institutions (Madrasas), do not have wealthy background in common. The above discussion proves the concept presented by Goffman and Link and Phelan that the group falls in the category of stigmatizer, is powerful while, the group who is stigmatized, does not possess power. In the same way, the women linked with religious institutions (Madrasas) in Pakistan, have no power to overcome the stigmatizers. This is why the females who are attached with these institutions/groups, always try to manage their stigma. As previously mentioned in chapter 2 that stigma can be visible as well as invisible and people apply different strategies to manage their stigma.

### *3.3.5 Stigma Management Strategies: Managing Stigma by Religiously Identified Females*

This social investigation describes that the females linked with religious institutions or religious groups in Pakistan use multiple strategies for the management of their stigmatized religious identity at invisible as well as visible level. When they interact with the members of out-group, they pass their devalued attributes which brought about stigmatized identity through fabrication, concealment, or discretion. They also apply revealing strategies as signaling, normalizing, and differentiating, to manage their stigmatized identity. Through selective social networking, they conceal their stigma from those to whom they consider the member of out-group and reveal it upon those to whom they think the member of their own group. The stigmatized identity is managed (in the case of visibility) via individuating information, increased positivity, and acknowledgement by these women.

Passing strategies are used at a large scale to manage the stigmatized identity. By using fabrication strategy, the females belonging to religious institutions (Madrasas), present false information in front of out-group. For instance, they manipulate the concept of Jihad by saying that the best way of Jihad is that you struggle against that devil who lives in you. But in real, they are taught persuade their sons, brothers, fathers, and husbands to fight physically against those to whom they consider the enemy of Islamic values in the way of ALLAH ALMIGHTY. Moreover, they are in some cases, learnt about women participation in Jihad. They adopt concealment strategy to manage their stigma as well. For example, they hide the



information that what material is taught to them in these religious institutions (Madrasas). They do not disclose that they are harassed, bitten, or made of afraid from the outer world by their teachers in these Madrasas. Discretion strategy is also utilized by females associated with these Madrasas for managing stigma. They avoid those questions which can be a cause of revealing their stigmatized identity. Like if someone who belongs to Madrasa is asked that “do you think if a husband beats his wife, is it right?” She replies, “no, but if the wife is disobedient and disloyal to her husband, in those circumstances, what husband should do? You tell”. If any female belonging to the religious institution, is asked that “are you forcefully taught in Madrasa to cover your body from head to foot”? She replies, “no, but it is unbearable to me that expect my husband, any man steers my face and body”.

Vis-a-Vis the revealing strategies are as well applied to manage the stigmatized identity by the religious oriented women. They use signaling strategy to understand the behavior of the member of out-group. As before revealing their identity, they send some signals to the other like they say greeting a specific way, in return, they receive the same accent and pronunciation, and they disclose their identity otherwise not. The women affiliated with the religious institutions (Madrasas) utilize normalizing strategy to manage their stigmatized identity too and this strategy is exemplified when a female linked with these religious institutions covers her face with scarf and tries to eat and drink in social gathering and shows that *Hijab* does not stop her routine activities. Differentiating strategies are also used by the women attached with Madrasas in Pakistan. A common perception among these women is found that *Burka*, *Pardah*, and *Hijab* differentiate them from irreverent women and make them as pious and virtuous. This is why they should cover them and maintain a different identity from those women who are away from Islam and are disliked by ALLAH ALMIGHTY.

Selected social networking as a strategy to manage the stigma, is applied at a large scale by the females associated with religious institutions. They fully disclose their identity in front of reliable members of in-group and do not expose their identity upon those who are not trustable. Under these Madrasas the social networks are built, in these social networks everyone discloses her identity. The concept of Jihad is discussed openly. How a pious woman should behave with her husband, is described. On what pattern, the children should

be brought up so that they become true Muslim. How in-group members should interact with the members of out-group and with what strategies the members of in-group can be increased. All hidden matters are explained in these social networks which are not disclosed in front of out-group. The best example of these social networks is Ijtimas that are held at informal level throughout the country.

The visible stigma management strategies like acknowledgement, individuating information, and increased positivity, are applied by women belonging to religious institutions or religious groups as well. By using acknowledgement strategy, they accept that they are religious-minded, in some cases they legitimize violence openly, they admit that women should live under the subordination of men, they explicitly argue that women have no leadership role in politico/economic spheres. The acknowledgement strategy helps them to increase the members of in-group. Sometimes, these females use individuating information strategy to give optimistic view about their group. Rather to present in-group stigmatized identity these women at individual level engage the member of out-group in interaction. They show their specific personality traits as good cooking, well stitching art, humbleness, down to earth behavior, and optimistic ideas. Another useful strategy to manage visible stigma is increased positivity and the females who are linked with religious institutions (Madrasas) or groups utilize this strategy in a well manner. They talk affectionately, they show their shyness to others, they expose obedient behavior, and they convince with a tactful way that they are more reverent and respectable than those women who spend modern/liberal life. As a result, they present their stigma with a positive technique and magnetize other females to these religious institutions (Madrasas) or motivate to join specific religious group/organizations/institutions. When management strategies are applied to overcome the stigmatized identity, the women adhered with religious institutions where they negotiate with their identity and select to live in a specific social environment which provides them comfort, satisfaction, and positive feedback for their stigmatized identity. [to understand in detail social stigma, stigmatizer and stigmatized, types of stigma by Campbell and Deacon, Link and Phelan model of components of stigma, consequences of stigma, and stigma management strategies, read chapter 2 'literature review']

### **3.4 Identity Negotiation and Radicalization: The Examination of Pakistani Religious Feminine Segments**

The research on identity negotiation denotes that people face difficulty to change or to modify their identity, this is why they usually negotiate with their identity. This enquiry seeks that Pakistani females linked with religion, religious institutions, and religious groups when come across stigma regarding their specific religious identity by modern/liberal spheres of society, they negotiate with it rather to be altered their stigmatized identity. As explored in chapter 2 that identity negotiation is reliant on some dialectical themes. These themes are: “Identity security- vulnerability, inclusion differentiation, predictability-unpredictability, connection-autonomy, and identity consistency-change across time (to go in deep of these themes, read chapter 2).”

#### *3.4.1 Dialectical Themes of Identity Negotiation: Exploring the Case of Religiously Affiliated Women*

The researcher argues that in the case of Pakistani religious feminine segments these themes have their existence and makes the understanding more clear that these women negotiate with their stigmatized identity. They live in a particular social environment which supports to their stigmatized identity. They do not effort to alter their stigmatized identity with they have negotiated.

They have a strong attachment with these religious institutions (Madrasas) or religious groups and those social circles in which they live. They feel comfort with those who do not put any threat to their identity. If someone or some group stimulates to change them, they cut off their relation with that individual or group. Ultimately for gaining self-confirmatory feedback the females associated with religious institutions interact very carefully and selectively with those to whom they consider the member of out-group (to read selective interaction, consult literature review).

### *3.4.2 Selective Interaction: Understanding the Case of Religious-Minded Feminine Spheres*

As the key thinker on identity negotiation Swan highlights that people use to live in a selective atmosphere which supplies self-verification for the identity adopted by these people. This particular study as well, argues that the environment of Madrasas for women in Pakistan if is observed and analyzed deeply, it becomes visible that the students who study there or the people who provide their services to these institutions live in a selective milieu which is far away from today's life. The female students are not allowed to interact with outer world. They even are restricted to the premises where they reside. They are not permitted to interact those who introduce these females with modern or liberal ideas. They even are not allowed to use mobile phone in Madrasas in the time of technological advancement. In a nut shell, for many years they live in strong intimacy and remain unaware from out siders. As a consequence, they avoid that environment which stereotypes or stigmatizes their negotiated identity. Resultantly, they are motivated to the rode of radicalization because their socialized process turns around those who galvanize them to adopt extremist thoughts and beliefs (teachers, friends, family members). The literature on radicalization proposes that socialization is a key factor that drives someone towards radicalized activities (Victorowicz, 2004). The females who negotiate with their identity also ignore positive criticism and stay away from that surrounding in which their negotiated identity can be changed. It will not be wrong to write that it becomes difficult to them to alter their identity because identities cannot be modified with easy process (to study in detail changing identity as a complicated process, look at literature review).

### *3.4.3 The Complex Process of Changing Negotiated Identity: Giggling Out the Social Conditions of Religiously Motivated Women*

In the case of Pakistani females belonging to religious institutions (Madrasas) or religious groups, it is noted that changing negotiated identity is not a simple procedure. The women who linked with the religious institutions are taught that they should never speak for their rights in front of their parents or husband, they should not try to raise their voice as this behavior is consider disobedient. If a female who gets education from these Madrasas is told that she should teach her son about the concept of Jihad in very young age, she acts upon this

advice because she believes that if she does not introduce her son with the concept of Jihad it is non-Islamic behavior. The researcher makes the case that whenever, the women affiliated to religious institutions or religious groups gain political, economic, or social power, they cannot use it because they by this time, negotiated with their powerless identity provided by their religious group and it becomes trouble for them to be changed according to the need of epoch. They if wish to modify their outlook, they have to face multiple criticism from those who have relations with them. The literature on identity negotiation elucidates that identity cues play a great role to negotiate with identity and the people who do not wish to alter or modify their negotiated identity, demonstrate some cues through which they express their belonging with their constructed identity (to understand identity cues, review chapter 2).

#### *3.4.4 Displaying of Identity Cues: Looking at Religiously Identified Females*

This work likewise, scrutinizes that the females who are related with religious groups or Madrasas strictly believe in identity cues. For example, they wear Hijab to be identified separately. They talk in a specific accent in which Arabic touch can be felt. Other than these cues, many indicators are found as they do not make their eyebrows, they do not cut their hair, and they do not use cosmetics on face as in their opinion, it is a sin to change the look through make over or through haircut. The females who are adhered with religious institutions or groups, specifically negotiate with religious identity and to change or transform this identity is the most difficult process for them because religion has the powerful element of the life to be influenced. (To understand in detail boundary-cross dialectical themes, competence outcomes, desired outcomes, selective interaction, complex process of changing identity, and identity cues, consult chapter 2]

### **3.5 Religious Identity Construction and Radicalization: The Case of Pakistani Religious Feminine Segments**

This research signifies that the females, who construct their identity on the bases of religion (Islam) and later, negotiate with it even the identity is stigmatized, remain satisfied with this identity. As previously, in literature review, it has been discussed that religious identity is most prior to all other identities (national, political, family, economic, or

educational) which a person holds throughout his life. This investigative study in specific, explicates that the case of the females associated with Pakistani religious institutions or religious groups if is examined through Gee's typology of identity, it can be noted that their identity is constructed on the bases of religion, they have negotiated with it, and they have no inconvenience when this religiously constructed identity is stigmatized by modern/liberal spheres.

### *3.5.1 Gee's Fourfold Typology of Identity: Religious-Minded Women*

Earlier to this study, in chapter 2, it has been dug out that Gee proposes fourfold typology of identity that is defined by different sources of socially constructed power: Nature-identity; Institution-identity; Discourse-identity; and Affinity-identity. The researcher utilizes Gee's typology as a theoretical illustration of how religious identities are contextually constructed in different ways, drawn upon, and reacted to different sources of social authority. However, the nature identity is difficult to analyze in religious sense with the context of female religious institutions in Pakistan because the women in these institutions belong to different racial/ethnic and lingual groups. But institution-identity they have, since, they all link to religious institutions. Discourse-identity is also related to them because their thinking, attitude, behavior, speaking style, accent, pronunciation and dialect is alike. The most importantly, affinity-identity is applicable upon these females because the values, beliefs, ideas, customs, and religious traditions have comparable among these women. [To understand in detail religious identity, identity construction as a psychological or sociological process, and Gee's typology of identity construction, read profoundly chapter 2]

After reviewing the existing literature on the process of radicalization, social identity, social stigma, identity negotiation, religiously constructed identities, and subsequent to go through the thoughts, beliefs, ideas, views, attitudes, and behavior of feminine spheres linked with religious institutions and religious groups, the researcher makes the case that the females associated with religious segments by covering body and by putting Hijab, differentiate them from other women of the society. Moreover, these women construct their identity on the bases of religion, (strong influence) this is the reason, they have strong bound with their group and do not wish to change their identity even they face stigma by the out-group for

their explicit life style. Rather to alter their stereotyped and stigmatized identity, they try to manage their stigma or negotiate with it. As a consequence, they remain away from modern/liberal social, political, economic, and educational system and like to live in a particular social environment (in-group) which provides them self-verification and self-confirmatory feedback. As an aftermath, the process of in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation, they are forced to adopt extremist ideas and beliefs and ultimately, they are stimulated towards radicalization and in some cases, to violent acts belonging to radicalization process.

In this chapter, by using gender lens within identity paradigm, the dynamics of radicalization have been overlooked. The investigator endeavored to apply theoretical underpinnings on the explicit case of Pakistani religious feminine spheres. The concepts related to social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation have been examined that how these three theories are interlinked and how these are playing as the driving dynamism to flame the process of radicalization among Pakistani religious-oriented females. By discussing overall methodology availed to accomplish the particular dissertation in the next chapter, this social enquiry moves to explore and to explain that how socially stigmatized religious negotiated identity brings about sociological, psychological, and economic factors which push or pull the religious women of Pakistan to the path of radicalization.

*3.5.2 Theoretical Under-Pinings*

<b>SOCIAL IDENTITY</b>	<b>SOCIAL STIGMA</b>	<b>IDENTITY NEGOTITION</b>
Social identification	overt or external deformities	Self-confirmatory feedback
Social categorization	known deviations in personal traits	Selective Interaction
Social comparison	tribal stigma	Changing negotiating identity
Self-categorization	Differentiation and Labeling	Identity Cues

Collective ideologies	Linking to Stereotypes	fourfold typology of identity
Collective identity	Us and Them	
De-individuation	Disadvantage	
Entitativity	Visible and invisible stigma	
Minimal group paradigm	Consequences of stigma	
Threat perceptions	Power dynamics	
Social networks		



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **METHODOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING: METHODS, APPROACHES, TECHNIQUES, AND TOOLS**

In the previous chapter, the theoretical perspectives have been overlooked. The activation of social identity, stigma, and identity negotiation among Pakistani religious feminine segments and their liaison with radicalization has been explicated with theory lens. Whereas, this chapter discusses the overall methodology to inquire the phenomenon of radicalization within identity paradigm in the context of gender with special reference to Pakistan? Why qualitative research is needed in completion of the thesis, what methods are conducted at ground to collect the information, how sampling techniques are used, what research approaches are utilized, and what analytical tools are availed to understand the social phenomenon are the subject matter of this specific chapter.

To explore and to explain the overall methodology, the chapter is divided into four sections. Part first shines the light on defining methodology, academic context, philosophical understanding, vitality of the qualitative research, and qualitative research approach with focus on phenomenology. The second part describes the data collection methods as secondary data usage; semi-structured and focused interviews; direct observation in field, sampling techniques as snowball; judgmental; stratified, and composition of sampling. In third section, the researcher's role and facing challenges as emotional, ethical, and trust-building are discussed. As well as limitations and data processing are overlooked. Part fourth throws light on data categorization, organization, and data analysis of this particular social inquiry.

#### **4.1 Philosophical and Qualitative Research Approaches**

The researcher in this section endeavors to highlight the academic context of the study like a brief description of the whole investigation, philosophical overview as explanation of ontology and epistemology, and using of qualitative research as a strategy of inquiry that why qualitative instruments are important to explore the phenomenon and why not quantitative methods are focused to apply. Although, prior to explore and to explain methodological tools,

designs, and approaches availed in this dissertation, to understand academic context of this research is essential.

#### *4.1.1 Academic Context of Study*

Subsequent to 9/11 incident, an upsurge of terrorism apprehended the world and the phenomenon caught attention of researchers and scholars gigantically. From multiple angles the process of terrorism has been dug out. Most of literature has been produced against Islam by arguing that due to the concept of Jihad, Muslims are getting radicalized and “Madrasas” (religious institutions) are giving the lesson to kill non-Muslims (non-believers) and Muslims (friends of non-believers) (Bar, 2008). In late 2000 world, international media and scholarly writings began to link terrorism with Muslims they were stigmatized and stereotyped as ‘radicalized’ and terrorist’ and the process of in-group formation between West and Islamic world and within Muslim society instigated to be activated. The Muslims were divided into religious and liberal and the concept of in-group became resilient. This particular study is interested to understand in-group formation of Muslim society and the dynamics of radicalization due to in-group and out-group formation. It explicitly explores that the progression of in-group formation also gave effect upon the females of Islamic world and they were divided in n-group and out-group as well.

The women who were flexible in adopting Western/modern values and had access to modern institutional system, were considered as liberal while who were rigid in following their religious/cultural norms and values and moreover, if linked to Madrasas, were thought as religious or fundamental. This investigative learning explains that the women who are affiliated with Madrasas or any religious group or simply have religious mentality and outlook, they due to their specific religious identity face stigmatization as “*hijabian*”, “*nakabian*”, “*burka posh*”, “letter box”, “*daku*”, and “*pardahdar bibi*” not only from non-Muslims but also from liberal segments of Muslim society. As a result these females endeavor to manage their stigma or simply negotiate with their stigmatized identity. They begin to live in a selective social environment where they get positive feedback for their identity. The process of stigmatization and identity negotiation further strengthened the concept of us vs. them in females linked with religious groups and they started to be kept

away from main stream and embrace radicalized views and beliefs due to some ideological foundations, defining role of an Islamic woman, and prevailing threat perceptions. When in-group formation becomes highly powerful, due to stigmatization and identity negotiation and the enablers like social marginalization and social exclusion, and unequal opportunities activate side by side, a few females related to Pakistani Madrasas befalls extremely rigid and they become ready to be involved in violent activities. The extremist organizations as ISIS/Daish took the advantage of their situation and provided them with economic and social opportunities and ultimately, they got engaged in the process of violent extremism. However, this social inquiry particularly concentrates on radicalization process which itself is not violent but leads towards violence and that is activated among Pakistani religious feminine spheres. For exploring the phenomenon from religious motivation to the adoption of radicalized thinking, the philosophical debate is necessary to look over.

#### *4.1.2 Philosophical Overview: Ontological and Epistemological Understanding*

Ontology and epistemology in any social science research are important to understand because these philosophical underpinnings explain that what the existing reality in the society is and how do one know the reality by utilizing theoretical perspective and through what methods/ approaches the research is completed. This section of the chapter highlights that what is significance of this study and which gaps in existing literature will be fulfilled and what methods will be applied to obtain the specific goals designing by the researcher.

However, in late 2000 world, there has been a considerable interest among researchers to explore radicalization within identity framework (Peek, 2005; Arena & Arrigo, 2006; Schwartz, Dunkel & Waterman, 2009; Crossett and Spitaletta 2010; Al Raffie, 2013; Harris, ET AL. 2014; Doosje, ET AL. 2016; Yusoufzai, & Emmerling, 2017; Lynn, 2020). Many academic writings have been concerned with the process of radicalization in the context of gender (Cunningham, 2007; Knop, 2007; Bari, 2010; Witlox, 2012; Fink, et al. 2013; Jacques & Taylor, 2013; Wagha, 2014; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Spencer, 2015; Pearson, 2016; Okowita, 2017; Gul, 2018; Mahmood, 2019; Windsor, 2020; Brown, 2020; Narozhna, 2021; Khalid and Mukhtar, 2021; Gowrinathan, 2021; Zych and Nasaescu, 2022). Also a great debate is generated to find out the factors of radicalization and a huge literature has been

produced that behind the process of radicalization the motivational force is religion specifically Islam (Barber, 1996; Bar, 2008; Hiro, 2012; Allan, ET AL. 2015; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Kusserow and Pawlak, 2015; Ahmed and Jafri, 2020; Basit and Ahmed, 2021; Zych and Nasaescu, 2022; Huda, 2022). Multiple scholars argued that economic and political motives push or pull people to the road of radicalization (Gurr, 1969; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Krueger & Malečková, 2003; Kimmel, 2003; Abadie, 2006; De Mesquita, 2008; Mitra, 2008; Ali, 2010; Kazmi and Pervez, 2011; Enders & Sandler, 2011; Meierrieks, 2012; Orsini, 2012; Choi & Luo, 2013; Ahmed, et al, 2018; Akbar, 2021; Khalid and Mukhtar, 2021; Khalid, 2022). A bunch of research is existed on the recruitment strategies utilized by extremist groups to engage males or females for nonviolent as well as for violent operations (Kydd & Walter, 2006; Von Knop, 2007; Cunningham, 2007; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010; Fink et al., 2013; Spencer, 2015; Kusserow and Pawlak, 2015; Allan, et al., 2015; Bakker and Seran, 2015; Berger, 2015; Bloom, 2017; Gul, 2018; Ismail, et al, 2022; Makki and Akash, 2022). A considerable amount of work is available on Madrasas and their educational system in the context of Pakistan (Abbas, 2004; Dalrymple, 2005; Bano, 2007; Blanchard, 2007; Rahman, 2007; Noor, 2008; Davji, 2008; Malik, 2008; Tavernise, 2009; McClure, 2009; Ahmed, 2009; Sajjad, 2009; Saini, 2009; Siddique, 2009; Rana, 2009; Kazmi and Pervez 2011; Fair, 2012; Khan, 2013; Rasheed, 2016; Syed, et al., 2016; Fani, 2020; Anjum, 2020; Khusnood, et al, 2020; Suhaib and Adnan, 2020; Hanif, et al, 2021; Ahmad and Shahid, 2022). While, this research is important to be conducted that it seeks to understand the nexus between radicalization and identity with gender dimension by doing an analysis of Pakistani religious feminine spheres.

Although, the process of radicalization has been explored previously with multiple theoretical lenses (Gurr, 1988; Crenshaw, 1988; Crenshaw, 2000; Silke, 2004; Neumann, 2008; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Research report by European Commission Expert Group, 2008; Crossett and Spitaletta, 2010; Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010; Borum, 2011; Pisiou, 2011; Schmid, 2013; Maskaliūnait, 2015; Lynn, 2020; ), whereas, the need of this thesis in existing literature on radicalization and identity based underpinnings that it develops a strong link between the three concepts of identity paradigm social identity by Tajfel and Turner (1979), social stigma of Erving Goffman (1963), and Identity negotiation of Toomey (1986) and Swann (1987) and claims that these three forces play a great role to push or pull

females to the process of radicalization and in some cases to violent operations. The inevitability of this investigation is vibrant as it exclusively concentrates to scrutinize that how the three concepts of identity paradigm (stigmatization, identity negotiation, and in-group formation) play the role as driving dynamism towards the process of radicalization among females of Pakistani religious elements.

This study has accomplished by availing qualitative research methods. Semi-structured open-ended interviews have been conducted via judgment/purposive, stratified and snowball sampling. Through phenomenological and case study approach, the target population has been convinced to share the experiences to achieve the objectives of the dissertation. To complete the research, the inquirer availed qualitative approaches, why the strategy of qualitative enquiry is important and why not quantitative methods? The answer of this question is pondered over below.

#### *4.1.3 Strategy of Inquiry: Using Qualitative Methods to Study Radicalization through Gender Dimension within Identity Paradigm*

The researcher describes here that how and why a qualitative methodology was adapted to understand the complex dynamics of radicalization in Pakistani religious women using a social, stigmatized, and negotiated identity perspective. As qualitative research enhances the understanding that “how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced because the researcher can holistically analyze a phenomenon” (Mason 1996). In the case of social enquiries commonly the researcher profoundly involves in particular social setting and he or she looks at the phenomenon with the eye of participant, this is why he needs flexibility and qualitative strategy provides him such flexibility such as use of ethnographic tools (Limb & Dwyer, 2001; Gubrium & Holstein, 2000; Patton, 1990). Such flexibility is availed to observe and to interact informally (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). However, qualitative research becomes difficult when it entangles with ethnographic tools and the researcher faces practical and ethical challenges because “both the researcher ‘s intrusion into the respondent ‘s life and the emotional involvement of a researcher in the setting” (Makki, 2015). For instance, the researcher’s presence in religious gatherings, Ijtimas or in Milad, generated suspicion that the provided information is going in the right

hand and the researcher will reflect the true picture and will not manipulate the findings and will not use the information against the particular religious group or Islam. Sword indicates this attitude or concern that “qualitative research is personal work and the researcher is influenced by a specific narrative which can guide the research outcome” (Sword, 1999). Usually, qualitative research devours some approaches to gather, organize, interpret, and analyze data. These approaches are narrative inquiry, phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory, and case study approach.

Narrative sights the life of an individual and tells their story. Phenomenology endeavors to understand or explicate life experiences or phenomena. Grounded theory examines the process, action, or interaction to develop a theory ‘grounded’ in observations. Ethnography explains and interprets an ethnic, cultural, or social group. While, case study scrutinizes episodic events in a definable framework, develops in-depth analyses of single or multiple cases, generally explains ‘how’ (Wertz, 2011). Case study research is difficult to operate, but it’s one of the simplest ways of researching as it involves a deep dive and thorough understanding of the data collection methods and inferring the data (Creswell, 2006). While to understand and to evaluate the dynamic process of radicalization within identity prototype through a gender lens with special reference to Pakistani society, the researcher has utilized phenomenological approach to gather data. By utilizing phenomenology, interviews have been conducted with selective cases in which the investigator targeted the particular population through the technique of stratified, purposive or/judgmental, and snowball sampling and endeavored to persuade the targeted religious females for revealing their experiences which forced them to adhere to their religiosity and to negotiate with their identity. It has been tried to find the answer that how they faced stigma from liberal segments and how this stigmatization kept them away from liberal/modern spheres. After assembling raw data, the researcher interpreted data and analyzed the dynamics of radicalization and penetration of the seeds of violence among these women. By availing support from inductive reasoning, the findings have been applied to the larger religious feminine segments of Pakistan.

#### *4.1.4 Discussion on Qualitative Research Approach: Utilization of Phenomenology*

This inquiry has utilized phenomenological design to explore and to explain the complex liaison of radicalization and construction of socio-religious identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation in the context of Pakistani religious feminine segments. However, previously, to dig out the underpinnings related to radicalization, terrorism, suicide bomb blasting, and violent behavior of the people, phenomenological approach has been utilized by the scholars and researchers. Whereas, to explore the process of radicalization within identity paradigm through gender dimension in Pakistani perspective, the work is rare. Usually, phenomenology is availed in psychological studies, but the use of phenomenology to investigate and to understand some social phenomenon is helpful because it concentrates on the experiences of the people and these experiences provide the researcher important information for further analysis of particular social phenomenon (Sokolowski, 2000; Qutoshi, 2018). Flood argues that social phenomenon with qualitative methods cannot be inquired until phenomenological tools are applied to gather data (Flood, 2010). Schutz indicates that the social world cannot be explored, investigated, understood, interpreted, and analyzed without using phenomenological approach because social world is the configuration of individual experiences and these experiences matter to dig out the complex lairs of society (Davis, 1971; Schutz, 1972; Wojnar and Swanson, 2007).

However, in the case of social inquiry such as radicalization and terrorism, phenomenology has its own vitality as it helps to understand that why the people get engaged in radicalization or terrorism? Which phenomenon push or pull them to the process? What factors leads or motivate them to adopt extremist ideas or beliefs? (Staun, 2010; Post, 2010; Dawson, 2017; Horgan, 2017; Ogwu, 2018; Cohen, 2019; Gkoutzioulis, 2020). To understand the dynamics of radicalization in Canada Dawson (2018), in Kenya Wakhungu (2020), in Northern Ireland Ferguson and McAuley (2020) have applied the phenomenological approach. To explore and to understand the process of social stigma, phenomenology is applied in wide-ranging studies (Harvey, 2001; McNulty and Roseboro, 2009; Vartanian, ET AL., 2014). To dig out that why people negotiate with their identity, Zimmerman in 2013 conducted phenomenological research among Arab Muslim female students studying in Europe and America (Zimmerman, 2013). Keeping in view the vitality

of phenomenology in qualitative research and its increasing use in understanding social phenomenon like radicalization, this study also has availed this method to examine and to scrutinize the dynamics of radicalization and the drivers of this process such as in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation in Pakistani religious females.

The researcher to collect data from the targeted population for completion of this dissertation has conducted phenomenological interviews. Experiences of those females who are considered religious have been utilized to find out the answer of this particular inquiry. These females were selected through purposive, snowball, and stratified sampling. The researcher exposed the stigmatized identity of these women and the indicators of radicalization among them due to stigmatization and identity negotiation by asking them the questions regarding their life experiences and that phenomenon which gave huge impact upon their thoughts and brought about the change in their inner and outer personality. Before applying the phenomenological approach and its effectiveness in collecting data from religious feminine spheres of Pakistani society, first, it is significant to understand the basics of this approach.

Phenomenology can be defined as “the study of phenomena: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience” (Robert, 2000). Phenomenology expounds, “Conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first-person point of view” (Smith, 2008). In Hegel’s point of view, phenomenology is an approach “to philosophy that begins with an exploration of phenomena (what presents itself to us in conscious experience) as a means to finally grasp the absolute, logical, ontological and metaphysical Spirit that is behind phenomena” (Hegel, 1968). This was considered dialectical phenomenology. Edmund Husserl (father of phenomenology) describes phenomenology as “the reflective study of the essence of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view” (Husserl, 1970). Phenomenologists in real believe that analyzing the daily behavior of the people can provide anyone with a greater understanding of their nature, thoughts, and personalities. This is the reason that for analyzing the process of stigmatization and identity negotiation and the process of nonviolent and violent radicalization because of stigmatized and negotiated identity, the researcher is using a phenomenological approach in the context of Pakistani



religious-minded female segments. By conducting semi-structured focused, intensive, and in-depth interviews of women affiliated with religious groups, the researcher will ask open-ended questions regarding their life experiences.

According to phenomenology, persons should be explored. Because persons can be understood through the unique ways they reflect the society they live in (Farina, 2014). To accomplish the particular project, the thoughts, views, ideas, and beliefs of the female sphere of religious groups will be explored with phenomenological questions. In doing so, the process of radicalization within the identity paradigm will be easy to understand and to explain among Pakistani women segments attach to religious groups or organizations. In designing interviews, one of the major elements of phenomenology, intentionality will be availed in this research.

Intentionality can be described as "aboutness", the notion that consciousness is always consciousness of something. The object of consciousness is called the intentional object, and this object is constituted for consciousness in many different ways, for example, through perception, memory, retention and protection, and signification (Zahavi, 2003). Intentionality offers an alternative to the representational theory of consciousness, which explores that reality cannot be grasped directly because it is available only through perceptions of reality that are representations of it in the mind (Michael, ET AL., 1995). On the other hand, Husserl argues, "consciousness is not 'in' the mind; rather, consciousness is conscious of something other than itself (the intentional object)" (Smith, 2007). This particular study also highlights that radicalization is not a psychological process that the people due to mental conditions engage in nonviolent or violent radicalization but their sociological factors, life experiences, or some social phenomenon develop the psyche of the people through which they are forced or motivated to the road of radicalization. These factors or motivational drivers can be strongly bound with religious groups or stigmatized and negotiated identity or nexus of the three.

The phenomenological approach of qualitative research devours some key themes such as intentionality, intuition, evidence, noesis and noema, empathy and inter subjectivity, and life world. By utilizing these concepts, the researcher became able to understand that why stigma occurs in Pakistani society and how it leads the religious-minded females towards

radicalization process. During cultivating questions for asking from interviewees, the phenomenological method of developing a research query, have been concentrated, for instance, 'why' or 'how'. To explore and to explain the phenomenon of radicalization in the Pakistani religious feminine spheres and to excavate the nexus between radicalization, in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation with a gender dimension, the researcher has designed the questionnaire based on these type of questions: "Why you are so attached with your group, organization, or like-minded people?" "Why your religious identity (thoughts and outlook) is negatively labeled from liberal segments?" "How you started to be confined to a specific social/religious environment?" "Why you instigated to dislike liberal/western thoughts and values?" after building research questions, the researcher collected raw data through interview and observation methods. For maintaining validity, reliability, generalizability, and impartiality of the research, semi-structured, intensive, focused, and in-depth interviews have been conducted from the females affiliating with the religion (who simply construct religious identity), religious institutions (Madrasas), and religious groups (Jamad-Islami or Dawat-e-Islami).

## **4.2 Data Collection: Methods and Techniques**

In this part of the chapter, the exploration of data collection methods has been overlooked as using of secondary information, conduction of interviews on ground, and direct observations at field.

### *4.2.1 Secondary Data*

To deal the research questions based on the dynamics of radicalization looking at gender dimensions within identity paradigm, a qualitative method based approach drawing on ethnographic tools has been to explore the process of radicalization in the religiously affiliated females in Pakistani context. Additionally, to understand and to dig out the broader context of radicalization among religious-oriented women , the researcher consulted available secondary data including contextual information, organizational reports, newspapers, the reports of international institutes, governmental documents, and existing literature which covers the process of radicalization, violent aspects of radicalization, factors behind the

process of radicalization, women engagement in violent activities, Madrasas in Pakistan, social identity, social stigma, identity negotiation, and radicalization as leading path to terrorism.

Besides studying the literature, from the very initial stages of this research activity, the investigator availed a range of social media outlets and multiple other websites which could supply a flow of information addressing the research questions that why modern segments stigmatize or stereotype religious women in the world as well as in Pakistan? How stigma forces religious feminine spheres to negotiate with their identity? And what consequences the stigmatized women face because of their identity? After thorough review of literature, the research questions were refined and objectives of the research have been clearer. Moreover, to collect primary data, new doors of this enquiry have been opened.

#### *4.2.2 Interviews: Semi-Structured and Focused*

The first method to accomplish this research was interview conduction. An interview can be defined as, “presentation of oral-verbal stimuli and reply in terms of oral and verbal responses, any person-to-person interaction between two or more individuals with a specific purpose in mind (Malik, 2014).” In general, interviews allow participants “to relive their past experiences through a process of constructing and reconstructing particular matters in a comfortable conversational environment which other methods may not offer (Mason, 2002; Makki, 2015).” Interviews are the suitable “means of determining another person’s perspective as they enable a researcher to interact directly with a participant (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Makki, 2015).” Prior to arrange interviews, the interviewees were provided with a dissertation information sheet and were given consent form containing detailed information regarding research objectives and associated possible risks with the study, for example, “emotional, psychological, and social” (Makki, 2015). The interviews conducted by the researcher for this exclusive work were semi-structured, intensive, focused, and in-depth. The questions were opened-ended so that informant could explain his or her experiences, thoughts, and beliefs. This method was really helpful to examine the ideas, thoughts, beliefs, and experiences of females affiliated with religion. These interviews proved beneficial and fruitful to apply inductive reasoning. By gathering data from a small sample, the researcher

became able to generalize the results and findings. Besides interviews, the observation method also has been utilized by investigators to gather primary material.

#### *4.2.3 Direct Observations*

This method is delineated as, “a purposeful, systematic and selective way of watching and listening to an interaction or phenomenon as it takes place (Malik, 2014).” Observation is extremely valuable to judge that interviewee either is narrating his or her own story or he or she just has an objective to deviate the researcher from the actual condition. During conducting an interview or spending time with the target population, the focus was more on vocal expressions. It has been observed that the selected individual for taking information felt discomfort to answer or he/she with relaxation gave a reply. His or Her rise and fall of voice, anxiety, shaking of accent, and ups and downs of speech provided the researcher to be capable of scrutinizing and analyzing the complex process of radicalization due to in-group bounding’s, stigmatization, and identity negotiation among Pakistani religious feminine spheres. To deeply observe the particular phenomenon and to understand the dynamics of radicalization the researcher has likewise attended “Ijtimas” and “Milads”, and other informal religious gatherings. The specific places like Madrasas where researcher through observation could have access to the particular information, were also visited. Observation method was however, useful as it gave the way to informal interactions but informal interactions provided the opportunity to the researcher to conduct formal interviews. The selection of interviewees was done through different techniques of qualitative research like judgmental/purposive, stratified, and snowball sampling.

#### *4.2.4 Sampling Techniques/Strategies for Data Collection*

Although, in quantitative research surveys and huge samples are designed to find results. While in qualitative research small sample is chosen from a large population. Sampling can be defined as “a technique of selecting individual member or subset of the population to make statistical inferences from them and estimate characteristics of the whole population (Esfahani and Edward, 2014).” In general, sampling strategies are divided into two distinct categories: probability and nonprobability sampling. Probability sampling is, “a sample in which every unit in the population has a chance (greater than zero) of being

selected in the sample, and this probability can be accurately determined (Lance & Hattori, 2016).” On the other, nonprobability sampling can be described as: “any sampling method where some elements of the population have *no* chance of selection (these are sometimes referred to as 'out of coverage'/'under covered'), or where the probability of selection can't be accurately determined (Deming, 1975).” Under probability techniques, four major strategies are simple random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling, and cluster sampling. Whereas, nonprobability methods are: convenient sampling, purposive or judgmental sampling, accidental sampling, and snowball sampling (Cochran, 1977). Each type has its benefits and drawbacks. Without throwing review all of these kinds, merely, those techniques which are useful and best suitable to this dissertation have been highlighted in this work. The first strategy for data collection, the researcher has applied was stratified sampling. This sampling technique can be defined as “dividing the population into subpopulations that may differ in important ways. It allows you to draw more precise conclusions by ensuring that every subgroup is properly represented in the sample (Deming, 1975).” To gather data to understand the dynamics of radicalization among Pakistani religious females through identity paradigm, the targeted population was split into small strata's (small groups or representatives of the whole group). First, religious-oriented women have been divided into three major categories: simply belonging to religious identity, affiliated with Madrasas or associated with political religious parties. Secondly, their sects were concentrated as 'Barelvis', 'Deobandis', and 'Vahabis'. Thirdly, from these three religious sects, representative parties or institutions are selected: Jamat-e-Islami, Dawat-e-Islami, and Al-Huda International system. Fourthly, from each religious category, three to five interviewees who were the optimal females epitomizing their whole religious group have been questioned through phenomenological approach. The informants were decided via snowball and purposive sampling strategies.

Snowball sampling and purposive sampling techniques belong to nonprobability and are considered reliable in qualitative research. By using these techniques, in limited resources and time, generalizability was easy and findings proved valid. Snowball sampling can be defined as “a method that is applied when the subjects are difficult to trace (Cochran, 1977).” As mentioned previously, to maintain validity and generalizability and to draw conclusions, three to five interviews have been conducted. The space between three to five interviews was

designed because, during data collection, the researcher tried to trace more interviewees through contemporaneous interviewees. Judgmental or purposive sampling was as well, availed by the researcher to accomplish this investigative study. It can be described, “The strategy formed by the discretion of the researchers. Researchers purely consider the purpose of the study, along with the understanding of the target audience (Lance & Hattori, 2016).” As earlier discussed that phenomenological interviews have been carried out, for this purpose the researcher’s judgments, knowledge, and observation have attempted to find out and to indicate the individuals particularly females who were attached to religious parties or institutions either formally or informally.

#### *4.2.5 Sampling Composition and Sampling Size*

In the contemporary Muslim world, three key sects exist who follow Suni doctrine: *Vahabi, Deobandi, and Barailvi*. For data collection, the women belonging to these sects have been targeted through stratified, purposive/judgmental, and snowball sampling. The subject of the study concentrates on ‘Suni’ ideology this is the reason that *Shias* are not included in finding data. For the representation of Barailvis, fifteen interviews were conducted from religiously motivated women and men who were linked with female Madrasas. To understand the process, from Deobandi thought, fifteen interviews were designed from the women. To take account of Vahabi ideology, the researcher has managed fifteen interviews. To meet with the criteria of validity, generalizability, reliability, and impartiality, 20 cities of the all four provinces of Pakistan were visited and woman from all religious parts of Pakistani society have been engaged to collect information, total 60 interviews have been conducted from 32 religious institutes (Madrassas) and 5 religious parties/groups.

After gathering raw data by using phenomenological and case study approach, the researcher analyzed and interpreted uncooked material. However it has been noticed that during data collection, the researcher was involved in emotional relations with the respondents, to maintain neutrality and to hold her own stance, the researcher had to be separated from the social settings and emotional process. Furthermore, she had to have the access to the targeted population by developing trust between her and the religiously

identified women and men belonging to female religious institutions who were really away from the modern world to provide the wanting information.

#### 4.2.6 Sampling Composition

<b>Province</b>	<b>City</b>	<b>Religious Institutions/ Party</b>	<b>Religious Sect</b>
Capital Territory	Islamabad	Jamia Amna-tul-Zia Lil-Banat	Deobandi
Capital Territory	Islamabad	Al-Huda International Institute	Ahl-e-Hadith
Capital Territory	Islamabad	Jami-Hafsa	Deobandi
Punjab	Rawalpindi	Minhaj Educational Complex	Barelvi
Punjab	Rawalpindi	Madrassa Binate Islam	hl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Sialkot	Kuliya Gousia Lilbant	Barelvi
Punjab	Pakpattan	Dini Darsgah Aminia Naqshbandi Al Sunnat wa Jummat	Barelvi
Punjab	Lahore	Idara Shamim-ul-Hadi Education Institute for Girls	Deobandi
Punjab	Lahore	Idara-e-Aloom Islamia Sharia Lilbanat	Deobandi
Punjab	Lahore	Al-Huda International Institute	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Lahore	Jamia Faisal Lil-Banat	Deobandi
Punjab	Lahore	Markaz-al-Hasan-ul-Taleem-ul-Tarbiya Islamia	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Sargodha	Madrassa Anwar-ul-Quran Qasmia Ferozia	Barelvi

Punjab	Multan	Abdulah bin Abas Madrasa	Deobandi
Punjab	Multan	Jamia Rahmania	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Multan	Al-Huda International Institute	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Layyah	Maqtaba Hafsa-tul-Binat	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Faisalabad	Madrasa Hafsa Lil- Banat	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Faisalabad	Jamia Harmain Lil- Baneen wa Lil-Banat	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Gujranwala	Jamia Islamia	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Gujranwala	Jamia Qura tul Ain Lil- Binaat & Jamia Masjid Rahmat e Mariam	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Chakwal	Madrassa khatm ul anbyaa	Barelvi
Punjab	Bahawalpur	Jamia Islamia(Dar ul Binaat)	Deobandi
Sindh	Karachi	Madrasa Um e Aiman Lilbanat Bandhani	Ahl-e-Hadith
Sindh	Karachi	Madrasa Um ul Qura Lilbanat	Ahl-e-Hadith
Sindh	Karachi	Jamia Rashidia	Deobandi
Sindh	Sukkur	Madrasa Haleea Sadia Lilbanat	Ahl-e-Hadith
KPK	Mardan	Jamia Islamia Shams-ul- Uloom	Deobandi
KPK	Peshawar	Idaratul ilm wattaqwa lilbanin wal banat	Ahl-e-Hadith
KPK	Noshera	Al-Jamia-tul-Islamic	Ahl-e-Hadith
Balochistan	Quetta	Madrassa Madina tul	Ahl-e-Hadith



		Ilam	
Balochistan	Pasheen	Jamiat Ulmah Islam (Fay Group)	Deobandi
Balochistan	Chaman	Jamiat Ulmah Islam	Deobandi
Sindh	Karachi	Jamat-e-Islami	Deobandi
Sindh	Karachi	Sunni Tehreek	Barelvi
Punjab	Lahore	Jamat-ud-Dawah	Ahl-e-Hadith
Punjab	Multan	Dawat-e-Islami	Barelvi
Punjab	Jhang	Sipah Sahaba	Deobandi
Punjab	Layyah	Jamat-e-Islami	Deobandi

### **4.3 Researcher's Role at Ground: Emotional, Ethical, Accessibility, and Trust-Building Challenges**

This part of the research throws light on the neutral role of the researcher and challenges faced by her during data collection. Because religious identity was a sensitive topic, the respondents sometimes, got emotional and a few of them became offended with researcher for conducting study on this phenomenon. Often ethical problems came in front when the participants did not allow to record their voice as they were considering it sin. Multiple interviewees were not ready to trust in the inquirer because in their opinion, this kind of research is promoted by the liberal/ modern segments to prove that religious-oriented people are radicalized and terrorist. A huge difficulty was faced when the researcher was not permitted to meet with the female students and teachers in Madrasas. Most of the male heads used to force the investigator to conduct interview of them. They were confused that why not men? Why only women are necessary to take into account to gather data? However, by meeting with all these challenges, this dissertation has been completed.

