On Security

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Acknowledgements

> Even in the common affairs of life, in love, friendship, and marriage, how little security have we when we trust our happiness in the hands of others!
>
> --William Hazlitt, *On Living to One's Self*

This book had its origins in 1990, when John Ruggie suggested that I assemble a group of people to consider the problem of "redefining security." After consultations with various colleagues, Beverly Crawford and I decided to take on the challenge. At the time, John was director of the UC-Systemwide Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), and he was kind enough to provide some funds to get the project started.

From the very beginning of the project, however, it was not at all clear that its focus ought to be on new definitions of security. We wanted a book that did more than define the "new" security challenges of the 1990s, or the 21st century. And we wanted to examine the constructions and discourses that underlie the definitions of security that, ultimately, result in force postures, weapons deployments, and so on. Consequently, in casting the net for contributors, we went beyond the "usual suspects," and tried to bring together a diverse group of individuals whose approaches to security policy and practice ranged from realist to "interdependista" to post-modern. The volume you hold in your hand is, thus, the result of several meetings by this group over the course of 1991-1992, during which the concepts, constructions, and conundrums of security were the focus of discussion, as well as subsequent reworkings and revisions of the manuscript as a whole.

In addition to the contributors to this volume, a number of other people attended various meetings, made comments and suggestions, and played a vital role in the project. Among them are Timothy Luke, Emanuel Adler, Jutta Weldes, Gene Rochlin, Bonnie Gold, Mark Nechodom, Elaine Thomas, Lisa Ellis, Steve Del Rosso, John Leslie, Albert Fishlow, Kate Wittenberg, Chad Kia, Leslie Bialler and several anonymous reviewers for Columbia University Press. The meetings could not have taken place without the assistance of Tanya DeCell, Judy Newman, Lani Blanc, and Peggy Tippet and the support of the staff of Stevenson College and the Adlai Stevenson Program on Global Security at UC-Santa Cruz. Additional funding for the project was provided, in a statement of faith, by Professor Susan Shirk, John Ruggie's successor as the IGCC's Director and through the good offices of Professor Richard Buxbaum, the Director of the Center for German and European Studies at UC-Berkeley. To all, our heartfelt thanks. This book is dedicated to Gene Rochlin--adviser, mentor, and friend.

Note: In addition to the contributors whose articles are published here, Timothy Luke was also a member of this group, but his contribution is not included here. It is, however, available from the volume editor at the address listed in the Contributors section, directly following.

RDL
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On Security

1. On Security

Ronnie D. Lipschutz

This is a book about security. Unlike many books on the subject, however, this one is not about potential enemies or redefined strategies in an uncertain world or the future of NATO or U.S. defense postures in the 1990s or emerging threats by refugees or ethnic conflict or environmental degradation. Rather, this is a book that addresses the *concept* of security by asking a number of questions about it.

First, *what* is it that is being secured? More than half a decade after the opening of the Berlin Wall, more than four years after the end of the Cold War and, as this book was being written, with crises in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and imminently, perhaps, in Cuba, the answer to this question is by no means clear (if it ever really was). Is the international system being secured? The nation-state? The "West?" Societies? Cultures? No one seems sure.

Second, what constitutes the *condition* of security? Protection against enemies? External or internal ones? Protection against neighbors? Suppression of individuals of a particular color or religion? Insulation against economic pressures and competitors? Environmental sustainability? All of these have been proposed; none is easy to accomplish.

And, third, how do *ideas* about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse and, eventually, become institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles, and practices? Do they arise, as the conventional wisdom might suggest, from objective threats and conditions inherent to an anarchic world? Are they generated within, a consequence of notions about multiple selves and feared others? Or, are they socially constructed, the worst-case result of a dialectic between what is observed and what is imagined? This process is the least-understood of all, yet it is this third question that may be the most important one to be asked.[1]

In a much-cited and often-criticized article published several years ago, John J. Mearsheimer told us why we would "soon miss the Cold War."[2] Presciently, he seems to have been correct, although not for the reasons he enumerated in the article. It is not the relative stability of the bipolar world that we seem to miss as much as having an enemy whose capacities and intentions were, if not confirmable, at least comprehensible. The missiles were, after all, clearly pointed in our direction. Today, in a time when minor warlords and rogue police chiefs seem able to frustrate the best the guardians of U.S. security have to offer, the relative clarity of the Cold War, and the "right" to weigh in on the "right" side, do begin to have their attractions. This book represents, therefore, an attempt to come to grips with some of the ontological and other dilemmas, such as those mentioned above, associated with security that have emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. In a series of three meetings, held between August 1991 and September 1992, the contributors to this book met as a group to consider whether the concepts and practices of security, as they had emerged in academia and policymaking, could still be analyzed and applied as they had been between 1947 and 1991.

Epistemologically speaking, the members of the group ranged from a point somewhere in the neighborhood of contemporary realism (in its English variant)[3] to the postmodernist and constructivist end of international relations theory.[4] For the most part, no one was moved by the arguments presented during the meetings to change her or his initial positions. But members of the group did force each other to think through more carefully their understanding of "security," as will be evident from the essays found here; certainly, none of the authors or their essays take for granted as givens the assumptions that today inform most public debates over security postures and "redefining security."[5]

None of the contributors assumed automatically that the shape of threats to come have the character often attributed to them by specialists on terrorism, fundamentalism, ethnicity, or Third World politics. And none of these essays should be seen as the product of solitary inductive or deductive efforts; they are the result of an ongoing process of discussion and mutual criticism among the authors. Thus, while some of the essays hew more closely than others to more "traditional" positions on security, all of the authors find themselves looking more closely at the conventional claims about security and the epistemologies underlying them. It seems safe to say that all of the participants have come away from this project with a much broader understanding of what we might call, for convenience, the "security problematique" of the late twentieth century, and we hope that you, the reader, will fare similarly.

This book is not, however, merely about seven authors in search of a topic; it also participates in the ongoing debate between neorealists, neoliberals, neoinstitutionalists, constructivists and postmodernists about the nature of political reality and its expression in international relations. Security practices are only one of a number of behaviors, ordinarily associated with states rather than other actors in the global system (except for those non-state actors in violent conflict with states). Whereas much of the intellectual debate takes the state more-or-less for granted as the subject of practice and the object of study, it seems to us that there are ontologically-prior questions that must be addressed first. Precisely *what* is the state? What is the nature of *relations* between states? And how do we account for behavior within the *system* of states? The contributors to this volume take a number of different tacks in trying to answer these questions and a set of shared hypotheses (suppositions might be a better word) does inform this introductory chapter and the ones that follow.

First, the structural features of international politics that constrained and directed security policies and practices between 1947 and 1991 have, for the most part vanished. Most of the institutions associated with the Cold War remain in place, to be sure, but they are now casting about for new ontologies of their own, not to mention policies, that can fit the hardware and procedures left behind. Thus, we have the members of NATO trying on a variety of new missions without being quite sure of their purpose. Is NATO to be a security "blanket," on standby against the eventuality of a newly aggressive and imperial Russia? Is it to become a security "regime," encompassing all of Europe, as well as North America and the ex-Soviet republics? Or can it best function as a security "maker," intervening in ethnic and other conflicts that appear to threaten European stability? The absence of what seemed to be clear and definable threats thus leads to the "hammer-nail" conundrum.[6]

Second, the disappearance of the constraints associated with nuclear bipolarity have allowed other "historical structures" (to use Robert Cox's term[7]) to resurface, thereby introducing high levels of uncertainty into parts of the world that, for decades, seemed quite fixed and stable. Thus, speculate some analysts, the conflicts in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, et. al. would not have taken place had the Cold War not come to an end. But the working assumption of most such analyses is that these re-emergent structures are, somehow, premodern or primordial, and that they have emerged only in

places not fully-socialized into twentieth- century modernity. It is, of course, also possible that they are fully reflective of such modernity, and that it is not only within the European Union, but in these places, as well, that we behold the future of world politics. If so, we may be starting to see the emergence of a "security dilemma" at the social, rather than interstate, level.

Third, the anchors that previously allowed self-reflective collectivities to identify themselves and others, friend and foe, and threats to the self and other, have come loose, making it ever more difficult to specify the self that is to be made secure. Moreover, a proliferation of new identities--as states, as cultures, as *ethnies* --are making it increasingly difficult to find new anchorages on which to base stable political relations, inasmuch as the fundamental units of international political interaction seem to be changing. This is not an argument that the state is obsolete, or that interdependence confounds sovereignty but, rather, that the boundaries that, for forty-odd years, disciplined states and polities, can no longer contain them. To rephrase Yeats's oft-cited line, it is not that the center cannot hold; rather, it is that the margins cannot be contained. And new margins are emerging everywhere, even in the center.

To be sure, amidst all of this change, war remains the defining limit of security, especially for those in the midst of one (although, as Kenneth Boulding once pointed out, at any given time, most of the world is not at war).[8] But even where wars *are* taking place, they are increasingly difficult to describe and define. Among and against whom are they fought? In Somalia, clans war against each other and the forces of the UN system. In the Caucusus, interstate wars, wars of secession and civil wars go on simultaneously, sometimes in the same place. In Afghanistan, multiple versions of Islam fight each other. In Rwanda and Burundi, social systems tear themselves apart through mutual genocide. Even the Gulf War, arraying international coalition against renegade state, now is seen to have been somewhat inconclusive. In the midst of such conceptual and practical confusion, against whom or what is anyone to be made secure?

Defining, "Redefining," or (Re)constructing Security?

The authors of a book entitled *Defending America's Security* tell us that:

> In the most basic sense, what the American people have to deal with when they adjust to the world outside U.S. frontiers is 170 [sic] assorted nation-states, each in control of a certain amount of the earth's territory. These 170 nations, being sovereign, are able to reach decisions on the use of armed forces under their government's control. They can decide to attack other nations.[9]

Despite the political and economic changes of the past decade, such sentiments still represent the basic premise of national security policy: There exist threats to the territory of one state posed by the activities of other states. In this neorealist world, with each state in command of a discrete territory and population, and with each capable of monopolizing the legitimate use of force within that territory, the essential security function remains, as the authors of the book quoted above and others suggest, self-defense and, if necessary, war. Other threats may exist and be of concern to governments but, according to the traditional line of thinking, they are not security threats.

Why, then, should we bother to revise security? In an essay published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1989, entitled "Redefining Security," Jessica Tuchman Mathews argued that the concept of security needed to be rethought. As she put it, "Global developments now suggest the need for . . . national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues."[10] According to this view, the global expenditure of $1 trillion per year could no longer be justified when there were so many other problems

that promised to undermine "national security" much more effectively than the Soviet Union. What Mathews and others left unexamined was the meaning of her use of the term "security." The concept seemed, at the time, self-evident: To secure the state against those objective threats that could undermine its stability and threaten its survival. In choosing as her audience the readers of *Foreign Affairs* , Mathews, who had been a member of the National Security Council during the Carter Administration, took aim at White House policymakers, the Cabinet agencies, the Pentagon, the U.S. Congress, and relevant interest groups and think tanks, all of whom played some role in assessing threats to the United States and formulating what they thought were appropriate responses. In retrospect, however, some basic problems with this formulation are evident.

Mathews, and others arguing along similar lines (myself included), understood security policy to be largely the result of the rational assessment, by knowledgeable analysts, of a universe of potential threats, of varying risk, to which a country might be subjected. These clearly defined and bounded threats could be countered by appropriate means, including the development and deployment of new weapons systems, shifts in military doctrine, and payoffs to allies. It seemed, in this scheme of things, a relatively easy proposition to shift the allocation of resources from one threat to another, so long as the new threat was conceptualized in terms of the state and couched in the language of "national security." The end of the Cold War seemed only to sharpen this argument; indeed, it was not long before President Bush, recognizing the ontological dilemmas inherent in the collapse of the Soviet Union, assigned to the CIA the task of searching for and analyzing new security problems. As one newspaper editorialized at the time, "Indeed, the major threats to security today are probably found in such disparate sources as the world's overcrowded classrooms, understaffed health facilities, shrinking oil fields, diverted rivers and holes in the ozone layer."[11]

On closer inspection, however, it is evident that most of the threats posited by those who have argued for a redefinition of security have primarily to do with human health and welfare, social problems, internal sources of instability, and the costs imposed upon societies by the disruption of customary ways of doing things. While such threats certainly could affect the safety, cohesion, and stability of individuals, families, communities, societies, and even countries, it was and is by no means clear that these constitute "security threats" or problems of "national security" in the Cold War or neorealist sense of the term. (To be entirely fair, many things were done in the name of national security during the Cold War that were also more about social welfare and political stability than military threats, but this still did not make them objective threats or risks.) Nor, for that matter, was it obvious how the reconfiguration of security policy might make it possible to address such issues with the tools in hand. This dilemma was illuminated with great clarity in Somalia, where it has been not so much the survival of the Somali people(s) that has seemed to be at stake as the very concept and existence of the Somali *state* . That entity's dissolution into perpetually warring clans was closer to the Hobbesian state of Nature than even the so-called anarchic international system seemed able to tolerate at the time.

What the Somali case tells us is that *defining* security, or even *redefining* it, becomes problematic when the *referent object* of security itself is ill-defined or changing. What, under the circumstances described above, might security mean? Security is a word with multiple and contested meanings; as Barry Buzan points out in *People, States & Fear* , security is an "essentially contested concept."[12] Analysts and policymakers contest the definition of the term because at its core, claims Buzan, there are moral, ideological, and normative elements that render empirical data irrelevant and prevent reasonable people from agreeing with one another on a fixed definition.[13] Buzan brings to the fore the difficulty of

specifying the referent of security and, in a search for a more precise meaning, argues that the state consists of three components: the idea of the state (nationalism); the physical base of the state (population, resources, technology); and the institutional expression of the state (administrative and political systems).[14] Having defined the state in this way, it becomes possible to imagine threats to each of these three components. But what happens when all three elements disappear?

In a cruel irony, the result is that the zero-sum geopolitics of realism and the Cold War come to be reproduced at the micro-level of household and society, with the complete and deliberate elimination of family and social group as official policy of whatever monopolizers of violence remain in existence. Often, there is no monopoly, as when control of violence has devolved to the level of household and social group as well. In Somalia, consequently, the security of one clan could be purchased only at the cost of another--with the United States and the UN playing the role of one clan among many--even if this meant wiping out entire extended families so as to deny the right of a clan to exist as a collective entity. What, under these conditions, could it mean to be *Somali* in the national sense, a concept that was, in any event, largely imagined into being by the British and Italian colonial authorities? If there were no Somalis in the nation-state sense, then there was no Somalia, and the national security of the Somali state would become, *ipso facto* , an empty set. Although Somalia is of marginal interest to most, an empty set where Somalia was once to be found does constitute something of a threat to the international system. The same sort of analysis could be applied to any of dozens of other so-called nation-states around the world that have collapsed, or are threatening to collapse, into a similar condition.

We could argue, of course, that these are simply zones of confusion and chaos, with little practical significance for states such as the United States or Germany or Israel. Countries and peoples with a strong sense of identity and social cohesion know who they *are* and who they are *not* (this being the essence of successful nationalism). Consequently, they presume to know what threatens them and they can take appropriate steps in response. The problem in the zones of chaos, one could argue, is that such identities crumbled, to be replaced by others, because their states became too weak to sustain them. But one might also argue that it was the crumbling of identities that weakened the states and made moot all notions of national security.

If the latter hypothesis is even remotely plausible, then "strong" states are in trouble, too. For more than forty years, the United States knew it was *not* the Soviet Union, the FRG knew it was *not* the GDR, Israel knew it was *not* Palestine. Who or what, now, are these places? What defines them when the defining enemy is gone? The answers are not so simple as one might think, as events have, and are likely to, illustrate. Nonetheless, these are among the dilemmas that confront us in defining, or redefining, security.

Creating Discourses of Security

Conceptualizations of security--from which follow policy and practice--are to be found in *discourses of security* . These are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat, but rather the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them. Hence, there are not only struggles over security among *nations* , but also struggles over security among *notions* . Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the *authority* to articulate new definitions and discourses of security, as well. As Karen Litfin points out, "As determinants of what can and cannot be thought, discourses delimit the range of policy options, thereby functioning as precursors

to policy outcomes. . . . The supreme power is the power to delineate the boundaries of thought--an attribute not so much of specific agents as it is of discursive practices."[15] These discourses of security, however clearly articulated, nonetheless remain fraught with contradictions, as the chapters in this volume make clear.

How do such discourses begin? In his investigation of the historical origins of the concept, James Der Derian (Chapter 2: "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard") points out that, in the past, *security* has been invoked not only to connote protection from threats, along the lines of the conventional definition, but also to describe hubristic overconfidence as well as a bond or pledge provided in a financial transaction. To secure oneself is, therefore, a sort of trap, for one can never leave a secure place without incurring risks. (Elsewhere, Barry Buzan has pointed out that "There is a cruel irony in [one] meaning of secure which is `unable to escape.' "[16]) Security, moreover, is meaningless without an "other" to help specify the conditions of insecurity. Der Derian, citing Nietzsche, points out that this "other" is made manifest through differences that create terror and collective resentment of difference--the state of fear--rather than a preferable coming to terms with the positive potentials of difference.

As these differences become less than convincing, however, their power to create fear and terror diminish, and so it becomes necessary to create ever more menacing threats to reestablish difference. For this purpose, Der Derian argues, reality is no longer sufficient; only the creation of a "hyperreal" world of computer and media-imaged and -imagined threats will do. Or, to cite Baudrillard, as Der Derian does: "It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real." It is the imagined, unnamed party, with the clandestinely assembled and crude atomic device, and not the thousands of reliable, high-yield warheads mounted on missiles poised to launch at a moment's notice, that creates fear, terror, and calls for greater surveillance and enforcement.

Yet, according to Der Derian, describing how the solitary computer wargaming of the Iraqi and American militaries were literally joined together in battle on the deserts of the Persian Gulf littoral, hyperreal threats do sometimes have an odd way of becoming material. The Gulf War created a "real" simulation, broadcast to the watching billions, that was later found out to have been a less-than-accurate representation. This does not mean that those who died suffered simulated deaths. Simulated threats may be imagined, but their ultimate consequences are all too real.

What this process suggests is that concepts of security arise, to a great degree, out of discursive practices *within* states and, only secondarily, *among* states.[17] Ole Wæver (Chapter 3: "Securitization and Desecuritization") illuminates this aspect of security, framing it not as an objective or material condition, but as a "speech act," enunciated by elites in order to securitize issues or "fields," thereby helping to reproduce the hierarchical conditions that characterize security practices. Thus, according to Wæver, much of the agenda of "redefining security" is a process of bringing *into* the field of security those things that, perhaps, should remain outside (but this struggle to redefine a concept can also be seen as an effort by heretofore-excluded elites to enter the security discourse). He warns, therefore, that redefining security in a conventional sense, either to encompass new sources of threat or specify new referent objects, risks applying the traditional logic of military behavior to nonmilitary problems. This process can also expand the jurisdiction of already-expansive states as well. As Wæver puts it, "By naming a certain development a security problem, the `state' [claims] . . . a special right [to intervene]." In intervening, the tools applied by the state would look very much like those used during the wars the state might launch if it chose to do so. This contradiction was apparent in the initial landing of U.S. Marines in

Somalia in December, 1992. Demonstrably, there was a question of matching force to force in this case, but the ostensible goal of humanitarian assistance took on the appearance of a military invasion (with the added hyperreality of resistance offered only by the mass(ed) media waiting on shore). This does not mean that Wæver thinks that "security as a speech act" should not be applied to anything at all; only that it is necessary to consider with care what is implied or involved if we are indiscriminate in doing so.

Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a *socially constructed* concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.[18] It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them.[19] To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there."[20] But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions.[21] That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with *theirs* .[22]

Security Dilemmas and Dilemmas of Security

The "Long Peace," as John Lewis Gaddis has stylized it,[23] continues to puzzle historians as well as students of war, peace, and arms control. How did it come about? Why was it so long? Can it continue? What can we do to maintain it? For many, the obvious answer to the puzzle is "nuclear deterrence" and "bipolarity." These were the two conditions that maintained a stable, armed peace between the two Great Powers.[24] The security dilemma led to a precarious stability, whose resilience was always open to question. Could nuclear weapons be used without provoking full-scale war? No one knew. Might a small, nuclear-armed country trigger war between the superpowers? No one knew that, either. Could war begin by accident? No one wanted to find out.

The result was the curious way in which nuclear weapons were used: While not being used in a literal sense, but only as threat, they were still being used.[25] The notion of "use" thus began to acquire a peculiar meaning. The threat to "use" nuclear weapons, as Thomas Schelling and others pointed out, was credible only to the degree that those in a position of power could convince not only others, but also themselves, that the weapons *would* be used under appropriate circumstances.[26] But such circumstances could never be too well-defined, for to do so might someday require an unwanted launch for the sake of credibility. The "use" of nuclear weapons consequently took the form of speech, backed up by doctrine and deployment, but hedged all about with hypotheticals and conditionals. For example, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1982, then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger argued that,

To deter successfully, we must be able--*and must be seen to be able* --to retaliate against any potential

aggressor in such a manner that the costs we will exact will substantially exceed any gains he might hope to achieve through aggression. We, for our part, are under no illusions about the consequences of a nuclear war: we believe there would be no winners in such a war. But this recognition on *our* part is not sufficient to ensure effective deterrence or to prevent the outbreak of war: it is essential that the Soviet leadership understands this as well. [27]

The inherent contradiction in such reasoning became all the more evident as the very same people who tried to define the hypothetical conditions of nuclear use also made every effort, first, to ensure "crisis stability," so that the weapons would not be used mistakenly or by accident during a periods of high international tension and, second, to convince the public at large, as Ronald Reagan tried to do, that *any* use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic. Such arguments, as Steven Kull discovered, did little to convince policymakers themselves that they said what they meant or meant what they said.[28]

A particularly vivid and nonfictional example of this process--only one among many--can be found in the deployment in Europe of the intermediate-range "Euromissiles"--Pershing-II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles--in response to the Soviet SS-20s discovered in Eastern Europe during the mid-1970s. The SS-20s, it was claimed by then-West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, threatened the West by taking advantage of a "gap" in a largely hypothetical ladder of crisis escalation. This gap could be used by the Soviets, according to the argument made by Schmidt and others, to *threaten* Western Europe with certain destruction, were they to be launched. But the intent of emplacement was to intimidate, inasmuch as to launch would have unpredictable, not to mention undesirable, consequences. Facing such coercion, Western Europe could find itself "Finlandized" or forced to submit to demands made by the Soviet Union.[29]

Such demands, of course, had not been made, and never were; they were demands that the West *imagined* might be forthcoming at some future date, and they were demands that, if met, would have changed Western Europe into something with a different identity and loyalty: a Greater Finland, perhaps? Nonetheless, imagined threats generated material responses. To remedy the hole in the whole of nuclear deterrence, policymakers determined that NATO must deploy its own equivalent missiles, thereby countering one set of imagined threats with another. Again, the Euromissiles were never intended to be *launched* ; they were put into Europe only to fill an imagined gap that had not existed prior to the deployment of the SS-20s.[30] To underline the imaginary quality of the threats invoked on both sides, in 1987, after some six years of off-again on-again negotiation, the gap disappeared, as if by sleight of hand. Both sides were now to be allowed to remain what they had been.[31] As is true with most magical thinking, the "gap" had never been real in any objective sense; it was created through discourses of deterrence and the projection of imagined intentions onto the "other." A whole world of the future was created out of dreams, casting its unreal shadow on the present.[32] Thus was mutual deterrence assured.

In the Euromissile episode, in other words, the state and its leaders sought to secure the citizenry against escape from the traps of security through new strategies of insecurity. This was accepted practice during the Cold War. It was a particularly common practice of the "nuclear state," which held its hostages in an eternal death grip as a means of credibly confronting the enemy, as Dan Deudney's essay (Chapter 4: "Political Fission: State Structure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Weapons in the United States") makes clear. But hostages are not always passive victims. As Deudney points out, they sometimes seek the means to escape from their maximum security situations; the "Stockholm Syndrome" does not necessarily hold where Mutually Assured Destruction is concerned. Indeed, it is the very self-disciplining

security strategy of the state that may encourage resistance and "jailbreaks," as attempted by the pro-peace and anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s.

Deudney argues that it is very difficult for the state to maintain its legitimacy when its strategies of self-preservation promise to annihilate its own "secured" population in time of war as a means of preventing war.[33] Yet, it is only through such nuclear strategies that the state has any hope of maintaining its international autonomy and disciplining its citizens and borders. Ironically, perhaps, the contradiction is least problematic when the state least needs to establish its commitment to a strategy of nuclear deterrence, as is evident today. It was during the Reagan Administration, when the nuclear threat was thought most necessary to establishing state autonomy, that civil society was most resistant to the nuclear project and most concerned about creating alternative discourses of security. Only by silencing its saber-rattling--which threatened to undermine its autonomy--was the state able to dampen resistance to its nuclear policies.

The state's security strategy must, therefore, encompass not just body, but mind as well; the "delusions of deterrence" require continual self-deception.[34] Part of the effort to make threats to security "real" involved (and still does involve) the linking of the material interests of individual citizens to those of the state. Pearl-Alice Marsh (Chapter 5: "Grassroots Statecraft: Citizens Movements, National Security, and U.S. Foreign Policy") shows how attempts by the Reagan Administration to define security threats and capture the citizenry via this approach could, nonetheless, backfire. In southern Africa, the case discussed by Marsh, security policy was defined and pursued in such a way as to *undermine* U.S. national security policy in that part of the world. The Reagan Administration feared Communism winning the minds as well as the minerals of South Africa, and used this scenario to legitimize its ultimately unsuccessful policy of "constructive engagement."

Beginning in the 1970s (and drawing on the geopolitical theories of Admiral Thomas Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, and Colin Gray), conservative analysts argued that Soviet activities in Africa were intended to "choke off" sources of critical strategic materials, a maneuver that would strike not just at U.S. security but also the material heart of American society.[35] As the President of the American Geological Institute put it during the 1980 Presidential campaign, "Without manganese, chromium, platinum and cobalt, there can be no automobiles, no airplanes, no jet engines, no satellites and no sophisticated weapons--*not even home appliances* ."[36] Was he correct? No one could say, since no one had tried to build such devices without low-cost minerals from southern Africa.[37] A more germane question is whether the Soviet threat to mineral supplies was even a plausible one, or the one to be most feared.[38]

Groups based in U.S. civil society argued that South African apartheid was more likely to result in embargoes of strategic materials than Soviet intervention or subversion, for two reasons. First, the South African government was already in a strong position to control the flow of minerals as a means of manipulating public policy the United States; and, second, a favorable policy toward the South African government now (in the 1980s) could result in hostile relations when, in the future, apartheid was replaced by majority rule. In making such arguments, citizens groups constructed a counter-scenario that was, in the final analysis, more convincing to the U.S. Congress and the public than the threat of "ore wars." Ultimately, civil resistance was able to undermine the plausibility of the Reaganaut security discourse for the region. Whose threats were "real?" Whose were not? Perhaps both, perhaps, given the recent transfer of political power in South Africa, neither.

Transforming the State, Transforming the System

The struggle to define the parameters of a concept is only one part of the security problematique; of equal importance are very real questions about the *referent* object of security. What, in the final analysis, is being secured? If ozone holes are a threat, is the enemy us? If immigrants are a threat, do police become soldiers? If the economic competitiveness of our allies is a threat, is Corporate America to be protected against leveraged buyouts by foreign capital or against those who have been fired during self-protective downsizings? If one social group threatens the mores of another, are there front lines in the "culture wars?" Perhaps it is the unemployed college graduate who is most to be feared, since he or she has much time in which to plot the overthrow of the regime deemed responsible for that insecure status.[39] All of these possibilities raise questions about what is to be made secure through the security practices of the state. Paradoxically, perhaps, the particular phenomena alluded to above are all material consequences of a process of economic globalization that was first set in train by the Cold War security policies of the United States.

Material processes have consequences for security, it would seem and, in today's world, the effort to (re)define security results not only from a changing world but also from changes in the state itself.[40] These changes, having primarily to do with the global economic system, affect material conditions *within* states--safety, welfare, sovereignty--in ways that serve to undermine the traditional roles of governments,[41] making them less willing or able to protect their citizens from these forces or provide services that might mitigate their impacts.[42] These transformative forces also have effects on the *capabilities* of states, by creating contradictions between the accustomed practices of governments and the responses needed to buffer against those forces, as illustrated by the demise of the Soviet Union and the endless fiscal troubles suffered by the United States.

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a "secure" global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.[43] One consequence of this project was the globalization of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important; the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.[44] This would make the world safe and secure for the United States inasmuch as it would *all* be the self, so to speak.

The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly. In Iran, for example, the Shah's efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but also, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic "fundamentalism," now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers' worst nightmares made real,[45] although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might have never acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American "security."

The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle--undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that *have* been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it?

According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First, they can try to restore state *autonomy* through self-reliance although, in doing so, they are likely to undermine state *strength* via reduced competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies, although this begins to include pretty much everybody. It also threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally, they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. The former approach may slow down technological development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially unreliable. All else being equal, in all three cases, the state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state from trying to gain.

How can a state generate the conditions for legitimating various forms of intervention into this process? Clearly, it is not enough to invoke the mantra of "competitiveness"; competition *with* someone is also critical. In Europe, notwithstanding budgetary stringencies, state sponsorship of cutting-edge technological R&D retains a certain, albeit declining, legitimacy; in the United States, absent a persuasive threat, this is much less the case (although the discourse of the Clinton Administration suggests that such ideological restraints could be broken). Thus, it is the hyperrealism of Clyde Prestowitz, Karel Van Wolferen, and Michael Crichton, imagining a Japan resurgent and bent anew on (non-)Pacific conquest, that provides the cultural materials for new economic policies. Can new industrialized enemies be conjured into existence so as to justify new cold wars and the remobilization of capital, under state direction, that must follow? Or has the world changed too much for this to happen again?

In a widely ranging survey of the "state of the state," and "the state of the system," Barry Buzan (Chapter 7: "Security, the State, the `New World Order' and Beyond) suggests that, within the industrialized core of the system, security and the state are not likely to change radically, although the fears raised by the "peddlers of prosperity," as Paul Krugmann puts it, are not likely to materialize, either.[46] No single state, by itself, argues Buzan, is likely to emerge as a challenger to the "single coalition of major capitalist powers" that includes Japan, the European Community, and the United States (plus, perhaps, Central Europe and some of the former Soviet republics). In his opinion, this coalition is more likely to consolidate than disintegrate, with the result that security relations between core and periphery will take

on greater overall importance, as evidenced by the growth in popularity of UN peacekeeping.

In Buzan's view, the central question is whether the coalition will choose to isolate itself from the periphery--in essence, trying to secure itself from external chaos in a sort of strategy of "self-containment"--or to intervene there in an effort to enlarge the zone of order--but thereby to risk being pulled into that chaos, as well. The choice will depend on how threats--and the social constructions of security--are framed. As is the case with the U.S. intervention in Somalia and, more recently, in Haiti, chaos can be framed as a threat to the core's moral legitimacy and supposed responsibilities to others. But chaos can also be framed as a threat to the limited zones of peace in the core, which continue to resist being pulled into the closer-to-home maelstrom of post-Yugoslavia and the Caucasian Republics. Neither threat can be escaped, but framing them in terms of moral burdens may ensure that the mentality of the *laager* --a self-protecting but neoisolationist zone of apparent peace amid chaos--does not come to dominate security discourses and practices.

In contrast to Buzan's political geography of core and periphery, an alternative view might see not a binary world with threats emanating from a periphery against which the core tries to protect itself.[47] Instead, we might also imagine a future in which "tame zones" and "wild zones" are scattered about the planet without any easily discernible pattern, having emerged out of the logic of capital mobility rather than territorial conquest. In such a world, some of the wildest zones might be found within tame ones, as South Central is within Los Angeles.

But even the tame zones might be further fragmented, not by territory but by modes of production, consumption, and accumulation. In this world, the Dow-Jones average becomes a representation of security: when it is up, we are strong; when it is down, we are weak. Yet, when the Dow is up, so paradoxically are interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds. It costs U.S. citizens more to remain who they are, and this weakens them. When unemployment is up, inflation is down. This is good for finance capital, but not for labor (or the consumer markets on which many globalizing corporations depend). Who is stronger, who is weaker? In this context, does it make any sense to speak of "security" except as the need to prevent wild zones from penetrating tame ones?

In this latter scenario, almost all conventional wisdoms about security no longer hold. The orderly practices of the world of international relations embodied in neorealist discourse--the practices of power, not the absence of disorder--require constant reiteration and reification in mantra-like fashion, even as they become increasingly problematic in the hyperreality of the non-place and time bound worlds of transnational society. The place-bound concerns of neorealists, and their idealized decisionmakers, matter only insofar as they help to shore up a crumbling world view. Security, its discourses, and its modes of production thus become a means of stanching the dikes not against the external forces of chaos but the internal dynamics of state disintegration.

These two contrasting views, of separate and intermingled zones of order and chaos seem to be diametrically opposed, but perhaps they are not. The world of states continues to exist and operate along the logics of neorealism and interdependence. In that world, all states are external to one other and view each other intersubjectively. Security is defined in terms of one or more of these external actors penetrating the threatened state in some material fashion. Missiles, pollutants, and immigrants all come from the "outside" and menace the inside. The world of intermingled order and chaos, however, is already "inside," snatching bodies, as it were. If the financial world poses a threat to the state, it is because it is part and parcel of the body politic. Surviving the depredations of the robber barons of Wall

Street (and London, Tokyo, et al.) will be much like a serious heroin addiction: take too little and you become ill; take too much and you die. The zone of tolerability--and security--might, for better or worse, come to lie on the fine line, and our ability to balance, between the two.

Note 1: See, e.g., Paul A. Kovert, "The Origins of Social Identity in International Politics," Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994. Back.

Note 2: John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56. A popular version was published in *The Atlantic Monthly* . Back.

Note 3: Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,"International Organization 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 327-52. Back.

Note 4: James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy--Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992). Timothy Luke was also a member of the group, but his contribution is not included here. Back.

Note 5: Among the books and articles that have recently arrived in my mail (admittedly a very small sample) are: Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order--Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1993); Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *America's Strategy in a Changing World* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); Donald M. Snow, *Distant Thunder--Third World Conflict and the New International Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, *World Security--Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); and Jeremy Brecher, John Brown Childs, and Jill Cutler, eds., *Global Visions--Beyond the New World Order* (Boston: South End Press, 1993). Back.

Note 6: Attributed, I believe, to Abraham Maslow, who was supposed to have observed that "if all you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail." Back.

Note 7: Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order--Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). Back.

Note 8: Kenneth E. Boulding, *Stable Peace* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), ch. 1. Back.

Note 9: Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Defending America's Security* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), pp. 3-4. Back.

Note 10: Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 162. In 1982, *International Security* published a piece with the same title, in which Richard Ullman made much the same argument. Back.

Note 11: Editorial, *San Francisco Chronicle* , Dec. 28, 1991, p. A18. Back.

Note 12: The notion of an "essentially contested concept" comes from W. B. Gallie, "Essentially

contested concepts," in Max Black, ed., *The Importance of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962) pp. 121-46. Cited in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991, 2nd ed), p. 7. Back.

Note 13: Buzan, *People, States and Fear* , p. 7. Back.

Note 14: Buzan, *People, States and Fear* , p. 65. Back.

Note 15: Karen Litfin, "Transnational Scientific Networks and the Environment: The Limits of Epistemic Cooperation," Paper delivered at the 1991 Western Regional Conference of the ISA, November 1-2, Los Angeles, p. 18-19. Back.

Note 16: Buzan, *People, States and Fear* , p. 37. Back.

Note 17: See Sanjoy Banerjee, "Reproduction of Subjects in Historical Structures: Attribution, Identity, and Emotion in the Early Cold War," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (March 1991): 19-38. For a more extended analysis of this phenomenon, see Steven Kull, "Nuclear Nonsense," *Foreign Policy* 58 (Spring 1985): 28-52; and Steven Kull *Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers* (New York: Basic Books, 1988). Back.

Note 18: For a specific application of the notion of social construction to policymaking, see Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 2 (June 1993): 334-47. Back.

Note 19: Banerjee, "Reproduction of Subjects." Back.

Note 20: In other words, the enemy, and the threat it presents, possess characteristics specific to the society defining them. See, e.g., Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests: The Logic of U.S. National Security in the Post-war Era," Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, University of Minnesota, 1992; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *When Nations Clash: Raw Materials, Ideology, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Ballinger/Harper and Row, 1989); David Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States," *Alternatives* 15 (1990): 263-86; and David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). Back.

Note 21: To this, the realist would argue: "But states exist and the condition of anarchy means that there are no restraints on their behavior towards others! Hence, threats must be material and real." As Nicholas Onuf, Alex Wendt, and others have argued, even international anarchy is a social construction inasmuch as certain rules of behavior inevitably form the basis for such an arrangement. See Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making--Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Alex Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 405; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1992): 389-420. Back.

Note 22: See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, "Bush Urged to Halve U.S. Nuclear Arsenal," *San Francisco Chronicle* , Jan. 6, 1992, p. A1:

> "In a world with many potential enemies, the United States should draw up a plan for targeting nuclear and

nonnuclear weapons `at every reasonable adversary' around the world, [a] panel of current and former Pentagon officials said. . . ." In June 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed an agreement to drastically reduce levels of nuclear arms held by the two countries. It is interesting to note the warnings by "conservatives" in both the U.S. and Russia not to give away strategic advantage in the pursuit of domestic political advantage or economy.

Back.

Note 23: John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Back.

Note 24: The most prominent claimant of this notion is, of course, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Waltz continues to mount this claim; see, for example, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-45; and Scott D. Sagan & Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995) A current version is John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 50-66. Back.

Note 25: Indeed, the essential task of deterrence was to convince the other that they *would* be used, although one would never want to get to the point that they *might* be used. For a full-blown exegesis of this point, see Timothy W. Luke, "On Post-War: The Significance of Symbolic Action in War and Deterrence," *Alternatives* 14 (1989): 343-62. Back.

Note 26: Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), ch. 2. Back.

Note 27: Casper Weinberger, "United States Nuclear Deterrence Policy," Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, Dec. 14, 1982, pp. 2-3. First emphasis my own. Back.

Note 28: Kull, "Nuclear Nonsense"; Kull, *Minds at War* . These pronouncements did have the effect of scaring the hell out of citizens, many of whom mobilized against the nuclear arms race. See Dan Deudney's chapter in this volume. Back.

Note 29: The term "Finlandization" is worthy of an entire paper in itself. One used to hear people say that to be like Finland would not be so bad; today, no one wants to be like Finland, which is in an economic slump brought on by the collapse of trade with the ex-Soviet Union. Back.

Note 30: R. Jeffrey Smith, "Missile Deployments Roil Europe," *Science* 223 (Jan. 27, 1984): 371-76; "Missile Talks Doomed from the Start," *Science* 223 (Feb. 10, 1984): 566-70; "Missile Deployments Shake European Politics," *Science* 223 (Feb. 17, 1984): 665-67; "The Allure of High-Tech Weapons for Europe," *Science* 223 (March 23, 1984): 1269-72. Back.

Note 31: There was, at the time, some controversy over why the Soviets had put the SS-20s into Eastern Europe. While some argued that it was done to take advantage of the escalatory gap, others pointed to the deployment as simply the arcane workings of the Soviet military-industrial complex, which had taken one stage off of an unsuccessful, solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile, thereby turning it into a working intermediate range one. The latter argument would, of course, have implied a state beset by bureaucratic conflict and inefficiency, rather than one bent on conquering the West. Back.

Note 32: It might be noted, in passing, that the eventual impacts of the SS-20s and Euromissiles were

greater at home than in enemy territory. The waves of protest against the missiles in the West were viewed with great alarm in many NATO capitals. In the East, the episode was the occasion of growing contacts between Western peace activists and Eastern dissidents which, in the long run, must have contributed to the revolutions of 1989 and 1991. See, e.g., David Meyer, "How the Cold War was Really Won: A View From Below," Prepared for the ISA Annual Meeting, March 19-23, 1991, Vancouver, BC. Back.

Note 33: This was, of course, a central reason for arguments made during the 1980s on behalf of a precise counterforce targeting policy against the Soviet Union as well as ballistic missile defense via the Strategic Defense Initiative. Back.

Note 34: Kull, "Nuclear Nonsense"; Kull, *Minds at War* . Back.

Note 35: See, e.g., David Rees, "Soviet Strategic Penetration in Africa," *Conflict Studies* no. 77 (Nov. 1977); W. Kaltefleiter, "The Resource War: The Need for a Western Strategy," *Comparative Strategy* 4, no. 1 (1983): 31-49. Back.

Note 36: Quoted in R. Weston, *Strategic Materials--A World Survey* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenheld, 1984), p. 151. Back.

Note 37: Although experiences with temporary shortages in supplies of cobalt from Zaire in the late 1970s demonstrated a remarkable price elasticity where high-technology goods were concerned. Back.

Note 38: See Lipschutz, *When Nations Clash* ; Hans W. Maull, *Raw Materials, Energy and Western Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). Back.

Note 39: "Since the same political forces are promoting the rapid spread of education [as growth in the labor force], that unemployed person is likely to be a high school or college graduate and therefore especially dangerous to political stability." Nathan Keyfitz, "The Growing Human Population," in: Scientific American, *Managing Planet Earth* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1989), p. 52. Back.

Note 40: The whole notion of "global transformation" is one that cuts two ways. Economic integration is thought to be the major effect, in that flows of capital, loci of production, and changes in the deployment of labor are happening "everywhere." What is less noted are the cultural effects of this process, which seem to involve social and political fragmentation. See, for example, Mike Featherstone, ed. *Global Culture* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1990); Stephen Gill, "Reflections on Global Order and Sociohistorical Time," *Alternatives* 16 (1991): 275-314. Back.

Note 41: I have in mind here the kinds of pressures that arise when governments, in trying to make their systems of production more competitive, are urged to eliminate budget deficits and entitlements. Back.

Note 42: In many cases, of course, governments are refusing to deliver services, for ideological as well as budgetary reasons, but I would argue that this refusal is not just domestically generated; see below and Herman Schwartz, "Can Orthodox Stabilization and Adjustment Work?" *International Organization* 45, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 221-56. For the Soviet case, many of these points can be found in Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Soviet reform and the end of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 225-50. Jeff Frieden argues, however, that industrialized country governments are not nearly so much at the mercy of international economic forces

as is often supposed; see "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1991): 425-52. Back.

Note 43: John G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, pp. 195-232, in: Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). Back.

Note 44: The project is impossible to realize because capitalism is premised on spatial differences in the costs of various factors of production; the "level playing field" is therefore something of a delusion. Back.

Note 45: William S. Lind, "Defending Western Culture," *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991): 40-50; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. Back.

Note 46: Paul Krugmann, *Peddling Prosperity* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994). Back.

Note 47: These thoughts are based on a paper by Timothy Luke, "Sovereignty, States and Security: New World Order or Neo-World Orders?" prepared for this project but not included in this volume. Back.

On Security

On Security, by Ronnie D. Lipschutz

2. The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard*

James Der Derian

Decentering Security

The rapidity of change in the international system, as well as the inability of international theory to make sense of that change, raises this question: Of what value is security? More specifically, just how secure is this preeminent concept of international relations? This evaluation of security invokes interpretive strategies to ask epistemological, ontological, and political questions--questions that all too often are ignored, subordinated, or displaced by the technically biased, narrowly framed question of *what* it takes to achieve security. The goal, then, of this inquiry is to make philosophically problematic that which has been practically axiomatic in international relations. The first step is to ask whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values.

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted.

We have inherited an *ontotheology* of security, that is, an *a priori* argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified."[1] From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference.

Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of *everything* --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability."[2]

One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from *latino* small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite.

There are also prodromal efforts to shore up the center of the International Relations discipline. In a newly instituted series in the *International Studies Quarterly* , the state of security studies is surveyed so as to refortify its borders.[3] After acknowledging that "the boundaries of intellectual disciplines are permeable," the author proceeds not only to raise the drawbridge but also to caulk every chink in the moat.[4] Recent attempts to broaden the concept of "security" to include such issues as global environmental dangers, disease, and economic and natural disasters endanger the field by threatening "to destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems."[5] The field is surveyed in the most narrow and parochial way: out of 200-plus works cited, esteemed Third World scholars of strategic studies receive no mention, British and French scholars receive short shrift, and Soviet writers do not make it into the Pantheon at all.

The author of the essay, Stephen Walt, has written one of the better books on alliance systems;[6] here he seems intent on constructing a new alliance within the discipline against "foreign" others, with the "postmodernist" as arch-alien. The tactic is familiar: like many of the neoconservatives who have launched the recent attacks on "political correctness," the "liberals" of international relations make it a habit to base their criticisms on secondary accounts of a category of thinking rather than on a primary engagement with the specific (and often differing) views of the thinkers themselves.[7] In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' "[8] By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control.

What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, *other than us* ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities.

The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to

make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought."[9] Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security:

> I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word *alternative* . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.[10]

The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference.

A Genealogy of the Concept

In traditional realist representations of world politics as the struggle for power among states, the will to security is born out of a primal fear, a natural estrangement and a condition of anarchy which diplomacy, international law and the balance of power seek, yet ultimately fail, to mediate.[11] By considering some historical meanings of security that exceed this prevailing view, I wish to suggest "new" possibilities and intelligibilities for security. Admittedly, this brief genealogy is thin on analysis and thick on description. But my intention is to provoke discussion, and to suggest that there is more than a speculative basis for the acceptance of a concept of security that is less coherent and dogmatic, and more open to the historical complexity and contingent nature of international relations.

In its earlier use, "security" traveled down a double-track and, then, somewhere at the turn of the nineteenth century, one track went underground. Conventionally understood, security refers to a condition of being protected, free from danger, safety. This meaning prevailed in the great power diplomacy of the modern states-system. In 1704, the *Act of Security* was passed by the Scottish Parliament, which forbade the ascension of Queen Anne's successor to the throne of Scotland unless the independence of the Scottish kingdom was "secured."[12] In 1781, Gibbon conveyed a specifically geopolitical meaning when he wrote in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* that "the emperor and his court enjoyed . . . the security of the marshes and fortifications of Ravenna."[13] Coeval, however, with the evolution of security as a preferred condition of safety was a different connotation, of security as a condition of false or misplaced confidence in one's position. In *Macbeth* , Shakespeare wrote that "Security is Mortals cheefest Enemie."[14] In a 1774 letter, Edmund Burke impugned "The supineness, neglect, and blind security of my friend, in that, and every thing that concerns him."[15] And, as late as 1858, the *Saturday Review* reported that "Every government knew exactly when there was reason for alarm, and when there was excuse for security."[16]

Clearly, the unproblematical essence that is often attached to the term today does not stand up to even a cursory investigation. From its origins, security has had contested meanings, indeed, even contradictory ones. Certainly, the tension of definition is inherent in the elusiveness of the phenomenon it seeks to describe, as well as in the efforts of various users to fix and attach meanings for their own ends. Yet there is something else operating at the discursive level: I believe there is a talismanic *sign* to security that seeks to provide what the *property* of security cannot. The clue is in the numerous citations from sermons found in the *Oxford English Dictionary* . They all use security to convey the second sense, that is, a careless, hubristic, even damnable overconfidence. The excerpts range in dates from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century: "They . . . were drowned in sinneful security" (1575); "This is a Reflection which

. . . should strike Terror and Amazement into the securest Sinner" (1729); one, claiming that "It is an imaginary immortality which encloses him in sevenfold security, even while he stands upon its very last edge"(1876).[17]

Mediating between these two senses of security lies a third. In the face of a danger, a debt, or an obligation of some kind, one seeks a security, in the form of a pledge, a bond, a surety. From the 1828 *Webster* : "Violent and dangerous men are obliged to give security for their good behavior, or for keeping the peace."[18] In Markby's *Elementary Law* (1874), the word is given a precise financial meaning: "I shall also use the word security to express any transaction between the debtor and creditor by which the performance of such a service (one capable of being represented in money) is secured."[19] A security could also be "represented" in person. Shakespeare again, from *Henry IV* : "He said, sir, you should procure him better Assurance, the Bardole: he wold not take his Bond and yours, he lik'd not the Security."[20]

Hobbes and Epistemic Realism

> Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.
>
> --Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*[1]

For his representation of security, Hobbes preferred the axiomatic style of Euclid and the historical reasoning of Thucydides to the poetic excess of Shakespeare. Both Hobbes and Shakespeare contributed interpretations that exceeded and outlived their contemporary political contexts and historical emulations.[21] However (and unfortunately), since Hobbes rather than Shakespeare enjoys a paradigmatic status in international relations, a short overview of his foundational ideas on realism and security is needed.

In chapter 10 of the *Leviathan* , Hobbes opens with the proposition that "The Power of a Man . . . is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good."[22] Harmless enough, it would seem, until this power is put into relation with other men seeking future goods. Conflict inevitably follows, "because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another."[23] A man's power comes to rest on his *eminence* , the margin of power that he is able to exercise over others. The classic formulation follows in chapter 11: "So that in the first place, I put a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."[24]

The implications for interpersonal and interstate relations are obvious. Without a common power to constrain this perpetual struggle there can be no common law: "And Convenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."[25] In the state of nature there exists a fundamental imbalance between man's needs and his capacity to satisfy them--with the most basic need being security from a violent and sudden death. To avoid injury from one another and from foreign invasion, men "conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that man reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, into one Will."[26] The constitution of the Leviathan, the sovereign

state, provides for a domestic peace, but at a price. Hobbes's solution for civil war displaces the disposition for a "warre of every man against every man" to the international arena.[27] Out of fear, for gain, or in the pursuit of glory, states will go to war because they can. Like men in the precontractual state of nature, they seek the margin of power that will secure their right of self-preservation--and run up against states acting out of similar needs and desires.

In these passages we can discern the ontotheological foundations of an epistemic realism, in the sense of an ethico-political imperative embedded in the nature of things.[28] The sovereign state and territoriality become the necessary effects of anarchy, contingency, disorder that are assumed to exist *independent* of and *prior* to any rational or linguistic conception of them. In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological: that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity. The irony, perhaps even tragedy, is that by constituting the first science of security, Hobbes made a singular contribution to the eventual subversion of the metaphysical foundations of solidarity.

Marx and Social Realism

> Of course, the measure of the power that I gain for my object over yours needs your recognition in order to become a real power. But our mutual recognition of the mutual power of our objects is a battle in which he conquers who has the more energy, strength, insight and dexterity. If I have enough physical strength I plunder you directly. If the kingdom of physical strength no longer holds sway then we seek to deceive each other, the more dextrous beats the less.
>
> --Karl Marx, Notes on James Mill's *Elements of Political Economy*

Marx took probably the most devastating--and certainly the most politically influential--shot at the metaphysics of Hobbesian security. I will avoid the obvious gesture of recounting how Marx put Hegel--and with him the state--back on material footing, and instead focus on Marx's early polemic against the universalist guise of the state, "On the Jewish Question."[29]

In the essay, Marx traces the split between civil society and the state to the spread of secularized traditions of Judaism and Christianity. In an essentialist if not racialist manner, Marx locates the earliest "spirit of capitalism" in the Judaic practices of usury and the "chimerical nationality of the Jew . . . of the trader and above all the financier."[30] He attributes to it a powerfully corrosive effect that sunders Christianity's universalist spirit into the "spirit of *civil society* , of the sphere of egoism, of the *bellum omnium contra omes* ." The "war of all against all" is not the residue of an imagined state of nature, but the universalization of the "capitalist spirit" of Judaism "under the reign of Christianity," which "dissolves the human world into a world of atomistic, mutually hostile individuals." Like Hobbes, Marx is a realist in that he acknowledges a universal struggle for power; and he is clearly indebted to Hobbes for his nominalist demythologization of power.

