

**Conflictual Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan; Impact on Socio-political and Economic Aspects of the Society**



By

Maham Shahbaz Bandesha

(Registration No: 00000400627)

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies Centre for International

Peace and Stability

National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)

Islamabad, Pakistan(2024)

# **Conflictual Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan; Impact on Socio-political and Economic Aspects of the Society**



By

Maham Shahbaz Bandesha

(Registration No: 00000400627)

A thesis submitted to the National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad, in

partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science in

Peace and Conflict Studies

Supervisor: Dr. Najimdeen Bakare

Centre of International Peace and Stability

National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST)

Islamabad, Pakistan(2024)


## THESIS ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE

Certified that final copy of MS Thesis written by Mr / Ms Maham Shahbaz (Registration No. 0000400627), of PCS, CIPS (School/College/Institute) has been vetted by undersigned, found complete in all respects as per NUST Statutes/ Regulations/ Masters Policy, is free of plagiarism, errors, and mistakes and is accepted as partial fulfillment for award of Masters degree. It is further certified that necessary amendments as point out by GEC members and foreign/ local evaluators of the scholar have also been incorporated in the said thesis.


Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ 

Name of Supervisor Dr Najimdeen Bakare

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature (HOD): \_\_\_\_\_ 

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature (Dean/ Principal) \_\_\_\_\_  **ASSOCIATE DEAN**  
Centre for International Peace and Stability  
NUST Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies  
Islamabad

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

# National University of Sciences & Technology

## MASTER THESIS WORK

We hereby recommend that the dissertation prepared under our supervision by:  
(Student Name & Regn No.) Maham Shahbaz (0000400627)  
Titled: "Conflictual Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan; Impact on Socio-political and Economic Aspects of the Society" be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of MS PCS degree and awarded grade \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ (Initial).

### Examination Committee Members

1. Name: Dr. Muhammad Makki Signature: [Signature]
2. Name: Dr. Anwar Jamil Signature: [Signature]
3. Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Supervisor's name: Dr. Najamdeen Bakare Signature: [Signature]  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_

[Signature]  
Head of Department

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

### COUNTERSIGNED

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

[Signature]  
Dean/Principal

ASSOCIATE DEAN  
Centre for International Peace and Stability  
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies  
Islamabad

### CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

This is to certify that the research work presented in this thesis, entitled "Conflictual Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan; Impact on Socio-political and Economic Aspects of the Society" was conducted by Ms Maham Shahbaz under the supervision of Dr Najimdeen Bakare.

No part of this thesis has been submitted anywhere else for any other degree. This thesis is submitted to the PCS, CIPS, NUST in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Field of Peace and Conflict Studies.


Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad.

Student Name: Maham Shahbaz

Signature: 

Examination Committee:

a) External Examiner 1: Dr. Muhammed Makki

Signature: 


b) External Examiner 2: Dr. Ansar Jamil

Signature: 

Supervisor Dr Najimdeen Bakare:

Signature: 

Name of Dean/HOD Dr. Ansar Jamil:

Signature: 

ASSOCIATE DEAN  
Centre for International Peace and Stability  
NUST Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies  
Islamabad

### AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I Maham Shahbaz hereby state that my MS thesis titled "Conflictual Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan; Impact on Socio-political and Economic Aspects of the Society" is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad or anywhere else in the country/world.

At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after I graduate, the university has the right to withdraw my MS degree.

Name of Student: Maham Shahbaz

Date: \_\_\_\_\_



### PLAGIARISM UNDERTAKING

I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled "Conflictual Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan; Impact on Socio-political and Economic Aspects of the Society" is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/ help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.

I understand the zero tolerance policy of the HEC and National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad towards plagiarism. Therefore, I as an author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited.

I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after award of MS degree, the University reserves the rights to withdraw/revoke my MS degree and that HEC and NUST, Islamabad has the right to publish my name on the HEC/University website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.

Student Signature: \_\_\_\_\_



Name: Maham Shahbaz

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate my work to my homeland and its people, who have been braving odds stacked up against them for the last 77 years. I dedicate this body of work to the resilience of my Balochis and Pashtuns and most importantly, to 'civilians'.



## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I would like to thank Allah Almighty, the most merciful and kind, who granted me strength and knowledge. My acknowledgement and thanks include my parents, whose financial and emotional support helped me through this endeavor. My ever-so-kind research supervisor, Dr Najimdeen Bakare deserves my most heartfelt gratitude and reverence. My friends, Zushmalen (Rania Iqbal Afridi), Saad Kausar (Babbah), Wazir Yasir Abbas Munaq (Singay) and Asma Ashraf Chohan who have made my MS journey the most beautiful and memorable chunk of my life. My mates, Rania, Singay and Babbah are the physical embodiment of ‘the blood of the covenant is thicker than the water of the womb’, and I wish nothing short of a happy, fulfilled and content life for them. Ameen!

# Contents

List of Figures .....	xii
List of Tables .....	xiii
List of Abbreviations.....	xiv
<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	<b>xv</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>Background</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>Problem Statement</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Research Assumption</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Research Questions</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Aims and Objectives</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Research Significance</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Thesis Outline</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Chapter 1</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>Chapter 2</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>2.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>Chapter 3</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>3. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>3.1 Theory</b> .....	<b>29</b>
3.1.1 Application of Theory of Concordance .....	29
3.1.2 The Impact of the ‘Colonial Experience’ .....	30
3.1.3 Strategies to Empower Citizenry .....	32
3.1.4 Alternate Theoretical Frameworks .....	34
<b>Chapter 4</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>4.1 Socio-Political</b> .....	<b>37</b>
4.1.1 Civil Bureaucracy vis-à-vis Military Bureaucracy .....	37
4.1.2 Governance .....	42
4.1.3 Accountability and Judiciary .....	47
<b>Chapter 5</b> .....	<b>53</b>

<b>5. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS .....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>5.1 Economy .....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>5.2 CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>APPENDICES .....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>Appendix 1 .....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>64</b>

## List of Figures

Figure 1 composition of interviewees.....	21
Figure 2 Flow Matrix 2 Principal-Agent Relationship in Pakistan .....	29
Figure 3 Sprawling MBEs .....	58
Figure 4 the spill-over control of military .....	60

## **List of Tables**

Table 1 Coding Mechanism of Interviewees .....	22
--	----

## List of Abbreviations

AWT	Army Welfare Trust
BF	Bahria Foundation
CJP	Chief Justice of Pakistan
CMR	Civil Military Relations
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSS	Central Superior Services
DHA	Defence Housing Authority
DMG	District Management Group
FF	Fauji Foundation
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FPSC	Federal Public Service Commission
FWO	Frontier Works Organization
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JC	Judicial Commission
MBEs	Military Backed Enterprises
MI	Military Intelligence
NAB	National Accountability Bureau
NCC	National Coordination Committee
NCOC	National Command and Operation Center
NDC	National Development Council
NICC	National Intelligence Coordination Committee
NLC	National Logistics Cell
NSC	National Security Committee
PC	Parliamentary Committee
PCO	Provisional Constitution Order
PECA	The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act
PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
PIA	Pakistan International Airline
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PMO	Prime Minister Office
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PSMC	Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
SF	Shaheen Foundation
SIFC	Special Investment Facilitation Council

## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the conflictual civil-military relations in Pakistan and their profound impact on the country's socio-political and economic landscape. Drawing on historical analysis, theoretical frameworks, and empirical evidence from semi-structured interviews, the research argues that the military's enduring dominance in Pakistani society has hindered democratic consolidation, undermined civilian institutions, and exacerbated existing social and economic inequalities. The study explores the colonial legacy that laid the groundwork for a powerful military-bureaucratic oligarchy in Pakistan. It analyzes how this oligarchy, dominated by a particular ethnic group, has consistently prioritized its interests over those of the broader population, leading to social fragmentation and political instability. The thesis scrutinizes the military's pervasive influence in governance, even during periods of civilian rule, arguing that this influence has taken various forms, from direct intervention through coups to more indirect forms of control through institutions like the National Security Committee. The research examines how this enduring military presence has undermined civilian supremacy, eroded public trust in democratic processes, and hampered the development of a robust and accountable civilian government. Furthermore, the thesis critically examines the military's extensive involvement in Pakistan's economy through its vast network of business ventures, collectively termed "Milbus". It investigates how this military-controlled internal economy has created an uneven playing field for private businesses, stifled competition, and potentially diverted resources from crucial social sectors. The research scrutinizes arguments made by both proponents and critics of Milbus, exploring the potential economic benefits and drawbacks of this unique system. However, the study ultimately argues that the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding Milbus, coupled with its intertwined nature with the military's political power, raises serious concerns about fairness, corruption, and the long-term health of Pakistan's economy. The thesis concludes by emphasizing the urgent need for comprehensive reforms aimed at strengthening civilian institutions, promoting democratic accountability, and addressing the structural imbalances that underpin Pakistan's conflictual civil-military relations. It suggests that achieving a more equitable, stable, and prosperous Pakistan necessitates a fundamental shift in the balance of power, where civilian authority is unequivocally supreme and the military is confined to its constitutionally mandated role of national defense.

**Keywords:** civil-military relations, oligarchy, governance, Milbus, civilian authority

## Introduction

Civil Military Relations have been an avenue of research and interest. There have been different trends of civil-military relations pre and post-Cold war. In Pre-Cold war era, militaries were placed as drivers of modernisation then, whereas in post Cold war era the literature tilted in the favor of participatory democracy and segregation of both spheres, civil and military. As democratic norms consolidated in the third world, different patterns of civil-military relations emerged. Pakistan is one such example, where after independence from British Colonisation in 1947 and consequent partition, democratic norms were not institutionalized sustainably. Pakistan has had an uneven and conflictual past of civil-military relations, that has translated into present realities.

There exists an intricate and often fraught dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan, producing a persistent conflict. This conflict has cast a long shadow over the country's socio-political and economic trajectory. Drawing on historical analysis, theoretical frameworks, and empirical evidence from semi-structured interviews with academics, policymakers, and practitioners, this research aims to unveil the intricate ways in which the military's enduring dominance has shaped Pakistan's development, often at the expense of democratic consolidation, institutional integrity, and equitable economic growth.

The genesis of Pakistan's civil-military imbalances can be traced back to its colonial inheritance. As highlighted by Alavi and Hussain, the British Raj bequeathed a robust military-bureaucratic apparatus designed primarily to control the local populace rather than serve its needs<sup>1</sup>. This “overdeveloped state apparatus” in Alavi's words, persisted after partition, fundamentally shaping the power dynamics of the newly formed state. Within this structure, a “Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy” emerged, composed primarily of Punjabi military and civilian bureaucrats who leveraged their ethnic dominance and control over key institutions to secure their interests. This historical context, as emphasized by several interviewees, laid the groundwork for a system where the military enjoyed significant autonomy and influence from the outset, a reality that has profoundly shaped Pakistan's trajectory ever since.

The thesis scrutinizes the evolution of this military dominance, tracing its manifestations through various periods of Pakistan's history. While direct military interventions in the form of coups have been a recurring feature, as evident in the country's record of having spent nearly half its existence under military rule, the research also examines the more insidious ways in which the military has permeated the political sphere even during periods of civilian governance. This enduring influence has taken various forms, from the establishment of powerful institutions like the National Security Committee (NSC)<sup>2</sup>, dominated by military figures, to the more subtle

---

<sup>1</sup> Hamza Alavi, “The State in Postcolonial Societies,” *Pakistan Monthly Review*, August 2024, <https://pakistanmonthlyreview.com/the-state-in-postcolonial-societies/>; Ejaz Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State,” *PCD Journal*, January 1, 2012, 113–46, <https://www.neliti.com/publications/385/pakistan-civil-military-relations-in-a-post-colonial-state>.

<sup>2</sup> Ejaz Hussain, “Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil–military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan,” in *Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan: Governance, Development and Environment* (Routledge, 2020), 73–92.; Madan Lal, “CHANGING PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN PAKISTAN,” *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 71, no. 2 (2010): 635–49.



manipulation of political processes and decision-making through backdoor channels and informal networks of power.

The research critically analyzes how this persistent military presence has eroded the foundations of democratic governance in Pakistan. As highlighted by several interviewees, the military's ability to influence or remove elected governments, as witnessed in the numerous instances of civilian premiers being ousted before completing their terms, has created a climate of uncertainty and fear, undermining the development of stable democratic institutions. This has fostered a culture of appeasement among civilian leaders, who often prioritize short-term political survival over challenging the military's dominance, further perpetuating the imbalance of power.

Beyond its political influence, significant attention to the Pakistani military's vast and opaque economic empire, often referred to as "Milbus"<sup>3</sup> is required. Drawing on Siddiq's comprehensive analysis in "Military Inc.", the research explores how this sprawling network of business ventures, encompassing sectors ranging from agriculture and real estate to banking and infrastructure, has become deeply intertwined with the country's economic fabric. While proponents, like the ex-serviceman interviewed for this research, argue that Milbus contributes to national development and steps in where civilian institutions falter, the thesis critically examines these claims, highlighting the inherent conflicts of interest and lack of transparency that plague this system.

The question of how the military's ability to leverage its political clout to secure preferential treatment, access state resources, and influence policy decisions has created an uneven playing field for private businesses in Pakistan, potentially stifling competition and discouraging private investment is explored. Drawing on interviews with economists and policymakers, the thesis analyzes the potential economic consequences of this imbalance, exploring whether the military's involvement in business hinders or helps Pakistan's overall economic growth and development. The research also examines the social implications of Milbus, investigating concerns about corruption, lack of accountability, and the potential for exacerbating existing inequalities as raised by critics like P14.

To comprehensively understand the complex dynamics at play, the thesis employs Rebecca Schiff's 'Concordance Theory' as a guiding framework, exploring its applicability and limitations within the Pakistani context. While Schiff's theory emphasizes the importance of agreement and partnership between the military, political elites, and citizenry for harmonious civil-military relations, the research critically assesses whether such a balance is attainable given Pakistan's historical trajectory and deeply entrenched power structures. Interviewees' perspectives on the potential for achieving concordance in Pakistan, along with their proposed alternative frameworks for understanding the country's civil-military dynamics, are analyzed in detail, highlighting the diversity of opinions within academia and policy circles.

This thesis contributes to the existing scholarship on civil-military relations by offering a nuanced and multifaceted examination of the Pakistani case, moving beyond simplistic narratives of military intervention or civilian weakness. It underscores the need to understand the historical, social, and economic factors that have

---

<sup>3</sup> Ayesha Siddiq, *Military Inc. - Second Edition*, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1h64kvc>.

contributed to the military's enduring dominance and its multifaceted impact on Pakistani society. Through rigorous analysis and empirical evidence, this research aims to shed light on the challenges of achieving a more balanced and democratic Pakistan, where civilian authority is supreme, institutions are accountable, and economic opportunities are available to all citizens, regardless of their position within the existing power structures.

## Background

Civil-military relations have been an object of intrigue due to the variety of patterns they exhibit. For this purpose, several scholars hailing from the disciplines of the social sciences crafted different models and theories to explain and categorize civil-military relations. Civil-military relations around the globe cannot be confined to, or modeled around a particular theory or explained via a bunch of concepts since this would negate the institutional and cultural processes unique to the nation-state. This fallacy was experienced while inspecting the civil-military relations of decolonized and other states that were transitioning to democracy. For instance, North and South-East Asian, former Soviet, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and industrialized Western economies all have differing patterns of civil-military relations.

Civil-military relations in Pakistan have not been smooth by any stretch and still oscillate between civil-military spheres being on one page and at odds. Pakistan has witnessed three coups, and almost half of the years since its inception in 1947 have been under dictatorships. Not only that, but during democratically elected civilian governments, the military yields massive influence inside the power corridors. Attempts to explore the ever-fluctuating dynamics of civil-military relations in the country have yielded moderate results. Classic, or 'normal' theories<sup>4</sup> concepts have fallen short to explain the predicament of Pakistani civil-military relations. This is remedied by adopting a relatively newer theory, 'theory of concordance'<sup>5</sup> that complements the unique case of Pakistan and offers valuable insights. Rebecca L. Schiff, deriving from the short-comings of the 'separation' theory<sup>6</sup> by Samuel Huntington, constructed a theory that explains the dynamics of civil-military relations via a three-thronged structure and keeps the historical and cultural sensitivities intact. This theory possesses the capability to explain the ins and outs of the subject to be researched thoroughly.

It is not a concealed fact that there is an acute dearth of good quality research on conflictual civil-military relations in Pakistan, and even less attention has been paid to the implications of this reality. Contentious civil-military relations impact political, economic, and social processes in a negative way. However, limited attempts have been made to explore the effects of the above stated dilemma in these aspects of society. These three interconnected aspects are chosen to unveil the influence of uneven relations. It is highly pertinent that Pakistani civil-military

---

<sup>4</sup> Janowitz. "Soldiers, Scholars, Liberals." *The Antioch Review*, 1957, 393–400. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4609990>.

<sup>5</sup> Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces & Society* 22, no. 1 (October 1, 1995): 7–24, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x9502200101>.

<sup>6</sup> Abdul Shakoor Khakwani, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: The Case of the Recent Military Intervention (October 12, 1999) and the Its Implications for Pakistan's Security Milieu," May 1, 2003, <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/items/34>.

relations are viewed through the broader lens of discordance<sup>7</sup> in civil military relations, and the effect of this discordance is gauged. Therefore, the question of how asymmetric relations impact political processes, institutional credibility, the social fabric of society, and the crest and troughs of economic performance, would be raised, and subsequent data would be collected via semi-structured interviews with politicians, policymakers, military personnel, journalists, and economists. This data would be supported by secondary sources as well.

## **Problem Statement**

Civil-military relations in Pakistan's context are not considered mainstream enough to produce good quality as well as quantity of research. It should not be said that no research in this direction has been carried out earlier. But most research has focused on the whys, hows, or what the reasons are behind military intervention in domestic politics and the mystery of coups. Also, research is dedicated to exploring outwardly, as in what are the implications of India, Afghanistan, or recently China's interactions with Pakistan. Inward reflection is the need of the hour. Research about Pakistan, the processes or events transpiring 'in' Pakistan, and the effects 'on' Pakistan. This is evidenced by the fact that limited research is present about Balochistan, or erstwhile FATA.

Therefore, the core purpose behind this research is to reflect inwardly and detect the changes and impacts, big or small, of asymmetric Pakistani civil-military relations 'on' Pakistan. Limited research has been carried out on conflictual civil-military relations in Pakistan and their impact on three aspects: society, politics, and economics. The interconnectedness of these three aspects would exhibit the effect of uneven relations viscerally.

## **Research Assumption**

This research claims that contentious civil-military relations in Pakistan result in negative impacts on socio-political and economic aspects of society.

## **Research Questions**

- Is the Civil-Military theory of Concordance a viable model for smoothening civil-military relations in Pakistan?
- If that is the case then, what strategies should be crafted to empowering the Pakistani citizenry towards striking a balance and closing up the partnership in civil-military relations?
- How do conflicting civil-military relations correlate to the economic indicators of Pakistan and result in social (dis)satisfaction?
- How uneven civil-military relations influence political (in)stability and governance?

## **Aims and Objectives**

- To view current and past civil military relations and to explore the possibility of the applicability of theory of concordance on Pakistani civil-military relations and explore options that can be employed to balance the three partners.
- To ascertain the relationship between the strength of civil-military relations and economy in Pakistan acting on social dissatisfaction.

---

<sup>7</sup> Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (Routledge, 2008).

- To gauge the impact of uneasy civil-military relation of the political landscape and governance of Pakistan.

## **Research Significance**

While there is research on civil-military relations in Latin American, Western industrialized economies, Middle Eastern countries, and North and South East Asian countries, a dearth of research has always been felt in the case of Pakistan. Due to strict censorship, better quality research exploring the pertinent questions that are still unanswered was stifled. Hence, there exists a vacuum when it comes to the real-time impact of conflicting civil-military relations in Pakistan. I intend to enrich the pool of research regarding the effect of civil-military entities on economic, political, and social dissatisfaction. Also, it is intended that Pakistan's case study be analyzed through the lens of the theory of concordance.

## **Thesis Outline**

The research would begin with a thorough introduction to the topic. Chapter one would comprise information gleaned from existing literature regarding the topic. Furthermore, a theory would be applied to consolidate the analysis. Chapter two would explain the research methodology employed and the tools used for data collection and translation. Chapters three and four would incorporate primary data and attempt to answer research questions and fulfill research aims and objectives. And finally, chapter five would serve as a conclusion, and possible recommendations and suggestions shall be provided here with a bibliography.

# Chapter 1

## 1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Civil-military relations entail the interactions between the military and institutions, political elites, and the general public. Civil-military relations have been one of the defining phenomena of statecraft, as they affect every crevice of it, ranging from foreign policy to domestic politics. While civil-military relations (CMR) are extensively explored, an anomaly is apparent. A bulk of scholarship is derived from and constructed for western states, for instance, the domination of American civil-military relations in civil-military relations' literature. Although efforts to examine the CMR of non-western or developing nations, or simply of transitioning or newer democracies are made, they are often viewed through the lens of a western theoretical lens. This negates the cultural and historical nuances that shape the institutions of each country. This literature review sets out to first explain what civil-military relations are, highlights its importance, and present the dos and don'ts of CMR. While focusing on the importance of civilian control, the review brings up different models and typologies crafted by scholars. Investigations of CMR in different countries, such as South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan, etc., are presented.

CMR is an integral part of a lengthy nation-building project since nation-building involves establishing social and political infrastructure, and this process naturally outlines the role of the military vis-à-vis society.<sup>8</sup> /In this way, CMR is a dynamic process. Akin to the fact that nations do not emerge wholly, a nation forged over time acquires political maturity accordingly. The story of each nation achieving that is unique, as the whole process is influenced by peculiarities of cultural and societal setups. Therefore, nations have to go through a phase where they struggle to define the role and boundaries of their guardians, the military, while guarding civilians' freedom. The discipline of CMR developed out of policymakers' optimism, specifically that of western ones who hold the view that it is quite plausible for civil and military wings to share a complementary relationship. This optimism started to fade in the post-1970s, when the military began to assume for themselves not a niche but a proper state-like entity within the state, in multiple cases across the globe<sup>9</sup>. This initiated a turn in CMR studies, as now the literature was targeted towards the reasons behind and tactics to avoid military-led coups. A bulk of scholarship began to emerge that focused on conceptual and theoretical models to control or curb militaries.

Although there are numerous patterns of civil-military relations across the globe, they are all marked by some degree of tension. This degree of inherent tension can be negligible in some countries and extreme in others. As per the principal-agent model highlighted by Florence Gaub<sup>10</sup>, civilian leadership is the principal, while military entities are the agents. The principal created the agent to meet certain ends of statecraft and protection of sovereignty. And for this purpose, the civilian sphere arranges resources and gives a strategic direction to the agent (military). This is an ideal scenario that follows the theory aptly; however, in practice, this is a rare

---

<sup>8</sup> Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (Routledge, 2008).

