
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Visions of Peace of Professional Peace Workers
The Peaces We Build
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Gijsbert M. van Iterson Scholten

Visions of Peace of Professional Peace Workers

The Peaces We Build

palgrave
macmillan

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This book is dedicated to my grandmother,
who spent her life fighting for peace (and related issues),
to my father, who knew the meaning of tevredenheid,
and to my children, in the hope that they will grow up in a
more peaceful world (whatever that may mean).

Preface

The subtitle of this book is *The peaces we build*. It deals with peaces (in the plural), as things that can be and are being built. Amongst others by the professional peace workers that are the subject of this study. Why then call it the peaces *we* build? Who is this we? There are three possible answers to this question, all of them correct. First, 'we' refers to a community of peace workers that I still consider myself to be a part of. This study grew out of my own professional engagement with peace work, and my wondering what kind of peace 'we', my colleagues and I, were building. Secondly, it refers to the academic community of peace scholars, another community to which I feel I belong. Although academics might not build peace in the real world, they do construct various concepts of peace in their writings. This study is a contribution to those constructs, linking them more firmly to what practitioners think important about peace. Finally, 'we' can be read as an invitation to the reader to think of him- or herself as part of a team that is on a joint mission: increasing our understanding of what peace means. For this reason, I will also use 'we' in the text, when taking the reader by the hand and leading him, her, leading you, through the philosophical maze that is so easily referred to as peace. I sincerely hope you will enjoy the tour.

Amsterdam, The Netherlands Gijsbert M. van Iterson Scholten

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

I was working for peace before I knew it had a name. It was just a work to make things fair, to make things just. But then all of a sudden I was a peaceworker, or a peace 'advocate'. And now everyone comes up with their own definitions of peace. And then they argue over them.
(Interview Aveen Acuña-Gulo (independent peacebuilding consultant, Mindanao))

There have always been people, like the Filipino peace advocate quoted above, working 'for peace', without giving it much thought.[1] Some incidentally: participating in a rally, signing a petition or, in our present media age, expressing solidarity with the victims of armed conflict through social media. Others are more structurally engaged, including many who could be called professional peace workers. They work for civil society organizations (CSOs), for intergovernmental organizations or for national governments, either as civil servants or—though some other peace workers might dispute this—as members of the armed forces.

With this professional engagement, a new set of questions arises. The question is no longer simply what one can do to 'make things fair', but

[1] For a historical perspective on peace work see, e.g. (Adolf 2009; Cortright 2008; Nicholls 1991).

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rather what should be the mission of my organization, how can we most effectively contribute to peace and how do we delimit our activities from what other actors do? Demonstrating against an imminent war or signing a petition not to sell arms to a country engaged in civil war are small but undeniable acts of peace. But what about projects aimed at spreading awareness of human rights? Projects supporting sustainable development? Environmental awareness programmes? Calling for humanitarian intervention? Organizing or supervising elections? Organizing elections in which nationalist or fundamentalist candidates are also allowed to run? The lines between working for peace and working for development, human rights or even against peace can become blurred.

In a case study of Nicaraguan peace commissions, French peace researcher Cécile Mouly describes how they changed their activities from the protection of civilians during the war to disarmament and demobilization after the signing of a peace agreement, then to human rights and conflict resolution workshops, and finally to development activities and environmental protection, all still under the heading of working 'for peace' (Mouly 2013: 51–55).

In itself, the question whether or not these activities contribute to 'peace' might seem rather academic. There is an apparent demand for those activities, and the 'peace commissions' are just organizations that are there and can meet that demand. Why should we care whether what they do is called peace work, development work or simply 'work'?

There are three reasons we should. First of all, the very tactic of shifting the focus of one's activities leads to complaints that CSOs are donor-driven, opportunistic or part of a 'peacebuilding industry' that merely serves its own interest, rather than contributing to peace (Zaidi 1999: 263; Fisher and Zimina 2008; Jad 2007: 628). The strongest version of this critique is that 'peacebuilding does not build peace' (Denskus 2007). Whether or not this is true, partly depends on what exactly one means by 'peace'. If peace includes living in harmony with the natural environment,[2] working on environmental protection is definitely a contribution to peace.[3] This means that for their own legitimacy organizations will need to develop some vision on the kind of peace they are working on and how their activities contribute to that.

[2] We will see in Chap. 8 that for some people, it does.

[3] It might even gain you a Nobel Peace Prize, as the 2004 and 2007 winners of that prize can attest.

Secondly, different organizations, but also different kinds of peacebuilders (e.g. local and international ones) sometimes have to cooperate to achieve their long-term goals (i.e. peace). Lacking a shared vision on what constitutes peace, or, perhaps even worse, failing to have an open discussion on what they think constitutes peace and thus assuming that the other has a similar vision, makes this cooperation much more difficult. From my own experience as a civil society peace worker, I noticed how difficult it was to cooperate with other Dutch CSOs working on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Half of them did not agree with the visions of peace of the other half, and accusations of 'legitimizing the occupation' or 'funding terrorist organizations' were a regular part of the discussions. Similar problems of working on different goals might occur when pursuing a 'comprehensive approach' in peacebuilding missions, where national armies have to cooperate with diplomats and local or international CSOs (see e.g. De Coning and Friis 2011; van der Lijn 2015).

Finally, there are calls to improve the effectiveness of peace work (Fortna 2008; Anderson and Olson 2003: 8–10; Paris 2004; Tardy 2017; Diehl and Druckman 2010). However, as the introduction to a practitioners' evaluation of civil society peacebuilding efforts points out, 'to talk about improving effectiveness, we need first to know where we want to get' (Anderson and Olson 2003: 11). Different definitions of what peace is will lead to different evaluations of the success of (international) efforts to promote it (Newman 2009: 27; see also Paris 2010: 247). By explicitly researching where peace workers 'want to get', as this study aims to do, the literature evaluating their efforts stands to gain a much more nuanced set of concepts to judge various kinds of peacebuilding by their own standards.

The topic of 'where we want to get', or what the different visions of peace are that professional peace workers subscribe to, is an understudied area in peace studies. Although it is widely recognized that peace means different things to different people, often only very little attention is given to the exact nature of the differences. For instance, in Thania Paffenholz's seminal edited volume on civil society and peacebuilding (Paffenholz 2010), almost every case study mentions that different actors in the case have a different idea of what constitutes peace. However, only a few of the studies go into any detail about what these differences exactly are (Kurtenbach 2010: 88; Belloni 2010: 109; Belloni and Hemmer 2010: 134; Çelik 2010: 155–156; Çuhadar and Kotelis 2010: 183; Çuhadar and

Hanafi 2010: 209; Borchgrevink and Harpviken 2010: 238; Orjuela 2010: 297–298).

Not that the academic community is not interested in peace 'as a phenomenon in and of itself' (Rasmussen 2010: 177). Recent years have seen an increase in attention for peace that is more than just the absence of violent conflict (e.g. Höglund and Kovacs 2010; Kühn 2012; Regan 2014; Diehl 2016). This renewed interest in what Johan Galtung once labelled 'positive peace' (Galtung 1964, 1969) has enriched the academic literature on peace with concepts like 'liberal peace' (Richmond 2006) 'hybrid peace' (Mac Ginty 2011) 'post-liberal peace' (Richmond 2011) 'quality peace' (Wallensteen 2015a) 'agonistic peace' (Shinko 2008; Aggestam et al. 2015) 'everyday peace' (Mac Ginty 2014; Berents and McEvoy-Levy 2015; Firchow 2018) and, most recently, 'sustaining peace' (De Coning 2018b; Tschirgi and De Coning 2018; Advisory Group of Experts 2015; Mahmoud and Makoond 2017).

All of these concepts somehow try to convey the message that 'peace' is not one single self-evident objective, but that it needs some qualification. Even though it is a word that does not have a plural (though Dietrich and Sützl 1997: argue that it should), apparently there are many kinds of peace that national and international actors (try to) bring about. The ensuing academic debate is mostly concerned with which of these concepts is best suited to describe the situation in 'post-conflict' countries.[4] None of these concepts is entirely without merit, but it is not always clear how they relate to peacebuilding practice and the self-images of peace workers, either in conflict areas or in the global West. Various authors have, for example, pointed out that the concept of liberal peace might be no more than a 'fictional policy narrative' created by critical academics but bearing little relation to actual policy practice (Chandler 2010: 138; Selby 2013: 58–59; Heathershaw 2013: 275–276).[5]

[4] A label that in itself is also deemed problematic by some authors, since it is not the conflict that is over, but rather the violent expression of that conflict (see, e.g. Cramer 2006; Klem 2018). However, it is still widely applied, though sometimes with a set of scare quotes around it. See, e.g. (Autesserre 2010: 65–68; and Junne and Verkoren 2005: 1). I will follow that common usage, but bracket the (post-) to accommodate this particular critique.

[5] The term 'global West' is used to label the group of mostly European and North American countries alternatively known as the global North or (especially in older publications) the 'First World'. For an eloquent defence of why these countries should be called 'the West', see (Rasmussen 2003).

This study seeks to explicitly make that connection. Rather than adding yet another qualified concept of peace to the academic debate, it inductively explores the concepts, or visions, of peace that professional peace workers themselves say they are working on. Studying these peace*s* adds an empirical dimension to the, often rather normative, debates on what constitutes peace and thus whether or not (international) peacebuilding efforts have been successful. Moreover, by explicitly conceptualizing peace in the plural and designing a conceptual framework to compare different visions of peace, we gain an understanding of where different (groups of) actors differ in their visions of the peaces they build.

Much of the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding seems to assume that different (groups of) peace workers have a different vision of what constitutes peace. Otherwise, why would there be 'friction'[6] or 'hybridity',[7] even amongst peace workers? As we will see in Chap. 2, the present debates on this topic focus primarily on the interactions and power (in)balances between different groups, rather than the content of what they want to achieve (see e.g. Mac Ginty 2010; Millar et al. 2013; Belloni 2012; Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012b; Richmond and Mitchell 2012). This study aims to redress that lacuna.

If we move from visions to the people holding those visions, the literature suggests two things. First, that there is a broad consensus amongst Western peace workers that what they should try to establish in conflict-affected areas is a so-called 'liberal peace' (see a.o. Paris 2004; Richmond 2005; Heathershaw 2008; Newman 2009; Tadjbakhsh 2011; Cooper et al. 2011). We will see in the next chapter what this liberal peace is supposed to entail, but its basic formulation is that peace is best served by a combination of democracy and free-market capitalism (Paris 2004: 5). The point here is not whether this is a correct interpretation of the liberal peace, but that rather than taking the idea that there is a liberal peace consensus for granted, we should empirically investigate this claim by studying different groups of Western peace workers. This study looks into the visions of peace of three of those: diplomats, military officers and civil society peace workers, all from the same Western country: the Netherlands. These groups were chosen because they are the primary actors involved in

[6] A process of conflictual encounters that produces 'new power relations, agencies, ideas and practices' (Björkdahl and Höglund 2013: 292).

[7] Mutual adaptation based on continuous processes of (intercultural) interaction (Mac Ginty 2010: 396–398).

(international) peacebuilding. Occasionally others might also be engaged in peacebuilding—like politicians leading high-level peace negotiations, police officers engaged in training national police forces or teachers teaching a curriculum that includes peace education. However, their involvement is often incidental rather than structural and their efforts to build peace are only a small part of what they do. This is different for the three groups under investigation, that can truly be called *professional* peace workers, in the sense that they have made working for peace their profession. If there is a liberal peace consensus, these professionals ought to take part in it.

The Netherlands is an interesting country to study because it is an internationally active, middle-sized power with a long history of international involvement in peace work, going back all the way to the Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907. It has a constitutional mandate to promote the international rule of law, is globally engaged in peace missions with all branches of its armed forces[8] and plays an active role in global governance institutions and high level policy discussions. The Netherlands is also home to a large range of peace organizations, including the century old International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), the international secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and PAX, one of the largest branches of Pax Christi International. Interestingly though, the Netherlands hardly features in the peacebuilding literature at all. Most studies focus on Anglo-Saxon actors, in particular Americans. This is understandable, given the large role these countries play in international peacebuilding, but it also means that peace workers from other countries are relatively underresearched. So although Dutch peace workers might not be representative of Western peace workers more broadly, studying the differences in their visions adds valuable insights for a more empirical approach to the liberal peace debates, as will be argued below and in Chap. 2.

The second thing the literature on peacebuilding suggests, is that there is a sharp divide between what local peace workers in conflict-affected countries want and what actors from the global West are 'imposing' on them (see a.o. Mac Ginty 2008; Pugh et al. 2008; Taylor 2009; Tadjbakhsh 2011; Jabri 2013). Also here, we will empirically investigate this claim, by

[8] At the time this book was written in Mali (MINUSMA), Lebanon, Syria and Israel (UNTSO and UNDOF), Kosovo (EULEX) and South Sudan (UNMISS). See https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/missies/inhoud/huidige-missies.

asking the question whether, and if so, how, the visions of local peace workers from two (post-) conflict areas: Lebanon and Mindanao, are different from the visions of international (that is: Dutch) peace workers. Also here, neither Lebanon nor Mindanao is supposed to be representative of a broader range of (post-) conflict areas, but by studying the visions of peace of civil society peace workers from these two rather different contexts and comparing them to the visions of peace workers from a Western country, we will at least get an empirical insight into how these visions differ from one another.

Lebanon and Mindanao were chosen as case studies based on four criteria: they should be home to a relatively large and diverse group of peace workers; have at least some experience with international peacebuilding efforts; be different from one another; and experience at least a minimal amount of negative peace. The first criterion is important because we are looking for different visions of peace. The more diverse the group of respondents within a country, the greater the odds of finding such differences. The second—having at least some experience with international peacebuilding—is important because this study seeks to understand the kind of peace that international actors build and how this relates to the peaces that national peace workers want to create. Without any international peacebuilding efforts, it would be very hard to draw out these differences. On the other hand, if a country has been 'swamped' by international peace workers (as for instance Kosovo or Bosnia has been) there is a real risk that local peace workers will have adapted their visions entirely to the demands of peacebuilding donors (Chandler 1999; Belloni and Hemmer 2010; Menkhaus et al. 2010).

The third criterion—that cases should be different from one another—relates to both their conflict dynamics and their general cultural environment. The underlying concern is again the quest for diversity. Not only amongst the peace workers within each case, but also between the cases. Finally, the cases should experience a minimal amount of (negative) peace. This is important because we are interested in visions of positive, substantive peace. Although it might be possible to work on such a peace even in the midst of war, the chances are that in a situation of ongoing armed conflict, most peace workers will focus on establishing negative peace: ending immediate physical violence.[9] This is understandable, but makes

[9] Think for example of the Nicaraguan peace commissions mentioned earlier and in (Mouly 2013).

the chances of finding more substantive positive visions of peace smaller than in cases where the armed conflict has ended.

If we look at the two (post-)conflict cases selected, they score high on each of these criteria. Lebanon has a large and vibrant civil society, at least part of which is working for peace.[10] It is home to the region's first University for Non-violence and, since the outbreak of the war in Syria, to many Syrian aid organizations in exile. With regards to international peace work, Lebanon is host to a longstanding UN peacekeeping mission (UNIFIL), as well as regional branches of many international NGOs and NGO networks working on peace, like the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), GPACC, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Pax Christi International and the Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst (ZFD). The civil war that ravaged the country was formally ended in 1990, after the signing of a power-sharing agreement known as the National Reconciliation Accord or Taif Agreement. All but one of the ethnic militias[11] were disbanded in 1991, elections took place in 1992 and the Syrian army retreated from the country in 2005 after a mostly non-violent 'Cedar revolution'. In 2006 the south of the country was invaded by neighbouring Israel, which is still officially at war with Lebanon. Thus, even though Lebanon does not presently register as a country experiencing armed conflict (Allansson et al. 2017), it can still be described as being in a situation of 'no war, no peace' (Mac Ginty 2006: 3), in which various kinds of peace work are highly relevant. The objective of this study is to find out which peaces are being served with this work.

Large scale violence on Mindanao has ended much more recently.[12] Being located at the other end of the world, Mindanao is culturally rather different from Lebanon. The character of the armed conflict(s) the country has experienced is different as well. The Lebanese civil war was basically a struggle for power between the different ethnic/religious groups

[10] A recent report mentions 8.311 registered civil society organizations, 1.3 per 1000 inhabitants (Lteif 2015: 7). Not all of these are working for peace, but it shows the vibrancy of Lebanese civil society. For a partial overview of Lebanese civil society organizations, see also the portal *Daleel Madani* on http://daleel-madani.org/directory, which lists 22 organizations working for 'peace and security' (last accessed March 23, 2017).

[11] The exception is Hizbollah, the powerful Shia militia that claims to be fighting an external enemy (Israel) rather than an internal one.

[12] And flared up again in May 2017 when a hitherto largely unknown new rebel group seized control over parts of the town of Marawi, leading to a renewed declaration of martial law on Mindanao.

that make up the country, where each side was supported by different neighbouring countries.[13] The armed struggle on Mindanao has mostly been a struggle for independence by one ethnic group: the Moros. Over the past 40 years various rebel movements have fought for independence from the Republic of the Philippines.[14] Although peace agreements have been signed with the most prominent of these movements, break-away factions and new contenders have taken their place, leading the government of the Philippines in 2017 to once again declare martial law on the island. Thus, Mindanao is more an example of a country 'in transition' than Lebanon. If civil society visions of peace do indeed change over time, as Mouly (2013) suggests, we ought to find differences between the two cases, unless such change is entirely context-dependent.

If differences are found, either between different groups of peaceworkers or between people from different countries, the question is how to interpret those differences, especially with regards to the effect they have on the possibilities for cooperation or conflict between different peace workers. There are three options. First of all, the different peaces might complement and reinforce one another. If this is the case, it could be argued that there is a division of tasks between different groups of peace workers, where each deals with a separate (aspect of) peace. This is, e.g., the idea behind the comprehensive approach in military peace building, where the military deal with security issues, diplomats deal with negotiation and the building of political institutions and civil society actors deal with development (van der Lijn 2015). Secondly, the differences in visions might lead to tensions and friction between different groups of peace workers. This can be both the case for Western and non-Western actors, but also, for instance, when civil society peace workers feel they have to contribute to their (state) donors' goals, rather than having the freedom to work on their own. Finally, differences might indicate a 'blind spot' on the part of (a group of) actors. Rather than being indicative of a division of tasks (complementarity) or a potential source of friction, peace workers might simply not know (or not care) that others have a different vision of peace.

Special attention is given throughout the book to the role of civil society peace workers. Western civil society organizations often claim that they are uniquely suited (and needed) to act as a 'bridge' between their local

[13] More on the history of the conflict in Lebanon can be found in Chap. 7, Sect. 7.1.
[14] More on the history of the conflict on Mindanao can be found in Chap. 8, Sect. 8.1.

counterparts in conflict-affected areas and international policy-making circles. Others, however, contend that Western NGOs are part of an international system of governance, more aligned to the demands of their (state) donors than of the people they aim to serve (Richmond 2005: 130).[15] One way of approaching this question is to look at whether Western civil society peace workers' visions of peace are more like those of local civil society peace workers in (post-)conflict areas, or more like those of Western governmental actors.

1.1 The Peace Cube

If we want to *systematically* compare the differences between the visions of peace of different groups of peace workers, we need more than just information on these visions. We also need a conceptual framework that allows us to interpret the differences between these visions. In line with this book's overall inductive approach, the conceptual framework used to compare the visions is also arrived at inductively. In Chap. 2, seven dimensions along which academic concepts of peace differ from each other are identified. These are (1) the scope of a concept (whether it is a narrow or a more holistic vision of peace); (2) its time-frame (whether the vision is of peace as a short-term or long-term objective); (3) its ontological status (a goal or a process); (4) the level at which peace is operative (individual, community, national or international); (5) the domain in which peace is located (e.g. whether it is a political, economic or psychological phenomenon); (6) the values that peace is supposed to embody (e.g. order, justice or harmony) and (7) whether peace is embedded in individuals or in institutions.

Then, in Chap. 3, these seven dimensions are mapped onto a first set of operational visions that came out of a Q study with representatives from all the groups of peace workers under study.[16] The differences between these visions were used to establish which of the seven dimensions 'do most of the work' in explaining the differences between operational—rather than academic—visions of peace. The dimensions of scope, embedding in individuals or institutions, and ontology were found to be relevant, as well as a fourth dimension that distinguishes political from personal

[15] There is a similar debate about the role of NGOs in development more generally. See, e.g. (Banks et al. 2015; Heiss and Kelley 2017).

[16] See Sect. 1.2 below for a description of Q methodology.



Fig. 1.1 Four-dimensional conceptual model of peace workers' operational visions of peace

visions of peace. The resulting conceptual model is graphically depicted below as a 'peace cube' (Fig. 1.1). It will be discussed in greater detail in Chap. 3, but it shows that the operational visions of peace workers differ along four dimensions. First, peace is thought of as either a goal or a (continuous) process. Second, peace can be envisioned as a political or a personal concern. Third, peace is sought either in individuals or in institutions. Finally, visions of peace differ in their scope: how large (or holistic) peace is considered to be. Using this graphic model, different visions of peace can be plotted as 'boxes' within the peace cube. The position of the box says something about the first three dimensions, its size something about the dimension of scope.

The added value of having such a four-dimensional conceptual model, rather than for instance an (implicitly) dichotomous model such as that proposed by the literature on hybrid peace and/or friction in global/local encounters (Mac Ginty 2010; Boege 2012; Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012b; Peterson 2012; Björkdahl and Höglund 2013; Millar 2014) will become clear once we see the diversity of visions held by professional peace workers in the coming chapters. In general terms, however, the model allows us to do two things. First, to empirically investigate *varieties* of peace (Dietrich and Sützl 1997; Höglund and Kovacs 2010) rather than presupposing (or imposing?) a single concept of peace as driving the

actions of peacebuilders on the ground. Second, the model makes it possible to compare and contrast the views of different groups of peaceworkers (co)operating in a single (post-) conflict area. This makes it a useful theoretical tool for future case studies of joint civil-military, integrated, comprehensive or 3-D approaches, as well as for evaluations of local-international partnerships. Both of these points will be further elaborated in the conclusion (Chap. 9).

1.2 A Brief Note on Methodology

In order to answer the questions above, this study uses an inductive comparative research design with five case studies, as depicted graphically in Fig. 1.2. The design is inductive, because we are interested in the operational visions that peace workers themselves espouse. It is comparative, because we want to know whether different groups of peace workers have different visions. In practice, the design means that the visions described in Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were distilled from a total of 188 interviews with 156 different peace workers.[17] All peace workers were selected using network (or 'snowball') sampling. Maximum diversity was sought amongst the interviewees, both in demographic variables such as age, gender, educational background and amount of experience in peace work and in their



Fig. 1.2 Five cases of peace workers, differing along geographical (vertical) and professional (horizontal) lines

[17] Full details on the interviewees can be found in Appendix A.

organizational background. A full list of interviewees and their professional affiliations can be found in Appendix A.

The reason there are more interviews than peace workers is that two different methods were used to collect the data on which this study is built: semi-structured interviews and Q. For readers unfamiliar with Q methodology, I will briefly outline its main features as well as the advantages and disadvantages of using it—compared to relying on regular interviews. Readers less interested in methodology can skip this section and move straight on to Chap. 2.

Q methodology was designed to identify clusters of 'operant subjectivity': subjective opinions on a topic that are clustered based on 'functional rather than merely logical distinctions' (Brown 1993: 97).[18] In plain English: a Q study captures the opinions that individuals have about a certain topic—in this case their visions of peace—and clusters them based on similarities in what they say about it. The first is done by having people sort a set of statements on the topic, the second by applying factor analysis on their sorts. The resulting factors each represent a particular vision of peace. Data from post-sorting interviews is then used to interpret these visions. Q originated as a method in social psychology (Stephenson 1953), and was adapted for political science research in the 1980s (Brown 1980). It has been hailed for 'improving the understanding of human perspectives' (Zabala and Pascual 2016) and has recently been proposed as an alternative to doing survey research in, amongst others, EU studies (O'Connor 2013), environmental policy studies (Howard et al. 2016; Pagnussatt et al. 2018) and NGO policy advocacy (Gen and Wright 2018).

The major distinction between Q and conventional factor analysis is that a Q study reveals the correlation between viewpoints, instead of the correlation between people holding these points of view. A Q study does not reveal 'what kind of people' have certain (pre-defined) visions of peace, but what visions of peace can be distinguished amongst a certain group of people (Van Exel and de Graaf 2005: 1). Given the purpose of this book to inductively identify visions of peace, this is an obvious advantage of the method.

In the Q study, respondents were asked to rank-order a series of statements (a Q set) according to how closely the statement describes the peace they consider themselves to be working on. These statements were selected

[18] *Operant subjectivity* is also the name of the primary journal devoted to reporting the outcomes and discussing the finesses of Q studies.



Fig. 1.3 Q sort: a Q score sheet with cards distributed on it

from a larger sample (called a concourse in Q research) that was based mostly on semi-structured interviews previously held with peace workers—both Western and peace workers from conflict areas. Statements were laid out on a score sheet with a suggested normal distribution ranging from +5 (fits most closely to my idea of peace) to −5 (fits least to my idea of peace), as shown in Fig. 1.3. The resulting distribution is called a Q sort. In a post-sorting interview respondents were then asked to elaborate on their Q sort, explaining why they particularly agree or disagree with a statement.

Next, the Q sorts of all respondents were collected and subjected to factor analysis, using a computer program called PQ method, which is specifically designed for this. The analysis resulted in five 'factors' or idealized Q sorts representing a particular vision of peace.

Finally, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted in R, calculating the average factor scores of the five groups under consideration. Since the factors themselves merely indicate that there are different points of view about the subject matter, the ANOVA is needed to see whether these different points of view are also differently distributed over the different groups. As will be explained in Chap. 3, significant differences were indeed found.

The main advantage of Q over semi-structured interviews is that the visions that are established in this way are easy to compare to each other, because they are all based on the same series of statements. Moreover, the design forces respondents to choose what is most important to them. Where in a semi-structured interview someone can easily say that peace is

both a personal and a political phenomenon or that it requires both security and justice, in a Q sort he or she will have to rank one statement higher than the other, thus drawing out what is most essential in their vision of peace.

On the other hand, a post-sorting interview is usually guided by a few statements that the respondent thinks highly salient. This means that the resulting visions might miss elements that are not captured in the Q set. To compensate for this possible bias, the Q study was complemented with a series of semi-structured interviews. The interviews were based on an interview guide[19] reflecting the theoretical framework and coded manually. These interviews not only added more nuances to the picture that emerged from the Q study, but also provided more context to the findings and allowed interviewees to express their visions in their own words. This was especially relevant for the Lebanon and Mindanao case studies, because the Q set did not include any statements taken from interviews with peace workers from these two areas as it was constructed prior to the field trips in which these interviews were held.

1.3 Structure of the Book

The next chapter (Chap. 2) delves into the academic conceptualizations of peace since the start of peace studies as a separate discipline, in order to develop the conceptual framework. Special attention will be given to the swath of literature dealing with post-conflict peacebuilding and the criticisms of a supposed Western 'liberal peace consensus', including authors writing about hybrid, post-liberal and everyday peace. One of the main points developed in this chapter is that the different peaces that academics write about, differ along seven identifiable dimensions. From these dimensions a first conceptual framework for comparing different visions of peace is derived.

Chapter 3 reports the results of a Q study among respondents from the Netherlands, Lebanon and Mindanao. In this study, five visions of peace were found. All of these will be worked out in further detail in the subsequent case study chapters (Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), but they already offer some telling insights on where the differences of opinion between the different groups lie. Most importantly, instead of a Dutch liberal peace consensus, a 'non-Western' consensus was found. A large majority of both the

[19] The interview guide can be found in Appendix E.

Lebanese and the Mindanaoan respondents envision peace as a personal, rather than a political endeavour. Based on the Q study, the conceptual framework is sized down to a more manageable four-dimensional form: the peace cube.

Chapter 4 deals with the visions of peace of Dutch military officers. Its main argument is that they work on a rather limited vision of peace: freedom from fear. They do have broader visions of peace, but stress that it is not up to them, but up to the population of a conflict-affected country to make choices about what such peaces look like.

Chapter 5 is about the visions of Dutch diplomats. They work mostly on political and institutional peaces: peace-as-agreement and peace-as-governance. Although especially the latter might seem very ambitious, as it implies building the political and administrative institutions to safeguard peace when armed conflict threatens, many diplomats stress that peace should not be made too big and preferably be conceptualized as a measurable goal.

Chapter 6 zooms in on the visions of Dutch civil society peace workers. They have a much broader understanding of peace, linking it to many other normative concerns such as development, human rights and environmental protection. Moreover, many of them stress that peace should not be seen as an attainable goal, but rather as a continuous process, a preference also found amongst Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers. What sets the Dutch apart is the fact that many—and especially the more senior—peace workers stress that they are working on political peace only.

Chapter 7 reports on the findings from Lebanon. There, political peace is shunned because it is usually associated with making peace with Israel. Instead, peace workers either work on a civil peace between Lebanon's different ethnic and religious groups, or on a culture of peace that treats it very much as a personal matter. This stands in marked contrast to the Dutch stress on political peace, a point taken up in the conclusion.

Chapter 8 is the final case study on Mindanao. There, each group in the conflict (Moros, settlers from the rest of the Philippines and indigenous Lumad) has a slightly different vision of peace. This makes the peacebuilding landscape rather complex, but also offers two lessons for (international) peace workers. First, that the relative power a group has is reflected in its vision of peace: the group in power wants civil peace and harmony, the marginalized demand justice. Second, that when dealing with a group

that puts peace of mind before political gain (the Lumad), great care will have to be taken to make sure they are not (politically) marginalized.

Chapter 9 summarizes the findings from the case studies and answers the question whether the differences between them should be seen as blind spots, complementarities or sources of conflict. It will be argued that there are three main differences in the visions established in Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. First between peace as an attainable goal—a conception favoured by Dutch governmental peace workers—and peace as a holistic process—as civil society peace workers from all three countries see peace. These two conceptions are complementary, so long as a focus on achieving the goal does not mean the underlying process is neglected. Secondly, between peace as a political phenomenon (or 'Security Council peace') and peace as a personal phenomenon ('UNESCO peace'). Here, Dutch peace workers tend to have a blind spot for the second conceptualization, even though this vision of peace is very important to most of the Lebanese and Mindanaoan respondents. Thirdly, there is a marked tension between what will be called 'civil peace'—harmony between different groups in a country—and a desire for justice. This tension mostly plays out between more powerful and more marginalized peace workers, either within a case (as in Mindanao) or between Western and local peace workers. Finally, the conclusion relates the findings to the broader academic debate on peacebuilding introduced in Chap. 2 and makes some suggestions for future directions the research of peace, as a positive and substantive phenomenon, could take.

1.4 Some Notes on Terminology

If one argues that the way peace is conceptualized has real consequences for peacebuilding practice, it becomes very hard to deny that language matters. Some of the words used in this study have evoked long, and sometimes heated, debates amongst social scientists. For the central notion of this study—peace—I will go into those debates in the next chapter. However, the choices for some other words commonly used in this study might also require some explanation. In this section, I will briefly elaborate on the choices made in this respect, before moving on to discuss the research questions, research design, case selection and methodologies.

Let me start with the people under scrutiny in this study: 'peace workers'. I take a peace worker to be anyone who is working—either paid or voluntarily—for peace, usually for an organization that has peace either as

its central mission, or as part of a larger set of goals.[20] The label is purposefully broad, including peacekeepers, peacebuilders, local peace activists and foreign peace interveners (cf. Autesserre 2014: 10–12) without getting entangled in conceptual debates over the boundaries between these various groups. Within the category of peace workers, I distinguish between military officers, diplomats and civil society peace workers.

'Civil society' is by far the most contested label for a group of people I will use. Even loosely defined as 'a sphere of collective action that is distinct from the state, political, private and economic spheres' (Spurk 2010: 8), it has sparked debates about both its 'civility' (Kopecky and Mudde 2005; Anheier 2007), its independence from the state and economy (Chandhoke 2002; Belloni and Hemmer 2010; Altan-Olcay and Icduygu 2012) and its implicit Western model of organizing state-society relations (Glasius et al. 2004). I will not go into these debates, but use the label of civil society to denote non-governmental peace workers, linking up to the literature on civil society peacebuilding (e.g. Belloni 2001; Tongeren et al. 2005; Paffenholz 2010; Van Leeuwen 2016; Cortright et al. 2016). In practice, they are often people working for NGOs, either paid or on a voluntary basis. However, especially in the conflict areas under scrutiny, these functions overlap with, e.g., academic positions, clan leadership (especially amongst the indigenous people of Mindanao), religious functions (priesthood) and for some Mindanaoans also a function in the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC), the political body that drafted the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) (see Chap. 8).

As to the work these people do, I will sometimes refer to it as peacebuilding. Not to contrast it with peacekeeping or peacemaking (as in Galtung 1975), but, following Jean Paul Lederach (Lederach 1997: 14), as an overarching term encompassing all three elements and possibly more. Besides anchoring the study in a line of research into peacebuilding (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Barnett et al. 2007; Call 2008; Belloni 2009; Newman 2009; Paffenholz 2010; Autesserre 2010; Heathershaw 2013; Jenkins 2013; Björkdahl et al. 2016; Björkdahl and Kappler 2017; Chandler 2017), this also stems from the fact that this research deals with positive, substantive visions of peace. Peaces that can be actively built.