But Marx goes one step further, identifying the source of the Leviathan's power not in a free association of alienated power, but in "the separation of man from man . . . the practical application of the right of liberty is the right of private property." The desire for security, then, does not emerge from some external state of nature: "rather, security is the guarantee of the egoism of civil society." It is not a Hobbesian fear or self-interest that gives rise to security; it is money, as "the alienated essence of man's labour and life, this alien essence dominates him as he worships it." This elevation of the egoistic partiality to a metaphysical universality conceals the real divisions created by alienated labor. Not the Leviathan but Mammon binds together society: "The god of the Jews has been secularized and has become the god of the world." The state takes on this universalist identity, becoming the "mediator to which man transfers all his unholiness and all his *human freedom* ."

In Marx, alienation gives rise to a struggle for power which necessitates the security of a state, whereas, in Hobbes, alienation is a consequence of the struggle for power. Moreover, in Marx the power struggle is not a permanent condition: it is historically and class specific, and once the contradiction between a social production of wealth and the private exercise of power comes to its dialectical resolution, the state would become obsolescent--and with it the security dilemma. For Hobbes, the struggle for power is permanent and universal; hence the state is unlikely to wither away. Moreover, it is improbable that a supra-state Leviathan could be constructed: "In states and commonwealths not dependent on one another, every commonwealth has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge most conducive to their benefits."[31] Marx sees this extra-territorial liberty to be as chimerical as Hobbes's domestic version. Just as the power of partial economic interests dominates the whole of civil society through the abstract universality of the state, Marx considered interstate politics to be the "serf" of a "universal" financial power hiding a narrow class interest.[32]

Nietzsche and Interpretive Realism

> In the last analysis, "love of the neighbor" is always something secondary, partly conventional and arbitrary--illusory in relation to *fear of the neighbor* . After the structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems secure against external dangers, it is this fear of the neighbor that again creates new perspectives of moral valuation.
>
> --Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future.[33] Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here.

One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In *Beyond Good and Evil* , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of

self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results."[34]

The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual *desire* for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for *only* power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a *positive* will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is *essentially* appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages."[35] Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war."[36] But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear.

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In *The Gay Science* , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the *instinct of fear* that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?"[37]

The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in *The Twilight of the Idols* :

> The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a *particular kind of cause* --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most *habitual* explanations.[38]

A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences."[39]

The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of *security* such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god."[40] For Nietzsche, of

course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the *psychology of error* : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of *believing* something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes."[41]

Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In *The Genealogy of Morals* , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors:

The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe *exists* --and that one has to *pay them back* with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a *debt* that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength.[42]

Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for

The ancestors of the *most powerful* tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a *god* .[43]

As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling

> One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man *outside* , the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts.[44]

The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago.

This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security:

> - My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. *Then* : by donation and cession.[45]

The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and

evaluation."[46] Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of *Daybreak* in a series of rhetorical questions:

> Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own *fearsomeness* , not also diminished?[47]

It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In *The Genealogy of Morals* , he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "*rhathymia* "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security."[48]

It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

Baudrillard and Hyperrealism

> Like the real, warfare will no longer have any place--except precisely if the nuclear powers are successful in de-escalation and manage to define new spaces for warfare. If military power, at the cost of de-escalating this marvelously practical madness to the second power, reestablishes a setting for warfare, a confined space that is in fact human, then weapons will regain their use value and their exchange value: it will again be possible *to exchange warfare*
>
> --Jean Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies*

Fine allegories, Baudrillard would say of Marx and Nietzsche. Nietzsche's efforts to represent the deeper impulses behind the will to security, as well as Marx's effort to chart the origins of the struggle for power, to pierce the veil of false consciousness that has postponed revolution, to scientifically represent the world-to-be, are just examples of a representational mirroring, a doubling of late-modernity's cartography of the world-as-it-is. "For it is with the same Imperialism," says Baudrillard, "that present-day simulators try to make the real, all the real coincide with their simulation models."[49]

Baudrillard goes beyond Nietzsche in his interpretation of the death of god and the inability of rational man or the proletariat to fill the resulting value-void with stable distinctions between the real and the apparent, idea and referent, good and evil. In the hyperbolic, often nihilistic, vision of Baudrillard, the task of modernity is no longer to demystify or disenchant illusion--as Nietzsche realized, "*with the real*

world we have also abolished the apparent "[50]--but to save the reality principle, which in this case means, above all else, the sovereign state acting in an anarchical order to maintain and if possible expand its security and power in the face of penetrating, de-centering forces, like the ICBM, global capital, military (and now civilian) surveillance satellites, the international or domestic terrorist, the telecommunications web, environmental movements and transnational human rights conventions, to name a few of the more obvious forces. In his now familiar words: "It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real."[51]

The idea that reality is blurring, or has already disappeared into its representational form, has a long lineage. It can be traced from Siegfried Kracauer's chronicling of the emergence of a "cult of distraction" in the Weimar Republic,[52] to Walter Benjamin's incisive warning of the loss of authenticity, aura, and uniqueness in the technical reproduction of reality,[53] to Guy Debord's claim that, in modern conditions, spectacles accumulate and representations proliferate[54] and, finally, to Jean Baudrillard's own notification that the simulated now precedes and engenders a hyperreality where origins are forgotten and historical references lost.[55] In his post-Marxist work, Baudrillard describes how the class struggle and the commodity form dissolved into a universal play of signs, simulacra, and the inertia of mass culture--and the revolution went missing along with the rest of reality. We are at end-times: but where Marx saw a relentless, dialectical linearity in capitalism leading to social revolution, Baudrillard sees only a passive population depending on the virtuality of technology to save a defunct reality principle.

War serves as the *ultima ratio* of all four thinkers. The Gulf War, and the postwar attempt to set up a "new world order," provide rich material for Baudrillard's thesis that security has now entered the realm of hyperreality. Back in 1983, when Baudrillard wrote of the renewed possibility of an "exchange of warfare," he had already spotted the dark side to a possible end of the ultimate simulation of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence. And if ever a war was "engendered and preceded by simulation," it was the Gulf War. We were primed for this war. Simulations had infiltrated every area of our lives, in the form of news (re)creations, video games, flight simulators, police interrogations, crime reenactments and, of course, media war games.[56] From the initial deployment of troops to the daily order of battle, from the highest reaches of policymaking to the lowest levels of field tactics and supply, a series of simulations made the killing more efficient, more unreal, more acceptable.[57] Computer-simulated by private contractors, flight-tested at the Nellis Air Force Base, field-exercised at Fort Irwin in the Mojave Desert, and re-played and fine-tuned everyday in the Persian Gulf, real-time war games took on a life of their own as the real war took the lives of more than 100,000 Iraqis.

But there is also evidence that simulations played a critical role in the decision to go to war. In an interview, General Norman Schwarzkopf revealed that, two years before the war, U.S. intelligence discovered, in his words, that Iraq "had run computer simulations and war games for the invasion of Kuwait."[58] In my own research, I learned that Iraq had previously purchased a wargame from the Washington military-consulting firm BDM International to use in its war against Iran; and almost as an aside, it was reported in September 1990, on *ABC Nightline* , that the software for the Kuwait invasion simulation was also purchased from a U.S. firm.[59] Moreover, Schwarzkopf stated that he programmed "possible conflicts with Iraq on computers almost daily." Having previously served in Tampa, Florida as head of the U.S. Central Command--at the time a "paper" army without troops, tanks, or aircraft of its own--his affinity for simulations was and is unsurprising.

In fact, Schwarzkopf sponsored a highly significant computer-simulated command-post exercise that was

played, in late July 1990, under the code-name of "Exercise Internal Look `90." According to a Central Command news release issued at the time, "command and control elements from all branches of the military will be responding to real-world scenarios similar to those they might be expected to confront within the Central Command AOR consisting of the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia." The war game specialist who put Exercise Internal Look together, Lt. General Yeosock, moved from fighting "real-world scenarios" in Florida to command of all ground troops--except for the special forces under Schwarzkopf--in Saudi Arabia.

Perhaps it is too absurd to believe that the Gulf War was the product of one U.S. wargame designed to fight another wargame bought by Iraq from an American company. Perhaps not. My purpose is not to conduct an internal critique of the simulation industry, nor to claim some privileged grounds for ascertaining the causes of the war.[60] Rather, my intent is to ask whether, in the construction of a realm of meaning that had minimal contact with historically specific events or actors, simulations demonstrated the power to construct the reality they purport to represent-- and international security suffered for it. The question is whether simulations can create a new world order where actors act, things happen, and the consequences have no origins except the artificial cyberspace of the simulations themselves.[61]

Indeed, over the last decade there has been a profusion of signs that a *simulation syndrome* has taken hold in international politics. According to Oleg Gordievsky, former KGB station chief in London, the Soviet leadership became convinced in November 1983 that a NATO command-post simulation called "Able Archer `83" was, in fact, the first step toward a nuclear surprise attack.[62] Relations were already tense after the September shootdown of KAL 007--a flight that the Soviets considered part of an intelligence-gathering mission--and since the Warsaw Pact had its own wargame, which used a training exercise as cover for a surprise attack, the Soviets assumed the West to have one as well. No NATO nuclear forces went on actual alert, yet the KGB reported the opposite to Moscow. On November 8 or 9, flash messages were sent to all Soviet embassies in Europe, warning them of NATO preparations for a nuclear first strike. Things calmed down when the Able Archer exercise ended without the feared nuclear strike, but Gordievsky still maintains that only the Cuban missile crisis brought the world closer to the brink of nuclear war.

On a smaller, more conventional scale, the mistaking of war for its simulation was repeated in July 1988, when the radar operator and the tactical information coordinator of the *U.S.S. Vincennes* misidentified an Iranian Airbus as an attacking Iranian F-14, even though the ship's highly sophisticated Aegis radar system registered an unknown airplane flying level at 12,000 feet. The nine months of simulation training with computer tapes that preceded the encounter proved more real than the reality of the moment. In effect, the Airbus disappeared before the surface-to-air missile struck, transmuted from an airplane with 290 civilians into an electronic representation on a radar screen and, then, into a simulated target.

The Gulf War is the preeminent, but probably not the last, case of a simulation syndrome manifesting itself in the discourse of national security. Baudrillard was right, in the sense that simulations would rule not only in the war without warring of nuclear deterrence, but also in the postwar warring of the present.[63] It was never in question that the coalition forces would win the military conflict. But they did not win a "war," in the conventional sense of a destroying a reciprocating enemy. What "war," then, did the U.S. win? A cyberwar of simulations. First, the prewar simulation, Operation Internal Look `90, which defeated the "Made in America" Iraqi simulation for the invasion of Kuwait. Second, the war game of AirLand Battle, which defeated an Iraqi army that resembled the game's intended enemy, the

Warsaw Pact, in hyperreality only. Third, the war of spectacle, which defeated the spectacle of war on the battlefield of videographic reproduction. And fourth, the postwar after-simulation of Vietnam, which defeated an earlier defeat by assimilating Vietnam's history and lessons into the victory of the Gulf War.

Perhaps Baudrillard's *and* Marx's worst scenarios have come true: the post-Cold War security state now has the technology of simulation as well as the ideological advantage of unipolarity to regenerate, at relatively low cost to itself, an ailing national economy and identity through foreign adventures. We should expect, then, endo- as well as exo-colonial wars, trade wars and simulated wars to figure in the new world order. Iraq served its purpose well as the enemy "other" that helped to redefine the Western identity: but it was the *other* enemy, the more pervasive and elusive threat posed by the de-territorialization of the state and the disintegration of a bipolar order that has left us with a "Gulf War Syndrome," in which the construction and destruction of the enemy other is measured in time, not territory; prosecuted in the field of perception, not politics; authenticated by technical reproduction, not material referents; and played out in the method and metaphor of gaming, not the history and horror of warring.

Not a conclusion but a provocation

> People in the newly sovereign republics of the former Soviet Union report greater fear and insecurity than they felt before they became independent. . . . Indeed, the data show that the greatest perceived threats are closest to home, with most of those asked more fearful of their neighbors than anyone else, reflecting the lingering unease among ethnic groups living side by side in the former republics."
>
> --"Many in the Former Soviet Lands Say They Feel Even More Insecure Now," Bruce Weber, *New York Times* , April 23, 1992.

If security is to have any significance for the future, it must find a home in the new disorder through a commensurate deterritorialization of theory. We can no longer reconstitute a single Hobbesian site of meaning or reconstruct some Marxist or even neo-Kantian cosmopolitan community; that would require a moment of enlightened universal certainty that crumbled long before the Berlin Wall fell. Nor can we depend on or believe in some spiritual, dialectical or scientific process to overcome or transcend the domestic and international divisions, ambiguities, and uncertainties that mark the age of speed, surveillance and simulation.

This is why I believe the philosophical depth of Nietzsche has more to offer than the hyperbolic flash of Baudrillard. Can we not interpret our own foreign policy in the light of Nietzsche's critique of security? As was the case with the origins of an ontotheological security, did not our debt to the Founding Fathers grow "to monstrous dimensions" with our "sacrifices"--many noble, some not--in two World Wars? Did not our collective identity, once isolationist, neutralist and patriotic, become transfigured into a new god, that was born and fearful of a nuclear, internationalist, interventionist power? The evidence is in the reconceptualization: as distance, oceans and borders became less of a protective barrier to alien identities, and a new international economy required penetration into other worlds, *national interest* became too weak a semantic guide. We found a stronger one in *national security* , as embodied and institutionalized in the National Security Act of 1947, as protected by the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, and as reconstructed by the first, and subsequent National Security Council meetings of the second, cold war.

Nietzsche speaks a credible truth to increasingly incredible regimes. He points toward a way in which we might live with and recognize the very necessity of difference. He recognizes the need to assert

heterogeneity against the homogenizing and often brutalizing forces of progress. And he eschews all utopian schemes to take us out of the "real" world for a practical strategy to celebrate, rather than exacerbate, the anxiety, insecurity and fear of a new world order where radical otherness is ubiquitous and indomitable.

Note *: This essay is a revision of a paper presented at the 1991 British International Studies Association Meeting in Warwick, England, and at the 1991-92 series of workshops on "Security and the Nation-State" held in Santa Cruz, California. An earlier version was published in Mick Dillon & David Campbell, eds., The Political Subject of Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). I would like to thank Ronnie Lipschutz, Beverly Crawford, Mick Dillon, David Campbell and all of the participants who offered comments at those occasions, and Bret Brown who provided valuable research assistance. Back.

Note 1: J. Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Science," A. Bass, trans., *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 279. Back.

Note 2: The same mantra has since been repeated by President Clinton. Back.

Note 3: Stephen M. Walt, `The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 211-239. Back.

Note 4: Walt, "Renaissance," p. 212. Back.

Note 5: Walt, "Renaissance," p. 213. Back.

Note 6: Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Back.

Note 7: The political theorist William Connolly has also noted this tendency among international relations theorists, and refers to it as the "strategy of condemnation through refraction." See William E. Connolly, *Identity\Difference--Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 49-63. Back.

Note 8: Walt, "Renaissance," p. 223. Back.

Note 9: M. Heidegger, "The Question concerning Technology" (David Krell, ed.), *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 317. Back.

Note 10: M. Foucault, "On the genealogy of ethics," interview by P. Rabinow and H. Dreyfus, *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 343. Back.

Note 11: See J. Der Derian, chapter 4 on "Mytho-diplomacy," pp. 47-68 and chapter 7 on "Anti-diplomacy," pp. 134-67, in: *On Diplomacy--A Geneology of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). Back.

Note 12: See *Oxford English Dictionary* , vol. 9, p. 370. Back.

Note 13: Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1781), xxxi, III, p. 229, quoted in *OED* , vol. 9, p. 370. Back.

Note 14: William Shakespeare, *Macbeth* (1605), III, v. 32, quoted in *OED* , vol. 9, p. 370. Back.

Note 15: E. Burke, *Letter to Marq. Rockingh.* , quoted in *OED* , vol. 9, p. 370. Back.

Note 16: *Saturday Review* (17 July 1858), p. 51, quoted in *OED* , vol. 9, p. 370. Back.

Note 17: *OED* , vol. 9, p. 370. Back.

Note 18: Ibid. Back.

Note 19: Ibid. Back.

Note 20: Ibid. Back.

Note 21: See S. Greenblatt, *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Back.

Note 22: Thomas Hobbes (C. B. Macpherson, ed.), *Leviathan* (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1968). Back.

Note 23: Thomas Hobbes (F. Tonnies, ed.), Elements of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), p. 26. Back.

Note 24: Hobbes, *Leviathan* . Back.

Note 25: Ibid., p. 223. Back.

Note 26: Ibid., p. 227. Back.

Note 27: Ibid., p. 188. Back.

Note 28: For a theoretical exposition of the ontotheological character of "epistemic realism," see Connolly, *Identity\Difference* , pp. 70-71; and William Connolly, "Democracy and Territoriality," *Millennium* (Winter 1991): 474 and 483*n* . See also David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). Back.

Note 29: A fuller account of this essay can be found in Der Derian, *On Diplomacy* , pp. 138-141. Back.

Note 30: K. Marx, "On the Jewish Question" (L. Easton & K. Guddat, eds.), *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 216-248. Back.

Note 31: Hobbes, *Leviathan* , p. 64. Back.

Note 32: Marx, "On the Jewish Question," p. 245. Back.

Note 33: This echoes an interpretation first presented by Gilles Deleuze in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), which inspires much of my analysis of Nietzsche on fear and security. Back.

Note 34: . Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* , no. 13. Back.

Note 35: *Beyond Good and Evil* , no. 259. Back.

Note 36: *Will to Power* , no. 53. In an equally significant passage, which links social valuation and biology, Nietzsche warns against interpreting particular legal institutions as anything more than temporary, life-restricting constructs. That is, to the extent that the legal order is "thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the struggle between power complexes, but as a means of *preventing* all struggle in general" it must be seen as hostile to life. (*On the Genealogy of Morals* , II, no. 11) Back.

Note 37: F. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* , no. 355. Back.

Note 38: Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols* , no. 5. Back.

Note 39: Nietzsche, *Will to Power* , no. 576. On the flip side of this influence of timidity, as man has over time overcome particular fears, the now rational, causal object or instance now gives pleasure precisely because it used to inspire fear. Therefore Nietzsche contends that the "feeling for nature" is possible now due to our previous invocation of mystical meaning and intention. See also *Daybreak* , no. 142. Back.

Note 40: *Will to Power* , no. 917 Back.

Note 41: *Twilight of the Idols* , "The Four Great Errors," no. 6 Back.

Note 42: F. Nietzsche (W. Kaufmann, ed. and trans.), *On the Genealogy of Morals* (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 88-89. See also Der Derian, *On Diplomacy* , pp. 53-56, for a fuller account of how the reciprocity of this relationship between the living and the dead is projected as a mytho-diplomatic mediation between alien peoples. Back.

Note 43: Ibid. Back.

Note 44: *Genealogy of Morals* , II, no. 9 Back.

Note 45: *Daybreak* , no. 112. Bret Brown pointed out to me the connection that Nancy Love makes between Nietzsche and Marx on the relationship of rights to security in *Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): "Marx says, `*security* is the supreme social concept of civil society, the concept of *police* , the concept that the whole of society is there only to guarantee each of its members the conservation of his person, his rights and his property.' Nietzsche says, `How much or how little is dangerous to the community, dangerous to equality...now constitutes the moral perspective.' They agree that freedom is oppression and equality is inequality, so security is insecurity. Again from different perspectives, they argue that liberal democracy secures an alienated existence." (p.157) Back.

Note 46: *Daybreak* no. 57. Back.

Note 47: Ibid., no. 551. Back.

Note 48: *Genealogy of Morals* , I, 11. Back.

Note 49: J. Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), p. 2. Back.

Note 50: See F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols* , pp. 40-41; and Der Derian, "Techno-diplomacy,"

Chapter 9, of *On Diplomacy* , pp. 199-200. Back.

Note 51: Baudrillard, *Simulations* , p. 48. Back.

Note 52: See F. Kracauer, "Cult of Distraction: On Berlin's Picture Palaces," (T. Y. Levin, trans.), *New German Critique* , 40 (Winter 1987): 95; and S. Kracauer, *Das Ornament der Masse* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1963); S. Kracauer (T. Y. Levin, trans. and ed.), *The Mass Ornament* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). Back.

Note 53: See Walter Benjamin (H. Arendt, ed.), "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," *Illuminations* (New York: Schocken, 1969), pp. 241-42. Back.

Note 54: See Guy Debord, *Society of the Spectacle* (Detroit: Black and Red, 1983), no. 1, 45pp. 1 and 23. In a more recent work, Debord persuasively--and somewhat despairingly--argues that the society of the spectacle retains its representational power in current times: see *Commentaires sur la Société du Spectacle* (Paris: Editions Gerard Lebovici, 1988). Back.

Note 55: Baudrillard, *Simulations* , p. 2. Back.

Note 56: Whether it took the form of representing criminality on "America's Most Wanted," where alleged crimes are re-enacted for the public benefit, or docu-dramatizing espionage on ABC primetime news, with a stand-in for the alleged spy Felix Bloch handing over a briefcase to a KGB stand-in, a genre of truthful simulations had already been established. There are as well the many commercially available war simulations. To name a few: from Navy simulations there is *Harpoon* , *Das Boot Submarine* , *Wolf Pack* , and *Silent Service II* ; from the Air Force, *Secret Weapons of the Luftwaffe* , *F-19 Stealth Fighter* , *A-10 Tank Killer* , and *F-15 Strike Eagle* ; and for those seeking more serious global simulations, *Populous* , *Balance of Power* , *SimCity* , and *Global Dilemma* . On the heels of the Gulf War, wargames like *Arabian Nightmare* (in which the player has the option to kill American reporters like Ted Koppel) and the *Butcher of Baghdad* were added to the list. Back.

Note 57: Simulations in this context could be broadly defined here as *the continuation of war by means of verisimilitude* , which range from analytical games that use broad descriptions and a minimum of mathematical abstraction to make generalizations about the behavior of actors, to computerized models that use algorithms and high resolution graphics to analyze and represent the amount of technical detail considered necessary to predict events and the behavior of actors. Back.

Note 58: See J. Albright, "Army mastermind stays ahead of the `game'," *Atlanta Constitution* , October 25, 1990, p. 1. Back.

Note 59: See T. Allen, *War Games* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987), p 4; and "ABC Nightline" transcript, September 26, 1990, p. 3. Back.

Note 60: Two excellent criticisms of the internal assumptions of gaming can be found in a review of the literature by R. Ashley, "The eye of power: the politics of world modeling," *International Organization* 37, no. 3 (Summer 1983); and R. Hurwitz, "Strategic and Social Fictions in the Prisoner's Dilemma," pp. 113-34, in: Michael Shapiro and James Der Derian, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989). Back.

Note 61: This is not to suggest that the 500,000+ troops in Kuwait were not real; rather, to point out that their being there might well have been a consequence of a "reality" constructed out of the imagined scenarios created within the computer war games. Back.

Note 62: C. Andrews and O. Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 583-605; and conversation with Gordievsky, 7-9 November 1991, Toronto, Canada. Back.

Note 63: The art of deterrence, prohibiting political war, favors the upsurge, not of conflicts, but of "*acts of war without war* ." Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer (Mark Polizotti, trans.), *Pure War* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), p. 27. See also Timothy Luke, "What's Wrong with Deterrence? A Semiotic Interpretation of National Security Policy," pp. 207-230, in: Shapiro and Der Derian, *International/Intertextual Relations* . Back.

On Security

3. Securitization and Desecuritization

Ole Wæver

During the mid-1980s, observers frequently noticed that the concept of security had been subjected to little reflection in comparison with how much and how strongly it had been used. Only a few years later, conceptual reflections on the concept of security have become so common that it is almost embarrassing to, once again, discuss or re-conceptualize *security* . Nonetheless, in this chapter I present one possible perspective on security, and assess its implications in terms of four different security agendas. My primary aim here is not to provide a detailed discussion of this new approach--a more detailed exposition can be found elsewhere[1]--but to illustrate the contrast between this perspective and more traditional approaches, which I intend to bring out via conceptual discussion and by addressing selected "security debates."

I could begin by expressing a certain discontent with the "traditional progressive" or "established radical" ways of dealing with the concept and agenda of security. The traditional progressive approach is: 1) to accept two basic premises of the established discourse, first that security is a reality prior to language, is out there (irrespective of whether the conception is "objective" or "subjective," is measured in terms of threat or fear), and second the more security, the better; and 2) to argue why security should encompass *more* than is currently the case, including not only "xx" but also "yy," where the latter is environment, welfare, immigration and refugees, etc. With this approach, one accepts the core meaning of "security" as uncontested, pushing instead in the direction of securitizing still larger areas of social life.

Still, in the final analysis, is it all to the good that problems such as environmental degradation be addressed in terms of security? After all, in spite of all the changes of the last few years, security, as with any other concept, carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape. At the heart of the concept we still find something to do with defense and the state. As a result, addressing an issue in security terms still evokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing it. This is not always an improvement.

Why not turn this procedure upside down? In place of accepting implicitly the meaning of "security" as given and then attempting to broaden its coverage, why not try instead to put a mark on the concept *itself* , by entering into and through its core? This means changing the tradition by taking it seriously rather than criticizing it from the outside.[2] I begin by considering security as a concept and a word. Next, I discuss security as a *speech act* . In the third part of the essay, I describe four cases of *securitization* and *de-securitization* . Finally, I ask whether we might not want to use "security" as it is classically understood, after all.

Security: The Concept and the Word

During the 1980s we witnessed a general move to broaden the security agenda.[3] One approach was to

move from a strict focus on the security of the *state* (national security) toward a broader or alternative focus on the security of *people* , either as individuals or as a global or international collectivity. The security of individuals can be affected in numerous ways; indeed, economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political rights are germane more often than military issues in this respect. The major problem with such an approach is deciding where to stop, since the concept of security otherwise becomes a synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable. How, then, can we get any clear sense of the specific character of *security* issues, as distinct from other problems that beset the human condition? To what extent can we apply any of the methods and lessons of security studies to this broadened agenda?

Johan Galtung and Jan Øberg have formulated an alternative concept of security, based on four sets of positive goals related to human needs: survival, development, freedom, and identity. Within this framework, security becomes "the combined defence policy for each need category, the totality of defence endeavours of the entire human-societal organization."[4] The result is a holistic program for world society and its development, welfare, and so on. This is a wholly legitimate approach, of course, but does it impinge at all on *security* debates? Certainly, the central actors and theorists in the field do not feel affected or threatened by this framework.[5] Moreover, there is no basic logic to this wider conception of security except for the corrective/mirror image of the traditional concept. And, in addition, the baseline in the Galtung/Øberg conception is the individual level. Security is then linked to all other goals, since they are all generated from the individual level: the individual has various needs and can be hurt by threats to these needs, and this makes everything a potential security problem. At least three, interrelated problems follow: First, the concept of security becomes all-inclusive and is thereby emptied of content; second, the lack of explicit attention to the connotative core of classical security makes the Galtung/Øberg approach an innocent contributor to the reproduction--and even expansion--of securitization; and, third, there is a lack of political effect on "security," as traditionally defined.

Widening along the *referent object* axis--that is, saying that "security is not only military defense of the state, it is also x and y and z"--has the unfortunate effect of expanding the security realm endlessly, until it encompasses the whole social and political agenda. This is not, however, just an unhappy coincidence or a temporary lack of clear thinking. The problem is that, as concepts, *neither individual security nor international security exist* . National security, that is, the security of the state, is the name of an ongoing debate, a tradition, an established set of practices and, as such, the concept has a rather formalized referent; conversely, the "security" of whomever/whatever is a very unclear idea. There is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of "security" in non-state terms; it is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any meaning. An abstract idea of "security" is a nonanalytical term bearing little relation to the *concept* of security implied by national or state security.

To the extent that we have an idea of a specific modality labelled "security" it is *because* we think of national security and its modifications and limitations, and not because we think of the everyday word "security." The discourse on "alternative security" makes meaningful statements not by drawing primarily on the register of everyday security but through its contrast with national security. Books and articles such as Jan Øberg's *At Sikre Udvikling og Udvikle Sikkerhed* , Richard H. Ullman's "Redefining Security," and Jessica Tuchman Mathews's "Redefining Security" are, consequently, abundant with "not only," "also" and "more than" arguments.[6] This reveals that they have no generic concept of the meaning of security--only the one uncritically borrowed from the traditional view, and multiplied and extended to

new fields. Thus, it seems reasonable to be conservative along this axis, accepting that "security" is influenced in important ways by *dynamics* at the level of individuals and the global system, but not by propagating unclear terms such as individual security and global security. The *concept* of security refers to the state.

The first edition of Barry Buzan's *People, States and Fear* (1983) failed to make clear how this problem might be handled. There was an obvious tension between the title of the book and its subtitle, *The National Security Problem in International Relations* . The three levels of analysis--individual, state and international system--were central to Buzan's argument, although national security remained, in some sense, privileged. Still, was it Buzan's intention to make a "triple-decker" out of the concept of security, or was he simply providing a contextualization of national security? This point has been clarified in the second edition of the book (1991), where Buzan argues that the state level *is* privileged even as national security cannot be comprehended at the state level alone. What national security links to at the other levels is not primarily individual security and international security, but dynamics and political processes of various kinds at these other levels.[7]

Buzan has shown powerfully that national security can neither be sufficiently understood nor realistically achieved from a perspective limited to one's own state. National security is fundamentally dependent on international dynamics (especially *regional* ones), but this is not the same as a relationship between national security and international *security* . Therefore, as indicated in Figure 3.1, I do not locate security at three levels but at the *center* of the hourglass image.

"Security," in other words, has to be read through the lens of *national* security.

Of course, "security" has an everyday meaning (being secure, safe, not threatened). Quite separate from this, though, the term "security" has acquired a number of connotations, assumptions, and images derived from the "international" discussion of national security, security policy, and the like. But, in these discussions, the conceptualization of security has little to do with application of the everyday meaning to an object (nation or state), followed by an examination as to when the state is secure (as if "security" possessed an independent, stable, context-free meaning that could be added to another stable, independently defined object, the state).



Figure 3.1 Hourglass model of security.

Rather, the label "security" has become the indicator of a specific problematique, a specific *field of practice* . Security is, in historical terms, the field where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on. Security,

moreover, has not been a constant field; it has evolved and, since World War II, has been transformed into a rather coherent and recognizable field. In this process of continuous, gradual transformation, the strong military identification of earlier times has been diminished--it is, in a sense, always there, but more and more often in metaphorical form, as other wars, other challenges--while the images of "challenges to sovereignty" and defense have remained central.

If we want to rethink or reconstruct the concept of security, therefore, it is necessary that we keep an eye on the entire field of practice. This is contrary to the now-standard debates on "redefining security," inasmuch as those who want radically to rethink the concept generally tend to cancel out the specific field. The concept is thus reduced to its everyday sense, which is only a semantic *identity* , not the *concept* of security. Of course, both choices are completely legitimate, but this question of language politics depends ultimately on what we wish to accomplish. If our intent is to determine when we are secure, the investigation can address many levels. If, however, we want to add something new to ongoing debates on "security" (in strategic studies) and national interests, we must begin with *those* debates, taking on that problematique, so that we can get at the specific dynamics of that field, and show how these old elements operate in new ways and new places.

The specificity, in other words, is to be found in the *field* and in certain typical *operations* within the field (speech acts--"security"--and modalities--threat-defense sequences), not in a clearly definable objective ("security") or a specific state of affairs ("security"). Beginning from the modality of specific types of interactions in a specific social arena, we can rethink the concept "security" in a way that is true to the classical discussion. By working from the inside of the classical discussion, we can take the concepts of national security, threat, and sovereignty, and show how, on the collective level, they take on new forms under new conditions. We can then strip the classical discussion of its preoccupation with military matters by applying the *same* logic to other sectors, and we can de-link the discussion from the state by applying similar moves to *society* (as I shall show, below). With this, we maintain a mode of thinking, a set of rules and codes from the field of "security" as it has evolved and continues to evolve.

To start instead from being secure in the everyday sense means that we to the now-standard debend up approaching security policy from the *outside* , that is, via another language game. My premise here is, therefore, that we can identify a specific field of social interaction, with a specific set of actions and codes, known by a set of agents as the security field. In international society, for example, a number of codes, rules, and understandings have been established that make international relations an intersubjectively defined social reality possessing its own specific laws and issues.[8] National security is similarly social in the sense of being constituted intersubjectively in a specific field,[9] and it should not be measured against some real or true yardstick of "security" derived from (contemporary) domestic society.

An alternative route to a wider concept of security is to broaden the security agenda to include threats other than military ones. When widening takes place along this axis, it is possible to retain the specific quality characterizing security problems: Urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political "we" from dealing with any other questions. With this approach, it is possible that any sector, at any particular time, might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities, and defense. Historically, of course, the military sector has been most important.[10]

Strategic studies often focused on the military aspects of security, whereas the realists and neorealists of International Relations seldom a priori defined military threats as primary. Indeed, Morgenthau, Aron,

and many others took the position that, to ensure its security, a state would make its own choices according to expediency and effectiveness, and these might not always involve military means. A state would make threats in the sector in which the best options were available. A response (security policy, defense) would often, but not always, have to be made in the same sector, depending on whether one sector might overpower another, and military means simply were often the strongest available. Logically speaking, the means to security should be secondary to the ends--that is, a conflict and the political decisions involved, as Clausewitz pointed out--and, thus, it has seemed a viable strategy to expand security in terms of *sectors* while keeping the state focus. Indeed, this is not only an academic option, it is also, to a large degree, what has taken place in political discourse, as the name of the field has through this century changed from war to defense to "security."

Still, what ties all of this together as security? When Buzan moves from his discussion of security in military terms to security in the political, economic, ecological, and societal sectors, the logic clearly says that security begins as a military field that is increasingly challenged by these new sectors. The question remains, however: What made the military sector conspicuous, and what now qualifies the others to almost equal status? While Buzan does not squarely address this question, he does hint at an answer. Military threats have been primary in the past because they emerged "very swiftly" and with "a sense of outrage at unfair play"; if defeated, a state would find itself laid bare to imposition of the conqueror's will.[11] Such outcomes used to characterize the military sector. But, if the same overturning of the political order can be accomplished by economic or political methods, these, too, will constitute security problems.[12]

From the discussion above, it follows that the basic definition of a security problem is something that can undercut the political order within a state and thereby "alter the premises for all other questions." As Buzan shows, the literature largely treats security as "freedom from threat," both objectively and subjectively.[13] Threats seen as relevant are, for the most part, those that effect the self-determination and sovereignty of the unit. *Survival* [14] might sound overly dramatic but it is, in fact, the survival of the unit *as* a basic political unit--a sovereign state--that is the key. Those issues with this undercutting potential must therefore be addressed prior to all others because, if they are not, the state will cease to exist as a sovereign unit and all other questions will become irrelevant. This, then, provides us with a test point, and shows what is lost if we "de-compose" the state by individualizing security. With the approach I have suggested here, even if challenges can operate on the different components of the state, they must still pass through one focus: Do the challenges determine whether the state is to be or not to be?[15]

When a specific issue is turned into a test case, everything becomes concentrated at one point, since the outcome of the test will frame all future questions. This logic is spelled out most clearly, perhaps, by Clausewitz, who shows that, although politics has to be prior to military, the logic of war--the *ziel* of war, victory--replaces the logic of politics--the specific *zweck* . To enter a war is a political decision, but once in, one has to play according to the grammar of *war* , not politics, which would mean playing less well and losing the political aim, as well. Rousseau put it thus: "War is not, therefore, a relation of man to man but a relation of state to state, in which individuals are enemies only by accident, not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers, not as members of the homeland, but as its defenders."[16] Rousseau's argument is presented here in terms of literal war, but the observation applies to "metaphorical war" that is, to other "tests of will and strength."[17]

The inner logic of war follows from its basic character as an *unconstrained* situation, in which the

combatants each try to function at maximum efficiency in relation to a clearly defined aim. During war, a state is confronted with a test of *will* --testing whether it is still a sovereign unit--in which the ability to fend off a challenge is *the* criterion for forcing the others to acknowledge its sovereignty and identity as a state.[18] It is, in fact, not the particular means (military) that define a situation as war, it is the structure of the "game." Logically speaking, therefore, it is a coincidence that military means have traditionally been the *ultimo ratio* .

The basic logic of Clausewitz's argument thus follows from the situation of an ultimate test: what then is logically to be done? "War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme."[19] The loser is forced to submit, and the outcome is defined in polar terms: victory-defeat. From this, it follows that the first logic for each party is: "Throw forward all forces" (therefore the inherent tendency for escalation in war); subsequently, various specific mechanisms intervene to modify this injunction.

War, then, is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will"[20] and, therefore, "War, insofar as it is a social act, presupposes the conflicting wills of politically organized collectivities."[21] It is in this struggle for recognition (Hegel) that states establish their identity as states. Nonetheless, this struggle can take place in spheres other than the military one; the priority of military means is a contingent, technical feature. Consequently, the logic of war--of challenge-resistance(defense)-escalation-recognition/defeat--could be replayed metaphorically and extended to other sectors. When this happens, however, the structure of the game is still derived from the most classical of classical cases: war.

From *Alternative Security* to *Security, the Speech Act*

Reading the theoretical literature on security, one is often left without a good answer to a simple question: What really makes something a security problem? As I have suggested above, security problems are developments that threaten the sovereignty or independence of a state in a particularly rapid or dramatic fashion, and deprive it of the capacity to manage by itself. This, in turn, undercuts the political order. Such a threat must therefore be met with the mobilization of the maximum effort.

Operationally, however, this means: *In naming a certain development a security problem, the "state" can claim a special right* , one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. Trying to press the kind of unwanted fundamental political change on a ruling elite is similar to playing a game in which one's opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of *securitization* of an issue to gain control over it. By definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so:

> And because the End of this Institution [the Leviathan, the Sovereign], is the Peace and Defense of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defense; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same.[22]

Thus, that those who administer this order can easily use it for specific, self-serving purposes is something that cannot easily be avoided.

What then *is* security? With the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a *speech act* . In

this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).[23] By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.[24]

The clearest illustration of this phenomenon--on which I will elaborate below--occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, where "order" was clearly, systematically, and institutionally linked to the survival of the system and its elites. Thinking about change in East-West relations and/or in Eastern Europe throughout this period meant, therefore, trying to bring about change without generating a "securitization" response by elites, which would have provided the pretext for acting against those who had overstepped the boundaries of the permitted.

Consequently, to ensure that this mechanism would not be triggered, actors had to keep their challenges below a certain threshold and/or through the political process--whether national or international--have the threshold negotiated upward. As Egbert Jahn put it, the task was to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on. As part of this exercise, a crucial political and theoretical issue became the definition of "intervention" or "interference in domestic affairs," whereby change-oriented agents tried, through international law, diplomacy, and various kinds of politics, to raise the threshold and make more interaction possible.

Through this process, two things became very clear. First, the *word* "security" is the *act* ; the utterance is the primary reality. Second, the most radical and transformational perspective--which nonetheless remained realist--was one of minimizing "security" by narrowing the field to which the security act was applied (as with the European détente policies of the 1970s and 1980s). After a certain point, the process took a different form and the aim became to create a speech act *failure* (as in Eastern Europe in 1989). Thus, the trick was and is to move from a positive to a negative meaning: Security *is* the conservative mechanism--but we want less security!

Under the circumstances then existing in Eastern Europe, the power holders had among their instruments the speech act "security." The use of this speech act had the effect of raising a specific challenge to a principled level, thereby implying that all necessary means would be used to block that challenge. And, because such a threat would be defined as existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state would not be limited in what it could or might do. Under these circumstances, a problem would become a *security* issue whenever so defined by the power holders. Unless or until this operation were to be brought to the point of failure--which nuclear conditions made rather difficult to imagine[25]--available avenues of change would take the form of *negotiated limitations* on the use of the "speech act security." Improved conditions would, consequently, hinge on a process implying "less security, more politics!"

To put this point another way, *security* and *insecurity* do not constitute a binary opposition. "Security" signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security problem *and* some measure taken in response. Insecurity is a situation with a security problem and *no* response. Both conditions share the security problematique. When there is no security problem, we do not conceptualize our situation in terms of security; instead, security is simply an irrelevant concern. The statement, then, that security is always relative, and one never lives in complete security, has the additional meaning that, if one has such complete security, one does not label it "security." It therefore never appears. Consequently, transcending a security problem by politicizing it cannot happen *through* thematization in security terms, only *away*

from such terms.

An agenda of *minimizing* security in this sense cannot be based on a classical critical approach to security, whereby the concept is critiqued and then thrown away or redefined according to the wishes of the analyst. The essential operation can only be touched by faithfully working *with* the classical meaning of the concept and what is already inherent in it. The language game of security is, in other words, a *jus necessitatis* for threatened elites, and this it must remain.

Such an affirmative reading, not at all aimed at rejecting the concept, may be a more serious challenge to the established discourse than a critical one, for it recognizes that a conservative approach to security is an intrinsic element in the logic of both our national and international political organizing principles. By taking seriously this "unfounded" concept of security, it is possible to raise a new agenda of security and politics. This further implies moving from a positive to a negative agenda, in the sense that the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization can never be captured so long as we proceed along the normal critical track that assumes security to be a positive value to be maximized.

That elites frequently present their interests in "national security" dress is, of course, often pointed out by observers, usually accompanied by a denial of elites' right to do so. Their actions are then labelled something else, for example, "class interests," which seems to imply that authentic security is, somehow, definable independent of elites, by direct reference to the "people." This is, in a word, wrong. All such attempts to define people's "objective interests" have failed. Security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites. All of this can be analyzed, if we simply give up the assumption that security is, necessarily, a *positive* phenomenon.

Critics normally address the *what* or *who* that threatens, or the *whom* to be secured; they never ask whether a phenomenon *should* be treated in terms of security because they do not look into "securityness" as such, asking what is particular to security, in contrast to non-security, modes of dealing with particular issues. By working with the assumption that security is a goal to be maximized, critics eliminate other, potentially more useful ways of conceptualizing the problems being addressed. This is, as I suggested above, because security:insecurity are not binary opposites. As soon as a more nominalist approach is adapted, the absurdity of working toward maximizing "security" becomes clear.

Viewing the security debate at present, one often gets the impression of the object playing around with the subjects, the field toying with the researchers. The problematique itself locks people into talking in terms of "security," and this reinforces the hold of security on our thinking, even if our approach is a critical one. We do not find much work aimed at *de-securitizing* politics which, I suspect, would be more effective than securitizing problems.

Securitization and De-securitization: Four Cases

From the discussion above, it follows that a major focus of "security studies" should be the *processes* of securitization and de-securitization: When, why and how elites label issues and developments as "security" problems; when, why and how they succeed and fail in such endeavors; what attempts are made by other groups to put securitization on the agenda; and whether we we can point to efforts to keep issues *off* the security agenda, or even to de-securitize issues that have become securitized?

Below, I explore these questions in the context of four different security agendas. First, I look at European security between 1960 and 1990, the period of change and détente, which provided the

framework for developing the speech act interpretation of security. During this period, the main issue was whether political and social change could be de-securitized even as the basic political structure of the region was kept frozen with major help of the security instrument. How much could be de-securitized and how was a major question, as is why and how change suddenly took on a new and different character in 1989. In the second part, I deal with a very different case: Environmental security. Here we see not an instance of de-securitizing an essentially securitized field but, rather, the potential advantages and disadvantages of securitizing a new area that, perhaps, should be addressed via other thematizations. In the third part, I take up the issue of societal security. This topic is presented in a fashion somewhat parallel to the preceding one, but I also ask the following: *If* we start using the concept of societal security in order to understand certain new dynamics, especially in post-Cold War Europe, what differences are there between a traditional, alternative security approach as opposed to a speech act approach to security? In the final part, I analyze the major new attempts to apply the concept of "security" in Europe, with particular reference to the notion of "European security."

Change and Détente: European Security 1960-1990

A peculiar feature of the Cold War system in Europe was the almost total exclusion of unwanted change, a guaranteed stability of the status quo. Raymond Aron once described it as a "slowdown of history" (but then went on to discuss the iron law of change that would ultimately upset this strange situation).[26] Security became the means whereby this slowdown was effected. The speech act "security" is, of course, more than just a word, since one must have in hand the means to block a development deemed threatening. For example, if a foreign army walks across the border or tries to intimidate a country, it is necessary (but not sufficient) to have adequate military strength to resist; or if social unrest, caused from within or without, is the problem, one must have a sufficiently repressive apparatus, ideological cohesion in the core group that allows the apparatus to be mobilized, and the legitimacy to use it that avoids the escalation of public opposition.

For a long time the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was such that, where nonmilitary issues were concerned, it was always possible for the regime to control things--*in extremis* , with the help of friends with tanks. In Cold War Europe, moreover, military threats could also be fenced off because of the general nuclear condition. As the late Franz Josef Strauss once put it: "In the present European situation there is no possibility of changes through war, but neither through revolution or civil war."[27] Change seemed impossible without some consent by the power-holders; it had to take place through a negotiated process of pressure and acceptance, stabilization and destabilization. And so it happened.

The central issue of the debates on European détente--and the mechanism that actually worked in them--was the *logic of change through stabilization* . In particular, as Willy Brandt explained, German *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik* were very explicit about the necessity of "stabilizing the status quo in order to overcome the status quo." Only by removing some threats to, and thereby some excuses for, the regimes in the East, would it then become possible to push back the securitization of East-West relations and change domestic conditions in Eastern Europe.

At the same time, the field of human rights evolved into an attempt to develop new *rules of the game* in the nonmilitary arena. "Human rights" became the label for a specific political struggle/negotiation over the border between security and politics, intervention and interaction. This theme generated a great deal of controversy in the mid-1980s, especially where efforts by West German Social Democrats (SPD) to revive détente were concerned.[28]

Through all of this, East-West relations were marked by a basic asymmetry, because internal legitimacy made Western society much more stable. In Buzan's terms, states in the West were strong, in the East, weak.[29] This contrast generated a specific and clearly discernible constellation of security concepts and practices: Since the West could not be destabilized from within--especially as the decline of Eurocommunism eliminated this fear--security concerns became focused on the "high politics" of military threats and, possibly, skillful diplomatic maneuvering by the Soviets.[30] The states of the East, in contrast, were fearful of "threats" from below; they regarded almost all societal interaction with the West as potentially dangerous and destabilizing. Accordingly, the concept of security became highly militarized in the West, while in the East it was broadened to incorporate economic security and various types of interference in domestic affairs.

A key political question thus became the definition of "normal" transnational politics, as opposed to intervention, which was deemed to be a security problem. A great deal of the East-West dialogue of the 1970s and 1980s, especially that on "non-military aspects of security," human rights, and the whole Third basket of the Helsinki Accords, could be regarded as a discussion of where to place boundaries on a concept of security: To what degree were Eastern regimes "permitted" to use extraordinary instruments to limit societal East-West exchange and interaction?

By turning threats into challenges and security into politics, the détente-oriented actors of the West tried to get elites in the East to avoid applying the term "security" to issues and to open up domestic space for more open political struggle. Even though this strategy did not ultimately prove instrumental to the change in East-West relations in 1989, it is certainly arguable that it did play an important role in a process of softening that allowed another form of change to take place. Détente, as negotiated desecuritization and limitation of the use of the security speech act, contributed to the modification of the Eastern societies and systems that eventually made possible, via sudden desecuritization through a speech-act failure, the radical changes of 1989.

Many observers noted that the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe came about not as regimes slowly gave way to forces gaining more and more control from the periphery but, rather, as a collapse from the center. Some have tried to attribute this sudden loss of legitimacy to the dismal economic performances of the 1980s. This was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the collapse, inasmuch as the regimes had been lacking in legitimacy for a very long time. The new feature in 1989 was the loss of support *within* the elites, which some characterized as a sudden loss of self-confidence by the regimes themselves.[31] In other words, to explain the change, we must look *within* elites, and the ways in which the question of legitimacy among elites translated into the capacity to act.[32] An important part of an order-maintaining action occurs by sustaining a shared worldview within some minimum inner-circle. In earlier cases of adjusting course, when it was necessary to overcome a crisis or repress a revolt, the question of worldview did not arise. The old leader was sacrificed and the new one regained elite support by calling for the restoration of order. Something was said in this act, of course, but the decisive question was not the truth of the act, per se. Rather, the truth was given by the act being said from a specific position, thereby regenerating a loyal elite following, (re)installing the truth, and reimposing the center's will on the majority.[33] In this system of myth-making, there was an almost infinite capacity for reappraisal through auxiliary hypotheses. That capacity was not, however, infinite and it ultimately became more and more difficult to regenerate the truth, especially in the face of continued economic failures.[34] When the final crisis came, no one wanted to take on the task of "calling to order" and no one wanted to take the place at the center from which the call to order would come.

This inside-to-outside collapse can be seen as a speech act failure: The performance of the security act and reinstallation of truth suddenly failed to work. In retrospect, this should not have come as a surprise to the speech act analyst of European security, although it did. As I noted in early 1989 (without drawing the logical conclusion):

> In a way, the most interesting about a speech act is that it might fail. And this is an essential part of its meaning. . . . In our context this is clearly the case: the invocation of "security" is only possible because it invokes the image of what would happen if it did not work. And not only this (. . .): the security speech act is only a problematic and thereby political move because it has a price. The securitizer is raising the stakes and investing some (real) risk of losing (general) sovereignty in order to fence of a specific challenge. In the present [post-structuralist] usage of speech act theory the *meaning* of the particular speech act is thus *equally* constituted by its possible success and its possible failure--one is not primary and the other derived.[35]

As a result, the security mechanism, having lost its internal functioning, suddenly disappeared from the European scene and, for a time, it became extremely difficult to argue for any acts or policies in West or East by making reference to either national or European "security."

Subsequently, it became possible to discern some options for establishing a new European point of reference for security, especially around the process of German unification. A general feeling of mutual fear of losing control of the process led to mutual self-control, as each major actor tried to take into account the concerns of the others. Each developed surprisingly similar "blueprints,"[36] using the stability of Europe as the point of "self-evident" reference, and each of which demanded a certain degree of self-control called "security."[37] The core element of this need for self-control was the assumption (or fear) that German unification, and reactions to it, might become explosive.

With unification, internationally sanctioned through the "2 plus 4" agreement, in place, however, the urgency and focus of the situation was lost. Subsequently, the general theme of European security analysis and policy statements has focused on the unbearable openness of the situation. So much of the unexpected had taken place that no possible development could now be excluded. Moorings had been lost. Metaphors of architecture and insistent talk of institutions revealed a longing for fixity, for structures, for predictability. In this situation it was believed, moreover, no institutions should be terminated, even if they seemed no longer necessary; indeed, there emerged a widespread assumption that there existed a *deficit* of institutions and structures, and too much instability and unpredictability. The implicit agenda of "security" became, as a result, the closing off of options! I will discuss further attempts to establish "security" in Europe, below.

Environmental Security

In recent years, presentation of environmental degradation as a security problem has become increasingly common. Environmental activists are not the only ones to use this slogan; the security establishment seems to have become more receptive to the idea, as well. But does it make sense? I would argue "no," if we follow the logic laid out above.