<sup>9</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

<sup>10</sup> Florence Gaub, "Civil-Military Relations: The Basics from Civil-Military Relations in the MENA:: Between Fragility and Resilience on JSTOR," 2016, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep06944.5>.

occurrence. The tension in civil-military relations results from the fact that, pragmatically, the military has in its possession all the means and training to assert its monopoly of violence<sup>11</sup>. This can be furthered to the extent that it can threaten or even eliminate the political entity. To remedy this fateful event, lines are often drawn between the political (civil) and military spheres. It is due to this, that politicians dislike the military's involvement in politics, and the military does not allow politicians to interfere in its autonomy unnecessarily. If the distance between these thresholds is overlapping, then problems might arise, and if it is too wide, it is still problematic. Given that the common goal of both parties is national defense and the pursuit of national interests, a healthy distance marked with cooperation is desired that doesn't endanger the objective. When national interests and defense are sidelined in the power struggle, the core purpose of their existence is nullified. This at-odds situation either ends with military intervention in domestic politics, like the cases of Pakistan<sup>12</sup>, Turkey<sup>13</sup>, and Egypt<sup>14</sup> or military disintegration on an operational level, just like the Iraqi army in 2014 or the Libyan army in 2011<sup>15</sup>. Since that fact is established, it is absolutely necessary that both spheres cooperate to ensure defense. Without the provision of national security, no meaningful end can be obtained, such as economic growth, better international standing, political reforms, etc. Civil-military relations should be sturdy enough to withstand a disagreement so that the entire set-up of the country does not suffer. The essence of the whole discussion is the need to strike a perfect balance when it comes to civil-military relations, which has been concluded by Gaub, Janjua<sup>16</sup> and Frazer<sup>17</sup>.

Civil-military relations evolved with the changing security and political landscapes. After WWI, there began to take shape a proper military entity that struggled for space and resources against the civil or political set-up<sup>18</sup>. Kohn beautifully pens down the evolutionary process post-Second World War, focusing solely on the American military. He explained the ebbs and flows of the American military's interactions with the executive branch, their protectiveness of their autonomy and operational space, and most importantly, their predisposition towards a president belonging to a certain political party. Kohn explained the emergence of the American military in the political sphere, the birth of the military industrial complex, and the warm and cold relations between heads of military and Democratic or Republican presidents. He dissected the glaring partisanship of the military, McNamara's endeavors to carve out a proper niche for the US military in the administration, and Powell's actions

---

<sup>11</sup> Gaub, "Civil-Military Relations: The Basics from Civil-Military Relations in the MENA:: Between Fragility and Resilience on JSTOR."

<sup>12</sup> Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA on JSTOR," 1989, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393356>.

<sup>13</sup> Mustafa ULUÇAKARAR and Ali ÇAĞLAR, "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Turkey," *JSTOR* 14, no. 55 (2016), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26406873>.

<sup>14</sup> Gaub, "Civil-Military Relations: The Basics from Civil-Military Relations in the MENA:: Between Fragility and Resilience on JSTOR."

<sup>15</sup> Gaub, "Civil-Military Relations: The Basics from Civil-Military Relations in the MENA:: Between Fragility and Resilience on JSTOR."

<sup>16</sup> Raashid Wali Janjua, "Civil Military Relations in Pakistan--Quest for an Ideal Balance," *IPRI Journal*, 2018, 1–25, <https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.210101>.

<sup>17</sup> Jendayi Frazer, "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition on JSTOR," *JSTOR*, 1995, 39–48, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187029>.

<sup>18</sup> Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations on JSTOR," *The National Interest*, 1992, 3–17, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/42894926>.

to elevate the military to new heights. In his article, in a timeline fashion, when he narrates the civil-military relation since WWI up until the first decade of the 2000s, a theme of the constant tussle of assertions of civilian control over the military and the military's efforts to avoid it is hard to miss. This theme, however, can be detected lurking in almost every other account of civil-military relations.

The question why is: civilian control important anyway? can be answered with a few logical rationales. Civilian control is essential because civic power should always be held supreme so that policies are 'made for the people and by the people'. Civilian control, however, is not a constant fact; rather, it is highly contextual. In simple words, while a certain degree of civilian control might be exercised at one point in time, it does not automatically entail that the same extent of control exists at another. This, as aforementioned, is a constant tug of war where both ends of the spectrum are locked in a struggle to gain an inch over the other. Civilian control is important to uphold because soldiers are trained to achieve set targets through operations. They are trained to perceive, think, calculate, and implement things differently. This makes them not so good administrators and policymakers. Hence, with a skewed civil-military relations balance, not only the run-of-the-mill government and developmental processes suffer, but major issues are also compromised.

In recent history and still, the civil-military relations of 'third-world countries' and 'transitioning democracies' have been the focus of research. Bienen, in his article 'Civil-Military Relations in the Third World'<sup>19</sup> gauged the impact of military interventions in domestic politics and military rules in third world countries. He concluded that socio-economic indicators took a hit and political processes lost their vigor and credibility. The importance of setting somewhat rigid boundaries is highlighted, since in the presence of power asymmetry between two wings in the country, political processes become performative. The question of who actually wields authority in a major chunk of third world countries is an open secret, a situation that is simply out of the question in industrialized economies. Such an imbalance results in social cleavages.

Civil-military relations can be perceived as a fluid or cyclic procedure. As societies and armies evolve over time, so does the impact of the military on society. And as societies go through transitions, they affect the recruitment processes, military composition, and military style. All in all, when the military's professionalism and corporate interests clash with policymaking and opportunities for intervention, it gives birth to a looped process. In this way, civil-military relations are destined to spark, given any friction.

Civil-military relations in 'Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations During Democratic Transitions'<sup>20</sup> are urged to be maintained at the absolute best level while upholding civilian primacy at all times. Frazer reiterates the importance of civilian control by highlighting the fact that constitutional endeavors on their own are not enough to consolidate democracy. In burgeoning democracies post-decolonization, the upper hand of civilian control should be established at the very beginning so that accountable political systems can take shape. These political systems would grant agency to the citizens to govern, instead of being governed by an authoritarian entity.

---

<sup>19</sup> Henry Bienen, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third World on JSTOR," *International Political Science Review* 2 (1977): 363–70, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601071>.

<sup>20</sup> Frazer, "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition on JSTOR."

However, at the same time, sensitivities regarding the uniqueness of each case and the cultural and historical baggage that would shape the institutions accordingly should be kept in mind. Institutional makeup is important to be considered, as establishing counterweights in the institutions at this time would thwart the military's influence in politics in the future. Moreover, constitutional strength should be endorsed by marking the limits of permissible military activities. This should be complemented with jurisdictional reinforcement. The non-military law-enforcing agencies should be trained and equipped enough so that military help is not sought in times of domestic crisis.

Pion-Berlin<sup>21</sup>, in the same vein, explored civil-military relations against the backdrop of the structure versus agency debate. Despite presidents being the commander-in-chief and possessing the constitutional authority to direct the military where and when they see fit, they occasionally fail to subordinate them (in Latin America). This dilemma raises serious questions, such as: What are the conditions that allow a civilian leader to maintain control over the military? How extended is the power grasp of politicians? How much is a civilian leader acted upon by the structure over which he has no control? Pion-Berlin compared a set of Latin American countries with North and East Asian countries and attempted to explore commonalities and divergences. Among others, a few commonalities include the somewhat frequent occurrence of the military acting selfishly to preserve their goals, in violation of public service. This has weakened the structure of democratic governance in the country. In addition, the journey towards civilian control in both regions is hindered and uneven. Another piece of literature supplementing Pion-Berlin's work is 'Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia'<sup>22</sup>. In this writing, Croissant, Kuehn, and Lorenz (2008) have presented a number of case-study-based civil-military relations analyses. They explained that while countries like South Korea, Indonesia, and Taiwan have established civilian control over the military, Thailand and the Philippines have failed to do so. These North and Southeast Asian countries are not all liberal democracies and have come a long way after decolonization's insurgencies and international interventions. All of this has shaped the equation of civil-military relations. South Korea, despite being military-dominated post-independence, weaseled its way out of its military stronghold while Indonesian forces assumed an entity of their own, a state within a state. Additionally, Croissant and others tried to enshrine the characteristics of civilian control. Elements such as elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization were used as indicators to measure the extent of civilian control or absence of it. For instance, in the area of public policy, if the military outbalances civilian entities in influence, then military sway can directly impact social, economic, and political policies antagonistically.

Different scholars have adopted models and/or theories produced by theorists of civil-military relations. For instance, in the article 'Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-military relations (1980-2002)' by Nilufer

---

<sup>21</sup> David Pion-Berlin, "The Study of Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 3 (December 1, 2011): 222–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.628143>.

<sup>22</sup> Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Philip Lorenz, *Breaking with the Past? Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia on JSTOR* (East West Center, 2008), <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep06501>.



Narli<sup>23</sup>, Narli tries to incorporate Luckam's 'covert guardianship model'<sup>24</sup> coupled with Schiff concordance theory and tries to narrate Turkey's oscillating civil-military relations. A snapshot of institutional and cultural context is explained by highlighting the inherent cultural propensity of Turks towards the 'martial race' ideology and reverence for armed forces by extension. Meanwhile, the security realities right after WWI, the Treaty of Sevres, and subsequent Kemalist projects, amidst the heightened importance of Turkey during the Cold War, made the military the biggest player of interest, especially for the US. The Turkish military, under the slogan 'defender of national security and interest', would exceed the normal civil-military dichotomy, resulting in coups being a recurrent event in the Turkish political landscape. The military in these coups would amend the constitution to grant themselves unlimited powers while banning political parties and free political association. The four episodes of coups from the 1950s until 2000 alone—1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997—exhibited an entrenchment of the military sphere in the political sphere, with episodic constitutional amendments in their favor. Meanwhile, in the time periods where political parties were allowed to contest elections and form parliamentary democracy, the endeavor to maintain the difference between both the civil and military spectrums proved to be an uphill battle.

Narli has divided the time periods of civilian governments for comprehensive analysis of political context against the backdrop of concordance and self-assigned covert guardianship roles by the military. The struggle to strengthen civilian institutions or civilian power in politics resulted in discordance between civil-military relations in Turgut Ozal's era. He tackled national security as a priority, which was exclusively held by the military previously. He held a referendum and laxed constitutional legalities to ensure the strength of political parties. And through a series of gradual laws, Ozal initiated the demilitarization of political decision-making processes. Allowed civilian associations, empowered business elites, and dabbled in the problems that were the domain of the military alone in the past. He tried to ensure, if not complete civilian control over the military, then at times civilian supremacy, for instance, by rejecting the recommendation for Chief of General Staff and appointing one of his choosing. Ozal was close to negotiating the end of the Kurdish insurgency when he died under suspicious conditions. He changed the economic landscape of Turkey, and as per Schiff's thesis<sup>25</sup>, a higher degree of economic strength ensures concordance among all segments.

Ozal's successor, Ciller, saw a spike in PKK-related terrorism and soon gave in and entrusted the Kurdish question to the military. The coalition government between Ciller and Yilmaz failed, and the latter, Ciller-Erbakan, faced 'a soft coup' apparently due to the threat of 'Islamist Islam'. Yilmaz's government saw discordance when he tried to restrain the military to its bounds on the Islamism hunt campaign. This was followed by Evecit's three-party coalition government, including Yilmaz's political party. Yilmaz still lamented the fact that despite the universal norm of national security being the area of civilian government, national security is taken care of by the military in Turkey. Evecit's government saw strong military dominance, as exhibited in the

---

<sup>23</sup> Nilüfer Narlı, "Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980–2002," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 215–25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.572629>.

<sup>24</sup> A. R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations on JSTOR," *Government and Opposition* 6 (1971): 5–35, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44482735>.

<sup>25</sup> Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (Routledge, 2008).

MGK (National Security Council) meetings and press releases. Civil-military relations saw deterioration again due to the fact that, constitutionally, the mandate of the military to attain the role of guardianship became legally unsound and weak. This is against the backdrop of the US' changed enthusiasm regarding the backing of the military and the EU's conditions for restraining the role and influence of the military in politics for membership. It was observed that throughout the timeline of 1980–2002, there did not exist concordance as such, but rather a military-induced state of forced accord as per their preferences. This overwhelming military influence was reduced gradually as the international relevance of Turkey decreased, especially for the US (at the end of the Cold War), conditions to strengthen civil institutions to prevent coup attempts (conditions set by the European Union), and a changed mindset of the general public and politicians resulted in a negative attitude towards the military's influence in civil and political spheres.

Civil-military relations is such a vast and contextual area that no single hypothesis, no set of few factors, and no particular cause can define the complexity of what goes inside the relations. Factors ranging from colonial legacy to high and low national consciousness, resource structure, strength of military and civilian institutions, interactions between them, character of military boundaries, etc. are all weighed against instances around the globe. Luckham<sup>26</sup> presented a typology where he clustered together the works of different theorists and social sciences and constructed a typology that housed patterns of different civil-military relations. Different military boundaries (integral, fragmented, and permeated) against the backdrop of high and low civil power, then filtered through stages of military power, produced different models of civil-military relations. Namely, 'objective' and 'subjective' control, 'apparatus control', 'constabulary control', 'garrison state', 'guardian state', 'post-colonial guardian state', 'nation-in-arms', 'praetorian state', and political vacuum<sup>27</sup>.

Civil-military relations when it comes to Pakistan are first filtered through the sieve of the South-Asian context and India-Pakistan rivalry. This context of high external threat (supplemented by the Afghanistan situation as well) and high internal threat due to insurgencies, extremism, and terrorism (BLA, TTP, Lashkar-e-Taiba), praetorianism<sup>28</sup>, as well as the entrenched role of the military in almost all areas of statecraft (foreign policy making, tax exemption, and subsidy procurement for its corporate entities, etc.), makes the presence of the military in all sectors of society omnipresent. Rizvi has written at length about the Pakistani state of civil-military affairs, its determinants, changing dynamics, and elements, and has tried to implement the prominent civil-military concepts and theories in this context.

Over and above that, Bruneau<sup>29</sup> after a thorough inspection of different theoretical and conceptual frameworks, concluded that a series of necessary steps must be taken so that a balanced CMR can transpire. He called attention to the fact that in order to establish a smooth control apparatus, the first and foremost requirement is the reinforcement of that mechanism by law (as enshrined in the Constitution, etc.). Then a few institutions, such as

---

<sup>26</sup> Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations on JSTOR."

<sup>27</sup> Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations on JSTOR."

<sup>28</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, "PAKISTAN: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN A PRAETORIAN STATE from The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific on JSTOR," in *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific* (ANU Press, 2004), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbj1g.11>.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau, "A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence," *Defense & Security Analysis*, October 2, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1529085>.

the Ministry of Defense, should be erected to maintain civilian-led control over the military. An efficient Ministry of Defense would be equipped to maneuver things like strategy, policy, budget, and personnel accordingly. The principal purpose of institutions is to act as oversight and guiding bodies. There is one thing: to spell out the role of executive power (president or prime minister) and to see to it that the military and the intelligence agencies are actually doing what has been briefed to them via the legislature. This oversight is usually carried out by audits, committee hearings, etc. Another tool, that of professional military education, can be utilized to make sure that a state's military is reflecting the will of the people's representatives. Reforms have been carried out in professional military education in states such as Argentina, Brazil, the United States, etc. In the same vein, to boost military effectiveness, there must be a well-formulated policy, such as a national security policy, supported by constant updates in the form of national security strategies to adapt to the fluctuating international security environment. In addition to that, the military working in smooth tandem with an effective Minister of Defense (who has the authority to ensure compliance) results in optimum military effectiveness. All the earlier mentioned constituents to ensure the smooth functioning of civil-military relations require resources. The resources that are lacking in newer democracies. Hence, an amalgam of multiple factors ranging from scarcity of resources to colonial history, following an ill-suited model for regulating civil-military relations, etc., results in unequal or conflictual civil-military relations.

## **1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Prominent theoretical frameworks that house civil-military relations are produced by Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver, Finer, and Rebecca L. Schiff. This research intends to utilize 'Concordance Theory' by Rebecca L. Schiff as the theoretical framework due to its applicability to the subject at hand. Concordance theory does not assume that there exists a dire need for 'control' by the civilian body or any other group; rather, it is built on the foundation of 'partnership'<sup>30</sup>. And if there is dialogue and agreement between the three stakeholders in partnership, then military intervention in domestic politics can be avoided. Concordance theory employs deductive causation, or simply attempts to put forth generalizations born out of multiple case studies<sup>31</sup>. The leading differentiator in Concordance theory that sets it apart from the much-famous and widely used theoretical framework of 'normal theories' is its incorporation of cultural and institutional traits unique to every subject. It can simply outline and highlight certain cultural and/or institutional idiosyncrasies that can act as a bulwark to military intervention in politics. Before Schiff introduced her theory to explain civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington's theory reigned supreme. It is not to be considered that after the proposition of Concordance theory, Huntington's work has been sidelined; instead, Concordance theory has enriched the theoretical scholarship pertaining to CMR. No discussion about a theoretical or conceptual framework involving CMR is complete without mentioning Huntington's work, since most of the theoretical literature produced has been a reaction to the former's theory.

---

<sup>30</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

<sup>31</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

Samuel P. Huntington, in his seminal works 'The Soldier and the State' and 'Changing Patterns of Military Politics', penned down the dynamics of civil-military interactions<sup>32</sup>. Huntington gave forth a dichotomous way to harness civilian control over military power that was set against the background of strict separation of both spheres. As per the distinction between 'objective control' and 'subjective control', the former acknowledges the autonomy of the military sphere and tends to 'professionalize' the military, which would eventually lead to voluntary civilian subordination. The latter, however, set out to 'civilianize' the military so that it could mirror the state and hence yield utter civilian control<sup>33</sup>. Nielsen, while reviewing 'the soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military relations by Samuel P. Huntington' wrote that the rationale behind the continued relevance of Huntington's theory lies in the fact that he was the founding father of theorizing in the civil-military sphere<sup>34</sup>. She elaborated on the flawed nature of the theory in her review of 'American civil-military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The soldier and the state' from the vantage point of American civil-military relations. Although Huntington's theory was not perfect, it did initiate the discourse on theorizing civil-military relations. In the very first chapter of his book, Huntington declares the military a 'profession' and enlists the traits such as expertise, corporateness, and responsibility that are common between the American military and any other profession. On the topic of expertise, Huntington himself cited Harold Laswell's words 'the management of violence' as the premise of expertise<sup>35</sup>.

The author of 'the soldier and the state' added that the sole purpose and function of the military is to excel at armed combat. On responsibility, the theorist declared that maneuvering expertise along the line directed by the state is the 'special responsibility' of the military as a profession. It is, however, to be kept in mind that the power or warrant to use expertise lies with the 'officer corps', which acts as a regulated bureaucratized entity.

Reverting to Nielsen's review, she held Huntington's take on 'military expertise' as the nucleus of her review and highlighted the in-built contradictions. Huntington declared military expertise 'universal' in nature, unaffected by the bounds of time and space, which, of course, is not the case. For instance, the military expertise of the American military cannot mirror that of the Egyptian or Nigerian military. Another contradiction that surfaces while inspecting Huntington's work is his direction to let the military profession augment its expertise without any external influences. But if that instruction is to be followed, then the chances of the military profession increasing their expertise in the area they deem fit instead of what the state actually requires increase starkly. In addition, Huntington completely ignored the ever-intrusive influence of national policies rooted in politics on military institutions. The elimination of the impact of the entwined nature of politics and warfare is one of the most glaring flaws of Huntingtonian work. On the question of exercising political decision-making and its impact on military expertise, Huntington bared the fact that civilian control over the military lies in exterminating the

---

<sup>32</sup> Khakwani, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: The Case of the Recent Military Intervention (October 12, 1999) and the Its Implications for Pakistan's Security Milieu."

<sup>33</sup> Bruneau, "A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence."

<sup>34</sup> Suzanne C. Nielsen, "American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's 'The Soldier and the State,'" *International Affairs* 88, no. 2 (March 2012): 369–76, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428611>.

<sup>35</sup> C. Nielsen, "American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's 'The Soldier and the State.'"

military of their political power. The theorist delved into the two ways civilian control can be achieved. While subjective control was suggested as one of the two ways, Huntington gave objective control precedence over subjective control. Objective control lays out a template that recognizes the ‘autonomy’ of the military as a profession as the crux. According to the theorist, objective control is way more efficient in achieving both targets—optimum civilian control and military effectiveness. One thing that Huntington failed to accommodate in his ‘objective control’ concept was the aforementioned drawback: the exclusion of the intertwined nature of politics and the military.

Janowitz expanded the idea of professionalism in military forces and presented a typology for housing civil-military relations in new democracies<sup>36</sup>. Building on Huntington’s concept, Janowitz too claimed that the professionalism of the military equates with civilian control, but Janowitz perceived civilian control as societal control as compared to political or institutional control. Janowitz identified five types of patterns of civil-military relations that emerge in developing countries. These are authoritarian-personal control, civil-military coalition, authoritarian-mass party, democratic competitive (or semi competitive) systems, and military oligarchy<sup>37</sup>. Janowitz cited Pakistan as a case study that oscillated between a civil-military coalition and a military oligarchy<sup>38</sup>. Bruneau calls attention to how the theories and concepts in the civil-military relations discipline fall short of explaining major phenomena such as war or the erasure of democracy due to their flawed nature<sup>39</sup>. He first dissects Huntingtonian theory, then moves on to security sector reform as a conceptual framework and declares that both are not equipped to explain basic phenomena in civil-military relations. In the article, ‘a conceptual framework for the analysis of civil-military relations and intelligence’ Bruneau posits that the overwhelming majority of established literature covering CMR is normative in nature and lacks empirical endorsement<sup>40</sup>. It was Cohen who, in his writing ‘Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime’, designated the title ‘normal’ to Samuel Huntington’s theory<sup>41</sup>. From that point on, the succeeding scholars produced their work, reviewing, critiquing, or seconding the ‘normal’ theory. Bruneau, however, enlists three primary flaws. The first flaw is the repetitive nature of Huntington’s argument, which has rendered his theory trite. The second drawback lies in the methodology; Huntington used very selective data when formulating his theory, and thirdly, Huntington has focused wholly on the ‘civilian control’ of the military. Expanding on the abovementioned shortcomings, other scholars contributed and gave insight as to how Huntington’s theory hinges on the differentiation of subjective and objective control and ‘professionalism’ essentially, but professionalism and objective control cannot be kept apart as per his own descriptions. Feaver also weighed in and explained that Huntington’s theory rests on this assumed link that is connected via his own given definitions. Similarly, on the quandary of selective date, the principal explanatory variable is ‘professionalism’ that Huntington has taken as a constant. This was

---

<sup>36</sup> Morris Janowitz, “The Military in the Political Development of New Nations,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 20, no. 8 (October 1, 1964): 6–10, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1964.11454697>.

<sup>37</sup> Janowitz, “The Military in the Political Development of New Nations.”

<sup>38</sup> Khakwani, “Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: The Case of the Recent Military Intervention (October 12, 1999) and the Its Implications for Pakistan’s Security Milieu.”

<sup>39</sup> Bruneau, “A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence.”

<sup>40</sup> Bruneau, “A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence.”

<sup>41</sup> Bruneau, “A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence.”

nullified by a series of authors, all of whom proved that taking professionalism as the primary variable and basing your whole argument on it is problematic. Nearing the last shortcoming on the list, Bruneau underscored the undue attention given to ‘control’ and ‘civilian control’. Huntington, in his seminal writing, briefly mentioned military effectiveness but never expanded on it; instead, he poured massive attention towards the ‘control’ of the military. To be more specific, Huntington explicitly focused on ‘democratic civilian control’ of the military, naturally eliminating all other forms of governance from applying the model. The overwhelming emphasis on control was felt and hence highlighted by multiple scholars such as Herspring, Feaver, Cohen, etc<sup>42</sup>. According to Feaver, for instance, to limit such a broad subject of civil-military relations exclusively to control would compromise the quality of discourse by restricting it.