These peaces are described as the 'operational visions' of peace workers, both words that might require some clarification. In military circles, but

[20] For an eloquent, yet more normative defence of the use of this term, see also (Galtung 1996: 266).

also in management terminology, 'operational' is often contrasted with 'strategic' or 'policy' considerations (e.g., Lykke Jr 1997; Naveh 2013). My interest is not in the strategic use of the term 'peace' (as in e.g. Kühn 2012), but in the ways that different visions of peace lead to different kinds of peacebuilding. The term 'operational' signifies that they are concepts of peace that influence the actual behaviour of peace workers in their day-to-day work. They are operational *visions*, because they say something about the long-term objectives of peace workers. About what they would like to achieve with all of their work, rather than just with a single project or single mission.

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CHAPTER 2

Peace in Peace Studies: Beyond the 'Negative/Positive' Divide

We cannot be adequate problem solvers or social scientists if we cannot articulate a definition of or the conditions for peace.
(Patrick M. Regan, *Presidential address to the Peace Science Society* (Regan 2014: 348))

In the introduction, it was argued that present-day academic concepts of peace do not necessarily reflect the ways practitioners think about it. Amongst other things, this threatens to make any policy dialogue between peace scholars and practitioners a 'dialogue of the deaf' (Heathershaw 2013: 276). Or at least a rather awkward conversation, where scholars of peace are asked 'with genuine puzzlement' whether they are 'some sort of theorist.' (Mac Ginty 2006: xi). At the same time, however, many practitioners do report having been influenced by classical authors in the field, most notably Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach.[1] Thus, there is at least some interplay between academics theorizing peace and practitioners building it. This chapter explores the academic side of that equation, before we delve into the visions of peace espoused by professional peace workers.

[1] These were the two names that came up most frequently in response to the background question whether an interviewee was familiar with the academic literature on peace and could name any authors that had influenced his or her thinking. See the interview guide in Appendix E.

G. M. van Iterson Scholten, *Visions of Peace of Professional Peace Workers*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
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This chapter describes how peace has been conceptualized by academics since peace studies became a separate field of social scientific inquiry.[2] Since we are looking for different visions of peace, most of the attention will go to the differences in these conceptualizations. By drawing these out, the chapter will develop a multidimensional conceptual model of peace, that serves as a first step towards the peace cube developed in Chap. 3.

Different academic conceptualizations of peace can differ from one another along various dimensions. A very clear example of such a dimension is the level at which peace is conceptualized. Is peace considered an individual or a collective phenomenon (Adolf 2009: 2)? And if the latter, is it something at the community, the national or the international level? These are important distinctions separating for instance the literature on peace psychology (Anderson 2004; Christie 2006; Webel 2007; McKeown Jones and Christie 2016) from that on local-level, bottom-up peace initiatives (Fabbro 1978; Babo-Soares 2004; Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005; Suurmond and Sharma 2012; Tongeren et al. 2005) and on peace in international relations (Galtung 1967; Owen 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001; Richmond 2008a).

Concepts are also often unique to a certain domain of scientific inquiry: as a political phenomenon, peace is something radically different than as a psychological phenomenon. Or as a cultural, economic or spiritual phenomenon. This chapter will develop seven of these dimensions into a conceptual framework that can be used to distinguish different visions of peace from one another. In the next chapter, we will see which of these dimensions best capture the differences between peace workers' operational visions of peace, leading to the 'peace cube' announced in the introduction.

The chapter is organized in two parts. First, in Sects. 2.1 and 2.2, the most influential 'classical' academic concepts of peace—those developed by peace researchers since the 1960s—are discussed.[3] From this discussion, a conceptual framework is developed, that consists of seven dimensions

[2] For a similar approach, but focused on International Relations (IR) theory, see (Richmond 2008a).

[3] This discussion does not cover even more classical visions of peace, such as those espoused by, e.g., Saint Augustine (Augustine 2010: 212–220), Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes 2003 [1651]: 101–102) or Immanuel Kant (Kant 1976 [1796]). Although present-day peace researchers may cite those visions in support of their own, the primary purpose of this chapter is to establish a conceptual framework for present-day visions of peace, rather than giving

along which these conceptualizations differ from one another. In the second part of the chapter this conceptual framework is used to compare the different visions of peace at stake in what is known in the literature as the 'liberal peace debate': a series of critiques of present-day peacebuilding by Western states, international organizations and NGOs. Over the past fifteen to twenty years, this debate has become increasingly complex (for an overview, see, e.g., Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015; Chandler 2017). I will tidy it up by analytically dividing the criticisms into four broad strands of critique on the liberal peace. In particular, I argue that each of these critiques stems from a different underlying vision of peace. In Sect. 2.3 the concept of liberal peace is mapped onto the conceptual framework. In Sect. 2.4 the four different visions of peace that underlie the critiques are analysed along these same seven dimensions. Section 2.5 summarizes the differences and ends with some conclusions.

2.1 Classical Academic Conceptions of Peace

With the introduction of a discipline called 'peace research' (in Scandinavia and Germany), 'conflict studies' (in the United States) or 'polemology' (in France and the Netherlands) in the 1950s and 1960s, 'peace' became a separate topic in social scientific research. In keeping with the general philosophical and political climate of the time, the founding fathers of this line of research defined the object of their study through a series of dichotomies. Peace was either one thing or another, usually accompanied by the normative claim that one part of the dichotomy was to be preferred over the other.

The most influential of these dichotomies was introduced by Johan Galtung, who conceptualized peace as being either negative or positive (Galtung 1964, 1969). Originally, these two words referred to an ontological difference. Negative peace denoted the absence of conflict, including but not limited to armed conflict, whereas positive peace denoted the presence of integration or cooperation (Galtung 1964: 2). In Galtung's later work, negative peace came to mean an absence of direct, physical violence, whereas positive peace meant the absence of structural violence, or structural limitations on the fulfilment of human potential (Galtung 1969: 168). Although this seems to undermine the ontological character

a full historical overview of thinking about peace. For that, see, e.g. (Adolf 2009; Dietrich 2012; Hassner 1994).

of the distinction, alternative formulations of positive peace as social justice (Galtung 1969: 171), the presence of a common legal order (Röling 1973: 85) or the fulfilment of human needs (Burton 1990) do uphold the distinction.

The inability of peace scientists to agree on what exactly was meant with positive peace meant that the focus of peace studies switched to negative peace, where it remains until today (Regan 2014: 348). Except for the contributors to the liberal peace debate—as I will argue below—most peace scientists are almost exclusively concerned with peace as the absence of armed conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2014). The notion of positive peace seems merely to function as a reminder that in order for negative peace to be sustainable, more needs to be done than silencing the guns. Still, the ontological distinction between (negative) peace as an absence and (positive) peace as a presence of something, is a useful tool for comparing different conceptualizations and will be taken to be the first dimension along which visions of peace differ.

Kenneth Boulding, widely considered a founding father of the American branch of peace and conflict studies, is also the founder of another fundamental conceptual distinction. The central argument in his classical book *Stable peace* is that peace (defined as the absence of war) can either be unstable or stable (Boulding 1978). An unstable peace is a situation of peace in which there is still a threat of the resumption of war. Later research has found that a large proportion of new wars are actually resumptions of old wars, so most peace is indeed unstable (Call 2012: 2; Wallensteen 2015a: 3). What makes Boulding's work interesting for our present purposes however, is his concept of stable peace. In a situation of stable peace, even the possibility of war with the former adversary is no longer considered to be realistic. War has literally become 'unthinkable' (Boulding 1978: 13). When we think about present-day examples of such a stable peace, the situation in Western Europe is the first (and perhaps the only) case in point. In a thorough analysis of changes in the meaning of (interstate) peace during the twentieth century, Danish peace researcher Mikkel Rasmussen argues that this is exactly what happened in Western Europe after the Second World War (Rasmussen 2003). European integration made the very idea of going back to war unthinkable, leading to a stable peace based on the idea that all European states were part of an international society of 'civil'—i.e. liberal—states. One of the challenges of contemporary peace workers is how to make unstable peace following a peace agreement into stable peace, or what is called nowadays sustaining

peace (De Coning 2018a). This calls attention to a second dimension along which concepts of peace differ: whether they are considered a short-term or a long-term goal. I will refer to this dimension as the *timeframe* of peace.

A third classical distinction is between peace as a static or a dynamic concept (Röling 1973: 87; Boulding 1977). According to the static conceptualization, peace is an identifiable state of affairs within a certain territory that is stable over time. This can be negative peace—the absence of war—but also something more elaborate. Oliver Richmond, for example, criticizes policymakers who think of peace as a 'Platonic Ideal': an unchanging ideal image—of a future state of affairs—that guides their thinking even though it cannot ever be achieved in practice (Richmond 2005: 16). Fukuyama's 'end of history' (Fukuyama 2006), Kant's 'perpetual peace' (Kant 1976 [1796]) or biblical notions of the Kingdom of Heaven (Revelation 21:1–27) are other examples of such a—static—ideal image of positive peace.

Instead of thinking about peace as a (desired) state of the world, peace can also be conceptualized as a dynamic concept: a process rather than a goal (Röling 1973: 87). A dynamic conception of peace calls attention to the way in which situations change: either through peaceful or through violent means. This conceptualization of peace has been explored most systematically by what can be called the 'conflict transformation school' in conflict studies (Lederach 1995, 2015; Galtung 2000; Ramsbotham 2010; Austin et al. 2013) but is also taken up by other authors writing more explicitly about peace. Mikkel Rasmussen, for example, has written an interesting account of 'democratic peace as a policy' (Rasmussen 2003). He argues that it is this policy, adopted by Western states vis-a-vis other Western states, that constitutes the social fact of the democratic peace. On his account, democratic peace is not just a description of a certain situation in which democracies do not wage war on one another (see Sect. 2.2 below), but depends for its continued existence on policy makers continuing to practice this policy (Rasmussen 2003: 175).[4] Amongst other things, this implies that peace is not just a long-term objective, but a process that is never finished, because the moment actors would stop treating other democracies as members of a special class of 'civil societies' that do not wage war on one another, democratic peace would cease to exist. A similar point is made by authors writing about complexity theory or 'adaptive

[4] It should be noted that this reading depends on a constructivist account of International Relations, as Rasmussen himself acknowledges (Rasmussen 2003: 4).

peacebuilding' (Brusset et al. 2016; De Coning 2018a), a line of thinking that will be explored further in the conclusion. For now, the distinction between peace as a (static) goal and peace as a (dynamic, never-ending) process is the third dimension along which concepts of peace differ.

As the discipline of peace studies progressed, some attempts were made to think of peace as a continuum rather than a dichotomous concept. Usually, this was done by ranking different ideas about peace in terms of how much violence they would tolerate. Martin Caedel for instance proposed a fivefold distinction of all theories of war and peace (Caedel 1987: 4–5) and Anatol Rapoport a sixfold distinction in concepts of peace (Rapoport 1992: 141–161). We will briefly look at Rapoport's proposal, because it points to a fourth and a fifth underlying dimensions along which concepts of peace differ from one another: level and domain. It should be noted that both of these dimensions remain implicit in Rapoport's work, but I will argue that that is exactly why some elements in his continuum seem rather odd.

Rapoport's continuum of concepts of peace starts at the most violent end with a notion he dubs 'peace through strength' (Rapoport 1992: 141). Peace through strength is the most violent form of peace imaginable since it means one party forces its will upon another one. Slightly less violent is the balance of power, which also rests on power, but the relative and counterbalancing power of coalitions rather than the dominance of a single hegemon. Collective security is even less violent, since it means that states enter a durable alliance to promote interstate peace. 'Peace through law' is the first form of peace that does not rely on force but rather on jointly established rules, although the maintenance of such rules might still require the use of force. Rapoport then makes an interesting switch to personal or religious pacifism as an even 'less violent' concept of peace. Finally, revolutionary pacifism, the abolition of the institution of war, is the least violent form of peace imaginable (Rapoport 1992: 141–161).

If we think about this continuum, 'personal or religious pacifism' stands out as a rather peculiar concept of peace amongst the others. Mostly, this is because such pacifism is an individual choice, rather than a matter of (international) politics. Putting it on a scale between the maintenance of peace through international law and the abolition of war as a means of conducting international relations is thus slightly odd, even if world peace might eventually come about if everyone became a personal pacifist. Personal pacifism locates peace at a different *level* than the others. This is

the fourth dimension of our conceptual framework. A basic distinction on this dimension would be Antony Adolf's distinction in individual, social (interpersonal) and collective (intergroup) peace (Adolf 2009: 2), although perhaps the collective level should be further subdivided into peace at a national and peace at an international level, a distinction taken up in the next section.

The fifth dimension along which concepts of peace differ from one another is what I will call the 'domain' in which they locate peace. In his ranking, Rapoport mixes political approaches to peace (a balance of power), legal approaches (peace through law and revolutionary pacifism) and psychological approaches to peace (personal or religious pacifism). The switch from 'peace through law' to 'personal or religious pacifism' is odd not only because peace switches to a different level, but also because these two concepts of peace locate peace in a different domain. As a political objective, peace is something quite different than peace as a psychological state of being or a legal state of affairs.

In order to understand the importance of this distinction, it is useful to briefly reflect on the three domains in the context of the Cold War. Put somewhat crudely, the charter of the United Nations abolished the right to wage war and thus established world peace in the legal sense of the word. This did not, however, prevent the Cold War, which meant that politically speaking, peace still hung in the balance. This in turn did not directly affect many people in the West (and probably also in the East), who may have experienced a psychological 'peace of mind', until peace movements worrying about nuclear destruction shattered this peace in the 1980s.

Conceptually, this dimension is neither a binary one, nor a continuum, but rather comprises a limited set of distinct domains in which peace is located. In line with science's general subdivision into academic disciplines, these domains often correspond to academic disciplines. Although peace studies is often presented as an interdisciplinary or even 'transdisciplinary' (Galtung 2010) field of research, the disciplinary background of peace researchers still shows in their conceptualizations of peace. Psychologists write about peace as a psychological phenomenon (e.g. Christie 2006; Coleman and Deutsch 2012; Webel 2007), political scientists about peace as a political phenomenon (e.g. Richmond 2008a; Hegre 2014), legal scholars about peace as a legal phenomenon (e.g. Kelsen

1944; Bell 2008) and economists about peace as an economic phenomenon (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004).[5]

A final valiant attempt at sorting out the different concepts of peace that peace studies had sprouted in its first few decades of existence was made by the British peace scholar Michael Banks. In a 1987 essay called *Four conceptions of peace*, he argues that peace can mean either 'harmony', 'order', 'justice' or 'conflict management' (Banks 1987). The latter is a process definition of peace, but the three others all equate peace with another value (harmony, order or justice). Without going into the details of his proposed conceptualization, we can note that this indicates that there is also a value-dimension to peace. This is the sixth dimension along which concepts of peace differ from each other. Like the previous one, it is neither binary nor a continuum, but composed of a limited number of values that are qualitatively different from each other. Peace becomes a different phenomenon if it is linked to one of these values. For instance, as Banks observes, peace-as-harmony is a vision in which all conflicts are solved and everyone lives together in agreeable companionship (Banks 1987: 260). In contrast, peace-as-justice might entail that certain wrongs are first set to rights, before any kind of 'harmonious' co-existence is deemed possible. Although this does not preclude the option that in the end, sustainable peace is dependent on an integrated set of values (Fischer and Hanke 2009), it does mean that different value-preferences lead to different visions of what constitutes peace (Basabe and Valencia 2007).

This leaves us with six dimensions along which the classical academic concepts of peace differ from one another: two ontological ones (positive/negative and goal/process), timeframe, level, domain and values. We will see in the next section that after the end of the Cold War a seventh dimension was added to this list.

2.2 Post-Cold War Conceptions of Peace

With the end of the Cold War, two things changed in the way scholars of peace approached their subject. First, the focus shifted from criticizing the warlike international order, to explaining the peace that suddenly seemed to prevail. The context in which scholars of peace operated, shifted from superpower rivalry to a unipolar world order, in which liberal democracy

[5] Although, to be fair, there are also quite some political scientists who are interested in the economic underpinnings of peace (e.g. Gartzke 2007; Hegre et al. 2010).

was seen to be the only viable political system (Fukuyama 2006). This not only led liberal optimists like Rapoport to declare peace 'an idea whose time has come' (Rapoport 1992) but it also led to a series of studies on 'democratic peace', or the proposition that democratic states do not wage war on each other (see a.o. Russett 1994; Owen 1994; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2007; Risse-Kappen 1995; Russett and Oneal 2001; Macmillan 2003; Dafoe 2011; Tomz and Weeks 2013). Although democratic peace was originally defined as a political state of affairs at the international level, efforts were made to reconceptualise it as a national-level phenomenon (Daxecker 2007; Hegre 2014; Hegre et al. 2001) and as a process rather than a state of affairs (Rasmussen 2003; Kustermans 2012).

Secondly, the end of superpower rivalry and the surge of civil wars in the first half of the 1990s meant that the focus shifted from the international to the national level, specifically to the study of civil wars and the peace agreements that ended them. Some analysts of war even declared that now 'new wars' were being fought out, although sadly they did not specify what a 'new peace' would look like (Kaldor 2006; Münkler 2005). This same shift from interstate to intrastate peace occurred in international policymaking circles, specifically in the United Nations. In his famous 1992 *Agenda for peace*, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed that his organization should take up a much more active role in addressing civil wars and building national-level peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992; see also Sect. 2.3 below).

One highly influential practitioner-scholar who got engaged in these peacebuilding efforts was John Paul Lederach. In his classical book on building peace (Lederach 1997) he develops what he calls a 'holistic and transformative approach' to achieving sustainable peace. The best known part of this approach is his insistence that peace is something that is made between actors on three different levels: the grassroots, mid-level and top-level leadership (Lederach 1997: 38–43; on its importance, see, e.g., Paffenholz 2014). However, in this model, all levels are still working on achieving (and then maintaining) one kind of peace: a national-level peace agreement. More interesting for our quest to understand differences between different visions of peace is Lederach's insistence that peace is something that is made by *individuals*. This stands in sharp contrast to the approach taken by scholars writing about the democratic peace, who stress that it is the *institutions*—of liberal democracy—that guarantee peace, regardless of who is in power. This distinction between individuals and institutions is the final dimension along which concepts of peace differ from one another, which I will refer to as the 'embedding' of peace.

Table 2.1 Seven dimensions of concepts of peace

Dimension	*Elements or endpoints*
1. Ontology I	Negative
	Positive
2. Timeframe	Short-term
	Long-term
3. Ontology II	Goal
	Process
4. Level	Individual
	Community
	National
	International
5. Domain	Political
	Legal
	Psychological
	Economic
6. Values	Order
	Justice
	Harmony
7. Embedding	Individuals
	Institutions

Table 2.1 summarizes all seven dimensions as well as the elements that they consist of. It should be noted that the list of elements is not exhaustive for the non-binary dimensions 4, 5 and 6, which are somehow multidimensional themselves as well. For instance, it could be argued that peace is something that takes place at a 'system' level, at whatever level (national or international) this 'system' may be conceptualized (e.g. Institute for Economics and Peace 2013; Senghaas 2004). In order to understand the various ways in which concepts of peace can differ from one another, however, the dimensions are more important than the precise elements they comprise.

2.3 Peace in Peacebuilding: The Liberal Peace Debate

The shift in focus from interstate to intrastate peace and the increased number and scope of UN peace operations in the 1990s, led to a new branch of peace studies: the study of peacebuilding operations (Jenkins 2013: 18–43; Call 2008; Call and Cousens 2008; Sambanis 2008; Zelizer

and Rubinstein 2009; Paffenholz 2010; Mac Ginty 2011; Heathershaw 2013; Chigas 2014). Older debates over the factors that do or do not lead to interstate peace still continue (e.g. Hegre et al. 2010; Park 2013; Tomz and Weeks 2013; Reiter et al. 2016) and many authors writing about civil war onset or termination still have a narrow focus on peace as the absence of armed conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2014). However, since we are interested in visions of peace as a substantive, positive, phenomenon, we will leave those debates aside and turn our attention to the study of peacebuilding.

The very notion of peace*building* suggests that peace is a positive phenomenon: something that can be built. Though some authors use the 'absence of armed conflict' definition of peace to measure the success of UN peace operations (e.g. Fortna 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2000), the study of peacebuilding missions has also led to two new literatures concerned with the question of what constitutes a positive peace. On the one hand, a number of authors has suggested criteria for the success of peacebuilding efforts that go beyond a continued absence of war (e.g. Call 2008; Call and Cousens 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Paris 2004; see also the overview in Autesserre 2014: 21–23). Most of these criteria have to do with the establishment of some form of either effective or democratic governance. For instance, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis take 'a minimum standard of democratization' as their stricter criterion for successful peacebuilding (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 783). Charles Call considers 'minimal political institutions capable of resolving social conflicts peaceably' the best indicator for a peace that is more than the absence of war (Call 2008: 174). Both of these approaches can be interpreted as efforts to 'translate' the democratic peace to a national level.

On the other hand, a number of critical authors maintains that peacebuilding efforts are an imposition of exactly these Western-style governance arrangements on (unwilling) non-Western populations (e.g. Richmond 2005; Mac Ginty 2008; Pugh et al. 2008; Heathershaw 2008, 2009; Lidén 2009; Cooper et al. 2011; Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015). Their criticisms gave rise to a series of academic debates collectively known as the liberal peace debate (see e.g. Sabaratnam 2011; Newman 2009; Heathershaw 2013).

Originally, 'liberal peace' was synonymous with the democratic peace discussed above (e.g. in Oneal et al. 1996; Doyle 2005). In the early 2000's, authors critical of the focus on democratization as a panacea for (post-)conflict countries, started using the term pejoratively to call attention to the over-optimism and hegemonic character of international peace-

building efforts (Duffield 2001; Richmond 2005; Chandler 2004; Pugh 2005). It is this critical use that is now most common.

The debate between proponents and opponents of liberal peace has often been framed in terms of one between 'problem solvers' and 'paradigm shifters' (Pugh et al. 2008: 391; see also Paris 2010: 337–338; van Leeuwen et al. 2012: 293). Or between those who want to save liberal peacebuilding by slightly modifying it (Paris 2010) and those who want to utterly transform it into 'post-liberal' peacebuilding (Richmond 2011). However, the debate—if we can call it a single debate—is far more complex than such a dichotomous approach suggests. It has experienced first a local, then a hybrid turn (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 2016; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015); some participants are urging others to move 'beyond' the confines of the debate (Heathershaw 2013); the critiques themselves have been subject to further critique (Chandler 2010; Sabaratnam 2013; Nadarajah and Rampton 2015; see also the overview in Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015) and the debate has involved both epistemological and ontological claims (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015) by, amongst others, 'poststructuralists, critical theorists, post-Marxists and social constructivists' (Cooper et al. 2011: 1996).

In the next three sections, I aim to tidy up this complex debate by focusing on the visions of peace that are espoused by pro- and opponents of the liberal peace. Although much of the debate seems to evolve around questions of *how* peace is being built—for instance whether this is done top-down or bottom up (Autesserre 2010; Mac Ginty 2010; Charbonneau and Parent 2013; Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016) or what role local actors (should) play in international peacebuilding missions (Donais 2009; Richmond and Mitchell 2012)—my argument is that the question of *what* is being built, is at least as important. As I will show in the next sections, the liberal peace and the alternatives proposed to it are different visions of peace. Depending on how exactly they are different, these differences can—but need not—lead to tensions between people working on achieving liberal peace and people working on achieving some of those other kinds of peace. While this might seem revisionist in the eyes of some of the more critical scholars, my primary purpose is to understand where liberal and post-liberal visions of peace can co-exist, where they lead to tensions and what this says about the blind spots of (international as well as local) peacebuilders. We will therefore have a closer look at the different visions of peace in the academic debates, using the seven-dimensional conceptual framework as a guide to where these visions differ. We will first look at the liberal peace.

2.3.1 The Liberal Peace

What is the liberal peace? In the words of two of the central figures in the liberal peace debate it consists of a combination of democracy and free-market capitalism (Paris 2004: 5; Richmond 2005: 121). This short formula covers two out of our seven dimensions: liberal peace is a political and economic phenomenon (dimension 5), that is found in institutions (democracy and free markets) rather than individuals (dimension 7). The liberal peace is clearly a positive phenomenon (dimension 1), since the objective is not only to end an armed conflict, but to build a set of institutions that should prevent a relapse. Moreover, this is seen as a goal, rather than a continuous process (dimension 3). Once elections have taken place, or the state is strong enough, international peacebuilders can leave the scene. As was shown above, the liberal peace is a national-level phenomenon (dimension 4), that is supposed to be established through a peacebuilding mission. Although such missions can last for quite some time, they are still meant to end within an limited period of time, making the liberal peace's timeframe 'medium-term' at most (dimension 2). Call, for instance, mentions a period of five years to establish whether a peacebuilding operation has been successful (Call 2008: 177)

On the final dimension, values (dimension 6) there is some debate, also amongst the proponents. Mostly, this debate is about how democratic liberal peace institutions ought to be (see, e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Call 2008; Paris 2004, 2010). Given the tensions between democratization and state-building as two peacebuilding strategies, as well as the shift in international policy from democracy-promotion to statebuilding (Carothers 2007; Nixon and Ponzio 2007), it is probably wise to distinguish at least these two types of liberal peace. Roland Paris, who is often cited as the principal defender of liberal peacebuilding (e.g. Newman 2009; Cooper et al. 2011) actually criticizes the original version of the liberal peace in this respect. According to him, peacebuilding should mostly be concerned with building strong, rather than democratic political institutions, something he captures in the motto 'institutionalization before liberalization' (Paris 2004: 7). This can be seen as a difference on the value dimension (dimension 6) between a peace that is mostly about order (statebuilding) and one that pays more attention to liberty (democratization) (Heathershaw 2008: 604). Table 2.2 briefly summarizes the seven dimensions of this concept.

Table 2.2 The liberal peace in seven dimensions

Dimension	*Liberal peace*
1. Ontology I	Positive
2. Timeframe	Short- to medium-term (5 years)
3. Ontology II	Goal
4. Level	National
5. Domain	Political Economic
6. Values	Stability (statebuilding) Liberty (democratization)
7. Embedding	Institutions

2.4 Criticisms and Alternatives to the Liberal Peace

As was already remarked above, the label of 'liberal peace' is mostly used by authors critical of the peace(s) that international peacebuilding missions have brought to (post-)conflict areas so far. Analytically, four main lines of critique can be distinguished in this critical literature. Liberal peace is considered to be (1) hegemonic, (2) technocratic, (3) neoliberal and/or (4) elitist. I will argue in this section that rather than just being different criticisms, each of these four critiques embodies a different vision of what constitutes peace, and hence calls for a different concept of peace to be taken into account. The first critique—that liberal peace is a hegemonic vision of peace—comes in a strong and two weaker varieties, but all three depend on a vision of peace as a concept that does have a plural (Dietrich and Sützl 1997) and hence on a certain value-relativism. The two weaker versions of this critique both call for more attention for local conflict resolution mechanisms in international peacebuilding efforts. Either as part of a local/liberal 'hybrid peace' (e.g. Mac Ginty 2011), or as intrinsically valuable concepts of peace. The strong version condemns the practice of international peacebuilding itself as a neo-imperialist project, merely promoting Western interests in (post-)conflict areas (e.g. Chandler 2006). We will see below that these three groups of authors all propose a similar alternative: a more emancipatory, locally grounded concept of peace that I will refer to as *hybrid peace*. The second critique—that liberal peace is too technocratic—sees peace as inherently political, and hence conflictual. Therefore, it calls for the development of a concept of *agonistic peace*: the

transformation of violent into non-violent conflicts. The third critique—that liberal peace promotes a neoliberal economic order—rests on an economic vision of peace and proposes that such a peace can only be found when policies are aimed at *welfare* rather than the development of free-market capitalism. Finally, the fourth critique—that liberal peace fails to affect the lives of ordinary citizens—rests on a vision of peace as an experience rather than an abstract state of affairs. This alternative vision is called *everyday peace*.

In practice, authors often combine different critiques and call for example for a post-liberal peace that is hybrid, emancipatory, agonistic and everyday (e.g. Richmond 2009a; Richmond and Mitchell 2012). However, since we are interested in the way different concepts of peace are structured—and in particular in how the visions of peace workers relate to each of these concepts—it is useful to analytically pry them apart, rather than seeking to combine them into one devastating critique of present-day peacebuilding. Therefore, we will now look at each of these four critiques, and the vision of peace on which it rests, using the conceptual framework as our theoretical lens.

2.4.1 Hybrid Peace

The first critique of the liberal peace is that it is imposing an essentially Western concept of peace on (post-)conflict societies that might have radically different ideas about what constitutes peace. According to this criticism, actors who promote the liberal peace pretend to have a universally valid formula for bringing peace to (post-)conflict areas. This leads to the establishment of a 'peace from IKEA', as Roger Mac Ginty—one of the leading proponents of this view—calls it (Mac Ginty 2011: 39). This 'flat-pack peace from standardized components' fails to do justice to the highly political environment in which international peace workers operate. Inspired by post-structuralism and post-colonialism, authors espousing this critique argue that the liberal peace is a hegemonic discourse, that is imposed from the outside on a (post-) conflict zone, but fails to fit local realities (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 763). Peacebuilders should pay more attention to local needs, cultures, ideas of peace and peacebuilding and, especially, local agency.

I will argue that rather than just being a criticism on how liberal peacebuilders go about in trying to bring peace to (post-)conflict areas, the criticism implies a different vision of what constitutes peace. Or, to further

complicate matters, of whether it exists as a positive phenomenon at all. Three positions can be distinguished. The adherents to all of these positions are united in their rejection of the idea that there is a universal formula for peace, either liberal or otherwise. Beyond that, opinions diverge, although we will see that they converge again when it comes to the vision of peace that is proposed as an alternative.

First, there are authors who claim that peace is—or has become—a 'virtual concept', void of any positive meaning (Kühn 2012: 396). Actors who say they promote peace are merely trying to cloak their self-interested actions—aimed at maintaining the (geo-political) status-quo—in moral language (Kühn 2012; Chandler 2004, 2006; Selby 2013). If this assertion is correct, it would make the present study into the different meanings attached to the concept of peace somewhat superfluous, since all of these visions would be merely scams designed to mask power politics. However, when we look at the alternatives these authors propose, none of them proposes the international community just stops doing peacebuilding at all. Instead, they call for more attention for the 'heterogeneity of contemporary peace processes' (Selby 2013: 81) or for a peace that is more emancipatory (Kühn 2012: 398). In this, they are not so different from the other two groups, as we will see below.

Secondly, there are authors—mostly with a background in anthropology—who study local peace mechanisms and rituals in non-Western countries. Attention for these rituals and customary approaches to peace goes back to the early days of peace research (e.g. Fabbro 1978) but has recently been rekindled as part of a resurgent interest in indigenous groups and their ideas about peace and peacemaking (Mac Ginty 2011: 57; see also Babo-Soares 2004; Mac Ginty 2008; Cisnero 2008; Boege 2011; Brigg and Walker 2016). This renewed interest has been called a 'local turn' by various researchers (e.g. Mac Ginty 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015; Paffenholz 2015) and is being hailed as a significant improvement over past studies that focused exclusively on international actors and their efforts to establish a Western-style peace. Underneath the local turn in peacebuilding is a recognition that peace means something different in different contexts (van Leeuwen et al. 2012) and that international peace workers ought to take this into account in order to be effective.

Interestingly, anthropologists specifically studying indigenous concepts of peace find that these are mostly about peace at the community or interpersonal level, with a focus on interpersonal relations (e.g. Krijtenburg

2007; Babo-Soares 2004; Tasew 2009). This stands in marked contrast to the focus on political and national-level peace that is common to the liberal peace debate, a point that will be further developed in the coming chapters.[6] Although some interesting work has been done in comparing local and international concepts of peace (Krijtenburg and de Volder 2015) these anthropological contributions do not seem to play a very large role in the overall liberal peace debate.

Instead, the most common alternative to the liberal peace seems to be a call for a mixture of local and international approaches. This is what the third—and most influential—group of researchers who criticize the liberal peace for its hegemonic tendencies calls for. Rather than studying non-Western visions in their own right, these authors take international intervention in a (post-)conflict area for granted. This has led to a series of studies on hybridity, or the interactions and mutual influence between local actors and international peacebuilders (Chopra and Hohe 2004; Mac Ginty 2010; Richmond and Mitchell 2012; Belloni 2012; Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012b). Originally, studies on the hybridity involved in peacebuilding saw *hybrid peace* as the unintended outcome of such interactions. A number of more recent studies points out that the notion of hybridity is increasingly used in a prescriptive way—both by policy makers and by some academics—but this use is heavily contested. Critical authors point out that efforts to design hybrid institutions from the outset miss the crucial point that there will always be 'friction' between what outside actors design and what local actors want (Millar 2014: 502; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016: 220; Björkdahl et al. 2016). Thus, hybrid peace is always a provisional peace, a process rather than a state of affairs. We will return to this point below.

Hybrid peace is both the most common and the most articulated alternative vision to the liberal peace for authors who consider liberal peace to be a hegemonic imposition. Unfortunately however, most of the authors writing about hybrid peace mainly discuss the different ways in which peace is brought about, rather than the exact details of how specific local or hybrid concepts of peace are different from a liberal peace (for an exception see Boege 2012). This makes it difficult to pinpoint what the notion exactly entails (Millar 2014). However, the general concept of hybrid peace that emerges from the literature seems to differ from the liberal peace along four dimensions: its ontology (dimension 3), its timeframe

[6] See especially Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2, Chap. 7, Sect. 7.3.3 and Chap. 9, Sect. 9.3.2 in the conclusion.

Table 2.3 Differences between liberal and hybrid peace

Dimension	*Liberal peace*	*Hybrid peace*
2. Timeframe	Short- to medium-term	Continuous/long-term
3. Ontology II	Goal	Process
4. Level	National	Multilevel (national, subnational, international)
6. Values	Stability	Inclusivity
	Liberty	Legitimacy
		Emancipation

(dimension 2) the values attached to peace (dimension 6) and the level at which peace is operative (dimension 4). Table 2.3 sums up the most important differences.