#### *4.3.1 The Researcher Perspective: Emotional Processing and Involvement in the Setting*

The literature on qualitative research alludes that the investigator because of several visits, spending time, and attending events with the purpose to understand the dynamics of a particular social setting, gets involved emotionally (Dickson-Swift et al., 2006). This is the reason that the researcher must reveal the emotions which he experiences during collecting and reporting on research (Gilbert, 2001) and to also “understand the influence that a researcher’s involvement may have on the research process (Makki, 2015).” To gather data for this particular dissertation, the researcher endeavored to remain impersonal and did not anticipate to develop friendships or amicable relations with the females belonging to religious groups or just have religious mentality. Watts describes the role of personal feelings in research: “Emotions act as a doorway to the inner terrain of people, and as a doorway that can be open or closed (Watts, 2008).” However, without engaging in the relationships, to collect data, building of trust between the researcher and respondents is extremely significant because trust motivates the respondents to reveal the actual information.

#### *4.3.2 Scoping Study as Pre-Cursor: Developing Trust and Access*

Usually, in the case of social investigation where stigma occurs, the participants conceal the truth and provide false information to the researcher. Pitts and Miller-Day propose that developing rapport with research respondents can be useful to gain the right information (Pitts and Miller-Day 2007; [see also] Kapila & Lyon, 1994). Gaglio, Nelson, & King describe, “the mutual trust between the researcher and respondents is a two-way process that helps to develop a relationship before conducting formal fieldwork (Gaglio, Nelson, & King, 2006).” Informal visits to explore and to understand complex dynamics of radicalization among stigmatized females or places have allowed the researcher to establish local networks through which the trust was built up between the researcher and research participants. The respondents were perceiving the researcher as the representative of the liberals or were thinking that the project is funded by the government to label Madrasas as radicalized and extremist but the investigator gave them surety that the information shared by them was purely used for academic work. Furthermore, to gain trust, the inquirer has pretended by outlook and dress appearance that she is one of them who has adopted religious

identity like them. In doing research on the sensitive topics like stigma, religion, and radicalization the researcher had to follow research ethics so that the informants could not be hurt about their identity. To access the actual experience and information from the participants, the researcher bracketed herself. In doing so the respondents openly conversed about their experiences, ideas, views, and beliefs.

#### *4.3.3 Researcher Role and Research Ethics*

Generally, the research questions define the role of researcher and his alignment with the methodology. Moreover, the “interpretive nature of a qualitative study requires researchers to be aware of their own position during data gathering and analysis stages (Stake, 1995).” To maintain research ethics during social enquiry is extremely vital and the researcher should be enlightened with the ethics (Ryan, 1997). The research questions can invoke emotions of the respondents. This is why, researchers are inducing to have an approach that can maintain the confidentiality and the anonymity of participants (Makki, 2015).

Because this research was applying phenomenological tools to dig out the phenomenon, the researcher induced the respondents to share their experiences, the respondents were ensured that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and they can reveal their experiences without any fear. As it is noted that participants with a stigmatized label face negative consequences or in some cases they can be harmed if their identities are revealed (Baez, 2002). However, it is argued that the researcher has the responsibility and moral obligation to “limit potential prejudice towards vulnerable groups by ensuring their anonymity during data analysis and reporting (Makki, 2015).” For the reason that multiple participants have been given a pseudonym to maintain confidentiality and anonymity in this dissertation. However, to complete this thesis, the researcher faced some limitations. How she dealt with these limitations, in the coming section, it has been described briefly.

#### *4.3.4 Limitations of Research: Why the Qualitative Research Method? Why Not Quantitative?*

Qualitative research methods can be defined as obtaining data through open-ended and conversational communication (Babbie, 2014). This method concentrates on “the why rather than what people think about you (Saldana, 2011).” In fact, there is a fundamental distinction between data types: qualitative and quantitative. Typically, quantitative data is called if it is in numerical form, and while, qualitative data is not dependent upon numeric and numbers (Savin-Baden, 2013). As this investigation was based on descriptive, constructivist, exploratory, and explanatory approach rather to be post-positive. This was the reason that the researcher had to be limited to qualitative method to accomplish the dissertation. Moreover, qualitative method was exactly suitable to conduct the research inquiry on the topics like exploration of radicalization with gender dimension using identity paradigm in the context of Pakistani religious feminine spheres.

#### *4.3.5 Limitations of Research*

This social investigation remained limited as various limitations have been faced by researcher. Firstly, time was really limited to conduct fieldwork particularly because she was permanent employ of government and she had a limited time to go in the four provinces of the country. Secondly, this was extreme hot weather of June, July, and August when the researcher had to move on ground to gather primary data. Thirdly, she had a little daughter of two years with whom she had to collect raw information. Fourthly, the researcher was having a personal vehicle for traveling with little girl in the extreme weather of Pakistan, at immediate bases she arranged some amount to buy a car to travel for reaching to the interviewees. Fifthly, she was not funded by her educational institute or from any organization to accomplish the dissertation, she herself managed all the expenditure during her fieldwork. Sixthly, the researcher was not relying to conduct interviews upon anyone this was the reason that she herself went to all the cities to gather data and during these visits she multiple times had no residence to stay in unfamiliar places, she had to sleep in her car with her little baby. However, after passing through all these limitations, she ultimately, completed this social investigation.

#### *4.3.6 Data Processing*

For maintaining generalizability, reliability, validity, and impartiality firstly, the researcher visited physically 20 cities of all four provinces of Pakistan to gather data. Secondly, this investigative study concentrated on three key feminine religious sects in Pakistan to collect primary data. The females belonging to every religious group/institution/party was engaged in discussions as the representative of all the Sunni religious sects are under the consideration of researcher to have the accessibility to conduct interviews. Thirdly, some interviewees were reached via online methods: Skype, zoom/meet, WhatsApp, and phone calls. Although, conventional methods have also been availed to collect data: face to face interviews were taken mostly because physical access was made possible by putting all efforts. Fourthly, the interviews were recorded, written, or typed roughly. In the later stage, these interviews have been refined in English and the responses in Urdu were translated in English. The transcriptase text was sent to the interviewees for review and those respondents have Anonymize who did not allow their name to be mentioned in the thesis to maintain confidentiality. In the next stage, these interviews and answers of the respondents were organized according to the chapters of the particular study. In the very last, the responses and answers have been meaningfully constructed, interpreted, and analyzed via analytical tool specifically thematic analysis.

#### **4.4 Data Categorization, Organization, and Analysis**

After completing formal fieldwork, firstly, all of the interview recordings have been replayed. Secondly, were organized the field notes, and have been identified different themes in the data through thematic analysis, that was helpful and valuable to find out the answers of particular enquiry (Yin, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Makki, 2015). Stake and Yin also propose that the themes that are extraneous should be separated (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1995; see also Neuman, 2000). But “thermalized separately to supplement the thick description of the case (Makki, 2015).” This suggested strategy (thematic analysis) has assisted the researcher to understand and to analyze the data relevant to research enquiry and theoretical underpinnings.

The collected data as well was considered in theoretical and conceptual perspectives by comparing data to the relevant literature so that coherence and a link could be developed between the gathered data and theoretical framework (Baxter, 2000). For establishing concrete findings organized data was interpreted and analyzed by using three sociological concepts of identity paradigm: social identity theory offered by Tajfel and Turner in 1979 to understand the process of in-group formation, theory of social stigma presented by Goffman (1963) to elucidate the stereotyping and labeling of religious-minded women by liberal spheres, and identity negotiation theory explored by Swan (1987) and Toomey (1993) and to highlight and to indicate social/religious environment in which females hold radicalized ideologies. Yin as well explores an analytical strategy which enables the researcher to explain the case through gathered data in narrative form (Yin, 1989). Professor Donald Polkinghorne (psychologist) also highlights, "the goal of organizing data is to refine the research question and separate irrelevant or redundant information from that which will be eventually analyzed, sometimes referred to as narrative smoothing" (Polkinghorne, 1995).

This dissertation has applied this strategy to emerge particular themes for exploring, understanding, explaining, and analyzing the phenomena: Whether social identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation played the role as driving dynamism to push or pull Pakistani religiously affiliated women to the path of radicalization? Under this main question, the following sub-questions are designed to complete this exploratory and explanatory research. What social, psychological, and economic drivers push or pull Pakistani females towards religiosity and religious institutions which help them to construct socio-religious identity? How Pakistani religiously affiliated women are stigmatized and why they negotiate with their stigmatized identity? How the consequences of stigma and why interplay of power dynamics lead religious feminine spheres to espouse extremist ideas, beliefs, views, and thoughts in Pakistan? How existing ideologies, defining women role in Islam and prevailing threat perceptions are penetrating the seeds of radicalization among religiously identified Pakistani women?

## **CHAPTER 5**

# **RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION: SOCIAL FORCES, STRATEGIES, CONCEPTS, AND SOCIAL/ECONOMIC CONDITIONS**

In the previous chapter the overall methodology to accomplish this dissertation was explored. To understand the liaison between identity paradigm and radicalization with gender dimension in Pakistan the use of phenomenological approach, sampling techniques as judgmental and stratified, and data collection methods to conduct interviews like structured or semi-structured have been explained profoundly. While this chapter explicitly endeavors to scrutinize that how social forces (family; friends; and neighbors) galvanize women towards religiosity and religious institutions, what particular strategies/ methods are applied to fascinate females to embrace religious mentality, how existing concepts are penetrated in the minds of women to motivate them to have religious ideals and aspirations, why social conditions inside the individual work to engage his/her in religious thoughts and behaviors, and how poverty dynamics stimulate the female segments in Pakistan towards religious views and beliefs and religious institutions / groups.

To understand and to analyze the motivation towards religion and religiosity (rigid religious thoughts) the chapter is divided into five sections: in the first section the researcher explores the role of social forces as family; friends; neighbors; and ideal personalities to incline women to adopt religious aspirations and to go to religious institutions. The second part concentrates on different strategies as religious gatherings; online methods; use of social media; and performance of dramas that are applied on females by religious elements to fascinate them to the religious thoughts and views. Under third section the investigator excavates the specific sensitive concepts like care for the life here after; indulgence in sinful life; and representation of devil that motivate women to espouse extremely religious mentality. Part four reveals contribution of social conditions (life incidents/happenings) as second marriage of husband, doubt of magical acts, failure in love stories, incidents of divorced and widow women, and domestic violence in pulling or pushing females to embrace rigid religious thinking and behaviors. Section five overlooks on the role of poverty dynamics

as unavailability of basic necessities and lack of affordability of modern education in inducing feminine spheres to move towards religious institutions.

## **5.1 Religious Motivation: Role of Social Forces**

Literature on religious motivation, social identity construction, negotiation, and radicalization highlights that social forces (family; friends; neighbors; or role models) because of extremely closeness to the individuals have a great impact to stimulate someone either male or female towards any discourse, affinity, or institution. This research also finds that Pakistani females go to religious institutions with keenness and interest even there living conditions are not suitable, a silent social environment welcomes them, and in spite of several restrictions like ban on use of mobile and lack of re-creative activities. The question is raised here that why they move towards this side? The inquirer explores that nearby people (social circles) as family, friends, and neighbors motivate them to be entered. These social forces have a great importance in people's lives for the reason that closed relations decide the destination for them. Same happens in the case of Pakistani feminine segments who moved towards extremely religious thoughts and religious institutions/groups. Some women are forced by male family members, some have been moved due to the desire of their mother; father; grandmother; and a few girls joined Madrasa because their aunties and uncles motivated their parents to send them in religious institutions.

### *5.1.1 Forcing Females by Male Family Members towards Religious Institutions*

Data suggests that male family members motivate their wives, sisters, daughters, and mothers to go to religious institutions to get religious knowledge so that they can become pious, virtuous, and pure in their character. During an interview at Chouk Azam district Layyah, it has been dug out that in male Madrasas boys and men are taught and motivated to take their female family members in religious institutions. The religious expert made at that place Madrasas for both males and females, the researcher asked him, "Do you incline boys at your male Madrasa to take their sisters in female Madrasa?" He said, "Yes! We teach the male students in male Madrasa that give order to the females of your family regarding Hijab and Pardah, prayers and fast, recite Quran, and some female should be motivated to study in



Madrassa then take her also so that the whole family can be enlightened with Islam (Danish, June 14, 2021).” It has been revealed in three interviews at Jhang, Multan, and Bahawalpur that male members of family have engaged in Madrasas to perform duties as teacher, administrator, or head. Usually it is seen that husbands force their wives to be involved in religious activities because generally in Pakistan religious scholars have established both Madrasas for males as well for females so they motivate their wives to be engaged in religious institutions.

### *5.1.2 Motivation by Husband for Involvement in Religious Activities*

A male as husband is most powerful person in Pakistani society. He in religious sectors is considered as controller of his wife’s life. When he motivates his woman towards religion and religious institution, she cannot deny. The researcher asked a woman in Faisalabad, “Did you engage in religious activities before marriage?” She told, “No! My husband encourages me to be the part of all this. He made me understood that this path will take you closed to ALLAH ALMIGHTY. Hanse, I get involved (female head at Faisalabad).” The same findings were in Karachi and Rawalpindi that Husbands engaged their wives in Madrasas as in Charge, head or teacher. Although in the cases of girl’s admission the result was a bit changed. Their mother, father, or grandmother sent them to get religious education in Madrasas.

### *5.1.3 Fulfilment of Parent’s Desire (Father, Mother, Grandparents)*

Data shows that most of the girls join Madrasa for the reason that their parents wish to make them a true follower of Islam. A girl at Gujranwala was asked that why she came in Madrasa? She told, “My father was really keen to give me religious education and as I passed fifth standard, he took me here (Shama, August 18, 2021).” A female teacher at Sialkot described, “My father himself was religious minded and had religious education. He sent me and my 3 sisters to Lahore and Gujranwala to get education in Madrasas.” She asserted, “my father’s wish was, we all start ‘Pardah’, When I told him that I and my sisters started to put “*Sharai Pardah*”, he in extreme sunshine fell on earth due to happiness and to thank to ALLAH he did ‘Sajda’ (Nasira, August 05, 2021).” In a Madrasa at Kallarkahar Chakwal a female student revealed, “my mother was keen that her daughter should do “*Hifz*”

(remembering of Quran) so she sent me here (Hadia, July 31, 2021).” Not only parents but sometimes, grandparents and aunts and uncles also play their role to admit girls in religious institutions. During an interview at Pakpattan, a 17 year’s girl told, “my aunty and grandmother convinced my mother to send here as my aunty was also a teacher here (Noor, September 14, 2021).” Often neighbors and family friends as well stimulate females to be admitted in Madrasa or to get religious knowledge.

#### *5.1.4 Family Friends and Neighbors as Motivational Factor for Religious Inclination*

The researcher finds that females who live in neighborhood or those who come regularly at home, they persuade girls to go to Madrasa or to adopt religious mentality. In five interviews at Jhang, Chakwal, Karachi, Lahore, and Mardan it has been described by the participants that they have been motivated to come to religious orientation due to convincing by their neighboring aunts and family friends. At Lahore an informant explained, “I am attached with this Madrasa from my childhood, when we had shifted to Lahore, I became attached with the family of Abd-ul-Rahman Kailani (author of Tehsil Quran). My mother was keen of reading Quran and the wife of Abd-ul-Rahman used to teach Quran. She and my mother became friends and I made friendship with her daughter named as Fouzia and is known as Umm-e-Abd-ul-Rub. I learnt Quran by heart by Atya Kailani the daughter of Abd-ul-Rahman Kailani. She made her regular institute after passing FSC in her house, she passed masters in Islamic studies and she also made me prepared for the exam of matriculation, I ultimately passed Matric privately, my teacher as got married, I with her sister Fouzia continued this program and took all responsibilities of Madrasa (Misbah, August 03, 2021).”

Another case came in front where the family friend induced a girl to join Madrasa at Jhang, a participant was asked, “How you have been motivated towards this side”? She answered, “one of my sister’s friend used to come to our home, I was free after matric, she said to my sister that send me with her in Madrasa in the next street it has been established, our “Baji” (religious teacher) says us to take girls for studies from nearby community so I went with her and day by day I was reluctant to learn Quran and Hadith, later I took admission in the course of female scholar and after six years I passed that (Bibi, July 29, 2021).” At Karachi a female was questioned that from where she got aspiration to get

religious education? Or who convinced her to be religious? She explained, “One lady who taught about the translation of Quran and held ‘Ijtima’ motivated my parents to engage me in religious education (Farukh, May 12, 2021).”

In another interview a woman was asked that from her childhood, she wear gown and Hijab? She said, “No! I belong to Lahore and our environment was very open there. Our father did not make Pardah as compulsory element for his daughters. When I got married, one aunty came to my home with her daughter from neighboring surroundings, both were very religious, they asked me that what do I do in my free time? To be very frank, I had no answer. However, I used to make drawings but I did not tell them and said that I do nothing and enjoy rest at bed. So they invited me to come in “Dars” (religious gatherings) (Mussarat, August 08, 2021).” The above mentioned cases explained that how important role neighbors and family friends have in persuasion of females towards religious institutions and in developing religious thoughts.

#### *5.1.5 Idealizing some Personality (Role Model)*

It has been understood and observed during field work that females make their role models, to whom they copy and adopt religious aspirations. A girl in a religious institution at Pasheen told, “I was inspired with my teacher and began to go to “dars” (religious gathering) every Sunday but later joined Madrasa to get religious knowledge (Batool, October 22, 2021).” During an interview at Rawalpindi, the respondent described, “when in me in laws another daughter in law came after marriage, she used to put “*Sharai Pardah*”, I started to copy her, I looked at her how she maintained her Hijab in spite of having many male members in her home, I began to sit with her in different functions and continuously followed her, slowly and gradually I learnt to have Pardah with my brother in laws and father in law (Gul, January 19, 2022).” Similarly, four other interviewees at Layyah, Multan, Faisalabad, and Naushehra said that they were impressed by someone and started to hold religious values and thoughts and began to go to nearby religious institution. It has been likewise noted that the loss of some beloved generated inclination towards Madrasas among Pakistani females.

### *5.1.6 Stimulation towards Religion: Loss of Beloved Family Members*

This explicit social inquiry also finds that females are stimulated towards Madrasas and religious mentality because they have lost their beloved. A concept is penetrated in the minds of females that their beloved after death is wanting from them recitation of Quran, offering of prayers, and having Hijab and Pardah. Multiple young girls who have lost their father or mother move towards religious institutions to send their parents “Sawab” (virtues). At Kallarkahar Chakwal a 18 year’s girl highlighted that she came in Madrasa because of his father’s death. When she was asked that how you motivated to come here even you did I.C.S? She explained, “it was my desire from my childhood to take religious education, my father was also wanting me to do so, when he died, I thought to fulfil his wish and to send him “Sawab” (virtues), my family was forcing me to go university but with my own reluctance I came here (Banaras, July 31, 2021).” In a Madrasa at Bahawalpur a female told that her Husband was killed, she had nothing to do without him, she used to cry day and night, and ultimately she decided to join Madrasa where she could bring about sending some virtues to her husband for the relaxation in his next life (Baigam, September 17, 2021). Except motivation by social forces, the religious-minded people apply some stimulating strategies to magnetize Pakistani feminine sphere towards religiosity and religious institutions/groups.

## **5.2 Motivational Strategies: Penetration of Religious Views and Admission in Religious Institutions/ Groups**

The researcher explores that motivational strategies are utilized to galvanize females to be entered in religious institutions, to join some religious group, or to adopt simply rigid religious views. Use of social media, social religious gatherings at communal and national level, door to door campaign, and various other methods are availed to fascinate Pakistani women towards religious mentality and religious institutions.

### *5.2.1 Door to Door Campaign*

The religiously affiliated women go door to door in communities to motivate females to adopt religious thoughts and to be entered in Madrasas. A respondent at Layyah denoted that she made a Madrasa in which however, the facility of hostel is not available but at daily

bases 40 women from her community come to get religious knowledge. She said that she did not advertise about her Madrasa but herself began to go in every home in her surroundings to tell women that how much this education is important for them and for their family, within few days, females started to join her Madrasa and some of them took their young daughters with them for gaining religious education and training (Salma Khatoon, Layyah). Another participant told the researcher, “We go street to street to make women understood the significance to come in Madrasa and to move towards religion (Female Head, Faisalabad).” In four interviews at Mardan, Lahore, Chaman, Karachi, and Rawalpindi same data came in front that females are mobilized towards religiosity and religious-orientation by door to door campaign. Besides this, online methods are as well applied to motivate the feminine segment in Pakistani society.

### *5.2.2 Online Methods and Using of Social Media*

As the technology became excessive to everyone, the religious-oriented women also took benefit from it and by sitting at home they through online religious education and by using social media motivate women towards religiosity and extremely religious views. An informant described at Gujranwala, “Online education for translation of Quran and Tafseer we give (Ishmat, August 02, 2021).” Religious activists from different religious groups like Jamat Islami use social media to engage women in religion and religious activism. A woman belonged to Jamat Islami was asked that how she motivates other females towards religion? She highlighted, “you know that on mobile usually dance and singing are seen and heard. I have the responsibility from Jamat-e-Islami to spread Islamic values through media and particularly social media. The girls who do not come in “dars” (religious gatherings), at their home via Facebook and Whatsapp they get Islamic Material and Islamic Messages. Besides we call at dars in which women are guided to become pious and virtuous, to wear “Pardah”, and to become obedient to ALLAH ALMIGHTY (Shakir, July 26, 2021).” A woman at Multan said, “I teach Quran, and Hadith online so that by living in home and by maintaining my Pardah, can spread Islam in this world (Bushra Bibi, Multan).” The researcher observed during her field work that this strategy is really useful and increasingly is availed in Pakistan to stimulate the women towards religiosity and religious institutions/groups. This social

inquiry likewise excavated that “Ijtimas” and “Dars” (religious gatherings) are highly utilized method to take women and girls to the path of religiosity and Madrasas.

### *5.2.3 Religious Gatherings (Ijtimas) at Communal and National Level and Conduction of Milad*

Literature on social identity, stigmatization, identity negotiation, and radicalization shines the light that social networking contributes a lot to motivate individuals/groups to adopt some thoughts, views, and behaviors. In Pakistan these social networks (Ijtimas, Dars, Milad) are activated to engage women towards religiosity and religious institutions in the name of religious gatherings and for admiration of Prophet Muhammad PBUH throughout the country. The investigator claims on the bases of collected data that “Ijtimas” and “Dars” (religious gatherings) are held at communal and national level and conduction of Milad (a gathering where Prophet Muhammad PBUH is admired through poetry and symphony), are utilized to provide religious knowledge and thinking to females.

Generally, these Ijtimas/dars and Milad are arranged at communal level by local women but at national level are conducted by religious groups like Tablighi Jamat, Jamat Islami, and Dawat-E-Islami. Moreover, institutions as Al-Huda International and locally established Madrasas conduct these kind of activities on daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly bases. A participant described during interview, “Women are invited in “*Ishtimas*” (religious gatherings) there we teach them to discriminate between the right and the wrong, real Islamic values, status of a religious woman in *Jannah* (heaven), threats to Muslims and Islam, and about bringing up their children according to Islam (Zartashia, July 27, 2021).” Except conduction of Ishtimas at communal level, religious groups as Tablighi Jamat and Jamat Islami at national level arrange these religious gatherings time to time.

Another respondent at Jhang was asked that do females also go for preaching with Tablighi Jamat? He gave a detailed answer, “yes they go but they have to go with their Mahram (blood relation) like brother, father, or husband. They are facilitated in every way, proper arrangement of Pardah is done, even during travel it is made sure that their Pardah and respect must be maintained.” He was questioned further by researcher that what duties females perform when they go with Jamat? He discussed, “early in the morning they are

preached by the female scholars, and then throughout the surroundings it is announced that women of Tablighi Jamat have come to your street/village/community, at evening or a time is decided for gathering and on fix time they engage women of that community in religious education. They explain about important elements of Islam and besides this they highlight those issues which are particularly are considered issues of females (Murtaza, July 29, 2021).” Another female described that she was convinced to have Hijab and Pardah in an Ijtima arranged at Minar-E-Pakistan Lahore by Jamat Islami (Zakia, August 02, 2021). Other than Ijtimas/Dars Milad are held from communal to national level to attract women towards religious mentality.

In an interview at Kallarkahar a girl was asked to suggest some ways to induce women towards religion, she highlighted a really new strategy which the researcher did not hear before, she said, “we should conduct Milad (a gathering where Prophet Muhammad PBUH is admired through poetry and symphony), when other girls will attend and listen these Milads, they will feel relaxation and ultimately to gain gratification and relaxation, they will come towards religious education (Hadia, July 31, 2021).” At national level these Milads are arranged by Dawat-E-Islami specifically in the month of Rabi-UI-Awal because Prophet Muhammad PBUH was borne in this month. An active member of Dawat-E-Islami explained, “popular Nathkhawan” (the admirers who highlight the status of Prophet Muhammad PBUH by poetry and symphony) are invited by paying huge amount in Milad so that people come to listen and see them and in this way they get closed to Islam (Qadri, August 07,2021).” It has been seen in this investigative study that except the month of Rabi-UI-Awal, females are also induced particularly in the month of Ramadan because Muslims consider that month the most respectable and honored and religious-minded women by taking benefit of this month accelerate their activities.

#### *5.2.4 Ramadan as a Motivational Month towards Religion and Religiosity*

This meticulous study highlights that in the month of Ramadan women are convinced to adopt extremely religious behaviors and thoughts. As with this month Muslims have their emotional attachment and they avoid to spend worldly life for thirty days so they are engaged more easily than before to embrace religious mentality. At Chouk Azam Layyah, a

participant with proud told the researcher a practical example, “in this Ramadan, I convinced a girl who has done B.S. computer sciences from Lahore and currently teaching in a college, to come in Madrasa to understand the translation of Quran, but I am hoping that I will totally motivate her towards the path of ALLAH ALMIGHTY.” The interviewee further expounded, “The modern educated female was motivated round about 3 years.” She explicated, “In the month of Ramadan, we begin particular classes of ‘dars’. So her mother used to come, I convinced her to take her daughter and she took. Constantly 3 years in every Ramadan she came with her mother. With the will of GOD, now she regularly comes to this Madrasa (F T C).” The female head of a Madrasa at Faisalabad said, “Particularly in Ramadan we arrange extra classes to stimulate the girls and women (Female Head).” Another motivator also told, “We persuade women by using the month of Ramadan because in this month, Muslims show more interest in following Islam, so we motivate them towards religious institutions where they recognize the true religion (Akhtari, October 14, 2021).” Except availing the religious sentiments of Muslim females in the month of Ramadan, the researcher noted that Jamat Islami is utilizing a new strategy to stimulate women to adopt religious behaviors and thoughts and that strategy is making of women wings at district, provincial, and national level.

#### *5.2.5 Motivation towards Religiosity by Making Wings of Religious-Oriented Women*

This dissertation makes the case that Jamat Islami has developed highly motivated strategy by which a great number of educated females is moving towards Hijab, Pardah and other religious values. An active member of this group revealed when she was asked, “what type of women are coming towards Pardah and Hijab?” “Usually, Jamat-e-Islami targets educated women. We have made different wings like “gharailu khawateen” wing (the women who live in house), teacher wing, and doctor wing. Current data of party shows that Ph. Ds are persuading towards Jamat and putting Hijab (Shakir, July 26, 2021).” The district president (Nazima) of female wing at Karachi told, “We have different wings of women which are active throughout the country, these wings at district, provincial, and on national level aware Pakistani women about Islam (Nazima, May 15, 2021).” It has been explored by the researcher that sometimes, in great Ijtimas, stage performance is as well used to incline



women to adopt religious mentality and behaviors and this method has been as well found by Jamat Islami to attract women towards religious values and thoughts.

#### *5.2.6 Performance of Stage Dramas for Inclination of Women towards Religiosity*

The inquirer finds with the help of gathering data that entertainment methods such as stage dramas and stage dialogs are also availed to motivate particularly young girls to espouse religious ideals and aspirations. An activist from Jamat Islami was inquired that how she has been motivated towards religion? She described, “I was expecting at that time for my forth child, when I got opportunity to attend one Ijtima (religious gathering) at Minar-e-Pakistan at Lahore, I with one of my friend entered there. I saw, it was arranged by students for young Muslim women. There, I got wondered that thousands of female students having *Abaya* and *Naqab* were attending that Ijtima. U even cannot imagine that how at stage the students of Jamat motivated the women to wear Hijab, to adopt Pardah. Through dramas, they stimulated young Muslim female students. Very important topics were designed to perform. For example, Haya (shame) and dialogue with devil. So from that time I started to put *Pardah*, *Hijab*, and *Naqab* (Najma, August 06, 2021).” The researcher noted that this strategy has also been utilized by Jamad Islami and any other Institution or group has not adopted this method in the country yet. It has been likewise examined that various Madrasas give equal certificates to matriculation and intermediate so those people who cannot have the facility of schools and colleges send their daughters in these institutions for taking certificates.

#### *5.2.7 Providence of Equal Certificate to Modern Education*

Well-developed religious institutions have the authority by “Wifaq-Ul-Madaris” (national body to regulate the system of Madrasa throughout the country) to issue equal certificates to matriculation, intermediate, graduation, and masters on the bases of religious courses which they offer for four to six years. During three interviews at Multan and Lahore, it has been dug out that this strategy is extremely useful to motivate girls and their parents to be admitted in Madrasas. A participant in Multan told, “We have equal certificate to masters and Higher Education Commission (HEC) recognizes that so those females who cannot afford expensive modern education, they should not be ignorant but in some way they should

pursue their education (Abd-UI-Manan Abid, Multan).” Mufti Mubashir Rabani described, “My two daughters study in Al-Huda International System, they get religious education there but they will be given equal certificate to matric.” He in addition spoke, “when I have opportunity to have religious education and to gain equal certificate to worldly education so why I will prefer schools or colleges for my daughters? (Rabani, August 03, 2021). A research participant highlighted, “my three daughters and one daughter in law got religious knowledge in this same Madrasa where I am in charge, they were given equal certificates to intermediate and now they all are serving this institution by teaching here (Maulana Sadiq, Multan).” An informant described at Islamabad, “Most of the girls teach Quran at home to the children however, we give them equal certificate to matriculation and intermediate so they can pursue their further education in colleges or universities (Muqaddas, January 03, 2021).” It has been seen during the fieldwork that providence of equal certificates fascinates girls to be admitted in religious institutions for gaining education of religion. The researcher found that the rich girls who moved to religious orientation are also presented as role model to incline the females to espouse religious thoughts and behaviors.

#### *5.2.8 Presenting of Rich Women as Role Models*

The religiously affiliated people make the case that in contemporary time the rich also send their girls to gain religious knowledge so the poor as well should admit their daughters to Madrasas. This motivating strategy works amazingly, because the poor usually remain in inferiority complex but when they are convinced that the rich are have inclination towards religious ideals and aspirations so they start to follow the rich and send their daughters to religious institutions for acquiring religious education. A respondent was questioned that whether the rich admit their girls in his Madrasa? He with happiness described, “if I talk of 2012 when I went to Madina, most of the students in Madrasas belong to poor families but when I returned in 2018, I saw that very strong families are sending their children (Abd-UI-Manan Abid, Multan).” Another interviewee with proud revealed, “Now rich families are also sending their children to Madrasas, I give the example from my own family. My sister in law has 3 children and believe me they are really wise and intelligent. But when they completed their 12 standard, she sent them to Madrasa by thinking that Islamic education is not just for the poor, dull minds, blinds, and disables. Our religion needs the best and brilliant

brains (Zartashia, July 27, 2021).” Besides highlighting the rich children as religious role models, the females are motivated by narrating the stories of brave Muslim women and by providing the link to ALLAH ALMIGHTY in their hard circumstances.

#### *5.2.9 Narration of the Stories of Brave Muslim Females and Stimulation in Hard Circumstances*

This social investigation discusses that people induce the feminine segments in Pakistan towards religiosity and religious activities via narration of the stories of those women who sacrificed and exhibited bravery. Furthermore, they are motivated in those circumstances when they pass from hardships of their lives. An informant described, “by narrating stories of Islamic personalities: as Hajira bibi and her efforts for providing water to Ismail, “Umahatul Mominin’s” (wives of Prophet Muhammad PBUH) stories, and other “Sahabiat’s” (female companions of Prophet Muhammad PBUH) life incidents women are inclined towards religious ideals and aspirations (Zartashia, July 27, 2021).” Another participant shined the light in her interview, “First of all, we pray for them. Because pray is the most important weapon to motivate and protect.” She provided the example, “When “Umar bin khatab” (Farooq-e-Azam) and “Amru bin Hasham” (Abu jahil) were non-believers, Prophet Muhammad also prayed from ALLAH that turn anyone from these two into Muslim. So we pray as well.” She told, “When we go NADRA office or hospital, we look at the females who don’t cover (pardah) themselves. We motivate them to be like us through narration of stories of daughters and wives of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) by keeping in mind that if we take someone on the right path, may be, we can make our own way to go to “*Jannah*” (heaven) (Faiza, April 26, 2021).”

In another discussion it has been excavated that when females face some difficulty or hurdle, they can be persuaded easily to adopt religious way of life. An interviewee explicated in her discussion with the researcher, “I stimulate women in the time of sorrow towards ALLAH ALMIGHTY. You know that when we are happy, we forget our Creator but when we are under cloud or passing from difficult time, we get closed to ALLAH TALA. So we look that when some female is facing grievances, we push her towards Islam because our religion has the solution of all problems (Batool, October 22, 2021).” The above revealing

data have clarified that women are motivated towards religious thoughts, views, beliefs, and behaviors via applying some strategies/methods by religious community in Pakistan. The investigator explored in her fieldwork that some concepts are prevailed to persuade women to embrace religiosity and to come to Madrasas or religious groups. These concepts are working as fuel for fire and extremely rigid religious female mindset is augmenting in the country.

### **5.3 Motivational Concepts: Moving towards Religiosity and Religious Institutions/Groups**

In Pakistani society various concepts are circulated by which women particularly push or pull to be entered in a religious stream or to go to Madrasas for gaining religious knowledge. During the collection of data this scrupulous dissertation the researcher identified that the concepts as care for life after death, fear from sinful life, or providence of gratification in religion are availed to motivate women for having religious thoughts and beliefs.

#### *5.3.1 Inducement of Women: Religion as a Source of Gratification, Pride, and Happiness*

Most of the women move towards religious institutions/groups because they want some place where they can find relaxation and gratification as they remain disturbed in their personal life. A participant was asked that how the rich can be motivated to get religious education in Madrasas? She discussed, “elite class come towards Islam to gain gratification and relaxation when they are disturbed mentally and cannot find appeasement anywhere so they come to Madrasas (Misbah, August 03, 2021).” Another respondent highlighted with happiness and pride, “when you start to be engage in the discussions regarding Prophet Muhammad PBUH and ALLAH ALMIGHTY, at all cost, you are attracted and galvanized, you feel happy, you forget your problems, and you become a regular visitor of such places like Madrasa (Akhtari, October 14, 2021).” Other than the concept of gratification, pride, and happiness, the fear from sin and care for life here after as a motivational force as well is activated to stimulate women in religious mentality and behaviors.

### *5.3.2 Fear from Sinful Life and Care for Life Here After*

This investigative study finds that religiously affiliated elements use the sensitive concepts of Islam to engage women in extreme religious behaviors and to attract them to join religious institutes/groups. They are made afraid of sinful life (to get modern education or to work with men in office). They are inclined to be prepared for eternal life, they are told that this preparation can only be done in Madrasas this is the reason that they should come upon those places where the syllabus for the exam at the day of “Judgment” (Qayamah) is taught. A female in her interview exposed with a strongly belief that Islam is true and exact so it magnetizes, when you visit the places where right and true things are taught, one day you accept that my previous life was useless and sinful, now I am on right path, and same has been happened with me (Sardar, December 07, 2021).” The researcher noted at Multan that women are induced by producing care among them for the life here after. The respondent said in his interview, “When we 24/7 will discuss this world, will care about this temporary life, and will remain busy in worldly activities then we cannot be stimulated towards religion and religious institutions. When we will be serious about the life here after and will be afraid of the day of “judgment” (qayamah), we will run towards religious thoughts and religious studies (Maulana, August 07, 2021).” It is also penetrated in the minds of women by religious-oriented people that only in religion and at religious places (Madrasas) the solution for all conflicts is available so they should come towards this side. In addition, it is highlighted that religious education is a trend of modern life.

### *5.3.3 Vitality of Religious Education for Removal of Conflicts (Fitna) and Religious Knowledge as Fashion and Trend*

This concept prevails at a large scale in Pakistan that religion is the resolution of all conflicts. Through religious thoughts and religious institutions, the domestic problems can be solved, the super powers can be defeated, west can be confronted, all the challenges to Muslim world can be tackled, and Muslims can win the economy and politics of this world if they begin to adopt religious mentality and if they start to get religious knowledge. A research participant was asked, “what do you think that why women are taking interest in religious studies in contemporary time? What can be the reasons?” She explained, “They are

looking that day by day conflicts (fitny) are amplifying, they are getting aware that only religion (Islam) can overcome these conflicts. Furthermore, challenges are posed by the Non-Muslims so automatically mind gets ready to conduct religious research (Gul, January 19, 2022).”

It is also propagated by religious-minded women that to get religious education is today’s trend and fashion so females should come to religious institutes as they do other fashion in their life. An informant was questioned that what does she think that in the decade of 70 and 80 women were more inclined towards religious education or today they are more induced towards Islam and its studies? She highlighted, “now women are more stimulated than before, however, ways and methods are different, previously education was considered as the mode of training but today it has become fashion. As other subjects are increasingly read similarly religious education is getting popularized (Misbah, August 03, 2021).” Another idea is penetrated in the minds of Pakistani feminine segments besides religious knowledge as the solution of all conflicts and it is the fashion of today’s life by the religious experts that they should open an account in the bank of ALLAH ALMIGHTY as they have opened in this world.

#### *5.3.4 Forcing for Opening of Account in Bank of ALLAH ALMIGHTY*

During the fieldwork at Multan this new concept came in front of the researcher that women are motivated and fascinated towards religiosity and religious institutions by convincing them to open a bank account above in skies. A respondent was inquired that how he pushes or pull females to be admitted in his Madrasa? He described his motivational idea, “I say to everyone that you open bank account in this world why not you open an account in the bank of ALLAH ALMIGHTY? You know when we recite a single word of Quran, we get 10 “naikian” (virtues), when we will recite billions of letters, how many virtues we will get? Definitely countless. So if we gather money in bank and become glad then why not we collect virtues in that bank which will lead us to *Jannah* (heaven) (Abd-UI-Manan Abid Multan).” Except this concept, he alluded another concept before researcher that religious girls are got married before those girls who do not have religious education because ALLAH ALMIGHTY sends proposals for them.

### *5.3.5 Motivation towards Religion: Dreaming to Religious Girls for Marital Proposals*

In the same interview it has been revealed that women are push or pull towards religious institutions by showing them the dreams for their marriages. The respondent expounded, “I looked, and those girls who are ‘*Hafiza*’ (the female who learnt Quran by heart) have more marital proposals than the girls who just got worldly education. You know why? Because ALLAH ALMIGHTY opens the doors for those females who recite Quran every day and every night (Abd-UI-Manan Abid,).” A participant at Nauhshehra described, “I was of forty years but I could not get married. Proposals used to come and liked me but in the end they rejected me. I was really worried. One day, I met with a woman who was an *Alima* (religious scholar), I told my problem to her, she invited me in her Madrasa, I began to go and literally I got married within one month (Gulnaz, December 11, 2021). Two other interviewees at Lahore and Layyah as well explained that religious knowledge opens the doors for marriages for girls. Women are persuaded towards religious values and customs such as Hijab and Pardah by explaining that women should not bring about social deviation, if they will not cover their head, feet, hands and faces, they will take society at the edge of social destruction and will develop non-Islamic society and will promote western culture in Pakistan.

### *5.3.6 The Concept of Social Deviation and Vulgarly: Stimulation to Religiosity*

This scrutiny also examines that religious-minded people push or pull the female segments to embrace religious ideals and beliefs by expansion of some concepts as to study or to work with na mahram (those who are not in blood relations) is illegitimate, non-Islamic, and takes deviation in society. They spread the perception that if in some difficult circumstances, women have to get education or have to do some job, they should cover their body from head to toe otherwise they will become the cause to promote vulgarity in society. An active member of Jamat Islami highlighted a research in her interview, “an American doctor named as Gohar Mushtaq found during his research that when man look at woman to whom he has no blood relation, his eyes fastly move.” She further described, “in his research, some pictures of women were shown to men and astonishingly the cornea of the eyes of men began to move rapidly but at the other hand when men’s pictures were displayed in front of

women, their cornea did not be effected (Zartashia, July 27,2021).” Another participant at Jhang was asked, “You put Pardah and also motivate girls here to maintain it. Why we should do Pardah?” She replied, “Pardah is necessary because it has been made essential by our Prophet and by Allah. In today’s world Pardah is really important because due to lack of “Pardah” (baipardagi) vulgarity and shamelessness is augmenting in our society this is why women should do Hijab and Pardah so that social deviation can be stopped to be occurred (Nibi, July 29, 2021).” In six different interviews at six different cities was asked the same question. The answer was alike that if women study or work with men or do not cover themselves from head to toe, they deviate the males. Even a respondent gave the blame of increasing rape cases to women. She said, “when girls will study and work with Na mahram and will wear western dress, how it is possible that men do not indulge in wrong doings (Zakia, August 02, 2021).” However, the fear of social deviation has been observed a highly motivating concept but the inquirer looked another concept is to be activated in Pakistani society which galvanizes particularly parents to admit their girls in Madrasas that a child must be sent to the religious institution so that he/he can bring about “*Jannah*” (heaven) for parents.