Despite all these shortcomings, an important question as to why Huntington’s theory is still practiced extensively in the United States is often raised. The answer lies in the fact that Huntington’s objective control maintains the military as an autonomous body, eligible to govern themselves, and it is in this autonomy that the American military has thrived for decades. Also, the question of why American civil-military relations are considered a pedestal, especially for the newer democracies, lies in the fact that pioneering literature, especially pertaining to conceptual and theoretical frameworks, was born out of the American experience. That is the sole reason behind the massive impact of the American civil-military relations model on the analysis of civil-military relations in new democracies. However, Huntington’s own pupil Feaver expressed in his book ‘Armed Servants’ that Huntington’s theory, although rooted in American experience, does not paint a complete picture of American civil-military relations<sup>43</sup>.

An alternative to Huntington’s objective control is sought in the form of security sector reform. But much like Huntingtonian work, the drawbacks of security sector reform, such as the lack of consistency required for a conceptual framework, the absence of unanimity among security sector proponents of what the security sector actually encompasses, etc., are what make it unsound. Military effectiveness as an expanding area in civil-military relations is tested as an alternative, but the possibility of that too is diminished. The solution to making the theoretical underpinnings of the field of civil-military relations more empirically sound and innovative rests in the availability of substantial quantitative data. But unfortunately, there is an abyss of absent military data because states do not publish such data due to security sensitivities, and the credibility of the present data can never be assured.

Peter Feaver outlined the flaws in his mentor’s work by highlighting the repetitiveness and inadequacy. According to Feaver, Huntington’s theory did not elaborate on a cause-and-effect phenomenon but rather centered his theory around the variable of ‘professionalism’ as he defined himself and that too objectively<sup>44</sup>. This prompted Feaver to introduce first ‘problematique’ and then his principle-agent (or rational choice model). In his work, Feaver has differentiated between two sets of actors in civil-military relations: ‘professional supremacists’ and ‘civilian supremacists’. While the former tends to tilt towards increased military inclusion in dialogues, the latter

---

<sup>42</sup> Bruneau, “A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence.”

<sup>43</sup> Bruneau, “A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence.”

<sup>44</sup> Bruneau, “A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence.”

champions the expanded presence of civilians as they believe that the military's opinion already populates the operational matters in civil-military relations<sup>45</sup>.

Schiff chimes in and highlights how Huntington's work, which was an inspiration for other theorists as well, is derived from 'American experience' and written from a western perspective and cannot be generalized for the rest of the world. All these stumbling blocks, namely, flawed Huntington's theoretical framework with an exclusive focus on control, duality of security sector reform that means everything and nothing at the same time, military effectiveness that does not provide a complete description of all military functions, and a lack of much-needed data, call for fresh blood in the area of conceptualization and reconceptualization of old theories and concepts to make them pragmatic and useful.

Schiff gave forth a 'Theory of Concordance' that centers around how historical and cultural factors influence institutions, hence the 'agreement'<sup>46</sup>. The three-pronged structure of the theory involves the military, political elites, and the citizenry. In contrast to Huntington's and others' propositions, separation and a 'liberal democracy' are not the pre-requisites for amicable civil-military relations, as per the theory. Schiff highlights the fact that separation might be the result of a cooperative relationship between the military and the other two partners, but the Concordance Theory does not need separation between civil and military entities for it to be applicable. Concordance theory, as per the theorist, seeks to attain a heightened degree of integration between the military and other sectors of society. This can result in one of many variable forms of civil-military relationship<sup>47</sup>. Schiff also sheds light on the fact that in certain cultures, the very idea of what civil society entails might not represent the entity that western theorists consider 'civil'.

The theory of concordance focuses on the shared values and objectives that exist among the military, political elites, and society. These shared objectives can then facilitate dialogue and accommodation among the partners. In this theoretical framework, political elites, or political leadership, are described in terms of function<sup>48</sup>. The nature of the governance model, that is, democratic, authoritarian, etc., is irrelevant, as concordance theory is more concerned with political elites that have influence over the support or composition of the armed forces while representing the government. Departing from the 'normal' theory and contemporary literature on civil-military relations that considered the political body as the 'civil' aspect of the CMR analysis, concordance theory does not conjoin citizenry and political institutions together and declare them as civil institutions. The former anomaly presented a limited account of CMR, while Schiff acknowledges that it is the citizenry that lends legitimacy to the other two partners and hence deserves a niche as an equal partner<sup>49</sup>. In this way, the theory of concordance does not scratch the surface by employing institutional analysis as the tool but embraces other constituents of society that affect the role and function of the military.

Four indicators—the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the recruitment method, and the military style—affect the conditions that can either lead to agreement or

---

<sup>45</sup> Bruneau, "A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence."

<sup>46</sup> Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance."

<sup>47</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

<sup>48</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

<sup>49</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

disagreement among the primary stakeholder groups. These four indicators are what Schiff has utilized throughout her theory as the tools to gauge the level of concordance. It is to be kept in mind that these indicators are influenced by historical and cultural phenomena, which set a specific social context that in turn affects the relationships among the parties involved. India and Israel's civil-military relations are the leading case studies of this theoretical model.

The social composition of the officer corps is a major indicator of concordance. While assuming the role of leadership, the officer corps does not only connect the military with the government but also acts as a link between the military and the citizenry. While broad representation in the composition of the military corps is a positive asset, it does not amount to an essential requisite for concordance. While that being said, incorporating a specific stratum or ethnic group while composing the officer corps can be one of the factors that result in discordance. After partitioning the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, the British left a legacy of 'martial races' in the military. While India reversed that by incorporating people from diverse backgrounds, Pakistan still had Punjabis as one of the most dominant groups in the military. This produced discordance and estrangement in the Bengali community and consequently disturbed the balance of equality among the military, citizens, and political elites. The second indicator, the political decision-making process, revolves around a set of institutions or organs of particular institutions that regulate important elements of the military. These elements commonly include budget, structure, resources, military size, etc. Since the needs of the military are discussed via certain channels, namely, parliamentary sessions, closed meetings, cabinet, dedicated committees, etc., the form of government is irrelevant. The most commonly practiced norm is that the military expresses their needs via a channel that might be the government or an agency, and then the above-mentioned routes are employed for deliberations. Again, there must be consensus among the partners on the best political channel that fulfills the needs of the armed forces<sup>50</sup>. There is no prescription of the best type of government to achieve that in concordance theory; as per the theory, the best government is the one that keeps a check on the military and succeeds in generating a partnership.

Another indicator is the recruiting method. There are two types of recruiting methods: persuasive and coercive. This typology is extracted from Samuel Finer's conceptual work, 'extraction-coercion-persuasion cycle'<sup>51</sup>. Coercive recruitment exists in the form of forced conscription and typically results in discordance between the military and citizens. Persuasive recruitment is voluntary enlistment, usually inspired by patriotism. Persuasive recruitment is an expression of a state of agreement among the partners over the needs and social composition of the armed forces. The last indicator employed in the concordance theory is military style. Style in this indicator is adopted in terms of social permeability. Style is the degree of integration of armed forces that exhibits the extent of rigidity of boundaries. This was used by Luckham to create a typology to classify different models depending upon the nature of boundaries: integral, fragmented, and permeated<sup>52</sup>. In simple words, style is the practice of establishing rigid social boundaries or eradicating them altogether. Military style is also the symbols,

---

<sup>50</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

<sup>51</sup> Finer, Samuel E. "State-and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military." *The formation of national states in Western Europe* (1975): 84-163.

<sup>52</sup> Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations on JSTOR."



the rituals, and the norms that exist within the military, for instance, uniforms. This usually includes cultural and societal traits.

Concordance theory accomplishes two goals that were not attained by the previous theoretical frameworks. It included and then dissected the impact of cultural and institutional contexts that affect interactions among the three partners: the military, political elites, and citizens. For instance, a certain cultural practice, such as the 'theory of martial races' brought by British colonizers in the subcontinent, impacted the social composition of the army officer corps. The second goal achieved was a prediction about the chances of military intervention in domestic politics solely based on the measure of agreement among the partners on the aforementioned four indicators. In Pakistan's case, as Schiff mentioned herself, there exists discordance that has led to multiple episodes of military interventions throughout history. Furthermore, Concordance theory challenged and subsequently shattered the very western-centric theoretical mold that was used extensively across the globe to analyze civil-military relations. Rebecca L. Schiff asserts that the 'normal' theory of Huntington revolves around the American example, while American experiences are rooted in their unique historical and cultural conditions. In simple words, Schiff exhibited that non-Western, developing countries, or burgeoning democracies need not appropriate Western models to express their political ripeness<sup>53</sup>. Also, Schiff recognizes the significance of a nation's culture and processes related to it in comparison to the superficial institutional analysis that was employed by the previous theorists. Realities like cultural diversity or ethnic orientations are considered crucial variables to investigate their impact on domestic politics and social structure. In a nutshell, the Concordance Theory sets out to implement the laid-out institutional and cultural indicators and calls attention to the actual conditions under which the partners can reach agreement. This agreement might result in an integrated, separate, or hybrid structure of civil-military relations that can prevent domestic military mediation.

Schiff highlights the importance of the strength of civil institutions, as they act as bulwarks against military intervention and as effective watchdogs. But this theory, too, is not devoid of criticism. Zulfiqar Ali, in his article 'Contradiction of Concordance Theory'<sup>54</sup> leveled a few criticisms against this theory and deemed it unfit to be used to describe the civil-military relations of Pakistan. Schiff's rebuttal, 'Concordance Theory in Pakistan: A Response to Zulfiqar Ali'<sup>55</sup> nullified every criticism with a logical explanation. Criticisms that were leveled mentioned that military intervention in Pakistan is not resisted and hence is an act of concordance instead of discordance; this theory, like Huntington's model, is superimposed; the four indicators provided in the theory are oversimplified; and lastly, there are no three parties in the Pakistani case; rather, two parties (Pakistan and the US) define civil-military relations<sup>56</sup>. Schiff responded by nullifying the first argument by supplementing her counter-argument with statistics on the literacy rate in Pakistan and extremism in society. Not only that, but since Pakistan has spent almost half of its time under dictatorial regimes that were heavy-handed with censorship and

---

<sup>53</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

<sup>54</sup> Zulfiqar Ali, "Contradiction of Concordance Theory," *Armed Forces & Society*, March 7, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x12467775>.

<sup>55</sup> Rebecca L. Schiff, "Concordance Theory in Pakistan," *Armed Forces & Society* 42, no. 1 (January 12, 2015): 226–34, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x14566444>.

<sup>56</sup> Schiff, "Concordance Theory in Pakistan."

freedom to express political opinion, such an oppressed mass hardly makes for an equal partner in the three-thronged concordance structure. The very essence of the theory is enshrined in the primacy of the importance of historical and cultural legacy, and like the first argument, this one too becomes obsolete. The argument about the US defining civil-military relations is unsound since no external agent or threat can act as such a force that it acts as a part of the country. Rebecca L. Schiff has utilized this theoretical framework to analyze five case studies, specifically post-revolutionary the United States (1790–1800), India, Israel, Argentina in Peron’s period, and discordance in Pakistan, in her book ‘The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance theory of civil-military relations’<sup>57</sup>. This theoretical model is the most apt to explain the discordance in Pakistan, and guided by an elaborate history of episodes of military intervention in Pakistan, it can provide modest predictions about the chances of military intervention in the future as well. This framework presents a sound and viable structure to base our civil-military relations on to improve progressive indicators in the economy, politics, and societal development since all the partners, especially the military, are dominating all three avenues.

---

<sup>57</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

## Chapter 2

### 2.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In line with the objective of the research endeavor, research design dealing with qualitative data is premised on primary research, supported with secondary data. Data on different themes is gathered and analyzed to deduce the impact of conflictual civil-military relations. The themes are socio-political and economy. Research design employed is cross-sectional research design. Cross-sectional research design involves a research based on collecting data of more than one cases at a single point in time dealing with two or more than two variables<sup>58</sup>. The data can be qualitative or quantitative in nature. The goal of the researcher, by employing this research design usually, is to scrutinize the collected data to discern patterns of association. It is also quoted that cross-sectional research design is more often used by researchers that are seeking out variation<sup>59</sup>. Since there is no sequential order to collect data for variables, given that all the data is collected in a single point in time and hence is simultaneously being collected, the chances to manipulate the variables drop significantly. Considering the fact that the research was carried in a single point in time, with three variables and the degree or fashion of association among them.

The sample is a non-probability sample. Non-probability sample is the sample that is acquired by focusing on a set of requirements, hence increasing the chances of one group's selection over the other. The sampling utilized is purposive sampling. In purposive sampling the researcher tends to obtain detailed information on a specific subject. Purposive sampling is mostly used in qualitative research and it is essential for the researcher to present information about the inclusion criteria. This adds precision to the research exercise. The sample chosen were academicians, economists, policymakers, practitioners, and journalists with expertise in civil-military relations (to get their point of view about the three themes, i.e, economy, politics and societal phenomena). Bulk of the respondents were academics that contributed in the field of civil-military relations in Pakistan. While policymakers, were consulted, they constituted a minority in the chosen sample. The research is primary research and the principal modus-operandi of data collection is semi-structured interviews with academics, policymakers, practitioners, etc. As aforementioned, the data collection was semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the tool to gather data so that the rigid structure of fixed questions does not obstruct valuable information. Semi structured interviews are often used when research questions are exploratory in nature, hence using an exploratory tool would complement is research objectives.

Initially a list of all the experts, and individuals who have worked actively in the field of civil-military relations, or possess expert opinion about the theme(s) (especially economy) was drafted. Upon emailing around, 74 individuals, only a few responded back. The researcher then, had to visit the offices, and institutions in Lahore and Islamabad to first ensure availability and consequently fix a time slot. The target of data collection was point

---

<sup>58</sup> Alan Bryman, "Social Research Methods," in *Taylor & Francis eBooks*, 2010, 157–84, [https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203381175\\_chapter\\_9](https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203381175_chapter_9).

<sup>59</sup> Bryman, "Social Research Methods."

of saturation which was achieved after 20 interviews that were conducted. Out of these 20 interviews, one was an audio (on-call), while five were online (via zoom and google meet), and three submitted an in-written response. The average duration of each interview was around an hour. The composition of interviewees is represented via pie chart below.




Figure 1 composition of interviewees

The rationale behind bulk of interview respondents belonging from academia was the research endeavor focusing on chances of application of Theory of Concordance on civil-military relations in Pakistan. Since three of the four research objectives were academic in nature, hence the composition. Also, the availability was a crucial factor as well. Availability of policymakers, and practitioners was also extremely scarce, the latter category being hesitant to respond as well. Similar was the case with journalists, as first, access to them was extremely difficult, plus negligible number of journalists possessed expertise in civil-military relations. Therefore, a freelance journalist, working for high reputed international news agencies, was interviewed. In addition, the volatile political and security environment of the country (at the time of research) acted as a factor to hinder the availability of multiple respondents as they simply did not want to indulge in an activity that might infringe their personal security (even though the said activity was purely academic in nature). These can be considered as limitations to the study.

Given the afore-explained situation, the interviewer ensured complete anonymity of the subjects to be interviewed. Also, the code of ethics was followed absolutely. The researcher asked permission from the subjects to voice-record them (for fool-proof transcription), and they were voice-recorded only if the respondent felt comfortable enough to be recorded. The tool used for voice recording was an I-phone application called “voice memos”. These voice recordings were then carefully transcribed to pen down the later chapter of findings and analysis. The confidentiality of the respondents is ensured throughout the entirety of the study, and for that purpose a coding mechanism is created to streamline the incorporation of primary data into the study. The table below in **Fig. 02**, presents the coding mechanism.

Codes	Interviewees	Background	Time	Location
P1	Anonymous	Academia, Author of a book	2024	Lahore
P2	Anonymous	Academia	2024	Lahore
P3	Anonymous	Academia	2024	Lahore
P4	Anonymous	Academia	2024	Lahore
P5	Anonymous	Academia	2024	Lahore
P6	Anonymous	Academia	2024	Lahore
P7	Anonymous	Academia	2024	Lahore
P8	Anonymous	Academia, Author of multiple books	2024	Lahore
P9	Anonymous	Academia, Author of a book	2024	Lahore
P10	Anonymous	Academia	2024	Islamabad
P11	Anonymous	Academia, Author of multiple books	2024	Islamabad
P12	Anonymous	Academia	2024	Islamabad
P13	Anonymous	Academia, extensive research in CMR	2024	Islamabad
P14	Anonymous	Economist	2024	Islamabad
P15	Anonymous	Economist	2024	Islamabad
P16	Anonymous	Policymaker	2024	Islamabad
P17	Anonymous	Policymaker/Bureaucrat	2024	Islamabad (PMO)
P18	Anonymous	Practitioner	2024	Islamabad
P19	Anonymous	Journalist	2024	Islamabad
P20	Anonymous	Economist/ policymaker	2024	Islamabad

*Table 1 Coding Mechanism of Interviewees*

In association to primary data, secondary sources such as books, scientific articles in journals, reports, dissertations of other researchers etc. is used to support data collected from interviews and a survey. For instance, multiple authors of books, scientific articles and dissertation written on civil-military relations in Pakistan, are cited congruently throughout the study. Not only that, the researcher managed to land interview with leading authors in that field and has used the primary (their answers) and secondary (their books and articles) data in the study. The data collected is analyzed thematically. In thematic analysis the researcher tends to trace out core themes and then decipher a probable connection among the variables. Thus, fulfilling the goal to produce multi-faceted cross-sectional research.

## Chapter 3

### 3. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Civil Military Relations have been an avenue of research and interest. There have been different trends pre-Cold war as militaries were placed as drivers of modernisation then, whereas in post-Cold war era the literature tilted in the favor of participatory democracy and segregation of both spheres, civil and military. As democratic norms consolidated in the third world, different patterns of civil-military relations emerged. In the third-world countries, also labeled as developing countries, majority having transitioning democracies, military thrives as a major political entity. Bulk of studies examining militaries of developing countries, in the civil-military relations equation, provide the rationale that due to certain characteristics, the military is widely dominant. These traits range from degree of modernity, organization, professionalism, competence as compared to civilian entities or politicians to deliver on administration and economic development<sup>60</sup>. This makes militaries in these countries popular and more prone to intervene in domestic politics. A fact to note is that most of the studies were carried out targeting Latin America, East and North East Asian countries. Thus, South Asian militaries in specific, and civil-military relations of South Asian developing countries, were not studied extensively as compared to aforementioned regions. Also, more attention has been focused on the contexts, causes and culminations of military coup d'etats generally, and the limited literature highlighting South Asian civil-military relations follows the same pattern. Extremely limited scholarship covers the challenges the post-military state faces, especially when it comes to succeeding civilian regimes<sup>61</sup>.

Guillermo O'Donnell's work around the themes of democracy, focusing on Latin American case studies is instrumental in drawing parallels between two data sets. O'Donnell, proposed a hypothesis based on the analysis of political developments in Argentina and Brazil. According to O'Donnell, the more the state (that is late to industrialization as compared to the North) undergoes socio-economic modernization, the more are the chances of extreme political transitions<sup>62</sup>. These seismic political shifts are likely to be non-democratic in nature. This phenomenon results due to the exponential development in a small frame of time, consequently generating surplus of technocratic roles. This gives rise to a specific group of individuals who have a self-perceived notion of themselves being better administrator of affairs, namely bureaucratic-authoritarians. O'Donnell in his work, published in 1973, tried to use multiple variables hypothesizing the causes and working of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, a political process sweeping Brazil and Argentina. According to him, a certain threat, or a perception of threat that endangers the pre-existing socio-economic status-quo, acts as a primary driver of a coup staged by bureaucratic-authoritarians<sup>63</sup>. This hypothesis paints Pakistan's situation as well. Social Scientists like Hamza Alavi, Hasan Askari Rizvi, Ejaz Hussain, Saeed Shafqat, Ilhan Niaz, Ayesha Siddiq, etc employed

---

<sup>60</sup> Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (New York, United States of America: Routledge, 2015).

<sup>61</sup> Gerald A. Heeger, "Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience," *World Politics* 29, no. 2 (January 1, 1977): 242–62, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010092>.

<sup>62</sup> Kenneth Paul Erickson, "Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 55, no. 3 (August 1, 1975): 565–67, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-55.3.565>.

<sup>63</sup> Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merkx, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited," *Latin American Research Review* 17, no. 2 (January 1, 1982): 3–40, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0023879100033628>.

multiple theoretical frameworks and concepts using the works of Amos Perlmutter, Guillermo O'Donell, Huntington, Gramsci etc. and at times producing their own original work, contributed to literature and discourse of civil-military relations in Pakistan immensely. Multiple aforementioned native authors have examined Pakistan via the lens of post-colonial state to explain the past and current civil-military equation and socio-political and economic effects to that.

Ejaz Hussain's research work depicting the effects of colonial character of military echoes the academic standing of multiple respondents including P1<sup>64</sup> and P5<sup>65</sup>, while P9<sup>66</sup> disagrees. Hamza Alavi's work especially in his "The State in Post-Colonial Societies"<sup>67</sup> reinforces Hussain's take on the politico-economic processes in a post-colonial state. Hussein elaborated that three-party structure, comprising of military, civil bureaucracy and landed-feudal class, fulfilled their economic and political goals when Britain was a colonizer. This nexus among the three stakeholders transitioned from pre-partition Pakistan to post-partition Pakistan seamlessly. Hussain, along with other Pakistani social scientists, term the civil-military relations or power relations in Pakistan using the concept of 'praetorianism' or 'praetorian oligarchy'<sup>68</sup>. In the same vein, Hasan Askari Rizvi classified Pakistan as 'praetorian state' where the military of the country possess the resources, will and is guided by experience to subjugate the principal political processes and civilian-political institutions.<sup>69</sup>

In the chapter 'Civil-Military Relations in Praetorian State' of book "The Military and Democracy in Asia and Pacific"<sup>70</sup>, Askari adroitly pens down the whole civil-military saga in Pakistan tracing the ins and outs, from colonial legacy to current state of affairs. While the historical origin and early evolutionary period of Pakistani military was moulded by British heritage of civilian supremacy, the military carved itself a seat as a key political stakeholder during political vacuum and chaos. This volatile political landscape resulted after the failure of Muslim League to gain character of national political party post untimely demise of Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan.

Pakistan has had a history of being governed by dictators and military administrators for around 33 years (which constitutes less than half of total age of Pakistan). The primary drivers that propel military to exercise power directly in the past and indirectly in the contemporary scenario, are autonomy of military, size of defence budget, professional and corporate interests which in turn make them active architects of security and foreign policy<sup>71</sup>. Some authors enlist 'Pakistan's insecurity syndrome' as the leading reason of military's preponderance in civilian areas, being bordered by India (the arch-nemesis), and unstable Afghanistan by either sides. Whilst those might be the drivers, the actions resulted and traditions established by military intervention in domestic

---

<sup>64</sup> P1, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>65</sup> P5, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>66</sup> P9, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>67</sup> Hamza Alavi, "The State in Postcolonial Societies," *Pakistan Monthly Review*, August 2024, <https://pakistanmonthlyreview.com/the-state-in-postcolonial-societies/>.