Most importantly, as we already saw, the critics present their alternative of hybrid peace as a process, not a state of affairs. Mac Ginty writes for instance that the concept of hybridity implies that peace is 'in constant flux', since both local and international actors are renegotiating the terms of peace 'on a daily basis' (Mac Ginty 2010: 396–397).[7] From a hybrid peace perspective, the goal of peace is never achieved, but has to be re-invented (or renegotiated) time and again, making this process a continuous (or very long-term) one rather than a short- to medium-term goal (Boege 2012: 95–96). Part of the reason that proponents of hybrid peace are very critical of efforts by policymakers to use the concept of hybridity in a prescriptive way—as a peacebuilding goal—is that it fails to do justice to this fundamental characteristic of hybrid peace as a continuous process.

The focus on process also means that, when looking at the values ascribed to peace, stability is not primarily what peace is about. Peace is not conceived of as a stable goal, but rather as an inherently dynamic process. 'Stability' is portrayed as an excuse to defend a status quo, turning the liberal peace into a conservative peace (Richmond 2005: 214) that—in the eyes of the critical authors—cannot be considered 'peaceful' at all. Rather, peace is associated with values such as inclusivity, (local) legitimacy and emancipation (Boege 2012: 96–97; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016: 227; Johnson and Hutchison 2012: 48–49). Partly, these values can be seen as 'safeguards' against liberal dominance. In the continuous process that is hybrid peace, the visions of peace of less powerful local actors have to 'compete' with the dominant liberal peace that international peace

[7] In a recent appraisal of the 'hybrid turn' in peacebuilding literature, Mac Ginty and Richmond even speak of hybridity as an 'emergent social construct' (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016: 221).

workers try to impose. Liberal dominance in this encounter can only be averted if peace is explicitly made to be something inclusive, locally legitimate and emancipatory.

Since hybrid peace authors are interested in the interaction between local and Western concepts of peace, they stress that peace is a multi-level phenomenon. We saw above that the more anthropological voices in this critique find that indigenous concepts of peace mostly relegate it to an interpersonal level (e.g. Krijtenburg 2007), but others stress that peace depends on work at subnational, national and sometimes even international levels simultaneously (Millar 2014: 502; Schia and Karlsrud 2013: 235).

On the other dimensions, there is much less difference. Hybrid peace is also a political phenomenon and much of the work on hybridity is mostly focusing on how it is incorporated into institutions like the Loya Jirgas in Afghanistan, Gacaca courts in Rwanda, or 'hybrid' international courts (Mac Ginty 2011: 75; Jarstad and Belloni 2012; Stensrud 2009). In those respects, hybrid peace is not that different from the liberal peace these authors criticize (Nadarajah and Rampton 2015).

2.4.2 Agonistic Peace

A related critique on the liberal peace is that it is too technocratic and fails to do justice to the inherently political character of peacebuilding. Partly, this critique overlaps with the first one. The supposed universal applicability of the liberal peace is one of the factors that lead peace builders to adopt a technocratic view of peace (e.g. Mac Ginty 2012: 288). However, according to the critics, the fact that peace is a fundamentally political phenomenon, means that is inherently conflictual. Hence, 'peace' does not refer to a situation in which all conflicts are solved, but rather to one in which these conflicts are brought back to manageable proportions. They refer to this concept of peace as 'agonistic peace' (Aggestam et al. 2015; Shinko 2008; Polat 2010; Nagle 2014).

Drawing on the work of Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 1993, 1999), William Connolly (Connolly 2002) and Carl Schmitt (Schmitt 2008 [1932]), these authors call for an embrace of conflict as the essence of the political. The only thing peace workers should do is move those conflicts out of an antagonistic friend/enemy distinction into the realm of the 'agonistic', where the 'other' is treated as a (political) adversary rather than a (military) enemy (Aggestam et al. 2015: 1738; see also Ramsbotham 2010).

Table 2.4 Differences between liberal and agonistic peace

Dimension	*Liberal peace*	*Agonistic peace*
2. Timeframe	Short- to medium-term	Continuous
3. Ontology II	Goal	Process
6. Values	Stability	Conflict
	Liberty	Justice
		Emancipation
7. Embedding	Institutions	Individuals

Inverting Carl von Clausewitz's famous maxim, agonistic peace can perhaps best be summarized as 'the continuation of war with other means.'[8]

Table 2.4 summarizes the main differences between agonistic and liberal peace. First, on the value dimension, conflict is valued as a positive force for change, not as something that needs to be reduced or solved. Conflicts can lead to justice and emancipation, which are both more highly valued than order and harmony. As Oliver Ramsbotham formulates it, the 'enemy of peace' is not conflict, but violence (Ramsbotham 2010: 218). Thus, conflicts need to be 'transformed'—into non-violent conflicts—rather than solved (see also Galtung 2007; Lederach 2015). This implies a second difference with the liberal peace that combines two dimensions: time-frame and the other ontological question, whether peace is a goal or a process. Agonistic peace is a continuous process, rather than a medium-term goal, because conflict is inevitable. Finally, agonistic peace calls for a greater focus on individual agency, rather than the building of institutions. Agonistic peace is relational, rather than structural. On the other dimensions, the differences are either not very explicit or just not there. Like the liberal peace, agonistic peace is a political phenomenon at the national level that goes beyond the absence of war.

2.4.3 Welfare

The third critique of the liberal peace targets its economic, rather than its political aspect. Proponents of this critique argue that the liberal peace is geared towards the spread of a neoliberal political economy, or the creation of an international economic order that is far from peaceful (Pugh et al. 2008: 394–396; Cooper et al. 2011: 2000–2001; Klein 2007; Millar 2016). The basic argument is that the neo-liberal order in itself is structur-

[8] Clausewitz's original maxim being that war is the continuation of policy—or (depending on the translation) of politics—with other means (Von Clausewitz 1984 [1832]: 87).

Table 2.5 Differences between the liberal peace and welfare

Dimension	*Liberal peace*	*Welfare*
4. Level	National	National/International
5. Domain	Political Economic	Economic
6. Values	Stability Liberty	Equality

ally violent (Galtung 1969: 170–171), fostering inequality and exploitation on both the international and the national level and effectively relegating conflict from the political to the economic sphere (Zizek 2009: 11).

Michael Pugh develops this critique on a conceptual level in a 2010 article on welfare (Pugh 2010). In his analysis, the (neo-)liberal focus on individual freedom of choice, self-reliance and participation in a free market and the subsequent privatization of government services, including the provision of basic needs, leads to an atomized society. A neoliberal economy is not a peaceful economy, because it puts people in direct competition with each other and thus breaks down the social contract upon which the state depends (Pugh 2010: 268–269). Pugh contrasts this with an economy based on welfare, which he defines as "individual and community-fostered well-being that embodies a functional social contract and incorporates social value, altruism and human agency" (Pugh 2010: 264). An economic system based on welfare is peaceful, because it builds a collective identity, it emancipates people and it provides for their everyday needs.

Table 2.5 sums up the main differences between the vision of welfare and the liberal peace. On most of the dimensions, the two visions are similar. Both see peace as a positive medium-term institutional goal. The main distinction is in the economic model that the authors propose. Rather than putting their faith in the pacific effects of free-market capitalism,[9] the authors espousing the welfare critique propose that many (post-)conflict states would be better off if they adopt (e.g., Keynesian) policies aimed at the establishment of a welfare-state. This means that, in terms of domain, their critique is economic rather than political, which is also what sets this critique apart from the others. Moreover, in line with the neo-Marxist background of many of these authors, the value of equal-

[9] For a brief overview of the classical arguments, in an interstate context, but equally valid for intrastate conflicts, see, e.g. (Gartzke 2007: 169–170).

Table 2.6 Differences between liberal peace and everyday peace

Dimension	*Liberal peace*	*Everyday peace*
3. Ontology II	Goal	Process
4. Level	National	Individual
		Community
5. Domain	Political	Social
	Economic	Psychological
6. Values	Stability	Care
	Liberty	Empathy
7. Embedding	Institutions	Individuals

ity is considered more important than stability or liberty. According to the authors who espouse this critique, genuine peace is only possible after a radical redistribution of wealth. Either at the national level (for Pugh) or at the international level (e.g. Zizek 2009; Klein 2007).

2.4.4 Everyday Peace

The final critique of liberal peace says that it does not have a positive impact on the lives of the ordinary inhabitants of a (post-)conflict area, because it is focused too much on elite- and national-level processes (e.g. Autesserre 2010: 15). International peacebuilders treat peace as an abstract political state of affairs, rather than a lived experience. Although the proponents of this critique do not deny that peacebuilding may have a positive impact on national level institutions (Autesserre 2010: 13–14; Richmond and Franks 2009: 182), they argue that this does not amount to peace as long as the general population does not experience it as such. Thus, they call for the inclusion of *everyday peace* into the objectives of peacebuilding missions (Mac Ginty 2014; Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016; Richmond 2009a; Autesserre 2010; Firchow 2018). Everyday peace is the kind of peace that the ordinary inhabitants of (post-)conflict areas both want to enjoy and seek to 'carve out' for themselves, regardless of what is happening on higher political levels.[10]

As Table 2.6 shows, the concept of 'the everyday' implies a shift along almost all of the dimensions along which peace is conceptualized. Most fundamentally, everyday peace is a peace at a different level. Proponents of

[10] In a seemingly largely forgotten essay, German peace scientist Ivan Illich called this 'vernacular peace' or *Vride*, after the medieval German word for this kind of peace. He contrasted the notion with the Roman word *Pax* that denoted the peace between rulers (Illich 1992).

this concept of peace stress that peace is something that should be felt by individual people in their day-to-day lives, not some aggregate 'national level experience' (Mac Ginty 2013: 59; Millar 2014: 502) that can be measured using proxies such as a peace agreement, national elections or the existence of certain institutions. Gearoid Millar calls this the 'institutional/experiential disconnect' and argues that even critical authors often 'erronously assume a direct and predictable relationship' between institutions designed to promote peace and people's actual experiences of peace (Millar 2014: 504). This assumption leads the proponents of the liberal peace[11] to work on national level goals—such as the building of a neoliberal, sovereign and territorial state—without pausing to consider what the impact of this is on the lives of the people living in (post-)conflict areas (Autesserre 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Millar 2014). In contrast, the proponents of everyday peace argue that these individual experiences should take centre stage. Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks, for instance, argue for a reinstatement of the distinction between statebuilding and peacebuilding, with the latter focusing on 'the needs and rights of individuals' (Richmond and Franks 2009: 182).

One very interesting study into everyday peace is Pamina Firchow's 2018 book *Reclaiming everyday peace* (Firchow 2018). It reports the findings of an elaborate bottom-up study into how ordinary people in two (post-)conflict countries define peace (Mac Ginty 2013; Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016). Firchow's main conclusion is that everyday peace is 'multidimensional, context-dependent and evolving' and comprises elements of development, social relations, security and human rights (Firchow 2018: 14). This is consistent with the conceptualization presented here of everyday peace as a community-level process, embedded in individuals. It does suggest that everyday peace extends across more domains than in my conceptualization, but Firchow also stresses that especially in contexts with a lot of external peacebuilding efforts, there is a need for more attention to psychological and social aspects of community healing (Firchow 2018: 26). Thus, as a critique on international peacebuilding, everyday peace certainly stresses these domains.

If we look at the domain(s) in which other authors place everyday peace, we find that it is sometimes argued that 'the everyday' is a domain of its own: that of life prior to politics or social organization (Lefebvre 1991 [1947]: 130–137). However, this would make the dimension some-

[11] According to Millar, the same is true for authors who want to prescribe a hybrid peace.

what tautological, so I would rather propose to conceive of everyday peace as both a social and a psychological phenomenon. It is concerned with individual people's wellbeing or personal 'peace of mind' (which makes it a psychological phenomenon), but also with the circumstances in which people live, or the state of their communities—making it a social phenomenon. Other domains can be added to these two fundamental ones. For instance, Richmond argues that the circumstances in which people live also include economic circumstances, leading him to stress the need for welfare-oriented public policies as a prerequisite for this kind of peace (Richmond 2008b: 289; see also Tadjbakhsh 2009). Conceptually however, the 'welfare' critique is a different one, as I have argued above, and a 'prerequisite' for everyday peace is not the same as everyday peace itself. Similarly, Mac Ginty argues that everyday peace '*can constitute* a more significant political phenomenon' (Mac Ginty 2014: 559, emphasis added). However, his hesitant formulation already indicates that this political reading of everyday peace is not central to the concept.

A third difference is that everyday peace is most fundamentally about individuals and their agency, rather than about institutional arrangements and governance (Mac Ginty 2014: 550). This is a direct consequence of the shifts in level and domain observed above, but also a point developed in much more detail by authors who study the ways in which, for example, women or young people act for peace (Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005; Noma et al. 2012; Rausch 2015; Berents and McEvoy-Levy 2015; Paarlberg-Kvam 2018). All of these studies point out that for people in conflict-affected areas, and especially for representatives of marginalized groups there, peace is fundamentally a personal concern, not something to be found in institutions.

Fourth, also the values associated with peace reflect the (inter)personal character of peace. Richmond, for example, stresses the need for empathy, respect and care for others (Richmond 2011: 10). All of these are personal-level values, prescribing how individuals should relate to each other, rather than system-level values such as stability.[12]

[12] Interestingly, care and empathy also feature heavily in feminist approaches to IR. Feminist authors such as Carol Gilligan and Sara Ruddick contrast a male perspective of domination with a female perspective of care for others, arguing that the latter is inherently more peaceful than the former (Gilligan 2009; Ruddick 1995). Likewise, Christine Sylvester proposes 'empathetic cooperation' as a feminist method for IR (Sylvester 1994), raising empathy to a concern at the international level as well.

Finally, the ontology of everyday peace is different as well. Everyday peace is a process of constant adaptation to the realities of living in a (post-)conflict area (Mac Ginty 2014: 552, 557). Or, with slightly less emphasis on the agency involved, a subjective experience (Richmond and Franks 2009: 184; Autesserre 2010: 186). This has two interesting consequences. The first one is that it is much harder to develop indicators for whether or not there is everyday peace in a certain area. Firchow's work, discussed above, is the first, and to my knowledge the only attempt to really build indicators for peace in a bottom-up way. She also argues that it is difficult to come up with indicators that are valid across different cases and that remain stable over time: what constitutes everyday peace is a dynamic and evolving concept (Firchow 2018: 147, 149). This might be one reason why more orthodox peacebuilders are reluctant to take such a peace into consideration and are calling for further specification (Paris 2010: 356). The second is that it moves the concept of peace towards a psychological phenomenon, even if this is not necessarily the intention of the authors. Of course this is not a new idea, and there already exists a considerable literature that treats peace as a certain state of mind. Most of this literature comes from psychology (e.g. Lee et al. 2013; Christie 2006; Coleman and Deutsch 2012), but a few authors have tried to bridge the gap between the two disciplines, by arguing for the need to include 'peace of mind' in the more political concept (Galtung 2010; Dietrich 2012). Such efforts might seem somewhat esoteric to political scientists, but the formulation 'freedom from fear' as a shorthand for a narrow definition of human security points in the same direction (see e.g. Begby and Burgess 2009). As we will see in the next chapters, the findings from this study also support this move: a lot of civil society peace workers from (post-)conflict areas also treat peace as a personal rather than a political phenomenon.

2.5 Conclusion

If we want to compare different concepts of peace, we need some sort of conceptual model to draw out the differences between them. In this chapter, we have developed such a model and used it to illuminate present-day debates over the goals and effectiveness of peacebuilding operations. Based on a reading of classical works, seven dimensions were identified along which academic concepts of peace differ from one another. These dimensions were subsequently used to analyse four (analytically) separate

Table 2.7 Four alternatives to the liberal peace along seven dimensions

Dimension	*Liberal peace*	*Hybrid peace*	*Agonistic peace*	*Welfare*	*Everyday peace*
1. Ontology I	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive
2. Timeframe	Short- to medium-term	Continuous	Continuous	Medium-term	Continuous
3. Ontology II	Goal	Process	Process	Goal	Process
4. Level	National	Multilevel (national, subnational, international)	National	National (international)	Individual Community
5. Domain	Political Economic	Political	Political	Economic	Social Psychological
6. Values	Stability Liberty	Inclusivity Legitimacy Emancipation	Conflict Justice Emancipation	Equality	Care Empathy
7. Embedding	Institutions	Institutions	Individuals	Institutions	Individuals

criticisms of and alternatives to present-day (liberal) peacebuilding. Table 2.7 sums up the results of this comparison.

The most striking finding is that every criticism differs from the liberal peace on the value dimension (dimension 6). This finding reflects the fact that much of the liberal peace debate is normative in character (Tadjbakhsh 2011: 3; see also Liden 2007; Heathershaw 2008; Richmond 2009a). Given that peacebuilding itself is a highly normative endeavour, this should not come as a surprise. However, if we focus on the content of these different concepts of peace, rather than the way in which they are brought about, we might find that these different concepts are not mutually exclusive, even though the more critical authors like to present them as such (e.g. Richmond 2009a: 558). Arguing that statebuilding efforts are aimed at peace-as-order (Heathershaw 2008: 609–612) whereas hybrid peace is aimed at the emancipation of local populations in conflict-affected areas becomes less convincing if it turns out that one of the first things the local population wants is order and stability.[13] Other authors also point out that both the liberal peace and its proposed alternatives draw on the same, broadly liberal, values: personal freedom, emancipation and human dignity (Paris 2010: 339–340; Selby 2013: 59; Begby and

[13] A point that will be developed in Chap. 8 on the Mindanaoan visions of peace.

Burgess 2009: 93; Chandler 2010: 146; Lidén 2009: 619). Thus, whether this value-dimension will prove to be as relevant to peace workers as it is to academics is an open question that will be taken up in the next chapter.

The second finding that stands out is that everyday peace differs from the liberal peace along all but one dimension. Where the other criticisms take up a specific aspect of peacebuilding practice, conceptualizing peace as everyday peace radically shifts the terms of the debate. It is one thing for international peace workers to help set up efficient and/or democratic institutions, but quite another for them to directly affect the everyday lives of an entire population. Perhaps this is why everyday peace is presented as the bottom-up alternative (or addition) to top-down liberal peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016). However, if international peacebuilding should directly (and positively) affect the lives of ordinary citizens in conflict-affected countries, this would require more than an engagement on a different level—as many authors are presently calling for (e.g. Autesserre 2010: 58; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Randazzo 2016). It would also require engagement in different domains than the political and economic; a realization that peace is a process rather than a one-off goal and a focus on individuals rather than institutions.

These latter two points are also broader concerns. Three of the four critiques point out that peace is a continuous process rather than a one-off goal, continuing a debate that has occupied peace researchers since the early days of their discipline (Röling 1973: 87). Some authors even argue that the focus on peace*building* automatically implies a shift from peace as a goal to peace as a process (Heathershaw 2008: 597). This might explain why some of the critical authors seem to be more interested in questions of *how* peace is built, rather than *what* is being built. However, if what is being built is also a process, this has rather radical consequences for notions of success or failure of peacebuilding as well as for exit-criteria for international peace workers. I will return to this point in Chap. 6, as well as in the conclusion.

Whether peace is primarily sought in institutions or in individuals[14] is also a deeply divisive issue that might be related to the previous question. On the one hand, some authors argue that institutions are needed to 'anchor' peace and prevent conflicts from running out of hand. Prominent examples are courts that can settle disputes over issues of landownership, local councils providing procedures for making community decisions,

[14] Or, using Giddens's terminology, in structures or in agents (Giddens 1979).

community mediation centres, and other 'infrastructures' for peace (Van Tongeren et al. 2012; Richmond 2013; Suurmond and Sharma 2012). On the other hand, many of the critical authors stress the need to take people's agency seriously in order to minimize resentment vis-à-vis international peacebuilders and increase the sustainability of peace (Mac Ginty 2014; Puljek-Shank 2017; Richmond and Mitchell 2012).

The only dimension along which there is not much variation amongst the different concepts is that they all treat peace as a positive phenomenon. As was argued above, this is one aspect in which the peacebuilding literature differs from the majority of literature on peace and might be considered to be implicit in the very notion of peace as something that *can* be built.

Interestingly, recent developments at the UN, in particular the Advisory Group of Experts' review of the peacebuilding architecture (Advisory Group of Experts 2015) and subsequent resolutions by the General Assembly (70/262) and Security Council (2282) about sustaining peace, seems to have taken in much of this criticism. Academic research always lags a few years behind such developments, but we are now beginning to see the first efforts to think through the conceptual implications of this shift towards sustaining peace as the overarching goal of peacebuilding (e.g. De Coning 2018a). Perhaps this means that David Chandler is right when he pictures peacebuilding as 'twenty years of crisis' resulting in a shift away from it in recent years (Chandler 2017). However, history also shows that once a certain mode of doing things has been established, usually it turns out to be more resilient than its critics suspect. Thus, for better or worse, peacebuilding efforts will probably continue in the years to come and it will be up to academics to faithfully take stock of the kinds of peace that are actually being built.

In the next chapters we will see that the people who do the actual building—peace workers rather than academics—have rather different ideas about what it is that they are building. In order to establish the differences between their visions of peace, we will first turn to the results of a Q study amongst respondents from all five groups discussed in this book.

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CHAPTER 3

Western Dissensus, Non-Western Consensus: A Q Study Into the Meanings of Peace

What is peace? Well, that's some question… Where can I start? It is a project, not a state of affairs. It means much more than not having war. Although that is also part of it, but it means more like having no sentiments of hate. And maybe to live a good life? […] It is always related to persons. Of course you can also talk of peace in society. Then one talks about security, being able to live under rule of law, justice, equality. But for me, peace is always something very personal.
(Anonymous interview employee #1 (Association Justice et Miséricorde (AJEM), Lebanon). Translated from French by the author.)

When asking professional peace workers like the one from Lebanon quoted above the relatively simple question 'what is peace?', it is not unusual to receive long monologues as an answer. In contrast to the rather neat distinctions academics make between positive and negative peace, liberal, hybrid, agonistic and everyday peace, practitioners often think of many different things at once when asked to reflect upon the peace they are trying to establish.

If we want to compare their different visions of peace along the dimensions identified in Chap. 2, we will first have to get some grasp of what these visions are. This chapter uses Q methodology to do so. As was

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explained in the introduction,[1] Q methodology is particularly suitable for this kind of disentanglement, because it does not impose any a priori concepts or categorizations on its respondents, but rather looks for patterns in the general discourse about a subject, by presenting respondents with a subset of statements taken from this discourse (de Graaf 2001: 303). Moreover, because respondents have to sort these statements based on how close they are to their own vision of peace, the methodology also establishes the relative salience or priority of the different elements that make up a respondent's vision of peace. The peace worker quoted above for instance talks about peace as a 'project, not a state of affairs', as a very personal goal ('to live a good life') and as some condition in society ('security, being able to live under rule of law, justice, equality'). By having people sort cards with these kinds of statements on them (a Q set) and statistically comparing their sorts to see which statements they tend to group together and which of these they give most priority, we can get a clear picture of the different visions of peace that the respondents have. Moreover, since the interviewees were asked to rank-order the statements based on the extent to which they represent the peace *they are actually working on*, we can also see whether different groups of peace workers have different *operational* visions of peace.

91 interviewees participated in the Q study: 21 Dutch military officers, 10 Dutch diplomats, 26 Dutch civil society peace workers, 20 Lebanese civil society peace workers and 14 civil society peace workers from Mindanao. They rank-ordered 48 statements about peace, taken from 79 previous semi-structured interviews, on a scale ranging from +5 to −5. A score of +5 indicates the statement is very close to how they would describe the peace they are working on, a score of −5 indicates the statement is very remote from what they are doing.

Factor analysis of their Q sorts yielded five factors, that each represent a different vision of peace. This vision is operationalized as an idealized Q sort of a hypothetical respondent that would totally adhere to this (and only to this) vision. In practice many people combine different visions and also see the ways these are interlinked and should be worked on simultaneously. Nevertheless, bringing the ideal-typical visions 'out in the open', reflecting on the ways they differ and on their distribution across the different groups, brings to light tensions that exist between the different visions, as will be explained below.

[1] In Sect. 1.2.

Each factor is characterized by the statements that get relatively high scores on it (+4 or +5), indicating that the statement closely reflects the respondent's own operational vision of peace. However, they are also characterized by the statements that get low scores (−4 or −5), since this is the kind of peace adherents to this vision reject, and by statements whose scores are markedly different from the other factors, for example because the statement only scores positively on this specific factor. Since we are interested in the ways the different visions differ from one another, this last category is quite useful. As is usual in Q studies, excerpts from the post-sorting interviews were used to further clarify the different visions. The five visions that emerged from the Q study are peace as a personal endeavour (vision I), peace as a universal ideal (II), freedom from fear (III), peace as process (IV) and peace as politics (V).

The chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 3.1 the five visions are introduced. For each vision, a table showing its characteristic Q statements and a graphical representation of the extent to which it is held by the five groups under investigation are discussed, using data from the post-sorting interviews. In Sect. 3.2 the division of the visions over the five groups is further scrutinized, leading to two important conclusions: there is no sign of a liberal peace consensus amongst the Dutch, but the respondents from Lebanon and Mindanao adhere almost exclusively to the vision that peace is a personal endeavour. Thus, if there is a peacebuilding consensus, this study shows it to be a non-Western one. In Sect. 3.3 a comparison of the visions themselves is used to sharpen the conceptual framework introduced in Chap. 2. It will be argued that the most relevant differences between operational visions of peace can be found on four dimensions: the 'scope' of a vision, its ontology as a goal or a process, whether it is embedded in individuals or in institutions and whether it treats peace as a personal or a political phenomenon. The theoretical framework will be adjusted accordingly, so that we will end up with a four-dimensional conceptual model (or 'peace cube') to study the visions of the five different groups in-depth in Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter by summarizing the most important findings.

3.1 Five Visions of Peace

3.1.1 Vision I: Peace as a Personal Endeavour

According to the first vision peace is a personal endeavour: something each and every person ought to work for in his/her own life. Table 3.1

Table 3.1 Characteristic statements for vision I: 'peace as a personal endeavour'

Statement	*Visions*				
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*
2. Peace is attainable.	**5**	4	−4	−1	1
15. Peace means empathy. Seeing the humanity of the other, even if you disagree with him.	**5**	0	−2	5	1
22. Peace is not just about human beings, it also relates to living in harmony with the environment, the wholeness of creation.	**4**	−2	0	−4	−3
33. Peace starts as an internal state of mind of a person and is then projected outwards.	**4**	0	−2	3	−1
13. Peace is a process in which everyone is heard, based on inclusivity and equality.	**3**	0	2	4	0
40. Peace is always related to situations of war. Therefore, peacebuilding in (e.g.) the Netherlands is a nonsensical activity.	**−5**	0	−1	−3	−3
34. Peace is the absence of war. Nothing more, nothing less.	**−4**	2	0	−2	−3

summarizes the characteristic statements for the factor representing this vision: statements with high (+4/+5), low (−4/−5) or markedly different (vis-à-vis the other factors) scores. In order to show the contrast with the other visions, their respective factor scores on the same statements are also shown.

As the table shows, peace as a personal endeavour starts within individual people (statement 33) and is strongly associated with empathy in one's dealings with others (statement 15). In contrast, it has low scores (indicating strong disagreement) on peace as the absence of war (statement 34) and the idea that peace is always related to situations of war (statement 40). This shows that on this vision peace work is not about ending or preventing armed conflicts as such, but rather about working on the interpersonal relations that underlie a population's willingness to support, or engage in, (civil) war. In the words of a young Mindanaoan peace worker: 'it's more like… people understanding each other, respecting each other. Understanding that we are different and that's ok. Especially in Mindanao that is important, because of all the different groups.'[2] Or as a

[2] Interview Rhea Silvosa (Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, Mindanao).

Dutch civil society peace worker put it: 'War is more of a symptom, peace is about what lies beneath that.'[3]

In their post-sorting interviews, people who score high on this factor stress that peace is a multi-level phenomenon. 'Peace is the relationship between me and myself, between me and you, between me and society, between me and nature, between me and my community'.[4] The one constant on all these levels, however, is that there is always a 'me' on one side of the relationship. Even if peace is conceptualized as a set of ever-wider circles of harmonious relationships, leading all the way up to harmony with all of creation (cf. statement 22), in the centre there is always an individual that has all these relationships. On this view, peace is fundamentally about individual human beings and their agency.[5] Peacebuilding is about changing people's mindset, their way of thinking, so that they will choose to solve their problems in peaceful ways.[6] In the long run and on a larger scale, changing these individual mindsets is thought to lead to the establishment of a culture of peace, rather than a culture of violence.[7]

The focus on agency means that peace as a personal endeavour is not the same as inner peace, the kind of peace Wolfgang Dietrich describes as 'meditating at your inner mountain lake' (Dietrich 2012: 17). Although many respondents do acknowledge that 'there is inner peace as well, acceptance', they stress that 'this is not passive acceptance, but acceptance that something is like this and then working to change it.'[8] Although working for peace might grant a peace worker a certain inner peace herself,[9] this is not the objective of their work. As a Lebanese peace educator put it: 'The first meaning of peace is peace of self, inner peace. But I don't know what inner peace feels like. And I think that maybe it is impossible to give people that gift of peace.'[10]

One final important element of this vision is that it sees peace as a continuous process (statement 13). Respondents who score high on this vision argue for example that 'peace is not a phenomenon, it is a quest'.[11]

[3] Interview Fulco van Deventer (Human Security Collective (HSC), the Netherlands).
[4] Interview Ramzi Merhej (Search for Common Ground (SFCG), Lebanon).
[5] Interview Maysa Mourad (independent peace educator, Lebanon).
[6] Interview Ziad Saab (Fighters for Peace (FfP), Lebanon).
[7] Interview Elie Abouaoun (United States Institute for Peace (USIP), Lebanon).
[8] Interview Assad Chaftari (Wahdatouna Khalasouna, Lebanon).
[9] E.g. interviews Silvosa and Merhej.
[10] Interview Manal Moukaddem (Center for Lebanese Studies, Lebanon).
[11] Interview Chaftari.



Fig. 3.1 Average group scores on factor I: 'peace as a personal endeavour'. (Note: Dashed line indicates average value over the five groups)

Or, as another one put it: 'it's not like you build this building in six months and then it is finished and you can have it for 30 years. You have to build it each day. The follow-up should be on a daily basis. No, not even a daily, a secondly basis.'[12] Changing people's mindsets is a never-ending process, rather than a one-off project.

In many ways, vision I comes close to the concept of everyday peace discussed in Sect. 2.4.4. It is also a continuous process, found in individuals' inner peace (statement 33, +4) and interpersonal relations, with emphasis on empathy as a core value (statement 15, +5). However, according to this vision peace is also intimately linked to environmental concerns (statement 22, +4), something that has so far not been investigated by authors interested in everyday peace.

Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of the level of support for this vision amongst the different groups in the study: Dutch military (NL mil), diplomats (NL Dipl), and civil society (NL CS), and the civil society peace workers from respectively Lebanon (Leb CS) and Mindanao (Min CS). For each group, the average level of correspondence of their Q sorts to the idealized Q sort of vision I is shown. A value of 0 means that the Q sorts

[12] Interview Merhej.

from the respondents in that group do not match with the idealized Q sort at all. This means that the respondents from that group do not subscribe to this particular vision of peace. A value of 1 means that people in the group fully subscribe to this vision: all of their Q sorts exactly match the idealized Q sort. In practice this is—of course—highly unlikely, the more so since we are comparing group averages. However, what we do see is, for example, that the Q sorts of military officers correspond to vision I for about 20%, whereas those of Lebanese civil society peace workers correspond to the vision for 55%.[13] These are telling differences in the level of support for this vision amongst these two groups.

The dotted line displays the average level of support of all respondents to this vision. For vision I this average level of support is almost 35%, making it the most popular vision in the study (see Fig. 3.6 below). The circles representing the scores of each separate group demonstrate that this is mostly due to the high scores of the respondents from Lebanon and Mindanao. Next to the variation between groups, the length of the error-bars surrounding the dots demonstrates the variation within the group: the larger the bars, the more heterogeneous a group is.[14]

As the figure shows, Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers identify quite strongly with this vision. The Q sorts of Dutch diplomats and military correspond much less to the factor and Dutch civil society takes up a middle position just below the average score of the total population of respondents (the dotted line). This suggests two things that are relevant for the academic debates on peacebuilding. First, the divergence between Dutch—especially Dutch governmental—and Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers lends credibility to the idea that there is a gap between the way peace is envisioned by Western and

[13] For the exact values, see Appendix D.

[14] The error-bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. This is a statistical tool normally used to show the reliability of estimates, arrived at by including the values two standard deviations above and below the group average in the error-bar. However, since we are not interested in a precise estimate of how common a vision is amongst a certain group of peace workers (since we are building theory, not testing it) the confidence interval is used here merely as a measure to compare the coherence of the group averages. A large confidence interval means that some respondents in the group score relatively much higher or lower on the factor than others. A smaller confidence interval means that the Q sorts of most respondents in the group cluster around the average correspondence level. In statistical analysis, the difference between two average factor scores is perceived as significant (at $p < 0.05$) if the 95% confidence intervals of the two groups do not overlap. Here, this is clearly the case for Lebanese and Mindanaoans on the one hand and Dutch military and diplomats on the other.

non-Western actors, supporting the anti-universalist critique discussed in Sect. 2.4.1.

