Peace and Security in the Postmodern World

The OSCE and conflict resolution

Dennis J.D. Sandole

Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution

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Comprising interviews conducted with senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators about recent tumultuous events in global affairs and insights from the conflict resolution literature, this book analyses how “postmodern” conflict such as the recent Balkan wars and the post–9/11 “new terrorism” can be prevented and/or otherwise dealt with in the future.

Using a conceptual framework designed to enhance analysis of complex identity-based conflicts, the author has developed a model for a new European peace and security system (NEPSS), and assessed the “goodness-of-fit” between NEPSS and the perceptions of CSCE/OSCE practitioners at four points in time, to explore whether there was a convergence of theory and practice on how to prevent and/or respond to future Yugoslav-type conflicts and related acts of terrorism.

The author also examines to what extent consensus existed on the various issues over time and analyses pre–9/11 (1993, 1997, 1999) and post–9/11 (2004) trends on various peace and security issues to discern to what extent there has developed over time a culture of conflict resolution and an “issue paradigm,” in which senior diplomatic practitioners come down on various issues in complex ways that are not neatly captured by a Realpolitik-only or Idealpolitik-only perspective.

This book will be of much interest to students of conflict resolution, peace studies, international security, and international organizations.

Dennis J.D. Sandole is Professor of conflict resolution and international relations at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University. Among his publications is *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post–Cold War Era* (1999).

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This book is dedicated to the women and men of the OSCE

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Foreword

Preventing the outbreak of armed conflicts still remains one of our most difficult challenges in the twenty-first century. And so does the management, settlement, and transformation of conflicts. While recent statistics demonstrate that the number of destructive conflicts has declined since the 1990s, they are likely to remain a characteristic feature of the international system. The 2005 Human Security Report emphasizes that policies spanning from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict peacebuilding are critical in our endeavors toward achieving sustainable peace and human security. Different forms of international activism, including the upsurge of conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding activities, particularly on the part of the United Nations, but also other international organizations, have clearly contributed to such changing patterns of violent conflicts.

New practices in international conflict management and prevention are also the focus of Professor Sandole's book. Drawing on research on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including extensive interviews of senior OSCE negotiators that have spanned over several years, Professor Sandole has created an insightful work that reveals the importance of lessons learned from armed conflicts, and the need for a peace and security system for Europe that "is comprised of multiple, existing institutions" with a potent early warning/conflict prevention capability. Moreover, the book illustrates how the OSCE has also been at the forefront of advocating and implementing new international norms and practices, not only in conflict prevention, but also in post-conflict peacebuilding.

The OSCE has a long-standing and distinguished history of activities in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. To understand this prominent role, Professor Sandole's book takes us first back to the historical roots of the OSCE, and the philosophical significance of these roots. It is essential to explore the initial creation of the OSCE, then called the CSCE, not just in the framework of realpolitik, that is, of assuring security between East and West during the Cold War. It is even more important to view the OSCE as an organization that along with other regional organizations, especially the European Union, has played a major part in long-term peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Europe.

More than 30 years ago, there was no such organization as the OSCE. Again, a century ago, there was no such organization as the European Union. In fact, the existence of common European institutions based on common values and norms was at best an idea that spun around in the heads of a few far-sighted philosophers, scholars, enlightened statesmen, and peace activists. Seen from this perspective, the creation of international institutions, such as the OSCE, along with other European organizations, not only provides crucial insights to our understanding of how ideas become the building blocks for normative change, but also of how ideas become practice, that is, political reality. Professor Sandole's underlying message in his book is that we should be aware of and recognize the power of ideas and beliefs about peace. Those ideas and beliefs underlie, and have shaped, the creation of our common European institutions. It is for this reason also that – now more than ever – we need an organization such as the OSCE.

The creation of the OSCE also provides critical insights into our understanding of how enemies can become friends. In other words, the OSCE, and its predecessor, the CSCE, illuminate how adversarial relationships can be transformed over time on the basis of new norms and practices. Therefore, as part of the broader European integration process, the OSCE, along with some of the other European institutions, has assumed a crucial role in the creation of a security community, one that is based on commonly agreed norms, values, principles, standards, commitments, and responsibilities. One can also make one other very bold assertion here – namely, that the process of creating common European institutions remains one of the most successful examples of post-conflict peacebuilding, sustainable conflict prevention, and positive peace.

Second, it is important to look at the OSCE in light of its distinct role – a role that is quite different from other regional organizations. I think that no other organization has been in the unique position of playing such a constructive role in preventing conflicts and in strengthening comprehensive security as the OSCE. Also, there is no historical precedent for the type of "constructive intervention" as practiced by the OSCE, and the normative framework that was created in the early 1970s. Nor are there any historical precedents for the unique toolbox that the OSCE has available when it comes to conflict prevention and conflict management. Moreover, the OSCE is perceived as having the necessary legitimacy to manage and prevent conflicts. The reason for this is that its existing institutional mechanisms for conflict management and conflict prevention have been legitimized by its 56 participating States through collective decision making and consensus.

This book is also providing the reader with a glimpse into the challenges that lie ahead of the OSCE, especially as it comes to the reform of the Organization, and the pressures it is under to maintain its niche in what it does best. Let me contribute some additional thoughts on these challenges.

The first one is to look at the OSCE not only in terms of what is wrong with it, or what does not work. Many are already doing this, and there are also enough efforts underway to address some of the organization's shortcomings. Rather, we should focus on what has been achieved and on the potential for future achievements. While reform is certainly necessary, I believe that it is also essential to focus on what the OSCE has done particularly well and what lessons can be drawn from these positive experiences. Professor Sandole's book should assist us with this endeavor.

The second challenge is that the OSCE needs to continue its work on early warning and conflict prevention, as also identified by those senior negotiators interviewed in the book. The OSCE already has unique and well-tested structures and processes for early warning and conflict prevention in place: institutions, field operations, the Conflict Prevention Centre, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, to name a few. The OSCE also has a well-tested toolbox of preventive measures and instruments, and wide experience and expertise in using the many preventive tools, such as "silent diplomacy" through political dialogue.

The third challenge is that the OSCE must stake its course on pushing to safeguard human security – a notion which puts the security of individuals front and center. This is not always easy in the present climate where globalization has increased the vulnerability of the individual, and where the insecurities of individuals and the conflicts among human beings are becoming more and more "globalized."

Last, despite the many critical views of the OSCE, it remains a crucial component among all the interlocking European organizations we now have, a phenomenon Professor Sandole refers to as the New European Peace and Security System. Thus, the way forward is to draw on the OSCE's long-term experiences in conflict prevention and conflict management. The way forward is also to "market" the organization's unique role and the many "best practices" when it comes to the prevention and management of violent conflicts.

Alice Ackermann
OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre
November 2006

Note

The views expressed are the personal opinions of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the OSCE. The number of OSCE participating States increased from 55 to 56 in June 2006, with the addition of Montenegro.

Preface

The origins of this volume lie in the largely unanticipated end of the Cold War in 1989–90, when I had the good fortune to be a William C. Foster Fellow at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This fellowship included serving as a member of the US Delegation to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) within the context of the (then) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), based in Vienna, Austria. The CSCE, now the OSCE, is the world's pre-eminent regional peace and security organization comprising former enemies of the Cold War (NATO and Warsaw Pact) and the neutral and nonaligned of Europe.

The end of the Cold War provided opportunities and challenges for reshaping international peace and security into a "New World Order" in which the former Cold War foes could collaborate on global problem solving to the benefit of all. Having become aware of the CSCE's contribution to ending the Cold War as part of the experience of serving as a diplomat on the US Delegation to the CSBMs negotiations, I was intrigued by the possibility that the CSCE could play a useful role in realizing this goal of a *New World Order*.

Regrettably, the end of the Cold War also provided opportunities for parts of Europe, particularly the Balkans, to descend into brutal genocidal warfare.

Accordingly, when, as a NATO Research Fellow, I returned to Vienna in summer 1993, 2 years after the onset of those wars, I conducted the first round of what eventually became four rounds of interviews over an 11-year period. I interviewed primarily heads of delegation to elicit their wisdom on, among other issues, what the causes were for the genocidal unraveling of Yugoslavia; what lessons they had learned from those wars and the international interventions into them; and, if given the chance, how they would design peace and security in post–Cold War Europe to either prevent or deal with such violent conflict in the future.

I returned to Vienna in summer 1997 as a Fulbright OSCE Regional Research Fellow to conduct the second round of interviews with primarily

heads of delegation to the "reinvented" Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This survey took place 2 years after NATO and the Dayton Peace Process had stopped the warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995.

As soon became clear, the CSCE/OSCE project started to "serendipitously" take on a *quasi-experimental*, "before–after" character:

1 The 1993 survey occurred 2 years *after* the onset of warfare in former Yugoslavia and 2 years *before* NATO and the Dayton Peace Process stopped the warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995.
2 The 1997 survey occurred 2 years *after* NATO and the Dayton Peace Process stopped the warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 2 years *before* NATO's intervention to stop Serb ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo in 1999.

Consequently, I returned to Vienna in summer 1999 as an OSCE "Researcher in Residence," immediately following the cessation of NATO's air war against Serbia over the ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo, to conduct a third round of interviews. Because I had asked basically the same kinds of questions across the three surveys, I was able to explore the likely impact of the two NATO interventions (in Bosnia and Kosovo) on respondents' answers, just as if I had intentionally conducted a "before–after" field or laboratory experiment.

The events of September 11, 2001 tragically provided me with another before–after opportunity to explore the impact of an unanticipated real-world event on OSCE negotiators' views of peace and security in post–Cold War Europe. In this case, a Fulbright teaching award at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna enabled me to return to Vienna for a fourth round of interviews during the spring and summer of 2004.

Whereas the 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys all occurred *before 9/11*, the 2004 survey clearly occurred *after 9/11*. In addition to exploring the impact of 9/11 on OSCE negotiators' responses to basically the same questions that were asked on previous surveys, I was able to explore responses to the issue of terrorism itself and its possible conceptual and/or operational linkage to the kinds of ethnic conflicts that had torn former Yugoslavia apart.

The objectives of the CSCE/OSCE project evolved over time to include:

1 Initially conducting, through surveys of appropriate literature, an *academic/theoretical* study of how the international community could either prevent or otherwise nip in the bud future Yugoslav-type conflicts.
2 Interviewing senior negotiators of the world's primary regional peace and security organization, based less than 1-hour flying time from the killing fields of former Yugoslavia, to elicit their wisdom about (1) the

causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s; (2) the lessons learned from, and interventions into, those wars; and (3) how, if given the chance, negotiators would design peace and security architecture for post–Cold War Europe that could more effectively prevent or otherwise deal with such conflicts.

In other words, this study approaches the *research problem* of how to prevent "future Yugoslavias" by combining two discourses: the *academic/theoretical* and the *diplomatic/practitioner*. In the process, the study explores the "goodness-of-fit" between the two discourses against the background of what developments in peace and security have actually taken place in and through, among others, NATO, European Union, and Council of Europe, to bring former Cold War enemies together into a *New World Order*.

Finally, the study examines the implications of the findings for theory, research, and policy, including prospects for "exporting" the OSCE to other regions worldwide as one "tested" approach for dealing with violent ethnic conflicts and related acts of terrorism.

Acknowledgments

This book would clearly not have been possible without the nearly 150 CSCE/OSCE diplomats and other practitioners who allowed me access to their busy lives, thoughts, and visions with regard to peace and security in the postmodern world. But even before conducting the interviews in 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2004, the book would not have seen the light of day without Dr Stanley Riveles, then of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), who invited me to apply for the William C. Foster Fellowship that took me to Vienna as a member of the US Delegation to the CSBMs Negotiations, or without Dr Pearce Corden, also then of ACDA, who assigned me to the Delegation in Vienna in May–July 1990.

The book also owes its genesis to members of the former US Information Service (USIS), US Embassy in Vienna (e.g. Dr Karin Czerny) and to the OSCE Secretariat (e.g. Dr Walter Kemp, Ms Florence Le Clezio) who provided me with information about current CSCE/OSCE activities in Vienna.

This book would never have come into existence without the love, generosity, and forbearance of my wife (Dr) Ingrid Sandole-Staroste and our son Timothy who accompanied me on all but the last of my journeys to Vienna. At the expense of her own work, Ingrid also patiently assisted me in preparing the manuscript for delivery to the publishers.

Finally, I wish to thank my friend and colleague Dr Alice Ackermann for taking time out of her busy schedule as Mission Programme Officer with the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna to write the Foreword.

Abbreviations

3PF	Three Pillar Framework
AMCP	Aggressive manifest conflict process
APEC	Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATU	Action Against Tourism Unit
AU	African Union (formerly the OAU)
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIDCM	Center for International Development and Conflict Management
CMG	Conflict Management Group
CoE	Council of Europe
CP	Communist Party
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre (OSCE)
CSBMs	Confidence- and security-building measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials
CSOs	Civil society organizations
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
ECCP	European Centre for Conflict Prevention
ECPCR	European Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	EU-led force
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation

FSU	Former Soviet Union
FYug	Former Yugoslavia
GMs	Grand Means
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
GWOT	Global war on terror
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE)
IA	International Alert
ICC	International Criminal Court
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGOs	International governmental organizations
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMTD	Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy
INN	International Negotiation Network
IOs	International Organizations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
MCP	manifest conflict process
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPSS	New European Peace and Security System
NGOs	Nongovernmental organizations
NNA	Neutral and Nonaligned
NPF	National Peace Foundation
NSC	National Security Council
NSFP	Negative Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
NSWP	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity (currently the AU)
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PA	Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE)
PC	Permanent Council (OSCE)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PRS	predictability, regularity, and stability
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
SDs	Standard deviations
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
TARC	Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission

UN	United Nations
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Mission
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USIS	US Information Service
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

Chapter 1

Violent postmodern conflict

A need to go beyond symptoms

Introduction

The primary objective of the project reported in this volume is to discover or invent architecture that can enhance efforts to deal effectively with the complexities of the *postmodern world*, including genocidal ethnic conflicts such as those that plagued Southeastern Europe (the Balkans) during the 1990s (the *new warfare*) and incidents of "catastrophic terrorism" (Hamburg, 2002), such as the events of 9/11 (the *new terrorism*), which may be conceptually and/or epiphenomenally linked to the "new warfare."

This introductory chapter articulates a vision of the entirety of the volume, including its value as a source of expert-generated insights and theory-based constructions about how to shape Europe and, by inference, other regions of the world into viable peace and security systems.

Linkage between the new warfare and the new terrorism

One reason why the new warfare and the new terrorism are linked conceptually in this study is that the means of warfare and of terrorist violence are distributed along a gradient of violence where neat lines of demarcation can easily become blurred. Further, these means are not monopolized by the state, but are instead possessed and used by nonstate actors as well (e.g., paramilitary participants in the ethnic warfare of Bosnia and suicide bombers assaulting persons and other symbols of Western "Civilization"). Indeed, whether an enraged individual is committing an act of "warfare" or "terrorism" against his or her perception of an Oppressor or Enemy may be largely a question of culturally based construction or, in general, semantics.

Nevertheless, clarity on this point has not been an issue for American policy makers who have been waging a "war on terror" in their response to the terrorism of 9/11: a war which has been expanded to include the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Similarly, the Israelis and Russians have been in no doubt about who their enemies are in their respective wars on terror in Occupied Palestine and Chechnya.

Clarity has also not been an issue for those who view terrorism as itself a form of warfare:

> [Given] the ancient roots of terrorism...from the viewpoint of military theory, domestic and international terrorism can constitute a *modern form of primitive warfare* and stand in a fluid relationship with guerrilla warfare [emphasis added].
>
> (Wheeler, 1991, p. 19)

Hence, the German magazine, *Spiegel*, has referred to terrorism as the *warfare of the twenty-first century* (*Terror: Der Krieg des 21. Jahrhunderts*) (Spiegel, 2004).

No matter what our particular views on the matter, under the still prevailing Westphalian system of international law, the use of force by majority group-based states (e.g., Israel) is considered a *legitimate* form of defense of, and by, the state; whereas the use of force by nonstate minority groups (e.g., Palestinians) to advance their "interests" in opposition to those of the majority group-based states, is *criminal* and/or *terroristic*.[1]

The post–Cold War "transitioning" international system, therefore, contains a serious flaw, a structural basis for *"frustration-aggression"* (Dollard *et al.*, 1939; Galtung, 1964, 1969; Gurr, 1970; Burton, 1979, 1990, 1997): a dynamic which can be expressed through acts of either the new terrorism or the new warfare – in general, *postmodern warfare* – depending upon the perspectives and motivations of perpetrators, "targets", and observers.

Understanding and explanation

Implicit in this project is a distinction made by, among others, Max Weber (1922/78) between an *inside actor's* sense of *understanding* (*verstehen*) and an *outside observer's* sense of *explanation* (*erklären*) (see, e.g., Hollis, 1994, pp. 142–51). Similarly, Abraham Kaplan (1964, pp. 32–3, 139–44, 358–63) has distinguished between *act meaning* (the meaning of an act as defined by an inside actor) and *action meaning* (the meaning of the act as defined by an outside observer in light of certain theories).

Certain steps are involved in making meaningful use of the insider [understanding]–outsider [explanation] distinction:

First of all, we require access to relevant actors (e.g., CSCE/OSCE negotiators), either directly through interviews or observation and/or indirectly through their personal documents (e.g., dairies), in order to elicit or otherwise to have revealed their views of what certain events and behaviors *mean* to them.

Second, through *introspection* and *empathy* resulting from our *identification* with those relevant actors, "We [need to] look within [ourselves] to arrive at the *act meanings* of the behavior of [CSCE/OSCE negotiators],

assuming that the act has for them the meaning it would have for us if we were to perform it" [emphasis added] (Kaplan, 1964, p. 142). And

Third, while *verstehen* (understanding) "is the apprehension of an **act meaning**, the significance of which attaches to an act in the light of the goals and purposes of those performing it," *erklären* (explanation) "is the apprehension of an **action meaning**, the significance of which attaches to an action in the light of some appropriate theory" (ibid.).

So, translating this complex epistemology into terms appropriate for the study reported here:

1 I have interviewed senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators at four points in time over an 11-year period to elicit their views of issues ("act meaning") associated with violent conflict in the postmodern world.
2 I have attempted to understand their views in terms of their own goals, motivations, agendas; that is, to ascertain what they themselves meant with their views and actions, in order to get at their "insider" *understanding*. Then
3 When I thought I knew what the negotiators meant, I took that information and compared it to corresponding, theory-based, "outsider" knowledge ("action meaning") or *explanation* of the same subject matter.

In other words, complementing my survey of relevant literature on peace and security in the postmodern world, I have interviewed senior negotiators involved in the "Helsinki Process": initially the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), subsequently reframed as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The results of those interviews feature in this volume as a basis for helping us to navigate our way through the turbulent "brave new world" of the postmodern era, to discover or invent appropriate mechanisms for preventing or otherwise responding to postmodern warfare: future "Yugoslavias" and future acts of 9/11-type terrorism.

The results of those interviews also allow us to explore the long-standing cultural/communications gap between academics and policy makers which tend to impede the effective application of theory to practice (see O'Leary *et al*., 1974; Ezekiel and Post, 1991). As Leatherman and Väyrynen (1995, p. 54) frame the problem, there is a gap, not only

> between academics and national foreign policy-makers, but also between academics and international civil servants, diplomats and other international policy-makers [such as CSCE/OSCE negotiators] involved in multilateral decision-making.

Why this particular effort, especially given the burgeoning number of publications on postmodern warfare? Many years ago, the philosopher

Jean-Jacques Rousseau commented that "Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232). The same situation exists at present: we are faced with the new warfare *and* the (possibly related) new terrorism – not to mention global environmental degradation and natural disasters that may exacerbate factors making for postmodern warfare – but with woefully inadequate conceptual and operational mechanisms for dealing with either, or their interconnections.

The new warfare

During the 1990s, Europe was shaken by genocidal ethno-religious warfare in the Balkans, the likes of which in intensity of death, destruction, and displacement of people, had not been seen since the end of the Second World War.

The implosion of former Yugoslavia seems to have taken everyone by surprise, rendering the "international community" – especially the trans-Atlantic security and European communities – incapable of acting effectively. Beginning with the secession of Slovenia and Croatia from the former Yugoslav Socialist Republic on June 25, 1991, warfare ensued in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and then, by the spring of 2001, in Macedonia.

The NATO-led peace mission operating in Bosnia, Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) for nearly a decade was replaced by an EU-led force (EUFOR) on December 2, 2004 (see AP, 2004a,b; Dempsey, 2004a,b). A North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission is still operating in Kosovo, Kosovo Force (KFOR), plus an European Union (EU) mission is in Macedonia. In each case, the mission is maintaining *negative peace* (i.e., the absence of hostilities) while providing a necessary (but not a sufficient) basis for *positive peace* (i.e., elimination of the deep-rooted causes and conditions of the conflict) (see Galtung, 1969, 1996).

As of this writing, the "positive peace" efforts of the international community are lagging far behind the "negative peace" efforts, necessitating the continued presence of peacekeepers in the region for some time to come: the ghosts of Vukovar, Srebrenica, and Racak, among others, still stir the imagination and soul.

The resurrection of violent ethno-religious conflict in the Balkans during the 1990s reflected a global trend that was already underway during the Cold War: the progressive increase in **domestic** *major armed conflicts* as a proportion of total (domestic and foreign) *major armed conflicts* worldwide.[2] According to figures reported by Peter Wallensteen and his associates at Uppsala University (see Table 1.1), not only was the number of domestic much larger than the number of foreign major armed conflicts between 1986 (1 year following Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in the former Soviet Union) and 1991 (the year in which the wars in former Yugoslavia began),

Table 1.1 Domestic as a proportion of total major armed conflicts worldwide, 1986–91[a]

	1986	*1987*	*1988*	*1989*	*1990*	*1991*
DomCon	32	32	33	33	36	33
ForCon	5	7	6	3	2	2
Dom%Tot Conf	86.5	82	84.6	91.7	94.7	94.3

Note
a From *State of World Conflict Report 1991–1992*, pp. 16–18.

but the number of domestic as a proportion of total (domestic and foreign) major armed conflicts basically *increased* during that period as well.

Wallensteen's figures overlap with conclusions reached by Ted Robert Gurr (1993) in his study of 233 minority groups at risk of oppression in 93 countries, for example,

- "Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts between communal groups and states have come to be recognized as the major challenge to domestic and international security in most parts of the world" (p. 314).
- "Every form of ethnopolitical conflict has increased sharply since the 1950s" (p. 316). And
- "Ethnonationalist civil wars are the most protracted deadly conflicts of the late twentieth century" (p. 319).

Overlapping further with, but going beyond the data presented in Table 1.1, Wallensteen and Axell (1993, pp. 332–3) reported that for the period 1989–92

> a total of 82 armed conflicts were recorded . . . 35 [of which] were . . . wars, resulting in at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a single year. . . . *very few of the armed conflicts were "classic" inter-state conflicts*. Only [4 conflicts] pitted two internationally and mutually recognized states against each other [emphasis added].

Regarding the nature of armed conflicts closer to the present time, in a meeting on November 23, 1999, with some 40 United Nations (UN) practitioners and academics at UN headquarters in New York City, Wallensteen reported that

> there were 108 armed conflicts between 1989 and 1998, and . . . there were more conflicts toward the end of the decade. *The number of inter-state conflicts remained low, and most conflicts were found inside states* [emphasis added].
>
> (ACUNS, 2000; also see Wallensteen, 2002, pp. 76–9)

Clearly, despite some improvements in the status of minorities and *reductions* in major armed conflicts worldwide during the period 1989–2004 (see Sollenberg, 1996; Gurr, 2000a,b; Gurr *et al.*, 2000; and Marshall and Gurr, 2003, 2005), ethnic-based violent conflict *within* states seems to be one discernible wave of the postmodern future – among the "low intensity conflicts" that, for Martin van Creveld (1991), have been replacing conventional interstate war as the dominant mode of warfare in the international system (also see Holsti, 1996; Gantzel and Schwinghammer, 1999; Kaldor, 1999; World Bank Institute, 1999).

Among these "new" wars, those involving acts of violence against Muslims in the Balkans have fueled the motivation and justification of some (even outside the region) to attack Western *Civilization* which they have defined as being responsible for the destruction and atrocities committed at Srebrenica, Racak, and elsewhere in former Yugoslavia.

In addition to this potential spillover to terrorism, these *new* wars could (as indicated below) spill over or escalate into "old" wars as well.

Spillover: a typology[3]

Spillover could mean different things to different people, including:

- conflict spreading within a given area;
- conflict spreading between a given area and contiguous areas; or
- conflict spreading anywhere, even far from its origins.

Spillover, then, suggests various kinds of conflict escalation or expansion of *conflict-as-process*; for instance, what I have labeled as (1) *functional spillover*; (2) *external intervention*; and (3) *multiplier-effect systemic contagion*.

Functional spillover

Functional spillover encompasses scapegoating (conscious or otherwise) and *role defense* (see Burton, 1979, p. 73 and ch. 7). It involves finding or "inventing" enemies in order to reintegrate or reunify a group which is collapsing ("failing"), or is likely to collapse in some meaningful sense, so that otherwise threatened elites can remain in power. This is the *functions-of-conflict thesis* of Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956), or *conflict-cohesion hypothesis*, which "has been so widely accepted among social scientists . . . that Dahrendorf (1964, p. 58) has remarked that . . . 'It appears to be a *general law*' " [emphasis added] (Levy, 1989b, p. 261).

"Functional spillover" is, perhaps, the oldest hypothesis (and principle) in the study (and practice) of politics: "when the natives are restless, find an enemy and go to war!" For example, former Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic manipulated for many Serbs the meaning of Kosovo in order to

hold on to power. Kosovo is the "Jerusalem" of the Serbian people, their "holy ground... where [their] most historic and religious monuments are located" (Dragnich and Todorovich, 1984, p. 1). Kosovo is the Serbs' medieval kingdom, the "cradle of their nationhood, when they were virtually its sole occupants... the center of [their] empire of the middle ages, at one time the strongest empire in the Balkans" (ibid.; also see Dragnich, 1992, ch. 9).

On June 28, 1987, Milosevic made a speech in "a field in Kosovo called Kosovo Polje, the Field of Black Birds, on the anniversary of [a major Serb] defeat there" (Rosenberg, 1993, p. 1):

> "They'll never do this to you again," he pledged to the crowd. "Never again will anyone defeat you." ... The defeat on that field took place in 1389.
>
> A year later, the coffin of the defeated Serb commander began a yearlong pilgrimage through every village in Serbia, followed by multitudes of sobbing mourners dressed in black in every town. For many in Serbia, the year 1989 marked not the fall of communism, but the 600th anniversary of the defeat of Knez Lazar at Kosovo Polje.

Serbs did not regain Kosovo until some five centuries later, as one result of the Balkan Wars of 1912. Still, 75 years later, in 1987, some 90 percent of Kosovo's population was comprised of the "Ottoman legacy": nearly 2 million ethnic Albanians, most of whom were *Muslim*. For many Serbs, therefore, nothing had changed in Kosovo in 600 years: the Muslims – and therefore, the "Turks" – were still there, and as the dominant group.

Richard Rose (1971, pp. 354–5) has commented that, in another conflict zone, Northern Ireland, "time past and time present can fuse together in an explosive way... [where] the conclusions drawn... are much the same in one century as in the next." The same clearly applies to the Balkans, where

> for most Serbs, the war in Bosnia [was] simply one more battle in a long struggle that began six centuries ago in a battle on the field of Kosovo in southern Serbia. They [were] driven by a conviction that the war [was] just and that it [would] not end until all Serbs [were] safely united in one state and the territory of Kosovo [was] permanently under Serbian control... [the Bosnian war was] no different from their struggle against the Turks over the centuries.
>
> (Emmert, 1993, p. C1)

For many Serbs, therefore, once the Balkan wars of the 1990s returned to Kosovo – where, arguably, the wars began with Milosevic's abrogation of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 – the resurrected *conflict-as-process* would not cease until a major *conflict-as-startup condition* had been dealt with

(see Sandole, 1999b, pp. 129–31): the return of Kosovo to permanent Serbian rule.

> Over the centuries, the cult of Kosovo evolved to celebrate martyrdom on the one hand but also to demand of all generations of Serbs that they avenge the loss of Kosovo and liberate all Serbs from oppression. During Ottoman rule . . . the Serbs believed that God would protect His people and return them one day from captivity. They also came to believe that there can be no free state without a struggle. Their epic poetry idealized those who sacrifice themselves in order to strike a blow against the oppressor. In the words of the epic: "Whoever is a Serb and of Serbian blood and comes not to fight at Kosovo . . . Let nothing grow from his hand . . . until his name is extinguished forever."
>
> (Emmert, 1993, p. C4)

The implications here for terrorism are great depending on the final resolution of the status of Kosovo, because for Serbs worldwide Kosovo has the status of what Vamik Volkan calls a *chosen trauma*:

> [A]n event that causes a large group of people (i.e., an ethnic group) to feel helpless and victimized by another group and to share a humiliating narcissistic injury. A group does not really elect the loss of shared self-esteem, but it does "choose," consciously as well as unconsciously, to psychologize and mythologize what has occurred. The group draws into its *identity* the mental representation of the "chosen trauma" and passes it along to the next generation along with related feelings of hurt and shame and associated defenses. Each successive generation gets a modified account of the event, but its place in the overall psychology of the group changes very little, and it continues to influence attitudes toward any other group directly or indirectly associated with those responsible for this historic offense. Once a shared trauma is "chosen," its historical truth is no longer important; what matters is its place in the *identity* formation of the victims and their establishment of mental representations of victimizers [emphasis added].
>
> (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1993, p. 129; also see Volkan, 1991, 1992, 1997, ch. 3)

External intervention

A second type of spillover, *external intervention*, can occur because of perceived *shared* ethnicity, race or religion; or on humanitarian grounds.

Intervention on behalf of ethnic kin

Approximately 1 year before Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the Yugoslav federation on June 25, 1991, the US

Institute of Peace (USIP, 1990, p. 26) reported

> Although problems in Romania, Bulgaria, and even…Albania would probably prevent Yugoslavia's neighbors from taking immediate advantage of its slide toward dissolution, it is not impossible that the Balkans will revert to the confusion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries over the next three to five years. Should foreign adventurism become useful to neighboring governments and should the Yugoslavs lose the ability to police [their] borders, a struggle could ensue among Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians and even Greeks over the Southern regions of the Yugoslav state. While the Serbs are focused on problems there, the Romanians could make further trouble by stirring up their brothers in Banat, and the Hungarians could do the same in Voivodina in the North.

According to this scenario, therefore, when Milosevic decided to "ethnically cleanse" Kosovo of its roughly 2 million ethnic Albanians, with the latter fleeing into neighboring Albania and Macedonia (where relations were already tense between Slavic Macedonians and the ethnic-Albanian minority), Albania could have gotten involved, somehow intervening on behalf of its "ethnic kin" in Kosovo and Macedonia.[4]

More importantly, however, Greece, which earlier had imposed economic blockades against Macedonia,[5] could have decided, perhaps together with its "religious kin" the Serbs, to exploit the situation, which could have brought in Bulgaria and even Turkey. With two NATO "allies" involved, but on opposite sides, it would be difficult to imagine how the Russian Federation could have avoided intervening more actively on behalf of its historic allies, fellow Cyrillic Slavs and Orthodox Christians: the Serbs.

This worst-case scenario was not all that far-fetched, especially since Greece and Turkey "went to the brink of war" in January 1996 (IHT, 1996; Lippman, 1996).[6] There could have been another general European war before the twentieth century came to an end.[7] However, gratifyingly, this did not happen during the Kosovo crisis of February 1998–June 1999:

- NATO did conduct an air war against Serbia, bombing even the capital, Belgrade, in response to Serb ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians;
- there *was* spillover into Macedonia and Albania (and elsewhere in the Balkans); and
- Greece was certainly more supportive of the Serbian position than were others in NATO (with Russia an outright advocate for Belgrade), while Turkey was steadfastly supportive of the Kosovar Albanians.

Clearly, the wars in former Yugoslavia posed the most immediate spillover threat for Europe in the post–Cold War period. They were not, however, the only threat to peace and security in the region. In addition to other *intra*national conflicts in Eastern Europe which reflected the "spillover

factor" (e.g., tensions between Slovaks and Hungarians *within* both the Slovak Republic and Hungary affecting relations *between* both states), there were conflicts in the former Soviet Union which dwarfed these and even the wars in former Yugoslavia. For example, prior to a ceasefire which has more or less held since May 1994, the war between ethnic Armenians and Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh (situated in Azerbaijan) had escalated to war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, affecting relations between Turkey and Russia to the extent that some high-level Russians threatened that Turkish intervention on behalf of the Turkic Azeris could actually trigger a *Third World War* (Shapiro, 1992).

Further, tensions between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine had exacerbated, and had been exacerbated by, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine over how to divide up the military assets left over by the collapse of the former Soviet Union (e.g., the Black Sea Fleet): "Beside a war between [these] two great eastern Slav nations, the conflict in Yugoslavia would pale into insignificance" (Bromke, 1993, p. 37).[8]

Whether in former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union or elsewhere in the postmodern world, spillover as intervention on behalf of ethnic kin plays a major role in Samuel Huntington's provocative concept of "clash of civilizations," through what he – borrowing from H.D.S. Greenway – calls the *kin-country syndrome*, or "civilizational rallying" (1993, pp. 35–9; 1996, pp. 272–91):

> In the post–Cold War world, multiple communal conflicts have superseded the single superpower conflict. When these communal conflicts involve groups from different civilizations, they tend to expand and to escalate. As the conflict becomes more intense, each side attempts to rally support from countries and groups belonging to its civilization. Support in one form or another, official or unofficial, overt or covert, material, human, diplomatic, financial, symbolic, or military, is always forthcoming from one or more kin countries or groups. The longer a fault line conflict continues the more kin countries are likely to become involved in supporting, constraining, and mediating roles. *As a result of this "kin-country syndrome," fault line conflicts have a much higher potential for escalation than do intracivilizational conflicts* and usually require intercivilizational cooperation to contain and end them. In contrast to the Cold War, conflict does not flow down from above, it bubbles up from below [emphasis added].
>
> (Huntington, 1996, p. 272)

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Huntington's thesis has appeared more credible to many people on both sides of the Judaic/Christian–Islamic civilizational divide, with, regrettably, a *self-fulfilling* dynamic bringing reality

more in line with it: for some, including Huntington himself (2004), the ultimate trap!

Humanitarian intervention

By November 30, 1994, there were 38,130 troops, 727 police, and 680 observers participating in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) missions in former Yugoslavia – "the largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations" – with military and civilian personnel provided by 37 UN member states (UN, 1995, p. 108).[9] Although this was not a "peacekeeping" mission in the traditional sense – as there was no "negative peace" to keep – it certainly represented further *internationalization* of the Balkan wars, with implications for spillover: there were then forces on the ground whose governments had been historically linked with, as well as supportive of, different warring parties, thereby creating the potential for "taking sides" and in the extreme, even for confrontations between some of the "peacekeepers" themselves.

A never-ending dilemma for third parties is, even though they may not actually take sides, they might still be *perceived* by some of the conflicting parties as if they were. UNPROFOR as a whole encountered this problem. It was criticized by some, including the Bosnian Muslims, for facilitating "ethnic cleansing" operations conducted by the Bosnian Serbs (e.g., by assisting fleeing refugees to evacuate besieged areas); for assisting the Bosnian Serbs in the realization of their military objectives (e.g., by taking up positions which Bosnian Serbs had seized and from which they had withdrawn, thereby allowing them to redeploy elsewhere); and for keeping otherwise doomed residents of besieged villages and cities alive long enough through food and medical aid, only to be killed or otherwise *ethnically cleansed* later on (Chalmers, 1993, p. 437; Posen, 1993, pp. 33–4; Anderson and Binstein, 1994; Rieff, 1994).

A further example of spillover through humanitarian intervention occurred during the Kosovo crisis, when NATO military action during March–June 1999 in response to massive Serb ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians was viewed, not just by Belgrade but by the Russian Federation (as well as by others), as *partisan* and "pro"-Albanian, while Russian actions, including the preemptive arrival of a small Russian military force in Kosovo in June 1999, were viewed by the West as partisan and pro-Serbian.[10]

Multiplier-effect systemic contagion

Multiplier-effect systemic contagion is a third, albeit less direct form of spillover whereby ethno-religious and other conflicts in some parts of the

world exacerbate or stimulate the development of similar conflicts elsewhere. For example, David Gompert (1994, p. 42), a former US National Security Council (NSC) official, warned that, "the crisis, in Bosnia especially, [has set] the worst possible *precedents* for the [post–Cold War] era" (emphasis added). Indeed, the Balkan wars of the 1990s could have been (and may still be) a wave of the future, a *model* for ethnic and other wars *in* – and through *functional* and/or *ethnic kin* spillover, *between* – Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union (especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia).

A connection between ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union had been observed for some time. In March 1988, for example, some 3 years before the collapse of former Yugoslavia, Jackson Diehl (1988, p. A29), reported:

> Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev . . . is due to spend four days traveling through Yugoslavia next week . . . As he flies from Moscow to Belgrade . . . [he] will leave behind bitter ethnic conflicts in Soviet Central Asia and rising nationalism in the western Baltic republics. In Yugoslavia, meanwhile, he will encounter nationalist problems that are *remarkably similar* in their dynamics and origin . . . [emphasis added].

In October 1991, some 4 months after the Yugoslav wars began, during the siege of the Croatian city of Vukovar, Michael Dobbs (1991b, p. A19) observed

> A recent confidential memorandum prepared by the KGB security police and leaked to the Soviet press warned that ethnic clashes and extensive internal migration could lead to the establishment of "national regimes of a populist, semi-fascist type." It added that the *Soviet Union is going down "the same path as Yugoslavia, repeating almost step by step events that happened there a year to 18 months ago*" [emphasis added].

A major reason for such developments in the former Soviet Union was not only the large number of different nations and ethnic groups, but also their distribution throughout the country. According to a 1989 census, there were

> 102 separate nations and ethnic groups [with] More than 65 million [former] Soviet citizens – out of a total population of 287 million – [living] *outside* their titular republics. *Of the 23 inter-republic borders in the former Soviet Union . . . only three [were] not contested. Similar disputes [were] at the heart of Yugoslavia's civil war* [emphasis added].
>
> (Dobbs, 1991a, p. A32)

Hence, Gurr's (1993, p. 322) proposition that, "The immediate potential for escalating ethnopolitical conflict [was] greatest in the Soviet successor states." This applied especially to Russia, with its 16 autonomous republics.

> When former Soviet prime minister Nikolai Ryzkhov paid a visit to the Croatian city of Vukovar [the "Hiroshima of Yugoslavia": a city totally leveled during a 3-month siege in 1991] he was startled by the physical devastation and ethnic hatred left behind by the war. *But what disturbed him most were the parallels between Yugoslavia's descent into violence and the political crisis in Russia.*
>
> "If Russian leaders are unable to find a solution to our political and economic problems [e.g., in Chechnya], the result could be something 100 times worse than what has happened in Yugoslavia. *I do not exclude the possibility of Vukovar happening many times over in Russia*" [emphasis added].
>
> (Dobbs, 1993)

Paralleling the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, therefore, has been the threatened disintegration of the Russian Federation itself, facilitated, in part, by one particular "Vukovar": the war between Moscow and Chechnya, the "self-proclaimed [Muslim] republic . . . landlocked in the Caucasus Mountains," which initially declared its "independence" in November 1991 (Hockstader, 1994):

> [Chechnya was] a headache for [former] Russian President Boris Yeltsin that [would] not go away. Attempting to keep it inside the Russian Federation [promised] nothing but trouble. *But letting it go altogether could encourage dozens of other regions populated by restive nationalities to follow suit by breaking with Moscow.* And Yeltsin . . . made it clear he [would] not tolerate Russia's unraveling [emphasis added].
>
> (also see Dobbs, 1991b; LeVine, 1994; WP, 1994)

In an apparent effort to save the Federation (and his presidency), President Yeltsin launched a military assault on Chechnya on December 11, 1994, which was disastrously counter productive: by July 30, 1995, when "the two sides signed an agreement aimed at ending the killing" (*which subsequently collapsed*), some 30,000 people had been killed, "most of them civilians, Chechen and Russian alike" (Zucchino, 1995, p. A1).

The war continued until August 31, 1996 – "with estimates of the number of dead [then] ranging from 30,000 to 80,000" – when the late General Alexander Lebed, "acting in his brief incarnation as . . . Yeltsin's security chief and special peace envoy to Chechnya," brokered a peace agreement, which deferred until 2001 the question "about whether Chechnya [was] legally still part of Russia" (Hockstader, 1997a; also see Hoffman, 1996).

As the second round of the Russian–Chechen war, which began in 1999, and similar conflicts continue to threaten to pull the Russian Federation apart,[11] it is likely that existing tendencies toward *role defense* and the playing out of the *functions-of-conflict thesis* will be reinforced as guides to action,[12] spurring further calls for a "reconstitution of the former Soviet Union," including by other than "voluntary" means. One ostensible (if not, in some cases, "real") reason offered would be the 27 million or so Russians living in other former Soviet republics as *minorities* – a situation already exploited by ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky who promised "to create a unitary Russian state from the Baltic Sea to the Bering Strait" (Dobbs, 1991b, p. A19).[13]

Complementing the problem of Russian minorities in the "near-abroad" and providing even more arguments for Russian ultranationalists, was that the same situation existed *within* the Russian Federation itself; for example, before the first Russian-Chechen war (1994–6), some 150,000 ethnic Russians lived within Chechnya (whose total population was 1.2 million people) (Hockstader, 1994).

No matter where the potential *Yugoslav model* may be operative or otherwise applicable – *within* Russia or other republics or, through spillover, *between* Russia and other republics or, as seems likely, at all levels within the former Soviet Union – we can appreciate Griffiths' (1993, p. 124)

> well-founded [observation] that a combination of economic, nationalist, ethnic and other social factors might produce some kind of *post–cold war "domino-effect" of conflict and societal collapse from region to region and level to level*. This scenario is most credible in terms of processes in the former Soviet Union [emphasis added].

A "domino effect" of instability and an increased threat of war in post–Cold War Europe, facilitated by *Yugoslav contagion*, is clearly what Egon Bahr had in mind when he warned:

> *What happened in Yugoslavia is a foretaste of what can happen and is already happening elsewhere. . . . Europe will see many Yugoslavias*, with huge numbers of refugees that could throw even countries that are stable today into disorder. Europe simply cannot wait for Eastern Europe to become as stable economically and politically as Western Europe is now. Organizing security in the classic sense must be started immediately [emphasis added].
>
> (NYT, 1993)

Enlargement processes currently underway in both NATO and the EU, with former members of the "Soviet Empire" and others (including *Muslim* Turkey) being offered various types and degrees of association, including full membership, are clear examples of responses to Bahr's gloomy prognostication.

A complex mix of the new and old warfare

In terms of the dominant mode of warfare in the postmodern world, therefore, we seem to have, on the one hand, *inter*state warfare being replaced by *intra*state warfare; but on the other hand, in a manner reflective of *"complexity"* – where everything seems to be connected to everything else (see Waldrop, 1992) – we may also have Westphalian business as usual: *inter*state warfare facilitated by spillover from *intra*state conflict, as John Burton (1984) argued was the case even during the Cold War. Recent examples include the Albanian–Serbian conflict in Kosovo and its implications for a wider Balkan war; for example, in Macedonia. There is also the Russian–Chechen conflict, resurrected into a second war in 1999 with renewed ferocity, multilevel reverberations throughout the former Soviet Union and implications for East-West relations and the *new* terrorism.

We seem to have, therefore, a complex mix of *new* warfare, associated with *identity*-based conflicts at the *intra*state level and *old* (Westphalian) warfare, associated with traditional political/ideological conflicts at the *inter*state level, with the *old* warfare variously conceptualized as (1) *military-security crises* (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997); (2) *enduring [militarized] rivalries* (Diehl and Goertz, 2000); and (3) *militarized [especially territorial] disputes* (Vasquez, 1993, 2000, 2002).

As already indicated, the *new* and the *old* – although in part analytically distinct – are operationally as well as conceptually linked, with the new capable of spilling over to the old warfare through, for instance, *civilizational rallying* (Huntington, 1993, 1996), perhaps exacerbated increasingly by environmental scarcity (see Homer-Dixon, 1999; Renner, 1999a,b). On this theme of linkage, in the closing days of the Clinton administration, "Sandy" Berger (2001, p. 21), national security advisor to President Bill Clinton, argued that a "principle that must guide U.S. foreign policy [in the future] is that *local conflicts can have global consequences*." (And contrariwise, global events can have local consequences.)

A basic problem for the much talked-about (and maligned) international community, however, has been that, while there are some mechanisms for dealing with the old, there are, as indicated earlier, few if any for dealing with the new warfare (see Sandole, 1999b, pp. 150–7).[14] To the extent that there are, they are not *coordinated* among themselves or with those dealing with the old (see Lund, 1996), let alone with mechanisms (if any) for dealing with the new terrorism.

The new warfare and its link with the new terrorism

When many of us think of "Yugoslavs," we think of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks who are racially – even culturally – the same or at least similar, speaking the same language, often in intermarried families. These and other factors (e.g., a fairly high standard of living) made the Balkan Wars of the

1990s difficult to anticipate and when they did occur, difficult to comprehend, plus challenging to respond to in a way that saved lives and prevented genocidal precedent. But for some, especially Muslims elsewhere, the Serb assaults on Bosnian Muslims – which went on for 3 years even in the midst of the United Nations "Protection Force" (UNPROFOR) – was just another, and the most recent, example of the *Crusades*, with Christians once again slaughtering Muslims into extinction.

This was certainly the view of Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi who became a *Mujahadin* in Afghanistan in the 1980s, fighting (with US assistance) the Soviet occupation. After the Gulf War of 1991, when the US-led coalition forced Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, the United States left in excess of 5,000 troops in Saudi Arabia where they remained until after 9/11, with subsequent efforts then underway to redeploy them elsewhere (perhaps eventually to "postwar" Iraq). This fact incensed bin Laden who saw the presence of foreign (especially US) troops in Saudi Arabia, site of the two holiest shrines in Islam – Mecca where The Prophet was born and Medina where The Prophet established the first Islamic state – as a sacrilege assaulting the core of Islam itself.

As with many other Muslims worldwide, including in the United States, bin Laden was also offended by the absence of an evenhanded approach by the United States in its dealings with the Middle East conflict, tending to always side with the Israelis and offer *carte blanche* support to anything they did to Palestinians. Indeed, while Israeli killings of Palestinians with US-supplied F-16 fighter jets, Apache helicopter gunships, and other weapons are seen by the United States as acceptable actions of national self-defense within the context of the Westphalian system of international law, Palestinian violence directed against Israelis, more and more in the form of suicide bombings, is seen by the United States as terrorism.

For these and other reasons, bin Laden and *al Qaeda* launched their *Jihad* on the West, especially the United States, with, among others, an earlier attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, plus subsequent attacks on US military installations in Saudi Arabia, two US embassies in East Africa, and the USS *Cole* in Yemen, culminating in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon of 9/11.

As further justification for his "holy war" against the United States, declared initially in August 1996, Osama bin Laden has used the complicity of the West, particularly the United States, in allowing the slaughter of Bosniak and Albanian Muslims to go on for as long as it did during the Balkan wars of the 1990s (see Dobbs, 2001), even though, paradoxically, it was the United States that led NATO to stop the slaughter in both cases.

What is *new* about 9/11-type terrorism, despite the fact that terrorism has been part of the human condition since antiquity (see Wheeler, 1991; Friedman, 2002)? Terrorists are now, compared to those of the 1970s, willing

to take their own lives in the execution of their acts of violence and to attack human and symbolic targets in the United States itself. With 9/11, there is now much more of a religious basis for acts of terrorism – and some responses to them (see Graham, 2003; Leiby, 2003; Zakaria, 2003) – transforming the heretofore primarily politico-economic North–South conflict into a potential realization of Huntington's *clash of civilizations* (1993, 1996).

With the catastrophic attacks of 9/11, the United States has been targeted almost exclusively as the epicenter of the driving force of globalization, with the World Trade Center symbolizing US economic power and the Pentagon US military power, in each case with global reach.[15]

Further, the 19 young Arab, *Salafi/Wahhabist* males who changed the world forever with box cutters and four hijacked, passenger-filled airliners on 9/11, did so in part by rendering impotent the entire military power of the world's surviving superpower; in effect, demonstrating the inadequacy of *traditional* military/security defenses – including ballistic missile defense systems (had they existed) – for dealing with the new terrorism.

Nevertheless, US President George W. Bush and his administration have been responding to the new terrorism almost exclusively in terms of traditional means, and solely at the level of *symptoms*. This is fine as far as it goes, as it is clearly necessary to protect innocents with appropriate security measures in the short term. Hence, the much needed improvements in airport and airliner security, establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, and "Patriot Act" legislation to enhance efforts to detect and deter terrorists before they can commit their violent acts.

Even the waging of war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan met with the approval of much of the international community because the 19 young men and others like them – waiting in their disaggregated cells in some 60 countries for opportunities to strike (e.g., in Bali on October 12, 2002, Madrid on March 11, 2004, and London on July 7, 2005) – were trained there. As Samuel Huntington (2004) puts it, going to war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan was "certainly justified because that was the base they attacked us from."

But as we now know, it is still possible to board aircraft with box cutters and mock explosives in the United States (see Stout, 2003), the *Patriot Act* legislation for preventing terrorist attacks is viewed by some as leading to an erosion of civil liberties (see AP, 2003; Medish, 2003; Reuters, 2003; Cole, 2004), and despite the success of the US-led military action in Afghanistan, there is a peacekeeping presence – the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – only in the capital Kabul. Tajik, Uzbek and other warlords control other parts of Afghanistan; al Qaeda and the Taliban have reconstituted themselves elsewhere in the country and, as of this writing, NATO's efforts to extend ISAF coverage beyond Kabul have not been successful (Dempsey, 2004c).

In addition, the United States has gone to war in Iraq, eliminating the despotic, deplorable regime of Saddam Hussein in just 3 weeks. Since May 1, 2003, however, when President Bush declared an end to "major military operations," the United States has faced a growing insurgency and terrorist campaign. The upshot of all these actions – none of which have targeted the *deep-rooted causes* of "why they hate us" – has been a worsening of the *war on terror*, as predicted earlier by Generals Wesley Clark and Anthony Zinni (see Milbank, 2002; WP, 2002a). More recently, according to Samuel Huntington (2004)

> the "with us or against us" framing of the war on terror by President George W. Bush has had catastrophic implications.
>
> What is happening now is that all the local wars between Muslims and non-Muslims [in Chechnya, Africa, the Philippines] are being incorporated into a broad clash of civilizations.

Indeed, according to the 2003 survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project

> The [United States] is losing a propaganda war for the hearts and minds of millions of Arabs spurred by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, according to a survey released [on June 3, 2003].
>
> The survey . . . suggests that al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden inspires more confidence than President Bush across much of the Arab and Muslim world. It also shows a further slump in public perceptions of the [United States] over the past year around the globe, with favorable ratings down to as low as 1 percent in Jordan and the Palestinian territories.
>
> "We have gone from bad to worse over the past year," said Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center, noting that hostility toward the [United States] has increased as a result of the invasion of Iraq. "We have been unable to make the case against bin Laden with Muslims because they see the [United States] as a threat".
>
> (Dobbs, 2003; for the Pew 2003 report see <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf>)

According to the authoritative *The Military Balance 2003–2004* issued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London (see Langton, 2003), "War in Iraq has swollen the ranks of al Qaeda and galvanized the Islamic militant group's will" (Chipman, 2003; Graff, 2003). Such observations even predate the revelations of US prisoner abuse coming out of Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Accordingly, whether we are trying to bring positive peace to the Balkans or deal effectively with terrorism, there is a need to address the underlying

causes and conditions of adversarial relationships that give rise to symptoms as well as to deal with the symptoms themselves (see Sandole, 2004b). The paradox is, if all we do is respond to symptoms then we will have a never-ending supply of them to deal with later on; in a counterproductive, self-defeating way that becomes more a part of the problem than of the solution. The paradox is further heightened by the fact that few of us see the role that we ourselves are playing in the self-fulfilling realization of the very problems that we claim to be combating.

The global context

In addition to all else that we have mentioned, the decade of the 1990s was characterized by the Rwandan genocide. During a mere 3 weeks in April 1994, some 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were brutally killed by the Rwandan Presidential Guard and Hutu militias. This atrocity occurred in the presence of Major General Romeo Dallaire, commander of a lightly armed UN force (UNAMIR) to oversee compliance with an earlier accord (the Arusha Peace Agreement) agreed to by the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). General Dallaire virtually begged UN headquarters in New York to upgrade his mandate and deployment to first prevent and then to stop the genocide that he had seen coming and warned about before it occurred (see Dallaire, 2004; Power, 2001, 2002, 2004).[16]

Arguably, Rwanda should never have happened: there was ample early warning, but no early action to prevent or to stop the genocide once it started. Worse, it sent yet another message that the international community, despite the "never again" sentiments expressed in the wake of the Holocaust, was still content to allow unspeakable acts of violence to occur, in Rwanda as well as in Bosnia. Presumably, members of the international community did not want to risk their soldiers being killed with TV images of their bodies being dragged through the streets telecast all over the world, which, in Somalia less than a year earlier, gave rise to the so-called *CNN effect*. Although it is difficult to argue with this sentiment, it could also be argued that this was a direct invitation to those who, for various reasons, were quite prepared to launch acts of catastrophic terrorism against the United States and others.

Bosnia and Rwanda occurred in the shadow of the ending of the Cold War, a period that has become synonymous with the complex coexistence of otherwise diametrically opposed forces, or what James Rosenau has referred to as *fragmegrative dynamics*; that is, the simultaneous presence of forces making for integration *as well as* for disintegration (see Rosenau, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1997). Integration is clearly obvious in NATO- and EU-expansion and in general, *globalization*; while disintegration is conspicuously manifest in the *identity*-based, ethno-religious conflicts that have occurred in parts of Europe, Africa, and elsewhere during the last decade of

the twentieth century, with a significant likelihood of continuing into the twenty-first century.

In some cases, integration and disintegration may be causally linked, such that increasing integration (e.g., the *perceived* "Americanization" of the global economy) may stimulate increasing disintegration (e.g., terrorist acts conducted against American persons and symbols, such as the events of 9/11); which may, perhaps paradoxically, lead to increasing integration (e.g., the initial post–9/11, US-led global coalition against terrorism), *ad infinitum*.

With the 9/11 terrorist attacks, these competing pressures have become more intense, with great risk of global destabilization. US President George W. Bush has declared to the world that "You are either with us or the terrorists"; he has identified the "Axis of Evil" (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea); he has (with others) invaded and occupied two Muslim countries (Afghanistan and Iraq); and in the process has undermined the Atlantic Alliance and called into question the entirety of the UN system. Finally, one member of the *Axis of Evil*, North Korea, has threatened the United States with nuclear war.

We have entered the *postmodern world*, regrettably, without the benefit of a leisurely transition. While the ultimate destination may be unclear, what is clear is that the Westphalian system of interstate relations and international law that has prevailed since the end of the barbaric Thirty Years War of 1618–48, is under assault.

As if to confirm the dire predictions of Martin van Creveld (1991) and Robert D. Kaplan (1994), the new terrorism – whose perpetrators are not deterred by traditional *Realpolitik* threats – is designed to enhance disorder: unpredictability, instability, and therefore, insecurity. In such a turbulent conflict environment, anything is possible given the availability of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – especially on the international black market (see Warrick, 2003a,b; Hirsh and Schafer, 2004) – the widely dispersed ability to construct them, and the means for their delivery.

Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) may have unwittingly launched a basis for the *self-fulfilling* realization of the *clash of civilizations* where, reminiscent of Kenneth Waltz's (1964) argument in favor of the simplicity and predictability of the bipolar international system of the Cold War, the rapidly emerging new post–Cold War "civilizational bipolarity" may be neater than, and therefore preferable to, a "messy" multipolar system, but also more dangerous.

After a decade in which genocide has returned to Europe and Africa, we are now in the bizarre situation where the entirety of *civilization* can be paralyzed – and US presidential elections influenced – by random videotapes shown by *al Jazeera* of Osama bin Laden making various pronouncements or walking leisurely in the serenity of no-man's-land along the Afghan–Pakistani frontier.

Conclusion

This volume focuses on how the international community can better deal with the disintegrative, identity-based (ethno-religious) conflicts and possibly related acts of terrorism that have come to characterize the postmodern era. The initial focus is on Europe, where recent wars in the Balkans have assaulted sensibilities worldwide with graphic images of horrific atrocities, massive physical devastation, and internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing for their lives.

The bodies of Kosovar Albanian men, women, and children have been dug up on the outskirts of Belgrade (see Gall, 2001; Smith, 2001), plus bodies from among 8,000–10,000 missing Muslim boys and men are still being unearthed around Srebrenica (see IHT, 2003): all vivid reminders – *symptoms* – that conflict can still escalate to the barbarism of the Thirty Years War of nearly four centuries ago.

With the catastrophic events, grim images and narratives of September 11, 2001 – plus, among others, October 12, 2002 (Bali), March 11, 2004 (Madrid), and July 7, 2005 (London) – the focus of this volume has been broadened to include the new terrorism on the assumption that such acts are related conceptually and/or causally to what has taken place in the Balkans and elsewhere.

This opening chapter ends on a note of urgency to respond further to the conflict-prevention/transformation mechanism deficiency implicit in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's comment that, "Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232). Our first order of priority, therefore, is to explore how to transform what Anatol Rapoport (1974, p. 175) calls "exogenous" (*mechanism-deficient*) into "endogenous" (*mechanism-rich*) conflict-prevention/transformation environments.