<sup>68</sup> Hussain, Ejaz. "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State." *PCD Journal*, January 1, 2012, 113–46. <https://www.neliti.com/publications/385/pakistan-civil-military-relations-in-a-post-colonial-state>.

<sup>69</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan: Civil-military Relations in a Praetorian State," in *ANU Press eBooks*, 2004, <https://doi.org/10.22459/mdap.03.2004.06>.

<sup>70</sup> Rizvi, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State," 2004.

<sup>71</sup> Rizvi, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State," 2004.

politics have been and are at the cost of democratic norms, participatory politics and better socio-economic conditions.

Pakistan's military has always jealously guarded its 'right' of larger-than-rational defense budget to the point where Zia-ul-Haq expressed that it is due to the military's capabilities that Pakistan can enjoy economic betterment.<sup>72</sup> The notion of Pakistan being mired in constant state of external threats (India and Afghanistan's invasion by USSR and then USA), made military sole designer of Pakistan's security and foreign policy in the past. Massive presence in such key areas trickled down domestically, as majority of actions although political in nature were flagged as 'internal threats' and suppressed violently under military regimes. This squashed erection of political parties and processes in that time, while hampered the initiation of such activities in the future as well. Such an environment, persistent over a couple of decades periodically naturally created weak, crumbling political institutions that rarely functioned on democratic norms in the face of highly organized and powerful institution of military. The acute imbalance was all but a result of aforementioned circumstances. There were no regulatory or legislative checks on military as an institution, thus contributing to increasing imbalance.

The political turmoil that resulted after Jinnah's untimely death and Liaquat Ali's assassination, could be directly credited towards discrepancies in Muslim League as a political party. This created a space for civil bureaucracy to maneuver the political processes directly<sup>73</sup>. The common ethnic linkages in both, civil bureaucracy and military, populated overwhelmingly by Punjabi followed by Pakhtoon ethnicities, alienated other groups such as Sindhi, Balochi and Bengalis<sup>74</sup>. This along with other gross mismanagements resulted in the separation of East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). Despite serious fluctuations in the internal and external state of affairs of the country, the political ground was almost always poised where the ruling regime wanted to stuck to power and the opposition adamant to dislodge the ruling party<sup>75</sup>, irrespective of the larger consequences that the people might have to pay. This also meant that the ruling regime carried favor with the upper echelons of the military to stay in power while the opposition looked towards the military to dislodge the ruling party<sup>76</sup>. This made both sides of actors pawn for the larger game of politics in the country.

The civilian governments almost always depended on the military to assist them in hour of need, most commonly, during natural calamity. Whilst that practice is universal in character, that is, multiple militaries step in to aid the civilian institutions or governments during natural disasters. In Pakistan's case, military was also called to maintain law and order every now and then. The additional policing responsibility coupled with military's perpetual presence in almost all civilian domains irrespective of presence of crisis, posed serious questions on the credibility, legitimacy and efficiency of civilian institutions. The aforementioned dilemma was often cited by

---

<sup>72</sup> Dawn 6 Feb, 1987.

<sup>73</sup> Hussain, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State."

<sup>74</sup> Irm Haleem, "Ethnic and Sectarian Violence and the Propensity Towards Praetorianism in Pakistan," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (June 1, 2003): 463–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659032000084410>.

<sup>75</sup> Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*.

<sup>76</sup> Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*.; Shaista Taj, Zahir Shah, and Manzoor Ahmad, "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN (1998-2015)," *Global Political Review* 1, no. 1 (December 30, 2016): 78–88, [https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2016\(i-i\).08](https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2016(i-i).08).; Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA on JSTOR," *Www.Jstor.Org* 42, no. 2 (April 1989): 47–78, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393356>.



the military, or the military dictator as the sole reason that motivated him to take the reins in his own hands since the civilian government or institutions were not apt enough to run the state<sup>77</sup>.

The similar ethnic base that both military and civil bureaucracy share is evident from the fact that with the exception of two chief of army staffs (COAS), namely, General Muhammad Musa and General Mirza Aslam Beg, the rest of COAS were either Punjabi or Pakhtoon<sup>7879</sup>. Moreover, the tradition of extensions has been rampant in the Pakistan military. COAS enjoys a tenure of four years, but more often than usual COAS has sought for extension to hold onto his position. For instance, with the exception of Lt General Gul Hassan, General Tikka Khan, General Abdul Waheed, General Mirza Aslam Beg, and General Raheel Sharif, all of the remaining Chief of Army Staff enjoyed extensions<sup>80</sup>. The often cited rationale behind the extensions would be the ‘external and internal threats’ demand avoiding transition of COAS.

Recruitment in military is not solely inspired by patriotism, instead military has evolved into a tremendously attractive job option because of the material benefits it offers. From Ayub’s era, military has initiated a series of actions that has contributed to increase the magnitude of these socio-economic benefits. These included, incorporating retired military personnel in Fauji Foundation, deployment in gulf states, allotting land in urban centres and cantonments, and designation of swathes of agricultural lands<sup>81</sup>. While Ayub rewarded parcels of land<sup>82</sup>, it was primarily Zia-ul-Haq’s regime that peaked in providing material perks and privileges to serving and retired military personnels. Zia not only increased the magnitude of already provided perks, he ensured quotas of retired military officers in civil job markets. For instance, he introduced 10% quote for ex-servicemen in civil-services, previously populated by civil bureaucrats. Not only that, in Zia’s regime, retired military generals were appointed as heads to multiple civil institutions, a tradition that is practiced till date. Finer rightly, termed this practice as act of ‘colonisation by military’ as an institution on other civil institutions<sup>83</sup>. Some authors deem these actions and perpetual involvement in politics as protective measures adopted by military to guard their corporate interests<sup>8485868788</sup>.

The cycle of military involvement in politics travels in a loop. Multiple authors allude to weakness in political institutions of a state as the primary driver of military intervention in domestic politics. In Pakistan’s case, while that rationale is quoted frequently to explain military coups, the reasons behind the weaknesses in political institutions and processes are often overlooked. In a state where the military directly ruled in its initial and formative years, and ruled by suppressing democratic activities, no ample space for inception and then

---

<sup>77</sup> Rizvi, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State,” 2004.

<sup>78</sup> Rizvi, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State,” 2004.

<sup>79</sup> Haleem, “Ethnic and Sectarian Violence and the Propensity Towards Praetorianism in Pakistan.”

<sup>80</sup> Rizvi, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State.”

<sup>81</sup> Rizvi, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State.”

<sup>82</sup> Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*.

<sup>83</sup> S E Finer, “The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and the Theory of Military Withdrawal From the Seats of Power,” *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 1985): 16–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598508419821>.

<sup>84</sup> Ayesha Siddiq, *Military Inc. - Second Edition*, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1h64kvc>.

<sup>85</sup> Rabia Chaudhry, *Changing Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Soldiers of Development* (Routledge, 2023).

<sup>86</sup> Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”

<sup>87</sup> Madan Lal, “CHANGING PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN PAKISTAN,” *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 71, no. 2 (2010): 635–49.

<sup>88</sup> Amos Perlmutter, *Political Roles and Military Rulers*, Routledge eBooks, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315034898>.

strengthening of political institutions was provided. Thus, military junta actively obstructed democratic norms to take root, as during their regime military dictators would restrict political activity considerably<sup>89</sup>. Pakistan's history is rife with examples of declaring certain political parties threat to internal security to outright banning others during military regimes<sup>90</sup>. Zia un Haq in 1979 forced a ban on political parties, while other political parties that exhibited soft stance towards military takeover were allowed to conduct political activities, that too, on a small scale<sup>91</sup>. Even when martial law would be uplift, a meticulously tailored political set-up would be implemented. Due to the aforementioned reasons, political culture based on democratic norms never really burgeoned or got consolidated in the political parties.

In the post military coup environment, when civilian governments were installed especially those of post 1998 era, military brass in cahoots with the Presidents kept the prime ministers in check<sup>92</sup>. Any falling out between the higher echelons of the military and the prime minister, meant the ouster of the latter. This explains the constant ouster of prime ministers before completing their terms in the 1990s, before culminating into yet another episode of military coup in 1999<sup>93</sup>.

Even though there hasn't been another military coup since Musharraf's regime (1999-2008), the military has not been out of the political picture. Military has ensured its position as the vital and key stakeholder in the power structure of the state. Through its seat in crafting foreign policy via troika structure, to engineering security policy due its massive presence and influence in the National Security Committee<sup>94</sup>, military as an institution has entrenched its tentacles far and beyond in the nooks and crannies of the country. The domestic political scene is also filtered through the sieve of national security and national interest, spearheaded by all influential military. The chief of army staff has emerged as one of the most powerful entity/person in the area of state craft. The COAS of Pakistan, often indulges in meetings with other heads of states, or high ranking officials of other countries. This is rather a peculiar activity as meetings between head of states or high ranking individuals and a COAS of another country is not a common phenomena internationally. This depicts the embedded power structure and asymmetry of civilian vis-a-vis military counterparts.

As for the question of hiatus in periodical military coups, since the last military regime ended in 2008, the answer can safely be concluded that influence of military entrenchment in the political web of the country ensures that their interests are protected, corporate and others. Even if the military has avoided directly intervening in domestic politics, that does not connote that their presence is void<sup>95</sup>. The fact that in the 77 year history of Pakistan, no civilian premier has fulfilled their complete term and been ousted, impeached or coup-ed before that, signifies

---

<sup>89</sup> Jamshed Khan and Asma Ullah Wazir, "Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era," *The Dialogue* 6, no. 2 (2011).

<sup>90</sup> Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*.

<sup>91</sup> Rizvi, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State."

<sup>92</sup> Rizvi, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State.," Haleem, "Ethnic and Sectarian Violence and the Propensity Towards Praetorianism in Pakistan."

<sup>93</sup> Khan and Wazir, "Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era.,"; Sughra Alam, Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti, and Asia Saif Alvi, "Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan: A Study of Musharraf's Era (2005-2008)," *Global Social Sciences Review* V, no. I (2020): 450–57, [https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2020\(v-i\).46](https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2020(v-i).46).

<sup>94</sup> Khan and Wazir, "Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era."

<sup>95</sup> Amina Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures," *Deleted Journal*, May 20, 2024, 1–31, <https://doi.org/10.1017/cps.2024.1>.

the presence of a relatively powerful actor. In the recent past, the military has acted behind the veil and influenced the political landscape via their patronage or backing of the prime minister until a conflict of interest emerges between both<sup>96</sup>. The conflict is sorted by the military backing another politician that is more acquiescent to their interests. Since the military can puppeteer the political setup to their advantage, there is no such need left for direct military intervention<sup>9798</sup>.

As far as governance is concerned, any government that fails to deliver on that front becomes unpopular and the military takes that onus on itself to oust an unpopular government via machinations. Also, since serious lapses in governance and handling economic activity of the state, directly jeopardizes the professional and corporate interests of the said institution, the military actively remains embedded in the politico-economy mesh. There do exist challenges to smoothen the governance process. Polarization of the society on the faultlines of class, language, ethnicity, and sect<sup>99</sup>, plus porous Afghanistan border that allows the spill of terrorist outfits and ammunitions, underwhelming performance of civilian institutions and law enforcing agencies due to their politicization and corruption<sup>100</sup>, etc. are some among many challenges that impact the quality of governance in the country.

Over the years, the military has emerged as the mighty political force to reckon, in the Pakistan political and power structure. This evolutionary process has transitioned the military's role from direct intervener or governor to 'influencer' working behind shadows. It has also earned them the title of 'deep state', similar to US and Turkey's establishments. The Pakistani establishment, now, likens rule over rule<sup>101</sup>, as to why alienate increasingly political conscious masses when they can maneuver the affairs indirectly to their advantage. The loop of the military patronage to ensure fulfillment of a full term of the civilian prime minister, thus ensuring military presence in the political scenery, because in an otherwise scenario, the ruling party's premier would be ousted, has consumed the socio-political and economic process of the state inhabiting 23 million population. The civilian governments simply have to appease and sacrifice civilian-political spaces to avoid coup.

Pakistan's history can also be translated via the 'principal-agent' model as per Hussain's body of work. Invoking Peter Feaver's work<sup>102</sup> Hussain used four actors, namely, politicians, civil bureaucracy, military and judiciary and painted the transition of roles historically. From the time period of 1947 to 1951, Politicians assumed the role of 'principal' while the rest of the actors (military, civil bureaucracy and judiciary) were agents. This changed with the pervasive presence of civil bureaucracy from the years of 1951 till 1958. During this era, civil bureaucracy took the role of principal while the other three actors were turned into agents. This situation changed with the first coup, staged by General Ayub Khan. Consequently, from the year 1958 till 1972, military was the

---

<sup>96</sup> Rizvi, "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA on JSTOR."

<sup>97</sup> Alam, Bhatti, and Alvi, "Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan: A Study of Musharraf's Era (2005-2008)."

<sup>98</sup> Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan."

<sup>99</sup> Haleem, "Ethnic and Sectarian Violence and the Propensity Towards Praetorianism in Pakistan."

<sup>100</sup> Rizvi, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Praetorian State."; Ilhan Niaz, *Understanding and Addressing the Administrative Aspect of Pakistan's Civil-Military Imbalance* (Manohar, 2015).

<sup>101</sup> Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "ROLE OR RULE?: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN 2014-2015," *JSTOR* (JSTOR, 2015), <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep10119.7>.

<sup>102</sup> Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (January 1, 1996): 149-78, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x9602300203>.

principal and judiciary, politicians and civil bureaucracy were the agents. During the civilian premiership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, politicians regained the position of ‘principal’. Again, after the 1977 coup d’état by Zia ul Haq, military was principal, while the other three actors were agents. This periodical transition continued up until 2008, when the last military dictator, General Pervaiz Musharaff resigned and Zardari became the president after general elections (2008). Extracting from Hussain’s book ‘Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan’<sup>103</sup> the sketch below depicts the historical curve of ‘principal-agent’ relationship among the aforementioned actors.




Figure 2 Flow Matrix 2 Principal-Agent Relationship in Pakistan<sup>104</sup>

### 3.1 Theory

#### 3.1.1 Application of Theory of Concordance

The leading research objective of the study was to gauge the application of ‘theory of concordance’ on Civil-Military relations in Pakistan. While, the history, or the contemporary situation showed negligible signs of the application of the said theory, the future remains equally bleak as well. Informed by an extensive and rich history of military intervention in domestic politics, under the structure of ‘pretorian oligarchy’<sup>105</sup> or ‘military guardianship’ substantial literature points towards unequal equation shared among the key stake holders (military, political elites and general public). According to the primary data collected, there exists a broad spectrum of different opinions with regards to application of Theory of Concordance. A small school of academicians applaud some of the merits of the theory but are at the same time skeptical of its application, given the ground realities. P11, appreciated the utility of theory of concordance, as an upgrade from the same old conventional theories (normal theories)<sup>106</sup>. The accredited academician acknowledged the twist that theory of concordance provides, unlike its predecessors. Categorically, the fact that theory of concordance provides space for the historical and institutional uniqueness of each country’s civil military equation. In the same vein, while disagreeing with its applicability and highlighting its demerits P2<sup>107</sup> directed that moving on from ‘normal’ theories (of Huntington, and Janowitz work) and picking a theory that focuses on historical and institutional uniqueness is a good start.

<sup>103</sup> Ejaz Hussain, *Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan*, Heidelberg Series in South Asian and Comparative Studies, vol. 6 (Samskriti, 2013).

<sup>104</sup> Hussain, *Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan.*; Hussain and Khan, “Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan- the Case of Balochistan.”

<sup>105</sup> Alavi, “The State in Postcolonial Societies.”; Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”; Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2000, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230599048>.

<sup>106</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” Fig. 02, 2024

<sup>107</sup> P2, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” Fig. 02, 2024

Adding to its flaws P2 highlighted that Theory of Concordance originates from a “positivist framework” that generates rigid categories that can be in turn “reductionist if (you) are trying to understand the nuances of civil and military interactions in Pakistan”.<sup>108</sup> P1, echoed similar stance, as she had already explored the theory’s application in her book’s introductory chapter<sup>109</sup>. The respondent stated that like all other theories, theory of concordance has its demerits, but in its true form it cannot be applied. In an attempt to offer a nuanced perspective, P1 argued that while theories like concordance theory can be useful tools for understanding complex phenomena, they should not be applied in a rigid or deterministic manner. She emphasizes the importance of looking at the specific facts of a particular country and cautions against using theories to prescribe policy solutions. Responding to the following part of the question, P1 signaled that the concept of ‘hybrid regimes’<sup>110</sup> is very much relevant when it comes to Pakistan’s civil-military relations.

### 3.1.2 The Impact of the ‘Colonial Experience’

A general theme that almost 40% of the respondents reverted to, to explain the reasons behind the current civil-military setup or the workings of civil bureaucracy vis-à-vis military bureaucracy is the colonial legacy. The ‘Colonial Factor’ has been extensively worked upon by multiple native social scientists, such as Ilhan Niaz, Ejaz Hussain, Hamza Alavi, Hasan-Askari Rizvi etc. Ejaz Hussain’s work ‘Pakistan; Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State’<sup>111</sup>, Hamza Alavi’s work ‘The State in Post-Colonial Societies’<sup>112</sup> and an academician respondent’s<sup>113</sup> detailed interview highlights the ‘colonial experience’ of Pakistan as a state. Alavi’s work inspired from Marxist theory explains how Pakistan before partition, possessed an already ‘overdeveloped’ state apparatus to aid Britain (a colonizer at that time). The overdeveloped military-bureaucratic apparatus was employed by Britain to control the indigenous population, and it remained intact after partition as well<sup>114</sup>. This tipped the balance of power in the favor of military-bureaucratic structure. This military-bureaucratic structure took the shape of a consolidated ‘military-bureaucratic oligarchy’ that seeped across different groups namely, indigenous bourgeoisie, metropolitan bourgeoisie and landed elites<sup>115</sup>. Given the invasive spread and consequent presence, the shared interests of the said classes emerged synonymous with the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. The situation was never rectified, as a ‘bourgeoisie revolution’ never occurred that could over-power this prior-established state apparatus and its aforementioned consequent manifestations. In the nutshell, the citizenry pre and post partition remained subaltern essentially.

Another development that transpired was the regional aspect of this oligarchic structure. The military-bureaucratic oligarchy was often confronted by the regional movements that sought autonomy, as it threatened the resources (and by extension, power) distribution system. Thanks to asymmetric development, Punjab emerged

---

<sup>108</sup> P2, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>109</sup> P1, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>110</sup> P1, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>111</sup> Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”

<sup>112</sup> Alavi, “The State in Postcolonial Societies.”

<sup>113</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>114</sup> Alavi, “The State in Postcolonial Societies.”

<sup>115</sup> Alavi, “The State in Postcolonial Societies.”

as a developed region relative to the rest of the country. The situation indicated further strengthened the ethnically major chunk of the oligarchy. Ejaz Hussain chimes in and terms this regional dominant group as ‘Punjab based praetorian oligarchy’<sup>116</sup>. The previously mentioned ethnically dominant structure was the product of over-representation of Punjabis in civilian and military bureaucracies, aided by their assets (land and other resources). The already established ethnic niche of praetorian oligarchy got further bolstered after partition, as it got more populated by the mass migrations of Punjabis from the other side of the border as well. Hussain further demystifies the commonly held belief that military intervention in domestic politics is a post-independence phenomenon. He draws attention to the time when Britain actively used Punjabi soldiers and created military-land owners alliances, the duo with shared corporate interests. Similar to Alavi’s thesis, Hussain also arrives to the conclusion that military’s oligarchic structure backed by alliances with the land-owning classes gave rise to augmented economic activities such as obtaining land and establishing businesses (Fauji Faoundation etc.)<sup>117</sup>. Consequently, military influenced and molded polices that would protect and benefit their corporate interests, expanding their power base and evading civilian control.

P11, whilst did not use the terms such as ‘praetorian oligarchy’ and ‘overdeveloped state apparatus’ but gave expansive responses on similar themes. The author of multiple books, P11, responded to the questions by giving a side-by-side example of India, given the fact that both Pakistan and India share same colonial experience and an apolitical army. However, while India maintained the tradition of apolitical army and civilian control, Pakistan’s military reversed its apolitical nature in less than a decade after independence in 1947. Series of events, such as the fact that Pakistan needed around 4,000 active military men, while we had only 2,000 and majority of that too belonged to low ranking officers. Therefore, Liaquat Ali expedited the process, by nationalizing the military and personally overseeing promotions (on shaky meritocratic grounds). This intervention inside military business was seen as invasion of autonomy of the military. In addition to the unique circumstances and poor choices, lack of establishing solid constitution and strong electoral process in time exacerbated the civil-military imbalance. Conclusively, Pakistan's post-colonial trajectory has been significantly shaped by the legacies of colonial rule, partition, and the enduring power of a "Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy." These factors, combined with the military's economic interests and recurring interventions in politics, have created a complex and imbalanced relationship between civilian and military institutions in Pakistan.

Having been actively shaped by the colonial experience, the ground realities are not favorable for theory of concordance at present or in near future. P16<sup>118</sup>, signaled towards the ‘idealist’ nature of theory of concordance. As according to him and P12<sup>119</sup>, while in theory the application is desirable but in order to actually achieve concordance the fault lines that create imbalance in the first place need to be eradicated. P13<sup>120</sup>, similar to P1 and P2, highlights the merits of the theory but disagrees with its core assumptions. A small group of academicians,

---

<sup>116</sup> Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”

<sup>117</sup> Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”

<sup>118</sup> P16, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>119</sup> P12, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>120</sup> P13, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

however, outrightly denies remotest chances of applicability of the said theory. According to P4, P5, P6, P7, P9, P17 and P19, theory of concordance is not a viable model for smoothening civil military relations in Pakistan. P4, supplicate his take by the historical civil-military saga of Pakistan and highlights how military intervention in civilian affairs have always been ‘disastrous’.<sup>121</sup> P4, alike his like-minded individuals, calls for military to be restrained in their roles and domains. P20, and P5, vehemently oppose any ‘power-sharing’ structure that might infringe upon civilian liberties, as was and still is the case now. P5<sup>122</sup>, highlights the fact, that

“there should be distribution of power among the institution. But when we talk about the military, military is not an institution of decision making. It should not be an institution of decision making because military is a government institution and its prime job is to implement the decision made by the civil authority.<sup>123</sup>”

As per P9, theory of concordance can be applied on the states such as the United States or Bangladesh but not on Pakistan<sup>124</sup>. Highlighting the work of Alfred Stepan<sup>125</sup>, and Amos Perlmutter<sup>126</sup> P9 makes a point that concordance can occur in strong democracies with civilian control over the military. And since Pakistan befits the model of ‘parent-guardian model’, as per P9, democratic norms are weak and hybridity exists. P8, puts forth another requirement that can ensure concordance. As per the interviewee,

“For concordance, a transparent and inclusive political decision-making process that involves both civilian and military leadership could mitigate conflicts and build trust.<sup>127</sup>”

The aforementioned pre-condition, however, runs directly against the take of P3, P4 and P5. They demand democratization, absolute civilian control over military and no democratic backsliding. The diversity of answers collected in the primary research with reference to theory of concordance depicts the vibrancy in the academia. In summary, the sources present a spectrum of views on concordance theory. While some experts view it as inapplicable or even detrimental to Pakistan, others see it as a potentially useful framework, although one that must be applied cautiously and with an awareness of its limitations.