During the 1980s, any idea about "nonmilitary aspects of security" was guaranteed to generate establishment suspicions. The following sequence of reasoning seemed, with some justification, threatening to security elites: (1) security is a broad concept and, therefore, many things are threatening in security terms; (2) in the light of a broader perspective, there exists a biased distribution of resources toward military concerns; and (3) this bias is relevant only for a limited portion of security threats as

defined in this broader sense.[38] Acquiescing to such a broadening, and admitting the biased allocation of resources, would quite obviously be seen by elites as a threat to their prerogatives in the security realm.

Following the events of 1989, however, security establishments began to embrace the idea of such alternatives as a means of maintaining their own societal relevance, as well as providing jobs to "security studies" and "strategic studies" analysts. For example, in late 1989, a special issue of *Survival* , the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which has always been a good indicator of mainstream, Western security thinking, addressed "Nonmilitary Aspects of Strategy." Articles in the journal addressed the panoply or possibilities of threats--economy, environment, migration, and drugs[39]--in a search for new security problems to replace the old ones. Notions about environmental security also emerged at the political level, as when James Baker, Secretary of State in the Bush Administration, named environmental problems as "threats to the security of our citizens,"[40] and in the Brundtland Commission's report, *Our Common Future* , which used explicitly the concept of "environmental security."

Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of environmental or ecological security[41] is its mobilization potential. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magnitude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprecedented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of signalling bias idanger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to persist in the environmental debates."[42] Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very reasons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for example, by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional.[43] This, by itself, does not make the threats any less *serious* , although it does take them out of the realm of *will* . As I pointed out earlier, the field of security is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert *its* will in defense of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environmental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it.

Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that *defense* from the problem is to be provided by the state:

> The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environmental problems, particularly those that have a global character.[44]

Moss goes on to warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to global environmental problems."[45] It might, he points out, even lead to militarization of environmental problems.[46]

A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of *us-them* , which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the `nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and `us *vs* . them' thinking (. . .) Of course, taking the war and `us *vs* . them' thinking out of nationalism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of `rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that `rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."[47] The tendency toward "us *vs* . them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems.[48]

Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which *is* , even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism.[49] Certainly, there is some risk that the *logic* of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to totalitarian projects, where also the *science* of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.[50]

These observations point back toward a more general question: Is it a good idea to frame as many problems as possible in terms of security? Does not such a strategy present the negative prospect of, in a metaphorical sense, militarizing our thinking and seeing problems in terms of threat-vulnerability-defense, when there are good reasons for not treating them according to this formula?[51] Use of the slogan "environmental security" is tempting, because it is an effective way of dramatizing environmental problems. In the longer run, however, the practices resulting from the slogan might lead to an inappropriate social construction of the environment, as a threat/defense problem. We might find it more constructive, instead, to thematize the problem in terms of an economy-ecology nexus, where decisions are actually interlinked.[52]

Use of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem *is* a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special way. When a problem is "securitized," the act tends to lead to specific ways of addressing it: Threat, defense, and often state-centered solutions. This, of course, leaves the environmental agenda, with its labelling problem, unresolved. One alternative is to view the emerging values of environmentalism as establishing their own moral basis. As his basis for optimism, for example, Buzan suggests that such values are already emerging as new norms of international society.[53] Deudney, more lyrically, talks about ecological awareness being linked to "a powerful set of values and symbols" that "draw upon basic human desires and aspirations," and argues that this, and not regressive security logic, should be the basis for mobilization.[54]

Buzan, Moss and others who have analyzed the concept "environmental security," and its use, recommend that environmental problems be treated as part of the economic field. "The security label is

one solution," according to Buzan, but he tends to prefer the other path: To "identify environmental issues as part of the economic agenda," which has

> the advantage of setting the issue at the heart of the action that is most relevant to it. There might, in the long run, be more advantage to making producers, consumers, taxmen and economists factor environmental costs into their accounting activities, than to arming the state with emergency powers derived from an analogy with war. It might be argued that process-type threats are better met by the process-type remedies of economics, than by the statist solutions of security logic.[55]

Societal Security

Over the last few years, an interest in the concept of "societal security" has developed, especially in Europe. If the societal sector is securitized in an unsophisticated way, however, the result could be used to legitimize reactionary arguments for, on the one hand, defining immigrants and refugees as security problems and, on the other, presenting European integration as a national security threat. Conversely, "societal security" could end as an absurd attempt to tell people who feel insecure that they really should not.

More systematically, what does the term "societal security" suggest in light of the three perspectives I have so far discussed: Traditional state centric, critical wider security concepts, and the speech act approach? First, in the traditional state-centric perspective, "societal security" could come to mean making the state secure against *society* , against the types of situations in which a state might be destabilized as its society disintegrates or turns against it. For a society that lacks a state, or is a minority within a state, moreover, *its* strengthening could be seen by the state as such a security problem.

Second, the conventional-critical approach of broadening the concept of security is likely to become locked into debate about whether, for example, immigrants and refugees really do pose a security problem to the state. A discourse on societal security might then be captured by neo-nazis who argue "we are only defending *our* societal security," or end up as a pedagogical project trying to convince people that, although they feel threatened, there really is no security problem.

Finally, the approach I have proposed above points toward a study of the mechanisms leading to securitization of certain issues related to identity, especially when and how these problems are handled, *by society* , in security terms. Such an approach implies that we have to take seriously concerns about identity, but have also to study the specific and often problematic effects of their being framed as *security* issues. We also have to look at the possibilities of handling some of these problems in nonsecurity terms, that is, to take on the problems, but leave them unsecuritized. This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize *themselves* as security agents that are under threat. This process of social construction can be studied, and the security quality of the phenomenon understood, without thereby actually legitimizing it. With the "as much security as possible" approach, this is hard to handle: one will have either to denounce such issues as not being security phenomena ("misperceptions"), or one will be pulled into the process as co-securitizer.

What, then, can a term such as "societal security" mean? The security of societies is closely related to, but nonetheless distinct from, political security. Political security has to do with the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy. In today's world, the boundaries of state and society are rarely coterminous. The key to society, therefore, involves those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social

group. Society is about *identity* , the *self-conception* of communities, and those individuals who identify themselves as *members* of a particular community. "Society" should basically be conceived of as both *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* , but thereby, to some degree, necessarily more than the sum of the parts (that is, not reducible to individuals).[56] Our analysis of societal security thus builds on a Durkheimian conception of society as a distinctive, *sui generis* phenomenon.[57]

It has become fairly common to talk about various sectors (or the like) within the field of security, but the concept almost always poses the state as the *referent object* . This, I have suggested above, leads to "societal security" being understood as the security of a state vis-à-vis its constituent societies, which is not what we want. My colleagues and I have therefore suggested a reconceptualization of the security field in terms of a duality of *state* security and *societal* security. State security has *sovereignty* as its ultimate criterion, and societal security has *identity* . Both usages imply survival. A state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live *as itself* .[58] There are, then, at the collective level between individual and totality, two organizing centers for the concept of security: state and society. At a secondary level, in the way portrayed in figure 3.1, there are also the "individual" and "international" levels, which influence national, or state, and societal security, as well (see figure 3.2).

The deeper cause of this emerging duality may well be a tendency toward the dissolution of the modern state system, as political authority is dispersed across multiple levels. This process begins to undermine the exclusive, sovereign, *territorial* state, as overlapping authorities begin to emerge.[59] In Europe, in particular, the coupling between state-nation is being weakened even in the absence of a new synthesis at the European level. No sovereign Euro-state will emerge any time soon but, at the same time, sovereign member states are beginning to lose some of their harder edges. This does not mean that nations will disappear, or even be weakened. The *territorial* state, however, with its principle of sovereignty, is being weakened. Left behind, we find nations with less state, cultures with less shell.

This development illuminates the increasing salience of "societal (in)security," that is, situations in which significant groups within a society feel threatened, feel their identity is endangered by immigration, integration, or cultural imperialism, and try to defend themselves. In the past, when a nation/culture felt itself threatened in these ways, it could call on "its" state to respond accordingly. This no longer seems possible, especially as border controls and various forms of economic policy move upward to the EU-European level. If such a development comes to be generally accepted, how are cultures to defend themselves? I would suggest that this will be done with culture. If one's identity seems threatened by internationalization or Europeanization, the answer is a strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, culture becomes security policy.



Figure 3.1 Modified hourglass model.

The case of Denmark is illuminating. During the past few years, viewers in Denmark have been treated to numerous television programs and seminars on "Danishness." These programs are not necessarily linked to an anti-European agenda or to the re-creation of a tight state-nation correspondence; rather, they represent a correlate of *acceptance* of integration into the European Union. It is the future and form of a Danish "non-state" nation within the EU that is at issue in the Danish EU-debate, and it has been the *cultural community* that has taken the first approach to these new themes, almost explicitly in terms of "cultural" security policy.

Several important questions regarding future developments in Europe follow from this example: First, will national identifications generally wane? Second, if they do not, in which of two possible directions will developments in cultural identity move? It is, on the one hand, possible that national identities might be revived in terms of non-state, cultural self-defense. This would help to support Europeanization of political structures, through the evolution of a European *political* identity, while leaving cultural identity at the national level (*Kulturnation* without *Staatnation*) On the other hand, it is also possible that cultural identity could be revived in the form of classical nation-state thinking, with classical concerns for state sovereignty, national autonomy, and self-expression at the cultural *and* political levels. Either might happen, although the former is the novel, challenging pattern.

With the process of European integration and the "culturalization" of nations proceeding, we can definitely see the emergence of societal security as something apart from state security. The state defends itself against threats to sovereignty and society defends itself against threats to identity. This dualism is not symmetrical. Society could, under some circumstances, choose to call upon the state for defense and collapse itself back into the old constellation. The integration scenario relates to a perspective whereby state security and societal security are increasingly differentiated as separate fields, each having a distinct referent object. If societies continue to take care of *their* security in *their* own way, this process of differentiation could continue. If, however, security concerns on the societal side escalate to the point of calling the state back in, we could see a retreat away from integration and back toward a Europe of distinct nation-states. So far, we have not elevated state and society to equal status but, rather, to separate status as referent objects of security. The long term importance of societal security in Europe is contingent on continuation of the process of integration, but the success of integration is also dependent on the separate security strategies of societies as distinct from those of the states.[60]

This brief summary shows how the concept of societal security could be used to capture the essential dynamics of European security. The concept is not, however, unproblematic. Analytically, as well as politically, it raises several thorny questions. One is that of voice: How does a society speak? Society is different from the state in that it does not have institutions of formal representation. Anyone can speak on behalf of society and claim that a security problem has appeared. Under what circumstances should such claims be taken seriously?

In thinking about this question, it is important to avoid notions of an undifferentiated society. In practical terms, it is not a society itself that speaks but, rather, institutions or actors in society. Normally and traditionally, according to liberal contract ideology, it is the state that has spoken about security in the name of a presumed homogeneous, amorphous society that it allegedly represents, with what is assumed to be a clear focus and voice. The notion of "societal security" might strongly imply that this homogeneous, amorphous society now speaks on its own behalf. But societies are, of course, highly differentiated, full of hierarchies and institutions, with some better placed than others to speak on behalf of "their" societies. But "society" never speaks, it is only there to be spoken for.

While such representations are made all the time--indeed, a large part of politics is about speaking in the name of society[61]--there is a difference between normal politics and speaking "security" in the name of society. We cannot predict who will voice "societal security" concerns; we can only see, with hindsight, how much legitimacy an actor *did* possess when s/he tried to speak on behalf of society. Various actors try this all the time, but the attempt becomes consequential on a different scale when society more or less actively backs up the groups speaking. This has sometimes been the case with neo-nazis in Germany, in contrast to ultra-leftist terrorist acts committed in the name of the people but without much, if any, public support.

Most often, there are no generally legitimized, uncontested representatives of society: There is the state or there is nothing.[62] This does not, of course, prevent groups from speaking on behalf of society and gaining some degree of backing for some period of time. Only in rare situations, as during the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia, do we see moments--almost seconds--of a kind of self-evident representation of "society" by some nonelected but generally accepted institution such as Civic Forum. It is much more common for a societal "voice" to be controversial and only partly accepted. Normally, the state has preempted or prevented societal actors from taking on this function,[63] but this is no longer necessarily the case, especially in the complex constellations evolving in Western Europe. There, we could begin to see a growing division of labor between state and society, as societal voices establish themselves as defenders of certain proclaimed identities, while the state continues to pursue the separate agenda of defending its sovereignty.

It is easy to envision potentially troubling effects if certain societal issues, such as migration, are securitized. Elizabeth Ferris illustrates how this has already happened in Europe, with the result that the previously dominant framings of immigration as a humanitarian or domestic economic issue are being crowded out by notions of security threats.[64] Dan Smith suggests that "if security policy is justified on essentially racist grounds, that will feed back to strengthen racist currents in society."[65]

Where Europeanization is concerned--if one favors European integration--it may be more advantageous to have such issues securitized in terms of *societal* security rather than state security. If, on the one hand, the "threat" from a new overarching identity is countered through a strengthening of state control over borders, the result will be to block integration and accelerate a renationalization of policies. If, on the

other hand, the challenge is taken on by society as something it should deal with *as the state is partly lifted to the European level* , a process of cultural "rearmament" of the nation may be compatible with political integration into Europe.

European Security After the Cold War

As suggested above in my discussion of European security during the Cold War, we could distinguish some tendencies toward installing new political limits by reference to European stability during 1989 and 1990 (especially in relation to the "German problem"). At that time, the risk was that the whole system might have become limitless, with the process falling to the hard realities of either external, superpower limits or the limits of national differentiation within Europe. The definition of European security would then have drifted until one of the major powers felt that overall developments had become intolerable. At that time, however, European thinking about security existed only in terms of *positive* programs, of increasing security for Europe. The result was various competing projects for Europe, each with a particular content that negated the other.[66] A purely negative limitation "for the sake of Europe" would not be more objective, but it would contain the possibility of being generalized. Without a new point of self-evidence, of a non-arguable reference point, it was feared by some that the system could end up testing the hard limits.

For more than forty years, "security" was the means for enforcing cohesion within the two halves of Europe. In the Western half, it defined the limits of loyalty/seriousness in relation to NATO, thereby regulating the state-to-state arrangement of the West. In the Eastern part, security was used to control domestic developments. After 1989, both of these functions were weakened, primarily and first in the East. "Security" then became the name for a possible handling of *Europe* , although, even today, this limit-defining function has not yet found a stable form. A good part of European politics since 1989 can thus be interpreted as attempts by "Europeans" to install a mechanism for disciplining each other and themselves, thereby reducing options.

The word-pair *European security* is an old one, but this should not lead us to overlook the important change in its meaning that took place during the 1980s. In 1987, Egbert Jahn pointed out that the term could have two very different meanings: *regional international security* or *Euronational security* .[67] Prior to that time, the term "European security" had, more often than not, meant something closer to the former, because in no meaningful way could one refer to the security of *Europe* except in the sense of the region being secure because a high proportion of its constituent security actors felt secure. Gradually during the 1980s, and in a much accelerated fashion after 1989, Europe as a whole became a referent object of security, and the second use of the term began to acquire greater salience. In some ways, the growing acceptance of this usage is paradoxical. With a referent object that is hardly constituted in political terms, and certainly not in institutional ones (except for largely administrative purposes), what can security discourse address? What is it that threatens Europe?

Balkanization is one possibility. James Der Derian has pointed out that the concept of Balkanization is a central one vis-à-vis Europe, and yet it is academically ignored: "Balkanization is generally understood to be the break-up of larger political units into smaller, mutually hostile states which are exploited or manipulated by more powerful neighbours."[68] Der Derian points out that, in the interwar years, competing users of the Balkanization slogan "shared epistemologies based on a closed structure of binary oppositions: for the Marxists, balkanization or federation, barbarism or socialism, nationalism or internationalism; for the Wilsonians, balkanization or confederation, despotism or liberal

constitutionalism, nationalism or cosmopolitanism."[69]

Balkanization is a tool for legitimizing an international order *without* a named enemy. A political/military order generally legitimizes itself through reference to an external threat (a method developed to perfection in the symmetry of the cold war). When order is not organized against a specific country, it must be based on a legitimizing principle that will help to define which specific developments are to be opposed (as was the case with the Concert of Europe, which stood against revolution and change in the status quo, and which calls to mind former President Bush's famous phrase about NATO being an alliance not against any particular country, but against the threat of uncertainty and instability). Using a metaphor of chaos and disintegration is a way of establishing order *as such* as an aim. Since 1990, the oft-used metaphor has been reinforced by events in the Balkans although, more recently, the use of the metaphor has diminished, as developments in post-Yugoslavia turned metaphor into painful reality.

Beneath the seeming agreement on the new dominant discourse, we actually find *two* major discourses about European security. First, there is the Bush argument that the new enemy is uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability. The chains of equivalence suggested here are:

Balkanization	<------vs------>	*st ability* =
change	<------vs------>	*continuit y* =
EU/Franco-German defense cooperation	<------vs------>	NATO

Given these equations, the fear of Balkanization becomes an argument against any change whatsoever: stick with NATO and don't rock the boat, so to speak. Attempts to organize defense cooperation in Western Europe are seen as upsetting the status quo, leaning toward the side of war and destabilization. In EU-discourse, the logic is:

fragmentation	<------vs------>	*in tegration* =
Balkanization	<------vs------>	*st ability* =
"Superpower"	<------vs------>	*EU responsibility* =
influence		*for security*

As indicated in the definition of Balkanization above, one traditional meaning implied that a region would be opened up to external influence; more important, however, is not just the focus on instability and change, but on *fragmentation* . This possibility, then, points to *integration* and centralization as the remedy.

Generally speaking, in EU-logic, the concept of integration is the master variable. Integration is itself considered a value,[70] and each specific option must demonstrate whether it will increase or decrease integration. More specifically, we can see in the literature on European security a symptomatic attempt to use neorealism (and/or American realist-federalizing logic of the *Federalist Papers*) to argue for the

stark choice between "fragmentation" and "integration."[71] This strategy might be seen as the new disciplining move: *"Europeans! You really have only two options--do not try to chose any other, they will be impossible. Do you want fragmentation or integration, Balkanization/re-nationalization or European Union?"*

Integration is, thus, increasingly driven by the specter of fragmentation[72] and, because the alternative is seen as inherently unacceptable, it becomes an aim in itself. Immediately following German unification, French President Mitterrand began to argue: We have to insist on the Europe of integration in order to avoid "the Europe of War."[73] "Security" thus became shorthand for the argument: We have to do everything to ensure that integration, and not fragmentation, is the outcome.

There is another interesting usage of security logic in the struggle over Europeanization. In several countries, the wider concept of security is being applied to the issue of *migration* as a strong pro-integration argument. While giving the Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture in 1991, Jacques Delors employed security as "an all embracing concept," and explicitly argued for further integration on this basis:

One thing leads to another. This has been a feature of the Community, which is constantly being taken into new areas. One of these new areas is closely linked to the overall concept of security. I am referring, of course, to the consequences of free movement for individuals and the need for joint action, or at the very least close co-ordination, to combat the various threats to personal security: organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism. . . . Political initiatives in this security-related area are another expression of solidarity, a *leitmotif* of the European pact. [74]

Here the *broad* , "progressive" concept of security is being exploited in order to build up the EU. With the fragmenting tendencies in Europe apparent since 1991--war in the Balkans; the ratification crisis over Maastricht; monetary turbulence--more classical security concerns have returned to dominate. The specter of new-old power rivalries becoming the future for the new-old continent is probably a main reason for security discourse increasingly concentrating on the integration/fragmentation theme.

Thus we see an emerging shared sense of what the agenda is about: Balkanization. If the code becomes strong enough, "security" will, once again, become a useful tool. Across the Atlantic, there are also two competing versions, but enough should be shared across the ocean to make it a politically empowered concept.[75] With the articulation of security as "European Security" then, we get a general strengthening of the image of disintegration *as such* as the threat.

In the *European* version of order/security, there is a statebuilding logic at play. Security is invoked in a sense that can be interpreted as a call to defend a not-yet-existing social order. Hobbesian anti-anarchy logic is being used at a level between the domestic and the international. "Security the speech act" is, at present, mainly a tool for "Europe." The separate units primarily engage in *societal security* . All of this could be seen as an indication that, at a deeper level, the Euro-state has arrived: *It* uses state security logic even as its constituent countries have begun to act as almost-stateless nations using the logic of societal security.

Security, Politics and Stability:
Or Why We Might Want "Security" After All

I have focused here on the issues of *securitization* and *de-securitization* , trying to demonstrate the importance of moving a theme or issue into the field of security, and thereby framing it as a "security issue." Throughout this essay I have tried to show the advantage of a nominalist, process perspective on the question, where the focus is on the constitution of security phenomena. This, I argue, avoids turning security into a thing.

The point of my argument, however, is not that to speak "security" means simply to talk in a higher-pitched voice. It is slightly more complex than that: "security" is a specific move that entails consequences which involve risking oneself and offering a specific issue as a test case. Doing this may have a price and, in that sense, it could be regarded as a way to "raise the bet."[76] The concrete issue is made principled, thereby risking principles (and order), but potentially controlling the concrete. The game has a whole inner logic to it and, when approaching it from some specific field, one should remain aware of the effects of having an issue codified in the language of security.

In the current European situation, security has, in some sense, become the name of the management problem, of governance in an extremely unstructured universe. We do not yet know the units--they have yet to be constructed through the discourse on security; we do not know the issues, and the threats--they are to be defined in the discourse on security; we only know the form: security. It might sound strange to say that we do not yet know the issues and threats when war has taken on still more brutal forms in Yugoslavia, with the possibility of European and American intervention having been raised now and again, when migration is discussed as a threat throughout Europe, and when German neo-nazis have attacked asylum seekers on this basis. To be sure, we may be aware of *some* of the events and processes that are likely to be part of the new security universe, but these are not yet fully conceptualized, and we do not know *in what form* they are going to enter this new security "system."

The point I wish to make here is that there is a widely shared, implicit assumption that limits and stability must be produced to at least some minimum degree. Some point has to become the political equivalent of the *transcendental signifié* --a point which is its own referent, endowed with the instruments (security) for reproducing itself. The *way* in which the mechanism of security is then inscribed in the new Europe will be a major factor in forming Europe's political system(s).

From a more Nietzschean perspective, I should also mention that politics always involves an element of exclusion, in which one has to do violence to the inherent openness of situations, to impose a pattern--and one has not only to remember but also to forget selectively.[77] To act politically means to take responsibility for leaving an impact, for forcing things in one direction instead of another. Whether such an act is "good" or "bad" is not defined by any inner qualities of the act or its premises, but by its effects (which depend on the actions of others, interaction and, therefore, an element of coincidence). As Hannah Arendt pointed out, "Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian."[78] Acting politically can, consequently, never be risk-free, and "progressiveness" is never guaranteed by one's political or philosophical attitude. Theoretical practices, as well as any political ones, have to risk their own respectability and leave traces, letting posterity tell the story about the *meaning* of an act. Post-structuralists have usually been arguing that their project is about opening up, implicitly arguing that a situation was too closed, too self-reproducing. Politics is inherently about closing off options, about forcing the stream of history in particular directions.[79]

In the present context, politics and responsibility can involve prevention and limitation and, at times, the tool of *securitization* may seem necessary. It is thus not impossible that a post-structuralist concerned

about risks of power rivalry and wars will end up supporting a (re)securitization of "Europe" through rhetorics such as that of integration/fragmentation. The purpose of this would be to impose limits, but it would have as a side-effect some elements of state-building linked to the EU project. This could therefore imply that *national communities* might have to engage in a certain degree of securitization of *identity questions* in order to handle the stress from Europeanization. Under such circumstances, there might emerge a complementarity between nations engaging in societal security and the new quasi-state engaging in "European security." Neither of these two moves are reflections of some objective "security" that is threatened; they are, instead, possible *speech acts* , moving issues into a security frame so as to achieve effects different from those that would ensue if handled in a nonsecurity mode.

Note 1: Ole Wæver "Security the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word," Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Working Paper no. 1989/19. Part of the sections entitled Security: "The Concept and the Word" and "From `Alternative Security' to `Security, the Speech Act' " as well as the subsection "Change and Détente: European Security 1960-1990" under "Securitization and De-securitization: Four Cases" are adapted (sometimes abbreviated, sometimes elaborated) from this working paper; the latter subsection, as well as the final one, "European Security After the Cold War," include ideas previously presented in the paper "The changing character of closing off optcontinuity: European Security Systems 1949, `69, `89, . . . ," presented in the panel on `European Change Revisited' at the annual conference of British International Studies Association, Canterbury, December 1989 and reprinted as Working Paper, 2/1990; the subsection "Societal Security" draws on my contributions to Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Morton Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993). Back.

Note 2: On the deconstructive strategy of such "post-structuralist realism," see Ole Wæver, "Tradition and Transgression: a post-Ashleyan position," in Nick Rengger and Mark Hoffman, eds., *Beyond the Interparadigm Debate* (Brighton, U.K.: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, forthcoming); Ole Wæver, "Beyond the `beyond' of critical international theory," paper for the (B)ISA conference, London March-April 1989 (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, Working Paper 1989/1.) Back.

Note 3: See, e.g., Jan Øberg, *At Sikre Udvikling og Udvikle Sikkerhed* (Copenhagen: Vindrose, 1983); Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre and Ole Wæver, *European Security: Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects* (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Papers of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1987); Barry Buzan *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, 2nd ed.); Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre & Elzbieta Tromer, eds., *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Confrontation* (London: Macmillan, 1989). Back.

Note 4: Øberg, *At Sikre Udvikling* ; see also Johan Galtung, "The Changing Interface Between Peace and Development in a Changing World," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* #2 (1980):145-49; Johan Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses," *Journal of Peace Research* 22, #2 (1985):141-58, see especially pp. 146f. Back.

Note 5: This discourse will probably only have a political role if it appears as part of a social movement (such as a peace movement) that presents the establishment with a wall of meaningless practice, i.e. if it appears as part of an external, upsetting activity which is shocking precisely because it is incomprehensible. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Ole Wæver "Moment of the Move: Politico-Linguistic Strategies of Western Peace Movements," paper presented at the twelfth annual

scientific meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Tel Aviv, June 18-22 (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Working Paper no. 1989/13); and Ole Wæver "Politics of Movement: A Contribution to Political Theory in and on Peace Movements," in: K. Kodama and U. Vesa, eds., *Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peacemovements* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth 1990), pp. 15-44. Back.

Note 6: Øberg, *At Sikre Udvikling* ; Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 129-53; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 162-77. Back.

Note 7: See Jahn, et.al., *European Security* , pp. 51-53. Back.

Note 8: Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-426; C. A. W. Manning, *The Nature of International Society* (London: London School of Economics, 1962); Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977); Ole Wæver, "International Society: The Grammar of Dialogue among States?," paper presented at ECPR workshop in Limerich, April 1992; Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). Back.

Note 9: "Most seriously, however, even if we admit that we are all now participating in common global structures, that we are all rendered increasingly vulnerable to processes that are planetary in scale, and that our most parochial activities are shaped by forces that encompass the world and not just particular states, it is far from clear what such an admission implies for the way we organize ourselves politically. The state is a political category in a way that the world, or the globe, or the planet, or humanity is not. The security of states is something we can comprehend in political terms in a way that, at the moment, world security can not be understood." R. B. J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," *Alternatives* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5. There is nothing inevitable about this way of defining security--it has emerged historically, and might change gradually again--but one has to admit "the extent to which the meaning of security is tied to historically specific forms of political community" (Walker, "Security, Sovereignty"). Only to the extent that other forms of political community begin to become *thinkable* (again), does it make sense to think about *security* at other levels. The main process at the present is a very open and contradictory articulation of the relationship between state (and other political structures) and nation (and other large scale cultural communities). Therefore, the main dynamic of security will play at the interface of state security and societal security (in the sense of the security of large-scale we-identities). Thus, in the section on "Societal Security," I will argue why the study of "societal security" should--although being aware of specific threats to social groups--construct the concept of societal security as distinct from this, as being at a specific level of collectivity, being a social fact. Back.

Note 10: But even here one can argue about the way of defining these standard cases as military or political; Jahn, et. al., *European Security* , pp. 17-20. Back.

Note 11: Barry Buzan argues more extensively as follows: "Because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly, military threats are traditionally accorded the highest priority in national security concerns. Military action can wreck the work of centuries in all other sectors. Difficult accomplishments in politics, art, industry, culture and all human activities can be undone by the use of

force. Human achievements, in other words, can be threatened in terms other than those in which they were created, and the need to prevent such threats from being realized is a major underpinning of the state's military protection function. A defeated society is totally vulnerable to the conqueror's power which can be applied to ends ranging from restructuring the government, through pillage and rape, to massacre of the population and resettlement of the land. The threat of force thus stimulates not only a powerful concern to protect the socio-political heritage of the state, but also a sense of outrage at the use of unfair forms of competition." *People, States and Fear* , p. 117. Back.

Note 12: Jahn, et. al., *European Security* , p. 9. Back.

Note 13: Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150. Back.

Note 14: Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 72f and 598f. Back.

Note 15: This is the reason why small states will often be careful *not* to designate "inconveniences" as security problems or infringements on sovereignty--if they are, in any event, unable to do anything about it. One example was Finland in relation to the Soviet Union. Back.

Note 16: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right" [1762], (translated by Julia Conaway Bondanella) pp. 84-174 in: Alan Ritter and Julia Conoway Bondanella, eds., *Rousseau's Political Writings* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), p. 90. Back.

Note 17: This essential argument--the repetition of war in nonmilitary form--is the basic difference between mine and the one made by some advocates of "non-offensive defense," most notably Anders Boserup and Poul Holm Andreasen (from whom I have learned this interpretation of Clausewitz). The ultimate test can arise in another sphere today, and the whole game therefore continues. Anders Boserup deduced from the nuclear condition an impossibility of Clausewitzian war, and from this a host of other far-reaching (political as well as theoretical) conclusions. These strong political conclusions, however, depend on a conceptualization of security (existential threats to sovereignty) as by necessity military. Elsewhere, I have criticised Egon Bahr's use of this operation and his way of thereby establishing political necessity from a military analysis; Ole Wæver "Ideologies of Stabilization--Stabilization of Ideologies: Reading German Social Democrats," in: V. Harle and P. Sivonen, eds., *Europe in Transition: Politics and Nuclear Strategy* (London: Frances Pinter, 1989), pp. 110-39. Still, the analysis presented here owes very much to the impressive and original Clausewitz interpretation of Anders Boserup. Back.

Note 18: Anders Boserup, "Staten, samfundet og krigen hos Clausewitz," in: Carl von Clausewitz, *Om Krig, bind III: kommentarer og registre* (Copenhagen: Rhodos, 1986), pp. 911-930. Back.

Note 19: Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* [originally published 1832], (Frankfurt: Ullstein Materialen, 1980), p. 19--Book I, Chapter 1. I follow here J. J. Graham's translation in *On War* , edited with an introduction by Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1985), p. 103. Back.

Note 20: Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* Book I, chapter 1, p. 17; *On War* , p. 101. Back.

Note 21: Aron, *Peace and War* , p.21. Back.

Note 22: Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1968 [1651]), pp. 232f. Back.

Note 23: More precisely, in the theory of speech acts, "security" would be seen as an *illocutionary* act; this is elaborated at length in my "Security, the Speech Act." See also: J. L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, 2nd ed.), pp. 98ff. Back.

Note 24: A point to which we will return: The other side of the move will, in most cases, be at least the price of some loss of prestige as a result of needing to use this special resort ("National security was threatened") or, in the case of failure, the act backfires and raises questions about the viability and reputation of the regime. In this sense the move is similar to raising a bet--staking more on the specific issue, giving it principled importance and thereby investing it with basic order questions. Back.

Note 25: The strongest case for the theoretical status of speech act failure being equal to success is given by Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," *Glyph* 1 (1977): 172-197 (originally presented in 1971). The article was reprinted, in a different translation, in Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Back.

Note 26: Raymond Aron, *On War: Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1958 [French original 1957]), pp. 80-102. Back.

Note 27: Rudolf Horst Brocke, *Deutschlandpolitische Positionen der Bundestagsparteien--Synopse* (Erlangen: Deutsche Gesellschaft für zeitgeschichtliche Fragen, 1985), pp. 66f and 79f. Back.

Note 28: Wilfried von Bredow and Rudolf Horst Brocke, *Das deutschlandpolitische Konzept der SPD* (Erlangen: Deutsche Gesellschaft für zeittgeschichtliche Fragen, 1986); Ole Wæver "Ideologies of Stabilization"; and Ole Wæver, "Conceptions of Détente and Change: Some Non-military Aspects of Security Thinking in the FRG," pp. 186-224, in: Wæver, et. al., *European Polyphony* . Back.

Note 29: Weak/strong *states* refer (in contrast to weak/strong powers) to the political strength of the state; how much state the state is, which means basically the degree of sociopolitical cohesion--not least how well the fit between state and nation is. Weak/strong *powers* then cover the more traditional concern about the "power" of a unit (as its ability to influence other units). See Buzan *People, States and Fear* , pp. 96-107, 113f and 154-58. Back.

Note 30: Ole Wæver, "Conflicts of Vision--Visions of Conflict," pp. 283-325 in: Wæver, et. al., *European Polyphony* . Back.

Note 31: See, e.g., Theodore Draper, "A New History of the Velvet Revolution," *New York Review of Books* , Jan. 14, 28, 1993 (in two parts). Back.

Note 32: Ole Wæver, "The Changing Character of Continuity." Back.

Note 33: See Jadwiga Staniszkis, "The Dynamics of a Breakthrough in the Socialist System: An Outline of Problems," *Soviet Studies* 41, no. 4 (1989): 560-73; Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Ontology of Socialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Back.

Note 34: To this might be added the interpretations of "conversion of power," that is, the way the old elite transformed its old system power into new capitalist "power"--and therefore did not *need* to oppose change as strongly as one would have expected. See Staniszkis, "Dynamics"; Elemér Hankiss, *East*

European Alternatives: Are There Any? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Ole Wæver, "The Changing Character of Continuity," pp. 11ff. Back.

Note 35: Ole Wæver, "Security the Speech Act," pp. 45f.--making reference to the argument of Derrida, "Signature Event Context." Back.

Note 36: Ole Wæver, "Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian," *International Affairs* 66, no. 3 (July 1990): 477-493; especially pp. 486-88. Back.

Note 37: Ole Wæver, "The Changing Character of Continuity," pp. 20f. Back.

Note 38: Alternatively, but not much better (in the eyes of the security establishment), a slogan of "non-military aspects of security" could point toward the "Eastern" argument for economic and political security and thereby for legitimizing a concern for system stability beyond the field of military threats (cf. the preceding section). Back.

Note 39: The articles were: Robert D. Hormats, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace--1989"; Hans W. Maull, "Energy and Resources: The Strategic Dimension"; Neville Brown, "Climate, Ecology and International Security"; Michael J. Dziedzic, "The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security"; and Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Demographic Component." Back.

Note 40: Secretary Baker, "Diplomacy for the Environment," address before the National Governors' Association, February 26, 1990, Washington D.C. (reprinted in *Current Policy* , No. 1254, February 1990), quoted in Richard H. Moss, "Environmental Security? The illogic of centralized state responses to environmental threats," in: Paul Painchaud, ed., *Geopolitical Perspectives on Environmental Security* (Cahier du GERPE, No. 92-05, Université Laval, Quebec). Back.

Note 41: This is one of the five sectors discussed by Buzan in *People, States and Fear* , pp. 131-33. Back.

Note 42: Barry Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue," in: Paul Painchaud, ed., *Geopolitical Perspectives on Environmental Security* (Cahier du GERPE, No. 92-05, Université Laval, Quebec), pp. 1 and 24f. Back.

Note 43: Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue," p. 15. Back.

Note 44: Moss, "Environmental Security?," p. 24. Back.

Note 45: Moss, "Environmental Security?," p. 32. Back.

Note 46: Moss quotes the Senate Armed Services Committee to the effect that protecting U.S. interests against environmental changes "may ultimately require the use of U.S. military power." See "Environmental Security?," p. 21. Back.

Note 47: Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," *Millennium* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1990): 461-76; here quoted from p. 467. Back.

Note 48: Moss, "Environmental Security?," p. 32. Back.

Note 49: Buzan, "Environment as a Security issue," p. 24. Back.

Note 50: This was what led André Gorz some years ago to the conclusion that the *way* we addressed environmental issues (which he certainly cared about too) contained the danger of "eco-fascism." See André Gorz, *Ecologie et liberte* (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1977). See also Charles T. Rubin, *The Green Crusade* (New York: Free Press, 1994). Back.

Note 51: Anders Boserup, presentation on the concept of security, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, 1985. Back.

Note 52: Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue." Back.

Note 53: Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue," p. 26. Back.

Note 54: Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation . . . ," p. 469. Back.

Note 55: Buzan, "Environment as a Security Issue," p. 25; see pp. 16-19 about the economic approach. Back.

Note 56: This issue of the nature of society (and individuals) is a debate often replayed under various headings such as methodological individualism versus methodological collectivism, or more fashionably these past few years as liberalism versus communitarianism; see, for example, Tracy B. Strong, ed., *The Self and the Political Order* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); and Quentin Skinner, "On Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty," pp. 211-24 in: Chantal Mouffe, ed., *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community* (London: Verso, 1992). Finally, there is a point in criticizing dichotomies like the *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* one, inasmuch as it obscures the important political arena of practices that are neither openly addressed nor a necessary expression of the "soul" of a community but transferred in the form of "practical knowledge." See Richard K. Ashley, "Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance," pp. 251-90, in: E.-O. Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); and Ole Wæver, "International Society: the Grammar. . . . " Finally, it could be argued that this debate ought to be displaced toward "the respective *constitution* of the individual (the `self') and the polity (the `order')," as argued by Tracy Strong, *The Self* , p. 3. Back.

Note 57: The insecurity of social groups could affect the stability and security of society as a kind of insecurity from below: The insecurity of social groups might spread to whole societies and into other sectors. Thus, "societal security" entails an interest in security at all lower levels. It seems, however, not advisable to *define* the sum of these smaller securities *as* societal security, inasmuch as this would lead us down the track toward an atomistic, aggregate view of security, where the ultimate question is individual (= global) security. Opening up the definition of societal security *as* the security of various groups would (beyond probably proving to be an infinite expansion of the subject) lead in the direction of an aggregate conception of the constituent collectivities. As with state security, societal security has to be understood first of all as the security of a social agent which has an independent reality and which is more than and different from the sum of its individuals. Approaching it by way of summing up, aggregating individual preferences, one will never capture the nature of *its* security problems which are constituted in the relationship of a state and its environment and a society and its environment. In the case of societal security, it is actually the case that societies are often made insecure because important groups in society feel insecure. This, however, has to be kept conceptually separate from the security of a

society, societal security. Societal security is not *social* security. The referent object for societal security is society as such, neither the state, nor the (sum of the) individuals. Back.

Note 58: The logic of security points to questions of survival but, of course, the rhetoric of security will often be employed in cases where survival--that is, sovereignty or identity--is *not* actually threatened, but in which it is possible to legitimate political action by making reference to such a threat. State security can be influenced by the (in)security of a society on which it is based, but this has to be seen as a two-step procedure. In the case of real "nation states", there will be small difference between the pure state definition and the new more complex one of state security via societal security. When nation and state do not coincide, however, the security of a state-challenging nation will often increase the insecurity of the state. More precisely, if the state has a homogenizing "national" program, its security will by definition be in conflict with the *societal security* of "national" projects of subcommunities inside the state. Back.

Note 59: This can be analyzed in terms of a "new middle ages." The medieval metaphor has the advantage of drawing our attention to the change in the organizing principle of the *sovereign, territorial state* , and not the *nation-state* (which is only half as old). The national idea is obviously not dying out (nor is politics as such giving way to interdependence or technocratic administration as often implied in ideas of "end of the nation-state"); what is modified is the *organization of political space* . For some four centuries, political space was organized through the principle of territorially defined units with exclusive rights inside, and a special kind of relations on the outside: International relations, foreign policy, without any superior authority. There is no longer one level that is clearly *the* most important to refer to but, rather, a set of overlapping authorities. Consequently, even those nations most closely approaching the ideal type of the nation-state are beginning to lose the option of referring always to "their" state.

In a historical perspective, therefore, the state-nation relationship is moving toward an unprecedented situation. The nation, born into an interstate system based on the sovereign state (already 200-300 years old at the time), might continue into a post-sovereignty situation. Thus, the post-modern political system will *not* be totally like the Middle Ages in this important sense. The understanding of this complex evolution is often blocked by the use of the term "nation-state" as designating both the emergence of the national idea and the twice as old territorial state (i.e. the principle of territoriality, sovereignty, and exclusivity), which means that the specific nature and importance of the latter concept (which is the basic system organizing principle) is overlooked. This obscures an understanding of the importance of a possible change at this level. Announcements of the demise of the nation-state are often refuted by pointing to the continuing importance of nationalism/the nation idea, but this misses the point since the major change seems to happen at the level of *the state* (which of course implies that the nation-state as we have known it will also change since it was built on the territorial state), whereas *the nation* as such continues.

See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 254f, 264ff, 285f, and 291ff; James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) pp. 70 and 79ff; Timothy W. Luke, "The Discipline of Security Studies and the Codes of Containment: Learning from Kuwait," *Alternatives* 16, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 315-44, especially pp. 340f; Ole Wæver, "Territory, Authority and Identity: The late 20th Century emergence of Neo-Medieval Political Structures in Europe," paper for the 1st conference of EUPRA, European Peace Research Association, Florence, November 8-10, 1991. Back.

Note 60: See Ole Wæver, et. al., *Identity, Migration and the new Security Agenda* , especially chapter 4; and Ole Wæver, "Insecurity and Identity Unlimited," in: Anne-Marie Le Gloannec & Kerry McNamara, eds., *The European Disorder* , forthcoming (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, Working Paper 1994/14). Back.

Note 61: See, for example, Ernesto Laclau, *Thoughts on the Revolution of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 89-92. Back.

Note 62: Probably we see here the reason why all this is more cryptic to Americans than to Europeans. At first, a concept of societal security should seem more natural to Anglo-Saxons who allegedly see state and society as separate, whereas the continental tradition is for state and society to be conceived as related; see Kenneth Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1957), pp. 192-95. The American tradition is, however, of a rather minimalist concept of state, in which the state is not given any inherent *raison d'être* in and of itself, but is only legitimated as derivative (in the form of *some* kind of social contract) and only when and if it serves--and defends--society. Continentals are more prone to grant the state its own right to existence, and continental traditions point to *society* as a collective, as more-than-the-sum-of-the-parts, which is more alien to anglo-liberal thought. Thus, in American thinking, "security" is implicitly assumed to be ultimately legitimized by reference to securing *individuals* . A concept of societal security then becomes odd (the natural reaction is to call for more correct and appropriate state policy), unless one denounces the social contract conception as simply liberal/American ideology. If one agrees with Thomas Paine that "What is government more than the management of the affairs of a nation? It is not," and further that sovereignty rests with the *nation* , which has always the right "to abolish any form of government if finds inconvenient and establish such as accords with its interests, its disposition and its happiness" (*Rights of Man* , pp. xx), then separate agendas of security for state and nation become inconceivable. To continental Europeans, the state, more than a pragmatic instrument for achieving the collective interests of a group of individuals, is seen as a unit with its own logic and concerns. So is society. Back.

Note 63: Carl Schmitt even claimed that the task of the state was to define enemy and friend, and if the state failed to accomplish this, inevitably others would come forward and do so, whereby the state would lose its position and be replaced by the new power. Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1963 [1932]), especially pp. 45-54. Back.

Note 64: Elizabeth G. Ferris, "Peace, Security and the Movement of People," unpublished paper, Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. Back.

Note 65: Quoted by Ferris, p. 17. Back.

Note 66: Wæver, "Three Competing Europes." Back.

Note 67: Jahn, et. al., *European Security* , pp. 35-37. Back.

Note 68: James Der Derian "S/N: International Theory, Balkanization, and the New World Order," *Millennium* 20, 3 (1991): 485-506, quote on p. 488; also in Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 141-169. Back.

Note 69: Der Derian, "S/N," p. 491. Back.

Note 70: Markus Jachtenfuchs and Michael Huber, "Institutional Learning in the European Community: The Response to the Greenhouse Effect," in: J. D. Lifferink, P. D. Lowe and A. P. J. Mol, eds., *European Integration and Environmental Policy* (London: Belknap, in press). Back.

Note 71: This argument is all-pervasive in the European press and used by numerous politicians, including Kohl as well as Mitterrand. An intelligent policy analysis arguing strongly along these lines is supplied by Peter Glotz, "Europa am Scheideweg" *Europa Archiv* 47, no. 18 (September 25, 1992): 503-14. Attempts to ground this ideological analysis in (mainly neorealist) theory is found in: Buzan, et. al., *The European Security Order Recast* ; Ole Wæver, "Sikkerhedspolitisk Stabilitet og National Identitet," pp. 101-61 in Christen Sorensen, ed., *Europa--Nation, Union: Efter Minsk og Maastricht* (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1992). Back.

Note 72: Ole Wæver, "Modelli e scenari futuri," *Politica Internazionale* 21, no. 3 (gennaio-marzo 1993): 5-27; and Ole Wæver, "Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies," *Journal of International Affairs* 48, no. 2 (1995). Back.

Note 73: Press conference of the President, François Mitterrand, in East Berlin, December 22, 1989 (reprinted in *Europa Archiv* no. 4 (1990): D. 96-99). Back.

Note 74: Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," *Survival* 33, no. 2 (March/April 1991): 99-109, quotation from p. 103. Back.

Note 75: Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* ; Ole Wæver, "Three Competing Europes"; Ole Wæver, "International Society: Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 27, no. 1 (1992): 147-178. Back.

Note 76: With European security used in the fragmentation/integration way (as presented above), the price seems to be that Yugoslavia becomes the test case for "Europe." As a place to "prove" Europe, however, solving the problem of the Balkans is hardly the test one would choose. The unfortunate first case poses a risk to Yugoslavia as well as to the EU. As the EU has become pulled/tempted to jump into the conflict, it becomes an aim in itself to act. Moreover, the EU has been conducting its policy with the main criteria being the effect on the EU, not on Yugoslavia. See Ole Wæver, "Den europæiske union og organiseringen av sikkerheden i Europa," pp. 33-72, in: Martin Sæter et. al., *Karakteren av Den europeiske union* (NUPI-Report no. 160, July 1992, Oslo), especially pp. 64-66; Håkan Wiberg, "Divided States and Divided Nations as a Security Problem--the Case of Yugoslavia" (Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Working Paper no. 1992/14). Back.

Note 77: This is probably most clearly argued in "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben," where Nietzsche says for instance that "all great things" depend on illusions in order to succeed (in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke* (Frankfurt/M: Ullstein 1969, vol. 1), p. 254). It further links up to the themes of "setting values" and "creating beyond oneself" from, for instance "Thus spoke Zarathustra," and the risk implied in "the will to power." See, for example, *Werke* , vol. 2, pp. 301, 356ff, 394f, 600, 730f, and 817-20; and Ole Wæver, "Tradition and Transgression . . . . " Back.

Note 78: Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958), p. 192. Back.

Note 79: If some reader were puzzled above to find the author referring to himself as an example of an

"ideological" and "disciplining" move, this was not (necessarily) a case of analytical scizophrenia but, rather, a conscious self-deconstruction. This points toward a tricky question about post-structuralism and politics. For understandable but contingent institutional reasons, post-structuralists have emerged on the academic scene with the political program of tearing down "givens," of opening up, making possible, freeing. This invites the reasonable question: opening up room for what? Neo-nazis? War? How can the post-structuralist be sure that "liberating minds" and "transcending limits" will necessarily lead to more peaceful conditions, unless one makes an incredible enlightenment-indebted "harmony of interests" assumption?For someone working in the negatively-driven field of security, a post-structuralist politics of responsibility must turn out differently, with more will to power and less de-naturalization. Back.

On Security

4. Political Fission: State Structure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Weapons in the United States

Daniel Deudney

During the last half century the unlimited destructive capacity of nuclear weapons has put the question of the "fate of the earth" onto the political agenda for the first time in history. This has forced publics, leaders, and theorists to grapple with the nuclear political question: what kinds of policies, practices, and institutions are best suited to providing security in the nuclear era? Because the state and state-system are currently the dominant forms of political institutions concerned with security and violence, the nuclear political question is first about the fit between the nuclear forces of destruction and statist institutions and practices. Do these capabilities pose a revolutionary challenge to the state and its role as provider of security? Or can these new realities be accommodated with relatively insignificant institutional adjustment?

Realism, the ancient, diverse, and forceful tradition concerned with the relationships between power, security, and political order offers a rich set of theories and practices relevant to answering the nuclear political question. There are, however, fundamental disagreements among Realists on this question. Realist views on this relationship fall into three broad groups, which I call *war strategism* , *deterrence statism* , and *nuclear one worldism* . Each of these interpretations were articulated at the beginning of the nuclear era, and each is based upon the application of a powerful Realist theoretical insight. Definitive resolution of these disputes is difficult but intimately connected with security practice in the nuclear age. The recent end of the Cold War casts these disputes in a new light, and can in turn be better understood by the disputes within Realism.

The first school of Nuclear Realism argues the *war strategist* view that the advent of nuclear weapons marks no decisive break in world politics and observes the behavior of states to be largely the same before and after their arrival. Interstate conflict is seen as endemic, and the quintessential state activity of preparing for and making war continues to define world politics. This view has been articulated by William Borden, Paul Nitze, Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and Colin Gray.[1] It postulates that states seeking security in a nuclear world will--and should--prepare themselves to exercise a full range of nuclear use options and seek to gain political advantage from relatively small differences in nuclear force levels. Although this view of the nuclear political question has been heavily attacked for a variety of important shortcomings, the actual force structures and military doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War embodied this view, to a first approximation and with significant anomalies.

A second Realist view, *deterrence statism* , holds that nuclear weapons have significantly altered, perhaps even revolutionized, interstate life by making war between nuclear-armed states prohibitively costly. In this view the states have created a strongly stable--perhaps the best of all possible--nuclear order by maintaining extensive nuclear forces in order to deter nuclear use. Such Realists take the state as

a given, but hold that states can solve the nuclear security problem by changing their behavior and avoiding war. Deterrence statists commonly hold that nuclear weapons demand revolutionary changes in interstate relations, but not in states or in the state-system. Security is found in the deterrence relationship, and arms control is seen either as irrelevant or a modest enhancement of deterrence. This view was first articulated in the late 1940s by Bernard Brodie and variants of it are held by most contemporary neorealists,[2] such as Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz. At the beginning of the nuclear era, this view was much less widely held than now. Early proponents emphasized the tentative, second-best, and temporary character of this solution, while most of its contemporary proponents see it as a highly enduring and sufficient solution. Although publics and militaries have resisted embracing this view, deterrence statism is the dominant theory among scholars of international relations and national security in the West.