### *5.3.7 Admission of Daughter in Religious Institution as the Service of Islam*

Multiple female students in religious institutions are admitted by their parents because they think that they will even engage in sins and will involve in illegal acts, but their daughter if gets religious education, she will say to ALLAH ALMIGHTY to forgive her parents. She will be closed to ALLAH this is why they will be forgiven in the Day of Judgment. In an interview at Chouk Azam Layyah, an informant denoted towards Hadith and Quran, “As such no strategy we have! Just we can motivate them by telling them that how much this education is important. For example, ALLAH ALMIGHTY says in Quran, the best among you is he who learns Quran and spread Quran among others.” He likewise narrated a Hadith, “among you, there must be one group who purely work for religion (Islam).” He in addition said, “I explain it, like if you have 3 daughters, you must devote one for the services of religion (Deen) (Danish, June 14, 2021).” At Karachi a female told, “if you give your daughter religious education and if you send your daughter in Madrasa, on the day of judgment, there will be a crown on your head and you will be shining among all (Farukh, May 12, 2021).”



This concept works a lot and parents for their forgiveness admit their daughters in religious institutions. Another very significant concept is circulated that religious-minded female is significant for the better survival of family for the reason that the women should come to religious institutions to gain religious knowledge.

#### *5.3.8 Highlighting the Importance of a Religious-Minded Female for Family*

This concept has also its routes in Pakistani society that religiously affiliated women will enlighten about right and wrong to their family, modern women are deviated, and they cannot discriminate between good and bad. Religious females will bring their children up according to Islam, they will become ideal wife; daughter; sister; and mother, they will tolerate misbehavior of their husband, they will not take divorce even they will be abused or bitten, they will take their male family members to “*Jannah*” (heaven), and they will persuade their men towards religion. During an interview, on the question of religious motivation to male family members, the respondent denoted, “When girls get admission here, first, we teach them and congratulate them that ALLAH ALMIGHTY has selected them for this noble cause. Learn and then start to teach others and first of all begin from your own home. Tell your brothers father, or son about right and wrong. It is your duty to enlighten the family that if you see evil, stop that with hand, if you don’t have power to stop with hand then speak against that evil, and if you even cannot do this then at least, think that evil as wrong, this is the last stage of belief (Eman) (Ishmat, August 2,2021).” During the visit of Faisalabad, a female student at Madrasa was questioned, “Do you wish to take your brother towards this side?” She told, “Yes! Why not! My full try will be to persuade them towards any Madrasa (Aysha, August 02, 2021).”

At Quetta a participant by citing an example, described, “Believe me that when girls come to us, they even don’t know how to greet (Salam). But as we provide them sense, they not only correct themselves but also their family. I give an example, in 2015 2 girls with their father came here and got admission, to be frank, their father was very old but he did not know how to offer prayer! He looked at others during prayer and did the same gestures. Later when his daughter after studying here, taught their father then he came to us to say gratitude that his daughters opened his eyes because of this Madrasa. He said we were as a whole family was

unaware of Islam before sending our daughters here (Akram, October 13, 2021). A respondent at Multan alluded, “in religious institutions, females are not taught about violence but they are given religious training to run their next life as a wife, mother, daughter, and sister.” He explicated, “When a woman is known about Islam, she sometimes tolerates misbehavior by husband and with a better method she will make her husband understand about his mistake and misbehavior.” He further told, “Particularly for girls religious knowledge is compulsory. I personally observed that the ratio of divorce is less among those females who have religious understanding (Abid, August 07, 2021).”

Another interviewee was asked at Jhang, “why religious education is compulsory for females?” He highlighted, “if a male studies, he is just only one while a female gets education, she teach her whole family, the first school for a child is the lap of a mother so she has more need of religious education than a man (Ghulam Murtaza, ).” On Emergence of female madrasas and expansion of religiosity the researcher inquired at Karachi, the interviewee discussed, “As you know that this time is so dangerous and particularly socialization and bringing up of the children is not according to Islam. Internet, television, and mobiles are deviating the youth from the right path, religious-minded women can socialize their children according to Islam, for the reason female Madrasas have been expanded and established by the religious people (sheikh Adil, Karachi).” At in an interview at Chaman, the respondent told, “when religious-minded girls become mothers, they are able to teach their children about the pray of sleeping, drinking, eating, and walking. If they become the mother of sons, they will teach them how to defend the religion, what is last prophet hood, and who is the enemy of Islam and Muslims (Ashraf Aziz, Chaman).”

This social investigation also reveals that females are considered responsible for the sins which men do and they will bring about hell and heaven for men. A research participant told that woman is responsible for heaven and hell for her male family members, they should be religious-oriented so that the men go into “*Jannah*” (heaven) at the Day of Judgment. He explained, “I thought that females should be concentrated because if a male is religiously educated then he just himself will be on the right path whereas a female not only will take herself to heaven (*Jannah*) but also to her husband and children.” He narrated a Hadith, “It is the Hadith that a woman will bring about the fire of hell (*Jahanum*) for her father, brother,

husband, and son. This are some reasons that I opened this institute for the females (Danish, June 14, 2021).” Although, a religious-oriented woman is considered compulsory for an Islamic family but other than this it is as well understood that women are the most powerful source to motivate the people from family to community and from community to society towards religious mentality and behaviors.

### *5.3.9 Woman’s Role as Motivational Force towards Religion*

Data suggests that in Pakistani society another concept is prevailed that as men cannot push or pull the people towards religion as women can. They can be the religious model for other women in their community and they can be proved as a chain for changing this world. From family to community and from community to society they can convert non-Islamic world into Islamic. A respondent described, “These girls after completing Madrasa education will go in society and motivate the other females from their surroundings who don’t have excess to these kind of institutions towards the path of ALLAH ALMIGHTY (Abd-UI-Manan Abid, Multan.” Another participant explained, “When Bani Israel was punished by ALLAH ALMIGHTY, it was order to the angels that destroy the last cottage of the village. As the whole village was ruined, the angels asked ALLAH TALA that the person was in that last cottage was so pious and virtuous, then why you were annoyed with him? ALLAH TALA said ‘he was just thinking about him.’” She further spoke, “it is not important that you become pious, virtuous, and worshiper but it is significant that you motivate others and who can be the best motivator than women (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).”

At Kallarkahar Chakwal an interviewee was asked that how she will motivate other girls to come in Madrasas to get religious education? She expounded, “first, I will have to strictly follow Islam, when I will become a true and real Muslim, I will persuade my family, when my family will be convinced, then I will move towards those girls who live in my community and then society to be changed according to Islam, I will tell them that if they want to be closed to ALLAH, they will have to come to Madrasas (Shumayla Banaras).” A respondent at Pakpattan explained, “I will tell first the discrimination between right and wrong which my teachers have told me here. I will begin from my close friends if they will be changed, they will motivate their own friends and relatives. In this way a chain will be

made and the keenness towards religion will increase among people (Noor, September 14, 2021).” It has been observed that women are considered as a motivational force to incline the people particularly to women towards religious ideals and aspirations, they stimulate others more easily than men to be entered in religious institutions/groups. After digging out the existing concepts among Pakistani women that induce them to adopt religious thoughts, views, and beliefs the researcher moves to highlight the role of personal social conditions in motivating females towards religious institutions and religiosity.

#### **5.4 Social Conditions: Persuasion towards Religion and Religious Institutions**

As some social forces, strategies/methods, and existed concepts galvanize the women towards religion similarly some social conditions due to some life incidents as well have their contribution to force Pakistani females to espouse religious mentality. Literature on religion identity construction claims that religion is the source of gratification when people cut off from their closed relations because of some occurrence, they find psychological shelter in religion. In Pakistan, religious institutions belonging to females not only supply personal satisfaction and comfort ability but provide as well a safe place to live to those women who have been excluded from society.

##### *5.4.1 Motivation towards Religion: Psychologically or Socially Disturbed Women*

Those females who fail in their love stories, possess suspicion for magical acts, or are avoided by their husband in second marriage cases rapidly motivate towards religion and religious institutions where they adopt religious thoughts, views, and behaviors. The researcher during fieldwork observed and found that in Pakistan generally, women get married one time, to take separation from the husband is considered as social stigma. The parents at the time of marriage say to their daughters, “you are allowed to die but you cannot be permitted to leave the house of your husband in any situation”. At the other as according to Islam a man is free to have four wives at a time, when he attracts towards the second woman in spite of having wife, he gets married. In these circumstances, the first wife is neglected. She gets mentally disturbed, continuously moves towards solitude, and ultimately

finds her solution in religion. An informant was inquired, “have you experienced that psychologically or socially disturbed women motivate towards Madrasa and religious education?” She replied, “Yes a great number.” She presented some examples, “a woman whose husband got second marriage and did not give her proper time and even began to avoid her, she initially became disturbed, but she started to be closed to ALLAH TALA and slowly and gradually she used to ignore the carelessness of her husband (Misbah, August 03, 2021).”

Another case was come in front linking to psychologically disturbed woman and her stimulation to the religious thoughts and views when an interviewee told about the failure of a girl in love story and she has been induced towards religion as she was socially excluded when faced rejection, she shared, “Another young girl was persuaded towards Islam because she wanted to marry with someone but unfortunately the families of girl and boy did not get ready to make the couple so she got upset to that stage where she could do suicide, but she decided to come out this trauma and joined Madrasa and ultimately she got closed to Islam (Nasira, August 05, 2021).” A female described her own experience, “I was quite young, I began to like a boy who lived next to my door, and her mother several times came to my parents to ask for marriage of her son and mine. My mother was better in wealth than that family so she rejected the proposal by saying that economic status is lower because of this the marriage is impossible. I literally used to cry days and nights even I became psychologically sick and was about to die. Someone told me a verse of Quran and said that translate it whenever you get time, one day you will be married with your beloved. Slowly I found relaxation in that translation, I further explored about religion and started to go in an “Ijtima” (religious gathering) where I met with my ALLAH. Now 22 years have been passed, I am still alone but if I am alive today, it is just because of my religious affiliation (Nazia, May 05, 2021).”

While gathering data, a very interesting case of motivation towards religious mentality has been seen when an informant highlighted, “a woman was feeling that someone has done magical acts and her husband did not come home every day, she began to recite Quran daily, within few days her family problems have been solved but she did not leave her relation with Quran and now she is giving her services in Madrasa (Rukhsana, August 11, 2021).” A woman expounded her experience, “I used to feel that some magical powers are

following particularly when I went at social places like market or some marriage. I totally cut off from all my social circles. My husband left me because of it. That incident further excluded me from society and I began to come to a religious institution to keep me away from those magical powers and ultimately, I became a religious teacher (Saqina, July 30, 2021).” Religious institutions just do not provide satisfaction to psychologically/socially disturbed women but give shelter to those women who have been divorced, widowed, or who are orphaned.

#### *5.4.2 Madrasas as a Shelter for Divorced, Widow, and Orphaned Females*

Female religious institutions from Jamia-Hafsa to Al-Huda International System give shelter, food, and clothe to the socially sidelined women due to their personal life happenings. When these women are push and thrown back, they move to the religious institutions to find a safe and secured haven where they spend their remaining days of life. An informant described, “multiple divorced and widow females are motivated to Madrasas because they at the one hand find a safe shelter as Madrasa provides them the facility of hostel and at other, they do not have to face negative behaviors of their family, parents, or of society.” She additionally highlighted, “through Madrasa we also try to find some respectable life partner for them so that they can spend their own family life (Bano, September 14, 2021).” A respondent was questioned, “As you told that you have a great experience to study and to teach in Madrasas, would you like to tell that either marginalized, socially excluded, or segregated women come in these institutions? Whether these institutions give them some kind of incentive as economic?” He spoke, “we do not have facility for these kind of women but Doctor Farhat Hashmi has made a branch under Al Huda educational system for such kind of women. There these females are given shelter, food, and clothe and most importantly religious education (Mehmood, April 31, 2021).”

It has also been noted that those girls who are orphaned and have no social support, religious institutions are a heaven for them. A student in a Madrasa was asked, “do you like to tell about your home?” She with sadness told, “My parents have been died, I have a married sister, in her home I go sometimes otherwise I do not have home (Aleena Zainab, Bahawalpur).” Although, the above mentioned cases indicated social exclusion but when

these women join Madrasas, they get motivated towards religious mentality and behaviors. Other than divorced, widow, and orphan females, religious institutions are a shelter for those women who are the victim of domestic violence and who work of sweeping, cleaning, and cooking at homes but they do not have some place where they leave their daughters while going at work.

#### *5.4.3 Victims of Domestic Violence: Motivation towards Religious Institutions*

Those women who face domestic violence or those who work at homes of the rich take their girls to admit in Madrasas where these girls stimulate towards religion and religiosity. A male in charge of a female religious institution revealed in his discussion, “Majority of those women who are victim of domestic violence take their daughters to us to admit.” The investigator further asked, “What do you mean by victim of domestic violence?” He told in detail, “I clarify it, for example, the husband is drug addicted or unemployed or has been dead, they have to earn for bringing up of their family, they work in factories or simply are performing their duty at someone’s home as made like for sweeping and cleaning house so in these circumstances they need security for their daughters. They come to us and ask for protection, when we assure them, they admit their daughters. At the one hand their daughters are secured and at the other, they are provided education free of cost (Maulana Sadiq, Multan).” By examining the motivation to adopt religious behaviors and religious mentality due to social conditions, it has been understood that neither outsider like friend; family; or neighbor, nor strategies/methods and concepts intervene. Personal life incidents and occurrences force females to move to religious institutions where they adopt rigid religious views and thoughts. Not just social conditions have been activated but poverty as well has been observed as driving dynamism towards Madrasas and religious mentality among Pakistani feminine segments.

### **5.5 Poverty as a Driving Dynamism towards Religion and Religiosity**

Literature on link between poverty and radicalization and lower economic status and stigmatization however, has been produced gigantically. In subsequent chapters of this dissertation these topics will be profoundly overlooked. While here, the researcher

specifically endeavors to highlight the role of poverty in motivating females towards religious institutions and religiosity. In the countries like Pakistan, a great number of population lives under miserable condition, people even cannot fulfil the basic needs of their children, due to expensive modern education system, they cannot send their children to schools or colleges. The religious institutions because of having capacity to supply shelter, food, cloth, and religious education free of cost to the students through social welfare induce those people including females who do not have affordability of meeting basic necessities and having modern education.

#### *5.5.1 Miserable Conditions of the Families and Unavailability of Basic Necessities*

Gathering data to inquire the contribution of poverty in persuading girls and their parents towards Madrasas exposes that the majority of the female students comes to be admitted for religious education from extremely lower economic background. At their homes the unavailability of primary needs is seen with naked eye. At Multan a male head of a female religious institution was investigated, “you told that you have recently established a madrasa particularly for girls, what was in your mind when you thought to have a separate institution for girls?” He with sadness, explained, “Before sometimes, I had visited a house, where I saw that the head of the family was so ill that he even could not walk. He had 6 daughters, who were spending their lives under miserable condition. Not to talk of education, they even did not have food for them in their house. When they were unable to have food and clothe how they could get education? How they could pay their dues? My wish is that every woman and man should have education, with this objective I started the system for girls as well (Abd-Ul-Manan Abid, Multan).”

A respondent at Karachi highlighted in his interview, “Round about 70% girls even cannot afford basic needs.” He gave the example, “I tell you we have a student who when came, even did not have single suit to wear except that which she put already.” He described, “In the end of every month we give 3 day’s leave but parents don’t come to meet or to take them to home because they don’t even have rent of 50 or 100 rupees (Sheikh Adil, Karachi).” At Faisalabad, a female head of a Madrasa further explained, “Out of 60 students, round about 7 to 8 girls are here who have little good financial background. But you cannot say that



they are too much strong. Little ok. Believe in me! Many girls even cannot afford 50 rupees per month. For them, soap, tooth paste, and washing powder we arrange as well (female head, Faisalabad).” A student at Kallarkahar Chakwal was asked, “What your father does? And how many brothers and sisters do you have?” She told, “My father is a shop keeper and I have 7 sisters and 2 brothers. He was unable to bring up all in his earning, sometimes we had to sleep hungry. By looking upon our poor condition, my uncle advised my father to admit me and my four sisters in this Madrasa to have food besides religious education (Hadia, July 31, 2021).”

Although, poverty from the existence of Pakistan triggered religious affiliation but in very recent days, a new phenomenon corona crisis has been emerged which impacted the economic conditions of the people throughout the globe. In Pakistan, it gave as well its effects and the religious community indicated towards this factor to increase enrolment of girls and their motivation in Madrasas.

#### *5.5.2 Corona Crisis: Augmentation of Enrolment of Girls in Madrasas*

From America to Europe and from Asia to Africa Covid 19 influenced economy badly. Unemployment, inflation, and hunger has been increased while purchasing power, life standard, and financial status has been decreased of the people. In Pakistan where already population was suffering from poverty, totally got collapsed to manage basic needs. To save from hunger and to keep away from begging, the parents began to admit their children including daughters in Madrasas. An interviewee at Rawalpindi revealed, “As you know that poverty is increasing day by day and particularly in corona crisis people have gone even below from poverty line, they have no food and clothe for their children, when we provide all these basic necessities, parents admit their girls in this Madrasa. At the one hand their daughter acquires free healthy food and at the other she gets education not only of Islam but also modern education if she wishes because we provide opportunity to the students to pass matriculation and intermediate through Wifaq-Ul-Madaris (Mehmood, April 31, 2021).” Another respondent described, “Before 7 years I opened this institution for girls but the strength turned double in corona crisis because people do not have financial sources to bring their children up (Afzal Baloch, Bahawalpur).” The religious feminine elements explicate

that in the time of inflation when basic necessities with free religious education are supplied to the students, they get motivation towards religion and religious institutions.

### *5.5.3 Religious Stimulation: Supply of Basic Needs and Free Religious Education*

Collected data for this social investigation suggests that Madrasas not only provide free education to the poor girls but as well fulfil their primary needs as shelter, food, and cloth. An in charge of a female religious institution at Quetta was questioned, “Whether from the poor family’s girls come in Madrasa to get education or the rich send their daughters likewise?” He discussed, “usually, economically weak families send their daughters in our Madrasa and the reason of this is that at the one hand they get Islamic education and at other, they get food and clothe here (Akram, October 13, 2021).” A female religious scholar who was running a Madrasa for girls in Lahore was included in discussion by researcher, “mostly the poor or the rich families show their interest to send their daughters to Madrasas to get religious education? Kindly share your experience.” She elaborated, “Some families really understand the importance of religion and consciously they admit their daughters to Madrasas but a large number of families send their girls that they cannot afford modern education of schools and colleges so they take decision to admit their daughters in Madrasas (Misbah, August 03 2021).” An active member of a religious political parti with sadness escribed, “modern education is expansive and parents think that if we cannot provide school education then we should admit the child in Madrasa, where he/she will get religious education (Zartashia, July 27, 2021).”

Another informant was inquired, “what do you see that generally what kind of families admit their daughters in Madrasa? I am meaning economic background?” She replied, “usually the poor send their girls because they cannot afford high fee of schools and colleges so they decide to provide religious education which is low-cost.” She further spoke, “the rich because can afford expensive modern education so they do not come towards this side (Kousar, January 05, 2022).” To scrutinize further lack of affordability of modern education and motivation towards religious institutes, a student was engaged in discussion at Pakpattan, “do you wish to get modern education in school or college?” She with grievance explained, “Yes! I have wish but I don’t have opportunity to do that. As my family is poor,

my father is a farmer, my brothers are so young, and I also don't have traveling facility to go to school or college this is why, I am unable to get modern education. But before sending me here, my parents promised me that as I will complete my Madrasa course, they will do efforts to admit me in college (Aysha, August 02, 2021).” Besides free religious education, female students as well meet with those basic needs in these Madrasas from which they were deprived at their homes, for the reason that they are induced towards religious affiliation.

A participant at Lahore told the researcher, “parents cannot fulfil basic needs like food and clothe of their children, and they sent the children to Madrasa by keeping in mind that they will be free from the responsibility of their child.” She in addition spoke, “You know, this is very negative behavior. Because it is the duty of the parents to provide all basic necessities to their children. To keep their responsibility away, they should not admit their daughters in Madrasas (Head at Al-Huda, Lahore).” An interviewee at Sargodha highlighted, “not only hostel but from food to clothe in short, all the basic necessities are given to them here, we give breakfast, lunch, and also dinner to them (Saqina, July 30 2021).” A respondent was asked at Peshawar, “what facilities are given to the female students in this religious institute?” She explained, “We provide free food, clothe, books and shelter to the girls (Nahid, November 10, 2021).” Exploring data about free religious education and fulfillment of basic needs by Madrasas is sufficient to analyze that Pakistani female segments get motivation to move to the religiosity and religious institutions because of their poor family conditions. A very different angle however, likewise has been presented during the fieldwork by the religiously affiliated women that the poor are inclined towards religion as ALLAH ALMIGHTY wants them to be fascinated.

#### *5.5.4 Admission of Poor Girls in Madrasas: Logic from Religion*

Why the poor females are galvanizing to be admitted in religious institutions and to have religious views and thoughts? The religious community answers for this question and gives logic from Quran, Hadith, and the incidents of the life of Prophet Muhammad PBUH. A participant was inquired, “Why the poor families why not strong families send their daughters to Madrasa?” She began, “I will give two reasons from Quran and Sunnah: ALLAH TALA in Quran says that when we want to destroy some village (basti), we indulge the elite class (the

rich) into bad habits and in wrong doings to that extent, they forget their creator and then that village is destructed. The second logic I will present from Hadith: Prophet Muhammad PBUH said that whenever people are called towards Islam, the poor accepted first among all.” She gave the several examples from the life of Prophet Muhammad PBUH, “when He started to preach, the poor came forward to embrace Islam, Umm-e-Aiman was a female slave, Zaid Bin Haris was a slave, Ali was economically weak, the first martyred of Islam Sumiya and Yasir were also poor and weak, except Abubakar and Khadija, all the companions were not financially strong and powerful (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).”

At Multan an informant presented another example, “when Abu Sufian was Non-Muslim, he with the purpose of trade went in the state of Harculous (the King of Africa in the time of Prophet Muhammad PBUH), he was called by king and was asked that either His (Prophet Muhammad PBUH) followers are the poor or the rich? Abu Sufian told that His followers are the poor, the king spoke, and in every age at every Prophet the poor people first took “Eman” (belief) so it means, and He is true (Female teacher at Al-Huda, Multan).” An interviewee quoted a Hadith, “Prophet Muhammad PBUH said that as today the poor are inducing towards Islam similarly in near days of “Qayamah” (day of judgement) the poor will act upon this religion and the rich and elite will turn their face from Islam (Faiza Sarfaraz, Islamabad).” Another respondent at Karachi explained, “the poor families yet are not accustomed to the “chakachond” (shine, gleet, and glow) of Maghrib (West) when the poor are not seeing the western life style, so why they will be fascinating or attract towards that life (Rashida, May 19, 2021)?”

A female teacher at Jhang told, “Prophet Muhammad PBUH said, in the last days of this world, most of the Muslims will be poor and they will call the people towards Islam so mostly today the poor have the inducement towards Madrasas (Bibi, July 29, 2021).” Via looking deeply at the logics of the religious elements, it has been understood that the poor females are motivated towards religious institutions by making their minds that ALLAH ALMIGHTY (their Creator) likes them to be moved towards Madrasas, to be adopted religious mentality, and to be engaged in religious behaviors. The examination of miserable family conditions, augmentation in poverty during Covid 19, free providence of religious education and basic needs, and the presentation of the logics from religion for the adoption of

the religious behaviors by the poor has authenticated the argument that poverty as a motivational factor is activated in Pakistani feminine spheres which forces them to be admitted in religious institutions.

Subsequent to discuss motivational social forces that how people play their role to attract women to the religious stream; stimulating strategies that what methods are applied to push or pull the women towards religiosity and religious institutions/groups; prevailing concepts which force women to adopt religious mentality and to fascinate them towards Madrasas/religious groups; social conditions that what happenings/occurrences at personal level contribute to persuade females towards religion and religious institutions; and the role of poverty that why miserable family circumstances and providence of free religious education and supply of basic needs drive Pakistani feminine segments to espouse rigid religious thoughts and views, the next chapter will focus on building socio-religious identity based on 'us vs. them', stigmatization, and negotiation of stigmatized identity of religious feminine spheres in Pakistan. It will be as well overlooked that how society compels the stigmatized women that ultimately they adhere with religious institutions where they find gratification, respect, and self-confirmatory feedbacks for their negotiated identity.

## **CHAPTER 6**

# **STEREOTYPICAL BEHAVIORS: SOCIO-RELIGIOUS IDENTITY, SOCIAL STIGMA AND IDENTITY NEGOTIATION**

The previous chapter of this dissertation explained the social forces, strategies, concepts, and social conditions, poverty dynamics that pull or push Pakistani feminine segments to adopt highly rigid religious views and beliefs and to incline them to be entered in religious institutions/groups. Whereas this chapter endeavors to scrutinize that how religiously motivated women develop their identity and how they differentiate themselves from liberal/modern women in Pakistan, how religious identity of women is stigmatized by liberal/modern parts of Pakistani society, why stigmatized identity is negotiated by religiously affiliated females, and what strategies are applied by religiously motivated women to manage and to negotiate stigmatized identity.

To discuss and to reveal the process of us vs. them, stigmatization, and identity negotiation, the chapter is divided into four sections: in first section, the researcher excavates the development of identity on the bases of religion and differentiation in thoughts, outlook, values, norms, beliefs, and objectives between religious and modern feminine groups. Second section highlights the negative labelling and stereotyping of religious-oriented women by liberal segments as harassment, ironic looking and wording, declaring them as backwards and typical mindset, disturbing them in functions, and taunting on their identity by in laws and closed relatives. Under third part the inquirer describes identity negotiation process by stigmatized religious females through selective interaction, self-confirmatory feedbacks, and closed social environment where they get respect, appreciation, and honor for their constructed religious identity. Part four shines the light on stigma management strategies as passing, revealing, or compensatory by which religiously identified women fabricate, conceal, differentiate, normalize or increase positivity for their stigmatized identity.

## **6.1 In-Group and Out-Group Formation: Construction of Socio-Religious Identity**

This part of the research endeavors to understand in-group vs. out-group formation (us vs. them) in Pakistani feminine segments by looking at the practicality of social grouping, cognitive processes, self-categorization, de-individuation and collective identity, and minimal group paradigm. Data revealed that in Pakistani society religious-oriented women categorize them on the bases of Islam, they do not identify themselves as modern/liberal females, they consider modern/liberal feminine segments as a separate entity, they compare their religious values and thoughts with modern prevailing concepts and claim that their religious identity is more superior to the liberal women, whereas the modern segments have anticipation that religiously motivated females are unaware of modern day life so these spheres stigmatize and stereotype the religious-oriented women. Hence, two different groups religious and modern/liberal groups configure in Pakistan and the concept of us vs. them gets activated. In the fieldwork multiple interviewees explicated that religious and modern women are two different groups, these groups have difference in objective, outlook, thoughts, beliefs, ideals/aspirations, educational background, economic motives, and social environment. Although, prior to go profound in grouping of religious and liberal feminine spheres, it is vital to evaluate the distinct categorization among Muslims at a large scale.

### *6.1.1 Socio-Religious Identity of Religious and Liberal Muslims*

Among Muslims basically two different streams (groups) are flowing from the one river. Both the groups however, are called Muslims but are not same in thoughts, values, beliefs, behaviors, and outlook. The group who follows Islam as a religion and does not apply it on the all aspects of life is considered as liberal. While the group who implements Islam in every field is thought as religious. The religious declare the liberals as away from Islam whereas the liberals understand that the religious group is orthodox and typical, it should be changed according to the prevailing modern system. An informant at Jhang was inquired in the discussion by researcher, “What do you think that modern and fundamental Muslims are two distinct groups or they are one group?” He clarified, “they are all Muslims and I consider them as one group. But yes there is the difference within the group due to actions and

thoughts.” He in addition explained, “if a person is offering prayer five times, the whole night is standing before ALLAH ALMIGHTY and at other a person offers prayer of Friday rarely so how can they both be treated equally? Although, both are Muslims, the modern is little away from ALLAH whereas religious or fundamental is little closed to ALLAH (Murtaza, July 29 2021).” A famous religious scholar further denoted at Lahore, “the religious group recognizes itself according to Quran and Sunnah, it makes its identity according to the demands of ALLAH TALA while the liberals/modern change their identity according to their wish, fashion, or the demands of other liberals (Rabani, August 03, 2021).” At Rawalpindi a respondent highlighted, “among Muslims there are two types, one category just is poor in religion and aware of kalma and other category completely acts upon Islam and that category is less in number (Mehmood, April 30, 2021).” The above describing data demonstrates that social grouping among Muslims has been occurred and these groups are very dissimilar in all aspects of life. After highlighting generally the two distinct entities among Muslims at a huge level, this scrupulous social investigation moves to the particular gender dimension and construction of socio-religious identity and explores the differences of religiously identified women from the Pakistani liberal feminine segments.

### *6.1.2 Difference in Objective: Recognition of ALLAH ALMIGHTY or Betterment of Economic Status/Personal Grooming*

It has been found by data that the religiously motivated women claim that they possess different objective by acquiring education. Modern women get knowledge to obtain worldly life like economic status and personality grooming but religious females focus on the recognition of ALLAH ALMIGHTY and HIS signs. At Lahore the researcher had the opportunity to conduct the interview of a lady who was serving as head of department of Islamic studies in a public sector university and educational consultant and teacher in a Madrasa at a time. The researcher questioned her about the different identity of religious and modern women, she explained, “the basic difference is the objective of education, a rare girls who reach university get education to recognize ALLAH ALMIGHTY or to identify the existence of Him, generally, the girls go to university for personal grooming or for the betterment of economic status. Whereas, the female students come in Madrasas not for personal gains or economic wellbeing, they come to get knowledge for ALLAH TALA and



their parents send them just with the purpose of ‘Sawab’ (reward). So the basic difference is that both the students have different objective (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” She further discussed, “as I told that when in university basic goal is economic benefit, then these students do all those things which can enhance their market value. To be in market, to achieve foreign scholarship, to find handsome job, or to be highlighted, they get ready to break their customs and traditions, they do not care about the limitations imposed by ALLAH ALMIGHTY upon them. While at the other, the students of Madrasas do not try to do like that (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” Another informant at Sukkur indicated, “The objective of religious institutions is not earning or economy. We here teach that the students can recognize ALLAH ALMIGHTY, they can identify the purpose of the creation of this world, they can understand Quran and message of ALLAH ALMIGHTY, they can know about Sharia, and they can be acquainted with Prophet Muhammad PBUH and His life and most importantly can act upon Islam (Nazia, May 05, 2021).” Besides difference in objectives/goals, it has been examined also that religious feminine spheres have difference in their outlook and dressing from liberal women.

### *6.1.3 Difference in Outlook and Dressing*

In religious Institutions/groups, women pass through some cognitive processes as social categorization, social identification, and social comparison. By these processes they construct collective socio-religious identity, they categorize them through their dressing as Islamic, identify them as religious, and compare their dressing as most civilized and symbol of Islam. At the other, modern women negatively label their clothes as old, traditional, and backward. During the fieldwork it has been noticed that the religious-minded women to identify them as Islamic mostly wear loose dress, avoid westernized style clothes like jeans or trousers whereas modern women today dress themselves up with western or Indian trends and fashion. A participant at Faisalabad, explicated that there is the great difference in dress outlook of religious and modern females, she said, “modern women avoid to wear even dupatta while at the other religious females put gown, *abaya*, and sometimes *Burka*. The liberal females usually wear tights and half sleeves, while religious women will put loose dress which fulfils all the conditions imposed by Quran and Hadith (Zakia, August 02 2021).”

At Karachi, an interviewee was asked, “do u think that religious-minded females have a different dress stile from the liberal women?” She said, “Yes! Definitely! The Islamic women wear Islamic dress, they do *Pardah*. While at the other, the females belonging to modern life style, put uncivilized clothe, u can say Western that is unacceptable (Nazima, May 15, 2021).” Another respondent highlighted, “a great difference can be seen between religious and modern females, the dress of modern girls will be of western stile like genes, tights, or capri, their hair will be colored, opened, and short, their dupatta will be either vanished or will be at one side of shoulder whereas religious girls will maintain proper *Pardah*, their head to toe will be covered, they will bind their hair and will not show in front of everyone (Safina, July 31, 2021).” At Lahore, it has been explained by an interviewee, “the modern/liberal students move in that society where those girls are liked who are looking beautiful and relaxed in their dress, I mean, apparently relaxed so they dress themselves which society and market demands from them. But the female students of Madrasas know about their limitations which ALLAH TALA has implemented upon them, they dress not to glad some human but to please their creator (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” The researcher as well found that religious women have de-individuate and depersonalize themselves and behave in that way as their group is expects from them. By sharia (according to Islam) *Pardah* and by covering face, they construct their religious identity.

During an interview, on the question of “*Pardah*” (separate religious identity): the respondent describe, “Yes! We do ‘sharai *pardah*’.” she explained, “*Pardah* means to expose just hands and feet remaining all parts of body must be covered.” In addition, she highlighted, “One thing I want to clarify here that *Pardah* is not just out of home. But if we are living with in laws (Sasural), we also maintain *pardah*. We should not show our face to brother in law and father in law.” She gave the example from Quran, “In Sura Noor, ALLAH has told that *pardah* is necessary from all “*namehrams*” (with whom women have no blood relations) (Gul, January 19, 2022).” Another respondent denoted, “although, there is a religious group who argues that to cover face is not compulsory but I must say that face is your recognition, you must cover that. This is the face which attracts someone. On face we spend a huge amount to make it beautiful so how can you say that your *Pardah* is complete by exposing face? I think that face is the beginning point who fascinates someone towards you so you should care to present it in front of every man in society (Ishmat, August 02, 2021).” Under this social

inquiry it is explored and explained that not only outlook is dissimilar of religious and liberal women but thoughts, views, and beliefs are as well quite different.

#### *6.1.4 Dissimilarities of Thoughts and Views:*

As social identity theory argues that social groups are like-minded, they have shared value and belief system, and they possess same thoughts to see the social world. Similarly the fieldwork for this investigation authenticates it that religiously motivated women have same thoughts and views by which they analyze social arena of their life. A participant at Layyah explained in front of researcher with the examples, “liberal women say that Pardah is of your mind, eyes, and heart. While the religious women know that to cover the body, face, and head is compulsory. In short the whole body from head to toe (Satar) must be covered. As the slogan was raised my body my will (*mera jism meri marzi*) by liberal females whereas religious women say my body and upon it the will of ALLAH (*mera jism ALLAH ki marzi*), as He wants from us, we do the same (Zartashia, July 27, 2021).”

In a Madrasa of Bahawalpur an interviewee was asked that whether religious girls have same values and thoughts as modern? She replied, “I think there is a huge difference. The girls who get modern education, they joke with parents, they in the name of generation gap make fun of their parents, when their mother or father asks one glass of water from them, they ignore and sometimes deny to give.” Four participants at Rawalpindi, Quetta, Multan, and Mardan gave the same answer that the religious women do not perceive this world as liberal females, they have Islamic thinking and value system to which they follow. Data likewise excavates that because of having dissimilarities in outlook and thoughts, both the groups religious and liberal promote and live in different environments.

#### *6.1.5 Universal vs. Islamic Environment*

The scholarly work on social identity argues that social groups have a particular social environment, they live in that, they behave according to that, and they promote that environment. This study noted that religious and modern women possess different environments and promote that as well. A respondent at Lahore described, “university students move with universal environment while students in Madrasa promote Islamic

environment in which religion is dominated upon all aspects of their life while however, here in Pakistan, female students of modern institutions are aware of their religion and are sensitive about it but do not strictly follow and become flexible to act upon Islam to gain economic status.” As the social environment is dissimilar similarly their ideals and aspirations are not matched.

#### *6.1.6 Promotion of Extremely Rich Women vs. Promotion of Women Who Left World for Religion*

By multiple interviews it is examined that the religious institutions promote those women in front of their students who have left the worldly life for the will of ALLAH ALMIGHTY while modern female institutes promote those women who earned economic status and popularity in this world for the reason that both the feminine segments (religious and modern) have difference in making of ideals and aspirations. During the interview of woman who was serving in university and Madrasa in the same time, the researcher persuaded her to highlight the difference of religious and liberal females. She said, “in universities those women are promoted in front of the students who achieved high economic value whereas, in Madrasas those women are idealized who defied economic status just for the sake of ALLAH ALMIGHTY and for their religion.” many other respondents answered that religious women wish to spend their life like the female members of Islam who were alive in the time of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) (His wives, daughters, and other female companions). Whereas liberal women idealize film actresses and fashion designers to whom they copy and consider their role model. Collected Data for this social investigation also reveals that in religious feminine sphere a distance is observed from the liberals and minimal group paradigm is activated.

#### *6.1.7 Beginning of Stereotypical Behaviors: Sharpening Similarities and Dissimilarities*

Social identity theory posits that when similarities are highlighted within the group and dissimilarities are sharpened between the groups, minimal group paradigm takes place where intra-group members finish or partially finish their interaction with the members of other group and process of stereotyping begins. In Pakistan, religious women avoids to interact with the liberal females as they have developed some perceptions about

modern/liberal feminine segment. They think that modern females are away from the concept of Jihad, they are spending sinful life, and they are the representative of devil. A participant described, “The women who have modern education are kept away from Jihad and do not teach their children about this concept which is the symbol of “Iman” (faith).” She gave the example from the time of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), “a mother took her very little child to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) that please take my son in war for Jihad. He said that the child cannot do anything and is unable to perform any duty so why you are sending him? She said, when an arrow will come to you, take my son in front of you, in this way you will be saved from that arrow and my son will be Shahid. But unfortunately, this sentiment from modern women has been totally ended due to liberal/western educational system.” Modern females are seen as the representative of devil.

The researcher asked the female student in a Madrasa when she claimed modern women as devilish representative that what does she mean by the representatives of devil? Who are the representatives of devil according to her? She spoke, “Those who don’t act upon Islam, who prevent others to follow Islam in its real spirit, in my opinion, liberal females do not act upon Islam but also abstain those who are the true followers of our religion (Aysha, August 02, 2021).” She in addition said, “They do not put Hijab and Pardah and they make us afraid of doing so (Aysha, August 02, 2021).” Another perception about modern feminine group, the religious women have built that they are at the path of sin and we should end our relations with them.

During an interview a participant with emphasis spoke, “Definitely, we say ‘Tauba’ and ‘Astaghfar’. (Seeking forgiveness from GOD).” When the researcher asked her, “why”? She by maintaining the distance from liberal segments answered, “Because they are on path of sin (F T C).” as social identity theory alludes that intergroup conflict occurs. When self-perceived categorization and social comparison are linked with each other. In-group similarities and out-group differences are visible. These real or self-perceived differences are based on attitude, behavioral norms, beliefs, or values. These differences and similarities later lead to the practice of stereotyping, discrimination, and prejudice which may shape intergroup conflict.

## 6.2 Religious Identity: Visible Stigmatized Behaviors

This section of the research shines the light on the stigmatization of religious women in Pakistan by liberal feminine segments through analyzing types of stigma as overt or external deformities; known deviations in personal traits; tribal stigma and Link and Phelan Stigmatization Model as differentiation and Labeling; linking to Stereotypes; us and Them; and disadvantage. Gathering data to accomplish this thesis suggests that religiously affiliated females are differentiated, negatively labeled, stigmatized, and stereotyped due to their specific religious outlook, and religious thoughts by liberal/modern women. During the fieldwork multiple respondents explained that how and why they are negatively labeled, in what circumstances they face stigma, who stigmatize them, and what are the reasons to treat religious women with stereotypical behaviors.

### 6.2.1 *Harassment of Pardahdar (Covered) Woman*

This specific social scrutiny explores and explains that because of having particular religious' identity women are stigmatized via harassment in Pakistani society. An informant told, "Although, I have never been harassed but some other experiences are there through which we can understand that because of Hijab and Pardah women are harassed and negatively labeled (Shabnam, August 03, 2021)." A female at Karachi told, "people harassed me due to my *Burka* (a cloth that highlights the identity of a Muslim female), it has been happened several times that when I go to market, a few children are push to disturb me, they pull my *Burka* and laugh at me (Rashida Bibi, Karachi)." Another interviewee highlighted that when she goes in marriages by covering face, the photographers and camera men constantly follow her to take pictures and to do so they are said by those women who do not cover their faces (Najma Bibi, Lahore). Other than harassment, multiple cases came in front at fieldwork that religious-oriented females are blamed and accused as characterless by modern and liberal segments.

### 6.2.2 *Blame of Characterlessness on Religious Women*

To stigmatize and stereotype religious identity, the stigmatizers blame women that they are not pious and virtuous but pretend to be like that. A woman at Layyah with high

emotions and loud tone spoke before researcher, “the female who starts to follow Islamic values like Pardah, is blamed by the liberal relatives, 100 faults are linked with that woman by saying that look now she is pretending to be very religious and pious but in real she is characterless (Shakir, July 26, 2021).” A lady explained that multiple blames are made upon her by her liberal relatives because of having Hijab and Pardah, she said, “when I began to cover my whole body, people accused me and said, look at her, in young age, countless affairs were continued but now she shows that she is the daughter or wife of a *Maulvi* (religious man who carries the responsibilities of a mosque) (Mussarat, August 8, 2021).” It has been noticed that not just blaming of characterlessness is faced but religiously identified women but in functions like marriages they are as well steered and are passed negative comments.

### 6.2.3 Ironic Eyes and Words: Stereotypical Behaviors with Religious-Oriented Women

The religious appearance and outlook of women is dealt as overt or external deformities by liberal/modern segments and on the bases of religion they are linked with stereotypical behaviors in Pakistani society. This dissertation also finds that due to particular religious dressing, females face tribal stigma and they are differentiated and negatively labeled at several occasion like marriages and birthdays. The researcher observed herself by attending some marriages that the women who wear Hijab and cover their bodies from head to toe, face stigmatization by the liberal/modern spheres. A modern lady engaged researcher in discussion at a marriage and indicated towards a woman who has covered her face, by saying that she used to open hair, put dupatta (a long cloth is carried with eastern dress by women) in neck, today is becoming as the most pious in this function.