By creating, implementing, operating, monitoring, and, given evaluative feedback, continuously adjusting *peacebuilding* mechanisms to complement existing *preventive diplomacy, peacemaking* and *peacekeeping* mechanisms (see Boutros-Ghali, 1992), the traditional "steps-to-war" (and terrorism) may be, if not actually replaced, at least significantly complemented by the "steps-to-peace" (see Vasquez, 1993; Raymond, 2000).

We turn now to the study reported in this volume, which includes analyses of interviews with senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators at four points in time over an 11-year period – 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2004 – to elicit their views on how to design peace and security in post–Cold War Europe relevant to preventing "future Yugoslavias." In turn, the prevention of Yugoslav-type conflicts could result in undermining the efforts of those who would manipulate such conflicts into *casus belli* for acts of catastrophic terrorism directed against those held responsible (rightly or wrongly) for allowing such conflicts to occur in the first place and/or to last as long as they do.

Plan of the book

In Chapter 2, we lay out a conceptual basis – the *3 pillar framework* (3PF) – for understanding violent postmodern conflicts in Europe and elsewhere. We then use that framework to develop, in Chapter 3, a system for responding to the new warfare and the new terrorism: the *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS). In Chapter 4, we articulate "research designs" for the surveys conducted at the first three points in time (1993, 1997, and 1999) to elicit CSCE/OSCE negotiators' views on select security issues.

Chapters 5–8 deal with negotiators' perceptions of those security issues *prior to* 9/11. Specifically, in Chapter 5, we examine negotiators' views elicited in 1993, 1997, and 1999 on a variety of those issues (based upon their responses to *closed-ended* statements).

In Chapters 6–8, we examine negotiators' perceptions (based upon their responses to *open-ended* questions) elicited in 1993, 1997, and 1999, of

- the *causes* of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s (Chapter 6);
- *"lessons learned"* from those wars (Chapter 7); and
- peace and security *architecture* reflective of those lessons that could be developed to deal more effectively with the new warfare in post–Cold War Europe (Chapter 8).

In Chapter 9, we revisit negotiators' views on these issues (based upon their responses to closed-ended statements and open-ended questions in 2004), plus examine, for the first time in this project, their views on global terrorism *after* 9/11.

Finally, in Chapter 10, we discuss the implications of the overall study for *theory*, *research*, and *practice* with regard to dealing more effectively with violence in Europe and elsewhere in the postmodern world.

Chapter 2

A framework for analyzing violent postmodern conflict[1]

Introduction

In this chapter we present a framework for analyzing postmodern conflicts as a basis for better understanding and more effectively dealing with them.

Before proceeding, let's say a few words about our general subject matter, *conflict*. Conflict is a process characterized by origins, escalation, controlled maintenance, de-escalation, and some kind of termination. During its "lifetime," any particular conflict may or may not go through all of these stages and, indeed, may move in both directions at different points in time (e.g., a conflict may escalate after having de-escalated for a while).

As a process, conflict may be latent: not yet clear to the potential parties, but on its way to becoming at least a *manifest conflict process* (MCP). An MCP is a situation characterized by at least two parties pursuing their *perceptions* of mutually incompatible goals by *undermining* each other's goal-seeking capability. (Here we must stress what must be a truism to many in the conflict-resolution field, that it is *perceptions* and not "objective realities" that drive conflicts.)

As an MCP, conflict is not necessarily "bad," something to be prevented or avoided. It may be an "early warning" signal that something has gone wrong in an otherwise important relationship. What we *are* interested in preventing, however, is either a latent conflict or an MCP escalating to an *aggressive manifest conflict process* (AMCP), where the parties pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by:

1. Damaging and/or destroying high-value cultural and other symbols of one another (e.g., mosques, churches, synagogues, national libraries, museums; the World Trade Center). And/or
2. Injuring and/or destroying one another (e.g., as in Rwanda in April 1994 or, presently, the Darfur region in western Sudan).[2]

The likely consequences of parties to MCPs seeking to undermine each other's goal-seeking capabilities are clearly indicated by the following situation in game theory ("mathematical decision-making theory").

Table 2.1 A "mixed motive game"

		Party II	
		C	*D*
Party I	*C*	+5, +5	−10, +10
	D	+10, −10	−5, −5

The situation features two "players" (I and II), each of whom can do one of two things: Cooperate with each other (C) or Defect from a cooperative solution (D). From a "conflict resolution point of view," the obvious choice would be CC (Cooperate–Cooperate), which would result in both parties "winning" (+5,+5). But for reasons known only to psychologists, psychiatrists, philosophers, and theologians, among others, many parties to conflicts tend to pursue the "zero-sum" option (+10, −10/−10,+10), attempting to gain at the expense of their opponent. The problem is, when both parties do this, they both lose (−5, −5).

Of course, we are talking here about the "Prisoners' Dilemma" where, according to one American cultural scenario, two young men are picked up by the police on suspicion of having committed a violent crime. They are taken to police headquarters and interviewed separately, unable to communicate with each other. During their interrogations, each "prisoner" is presented with the following proposition: "confess and you go free; alternatively, we convict you on a lesser charge."

Here is the prisoners' *dilemma*: It would clearly be in the two men's best interests (assuming, of course, that they *are* guilty) to remain silent about the crime and then receive a less severe sentence (e.g., for manslaughter instead of homicide). However, since they cannot communicate with each other to *coordinate* making the obvious "collectively rational" choice (+5,+5), each aims for "individual rationality" and self-interest (+10, −10/−10,+10): each concludes that he would be better off by confessing, no matter what his partner does. And of course, in the scenario both men do confess and, therefore, both "lose" (−5, −5).

Underlying and reinforcing the tendency to pursue the zero-sum/"win–lose" option is the oldest, most pervasive political paradigm in all of human history – a philosophy associated with Mencius of ancient China, Kautilya of ancient India, Machiavelli of Renaissance Italy (see Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001, pp. 8–9), and most recently, U.S. President George W. Bush and his foreign policy team pursuing preemptive war against potential and actual enemies in the "global war on terror" (GWOT).

Thucydides, a Greek historian of antiquity, reveals the core element of this paradigm, best known by its identification in German as *Realpolitik*

(or "political realism"). In his classic *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides tells us about an event that took place in the middle of the 30-year Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431–404 BC). In 416 BC, Athens attempted to fill a power vacuum created by the withdrawal of Lacedaemonia (Sparta) from the island state of Melos. Athens sent emissaries to present a compelling case to the Melians that they should forfeit their newfound freedom and self-determination for the "security" of Athenian hegemony and control. The Athenians presented the Melians with generous terms and logical arguments, but, in the end, were unpersuasive. The Melians persisted in their rejection of the Athenian offer and as a result, the Athenians killed all the Melian men, sold the women and children into slavery, and populated the island with Athenians.

Early in the Athenian–Melian debate, we read the Athenian words that still echo and underlie *Realpolitik* up to the present day: "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides, 1951, p. 331). These words will surely resonate with, among others, the survivors of Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vukovar, Srebrenica, Jenin, Rafah, Jabaliya and inmates of Abu Ghraib and Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay.

A major working hypothesis of this study is that, for behavior to lead to sustainable, positive outcomes, it must be *moral/ethical* (where actors do the "right thing") *as well as rational* (where actors do the "practical thing"). Regrettably, *Realpolitik*-based, zero-sum/win–lose actions are practical and rational only in the narrow sense of advancing one's own interests (+10) at the expense of one's opponent (−10). Such actions are at least amoral, if not totally immoral and unethical.

In his classic treatise on *Realpolitik*, Hans Morgenthau (1973, pp. 10–11) maintained that traditional notions of *individual* morality should play no role in decisions dealing with the advancement, protection and projection of *national* interests. The reason for Morgenthau was clear:

> There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side and that what one wills himself cannot fail to be willed by God also....
>
> The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible...That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment which, in the blindness of *crusading frenzy*, destroys nations and *civilizations* – in the name of moral principle, ideal, *or God himself* [emphasis added].
>
> (Ibid., p. 11)

Professor Morgenthau was obviously ahead of his time and prescient as well. Regrettably, since 9/11, his prescription for a prudent, "rational"

Realpolitik amorality has been overtaken by an emotionally charged *Realpolitik immorality* on both sides of the rapidly developing, self-fulfilling "clash of civilizations" (see Sandole, 2005).

The nearly universal tendency to advance one's interests at the expense of others can lead to a *morality/rationality disconnect*; for example, the collective negative implications of the United States opting out of the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court (ICC). Such is the stuff of the *security dilemma* (Herz, 1950, 1959), where national decision makers pursue their *own* interests by paradoxically engaging in counterproductive, self-defeating behaviors (Burton, 1972). Hence, John Vasquez's (1993) observation that the use of *Realpolitik* measures to preclude war can actually make war more, rather than less, likely.

One particular worst-case scenario may develop as part of the security dilemma: when decision makers persist in pursuing the zero-sum option (+10, −10/−10,+10), often winding up, like the Israelis and Palestinians, by being worse off than they were before the onset of the Second *Intifada* (−5, −5); they might, given the availability of WMD, bring about a structural transformation of their "game" from Prisoners' Dilemma to "Chicken."

In the film, *Rebel without a Cause*, featuring James Dean and Natalie Wood (Warner Brothers, 1955), Wood falls in love with Dean, frustrating her boyfriend "Buzz" (Corey Allen) who sets out to punish Dean for his complicity in this act of *disrespect* by capturing him and forcing him into a deadly duel. Two stolen cars facing a cliff are revved up, with Dean in one and Buzz in the other. When the referee yells "go," both cars are meant to speed toward the cliff. The objective? To determine which of the two young men will jump out first (the *chicken*) before the cars plunge over the cliff.

In contrast to the Prisoners' Dilemma, which represents a clash between *collective rationality* (+5,+5) and *individual rationality* (self-interest) (+10, −10/−10,+10), Chicken represents a clash between *prestige* (the warrior/hero) and *survival* (the chicken). It is noteworthy that, in Chicken, prestige is rated higher than survival: the ultimate irrationality of a *Realpolitik*-only approach to pursuing, achieving, and maintaining individual interests at the expense of others.

Chicken also captures the irrationality of the nuclear arms race of the Cold War; the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan; and the developing, self-fulfilling *clash of civilizations* between the West and Muslims worldwide.

Once parties to a conflict enter the parameters of the Game of Chicken, they are in what Lewis F. Richardson (1939, 1960a) has called a "runaway arms race," where "men do not stop to think." Alternatively, as I have argued, they – *men* in particular – *do* stop to think, but only in terms of *Realpolitik*, where they believe that they are better off advancing their own interests (+10) at the expense of others (−10), no matter what others might do.

Once embedded in such a seemingly deterministic process, the parties' *emotional* (*affective*) brains will likely overwhelm and overtake their *thinking*

(*cognitive*) brains – where emotions are mobilized to defend highly valued beliefs that are under threat or attack – so that "feeling is believing" instead of "seeing is believing" (Maclean, 1975, 1978).

When the emotional brain controls the thinking brain – what Paul Maclean (ibid.) calls a "schizophysiology" – at least two consequences result:

1 Actors tend to *overperceive* the threats and attacks being directed at them by their opponent[s]. And worse
2 Actors tend to *overreact* to each other (Zinnes *et al.*, 1961; Holsti *et al.*, 1968).

Clearly, in the midst of runaway conflict escalation, the parties themselves may not be able to "stop" and may, therefore, require the assistance of one or more experienced third parties. One 3rd party, appropriately trained, could endeavor to stop the *symptoms of violence*, and another could attempt to work on the *fractured relationships* that have led to the violence by addressing, with still other third party actors, the often *deep-rooted, underlying causes and conditions* of the fractured relationships.

At this point in our discussion, it would be useful to mention the concept of "community policing," where the police work together with social welfare agencies (see Trojanowicz *et al.*, 1994, 1998). For example, when spouses are involved in domestic violence, as when a husband has physically assaulted his wife, the police can forcefully separate the couple. Subsequently, the abusive husband can be arrested and upon his release from jail, given a restraining order by a judge to leave his wife alone. Meanwhile, once the symptoms of violence have been terminated, or at least suppressed, the social welfare agencies, including domestic abuse therapists and conflict-resolution professionals, can begin to work on the relationship between the battering husband and battered wife by addressing the underlying causes and conditions of the problem.

This same two-pronged approach has been attempted in violent conflicts at other levels. For example, in the genocidal warfare that characterized former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, NATO "stopped" the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. Further, through SFOR peace enforcers in Bosnia and KFOR peace enforcers in Kosovo, NATO has forcefully kept violence from significantly resurfacing.[3] Meanwhile, other members of the international community – the UN, OSCE, EU, Council of Europe and various NGOs – have been working with the parties on their troubled relationships and underlying causes and conditions that have given rise to the violence.

Thus far in former Yugoslavia, however, treating the symptoms has been much easier and much more successful than dealing with the relationships and their underlying causes and conditions.

In order for third parties performing different tasks over time to work effectively in *coordinated* fashion, they need a plan of action and strategy for implementation preceded by sound analysis of the conflict they are likely dealing with.

A comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution

Such an analysis and corresponding intervention can be facilitated by use of the *three-pillar framework* (3PF) that I have designed for analyzing and resolving conflicts at any level (see Sandole, 1998a,b). The 3PF locates the characteristics of any particular conflict under *pillar 1*; the causes and conditions of the conflict under *pillar 2*; and elements of conflict intervention design and implementation, under *pillar 3*. The underlying working hypothesis here is that we must understand the conflict itself in terms of its significant elements (pillar 1) and underlying causes and conditions (pillar 2) before we can design and implement an effective intervention into it (pillar 3). The 3PF is represented schematically in Table 2.2.

Pillar 1: elements of conflict

Pillar 1 of the 3 pillar framework – the elements of *conflict* (latent, MCP, AMCP) – comprises the phenomena that concerned members of the international community, including the OSCE, would want to monitor,

Table 2.2 A comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution: a three pillar approach

Pillar 2	*Pillar 1*	*Pillar 3*
Conflict Causes and Conditions	***Conflict [Latent (Pre-MCP) MCP/AMCP]***	***Conflict Intervention 3rd-Party Objectives [Violent]***
Individual level	Parties	Conflict *Prevention*
Societal level	Issues	Conflict *Management*
Int'l level	Objectives	Conflict *Settlement*
Global/Ecological Level	Means	Conflict *Resolution*
	Conflict handling orientations	Conflict *Transformation*
	Conflict environment	[Conflict *Provention*]
		3rd-Party Approaches
		Confrontational and/or collaborative processes
		Negative and/or positive peace orientations
		Track 1 and/or Multitrack actors and processes

understand and predict as a basis for taking effective action with regard to any conflict situation. Here, a policy analyst would want to distinguish between parties, issues, objectives, means, preferred conflict-handling orientations, and the conflict environments within which conflicts are occurring.

Parties

Under *parties*, an analyst would want to determine whether he or she was dealing with individuals, groups, organizations, societies, states, and/or regions. More specifically, as indicated in Table 2.3, the analyst would want to determine whether she or he was dealing with personal, family, labor-management, environmental, identity (ethnic, racial, religious, class, gender), and/or international/"civilizational" conflicts.

While these types of conflict are analytically distinct, they may overlap operationally. For example, individuals are involved at all levels as decision makers (see Burton, 1984; North, 1990). Groups can be fairly small, such as the family. They can be large, such as ethnic, racial, and religious *identity* groups (see Burton, 1990, 1997). They can also be *civilizational*, as in the *clash of civilizations* hypothesized by Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) to be a major conflict trend of the post–Cold War era. And organizations can be local, national, regional or international, as well as governmental or nongovernmental.

Table 2.3 A party typology of conflict

Types of conflict	*Levels of conflict*	*Units*
Personal	Intrapsychic Interpersonal	 Individuals
Family	Interpersonal [intragroup] Intergroup	Individuals Groups
Labor-management	Interorganizational	Organizations
Environmental	Group-organizational/Interorganizational [intrasocietal/intrastate] Intersocietal/intra- and interstate	 Groups Organizations Societies States
Identity [ethnic, religious, racial, class, gender]	Intergroup/interorganizational [intrasocietal/intersocietal] Intra-/interstate	 Groups Organizations Societies
International/"Civilizational"	Interstate/Transnational	States Civilizations

Another useful distinction under parties is between *intrapsychic* and *inter-actor* conflicts. In many cases, such as those involving the genocidal ethnic cleansing associated with the Balkan wars of the 1990s, a potential third party (pillar 3) may first have to deal with *chosen traumas* (see Volkan, 1991, 1997) at the intrapsychic level (pillar 2). For example, the fall of Kosovo on June 28, 1389 to the Ottoman Turks and its impact on the identities of Serbs and their perceptions of Turks and Muslims in general, may first have to be addressed as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for dealing with later conflicts at the inter-actor level between Serbs and Albanian or Bosnian Muslims (pillar 1) (see Sandole, 1987, p. 296; Sandole, 2002b, 2003b; Parkinson, 1977, pp. 202–3).

Here it is useful to mention Kenneth Boulding's (1956, 1959) typology of cognitive, evaluative, and affective images. The *cognitive* level refers to beliefs; the *evaluative* to the values we assign to beliefs; and the *affective* to the emotional energy mobilized to defend highly valued beliefs under threat or attack. Of related value is Paul MacLean's *triune theory of the brain* (1975, 1978) which hypothesizes that the *reptilian, limbic*, and *neocortical* parts of the brain may all respond to the same stimulus but, like different paradigms (see Kuhn, 1970) or Boulding's (1956) images, in different ways.

For example, a man may have been abused by his parents at a preverbal stage of life and, therefore, may have a lot of repressed emotional energy from his traumatic childhood. He may also spend the greater part of his life, with or without therapeutic assistance, trying to "attribute" the right meaning (cognition) to the affect. Under the stress of escalating conflict, in MacLean's system, the man's limbic system may come to overwhelm and dominate his neocortical brain, producing what we referred to earlier as a *schizophysiology*, where, again, *feeling [affect] is believing [cognition]* instead of the more traditional, *seeing [cognition] is believing [cognition]*. Similarly, in Boulding's system, the man's affective image has come to overwhelm and dominate his cognitive image.

When there is such a gap between the affective and cognitive interpretations of the same event, the challenge for a prospective third party, acting on the basis of a three pillar analysis, is to assist the individuals concerned to achieve *consonance* between the two so that the cognitive is an accurate reflection of the affective experience. Otherwise, the individual may spend the greater part of his life engaging in inter-actor conflicts through spillover (*transference*) from the intrapsychic level, displacing feelings originally aroused by a situation earlier in his life onto individuals in later situations which may be similar, as part of his effort to make sense of, and perhaps eliminate "acute personal distress."

Leon Festinger's (1962) creative concept of *cognitive dissonance* captures the experience of such acutely uncomfortable feelings. Cognitive dissonance can be viewed, therefore, as the breakdown between cognitive and affective images where, for example, highly valued needs for *predictability*, *regularity*, and *stability* (the "PRS needs") may have been violated (see Sandole, 1984, 1987).

The less an actor's expectations are fulfilled, the less *predictability* she or he experiences; the less predictability, the less *regularity*; and the less regularity, the less *stability* (and overall emotional security).

The PRS needs – a subset of Maslow's (1987) *safety and security* needs – are deeply rooted, possessing the status of what Kenneth Boulding (1962) calls *inner-core values* (in contrast to the more negotiable *outer-shell values*). This leads to yet another, but overlapping, distinction by Burton (1990, pp. 2–3) between *conflicts*, which are about nonnegotiable (inner-core) values, and *disputes*, which concern negotiable (outer-shell) values.

If an event in an actor's environment precipitates affect (dissonance) even at the otherwise unimportant cognitive level of playing cards whose colors and signs have been reversed – as in the well-known Bruner–Postman experiments (1949; Kuhn, 1970, pp. 62–4) – the PRS needs for predictability, regularity, and stability may have been violated, causing feelings of acute discomfort that will remain palpable until an appropriate cognitive interpretation can be put on the sensation. Hence, the occasional need for *paradigm shifts* to account for *anomalies* – significant breakdowns in paradigm-based expectations (see Kuhn, 1970) – and to achieve cognitive–affective balance.

Examples of intrapsychic conflict, which may or may not spillover to the inter-actor level, include role-set conflict and multiple-position conflict. *Role-set* conflict deals with two conflicting parts of the same role, for example, the wife vs. mother components of the married woman role, where a married woman finds that the more she tries to perform her role as a mother, the more she does so at the *zero-sum* expense of her spousal role, and vice versa. *Multiple-position* conflict, on the other hand, refers to conflict between two or more different roles, for example, married woman vs. working woman (see Thompson and Van Houten, 1970, pp. 143–4).

Multiple-position conflict may also apply to a member of a third party team intervening in, for instance, the protracted conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. In this case, she or he may be a Palestinian or an Israeli concerned for the safety and rights of her or his "own" people (+10, −10/−10,+10) *as well as* a specialist in conflict resolution intent on helping the parties reach fair, durable outcomes (+5, +5).

There are also *motivational* conflicts which, due to conflicting pressures, tend to lead to decision-making impasses. The most benign of these is the *approach–approach* conflict between two equally attractive options. Probably the most painful type of motivational conflict is the *avoidance–avoidance* conflict between two equally unattractive options; for instance, the Holocaust-era nightmare faced by the Jewish mother in "Sophie's Choice" between giving up one or both of her children to certain death (see Styron, 1979).

There are more "complex" motivational conflicts, such as the *approach–avoidance* conflict between equally compelling negative and positive elements of a given option. Even more challenging is the *double approach–avoidance* conflict between two options, each of which is characterized by equally weighted negative and positive elements (see Brown, 1957). Having to

choose between two "roadmaps to peace," each associated with different costs and benefits, would fall into this category.

At the intra-actor level, a distinction has traditionally been made between *balanced (symmetrical)* and *unbalanced (asymmetrical)* conflicts. Here the key question for interveners is whether the parties are the same (balanced or symmetrical) or different (unbalanced or asymmetrical) in terms of access to resources (see Curle, 1971, pp. 5–8). If, as is often the case, one party has the upper hand, a potential third party adhering to a strict notion of *neutrality* may experience a decision-making quandary. If he facilitates the parties arriving at an agreement that leaves intact the original *inequitable* relationship that helped bring about the conflict in the first place, then the agreement may not be a durable one. If, on the other hand, the third party steps temporarily outside the neutral role to help empower the originally disempowered party (e.g., by providing a workshop in negotiation skills for residents of a contaminated area in an environmental conflict), perhaps initially compromising his neutrality in the eyes of the originally more powerful party (e.g., the chemical company suspected of the contamination), he may nevertheless, over time, help the parties to reach a durable agreement.

Hence, strict neutrality, which leaves in place *structural violence* (Galtung, 1969, 1996), may be a less important norm for a third party than working within an overarching, flexible framework focusing on achieving and maintaining durable solutions. If conflicts are indeed complex, as I have argued elsewhere (see Sandole, 1999b), then efforts to deal with them must capture that complexity.

The various units and levels of analysis listed in Table 2.3, and the possibility that conflicts can spill over from one level to another are a useful reminder that analysts and interveners should be clear about what units and levels they are focusing on at any point in time. Otherwise, they may inadvertently *drift* across units and levels (see Singer, 1961, p. 78). This includes generalizing inappropriately from macro- to microlevels (*ecological fallacies*); for example, generalizing from data collected at the regional level in the United States on a particular relationship (e.g., between literacy and United States or foreign place of birth), to the same relationship for *all* individual Americans (see Robinson, 1950). The reverse, generalizing inappropriately from micro- to macrolevels (*individualistic fallacies*), such as from observations about some Muslims to statements about the entire Islamic world, seems to be what occurs in the development of stereotypes. In any case, apart from appropriate cases of generalization, one must be careful not to start out addressing actors at one level and then end up drawing fallacious conclusions about the same or other actors at other levels (see Frankfort–Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 54–5).

Issues

There are many categories of *issues*: the reasons why parties wage conflict with one another. Conflicts may be, for instance, *structural* or *nonstructural*

(Moore, 1986, p. 27). If structural, conflicts are about change in, or maintenance of existing political, economic, social, or other systems. Nonstructural conflicts, on the other hand, are about means to ends *within* existing systems; for instance, enhancing the rights of minorities in order to conform to an existing political contract.

Realistic issues are "really" about something, such as territory (see Vasquez, 1993), in contrast to *nonrealistic* issues which are "merely" the man-ifestation of a need to let off emotional steam (see Coser, 1956, pp. 48–55). However, this distinction, although analytically useful, may be irrelevant in reality: due to transference of responses associated with earlier conflicts, the need for emotional release (*catharsis*) may translate into a realistic conflict. In such a case, a potential third party may have to deal first with the earlier conflict and the associated unresolved need to release repressed emotional energy, as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of dealing with the more recent conflict (see Sandole, 2002b, 2003b). This further highlights the importance of the intrapsychic level and the necessity of bringing the affective (limbic) and cognitive (neocortical) definitions of the situation into a harmonious relationship – one of many challenges facing the third party.

Issues may also be *displaced*, in which case the right parties may be involved, but they are dealing with the wrong issues (see Deutsch, 1973, pp. 13–14). For example, the passion may have gone out of a relationship between a husband and wife, but rather than deal with the threatening dissonance in what both still view as a valued relationship, they might argue about other, "safer" issues; for example, what to do on their vacations or what to watch on television. The "real" problem, therefore, remains unresolved, always ready to reemerge.

Further, issues may reflect *misattributed* conflicts (ibid.), where, for instance, political leaders – consciously or otherwise reflecting the propositions of Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) – may even go so far as to invent enemies if none already exist in order to project/displace conflicts (affect) within the ingroup onto some outgroup as a way to stave off internal dissent and remain in power. This is what Burton (1979) calls *role defense* and what we discussed in Chapter 1 as *functional spillover*. For example, former Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic manipulated the "legacy of Kosovo" for many Serbs in the late 1980s – culminating in the genocidal ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo during 1998–9 – as a way to hold on to power when, during and after the ending of the Cold War, other communist leaders were collapsing all around him.

Objectives

Parties wage conflict over certain issues, often dealing with physical territory or psychological "turf," in order to achieve certain objectives, such as maintaining or changing a certain state of affairs (see Lerche and Said,

1970, pp. 147–50). For example, if the husband and wife referred to above start to directly face their real conflict, the wife may want to terminate the marriage (structural/status-quo-changing) while the husband may want to hold on to it (status-quo-maintaining). The question here, of course, is how should a third party deal with a "conflict" between two apparently irreconcilable opposites? This has become a major challenge for third parties attempting to deal with a defining characteristic of postmodern conflicts: clashes between the contradictory preferences within existing states for self-determination on the part of status-quo-*changing* minorities and for territorial integrity on the part of status-quo-*maintaining* majorities (see Mikeladze, 2000).

Means

Parties wage conflicts over certain issues to achieve certain goals by employing violent and/or nonviolent *means*. Anatol Rapoport's classic *Fights, Games, and Debates* (1960), is suggestive of a useful typology here. In *fights*, the parties view each other as enemies and attempt to destroy each other (AMCPs). In *games*, the parties view each other as opponents and attempt to outwit each other (MCPs). And in *debates*, the parties view each other as opponents and attempt to convince each other (and/or some neutral third party) of the validity of their position (MCPs). If an intermediary were influenced by *contingency theory* (see Fisher, 1997, ch. 8; Fisher and Keashly, 1991) and concluded that a conflict was at the level of an AMCP, his or her first priority would be to extinguish the fire and then to transform the "fight" into a "debate."

While many in the diplomatic, military and other fields talk about conflict *prevention*, in the field of conflict resolution we do not set out to prevent conflict as such. As mentioned earlier, conflict in the form of an MCP may be an early warning sign that something has gone wrong in an otherwise important relationship (e.g., in a marriage or interstate alliance), and this should be addressed. Conflict in this "functional" sense would not be a bad thing. Instead, we seek to prevent MCPs (debates, games) from escalating into AMCPs (fights), because then conflicts would become more costly and difficult to deal with. We are, therefore, concerned with *violent* conflict prevention (see pillar 3 discussion later).

Preferred conflict-handling orientations

While parties may, at any point in time, be characterized by certain means in the waging of their conflicts (*violent* fights or *nonviolent* games and debates), they may, nevertheless, prefer other options. Extending Deutsch's (1973) competitive–cooperative gradient with regard to *conflict handling*, parties may be characterized by a preference for *avoidance, accommodation, confrontation, compromise*, and/or *collaboration* (see Thomas, 1975).

Implicit here are the parties' underlying worldviews, philosophies, views of human nature, as well as what they would prefer to be doing in certain conflict situations, despite what they are actually doing.

Parties who are fundamentally confrontational may have a *Realpolitik* approach to life: a dim, Hobbesian view of the human condition and a Machiavellian philosophy that says, "anything goes" (+10, −10/ −10, +10). Cooperative parties, on the other hand, may have an *Idealpolitik* approach: a sanguine view of human nature and a philosophy that seeks to advance social justice for all concerned (+5, +5) (see Sandole, 1993a, 1999b, ch. 6). The value of such knowledge for the third party is that, although he may initially find that a conflict is at the AMCP level, he may also determine that the parties are fundamentally cooperative in their *preferred* orientations to conflict handling, which could make his task of helping to transform the AMCP (fight) into an MCP (debate) considerably easier.

Depending on one's culture, religion, and/or idiosyncratic personality, one may be a conflict *avoider* where anything approaching an MCP, not to mention an AMCP, generates too much negative energy which one cannot "see," but which one can certainly feel and be stressed, oppressed, and virtually paralyzed by.

If denial does not succeed in concealing this condition, then one may aim for conflict *accommodation* where one effectively surrenders his or her decision-making autonomy to the opponent. For instance, the husband in a divorce battle may offer his estranged wife *everything* – the children, house, etc. – to avoid remaining in their "negative force field" any longer than he has to.

When accommodation does not succeed and the person benefiting at the accommodator's expense (+10, −10) comes back for more, just like in some cases of blackmail, the accommodator may explode with rage into the *confrontational* mode where an AMCP or *fight* is in full bloom.

If a "hurting stalemate" (Zartman, 1989) then occurs, recognized as such by the parties on their own or with the assistance of a third party, they may attempt to achieve a *compromise*, which lies somewhere between +10, −10/ −10, +10 and +5, +5.

The problem with compromises, however, is that each party has to give something up in order to get anything at all, which may set up the conditions for future conflict. For example, in the case of a conflict over an "orange," if another orange of equal appearance and weight cannot be found, then compromise would likely call for the orange to be cut evenly in half, with each party getting half an orange.

But is that the best that the parties can do? Suppose they invite two talented, experienced co-mediators to assist them. One mediator may call for a "*caucus*" with one of the parties and take her out to another room for an in-depth, one-on-one session where the mediator presses the party to reveal what it is that she wants the orange for: the juice!

Upon their return to the negotiating room, the other mediator takes the remaining party out for a caucus where the latter is pressed to reveal why he wants the orange: to make marmalade!

When both mediators and parties get together again, it becomes clear that each side can get 100 percent of what she and he want: juice for one and the peel and "meat" of the orange for the other (see Fisher and Ury, 1981, p. 59). Such an *integrative agreement* (+5, +5) (Pruitt, 1987) is the result of *collaborative problem solving*, which is clearly superior to compromise.

"Ah," the skeptic might say, "but Jerusalem is not an 'orange'!" Indeed, it is not but, according to interviews conducted with Palestinians and Israelis in Jerusalem by Jerome Segal (1998) and his associates (Segal *et al.*, 2000), approximately 98.5 percent of Jerusalem could be divided between the two groups in something approaching a +5, +5 manner – a finding which may help shape an eventual peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians (for which the "unofficial" Geneva Accord [GA, 2003] may be a model).

In addition to this potential example of "joint custody" of territory, there is an actual case: the Åland Islands which are owned by Finland but where the population is Swedish with maximum autonomy, including their own legislature, flag, stamps, control over their state television and radio broadcasts and a "slightly different version of the Finnish passport" (see *OSCE Review*, 1997a). As Kenneth Boulding is reputed to have remarked years ago concerning *"Boulding's First Law*: if it exists, then it is possible!" (private communication).

Conflict environments

Finally under pillar 1, we have *conflict environments*, where Rapoport (1974, p. 175) distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous environments. *Endogenous* conflict settings are those where there are mechanisms available for controlling or resolving conflict. By contrast, *exogenous* environments are those where there are few, if any, such mechanisms, as in the typical *Realpolitik* conception of the "anarchic" international system (see Waltz, 1959).

Given that the "space" within which a conflict occurs can comprise multiple dimensions – cultural, religious, historical, economic, political, institutional – each with its own possible presence or absence of appropriate mechanisms, the analyst's assessment here may not be an either/or one, but an exploration of the *degree* to which an overall conflict environment *is* endogenous and then to *coordinate* with those who administer the corresponding mechanisms to help the parties reach and maintain a cooperative, durable outcome.

Since the end of the Cold War, the OSCE has been endeavoring to transform the area covered by its 55 participating states, "from Vancouver to Vladivostok," into more of an endogenous conflict-resolution system. That system currently includes mechanisms for violent-conflict prevention, crisis

management, and post-violent-conflict rehabilitation, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw; the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in The Hague; the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna; various field missions in member states; and most recently, "REACT": the Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (see Zaagman and Thorburn, 1997; Hopmann, 1999, 2000, 2005; Kemp *et al.*, 2000; *OSCE Newsletter*, 2000a; van der Stoel, 2000; OSCE, 2003, 2004).

It is conceivable that not all the parties to conflicts within the OSCE area are aware of what the OSCE (and other international organizations such as the UN, EU, NATO, and Council of Europe) have to offer, or that OSCE and other "early warners" themselves may not always be aware of what each has to offer or of latent conflicts developing in the region. Analysts and potential intermediaries, therefore, could help to identify those mechanisms and conflicts, and facilitate *coordination* between the mechanisms and the parties concerned as all seek to avoid "future Yugoslavias" and potentially related acts of terrorism.[4]

Pillar 2 types: conflict causes and conditions

Under pillar 2, *conflict causes and conditions*, we can distinguish between relatively more or less *complex* conflicts. The more dimensions or variables involved in a conflict, the more complex it is and, by implication, the more difficult it would be to deal with.

For example, no matter at what *level of analysis* conflicts may be occurring under pillar 1 – at the interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, or international levels – they may be influenced by factors from at least four *levels of explanation* under pillar 2: individual, societal, international, and global/ecological levels (see Waltz, 1959; North, 1990). The problem with this, however, is that few if any of us – analysts, interveners, policy makers, or the parties themselves – have been educated in terms of disciplines at all four levels, that is,

- the *Individual level* comprises, among others, biology/physiology, psychology, psychiatry, philosophy/theology;
- the *Societal level* comprises, among others, anthropology, economics, history, political science, sociology;
- the *International level* comprises, among others, all the disciplines listed for the individual and societal levels, plus the field of international relations; and
- the *Global/Ecological level* comprises, among others, demographics, ecology, geology/petrology.

This is an important observation because conflicts, embedded as they are in *relationships*, may involve all these and more disciplines. As Dougherty

and Pfaltzgraff note just with regard to the field of international relations (2001, p. 19):

> students who major in international relations wish that they knew more about history, politics, economics, geography, demography, diplomacy, international law, ethics, religion, and nearly every branch of contemporary science and technology.

Specifically with regard to conflict (ibid., p. 192):

> Should we seek the origins of conflict in the nature of human beings or in their structures and institutions? Generally speaking, psychologists, and social psychologists, biologists, game theorists, and decision-making theorists take as their point of departure the behavior of individuals; from this, they draw inferences to the behavior of the species. Sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, organization and communication theorists, political scientists, international-relations analysts, and systems theorists typically examine conflict at the level of groups, collectivities, social institutions, social classes, large political movements, religious or ethnic entities, nation-states, coalitions, and cultural or global systems.

Given that most of us are educated in terms of only one discipline at one level, if we try analytically or operationally to tackle a complex conflict on our own, *we may, good intentions to the contrary, become more a part of the problem than of the solution*.

The rational and moral response to this potential dilemma is to form multidisciplinary teams of conflict analysts, interveners, and policy makers, with optimal *coordination* and integration within and between them: something that the 3 pillar framework can help to foster.

Helping to make the point: a hypothetical conflict

As an example of how all four levels under pillar 2 might be "driving" a conflict, even one at the interpersonal level, let's return to the community policing reference that we made earlier, and assume that a crisis intervention team has been called in to deal with a case of domestic abuse.

After the police come onto the scene and pull the abusive husband away from his battered wife, social case workers determine that the husband has just lost his job. Due to restricted access to a natural resource used in his work, brought about by a war in some remote corner of the globe, the multinational corporation that he worked for has decided to pull out of the country and in the process, render a large number of workers, including the husband, unemployed.

Adding to the complexity of the situation, it is clear to all involved that the unemployed husband is a member of a minority group traditionally

discriminated against. As such, it is safe to assume that his basic needs for identity, recognition, and security have not been optimally met. Moreover, it is precisely those needs – including his identity, recognition, and security *as a man* capable of providing for his family – that are now under assault by the fact of his recent unemployment.

Diagramming this discussion in terms of the four levels subsumed under pillar 2, we obtain the following:

Individual level: The husband has lost his job through no fault of his own; hence, his identity, recognition and security as a man capable of providing for his family have been violated, especially as a member of a minority group.

Societal level: The multinational corporation employing the man has decided to terminate operations in his country and relocate elsewhere where economic conditions are more favorable to maximizing profit. Further, the local economic system is unable to absorb the man's available labor.

International level: War in some remote corner of the world has disrupted access to a resource necessary to the multinational corporation's production in the man's home country.

Global/Ecological level: The resource is nonrenewable, unevenly distributed globally and, therefore, scarce.

How exactly do these factors combine to influence the husband to physically assault his wife? Enter *frustration–aggression theory* (Dollard *et al.*, 1939). Here it is useful to revisit Festinger's (1962) concept of *cognitive dissonance*: the breakdown between a preferred and an actual state of affairs. We can imagine that the husband would rather be employed and not under arrest for assaulting his wife – "the mother of his children." The greater the "emotional distance" between the preferred and the actual, the stronger the motivation "to do something" to reduce the gap and the corresponding *anxiety and* often *shame* (see Gilligan, 1996; Garbarino, 1999).

Under the circumstances, the man's "emotional brain" has overwhelmed and overtaken his "thinking brain," pushing him, through overperception and overreaction to threat, out of the *Prisoners' Dilemma* and into the sublime, total insecurity and chaos of *Chicken*, where prestige (absence of shame) is more important than survival. But, how does that happen?

Let's first examine the man as a member of a minority group. In his particular social milieu, he has been subjected to what Galtung (1969, 1996) calls *structural violence*: a situation whereby, because of his involuntary membership in certain racial, religious, ethnic, national, class and/or other minority groups, the man has been denied equal access to the political, economic, social, and other resources typically enjoyed and presided over by the dominant group in society. It is important to understand that this has occurred not because of what "these people" have done, but because of who they are.[5]

Add to this that the husband's experience of "structural violence" has often translated into *cultural violence* (Galtung, 1996), where the society in

which he is embedded seems to "celebrate" discrimination against his group by how it negatively portrays its members in the media, entertainment, advertisements, and the like.

Although some people – conflict avoiders and accommodators – might not perceive the structural and cultural violence that is directed against their groups, our hypothetical man does. Specifically, he experiences what Ted Robert Gurr (1970) calls *relative deprivation*, where the man's sense of what he is entitled to achieve ("value expectations") far outweighs his perceived capability to get and hold on to what he wants or feels he needs ("value capabilities"). He also experiences what Galtung (1964) calls *rank disequilibrium* – "status inconsistency" – where his relatively high ranking on, say, education far exceeds his relatively low rankings on income, quality of life, security, social esteem, and the like.

In other words, our hypothetical wife abuser has been experiencing significant dissonance most of his life *even* before he lost his job. With the loss of his job (a "realistic" conflict issue), his near perpetual state of dissonance – or *frustration* – has been reinforced and coupled with an overwhelming sense of *shame*, making it likely that he would lash out at something or someone, just to let go of his bottled-up negative emotional energy (an "unrealistic" conflict issue).

Frustration, according to John Dollard and fellow members of the "Yale School" (1939), is the emotional experience of an action being prevented from reaching its desired end-state at a particular point in time. Frustration leads to aggression – some kind of attack at some level of violence against something or someone, either the source (including oneself) or a surrogate of the source of the blocking – depending upon the actor's experience of three aspects of frustration:

1 The *importance* of the goal being blocked.
2 The *intensity* ("violence") of the blocking. And
3 The *frequency* of the blocking.

Losing his job is an experience of a significant goal being blocked and being told summarily to clear his working space and go home by his employer, not to return for any reason, is an intense experience of frustration – all against the background of frequent frustrations associated with his minority status. His needs for identity, recognition, and security are at an all-time low: a sense of multiple deprivation exacerbated by a profound sense of shame.

And then there is a fourth aspect of the frustration–aggression process that determines whether the man will lash out and if so, how:

4 The *anticipation of punishment* for expressing his grievance or otherwise "acting out" his frustration.

Because our hypothetical man is a member of a minority group in a social setting where he has experienced discrimination (including "racial profiling") all his life by the police, among others, he is not likely to lash out directly at those who have compounded his perpetual sense of dissonance by terminating his employment. So, he goes home and takes out his frustration-based hostility on his wife who he knows loves him and will stand by him "no matter what": she is a "safe" target!

We have here a core element of a generic explanation *or* understanding for domestic abuse, workplace violence ("going postal"), school shootings, and probably terrorism as well (see Sandole, 2002c). Long before termination of his employment, shame has played a key role in the man's life because of his minority status, which has encouraged him all his life not to feel good about who he is or be safe in that identity. The concept of *toxic shame* may apply here: "People who live with toxic shame feel fundamentally disgraced, intrinsically worthless, and profoundly humiliated in their own skin, just for being themselves" (Garbarino, 1999, p. 58). It may not get any worse than that for many minorities, and then it is just a short step to Gilligan's (1996, p. 110) observation that the "emotion of shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence, whether toward others or toward the self." This could apply to "suicide bombers" as well as to our hypothetical wife abuser.

Accordingly, what an *analyst* would do under pillar 2 is identify the factors that combine to produce and sustain this frustration/shame-aggression nexus. And then, under pillar 3, the *intervener* would design and implement an intervention that responds effectively to the causal complexity of frustration/shame-aggression.

Pillar 3 types: conflict intervention

Pillar 3, *conflict intervention*, is where a potential intervener can attempt to do something about a complex conflict, including facilitating processes that lead to quite different, albeit potentially interrelated outcomes, whether one is dealing with our hypothetical wife abuser or participants in ethnic, religious, and political conflicts with implications for acts of terrorism.

Using the metaphor of a burning house, a third party could attempt to prevent the house from catching fire in the first place (*violent-conflict prevention*) as was accomplished by the first-ever UN preventive deployment mission (UNPREDEP), in Macedonia (see Ackermann, 1999; Williams, 2000; Sokalski, 2003). If that fails, which, given the human tendency toward *reactive* in contrast to *proactive* orientations, it often does, then the intervener has a number of other options available. He, she or they can attempt to prevent a fire from spreading (conflict *management*) as was attempted by the UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Failing that, as UNPROFOR in

fact did, third parties can attempt to put the fire out, forcefully if necessary. Hence, conflict *settlement*, as was done by NATO following the shameful tragedy of the fall of the first UN-protected safe area in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srebrenica, in July 1995 (see Honig and Both, 1996; Rohde, 1997). The third party may then enforce the settlement, as NATO has done in Bosnia-Herzegovina, first with the Implementation Force (IFOR) and then with the Stabilization Force (SFOR); and in Kosovo, with the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Having put the fire out, and kept it out, third parties may (or, as is often the case, may not) decide to go further and deal with the underlying causes and conditions of the fire at hand: conflict *resolution*.[6] If they achieve that, they may then decide to work on the long-term relationships among the survivors of the fire so that next time they have a conflict, they do not have to burn down the house and the neighborhood (as Israelis and Palestinians have been doing for some time). This is conflict *transformation*, leading to, in John Burton's (1990, 1997) lexicon, conflict *provention*: the prevention of deep-rooted conflict by eliminating structural/cultural violence and other underlying causes and conditions of deep-rooted conflict (see Lederach, 1997; Mitchell and Banks, 1996).

Also relevant here is the typology advanced by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) as part of his effort to make the UN more relevant to the conflicts of the post–Cold War world, that is, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding:

- *preventive diplomacy* = violent conflict prevention;
- *peacemaking* = (coercive) conflict settlement and (noncoercive) conflict resolution;
- *peacekeeping* = conflict management; and
- *peacebuilding* = conflict transformation [provention].

Having examined these and other potential third party *goals*, the analyst would then explore third party *means* for achieving any of them. Does the conflict situation require, for instance, *confrontational* and/or *collaborative* means? Clearly, in the community policing discussion and ethnopolitical conflicts of the postmodern era, there is often a need for separation of attacker and victim, followed by more conflict "resolution" types of intervention. Or to be more blunt, there was clearly a need for the international community to forcefully prevent/stop genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 and in Srebrenica in July 1995 (which, in both cases, the international community elected not to do), before attempting to deal with the parties' relationships and the underlying causes that gave rise to the violence.

Confrontational means usually imply *negative peace*, while collaborative means imply *positive peace* (see Galtung, 1969). There is nothing inherently wrong with negative peace. "Negative" in this context simply means the

absence of hostilities achieved either through the prevention of potential or the cessation of actual hostilities, usually by confrontational means such as the threat or actual use of force by police or military forces. Negative peace is what most people mean by peace.

Positive peace, on the other hand, may assume the achievement of negative peace, but, in any case, moves beyond it to deal with the underlying conflict causes and conditions (pillar 2) through the use of collaborative means to achieve Burton's provention by eliminating structural/cultural violence.

Combining (integrating) some of these categories, the overlapping objectives of preventive diplomacy (violent-conflict prevention), *coercive* peacemaking (conflict settlement), and peacekeeping (conflict management), would be achieving and maintaining *negative peace*. By contrast, the overlapping objectives of *noncoercive* peacemaking (conflict resolution), and peacebuilding (conflict transformation), would be to achieve and maintain *positive peace*.

Negative peace measures, therefore, are concerned with preventing a house from catching fire at the latent or MCP stage. Alternatively, if the fire has already broken out, transforming MCP into AMCP, negative peace would depend on suppressing the fire. Negative peace measures, however, do not necessarily deal with the underlying causes and conditions. Positive peace measures, on the other hand, are designed to deal with underlying causes and conditions. Accordingly, long-term durable peace requires different measures from what is required to achieve and maintain enforced peace.

The difficulty in achieving and maintaining long-term durable peace demonstrates the need for a variety of actors working to achieve peace through different means and levels. Thus, another distinction between third party means is useful: track 1 and track 2 or "multitrack" actors and processes (see Davidson and Montville, 1981/82; McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987; Diamond and McDonald, 1996). While *track 1* refers to governmental/international governmental actors (i.e., states and interstate governmental organizations [IGOs], such as the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU, Council of Europe), *track 2* or *multitrack* refers to local, national and international conflict-resolution NGOs and other nongovernmental actors (for example, scholar-practitioners, trainers, citizen-activists, religious leaders, businesspersons, philanthropic donors, and journalists).

Traditionally track 1 has attempted to achieve negative peace, often through confrontational means (+10, −10), while track 2, followed by multitrack, efforts have come into existence to fill the void, picking up where track 1 has left off, attempting to achieve positive peace through collaborative means (+5, +5). Clearly, to achieve and maintain positive *as well as* negative peace, track 1 and track 2 – multitrack efforts in general – must work together in a *coordinated* fashion (Lund, 1996; Sokalski, 2003; Nan, 2004). This is the objective of the Platform for Cooperative Security of the OSCE's Charter for European Security (see OSCE Istanbul, 1999b), and of

the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe: an EU initiative for a coordinated *regional* approach to the problems of the Balkans (see AIIS, 2000; Busek, 2006; Jurekovic *et al.*, 2002; Pierre, 1999; Soros, 1999; SP, 1999). My own design for an integrated, *coordinated* post–Cold War peace and security system – the *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS) – reflects these sentiments as well (see Chapter 3).

Conclusion

The regional focus of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, which operates under the auspices of the OSCE, is one example of potential, significant movement toward capturing the complexity of the identity-based conflicts of the postmodern world. The savage wars in Croatia and especially Bosnia were apparently not sufficient for the international community to recognize the utility of a *regional approach* to violent conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation.

Reflecting a major principle of complexity theory – that everything is connected to, or otherwise impacted by everything else (Waldrop, 1992; Rosenau, 2005) – it took the further brutality of Kosovo to encourage policy makers and laypersons alike to realize that any strategy for dealing with *any* conflict in the Balkans must deal with *all* of them, if not at the same time, then certainly in sequence. The same applies to conflicts in other regions as well, for example, in Africa (see Crocker, 1999).[7] This also applies to *civilizational* conflicts involving non-Muslims and Muslims (e.g., Russian–Chechen, Israeli–Palestinian, US–Iraqi Baathist, Thai Buddhist–Muslim, Filipino Christian–Muslim conflicts).

The 3 pillar mapping used to structure the discussion here has been advanced as a useful point of departure for capturing the complexity of conflict at any level as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for doing something about the conflict. It promises to enhance the prospects for analysts, interveners, and policy makers in the international community to make more than a simplistic effort to do something about the often genocidal conflicts of the postmodern world, thereby avoiding complicity – that is, becoming more a part of the problem than of the solution – and dampening the reactive tendency of policy makers to perpetuate the often structurally violent status quo.

By implication, the 3PF may also be relevant to doing something about the terrorism whose genesis lies in, or is otherwise similar to the etiology of the Yugoslav-type ethnopolitical conflicts of the 1990s (e.g., see Kohlmann, 2004).

In the next chapter, we discuss my own efforts to apply the 3PF to outlining a *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS) that may be relevant to preventing *future Yugoslavias* and future acts of catastrophic terrorism.

Chapter 3

A model for responding to violent postmodern conflict

Introduction

In this chapter, we use the 3PF outlined in Chapter 2 as a basis for developing a model of peace and security for post–Cold War Europe that could, *hypothetically*, deal more effectively with "future Yugoslavias" and related acts of terrorism. The model I have developed for this purpose is the NEPSS (see Sandole, 1993b, 1995b, 1998c, 1999a, ch. 7, 1999b). Since NEPSS was designed initially with the Balkans in mind, let's look first at the Balkans where something like NEPSS could eventually be implemented.

The Balkans: a "conflict space" ripe for an NEPSS-type intervention

Former Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic died as an indicted war criminal in his cell at The Hague on Saturday, March 11, 2006, depriving history of an opportunity to pass judgment on him for having presided over *four wars* in the Balkans during almost the entirety of the 1990s: in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, plus spillover into a near civil war in Macedonia.

By far the most lethal of these wars was that in Bosnia, which raged for 3 years, even with a UNPROFOR on the ground. *Negative peace* (i.e., the absence of hostilities [Galtung, 1969, 1996]) was finally established in Bosnia by NATO military action following the genocidal massacres in Srebrenica of July 11, 1995, plus the Dayton Peace process culminating in a treaty by December 1995. "Peace" in the region has been maintained since then by a NATO-led peace enforcement mission, initially the IFOR and later the SFOR. On December 2, 2004, NATO relinquished control of the mission to the EU (AP, 2004a,b; Dempsey, 2004a,b; NATO Istanbul Summit, 2004).

The question at this point is what is the nature of the "conflict space" that the new "European Force" (EUFOR) has entered, within which something like NEPSS could be implemented? One interim answer was provided by Jeffrey Smith (2000, p. A1) five years after the Dayton Peace Accords

brought negative peace to Bosnia:

> Five years into a multibillion-dollar effort to construct a viable, peaceful country from the ruins of Bosnia's civil war, Western governments are tiring of the job, citing rampant corruption, persistent ethnic hatred and a seemingly open-ended need for NATO peacekeeping troops.
>
> Many large aid donors, including the [U.S.], the World Bank and the [UN] say they will cut their assistance to Bosnia in the next year, in some cases by as much as a third. Members of NATO are weighing new cuts in its 20,000-member force after reducing strength from 32,000 at the outset.
>
> *Bosnians worry that major reductions in aid and troops could reignite the 1992–1995 war* that shocked the world with neighbor-against-neighbor bloodletting and shelling of cities. As U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Michael L. Dodson, the top NATO commander in Bosnia note[d], *the troops are "the glue that holds all this together"* [emphasis added].

According to a more recent assessment:

> What does it take for outside powers to rebuild a war-ruined and badly divided country? Bosnia offers a state-of-the-art – and sobering – example. Seven years after a U.S. intervention helped end its civil war and Western troops poured in to keep the peace, the Balkan nation of 3.5 million remains far from able to live on its own. The good news is that the horrific fighting that killed a quarter of a million people in less than four years has not been renewed, that several hundred thousand refugees and victims of ethnic cleansing have returned to their homes, and that peaceful and free elections were held [in October 2002] for all levels of government – the sixth elections to be staged in as many years. But the [*negative*] peace continues to depend on 12,000 foreign troops, including 2,000 Americans; the functioning of government relies in no small part on the interventions of a Western "high representative" with near-dictatorial powers; and, most discouraging of all, the victors in the recent elections were the same nationalist parties that tore the country apart a decade ago. Bosnia is not now a failed state, but it is a center for the trafficking of women and narcotics, a hide-out for war criminals and a steady drain on Western aid and defense budgets. It's not likely to collapse soon, *but neither will foreign troops and administrators likely be able to safely pull out for many years to come* [emphasis added].
>
> (WP, 2002b)

An assessment of neighboring Croatia (CWWPP, 2004, p. 3), ostensibly in better shape than Bosnia, indicates that

> The situation with regard to psychological trauma, non-violent conflict resolution and reconciliation continues to be poor and/or is deteriorating

> in the region. Suicides and domestic violence continue to increase. The unemployment situation remains catastrophic and is not improving. There is little hope among people that solutions will be found. Unfortunately, there is little input from local and national governments and international organizations on any of these issues, and politics remains a major barrier to progress. Nongovernmental organizations, both local and foreign, fight from month to month to survive and to do what they can, but it is difficult for most organizations to remain alive.
>
> The recent elections in both Croatia and Serbia also give cause for concern. The parties that started the war won in both cases.
>
> We feel strongly that this region that is on the edge of Europe is being ignored, and that this policy is a dangerous one for Europe and the world. The problems here have not even begun to be solved.

And regarding Kosovo, in March 2004:

> Kosovo . . . took a very disturbing turn, with the most extensive ethnic violence seen there since 1999, resulting in 19 killed, 900 wounded and hundreds of Serb houses, churches and monasteries destroyed or damaged.
>
> (ICG, 2004)

Accordingly, some in Bosnia are wondering if a similar regression into violence is likely for them as well, especially given the transition from NATO's SFOR to the EU's EUFOR as guarantor of security (private communication).

The challenge facing the EU, therefore, is: how to implement further the military mission, inherited from NATO, in such a way that the EU can work together with Bosnians to build *positive peace* in the country – that is, reducing if not eliminating the underlying causes and conditions of violent conflict – and, given the intimate interconnections between conflicts in the region, to build sustainable peace in the Balkans as a whole.

NEPSS: a basis for intervention in Bosnia?

I have been working on NEPSS in recent years as a basis for intervening into the latent and manifest conflicts of post–Cold War Europe in a way that could prevent *Future Yugoslavias*. Given the connection, "civilizational" and otherwise, between the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and the global war on terrorism, NEPSS may also be relevant to preventing future instances of the "new" (post–9/11) terrorism (see Huntington, 1993, 1996; "Beirut to Bosnia," 1993; Berman and Grgic, 2004; Kohlmann, 2004; Maroevic and Williams, 2005; Wood, 2005; http://www.sky.com/skynews/video/videoplayer/0,,91134-bosnia_p3705,00.html). As former US Deputy Defense Secretary (now World Bank President) Paul Wolfowitz commented:

> September 11 has clearly changed the stakes for the [U.S.] in dealing with security issues in those areas that could be sanctuaries for terrorists.

> [Bosnia would not be] just any failed state around the world, but one with a Muslim population in the heart of Europe.... Even today...Bosnia remains a channel for terrorist networks to move money and people.
>
> (cited in Shanker, 2003)

To put it simply, "September 11 changed [the] perception of the Balkans" (cited in Dempsey, 2004a), to include the potential for terrorism as well as ethnopolitical conflict.

The New European Peace and Security System (NEPSS)

NEPSS – a "work [still] in progress" – comprises descriptive and prescriptive elements; that is, developments that have occurred or are occurring as well as those that could or should occur to maximize the positive implications of actual events.

Descriptive elements of NEPSS

Descriptively, NEPSS is a model for a post–Cold War peace and security system in Europe that calls for making use of, and integrating, *existing* institutions and mechanisms within the overall context of the OSCE.[1] The OSCE plays a pivotal role in NEPSS because, in addition to its (now) 55 participating States representing all of the former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) of Europe, its traditional three "basket" structure (see Helsinki Final Act, 1975) provides a basis for integrating existing European and trans-Atlantic institutions and processes into *interdependent* components of a post–Cold War peace and security system:

OSCE component	*Corresponding institutions*
Basket 1	
Originally *Security in general*; later *Political/Military Dimensions of Comprehensive Security*	NATO/NACC [EAPC] Partnership for Peace; WEU/EU;
Basket 2	
Economic and Environmental Dimensions of Comprehensive Security	EU/European Free Trade Association (EFTA); and
Basket 3	
Human Rights and Humanitarian Dimensions of Comprehensive Security	Council of Europe (CoE)

Western organizations corresponding to each of the three *baskets* indicated above have in recent years been reaching out to their former adversaries in the East, if not to explicitly encourage their membership then certainly to otherwise liaise and collaborate with them in previously unprecedented

ways, which augurs well for their membership later on. In effect, the existing organizations, *led by NATO*, have been participating in an unprecedented *paradigm shift* away from Cold War era, *Realpolitik* **national** security to post–Cold War, *Idealpolitik* **common** security.