The third school of nuclear Realism is *nuclear one worldism* , which holds that nuclear explosives pose a radical challenge to the core security-providing function of the state and that only major institutional changes in the state-centric world order can meet the challenge posed by nuclear capability. This revolutionary challenge cannot be met solely with changes in interstate *relations* ; rather survival imperatives require polities to achieve political reconciliation in order to practice and institutionalize new forms of non-state arms control. Most early nuclear one worlders held that the inevitable trajectory of nuclear politics was either a catastrophe or a world government of some sort. Nuclear one worldism reached its theoretical apogee around 1960 in the works of John Herz and Kenneth Boulding,[3] and was also forcefully stated by Hans Morgenthau. Nuclear one world theory has nearly disappeared with the rise in popularity of various deterrence statist theories.[4] Such ideas have continued to enjoy a strong but indistinct presence in the academic field of peace studies and in the citizen peace movement, where typically they are mixed and linked with ethical critiques of war, militarism and oppression that go far beyond the simple nuclear one world argument.

Is nuclear one worldism really Realist? This argument posits that the state-system is obsolete and likely to be replaced with either a world state or complemented with a non-state system-level security institution, but most Realists today hold that the state is the ontological given of Realism. Nuclear one worldism is the application to the nuclear era of the most primitive form of Realism, geopolitics (or what for purposes of clarity I call "security materialism") that analyzes the relationship between material forces of destruction and security providing practices and institutions. The essence of this paleo-Realist argument can be captured by analogy to Marxian historical production materialism: the forces of destruction, understood as the interaction of geography and technology, constitute the "base" which roughly determines the institutional "superstructure" constituted by security providing units and systems, one form of which has been the state. Security materialism posits that states and state systems emerge, persist, and are replaced according to whether they are, in the long term, viable or functional as providers of security. Neo-Realisms that take the state as a given and then examine its interaction with other states are inherently limited in their ability to theorize about the consequences of changes in the deep structure of material forces, such as the development of nuclear weapons.

Elsewhere[5] I have argued at length the superiority of a version of nuclear one worldism modified in two ways, with regard to how the state has been rendered obsolete, and what kind of security institution is more appropriate. First, the nuclear forces of destruction have rendered the state as a mode of protection simultaneously unnecessary and insufficient. Nuclear weapons are so destructive that the perennial state task of concentrating enough violence capability to balance against outside threats is generally solved,

while at the same time the state approach of monopolizing violence within a particular territory is unsuited to the imperative task of separating and containing nuclear capability from political conflicts. Second, the institution needed to achieve security in the nuclear era is not a world state, as the early or classical nuclear worldists projected, but rather a "thick" regime of constraints on both leaders and arms, or what might be thought of as a *nuclear republican union* .

Modified Nuclear One Worldism and the End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War seems to have provided an important vindication to the modified version of nuclear one worldism. While this event has many contributing causes,[6] two features are central. First, the proximate cause of the end of the Cold War was the embrace by the leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union of a view of nuclear weapons and their relation to state security that is, to a first approximation, nuclear one worldism. Second, the settlement of the Cold War was based on the establishment of an extensive system of arms control, and a commitment to go even further. In sharp contrast, these developments are completely unexpected and inexplicable to the war strategist[7] and deterrent statist[8] schools of nuclear Realism.

But viewing these developments as late vindications of modified nuclear one worldism raises as many questions as it answers. If the end of the Cold War is a problem for nuclear strategic and deterrence statist Realists, the Cold War itself poses problems for nuclear one worldism: Why did it last so long? Why are the global constraint institutions established in its wake so incomplete? And why did it end in the peculiar ways that did? The simplest answer to these questions is that it took time to experiment with the possibilities of nuclear capabilities, draw appropriate lessons, and then overcome other disputes in order to respond appropriately together.

This answer, while being to a first approximation sufficient, still leaves many aspects of the process and outcome underspecified. In this chapter, I sketch an extension of the modified nuclear one worldist argument to capture more of the political specificity of the end of the Cold War changes, whose general pattern among Realist theories only nuclear one worldism leads us to expect. In order to achieve this richer explanation of the political dynamics that culminated in the end of the Cold War, it is necessary to carefully examine *intrastate* nuclear political dynamics.

Of particular interest is the role of the citizen peace movement and the radical anti-nuclear critique it advanced. The end of the Cold War came in the wake of the most vociferous and widespread popular anti-nuclear movement in history. The connection between this popular outburst and the end of the Cold war is hotly contested. On one side, former officials of the Reagan Administration and various conservatives completely discount its significance.[9] On the other hand, leaders of the peace movement, such as David Cortright of SANE, argue that it played a decisive role in moving the United States government to reciprocate the ambitious program of political reconciliation and nuclear arms control that Mikhail Gorbachev sought to achieve.[10] Almost all Realists are actively hostile to popular peace movements, or else indifferent to them, and almost all peace movement intellectuals and arms control specialists believe that their practices and program challenge Realism. Here, I challenge this contemporary consensus and argue that the practice and program of the anti-nuclear peace movement is consistent with the most basic Realists' reading of the nuclear political question, and that it is statist practice and institutions that are out of synch with Realist survival imperatives.

In order to make this case, I construct arguments about intrastate nuclear politics and employ them to explore patterns of popular resistance. Modified nuclear one worldism posits a system-level transformation caused by the deep structural material forces, but to understand the timing and political dynamics of the actual transformation, second image factors must be considered. How do deep structural material forces such as nuclear weapons flow through--or become blocked--on their way to determining system-level structure? I advance this corollary to modified nuclear one worldism: Nuclear weapons generate a profound *legitimacy deficit* for states, for reasons rooted in the fundamental nature of states. Nuclear weapons deform civil society-state relations, and the consequent challenges to legitimacy provide the political energy or impetus to challenge core state practices and institutions. But state apparatuses are able to combat and for long periods avoid the political consequences of this deficit by embracing *declaratory anti-nuclearism* . This strategy of evasion is feasible because nuclear weapons are uniquely *recludable* , that is, their physical properties enable them to be kept out of public consciousness. It is these factors which account for the existence of *contradiction* between deep material forces and institutional superstructures, and in their limits are to be found the triggers of structural adjustment or resolution. As a result of these evasions and their breakdowns, the actual patterns in which nuclear legitimacy deficits are politically manifested are likely to be highly *eruptive* , occurring in intense episodes triggered by the breakdown in evasive techniques.

The scenario sketched out in this second image corollary to modified nuclear one worldism is at the appropriate level of analysis, but is still too general and must be linked to an analysis of the specific national security constitutions of particular states. Thus, to complete the argument, I sketch the main features of the nuclear security constitution of the United States of America, and then examine how it also shapes the expression of the structural pressures generated by state obsolescence.

The argument in four steps . First, I summarize the nuclear one worldist argument on the obsolescence of statist practices and institutions. In the second section, I unfold the corollary of the impacts of modified nuclear one worldism on the dynamics of nuclear politics within nuclear possessed polities, specifying the structural deformations and legitimacy deficiencies that arise, as well as the structurally rooted opportunities and state strategies to evade them. In the third section, I analyze the ways in which the internal security structures of the United States shape the dynamics of nuclear legitimacy politics. There is a great deal of variability in the internal security constitutions of various states, and the United States is by no means typical. However, only by looking at these specific institutional structures is it possible to understand how the general pressures of nuclear illegitimacy are channelled, diverted, and ultimately manifested as political events. In the fourth and final section I focus upon the tumultuous nuclear politics of the United States during the Reagan administration that culminated in the end of the Cold War. Here I argue that the extraordinary patterns of nuclear politicization during this period are well-explained by the corollaries to the modified nuclear one worldist argument.

The Real-State Obsolescence Argument

The Real-State

In analyzing the implications of nuclear explosives for the state, it is necessary to return to very elemental levels of analysis. To understand how the state as a protection unit has been affected by nuclear weapons, a clear image of the state is required. Before it is possible to gauge the effects of nuclear explosives upon security-providing institutions, the forms of those institutions must be clearly specified. In both political science and political discourse, the term "state" is used in so many ways as to

be useless without further specification. Rather than search for the essential nature of the state, it is more analytically useful to distinguish and label the different phenomena that are commonly overpacked into the state. One such facet of the state that has been central to Realist international theory is the state as a "mode of protection," a distinctive, elemental and widely recurring statist approach to power and protection. The practice and theory of the state as a mode of protection has been most extensively developed by the European tradition of *realpolitik* . Out of deference to this ancient and rich tradition, and in order to avoid the semantic confusions inherent in offering yet another definition or redefinition of "the state" in general, I will refer to the state mode of protection as the *real-state* .

The real-state is a type of political institution characterized by five inter-related features:

1. the *monopoly* of violence capability within a particular territorial space;
2. the *concentration* of control over that violence capability in the hands of a distinct organization;
3. the relative *autonomy* of the organizational apparatus wielding this capability;
4. the tendency to *employ* the capability at its disposal and thus to *couple* capability to outcomes; and
5. the public acceptance, or *legitimacy* , of state authority as a consequence of the state's ability to provide security.

According to this formulation,[11] not every authoritative political order, state apparatus, territorially distinct polity, or recognized sovereign state is a real-state. Rather, real-states are governmental apparatuses that have these five distinctive attributes. For the real-state, to *be* is to be *able* --to be capable of performing a specific task: the provision of security through the maintenance of a monopoly of violence capability in a particular territory. This image of the real-state as a mode of protection has been held, with minor variations and under a variety of labels, by a wide range of Realist theorists.

Although analytically distinct, the features of the real-state are integrally connected. Concentration and autonomy are closely linked to violence monopolies. For power to be monopolized in a meaningful fashion, it must be concentrated into the control of one organization. An organization possessing such a concentration of power will tend toward autonomy, both because its concentrated monopoly renders it intrinsically difficult to control, and because such autonomy greatly facilitates effective and efficient employment of its concentrated power. To achieve autonomy, the state apparatus strives to avoid checks and limits imposed either from within its polity or from outside it. The tendency for a state apparatus to seek autonomy from external control is not, of course, confined only to situations where violence capability lends itself to territorial compartmentalization, but is most likely to be realized in such situations. This quest for autonomy by the real-state apparatus is a feature of the real-state mode of protection that is most in tension with democratic and republican norms of governance.

The fifth feature of the real-state--legitimacy--is key to understanding state-civil society relations in the nuclear era. Legitimacy and authority are complex and elusive, but achieving and maintaining some rough acceptance by the members of the polity is necessary for all but the most coercive political orders. The legitimacy of real-states derives from their ability to secure their citizens.[12] A real-state that lacks legitimacy will not be able to carry out the first four functions enumerated above; a state that carries out the first four functions in a manner that does not generate rough acceptance of its practices by members of the polity will lack legitimacy.[13]

The Hobbesian claim that all political and social institutions can be derived from fear of physical death

overstates the real-state stake on legitimacy, but few would deny that the general provision of such protection is a primary or basic task of states, a task upon whose successful completion--or at least strenuous pursuit--the rest of social and political life relies. For Realists, there is a primal link between the ability to provide security and the acceptance of a political regime by the people who live within it.[14] When the ability of a political order to deliver security declines, or is called widely into question, its legitimacy is likely to be compromised.

Nuclear Explosives and the End of the Real-State

Against this sharp image of the state mode of protection, the impacts of nuclear explosives can be gauged. Nuclear weapons fundamentally challenge the real-state. They do so because they *deny* the possibility that a political order of less than universal scope can monopolize violence capability within its territory. Prior to the advent of nuclear explosives, the scale requirements of military viability in the nuclear era mandated that an entity be of approximately continental scale, as the two world wars demonstrated. With the advent of nuclear explosives, an entity must encompass the entire globe, or else monopolize all nuclear capability (in which case one state would be secure, and all the rest insecure). Nuclear weapons are to the real-state what gunpowder was to the medieval fief: A technology that renders it militarily unviable. The scale imperatives of nuclear explosives mean that security can be achieved only through the creation of a worldwide state or the abandonment of the real-state approach to security and the creation of a security order that systematically paralyzes state power.

A simple analogy captures the impact of nuclear explosives upon the real-state. As Arnold Wolfers suggested, realpolitik theorists of states liken them to "billiard balls" knocking each other about, only weakly constrained by the "cobwebs" of interstate norms.[15] The invention of nuclear explosives turns billiard balls into "eggs," and the continuing quest for security drives fragile states to create cushioning and protective structures not unlike an "egg carton." The "hard-shelled" billiard balls of pre-nuclear times knocked each other about for political and security gain, but collision has become suicidal for the inescapably vulnerable eggs of the nuclear world. Where the billiard ball states crashed through the weak webs of international norms and institutions, the fragile nuclear egg states sit paralyzed, and have begun, but not finished, creating an egg carton--a system of mutually protective norms and institutions. These egg-like states can co-exist, if they are cautious, but to be cautious means to yield up at least some of the perquisites of the billiard ball states of the past.

Support for the proposition that the real-state has been fundamentally compromised by nuclear explosives can be found by comparing the security-related definitions of the real-state provided by Hobbes, Ranke, and Weber with nuclear security realities. The advent of nuclear weapons makes the interstate system akin to Hobbes's "state of nature" because it is possible for political collectivities to suffer a sudden and comprehensive death. Nuclear weapons greatly weaken the gradation between the larger powers and the smaller ones. In a world with abundant nuclear weapons, it is possible for even the largest human collectivities to be quickly and completely destroyed. Nuclear weapons have also created a condition of essential equality with regard to survival. Once a state apparatus or human organization, no matter how otherwise lacking in assets, acquires a certain number and type of nuclear weapons, that state is the peer of even the largest state in the most fundamental sense that the small state can effectively "kill" the large one.

The nuclear revolution means essentially that the greatest of state sovereigns have fallen back into a state of nature vis-à-vis each other. At the end of the Second World War, the greatest sovereign states were in

an Hobbesian "state of war" with each other but, as they were not capable of killing each other, were not in a "state of nature" with each other. Now they have had their military viability pulled out from under them and are, in the most essential respects, more like men in the "state of nature" than sovereigns in the "state of war." Thus, the logic of Hobbes's argument applied to the nuclear era points toward the creation of a world sovereign, as several Hobbes scholars have pointed out.[16]

Ranke's definition of a "Great Power" provides a second powerful indicator that nuclear weapons have fundamentally challenged the state mode of protection. In his classic analysis of European power politics, the German historian Leopold von Ranke defined a great power as " . . . a power capable of standing alone in war against a coalition of other Great Powers and surviving."[17] Since not even the United States and the Soviet Union could have stood alone against each other in a war and survived, they were not, by Ranke's definition "great powers." If sheer magnitude of power were the measure, or if power relative to all other states were the measure, then the United States and the Soviet Union would surely have qualified for special status.[18] Ranke's definition, however, centers upon neither absolute quantity of power nor simple relative power, but is about the capability of states to achieve an absolute value or condition--survival in war--against other similarly-capable powers. In the nuclear era, the last of the "great powers" have been abolished by the "superpowers" in the sense of their supercapabilities, but this abolition has been obscured by the tendency to speak of political collectivities as well as things and capabilities as "superpowers."

Weber's classic definition of the state also points to the fundamental challenge posed by nuclear explosives. Many of the institutions which today claim to be states have the only legitimate capacities for violence within their territory, but they do not have the ability to prevent other state apparatuses from effectively sending overwhelming military force onto their territory. And, because nuclear weapons can be hurled or dropped, more or less at will, anywhere on the planet, there is no institution which has the monopoly of violence in any particular territory. The invasion of territory and nuclear bombardment may not constitute legitimate uses of violence, but they can occur nevertheless. Institutions claiming to be states have the only legitimate capacities for violence in all territories, but none has the monopoly of violence in any territory. "States" today have a monopoly on the ability to *legitimize* violence, but they do not have the ability to *monopolize* violence.

Nuclear Contradiction

Nuclear weapons have rendered the real-state approach to security nonviable, but security-providing institutions appropriate to the new security imperatives and opportunities have emerged only partially. The paralysis of states entailed in deterrence, and the limited arms control achieved in the nuclear era, mark important steps away from the real-state approach, and the first steps down a path the logic of which has yet to be fully understood (and whose exploration is beyond the scope of this paper). But absent a full adjustment, existing real-state institutions are in contradiction to the existing forces of destruction. When institutions are in such a condition of contradiction, they still exist but they have been drained of their previous functionality, and they sit increasingly as facades. In such a situation, they are unrelated, except negatively, to the actual achievement of the security goals that animated their creation. There are two criteria for judging whether a contradiction exists. First, do the dominant security approaches generate counterproductive consequences when they are brought to bear on security issues? Second, does security derive from the ad hoc departures from the dominant approaches rather than from their application?

To say that the present situation is characterized by a contradiction is to imply that a consolidation of some sort between the existing security institutions is necessary in order to achieve their primal objective as providers of protection services. Protection-providing units which are in contradiction to the forces of destruction are like firms that are natural monopolies but which are forced to consolidate by changes in the economies of scale in the provision of services in order to avoid ruinous competition. Whether consolidated institutions will emerge without or through ruinous competition is not, however, determined in this model.

States, Violence, and Legitimacy

From the general argument about nuclear weapons and the real-state, we are now prepared to unfold our second-image corollaries to modified nuclear one worldism: How does the obsolescence of the state mode of protection affect the relationship between the state apparatus and the citizens or populace of states entailed in deterrence, and the limited arms controa political unit? What happens to the relationship between a state apparatus that cannot fulfill its historical role as protector, and a civil society that cannot be protected?

Violence Capabilities and Domestic Politics

In analyzing the domestic politics of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to examine the overall political system rather than simply the internal structure of the state apparatus. Much of the work of security analysts has focused on either the force structures within military organizations, or upon the civil-military relations within the state apparatus, leaving the relationship between nuclear weapons and the overall security constitution largely unexplored. A polity's security constitution[19] encompasses the relationships between the citizens of the polity, the instruments of violence, and state structure. The citizens of a polity and their relation to and degree of control over violence capabilities and organizations are as much a part of that polity's security constitution as are its military organizations.

At the core of any polity's security constitution is its system of "arms control"--the ways in which polities internally organize the control of violence capability, and particularly the interface between the instrumentalities of violence and domestic political order. Although nuclear weapons are new, analysis of the relationship between violence capabilities and domestic politics has a long pedigree. As Otto Hintze pointed out nearly a century ago, the internal form of a polity will be heavily shaped by demands of the security environment: "The form and spirit of the state's organization will not be determined solely by economic and social relations and clashes of interests, but primarily by the necessities of defense and offense, that is, by the organization of the army and of warfare."[20]

The security environment of a polity has two interactive but distinctive components: the particular interstate setting or system in which a polity exists, (i.e. proximity to other actors, relative power of other actors, the intentions of other actors, etc.) and the military technological environment--the types of military capacity that are prevalent in a particular era.[21]

In looking for antecedents to the nuclear revolution, history provides many examples of important changes in military technology having revolutionary impacts upon the internal life of polities. Innovations such as bronze weapons, iron weapons, the stirrup, walls and siege works, the long-bow, and gunpowder all had major effects upon internal political structures. Changes in military technology alter political order within polities by changing the relative power of various groups within the polity, and the

relative size and political power of the state within the polity.[22]

The Deformation of State-Civil Society Relations

The inability of a state apparatus of less than comprehensive scope to secure itself in the nuclear era has "revolutionary" implications for the basic relationship between the state apparatus and the citizens of the polity. If citizens were purely consumers of protection services, and if states were purely providers of such services, then a consolidation of protection-providing institutions could be expected in the nuclear era. In the absence of such consolidation, state apparatuses are thrown into a curiously antagonistic relationship to their citizens. Deformations of the citizen-state relationship can be expected to exist in all legitimate polities possessing nuclear weapons, but they should be particularly pronounced and visible in those polities where the state apparatus' role as servant of the citizenry has been most extensively and effectively institutionalized.

Life in a world of nuclear-armed states sunders the common interest between state apparatus and citizenry. The state apparatus' interest in autonomy is thrown into conflict with civil society's interest in survival. The basic fact of life in the nuclear world is simple: The state apparatus can no longer relate to civil society as the effective protector of civil society from destruction. Nuclear destruction does not, however, confront countries in an unmediated form but is experienced in terms of the deterrent relationship. As long as deterrence does not fail, the gap that exists between security *promise* and *performance* is potential rather than actual. By maintaining nuclear weapons only for purposes of deterrence (i.e. only to retaliate against an attacker using nuclear weapons), the state apparatus can achieve a partial substitute for military viability. As long as deterrence does not fail, the relationship between nuclear weapons and societal destruction remains a *potential* rather than an *actual* one.

Deterrence seems to be an innocuous nuclear age approximation and extension of the traditional role of the state apparatus as defender of civil society, or at worst making the best of a bad situation, but it has a deeper meaning for the relationship between the state apparatus and civil society. A strategy of deterrence turns the relationship between civil society and the state apparatus on its head. For a state apparatus to hold nuclear weapons for the purpose of "deterrence" means that the state apparatus makes a conscious decision to accept its own civil society as a hostage. As the legal theorist John Barton notes:

> [Nuclear deterrence] affects the philosophical relationship between government and citizen, for in the nuclear era a government can defend its own citizens only through threats to attack other nation's citizens or through agreements with other governments, sometimes even designed to leave its own citizens vulnerable. The government's defense function is, in a sense, turned against its citizens, and part of the unity of interest between government and citizen is lost.[23]

Policies designed to hold civil society hostage to nuclear threat are not the only possible response to the security threat posed by the nuclear world. The state apparatus has (at least in principle) the alternative of abrogating or abridging its autonomy to a larger security entity. This situation poses a dilemma for civil society-state relations: Will the state apparatus continue to force civil society to undergo the conditional suicide of nuclear deterrence or will civil society force the state apparatus to commit the conditional suicide of modification of its autonomy to an exterior entity (e.g. a world state, a world federation, or a world disarmament authority)? The most basic political meaning of the nuclear revolution for civil society-state apparatus relations is that the autonomy of the state apparatus and the security of civil society are in direct and inescapable contradiction with each other.

This clash between the state apparatus' interest in autonomy and civil society's interest in survival can be

described in terms of the choices faced by an individual, in Hobbes's "state of nature," who is contemplating entrance into civil society through the ratification of the basic social contract. An appropriate analogy in Hobbes's model for the choice between state apparatus autonomy and civil society survival would be an "interior dialogue" between the man-in-the-state-of-nature's *will* and *body* . Facing a precarious life in the full state of nature, the corporeal body will favor trading away the autonomy of will--the freedom to do whatever one wills in the state of nature--in order to achieve security for the body from violence. The will, on the other hand, will seek to remain in the state of nature where its autonomy will be completely unabridged. For Hobbes, the decisive argument is with the body for, without continued corporeal existence, the will is also extinguished and thus cannot be exercised. Hobbes's materialistic model of man is slanted in favor of the entry into civil society: *Bodily survival is a necessary pre-requisite for the autonomy of the will* .

Nuclear Legitimacy Deficits

This deformation of the relationship between the state and civil society has important implications for the legitimacy of state institutions. Assuming that the provision of security generates legitimacy for state institutions, the deformation of the traditional state apparatus-civil society relationship will significantly compromise the legitimacy of the state apparatus in the eyes of civil society.

The concept of a structurally rooted deficiency or gap in the legitimacy of states and other institutions has been extensively explored by political scientists. The popularity and acceptability of particular state apparatus policies and actions wax and wane according to many factors. But when popular dissatisfaction becomes either chronic or particularly intense, structural sources are often to blame. Legitimacy deficits occur when a significant gap exists between what the populace comes to expect and what the state apparatus is able to provide.[24] A legitimacy *deficit* may be defined generally as a loss of state apparatus authority caused by its failure to perform some important and expected function. A legitimacy *crisis* occurs when such a deficiency manifests itself in a particularly intense fashion. Legitimacy deficits are often chronic and cloaked, and only erupt episodically into crises. In short, legitimacy deficits stem from gaps between performance and promise, and legitimacy crises are eruptive manifestations of this situation.

Most of the theoretical analysis on legitimacy and structure has focused upon the relationships between the state apparatus, class structure, and the modes and forces of production. Neo-Marxist scholars have extensively employed the concept of a "legitimacy crisis" to understand the consequences of domestic contradictions, particularly between capitalist economies and democratically constituted states and, less frequently, to understand contradictions stemming from a state's position within an international political economy beyond its control.[25]

Legitimacy deficits and crises can also be expected in situations where a significant gap exists between the state apparatus' obligated promise and its potential performance in meeting the security needs, or perceptions of need, of the members of civil society. The contradiction between state purpose and performance in a nuclear world can be expected to exist in every country, because all countries have the elemental expectation that the state apparatus will seek or achieve at least some minimum physical security.

This deficiency is generally less sensitive to regime type than to other structurally rooted legitimacy problems, but still shows some variation. The contradiction between security performance and purpose is likely to be less acute and in less visible form in highly *statist* countries, where the state has

subordinated, marginalized, or absorbed civil society, and where it is widely accepted that the part of the polity outside the state apparatus exists solely for the benefit of the state apparatus.[26] Conversely, the manifestations of such deficiencies are likely to be much more severe in countries with constitutions subordinating the state to civil society. Thus, among the nuclear-armed polities, the legitimacy deficits caused by the contradiction between security promise and performance can be expected to be most extreme in liberal democratic republics such as the United States, as Henry Kissinger has observed:

> [The strategy of mutual assured destruction] imposes an unbearable psychological burden. For how long can democratic leaders tell their public that their security is based on leaving them naked to extermination? Faced with such prospects, pacifism and unilateral disarmament will sooner or later sap the will to defend the West.[27]

State Legitimation Strategies

States are structures, but governments are actors, and as such they are not simply passive recipients of pressures. Executives of states actively seek to shape their environment and to evade or escape uncongenial realities. In order to avoid the full revolutionary implications of nuclear explosives for their autonomy, state apparatuses in the nuclear era have sought to manage nuclear legitimacy problems through *nuclear reclusion* and *declaratory anti-nuclearism* . These are coping and managing responses that do not solve or eliminate the actual problems but, at best, only ameliorate them. Such strategies also entail their own costs, and are subject to breakdowns. Their existence is further evidence of the contradiction between state institutions and nuclear security imperatives, and a reason why nuclear legitimacy problems manifest themselves in the patterns they do.

One managing or compensatory response to nuclear contradiction is for states to attempt to hide or obscure the presence or implications of nuclear weapons from their citizens. Nuclear reclusion combats nuclear legitimacy deficits because nuclear weapons that are out-of-sight are also out-of-mind for the public. Prior to the nuclear era, weapons were frequently objects of public display, in parades and other public ceremonies that served to enhance the prestige and reputation of a state both at home and abroad. A display of pre-nuclear military capability was likely to engender feelings of pride and patriotism in the citizenry and enhance public confidence in the legitimacy and effectiveness of a state. By contrast, nuclear weapons tend to evoke dread and unease among the public whom they are intended to protect, thus undercutting state legitimacy and public patriotism. As a result, state apparatuses have been quite careful to keep nuclear weapons as much out of sight as possible.[28]

Nuclear reclusion is *appealing* because it combats nuclear legitimacy deficits, but it is *feasible* only because of nuclear weapons' highly distinctive features and their compact form. The relative ease with which states have been able to recluse nuclear weapons rests upon the distinctive material features of the devices. Nuclear weapons lack a salience in everyday life, and so are relatively easy to keep from public view. This feature of nuclear weapons helps account for the infrequency with which the nuclear legitimacy deficit has erupted into an actual legitimacy crisis.

Evidence for the importance of nuclear reclusion in sustaining nuclear legitimacy can be found by examining the handful of instances in which the state could not maintain the separation between its nuclear activities and the civil population. Two of the most politically important public resistances to nuclear weapons in the United States were the opposition to atmospheric nuclear testing during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, and to the proposed basing of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptors near cities during the late 1960s.[29] In both cases, the public was aroused by the intrusion of nuclear capability

into their everyday lives. The opposition to atmospheric nuclear testing was based upon the public's awareness that it was being poisoned by the radioactive fallout, and the elimination of atmospheric nuclear testing--not testing in general--caused public concern to diminish.[30]

The second episode of successful public activism against nuclear weapons took place in response to the efforts of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations to deploy a limited ABM, which generated intense public opposition to the placing of nuclear anti-missile missiles around American cities.[31] By contrast, the MIRVing of Minuteman missiles in the early 1970s was a much more strategically significant development. It proceeded with little public concern, however, because it never intruded into everyday life. What the episodes have in common is that they were caused by the inability of the state to keep the nuclear world clearly separated from the civilian world.[32]

State apparatuses also can manage or compensate for the legitimacy problems posed by nuclear weapons by embracing anti-nuclearism at a rhetorical level. States have frequently introduced and maintained a wide gap between nuclear declaratory policy and nuclear operational policy. Gaps between word and deed are as old as history, but the nuclear era is exceptional for the intensity of anti-nuclear propaganda propagated by nuclear-armed states. States have sought to deflect popular unease about nuclear insecurity by posing as advocates of nuclear abolition or deep disarmament. Since the very beginning of the nuclear era, the American political leadership has frequently declared its support for the elimination of nuclear weapons. President Truman's support for the Baruch Plan, which envisioned eventual disarmament, was part of a strategy of building public support for continued American nuclear weapon possession and development.[33] During the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union traded a series of proposals for deep disarmament that were motivated, in part, by a similar desire.[34] Nuclear utopianism has been a vital instrument of state apparatus legitimacy during the nuclear era.[35]

American Security Structures and Nuclear Illegitimacy

We have hypothesized the existence of a nuclear legitimacy deficit and described some of the ways in which it can be managed and deflected, but we are still only partially prepared to begin looking for evidence for it and employing this model to explain events of the 1980s. The structurally-rooted legitimacy deficit postulated by a modified nuclear one worldism argument does not exist in a political vacuum but will inevitably be refracted by the specific institutional structures of a polity's security constitution. To draw an analogy from astrophysics, the pressures created by the obsolescence of the real-state are like the "solar wind" of charged particles steadily striking the earth from the sun. These forces do not, however, strike the ground evenly, but are instead shaped by the earth's magnetic field. As they pass through this field, the solar forces are not stopped or diminished, but rather concentrated in some locations, diverted from others, and given a distinct overall shape. In a similar manner, the pressures produced by nuclear legitimacy deficits are directed and diverted by the institutional structures of a polity's security constitution. They do not make themselves felt everywhere in the same way or degree; instead they are particularly intense at some institutional locations while being weak in others.

To understand the institutional fields shaping these forces, we must thus examine a second and more variable set of security structures: The specific organizations and institutions tasked with the regulation of violence and the provision of security. Our main interest is not with this structure but, instead, in the more basic dynamic of nuclear legitimacy. But because such intrapolity structures exist, they must be

mapped and analyzed for the ways in which they refract the pressures. Such an analysis will help us identify places where the nuclear legitimacy deficits are likely to emerge as political phenomena.

The American Nuclear Security Constitution

Single case studies can never be definitive, but there are three strong reasons why a close examination of the nuclear legitimacy dynamics in the United States is particularly interesting. First, the United States has possessed nuclear weapons longer than any other state, information about American nuclear political control is relatively more available, and nuclear weapons policy has been subject to extensive debate. Second, democratic institutions and norms are particularly well established in the United States, and the depth of reflection and concern with internal control of violence capability and war-making authority in the American political tradition and Constitutional structure exceeds that of any other major state in the world. Third, the United States has been the most powerful state in the post-World War II era; the resulting pressure to compete with other states, while quite strong, would still be expectably less than would be the case in smaller and more precariously situated countries.

The fundamentals of the nuclear era security constitution of the United States can be readily schematized. Three features of this security constitution are of particular importance. First, the executive occupies a central position in the American nuclear security constitution. The office of the President as originally constituted was balanced and checked by the Congress, the states and citizen militias, but these constraints do not significantly bind the Presidency in the nuclear security constitution. The Presidency is the juncture where the apparatus for commanding nuclear weapons must be mediated with the citizens of the polity.

A second feature of the nuclear security constitution is that the citizenry has been reduced to a largely passive and non-participating role and is fundamentally disengaged from the control of nuclear weapons. Whereas the hallmark of the original American security constitution was the direct possession of the instruments of violence by the citizenry, the nuclear security constitution completely removes nuclear weapons from the hands of the citizens and the militia.[36]

Third, the link between executive and nuclear weapons has been greatly strengthened. A key feature of the contemporary nuclear security constitution is the elaborate system of electronic locks and codes placed upon nuclear weapons.[37] These technologies and systems have introduced a fundamentally new option into the arms control repertoire: the possibility of separating weapon *possession* from weapon *control* . These technologies thus enable the United States to maintain its tradition of preventing the military from having exclusive control over the instruments of violence.

Three Types of Anti-nuclearism

In the paleo-Realism of nuclear one worldism, the legitimacy challenge posed by nuclear weapons is essentially based on their problematic relationship to the most primal of Realist values: survival. But nuclear weapons in the American polity have posed two other legitimacy problems as well, ones that should be distinguished from the core of our argument. The *survivalist* challenges that derive from the public vulnerability produced by nuclear violence are different in important ways from the traditional *moralist* and *pacifist* criticisms of state violence, as well as the particular *Constitutional corruption* concerns unique to American politics. The nuclear problem has sharpened and intensified the moralist and constitutional corruption objection. These three legitimacy challenges are fundamentally different, but they do overlap, obscuring the distinctively Realist nature of the nuclear legitimacy problem, so it is

necessary to briefly describe and distinguish them.

Strong moral and ethical arguments against the use of nuclear weapons constitute a distinct, but powerful, challenge to the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. The essence of the moral critique is the claim that nuclear weapons are inherently genocidal (if not omnicidal) and that mass murder is not, or should not be, a legitimate option of statecraft. Many modern wars have generated moral challenges to their legitimacy from pacifists who claimed that killing was wrong and war was organized murder. But this objection was not nearly so pronounced a basis for civil society-state apparatus conflict and legitimation challenge as nuclear weapons have been. In terms of the Hobbesian "state of nature," the moral challenge to nuclearism is like an individual wishing to leave the state of nature because that individual finds it morally objectionable to kill (as opposed to his fear of being killed).

The legitimacy deficit posed by nuclear weapons should also be distinguished from the legitimacy problems that have attended the United States' activities as a Great Power. Since the founding of the American republic, and with growing intensity during the last half century, Constitutionally defined relationships have been significantly deformed. This has generated a chronic legitimation problem, with "the flag outrunning the Constitution." This legitimation problem is the consequence of the United States' role as a state with an extended military and diplomatic presence throughout the world and from the exercise of hegemonic power within its spheres of influence. Such foreign involvement corrupts and deforms the domestic political system by: 1) altering the balance of power within the government by shifting power from Congress to the President, creating an "Imperial Presidency" and a "state within a state"; 2) limiting popular control over the government and increasing state apparatus autonomy; 3) corrupting and militarizing the political culture; 4) eroding civil liberties; and 5) sapping economic strength and corrupting capitalist "free enterprise." The deleterious consequences of these foreign interventions, entangling alliances, and the institutions necessary to sustain them were given classic statement by George Washington and John Adams. Such objections were raised by opponents of the War with Mexico, taken up again by the opponents of the Spanish-American and Philippine War, reiterated in the 1930s by Charles Beard, and yet again in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the demands of global anti-communist containment, and Vietnam, in particular. This regime corruption and deformation has been accentuated by the nuclear revolution.

Nuclear weapons pose a legitimacy problem for American state institutions that is, in some respects, a similar, if more extreme, version of those posed by the burdens of traditional Great Power activity. But at their most fundamental level, they are opposites. Their difference can be described thus: The older one is caused by the fact that the United States (vis-à-vis weaker neighbors) *is* a Great Power; the newer one is caused by the fact that the United States (vis-à-vis survival against nuclear attack) *is not* a Great Power. The older, pre-nuclear challenge stems from an *excess* of strength toward neighbors; the newer nuclear challenge stems from an *absence* of strength to achieve basic security.

Publics, Presidents, and Militaries

Combining this structure with the general pressures of nuclear illegitimacy suggests that the politics of nuclear weapons are likely to take several distinct forms, as can be seen from the recent nuclear history of the United States.

First, the Presidency is an institutional juncture where two very different demands and discourses must somehow be reconciled. The people want security, and the military wants to win wars. In the pre-nuclear era, these two could be reconciled; in the nuclear era, security means not fighting wars, and winning wars

means no security. Given these dual demands, the Presidency will tend to be Janus-faced and equivocal, saying and doing different--if not opposite--things to its different constituencies. On the one side, the Presidency will want to keep nuclear issues and the public as far removed from one another as possible. Where complete evasion is not possible, the Presidency will want to reassure the public that everything possible is being done to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons.

Second, the public will tend to be generally quiescent so long as this contradiction does not receive full airing, either through speeches or actions; when the contradiction is aired, however, the public will become *eruptive* . An alternating pattern of long noninvolvement and episodic intense involvement is produced by the structure of the nuclear security constitution. It also follows from this observation that, when the public does become intensely involved, its attitudes toward nuclear issues will be undersocialized into the norms and assumptions of the state security apparatus regarding nuclear weapons.[38]

The third consequence of the public's relationship to nuclear weapons is that it will not provide good support for the emergence of a critical mass of sustained intellectual critique. The Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, in analyzing the formation of consciousness conducive to revolutionary change, spoke about the formation of "organic intellectuals" whose ideas and theories would provide the strategies and designs for systemic alternatives.[39] The relationship between nuclear weapons and civil society is, in particular, not especially conducive to the generation of organic intellectuals devoted to creating and disseminating nuclear structural alternatives. When the public is quiescent, the state and its derivative organs--including extra-governmental "think tanks" and academics concerned with nuclear security--will tend to monopolize discourse on nuclear issues. In this situation, experts inclined to be fundamentally critical of the status quo will lack institutional support and so will be relatively few in number compared to the legions of state-supported and state-supporting experts. In order to remain relevant, experts critical of the status quo will be forced to work only on incremental alternative measures that have credibility with statist representatives. Absent an agent to implement their schemes, organic intellectuals offering models of nuclear security orders congruent with public safety, rather than state interests, will be regarded as "utopian," as were socialists prior to the emergence of the working class.

These features of the public's relationship to deep structural nuclear realities mean that moments of public eruption are less likely to give birth to enduring institutional change. When public nuclear concern suddenly does emerge in full force, the intellectual groundwork for alternatives will not have been prepared, and those experts concerned with nuclear alternatives will see their incremental agendas swamped by possibilities they are unprepared to exploit. Furthermore, the absence of organic nuclear survival intellectuals means that the leadership of the eruptive moments will tend to pass into the hands of other elites outside the state apparatus with the resources at hand to lead. But these elites will have their own orientations and agendas that will tend to become conflated with nuclear issues, and will tend to employ public concern to further their established goals.

Nuclear Doctrines as Political Ideologies

The structural analysis of nuclear politics also suggests that, in the nuclear era, there will be a stratification of nuclear ideologies in democratic polities. The various schools of thinking about nuclear policy are typically treated as competing *substantive* claims about nuclear reality. But they are also ideological formulations that serve to legitimate the activities of various actors and to advance their interests. The old adage "where one stands is determined by where one sits" can be fruitfully applied to

understand the nuclear realm.

If nuclear ideology reflects differing situational interests, then we should expect a stratification of nuclear thinking into three broad levels. First, military organizations have a distinct corporate interest in and orientation to military questions that are not simply derivative of broader formulations of the "national" interest. Building on organization theory, Barry Posen has pointed out that, all else being equal, military organizations have a corporate interest in larger budgets, greater autonomy, and in having a political mandate to win wars, rather than defend against or avenge attacks. Military organizations thus will tend to prefer doctrines and force structures that are oriented toward the offense (pre-emption, escalation-dominance, and victory), rather than defense or deterrence.[40] In the nuclear era, this military organizational interest will tend to generate and support the *war strategist* orientation toward nuclear weapons. War strategism thus provides support for the "conventionalization" of nuclear weapons, and for military force structures and doctrines that require large numbers of nuclear weapons postured for use in a wide range of situations.

Second, the public, while generally uninformed about the intricacies of nuclear issues, will tend to favor measures that eliminate the threat of nuclear destruction, either through disarmament or defense. Civil society will, depending upon circumstances, thus tend toward *nuclear one worldist* orientations that will be threatening to state autonomy and to the approaches preferred by military organizations. These orientations will be dismissed by the state apparatus and its supporters as "utopian," "idealist," or "unrealistic." The state apparatus and its ideologies will tend to treat as unrealistic positions that are unstatist, even if their statist orientations are dysfunctional according to the Realist criteria of survival.

Third, the executive (and the parastatal sectors that serve it) will be forced to somehow mediate between the politically explosive opposites of public nuclear one worldism and military war strategism. The civilian executive must simultaneously gain popular acceptance for policies and perform the role of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Given this structurally rooted ideological stratification, the office of the Presidency should be particularly subject to turbulence and disjuncture, because it is here that popular anti-nuclearism must be mediated with its antithesis of nuclear employment. This is where one individual must cope with intense competing pressures and, somehow, square the circle.

In order to cope with these opposing demands, the senior civilian leadership and parastatals that serve them will tend to embrace doctrines of deterrence. Such doctrines respond to both the military's demands for an expansive offensive capability, and the people's desire to be secured from the nuclear world. The prevalence of such deterrence orientations among civilian strategists has recently been attested to by Richard Betts, a national security intellectual:

> Outside the fraternity of strategists and foreign policy experts the idea [of nuclear deterrence] has been less hallowed; from anti-military intellectuals, to President Reagan, to the Catholic Bishops, some have questioned the morality or durability of policies based on deterrence. With the exception of a minority of radicals, these challenges were episodic or inchoate and never dented the dominance of the principle [of nuclear deterrence] within circles that make or analyze foreign policy.[41]

It is notable that what Kissinger thought of as a deep-seated tendency within democratic publics, Betts regarded as a marginal phenomenon, held only by marginalized radicals. Those critics who point out that doctrines of nuclear deterrence do not add up conceptually miss the more essential point that they are, at least in part, ideologies meant to appeal simultaneously to opposing constituencies. The appeal of such deterrence doctrines is that they promise, or at least attempt, to square the circle--to simultaneously

constrain the military's appetite while soothing the fears of the citizenry.

The Reagan Nuclear Episode

Many of the most powerful political currents of the nuclear era reached a climax in the early 1980s during the Reagan Administration, whose behavior on nuclear questions was extraordinarily erratic.[42] In 1981, the Reagan era began with a campaign designed to convince the Soviet Union that the United States could "prevail" in a nuclear war, but it ended with a near-commitment by President Reagan to abolish nuclear weapons. A closer look at this peculiar period reveals the dynamic of nuclear legitimation and de-legitimation more clearly and strongly than ever before.

Reagan, Rhetoric, and Reaction

The opening act of the drama was the unprecedented attempt by President Ronald Reagan, and many key officials in his administration, to close the gap between declarative and operational nuclear policy by saying publicly that the United States would do what it had long been preparing to do. Numerous Reagan Administration officials publicly espoused a war strategist understanding of nuclear weapons.[43] Rhetorically, nuclear weapons were treated as conventional ones, and the dangers of nuclear use were downplayed, if not wholly dismissed. Ironically, perhaps, the Reagan Administration's departures were much greater in rhetorical than operational terms. In terms of operational doctrine and the deployment of nuclear forces, the Reagan Administration's initiatives marked only incremental changes from the policies of the Carter Administration, and those before it. But at a rhetorical level, the change was revolutionary. For the first time since World War II, U.S. officials cast aside the rhetorical facade of anti-nuclearism and brought American declarative policy into line with actual operational and deployment policy.

This unprecedented rhetorical revision stimulated a public eruption, a rapid and massive rise in public anxiety, opposition, and activism. On June 12, 1982, between 500,000 and one million Americans rallied in New York City's Central Park in support of a "freeze" on nuclear weapons.[44] Public opinion polls consistently showed that somewhere between two-thirds and three-fourths of the adult population of the United States supported efforts, of a fairly radical and comprehensive nature, to restrain and reverse the nuclear arms race.[45] Much of the public activism was focused upon the proposal for a "nuclear freeze" advocated by a largely "grass-roots" political movement.[46] Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force general and National Security Adviser during the Ford and Bush Administrations, observed: "What seems to be emerging in the United States is a reaction at both ends of the political spectrum against deterrence and the despair which in the current situation it tends to promote."[47] A range of religious leaders, most notably the Catholic Bishops' Conference,[48] seriously called into question the basic tenet of nuclear strategy, the willingness to retaliate against, and thus deter, a nuclear attack.

As a result of these developments, thoughtful observers from diverse political viewpoints registered a "sea change" in basic popular and elite attitudes toward nuclearism. Deterrence was attacked from both ends of the political spectrum. On the right, conservatives who otherwise supported the Reagan Administration insisted that the willingness of the government to tolerate, even support, the permanent vulnerability of its citizens to assured destruction was an abrogation of its basic responsibilities. On the left, Richard Falk, with perhaps some overstatement, spoke of a "societal consensus" against reliance upon nuclear weapons and argued that "the state is losing its legitimacy in the national security sector, especially in relation to nuclear war."[49] Because deterrence was de-legitimated on the both the political

right and left, the more basic fissure in this debate was between the democratic and libertarian elements of civil society, on the one side, and the state security apparatus on the other. So widespread was this calling into question of deterrence that even Robert W. Tucker, a well-known *realpolitik* scholar and foreign policy commentator, spoke gravely about a dangerous loss of "nuclear faith" and predicted that this challenge to the nuclear state was not a temporary or passing event:

> . . . there seems little doubt but that a striking change in attitude has occurred and that in consequence the public now takes a far less acquiescent view toward nuclear weapons than it once did. Nuclear weapons are no longer seen to strengthen the nation's security. Instead they are increasingly found to have weakened it. . . . Although triggered in large measure by careless words of Reagan Administration officials, the movement and controversy are the results of developments that can scarcely be laid at the doorstep of this Administration. To argue that the emergence of the nuclear issue in the 1980s can be seen as the work of a misguided administration during its first years in office is to misunderstand the deeper significance of recent events and the portent they may well hold out. Although the activity of the anti-nuclear movement has clearly abated, the basic circumstances conditioning the explosive emergence of the nuclear issue have not diminished. If anything, they may be expected to grow stronger with the passage of time.[50]

The unpopularity of the policies of one Administration does not itself demonstrate the existence of a structurally rooted crisis in civil society-state apparatus relations. But the breadth and depth of this attitudinal shift provides evidence that the chronic and cloaked legitimacy deficit had become an outright crisis. These events were much more than a heated policy dispute. The calling into question of deterrence and nuclearism can accurately be labeled a legitimacy crisis because these disputes touch upon primal state apparatus functions.

"Casual Utopianism"

The Reagan Administration's response to the rapid decline in the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and deterrence was as unprecedented as its initial moves. When the nuclear freeze movement challenged the legitimacy of deterrence and nuclearism in a highly popular way, Reagan responded by adopting it as his own,[51] although he did not stop with a return to the nuclear-era rhetorical status quo of declaratory anti-nuclearism. Instead, much to the dismay and bewilderment of the other members of his administration, he sought to implement a radical anti-nuclear agenda. First, he launched the Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as "Star Wars," to roll back or technologically repeal the nuclear revolution by "rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." Then, at the Reykjavik Summit in March 1986, he agreed enthusiastically to deep disarmament proposals that had not been considered seriously by official groups for more than thirty years.[52]

The ease with which Ronald Reagan embraced the radical anti-nuclear critique, and then sought to implement it, reflected his own particular character and talents as well as the nature of his political constituency. Although never strong on details of policy, he had an extraordinarily keen sense of the popular psychology. Two recent analyses of Reagan and his presidency by political journalists Lou Cannon and Don Oberdorfer both document that Reagan's anti-nuclearism was deeply held and not just a public relations expedient.[53] In his outlook and temperament he remained a Washington outsider. The Republican Party's long-standing ideology of opposition to large and uncontrollable governments in Washington always contained the risk that the national security state, as well as the social welfare state, might be delegitimated.

The response of the security state apparatus to Reagan's initiatives was overwhelmingly hostile. Reagan's Reykjavik initiatives were disavowed by the horrified and embarrassed members of the national security

establishment, who favored traditional arms control aimed at stabilizing deterrence. James Schlesinger, whose career in the upper echelons of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy makes him as close to a nuclear state spokesman as one could hope to find, scathingly faulted Reagan for the sin of "casual utopianism."[54] From the standpoint of the national security state, both Reagan's ambitious version of Star Wars and deep disarmament were seen as fundamentally utopian, since both were based upon the premise that deterrence is unacceptable. As Richard Nixon, perhaps the most *realpolitik* President of the postwar era observed: "At the Reykjavik summit, the Reagan Administration undermined public support for nuclear deterrence by advocating the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons. We must renounce the Reykjavik rhetoric in unequivocal terms and explain to western publics the realities of the nuclear age."[55] The very fact that they were seriously entertained in a bold fashion at an international summit by a popular leader with impeccable anti-communist national security credentials further threatened the statist legitimation of deterrence.

The state security apparatus also sought to redirect Star Wars to the "realistic" goal of shoring up deterrence rather than eliminating it. The conflicting agendas of those who wanted to secure the public and those who wanted to preserve state autonomy were clearly visible in the conflict over the re-direction of the Star Wars program: The state security apparatus sought to re-direct the program away from Reagan's goal of protecting population to one designed to protect missiles and military command centers.

The extraordinary shift of the Reagan Administration from the most extreme war strategist rhetoric to the most extreme nuclear one worldist program of the nuclear era was set up by a desire to close the gap between nuclear declaratory and operational policy. And, so, where Reagan began by attempting to bring rhetoric in line with traditional operational reality, he ended by attempting to bring reality in line with the utopian rhetoric.

In contrast to his predecessors, Reagan had not been adequately socialized into the institutional requirements of the Presidency during the nuclear era and the Cold War. During the 1980 election, Jimmy Carter and the Democrats argued that Reagan was not responsible enough on nuclear issues to occupy the office of the Presidency. This turned out to be both right and wrong in ways completely unexpected at the time. In failing to understand or respect the delicate balancing role of the Presidency in mediating the powerful cross-currents created by nuclear weapons, Reagan was indeed unsuited, or at least unprepared, to play the role of President as it had been defined by the nuclear statists. However, in pursuing a policy of actual rather than rhetorical anti-nuclearism, Reagan was arguably the first President of the nuclear era who sought to represent the interests of the public to the state, rather than the interests of the state to the public. Thus, like a bolt of lightening in a dark night, the Reagan episode illuminates brilliantly, if briefly, the basic structural forces and fields created by nuclear possession.

Civil Defense and Civic Activism

Further insight into the deformation of state-civil society relations wrought by nuclear weapons can be seen by considering the politics of civil defense in the nuclear age. Compared to the Soviet Union, the United States invested relatively little in nuclear civil defense during the Cold War.[56] Civil defense was one area of actual nuclear policy where the Reagan administration did seek to make an important departure from previous administrations. The strategic program of the early Reagan administration had five main components: 1) deployment of a new land-based heavy ICBM (the MX or "Peacekeeper"); 2) deployment of a new generation of ballistic missile submarines and missiles (the Trident); 3)

procurement of a new generation of manned bombers (the B-1 and the B-2); 4) upgrades in the strategic command and control system; and 5) a greatly expanded program of civil defense. Of these five initiatives only the last--civil defense--was a major departure from the programs of the later Carter Administration.[57] Upon entering office, the Reagan Administration assigned a relatively obscure agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to draw up plans for civil defense evacuations. FEMA was also directed to actually hold practice civil defense evacuations.[58]

This was more easily ordered than accomplished. Due to the federal character of the United States Constitution, FEMA had to convince local governments to cooperate in conducting the evacuation exercises. Governments might be willing, but FEMA's efforts to design and practice evacuations to be used in the event of a nuclear attack encountered stiff resistance from the exploding "grass-roots peace movement." These groups reasoned that civil defense would be an ineffective measure in the actual event of a nuclear war and, even more ominously, that the practice of nuclear evacuations would add to the illusion among both the public and the government that nuclear wars could be fought and survived. Because of their ability to readily influence the various local government bodies that actually had to authorize the plans and the practices, anti-nuclear groups were able to thwart most of FEMA's efforts. The result was that, after a year of fruitless effort, the Reagan Administration abandoned its civil defense initiative. Of the five nuclear modernization programs of the Reagan Administration, only the civil defense initiative was actually halted by the public uprising against nuclear weapons during the early 1980s.