An informant also explicated upon the question, “Did you ever face negative behavior from society regarding your Pardah?” She accepted, “Yes! Multiple times, like when we go to any marriage or any other function, people ironically look at us. If you have to do Pardah, then why cannot sit at home”, “on the one hand, wishing to get heaven (*Jannah*), at the other, enjoyment of the world cannot be left (Aysha, August 02, 2021)”. Another participant on stereotyping in functions asserted, “Yes! Multiple comments are passed. Look at them, they are *pardahdar bibian* (the women who put Hijab are negatively called in Pakistani society) if

you have to cover and hide then don't come at function, just sit at home." She told, "To save us from all these stuff, we avoid to attend many functions. Just we go there, where the special arrange is done for us so that our *Pardah* can be maintained (Saqina, July 30, 2021)." An informant highlighted at Chakwal, "we are religious, do *Pardah*, and go to some marriage, at other, girls there have opened their hair, dupatta in neck, put tight dress, they look at us as we are stranger, they steer our faces and *Pardah*, most importantly, and they consider us as backward (Safina Bibi)." In two other interviews at Rawalpindi and Faisalabad the same experiences have been shared by the women with investigator. Furthermore, women are taunted and teased due to maintaining explicit religious appearance by modern parts of society in Pakistan.

A research participant was asked that due to *Pardah* whether females are taunted and negatively labeled? She asserted with an example, "a girl from a modern family came to our Madrasa and began to get Quranic education. After sometimes, she began to do proper *Pardah*, when she was going to marry, she invited us with the request that you people have to arrange and manage *Pardah* for me in my Marriage. We all went to her *Nikah*, when she was moving to her in laws, we put a big cloth like *Burka* upon her. A woman came forward and snatched that cloth from her body that why you are deteriorating your look? We faced some ironic words as "kalay kalay burky har taraf" (black gown women are everywhere) but we managed and did not feel uncomfortable in our *Pardah* (Misbah, August 03, 2021)." The liberal elements do not stop on ironic eyes and words but go beyond. Religious-minded females are anticipated as backward, uneducated, ignorant, and typical.

#### 6.2.4 Religious Identity as the Symbol of Backwardness

Various negative concepts are attached with the women who maintain their identity on the bases of religion. In spite of acquiring higher education in modern institutions, they are labeled as *Jahil* (ignorant), old-minded and religious extremist. A respondent was asked, "What have you heard about you and your friends regarding your identity from those who do not like you and your friends?" she expounded, "Firstly, they don't want to sit with us. Because in their opinion, we are *Dakianoos* (backward), Tangnazar (conservative), they think that we will start preaching and their time will be waisted so it is better to avoid to sit or to



meet with us.” She further asserted, “They laugh at us and our Hijab but we don’t become deviated because Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) has said that near *Qiamah* (the day of judgment) to adhere with “Eman” (belief/faith) will be as the burning fire in palm. So we with Pardah adhere with our religion and its values in spite of all this negativity in society regarding us and our “Hijab” and “Pardah” (Kousar, January 05 2022).” Data shows that specific religious identity is related to backwardness and ignorance but it is likewise linked with skin diseases and ugliness of women in Pakistan.

#### *6.2.5 Religious Outlook as the Symbol of Skin Disease and Ugliness*

The inquirer notes that religious-minded females are thought by liberal spheres to be ugly, defective, or indulged in some kind of skin problems. On the negative behavior of society: an informant shared, “Multiple times we face negative behavior.” She continued, “For example, many people ironically say that perhaps, they have some pimples upon face, this is why they cover their face.” She with sad feeling told, “Sometimes, it is heard by us that may be face is ugly this is the reason that they are hiding the face.” The researcher also observed that a bride came at in laws by maintaining her Pardah. She used to cover her face whenever she came out of her room, her in laws consistently passed negative remarks about her religious outlook by speaking that because she had thick lips this is why she covered her face. Another respondent described, I put Hijab and Pardah for gaining blessings of ALLAH ALMIGHTY but people talk that I hide my black skin tone (Zakia, August 02, 2021).” The exploring data above clarifies that how religiously identified women are given psychological stress via stigmatization. At field it has been as well dug out that sometimes, family members get engaged in the process of stigmatization of those females who possess particular religious’ identity.

#### *6.2.6 Stigmatized Behaviors by Family and In-Laws*

This study asserts that sometimes the stigmatizers do not come from outer society but from the own family and link the religiously affiliated feminine segments with stereotypical behaviors. A female teacher shared the experience of one girl who was her student in Madrasa, “she was a student here but when she went her home, her mother said, what look you have adopted? Now you are not in Madrasa, change yourself so that you can be liked for

marriage (Safina, July 31, 2021).” Another participant explicated in detail, “our parents are getting advanced and are impressed by media, they force their girls not to have proper Pardah, and even we teach a lot about it. A really pious girl, every time she used to do *Tasbih* (religious symbol), she went her home after the completion of her course, her mother stereotyped her as “*Maulviani*” (a female who gives religious education is negatively labeled) and forced her to change her look, believe you me! When she returned after six months, she put short shirt and palazzo, I made her understood that it is wrong but she told that her mother began to stigmatize and forced her to do so. (Ishmat, August 02, 2021).” It has been excavated that in laws more strictly get involved in stigmatization of religious-oriented women than parents and siblings.

An informant was questioned, “Do those females who do Pardah, face stereotypical behaviors in society?” She shared the experience of her friend, “yes, a lot of problems and negative behaviors they face. One of my friend began to do Pardah in front of her brother in laws and father in law, one day her brother in law created a great conflict that what do you think I am a characterless man so you cover your face whenever I come to your house (Bibi, July 29, 2021)?” An interviewee at Multan highlighted her own example that when she started to put Hijab and stopped her brother in law to come in room, her mother in law kicked her out from home by saying that who is she to stop her son in his own home (shahida, August 10, 2021)?” The investigator knew another case that a girl after coming in Madrasa began to maintain Pardah, her engagement was broken by saying that she has become “*Ama Hajan*” (a woman who is negatively seen as very pious), her in laws said that they cannot hide her from the whole society (Fatima, January 15, 2022). Although, some religiously motivated people think that behind stigmatization of religious identity, the religious-oriented females have their own fault.

#### *6.2.7 Faults of Stigmatized Population behind Stereotypical Mindset*

Under this meticulous research it is also denoted that religiously motivated women because of living in a constant environment, limited interaction, thinking modernity as sin, fear from stigmatizers, and their distance from modern education face stereotypical behaviors from liberal spheres. An informant at Multan was inquired, “When you were talking about

lower economic status, you spoke the word negative behavior of society with the people who go in society after getting education from Madrasas, can you explain that what kind of negative behavior the society does?” He began, “the people who teach or study in Madrasas, do not have much interaction with society, they do not go in school or college this is the reason that they become unaware from modern life, when they come out, they cannot adopt new trends so they are stigmatized by the liberal/modern society. At the other due to unawareness, they see modern life as a sin and keep themselves restricted in interaction (Abd-UI-Manan Abid, Multan).” Data asserts that female religious teachers in Madrasas are dealt with physical violence by modern women.

A teacher at Islamabad indicated towards a very extreme behavior, “As you know, when any teacher in school or college does some mistake or misbehaves with the student, no person can touch him directly. The complainant will go to the principal and report about mistake or misbehavior. While at other when teacher of Madrasa is guilty of some wrong doing, the third class citizen or completely uneducated person comes and catches the hand of the teacher, even sometimes, the religious teacher is slapped in front of the students.” He further spoke, “why religious teachers remain silent? You know that they have perceived that they are inferior and they are lacking in modern education, so they get afraid of those people who are considered themselves as modern and liberal (Faiza Sarfaraz, Islamabad).” It is found as well that religiously affiliated women extremely avoid men for the reason that they are stigmatized by society.

At Lahore a respondent explored in front of the investigator, “sometimes problems are raised by those who do Pardah as they behave that they do not know how to speak? Their voice is so low; their communication skills are poor so they are stereotyped.” She got worried that why religious-oriented women do so, with high pitch she spoke, “pardah you have put on your body and face not on your capabilities and not on voice.” A participant Quetta shared the experience of his daughter in law, “she used to hesitate to talk to men. If any person knocks at door she did not open by thinking that there can be man, the children of community often in fun knocked the door to disturb her when in morning she was alone in home. I asked her that why she does not speak with men? She told me the reason that she has been taught that ALLAH ALMIGHTY gets offended when females talk to those men with whom females

have no blood relations (Akram, October 13, 2021).” By understanding stigmatization and stereotyping of those women who identify themselves as religious and maintain religious outlook, appearance, and thoughts, the researcher shines the light that how these stigmatized women negotiate with their religious identity.

### **6.3 Negotiation with Stigmatized Religious Identity**

Under this part of study, the practice of negotiating stigmatized identity is excavated and analyzed in Pakistani religious feminine spheres. The researcher by examining constant social environment, strong intimacy, selective interaction, self-confirmatory feedback, identity cues, and the process of changing negotiating identity, endeavors to understand that how and why religious-minded women negotiate with their stigmatized identity which they have constructed on the bases of religion. At fieldwork it has been observed that for a long time students live at Madrasas in a closed and constant social environment where they not only construct their religious identity but negotiate with that in order to get inner satisfaction and positive response from selective interaction for their self-conceptions.

#### *6.3.1 Constant Closed Social Environment*

Gathering data for this study asserts that in religious institutions like Madrasas female students live for four to ten years without having interaction with the outer world for the reason they construct a specific religious identity and negotiate with it. At Jhang the investigator observed that in a Madrasa residential facility was not available but females live there from morning to evening where they were not allowed to study any school book, to use mobile phone, or to go to their home. At Chakwal a female teacher was asked, “From how many time you are teaching here?” She told, “I am teaching from 15 years.” The researcher further inquired, “Do you live here day and night?” She told, “yes, I am here for 24-7, I have a son of four years, he lives here with me, my husband works in Karachi, my mother in law and father in law have been died, I have one brother in law but I do Pardah from him this is why I do not live with him, in fact, I consider more secure here than my home (Safina, July 31, 2021).”

Another informant was questioned that in how many years a student gets free from education after her admission here in Madrasa? She described, “*Hifz* (remembering of Quran) takes four years, and short courses take six months, the major course of *Alima* (female scholar) takes four years (Bano, September 14, 2021).” At Lahore the head of Madrasa was asked, “For how many time girls are kept in the religious institution to complete their education? After how many days they are allowed to go home?” She explained, “for *Hifz* (remembering Quran) every girl has her own capacity and capability, some girls can remember the whole Quran in two years while some girls take four years. The second field is of Hadith, grammar, translation, Tafsir, and other syllabus, this course is of six years.” She in addition told, “Every Saturday after prayer of Zohar we allow parents to take their daughters with them to home and leave back at early in the Monday so that their studies cannot be affected.” She also said, “Some parents do not take girls the whole month but we do not force to go to home if parents and daughters are satisfied without going at home so they are not necessarily sent (Misbah, August 03, 2021).”

Some girls belonging to religious institutions were as well inquired besides teachers and heads to understand constant and closed social environment of religious-oriented feminine spheres where they negotiate with their constructed and stigmatized religious identity. A student was asked, “From how many times you are studying here?” She told, “From seven years I am here.” The inquirer further motivated her to speak, “what have you studied in this time?” She said, “first, I read Quran, then I remember it, now I am completing my course of four years as an *Alima* (female scholar) (Aleena Zainab, Bahawalpur).” Another student told, “This is my sixth year in this Madrasa (Aysha, August 02, 2021).” At Rawalpindi a girl was questioned, “from how many time you are here in Madrasa?” she spoke, “I am studying here from six years.” The researcher additional asked, “What have you studied here in these six years?” She described, “After remembering Quran I did some short courses, now I am doing the course of female scholar (Fatima, January 15, 2021).” Another student was inquired that after how many days she goes to her home to meet with family? She highlighted, “after one month I go (Hadia, July 31, 2021).” At Pakpattan a girl shared that she has spent 8 years in Madrasa and goes to her home after every two months (Noor, September 14, 2021). The above mentioned data is enough to analyze that how much constant social atmosphere religiously affiliated females have in which they live and

negotiate with their religious identity. It is also seen in fieldwork that females either students or teachers do not have reluctance to go to their home.

### *6.3.2 Denial from Going Home and Extreme Attachment*

To gain comfort social environment and self-confirmatory feedbacks for their negative or positive conceptions the females avoid to go to their home from Madrasas as they negotiate with their religious identity and do not want to be criticize or stigmatized from stigmatizers. A participant who was a teacher in a religious institution with happiness told the researcher, “Students even don’t want to go home. Because they are more comfortable here. They say that after going home, our *Namaz* (prayer) is left and we get late and remain busy in household. So here we are living in the castle of Islam, we are more happy here than home.” She by differentiating between home and Madrasa said, “House take them closed to the world while Madrasa takes them closed to ALLAH. This is why they feel happy here (female teacher, Layyah).” A student was questioned “do you wish to go from here to your home?” She denied, “No, I do not want to go (Aleena Zainab, Bahawalpur).” The investigator noted that the residing females even begin to love their institution and they have emotional attachment with that.

An informant on the question that whether she is attached with her Madrasa asserted, “Yes more than my children and parents I am attached with it and even this institute is my first priority (Zakia, August 02, 2021).” Another respondent was engaged by researcher, “Tell me about environment of Madrasa.” She spoke, “extremely good, all teachers are really loving, Shah Sahab (owner of that Madrasa) loves us a lot, he cares for us (Alia, July 31, 2021).” A student was inquired, “Are you comfortable in the environment of this Madrasa?” She said, “Yes! I am comfortable, because on time, we offer prayers, at the time of classes, we study about Islam, in free time, we recite Quran, no worldly activities disturb us or drag us from the path of ALLAH TALA, and the most important, and we don’t face negative behavior of society here. We are safe and secure from devil and his representatives (Aysha, August 02, 2021).” Under this exploratory and explanatory inquiry, it has likewise been revealed that religiously motivated females interact selectively and carefully to acquire self-verification and self-confirmatory feedback for their negotiated identity.

### *6.3.3 Avoidance of Modern Company and Increasing Discomfort Level in Liberal Spheres*

Identity negotiation theory refers to the processes through which people reach agreements regarding "who is who" in their relationships. By analyzing interviews of religious-oriented women, the researcher noticed that they make their relations with those who provide them behavioral confirmation. They make friendships with those who satisfy their need of identity respect and they prefer to marry with those who admire and understand their negotiated religious identity. An interviewee was inquired that does she like to sit with modern/liberal women? She with disliking voice told, "No I do not like to have their company. You know why, because company must have its impact. If I will sit and spend my time with them, I will try to become like them." She shared her own experience, "when I was in university, I had a friend who even did not take dupatta, with her I also used not to have dupatta because I felt that I become a bride. When I started to sit with those women who put Hijab and Pardah, I began too, so this is all because of my company." She continued, "I like to sit with those who do not laugh at my Hijab, who appreciate my Pardah, who love me as I am, and who do not want me to change my religious outlook (Shakir, July 26, 2021)."

A respondent was asked that whether she feels discomfort with those to whom she considers modern/liberal? She explained, "Always! Discomfort! I feel that I am just not wasting my time but also doing some sin. I usually don't avoid to go at those places where I have to meet modern/liberal women because I think rather to earn sin by spending time with them, I should learn something religious which can cause for my forgiveness (Gulnaz, December 11, 2021)." Another interviewee was asked that when she got married, what was her wish? That how her husband should be? She said, "I requested my parents that my husband should be purely religious who acts upon religion as I. he should admire my religious appearance and he should not force me to be changed according to the contemporary trends (Mussarat, August 08, 2021)." It has been also found that religiously affiliated women provide identity cues to develop their relations and to gain self-verification.

### *6.3.4 Identity Cues and Developing of Social Relations*

Identity negotiation theory argues that people give and receive some identity cues to each other so they can understand that who should be in their links. Data highlights that in

Pakistani society the religious-minded feminine segments as well transfer some identity cues before building social liaison. A female student in a Madrasa was inquired that when she makes friendship with any other girl, what qualities, she observes in her so she thinks that she is capable of making friend? The participant explained, “I look that she does Hijab or not. She has some stimulation towards “deen” (religion) or not. When I get satisfied that she maintains Pardah and she strictly follows Islam, I choose her for friendship. However, I also find some other attributes but first these 2 are, Hijab and inducement towards religion (Noreen, January 09, 2022).” The conducted interviews and ground observations made the point clear that through giving identity cues, the religiously identified women feel free to engage the like-minded individuals in relations because they in this way, have no fear to be stigmatized by the out-group members (modern/liberals). It has been also seen that religious females live in their comfort zones and do not come out from their loopholes.

#### *6.3.5 Living in Loopholes and Comfort Zones*

People when negotiate with their identity, they prefer to live in their loopholes where they do not face any type of stigma, they get their expectancies, and they do not engage in battle of wills (difference in action and thought). The females who get education in Madrasas or simply live at home with their negotiated identity which they have constructed on the bases of religion do not wish to come out and like to live with their identity in Pakistani society. A respondent was questioned at Rawalpindi, “If you are offered some office job or teaching in school or college, will you accept?” She denied by saying, “No! I will just prefer to work for my religion. If any job is given to me through which I can contribute for my religion, sure! I will do that job (Fatima, January 15, 2022).” During other six interviews at Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Multan, Islamabad, and Chakwal the investigator received the same answer upon this question. It has been understood that women belonging to religious identity have a very limited interaction with the outer world, for the reason that they are glad with their negotiated identity and do not want to break their loopholes. It has been excavated in fieldwork that in almost all religious institutions (Madrasas) internet or mobile phone facility is not given to the females and they are cut off from the world to which we call global village.



### *6.3.6 Lack of Access to the Outer World and Limitation on Mobile Phone Availability*

The visit of multiple cities of Pakistan with the objective to gather data to accomplish this dissertation clarifies that to use mobile phone is banned in Pakistani Female Madrasas. Consequently, the students get limited and remain unaware of the outer world. They easily negotiate with their religious identity and do not look at modern society with technological advancement. A female head of a Madrasa at Karachi was asked by the researcher that whether mobile phone is allowed to the students? She described, “We do not allow for having mobile with them in hands. Although, in two days of every week we permit girls to talk to their family, for this purpose telephone of Madrasa is used, and a female is appointed to make phone calls for girls and in emergency we also facilitate the students to make call at home (Rashida, May 19, 2021).” Another male head of a female religious institution at Multan was inquired about mobile phone usage, he told, “no! We do not give this facility and when parents come to us for admission, we clear cut tell them that your daughter will not be permitted for mobile.” He said additionally, “we however, have facilitated students for telephonic conversation with their family, we also give the message of the student to her family and the message of family to the student, and time to time we ask from the students that if they wish to talk in family then come in office and make a phone call to at your home (Maulana, August 07, 2021).” Due to closed social environment and limited interaction with outer world the women strongly get attached with their negotiated identity, this is why to change or to alter their constructed and negotiated identity becomes extremely difficult for them.

### *6.3.7 Difficulties in Changing Negotiating Identity*

The researcher shines the light that liberal segments force religiously motivated women to change their adopted identity but generally the religious identities are constructed and negotiated on the bases of institutions, discourse, and affinity, this is why are difficult to change. For example, an informant told, “my family does not like my religious affiliation regarding Hijab and argues to alter my identity that we should not do backbiting, we should not tell a lie, we should not steal something, just Pardah is not important. At the one hand we do Hijab and at other we are disobedient to our husband or father, it’s not Islam. They as keep me away from fake logic from my religious appearance as I get more closed (Shakir, July 26,

2021).” It has been noticed that if stigmatizers wish to alter them, the stigmatized population more strictly gets adhered with the negotiated identity. A participant who was a female teacher in a Madrasa, said that people are getting modern and are adopting western values. They due to poverty or religious motivation send their daughters here but when the girls return to their homes, their families wish to change them according to the prevailing trends. She shared an experience of a girl who was her student in Madrasa, “a girl was my previous student but when I saw her in market, her dupatta was round her neck, I asked her that have you forgotten Islam? She replied me that her family does not like her “*Pardahdar*” (covered) look (Safina, July 31, 2021).”

Another respondent explained in her discussion, “sometimes, the girls of Madrasa also get impressed by the modern girls, they become confused and prefer to open their half head but we make them understood that their Pardah is their beauty and they should not feel inferior as they are liked by ALLAH ALMIGHTY (Farukh, May 12, 2021).” The investigator found that when modern/liberal segments try to modify their religious identity, the religious-oriented females begin to interact very selectively and develop their relations with those who understand, admire, respect, and like them as they are because their friends, teachers, and their role models who help in identity negotiation process, do not permit them to be altered if they start to build a new identity. The theorists of social stigma and identity negotiation claim that stigmatized segments endeavor to manage stigma by availing some strategies so that their constructed and negotiated identity is not disregarded by stigmatizers. In the next section those strategies are discussed profoundly.

#### **6.4 Strategies for Managing Stigmatized Religious Identity**

This dissertation here explores that why and how stigma management strategies are utilized by the stigmatized population (religious feminine spheres). By analyzing the applicability of invisible and visible managing strategies as passing, revealing, and compensatory the researcher asserts that the religious-minded women negotiate with their religious identity and manage it in front of the liberal and modern segments who stigmatize them because of their particular appearance and mentality. Under fieldwork it has been observed that fabrication, concealment, discretion, signaling, normalizing, differentiating,

acknowledgement, individuating Information, and increased positivity are applied to manage invisible (behaviors values, thoughts, beliefs) and visible stigma (outlook and appearance). The religious women use fabrication strategy by which they either provide false information or manipulate the things so the actual identity cannot be disclosed.

#### *6.4.1 Adopting New Trends and Modern Look (Fabrication)*

Under passing strategies, fabrication is at the top to manage invisible stigmatized and negotiated identities. On ground, it has been observed that various participants were availing this strategy to hide their factual identities by thinking that the researcher is doing PH. D in peace and conflict studies for the reason that she belongs to modern/liberal spheres who stereotype or negatively label their outlook, thoughts, ideals, and aspirations so the researcher herself is a stigmatizer. A woman before her interview said to wait out of the door because she is covering her face and hands as with researcher a boy was present to record her voice. When she came in front by putting a traditional black colored *burka* (a conventional clothe to be covered, it is considered as the symbol of Muslim woman's identity), she was asked, and "do you think that religious females think them as different from the modern women (physical appearance and outlook) She described, "no now a day not, religious women wear colorful *abayas* and gowns. Because colors are made for women not for men. However, before some year's Islamic women were used to put black *Burkas* but today this concept has been altered. Very beautiful *abayas* are sold in market, women use them and feel covered and comfortable, I myself sometimes, prefer colorful gown to put (Nasira, August 05, 2021)." A female student in a Madrasa at Multan was asked that does she intends to be a doctor or engineer in future. She refused, "No! I just want to preach about religious obligations to the people. Other than this I don't think anything. In her previous questions, she discussed with investigator that her parents made a promise with her that if she gets education in Madrasa, after three to four years, they will send her school because it was her dream to go to school and college and she was not agreed to be admitted in Madrasa. By looking at the answers of the interviewees above, it becomes clear that how false information is presented by the religious female segments to manage their stigma. Except fabrication, concealment method is likewise is applied by the religious-oriented women in Pakistan at a great level to be save from stigmatization.

#### 6.4.2 Denial for Negative Comments for Religious Outlook (Concealment)

This strategy is used when the stigmatized population does not reveal that some stigma is attached with the negotiated identity. At Rawalpindi a respondent was inquired that does she put Hijab and Pardah? She said, “Yes, I do and cover myself.” She was further asked, “Have you faced negative comments from anyone due to your Pardah?” She denied, “No, I did not face because my family is religious and admires me for this act. Furthermore, we are not allowed to go out from this Madrasa and from home this is why I do not meet with a lot of people who can criticize upon my Hijab or Pardah, I remain limited to this institute and to my family (Fatima, January 15, 2022).” Another informant tried to conceal her stigmatized religious identity by saying that she had never been criticized because of her religious outlook when she was asked that does she face some negative wording from surroundings. Similarly, seven females at different cities of Pakistan answered that nobody made fun, spoke negative words, steer with ironic eyes, or try to stereotype them due to their adopting identities. Using of discretion strategy has also been observed by the researcher to manage stigma.

#### 6.4.3 Avoidance from Sensitive Questions and Diverting Focus (Discretion)

The discretion strategy is subtly different from the concealment strategy as it involves an individual avoiding questions or revealing information that is exclusively related to his invisible stigma. During the fieldwork, it has been noticed that the informants in society and as well in front of the investigator were managing their stigma by discretion. A participant on the question that whether she faced some negative behavior from society or family regarding her religiously constructed identity? The responded described, “In joint family, brother in laws talk about us negatively. But we avoid all this rubbish by thinking that we are covering us for the will of GOD so we should not concentrate upon all this (Ishmat, August 02 2021).” Multiple respondents avoided to talk on the topic of religion by asking the researcher ridiculous questions as “why you are digging this topic when you are the student of peace and conflict study?” A female got offended when she was asked that has she ever faced negative labeling by people for her Hijab. She said, “Why you are dealing religion as a fun? It is Islam, please, withdraw from this topic as you will be punished in “*Qiamah*” (the Day of Judgment) (Batool, October 22, 2021).” Other than passing strategies as fabrication,

concealment, and discretion some revealing methods as differentiating, signaling, and normalizing are availed by Pakistani religious feminine spheres to manage their stigma.

#### *6.4.4 Rejection of Mobilized Beauty; Stigma as an Award; Need of Tolerance: (Differentiating)*

The applicability of this strategy has been explored at a huge scale in Pakistani society. Most of the women who are attached with their religion, differentiate them from the modern (western) thoughts and values. They manage their stigma by satisfying themselves that they are separate and are more liked by ALLAH ALMIGHTY due to their identity and they should not try to behave as modern/liberal females. An informant described in her interview with researcher, “You know that beasts are sitting everywhere. They need “chalti phirti khubsurti” (mobilized beauty), if women sit at home from where they give relaxation to their eyes? So our women have to think over it.” She continued, “It is the sign of an Islamic woman that she covers herself completely, this differentiates Muslim female from the Non-Muslim. When modern feminine segments will care for criticism and stigmatization, at “*Qiyamah*” (the Day of Judgment) they will be stood with Non-Muslims (Nazima, May 15, 2021).”

Another participant highlighted at Layyah, “ones a person is tied with Islam, he never cares for any type of criticism. The person who with his own will is attached, not because of family but himself, he loves to be stigmatized. As I think that stigma is an award for a true Muslim, this differentiates you from those who are away from ALLAH ALMIGHTY (Shakir, July 26, 2021).” Some respondents endeavor to manage their stigma by having the view that patience and tolerance must be maintained if we are stigmatized because stigma draws the line between pious and sinful. A female in a Madrasa at Islamabad gave the example from Quran, “ALLAH says in ‘Surah Asar’ that do patience so patience is compulsory even our Hijab is stigmatized you know why as Hijab is the differentiation of virtuous and non-virtuous.” She also quoted that “Prophet Muhammad PBUH had faced criticism. He was stigmatized with multiple labels but he did not care and continued his task. Similarly, we should carry on our job without caring for stigmatization from liberal segments (Muqaddas, January 03, 2021).”

By indicating towards differentiation, a participant at Sukkur became sad while she was describing the stigmatized time (difficulties of life) of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH.) She discussed the visit of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) of Taif tribe. With a sigh, she explained, “he was thrown stones, he was push and jerked.” She further articulated, “The people of Ta’if stigmatized our Prophet by saying, are you Prophet? Ok if you are, then why you fall down when we push you? Why not you can be saved from our stones if you are prophet?” She continued, “Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) tolerated all this stigmatized behavior and continued His job, if some other one was there instead of our Prophet! He never went out for preaching but he fulfilled his task (Nazia, May 05, 2021).”

An interviewee at Lahore expressed, “Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said, before the Day of Judgment a time will come when the true followers of Islam will be considered stranger and unfamiliar in society, for those people there is a good news.” She carried on, “I say to my students that if due to your outlook, your studies, or your thoughts are seen with a strange eye by society, do not lose your confidence but with more strength act upon Islam and amplify your confidence because you are among those for whom Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) announced good news and reward, stigma is your differentiation from the people who are disliked by ALLAH ALMIGHTY (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” In fact, the strategy of differentiation supplies more help and satisfaction to the women who negotiate with their stigmatized religious identity. Another strategy known as signaling is likewise utilized by religiously affiliated females in Pakistan.

#### *6.4.5 Liberal Stigmatizers as Socially and Psychologically Ill (Signaling)*

This strategy argues that the stigmatized people do not completely disclose that they face some stigma for their constructed identity upon their interactive partners and try to blame to stigmatizers in different ways. A religious woman who got modern education but because of her affiliation with a religious group she adopted a religious appearance, thoughts and beliefs and negotiated with her identity. She was questioned that what the stigmatized segment should do so that stigma can be removed from the religious identity? She asserted, “The religious women or religious institutions/groups have no need to do something. The persons from liberal segment are really “mutasib” (prejudice), they do not want to see a covered woman in university or in office, according to me they extremely needs some

counseling because they are socially and psychologically ill (Mussarat, August 08, 2021).” An informant at Islamabad spoke, “problems are not in us but in those who themselves are away from Islam and also want us to be so (Kousar, January 05, 2021).” The highly implemented strategy to manage stigma by religious-minded women however, is normalizing in Pakistan.

#### *6.4.6 Confidence and Comfort (Normalizing)*

This social inquiry asserts that normalizing is most useful stigma management strategy as the stigmatized population reveals that our negotiated identity is normal and why the stigmatizers are considering as abnormal identity. A woman was interviewed about stigmatized behaviors at Lahore highlighted, “my experience is really good and I think that due to Pardah you are more regarded than those women who do not maintain Pardah. however, some difficulties can be faced during all your routine for example, you cannot take tea freely when in any meeting men are sitting at all sides but in such circumstances you should handle the situation, you can wait or simply you can deny because it is not the matter of life and death (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).”

An informant explained, “Initially when I began to put Hijab and Pardah, I felt anxiety in functions like marriages but now I go with confidence with my Pardah. At the one hand I am fulfilling my religious obligation while at other, I am becoming the example for those women who are willing to do Pardah but are afraid of problems like difficulty in eating and drinking.” She further explicated, “in the marriage of my brother, I was alone who was in *abaya* but in spite of that I did not feel shy even though, multiple criticism I faced, like the guests were talking, this is the family function so you should not become an unknown person, we are feeling that you are invited and we are host, I did not care. When the time of lunch came, I went into the bridal room and ate fully (zakia, August 19, 2021).” A religious scholar was inquired, “Do you think that the female students of Madrasa do Pardah that is why they face discrimination in society?” He said, “No Pardah is not the reason, we see at very high posts women are working with Pardah and Hijab and they do not feel any difficulty to do so (Rabani, August 03, 2021).”

At Jhang a female described, “Yes some problem I face but I go in spite of this in functions. But I have seen that a lot of women due to their Pardah do not go in ceremonies like marriages, birthdays, or engagements. Even though, to go to feast is Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad PBUH, He said, if someone invites you for lunch or dinner, go and attend but I note that women feel hesitation in going just because they do Pardah. This is why they cut off from society. I say that they should go so that they can show that how with Pardah all activities can be continued. How Pardah can be managed. If they will go in functions they will set example for those women who make lame excuses not to have Hijab and Pardah. I go in functions, I eat and drink there, I find those females who also do Pardah, we sit to gather in a separate room and enjoy and sometimes, separate room is not available, we turn our face towards wall and eat food by maintaining Pardah from men (Bibi, July 2, 2021).” The above mentioned data is sufficient that normalizing method is availed most of the time by religiously identified women for stigma management. Other than passing and revealing, religious-oriented females manage their visible stigma by compensatory strategies.

#### *6.4.7 Removal of Fear from Stigmatization (Acknowledgement)*

This strategy is applied when people not only accept their stigma but do not try to hide it as well from their interacting partners. In a Madrasa, on the question that how she deals with stigmatized behaviors? The interviewee shared, “People make us afraid of heating by saying that you are covering your face, look at hot weather! How you will manage cooking? We ignore them by perceiving that the “*Jahanum*” (fire of hell) will be too hot, how we will bear that? This fear gives us energy to maintain Pardah and Hijab (female teacher, Layyah).”

At Multan the head of a Madrasa was questioned, “The female students after getting education from religious institutions when go in society, do they face negative behavior there?” He explained, “I usually have a limited interaction with the outer world and remain busy here in Madrasa so you because are moving in society can understand it instead of me. However, if society behaves negatively, females should not be disturbed because every Prophet in this world had faced negativity from his people.” He presented the example of Nuh A.S, “he preached round about 900 years but only 80 to 85 people believed in Him and in ALLAH ALMIGHTY.” He also quoted the verse from Quran, “ALLAH clearly says in



His book that when any Prophet on this earth began to preach, he has been made fun and people used to joke with him, so we should not be tense because till the Day of Judgment this negative behavior will follow the people who are on right path (Maulana Sadiq, Multan).” Acknowledgement helps the religious-minded women to disclose their identity and to increase the members of their religious group because through acknowledging their stigma, they openly preach about rigid religious thoughts and beliefs and persuade other women to espouse physical religious appearance. The other strategy which religiously affiliated females avail is increasing positivity.

#### *6.4.8 Focus on Appreciation of Hijab and Pardah (Increasing Positivity)*

This stigma management strategy is utilized when the stigmatized groups/individuals enhance positivity among those who have constructed or negotiated the same identity. A female at Karachi said, “In my opinion all men of Pakistani society appreciate those women who do Pardah in this modern time (Farukh, May 12, 2021).” Another informant discussed, “my religious outlook is admired by almost all those people who ever remained in my relations (Sardar, December 07, 2021).”

A participant explicated that extremely following Islam and acting upon the value of Pardah and Hijab by religious-minded females will increase positivity among those who want to maintain religious outlook and appearance but they are scared that they will be stigmatized by liberal/modern segments. He indicated at today’s purely religious (Islamic) woman, “the women who do Pardah, do not go out by thinking that they will have to face negative behavior, but in my opinion they should not care of stigmatization and more strictly act upon Hijab and Pardah and must show the modern women that we under this gown and by putting Hijab can do our all work. The women should come forward in jobs and public so that they can build a positive image of Islam (sheik Adil, Karachi).”

An active member of a religious political party described on the question, “Do you think that the job opportunities are less for those women who do Pardah?” “No I do not think, shehnaz Laghari who is the first female pilot of Pakistan, maintains her Hijab, in army multiple women do Pardah, in Lahore Doctor Humaira Tariq is the principal of college puts Hijab. In short if you are capable then Pardah does not become a hurdle to find job

(Zartashia, July 27, 2021).” Besides increasing positivity, the religious feminine spheres apply individuating information likewise to manage their negotiated and stigmatized visible religious identity.

#### *6.4.9 Individuating Information*

Some individuals with visible stigmas also adopt the compensatory strategy of providing individuating information to their interactors. This information allows the interactor to evaluate the target on an individual level rather than as a product of their stigma. Although, it has been observed that the women who construct and negotiate with their identities on the bases of religion do not focus on their individuality and consider them the part of a whole. But it is incorrect to say that in Pakistan this strategy is not applicable and practiced. At a small scale, religiously affiliated females manage their stigma by availing this strategy. An interviewee at Sawat revealed, “Do not judge me by my dressing and outlook, I am modern. I listen music, draw paintings, and watch movies.” She in addition told, “Pardah is the part of my culture but not of my personality (kiran, December 09, 2021).” Another girl in a Madrasa at Islamabad described, “When some relatives came to my home to like me for their son, they were steering at my dress as I carried simple and lose clothe. I spoke unwantedly that look at my education, I have done masters in Islamic studies, I know how to cook, clean house, compose family members, and talk with etiquettes. Before rejecting me all other my qualities must be remembered. I cover myself because my ALLAH ALMIGHTY ordered me to do so but I am aware of all those trends which are the part of this modern society (Arooj, April 29, 2021).”

Subsequent to explore socio-religious identity that how feminine spheres developed religious identity on the bases of concept of ‘us vs. them’, social stigma that how and why liberal/modern society stigmatized and behaved negatively with religiously affiliated women, identity negotiation that why and when religious identity has been negotiated by religious-oriented females, and stigma management strategies that through what methods stigmatized and negotiated religious identity has been managed by religious women, the investigator is moving to the next chapter where she highlights the consequences of stigmatized identity and interplay of power dynamics as social exclusion, marginalization/discrimination, and socio-

economic inequalities with the stigmatized religious feminine segments by modern spheres and institutions/government in Pakistan.

## 6.5 Stigma Management Strategies

<b>Passing Strategies</b>	<b>Revealing Strategies</b>	<b>Compensatory Strategies</b>
Fabrication	Signaling	Acknowledgement
Concealment	Normalizing	Individuating Information
Discretion	Differentiating	Increased positivity

## **CHAPTER 7**

# **CONSEQUENCES OF STIGMA AND INTERPLAY OF POWER DYNAMICS: SOCIAL EXCLUSION/MARGINALIZATION, DISCRIMINATION, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES**

In chapter six socio-religious identity and the process of in-group and out-group has been excavated among Pakistani women. Social stigma of attached with religious-oriented females in the country, their labeling, and negative behaviors of modern and liberal segments was overlooked. The practice of identity negotiation, selective social interaction, self-confirmatory feedback, and closed environment has been discussed. To manage stigma by the religious female sectors the application of passing, revealing, and compensatory strategies was gone through in detail. This explicit chapter concentrates on the practicality of consequences of stigma. The researcher shines the light that how and why religious feminine spheres are socially excluded and marginalized, why government discriminates with religious women/institutions/groups, why and how religious institutions are considered stigmatized and miserable/pathetic place and based on this stigmatization are sidelined and criticized. In order to understand the socio-economic inequalities of religious-oriented women this chapter as well explicates discrimination in jobs, salaries, food, and unequal standard of life.

To scrutinize the applicability of consequences of stigma and interplay of power dynamics in Pakistani feminine spheres, the chapter is divided into five sections. The first part focuses on social exclusion of those women who negotiated with their religious identity. Under second part discrimination with religious-minded females and institutions at governmental level is expounded. The third section argues that the Madrasas are considered and seen as a stigmatized place among social arena. It as well analyzes the thinking of modern/liberal society which discriminates with those institutions that are attached with religious mentality and religion. Fourth part describes the financial sources of Madrasas to discern social welfare by the rich of religious institutions through which the population is divided between stigmatizer and stigmatized. Furthermore, based on this division power

dynamics of social stigma are clarified. Section five reveals the unequal economic status of religiously motivated females and religious institutions.

## **7.1 The Stigmatized Religious Identity: Social Exclusion and Marginalization**

This section shines the light on those women who are socially excluded, marginalized, and discriminated because of having stigmatized and negotiated religious identity. The religious-minded females cannot broaden their vision to look on social world, they cannot even break norms routed in culture, and they sometimes face rejection in making social relations as marriages for the reason that they belong to particular religious' identity. It has been observed that the female students who get education from Madrasas or maintain stigmatized identity on the bases of religion, cannot gain confidence as those girls who study in modern educational institutions and adopt modern views, thoughts, and outlook.

### *7.1.1 Lack of Confidence in Religious-Minded Women*

The researcher felt and profoundly ponder over the religious feminine segments and found that they have lost their confidence because of their constant stigmatization regarding their religious mentality and appearance. As they have no or very little confidence for the reason that they negotiate with their stigma and feel hesitated to come in modern society of Pakistan. A respondent at Faisalabad alluded, “the females who get education from Madrasa, lose their confidence because they have no educational carrier, they just pass fourth or fifth standard in schools and joined Madrasa where they remain restricted to interact with the modern world. In addition, the modern world does not look at them as they are capable of working professionally (Zakia, August 19, 2021).” An interviewee answered on the confidence among religious females, “those students who remain limited to religious education and live in Madrasa throughout their 4 5 years, they do not have confidence because their purpose is to compose household and they do not want to do more than this so they avoid to come in front of huge people and cannot get exposure (Rabani, August 03, 2021).”

However, besides Madrasa environment and constant living at one place, some other factors contribute to exclude the religiously motivated women from main stream, for example the role of their family and those teachers who give them limited education with limited methods and with limited resources and training. An informant explained, “The reason of lacking confidence among religious-oriented girls is that the family cannot boost the confidence among the children because family is also unaware of modern way of life.” She pointed out another reason of lacking confidence, “the teachers who teach in Madrasas are failed to develop confidence among their students, you know the highly confident students in society are medical students because during their five year’s education, their teachers penetrate among them that your studies are better than everyone, you are the best, your degree is most valuable, this is why, they perform and contribute in the development of society. At the other hand the students of religious institutions are told that you are just for religious knowledge, you should not speak English, you should not talk to men if you are a woman, you should not do job as your role is to obey the husband; to deliver the children; to cook food, and to run household (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” As the religious females lose their confidence, they cannot talk, walk, or manage their professional life with proper exposure and are sidelined and marginalized. Because they only study religion this is why their vision cannot be expanded as of modern/liberal feminine spheres.

### *7.1.2 Attachment with One Subject: Development of Limited Vision*

It has been noted that the religious women are taught only one subject Islam whereas the females who get education in schools, colleges, or universities study multiple subjects, hence the religious-minded women remain limited in their vision and modern females have broad vision because of the knowledge of various subjects. The religious women get afraid from coming in liberal society by thinking that they do not have much broaden mentality as the modern women. Resultantly, they are excluded from social arena. A participant discussed in her interview, “the students in Madrasas just are taught one subject Islamic studies while the students in universities are taught multiple subjects as English, Pakistan Studies, international relations, sociology, and computer. So when they meet with the students of other departments, their vision gets broadened, while the students in Madrasas remained limited and do not interact with multiple departments or different type of students, as a

consequence, they go on back foot (Mussarat, August 08, 2021).” This exclusion helps them to negotiate with their stigmatized identity and go in solitude from this modern world and begin to dislike to enter in that life to which they already were considering sinful. Although, some religious experts understand that traditional Indo-Pak culture force religiously affiliated females to be marginalized rather religion.

### *7.1.3 Cultural Norms as the Reason for Social Exclusion*

When we look at the custom and value system of Sub-continent, it is clarified that a bundle of traditions is transmitted generation to generation. Taking a huge *Burka* (big clothe to be covered) is also the old custom of Muslim woman in India and Pakistan. Some religious-oriented women think that these kind of traditions exclude religious females from modern society otherwise Islam does not put the conditions to have some *Burka*, it just emphasizes to be covered and this can be done by adopting new trends as colorful *Abaya*. An active member of a religious political party shared with the researcher, “in many Madrasas however, problems are made without any reason, some persons who run Madrasas, apply many conditions on female students which are not in Islam.” By giving the example, she told, “near my home there was a Madrasa, where students were abided by having a huge *Burka* which must have a cap with countless fowls (big and traditional cloth which the women in old times in India used to wear while going out from their homes), the students although, put that but they stopped to go at any other place under that *Burka*, they did not go in marriages or functions, in this way they feel excluded from this social world due to their particular outlook (Shakir, July 26, 2021).” However, some cultural norms have their impact for social marginalization of religious women but it is as well clear that these norms are attached with religion and are adopted to maintain religious identity. Except cultural/religious norms modern/western thinking has a great role to segregate those feminine spheres who are linked with particular religious’ identity. They not only face problems in going at those places where they have chance to be stigmatized but unfortunately they even are rejected for marriages and making family.