BASKET 1: POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

Under *Basket 1*, NATO has been collaborating with its former adversaries, first in the form of the *North Atlantic Cooperation Council* (NACC), then the *Partnership for Peace* (PfP), and more recently, the *Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* (EAPC) which succeeded the NACC.

The NACC was created at the NATO Rome summit of November 7–8, 1991, to facilitate consultations and cooperation in security matters among the former Cold War adversaries (see NATO Rome Summit, 1991). NACC represented the concretization of sentiments expressed in the *Joint Declaration* of the Paris CSCE summit, furthering the paradigm shift from confrontational (*national* security) to collaborative (*common* security) processes.[2]

The Partnership for Peace (PfP), created at the NATO Brussels summit of January 10–11, 1994, has been open to all members of the OSCE, and not just, as in the case of NACC, to the former Cold War adversaries. The PfP built upon NACC (and the paradigm shift) by inviting the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) to join with NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty countries in developing a common security system through bilateral arrangements between NATO and each Partner country for, among other tasks, joint planning, training and exercises to facilitate PfP participation in peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other operations.[3,4]

PfP also encourages the expectation that membership will ultimately lead to entry into an expanding and undoubtedly, "reinvented" NATO (see NATO Brussels Summit, 1994): originally a source of concern for Russians who felt that, notwithstanding their membership in the Partnership, eventual NATO membership did not apply to them. Many Russians still viewed NATO in Cold War terms.

At its July 8–9, 1997 summit in Madrid, NATO invited three former Warsaw Pact members – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – to negotiate entry into NATO. Given Russian sensitivities to NATO "enlargement" (*expansion*),[5] the Madrid invitation was preceded by the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between [NATO] and the Russian Federation*, signed in Paris on May 27, 1997. The Founding Act effectively allowed a Russian voice, but not a veto, in NATO deliberations. Madrid was also preceded by a meeting on May 29, of NATO foreign ministers in Sintra, Portugal, establishing the EAPC. EAPC succeeded and went beyond the NACC – and enhanced the PfP – by promising to "bring NATO and its Partners even closer together with more intensive military exercises, planning, consultations and other activities" (White, 1997, p. 13).

Together with the NATO–Ukraine Charter, also agreed to at Sintra and signed at Madrid, these developments furthered the *paradigm shift* from national to common security (see AP, 1997; *OSCE Newsletter*, 1997; *OSCE Review*, 1997b).[6]

Nevertheless, with the recent entry of the three Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – into NATO, Russia once again expressed its concerns about NATO moving right up to its borders; in effect, creating a Cold War era bipolar line of demarcation (see Myers, 2004).

BASKET 2: ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

The EU is the premier organization for facilitating realization of the goals implicit in the OSCE's *Basket 2* emphasis on promoting "economic and social progress and the improvement of the conditions of life" (Helsinki Final Act, 1975, p. 89). Despite crises over the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (see, e.g., Levinson *et al.*, 1992), the EU has been pursuing the further development of a "common economic space"; for example, negotiations between the (then) European Community (EC) and the EFTA during 1989–92, to create a *European Economic Area* (EEA), "which was to come into force on January 1, 1993 and include 19 countries" (*Europe in Figures*, 1995, p. 24), representing "the world's biggest and wealthiest single market [with a population, at the time, of 380 million]" (Drozdiak, 1991):[7]

> [This] agreement breaking down the barriers between the remaining economic blocs in Western Europe [was] also expected to accelerate the process of eventually incorporating the impoverished new democracies in the eastern part of the continent....
>
> Jacques Delors, [then] president of the EC's executive commission, said...that *the Community may include as many as 30 member states in the future* [emphasis added].

The EU, therefore, has been poised to take in additional members,[8] including states which were formerly adversaries; for example, members of the *Pact on Stability in Europe*: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (see Helenius, 1995). Indeed, at its summit meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, the EU invited the three candidates for NATO membership – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – one other Pact country, Estonia, plus Slovenia and Cyprus, to begin to negotiate entry into the EU. In addition:

> the EU [would] be working closely with another five states that [had] expressed an interest in joining the union: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia [the remaining Pact countries]. These states

> [would] be offered expanded political and economic assistance from the EU with an eye toward eventual membership.
>
> (*The Week in Germany*, 1997, p. 1)[9]

And on June 16, 2001:

> After a three-day summit [in Göteborg] marred by the worst street violence in Swedish history, leaders of the 15-member European Union agreed . . . to a firm timetable to admit new members from Eastern Europe by 2004 . . . . The summit's final communique called the enlargement process 'irreversible.' That was particularly good news for the candidates likely to be admitted first – Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Poland. The EU began talks with those countries and with Cyprus in 1998 and with Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta last year.
>
> (Richburg, 2001)

Reflecting in part the assumption that increases in living standards in these and other countries would undermine some of the factors that encouraged the violent expression of ethnic and other conflicts during the 1990s, Walker (1993a, p. 50) suggested that

> As the [EU] gradually encompasses many of Europe's new democracies at least in closer association arrangements, and some of them as full members, it could become the most important European organization for mitigating ethnic tensions.[10]

Indeed, "History does not record any other organization so successful in exporting its values, rules and institutions without the use of force. [We] might call it conquest by example" (Stephens, 2004).

One example of relevant post–Cold War developments associated with the EU under Basket 2, with which I have been personally involved (UNECE, 2002, pp. 1–2), is the *Villiers Colloquium*:

> The proliferation of conflicts in Europe following the end of the Cold War has created new challenges and opportunities – of *great complexity* – for intergovernmental and national institutions dealing with *economic and environmental aspects of security* . . .
>
> Organizations and alliances such as the European Union, OSCE, NATO, and UNECE [UN Economic Commission for Europe] have taken the lead to define the nature and scope of the new security environment and the shifting *economic and environmental* dynamics contributing to it.
>
> These organizations and unions have also been instrumental in engineering the type of constructive dialogue which allows new strategies,

> policies, responses and instruments for conflict prevention and resolution to be developed. The various institutions agree that the time is right to further refine approaches to conflict prevention and resolution and enhance their effectiveness.
>
> The Villiers Colloquium, hosted by UNECE–OSCE with input from NATO experts and the participation of a broad spectrum of governmental, business and civil society specialists, is a critical contribution to the renewed efforts to develop more effective responses both to developing and actual conflicts. Furthermore, the meeting agreed that conflict prevention, based on effective use of early warning indicators and detailed analyses of the causes of individual conflicts, is the most politically and economically preferential approach.
>
> The participants identified three primary causes of conflict in Europe, namely: economic decline and rising poverty; growing inequality between and within states; and weak and uncertain state institutions. Key secondary causes, which can act to sustain conflicts, include: high unemployment, notably amongst youth; and the abuse of ethnicity as a form of political strategy.
>
> The role of parallel structures (*terrorist* and *organized crime groups*) and their ability to access international financing, from both seemingly legitimate and illegal sources, are also key destabilizing factors. Consistent and well-resourced efforts, based on international cooperation, will be required to effectively subdue and dismantle these parallel structures.
>
> Macroeconomic challenges linked to the processes of globalization and the transition to market economies create additional stresses for those states where the key focus remains state building and establishing the integrity of their borders.
>
> The Villiers Colloquium has laid the foundation for a continuing Villiers Group which, if realized, will have the aim of establishing a *comprehensive framework to facilitate more effective preventive responses to conflict and emergency security issues* [emphasis added].

What is striking about the Villiers Colloquium is that, as with the EU itself, it goes beyond the economic and environmental dimensions of Basket 2, synergistically feeding into and reinforcing the political and military dimensions of Basket 1 and the humanitarian and human rights dimensions of Basket 3, to which we now turn.

BASKET 3: HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

The humanitarian objectives associated with *Basket 3* are to further

> the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, [through] increased cultural and

> educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems.
>
> (Helsinki Final Act, 1975, p. 113)

The realization of these goals is meant to occur "in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating states," listed as part of Basket 1, where Principle VII deals with "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief"; and Principle VIII with "Equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (ibid., pp. 80–1).[11]

The CoE, which "makes being a functioning democracy a condition of membership" (Walker, 1993a, pp. 47–8), has been instrumental in achieving these goals.

> In considering applications for membership the Council conducts detailed examinations of national and local government laws, regulations and behavior to ensure conformity not only with electoral, police, judicial and civil service practices of member states, but also with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Council also offers extensive information, training programmes and practical help to enable aspiring members to meet its standards, as well as to understand the practical problems of enforcing the European Convention on Human Rights [through the European Court of Human Rights which renders binding judgements on members' compliance with the Convention].[12]

The actual or potential expansion of, among others, NATO, the EU, and CoE within the conceptual frame of the OSCE is compatible with a major feature of NEPSS: *no one* – ethnic and other groups within states as well as states themselves (*including* the Russian Federation) – should be left out in terms of systems designed to enhance the *political/military*, *economic/environmental*, and *humanitarian/human rights* dimensions of comprehensive security. For post–Cold War Europe to "work," therefore, it must reflect, *for all concerned*, "peace, security *and* justice" (emphasis added) (Helsinki Final Act, 1975, p. 77, *passim*): to leave any party *outside* the "European house" would be to ensure that they have no stake in preserving it; worse, to encourage them to stand by while others attempt to destroy it!

In summary, then, within the *descriptive* component of the NEPSS framework:

- NATO deals with *political* and *military* aspects;
- the EU deals primarily with *economic* and *environmental* aspects; and
- the CoE deals with *humanitarian* and *human rights* aspects of the new, *comprehensive view of common security* pioneered during the 1990s by the OSCE.[13]

More importantly, each of these heretofore Cold War institutions has been reaching out to its former enemies, inviting them to either become members and/or join together in constituting new, post–Cold War institutions.

NATO, which had already taken in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as members, continued these trends at its November 2002 summit in Prague by issuing invitations to seven other members of the former communist world – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – all of which became members on March 29, 2004.

At the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, invitations were issued to Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, with all becoming members on May 1, 2004. In addition, on May 12, 2004, the EU began to

> map out a new strategy for dealing with its "neighbors" from Morocco to Georgia, heralding further levels of co-operation but stopping short of an offer of membership.
>
> The new policy offers the prospect of money, trade and security co-operation in exchange for progress in democratic and economic reforms.
>
> For the first time the EU's horizons will extend to the Southern Caucasus, with the prospect of enhanced co-operation with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia....
>
> [Guenter Verheugen, then the EU enlargement commissioner, planned to] announce a framework under which initially seven countries would sign up to action plans for democratic and economic reform, which would be monitored by the [European] Commission.
>
> If successful, the countries could then enjoy access to the EU's market of 450m people, help in building transport and energy networks with the EU and assistance in securing external frontiers against *terrorists* and traffickers.
>
> The first wave in the programme are Moldova, Ukraine, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, with Egypt and Lebanon expected to be included in the autumn [emphasis added].
>
> (Parker and Cienski, 2004)

Again, all these developments are nothing short of revolutionary, facilitating further paradigm shifting away from *Realpolitik*, "zero-sum" *national* security, toward *Idealpolitik*, "positive-sum" *common* security.

However, notable and revolutionary though these developments are, NEPSS is basically a *descriptive model* for an *inter*state peace and security system: the *existing* institutions and processes it would integrate in terms of OSCE's three *baskets* are basically *inter*state governmental organizations. As such, NEPSS would likely perpetuate international "business as usual," albeit a much improved version thereof.

Accordingly, to be more effective in preventing Yugoslav-type conflicts in post–Cold War Europe, NEPSS requires a *prescriptive* element: something which deals with the *intra*state level, for example, relations between minority and majority (e.g., ethnic or religious) groups *within* states.

Prescriptive elements of NEPSS

Prescriptively, NEPSS is characterized by *"integrated systems of conflict-resolution networks"* comprising multitrack mechanisms and processes, plus *joint vertical/horizontal* as well as *reinforced horizontal dimensions* (see Lund, 1996, chs 4 and 5; and Sandole, 1993b, 1995b, 1998c, 1999a,b, ch. 7).

JOINT VERTICAL/HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION

Under the *joint vertical/horizontal* dimension of integrated systems, we would have a mapping of sections of Europe in terms of local, societal, subregional, regional, and global levels of analysis, with *track 2 (writ large)* (nongovernmental) complementing *track 1* (governmental) actors and processes whenever possible. Expanding upon the original track 1–2 dichotomy (see Davidson and Montville, 1981–2), Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996) developed their *Multi-Track Framework* as follows:

1. *Track 1* remains the realm of official, governmental activity, *peacemaking through diplomacy*, with track 2 (*writ large*) subdivided into the following tracks:
2. *Track 2* (*writ small*) (nongovernment/professional): *peacemaking through professional conflict resolution.*
3. *Track 3* (business): *peacemaking through commerce.*
4. *Track 4* (private citizen): *peacemaking through personal involvement.*
5. *Track 5* (research, training, and education): *peacemaking through learning.*
6. *Track 6* (activism): *peacemaking through advocacy.*
7. *Track 7* (religion): *peacemaking through faith in action.*
8. *Track 8* (funding): *peacemaking through providing resources.* And
9. *Track 9* (communications and the media): *peacemaking through information.*

The core idea of "integrated systems" is that, although "all conflicts are local," they are embedded in various overlapping political, social, economic, and other environments (see Dugan, 1996; Lederach, 1997). Assuming an *early warning system* to activate the *preventive diplomacy* envisaged by Michael Lund (1996) and others (e.g., Wallensteen, 1998; Kemp, 2001), conflicts developing at any "local" level could, *horizontally*, be responded to by a synergistic combination of track 1–9 resources operating *at that*

level and, ***vertically*** and ***diagonally***, at the societal, subregional, regional, and global levels as well.

Hence, following early warning of a developing (i.e., latent) conflict within the OSCE area that could spread to other levels, appropriate track 1 and track 2–9 conflict handling and third party intervention resources could be brought together – perhaps by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office or the HCNM assisted by an NGO (e.g., the *Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations* [see Zaagman and Thorburn, 1997]) – to deal with the conflict at its initial (*local*) level of incidence/observation. This process would include communication and collaboration with, and resources from, other levels as well, such that the conflict does not spill over to any of them. As Michael Lund (1996), anticipating the OSCE's "Platform for Cooperative Security" (*OSCE Istanbul Summit*, 1999a,b; *OSCE Lisbon Document*, 1996), put it:

> the international community needs to think in terms of appropriate *divisions of labor* and *complementarities* (p. 144)....The *vertical division of labor*...would be achieved by pushing explicit direct responsibility and accountability downward...to the parties to the conflicts themselves and to subregional and regional actors. At the same time, extralocal and extraregional states and the [UN] would provide appropriate facilitative, technical, political, and (if necessary) *military* support [emphasis added].
> (Ibid., p. 183)

Together with violent conflict *prevention*, the *joint vertical/horizontal* dimension of NEPSS would include systems of conflict *management*, *settlement*, *resolution*, and *transformation* (see Sandole, 1998b):

(a) *Violent Conflict Prevention* is the functional equivalent of *Preventive Diplomacy* in former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's (1992) typology. It would be a *proactive* effort based on conflict monitoring and early warning using, for example, data from the Uppsala University Conflict Data Project or the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) – including "Minorities at Risk" data – to track developing conflicts in order to "prevent houses from catching fire" (see Wallensteen, 2002; *www.pcr.uu.se/database/*; Gurr, 1993; Gurr, 2000a; Gurr *et al.*, 2000; Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Marshall and Gurr, 2005; www.cidcm.umd.edu/datasets.asp).

Despite a growing literature on violent conflict prevention [preventive diplomacy], especially since the publication of Michael Lund's (1996) classic work on the subject, this is rarely attempted. There are, however, notable exceptions such as the "quiet diplomacy" of the OSCE HCNM (see Kemp, 2001) and the first-ever and, thus far, *only* UNPREDEP, which was conducted in Macedonia (see Williams, 2000; Sokalski, 2003).

(b) *Conflict Management* can be viewed as the functional equivalent of *Peacekeeping* under chapter 6 of the UN Charter (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). It is also what arms control negotiations and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) aim to achieve. Conflict management [peacekeeping] is attempted "reactively" whenever violent conflict prevention [preventive diplomacy] has not been tried or if tried, has failed and the house *has* caught fire. Conflict management is what the UNPROFOR attempted to accomplish in Bosnia during 1992–5. The Uppsala University Conflict Data Project or the University of Maryland's CIDCM datasets could also be used here as a basis for tracking ongoing conflicts to ensure that existing "fires" do not spread out of control.

(c) *Conflict Settlement* can be viewed as the functional equivalent of *Coercive Peacemaking* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). When conflict management [peacekeeping] fails and the fire starts to spread as, in fact, happened with UNPROFOR, the international community may then step in to forcefully suppress the fire. Hence, following the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, NATO conducted military operations against Bosnian Serb positions. Together with the Dayton Peace Process (see Holbrooke, 1998), a "negative peace" was achieved by the end of 1995 which has since been maintained by the IFOR, then by the SFOR, and currently by the EUFOR.

(d) *Conflict Resolution* is the functional equivalent of *Noncoercive Peacemaking* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Putting out the fire does not necessarily deal with its underlying causes and conditions. This is where conflict resolution [noncoercive peacemaking] enters the scene: to identify and render null and void the underlying combustible causes and conditions so that a particular fire does not flare up again. The premier example of an enterprise that does this in Europe (or anywhere else for that matter) is the European Union.

(e) *Conflict Transformation* can be viewed as the functional equivalent of *Peacebuilding* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Once the causes and conditions of a particular fire have been identified and addressed, then the international community may decide to work with the survivors of the fire on their long-term *relationships* so that next time they have a conflict, they do not have to burn down the house, the neighborhood, and the region.

Since conflict transformation [peacebuilding] is a response to the observation by Jean-Jacques Rousseau that "Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (Waltz, 1959, p. 232), interventions at this level may involve the creation of mechanisms that, had they existed earlier, might have prevented the house from catching fire in the first place.

Any of the above five types of intervention or a *sequenced strategy employing them all* (which, collectively, could be viewed as *peacebuilding "writ large"*), could involve third parties and other resources from multiple

levels: local, societal, subregional, regional (EU/WEU, CoE, NATO/EAPC/PfP, OSCE), and global (UN). In the event, track 2–9 (nongovernmental) could complement track 1 (governmental) activities whenever possible. The working hypothesis here is, given that the causes and conditions of a violent conflict can be found at different levels, then an effective response to such a conflict would have to take into account factors at those levels as well.

Should the *joint vertical/horizontal dimension* fail to prevent "the house from catching fire," then there may be a need for the *reinforced horizontal dimension* to become operational. This would involve the judicious use of *Realpolitik* force, but basically within an *Idealpolitik* framework, to achieve *negative peace* (put the fire out) but only as a "necessary" (although not "sufficient") condition for achieving *positive peace*: the elimination of the underlying causes and conditions.[14]

REINFORCED HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION

In order for NEPSS to succeed, therefore, especially if an initial attempt to employ the *joint vertical/horizontal dimension* of *integrated systems* fails, NEPSS should also include an "embedded" *Realpolitik* option for use as part of a larger whole consisting primarily of *Idealpolitik* measures and processes to move to, but then beyond, negative and toward positive peace.

For instance, track 1 peace enforcement personnel, representing the UN, OSCE, NATO, the EU, or something approaching a *"representative sample"* of the EAPC/PfP, might, under very clear conditions, enter a war zone to effect and/or enforce a negative peace, as a necessary (but clearly not sufficient) condition for moving toward positive peace. Such clear conditions should include the attempted imposition by one party of a genocidal "final solution" on another (e.g., in Rwanda in April 1994; Srebrenica, Bosnia in July 1995; or, presently, in Darfur, western Sudan). In the event, the objectives of the peace enforcement operation would not include the bombing of civilian centers and the killing of tens of thousands in order to "win," or to "impose solutions," or – what is, in any case, impossible – to "solve" (through *military* means) the conflict, but to

- prevent genocide;
- permit international relief operations to get through to threatened populations; and to
- separate the warring factions in order to afford them a "cooling-off" period, as a necessary (but again, not sufficient) condition of collaborative resolution of the conflict that they have been expressing through violent means.

Some international developments are suggestive of progressive reinforcement of NEPSS's *descriptive* character and the joint vertical/horizontal dimension

of its *prescriptive* character – such as the emergence from the November 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul of the *Charter for European Security*, inclusive of the *Platform for Cooperative Security* (see OSCE Istanbul, 1999a,b). Other developments, however, are suggestive of the sole narrow use of *Realpolitik* force; for example, the destruction of Grozny and killings of tens of thousands of Chechen civilians in the Russian Federation. Even the 1999 NATO air war against Serbia over Kosovo – albeit clearly for the humanitarian purpose of preventing further genocidal ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians – falls more into the category of the narrow use of *Realpolitik* force basically within a *Realpolitik* (instead of an *Idealpolitik*) framework. (Only time will tell how the post–9/11 interventions into Afghanistan and Iraq will be ultimately characterized.)

Accordingly, to do the *right thing* as well as *practical thing, Realpolitik* force should *always* be applied within a framework like the *joint vertical/horizontal dimension* of NEPSS's *prescriptive* component which allows for, and encourages

- conflict *resolution*: dealing with the underlying causes and conditions of the fire at hand; and
- conflict *transformation*: dealing with the future long-term *relationships* among the survivors of the fire; *as well as*
- [violent] conflict *prevention*: preventing the house from catching fire in the first place;
- conflict *management*: preventing the fire from spreading if initial [violent] conflict prevention is not attempted or if attempted, fails; and
- conflict *settlement*: if management fails, forcefully suppressing the fire (see Sandole, 1998b).

If peace is not *positive* as well as *negative* – if it does not deal ultimately with the underlying *"conflicts-as-startup conditions"* (pillar 2) – then *"conflict-as-process"* (pillar 1) will never be far from the surface, always ready to be resurrected to come back, to haunt us time and time again (see Sandole, 1999b, pp. 129–31): this is the ultimate message and "categorical imperative" of a *complexity* approach to conflict analysis and resolution/transformation (see Waldrop, 1992; Sandole, 1999b, ch. 8; Rosenau, 2005).

In terms of former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's (1992) categories of intervention, therefore, the Dayton Peace Accords represent fairly successful *coercive peacemaking* in Bosnia, both of a military (NATO bombing) and a political nature (Richard Holbrooke's mission [see Holbrooke, 1998]). Dayton also represents successful *peacekeeping/peace enforcement*, achieved through NATO's IFOR and subsequent SFOR and currently through the EU's EUFOR.

As of this writing, *peacebuilding* still lags far behind in the Balkans. Operationally speaking, Dayton remains a track 1/*Realpolitik* agreement

still in need of a viable multitrack/*Idealpolitik* complement. And that is part of the continuing challenge for the international community: to design, implement, and follow through with such a component. Clearly, since it assumed control of the SFOR mission in December 2004, this is primarily a challenge for the EU.

Part of that challenge is to persuade fellow Europeans to maintain a credible, effective peacekeeping force in Bosnia beyond any politically motivated, unrealistically short time lines – long enough to ensure that negative peace holds.[15] Bosnia is a clear case of where negative peace is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of positive peace. The reconstruction of Bosnia – in emotional/reconciliative as well as physical/economic terms – will take *years* (see Lederach, 1997, p. 77 [fig. 6]). Hence, an appropriate peacekeeping/peace enforcement presence should stay long enough to ensure that the job gets done.

How can the European Union make use of NEPSS?

The simplest answer to this question would be for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) strategists to make use of what already exists – as in the descriptive component of NEPSS – as a basis for translating something like NEPSS into action in the Balkans. What might come to mind here is the EU's Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe which has been in operation since 1999. Although the object of much criticism and of efforts to improve its operation (see Sandole, 2002a; Jurekovic *et al.*, 2002), the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe provides an existing conceptual and operational entry into force of a NEPSS-type system in the region, thereby enhancing its prospects for success. Much further work needs to be done, however, before that hypothesis can be fully tested.

As part of that effort, what has become known as the "European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management" (EU, 2003a, p. 5) can be further developed:

> Recent history in the Balkans, in Africa and elsewhere has shown that *the international community needs to strengthen its capacity to better prevent conflicts from breaking out, to intervene more quickly and efficiently in crisis situations when conflicts do occur and to provide sustainable support for post-conflict reconstruction*. *Military peacekeepers* are needed to monitor cease-fires and re-establish safe environments for the local population and international actors on the ground. *Civilian experts*, however, play a fundamental role in complex peace operations, in crisis as well as in post-conflict situations, by supporting democratisation and the rule of law, by strengthening human rights, and by rebuilding civil societies and viable civil administrations.

> The European Union has taken up the challenge to boost its civilian *peacekeeping* and *peace-building* capacities and to improve the number of available and suitably qualified civilian personnel for peace missions. The European Council meetings at Feira in June 2000 and in Göteborg in June 2001 represented important milestones concerning efforts to critically take stock of the current levels of readiness and future preparation of civilians required for various crisis management activities. The existence of well-trained civilian experts ready to be deployed within a short amount of time was approved as important for the European Union's ability to undertake the full range of *conflict prevention* and *crisis management* tasks. However, many civilians assigned by Member States are not well trained or do not have previous mission experience. Experience has proved that the pool of people available on short notice has to be much larger than the actual number of people demanded. The creation of so-called trained reserves is essential in order to provide civilian personnel for peace missions and field activities of the European Union and other international organizations like the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe. These findings led the European Commission to launch a pilot project in October 2001 on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management [emphasis added].
>
> (Also see EU, 2003b)

More recently (EU, 2003a, pp. 6–7):

> Proposals [have been] developed with regard to the future training cooperation within the EU and with other international organizations with particular attention to very recent developments: The mandate of the European Council in Thessalonika to develop a *co-ordinated* EU training policy in the field of ESDP, with *civilian and military dimensions* as well as with the very recent Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament "The European Union and the United Nations: the Choice of Multilateralism" [COM (2002), 526 final of September 10, 2003] and the concrete implementation of the joint UN–EU declaration signed in New York, on September 24, 2003. Proposals for future training cooperation include:
>
> - fostering closer training co-operation in the EU and the organisation and *co-ordination* of training courses in order to enlarge the pool of well trained civilian experts available on short notice;
> - contribution to a *co-ordinated* EU training policy in the field of ESDP, encompassing both *civilian and military dimensions*;
> - exchange of information and co-operation between EU and other international organisations such as the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe;

- enhancement of the EU-UN training co-operation by a EU-UN training course based on the identification of joint standards and requirements;
- development of assessment criteria in order to see if the participants have attained the desired level of knowledge and competence; and
- support of compatible civilian personnel rosters on Member States and EU level which are important for the rapid deployment of qualified personnel for specific mission tasks [emphasis added] [Also see www:eutraininggroup.net].

It is clear from the above that the EU is already working within the context of a NEPSS-type structure, including the *joint vertical/horizontal dimension* of the *prescriptive* component, and given the emphasis on the military as well as civilian dimensions of the ESDP, with implications for the *reinforced horizontal dimension* as well.

Further, these activities are taking place within the context of a global initiative stimulated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in June 2001, urging "NGOs with an interest in [violent] conflict prevention to organise an international conference of *local, national and international NGOs* on their role in [violent] conflict prevention and future interaction with the United Nations in this field" (emphasis added) (ECCP, 2003a, p. 1). The initiative has been responded to by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) in Utrecht, the Netherlands, with the "Programme on the Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict." The Programme is being implemented through the "Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict" (GPPAC) and coordinated by an International Steering Group through its Secretariat at the European Centre for Conflict Prevention.

The Programme's overall objective is "To develop a common platform for effective action in conflict prevention from the *community to the global level*" (emphasis added) by achieving the following specific goals:

- To explore fully the role of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
- To improve interaction between civil society groups, the UN, regional organisations, and governments;
- To strengthen regional and international networking between conflict-prevention actors;
- To promote the development of conflict-prevention theory and practice;
- To integrate regional experience into an International Agenda for conflict prevention.

The very first regional meeting of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict took place in Dublin, Ireland, March 31–April 2, 2004:

> This Dublin Action Agenda reflects outcomes of a consensus-building process among more than 200 participants, representing CSOs [civil society organisations], governments and multilateral organisations. It articulates common ground amongst those European CSOs committed to conflict prevention and puts forward key recommendations to strengthen strategic partnerships for preventing violent conflict and building a *culture of peace*. It identifies common goals and strategies to encourage national governments, European multilateral organisations (especially the EU) and the UN, as well as CSOs themselves, to better implement [*violent*] *conflict prevention* and *peacebuilding* policies.
>
> These institutions are already committed to furthering this agenda and to the active engagement of CSOs in that process. This provides us with a real opportunity to have an impact. This Dublin Action Agenda was presented to the Irish Government – which [then held] the EU Presidency – on April 2, 2004. It will subsequently contribute to the development of an International Action Agenda, to be presented to the UN Secretary-General in July 2005 in New York [emphasis added].
>
> (ECCP, 2004, p. 2)

Accordingly, an international conference was held at the UN in New York in July 2005, to analyze recommendations generated by 15 regions worldwide in order to further develop an "International Agenda to guide future conflict prevention initiatives" (also see ECCP, 2003b,c; www.conflict-prevention.net).

> The global Conference, which brought over 900 attendees – including civil society, governments and UN personnel – to the [UN] headquarters in New York in July, decisively placed conflict prevention on the international community's radar. Subsequently, GPPAC has been increasingly involved in high-level UN discussions, including with the Security Council, about civil-society government partnerships for conflict prevention.
>
> The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission after the World Summit secured a base within the UN system to consolidate and coordinate peacebuilding activities. GPPAC and our partners lobbied hard to ensure that civil society has a consultative role in the Commission, and we look forward to making the most of that role.
>
> (van Tongeren, 2006)

Clearly, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is an initiative for the worldwide development of something like

NEPSS. Through the "top-down/bottom-up" synergy likely to be generated by international–regional interaction, collaboration, and *coordination*, this program should facilitate the development of something like NEPSS – in its prescriptive as well as descriptive manifestations – in the Balkans in particular and Europe in general. This could, in turn, feed back into the further development of something like NEPSS in other regions and, ultimately, at the global level as well (see Chapter 10).

Conclusion

NEPSS has been presented in this chapter as a possibly appropriate design for the European Union to use as a basis for "capturing the complexity" of deep-rooted, identity-based conflicts such as those that characterized the Balkans during the 1990s. As of this writing, the EU has assumed control of the NATO-led SFOR mission in Bosnia. The EU has also embarked upon a policy "to strengthen its capacity to better prevent conflicts from breaking out, to intervene more quickly and efficiently in crisis situations when conflicts do occur and to provide sustainable support for post-conflict reconstruction," in a "space" where the UN and civil society organizations (CSOs) are attempting to achieve worldwide the same goals through the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).

It has been argued that NEPSS is relevant to dealing with Yugoslav-type conflicts at any point in their development (latent, manifest/nonviolent, manifest/violent), but preferably at their earliest stage, when the international community can be most proactive and effective with steps to achieve violent-conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy.

Given the present state of affairs in Bosnia, a fully developed, "mature" NEPSS could facilitate further the transition from negative to positive peace, and perhaps reduce some of the motivation for those in the region and elsewhere who are, or could be, prepared to forfeit their lives in the commission of acts of catastrophic terrorism.

In the next chapter, we articulate the design of a research project involving interviews with CSCE/OSCE negotiators at three points in time – 1993, 1997, and 1999 – to elicit their views on peace and security in the post–Cold War, *pre*–9/11 world, in part to explore to what extent their collective wisdom (*practice*) overlaps with, improves upon or undermines (*"falsifies"*) NEPSS (*theory*).

Chapter 4

Eliciting the wisdom of CSCE/OSCE negotiators

Research design

Introduction

The original research problem for the project featured in this volume was to explore how the international community could do better at anticipating and preventing *future Yugoslavias*. After 9/11, the prevention of *catastrophic terrorism* (Hamburg, 2002) was included as a goal as well on the assumption that the etiologies of both types of *political* violence are conceptually similar and/or epiphenomenally connected. In other words, I hypothesized that the sources of the genocidal violence in former Yugoslavia could give rise to terrorism as well.

I conducted interviews with senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators in Vienna, Austria, at three points in time during the turbulent 1990s, plus in 2004, to explore to what extent, if any, something like the 3PF-based NEPSS was part of the thinking of diplomatic practitioners, and to ascertain trends over time in negotiators' *perceptions* of peace and security in Europe during the postmodern era.

One question immediately comes to mind: Why the CSCE/OSCE, instead of, say, NATO or the EU? Alternatively, why did I not interview political–military officers from European and other embassies in Washington, DC? Why did I decide that this particular international organization, based in Vienna, Austria, was an appropriate source of relevant insights and a conceptual and operational vehicle for applying some of the theory outlined in Chapter 2 to international efforts to deal with Yugoslav-type conflicts?

In the beginning: the "Helsinki process"

The CSCE was a product of the Cold War. Its initial negotiations were launched in 1972 and ended in 1975, with the *Helsinki Final Act* establishing a basis for coexistence and eventually cooperative relations between the two superpowers and their respective treaty organizations of the period – NATO and WTO – plus the neutral and nonaligned of Europe.

Over the years, there were numerous review and summit meetings of the CSCE, further refining and implementing provisions based on the three

"baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act (1975). By the end of the Cold War, and the reframing of the CSCE as the OSCE, these had evolved into the

1 *Political and military*.
2 *Economic and environmental* and
3 *Humanitarian and human rights'* dimensions of *comprehensive* security.

Two of these, basket 1 with its emphasis on CSBMs and basket 3 with its emphasis on human rights, helped bring about the end of the Cold War.[1]

It is interesting to note that the revolutionary developments that facilitated the ending of the Cold War took place within the same time frame that one particular consequence of the ending of the Cold War also occurred: the implosion of former Yugoslavia into genocidal warfare.

Among the positive developments, however, especially within the context of the CSCE/OSCE, there were those that constituted explicit attempts to end – and to build upon the ending of – the Cold War, in effect to *endogenize* (i.e., replace with conflict-resolving mechanisms) the "Hobbesian black hole of international anarchy."

Peace and security in post–Cold War Europe

These developments included one of the signature events of the ending of the Cold War, the Paris Summit of the CSCE (November 19–21, 1990), plus the summit's related and subsequent developments.

The Paris CSCE summit

One of the achievements of the Paris CSCE summit was the US criterion-event for holding the summit, the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (CFE), which limited each of the former Cold War blocs, NATO and the WTO, to equal numbers of tanks (20,000), armored combat vehicles (30,000), artillery (20,000), combat aircraft (6,800), and attack helicopters (2,000) (see ACDA, 1990). Ambassador Jonathan Dean, former chief US negotiator at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks which preceded CFE, defined the CFE Treaty as "the *definitive* end of the surprise attack option" (emphasis added) (cited in Leopold, 1990).

Another development of the Paris summit was the *Joint Declaration* in which the 16 members of NATO and six members of the WTO solemnly pledged that they were "no longer adversaries," but instead, determined to "build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship." They agreed further to recognize that "the security of each of their countries [was] inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the [CSCE]" (ibid.). In effect, they were attempting to neutralize two sources of *strategic frustration* during the Cold War – the *prisoners' dilemma* (Rapoport, 1960) and *security dilemma* (Herz, 1959) – whereby competing states in the

Realpolitik mode tended to *counterproductively* pursue their own security interests at the expense of one another (−10, +10/ +10, −10).

The *Document of the Vienna Negotiations on* Confidence- and Security-building Measures (CSBMs Vienna Document, 1990) was issued right before the Paris summit. It contributed further to the confidence-building process begun during the initial meetings of the CSCE in 1973–5 and improved upon during the Stockholm Conference on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm Document, 1986).[2] By enhancing *transparency* within the CSCE concerning otherwise potentially suspicious military activities, these new CSBMs built upon a "conflict-resolution-friendly" tradition that had developed over time within the CSCE, by providing the former Cold War adversaries with further "*opportunities to falsify their worst-case assumptions about each other*" (Sandole, 1991, p. 10).

The remaining, and in some ways, most important development associated with the Paris CSCE summit was the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* that on behalf of all (then 34) CSCE participating states formally brought the Cold War to an end: "*The era of confrontation and division of Europe [had] ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation*" (emphasis added) (*Charter of Paris*, 1990, p. 13).

The Charter also took initial steps to institutionalize the CSCE which, until the Paris summit, had been a process with no fixed address, secretariat, or regularly scheduled meetings. Thus, the Charter called for regular meetings of CSCE heads of state or government during CSCE follow-up meetings (approximately once every 2 years); and for meetings of CSCE foreign ministers, in the form of the newly created Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, to take place at least once each year. To prepare the meetings of the Council (including reviewing current issues and making recommendations), the Charter created a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), which would also implement the Council's decisions.

Further, the Charter created

- CSCE Secretariat in Prague (which was subsequently relocated to Vienna, but with an office remaining in Prague);
- an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw (subsequently renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR]); and
- a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna.[3]

The CPC was initially given responsibility for providing support for the implementation of a number of the newly created CSBMs:

- annual exchange of military information;
- consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities;
- communications network;
- cooperation regarding hazardous incidents of a military nature; and
- the annual implementation assessment meetings.

Left unclear was whether the Centre would constitute a forum for dispute settlement. The Charter had affirmed the commitment of the participating states, not only to *prevent* [violent] conflicts, but to define and seek "appropriate mechanisms for the *resolution* of any disputes which may arise" (emphasis added) (*Charter of Paris*, 1990, p. 18). It mentioned the opportunity provided by CSCE experts scheduled to meet in Valletta, Malta, January 15–February 8, 1991, whose objective was to create a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Valletta meeting took place and established the "CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" (Valletta Report, 1991). It did not, however, assign the Procedure to the Conflict Prevention Centre. That task was left to the first meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which took place in Berlin, June 19–20, 1991.

Among other things (accepting Albania into the CSCE and adopting the *Berlin Mechanism* for consultation and cooperation regarding emergency situations), the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs designated the Conflict Prevention Centre as the "nominating institution" for the CSCE Procedure (the *Valletta Mechanism*); that is, for any given dispute, the Centre director could preside over the creation, but not the functioning, of a "CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism." Hence, the Berlin meeting of the Council provided the CPC with some degree of a conflict-resolution supplement to its original crisis-prevention/management function.

The Charter also affirmed "that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious *identity* of national minorities will be protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop that *identity* without any discrimination and in full equality before the law" (emphasis added) (*Charter of Paris*, 1990, p. 14).

The signatories expressed their "determination to combat all forms of racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds" (ibid., p. 17). This concern was based, in large part, on certain right-wing extremist developments that had been occurring in Austria, France, Germany and elsewhere (see, e.g., Kitschelt, 1995; Merkl and Weinberg, 1997; The Evens Foundation, 2002), which led to the CSCE Experts Meeting on National Minorities in Geneva, July 1–19, 1991. The objective of this meeting was, "to hold a thorough discussion on the issue of national minorities and of the rights of persons belonging to them" (*Charter of Paris*, Supplementary Document, 1990, p. 21; Geneva Report, 1991).

Post-Paris CSCE developments

Shortly after the abortive coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev during August 19–21, 1991, the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE took place during

September 10–October 4, 1991. This contributed further to the development of the evolving human dimension mechanism (the *Moscow Mechanism*), including conditions under which "A state may . . . be *forced* to receive a rapporteur mission . . . for fact-finding" (emphasis added) (CSCE Commission, 1992, p. 27).

Also, during January 30–31, 1992, the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers met in Prague. One of the decisions it took was to establish the possibility of *consensus-minus-one* decision making in cases of egregious violations of CSCE principles and commitments (ibid., p. 22). Specifically, in cases of "clear, gross and uncorrected violations" of CSCE commitments, the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers or CSO could take "appropriate action," even, if necessary, "*in the absence of the consent of the State concerned*." But this particular encroachment on the principles of consensus and national sovereignty went only so far: "Such actions would consist of political declarations or other political steps to apply *outside* the territory of the State concerned" (emphasis added) (Prague CSCE ["Prague Document"], 1992, p. 4).[4]

By the time the fourth CSCE review conference convened in Helsinki, a number of additional CSBMs had been produced. Adopted by consensus on March 4, 1992, these were inclusive of new provisions on, among others,

- information exchange;
- notification;
- constraints on the size of military exercises; and
- inspections (see CSBMs Vienna Document, 1992).

Further, an *Open Skies Treaty* had been concluded on March 21, 1992, permitting overflights of the territories of the 24 signatory states (covering the area from Vancouver to Vladivostock), thereby providing additional (and "equal") opportunities for *"falsifying worst-case assumptions."* The stage was set for more to come.

The Helsinki CSCE review conference met during March 24–July 8, 1992, concluding with a 2-day summit during July 9–10 and a declaration which reflected the recommendation of the 1991 NATO Rome summit to improve CSCE conflict-prevention and crisis-management mechanisms (NATO Rome Summit, 1991). In this regard, the Helsinki CSCE created a HCNM which, using the resources of the Warsaw-based ODIHR, would have two functions: (1) *early warning* and (2) *early action*. These could be performed:

> at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgment of the Commissioner, have the potential to

> develop [*spill over*] into a conflict within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating States.
>
> (*CSCE Helsinki Document 1992*, ch. II, p. 7)

At the "early warning" level, the HCNM could collect and assess information concerning minority issues, "from any source, including the media and nongovernmental organizations" (ibid., p. 11). Such sources could include data generated by Ted Robert Gurr's *Minorities at Risk* project (Gurr, 1993, 2000a,b; Gurr *et al.*, 2000). Also at this stage, the HCNM could visit any CSCE state and "communicate in person . . . with parties directly concerned to obtain first-hand information about the situation," for example, the "role of the parties directly concerned, the nature of the tensions and recent developments . . . and . . . the potential consequences for peace and stability within the CSCE area" (*CSCE Helsinki Document*, 1992, ch. II, pp. 8–9). If the HCNM were to determine "that there [was] a *prima facie* risk of potential conflict . . . he/she [could then] issue an early warning, which [would] be communicated promptly . . . to the CSO" (ibid., p. 9).

Part of the HCNM's "early action" function might be "to enter into further contact and closer consultation with the parties concerned with a view to possible solutions, according to a mandate to be decided by the CSO" (ibid.). Suggestive of opportunities for *nongovernmental* conflict-resolution specialists to work collaboratively with the CSCE, the HCNM could consult up to three experts "with relevant expertise in specific matters" (ibid., p. 13). Such persons would "be selected by the [HCNM] with the assistance of the ODIHR [Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights] from the resource list" maintained by the ODIHR for the Human Dimension Mechanism (the "Moscow Mechanism") (ibid.).

Once it received an early warning from the HCNM or any other prescribed source (e.g., other CSCE offices, or a state directly involved in a dispute), the CSO could also "seek independent advice and counsel from relevant experts [as well as from] institutions, and international organizations" (ibid., ch. III, p. 16). Thereafter, the CSO, acting on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers, would have "overall CSCE responsibility for managing [any] crisis with a view to its resolution":

> It may, *inter alia*, decide to set up a framework for a negotiated settlement, or to dispatch a rapporteur or fact-finding mission. The CSO may also initiate or promote the exercise of good offices, mediation or conciliation.
>
> (Ibid., pp. 16–17)[5]

The Helsinki review conference also provided for the possibility of CSCE peacekeeping operations: a development prompted by the escalation of violent ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union.[6]

Overall, the conference was associated with new and enhanced conflict-prevention and crisis-management mechanisms, plus references in the

concluding document to *social justice*, *basic human needs*, and *provention* (Burton, 1990): to "the CSCE [as] crucial to our efforts to forestall aggression and violence by addressing the *root causes* of problems" (emphasis added) (*CSCE Helsinki Document 1992* ["Helsinki Summit Declaration"], pp. 2, 5, 6). Accordingly, CSCE negotiators appear to have concluded at Helsinki that a post–Cold War peace and security system in Europe should require elements of both *negative* and *positive peace*: the former to stop or prevent violence and the latter to deal with the often *deep-rooted* problems underlying violent expressions of conflict.

By the end of Helsinki, on July 10, 1992, problems with the CFE Treaty resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union into the three Baltic States and 12 other successor states, had been resolved, with the relevant states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine) accepting a redistribution of the obligations incurred by the former USSR. By that time, although Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia had yet to ratify the CFE,[7] "all states parties signed the Provisional Application of the CFE Treaty, which brought the Treaty provisionally into force" (Sharp, 1993, p. 598).[8] The follow-up to the CFE negotiations, the CFE–1A Talks, dealing with personnel limitations, produced an agreement that was signed in Helsinki on July 10, 1992 as well.[9]

Also at Helsinki, the CSCE participating states decided to continue the momentum generated, in part, by the CSBMs and CFE negotiations, by combining them into one set of negotiations: the CSCE *Forum for Security Cooperation* (FSC), which began in Vienna, September 22, 1992 (see *CSCE Helsinki Document 1992*, ch. V). The FSC is

> less concerned with negotiating force reductions than with establishing a *continuing dialogue* on security *perceptions* and policies, not least the *military's role in a democracy*. High on the agenda [was] the negotiation of [the] *code of conduct*... prescrib[ing] limits on a government's use of force on its own territory [which was later agreed upon as part of the Budapest CSCE 1994 decisions; see below] [emphasis added].
>
> (Walker, 1993b, p. 110)

Attempting to further develop CSCE capabilities for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the participating states also decided at Helsinki to convene a meeting at Geneva, during October 12–23, 1992, to work toward the creation of a CSCE *Conciliation and Arbitration Court*, enhancing the Valletta Mechanism, and establishing "a CSCE procedure for conciliation, including directed conciliation" (*CSCE Helsinki Document 1992*, ch. III, p. 24). By the time the fifth CSCE review conference and accompanying CSCE summit concluded in Budapest, in December 1994, the *Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration* had come into force.[10]

Decisions taken at the Budapest CSCE summit, December 5–6, 1994, included, among others:

(a) the *CSCE becoming the body of first resort for dealing with conflicts*: "a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the region";
(b) agreement on a *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*, setting forth guidelines for the "role of armed forces in democratic societies";
(c) agreement on the "political will to provide, with an appropriate resolution from the [UN] Security Council, a *multinational peacekeeping force* [for Nagorno-Karabakh] following agreement among the parties for cessation of the armed conflict"; and
(d) as of January 1, 1995, "the CSCE [would be] known as the *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe* (OSCE)" [emphasis added].

(*CSCE Budapest Document 1994*, "Budapest Summit Declaration" and "Budapest Decisions," chs I–II, IV)[11]

Further, an agreement on CSBMs (CSBMs Vienna Document, 1994) was adopted at Budapest:

> Together with many additions and improvements, completely new texts [were] added, for instance the annual exchange of information on defence planning, to be given not later than two months after the adoption of the defence budget.
>
> (*CSCE '94*, no. 4, p. 10)

This was all rather impressive, especially the "historical first" for the CSCE: agreeing in principle to provide a peacekeeping force to help maintain the "negative peace," in effect since May 12, 1994, between the Armenian and Azerbaijani parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh war. However, at least two developments dampened the enthusiasm one might otherwise have experienced upon reviewing the results of CSCE Budapest:

1 The CSCE representatives could not agree on either a common position or common policy with regard to the brutal war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
2 Slightly less than a week after the conclusion of the Budapest CSCE summit, on December 11, 1994, Russia initiated its disastrous "first" war against Chechnya (1994–6).

Taken together with (then) CSCE Secretary-General Wilhelm Höynck's (1994, p. 5) observation that, "to date none of the CSCE's procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes [including the 'Valletta Mechanism'] has

been used by the participating States," the CSCE's overall efforts to *endogenize* the *Hobbesian black hole of international anarchy* reflected more illusion than reality.

The potential of CSCE mechanisms had not been fully realized because of, among other reasons:

1 The lack of political will on the part of member states to make difficult decisions, for example, regarding the wars in former Yugoslavia.
2 The existence of competitive (inter*blocking* instead of inter*locking*) relations between the CSCE and other international organizations, for example, the UN (see Sandole, 1995a). And
3 The *intractability* (i.e., resolution-inhibiting aspects) of the conflicts themselves due, in part, to the *interaction effects* of "history" and impact of (then) recent brutalities on parties' willingness to continue fighting to "settle" conflicts on the battlefield.

In addition, the "temporal immaturity" and jurisdiction of the new CSCE institutions and processes at the time rendered them relatively impotent to either prevent or otherwise deal with the violent ethnic conflicts of post-Cold War Europe. The Geneva meeting on national minorities in July 1991, for instance, occurred during the onset of the first round of the Yugoslav wars. Appropriate CSCE institutions and processes were then either nonexistent (e.g., the HCNM) or not sufficiently developed (e.g., the CPC, ODIHR) to be of any use: they were "too" new.

Except for those few cases where the new mechanisms dealt specifically with relations *within* CSCE participating states (e.g., the Moscow Mechanism and the HCNM), the CSCE – subsequently the OSCE – deals with relations *between* member states. This is a major example of Muzafer Sherif's (1967) "heavy hand of the past," in this case, the sovereignty-protecting tradition of the Westphalian system of international law. Although there have been some attempts at "paradigm shifting" on this issue,[12] the CSCE/OSCE and other IGOs have been, and in some ways, remain *irrelevant* to what has been occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This potentially fatal flaw has been a major challenge facing the architects of peace and security in postmodern Europe.

The situation did not improve dramatically with the "reinvention" of the CSCE as the OSCE. The results of the OSCE summit at Lisbon during December 1996, for example, were basically uninspiring, in part, because of a lack of consensus on how to frame efforts to deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. One possible exception to an otherwise lackluster final document was the *Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-first Century*, comprising, among other things, a *Platform for Cooperative Security* which would

define "modalities for cooperation between the OSCE and other security organizations," and a *Charter on European Security* (see *OSCE Lisbon Document 1996* and CSCE Commission 1997b).

As indicated in Chapter 3, the Charter and Platform were among the products of the OSCE summit at Istanbul during November 1999. These enhanced the capabilities of the OSCE to respond more effectively to Yugoslav-type conflicts. Another consequence of Istanbul was the decision to create:

> Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) [which] would enable the OSCE "to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations." The [Istanbul] Summit recognized that "the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation." The implementation of the REACT initiative would give the [OSCE] "the ability to address problems before they become crises and to deploy quickly the civilian component of a peacekeeping operation when needed."
>
> (*Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities*, pp. 110–11)[13,14]

A multitrack basis for OSCE collaboration with other International Organizations (IOs)

Either through the Platform for Cooperative Security, REACT, or any other vehicle for facilitating *complementarity*, the OSCE could draw upon *non-governmental* (e.g., *track 2–9*) conflict-resolution resources to deal with violent conflicts that are likely to take place (*early warning* and *conflict prevention*); are taking place (*crisis management*); or have taken place (*post-conflict rehabilitation*). One attraction of multitrack actors is that they can attempt to get a constructive dialogue going between conflicting parties, often in situations where *track 1 governmental* processes have failed to do so.[15] A major objective of such dialogues is to substitute collaborative, *problem solving* conflict resolution for confrontational processes.[16]

Multitrack processes can be used in the short term as part of OSCE REACT/EU Crisis-Management deployments to help avert or reduce and terminate hostilities (*negative peace)*. In the middle to long term, they can be used to facilitate the collaborative solving of problems underlying violent conflict situations and reconciliation among the parties (*positive peace*). In either case, parties to conflicts would have to invite multitrack practitioners into their "space" as third parties (e.g., facilitators, mediators) to assist them in establishing and maintaining collaborative processes, complementing and/or linking up with corresponding track 1 processes (e.g., UN, OSCE, EU, NATO) whenever appropriate and possible.

The number of potential practitioners of problem-solving conflict resolution is growing.[17] Their names could be included in the registers of qualified

candidates maintained by the CPC for the *Valletta Mechanism* and by the ODIHR for the *Moscow Mechanism* and the HCNM. Through the good offices of the OSCE, EU, UN, and other IOs, these practitioners could be made available to conflicting parties considering use of any of the various OSCE, EU, or other mechanisms for conflict prevention or peaceful settlement of disputes.[18]

The promise and working hypothesis of the multitrack option is that effective collaboration – *coordination* – between the OSCE (and other IGOs) and nongovernmental conflict-resolution resources could enhance the prospects for originally "local" conflicts to be dealt with at that level to the satisfaction of all concerned, thereby preventing them from *spilling over* to neighboring and other areas within or outside the OSCE.

Relevance of the CSCE/OSCE to exploring the "goodness-of-fit" between NEPSS and the thinking of diplomatic practitioners

Despite the relative lack of success of the CSCE/OSCE in dealing with some of the major ethnic conflicts of the postmodern period – the HCNM and field missions constituting major exceptions (see Hopmann, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005; Kemp, 2001) – CSCE/OSCE negotiators remain appropriate for this study for a number of reasons:

1 They are among the "official" (track 1) *architects* of peace and security in postmodern Europe and, therefore, their views could be useful in preventing "future Yugoslavias" and acts of catastrophic terrorism (e.g., Madrid on March 11, 2004 and London on July 7, 2005). As the world's most comprehensive *regional* peace and security organization, their activities are enhanced by the fact that the OSCE includes nearly 30 percent of UN member states (55/191 = 29 percent), 4 out of 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and the richest and most powerful states on the planet.

2 In contrast to NATO, which is concerned primarily with *"hard security"* (e.g., the use of coercive peacemaking and peacekeeping to lead to and maintain *negative peace*), the OSCE deals primarily with *"soft security"* (e.g., noncoercive peacemaking and peacebuilding that could lead to and maintain *positive peace*) (see Nye, 2004; Leatherman, 2003).

3 As *forecasters*, CSCE/OSCE negotiators could provide expert judgments on issues such as the (1) spillover potential of certain conflicts (e.g., in the Caucasus or Central Asia); (2) how those conflicts might end; and (3) the likely resumption of other conflicts (e.g., the Balkan wars of the 1990s). For example, their judgments on the likelihood that the Balkan wars could have spilled over to other countries (e.g., Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania), that they could have ended in certain ways, and that they might, or might

not resume – could be used, together with insights from representatives of other IOs (e.g., EU, NATO, IA, Carter Center), as a basis for *proactive* early warning, anticipating likely events and then, in a *coordinated* fashion with others, taking corrective action to attempt to head them off. And

4 Their perceptions of peace and security could influence their own behavior in dealing with conflicts that could develop into Yugoslav-type situations and related acts of terrorism. As Anatol Rapoport (1974, p. 7) reminds us

> what men say or think about conflict . . . has a great bearing on the nature of human conflict and its consequences. . . . [Hence,] we shall have to examine various *conceptions* of conflict, not only with the view of estimating to what extent the concepts are accurate (as one does with scientific theories) but also with the view of seeing how some of these conceptions make human conflicts what they are.

Further, there was always the chance that the interview process might be as revealing of insights for the participants as it was for me. In other words, I initially conducted this study not only for its intellectual, "scientific" value, but also to help move the process of preventing future Yugoslavias along, by endeavoring to interact in a mutually beneficial manner with diplomatic practitioners involved in that process. That process has included, from the start, my sending copies of successive reports of the project to interviewees, often with the assistance of the OSCE Secretariat.

This relates to the reasons why anyone conducts research on some *natural* or *social phenomenon*. According to Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook (1965, pp. 4–5, 26–8), these include:

1 *Scientific/intellectual* reasons; that is, adding to, revising, and/or rejecting established knowledge in a particular field. And
2 *Practical* reasons; that is, assessing the need for – or establishing – new facilities, mechanisms or procedures; or improving existing facilities, mechanisms or procedures. For example, as *evaluators* of the CSCE/OSCE, the respondents could provide assessments of and recommendation for improving the organization's capabilities for (1) early warning; (2) conflict prevention; (3) crisis management; and (4) post-conflict rehabilitation. These are, again, possible responses to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's comment uttered centuries ago that "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232).

Given our discussion in Chapter 2, we could also add a third set of reasons:

3 *Moral/ethical* reasons; that is, doing the "right thing" for *the common*, sustainable development, and for the parties in conflict, especially

members of minority groups embedded in structurally and culturally violent systems – what Louise Diamond (1997) calls *conflict-habituated systems*.

I was as concerned with the practical and moral as well as the scientific. Hence, by virtue of the process of conducting the interviews, plus by sending respondents copies of successive reports on the project, I hoped to provide them with opportunities to *reflect* on their views about certain issues, and about how the CSCE/OSCE was performing its various duties and missions. In effect, I hoped to provide them with an external basis for *evaluating* the CSCE/OSCE in particular, and other institutions of the international community in general, with a view toward achieving three objectives:

1 *Improving* CSCE/OSCE efforts to achieve early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation.
2 Enabling CSCE/OSCE negotiators to *judge* whether any particular CSCE/OSCE facilities, mechanisms, procedures, or operations should be continued and/or disbanded. And
3 enhancing their general *knowledge* about what the CSCE/OSCE and other international actors were doing to prevent Yugoslav-type conflicts and catastrophic terrorism in postmodern Europe. Such activities could encompass "lessons learned and/or . . . policy options" (Patton, 1997, p. 70), including those that could be exported elsewhere (e.g., to the Korean peninsula).[19]

Relevance of the OSCE to efforts to deal with terrorism

At the Ninth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Bucharest, Romania, December 3–4, 2001, the "Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism" was adopted. Basically, the Plan called for the OSCE to expand what it normally does, to "contribute to the global fight against terrorism, facilitate interaction between States and, where appropriate, identify new instruments for action" (*OSCE Newsletter*, November/December 2001). This provided the mandate for the establishment of the OSCE's Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) (www.osce.org/atu).

In addition, according to the (then) OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Romania's Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana

> [Although] the OSCE is not the lead organization in the fight against terrorism . . . we can address some of its *root causes*, the political, social and economic inequalities that provide a fertile breeding ground for exploitation by extremist ideologies [emphasis added].
>
> (Ibid.)