### 3.1.3 Strategies to Empower Citizenry

The second part of the question, inquiring the application of theory of concordance for smoothening civil-military relations, deals with the strategies that can be employed to empower the general public. As per the assumption of the theory, the three partners, military, political elite, and citizenry must assume a partnership, agreeing on four indicators. While the military and political elites are formidable enough, it is the citizenry that lacks meaningful

---

<sup>121</sup> P4, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>122</sup> P5, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>123</sup> P5, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>124</sup> P9, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>125</sup> Juan J. Linz and Alfred C Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (April 1, 1996): 14–33, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0031>.

<sup>126</sup> Amos Perlmutter, *Political Roles and Military Rulers*, Routledge eBooks, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315034898>; Amos Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army,” in *Routledge eBooks*, 2017, 300–322, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351319645-21>; Amos Perlmutter et al., “The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements,” *World Politics* 33, no. 1 (October 1, 1980): 96, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010257>

<sup>127</sup> P8, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024

agency and equal footing. Focusing on that, a follow up question was drafted and pitched and the primary data gathered revealed multiple ways through which Pakistani citizenry can be empowered.

The general theme that is endorsed by almost all interviewees is consolidation and reinforcement of ‘democratic norms’, and ‘democratic institutions and processes’. P4, for instance, advocates for "total civilian rule" achieved through democratization, suggesting that a more participatory approach to governance with minimal state involvement is ideal. He makes his case by pointing to the success of European Union programs aimed at democratizing Eastern European nations as a potential model for Pakistan.

In the same vein, P6, underscores the need to strengthen civilian institutions, enforce the rule of law, and ensure judicial independence to empower citizens to advocate for their rights and interests. She also emphasizes the importance of free and fair elections, a demand echoed by P1, P3, P8 and P11, arguing that allowing even potentially corrupt governments to come to power through legitimate means is crucial for the long-term health of a democracy. P1, strengthened the case, by explaining the working of state institutions and quoted that is how state institutions, civilian institutions work essentially, they make mistakes and they learn from it. Quoting P1,

“Because this is how systems sort themselves out. They make a mistake, they sort themselves out. But what you are doing is, you are not letting them make mistakes as well. Properly. You are not letting people say, we have tried you out and we have checked you out for five years and we don't like you and now we are going to vote somebody else in.<sup>128</sup>”

The time, the chance that citizenry is being robbed off to truly try and test their representatives without the adulterations of machinations of ‘power corridor’, translates into trust deficit that general populace experience regarding ‘democratic practices’ and ‘free and fair election’.

P16, calls attention to the ‘dependency’ of civilian sphere on military. He highlights the need for strong parliamentary institutions, a competent and empowered defense ministry, and a robust national security apparatus with strong civilian representation. He argues that bolstering these institutions is crucial to enable civilians to make informed decisions and reduce reliance on the military.

Importance of education and skills is another theme, along with strong civil society, that is prevalent in the data. P5, argues that citizens need to be educated about their rights and the political system, including a clear understanding of the difference between the state and the government. He emphasizes the importance of a free media and active civic institutions to hold those in power accountable. P8, echoes the same idea and criticized the draconian laws imposed by PEMRA (Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority) in the shape of PECA (The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016). He emphasizes the importance of education, arguing that an educated population is more likely to make informed choices and hold leaders accountable. He also highlights the need for transparency and access to information, citing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 2000) in the United States as a model for Pakistan to emulate. P2, follows the suit and points to the value of education and open discourse in creating a more politically aware populace. He observes that the increased use of terms like

---

<sup>128</sup> P1, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024



‘deep state’ in Pakistani society, even if used as propaganda, indicates a growing awareness of the complexities of power dynamics within the country.

Focusing in strengthening the civil society, P1, stresses the importance of unions, freedom of opinion, and grassroots movements in building a strong and empowered civil society. She contends that allowing citizens to organize and advocate for their interests in their safe spaces and ‘meeting points’ is crucial to counterbalancing the influence of the military. P6, shares the same stance arguing that empowering citizens requires fostering a culture of civic engagement. She suggests strengthening civil society organizations, protecting their operational space, and creating platforms for dialogue and collaboration between citizens, civilian officials, and the military. Whilst there is a long list of things that must be done to empower citizenry, there are challenges as well. These challenges emanate given the historical context of military dominance and the ongoing struggle to strengthen civilian institutions. P10, emphasizes that true empowerment requires a shift in the attitude of the military itself. He argues that the military must be willing to accept civilian control and act professionally for citizens to feel confident in exercising their agency. More importantly, actual, meaningful and sustainable empowerment of citizenry can materialize only when a genuine commitment to grass-root level reforms from both sides, civil and military occur.

### 3.1.4 Alternate Theoretical Frameworks

While drafting questionnaire of semi-structure interviews attention was paid towards providing adequate options to interviewees. In case the interviewee does not agree that theory of concordance is applicable, then a follow-up question inquiring about an alternate theory, concept, or theoretical framework that can house civil-military relations in Pakistan is posed. Respondents shared their critiques about the existing models that fall short to explain civil-military relations in Pakistan. The leading critique was the western-centrism and bias of the theories and concepts. Several interviewees critique classic civil-military relations theories, such as those proposed by Huntington and Janowitz, as being too focused on Western experiences and not applicable to Pakistan's unique historical and political context<sup>129</sup>. They argue that these models often assume a democratic framework as a prerequisite for achieving a balance between civilian and military institutions, which doesn't align with Pakistan's experience<sup>130</sup>. Multiple respondents agreed that true democracy does not transpire in Pakistan<sup>131</sup>.

While some interviewees see merit in Rebecca Schiff's Concordance Theory, which emphasizes partnership between the military, political elites, and citizenry, they also point out its limitations in the Pakistani context<sup>132</sup>. The theory posits that agreement between these three actors on aspects like the military's composition, recruitment,

---

<sup>129</sup> P3, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P8, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P16, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*

<sup>130</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*

<sup>131</sup> P2, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P3, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P4, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P4, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P9, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P13, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P19, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*

<sup>132</sup> P13, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P16, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*; P20, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02, 2024*

and political decision-making is crucial for smooth civil-military relations<sup>133</sup>. However, interviewees argue that Pakistan's reality doesn't allow for such agreement<sup>134</sup>. They highlight that the military wields significant power, limiting the ability of the citizenry and even political elites to have an equal say in these matters<sup>135</sup>.

Alternate concepts and framework suggested by interviewees were informed by different variables, such as colonial legacy, praetorianism, democratic backsliding etc. According to P11, Pakistan is fundamentally a "military state," as opposed to India, which they classify as a "civilian-led state". This fact is also supplemented by Niaz's classification of orientation of states given their civil-military inclination<sup>136</sup>. This categorization suggests that the military is not simply a powerful institution within Pakistan, but rather a defining characteristic of the state itself. The interviewee argues that this dynamic has been in place since the mid-20th century, with the military exercising direct or indirect control for most of Pakistan's history<sup>137</sup>. This perspective directly challenges the applicability of models that assume a separation between civilian and military spheres, suggesting instead a need for frameworks that account for the military's deeply entrenched role in the state apparatus.

To describe the persistent presence of the military in governance, even without direct rule, one interviewee proposes a "parent-guardian" model<sup>138</sup>. This framework suggests that the military views itself, and is often perceived by the populace, as a paternalistic figure responsible for guiding and protecting the nation, even if it means intervening in civilian affairs<sup>139</sup>. This is also supported by the infamous 'saviour complex' that military is afflicted with<sup>140</sup>. This paternalistic role, the interviewee argues, is particularly evident in the post-2008 period, where despite a return to electoral politics, the military has maintained a significant presence in governance through institutions like the National Security Committee<sup>141</sup>.

The lasting impact of Pakistan's colonial past on its civil-military relations cannot be ignored. One interviewee posits that both the civil and military bureaucracy were designed by the British to govern, not serve, the public, leading to a culture of self-preservation and a tendency to prioritize their own interests over public welfare<sup>142</sup>. Waseem argues that Pakistan evolved as a "bureaucratic polity," where power has historically been concentrated within the bureaucracy, both civilian and military, rather than elected representatives<sup>143</sup>. This perspective suggests

---

<sup>133</sup> L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*.

<sup>134</sup> P8, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>135</sup> P10, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024; P18, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>136</sup> Niaz, *Understanding and Addressing the Administrative Aspect of Pakistan's Civil-Military Imbalance*.

<sup>137</sup> P11, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>138</sup> P9, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>139</sup> P9, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; P18, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>140</sup> P8, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; P9, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; P10, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; P13, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; P16, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; P19, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024

<sup>141</sup> Alam, Bhatti, and Alvi, "Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan: A Study of Musharraf's Era (2005-2008)."; Khan and Wazir, "Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era."; Lal, "CHANGING PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN PAKISTAN."; Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."; P1, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024; P9, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>142</sup> P1, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>143</sup> Mohammad Waseem, "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan," in *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2009).; Mohammad Waseem, "Military, Militancy, and the Crisis of Governance," in *Pakistan's Democratic Transition*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2016).

that achieving a balance in civil-military relations requires addressing the structural legacies of colonial rule and reforming the bureaucracy to be more accountable and responsive to civilian needs.

The interviewees acknowledge the significant challenges in applying any single theoretical model to Pakistan's complex reality. They emphasize the need for nuanced, context-specific solutions that take into account the country's unique historical trajectory, socio-political dynamics, and the deep-rooted power structures that shape civil-military relations. While some advocate for gradual reforms and a focus on building consensus<sup>144</sup> others argue for more assertive measures to push back against the military's dominance and prioritize democratic consolidation<sup>145</sup>. The specific strategies and approaches proposed vary, reflecting the diverse perspectives within academia and the ongoing debate about the best path forward for Pakistan. It can be analytically concluded that there is need for developing a curated theoretical model for civil-military relations for countries (or case studies) where Pakistan-like dynamics exist. Since Pakistan is not developed enough to apply Theory of Concordance, because citizenry is nowhere close to an equal footing to assume partnership.

---

<sup>144</sup> P3, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02, 2024.*; P18, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02, 2024.*

<sup>145</sup> P4, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02, 2024.*; P5, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02, 2024.*

## Chapter 4

### 4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

#### 4.1 Socio-Political

Political instability is the product of absence of bolstered institutionalization on democratic norms. This occurred due to recurrent episodes of military intervention in domestic politics in the form of coup, even in the time period when military was not there in the role of dictator, or administrator, military always maintained its omnipresence via hegemony. As per academics, military intervention occurs due to weak civil institutionalization, so the whole process takes shape of a vicious loop. Against the backdrop of over bearing presence of military, in cahoots with financial-industrial groups<sup>146</sup>, political elites engage in retaliatory politics and so, least attention is given to cases of actual sustainable development and to its agent, governance. Hegemony of an unelected body over an elected body and civilian institutions create a climate of uncertainty, erode trust of citizenry in civilian institutions and derail democratic practices. Eventually, economic instability is an inevitable consequence. This generates a process where investments (both foreign and domestic) plummets, disrupting economic growth and thus increasing social-political tensions by deepening the social cleavages. In addition, performative nature and inefficiency of civil bureaucracy worsens the plight. Historically, Pakistan's civil bureaucracy has worked efficiently and independently for a very short period of time, as political landscape was consumed by an oscillatory military-hegemonic system and party-dominance system. In the contemporary scenario, civil bureaucracy has been reduced to the stature of politicized tools and as an entity rife with the 'kiss up, kick down culture'<sup>147</sup>. This has negatively impacted citizenry's entitlement to social benefits. As one of the most important pillar of state, judiciary cannot hold political and military elites accountable, Judiciary itself needs reforms and an equal check via legislature.

##### 4.1.1 Civil Bureaucracy vis-à-vis Military Bureaucracy

Pakistan's history is dominated by a mix of governing models. Pakistan has been governed by military rule, bureaucratic control and civilian rule (at times bordering on civilian authoritarianism)<sup>148</sup>. Khan and Wazir, call attention towards the obstacles hindering democratization by naming two institutions responsible, bureaucracy and military<sup>149</sup>. Inspired by the pre-partition colonial up-bring civil bureaucracy and military were not ready to share the exclusivity of execution of authority with the political elites. This made them perceive political class with mistrust and incapable of managing affairs of the state, and made them an entity exercising 'aloof superiority to the masses'<sup>150</sup>. Moreover, as power was concentrated in the executive wing of the state, that was controlled and operated by civilian bureaucracy, the quality of legislature deteriorated.

---

<sup>146</sup> Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*.

<sup>147</sup> P11, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>148</sup> Hussain, "Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil-Military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan."

<sup>149</sup> Khan and Wazir, "Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era."

<sup>150</sup> Khan and Wazir, "Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era."

Hussain, tried to theorize the civil-military relations of Pakistan, and concluded that the post-inception (1947) and pre-Ayub era exhibited trend of ‘dyarchy’<sup>151</sup>. Where civil-bureaucracy in tandem with military dominated the political scene. However, after Ayub’s coup, tables turned and the balance of power tilted towards the military. Since that moment onwards, initially civil bureaucracy was in cahoots with military (during the early Ayub years), but down the line, civil bureaucracy was reduced to the stature of operational tools. For instance, Ayub Khan used civil bureaucracy as a channel to implement his economic policies and gain legitimacy in the civil society<sup>152</sup>. Reflecting on the ‘principal-agent’ oriented explanation of Pakistan’s civil-military relations, it is aforementioned that civil-bureaucracy fulfilled the role of ‘principal’ during the era 1951-1958, and reverted back to its role as agent till this day. Due to the colonial experience, Pakistan’s civil (and military) bureaucracy was an efficiently established structure as compared to the rest of the state apparatus. Referencing, Alavi’s and Hussain’s work, the emergence of civil bureaucracy from the structure of ‘Punjab based praetorian oligarchy’ pre and post partition made it a very relevant political actor. The politics involving the creation of position ‘secretary general’ by Punjabi bureaucrats exhibits the degree of supremacy that civilian bureaucracy enjoyed back in the day<sup>153</sup>. Due to Quaid-e-Azam’s deteriorating medical condition, Punjab based bureaucrats created a unique space ‘secretary general’ and a ‘planning committee’ that reported to Jinnah. Choudhary Muhammad Ali, who assumed the role of secretary general and later became prime minister, during the leadership of Liaquat Ali Khan diverted from the cabinet the latter when it came to formulating and implementing policy decisions<sup>154</sup>. During the formative years of Pakistan, civil bureaucracy yielded unparalleled power to the point where it was the sole apparatus responsible for policy architect for the administrative affairs of the state. In that time period (1951-58), civil bureaucracy was supreme in power, influence and function, relative to military. To sum up, although ‘civil-bureaucracy led praetorian oligarchy’<sup>155</sup> dominated the political scenes in the absence of strong political leadership or cohesive Muslim League, the tides turned and after 1958’s coup, military was the unchallenged partner of the praetorian oligarchy. P11, cited an example of India’s trajectory as an equally colonial remainder as Pakistan is. India, was quick and efficient in crafting their constitution and a much credible election machinery. In contrast, Pakistan’s legislators were first mired in the controversy regarding the ‘Objectives Resolution’, then they failed to establish credible electoral processes. P11, further explained that,

“In India, the election commission succeeded in ensuring that there was no cold day rigging and there was no issue with the announcement and the tabulation of the results. In Pakistan, the Muslim League used the civil service machinery in order to sway the vote in about 15 constituencies in the Punjab. So, there was no military involvement in this. This was just our civil service and police with the Muslim League leadership interfering in about 15 constituencies to ensure the election of various individuals associated

---

<sup>151</sup> Mohammad Wasseem, “Pakistan’s Lingerin Crisis of Dyarchy,” *Asian Survey* 32, no. 7 (July 1, 1992): 617–34, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644945>.

<sup>152</sup> Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”

<sup>153</sup> Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”

<sup>154</sup> Alavi, Hamza. "Authoritarianism and legitimation of state power in Pakistan." *The post-colonial state in Asia: Dialectics of politics and culture* (1990): 19-71.

<sup>155</sup> Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”

with the Muslim League parliamentary party. So, from that day onwards, every election in Pakistan follows a very predictable script.<sup>156</sup>”

The interviewee attempts to draw attention towards how, in the very beginning, civil bureaucracy was politicized. Also, it can be noted that since the aforementioned moment onwards elections in Pakistan have become a dubious practice. This also reflects as one of the glaring examples of lack of empowerment of citizenry, as their leading agent of change, ballot box has been tampered with. To quote the same respondent, “So, having an election does not actually serve the purpose of providing you with a legitimate government....”<sup>157</sup>, sums up the dismal situation that is rather cyclic in Pakistan. In the early years, as per P11, civil bureaucracy is fully backed up by the military ran the political system thus, disturbing the working and constitutional relationship among political elites, administrative and military class. So essentially, a governing model based on ‘hybridity’ takes shape, as eloquently put forth by P11,

“Pakistan is sort of caught in this loop of periods of hybrid rule followed by periods of military rule followed by periods of hybrid rule and sort of we go back and forth between these two periods and this has been going on since 1953.<sup>158</sup>”

During Ayub Khan’s era however, the dyarchy could not be materialized<sup>159</sup>. And according to P11,

“.....from 1953 to 1958, the civil bureaucracy was the senior partner and the military was the junior partner in the hybrid regime. Then obviously from 1958 to 1971, the military was the senior partner and the civilian bureaucracy was the junior partner.<sup>160</sup>”

The state of affairs went through transition after independence of Bangladesh and transfer of power from military dictatorship to civilian presidency. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed office of the president, and brought about massive changes. Bhutto, tried to rein in the military by tinkering with command-and-control structure of military, and organization of bureaucracy simultaneously<sup>161</sup>. Bhutto left a historical legacy when it comes to civil bureaucracy downwards spiral, as he actively contributed in it. In the words of P11,

“He (Bhutto) also introduced various changes to the structure of the civil service, essentially aiming to politicize the civil service in favor of the political leadership. So, he sort of saw that the civil service is the B team of the military. So, his goal through his reforms was to turn the civil service into the B team of the politicians. So, he wanted to have a civil service that would be subservient to the political leadership. And in the process of doing that, he deprived the civil service of its autonomy. He appointed thousands of people to various positions through the lateral entry scheme. He did away with security of tenure and service guarantees, reduced the powers of the Federal Public Services Commission just to an exam taking body, and a range of other things. So, what he wanted was a politicized civil service, but politicized in his favor. So, what of course happens is that while Bhutto is in power, the bureaucracy does become very

---

<sup>156</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>157</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>158</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>159</sup> Hussain, “Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil–Military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan.”

<sup>160</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>161</sup> Hussain, “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.”

subservient. But the minute he is overthrown, it quickly becomes subservient to the new boss, the military again.<sup>162</sup>”

Bhutto was military couped, in 1977, by his chosen Chief of Army Staff Zia-ul-Haq, and then a year later he was hanged via dubious judicial trial. Hussain also quoted articulately, that if Bhutto had done things differently, institutionally bolstered parliament, established proper regulatory and oversight mechanism of military, not politicized the bureaucracy, not only his end would have been different but that of Pakistan’s participatory democracy<sup>163</sup>. Under military dictatorship yet again, the gap between the professionalism of the military and the professionalism of the civil service had grown tremendously. This situated the civil service (bureaucracy) in a much weaker position relative to the military than it was in the 1950s and 1960s. After Zia-ul-Haq’s death, in the inter-military dictatorship period (1988-1999) when civilian political elites were in power the trend of civilian bureaucracy’s degradation continued. To quote P11,

“...whenever civilian governments are restored to an extent, they quickly start to use and abuse the civil service, undermining it further. And when they undermine it further, it becomes actually easier for the military to also interfere and use the civil service for its own purpose. So, in a way, what happens is that the civil service basically bends towards whoever happens to be demanding something of it, and is more powerful than it at any given point in time.<sup>164</sup>”

Under the fourth military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, civil bureaucracy much like judiciary, suffered tremendously. P2, points towards the "slight tussle" between the civil and military bureaucracy, citing the example of Musharraf's local government ordinance that temporarily curtailed the power of the District Management Group (DMG) within the civil service. One of the most damaging actions that has scarred the civil bureaucracy to this day, was the appointment of serving and retired military officers in top and other positions of civil bureaucracy. This tradition, started in Zia’s regime, peaked in Musharraf’s. Operational spaces where civil servants could have used their influence was robbed from them. P8, seconds the situation by adding that the civil bureaucracy enjoyed a period of relative dominance over the military in the early decades after Pakistan's independence. However, prolonged periods of military rule and strategic alliances between the military and bureaucratic elites gradually shifted the balance of power.

A general theme that runs rampant in the primary data, declares deleterious social-political effects of civil bureaucracy’s compliance to military bureaucracy. This compliance translates directly into absence of civilian supremacy, hence, challenging true democratic governance. P6, for instance, asserts that this compliance erodes democratic norms and leads to the increased militarization of governance, reducing civilian oversight and accountability<sup>165</sup>. The spillover effect, of governance and accountability, also echoes in the response of P11. P11, succinctly puts forth,

---

<sup>162</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>163</sup> Hussain, “Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil–Military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan.”

<sup>164</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>165</sup> P6, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

“...as a class of people or as a group of people, civil servants in Pakistan are perceived to be the witting or unwitting tools either of the military or the politicians, depending upon who happens to be in a temporarily superior position. And what this basically does, of course, is that it undermines the credibility of the civil service as an instrument for government. And it also means that the civil servants are less inclined and less interested in actually delivering public services to the society at large, and more interested in doing things that will effectively please the boss, if you will, at any given point in time. They no longer think of themselves as servants of the state. They think of themselves as personal servants of whoever happens to be more powerful than them at any point in time. So, that has profound consequences for the ability of the state to deliver anything, because the civil service also benefits from politicization, because politicization essentially eliminates any kind of routine accountability. So, it essentially allows civil servants to behave in an unprofessional and in an unaccountable manner.<sup>166</sup>”

Ilhan Niaz’s “Understanding and Addressing the Administrative Aspect of Pakistan’s Civil-Military Imbalance” is seminal piece of literature to comprehend the structural flaws in civil bureaucracy influenced by history and other factors. Ilhan Niaz explains the civil-military balance in Pakistan by focusing on the decline of the civilian bureaucracy's administrative capacity in contrast to the military's strength and enduring institutional coherence. He argues that this imbalance is not simply about resources, but about the quality, professionalism, and motivation of the armed forces compared to the civilian institutions<sup>167</sup>. Niaz points to the decline in the quality of Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy, particularly the Central Superior Services (CSS), as a key driver of the imbalance. He argues that successive governments, both civilian and military, have treated the civil service arbitrarily, undermined its professionalism, and eroded its morale through practices like politically motivated purges, demotions, and transfers. This has resulted in a bureaucracy that is more focused on self-preservation and serving the interests of those in power rather than effectively governing and delivering public services as seconded by the aforementioned views of P11 .