Secondly, the fact that the non-Westerners in this study regard peace primarily as a personal endeavour means that the so-called 'local turn' in the study of peacebuilding (e.g. Mac Ginty 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013) should perhaps focus less on the construction of hybrid political institutions and more on how international peace workers influence such personal endeavours. In the chapters on Lebanon (Chap. 7) and Mindanao (Chap. 8), we will explore this vision in more depth, based not only on what respondents remarked about their Q sorts, but also on additional semi-structured interviews.

3.1.2 Vision II: Peace as a Universal Ideal

For the adherents to the second vision, peace is a rather abstract ideal. Peace is not something that is made on a day-to-day basis, as in the first vision, but is indeed a 'vision', a goal that will hopefully someday be attained. The meaning of peace is thought to be intuitively clear and no cause for philosophical musings: 'peace is peace!'[15] As such, it can act as a 'moral compass' (statement 3), guiding policies to ever more closely resemble this ideal. Table 3.2 sums up the characteristic statements for this vision.

Four things are important about this ideal: it is universal, it has a rather limited scope, it is attainable and it is related to statebuilding. We will briefly look at these four characteristics. First, the ideal of peace is *universal*. This shows in the factor score on statement 45—what peace looks like is different for different people (−3)—but also in the highly negative score (−5) on the statement that peace is 'a vague container notion' (8) and the highly positive score (+5) on the statement that 'the objective of peace operations is to uphold the international rule of law' (19), since one of the defining characteristics of the rule of law is its universal applicability.[16] This universality stands in sharp contrast to the other visions. Visions 1 and 4 come out neutral on the question whether 'what peace looks like is different for different people' (statement 45), visions 3 and 5 have a moderately

[15] Interview Sara Ketelaar (PAX, the Netherlands).

[16] Interview anonymous Dutch pilot #1. See also (Carothers 1998: 99; Upham 2010: 84).

Table 3.2 Characteristic statements for factor II: 'peace as a universal ideal'

Statement	*Visions*				
	I	***II***	*III*	*IV*	*V*
3. Peace is a moral compass: it implies that people work from a certain moral attitude, certain moral values.	1	**5**	−1	2	2
19. The objective of peace operations is to uphold and promote the international rule of law.	0	**5**	1	−3	3
2. Peace is attainable.	5	**4**	−4	−1	1
48. Peace is made between or within communities.	1	**4**	5	3	2
12. Peace is the institutional capacity to manage conflicts.	0	**3**	1	−1	1
20 Peace is security, the ability to deal with whatever threats the future will hold.	−1	**3**	1	2	0
34. Peace is the absence of war. Nothing more, nothing less.	−4	**2**	0	−2	−3
37. Peace means living in 'a democratic state with rule of law'.	−1	**1**	−5	−1	−1
39. Peace is embedding the use of violence in a legal framework.	−3	**1**	0	−3	−5
8. Peace is a vague container-notion that can mean anything. Peace is too abstract to be of any practical value in my work.	−3	**−5**	−1	−4	−1
10. Perfect peace is a vision, and dangerous if you don't accept that you will always fail to reach it.	−2	**−5**	3	−3	1
45. What peace looks like is different for different people.	0	**−3**	3	0	3

positive score (+3). Vision II is the only vision with a negative score on this statement (−3).[17]

Part of the reason why peace is considered to be a universal ideal, is that—in this vision—peace is rather narrowly defined. This might not show directly in the characteristic statements for the vision, although it is the only one with a positive score on the statement that 'peace is the absence of war. Nothing more, nothing less' (34). In their post-sorting interviews, however, adherents to the vision stress that we should not conflate peace with other normative goals. As one of them put it: 'If you put too much in that boat, there is a risk it will sink. I am not a priori against any of these things [referring to a series of statements he put on +1], but they make it too big'.[18] Empathy, human rights or development might all be conducive to peace, but they are not peace itself.[19] Because it is rather

[17] Interestingly, when the phrasing is changed to 'what peace looks like depends on what the conflict is about' (statement 36), the factor scores change to −2/−2/+2/−2/+1.

[18] Interview André Carstens (Former director of Governance, Dutch ISAF mission, the Netherlands).

[19] Interview Sara Ketelaar (PAX, the Netherlands).

narrowly defined, peace is also attainable, even if 'not always everywhere simultaneously'.[20] But the high scores on statements 2 ('peace is attainable', +4) and 10 ('perfect peace is a vision, and dangerous if you don't accept that you will always fail to reach it',−5) clearly show that the ideal of peace is not thought to be a utopian one.

Finally, when we look at the 'content' of peace, we see a close relationship between peacebuilding and statebuilding. The core of peace is security (statement 20), rule of law (19) and an institutional capacity to manage conflict (12). In line with the insistence that peace should not be conflated with other normative goals, democracy (statement 37) and 'embedding the use of violence in a legal framework' (statement 39) do not receive very high scores (+1), but this is the only factor on which these two statements receive a positive score at all. Given the centrality of both democracy and rule of law to the concept of liberal peace, their virtual absence from the Q study is a rather striking finding.

Nevertheless, if there is one vision that comes close to the liberal peace, this is it. As we saw in Chap. 2, liberal peace is also considered to be a universal ideal that drives international policy (cf. statement 3), focuses on institutional development (statement 12), and is considered an attainable (medium-term) goal. The only statement that is puzzling from this perspective is the one that says peace is a community-level phenomenon (statement 48, +4), since one of the criticisms of the liberal peace is that it is focused too much on the national level and disregards community- and individual-level peace (e.g. Autesserre 2010, see also Sects. 2.4.1 and 2.4.4).

Figure 3.2 shows that adherents to this vision of peace are found primarily amongst Dutch diplomats and civil society. Especially diplomats quite often subscribe to this vision, although the in-group variety is also rather large, as the long error-bar in the figure shows. This variety, and the question to what extent this vision conforms to the liberal peace, will be further investigated in Chap. 5. In contrast, Dutch military officers are much less partial to this vision. As the next factor will show, Dutch military do not really believe in sustainable peace, nor in universal ideals. Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers also tend not to subscribe to this vision of peace. While many of them agree that peace is a moral compass (statement 3), it is a compass to guide everyday decisions, rather than a compass for statebuilding.

[20] Anonymous interview Dutch diplomat #2.



Fig. 3.2 Average group scores on factor II: 'peace as a universal ideal'. (Note: Dashed line indicates average value over the five groups)

3.1.3 Vision III: Freedom from Fear

The third factor represents a vision of peace that stresses the everyday character of it: peace should be experienced by people in their daily lives (statement 1) and peace means that normal people can just live their normal lives (statement 6). As an army chaplain summarized it: 'peace is no more than the ability to raise your children in safety and relative non-poverty'.[21] I have labelled this vision 'freedom from fear', after the narrow conception of human security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2012: 40). As we will see below, it is a vision that is adhered to mostly by military officers.[22] Table 3.3 sums up the characteristic statements for this vision.

This is a rather mundane, perhaps even 'boring' vision of peace (cf. statement 27), but the people who adhere to it stress that it sums up a

[21] Anonymous interview Dutch army chaplain. 'Relative non-poverty' is an interesting addition in light of the 'welfare'-critique on liberal peacebuilding (see Sect. 2.4.3), as well as discussions of broad vs. narrow interpretations of human security (e.g. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2012: 40–41). However, it does not otherwise feature very prominently in this vision.

[22] Although it is not the most prominent vision amongst them either. Military respondents score highest on factor V, political peace, and approximately as high on factor I, peace as a personal endeavour. See Fig. 3.6 in Sect. 3.2.

Table 3.3 Characteristic statements for factor III: 'freedom from fear'

Statement	*Visions*				
	I	*II*	***III***	*IV*	*V*
6. Peace is a situation of 'normality': normal people can just live their normal lives.	−1	0	**5**	0	0
48. Peace is made between or within communities.	1	4	**5**	3	2
1. Peace is an experience, that should be felt by people in their daily lives.	3	0	**4**	1	3
41. Peace is a dualistic concept. On the one hand there is the ideal, on the other what you can do in practice.	0	−1	**4**	−1	2
10. Perfect peace is a vision, and dangerous if you don't accept that you will always fail to reach it.	−2	−5	**3**	−3	1
45. What peace looks like is different for different people.	0	−3	**3**	0	3
27. Peace is the ability to live a "boring" life, within a predictably stable environment.	−4	0	**2**	−5	−2
32. You have to make sure that the state operates smoothly, without reliance on military force. Then you have peace.	−1	−1	**−5**	0	−2
37. Peace means living in 'a democratic state with rule of law'.	−1	1	**−5**	−1	−1
2. Peace is attainable.	5	4	**−4**	−1	1
21. Working for peace is working on a more just, equal and better world, so that people will no longer have any reason to go to war with others.	3	3	**−3**	2	2
30. A peaceful society is a society that can change itself without using violence.	1	2	**−3**	2	4

meaningful and attainable goal for their work, whereas 'all the rest is utopian.'[23] As the same army chaplain put it in response to statement 21 about creating a just and equal world: 'that is beautifully idealistic, but then people will just think of some other reason to go to war'.[24]

Adherents to this vision do acknowledge that others might have a more ambitious idea of peace (cf. statements 41 and 45), but warn against the dangers of striving for a 'perfect peace' (statement 10). Specifically, neither statebuilding (32) nor democratization (37) is part of peace. This is not only because the adherents to this vision deem it impossible to do more than 'controlling hotspots' in an inherently dangerous world,[25] (see also

[23] Anonymous interview (Ministry of Defence, evaluations division, the Netherlands).
[24] Anonymous interview Dutch army chaplain.
[25] E.g. anonymous interview (Ministry of Defence, evaluations division, the Netherlands).

the negative score on statement 2) but also because they consider building a (democratic) state something that should be left to the people in conflict areas themselves. 'We can create the conditions, maybe lay some sort of groundwork, but after that it is up to the country itself' is a quote that is representative of this relativism.[26] With a military expression, this vision can also be summed up as creating 'a safe and secure environment', so that other actors (such as development NGOs) can do their work.[27]

The vision differs from the other four visions in two other respects. Most fundamentally, the post-sorting interviews reveal that respondents are hesitant to describe the situation they are creating as one of peace. In a typical statement on whether they ever establish peace in an area, one respondent, for example, remarked that 'usually we leave earlier. […] The final situation is often defined as "stable", or as "restauration of authority". To make peace last, a lot more work has to be done'.[28] Secondly, adherents to this vision are much less optimistic about the attainability of peace (statement 2, −4) than the adherents to any of the other visions. As a consequence, the vision also diverges from the others on the question of whether striving for a perfect peace is dangerous (statement 10, +3), whether in a better world there will be no more reasons to go to war (statement 21, −3) and whether societies can change themselves without using violence (statement 30, −3). Put bluntly, adherents to vision III are more sceptical about peace than adherents to the other visions.

Figure 3.3 shows the extent to which different groups subscribe to this vision of peace. The average correspondence rate is only 9%, making this the least popular vision in the study. Only Dutch military score significantly above this average, all other groups score only slightly above 0. Even so, this does not mean that the vision is totally irrelevant for other peace workers. We will see in Chap. 8 that some of the Mindanaoan peace workers also mention a vision of peace that comes quite close that what is described here. According to them, this is what people 'at the grassroots' might think peace is. They themselves however, subscribe to a different vision.[29]

[26] Interview Major Lenny Hazelbag (Dutch Army).
[27] Interview Major Daan Boissevain (Dutch Air Force).
[28] Interview Major Martijn Hädicke (Dutch Army).
[29] See Chap. 8, Sect. 8.2.1.



Fig. 3.3 Average group scores on factor III: 'freedom from fear'. (Note: Dashed line indicates average value over the five groups)

3.1.4 Vision IV: Peace as Process

The fourth vision stresses the process-character of peace. Peace work is not about reaching any state of peace, whether sustainable or not, but about 'keeping the conversation going' (statement 44, +5) and including everyone in the process (statement 13, +4). In the factor that represents this vision, high scores on these two statements are combined with negative scores (−4 and −5) on statements 22 and 27, both of which describe peace in more static terms as harmony or stability. As a process, peace is not a technocratic, but a highly political endeavour (statement 46, −5). This is not because it is about building political institutions (as in statement 12 and visions II and V), but rather since peace work is about bringing together people with different points of view (statements 13 and 38, +4) and getting them to empathize with each other (statement 15, +5). Respondents who score high on this factor stress that in protracted conflict environments like Congo or Afghanistan, practically the only thing outside actors can do is try to keep the lines of communication between actors open (Table 3.4).[30]

[30] Interviews Joost van Puijenbroek (PAX, the Netherlands) and René Grotenhuis (independent consultant, formerly director of Cordaid, the Netherlands).

Table 3.4 Characteristic statements for factor IV: 'peace as process'

Statement	*Visions*				
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
44. The objective of peacebuilding interventions is not peace as a state of affairs, but to 'keep the conversation going'.	−1	1	3	**5**	−1
15. Peace means empathy. Seeing the humanity of the other, even if you disagree with him.	5	0	−2	**5**	1
13. Peace is a process in which everyone is heard, based on inclusivity and equality.	3	0	2	**4**	0
38. In peace work, people are central, not politics or institutions.	0	−2	−3	**4**	−4
46. Peacebuilding should just be a matter of 'what needs to get done', without any political interference.	−2	−3	−1	**−5**	−5
27. Peace is the ability to live a "boring" life, within a predictably stable environment.	−4	0	2	**−5**	−2
22. Peace is not just about human beings, it also relates to living in harmony with the environment, the wholeness of creation.	4	−2	0	**−4**	−3

As Fig. 3.4 shows, this vision is found mostly amongst Dutch civil society peace workers, although the length of the error-bar shows that variation amongst diplomats is also particularly high. We will not go into the details of that here, but in Chap. 5 we will look into the reasons some diplomats have for subscribing to this vision of peace. One way to make sense of the relatively high scores that Dutch civil society peace workers have on this vision is to consider that a never-ending peace process also means they will never be out of a job. Moreover, if peace is only about the 'how' (the process) and not the 'what' (the desired end state), they can avoid awkward discussions about whether supporting some kind of activity falls under their mandate or not, allowing them maximum flexibility and pragmatism. As the former director of a large Dutch NGO put it: 'If you consider peace to be an end state, it leads to all kinds of ideal-typical discussions. Like is healthcare part of peace or not?' [31] However, there is also a less cynical reason for Dutch civil society peace workers to endorse this vision, as the same interview shows: 'often, those discussions [about peace as a goal] are about really long-term vistas, whereas the people in Congo are not worrying about what their country will look like 30 years

[31] Interview Grotenhuis.



Fig. 3.4 Average group scores on factor IV: 'peace as process'. (Note: Dashed line indicates average value over the five groups)

from now, but how to make sure they make it to next month.'[32] By focusing on peace as a process rather than an outcome, such concerns can be dealt with as they arise.

3.1.5 Vision V: Peace as Politics

The final vision of peace stresses its inherently political-institutional character. Characteristic statements for this vision are that peace is intrinsically political (29, +5), that it is not a technocratic job (46, −5), and that politics and institutions are more important than individual people (38, −4). As a Dutch diplomat put it rather bluntly in response to this latter statement: 'Often, those individual people don't matter all that much. Except insofar as they are part of politics and institutions.'[33] Rather than an individual striving (as in vision I), or an experience (vision III), peace is seen as a characteristic of an environment in which people live, similar to how it is treated in vision II. Conflict itself is not considered to be a problem (statement 47, +3), since conflict 'is constitutive of politics' as one military

[32] Interview Grotenhuis.
[33] Interview anonymous Dutch diplomat #2.

Table 3.5 Characteristic statements for factor V: 'peace as politics'

Statement	*Visions*				
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
29. Peace is intrinsically political, so whether or not it has been reached will always be contested.	−1	−2	−2	2	**5**
17. Living in peace means living in freedom: having the ability to do what you want to do, or to be who you want to be, as long as you don't hinder anyone else with it.	1	2	0	−2	**5**
30. A peaceful society is a society that can change itself without using violence.	1	2	−3	2	**4**
43. Human rights, development and peace are inextricably linked: both human rights and development are part of peace.	3	1	2	1	**4**
47. Peace does not imply the absence of conflict, since conflict is also a force for change.	2	0	1	1	**3**
45. What peace looks like is different for different people.	0	−3	3	0	**3**
39. Peace is embedding the use of violence in a legal framework.	−3	1	0	−3	**−5**
46. Peacebuilding should just be a matter of 'what needs to get done', without any political interference.	−2	−3	−1	−5	**−5**
38. In peace work, people are central, not politics or institutions.	0	−2	−3	4	**−4**

interviewee put it.[34] Rather, the problem is violent conflict (statement 30, +4) and peace means, paraphrasing Von Clausewitz's definition of war (Von Clausewitz 1984 [1832]: 87), 'the continuation of politics with political means only'. Table 3.5 sums up the characteristic statements for this vision.

So far, the factor seems to represent rather adequately the concept of 'agonistic peace'. As we saw in Sect. 2.4.2 the academic adherents to that concept also stress the inherently conflictual character of peace. However, the final three statements that are characteristic for this factor (39, 17 and 43) are slightly puzzling in this respect. Nevertheless, the post-sorting interviews show that there is a connection to this vision of peace as the continuation of politics without Clausewitz's other means. Curbing violence by legal means (statement 39, −5) is not thought to be sufficient for peace, because 'Saddam Hussein also had laws about the use of force', as an army officer put it.[35] Since legal rules are seen as the result of political

[34] Interview Jasper van Koppen (Dutch Army, national reserve).
[35] Interview Van Koppen.

decisions, they cannot serve as an independent guarantee that politics will remain non-violent. Personal freedom (statement 17, +5) can be conceived as a precondition for democratic, hence peaceful, politics. However, the high score for this statement might also be a reflection of a tendency (especially amongst Dutch military) to equate peace with freedom, based on the country's experience in World War II.[36] In Chap. 4 we will further investigate this military tendency to see peace as freedom, based on what they say about this in their post-sorting, as well as separate semi-structured interviews.

As Fig. 3.5 shows, this political vision of peace is most prominent amongst Dutch diplomats and military officers, and least amongst Mindanaoan civil society peace workers. This is an interesting finding, given that the interviews on Mindanao took place at the height of the political peace process and most respondents were somehow involved in this process as well. Thus, their relatively low scores on this vision of peace



Fig. 3.5 Average group scores on factor V, 'peace as politics'. (Note: Dashed line indicates average value over the five groups)

[36] Which was more of an occupation than an actual war and ended with a (military) liberation by the allied forces that is still celebrated widely each year. Especially military interviewees often still mention this as a constitutive idea of the peace they are defending. E.g. interview General Mart de Kruif (Dutch Army), Eric Overtoom (Dutch Army, national reserve) and Maj. Hazelbag.

call for an explanation, that will be developed in Chap. 8, based on an in-depth analysis of both the Q sorts and the semi-structured interviews.

3.2 A Non-Western Consensus?

If we combine the average group scores of all groups on all visions, we get an overall picture of where the differences between these groups are. This is graphically represented in Fig. 3.6 on the next page.

If we look at Fig. 3.6, two things stand out. First, instead of a consensus amongst the Dutch—as the liberal peace thesis would predict—we find moderate levels of support for all five visions. Moreover, there are significant differences in the level of support for specific visions of peace amongst the three groups. For example, the vision of peace as a universal ideal (represented by the squares in Fig. 3.6) is three times as popular amongst Dutch diplomats as it is amongst Dutch military officers.[37] Vision V, peace as politics, is the only vision that has rather high levels of support amongst all three Dutch groups, but these average around 30% only. Other visions are equally popular, most notably amongst Dutch civil society peace workers. There is no dominant vision that might be considered a consensus view.

In contrast, Lebanese and Mindanaoan peace workers tend to see peace almost exclusively as a personal endeavour (vision I). The level of support for this vision is almost five times as high as that for any of the other



Fig. 3.6 Average group scores on all five factors

[37] Its average level of support amongst diplomats is 26%, vs. 8% for Dutch military. See Appendix D.

visions.[38] Thus, if the data do show a consensus, it is a 'non-Western' one, an idea that stands in sharp contrast to the heterogeneity that is usually ascribed to non-Western concepts of peace (see e.g. van Leeuwen et al. 2012).

Although the finding is so robust that it will be taken very seriously in the coming chapters, two caveats apply to this idea of a 'non-Western personal peace consensus'. First of all, the outcome of a Q study partly depends on the breadth and depth of the Q set that people are asked to sort (Brown 1993: 95–96). In this case, the Q set was mainly built from statements drawn from previous interviews, primarily (though not exclusively) with Western peace workers.[39] Thus, the resulting visions might be biased towards Western conceptualizations of peace. To complement these visions, the next five chapters will also draw on semi-structured interviews to further elaborate the visions found amongst the five groups. These chapters will show that there is more variation, especially amongst the non-Western peace workers, than can be captured by this Q study. Even so, the finding is still highly relevant for scholars of international peacebuilding, since it shows what local peace workers find most attractive in an essentially Western concourse.[40]

Secondly, it falls beyond the scope of the present study to ascertain whether peace workers from other conflict areas share this same vision of peace. However, Lebanon and Mindanao were chosen in part because they are two very different contexts, so it is at least remarkable that civil society peace workers from these different contexts are so unanimous in their support for this vision. Moreover, other research has shown similar results for peace workers from, e.g., southern Sudan and South Africa (Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005; De la Rey and McKay 2006). Thus, the idea that peace is something personal would seem to apply to a broader range of non-Western peace workers.

This study also does not show whether this non-Western consensus is shared by a broader range of inhabitants of (post-)conflict areas, including what Richmond calls 'local-local' actors or 'subaltern' voices (Richmond 2011: 14–15; see also Spivak 1988; Mac Ginty 2013). All interviews were

[38] With the exception of Lebanese support for the vision of peace as politics. Which is quite interesting, because it directly contradicts what they say in semi-structured interviews. This contradiction will be explored in Chap. 7.

[39] See Sect. 1.2 above.

[40] As was explained in the introduction, 'concourse' is the technical term in Q methodology for a collection of statements about a certain topic from which the Q set is drawn.

conducted with professional peace workers, who often (though by no means always) make a living out of working for peace and/or consider working for peace to be their life's work. This might have biased the findings towards the vision of peace as a personal endeavour. However, studies of the ways peace is conceptualized by women in conflict areas (Paarlberg-Kvam 2018), as well as Firchow's recent book on everyday peace indicators (Firchow 2018) and anthropological studies into the meanings of peace in non-Western societies (e.g. Krijtenburg 2007; Babo-Soares 2004; Tasew 2009) also point to personal peace as an important consideration.

3.3 Refining the Conceptual Framework

So far, the analysis has yielded five different visions of peace, that are all held to a greater or lesser extent by the different groups under investigation. However, the objective of this chapter was not just to identify these different visions, but also to find out where exactly they differ from each other and to use those differences to further sharpen our conceptual framework. To remind the reader, Table 3.6 sums up the seven dimensions along which academic concepts of peace differ from one another, including the additional elements on some dimensions found in the discussion of peacebuilding literature in Sects. 2.3 and 2.4.

As Table 3.6 shows, this is an impressive list of potential differences between the operational visions. However, not all of these dimensions are equally useful in explaining these differences. The timeframe of a vision is, for example, hardly referred to by the respondents, although some do point out that imposing peace (as mentioned in statements 5 and 26) only works for a short time.[41] However, neither of these two statements is characteristic for any of the visions described above and most of the respondents who mention the time-dimension stress that their work for peace is a long-term effort.[42] In itself this is a useful observation, also in light of discussions about the need for long-term engagement (Advisory Group of Experts 2015: 13), but it makes the dimension rather useless for the purpose of comparing different visions of peace.

[41] E.g. interviews Gabriella Vogelaar (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), the Netherlands), Mathieu Hermans (PAX, the Netherlands), anonymous former Dutch diplomat #2 and anonymous diplomat #5 (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM).

[42] Idem.

Table 3.6 Seven dimensions of concepts of peace

Dimension	*Elements or endpoints*	
1. Ontology I	Negative	
	Positive	
2. Timeframe	Short-term	
	Medium-term	
	Long-term	
	Continuous	
3. Ontology II	Goal	
	Process	
4. Level	Individual	
	Community/subnational	
	National	
	International	
5. Domain	Political	
	Legal	
	Economic	
	Social	
	Psychological	
6. Values	Order	Legitimacy
	Justice	Emancipation
	Harmony	Conflict
	Stability	Equality
	Liberty	Care
	Inclusivity	Empathy
7. Embedding	Individuals	
	Institutions	

The value-dimension is also not very useful for comparing operational visions of peace, albeit for a different reason. On most statements that include values (e.g., statements 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 26 and 28) all factor scores are at least moderately positive. This shows that in practice, peace workers are not 'against' any values. However, with only a few exceptions, these statements do not receive very high scores either. This implies that most peace workers do not think that it matters very much whether peace is associated with one value or another. This view is confirmed in the post-sorting interviews, where many comments about specific values are more along the lines of 'that is also part of it' rather than outright support or rejection. The only two exceptions are 'empathy' (statement 15) for civil society peace workers and 'freedom' (statement

17) for military officers. However, as we saw above, the first is because civil society peace workers stress individual agency for peace, the second because of the Dutch experience in World War II. The general picture that emerges is that values matter, but, in contrast to the academic debate, value differences are not an overriding concern for professional peace workers.

Two of the other dimensions are useful to distinguish different visions of peace. The first of these is the second ontological dimension: whether peace is conceived of as a goal or a process. Vision IV—peace as process—was defined by its ontology, but we saw above that also adherents to vision I stressed that as a personal endeavour, peace is 'a quest' or something that requires follow-up 'on a "secondly" basis'.[43] In contrast, visions II and III treat peace as a goal—either a utopian one (vision II—peace as a universal ideal) or a very practical attainable one (vision III—freedom from fear). The embedding of peace in either individuals or institutions is also a relevant dimension. Visions I, III and IV look for peace in individuals—either in their agency (visions I and IV) or in their experience of peace (vision III)—whereas visions II and V are more about building institutions that can 'anchor' peace.

The final three dimensions—ontology 1 (positive/negative), level and domain—are useful for the comparison, but not immediately so. As we saw in the previous section, a lot of the difference between non-Western and Western visions of peace can be captured by distinguishing 'personal' from 'political' visions of peace. This is a dimension that was not part of the conceptual framework, but it combines elements from the dimensions 'level' and 'domain'. Personal peace is an individual-level psychological and social phenomenon, whereas political peace is a collective, most often international-level, political process. The other levels and domains are not really useful for explaining the differences between visions. Either because everyone agrees about their importance, for instance the consensus that peace is a community-level phenomenon,[44] or because they are not mentioned by any of the respondents.

Although this dimension might be thought to overlap with the previous one—the embedding in individuals or institutions—the two dimensions are analytically, and to some extent also empirically, different. Whether peace is considered a personal or a political phenomenon says

[43] Interviews Chaftari and Merhej.

[44] Statement 48, scores of respectively +1, +4, +5, +3 and +2.

something about the domain in which an actor operates. Peace workers promoting personal peace might, for example, engage in trauma counselling for victims of conflict, so that they regain their 'peace of mind'—a psychological concept of peace. Or they might engage in peace education, so that children learn to solve conflicts—with their peers or their parents—in non-violent ways. Peace workers working on political peace on the other hand, would focus on lobby to get a peace agreement signed, or organize demonstrations against certain government policies.

The dimension of individuals or institutions on the other hand, is about the embedding of peace. Individuals working for peace might both engage in yoga classes to further their own peace of mind (or in trauma healing or peace education), but also participate in demonstrations, strikes or sit-ins to further political peace. A Nelson Mandela or Mahatma Ghandi would equally be an example of an individual working for political peace. Peace workers subscribing to, e.g., the vision of peace as process, which is an example of a vision of political peace that depends on individual agency, would seek to support such individuals. On the other hand, peace workers who look for peace in institutions would either support efforts at political reform, rule of law and democratization (if they want to further political peace) or seek to institutionalize peace education in a school's curriculum—in order to further personal peace. Both combinations do exist and we will see in the next five chapters that tensions exist along both dimensions.

Finally, we have the dimension of positive or negative peace. In order to shed light on the differences between peace workers' operational visions, also the positive/negative dichotomy will have to be reworked. We saw in Chap. 2 that in the peacebuilding literature, peace is widely considered a positive phenomenon—something that can be built.[45] The same is true for the large majority of the peace workers who participated in the Q study. The statement that 'peace is the absence of war, nothing more, nothing less' (statement 34) received a positive score (of +2) only on vision II, that in itself is also a positive vision of peace, since it sees peace as a moral compass comprising much more than just the absence of war. Thus, the original dichotomy does not seem to do any explanatory work.

However, when we think of negative and positive peace as a continuum rather than a dichotomy (cf. Davenport et al. 2018) the dimension turns out to be quite relevant. On this reading, negative peace is considered a rather minimalistic form of peace. It is mentioned by quite a few respon-

[45] See Chap. 2, Sects. 2.3 and 2.4.



Fig. 3.7 The 'peace cube': a graphical depiction of the four dimensions along which operational visions of peace differ from one another

dents, but most of them stress that peace is more than that and that they work on a positive peace.[46] What they disagree on, however, is 'how much more' peace entails. We saw above that adherents to vision II—peace as a universal ideal—stress that the concept should not be made to include too much more, whereas adherents to vision I—peace as a personal endeavour—also include 'harmony with all of creation' (statement 22) in their vision. I will refer to this ontological dimension as the 'scope' of a vision.

This leaves us four dimensions that capture the differences between the five visions from the Q study: personal or political, ontology (process or goal) embedding (in individuals or institutions) and scope. Taken together, these four dimensions form the 'peace cube' that is graphically depicted in Fig. 3.7. In this figure, three of the four dimensions are plotted on the x,y and z-axes. Any vision can be projected as a point in this three-dimensional space, or rather as a 'chunk' of the cube.[47] The fourth dimension, scope, can be visualized as the size of this chunk. More holistic visions of peace

[46] E.g. interviews anonymous diplomat #3 (Dutch MoFA, Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH)), Michel Rentenaar (Dutch MoFA, former Political Advisor to ISAF), Theo Brinkel (Royal Military Academy, the Netherlands), anonymous programme officer (Cordaid, the Netherlands), Jan Jaap van Oosterzee (PAX, the Netherlands), Saab and Mourad.

[47] It should be stressed here that the cube is a visualization of a certain way of conceptualizing peace, not a three-dimensional graph plotting the outcome of some quantitative study.



Fig. 3.8 Five visions of peace rendered on the four-dimensional peace cube

take up more space in the cube than less holistic ones. This cube will be used as the conceptual framework in the subsequent case study chapters.

If we plot the five visions on this peace cube, we get something like Fig. 3.8, depicted below. The exact positions and sizes of the cubes representing the different visions are debatable, but the picture that emerges is clear. The five visions differ from one another along all of the four dimensions. Visions I and III treat peace as a personal phenomenon, the others as something political. Visions I, III and IV look for peace in individuals, II and V in institutions. Visions II and III see peace as a goal to be reached, on visions I, IV and V it is more of a process. Finally, vision III has the smallest scope, II is slightly broader, IV and V are broader again and I is the most holistic vision of all.

Conceptualizing peace as a concept with a plural has two advantages over previous approaches to the study of peacebuilding. First, previous conceptual tools like hybridity (Boege et al. 2008; Mac Ginty 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016), friction (Millar et al. 2013; Björkdahl et al. 2016), top-down vs. bottom up (Charbonneau and Parent 2013; Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016) peace formation (Van Tongeren et al. 2012; Richmond 2013) but also new approaches like adaptive peacebuilding (De Coning 2018) all focus on the way peace is brought about, rather than on what is being brought about. I do not want to deny that power differences between local and international actors play a role in what kind of peace is established in a (post-)conflict area, nor that it would be useful to have more attention for bottom-up initiatives or the workings of complexity,

but without understanding the differences in the outcomes that actors desire, all of these theories tell only part of the story. One of the centrals claims of this book is that part of the friction in international peacebuilding comes from actors just not working on the same kind of peace. This also implies that part of the problem of bringing together, for instance, bottom-up and top-down efforts at peacebuilding is that bottom-up peacebuilders (like the civil society peace workers from Lebanon and Mindanao) might be working on a different peace—personal peace—than top-down peace workers like the Dutch diplomats. Hence, there might not be anything to practically bring together, other than under a rather holistic and abstract concept of 'positive peace'.

This brings me to the second advantage. Concepts like post-liberal peace (Richmond 2011) or sustaining peace, that try to expand the concept of peace in response to the perceived disarray (Richmond 2011: 4), or even crisis (Chandler 2017), of peacebuilding, still fall for the fallacy that 'all roads lead to Rome' or that all peacebuilding activities can be subsumed under one 'deliberate meta policy' (Mahmoud and Makoond 2017: 3). As we will see below,[48] some differences between visions can be seen as complementarities, but others lead to real tensions. Moreover, every organization in the peacebuilding field has its own mandate, mission and vision, specialized personnel and limited resources. Hence, if we want to understand the complex practices of inter-organizational cooperation that we so easily refer to as 'peacebuilding', it might be more useful to think of these different peacebuilding actors as working on different peaces, rather than endlessly expanding the concept of peace until it covers any activity undertaken in either post- or pre-conflict settings.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented the results of a Q study amongst five groups of peace workers. Its main finding is that a large majority of the non-Western respondents sees peace as a personal endeavour. With a slight leap of the imagination we can call this the 'personal peace consensus'. Although more research in different (post-)conflict areas is needed to verify whether this truly is a non-Western consensus, we can juxtapose it to the liberal peace consensus that some academic authors propose (Richmond 2005; Paris 2004). This 'Western' consensus was not found to exist amongst the

[48] In Sect. 9.4.

Dutch respondents in this study, although this might be different for respondents from other countries. Rather, Dutch military, diplomatic and civil society peace workers clearly have different preferences when it comes to their visions of peace. In the next five chapters these differences, and the tensions they lead to in the practical work of military, diplomatic and civil society peace workers—both Western and non-Western—will be explored in more detail.