#### 7.1.4 Rejection of Religious Females for Marriages

During the fieldwork it came in notice that the girls who are recognized by their religious identity face difficulties to be married. An interviewee revealed at Islamabad, , “in doing marriages and making couples religiously identified females face problem, people demand for a modern girl who has big nail, makes eyebrow, and applies nail polish, the religious girls do not adopt such things so they are rejected (Muqaddas, January 03, 2022).” Another respondent at Karachi told on the question related to marital difficulties, “yes a lot. Even paternal and maternal aunties reject these girls for their sons. They say no never, we cannot take this “*Pardahdar bibi*” (fully covered woman) to our home, if we take her in family, where the men will go from home? These kind of discussion is done about those girls who put Hijab and do “*Sharai Pardah*” (covering of woman under the limitation of Islam) after getting education from Madrasa (Farukh, May 12, 2021).”

On discriminated behavior at marital time, a participant at Sargodha exposed, “Yes! Various families rejected by saying that no, not suitable with our son. she does Pardah, how she will survive in our family, my son has a wish to have a modern and fashionable wife who can sit with him in restaurants and to whom he can introduce with his male friends (Saqina, July 30, 2021).” When they face rejection, they avoid to meet with the modern world by thinking that they will be stigmatized and people will speak ironic words regarding their religious identity as their thoughts and outlook brought about their rejection and ultimately they face psychological trauma due to constant stigmatization process. This discrimination does not have its routes at social and cultural level but at governmental level too. Government consciously or unconsciously is sidelining those women who are attached with religious identity.

### 7.2 Religious Identity: Discrimination at Governmental Level

Social stigma theory argues that when stigmatized population gets sidelined and marginalized, the government puts also its contribution. In this way the concept of us vs. them is accelerated and power dynamics become visible. The people who belong to specific religious identity have the opinion that hate in religious women is amplifying due to the discriminated policies. According to them government officials are involved in stigmatization



of religious mentality and religious appearance. They have the perception that government is the promoter of western values for the reason that it is creating the distance between the people and religion. Negligence of the government is dividing Pakistani feminine spheres and in-group and out-group perspective is getting accelerated.

### *7.2.1 Amplifying Hate Due to Discriminated Government Policies*

Previously it has been described that the religious-minded women dislike to be the part of this modern society, they hate with those who adopt liberal and new trends, and they do not wish to interact with the modern feminine segments as they are stigmatized for their particular religious' identity by these segments. People who are attached with religious identity blame the government for increasing this hate. An informant at Multan highlighted, "I must say that due to government's policies, a distance is increasing between Madrasas and other society and a hatred is augmenting among the females of Madrasas as they are not treated equally as the other parts of Pakistan (Abid, August 07, 2021)." In four different interviews at Rawalpindi, Quetta, Lahore, and Karachi the government is blamed to sharpen the hatred and to enhance stigmatization of religious women. It has been seen that behind stigma of religious identity even government officials are engaged sometimes.

### *7.2.2 Discrimination and Stigmatization by Government Officials for Religious Identity*

Stigmatized identity becomes more painful when those people who are the part of the government begin to push behind the wall to stigmatized population. In Pakistan it has happened. A research participant highlighted, "multiple times, government officials and liberal segments speak negative words about religious institutions, experts, and religiously affiliated people but I say that good and bad individuals are everywhere and in all fields but when you fall all good and bad in same category, those who are performing their positive role, get engaged in negative activities by thinking that whatever we do, ultimately are negatively labeled then why not we should behave as we are understood." He further described, "If a normal person is repeatedly labeled as mental. A day will come when that person will think, yes! I am mental. So when you constantly stereotype all Madrasas, one day you will see that stereotypical segment will prove your stigma (Akram, October 13, 2021)." The theory of social stigma presents that when constant labeling is done, one day, the

stigmatized people start to prove their stigma. The investigator explores that governmental policies in fact are economically discriminating with religious institutions and its impact is prevailing in religious female segments also.

### *7.2.3 Discriminated Policies: Denial for Paying Electricity Bills and Making of Lather Devalued*

A common perception among religious women is found and almost all women who became the part of this research and are belonged to religious institutions pointed out this perception that the government is treating them unequally particularly in economic sector to damage religious identity. A member linked with a religious political group on the question on economic discrimination by the government with religious institutions asserted, “Yes! These institutes are discriminated. Even we ask government to pay electricity bills of Madrasas but we are denied.” She presented the example, “at Eid-ul-Azha, Madrasas get lather from people who do sacrifice of cows and sheeps, now to push religious segment behind the wall, the price of this lather was decreased why? Just because Madrasas cannot be flourished, this was the objective (Zartashia, July 27, 2021).”

Another respondent who was the head of a female Madrasa at Jhang was inquired, “Do you think that the government discriminates with Madrasas or treats equally as schools and colleges?” He replied, “It is the visible reality that the government is not treating with Madrasas as it is dealing with schools and colleges. Look, all salaries to the teachers in school’s government pays while for Madrasa teachers nothing is done. If Madrasas in their own capacity want to generate or increase income, government makes hurdles for example, we used to collect sheep or cow skins from the people at the occasion of “Eid-UI-Adha” (a Muslim religious festival) but now the government banned that Madrasas cannot collect this lather moreover, the cost of lather has been fallen down so that we can be stopped to be stable economically, given in this way we are sidelined and marginalized and consciously we are thrown back (Murtaza, July 29, 2021).” It has been excavated that the perception among stigmatized group is making its way that the government is endeavoring to keep people away from religion (Islam).

#### 7.2.4 Efforts for Creating Distance between Religious Population and Religion

This has been illustrated before that on the bases of socio-religious identity the feminine sectors have been divided between us vs them. Furthermore, stereotypical behaviors of modern/liberal group separated these groups between stigmatizer and stigmatized. As the grievances of stigmatized females augmented due to social and economic discrimination, the concept has been emerged that the government is the part of liberal society and promoter of western values this is why it is trying to keep religiously motivated women and their institutions/groups away from religion. When an interviewee at Rawalpindi indicated towards the discrimination of government with Madrasas, the researcher asked, “Why this discrimination is done by the government with Madrasas? What do you think?” He gave the example from the life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), “when He began to preach, His companions were socially boycott, psychologically and physically hurt, and economically damaged so that they after bearing a lot of pain, could leave Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) alone. Same today is happening. We are afflicted in order to keep us away from Islam and from the right path (Mehmood, April 30, 2021).” By alluding to the government, a respondent at Sialkot said, “government discriminates with us as well, I am saying this is a collective conspiracy against those who are on the right path (the path of ALLAH TALA) (Nasira, August 05, 2021).”

Many religious women think that government is the promoter of western value system for the reason that it is marginalizing us so that Islam can be weakened and we throw our religious identity as west did. An informant at KallarKahar Chakwal explicated on asking that whether government discriminates with them, “yes, because government is promoting schools and colleges, our government is inclined to the western civilization, in doing so Madrasas are not treated equally (Safina, July 31, 2021).” During the visit of Karachi a participant astonishingly pointed out in front of inquirer, “This is in fact, the collective effort of modern society that the liberals don’t let us “*Maulvi tabqa*” (religious class) to come in power economically because they know that as we will get financial strength, Islam will be imposed and they will be abolished this why they don’t allow religious teachers to be flourished (Sheikh Adil, Karachi).” A very important deprivation has been noticed among

religious females that they have the view that government helps economically to particular selective Madrasa teachers and heads who disseminate its agenda.

#### *7.2.5 Financial Support for Promotion of Governmental Agenda*

While collecting data, it has been observed that those religious institutions and religious women who previously were linked with some banned organization as Jamaat-ud-Dawa have the opinion that government deliberately provides economic incentives to those who promote western agenda, do not call west as the enemy of Islam, and after leaving the organization began to propagate liberal stance. At Lahore a famous religious scholar who was running a female Madrasa revealed, “Before sometimes, government began to give salaries to the teachers of a few particular Madrasas. Those Madrasas who act upon governmental agenda, are blessed by the leaders but those who stand on right and truth, are suppressed and are not given salaries. As some Madrasas belonging to Jamaat-ud-Dawa are given salaries to ban their campaign and I was also nominated and attached with Jamaat-ud-Dawa but I did not move from the right path this is the reason that my Madrasa always remained in bad books of government and I am disliked in governmental sectors (Rabani, August 03, 2021).” The religious-oriented women and their institutions are as well neglected by the government and are discriminated educationally.

#### *7.2.6 Deprivation from Worldly Education and Facilities for Poor School, College, and University Students*

Data asserts that religiously motivated females and their institutions (Madrasas) are deprived from modern education for the reason that they go out from liberal society and faced stigmatization. They are not provided equal educational opportunities, they do not have any kind of scholarship, as above mentioned in this chapter that they have limited vision due to getting the knowledge of only one subject. Some religious experts understand that the key cause of stigmatization of religious identity and based on this stigma marginalization is that the religious feminine spheres are deprived from modern education. A head of a women Madrasa at Multan explicated during his interview, “the students of Madrasas have been totally deprived from modern and worldly education, and this distance between Madrasa and world played a great role to divide the Muslims between liberal and religious. As a

consequence, Islam was stigmatized and negatively labeled in the world and Madrasas are incapable to deal with the negative attitude of those who are stigmatizers (Abid, August 07, 2021).”

Another scholar who was the member of a religious party spoke, “government facilitates poor students in universities and schools but no focus on poor students of Madrasas why? Because we are understood as incapable of getting modern education, we should live behind the walls, just should recite Quran, and should be engaged in prayers (Javaid Qadri, Multan).” The researcher during her interviews and visits to Madrasas looked that not just in education religiously identified women/institutes/groups are discriminated but in finding job likewise they face segregation.

#### *7.2.7 Discrimination in Job Opportunities*

Most of the females who get education from religious institutions and are attached with religious identity face exclusion and discrimination in job opportunities. An interviewee at Rawalpindi proceeded, “if a girl after matriculation gives 6 years to her modern education, she completes her masters and has multiple opportunities to find job as school teacher, clerk, media reporter, or computer operator but in Madrasa after matriculation when the student spends 6 years, she accomplishes the course of Hadith and when she goes in field she has no opportunity, ultimately, she will take the charge of some Madrasa where she will wait for financial help of the rich to fulfil her needs (Gull, January 19, 2022).” A participant at Gujranwala exposed upon researcher, “miserable conditions sometimes are seen of those who are the teacher in Madrasas or are performing some administrative duties there (Ishmat, August 02, 2021).” An interviewee gave the example from her own family, “my father is a school teacher and now his salary is 60 thousand+ but the teacher of Madrasa usually gets 6 to 7000 only (Salma Khatoon, Layyah).”

An informant was investigated “Whether the female students of Madrasa face some difficulties in finding jobs?” He shortly replied, “yes they face problems while comparatively those girls who are educated from modern educational system, get job more easy than these girls (Rabani, August 03, 2021).” A respondent asserted at Karachi on the question regarding unequal job opportunities for religious females, “Yes! This is the horrific picture of our

society that if a girl is with “*Naqab*” (covering face) and Hijab will go to take job, she will be rejected. While at the other hand, a female with makeup and without dupatta will be preferable and will be accepted for that job (Farukh, May 12, 2021).” During the visit of Faisalabad, a participant in a Madrasa was asked “do you feel that the female students of Madrasas are really at back foot in our society?” She spoke, “yes it is the fact and its reason poverty because majority of Madrasa students is financially weak, they cannot get modern education, and this is the reason that they cannot find healthy jobs (Zakia, August 19, 2021).” It has been dug out that the discrimination and marginalization by the government are the consequences of stigmatization and government is dividing the feminine segments between us vs. them. As Madrasas are discriminated by not only liberal parts of society but by the government who has the patronage of all institutions either modern or religious, this is why Madrasas are considered as stigmatized place. Social stigma theorists claim that where stigmatized population lives, that place is also labeled negatively by stigmatizers.

### **7.3 Social Marginalization: Madrasa as Stigmatized Place**

The word Madrasa is the replacement of the English word school but when it comes in mind, multiple negative thoughts associated with Madrasa start to develop as poverty, conservative population, backward stile of religious education, violence by *Maulvis* (religious teachers), radicalization, extremism, and terrorism. Why is this so? Because Madrasa in itself is stigmatized by the modern/liberal segments. The inquirer discovered various reasons behind this stigmatized identity of Madrasas on the bases of religion like cultural assimilation, media criticism, development of fear among children, deviant religious institutions/teachers/students, and misconceptions as Madrasa is the place where terrorists are prepared and produced. The people who are linked with Madrasas think that key cause is the impact of Indian and English culture which devalued and stigmatized religious institutions.

#### *7.3.1 Cultural Assimilation: English and Indian Color*

Data suggests that a common perception among religious community is prevailed that generally Indian and particularly English color upon the modern people of Pakistan forced them to remain away from Madrasas as these are backward place and are made for the poor and the needy. A participant in a religious institution belonging to women at Multan was

asked in his interview that why people are kept away from Madrasas in today's Pakistani society? He with smile began, "you can give better answer than I because you are writing a whole thesis on this topic and visiting multiple places." The researcher motivated him to reply her for the question and requested him to give his opinion. He ultimately moved forward and explained, "nobody is fleeing from Madrasas but other than those who are already dislike Islam and are impressed and dominated by "*ghairon ki tehzeb*" (western civilization)." He in addition alluded on the time of Sub-continent before partition, "British governed us round about 300 years, and moreover, we used to live with Hindus in the same land so we have color of these two cultures upon our life style. Now we do not like to live according to Islam and those who force Pakistani modern segments to be Islamic, they begin to abhor them (Maulana, August 07, 2021)." Not only cultural assimilation helps modern/liberal society to stigmatize Madrasas but media and the persons associated with it saw towards religious institutions with stereotypical eye. Even though, media is considered impartial and neutral in all other matters.

### *7.3.2 Criticism and Discrimination by Media*

Media is understood as the main pillar of a society. It disseminates information, makes public opinion, frames minds, and sets agendas. In case of Madrasas, media played a negative role and supported those who were seen as stigmatizers among religiously motivated individuals/institutions. During many interviews of religious females and males who are attached with female Madrasas it has been noted that media propagates a lot regarding religious institutions. As a result, the stigmatized religious identity faced more educational discrimination, social marginalization, and economic exclusion. A respondent brought into light, "I understand that to highlight Madrasas as uneducated and a violent/terrorist place, our media is responsible. How? You know one case of harassment from a Madrasa has been taken in public, all Madrasas are criticized and negatively labeled. Hence those who propagate against Islam, get opportunity to stigmatize more strongly (Adil, May 17, 2021)." Another interviewee spoke, "faults of Madrasas are covered by media but their positive contribution is not showed on television to build negative image of religious identity to please the God and their God is "Maghrib" (west) (Mussarat, August 08, 2021)." However, some participants said that a few persons associated with Madrasas and some deviant institutions

played the role to develop stigmatized identity of Madrasas and provided the opportunity to media to discriminate with religious institutions/individuals.

A religious expert who was running a female Madrasa at Multan alluded with sadness, “some deviant religious institutions and some cheap and less educated *Maulvis* (religious experts) played a great role to enhance negativity about Islam but one thing I will must say that dirty fish are everywhere and in all fields but unfortunately our media exclusively gave coverage to the wrong doings of these institutions and to these cheap *Maulvis*. I will must say that media showed a prejudice behavior for religious people and institutions (Abid, August 07, 2021).” At Islamabad, an interviewee quoted a recent example of a girl who was killed mysteriously by her boyfriend and that man has been seen as religious minded in liberal sectors, “how many rape cases are reported in society every day but one case of Noor Muqadam has been highlighted by media why? Because notorious is considered the actual criminal rather he/she is not guilty.” She spoke further, “similarly Madrasas have been made notorious by media, by making cases of violence, and by highlighting some flaws of Madrasas, and this bad name has been made by those powers who are devilish powers, who cannot see to flourish the religion of ALLAH ALMIGHTY at this earth (Kousar, January 05, 2022).” However, culture and media played a great part to stigmatize religious institutions but modern/liberal society has much role as it filled the minds of coming generation with fear about religious institutions.

### *7.3.3 Development of Fear among Children Regarding Madrasas*

The researcher personally observed and her fieldwork authenticates her observation that from Madrasas the members of modern society in Pakistan terrify their children. Literature on stigma shines the light that when any place is stigmatized, people avoid to visit and begin to be afraid of that place. Similarly, in the case of religious institutions happened. A respondent from modern segments shared an experience that one of her nephew was wandering here and there, he was not ready to pursue his college education, her mother used to draw a horrific picture of Madrasa in front of her son by saying, “if you will not go to college, you will be thrown in some Madrasa where you will be given two time meal, 12 hours Quran will be taught, the head of Madrasa will send you to beg lunch and dinner from



the noble families, and six months you will not be allowed to see the face of your home (Malik, January 11, 2022).”

An informant at Bahawalpur explained, “People get afraid of this word even. Often, families develop fear among their children regarding Madrasa.” He gave the example, “a boy was not interested in school, his father terrified him from Madrasa by penetrating negative thoughts in his son and said, start to go school regularly otherwise I will send you to a Madrasa where you will be bitten every day, at that time, you will be aware of the value of school (Baloch, September 21, 2021).”. At Lahore a female religious scholar was inquired, “Why Madrasa is negatively labeled in society? Why parents create fear among their children when they do not perform in school that they will be admitted in Madrasa?” She answered, “If we talk about a person, family, or an institution, when the name is deteriorated, that person, family, or institution becomes stigmatized and criticized by society, the name of Madrasa is notorious now because its credibility has become doubtful due to some cases related to violence. In addition, religious identity in itself has been stigmatized so Madrasas belong to religious identity for the reason that now the stigmatizers are afraid of these institutions (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” The investigator found that modern/liberal segments established misconceptions regarding Madrasas and associated some negative activities with these institutions like terrorism because of some incidences related to radicalization and extremism.

#### *7.3.4 Madrasa as the Place of Terrorism*

As religious-oriented women are stigmatized, their belonging place where they construct and negotiate with their religious identity faced also negative labeling. By extracting the argument from 2 percent cases of terrorism, 98 percent religious institutions were charged with stigma as among these Madrasas terrorism is promoted, radicalization is taught, and extremism is brought up in students. An interviewee at Layyah described, “from Qaziabad, a man after removing the name from school, took his son to us to admit here, literally, the school teacher reached at the home of that boy and said his parents that after studying in Madrasa, your son will turn into a terrorist before seeing this phenomenon, send him again to school and don’t destroy his future (Danish, June 14, 2021).” Another participant highlighted that due to producing a lot of literature on link between terrorism and

Madrasas the religious identity has been damaged by stigmatizers, rather to tackle this stigma the religious community began to behave as stigmatizers (modern/liberal spheres) were expecting from them. The labeling of terrorism further economically, culturally, socially, and educationally marginalized not only religious feminine parts of Pakistani society but their institutions as well. Literature on social stigma makes the case that when stigmatized population face stereotypical behaviors, it goes down economically and begins to survive by social welfare which it gets from stigmatizers. In this way the play of powerless and powerful starts.

## **7.4 Financial Sources of Religious Institutions: Generation of Income by Social Welfare**

Usually Madrasas provide basic necessities to the students like residence, food, clothe, and secured environment where the females are respected rather to be stigmatized. However, previously in chapter on the motivational factors and strategies it has been discussed profoundly that economic incentives by Madrasas fascinate girls and their parents to be admitted in Madrasas because of poverty. Here exclusively it is explored that due to consistent stigmatized identity religious institutions are dependent on social welfare and are compelled to take financial aid in the name of ALLAH ALMIGHTY to run the educational system. Why it occurs? Why the religious institutions are dependent on social welfare? The answers of these questions are that because neither government gives economic assistance to them nor they generate income themselves. Their stigmatized identity further forces them to be survived on the help of the rich and the noble.

### *7.4.1 Cooperation of the Rich and the Noble with Madrasas for Providing Facilities to the Students*

Data asserts that the rich or the noble of Pakistani society do not send their children to Madrasas to get education as they consider these institutions just for the poor but however, they give a handsome amount to provide basic needs to the poor people who are the part of Madrasas so that they can please their Creator. Hens the stigmatized religious identity befalls inferior and modern/liberal stigmatizers who mostly belong to rich families maintain their

superiority. Religious feminine segments are treated as taker whereas modern/liberal female spheres are understood as giver. A participant was asked, “When this Madrasa is not under the patronage of government so how all expenditures of this institute are carried?” She explained, “Neither the government helps nor we take any kind of fee from the students. Even books we provide to the students. On monthly bases some noble men cooperate with us and give a handsome amount to us in the name of ALLAH, through that financial aid we try to supply all basic necessities (Baigam, September 17, 2021).”

An interviewee was questioned at Mardan “how you manage this huge system? Does government help you financially?” She described, “No government does not give assistance, and all this management is done due to the help and support of the rich and the noble people (Sardar, December 07, 2021).” Another financial factor came in notice at Multan when the head of a female religious institution expounded, “some noble families who send their children here to read Quran from community, they give financial assistance to us for the continuation of the studies of poor girls, and they take responsibility to bear all of their expenditure who live here day and night in Madrasa to please ALLAH ALMIGHTY (Maulana Sadiq, Multan).” Astonishingly it has been as well observed that the land upon which these religious institutions are constructed is generally donated by the rich or the noble.

#### *7.4.2 Land as a Donation*

During the fieldwork the researcher noticed that Madrasas of big cities have good infrastructure while in small cities or villages very poor buildings are used for providing religious education. Although, either Madrasas are constructed in cities or in villages one thing is common that these all are made on donated land. Any single religious institution the inquirer did not find that has been established by someone who personally purchased land to develop religious institution. A female head of a Madrasa told, “As you know that such institutes are run through social welfare like “Zakat” (the amount is given in the way of ALLAH ALMIGHTY by the rich Muslims), we had no place (land) to establish it, but with the cooperation of the noble people, this has been made. Like, someone has donated this land to us to build it (female head, Layyah).” Various other respondents revealed that the land to make Madrasa was donated by the rich and the noble of society. An informant explained in

discussion with researcher, “A business man donated this land to build Madrasa for girls because his son was indulged in drug addiction, he thought to ask forgiveness for his son from ALLAH ALMIGHTY through this Madrasa (Mehmood, April 30, 2021).” It has been dug out at field while collecting data that in the month of Ramadan these institutions increasingly generate income via financial support as the Muslims have much inclination towards religion in this month.

#### *7.4.3 The Month of Ramadan and Paying of Zakat*

It is visible reality that Muslims see the month of Ramadan with respect and get closed to their religious identity. Most of the Muslims although, do not negotiate with this temporary identity but help financially to those institutions/individuals to whom they consider religious just to gain gladness of ALLAH ALMIGHGHTY as the Muslims have belief that in the month of Ramadan they will be forgiven for their sins if they spend in the name of GOD so they with open heart spend on Madrasas. A participant at Multan indicated in his interview, “in this Ramadan many people supported us and we made uniforms for all students, one industrialist has given money which was needed for stitching uniforms (Abd-UI-Manan Abid, Multan).” A female in charge of a Madrasa was inquired that from where she generates income to provide all the facilities to girls? She discussed, “The noble and the rich assisted financially in the form of “*chanda*”, “*zakat*”, “*attia*”, “*sadqa*”, “*khairat*” (these all are the forms of social welfare in Pakistani society) specifically in Ramadan (Batool, October 22, 2021).” However, besides the month of Ramadan these religious institutes get economic assistance as the whole year their dependency is on social welfare.

#### *7.4.4 Financial Sources: Zakat, Sadqa, and Khiraj*

When the rich Muslims give aid to these institutions, they fall it into different categories, as “*Zaqat*” (a decided percentage donated to the poor and the needy by the rich at every Islamic year), “*Sadqa*” (an amount is given the poor to keep calamities away), and “*Khiraj*” (a decided quantity of wheat is donated from crop to the poor). Madrasas are supplied money in all these categories. A head of a women religious institute was interviewed and asked that how she manages all the things as food, residence, and clothe for 100 girls throughout the year without taking any kind of fee? She with smile answered, “With the help

of ALLAH ALMIGHTY but in fact, with the great cooperation of the rich this system is continued.” She in detail expressed, “generally some landlords send “*anaj/dany*” (wheat) at the time of harvesting of crop, a number of people give their “*Sadqa*” (charity) when they are under cloud so in this way the system remains constant (Gulnaz, December 11, 2021).” Another respondent who was running a female Madrasa in the village of district Layyah denoted, “We fulfil all necessities of these students with the cooperation of the noble and the rich of this area. For example, now a day, wheat season is continued, people are giving us that wheat for the sake of ALLAH ALMIGHTY (Danish, June 14, 2021).”

An in charge at Pakpattan was investigated that how much noble people play their role to fulfil the needs of the female students in her Madrasa? She said, “We do not beg from the rich to carry the responsibility of this Madrasa. May be other Madrasas do this but we do not. We do not even ask for Chanda (the money which is given for religious activities). If someone comes here to request students to pray to keep calamities and difficulties away from his or her, he or she with his or her wish wants to help us then we take that amount (Bano, September 14, 2021).” However, some other concepts circulate in religious community that how financial aid is coming. For example, they think that it is the hidden system of ALLAH ALMIGHTY by which these religiously motivated females are fulfilling their needs in these Madrasas. A perception is that to eat to gather brings about more food in lunch or dinner. Another thought is found that because female students in these Madrasas offer “*Salat-Ul-Haja*” (prayer of need) for the reason that ALLAH ALMIGHTY is blessing Madrasas to provide basic needs to the students.

#### *7.4.5 Hidden System of ALLAH ALMIGHTY, Offering Prayer of Need, and Blessing of Eating Together*

Besides financial cooperation of the rich and the noble, paying amount as *Zakat*, *Sadqa*, *Chanda*, *Khiraj*, and other donation, the religiously affiliated people including women think that the economic system is running by hidden control of ALLAH ALMIGHTY. An informant at Quetta described, “this is the hidden system of ALLAH ALMIGHTY that He is giving food for everyone even that is human or animal in this world so the girls in Madrasa how can be deprived when they are here for ALLAH’s religion (Akhtari, October 14, 2021).” A participant in a Madrasa at Lahore denoted, “the prayer of need is performed and ‘Sura-e-

Yasin’ and ‘Sura-e-Waqyah’ are recited so due to these activities ALLAH ALMIGHTY showers His blessings upon us (Najma Bibi, Lahore).” An administrator of a female religious institute alluded towards another factor, “you know that when we eat to gather, ALLAH ALMIGHTY enhances the quantity of food and little meal remains enough for a large number (Zakia, August 19, 2021).” It can be understood without any difficulty that all these methods (the concept of hidden system, offering prayer of need, and blessing of eating to gather) highlight frustration, marginalization, exclusion, discrimination, psychological stress, and deprivation of those people particularly women/institutions/groups who negotiate with their stigmatized religious identity. The people including women who were linked with these institutes began to survive on social welfare, their standard of life went down, and generally lower economic status has been observed of them.

## **7.5 Socio-Economic Inequalities: Religious Identity as the Reflection of Poverty**

Literature on social stigma Describes that socio-economic inequalities become visible when interplay of powerless and powerful gets activated in society. Collected data for this dissertation and field observations of researcher clarify that stigmatized religious feminine segments and their affiliated institutions are not equal economically to those sectors who fall into the category of stigmatizers. Unequal life standard, lower economic status, unavailability of basic needs, lack of excess to modern education, and their wait for financial help from the rich can be seen through naked eye in Pakistan.

### *7.5.1 Link between Stigmatized Religious Identity and Lower Economic Status*

Previously in this thesis it has been overlooked that the factor of poverty motivates the females and their parents to be admitted in Madrasas because Madrasas provide them free religious education and fulfil their needs but when they come in these institutions, construct religious identity, face stigmatization, negotiate with stigma, rely on social welfare, and live under miserable conditions. They economically go down as they already were belonging to poor families. Their outlook, appearance, residence, and food with loud voice tell to everyone that we are not equal to modern/liberal feminine spheres of this society. The inquirer visited several cities and villages to collect data and met with multiple females associated with

religious identity but any single woman did not possess personal vehicle, other than two to three women never saw beauty salon, a few women ever went to restaurant, except few females did not go anywhere for shopping, they did not heard about brands, and never wore expensive dress or shoes.

Religiously identified feminine segments argue that their lower economic status does not permit modern society to come close to them and their institutions. An informant was asked, “Do you think that lower economic status of the individuals who are linked with religious institutions is a key factor to keep multiple girls away from religious education?” She highlighted, “yes it is! Because people think about their wealthy and strong financial carrier but when they look poverty of the teachers and administrators of Madrasas, they wish to have modern/worldly education rather to get religious knowledge (Baigam, Spetember 17, 2021).” Why is this so? Because the stigmatized population is not treated equally and is discriminated economically. A shocking fact came into notice during various interviews that the teachers or other staff who is performing duties in Madrasas is not paid any salary to fulfil basic necessities. If some institutions are giving some amount but that is too little to survive in this time of inflation.

#### *7.5.2 Economic Inequality: Paying No or Low Salaries*

It has been excavated that most of the religious institutions do not pay any salary to their staff particularly to teachers. Generally, these teachers reside within the premises of Madrasa with students, they eat that food which is cooked for students, and their children get free education in the same Madrasa where the parents work. If someone lives out of the institution, he/she is not paid a single rupee in the name of salary. A respondent was questioned, “Do you feel that you or those women who are linked with Madrasas face discrimination in modern society? I mean you have equal salary or you have equal standard of life?” She expressed, “yes, we are segregated and we do not have equal opportunities to be developed. In spite of having no salary or very little salary we do not protest against government and try to manage our livelihood because we know that we are weak and nobody will listen our voice and furthermore we will be threatened to shut the institution down (Bibi, July 29, 2021).”

The researcher at Karachi asked from an informant who was running a female Madrasa regarding paying salaries to teachers, he replied, “yes! We pay.” The discussion was proceeded and he was inquired, “You have experienced multiple Madrasas and you are really aware of school system, do you think that there is the difference between the salary of school or college teachers and Madrasa teachers?” He described, “Yes! A huge difference. When I joined this institute in 2018, the teachers were paid 7000 to 8000 but I have increased it and minimum salary is now 15000. And I think it should be 25000.” He in addition said that he gave a challenge that 98 percent religious institutions do not pay salary to teachers but he had international exposure and got education in Saudi Arabia this was the reason that he began to pay some salary to his teachers (Sheikh Adil, Karachi). During his interview it was also come in knowledge that if any Madrasa pays some amount to its teachers, that is as well generated from financial help by the rich and the noble.

At Kallarkahar the researcher found an opportunity to meet with a female teacher of a Madrasa, when she was asked about her salary, she got emotional and replied, “I have completed my education from this Madrasa, this institute is like my mother, I consider Shah Saheb (the in charge of Madrasa) as my father or more than my father, now he is ill, as I weep for his health perhaps his daughters did not weep.” She literally began to cry and said, “ALLAH ALMIGHTY gives him health and life, I do not need any salary from him.” At various places it has been observed that religious teachers were really attached with their institutions and consider sin to demand some salary for that work which they do for the will of ALLAH ALMIGHTY. Another female teacher was inquired at Quetta, “you teach without any salary or some amount is given to you from Madrasa?” She told, “I teach without any economic incentive. However, my residence is far away from here this is why the in charge gives me some amount so that my rent of vehicle can be paid (Akhtari, October 14, 2021).”

An in charge of a female religious institution during his interview revealed at Multan, “we pay salary to all those who are involved in administration as cook, gate keeper, and runner, but the teachers sacrifice their salaries and most of the teachers are belonging to my family as my 3 daughters and 4 daughters in laws are teaching here. We have residence here, eat here, and are engaged in the way of ALLAH so I and my family does not need to have salary (Maulana Sadiq, Multan).” Another participant highlighted, “those students who have



completed their studies, they are motivated to teach free of cost so in this way we lessen our expenditure (Bano, September 14, 2021).” On economic inequality of Madrasa teachers, an interviewee denoted, “We pay salary but that is very little. From 5000 to 8000 and this is not sufficient but at the other, you know that the teachers of schools or colleges are paid 20 to 25 thousand, this is the reason that the financially strong people do not admit their daughters or sons in Madrasas because they are aware that this education can take closed to ALLAH TALA but cannot make their future bright (Danish, June 14, 2021).” When the researcher was in field, she noted that if someone has made two institutions separately for girls and boys, food to girls comes from male side when boys eat, the remaining food is sent to female side to be eaten.

### *7.5.3 Providence of Food from Male Madrasa*

It has been explored that mostly people have established two institutions: one for girls and one for boys. Husband runs male while wife administers female Madrasa. Generally, meal is prepared at male side as boys can be engaged in buying vegetable, ration, and other things from market. A Male appointed to cook works at male side. When lunch or dinner gets ready, it is presented to boys by keeping in mind that they have more need to eat than girls as they are male. Whatever, they leave behind after eating, that food is sent to girls. A female head was interviewed and researcher asked her, “how you cook food (lunch and dinner) for the students?” she answered, “we have another male Madrasa there we have a male cook, he prepares all the food. So from male Madrasa, here for the girls, lunch and dinner is made accessible (female head, August 17, 2021).”

The religiously affiliated people explain the reasons that why at male Madrasa food is cooked. Firstly, they cannot afford two persons for kitchen. Secondly, as girls need less eating than boys. Thirdly, boys can be sent to market to purchase edibles. Fourthly, females have more tolerated nature so that sometimes, they have to spend their day in very little food, they can do but males cannot so this is why male side is given lunch and dinner before females. In four different interviews at Multan, Chakwal, Naushehra, and Quetta, it was investigated that what kind of food is given to students in Madrasas. Most of the answers were alike. For example, vegetable and pulses in dinner and lunch whereas rusk with tea in breakfast. It has been noted too that some religious institutions just two times entertain girls

with food, like tea in morning and meal in dinner. The above discussion is enough to understand that religiously identified females are not just discriminated by modern and liberal spheres but from inside, they face discrimination as well. Not only eating conditions of girls are miserable but living environment likewise.

#### *7.5.4 Pathetic Conditions for Residence and Food in Madrasas*

The researcher observed during her visits to religious institutions that living conditions are extremely poor there. At some places, in one room, 10 to 12 girls are residing. In villages, 40 to 50 female students share only one washroom. They even do not have beds to sleep. Rather to provide bed, they are encouraged to lay at ground. A girl in a village of Bahawalpur shared with inquirer, “in summers, we really cannot sleep the whole night by thinking that in deserts many snakes come out from sand. We are laying on ground, some snake will appear and will throw us into the valley of death (Zainab, September 18, 2021).” In almost all Madrasas, mattress is not available to students, they sleep at rough carpet which are donated by the rich in winter while in summers they sleep on “*Chatais*” (mats which are prepared by the tree of dates). It has been seen as well that religious education is given at floor. In any Madrasa the researcher did not find a single chair for students.

The living conditions, providence of food and educational system is shouting with loud and clear voice in religious institutions that social, educational, and cultural discrimination is visible, socio-economic inequalities are clear, why nobody is listening painful voices? The researcher here makes the case that consequences of stigmatized identities if are not addressed and interplay of power dynamics remains continued, the stigmatized population will push or pull to the path of radicalization. This radicalization can be violent or nonviolent but ultimately the results can be horrific. When literature on radicalization and Madrasas are produced, the scholars do not understand the dynamics of these institutions. Modern/liberal segments accuse religious thoughts and Jihad as responsible to promote violence but what is going inside, no one is ready to look over: neither government nor academia.

This chapter in detail excavated and analyzed consequences of stigma and interplay of powerless and powerful by explaining social exclusion, educational marginalization,

discrimination at governmental level, social welfare system, and socio-economic inequalities of religious feminine sections and their institutions. In next chapter of this dissertation the researcher explores that when these consequences get activated with ideologies as Jihad, defining role of women in Islam as brave mother/daughter, and threat perception as liberals are endeavoring to modifying Islam so how religious-oriented females/institutions/groups can lead to the pathway of radicalization in Pakistan.

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **THE PATHWAY TO RADICALIZATION: IDEOLOGIES, ROLES, AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS**

Subsequent to evaluate consequences of stigma and interplay of power dynamics as social exclusion of religious-oriented women, discrimination by government with religious identity, marginalization of religious institutions, and unequal socio-economic status of religious feminine spheres on the bases of stigmatization; construction; and negotiation with religious identity, this chapter scrutinizes that prevailing ideologies as sympathy to violent Islamist organizations; promotion of Jihad against the enemies of Islam; and adoption of aggression for implementing religious value system produce extremist female mindset, defining women role as brave mother; socialization of children on the way of Mujahidin; and physical/mental involvement of women in Jihad if needed generate radicalized thinking among religious feminine elements, the developing threat perceptions as contamination of religious values; genocide of Muslims; and abolition of religious identity (Hijab and Pardah) that push or pull religious-oriented women towards the road of radicalization, and direct promotion of violent behaviors among religiously motivated women and their institutions as gap between Madrasas and worldly life; personal motives; and blame of extremism and terrorism play a role as driving dynamism to push or to pull religious-minded females to the radicalization path.

To explore and to explain the phenomenon, the chapter is divided into 4 parts. Part first describes ideologies that are prevailed among religiously belonging females which have potential to lead socially excluded and marginalized community to the path of radicalization. In second section the researcher shines the light on the defined roles of religious-minded women in socialization of their children and direct involvement in Jihad. Part third explicitly explicates threat perceptions which push or pull feminine spheres of linking to stigmatized religious identity towards radicalization or in some cases to violent extremism. The fourth section reveals direct promotion of violent behaviors among religiously identified women and their institutions in Pakistan. Perspective of segregated religious community regarding augmenting radicalization, extremism, and terrorism as well is overlooked.

## 8.1 Violence Promoting Ideologies: A Way Forward to Radicalization

The research on radicalization asserts that ideologies play a gigantic role in driving the individuals or groups to the path of radicalization. By taking the help from already produced work on radicalization the researcher in this section throws light on those concepts, ideas, views, thoughts, beliefs, and aspirations that are existed in the minds of religiously identified women and give indicators that radicalization is particularly augmenting in Pakistani society.

### 8.1.1 *Jihad vs. Fasad (Rottenness)*

Literature on radicalization suggests that people including women get engaged in radicalization when they want to take revenge from the members of out-group for their some loss. Among Pakistani religious females this concept has been observed and noted by the inquirer that they have the thought that in various places in the world Muslims are killed in the name of religion as the west (champion of the liberals) has the intention to remove Islam from the human planet. The Muslims belonging to any country have to take revenge by doing Jihad from those who are the enemy of Islam and have to save the Muslims because of sharing same religious identity. If the models of radicalization are studied profoundly, it becomes clear that strong religious identity force people to go to the path of radicalization. A woman from religious segment during her interview explained in front of researcher at Layyah, “Muslims are doing Jihad but Non-Muslims are doing Fasad.” She gave the example, “India is killing Kashmiris brutally, America is ruining Afghan people bluntly, Palestinians are murdered fearlessly, and Iraq was destroyed completely no individual in the world said that India, America, or Israel is terrorist but Muslims are labeled why? Because those who are the opponent of our religion want to abolish us but we through Jihad will remove them and this is the reason that they are afraid of the sentiment of Jihad (Shakir, July 26, 2021).”

A participant told from the Life of Prophet Muhammad PBUH, “When He fought wars against Non-Muslims, He taught His companions that you will not attack on women, disables, old persons, religious personalities, gardens, religious places, and non-combatants. Is this terrorism? No. terrorism is done by India in Kashmir when its soldiers rape young

Kashmiri females, terrorism is that when Israel devastates Palestinian territory, terrorism is done by America when it throws carpet bombing on hospitals, schools and civilians in Afghanistan (Mussarat, August 08, 2021).” A respondent discussed in her interview, “all cruelty and brutality is done with the Muslims and furthermore, they are terrorists and extremists? Why?” she threw a question towards researcher by saying, “you tell, I can also ask from you that why Muslims are blamed as radicalized and extremist when they are the victim of terrorism done by America, India, and Israel (Bibi, July 29, 2021)?” Although, some respondents said that because of adopting liberal and modern value system, Muslims have forgotten to fight in the name of ALLAH ALMIGHTY due to this everywhere Muslims are killed and ruined.

### *8.1.2 For Getting Jihad as the Factor for Killings of Muslims*

Multiple religiously affiliated women and men who were attached with female Madrasas expressed the concerns in their discussion that we (liberals) have thrown the basic element of “Eman” (faith) Jihad into the back, sufferings of lives, property, and religious places is compulsory. ALLAH says in Quran that when you leave the way of ALLAH, you will be destroyed. To secure Islam and Muslims we have to wake Jihad in Muslims again. By highlighting the concept of Jihad and its effectiveness an informant said, “Every religion has some key values and the main value of Islam is Jihad. As we left this, we went down. You see the situation in Syria, in Kashmir, and what happened in this Ramadan in Aqsa Mosque? Hundreds of people were killed by Israel, why it is all happening? Just because we have forgotten to fight in the name of ALLAH ALMIGHTY (Zartashia, July 27, 2021).” Religious feminine spheres have a great belief in Jihad and they think that via Jihad they can dominate at international stage and can remove those who cannot see Muslims in power.

### *8.1.3 Jihad as the Source of Coming in Power*

The scholars on radicalization write that extremist ideas and beliefs are espoused by individuals and groups when relative deprivation is visible and powerless want to befall powerful and people wish to take radical changes in society. In Pakistan the religiously motivated women have the same view that Muslims are sidelined from world screen, they are segregated, their religious values (Hijab, Pardah, Jihad) are seen as ridiculous, Muslims

should amplify the Jihadi aspirations so that power can be achieved. A female student at Rawalpindi in a Madrasa described, “first we have to try to come in power through politics but if politics fails, we then move towards Jihad because when Muslims will come in power, Islam will be implemented, the brutality upon Muslims like in Kashmir, Palestine, and Afghanistan will be stopped (Fatima, January 15, 2022).” Another participant revealed, “First of all, the religious people should come in politics as Hafiz Said joined practically politics by making his own political party named as ‘Milli Tanzim’, except this Jamat Islami, Jamiat Ulma Islam and many more. However, if through politics and vote, we face failure, then we should fight in the way of ALLAH to develop the world purely Islamic (Ishmat, August 2, 2021).” The inquirer observed that in Pakistan various religiously identified females think that one-day global Islamic government will be established but this dream cannot be fulfilled until and unless Muslims begin to Jihad (fight) against modern/liberal political, economic, and cultural values. A very significant ideology is as well existed among religious community and that is the sentiment of “Shahadat” (martyrdom)

#### *8.1.4 Removal of the Sentiment of Shahadat*

The research on radicalization highlights that at group level some mechanisms work and an important among them is the sentiment of martyrdom. When it gets activated, groups involve in the process of radicalization. In the collection of this data, it has been notified that in Pakistani religious feminine segments the sentiment of martyrdom is deeply present and they wish to transfer it to their male family members and their children likewise. It has been seen that the religious-oriented women are worried as they think that from Muslims this sentiment is demolishing because of augmentation in modern/liberal mindset. A female expounded in her interview, “the enthusiasm of Shahadat forces Muslims to fight against those who are the enemies of Islam and Islamic values, if this zest have been abolished, Muslims can be controlled without using any military or weapon (Sakina, July 30, 2021).” A respondent shows her concerns by saying that from Muslims the keenness of martyrdom is diminished via spreading liberal culture and modern segments of Muslim world are behaving as the agent of devilish mentality. However, not majority but many religious-minded Pakistani women have the view that banned international/national Islamist organizations are on the right path and Muslim community should support morally them.