While Niaz criticizes civilian leaders for their role in weakening the bureaucracy, he also argues that the military has actively contributed to the imbalance. He notes that military regimes, despite their claims of seeking reform, have often been indifferent or even hostile to strengthening civilian institutions<sup>168</sup>. He suggests that the military, recognizing its own superiority, has at times been content to allow civilian institutions to deteriorate, thereby justifying their own interventions. P4 supports this notion, by expressing that this situation creates power overlaps that hinder the proper functioning of the state and ultimately lead to “de-institutionalization, anarchy, and chaos.<sup>169</sup>”

Niaz paints a bleak picture of a civil service that has been systematically undermined and demoralized by successive governments and military. P6 also draws attention to the fact that the military's influence hinders developing transparent and accountable governance practices, impeding efforts to address socioeconomic

---

<sup>166</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>167</sup> Niaz, *Understanding and Addressing the Administrative Aspect of Pakistan’s Civil-Military Imbalance*.

<sup>168</sup> Niaz, *Understanding and Addressing the Administrative Aspect of Pakistan’s Civil-Military Imbalance*.; Hussain, “Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil–Military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan.”

<sup>169</sup> P4, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.



disparities and meet the needs of marginalized communities. He argues that unless there is a fundamental shift in the way the bureaucracy is treated, one that prioritizes merit, professionalism, and accountability, the decline will continue, further eroding the state's capacity to effectively govern and address the myriad challenges facing Pakistan

Summarily, the decline of Pakistan's civil bureaucracy can be attributed to the relentless interference and neglect from both civilian and military leaderships who have prioritized short-term political gains over building a competent and autonomous state apparatus. This has led to a vicious cycle where the bureaucracy has become increasingly subservient, corrupt, and ineffective. P13, states that the public views the civil bureaucracy as corrupt and working in tandem with the military, furthering negative public perception and social distrust<sup>170</sup>. Almost all the sources generally agree that the growing compliance of Pakistan's civil bureaucracy with military bureaucracy has detrimental social effects. They argue it undermines civilian supremacy, exacerbates social tensions, and hinders good governance. While some sources acknowledge a history of friction between these entities, they generally agree that the balance of power has shifted decisively in favor of the military in recent times, with negative implications for Pakistani society.

#### 4.1.2 Governance

As concluded in the prior section, the civil-military imbalance has acted as a catalyst for the decay of civil bureaucracy and this consequently has rendered governance in shambles. Niaz, argues that the administrative breakdown resulting from this imbalance has had severe consequences for Pakistan. It has hindered the government's ability to collect taxes, maintain law and order, deliver essential services, and pursue effective economic development policies<sup>171</sup>. This lack of capacity, in turn, further undermines the legitimacy of civilian governments and reinforces the military's perception as the only institution capable of ensuring stability.

P2, uses the term 'democratic backsliding'<sup>172</sup>, while Rizvi points towards the 'power sharing arrangement'<sup>173</sup>. S. Akbar Zaidi and Ayesha Siddiqi use the concept of 'hybridity'<sup>174</sup> to explain Pakistan's governance model while other academicians point towards Fareed Zakaria's 'illiberal democracy'<sup>175</sup>, or Guillermo O'Donnell's 'defective democracy'<sup>176</sup>. Zaidi, skillfully narrates that while democracy is a common governance model frequent across the globe, Pakistan has its unique variant of democracy. Pakistan's democracy revolves around the brazen military dictatorships or men in uniform running the state using 'civilian proxies and surrogates'<sup>177</sup>. Citing the example of recent development, Zaidi accentuates military's old practice of using their influence on political elites and

---

<sup>170</sup> P13, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>171</sup> Niaz, *Understanding and Addressing the Administrative Aspect of Pakistan's Civil-Military Imbalance.*;

<sup>172</sup> P2, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>173</sup> Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan."

<sup>174</sup> Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

<sup>175</sup> P2, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

<sup>176</sup> P2, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; P9, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.; Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

<sup>177</sup> Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

legislature in their favor. Official Secrets Act 1923, was amended to allow ‘law enforcing agencies’ (namely intelligence agencies such as ISI, MI etc) to arrest individuals without warrant<sup>178</sup>. Using constitutional amendment to carry out an action essentially unconstitutional, depicts true state of ‘praetorian democracy’ that Pakistan is experiencing. Another fact regarding the longest stretch of uninterrupted civilian power transfer, that of just 15 years, in the 77-year long history of Pakistan, presents the dismal record of democracy in the state. While the hegemonic military is to be blamed for this democratic backsliding, the political elites are equally guilty as well. Political class is opportunistic, involved in kowtowing the military for their patronage so that they could flourish. This patronage-client relationship has hollowed out the democratic traditions of the country. Political elites have voluntarily provided space to military in their spheres just to stay in power. This can be evidenced through recent amendment of Pakistan Army Act 1952 (July 2023)<sup>179</sup>.

Former prime-minister, Imran Khan’s ouster has led to heightened focus on the phenomenon of hybridity. The signal of ‘on one-page’ used by political elites and media, referring to political class’s and military’s alignment is but an expression of hybrid regime. Zaidi, calls to attention that while Khan’s governments has been increasingly called out as a hybrid regime, it is to be noted that all the governments that came into power post-1985 are essentially hybrid regimes as well. The degree of influence, intrusion, micro/macro-management in all spheres (policy-making and governance) varies, but the patronage of military has been a constant feature of civilian elected governments. P11, echoes the same stance when he traced back the hybrid regimes to the time of Muhammad Ali Bogra as the civilian premier,

“Ghulam Mohammad, who is the Governor General, he dismisses the government first in the Punjab, then he dismisses the Prime Minister sometime later and effectively brings Mohammad Ali Bogra in as the Prime Minister. He is at that time serving, I think, in Washington DC as our ambassador and the first hybrid regime takes place. So, the civil service, supported by the army, sort of take over the running of the political system and what that essentially means is that the working relationship and the constitutional relationship between the political class and the administrative and the military class is disturbed and since 1953, we have not been able to restore the equilibrium that we inherited from British rule which the Indians consolidated but we have been unable to do so. So, Pakistan is sort of caught in this loop of periods of hybrid rule followed by periods of military rule followed by periods of hybrid rule and sort of we go back and forth between these two periods and this has been going on since 1953.<sup>180</sup>”

For instance, during the spell of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif’s governments (1988-1999), the military practiced strong bond with the presidents, whom the former used to oust the prime ministers when the civilian premiers were not on the ‘same page’. Therefore, while describing the nature of democracy of Pakistan, hybridity is the main theme, variable but constant. As cited in ‘Populism, Hybrid Democracy and Youth Cultures’, The Economist and Freedom House has labelled Pakistan’s governance model as ‘hybrid democracy’<sup>181</sup>. In a post-

---

<sup>178</sup> Yaqin et al., “Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures.”

<sup>179</sup> Yaqin et al., “Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures.”

<sup>180</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>181</sup> Yaqin et al., “Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures.”

2008 political landscape, even though civilian to civilian power transfer was a burgeoning phenomenon, ‘the politically powerful army’<sup>182</sup> was creeping in from all sides into governance.

Siddiq, agrees with the hybridity of democracy, but in light of recent events, Imran Khan’s removal via vote of no-confidence and the subsequent crack-down on his political party (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf PTI)<sup>183</sup>, she has questioned the nature of hybridity. Making reference to the recent developments, heightened presence of COAS and military as an institution in all spheres, amendment of laws (aforementioned) that jeopardize basic constitutional freedoms, stifling political participation and expression, restrictions on social media etc. all points to the presence of military authoritarianism instead of hybrid regime. The situation that Pakistan is experiencing currently, rings bell with the times the country was under martial law. P9, succinctly puts forth the power relations in Pakistan by saying, “....you have control of the state without actually taking control of the state”<sup>184</sup>. Nothings fits better than the preceding statement by P9, to emulate civil-military relations and its reflection in governance. Siddiq sets out to portray that the actual transition that military has made since the end of 1999 coup is from actual control of government to entrenchment in governance. As the latter ensures enduring presence in power politics and by extension eternal authority on state. Once an invasive presence of military in governance is now a glaring reality where civilian entity has been sidelined tactically. Military, expanding its base in governance ensures that they do not have to necessarily assume the office of prime minister to run things. Fasih Zaka termed the situation when military has maneuvered the political system to such a degree where the latter’s worth is null and void and have taken up strategic control of state as ‘naked praetorianism’<sup>185</sup>.

Saddiq puts forth a case that although military’s ingress in governance was set in motion in 2008, 2013 was the point where onwards military actually crept in extensively in governance through different channels. For instance, from 2008 till 2013, parliament conceded its ground to manage weapons procurement<sup>186</sup>. Another development was erection of National Security Committee, initially comprising of four-star generals among other members. Such over-population of men in uniform in all policy-making spheres, asserting their institutional superiority, pushes the civilian stakeholders to the side.

A trend of military intervention started in post-2008 governance, intensified in Imran Khan’s government. Military men, retired and serving, were spearheading multiple projects of varying magnitudes. Naya Pakistan Housing Scheme, Pakistan International Airline (PIA), are few out of many examples where military personnel were in the top positions. Not only that, but multiple governance-aiding bodies especially during Covid-19, such as National Command and Operation Center (NCOC), National Coordination Committee (NCC) etc. were populated by men in uniform. An egregious action threatening civilian autonomy, was also undertaken by Khan’s

---

<sup>182</sup> Yaqin et al., “Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures.”

<sup>183</sup> Samra Hameed, “Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Reasons of Imran Khan’s Downfall,” *PAKISTAN LANGUAGES AND HUMANITIES REVIEW* 7, no. III (September 30, 2023), [https://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2023\(7-iii\)51](https://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2023(7-iii)51).

<sup>184</sup> P9, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>185</sup> Fasih Zaka (@fasi\_zaka), Post, Twitter, August 2, 2023, 10:22 a.m., [https://twitter.com/fasi\\_zaka/status/1686744243849588741?s=20](https://twitter.com/fasi_zaka/status/1686744243849588741?s=20).

<sup>186</sup> Sartaj Aziz, *Between Dreams and Realities : Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History*, 2020, <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BB03012481>.

government when he erected National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC), an intelligence gathering parent watch-dog.

Primary data collected questioning the social effects of civil-military imbalance in terms of political instability and quality of governance is unanimous in declaring that degree of governance has gone down-hill due to highly skewed equation. P7, argues that persistent uneven civil-military relations directly undermine Pakistan's democratic structures, state sovereignty, and the sanctity of the constitution. P12, adds to this discourse by unveiling that the civil-military relations as, "...the central question<sup>187</sup>" in Pakistan's political history, directly impacting its continuous political instability. He notes a recent transformation, with political elites feeling increasingly independent and powerful, leading to more open criticism of the military, particularly after the Panama Papers case<sup>188</sup> against Nawaz Sharif. This shift, he argues, has fueled political instability, with both PMLN (Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz) and PTI at different points experiencing friction with the military. P2, shares the same sentiments as he highlights the dynamic and evolving nature of Pakistan's civil-military relations, arguing against rigid categorization. While acknowledging the military's significant influence, he notes that it might not be as absolute as perceived. He points to instances where civilian leaders have publicly criticized the military or defied its perceived directives. He shares that focusing solely on military elites might be reductionist and emphasizes the role of other actors, including economic elites and international variables, in shaping Pakistan's complex power dynamics. He observes a recent surge in political awareness among the Pakistani populace, particularly in the aftermath of the events surrounding Imran Khan's removal from office.

P13, contributes in the political instability conversation but with a different take, he attributes political instability to Pakistan's "agitation politics" where political parties excluded from power, often with the perceived backing of the military, resort to disruptive protests and demonstrations. He rightly points to PTI's actions in 2014-15 and PMLN's actions and speeches when Khan was in power where he was addressed as 'selected' on the parliament floor. He expresses that this cyclical pattern of military supported political maneuvering hinders policy continuity, weakens law and order, delays decision-making, and makes it difficult to assign responsibility for governance failures. In this way no one gets to be held accountable for policy lapses, neither in making nor in implementing. P11, links the degradation of civilian bureaucracy and its impact on quality of governance by alluding to 'negative feedback loop' process. According to him,

"... that again creates a kind of negative feedback loop, where the more the army and political class abuse the civil service structure for short-term political gain, the worse the civil service becomes at actually delivering good governance outcomes. The worse the governance outcomes are, the worse the public service delivery is, the greater the sense of public hostility and apathy towards the state at large. So, that process sort of keeps on going and creating more and more of a mess for everybody."<sup>189</sup>

P6, shares her stance on the same wavelength, she argues that when the military's power outweighs that of civilian entities, it erodes democratic accountability, civilian oversight, and transparency. This imbalance, she believes,

---

<sup>187</sup> P12, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>188</sup> Hussain, "Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil-Military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan."

<sup>189</sup> P11, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

fosters public distrust in democratic institutions, fuels social tensions, and allows the military to prioritize its interests over national ones. She concludes that this negatively impacts policy-making, implementation, and ultimately, effective governance. Using the analogy of a dysfunctional household P18, illustrates the impact of uneven civil-military relations. He argues that when these institutions have an unhealthy relationship, it creates ambiguity in jurisdiction and policy, leading to societal confusion. He also points out the social impact of this imbalance, with citizens losing trust in civilian institutions, leading to a sense of helplessness and reliance on the military as the only perceived solution, thus feeding into another negative feedback loop. P5, supports the narrative shared by multiple academician peers by putting forth that uneven civil-military relations breed instability and a pervasive ‘trust deficit’<sup>190</sup> between citizens and all state institutions, including the political, military, and judicial elites. This distrust, he believes, makes effective governance incredibly challenging and hinders national progress.

P1 acknowledges that the civil-military imbalance is in favor of the military and sees it as problematic because it grants undue influence to an unelected, unrepresentative institution. She argues that this imbalance, coupled with the military's influence over civilian institutions, renders the concept of checks and balances ineffective, thus making true accountability null and void. P4, believes that the military's hierarchical structure and reliance on authority are fundamentally incompatible with civilian governance. This disparity, he argues, leads to the ‘de-institutionalization of the state’<sup>191</sup> where civilian institutions become irrelevant and political parties lose influence. He contends that this imbalance creates a vicious cycle of instability, rendering free and fair elections meaningless and further eroding public trust in the democratic process.

To put it in short, the sources paint a complex picture of Pakistan's civil-military relations, with a clear consensus on the detrimental impact of an uneven power balance. They highlight the fragility of civilian institutions, the military's pervasive influence, and the urgent need to strengthen democratic processes, ensure accountability, and foster a culture of respect for the rule of law. Few of the interviewees highlight the urgency of swift checks on military's intrusion in governance as in the words of P4, “..that the military lacks the experience and understanding to effectively manage civilian affairs<sup>192</sup>” as they are trained differently. He then uses the analogy of police officers issuing birth certificates, highlighting the potential for "governance disaster" when roles and expertise are misaligned.

Political instability and bad governance is a by-product of uneven civil military relations. As incompetency breeds bad governance, and bad governance further lopsides the civil-military equation. An over bearing presence of an unelected body over an elected body and civilian institutions create a climate of uncertainty, erode trust of citizenry in civilian institutions and derail democratic practices. This situation in turn have a deleterious effect on governance. In a said environment, economic instability is an inevitable consequence. This generates a process where investments (both foreign and domestic) plummets, disrupting economic growth and thus increasing social-political tensions by exacerbating the social cleavages. Not only that, but according to a respondent P3,

---

<sup>190</sup> P5, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>191</sup> P4, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>192</sup> P4, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

uneven civil military relations dampen the process of strong institutionalization which off course have long term negative effects. In such a situation, policy making and its consequent implementation both suffer.

### 4.1.3 Accountability and Judiciary

Accountability is the cornerstone of a functioning democratic state. Reproducing policy brief by V-dem institute, political accountability is essential to ensure, vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability<sup>193</sup>. Political accountability alleges the check and balance on the executive power, and the processes to make an entity (agent) accountable and/or penalize, when citizenry (principal) transfer decision making power to the former. This accountability has three sub-types, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, and diagonal accountability. The earlier mentioned subtypes sequentially develop in a civilized democratic society. As per study carried out by Mechkova and others<sup>194</sup> to trace out the sequential order of subtypes of accountability, vertical accountability is the pioneer of political accountability. By expanding the scope of vertical accountability, space for other two subtypes is created. Vertical or electoral accountability refers to the practice or institutions installed to make the government accountable via the channel of political parties and elections. P11 and P1, share the same sentiments when they refer to first, the failure of Pakistan Muslim League to build a credible electoral machinery relative to India's progress in that case and then military acting as 'king makers' and not giving citizenry space to vote in and vote out their representatives. Siddiqi supports the discourse by disclosing that military in Pakistan used and to this day utilizes elections and then parliament to ensure their control on state<sup>195</sup>. Rooted in the colonial experience, military is said to indulge in a divide and rule strategy whereby they use electoral system as a tool to put forth the desired candidate<sup>196</sup>. Horizontal accountability on the other hand points to the mechanisms installed by the legislators and judiciary to keep the executive in check. To ensure horizontal accountability, there must be strong legislation, implementation of constitution and an independent judiciary. Diagonal accountability involves a more micro approach to accountability. In diagonal accountability civil society and media keep checks and balances on the government. They do so by making use of dissemination of information, protests or sit-ins etc. Again, for ensuring diagonal or social accountability a robust civil society and free media are a necessity. Social accountability hinges on citizenry's participation in civil society organizations and other social engagements. The bare minimum that is to be established to make certain that a semblance of accountability exists in a political society, is vertical accountability<sup>197</sup>. Only after vertical accountability is present and flourishing aided with diagonal accountability, horizontal accountability can be ensured. Such is the sequential order of subtypes of

---

<sup>193</sup> Emily Walsh, "Political Accountability: Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Constraints on Governments," *V-Dem Institute* (V-Dem Institute, 2018), [https://v-dem.net/media/publications/pb\\_22\\_final.pdf](https://v-dem.net/media/publications/pb_22_final.pdf).

<sup>194</sup> Valeriya Mechkova, Anna Lührmann, and Staffan I. Lindberg, "The Accountability Sequence: From De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 54, no. 1 (May 25, 2018): 40–70, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-018-9262-5>.

<sup>195</sup> Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

<sup>196</sup> Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

<sup>197</sup> Guillermo A. O'donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*, 2013, <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BB12737827>; Susan C. Bourque, "Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective," Edited by Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela," *Political Science Quarterly* 108, no. 1 (January 1, 1993): 169–70, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2152498>.

accountability. The central question in the debate of accountability rises when in case of Pakistan, the very mechanisms constituting vertical accountability are compromised, as mentioned earlier. The detailed account of P11, regarding India's success to install a credible and efficient electoral machinery shortly after independence from Britain, meanwhile Pakistan's absolute failure to do so has wreaked havoc on the democratic integrity of the state. Also, P11, shares the earliest rigging of elections (1951) and concludes that, from that point in history onwards no political electable has ever taken their loss of seat gracefully and have always parroted the script of the opponent being backed up by the 'you-know-who'. P11, gives a crisp response by saying, "...So, having an election does not actually serve the purpose of providing you with a legitimate government."<sup>198</sup>

The general elections held on 8<sup>th</sup> February, 2024 are again incredulous as the massive cold-day rigging that started even before general elections. The court took the election symbol, from the most popular political party PTI, their electables had to contest on random symbols, the PTI electable would be abducted in broad day light, cellular services were not provided on election day, gross violations occurred while declaring results. The whole Form 45 vs Form 47 debacle, puts to shame the sham practice of 'elections' in Pakistan. P20 believes the military's tactic of installing favorable governments, often through coercion or manipulation, creates significant instability. He cites the examples of the "Form 47" issue in the recent elections and the alleged RTS breakdown in 2018 general elections. He argues that this interference undermines the legitimacy of civilian governments, making them vulnerable to internal and external pressures, ultimately hindering effective governance.

When it comes to judiciary as an institution in Pakistan, it itself needs structural reforms. The whole process of selection of senior judges for high and supreme court exhibits the negligible influence of legislative wing. In the pre 18<sup>th</sup> amendment era judges used to choose other judges in essence. The Chief Justice of Supreme Court would recommend a panel to the President among whom the President would pick out a candidate. In the same manner, for the appointment of judges of High Court the chief justice of that respective high court would send his chosen panel to the President via Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) and the governor of that province. The 1996 'Judges' Case', concluded that the recommendations of CJP are somewhat binding on the President<sup>199</sup>. And in case the President choose a different candidate from the given panel, he is to give 'justiciable' rationale for that action. The 18th Amendment (passed in 2010) was an attempt to dissolve some of the dominating power of judiciary over their own selection process, among many other things. Under 18th amendment a new process was pronounced for the selection of judges of superior courts. A two phased process was initiated, in which two bodies a Judicial Commission (JC) and a Parliamentary Committee (PC) would be involved in the process. Judicial Commission was structured to be headed by CJP, comprising of two senior judges of supreme court, two chief justices or senior judges of high court, and an Attorney General, a representative of Federal and Provincial Bar Council and a Federal and Provincial Law Minister. JC was tasked with the nomination of judges for various vacancies. These nominations were then transferred to Parliamentary Committee for further processing. The structure of PC is as follows, four members from the upper house (the Senate), four members from lower house

---

<sup>198</sup> P11, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>199</sup> Saroop Ijaz, "Judicial Appointments in Pakistan: Coming Full Circle | SAHSOL," n.d., <https://sahsol.lums.edu.pk/node/12802>.

(the National Assembly), bringing the total membership of eight members. These members would then forward the shortlisted candidates to the Prime Minister who would send it up to the President for consultation. As innovative and balanced this scheme was, it got challenged in Supreme court citing the grounds that this new set up would threaten the independency of judiciary. The Supreme Court had a full court hearing and consequently it was 'recommended' that certain changes should be made to the structure of JC which basically made the entity of PC void and ineffectual.

Judiciary has been pliant to military in the past, as it has almost always legalized military coups under the premise of 'doctrine of necessity' in the twentieth century<sup>200</sup>. The military regime itself clipped the wings of judiciary periodically by normalizing martial law orders, repressive legislature (when in power), and suppression of political activities. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, tried to restrict the independence of judiciary, despite being a civilian premier. He proposed 'fourth constitutional amendment in 1975, that curtailed judicial powers<sup>201</sup>. In 1977, however, when opposition and majority of sections in socio-political circles got alienated from Bhutto, few members of judiciary band wagoned along. Four former judges from Supreme Court and High Court, in a joint statement demanded trial of Bhutto for 'crimes against Pakistan'<sup>202</sup>. Musharraf established National Accountability Bureau (NAB), to counter corruption and other mal-practices during his military regime. However, NAB was always selective in its 'accountability' as no personnel of military or no judge of higher judiciary was ever tried<sup>203</sup>. Moreover, NAB was used as a scare tactic to 'discipline' politicians or to sway their loyalties in favor of the ruling regime.

The climax of judiciary versus the military regime reached during Musharraf's era. In a unique occurrence, judiciary on the case against the privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (PSMC), went against the decision of the military regime<sup>204</sup>. This was a first time ever event, as judiciary never objected on any ordinance, decree, or action issued by Musharraf's regime up till then. In another action of exhibition of independence of judiciary, the then CJP, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary, listened to the 'missing persons case'. This initiated a 'security dilemma' for Musharraf as he translated this act as a threat to the continuation of his rule. Consequently, Musharraf demanded a resignation from Chaudhary, and upon refusal from the latter, Musharraf terminated his position nonetheless. This action prompted protests in the streets by lawyer community and other civil society organizations. These protests were met with brutal force which resulted in loss of life of dozens of protestors. Eventually, Supreme Court intervened and issued a verdict to re-instate the suspended CJP.