Finnish Member of Parliament Kimmo Kiljunen (2001) has expanded on this *added-value* of the OSCE:

> [T]he deepest meaning of [September 11, 2001] is the change in the forms and logic of warfare. This *new warfare*... forces the states to change many traditional political conclusions, such as the resources used for defence.... To prevent the worse scenarios from happening, we need *global* political solutions... a wholly *new way of thinking* on many issues.
>
> The approach of the OSCE for a *comprehensive security agenda*... is expansive and integrated. It is largely based on the broad concept of security developed by the Organization [which] aims to define and solve the *root causes* of insecurity, and in so doing articulates positions on a wide range of problems – military, humanitarian, minority, economic, environmental, juridical, and democratic. This, in sum, is a *methodology*, a method for developing security, that engages with the cause of insecurity. With terrorism and anti-terrorism now so suddenly a massive issue of *common security* the right approach could be used to ensure that revenge, war, and conflict do not take over. The means for doing this are there [emphasis added].

On December 14, 2001, 10 days following the Bucharest meeting, a conference took place in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. This led to the "OSCE Programme of Action," which included the option, suggested by (then) Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev (later overthrown by a popular revolt), of initiating a dialogue between the OSCE and the 55-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (*OSCE Newsletter*, 2002a). Subsequently, on January 29, 2002, the new OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Portugal's Foreign Minister Jaime Gama, "appointed a former Danish Minister of Defence, Jan Troejborg, to be his Personal Representative to co-ordinate OSCE activities in the fight against terrorism" (*OSCE Newsletter*, 2002b).

Overarching research design

The project presented in this volume comprises four successive surveys during an 11-year period:

1. Spring/summer 1993, when 32 representatives from 29 of the (then) 53 CSCE participating States were interviewed.
2. Spring/summer 1997, when 47 representatives from 46 of the 55 OSCE participating States were interviewed.
3. Spring/summer 1999, when 47 representatives from 47 of the 55 OSCE participating States were interviewed. And
4. Spring/summer 2004, when 19 representatives from 18 of the 55 OSCE participating States were interviewed.

Why conduct interviews at four points in time over an 11-year period? The simple answer is, to explore *trends* and the extent to which responses to questions reflected *convergent* or *divergent views*. If perceptions on a given security issue converged over time, that would imply a tendency toward *common perceptions* on the issue. The corresponding policy implication is that common perceptions are likely to lead to *common approaches* to problem solving with a greater likelihood of success.

Also noteworthy about this study is that the 1993 CSCE survey occurred *2 years after* the onset of war in former Yugoslavia and *2 years before* NATO and the Dayton peace process stopped the wars in Bosnia in 1995. By contrast, the 1997 OSCE survey took place *2 years after* NATO and Dayton stopped the wars in Bosnia, and *2 years before* the crisis in Kosovo reached the boiling point, ushering in massive NATO intervention to stop the Serb-led campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar ethnic Albanians. The 1999 OSCE survey took place immediately after the cessation of NATO's 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia over the Kosovo issue. It also took place *2 years before* the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Finally, the 2004 OSCE survey took place *3 years after* 9/11.

As in a *"true" experimental design*, therefore, we could say that the 1993 CSCE interviews took place 2 years *before*, and the 1997 OSCE interviews 2 years *after*, NATO intervention in the Bosnian wars, which culminated in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords and cessation of those wars. Further, we could say that the 1997 OSCE survey took place *before* and the 1999 survey took place *after* the NATO intervention in the Kosovo crisis.

Since basically the same questions were asked in 1997 and 1999 as in 1993, another objective of the CSCE/OSCE project was to explore to what extent, if any, NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo may have influenced respondents' perceptions of peace and security in post–Cold War Europe.

Finally, we could say that the 1999 survey took place *before* and the 2004 survey *after* 9/11. Again, in addition to some updating and fine-tuning, much the same categories of questions were asked as before. Hence, we could explore to what extent 9/11 may have impacted negotiators' views of select categories of issues. (We could also explore the extent to which negotiators felt that there was any linkage between the new warfare and the new terrorism.)

Accordingly, NATO intervention and the return of "negative peace" to Bosnia (see Holbrooke, 1998; Bildt, 1998) and Kosovo (see Clark, 2001), plus 9/11, could be viewed as *"natural"* or *"social experiments"*: "where [in each case] the changes [in a situation were] produced, not by the scientist's intervention, but by that of the policy maker or practitioner" (or terrorist).[20] These changes could also be viewed as *profound discontinuities*, *catastrophic shifts*, or as *"benchmarks"* (see K.J. Holsti, 1998).[21] (For further details of the designs for the 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys, see Appendix A.)

Conclusion

Despite a marked lack of success in dealing with some of the major *new wars* early on in the 1990s, the OSCE remains committed to dealing with those wars and the conflicts which have, or could have, escalated into them. Moreover, certain OSCE mechanisms, especially the field missions and the HCNM, have been particularly successful during the latter part of the 1990s (see Hopmann, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005; Kemp, 2001; Oberschmidt and Zellner, 2001). For these and other reasons, senior OSCE negotiators remain relevant as sources of insight on peace and security in postmodern Europe, including, in general, how the international community could better strive to prevent *future Yugoslavias* as well as, in particular, how the OSCE itself could play a significant role in this regard.

The next chapter deals with negotiators' *perceptions* of key security issues, plus shifts in the levels of *agreement* and *consensus* on those issues, across the original three points in time: 1993, 1997, and 1999. Consensus – a key feature of the CSCE/OSCE – is especially relevant to generating momentum to do the *right thing* as well as the *practical thing*: to respond to regional and global challenges to peace and security in *coordinated*, multilevel ways. It is only through such action that *superordinate* global challenges posed by poverty, terrorism, the AIDS pandemic, avian bird flu (H5N1), and other problems, can be effectively addressed.

Chapter 5

CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions of select peace and security issues[1]

Introduction

Before addressing our initial set of empirical findings, let's briefly recap where we have been in our "intellectual journey" to explore prospects for more effectively analyzing and dealing with future Yugoslavias and related acts of terrorism.

Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the volume, the reasons for it, its objectives, and its layout. Chapter 2 articulates a framework that may enhance prospects for better analyzing and preventing *future Yugoslavias* and related acts of terrorism. Chapter 3 represents a theoretical application of that framework to the development of a peace and security system for post–Cold War Europe that could be more effective in preventing future Yugoslav-type conflicts and terrorism. Chapter 4 designs an empirical research project to explore the "goodness-of-fit" between the theoretically based NEPSS and the perceptions of senior diplomatic practitioners who are professionally committed to advancing peace and security in Europe.

In this chapter, the first of our five chapters on the findings generated by that project, we examine responses by senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators in the *pre–9/11 world* (1993, 1997, and 1999), to 15 closed-ended questions dealing with peace and security in post–Cold War Europe.[2]

We conduct this examination by making "before–after" comparisons between *mean scores* for the five individual groupings of CSCE/OSCE participating States – NATO, NNA, FYug (former Yugoslavia), NSWP (Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact), and FSU (Former Soviet Union) – and between "*grand means*" for the five groupings taken together, with higher scores on a 1–5 scale indicating levels of agreement with any particular question (and corresponding issue).

Our *measures of central tendency* – that is, in each case, "the most representative value of [a] distribution" for each grouping on a particular

question – are indicated by the *mean scores* reported in Appendix B. These provide us with some sense of where each of the five groupings of CSCE/OSCE participating States was at any point in time with regard to the others, and over time with regard to itself on the 1–5 scale (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, p. 371). *Grand means* provide some sense of where all five groupings *taken together* were on each question at each point in time on the 1–5 scale. Again, *the higher the score on the 1–5 scale, the higher the level of agreement.*

In addition to locating the CSCE/OSCE negotiators in terms of levels of agreement/disagreement on any particular question and corresponding issue, we attempted to ascertain their *consensus* on that issue. We did that by computing, for each grand mean, the corresponding *standard deviation* as a measure of the "extent of dispersion about the central value [the grand mean]" (see ibid., p. 371) or, in our case, an indicator of homogeneity, unanimity or *consensus* of agreement/disagreement. By providing some sense of the range or spread of *individual means* (for the five groupings) about the *grand mean*, we can interpret each standard deviation as follows: the *smaller the standard deviation* or spread, the *closer* the individual means are to the grand mean, the *more similar* the individual means are and, therefore, the *more* reflective of *consensus* they are. The *larger the standard deviation*, on the other hand, the *less consensus* among the five groupings taken together on a particular question (issue).

So, to recap, *lower standard deviations* mean *higher consensus* on any particular question (issue), while *higher standard deviations* mean *lower consensus*.

The findings: a community of values?

Grand means (GMs) and standard deviations (SDs) are presented in Table 5.1. What do they tell us?[3] Do they suggest that agreement and consensus on an "effective political system" might be developing in the CSCE/OSCE, comprising "rules of the game [and] functional equivalents to war" (see Vasquez, 1993, pp. 264, 268, 308) and therefore, an institutional response to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's proposition that "Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232)? Are there at least hints, more than 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, of "new practices and channels for the resolution of issues" (see Vasquez, 1993, p. 308) relevant to the prevention of "future Yugoslavias"? In other words, can we say that there appears to be – or appears to be developing over time (1993, 1997, 1999) – a *community of values* (*common perceptions*) on select issues within the CSCE/OSCE that might be compatible with developing something like NEPSS?

Table 5.1 Grand means and standard deviations for questions 1–15 for 1993, 1997, 1999

Q	*1993*		*1997*		*1999*	
	GM	*SD*	*GM*	*SD*	*GM*	*SD*
1	4.75	0.2326 *[3]*	4.08	0.1527 *[2]*	4.23	0.1450 *[1]*
2	3.98	0.4724 *[3]*	4.28	0.3067 *[1]*	4.19	0.4408 *[2]*
3	3.73	0.8871 *[3]*	4.01	0.5693 *[1]*	3.75	0.7645 *[2]*
4	4.17	0.6598 *[3]*	4.16	0.2853 *[2]*	4.11	0.2294 *[1]*
5	3.42	0.5765 *[3]*	3.62	0.3301 *[1]*	3.46	0.3372 *[2]*
6	3.80	0.1706 *[1]*	3.42	0.1792 *[2]*	2.96	0.5209 *[3]*
7	—	—	3.54	0.2771 *[1]*	3.68	0.3264 *[2]*
8	4.56	0.4015 *[3]*	4.57	0.2507 *[2]*	4.65	0.2393 *[1]*
9	4.36	0.2334 *[3]*	4.20	0.1253 *[1]*	4.16	0.1710 *[2]*
10	3.89	0.5645 *[3]*	4.06	0.1650 *[1]*	4.42	0.1696 *[2]*
11	3.72	0.7365 *[3]*	4.00	0.4499 *[2]*	3.84	0.3180 *[1]*
12	4.24	0.1445 *[2]*	3.87	0.1184 *[1]*	3.98	0.3128 *[3]*
13	—	—	2.45	0.3308 *[1]*	2.48	0.6869 *[2]*
14	3.87	0.2160 *[2]*	3.35	0.4220 *[3]*	3.51	0.1716 *[1]*
15	2.35	0.3537 *[3]*	2.55	0.3022 *[2]*	2.34	0.2842 *[1]*

Note
The *higher the grand mean (GM)*, the *more in agreement* respondents were with a question, and the *lower the standard deviation (SD)*, the *more consensus* there was among respondents on the question. *Italicized numbers in brackets* are rankings for the *standard deviations*: *"[1]"*: highest consensus; *"[2]"*: second highest; *"[3]"*: lowest consensus, for each of the 15 questions across the three time periods (read *horizontally* as rows). Questions nos. 7 and 13 were asked only during the 1997 and 1999 surveys. Hence, the total number of closed-ended questions in the 1993 sample corresponding to those in the 1997 and 1999 surveys is 13 (instead of 15).

A "static" picture

Let's look first at the grand means in terms of their magnitudes:

Given the data in Table 5.2, CSCE/OSCE negotiators *agreed [at least] fairly strongly* across the three time periods that:

- ethnic conflicts such as those in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union would continue to be among the major threats to international peace and security in the post–Cold War world (*question number 1*) (*pillars 1 and 2*);
- NATO could play an effective role in responding to some of these conflicts by providing peacekeeping forces (*question number 2*) (*pillar 3*);
- in dealing with these conflicts (as issues of common security), NATO should continue to consult with its former Cold War adversaries (*question number 4*) (*pillar 3*);
- there was a need to deal with the issues underlying violent conflicts like those in former Yugoslavia (*question number 8*) (*pillars 2 and 3*);

Table 5.2 Magnitudes of grand means

Near, at or above 4.00	*3.00–3.80*	*Under 3.00*
Q.1 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.2 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.3 (1997)	Q.3 (1993, 1999)	
Q.4 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
	Q.5 (1993, 1997, 1999)	
	Q.6 (1993, 1997, 1999)	
	Q.7 (1997, 1999)	
Q.8 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.9 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.10 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
Q.11 (1997, 1999)	Q.11 (1993)	
Q.12 (1993, 1997, 1999)		
		Q.13 (1997, 1999)
Q.14 (1993)	Q.14 (1997, 1999)	
		Q.15 (1993,1997,1999)

- forceful NATO intervention *alone* would not be sufficient to result in "resolution" of those conflicts (*question number 9*) (*pillar 3*);
- there was a need for coordination and integration among all actors involved in peace operations (*question number 10*) (*pillar 3*) and, finally,
- the Cold War was over (*question number 12*) (*pillar 1*)!

The CSCE/OSCE negotiators were *unsure* about whether NATO's mechanisms for reaching out to its former adversaries (NACC [EAPC]/PfP) could develop into a security system for all former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned (*question number 5*) (*pillars 1 and 3*).

They were also unsure about whether, to the extent that such a security system did develop, it should do so within the context of the CSCE/OSCE (*question number 6*) (*pillar 1*). And, further, they were unsure about whether SFOR withdrawal from Bosnia would lead to a resumption of warfare between Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (*question number 7*) (*pillars 1 and 3*).

The respondents *clearly disagreed* that NATO enlargement would threaten the relationships developed between East and West in the post–Cold War period (*question number 13*) (*pillars 1 and 3*). They also disagreed, to the extent that a perception had developed in the "Third World" that the end of the Cold War meant only that East–West had been replaced by North–South, that the perception was valid (*question number 15*) (*pillars 1 and 2*).

Putting all this together, for the CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled in this study, the Cold War ("as we knew it") was over and NATO expansion would not threaten that state of affairs. Instead, major threats to international peace and security in Europe would continue to emanate from Yugoslav-type

conflicts (although respondents were unsure whether withdrawal of the NATO-led SFOR from Bosnia would lead to a resumption of hostilities). Hence, NATO should continue to respond to these conflicts with peacekeeping forces; continue to consult with its former Warsaw Pact adversaries; and, to the extent possible, work in a coordinated, integrated fashion with conflict-resolution and humanitarian NGOs in dealing with such conflicts. These other organizations were appropriate for dealing with the issues underlying the violent expression of conflicts, which should be pursued, because conflict "resolution" in those cases would not occur from forceful NATO intervention alone. In any case, as it goes about its post–Cold War business, NATO should not develop into a security system for all former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned, and certainly *not* within the context of the CSCE/OSCE. And no matter what NATO does or does not do, the end of the Cold War does *not* mean that East–West has been replaced by North–South as the dominant axis of international conflict, even though there may be a perception to that effect in the developing world (and perhaps the beginnings of a "civilizational overlay" to global affairs).

This is not a "bad" picture of Europe in the post–Cold War, *pre–9/11* period (1993, 1997, 1999), but it is a *static* picture. What about a *dynamic*, "moving picture" – involving *shifts* and *trends in shifts* – across the three time periods?

A dynamic, "moving picture"

According to the data presented in Table 5.3, the only questions whose levels of agreement (grand means) *increased* across all three time periods were *question numbers 8 and 10*. Taken together with the observations that all of the grand means for question number 8 were above 4.56, increasing to 4.65 for 1999, and that the level of agreement for question number 10 increased from 3.89 for 1993 to 4.42 for 1999, these data suggest that an embryonic *conflict-resolution culture* developed across the three time periods in the CSCE/OSCE. That is, there were progressive increases in a strong belief that, beyond the threatened or actual use of force to "keep the peace," there was a need to deal with the issues underlying the violent expression of conflict in former Yugoslavia. Further, in their overall response to Yugoslav-type conflicts, states and IGOs should, to the extent possible, work together with humanitarian and conflict-resolution NGOs as part of an *integrated* whole.

Those questions whose levels of agreement *increased* between 1993 and 1997 (after NATO intervention in Bosnia), but then *decreased* between 1997 and 1999 (after NATO intervention in Kosovo), were: *questions number 2 [at or above 4.00], 3 [basically "mixed feelings"], 5 [mixed feelings], 11 [basically at 4.00] and 15 [under 3.00]*. Most of these questions dealt with the role of NATO in the post–Cold War world: whether NATO should intervene in Yugoslav-type conflicts; whether it should have intervened earlier in Croatia and Bosnia (and, for the 1999 survey, in Kosovo);

Table 5.3 Increases and decreases in grand means across the three time periods

[NATO in Bosnia: 1995] 1993–7		*[NATO in Kosovo: 1999] 1997–9*	
Increases	*Decreases*	*Increases*	*Decreases*
	Q.1	Q.1	
Q.2			Q.2
Q.3			Q.3
	Q.4[=]		Q.4
Q.5			Q.5
	Q.6		Q.6
		Q.7	
Q.8[=]		Q.8	
	Q.9		Q.9
Q.10		Q.10	
Q.11			Q.11
	Q.12	Q.12	
		Q.13[=]	
	Q.14	Q.14	
Q.15			Q.15

Note
The symbol [=] indicates that the change observed was minimal, suggesting near equivalence between the grand means for the two time periods concerned.

whether it – or its creations (NACC [EAPC]/PfP) – should develop into a peace and security system for all former Cold war adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned; and whether there was a need for more peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms to complement what NATO was doing.

After NATO's intervention in Bosnia in 1995, there was an *increase* in agreement with NATO's role along these dimensions, but after NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, those levels of support had *decreased*. Basically, for CSCE/OSCE negotiators, NATO seems to have had a more positive image after its intervention in Bosnia than after its intervention in Kosovo.

The questions whose levels of agreement had *decreased* between 1993 and 1997 (after NATO intervention in Bosnia) and then *increased* between 1997 and 1999 (after NATO intervention in Kosovo), were: *questions number 1 [all above 4.00], 12 [all near, at, or above 4.00] and 14 [basically mixed feelings]*. These questions concerned the nature of threats to international peace and security in the post–Cold War world.

For instance, after NATO's intervention in Bosnia in 1995, when CSCE/OSCE negotiators seem to have had a more positive image of NATO, *decreases* occurred in their level of agreement with the views that (1) Yugoslav-type conflicts would be among the major threats to international peace and security; (2) the Cold War was over; and (3) there was an image developing in the Third World that the end of the Cold War meant only that

East–West had been replaced by North–South as the dominant axis of international conflict. By contrast, after NATO's intervention in Kosovo, when CSCE/OSCE negotiators seem to have had a less favorable image of NATO, *increases* occurred in their levels of agreement with those views.

What is interesting here is that *inverse relationships* are implied between the three views. When CSCE/OSCE negotiators felt good about NATO (after the Bosnia intervention), they believed that it was (1) *less likely* that Yugoslav-type conflicts would threaten their security (presumably because of the relative success of NATO's intervention in Bosnia); (2) *less likely* that the Cold War was over (perhaps, in part, because of Russia's "first" war with Chechnya during 1994–6); and, therefore, (3) *less likely* that there was a view developing in the Third World that East–West had been eclipsed by North–South as the dominant axis of international conflict.

Conversely, when CSCE/OSCE negotiators felt less positive about NATO (after the Kosovo intervention), they believed that (1) Yugoslav-type threats were *more likely*; (2) the Cold War was *more likely* to be over; and, therefore, (3) it was *more likely* that a view was developing in the Third World that the end of the Cold War meant only that East–West had been replaced by North–South as the dominant axis of international conflict. Or, as I have mentioned elsewhere, "It has been almost as if a certain 'conflict equilibrium' must be maintained worldwide: when conflict at one level [i.e., *inter*state [East–West] subsides, it picks up elsewhere" [*intra*state [FYug and FSU] *and inter*state [North–South] (see Sandole, 1999b, p. 134).

The questions whose levels of agreement *decreased* across all three time periods were *questions number 4 [all above 4.00], 6 [mixed feelings] and 9 [all above 4.00]*. Although most of these decreases were minimal-to-moderate (particularly for *question numbers 4 and 9*), they seemed to progressively argue in favor of *NATO's autonomy of action*; that in the "final analysis," it was NATO and no other organization that finally took the initiative and stopped the clear slaughter of Bosniak Muslims in Bosnia and Albanians in Kosovo. Therefore, because only NATO did this, it should not be constrained in the future by it – or its offshoots (NACC [EAPC]/PfP) – being subsumed within any other entity (i.e., the CSCE/OSCE) or by having to check first with others before taking action to stop genocide. Further, forceful NATO action just *might* lead to conflict *resolution*, even in the absence of attempts (e.g., by conflict-resolution NGOs) to deal with underlying causes.

Levels of agreement for the two questions that were asked only during the 1997 and 1999 surveys, *question numbers 7 [mixed feelings] and 13 [under 3.00]*, increased between 1997–9. Hence, there was some *increase* in the belief that SFOR withdrawal from Bosnia would likely lead to a resumption of warfare between Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, which corresponded to increases for the same period in the belief that ethnic conflicts would continue to be threats to international peace and security. And, although all *disagreed* that the issue of NATO enlargement could put at risk the peace developed between East and West in the post–Cold War

period, there was a minimal *increase* in the grand means between 1997 and 1999: perhaps a reaction to the crisis in East–West relations created by the Kosovo intervention.

So, what does the *dynamic*, *moving picture* tell us? First of all, looking also at the breakdowns for each of the five groupings in Appendix A for each of the 15 questions,[4] it seems that different actors came down on different issues in different ways at different points in time. Nevertheless, *four patterns* emerged:

1 The development over time of a *conflict-resolution culture* in the CSCE/OSCE (*question numbers 8 and 10*).
2 A mixed view about the role of NATO and its offshoots (NACC [EAPC]/PfP) in the post–Cold War world, which was more positive following NATO's intervention in Bosnia in 1995, but less so after its intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (*question numbers 2, 3, 5, 11, and 15*).
3 A mixed view about the locus of threats to international peace and security in the post–Cold War world: after NATO's intervention in Bosnia in 1995, these threats were *more likely* to emanate from East–West than from Yugoslav-type conflicts and North–South, but after NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, they were *less likely* to come from East–West than from Yugoslav-type conflicts and North–South (*question numbers 1, 12, and 14*). And
4 The development over time of an *autonomy-of-NATO-action culture*: a persistence of a *Realpolitik* belief that, in the *final analysis*, forceful NATO intervention may be all that we have for responding to genocidal assaults to human rights in post–Cold War Europe (*question numbers 4, 6 and 9*).

There is an interesting *complexity* inherent in these four patterns: the simultaneous development of an *Idealpolitik*-based conflict-resolution culture and a *Realpolitik*-based autonomous NATO culture, and in between these, mixed feelings about the role of NATO and the locus of threats to international peace and security, with NATO's interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 having clearly distinguishable impact on the views of the CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled here.

Consensus and dissensus

To what extent are the standard deviations (for the grand means), as indicators of *consensus*, compatible with the above findings? According to the SD data in Table 5.1

1 For ten of 13 questions (*77 percent: question numbers 1–5, 8–11, and 15*), consensus was *lowest* for the 1993 grand means (and *highest* for only one of the 1993 grand means [*question number 6*]).

2 For eight of the 15 questions (*53 percent: question numbers 2–3, 5, 7, 9–10, and 12–13*), consensus was *highest* for the 1997 grand means (and *lowest* for only one of the 1997 grand means [*question number 14*]). And
3 For six of the 15 questions (*40 percent: question numbers 1, 4, 8, 11, and 14–15*), consensus was *highest* for the 1999 grand means (and *lowest* for four of the 1999 grand means [*question numbers 6–7 and 12–13*]).

In other words, the *least amount of consensus* – of *community – in the CSCE/OSCE* as a basis for developing a NEPSS-type system was recorded for 1993, immediately following the ending of the Cold War. The *greatest amount of consensus* occurred in 1997, two years after NATO and the Dayton peace process brought "negative peace" to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This trend was arrested somewhat in 1999, immediately following the end of the NATO air war against Serbia over Kosovo. Simply put, *there was much more consensus (and therefore, "community") in the CSCE/OSCE in 1997 than in 1993, and somewhat more in 1997 than in 1999*, which is compatible with our findings that NATO seems to have enjoyed a more positive image with CSCE/OSCE negotiators after its intervention in Bosnia in 1995 than after its intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

One interpretation of these data is that consensus had been developing in a linear manner from 1993 to 1997 but, between 1997 and 1999, the *divisiveness* generated by the Kosovo conflict – and reactions to it – constituted a minor "blip" on the radar screen, resulting in a dip in consensus during that interval, which *could be* resolved in due course. This interpretation has been lent considerable weight by the statement by (then Acting) Russian President Vladimir Putin, not too long after the NATO bombing campaign which so infuriated the Russians, that he could nevertheless *imagine the Russian Federation becoming a member of NATO*:

> [I]n an unexpected gesture to the West, [Putin] suggested in a television interview [on March 5, 2000] that Russia would consider joining NATO if the Western alliance agreed to treat Russia as an equal partner. "Why not? Why not?" Putin said when asked by BBC interviewer [Sir] David Frost about Russian membership. "I do not rule out such a possibility . . . [Given that] Russia is a part of European culture, and I do not consider my own country in isolation from Europe and from . . . the civilized world . . . it is with difficulty that I view NATO as an enemy" (see Hoffman, 2000).

NATO–FSU polarity and "togetherness"

The data in Appendix B are further supportive of such a *"complex"* interpretation; that is, *Idealpolitik*-based cooperation coexisting with *Realpolitik*-based conflict within a basically cooperative system, which is

compatible with a NEPSS-type system. For each of the *following four issues*, for instance, NATO and the FSU are (for at least two of the three time points), *polar (or nearly polar) opposites* in terms of numerical distance between grand means and/or their rankings:

1 Whether NATO should have intervened earlier in the Balkans (*question number 3*).
2 Whether NATO will have to continue liaising with its former Warsaw Pact adversaries in dealing with issues of common security (*question number 4*).
3 Whether the NATO-established NACC [EAPC]/PfP could develop into a post–Cold War security system inclusive of all former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned (*question number 5*). And
4 Whether there is a need to deal with the causes and conditions underlying violent conflict (*question number 8*).

By contrast, for each of the *following 11 issues*, NATO and the FSU are (for at least two of the three time points) *close together* in terms of numerical distance between grand means and/or their rankings:

1 Whether or not ethnic conflicts will be among the threats to future peace and security (*question number 1*).
2 Whether NATO can respond effectively to such conflicts (*question number 2*).
3 Whether a NATO (NACC [EAPC]/PfP)-based security system could develop within the context of the CSCE/OSCE (*question number 6*).
4 Whether the withdrawal of SFOR would lead to a resumption of warfare in Bosnia (*question number 7*).
5 Whether *not* addressing the underlying causes and conditions of violent conflict would prevent conflict *resolution* (*question number 9*).
6 Whether coordination is possible between governmental and nongovernmental actors in responding to violent ethnic conflict (*question number 10*).
7 Whether there is a need for more peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms (*question number 11*).
8 Whether or not the Cold War is over (*question number 12*).
9 Whether NATO enlargement will put East–West relations at risk (*question number 13*). And
10 Whether the developing world perceives ("validly") that the end of the Cold War means only that East–West has been replaced by North–South as the main front of international conflict (*question numbers 14–15*).

Going further and examining *each* of the 15 questions at *each* of the three time periods for evidence of either (1) NATO–FSU *polarity* or

(2) NATO–FSU *"togetherness"* in terms of numerical distance between grand means and/or their rankings, we find the following patterns:

The more complete polarity–togetherness data in Table 5.4 *"triangulate"* with, and reinforce, the partial polarity–togetherness findings discussed earlier. Hence, whether we look at partial or all grand means (and their rankings) as indicators of levels of polarity and togetherness between NATO and the FSU or at standard deviations as indicators of overall consensus:

1 overall consensus and NATO–FSU togetherness *coexisted* with dissensus and NATO–FSU polarity *across all three time periods*; but
2 there was, across the three time periods (1993, 1997, 1999), more of a definite trend toward overall consensus *and* NATO–FSU togetherness than of overall dissensus and NATO–FSU polarity, thereby suggesting that this was dominant;
3 the lowest level of overall consensus *and* highest level of NATO–FSU polarity occurred in 1993; and
4 taken together with the observations that overall consensus was highest *and* NATO–FSU polarity lowest in 1997, the year of highest NATO–FSU togetherness, then again, it seems that the relatively more "neat" NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 may, in fact, have had a unifying or consensus-strengthening effect on OSCE negotiators, whereas the relatively more "messy" NATO intervention in Kosovo may have had a consensus-diminishing effect.

Table 5.4 NATO–FSU polarity vs. "togetherness"

	NATO–FSU polarity			*NATO–FSU* togetherness		
	1993	*1997*	*1999*	*1993*	*1997*	*1999*
	Q.1				Q.1	Q.1
				Q.2	Q.2	Q.2
	Q.3		Q.3		Q.3	
	Q.4		Q.4		Q.4	
	Q.5	Q.5	Q.5			
			Q.6	Q.6	Q.6	
					Q.7	Q.7
	Q.8	Q.8	Q.8			
	Q.9				Q.9	Q.9
	Q.10				Q.10	Q.10
	Q.11				Q.11	Q.11
			Q.12	Q.12	Q.12	
					Q.13	Q.13
		Q.14		Q.14		Q.14
	—	—	Q.15	Q.15	Q.15	—
TOT	8	3	7	5	12	8

The findings combined

Looking at the various sets of findings together, we can conclude that:

- the *static* portrait of peace and security in post–Cold War Europe, according to the views of CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled here, is interesting, but, again, "static"! Hence, the need for a *dynamic* picture, indicative of shifts and trends in shifts across the three time periods;
- according to that "dynamic" picture, there seems to have been an increasing "meeting of minds" on *Idealpolitik* as well as *Realpolitik* issues; for example, a need to deal with the factors underlying violent expressions of conflict, but that if these were not dealt with, this would not necessarily undermine whatever *resolution* potential inheres in forceful (e.g., NATO) intervention alone;
- CSCE/OSCE negotiators seem to have a "love–hate" relationship with NATO and its various offshoots, with the Bosnia intervention in 1995 tilting the respondents toward more positive and the Kosovo intervention in 1999 toward less positive affect; nevertheless;
- there seems to have been an increasing convergence on the issue of NATO autonomy to do what no other actor wants to or can do: forcefully stop genocidal conflict in post–Cold War Europe;
- there is a mixed picture on the locus of future threats to peace and security in Europe, whether it is Yugoslav-type (ethnic, genocidal) conflicts, East–West, or North–South depending on whether CSCE/OSCE negotiators feel positive or not so positive about NATO;
- consensus and NATO–FSU togetherness coexisted with dissensus and NATO–FSU polarity across the three time periods, but overall trends were clearly in the direction of consensus and NATO–FSU togetherness, although these dipped a bit after NATO's intervention in Kosovo.[5]

Accordingly, a *complex community of values* seems to have been developing in the CSCE/OSCE, *at least in the minds of some of its practitioners*, with conflict (*Realpolitik = negative peace*) and cooperation (*Idealpolitik = positive peace*) coexisting in complex ways on various issues (or positions on issues) within a basically cooperative system – all of which are compatible with a NEPSS-type system.[6]

Grounded theory: an issue paradigm of practice and theory?

Overall, the findings reported here suggest that an *issue paradigm* – comprising "positive-sum," *common security* (+5,+5) *as well as* "zero-sum"

national security (+10, −10/−10, +10) – characterizes the CSCE/OSCE negotiators sampled here, instead of a simpleminded expression of Cold War *Realpolitik*. So much for the CSCE/OSCE negotiators. What about academics, those of us studying or otherwise interested in European peace and security? Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez (1981, pp. 77–8) argued some 25 years ago that

> Questions of actor agreement lead to the analysis of interaction patterns and the concepts of cooperation *and* conflict, which constitute [a] major topic of inquiry on the new [*issue paradigm*-based] research agenda. Of course, much of the study of international relations has featured these as central dependent variables, and the assumptions of *realism* reinforced this propensity. Such research has not been misguided, but it has been hampered by the assumption that cooperation and conflict constitute two ends of a single continuum and that behavior is unidimensional. Recent research suggests that this assumption is incorrect, and that *both* cooperation and conflict are *complex* and multifaceted variables…
>
> More significantly from the perspective of an *issue paradigm*, relationships among actors *may vary by individual issue*, so that it is misleading to describe them in terms of any single mix of cooperation and conflict. The existence of separate issues with separate arenas of competition produces the possibility of cross-cutting effects as well as reinforcement of dominant patterns of behavior. A major task of the new research agenda is the analysis of the ways in which linkages among issues serve to dilute overall cooperation *or* conflict among actors, or produce spirals of one sort or another. Indeed, if issues are sufficiently encapsulated, several *apparently contradictory patterns of interaction may exist at one time among the same contending actors* [emphasis added].

If it is, indeed, the case that "the relations of actors are considerably more *complex* than *realists* had assumed, and [that] cooperation/conflict does not adequately describe this *complexity*" [emphasis added] (see ibid., p. 80), then, to the extent that a predominantly *Realpolitik* worldview characterizes academics, International Relations theorists, and researchers, reframing on their part may clearly be in order – just to keep up with the perceptions and actions of OSCE practitioners.

Conclusion

We turn now to the sixth and subsequent chapters dealing with responses to the open-ended questions, to explore to what extent they overlap with the findings presented here and ultimately, in the ninth and tenth chapters, to determine to what extent the findings generated by the four surveys collectively constitute a coherent mosaic of CSCE/OSCE wisdom relevant to preventing "future Yugoslavias" and related acts of terrorism.

Chapter 6

CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions of causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s[1]

Introduction

As part of our efforts to explore the "goodness-of-fit" between theory (*3PF/NEPSS*) and diplomatic practice with regard to the prevention of "future Yugoslavias" and related acts of terrorism, Chapter 5 reported on CSCE/OSCE negotiators' responses to closed-ended questions dealing with a range of security issues. As a continuation of that effort, this chapter focuses on their responses to the first of our select open-ended questions, "*What do you believe were the causes of the wars in former Yugoslavia?*" In terms of the 3PF, this chapter presents on practitioners' perceptions of pillar 2.

As indicated earlier, pillar 2 of the 3PF comprises four levels of analysis: (1) individual, (2) societal, (3) international, and (4) global-ecological levels at which causes and conditions of any particular conflict can be located. For the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, exploration of the *individual level* might reveal the importance of the impact of the death of Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito on the ultimate unraveling of the Yugoslav Federation. It could also reveal the later role of Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic in encouraging the expression of violent conflict between the various ethnic groups.

The *societal level* might be revealing of economic problems (e.g., relative Serb weakness) and political factors (e.g., relative Serb strength) that helped drive the former Yugoslav citizens apart along ethnic lines. By contrast, the *international level* might suggest that the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union played major roles in eliminating the "glue" that once held the Yugoslavs together in one state.

Finally, the *global/ecological level* could suggest that the absence of oil reserves in the region proved to be a disincentive for the "International Community" to intervene in a timely, forceful manner (as it did in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990), thereby allowing the violence in former Yugoslavia to escalate to genocidal proportions.

Whether using something like the 3PF or any other framework, academic and other investigators typically conduct research on, and otherwise theorize about the causes and conditions of violent conflict and war *without* inquiring

into the views of those whose professional task it is to deal with such expressions of violence (e.g., police officers, military personnel, diplomats, and policy makers).[2] By contrast, in this chapter, I focus on the views of CSCE/OSCE diplomatic (and in some cases, military) professionals tasked with, among other things, preventing *future Yugoslavias*. Again, as indicated in Chapter 4, one reason for this choice is that the views of CSCE/OSCE negotiators and those of other policy-oriented practitioners – probably far more than those of academics – could influence their efforts to deal with these and similar conflicts in the future (pillar 3).[3]

In addition to exploring the possible impact of the NATO interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) on OSCE negotiators' views about the etiology of the Balkan Wars, I was curious to what extent, if any, their views might reflect Samuel Huntington's controversial thesis on the "clash of civilizations" (1993, 1996). Huntington had argued, initially at about the time that I conducted the 1993 CSCE study, that in the post–Cold War world, wars would be fought, not between states as *Realpolitik* centers of wealth and power, but among states and other groups as indicators of different *civilizations*: Sinic (Chinese), Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American, and possibly African civilizations (see Huntington, 1996, ch. 2).[4]

The extent to which Huntington-type themes were reflected in the discourse and thinking of OSCE representatives might account in part for the nature of the international community's responses to the Balkan wars of the 1990s, as well as influence OSCE (and other organizational) responses to Yugoslav-type conflicts in the future. In other words, if policy makers believed that Bosnian Muslims were, in fact, intent on establishing an Islamic state in Southeastern Europe (perhaps as part of a regional or global caliphate), and preferred for that *not* to happen, then they may have allowed the Serbs to act on their behalf and "protect Christian Civilization in Europe" as they had done often before.

A methodological reminder

In Chapter 5, we analyzed responses to closed-ended questions to reveal *levels of agreement* with, and *coherence* on, select security issues. By contrast, in this chapter, we analyze responses to the first of our select open-ended questions to identify *common themes* within each of the five membership groupings (NATO, NNA, FYug, NSWP, and FSU) as well as dissimilar and common themes across groupings (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 292–6).

The 1993 CSCE survey

For the 1993 CSCE survey, content analysis led to the results presented in Table 6.1.[5]

Table 6.1 Comparisons across the five groupings for 1993: common and dissimilar *themes* on the "causes of FYug wars"

	Hist	*Econ*	*Ethnic*	*CP*	*SerbS*	*SerbN*	*UnsPr*	*Land*	*Artif*	*Compl*	*Polit*	*Milos*	*Tito*	*Natio*
NATO	10	3	3	4	3	3	3		1	1	2	2	2	
NNA	2	1	1	1	2		1	2	2		1		2	1
FYug	2		1		2	2						2		
NSWP	1	4	2	1			1	2	1	2	1			3
FSU	1	1	1	1						1				
Total	16	9	8	7	7	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
% of 29	55.2	31	27.6	24.1	24.1	17.2	17.2	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.8
Rank	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4.5*	*4.5*	*6.5*	*6.5*	*8.14*	*8.14*	*8.14*	*8.14*	*8.14*	*8.14*	*8.14*

By far, the overwhelming similarity/commonality across the five CSCE groupings for 1993 was an emphasis on *history*, for example, "historical" memories of atrocities committed against members of, and by, various groups in the past, particularly during the Second World War [*Hist*] (*1st ranking*). This was followed by the role of *economic* factors, particularly economic inequalities experienced by Serbia [*Econ*] (*2d ranking*). Then came the existence of *ethnic* tensions and conflicts [*Ethnic*] (*3rd ranking*). The collapse of the Yugoslav Federation and its *communist party* [*CP*], plus its mechanisms for holding the country together, was tied for *4th ranking* with the *need for Serbs to hold the Federal state together* [*SerbS*], in effect, to preserve their dominant position in the Federation. Tied for *6th ranking* were aggressive *Serb nationalism* [*SerbN*] and *unsolved problems* [*UnsPrb*].

Seven other factors were tied for *8th ranking*: the *quest for territory*, including dealing with unfair borders [*Land*];[6] the *artificiality* of the Yugoslav federal state [*Artif*]; *complexity* of causes and conditions [*Compl*]; *political* factors, including "*role defence*" (see Burton, 1979, ch. 7), for example, holding on to power after the collapse of the Federation and the communist party [*Polit*]; the role of Serb leader *Slobodan Milosevic* in fomenting the Yugoslav wars [*Milos*]; the idea that the *death of Tito* laid the basis for the ultimate unraveling of FYug [*Tito*]; and *nationalism* in general [*Natio*].

Other factors mentioned were: "clashes" in the Huntington sense between Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism, Christianity and Islam, and between the successors of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires; manipulation of existing ethnic tensions by the media, political leaders, and others; instability following the end of the Cold War; the role of the Yugoslav Army; the role of religion; instability associated with profound social change; perceived utility of violence (a sort of *Realpolitik* option); instability caused by the collapse of the USSR; the role of gender; the role of the international community (US, Germany, European Community, Turkey); the legacy of communist ideology; and the "*fear of extinction*" (see Horowitz, 1985, pp. 175–81).

Accordingly, before NATO and the Dayton Peace Process stopped the wars in Bosnia in 1995, and before Huntington's controversial "civilizational thesis" had been well publicized, there was barely any mention of *clash of civilizations*-type themes as causes or conditions of the genocidal warfare in the Balkans (3 out of 29 = 10.3 percent of respondents subscribed to this view), with only two persons (2/29 = 6.9 percent) specifically mentioning religion as a factor.

Instead, the primary causes and conditions of the Yugoslav wars, as *perceived* by senior CSCE representatives in 1993, included: (1) historical grievances; (2) economic inequalities suffered by Serbia; (3) ethnic differences and tensions between the various groups; (4.5) instability following

the collapse of former Yugoslavia and its communist party; and (4.5) Serbia's need (therefore) to hold the Yugoslav federal state together in order to maintain its dominant position of power.

The 1997 OSCE survey

For 1997, I examined responses first to the question, "*What do you believe were the causes of the wars in former Yugoslavia?*" and then responses to the composite question, *There is the view that a major cause of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the attempt to establish an Islamic republic in Europe. Have you heard of that view? What do you think of it?* For each question, common themes were discerned for each of the five groupings and the OSCE Secretariat, in addition to noting dissimilar as well as common themes among them.[7]

According to Table 6.2, the overwhelming similarity/commonality across the five OSCE groupings and OSCE Secretariat for 1997 was an emphasis on *ethnic* groups, for example, animosities and tensions between ethnic groups [*Ethn*] (*1st ranking*). This was followed by the role of *historical* factors, including long-term grievances between groups "still caught in the grip of history" (see Fukuyama, 1989, p. 18), perhaps based on "*chosen trauma*" (see Volkan, 1997, ch. 3) [*Hist*] (*2d ranking*); the death of *Tito* leading to the ultimate unraveling of the Yugoslav Federation [*Tito*] (*3rd ranking*); and the *clash of civilizations* in the Huntington sense [*Clash*] (*4th ranking*). The collapse of the Yugoslav Federation and its *communist party* [*CP*] and the role of *political* factors [*Polit*] were tied for *5th ranking*.

The role of *nationalism* in general [*Natio*] came next (*7th ranking*), followed by the *Serb need to maintain the federal state* and their position of dominance within it [*SerbS*], which, like political factors for 1993, reflected Burton's (1979) concept of *role defence* (*8th ranking*). The role of *economic* factors [*Econ*], particularly economic inequalities between Serbia and the other republics (Slovenia and Croatia), was tied for *9th ranking* with the role of *unsolved problems* [*UnsPr*]. The role of *religious* differences between the groups [*Relig*] came next, which was tied for *11th ranking* with the role of *manipulation* of ethnic differences and tensions [*Manip*]. These were followed by the *artificiality* of the Yugoslav Federation [Artif] (*13th ranking*).

The *instability caused by the end of the Cold War* [*CW*] was tied for *14th ranking* with aggressive *Serb nationalism* [*SerbN*]. These were followed by the role of Serb leader *Slobodan Milosevic* in fomenting the Yugoslav wars [*Milos*], which was tied for *16th ranking* with the role of *Croat nationalism* [*CroatN*] (not shown in Table 6.2).

Other factors included: the absence of adequate mechanisms for problem solving[8]; the need for self-determination and independence; the role of the international community (EC, Germany, the United States); the role of Croat

Table 6.2 Comparisons across the five groupings and OSCE secretariat for 1997: common and dissimilar *themes* on the "causes of FYug wars"

	Ethn	*Hist*	*Tito*	*Clash*	*CP*	*Polit*	*Natio*	*SerbS*	*Econ*	*UnsPr*	*Relig*	*Manip*	*Artif*	*CW*	*SerbN*	*Milos*
NATO	9	4	4	3	6	4	4	3	4	1	1	4	1	5	3	3
NNA	5	4	6	6		2	2	2	1	5	3	1	3	1		
FYug	1		1		2	2	1	3	2		1	2	1		3	1
NSWP	6	3	3	2		1	1	2	1	2	2		2	1		
FSU	5	3	1	4	3	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1		1	
OSCE	2	3	1		2	2	2			1		1				1
Total	28	17	16	15	13	13	12	11	10	10	9	9	8	7	7	5
% of 51	54.9	33.3	31.4	29.4	25.5	25.5	23.5	21.6	19.6	19.6	17.6	17.6	15.7	13.7	13.7	9.8
Rank	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5.5*	*5.5*	*7*	*8*	*9.5*	*9.5*	*11.5*	*11.5*	*13*	*14.5*	*14.5*	*16.5*

Table 6.3 Comparisons across the five groupings and Albania for 1999: common and dissimilar *themes* on the "causes of FYug wars"

	Ethn	*Hist*	*SerbS*	*Natio*	*Tito*	*Polit*	*Milos*	*Econ*	*UnsPr*	*Relig*	*Manip*	*Demo*	*CW*	*Clash*	*SlvSD*	*CP*
NATO	5	3	1	5	5	5	3	4	3	4	5	2	1	4	1	2
NNA	4	3	3	2	3	1	2	1	3	1	1			1		
FYug	2	2	2	1		3	2	2			2	1	1		1	1
NSWP	1	2	1	2	2		1	3	1	1		2	2		1	
FSU	5	7	5	2	1	3	3		3	3		3	3	1	3	2
Alb			1	1	1											
Total	17	17	13	13	12	12	11	10	10	9	8	8	7	6	6	5
% of 46	37	37	28.3	28.3	26.1	26.1	23.9	21.7	21.7	19.6	17.4	17.4	15.2	13	13	10.9
Rank	*1.5*	*1.5*	*3.5*	*3.5*	*5.5*	*5.5*	*7*	*8.5*	*8.5*	*10*	*11.5*	*11.5*	*13*	*14.5*	*14.5*	*16*

President Tudjman; conflict dynamics; complexity of causes and conditions; violent approach to problem solving (frustration-aggression-based [see Dollard *et al.*, 1939]); hatred/legacy of communism; minority problems; territory; Serb abrogation of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989; Slovene nationalism; Bosnian nationalism; collapse of the USSR; profound social change; the role of the Yugoslav Army; causes and conditions similar to those in the former Soviet Union; the *fear of extinction* (Horowitz, 1985); unfulfilled expectations (see Davies, 1962); and what can only be called an example of Freud's "*narcissism of minor differences*" (see Volkan, 1997, ch. 6).

According to senior OSCE representatives for 1997, therefore, the primary causes and conditions of the Yugoslav wars included: (1) ethnic differences and tensions; (2) historical grievances; (3) the death of Tito leading to the eventual disintegration of former Yugoslavia; (4) Huntington's *civilizational thesis*; and (5.5) instability following the collapse of the Yugoslav federal state and its communist party and (5.5) the role of political factors.

The 1999 OSCE survey

For 1999, I again asked questions about the causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s and whether or not a "civilizational" element was among them.

According to Table 6.3,[9] for the 1999 OSCE survey, *ethnicity* (*Ethn*) and *history* (*Hist*) were tied for *first place*. These were followed by the *need to hold the Serb state together* (*SerbS*) and *nationalism* (*Natio*), which were tied for *3rd place*; and the *impact of Tito's death* (*Tito*) and *political factors* (*Polit*), which were tied for *5th place*.

The *role of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic* (*Milos*) then followed in *7th place*, with the *impact of economic factors* (*Econ*) and of *unsolved problems* (*UnsPr*) tied for *8th place*. The *role of religion* (*Relig*) followed in *10th place*, with *political manipulation* (*Manip*) and *absence of democracy* ("*Democ*") tied for *11th place*.

The *end of the Cold War* (*CW*) occupied *13th place*, while existence of a *clash of civilizations* (*Clash*) and *Slovenian self-determination* (*SlvSD*) were tied for *14th place*. *Collapse of the Yugoslav Communist Party* (*CP*) occupied *16th place*.

Other factors included: complexity; Serb abrogation of Kosovo's autonomy; Serb nationalism; fears; German and Austrian recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence; and the transition from socialism to democracy.

Accordingly, for senior OSCE negotiators in 1999, the primary causes and conditions of the Balkan wars of the 1990s were: (1.5) ethnic differences and tensions; (1.5) historical grievances; (3.5) efforts by Serbs to hold the federal state together; (3.5) nationalism in general; (5.5) the death of Tito leading to the ultimate unraveling of former Yugoslavia; (5.5) the role

of political factors; and (7) the role of Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic in fomenting the Balkan wars.

The 1993, 1997, and 1999 findings compared

How do the 1993, 1997, and 1999 findings compare in terms of constancies and/or shifts over time?

We observed in Chapter 5 that CSCE/OSCE negotiators' responses to the 15 closed-ended questions seem to have been affected by (or at least were correlated with) their more positive views of NATO's intervention in Bosnia in 1995 and less positive assessments of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Accordingly, I decided to explore for *trends* in the above findings for three intervals: (a) 1993–7 (after the Bosnia intervention), (b) 1997–9 (after the Kosovo intervention), and then (c) 1993–7–9.

For (*a*) *1993–7* (*Bosnia intervention*), Table 6.4 shows some interesting findings. The proportion of interviewees referring to instability caused by the collapse of the Yugoslav state and its communist party was remarkably similar for 1993 (24.1 percent) and 1997 (25.5 percent). "CommParty" was also similar across the two periods in terms of rankings: 4th place for 1993 and 5th place for 1997. Also in terms of rankings, nationalism in

Table 6.4 The views of senior CSCE/OSCE representatives on the causes and conditions of the Yugoslav wars, 1993, 1997, and 1999

	1993		*1997*		*1999*	
	Rank	*% of respdnts*	*Rank*	*% of respdnts*	*Rank*	*% of respndnts*
History	1	55.2	2	33.3	1.5	37
Economic	2	31	9.5	19.6	8.5	21.7
Ethnic	3	27.6	1	54.9	1.5	37
CommParty	4.5	24.1	5.5	25.5	15	10.9
SerbState	4.5	24.1	8	21.6	3.5	28.3
SerbNat	6.5	17.2	14.5	13.7	19.2	6.5
UnsPrbs	6.5	17.2	9.5	19.6	8.5	21.7
Land	8.14	13.8	20.15	5.9	23.2	4.3
Artificl	8.14	13.8	13	15.7	23.2	4.3
Complxty	8.14	13.8	18.5	7.8	17.5	8.7
Politics	8.14	13.8	5.5	25.5	5.5	26.1
Milosevic	8.14	13.8	16.5	9.8	7	23.9
Tito	8.14	13.8	3	31.4	5.5	26.1
Nationlsm	8.14	13.8	7	23.5	3.5	28.3
Clashes	15.2	10.3	4	29.4	14.5	13
Manipulat	15.2	10.3	11.5	17.6	11.5	17.4
ColdWar	15.2	10.3	14.5	13.7	13	15.2
Religion	20.14	6.9	11.5	17.6	10	19.6

general was fairly consistent across time, occupying 8th place for 1993 and 7th place for 1997.

In addition, ranked among the top five factors for the 1993 and 1997 surveys (albeit in terms of different rankings) were: historical grievances, ethnic differences and tensions, and instability caused by the collapse of the Yugoslav state and its communist party.

An interesting coherence seems to connect these primary factors for 1993 and 1997: historical memories of past atrocities committed by members of different ethnic groups, perhaps "unfrozen" by the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation and its communist party. For the 1993 survey, these factors could have combined to enhance Serb nationalism, putting pressure on them to attempt to hold the Yugoslav federal state together to avoid becoming an economic underdog, thereby resolving, for them, that particular problem. And for the 1997 survey, these factors could have combined to exacerbate the tendency toward the ultimate unraveling of the Yugoslav Federation caused by the death of Tito; further, to provide background against which to better perceive something more comprehensive than the *societal level* that most of the factors listed in Table 6.4 reflect: Huntington's *civilizational thesis*.

Themes that *increased significantly* from 1993 to 1997 were: ethnic differences and tensions (27.6 percent for 1993 and 54.9 percent for 1997); the impact of Tito's death (13.8 percent for 1993 and 31.4 percent for 1997); *clash of civilizations* (10.3 percent for 1993 and 29.4 percent for 1997); the role of religion (6.9 percent for 1993 and 17.6 percent for 1997); the role of political factors (13.8 percent for 1993 and 25.5 percent for 1997); the role of nationalism in general (13.8 percent for 1993 and 23.5 percent for 1997); and the role of manipulation by the media, political leaders, etc. (10.3 percent for 1993 and 17.6 percent for 1997).

Themes that *increased slightly* were: artificiality of the Yugoslav Federation (13.8 percent for 1993 and 15.7 percent for 1997); unsolved problems (17.2 percent for 1993 and 19.6 percent for 1997); and the instability generated by the end of the Cold War (10.3 percent for 1993 and 13.7 percent for 1997).

Themes that *decreased significantly* were: historical grievances (55.2 percent for 1993 and 33.3 percent for 1997); the quest for territory/to change borders (13.8 percent for 1993 and 5.9 percent for 1997); the role of complexity (13.8 percent for 1993 and 7.8 percent for 1997); and the role of economic factors (31 percent for 1993 and 19.6 percent for 1997).

Themes that *decreased slightly* were: the Serb need to hold the federal state together (24.1 percent for 1993 and 21.6 percent for 1997); Serb nationalism (17.2 percent for 1993 and 13.7 percent for 1997); and the role of Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic in fomenting the Yugoslav wars (13.8 percent for 1993 and 9.8 percent for 1997). The latter reduction may have been due to Milosevic's perceived positive role in the Dayton peace process.

A significant change, and perhaps surprise, was that Samuel Huntington's *clash of civilizations* thesis moved from 15th place in 1993 (not shown in Table 6.1) to 4th place in 1997, perhaps, in part, because of the media visibility given to it and its contentious nature since its initial publication in summer 1993.[10]

For (*b*) *1997–9* (*Kosovo intervention*), political problems for 1997 and 1999 occupy the same ranking (5.5) and nearly the same proportion of respondents (25.5/26 percent). Milosevic was viewed as more a part of the problem than of the solution after the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (24 percent: 7th place) than he was in 1997, following NATO's intervention in Bosnia (9.8 percent: 16.5 place).

The role of political manipulation was surprisingly constant for 1997 and 1999, both in terms of rankings (11.5) and proportion of respondents (17.6 percent/17.4 percent).

As for the combined intervals, (*c*) *1993–7–9*, the first obvious constancy is that ethnic relations/tensions and historical memory/grievances are found among the first three rankings.[11] Unsolved problems seem to have remained fairly constant across the three time periods as well, both in terms of proportion of respondents (17–22 percent) and rankings (6.5–9.5).

The impact of nationalism in general steadily increased across the three periods: 13.8 percent [8.14 place], 23.5 percent [7th place], and 28.3 percent [3.5 place]. The impact of *clash of civilizations* increased greatly between 1993 and 1997, then dropped down to nearly its 1993 level by 1999.

The perceived impact of the ending of the Cold War remained low, but consistent across the three periods: 10.3 percent [15.2 place], 13.7 percent [14.5 place], and 15.2 percent [13th place].

Finally, the role of religion increased sharply between 1993 and 1999 and then slightly between 1997 and 1999, moving from 20th place to 10th place across the three periods.

To elicit further details about the role of the "civilizational factor," including whether or not respondents agreed with it, the composite question dealing with the establishment of an Islamic state in Europe was added for 1997, responses to which are summarized below in Table 6.5 for 1997 and Table 6.6 for 1999.

A "clash of civilizations"?

According to Table 6.5,[12] the view that the Bosnian Muslims were *secular* instead of religious ["*Secular*"] was the dominant response (*1st ranking*) for 1997, followed by the view that there were *European concerns* about the establishment of an Islamic state in Europe ["*EurConcerns*"] (*2d ranking*). Those who felt that such a view was *nonsense* ["*Nonsense*"] followed (in *3rd place*).

Table 6.5 Establishing an Islamic state in Europe as a cause of the Yugoslav wars: 1997

	Nonsense	*Secular*	*EurConcerns*	*SelfFlProp*
NATO	6	7	3	4
NNA	2	5	6	1
FYug	1	2	1	2
NSWP	1	3	2	1
FSU		7	7	2
OSCE	1	4		
Total	11	28	19	10
% of 51	21.6	54.9	37.25	19.6
Rank	*3*	*1*	*2*	*4*

Table 6.6 Establishing an Islamic state in Europe as a cause of the Yugoslav wars: 1999

	Nonsense	*Secular*	*EurConcerns*	*SelfFlProp*
NATO	3	11	4	2
NNA		7	3	
FYug	1	3		1
NSWP	1	3	3	
FSU		9	6	
Alb		1	1	
Total	5	34	17	3
% of 45	11.1	75.6	37.8	6.7
Rank	*3*	*1*	*2*	*4*

There were also those who felt that concerns about the establishment of an Islamic state in Europe could have engendered a *self-fulfilling prophecy* ["*SelfFlProp*"] (*4th ranking*) in the sense that such concerns could have discouraged the international community from helping the Muslims. This could have led to a prolonging of the war and genocidal assault by Serbs and Croats on the Bosnian Muslims, which could have encouraged Islamic states (e.g., Iran) to support their "religious kin" in Bosnia: an example of Huntington's "civilizational rallying". The upshot of this insidious dynamic could have been to move the Bosnians closer to a religious Muslim identity, with corresponding social and other institutions.[13]

Remarkably, according to Table 6.6,[14] the same rankings obtained for 1999 as for 1997: (1) most respondents believed that Bosniaks were secular (75.6 percent); (2) but many were nevertheless concerned about the establishment of an Islamic state in Europe (37.8 percent); (3) a small proportion thought that any claim that establishing an Islamic state in Europe

was a cause of the Balkan wars was *nonsense* (11.1 percent); and (4) an even smaller proportion thought that a "self-fulfilling prophecy" might have been at work (6.7 percent).