### *8.1.5 Ban on Islamist Organizations as a Conspiracy against Islam*

The scholars who write on radicalization denote to the sympathy as pulling or pushing mechanism that moves people to the radicalization track. According to them, it is a slippery slope from where an individual slip to adopt radicalized thoughts and beliefs. In Pakistan this mechanism is activated and women linked to religious identity show their sympathy not for the killings of Muslims in different corners of the world but they have their empathy and compassion with those organizations that involve in international terrorist activities as Al-Qaida, Tehriq-e-Taliban, and ISIS/Dai'sh and data for this meticulous dissertation authenticates it. A participant at peshawar was questioned, "what do you think about banned international Islamist organizations?" She boldly replied, "They are right and absolutely right. But their bravery and true enthusiasm is not digested by those who cannot see Islam to be flourished, they banned internationally to these organizations to damage Islam and Muslim identity. I ask, why India America and Israel are not banned in spite of they are killing innocent Muslims, in fact, they are genociding but even though, they are civilized just because today international system is controlled by them (Nahid, November 10, 2021)."

Generally, it has been observed by researcher that if interviewees had sympathy with banned Islamist groups, they got afraid of taking their names whereas some females exposed their thinking and expressed their views without any fear and with exposure. A woman at Multan confidently spoke about Taliban, "Taliban were really weak and did not have modern weapons but in spite of that they stood against super power. Their belief in ALLAH ALMIGHTY was strong and they made the strategy and started to fight against unipolar state (United States) (Shahida, August 10, 2021)." She in addition described that as Taliban have the zest of Jihad, all Muslims will have to espouse it to acquire power globally. Another very significant concept is circulated among religious feminine segments that we (Muslims) are attacked by the enemies of Islam (liberal west), to defend us and our religious identity, Jihad (fight) is justified.

### *8.1.6 Jihad for Defense Rather Offence*

Academic work related to radicalization makes our understanding clear that people justify and legitimize violence when they look at it with defensive eye. During the field



research it has been identified that Pakistani religious-oriented females and the males who are belonging to female Madrasas have the thought that Jihad if is done for defense, it is legal and moral and they claim that Muslims never did use of force for offensive acts, always the Muslims carried weapon for defense. Either this defends can be of religion (Islam), religious places (Aqsa mosque), religious identity (Hijab and Parda), Muslim community (Kashmir, Palestine, and Syria), or assets of Muslims (oil.). An informant was asked who was the head of a female Madrasa about the concept of Jihad among girls who get education in religious institutions, she described, “Madrasas give the lesson of peace, we never teach to be violent, our Holy Prophet fought all wars in defense rather in offence, Madrasas teach to defend not to offend (Misbah, August 03, 2021).”

A respondent at Jhang presented a logic in his interview, “if someone destroys my home and gives damage to my family and if I try to save my home and my family and I defend myself and my family, whether I will be terrorist? No.” He further explained with the example, “during the era of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) a person named as Asfad Ansi declared himself as prophet, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) sent his companion (Sahabi) to kill that “*Jhuta*” (liar), is it terrorism no. if someone speaks or does something against Islam, Quran, Prophet Muhammad PBUH, His companions (Sahaba), he will not be tolerated and we do not consider wrong to take action against that devilish person (Murtaza, July 29, 2021).”

On the same concept: another interviewee explained with the example, “If we kill one soldier of India in Kashmir, definitely, Indian forces will kill 10 Kashmiris. So first we should prepare then must secure the whole Muslim nation anywhere in the world. Although, Quran says that you should be defended rather to be offensive. If hostile powers come to remove Islam or Islamic values. There must be protective wall and by hook or crook “*Deen*” (religion) and Muslims should be saved (Danish, June 14, 2021).” Above discussed all answers of participants indicate that use of violence is legitimated if is utilized for defense and according to the religious feminine elements, Muslims are defending their religious identity, values, and culture from the offensive powers who wish to abolish Islam. It has been as well seen during data collection that selective social networking and interaction makes

religious-minded women aggressive and they cannot tolerate anything that looks against religious values and culture.

#### *8.1.7 Lack of Tolerance and Aggressive Mentality for Non-Islamic Acts*

The tree of radicalization brings up when values of an individual or of a group are degraded and that individual or group begins to take strict actions to gain respect, glory, and honor for its value system. Furthermore, supplementary factors as selective interaction, closed social environment, and rigid religious mentality play their own role. While conducting interviews in different cities of Pakistan, the inquirer observed and noted that religiously motivated women have 0 tolerance for those who do not act upon the religion and devalue religion by forgetting it. They do not consider it wrong if someone or some group becomes aggressive to apply religious values as according to them, the aggressive person or group wants to save their fellow beings from the fire of hell. At Faisalabad, a female who used to teach in a Madrasa told, “Somehow it is right that females affiliated with Madrasas are not tolerant and do aggression because when 6 7 8 years we are taught about religion and we live in a constant religious atmosphere and we read about the fear of hell and horrific fire, so we become strict to follow religion. When we look at something non-religious acts, we show aggression just for the will of ALLAH ALMIGHTY and behind this, promise, by GOD, our determination is purely pious because we want to take the people on the right path and wish to save the deviated population (liberal/modern) from the path of devil (Zakia, August 19, 2021).”

Multiple females belonging to religion have the view that only aggression can put or pull the people towards religion because this is not the time to convince anyone with affection and love. An interviewee shared her own experience with social investigator, “after my marriage, I used to put dupatta round my neck. My husband several times tried to make me understand that I am on the wrong way but I never concentrated. One day, he was smoking, he burnt my neck with a little flame by saying that if you are unable to bear it, how you will bear the high flames of hell when you will be punished for your shameless acts? I from that time never removed my scarf from my head (Kousar, January 05, 2022).” Another respondent described, “My daughter after watching dramas and films, began to follow modern/liberal culture. Initially, she hid from me her fashions but gradually she started to

expose herself in front of me. For some time, I tolerated and told her that she is breaking our value system, which we are following from centuries and which our Creator has implemented upon us but she did not get even my single word. When used little offensive mood like two to three times, I in front of her slapped her mother by saying that she did not train her daughters according to Islam, literally my daughter did not break our religious values after that incident and came on the right way (Qadri, August 07, 2021).” As a consequence, religious community including females understands aggression and 0 tolerance right and moral for applying their value system which is disrespected and humiliated by modern/liberal segments and their ideals (west). All the ideologies circulating among religious feminine spheres exploring above are sufficient to understand and analyze that religiously identified females are moving towards the process of radicalization. The researcher found likewise while inquiring for this particular social study that extremist mentality is promoted by highlighting the role of women in Jihad and their role for survival of religion and its values.

## **8.2. Penetrating Extremist Thoughts: Understanding the Women’s Role in Jihad**

When we look over the roles of women in radicalized activities throughout the history, it becomes clear that on ground they perform very rare. Their role has been seen exclusively in radicalization like fund raiser, trainer, teacher, or spy. By conducting the multiple interviews and by meeting with a lot of religious-oriented women, the researcher noted that explicitly women are given the task to socialize their children and to bring them up as the “Mujahid” (fighter) of Islam. Although, just this is not their duty in Jihad, they can be writer, fund-raiser, sympathizers, and doctors at battlefield, spies, or ground-operators in certain conditions.

### *8.2.1 The Role of a Female as a Brave and Islamic Mother*

The first obligation of a women is considered as a brave and Islamic mother who can socialize and train her children according to the religion and its values. She has to prepare specifically sons to be ready to die for their religion and they must not tolerate anything against their religious value system. An informant was asked at Lahore about the role of women in Jihad, she spoke, “a woman is not a Prophet but she is the mother of Prophet so

females should play their role as the brave and true Muslim mothers.” Another respondent explained at Sialkot, “if women want to do Jihad, they have to deliver the sons as Aurangzaib Alamgir (religious king in Mughal dynasty) who can rule the world according to the teachings of Islam and who can alter international system from devilish to Islamic in which Muslims and their identity, values, and culture will be secured (Nasira, August 05, 2021).” An educational director of a Madrasa expounded in detail regarding the role of a woman as Jihadi mother, “the women should train their children according to Islam, they should give awareness to their families and their children about right and truth, they should bring their children up as Quran and Hadith demands, they should prepare their children as the Mujahid of Islam (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” Some participants as well highlighted that women can play their role in Jihad by sitting at home and for participating to fight in the way of ALLAH, they do not need to go out.

#### *8.2.2 Woman's Jihad as Spending Life According to Religion and Praying for Mujahideen*

In Pakistan various religiously affiliated females and males belonging to women Madrasas think that the best of Jihad of a woman is that she should sit at home, she should spend her life according to the rules of Islam, she should not break religious values and limitations which Islam has imposed upon her, she should sympathize with those who are fighting for the will of ALLAH, and she should pray for their victory. A male in charge of a female religious institution at Jhang was inquired, “Whether females are given education in Madrasas to defend Islam?” He told, “No such education is not for females. Even though, in the era of Prophet Muhammad PBUH some females took part in these kind of activities but now we prohibit.” He was further questioned, “Why females are prevented to take part? Why they are kept away from this important act?” He described, “No we have not deprived them, they can pray at home, they can fast and offer “*Nawafil*” (prayers) for the success of Muslims and Islam but they should not go to ground to fight for the defense of Islam (Murtaza, July 29, 2021).” A women explained in her interview, “Women are not liked and permitted for fighting at ground because we have a clear example that when a female asked Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to take her for Jihad, he not only denied but offended. By this instance, it is visible that the best Jihad of a female is to spend her life as Islam told her (Batool, October 22, 2021).” The females who remain limited to their religion and follow religious

values as *Hijab, Pardah*, prayer, fast, and perform their responsibilities which their religion has given them are called *Mujahidat* by religious segments.

### 8.2.3 *The Role of Mujahidat (Women Warriors)*

Literature on women in Islam suggest that the females who propagate, raise fund, train, or teach about Jihad are called *Mujahidat* whereas, collected data for this specific dissertation clarifies that religious community considers those females as *Mujahidat* who spend their lives upon the rules set for them by ALLAH ALMIGHTY and construct their religious identity. A scholar who was running a female Madrasa at Lahore was asked about the role of women in Jihad, “what do you say about the concept of *Mujahidat*?” He replied, “the actual *Mujahidat* are those females who spend their lives according to Quran and Sunnah, to fight in the battlefield is not woman’s *Jihad* but to live in her limitations which are imposed by her ALLAH is her *Jihad* and by living under Islamic limitations, she can serve not only her nation but humanity (Rabani, August 03, 2021).”

Another female religious scholar was investigated by researcher, “I was reading a book in which the concept was given of *Mujahidat*, what do you say about it?” She with sadness said, “Many books have been written unfortunately which were not needed and were totally wrong.” She continued to articulate, “A female can do Jihad with pen for example, when all men are afraid of speaking truth, the female can write.” She further highlighted, “*mujahidat* was not any female wing in Islamic military in era of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), although, he kept 6 to 7 women with him during Jihad. These women were those who had their “*Mehram*” (blood relations) with them, these women were not quite young and were appointed to cook and to heel the injured (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” Although, some respondents also justified the role of women in ground operations in certain conditions.

### 8.2.4 *No Responsibility of Jihad on Women but in Certain Conditions*

In during fieldwork, it has been revealed that many religious-minded females have the view in Pakistan that however, at ground women have no role to play in Jihad but in particular circumstances they have to be involved in fighting activities and they present the logic from the life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) for ground participation of women. The

researcher at Islamabad inquired in a discussion with a religiously identified female about the practical role of women in Jihad, she told, “a woman does not have any responsibility to defend her country or nation militarily, Islam does not want woman to fight in battlefield, but yes when no man is there to compete with the enemy, in that condition a female can carry up the weapon.” She gave the example of Prophet’s wife *Safiah* (R.A), “when all the Muslim men went out from Madina for Jihad and all Muslim women were living in a castle, a Jew saw that the women are alone and only a blind man is appointed on security, he tried to jump in, *Safiah* saw and killed him, when Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) came back, he admired this action of his wife.” She said, “it was not the duty of *Safiah* but when she performed, she was liked (Muqaddas, January 03, 2022).”

On the concept of role of women in Jihad, another participant described, “Yes! If *Jihad* is obligated, then women should come forward as well.” He presented an example, “in the era of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) multiple females perform the duty in battles. So women should also be prepared for *Jihad* (Danish, June 14, 2021).” At Karachi, an interviewee highlighted another example from Prophet’s life, “in a war, when all fighters were away from Prophet Muhammad PBUH, a female came and stood before Him so that He could be saved from attack so in these circumstances women can come forward (Nazima, May 15, 2021).” Media reports and some scholarly research on female radicalization likewise indicated that by gaining impression from Sahabiya (female companions of Prophet Muhammad PBUH), a few women who were affiliated with religion a lot moved to fight with banned Islamist organizations as ISIS/Da’ish from Pakistan but in fact, the data collection for this study denotes that most of the religious feminine spheres understand their act as illegitimate and non-Islamic.

#### *8.2.5 Direct Involvement of Pakistani Religious-Minded Females in Extremist Organizations*

However, it has been observed that religious-oriented women have sympathy for extremist organizations and they think that the Islamist groups are right and their objective is purely exact as that are fighting in the way of ALLAH ALMIGHTY but they do not support direct involvement of women in these organizations to fight. To gather data for this scrupulous social investigation, researcher was told by various members of Al-Huda International System that from their group any woman did not join personally banned

Islamist organizations but a wing separated from Al-Huda International System allowed its females to go and to participate practically at ground. According to them, these females did not get success and returned. A respondent was asked by the researcher, “have you ever experienced that female students from Madrasas got involved in radicalized, extremist, or terrorist activities?” He denied, “no girls not, other than that group which got separated from Al-Huda International, any girl in my view did not go for such activities, but a few females were motivated to do so from that organization which has been established by the sister of doctor Farhat Hashmi (the founder of Al-Huda International System).” He in addition highlighted, “some women from that organization went into Dai’sh to fight but when all men were killed, they came under control and were prisoned (Rabani, August 03, 2021).”

Another informant belonging to Al-Huda International System described in her discussion at Multan, “I through media came to know that a girl known as Tashfeen Malik after acquiring religious education here in Multan from Al-Huda International System went to U.S. after her marriage, she with her husband named as Rizwan got engaged in violent activities and killed some Americans at a shopping mall in United States. But I did not see any training or persuasion to females in this institute (Rukhsana, August 11, 2021).” A girl from Sawat shared during her interview, “in Sawat religiously motivated women gave their financial help, offered prayer, showed sympathy, and sent their sons and husbands in Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) but they themselves did not involve in violent activities (Kiran, December 09, 2021).” . At Rawalpindi, a participant told, “we just heard about direct engagement of females in violent acts in case of Jamia-e-Hafsa where women were trained to fight physically and began to act as a female military force but I really condemn that action because physical Jihad is not obligated upon women and when men of Islamic society are alive so why females carry weapons (Gull, January 19, 2022).”

The above exploring data has alluded that direct involvement of women in ground operations are not seen appreciative among Pakistani religious feminine spheres but they consider indirect engagement as legitimate and justified. However, they consider legitimized direct participation in Jihad of women in certain circumstances. Collected Data to accomplish this thesis throws light not only on circulating ideologies and the role of women in Jihad to penetrate extremist views and ideas but also explains that threat perceptions which

have been developed among religiously affiliated females are performing as driving dynamism towards radicalized mentality.

### **8.3 Threat Perceptions: Liberal Segments (Westernized System) As the Opponents of Islam**

Literature on social identity and radicalization asserts that when some group is segregated and marginalized, it feels threats from out-group and perceives that its identity/culture/values are at danger. In Pakistan the women who have constructed their identity on the bases of religion, built threat perceptions against liberal/modern (western) segments for the survival of their religion and religious identity. The threat perceptions as promotion of vulgarity through internet, cultural attack on Muslims, economic incentives to Muslims for spreading western values, efforts for modification of Islam, and manipulation of Jihad with terrorism by modern/liberal (west) groups are circulating among religious-minded females.

#### *8.3.1 Efforts for the Modification of Islam*

A threat among religiously identified women has been revealed while conducting interviews for this social inquiry that they think that throughout the world no religion is in its real condition except Islam. In their point, those who are the enemies of Islam, want to modify it as they did with their own religions. A respondent at Karachi expressed during his discussion with researcher, “the opponents (west) dislike Islam and they always try to pervert the actual Islam and want to modify it according to their thoughts so that the people cannot be acquainted with the real Islam. At the other hand, Muslim scholars always presented the logic to keep the doubts away created by west and non-believers (Adil, May 17, 2021).” Another informant highlighted about the efforts to undermine the true religion to alter it according to the human wish rather of ALLAH ALMIGHTY, “you look religious Hindu ladies, they cover their head while usually, and Hindu women do not follow their religious customs. When you look at religious Christian women (nans), they also wear scarf but generally they have left this religious norm. When you look Jews women, in their worshipping places, they cover their head whereas, their common ladies have avoided their value to be covered. This is the



reason that Muslim females are emphasized to remove their Hijab because the hostile powers cannot tolerate Islam in its real form (Zartashia, July 27, 2021)?”

A respondent further explicated, “Among liberals (west) there is tiredness from religion, they hate from religion, they have removed religious element from their lives, now, they do not digest Islam to be established and flourished, by making Islam notorious they gratify themselves. They through modification in true religion wish to provide relaxation to their utmost desire (Najma, August 06, 2021).” Other than the threat of modification of Islam, a common perception has been overlooked in religious feminine spheres, they understand that Jihad is manipulated with terrorism to damage the sentiment of bravery among Muslims and to ruin religious values.

### *8.3.2 Manipulation of Jihad with Terrorism*

Jihad is thought the basic element of Islam. Several verses in Quran and multiple chapters of Hadith explain the importance of Jihad. Muslims from the arrival of Islam, look at Jihad as pious and pure act because according to Islam, firstly, Jihad is obligated when Muslims are devastated. Secondly, when Islam is under threat. Religious community claims that in Quran or in Hadith no word is found that Jihad can be done for offensive acts. The religiously motivated women in Pakistan make the case that most of the terrorism has been seen in Europe but Muslims are declared terrorist just for the reason that Islam can be abolished and Jihad must be proved as terrorism. An interviewee belonging to a religious political party was asked about Jihad and terrorism, she replied, “wars of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) are presented as the example of terrorism and is blamed that Islam has been spread with sword but it is incorrect because if you study those wars just some thousand people had lost their lives at the other hand when you look on World War I and World War II, millions of people were killed. These wars were not fought by Muslims. So how it can be argued that Islam is a radicalized and extremist religion and followers of this religion are also extremist and radicalized. In fact, the actual terrorists (enemies of Islam) are making noise and manipulating Jihad with terrorism to destroy our religion (Ishmat, August 02, 2021).” Another female in her interview bluntly said, “Jihad is called terrorism by opponents of Islam (west), you look at Prophet’s life, he continuously did Jihad, do you think he was a terrorist? No never. Muslims are kept away from Islam by different technics and blame of terrorism is

one of them. Why west is doing so? To make Islam weak and disliked by Muslims. One day, the followers of Islam will hate with the religious values and will throw it as all other religions have been thrown at back (Shakir, July 26, 2021).” In four other interviews at Karachi, Quetta, Mardan, and Faisalabad the same data came in front that the religious feminine segments perceive the manipulation of Jihad and terrorism as a challenge to Muslim identity. It has as well been excavated that most of the religious-oriented women have the view that cultural attack and penetration of modern/liberal norms by the rivals of Islam is the biggest threat to religious identity of the Muslims.

### *8.3.3 Cultural Attack and Promotion of Liberal (Western) Values*

The Muslims live anywhere in the world but they follow their religion side by side their local cultures and they develop a common identity on the bases of their religion. Literature on Islam and west highlights that among Muslims a threat is existed that their religious values are contaminated and via cultural attack it is endeavored to control Muslims and to undermine their common religious identity. A participant in her interview declared that to fight against modern/liberal culture is the best Jihad in today’s world. She was inquired, “What do you think that in current era what is Jihad?” She described, “Jihad today is that we can save us from liberal (western) civilization and their values.” She in addition quoted a Hadith, “Prophet Muhammad PBUH has said that the best Jihad is to fight against your own desires. Today our utmost desire is to become like west, we want to gather wealth like them, we wish to dress up like them, we want to follow them in all aspects of life so if we abstain us to become as they are, if we control our desires, we are doing the best Jihad (Safina, July 31, 2021).”

Another respondent was asked at Lahore, “How can we save our females from western civilization and its impact? Kindly give your opinion.” She spoke, “Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) has told the way to be saved from such cultures and civilizations that to make relation with Quran and Sunnah. As females will listen, read, and understand Quran and Hadith, they will not be dominated by liberals (west) (Misbah, August 03, 2021).” At Peshawar, a female was questioned, “What do you think that today Islam is threatened from west politically or culturally?” She denoted towards cultural aspects, “I think cultural threat Islam has from west, they want to abolish our Islamic value system. They have no fear from

those Muslims who offer prayer (Namaz) or to fast (*Roza*) but they are afraid of those Muslims who want to make this world as Islamic society where from economy to politics and from culture to social aspects all will be run via Islamic point of view this is why they are trying to remove our Islamic culture. They say that we have no objection from prayer or fast but we cannot see your religion to be dominated in every field of life.” She further said, “Today war is not of weapon but of values and civilization, they have attacked our culture by “*Maghribi Yalghar*” (western imperialism) to remove our religion (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).”

Discussing data above made the understanding clear that from modern and liberal values, the religious-oriented females feel a huge threat to their constructed religious identity. They possess the view that through internet and media vulgarity is promoted in Pakistani society to keep Muslim women away from their religious limitations and bindings. A male head of a female Madrasa at Jhang was interviewed, “does west feels threat from Islam?” He replied, “No now they do not feel Islam as a threat because they know that they have weakened Islam by removing it from the hearts of Muslims.” He further asserted, “To make Islam weak among Muslims they made a strategy and that strategy is promotion of vulgarity in Muslim countries, this vulgarity is promoted through media, internet, and mobile. What our girls see at television or on social media, they try to copy so these modes of entertainment are playing the role as agents of west in our society (Murtaza, July 29, 2021).” A current threat perception has been emerged among Pakistani religious feminine segments that by demonstration of modern/liberal values in *Aurat march* every year at eight March, the religious identity of Muslim women is damaged.

#### *8.3.4 Aurat March as a Threat: Western Propaganda as my Body My Will*

From 2018 in Pakistan *Aurat March* at women day yearly is celebrated to highlight the problems which women face in their domestic, social, cultural, economic, and political life. Collected data to accomplish this dissertation denotes that religiously affiliated females perceive it as against Islam and an attack on their religious identity like Hijab and Pardah because in this march some girls have protested via pamphlets that why they are bound to wear Pakistani/Islamic dress, it is their body, whatever, they like, they will put on. The religious community including women considered these demonstrations as an open attack on

specific religious identity. At Islamabad, a woman linking to a religious group discussed in her interview about *Aurat March* in Pakistan, “look at the slogan, *mera jism meri marzi* (my body my will), what is this? This is in fact western/devilish propaganda. The young liberal Muslim women should identify the friends and enemies of Islam.” She gave the example of a girl who was the key part of *Aurat March* named as *Noor Muqadam*, “look at her, she was speaking in favor of liberal values and said my body my will. What happened? She has been killed by her boyfriend in an alone house (Mussarat, August 08, 2021).”

At Karachi, an informant with emphasis spoke with researcher, “to tackle the liberal activities as *Aurat march*, we should strictly follow our religion. Liberals are keeping away but we should keep closed to Islam.” She additionally pointed out, “*Abaya, Burka, Dupatta, Hijab*, and *Nakab* is stigmatized, to demolish this stigma, all Muslim women should wear this Hijab.” She further said that modern women unwantedly and unknowingly are utilized to fulfil western agenda, they should know the reality and should not behave as west is demanding from them.” She continued, “You know that beasts are sitting everywhere. They need “*chalti phirty khubsurty*” (mobilized beauty), if women sit at home from where they give relaxation to their eyes? So our women have to think over it.” She also gave the message to the liberal females, “we try to be liked by west but we do not try to be liked by ALLAH ALMIGHTY, the modern/liberal women should also think about eternal life, which will never end, this life is temporary so please do not be partner of the devil (Nazima, May 15, 2021).” Among religiously motivated women a key perception has been routed that modern/liberal Muslims are given economic incentives by those who have desire to pervert Islam completely. They provide financial benefits to the liberal segments to follow their agenda and to spread their values to eradicate Islamic way of life.

### 8.3.5 *Economic Incentives to Liberals for Following Agenda against Islam*

The religious and liberal women segments remain away in Pakistani society as the religious-minded females perceive the liberals the agent of west. In their opinion west to expand its value system among Muslim community provides financial benefits to the modern/liberal spheres. An interviewee who was running a female religious institution at Multan explained, “Firstly, we are impressed by western civilization. Secondly, Muslims are weak economically and enemies of Islam have more financial resources than Muslims so we

are dominated by them, they show us the light of dollars, we leave Islamic values, and begin to run behind them and their values (Maulana, August 07, 2021).” A woman affiliated with a religious political party described, “Most of the Muslims are away from Islam why? Because they are getting incentives from America and west to keep away from Islam (Zartashia, July 27, 2021).”

At Lahore a participant who was the educational director in a Madrasa and at the same time was performing her duty as head of the department of Islamic studies in a university denoted, “to damage the name of Islam, these hostile powers (west) find some Muslims from us who are not *Abdullah* (worshipper of ALLAH) but Abd-diram, Abd-dinar (worshipper of wealth), they become greedy that they will get bungalow/palace, car, bank balance, or high post so they start to follow modern/liberal agenda and some Muslims are really not aware that they are being used against Islam and Muslims, they work unconsciously (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” By analyzing data highlighted above, it has been clarified that the religious elements consider the modern/liberal groups a separate entity because they think that the liberals are more undermining the religious identity of Muslims than those who are the actual rivals (west and America) just to acquire economic incentives. Another perception has been dug out during the fieldwork that the religiously identified women understand that west (the champion of liberals) hates from Muslims and their religious identity.

### *8.3.6 Augmentation of Hate by West Not by Muslims*

Generally, it is perceived that the religious community among Muslims dislikes liberal culture and hates western civilization but gathering data for this social inquiry makes the case that the religious feminine spheres have the view that west and the liberals hate them and their identity, they overlook this hatred as a threat for Islam and Islamic culture. A respondent at Multan was questioned, “It is thought that Muslims hate west and U.S and this hatred is promoted by religious institutions and religious groups, is it so?” He refused completely, “no we Muslims do not hate, west hates us, this is the reason that stigmatized behavior is encouraged against Islam and Muslims.” He highlighted, “if we hate why we use their technology? If we hate, then why we go to study in England.” He additionally described, “They disliked us and our religion that’s why they are marginalizing us (religious elements)

from international stage (Abid, August 07, 2021).” Another informant spoke in her discussion with researcher, “west and western-minded people abhor us as we are second class citizens. They dislike our outlook (Hijab), they consider us as we are backward and there is the need to change our dress appearance, they take initiatives to declare Hijab as illegal and immoral, and even at everyday bases, they want to legislate against our religious identity. What is this? This is just hatred against Muslims and Islam (Faiza, April 26-2021).” The perception of hate by liberals is further pushing the segregated population towards identity negotiation and ultimately to radicalization. Exploring all existing ideologies, defining roles of Muslim women in Jihad, and developing threat perceptions are giving indicator that extremist thinking and nonviolent radicalization is amplifying in religiously motivated women in Pakistani society. Although, the religious elements possess their own perspective and argue that neither they have adopted radicalized mentality, nor they promoted any violent activity among religious-oriented women. To excavate and to understand direct promotion of violent radicalization in religiously affiliated females and their institutions/groups is significant to accomplish this social scrutiny.

#### **8.4 Direct Promotion of Radicalization among Religious-Oriented Females and their Institutions/Groups**

An enormous literature developed on radicalization and terrorism claims that Pakistani religious individuals/institutions/groups are engaged in violent activities in the name of Islam. Not only men but their counterpart, females are likewise charged with the acts of violence. By making some cases like Jamia-Hafsa incident, Norin Laghari, and Tashfin Maliq as example, the argument is proved that religiously identified women are involved to promote and to conduct violent actions related to radicalization in Pakistani society at some scale. Data for exploring this dissertation refuses the claims regarding direct promotion of violence in religious feminine segments and exposes that except few individual cases, religiously affiliated women are not indulged in violent extremist acts. The researcher asserts that the religious elements do not give total denial for promotion of violence, they argue that some religious individual cases have been reported but on the bases of those cases all religious women and their institutions cannot be blamed. Multiple research participants indicated towards some factors and elements due to which violent behaviors under the

process of radicalization makes its way among religiously motivated women and their institutions/groups as gap between religious and worldly life and personal motives of religious individuals/institutions but majority of the interviewees described that radicalization, extremism, and terrorism all are social stigma to abolish religious identity of Muslims and no truth is behind all accuses.

#### *8.4.1 Violence: Gap between Worldly Life and Madrasas*

Data highlights that at some religious institutions' violence has been promoted among women like Jamia-Hafsa located in the capital of Pakistan. But these kinds of institutes are very rare in number in the country. The religious elements explain that if some where females are forced to be engaged in violent acts against government or any other group, the reason is behind the distance between them and worldly life not religion. A respondent who was running a female Madrasa pointed out towards this gap or distance in his interview, "in Punjab Madrasas are playing a constructive role, however, a few Madrasas which are far away from worldly life, some militancy can be promoted but they are rare in number. Our media, scholars, researchers and government should not stand all religious institutions and religious minded women in their category (Abid, August 07, 2021)."

Another participant expounded, "When no opportunity to gain economic status, no involvement in sports, no concentration of the government, only solitude is seen in religious institutions, what will happen? What you expect? The progressive mentality will be produced? No never. Lack of tolerance and violent behaviors are promoted particularly in those female religious institutions which are remained away from worldly education and modern ways of teaching (Farukh, May 12, 2021)." Except the gap between religious-minded females and worldly life, some informants also indicated that personal motives as political or economic gains are activated in religious women and their institutions for which they promote or get engaged in violence.

#### *8.4.2 Enhancing Extremist Thinking: Political and Economic Objectives*

Literature on radicalization discusses that individuals/groups adopt or promote violent behaviors to obtain their political/economic goals. Data for this thesis authenticates it and

reveals that females if have been engaged in violent activities, the aim was purely political and financial. A participant at Karachi described, “Some women for their own political or economic objectives adopt or promote violence and militancy, in fact, Islam does not force to be violent, militant, terrorist, or radicalized.” He presented the example from the life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), “the last Prophet of ALLAH ALMIGHTY says, ‘among you the best is he who spreads peace and virtue’, He did not say that the best person is that who augment deviance and violence. So those Madrasas either female or male if are involved in violent activities, the majority among us does not agree with their thoughts (Adil, May 17, 2021).” At Rawalpindi an interviewee explained, “Although, among Jamia-Hafsa case, it was propagated that female students of that institute determined to make Pakistan as an Islamic state but in fact, their motive was not religious, they were not threatened by state, and they were not oppressed to leave their values. They want to gain political control and began to work as police force, Islam does not permit this behavior (Gul, January 19, 2022).” Another respondent spoke in her discussion with inquirer, “some females who moved to Syria to be the part of ISIS/Dai’sh, they were adventurous, and financially weak, they through internet adopted violent ideologies, the members of that organization attracted them by showing some economic incentives, so they got engaged. It is completely incorrect to say that those women were motivated because of religion (Nahid, November 10, 2021).” Multiple research participants made the claim during the fieldwork that a few women at individual level may be engaged in violent behaviors but at institutional level neither women are trained nor are induced to be radicalized.

#### *8.4.3 Individual Cases No Involvement of Institutes*

A bunch of scholarly work, books, research articles, media reports, and international and local governmental agencies made the case that in Pakistan Madrasas are not only promoting violent behaviors among their students but also giving them training to attack on liberals, Europeans, and Americans. With the objective to collect data for this meticulous study, the researcher visited all the four provinces of Pakistan, conducted interviews from all religious feminine segments, personally observed, and detected with the manipulation of words but could not find any proper training center or academy in which students are prepared to attack or to ruin modern/liberal groups, Europeans, or Americans. However,



nonviolent radicalization is augmenting consciously or unconsciously through prevailing ideologies, defining role of Muslim women, and developing threat perceptions while violent extremism (physical preparation) has not been noted. Various interviewees highlighted that individual involvement or some cases at Madrasa level in north and South Waziristan have been reported but behind those institutes' other factors like revenge from America for drone attacks and political control of those areas were triggering them to be violent, religion was not playing the role.

An informant at Bahawalpur told, "We also read in newspaper and listen in media about some terrorist elements in south and North Waziristan and tribal areas where Pak army has done different operations to remove those factors from there, but those kinds of madrasas are really less in number and most of Madrasas are against of such activities." He continued, "Here in Punjab I did not hear promotion of terrorism in religious institutions, as my Madrasa just forces students to offer 5 times prayers and obedience of parents, other than this we concentrate on studies and curriculum (Baloch, September 21, 2021)." Another respondent replied, "As you read in newspaper or hear in media, I listen as well. The "Deobandi" (religious sect among Muslims) scholars say several times that if some individuals do mistake, you cannot blame the whole institution." He pursued his argument, "human is made of error, as some females move towards violence unconsciously or consciously after getting education from Madrasa, similarly, from modern educational institutes individuals remain involved in violent activities but it cannot be said that modern education is motivating students to engage in violence." He carried on, "our leader's multiple times gave the challenge to the government that show us just one Madrasa throughout the country where all administration, teachers and staff is giving patronage to violence (terrorism) but the government could not point out even the single one (Sadiq, August 07, 2021)." The inquirer at field observed that most of the religious feminine elements consider that radicalization, extremism, and terrorism all are the stigmatized words and describe that this is just blame on Muslims and Islam to stereotype our religious identity.

#### *8.4.4 Blame of Extremism and Terrorism: The Process of Stigmatization*

Although, some cases at individual and institutional level have been noted related to violent behaviors among religious-oriented women but majority of religious community gives

total denial and rejects these cases by making the argument that these are all blames by those who are the enemies of Islam, who do not tolerate religious mentality of Muslims, who do not like Muslim female to put Hijab, and a Muslim male to keep “*Dahri*” (beard). A participant was asked at Naushehra, “Islam is considered an extremist religion, why?” She replied, “Have you ever heard about the ending point to collect wealth? The wealthy person should earn 10 billion dollars now he should be stopped. Have you ever heard that beauty has some ending point? The woman who is very beautiful, she should not use cosmetics and should not go to parlor. No never, then why Islam is seen that there must be ending point that the Muslims should act upon Islam to a limited extent.” She with emphasis talked, “Islam has no level,” by pointing out the researcher’s outlook she alluded, “if you are taking dupatta while I am wearing *Abaya*, how can you say that the women who wear *abaya* are extremist and who put simple dupatta are not? Extremism is a an accuse to stigmatize Muslims (Gulnaz, December 11, 2021).”

A woman linking to a religious political party spoke, “our enemies (west and the liberal agents of west) try to find defects and flaws in our religion and religious people either women or men as well as in religious institutions, in fact, by doing so they remain engaged in conspiracies against us (Misbah, August 03, 2021).” A famous religious scholar was questioned, “It is blamed on Madrasas that they are promoting terrorism or extremism. What is your opinion? Have some students gone towards this side from Madrasas?” He gave complete denial by saying, “I do not know anyone, and I think it is just blame and has no truth in it (Mehmood, April 30, 2021).” An informant at Pakpattan categorically refused and replied, “This is totally wrong. We just focus on Quran and Sunnah and do not go beyond.” He said, “Islam is the religion of peace and does not promote violence even does not tolerate violence. There are multiple examples from the era of Prophet Muhammad PBUH and four caliphs that they even designed some rules to fight in the wars so how it can be blamed that Islam is the religion of terrorism and how it can engage women in violent acts. It is really illogical blame (Bano, September 14, 2021)?” except refusal of promoting of violent behaviors and activities among religious feminine elements, many females and males who perform their duty as in charge at female religious institutions as well explained their opposition for extremist organization and have the claim that Jihad is obligated on the ruler of the time not on national or international organizations.

#### *8.4.5 Opposition of Extremist Organizations*

At the one hand some religious-minded women revealed their sympathy for banned Islamist organizations and declared them as “Mujahideen” (fighters in the way of ALLAH ALMIGHTY while at the other some females and religious scholars took opposite stance and argued that these groups are deviant and they have no right to do Jihad without the permission of the ruler of the time. A participant at Lahore was asked, “What is Jihad in your opinion in today’s world?” He said, “Jihad is the necessary element of Islam, but its duty is upon the ruler of the time. When the Muslim ruler sees that at some place non-Islamic concepts are prevailing, enemy of Islam is dominated, and Islam is sidelined, then it is the responsibility of that ruler to stand the military and to prepare the nation to fight against the enemy of Islam and Muslims.” He further highlighted, “no individual can stand to do Jihad without the permission of the ruler, if someone does, he is wrong and brings about the problem for Islam and becomes the cause of sectarianism, deviance, and violence (Rabani, August 03, 2021).”

By giving his opinion against banned Islamist Organizations an interviewee at Multan described, “Although, these organizations began to develop in the name of Islam but later these groups have been involved in sectarianism, they started to implement some illegal/illegitimate ideologies, and ultimately, they got engaged in killing of innocent Muslims like suicide attacks in Pakistan (Qadri, August 07, 2021).” In two discussions at Karachi and Islamabad, the informants shared the same views with the researcher regarding these organizations. However, in field both the schools of thoughts have been observed, in favor of banned Islamist groups and in opposition of them as well in the country. To understand the promotion of violent extremism in Pakistan and involvement of female religious institutions the inquirer studied a lot about Al-Huda International System and Jamia-Hafsa during reviewing the literature as a high-profile incident of violence escalation in Islamabad and some individual female cases have been reported in international and national media that the students at these institutes by adopting violent ideologies indulged in extremist acts. The researcher herself decided to examine the environment and studies of these institutions by going on grounds.

#### 8.4.6 High Profile Female Religious Institutions: Jamia Hafsa and Al-Huda International System

The female Madrasa Jamia-Hafsa located in Islamabad and three branches at Lahore, Islamabad, and Multan of Al-Huda International System were visited with the objective to conduct the interviews of the students and staff of these institutes and to observe the social environment of there. At Lahore the head of the branch of Al-Huda International told in her discussion with the researcher, “the girls who engaged in violence were not from that system which has been established by Doctor Farhat Hashmi. Her sister made an organization alike Al-Huda international but that is separate from the actual one. The girls from that organization go out and perform their duties at ground. Before some time I came to know that a few females from Lahore went to Peshawar with the purpose of preaching, when I knew, I made them understood that its wrong and non-Islamic to live out from home without any *Mehram* (blood relation), why these girls went into a strange city where they do not have men of their family (head of Lahore branch).” A student described, “due to one to two cases we all are blamed, never we have been sent in field to perform any duty related to practical assignments.” She in addition said, “we are trained to preach by covering ourselves, we can write books for religion, we through social media can disseminate Islamic values, and we are trained to become an Islamic brave mother; daughter; sister; and wife. Other than this we are not taught anything that what media frames about us (Noreen, January 09, 2022).”

A female teacher at Al-Huda center in Multan highlighted, “I was divorced as my husband did not like me, and He was interested in some other woman. My parents have been died, I returned to my brother’s home, he kept me with him for four months, his wife began to make clashes at every day routine, I have no other place to live except Al-Huda. I came here, this institute gave me shelter; food; clothe; and education. I have heard about Tashfin Maliq that she studied here in Multan but throughout my three years’ experience, I did not see any student to be engaged in violence or ever talked to be engaged (female teacher, Multan).” However, the indicators of radicalization were quite visible in interviews of the females belonging to Al-Huda International System when they were talking about western civilization, cultural attack, contamination of Islamic values, brutality in Muslim areas by non-Muslims, obligation of Jihad, and control of non-believers on international stage, but

promotion of violent process as physical preparation and ground operations have not been seen.

By facing a huge difficulty, the inquirer at Islamabad found an opportunity to conduct an interview of a student of this institute who was present when in 2007 some religiously motivated women under the patronage of the head of the institution carried the weapon against the government and a few liberal individuals. She was asked, “it was the time of general Parwaiz Musharaf, he was impressed by Turkish culture, he opened some clubs on way of Turkey, and he announced to convert the country into a liberal state. We were guided by our leaders that Parwaiz Musharaf is the agent of America as he played his role to ruin Taliban in Afghanistan for the will of United States. As a true Muslim female we should contribute to force Musharaf not to alter Pakistan’s Identity.” she further asserted, “we were told, what a woman can do, a man cannot, where a woman can go man cannot, so the women have to prevent the government not to promote liberal or Turkish value system here. Our leadership has informed us that initially massage parlors have been made in Islamabad to comfort men by women, the days are coming when everywhere like Europe vulgarity will be seen. To save our religious identity we came forward but we were charged as terrorist. What happened? Various females sacrificed their lives but could not abstain Pakistani women to be dominated by modern/liberal culture (former student of Jamia-Hafsa).”

A current student of this institution told in her discussion with the researcher, “we have heard about 2007 incident when the staff and students were involved in activities that were not permitted by Pakistan’s government, however, we have not seen such actions during the studies in this institution (female student of Jamia-Hafsa, Islamabad).” Although, it has been endeavored a lot to meet with any of the member of the staff of this Madrasa but could not be made possible, as the government of Pakistan has restricted the teachers there to give interviews without the permission of the government’s agencies. The above highlighting data in this section is sufficient to provide the argument that violent extremist mentality among religious women in Pakistan has not been promoted or activated at a large and institutional level while some individual cases have been reported in media and a few institutions for their own motives and for protecting religious identity utilized females in direct violent acts related to radicalization.