The logic of the leaders of the peace movement in opposing the civil defense measures was curiously contradictory, and may have been ultimately counterproductive to their more basic goals. At the heart of the case against civil defense measures was the fear that practicing evacuations for nuclear war would have added to the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. But this conclusion defies common sense. Instead of generating public support, such exercises would be more likely to drive home to the public the harsh reality of their vulnerability to nuclear attack. Civil defense exercises would end nuclear reclusion, and the reality of insecurity in the nuclear era would be vividly experienced by the public. Civil defense practices would have constituted a mass, government-funded lesson in the vulnerability of the populace to nuclear annihilation. The peace movement leaders assumed not only that the public would fail to catch on to this fact but also that the public could be educated into the evils of various offensive weapons systems such as the MX. In reality, civil defense practices might well have provided the means for conversion of the generally quietistic and episodically eruptive public into a routinely activated and participating force in nuclear security politics.

With the civil defense program, the Reagan Administration inadvertently sabotaged the principle of nuclear reclusion that had kept the structural realities of the nuclear era from manifesting themselves as legitimacy crises. The blundering move to undo their own legitimacy was, however, short-lived and self-correcting. The peace movement quickly solved the Administration's problem for it by covering the gaping hole that had been opened in the screen of reclusion. Spared further traumatic exposure to the reality of its situation, the public soon returned to its slumber, able again to rest in peace in the cocoon of statist nuclear evasion.

Conclusions

Three conclusions are suggested. First, the "black box" of the units has been opened, and light has been shed light on the dynamics and dilemmas of nuclear security politics within nuclear possessed polities.

The advent of nuclear explosives has fundamentally altered the relationship between the state apparatus and civil society, creating a nuclear *legitimacy deficit* . Nuclear weapons are revolutionary in their implications for the viability of states as security providers and, thus, of state-civil society relations, but this fact has not yet registered in a fundamental or revolutionary restructuring of polities. Rather than a *revolution* , there is a *revolutionary challenge* --a set of unresolved contradictions between the security imperatives of the nuclear world, the security approaches of states, and the security requirements of civil society. One important political consequence of this unresolved tension is the reduced legitimacy of states, particularly when they apply statist approaches to nuclear security issues. Because state apparatuses derive their legitimacy, at least in part, from their viability as providers of security, the unmet nuclear security challenge produces a chronic "legitimacy deficit" for states. How legitimacy deficits are politically expressed depends on the internal structure of the polity. This legitimacy deficiency is generated by the contradiction between statist approaches to security and the security imperatives of the nuclear world, and it cannot be eliminated or fully resolved except through a displacement of statist approaches to nuclear security--a change that no one polity can unilaterally achieve. It is possible, however, for this nuclear legitimacy deficit to be evaded and cloaked by a variety of stratagems, even if not actually resolved or permanently avoided by them. But such evasion and displacement cannot be achieved in all circumstances, and chronic nuclear legitimacy deficiencies can erupt periodically into full-fledged crises. On these crisis occasions, the public becomes highly aroused and the politics of nuclear weapons become supercharged with potential for far-reaching institutional change.

The ability of states to evade--at least for a while--the domestic political consequences of nuclear possession helps to solve an important theoretical puzzle in the nuclear one world model. If the state mode of providing security and protection has been rendered obsolete by the advent of nuclear weapons, then it could be expected that alternative institutional forms would emerge to take its place. States with *realpolitik* orientations might persist after the demise of the real-state mode, but if they persist long enough, then doubt must be cast upon the basic proposition that they have been rendered unviable. Contradiction, while a vital analytic tool for understanding change in institutions, can degenerate into a convenient means of avoiding discomfirming evidence. However, if states have a menu of mechanisms for evading and managing the domestic political consequences of the obsolescence of the real-state mode, then an explanation is available for the persistence of the contradiction.

Second, Ronald Reagan and his administration are cast in a new light. The odd and unprecedented gyrations of the Reagan Administration on nuclear matters provides initial support for the proposition that nuclear weapons pose fundamental legitimacy problems for the states that possess them. Attacked from both the political Right and Left for deviations from orthodoxy, Reagan ultimately may have served as a better bellwether for the American polity's genuine security interests than either his political friends or enemies are prepared to recognize. His friends on the Right have yet to grasp that his radical anti-nuclearism was profoundly consistent with his general anti-statism. His enemies on the Left, highly critical of the imperialistic tendencies of American foreign policy, have yet to grasp that his radical anti-nuclearism, not the statism of realpolitkers Nixon and Kissinger, is the most consistent application of the core American tradition of republican anti-statism.

Third, and finally, the relationship between Realism and popular anti-nuclearism has been recast, and a new understanding has been achieved about the weaknesses and strengths of its security practices in the nuclear era and their interaction with domestic political structures. The insistence that the real-state be transformed into a component of a more general nuclear control system is based in Realism, but is

significantly dependent for its realization upon popular mobilization. The political consequences of nuclear illegitimacy may not be so consistently felt as to constitute a major barrier to acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons by states, and even states embedded in polities with relatively strong traditions of civil society supremacy. The strategies available to states to evade the legitimacy burdens of nuclear weapons, rooted in the ease with which nuclear weapons lend themselves to reclusion, suggest that the nuclear revolution is unlikely to generate a political revolution within nuclear polities. Furthermore, the structurally rooted difficulties in sustaining a critical mass of organic intellectuals focused upon genuine nuclear security alternatives provides another hurdle to revolutionary institutional change.

Given that the effectiveness of nuclear reclusion and of popular peace movements are inversely proportional, new avenues for peace movement strategy to combat reclusion deserve consideration. Nuclear reclusion can be countered by institutionalizing public symbolic representations of nuclear reality, so that both the public and its leaders will never be able to forget that they sit eternally perched at the edge of a bottomless well of nuclear destructive energies. Such an agenda has lengthy precedents. States have long sought to instill the requisite patriotism and obedience in their subjects. And republics, unlike the purely liberal polities in which individual preferences are taken as given, have long sought to form civic personalities consistent with their institutional machinery, particularly the virtues of self-restraint and a suspicion of centralized power.

Note 1: Colin Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane Russak, 1977); and Colin Gray, *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) Back.

Note 2: Bernard Brodie, "War in the Atomic Age," and "Implications for Military Strategy," in Brodie ed., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Charles Glazer, *Analyzing Nuclear Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Back.

Note 3: John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Era* (New York: Columbia University , 1959); Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). Back.

Note 4: A good index of this disappearance is that no "nuclear one world" arguments appear in recent synoptic overviews of "security studies." See Joseph Nye Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988); and Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 211-39. Back.

Note 5: Daniel Deudney, "Dividing Realism: Structural Realism versus Security Materialism on Nuclear Security and Proliferation," *Security Studies* 2, nos 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993): 7-36; and Daniel Deudney, *Pax Atomica: Planetary Geopolitics and Republicanism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). Back.

Note 6: For analysis of the multiple factors that contributed to the end of the Cold War, see: Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security*

16, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92). Back.

Note 7: "The US-Soviet competition is for all practical purposes a permanent feature of international relations." Back.

Note 8: John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 5-58. Back.

Note 9: Patrick Glynn, *Closing Pandora's Box* (New York: New Republic Books, 1990). Back.

Note 10: David Cortright, *Peace Works: The Citizen's Role in Ending the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview, 1993). Back.

Note 11: Thus drawn, the real-state is an ideal type, and actual political orders will only be approximations of these features. Back.

Note 12: It should be noted that an additional assumption of this model is that the state apparatus is ultimately the security servant or agent of its citizens, a view shared by Realists and non-Realists alike. Back.

Note 13: Thus, in this formulation, legitimacy is *not* a dependent variable of the first four functions and therefore deserves to be considered along with them. Back.

Note 14: The relationship between legitimacy and the ability to provide security has been well-stated by Herz (*International Politics in the Atomic Age* , p. 41): "For throughout history, we notice that the basic political unit has been that which actually was in a position to afford protection and security to human beings, i.e., peace within, through the pacification of individual and group relationships, and security from outside interference or control. People, in the long run, will recognize that authority, any authority, which possesses this power of protection." Back.

Note 15: In the "billiard-ball model" states "represent a closed, impermeable and sovereign unit, completely separated from all other states." Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 3-24. This image is similar to John Herz' "hard-shelled" vs "permeable" units; see *International Politics* . Back.

Note 16: David Gauthier, *The Logic of Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), appendix, "Hobbes on International Relations," pp. 206-212. Back.

Note 17: Leopold von Ranke, "The Great Powers," in Theodore H. von Laue, *Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). Back.

Note 18: Since the beginning of the nuclear era, many realist theorists have retreated from the demanding criteria for great power status laid down by the classical realists and instead postulated that great powers are defined by the quantity of power assets held by states relative to others in the system. See for example, Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978); and Jack Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983). Back.

Note 19: For the concept of the "national security constitution" see Harold Koh, *The National Security*

Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). Back.

Note 20: Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," (1906) in Felix Gilbert ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 215. Back.

Note 21: Thus it would be misleading to classify Hintze's argument as "second-image reversed," because the "organization of army and of warfare" is driven, at least in part, by technological realities not reducible to the interstate environment and its distinctive logics of interaction. Back.

Note 22: The two best general works in this area are both highly idiosyncratic and in need of redoing: Stanislov Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); and Carroll Quigley, *Weapons Systems and Political Stability* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983). Back.

Note 23: John Barton, "A Third Nuclear Regime," in David Gompert, et al., eds., *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), p. 154. Back.

Note 24: Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and William Connolly, ed., *Legitimacy and the State* (New York: New York University Press, 1984). Back.

Note 25: Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975); Alan Wolf, *The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Back.

Note 26: France is an example of a highly statist country where, in a number of issue areas, civil society has been subordinated to the state. Back.

Note 27: Henry Kissinger, "How to Deal with Gorbachev," *Newsweek* , March 2, 1987, p. 42. That Kissinger proved to be absolutely wrong in his prediction does not gainsay his noting the contradiction and its potential implications. Back.

Note 28: Reclusion is also the rule in the United Kingdom and, to the extent possible, was the case in West Germany. In the Soviet Union, where discussions of the "dilemmas of deterrence" rarely reached outside of state institutions, the state would parade its ICBMs through Red Square every May Day. This was less for the consumption of Soviet citizens in Moscow than for CIA analysts in Reston. Back.

Note 29: A third, but more localized, successful public mobilization against a nuclear deployment occurred during the 1980s, when the citizens of Utah and Nevada helped derail the Air Force's plans to deploy a massive system of MX missiles and shelters in thinly populated regions of the two states. Back.

Note 30: Robert Divine, *Blowing on the Wind: the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1980* (New York: Oxford, 1978); and Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). Back.

Note 31: See Joel Primack and Frank von Hippel, "Stopping Sentinel," *Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena* (New York: New American Library, 1974), ch. 13. Back.

Note 32: The 1980s opposition across Europe to deployment of the "Euromissiles," and the rise of nuclear opposition in the Soviet Union after Chernobyl, reinforce the argument presented here. Back.

Note 33: On the propaganda dimensions of the Baruch Plan, see Thomas W. Graham, *American Public Opinion on NATO, extended deterrence, and use of nuclear weapons: Future fission?* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989). Back.

Note 34: Alva Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament* (New York: Pantheon, 1982, 2nd ed.). Back.

Note 35: The role of declaratory anti-nuclearism in overcoming the legitimacy deficit created by nuclear weapons possession has implications that go beyond domestic political dynamics. Advocates of the "nuclear revolution" hypothesis often cite the declaratory statements of political leaders as evidence for their claim that states have learned or absorbed basic facts about the nuclear world. If, however, such declarations serve the purpose of legitimating nuclear possession to domestic audiences, then they may not, in fact, be evidence for such adjustment. Back.

Note 36: Admittedly, this shift did not occur suddenly, inasmuch as, by 1939, the public's role had already been greatly reduced. Nonetheless, whereas World War II could not have been fought without the involvement of the country's citizens, World War III could have been and might still be. Back.

Note 37: Peter Douglas Feaver, *Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). Back.

Note 38: Although France might seem to provide a counter-example to these observations, it does not. As suggested earlier, French *étatisme* does not provide for a significant public role in that country's "security constitution." Public reaction to nuclear weapons policies at various times in the United Kingdom and West Germany, the latter not a nuclear state but certainly "nuclearized," tend to reinforce the argument I make here. Back.

Note 39: Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (New York: International Publishers, 1967). Back.

Note 40: This image of the preferences of military organizations is derived from Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), ch. 2. Back.

Note 41: Richard Betts, "The Concept of Deterrence in the Postwar Era," *Security Studies* 1, no. 1: 25. Back.

Note 42: It is always dangerous to assess those recent events for which additional information will become available, but a wealth of high-quality information is already available concerning this period. Back.

Note 43: For collections of such statements, see: Center for Defense Information, *Nuclear War Fighting: Quotations by Reagan Administration Officials* (Washington D.C., 1983); and Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War* (New York: Random House, 1982). Back.

Note 44: R. Herman, "Rally, speakers decry cost of nuclear arms race," *New York Times* , June 12, 1982, p. A3; and Fox Butterfield, "Anatomy of the Nuclear Protest," *New York Times Magazine* , May 11, 1982, pp. 16-17, 33-35. Back.

Note 45: Daniel Yankelovitch and John Doble, "The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R.," *Foreign Affairs* , Fall 1984, pp. 33-46; and Daniel Yankelovitch, et al., eds., *Voter Opinions on Nuclear*

Arms Policy (New York: The Public Agenda Foundation/ The Center for Foreign Policy Development, 1984). Back.

Note 46: Adam M. Garfinkle, *The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984). Back.

Note 47: Brent Scowcroft, "Strategic System Development and New Technology: Where Should We Go," *New Technology and Western Policy* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985, Adelphi Paper 197), Part I, p. 9. Back.

Note 48: Jim Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), text of the Bishops' 1983 pastoral letter. See also The United Methodist Bishops, *In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace* (Nashville, Tenn.: The Graded Press, 1986). Back.

Note 49: Richard Falk, "Nuclear Weapons and the Renewal of Democracy," in Avner Cohen and Steven Lee, ed., *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenheld, 1986). Back.

Note 50: Robert W. Tucker, *The Nuclear Debate: Deterrence and the Loss of Faith* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), pp. 14-15. Back.

Note 51: Leon Wieseltier, "Nuclear Idealism, Nuclear Realism," *The New Republic* , March 11, 1985, pp. 20-25. Wieseltier observed that the President had joined the peace movement "in the delegitimization of deterrence." Back.

Note 52: See Daniel Wirls, *Buildup: the Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 133, 163-64. Back.

Note 53: Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); and Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991). Back.

Note 54: James Schlesinger, "Reykjavik and Revelations: A Turn of the Tide," *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 3 (1987): 426-46. Schlesinger, who has been Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, head of the Office of Management and Budget, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was (and is) as clearly qualified to represent the nuclear state security apparatus as anyone alive. His review of Reagan's foibles was as scathing as any emerging from the left. Back.

Note 55: Richard Nixon, "American Foreign Policy: The Bush Agenda," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (1988/89): 208-9. Back.

Note 56: B. Wayne Blanchard, *American Civil Defense 1945-1984: The Evolution of Programs and Policies* (Emmitsburg, MD: National Emergency Training Center, 1985). Back.

Note 57: The MX, Trident, and C^3I upgrades were Carter Administration programs, while the B-1 and B-2 were revivals of projects killed by the Carter Administration, more for reasons of domestic political coalition than strategic value. See Nick Kotz, *The Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics and the B-1*

Bomber (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Back.

Note 58: FEMA was a direct descendent of the original civil defense agency established in the 1950s. That effort, which reached its culmination with the "shelter scare" of the early 1960s, was not much more successful than the Reagan Administration program. Back.

On Security

On Security, by Ronnie D. Lipschutz

5. Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens' Challenges to U.S. National Security Policy

Pearl-Alice Marsh

One of the goals of this volume is to better understand how particular conceptualizations of national security are formed and subsequently become the basis not only for declaratory policy but also for initiatives with respect to different parts of the world. In Chapter 3, Ole Wæver describes how security as a "speech act" can be used to securitize particular areas of national life. Such securitization projects do not always succeed; if they are to do so they must be plausible and present convincing cause-effect relationships. It is useful, therefore, to consider situations in which a securitization project has failed, and that is my purpose here.

During the Reagan Administration, major episodes of contestation over definitions of security took place when citizens groups, through a process of "grassroots statecraft," challenged national security policy with respect to a number of Third World countries. Operating under the conditions of the Cold War and the compelling ideas of geopolitics, the Reagan Administration was driven by the logic of both to compete with the Soviet Union and to draw strategic boundaries around, and through, an increasing number of states in the "periphery." This logic organized states into two dominant camps, each lined up with one or the other of the two superpowers. Civil conflicts occurring within any particular Third World country were, consequently, seen in "zero-sum" terms and as an opportunity by each superpower to weaken the influence of the other. Often such conflicts were fostered and exacerbated exactly for this purpose. The internal causes of civil conflict often were overlooked because of a desire either to destabilize or maintain the status quo, regardless of the legitimacy or domestic policies of the government in question. What emerged, then, in the context of Third World civil strife, was a contest between two public discourses: The first was an "official" statist one that focused on geopolitics and the securitization of specific countries; the second was one offered by citizens groups that focused on human rights, national self-determination, and desecuritization.

It has been axiomatic in foreign policy that geopolitical factors best account for our security concerns and that realms of concern such as human rights are too murky or contestable for official engagement.[1] The geopolitical framework has focused primarily on "balance" and "stability" and views all conflict through those lenses. Thus, regime stability, the maintenance of friends, and the arming of insurgents against enemies were the mainstays of both the U.S. and Soviet foreign policies.

The framework rooted in human rights challenged this notion that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," and looked more deeply at the internal social dynamics of political conflict within specific countries. This counter-discourse drew different conclusions regarding the implications of Third World conflicts for U.S. security and, indeed, whether such conflicts had anything at all to do with national security. The conclusion derived from the human rights approach was that a geopolitical framework fostered unnecessary interventions into the domestic affairs of countries and had the effect of

overmilitarization of civilian conflict. The outcome would be exactly what such intervention was intended to prevent--regime instability and, in the long run, hostility toward the United States--thereby fulfilling the scenario imagined and feared by U.S. policymakers, although for reasons quite the opposite of those they had postulated.

Oddly enough, both frameworks claimed the same ultimate outcome: The strengthening of relations with foreign regimes and, as a consequence, the strengthening of national security (neither considered seriously the likelihood that social chaos might also be a possible outcome, no matter which policy was pursued). Government and citizens groups competed to win the hearts and minds of the public by offering the public what they hoped were plausible cause-effect outcomes that would alter the perception of U.S. national security interests and, ultimately, enable them to prevail when the particular foreign policy initiatives they advocated were implemented.

I focus here on two specific cases. The first involves U.S. policy toward South Africa, a policy that was linked to U.S. national security as long ago as the late 1940s. This became a major concern of the Reagan Administration, in light of its fears of Soviet-launched "resource wars" in southern Africa. The second deals with Central America, where leftist governments and rebellions were pictured as the "thin wedge" of an expanding Communist base in the Western Hemisphere. I begin with a brief discussion of the concept of grassroots statecraft. I then analyze how conventional theories of international relations and foreign policy regard citizens' involvement in the practice of foreign policy as undesirable, if not dangerous. Next, I describe the ways in which grassroots statecraft challenges the discursive national security projects of the state. Finally, I discuss the two cases mentioned above.

Grassroots Statecraft: Challenging the Discourses of the State

I call the challenges to the state put forth by citizens' groups "grassroots statecraft." I define grassroots statecraft as encompassing the organized actions of citizens who are directly challenging the foreign policy of their government through contending discourses and "speech acts." Grassroots statecraft is rooted in the political processes that pit ideologies, values, strategies, and tactics of organized civil society against the foreign policy establishment of the state. It is the presence of overt public dissent within the political life of a community, in this case over national security policy. It is a process of forging political relations within civil society, and across national borders, sufficient to alter the terms of discourse within the formal political institutions and, in its strongest manifestation, to alter national security policy. It is what James Rosenau calls "stirrings at the micro level which are converted to macro outcomes."[2]

Theories of international relations and foreign policy do not have much to say about the role of the citizenry in foreign policy: From *realism* to *interdependence* , we find either silence or outright hostility to citizen involvement.[3] To the extent that the high politics of foreign policy are understood to emerge from the state in a "single voice," dissenting voices are minimized or ignored as not possessing the data needed to make an "informed" and "objective" judgment. It is in the interest of the state to create the sense of monopoly over the information that forms the basis for the definition of national interests and the formulation of foreign policy. As Ole Wæver points out in chapter 3: "In naming a certain development a security problem, the `state' can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. . . . By uttering `security,' a state-representative moves a

particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it."

Indeed, the state will do all that is in its power to discredit contrary or oppositional security discourses. Samuel Huntington has gone so far as to suggest that citizens' involvement in foreign policy matters represents an " `excess of democracy' and threatens the democratic order."[4] This extreme view illustrates the strong anti-citizen nature of a state-centered approach and implies that an "anti-democracy" stance in foreign policy is necessary in order to preserve democracy!--a stunning suggestion if taken to its logical conclusion.

In any event, the question of the "legitimacy" of citizens' actions, whether or not explicitly expressed, begs empirical observation: Citizens' groups are increasingly involved in the foreign policy process. Concerted citizens' actions range from the anti-apartheid movement in the United States to the environmentalist movements in Europe, each focused on interstate or transnational concerns and sharing common interests that lie beyond national political borders, beyond the range of conventional "domestic politics."[5] These groups seek not only to influence the foreign policy of the state, but also to conduct their own foreign policies, as well.

There are three forms of citizens action movements that seek to alter the behavior of states: (1) those that attempt to influence the affairs of foreign governments by changing the behavior of their own government toward the former (e.g., the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Sanctuary Movement); (2) those that assume responsibility for directly intervening in the affairs of the foreign government (e.g., human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, whose primary aim is to organize citizens around the world to apply pressure directly to individual governments[6]); and (3) those that go beyond governments and nations to an anti-national form of organization (e.g., some of the activities of organizations such as Greenpeace[7]). My concern here is primarily with movements and groups of the first type.

While the objectives of groups involved in grassroots statecraft vary as widely as their professed political tendencies, they share some common features: (1) a moral or ideological code which justifies their concerns and actions; (2) an information dissemination and communication structure able to access the general public through traditional organizational channels, mediated through a network of core activists who share a wide range of political and technical skills; (3) an array of tactics and means involving mass action and/or direct public pressure on elected officials; (4) direct relations with foreign movements or governments for whom they claim a cause; and (5) access to resources sufficient to sustain the groups' activities and to help support the movement. The degree to which groups are or are not successful depends on each one's ability to maximize these five features.

The difference between grassroots statecraft and the ordinary lobbying of Congress and the Executive by conventional interest groups is a critical one. Interest groups seek to alter the balance of forces within the federal government with respect to a particular policy issue. The questions they address include: Whom do we support? What should we give them? How much? Interest groups do not, however, question the fundamental premises of national security policy or the content of the security discourse. Threats are a given; responses are a necessity. Practitioners of grassroots statecraft seek to alter the very premises of national security discourse. They do not ask "whom should we should support?" but rather "is there a threat?" They do not accept as given the adversarial and conflictual nature of international politics but rather ask "What is in the best interests of the people involved?"

In the United States, grassroots statecraft movements have emerged primarily on the political left and, indeed, their more recent emergence in the United States can be traced directly to the left's opposition to the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Comparable movements on the right have developed subsequently (although similar movements existed in the 1950s) and they have tended to play up the conflictual and threatening nature of international politics (to the United States). While the left could claim credit for the overwhelming support for anti-apartheid legislation that emerged from the U.S. Congress during the 1980s, the right had its victories as well--support for the Contras in Nicaragua, the government of El Salvador, and the FNLA in Angola. In some cases--for example, U.S. policy toward Israel--the left/right dichotomy was ambiguous (an ambiguity that has not been made that much clearer by the 1993 agreement between Israel and the PLO). Supporters of a strong U.S.-Israel alliance in the Middle East, for example, ranged from the left and liberal to the far right. This support was not, however, an instance of grassroots statecraft as defined here; it developed much more along the lines of conventional interest group politics.

In the United States, well-organized, state-oriented protest politics and political movements work primarily within the structures of influence in electoral politics and levels of governance, taking advantage of the separation of jurisdictions between local, state, and national authorities, and the two-party political system. It is within the interstices of the checks and balances of this system that foreign-policy-oriented movements find their space. It is here that conflict is processed and mediated in American politics, and where the effectiveness of the complexity of American politics is most vigorously tested.

Because levers of influence exist at all levels of government in the United States, and can be expressed through public protest, successful movements tend to develop both horizontal and vertical structures. Horizontally, participants attempt to minimize internal ideological differences to create common ground for public demonstrations against foreign policy proposals. Thus, in the United States, at the horizontal level, ideological flexibility is essential so long as there is adherence to a core value, for example, anti-racism in the case of apartheid in South Africa, human rights for Soviet Jewry, or nonintervention in Central America.

Whereas horizontal organization creates political power "from the people," vertical organization constructs political power along hierarchical and technical lines. Horizontal organization exists among mass-based organizations whereas vertical organization exists in several arenas: (1) within the hierarchies of key organizations, including upper echelon staffs and boards of directors, former activists in responsible positions in the public and private sectors, elements among the affluent, religious and labor leaders, and so on; (2) within the hierarchies of the political parties, both in terms of their party organization and local, state, and national levels; and (3) in a technical hierarchy that involves highly trained individuals in fields of various sciences, public policy, and law.[8]

American movements have at their disposal a wide range of protest means that fall within the parameters of accepted politics. Since the days of the Civil Rights Movement, civil disobedience has become a mainstay of protest organizations on the left and right.[9] And, successful movements do not employ tactics that alienate a mass following: Coalition-building has become axiomatic to American politics, and to build coalitions requires broad-based appeal on the issue.

So far, I have addressed the domestic organization of these movements; they also develop strong international components. Indeed, one of the key factors in the development of grassroots movements

concerned about state policies toward Third World countries is a relationship with a solidarity movement, particularly when the latter has developed strong organizational capacities inside a specific target country. Once this internal organization is established in the democratic state, the ability of the liberation movement in the target state to establish its international legitimacy becomes much easier. It is, in fact, through the establishment of these linkages that threats promulgated by the state are "deconstructed." While those practicing grassroots statecraft in the United States might be accused of consorting with or being "Communists," as they sometimes were, relationships with solidarity and liberation movements provided a communication channel *into* the United States, directed toward the broader public. It thus becomes possible to understand the goals of these foreign movements in a more benign and nonthreatening light, and to use these "reconstructed" images to influence national security policies.[10]

National Security Policy in a World Transformed

Those who pose normative arguments for grassroots statecraft suggest that, while "security" may be defined legitimately as the preservation through military means of the physical safety of the citizenry within political and geographic boundaries, real political contingencies are not subject to such efficient definitions.[11] Even the idea of dependence on the strategic inputs on which military technological preparedness is presumably based is, itself, a function of how political contingencies are understood. What this means is that the concept of "national security," conventionally the anchor for a stable foreign policy, and restricted largely to the purview of military and foreign policy officials, is best understood as an outcome of social processes within a civil society-state complex.

The debate over the importance of South Africa to U.S. national security can be interpreted in this light. Following a geopolitical argument that can be traced back to the late 1940s, the Reagan Administration argued that the Soviet Union, through its regional proxies, was seeking to gain control of critical strategic resources in southern Africa as a means of coercing, or "Finlandizing," the West. This objective was adduced from Soviet assistance to proto-marxist groups and governments in the Horn of Africa, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and elsewhere. Hence, U.S. support for the white government of South Africa was essential to ensure that the "resource war" was not won by the Soviets.[12]

But the same evidence could be used to deduce a different meaning for events in Africa and to argue that U.S. support for the South African regime could have the very consequences so feared by the ore warriors of the Reagan Administration. That argument was as follows: First, the South African government could not assure long-term domestic political stability so long as a minority tried to dominate a majority, so by allying ourselves with the apartheid state, we were increasing our vulnerability in the long run. Second, our stockpiles of strategic minerals were, in any case, sufficient to outlast short-term cutoffs imposed by the apartheid regime, and thus our interests lay with the emergence of a more stable post-apartheid government. Finally, the United States possessed the technological capacity to produce reliable substitutes for these strategic materials, which meant that dependence was not the threatening strategic issue it was so often made out to be.[13]

But this debate was not merely an intellectual one among competing epistemologies, as we shall see below; it also came to depend on the leverage that citizens' groups were able to bring to bear domestically, as well as transnationally, on the "subjects" of the debate: American *and* South African societies. The possibility of validating interpretations through "real-time" displays of information proved crucial not only to altering opinion within the United States but also to convincing the South African

government that it must change to survive.

The work of James Rosenau and others indicates just how important these transnational, real-time capabilities may be in transforming social realities and epistemologies, even where national security is concerned.[14] Rosenau's central thesis focuses on global change and the breaking down of old boundaries and barriers. He begins with the assumption that "profound transformations are occurring in global life" (p. 92) and moves on to develop new conceptual approaches to these profound changes by treating "anomaly as pattern" (p. 96). Rosenau posits four patterns sufficient to warrant a break with Cold War structures. The first three involve the coexistence of multicentric, "sovereignty-free" and state-centric "sovereignty-bound" worlds, within which multinational and national actors function and often compete. In Rosenau's framework, phenomena exist in the international environment which, simultaneously, underpin the international states system, where national sovereignty and security are preeminent, and the interdependent state system, where autonomy becomes a dominant concern under constraining conditions. There is, moreover, yet another "realm" in which "sovereignty-free" actors can pursue ends without regard for the desires of states or the constraints of the state system. The fourth pattern is particularly descriptive of the conditions at the micro level that foster an environment for the practice of grassroots statecraft at the macrolevel. As Rosenau puts it:

> Changes at the level of macro structures and processes have served as both sources and products of corresponding micro-level shifts wherein individuals are becoming more analytically skillful and cathectically competent, thus fostering the replacement of traditional criteria of legitimacy and authority with performance criteria that, in turn, serve to intensify both centralizing and the decentralizing tendencies at work within and among macro collectivities. (p. 98)

How does Rosenau's framework apply to the arguments about national security policy that I discuss here? Grassroots statecraft--at least in its most recent form--originated in direct response to the politics of the Cold War. First, Cold War politics defined the world in bipolar terms. Domestic conflicts in Angola, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and so on were viewed in the context of superpower contention. No episode attests to this more vividly than the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, during which the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged client states, thereby demonstrating a complete lack of any convictions except the importance of the zero-sum "game."

Second, the overwhelming capacity of the superpowers to destroy the planet through nuclear war made the significance of conventional regional and national conflicts less plausible. In the face of mass nuclear annihilation, ragtag Third World soldiers in various jungles and deserts around the world hardly seemed threatening to near-hegemonic states. Both of these contradictions undermined explanations regarding national security policies.

Grassroots statecraft was also assisted by advances in communications and transportation, which transformed not only relationships among political and economic leaders but also moved citizens' communication into the new world of information. As Rosenau puts it:

> New electronic technologies have so greatly collapsed the time in which organizations and movements can be mobilized that the competence of citizens feeds on itself, in the sense that they can virtually "see" their skills and orientations being cumulated into larger aggregates that have consequences for the course of events. Unlike any prior time in history, therefore, citizens are now able to intrude themselves readily into a situation anywhere in the world, because information about its latest twists and turns is immediately at hand. (p. 15)

Television and satellite transmissions operate outside the reality of physical boundaries, and have

democratized access to other nations. Cable Network News (CNN)--"news without borders"--broadcasts "local news" to more than 135 countries around the world and through CNN it is estimated that more than 100 million people have access to images of other citizens all over the world. In one hour, an individual sitting in her home in Omaha can see the politics and societies of countries on every continent. On CNN, mothers in America can see desperate mothers in Mozambique holding their starving children to their milk-dry breasts; American viewers can see militant Muslims in Iran writing protest signs in English (rather than Arabic) and displaying them for television transmission to the United States; white supremacists in Idaho can see and identify with neo-fascist activists in Germany, and so on.

In the past, cultures and politics were contained within national borders. Leaders and elites were, for the most part, the only ones who knew the world first hand, and they were relied upon to interpret the motives, behaviors, and actions of other leaders and elites and to formulate responses. Today, that reliance has all but vanished. Since the average American spends between five and eight hours per day watching television, her opportunity to know and interpret the world for herself sharply decreases the historical control by political leaders over national world views.

Passive television communications from civil society to civil society have been augmented by active communications technologies--fax machines, electronic mail, computer networks, the convenience of air travel, and so on. All of these have allowed grassroots foreign policy activists to bring a powerful critical view of governments' foreign policy directly to voters. An example of this "real-time" transmission can be seen in the formal channels of communication established between ten U.S. cities and black communities under the threat of relocation in South Africa.[15] Within hours of the South African government's announcement that the community of Oukasie was to be bulldozed under the relocation policy,[16] for example, leaders of that community contacted the mayor of Berkeley, California, their sister community, asking for intervention. Telephone calls went directly from the Berkeley City Hall to the South African Embassy in Washington. A political advertisement, with a coupon, was inserted in the local co-op newspaper, and the co-op's fifteen thousand members were urged to clip and send it to the South African Ambassador as a form of protest. This heightened awareness and immediate international response helped stave off the removal threat (in this instance, the U.S. government would not have pressured the South African government for fear of alienating it). Through such communication channels, it first became possible and then easier to offer alternative scenarios in which officially promulgated threats were critiqued or undermined.

Democratic systems are based on the assumption that the will of the citizens--expressed through direct and indirect processes--is reflected in the policies of government. National security policy has always been seen as an exception. But, with the emergence of these new technologies, the assembly and interpretation of information has been democratized, with a growing concomitant impact on national security and foreign policies. Through the revolution in communications technology, civil societies around the world are becoming linked in a variety of ways, making available lateral inputs into grassroots discourses that can then compete with those of the makers of foreign policy. Given that the free flow of information is a cardinal principle in democracy, citizens and the media seek regularly to confirm or disaffirm government "facts" and to interpret the world for themselves. The government becomes only one source of public information, and disingenuous constructions or falsification of information are readily apparent.

Thus, while there is clearly still a "foreign policy establishment" composed of individuals who, in and out of government, strongly influence and make foreign policy, in the larger political *gestalt* involving

partisans, constituents, opposition parties, the electorate, foreign lobbyists, and so on, national security and foreign policy have become ambiguous domains. By this I mean there are few foreign policy decisions today that enjoy absolute public consensus because, as a result of increased public access to information, the conflicting ideologies and perspectives of the public are themselves being strengthened and carried into the policymaking system. Consequently, we observe a perceptible decline in the commonality of public and official thought. Although there is not yet a majority consensus and common voice in contradiction to the government's definition of security threats, there are growing concerns over new issues that might be come to be seen as "threats" to national security. In a 1989 *U.S. News and World Report* poll, for example, 47 percent of Americans ranked global environmental problems as the top priority threat. Only 5 percent considered Soviet aggression in Europe a concern, while the Persian Gulf garnered a 15 percent rating.[17] Where the Third World was concerned, 32 percent considered poverty a threat, while only 15 percent were still concerned about the spread of communism.[18]

I cannot do complete justice to the importance or role of the revolution in communications technology in this chapter. I do, however, argue that the emergence of these new communication technologies has been absolutely instrumental to the emergence and development of grassroots statecraft. From passive to active use technologies, citizens have at their disposal alternate channels of information and interpretation that are both accessible and cheap.[19] A few thousand dollars or less can purchase the computer equipment, whose basics can be mastered within hours, that allows access to bulletin boards and other communications channels all around the world.[20] A reasonably reliable fax machine can supply an insurgent group or a government in crisis access to a myriad of foreign citizens and organizations.[21] I will return to the role of the "communications revolution" in the context of grassroots statecraft, below.

Citizens do not break easily with their leaders. The rate of reelection of political incumbents in the U.S. (at least until the 1994 mid-term elections), and the long tolerance of a large and inefficient bureaucracy in the Soviet Union, attest to that. Rosenau is correct when he argues that postinternational politics are marked by an "authority crisis" because of the transformational changes at the global level (p. 89). Old icons of authority--politicians, national leaders, heads of religious organizations--are not capable of influencing the everyday lives of individuals in a meaningful way. New national and transnational icons, often charismatic individuals, are being sought out. Transnational social networks are emerging based on gender, ethnic identity, neo-fascism, human rights, religion, wealth, and labor. While there are few shared consensuses among these groups, they are, nonetheless, forming new national and international networks.

Grassroots statecraft is not only a symptom of the declining role of governmental authority, resulting primarily from the uncontrollable complexity of international affairs, but also a reflection of the overwhelming technological and informational revolutions that have taken place and have the capacity to inform citizens almost as quickly as political leaders.[22] Activists on the left and right are crafting means to challenge political authorities, and the claims they make, in ways that reflect and tap into this mass uneasiness. The process is illustrated in the two case studies that follow.

Central America and Southern Africa: The Right and the Left

The basic proposition I present here is that, through grassroots statecraft, it is possible to contest state policymaking when several conditions obtain: (1) the structure of the grassroots or social movement

itself can minimize internal ideological differences and create common ground for public opposition to a foreign policy; (2) the organizational structure encompasses practical methods of building a mass base at home and reaching out to liberation groups abroad; (3) group goals link foreign and domestic concerns; and (4) tactics are pursued that successfully alter the balance of power between decisionmakers and organized public opposition and undermine the believability of the arguments of the former.

A central feature of grassroots statecraft movements is the shift from the "self-interest" politics that dominate the domestic agenda to a "moral" and "ideological" politics. New Right anti-communist support for the governments in El Salvador and Guatemala and the Nicaraguan Contras was characterized as "humanitarian assistance." New Left "self-determination" and "anti-racist" support for the (South) African National Congress, the Palestinians, and Nicaragua's Sandanista government was also characterized as "humanitarian." The battle for the middle class was and is about securing the moral and ideological "high ground." The appeal to values is fundamental in reorienting civil society for mobilization against a policy, and it is an appeal with great societal legitimacy by comparison with *realpolitik* security concerns. Human rights are among the most universal values professed and, as such, they were and continue to be the basis for the organizing efforts of both secular and religious organizations. In each of these cases, movements tried to recharacterize events away from the realm of "national security," to contest and delegitimize official explanations, and if possible to provide alternative accounts of "threats" (turning them into non-threats, where feasible).

Organizationally, the lifeblood of these social movement networks is human agency--individuals and collectives committed to change. At the center of grassroots politics are pragmatic radicals, key individual members of organizations who possess a range of competencies, including organizational and technical skills (such as research and writing), and the personal ability to foster communication among organizations as well as to mediate between core organizations and the general public. Critical to such cooperation within a loose local and national network are the abilities to: (1) diminish the importance of narrow and contradictory ideological convictions; (2) work with groups whose purposes fall outside the normal range of activities, beliefs, and interests of the core organization; and (3) work in a task-oriented organizing mode. Even though the individuals in these activities may interact collectively at the national level, their networks are highly decentralized, since their work is primarily and fundamentally local.

Equally critical to these networks are core groups, committed to the overall goals of the movement, while at the same time having particular interests--ideological, political, or functional--that make an issue germane to them. Such groups are often local "chapters," or "subsidiaries," of larger organizations that have either chosen or been delegated a particular issue as a focus--for example, the justice committees of religious organizations. They may also be narrow, sectarian groups with no particular ties to larger organizations, such as student, religious, human rights, political/civic, and trade unions. These groups may also be further classified according to function: direct action, economic action, resource and information, cultural, media, lobbying/legislative, coalition or coordinating councils.

Core groups are often linked to mainstream organizations that serve as "anchor" institutions in the community, such as churches, trade unions, fraternal associations, and universities. As such, they have the institutional stability to serve as an ongoing base for the movement, whether or not the participants in the core group shift over a period of time. Thus, while spontaneous, ad hoc groups in the core may form and disappear over time, creating some general fragmentation at the grassroots operational level, in the overall movement these anchor institutions provide a stable base through which the coherence of the movement is sustained.

The tactics of grassroots movements are designed for one specific purpose: To alter the "balance of power" between decisionmakers and the general public, thereby discrediting the claims of the former. Democracy creates power elites who, though democratically elected, once in office often isolate themselves from the electorate.[23] The division between the expert foreign policymaker and the public is ordinarily legitimated on a number of grounds: National security matters require secrecy and cannot be a part of the public debate; democracies prefer "easy" policies in which the rewards are immediate and tangible; peril exists for a foreign policy that changes in response to domestic pressures that have little to do with a state's position in the world; and the public mandate gives authority to the elected elite.[24] A challenge to official policy must, therefore, confront each of these.

The tactics used by grassroots organizations in this process include, therefore: (1) organizing and disseminating "counter-intelligence"; (2) psychological mobilization; and (3) direct action. Communications are built on reliable data and analysis provided by an active grassroots intelligentsia. The role of the grassroots intelligentsia is not simply to collate existing data but to establish criteria for selecting and evaluating these data. Their success is based on what Rosenau calls "the persistence of competing criteria of evidence." He suggests that "the processes of assessing proof are embedded deep in the underpinnings of the culture."[25]

The debate that took place in the United States over whether or not to impose sanctions on South Africa illustrates this point. The U.S. government argued that sanctions would hurt a strong anti-communist ally (the South African government), our strategic interests in the southern region (security risk) and black South Africans, the very people the sanctions were intended to help (humanitarian). The anti-apartheid movement countered that apartheid's racism was so reprehensible as to cancel out any gains we might realize from an anti-communist position, that our long term security interests were not secure with white minority governments (witness the collapse of white rule in Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola), and that apartheid did much more harm to blacks in the long run than sanctions could do in the short run.

The acquisition of "intelligence" useful to the anti-apartheid movement that emerged during this process, and the ability to challenge the government in knowledge terms, were profound. The two divergent accounts proceeded from identical data--unemployment rates among black South Africans, collapse of white regimes in the region--but the final interpretations were quite different. High unemployment rates were a direct result of apartheid's industrial policies, not sanctions. Race-based anti-communism in the region fuelled, rather than staved off, revolutionary and communist sympathies among blacks, who argued that, if whites were against communism, they were for it. Not only did the movement's knowledge and data base approach parity with the U.S. government's, the extent to which their interpretations were believable and believed also exceeded that of the Reagan Administration.

One of the fundamental tasks of mobilization in such instances is the creation new psychological and political images that counter those posed by policymakers--for example, transforming "terrorists" into "freedom fighters," "communists" into "national liberators," and so on.[26] Moreover, certain images or slogans the government uses in defining its interests can be "captured" and redefined. For example, during the Persian Gulf War, leftist antiwar movements used the American flag and the slogan "support our troops" as part of their oppositional campaign. This psychological mobilization was thus intended to persuade the public that true patriotism was on the side of the opposition and to encourage it to identify personally with the movement's cause.

Mass mobilization involves demonstrations, public hearings, mass meetings, letter-writing campaigns,

boycotts and so on. Direct action campaigns are a substantial component of grassroots movements. To aid direct activism, many guides and booklets have appeared, telling groups and individuals how to organize local campaigns and generate direct action.[27] The success of these efforts was evident in, for example, the "Pledge of Resistance Campaign" to oppose intervention in Central America, which was organized nationally through the American Friends Service Committee. Individuals were asked to commit to different levels of activism, ranging from serving on a telephone alert tree to pledging civil disobedience. In October 1987, the Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador (CISPES) organized a 22-city national walk-a-thon to raise $300,000 for medical supplies, reconstruction projects, and agricultural development in El Salvador.

Another important element in grassroots statecraft is the creation of a structure parallel to the foreign-policy decisionmaking process of the government. Thus, grassroots movements set foreign policy goals, organize diplomatic strategies, and pursue policies with measurable outcomes. Grassroots movements act "as if" they were in the business of conducting foreign policy in order to influence the general public as well as policymakers. As with the foreign policy establishment, the goals of grassroots movements are based primarily on a set of ideological principles. Prior to the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe, for example, anti-communist conservatives saw the containment of Soviet influence in the Third World as a primary foreign policy goal. Leftist religious and human rights ideologies drove much of the Central America movement in the U.S. These ideologies facilitated the organizing capacity of the movement, and dictated the kind of organizations to which the movement could appeal and the individuals it could recruit.

Grassroots diplomatic strategies also help to legitimize both the domestic movement itself and the insurgent group or country with which the movement is identified. Movements host delegations and send their members on fact-finding missions to the target countries. Movement leaders are invited on national lecture tours. Members of the Catholic Church routinely organized missions to El Salvador. In other instances, skilled volunteer workers were sent on "work brigades" to support the grassroots economic and social service work of insurgent groups inside their home countries.[28]

Finally, movements establish policies that produce measurable outcomes. The Anti-Apartheid Movement pushed for economic sanctions legislation; the Neighbor-to-Neighbor movement worked against military intervention in Central America; the Sanctuary Movement attempted to establish political refugee status for citizens fleeing conflict in Central America; conservatives demanded complete economic and diplomatic isolation of Angola during the civil war there. The relative degrees of success of these movements demonstrate the possibility of grassroots statecraft playing a critical role in the policymaking of the government.

The most striking innovation in terms of grassroots organizing in the world of foreign policy has been in the ability of activists and insurgents to form international solidarity structures. Groups organized within civil society, such as trade unions, human rights organizations, religious movements, and women's groups, are able to establish formal ties with activist groups in foreign countries and even with foreign governments. In fact, groups may even assert that government policies are so wrong-headed that they have the right and even the duty, as American citizens living within a democratic framework, to *act* as if *their* alternative foreign policy initiatives were wholly legitimate. This can be understood as a foreign policy "civil disobedience" or foreign policy "self help" movement.

A key purpose of solidarity links is to establish the domestic and international *bona fides* of a liberation

movement. A government, even if it is challenged domestically, already has international legitimacy by virtue of its sovereignty and control of the political and military machinery of its state. In order to challenge the foreign policy of a government, and the domestic policies of a target state, a grassroots movement and insurgent groups must develop a parallel citizens' political machinery. This requires the insurgent group to establish "government-like" structures, with foreign supporters, and to help create opportunities through which the latter can call attention to the reasons they are challenging the legitimacy and authority of their government's policies, as well as that of the target government. In citations of its human rights violations, reprehensible laws and the illegitimate political practices, a target government can find itself subjected to public criticism, diplomatic censure, economic sanctions, humanitarian opposition, and even military intervention. It is, of course, the task of a target government to take countermeasures against these pressures and to keep domestic political conflicts out of international fora. The primary means of countering these pressures include discrediting the opposition, branding their leaders "terrorists," "outside agitators," "criminals," and asserting that their claims either are false or exaggerated.[29]

Liberation movements have to engage in diplomacy and court foreign supporters, and they often employ symbolic activities to enhance their legitimacy in international affairs. When U.S. President George Bush agreed to meet with Albertina Sisulu of the South African United Democratic Front (UDF), it was a great political coup for the African National Congress and a serious blow to the legitimacy of the South African government. Likewise, the U.S. government's refusal to let Yassir Arafat visit the United States was, until 1993, considered a demonstration of legitimacy for the Israeli government (showing, more recently, that legitimacy can be a tricky and ephemeral condition).

Another function of a solidarity movement is the development of solidarity through cultural affinities. One of the key devices a target government or insurgent group can use to discredit its opposition is to make itself more culturally acceptable to politically important groups. In other words, the more one can create a sense that group members look and act in ways similar to those whose support is being sought, the easier it is to build political support. As an example, in 1984, Ted Koppel broadcast the popular television news show *Nightline* from South Africa during the height of the first state of emergency in that country.[30] The South African government agreed to the broadcast of a debate between government representatives and African leaders, counting on the opportunity to exhibit the former's "westernness"--coded language for white, civilized, and so on--in order to establish an affinity with Americans. But the images of black South Africans portrayed by these officials--unpredictable, non-western, simple, traditional, terrorist, and incapable of handling the complexities of modern political life--were completely at odds with the actual images of Bishop Desmond Tutu, ANC leader Oliver Tambo, Reverend Alan Bosaek, UDF's Albertina Sisulu, and others that American viewers saw in the satellite transmission. They looked very familiar, even conservative: The women in designer-style African dresses, the men in conservative dark suits, clerical collars, and horn-rimmed glasses.

The South African government's strategy backfired, much to its dismay. An international news blackout was imposed after that broadcast, but the damage had been done. The image of black South Africans as educated, articulate, westernized people had been established in American minds. Inasmuch as the Civil Rights Movement, with its goals of desegregation, enfranchisement, and equal rights, was embedded deep in the collective American consciousness, there was no way to convince the American public that these individuals were not worthy of the same political rights.

Another important feature in the growth of grassroots movements is the development of resources to

sustain the movement and to provide material assistance to the liberation movement. Governments have institutions, formal international alliances, tax bases, budgets, and military and intelligence agencies. Grassroots and liberation movements depend almost exclusively upon external resources, funds, supplies, and refuge that are purely voluntary in nature.[31] The supporters of liberation movements depend on their numbers, personal organizing skills, and abilities to raise funds through their organizations via direct donations, passing the hat, fundraising events, and so on. Films, lectures, cultural events, "celebrations" and grants are typical means for organizations to maintain their financial obligations and their material commitments to the liberation movements.

The somewhat haphazard nature of the fundraising strategies masks the core funds that sustain movements over time. Anchor institutions provide direct funds and in-kind support directly to political core groups organizations. For example, it has been estimated that, over the past twenty years, a total of $500,000 was contributed directly to "liberation work" in northern California by such anchor institutions.[32] The "$top Banking on Apartheid" campaign was, for several years, funded and supported by the American Friends Service Committee. It was responsible, along with the Africa Fund and several other major national organizations, for the growth of the sanctions movement in this country. The National Conservative Foundation spent $1.3 million on television spots and a 30-minute documentary in support of the Nicaraguan Contras.[33] In summary, the resources available to grassroots movements, while not absolutely quantifiable, can be estimated, and they are substantial and reliable over sustained periods of time.

After organizing large constituent groups against a particular foreign policy, the effort then turns to Congress and more traditional lobbying strategies. Here, the battle is over the vote for or against a particular policy. In the cases of Southern Africa and Central America, did both the popular and congressional strategies of grassroots statecraft work? Were the organizing efforts effective? The major political victory for the anti-apartheid movement was the imposition of national sanctions against South Africa over the opposition of President Reagan, who twice vetoed legislation. In spite of presidential opposition, the pressures put on Congress in 1984 were sufficient for passage of the first sanctions legislation. Reagan invoked the presidential veto and responded with a promise to impose weak economic pressure through executive order, and to provide opportunities to black South Africans through scholarships, grants to community organizations, and other inducements.

But the South African crisis did not go away. The images of townships in rebellion, and the South African government's violent response, brought back memories of the Civil Rights era in the United States. After the second state of emergency was declared by the South Africa government, the Reagan policy of "constructive engagement" was subject to increasing condemnation. Ultimately, it collapsed. A number of Republicans, including 31 neo-conservatives such as Vin Weber (R-Minnesota), John McCain (R-Arizona) and Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), joined Democrats in overriding a second Presidential veto. As Representative Jim Leach (R-Iowa) put it, "The administration must not be allowed to walk blindly to the grave with the black glove of white supremacy."[34] Sanctions became law.