While the rankings remained the same between 1997 and 1999, the proportion of respondents (1) for *Secular* increased (54.9 percent to 75.6 percent); (2) remained remarkably consistent for *EurConcerns* (37 percent/ 37.8 percent); (3) decreased significantly for *Nonsense* (21.6 percent to 11.1 percent); and (4) also decreased significantly for *SelfFlProp* (19.6 percent to 6.7 percent).

Interpreting the findings

Interpretation of these findings involves *static* as well as *dynamic* dimensions. On the static side, the question is, what did senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators, at three points in time, believe were the major factors underlying the Balkan wars of the 1990s? On the dynamic side, the question is, did these factors increase, decrease, or remain fairly constant in salience across the three time periods? A related question is to what extent were

Table 6.7 Perceived causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s

Factor	*Bosnia (1995)*		*Kosovo (1999)*
	1993%	*1997%*	*1999%*
History	55.2	33.3	37
Economic	31	19.6	21.7
Ethnic	27.6	54.9	37
SerbState	24.1	21.6	28.3
UnsProblems	17.2	19.6	21.7
Politics	13.8	25.5	26.1
Tito	13.8	31.4	26.1
Nationalism	13.8	23.5	28.3
Other factors in the top eight at different times were:			
CommParty	24.1	25.5	10.9
Milosevic	13.8	9.8	23.9

Table 6.8 A "clash of civilizations"?

Assessment	*1997%*	*1999%*
Nonsense	21.6	11.1
Secular	54.9	75.6
European Concerns	37.25	37.8
SelfFlProp	19.6	6.7

those trends *apparently* affected by the NATO interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999)?

Returning to Table 6.4, the *top eight causal factors across the three time periods* appear to have been as expressed in Table 6.7.

And returning to Tables 6.5 and 6.6, the perceived role of the *civilizational* component accompanying these causal factors was as expressed in Table 6.8.

Static interpretation

In terms of the CSCE/OSCE negotiators' *understanding* (and not my "outsider" *explanation*), therefore, we seem to have here, across the three time periods, the basis of a fairly stable *10-factor theory on the causes and conditions of the Balkan wars of the 1990s*.

Although analytically distinct, it is difficult, in practice, to disentangle the "individual" from the "societal" and "international levels of analysis." Nevertheless, we can probably subsume under the *individual level of analysis*:

1 *Historical memory of grievance*.
2 *Ethnic tensions/ethnocentrism*.
3 *Nationalism*.
4 *The impact of Tito's death on the unraveling of former Yugoslavia*. And
5 *The impact of Milosevic's manipulations in fomenting the Balkan wars*.

We can then subsume under the *societal level of analysis*:

1 *Economic problems*.
2 *Political factors*.
3 *Serb efforts to maintain the Yugoslav state*.
4 *Unsolved problems* (with regard to historical grievances). And
5 *The role of the Communist Party in holding Yugoslavia together*.

In other words, the *individual* and *societal levels* of Pillar 2 seem to have captured all the major causes and conditions of the Balkan wars revealed by the CSCE/OSCE negotiators interviewed for this study, leaving the international level (*clashes*, "Cold War") barely commented on and the global-ecological level not commented on at all.

When specifically asked about the issue of *clash of civilizations* in the 1997 and 1999 surveys, the majority of respondents felt that Bosnian Muslims were basically secular; nevertheless, a fairly sizeable proportion were concerned about the possibility of the establishment of a Muslim state in Europe.

Dynamic interpretation

Some interesting patterns can be noticed here against the background of the different perception CSCE/OSCE negotiators had about the NATO

interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. After the positively viewed intervention in Bosnia, for example, there was an apparent *decrease* in, among other factors, the perceived role of history, economic factors, Serb efforts to maintain the federal state ("role defense"), and Milosevic.

The relatively positive feelings that many had about Dayton – which did, after all, end a disastrous war on the EU's doorstep – could have contributed to the *decrease* between 1993 and 1997 in the perceived role of history in perpetuating the conflicts in the region and the role of economic factors, and consequently the Serb need to maintain the former federal state: all factors which could have been, in principle, eventually addressed, or rendered benign by the continuation of an overall peace process inclusive of *positive* as well as *negative peace* elements. And as indicated earlier, Milosevic's fairly "constructive" role in the Dayton peace process – it seems that he did force the Bosnian Serbs to give up the war (Holbrooke, 1998, ch. 10, p. 243) – may account for the *decrease* in the perception of his role in fomenting the wars to begin with.

Huntington's *clash of civilizations* (1993, 1996) also became prominent between the 1993 and 1997 surveys. In the overall etiology of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, growing awareness of the *civilizational thesis* and the debates it generated, may account in part for the *dramatic increase* in the perceived role of ethnic differences and tensions, the impact of Tito's death on expressing those differences and tensions, and, indeed, on the perceived role of "civilizational conflict" itself, which imposed a global overlay on otherwise "local" ethnic conflicts. It might also account for an *increase* in the perception of the role of nationalism in general.

While *clash of civilizations*-type themes were clearly more prominent in the 1997 OSCE survey than in the 1993 CSCE survey,[15] a clear majority (54.9 percent) of OSCE respondents in 1997 tended to view the Bosnian state as a secular entity and, as such, not a (*religious*) cause of the wars. However, we must not lose sight of another significant group of responses (37.25 percent) that expressed concerns over the possible establishment of an Islamic state in Europe. But then there were those responses (21.6 percent) that expressed the view that the *civilizational thesis* in the context of Bosnia was nonsense. And then there were those responses (19.6 percent) which expressed the view that the fear of an Islamic state may have triggered what I call a *negative self-fulfilling prophecy (NSFP)* (see Sandole, 1987), which could have set off a train of events leading to some degree of realization of the feared event.

The self-fulfilling option raises the concern that, as a likely consequence of conferring "scientific" legitimacy and credibility on some of the most base expressions of our "common" human nature – for example, virulent ethnocentrism, jingoism, racism – resulting in genocidal ethnic cleansing, the *clash of civilizations* thesis, like *Realpolitik* before it, may have become *prescriptive as well as descriptive* (i.e., encouraged the creation of certain

"realities" as well as provided a basis for describing them) and in the process, even more self-fulfilling, counterproductive, and self-defeating (see Sandole, 1999b, ch. 1; Vasquez, 1993, chs 3 and 5).

But, by 1999, following in the wake of the less positively assessed NATO intervention in Kosovo, smaller proportions of OSCE negotiators felt that the *civilizational thesis* was either nonsense or the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy. While the proportion in favor of a secular view of Bosniaks *increased by 73.6 percent*, those expressing concern at the prospect of the creation of an Islamic state in Europe *remained remarkably stable*.

In addition, the roles of history, economic factors, Serb efforts to maintain their state, unsolved problems, politics, and nationalism *increased moderately*, while the role of ethnic factors *decreased quite a bit* (albeit remaining at a fairly high level). The roles of Tito and the collapse of the communist party in the unraveling of the Yugoslav state became less important, while the role of Milosevic in fomenting the Balkan wars *jumped quite a bit*: after Kosovo, the peacemaker of Dayton was a war criminal!

We learned in Chapter 5 that, after Kosovo, *consensus* among OSCE negotiators was down as well, after having *increased dramatically* following NATO's earlier intervention in Bosnia. This set the stage for a crisis within the OSCE that I encountered when I returned in 2004 for a 4th round of interviews, following the terrorist attacks in Madrid (see Chapter 9).

Conclusion

What is striking about the findings presented in this chapter is that, for each of the three time periods as well as across them, the CSCE/OSCE negotiators did not converge on only one or a small number of factors being responsible for the outbreak of war in the Balkans during the 1990s. The CSCE/OSCE practitioners sampled here reflected different *paradigms*, "worldviews," theories, and experiences about the causes and conditions of violent conflict in general and the Yugoslav wars in particular.

Further, in opposition to those in the academic/scientific worlds who call for as small a number of variables in their findings as possible (*parsimony*) (see Sandole, 1999b, pp. 9–12), the practitioners interviewed for this project revealed a fairly large number of variables. Even *within* each of the five groupings (NATO, NNA, FYug, NSWP, FSU), there was quite a good deal of variability.

On the assumption that the brutal conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere, including those expressed as terrorism (e.g., in the Caucasus and Middle East), are *complex* in their etiology (see Sandole, 1999b, 2002c), the findings presented here, including the *10-factor theory on the causes and conditions of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s*, seem to "capture that complexity" more so than would have been the case had the "*primacy-of-the-single-factor thesis,*" or only a few variables, been expressed by the respondents.

Still, it must be said that, although senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators perceived, at three points in time, certain factors as causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, this does not necessarily mean that they were correct in their assessments. However, whether "right" or "wrong," perceptions about causes of conflicts (pillar 2) can affect views about "lessons learned" and how to reconstruct Europe's post–Cold War peace and security architecture to prevent or otherwise deal with future Yugoslav-type conflicts driven by the same or similar factors (pillar 3).

In the next chapter, we explore those *lessons learned* in the negotiators' interview responses for the 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys, while in Chapter 8, we discuss their views on how to construct "ideal" peace and security for post–Cold War Europe.

Chapter 7

CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions of *lessons learned* from the Balkan wars of the 1990s

Introduction

In this chapter, we deal with the second of our select open-ended questions, "*What are the 'lessons' of Yugoslavia?*" In terms of the 3PF, we are concerned here with pillar 3: conflict (3rd party) intervention.

Once a conflict analyst has explored the elements of a select conflict [*pillar 1*] (e.g., the genocidal warfare in the Balkans during the 1990s), and the multilevel factors that drive the conflict [*pillar 2*] (e.g., the "10-factor theory" revealed in Chapter 6), he or she is then ready to determine what can be done about it [*pillar 3*]. This involves a consideration of objectives and means, and then designing and implementing an appropriate intervention into the conflict.

As indicated in Chapters 2 and 3, 3rd party *objectives* can include:

1 [Violent] Conflict *Prevention* (or *preventive diplomacy*): "preventing a house from catching fire" in the first place. Since such *proactivity* is rarely attempted because policy makers are often preoccupied with responding *reactively* to pressing current conflicts, the next option tends to become the first line of defense.
2 Conflict *Management* (or *peacekeeping*): preventing an existing fire from spreading. Since fire can easily spread, policy makers are sometimes forced to move to the next option.
3 Conflict *Settlement* (or *coercive peacemaking*): forcefully suppressing a fire. This is often the point where official, governmental actors end their efforts, albeit at their peril as the extinguished fire might reignite. Hence, the need for the next option.
4 Conflict *Resolution* (or *noncoercive peacemaking*): once a fire has been suppressed, the 3rd party can then enter the remains of the ruined house, identify the "combustible" causes and conditions, and then deal with them so that the fire does not reignite. And
5 Conflict *Transformation* (or *peacebuilding*): after dealing with the causes and conditions of the current fire, the third party can then work with the

> surviving residents and their neighbors on their *long-term relationships* so that *next time* they have a conflict, they do not have to burn down the house, the neighborhood and, in general, the "commons." Accordingly, conflict *transformation* deals with the future, while conflict *resolution* deals with the here and now.

The following are among the possible 3rd party *means* for achieving any of the above objectives:

1 *Confrontational* and/or *Collaborative* Means.
2 "*Negative Peace*" and/or "*Positive Peace*" Orientations.
3 "*Track 1*" and/or "*Multitrack*" Actors and Means.

Especially for young students of peace and conflict studies, to include "confrontational" means in any subject matter for them is a nonstarter. Whether they are, by virtue of religious, ideological or emotional persuasion, pacifists or not, the use of violence – usually by the military or police – cannot possibly be a part of any course in peace and conflict studies. So, how can we possibly justify including it here?

The answer to this question depends upon how strategic and dynamic one's model of 3rd party intervention is. If one's perspective on the 3rd party process means only bringing parties to the table for mediation or facilitation, then there is absolutely no place for *confrontational* means in the sense of *deadly force*. But what if one's model of intervention reflects Ron Fisher's *contingency approach* (Fisher and Keashly, 1991; Fisher, 1997), where 3rd party intervention may encompass multiple 3rd parties performing different tasks at the same point in or over time, depending upon the "temperature" of the conflict at each point of intervention. For example, after reading General Romeo Dallaire's sobering *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (2004), conflict analysts may decide that it is necessary for the international community to use "deadly force" in order to prevent or stop genocide as a *necessary* condition to conducting less lethal 3rd party interventions later on in a given conflict situation.

In the event, the designers and implementers of the intervention would be aiming for *negative peace* (the prevention or cessation of hostilities) as a basis for achieving and maintaining *positive peace* (elimination or significant reduction of underlying causes and conditions). If achieving and maintaining *negative peace* is not what many students of peace and conflict studies have been trained to do, then they must learn how to *communicate, cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate* (*C4*) with those who have been so trained (see Nan, 2004), if they want an opportunity to do what they have been trained for.

In the process of designing and implementing a "*full-C4*," *contingency*-based peace operation into a complex conflict situation where genocidal conflict is

imminent or actually occurring, then *track 1* national military and police forces, plus diplomats and IGOs, will have to "communicate, cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate" with *multitrack* actors from the business, media, education and training, humanitarian relief, citizen advocate, philanthropic, and other domains (see Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

So, how are the responses of our CSCE/OSCE senior negotiators to the "lessons learned" question distributed with regard to these and other elements of 3rd party intervention in the 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys? Also, to what extent were these perceptions "apparently" impacted by the NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as by popularization of Huntington's "civilizational thesis"?

Again, we examined responses to the question to identify *common themes* within each of the membership groupings (NATO, NNA, FYug, NSWP, and FSU), followed by a search for dissimilar as well as common themes across groupings.

The 1993 CSCE survey

For the 1993 CSCE survey, content analysis led to the results presented in Table 7.1.

By far, the overwhelming similarity/commonality across the five CSCE groupings for 1993 was an emphasis on the *need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention* [*PD/CP*] (*1st ranking*), followed by the likelihood that the *wars in FYug would serve as a model for others elsewhere*, especially in the former Soviet Union [*Model*] (*2d ranking*).[1]

Three of the groupings (NATO, the NNA, and FSU) talked about the *need to focus attention on complex (identity-based) ethnic-type conflicts* [*Ethnic*] (*3rd ranking*), but only two of these (perhaps, not surprisingly, the former superpower adversaries of the Cold War, NATO and the FSU) talked about the *need for forceful action in such situations* [*Force*] (*4th ranking*). Two (NATO and the NNA) talked about the *need for complementarity and*

Table 7.1 Comparisons across the five groupings for 1993: common/dissimilar *themes* on the "lessons of Yugoslavia"

	PD/CP	*Model*	*Ethnic*	*Force*	*Coord*	*None*	*Demo*
NATO	6	2	4	4	3	3	
NNA	3	2	2		1		1
FYug	1	1					
NSWP	3	3					
FSU	1	1	1	1			
Total	14	9	7	5	4	3	1
% of 31	45.2	29	22.6	16.1	12.9	9.7	3.2
Rank	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*

coordination among the various actors involved in dealing with such situations [*Coord*] (*5th ranking*). One of these (the NNA) referred to the *need for democracy building* [*Demo*] (*7th ranking*) while some in the other (NATO) said there were "*no lessons*" *learned from the wars in former Yugoslavia* [*None*] (*6th ranking*).

The 1997 OSCE survey

Content analysis for the 1997 OSCE survey led to the results in Table 7.2.

Across the five basic groupings of OSCE members and OSCE Secretariat for 1997, the dominant *lesson learned* from the wars in former Yugoslavia was (again) the *need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention* [*PD/CP*] (*1st ranking*). This was followed by the *need for coordination among the various actors involved in such activities* [*Coord*] (*2d ranking*); the *need to pay attention to complex (identity-based), ethnic-type conflicts* [*Ethnic*] (*3rd ranking*); with some in four of the six groupings believing that *forceful or otherwise resolute (decisive) action may be necessary in such situations* [*Force*] (*4th ranking*). Some in three of the groupings (inclusive of NATO but not the FSU) subscribed to the *need for US leadership in such situations* [*US*] (*5th ranking*). Other themes were the *need for democracy building* [*Demo*] (*6th ranking*) and the idea that *the wars in former Yugoslavia might be a model for others elsewhere* [*Model*] (*7th ranking*), while a few felt that *there were no* "*lessons*" *learned* [*None*] (*8th ranking*).

The 1999 OSCE survey

By 1999, when successive versions of the Balkan wars had been ongoing for nearly a decade, I first asked the question, "*What were the 'Lessons of Yugoslavia' before Kosovo?*" Then I asked, "*Were they applied to Kosovo? If not, why not?*" Finally, I asked, "*What are the* "*Lessons of Kosovo?*"

Table 7.2 Comparisons across the six groupings for 1997: common/dissimilar *themes* on the "lessons of Yugoslavia"

	PD/CP	*Coord*	*Ethnic*	*Force*	*US*	*Demo*	*Model*	*None*
NATO	6	10	3	2	3	1	1	
NNA	5	1	5					
FYug	2	2	2		2	1		
NSWP	4	2		2		2		
FSU	7	6	5	4		1	2	1
OSCE	2	2	2	1	2			1
Total	26	23	17	9	7	5	3	2
% of 52	50	44.2	32.7	17.3	13.5	9.6	5.8	3.8
Rank	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*

Table 7.3 Comparisons across the six groupings for 1999: common/dissimilar *themes* on the "lessons of Yugoslavia" *before* Kosovo

	PD/CP	*Coord*	*Force*	*Ethnic*	*Milos*	*SoftP*	*Cmplx*	*StP*
NATO	9	7	5	1	3	2	1	2
NNA	6	3	3	2	1		2	
FYug	3	1		1	1			1
Alb	1							
NSWP	2	5	2	1	1	1	1	1
FSU	6	4	3	4	2	3	1	
Total	27	20	13	9	8	6	5	4
% of 45	60	44.4	28.9	20	17.8	13.3	11.1	8.9
Rank	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*

Responses to the first question for each of the five groups, *plus* Albania, are summarized in Table 7.3.[2]

For the 1999 survey, the *need for conflict monitoring, prevention and quick response* to developing conflicts [*PD/CP*], *ranked 1st* (yet again). This was followed by the *need for a common foreign and security policy*, where *coordination* and *unity of effort* were necessary [*Coord*] (*2d ranking*). Then came the *need for appropriate military force* ("with full authority to act") [*Force*] (*3rd ranking*); the *need to pay attention to nationalism and ethnicity* as causes of conflict [*Ethnic*] (*4th ranking*); and the illusion that *Milosevic* after Dayton could be trusted or that he was "remedial" [*Milos*] (*5th ranking*).

A preference for what has come to be called "soft" power (e.g., dialogue, negotiations) over, or in addition to, "hard" power (see Nye, 2004) came next [*SoftP*] (*6th ranking*), followed by the belief that *Kosovo was a particularly complex conflict* [*Complx*] (*7th ranking*) and the *need for a regional approach* (along the lines of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe) to solving the problems of the Balkans [*StP*] (*8th ranking*).

According to Table 7.4,[3] 28 OSCE negotiators (68.3 percent) thought that the lessons of the Yugoslav wars *prior to Kosovo* (e.g., the lessons of Bosnia) had been applied to Kosovo; 10 (24.4 percent) thought they had not; and 3 (7.3 percent) had "mixed feelings" on the matter.

Among those agreeing that the lessons of Bosnia had been applied to Kosovo, quite a few expressed the view that the international community had intervened *earlier* in a more *coordinated* and *resolute* fashion (with NATO military force) in Kosovo than it did in Bosnia. Among those expressing *mixed feelings*, two (from the NSWP) indicated that the lessons of Bosnia had not been applied before Kosovo, but certainly after. One (from the FSU) expressed the view that NATO's intervention in Kosovo without UN Security Council authorization was an example of "double standards."

Among those disagreeing that the lessons of Bosnia had been applied to Kosovo, some expressed the view that the reason was a lingering tendency to trust Milosevic as a "peacemaker." Others claimed that the international

Table 7.4 Comparisons across the six groupings for 1999: lessons of Bosnia applied to Kosovo?

	SA	*A*	*MF*	*D*	*SD*
NATO	2	8		2	1
NNA		5		2	
FYug		3		1	
Alb		1			
NSWP	1	3	2		
FSU		5	1	4	
Total	3	25	3	9	1
% of 41	7.3	61	7.3	22	2.4
Rank	*4*	*1*	*3*	*2*	*5*

community did not act in time or resolutely enough, because of a lack of political will, consensus, and/or competence.

Here, the proposition that different actors can see "different" things when looking at the "same" thing becomes reinforced. For some respondents, the international community responded quickly and resolutely to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, whereas for others it did not. Further, a majority of OSCE negotiators from four of the five groupings (NATO, NNA, FYug, and NSWP) *and* Albania expressed the view that the lessons of Bosnia had been applied to Kosovo. By contrast, negotiators from the FSU were nearly evenly split, with five agreeing, four disagreeing, and one expressing *mixed feelings*.

What is particularly noteworthy about these findings is that the vast majority of OSCE negotiators sampled believed that the lessons of Bosnia *were* applied to Kosovo, thereby suggesting that learning among members of the international community had, indeed, taken place over time – a suggestion reinforced by other data reported in this volume.

The question at this point is, what were the lessons of Kosovo (Table 7.5),[4] and to what extent are they compatible with, or dissimilar to, the lessons *prior to Kosovo*?

Once again, the *need for conflict prevention and quick action*, especially in response to "ethnic cleansing" [*CP/PD*] *ranked first*. This was followed by the *need for a new kind* or *new model of force* (where force was part of the whole) [*Force*] (*2d ranking*); the *need for consultation, consensus, coordination, and collaboration* [*Coord*] (*3rd ranking*); and the *need for a soft power approach* [*SoftP*] (*4th ranking*).

The *need to build civil society and democratic institutions* [*Demo*] (*5th ranking*) came next. This was followed by the *need for a stability pact* (regional approach to problem solving) in the Balkans [*StP*]; the view that *Kosovo was a unique case* [*KosUnq*]; and the *need for UN Security*

Table 7.5 Comparisons across the six groupings for 1999: lessons of Kosovo?

	CP/PD	*Force*	*Coord*	*SoftP*	*Demo*	*StP*	*KosUnq*	*UNSC*	*NEthCl*	*TEarly*	*Econ*
NATO	2	5	2	2	3	3	2	3	1	2	2
NNA	4	2	1							2	
FYug	1	2		1	1	1	1				
Alb	1	1			1		1				
NSWP	3	1	4	1	3	1	1		1		1
FSU	4	3	4	5				2	2		
Total	15	14	11	9	8	5	5	5	4	4	3
% of 44	34.1	31.8	25	20.45	18.2	11.4	11.4	11.4	9.1	9.1	6.8
Rank	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6.3*	*6.3*	*6.3*	*9.5*	*9.5*	*11*

Council authorization for the use of force [*UNSC*], all of which were tied (*6.3 ranking*).

Respondents then expressed the views that *ethnic cleansing was unacceptable* [*NEthCl*] or that *it was too early* to say what the lessons of Kosovo were [*TEarly*], which were tied (*9.5 ranking*). Finally, some respondents expressed a *need for economic reconstruction* in the Balkans [*Econ*] (*11th ranking*).

The 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys compared: lessons *before* Kosovo

The major similarity between the results of the 1993 CSCE, 1997 OSCE, and 1999 OSCE surveys *before Kosovo* was that the need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention was ranked *first* as the dominant "Lesson of Yugoslavia" for all three surveys, with the proportion of CSCE/OSCE negotiators subscribing to this view *increasing* across time: *45 percent* for 1993, *50 percent* for 1997, and *60 percent* for 1999.

The need for forceful (resolute, decisive) action remained at *4th place* for both 1993 and 1997, but, in terms of proportions of respondents subscribing to such views, *increased* slightly from 1993 (*16 percent*) to 1997 (*17 percent*). It then *increased* quite a bit by 1999 (*28.9 percent*), and moved into *3rd place*. This observation is compatible with responses to closed-ended question number 2 dealing with the continued role that NATO could play in addressing the conflicts of post–Cold War Europe by providing peacekeeping forces: *3.98* (1993), *4.28* (1997), and *4.19* (1999) (see Appendix B, Table B.2).

One of the big changes across the three surveys was that the need for a division of labor, complementarity, coordination, and "unity of effort" among actors involved in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention *increased* from *5th place* in 1993 (*13 percent*) to *2d place* for 1997 (*44 percent*), where it remained for 1999, both in terms of rankings and proportion of respondents expressing that view (*44.4 percent*). This observation directly overlaps the trends in responses to closed-ended question number 10 dealing with the need for coordination and integration of multitrack efforts across the three time periods: *3.89* (1993), *4.06* (1997), and *4.42* (1999) (see Appendix B, Table B.10). The expressed need for coordination is also generally compatible with responses to closed-ended question number 4 dealing with the need for NATO to liaise with its former Cold War adversaries in addressing issues of common security: *4.17* (1993), *4.16* (1997), and *4.11* (1999) (see Appendix B, Table B.4).

Another major change was that the proposition that the wars in former Yugoslavia might constitute a model for wars elsewhere (i.e., "multiplier-effect systemic contagion") *decreased* from *2d place* in 1993 (*29 percent*) to *7th place* in 1997 (*6 percent*), and then, by 1999, *disappeared altogether* as an issue.

While the proportion of respondents subscribing to the view that there was a need to pay attention to complex (identity-based) ethnic-type conflicts *increased* from 1993 (*23 percent*) to 1997 (*33 percent*), the rankings remained at *3rd place* for both surveys. By 1999, this issue had *decreased* to *4th place* (*20 percent*). This observation overlaps somewhat with responses to closed-ended question number 1 dealing with violent ethnic conflicts remaining among the major threats to international peace and security in the post–Cold War world: *4.75* (1993), *4.08* (1997), and *4.23* (1999) (see Appendix B, Table B.1).

The proportion of respondents advancing the view that there was a need for democracy building *increased* from 1993 (*3 percent*) to 1997 (*10 percent*), then *decreased* slightly by 1999 (*6.7 percent*) (not shown in Table 7.3), with the rankings remaining within a very small range (*7th*, *6th* and *9th place*, respectively).

Interestingly, the proposition that there was a need for US leadership in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention (and beyond!) was manifested only in the 1997 survey, and at a fairly low level: only *13 percent* of the respondents subscribed to this view, which was ranked in *5th place*. By 1999, only one respondent (*2.2 percent*) mentioned the need for the United States to play a positive leadership role (in order to influence the Russians to work collaboratively for conflict prevention), while another (*2.2 percent*) expressed the view that it was unhealthy for Europe to be unduly dependent on the United States for security purposes.

Among the unique features of the 1999 survey was the emergence of Milosevic as a peacemaking *liability* rather than asset (*5th place*). Others include the emergence of "soft power" (*SoftP*) as an issue (*6th place*), the complexity of the Kosovo conflict (*7th place*) and the need for a regional approach to problem solving in the Balkans (*StP*) to "capture that complexity" (*8th place*).

Interpreting the findings *before* Kosovo

What can we make of these findings, and the consistency and/or changes observed from 1993, 1997, to 1999? That there were more references to the need for preventive diplomacy as the *primary* lesson of the wars in former Yugoslavia in 1999 (*60 percent)* and 1997 (*50 percent*) than in 1993 (*45 percent*), for instance, can be seen against the background of developments in preventive diplomacy. Although coined in 1960 by then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (Lund, 1996, p. 32), "preventive diplomacy" was not an oft-thought-of expression until 1992 when then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published his *An Agenda for Peace*, broadening as well as publicizing the term. This was the same year that the CSCE had decided to send missions into the field to provide "early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management" and to create the office of the

HCNM (see *CSCE Helsinki Document 1992*). It was also 1 year before I conducted the 1993 survey and some 4 years before Michael Lund published his major contribution to institutionalizing the concept: *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (1996), itself 1 year before I conducted my follow-up 1997 survey.

In other words, although it was the dominant lesson to have emerged from the three surveys, *preventive diplomacy* may have been referred to more often in 1999 than in 1997 and 1997 than in 1993 – and in terms of the need to *coordinate* such activities – in large part because it was not embedded in the track 1 or multitrack conflict-resolution lexicons and practices as much in 1993 as it was in 1997 and 1999. Quite simply, by 1997 and even more so by 1999, the men and women of the OSCE were thinking more about *coordinated preventive diplomacy* than their CSCE predecessors had done in 1993. Moreover, they had a more concrete sense of where preventive diplomacy could be useful: in complex (identity-based), *ethnic*-type conflicts such as those that had given rise to the wars in former Yugoslavia.

The significant decrease between 1993 (*29 percent*) and 1997 (*6 percent*) among those subscribing to the view that the wars in former Yugoslavia might constitute a model for others elsewhere (especially in the former Soviet Union) might have something to do with the termination of the first Russian–Chechen war in 1996. It might also have a lot to do with the relative success of the US/NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: a mission that had been in place some 18 months by the time I conducted the 1997 OSCE survey. This could also explain the absence of references to the need for US leadership in the 1993 survey, but their presence (although, again, not at a critical level) in the 1997 survey.

That the more forceful and contentious US/NATO-led intervention in the Kosovo crisis occurred immediately before I conducted the 1999 survey, may account for the total disappearance of the need for US leadership in conducting interventions (which correlates with the total disappearance as an issue of the Balkan wars as a model for others elsewhere). After the intervention in Kosovo, therefore, certain members of the OSCE seem to have become less sanguine about military interventions, especially if conducted by the United States *without* UN Security Council authorization: a situation which seems to have only worsened with the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

Lessons of Kosovo

The "lessons of Kosovo" reported here are interesting, despite (or because of) the fact that the intervention in Kosovo was a source of frustration for OSCE negotiators associated with the view that NATO should not have acted against Serbia without UN Security Council authorization. For instance, the consistently expressed need for conflict monitoring and quick

action to prevent ethnic cleansing remained high *after Kosovo* as did the need to use appropriate force and coordinate such efforts: *1st place* [*CP/PD*], *2d place* [*Force*] and *3rd place* [*Coord*], respectively. The need to build civil society and democratic institutions in Kosovo (at *5th place*) (*18.2 percent*) was a significant improvement over earlier calls for democratization in Bosnia: *3 percent* [*7th place*] (1993), *10 percent* [*6th place*] (1997), and *6.7 percent* [*9th place*] (1999 *before* Kosovo; not shown in Table 7.3).

Perhaps reflecting the bitterness of some with regard to the US/NATO-led Kosovo intervention, the *post-Kosovo* increase in the need for democratic/civil society institutions is compatible with the view that, while *Force* remained in the top four lessons across the three time periods, it was, after the Kosovo intervention, the call for a *new model* (*2d place*) where force – authorized by the UN Security Council (*6.3 place*) – was *part of a larger whole* (e.g., the *3PF-based NEPSS*), inclusive of a *soft power* dimension (*4th place*) as well as an emphasis on civil society and democratic institutions, all within the context of a regional approach to problem solving in the Balkans (*6.3 place*), with economic reconstruction one goal among many (*11th place*).

Prioritized lessons learned for each of the five groupings, 1993, 1997, and 1999

In order to comprehensively assess trends in *lessons learned* across the three time periods, it is useful to examine the *top three rankings* for each of the groupings:

Clearly, for 1993 (Table 7.6a), the need for preventive diplomacy and early response was the dominant *lesson learned*, with *multiplier-effect systemic contagion* (Model) a co-equal lesson for 3 of the 5 groupings (FYug, NSWP, and FSU) and 2d lesson for one (NNA). The need to pay attention to ethnicity (FSU, NATO, and NNA) and to use force in such conflicts (FSU, NATO) varied between 1st and 2d *lessons learned*. The need to coordinate interventions in ethnic conflicts was not a "top three" priority in 1993, emerging as a 3rd (co-equal) choice for only two of the groupings (NATO

Table 7.6a 1993

	I	*II*	*III*
NATO	PD/CP	Ethnic–Force	Coord–None
NNA	PD/CP	Ethnic–Model	Coord–Demo
FYug	PD/CP–Model		
NSWP	PD/CP–Model		
FSU	PD/CP–Model-Ethnic–Force		

and NNA). The need for democratic institutions was even less of a top three priority, mentioned by only one grouping (NNA) and as a 3rd (co-equal) *lesson learned*.

By 1997 (Table 7.6b), the need to coordinate interventions moved into 1st place for NATO, was a co-equal 1st choice for the FYug and OSCE Secretariat, and the 2d place choice for the NNA, NSWP (co-equal) and FSU. Preventive diplomacy/conflict prevention (PD/CP) remained the dominant (or codominant) choice for all but NATO, where it occupied 2d place. The need to pay attention to ethnic conflicts was a co-equal 1st choice for the NNA, FYug, and OSCE Secretariat, and 3rd choice for NATO and the FSU. The need to use force in such conflicts was a co-equal 2d place choice, both for the NSWP and OSCE Secretariat. The need to build democratic institutions following such conflicts was the second place choice for the FYug and a co-equal second place choice for the NSWP. The need for the United States to play a role in international interventions was mentioned on three occasions, as a co-equal 1st place choice for the FYug and OSCE Secretariat and as a 3rd place (co-equal) choice for NATO.

By 1999 (*before Kosovo*) (Table 7.6c), PD/CP was uniquely dominant for all but the NSWP, where it occupied 2d place. The need to coordinate such missions was in 2d place for all except the NSWP, where it occupied 1st

Table 7.6b 1997

	I	*II*	*III*
NATO	Coord	PD/CP	Ethnic–US
NNA	PD/CP–Ethnic	Coord	
FYug	PD/CP–Coord–Ethnic–US	Demo	
NSWP	PD/CP	Coord–Force–Demo	
FSU	PD/CP	Coord	Ethnic
OSCE	PD/CP–Coord–Ethnic–US	Force–None	

Table 7.6c 1999 (before Kosovo)

	I	*II*	*III*
NATO	PD/CP	Coord	Force
NNA	PD/CP	Coord–Force	Ethnic–Cmplx
FYug	PD/CP	Coord–Ethnic–Milos–StP	
Alb	PD/CP		
NSWP	Coord	PD/CP–Force	Ethnic–Milos–SoftP–Cmplx–StP
FSU	PD/CP	Coord–Ethnic	Force–SoftP

place (co-equal). The need to use force to prevent or stop ethnic cleansing was a co-equal choice in 2d place for the NNA and NSWP, 3rd place choice for NATO and co-equal 3rd place choice for the FSU. The need to pay attention to ethnic conflicts was a co-equal choice in 2d place for the FYug and the FSU, and co-equal 3rd place choice for the NNA and NSWP. The complexity of Kosovo was a co-equal 3rd place choice for the NNA and NSWP, while the need for *soft power* in such situations was a co-equal 3rd place choice for the NSWP and FSU. The need for a regional approach (through the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe) to deal with such complexity was the co-equal 2d place choice for the FYug and co-equal 3rd place choice for the NSWP. The perception of Milosevic as more a part of the problem than of the solution was a coequal 2d place choice for the FYug and co-equal 3rd place choice for the NSWP.

Accordingly, trends in the top three *lessons learned* for the CSCE/OSCE groupings from 1993 to 1999 (*before Kosovo*) included the persistent, near unanimous 1st place ranking of the need for preventive diplomacy and quick response to ethnic conflicts/ethnic cleansing and emergent 2d place ranking of the need to coordinate such missions, plus a mix of force and *soft power* within a regional framework to deal with the complexity of such situations – all very much in keeping with the development of a NEPSS-type system.

Trends also included the disappearance, as a major issue, of the fear of the Balkan wars generating *multiplier-effect systemic contagion* elsewhere (e.g., in the FSU) and the brief appearance and then disappearance of the need for the United States to lead international interventions into complex conflict situations.

The trends in rankings of the top three *lessons learned* also suggest an increase in *consensus* among the groupings of CSCE/OSCE members on *lessons learned* from the Balkan wars across the 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys (*before Kosovo*), which overlaps with our findings for the closed-ended questions:

> the *least amount of consensus* – of *community in the CSCE/OSCE* – was recorded for 1993, immediately following the ending of the Cold War; [by contrast] *the greatest amount of consensus* occurred in 1997, two years after NATO and the Dayton peace process brought "negative peace" to Bosnia [emphasis in original] (see Chapter 5).

This quote goes on to claim that, based on the analysis of responses to the closed-ended questions, consensus then declined because of the contentious nature of the US-led NATO intervention in Kosovo. This finding *triangulates* exceedingly well with our findings on prioritized *lessons learned* for each of the five groupings *after* Kosovo:

Table 7.6d 1999 (after Kosovo)

	I	*II*	*III*
NATO	Force	Demo–StP–UNSC	PD/CP–Coord–SoftP–KosUnq–Econ–TEarly
NNA	PD/CP	Force–TEarly	Coord
FYug	Force	PD/CP–SoftP–Demo–StP–KosUnq	
Alb	PD/CP–Force–Demo–KosUnq		
NSWP	Coord	PD/CP–Demo	Force–SoftP–StP–KosUnq–NethCl–Econ
FSU	SoftP	PD/CP–Coord	Force

For the 1999 survey (*after Kosovo*) (Table 7.6d), the need for preventive diplomacy and quick response was the 1st (or co-equal 1st) choice only for the NNA and Albania, the co-equal 2d place choice for the FYug, NSWP, and FSU, and the co-equal 3rd place choice for NATO (which had conducted the air war against Serbia over Kosovo). The need for coordination in responding to ethnic conflicts and ethnic cleansing was the 1st place choice for the NSWP, co-equal 2d place choice for the FSU, 3rd (or co-equal 3rd) place choice for NATO and the NNA.

Force became the 1st (or co-equal 1st) place choice for NATO (which, again, had conducted the air war against Serbia), the FYug and Albania (which were intimately affected by the Kosovo crisis); the co-equal 2d place choice for the NNA, and the 3rd (or co-equal 3rd) place choice for the FSU (which was profoundly against NATO's action against Serbia) and NSWP.

The uniqueness of Kosovo, perhaps calling for a complex approach to the crisis, was a co-equal 1st place choice for Albania, co-equal 2d place choice for the FYug, and a co-equal 3rd place choice for NATO and the NSWP.

The need for *soft power* in such situations was the 1st place choice for the FSU (which, again, did not agree with the use of force against Serbia), the co-equal 2d place choice for FYug, and the co-equal 3rd place choice for NATO and the NSWP.

The need for democratic institutions in such situations was a co-equal 1st place choice for Albania and a co-equal 2d place choice for NATO, FYug, and the NSWP. The need for a regional approach to dealing with complex conflicts in the Balkans (StP) was a co-equal 2d place choice for NATO and the FYug, and a co-equal 3rd place choice for the NSWP.

Clearly, whatever linear development in consensus on *lessons learned* had occurred from 1993 to 1999 (*before Kosovo*) was disrupted because of Kosovo. This applies as well to the trends in NATO–FSU togetherness/polarity. After (and because of) Kosovo, NATO–FSU consensus on the top

three rankings was completely reversed, as is clear (from Table 7.6d) in their 1st and 3rd place rankings regarding the use of force (*hard power*) and *soft power* This overlaps the finding from Chapter 5 that

> taken together with the observations that overall consensus [on the closed-ended questions] was highest *and* NATO–FSU polarity lowest in 1997, the year of highest NATO–FSU togetherness, then again, it seems that the relatively more "neat" NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 may, in fact, have had a unifying or consensus-strengthening effect on OSCE negotiators, whereas the relatively more "messy" NATO intervention in Kosovo may have had a consensus-diminishing effect (Chapter 5).

Conclusion

The lessons (apparently) learned from the Balkan wars of the 1990s by the CSCE/OSCE negotiators involved in this study, represent elements of what could constitute a peace and security system for Europe in the postmodern period: coordinated "contingency" and multitrack approaches to conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation, where *hard power* may sometimes be necessary but only as part of a larger, integrative framework inclusive of *soft power* (e.g., civil society) elements with a regional focus, to "capture the complexity" of complex conflicts such as those that led to the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia.

Part of that complexity are the dynamic shifts in the weights and interactions of the likely causal factors revealed in Chapter 6 (see Tables 6.4–6.8). Whether it is those or other causes, the levels of responses to closed-ended question number 8 dealing with the need to address the *issues underlying the violent expression of conflict*, indicate that, across the three time periods, CSCE/OSCE negotiators increasingly prioritized highly the need to address those issues in efforts to deal with violent conflicts: *4.57* (1993), *4.57* (1997), and *4.65* (1999) (see Appendix B, Table B.8).

Negotiators also prioritized highly – but at a *decreasing rate* across the three time periods – their positive responses to closed-ended question number 9 dealing with the proposition that, without successfully dealing with the issues underlying the use of violence, forceful intervention would not, by itself, lead to a resolution of the conflict: *4.36* (1993), *4.20* (1997), *4.16* (1999) (see Appendix B, Table B.9). That these mean responses are not as high as those for closed-ended question number 8 and are on a downward trajectory across the three time periods, are compatible with the primacy given to the use of force as one of the *lessons learned after Kosovo*.

The findings reported in this chapter further suggest that the revealed elements of peace and security are becoming more thought about, talked

about and (*political will* "*willing*") more likely to translate into corresponding action as the OSCE and other track 1 and multitrack actors pursue, achieve and work to maintain *positive* as well as *negative peace* in postmodern Europe.[5]

As one major test of this overarching proposition, Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (2005) report in the most recent of their biennial *Peace and Conflict: Global Surveys of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, that ethnonational wars for independence, autocratic regimes, repression and political discrimination, and the global magnitude of armed conflict have continued to *decline*. Further, that these gains

> are the result of persistent and *coordinated* efforts at *peace-building* by *civil society* organizations, *national leaders, non-governmental organizations*, and *international bodies* [emphasis added].
>
> (Ibid., p. 1)

Kosovo, building upon the coordinated missions to Bosnia-Herzegovina, remains a further test of this hypothesis.[6] For the moment, as of this writing, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has indicated that the time has come to start negotiations to

> determine whether the *predominantly Muslim territory of Kosovo* should gain independence or remain an autonomous part of Serbia-Montenegro, a remnant of the former Yugoslavia.
>
> The move is intended to force major powers to confront the most politically sensitive issue remaining in the region from 1999, when a U.S.-led air war forced Serbian forces out of the predominantly ethnic-Albanian province, which was turned into a U.N. protectorate defended by tens of thousands of U.S., Russian and European troops [emphasis added].
>
> (Lynch, 2005)

Befitting the *complexity* and *uniqueness of Kosovo* expressed by respondents in the 1999 OSCE survey, resolving Kosovo's "status question" will be challenging, as it

> sets the stage for contentious debate between Kosovo's pro-independence ethnic Albanians who make up 90 percent of the population, and the Serbs, who are reluctant to abandon their claim to a province that played a central role in their history.
>
> (Ibid.)

Kosovar Albanian–Serb hostility is inherent in observations such as:

> Half of Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs live in NATO-protected enclaves, and Serbian officials have argued that this is evidence that there have not been sufficient advances in minority rights.
>
> They also point to mass rioting in March 2004, when 50,000 ethnic Albanians took part in a three-day wave of attacks on Serbs and other minorities, resulting in 19 deaths. Four thousand people were driven from their homes.
>
> (Hoge, 2005)

Further, UN Secretary-General Annan's move to start negotiations to settle the status question

> is likely to generate tension between the United States, which has sympathized with Kosovo's bid for independence, and Russia, a close ally of Serbia. [Clearly, a "benign" example of *ethnic kin spillover*.] It will also increase pressure on the European Union to pledge to integrate Serbia and Kosovo into Europe if they resolve their long-standing dispute.
>
> "This has the makings of a classic conflict," said Ivo Daalder, a Balkans specialist at the Brookings Institution. "The American view is to lean towards independence; the European Union will say, 'Let's figure out a way not to make that decision'; and the Russians on the opposite [will say], 'Over my dead body'."
>
> (Lynch, 2005)

In the next chapter, we will examine, across the three time periods, CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions of what an *ideal* peace and security system might look like in a postmodern Europe whose members are exploring the future status of Kosovo with its predominantly Muslim population (in addition to negotiating Turkey's entry into the EU). This examination will include searching for further references to elements of an effective peace and security system for Europe that may or may not resemble the NEPSS-like coordinated "contingency" and multitrack system components already revealed in this chapter as developing options.

Chapter 8

CSCE/OSCE negotiators' visions of *ideal* peace and security in postmodern Europe

Introduction

In this chapter we focus on responses to the last of our select open-ended questions prior to 9/11: *If you could design the ideal peace and security system for Europe, what would it look like?* As in Chapters 6–7, qualitative analyses of responses consisted of noting each respondent's answer to the question, identifying common themes within each of the five groupings, and then noting dissimilar as well as common themes across groups. For the 1993 CSCE survey, this led to the results presented in Table 8.1.

The 1993 CSCE survey

Before interpreting these figures, it is useful to remind ourselves of the context within which the 1993 CSCE survey took place: the Cold War had recently ended; the Berlin Wall had come down; Germany had been reunited; the Soviet Union had collapsed into the Russian Federation and 14 other successor states; the Warsaw Pact was no more; and the former communist states of Eastern and Central Europe were enmeshed in complicated transitions from closed, authoritarian to open, democratic political, economic, and social systems (see Sandole-Staroste, 2002).

Clearly, in such a setting, which also included the onset of warfare in former Yugoslavia, there may have been a feeling among the CSCE participants that their world was far more fluid than it had been in years and that the old ways of doing things internationally just would not do anymore.

That might, in part, explain why the CSCE negotiators in the 1993 survey frequently referenced soft security, problem solving, inclusive options in response to the question. Hence, the "*modal*" (*highest ranked*) response to the question across the five groupings was that the CSCE should play a role in the peace and security system of post–Cold War Europe. This was followed in *2d place* by the need for such a system to include a problem-solving capability leading to, among other things, conflict resolution. Competing for *3rd place* was the need for such a system to include NATO and beyond that, an arrangement for European security *for all*, perhaps along the lines of the

Table 8.1 Comparisons across the five groupings for 1993: ranked components of *ideal* peace and security in post–Cold War Europe

	NATO (N = 15)	*NNA (N = 6)*	*FYug (N = 3)*	*NSWP (N = 5)*	*FSU (N = 1)*	*Total (N = 30)*
CSCE	6	4		3		13 (*1*)
Problem solving/CR	8	1	1	1	1	12 (2)
NATO	4	2	1	2		9 (*3.5*)
European security (NACC)	5	1	1	2		9 (*3.5*)
EEC	4	2		2		8 (*5*)
Early warning/ConfPrev	3	1	1	1	1	7 (*6.5*)
Human rights	3	1	1	1	1	7 (6.5)
No will to deal with difficult issues	5	1				6 (8.3)
EEC-based	2	2		1	1	6 (8.3)
Reforms/resources	3	1		1	1	6 (8.3)
Include Russians	3			2		5 (11.5)
Multiple actors	3	1		1		5 (11.5)

NACC. In *5th place* was the need for the European Economic Community (EEC) to be included in the post–Cold War system.

Competing for *6th place* was the need for an early warning/conflict-prevention capability in the future system, and that provisions had to be included to ensure respect for human rights (especially for minority groups). The need to reform, and provide more resources for, existing institutions competed for *8th place* with a need for the future system to be based on the EEC and a need for political will to deal with difficult, serious issues (e.g., genocidal ethnic conflict in Europe).

Competing for *11th place* was that the future system would (should) comprise multiple (in many cases, existing) actors with an effective division of labor between them (one characteristic of NEPSS) and, in any case, *must find a way to include the Russians*.

In addition to looking at total figures for each category, it is interesting to examine differences as well as similarities among the five groupings on each item, a process rendered somewhat challenging since, for the 1993 survey, only one of the 15 successor states of the FSU was included. Nevertheless, we can observe that the need to have the CSCE in the future peace and security system of post–Cold War Europe was an item for the NNA (4/6 = 67 percent), NSWP (3/5 = 60 percent), and NATO (6/15 = 40 percent), but not even mentioned by the FYug and FSU. It is interesting that the NNA would have proportionately the highest number making this judgment, followed by the Eastern and Central Europeans (NSWP), and then NATO, some of whose members viewed the CSCE as "meddlesome competition." Nevertheless, two NATO members (2/15 = 13 percent) wanted the future

system to be CSCE-based (not shown in Table 8.1). One of those NATO respondents said the following:

> The future will be a simple system of collective security, perhaps the CSCE as that system. I am not so sure what will become of the CSCE as an institution. It is now in the midst of a transformation from a "negotiating forum" toward an international organization, experiencing growing institutionalization (e.g., it now has a Secretary General). What is needed as a first step, even prior to all your [interview] questions – as it is not just a matter of NATO, NACC, WEU, EEC, CSCE – is that what we in Europe have to do is come to grips with each other. We have to have a division of labor between these institutions. If these institutions merely muddle along . . . NATO as well as the CSCE is in transition. We need time (2–3 years). And all the organizations will have to agree on the nature and contents of the division of labor. Peace will be a function of these organizations working together.

The need for NATO in the future system was mentioned by all with the exception of the FSU, and within a fairly common range of proportional frequency: NSWP (2/5 = 40 percent), NNA (2/6 = 33 percent), FYug (1/3 = 33 percent), and NATO (4/15 = 27 percent). In addition, two in NATO (2/15 = 13 percent) wanted the future system to be NATO-based (not shown in Table 8.1). Even if we combine the NATO scores (40 percent), that still means that fewer than 50 percent of NATO members in the 1993 survey believed that NATO should be part of a peace and security system for post–Cold War Europe.

The need for a common European security arrangement in the form of the NACC was an item for the NSWP (2/5 = 40 percent), NATO (5/15 = 33 percent), FYug (1/3 = 33 percent), and the NNA (1/6 = 17 percent). Interestingly, members of the two formerly opposing ideological systems (NATO and the FYug/NSWP) were among the highest ranked on this issue, with the NNA in last place.

The need to have the EEC in the system was indexed by the NSWP (2/5 = 40 percent), NNA (2/6 = 33 percent), and NATO (4/15 = 27 percent). In addition, two in NATO (2/15 = 13 percent), two in the NNA (2/6 = 33 percent), one in the NSWP (1/5 = 20 percent) and the sole respondent in the FSU wanted the future system to be EEC-based. If we combine these scores, we obtain: the NNA (67 percent), NSWP (60 percent), and NATO (40 percent). Here, in contrast to their standing on other "relational" issues, the NNA represented proportionately the highest number of negotiators making this judgment, followed by the Eastern and Central European states which, then recently "liberated" from Communism, stood to gain a great deal by eventually becoming members of the EEC. Interestingly, the Yugoslav successor (FYug) states, which also stood to gain

by EEC membership, did not even mention the EEC as an item. One of the NATO respondents expressed his overall views as follows:

> The main elements of the future system would include developing economic links between all European countries such that the development of war would be impeded. There is a need for stronger linkage between economic development and economic prosperity. *We have to try to integrate as many countries as possible*. There is also a need for a conflict resolution system to which all would subscribe. Also, all minorities everywhere should have fair participation opportunities.

For the 1997 OSCE survey, the results are presented in Table 8.2.

The 1997 OSCE survey

By the time of the second survey in 1997, the CSCE had evolved into the OSCE, the first Russian–Chechen war had come and gone (1994–6), genocide had occurred in Rwanda (April–July 1994) and in Bosnia (Srebrenica, mid-July 1995), and NATO had stopped the wars in Bosnia, leaving a peacekeeping mission in the country (IFOR/SFOR) to keep the warring parties apart.

In addition, US military personnel had been killed in Saudi Arabia (November 1995 and June 1996) and Osama bin Laden had issued the first of his *fatwa* against the United States and Americans in general (August 1996).

Table 8.2 Comparisons across the five groupings and OSCE secretariat for 1997: ranked components of *ideal* peace and security in post–Cold War Europe

	NATO (N = 13)	*NNA (N = 9)*	*FYug (N = 3)*	*NSWP (N = 6)*	*FSU (N = 12)*	*Secr't (N = 5)*	*Total (N = 48)*
OSCE	9	4	1	2	4	5	25 (*1*)
NATO	7		2	4	4	5	22 (2)
Multiple actors	4	4		3	3	4	18 (*3.5*)
EU	8	1		3	4	2	18 (*3.5*)
Problem solving/CR	4	2	1	2	4		13 (*5.5*)
All voices	2	3			8		13 (*5.5*)
Early warning/ ConfPrev	5	4		1	1		11 (*7*)
Include US	4	1			2	2	9 (*8.5*)
Include Russians	3	1			5		9 (*8.5*)
European security (EAPC)	4			2	2		8 (*10.5*)
CoE	3	1		1		3	8 (*10.5*)
Int'l Law	1	3		1	1	1	7 (*12*)

Respondents in 1997 indicated that the ideal or likely peace and security system for post–Cold War Europe would consist of the OSCE (*1st place*), NATO (*2d place*), the EU and, in any case, multiple actors with a division of labor among them (tied for *3rd place*).

Tied for *5th place* was that the future system should include a problem-solving capability leading to, among other things, conflict resolution, and that all voices should be heard. Ranked in *7th place* was that such a system should contain an early warning/conflict-prevention capability. Competing for *8th place* was that the system should include both the United States and Russian "voices." The need for all states in Europe to be part of a common security arrangement, perhaps along the lines of the EAPC (which had succeeded the NACC), competed for *10th place* with the need for the evolving system to include the CoE. The importance of international law in the evolving system ranked in *12th place*.

Since the 1997 survey included many of the FSU successor states in contrast to the 1993 survey, it is particularly interesting to examine similarities and dissimilarities among the five groupings – especially NATO and the FSU – as well as the OSCE Secretariat subsample on the various items. For example, the need to have the OSCE in the future peace and security system of post–Cold War Europe was an item for all subsamples: the OSCE Secretariat (5/5 = 100 percent), NATO (9/13 = 69 percent), NNA (5/9 = 55 percent), NSWP (3/6 = 50 percent), FSU (4/12 = 33 percent), and FYug (1/3 = 33 percent). In addition, one NNA respondent (1/9 = 11 percent) and one NSWP respondent (1/6 = 17 percent) indicated that the future system should be OSCE-based (not shown in Table 8.2). That NATO was on the high side and the FSU on the low is interesting given that, when the CSCE first came into existence in the 1970s, it was the FSU calling for it in the face of NATO skepticism and often resistance. In any case, according to the one NNA respondent in favor of a system based on the OSCE:

> The future peace and security system wouldn't look very different from the OSCE, with all European states participating equally and fully (for those who want to do so) in a collective security arrangement. But the principles on which they operate should be the same. We can assume that the era of surprise, large-scale military confrontation is over and here extension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to nonmembers is vital. *We now have to deal with root causes of ethnic tensions and new risks such as international crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and migrant movements due to economic inequalities.*

According to the NSWP respondent:

> An ideal system should be based on principles of the Final Act of the OSCE. They form a very balanced system: human rights, economic,

> environmental, social, military – none should be neglected. *In this new world, the military aspects of security are less important. There is no danger of a big military confrontation. There is still a threat, but not a real danger. The real dangers for instability now are in other areas: human rights, crime, etc.*

All subsamples, with the exception of the NNA, indicated that the future system should include NATO: the OSCE Secretariat (5/5 = 100 percent), FYug (2/3 = 67 percent), NSWP (4/6 = 67 percent), NATO (7/13 = 54 percent), and the FSU (4/12 = 33 percent). As indicated earlier, NATO seems to have been held in rather high regard during the 1997 survey because of its success in stopping the warfare in Bosnia and maintaining the negative peace there for two years by the time the 1997 survey occurred. Hence, in addition to these favorable figures, one NATO respondent (1/13 = 8 percent), one NNA respondent (1/9 = 11 percent), and one NSWP respondent (1/6 = 17 percent) indicated that the future system should be NATO-based (not shown in Table 8.2). Combining these figures, we obtain: the OSCE Secretariat (100 percent), NSWP (83 percent), FYug (67 percent), NATO (61.5 percent), FSU (33 percent), and the NNA (11 percent). Again, as in many of the *relational* issues, the NNA were the lowest, but NATO was eclipsed by the OSCE Secretariat, Central and Eastern European (NSWP) and Yugoslav successor (FYug) states. According to the one NSWP respondent in favor of a NATO-based system:

> NATO, with all countries in NATO, would be OK. Many countries want to join NATO. Otherwise, an ideal system would be difficult to achieve. There is no ideal system.

All subsamples, with the exception of the FYug, indicated that the future system should include the EU: NATO (8/13 = 62 percent), NSWP (3/6 = 50 percent), FSU (4/12 = 33 percent), the OSCE Secretariat (2/5 = 40 percent), and the NNA (1/9 = 11 percent). In addition, one NNA respondent (1/9 = 11 percent), one NSWP respondent (1/6 = 17 percent), and two FSU respondents (2/12 = 17 percent) indicated that the future system should be EU-based (not shown in Table 8.2). Combining these scores, we obtain the following: NSWP (67 percent), NATO (62 percent), FSU (50 percent), OSCE Secretariat (40 percent), NNA (22 percent) and FYug (0 percent). Among the top three, therefore, were members of the former Soviet bloc (NSWP and FSU) and NATO. Interestingly, the OSCE Secretariat was toward the low end and the NNA – again in traditional "nonaligned" fashion – was, with the exception of the Yugoslav successor states (FYug), the lowest ranked group on this issue. Perhaps the greatest surprise here is that the FYug, which stood to gain a great deal by eventual EU membership, did not even acknowledge the EU in response to the question. According to the

one NSWP respondent who believed that the future system should be EU-based:

> I would unite Europe via the EU. NATO is a big question mark. Should it gradually include all of Europe? But some say, "If Russia were to be in NATO, then what is the point of NATO?" A United Europe would need a coordinated defense system, but again, against whom? The Chinese? *The Muslim states*? If Europe is united and war is unthinkable, then where will be the future wars?
>
> This is the way the world is developing: (1) United Europe; (2) Western Hemisphere; and (3) Asian Centre (China and Japan). These three blocs will be competing for resources, markets, economic survival*, if not dominance. It is already taking shape. Sometimes perceptions lag behind realities*. Then we have the question of Africa. The Mediterranean countries are trying to integrate with Europe, but what about Black Africa?