We will do so by using a modified version of the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter: the four-dimensional 'peace cube'. The most important change in this adjusted model is that the dimensions 'level' and 'domain' were merged into a new dimension that reflects the differences between Western and non-Western peace workers: peace is envisioned as either a personal or a political phenomenon. The first ontological dimension—positive or negative peace—was reworked into a continuum: the scope of a vision. The dimensions 'time-frame' and 'values' were dropped.

Although this has been a sizeable chapter, within the broader study it serves mostly as a first take on the different operational visions that our five groups of peace workers have. The next five chapters will each provide an in-depth analysis of the visions found amongst one group of respondents. In each chapter, the analysis of these visions builds on the previous chapter(s), as well as on the findings presented in this chapter. We will start (in Chap. 4) with the visions espoused by Dutch military officers, look at the visions of Dutch diplomats in Chap. 5, then those of Dutch civil society peace workers (Chap. 6), Lebanese civil society peace workers (Chap. 7), and finally (in Chap. 8) the visions of Mindanaoan civil society peace workers. In the conclusion (Chap. 9) all of these visions will be compared to one another, as well as to the academic concepts, and critiques, encountered in Chap. 2.

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CHAPTER 4

Military Visions of Peace

For Mali, I think we are already doing really well if we can get to the point where people have some food and don't have to fear for their lives. That's where it stops. But it also stops there, because otherwise we'll start to impose our cultural views on them. […] And I think with that we would be creating unrest that can again threaten the peace.
(Interview anonymous Dutch pilot)

This quote, from an anonymous Dutch helicopter pilot who had just returned from the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), nicely summarizes the vision of peace that most Dutch military officers have of the peace they are bringing to conflict areas. It is not a very ambitious peace (food and physical security), but it is so on purpose: bringing anything more ambitious (like democracy) might threaten the peace again, because 'we', the interveners, would impose our own ideas, norms and values on a population that might think differently. This combination of modesty about their own goals and relativism about peace is representative of the vision that was labelled 'freedom from fear' in Chap. 3.

In that chapter, we saw that in the Q study military officers scored highest on the vision of peace as politics (vision V) and were the only ones with a significant adherence to the vision of freedom from fear (vision III). We will now expand our analysis of these military visions of peace, drawing on both their post-sorting interviews and additional semi-structured

G. M. van Iterson Scholten, *Visions of Peace of Professional Peace Workers*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
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interviews. These show that the high average score on vision V actually reflects two separate visions of peace. On the one hand, military respondents score high on this vision because they believe their efforts are part of a wider political effort to (re-) establish a functional state authority in (post-)conflict areas. On the other hand, some respondents score high on this vision not based on what they try to bring to (post-)conflict areas, but what they try to defend at home: freedom.[1]

This gives us three military visions of peace to explore. We will see below that they differ from one another mostly in how holistic they are. At the minimum, for the military respondents peace means that the civilian population of a (post-)conflict area experiences *freedom from fear* (vision III from the last chapter). This is what an army can (or should try to) establish in a conflict zone, at least for as long as the troops are stationed there. The next vision expands peace to the political realm. It comprises *a functioning state authority* that can maintain law and order on its own. Finally, the most comprehensive form of peace is *peace-as-freedom*: personal freedom for every individual, so long as this freedom does not impinge on the freedom of others. This, however, is not something a military mission can bring to conflict-affected areas, but rather the peace they are defending at home, in the Netherlands.

Two things are remarkable about these visions. First, for many respondents, especially those with a more holistic vision of peace, these are not so much separate visions, but rather three different steps on a 'stairway' that leads from negative to positive peace.[2] Many of the interviewees explicitly endorse more than one vision of peace, stating, e.g., that 'as a military officer, I am not the one to carry that political aspect [of peace]. […] We make sure there is a safe environment, so that the political process can take place.'[3]

The second remarkable finding is that the military officers interviewed were almost unanimously relativistic about peace. Peace is not a universal ideal, but something that people in conflict areas will have to establish amongst themselves, according to local standards. As an air force officer rather bluntly put it: 'we will never succeed in making Afghanistan, Bosnia

[1] Accounting for the somewhat puzzling high score (+5) on the statement that 'peace is freedom' in this vision that was briefly discussed in Sect. 3.1.5.

[2] E.g. interviews Colonel Dr. Allard Wagemaker (defense attaché, interview in private capacity), anonymous pilot and Colonel Kees Matthijssen (military advisor at the ministry of Foreign Affairs/former ISAF-commander).

[3] Interview Major General (ret.) Patrick Cammaert.

or Iraq "Western". People just have a different mindset there.'[4] Thus, many military interviewees can easily imagine that peace means something different to other actors, either actors in the areas where they operate,[5] or other professional peace workers, such as civil society actors.[6] If there is a universally accepted concept of peace, it is just that people everywhere 'will want to raise their children in safety.'[7] However, this universal desire does not translate very well into a universal vision of peace. Local ownership and local responsibility are extremely important and international interveners should not let themselves 'be guided too much by [their] own preoccupations.'[8] For example, as another respondent put even more boldly: 'whether "living your normal life" includes going to school depends on the local culture. In Afghanistan, you are an adult at the age of 14. […] That goes against the international Convention on the Rights of the Child, but it is peaceful.'[9] We will now look at the three military visions in depth.

4.1 The Base Layer: Freedom from Fear in a Safe and Secure Environment

The most basic, or minimal, vision of peace endorsed by the military respondents is the idea that 'peace is a situation that people can live their lives, that their children can go to school, that they can go to work, do whatever they want in their pastime, without running a major risk of bombings or shootings.'[10] There will always be some level of violent threats (e.g., criminal violence) to people's security, but as long as these are not major threats, there is 'some kind of peace, or at least a beginning of peace.'[11] This vision was labeled *freedom from fear* in Chap. 3, since it stresses that peace has to be experienced in the everyday lives of people. Two things are important about it.

First, peace is an experience, rather than an objective state of affairs. What the military does in post-conflict zones is establish a safe and secure

[4] Anonymous interview (Ministry of Defence, evaluations division).
[5] E.g. interviews Major Martijn Hädicke (Dutch Army) and anonymous pilot.
[6] Interview anonymous captain (Dutch Army, Land Training Centre).
[7] Interview anonymous Dutch army chaplain.
[8] Interview Lieutenant Erik Noordam (Dutch navy, CIMIC officer).
[9] Interview Maj. Hädicke.
[10] Interview Col. Matthijssen.
[11] Interview Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert.

environment, most elementary by making people stop fighting and then making sure they do not start again.[12] But interviewees stress that they do so in order for the civilian population in those areas to be able to experience a 'feeling of peace' in their everyday lives.[13] It is the absence of *fear* of violent conflict rather than the absence of armed violence per se that constitutes peace.

The fact that freedom from fear is seen as an experience, not an abstract state of affairs, has consequences for the actual jobs that military perform when on a mission. Those cannot be decided in advance or at a ministry in The Hague, but should depend on what is locally needed. In a 2000 article in the New York Times, future secretary of state Condoleeza Rice was quoted as saying that 'we don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to Kindergarten' (Gordon 2000). That remark on what American marines should and should not do has taken up a life of its own in academic and policymaking circles (e.g. Ottaway 2002; Kaldor and Beebe 2010: 104–141; Preble 2011: 131–132), but the point is that most of my respondents would disagree. Sometimes the 82nd Airborne division (or any other division) does need to accompany children to Kindergarten. If, within a certain context, that is what it takes for people to feel—relatively—more secure. As a colonel working at the ministry of Defence put it: 'what matters in the end is that the population feels safe. And people feel safe, because they see that the military are there.'[14] At the same time he also acknowledged that this carried something of a paradox: 'it's like putting more cops on the street. That is proposed as a policy measure to make people feel more safe. But if I see more cops on the street I don't feel safe at all. Because I wonder what all the cops are doing in my neighbourhood.'[15] Thus, it is far from certain whether the military alone can actually bring this kind of peace to an area. Quite some of the military respondents argue they cannot, one with the colourful expression that 'fighting for peace is like fucking for virginity'.[16] Others argue that the

[12] Interview Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert.

[13] E.g. interviews anonymous Dutch pilot, Colonel Erwin Hoogland (Dutch Ministry of Defence, department of operations), Major Daan Boissevain (Dutch Air Force), anonymous Colonel (Dutch Army).

[14] Interview Col. Hoogland.

[15] Idem.

[16] Interview Lt. Noordam. Similar views were expressed by e.g. the anonymous interviewee at the evaluations division, Col. Dr. Wagemaker and the anonymous army chaplain.

military can only create the conditions in which other actors can work on sustainable peace.[17]

However, before we look into that more sustainable peace, we should pause and consider the example of bringing children to school in some more detail. Interestingly, 'sending one's children to school' is brought up quite often as an indicator of peace. Not only by the military respondents, but also by civil society peace workers from both the Netherlands and Mindanao.[18] As an indicator, it indicates two things. First of all that the environment is safe enough for people to let their children out of sight, signalling a confidence that no harm will come to them while they are at school. This is consistent with the psychological reading of freedom from fear discussed here: people *feel* safe enough to let their children out of sight. But it is also signalling something else, that may be at least as important for the experience of peace: a long-term perspective. Even though the establishment of a safe and secure environment is a short-term military goal,[19] freedom from fear also means a long-term expectation that things will remain peaceful. It only makes sense to send your children to school if you think they will live long enough to benefit from their education. Likewise, it only makes sense to sow crops if you expect to be able to harvest them.[20] The experience of 'living in peace' is linked to an expectation of stability, both in society at large and in one's own private life.[21] This long-term aspect makes military officers wonder whether they really are contributing to peace, since they know that inevitably their mission will end long before those children will graduate.[22]

This brings us to the second important point about this vision of peace: it is always established in a context of non-peace. Hopefully it is a first step towards more sustainable forms of peace, but many respondents acknowledge that this is not always the case. As the Dutch helicopter pilot quoted above phrased it: 'if we have to go on a peacekeeping operation, the 'peace' in that peacekeeping is at best doubtful. Otherwise there would

[17] E.g. interviews Major Lenny Hazelbag (Dutch Army), Major General Marc van Uhm (Dutch Army).

[18] E.g. interviews Annemarie Sweeris (PAX), Marianne Brandt (PAX), Peter van Tuijl (GPPAC), Aveen Acuña-Gulo (independent consultant, Mindanao), Elvyra Ang Sinco (ZFD, Mindanao).

[19] As was argued in Chap. 3.

[20] Interview Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert.

[21] Interview Colonel Björn de Heer (Dutch Ministry of Defence, CIMIC division).

[22] E.g. interviews Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert and Maj. Hädicke.

not be any reason for us to go and keep it. So it is quite likely that […] the people there do not experience that situation as peace.'[23] Military officers do recognize that freedom from fear requires a long-term perspective, but they lament the fact that they can never really bring such a perspective, because they will leave once the first step has been taken. Thus, their mission goal often is not peace, but at best 'something like stability'.[24] In Chap. 3, this sentiment was expressed in a high score on the statement that one needs to distinguish the ideal of peace from what can be done in practice.[25] Military officers are idealistic enough to aspire to more holistic visions of peace, but realistic enough to see that in practice, much of their work is 'nothing but aspirin'.[26] It might improve people's experience of the situation, but it does not really solve any underlying issues.

4.2 Towards Sustainable Peace: A Functioning State Authority

If the freedom from fear that military missions are establishing is considered a first step only, the question becomes what other steps are necessary.[27] About one third of the military respondents stress that in the end, peace requires a functioning state authority: 'if a country is able to govern itself, we're done'.[28] This is a far more ambitious goal than in the previous vision. It means that peace shifts from being an individual experience to being a more abstract political state of affairs, that requires not only individual agency, but also some embedding in institutions.[29] Given this focus on statebuilding and governance, it might be tempting to say that these military officers at least *are* part of the liberal peace consensus identified in the literature, even though we saw in the previous chapter that this

[23] Interview anonymous Dutch pilot. Similar views were expressed by a.o. Derek Suchard (army chaplain), Maj. Hädicke, Lieutenant General (ret.) Lex Oostendorp (Dutch Army) and the anonymous interviewee at the Ministry of Defence, International Military Co-operation division.

[24] Interview Maj. Hädicke

[25] See Sect. 3.1.3.

[26] Interview Col. De Heer.

[27] We saw above that for military officers, peace is a step-by-step process, where every goal that is achieved leads to a new, more ambitious, goal.

[28] Interview Lt. Gen. De Kruif. Similar views were expressed by a.o. Col. Dr. Wagemaker and Col. Matthijssen.

[29] Interviews Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert and Maj. Hazelbag.

consensus is not very widely shared amongst the Dutch peace workers participating in the Q study.[30] However, there are two crucial differences.

First, where the liberal peace is supposed to be a universal ideal, military officers stress that the kind of peace, and hence also the kind of state that is built in, e.g., Afghanistan is totally different from Western states. In the words of a major: 'we look at statebuilding processes in Europe. And we use those as some sort of foundation for how to build a state in Afghanistan. But perhaps that foundation doesn't fit at all to the kind of state we can build there.'[31] Or, as a retired major general asked rhetorically: 'Why would we want to change a 2000 year old tribal system?'[32] Most crucially, this relativism and the limited role outsiders can play, imply that 'foreigners, or international organizations, can never decide that now there is peace [in an area]'.[33] Peacebuilding is a thoroughly local process, where outside actors can only create some of the boundary conditions, like the establishment of a safe and secure environment or the provision of economic resources to pay for statebuilding processes. But, as a young major pointed out, even seemingly neutral, technocratic objectives like the restoration of authority—arguably a minimal requirement for a functioning state—are interpreted differently by—in his case—the central government of Mali and local rebel groups.[34] International interveners should be well aware of those differences and not try to impose their own preferences or worry too much about their own preoccupations. As another young officer put it, the moment the international community decides that certain local practices cannot be tolerated, or that certain Western practices have to be adopted, they become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.[35]

This relativism is not specific to the adherents to this vision of peace only. We saw in the previous chapter that both vision III—freedom from fear—and vision V—peace as politics—scored relatively high on the statement that peace means something different to different people.[36] It is no coincidence that these are also the visions that have the most support

[30] See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3 and Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2 above.
[31] Interview Maj. Hazelbag.
[32] Interview Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert.
[33] Interview Maj. Daan Boissevain (Dutch Air Force).
[34] Interview Maj. Hädicke.
[35] Interview Lt. Noordam.
[36] See Sects. 3.1.3 and 3.1.5. Both visions have a score +3 on statement 45: What peace looks like is different for different people.

amongst military officers. We will return to this observation in the conclusion to this chapter.

The second major difference between the liberal peace and the military vision on statebuilding is that military officers tend to stress the role of individual agency, rather than the necessity of building institutions. As a retired general who is now advising the UN on peacebuilding put it: 'you can have the best institutions in the world, but if you don't have the right people, things will still go all wrong'.[37] Conversely, if the people in charge are not corrupt and do not cling to power, they are able to transform the institutions they lead.[38] Peace requires strong leadership, hence peace workers have to work with whoever has a local power base in order to achieve anything at all.[39] Democratic institutions are needed to make sure these strong leaders make room for a new generation of leaders and institutions after a while—preferably as soon as possible,[40] but in the step-by-step approach of military peace workers, building up these institutions is again a next step, and not one that is easily done in a post-conflict setting, nor one that international peace workers can help a lot with.

4.3 A Peace Worth Defending: Peace-as-Freedom

Finally, some military officers see their job not so much as bringing peace to other areas, but rather as defending peace—or freedom—in the Netherlands. None of the other groups of respondents has a similar dualistic image of their work for peace, so the vision is slightly odd in this respect. It is also less directly relevant for our quest to understand how different visions of the peace to be established lead to tensions between different groups of peace workers doing the establishing in an area. However, as will be argued below, the vision is definitely useful in order to understand the observed military relativism. And hence, on a higher level of abstraction, also to understand why the military visions of peace lead to much less tensions with the visions of other groups than might be expected if we focus—as is commonly done—at the means that military employ to bring peace about. Therefore, and because it is a vision that came up regularly in the interviews, I included it in the analysis.

[37] Interview Major General (ret.) Cammaert.

[38] Idem. Similar views were expressed by Jasper van Koppen (Dutch Army, national reserve) and Maj. Hazelbag.

[39] Interview Lt. Gen. (ret.) Oostendorp.

[40] Interview Col. Dr. Wagemaker.

Military interviewees conceptualize peace 'at home' rather differently from the peace(s) they are seeking to establish in conflict areas. As we saw, in conflict areas they consider to be 'doing really well, if we can get to the point where people have some food and don't have to fear for their lives.'[41] In contrast, what they are defending in Europe is a rather expansive concept of freedom: 'the possibility to develop yourself in all thinkable dimensions. […] without any limits, except that you take the needs of others into account. […] I think that is the most far-reaching form of peace there is.'[42]

Here, the idea that there is a 'stairway' of ever more holistic forms of peace comes out very clearly. When asked for examples of the kind of peace they are defending, respondents came up with examples as different as defending the freedom of homosexuals to walk hand in hand with their partner, the freedom of expression and the freedom to practice whatever religion one wants.[43] Threats to these freedoms, or to the way in which 'we Dutch' live our lives, are perceived as threats to peace in the Netherlands, echoing a discourse well known from the War on Terror. At the same time, their experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali or other conflict areas, has taught them that not all people everywhere share this same way of life. If peace equals freedom, it also entails the possibility that people freely choose not to live a Western lifestyle. We see here the same relativism as in the two previous visions. People have to decide for themselves what they want, and that includes the possibility to give up certain freedoms. As a reserve captain put it rather strongly: 'if they want to live under Al Shabab, so be it'.[44] Imposing Western freedoms on people in (post-) conflict areas means that—just as with imposing Western institutions of governance—international peacebuilders become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.[45]

4.4 Underlying Dimensions

Where do these visions put the Dutch military in our conceptual model? Figure 4.1 is a graphical representation of the three visions along the axes of the peace cube. It clearly shows that the different visions have an

[41] Interview anonymous pilot.
[42] Interview Maj. Hazelbag.
[43] Interviews Maj. Hazelbag, Col. De Heer and anonymous pilot.
[44] Interview Jasper van Koppen.
[45] Interviews Maj. Hädicke and anonymous pilot.



Fig. 4.1 Three military visions of peace

increasingly broad scope—graphically represented as the size of the cube that represents the vision—as we go from freedom from fear via a functioning state authority to peace-as-freedom. The vision of peace-as-freedom is depicted as partially outside the conceptual cube to signal that freedom is a larger objective than peace per se. Moreover, its outline is shaded rather than solidly filled to indicate that this is not a vision of a peace the respondents are trying to establish in (post-) conflict areas, but rather a peace they are defending at home. I will briefly elaborate on each dimension.

As mentioned, the dimension on which the three visions differ the most is their scope. Freedom from fear is a really narrow vision of peace, establishing a functioning state authority is somewhat broader and peace-as-freedom is a rather holistic vision of peace. However, these differences hide a more fundamental consensus amongst the military respondents: their *contribution* to peace is always rather limited. This modesty is only partially translated into the scope of their visions of peace, but we will see in the next chapters that this is a marked difference to how other groups of peace workers, especially civil society, envision peace. For instance, many civil society peace workers from Mindanao also stress that peace is an individually felt experience, but they insist that that experience includes much more than just freedom from fear.[46]

[46] See Chap. 8, Sect. 8.2.1.

On the second dimension, the embedding in individuals or institutions, all military respondents look for peace primarily in individuals, not in institutions. Even those arguing for a functioning state authority as a second step in building peace, stress that it requires individual leadership—rather than technocratic institution-building—to bring this about.[47] On the other two visions, peace is squarely an individual affair: both freedom from fear and peace-as-freedom are an individual experience, not something that can easily be institutionalized. In this, they markedly differ from the majority of Dutch diplomats, as the next chapter will show.

On the third dimension, personal vs. political notions of peace, the scores are more mixed. The visions of freedom from fear and peace-as-freedom are in essence very personal concepts of peace. Only the vision of peace as a functioning state authority is political in character. How does this match with the finding from Chap. **3** that military respondents score relatively high on the vision of peace-as-politics?[48] Part of the answer is that this vision combined elements of two of the military visions: not only the vision of a functioning state authority, but also peace-as-freedom. However, the interviews show two more reasons why military officers do consider peace to be a political phenomenon. The first is that the decision to deploy (or withdraw) troops is, and according to most respondents should be, a political decision. Especially the decision to withdraw the Dutch armed forces from the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is quoted as a prominent example of how peace is 'politicized'. Because of a lack of parliamentary support the Dutch government declared that the region where the Dutch forces were stationed was now so peaceful that the troops were no longer needed. In contrast, many of my respondents stress that establishing peace in Afghanistan—even in its most limited form—would have required years of intensive—if phased—international involvement.[49]

The second reason is that respondents stress that before they get deployed to an area, a political deal between the conflicting parties ought to have been reached. If not, there is no peace to keep.[50] Arguably, this does not hold for cases of military intervention that are often discussed in the peacebuilding literature. However, perhaps unlike their American or

[47] E.g. interviews Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert, Lt. Gen. De Kruif, Col. Dr. Wagemaker.

[48] Vision V, peace as politics. See Sect. 3.1.5.

[49] Interviews Maj. Hazelbag, Maj. Hädicke, Col. Dr. Wagemaker, Lt. Gen. De Kruif, Lt. Gen. Oostendorp.

[50] Interview Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert.

British counterparts, Dutch military are deployed mostly in post-settlement operations, just like their colleagues from many other middle-sized powers.

Moreover, military officers are not directly involved in either of the two political processes described above. In their view, politicians decide on starting or ending a mission and diplomats are responsible for negotiating peace agreements. Thus, the military respondents stress that in their day-to-day work, they strive to be neutral and try not to get caught up in the political machinations of the country or region they are deployed in. The adherents to the vision of *freedom from fear* do this by emphasizing that they just try to help the people there to live better lives.[51] By providing security and perhaps some opportunities for development—by, e.g., reconstructing roads or building schools—for *all* people in their area of operations, regardless of their political differences. Respondents who say they work on establishing a functioning state authority more often realize that by establishing a presence in an area they become part of the political environment, but stress that working for peace means trying to minimize this political interference and be as neutral as possible.[52] This resonates strongly with their relativism about Western values and institutions. Solving the political issues in a country should be left to the people in that country, military missions merely provide the safe and secure environment in which such processes can take place.

On the fourth dimension—ontology—defending freedom is clearly a continuous process. This is also stressed in the interviews, for instance when a reserve officer remarked that in the Netherlands, we live in peace until some violent incident happens or another interviewee that peace requires continuously monitoring threats.[53] However, when it comes to their visions on what they are establishing in (post-)conflict areas, they clearly see peace as a (mission) goal. Either a rather limited goal—freedom from fear—or a somewhat more expansive one—establishing a functioning state authority—but both visions describe a certain state of affairs, rather than an everlasting process.

In numerical terms, about half of the military interviewees says that peace is a process, the other half says it is a goal. Partly this can be explained by the difference between people who envision peace as freedom and

[51] E.g. interviews major Hädicke, anonymous pilot, anonymous captain (Dutch Army, Land Training Centre).

[52] E.g. interviews Maj. Hazelbag, Col. de Heer.

[53] Interviews Jasper van Koppen and Col. de Heer.

those who conceive of it as an end to fighting, or the establishment of freedom from fear. However, there is also a sizeable group that only rather hesitatingly chooses between the two, arguing rather that peace is both a process and a goal. Or more specifically, that it is a step-by-step process, in which every step consists of an identifiable goal.[54] This means that in their practical work to establish peace, military are working towards a certain cut-off point in this process, that can be called the 'end-state' that allows them to leave again.[55] The end-state might not be an ideal peace, but the steps after it will have to be climbed without military assistance. We will see in Chap. 6 that this metaphor of peace as a 'stairway' with identifiable steps clashes with the view of civil society peaceworkers who stress that peace requires a lot of *simultaneous* efforts in order to become sustainable.

4.5 Conclusion

Dutch military officers work on three different visions of peace: freedom from fear, a functioning state authority and peace-as-freedom. Three things are remarkable about these visions. First, the respondents make a clear distinction between what they are defending at home—peace-as-freedom—and what they try to build in (post-)conflict areas—freedom from fear or a functioning state authority. Secondly, they tend to treat these visions as three consecutive steps on a 'stairway' that leads to ever-more holistic forms of peace. First you have to secure an area, then you can start working on other goals, such as the (re-) establishment of political authority, (economic) development or reconciliation projects.[56] And before a country can enjoy peace-as-freedom, a lot of other steps on this stairway will have to be taken. Finally, they are remarkably relativistic about their visions of peace, stressing that other people will probably have different opinions.

Whether this relativism is a cause or a consequence of the division of peace into various small steps is a chicken-and-egg question that cannot be answered based on the available data. Nor does it necessarily have to be

[54] Interview Col. Matthijssen. Similar views were expressed by Eric Overtoom (Dutch Army, national reserve), Col. de Heer, Col. Dr. Wagemaker and the anonymous pilot.

[55] E.g. interviews anonymous pilot, Maj. Hädicke, Theo Brinkel (Netherlands Defence Academy), Col. De Heer. The term mostly surfaces in debates over whether military operations should end on a certain end-*date*, or after reaching a certain end-*state*. See e.g. (Noll et al. 2016).

[56] E.g. interviews Lt. Noordam, anonymous army chaplain, Maj. Hädicke.

answered. For our purpose—identifying the actual differences between the visions of peace that various groups of actors have and the tensions these lead to—we can conclude two things. First, the military relativism—as well as their modesty when it comes to their own role in establishing any kind of peace—makes it more likely that their visions of peace can be complementary to the visions of other peace workers than that they lead to tensions with these other visions. Secondly, that their step-by-step approach to climbing the 'stairway of peace' conflicts both with grand visions of peace such as the academic liberal peace and with visions that stress that peace is a cyclical, never-ending process, such as vision IV we encountered in the last chapter. We will see in the coming chapters whether this indeed leads to tensions between military and other peace workers.

One final note. It might be tempting to view the military relativism and modesty as scepticism or perhaps even cynicism. The fact that they do not think the international community will ever succeed in building sustainable peace—that all international efforts are 'nothing but aspirin', as one respondent put it[57]—can easily be framed as an expression of the sceptical worldview of people who spend their life fighting others. However, this fails to do justice to the military on two accounts. First of all, with the exception of a few die-hard hawks, who consider themselves to be not peace workers but 'war-goers',[58] who are 'trained to destroy things',[59] many respondents stress that military officers are 'the greatest pacifists there are'.[60] About two thirds of them do believe that peace is attainable, and they do not mean just freedom from fear with that, but also a functioning state authority[61] and peace-as-freedom.[62]

More importantly, taking the military relativism seriously offers opportunities for more locally grounded peace work. As we saw in Chap. 2, critical scholars also point out that the forms of governance implemented in a post-conflict country should mirror local preferences rather than Western standards and that peace is something that has to be experienced by people in their daily lives.[63] The military relativism, their stress on peace

[57] Interview Col. De Heer.

[58] Anonymous interview (Dutch ministry of Defence, evaluations division).

[59] Anonymous interview (Dutch ministry of Defence, International Military Co-operation division).

[60] Interviews Col. Dr. Wagemaker, Col. Hoogland and Suchard.

[61] E.g. interviews Col. Dr. Wagemaker, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Cammaert.

[62] E.g. interviews Major Hazelbag, Col. De Heer.

[63] See Chap. 2, Sects. 2.4.1 and 2.4.4.

as an experience and their focus on individual agency rather than institution building all fit surprisingly well with the recommendations of these critical scholars, as well as with recent contributions on complexity and resilience (e.g. Chandler 2014; De Coning 2016; Brusset et al. 2016) that equally stress that outside intervention can only achieve so much. We will see in the next chapter whether the Dutch diplomats offer a similar surprise.

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CHAPTER 5

Diplomats: Peace as Governance

In practice of course it is about how countries and governments and institutions within and between those countries are organized.
(Anonymous interview diplomat #2 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH)))

Where the military officers stress that they work on the establishment of a short-term freedom from fear as a necessary first step on a stairway towards ever more holistic visions of peace, the interviewed diplomats stress that they work on long-term arrangements to make peace sustainable. Peace starts when a peace agreement is signed, but needs to be shored up by strong political institutions in order not to collapse again. As the quote opening the chapter illustrates, they tend to think it self-evident that peace is a political phenomenon, to be found in institutions of governance.

This chapter discusses the visions of peace that were found amongst Dutch diplomats. The Q study in which ten of them participated, yielded two visions on which they scored relatively high: peace as a universal ideal and peace-as-politics.[1] In this chapter, we will unpack these two visions for the group of Dutch diplomats, drawing both on the post-sorting interviews

[1] See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.

G. M. van Iterson Scholten, *Visions of Peace of Professional Peace Workers*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27975-2_5

of the diplomats who participated in the Q study as well as eleven additional semi-structured interviews with others.[2]

The chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 5.1 it is shown that the universal ideal is described in rather narrow terms—the absence of war—which in practice amounts to a focus on (the implementation of) peace agreements. I will label the corresponding vision *peace-as-agreement*. In Sect. 5.2 we will see that for most diplomats the 'politics' in 'peace-as-politics' refers to (institutions of) governance, leading to a re-description of this vision as *peace-as-governance*. Section 5.3 deals with the underlying dimensions of these visions. Its most important findings are a broad consensus on three of the four dimensions but a split on the question whether peace is embedded in individuals or in institutions. Diplomats who work a lot with civil society organizations or are engaged in counter-terrorism stress that peace is an individual phenomenon, all the rest look for it mostly in institutions. A short conclusion (Sect. 5.4) wraps up the chapter.

5.1 A Narrow Universal Ideal: The (Formal) Absence of Armed Conflict

In Chap. 3 it was argued that the vision of peace as a universal ideal is interpreted rather narrowly by the people who adhere to it. Although we will see in the next chapter that civil society peace workers have a much more holistic vision of peace, for the diplomats this is certainly true. A typical answer to the question 'what does peace mean to you' comes from a diplomat working at the department that coordinates the Dutch peacebuilding efforts. He says: 'you could define peace as the absence of armed conflict, which is a really narrow definition. But maybe at heart peace is the capacity, or the extent to which, groups in a society are able to peacefully solve their disputes.'[3] The two definitions of peace offered in this quote are representative of how most diplomats envision peace as respectively a short- and a long-term goal. We will first look at the former.

Many diplomats, when asked to come up with a definition of peace, reply that peace 'at least is the absence of war'.[4] However, unlike the

[2] Using the interview guide that can be found in Appendix E.

[3] Anonymous interview Dutch diplomat #1 (MoFA, Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH)).

[4] Anonymous interview diplomat #2 (MoFA, DSH). Similar views were expressed by former diplomat #2, diplomat #3 (MoFA, Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department

military officers who start their answers in the same way, this negative definition does not primarily denote the absence of combat operations (actual fighting), but rather the absence of war in a more formal, or political, sense. In a (post-)conflict setting, this means there is a signed peace- or cease-fire agreement. We can call this vision *peace-as-agreement* and it shows clearly in the associations diplomats have with peace. A former diplomat I asked whether he had ever considered himself to have been working for peace for example immediately replied that he had never been one of 'those peace-diplomats that shuttle to and fro all the time in order to get people to the negotiating table'.[5] About half of the interviewed diplomats referred to agreements between warring parties as one of the forms that peace takes in their line of work.

However, many of them argue that a peace agreement does not always lead to sustainable peace.[6] Here the second definition offered above comes into play. In the long run peace is described by many of the interviewed diplomats as a situation in which the different groups within a society solve their disputes without using violence.[7] This is the 'universal ideal' of peace. Most diplomats accept that there will always be conflicts. They state for example that their job is 'to create peaceful societies, not perfect societies'.[8] This means that also as a long-term objective, peace has a rather narrow scope. What is universal about the universal ideal is the desire to live a life that is not marred by violent conflict. As soon as interviewees are prompted to think of a peace that is more than the absence of war, almost all of them say that what such a peace looks like depends on the context in which it has to be built.[9]

(DSH)), Koen Davidse (MoFA, Director of Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights (DMM)/ Special envoy post-2015 development goals), Peter van Walsum (former permanent representative to the United Nations, retired) and the anonymous diplomat #1 quoted above.

[5] Anonymous interview former diplomat #2. Similar associations were made by e.g. former diplomat #1 and Peter van Walsum.

[6] E.g. interviews former diplomat #1, Heino van Houwelingen (European External Action Service (EEAS)), diplomat #3 (MoFA, DSH), Louise Anten (MoFA, former director of the Peacebuilding and Governance Department).

[7] E.g. interviews diplomats #1, #2, #4 (MoFA, Security Policy Department(DVB)), #5 (MoFA, North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM)) and #7 (United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (UNPBSO)).

[8] Interview diplomat #7 (UNPBSO).

[9] E.g. interviews diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH), former diplomat #1, Koen Davidse.

If this is the universal ideal, it is not like the liberal peace after all.[10] Although the idea that groups should be able to solve their conflicts without using violence is seen as the long-term goal of their efforts, the diplomats indicate that they have relatively little influence on these inter-group dynamics in other countries. Rather, what they do is create the structural conditions under which such a peace can occur. As one diplomat put it: 'depending on the context, you go and see whether you can positively influence the somewhat more structural sides of a conflict. That is the long-term work we do with peacebuilding.'[11] We will see in the next section that this mostly means they work on institutions of governance.