In the case of Central America, the Neighbor-to-Neighbor Organization and Nicaragua Information Center provided grassroots organizing in opposition to aid to the Contras, while the Sanctuary Movement and CISPES were the primary organizations concerned with El Salvador. In 1986, Neighbor-to-Neighbor successfully targeted key Congressional districts, where anti-intervention candidates were on the ballot in New York, Colorado, and Pennsylvania, and won. Neighbor-to-Neighbor virtually saved Alan Cranston's (D-California) seat in the Senate in a campaign in which he won with a margin of 116,662 votes, as a

three-week campaign by 3,000 volunteers brought out an estimated 160,000 voters.[35] In the Senate, where aid to the Contras had previously been approved by slim margins (53-47 and 52-48), Neighbor-to-Neighbor targeted William Cohen (R-Maine), who had voted for and against Contra aid, and Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas), who was considered vulnerable to constituent pressure.[36] The centerpiece of the campaign was a television advertisement and a graphic thirty-minute documentary, "Faces of War," on U.S. policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua. By 1987, Neighbor-to-Neighbor had identified fourteen representatives and four senators from nine states who were wavering on the Contra aid vote. The slogan used by Neighbor-to-Neighbor in the Congressional offensive was: "Now is the time to prevent another Vietnam War in Central America." Neighbor-to-Neighbor won four of five targeted elections.

The Sanctuary Movement focused primarily on El Salvador and the refugee problem. Intensive lobbying campaigns were directed at the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee and these led to a reduction in allotted funds from the $514 million requested by the Reagan administration to $300 million. Legislation was sponsored by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) in 1982 and by 88 members of Congress in 1983 to have "extended voluntary departure" status granted to El Salvadoran and Guatemalans.[37] The movement engaged in a pitched battle with the State Department over charges of human rights violations in El Salvador. While challenging the government on its refugee return policy, the Church was directly engaged in a major civil disobedience campaign in which sanctuary was granted to refugees at churches throughout the country. In addition, a number of cities declared themselves sanctuaries. In 1986, the City of Oakland, California: (1) declared that it would not participate in prosecuting anyone giving sanctuary to refugees; (2) directed the Police Department to allow support services access to refugees being detained in jail; (3) requested that the state of California become a "State of Refuge"; and (4) encouraged residents of the city to support sanctuary activities.[38]

Although these movements did not, ultimately, manage to engineer a reversal of Central America policy during the Reagan Administration, they did create sufficient popular and Congressional opposition to that policy so that the government was driven to extra-legislative and illegal means to achieve its goals via the Iran-Contra affair. Moreover, they helped to establish public support for the eventual peace initiatives in Central America, in which regimes supported by the United States engaged in official negotiations with the very insurgents that had, so recently, been described as the "entering wedge" of global Communism.

More to the point, it was largely through the efforts of grassroots "diplomats" that issues initially defined as "threats" to the national security of the United States were transformed into problems to be addressed through nonmilitary means. All this suggests that what governments deem a security "problem" is, more often than not, defined intersubjectively, and not by any objectively defined indicators. We must ask not only "who threatens?" but also "who is threatened?" The widely held image within security studies, and by security analysts, of the state as a singular object simply disregards such nuances. By shifting the terms of domestic discourse, grassroots diplomacy is able to alter such intersubjective definitions, in the process not only changing security policy but also highlighting a much more sophisticated understanding of international politics.

I have offered here an analytical basis for studying the involvement of citizens in challenges to official foreign policies as well as national security doctrines and practices.[39] This, I argue, is a phenomenon that has emerged on a relatively large scale only since the Vietnam War. Citizens' involvement in foreign

policy matters is not anathema to democracy but is more accurately a result of changes in global politics, in communications technology, and in the ideas and values held by a significant fraction of the U.S. population toward "other people" in the world. These changes have helped to undermine the plausibility of supposed "threats" to national security, as formulated by *realpolitik* strategists of the Cold War period. The U.S. government's freedom to craft national security policies is, increasingly, problematic and being questioned, and there is no reason to think that other governments are not feeling similar challenges from their own grassroots.

Note 1: See, e.g., George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 64, no. 2 (Winter 1985/86): 205-18. Back.

Note 2: James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics--A Theory of Continuity and Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 317. Back.

Note 3: Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 12-13, 269. Back.

Note 4: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Dilemma of American Ideals and Institutions in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981). Back.

Note 5: Paul Wapner, "Ecological Activism and World Civic Politics," paper prepared for a panel on the Role of NGOs in International Environmental Cooperation and Security, International Studies Association annual meeting, Atlanta, March 31-April 4, 1992; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1992): 389-420; Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," *International Organization* 47, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 411-42; David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., *The Limits of State Autonomy--Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); and Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, *Double-Edged Diplomacy--International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Back.

Note 6: In its *Handbook* , Amnesty International goes so far as to state that " . . . human rights are too important--and too vulnerable--to be left to governments." Maurice Staunton, Sally Fenn, and Amnesty International U.S.A., eds., *The Amnesty International Handbook* (Claremont, Calif.: Hunter House, 1991). Back.

Note 7: Paul Wapner, *Making States Biodegradable* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). Back.

Note 8: Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 20-26. Back.

Note 9: The anti-abortion movement, Operation Rescue, has successfully adopted this protest strategy with the result that the state has responded with laws limiting particular forms of civil disobedience. Back.

Note 10: As I point out below, the appearance of ANC representatives on the ABC program *Nightline* did more to defuse the specter of a Communist "threat" in South Africa than any amount of information

or propaganda provided by governments. Back.

Note 11: The debate over the percentage of the federal budget that should be allocated to military vs. entitlement and other domestic programs is an example. Another is the debate over the strategic value of the Panama Canal and our contingent relationship with Panama's former military dictators. Back.

Note 12: For a discussion of the "resource wars" thesis, see David Rees, "Soviet Strategic Penetration in Africa," *Conflict Studies* no. 77 (Nov. 1977). A general discussion of the role of strategic resources in U.S. foreign policy can be found in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *When Nations Clash: Raw Materials, Ideology, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Ballinger/Harper and Row, 1989), ch. 5. Back.

Note 13: A fairly measured and sober discussion of the strategic minerals issue is Hanns W. Maull, *Energy, Minerals, and Western Security* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). Back.

Note 14: Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* . Back.

Note 15: Among the American cities that have established "Sister-community" organizations are Berkeley, Seattle, St. Louis, Chicago, Atlanta, and St. Paul. Back.

Note 16: The policy was to remove blacks from areas that were either designated "white areas" or were too close to white residences--a policy of "racial cleansing" akin to the Serbian "ethnic cleansing" policy in Bosnia. Back.

Note 17: The care with which the Bush Administration orchestrated the Gulf War of 1991 illustrates this point. Because there could not be a reliable consensus during the early days of the confrontation (critics ranged from Pat Buchanan on the right to Ron Dellums on the left), the Bush administration had to bring the country to the brink (the war was a fait accompli by late December) in order to manufacture consensus. Then, given the weak stomach Americans have for "killing fields," the military information services made sure visual images of the war were highly technological, sanitized, and devoid of human catastrophe. Back.

Note 18: "The U.S. Under Siege?,"*U.S. News and World Report* , June 12, 1989. Back.

Note 19: Within days of the launching of hostilities during the Gulf War, for example, student groups from Yale, Berkeley, Brown, and other universities had set up a daily bulletin on the Internet to allow national exchange of information regarding daily events on their respective campuses. There is some small irony here, in that the Internet was established as a defense communications network. Back.

Note 20: A paper on the Gulf War, written by Prof. George Lakoff, Linguistics Department at the University of California at Berkeley, was disseminated through the Internet, garnering responses from individuals "on the net" in North America, Western Europe, and Scandinavia. Back.

Note 21: The fax machine has fast become the cheapest propaganda machine in use. The Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C. routinely faxes *Israel Line* to interested individuals. This even includes those institutional fax lines where there is limited interest in Israeli government news. Back.

Note 22: If they are to be believed, a number of elected officials publicly asserted during the Gulf Crisis that they had no more information in hand than that available to news reporters and citizens from

satellite-based news reporting. Back.

Note 23: A useful body of knowledge to help understand this tendency among elected officials is to be found in organization theory, which describes the behavior of self-protection. Back.

Note 24: Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 12-14, 269. Back.

Note 25: Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* , p. 203. Back.

Note 26: For example, see Julie Frederikse's *None But Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe* (New York: Penguin, 1984), which addressed the struggle for the hearts and minds of Zimbabweans, and her *South Africa: A Different Kind of War--From Soweto to Pretoria* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), about security-related activities in the South African townships. Back.

Note 27: These "how to" books include Martin Oppenheimer and George Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), and Theodore W. Olsen and Lynne Shivers, eds., *Training for Nonviolent Action* (London: Friends Peace and International Relations Committee, 1970). Such guides and manuals offer comprehensive, understandable instruction in the politics and tactics of people-based organizing. They include a profusion of illustrations and examples of successful grassroots tactics. Back.

Note 28: The 1960s Venceramos Brigades to Cuba "grandfathered" solidarity work brigades to Nicaragua--construction, coffee bean harvesters, medical suppliers, and others. Back.

Note 29: During the Nigerian Civil War, the Nigerian government and Biafran insurrectionists hired American public relations firms to counter each other's propaganda. Nowadays, many foreign governments have public relations firms representing their interests in Washington. Back.

Note 30: The South Africa government declared the first state of emergency in 1984 following an attempt to hold limited "non-racial" elections which included "Indians" and "coloureds" but excluded the African majority. Back.

Note 31: Although liberation movements may be able to collect taxes in "liberated territories," these rarely compare to the resources as the disposal of governments in power. Back.

Note 32: Estimate provided to the author by members of the African Resource Center, Oakland, California. Back.

Note 33: Action Fund letter, Neighbor to Neighbor, 1987. Back.

Note 34: The entire debate can be found in *The Congressional Record* 132, #132 (Sept. 30, 1986):H8648-8672. The Leach quote is on page H664. Back.

Note 35: "Grassroots Politics Pays Off: Use of El Salvador Video Helped Anti-Interventionists Win," *San Francisco Examiner* , November 10, 1986. Back.

Note 36: Action Fund letter, Neighbor to Neighbor, 1987. Back.

Note 37: "Sanctuary: Part of a Bigger Picture--What People are Fleeing, and why, must be Considered," Michael J. Farrell, *National Catholic Reporter* , September 14, 1984. Back.

Note 38: "Oakland Declared a City of Refuge," *CISPES Action Bulletin* , August 1986. Back.

Note 39: More detailed accounts of such citizens' diplomacy can be found in: Janice Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement--Local Activism in Global Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1985); and Elizabeth S. Rogers, "The Conflicting Roles of American Ethnic and Business Interests in the U.S. Economic Sanctions Policy: The Case of South Africa," in: Skidmore and Hudson, eds., *The Limits of State Autonomy* , pp. 185-204. Back.

On Security

On Security, by Ronnie D. Lipschutz

6. Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: International Economic Interdependence and Construction of the New Security Dilemma*

Beverly Crawford

During much of the Cold War, national security was defined primarily in terms of military threats to state, society, and industry. To this last category we can add concerns about oil and other raw materials, whose reliability of supply could never be assured with confidence through global markets. Those concerns have, for the most part, now disappeared, to be replaced by language focused on economic "competitiveness" (a modern variant of old Social Darwinist arguments) and threats to the nation-state by other countries. There are two perspectives embedded in discussions of this new "security dilemma." The first postulates declining national welfare if competitiveness is lost; the second, a threat to the American ability to prosecute major wars against unnamed adversaries. Advocates of the first perspective propose major government intervention into and control of research and development. Inasmuch as this remains ideological anathema in the United States, the second offers a more acceptable rationale for such intervention, invoking military security arguments that do not differ very much from those sometimes put forth during the Cold War.

I examine here the impact of international economic interdependence on recent debates over the redefinition and reconstruction of "national security." I explore how the forces of interdependence influence those debates by reducing military *threats* in the view of some analysts (whom I call economic "doves") and increasing military *vulnerabilities* in the view of others (whom I call economic "hawks"). The arguments by both sides can be simply stated: Interdependence reduces threats because it weakens incentives for military conquest.[1] But at the same time, interdependence increases vulnerabilities, and threatens to weaken the state, because potential military resources--especially high-technology ones--are increasingly found in global commercial markets over which states have little control.[2] Policy responses are, in some countries, at least, focused on reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening the state through strategies of market control, indicating that "hawks" have come to dominate the discourse of economic security. In examining these debates and policy strategies, this essay is both an exploration of the interaction between material and cognitive factors that shape the political elite's new definitions of security and an assessment of their policy responses.

I begin by constructing the arguments made by both "doves" and the "hawks" about the connections between international economic interdependence and national security. I then examine in a preliminary way how economic interdependence between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War--a relationship characterized in U.S. policy debates as having important security implications--affected perceptions of state power and security of the principal actors. In the final section I briefly examine the changing security implications of international interdependence in the post-Cold War

period in three regions--the former Soviet Union, the Third World, and the industrialized countries of Western Europe--and relate these to the "construction" of national security in economic terms.

The Argument Defined

My argument can be stated succinctly: Assuming that state actors in the international system will continue to seek their security through military means, increasing globalization of production and exchange presents them with what I call an "economic security dilemma." This new "dilemma" changes the way state decisionmakers construct threats and, consequently, changes arguments about the requirements for maintaining and increasing national security. Military *threats* are reduced in that construction, since there are few, if any, specific opponents in evidence, but fears of military *vulnerability* increase. The intensity of these fears is, on the one hand, a function of the historical primacy of the state in the military realm and, on the other hand, a function of the position of the state in international markets. This combination arises because, nowadays, those cutting-edge technologies most vital to military power are found not in defense research labs but in global commercial markets. As a result, autarky and a narrow focus on military R&D in the face of the globalization of commercial high technology production and exchange severs the state from the fruits of technological innovation. Therefore, if states wish to maintain access to these technologies, they must seek it through markets. Markets are not wholly reliable, however, since there is at least some possibility that they could be controlled by rivals (or firms acting together) who could block or manipulate access in ways that prevent an importer from acquiring desired capabilities. The discussion of Soviet technology trade with the West during the Cold War, below, illustrates this point.

A second problem for states is that if they secure resources through the market--as they are increasingly compelled to do--they must also acquire property rights on the basis of market rational behavior so as to provide innovators with the stability of legal protection. The vulnerability consequences of an inability to secure such property rights are illustrated here by the case of the Soviet Union, which was undercut by the diffusion of military technology to its rivals (and, as we shall see, similar arguments are being made today on behalf of the United States).

Securing domestic property rights does not, however, assure the state's control over the fruits of innovation, inasmuch as unhampered global markets can diffuse sophisticated technologies to military rivals. In general, efforts to acquire or the freedom to sell technological resources necessary to military strength through commercial markets reduce state autonomy without necessarily increasing capabilities. Perceptions of reduced autonomy and capability lead to fears of increased vulnerability. The discussion of the consequences of increasing Soviet economic dependence on the West during the last stages of the Cold War and the story of Third World vulnerabilities in the post-Cold War era elaborates on this point.[3]

In order to counter these autonomy and capability-reducing effects, political elites in modern industrial states have devised three kinds of policies that allow them to exercise market control. The first has as its goal the preservation of state autonomy. It focuses resources on domestic military research and development in order to capture the fruits of innovation for the state (there is, in the United States, strong ideological opposition to such a strategy, although it was the dominant strategy during the Cold War). But the diversion of commercial resources to military applications reduces commercial competitiveness, weakening overall national economic capabilities. Given the argument that innovation occurs primarily as a result of market forces, falling behind in commercial competition ultimately means falling behind in military competition. The Soviet case, under limited opening to the international economy, nicely

illustrates this argument.

Second, in an additional effort to preserve autonomy, political elites may attempt to restrict the sale in global markets of home-grown commercial technologies with military applications, so that those technologies do not fall into the hands of military rivals. But these restrictions tie the hands of commercial technology producers and reduce their ability to innovate. Once again, capability is increased in exchange for autonomy. Thus, to maintain the economic foundation of military strength, states must allow markets to operate, more or less freely, a condition that, as noted above, appears to increase vulnerability. Furthermore, trade restrictions expand the role of the state in society in unacceptable ways. Evidence for this argument comes from the story of U.S. export control policy in the Cold War, and that experience should provide a lesson to policy elites who want to extend export controls over commercial technology transfers to Third World countries.

Finally, political elites whose states have achieved a measure of technological proficiency may join together in co-production projects with other states and permit strategic transnational corporate alliances among their private firms. Through this means, they lose less autonomy than they would by acting in competitive markets, although such projects may preclude the competition necessary to stimulate innovation. The autonomy-capability tradeoff in this instance is unclear, however. New policies pursued in post-Cold War Europe illustrate the argument.

In short, market allocation of commercial resources necessary to military strength, though essential to innovation, threatens the state's ability to secure those resources. The result is, apparently, a "new" security dilemma under international economic interdependence, as seen from the vantage point of the "hawks." To ensure access to military resources within increasingly global commercial markets, rational state actors will try to consolidate market control in such a way as to stabilize open markets while, simultaneously, reducing the possibility of market control by others and still maintaining the commercial competitiveness necessary to military strength. This is no easy task, even under the best of circumstances. It elevates questions of tactics and ploys to "raise the stakes" to the highest levels as a means of mobilizing support for such strategies. Only a very few states, under certain conditions outlined below, have been able to succeed in such an effort, and it is by no means clear that the United States will be among those that succeed in the future.

In the following section of this essay, I elaborate on these arguments. I begin by tracing the origins of the recent conceptual linkages between security requirements and economic interdependence in the academic literature. I then reconstruct the security debates over the impact of interdependence, and finally I outline alternative policy responses.

The Dilemma Defined

International Economic Interdependence and National Security

The connection between international economic interdependence and national security has not, in my view, been explored with sufficient care in the modern security studies literature.[4] In recent studies of international interdependence, little attention has been paid to security issues, even though the growth of such interdependence has generally meant that the nation-state becomes increasingly vulnerable to external forces, a phenomenon commonly thought to have security implications. At first glance this is surprising, because vulnerabilities arising from growing economic transactions and linkages have resulted from the increasing allocation of goods and services by international market forces. The

expansion of these forces has meant the state's increasing material *dependence* on goods produced in other states, implying vulnerability to a disruption in the flow of raw materials, goods, and services. Such vulnerabilities have meant a loss of autonomy in economic decisionmaking, and they have meant increasing political entanglements that constrain foreign policy choices.

What the literature has not suggested, however, are hypotheses specifying the kinds of dependence, loss of autonomy, or entanglements that would directly threaten the state's ability to provide for military security. This raises the possibility that the posited threats are empty ones. Despite a growing awareness of the overlap between the spheres of politics and economics, and a burgeoning intellectual interest in international political economy, the spheres of security and economics have, for the most part, been considered separate and distinct. This remains much the case, even today. Security studies continue to be concerned more with the state's "high politics" of war and military power, than with the "low politics" of international economic transactions.[5]

Since 1945 the field of security studies has typically minimized the impact of international economic interdependence on national security for two reasons. First, security studies were concerned primarily with the phenomenon of war and with the threat, use, and control of military force.[6] Traditionally, moreover, the responsibility for countering military threats to national security has been lodged in the *state* ; therefore, security studies have generally taken the "state" and its ability to ward off military threats and defend the nation in time of war as the central focus of analysis. Although the forces of international interdependence have always restricted the state's autonomy of action in other areas,[7] during the Cold War it was assumed that the military sphere of state autonomy remained unaffected. American dominance in the international economy, and the subordination of economic concerns to alliance politics, further ensured that this division would remain a clear-cut one.

Until recently this assumption has been warranted. Economic interdependence among nations was, and is, a function of growing international market forces, which has varied over the past century, whereas the industrial capabilities involved in the development and maintenance of military strength have, historically, not been subject to market allocation. By the end of the nineteenth century, many, mostly European, nation-states had consolidated their monopoly on the use of force and their near-complete control over the supply of resources and territory used to enhance military power.[8] States that did not have the internal capabilities to marshal resources for their military force joined together in alliances to enhance their security. They did *not* seek security through reliance on the market.

Indeed, as Barry Buzan points out, markets are a constant source of *insecurity* ; they brook no alliances among buyers and threaten inefficient sellers with extinction.[9] It is no wonder, then, that the modern state would not want to leave the vital function of securing its territory from military threats to the vagaries of the marketplace. So the market forces that gave rise to the vulnerabilities of interdependence and chipped away at the state's autonomy and capacity in international trade, investment, and finance did not affect the state's capabilities to pursue its security interests.

A second reason why international economic interdependence has been minimized in the security studies literature is because its focus was primarily on the United States and its allies. The United States' preponderance of power implied its relative independence; within the alliance, its dominance in all issue areas essential to the maintenance of military power ensured relatively autonomous control over material resources necessary for security. The same internal economic resources that supported a strong American military machine were used to supply aid and provide market access to allies in exchange for agreement

with U.S. security preferences.

Much of the security studies literature has assumed the continued dominance of the United States in its overall power relations with other Western capitalist nations and the general irrelevance of market forces. Moreover, the system of free trade and comparative advantage envisioned in the early postwar period and codified in the Bretton Woods system was assumed to be static, in much the same way as international relations were seen as almost unchanging. It was constructed under the assumption that absolute growth for all was assured, but that the relative ranking of nations participating in the system would remain the same. It was further assumed that the technical advantages that had accrued to the United States would never be lost, and that all others would be carried along in its wake. As long as technological change was driven by military investment and R&D, this continued to be more or less true. But as we shall see below, the gradual divergence between military and civilian-oriented technologies exposed the fundamental problem with this particular set of assumptions about the economic universe. And by the 1990s, arguments about relative economic decline had opened a new security debate in the United States.

In short, both of the assumptions underlying the exclusion of economic interdependence from security studies have been undermined in the last twenty years: That the military domain of state autonomy would remain unaffected by the forces of interdependence was challenged by the changing relationship between military and commercial technology and the globalization of production and exchange; and that U.S. military *independence* --rather than *interdependence* --would not find itself challenged by the more general phenomenon of relative American economic decline.

Economic Interdependence and the Redefinition of Security

How have the challenges to these assumptions affected security debates? Of course, because the threat of war is not the only security threat that states face, and because military power is not the only means by which national security can be assured, one group of analysts has suggested that international interdependence has threatened national security in ways that are more indirect and not easily countered by military force.[10] If the mandate of the state to provide security is broadened to include both the preservation of territorial integrity *and* societal well-being, then the forces of interdependence that are chipping away at the state's autonomy and capacity to maintain the integrity of its territory and provide for the well-being of its society will also threaten national security. But it is also entirely possible that some of the forces of interdependence actually *enhance* the security of society--that is, enhance societal well-being--even as they undermine the autonomy and capacity of the state. For example, a state might find itself unable to innovate technologically in order to keep up with changes in the global economy, resulting in a declining standard of living. High levels of foreign investment in that country might be able to restore this standard, but at the potential cost of the host state's loss of control over strategic parts of the economy.[11]

Conversely, expanding the domain over which market forces hold sway may ultimately make society less secure, too. The question that Karl Polanyi addressed decades ago could be raised anew: If the expansion of the market also reduces the autonomy and capacities of the state, how can society be protected from the most destabilizing consequences associated with the introduction of market forces?[12] The idea of complex interdependence reinforces the need to distinguish between the security of the state and the security of society.[13]

Policy-oriented discourses around the redefinition of security, however, have ignored these arguments.

Instead, they have focused on the impact of interdependence on the state's security under more traditional assumptions about its role in maintaining the security of society. Those dominant security debates ignited by the perceived impact of international economic interdependence continue to characterize security more narrowly, framing it as the state's ability to marshal resources to counter only military threats. Consequently, these debates center around the distinction between threats and vulnerabilities. Below I explore how the economic "doves" see interdependence as a source of threat reduction, while the economic "hawks" focus on the potential of interdependence to increase vulnerabilities.

Arguments by "Doves": Interdependence and Military Threats

Threats have to do with the *intentions* of others that affect a state's national security. Do others intend to attack, invade, or initiate an economic embargo to cut off vital resources? Or are they willing to negotiate the peaceful settlement of disputes, arms control agreements, and treaties to protect security? Can international economic interdependence modify those intentions in ways that reduce military threats? Such questions can be traced at least as far back as the Manchester liberals, although the validity of the answers has always been open to debate.[14]

Today's economic doves suggest that there are three ways in which interdependence can reduce potential military threats. First, in *Power and Interdependence* , Keohane and Nye argue that economic interdependence among advanced industrial states can minimize threats directly by reducing incentives to use force against one another in settling their disputes.[15] But an opposite argument can be adduced, as well. Waltz argues that, because the terms of interdependence may favor one nation over another, interdependence can spark new conflicts, something that is not possible among states who remain aloof from one another.[16] Who is correct?

To manage such conflicts, states have institutionalized their interdependencies in international regimes. The rules and procedures of these regimes enforce the norm of reciprocity and ensure a convergence of expectations that can lead to compromise. Mediated through international regimes, interdependence reduces the fear of threats to national security from economic partners by reducing their incentives to translate power into the use of military force. This was the argument circulated within U.S. policy circles during the early days of détente in support of increasing economic interdependence with the Soviet Union. It is an argument supported by the Western Europe's evolution from bloody balance of power politics to the halting but relatively peaceful regional integration of the European Union.[17]

A third argument linking international economic interdependence to the reduction of military threats focuses on the globalization of production and exchange. "Globalization" increases competition among states for wealth and power although, at the same time, it shifts economic priorities in ways that can reduce traditional threats to national security. Globalization means that the factors of production have become increasingly mobile: Capital moves freely across national boundaries (indeed the cost of capital in the industrialized countries is rapidly converging); corporations can easily move their bases of operation to lower-cost production areas; technology and information diffuse almost instantly across national boundaries; raw materials are rapidly transported from their source to processing and production sites thousands of miles away.[18]

The consequence of globalization is not only the growing perception that a more intense interdependence among advanced industrialized states has arisen that can reduce incentives to issue military threats against one another but also a heightened fear of *economic* competition among industrialized states as

they search for ways to ensure that innovative activity takes place on *their* territory and not elsewhere. Because an open international economy, and the institutions that bolster it, foster global production and exchange, the argument runs, if national firms are not competitive internationally, the societies in which they are based will grow poorer as capital moves elsewhere in search of a better rate of return. To enhance their own power, therefore, states will seek to ensure that wealth-generating production stays within their territory. Most analysts agree that those nations that have a skilled workforce, and are capable of rapid technological innovation to adapt to new market opportunities and make production more efficient, will be the most competitive internationally. Technological advance is crucial to a state's successful participation in an interdependent international economy.[19]

As a consequence of heightened perceptions of economic competition among trading partners, there has been an important shift in the economic priorities of industrialized nations. The foundation of a state's economic strength, along with its ability to compete internationally, are no longer sought in the promotion of heavy industries that depend on relatively simple technology and a large unskilled labor force but, instead, in knowledge-based production that relies on a cadre of highly trained engineers and a smaller, technologically sophisticated production workforce in all sectors of the economy. A country's ability to compete internationally lies in its capacity to absorb new technologies into the production process in all sectors and apply them efficiently. Other factor endowments like raw materials and cheap labor are less important in creating competitive advantage and determining the total cost of production.[20]

This shift in economic priorities can enhance national security by reducing threats.[21] In the past, incentives to engage in military aggression often derived from opportunities to extract wealth from others in the form of land, raw materials, or industrial capability. Nowadays, more territory may not add to economic power, but innovative technology almost certainly does. High-technology industries would be of little use to a conqueror without the expertise to exploit them, or without the cooperation of the local population. With some important and notable exceptions, territorial aggression for economic gain is increasingly less frequent and less rational than a strategy of innovation.

Argument by Hawks: Interdependence and Vulnerability

Ironically, however, if the interdependence that fosters high-technology competitiveness can reduce traditional threats to national security, it can also increase the state's vulnerabilities in ways that undermine the state's confidence in its ability to provide for national security. Vulnerabilities should not matter if threats are reduced and if interstate violence is diminished but, nonetheless, as security debates over "threats" have subsided, arguments about "vulnerabilities" have intensified. Economic hawks find vulnerabilities in the comparison of relative power positions among states and measure them by comparing one's military capabilities with the capabilities of real or imagined military rivals. It is this last point that is problematic: Is an economic rival also a military one? Or is such a rival simply a postulate of the argument?

Raymond Vernon and Ethan Kapstein, following every realist since Thucydides, argue that there is a persistent national need to reduce vulnerabilities by maintaining or increasing one's relative power position in the international system and maintaining as much autonomy as possible, notwithstanding changes in threat perceptions. As they put it: "Whatever the contingencies and threats that defense planners foresee, their hope is to maintain the largest possible measure of superiority over the enemy."[22] Despite variation in their perceptions of the intensity, kind, and source of threats, according to the hawks, states under international anarchy continue to measure their vulnerabilities by comparing military

capabilities with other states, by assessing their dependence on strategic resources located on the territory of other states, and by assessing their economic and diplomatic entanglements with others through analysis of the effects of those entanglements on their power to control outcomes in such a way as to maintain their capabilities and reduce dependencies.

How does increasing globalization of production and exchange increase the state's perception of insecurity by increasing economic vulnerabilities? One answer lies in the encroachment of the market on the allocation of goods and services necessary to military strength, and the subsequent chipping away at the state's ability to control the allocation of those resources. The trend in increasing state control over those resources, evident since the late nineteenth century, would seem to have reversed itself in the late twentieth century.

Market allocations to defense have grown since World War II because military power has increasingly relied on commercial inputs.[23] There are two related reasons for this. First, weaponry is increasingly developed as a "system" that includes command, control, and communications components, as well as logistics and support services. Many of the necessary components of these "systems" are developed in the commercial sector. As a result, the concept of the "defense industrial base" is, once again, becoming increasingly popular among defense planners.[24] Economic hawks define the defense industrial base as any good, service, component, or input to the national economy necessary to the security interests of the state. This means that commercial firms who respond primarily to market signals may nonetheless produce goods necessary to the maintenance of military strength.

Second, the postwar period has witnessed the growth of systems developed for commercial purposes that, while previously considered inaccessible or irrelevant to military activity, are now considered critical. The capabilities for land, sea, air, and space warfare have grown tremendously, and the range and targeting capabilities of weaponry have been perfected. This means that commercial and military environments have come to overlap in many more ways than were once the case.

This overlap has meant that the manufactured goods and technology for these environments have acquired a "dual" use. Satellites survey the globe's weather patterns in order to predict crop performance; the same technology can be used to verify whether states are adhering to arms control agreements.[25] The microchips found in wrist watches, computers, and VCRs were also found to have been in the trigger of the bomb that destroyed Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland[26] as well as in the bombs dropped on Iraq during the Gulf War. Electronic components developed for automobiles have been adapted for use in tanks. Dual-use means that technologies needed for weapons systems are also traded in commercial markets. Thus market allocation of military resources has, in effect, grown enormously throughout the postwar period. This will be even more the case in the future.

Given the increasing reliance of military power on such commercial inputs, the globalization of production means not only that the market will, increasingly, allocate goods necessary for national security but also that those goods cannot necessarily be confined to markets that states can control. From a classical liberal perspective, if weapons have become vast "systems," thereby broadening the defense industrial base in the context of globalized production, it is natural that market forces will also create specializations of production. Consequently, different firms around the globe will occupy niches in markets that supply the defense industrial base of any particular nation. Vernon and Kapstein argue, for example, that market forces will push most countries to rely on foreign technologies in order to maintain their own defense capabilities.[27]

This inability to control those global markets that supply goods to the defense industrial base can lead to perceptions of vulnerability in the "home" state in two ways. The first is via the vulnerability of dependence. Theodore Moran argues that if the sources of supply to the U.S. defense industrial base become concentrated in too few hands, U.S. security will become increasingly dependent on others. As the state becomes increasingly dependent upon resources outside its borders, its ability to act autonomously is threatened and its capacity to channel resources to its military through authoritative allocation is diminished. Moran suggests a remedy for vulnerability: No four countries or four companies should supply more than fifty percent of the arms-length world market in goods vital to the defense industrial base.[28] The role of government is to stimulate competition and prevent the emergence of monopoly suppliers in order to stimulate efficiency.

Michael Borrus and John Zysman take issue with the assumptions behind this argument and the policy prescriptions that follow.[29] In their view, globalization does not necessarily lead to a specialization of production based on efficiency criteria. Market control becomes a new "threat" to replace the threat of territorial control. Indeed, they argue that just because threats to a nation's economy and resources do not arise in the form of military aggression, the threats themselves have not disappeared. States in intense competition with one another will seek to manipulate markets to control the resources of others.[30] For Borrus and Zysman, however, the loss of market control in an environment of global competition is simply a symptom of a more pernicious national security problem. In their view, vulnerability is measured by comparative national commercial technological strength; it does not result so much from dependence as from comparative technological weakness. Their analysis thus takes the causal arrow one step back and focuses on *why* a nation's defense industrial base becomes vulnerable to the forces of globalization.[31]

For them, the defense industrial base requires sourcing from abroad because home industries have lost their ability to innovate. Although there are many reasons for the relative decline of innovative capacity, one explanation points to the diversion of civilian resources to military projects. This is because, in the present period, the contribution of commercial technology "spin-ons" to military applications may be far more significant than military technology "spin-offs" to commercial industry. Civilian technology is immediately applicable, often without adaptation, to military use. For example, for sophisticated automobile models, semiconductor chips have been developed that operate in real time to control the car's mechanical systems in environments that are often as hostile as the battlefield.[32] In the United States, however, the military importance of commercial innovation has been underestimated. Moreover, in the 1980s, U.S. civilian research and development commanded a smaller fraction of GNP than in Japan or Germany, and military research and development captured 70 percent of all resources devoted to technological innovation. And the Reagan-era military buildup siphoned off scientific and engineering talent into military projects with limited commercial applications.[33]

The argument, then, is that technological leadership is the basis of economic power, and economic power is the foundation of military might. Those states where commercial innovation flourishes and which provide the source of production for another's defense industrial base are those who are economically competitive and thus increasingly powerful. And their economic power is a growing source of political influence and can, under the right conditions, be adapted to bolster national military capabilities.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, many officials in the U.S. Department of Defense started to feel the impact of these forces on the ability of the United States government to provide for military security, as the

resources required for the defense industrial base were increasingly found in foreign markets, revealing the erosion of innovative capability in domestic high technology industries. For example, in the mid-1980s, the Defense Department began to express concern that a general decline in the U.S. semiconductor industry could weaken the entire American electronics industry so that it would no longer be in a position to advance rapidly enough to offset any advantage the Soviet Union might have in numbers of troops or weapons.[34]

This apparent relative decline in control over military resources by the United States triggered perceptions of vulnerability in the face of those who would control markets for the supply of strategic goods. In a widely publicized book, *The Japan that Can Say "No"* , written with Sony President Akio Morita, Shintaro Ishihara wrote:

> It has come to the point that no matter how much they [the United States] continue military expansion, if Japan stopped selling them the chips, there would be nothing more they could do. . . . If, for example, Japan sold chips to the Soviet Union and stopped selling them to the U.S., this would upset the entire military balance. . . . the more technology advances, the more the U.S. and the Soviet Union will become dependent upon the initiative of the Japanese people.[35]

Even if such statements were exaggerated and intended for domestic Japanese political consumption, the U.S. Department of Defense translated the book and distributed it widely, suggesting that it confirmed their fears of economic vulnerability.

The United States' position in the last decade of the Cold War, then, provides a good example of the economic hawks' formulation of a new economic security dilemma to replace the old one: Growing market allocation of dual-use technologies and continued U.S. concentration on military vs. commercial R&D have combined to reduce state autonomy in the effort to secure the resources of military strength. This has led to increased *vulnerability* despite reduced security *threats* . But, as we shall see below, the United States is not alone in experiencing this dilemma, although it manifests itself differently under different market conditions.

The Hawks' Policy Response: Can the State Strike Back?

The vulnerability arguments presented above form the core of the new security dilemma under international economic interdependence. Borrus and Zysman argue that, within this construction of the new economic security problem, the real question is not whether the forces of international economic interdependence decrease national security by shifting the allocation of military resources to the market, as Moran suggests, but rather whether states can consolidate their power in the face of forces that decentralize market power and in the face of other state actors who attempt to control markets. For policy elites, the essence of that dilemma is the tradeoff between state autonomy and technological capability and how that tradeoff is to be managed. Choices then revolve around the kind and degree of market control appropriate to reduce perceived vulnerabilities.

To reiterate, states have a range of policy choices through which they can control markets.[36] They can pursue extreme import substitution and industrial policies that assure that all innovative activity takes place on their soil. These policies will result in expanded autonomy but, ultimately, reduced capability if they concentrate resources on military research and development at the expense of commercial development, or if they deny imports of commercial technology required as inputs into industrial activity. Another means of increasing autonomy is through export control. Export control policies, however, give markets to competitor nations that permit uncontrolled exports, reducing profitability and returns to

R&D, thereby also reducing capability.

Alternatively, states can allow markets to operate freely. Autonomy will be reduced and the contribution of market competition to innovative capability will depend on the technological level of the country's industry and the structure of the international market, that is, whether it is dominated by a few or many suppliers. If dominated by many suppliers, the state can sponsor the development of its own industries and leave markets open; autonomy may be reduced, but threats of dependence are reduced as well. If the market is dominated by a few suppliers, then states will be tempted to close markets to prevent vulnerability at the hands of those who could exercise market control. An intermediate strategy is cooperation and technology sharing agreements. Here, both autonomy and market competition are compromised, but the benefits to security are perceived by state actors to be greater than the costs.[37]

The remainder of this essay is devoted to an examination of the old and new economic security dilemmas under assumptions of economic vulnerability resulting from increased interdependence, and an assessment of the strategies outlined above that states use to exert market control. In the following section, I explore the Cold War history of growing economic interdependence between military rivals--the United States and the Soviet Union. The story of that growing interdependence suggests that the Soviet Union was a state that was *unable* to consolidate market control in the face of growing dependence, entanglements with the West, and loss of autonomy. It could neither prevent Western control of markets nor stabilize property rights in the process of reform geared toward meeting the West's conditions for entering into the Western-dominated international economy. The United States, by contrast, was able to consolidate market control in the interdependent relationship, and U.S. and other Western private corporations were able to manipulate the markets for manufactured goods upon which the Soviet state came to depend. Nonetheless, the consolidation of market control through export controls had pernicious effects on political relations among Western industrialized countries, on the U.S. economy, and on its state-society relations. The following section tells the story.

USSR and U.S. Compared

The Soviet Economic Security Dilemma in the Cold War [38]

At the beginning of the Cold War, Stalin refused to become part of the new postwar international economic order, and attempted to steer the Soviet Union in the direction of economic autarky. Import substitution was the top investment priority in the early 1950s. Attacking the "dictatorship of the Marshall Plan," Stalin announced the creation of the CMEA in order to reduce dependencies through control over a trading bloc that was secured from the influence of global capitalism. The Soviet defense industrial base was, consequently, dependent only on national and CMEA resources.[39]

During the 1950s, however, Soviet growth rates *fell* --not only because of the distortions of central planning but also as a result of the inefficiencies of autarky. The Soviet Union found itself on the sidelines in the race for economic prosperity as its technical expertise in commercial industry began to lag far behind the industrial capitalist nations. The same imperatives that would affect the U.S. defense industrial base in the 1970s began to impinge on the Soviet defense sector by the early 1960s. That sector was always a top priority in the Soviet economy, but weapons systems requiring dual-use technologies meant that military strength increasingly rested on the civilian industrial base. And Soviet civilian technological innovation lagged farther and farther behind that of the West. The continuation of autarkic policies in an increasingly global sourcing network pulled defense innovation even farther behind.

Recognizing this lag, Soviet leaders, beginning with Khrushchev and ending with Gorbachev, initiated measures that would lead to a systematic but highly controlled opening to the international economy, while still preventing the creation of internal markets. Nonetheless, because the opening to the international economy was so limited, technology gaps between the USSR and the West widened and multiplied. The Soviet state responded to these growing vulnerabilities with expanded efforts to acquire Western technology vital to military industries. Although the Reagan Administration mistook the purpose of both legal and illegal technology acquisition efforts in the late 1970s and early 1980s for positive results in the Soviet defense sector, the acquisition efforts were real. Nonetheless, they failed to achieve their objective; acquisitions did nothing to narrow the high technology gap between the Soviet Union and the West. In fact, the gap continued to grow.[40]

Only when Gorbachev came to power did the Soviet regime finally open the floodgates to the international economy and begin the process of creating internal markets.[41] Initially, these moves were widely supported by Soviet economic hawks, who (and it would now appear they were correct) believed that the USSR would not remain a great military power unless it could raise the technological level of its industry to meet the standards of global competition. Opening to the West was one of the many strategies of renewal pursued to meet this goal.

The introduction of domestic reforms and the establishment of market ties with the West obviously failed to strengthen the security of the state; indeed, it had the effect of undermining the state itself. Why? The failure can be explained in two ways. First, western security and corporate concerns shaped the way the Soviet Union was initially integrated into the international economy. That integration was characterized by both dependence and peripheralization. Second, the particular sequencing of both external and internal reforms in the Gorbachev era worked to weaken the Soviet economy more than ever before by vastly increasing external debt. Both of these causes served not only to reduce the security benefits sought by the Soviet state, but also further exacerbated the weakening of the Soviet state itself.[42]

Western investments in the Soviet Union were, in any event, meager, and the pattern of investments, combined with Western corporate strategy, worked to ensure Soviet *dependence* on western technology.[43] Western private investment was targeted primarily for extractive industries and commodity production, and most joint ventures were in services and the marketing of Western imports. Investment targeted for manufacturing industries was largely confined to assembly operations, adding little value to the goods produced and intended for the Soviet market rather than for export. Component parts for Soviet plants were sourced in the West, inhibiting the creation of linkages between the joint venture and the rest of the economy. Corporate officials in the West believed that transfer of obsolete technology through these ventures was sufficient to capture domestic market share. Contractual provisions ensured that the most advanced Western technologies were withheld from the Soviet economy. Technology transfer was used as a "hook" in order to get a foot into the Soviet market, and "core" technologies were rarely included in joint venture agreements.[44]

The problem of dependence and the peripheralization of the Soviet Union in the global economy was compounded by the problem of faulty sequencing in the introduction of market forces. Because internal economic rigidities still persisted, Western technology was purchased as a substitute for economic restructuring; if Soviet industries were to compete in the world market, innovative technology would have to be imported. Soviet planners knew that if they tried to compete in the international economy with sales of oil, timber, furs, and other commodities, they would never be as competitive as those states who

produced computers, advanced components and new materials. But hard currency was required for the technology purchases necessary to the production of these goods, and hard currency could be earned only through increased commodity exports. Export earnings, however, were subject to the vagaries of commodity markets, and when they could not cover imports, technology had to be purchased with Western credits. The debt to the West grew quickly.

Growing internal economic weakness meant that the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw Pact were eventually plunged deeply into debt in order to purchase consumer goods and raise wages to stave off domestic unrest. East European and, later, Soviet debt to the West reached dangerously high levels in the 1980s, only to be reduced by drastic cuts in Western imports and massive rescheduling of loans. Subsequent decreases in the rate of economic growth and decline in living standards squeezed populations who could no longer be mobilized by ideological appeals.

Thus the conditions under which Western investment entered the Soviet economy both indicated and contributed to the rising vulnerability and, therefore, declining security of the Soviet state. Lacking a "developmental" state to create an investment code that would identify priority sectors as targets of foreign investment, Western capital was used to bolster extractive industries and light manufacturing, perpetuating the Soviet Union as a raw materials supplier and producer of labor-intensive goods. The Soviet state in the international economy was moving down the precarious path traveled by many Third World countries: A weak state saddled with mounting debt and unfavorable terms of trade.

In sum, in the Soviet case, controlled attempts to *secure* resources for the defense industrial base in international markets helped to *undermine* the stability and, hence, the security of the state. The story of the Soviet demise is, thus, partly one of how the Soviet state first lost out on the capabilities acquired through the international diffusion of technology and, subsequently, how it became dependent on markets controlled by the West as its own defense industrial base became subject to the forces of globalization. Policies to cope with vulnerability reduced state autonomy but did not succeed in increasing capabilities.

The United States

By contrast with the USSR, the United States reduced its perceived vulnerabilities in its interdependent relationships with the Soviet Union by consolidating unilateral and multilateral control over East-West technology markets. The chief instrument of market control was the legal restriction of technology exports. Beginning in 1949, U.S. Congressional leaders and Administration officials made sure that America's major trading partners would also be military allies and, at the same time, they constructed a policy of "economic warfare" against the Soviet Union. This latter policy was embodied in the U.S. Export Control Act of 1949. The law stated that the "unrestricted export" of materials without regard to their "potential military significance" could "affect the national security" of the United States.[45]

The second instrument of market control was multilateral technology export restrictions. This instrument was promoted inasmuch as the United States could not carry out the task of trade denial alone. Because the allies could sell the Soviets goods that the United States restricted, their compliance was needed in the export control effort. Thus, also in 1949, the United States took the lead in creating COCOM (Coordinating Committee), a multilateral "regime" to restrict Western exports to the Soviet bloc. The purpose of the unified embargo was to wage economic warfare against the Soviet Union and thereby protect Western security by creating a broad list of goods to be embargoed by all COCOM members. This embargo list would restrict both military and nonmilitary goods. The trick was to persuade the allies

to accept these embargo norms based on economic vulnerability claims and to ensure compliance with the regime rules.

Although effective in reducing the flow of militarily significant technology to the Soviet Union, the multilateral control effort was achieved only at high political cost. Few other issues aroused as passionate a dispute between the United States and its Cold War allies. Few other issues signaled so clearly or so early Europe's emerging self-assertion and drift from the preferences of the United States. In particular, the 1980s witnessed acrimonious debate between the United States and its European allies over which technologies were to be restricted, and general allied disgust over America's extension of extraterritorial export controls.[46] The surreptitious violation of COCOM regulations by allies, as seen in the Toshiba Corporation's illegal sale of submarine-quieting technology to the Soviet Union, became an important issue in ongoing trade disputes between the United States and Japan.

U.S. unilateral controls also carried high domestic economic and political costs. Declining U.S. competitiveness led high-technology industry officials to argue that a central requirement for enhanced industrial productivity was the freedom to capture and maintain new markets abroad and an infusion of new (and sometimes foreign) capital into declining sectors. These requirements, however, clashed directly with export controls.[47] Ralph Thompson, former senior vice president of the American Electronics Association, succinctly expressed the industry position when he stated that the relaxation of export controls would revitalize the competitiveness of American industry in the global marketplace: "In a situation where it's clear the principal confrontations now are economic rather than military, we certainly need to have the weapons released for use so we can fight the battle properly."[48] Export controls were, thus, utilized in debates over how to reconstruct the requirements for "national security" in an interdependent world. They also permitted some American industry officials to place the blame for their declining productivity entirely on export restrictions.

Two industry-government conflicts in the 1980s illustrate the painful tradeoff and paradoxical relationship between autonomy and capability triggered by export control policy.[49] In 1987, General Motors and General Electric vigorously lobbied the U.S. government for export licenses to permit launchings of their commercial communications satellites from the Soviet Union. The Soviets promised a "fast track to the stars" with their Proton rocket. Their promise was a bargain at a cost of $30 million per launch, half the cost of similar launchings in the West. State Department officials insisted, however, that it would not be in the U.S. national interest to issue export licenses for these satellites, because using Soviet rockets would provide the adversary with access to strategic U.S. technology, thereby potentially reducing relative U.S. technological capability.

The U.S. communications satellite industry, however, was in deep trouble. After the 1986 Challenger explosion, President Reagan had ordered an end to commercial satellite launchings by U.S. space shuttles, and American rockets were booked with military orders through 1989. Without launching facilities, the industry recognized, it would be at a grave disadvantage vis-à-vis Europe and Japan, who were not only constructing their own rockets, but also permitting the Soviet Union to launch *their* commercial communications satellites. Furthermore, to avoid U.S. extraterritorial export controls on their Soviet launchings, these competitors were designing out American components, further harming the American industry. Therefore, the satellite producers argued, export controls would *cause* rather than prevent capability loss.

Congressional representatives, on the other hand, worried that if the U.S. communications satellite

industry used Soviet launch facilities, the fledgling U.S. commercial rocket industry would be destroyed. NASA officials opposed this view and backed the communications satellite industry, urging the administration to drop restrictions in the interest of U.S. "competitiveness." At first the government denied the export licenses to the Soviet Union, but permitted launches from China; later, it relented to allow some launches from the USSR. Arguments for market opening in the interests of capability enhancement seem to have won.

A similar set of conflicts emerged when, in 1986, Japan's Fujitsu Ltd. announced plans to merge its semiconductor business with Schlumberger Ltd.'s Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation. Like many firms in the U.S. semiconductor industry, Fairchild was ailing. In exchange for 80 percent of the firm, Fujitsu would invest $400 million in the company over two years, making available to Fairchild all of its technology. Some observers estimated that the Japanese infusion of cash would make Fairchild a major player in the American market again, and Fairchild would leapfrog from thirteenth to tenth among world chipmakers.

Again, the U.S. government was divided in its assessments of the sale's implications. Many argued that actions such as the proposed merger were just what the U.S. semiconductor industry needed to become competitive again. Others argued that the merger would jeopardize U.S. security interests. Since Fairchild made defense products under contracts worth $150 million a year, Fujitsu would conceivably have had access to contracts, catalogs, and Defense Department documents. And since Japan traded with the Soviet Union, it was argued, the sale might easily compromise U.S. military security interests. The controversy caused Fujitsu to withdraw the offer.

Both of these cases illustrate the painful tradeoff between preserving military autonomy and relative capability through trade and investment restrictions, and stimulating commercial innovative capability through market opening. In the first case opening was preferred; in the second, it was denied. Overall policy on trade controls was inconsistent but, in general, export controls were given priority over measures with the potential to increase U.S. competitiveness.[50]

A second problem with trade and investment restrictions was that they led to an expansion of state control over domestic society. Part of the Reagan Administration's strategy to gain increased executive authority, so as to reduce perceived security threats and vulnerabilities in economic relations with Warsaw Pact countries, was to exaggerate vulnerability claims for the purpose of expanding the domestic scope of the state regulation in order to protect "national security." Export controls restricted attendance at scientific conferences in the United States where unclassified material was presented, and the Department of Defense was required to review unclassified scientific research before publication. The National Academy of Sciences and others argued that these controls impinged on basic constitutional freedoms in the United States,[51] leading to the increased militarization of civil society.

The story of U.S.-Soviet economic relations during the Cold War nicely illustrates the new economic security dilemma that many policy elites will face in the post-Cold War era if they continue to conceptualize security within traditional state-centered and military assumptions. The Soviet Union, with a weakening defense industrial base, attempted to strengthen its position--not through increased domestic innovative activity, but through attempts to acquire technological resources in international markets. Those markets, however, were controlled by Western firms who manipulated them to ensure continued Soviet *commercial* dependence on Western inputs, thereby increasing Soviet *military* vulnerability. They were further controlled by both unilateral and multilateral export restrictions. There was no

evidence that the sale of those technologies had bolstered Soviet military strength by closing the technology gap between the USSR and the West.[52] These points raise the question: Which strategy, if either, was most responsible for the eventual Soviet collapse? In a dynamic sense, neither was. Rather, it was the initial Soviet decision to pursue autarky which set it on a divergent development path that led to lower technological capabilities and eventually forced it to seek external sources in order to try to catch up.[53]

For the United States, the dilemma presented itself in a different form: Export controls, intended to ensure that the fruits of innovation did not fall into the hands of military rivals, were resisted in the private sector because of perceived harm to domestic innovative activity. They were also resisted by scientific and technical elites on the basis of the argument that they impinged on constitutional freedoms.