According to one FSU respondent who believed that the future system should be EU-based:

> I envisage a common Europe, with one institution that would combine the interests of all states, with one mechanism for conflict prevention (*before conflict erupts*), one for conflict resolution (*during conflict*) and one for post-conflict rehabilitation (*after conflict*). In this sense, there would be no NATO, no Council of Europe, no OSCE, no subregional mechanisms, just one institution that would combine all these capacities. But the chances for this would be very remote. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, the Platform for Cooperative Security is the way to go, which should also have room for non-bloc countries, with special security guarantees.

All subsamples, with the exception of the FYug, indicated that the future system would be comprised of multiple (existing) institutions with a division of labor among them in the form of the developing concept of the Platform for Cooperative Security: the OSCE Secretariat (4/5 = 80 percent), NSWP (3/6 = 50 percent), NNA (4/9 = 44 percent), NATO (4/13 = 31 percent), and FSU (3/12 = 25 percent). It is interesting that NATO and the FSU are fairly close here on the low end, suggesting that "hegemons" do not have to pay much attention to other actors. By contrast, the OSCE Secretariat, whose organization recognizes the utility of collaborating with other actors, is the highest ranked on this issue. According to one NATO respondent:

> The system would have fewer "rough edges," less duplication, less competition. I would want to have the same functions of the OSCE,

> NATO, Western European Union, Council of Europe, but with better coordination, and more swift action.

According to one NSWP respondent:

> I envisage a cooperative security system based on mutually supporting institutions and a flexible distribution of roles; e.g., NATO as the basic military pillar, but still with basic characteristics of a defensive alliance; the European Union for basic economic infrastructure; the Council of Europe for human rights; and the OSCE for conflict prevention, democracy building, and arms control based on the CFE Treaty. The basic concept here is that of institutions and not of power.

All subsamples, with the exception of the OSCE Secretariat, indicated that the future system should include a problem-solving component leading to, among other things, conflict resolution: FYug (1/3 = 33 percent), NSWP (2/6 = 33 percent), the FSU (4/12 = 33 percent), NATO (4/13 = 31 percent), and the NNA (2/9 = 22 percent). In this case, there was a good deal of commonality among the respondents, including NATO and the FSU, but on the low end. Although salient as an issue, therefore, problem solving seemed to remain an "acquired taste."

NATO–FSU commonality was not the case with respect to the need for "all voices" to be included in the future system: the FSU (8/12 = 67 percent), NNA (3/9 = 33 percent), and NATO (2/13 = 15 percent). One could hypothesize here that the Cold War "victors" tended not to be overly generous in asserting the right for *all voices* to be heard in discussions about critical security issues, in contrast to those who "lost" the Cold War. According to one FSU respondent:

> Not just Bosnia but other conflicts have to be taken into account. We should not overestimate the importance of the Bosnian example. *All* conflicts should be taken into account. We have a *multipolar security system*. The Permanent Council (PC) meetings are now boring (in contrast to 1992). The major players (the EU, U.S., and the Russians) read statements and that is it. There is no lively discussion. In most cases, there is no lively exchange of views to avoid irritating the Russians.

Similarly, the expressed need for the future system to include an early warning/conflict-prevention capability was asymmetrically distributed: NNA (4/9 = 44 percent), NATO (5/13 = 38 percent), NSWP (1/6 = 17 percent), and the FSU (1/12 = 8 percent). Here the NNA ranked highest, followed

by NATO, with the former Soviet bloc members (NSWP and FSU) on the low end. According to one NATO respondent:

> We have good institutions, good principles, so there is no necessity to create more elaborate principles. The Helsinki Final Act (of 1975) and the additions to it (e.g., the Code of Conduct) are adequate for good security architecture. The one problem is the overlapping of tasks and wasting of resources.
>
> Elements of the future system include: (a) the OSCE, whose functions are early warning, preventive diplomacy and post-conflict rehabilitation; (b) the possibility to use force resides with NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and Russia; (c) parallel to NATO is the economic dimension (EU); and (d) it is important to preserve the Euro-Atlantic bridge: participation of the U.S. is indispensable in military, political, and economic areas. *The U.S. is the most credible element in the security architecture. The EU will need a lot of time to become such an element.*
>
> Among these elements, we just need more streamlining, plus a clear willingness to apply existing principles. There is still too much waste, too much spent on the military. Selective applications of principles should be more broad in scope.

What was especially intriguing were the nearly "mirror images" of NATO and the FSU with regard to the inclusion of the United States and the Russians in the future system. The need to include the United States was expressed by two OSCE Secretariat respondents (2/5 = 40 percent), four NATO respondents (4/13 = 31 percent), two FSU respondents (2/12 = 17 percent), and one NNA respondent (1/9 = 11 percent). By contrast, the need to include the Russians was expressed by five FSU respondents (5/12 = 42 percent), three NATO respondents (3/13 = 23 percent), and one NNA respondent (1/9 = 11 percent). *What is especially interesting is the low number of NATO members (roughly a third) who believed that the United States should be included in the future system*, despite the fact that it was the United States that led NATO into Bosnia-Herzegovina to successfully stop the wars there. The number of NATO members who felt that the United States should be included was double the number of FSU members who felt the same. According to one FSU respondent:

> The future system should consist of an enlarged NATO, enlarged EU, cooperation of both NATO and the EU with the Russian Federation, and strong U.S. involvement in European affairs.

For the 1999 OSCE survey, the results are presented in Table 8.3.

The 1999 OSCE survey

By the time of the 1999 survey, three former Warsaw Pact members had been embraced by NATO: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. More importantly, in defiance of Russia and other members of the international community, NATO had conducted an air war against Serbia, including bombing the capital Belgrade, in response to Serb ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo.

Once again, the need for the OSCE to play a role in the future peace and security system was ranked in *1st place*. This was followed in *2d place* by the need for a regional approach to tackling the challenges facing that system (e.g., the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe). In *3rd place* was that the future system would comprise multiple actors with an effective division of labor among them (e.g., the Platform for Cooperative Security).

Competing for *4th place* was that the system should include both NATO and the EU. Competing for *6th place* was that the future system should include an early warning/conflict-prevention capability and reforms of, and more resources for, existing institutions and mechanisms. The need for a problem-solving capability leading to, among other things, conflict resolution, ranked in *8th place*.

Competing for *9th place* were a future system in which human rights would be respected, which is precisely the mandate of the CoE; and the need for a European security arrangement in the form of the EAPC. Finally,

Table 8.3 Comparisons across the five groupings and Albania for 1999: ranked components of *ideal* peace and security in post–Cold War Europe

	NATO (N = 13)	*NNA (N = 8)*	*FYug (N = 4)*	*NSWP (N = 6)*	*FSU (N = 12)*	*Albania (N = 1)*	*Total (N = 44)*
OSCE	9	4	1	2	9		25 (*1*)
Regional approach	7	2	2	2	3	1	17 (*2*)
Multiple actors	6	5	1	4			16 (*3*)
NATO	6	2	3	1	2		14 (*4.5*)
EU	6	1	1	3	2	1	14 (*4.5*)
Early warning/ ConfPrev	2	2		1	5		10 (*6.5*)
Reforms/resources	4	1		2	3		10 (*6.5*)
Problem solving/CR		3		1	4		8 (*8*)
Human rights	3				2	1	6 (*9.3*)
European security (EAPC)	2		1	1	2		6 (*9.3*)
Include CoE	2	1	1	1	1		6 (*9.3*)
Include US	3	1			1		5 (*12.3*)
Include Russians	1	2	1		1		5 (*12.3*)
UN		1	1	1	2		5 (*12.3*)

in *12th place*, were the needs to include the United States, the Russians, and the UN. Clearly, in the wake of NATO's contentious intervention in the Kosovo crisis, neither the United States, nor the Russian Federation, nor the UN seemed to merit much positive mention as a component of a peace and security system for post–Cold War Europe.

Examining once again the commonalities and differences among the subsamples (including Albania), NATO and the FSU were virtually "neck-in-neck" with regard to responses indicating that a future peace and security system should include the OSCE: FSU (9/12 = 75 percent), NATO (9/13 = 69 percent), NNA (4/8 = 50 percent), FYug (1/3 = 33 percent), and the NSWP (2/6 = 33 percent). In addition, one member of the NNA (1/8 = 12.5 percent) expressed the view that the future system should be OSCE-based (not shown in Table 8.3). According to one NATO respondent, "The present course is a positive one." That is

1 OSCE for human rights and democracy building. We should not exclude OSCE peacekeeping capability. This does not mean the OSCE having its own forces. It could cooperate with others in this regard (see ch. III of Helsinki '92). If there are troubles in the OSCE area, but UN action is blocked by Russia or China, and NATO says that it is not in its interests to intervene, an OSCE capability under such circumstances would be useful. Again, this does not mean the OSCE having its own forces.
2 Of course, NATO.
3 EU for common security and defense identity, and development of its autonomous capacity. There should also be a strong disarmament component, economic development of Europe, and entry of Southeastern Europe into the EU. The EU is a very good model as it is now. It has had a fantastic record over the last 40 years. But before Southeastern European states can enter the EU, they need democracy development, facilitated by OSCE and Council of Europe working cooperatively instead of competitively. Then the Southeastern European states can be integrated into the EU.

On the issue of the need for a regional approach in the future system, NATO–FSU consensus is again absent: NATO (7/13 = 54 percent), FYug (2/4 = 50 percent), NSWP (2/6 = 33 percent), the NNA (2/8 = 25 percent), FSU (3/12 = 25 percent), and Albania. According to one NATO respondent:

> The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe is the first priority: a new Marshall Plan. Some think it is all form and no substance. But we need some sort of framework for action that addresses the region as a whole. This will require a lot of money. We have to get the former Yugoslav

> states to be as self-sustaining as possible and into the EU as soon as possible.

NATO–FSU consensus is also missing in responses to the issue that the future system will consist of multiple (existing) actors with a division of labor among them in the form of the Platform for Cooperative Security: NSWP (4/6 = 67 percent), NNA (5/8 = 63 percent), NATO (6/13 = 46 percent), FYug (1/4 = 25 percent), and FSU (0 percent). According to one NNA respondent:

> Given the lack of cohesion (not necessarily of good will), we have to look at the various institutions to see what they have to offer. Then we have to see how best they could work together (e.g., the Council of Europe does a lot of good work). There are layers and layers involved in how we build up stable societies; also different roles of the various organizations. The OSCE could play a useful (*but not hierarchical*) role in developing this kind of cooperation through the Platform for Cooperative Security.

According to one NSWP respondent:

> The UN, NATO, EU, CoE, OSCE: Each should be in such a future system, playing its role as appropriate in each situation. Maybe not all would be involved in each phase, but at *different phases of a conflict*. A *synergy effect* should be present, plus a *scale of values*; e.g., *genocide should not be tolerated even if occurring within a sovereign country*.

This absence of NATO–FSU consensus is also apparent in responses to the issue that the future system should include NATO: FYug (3/4 = 75 percent), NATO (6/13 = 46 percent), NNA (2/8 = 25 percent), NSWP (1/6 = 17 percent), and the FSU (2/12 = 17 percent). With the exception of the Yugoslav successor states (FYug), these figures also reflect the contentious nature of NATO's air war against Serbia (even within NATO). But one FSU respondent as well as one NNA respondent and one NSWP respondent expressed the view that the future system should be NATO-based (not shown in Table 8.3). According to the NSWP respondent:

> Such a system must be based on NATO. Without NATO, we cannot have peace and security in Europe. We must also have the Platform for Cooperative Security, *but without hierarchy*, to enhance cooperation without duplication and complementarity based on comparative advantage of all organizations.

According to the FSU respondent:

> NATO should be the core of a security system with a very comprehensive approach to security, plus for conflict resolution (OSCE).

The EU also did not fare too well as a potential source of NATO–FSU consensus: NSWP (3/6 = 50 percent), NATO (6/13 = 46 percent), FYug (1/4 = 25 percent), FSU (2/12 = 17 percent), NNA (1/8 = 12.5 percent), and Albania. No respondent for 1999 expressed the view that the future system should be EU-based. Once again, the NNA ranked last on a *relational* issue, while the Eastern and Central European states (NSWP) ranked first, indicating that they had clearly set their sights on eventual EU membership (which occurred on May 1, 2004). According to one NATO respondent:

> For "*Little Europe,*" the EU should evolve into a *federation*, keeping alliances with the U.S. and Canada, but not as before; instead, by working together. For "*Big Europe,*" the OSCE should become involved in the Caucasus and Central Asian republics.

Interestingly, a higher proportion of FSU than of NATO respondents expressed the view that the future system should include an early warning/conflict-prevention capability: the FSU (5/12 = 42 percent), NNA (2/8 = 25 percent), NSWP (1/6 = 17 percent), and NATO (2/13 = 15 percent). According to one FSU respondent:

> We have to develop a system of early warning, with a clear procedure/mechanism of realization of early warning. For example, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) declared early warning several times, but nothing happened. Hence, it might be better if the OSCE were more like the Council of Europe, with a treaty underpinning it.

On the need for reforms of, and more resources for, existing institutions, however, NATO and the FSU were nearly back on track, although at a fairly low level: NSWP (2/6 = 33 percent), NATO (4/13 = 31 percent), the FSU (3/12 = 25 percent), and NNA (1/8 = 12.5 percent).

Combining the total rankings for 1993, 1997, and 1999, we obtain the macropicture as revealed in Table 8.4.

Constancies and shifts over time

What is noteworthy about these combined figures is that they are revealing of the "usual suspects" – for example, the CSCE/OSCE, NATO, EEC/EU,

Russians, Americans, and the UN, among others – as components of a peace and security system for post–Cold War Europe. In terms of content, therefore, the respondents in the 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys did not reveal too much of an "absolutely new" nature. What is particularly interesting are the stable or shifting locations of these components across the three time periods. The CSCE/OSCE, for example, remained consistently in *1st place* across the three data points: an indication not that the CSCE/OSCE was perceived by CSCE/OSCE negotiators as being more important than the other institutions (e.g., NATO, EEC/EU), but only that it was mentioned more often than the others.

Further, NATO moved from *3rd place* in 1993 to *2d place* in 1997, presumably because of its success in stopping the warfare in Bosnia in 1995; however, given the contentious nature of its Kosovo intervention, NATO moved to *4th place* by 1999. The EEC/EU moved from *5th place* in 1993 to *3rd place* in 1997, and to a co-equal *4th place* with NATO by 1999.

The movement of the EEC/EU from a position two rankings below NATO in 1993 to a position of equal importance with NATO in 1999 undoubtedly reflects the emerging importance of the EU as well as NATO as bases for productively incorporating all the former enemies of the Cold War

Table 8.4 Total ranked components of peace and security in post–Cold War Europe, 1993, 1997, and 1999

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
1.	CSCE	OSCE	OSCE
2.	Problem solving/ Conflict resolution	NATO	Regional approach
3.	NATO and NACC	Multiple actors and EU	Multiple actors
4.			NATO and EU
5.	EEC	All voices and Problem solving/Conflict resolution	
6.	Early warning/Conflict prevention and Human rights		Early warning/Conflict prevention and Reforms/resources
7.		Early warning/Conflict prevention	
8.	Political will, Reforms/ resources, EEC-based	Include US and Russians	Problem solving/ Conflict resolution
9.			Human rights, EAPC and CoE
10.		EAPC and CoE	
11.	Multiple actors, including Russians		
12.		Int'l law	Include the Russians, US and UN

into systems of "*common security.*" This shift in the importance of the "*economic dimension*" of security also reflects the CSCE/OSCE's broadening of the concept of security across the three time periods.

The NACC was co-equal with NATO in *3rd place* in 1993, presumably because in the halcyon, early days of the ending of the Cold War, many felt that it was important to include the former Warsaw Pact countries in a joint arrangement with NATO (hence, the establishment of NACC in 1991, as one vehicle for embracing *all voices*) as well as to continue to maintain NATO itself. NACC's successor, however, the EAPC, slipped into *10th place* by 1997, and then increased marginally to *9th place* in 1999. Interestingly, for both 1997 and 1999, the common European security arrangement, EAPC, was co-equal with the primary source of the protection of human rights in Europe, the CoE.

Overlapping with "lessons learned" noted in Chapter 7, the respondents in all three surveys indicated the need for the post–Cold War system to include an early warning and conflict-prevention capability, which ranked in *6th place* for 1993, *7th place* for 1997, and back in *6th place* for 1999. Respondents also indicated a need for that system to have a problem-solving component, leading to, among other things, conflict resolution, which ranked in *2d place* for 1993, *5th place* for 1997, and *8th place* for 1999.

As specific expressions of the need to include *all voices*, albeit on the low end, including the Russians in the post–Cold War system was ranked in *11th place* for 1993, *8th place* for 1997, and *12th place* for 1999. The need to include the United States ranked in *13th place* for 1993 (not shown in Table 8.4), and was co-equal with the need to include the Russians in 1997 (*8th place*) and 1999 (*12th place*). Including the UN was co-equal with the need to include the United States in 1993 (*13th place*). The UN again occupied *13th place* in 1997 (not shown in Table 8.4), and was co-equal with including the United States and Russians in 1999 (*12th place*).

The need for the post–Cold War system to ensure compliance with human rights was co-equal with early warning/conflict prevention in 1993 (*6th place*), did not appear in the top 12 rankings for 1997, but was co-equal with the need to include the EAPC and CoE in 1999 (*9th place*). The need to include *all voices* in general did not appear in the top 12 rankings for 1993, but was co-equal with problem solving/conflict resolution in 1997 (*5th place*) and did not appear in the top 12 rankings for 1999.

The need for reforms of, and resources for, existing institutions was co-equal with the need for political will to make use of existing institutions in dealing with difficult issues and to have an EEC-based system in 1993 (*8th place*). Reforms/resources did not appear in the top 12 rankings for 1997 but, together with early warning/conflict prevention, was ranked in *6th place* by 1999.

What was especially novel across the three time periods was that the need for a *regional approach* to problem solving, early warning, and the like did

not appear in the top 12 for either 1993 or 1997, but achieved *2d place* status by 1999.

Accordingly, the great majority of CSCE/OSCE respondents across the three time periods talked about the need for a peace and security system for post–Cold War Europe comprised of multiple, *existing institutions*, including the one remaining superpower and its former rival, plus NATO, the EEC/EU, and the CSCE/OSCE. These institutions should be enhanced by necessary reforms, additional resources, and in general, the political will to make effective use of them when the need arises. They should also be in a relationship with each other where there is a division of labor and coordination, as was eventually exemplified by the time of the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit in the form of the Platform for Cooperative Security.

Building upon NATO, this system should contain a *common European security* component, perhaps in the form of, originally, the NACC and later, the EAPC. The system should, therefore, reflect *all voices* (inclusive of, e.g., the smaller powers of NATO, EU and those of the South Caucasus and Central Asia). Part of this was the further development of "common values." Further, this system should include an early warning/conflict-prevention capability, plus a problem-solving component facilitating, among other things, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation. This capability should also monitor compliance with human rights (the primary jurisdiction of the CoE), especially for minority groups which could be enhanced by further democracy building.

Interestingly, the *regional approach* to problem solving, early warning, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict rehabilitation emerged only with the 1999 survey. This survey took place soon after Germany, upon the conclusion of its 6-month EU presidency on June 10, 1999 (which coincided with the cessation of NATO's air war against Serbia), had introduced its idea for a Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe: a *regional* basis for preventing future warfare in the Balkans by enhancing prospects for the eventual inclusion of those states in the EU.

A "goodness-of-fit" with NEPSS?

To what extent do the perceptions of CSCE/OSCE negotiators across the three time periods reveal a developing compatibility with the idea of the *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS)? According to the above findings, the future peace and security system for post–Cold War Europe should (would) comprise the following elements:

1 Existing institutions at the regional (CSCE/OSCE, NATO, EEC/EU, CoE) and global (UN) levels.
2 Reforms of those institutions and more resources for their effective operation.

3 New institutions comprising former enemies (NACC, EAPC) and, in effect, *all voices*.
4 Early warning/conflict-prevention mechanisms.
5 Problem solving and conflict-resolution capabilities. And
6 A specific focus on human rights, especially for minorities.

All this, plus the reinforced presence of "multiple actors" with their division of labor and coordination in *3rd place* for both 1997 and 1999 (having increased from *11th place* in 1993), and, by 1999, the appearance of a focus on *regional approaches* to early warning and conflict prevention, problem solving and conflict resolution, ranking in *2d place*, can be viewed as compatible with the NEPSS-like

> coordinated "contingency" and multitrack approaches to conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation, where "hard power" may sometimes be necessary but only as part of a larger, integrative framework inclusive of "soft power" (e.g., civil society) elements with a *regional* focus to "capture the complexity" of complex conflicts such as those that led to the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia (see Chapter 7).

In other words, CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions of an ideal peace and security system moved progressively closer across the three time periods to elements comprising our image of NEPSS (see Chapter 3). The question now is, would this *practitioner-based knowledge* on how to construct Europe's post–Cold war peace and security system, elicited prior to 9/11, be relevant to preventing or otherwise dealing with the "new terrorism" *after 9/11*?

Interestingly, there was no mention of terrorism in the responses to the ideal peace and security question for 1993, even though the first attack on the World Trade Center occurred on February 26, 1993, some three months before the 1993 survey was initiated. There was only one mention of terrorism (by an NNA respondent) as a threat that the post–Cold War system had to guard against for 1997; and only two mentions of terrorism as a threat (by Central Asian/FSU respondents) for 1999. This may have been due, in part, to the fact that I never raised the issue explicitly in the three sets of interviews, plus the fact that the conflict *Zeitgeist* during 1993–9 was definitely ethnic warfare in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Accordingly, following 9/11, I decided that the time had come to specifically address the issue of the *new terrorism* and the possible linkage between it and ethnic conflict. Hence the 2004 survey, whose results we will now discuss in Chapter 9.

Chapter 9

After 9/11

Peace and security issues revisited

Introduction

Many observers of global affairs, notably members of the Bush administration, have claimed that, after the events of 9/11, we were clearly living in a different world. With particular regard to the OSCE, however, some signs of the "looming crisis" that befell the organization in the wake of those tragic attacks were implicit (and sometimes explicit) in some of the comments our interview questions elicited in the 1999 survey. In addition to those already mentioned in Chapter 8, we have, among others, the following comments by one NNA respondent:

> I cannot see any convergence between the Russians and U.S., especially after Kosovo. The U.S. wants the security of Europe to be *NATO-oriented*, while the Russians want it to be *OSCE-oriented*. *Kosovo made it NATO-oriented*. The ideal system would be to establish a buffer zone of neutral countries with defense capabilities between East and West. Always at the back of our minds is the thought that *the Russians might "come back"!*

According to one FSU respondent:

> We are not yet at the stage where we can develop an ideal system. Processes [of change] in Russia are not over. We need a "clean table," so to speak; "zero level," to reconfirm the validity of the Helsinki Final Act. The situation is not yet ripe for an ideal system. Also, what do we mean by "ideal": *within* or *outside* the OSCE (on the periphery)?
>
> OSCE *in the center* has all the players, operational capability. The only thing lacking is a commitment to implement this vision.
>
> The OSCE is no longer a consultative forum; decisions are made elsewhere. It is a vehicle for 54 states coming together to "rubber stamp" decisions made elsewhere. The OSCE has never done anything first. This is a shame because it is the only pan-European organization. The EAPC might be developing in this direction, but it is still in its infancy. I don't feel there is any movement in the organization.

In any case, we have to fully utilize early warning capabilities and then be decisively action-oriented.

For another FSU respondent:

The OSCE has some mechanisms, but not all are for early warning. These should be further developed, as we have new challenges; e.g., *terrorism*. We should create new mechanisms for the entire OSCE. For instance*, in Central Asia, it is impossible to have stability without peace in Afghanistan*. We need mechanisms for tolerance: we cannot have one level of human rights for the entire OSCE. This is impossible and, in any case, we would need time for it to develop.

Without economic development, it is difficult to think about human rights. Some Westerners demand of us, "human rights," and *then economic development*. Then there is the environmental problem of the Aral Sea and a faulty dam, where the lake could flood half of Central Asia in 70 hours. This is too expensive for us to repair. An earthquake could collapse the dam.

For us, the Balkans are so far away. For the U.S. and Europeans, they are not so far. There is lots of discussion in the Permanent Council (PC) on the Balkans, and only a little bit of discussion on Central Asia.

According to yet another FSU respondent:

We are interested in providing the OSCE with "muscle." The U.S. is very happy with the role of NATO in security. They do not see the OSCE as at least an equal partner. *Our view is that the OSCE should not be limited to the 3rd Basket;* it should play a leading role in European security.

What is the primary organization for dealing with security? We cannot deny the role of NATO, but it should be coordinated with the UN first. According to ch. 3 of Helsinki 1992, the OSCE could have peacekeeping forces, with forces supplied by others, all within the framework of the UN Security Council. Because of how Kosovo has been dealt with, the whole jurisdiction of the UN Security Council has been undermined.

We have heard so many arguments about the use of force for humanitarian grounds, but there are so many ethnic groups. Should we use force for all of these?

Another FSU respondent also expressed dissatisfaction with NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis:

What the world needs now in Europe in its security architecture is to prevent Kosovos and *not* to train police officers *after the conflict*. NATO does not want to assume that it needs help. *NATO is part of the problem*. It cannot prevent future Kosovos. The paradox for NATO

is, by conducting the air war against Serbia, it cannot possibly do the same again.

The US is not prepared to create structures (in the OSCE) aimed at prevention. The US tends to "fix it" when something is "broken," rather than preventing it from breaking in the first place, in part, for domestic reasons. It would be in US interests to have *stability by prevention* rather than *enforcing stability after the fact*. It would be better not to have a "wreck" than to try to repair a wreck. But then the structure is unsound: US diplomatic doctrine calls for faster "fire engines," highest tech "fire engines."

What can [my country] do? We constantly argue that the OSCE should be a conflict prevention mechanism. The US delegation has a derogatory view of the OSCE as a "talking club." US contempt for the OSCE as a "talking club" vs. what? NATO as a "doing club"? *The day that NATO fires a shot, it has failed*. Better to have a "talking club" that works, so that the "acting club" does not have to act. The utility of the OSCE is that it *is* a "talking club." If you are talking, you are not shooting!

The US dominates the OSCE even when it cannot make the OSCE do what it wants. It can prevent the OSCE from doing what it does not want it to do. But in the long run, the US is not a beneficiary of such a policy. The OSCE is a forum for bashing people who are not worthy of bashing (e.g., President Lukashenko of Belarus). If Lukashenko released his opposition from prison, what effect would that have on European security? And yet, at every meeting of the Permanent Council (PC), the US delegation pathetically makes some kind of statement about Belarus.

The following are important elements of [an] "upside down triangle" model of security:

1 We need to deal with *underlying causes*.
2 We need *political will* to deal with these.
3 There must be a *commitment of resources* to facilitate dealing with these.
4 We need "*social technology*": the *knowledge* for dealing with underling causes.

According to yet another FSU respondent:

I have no real answer to this. I don't believe that the OSCE could do anything for security in Central Asia, *if, e.g., conflict in Afghanistan were to spread in Central Asia*. Here it is important to understand what OSCE can do and what it cannot do. If the OSCE wants to act more strongly in the Central Asian region, it has to identify practical goals, like the UN agencies have done.

People in the West try to push us to go faster (re: development, democratization). We cannot act in a faster manner; this is what we try to explain!

Most of the dissatisfaction revealed in these statements is from FSU respondents concerned with the absence of respect or urgency for their issues with or within the organization, in contrast to the issues of OSCE members "more centrally located" (an example of the *periphery* vs. the *center*). But some of those concerns apply to other regions within the OSCE, such as the Balkans where, as of this writing, leaders of the former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina are exploring how best to proceed "10 years after Dayton" (see Perry, 2005), while Serbs and Albanians, among others, are dealing with the thorny issue of the final status of Kosovo (see ICG, 2006).

More specifically, within the Balkans as well as the Caucasus there is clearly a clash between two principles of international law: *territorial integrity* (sovereignty) and *self-determination*. According to one NSWP respondent:

> We should not focus only on structures, which is the most popular way for people to discuss this issue. We are not yet at the stage where we can design a theoretical system that can be imposed. The end of the Cold War is not the same as the end of World War 2. Hence, there is no *hierarchica*l cooperation between organizations.
>
> We need a new interpretation of *territorial integrity, self-determination* (Georgia, Moldova, Armenians), and the use of force, especially after Kosovo. We must try to frame a *European security system*, which will depend on the future of European and trans-Atlantic integration processes (e.g., there is a difference between an EU of 15 and an EU of 20 nations). The deeper and more open the European/trans-Atlantic integration, the less the need for a rigid security architecture.

According to one FSU respondent:

> The future system should include (1) a rapid reaction to violence; (2) elaboration of two principles: *territorial integrity* and *self-determination*; (3) implementation of resolutions; (4) democracy building; and (5) development of a system of reaction to noncompliance of international norms and principles (when someone wants to abide but cannot vs. someone who does not want to abide [e.g., Milosevic]). For this, we need the help of the International Community.

Despite these cited examples of dissatisfaction with the OSCE, the findings of the 1999 survey coalesced around a number of themes which reflected commonality across the groupings, including NATO and the FSU. According to one NATO respondent:

> Being a Realist, I would not see much of a future in this [ideal system]. NATO is the only cornerstone (lynchpin) of European security in

> a traditional sense. But since security also contains other elements, NATO is a necessary mechanism, but it needs complementing. This is where the OSCE comes in. *Once we settle a conflict by force, we have to deal with other elements*. I see an amalgamation, in substance, not institutionally; a division of labor between NATO and the OSCE, which we actually have in practice (in Bosnia).The same thing will happen in Kosovo. *The whole is larger than the sum of the parts. No one can do everything by itself*. Therefore, there is a need for complementarity and cooperation (e.g., the Platform for Cooperative Security).

According to an FSU respondent:

> There is nothing ideal in this world, especially in such a dynamic sphere as international relations. Any newly established security system will not be efficient, since definite schemes will be applied. Its creation is a *process*. We think that the most important role should be given to the development of the three multilateral institutions which are of most importance for European security: NATO, EU, and the OSCE. So, the main elements of the future security system will be preservation and strengthening of multilateral structures built during the past 50 years.
>
> *There is no external threat for Europe. The main threats and dangers are of an internal character*. And they emerge from economic and social problems. *That is why nonmilitary elements of stability will be of increasing significance*. We repeat once more that the *new order of security* will be organized in the course of a complex and gradual *process*.

Among those internal threats which, via *spillover*, could take on an “external” character, is *terrorism*. Again, terrorism was explicitly mentioned by only two FSU (Central Asian) respondents during the 1999 survey and by one NNA respondent during the 1997 survey, as something that the future peace and security system must deal with. After 9/11, therefore, it was decided to return to Vienna for a fourth round of interviews to explore this among other issues. Hence, the 2004 survey, to which we now turn.

The 2004 OSCE survey

Between the 1999 and 2004 surveys, the events of 9/11 occurred and, for many, “the world had clearly changed!” Shortly after 9/11, President George W. Bush declared a GWOT, in effect, subdividing the world into “us” and “them” (the terrorists). Later, he added the “axis of evil,” comprised of three states (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) construed as sponsors of terrorism. In addition, a month or so prior to conducting the first

interviews as part of the 2004 survey, on March 11, 2004, the commuter rail system in Madrid was attacked by terrorists during morning rush hour, killing some 200 people and wounding over 2000 in the process. During subsequent weeks, the 9/11 Commission conducted its hearings in Washington, DC (see the 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). On a more positive note, NATO expanded its membership from 19 to 26, and the EU from 15 to 25 members, in both cases embracing former Cold war adversaries and furthering the process of paradigm shifting from *national* to *common security*.

With terrorism so clearly a part of the post–9/11 conflict *Zeitgeist*, one objective of the 2004 survey was to explore to what extent, if any, the world had, indeed, "changed" in terms of OSCE negotiators' perceptions of select security issues similar to those outlined in Chapter 5 (see also Appendix B).

Research design

Regrettably, despite doing everything for the 2004 survey that I had done for the three previous surveys, I was able to secure interviews with representatives of only 18 of the 55 OSCE participating States (including two representatives from one of those states [the Netherlands], for a total of 19 respondents).[1] This may have been due to OSCE negotiators having more duties in 2004 than they had previously and/or the "crisis of relevance" that I began to notice during the 1999 survey, which may have discouraged some OSCE negotiators from taking the time to speak with an "academic" about an organization whose "days were numbered." One indicator of that crisis has been that, even as of this writing, not one OSCE summit has occurred after Istanbul 1999.

Among the 19 respondents, nine were from NATO (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands 1, the Netherlands 2, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States); two were from the NNA (Finland and Switzerland); two were from the FYug (Serbia-Montenegro [for the very first time] and Croatia); two were from the NSWP (Bulgaria and the Czech Republic); and three were from the FSU (Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Turkmenistan).[2] In addition, I interviewed a representative of the Albanian Delegation to the OSCE. As was the case on previous occasions, the great majority of respondents were either Ambassadors/Heads of Delegation or Deputy Heads. Interviews lasted between 48 minutes and two and one half hours, and took place primarily in delegation offices and on occasion in one of Vienna's restaurants or cafes (which always offered logistical challenges as well as local décor). Interviews included closed-ended and open-ended questions. Closed-ended questions were scaled in terms of *Likert* Strongly Agree (5), Agree (4), Mixed Feelings (3), Disagree (2), and Strongly Disagree (1) response schema.

Findings on closed-ended questions

To gauge to what extent, if any, OSCE negotiators perceived the world to have *changed* since the events of 9/11, it was decided to first examine their responses to the closed-ended questions that were similar to those asked of their predecessors on previous occasions (see Chapter 5; Appendix B).

According to Table 9.1,[3] for 2004, on the issues of ethnic conflicts remaining a threat to international peace and security, NATO dipped quite a bit from where it was previously, in large part because violent conflicts in the Balkans no longer seemed as inevitable as they once did. Interestingly, the NNA registered the same mean score as they did in 1999 (4.00), implying that nothing much had changed for them on this particular issue, especially with regard to conflicts globally. Both the FYug and NSWP achieved the exact same score for 2004 (3.50) as they had in 1997 (4.00) and 1999 (4.25) and nearly in 1993 (5.00/4.60), but dipped as well because violent conflicts in the Balkans were basically over. Albania remained close to the FYug and NSWP, concluding that future violent conflict was most likely in the FSU, but less so in the Balkans. By contrast, the FSU shot up quite a bit from their earlier scores, especially with regard to conflicts in the FSU (e.g., Caucasus and Central Asia). Consensus on this issue across the groupings (.5500) was the third lowest of all the closed-ended issues addressed in the 2004 survey. This level of consensus was also dramatically lower than that achieved on this issue for 1999 (.1450), 1997 (.1527) and 1993 (.2326).[4]

Clearly, by 2004 (see Tables 9.2 and 9.3), in contrast to 1997 and 1999, there was less of a sense for all concerned (with the possible exception of the Albanians) that ethnic warfare would break out again in Bosnia-Herzegovina if SFOR (now EUFOR) were to withdraw. The FSU, which had nearly the same mean response in 2004 as in 1999 and 1997, was (after Albania) the closest to agreement and, therefore, the highest ranked on this issue among the groups for 2004. By contrast, all the groupings, plus the

Table 9.1 Mean responses to closed-ended question 1 for 2004 *Q.1: violent ethnic conflicts, such as those that have occurred in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, will be among the major threats to international peace and security in the post–September 11 world*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
3.22	4.00	3.50	3.50	4.67	3.00	3.65	.5500

Notes
GrdMean = "*Grand*" *Mean* of all the means for the groupings taken together. SD = *Standard deviation*. The lower the standard deviation, the *higher* the consensus across the groupings; contrariwise, the higher the standard deviation, the *lower* the consensus across the groupings.

Table 9.2 Mean responses to closed-ended question 6 for 2004 *Q.6: if NATO and others participating in KFOR in Kosovo start to withdraw their forces in the near future, then warfare is likely to resume between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbs*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
4.00	4.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.08	.1864

Table 9.3 Mean responses to closed-ended question 7 for 2004 *Q.7: if NATO and others participating in SFOR in Bosnia start to withdraw their forces in the near future, then warfare is likely to resume between the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
2.55	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.67	4.00	3.20	.4836

Table 9.4 Mean responses to closed-ended question 8 for 2004 *Q.8: beyond the threatened or actual use of force to "keep the peace" (e.g., KFOR, SFOR), there is a need to deal with the issues underlying the violent expression of conflict in locations such as former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
4.67	4.50	5.00	4.50	4.00	4.00	4.445	.3560

Albanians, agreed that warfare would probably resume if KFOR were to withdraw from Kosovo. Interestingly, with one exception (NNA = 4.50), all groupings, plus the Albanians, had exactly the same mean response in agreeing with this issue (4.00). As a result, consensus on this issue among the groupings (.1864) was the highest for all the closed-ended issues addressed in the 2004 survey.

Most respondents felt that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was far more stable than in Kosovo. Reasons for this more sanguine assessment of Bosnia were: the recency of the startup of the NATO operation in Kosovo (1999) in contrast to that in Bosnia (1995); Kosovo's status as a *dejure* part of Serbia vs. the Kosovar Albanians' desire for total independence from Serbia; and the lethal disturbances in Mitrovica, Kosovo in March 2004, which had occurred right before the 2004 survey began.

Table 9.4 contains results on the first of a small number of *classic* "conflict-resolution questions" that I have been asking since the launching of the CSCE/OSCE project in 1993, usually with very high levels of agreement from all respondents. The results of the 2004 survey were no exception, although, for most, they tended to dip a bit. NATO's response for 2004 was exactly the same as it was in 1999 and 1993 (4.67), while the FYug shot up

Table 9.5 Mean responses to closed-ended question 9 for 2004 *Q.9: without successfully dealing with the issues underlying the use of violence, external intervention to forcibly keep the warring parties apart will not, by itself, lead to a resolution of the conflict*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
4.11	3.00	5.00	4.50	4.00	4.00	4.10	.6055

Table 9.6 Mean responses to closed-ended question 10 for 2004 *Q.10: in the violent conflicts of the post–September 11 world, states and international organizations should, to the extent possible, work together with humanitarian and conflict-resolution NGOs as part of an*

	NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
[a] Integrated whole	3.55	2.50	3.00	3.50	3.00	4.00	3.26	.4834
Or								
[b] Coordinated whole	4.11	5.00	5.00	4.00	3.67	4.00	4.30	.5153

to 5.00. Consensus on this issue among the groupings (.3560) was the fifth highest scored for 2004. This level of consensus was also lower than that recorded on this issue for any period except 1993 (.4015).

Mean responses to question 8 were always higher than for another *conflict-resolution question*, question 9, which was also asked in 2004 (Table 9.5).

The 2004 survey produced a bit of a surprise in the question 8–9 comparison: with the exceptions of NATO and the NNA, which, following the general pattern observed since 1993, dipped for 2004, the FYug, NSWP, FSU and Albanians responded to question 9 in exactly the same way that they responded to question 8. Since question 9 is far more of a *conflict-resolution question* than question 8, the 2004 comparisons might suggest the further institutionalization of a *culture of conflict resolution* within the OSCE over time.[5] Nevertheless, consensus on this issue among the groupings (.6055) was the second lowest scored for the 2004 survey. This level of consensus was, by far, also the lowest recorded for this issue across all four surveys.

Question 10 (see Table 9.6) was phrased in a "two-choice" manner because, in previous years, respondents had either implicitly or explicitly made a distinction between "integrated" and "coordinated" collaboration, tending to prefer *coordinated* to *integrated* collaboration in dealing with violent conflicts. Clearly, for 2004, there was again a preference for *coordinated* instead of *integrated* collaboration, with the exception of the Albanians who scored 4.00 for both options. But even with "coordination"

as the continuing preference, the FSU ranked last in barely agreeing with this framing of the issue. Indeed, with the exception of 1997, when it ranked first, the FSU ranked last in 1993 and 1999 as well as in 2004. Compared with the 1999 figures, NATO, the NSWP and FSU dipped by 2004, while the NNA and FYug shot up in their agreement scores for *coordinated* collaboration.

The extent to which a *culture of conflict resolution* had taken hold in the OSCE by 2004 was revealed by another question as well (see Table 9.7).

Compared with their earlier mean responses, NATO shot up quite a bit on this issue by 2004 (from 3.73 to 4.55), whereas the FSU remained consistent at its 1997 and 1999 levels (4.00). The NNA dipped somewhat from 1999 to 2004, while the FYug shot up from 1999 to 2004, but not as much as its 1993 and 1997 scores. The NSWP followed suit but was not as much in agreement with this issue as was the FYug. There were always those respondents who felt that there were enough mechanisms, but that these had to be fine-tuned, more resources had to be applied to them, and/or there had to be more political will to make use of them. Clearly, for NATO and the FYug – the two groupings most intimately involved in the Balkan conflicts and interventions of the 1990s – there was a need for something new by 2004. Consensus on this issue among the groupings (.3540) was the fourth highest scored for the 2004 survey. This level of consensus was also moderately lower than that recorded for this issue in 1999 (.3180), but higher than that achieved for 1997 (.4499) and 1993 (.7365).

Interestingly, all but the FSU agreed highly that the Cold War was over (see Table 9.8). Compared with earlier responses for 1993, 1997, and 1999, all had shot up, with the exception of the FSU which dipped to a new low. One poss-ible explanation for this was the fissure in international institutions, including the OSCE, caused by NATO's contentious intervention in the Kosovo crisis by conducting an air war against a Slavic ally in the Balkans,

Table 9.7 Mean responses to closed-ended question 11 for 2004 *Q.11: while there are many peacekeeping mechanisms (e.g., KFOR, SFOR), there is a need for more peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
4.55	4.00	4.50	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.09	.3540

Table 9.8 Mean responses to closed-ended question 12 for 2004 *Q.12: basically, despite the problems faced by President Putin and others in the former Soviet Union, the Cold War is over*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
4.44	4.50	4.50	4.50	3.00	4.00	4.16	.5472

Serbia. An explanation particularly among non-Russian members of the FSU might have been perceived Russian efforts to undermine the viability of the OSCE by, among other things, withholding funding because of alleged "double standards" in OSCE election monitoring and other activities in the FSU (see Rupel, 2005; Dombey and Jack, 2004). Still another might have been perceptions among non-Russian members that Russia under Putin was regressing back toward an authoritarian, regionally hegemonic system (see Politkovskaya, 2005). Consensus on this issue among the groupings (.5472) was the fourth lowest scored for the 2004 survey. This level of consensus was also the lowest recorded on this issue across the four surveys, continuing a trend already observed in 1999 (.3128). The highest consensus on this issue was recorded in 1997 (.1184), following NATO's intervention into Bosnia.

Although all groupings and Albania *disagreed* with this statement (Table 9.9), the FSU were the *closest* to agreement, which is compatible with their response to the end-of-the-Cold-War question (number 12) for 2004. Nevertheless, the FSU's mean response for 2004 was lower than their responses for 1997 and 1999 which, on this issue, would indicate an improvement in East–West relations by 2004. Interestingly, the FYug were ranked second after the FSU in terms of *closeness* to agreement: a mean response which was also higher (and therefore, *closer* to agreement) than their 1997 and 1999 responses. To put the analysis on this issue in another frame, NATO, the NNA, *and* the FSU all shifted *closer* to *strong disagreement*, while the FYug and NSWP shifted *closer* to *agreement* (but not by very much). Consensus on this issue (.3785) was higher than it was for 1999 (.6869), but moderately lower than it was for 1993 (.3308).

There was total NATO–FSU "togetherness" on the issue of whether there was a perception in the developing world that East–West had been replaced by North–South as the dominant axis of international conflict

Table 9.9 Mean responses to closed-ended question 13 for 2004 *Q.13: the issue of NATO enlargement could put at risk the post–Cold War peace that has developed between East and West*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
2.11	1.50	2.50	2.00	2.67	2.00	2.13	.3785

Table 9.10 Mean responses to closed-ended question 14 for 2004 *Q.14: there is a perception in the developing world that the "New World Order" means nothing more than that East–West has been replaced by North–South as the dominant axis of international conflict*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
3.33	4.00	3.50	4.00	3.33	4.00	3.69	.3119

(see Table 9.10). Indeed, all groupings – especially the FYug, NNA, and NSWP – plus Albania were on the "agreement" side of the issue. Compared to the mean responses for the previous three surveys, by 2004, NATO had dipped to its lowest level (3.33), the NNA and NSWP shot up to their highest level (4.00), and the FYug remained consistent at the same level that it had achieved for 1999, which was its lowest mean response (3.50) over time. The FSU achieved a slight increase over its 1999 level. *All and all, respondents seemed to be recognizing that something approaching a "clash of civilizations" might exist between the developed and developing worlds.* Consensus on this issue among the groupings (.3119) was the second highest scored for all the closed-ended issues explored in the 2004 survey. This level of consensus was also lower than that recorded for this issue in 1999 (.1716) and 1993 (.2160), but higher than that recorded for 1997 (.4220).

As one explicit test of the "civilizational proposition," question number 15 was added to the 2004 survey, the results of which appear in Table 9.11.

According to these figures, NATO, the FYug, and definitely the FSU did not accept the explicit framing of a "civilizational clash," but the NNA, Albania, and the NSWP apparently did see some value in the proposition. This was an instance of where it was important to observe respondents' *"comments in the margins"* to explore "what they really felt" about the issue. For example, according to one NATO respondent:

> Indeed, there is a kind of a "clash," but it is not with the whole of the Islamic world, just *some* "fanatics."

According to another NATO respondent:

> A part of the Islamic world has put forward this perception, not the Islamic world as a whole, but *terrorists*.

Another NATO respondent confided:

> I think Samuel Huntington is a pretty smart guy – there is something to this [idea], for example, with regard to more traditional cultures vs. the role of women. They are not against Americans as such, but are threatened by rapid change, and the U.S. thrives on change!

Table 9.11 Mean responses to closed-ended question 15 for 2004 *Q.15: given the events and aftermath of September 11, 2001, a "clash of civilizations" has been developing between the Western and Islamic Worlds*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
3.00	4.50	3.00	3.75	2.00	4.00	3.375	.8133

Still another said,

> I have been struck by the vigor with which this thesis is being resisted by politicians.

According to one NNA respondent:

> I know what the "politically correct" answer is, but you would have to be blind *not* to see it!

Another NNA respondent said:

> There are problems based on ignorance, prejudices on both sides. A "*dialogue of civilizations*" is essential.

According to one NSWP respondent:

> *Officially*, we disagree with this, but it is a fact. If we accept reality, we cannot simply ignore this.

There seemed to be some tension, therefore, between an "official" line and what some of the respondents *actually* believed with regard to this issue, for which consensus (.8133) was the lowest achieved for all the closed-ended issues addressed in 2004. To further explore the view about "fanatics" and "terrorists" as agents of *civilizational clash*, we added a new question number 2 for the 2004 survey, which dealt explicitly with 9/11-type terrorism as a threat to peace and security, the results of which appear in Table 9.12.

Accordingly, while there might have been some tension between personal and official views with regard to the "civilizational thesis," there was no such tension with regard to whether 9/11-type terrorism would be a threat to international peace and security for the foreseeable future. Consensus on this issue among the groupings (.4214) was in the middle of the gradient between low and high consensus. The problem of "political correctness," however, may have reared its head again with regard to a new question number 3 for the 2004 survey, which dealt explicitly with a link between ethnic conflicts of the post–Cold War era and 9/11-type terrorism, the results of which appear in Table 9.13.

Table 9.12 Mean responses to closed-ended question 2 for 2004 *Q.2: catastrophic acts of terrorism, such as the events of September 11, 2001, will also be among the major threats to international peace and security in the post–September 11 world*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
4.22	4.50	5.00	4.00	5.00	4.00	4.45	.4214

Table 9.13 Mean responses to closed-ended question 3 for 2004 *Q. 3: there is a linkage between, on the one hand, the violent ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union and, on the other hand, September 11-type terrorism*

NATO	*NNA*	*FYug*	*NSWP*	*FSU*	*Albania*	*GrdMean*	*SD*
2.00	2.50	3.00	2.50	2.33	2.00	2.39	.3426

So, despite the knowledge that *"jihadhis"* trained in the Afghan war against the Soviets (with the United States' and other Western assistance) had participated in the Bosnian and Chechen wars (see, e.g., Kohlmann, 2004), OSCE respondents in 2004 saw fit to ignore this connection in their responses to question number 3. Indeed, consensus here (.3426) was the third highest scored for all the closed-ended issues addressed in the 2004 survey. But what about respondents' *comments in the margins*?

According to one NATO respondent:

> There may be some possible linkages, but this is a totally different sphere of interest. There are factors that can create organized crime, e.g., illegal trafficking. These are conditions that might make terrorism likely.

According to another NATO respondent, "I disagree, but with exceptions, maybe in Chechnya." According to another, "I disagree, but there may be some linkage, although it is marginal."

One NNA respondent said, "Al Qaeda has made an effort in the Balkans, but they have been pushed back." Another NNA negotiator said: "We cannot make the linkage in a direct way. Terrorism has many causes, some direct, some indirect."

According to a FYug respondent:

> Suppressed conflicts, like that in Bosnia, could be exploited by terrorists, but such allegations have not been proven. In Central Asia, however, such a threat is more visible; the linkage might be direct.

According to another FYug respondent:

> I disagree, but it is evident that some Chechen extremists could be used by al Qaeda, but there is no direct connection. How could NATO influence Chechnya?

One NSWP negotiator said,

> In Tajikistan, the opposition to the government is linked to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, but not with the Taliban. In Bosnia, there were some Islamic fighters; also in Chechnya.

According to one FSU respondent:

> This linkage is more related to conflicts in the Middle East. Osama bin Laden is a major ideologist of terrorism. That is, he influences terrorism *ideologically* rather than *operationally*. This does not, however, diminish his threat or danger.

A "different world" after 9/11? Reflections on the responses to the closed-ended questions

According to responses to the closed-ended questions in the 2004 survey, therefore, there were some nonlinear as well as linear dynamics between 1993/1999 and 2004. For example, terrorism eclipsed ethnic conflicts as the dominant threat to international peace and security, with no *direct* linkage perceived to exist between them. Still, on the issue of ethnic conflicts, Kosovo remained of significant concern, while Bosnia-Herzegovina seemed to be moving toward "negative peace" stability.

A *culture of conflict resolution*, with implications for "positive peace," seemed to have become further institutionalized among OSCE negotiators by 2004. Perhaps as a consequence, OSCE negotiators perceived, far more definitely than they had earlier, that the Cold War was, indeed, over and that continued NATO enlargement would not threaten the new East–West relationship. There was, however, a sense that, with the end of the Cold War, the North–South overlay had replaced the East–West relational system as the dominant axis of international conflict, perhaps reflecting Samuel Huntington's *clash of civilizations*.

Overall, the findings reinforced the observation made in Chapter 5 that an *issue paradigm* had, over time, come to characterize the perceptions and thinking of OSCE negotiators, in which the five main groupings (NATO, NNA, FYug, NSWP, and FSU) were distributed across particular issues in complex ways, thereby defying simple "capture" by either a *Realpolitik*-only or *Idealpolitik*-only perspective.

Indeed, consensus seemed to improve on only one issue from 1999: (*disagreement* on) the issue of whether NATO enlargement might be putting at risk post–Cold War peace between East and West.

We now move on to the three select open-ended questions for 2004, to explore their impact, if any, on the apparent further development of the *issue paradigm* and their "goodness-of-fit" with NEPSS.

Findings on open-ended questions

Comparing the figures in Table 9.14 with those generated by the three earlier surveys, *nationalism* (**Natio**) moved from 13.8 percent of respondents

Table 9.14 Comparisons across the five groupings and Albania for 2004: common and dissimilar *themes* on the "causes of FYug wars"

	Natio	*Ethnc*	*Milos*	*CP*	*Tito*	*Artif*	*SerbS*	*NoAct*
NATO	4	2	3	3	2	1	2	1
NNA	2	1	1			1		2
FYug		2	1	1	1		1	
NSWP	2		1	1			1	
FSU		2		1	2	1		1
Alb						1		
Total	8	7	6	6	5	4	4	4
% of 19	42.1	36.8	31.6	31.6	26.3	26.1	26.1	26.1
Ranks	*1*	*2*	*3.5*	*3.5*	*5*	*6.3*	*6.3*	*6.3*

in 1993 (*8th place*), to 23.5 percent in 1997 (*7th place*), 28.3 percent in 1999 (*3rd place*) and then, by 2004, 42.1 percent of respondents (*1st place*). In the process, *nationalism* completely eclipsed the previously dominant perceived role of *history* which, by 2004, had achieved *9th place* status (along with *economic factors*) (not shown in Table 9.14). By contrast, *ethnicity* [*Ethn*] moved from 27.6 percent of respondents in 1993 (*3rd place*) to 54.9 percent in 1997 (*1st place*), 37 percent in 1999 (*1st place*) and, by 2004, to 36.8 percent of respondents (*2d place*) and in the process, remained consistent across the four surveys over an 11-year period.

The *role of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic* [*Milos*] moved from *8th place* in 1993, *16th place* in 1997, *7th place* in 1999, and by 2004, to *3rd place*. *Collapse of the Yugoslav Communist Party* [*CP*] moved from *4th place* in 1993, *5th place* in 1997, *15th place* in 1999 and by 2004, also to *3rd place* (tied with *Milosevic*). The *impact of Tito's death* [*Tito*] moved from *8th place* in 1993, to *3rd place* in 1997, *5th place* in 1999 and by 2004, remained in *5th place*. The *need to hold the Serb state together* [*SerbS*] moved from *4th place* in 1993, to *8th place* in 1997, *3rd place* in 1999 and by 2004, to *6th place*. This, too, remained fairly consistent across the four surveys. The *artificiality* of the Yugoslav Federation [*Artif*] moved from *8th place* in 1993, to *13th place* in 1997, *23rd place* in 1999 and by 2004, also to *6th place* (tied with *need to hold the Serb state together*).

The role of *economic factors* [*Econ*] moved from *2d place* in 1993, *9th place* in 1997, *8th place* in 1999 and by 2004, back to *9th place* (not shown in Table 9.14) and in the process, remained fairly consistent across the four surveys. The role of *history* [*Hist*] moved from *1st place* in 1993, to *2d place* in 1997, back to *1st place* in 1999 and by 2004, to *9th place* (with *economic factors*) (not shown in Table 9.14).

Finally, a "brand new item" entered the calculations for 2004: *absence of decisive action by the International Community* [*NoAct*] which, as odd as

it may seem, never showed up in the three previous surveys. But, by 2004, not only did it show up but it ranked in *6th place* (with *artificiality* of the Yugoslav Federation and *need to hold the Serb state together*).

What can we say about these comparisons across the four surveys over an 11-year period? Eight of the 10 factors revealed in the *10-factor theory on the causes and conditions of the Balkan wars of the 1990s*, remained the same but in terms of different rankings (see Chapter 6). By 2004, *history* lost its dominant position; *nationalism* moved into 1st place; *ethnicity* remained consistently strong; the perceived *role of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic* increased to *3rd place*; with one exception the *Collapse of the Yugoslav Communist Party* remained fairly consistent among the top five factors; the *impact of Tito's death* remained consistent for the last three surveys in the top five factors; the *need to hold the Serb State together* remained fairly consistent within the top 10 factors; the *artificiality* of the Yugoslav Federation shot up dramatically from 1999 to 2004; *economic factors* remained fairly consistent on the low end of the top 10; and finally, the *absence of decisive action by the International Community* was a new item added to the "10-factor theory," while *unsolved problems* and *political factors* fell out by 2004.

Despite the fact that the sample size of the 2004 survey was less than half of the 1997 and 1999 surveys, there were some remarkable consistencies with regard to OSCE negotiators' perceptions of the validity of the *"civilizational thesis"* across the three surveys (see Table 9.15):

1 The exact same rankings across the four categories occurred for 1997, 1999, *and* 2004.
2 The exact same number of NATO and FYug respondents thought that the *civilizational thesis* as an explanation for the Bosnian wars was *nonsense* for 1999 and 2004 (3 and 1, respectively).
3 The exact same number of NATO and FYug respondents thought that the "civilizational" explanation may have unleashed *a self-fulfilling prophecy* for both 1999 and 2004 (2 and 1, respectively). And
4 The total figures in the *nonsense* and *self-fulfilling* categories for 1999 were nearly identical with those for 2004.

In general, it is clear that, since this question was first put to OSCE respondents in 1997, the top two responses remained the same: OSCE negotiators perceived the majority of Bosnian Muslims to be *secular*, yet negotiators remained *concerned* about the establishment of a Muslim state in the Balkans.

For the 2004 survey, according to Table 9.16, the primary "lesson learned" from the Balkan wars of the 1990s was the need to prevent conflicts through early warning and early action (*1st place*). This was followed

Table 9.15 Establishing an Islamic state in Europe as a cause of the Yugoslav wars: 2004

	Nonsense	*Secular*	*EurConcerns*	*SelfFIProp*
NATO	3	5	2	2
NNA		2	1	
FYug	1	1		1
NSWP		2	1	
FSU		1		
Alb			1	
Total	4	11	5	3
% of 18	22.2	61.1	27.8	16.7
Ranks	*3*	*1*	*2*	*4*

Table 9.16 Comparisons across the five groupings and Albania for 2004: common/dissimilar *themes* on the "lessons of Yugoslavia"

	PD/CP	*Ethnc*	*Coord*	*Force*	*SoftP*	*Artif*	*Econ*	*Iraq*
NATO	5	3	4	4	2	1	2	3
NNA	2	2						
FYug	2				1			
NSWP	1					1		
FSU	2	1			1			
Alb		1	1	1		1	1	
Total	12	7	5	5	4	3	3	3
% of 19	63.2	36.8	26.3	26.3	21	15.8	15.8	15.8

by the need to pay attention to ethnicity, nationalism, extremism and similar root causes of violent conflict (*2d place*).