In an unconstitutional practice, Musharraf contested presidential election on the then electoral college instead of new one, meanwhile he had outstanding petitions in court regarding the credibility of his presidential candidature. Fearing his removal as the newly elected President Musharraf declared a state of emergency (invoking Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007) while issuing a restraining order against judges of superior courts. He then conditioned the judges of superior courts to assume their positions if they would take a new oath under PCO.

---

<sup>200</sup> Hussain, "Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil–Military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan."

<sup>201</sup> Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*.

<sup>202</sup> Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*.

<sup>203</sup> Khan and Wazir, "Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era."

<sup>204</sup> Alam, Bhatti, and Alvi, "Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan: A Study of Musharraf's Era (2005-2008)."



Musharraf was met with overwhelming refusal as around 61 out of 90 judges refused to do so. Things escalated, as he went to put the judges of Supreme Court under compulsory leave, CJP included. The judges who stood against his draconian measures faced house arrests. However, judiciary was reined in when, after the emergency, the new supreme court headed by Chief Justice Abdul Hamid Dogar declined to entertain any petition questioning eligibility of Musharraf's candidature<sup>205</sup>. Musharraf had to resign as a president in 2008 after general elections. Zardari and Sharif made a coalition government in post-2008 era, where the latter used the promise of reinstating judiciary to its former glorious state in his campaigns. The initial split between Zardari and Sharif also occurred on the grounds where Zardari was not as eager to reinstate the judges relative to Sharif.

Chapter 6, 'Military Overreach in Brazil and Pakistan; When General Become the Judges' of book "Military Courts, Civil-Military Relations and the Legal Battle for Democracy; The Politics of Military Justice", aptly defines military intrusion in Pakistan judicial system<sup>206</sup>. Reiter and Kyle, describe Pakistan as a country that repeatedly cycles between "jurisdictional contestation" and "military overreach" highlighting the military's longstanding efforts to expand its legal authority. The author details how the military has repeatedly used periods of martial law and states of emergency to legitimize its legal dominance. For instance, even when not formally imposing martial law, military governments have employed tactics like issuing Provisional Constitutional Orders (PCOs), which, while maintaining the civilian judiciary, severely restricted its powers and prevented it from challenging military actions. As can be seen in Musharraf's case.

On the question of judiciary's capacity to hold military and political elites accountable, the general theme in the primary data was dismal. In an ideal situation, or theoretically judiciary is supposed to or should be empowered enough to try the political and military elites, but the practical limitations and history of selective accountability casts another picture. P4 and P5, call attention towards the supremacy of constitution and duty of judiciary to ensure its implementation. P5, quotes "...the Constitution, as the ultimate social contract, should hold everyone accountable, with the judiciary responsible for upholding it."<sup>207</sup>

Like almost every other military in the world, the Pakistani military also has its in-built mechanisms for accountability, but according to few respondents that system is equally crippled to function efficiently as the judiciary of the state. A respondent P9 even declared that 'no process of military goes through audit'. P8 noted that due to a particular mindset of military 'the less the people know about the problem, the better' has dealt serious blows to the credibility and image of both institutions' military and judiciary. Adding to his stance, he criticizes the perceived lack of transparency and functionality in the military's internal justice system, referring the rarity of high-ranking officials being held accountable for corruption or misconduct. He uses the example of the naval chief's alleged involvement in a corruption scandal to illustrate the military's tendency to protect its own in the name of preserving the sanctity of the institution. Supporting the earlier mentioned stance, Kyle and Reiter also emphasize the opaque and secretive nature of Pakistan's military justice system, noting that it conducts trials

---

<sup>205</sup> Alam, Bhatti, and Alvi, "Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan: A Study of Musharraf's Era (2005-2008)."; Lal, "CHANGING PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN PAKISTAN."

<sup>206</sup> Brett J. Kyle and Andrew G. Reiter, "Military Overreach in Brazil and Pakistan: When the Generals Become the Judges," in *Military Courts, Civil-Military Relations And The Legal Battle For Democracy; The Politics Of Military Justice* (Routledge, 2021), 126–59.

<sup>207</sup> P5, "Coding Mechanism of Interviewees," Fig. 02, 2024.

without transparency and resists civilian oversight. This lack of transparency, coupled with the military's historical reluctance to hold its personnel accountable for human rights violations, as indicated by the example of the '1999 Liaquat Hussain case' where the Supreme Court upheld the military's self-amnesty, raises concerns about impunity within the military justice system. This culture of impunity, shielded from independent judicial review, further undermines the civilian judiciary's authority and perpetuates a cycle of unchecked military power. P11, gives a deep dive into the whole rationale behind army courts and the politicization of accountability by using NAB and as a tool to ensure servility of opposition. While army courts present this parallel system that allows the military to circumvent civilian courts, fostering an environment of impunity, the rationale behind it was fair. Army courts were created to protect civilian judges at lower levels as they would be judging hardened criminals that might use tactics to intimidate them and consequently influence the decision in their favor. It is a state of shame that such an initiative is being used so negatively in post 9<sup>th</sup> May (2023) scenario where civilians were being trialed in a politized game. Another perspective is also prevalent that says that the military has consistently used internal security threats, such as terrorism and public disorder, as justification for expanding the jurisdiction of military courts and undermining the civilian judiciary. This pattern is evident in the aftermath of the 2014 Peshawar Army Public School attack, where the civilian government, under pressure to respond to terrorism, amended the Pakistan Army Act and the constitution to empower military courts to try civilian suspects in terrorism-related cases<sup>208</sup>. In the same vein, P9, uses the definition of 'professional army' provided by NATO, where NATO uses accountability as the cornerstone of 'professionalization'. In Pakistani context, this makes military non-professional as it goes scot-free in majority of cases.

Regarding the whole concept of accountability in case of corruption it is essential to note in the words of P11,

“...the best anti-corruption actually prevents corruption from taking place and that requires the concerned departments who are administering whether it is development or agriculture or whatever projects where public money is being spent where those departments have good internal accountability”<sup>209</sup>

As p3, highlights that the corruption charges and cases have almost always been used to counter the opposition of one political force by the other one (to maintain the status quo). As P11 states the ins and out of the political and judicial system he says,

“The way that we use anti-corruption is basically as an instrument for political engineering. So the idea basically is that if I happen to be in the good books of the military or the civilian leadership of a particular point in time and someone is opposing me then rather than defeating that person through a political process, I will instead resort to what is called lawfare. I will essentially start using the legal machinery against that individual. This might include registration of various corruption cases against that person. This might include registration of various civil cases against that person but the idea basically is to harass that person and to make it very, very difficult for them to operate. So at the same time when I do this to that person, I have created leverage over them. So when the need arises, I can always offer them a deal whereby I tell

---

<sup>208</sup> Kyle and Reitrer, “Military Overreach in Brazil and Pakistan: When the Generals Become the Judges.”

<sup>209</sup> P11, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

them that you know why don't you drop your opposition and join with me and I will make all these cases go away. So in Pakistan when we think of anti-corruption, typically we think of this kind of politicized anti-corruption which is used in order to essentially intimidate whoever happens to be in opposition at a given point in time in order to force them to compromise or collaborate with the powers that be. So that type of accountability of course turns accountability into a joke in a sense because literally the same people that are in jail or accused of all manner of crimes and theft and mismanagement and waste of public funds, one day, the next day all the cases are gone and they are restored to power and the day after that the cases are restored and they are thrown out of power. So that creates the impression that there is no real accountability. It's just an instrument of the domestic power politics and consequently maybe everybody is guilty and maybe everybody is innocent but certainly there is no way to prove any of that when it comes to a fair judicial process.”

While in an ideal situation Judiciary is supposed to uphold supremacy of law, but according to P16 judiciary has itself become politicized and hence cannot play the role of an ‘honest broker’. While another respondent P11 claimed that due to power over-lap ‘informal culture’ has taken its roots and it has resulted in institutional decay, an evident example of which is weakened judiciary. At the same time, it is essential to comprehend that the technicalities of the whole process situate judiciary at the end of the chain. In any case, it is prosecution office that builds the case and judges only hear the facts presented during the trial, as framed by the prosecutor. So the net result is that because the working tier of the judiciary, the subordinate judiciary is not able to resist pressure both from powerful parties as well as from the military, they tend to deliver arbitrary verdicts. And then when it goes to the high court or in some cases might go all the way to the Supreme Court, then you have at least in some cases the judiciary overturning these verdicts. So overall the impression that is then created is that the judiciary is also politicized, especially at the subordinate level and that politicization undermines the credibility of the judicial institution. So in this way, people do not have an expectation of fairness, from the judicial process. Even if the judiciary exonerates you, that exoneration will hold very little value as people have no faith in the system. So that again undermines the whole process of justice.

While the Pakistani judiciary possesses the theoretical authority to hold the political and military elite accountable, its effectiveness is hampered by practical challenges, historical precedent, and internal weaknesses. The sources suggest that true accountability requires a multifaceted approach, including strengthening the judiciary's independence, promoting transparency within the military, and fostering a culture of respect for the rule of law. A glimmer of hope does appear, in the words of P12, when he suggests that the judiciary has shown a growing sense of autonomy in recent years, evidenced by its willingness to question both the military and political parties. However, he also acknowledges that this independence is not absolute, and the judiciary still faces pressure from powerful actors.

## Chapter 5

### 5. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

#### 5.1 Economy

To explain military's intervention in domestic political scene, Ayesha Siddiqa's "Military Inc.", Rabia Chaudhry's 'Changing Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Soldiers of Development', has been seminal among other pieces of literature. In the 'Military Inc.', Siddiqa puts forth the concept of 'milbus', to describe the Pakistani military's involvement in commercial activities for the personal gain of its members, particularly high-ranking officers. These activities, she argues, represent a distinct form of military capital that exists outside the official defense budget and lacks transparency and accountability, hence making it as an "illegal military capital"<sup>210</sup>. Milbus encompasses a wide range of economic activities, from small-scale ventures like farms to large-scale industries like cement and fertilizer production. Siddiqa provides a detailed evolutionary account of milbus in Pakistan by tracing the origins of the military's financial autonomy to the post-independence era. The partition's chaotic aftermath, including a weak civilian government and a perceived threat from India, created an environment where the military quickly gained prominence. This period saw the military begin to assert its control over defense and foreign policy, areas directly linked to resource allocation and budgetary autonomy, thus opening entry points towards financial autonomy of military. The establishment of the Fauji Foundation (FF) in 1954 marked a pivotal step in the military's incursion into business. Utilizing funds from the British Post War Services Reconstruction Fund, the FF's creation signaled the military's intent to operate independently in the economic sphere, early on. Ayub Khan's delegation of huge land parcels to military men adds on the military's intent to increase their material standing<sup>211</sup>.

While civilian leaders during this period did not actively challenge the military's growing economic activities, a crucial difference between India and Pakistan emerged. Unlike the Indian military, which remained under stricter civilian control and accountability, the Pakistani military faced fewer constraints, thus enabling its economic expansion. The military regimes, particularly Zia ul Haq's rule (1977-1988) can be observed as a period of significant expansion for the military's economic activities. Zia's policies, aimed at reversing nationalization and promoting privatization, created opportunities for the military to expand its business ventures, often with preferential treatment and access to state resources. This era saw a deepening of the military's financial autonomy and its influence on the national economy. The creation of entities like the Askari Bank in 1982 and the expansion of existing ventures like the FF exemplified this trend.

Civilian governments, in the periods between military rule, often chose to appease the military by avoiding confrontation over its economic activities. Fearing a backlash or seeking the military's support, civilian leaders

---

<sup>210</sup> Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc. - Second Edition*, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1h64kvc>.

<sup>211</sup> Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*.; Hussain, "Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil-Military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan."; Hussain, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State."

often prioritized short-term political stability over long-term institutional checks and balances. The Musharraf regime (1999-2008) further solidified the military's economic power. This period saw the military gain greater confidence in demanding perks, expanding existing businesses, and securing its financial interests through its political dominance. Despite growing concerns about the military's economic clout, there was continued reluctance of civilian actors, including political parties and even religious groups, to challenge the military's financial autonomy directly. However, during the lawyers movement, slogans were raised targeting the economic predation of military during the protests<sup>212</sup>.

One of the research objectives was centered around impact of military's business ventures on the economy of Pakistan. The primary data collected, supported by secondary data as well is unanimous in its stance. All of the interviewees agreed that military has no place in running economy of the state. P18, as an economist believes that the state, including the military, should not intervene in the market. He argues that while civilian elites also engage in rent-seeking behavior, the military's involvement is particularly harmful because it uses its institutional power to gain an unfair advantage. The interviewee cites examples like Shaheen Foundation (SF), Fauji Fertilizers, and Askari Bank to illustrate the military's extensive business interests. He also contends that the military's focus on sectors like agriculture and real estate diverts resources from industries like defense manufacturing, where their expertise could contribute more effectively to economic growth. P8 and P4 both argue that the military's extensive involvement in the Pakistani economy stifles private enterprise and contributes to a sense of social discontent and economic disenfranchisement among the populace. They suggest that reining in the military's economic activities would create a more level playing field for civilian businesses and empower citizens economically.

Reverting back to milbus, as per Siddiqa, it operates through three main channels. Either military unit are directly involved in it as in the case of the National Logistic Cell (NLC) and the Frontier Works Organization (FWO)<sup>213</sup>. These military-run organizations are heavily involved in transportation and infrastructure projects. They often outcompete private companies due to their military connections, securing lucrative government contracts, particularly in road construction and cargo transport. This dominance has contributed to the weakening of Pakistan Railways and the displacement of private construction companies. The abovementioned fact is seconded by an account provided by P4. P4 explained that due to NLC, a private business venture by the name of "Karakoram Railways" failed. To quote his words directly,

"They started putting trains of NLC in competition, especially for the cargo purpose. And they don't need to pay any rent. They had to pay 1 crore 20 lakhs daily. What benefit is this giving to the state? Within months, I think, Karakoram Railway failed. We know in the capitalistic market, free competition is essential. But if there is a group or a party that has all political support, whose business is heavily

---

<sup>212</sup> Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

<sup>213</sup> Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc. - Second Edition*, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1h64kvc>.

subsidized, there is no taxation. Instead, they receive public money. how will you find an equilibrium?

Hence, economic stability. It is disastrous for the Pakistani market.<sup>214</sup>”

P8, in the same fashion argues that the military’s involvement in various sectors, often with subsidized access to state resources, crowds out private sector growth, alluding to the ‘crowding out’ phenomenon. He cites examples like the NLC's dominance in the transport sector and the FWO's expansion into construction, arguing that their presence stifles competition and hinders the development of a robust private sector. He then gave an example of the Chinese model of abolishing the military's economic activities to create a level playing field and encourage private investment. To quote his words,

“So overnight, the Communist Party of China abolished all military-owned enterprises, what was known as PLA Inc. There's a book by that title also, I think. That was dissolved and divested and it ended up helping the economy because through those divestments emerged very major ready-made corporate entities that could compete in the world.<sup>215</sup>”

Rabia Chaudhry, in her book “The Changing Dynamics of Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Soldiers of Development”<sup>216</sup> examines the extent of the Pakistani military's intervention in the country's domestic economic sphere. Focusing on the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) and the Fauji Foundation, Chaudhry argues that these entities exemplify the military's hegemonic control over key sectors of the economy. Rather than resorting to traditional coercive methods, the military has strategically positioned itself within the development sector, blurring the lines between defense and development to legitimize its economic activities and consolidate its power. Chaudhry argues that FWO, a military-run commercial organization specializing in infrastructure projects, reveals how the military leverages its technical expertise to expand its economic influence under the guise of national development. While initially tasked with projects in remote and strategically sensitive areas, FWO’s reach has expanded significantly, encompassing large-scale infrastructure projects in major cities. This expansion, Chaudhry posits, allows the military to present itself as an indispensable actor capable of delivering where civilian institutions have failed. Chaudhry highlights several factors that contribute to FWO’s dominance. As per Chaudhry, the military justifies its involvement in infrastructure development by emphasizing the perceived inefficiency and corruption within civilian institutions. This narrative of a failing civilian government incapable of fulfilling basic development needs creates space for the military to step in and assume the role of a capable and reliable actor. The military strategically combined its economic activities with national security concerns, arguing that a strong infrastructure is vital for defense preparedness. This blurring of lines between defense and development allows the military to legitimize its economic expansion and secure public support for its involvement in traditionally civilian domains. Despite its military connections, FWO operates with a degree of financial autonomy, obscuring the flow of funds between the organization and the military. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess the true extent of the military’s economic interests and hinders accountability.

---

<sup>214</sup> P4, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>215</sup> P8, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.

<sup>216</sup> Chaudhry, *Changing Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Soldiers of Development*.

The second channel is military-owned subsidiaries, namely, the four primary foundations, Fauji Foundation (FF), Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation (SF), and Bahria Foundation (BF). These enterprises operate as conglomerates with holdings in various sectors. Chaudhry argues that the Fauji Foundation, seemingly created to provide welfare to ex-servicemen and their families, has evolved into a sprawling commercial conglomerate, exemplifying the military's deep-rooted economic interests. With investments spanning various sectors, including cement, fertilizer, cereal production, and banking, the Fauji Foundation has become a major player in the Pakistani economy, further solidifying the military's economic and political dominance. Chaudhry went on to highlight certain strategies employed by the military to legitimize the Fauji Foundation's commercial activities. For instance, the military presents the Fauji Foundation's commercial ventures as a form of nation building, arguing that its profits are reinvested in the economy and contribute to national development. This narrative strategically overlooks the inherent conflict of interest in a military entity engaging in profit-making ventures while simultaneously wielding significant political influence.

The Fauji Foundation's welfare activities, primarily targeted at ex-servicemen, are used to project an image of the military as a benevolent actor concerned with the well-being of its personnel and, by extension, the nation. This emphasis on welfare serves to deflect criticism of its commercial activities and garner public support. The military maintains a degree of financial separation from the Fauji Foundation, obscuring the flow of funds and resources between them. By emphasizing its financial independence and downplaying its control over the organization's operations, the military attempts to deflect accusations of economic exploitation and hegemonic control.

The third channel is benefits accrued by men in uniform directly. This includes preferential access to land acquisition, lucrative contracts, and business opportunities leveraged through their military connections. A key characteristic of Milbus is its obscurity. The military tightly controls information about its business operations, making it difficult to assess the true scale and profitability of these ventures. This lack of transparency hinders public scrutiny and accountability, raising valid concerns about corruption and misuse of public resources.

These Military Backed Enterprises (MBEs), operating with varying degrees of transparency have a substantial presence in various sectors of the Pakistani economy. DHA is one glaring case study. DHAs, initially designed to provide housing for military personnel, have evolved into major real estate developers, expanding into urban areas and often acquiring land at subsidized rates. The sources note that this has driven up property prices, benefiting military personnel who can purchase property within these schemes, and fueling speculation in the real estate market. The management of DHAs by retired and serving military officers raises concerns about transparency and accountability, with allegations of preferential treatment and disregard for regulations. An economist, P14, used DHA as a prime example and explained the economic predation of military using it. He views the Pakistani military's involvement in business not merely as economic activity but as a form of political intervention that undermines the country's economic and social fabric. He argues that the military's economic ventures are fundamentally about corruption, lawlessness, and the hijacking of the state for private gain. His key argument asserts that the military's business ventures, particularly those like DHA, NLC, and FWO, constitute


‘textbook corruption’. He bases this on the definition of corruption as, “use of public resources for private gain<sup>217</sup>” arguing that these entities utilize state resources and backing for the benefit of the military establishment rather than the public good. He also contends that the military’s unaccountable economic activities contribute to a culture of “lawlessness” in Pakistan. He cites the example of DHA operating without independent audits, implying that this lack of transparency is symptomatic of a broader disregard for rules and accountability within the military’s business dealings. Elaborating on the impact of DHA on the city of Lahore he criticizes DHA’s impact on Lahore’s urban planning by arguing that its unchecked expansion has led to unsustainable urban sprawl, increased pollution, and a decline in quality of life. He connects this to the military’s influence on policy, suggesting that its economic interests have taken precedence over sound urban planning and environmental considerations. The impact is not limited solely there as it has increased economic disparity. He posits that the military’s dominance in real estate, fueled by preferential policies like amnesty schemes, has driven up land prices and exacerbated economic inequality. He argues that this diverts resources away from actual development, erection of industries and job creation, benefiting a select few while hindering broader economic development. He draws parallels between the Pakistani military’s involvement in business and the East India Company, arguing that the military has effectively “hijacked the state” to serve its own corporate interests. He criticizes the military's ability to manipulate policy for its benefit, citing the example of amnesty schemes favoring real estate development.

The extent of military intervention in economic space of Pakistan, is spread all across Pakistan as shown by the picture below.

---

<sup>217</sup> P14, “Coding Mechanism of Interviewees,” *Fig. 02*, 2024.





Map 1 Placement of welfare foundation businesses

Figure 3 Sprawling

MBEs<sup>218</sup>

While military was and still is inching its way closer to expand their economic base, they face zero resistance by the civilian sphere. Civilian leaders, wary of the military's power, often avoided challenging its economic activities, opting instead for appeasement to ensure stability and maintain their own hold on power. Also, lack of political will and long-term vision among civilian leaders to curb the military's economic expansion and prioritize the strengthening of civilian institutions. In addition, certain ideological alignments, particularly the narrative of the military as a guarantor of national security and development, made it challenging for civilian leaders to effectively counter the military's expanding economic role. The sources both primary and secondary, argue that this historical interplay between military assertiveness and civilian complicity created a system where the Pakistani military's financial autonomy became deeply intertwined with its political power, posing ongoing challenges for democratic consolidation and civilian control of the military. For instance, under the former government of Khan, Bajwa (the then COAS) was holding meetings with the business groups. Not only that, but Bajwa was included in the apex economic planning committee, National Development Council (NDC). In addition, in the finance bill of 2021, Khan exempted two major MBEs from taxation<sup>219</sup>. This trajectory has but escalated in the caretaker and later government of Shebaz Sharif. Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC)

<sup>218</sup> Siddiqi, *Military Inc. - Second Edition*.

<sup>219</sup> Shahbaz Rana, "Govt Frees AWT From Income Tax," *The Express Tribune*, July 6, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2308175/govt-frees-awt-from-income-tax>.

was a body made to attract and handle foreign investments. COAS is a member of SIFC. P16, ex-serviceman/policymaker while acknowledging the military's role in economic initiatives like the SIFC defends their involvement, arguing that it's driven by a desire for national progress and a stable economy. He argues that the military steps in when civilian institutions fail to deliver, citing the SIFC as an example of the military streamlining bureaucratic processes to attract foreign investment. He refutes claims that military-run businesses are inefficient and emphasizes that they operate as corporate entities, paying taxes and contributing to the national economy.

Also, military has entered corporate farming at a large scale under the name of "FonGrow"<sup>220</sup>. Scholars have been comparing this recent development with Ayub Khan's green revolution due to the parallels both share. Kaiser Bengali has warned about the efficiency of the initiative and the socio-economic problems that it would breed in the future. With the memory of "Okara Farms' bloodshed still etched in the minds, FonGrow among plethora of other military backed corporate entities depicts nothing short of "ugly power and capitalist ambitions of state backed companies"<sup>221</sup> P12 acknowledges that the military's involvement in business, especially in sectors like corporate farming and CPEC projects, has become a significant point of contention. He cites a 2017 incident where the military demanded a share in CPEC contracts, initially refused by then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This conflict, according to Siddiqi, stems from the military's "saviour complex" a belief that it's their duty to manage all aspects of Pakistan, including the economy, as echoed by Rabia Chaudhry as well.