The Economic Security Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era

As I argued above, most policy elites who focus on the vulnerability effects of international interdependence face the dilemma of balancing their access to technologies necessary to military strength that provide security, while keeping markets more or less open. This may, however, be more of a cognitive problem than a practical one. Since World War II, very few countries, except for the United States and the Soviet Union, have had either the technological edge or the practical possibility of reducing technological sensitivities to market forces. Even Japan, posited by some as a future "challenger," has little hope of achieving this position any time soon. "Real" military vulnerability therefore remains more of a theoretical possibility than an existing fact; turning such theoretical possibilities into the threats that could motivate real security policies will be difficult.

As with the different dilemmas faced by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the economic security dilemmas states face in the post-Cold War era will differ with their position in international markets and the resources available within their own sovereign jurisdictions. Their choice of measures for market control will ultimately be determined by the nature and extent of perceived vulnerabilities shaped by those material factors. Below I outline briefly how those dilemmas are likely to be perceived and whom they are most likely to affect.

The Former Soviet Union (FSU)

One of the central economic problems in former Communist countries is the state's almost total inability to control markets and to establish stable property rights on the basis of market rational behavior. To establish stable property rights is, perhaps, the first and foremost requirement for the production of resources important to military strength in the era of globalization, since foreign investment will otherwise be stunted. The fact that Russia and the other republics of the FSU have not been able to do this means that it is one of the regions most vulnerable in the face of global economic interdependence. It also means, somewhat ironically, that the West could become vulnerable, and threatened, as a result of the region's disintegration, turmoil, and potential economic collapse. Within the Cold War logic, the prospect of the fragmentation of a powerful Soviet Union was a welcome scenario, inasmuch as a fragmented Soviet Union would be a less powerful adversary whose "threats" to western security would be reduced. In the aftermath of Communism, however, the threat is seen not as one of intention--of economic blackmail, leverage, and the use of economic relations for political and military ends--but rather as a threat of unintended chaos over which new and fragile governments will have little control.

By the beginning of 1993, production had all but halted as large conglomerates became trading companies, extracting profits from barter. Supplies of goods and services could not be assured, idling other enterprises. And wage levels had collapsed, too, under the impact of inflation and devaluation of the ruble, leading to fears of technology exodus *from* the former Soviet Union to dangerous Third World countries, and replacing fears of technology exodus *to* the Soviet Union from the West.

Uncertainty over control of economic forces and the disintegration of the Soviet state also led many of the thousands of Soviet scientists trained in building nuclear and chemical weapons to think about selling their expertise to the highest bidder, including states such as North Korea, Libya, and Iraq, thereby increasing the military "threat" from those areas to the West and to the former Soviet Union itself.[54] In another example, a group of former party elites in Russia with good connections to the state bank--promising easy credit terms--bought dual-use space technology and planned in early 1992 to sell it in global markets.[55] Although Russian President Yeltsin threatened to impose sanctions on such activities, it is entirely unclear whether his government has the wherewithal to do so.

In order to prevent this technology exodus *from* the former USSR to other dangerous countries, the Bush Administration--in a program supported by the Clinton Administration as well--initially provided $25 million to help support former Soviet scientists and engineers so that they could redirect their talents to nonmilitary endeavors, and later on--in a program for which Congressional support was wavering in early 1995--put substantial sums into the disassembly of nuclear weapons and purchase of nuclear materials.[56] At the same time, however, the United States blocked the purchase of missiles, rocket engines, satellites, space reactors, spacecraft, and other aerospace technology from the former Soviet Union, in order to force the decline of the Russian space and military industry so that it could pose no future threat to the U.S. Many argue that this embargo could further force former Soviet scientists to sell their knowledge to potential military rivals in the Third World.[57]

The Third World

Most Third World countries, except, perhaps, the Newly Industrializing Countries of East Asia, have little innovative capability, few technologies to offer for cooperative projects, and little state capacity to maintain autonomy in the face of international economic interdependence. Poor Third World countries have weak states, little control over markets, and limited ability to cushion themselves against shocks, imposed by changes in the international economy, that threaten what strength they have. By contrast, industrialized nations, with their resilient political institutions, strong economies, efficient bureaucracies, and control over markets and supplies of raw materials possess the capabilities to withstand much better the international economic vacillations that render less-developed countries vulnerable. Third World states are forced to *import* security resources from the international market. As discussed above, the need to import creates *dependence* on a supplier. The Cold War led each superpower to place stiff political and ideological conditions on the sale of militarily relevant goods, forcing weaker states to become their clients in order to maintain access to military resources.

In the post-Cold War era, marked by diminished ideological rivalry, with the commercialization of resources necessary to military strength, and more intense competition among suppliers, dependence on single suppliers has receded. Suppliers in the technologically innovative countries who are faced with the need to extend production runs will be eager to sell in this market, increasing supplier competition even more.[58] When dependence on a single supplier is lessened, industrialized states cannot impose "political conditionality" requirements on importers and may perceive that they have less control over Third World

importing states and their use of military resources. And for many Third World states, expanded *choices* increase state *autonomy* .

Furthermore, without the security umbrella of a great power, Third World technology importers may seek to build up an indigenous military-industrial base that will be safe from the vicissitudes of international trade. They may seek to acquire from abroad the advanced technology necessary for increased domestic production efficiency and dual-use technologies needed to build weapons production capabilities. The case of Iraq provides one such example.

Both before and in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a rash of reports appeared throughout Europe and the U.S. accusing Western firms of selling to Iraq the very technology that enhanced the enemy's defense industrial base and jeopardized Western security in the Persian Gulf. Most of those purchases of commercial high technology were legal and were authorized by Western governments in the effort to help balance against Iran's power in the Middle East. Western firms legally sold Iraq industrial production machinery that could be used to build nuclear weapons--indeed the U.S. Commerce Department approved 771 licenses to export $2 billion worth of computers, chemicals, and communications equipment to Iraq between 1985 and 1990.[59] West German firms legally sold Iraq machinery for making gas centrifuges--which can separate uranium-238 from the more easily fissioned uranium-235, an essential step in creating weapons-grade nuclear material. Furthermore, Iraq had been in good standing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because most of the technology it purchased could legitimately be used to enhance civilian production capabilities.

Indeed, throughout the 1980s, several Third World powers sought to develop chemical and biological weapons capabilities.[60] Because traditional Western export controls were targeted on the Soviet Union, and the technology became increasingly available from non-Western suppliers whose export controls were lax, most weapons production technologies were available on international markets. Even when controls were in place, private firms could legitimately claim that they were selling commercial, not military, technology. Most firms knew that, in Third World transactions, there were no legitimate institutions monitoring what was being sold and for what purpose.

The expected response in the future, therefore, would be for policy elites in industrialized nations to control technology exports to the Third World in much the same way that they controlled exports to the Soviet Union. If the Soviet case provides an example, however, extensive export controls beyond the restriction of military technology are not required and their costs in terms of reduced domestic innovative capability and restriction of constitutional freedoms at home far exceed the benefits. Recall that in the Soviet case, corporations did not sell their most advanced products, yet still created dependence on their "core" technologies.

Furthermore, because of economic weakness, Third World purchases of advanced Western technology are likely to go the way of Soviet purchases. Western technology had little "spillover" effect on the industrial base of the Soviet economy as a whole.[61] The successful utilization of technology within any country depends on the extent to which its positive effects can be diffused throughout an industry, sector, or the economy as a whole. The success of commercial technology transfer depends on the nation's industrial structure and whether that structure provides for strong linkages among related industries through which the positive effects of innovation can spread. And the speed at which commercial innovation can be translated into weapons systems seems to depend on the strength of the networks between scientists, engineers, and defense contractors in military and civilian industries and

policymakers in government.[62]

Within a state that has a "military-industrial complex," these networks are both tight and stable. But in weak countries such linkages do not exist, and the positive effects of commercial technology imports on military strength will be small or nil. Finally, if scarce resources are invested in military technology, Third World states will undercut their ability to innovate and develop, perpetuating their dependence on the international market. This does not mean, of course, that they cannot develop weapons of mass destruction and crude, but capable, delivery systems. The cases of Iraq, India and China demonstrate this. But it is unlikely that they will be able to develop the sophisticated support and delivery systems necessary to make the weaponry wholly effective or reliable.[63]

The Industrial States of Western Europe

During the Cold War, the United States provided the military resources perceived necessary for its allies' security. The NATO alliance itself weakened fears associated with the security dilemma among its members. These two factors alleviated much of their perceived need to commit resources to arms production and to create the structures necessary to translate commercial innovation into weaponry. Instead, U.S. allies concentrated on more profitable commercial within any country depeninnovative activity. These countries, therefore, (with certain exceptions) began the post-Cold War era without having in place the "networks" or policy communities necessary to immediately or effectively translate technology from commercial use to military application.

In the post-Cold War environment, however, several forces have converged to raise fears of a new economic security dilemma among decisionmakers within these states. The waning of the Cold War, the end of the Soviet threat and the Soviet Union, and the relative decline of the U.S. economy have combined to pressure these states into providing the military resources thought necessary for their own security.[64] But the rising costs of both military and civilian R&D necessary to do so appear prohibitive, and they have been unwilling to relinquish their full autonomy by completely ceding resource allocation to the market.[65]

With respect to the commercial industries of concern in this essay, the solution appeared to be a combination of state cooperation in research and development and the fostering of strategic corporate alliances among private firms. At the level of interstate cooperation, programs like FAST (designed to devise long-term joint research activities), EUREKA and ESPRIT (cooperative activity between private firms and national research institutes for R&D), BRITE (a program to disseminate R&D results), RACE (a program to integrate telecommunications system), and JESSI (a consortium for microelectronics research) proliferated in the 1980s.[66] Although their success was in doubt in the 1990s, the emergence of these programs indicated the beginning of a new understanding among policy elites of the requirements for security under economic interdependence.

At the level of private interaction, particularly in high technology industries where customized production requires direct contacts with end-users, and where converging technologies require firms to integrate a full line of products rather than simply selling a single piece of technology, cooperative efforts have sprung up among European firms.[67] In most of these projects, participants divide market shares between them. There is, however, some debate over the effectiveness of these latter arrangements. These cartel-like structures clearly suppress competition and, from a classical liberal perspective, the suppression of competition will dampen innovation. Nonetheless, for the smaller countries, economies of

scale and the pressures of regional competition seem to require such forms of cooperation. A further problem is that all of these arrangements probably work best within a tight alliance structure. But in a post-Cold war environment, the stability of alliances may be unpredictable.[68] Finally, to the extent that states must give up part of their control over these arrangements, they also give up some of the functional distinctions between them, and their societies may come to recognize that these states must compromise the task of protection from one another.

I have attempted, in this essay, to delineate the issues that make up the construction of the new security dilemma under international economic interdependence. In contrast to the traditional assumption that the state's security rests on the threat, use, and control of military force and that military power is an essential ingredient of both state survival and prosperity, I have argued here that resources necessary to military strength increasingly escape the state's control. Efforts to "strike back" and gain control vary with state development, capacity, size, resource distribution, and market power. Most of these efforts, however, are either counterproductive (import and export controls and the concentration of domestic resources on military R&D) or, if potentially successful, are available to only a few states (co-development, co-production, and strategic corporate alliances).

Third World states must continue to import military resources and will be at a disadvantage in trade with those who dominate markets. Nonetheless, their position may have improved with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of its rigid patron-client relationships. The former Soviet Union has the least control of all in that its component republics have not yet been able to stabilize the economic forces necessary to either produce resources essential to military strength or gain market positions that would lead them away from dependence on those who would control markets for their own advantage.

This argument, however, has been largely suggestive rather than conclusive. Future research should address the following questions: If economic vulnerability fears persist, what balance of state intervention and market allocation will allow technological innovation to flourish, yet maintain state control over allocation of resources deemed essential to security? What political and economic structures are compatible with this process? Under what conditions are some states structurally advantaged or disadvantaged in the pursuit of technological innovation in the current world environment?[69]

Such questions might not be the right ones to ask, inasmuch as they continue to be formulated within the traditional assumptions about states as "black boxed" central actors, and "security" as correlated with military power. In light of arguments made here and by the other contributors to this volume, such assumptions may no longer be valid. If such is the case, the framing of concerns and policies about innovation and competitiveness in terms of national security may be more in the nature of "spitting into the wind" than "defending the national interest." Nonetheless, the dominance of this new security dilemma in the political discourse may act to decisively change the way security will be defined in the coming years. In much the same way that nuclear interdependence between the United States and the Soviet Union changed threat expectations and the role of the military in protecting national security, changing economic conditions could lead to a new security "problematique" in international relations.[70]

Three scenarios are possible, each calling for a changing conception of security concerns in a changing international environment. First, with regard to the distribution of capabilities that leads to vulnerability, it is possible that a qualitative leap in innovative capability will give one state (Japan) or region (the European Union) the status of a new international hegemon. A benign hegemon could provide for the security of its allies, in much the same way that the United States did during the Cold War. A more

self-interested hegemon might manipulate and control international markets to enhance its own capabilities at the expense of others. Technology diffusion will enhance the economies of those importers who possess the infrastructure, policy networks, and economic linkages to use imports to strengthen capability. If the argument presented here is correct, many of the problems of hegemony that plagued United States in the Cold War are likely to follow any new hegemon in the post-Cold War period.

This scenario focuses on vulnerabilities and ignores changing threats. The arguments of the "doves," however, suggest that the forces under examination here can *weaken* threats, even while they exacerbate vulnerabilities. Threat reduction, however, will have both external and internal consequences, with conflicting implications for the construction of security. A second scenario, then, looks to the rise of "trading states" who devote fewer and fewer resources to defense. In this scenario, the policy networks between industry and the military essential to the rapid translation of commercial innovation to military power will wither, reducing vulnerabilities as well as threats. The draining of both threats and vulnerabilities from interstate relations could expand the growth of "republican unions" and "pluralistic security communities" that would reinforce threat reduction, ultimately strengthening the international society of states.[71]

In a third scenario, however, interdependence and the threat reduction it triggers could have internal consequences that expand the power of the state. If central policymakers cannot find external threats, a major source of social mobilization is withheld from the state, and a central basis for its legitimation is weakened.[72] We can understand this process in a more mundane sense when we remember that, in the United States, traditional threat definitions constructed by traditional "hawks" fueled defense expenditures that, in turn, supported employment and kept political constituencies happy. The story of exaggerated threats and vulnerabilities to expand state power as told in this paper also illustrates this point. In the post-Cold War environment, will politicians need to manufacture or find new kinds of threats to maintain their political power?[73]

No matter which of these scenarios is realized, I have suggested here that material changes in the international economy have affected the hopes, fears, and cognitive understandings of the policy elite as they engage in the task of reconstructing the requirements for national security. The third scenario above suggests that a widespread belief in the new security dilemma under international economic interdependence could, ultimately, mean the extension of security concerns and military issues into economic realms far more than has been the case during the period since 1945. This would not necessarily be a positive development. As the story of U.S. economic relations with the Soviet Union suggests, the definition of economic interaction as a security issue gave the state the license to control new areas of social activity and to raise fears of encroachment on constitutional freedoms. And a massive American military establishment built to wage global war against totalitarian regimes will naturally look for a new security agenda to justify its continued existence. Raising the specter of an "economic security dilemma" may be an important part of this strategy. Increasing global economic interdependence has not yet changed the basic assumptions of the national security debate; indeed, it has provided an excuse to expand the range of concerns that are considered "security" issues.

Note *: Thanks to Barry Buzan, Dan Deudney, and Ronnie Lipschutz for valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper and to the other participants in the project, "Security and the Nation-State" for useful suggestions and criticisms. I also thank John Leslie for expert research assistance and for

helping to refine and clarify the arguments presented here. A somewhat different version of this paper appeared in Millennium 23, #1 (Spring 1994):23-55. Back.

Note 1: Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Back.

Note 2: The classical discussion of threats and vulnerabilities can be found in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989, 2nd ed.). Back.

Note 3: One would think that the inability of all states to control markets in this way would put them on a more-or-less equal footing where vulnerability is concerned. The problem is not, however, to be understood, strictly speaking, as access to *goods* but, rather, access to the *information* required to manufacture those goods. Back.

Note 4: The interaction between international economic and security issues is an ancient one: Thucydides gave detailed attention to it in his history of the Peloponnesian War, and Friedrich List's analysis of Germany's potential military vulnerability in the face of international economic interdependence is classic. There is a large literature linking industrial power, natural resources, and great power grand strategy; and the relationship between oil and international security has been a major preoccupation in American foreign policy since the 1970s. Indeed, realism, according to Jacob Viner, is about the struggle for power and plenty. For important general discussions see Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, eds., *Economic Issues and National Security* (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, Inc., 1977).

Much of the recent literature, however, has suffered from the division in the field of international relations between "security studies" and "international political economy." Dan Deudney has reminded me that the emergence of this split was partly an effort to demonstrate that the advanced liberal democracies were no longer so preoccupied with security affairs and that it was possible, for the first time, to talk about economic interaction between states that was not driven by security concerns. (Personal communication, September 21, 1992). The separation can also be explained by the fact that much of the security debate was focused on the Cold War, and interdependence among adversaries was low. At the Cold War's end, more scholars have turned their attention to this connection in relations among allies and between industrialized capitalist countries and the Third World. See, for example, Theodore Moran, "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 57-99; Theodore Moran, "International Economics and National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5 (Winter 1990-91): 74-90; Michael Borrus, Ken Conca, Wayne Sandholtz, Jay Stowsky, Steven Weber and John Zysman, *The Highest Stakes: Technology, Economy and Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Ethan Kapstein and Raymond Vernon, eds., *Searching for Security in a Global Economy, Daedalus* 120, no. 4 (Fall 1991). Back.

Note 5: In discussing the future research agenda of security studies, Stephen Walt suggests that the connection between economics and security merits further attention. The topics of concern, however, which include the connection between military spending and economic performance, the role of strategic resources as potential causes of international conflict, and the political influence of the military-industrial complex have all been explored in a sizable literature. His neglect of a concern with the impact of

international economic interdependence on national security seems to presuppose the continued separation in the security studies literature between studies of "high" and "low" politics. See Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 227. Back.

Note 6: See Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," pp. 211-39, and Joseph S. Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 5-27. Back.

Note 7: Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence* , p. 9. Back.

Note 8: Stephen Krasner and Janice Thompson, "Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty," in: Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges--Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (New York: Lexington, 1989), pp. 195-220. Back.

Note 9: Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2nd edition, 1991), pp. 124-31. Back.

Note 10: See, for example, arguments by Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 129-53; Jessica T. Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 162-77, and Lester Brown, *World Without Borders* (New York: Random House, 1972). Back.

Note 11: For the best discussion of this issue with regard to the United States see Edward Graham and Paul Krugman, *Foreign Direct Investment in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1991, 2nd ed.). Back.

Note 12: Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). Back.

Note 13: Barry Buzan makes this important distinction in *People, States, and Fear* . Back.

Note 14: Prior to World War II, Cordell Hull is reputed to have observed, "If goods can't cross borders, soldiers will." A more common experience seems to be that goods can cross borders even after soldiers have. Back.

Note 15: Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence* , pp. 27-29. Back.

Note 16: This is essentially the argument Waltz makes about Europe just before World War I; see "The Myth of Interdependence," in: Charles Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 205-33. Back.

Note 17: As we shall see, the Soviet case also supports the argument, but not in quite the same way. Back.

Note 18: A recent analysis of the different forms of "globalization" can be found in: Richard Gordon, "Internationalization, Multinationalization, Globalization: Contradictory World Economies and New Spatial Divisions of Labor," Center for the Study of Global Transformations, University of California, Santa Cruz, August 1994, Working Paper 94-10. Back.

Note 19: See, for example, Michael Borrus, et. al, *The Highest Stakes* ; and Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1991). Back.

Note 20: For a detailed discussion of this argument, see W. Michael Blumenthal, "The World Economy and Technological Change," *Foreign Affairs* 67, no. 1 (January 1988): 529-50. Back.

Note 21: See Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* ; Richard H. Ullman, *Securing Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Timothy J. McKeown, "The Limitations of `Structural' Theories of Commercial Policy," *International Organization* 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986), especially p. 53. Back.

Note 22: Raymond Vernon and Ethan Kapstein, "National Needs, Global Resources," *Daedalus* 120, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 4. Back.

Note 23: For evidence on this important change see Ina Spiegel-Roesing and Derek de Solla Price, eds., *Science, Technology, and Society* (London: Sage, 1977); John Zysman and Stephen S. Cohen, *Manufacturing Matters* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); National Science Foundation (NSF Report 84-11), *National Patterns of Science and Technology Resources, 1984* (Washington, D.C.: NSF, 1985); and John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963). Back.

Note 24: See, for example, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *The Defense Technology Base: Introduction and Overview--A Special Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1988); and Jeff Bingaman and John McCain, *Deterrence in Decay: The Future of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989). Back.

Note 25: And allow states to monitor their own citizens, as well; see James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy--Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), ch. 2 & 3. Back.

Note 26: See Robert Kupperman and Tamara Kupperman, "The Politics of Pan Am 103," *New York Times* , November 16, 1991, p. 15. Back.

Note 27: Vernon and Kapstein, "National Needs, Global Resources," p. 19. Back.

Note 28: Theodore Moran, "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries," p. 82. Back.

Note 29: Michael Borrus and John Zysman, "The Highest Stakes: Industrial Competitiveness and National Security, " in: Borrus, et. al., *The Highest Stakes* , pp. 7-52. Back.

Note 30: This is not, of course, a new argument; the conflict between the "have" and "have-not" states in the 1930s centered on exactly this distrust of markets; see Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *When Nations Clash--Raw Materials, Ideology and Foreign Policy* (New York: Ballinger/Harper & Row, 1989), ch. 4. Back.

Note 31: This is the argument of those in the "declinist" school generally. See, for example, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987); and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Back.

Note 32: See John Zysman, "Redoubling the Bet: Power, Wealth, and Technology," BRIE Working Paper no. 38 (Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, October 1989), pp. 13-14. For a

review of the debate over spin-off vs. spin-on technologies see D. Weston and P. Gummett, "The Economic Impact of Military R&D: Hypotheses, Evidence and Verification," *Defense Analysis* 3, no. 1 (1987): 63-76. Back.

Note 33: See Jay Stowsky, "Beating our Plowshares into Double-Edged Swords: The Impact of Pentagon Policies on the Commercialization of Advanced Technologies," BRIE Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1986. Back.

Note 34: A comparative rating of semiconductor suppliers computed by the Department of Defense indicated a dramatic drop in the rank of U.S. semiconductor firms between 1985 and 1987. Motorola dropped from the rank of second to fourth, Intel from eighth to tenth, and Texas Instruments from third to fifth. Among the ten leading chip producers, six are Japanese, three are American firms, and one is an American joint venture, involving a European firm. See Defense Science Board Task Force, *Defense Semiconductor Dependency* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 1987), p. 51. Back.

Note 35: Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan that Can Say "No": The New U.S.-Japan Relations Card* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, mimeo, 1989), pp. 3-4. Back.

Note 36: This argument is made specifically for the arms industry by Ethan B. Kapstein, "International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best Solution," *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 4 (Winter 1991-92): 657-76. I have adapted the argument to include market control efforts over civilian industries as well. Back.

Note 37: Clearly, this only really works as an alliance strategy; see the discussion below. Back.

Note 38: For a much more wide-ranging argument on the economic sources of Soviet decline see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security* 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991-92): 74-118, especially pp. 97-104. Back.

Note 39: See Christopher Mark Davis, "The Exceptional Soviet Case: Defense in an Autarkic System," *Daedalus* 120, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 113-20. Back.

Note 40: See Beverly Crawford, *Economic Vulnerability in International Relations--The Case of East-West Trade, Investment, and Finance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), ch. 4. Back.

Note 41: For example, by January 1, 1991 there were 2,905 Soviet joint ventures with western firms, and some of these involved the transfer of dual-use technology over the entire life of the project. Of those registered, 1,027 were operational. See John Lloyd, "Joint Ventures Gleam Amid Economic Gloom," *The Financial Times* , April 27, 1991, p. 2.22 Back.

Note 42: Under weakening economic conditions, uncertainties about the spheres in which the market would operate further undermined political legitimacy and finally undermined the Soviet state itself. See, for example, Ken Jowitt, *New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Back.

Note 43: This argument about dependence was made by Timothy W. Luke, "Technology and Soviet Foreign Trade: On the Political Economy of an Underdeveloped Superpower," *International Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (1985): 327-53. Back.

Note 44: See Crawford *Economic Vulnerability* , ch. 3. Back.

Note 45: The Export Control Act of 1949, Section 1b. The full text of the law is reprinted in Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare* (Stockholm: Almquvist and Wiksell, 1968), pp. 217-19. Back.

Note 46: See, for example, Bruce Jentleson, *Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). Back.

Note 47: This argument is made forcefully in the National Academy of Sciences, *Balancing the National Interest* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987) and National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, *Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991). Back.

Note 48: Quoted in John Eckhouse, "U.S. May Loosen High-Tech Export Rules," *San Francisco Chronicle* , January 20, 1990, p. B1. Back. *Th*

Note 49: *This section is taken from Crawford, Economic Vulnerability , ch. 1. Back.*

Note 50: *See Michael Mastanduno's argument at the conclusion of his essay, "The United States Defiant: Export Controls in the Postwar Era," Daedalus 120, no. 4 (Fall, 1991): 91-110. Back.*

Note 51: *See Robert E. Sullivan and Nancy E. Bader, "The application of Export Control Laws to Scientific Research at Universities," Journal of College and University Law 9, no. 4 (1982-83): 451-67; "Science and the Citizen," editorial, Scientific American , July 1984, p. 66; and Gary Putka, "U.S. blocks access of foreign scientists to high technology," The Wall Street Journal , January 25, 1985, p. 1; National Academy of Sciences, Scientific Communication and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, September, 1982). Back.*

Note 52: *For documentation of this point see Crawford, Economic Vulnerability , ch. 4. Back.*

Note 53: *Even with their lagging technology, the Soviet Union was able to accomplish a great deal as far as military technology was concerned. In some instances, these technologies provided unanticipated advantages. During the 1980s, for example, the Pentagon and others worried a great deal about the effects of the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) associated with nuclear detonations on delicate solid-state electronic equipment. When a Soviet MIG pilot defected to the West with one of the latest versions of the jet fighter, it was discovered that the plane's electronics relied heavily on the vacuum tube technology that the West had abandoned two decades earlier. But vacuum tubes are much less vulnerable to EMP than silicon-based components. The American response to this problem was to develop much more costly alternatives. Back.*

Note 54: *See Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Worries About Spread of Arms from Soviet Sales," New York Times , November 16, 1991, p. 5. Back.*

Note 55: *See "Russia to fight Private Sell-offs by Ex-Officials," New York Times , February 29, 1992, p. 4. Back.*

Note 56: *The European Community and Russia also promised to assist in financing. See "Baker and*

Yeltsin Agree on U.S. Aid in Scrapping Arms," New York Times , February 18, 1992, pg. 1. Back.

Note 57: *Opponents of this policy claimed that the acquisition of Moscow's best technology could save Washington and American industry many billions of dollars in development costs, ease Russia's economic woes, discourage the spread of Russian scientists to the Third World, and help the U.S. compete with foreign rivals. See "U.S. Moves to Bar Americans Buying Soviet Technology," New York Times , March 1, 1992, p. 1. In response to both of these moves, a panel of 120 scientists and engineers from the National Academy of Sciences recommended that the United States provide $150 million to support Russia's scientific elite. The panel also called on the U.S. to open its markets to Soviet high technology in order to create more revenue in the Soviet Union and discourage the exodus of Russian scientists. See "Panel Calls for Wider Help for Ex-Soviet Arms Experts," New York Times , March 14, 1992, p. 3. Back.*

Note 58: *See Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Changing Relationship Between Economics and National Security," Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 265-76. Back.*

Note 59: *"Curb Deadly High-Tech Trade," New York Times , April 12, 1991, p. A28. Back.*

Note 60: *See Aaron Friedberg, "The Changing Relationship between Economics and National Security," pp. 270-271. Back.*

Note 61: *Crawford, Economic Vulnerability , ch. 3. Back.*

Note 62: *This argument is made persuasively by Philip Gummett and Judith Reppy, "Military Industrial Networks and Technical Change in the New Strategic Environment," Government and Opposition 25, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 287-303. Back.*

Note 63: *See Future Security Environment Working Group, The Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, October 1988). Back.*

Note 64: *The dilemmas involved in this transformation are explored in Beverly Crawford, ed., The Future of European Security (Berkeley: University of California, International and Area Studies, 1992). Back.*

Note 65: *These problems are addressed with regards to the armaments industries in Europe in Ethan B. Kapstein, "International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best Solution," pp. 657-71, and Andrew Moravcsik, "The European armaments industry at the crossroads," Survival 32, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 65-85. Similar problems have arisen in the commercial industries that are the focus of this essay. See Peter W. Schulze, "Bridging the Technology Gap: The Role of National and Regional Research and Development Programs in Europe," in: Beverly Crawford and Peter W. Schulze, eds., The New Europe Asserts Itself: A Changing Role in International Relations (Berkeley: University of California, International and Area Studies, 1990), pp. 179-217. Back.*

Note 66: *Peter W. Schulze, "Bridging the Technology Gap." Back.*

Note 67: *The literature on strategic corporate alliances is growing rapidly. See, for example, OECD, Technical Cooperation Agreements Between Firms (DSTI/SPR 86-20, Paris, 1986); Kenichi Ohmae, Triad Power: The Coming Shape of Global Competition (New York: Free Press, 1985); Harold*

Perlmutter and D. Heenan, "Cooperate to Compete Globally," Harvard Business Review 64 no. 2 (March-April 1986): 137-155; and J. Peter Killing, Strategies for Joint Venture Success (New York: Praeger, 1983). *Back.*

Note 68: *These arrangements may work best in Europe within an EU framework that stabilizes property rights, but, for example, they will be difficult in Asia, where different degrees of development, conflicting cultures, and conflicting ideologies characterize states in the region. See Buzan's analysis in "Security, The State, The `New World Order' and Beyond," chapter 7 in this volume.* *Back.*

Note 69: *These questions were suggested by John Leslie, personal communication.* *Back.*

Note 70: *See Dan Deudney, Pax Atomica: States and Republics in Sustainable Global Security Systems (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).* *Back.*

Note 71: *For a discussion of the growth of "republics," see Dan Deudney's Pax Atomica . For a discussion of "pluralistic security communities, see Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order; A Pluralistic Security Community," in: Beverly Crawford, ed. The Future of European Security , pp. 287-326.* *Back.*

Note 72: *See the contributions by Ronnie Lipschutz, Ole Wæver and Dan Deudney in this volume.* *Back.*

Note 73: *See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49, and the comments and replies in the following two issues.* *Back.*

On Security

On Security, by Ronnie D. Lipschutz

7. Security, the State, the "New World Order," and Beyond

Barry Buzan

Overview: The State as a Malleable Id(entity)

There can be no question that the object we refer to when we use the term "state" is not fixed in character. The essential meaning of the term refers to autonomous, territorially organized political entities in which the machinery of government is in some sense recognizably separate from the organization of society. States are distinguished from tribes and other less complex forms of "stateless societies" by this differentiation of the political from the societal. Within this definition lies a very wide array of possible sociopolitical constructions, though there will always be a relationship between rulers and subjects, a territorial domain of some sort, and a societal realm (or realms) as well as a political one. In most, but not all, cases there will also be relations with other autonomous political entities. Where this is so, states will face security problems arising from the interplay of threats and vulnerabilities among them.

Beyond these basics, there can be virtually infinite diversity in how the internal components of the state are constructed and arranged. The relationship between rulers and subjects can range from remote and detached at one end of the spectrum (imperial China, Tsarist Russia), to close and strongly connected at the other (contemporary Scandinavia). Similarly, the structures of government and society may be quite distinct (Chinese-controlled Tibet) or tightly interwoven (USA). It is uncommon, except in colonies, to have a complete divorce between government and society, but very common for large sections of society to be alienated from the government, as in Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Canada, Iraq, Turkey and many others. Government, society, and territory can have long and deep connections (Japan), or they can be superficial and ephemeral (Jordan, Yugoslavia, Chad). How society, government and territory are organized depends heavily on the nature of the prevailing social and material technologies, and on the relationship between the holders of coercive power and the holders of capital.[1] It may also depend on how the state came into being: in Giddens's typology, whether it is classical (France), colonized (United States), postcolonial (Nigeria) or modernizing (Japan).[2]

How states relate to each other depends, *inter alia* , on the ease of movement between them which, in turn, is a function of geography and technology. Historically, the limits of technology have meant that strategic interaction (i.e., military, bulk trade, mass migration) has been easiest among neighbors, though low-volume, high value, long distance trade (e.g., the silk roads) has been possible among states with no political relations.[3] Relations also depend on whether states are bound together by significant economic activity, and whether their domestic constructions and activities are perceived by others as more threatening or more supportive. As Little notes, states face a double security dilemma, with rulers having to handle linked mixtures of domestic and external threats both to themselves and to their state/society.[4]

One assumption underlying this chapter is that differences in internal construction have a substantial

impact on how states define threats and vulnerabilities, and therefore on the whole construction of the security problematique. Given their fundamental character, all states (or at least all of those that are embedded in an international system--and it is only these that will be discussed here) will share bottom line security concerns about the maintenance of their territorial base and their political autonomy. If the threat is of external armed attack aimed at seizing territory or resources, or overthrowing the government, then, within the limits of resources, conceptions of security will tend to be similar in all states, and the effect of internal differences will be pushed into the background. Beyond that bottom line, however, internal differences can have radical effects on the construction of security, affecting both the breadth of the security agenda (what kinds of actions--military, political, economic, societal, environmental--are perceived as threats), and the definition of priorities for security policy.

Some insight into this security problematique can be gained by examining the historical sociology of the state, which is the purpose of the section that follows. Subsequent sections seek to apply that insight to two sets of circumstances, one real and one speculative. The first, in the third section of the chapter, is the contemporary "new world order"("NWO") following the ending of the Cold War. The second, in the section following that one, is what I have elsewhere labelled "mature anarchy." The idea in that section is to speculate about the nature and, indeed, the relevance of the state and security under those conditions.[5] The general question in these two sections is: If international society becomes very strong, and international relations is dominated by a dense web of shared rules, does the security problematique or, perhaps, even the state itself, fade away? These are big questions, and this is a short essay. I can therefore only paint in broad brush-strokes and my intention is no more than to open up a line of thinking.

A Historical Sociology of State, System, and Security

For all states, the security problematique has two faces, internal and external. States can be just as thoroughly disrupted and destroyed by internal contradictions as they can by external forces. These two environments may function more or less separately, as when an internally coherent state is threatened by aggressive neighbors (Britain vs. Nazi Germany, Japan vs. United States), or when an unstable state disintegrates largely on its own initiative (the Roman Empire, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Soviet Union). They may also work together, as when internal divisions provide opportunities for intervention by outside actors (China during the 1930s, Pakistan in 1971, Lebanon after 1976). Any attempt to construct a historical sociology of security has, therefore, to take into account the changing quality of both the internal construction of states and the nature of the external environment formed by their relations with each other. It would be convenient if one had to hand a coherent orthodoxy about the history of the state on which to draw. It would be even more convenient if this orthodoxy came as an evolutionist account in which a clear pattern of developmental stages offered a framework within which to explore the security issue. But as Smith points out, neither is the case.[6] There is an extensive body of work, but it is divided into evolutionists and discontinuists, and there is no single dominant scheme or pattern.

On the domestic front, it might be argued that the leading states have been evolving (very unevenly, and not, until recently, in a smooth progression) toward higher levels of internal integration. For much of the 5,000-year history of the state, this integration has been about the mechanisms of territorial control and about increasing the cohesion of the ruling elite.[7] Recently, it has been more about linking rulers to people, and state to society and territory.[8] Compare, for example, the absolute monarchies of Europe and Asia, or the despotic empires of ancient and classical times, with contemporary democratic nation-states. In absolute monarchies, the state was little more than the personal property of the ruler.[9] It provided a

measure of order and security for those within it, though it may also have been a major source of insecurity for them. The people were subjects rather than citizens. There was little in the way of sociopolitical integration except that provided by the coercive and extractive powers of the ruler. People and territory were added to or subtracted from any given state quite casually. Boundaries changed according to the fortunes of war, the balance of power, and the manipulations of dynastic marriage and succession. In such a state, security concerns focused very much on the interests of the ruling family.

The development of the modern state has taken place within the shell of territorial sovereignty provided by the absolutist one. This process occurred first in the leading European states, and spread from there to a few others in the Americas and Asia. A substantial majority of the current states have not completed this process, and some have barely begun: Many of the products of decolonization are still "quasi-states," enjoying external recognition but not yet having succeeded in establishing internal sovereignty.[10] At least four major additions to the basic absolutist state can be identified. One was the development of an administrative bureaucracy to manage the state. As it developed, this both extended the powers of government and created a state establishment considerably broader than the ruling family. Second was the rise of an independent commercial class. This increased the resource base of the state, but also created a more complex class structure as well as centers of power and interest within the state that were separate from the traditional dynastic ruling establishment.[11] Third was the invention of nationalism as an ideology of the state. This transformed the people from subjects into citizens. It welded government and society together into a mutually supportive framework, and it strengthened the bond between a state and a particular expanse of territory. As Mayall argues, the rise of nationalism changed not only what states were, but also many aspects of how they related to each other.[12] Fourth was the introduction of democracy. This institutionalized the transfer of sovereignty from ruler to people implicit in nationalism, and made the state actually as well as notionally representative of its whole citizenry.

Seen in this perspective, the state is a concept whose content has undergone a remarkable expansion. The most advanced states have steadily fused government and society, in the process becoming much deeper, more complex and more firmly established constructs than either their predecessors or contemporary "weak" states (those with low levels of sociopolitical cohesion[13]). They have expanded not only to incorporate, but also to represent, an ever-widening circle of interests and participants. Their functions and capabilities have expanded along with their constituency, until the state has become involved in all sectors of activity, and responsive to all sectors of society. Because of their broader constituencies, powers, and functions, the security interests of such "strong" states are much more extensive than those of their absolutist ancestors. They share the basic worries about independence and integrity common to all states but, in addition, they include concerns about territory, citizens, welfare, economy, culture and law that would hardly have registered with the absolute monarchs of yesteryear.

In domestic perspective, then, the advanced modern state appears to have grown much more solid and deeply rooted. Compared with its ancestors, it is an altogether more developed entity, much better integrated with society, much more complex and internally coherent, much more powerful (in terms of its ability to penetrate society and extract resources from it), and much more firmly legitimized. Along with this development, and stemming from it, is a much more comprehensive security agenda. States have now to worry not just about their military strength and the security of their ruling families, but also about the competitiveness of their economies, the reproduction of their cultures, the welfare, health and education of their citizens, the stability of their ecologies, and their command of knowledge and technology. On this basis, it seems quite reasonable to ask how the state as the core referent object for

security has changed. What is at first sight more difficult to explain is why there is so much questioning of the viability and relevance of the state as a referent object for security. Whole literatures (interdependence, world society, transnationalism) are largely built on the supposition that the state is a fading force in international relations. If the leading states have become so much more powerful and inclusive, why should they still not be at the center of security thinking and policy?

One answer to this puzzle is found in the external environment of states, which has not been standing still as the state has evolved. Two features of this environment have themselves been evolving rapidly since the onset of the industrial revolution: the *interaction capacity* of the system[14] and *international society* .[15]

By the term "interaction capacity," I mean the technological and organizational factors that determine what volume and what quality and type of goods and information can be moved between states, and at what range and speed. During the last two centuries, interaction capacity has grown enormously. Huge volumes of information can now be transferred almost instantaneously from one part of the planet to any other, and huge volumes of goods likewise flow around it. Myriad organizational networks exist to facilitate and sustain these movements. For individual states this development poses both threats and opportunities. Invasions or attacks can come swiftly from thousands of miles away. Economic and financial developments on other continents can have major local effects. Societies, cultures, and environments are all under intense pressure from global flows of language, style, information, goods, pollutants, diseases, money, propaganda, entertainment, and people.

These threats are accompanied by opportunities. Military and economic assistance can arrive quickly if needed. Global sources of finance, information, and markets are available to assist economic development. It is becoming impossible for states to isolate themselves from these flows. Even major attempts by semicontinental states, such as the Soviet Union and China and, to a lesser extent, India, have failed spectacularly. Isolation means relative poverty, backwardness, and, eventually, weakness. But engagement means loss of control over much of social, economic, and political life, and the massive penetration of state and society by outside forces that frequently have disruptive effects.

By international society, I take Bull and Watson's classic definition:

> [A] group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.[16]

The bottom line of international society is that states accord each other mutual recognition as legal equals. In doing so, they lay the foundation for international law, diplomacy, regimes, and organizations. They also create a society of states in terms of shared identity: Each accepts the others as being basically the same type of entity.[17] Since decolonization, a rudimentary international society of mutual recognition has covered virtually the entire international system. In regions where interaction capacity is high and longstanding, groups of states have established very dense networks of common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations. The most spectacular example of this is the European Union (EU), where the level of integration may be approaching confederation and there is some question about the continued existence of sovereign states. International society therefore does cover the whole planet, but it does so very unevenly. There is a complex array of circles of international society, some defining regional or cultural groupings (the EU, the Arab League), and some forming concentric patterns in relation to the

core of leading capitalist states, among which there is a dense network of rules and institutions. This core leads the development of international society for the whole system, but it also maintains its own exclusivity. Many countries in the periphery resist, in varying degree, the attempt by the core to impose its own "standard of civilization"[18] on them (China, India, Brazil, Iran, Mayanmar/Burma, and so on) The line between international society and the hegemony of the capitalist core can sometimes be difficult to draw.[19]

The development of international society is a response both to the general problem of disorder in an anarchic system, and to the specific problems created by the increase in interaction capacity. In many ways, international society is supportive of state security. It provides the legitimation of external sovereignty and some legal protection against aggression. It also provides ways for states to deal with some of the threats and opportunities arising from increased interaction capacity. Participation in frameworks of rules and institutions gives states some power to shape their environment, and provides a greater element of stability and predictability than would otherwise be the case. But international society can also threaten states. It limits their freedom of action, seems to subordinate them to larger bodies, and may erode their distinctive identity. Many states in the periphery feel threatened by international societal norms (e.g., human rights, democracy, nuclear nonproliferation) coming from the center that go against either their own political and cultural identity, or what they perceive as their foreign policy rights and interests. Less powerful and weaker states are more vulnerable to this type of threat, but as reactions against the process of European integration show, the intensification of international society can threaten even quite powerful strong states.[20]

Both interaction capacity and international society have been increasing in scale and scope and, in doing so, have greatly expanded the menu of threats and opportunities that states face in their international environment. The most obvious example of this is the way in which increasing interaction capacity allowed Europeans to bring their military, political, economic, and cultural power to bear on all of the other peoples and civilizations of the planet between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.[21] It is also important to note that these developments have been driven by the activities of the leading states in the system. This has important consequences, given the persistence of dramatic levels of unequal development among states themselves. Unequal development means that states of very different capacities all have to face an international environment created by those with the highest level of development and power. Late developers exist in an international system whose activity and structure have been set by those that developed earlier. This makes their whole position vis-à-vis their international environment radically different from that faced by the earlier developers. For late developers, the influence of the international system and other states is much more powerful in relation to their own level of development than was the case for the early developers.

Taking these domestic and systemic themes together suggests a dialectic. On the one hand, there is an expanding, consolidating and deepening "strong" state that defines the leading edge of power and development in the international system. On the other, there are developments at the system level that seem to threaten the state as such with erosion or even dissolution. One key element in this contradiction is that strong states allow their strong societies considerable latitude to pursue boundary-crossing activities. The strong system is, in many ways, simply the result of powerful states and societies projecting themselves beyond their boundaries in myriads of economic, cultural, political, and military ways. Thus, system-level factors weigh much more in the balance than they used to, but (some) states are also more solid and dense. Where does this dialectic lead? On the surface, it seems to point toward

something along the lines of pluralistic security communities or "republics," where these simultaneous strengthenings can create the conditions for a new synthesis. For some countries, notably the leading cohort of strong states, this may be the case.

But remember that most states in the system do not fit the "strong state" evolutionary model sketched above or, if they do, they are still in the earlier phases of it. This fact changes the balance of the dialectic. The international environment, driven by the leading states, is changing for *all* states. But not all states have undergone the deepening and consolidating developments of the leading few. Many states are of recent origin. They have not acquired cultures, leaderships, bureaucracies, identities, or class structures that are adapted to either their territory or to statehood itself: Think of Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Sudan, the Philippines, and many others. Nationalism (and therefore democracy) divides rather than unites them. Their governing machinery is weak and poorly integrated with society. Their economies are stagnant and dependent. Although a few are making developmental gains on the leading states, and some are at least keeping pace, many are falling relatively further behind. Some African states are incapable even of maintaining basic infrastructures of road and railway. Yet these "weak" states also have to live in this greatly-expanded and expanding international environment, and the balance between it and them is much more lopsided. For weak states, the penetrative effects of the international system have increased much more than the development of the state. Through decolonization, the system imposed existence and definition on many of them, and still holds some of them in place.[22] It penetrates their domestic life and constrains their foreign policy behavior to a degree not experienced by the older classical, colonized, and modernizing states during their formative stages.

It is not at all clear how states develop under these conditions--or even whether they can. But neither it is clear what happens if they fail to develop. The problem of security and the state is thus not a single one. A spectrum of states exists, differentiated by radically different degrees of development and consolidation as states. These states all face a single international environment (albeit with substantial regional variations--see below), but some do so from a position of relative strength and some from a position of relative, and indeed absolute, weakness. An understanding of this dialectic between state and system, and the influence on it of uneven development is, it seems to me, a precondition for thinking about the security problematique in the "new world order" and beyond.

The Security Problematique in the "New World Order"

The term "new world order" (NWO) had a brief vogue, though there was, and is, little agreement about what it means. Its use reflects a desire to capture the apparently big changes in some of the main patterns of international relations. The easiest element is the structural change caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was a double change, in that it ended not only the four decades of bipolarity in the distribution of power, but also the ideological cleavage of the international system between communist and capitalist blocs. One immediate consequence has been a great lessening of military tensions and threats among the major powers. This has taken the spotlight from military power as the core determinant of international order and security, and opened up more space for the operation of economic, political, and societal forces. It has also triggered a search to identify the new international political structure. Is it unipolar, empowering the United States? Or does the decline in military concerns redefine what constitutes a great power, and so point toward a revival of multipolar forms? Or is polarity analysis itself now less appropriate than a center-periphery model of international system structure?[23]

Or is this the wrong set of questions? Are we looking at an even deeper change, which has been long in the making, and of which the ending of the Cold War is only a minor element, albeit important because it removed the major obstruction blocking the view? Rosenau labels this possibility "postinternational politics."[24] He sees the changes in interaction capacity as having themselves reached system-transforming levels in the decades since the Second World War, and posits a global system simultaneously occupied by, and in some senses divided between, a state-centric world of "sovereignty-bound" actors, and a "multicentric" world of "sovereignty-free" actors. In this view, the "NWO" is new not because the state system has a new structure, but because "international" relations can no longer be understood adequately using an analytical framework that defines the system in terms of states.

In both of these views, the normative rhetoric of former President Bush about revitalized U.S. hegemony has been the least interesting aspect of the concept of a "NWO." There is some leeway for making a "NWO" through policy choices, but the main game is trying to understand the consequences of structural changes. It needs also to be noted, however, that the deep *political* structure of the system has not changed. Anarchy remains the organizing principle, and the state remains the primary unit. The force of these deep structures can be seen in the proliferation of new states attending the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. The international system still contains many familiar patterns. The disintegration of the Soviet empire echoes earlier disintegrations of Austria-Hungary and Rome. American worries about economic decline are recognizably similar to the experiences of ancient Athens and nineteenth-century Britain. The phenomenon of mutual threat arising from different cultural and political systems affected the ancient Greeks and Persians in much the same way as it operated between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and as it now operates between the West and both China and parts of the Islamic world. Even contemporary images of "barbarians at the gates" have many (and more literal) historical precedents.[25]

There are nevertheless some quite striking changes in the international security problematique consequent upon the ending of the Cold War. In the light of the argument about the uneven development of states, it should come as no surprise that the security consequences of the "NWO" are different for different groups of actors. One way to cut into this question is to see the "NWO" system as broadly structured in center-periphery terms, and then to look separately at the security problematique for each. At either extreme on this divide, there are serious questions about the survival of the existing framework of states.

The Center

With the ending of the Cold War, the center has become multipolar, but is dominated by a single coalition of the major capitalist powers (North America, EU, Japan). This coalition is a security community in that none of its members expect or prepare for a military threat from other members. It does not face serious military threats from semiperiphery powers, and no major external military challenge seems likely for some considerable period. Most of the Cold War challengers are now eager to associate with or even join this club, and even China is anxious to stay on reasonable terms with it. The major questions for this coalition are: (1) How well will it be able to consolidate itself as a single security entity;[26] and (2) will it take a relatively isolationist or a relatively interventionist posture toward the rest of the system?

There is little reason to think that the capitalist coalition will succumb to the Leninist fate of falling into

conflict over the redivision of the global market, now that its external challenger has been seen off. Economic competition there will doubtless be--and it may possibly be quite fierce, as global surplus capacity in many industries begins to bite, and as the instabilities of financial liberalization disrupt both the welfare state and the trading order.[27] But the prosperity of the capitalist powers and their economic processes are now so deeply interdependent that the potential costs of full-blown neomercantilism act as an effective deterrent. Capital itself is substantially internationalized and no longer offers the strong possibilities for dominant nationalist coalitions that it did before 1945. The military option of competing for empires in 1930s fashion is ruled out not only by costs and dangers of modern warfare, but also by changes in attitudes toward imperialism, and by stronger capabilities for resistance in the periphery.

The interesting question goes more in the other direction: How far will interdependence go in shifting the referent object for security away from individual states and toward larger collective entities? These entities might take various forms: security communities, international societies, "republics," common markets. There are two clear options here: First, that such consolidation takes place regionally, or second, that it takes place over the entire capitalist coalition. These options are not mutually exclusive; it is possible to have elements of both simultaneously. The EU is the clearest example of both the regional approach *and* the dissolving of individual national securities into a larger political entity. In some areas of the economy and border controls, the EU is already beginning to function as a security entity (migration, trade). Military command remains national, but there is a rising awareness that military security makes sense only in European terms. Foreign and military policy integration are still controversial, though cooperation and coordination are becoming the norm, and the Maastricht Treaty makes it a commitment. Underlying this hesitancy is a fairly rapid erosion of national military industries. Even France is abandoning the idea of an essentially national arms industry, and the consequence is that no European country can any longer contemplate a self-contained national military mobilization.