The need to have consensus and to coordinate among participating actors in a timely intervention was tied for *3rd place* with the need to use force when it was appropriate to stop bloodshed. Actors could also use "soft power" in addition to "hard power" to deal with sources of developing conflicts (*5th place*). Tied for *6th place* were (1) the likelihood that artificial means for bringing disparate ethnic or other groups together (such as in FYug or even Iraq) would break down; (2) the need to pay attention to economic factors; and (3) the existence (for three NATO representatives) of a linkage between the interventions into the Balkan wars and what was then taking place in the US-led war in Iraq, for example:

> We should not attempt to impose "Western" systems on others (e.g., as in Iraq).
>
> There are no votes to be gained by spending money [on a given intervention], but as soon as troops are committed, that is OK (e.g., as in Iraq).

> We should have learned that preventive action should have been used with international consensus. That is the main issue in Iraq.

These findings are noteworthy largely because they are more reflective of *lessons learned before Kosovo* rather than *after Kosovo*, where:

> Trends in the top three "lessons learned" for the CSCE/OSCE groupings from 1993 to 1999 (*before* Kosovo) included the persistent, near unanimous 1st place ranking of the need for preventive diplomacy and quick response to ethnic conflicts/ethnic cleansing and emergent 2d place ranking of the need to coordinate such missions, plus a mix of force and "soft power" within a regional framework to deal with the complexity of such situations – all very much in keeping with NEPSS (see Chapter 7).

After the contentious NATO intervention in Kosovo, the findings were more dispersed, suggestive of *outliers* in an otherwise "linear development in consensus on 'lessons learned' . . . from 1993 to 1999." But even combining the nonlinear (*after* Kosovo) with the linear (*before Kosovo*), the overall findings on the four surveys reinforce the hypothesized emergence of an *issue paradigm* where military force (*Realpolitik*) and *soft power* (*Idealpolitik*) are conceptually integrated in coordinated international interventions to prevent and otherwise deal with complex ethnic and other conflicts involving multiple issues, that is,

> a *complex community of values* seems to have been developing in the CSCE/OSCE, *at least in the minds of some of its practitioners*, with conflict (*Realpolitik = negative peace*) and cooperation (*Idealpolitik = positive peace*) co-existing in complex ways on various issues (or combinations of issues) within a basically cooperative system (see Chapter 5).

As a further test of these trends, let's examine the findings on the third (and final) of our select open-ended questions for 2004, which dealt with the issue of ideal peace and security in post–Cold War Europe (see Table 9.17).

What is particularly fascinating about these findings is that the UN, including an UN-based system, shot up to *2d place* for 2004, from no placement at all in the 1993 and 1997 rankings, and *12th place* for 1999; while a regional approach to problem solving dropped from *2d place* in 1999 to *9th place* for 2004. Surprisingly, early warning and conflict prevention fell out of the top 10 rankings completely for 2004, having occupied *6th* and *7th place* previously. Otherwise, the 2004 rankings were surprisingly similar to the previous ones, especially the consistent dominance of the OSCE in *1st place*, and the general tendency for NATO to eclipse the EU by one or two rankings.

Table 9.17 Comparisons across the five groupings and Albania for 2004: ranked components of *ideal* peace and security in post–Cold War Europe

	NATO (N = 9)	*NNA (N = 2)*	*FYug (N = 2)*	*NSWP (N = 2)*	*FSU (N = 3)*	*Albania (N = 1)*	*Total (N = 19)*
OSCE	8		2		2	1	13 (*1*)
UN/UN based	3	1	2	2	2		10 (2)
NATO	6		1		1	1	9 (*3*)
Multiple actors	4		2	1		1	8 (*4.5*)
Reforms/ resources	5		1	1		1	8 (*4.5*)
EU	4		1	1			6 (*6.5*)
Problem solving/CR	4				1	1	6 (*6.5*)
Include CoE	3		1			1	5 (*8*)
Regional approach	1	1	1		1		4 (*9.5*)
Include Russians	1		1	1	1		4 (*9.5*)

A *goodness-of-fit* with NEPSS (revisited)?

To put a major theme of this study in perspective, let's look at the complete response of one of the NATO respondents for 2004:

> The existing security structures in the Euro-Atlantic Region are an accumulation of all international developments since 1945. So, the present security structure is *not* the result of *reflection*: It is an accident! NATO was a response to the Soviet Union. The EU is a different set-up. So, we can do one of two things: (1) Adapt the present system to our needs, which might be difficult because of different institutional arrangements (NATO, OSCE) or (2) Start with a clean slate to try to devise a new set-up – ideally the best way to go but realistically, a "no-go" situation.
>
> Realistically, we can only work with the first option. The International Community must come to understand that duplication, redundancy does not serve our interests. Therefore, each actor must do what it does best: (1) NATO is for *"hard security"*; (2) the Council of Europe (CoE) is for the legal aspects of the Human Dimension; and (3) the OSCE is for *"soft security,"* conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation, and it is politically binding.
>
> The biggest question is: Where does the European Union (EU) fit in here? The EU is trying to do everything. It does not have a policy vis-à-vis the OSCE with regard to common security.

> Also, the Russian Federation is a partner of Europe, but also a rival of Europe. Russia is too big, too powerful to be digested in a European arrangement. Perhaps we need a new "Congress of Vienna" to sort this out.
>
> Again, there is too much overlap, too much redundancy; for example, in Georgia, there are overlapping OSCE and EU missions with *no* coordination. (The EU sent a Rule of Law border monitoring mission to Georgia without coordinating with the existing OSCE mission.)
>
> *The Russians are adamant about OSCE reform.* So, there is a working group on reform, plus smaller groups doing other things. *Something is wrong with the OSCE*, which has to be addressed. But we cannot agree on definitions. For instance, U.S. perceptions, Russian perceptions, and EU perceptions of the OSCE are different. *The U.S. advocates a weak OSCE model, while the Russians prefer a strong OSCE.* The biggest problem is [how] to make these the same, to advance *consensus* on what the OSCE is, what it can do; for example, sending missions to Central Asia, the Caucasus, Southeastern Europe, where some of the hosting countries have as their only priority getting rid of the missions!

This is a very thoughtful response to a complex question, providing context for the figures in Table 9.17. It overlaps with *descriptive* elements of NEPSS in its emphasis on fine-tuning and adapting existing institutions to new and continuing challenges to the post–Cold War and post–9/11 worlds.

Among those challenges, which constitute "issues" of the still emerging *issue paradigm* are: the frustration of having to achieve consensus in the OSCE (2 NATO, 1 NNA respondents); fighting organized crime (1 NATO and 1 FYug); combating human trafficking (2 NATO); nonproliferation of various weapons (1 NSWP); ensuring that "all voices" are heard (1 NNA and 1 FYug); economic development (1 NATO); police reform (1 NATO); educational reform (1 NATO); human rights (1 NATO, 1 FYug, and Albania); protecting territorial integrity (1 FYug and 1 FSU); ensuring compliance with international law (2 FSU); need for sanctions to "reprimand disobedient" actors (1 FSU).

Surprisingly, what I thought might have been one of the main issues expressed for the 2004 survey, *terrorism*, was referenced by only two respondents (1 NATO and 1 FYug). Compare this with part of our conclusion to Chapter 8:

> Interestingly, there was no mention of terrorism in responses to the ideal peace and security question for 1993; only one mention of terrorism (by an NNA respondent) as a threat that the post–Cold War system had to guard against for 1997; and only two mentions of terrorism as a threat (by Central Asian/FSU respondents) for 1999. This may have been due, in part, to the fact that I never raised the issue explicitly in the [first] three

> sets of interviews, plus that the conflict *Zeitgeist* during 1993–1999 was definitely ethnic warfare in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

By contrast, for the 2004 survey, terrorism was definitely part of the conflict *Zeitgeist* and was mentioned often, yet it does not seem to have changed OSCE negotiators' perceptions of it as an issue that the system had to deal with, despite the events of 9/11 *and*, prior to the initiation of the 2004 survey, the terrorist attacks on the Madrid commuter train system during rush hour on March 11, 2004. Perhaps I should take to heart the comment made by one NSWP respondent, whose country is now a member of NATO:

> In your [further] research, you should visit capitals of the member states because of an institutional bias in the OSCE and other international organizations which influences different delegations to, more or less, say the same thing. [By contrast], if you went to [my country's capital] or to NATO, you would hear different things from [my country's] representative.

What may also be surprising was that the need to have Russia in the new system (1 NATO, 1 FYug, 1 NSWP, and 1 FSU) seems to have been more important than having the United States in the system, but just barely (1 NATO, 1 NSWP, and 1 FSU). While this finding is in agreement with the low rankings for Russian and US inclusion in the system for the 1993, 1997, and 1999 rankings, at least for 1997 and 1999, Russia and the United States were *co-equal* in ranking (*8th* and *12th place*, respectively). Russia's ranking ahead of the United States may be indicative of its perceived potential potency for undermining the OSCE's existence. According to one FYug respondent, "Russia used to pay great attention to the OSCE as a substitute for NATO, but after the Istanbul [and last] OSCE summit [in November 1999], Russia is changing its view." Or as one NATO respondent put it: "The 'near abroad' of the West is now in conflict with the 'near abroad' of the East. This is why the OSCE might be 'killed off!' "

As to a continuing perception by some of the smaller states (in 1999, one of the FSU respondents) that the "big players" use the weekly PC meetings in Vienna to "gang up" on some of the others, particularly among the transitioning FSU states, one representative from the Balkans in 2004 said:

> Every week in the Permanent Council, the U.S., EU, Canada, Norway, and sometimes Switzerland accuse Belarus and Turkmenistan [among others, of human rights violations]. So, the OSCE is [still] about *accusers* and *the accused*!

Finally, there was a recommendation by this same representative from the Balkans that members of other international organizations should express

the political will to allow the OSCE to *coordinate* interventions into complex problem areas. Since this would involve many of the items listed in Table 9.17 – multiple actors with a division of labor among them, inclusive of *Realpolitik* "hard security" (NATO) and *Idealpolitik* "soft security" (OSCE, CoE), plus combinations of them (UN, EU) on a regional basis – which would deal more with the *prescriptive* elements of NEPSS, there is clearly much work that needs to be done. This includes encouraging the Russians, Americans and "other voices" to feel that they have a significant stake and role to play in maintaining peace and security in the postmodern world.

Conclusion

By 2004, the primary closed-ended findings emerging from the CSCE/OSCE project reported in this volume were:

1 Terrorism had eclipsed ethnic conflicts as the dominant threat to international peace and security, with no *direct* linkage perceived to exist between them.
2 Kosovo remained of significant concern, while Bosnia-Herzegovina seemed to be moving toward *negative peace* stability.
3 A *culture of conflict resolution*, with implications for *positive peace*, appeared to become further institutionalized among OSCE negotiators by 2004.
4 The Cold War was, indeed, over and continued NATO enlargement would not threaten the new East–West relationship.
5 There was, however, a sense that, with the end of the Cold War, the North–South overlay had replaced the East–West relational system as the dominant axis of international conflict, part of which may have reflected Samuel Huntington's *clash of civilizations*.
6 Overall findings on the closed-ended questions reinforced the observation made earlier (in Chapter 5) that an *issue paradigm* had, over time, come to characterize the perceptions and thinking of OSCE negotiators, in which the five main groupings (NATO, NNA, FYug, NSWP, and FSU) were distributed across particular issues in complex ways.

Findings on the three open-ended questions included:

1 Eight of the 10 factors revealed in the *10-factor theory on the causes and conditions of the Balkan wars of the 1990s*, remained the same but in terms of different rankings: (1) nationalism; (2) ethnicity; (3) Milosevic; (4) Tito's death; (5) Serb state; (6) artificiality of Yugoslav Federation; (7) economic factors; and (8) history. In addition, by 2004, a new factor emerged: (9) absence of decisive action.

2 The majority of Bosnian Muslims continued to be perceived as *secular*, yet there was still concern about the establishment of a Muslim state in the Balkans.
3 Overall findings on the three open-ended questions also reinforced the hypothesized emergence of an *issue paradigm* where military force (*Realpolitik*) and *soft power* (*Idealpolitik*) were conceptually integrated in coordinated international interventions to prevent and otherwise deal with complex ethnic and other conflicts involving multiple issues (although, remarkably, terrorism was barely mentioned among those).
4 Across the four surveys, the OSCE remained consistently in *1st place*, while NATO tended to eclipse the EU by one or two rankings, as components of an *ideal* peace and security for postmodern Europe.

So, what might be the implications of these (and other) findings for further research, theory, and policy (*including in Iraq*)? Exploring responses to this query is our task in the 10th and final chapter, to which we now turn.

Chapter 10

A work in progress

Implications of findings for research, theory, and policy

Introduction

This final chapter summarizes the findings of the CSCE/OSCE project. Again, the objectives of the project were to

1 Conduct an *academic/theoretical* study of literature relevant to building peace and security in postmodern Europe that could more effectively prevent or deal with brutal genocidal conflicts such as those that tore former Yugoslavia apart during the last decade of the twentieth century.
2 Interview senior negotiators of the CSCE/OSCE to gain their *diplomatic/practitioner* wisdom on what the causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s were; what the lessons of those wars, and the interventions into them, were; and what, if given a chance, would be their visions for optimal peace and security to either prevent or otherwise deal with "future Yugoslavias." And
3 Explore the "goodness-of-fit" between the *academic/theoretical* and *diplomatic/practitioner* discourses with regard to enhancing peace and security in postmodern Europe to better prevent or otherwise deal with Yugoslav-type conflicts and related acts of terrorism.

Structure of volume/summary of findings

Chapter 1 lays out the problem, *postmodern war* (the *new* warfare and the *new* terrorism) that has become the dominant mode of warfare worldwide and its risks of spillover to violent conflict within, among, and between states.

Chapter 2 articulates a framework, the *3 pillar framework* (3PF), for analyzing and understanding/explaining postmodern warfare as a basis for deciding what, if anything, can be done about it.

Chapter 3 conducts a "thought experiment" by using the 3PF to develop the *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS) which could be

more effective at preventing or otherwise dealing with future instances of postmodern war in post-Yugoslavia Europe.

Chapter 4 designs a research project for interviewing senior negotiators from the world's pre-eminent regional peace and security actor, originally the CSCE, subsequently reconfigured as the OSCE. The design includes closed-ended as well as open-ended questions that were put to senior CSCE/OSCE negotiators – primarily heads of delegation – in Vienna, Austria, at four points in time: 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2004. Questions were designed to elicit negotiators' perceptions of, among other issues, threats to peace and security in post–Cold War Europe; causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s; lessons learned from those wars (Bosnia, Kosovo) and the interventions to stop them; and visions of peace and security in post–Cold War Europe to prevent or otherwise deal with *future Yugoslavias*.

Chapter 5 presents CSCE/OSCE negotiators' responses to closed-ended questions dealing with a number of security issues for the first three surveys (1993, 1997, and 1999), covering the *pre–9/11* period. This analysis indicates consistencies and upward or downward trends in levels of agreement/disagreement with select issues and consensus among the five main groupings of CSCE/OSCE members (NATO, NNA, FYug, NSWP, and FSU) in agreeing/disagreeing with each issue. Specifically, looking at the various sets of findings together, we observed that

- there seemed to have been an increasing "meeting of minds" on *Idealpolitik* as well as *Realpolitik* issues; for example, a need to deal with the factors underlying violent expressions of conflict, but that if these were not dealt with, this would not necessarily undermine whatever "resolution" potential inheres in forceful (e.g., NATO) intervention alone;
- CSCE/OSCE negotiators seemed to have a love–hate relationship with NATO and its various derivatives (NACC, PfP, EAPC), with the Bosnia intervention (1995) being framed in a more positive and the Kosovo intervention (1999) in a less positive light; nevertheless,
- there seemed to have been an increasing convergence on the issue of NATO autonomy to do what no other actor wants to or can do: forcefully stop genocidal conflict in post–Cold War Europe;
- there was a mixed picture on the locus of future threats to peace and security in Europe, whether it was Yugoslav-type conflicts (ethnic, genocidal), East–West or North–South depending on whether CSCE/OSCE negotiators felt positive or not so positive about NATO;
- consensus and NATO–FSU togetherness coexisted with dissensus and NATO–FSU polarity across the three *pre–9/11* time periods, but overall trends were clearly in the direction of consensus and NATO–FSU togetherness, although these dipped a bit after NATO's intervention in Kosovo. We were able to conclude, therefore, that a *complex community*

> *of values* seemed to have been developing in the CSCE/OSCE, *at least in the minds of some of its practitioners*, with conflict (*Realpolitik = negative peace*) and cooperation (*Idealpolitik = positive peace*) coexisting in complex ways on various issues (or positions on issues) within a basically cooperative system – all of which were compatible with NEPSS.

From this, we inferred the emergence of an *issue paradigm* in which NATO, NNA, FYug, NSWP, and FSU respondents agreed or disagreed on select issues in different ways, suggesting a *complexity* that was not neatly captured by either a *Realpolitik*-only or *Idealpolitik*-only paradigm.

Chapter 6 provides a *pillar 2 analysis* by reporting on responses to the open-ended question dealing with the causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. In terms of the CSCE/OSCE negotiators' *understanding* (and not my "outsider" *explanation*), we had, across the three pre–9/11 surveys, the basis of a fairly stable *10-factor theory on the causes and conditions of the Balkan wars of the 1990s*. Although analytically distinct, it was difficult, in practice, to disentangle the "individual" from the "societal" and "international levels of analysis." Nevertheless, we subsumed the following identified "drivers of conflict" under the *individual level of analysis:*

1 *Historical memory of grievance.*
2 *Ethnic tensions/ethnocentrism.*
3 *Nationalism.*
4 *The impact of Tito's death on the unraveling of former Yugoslavia.* And
5 *The impact of Milosevic's manipulations in fomenting the Balkan wars.*

We then subsumed under the *societal level of analysis:*

1 *Economic problems.*
2 *Political factors.*
3 *Serb efforts to maintain the Yugoslav state.*
4 *Unsolved problems* (with regard to historical grievances). And
5 *The role of the Communist Party in holding Yugoslavia together.*

The *individual* and *societal levels* of pillar 2, therefore, seemed to have captured all the major causes and conditions of the Balkan wars identified by the CSCE/OSCE negotiators interviewed for this study, leaving the international level ("clashes," "Cold War") barely commented on and the global-ecological level not commented on at all.

When specifically asked about the issue of "clash of civilizations" in the 1997 and 1999 surveys, the majority of respondents felt that Bosnian Muslims were basically secular. Nevertheless, a fairly sizeable proportion were concerned about the possibility of the establishment of a Muslim state in Europe.

Chapter 7 reports on the question of perceived lessons of the Balkan wars of the 1990s and in the process, deals explicitly with *pillar 3*. Trends in the top three "lessons learned" for the CSCE/OSCE groupings from 1993 to 1999 (*before Kosovo*) included the persistent, near unanimous 1st place ranking of the need for preventive diplomacy and quick response to ethnic conflicts/ethnic cleansing. This was followed by the emergent 2d place ranking of the need to coordinate such missions, plus a mix of force and "soft power" within a regional framework to deal with the complexity of such situations. These trends were all very much in keeping with the development of a NEPSS-type system.

Trends also included the disappearance, as a major issue, of the fear of the Balkan wars generating *"multiplier-effect systemic contagion"* elsewhere (e.g., in the FSU) and the brief appearance and then disappearance of the need for the United States to lead international interventions into complex conflict situations.

Whatever linear development in consensus on *lessons learned* had occurred from 1993 to 1999 (*before Kosovo*) was disrupted because of NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis. This applies as well to the trends in NATO–FSU togetherness/polarity. After (and because of) Kosovo, NATO–FSU consensus on the top three rankings was completely reversed, as was clear (from Table 7.6d) in their 1st and 3rd place rankings regarding the use of force (*hard power*) and *soft power*.

Chapter 8 reports on designs for peace and security in post–Cold War Europe that could be more effective in preventing or responding to future Yugoslav-type conflicts. Chapter 8 also explores to what extent CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions in this regard overlap with NEPSS. The great majority of CSCE/OSCE respondents across the three time periods talked about the need for a peace and security system for post–Cold War Europe comprised of multiple, *existing institutions*, including the one remaining superpower (the United States) and its former rival (Russian Federation), plus NATO, the European Economic Community/European Union, and the CSCE/OSCE. These institutions should be enhanced by necessary reforms, additional resources, and in general, the political will to make effective use of them when the need arises. They should also be in a relationship with each other where there was a division of labor and coordination. By the time of the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, this was exemplified in the form of the Platform for Cooperative Security.

Building upon NATO, this future peace and security system should contain a *common European security* component, perhaps in the form of, originally, the NACC and later, the EAPC. The system should, therefore, reflect "all voices" (inclusive of, e.g., the smaller powers of NATO, EU and those of the South Caucasus and Central Asia), plus the further development of "common values." In addition, there should be an early warning/conflict-prevention capability, and a problem solving component facilitating, among other things, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation.

This capability should also monitor compliance with human rights (the primary jurisdiction of the CoE), especially with regard to minority groups, which could be enhanced by further democracy building.

Chapter 9 examines responses to basically the same or similar questions but *after 9/11*, in part, to explore the impact of the *new* terrorism on OSCE negotiators' perceptions of threats to peace and security in postmodern Europe. Chapter 9 also examines the 2004 responses against the background of the 1993, 1997, and 1999 responses to explore, across the four surveys, shifts in certain issues and to what extent, if any, there was further development of an issue paradigm inclusive of *terrorism*.

Accordingly, by 2004, the primary findings emerging from analyses of responses to the closed-ended questions were

1 Terrorism had eclipsed ethnic conflicts as the dominant threat to international peace and security, with no *direct* linkage perceived to exist between ethnic conflicts and terrorism.
2 Kosovo remained of significant concern, while Bosnia-Herzegovina seemed to be moving toward "negative peace" stability.
3 A *culture of conflict resolution*, with implications for "positive peace," appeared to become further institutionalized among OSCE negotiators by 2004.
4 The Cold War was, indeed, over and further NATO enlargement would not threaten the new East–West relationship.
5 There was, however, a sense that, with the end of the Cold War, the North–South overlay had replaced the East–West relational system as the dominant axis of international conflict, part of which may have reflected Samuel Huntington's *clash of civilizations*.
6 Overall findings on the closed-ended questions reinforced the observation made earlier (in Chapter 5) that an *issue paradigm* had, over time, come to characterize the perceptions and thinking of OSCE negotiators, in which the five main groupings (NATO, NNA, FYug, NSWP, and FSU) were distributed across particular issues in complex ways.

Findings generated by analyses of responses to the three open-ended questions included,

1 Eight of the 10 factors revealed in the *10–factor theory on the causes and conditions of the Balkan wars of the 1990s*, remained the same but in terms of different rankings: (1) *nationalism*; (2) *ethnicity*; (3) *Milosevic*; (4) *Tito's death*; (5) *Serb state*; (6) *artificiality of Yugoslav Federation*; (7) *economic factors*; and (8) *history*. In addition, by 2004, a new factor emerged: (9) *absence of decisive action*.
2 The majority of Bosnian Muslims continued to be perceived as *secular*, yet there was still concern about the establishment of a Muslim state in the Balkans.

3 Overall findings on the three open-ended questions also reinforced the hypothesized emergence of an *issue paradigm* where military force (*Realpolitik*) and *soft power* (*Idealpolitik*) were conceptually integrated in coordinated international interventions to prevent and otherwise deal with complex ethnic and other conflicts involving multiple issues (although, remarkably, terrorism was barely mentioned as one of those).
4 Across the four surveys, the OSCE remained consistently in 1st place, while NATO tended to eclipse the EU by one or two rankings, as components of an *ideal* peace and security system for postmodern Europe.

Finally, Chapter 10, our present location, asks the blunt question, "So what?" What are the implications (*if any*) for research, theory and practice/policy? But before discussing these, it is useful to discuss the extent to which the findings reported here *"triangulate"* (i.e., agree) with findings produced by other research projects. (See Brewer and Hunter, 2006.) In other words, have our CSCE/OSCE negotiators perceived peace and security issues accurately and presciently, to the extent that the *external validity* of our findings (e.g., applicability to other regions) may have been enhanced?

Validation of findings

At a 10th anniversary conference in Washington, DC, on "Beyond Dayton: The Balkans and Euro-Atlantic Integration," former German Ambassador to the US Wolfgang Ischinger (2005), who was involved in the Dayton Peace Process, shared with the audience "10 very simple lessons" from Bosnia:

1 We need to focus more on prevention. (Bosnia and even Kosovo could have been prevented. The Europeans should have prevented them, but they did not.)
2 We need to be able to apply military force if necessary too prevent [violent] conflict.
3 We need to insist on regional approaches to conflict and conflict resolution. (In retrospect, it was a mistake not to include Kosovo in Dayton. The unresolved Kosovo issue came back to haunt us 3 years later.)
4 We need time. (Often there is too much pressure to achieve too much in a very short time. We need time, patience, and long-term sustainability.)
5 We need strong leaders (e.g., Richard Holbrooke, Warren Christopher) who are tough on principles (e.g., Bonn Powers).
6 We need elections, but alone they are not enough and too easily can freeze wartime gains. Also we need rule of law, justice.
7 We need to ensure that civilian response capabilities are as highly effective as military responses.

8 The Europeans and the United States need to act together. (Euro-Atlantic Partnership [consultation] works! We should act together and remain united. Germany now has 10,000 troops in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Kosovo.)
9 We need to be modest in our ambitions. (There is a need for local ownership, local responsibility, and local legitimacy: Only if they [the "locals"] do it themselves will they be prepared for EU membership.) And
10 There is a need in the Euro-Atlantic relationship for something like the Dayton process. (Dayton was a great bonding, transformative moment!)

If we compare Ambassador Ischinger's "lessons" to those generated by the project reported in this volume, we find some interesting comparability:

CSCE/OSCE project	*Ischinger*
1. Preventive diplomacy/ quick response	Prevention
2. Coordination	Force (*Hard power*)
3. Force (*Hard power*)	Regional approach
4. *Soft power*	*Soft power*
5. Regional framework	Coordination

While the implicit rankings may not converge, it is clear that at least five of our *lessons* correspond exactly to five of Ambassador Ischinger's. Combining them we can say that there is a need to prevent violent ethnic conflicts by using a mix of *hard* and *soft power*, coordinated within a regional framework. These lessons are also compatible with both an issue paradigm and NEPSS.

In Chapter 7, we mentioned that these elements of peace and security were becoming more thought about, talked about and more likely to translate into corresponding action as the OSCE and other track 1 and multitrack actors pursued, achieved and worked to maintain *positive* as well as *negative peace* in postmodern Europe. Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (2005) provide one significant test of this proposition by reporting in the most recent of their biennial surveys, that ethnonational wars for independence, autocratic regimes, repression and political discrimination, and the global magnitude of armed conflict have continued to *decline*. Further, that these gains were

> the result of persistent and *coordinated* efforts at *peace-building* by *civil society* organizations, *national leaders, non-governmental organizations*, and *international bodies* [emphasis added].
>
> (Ibid., p. 1)

These findings are compatible with those generated by the recently published *Human Security Report* (2005) (which also includes Marshall and Gurr's data):

> By 2003, there were 40 percent fewer conflicts than in 1992. The deadliest conflicts – those with 1,000 or more battle-deaths – fell by some 80 percent. The number of genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians also dropped by 80 percent, while core human rights abuses have declined in five out of six regions of the developing world since the mid-1990s. International terrorism is the only type of political violence that has increased. Although the death toll has jumped sharply over the past three years, terrorists kill only a fraction of the number who die in wars.
>
> What accounts for the extraordinary and counterintuitive improvement in global security over the past dozen years? The end of the Cold War, which had driven at least a third of all conflicts since World War II, appears to have been the single most critical factor.
>
> In the late 1980s, Washington and Moscow stopped fueling "proxy wars" in the developing world, and the United Nations was liberated to play the global security role its founders intended. Freed from the paralyzing stasis of Cold War geopolitics, the Security Council initiated an unprecedented, though sometimes inchoate, explosion of international activism designed to stop ongoing wars and prevent new ones.
>
> Other international agencies [*including, for example, the OSCE*], donor governments and nongovernmental organizations also played a critical role, but it was the United Nations that took the lead, pushing a range of conflict-prevention and peace-building initiatives on a scale never before attempted. The number of U.N. peacekeeping operations and missions to prevent and stop wars have increased by more than 400 percent since the end of the Cold War. As this upsurge of international activism grew in scope and intensity through the 1990s, the number of crises, wars, and genocides declined (Mack, 2005, 2006).

In other words, according to the perceptions of its senior diplomats, as the CSCE/OSCE moved closer to a complex operating paradigm, with *Idealpolitik* as well as *Realpolitik* elements inclusive of a *culture of conflict resolution*, the world seemed to be developing in a less violent, more peaceful way.

Implications of findings

So, what are the implications of the findings of the CSCE/OSCE project, which appear to be grounded in corresponding "real world" developments, for theory, research, and policy?

Before discussing the implications of each – theory, research, and practice – it is important to mention how intimately connected all three are in the *real world*, despite the analytical usefulness of viewing each separately. For example,

- Theory can (and should) inform research and practice;
- Research can (and should) be a basis for applying theory to practice;
- Research can be used to feed back the results of practice to theory (and then the process can begin all over again).

Theory

There are at least three theoretical constructs mentioned often in this volume: (1) the 3PF, (2) NEPSS, and (3) the issue paradigm. What might be the implications of the findings reported here for each of these three constructs?

We used the 3PF as a basis for thinking about peace and security systems that might be more effective for analyzing and responding to ethnic conflicts such as those that tore former Yugoslavia apart (Chapter 2). Using the 3PF as a point of departure, we developed NEPSS as an expression of pillar 3 that might be a candidate for such a peace and security system (Chapter 3). The issue paradigm developed by Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez (1981), although not an original part of the CSCE/OSCE project, emerged "inductively" from an interpretation of the patterns generated by analyses of responses to the closed-ended questions in the 1993, 1997, and 1999, *pre–9/11* surveys (Chapter 5). These issue paradigm-relevant patterns were reinforced by findings generated by analyses of responses to the three select open-ended questions (Chapters 6–8), plus the update of the project to include the *post–9/11* period with questions dealing explicitly with terrorism as well as Yugoslav-type conflicts and the possible connections between them (Chapter 9).

One implication of the findings of this study for theory would be to further fine-tune the 3PF as a basis for (1) identifying, (2) tracking, (3) analyzing, and (4) heading off potentially catastrophic conflicts before they become violent. This would include "mining" the findings to further fine-tune NEPSS as a pillar 3 expression of efforts to prevent, manage, settle, resolve, and transform conflicts within particular regions, such that decision making based upon various framings of an issue paradigm, where consensus may be relatively low (as it was in our 1993 and 2004 surveys), does not generate worst-case scenarios that escalate out of control. In other words, an issue paradigm as a basis for policy within an *Idealpolitik* "metaframe" would likely be more "planet-friendly" and conducive to human security than one embedded within *Realpolitik*.

To successively test the efficacy of progressively improved theories, research would be necessary.

Research

Successive "dry runs," with computer assistance, could be conducted of the 3PF as a basis for progressively improved conflict identification, tracking, and analysis – early warning and early action – with appropriate data sets such as those generated by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden <www.pcr.uu.se/database/> the Peace and Conflict project at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland <www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/peace.htm> and the Human Security Project at the Human Security Centre at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia in Canada <www.humansecurityreport.info>.

By comparing what could have been done in response to select conflicts, based upon a progressively improved 3PF/NEPSS, with what has actually been done, potentially more effective policy recommendations could be forthcoming. This, plus continuing the practice of interviewing OSCE (and other) practitioners as a basis for anticipating likely conflicts within their regions as well as problems within their organizations, takes us into practice.

Practice

Apropos the impact of theory on research and practice, Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) tell us that an *issue paradigm* encourages

> scholars to give greater weight to the cognitive processes of elites within actors than has traditionally been the case under the assumptions of *realism*. Rejecting the assumptions that these processes are fixed or that interests are "self-evident," the new *[issue] paradigm* encourages research into the *prospects for restructuring cognitive maps* and the possibility that such restructuring will *intrude upon existing patterns of relations*. Failure and success of existing cognitive maps, for instance, disturb or reinforce the elements of those maps, though in ways that have not been specified by political scientists. Cognitive maps provide actors with *prescriptions* concerning what they should do under different conditions. What processes are initiated if the maps in fact lead to unexpected destinations [e.g., counterintuitive results of policies in the Balkans or Iraq]? Under what conditions are existing maps altered or reinforced? [emphasis added].
>
> (Ibid., p. 79)

The research undertaken as part of the CSCE/OSCE project reported here has been an attempt not only to explore with CSCE/OSCE negotiators their "cognitive maps," but to encourage them to rethink them as well, perhaps offering them opportunities to reframe their maps and make them more relevant to "capturing the complexity of conflict" in the post–Cold War world. Gratifyingly, as indicated by the findings reported here, such reframing appears to be actually taking place.

The "trick" now is for all of us interested in preventing the violent expression of conflict as *future Yugoslavias* or "future Madrids and Londons," to help translate the developing OSCE *community of values* into a corresponding *community of institutions* – something like NEPSS – beyond the otherwise impressive developments that have already taken place. In the event, we would be turning Rousseau on his head where, "genocidal ethnic wars and acts of catastrophic terrorism *do not* occur – or at least not so frequently – because there *are* mechanisms for preventing or otherwise dealing with them!"

Adopting the *issue paradigm* within an *Idealpolitik meta-frame* for analysis (*3PF*) *as well as* practice (NEPSS) would be one step in that direction. Then, speaking a "common language," it would be easier for international relations and conflict theorists and researchers to work together with OSCE and other practitioners in bridging the cultural and communications gap between the *academic/theorist* and *diplomatic/practitioner*.

On July 15, 2005, I had an opportunity to do precisely that when I was invited to a US State Department briefing in Washington, DC, for US Ambassador Julie Finley. Before sharing some thoughts with the Ambassador relevant to her new posting to the OSCE in Vienna, I mentioned the following as background information:

First, shortly before Dr Condoleezza Rice's appointment to the post of US Secretary of State, she indicated that, in her new role, she would emphasize *Public Diplomacy*. Second, as a "soft security"/*soft power* organization, the OSCE overlaps significantly with the Public Diplomacy image. And third, as had already been implied at the briefing by others, if the OSCE did not already exist, it would have to be invented, because of

1 Its comprehensive membership (including all former members of the Cold War – NATO and the defunct Warsaw Pact – plus the original neutral and nonaligned states of Europe, totaling 55 participating States in all.
2 Its comprehensive approach to security, comprising the (1) political and military, (2) economic and environmental, and (3) humanitarian and human rights dimensions (the original 3 "baskets" of the *Helsinki Final Act* [1975]). And
3 its relatively successful field missions and other mechanisms (e.g., HCNM) for conducting (1) early warning, (2) conflict prevention, (3) crisis management/conflict resolution, and (4) post-conflict rehabilitation.

In addition to these advantages, I mentioned

4 the OSCE's potential as a *"model"* for other regions (e.g., the Korean Peninsula, India and Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, Africa).

A further factor influencing my comments at the briefing was a statement made by Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel, then Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, at the 14th Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, in Washington, DC (July 1–5, 2005). Chairman Rupel urged representatives of the participating States, in their deliberations on how to make the OSCE more effective, to think "outside the box" (www.oscepa.dk).

Following this background information, especially the imperative "to think outside the box," I offered a number of recommendations to Ambassador Finley for her consideration in her new role as Head of the US Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria.

For reasons already expressed by others at the briefing, I indicated that the first priority for a new US Ambassador to the OSCE was to *save* the OSCE from a premature demise threatened by, among others, the Russian Federation. In effect, Ambassador Finley should ensure that she is *not* the last US ambassador to the OSCE. She should work toward this goal not by using the OSCE as a "club" with which to beat the Russians over the head, but by working together with them and others on issues of *common security* which is, after all, the "OSCE way."

I argued that one means for enhancing the longevity of the OSCE was to upgrade its operating effectiveness by leading a "Coalition of Friends of the OSCE," both inside and outside the organization, to establish something like an "interagency task force" to *coordinate* the OSCE's activities in conjunction with those of the UN, NATO, European Union, Council of Europe, and NGOs. (Better to have *interlocking* than *interblocking* relations with others working on the same issues.) Since many problems (e.g., terrorism, human and drug trafficking, environmental degradation, WMD proliferation, ethnic and religious conflicts, HIV/AIDS and other pandemics) are truly global in scale, it was not possible for any one nation or organization to deal with them effectively on its own. Hence, the need to maximize the "4 Cs" on complex global problems: *communication, cooperation, coordination*, and *collaboration* (see Nan, 2004).

Parallel versions of such an *"Inter-organizational Working Group"* – comprising representatives of the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU, CoE and NGOs (e.g., International Alert; Search for Common Ground) – could exist in the capitals where each of the participating organizations is based (e.g., Brussels, Copenhagen, Geneva, The Hague, London, Moscow, New York, Vienna, Warsaw) to brainstorm and fine-tune collaborative approaches to complex problem solving for which the local organization feels it has relevance and competence. As former OSCE Chairman-in-Office Rupel has said, "security

issues [facing the OSCE are] so complex, *inter-linked* and diverse that a *holistic* approach [is] needed" (emphasis added) (see "Press Release").

The recommendations made by Working Groups at the local level could then be fed to something like a "Meeting of Principals," comprised of representatives of each of the local Working Groups, for final fine-tuning and translation into policy design *and* implementation.

Another recommendation specifically addressed the Russian (and some other CIS states') claim of "double standards" used by Western members of the OSCE when they focus on conflicts and other issues *only* in the former Communist world. The idea here was again for the US Ambassador to lead a *Coalition of Friends of the OSCE*, both within and outside the OSCE, to establish *Conflict and Terrorism Working Groups* for conflicts (including those with possible linkages to terrorism) *throughout the OSCE area*, "from Vancouver to Vladivostok." Such groups would work on conflicts in a transparent manner in:

- Northern Europe (*Northern Ireland*);
- Southern Europe (*Spain*, *Balkans*, *Cyprus*, *Turkey*); and
- Former Soviet Union
  - *Moldova*.
  - Caucasus (*Armenia*, *Azerbaijan*, *Georgia*, *Chechnya*).
- Central Asia (*Kazakhstan*, *Kyrgyzstan*, *Turkmenistan*, *Tajikistan*, *Uzbekistan*).

The objective of such groups would be threefold; to: (1) *"map" conflicts* throughout each region; (2) their *causes and conditions*; and (3) conduct research on *"best practices"* for dealing with them with regard to any of the following 3rd party goals:

- violent conflict *prevention* (*preventive diplomacy*);
- conflict *management* (*peacekeeping*);
- conflict *settlement* (*coercive peacemaking*);
- conflict *resolution* (*noncoercive peacemaking*); and
- conflict *transformation* (*peacebuilding*).

To facilitate the analysis of conflict causes and conditions plus research on *best practices* of conflict handling and intervention, I mentioned to Ambassador Finley and others at the briefing that I had developed a "conflict mapping" tool that could be useful in this regard (see Chapter 2).

To enhance the search for *best practices*, I mentioned that I would encourage the Working Groups to identify representatives of the parties to conflicts in each area to travel to other conflict zones to share their "insider insights" with the parties involved. For example, Catholic (Nationalist/Republican) and Protestant (Unionist/Loyalist) parties could travel from Northern

Ireland to Cyprus and Azerbaijan [Nagorno-Karabakh] to share their insights with the parties to those conflicts, and vice versa.

This led to yet another recommendation, which was for the OSCE to make a concerted effort to solve its lingering, "frozen conflicts," especially in Nagorno-Karabakh, but also the Georgian–Abkhaz, Georgian–South Ossetian, and Moldovan–Transdniester conflicts.

Nagorno-Karabakh seems particularly "ripe" for resolution, although it is exceedingly complex. The nearly 3 million Armenians in Armenia (and 3–4 million in the Armenian Diaspora worldwide) "perceive" the nearly 8 million Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan as "Turks." Given the nearly 70 million *Turks* in neighboring Turkey, this means that Armenians worldwide see nearly 3 million of their ethnic and religious kin surrounded by nearly 80 million *Turks*. This is particularly significant since Armenians *perceive* that the *Turks* in Azerbaijan started the war over Karabakh (an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan) in the late 1980s to finish the job that the "Young Turks" started in 1915.

Accordingly, in order for the *current* Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to be effectively dealt with, the *historical* as well as current Armenian–Turkish conflict about whether or not *genocide* occurred against Armenians 90 years ago must first be dealt with (see Sandole, 2002b).

Despite intense Turkish resistance to dealing with this issue, Turkey could be encouraged to finally resolve it by working with Armenians and others to reconvene the now defunct *Turkish–Armenian Reconciliation Commission* (TARC) (see Mooradian, 2003, 2005), or a successor to it.

Turkey began talks for entering the European Union in October 2005, following negative referenda by the French and Dutch on the EU Constitution (and, in effect, on the issue of Turkish entry to the EU). There is no way for Turkey to successfully gain entry to the EU without finally laying to rest its "Armenian problem" (not to mention its "Kurdish problem," which has resurfaced). Conceivably, the prospect and attraction of its entry to the EU can be a source of influence on Turkey with regard to finally dealing effectively with Armenians as a necessary condition for resolving the Karabakh conflict.

If Nagorno-Karabakh can be solved, then why not the Moldovan–Transdniester, Georgian–Abkhaz and Georgian–South Ossetian conflicts? The need in each case is great: these conflicts are inhibiting economic development and democratization in strategically important parts of the former Soviet Union, plus impeding development of Caspian Sea oil reserves. Solving these conflicts would not only open up these areas to further development, but perhaps "spill over" to the Russian–Chechen conflict (with its clear linkages to global terrorism) which desperately needs attention. In any case, in none of these *conflict-habituated areas* is the status quo a viable option.

Finally, I recommended that Ambassador Finley and her colleagues in Vienna build upon the enhanced capability and effectiveness of the OSCE

that might accrue to the organization through some of the recommendations outlined earlier, plus those contained in the *Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons On Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE* (OSCE, 2005) and *Report of the Colloquium on "The Future of the OSCE": A Joint Project of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Swiss Institute for World Affairs* (OSCE PA, 2005).

The objective here would be to further market the OSCE as a model for other regions (e.g., Korean Peninsula, India and Pakistan, Israel and Palestine, Africa). The South Koreans – an OSCE Partner for Security Cooperation – have done a good deal of work in this regard by hosting three "Korea-OSCE Conferences" in Seoul (March 2001, September 2003, and April 2005). These conferences have dealt with the "exportability" of CSBMs pioneered by the OSCE to the Northeast Asian region (see *Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia Revisited*, 2003), and the development of new security threats and a *"new security paradigm"* for the region (see "2005 OSCE-Korea Conference on New Security Threats and a New Security Paradigm").

Should elements of the *OSCE model*, with appropriate cultural and other fine-tuning, be successfully transferred to other regions, resulting in a series of *"regional security experiments,"* this just might enhance prospects for eventually fulfilling German philosopher Immanuel Kant's ideal of *"perpetual peace."*

I mentioned that this would be a tall order for Ambassador Finley to attempt to achieve during her tenure as Head of the US Delegation to the OSCE. However, as a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs said at the briefing, in his experience with the OSCE, "when the U.S. cared, when it was engaged, things happened!" If then, why not now – on the 30th anniversary of the CSCE/OSCE and 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre and the Dayton Peace Accords?

Conclusion

What would it take for these and other recommendations to be successfully implemented? Potential responses to this question cut across at least three "issue areas": (1) further stabilization of the OSCE region; (2) exportability of the OSCE to other regions with implications for *Global Governance*; (3) the role of the United States in helping to "drive" constructive developments worldwide; and (4) the *interaction-effect* of developments across these and other categories.

Further stabilization of the OSCE region

The OSCE region encompasses, among others, the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo), South Caucasus (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia),

and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). The region is clearly "conflict rich," with much attention focused on it by members of the OSCE, NATO, EU, Council of Europe, and UN, among others.

Perhaps the most compelling of these conflict areas within the region is the Balkans. Bosnia, 10 years after Dayton, presents a mixed picture, with some observers reporting that much progress has been made; others lamenting that all that Dayton has done is to transform the military conflict between the three sectarian groups into a political conflict that continues to this day; and some saying that Dayton at least stopped the bloodletting, but now is in need of reform in order to move into the future. Attempting to transform three "fiefdoms" into a unified state will, for the pessimists and skeptics, be as "artificial" as the former Yugoslavia was, which may be a recipe for Bosnia's eventual similar collapse and failure as a state (*with implications for trying to build a unified state in Iraq between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds*). Add to this the presence of several hundred *jihadi* who helped defend the Bosniak Muslims during the wars of the 1990s, and we have Bosnia as a potentially failed state and source of terrorism on the European Continent.

As of this writing, the Kosovo status negotiations are taking place in Vienna where either the preferred Serb outcome or the preferred Albanian outcome could lead to renewed hostilities.

In both the Bosnian and Kosovo cases, therefore, *negative peace* is being maintained by the presence of EU and NATO peacekeeping forces, respectively. Although our findings and "reality" indicate that Bosnia is doing much better than Kosovo, *positive peace* in both cases remains more an abstraction than a reality. Hence, the role of the *Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe* which, among other things, is helping to prepare all Yugoslav successor and other Balkan states for eventual entry into the EU (see Chapter 3). While the OSCE is barely a household word for many Americans, the EU fares nearly as badly. Nevertheless, according to Nobel Peace Prize Laureate John Hume of Northern Ireland:

> The European Union is the best example of conflict resolution in the world. Europe has made a conscious decision to leave war and differences behind, and then found a way to do it. It's been a phenomenal success.
>
> (cited in Reid, 2004, p. 290)

Hopefully, the EU, with the active assistance of the *regionally* based Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, will be as successful in the Balkans as it has been with the former enemies of the Second World War (especially France and Germany). Then, as the EU reaches further eastward, with various categories of association offered to former Cold War enemies, something

like the Stability Pact can be developed for the Caucasus and Central Asia as well.

Exporting the OSCE to other regions with implications for global governance

In addition to the Republic of Korea, Japan – another OSCE Partner for Security Cooperation – has been actively involved in exploring the "transferability" of OSCE principles, lessons, and mechanisms to East Asia. In a set of policy recommendations presented by the Japan Forum on International Relations to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, there is a plethora of OSCE/NEPSS-like expressions such as "pluralistic security community," "multi-layered networks," "non-traditional security threats," "preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution," "security webs," "strategic convergence of existing and proposed multi-lateral frameworks," "coalitions of the willing," and "security cooperation" (see JFIR, 2002).

Part of the inspiration for the Korean, Japanese, and other initiatives in Asia and elsewhere undoubtedly derives from sentiments expressed nearly 20 years ago by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (who currently heads the International Crisis Group). According to FM Evans (1990):

> The security picture in Asia is generally favorable. The moves toward democracy and the healing of some tension points in East Asia are very encouraging. But, although the worldwide retreat of ideological competition has significantly decreased the level of global tension and the prospect of superpower confrontation, there is probably rather more uncertainty than there has ever been about what the longer-term political and security environment will be in the region.
>
> We should now be looking ahead to the kind of wholly new institutional processes that might be capable of evolving, in Asia just as in Europe, as a *framework for addressing and resolving security problems*. In Europe, wildly implausible as this would have seemed even just a year ago [1989], the central institutional framework for pursuing *common security* has become the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE is made up of all the countries in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Why should there not be developed a similar institutional framework, a *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia*, for addressing the apparently intractable security issues which exist in the region?
>
> A number of negative responses can quickly be given. Asia contains many different issues of contention and has many different "fronts," unlike Europe, where there has been a single East–West conflict. Asia is also a diverse region with little of the sense of common cultural identity

> and common diplomatic tradition of Europe. Still, it is not unreasonable to expect that new Europe-style patterns of cooperation between old adversaries will find their echo in this part of the world, and that *imaginative new approaches to confidence building and problem solving can be found*.
>
> It is too early to map in detail what might evolve. What matters for the moment is that the process of dialogue, both bilateral and regional, be assiduously pursued. Efforts should be constant to make all the individual strands of the web both denser and more resilient, so that sooner or later a base will emerge on which more systematic security cooperation can be built [emphasis added].

Clearly, the South Koreans and Japanese, among others, have been making such efforts, often within the context of the *ASEAN Regional Forum* (ARF) as a major framework for security cooperation in the region (see Johnston, 2003).

As these and other efforts bear fruit – further *endogenizing* the Hobbesian "black hole of international anarchy" with culturally and politically relevant versions of the OSCE and NEPSS – additional strides will have been made toward making possible the goal of "effective global governance."

On December 7, 2005, a conference took place in Washington, DC, sponsored by the Center for US-China Cooperation at the University of Denver in cooperation with the Washington, DC office of the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. The conference was entitled, "Weak Multilateral Cooperation and Strong Transnational Security Threats: Prospects for Effective Global Governance." According to the online announcement of the conference (DCSymposium2005Agenda.doc):

> Over the past three years, the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies has conducted a dialogue among policy intellectuals and diplomats principally from China and the United States, but also from Japan, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, Germany, France, and the UK. Meetings were held in Colorado (2003), Beijing (2004 in partnership with the School of International Relations of Peking University) and Berlin (2005 in partnership with the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*). In these dialogues, participants were asked to address the following premises:
>
> - That the great 21st century challenges to human and national security are not being and cannot be adequately addressed by the present mélange of bilateral relationships and multilateral institutions that are sometimes referred to collectively as "global governance";
> - That the United Nations in its present form together with regional organizations in their present forms cannot serve as the operational core of an adequate system of global governance;

- That an adequate system of global governance can be achieved only through the institutionalization of historically unprecedented levels of cooperation among the leading states;
- That institutionalization means the creation of multi-nationally integrated elite threat identification, planning and operations staffs and close networking of senior officials;
- That possibly for the first time in human history, the objective interests of all leading states or at least of their regimes overwhelmingly support cooperation over competition;
- That by making the case for institutionalization and illuminating its elements and thus giving it credibility as a structural goal, policy intellectuals can influence the trajectory of cumulative ad hoc and incremental responses to immediate challenges faced by the regimes in leading states.

The aforementioned recommendations made to US Ambassador to the OSCE Julie Finley, including the need "to think outside the box," come to mind here in order to deal effectively with nontraditional security threats, such as the *new* terrorism. This has also been among the objectives of the GPPAC (see Chapter 3). GPPAC held its first Global Conference at UN Headquarters in New York City on July 19, 2005, bringing together more than 900 people from 118 countries to address the theme, "From Reaction to Prevention: Civil Society Forging Partnerships to Prevent Violent Conflict and Build Peace."

During the conference's opening plenary session, Assistant Secretary-General Stephan Stedman read a statement from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in which SG Annan talked of a "shared mission" (European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 2006, p. 5):

> There is no higher goal than preventing armed conflict. This calling is even more pressing today, because of the interconnected nature of today's threats. Around the world, a triad of poverty, disease and war creates a cycle of death. Civil violence, human rights abuses and poverty make weak States vulnerable to transnational organized crime, *terrorism* and illicit trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons.
>
> I look to civil society to act as our partners in helping to defuse potential conflicts. As experience tells us, you will be most effective by *coordinating* with bilateral and intergovernmental actors – and with one another [emphasis added].

As indicated in Chapter 3, the GPPAC is an example of NEPSS-type development at the global level. It is, therefore, appropriate that GPPAC should be embedded within the UN, especially given Andrew Mack's (2005, 2006) aforementioned thesis that it has been the peacemaking and peacebuilding activities of the UN and other IOs (including the OSCE) that are

responsible for the measurable decreases in the frequency and intensity of armed conflicts worldwide during the last 10–15 years. Against this background, it is useful to remind ourselves that the UN moved from no placement at all in the 1993 and 1997 rankings, and 12th place for 1999, up to 2d place for the 2004 survey, in CSCE/OSCE negotiators' visions of the elements that should comprise a future peace and security system for postmodern Europe (see Chapters 8–9).

What would it take to facilitate further movement toward the GPPAC vision of *effective global governance*?

The role of the United States as "driver"

Despite the low rankings for the United States (and Russian Federation) as elements of a future peace and security system in the 1993, 1997, and 1999 surveys, and its exclusion from the top ten elements in the 2004 survey, the United States has great potential to play the role of *driver* of further *endogenization* of "Hobbesian space" toward *effective global governance*.

Here we can recall the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, at the briefing for US Ambassador Julie Finley, who said that, in his experience with the OSCE, "When the US cared, when it was engaged, things happened!" Reinforcing these sentiments, at the aforementioned 10th anniversary conference on Dayton, Lord Paddy Ashdown (2005), the current (and by all accounts, "last") High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, said that US *re-engagement* in the Balkans, "at full throttle, was *absolutely essential* to peace in Bosnia and in the region."

Predating these comments is, by far, one of the most compelling articulations of the potential US role in moving further toward *effective global governance*, crafted by Michael Lund in the final chapter of his now classic *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (1996):

> If the idea of a multilateral, stratified regime of preventive diplomacy is to become a reality, it must be championed by an actor or actors of global stature, able both to advocate the adoption of such a plan and to actively support it at the local, regional, and global levels. For several reasons, the United States is not necessarily the only, but clearly one of the best candidates to undertake this role. In the first place, the United States has the world's most extensive foreign policy bureaucracy and information-gathering apparatus, thus affording it unparalleled opportunities to become involved in or supportive of preventive diplomacy at each of the vertical levels described above. Second, the United States is the only country that is effectively a "member" of all regions – in some cases by virtue of formal membership (in NATO, OSCE, OAS, APEC, NAFTA, and so forth), in others by dint of joint interests (OAU [now the AU], ASEAN, the Middle East multilateral peace process).

> Third, while it is true that few international issues can be resolved by the United States alone, it is also true that many international issues cannot be resolved without U.S. leadership. Thus, while the United States should welcome, encourage, and seek to enhance the international roles of other states and entities, both bilaterally and through the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, it remains the one actor on the world stage that can marshal the political will to provide leadership and resources on the widest range of issues.
>
> When it chooses to play this role, it is the hub around which many key international institutions and relationships revolve at each level of the prevention hierarchy. Although U.S. leadership regarding the Bosnian conflict was not forceful until military conditions on the ground changed in August 1995, at that point the United States did help to galvanize international action and sponsored the best hope so far of ending the conflict [Dayton].
>
> (Lund, 1996, pp. 195–6)

One of Ambassador Julie Finley's challenges as US Ambassador to the OSCE, therefore, would be to encourage the US Government to "take the initiative by proposing the creation of a conflict prevention regime" (ibid., p. 196), initially within the OSCE area, but with implications for "export" to other regions as well.

One way to do this might be to ensure that some of the proposed OSCE Working Groups – comprising members of delegations, the OSCE Secretariat, other IGOs, universities, think-tanks, and NGOs – should focus on certain issues, for example, the often "zero-sum" relationships between *self-determination* and *sovereignty* that lie at the heart of many deep-rooted conflicts of the post–Cold War era.

Within such Working Groups, facilitators could help track-1 and multi-track participants, via creative brainstorming, to *conceptually* integrate the *Realpolitik* (conflict = negative peace) and *Idealpolitik* (cooperation = positive peace) issues (or positions on issues) that otherwise coexist in complex ways.

The objective here would be to enhance efforts to *operationally* integrate the various components either of (a) early warning systems or, in the event that they fail, (b) peace operations – comprising state, IGO, NGO (humanitarian and conflict resolution) and other actors – to maximize the fit between theory (*3PF/NEPSS*) and practice (*CSCE/OSCE and other practitioners' perceptions and behavior*).

Interaction effects between further stabilization of the OSCE region, export to other regions with implications for global governance, and the United States as driver

Clearly, nothing happens in a vacuum. According to *complexity theory*, "everything is connected to everything else" (Waldrop, 1992). As many of

us now know, many "current events" in international and domestic affairs are the "unintended consequences" of earlier policies. There is, however, also an "up side" to this story, which could become the basis for a "new realism."

Imagine if the United States were to decide to stop bucking the trend of the decreasing frequency and intensity of armed and other violent conflicts worldwide documented by *The Human Security Report* (2005), Andrew Mack (2005, 2006), Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (2005), and others (Kriesberg, 2006). What would it take, for example, for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to persuade President George W. Bush that, in his remaining time in office, he should change course in a profound way?

In this regard, Dr Rice could persuade the President to send his friend (and his father's friend) former US President Bill Clinton – who nearly presided over a successful Israeli–Palestinian negotiation in July 2000 – to be his envoy in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as one potentially effective way to deal with forces making for the self-fulfilling realization of the *clash of civilizations*. President Clinton could then set up a presence in Jerusalem, working together with other members of "the Quartet" (the UN, EU, and Russian Federation) as well as the parties, *no matter how long it took to resolve the conflict*.

Given the pivotal linkage between this most intractable of conflicts, plus, among others, the GWOT and the US-led war in Iraq, success with the Palestinian and Israeli conflict could "spill over" to other conflicts and conflict-rich regions worldwide.

After nearly 50 years of obscene savagery and reciprocal victimhood (with complicity of the West), brutally embedded in a "security dilemma" *par excellence*, this is clearly the *right thing* as well as *practical thing* to do!

Appendix A: research designs for 1993, 1997, and 1999

The 1993 CSCE survey

During the summer of 1993, some 15 months after the Yugoslavian wars had spilled over from Croatia into Bosnia-Herzegovina, I returned to Vienna to conduct the first round of interviews, eliciting from heads of CSCE delegations their views on peace and security in post–Cold War Europe, including "what went wrong in former Yugoslavia?" During this phase of the project, which ran from June to July 1993, I interviewed 32 (primarily) heads of delegation from 29 of the (then) 53 participating States of the CSCE.