Primary and secondary data, explores the complex and multifaceted ways in which the Pakistani military's business ventures have shaped the country's economic realm. These ventures encompassing a wide range of sectors from agriculture and food production to banking, infrastructure, and housing, have become deeply entwined with the Pakistani economy, creating a complex web of interests, dependencies, and challenges. The transformation of 'from welfare to economic hegemony' has been facilitated by a combination of factors, including the military's historical dominance in Pakistan's political sphere, its perceived role as a guarantor of stability and development, and its strategic exploitation of national resources. The result is a system where the lines between the military's security mandate and its economic interests have become increasingly blurred. Chaudhry underscores how the military leverages the perceived shortcomings of civilian institutions to justify its involvement in infrastructure development. A narrative that emphasizes the military's efficiency, technical expertise, and lack of corruption, contrasting it with a supposedly inept and corrupt civilian bureaucracy, has been carefully cultivated over time, solidifying the military's image as a capable and reliable actor in delivering essential services.

Focusing on systemic impact, MBEs, with their privileged access to resources and lack of transparency, contribute to a climate of crony capitalism<sup>222</sup>, undermining fair competition and hindering the development of a robust private sector. This system benefits a select few with close ties to the military, exacerbating economic inequality and hindering sustainable growth.

---

<sup>220</sup> Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

<sup>221</sup> Yaqin et al., "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures."

<sup>222</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc. - Second Edition*, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1h64kvc>.

The military's economic dominance often comes at the expense of the public sector. MBEs, through their political clout, secure lucrative government contracts, diverting resources from essential public services. Furthermore, the perception of military efficiency, often juxtaposed with a narrative of civilian incompetence, creates pressure on the government to favor MBEs, weakening public institutions and reinforcing the military's dominance. The military's vast economic interests, intertwined with its political influence, present a significant obstacle to democratic consolidation in Pakistan. The sources argue that these economic interests incentivize the military to maintain its grip on power, hindering the development of strong civilian institutions and a balanced power structure. This creates a vicious cycle where the military's economic power reinforces its political dominance, further impeding democratic progress. As exhibited by pictorial illustration, the spill-over control of military's intervention in domestic politico-economic scene has far reaching effects.




Figure 12.1 From military control to hegemony

Figure 4 the spill-over control of military<sup>223</sup>

The potential negative consequences of Milbus on the professionalism of the Pakistani military are equally important avenue to explore. The pursuit of economic gain can create conflicts of interest, diverting focus from the military's primary responsibility of national defense and potentially influencing its strategic decisions. This intertwining of economic and security interests raises concerns about the military's ability to act impartially and in the best interests of the nation. The data all in all, depicts a complex and concerning picture of the military's

<sup>223</sup> Siddiq, *Military Inc. - Second Edition*.

economic footprint in Pakistan. While the military argues that its ventures contribute to national development and provide essential services, the lack of transparency, preferential treatment, and intertwined political and economic interests raise significant concerns about fairness, accountability, and the long-term health of Pakistan's economy and democracy. Therefore, addressing the military's economic dominance is crucial for fostering a more equitable, competitive, and democratically accountable economic system in Pakistan.

## 5.2 CONCLUSION

Civil-military relations have been an intricate piece of work academically, in the case of Pakistan, it is complex more so. To gauge civil-military relations in Pakistan traditionally, using the primary underpinning of conceptual models in civil-military relations, would be a wrong turn to begin with. Mapping out reach of military entrenchment in public domain given an individual a vivid idea of hegemonic patterns of military. This uneven equation in the past and still is tipping in the favour of one party. This situation, with the incidence of increased political consciousness is producing fissures and spaces for conflict and latent violence in the society.

This thesis has examined the complex and often conflictual relationship between civilian and military spheres in Pakistan, analyzing its profound and multifaceted impact on the country's socio-political and economic landscape. By tracing this intricate relationship through historical analysis, theoretical frameworks, and empirical evidence, the research has sought to illuminate the deep-rooted challenges hindering Pakistan's progress towards a more democratic, stable, and equitable society.

The findings of this research present a sobering picture of Pakistan's enduring civil-military imbalance. The legacy of colonial rule, coupled with the strategic choices made by key actors in the post-independence era, facilitated the emergence of a powerful military-bureaucratic oligarchy that has consistently prioritized its own interests over those of the broader populace. This imbalance has manifested in various forms, ranging from direct military interventions through coups to more subtle forms of control over civilian institutions, policymaking, and even the economy.

The research has demonstrated how this enduring military dominance has had a corrosive effect on Pakistan's democratic development. The military's ability to influence or remove elected governments, as evidenced in the numerous instances of civilian premiers being ousted before completing their terms, has created a climate of perpetual uncertainty and fear, hindering the consolidation of democratic norms and institutions. This has entrenched a culture of appeasement among civilian leaders, who often find themselves caught in a difficult balancing act, prioritizing short-term political survival over challenging the military's dominance.

Furthermore, the study has revealed the extensive reach of the Pakistani military's economic activities, revealing a vast but obscure network of business ventures, collectively termed 'Milbus'. The thesis has also explored the social impact of this enduring civil-military imbalance. The research has shown that the military's dominance has exacerbated existing social cleavages, fueling ethnic tensions, undermining the rule of law, and eroding public trust in civilian institutions. This has created a vicious cycle where the military's perceived ability to provide stability and security is often used to justify its continued involvement in civilian affairs, further entrenching its power and influence.

While the findings of this research paint a concerning picture of Pakistan's present reality, they also offer valuable insights for charting a path towards a more balanced and equitable future. Addressing the deep-rooted structural imbalances that underpin Pakistan's conflictual civil-military relations necessitates a multifaceted approach, demanding sustained effort and commitment from all segments of society. A fundamental prerequisite for achieving a more balanced civil-military relationship is the strengthening of civilian institutions, particularly those tasked with governance, oversight, and accountability. This includes bolstering the capacity and independence of the judiciary, parliament, and other key institutions responsible for ensuring civilian control of the military. Establishing a culture of meritocracy, professionalism, and transparency within these institutions is crucial for regaining public trust and ensuring their effectiveness. As articulated by P5, upholding the constitution as the ultimate social contract, with a robust judiciary empowered to hold all actors accountable, is paramount. Fostering a vibrant and participatory democracy is essential for creating a system where civilian authority is unequivocally supreme. This requires ensuring free and fair elections, protecting freedom of expression and assembly, and empowering citizens to hold their leaders accountable, thus ensuring vertical accountability. Creating a level playing field for political parties, where competition is based on ideas and policies rather than military patronage, is crucial for breaking the cycle of political instability and democratic backsliding.

A critical, yet often overlooked, aspect of rebalancing civil-military relations in Pakistan is addressing the military's expansive economic empire. While the military's involvement in certain sectors might be strategically justified, greater transparency, accountability, and oversight are needed to ensure fairness, prevent corruption, and mitigate potential economic distortions. As highlighted by several interviewees, a gradual disengagement of the military from non-strategic commercial activities, coupled with measures to promote a more competitive and inclusive private sector, is essential for long-term economic growth and stability. Ultimately, the success of any effort to rebalance civil-military relations in Pakistan hinges on the active participation and empowerment of its citizens. As articulated by several interviewees, promoting civic education, strengthening civil society organizations, and creating opportunities for citizens to engage in the political process are essential for building a more informed, engaged, and empowered citizenry capable of demanding accountability and holding their leaders responsible.

The path towards a more balanced and democratic Pakistan is undoubtedly fraught with challenges, demanding sustained effort, unwavering commitment, and a willingness to confront deeply entrenched power structures. However, the pursuit of this goal is not merely an idealistic aspiration but a fundamental necessity for ensuring Pakistan's long-term stability, prosperity, and rightful place in the community of nations. The responsibility for achieving this vision lies not solely with the political and military elite, but with all segments of Pakistani society, working together to build a future where civilian authority is supreme, democratic principles are upheld, and the well-being of all citizens is paramount.

# APPENDICES

## Appendix 1

Title: *Conflictual civil-military relations in Pakistan; impact on socio-political and economic aspects of the society*

### Questionnaire (for semi-structured interviews)

- 1) Is the Civil-Military theory of Concordance<sup>224</sup> a viable model for smoothening civil-military relations in Pakistan?
  - a) if yes, then what strategies should be crafted to empowering the Pakistani citizenry towards striking a balance?
  - b) If no, then, what theoretical model do you propose can house, Pakistani Civil Military Relations the best?
2. What are the social effects of civil bureaucracy's compliance to military bureaucracy?
3. In terms of accountability, can judiciary really hold the political elites and military accountable?
4. How uneven civil-military relations influence political (in)stability and governance?
5. How does military's business ventures (agricultural and food goods, banking, infrastructure, housing schemes, stake in CPEC etc.) reflect in the economic realm of Pakistan?

---

<sup>224</sup> Concordance theory, developed by Rebecca L. Schiff, posits that stable civilian-military relations are achieved through the cooperative relationships among three societal partners: the military, political elites, and the citizenry. The theory emphasizes consensus and shared values among these groups, rather than just focusing on control mechanisms or a clear separation of military and civilian spheres. Agreement on four indicators, namely, composition of military corps, political decision-making model, recruitment method and military style is necessary to discourage military intervention in domestic politics.

## Bibliography

- . “Military, Militancy, and the Crisis of Governance.” In *Pakistan’s Democratic Transition*, 1st ed. Routledge, 2016.
- . “Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State.” *PCD Journal*, January 1, 2012, 113–46. <https://www.neliti.com/publications/385/pakistan-civil-military-relations-in-a-post-colonial-state>.
- . “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army.” In *Routledge eBooks*, 300–322, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351319645-21>.
- . *Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan*. Heidelberg Series in South Asian and Comparative Studies. Vol. 6. Samskriti, 2013.
- . *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*. Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2000. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230599048>.
- Alam, Sughra, Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti, and Asia Saif Alvi. “Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan: A Study of Musharraf’s Era (2005-2008).” *Global Social Sciences Review* V, no. I (2020): 450–57. [https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2020\(v-i\).46](https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2020(v-i).46).
- Alavi, Hamza. “The State in Postcolonial Societies.” *Pakistan Monthly Review*, August 2024. <https://pakistanmonthlyreview.com/the-state-in-postcolonial-societies/>.
- Ali, Zulfiqar. “Contradiction of Concordance Theory.” *Armed Forces & Society*, March 7, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x12467775>.
- Ali, Zulfiqar. “Pakistan, Military Coup, and Concordance.” *Armed Forces & Society*, May 8, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x15583291>.
- Aziz, Sartaj. *Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History*, 2020. <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BB03012481>.
- Bienen, Henry. “Civil-Military Relations in the Third World on JSTOR.” *International Political Science Review* 2 (1977): 363–70. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601071>.
- Bourque, Susan C. “Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, Edited by Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela.” *Political Science Quarterly* 108, no. 1 (January 1, 1993): 169–70. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2152498>.
- Bruneau, Thomas C. “A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Intelligence.” *Defense & Security Analysis*, October 2, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1529085>.

- C. Nielsen, Suzanne. "American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's "The Soldier and the State." *International Affairs* 88, no. 2 (March 2012): 369–76. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428611>.
- Chaudhry, Rabia. *Changing Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Soldiers of Development*. Routledge, 2023.
- Cohen, Stephen P. *The Idea of Pakistan*, 2004. <http://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1232477>.
- Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, and Philip Lorenz. *Breaking with the Past? Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia on JSTOR*. East West Center, 2008. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep06501>.
- Donnithorne, Jeffrey W. "Theories of Civil-Military Relations." *Culture Wars: Air Force Culture and Civil-Military Relations*. Air University Press, 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13816.8>.
- Erickson, Kenneth Paul. "Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 55, no. 3 (August 1, 1975): 565–67. <https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-55.3.565>.
- Feaver, Peter D. "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (June 1, 1999): 211–41. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211>.
- Feaver, Peter D. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (January 1, 1996): 149–78. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x9602300203>.
- Feaver, Peter D. "The Irony of American Civil-Military Relations." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (2015): 3–12. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271515>.
- Finer, S E. "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and the Theory of Military Withdrawal From the Seats of Power." *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 1985): 16–30. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598508419821>.
- Frazer, Jendayi. "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition on JSTOR." *JSTOR*, 1995, 39–48. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187029>.
- Freedman, Lawrence, and Peter D. Feaver. "Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations." *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 6 (January 1, 2003): 158. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033780>.
- Gaub, Florence. "Civil-Military Relations: The Basics from Civil-Military Relations in the MENA.: Between Fragility and Resilience on JSTOR," 2016. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep06944.5>.
- Goodman, Louis W. "Civil-Military Relations." *Harvard International Review* 8, no. 6 (1986): 13–17. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42760880>.
- Haleem, Irm. "Ethnic and Sectarian Violence and the Propensity Towards Praetorianism in Pakistan." *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (June 1, 2003): 463–77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659032000084410>.
- Hameed, Samra. "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Reasons of Imran Khan's Downfall." *PAKISTAN LANGUAGES AND HUMANITIES REVIEW* 7, no. III (September 30, 2023). [https://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2023\(7-iii\)51](https://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2023(7-iii)51).



- Heeger, Gerald A. "Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience." *World Politics* 29, no. 2 (January 1, 1977): 242–62. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010092>.
- Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas. "Patterns of Civil-Military Relations: Patronage & Clientelism." *Sicherheit Und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace* 29, no. 4 (2011): 244–48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24233362>.
- Herspring, Dale R. "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Potential for Praetorianism." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 25, no. 2 (1992): 99–122. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45367231>.
- Hopkins, Keith. "Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries." *The British Journal of Sociology* 17, no. 2 (1966): 165–82. <https://doi.org/10.2307/589055>.
- Hussain, Ejaz, and Ahmed Khan. "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan- the Case of Balochistan." *Asian Studies*, 2014, 11–24.
- Hussain, Ejaz. "Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil–military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan." In *Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan; Governance, Development and Environment*, 73–92. Routledge, 2020.
- Hussein, Saddam. "THE DOOR-STEP CONDITIONS FOR TRANSITION FROM LIMITED ACCESS ORDER TO OPEN ACCESS ORDER: EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN." M.Phil dissertation, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (PIDE), ISLAMABAD., 2018.
- Ijaz, Saroop. "Judicial Appointments in Pakistan: Coming Full Circle | SAHSOL," n.d. <https://sahsol.lums.edu.pk/node/12802>.
- Janjua, Raashid Wali. "Civil Military Relations in Pakistan--Quest for an Ideal Balance." *IPRI Journal*, 2018, 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.210101>.
- Janowitz, Morris. "The Military in the Political Development of New Nations." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 20, no. 8 (October 1, 1964): 6–10. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1964.11454697>.
- Janowitz. "Soldiers, Scholars, Liberals." *The Antioch Review*, 1957, 393–400. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4609990>.
- Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz. "ROLE OR RULE?: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN 2014-2015." *JSTOR*. JSTOR, 2015. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep10119.7>.
- Javid, Hassan. "Class, Power, and Patronage: The Landed Elite and Politics in Pakistani Punjab," 2012. <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/468/>.
- John W. R. Lepingwell. "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup." *World Politics* 44, no. 4 (1992): 539–72. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010487>.
- Kamrava, Mehran. "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East." *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 1 (2000): 67–92. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2658034>.

- Khakwani, Abdul Shakoor. "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: The Case of the Recent Military Intervention (October 12, 1999) and the Its Implications for Pakistan's Security Milieu," May 1, 2003. <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/items/34>.
- Khan, Jamshed, and Asma Ullah Wazir. "Civil-Military Imbalance in the Administration of Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era." *The Dialogue* 6, no. 2 (2011).
- Kohn, Richard H. "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations on JSTOR." *The National Interest*, 1992, 3–17. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/42894926>.
- Kyle, Brett J., and Andrew G. Reitrer. "Military Overreach in Brazil and Pakistan: When the Generals Become the Judges." In *Military Courts, Civil-Military Relations And The Legal Battle For Democracy; The Politics Of Military Justice*, 126–59. Routledge, 2021.
- L. Schiff, Rebecca. *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*. Routledge, 2008.
- Lal, Madan. "CHANGING PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN PAKISTAN." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 71, no. 2 (2010): 635–49.
- Lee, Terence. "The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia." *Asian Survey* 40, no. 4 (2000): 692–706. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3021189>.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C Stepan. "Toward Consolidated Democracies." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (April 1, 1996): 14–33. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0031>.
- Luckham, A. R. "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations on JSTOR." *Government and Opposition* 6 (1971): 5–35. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44482735>.
- Lutterbeck, Derek. "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS." In *Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance*, 2:8–19. Ubiquity Press, 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv6zdb3t.4>.
- Mannitz, Sabine. "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES." In *The "Democratic Soldier": Comparing Concepts and Practices in Europe*, 9:10–27. Ubiquity Press, 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv6zdbg4.4>.
- Matthews, Ron. "Country Survey IV: Pakistan." *Defence and Peace Economics* 5, no. 4 (November 1, 1994): 315–38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10430719408404802>.
- Mechkova, Valeriya, Anna Lührmann, and Staffan I. Lindberg. "The Accountability Sequence: From De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 54, no. 1 (May 25, 2018): 40–70. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-018-9262-5>.
- Momayezi, Nasser. "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY." *International Journal on World Peace* 15, no. 3 (1998): 3–28. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753165>.
- Narlı, Nilüfer. "Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980–2002." *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 215–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.572629>.
- Nasr, Vali. "Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan." *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (2004): 195–209. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330001>.

- Nawaz, Shamsa. "Civil-Military Relations in India: 'Riding the Tiger.'" *Strategic Studies* 33, no. 2 (2013): 69–84. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527613>.
- Niaz, Ilhan. *Understanding and Addressing the Administrative Aspect of Pakistan's Civil-Military Imbalance*. Manohar, 2015.
- Nix, Dayne E. "AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: Samuel P. Huntington and the Political Dimensions of Military Professionalism." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 2 (2012): 88–104. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26397288>.
- O'donnell, Guillermo A., and Philippe C. Schmitter. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*, 2013. <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BB12737827>.
- Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "WHAT MILITARY OFFICERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 2 (2012): 67–87. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26397287>.
- Perlmutter, Amos, Raymond W. Baker, Samuel Decalo, John Samuel Fitch, Moshe Lissak, Abraham F. Lowenthal, Keith Panter-Brick, Itamar Rabinovich, and Alfred Stepan. "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements." *World Politics* 33, no. 1 (October 1, 1980): 96. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010257>.
- Perlmutter, Amos. *Political Roles and Military Rulers*. Routledge eBooks, 2014. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315034898>.
- Pion-Berlin, David. "The Study of Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 3 (December 1, 2011): 222–30. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.628143>.
- RAGHAVAN, SRINATH. "The Civil-Military Divide." *Economic and Political Weekly* 47, no. 19 (2012): 12–15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23214967>.
- Rana, Shahbaz. "Govt Frees AWT From Income Tax." *The Express Tribune*, July 6, 2021. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2308175/govt-frees-awt-from-income-tax>.
- Remmer, Karen L., and Gilbert W. Merkx. "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited." *Latin American Research Review* 17, no. 2 (January 1, 1982): 3–40. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0023879100033628>.
- Rizvi, H-a. "Civil-military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan." *Survival* 40, no. 2 (1998): 96–113. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.1998.10107841>.
- Rizvi, Hasan Askari. "PAKISTAN: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN A PRAETORIAN STATE from The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific on JSTOR." In *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific*. ANU Press, 2004. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbj1g.11>.
- Rizvi, Hasan Askari. "Pakistan: Civil-military Relations in a Praetorian State." In *ANU Press eBooks*, 2004. <https://doi.org/10.22459/mdap.03.2004.06>.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA on JSTOR," 1989. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393356>.

- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA on JSTOR." *Www.Jstor.Org* 42, no. 2 (April 1989): 47–78. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393356>.
- Schiff, Rebecca L. "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance." *Armed Forces & Society* 22, no. 1 (October 1, 1995): 7–24. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x9502200101>.
- Schiff, Rebecca L. "Concordance Theory in Pakistan." *Armed Forces & Society* 42, no. 1 (January 12, 2015): 226–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x14566444>.
- Schiff, Rebecca L. *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*. Routledge, 2008.
- Serrano, Monica. "The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations in Mexico." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 27, no. 2 (1995): 423–48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/158121>.
- Shafqat, Saeed. *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*. New York, United States of America: Routledge, 2015.
- Shanks Kaurin, Pauline. "An 'Unprincipled Principal': Implications for Civil-Military Relations." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 15, no. 2 (2021): 50–68. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27032896>.
- Siddiqa, Ayesha. *Military Inc. - Second Edition*, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1h64kvc>.
- Springborg, Robert. "The President and the Field Marshal: Civil-Military Relations in Egypt Today." *MERIP Middle East Report*, no. 147 (1987): 5–42. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3011943>.
- Taj, Shaista, Zahir Shah, and Manzoor Ahmad. "CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN (1998-2015)." *Global Political Review* 1, no. 1 (December 30, 2016): 78–88. [https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2016\(i-i\).08](https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2016(i-i).08).
- ULUÇAKARAR, Mustafa, and Ali ÇAĞLAR. "An Analysis of Two Different Models of Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Turkey." *JSTOR* 14, no. 55 (2016). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26406873>.
- Walsh, Emily. "Political Accountability: Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Constraints on Governments." *V-Dem Institute*. V-Dem Institute, 2018. [https://v-dem.net/media/publications/pb\\_22\\_final.pdf](https://v-dem.net/media/publications/pb_22_final.pdf).
- Waseem, Mohammad. "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan." In *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, 1st ed. Routledge, 2009.
- Wasseem, Mohammad. "Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy." *Asian Survey* 32, no. 7 (July 1, 1992): 617–34. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644945>.
- Yaqin, Amina, S. Akbar Zaidi, Ayesha Siddiqa, and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar. "Critical Forum: Populism, Hybrid Democracy, and Youth Cultures." *Deleted Journal*, May 20, 2024, 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cps.2024.1>.

# Maham Shahbaz FINAL THESIS

## MS PCS.docx

*by Sheraz Khaliq*

---

**Submission date:** 02-Sep-2024 01:41AM (UTC-0700)

**Submission ID:** 2443057358

**File name:** Maham\_Shahbaz\_FINAL\_THESIS\_MS\_PCS.docx (3.17M)

**Word count:** 31149

**Character count:** 183998

## Maham Shahbaz FINAL THESIS MS PCS.docx

### ORIGINALITY REPORT

<b>3%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>1%</b>
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS

### PRIMARY SOURCES

<b>1</b>	<b>dokumen.pub</b> Internet Source	<1%
<b>2</b>	<b>archive.org</b> Internet Source	<1%
<b>3</b>	<b>etheses.lse.ac.uk</b> Internet Source	<1%
<b>4</b>	<b>prp.hec.gov.pk</b> Internet Source	<1%
<b>5</b>	<b>Submitted to Higher Education Commission Pakistan</b> Student Paper	<1%
<b>6</b>	<b>ebin.pub</b> Internet Source	<1%
<b>7</b>	<b>This dissertation examines and compares civil-military relations in Turkey and Israel with a focus on military interventions in politics. It aims to understand the reasons behind the militaries' political interventions at different levels and in different types in these countries. Through a detailed comparison, it</b>	<1%