To explore and to understand the process of radicalization among Pakistani religious feminine elements, this chapter overall discussed and revealed the prevailing ideologies as Jihad vs. Fasad; sentiment of Shahadat; ban on Islamist organizations as a conspiracy against Islam; and lack of tolerance and aggressive mentality for non-Islamic acts, defining roles of religiously identified women as a brave and Islamic mother; praying for *Mujahideen*; and responsibility of Jihad on women in certain conditions, developing threat perceptions as Efforts for the modification of Islam; Manipulation of *Jihad* with terrorism; *Aurat March* as a threat: Western propaganda as my body my will; and Cultural attack and promotion of liberal (western) values. To scrutinize the promotion of violent behaviors belonging to radicalization process, Gap between worldly life and Madrasas; political and economic objectives; Individual cases of violent behaviors; Blame of extremism and terrorism; and opposition of extremist organizations have been studied in this particular chapter. Furthermore, the two high profile female religious institutions have been dug out that what happened there and what is going on.

The inquirer in the next chapter of this social investigation will endeavor to discuss that stigmatized negotiated identity, social marginalization, exclusion, and unequal economic opportunities are triggering radicalization and this process is leading the women towards the adoption of violent behaviors and activities in Pakistan because these women have espoused some violent ideologies, roles, and threat perceptions, and in addition, have set some practical examples of women's engagement related to violent ground operations. The researcher alludes that if precautionary interventions and inclusive mechanisms are not introduced, the results can be horrific. Based on gathering data, the researcher in subsequent chapter will suggest some recommendations and gender-based policies in order to include the religious-oriented women in social, political, economic, and educational field in the country so that violent behaviors can be prevented.

## **CHAPTER 9**

### **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

Subsequent to dig out the existing ideologies, defining women's role in Islam, prevailing threat perceptions leading to radicalization, and evaluating the direct promotion of violent behaviors belonging to radicalization process among Pakistani religious feminine segments the inquirer moves to conclude the dissertation. This explicit chapter illuminates an overall analysis of this investigative learning. The researcher exclusively throws light on the apprehensions that how radicalization can lead to violent process to the religiously identified women. She as well suggests that what inclusive mechanisms are needed to prevent the threat of violent behaviors among religious-oriented females in the country.

To conclude and to suggest the strategies, the chapter is divided into three parts. Part one analyzes the complete dissertation that how women motivate to religious environment, how they construct socio-religious identity, why they face stigma, why they negotiate with their stigmatized identity, how they become the victim of social marginalization; exclusion; and economic discrimination, and why they adopt extremist ideas and beliefs through ideologies, roles, and threat perceptions. Under second section it is expounded that why the apprehensions are knocking the door to enter into the process of violent engagement of Pakistani religious feminine segments, how the potential is existed to move from radicalization to the violent extremism, and what utilities the extremist organization can take from the situation of Pakistani religious feminine elements. Part third recommends some precautionary measures to engage the marginalized and excluded community in the positive progress of the country and explicates likewise that how gender-based policies can be proved fruitful to include these females in society in order to prevent the threat for the involvement from radicalization to violent behaviors.

#### **9.1 Brief Description of the Dissertation**

The investigator carried the one key question initially to begin the particular research that whether social identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation played the role as driving dynamism to push or pull Pakistani religiously affiliated women to the path of radicalization?

Under this main question, the following sub-questions were designed to complete this exploratory and explanatory work. What social, psychological, and economic drivers push or pull Pakistani females towards religiosity and religious institutions which help them to construct socio-religious identity? How Pakistani religiously affiliated women are stigmatized and why they negotiate with their stigmatized identity? How the consequences of stigma and why interplay of power dynamics lead religious feminine spheres to espouse radicalized thinking in Pakistan? How existing ideologies, defining women role in Islam and prevailing threat perceptions are penetrating the seeds of radicalization among religiously identified Pakistani women?

To find the answers, in the second chapter of this thesis the literature on radicalization has been studied profoundly. The terminology of radicalization was understood via scholarly work and institutional research, motivational factors that fascinate women to the process of radicalization, strategies to engage the individuals in general and women in particular have been reviewed, and models exploring by the researchers related to radicalization have been gone through, and existing literature on the link between identity and radicalization; religion and radicalization; socio-economic inequalities and radicalization; and gender and radicalization was revisited deeply. The contributions on social identity, social stigma, identity negotiation, and religious identity construction has been described in detail. After reviewing the available research, the inquirer designs the theoretical framework to understand the phenomenon of radicalization among Pakistani religious women.

In the third chapter of the study to acquire the reply of the research questions a nexus between radicalization, socio-religious identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation was developed. By looking on the main components of the three identity prototypes the applicability and practicality of the theoretical underpinnings in the context of women belonging to religious segments in Pakistan was highlighted. Subsequent to frame the theory, methodology was aligned with theoretical concepts and to investigate the process and to accomplish the thesis, qualitative methods have been applied. By utilizing phenomenological approach, the sample was configured and semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect data. The researcher herself went into the social setting and began her fieldwork. To maintain generalizability, validity, reliability, and impartiality twenty cities of the four



provinces of Pakistan were visited with the purpose to observe the ground realities and to manage face to face interviews for gathering primary data. The investigator got access to thirty female religious institutions of different sects of Islam where she met with various women who were living, studying, or teaching there. She also had opportunity to have discussions with the males who were performing their duties in these Madrasas as in charge or head of the institute. Fifty interviews were finalized to use in this dissertation (to read methodology in detail, consult chapter four).

When the researcher went into the field, she knew that behind religious motivation some drivers are activated. In chapter five she elaborated these drivers and found that social forces as family, friends, neighbors, or role models (idealized personalities) help the females to move towards religious institutions where they adopt specific identity. It has been noticed that in Pakistani society some concepts are circulated which motivate girls and their parents for admission in Madrasas. Other than these concepts the religious elements apply some strategies to galvanize the women to espouse rigid religious thoughts and beliefs. In the same chapter the inquirer argued that social/psychological disturbance and exclusion and poverty likewise put its part to push or pull girls to the religious institutions or groups as these institutions supply basic needs and free religious education to these girls. The investigator observed that when these women remain constant in a specific religious atmosphere, they begin to construct their exclusive identity on the bases of religion.

It has been illuminated in chapter six that as religious identity is developed, the process of us vs. them gets activated and differences and similarities of the religious and liberal spheres become visible. The inquirer found that the specific socio-religious identities are stigmatized by the modern/liberal parts of society. The women who have affiliations with religion, are harassed, taunted, negatively labeled, and stereotyped through multiple ways. By analyzing the data, the researcher argued in chapter six that in social gatherings, functions, and at public places these women face difficulties because of stigmatization. They are rejected even for marriages and other social relations. As an aftermath, these women manage their stigmatized identity by using different strategies as passing, revealing, and compensatory. The researcher found that when religiously identified females are disregarded,

devalued, and shunned, they begin to live in a particular environment which provides them respect, honor, and satisfaction.

In chapter seven the inquirer claimed that as the consequences of stigmatized identity social exclusion, marginalization, discrimination, and socio-economic inequalities are seen with naked eye in Pakistani religious feminine segments and in their belonging institutes where they reside, study, and construct their identity. She described that not only liberal parts of society treat them with stereotypical behaviors but government itself discriminates with these spheres through its policies. Media propagates against Madrasas and poor living eating and studying conditions among these institutions further help the religiously motivated women to maintain distance between them and the liberals. She as well claimed that as religious institutions are run through social welfare; the interplay of powerful and powerless is quite obvious in Pakistani religious feminine elements.

In chapter eight she argued that stigmatized and negotiated identity push or pull these women in that environment where they adopt extremist views, thoughts, and beliefs through existing violent ideologies, defining woman role in Islam, and prevailing threat perceptions regarding their constructed religious identity. She found that these females possess some ideologies that have the potential to lead them to the path of violence if their deprivations boost up and the constant discrimination is occurred with them. In addition, woman's role in Islam as a brave mother, wife, daughter, and sister enhances their feelings for moving towards violence. The researcher argued in the same chapter that the religious-oriented women have built various threat perceptions and they conceive that the modern/liberal value system is a poison for Islamic identity and west (the enemy of Islam) by using some Muslims (who are greedy and take economic and political incentives from west), is contaminating religious identity of Muslims. The religiously identified females consider that Islam is under attack not from military but from cultural forces. She argued that although, promotion of violent radicalization is not at a large scale in Pakistani religious institutions but the development of extremist ideologies, roles and threat perceptions are the indicators of radicalization and are sowing the seeds of violence at consistent bases.

## **9.2 Apprehensions for Augmentation of Radicalization Leading to the Violent Engagement**

The inquirer argued that so far violent Extremism among religiously motivated women is less visible but she observed the threats that radicalization is spreading at a large scale and has a capacity to accelerate violent behaviors, as all models developed on the process of radicalization illuminated that an individual or group move slowly and gradually towards violent acts from nonviolent extremist thoughts. The researcher found that many of the factors, steps, or indicators of radicalization presented in highly accepted five models of radicalization are visible in Pakistani religious feminine segments.

The model explained by Borum (2003) denotes towards a prototypic psychological pathway along which an individual develops an ideology that legitimizes terrorism. This model proposes four stages: it is not right, it is not fair, it is your fault, and you are evil. The researcher finds that religiously affiliated women usually pass all these four stages. For example, they think that liberals, media, and even government is discriminating with them and their institutions (it's not right). They compare their economic, social, political, and educational conditions with modern/ liberal parts of society and conclude that they are backward, underdeveloped, and poor, while the females belonging to modern institutional life are more progressed and prosperous (it's not fair). Similarly, Moghaddam (2005) explores in his model that when feelings of deprivations enhance, individual/group adopts radical options to reduce injustice. Sageman (2008) as well highlights in his model that Resonance with personal experience is a cognitive factor and when an individual or group learns from the environment that he/she is discriminated or is not treated equally particularly in term of economy, he/she moves towards violence. The inquirer claims that the religious-oriented women perceive the liberals as the member of westernized civilization and understand that modern value system is an attack on Islamic identity where as they are saving Islam from contamination (it's your fault). They think that Islamic government should come in power to protect Islam and Muslims from those who are killing Muslims in different parts of the world and should devastate those who wish to ruin the religious identity of Muslims (you are evil). The investigator argues that the model suggested by Wiktorowicz (2004) is likewise quite obvious among Pakistani religious females.

He indicates towards four processes: cognitive opening, religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization. It is argued that when the process of us vs. them begins and differences and similarities in thoughts, views, objectives, and outlook becomes visible between the religious and liberal women, antagonism takes place (cognitive opening). Sageman (2008) calls this process as moral outrage and Silber and Bhatt (2007) describe this stage as pre-Radicalization. The researcher points out that when due to difference in thoughts and outlook, the religiously motivated females face stigmatization from the modern segments, they adhere more with their religious group and negotiate with their constructed identity (religious seeking). Silber and Bhatt (2007) allude this step as self-Identification. As religious identity is negotiated and the religiously affiliated females start to live in a constant social environment and the modern/liberal parts of the Pakistani society instigate to discriminate with them, these women develop some perceptions against the liberal value system and anticipate that their religious (Islamic) identity is under threat and the champion of the liberals “west” has the intentions to abolish Islam via cultural attack (frame alignment) Sageman (2008) as well denotes towards this frame alignment and Silber and Bhatt (2007) explore this process as indoctrination.

The researcher argues in this dissertation that a few individuals/groups from religious feminine elements after passing through cognitive opening, religious seeking, and frame alignment joint practically extremist organizations or committed violent acts at ground like Jamia-Hafsa and Tashfeen Malik cases. She illuminates that at a large scale the involvement of religious-oriented women in violent radicalization is quite ambiguous in Pakistan so far (socialization). Moghaddam (2005) calls this stage as willingness to commit a terrorist act, Silber and Bhatt (2007) highlight it as Jihadization, and Sageman (2008) indicates this process as mobilization through networks). Although, violent aspects of radicalization are less visible but the indicators of radicalization as a process leading to violence are giving the signal that if inclusive measures are not introduced to involve the religious feminine segments at nonviolent level, the escalation of violence is not really away. After understanding the applicability of the models of developed on radicalization among Pakistani religious-minded women with theoretical underpinnings as in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation based on primary data collection the investigator

moves to exclusively list down the enablers of radicalization finding in religiously identified females in Pakistan.

### *9.2.1 Pakistani Religious Feminine Segments: Drivers of Radicalization*

Multiple authors presented a bunch of factors that pull or push the individual/group to the path of radicalization and in chapter two belonging to literature review have been studied in depth. This investigative learning by focusing on Pakistani religious-oriented women has explored various sociological/societal, psychological, economic, socio-political, and socio-religious drivers dragged from three identity prototypes as in-group formation, stigmatization, and identity negotiation. However, in previous chapters all the drivers have been explicated profoundly but here specifically these are listed down to clarify the understanding regarding the existing factors of radicalization among Pakistani religiously affiliated feminine elements.

#### A. sociological/societal factors

Sociological/ societal enablers have been identified during analyzing and interpreting the primary information: distance from worldly education; limited vision of religious-oriented females; avoidance from going at social gatherings other than religious meetings; constant social environment of Madrasas; unavailability of modern technology in Madrasas (mobile phones, internet); selective social interaction (saving from stigmatization); social exclusion (divorce, widowhood, and orphaned status); domestic violence; motivational social forces (family, friends, and neighbors); impressing from role models; and the loss of loved ones.

#### B. Psychological enablers

The researcher has found out from raw data the psychological factors: strong intimacy with religious institutions; psychological distortion (religion as the source of relaxation); social rejection in relations (religion as source of gratification); disrespect for religious identity among liberal spheres; frustration; devalued behaviors regarding Hijab and Pardah; liability of characterlessness on religiously identified women from closed relatives; psychological stress and harassment of covering women; ironic eyes and words for religious identity adoption; lack of confidence among religiously identified women in espousing modern way of life; forceful satisfaction from religious educational system; the sentiments of

hate and disliking for modern/liberal segments; development of fear for religious institutions among children by liberals; and development of the concept of inferiority and superiority.

#### C. Economic factors

The data for this dissertation indicated towards socio-economic inequalities and the drivers have been illuminated as: division between powerful and powerless; dependency on social welfare; gap between religious and modern feminine standard of life; poverty and lower standard of life in the country; lack of affordability of modern education; miserable conditions of family; pathetic living, eating, and studying conditions in Madrasas; perception that Madrasas are just for the poor and the needy; shelter for socially excluded and marginalized women in Madrasas; free religious education; and fulfillment of basic necessities by religious institutions.

#### D. Socio-political factors

Some of those factors have been alluded in which political structures are involved, the inquirer called these enablers as socio-political. These have been noted: lack of opportunities in modern social, political, and economic life; discriminated government policies; negligence of government for the betterment and advancement of religious institutions; stereotypical behaviors of government officials; disregarding religious identity for public posts; typical mentality and lack of training of the teachers in Madrasas; negative labeling by media; lack of access to media for positive representation of Madrasas; devaluing religious outlook to come in media; accusation of promotion of terrorism on Madrasas; and blame on Islam as the religion of extremism.

#### E. Socio-religious factors

The investigator has pointed out under this meticulous study multiple those drivers in which other than social, political, and economic indicators, religion is involved particularly. These are: establishment of global Islamic government; the sentiment of becoming the part of Islamic government; socialization of children as Mujahideen; revenge (saving of innocent Muslims in Kashmir, Palestine, and Afghanistan); existence of enthusiasm of martyrdom; empathy for extremist organizations; the concept: liberal efforts for modifying religious

identity; apprehension for cultural contamination; religious obligation for preventing vulgarity; fight against liberal culture as Jihad in modern time; the concept: liberals as the representative of west; perceptions regarding economic incentives for liberals from west; alteration of religious identity as sin and guilt; considering modern work and education as sinful acts; admission of girl in Madrasa as virtuous and pious act; and online preaching and literature on violence.

Subsequent to look over the sociological/societal, psychological, economic, socio-political, and socio-religious enablers among Pakistani religiously motivated women belonging to identity paradigm explored from primary data for this thesis the inquirer raises the concerns that these drivers have the potential to lead women to the track of violent extremism and the extremist organizations may exploit the prevailing conditions by making already existing violent ideologies strong, by building an unbreakable narrative derived from threat perceptions, by providing opportunities to take revenge from those to whom the religious feminine elements consider liable for their marginalization, exclusion, and horizontal inequality, and by supplying economic incentives to the poor and financially weak religious feminine community.

*9.2.2 Table of Factors of Radicalization among Religious Feminine Segments in Pakistan*

<b>Sociological/ Societal Factors</b>	<b>Psychological Factors</b>	<b>Socio- economic Factors</b>	<b>Socio-political/ Structural Factors</b>	<b>Socio-religious Factors</b>
Distance from worldly education	Strong intimacy with religious institutions	Division between powerful and powerless	Lack of opportunities in modern social, political, and economic life	Establishment of global Islamic government
Limited vision of religious-	Psychological distortion	Dependency on social welfare	Discriminated government	The sentiment of becoming

oriented females	(religion as the source of relaxation)		policies	the part of Islamic government
Avoidance from going at social gatherings other than religious meetings	Social rejection in relations (religion as source of gratification)	Gap between religious and modern feminine standard of life	Negligence of government for the betterment and advancement of religious institutions	Socialization of children as Mujahideen
Constant social environment of Madrasas	Disrespect for religious identity among liberal spheres	Poverty and lower standard of life in the country	Stereotypical behaviors of government officials	Revenge: saving of innocent Muslims in Kashmir, Palestine, and Afghanistan
Unavailability of modern technology in Madrasas (mobile phones, internet)	Frustration	Lack of affordability of modern education	Disregarding religious identity for public posts	Existence of enthusiasm of martyrdom
Selective social interaction (saving from stigmatization)	Devalued behaviors regarding Hijab and Pardah	Miserable conditions of family	Typical mentality and lack of training of the teachers in Madrasas	Empathy for extremist organizations
Social exclusion (divorce, widowhood, and orphaned)	Liability of characterlessness on religiously identified	Pathetic living, eating, and studying conditions in	Negative labeling by media	The concept: liberal efforts for modifying religious



status)	women from closed relatives	Madrasas		identity
Domestic violence	Psychological stress and harassment of covering women	Perception that Madrasas are just for the poor and the needy	Lack of access to media for positive representation of Madrasas	Apprehension for cultural contamination
Motivational social forces (family, friends, and neighbors)	Ironic eyes and words for religious identity adoption	Shelter for socially excluded and marginalized women in Madrasas	Devaluing religious outlook to come in media	Religious obligation for preventing vulgarity
Impressing from role models	Lack of confidence among religiously identified women in espousing modern way of life	Free religious education	Accusation of promotion of terrorism on Madrasas	Fight against liberal culture as Jihad in modern time
The loss of loved one's	Forceful satisfaction from religious educational system	Fulfillment of necessities by religious institutions	Blame on Islam as the religion of extremism	The concept: liberals as the representative of west
Injustice	The sentiments of hate and disliking for modern/liberal segments		Structural Violence	Perceptions regarding economic incentives for liberals from

				west
	Development of fear for religious institutions among children by liberals		Political Inefficacy	Alteration of religious identity as sin and guilt
	Development of the concept of inferiority and superiority			Considering modern work and education as sinful acts
				Admission of girl in Madrasa as virtuous and pious act
				Beginning of religious preaching by females in Pakistan
				Online preaching and literature on violence

### *9.2.3 Social ostracism of Pakistani religiously identified women*

In seventh chapter of this dissertation consequences of stigmatized religious identity have been exposed in detail and found that as an aftermath of stigma, religiously motivated feminine spheres have been neglected, shunned, discriminated, excluded, and marginalized in

different fields of life. Through data interpretation it has been alluded that stigmatization at social level impacted their psychological condition and they felt socially ostracized. When a huge number of people or their institutions/groups faced rejection from modern/liberal parts of the society, they adhered more and more with each other, for the reason that they even though, have no social/cultural and geographical connection but they possess similar mentality.

Although, earlier in this thesis the term social ostracism has not been used but subsequent to collect and analyze data it has been found that religiously affiliated women in Pakistan have been socially ostracized because when they faced stigmatization for their religious identity and as a result of stigma, rejection; discrimination; exclusion; marginalization; and ostracism forced them to be attached with their group [social ostracism means rejection of a person/group due to having certain attributes by a large part of society(Williams, 1997)]. In spite of having data during interviews from the people of diver's background, the researcher found that they even belong to various geographical and cultural areas but they think alike, their emotions are same, their perceptions; objectives; goals; and ideologies are similar. The inquirer visited from Karachi to Islamabad and from Multan to Peshawar. Not only urban areas of the country have been selected to collect the sample, but rural sides have also been remained in touch to conduct interviews. Women having lingual, ethnic, social/cultural, political, and geographical differences gave the same response for example regarding threat to religious identity, hearing of ironic words for their covering head or face, discrimination at educational or professional level because not to wear modern dress, cultural assault by America, and efforts for modification of Islam.

Social ostracism from modern/liberal segments pushes them in their loop wholes where they get self-confirmatory feedback for their negotiated identity. they investigator met with the reality that religious institutions either are activated in developed areas or underdeveloped cities/villages of Pakistan, they provide social acceptance to the ostracized females, and this is why, the person sitting in Lahore's religious institute (developed area of Pakistan) has the beliefs or thoughts resembled to the person who is getting education in Madrasa of Layyah (underdeveloped city of the country). The researcher concluded under analytical process that social ostracism has a great potential to lead religious-oriented females

to be engaged in the process of radicalization and the vulnerability to be exploited their ostracism by the extremist organizations also has its existence because literature on motivational strategies used by extremist groups highly focuses on those people who are neglected or rejected by social circles.

### **9.3 Extremist Organizations: Exploitation of the Conditions of Pakistani Religiously Affiliated Women**

The literature on the recruitment methods applied by extremist groups specifies four common strategies: narratives, ideologies, opportunities to revenge, and economic incentives (Von Knop, 2007). It is claimed that availability of applying all these describing strategies is observable and visible in religious-minded women in Pakistan. Although, except a few examples of recruiting religiously identified females by extremist groups as Tahriq-E-Taliban (TTP), terrorist movement in Sawat by Mullah Fazal-Ullah, and ISIS/Dai'sh the researcher did not get evidence of engagement of women in violent ground operations, but it will be wrong to write that the extremist organization cannot utilize the women for their objectives. The researcher finds that most of the women who are identified as religious, belong to poor family background. In addition, when they admit in Madrasas, they meet with more pathetic conditions. Although, they are provided food, shelter, and education but they when compare their situations with the modern/liberal parts of the society, they feel marginalized; inferior; and powerless in economic terms. If existing or newly emerged extremist organization needs the utilities from these deprived females for nonviolent and violent activities related to terrorism, they may have opportunity to recruit these women belonging to religious institutions by showing them financial benefits.

The investigator argues that the strategy of narrative building may likewise be proved fruitful for violent groups as in chapter eight it has been illuminated that threat perceptions are developed among religiously motivated women regarding their Islamic identity from the liberals and from the west to which they perceive as the champion of modern value system. Such narratives can as Islam is under threat, Muslim identity is contaminated by liberal culture, and modern segments are the agent of west fuel the fire and the women affiliated with religion may be engaged or utilized for violent actions. The prevailing aggressive

ideologies explained previously have capacity to be availed by the groups that promote violence. As manipulation of Jihad with terrorism, wakening of Jihad among young Muslims, sympathy with extremist groups, policy of zero tolerance for the violation of religious values, implementation of Jihad for establishing global Islamic government, and preparation for the defense of Islam can trigger violent behaviors among women associated with religion if they get a bit hope from the extremist organizations.

It has been found as well earlier in this project that the sense of revenge has its own routes, and the religious feminine spheres literally hate from those who are the responsible of the killings of innocent Muslims in Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan. The researcher makes the case that whenever the segregated and marginalized religious community including women in Pakistan gets a little light of revenge and domination at international system from the violent groups for the brutalities with Muslims and their zest for martyrdom can lead them to that process to which Sageman (2008) calls mobilization through networks, Silber and Bhatt (2007) highlight it as Jihadization, Moghaddam (2005) considers this stage as willingness to commit a terrorist act, Wiktorowicz (2004) discusses as socialization, and Borum (2003) points it out as you are evil. If some individual female cases related to violent actions and a popular incident of Jamia-Hafsa is understood, the ambiguous thoughts alter into clarification that people including women travel slowly and gradually from adoption of extremist views to violent actions.

#### **9.4 Travel from Radicalization to Violent Process: Available Practical Examples**

As this research was begun, some practical instances came in front of the inquirer and by looking at those cases related to committing violence by women belonging to the religious identity, this dissertation was designed to scrutinize and to evaluate the dynamics of nonviolent and violent radicalization among Pakistani religious feminine elements. The highly digging case of Jamia-Hafsa in the capital of Pakistan has astonished the scholars and researchers when the religious-oriented women began to be activated as police force and challenged the government of the time. These women in addition threatened the state to prevent the spread of modern/liberal value system in the country. When the investigator

excavated the reasons behind this incident, she noted that already explained drivers were motivating these females to escalate violence as social exclusion, marginalization, discrimination, and distance from the mainstream. Furthermore, the violent ideologies which were penetrated in their solitude by their selective interactive partners and the role of an Islamic woman which was defined by their teachers, and threat perceptions which they developed in the process of identity negotiation that the modern/liberal culture is enhanced to abolish religious identity of Muslims triggered these women to move towards violent behaviors from radicalization process.

Individual cases like Norin Laghari, Tashfin Maliq, and five to seven female suicide bombers gave alert that violence can occur if at nonviolent level the augmentation of extremist views, thoughts, and beliefs are not abstained and the root causes (marginalization, exclusion, economic inequality, and increasing gap between the religious and modern feminine groups) are not tackled. However, during fieldwork the inquire herself did not observe direct promotion of violent activities in religiously identified women or their institutions but on the bases of those cases through which she was convinced to carry this particular study to understand the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan with special reference to religious-oriented women , argues that if inclusive mechanisms are not introduced to engage the religiously motivated females at nonviolent level to be protected from a huge escalation of violence.

## **9.5 Pakistani Religious Females: Inclusive Mechanisms and Gender-Based Policies**

The last part of this research suggests some constructive strategies and gender-based policies through which Pakistani women belonging to religious institutions and groups can be made an affective part of the society and they can be motivated towards peace and harmony. How stigmatized identity can be deconstructed and how these women can be pull out from their negotiated selective atmosphere and how these women can be involved in mainstream through governmental mechanisms by lessening their deprivations, are the investigative subject matter of this section. These mechanisms are of two types: one those which have been recommended by religious community during fieldwork and the other are those which the

researcher herself derived from the observations at ground and available literature on inclusive mechanisms explained by the scholars previously and have been applied in different parts of the world where the process of radicalization has been declined.

The inquirer argues that there is the need to introduce socio-educational, socio-cultural, socio-political, and socio-economic inclusion methods to deconstruct rigid religious identity (which does not allow the religiously affiliated women to be progressed) and to take them in mainstream of Pakistani society. There must be appeasement policy and discrimination at governmental and societal level has to be reduced in order to fill the gap between the religious and modern feminine segments and to supply the sense to be respected, understood, and valued.

#### *9.5.1 Strategies for Socio-Educational Inclusion*

During the fieldwork the researcher found that a great gap exists between the religious and modern educational system. The Syllabus, way of teaching, classroom structure, and basic facilities are quite separate in religious institutions and modern schools and colleges. The religious female students are relatively deprived from the educational tools, trainings, and courses which are available to the students of modern system. A respondent at Multan who was running a female religious institution discussed profoundly with the researcher that school system must be implemented in Madrasas to make the religious students better and capable.

He in detail explained his reforms in his institute, “when I joined, I saw that the teachers were teaching without any arrangement: I firstly implemented period system, syllabus was divided, and every teacher properly takes period as simply in schools. Secondly, I made compulsory that the students and teachers will prepare their lessons before coming next day, now from the prayer of Maghrib to 10 PM all students read those topics which they will be taught the next morning. Thirdly I banned the use of mobile during studies not only for students but also for teachers. Fourthly I initiated to take proper feedback from the students about their teachers, at the end of every month a questionnaire is given to the students in which they tell their comments regarding studies, teachers, and administrative staff. Fifthly I myself do round two to three times in a day to supervise that the teachers are

performing their duties or not? Students are engaged or not? Sixthly I started to have parental teacher meetings on monthly bases and every month we also send a student report to the parents about the performance of their child (Abid, August 07, 2021).”

It has been observed that in Madrasas the teachers use old methods of teaching as cramming, remembering, beating, and without using white board. They do not focus on the skills of analysis, they do not allow the students to raise the questions, and they do not permit them to interpret the social world with modern eye. The investigator argues that there is the great compulsion to introduce modern ways of teaching in religious institutions to include the students capable of modern society. An informant at Karachi proceeded during interview, “I must say that the teachers in Madrasas should understand the reality that this is not that time in which you beat the student with stick and force him to read. Religious teachers will have to adopt modern ways to persuade student for education as ‘no slap but love’ (Adil, May 17, 2021).”

Another participant highlighted, “have you seen in schools or colleges? From computers to multi-media system is available to the teachers to communicate with the students. Here even in a single Madrasa, white boards are and markers are not met to the teachers, what analysis they will do in front of their students (Nasira, August 05, 2021)?” multiple interviewees described that only religious education is not enough, the students including women of Madrasas should be given worldly (modern) education to enhance their abilities. An in charge of a female religious institute shared about his personal modern education, “I am not against of worldly education, in fact, I have myself done masters and I am looking for admitting in M. Phil and have intention to do PH. D.” the inquirer asked him further, “can it be motivational strategy to fascinate the people towards religious education and to de-construct the views regarding Madrasas among liberal segments?” He explicated, “Every Madrasa’s principal has his own opinion, I think that with religious education, worldly education is also necessary. When both will be continued, the person can be successful.” He additionally described, “I myself am against of Mullah (typical religious teacher) nature.” He gave the example of Prophet Muhammad PBUH, “look at His life, He was preacher but at the same time, He was ruler, administrator, reformer, and soldier.” He told, “In our society it is considered that “*Maulvi*” (the person who carries religious



responsibilities) just concerns with mosque, I have opposite view, he should have worldly as well as religious knowledge and he should be able to work in both fields (Abid, August 07, 2021).”

A respondent explained, “Just Madrasa education is not enough for earning, if girls want to be come in job or in business, they should also get worldly education (Faiza, April 26, 2021).” At Rawalpindi an informant described, “For learning the methods for earning, modern schools and colleges are working in society, we say the students that as you get religious education similarly go in worldly institutions of education so that you can be able to earn for you and your family (Mehmood, April 30, 2021).” Some of the members of religious community likewise expounded that there should be implementation of worldly education in Madrasas and religious education in modern institutions to reduce the gap between religious and modern educational system. An interviewee asserted, “generally, two demands we do from the government: firstly, in all those institutions where modern/liberal education is given, there religious education should be made compulsory and secondly, we say that all facilities and worldly education should be implemented in Madrasas in such a way that religious education is not being disturbed and students of religious institutions instead of negative treatment, can receive that respect and honor which those officers get from society who get education from schools, colleges, and universities (Maulana, August 07, 2021).”

Although, not majority but few of the religiously affiliated individuals consider modern education compulsory particularly for girls and raise the point that women have more need to get modern knowledge than men as they have to serve not only their family but the other women of their community, society, and nation. A respondent was inquired at Quetta, “It is said that religious-minded people are against the education of females, is it correct?” He in detail replied, “This concept is totally wrong that Islam stops women to have worldly/modern education. I further explain it, at the one hand it is said that women should not do job and should not get education, while at other, when any female is needing to be operated to deliver the child, it is said that no man will operate our woman.” He spoke, “when you will not allow the females to get education, who will become doctor for women?” he gave his own example, “when my sister was in Madrasa, she wanted to do masters. I

permitted her to be admitted in M.SC and she has done masters in double math and in the same time, she continued her Madrasa as well (Akram, October 13, 2021).”

It has as well been revealed that various religiously identified women and men who are associated with female religious institutions emphasize on training of religious teachers and students and know the reality that lack of training is augmenting the distance of religious community from the modern way of life. An Informant illuminated at Lahore, “the administration of female Madrasas should engage their students in such exercises through which not only the students gain confidence but can compete in society with a broader Islamic vision.” She emphasized, “Madrasas should train their students in such a way that wherever these students go for job or further education, they can bring about good name of their institute. For example, they should not tell a lie, they should be calm and cool, they should avoid violence, and they should not engage in those activities which become the cause of negatively stereotyping of Madrasas.” She further described, “The teachers of Madrasas should be involved in those trainings by which they can deliver with modern ways of teaching.” She raised her concern, “when the female students without proper confidence and training go in society, they try to alter that society into Islamic one with radicalized behave and this radicalization leaves negative impact not only on Madrasa’s image but also disliked by society (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).”

However, most of the religiously identified women and the men who were serving female Madrasas who were selected to conduct interviews, were unaware of English language and considered that English is the liberal value and can be harmful for Arabic (Islamic language) for the reason that the researcher took information first in Urdu (national language of Pakistan) and later translated it into English to write the dissertation. However, some of them had the view that learning of English language is essential particularly for those who link with the religious institutions in order to portray the positive image of Islam in the world and to alleviate the gap between the religious and liberal community. A respondent discussed by highlighting the significance of international way of communication, “you know, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said to His one companion to learn Suriani language.” He told, “My research says that Suriani language has really resemblance with English.” He

with sadness spoke, “unfortunately! In our society modern education is seen as devilish act but it is wrong.”

He shared his own experience, “when I was in Madrasa, I in a cold night was preparing for my exams. Near to me heater was giving me heat, an old man came after *Wazoo* (ablution) to dry his hands on that heater. Literally, when he saw the book in English in my hand, he began to do “tauba” (sorry from ALLAH) by saying ‘*ASTAGHFIRULAH, ASTAGHFIRULAH,*’ (seeking forgiveness from ALLAH ALMIGHTY) and ran from there. I went behind and caught him from the place where we put our shoes off for prayer. I requested him to give me just 5 minutes, he denied bluntly and said you are partner of devil because you opened the book of English in mosque. I did not get angry and began to convince him to go with me for a little time. As a result, he came, I asked him that what is Islamic and Quranic language? He confidently said, Arabic, I asked that then why you speak Punjabi? He became silent. Then I further asked, if an “Angraiz” (English man) comes to you and he is not aware of Islam then how will you preach him? He cannot speak Punjabi or Urdu and you cannot speak English then how will you send him the message of ALLAH ALMIGHTY? Should he be died nonbeliever? He kept quiet and ultimately picked my argument and said that I am sorry I was wrong (Abid, August 07, 2021).” The inquirer argues that for socio-educational inclusion of religiously motivated females, some of initiatives as implementation of school system, modern methods of teaching, supply of modern education in Madrasas, trainings of teachers and students, providing technological advancement, supplying basic facilities (chairs; tables; and dice in classes), and learning of English language are really important to be taken to include the women belonging to religious institutions and groups at nonviolent level in modern society. Besides socio-educational reforms, the inclusion at cultural surface is vital to provide the stigmatized and negotiated identity the sense of respect, honor, and regard.

#### *9.5.2 Strategies for Socio-Cultural Inclusion*

Socio-cultural inclusion of religious-oriented women is necessary to deconstruct the negotiated religious identity as they feel threat to Islam from cultural contamination by modern/liberal parts of the society. to make them the part of the modern social world various methods at cultural levels may be proved fruitful as introducing extracurricular activities in

religious institutions, boosting up their confidence, accepting them with their specific religious outlook, admitting the brilliant girls with the dull in Madrasas, allowing use of mobile and internet in religious institutions, taking tours of students to historical/re-creative places, and celebrating of national/cultural events in Madrasas.

An informant at Karachi spoke during the discussion with the researcher, “there must be sports activities in Madrasas for students in order to enhance their mental capacities (Farukh, May 15, 2021).” Another participant described, “in schools and colleges multiple games are held, students are exercised by physical teachers but in religious institutions just focus is given on dry mode of education. Not to talk of girls even boys are discouraged to be involved in games (Zakia, August 02, 2021).” An interviewee who was working as the head of a female Madrasa at Multan told, “I provide opportunity to play, the students play cricket and football, I also arrange an annual tour to the different cities of Pakistan as sometimes, we go to Lahore and sometimes, “Marri, and fort Monroe” (a small and cold town of Baluchistan near to South Punjab) (Abid, August 07, 2021).”

It has been also excavated in chapter six that religiously identified women because to negotiate their stigmatized identity interact selectively and this process decreases their self-confidence and in addition when they are marginalized, discussed in seventh chapter of this social inquiry, they lose their exposure as they become the victim of inferiority. Multiple participants during their interviews argued that if cultural inclusion of religious-minded females is necessary, the modern segments and the religious as well will have to boost the confidence of those women who are linked with religious institutions/groups. An informant at Lahore with emphasis said, “there must be coaching of the teachers of Madrasas that how they can build confident personalities, a teacher in Madrasa should tell his or her students that you are the best, you must increase your knowledge so that no other person can compete you in your field, you are that group for which ALLAH Himself passed an order for the establishment and said that among you there must be a group who call people towards virtue and prevents you from sin.” She continued, “The best group is of those people who are linked with Madrasas but unfortunately they are not enlightened about their status and face negative labeling and ridiculous behaviors from society.” She again explained, “although, three reasons are there for lacking confidence: lower economic status, family, and teachers and

institutions but among all the low quality of education (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” The investigator makes the case that amplifying exposure among religiously affiliated women will include them in modern culture and they will get ready to deconstruct their views, thoughts, beliefs, and threats.

Another aspect came in front during the fieldwork that majority of the female students in religious institutions is dull mind and the parents mostly send there that girl to Madrasa who cannot compete in modern schools or colleges. It is argued that the dull minded students may be motivated towards violence more easily than the brilliant one. The religious feminine spheres understand that Madrasas are stigmatized as backward and typical but the stigmatizers (liberals) are not enlightened that the religious institutes deal with the dull segment of society whereas the intelligent minds are admitted to get modern education then how Madrasas can produce that wisdom which is needed for the constructive development of the country. An interviewee explained deeply, “my father’s wish was that I become a religious expert because I was the brilliant among all my siblings and my father used to say that Islamic education is not for the dull children.” He happily explained, “When I interact with the people in any program, I take Quran in hand and ask from the people that this book has some importance in your life? Most of the people answer, yes, and this book is not just significant, but it is our life. Then I ask that is this correct that you send you’re the dull and below average daughter or son? Majority acknowledges that we do (Adil, May 17, 2021).”

Another respondent who was the head of the department of Islamic studies in a public sector university and at the same time was performing her responsibilities as director education at a highly developed Madrasa of girls in Lahore highlighted, “the dull girl of the family is enrolled in Islamic studies because when she does not get admission in any subject, she moves towards Islamic studies as its merit is really low this is why the dull students come in this subject. Islam will give you leadership when you send your brilliant child for this study rather to send the dull (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).” A participant asserted in her discussion, “I will say that if you want Madrasas to play an active role in the development of nation and contribute for the progress of the country first, you have to send the brilliant children rather to send the dull. As you admit the intelligent brains, Madrasas will produce leadership for the country as well as for Islam.” She said, “when the dull after joining

Madrassa can become a useful part of society then why not the intelligent can convert into highly capable leaders (Ishmat, August 02, 2021)?.” The researcher illuminates that the dull girls may be proved easy target and may be exploited and recruited for violent operations than the brilliants. To prevent radicalization from spreading in the country, the society should realize that religious education is not just for the dull.

The inquirer likewise argues that for cultural inclusion the female students and teachers in religious institutions must be allowed to use modern tools of communication as mobile phones and internet facilities to come out from their loopholes, chapter six of this thesis discussed that mobile phones are banned to use in religious institutions for students. Cultural festivals and national events like national days and welcoming of spring must be celebrated in Madrasas to provide awareness about outer world to the religiously identified females. Hens they will deconstruct their negotiated identity and stigma will be lessened. When they enjoy worldly life, they will adopt modern ways of communication, education, and earning, in this way, they will not feel threat from liberal segments for Islam and will not espouse extremist ideas and beliefs which are penetrated due to their social and cultural exclusion. Although, other than the religious community, the modern society itself and the government structures have to play their effective and progressive role to disengage these women at their nonviolent stage and will have to prevent them to travel to the violent process by appeasing them.

### *9.5.3 Applying Appeasement Method and Removal of Discrimination at Governmental and Societal Level*

As chapter seven explicated in detail that discrimination with the religiously affiliated females and their institutions is quite obvious and visible in Pakistan and the government officials, policies, structures, media, and liberal spheres are involved in this stigmatization, segregation, marginalization, and discrimination. The researcher here specifies that to reduce the gap between the stigmatized and stigmatizer population, appeasement is essential to supply the sense of equality explicitly in government policies to the religiously identified feminine elements. Furthermore, media and modern society has to contribute to drag the excluded religious feminine elements into the mainstream of the country.

An informant suggested in the discussion, “the government should promote peace through Madrasas, should engage the students of Madrasas for peaceful and social activities, rather to differentiate between religious and modern education, educational activities should be dealt just educational not religious or modern. By doing this, the distance between modern and religious segments will be lessened and a positive role in nation-building can be performed by Madrasas.” She in addition said, “these girls can be engaged in multiple activities as awareness campaign regarding polio, environmental pollution, and education of women but unfortunately, in Madrasas a bunch of the youth is neglected and is not involved in prosperity of the country, this segment is considered just for religious education and for the development of Pakistan, modern/liberal group is anticipated as capable and eligible for the reason that the sense of incapability leads the religious-oriented individuals including women to that path which is in the loss of the state (Gull, January 19, 2022).

Another respondent at Lahore explicated, “We are with our government and its policies, and whenever our army needs us, we are available for any kind of enquiry or cooperation. At different times our police ask for maintaining law and order, we assure that we will give full support in all matters. It is wrong to accuse all religious institutions just because of a few Madrasas.” He said, “in return, what we need? Only the concentration of the government on our miserable conditions, respect, and dignity not just in words but in practical incentives as educational equality between the modern institutions and Madrasas; paying our electricity bills, provide us some amount in the name of salary, and job opportunities (Mussarat, August 08, 2021).” The investigator argues that among religious-minded women, the level of frustration is extremely high this is because they feel rejection from modern society and as well from government.

A participant illuminated his opinion with Goffman’s (1969) argument by saying, “rather to marginalize and segregate religious Institutions, government and society should keep those people closed who are linked with Madrasas. Because when you consistently try to shake hand and in return you are rejected again and again, definitely frustration is generated, and this frustration can lead some people to adopt radicalized behavior (Abid, August 07, 2021).” The literature on radicalization and stigmatization claims that frustration is a mechanism that has the potential to motivate the individuals/groups to adopt violent and

aggressive options to tackle their miseries. To lessen the level of aggression and to make them feel that they are the important and progressive part of Pakistani society, scholarships for modern and religious education to the students, salaries to the teachers and administrative staff, furniture for the premises and classrooms, and modern technology as computers/laptops should be given by the government to increase the educational quality among religious institutions (Madrasas).