1993 CSCE historical context

In addition to the start-up and escalation of the wars in Yugoslavia and collapse of the country into five successor republics, some of the major changes that had occurred in Europe between the time I served on the US delegation to the CSBMs negotiations in spring/summer 1990 and my return to Vienna in summer 1993, included:

1. The reunification of Germany.
2. The collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).
3. Democratic elections in and further democratization of post-communist states in Eastern Europe.
4. Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe.
5. The collapse of the Soviet Union into 15 successor states.
6. The "Velvet Divorce" of the Czech and Slovak Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia) into the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic.
7. An increase in CSCE membership from 35 to 53, with the replacement of the two Germanies by a unified Germany; succession of the Czech and Slovak Republic by the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; replacement of the former Soviet Union by 15 successor republics;

replacement of former Yugoslavia by five successor republics, four of which became members; plus the admission of Albania.

8 Establishment of the CSCE Centre for Conflict Prevention (CPC); the CSCE Secretariat; and CSCE Secretary-General in Vienna.
9 Creation of the CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw.
10 Creation of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Copenhagen.
11 Creation of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in The Hague. And
12 NATO's creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to facilitate the pursuit of issues of common concern with former members of the defunct WTO.

In general, the events of 1990–3 were suggestive of major changes in the international system, particularly in East–West relations, inclusive of *paradigm and behavioral shifts* from *Realpolitik*-based *national* security, toward *Idealpolitik*-based *common* security. Summer 1993 was an appropriate time, therefore, to gauge to what extent evidence of these apparent shifts was present in the discourse and, by implication, mindsets of senior representatives to the trans-Atlantic, pan-European CSCE, who, among others, were responsible for dealing with the return of genocidal warfare to Europe.

1993 CSCE research design

Based upon information provided by the US Information Service (USIS) in Vienna, I had written letters to the heads of all 53 delegations, informing them that I was a former member of the US delegation to the CSBMs negotiations and that I would be coming to Vienna in June 1993 as a NATO Research Fellow to explore with them their views on peace and security in post–Cold War Europe.[1] Upon arrival in Vienna, I contacted the offices of all 53 delegations and by the middle of July, succeeded in interviewing 32 of them from 29 participating states[2]; that is,

1 *13 NATO states*: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United States, and United Kingdom (*not included*: France, Luxembourg, and Spain).
2 *6 NNA states*: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Switzerland (*not included*: Cyprus, Holy See, Malta, Monaco, and Sweden).
3 *3 former Yugoslav republics (FYug)*: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia (*not included*: Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]).[3]

4 *5 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP)*: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (*not included*: Romania). And
5 *2 former Soviet republics (FSU)*: Russian Federation and Ukraine (*not included*: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan).

For a variety of reasons, I was unable to interview individuals from all 53 participating States. Instead, I interviewed persons from *convenience samples* (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 183–4) of the five main groupings, with some samples being more representative than others:

1 NSWP: 5/6 (83 percent).
2 NATO: 13/16 (81 percent).
3 FYug: 3/4 (75 percent).[4]
4 NNA: 6/11 (55 percent). And
5 FSU: 2/15 (13 percent) – the least representative of all.[5]

Interviews comprised 15 *closed-ended* and 12 *open-ended* questions (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 253–5). The closed-ended questions reflected *Likert scale*-type responses; for example, SA (strongly agree), A (agree), MF (mixed feelings), D (disagree), and SD (strongly disagree), where SA = 5, A = 4, MF = 3, D = 2, and SD = 1 (see ibid., pp. 465–7). Hence, the higher an interviewee's score on a particular item, the more in agreement she or he was with that item. To facilitate comparisons between the five groupings, *group mean scores* were computed for each of the 15 closed-ended questions. By contrast, open-ended questions allowed respondents to wax lyrically and philosophically about the issues in question. Analyses of responses in this case were searches for common as well as dissimilar themes.

The interview schedule or questionnaire reflected basically the *schedule-structured* format, where all interviewees were asked the same questions, with the same wording, and in the same order (see ibid., pp. 232–7), with the one exception that, on occasion, additional information was provided to some subjects to make a question clearer.[6] The interviews were conducted usually in delegation offices, and lasted between 1 and 3 hours.

Closed-ended questions are listed in Appendix B and are dealt with in Chapter 5, while open-ended questions appear in Chapters 6–8.

The 1997 OSCE survey

A Fulbright award allowed me to return to Vienna during May–August 1997, to conduct a second round of interviews and, because of the similarity

between the questions for both the 1993 and 1997 surveys, explore the *external validity* of the findings of the 1993 CSCE study; that is, the extent to which they were applicable to the OSCE in 1997 (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 113–15). In effect, I was able to test the 1993 CSCE findings as *hypotheses* in the 1997 OSCE setting.

1997 OSCE historical context

In addition to NATO and the Dayton Peace Accords having stopped the wars in Bosnia, other developments that occurred between the 1993 and 1997 surveys included:

1 The "reinvention" of the CSCE as the OSCE, with Macedonia and Andorra increasing the membership from 53 to 55.
2 NATO's creation of the PfP to facilitate, within the framework of the NACC, collaboration between NATO and its former WTO adversaries on issues of *common* security.
3 The disastrous Russian–Chechen war of 1994–6.
4 The campaign to "enlarge" (*expand*) NATO, right up to the borders of the former Soviet Union, culminating in the July 1997 offer to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to begin negotiating entry into NATO (a status they achieved by March 1999).
5 NATO's "sweetener" to the Russian Federation in the form of the *Founding Act* which gave Russia a voice but not a veto in NATO deliberations (with a similar arrangement for Ukraine).
6 The creation of the EAPC, which replaced the NACC and enhanced the PfP. And
7 Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" (1993, 1996), which became a part of elite if not also popular culture.

The summer of 1997 was an appropriate time, therefore, to explore to what extent (if any) the 1993 findings held up in the 1997 setting, with special attention devoted to the likely effect of the extraordinary cessation of the Bosnian wars and the increasing renown of Huntington's civilizational thesis on the thinking and discourse of senior OSCE diplomatic practitioners.

1997 OSCE research design

Once again, prior to departing for Vienna, I wrote letters to the heads of the OSCE delegations, informing them that I planned to return to Vienna as a Fulbright OSCE Regional Research Scholar to conduct interviews similar to those that I had conducted in 1993. Upon my arrival in early May 1997,

I contacted all delegations and, by the end of August, succeeded in interviewing 47 individuals from 46 of the 55 participating States:

1 *15 NATO states*: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (*not included*: Iceland).
2 *9 NNA states*: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Holy See, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Sweden, and Switzerland (*not included*: Monaco, San Marino).
3 *4 former Yugoslav republics (FYug)*: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia (*not included*: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY: Serbia and Montenegro][7]).
4 *6 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP)*: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. And
5 *12 former Soviet republics (FSU)*: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine (*not included*: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).[8]

Clearly, in terms of representativeness, I did better in 1997 than in 1993:

1 NSWP: 6/6 (100 percent).
2 NATO: 15/16 (94 percent).
3 NNA: 9/11 (82 percent).
4 FYug: 4/5 (80 percent). And
5 FSU: 12/15 (80 percent).

Although still a "convenience sample," 46 interviewed delegations out of 55 OSCE participating States nevertheless represented 84 percent of that population, which was frustratingly close to being a "population sample."[9]

Again, basically schedule-structured interviews, comprising closed- and open-ended questions, were conducted usually in delegation offices, with interviews running between 1 and 3 hours. The closed-ended questions, with some exceptions, were basically the same as those for 1993 (including the *Likert-type* response structure) – the exceptions dealing with updated revisions of text and recent and future developments such as NATO enlargement and the withdrawal of the NATO-led SFOR from Bosnia, then planned for June 1998.

The 1999 OSCE survey

An OSCE "Researcher in Residence" award allowed me to return to Vienna for a third round of interviews during June–August 1999, providing a second opportunity to test the *external validity* of the 1993 CSCE findings.

1999 OSCE historical context

A major change in the operating environment of OSCE negotiators between the 1997 and 1999 surveys was the Kosovo crisis that began in February 1998, culminating in the 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia that ended immediately before I started interviews in June 1999.

1999 OSCE research design

Accordingly, during the third survey, I interviewed 47 (primarily) heads of delegation from 47 of the 55 OSCE participating States:

1 *15 NATO states*: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (*not included*: Iceland).
2 *8 neutral and nonaligned states (NNA)*: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Sweden, and Switzerland (*not included*: Holy See, Monaco, San Marino).
3 *4 former Yugoslav republics (FYug)*: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia (*not included*: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY: Serbia and Montenegro][10]).
4 *6 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP)*: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.[11]
5 *13 former Soviet republics (FSU)*: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (*not included*: Belarus, Kyrgyzstan). And
6 *1 Other*: Albania.[12]

In terms of representativeness, I did about the same in 1999 as in 1997:

1 NSWP: 6/6 (100 percent);
2 NATO: 15/16 (94 percent);
3 NNA: 8/11 (73 percent);
4 FYug: 4/5 (80 percent);
5 FSU: 13/15 (87 percent); plus
6 on this occasion, I finally succeeded in getting Albania!

Although still a *convenience sample*, 47 interviewed delegations out of 55 OSCE participating States was 85 percent of that population (a slight improvement over 1997) – again, frustratingly close to being a *population sample*.[13]

Appendix B: the 15 closed-ended questions and data specific to each: individual means, "grand means" and standard deviations

Question 1: "Violent ethnic conflicts, such as those in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, will be among the major threats to international peace and security in the post–Cold War world."

Table B.1 Mean responses to question 1

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	4.50 *[5]*	4.31 *[1]*	4.40 *[1]*
NNA	4.67 *[3]*	3.94 *[5]*	4.00 *[5]*
FYug	5.00 *[1.5]*	4.00 *[3.5]*	4.25 *[3.5]*
NSWP	4.60 *[4]*	4.00 *[3.5]*	4.25 *[3.5]*
FSU	5.00 *[1.5]*	4.17 *[2]*	4.27 *[2]*
Grand Mean	4.75	4.08	4.23
StanDev.	.2326	.1527	.1450

Notes
For Questions 1–15, the *higher the grand mean*, the *more in agreement* respondents were with a question, and the *lower the standard deviation*, the *more consensus* there was among respondents on a question. *Italicized numbers in brackets* refer to rankings for *individual means* for each of the five groupings for each question at each time period (read *vertically* as columns).

Question 2: "NATO can play an effective role in responding to some of these conflicts by providing peacekeeping forces."

Table B.2 Mean responses to question 2

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	3.875 *[3]*	3.90 *[5]*	4.00 *[4]*
NNA	3.60 *[4]*	4.22 *[3]*	3.625 *[5]*
FYug	4.33 *[2]*	4.75 *[1]*	4.75 *[1]*
NSWP	4.60 *[1]*	4.33 *[2]*	4.50 *[2]*
FSU	3.50 *[5]*	4.21 *[4]*	4.08 *[3]*
Grand Mean	3.98	4.28	4.19
StanDev.	.4724	.3067	.4408

Question 3: "NATO should have been used earlier in a peacekeeping role in Croatia, Bosnia [and Kosovo]."

Table B.3 Mean responses to question 3

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	3.75 *[3]*	3.94 *[2]*	3.00 *[5]*
NNA	3.60 *[4]*	3.55 *[5]*	3.375 *[4]*
FYug	5.00 *[1]*	5.00 *[1]*	5.00 *[1]*
NSWP	3.80 *[2]*	3.83 *[3]*	3.50 *[3]*
FSU	2.50 *[5]*	3.75 *[4]*	3.85 *[2]*
Grand Mean	3.73	4.01	3.75
StanDev.	.8871	.5693	.7645

Question 4: "Whatever peacekeeping role NATO plays in the future, it will have to continue to include its former Warsaw Pact adversaries in dealing with issues of common security."

Table B.4 Mean responses to question 4

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	4.50 *[2]*	3.94 *[4]*	4.33 *[2]*
NNA	4.40 *[3]*	4.44 *[2]*	4.375 *[1]*
FYug	4.33 *[4]*	4.00 *[3]*	4.00 *[3.5]*
NSWP	4.60 *[1]*	4.50 *[1]*	4.00 *[3.5]*
FSU	3.00 *[5]*	3.92 *[5]*	3.85 *[5]*
Grand Mean	4.17	4.16	4.11
StanDev.	.6598	.2853	.2294

Question 5: "The Partnership for Peace (PfP) and North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC; replaced later by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC]), established by NATO, could develop into a post–Cold War security system for Europe, inclusive of all the former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and nonaligned."

Table B.5 Mean responses to question 5

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	3.375 *[4]*	3.09 *[5]*	2.97 *[5]*
NNA	3.80 *[2]*	3.67 *[3]*	3.875 *[1]*
FYug	4.00 *[1]*	3.62 *[4]*	3.50 *[3]*
NSWP	3.40 *[3]*	4.00 *[1]*	3.33 *[4]*
FSU	2.50 *[5]*	3.71 *[2]*	3.615 *[2]*
Grand Mean	3.42	3.62	3.46
StanDev.	.5765	.3301	.3372

Question 6: "If the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC; later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC]) do develop into a post–Cold War security system, they should do so within the context of the CSCE [OSCE]."

Table B.6 Mean responses to question 6

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	3.94 *[2]*	3.31 *[4]*	2.33 *[5]*
NNA	3.60 *[5]*	3.55 *[2]*	3.56 *[1]*
FYug	3.67 *[4]*	3.25 *[5]*	2.50 *[4]*
NSWP	3.80 *[3]*	3.67 *[1]*	3.17 *[3]*
FSU	4.00 *[1]*	3.33 *[3]*	3.23 *[2]*
Grand Mean	3.80	3.42	2.96
StanDev.	.1706	.1792	.5209

Question 7: "If NATO, PfP and others participating in SFOR in Bosnia start to withdraw their forces in the near future, then warfare is likely to resume between the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims."

Table B.7 Mean responses to question 7

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	—	3.91 *[1]*	3.47 *[4]*
NNA	—	3.28 *[4]*	3.31 *[5]*
FYug	—	3.25 *[5]*	3.75 *[2]*
NSWP	—	3.67 *[2]*	4.17 *[1]*
FSU	—	3.58 *[3]*	3.69 *[3]*
Grand Mean	—	3.54	3.68
StanDev.	—	.2771	.3264

Question 8: "Beyond the threatened or actual use of force to 'keep the peace,' there is a need to deal with the issues underlying the violent expression of conflict in former Yugoslavia."

Table B.8 Mean responses to question 8

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	4.67 *[3]*	4.75 *[2]*	4.67 *[4]*
NNA	4.83 *[2]*	4.78 *[1]*	4.75 *[2.5]*
FYug	4.33 *[4]*	4.50 *[4]*	4.75 *[2.5]*
NSWP	5.00 *[1]*	4.67 *[3]*	4.83 *[1]*
FSU	4.00 *[5]*	4.17 *[5]*	4.23 *[5]*
Grand Mean	4.566	4.574	4.65
StanDev.	.4015	.2507	.2393

Question 9: "Without successfully dealing with the issues underlying the use of violence, external intervention to forcibly keep the warring factions apart will not, by itself, lead to a resolution of the conflict."

Table B.9 Mean responses to question 9

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	4.53 *[2]*	4.25 *[2.5]*	4.40 *[1]*
NNA	4.33 *[3.5]*	4.33 *[1]*	4.00 *[4.5]*
FYug	4.33 *[3.5]*	4.25 *[2.5]*	4.25 *[2]*
NSWP	4.60 *[1]*	4.00 *[5]*	4.00 *[4.5]*
FSU	4.00 *[5]*	4.17 *[4]*	4.15 *[3]*
Grand Mean	4.36	4.20	4.16
StanDev.	.2334	.1253	.1710

Question 10: "In the violent (often ethnic-based) conflicts of the post–Cold War world, states and international governmental organizations should, to the extent possible, work together with humanitarian and conflict-resolution NGOs as part of an integrated whole."

Table B.10 Mean responses to question 10

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	4.27 *[2]*	4.06 *[2]*	4.33 *[4]*
NNA	3.67 *[4]*	3.89 *[5]*	4.375 *[3]*
Fyug	4.33 *[1]*	4.00 *[3.5]*	4.50 *[2]*
NSWP	4.20 *[3]*	4.00 *[3.5]*	4.67 *[1]*
FSU	3.00 *[5]*	4.33 *[1]*	4.23 *[5]*
Grand Mean	3.89	4.06	4.42
StanDev.	.5645	.1650	.1696

Question 11: "While there are many peacekeeping mechanisms, there is a need for more peacemaking and peacebuilding mechanisms."

Table B.11 Mean responses to question 11

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	3.73 *[3]*	3.875 *[3]*	3.73 *[4]*
NNA	3.00 *[4.5]*	3.55 *[5]*	4.125 *[1]*
FYug	4.67 *[1]*	4.75 *[1]*	4.00 *[2.5]*
NSWP	4.20 *[2]*	3.83 *[4]*	3.33 *[5]*
FSU	3.00 *[4.5]*	4.00 *[2]*	4.00 *[2.5]*
Grand Mean	3.72	4.00	3.84
StanDev.	.7365	.4499	.3180

Question 12: "Basically, despite the problems faced by President Yeltsin and others in the former Soviet Union, the Cold War is over."

Table B.12 Mean responses to question 12

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	4.33 *[1.3]*	4.00 *[1.5]*	4.27 *[1]*
NNA	4.33 *[1.3]*	4.00 *[1.5]*	4.00 *[3.5]*
FYug	4.33 *[1.3]*	3.75 *[5]*	4.00 *[3.5]*
NSWP	4.20 *[4]*	3.83 *[3]*	4.17 *[2]*
FSU	4.00 *[5]*	3.79 *[4]*	3.46 *[5]*
Grand Mean	4.24	3.87	3.98
StanDev.	.1445	.1184	.3128

Question 13: "The issue of NATO enlargement could put at risk the post–Cold War peace that has developed between East and West."

Table B.13 Mean responses to question 13

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	—	2.50 *[3]*	3.00 *[1.5]*
NNA	—	2.67 *[2]*	2.875 *[3]*
FYug	—	2.25 *[4]*	2.00 *[4]*
NSWP	—	2.00 *[5]*	1.50 *[5]*
FSU	—	2.83 *[1]*	3.00 *[1.5]*
Grand Mean	—	2.45	2.48
StanDev.	—	.3308	.6869

Question 14: "There is a perception in the developing world that the 'New World Order' means nothing more than that East–West has been replaced by North–South as the dominant axis of international conflict."

Table B.14 Mean responses to question 14

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	4.07 *[1]*	3.44 *[3]*	3.53 *[3]*
NNA	3.67 *[4]*	3.17 *[4]*	3.625 *[2]*
FYug	4.00 *[2.5]*	3.75 *[1]*	3.50 *[4]*
NSWP	3.60 *[5]*	3.67 *[2]*	3.67 *[1]*
FSU	4.00 *[2.5]*	2.71 *[5]*	3.23 *[5]*
Grand Mean	3.87	3.35	3.51
StanDev.	.2160	.4220	.1716

Question 15: "The view that East–West has been replaced by North–South as the dominant axis of international conflict, is an accurate perception."

Table B.15 Mean responses to question 15

	1993	*1997*	*1999*
NATO	2.40 *[3]*	2.59 *[2]*	2.73 *[1]*
NNA	2.83 *[1]*	2.55 *[3]*	2.50 *[2]*
FYug	2.00 *[4.5]*	3.00 *[1]*	2.00 *[5]*
NSWP	2.00 *[4.5]*	2.17 *[5]*	2.17 *[4]*
FSU	2.50 *[2]*	2.42 *[4]*	2.31 *[3]*
Grand Mean	2.35	2.55	2.34
StanDev.	.3537	.3022	.2842

Notes

1 Violent postmodern conflict: a need to go beyond symptoms

1 The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) created a system of states and norms emphasizing, among other things, sovereignty and noninterference of states in any other state's domestic affairs. It was designed to enhance order in the international system: predictability, regularity, security, and therefore, stability.

According to an introduction to an international conference commemorating the 350th anniversary of Westphalia (Westphalia, 1998, p. 3):

> The peace treaties of Westphalia (1648) brought an end to almost 150 years of continuous fighting in Europe and as such marked the end of the era of religious wars. The turning point in history was found in the mutual recognition of one another's sovereignty rights. The major European powers embraced the principle that every ruler had the right to prescribe the laws and religion of his or her subjects. Accordingly, they agreed to abstain from interfering in one another's domestic affairs. As a result, the modern state system was born.
>
> During the decolonialization process in the twentieth century the principle of sovereignty has been globalized and until now, political independence has been symbolized by the international recognition of formal sovereignty. In this respect, the UN-system is also structured by the Westphalian legacy.

2 A *major armed conflict*, according to Peter Wallensteen, is "a prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments or of one government and organized armed opposition forces, involving the use of manufactured weapons and incurring battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 persons [during the course of the conflict]" (cited in *State of World Conflict Report 1991–1992*, p. 11; also see Wallensteen and Axell, 1993).

3 This section builds on Sandole, 1999b, pp. 143–50.

4 By March 1998, following a Serbian "military campaign against ethnic Albanian rebels . . . using helicopter gunships, armored vehicles and heavy artillery to demolish villages and hunt down pro-independence leaders" (Soloway and Stephen, 1998, p. A1), "nerves rather than sabers appear[ed] to be rattling in Albania. [At the time, no refugees were] pouring into the country [one of the poorest in Europe] or into neighboring Macedonia, which has a sizable Albanian population" (Spolar, 1998c). But this could have been the lull before the storm: "Western diplomats fear[ed that] the ethnic violence [in Kosovo was] spinning out of control and risk[ed] destabilizing Albania as well as neighboring Macedonia" (Dinmore, 1998). Indeed, as of June 28, 1998 – the 609th anniversary of the fall

of Kosovo to the Ottoman Turks – ethnic Kosovar Albanians *were* pouring into Albania, while "U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, just back from a four-day trip to the region, [indicated] that 'we are only a few steps away from a general war' in Kosovo" (AP, 1998).

5 The Greek blockades of Macedonia occurred during August–December 1992 and February 1994–September 1995 (Macedonian Embassy, Washington, DC, 1996).

6 Two years later (January 1998), Greek-Turkish tensions were again high:

> Recently Greece and Turkey have engaged in provocative military maneuvers [in which] both parties violated a six-month-old moratorium on military overflights of Cyprus. More threateningly, Turkish military planes more than once buzzed the C-130 aircraft carrying the Greek defense minister.... As recently as [January 1, 1998], Greek warships reportedly challenged two Turkish cargo vessels in international waters in the Aegean Sea.
>
> (Klarevas, 1998)

And in June 1998

> Turkey sent six F-16 fighter jets to northern Cyprus today [June 18, 1998] in response to Greece's brief deployment of fighter jets to southern Cyprus, and warned Athens against attempting a military buildup on the divided island.... Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz...said the *possibility of war between Turkey and Greece* over Cyprus "largely depends on the Greek-Cypriot attitude" [emphasis added]
>
> (Couturier, 1998)

7 Misha Glenny (1995, p. 106) did not agree with the view that Kosovo could play a pivotal role in such a regional conflict expansion scenario, arguing

> during the Bush [Sr.] administration and the first half of President Clinton's term...U.S. policymakers appeared to believe that the spark that could light a wider Balkan war was not Macedonia but Kosovo. This was due in part to the misperception that irrational blood lust rather than calculated territorial expansion was the cause of the Balkan conflict.... Milosevic had no intention of opening up a southern front of military conflict on territory that the Serbs already controlled.

8 By late May 1997, however, "After years of frustrating diplomacy, Russia and Ukraine...ended their tug-of-war over the Black Sea Fleet" (Gordon, 1997). Nevertheless, at least from the point of view of Ukrainians, Russian–Ukrainian relations continue to reflect, in the words of James Mace, a "gaping, unhealed wound," the result of "Stalin's forced collectivization in the early 1930s in which millions of Ukrainians died."

> The metaphor of a gaping, unhealed wound could not be more apt for understanding the depth of pain, fear, and hatred a history of unatoned violence creates in a *victim*ized people.
>
> (Montville, 1993, pp. 112–13)

Against the background of this particular "conflict-as-startup condition," therefore, other issues could threaten to stimulate the development of a "conflict-as-process" between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

9 The 28 contributors of the 38,130 troops participating in UNPROFOR's missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia as of November 30, 1994, were (1) France [4,493]; (2) Britain [3,405]; (3) Jordan [3,367]; (4) Pakistan [3,017]; (5) Canada [2,091]; (6) Netherlands [1,803]; (7) Malaysia [1,550]; (8.5) Russian Federation [1,464]; (8.5) Turkey [1,464];* (10) Spain [1,267]; (11) Bangladesh [1,235]; (12) Denmark [1,230]; (13) Sweden [1,212]; (14) Ukraine [1,147]; (15) Poland [1,109]; (16) Belgium [1,038]; (17) Czech Republic [971]; (18) Kenya [967]; (19) Nepal [899]; (20) Argentina [854]; (21) Norway [826]; (22) United States [748]; (23) Slovak Republic [582]; (24) Finland [463]; (25) Egypt [427]; (26) New Zealand [249]; (27) Indonesia [220]; and (28) Lithuania [32].

*The arrival of the Turkish contingent in 1994 was not without controversy, in part, because, "At the peak of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish soldiers occupied parts of the Balkans for more than five centuries" (Pomfret, 1994). This may be why the Turkish contingent was numerically matched and perhaps "symbolically neutralized" by the contingent of one of Turkey's traditional enemies, the pro-Serbian Russians.

10 This raises an interesting, perhaps paradoxical issue: does intervention on behalf of an endangered minority undergoing genocidal ethnic cleansing reveal an underlying ideological bias *toward* the minority on the part of the intervener? A bias against genocide? Against the oppressor? *Does it matter, if the lives of innocents are being saved*? Contrariwise, does support of a state whose government conducts the ethnic cleansing reveal an ideological bias toward the oppressor? A bias against the minority? In favor of sovereignty? *Does it matter, if innocents are being killed*? No matter how one frames this conflict – including as one between territorial integrity (sovereignty) and self-determination – it continues to defy efforts at resolution (especially within the context of the Westphalian international system).

11 General Lebed (1996) warned that the "chances [were] rather high that the [Russian–Chechen] war may resume with fresh force and on an even larger scale." This fear was initially dampened when, on May 12, 1997, Mr. Yeltsin and his Chechen counterpart, Aslan Maskhadov, signed a peace treaty formalizing the cease fire reached some 8 months earlier, one objective being "to present a united front against rejectionists who have staged a series of bombing attacks and kidnappings." Yeltsin pledged that both parties would "reject forever the use of force or threat of force" (Hoffman, 1997). But the war did start up again, with renewed ferocity, in late September 1999, following the mysterious bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow and other cities, resulting in the deaths of some 300 people.

12 It is fairly clear, for instance, that the *second* Russian–Chechen war, which began in late September 1999, had the effect of solidifying Russians behind then prime minister (and later acting president) Vladimir Putin who seems to have used the mysterious bombings of four apartment buildings and deaths of 300 people in September to justify his campaign against the "terrorists." So successful was this (apparent) campaign that Putin was democratically elected president of the Russian Federation in March 2000 (see Hoffman, 1999; Womack, 1999; WP, 2000).

13 According to some estimates, the proportion of Russians in the Russian Federation was 82.6 percent; Kazakhstan, 38 percent; Kyrgyzstan, 21.5 percent; Ukraine, 20.3 percent; Belarus, 13.2 percent; Moldova, 12.8 percent; Turkmenistan, 12.6 percent; Uzbekistan, 10.8 percent; Tajikistan, 10.4 percent; Azerbaijan, 7.9 percent; Georgia, 7.4 percent; Armenia, 1.5 percent; and in the three Baltic states: Lithuania, 8.6 percent; Estonia, 30.3 percent; and Latvia, 33 percent (CT, 1991; Bromke, 1993, pp. 36–8; Russian Embassy, Washington, DC, 1995).

14 At his meeting at the UN on November 23, 1999, Peter Wallensteen "divided [*intra*state] conflicts into two groups: civil wars concerning the control over power in an existing state; and state formation wars involving challenges which might result in new states. The latter category, in Wallensteen's view, were those for which the international community was least prepared" (ACUNS, 2000).
15 For some historical perspective on the West, including the United States, as the perceived source of all that is evil in the world, see Buruma and Margalit (2004).
16 To put into perspective the half million tragic deaths that occurred in Rwanda in just 3 weeks, during the more than 30 years of "The Troubles" in Northern Ireland, less than 4,000 people were killed there.

2 A framework for analyzing violent postmodern conflict

1 This chapter builds on Sandole (2003a).
2 AMCPs imply violence as well as aggression. While often used interchangeably, the two terms can be distinguished analytically as follows:

- *aggression* is an attack against something or someone; while
- *violence* refers to the intensity of the attack.

Hence, an ethnic joke might be an example of extremely low-violence aggression, while genocide is clearly an example of extremely high-violence aggression.

3 Thus far, the international peacekeeping record has been much better in Bosnia than in Kosovo.
4 As we shall see in Chapter 3, the EU, in particular, has been making some interesting contributions to the further "endogenization" of the European *space*.
5 For example, members of the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit tribes of the Darfur region of western Sudan are being "killed because of the color of their skin [as] part of an officially sanctioned drive by Sudan's Arab government to purge the western Sudanese countryside of black-skinned non-Arabs" (Kristoff, 2004).
6 *Resolution* is still lagging behind military-based *management* efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo (see Smith, 2000; WP, 2002b; ICG, 2003a,b).
7 See Wallensteen (2002, ch. 8) on *regional conflict complexes*.

3 A model for responding to postmodern conflict

1 The OSCE succeeded its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on January 1, 1995. "Within the overall context of the OSCE" means within the *framework* of, but *not* subsumed (in a hierarchical relationship) to, the OSCE.
2 By January 1, 1993, NACC comprised 38 members:

   1 The 16 members of NATO (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom).
   2 The 6 Eastern European former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia).
   3 Albania.
   4 The 3 Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).
   5 Russia and the 11 remaining former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), plus,
   6 One observer: Finland (see Rotfeld, 1993, p. 177). By 1997, NACC membership climbed to 40 with the addition of Slovenia and the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, plus 4 observers with Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland joining Finland in that role (see *NATO Basic Fact Sheet Nr. 2*, 1997).

The WEU–the "European pillar" of NATO and eventual security arm of the EU (see later)–created a similar organization in 1992, the *WEU Consultative Forum*, with Central and Southeast European states. In addition to the 10 WEU members (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and 3 associate members (Iceland, Norway, and Turkey), the Consultative Forum included 10 associate partners (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and 5 observers (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) (see Walker, 1993a, pp. 50–1; Walker, 1994, pp. 48, 54; YIO, 1997/8, pp. 1656–7).

During the Cologne EU Summit in June 1999, "European leaders approved a landmark document ... that formally commit[ted] the EU to a common policy on security and defense aimed at giving it 'capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces' " (James and Schmid, 1999). By the time of the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999, the WEU had been absorbed by the EU as the basis for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana as its high representative (Fitchett, 1999; Hoagland, 1999).

3 By summer 1996, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) included the NATO 16 and 27 others, including (after months of tense delays) Russia, for a total of 43 members (see Williams, 1994; *CSCE Digest*, 1996). Among the 27 non–NATO members were the 6 Eastern European members of the former Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia); 14 former Soviet successor states (i.e., all with the exception of Tajikistan); 2 former Yugoslav republics (Macedonia and Slovenia); Albania; and 4 neutral and nonaligned (Austria, Finland, Malta, and Sweden). Malta has since withdrawn, while another member of the neutral and nonaligned, Switzerland, has joined.

By 1998, Tajikistan was a member as well, for a total of 44 PfP members: the same as the 40 members of the (now defunct) NACC and its 4 observers or, the 44 members of the EAPC which replaced the NACC in May 1997 (see *NATO Fact Sheet Nr. 9*, 1997; PfP, 1998).

And by 2002, Tajikistan dropped out but then became a member again, plus Croatia and Ireland had become members as well, bringing the total membership to 46, all of which are also members of the EAPC (see EAPC, 2003; PfP, 2002).

4 PfP activities include the Study Group on Regional Stability in Southeast Europe which, in association with the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, hosted the 5th Reichenau Workshop in Austria at which an earlier version of this chapter was presented (Sandole, 2004a) (www.pfpconsortium.org).

5 On September 8, 1995, then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, perhaps in part to defuse criticism of his policies by ultranationalists and others, condemned, in the wake of the genocidal fall of Srebrenica (Bosnia–Herzegovina), NATO's bombing of Bosnian Serb positions, even hinting that in addition to humanitarian aid for Serbian refugees from Croatia, "Russia might consider ... sending military aid if the NATO attacks continue." He also made a connection between NATO's bombing and its planned expansion up to Russia's borders, arguing that the latter "will mean a conflagration of war throughout all Europe" (see Hoffman, 1995). Further:

> In Moscow ... antagonism towards NATO's expansion [was] growing. Polish and Hungarian accession to NATO would be unwelcome but tolerated; the Baltics would be a different matter.

> Leading Russian military strategists . . . warned that Moscow could respond by repositioning tactical short-range nuclear missiles on its western borders.
>
> Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's atomic energy minister . . . even suggested bombing Czech bases if the republic becomes part of NATO's military infrastructure.
>
> (Hearst, 1996)

6 The first meeting of the EAPC took place at the Madrid NATO summit on July 9, 1997 (the same day that the NATO–Ukraine Charter was signed) with the 44 member nations discussing the role of the EAPC in conflict resolution and crisis management, and its relationships with the UN, OSCE, and NATO (see Marshall, 1997).

As mentioned earlier, "All members of PfP are also members of the [post-NACC] EAPC," the overarching framework within which PfP activities occur (see Balanzino, 1997; *NATO Fact Sheet Nr. 9*, 1997; PfP, 1998).

7 By January 1, 1995, the EEA had 18 members–the 15 EU members, plus Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein–minus Switzerland which had rejected membership through a referendum (see *Europe in Figures*, 1995, p. 24).

8 By January 1, 1995, EU membership climbed to 15 with the addition of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to then existing members Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom (*Europe in Figures*, 1995, p. 24).

9 As a reflection of, among other things, the "clash of civilizations" (see Huntington, 1993, 1996) *within* NATO:

> the EU leaders decided in Luxembourg against including [Turkey] in the expansion process . . . . Turkey, an associate member of the EU and its predecessors since 1964, [had] been seeking to join the EU for the past ten years.
>
> (*The Week in Germany*, 1997, pp. 1, 2) (also see Hockstader, 1997c; Hockstader and Couturier, 1997; IHT, 1997)

Two years later, however, at the EU Summit in Helsinki, EU leaders decided to accept Turkey as a candidate for eventual membership. But further reflective of the clash of civilizations dynamic among the Western allies:

> . . . [T]he president of the European Commission [Romano Prodi] warned that a difficult time lay ahead before the EU would be ready to admit its first *Islamic and non-European member* . . . . Some, including the president of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, expressed fears that the dramatic proposed enlargement would dilute Europe's *identity* and cohesiveness [emphasis added].
>
> (James, 1999, p. 1)

In any case

> Talks on Turkish admission [would] not even begin until 2004, to give Ankara time to settle its quarrels with Athens [in the Aegean and over Cyprus].
>
> The European leaders [also] decided to start entry talks in February [2000] with Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta. Talks [had] already begun with Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus.
>
> (Ibid., p. 5)

By October 2004, the European Commission announced that Turkey, subject to full EU approval, could start to negotiate entry into the EU. This approval was forthcoming on December 17, 2004, with talks on Turkish accession set to begin in October 2005 (Sachs, 2004).

10 Walker (1993a, p. 50) adds: "This will be true as much because of the 'socializing' effect of constant contact and co-operation among interior, justice, social affairs or other ministries, as well as those responsible for economic and foreign policy, as because of specific agreements."

11 Strictly speaking, therefore, the *Human Dimension* combines the humanitarian concerns of Basket 3 and the human rights concerns of Basket 1.

12 By 1989–90, as the Cold War was coming to an end, the CoE consisted of 23 members: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (see CoE, 1998).

By the end of 1993, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia–former adversaries of the West–had become members as well, bringing CoE membership up to 32 (ibid.). Many others had also applied, "including Russia and other member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)" (Walker, 1993a, p. 47).

By the end of 1995, the Council's membership stood at 38 countries, including Albania, Andorra, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine (see CoE, 1998).

Russia was admitted in 1996, despite its continuing brutal campaign in Chechnya, because "there was also broad consensus within the council that denying Russia membership would be a blow to the country's advocates of democracy" (*The Week in Germany*, 1996). Croatia, one of the primary combatants of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, was also admitted in 1996, bringing total CoE membership up to 40 countries (see CoE, 1998).

In 1999, Georgia was admitted and in 2001, the remaining two states of the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan-in a "cold peace" over Nagorno-Karabakh-were admitted, bringing total CoE membership up to 43 (see CoE, 2001).

By 2003, membership climbed to 45 with the addition of two other primary combatants of the Balkans Wars of the 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro (see CoE, 2003).

13 For further information about the OSCE, see the *Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2003*(OSCE, 2003).

14 A *necessary* condition is one that must be present in order for something else to occur, but its appearance does not make that "something else" occur automatically. A *sufficient* condition, on the other hand, *is* followed automatically by that *something else*.

15 On December 18, 1997, President Clinton decided to extend the US presence in Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadline for SFOR:

> With a blunt admission that he misjudged how long it would take to build *lasting peace* in Bosnia, President Clinton . . . announced that he [had] decided in principle to keep U.S. military forces there past a June 1998 deadline and *into the indefinite future*. . . . [He] said pulling out the U.S. force now would invite a return to . . . ethnic violence [emphasis added]
>
> (Harris, 1997, p. A1)

Two months later, on February 18, 1998, "NATO decided . . . to extend its military mission in Bosnia beyond June at roughly the current strength of 34,000

troops, although it may be reduced significantly after national elections there this fall" (WP, 1998a). Two days later, the "20 non-NATO countries that participate[d] in the operation [also] approved extending the force's mandate beyond its June expiration date" (WP, 1998b). (Among the non-NATO countries, PfP members included Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. Non-PfP participants were Egypt, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco [see Balanzino, 1997, p. 11].)

4 Eliciting the wisdom of CSCE/OSCE negotiators: research design

1 For further details on the development of the CSCE/OSCE, see:

1 Maresca (1985) for an insider's account of the CSCE during the Cold War.
2 Bloed (1993, 1997) for an "extensive analysis of the origin, development and basic features of the Helsinki process" from 1972 until 1995, with accompanying official documents.
3 Lucas (1990, 1993), Kemp (1996), Hopmann (1999, 2000, 2002, 2005), and Oberschmidt and Zellner (2001) for specific discussions of the role of the CSCE/OSCE during the post–Cold War period. And
4 Leatherman (2003) for an analysis of how the CSCE participating States avoided "violent confrontation, a devastating conventional war, or even a nuclear holocaust," and helped to achieve a *democratic peace* for post–Cold War Europe.

For monthly, quarterly, annual and other periodic reports on the OSCE, see the *OSCE Review: European Security* (published by the Finnish Committee for European Security [STETE]; www.stete.org; the *Helsinki Monitor: Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (published by the Netherlands Helsinki Committee [NHC]; www.nhc.nl/); the *OSCE Yearbook* (published by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Centre for OSCE Research [CORE]; www.core-hamburg.de; and documentation from the OSCE Secretariat, including the monthly *OSCE Newsletter* (later, the *OSCE Magazine*) and *Secretary-General's Annual Report* (www.osce.org).

2 I worked on the *Document of the Vienna Negotiations on CSBMs* as a member of the US Delegation to the CSBMs Negotiations, May–July 1990, in Vienna, Austria.
3 A CSCE Parliamentary Assembly was established later, in April 1991 (see *CSCE Digest*, 1991), with a secretariat in Copenhagen.
4 The "consensus-minus-one" procedure was used by the CSO at the end of the 4th CSCE review conference in Helsinki, on July 8, 1992, to "suspend the presence" of Yugoslavia (then comprising only Serbia and Montenegro) at the CSCE Summit, held July 9–10, "and [at] all CSCE meetings." The suspension lasted until November 2000, when, following the removal from power of Slobodan Milosevic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was invited to return to full OSCE participation.
5 The 3PF described in Chapter 2 could be used as a conceptual basis for framing early warnings and exploring early and subsequent actions.
6 Two of the conditions necessary for CSCE peacekeeping (which could include the "resources and possible experience and expertise of . . . the [EU], NATO and the WEU . . . [and] the peacekeeping mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]") are that "the parties directly concerned" must consent to a peacekeeping operation, and "an effective and durable cease-fire" must first be in place (*CSCE Helsinki Document 1992*, ch. III, pp. 19–20, 23).

7 Russia ratified the CFE Treaty on September 3, 1992; Armenia on October 12; Belarus on October 30; and Kazakhstan also on October 30, 1992 (Sharp, 1993, p. 592).

8 The CFE "entered into force *de jure* on 9 November 1992, when all [29] signatory states had deposited their instruments of ratification" (Walker, 1994, p. 29, fn. 20). Some 3 years later, however, problems with CFE implementation persisted:

> The November 16 [1995] deadline for full implementation of the [CFE Treaty] passed amid continuing concern over non-compliance, particularly over Russia's failure to reduce its military border strength to levels, or so-called "flank limitations," called for under the accord... [T]he issue has taken on increased significance and sensitivity since Russia launched a large-scale military campaign against separatist elements in Chechnya [in] December [1994], swelling its force levels in its southern flank and contributing to its violation.... The impasse [was] further complicated by attempts by several high-ranking Russian military officials and others to link CFE and planned NATO expansion, threatening abrogation or replacement of the treaty (McNamara, 1995).

Implementation problems were also noted for Ukraine and Belarus. For successive reviews and updates of the CFE, see CSCE Commission (1997a), Dunay and Zellner (2000), Kemp *et al.* (2000, pp. 128–30), and Rademaker (2004).

9 According to this agreement, the United States would be allowed to station 250,000 troops in Europe; Russia, 1,450,000; Ukraine, 450,000; Germany, 345,000; France, 325,000; Britain, 260,000; Poland, 234,000; Hungary, 100,000; and Czechoslovakia, 140,000 (*CSCE Helsinki '92*, 1992, p. 6. For a more comprehensive listing, see Walker, 1994, p. 157).

10 Some five months later, on May 29, 1995, the Court on Conciliation and Arbitration was established in Geneva, to settle disputes submitted to it by the (then 15) states which had ratified the Convention (*OSCE Newsletter*, 1995, p. 7).

11 Other name changes included:

1. The CSCE Council of Ministers became the Ministerial Council, the OSCE's "central decision-making and governing body [to] meet, as a rule, towards the end of every [1-year] term of chairmanship at the level of Foreign Ministers".
2. The CSO became the Senior Council, to "meet in Prague twice a year, at the minimum [to] discuss and set forth policy and broad budgetary guidelines". And
3. The Permanent Committee became the Permanent Council (PC), "the regular body for political consultation and decision-making [which meets weekly and] can also be convened for emergency purposes." The PC comprises the permanent representatives of the participating States and hence, meets in Vienna (*CSCE Budapest Document 1994*, "Budapest Decisions").

12 Former UN Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Sir Brian Urquhart (1991a), for example, argued that "National sovereignty[, which] is almost everywhere in retreat[, should] become a thing of the past."

13 For assessments of REACT and OSCE field missions in general, see Hopmann (1999, 2000, 2002, 2005).

14 As a potential expression of the OSCE's Platform for Cooperative Security, which encourages complimentarity between the OSCE and other IOs, REACT overlaps (at least conceptually) with the European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management discussed in Chapter 3.

15 For accounts of multitrack actors and processes, see Davidson and Montville (1981–2); Montville (1990); Volkan, Montville, and Julius (1991a,b);

McDonald and Bendahmane (1987); Diamond and McDonald (1996); and Reychler and Paffenholz (2001).

16 For examples of these "soft power" approaches (Nye, 2004), see Burton (1969, 1979, 1990, 1997); Burton and Dukes (1990); Deutsch (1973); Deutsch and Coleman (2000); Fisher and Keashly (1991); Fisher (1997); Kelman (1986, 1991); Miall *et al.*, 1999; Mitchell (2000); Mitchell and Banks (1996); Reychler and Paffenholz (2001).

17 Nongovernmental conflict-resolution resources include the *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management* in Berlin (see Ropers, 1995); the *Conflict Management Group* (CMG) in Cambridge, Massachusetts (which has worked with the OSCE, especially the High Commissioner on National Minorities [HCNM]. See Chigas, 1994a,b; Chigas *et al.*, 1996; CMG, 1993, 1994); the *Helsinki Citizens' Assembly* in Prague (see HCA, 1990, 1992); the *Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy* (IMTD) in Washington, DC (see Diamond and McDonald, 1996; <imtd@imtd.org>); *International Alert* in London (see IA, 1996. For an evaluation of IA's activities, see Sørbø, *et al.*, 1997); the *International Negotiation Network* (INN) of the Carter Center at Emory University in Atlanta (see *State of World Conflict Report 1991–1992*; *1995–1996*); the *Japan Center for Preventive Diplomacy* in Tokyo (see JCCP, 2002); the *National Peace Foundation* in Washington, DC (see NPF, 1997); *Partners for Democratic Change* in San Francisco and Washington, DC, which maintains centers in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, and elsewhere (see PDC, 1992; Shonholtz and Shapiro, 1997; <www.partnersglobal.org/>); and *Search for Common Ground* in Washington, DC and Brussels (see <search@sfcg.org>). For further information about nongovernmental conflict-resolution resources and their activities, see the articles in Shonholtz and Linzer (1997).

18 Sources of potentially relevant practitioners are

1. *Who's Who in Europe, in Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution*, prepared by Mehmet Gürkaynak (1993) for the European Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (ECPCR).
2. *International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution*, prepared by the Conflict Resolution Program of The Carter Center (1995).
3. *Prevention and Management of Violent Conflicts: An International Directory*, prepared by the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (1998). And
4. *Directory of Organizations for Conflict Prevention in Asia and the Pacific*, prepared by the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (2002).

19 According to Patton (1997), therefore, this project could facilitate three facets of *utilization-focused program evaluation*: (1) *Improvement*-oriented evaluation; (2) *judgment*-oriented evaluation; and (3) *knowledge*-oriented evaluation.

20 See Kaplan (1964, pp. 164–5). Also see Katz (1953, pp. 78–9).

21 This study is also a *successive cross sectional study* (see Campbell and Katona, 1953, pp. 24–5), because data have been collected from

- CSCE negotiators *2 years before* and from OSCE negotiators *2 years after* NATO and the Dayton peace process brought negative peace to Bosnia;
- from OSCE negotiators *2 years before* NATO intervention in Kosovo and immediately *after* NATO intervention in Kosovo; and
- from OSCE negotiators *2 years before* and *3 years after* 9/11.

5 CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions of select peace and security issues

1 This chapter is a revised version of Sandole (2001a).
2 Strictly speaking, the "questions" posed in this chapter are "statements," as is often the case with *closed-ended* survey items. Nevertheless, the statements are referred to here as "questions" not only because that is the traditional usage but, more importantly, I *asked* respondents to let me know how they felt about each *statement* in terms of the following scheme: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Mixed Feelings (MF), Disagree (D), or Strongly Disagree (SD)?
3 The 15 closed-ended questions and results specific to each are presented in Appendix B.
4 Whenever a researcher talks about the *micro* (or "disaggregated") level – in our case, the five groupings of CSCE/OSCE membership *taken individually* – on the basis of *macro* (or "aggregated") data – that is, our *grand means* across the five groupings *taken together* – then there may be some probability that the *ecological fallacy* has been committed (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 54–5). This fallacy would occur in our case if I assumed, *erroneously*, that shifts in the *grand means* corresponded to shifts in the *individual means*. This may, indeed, be the case in our study, but only for question numbers 5 and 10 for 1993–7 where, for each question, three of the five *individual means decreased*, while the *grand mean increased*, from 1993 to 1997.
5 This overall trend continued during the closing days of the Clinton presidency, with the apparent NATO–FSU *togetherness* in response to President Clinton's decision not to deploy a contentious missile defense system (see Dodds, 2000).
6 As I have discussed elsewhere (Sandole, 1999b, ch. 8), such *"complexity"* is not about *Realpolitik or Idealpolitik*, but about *both*.

6 CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions of causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s

1 This chapter builds on a paper presented at the 42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), in Chicago, Illinois, February 20–24, 2001: "'Clashes of Civilizations' and Other Possible Influences on Ethnic Warfare in Former Yugoslavia: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997."
2 See the "academic" studies conducted, for example, by Richardson, 1939, 1960a,b; Sandole, 1999b, 2002c, 2004b; Sandole *et al.*, 2004; Vasquez, 1993, 2000; and Wright, 1964.
3 On the issue of communication challenges between academics and policy makers, see O'Leary *et al.* (1974). Leatherman and Väyrynen (1995, p. 54) argue that there is a gap, not only "between academics and national foreign policy-makers, but also between academics and international civil servants, diplomats and other international policy-makers involved in multilateral decision-making" (see Sandole, 1999b, p. 191).
4 Huntington's first published work on his "civilizational paradigm" appeared in the 1993 summer issue of *Foreign Affairs*.
5 The responses indicative of the various themes in each of the tables in this report are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as interviewees' responses to the questions often revealed more than one theme.
6 In this regard, John Vasquez (1993, p. 125) has argued that, "of all the possible issues that could end in war, issues involving territorial contiguity are indeed the

most war prone." On the basis of further studies, however, he later stated: "In light of these findings, it should come as no surprise that wars that are fought are frequently over territorial disputes" (whether or not the parties are neighbors) (Vasquez, 2000, p. 338). Hence, "territory rather than contiguity [especially territorial disputes that involve "disagreements over *ethnic* issues"] seems to be the more important underlying factor associated with war" (emphasis added) (ibid., p. 339).

7 Due to time constraints, one NATO respondent could not complete the interview, leaving unanswered the two questions examined here. This reduced the number of NATO respondents from 16 to 15. This led, in turn, to a reduction in the overall sample of OSCE representatives from 47 to 46 and, given the five members of the OSCE Secretariat included for 1997, a reduction in the total sample size from 52 to 51.

8 As noted elsewhere in this volume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau has commented that, "Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (see Waltz, 1959, p. 232). Such a mechanism-deficit reflects Anatol Rapoport's (1974, p. 175) concept of " 'exogenous' conflict environments," where there are few if any "mechanisms for . . . controlling or resolving conflict."

9 Due to lack of time, one representative of the NNA states was unable to respond to these questions, thereby reducing the overall sample size from 47 to 46.

10 For some sense of the debate surrounding Huntington's *civilizational thesis*, see CFR (1993) and Barber (1997/8).

11 This certainly "triangulates" with the observation in Chapter 5 that CSCE/OSCE respondents perceived ethnic conflicts to be a continuing threat to peace and security in Europe for some time to come (*Q.1*).

12 Again, some responses to the question were revealing of more than one theme; hence, the four ranked groupings of responses here are not necessarily reflective of mutually exclusive subsamples of respondents.

13 As one travels through Bosnia-Herzegovina today, for example, from Sarajevo to Bihac, the northern-most Muslim-held town, one sees newly constructed mosques in the midst of destroyed houses, neighborhoods, and cars. And in Sarajevo itself, where the people of the city regularly take evening strolls fashionably dressed, one sees more young girls with head covering than before the warfare of the 1990s.

14 See Note 12.

15 Four respondents in 1997 – 3 NATO and 1 NNA – referred to Huntington by name, all in *disagreement* with his *civilizational thesis*: it was for them, *nonsense*! On the other hand, one NNA respondent mentioned the *clash of civilizations*, with which he *agreed*, but in terms of the Orthodox–Catholic, instead of the Islam–Christianity, split.

7 CSCE/OSCE negotiators' perceptions of *lessons learned* from the Balkan wars of the 1990s

1 That the wars in former Yugoslavia could stimulate wars elsewhere (e.g., in the former Soviet Union) is an example of one of the three types of spillover discussed in Chapter 1: *multiplier-effect systemic contagion*.

2 Two respondents did not complete this question, thereby reducing the total number to 45 participants.

3 Six participants did not respond to this question, thereby reducing the overall number to 41 respondents.

4 Three participants did not respond to this question, thereby reducing the overall number to 44.

5 In this connection, see the comments by former OSCE Secretary-General Giancarlo Aragona in *OSCE Review* (1998).
6 One possible hint of this early on was President Clinton's comment:

> that U.S. ground troops should participate in a NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo to give the warring sides "the confidence to lay down their arms." "Bosnia taught us a *lesson*," Clinton said in his weekly radio address, referring to the estimated quarter-million people killed in [Bosnia] before NATO peacekeepers intervened. "If we wait until casualties mount and war spreads, any effort to stop it will come at a higher price under more dangerous conditions" [emphasis added]
>
> (Priest, 1999, p. A1)

9 After 9/11: peace and security issues revisited

1 I was actually able to do more in 2004 than I was in 1993, 1997, or 1999, as, for the 2004 survey, I was able to establish initial contact, and to maintain contact, with OSCE delegations in Vienna through the Internet.
2 In keeping with my practice of maintaining consistency of OSCE group membership across the four time periods, Finland remained in the NNA category even though it is an EU member, while Bulgaria and the Czech Republic remained in the NSWP category even though they are NATO members and one of them, the Czech Republic, is also in the EU.
3 Some respondents distinguished between OSCE area [Disagree] and globally [Agree], or between the Balkans [Agree] and the FSU [Strongly Agree].
4 Again, the higher the standard deviation the lower the consensus; conversely, the lower the standard deviation the higher the consensus.
5 The difference between the two questions is that, for question number 8, we are asking whether there is a need to deal with underlying issues when we are forcibly separating parties. By contrast, for question number 9, we are asking whether, if we do not deal with those underlying issues, force by itself will lead to a resolution of the conflict.

Appendix A: research designs for 1993, 1997, and 1999

1 In the course of conducting interviews in Vienna, I was often reminded that my brief tenure as a diplomat during spring/summer 1990 had facilitated my subsequent entree to otherwise busy delegations in Vienna. Hence, I was always mindful to mention to potential interviewees my relevant experience and status as recipient of the various awards that brought me back to Vienna on four occasions.
2 Germany, Italy, and the United States each made two representatives available for interview. Among the remaining states in the sample, one representative from each was interviewed. Hence, 29 CSCE states in the sample plus 3 additional interviewees = a total of 32 interviewees. Twenty-three of these (72 percent) were heads of delegation (Sandole, 1995a, p. 136 [fn. 12]). Because three of the respondents did not answer the question dealing with the causes and conditions of the Yugoslav wars, this reduced the total sample size for this question for 1993 from 32 to 29.
3 Although a member of the CSCE, the "rump" Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro) was banned from attending all meetings of the CSCE at the end of the 4th CSCE review conference in Helsinki, on July 8, 1992, because of its

(particularly Serbia's) responsibility for fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia.

4 The remaining successor republic of the former Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although not yet a member of the CSCE, had "observer" status by the summer of 1993.

5 Many of the successor states of the former Soviet Union either did not have CSCE delegations in Vienna by summer 1993, or if they did, they were usually "one-man shows" representing their governments at various levels (e.g., to the State of Austria and the United Nations in Vienna as well as to the CSCE) and, therefore, their representatives were generally unavailable for interview. This was also the case with other CSCE participating states that were either not represented in Vienna (e.g., Malta) or, if they were, their busy representatives were not available for interview (e.g., Albania). (Albania, incidentally, does not belong to any of the five main groupings.)

6 All interviews were conducted in English. With the exception of the American, British, and Canadian representatives, for whom English was [one of] their mother tongue[s], the other representatives spoke English as *one* of their foreign languages. Some of these individuals requested additional information "in English" for a particular question to be made clearer to them. On the assumption that this provision of additional information on an *ad hoc* basis could have contaminated and undermined the *comparability* of responses between individuals to the same item, as partial checks interviewees were invited to explain their SA–SD answers in an open-ended fashion – "in the margin," so to speak – as well as to respond to the 12 open-ended questions, many of which overlapped with the closed-ended ones.

7 The FRY remained banned from attending all meetings of the OSCE because of its (particularly Serbia's) role in fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia: a situation which continued with the brutal Serbian repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

8 I interviewed one person from each participating State in the overall sample, with the exception that the US delegation had two persons available for interview (hence, 47 persons from 46 participating States). Thirty-seven (79 percent) of the interviewees were heads of delegation. *Two persons in the 1997 sample were present in the 1993 sample.*

9 As in 1993, I was unable to reach certain participating States, either because they were not represented in Vienna (e.g., Andorra, the newest OSCE member) or if they were, were represented by busy delegations (e.g., Kazakhstan). I succeeded in contacting some delegations, even talking with their ambassadors, but for a variety of reasons, was unable to conduct interviews (e.g., Albania, Tajikistan). (Andorra, like Albania, is not a member of any of the five main groupings.)

10 The FRY still remained banned from attending all meetings of the OSCE because of its (particularly Serbia's) role in fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia: a situation which, again, continued with the brutal Serbian repression of Kosovar Albanians. The situation only changed when, following the toppling of Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic from power in October 2000, the FRY was allowed, on November 10, 2000, to occupy the seat previously held at the OSCE by the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (see *OSCE Newsletter*, 2000b).

11 Although the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had been admitted to NATO in April 1999, for purposes of comparison with the observations generated by the 1993 and 1997 surveys, I retained them in the NSWP category.

12 I interviewed one person from each participating State in the overall sample (hence, 47 persons from 47 participating States). Thirty-eight (81 percent) of the interviewees were heads of delegation. *Nineteen (19) persons in the 1999 sample (40 percent) were present in the 1997 sample*.

13 As in 1993 and 1997, I was unable to reach certain participating States, either because they were not represented in Vienna (e.g., Andorra and Iceland) or if they were, were represented by busy delegations (e.g., Belarus).

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