It is possible that the regional level will dominate as far as the emergence of multinational security entities among the capitalist states is concerned. Europe, North America, and, possibly, parts of East Asia could become regional blocs for purposes of both economic and military security. It is also possible that the whole of the capitalist coalition could, in some sense, become a coordinated security entity. The existence of a capitalist security community would be considerably reinforced if military industries became significantly integrated across regional blocs rather than within them. There are some signs of such a development in, for example, American dependence on Japanese components, and in some patterns of corporate integration within the industry. The denationalization of the arms industry, and its integration across the capitalist coalition, would be a major step toward constituting the capitalist core as a single security entity. In theory, the same logic applies to the economic sector. Attempts at collective economic management, through such instruments as the G7, might be seen as foreshadowing a move toward seeing the international economy as a single entity on whose well-being the security of all depends. In the economic sector, however, the pressure for competition is large and the potential for instability is high. This will tend to limit the degree of integration.

The other security question affecting the core is to what extent it wants or has to intervene in the periphery? Will its own integration make it more inward looking, or will it seek to exert increased control over the periphery? Isolationism could result from preoccupation with internal restructuring, plus both a perceived lack of threat from the periphery and a measure of despair that anything can be done for it. The norm against overt intervention remains strong as a basic ordering principle of international society. Western states are sensitive to the charges of imperialism that many in the periphery are still prepared to make and, in the more chaotic and underdeveloped parts of the periphery, not much can be done without

intervening on a scale sufficient to justify the charge. There is also much valid concern about the cost of doing anything meaningful, and much hesitation caused by a lack of any proven means of transferring development effectively. There certainly does not seem to be a path to development that enables non-Western societies to modernize without putting into serious jeopardy the cultural heritage that their political sovereignty is supposed to protect.

Interventionism could result from ideological consensus, a dominant power position, and a desire to enforce some of the standards of Western international society (human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, pluralism, market economics, environmental protection) on a global scale. Given the chaos in places such as Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and ex-Yugoslavia, there has already been extensive discussion as to whether the nonintervention norm can and should be overridden for human rights purposes, even during and after interventions couched in these very terms. This is the beginning of a very slippery slope leading to obligations to provide welfare and order so massive that they would constitute a kind of (institutional) recolonization. In different ways, developments in Somalia, Haiti, Bangladesh, and Cambodia all illustrate a drift toward using international institutions as a vehicle for a kind of recolonization in circumstances with which indigenous state structures are unable to cope. If this type of interventionism is to be significant, then one major problem facing the capitalist core is how it should organize itself for a global management role. Indeed, the seemingly endless conflict in Bosnia has revealed profound confusion about how the various organizational machineries available to the center should relate to each other. The UN Security Council, NATO, CSCE (lately renamed the "Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe"), WEU, the EU, and the G7 have no clear sense of either their mandate or their interrelationship for the collective core management of the "NWO."

Particularly urgent is the question of the UN Security Council, which is the prime forum for global security management, and which is in serious danger of slipping badly out of alignment with the new distribution of power. If the Cold War had been a hot one (and had anybody survived), then there would have been no question that the defeat of the Soviet Union would have triggered major reforms in international institutions, as happened after the First and Second World Wars. The remarkable achievement of a peaceful transformation in the power structure has, however, come at the cost of institutional continuity in the UN. The central problem is the nonrepresentation of Japan, Germany, and the EU among the permanent members of the UNSC. The resultant distortion overrepresents Britain and France, excludes two of the major financial supporters, and overemphasizes the hegemonic role of the United States. There is a real danger that, unless this problem can be solved, the security management function of the UNSC will be either delegitimized (seen as a tool of the U.S.) or crippled by underfunding. One key to this solution lies in the EU, which needs to face the very difficult issue of sorting out its own identity for this purpose. The stakes in any reformulation of permanent membership of, and veto power within, the UNSC are high, and can be expected to attract strong pressure from major periphery powers such as India and Brazil.

The Periphery

In some parts of the periphery, most notably Africa and the Middle East, the question of dissolving states could also arise, but in a much less orderly and benign way than in the EU. In places where the state is still very weak, where its prospects for development are poor, and where there are strong social forces challenging the present configurations, the existing frameworks could dissolve. State boundaries in these two regions are mostly both of recent origin and arbitrary design. They are held in place less by their local roots than by the conventions of international society about the sanctity of boundaries. The

possibility that such boundaries will dissolve is more likely if the center takes a hands-off view of the periphery than if it remains engaged. The prospect of dissolving states is not a pretty one, no matter how arbitrary and shallow the existing arrangement. A repeat of the relatively peaceful Soviet experience of dissolution--which is, in any event, proving more violent than seemed likely in 1992, as seen in the Russian "invasion" of Chechnya--is unlikely in Africa and the Middle East. Sticking with the existing state structures does not look likely to solve problems of either economic or political development. Abandoning them points toward violent restructuring, with not much obvious possibility of improvement in the overall condition. The sickening long-term chaos in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda and, to a lesser degree, in a growing number of other countries, offers a somber vision of the possibilities.

It simply is not clear what political structure would best serve the needs of these regions. They are caught in the overpowering grip of an advanced international system, and do not appear to have the domestic social and political resources to consolidate a viable position within it. Many of them are losing ground, in the sense that their internal development is not keeping pace with an ever-more invasive international system. Taken individually, most are threatened more by internal than external security problems but, taken collectively, these weak states are threatened by their inability either to disengage from, or to deal with, an international system designed and driven by the leading-edge states. It is difficult to apply security logic to weak states, and a case can easily be made that such states are as much or more a definition of the problem than they are a meaningful referent object for security. That said, however, and as witness the situations in ex-Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, it is not at all clear that the collapse of existing states, or the emergence of new ones, would result in improved security for the societies and peoples of these regions. Neither is it clear that institutional recolonization would improve their condition. In the periphery, powers of resistance to occupation, or indeed government in any form, are high. And, were UN intervention to occur in these places and come to be seen as the "colonial projects" of the Security Council powers, it would quickly become as unsustainable as were the dying days of European imperialism.

Asia

In Asia, the consequences of the "NWO" are rather different from the extremes of center and periphery. The forcible transplantation of European state structures has, broadly speaking, worked in Asia. Most of the states there look viable and many of them have integrated successfully into the global capitalist economy. The transplantation of Western values, however, has been much less successful, and there is increasing assertion of the difference of Asia from the West in terms of attitudes toward liberal ideas such as human rights, democracy, and cultural openness. With the ending of the Cold War, and the pulling back of Russian and American power from the area, room is now available for the states of the region to work out their own pattern of relations for the first time since the onset of Western domination during the nineteenth century. There is a real possibility that something like a classical balance-of-power system could emerge in Asia. The region is remarkably poor in local regimes and institutions, and remarkably rich in unresolved disputes, strong nationalisms, and historical rivalries, fears, and hatreds. In contrast to Europe and North America, Asia lacks any well-developed regional "international society." It contains states with very different degrees of development, very different cultures, and very different political ideologies. Many countries within the region have begun to respond to the ending of the Cold War by increasing their military strength. In a number of alarming ways, parts of Asia begin to look like nineteenth-century Europe: A dense cluster of powerful states, industrialization producing rapid shifts in absolute and relative power, unresolved rivalries and territorial disputes, strong nationalisms, and some

states on the verge of collapse.[28]

There is some possibility that a new and voluntaristic version of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere might emerge under Japanese leadership. Incentives for this would rise if the center moved more toward regional blocs than toward a wider pattern of capitalist integration. If so, such a sphere would have to have at least a security regime, perhaps with states adopting versions of Japan's non-offensive defense policy. But even in its best version, this will still be a much looser arrangement than what is happening in Europe, and it begs the still almost unasked question of how the region's two big powers, China and Japan, are going to relate to each other in the new era. As underlined both by the eagerness of the Koreans and others to continue raising Japan's wartime conduct as an issue in current relations, and by the unwillingness of the Japanese to deal with this issue openly, huge obstacles to regional Japanese leadership remain.[29] Real military rivalries are still entirely possible in many parts of Asia. In several states (India, Pakistan, North Korea), nuclear options lie close to the surface, and in several others (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), the technological and financial base exists to create them quickly if need be. For Asia, there is a worrying prospect that the "NWO" will be a journey "back to the future" of classical anarchic international relations, albeit constrained by the military and economic conditions of the early twenty-first century. If that is the case, then Asian security agendas will be primarily national, military, and power-orientated, although shot through with ties of economic interdependence.

Depending on one's point of view, there are cases for and against encouraging such a development. The case against is that a balance-of-power Asian subsystem would be dangerous for the rest of the world because of the possibility of spillover. There is also a moral point to be made about not promoting retrograde behavior. The case in favor is that classical insecurities in Asia would sap some of its economic vitality, and give a breathing space to Europe and America. It might also be argued that a balance of power stage is somehow a "natural" development for Asia, paralleling similar developments in Europe when the modern state was consolidating itself there. The downside to this is that it was precisely the fierce competition among the European states that not only equipped them to go out and take over most of the rest of the world, but also generated the thirty years of global crisis and war during the twentieth century.

The Security Problematique in the "NWO": Conclusions

For all of the countries enmeshed in the "NWO," one key to the security problematique can be found in the question of how open or closed states try to be in relation to the international system. When the system is strong in relation to the units, as it now is, this is a central question. The degree of openness or closedness sought by a state defines what is perceived as a security problem, and what is not.[30] Very open states will resist attack, but will also try to make themselves militarily transparent and nonthreatening to others. They will impose few restrictions on the flow of political ideas, though they will treat intervention in their political life as a threat. They will by and large be completely open to economic and social transactions, posing relatively few restrictions on the movement of people, goods, money, entertainment, style, and suchlike. For open states, the security agenda will be narrow, because most types of interaction are not seen as threatening. The Netherlands provides a good example of this posture.

A very closed state, by contrast, will see most types of interaction as threatening. Few examples remain,

but Myanmar/Burma and North Korea still come close to this ideal type. Closed states are usually trying to protect or promote a culture or an ideology that is seen as vulnerable to corruption by contact with other ideas and practices. Governments in such states may, of course, simply be trying to protect their own power base, as in Myanmar/Burma and North Korea. From this perspective, the national security agenda includes not only military attack and political subversion, but almost all political contact, and a very wide range of economic and social transactions as well. Iran and other strongly Islamic states see Western entertainment and styles as threatening (viz the ban on satellite dishes in Iran). For a long time, the old Soviet Union also tried to keep Western ideas and culture at bay (and one sees some of the more-extreme Russian nationalists now arguing along similar lines). China's leadership fears the creeping influence of ideas about human rights and political pluralism.

In the "NWO," the costs of extreme closure are very high, but so are some of the costs of extreme openness. Many states have legitimate fears about the ability of their cultures and traditions to withstand full exposure to powerful outside forces. Increasingly, even powerful states are questioning their ability and willingness to withstand too much economic openness. Societal reactions against the integration process in Europe, focused around the Maastricht treaty, suggest the character and force of these fears, and point to the use of the state to protect society against the pressures of internationalization.[31] Economic openness exacts a high cost in continuous pressures for domestic adaptation. It provides the considerable benefit of economic efficiency and global markets, but it does not treat losers kindly. Sometimes the system booms but, as a whole, it is vulnerable to painful downturns and crises.

Security agendas in the "NWO" will be very much set by how states respond to the cost-benefits of openness and closure. It seems likely that neither extreme will be attractive to more than a few states. For many of those states for which military threats have declined, threats in trade, finance and production, and fears of migration and erosion of identity may well stimulate some degree of closure in the economic and societal sectors.

The Security Problematique in a Mature Anarchy

If international society becomes very strong, and international relations is dominated by a dense web of shared rules, does the security problematique and, indeed, the state itself, fade away? This question presupposes an international system composed of strong states. But however one defines the "NWO," it is clear that, at the present stage of history, the member states of the international system are far too mixed in their quality as states for us to be able to treat the state-system relationship in such a uniform manner. As argued above, the unevenness of political, economic, and societal development between weak and strong states creates very different security problematiques in different parts of the system.

To think about the security problematique in a "mature anarchy," one needs to construct a model. By the term mature anarchy, I mean a system of strong states (in terms of high levels of sociopolitical cohesion), embedded in a well-developed international society (a dense network of mutually agreed norms, rules and institutions). It also seems likely, though not absolutely necessary, that a mature anarchy would only develop in a system with high interaction capacity. In one sense, the model represents a fusion between liberal and realist visions of the international system: It keeps states as the basic unit, but contains the security dilemma within a liberal-inspired "non-violent conflict culture."[32] As I will show, however, mature anarchy does not necessarily incorporate the whole liberal agenda of openness and interdependence, and it depends on avoiding the dissolution of the state. Thus, a mature anarchy could also be composed of relatively closed states. The model depends on the maintenance of a deep structure

of anarchy as its foundation. In speculating about this model, it is useful to keep in mind what was said about the EU, and the West generally, in the previous section. The EU is the closest example we have of what a mature anarchy looks like in practice, albeit on a subsystemic scale. More loosely, the West (roughly speaking the OECD states) is also beginning to display some important qualities of a mature anarchy, most notably in its status as a security community, and in its sustained attempt to manage the global economy.

If we imagine development along these lines incorporating the entire international system, what would the security problematique look like --or would it exist at all? Would states themselves dissolve, as the EU example seems to suggest? Does mature anarchy necessarily point to political (con)federation along EU lines or is the EU case dominated by the particular need to form a European superstate in relation to the rest of the international system, and therefore not relevant to a global-scale mature anarchy which would experience construct a model. By the term mature anarchy, I mean a system of sno such structural pressure? It is perhaps suggestive that within the EU, the process of aggregation at the macro level is being accompanied by rising demands for autonomy from nationalities and regions previously embedded in larger states. Would the lifting of military and political threats within a mature anarchy likewise cause a devolutionary shift?

If the concept of mature anarchy is to have any interest, one has to suppose that it represents a real structural alternative to both world government and extreme liberal-anarchist visions of stateless world society. This presupposes two things: First, that the development of a strong international (and, to some extent, world) society still needs a political structure and, second, that the desire for political autonomy remains strong enough on cultural and/or ideological grounds to continue to legitimize states. Both these suppositions appear plausible. The only alternative to world government or international anarchy is no government at all. There are no signs as yet to suggest that human society can conduct itself on a large scale without any government (that is, as a primal anarchy). And given the massive historical legacy of cultural diversity, and the continued robustness of national identity, nationalism, and xenophobia, there would seem to be no political ground on which to establish world government. The continuity of a deep structure of international anarchy for a long time is therefore a reasonable premise.

Thinking about mature anarchy in terms of the balance between politics (state) and society is helpful. Strong states require a close interweaving of state and society, by definition. Mature anarchy requires a well-developed international society (between states) which, in turn, requires at least some measure of world society (among individuals).[33] Where society is strong and relatively autonomous, it limits the functional requirement for state activity. In a strong state, and therefore also more widely in a mature anarchy, it might thus be argued that *security is the only legitimate function of the state* . In other words, the legitimacy of state action would be confined entirely to the sphere of security. Such an approach of course focuses on the legitimate scope of the security agenda itself. If the purpose of the state is to protect its distinct society, then the security agenda can legitimately range across the military, political, societal, economic, and environmental sectors.

But, as argued above, what ultimately counts as a security issue depends on whether states and their societies wish to be relatively open or relatively closed. The pursuit of closure casts a wider range of things as potential security threats than does the acceptance of openness. The consequences of openness may well cause reactions in favor of closure. Openness and closure are not undifferentiated, and it is useful to see them in relation to a potential set of security sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Although the EU model suggests that mature anarchy is about increased openness

and interdependence, this is not logically the only form that mature anarchy could take.

One can also imagine a mature anarchy of relatively closed units whose relationship was based on the cultivation of their own differences in a context of agreed "live and let live" rules for the conduct of their security relations. A mature anarchy that was relatively open across all sectors would tend to dissolve, or at least to penetrate profoundly, both states and societies. By definition it would reduce military security concerns, and also those elements of economic insecurity that concern restrictions on access to resources and markets. But, as the EU experience suggests, openness can create societal and economic insecurities as a consequence of greater vulnerability to competition. It might also shift some of the remaining security functions either up to other entities on a larger scale, or down to more micro-level ones, as also seems to be happening in Europe. Military openness would mean not only high levels of transparency, but also substantial internationalization of military forces, and integration of military-industrial capabilities. Political openness means allowing all ideologies and parties to compete in one's own political space. Economic openness means allowing market forces and actors to operate relatively freely, and on equal terms, throughout the system. Societal openness means allowing relatively free movement of people within the system, and not blocking the flow of information, style, fashion, art, entertainment, and suchlike between cultures. It would also require accepting common standards for human rights. Environmental openness would mean, *inter alia* , accepting common standards for pollution control. Contemplating the scenario that this list implies suggests a very high degree of global cosmopolitanism. Such a development is neither likely in the foreseeable future, nor is it a necessary condition for a mature anarchy. It is not remotely sustainable or politically achievable under present international conditions of uneven development.

A relatively closed global mature anarchy would require large units. It would therefore have either to suppose a whole series of EU-like regional federations, re-creating the state on a higher level, or else a series of regional communities of states, each of which was relatively open within itself, and relatively closed without. (Shades of Huntington's civilizational view of the future, though in a much more benign perspective!)[34] In the military sector, a mature anarchy presupposes that there would be no serious external military threat, since the whole system would be a security community. In a closed system, high levels of transparency and the adoption of nonoffensive defense policies would work against the security dilemma, even though states would retain military independence. Economic closure, or at least a rather partial and selective openness, would require large units in order to sustain acceptable levels of efficiency. The purpose of relative closure would be to reduce the intense pressures for adjustment and cultural disruption that come from a global market, and to bring the management requirements of the international economy more into line with available resources (and the tolerance of populations). Even large units would have strong incentives to cooperate on projects where only global economies of scale could produce economic viability, for example, fusion power and space exploration. Political closure might reflect a mixture of ideological and cultural difference (a theocratic Islamic subsystem, a domestically more hierarchical and less pluralistic Asian subsystem). Societal closure would mean restrictions on the movement of people and, perhaps, of ideas. Environmental closure may not be an option, since it would undermine the security community if it endangered the planetary ecosystem.

Extremes of openness and closure are probably not sustainable but, nevertheless, a broad spectrum of possible constructions for mature anarchy is conceivable. The picture can be made more complex by envisaging different degrees of openness and closure for different sectors, though a deeper investigation may suggest that the economic sector links and drives the others, and that all of the sectors move together on the open-closed scale, albeit not necessarily in tight lockstep. As openness increases, the security

agenda should both shrink and move away from states. Closure adds to the security agenda and reinforces the state.

Mature anarchy thus does not necessarily mean the demise of either security concerns or the state. In theory it could mean both, but the "NWO" does not take us very far toward such a condition. The huge disparities of uneven development indicated by the center-periphery structure stand as a major blockage to any sort of global mature anarchy. The existence of a substantial proportion of humankind in weak states means that a strong international society cannot escape having a center-periphery structure with its hegemonic or even quasi-imperial qualities. Weak states cannot fulfill their role in a mature anarchy, and their existence in any quantity therefore prevents its formation on a planetary scale. Uneven development has been a persistent feature of the international system for all of history and, as the discussion of center and periphery in the previous sections suggests, shows no sign of loosening its grip. Its persistence might prevent any possibility of a global-scale mature anarchy if large swaths of very weak states persist. It would certainly prevent the more open versions. Closed versions might be thinkable, despite large disparities in degrees of development, if the weaker states were powerful enough and strong enough as states to establish an independent presence, rather as China and India have done. This would offer the possibility of a system of "live and let live" blocs or superstates, cultivating their differences in an overall environment of low threat. The problem here is how to construct such large entities and make them stable. Even the EU project is confronted with serious dilemmas of nationalist reaction against further integration, and is hard put to find the historical, societal, and political resources necessary to create a larger European identity.[35] The disintegration of the Soviet Union has destroyed another possible model, and there are no convincing signs that Pan-Arab, or Pan-African, or Pan-Islamic sentiments are anything like strong enough to weld together the regional units necessary for a relatively closed mature anarchy.

Mature anarchy simply may not be available on a global scale in the foreseeable future. If uneven development is a powerful and permanent feature of the human condition, then it may not be available for a rather long time, at least until the weaker parts of the system are strong enough to hold their own. What is available are quite high degrees of mature anarchy within, and possibly between, several regions. The problem, as Goldgeier and McFaul put it, is how this liberal core and realist periphery are to relate to each other.[36] In the periphery a wide range of security problems will dominate the agenda of states. Within the core, a much less militarized and ideological set of security relations seems possible, with security logic focusing primarily on economic, societal, and environmental agendas. Since it is the strong states that generate the strong international system, it seems most unlikely that the mutual insecurities of a dialectic of dominance and subordination will be avoidable in relations between center and periphery.

Note 1: Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1, A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and the European State A.D. 990-1990* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). Back.

Note 2: Dennis Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 152. Back.

Note 3: Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "The Idea of International System: Theory," *International Political Science Review* 15, no. 3 (1994): 231-55; Barry K. Gills and Andre Gunder Frank, "World System Cycles, Crises and Hegemonial Shifts, 1700 B.C. to 1700 A.D.," *Review* 15, no. 4 (1992): 621-87; Philip D. Curtin, *Cross Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University

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On Security

8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End

Ronnie D. Lipschutz

> How each nation answers the questions "who am I," "who are you," and ultimately, "who are we" determines how they [sic] address the realist problematic "whose side are you on," or the liberal institutionalist question, "what's in it for me?"
>
> --Bruce Cronin[1]

What is security? How do we define it? Who defines it? Who (or what) constitutes a threat? Why are they (it) threatening? Where do threats begin? Where do they end? What, when all is said and done, is being secured? In various ways, the contributors to this volume have taken up these, and other, questions having to do with conceptions, practices, and referents of security. Each has brought to her/his chapter differing epistemologies, methodologies and, indeed, ontologies. Some, taking their cues from what we might stylize as "postmodernism," have struggled with the languages, discourses, and speech acts that overpower and imprison us within a certain security logic. Others are of a more liberal bent, analyzing the attempts of government to define security policy, and the resistance of civil society to such a prerogative. Finally, there are those who come from a more traditional, "realist" position, and have looked at domestic and international struggles for power, and the power to define, in order to examine security as a condition or process.

As writer, reader and editor, I stand somewhere in the middle--in a literal, and not an epistemological sense--trying to understand where these three broad approaches might share boundaries, concepts and explanations. In my view, their major point of difference has to do with the question of whether security can be analyzed as an objective condition, or whether it is better understood as an intersubjective phenomenon, in which mutually constituted threats, and security problematiques, are as much about "negotiating the boundaries of difference" between and among states as about the material implements that, on the pain of war, reinforce those differences.

In this final chapter, I take on the task of looking more closely at the ways in which security is constituted. I first consider security as a "speech act" or discourse, which emerges from the particular logic of the state system and rests upon the differentiation between the self and the enemy. I then consider what happens to this process when the Enemy disappears and why, in the "new world" (which is by no means orderly), finding new enemies is proving difficult. Finally, I analyze the implications of these ideas and point out why efforts to "redefine security," are likely to prove difficult.

Security the "Speech Act"

"Intersubjectivity" among the actors in international relations includes not only the mutually constituted relationship between two actors--in terms of the *logic* of the state system, between potentially hostile

states--but also *interpretations of position* and *responses to interpretations* that arise from the logic of that relationship. In other words, the structure of the system as it is commonly understood provides the setting within which interpretations take place. So far, this is not very different from the neorealist notion that anarchy and self-help require the state to ensure its own security. What the condition of intersubjectivity adds to this is the idea that there is nothing "objective" about this arrangement; it grows out of the mutual interpretations and responses to one another by the actors constituting the system.

The logic, the interpretation and the response together comprise the "speech act" of security. As Ole Wæver has put it,

> With the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a *speech act* . In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more "real"; it is the utterance *itself* that is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.[2]

What then, is the form and content of this speech act? The *logic* of security implies that one political actor must be protected from the depredations of another political actor. In international relations, these actors are territorially defined, mutually exclusive and nominally sovereign states. A state is assumed to be politically cohesive, to monopolize the use of violence within the defined jurisdiction, to be able to protect itself from other states, and to be potentially hostile to other states. Self-protection may, under certain circumstances, extend to the suppression of domestic actors, if it can be proved that such actors are acting in a manner hostile to the state on behalf of another state (or political entity). Overall, however, the logic of security is exclusionist: It proposes to exclude developments deemed threatening to the continued existence of that state and, in doing so, draws boundaries to discipline the behavior of those within and to differentiate within from without. The right to define such developments and draw such boundaries is, generally speaking, the prerogative of certain state representatives, as Wæver points out.[3]

Of course, security, the speech act, does draw on material conditions "out there." In particular, the logic of security assumes that state actors possess "capabilities," and the purposes of such capabilities are interpreted as part of the speech act itself. These interpretations are based on indicators that can be observed and measured--for example, numbers of tanks in the field, missiles in silos, men under arms. It is a given within the logic--the speech act--of security that these capabilities exist to be used in a threatening fashion--either for deterrent or offensive purposes--and that such threats can be deduced, albeit incompletely, without reference to intentions or, for that matter, the domestic contexts within which such capabilities have been developed.

Defense analysts within the state that is trying to interpret the meanings of the other state's capabilities consequently formulate a range of possible scenarios of employment, utilizing the most threatening or damaging one as the basis for devising a response. Most pointedly, they do not assume either that the capabilities will *not* be used or that they might have come into being for reasons other than projecting the imagined threats. Threats, in this context, thus become what *might* be done, not, given the "fog of war," what *could* or *would* be done, or the fog of bureaucracy, what might *not* be done. What we have here, in other words, is "worst case" interpretation. The "speech act" security thus usually generates a proportionate *response* , in which the imagined threat is used to manufacture real weapons and deploy real troops in arrays intended to convey certain imagined scenarios in the mind of the other state. Intersubjectivity, in this case, causes states to read in others, and to respond to, their worst fears.

It is important to recognize that, to the extent we make judgments about possibilities on the basis of capabilities, without reference to actual intentions, we are trying to *imagine* how those capabilities might be used. These imagined scenarios are not, however, based only on some idea of how the threatening actor might behave; they are also reflections of what *our* intentions might be, were we in the place of that actor, constructing imagined scenarios based on what s/he would imagine our intentions might be, were they in our place. . . . and so on, *ad infinitum* . Where we cut into this loop, and why we cut into the loop in one place and not another, has a great deal to do with where we start in our quest to understand the notion of security, the speech act.

Consider, once again, the tale told in chapter 1 of the Pershing-II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, placed in Europe as a response to the Soviet SS-20s. There was, at the time, some controversy over why these latter missiles had been deployed in Eastern Europe. The widely accepted argument, and the one that became the basis for policy, was that it was done to take advantage of an escalatory gap. But others suggested that the deployment was simply the result of the arcane workings of the Soviet military-industrial complex, which had taken one stage off an unsuccessful, solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile, thereby turning it into a working intermediate-range one. The latter argument would, of course, have implied a state beset by bureaucratic conflict and economic inefficiency, rather than one bent on threatening Western Europe.

Another example of this can be found in the idea of "environmental security."[4] If we apply the logic of security to the environment--and this is not really what the concept is intended to do--we might reasonably conclude that the major threats to the environment are the very people who seek security from the effects of a damaged environment. If we consider the concept in terms of societal and state disintegration, we are forced to conclude that the threat to security arises primarily from the activities of members of the society and the citizens of the affected state.[5] We are then left with the state "coercing conservation" by its citizens. This approach might work under certain limited circumstances but, in effect, it targets as enemies the very people who live within the damaged ecosystems under state jurisdiction.[6]

Much the same conclusion follows from the application of other similar concepts, such as "economic security." So long as the economies of Great Powers were more-or-less autonomous from one another, they could exercise sufficient control over domestic economic conditions so as to reinforce such autonomy. The nationality of corporations mattered. Their behavior in time of peace and war was of concern to the state, and the state sought to discipline corporate behavior to its ends. The great experiment in global liberalism has made such a condition a thing of the past. Today, as Beverly Crawford makes clear, enforcing economic security in a traditional sense runs the risk of declaring economic warfare on the most productive and innovative actors in the economy. The logic of the market is quite different from that of the military, a point to which I will return, below.

As a speech act, security is about specifying, through discourse, the permitted conditions under which acts that "secure" the state can take place. In a world of relatively autonomous states, with low levels of interaction, it is possible to draw the conceptual boundaries that establish difference between two states and that also define a range of permitted behavior and beliefs. Specifying the goals of other states' behaviors, as friendly or hostile, could also be a part of this boundary-drawing. Whether we accept such boundary definition as justifiable or not is beside the point; the state is clearly the *referent* of security as speech act and as behavior.

The most secure state is, under these conditions, the one most successful in excluding outside influences by drawing boundaries that can be secured; in Barry Buzan's terms, a "closed" state. But, as Buzan's analysis suggests, a closed state is either very sure of itself and its purpose in the world, or very insecure about its viability.[7] It is either very confident of its ability to ward off the efforts of others to penetrate it, and very sure that it has the undying loyalty of its citizens, so that no social and economic intercourse is desirable or necessary. Or, it is so weak and insecure that, as in the case of North Korea, closure is the only way to ensure that the state and its citizens will not be subverted and "turned" by external influences.

Major difficulties arise when the referent of security becomes less clear. We can maintain the state as the referent of security, the speech act, but in doing so we may be muddying the waters. Indeed, the very notion of the state becomes problematic: On the one hand, it is assumed to be an independent and autonomous political entity that fulfills a particular set of constitutive characteristics codified in part in the Treaties of Augsberg and Westphalia; on the other hand, it is quite evident that the state of 1995 is not the same as the state of 1648. Giving the name "state" to particular political entities at a particular time does not mean that they meet the complete, idealized set of constitutive requirements imagined to apply at another time.[8] Consequently, applying unchanging concepts or practices to these entities, or to others that we might choose to define, does not mean that the logic of security follows today as it once did, either 30 or 300 years ago.

Closure is, consequently, a formula for poverty and destitution, as both Buzan and Beverly Crawford make clear. The citizens of such states are wont to escape their security in the interest of finding better lives and more "secure" livelihoods. Left behind is a hollow shell, less and less able to secure itself. For different reasons, open states are subject to much the same logic: As they engage in extensive social and economic intercourse, the boundaries separating one state from another become, more and more, lines on a map and, perhaps, lines on the ground, but lines that become quite unclear in the minds of citizens whose routines involve living in culturally diffuse "borderlands" that may, geographically, be quite distant from the lines on the ground.

Security, under these circumstances, is about the drawing and defense of lines and boundaries, about limits, and about exclusion and, in this sense, it is the quintessential "speech act" described by Ole Wæver. Defining security involves establishing a definition of the collective self vis-à-vis other collective selves. It is not only about "who is against us," but also, as the observation offered at the beginning of this chapter suggests, about "who we are" and whom we do not wish to be. It is, to a large degree, about boundaries of difference that are increasingly difficult to specify and negotiate.

Lose an Enemy, Lose Yourself

Some years ago, according to a now almost-apocryphal story, a U.S. diplomat was approached by a Soviet colleague and told, *sotto voce* , "We are about to do a terrible thing to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy."[9] At the time, the story had a certain appealing charm to it: The Soviet Union was the primary threat to, and enemy of, the United States, as forty years of Cold War had definitively established. Without the Soviet Union as an enemy, a new era in international cooperation could begin. Financial resources allocated to the defense sector by the two superpowers and their allies could now be redirected to social welfare, basic infrastructure, technological innovation, and environmental protection. The security dilemma that had resulted in the manufacture of more than 50,000 nuclear weapons, the deployment of 300,000 American troops and a comparable number of Soviet soldiers in Europe, and the

annual global expenditure of close to $1 trillion could be eliminated. A new Concert of states, acting through international institutions, would help to wind down the regional and civil wars fostered by the East-West conflict.

In retrospect, the clarity of those last days of bipolarity, only a few short years ago, was illusory; the Cold War appears to have been a period of great stability (although this, too, is something of an illusion), inasmuch as the world now seems to be rent by conflict and war to a degree that would have been difficult to imagine in 1989. These wars and conflicts are, however, largely of a quite unanticipated character: They are mostly *intrastate* and *social* , rather than *interstate* and *political* . Today's wars are mostly between literal neighbors, not neighboring states; the security dilemma has been domesticated and brought *into* the state (and, in some instances, down to the household level).[10] How can we explain this puzzling phenomenon?

Much of the analysis that currently purports to explain these wars revolves around the concepts of *ethnicity* and *sectarianism* : Increasingly, groups of people are defining themselves collectively, relative to others, in terms of certain shared or acquired characteristics such as appearance, religion, history, origins, language, and so on. This is not something new, of course; the very ideas of nationalism and the nation-state are based on such differences. But analyses based on the construction and application of ethnicity generally ignore the importance of the *Other* --whom one is not--in fostering the sense of collective identity so important to action centered on ethnicity or sectarianism.[11]

Defining oneself in such terms requires defining someone else in different terms; differentiation thus draws a boundary between the self and the Other. This Other is not, at first, necessarily a threat in terms of one's own continued existence, although ethnicity can and does become securitized.[12] But the peaceful acceptance of an Other requires that boundaries be drawn somewhere else, and that security, the speech act, specify another Other (as in, for example, South Slavs against the Hapsburgs, or Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union). There are always implicit risks in the peaceful acceptance of an Other as a legitimate ontology, because doing so raises the possibility, however remote, of accepting the Other's characteristics as a legitimate alternative and, consequently, of being taken over by the Other. Given this epistemology of threats, it does not take much to be "turned."[13] How else to account for the life and death character of the distinctions among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia, which the untutored eye can hardly detect?[14] As James Der Derian puts it in his contribution to this volume, "The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable."[15]

The loss of an Enemy can be seen, therefore, as something of a catastrophe for an identity based on that Enemy, and it opens up a search for a new Other that can function as the new Enemy. And, make no mistake about it: While the myths underlying American identity are many, during the Cold War the strongest one had to do with not-being, and not-becoming, Communist, both individually and collectively. In a world dominated by Great Powers and balance-of-power politics, as was the case prior to World War II, losing one enemy was not a problem; there were others to be found. In the post-bipolar world, the search for enemies and new security threats is less easily solved, inasmuch as the disappearance of the only Other that counts leaves no other Others that can credibly fill its place.

One World or Many?
The Dialectics of Order and Chaos

Why are enemies so important to our collective selves? Why are we driven to find new ones when the body of the old one is hardly yet cold (and might yet be revived, perhaps with our unwitting assistance)? Consider what is said to threaten our security today. An incomplete list would include terrorism (infection by fanaticism); nuclear proliferation (infection by irradiation or, perhaps, blackmail--making us behave as we never would want to); environmental degradation (infection by Nature or ourselves); immigration (by religion and culture); drugs (by turning us into mindless robots); and AIDS (by tainting our bodily fluids). Consider how in the past, at one time or another, many of these "threats" were said to be fostered and assisted by the Kremlin and its state and non-state proxies. Now, when there is no one single enemy anywhere, there are enemies everywhere, inside as well as outside. If this is so, then the threat of social chaos, the loss of self, can arise from within, from the "wild zones" inside of each of us (shades of Hobbes!). Can the existence of such wild zones be tolerated by the "tame zones" of the industrial coalition proposed by Barry Buzan? Do the former not pose a threat to the very organizing principles of the latter? Can they be contained or excluded?

The chapters by Dan Deudney and Pearl-Alice Marsh remind us just how problematic it can be to discipline wildness and direct tameness, even when, to some, the world appears to be black and white. Even as nuclear doctrine sought to secure the United States against the enemy, it threatened the very people it was intended to protect. And, even as U.S. security policy in southern Africa promised to protect the home appliances apparently deemed so important to the American people by its leaders, so, too, did it also raise the possibility of a cessation in the very mineral flows that made those appliances feasible and affordable. Contradictory speech acts emerged from this process, undermining security policy and leaving behind less security, rather than more.

Today, a similar set of circumstances, brought on by economic globalization, seems to be developing and imposing costs and risks on the very people it is intended to benefit. In this context, talk of "economic security" becomes, once again, a speech act that seeks to legitimate a policy that promises very real insecurity for many. The market is a place full of risks, and only those who are willing to take risks in the market are likely to reap great benefits; given the logic of the market, these same individuals also risk bankruptcy and personal economic insecurity (an outcome only too evident in Orange County California's declaration of bankruptcy and Mexico's economic travails).

Indeed, as Beverly Crawford's chapter seems to suggest, in a world of economic globalism, in which states must collaborate to foster global capitalism, and the processes of production, consumption, and accumulation become decoupled from individual states, it becomes more and more difficult to constitute an Other that might be transformed into a threatening enemy, thereby legitimating the differential degrees of personal and national security awarded by the market. We have seen some feeble efforts, based on notions of economic competitiveness and technological innovation, and given illustration in Michael Crichton's xenophobic and misogynistic *Rising Sun* , but these seem not to be very persuasive. A few argue that we (the United States) must become more like the Other (Japan) if we are to be made secure.[16] How different this is from the world(s) of Morgenthau and Waltz!

Business and capital are only too aware of this paradox, whereas the world of states and military power seems blissfully oblivious to it. For capital, there are no enemies, only competitors; indeed, the market, while competitive, is a realm of *cooperation* , not conflict, as is often assumed.[17] Markets are rule-governed institutions and, to get along, you must go along. In the marketplace, nonexclusive identities are prized, not shunned, and multiple identities are encouraged in the name of consumer taste and "autonomy." This world is, as Kenichi Ohmae puts it, truly "borderless."[18] Not only are there no

borders between countries, there are no borders between market and consumer, either. What can security possibly mean in such a world?

Not everyone is, of course, a participant in the market; indeed, there are billions of people and dozens of countries that are not. In spite of warnings about instability as the "enemy," these people and "states" are neither enemies nor threats to us in either an objective or intersubjective sense. Rather, the places in which many of them are found are more akin to realms constituted or consumed by chaos. The inhabitants of these zone participate in neither statist politics *nor* global markets as we understand them, not so much out of choice or desire as out of the logic of economic globalization driven by capitalism and the industrial coalition. But these zones of chaos are not just places "outside" of space or time; paradoxically, perhaps, they are sites of political experimentation, from which are emerging "world systems" that, if successful, could ultimately undermine the relative orderliness of the peaceful zones of the industrial coalition.

One example of such a world system can be seen in the collapse of Somalia, the state. Somali nationalism, such as it was, defined the Somali state in part by what it was not, yet yearned to be. The five-pointed star on the national flag referred not only to the former British and Italian colonial territories, now united into the authorized Somali state, but also to the missing parts of the body politic in the Ogaden Desert of Ethiopia, in Djibouti, and in Kenya, places where Somali identity could never be wholly secured. To reunite the parts of this body, in 1977, the Somali president, Siad Barre, sent his troops into the Ogaden to fight the enemy Amhara, rulers of Ethiopia and that contested region. They, with the help of the Soviet Union and the relative indifference of the United States, were able to throw back the invasion, thereby preventing Somalia from uniting the body, and sowing the seeds for a dismal future.

With the end of the Cold War, both Ethiopia and Somalia imploded, and with them went the borders that kept Somalis apart. Paradoxically, the disappearance of lines in the sand meant that long-separated groups could now be reunited, to reclaim lost identities. But these identities had little to do with the Somali state itself; rather, they were and are defined in terms of a pre-colonial but post-industrial "world-system" of families and clans, for whom borders were less lines drawn in the sand than in the family tree. The reconstruction of the Somali "state" would destroy this old-new world-system; Somalia the state is, thus, as much a threat to clan identities as anything else might be. Hence, those who would reconstitute Somalia as a state--certain clan leaders, the UN, the United States--came to be seen as threats to the security of those who preferred no state to one dominated by a single clan.[19]

Is the "immature anarchy" of ex-Somalia tolerable to the state-centric world system of the industrial core? I would suggest that the apparent disorder of the African Horn, driven by a different organizing logic than the international system, is too much for even the anarchic state system to stomach, because it makes clear how weak are the boundaries between the relatively ordered politics of international society and the Hobbesian state of nature. The Somali world system, and the "world systems" of Bosnia, Georgia, and other zones of chaos, are all threats to the international state system even as that system is a threat to these micro-world-systems.

Which constitutes the greater threat to the other? The state system cannot cope with the "social warfare" that has atomized these zones of chaos into their fundamental particles; the "political" actors within these mini-world systems see no benefit in giving up power to others in the name of reconstituting the state and, with it, some oppressive international order. As Robert Kaplan points out in his provocative article,

"The Coming Anarchy," many of the actors within these zones of chaos are now better off than they have ever been before; to put it another way, they have taken risks in the market, and see no reason to give up the benefits they have won.[20] The international state system does not want to--indeed, cannot afford to--bribe all of those who have benefitted from the chaos to rejoin the international order. All of this simply illustrates, as Nicholas Onuf implies in his discussion of the essential linkages between realism and liberalism, that the Hobbesian world is implicit in the modern capitalist state, not kept at bay by it.[21] This does not bode well for our future.

A Beginning, by Way of Conclusion

What, then, is security? The contributors to this volume have told us, if nothing else, that it irreducibly involves boundaries. As James Der Derian points out, it is the drawing of lines between the collective self and what is, in Nietzsche's words, "alien and weaker." Der Derian argues that "A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security."[22] The boundary between known and unknown is reified and secured. But where are these boundaries to be drawn?

I have suggested above that they are drawn between the self and the Enemy, between the realm of safety and the realm of danger, between tame zones and wild ones. The practitioners of national security and security policy conventionally drew these boundaries between states, or between groups of states. By 1989, the roster of states had been fixed, the books closed for good. There were many "international" boundaries, but these were fixed and all there were or could be. States might draw imaginary lines, or "bordoids," as Bruce Larkin has stylized them,[23] in defining the parameters of their "national interests." They might extend their national boundaries in order to incorporate allies, as in practice of extended deterrence in Europe. Enemies and threats were, however, always across the line.

The revolutions of 1989 completed what had already been in the works for some time, the fluidization and disappearance of borders and boundaries, a phenomenon that many observers had, in the past, named "interdependence." But interdependence assumed a continuity of borders and boundaries, not their dissolution. Moreover, as old borders disappeared, new ones emerged. Compatriots within boundaries now found themselves on the opposite sides of borders, sometimes, as was the case with the 25 million Russians in the "near abroad," on the wrong side. New boundaries were drawn within what had once been states or titular republics, securitizing multiple new identities where there had been only one before . Even the industrial coalition might not be secure from this phenomenon: Ole Wæver suggests that, in some cases within Western Europe, "*national communities* might have to engage in a certain degree of securitization of *identity questions* in order to handle the stress from Europeanization."[24] The new post-1989 borders had much the same effect, with newly imagined nations securitizing their identities in order to establish their imagined autonomy from old ones. In doing this, however, these new nations rejected old ones, rendering them both illegitimate and undesirable.

But even new borders do not, and cannot, put an end to the old question: Who are you? Who am I? The setting of boundaries is never finalized, never set in stone markers. Borders are meant to discipline, but they also open up the possibility of "going too far" or "overstepping the bounds." Borderlands are always regions where mixing occurs, or might occur, and they are, in themselves, a threat to the security supposedly established by borders. The boundaries are always under challenge and they must always be reestablished, not only on the ground but also in the mind. During the final decade of the Cold War, as

Dan Deudney and Pearl Alice Marsh point out, struggles were renewed over where to draw the lines, even as the lines began to dissolve. Star Wars would have drawn a line--or a surface--in the sky, a dome within which the self would be secure and secured, and outside of which was the eternal threat of the Other. Few believed that such a surface could be made at all, much less made secure.

Nuclear deterrence depended on lines on the ground *and* in the mind: To be secure, one had to believe that, were the Other to cross the line, both the self and the Other would cease to exist. The threat of nothingness secured the ontology of being, but at great political cost to those who pursued this formula. Since 1991, deterrence has ceased to wield its cognitive force, and the lines in the mind and on the ground have vanished, in spite of repeated efforts to draw them anew. To be sure, the United States and Russia do not launch missiles against each other because both know the result would be annihilation. But the same is true for France and Britain, or China and Israel. It was the existence of the Other that gave deterrence its power; it is the disappearance of the Other that has vanquished that power. Where Russia is now concerned, we are, paradoxically, not secure, because we see no need to be secured.[25] In other words, as Ole Wæver might put it, where there is no constructed threat, there is no security problem. France is fully capable of doing great damage to the United States, but that capability has no meaning in terms of U.S. security.

The search for new rationales for security leads, as Beverly Crawford's essay suggests, not to security redefined but to endless iterative loops. To be secure, we must become more self-reliant, inasmuch as to be reliant means depending on others who are potential Others. To depend on others means that they are more competitive than we are. To be less competitive means our survival may be threatened. But to be less reliant means that we forego the fruits of technological collaboration with others. To forego the fruits of collaboration means that we become less competitive, poorer and less secure than others might be. If we are poorer and less secure, we are more open to penetration by others, who might well take us over. If we were more like the Japanese, we would be the equal of Japan and secure; but if we were more like the Japanese, we would be less like Americans and therefore insecure. And so on through this new Hall of Mirrors. The "new economic security dilemma" is more of a contradiction than a dilemma. While U.S. policymakers fret over competition, U.S. corporations establish strategic alliances with their Japanese counterparts.

To put this another way, and as I suggested above, there are no security dilemmas in the globalized economy, although there are likely to be security dilemmas in economic globalization. As Barry Buzan puts it,

> There is little reason to think that the capitalist coalition will succumb to the Leninist fate of falling into conflict over the redivision of the global market now that its external challenger has been seen off. Economic competition there will doubtless be, possibly quite fierce, as global surplus capacity in many industries begins to bite. But their prosperity and their economic processes are now so deeply interdependent that the costs of full-blown mercantilism act as an effective deterrent.[26]

But the security dilemma might yet arise between those who participate in the global economy and those who do not, between the stable core and chaotic periphery. So long as instability can be contained within the periphery, the center will remain peaceful and secure. Some countries may be brought into the zone of peace; others may find themselves pushed outside, relegated to looking in. The boundaries within will fade away, but the boundary between center and periphery will remain clear. Then the question becomes: Is greater security achieved by keeping these peripheral Others out or by trying to bring them in and risking rejection? Inasmuch as the latter is a formula for endless heartbreak and tears, exclusion begins to

look easier.

Is exclusion feasible, however? "Tame zones" are to be found not only in Rome but also in Rio; "wild zones" exist not only in Somalia but also in South Central. Where, in this world of intermixed, cheek-to-cheek order and chaos are we to draw new borders and boundaries? In Bosnia and Somalia, the lines have been drawn block-by-block; in Los Angeles, the *cordon sanitaire* of freeways separates one zone from its neighbor (at least until the "Big One" hits). The next time there is an altercation at Florence and Normandie, will the periphery flow toward the center? Will the lines give way?

For the state policymaker, the "security dilemma" thus has taken on a new meaning. Confronted by limited resources and forced to make choices, the fragmentation of states and the loss of certainty will make it that much more difficult to decide who or what constitutes a problem of security. Threats can always be constructed through the speech acts of security, but they do not always perform as expected nor are they always believed by those who are to be secured. Sometimes, they just go away, leaving behind them a security "vacuum" of a sort different than that posited by geopolitics and realists. As Constantine Cavafy put it,

> Why this sudden bewilderment, this confusion?
> (How serious people's faces have become.)
> Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly,
> everyone going home lost in thought?
>
> Because night has fallen and the barbarians haven't come.
> And some of our men just in from the border say
> there are no barbarians any longer.
>
> Now what's going to happen to us without barbarians?
> Those people were a kind of solution.[27]

Note 1: Bruce Cronin, "Defining a Raison d'être: The Politics of Identity and Purpose in the New World Order," Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2-5, 1993, p. 2. Back.

Note 2: This book, p. 55. Back.

Note 3: None of this is meant to suggest that the act of drawing boundaries is quick or easy. For an example of such "boundary-drawing," see William S. Lind, "Defending Western Culture," *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991): 40--50; Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. Back.

Note 4: This concept is not addressed in the present volume, but there is a rapidly-growing literature on the topic. See, for example, the work of Norman Myers, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon and Peter Gleick. Back.

Note 5: See, e.g., Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 5-40. Back.

Note 6: Nancy Peluso, "Coercing Conservation: The Politics of State Resource Control," in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca, eds., *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics* (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 46-70. Back.

Note 7: Experience suggests that it is not the state whose viability is called into question but, rather, that of a government. Still, governments who try to close off a state tend to take the view that they are all that stand between state survival and its disappearance. Back.

Note 8: John G. Ruggie, "International Structures and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method," in: Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges--Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 21-36. Back.

Note 9: Cited in Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century--United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 232. Back.

Note 10: John Mearsheimer has proposed, in the case of ex-Yugoslavia, that the security dilemma be restored to its proper place *between* states by separating ethnic groups and allowing them to arm, which would establish a stable and "peaceful" balance-of-power among them; see John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer," *The New Republic* , June 14, 1993, pp. 22-25, 28. Back.

Note 11: More to the point, scholars of nationalism tend to define it in positive, rather than negative, terms. See, for example, Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991, 2nd. ed.). Back.

Note 12: Clearly, in some, usually liberal, contexts, the identification of "others" does not lead to securitization. Loggers and environmentalists do not, for the most part, take up arms in an organized fashion with the intent of eliminating the other. At the same time, as will be seen below, the ways in which the language of war is sometimes used in a domestic context are intended to create a threat of existential annihilation by a feared Other. Back.

Note 13: In the film *Dances with Wolves* , for instance, the Kevin Costner character is accused by a soldier in the U.S. Cavalry of having "turned Indian." The implication is, of course, that Costner is a weak individual, who succumbed to the enemy when most U.S. soldiers would have been able to resist. See also Richard Condon, *The Manchurian Candidate* (New York: Jove, 1988). Back.

Note 14: And how else to account for the gradual acquisition of identifiable, and differentiable, characteristics, such as dress, if not to facilitate identification and assurance of loyalty? Back.

Note 15: This book, pp. 33. Back.

Note 16: While no one explicitly suggests the United States should adopt Japanese characteristics, a few observers have looked with some admiration at the technology policy fostered by the Japanese state. This is implicit, for example, in Daniel F. Burton, Jr., "High-Tech Competitiveness," *Foreign Policy* 92 (Fall 1993): 117-32. Back.

Note 17: George Breslauer used to call the U.S.-Soviet relationship one of "collaborative competition"; see "Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1972: Unalterable Antagonism or Collaborative Competition?" in: Alexander L. George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry--Problems of Crisis*

Prevention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 65-106. Back.

Note 18: Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World--Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990). Back.

Note 19: A good discussion of the clan and state politics of Somalia can be found in Patrick Giles, "From Peace-Keeping to Peace Enforcement--The Somalia Precedent," *Middle East Report* , no. 185 (Nov.-Dec. 1993): 21-24. Back.

Note 20: Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* , February 1994, pp. 44-76. Back.

Note 21: Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making--Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). Back.

Note 22: This book, p. 34 Back.

Note 23: Bruce Larkin, *War Scripts/Civic Scripts* , manuscript in preparation. Back.

Note 24: This book, p. 76. Back.

Note 25: Now, threats emerge because the lines of security, drawn around Russian nuclear facilities, have literally dissolved, allowing fissile materials to become commodified and objects of exchange. In the market, there are no boundaries, only risks. See, e.g., David Perlman, "Russian Nuclear Security So Bad It Almost Invites Bomb Thieves," *San Francisco Chronicle* , Aug. 22, 1994, p.A12. Back.

Note 26: This book, p. 197-98. Back.

Note 27: "Waiting for the Barbarians," in: Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard, transl., George Savidis, ed., *C.P. Cavafy--Collected Poems* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Copyright (c) 1992 by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard, transl. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Back.

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