By keeping in view, the important services of religious institutes as fulfillment of basic needs of the poor and the needy students and providence of free education, the governmental organizations must confer the funds from the capacity of the government to enhance the status and educational standard. Although, after releasing funds, the law enforcement agencies must maintain check and balance until these Madrasas do not move as a whole to that positive path which is required (construction, progress, and inclusion) from them. The inquirer recommends that it is essential to disengage Pakistani religious feminine spheres at nonviolent phase that their frustration and grievance must be removed, and appeasement must be done by providing them generally space in all fields (education, culture, and society) of life with the respect to their specific religious affiliations and particularly in economic realms.

#### *9.5.4 Mechanisms for Socio-Economic Inclusion*

In chapter five, six, and seven it has been revealed that horizontal inequality exists between the religiously identified females and their institutions and the modern segments of Pakistani society. The concept of have and have not presented by Gurr (1969) is observable and visible in living, eating, and studying conditions. As discussed before that socio-economic inequalities and relative deprivation can lead the religious-oriented women to the process of violent extremism as they already are moving towards radicalized mentality. To include these females in society and to engage them in constructive activities, they will be given economic opportunities according to their capabilities through providing honor and value to their adopted religious identity rather to leave them on social welfare supplied by the rich. Below some of the suggestions are illuminated to include the excluded segment in economic activities in order to boost their life standard up, these suggestions have been



described by the religious community including women and men during collecting information to accomplish this social inquiry.

A female religious scholar recommended in her interview that these women can be provided opportunity to teach Quran in modern schools and colleges to engage positively in economy. She said, “In all schools of government belonging to modern education, Quranic education is now compulsory, females after getting education from Madrasa can contribute as teachers in these schools to give the education of Quran (Saqina, July 30, 2021).” A respondent at Karachi suggested that online tuitions, they can teach to those children who live abroad or whose parents wish them to learn Quran at home. She told, “some women made their face book pages, and you tube channels through which they teach online and earn already, this model can be enhanced to carry up the financial status of religious feminine elements (Nazima, May 15,2021).” Another participant indicated towards online opportunities of earning by saying, “a lot of girls now teach Quran online to children, sometimes from foreign countries students of Quran or the Muslim parents contact these females for learning Quran and by these kinds of tuitions they earn healthy amount (Misbah, August 03, 2021).”

Except teaching Quran in modern educational institutes, some interviewees pointed out that these women can earn livelihood for them by working as administrative staff or religious teachers in Madrasas on the condition that they will be paid a suitable salary to run the family. An interviewee asserted, “The religiously affiliated females can serve in Madrasas as teachers or administrative staff as these institutions need women to fulfil the responsibilities of female teachers or female staff (Batool, October 22, 2021).” An informant at Lahore alluded towards a very new aspect to provide economic opportunities to the religious-oriented women that after qualifying from Madrasas and after proper training, they can be hired as Sharai advisers in industries. She said, “as you requested me to suggest so from many time one thing was clicking in my mind, the government should force the industry to advertise the vacancies of ‘shari adviser’ and in all businesses Sharai advisers should be appointed who can advise the businessmen to run their business with Islamic laws and also can fulfil the requirements of modern day in this way, multiple males and females of Madrasas can make their life better and can earn for their family.” She additionally explained,

“These Sharai advisers must be properly trained and certified from highly capable Madrasas. By doing so the quality of our products will be increased likewise and export of the country will be augmented because according to Islamic laws, purity is maintained, and adultery is prohibited in the preparation of the products (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).”

As previously in chapter five it has been expounded that religion is the source of gratification and when people particularly women get disturbed because of their personal, social, and mental conditions fascinate towards religion to come out from their psychological stress. The researcher argues that the religiously identified women can be given employment of religious experts as psychologists and counsellors to provide therapy to the socially/psychologically distorted people. A respondent gave the suggestion in her discussion, “the psychologists and religious experts to gather can offer short courses for counseling in Madrasas because a person who has the knowledge of Islam and knows about the life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) can become an affective counsellor as he has the power of religion to gratify someone or to provide inner satisfaction to discontented so in this way a bunch of Madrasa students can play an active and effective role in society (Shabnam, August 03, 2021).”

Minority of the religious segments openly said before the inquirer that the religiously motivated women themselves should find the prospects to earn money to become the useful part of the society. A female shared the experience of her familiar woman, “we had a female here before sometimes, she used to teach in Madrasa and besides this she stitched clothe and earned a handsome amount for her family.” She emphasized, “in Madrasas female students should be made understood that it is not a sin to earn for the betterment of your family, other than religious education, you can acquire some skills like stitching, designing, or any other. You can also go to university for further education and can be expert in linguistics, humanities, social or natural sciences (Farukh, May 12, 2021).” Three respondents at Peshawar, Sukkur, and Jhang gave the same opinion that except religious education, the females who are attached with religious institutions develop their knowledge in various other subjects.

Multiple participants clarified that the religiously associated women anticipate earning money or doing job is not allowed to women in Islam, but this perception is falsified.

Islam although, does not put responsibility on female to carry the financial burden of the family but it does not prevent that woman to come in economic field who herself has a wish to be entered in business or jobs. A religious expert highlighted, “women in Islamic society have no economic burden or responsibility but if a woman is capable of doing some business or job and in doing so she does not break Islamic limitations, her father, brother, or husband should be her supporter rather to stop her and Islam likes his support.” She gave the example from Prophet’s life, “one wife of Prophet Muhammad earned money by coloring lather, but Prophet Muhammad PBUH never asked her for a single rupee to spend at home. She used to spend all earning in the way of ALLAH, Prophet never prevented her to do so (Muqaddas, January 03, 2022).”

Besides those economic prospects that have been presented by the research participants, the inquirer herself asserts that the religiously identified females can be engaged in spreading inter-faith harmony to amplify tolerance, patience, and cooperation in society. They may be highly capable of doing the job of peace builders, peace makers, peacekeepers, and peace educationist. They can be offered small loans by the government to run their own business at their home. The investigator claims that however, religious feminine spheres are capable of working and earning but they have lost their exposure because of the reasons explored before, if the modern/liberal segments rather to stigmatize them or push them to the process of identity negotiation where they adopt extremist thoughts and beliefs, take them closed and the government structures develop those policies that can supply them the sense of equality instead of discrimination, these women may be proved fruitful for nation-building rather to be segregated. By socio-educational, socio-cultural, appeasement by the government, and socio-economic inclusion not only a great part of the society will be availed for the progress and prosperity of Pakistan but likewise will be abstained to move to the path of radicalization.

In this chapter the researcher presented an overview of the whole project. Why this has been begun? How the process of radicalization caught the attention? What incidents and indicators became the base to initiate the research? Which literature has been consulted and used to examine the process? How theoretical underpinnings have been applied? What methodology was availed to explore and to explain the drivers of radicalization? All these

questions have been dealt briefly. In second part of the chapter the inquirer raised her concerns that how and why radicalization can lead to the religious feminine segments to the violent behaviors. The potential to apply the strategies by the extremist groups and existing enablers of radicalization belonging to identity prototypes have as well been analyzed. In very last, the researcher discussed some constructive and concrete suggestions that have been derived from the collected data for this meticulous study and can bring a positive change and can drag the marginalized community into the mainstream as socio-educational inclusion, socio-cultural inclusion, appeasement policies of social and governmental structures, and socio-economic inclusion.

## **9.6 Summary of the Dissertation**

This investigative learning was an effort to understand the nexus between the process of radicalization and identity paradigm through gender lens with special reference to the religious segments of Pakistani society. The researcher by reviewing the literature on radicalization, in-group formation, stigmatization, identity negotiation, and construction of religious identities, designed the theoretical framework to explore the process in the context of Pakistan. Methodology was configured and qualitative methods have been utilized to collect the primary information. By transcribing, categorizing, organizing, interpreting, and analyzing the themes, the investigator argued that the drivers of radicalization mostly get activated in a sequential way and sometimes, these factors contemporarily work as well. Firstly, the inquirer illuminated those social forces, strategies, concepts, and the driving dynamism as social/psychological disturbance and poverty that motivate the Pakistani feminine segments towards religious institutions and groups where they construct socio-religious identity. secondly, it has been argued that the process of us vs. them gets instigated and differences and similarities become obvious, the religiously identified women face stigmatization from the modern/liberal parts, to manage their stigma, these women use stigma management strategies, ultimately, the stereotypical behaviors lead these women to that stage where they negotiate with their constructed identity on the bases of religion and remain limited to their closed social environment and do care in making interactive partners. Thirdly as the consequences of stigmatization, the interplay of powerful and powerless begins. The religious-oriented females are marginalized, excluded, discriminated, and unequally treated in

economic realm. Fourthly, these women espouse extremist ideas, views, thoughts, and beliefs via existing ideologies, defining woman's role in Islam, and threat perceptions that are penetrated in particular religious' environment. The researcher claimed that when all the drivers get to gather in the end, the travel to the violent radicalization starts as the models developed on radicalization indicate that the last stage of radicalization is the escalation of violence. It has also been raised concerns in the last chapter of this dissertation that the extremist organizations may exploit the situation of the religiously motivated women by providing them economic incentives, by building the narratives, by availing basic ideologies of Islam, and by supplying them the opportunity of revenge from those who are liable of the killings of innocent Muslims in different parts of the world if inclusive mechanisms are not introduced. By suggesting some strategies as socio-educational inclusion, socio-cultural inclusion, appeasement behavior of governmental and social structures, and socio-economic inclusion the scrupulous study asserted that these women may be engaged in positive progress of the country at very initial level and the threat of violence activities may be eradicated from Pakistan.

## Glossary

Fitna (conflict) *Fitna*

Burka, (a traditional clothe, which is used to cover the body in Sub-continent)

Maulvi, (the word is spoken for religious teacher in negative sense)

Maulviani, (the word is spoken to stereotype religiously affiliated female)

Jahil, (ignorant/uneducated/illiterate)

Qiamah, (the day of judgement)

Tang nazar, (conservative)

Dakianoos, (backward)

Eman, (faith/belief)

Tasbih, (a string, made of wooden beads or gemstones upon which Muslims count the worshipping words to glorify ALLAH ALMIGHTY)

Alima, (female religious scholar)

Hifz, (remembering Quran by heart)

Namaz, (prayer)

Pardahdar, (covered woman)

Jahanum, (hell)

Pardahdar bibi, (fully covered woman)

Sharai Pardah, (covering of woman under the limitation of Islam)

Eid-Ul-Adaah, (a religious festival at which the Muslims sacrifice cows and sheep)

Maulvi tabqa, (religious class)

Naqab, (to cover the face with cloth)

Ghairon ki tehzeb, (western civilization).”

Chanda/ attia, (fund for noble cause)

Sadqa, (the amount is given to the poor by the rich to keep the calamity away)

Khairat, (voluntary charity)

Zakat, (a decided percentage donated to the poor and the needy by the rich at every Islamic year)

Khiraj, (a decided quantity of wheat is donated from crop to the poor).

Anaj/Dany, (wheat)

Chatais, (mats which are prepared by the tree of dates).

Jhuta, (lie),

Nawafil, (additional prayers)

Mujahidat, (females who do Jihad)

Mehram, (blood relations)

Safiah RA

Roza, (keeping fast the whole day to understand the feelings of hunger and thirst)

Maghribi Yalghar, (western imperialism)

Aurat March, (an annual socio-political demonstration in Pakistan to highlight the problems of women)

Mera jism meri marzi, (my body my will),

Chalti phirty khubsurty, (mobilized beauty),

Abdullah, (worshipper of ALLAH)

Abd-diram and Abd-dinar, (worshipper of wealth),

Dahri, (beard).

Abaya, (an Arabic-style clothe to cover the body)

Duppata, (the part of female dress used in Sub-continent)

Hijabian, (the woman who covers her head to toe)

Nakabian, (a female who covers her face)

Burka posh, (a woman who cover herself with traditional clothe in Sub-continent and is negatively labeled)

Daku, (robber who covers his face to hide his identity or to disguise)

Parda bibi, (a woman who does not come in front of men other than her family)

Vahabi, Deobandi, and Barailvi (religious sects among Muslims)

Shias, (a sect among Muslims which has differences upon basic religious matters from other sects)

Naamahram, (the person who is not in blood relation)

Jannah, (heaven)



Muslim Ummah, (the concept of Muslim nation on the bases of collective identity)

Kufar, (non-believers)

Mullah, (typical religious teacher)

ASTAGHFIRULAH, (asking forgiveness from ALLAH ALMIGHGHTY)

Wazoo, (ablution)

Amma Hajjan, (a woman who pretends to be pious)

## Interview protocol of my research

This interview protocol is designed to accomplish my PH. D dissertation, entitled: “**Identity Framework and Radicalization Nexus: Examining Pakistani Religious Feminine Spheres**”. The key purpose of this investigative study is to explore the phenomenon of radicalization (nonviolent or violent) within identity paradigm by using gender lenses through the explicit case of Pakistani religious feminine sphere. Under this main goal, the study encompasses the following objectives: I) to study and evaluate the question of religious in-group formation at international and regional as well as domestic level in Pakistan. II) to develop the nexus between the process of social identity, stigma, and identity negotiation in the context of females linked with religious groups in Pakistan. III) Furthermore, based on the analysis of social identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation it illuminates the adoption of extremist views and beliefs by the females belonging to religious segments. IV) Not only to highlight the complex dynamics of radicalization (nonviolent or violent) but also to specify an exploitation of stigmatized and negotiated identity of females of religious groups by extremist organizations. This research borrows some of the definitions from already existing literature to explore and to explain the phenomenon, the particular study highlights radicalization in the light of important work of Wilner and Dubouloz and likewise, McCauley & Moskalkenko. Wilner and Dubouloz define radicalization as: “radicalization (or radicalisation) is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice” (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010). According to this particular definition, radicalization is process that presses an individual or a group to adopt extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations. These ideals and aspirations deny or destroy the contemporary political system, social ideas, and expression of freedom of choice. Ultimately, through this process that individual or group stands against current political and social institutions. Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalkenko in their research, describe radicalization as: “radicalization is a dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict and violence, across individuals, groups, and mass publics” (McCauley & Moskalkenko, 2008). This description argues that radicalization is an aspect of the augmentation of beliefs feelings, and behavior that support intergroup conflict and violence. Both the researchers argue that radicalization works across individuals, groups, and mass levels. To understand and analyze the complex dynamics of radicalization, this research avails 3 of key themes of identity framework: social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation. By taking help from contribution of Tajfel and Turner, this social inquiry delineates social identity as “the part of self that is defined by one’s group membership. It describes the conditions under which social identity becomes *more* important than one’s identity as an individual” (Tajfel and Turner 1979). . to understand the theory of social stigma, Goffman’s definition is utilized. He described stigma: “a phenomenon whereby an individual with an attribute which is deeply discredited by his/her society is rejected as a result of the attribute” (Goffman, 1963). To allude identity negotiation, the significant studies of Swann (1987) and Toomey (1993). Toomey refers to identity negotiation as “the exchange of verbal and nonverbal messages between the two or more communicators in maintaining, threatening, or uplifting the various socio-cultural group-based or unique personal-based identity images of the other” (Toomey, 1993). Swann, ET AL describe identity negotiation: “the processes through which people reach agreements regarding ‘who is who’ in their

relationships” (Swann, et al. 1987). By hybridizing these 3 key components (social identity, social stigma, and identity negotiation) and through availing gender lens, this research will analyze the dynamics of radicalization among religious-oriented feminine segments in Pakistani society. The findings of this social inquiry will be exclusively beneficial to understand the nexus between radicalization and identity framework. And how the three concepts of identity paradigm (stigmatization, identity negotiation, and social identity ) play the role as driving dynamism towards nonviolent or violent radicalization among Pakistani religious female spheres and how these drivers are exploited by the extremist organizations to engage them in their activities.in addition, this investigative study will provide the opportunity to the government and policy-making institutes to formulate gender-based policies to take the females belonging to the religious institutions (Madradas) towards main stream and to disengage them from radicalization process.

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## **Name**

Individual/ Madrasa/ religious group or party [female wing of Jamad-e-Islami, Ahel-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamad, Al-Huda, Dawat-e-Islami, or any other]/ religious sect [Fiqah]/religious organization [Jamad-ud-Dawah, Sipasahaba, Harqat-ul-Mujahidin, or any other]

## **Designation**

- **Research Questions**

1. Interview questions

- Inspiration and their references (some interview questions are adapted)
- a. Probe questions

- What factors at international and regional level led the Muslims to be divided into in-group and out-group and how this in-group formation supplied the fuel to the process of radicalization in Islamic world?
  - Kepel, Gilles. (2006) *Jihad: The trail of political Islam*. IB Tauris.
1. Whether U.S. and Europe has some role to sow the seeds of radicalization among Muslim society?
    - a) Do you think that to win in Cold War, west has promoted extremist thoughts among Muslims via Afghan ‘Jihad’?
    - b) How War on Terror divided the world between ‘us vs them’?
    - c) Whether the Policy of Dual containment strengthened extremist ideas and beliefs in Muslim society?
  2. Why religious-minded Muslims dislike or abhor west?
    - a) What is your opinion on the role of U.S. and Europe in Yemen crisis, Iraq invasion, Syrian civil war, and Libyan conflict?
    - b) How you look at west and its role in Palestine/Israel conflict, Kashmir insurgency, and Afghan crisis?
  3. Do you think that west is contaminating Islamic culture through modern values (second offence)?
  4. Why unipolar world augmented the hatred among Muslims against west?
    - Nye, J. S. (1992). What new world order? *Foreign Affairs*, 71(2), 83-96.
    - a) How the concept of ‘clash of civilization’ created the gap between the Muslim world and U.S. and Europe?
    - Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), *The Clash of Civilizations?* in "Foreign Affairs", vol. 72, no. 3, Summer, pp. 22–49.

- b) Why Muslims perceived U.S. as the greatest enemy to Islam (policy of global domination (end of history))
- Fukuyama, Francis. (1989) *The End of History?* The National Interest.
5. How and why traditional/religious Muslims have been stigmatized and stereotyped by west (From Mujahidin to terrorists 'stigmatization at international level')?
- Chomsky, Noam (1989). *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*. Pantheon.
  - Said, Edward (1980). "Islam Through Western Eyes". The Nation.
6. How Relative deprivation between west and Muslims generated negative sentiments among Muslims and west (us vs them)?
- Gurr, Ted Robert. (1971) *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press.
  - Pisiou, D. (2011). *Islamist radicalisation in Europe: an occupational change process*. Routledge.
    - a. In what way globalization accelerated the process of in-group and out-group formation (for example, online websites)?
  - Moghaddam, F. M. (2008). *How globalization spurs terrorism: The lopsided benefits of "one world" and why that fuels violence*. Praeger Security International.
7. Is there any role of Muslims to negotiate with the stigmatized religious identity?
- Peek, L. (2005) Becoming Muslim: the development of a religious identity. *Sociology of Religion*, 66 (3), pp. 215-242.
    - a. How and why Muslim leadership constructed religious identity?
    - b. In what way Iranian Revolution provided the example to the Muslims to be dominated at world stage?
  - Fischer, Michael M.J.,(1980) *Iran, From Religious Dispute to Revolution*, Michael M.J. Fischer, Harvard University Press, p.31.
    - c. Whether oil importance in international market revolutionized the religious thoughts of Muslims?

- d. Why religious educational institutes and groups emerged at a great number among Muslim society in post-colonial era?
  - e. How intellectual revolution (Syed Qutab, Maulana Moududi, Ali Shariti, and *Ruhollah Khomeini*) engaged Muslims in in-group process?
- Krauthammer, Charles. (1990/1991). "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1.
  - What drivers at domestic level augmented the process of in-group formation on the bases of religion and how religious in-group formation led people in Pakistan to the road of radicalization?
- Haqqani, Hussain (2005). *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; From Islamic Republic to Islamic State*. United States: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 148.
  - Hiro, Dilip. (2012) *Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia*, Yale University Press.
  - Abbas, H. (2004). *Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and America's war on terror*. ME Sharpe
- 1) Why in late 70's religious institutions (Madrasas) increased rapidly in Pakistan?
    - Bano M. (2007) *Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi madrasa in Pakistan*. *Islamic studies*, 18,
      - a. Whether Saudi Arabia influenced religious lobby in Pakistan?
  - 2) How Zia's Martial law amplified and boosted up the traditional/religious mentality?
    - b. What kind of society was created during and after zia's regime?
      - Hoodbhoy, Pervez, (1991) *Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality* London: Zed, pp. 140-54.
  - 3) Do you think that religious elements and liberal lobby has a conflict over rules and laws in Pakistan?
    - Rahman, F. (1973). Islam and the new constitution of Pakistan. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 8(3), 190.
      - a) Why the constitution of the country is always criticized by the religious groups?

- 4) Do you think that religious minorities are enjoying all rights given in the constitution of Pakistan (Asya Bibi and Salman tasir case)?
  - a) What do you think about Mumtaz Qadri?
- 5) Do you see the minorities in society to have Second class citizenship?
  - a) Why young Hindu girls are forced to marry with Muslim men and embrace Islam (particularly in Sindh)?
- 6) Why the culture of Ishtima is promoted among females?
  - a) How through Ishtima females are convinced to be purely religious?
  - b) What kind of knowledge is provided to the females in these Ishtimas?
  - c) Whether online modes are utilized to spread religious views?
- Bari, Farzana.(2010) "Gendered perceptions and impact of terrorism/talibanization in Pakistan." *Islamabad: Henrich Boll Stiftung*.
  - Whether social identity, stigmatization, and identity negotiation played the role as driving dynamism to push or pull Pakistani religiously affiliated women to the path of nonviolent or violent radicalization?
- Ting-Toomey, S. (1993). Communication resourcefulness: An identity-negotiation perspective. In R. Wiseman & J. Koester (Eds.), *Intercultural communication competence* (pp. 72-111). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. *The social psychology of intergroup relations*, 33(47), 74.
- Swann, W. B. (1987) Identity negotiation: where two roads meet, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53 (6), pp. 1038-1051.
- Goffman, E (1963). *Stigma. Englewood Cliffs*, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. *Political Psychology*, 21, 405–420.
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- Kusserow, Sebastian and Pawlak, Patryk (2015), Understanding Jihadand Jihadism, *European Parliamentary Research Service*.
- Borum, Randy. (2011), “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol. 4, Issue 4.

- C. Crossett and J. Spitaletta. (2010). *Radicalization: Relevant psychological and sociological concepts* Ft. Meade, MD: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group.
  - Jacques, K., & Taylor, P. J. (2013). Myths and realities of female-perpetrated terrorism. *Law and human behavior*, 37(1), 35.
  - Neumann, P. (2008). Perspectives on radicalisation and political violence. *London, England: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*
- 1) How and why you developed strong religious identity?
    - a. How u joined this group or institution (your aspirations or any phenomenon in your life)?
    - b. How much u attach with your group or institute (sense of belonging)?
    - c. Do u feel proud after becoming the part of the particular group or institution ‘madrassa’ (source of pride)?
    - d. Do u recognize yourself with your group and Are u identified due to your group by others (social identification)?
    - e. Do u behave as your group or institution expects from u (social identification)?
  - Harris, K., Gringart, E., & Drake, D. (2014). *Understanding the role of social groups in radicalization*. Australian Computer Society Harvard University Press.
  - 2) What do u think about religious minded women and modern/liberal female segments of society (prejudicial beliefs)?
    - a) Do u think that traditional/religious and modern/liberal females are two categories in Pakistan (social categorization)?
    - b) Do u think the religious women and religious institutions/groups are better than modern/liberal groups or institutions (social comparison ‘prestige and social standing’)?
    - c) Can u explain that what are the differences between you and modern females of society? (Minimal group paradigm)
  - 3) Do u prefer your individual identity or the identity given by your group (de-individuation and collective identity)?
    - Bandura, A. (1990). “Mechanisms of moral disengagement”. In W. Reich (Ed.), *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (pp. 161-191). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  - 4) Do u perceive liberal/western values a threat to Islam (threat perception)?
    - Al Raffie, D. (2013). Social identity theory for investigating Islamic extremism in the diaspora. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 6(4), 67-91.
  - 5) How and why identity of religious-oriented women is stigmatized?
    - a. Do u face some negative behaviour towards u from liberal segments of society?
    - b. Are you ever labelled for your specific outlook?
    - c. Have you ever felt tension or depression because of deleterious behavior of modern spheres?



- Cox, William T. L.; Abramson, Lyn Y.; Devine, Patricia G.; Hollon, Steven D. (2012). "Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Depression: The Integrated Perspective". *Perspectives on Psychological Science*. 7 (5): 427–49. Doi:10.1177/1745691612455204. PMID 26168502.
- 6) Is u treated in the same way in society as modern women or u face any kind of discrimination?
  - Watkins, F., & Jacoby, A. (2007). Is the rural idyll bad for your health? Stigma and exclusion in the English countryside. *Health & Place*, 13(4), 851-864.
- 7) Are you discredited by others as u put hijab or burka and offer prayers?
  - Goffman, E (1963). *Stigma*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
  - a. Do u feel some isolation in marriages or birthday parties?
    - Jones, E. E., Farina, A., Hastorf, A., Markus, H., Miller, D. & Scott, R. (1984). *Social stigma: The psychology of marked relationships*. New York: W. H. Freeman.
  - b. Is u devalued because u have studied from a madrasa rather from a college or university?
    - Crocker, J., Major, B., & Steele, C. (1998). Social stigma. In D. Gilbert, and S. Fiske (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 504-53). New York: Oxford University Press.
- 8) Do u have access to social, economic, and political power as liberal women in society?
  - Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. C. (2001). Conceptualizing stigma. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 363-385.
  - a. Do u face discrimination in the realms of employment and housing?
    - Bordieri, J. E.; Drehmer, D. E. (1986). "Hiring Decisions for Disabled Workers: Looking at the Cause". *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*. 16 (3): 197–208. Doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1986.tb01135.x.
  - b. Is your earning being equal to those who work in modern institutional system (economic inequality)?
    - De Mesquita, E. B. (2008). The political economy of terrorism: A selective overview of recent work. *The Political Economist*, 10(1), 1-12.
  - c. Do u have equal voice in media and civil society (social exclusion and marginalization)?
    - Gurr, Ted Robert. (1971) *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press.
  - d. Do u feel that your standard of living is balanced with the liberal/modern women (wider horizontal inequalities between so-called normal and the stigmatized)?
    - Makki, M. (2015), Coal Seam Gas Development and Community Conflict: A Comparative Study of Community Responses to Coal Seam Gas Development in Chinchilla and Tara, Queensland. A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. School of Communication and Arts. University of Queensland.

- 9) Whether the religious institutes ‘madrasas’ are negatively seen in liberal segments of society (stigmatized place or disadvantaged location)?
- a. What do u think that Madrasas have unhygienic living conditions for the students while modern educational institutes are more likely to be ideal for living?
    - Harvey, D. (1996). *Justice, nature, and the geography of difference*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
  - b. Can u explain that whether madrasas and teachers in madrasas are heavy dependence on social welfare?
    - Harvey, D. (1996). *Justice, nature, and the geography of difference*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
  - c. What do u think that the government also behave differently (discrimination at a structural level)?
    - Makki, M. (2015), Coal Seam Gas Development and Community Conflict: A Comparative Study of Community Responses to Coal Seam Gas Development in Chinchilla and Tara, Queensland. A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. School of Communication and Arts. University of Queensland.
- 10) How the religious-oriented women negotiate with their stigmatized identity?
- Read, J. G. and Bartkowski, J. P. (2000) To veil or not to veil? A case study of identity negotiation among Muslim women in Austin. *Texas, Gender and Society*, 14 (3), pp. 395-417.
    - a. Do u find your like-minded people, when u go in social gatherings?
  - Swann Jr, W. B., & Pelham, B. W. (1988). The social construction of identity: Self-verification through friend and intimate selection. *Unpublished manuscript, University of Texas, Austin*.
  - Swann, W. B., Jr., & Predmore, S. C. (1985). Intimates as agents of social support: Sources of consolation or despair? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49, 1609-1617.
    - b. Is u more attach with those who have the identity same of u “visible and non-visible appearance” (the interpersonal "glue" that holds relationships together)?
- 11) Do u feel more comfortable with those who give positive feedback to your outlook and thoughts (behavioral confirmation and self-verification)?
- Swann, W. B., Jr., & Ely, R. J. (1984). A battle of wills: Self-verification versus behavioral confirmation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 46, 1287-1302.
  - Swann, W. B., Jr., & Read, S. J. (1981a). Acquiring self-knowledge: The search for feedback that fits. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 41, 1119-1128.
    - a. Do u interact with specific and selective people or social environment which positively evaluate your identities (selective social interaction)?

- Abdul-Jabbar, W. K. (2019). *Negotiating diasporic identity in Arab-Canadian students: Double consciousness, belonging, and radicalization*. Springer.
  - Swann, W. B., Jr., & Giuliano, T. (in press). Confirmatory search strategies in social interaction: When, how, why, and with what consequences. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*.
  - Pervin, L. A., & Rubin, D. B. (1967). Student dissatisfaction with college and the college dropout: A transactional approach. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 72, 285-295.
- 12) Do u wish to be empowered socially, politically, and economically by maintaining your identity (connection-autonomy)?
- Swann, W. B., Jr., and Hill, C. A. (1986). Some cognitive consequences of threats to the self. *Unpublished data, University of Texas at Austin*.
  - a. Has u ever experienced that your identity is vulnerable because of liberal/modern feminine spheres (Identity security- vulnerability)?
  - b. Do u wish to be included in social/political realms with your identity (inclusion differentiation)?
  - c. Do u like to live in the specific social environment (predictability-unpredictability)?
  - d. Does u dislike those who wish to alter your identity (identity consistency-change across time)? Has u ever thought to alter your identity (outlook) if yes what behavior u faced from your social circles (**changing negotiating identity as a complicated process**)?**
  - Swann, W. B., Jr., & Hill, C. A. (1982). When our identities are mistaken: Reaffirming self-conceptions through social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 43, 59-66.
13. Do u reflect your identity in way of dressing and way of communicating (identity cues)?
- Zimmerman, D. D. (2013). *Identity negotiation of young Arab Muslim women attending college in the United States and France* (Doctoral dissertation, Loyola University Chicago).
  - Why and how the stigmatized and negotiated identity leads the religious-motivated Pakistani women to meet with nonviolent or violent radicalization process?
  - *Murphy, Eamon (2013). The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism. Routledge.*

- Rahman, T. (2007). Madrasas: the potential for violence in Pakistan? In *Madrasas in South Asia* (pp. 71-94). Routledge.
- Noor. Sabah, (2011) Women Suicide Bombers: An Emerging Security Challenge for Pakistan. *CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*. Volume 3 Issue 11.
- Malik, Jamal, ed. 2008. *Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror?* London and New York: Routledge.
- 1. Why you devoted yourself for Islam?
  - a. Is any memory (loss of closed relative) motivated you to be purely religious and devoted for Islam?
- Fink, Naureen Chowdhury. Rafia Bakarar, Liat Shetret. “The Role of Women in Terrorism, Conflict, and Violent Extremism: Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors,” *Global Center on Cooperative Security*, Policy Brief, (April 2013).
  - b. whether any closed relative or friend showed this path to serve religion?
- 2. Have you ever felt extreme hatred in your heart against any of woman or man who was highly liberal?
  - Post, J. M. (2010). “When hatred is bred in the bone:” the social psychology of terrorism. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1208(1), 15-23.
- 3. Whether in changing political order, either legal process is enough or illegal means should be applied (violence)?
  - a) What do u think that violence without the permission of state (illegal means) can be used to change social/political order (legitimation and justification of violence)?
  - b) Do u think that the time has come to implement Islamic system (sharia) throughout the globe (sense of urgency and emergency)?
  - c) How do u reflect religion ‘Islam’ In your socialization (use of religion in socialization and motivation towards jehad through weapon, pen, internet, or any other mean)?
- 4. Is there any capacity in Islam for liberal/modern values (way to compromise)?
  - a) Do u participate in democratic elections (vote, or any other political activity (disliking of prevailing democratic/political order)?
- 5. What is your opinion about Jihad (no direct involvement but support for those who do jehad)?
  - a. How u see the campaign of ttp (sentiments of sympathy)?
  - b. The people who are attach with current movements like Daish, alquida/Taliban, in your opinion, why they are fighting?
- Bloom, M. (2017). Constructing expertise: Terrorist recruitment and “talent spotting” in the PIRA, Al Qaeda, and ISIS. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 40(7), 603-623.
- c. What do u think about suicide phenomenon in Muslim world?

- Witlox, M. (2012). What motivates female suicide terrorists? *Social Cosmos*, 3(1), 40-46.
- Okowita. Samantha Louise, Female Suicide Terrorism: An analysis of trends and group motivations linked to the increase in female participation as suicide bombers. A Thesis Presented for the Master of Arts Degree. The University of Tennessee, Knoxville. (May 2017).

6. How do you see the females of Jamia-Hafsa, whether their strategy was right?

a) Which kind of role a female should play in implementing ‘Sharia’?

- Spencer, Amanda N. (2015), The hidden face of terrorism, an analysis of the women in Islamic State, *Journal of Strategic Security* 9:3.

b) Whether women can contribute in practical ‘Jihad’ (the concept of Mujahidat)?

c) Would you prefer to join some kind of activity related to ‘Jihad’?

d) How much you are enthusiastic for ‘martyrdom’?

7. What is your opinion about those females who marry with ‘Mujahidin’ (fighting in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Palestine) [the concept of ‘Jehadi brides’]?

- Pearson, E. (2016). The case of roshonara choudhry: Implications for theory on online radicalization, ISIS women, and the gendered jihad. *Policy & Internet*, 8(1), 5-33.
  - How stigmatized and negotiated identity of religious females is exploited by the extremist organization to recruit them for nonviolent and violent activities?
- Von Knop, K. (2007). The female jihad: Al Qaeda's women. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(5), 397-414.
- Cunningham, Karla J. (2007) "Countering female terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 2.
- Ahmed, Zahid Shahab. (2017) Local approaches to preventing violent extremism in Pakistan. Research report. Peace Direct. Dania Ali/Stars Foundation/Aware Girls.

- Khan, AU. (2015) “De-Radicalization of Pakistani Society”. *Journal of Research in Social Sciences*. Fani, M. I. (2020). Non-Academic Reforms for Madaris System in Pakistan. *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan–Vol. No, 57(1)*.

1. Whether ideology of the religious organizations inspire the members to be adhered?

- Von Knop, K. (2007). The female jihad: Al Qaeda's women. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(5)*, 397-414.

a. What mode is availed to galvanize the females to adopt the particular ideology (print literature, internet, or face to face interaction)?

2. Why the women particularly belonging to lower background are attracted towards the religious groups?

- Von Knop, K. (2007). The female jihad: Al Qaeda's women. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(5)*, 397-414.

a. How much poverty plays its role to push or pull women towards religious organizations?

b. Whether they are given financial benefits?

- Abadie, A. (2006). Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism. *American Economic Review, 96(2)*, 50-56.

3. Why divorced, widow, orphen and old unmarried women mostly and quite frequently join the religious organizations/groups (social marginalization/exclusion)?

- Von Knop, K. (2007). The female jihad: Al Qaeda's women. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(5)*, 397-414.

- Khan K. and A Kiran. (2012) “[Emerging tendencies of radicalization in Pakistan: a proposed counter-radicalization strategy](#)”. *Strategic Studies*.

a. Whether they are promised to be honoured and respected in the group?

4. Why religious-oriented women (studied from any Madrasa, easily move towards extremist/terrorist organization like TTP or AL-Qaida or Daish/ISIS (this question specifically targets terrorist organizations and violently radicalized women)?

- Von Knop, K. (2007). The female jihad: Al Qaeda's women. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(5), 397-414.
- Khan, R. (2013) “The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the Madrasas of Pakistan”. *Asian Affairs*. Volume 44. Issue 2.

a. Whether the sense of revenge works effectively?

b. How much Promises of honour and glory plays its role?

c. How much ideology has potential to fascinate the members?

d. Whether economic incentives are provided to the members by the extremist groups?

- Kazmi. Sf and T. Pervez. (2011) “Socio Economic and Cultural Perspectives of Terrorism in Pakistan and the Madrassa (Mosque) Students”. *International Journal of Academic*.

## References

### A. Research Participants

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- Ahmed, Z. S., & Jafri, Q. A. (2020). Drivers of violent extremism in higher education institutions of Pakistan. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 13(3), 230-244.
- Alia, Nusrat. (July 31, 2021). "Selective interaction and strong intimacy with Madrasa". Noor-UI-Huda. Kalarkahar.
- Akram, Faizan. (October 13, 2021). "Socio-religious identity". Noor-UI-Huda. Quetta.
- Arooj, Asma. (April 29, 2021). "Stigma management strategies". Noor-UI-Huda. Islamabad.
- Aysha, Bibi. (August 02, 2021). "Identity negotiation and religious environment". Noor-UI-Huda. Faisalabad.
- Akhtari, Parveen. (October 14, 2021). "Negative behaviors of liberal society with religious outlook". Noor-UI-Huda. Quetta.
- Aziz, Ashraf. (October 17, 2021). "Increasing radicalization in Pakistan". Noor-UI-Huda. Chaman.
- Baloch, Afzal. (September 21, 2021). "Religious environment in Madrasas". Noor-UI-Huda. Bahawalpur.
- Bano, Bilqis. (September 14, 2021). "Construction of socio-religious identity". Noor-UI-Huda. Pakpatan.
- Batool, Sameena. (October 22, 2021). "Hesitation in social gatherings because of having Hijab and Pardah". Noor-UI-Huda. Pasheen



- Baigam, Fozia. (September 17, 2021). "Motivation towards religion: loss of loved ones". Noor-UI-Huda. Bahawalpur
- Banaras, Shumaila. (July 31, 2021). "Fascination towards religious education: strong attachment with Madrasas". Noor-UI-Huda. Kalarkahar
- Bibi, Amna. (July 29, 2021). "Breaking of social relations due to religious identity of women". Noor-UI-Huda. Jhang
- Danish, Qari Sulaiman. (June 14, 2021). "The concept of Jihad and its importance for females". Noor-UI-Huda. Layyah
- Faiza, Noureen. (April 26, 2021). "The difference between the religious and modern segments in society". Noor-UI-Huda. Islamabad
- Farukh, Sadia. (May 12, 2021). "Stigma and identity negotiation process". Noor-UI-Huda. Karachi
- Fatima, Dua. (January 15, 2022). "Adoption of religious identity by Pakistani women". Noor-UI-Huda. RawalPindi
- Female head of a religious institute. (August 17, 2021). "Poverty and motivation to religion". Noor-UI-Huda. Faisalabad
- Female Teacher at Al-Huda, (August 12, 2021). "Promotion of radicalization by religious institutions". Noor-UI-Huda. Multan
- Female Head. Of a Madrasa. (June 14, 2021). "Social welfare and running of religious system". Noor-UI-Huda. Layyah
- Gul, Fatima. (January 19, 2022). "Madrasas as shelter for socially excluded women". Noor-UI-Huda. RawalPindi
- Gulnaz, Nasreen. (December 11, 2021). "Promoting ideologies among feminine spheres in religious institutions". Noor-UI-Huda. Naushehra

- Hadia, Khadija. (July 31, 2021). "Socio-inequalities: pathetic living conditions of Madrasas". Noor-UI-Huda. kalarkahar
- Head at Al-Huda, (August 04, 2021). "Moving of Pakistani religious women towards radicalization". Noor-UI-Huda. Lahore
- Ishmat, Rukhsana. (August 2, 2021). "Stigmatized religious identity and social marginalization". Noor-UI-Huda. Gujranwala
- Jamal, Naheed. (August 19, 2021). "Woman's role in Jihad". Noor-UI-Huda. Gujranwala
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- Kiran, Shehzadi. (December 09, 2021). "Involvement of females in violent activities". Noor-UI-Huda. Sawat
- kousar, Nabila. (January 05, 2022). "Zero-tolerance for nonreligious acts". Noor-UI-Huda. Islamabad
- Malik, Mahnoor. (January 11, 2022). "Identity negotiation process among religious-oriented women". Noor-UI-Huda. Islamabad
- Maulana, Ghulam Rasool. (August 07, 2021). "Poverty and religion and involvement of religious institutions in radicalization". Multan
- Mehmood, Tariq. (April 31, 2021). "Islamic identity under cultural attack". Noor-UI-Huda. RawalPindi
- Misbah, Sabahat. (August 03, 2021). "Importance of religious education for girls and social exclusion of women". Noor-UI-Huda. Lahore
- Muqaddas, Noor. (January 03, 2022). "Jihadi aspirations and socialization of children". Noor-UI-Huda. Islamabad

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- Mussarat, Kulsoom. (August 8, 2021). "Dynamics of Radicalization." Noor-UI-Huda. Lahore
- Nahid, Kishwar. (November 10, 2021). "Fulfillment of basic needs by Madrasas and free education". Noor-UI-Huda. Peshawar
- Nazia, Rukhsar. (May 05, 2021). "Religious motivation and stigma management strategies". Noor-UI-Huda. Sukkur
- Nazima (female head of a city appointed by the religious party). (May 15, 2021). "Significance of Hijab for women for saving society from deviation". Noor-UI-Huda. Karachi
- Najma, Bibi. (August 06, 2021). "Online preaching and earning of religious-minded females". Noor-UI-Huda. Lahore Jamat Islami
- Nasira, Hamida. (August 05, 2021). "Establishment of global Islamic government". Noor-UI-Huda. Sialkot
- Noor, Hamna. (September 14, 2021). "Poverty and religion: unavailabilities of fundamental needs". Noor-UI-Huda. Pakpattan
- Noreen, Palwasha. (January 09, 2022). "Providing education on Jihad to women in Madrasas". Noor-UI-Huda. Islamabad
- Rabani, Mufti Mubashir. (August 03, 2021). "Discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion of religiously motivated females". Noor-UI-Huda. Lahore
- Rashida, Mobeen. (May 19, 2021). "Closed social environment in religious institutions and distance from worldly life". Noor-UI-Huda. Karachi

- Rukhsana, Sabra. (August 11, 2021). "Religious understanding: increasing negative behaviors in society". Noor-UI-Huda. Multan
- Saqina, Riffat. (July 30, 2021). "Development of socio-religious identity". Noor-UI-Huda. Sargodha
- Safeena, Bibi. (July 31, 2021). "Religious motivation and socio-economic inequalities". Noor-UI-Huda. Kallar Kahar Chakwal
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