5.2 Peace-as-Governance

If peace agreements are only a short-term goal that require much more work to be made sustainable and the universal ideal of different groups solving their conflicts peacefully is not something diplomats are directly working on, the question becomes what it is that they work on. As we saw above, many diplomats think of themselves as working on 'the somewhat more structural sides of a conflict'.[12] But what are these structural sides? There are two answers to this question. For some, especially those with a background in development cooperation, it refers to tackling the root causes of conflict, like poverty or large-scale inequality.[13] The idea is that this will take away future sources of conflict, substantiating the slogan 'no peace without development, and no development without peace.'[14] However, these same diplomats also point out that even though 'people who are affluent usually have no reason to break the peace', economic development is a different goal than achieving peace and there is no direct relationship between poverty and violence.[15] Hence, addressing the economic root causes of conflict is not deemed a sufficient precondition for peace to prevail.[16] Although economic aspects are part of the 'structural

[10] As was suggested in Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.2.

[11] Anonymous interview diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH).

[12] Anonymous interview diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH).

[13] E.g. former diplomat #2. This is reminiscent of Galtung's notion of 'structural violence' and positive peace as the absence of such violence, as introduced in Chap. 2.

[14] Interview Anten.

[15] Interviews Anten and diplomat #2 (MoFA, DSH).

[16] E.g. interviews diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH), former diplomats #1 and #2 and Van Houwelingen.

sides of a conflict' that diplomats address in their work, it is not what most of them are actually working on.

Rather, working on the structural sides of conflicts means working on structures (or more precisely on *institutions*) that can mitigate or manage conflicts, regardless of what causes them. I will refer to the idea that peace is found in conflict-management institutions as *peace-as-governance*. As one diplomat put it: 'there must be a certain institutional capacity to talk about differences. Something that transcends people, that is disconnected from individuals and their interests.'[17] In other words, peace should not rely on the good intentions of people, but on institutions that form a barrier against taking up arms in case a conflict emerges. If there are no formal institutions to which people (and groups of people) can turn if they have a conflict, or if these institutions are not impartial but depend on the strength of local warlords or the whims of a political leader, chances are that people with a grievance will turn to Clausewitz's 'other means' to settle their dispute. Thus, peacebuilding becomes statebuilding, or at least the strengthening of (presumably state-run) institutions such as the police and the judiciary.

However, this does not mean that the ultimate goal of their work is the creation of Western-type states, as some of the critical liberal peace literature seems to suggest (e.g. Richmond and Franks 2009: 182). Indeed, one diplomat vehemently rejected the notion that he was complicit in 'imposing a Western model of liberal democracy and free market capitalism on other countries', exclaiming that 'that really makes me wonder: where do we do that? We really don't! I can't think of a single example where we imposed a free market!'[18] Others argue for example that 'in Afghanistan we overplayed our hand. We tried to create some sort of Switzerland there. Which is a beautiful vision, but that kind of social engineering ideals just doesn't work there.'[19] Dutch diplomats appear to have a much more 'modest' vision of peace than the liberal peace thesis suggests.

Moreover, they are also more relativistic than the liberal peace thesis suggests. When explicitly asked whether peace is a universal phenomenon, only six out of the 21 diplomats interviewed say it is. Moreover, we saw

[17] Interview diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH).

[18] Interview diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH).

[19] Anonymous interview diplomat #6 (Dutch Permanent Representation to NATO). Similar views were expressed by Valerie Sluijter (MoFA, retired), Anten and diplomat #5 (MoFA, DAM).

above that when they say peace is a universal phenomenon, they mostly mean that the desire to live a life without armed conflict is a universal desire, not that there is a universal 'blueprint' for statebuilding that they can easily implement in (post-)conflict areas.

5.3 Underlying Dimensions

The two visions described above can be plotted on the peace cube, as is shown in Fig. 5.1. Both treat peace as a rather narrowly defined political goal, although peace-as-governance is a larger goal than the signing of a peace agreement. Conceptually, peace-as-governance is mostly about building (state) institutions, putting it in the right-hand corner, whereas peace agreements are made between individual leaders, putting peace-as-agreement on the left side.[20]

However, we are not only interested in diplomats full-blown visions of peace, but also in how they score on the different dimensions that lie beneath those visions. Figure 5.1 shows that almost all diplomats think of peace as a political phenomenon, that should not be made too big and is



Fig. 5.1 Dutch diplomats' visions of peace

[20] Although it could be argued that more comprehensive peace agreements also deal with institutional aspects, the point here is that working on the establishment of peace-as-agreement (regardless of the scope of such an agreement) means working with individuals, usually political leaders, on a rather narrowly-defined goal: getting their signature under an agreement.

a goal rather than ('merely') a process, although we will see below that some of them do think that making peace last can also require an everlasting process. The only dimension on which opinions significantly diverge is whether peace is found in individuals or in institutions. I will argue below that this is not just so for the people who say they work on peace-as-agreement, but also for some of the diplomats who work on peace-as-governance. We will look at each of these dimensions in turn, starting with the political, because diplomats' focus on political (rather than personal) peace is to a large extent what drives their position on the other three dimensions as well.

5.3.1 Political or Personal Peace

With only two ambiguous exceptions, all diplomats stress that the peace they work on is a political phenomenon.[21] Peace agreements are political because they depend on negotiations between the different parties to the conflict. Peace-as-governance is also political, because the institutions that are being set up wield power over the inhabitants of a conflict-affected country.

As one of them put it: 'peace is politics. If you would sketch some sort of continuum between Waltz' *Man, the state and war* [(Waltz 1959)], which explains conflict mainly at the level of societies, and Pinker's *Better angels of our nature* [(Pinker 2011)], which emphasizes psychological explanations, I am more on Waltz' side. There are conflicts between groups, or between states, that can lead to armed conflict. If you put people in a more peaceful society, they might be less inclined to wage war, but I don't believe in a purely psychological explanation of peace and war.'[22] Others might be slightly more sympathetic to a personal, or even psychological reading of peace,[23] but they all stress that *in their work*, peace is a political goal.

[21] The exceptions are one diplomat who holds that 'the international usage of the word peace is empty rhetoric' since peace is always a personal experience. However, he conceded that what he had mostly been doing in his professional life was working on the political conditions that should (but far from always do) allow people to experience this kind of peace. The other similarly talked about the need for people to 'feel at peace', remarking that the international community he is a part of almost always fails to deliver this kind of peace. Interviews Peter Knoope (International Center for Counter Terrorism) and Van Houwelingen.

[22] Interview Davidse.

[23] We saw in Chap. 3 that personal peace is not necessarily a psychological phenomenon, but the tendency to equate the two is quite strong amongst diplomats.

This should not come as a big surprise. Given that diplomats get their orders from politicians, and work mainly with governmental partners and in bureaucratic institutions in the countries where they try to establish peace, it makes perfect sense that they see peace as a political phenomenon and leave dealing with more personal kinds of peace to others. As one diplomat joked: 'if you're looking for a more spiritual definition, of peace within yourself, peace between people, you are in the wrong office.'[24]

5.3.2 Scope

The fact that peace is treated as a political objective, and that more personal kinds of peace are delegated to people 'in another office', means that many diplomats favour a rather narrow vision of peace. If political peace is correctly summarized as the continuation of politics with political means only,[25] the primary responsibility of those working for it is to prevent the use of other means: war. Thus, to many diplomats peace means 'at least the absence of war', although usually they add that it is a little more than that. The concern that peace should not be encumbered with too many other concerns, even if, or perhaps because, peacebuilding entails a potentially infinite list of demands, are a recurring theme in the interviews.[26]

Beyond that observation we should ask ourselves, or rather the diplomats interviewed, why this is the case. The answer is directly related to the next dimension: peace is considered to be a goal. A political goal. And as such, it should be conceptualized in such a way as to make it attainable, or even measurable, which means that it should not be too holistic in scope.[27] In the post-sorting interviews to their Q sorts, many diplomats argue that they would love it if the world would be such that people do not have any reason to go to war with each other, or if there would be no exclusion and inequality, but that in practice unfortunately this will never happen. However, that does not mean that 'peace' should be considered an unattainable goal. Eighteen out of the 21 diplomats interviewed unhesitatingly answers 'yes', or even 'of course' to the question whether peace is attainable. Even a somewhat conditional answer starts with a 'yes', adding that 'the chances of solving all conflicts with all their separate causes simultane-

[24] Interview diplomat #2 (MoFA, DSH).
[25] As was done in Chap. 3.
[26] E.g. interviews Carstens and former diplomat #2.
[27] Interview diplomat #3 (MoFA, DSH).

ously are rather small, but in principle: why not? If you see what Europe has achieved.'[28]

Besides their desire to keep peace a realistically attainable goal, they warn against the dangers of taking on too many tasks in a post-conflict situation. As one of them formulated it: 'if you put too much in that boat, there is a risk it will sink.'[29] Diplomats are acutely aware that since peace is political, the limits of what falls under peacebuilding are also subject to political negotiation. Although diplomats are not as openly 'traumatized' by the sudden Dutch withdrawal from Uruzgan as their military counterparts, we saw above that they still argue that the level of ambition displayed there was far too high for the resources they could muster.[30]

5.3.3 Ontology

Almost without exception, diplomats consider the peace they are working on to be a goal. They might work on peace processes, but these processes are never an end in themselves. They are processes that should lead to some, preferably well-defined goal. First of all this goal is a peace agreement, but many diplomats recognize that the work is not done (or is only just getting started) when an agreement is signed. This means the process should continue in order to implement the agreement and come to a situation of sustainable peace.[31] As one of them summed it up: 'in my work, I think that peace is a state of affairs, that you work towards via structural processes. Not that they are always successful, but that is the model that we use.'[32]

That said, there are some diplomats who recognize that in some situations achieving such a sustainable peace might be a never-ending process. They still say they work on specific goals such as achieving or implementing a peace agreement, but add for example that 'the process might be in tackling all those root causes. Which is never finished.'[33] Or at least highly circular. As another diplomat warned: 'things can go wrong with peace and then negative peace becomes not the absence of war, but the prelude to war'.[34]

[28] Interview Davidse.
[29] Interview Carstens.
[30] Interviews Sluijter, Anten and diplomats #5 (MoFA, DAM) and #6 (NATO).
[31] Anonymous interviews diplomats #1 (MoFA, DSH) and #6 (NATO).
[32] Interview diplomat #2 (MoFA, DSH).
[33] Interview Davidse.
[34] Interview Van Walsum.

Although this might be construed as evidence that some diplomats do see peace as a continuous process, it actually shows they see it as a goal. It is just that they are disappointed that in some places they have failed to reach this goal. As an interviewee mused upon leaving Sudan after four and a half years there: 'I looked around and thought that on a macro level, we have not accomplished anything here.'[35] The diplomat who stated that 'things can go wrong with peace' explicitly insisted that in his view, peace is a state of affairs.[36] This interpretation was also given by a diplomat talking about peace as 'something that requires continuous upkeep',[37] but then immediately adding that 'in policy [however], it is a goal'.[38] Only one diplomat unequivocally asserted that 'of course it is a process. Sometimes countries are more peaceful than at other times. Just look at the Netherlands: we are also less peaceful than a few years ago.'[39] Adding that he did not really believe there are exit-criteria for peacebuilding operations either.

Interestingly, the respondents who say that peace is a process, rather than, or next to a goal, are largely the same people who say it rests in individuals rather than in institutions. We will see in the next section that these are mostly diplomats who either have a background in working with or for civil society peace organizations,[40] or are engaged in counter-terrorism.[41] The numbers are too small to draw any hard conclusions, but especially the former finding is interesting because we will see in the next chapter that civil society peace workers also tend to see peace as a process.[42]

5.3.4 Embedding: Individuals or Institutions

Finally, there is the dimension of the embedding of peace in either individuals or institutions. Here is where the views of different diplomats dif-

[35] Interview diplomat #4 (MoFA, DVB).

[36] Interview Van Walsum.

[37] Cf. the description of the vision of 'peace-as-process' (vision IV) in Chap. 3.

[38] Anonymous interview diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH). Similar views were presented by Anten and anonymous diplomats #3 (MoFA, DSH) and #5 (MoFA, DAM).

[39] Anonymous interview diplomat #7 (UNBPSO).

[40] E.g. anonymous diplomats #3 (MoFA, DSH) and #5 (MoFA, DAM), Van Houwelingen and Anten.

[41] Interviews diplomat #4 (MoFA, DVB), Knoope and Singleton (International Centre for Counter Terrorism).

[42] The latter finding is not directly relevant for our present purposes, but offers an interesting lead for further research into the intricate relationship between peacebuilding and terrorism (see e.g. Richmond and Tellidis 2012; Wagner 2006).

fer the most. Most of the diplomats interviewed (13 out of 21) infer from the fact that they are working on a political peace that this peace is found first and foremost in institutions. This shows in quotes like 'some sort of institutionalized structure, that transcends the interests of individual people. That is what you're looking for.'[43] Or as the quote opening this chapter matter-of-factly put it: 'in practice *of course* it is about how countries and governments and institutions within and between countries are organized. That they are able to effectuate peace.'[44] Or in a third diplomat remarking that as a state actor, her counterparts often just are institutions, rather than individuals like civil society organizations work with.[45]

As these quotes show, there is both a practical and a substantial reason why so many diplomats focus on institutions. The practical reason shows most clearly in the last two quotes: as a state bureaucracy, they do what they know best—strengthening other state bureaucracies. Even if they would want to work on peace at other levels of society and engage with individual peace workers in a (post-)conflict country, they just wouldn't know where to start.[46] However, as an institution they have certain rules, procedures, best practices, etc. that they think similar institutions might benefit from in order to get strengthened.

There is also a substantial reason for the focus on institutions. Institutions are what anchors peace, because they make life predictable and hence also add to people's personal feelings of peace and security. As one diplomat put it: 'that deeper peace we just discussed, it means that if you leave your house in the morning, take your kids to school and go to work you can be confident that if you come home at night, your kids and house will still be there. And that is made possible by institutions. By having governance, police, but also the social mores that people will not enter your house and beat up all your stuff. Or sell your children into slavery. The more you can institutionalize life, make sure you are not on your own, that's where peace starts.'[47] The argument here is basically Hobbesian: you need a strong state to escape from the insecurity that characterizes life in circumstances of civil war.[48]

[43] Interview diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH).
[44] Interview diplomat #2 (MoFA, DSH). Emphasis added.
[45] Interview diplomat #5 (MoFA, DAM).
[46] Interview diplomat #5 (MoFA, DAM).
[47] Interview Davidse.
[48] For Hobbes, the natural state of living for mankind was in a 'war of all against all', an image he probably came up with because he lived at the time of the English civil war (1642–

However, there is a sizeable minority (eight out of 21 interviewees) that points out that peace is something that should be felt by individuals. As one retired diplomat who spent a lot of time in Bosnia remarked: 'There is still no peace in the hearts of people there.'[49] No matter how many formally democratic institutions are being built, or how many Truth and Reconciliation Committees are being set up, people who have lived through a war will never feel completely at peace again. Institutions cannot really help bring that kind of peace about, especially not since most of them might be formally democratic, but in practice are run by a rather small elite. She remarked that 'in the West, we are too naive about that. We don't see all the possibilities for things to go wrong.'[50]

When asked, diplomats offer two main reasons for thinking peace resides in individuals, rather than in institutions. First, institutions also consist of people, and in order to successfully build institutions, you need to work with those people.[51] As long as they do not have an interest in peace, powerful actors will not allow the institution to work for peace. Still talking about Bosnia, the diplomat quoted above remarked that 'even if there were institutions that would promote peace, to implement them, you need political clout. Often from people who don't want peace at all.'[52]

Secondly, and in contrast to the Hobbesian view described above, some diplomats point out that most people are in fact peaceful by nature. Institutions are only a back-up in case people, or groups of people, cannot manage to solve conflicts themselves. Then you need rule of law, some institution that can make impartial decisions and has the power to implement them. Institutions thus are a back-up for interpersonal peace, but this interpersonal peace is what really counts.

However, actually *working* on this kind of peace is rather difficult for state actors, as the same diplomats attest. Talking about winning the hearts and minds of a population is one thing, but, as a senior diplomat remarked: 'in practice we say let's work on building water wells and hospitals, and then those minds will follow automatically.'[53] Put even sharper, another remarked that people also *have to* make peace themselves. What an embassy can do is support some small scale agricultural projects, put up a school or

1651). (Hobbes 2003 [1651]).

[49] Interview Sluijter.

[50] Interview Sluijter.

[51] E.g. interviews Anten, Sluijter, anonymous diplomat #4 (MoFA, DVB).

[52] Interview Sluijter.

[53] Interview Anten.

protect some human rights activists. Hoping that (young) people will see that there is a different, more peaceful way to address problems. They might not immediately adopt this way, but in the long run these foreign examples might contribute to a slow changing of minds.[54]

There are two interesting characteristics in the background of the diplomats that have this minority view. First, all three interviewees who were working on counterterrorism held this opinion.[55] Although it is not possible to generalize from just these three cases, this is a relevant finding as it points to the fact that terrorists (or 'spoilers' more generally, see, e.g. (Stedman 1997; Greenhill and Major 2007)) require an individually-targeted approach rather than one focused on building institutions, if they are to be neutralized as a threat to the sustainability of peace.

Secondly, almost all of them have been working either directly for a civil society organization,[56] or with a lot of civil society organizations in the field.[57] As we will see in the next chapter, Dutch civil society peace workers all consider peace to be something that is found primarily in individuals, not in institutions. The overlap on this dimension suggests that perhaps they have been able to convince at least some of their diplomatic counterparts of the usefulness of taking this more individual perspective on peace. Alternatively, it suggests that maybe there is indeed a division of tasks between diplomats and civil society peace workers, where the diplomats work on the institutions and civil society peace workers support individuals.[58]

One final note. It could be argued that the institutional and the individual perspective are actually one and the same, but on different levels of abstraction. Especially since the diplomats who say that peace is mostly an individual matter, stress that institutions are made up of individuals. However, the point of explicitly making the distinction is that by strengthening institutions without paying close attention to whether the individuals within these institutions (especially in the leadership) are 'agents of peace', nor to how these institutions impact the lives of the people they should serve, makes diplomatic peacebuilding run the risk of creating only what Richmond calls a 'virtual peace' (Richmond 2005: 227–230).[59]

[54] Interview diplomat #4 (MoFA, DVB).

[55] Interviews Knoope, Singleton and anonymous diplomat #4 (MoFA, DVB).

[56] E.g. interviews Anten, Knoope and Van Houwelingen.

[57] E.g. interviews Sluijter, anonymous diplomat #5 (MoFA, DAM) and Ernesto Braam (MoFA, North Africa and Middle East Department).

[58] As suggested by e.g. anonymous diplomats #2 (MoFA, DSH) and #5 (MoFA, DAM).

[59] A similar concern was raised by Sluijter and anonymous diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH).

5.4 Conclusion

So what is peace, according to the Dutch diplomats who work on it? In this chapter we found two new visions of peace that diplomats say they work on. Peace-as-agreement, which is the short-term goal of ending an armed conflict. And peace-as-governance, referring to a set of strong and impartial institutions that make sure conflicts between groups or individuals will not turn violent.

In terms of our conceptual model, all diplomats' visions of peace can be located in the top-front of the peace cube: peace is a political goal. A peace process should always lead to some situation that can be defined as peace. Moreover, the scope of peace should explicitly not be made overly large. The one dimension along which diplomatic opinions significantly diverge is whether peace is found in individuals or in institutions. A majority of them thinks in terms of institutions (peace-as-governance), but especially diplomats with close connections to civil society peace organizations also insist that in the final instance you need to work with the individuals that make up those institutions or that if enough people are not satisfied with the way those institutions perform, this might spark violent conflict.

What are the consequences of adopting such a narrow political goal-oriented vision of peace? On the positive side, it allows diplomats to focus on the job at hand and to 'deliver' measurable results. However, this focus comes at a price. First of all, the tendency to focus on institution-building, coupled with a preference for narrow definitions of peace and a need for goal-oriented action, means that diplomats potentially miss a lot of 'peaces', the absence of which might lead to problems in the future. The diplomat remarking that in Bosnia 'there is still no peace in the hearts of people' was referring to exactly this dynamic. She (and others working on Bosnia as well (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2014)) feared very much that because people lack this more personal peace and institutions are formally democratic and accountable, but in practice still run by the same people that ran the country during the war, tensions might flare up again any time.[60] In her study on international peacebuilding in Congo, Severine Autesserre gives a similar warning: the internationals' focus on national-level institutional developments means they lose sight of conflict dynamics at a grassroots-level (Autesserre 2010: 8–9).

Secondly, their political reading of peace sits rather uncomfortably with the way peace is envisioned by civil society peace workers coming from

[60] Interview Sluijter.

conflict-affected areas. As we saw in Chap. 3, and will elaborate in Chaps. 7 and 8, the large majority of respondents from Lebanon and Mindanao stress that peace is primarily a personal phenomenon, rather than a political one. This suggests that when these two kinds of actors meet, there is ample room for misunderstandings. Or, depending on the dynamics of the encounter, for hybridity and friction. Here at least, the critics of liberal peacebuilding seem to have a point.

However, it is a different point than the one(s) usually made in the liberal peace debates.[61] Partly, this is because none of the diplomatic visions amounts to a liberal peace, not even in its more restrictive statebuilding guise. We saw in Sect. 5.2 that Dutch diplomats are more relativistic than the liberal peace thesis would allow. They stress that although governance institutions are indispensable for the maintenance of peace, what such institutions look like depends very much on the context of the post-conflict country. Free-market capitalism, or indeed any economic goals at all,[62] are not mentioned by any of the diplomats interviewed as part of what they work on. The only respondent who mentions free-market capitalism was the diplomat exclaiming that we could not think of a single example of where he would be imposing it.[63]

How can we explain this discrepancy between the visions of peace that Dutch diplomats adhere to and what is proposed in the liberal peace literature? First, it might be that the rather narrow interpretation of peace-as-governance is a specific Dutch vision of peace and that diplomats from other countries, like the United States or the United Kingdom,[64] have a more ambitious reading of peace. More research on the visions of peace of diplomats from other countries would be required to establish whether this is indeed a specifically Dutch vision. Alternatively, there might have been a shift away from more ambitious goals, as the quote about turning Afghanistan into 'some sort of Switzerland' seems to suggest.[65] As was shown in Chap. 2, there is a similar shift in the academic debates on liberal peace, starting with Paris's proposal to look at 'institutionalization before liberalization' (Paris 2004: 7).

[61] See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.4.

[62] With the exception of lowering global inequality for diplomats with a background in development assistance. E.g. interviews former diplomat #2, Rentenaar, Anten.

[63] Interview diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH).

[64] To name two countries that feature heavily in the liberal peace literature.

[65] Interview diplomat #6 (NATO).

A third possibility is that although diplomats do not expressly aim to transform other countries' political and economic system, in practice this is what happens as a result of their well-intentioned, modest and relativistic work on governance. Also here, additional research with a different research design would be required, that focuses more on the consequences of rather than the intentions behind diplomatic peacebuilding efforts.

However, even if such research would find that there is a gap between the visions and the outcome of Dutch diplomatic peace work, it would still not show that Dutch diplomats are active agents of a liberal peace consensus any more than the Dutch military officers were. We will now turn to the third and final Dutch group of respondents—Dutch civil society peace workers—to see what their visions of peace are.

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CHAPTER 6

Dutch Civil Society: Peace Writ Large

Peace is a final state we will never reach, so the process is extremely important. The process of human interaction, in all of its aspects. […] That's what I see myself contributing to. Every now and then.
(Interview Joost van Puijenbroek (PAX))

Having discussed the views of Dutch military and diplomatic peace workers, we now turn our gaze to the Dutch civil society peacebuilders. The quote opening this chapter is representative of a large number of them who see peace as a utopian goal. Which means that the peace they are working on—their operational vision of peace—is a continuous process rather than a goal. In Chap. 3 we saw that the vision of peace-as-process (vision IV) was found mostly amongst Dutch civil society peace workers. In this chapter we will explore the details of that vision, as well as the other visions popular amongst this group of peace workers: peace as a universal ideal (vision II), peace as politics (vision V) and peace as a personal endeavour (vision I).

In the introduction, and again in Chap. 3, the question was raised whether Dutch civil society peace workers might serve as a bridge between Dutch governmental peace workers and civil society peace workers in conflict-affected areas, since they score high both on visions of peace favoured by diplomats and military officers, as well as those favoured by

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Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society. However, an alternative explanation of the Q study findings could be that this is a sign of a sharp divide within Dutch civil society. The Q study only looked at the average level of correspondence to the different visions. In this chapter I draw on extensive interviews to determine which interpretation is correct.

The chapter is organized along similar lines as the last two. Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 discuss the three visions of peace that Dutch civil society peace workers implicitly or explicitly use when talking about their work. It will be argued that most of them have an implicit understanding of peace as some very large holistic ideal: *Peace Writ Large*. This vision is comparable to the vision of peace as a universal ideal we encountered in Chap. 3, except that there, peace was conceptualized in much narrower terms.[1] Since this large holistic peace is, according to most, never fully attainable, the process of reaching for peace, the continuous striving for it, becomes a paramount concern for many. This explains why *peace-as-process* is the second prominent vision of peace found amongst Dutch civil society peace workers. The third is what they call *human security*, or freedom from fear, a vision that comes close to the military vision with the same name, but is portrayed as a political rather than a personal operationalization of peace.[2] In Sect. 6.4 their visions are mapped onto the four dimensions of the peace cube: scope, goal vs. process, individuals vs. institutions and personal vs. political. For each dimension, the views of civil society peace workers are compared to those of the military and diplomats from the previous two chapters in order to highlight the differences between the visions of these three groups of Western peace workers.

6.1 Peace Writ Large

Virtually all Dutch civil society peace workers interviewed have an implicit idea of peace as a big, holistic, long-term vision of what the world should look like. This peace includes not only the absence of violence in various forms, but also respect for human rights,[3] chances for (economic)

[1] See Sect. 3.1.2.

[2] E.g. interview Jan Gruiters (PAX). In Chap. 3 it was shown that military officers think of freedom from fear as a personal conception of peace, rather than a political one.

[3] E.g. interviews Miriam Struyk (PAX), Lennart Vriens (Kerk en Vrede) and Wilco de Jonge (Amnesty International (AI)).

development,[4] opportunities for self-realization[5] or even a general feeling of contentment or inner peace.[6] Building on Anderson and Olson's study of the objectives of civil society peacebuilding, we can call this vision 'Peace Writ Large'.[7] They point out that although Peace Writ Large is not a very specifically defined vision of peace, it refers to 'changes at the broad level of society as a whole' that are seen as 'foundations for sustainable peace, addressing political, economic, and social grievances that may be driving conflict.' (Anderson and Olson 2003: 12).

This broadness stands in sharp contrast to how diplomats and military officers think about peace. When I asked them for a definition, they mostly replied with variations on 'at least it is the absence of war' and then added other elements that they thought necessary to make this absence of war sustainable. Civil society peace workers think the other way around. In a typical answer, a respondent remarked that 'to me, it's all connected. […] You can't speak of a situation of peace if there is no respect for human rights. Or if people cannot develop themselves. […] Peace is the big picture.'[8] Similarly, when asked whether peace is more of a political, a psychological, an economic or a social phenomenon, a typical Dutch civil society peace worker's answer is that peace requires work in all of those domains.[9]

However, most civil society peace workers go on to stress that this Peace Writ Large is not what they are actively pursuing in their work, a point Anderson and Olson also make (Anderson and Olson 2003: 12). Their *operational* vision of peace is much more circumscribed. Specifically, many interviewees stress that they (or the organization they are working for) are limiting themselves to working on the political side of peace and

[4] E.g. interviews Rojan Bolling (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)) and Guus Meijer.

[5] E.g. interviews Struyk and Guido de Graaf Bierbrauwer (PAX).

[6] E.g. Interviews Jogien Bakker (PAX), Gabriella Vogelaar (GPPAC) and Mathieu Hermans (PAX).

[7] Anderson and Olson actually say that Peace Writ Large (the capitalization of each word is theirs) consists of two goals: 'stopping violence and destructive conflict' and 'building just and sustainable peace'. In this study however, the first goal is referred to as either 'freedom from fear' or 'peace-as-agreement', both of which are considered short-term and rather narrowly defined goals. This leaves the latter element as the more holistic long-term goal of civil society peace workers (Anderson and Olson 2003: 12).

[8] Interview Struyk.

[9] E.g. interviews Gruiters, Isabelle Geuskens (Women Peacemakers Program (WPP)), Piet Halma (PAX), Wim de Regt (AI).

do not really touch upon its more psychological aspects. Not because it would not be required, but because they focus on peace as a political situation. In the words of an interviewee: 'I do not consider all that thinking about "peace within yourself" to be our job. If peace is some sort of state of affairs, it is a political one.'[10]

This raises an interesting question. If it is not the direct objective of their work, why would so many civil society peace workers refer to this holistic vision of peace? There are two answers to this question. The first is somewhat cynical, but quite relevant for our broader question of whether Dutch civil society can serve as a bridge between other actors. Having a broad definition of peace allows actors to pursue a whole lot of different projects under the banner of working for peace.[11] Conceptualizing peace in such a holistic way might be a way for them to legitimize (even just to themselves) that some of the work they do is not directly related to ending or preventing armed conflicts. Working on democratization, women's rights under the dictatorship in Syria or conflicts caused by large-scale mining operations in Colombia are examples that came up in the interviews.[12] Since civil society peace workers are under constant pressure to find new funds for their work, broadening their vision of peace also means broadening the pool of potential resources. For themselves, but also for their partners in countries where international funds for peace work are slowly drying up, like the Balkan countries.

Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, this holistic vision of peace functions as an ideal that mobilizes people. In the eyes of many civil society peace workers, peace depends on the willingness of ordinary citizens, including themselves, to work for peace. And in order to trigger people to do so, you need some inspiring ideal, not the SMART[13] goals and logframes that are the everyday tools of professional NGO peace

[10] Interview Jan Jaap van Oosterzee (PAX). See also Sect. 6.4.4 below and e.g. interviews Gruiters, Peter van Tuijl (GPPAC), Dion van den Berg (PAX), Han Deggeller (WILPF) and Amanda Beugeling (DAG).

[11] One diplomat made the same point when quipping that the whole comprehensive approach might only work exactly *because* peace is such a nicely vague holistic term that they could all read their own priorities into it. Interview Michel Rentenaar. See also the wonderful description of the evolution of the work of the Nicaraguan peace commissions in ((Mouly 2013)).

[12] Interviews De Graaf Bierbrauwer, Evert-Jan Grit (PAX), Bakker and anonymous programme officer #1 (PAX).

[13] A policy acronym that stands for Specific, Measurable, Acceptable, Realistic and Time-bound.

workers. As one interviewee pointedly remarked: 'as a goal, peace is like having 100% vaccination coverage. The World Health organization knows full well they will never reach that anywhere in the world, not even in a country like the Netherlands, but that does not stop them from making it their symbolic target.'[14]

As a consequence, most NGO peace workers do not think they will ever reach Peace Writ Large. A clear majority plainly says 'no' when asked whether peace is attainable.[15] They might reach other goals, like the establishment of a peace agreement in country A, or reconciliation between two ethnic groups in country B, but all of these are only so many steps on a never-ending road. Not only because Peace Writ Large is a very large objective, but also because it is not a stable goal. In a typical answer to the question whether he thought peace is attainable, a respondent remarked: 'Peace is never a given, a stable situation that you can just take for granted. […] It will always remain a tremendous effort to make sure that peace not only comes about, but stays.'[16] This leads us to the second vision of peace that was found amongst the respondents: peace as process.

6.2 Peace-as-Process

If peace is an end-state they will never reach, the process of working on peace becomes an important vision of peace in its own right.[17] We saw in Chap. 3 that Dutch civil society peace workers score relatively high on the vision of peace-as-process, but what does this mean? We will explore three answers to this question, although we will see that for most of the Dutch civil society peace workers the third is what they are after.

First, the process of peace can refer to a process of negotiations leading to a situation of peace, that is: a peace agreement. Although the term 'peace process' is commonly used in this way, (see e.g. Abubakar 2004; Darby and Mac Ginty 2001; Irwin 2002; Magdalena 1997; Said 2012), this is not what civil society peace workers have in mind. Rather, they

[14] Interview Van Puijenbroek.

[15] 31 respondents, vs. 17 who say yes on this question. In a focus group discussion on the Q sorts of five employees of PAX, this also turned out to be a major point of contention: is peace attainable? The conclusion of the participants in this particular focus group was that that depended on whether you thought of peace as a large holistic ideal or as a very specific inter-personal phenomenon (see below).

[16] Interview Van Oosterzee.

[17] E.g. interviews Van Puijenbroek, Albert van Hal (Cordaid), René Grotenhuis.

stress that peace is a *continuous* process, that needs to take place irrespective of whether there is a peace agreement or not. In a typical answer, one interviewee remarked for instance that 'signing a peace agreement is one step in the process, but keeping the peace afterwards is even more difficult. […] And even in the Netherlands, the potential for conflict is rather large on some issues. Not that it is very likely that they will lead to armed conflict, but there is work here for a peace organization'.[18]

Second, peace as process might be interpreted as a call for solving problems without using violence. 'There is no way to peace, peace is the way' poetically sums up this attitude towards peace.[19] However, this formula also opens up a new question, because if peace is 'the way', what does this way look like? Traditionally, it has been understood to mean that non-violent activism is the way to achieve social change (e.g. Wink 2000) and hence as a defence of pacifism. However, this is not a widely held view amongst Dutch civil society peace workers. Some of the interviewees do promote non-violent activism, but only a handful declared themselves to be principled pacifists.[20] Most others agree that at some point military intervention might be necessary in order to save civilian lives or prevent a greater harm. Moreover, non-violent activism is portrayed as one way of 'doing' peace, or as a value underlying peace, but peace as a process is characterized by more than just the negative criterion of not using violence to achieve one's goals.

This means that the third interpretation of peace-as-process is the most common one. In this interpretation, peace-as-process refers to a continuous need for dialogue, reassessment of the context and the required action and most of all for continuously working to keep things peaceful between the participants in a peace process. In the words of John F. Kennedy, quoted by an interviewee: 'peace is a daily, a weekly, a monthly process. Gradually changing opinions, slowly eroding old barriers, quietly building new structures.'[21] Peace is a continuous struggle, or, using a less militaristic metaphor, a continuous dialogue. A dialogue to solve conflicts, to address grievances, to prevent violence and generally to make people

[18] Interview Hans Rouw (PAX).

[19] The quote is from the early twentieth century American peace activist A.J. Muste, who was indeed a pacifist. It is also sometimes ascribed to Ghandi, also by my interviewees. E.g. interviews Hermans, Deggeller and Puco Danilovich (PAX).

[20] Specifically Danilovich, Grit, Vriens, Guido van Leemput (United Civilians for Peace) and Victor Scheffers (Justice and Peace).

[21] Interview Sara Ketelaar (PAX).

understand each other's point of view. Having a dialogue, or 'keeping the conversation going' as an interviewee put it, is of intrinsic value.[22] In this conception of peace, *how* you work is at least as important as what you actually do. Talking about Afghanistan, a senior peace worker said that he did not care very much whether his organization would build schools or hospitals or water wells. All of those activities could be a contribution to peace because building them meant that representatives of the different communities had to come together to discuss the plans. His actual work consisted mostly of 'drinking tea with men with beards', but this tea-drinking was what kept the peace, because it created a network in which problems and mutual misunderstandings could be addressed and common goals could be set.[23]

Three things are considered important in this process of dialogue. First, it has to be bottom-up. Many NGO peace workers stress that one of their core aims is to bring the voice of ordinary citizens into higher level policy discussions.[24] The voices of (potential) victims of conflict, but also local agents for peace should be taken into account in the global discussions on peace and security. Because if this is not the case, and decisions are taken 'about but without' the people affected by them, there is a real risk that those decisions will not give them peace of mind, but rather lead to more anxiety and ultimately to people 'spoiling' the high level peace process. As an interviewee who had spent 15 years working on the Isreali-Palestinian conflict explained: 'You will only get to a sustainable solution if […] people feel that it is acceptable to them. Then you will have peace.'[25]

Secondly, the process has to be inclusive. Of course inclusion partly overlaps with bringing the voices of ordinary citizens to the table, but it also means that all parties to a conflict, or all affected groups in an area, are consulted before any decisions are taken. This specifically includes minorities,[26] but also—in the context of (post-) conflict areas—groups that are considered to be the enemy, terrorists, or spoilers.[27] As the same

[22] Interview Van Puijenbroek. Similar views were expressed by a.o. Ketelaar, Grotenhuis and Fulco van Deventer (Human Security Collective (HSC)).

[23] Interview Van Hal (Cordaid). A similar argument was made by Ketelaar and Kees van den Broek (PAX).

[24] E.g. interviews Gruiters, Van Deventer, Van Leemput and Meijer.

[25] Interview Jannie Kuik (PAX).

[26] E.g. interviews Amanda Beugeling (DAG) and Annemarie Sweeris (PAX).

[27] Interviews Kuik, Van Deventer and Van den Broek

interviewee quoted above put it: 'peace is made between enemies, not between friends.'[28]

Finally, the dialogue, the process of peace, is never finished, also not in countries that are ostensibly 'at peace', like the Netherlands. The argument given most often for this is that 'conflicts are inherent to how the world works', which means that peace workers will always have to make sure they do not turn violent.[29] Peace-as-process means that people have the capacity, either as individuals or by their embeddedness in institutions, to solve their conflicts without using violence. This is reminiscent of the concept of agonistic peace we encountered in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.4.2). Conflict is a driving force for (much-needed) change in the world and what peace workers do is manage those conflicts so that they do not turn violent.[30]

6.3 Human Security

Not all Dutch civil society peace workers agree that peace is a never-ending process. There is a group that draws a different conclusion from the premise that Peace Writ Large is a utopian goal. For them, this implies first and foremost that peace needs to be 'operationalized' into a more manageable, less holistic goal. In a typical response to the question what peace meant to him, the director of a peace NGO stated for instance that 'that is too big a question, […] a question of a different category. It's the stuff of documents like Pacem in Terris. […] But human security is a political operationalization of peace. That has three elements in it.'[31] Going on to explain what these elements were and how they were relevant for influencing governmental (peacebuilding) policy.

Most importantly, this operationalization of peace as human security serves to bring a human perspective into policy discussions. Similar to the stress on the bottom-up character of peace as a process, civil society peace workers who say they are working on human security stress that this is their first priority. Someone working on the post-2015 development agenda remarked for instance that 'human security has the advantage that

[28] Interview Kuik.

[29] Interview Vogelaar. Similar arguments were made by a.o. Van den Broek, De Graaf Bierbrauwer and anonymous programme officer (Cordaid).

[30] E.g. interviews Meijer, Geuskens, Van Tuijl, Rouw and Van den Berg.

[31] Interview Gruiters. Pacem in Terris refers to the 1963 papal encyclical about peace.

it brings a language with it that allows a much broader group of stakeholders to take part in the conversation.'[32] In this respect, human security is contrasted with state security, that is considered to be more 'militaristic'[33] and less concerned with the plight of individuals.

Beyond the consensus that human security calls attention to the plight of individuals, there is a split in opinion on whether it is a political or a more personal operationalization of peace. For some, including the director quoted above, it is first of all a political tool. We will see below (in Sect. 6.4.4) that more senior staff tends to support this political vision. They consider peace not only too abstract, but also too much 'tainted' by spiritual or religious overtones to be useful in policy dialogues. Human security is a clear policy-guiding principle, that prioritizes the well-being of the ordinary inhabitants of conflict-affected areas over other concerns, most notably economic or geopolitical interests.

According to the adherents to this vision, this should also be reflected in the institutional set-up of states, or in international mechanisms that protect civilians in case an armed conflict breaks out.[34] With regards to the first, the focus on human security turns into an argument for working on democratic institutions and good governance. Since, as two interviewees put it 'dictatorships are effectively waging war on their own people.'[35] On the international level, peace workers with this vision of peace call for a.o. early warning mechanisms, humanitarian intervention in civil wars and the banishment of certain types of weapons.[36] In their eyes, human security is a call to political action. All states should minimally guarantee human security on their territory, with the international community as a back-up.[37] The objective of civil society peace workers is to make states aware of that responsibility and pressure them into taking it seriously.

However, not everyone sees human security as a political tool or a policy objective. Some Dutch civil society peace workers stress that it is (also) the minimal requirement for people to experience peace, or even 'to lead a good life'.[38] In this sense, the vision of human security comes very close

[32] Interview Van Tuijl.
[33] Interview Van Deventer.
[34] E.g. interviews Van Tuijl, De Graaf Bierbrauwer and Van den Berg.
[35] Interviews Grit and Van Oosterzee.
[36] Interviews Van Tuijl, De Graaf Bierbrauwer, Van Oosterzee and Struyk.
[37] Cf. the notion of states having a primary Responsibility to Protect (Bellamy 2009).
[38] Interview Grit. Also in e.g. interviews anonymous programme officer (Cordaid) and René Schoenmakers (PAX).

to the military vision of 'freedom from fear' that was described in Chaps. 3 and 4. This is a more practical goal, that peace workers should contribute to directly, by being engaged on the ground in conflict areas, for example accompanying peace and human rights defenders there, as organizations like Peace Brigades International or Non-Violent Peace Force do.[39] To the peace workers who adhere to this vision, that they also refer to as 'freedom from fear' rather than human security, peace is a psychological phenomenon at the personal level.[40] However, as will be shown in the next section, this version of the vision of human security is less influential than the political interpretation. It is adhered to mostly by less senior staff, or by people who stress that you need both and that within their organization, usually the political interpretation holds sway.[41]

6.4 Underlying Dimensions

Graphically, the three visions can be rendered on our four-dimensional peace cube as follows (Fig. 6.1).

Peace Writ Large is the largest vision of peace imaginable. It is both personal and political, both an individual state of mind and an institutional



Fig. 6.1 Dutch civil society visions of peace

[39] Interview Christa Hijkoop (Peace Brigades International).

[40] Freedom from fear was explicitly mentioned as a definition of peace by a.o. De Graaf Bierbrauwer, Schoenmakers, Bolling, De Regt and Astrid Schrama (PAX).

[41] E.g. interview Deggeller.

set-up. It is a goal, but since it is a utopian goal, it is also a continuous process. Thus, it takes up the whole cube. As with the military vision of peace-as-freedom, it is shaded to indicate that although it is a vision many peace workers adhere to, it is not necessarily an *operational* vision they are working on in (post-)conflict areas. The second vision, peace as process, is still a rather holistic vision of peace—and thus graphically a rather large block. It is more concerned with individuals than with institutions, but it requires efforts both in the personal and the political sphere. Needless to say it is a process, not a goal. Human security is the most narrow of the three visions. It is a goal rather than a process, and although it is still mainly concerned with individuals rather than institutions, for Dutch civil society it is a political rather than a personal goal.

The last two sections already indicated that the operational visions of Dutch civil society peace workers are split on the ontological dimension—whether peace is a process or a goal—and the political/personal dimension. In the remainder of this section, we will further analyse these two splits as well as the consensus on the other two dimensions: scope and embedding. While discussing these four dimensions in turn, I will argue three things. First, that one of the crucial differences between the visions of Dutch governmental and non-governmental peace workers is that the former have a narrow vision of peace, whereas the Dutch civil society peace workers have a broad vision of peace. This means inter alia that different visions of peace are more easily seen as complementary rather than competing, a characteristic that enhances the 'bridge building' potential of Dutch civil society peace workers. Secondly, we will see that the difference in opinion about whether peace is a process (peace-as-process) or a goal (human security) is a direct consequence of a different operationalization of their holistic vision of Peace Writ Large. This means that also these two visions are complementary rather than competitive. Finally, and most interestingly, there is the division over whether peace is a personal or a political phenomenon. We will see that the latter vision is shared most widely, and adopted by the most senior peace workers within an organization. Since they also tend to be somewhat derisive of peace as a more personal phenomenon, this leads to a real tension on this dimension. That also has consequences for the bridge-building potential of Dutch civil society, since, as we will see in the next two chapters, civil society peace workers from Lebanon and Mindanao in majority envision peace as a personal, rather than a political phenomenon.

6.4.1 Scope

With only a few exceptions, Dutch civil society peace workers tend to view peace in a rather holistic way.[42] Many stress that peace is not just the absence of war, but also entails, e.g., equal opportunities,[43] freedom of speech and movement,[44] functioning rule of law,[45] justice,[46] dialogue[47] and compliance with human rights norms.[48] As the standard against which peace workers judge the outcomes of their efforts, this stands in sharp contrast to the rather minimalistic way peace is conceptualized by military and diplomatic actors.

However, there is an interesting dynamic at play along this dimension. As we saw in the previous chapters, military and diplomatic actors both stress that if we want to make peace sustainable, we have to enlarge the scope of the concept and include other elements as well. This fits with some of the critical work in peace studies, that also aims to 'enlarge' peace by taking other prerequisites for it, or sometimes even conceptualizations of it, into account.[49] For Dutch civil society peace workers, the dynamic is the other way around. They know that their Peace Writ Large is a utopia, so they are limiting themselves to only working on certain aspects of it. But they are fully aware that this is a choice, either individually or for an organization. And that other actors are taking care (or should be taking care) of the other sides of peace as well. This makes them, much more than the military and diplomats, prone to take up projects outside their core area of work, especially if their partners in (post-) conflict countries ask them to.[50] It also means that different visions of peace are more easily seen as complementary to their own vision, which enhances their bridge-building potential.

[42] The exceptions are Regina Teunen (PAX), De Regt and (to some extent) Beugeling and Deggeller who both make a distinction between peace in their personal and their professional lives (see below).

[43] Interviews Van Hal and Peter van Sluijs (Cordaid).

[44] Interviews Schrama and Brandt.

[45] Interview Schrama.

[46] Interview anonymous programme officer (Cordaid).

[47] Interviews Van Deventer and Ketelaar.

[48] Interviews De Jonge and Van Deventer.

[49] See e.g. the work on 'everyday peace indicators' by Firchow and MacGinty (Mac Ginty 2014; Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016).

[50] We will see in the next chapters that this holism is also characteristic for the way in which Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers conceptualize peace.

To put the same point slightly differently: civil society actors need an argument *not* to take up a certain project that falls outside their usual focus, since they feel it will almost always benefit Peace Writ Large either directly or indirectly. Thus, if a partner organization of theirs asks them for assistance in dealing with a large mining corporation, for a project to train human rights defenders or for materials like fishnets or trucks, their initial response is always to say yes.[51] After all, responsible business ethics, human rights and economic development can all contribute to maintaining Peace Writ Large. However, as various authors point out, they do not always think very strategically about how this fits their mandate and expertise, which might lead to less efficient solutions or doing double work (Anderson and Olson 2003; Fisher and Zimina 2008).

6.4.2 Ontology

On the second dimension, goal or process, the image appears to be mixed, but in the end, Dutch civil society peace workers mostly stress that the peace they are working on is a continuous process. As was argued above, most Dutch civil society peace workers have an implicit or explicit understanding that Peace Writ Large is a utopian goal. However, since they recognize its utopian character, two opposite conclusions are drawn on the goal/process dimension when they talk about peace as an objective of their work. Some civil society peace workers insist this means that the goal needs to be operationalized. Taking human security as a starting point for peacebuilding policy, or signing a peace-agreement in a specific situation are both considered attainable and worthwhile goals and hence the sort of peace that peace workers should aim for.[52] This was summed up best by the interviewee who bluntly said: 'if you are in a war, peace is certainly a goal.'[53] However, she then went on to say that when there is no immediate threat of war, peace becomes rather more of a process, a continuous striving to keep that peace alive.[54]

[51] The examples come from interviews with anonymous programme officer #2 (PAX) and Meijer.

[52] E.g. interviews Gruiters, Van den Berg, Lucas and Meijer.

[53] Interview Bakker.

[54] A similar argument was made by a.o. Van Oosterzee and Van Sluijs.

This idea is shared by a majority of the interviewees.[55] The peace they work on is not some static situation in the world, but a continuous striving in a world characterized by conflict. A common theme in many interviews is that peace is never a given, but requires constant work, both in situations with and without armed conflict. As one interviewee summarized this argument: 'peace is not a passive situation. It is something you must do, something to work on. It is never finished, because there will always be new problems. Peace is something different for somebody every day.'[56]

This process view stands in stark contrast to the way diplomats and military officers conceptualize peace. For them, peace is a goal, an 'end-state' that means that international peace workers can leave again.[57] Because a peace agreement has been signed, a 'safe and secure environment' is established, a project on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has been successfully concluded, people have returned to their homes or elections have been held. If peace is considered a process, it is a process that should lead to this goal.[58] This leads to tensions when civil society peacebuilders are dependent on (governmental) donors and have to formulate SMART[59] goals for their projects, that fit uneasily with their intuition that the best that can be done in intractable conflicts is to keep lines of communication open and have different actors regularly talk to each other.[60]

6.4.3 Embedding: Individuals or Institutions

The second point of consensus amongst Dutch civil society peacebuilders is that almost all of them start from the premise that peace is to be found in individuals, not in institutions.[61] Where a majority of the diplomats said their work is mostly institution-building, institutions are hardly mentioned at all by civil society peace workers when they talk about their work. And if they do, it is mostly to denounce purely institutional solutions to armed conflict. In a typical answer, a respondent said for instance: 'there is a

[55] 28 out of 48 respondents stated explicitly that peace is a process rather than a goal. Three others added that it becomes a process once the war is over.

[56] Interview De Graaf Bierbrauwer.

[57] See Chap. 4, Sect. 4.4.

[58] Cf. the first perspective in Sect. 6.2. above. E.g. interviews Peter van Walsum, anonymous diplomat #2 (MoFA, DSH) and anonymous former diplomat #2.

[59] Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Time-bound.

[60] E.g. interviews Van Hal, Grotenhuis and Van Puijenbroek.

[61] Two notable exceptions are Van Tuijl and Van den Berg.

rule-of-law approach to peace: for peace you need a few institutions and then you fill it in according to some blueprint. That is exactly what you should not do. You should offer citizens the opportunity to express themselves […] in order to make headway.'[62]

Peace is first and foremost something made by people, whether these are individual inhabitants of a conflict-affected area or political leaders.[63] At all levels, peace requires active engagement by individuals. Some consider viable institutions one of the conditions for peace to thrive,[64] but others point out that in many places without any institutions, there is still peace.[65] Moreover, when talking about institutions that should safeguard the peace, Dutch civil society actors also have a sharp eye for the disadvantages of statebuilding. When a state (or any other institution) does not serve its citizens, but only the people in power, there is no peace.[66]

Hence, Dutch civil society peace workers mostly stress the importance of the individual level in their peace work. What they do is support individual dissidents or local peace or human rights activists,[67] organize people-to-people dialogues or other grassroots activities,[68] bring the voices of ordinary people to the attention of political decision-makers,[69] and generally try to counteract complicated conflicts between groups with individual-level examples of reconciliation and reaching out for peace.[70] As a senior peace worker put it: '[reconciliation after violent conflict] is only possible when it is possible to tell stories about how people in a conflict situation still worked together. […] that people on both sides of that conflict remained human, with an eye for each other.'[71] This is an important finding, because peacebuilding is often portrayed as work on *structures*, either in the form of political institutions (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 203–204), or local 'infrastructures for peace': organizations, agreed-upon mechanisms and other institutions that can support peace beyond interpersonal

[62] Interview Van Deventer.
[63] E.g. interviews Ruigrok, Vogelaar and Geuskens.
[64] E.g. interviews Schoenmakers, Gruiters, Bolling and Ruigrok.
[65] E.g. interviews Vogelaar, Hermans and Deggeller.
[66] E.g. Interviews Scheffers and De Graaf Bierbrauwer.
[67] E.g. interview Hijkoop.
[68] E.g. interview Sweeris.
[69] E.g. interviews Gruiters, Van Deventer, Meijer and Van Leemput.
[70] E.g. interviews Kuik, Ketelaar, anonymous programme officer #2 (PAX).
[71] Interview Kuik.

relations (Van Tongeren 2011; Richmond 2013; Mouly 2013).[72] Dutch civil society peace workers do not deny this, but insist that 'structures, laws, governance and all that should contribute to the empowerment of individuals' and are not a goal in themselves.[73]

This focus on individuals is congruent with the way military talk about freedom from fear, but with one important difference. As we will explore in some more detail below, civil society peace workers stress that peace is something that is actively *made* by individuals, whereas military officers consider peace to be something that should be *experienced* by individuals (and made by themselves). Given the importance of local ownership and bottom-up agency for sustainable peace (Mac Ginty 2008: 142) as well as the important criticism that in practice, 'local ownership' often turns out to be shallow at best (Mac Ginty 2011: 59–60; Donais 2009), this is a crucial difference. As a feminist peace worker argued, even the originally feminist notion of care 'is being awfully misused by the army: we make sure that the world is safe for you poor people'.[74]

6.4.4 Personal or Political

Although there is a widespread belief that peace is an individual-level phenomenon, this does not mean there is also a consensus on the related dimension of whether peace is a personal or a political phenomenon. For some, the fact that peace is found in individuals also implies that peace is something very personal. In the end, what these peace workers want to contribute to is that people experience peace in their personal lives, regardless of the (political) circumstances in which they live. Although it is easier to experience this kind of 'inner' peace in a situation that is not characterized by violence or oppression, in principle it is possible to experience peace 'even in a concentration camp'.[75]

Most, however, object to this focus on individual feelings of wellbeing and stress that the peace they work on is something that requires political agency.[76] Peace is not 'found' in individuals, peace is actively *created by*

[72] See also Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3.

[73] Interview Vogelaar. Similar views were expressed by a.o. Sweeris, Kuik and De Jonge.

[74] Interview Geuskens. On the concept of 'care' see e.g. (Ruddick 1995).

[75] Interview Hermans.

[76] Although some do mention experiencing inner peace as a prerequisite, or at least a condition conducive to working on more political kinds of peace. E.g. interviews Beugeling, Deggeller, Ruigrok and Sweeris.

individuals. In a typical answer, a respondent complained that 'sometimes you meet some spiritually engaged people who say "don't we all want the same?" Like hell we don't! Peace should not remain limited to some vague spiritual notion. You have to organize it!'[77] Also in conflict areas, Dutch civil society peace workers say they team up with partners that are not so much the victims of conflict, but those that are able to move beyond that victimhood to become a (political) actor.[78] It is never enough to have people make peace with their neighbours (let alone find peace 'within themselves') if the big political conflicts are not solved as well. This is also an important reason why peace is an active process, a shaping of the future, rather than some stable state of affairs, bringing us back to the ontological dimension.

Interestingly, opinions are not just split on this dimension, but they are split in a way that puts the more personal visions of peace at a disadvantage. Twenty-four out of 45 interviewees considered peace to be a political phenomenon, with a further six arguing that it is both. With two exceptions, this group includes all staff with a higher management function (like team leader, director or president of the board). In contrast, the fifteen interviewees who said that peace is a personal phenomenon included five out of the six administrative staff-members interviewed and only two senior people. Finally, all six people who said that peace is both personal and political, stressed that their organization mainly dealt with peace as a political phenomenon. Moreover, the peace workers who conceptualize peace as a political phenomenon actively renounce the more personal conceptualization, saying things like 'people who talk about personal peace just haven't understood it.'[79] This not only contradicts the idea that in the end peace is a holistic, albeit utopian, goal, it also poses a particular challenge for the bridge-building function of Dutch civil society. As we saw in Chap. 3 (and will explore in more detail in the next two chapters), many civil society peace workers in Lebanon and Mindanao *do* think of peace very much as a personal endeavour. If Dutch civil society peace workers want to 'give voice to the people over there',[80] it would be expected that they would consistently call attention to this more personal peace and

[77] Interview Deggeller. Similar objections to conceptualizing peace as a state of mind were raised by e.g. Kuik, Bakker and Meijer.

[78] E.g. interviews Kuik and Geuskens.

[79] Interview Van den Berg.

[80] Interview Van Leemput. Similar views were expressed by a.o. Gruiters, Meijer, Geuskens and Van Deventer.

berate diplomats who say that this is something that people 'in another office' should take care of.[81] Instead, they train their partners in (post-) conflict areas to do political lobby and stress that grassroots efforts at peacebuilding (like people-to-people dialogues) should always be connected to the political level in order to be relevant.[82] Even when their lobby is focused on the drawbacks of international policies for local people in conflict-affected areas, they tend to focus on for example the consequences of counter terrorism policies for political activism, rather than for people's everyday lives.[83]

Moreover, only one Dutch peace worker identified this as a major problem. In his own words: 'a very important component for almost all the people with whom you cooperate, goes back to some sort of peace with yourself. […] Almost all of our partners, all the people I know that we cooperate with, are working on that. […] When we decided not to work on social cohesion anymore, we immediately ran into trouble. Because this is what all of our partners were doing.'[84] Most other civil society peace workers appear to have a blind spot for the importance that peace workers in (post-) conflict areas attach to peace as a personal endeavour. Or perhaps they partner only with those peace workers who do have a political agenda. More research into specific civil society partner relationships would be needed to establish this.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that Dutch civil society peace workers conceptualize peace in three distinct ways. Almost all of them implicitly or explicitly think of peace as a rather holistic, utopian goal: *Peace Writ Large*. This holistic conceptualization stands in sharp contrast to the rather narrow visions of peace that diplomats and military officers say they work on. Envisioning peace in this way grants civil society peace workers the flexibility to take up a wide array of projects (usually at the behest of their local partners in (post-)conflict areas), since all of these will somehow benefit Peace Writ Large. Put cynically, it means that civil society peace workers

[81] As anonymous diplomat #4 (MoFA, DVB) remarked. See Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.1.

[82] E.g. interviews Schoenmakers, Gruiters and Van Tuijl.

[83] E.g. interviews Geuskens and Van Deventer.

[84] Interview Grit. 'Social cohesion' refers to one of the seven functions that civil society peacebuilding organizations have (Paffenholz 2010: 71–73) that were used by his organization as a tool to focus their work.

will never run out of jobs to do. The drawback is that this holistic vision does not force them to ever make strategic choices, since everything they do will somehow contribute to Peace Writ Large.

Since Peace Writ Large is too big a goal to be ever fully attainable, Dutch civil society peace workers offer two other, more operational visions of peace. Most of them say that the peace they work on is a continuous striving, a never-ending process of dialogue: *peace-as-process.* This vision implies that peace requires work both in (post-) conflict countries and in countries that are mostly considered to be peaceful (such as the Netherlands). Envisioning peace as a continuous process still means that civil society peace workers never run out of a job, but it also implies that *how* things are done (inclusively, non-violently, bottom-up) is at least as important as what is being achieved.[85] In some very difficult protracted conflicts, keeping a dialogue going between different groups or their leaders, is a notable achievement in itself.

The other popular operationalization of peace is *human security.* This third vision is close to the military vision of 'freedom from fear', but with two important distinctions. First of all, many civil society peace workers consider human security to be a political concept, that ought to be translated into different people-centred policies, rather than the immediate goal of their own efforts. Secondly, where military officers think of freedom from fear as something that individuals should experience as a result of military efforts to establish a safe and secure environment for them, civil society peace workers stress that freedom from fear is also something that is actively being built by the inhabitants of a conflict-affected area. Peace requires agency, a conclusion that fits with much of the critical peacebuilding literature (e.g. Richmond 2010; Richmond and Mitchell 2012; Mac Ginty 2014; Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic 2016).

If we look at the underlying dimensions, the most important finding is that the dominant vision is that peace is a political, rather than a personal phenomenon. This is not only how most Dutch civil society peace workers treat peace, but also how most of the more senior peace workers see peace. Moreover, quite some of these dismiss a more personal view of peace as irrelevant. This is remarkable, because many Dutch civil society peace workers say they want to bring the point of view of local civil society actors in (post-) conflict areas into the international policy arena. In the next

[85] See also Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.4.

chapters we will see that most of these local civil society actors, at least in Lebanon and Mindanao, treat peace primarily as a personal phenomenon.

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CHAPTER 7

Lebanon: Civil Peace

In Arabic actually we have two words for peace: salaam and silim. Salaam is about a conflict between countries, or some conflict related to governance. Like the war between Syria and Israel, or the pro-and anti-Assad forces. Silim is more like 'civil peace', the relations between people from the different groups in a society.
(Interview Mustafa Haid (Dawlaty))

Having discussed the views of Dutch military, diplomatic and civil society peace workers, we now turn our gaze to the people in (post-) conflict areas that they try to help in achieving peace. It is important to consider those visions—and how they differ from the Dutch—because one of the major criticisms on peacebuilding is that Western actors wrongly assume their visions of peace to be universal.[1] Although we saw in the last chapters that this is not in fact true for most of the Dutch peace workers interviewed, they still tend to focus on peace as a political phenomenon. In this chapter we will see that, in contrast, many Lebanese civil society peace workers say they are not working on a political peace at all. In Lebanon, political peace—*salaam* in Arabic—is often equated with 'peace with Israel', a notion that is highly unpopular amongst the general public. Therefore,

[1] See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.4.1.

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many interviewees explicitly stress that they are working on a different vision of peace: either *peace as a personal endeavour* that might (but need not) be a basis for *non-violent activism* or *civil peace* amongst the different Lebanese ethnic and religious groups—*silim* in Arabic.

We already saw some of this coming in Chap. 3, where the Q study showed that peace workers from both Lebanon and Mindanao score much more highly on the vision of peace as a personal endeavour than any of the Dutch. In this chapter (and for Mindanao the next) we will explore what exactly this entails and how this vision of peace is connected to other visions that these peace workers adhere to.

The chapter is organized much like the preceding chapters. It starts with a short introduction on the Lebanese context—Sect. 7.1. In Sect. 7.2 the three visions of peace that these peace workers work on—personal peace, non-violent activism and civil peace—are introduced, as well as a fourth—political peace—that is often mentioned, but almost exclusively as what Lebanese civil society peace workers are *not* working on. Finally, the visions are compared along the four dimensions of our theoretical framework, both to each other and to the visions of Dutch peace workers. A conclusion wraps up the chapter.

7.1 Peace in Lebanon

As was already indicated in Chap. 1, Lebanon can best be described as a country in which there is no war, but also no peace. A civil war between shifting coalitions of the different ethnic and religious groups—many of whom were aided by foreign powers—ravaged the country from 1975 until 1990. It ended after the so-called Taif agreement stipulated new power-sharing mechanisms that effectively froze the ethno-religious balance of power. All of the militias were disbanded in 1991, with the exception of Hezbollah, a powerful Shiite militia that claimed to be fighting Israel—that was, and still is, officially at war with Lebanon—rather than any domestic enemies. After the war Lebanon was occupied by Syrian forces. Their official purpose was to help the country revive its own security architecture, but in practice they meant that Syria had a large influence over Lebanese politics. After a non-violent 'Cedar revolution' that followed the murder of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, the Syrians were forced to withdraw from the country. The next year a Hezbollah raid on Israel led to the temporary Israeli occupation of the south of Lebanon, as well as heavy fighting in the capital Beirut. The conflict was ended by dip-

lomatic intervention on the part of the UN that weakened Hezbollah and strengthened the role of UNIFIL, a UN mission that has been deployed along the Lebanese-Israeli border since 1978 (Salem 2006).

At the time this research was undertaken (2014), Lebanon was politically deadlocked over the question who should become the next president, a symptom of a broader crisis in the post-Taif political system (Ghosn and Khoury 2011; Knudsen and Kerr 2012). Moreover, the civil war in neighbouring Syria was severely affecting Lebanon (International Crisis Group 2015). Not only because of the influx of approximately one million refugees (at a population of roughly four million Lebanese), but also because of frequent bomb attacks both in the border areas and in Beirut. Many interviewees saw parallels between the situation in Syria and the Lebanese civil war and explained they were also working with Syrian refugees.[2] Some expressed a concern that tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Syria might spark violence between similar groups in Lebanon, especially because Hezbollah was openly supporting pro-Assad forces in Syria.[3] Others were confident that the Lebanese would not fall into the trap of civil war again.[4] All interviewees, however, agreed that peace work was still highly relevant in Lebanon.

7.2 Visions of Peace in Lebanon

From the interviews, four visions of peace can be established. In Chap. 3 we already saw that the Lebanese respondents in the Q study scored highest on the vision of peace as a personal endeavour. In Sect. 7.2.1 this vision is described in more detail, based on the Lebanese interviewees' input. It will be shown that as a personal endeavour, peace mostly consists of a certain mindset, or personal conviction that violence does not solve one's problems. This personal conviction is the basis for two further conceptualizations of peace. On the one hand non-violent activism, which is the politicization of peace as a personal endeavour. On the other hand there is civil peace, or *silim* in Arabic. This is seen as an extension of personal peace to the level of societal groups and the relations between them. These two

[2] E.g. interviews Lama el Chaar (WILPF), Ramzi Merhej (Search for Common Ground (SFCG)), Rania Fazah (independent consultant) and Riad Jarjour (Forum for Development, Culture and Dialogue (FDCD)).

[3] E.g. interviews Hana Nassif (Association Justice et Misericordia (AJEM)), Jarjour and Ziad Saab (Fighters for Peace (FfP).

[4] E.g. interviews El Chaar and Ali Chahine (independent consultant).

visions will be elaborated in Sects. 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 respectively. In Sect. 7.2.3 we will also discuss the final vision of peace found in Lebanon: political peace or *salaam* in Arabic. According to the interviewees, this is the most widespread conceptualization of peace amongst the Lebanese public, but since it comes with an implicit understanding that it is about a peace agreement with Israel, all but one interviewee stress that *salaam* is not in fact what they are working on. Still, it colours the Lebanese discourse on peace to a large extent and many interviewees frame their own work in opposition to this conceptualization of peace.

7.2.1 Peace as a Personal Endeavour

The vision of peace as a personal endeavour is, as the label already indicates, a personal level conception of peace. It is a mindset that peace educators try to instil in as many people as possible.[5] As one of them formulated it: 'We have to raise a generation believing in talking, taking a breaks before you start to fight.'[6] In this vision, peace is not a political goal—though we will see below that it can serve as a basis for non-violent political activism—but rather a personal choice to renounce violence and hatred.[7] As an interviewee whose answers are typical for this approach put it: 'peace is always something very personal. No matter what people might say of someone, when he is at peace, he will be at peace. It depends on a personal work by every person'.[8]

On this vision, peace is primarily about how to relate to others in everyday life. According to some of the respondents, the underlying problem is that a basically violent, or 'domineering' attitude towards others is part of the culture of the region (cf. Gilsenan 1996). This culture needs to be replaced by a more peaceful one, that incorporates a rejection of violence

[5] E.g. Maysa Mourad (independent educationalist), Saab, Nemer Frayha (Lebanese University), Fouad Dirani (FfP), Hoda Barakat (Adyan) and Elie Abouaoun (USIP). Analytically, it is possible to further subdivide this peace into a purely psychological 'inner peace' and a more outward-oriented 'interpersonal peace'. In practice however, all interviewees who talked about peace as an individual-level phenomenon stressed that they see peace as multi-layered, with inner peace a precondition for working on peace with others.

[6] Interview Frayha.

[7] The inclusion of 'hatred' indicates that it is not just a choice about behaviour, but also an emotional disposition. See e.g. interviews Assad Chaftari (Wahdatouna Khalasouna) and Merhej. In conceptual terms, it is similar to what Anatol Rapoport called 'personal pacifism' (Rapoport 1992: 153–156).

[8] Anonymous interview employee#1, AJEM.

and a basically cooperative, or at least empathic, attitude towards others. In a typical remark an interviewee said for example that 'violence is not an imported phenomenon in the region. It is not just jihadi's from Afghanistan. But it is a mindset that is prevailing in the region. […] We have been raised with the idea, I have been raised this way, that strength is necessary. That you have to use force.'[9] Their work on changing individual people's attitudes towards violence is seen as part of a cultural change that transcends these individuals. As another peaceworker put it: '[my organization] is working on the mentalities that are behind this regime. Because you can change the whole [political] structure, but then you will still have the same underlying mentalities.'[10]

Interviewees stress that their work on peace as a personal endeavour is not necessarily going to lead to political change, even though they hope that in the long run it will lead to a different kind of politics. An interviewee who made an explicit difference between three levels at which one could work for peace claimed for example that 'sometimes it is really hard to target all these three levels [the individual, the people in his immediate surroundings and the wider political context]. For instance, we are working with Syrians. It is really hard to work on [their political problems]. But we can work on their inner peace, and their peace of heart, to have them come together for social cohesion and at least respect each other.'[11] An ex-fighter turned peacebuilder similarly saw his efforts as contributing not to solving the political situation in his country, but to convince individual youngsters not to repeat his mistakes: 'I don't think I will solve the problem with my work. But if I effect the youth not to repeat my experience, I will be satisfied.'[12]

Working on peace as a personal endeavour is thus seen as both intrinsically worthwhile for the people directly affected and a contribution to a long-term cultural shift. Thus, it is not only an individual-level goal, but also a continuous process. Most interviewees stress that peace cannot be inner peace only, but that there are cross-cutting linkages between peaces

[9] Interview Abouaoun. Similar views were expressed by a.o. Chahine, Abouaoun, Merhej, Saab, Chibli Mallat (Right to Non-violence (RNV)) and Antoine Messara (Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace (LFPCP)).

[10] Interview Barakat. Although the organization is not mentioned very often, the argument is reminiscent of UNESCO's work on building a culture of peace. See http://en.unesco.org/cultureofpeace/.

[11] Interview Merhej.

[12] Interview Saab.

on different levels of human experience. One very clear example of this is the statement that 'if I live in a country that is at war, I do not have the peace of mind to establish a business, or do a job.'[13] This means that many interviewees also feel they cannot wait on a long-term cultural change to ensure peace at a national level. Therefore, working on peace as a personal endeavour is often complemented with work on another vision of peace. In Lebanon, this is most often either civil peace or non-violent activism. We will first look at the latter.

7.2.2 Justice by Peaceful Means: Non-violent Activism

Although some interviewees consider furthering peace as a personal endeavour to be a worthwhile effort regardless of whether it has any direct impact on the political situation in Lebanon, there is also a group that laments the apolitical character of much of the peace work that is done in Lebanon.[14] The strongest proponents of a more political endeavour can be found amongst people that promote non-violent activism as a tool for social change.[15]

Non-violent activists share the same mindset as the proponents of peace as a personal endeavour, but take this 'personal pacifism' (Rapoport 1992: 153–156) from the realm of everyday social interactions into the political domain. They use a specific repertoire of non-violent techniques to reach their goals (see, e.g., Sharp 2012), but stress that non-violence is more than just a method. Rather, it is a philosophy in which peace truly is 'the way', rather than the destination.[16] Peace is not just a continuous process, peace is a method, a means to an end: justice.

As one outspoken peace worker put it in response to the question whether peace is attainable: 'Peace is something that does not exist. So I can't tell whether it is achievable. I think I am working to minimize injustice. And peace to me is about equality, justice, […] that people feel they got what they deserve to get.'[17] The Syrians I interviewed also insisted that peace in their country was not just a return to the state of affairs before the

[13] Interview Merhej.

[14] More on this in Sects. 7.2.3 and 7.3.3.

[15] E.g. interviews Fazah, Mallat and Maan Abdul Salam (Etana).

[16] To paraphrase a quote we also encountered in Chap. 6: 'there is no way to peace, peace is the way'. Interview Mallat.

[17] Interview Fazah. Similar views were expressed by a.o. Mallat, Nassif and Fadi Abi Allam (Permanent Peace Movement (PPM)).

war erupted. In a typical remark, one of them said for example that 'before 2012 there was also no peace. There was injustice, dictatorship, human rights violations.'[18]

In order to achieve justice, non-violent activists stress that they might have to enter into a conflict with the authorities sometimes. Thus, peace to them does not mean the absence of conflict, but rather a choice not to use violence to solve these conflicts. As a former fighter now turned peace activist put it: 'as a fighter I had an idea. I wanted to change the country, to have justice, equilibrium. But using violence just led to war and we lost what we had. Lebanon was more developed in 1972 than it is now.'[19]

As an example of the shift from peace as a goal to peace as a method, the following anecdote from a Lebanese interviewee is representative of how non-violent activists approach peace. In a meeting of a network of young Middle Eastern activists, organized and sponsored by a Dutch peace organization, the question came up whether they should call themselves 'peace activists'. This was vehemently rejected by many of the participants, who felt that peace was not the objective of their work, because they did not want to 'make peace' with the dictators that ran their countries. One of the participants then proposed to call themselves 'peaceful activists', a solution that all endorsed. According to the interviewee, especially the Syrians were hesitant to use the word peace, because it was associated with striking a deal with Assad.[20] A similar hesitancy with regards to the word peace has been observed amongst Israeli and Palestinian 'joint non-violent activists', who say they do not want peace, they want justice (de Jong 2012: 195–196).

7.2.3 Civil Peace: Silim, *not* Salaam

The third vision of peace that Lebanese civil society peace workers work on is civil peace. Civil peace, or *silim* in Arabic, relates to peaceful relations between the different groups in a society. Although it might be supported by individuals adopting the mindset described above as peace as a personal endeavour, civil peace is a collective, rather than an individual concept of

[18] Interview Abdul Salam. Similar views were expressed by the other Syrians I interviewed: Salloum and Haid. Cf. also the opinion that 'dictators wage war on their own people' we encountered in Chap. 6.

[19] Interview Saab

[20] Interview Fazah. More on this hesitancy in Sect. 7.2.3.

peace (Adolf 2009: 2). Given Lebanon's distinct identity as a pluralistic country, with 17 different officially acknowledged ethnic and religious groups living together in one of the smallest continental countries in the world,[21] managing the relations between these different groups is no small feat. Therefore, many of the peace workers interviewed indicate that after having been through 15 years of civil war, they are now working to maintain civil peace—at all costs.

This civil peace is most easily defined by what it is not. Most importantly, it is not a political conceptualization of peace. Many interviewees concurred that in the Lebanese context the word peace (*salaam* in Arabic) refers to a political deal, specifically a deal with Israel.[22] They answer for example to the question what peace means: 'in Lebanon peace is often associated with surrendering to Israel.'[23] Or, in slightly more words: 'the general position towards the issue of *salaam* is that they [the Lebanese] consider that whenever you mention *salaam*, you are talking about *salaam* with Israel. Because the Israeli media succeeded in creating this image that "we are asking for *salaam*." And they have this organization called Peace Now, *salaam* now.'[24] Many interviewees stress that they do not want to 'enter into politics', and hence always say they work on *silim*, civil peace, rather than *salaam*.[25] The only interviewee who proclaimed very proudly that 'we are the first organization in the MENA region to dare to use Salaam' was the president of the Permanent Peace Movement, a large and regionally active peace organization that is part of the GPPAC network.[26]

What does this mean? Why do they not want to enter into 'politics'? In Chap. 5 we saw that for the Dutch diplomats who mention a similar vision of civil peace, politics is essential to solving the tensions between different groups in a society.[27] One Dutch diplomat stated for example that 'perhaps at heart peace is the capacity, or the extent to which, groups in a society are able to solve their differences peacefully', a formulation that

[21] Lebanon is ranked 35 in the top-100 of smallest countries in the world. See https://www.countries-ofthe-world.com/smallest-countries.html.

[22] E.g. interviews Abi Allam, Chaftari, Abouaoun, Haid and Mazen Abou Hamdan (Chaml).

[23] Interview Abou Hamdan.

[24] Interview Abi Allam. Similar views were also expressed by Abouaoun and Haid.

[25] Interviews Chaftari, Abi Allam, Ouaiss and Fazah. (See also Zakharia 2011: 8, 16–17).

[26] Interview Abi Allam.

[27] See Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.1.

could easily be used as a description of civil peace.[28] However, as we saw in Chap. 5, in practice diplomats who subscribe to this long-term vision of peace mostly work on strengthening political institutions that serve as the proverbial 'big stick' in case civil peace breaks down.[29] Given their qualms about the sustainability of peace in Lebanon, why would Lebanese civil society peace workers not work on similar goals, but instead emphasize they steer clear of politics?

First of all, because the term 'politics' might refer to 'international politics', specifically the ongoing conflict with Israel. This was for example what a member of the board of the civil society coalition *Wahdatouna Khalasouna* meant when he explained that 'in Lebanon, when we speak of peace, we have to say it is 'civil peace'. Otherwise the Shiites refuse it.'[30]

However, the distinction, and the difficulties Lebanese civil society peace workers have with working on *salaam*, run deeper.[31] *Salaam* is the traditional notion of peace used in political science and international relations. It is the peace that is written down in peace treaties, whether between countries or between the opposing parties in a civil war. The Taif agreement is a case in point. As we saw above, most Dutch peace workers also have a political vision of peace, that would amount to *salaam* in the Lebanese context.

Civil society actors who want to influence political peace, do so through political mechanisms, most notably lobby and advocacy. In Lebanon however, such lobby and advocacy efforts are not very common, nor deemed very effective.[32] As one Lebanese peace activist explained when talking

[28] Anonymous interview diplomat #1 (MoFA, DSH).

[29] Interview Ernesto Braam (MoFA, DAM). Similar views were expressed by e.g. anonymous diplomat #5 (MoFA, DAM), former diplomat #1 and Dutch civil society peace workers Van Oosterzee, Sweeris and Ketelaar.

[30] Interview Chaftari.

[31] The rest of this section draws heavily on the interview with Haid. Other interviewees did not make the same sharp distinction between *salaam* and *silim*, but argued for example that *salaam* can also refer to a more spiritual notion of peace (interview Abdul Salam), or that the difference is somewhat semantic (interview Abouaoun (USIP). However, when asked directly, they all did concede that there is a difference and that most Lebanese organizations are not in fact working on political *salaam* but rather on social *silim* (see also, e.g., interviews Chami and Abi Allam).

[32] A 2015 report written for the EU confirms this observation for Lebanese civil society more broadly, stating that only 31% of all CSOs is engaged in lobby and advocacy efforts and fewer than 4% of the respondents considered their lobby to have been successful (Lteif 2015: 64, 108).

about a workshop on lobby and advocacy that was organized by a Dutch peace organization, 'in Lebanon things just don't work that way. […] Basically, people vote for their sectarian leaders, mainly because they are afraid of the other sects. I come from a Druze background. My background means that our leader is Jumblatt. And many of my people will vote for him no matter what he says. There is a lack of intellectual independence. People just think he is wiser than us, because he protects our sect.'[33] This lack of accountability of the political leaders makes it very hard to have any influence on political processes, including ones leading to political peace.

Perhaps because of this difficulty in having a political impact,[34] or because—25 years after the Taif agreement—they have given up the hope that change will come from politicians, they do not consider *silim* a very political phenomenon at all. As an interviewee explained it: '*Silim* is about peace within societies, for example between different religions, different sects: Sunnis and Alawites, Christians, Druze, etc. […] *Silim* focuses more on the social aspect: organizing diversity and prevent a conflict between the groups from happening.'[35]

Unlike the Dutch, Lebanese peace workers do not think civil peace comes from formal agreements or institutions. According to the interviewees, it depends much more on a mindset of trust, acceptance and tolerance: on peace as a personal endeavour. Thus, working on *silim* means for instance bringing people from different groups together, at the grassroots and middle levels (cf. Lederach 1997).[36] Peace education can also contribute to this civil peace, if it teaches children how they can overcome their fears of the other and solve their conflicts in a non-violent way.

The distinction between political peace and civil peace, between *salaam* and *silim*, becomes even clearer when we consider the consequences of a breakdown of these two forms of peace. As we saw in Chap. 3, a breakdown of political peace means, in the words of Von Clausewitz, the 'continuation of policy by other means': i.e. war (Von Clausewitz 1984 [1832]: 87). In Clausewitz' classical conception of war, two (or more) parties fight to reach some political objective. This war can take place on either an

[33] Interview Abou Hamdan.

[34] Cf. interview Fazah, who said that 'in Lebanon no-one is working on political peace. They have given up because it is too hard.'

[35] Interview Haid.

[36] Interview Haid.

inter- or intranational level, but it is, as Clausewitz correctly observed, a political phenomenon at heart.

A breakdown of civil peace on the other hand, does not necessarily lead to open warfare. Usually, the breakdown manifests itself in much less intense violence, like clashes between hotheaded youth, hooliganism or individual acts of violence.[37] However, in a situation of (political) war, the breakdown of civil peace between the different groups that make up a country, can turn a political conflict into an all-out civil war—like the one Lebanon experienced. For the Syrians I interviewed, this is more than an academic distinction. They were all outspoken in their opinion that the present conflict in Syria could not yet be described as a civil war, regardless of the death toll and the enormous amount of refugees.[38] Instead, they portrayed the 'current confusion' as a political conflict over who holds the power in the country.[39] The term civil war they reserved for conflicts like the Lebanese civil war, where the faultlines all run along sectarian lines and, as one of them put it, 'you will not find a single Druze fighting in a Sunni militia.'[40] As long as there is peace between the communities, they retain hope that the conflict can be solved politically, without degenerating into a true civil war.[41]

Maintaining civil peace is seen as a continuous process, rather than the achievement of a one-off goal. This is because civil peace focuses on the relationship between (groups of) people and relationships, in the words of a young peace worker, 'always have ups and downs, you always have to

[37] Interview Haid. There is an intriguing question here of where terrorist violence fits in. My guess would be that for the terrorists, it is an attempt to breach the political peace and start a war. With a few high-profile and highly destructive exceptions however, their effect is usually limited to breaching civil peace. In the Lebanese context this manifests as increased tensions between Shiites and Sunnis, in a Western context between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim natives.

[38] The interviews were done in the summer of 2014, before the rise of Islamic State.

[39] The term 'current confusion' is a euphemism used by Salloum. The other Syrians also refused to openly speak about 'civil war'. Haid, e.g., explicitly said that 'the majority of Syrians, both pro and against Assad, and also the non-violent activists, say it is not a civil war.'

[40] Interview Haid.

[41] Interview Abdul Salam. For scholars of war this distinction between two kinds of intrastate war might be slightly confusing, since the terms civil war and intrastate war are often used interchangeably. However, in the Lebanese context this distinction serves to delineate the traumatic 1975–1990 civil war from other (and ongoing) episodes of violence. A Dutch peace worker residing in the region confirmed the idea that, at least in 2014, the conflict in Syria was not yet a civil war (Marjolein Wijninckx (PAX), private correspondence). See also (Setrakian 2012).

work on them.'[42] As we will see below, almost all Lebanese peace workers interviewed think of peace as a process, rather than a goal.

7.3 Underlying Dimensions

The three different peaces that Lebanese civil society peace workers are working on can be graphically depicted as a horizontal column in the back-left corner of our peace cube (see Fig. 7.1). At the base of this column is peace as a personal endeavour, which is, as the name already indicates, a very personal conceptualization of peace, that does not necessarily extend into the realm of politics. It does however support both civil peace—or *silim*, the block in the middle—and, at the political 'top' of the column,[43] non-violent activism, which is the political translation of a personal commitment to peace. As we move up the column, the cubes become smaller, to indicate that the concept becomes more circumscribed.

In this section, we will look into each of these four dimensions in turn. On each dimension, we will compare these three visions to one another,



Fig. 7.1 Lebanese civil society visions of peace

[42] Interview Merhej.

[43] The fact that the three peaces line up in a column does not necessarily indicate a hierarchical relationship, although it is tempting to see the argument in this light: personal pacifism underlies both civil peace and non-violent activism. However, there is no hierarchical relationship between civil peace and non-violent activism, as they are located in different domains (social and political)2.

but also look at the differences between the Lebanese interviewees as a group and the other cases. This comparison shows for example that the Lebanese stress that peace is a process—even more strongly than their Dutch civil society counterparts do.

7.3.1 Scope

Contrary to their Dutch counterparts (and as we will see in the next chapter, also the Mindanaoans), Lebanese civil society peace workers work on rather neatly circumscribed visions of peace. Peace means primarily that no violence is used. Either on an individual level (peace as a personal endeavour), between groups (civil peace) or in political struggles (non-violent activism). A typical statement showing this is that 'conflict will always be there, but it should not lead to violence.'[44] If they want to bring up larger goals than preventing violence, Lebanese tend to frame these as working on justice rather than on peace.[45]

Of the three visions outlined above, peace as a personal endeavour is the most holistic, since peace is considered a 'way of life' that profoundly affects the person who chose peace in all aspects of his/her life.[46] In a typical comment, one respondent stated for example that 'I don't think you can separate peace form any other component in our lives. You cannot enjoy family, have social facilities, without peace. You cannot spread culture if there is no peace. […]Peace is not a phenomenon, it is a quest. To improve. Either within yourself or improve the society.'[47] Moreover, people with this vision of peace often also point out that peace is a multi-level phenomenon, consisting of both someone's inner peace, his relations with other individuals and the wider situation in his country.[48] Peace at each of these levels reinforces peace at the others.

[44] Interview Chami. Similar views with regard to the centrality of (non)violence to peace were expressed by a.o. Abi Allam, Mallat and Abouaoun.

[45] See Sect. 7.2.2. It could be noted that 'justice' does seem to be a rather holistic concept, encompassing both accountability for past crimes, equity in the socio-economic domain, upholding collective and individual rights and generally 'everyone getting what she or he deserves' (interview Rania Fazah). Visions of justice are not part of the present study, but it would be an interesting follow-up project.

[46] E.g. interviews Merhej, Moukaddem, Chaftari.

[47] Interview Chaftari.

[48] E.g. interviews Merhej, Abi Allam and anonymous employee #1, AJEM.

Civil peace is less holistic, since it 'merely' indicates a situation in which the different groups that make up Lebanese society do not use violence against one another. It does not mean that all other issues on which they are divided are solved, nor does it mean anything for peace at the international level (i.e., with Israel).

Finally, non-violent activism is aimed at justice, but is a vision of peace only because it stipulates that only peaceful means should be used to achieve this justice.[49] Thus, it is the least holistic of the three visions of peace that Lebanese civil society peace workers are working on. Political peace—*salaam*—is not a vision of peace that many respondents are working on, but as we saw, this is mostly because *salaam* too is interpreted very narrowly in Lebanon—as a peace agreement with Israel. Thus, we can conclude that on the scope-dimension, peace workers in Lebanon have rather narrow visions of peace, more like the Dutch diplomats than like Dutch civil society peace workers.

7.3.2 Ontology

Even more strongly than their Dutch counterparts, Lebanese civil society peace workers stress that peace is a continuous process. Only five of the people interviewed described peace as a goal, two of whom said that as a goal, it is utopian.[50] All the others explicitly stated that peace is a never-ending process, and criticized people (often foreigners), who present it as a goal. One young peacebuilder remarked for example: 'of course I think it is a process. Peace is not endurable. This is what the Europeans don't understand. […] It's not like you have reached this state and now this is the end of it.'[51] Like the Dutch civil society they stress mostly the need to actively work to maintain peace. Or, in their case, of keeping the rather fragile balance that keeps the country from once again plunging into a civil war. As one interviewee quipped: 'Lebanon has been really successful and unique in its ability to stay unstable, but not to explode.'[52]

In the previous chapter, we saw that the vision of peace as a never-ending process is very much at odds with the project-based approach of

[49] Interview Mallat.

[50] Similar to the holistic vision of Peace Writ Large that inspires Dutch civil society peace workers. See Chap. 6, Sect. 6.1.

[51] Interview Barakat.

[52] Interview Chahine.

many (government-sponsored) peacebuilding efforts. For Lebanese civil society peace workers, this project approach is even more frustrating. As a young engineer-turned-peaceworker put it: 'Peace is not like you build this building in six months and then it is finished and you can have it for 30 years. You have to build it each day. The follow-up should be on a 'secondly' basis. Not even a daily basis, but every second you have to work for peace.'[53]

The emphasis on the process character of peace matches with the rejection of political peace by most interviewees. If we look at the four visions outlined above, *salaam* is the only one that can easily be described as a goal: the signing of a peace agreement. Civil peace, on the other hand, is described by an interviewee as 'a constant process of managing a diverse society and the conflicts that diversity generates.'[54] Another concurs that 'peace has to change constantly, because society changes constantly.'[55] Both of these formulations point to the same idea: there is no stable state of affairs that is 'peace'. Civil peace is the dynamic process of keeping a diverse society together. Similarly, getting people to renounce the use of violence in their dealings with others can be seen as a (project) goal, but they then have to remain committed to this ideal, also in more adverse circumstances. As one of the former fighters now turned peace-activists confided to me in response to the Q statement that peace means that war is unthinkable: 'I don't know which will be the solution for what is happening now in Iraq [Islamic State's conquest of Mosul]. What I hope is not to use violence. I will not use this way anymore. But in general, I am not sure.'[56]

7.3.3 Personal or Political

We saw above that political peace, *salaam*, is not very popular amongst Lebanese civil society peace workers. Fifteen out of the 25 interviewees say that they do not work on the political side of peace. And one interviewee proudly remarked that his organization was the only organization in

[53] Interview Merhej.
[54] Interview Fadi Daou (Adyan).
[55] Interview Merhej.
[56] Interview Saab.

Lebanon that did target *salaam*, although he hastily added that this is not *salaam* with Israel.[57]

However, this does not mean that they consider politics irrelevant to the long-term sustainability of peace. A typical comment on peace education is for example that 'we are reaching 1200 students this year. I don't think it's enough to stop the war though. For that, we would also need to be involved in politics.'[58] Lebanese civil society peace workers seem to be aware of the need for political solutions to peace issues, something that also shows in their average score on the vision of peace-as-politics in the Q study. This score is similar to the average score of Dutch civil society peace workers, though lower than that of the military and diplomats.[59] It is just that they do not see a role for themselves in these politics.

In the interviews, two reasons were given for this lack of enthusiasm for working on political peace. The first is that it is simply too hard for civil society organizations to have any impact on Lebanese politics.[60] Politics in Lebanon is a highly elitist affair, with the same politicians that were responsible for signing the Taif agreement, still calling the shots. In this climate, political lobby becomes extremely difficult (cf. Lteif 2015: 108). Thus, civil society peace workers express that they have lost faith in politics as a way of solving problems without a previous shift in mindsets. This is why they work on a long-term process of cultural change rather than on (more immediate) political reform.[61] The second reason is that when talking about political peace, it is connected immediately to making peace with Israel.[62] Since this is a highly unpopular notion in Lebanese society more broadly, civil society organizations have no real choice other than renouncing their involvement in 'politics'.

However, the fact that Lebanese civil society is not working on political peace, does not mean that it does not address broader political issues like democratization or good governance. Roger Mac Ginty has, e.g., extensively documented the hybridity involved in governance reforms in

[57] Interview Abi Allam. As far as I can tell he might be right about this claim as well. The others who stated that peace is a political phenomenon were either independent consultants mainly involved in peace projects outside Lebanon (e.g. Chahine and Chami), or people working on non-violence (e.g. Abouaoun, Mallat and Mourad).

[58] Interview Saab.

[59] See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.5.

[60] E.g. interviews Fazah, Merhej and Abou Hamdan.

[61] Interviews Barakat and Abouaoun.

[62] E.g. interviews Abi Allam, Chaftari, Abouaoun, Abou Hamdan and Haid.

Lebanon, as part of his study into hybrid forms of peace (Mac Ginty 2011: 158–182). Crucially however, local civil society actors do not think of such efforts as being part of peace work—as Dutch civil society peace workers do[63]—but instead see civil peace (*silim*) as a precondition for addressing these other issues, while refusing to attach the label of *salaam* (political peace) to them.[64] Treating governance reform automatically as part of peacebuilding, as Mac Ginty does, is indeed an indication of a certain Eurocentrism in his conceptualization of peace (Sabaratnam 2013: 260).

Moreover, civil peace is not an entirely personal vision of peace either. It is concerned with the relations between (ethnic) groups, not between specific individuals—as the vision of peace as a personal endeavour is. Thus, it does not fit neatly in the dichotomous divide between personal and political visions of peace but rather occupies a position halfway between these two opposites. Interestingly though, this halfway position is envisioned differently by Dutch and Lebanese peace workers. For the Dutch, political arrangements are what shores up civil peace.[65] Or, conversely, civil peace is a basic prerequisite for political peace agreements to be stable.[66] The political and the social go together into one conception of peace as a social-political, *collective* phenomenon, that is distinguished from peace as an individual, personal, phenomenon, which is what a majority of them says they are not working on, although the military officers are an exception in this regard.[67] In contrast, for the Lebanese peace is first of all a personal mindset that will, if enough people have this mindset, lead to civil peace as well. The disconnect is with political peace, which is something *they* do not work on. Not because they do not think it might be needed, but because they feel it is outside their sphere of influence. Graphically, this insight can be portrayed as in Fig. 7.2.

7.3.4 Embedding: Individuals or Institutions

In line with the gap observed between personal and political peace, Lebanese civil society peace workers tend to look for peace in personal

[63] See Chap. 6, Sects. 6.1 and 6.4.1.

[64] Interview Chaftari.

[65] See Chap. 5, Sect. 5.2.

[66] E.g. interviews Jan Jaap van Oosterzee (PAX) and Guido van Leemput (UCP).

[67] See Sects. 4.4, 5.3.1 and 6.4.4. The distinction between peace as a collective and peace as an individual phenomenon is also made by, e.g. (Adolf 2009: 2).



Fig. 7.2 Dutch and Lebanese interpretations of civil peace on the personal-political dimension

agency, not in (political) structures. Only four interviewees raised the issue of the institutionalization of peace, and then mostly as something that would have to be done in the future, not as part of their efforts.[68] When the issue of institutionalization was raised, a typical answer would be 'Peace is not as institutional as it might seem. […] When you are working with, for example, the embassies [on a peacebuilding project], you see that one ambassador can lead the diplomatic effort and give it a different shape. Even though the diplomatic policies in the background are the same. Peace needs a voice.'[69]

Although it does not always come out very explicitly, one obvious factor in this low trust in institutions to safeguard the peace is that the political institutions in Lebanon are all formally very democratic and representative of the countries difficult ethnic and religious make-up. However, in practice the difficult balance of power between and within these institutions leads to administrative deadlock and political stagnation. Structural reforms might be needed (see, e.g., Rosiny 2015: 498), but are nowhere in sight.

The stress on agency is of course even more pronounced in peace as a personal endeavour. Although some interviewees talk about the need of 'institutionalizing' peace education in the official curriculum, they also point out that if people are unconvinced of the value of peace, this will be of limited use.[70] Thus, agency becomes a critical issue, both to (non-violently) force political change and to slowly but steadily change the Lebanese culture of violence into a culture of peace.

[68] Interviews Messara, Chami, Abdul Salaam and Mallat.
[69] Interview Barakat.
[70] E.g. interviews Frayha and Mourad.

7.4 Conclusion

If we look at the ways the interviewed Lebanese peace workers talk about peace, three things stand out. The most striking is that they hardly work on political peace at all. This stands in sharp contrast to the way peace is conceptualized by Dutch peace workers. In the previous chapters, we saw that the large majority of Dutch peace workers, both military, diplomats and civil society, thinks of peace as a political phenomenon.[71] In Lebanon, this is not the case. Peace workers do acknowledge that there is a political vision of peace—*salaam*—but say they work on either civil peace—*silim*—amongst the different religious groups that make up Lebanese society, or on instilling a more peaceful mindset in the Lebanese.

Secondly, almost without exception, peace workers define peace as a continuous process, not a (one-off) goal. Peace is not something that you can achieve either with a peace agreement, with post-conflict elections, or with a transitional period of foreign peacekeeping. Instead, it is as an interviewee said: 'something you have to work on every day. Even if it can never be achieved on this planet earth.'[72] Even more strongly than their Dutch counterparts, Lebanese civil society peace workers reject the notion that peace is something that can be established for all time. Given the situation in Lebanon this should not come as a surprise. The civil war formally ended over 25 years ago, but the country is still politically deadlocked, and low level violence is at the order of the day (International Crisis Group 2015).

Thirdly, we found an interesting vision of peace as non-violent activism, according to which peace is a method, rather than a goal. This view of peace contrasts sharply with the idea of establishing a (post-) liberal peace in conflict areas, because it reverses the relationship between goal and method. As we saw in Chap. 2, the central concern of liberal peace approaches is to establish a political system (democracy) and an economic system (free market capitalism), in order to ensure the non-use of violence. In contrast, non-violent activists take the non-use of violence as

[71] The exception would be those military officers that say they work only on establishing a safe and secure environment in which people can experience everyday peace. However, even many of them say that the next step would be to implement political reforms and build a viable state. It is just that they do not see a role for themselves in this statebuilding process. Cf. also the high average group score of the military officers on vision V, peace as politics, in Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.5.

[72] Interview Merhej.

their starting point and use non-violent activism to make political systems more just. This means that peace is not about changing the (political or economic) system so that people have no incentives to use violence anymore, it is about changing the mindset of people so that they will not use violence to achieve political change. In terms of our conceptual peace-cube: peace starts from individuals that should change the institutions, rather than from institutions that should regulate interpersonal relations.

The study of non-violent activism has spawned a literature of its own (see, e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Cortright 2015; Cunningham et al. 2017) that is however only rarely connected to the literature on peace and peacebuilding (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013: 272). Doing so would, at least for Lebanon, probably shed much more light on the kind of political 'peace work' (if we can still call it that) that is taking place there.

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CHAPTER 8

Mindanao: Justice, Harmony and Peace of Mind

It's the process in itself. The peace agreement is just a milestone. And the government really hyped it. Maybe the international community as well, because they were really excited about it. But the work doesn't end on a peace agreement. What is important is that the people left behind in the battleground need to go back to their community, to live together with people different from them.
(Interview Lyndee Prieto (International Initiatives for Development (IID)/Mindanao Peace Weavers (MPW)))

The final case study concerns the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. As was already stated in the introduction, Mindanao differs from Lebanon in that the final peace agreement between the central government and the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was signed only in 2014 and is currently still being made into law: the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). The BBL should form the legal basis for far-reaching autonomy for the Mindanaoan provinces in which the Bangsamoro are a majority. At the time the interviews for this research were done (October–November 2015), two drafts of this law were being discussed in the Philippine parliament.[1]

[1] Halfway through 2017, the law has still not been passed.

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This means that the context in which Mindanaoan peace workers operate is much more one of immediate post-conflict peacebuilding, or—since not all armed factions have signed on to the peace agreement—even still a conflict situation.[2] Thus, it might be expected that compared to the Lebanese case where the peace agreement was signed over 25 years ago, the political process (the BBL negotiations) and hence also more political visions of peace, are much more on the minds of the interviewees. However, when asked whether the implementation of the BBL constitutes peace, without exception they say it does not. For some because they know from experience that signing and implementing a peace agreement are two different things,[3] but for most others because peace is just not something that is dependent on laws and politics, but much more on direct interpersonal relations.

This reflects the findings from the Q study in Chap. 3. There, it was found that the Mindanaoan civil society peace workers who participated in the Q study almost universally supported the vision of peace as a personal endeavour. The support for this vision was at least six times as high as for any of the other visions, including that of peace-as-politics.[4] However, when we take the interview data into account, we see that this seeming consensus hides a threefold division amongst the interviewees. Some have a vision of peace close to the vision of *civil peace* found in Lebanon. Others stress the need for *peace-as-justice*, while a third group is concerned mostly with keeping everyone's *peace of mind*. Interestingly, a considerable correspondence was found between the ethnic group peace workers belong to and their visions of peace. Peace workers who are (descendants of) settlers from other parts of the Philippines in majority favour civil peace, Moros tend to say they work on justice and the indigenous Lumad stress the importance of peace of mind. In the context of the ongoing negotiations on the future of Mindanao, these differences have political consequences that will be explored in a separate section.

The chapter is structured as follows. The next Sect. 8.1, introduces the case study of Mindanao, giving background information on the conflict(s)

[2] The most notable groups who are not part of the BBL process are Abu Sayyaf and the Bangsamoro Independent Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a break-away faction from the MILF that does not want to settle for anything less than full independence. See also Sect. 8.1 below.

[3] E.g. interviews Froilyn Mendoza (Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)/Teduray Lambangian Women's Organization (TLWO)), Fr. Roberto Layson (Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI)), Danny Ong (Forum Ziviler Friedens Dienst (ZFD)).

[4] See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2 and Appendix D.

and peace process there. Section 8.2 introduces the three different visions of peace civil society peace workers are working on, as well as two others that came up in the interviews, but are not the kind of peace they are ultimately working towards: the BBL and freedom from fear. In Sect. 8.3 the underlying dimensions of the visions are explored, in order to compare them to the findings from the other cases. In Sect. 8.4 the political consequences of the skewed division of the three visions over the three different groups are investigated. Section 8.5 wraps up the chapter with a brief conclusion.

8.1 War and Peace in Mindanao

The island group of Mindanao is the southernmost part of the republic of the Philippines, consisting of mainland Mindanao and various outlying islands. Approximately 70% of the present-day population of Mindanao consists of (mostly Christian) settlers from the other parts of the Philippines (Luzon and the Visayas) who moved to Mindanao from the early twentieth century, as part of large-scale resettlement programmes of the central government in Manilla.[5] The other 30% is made up of Moros (20%) and Lumad (ca. 10%). The Moros consist of some 13 ethnolinguistic groups, whose ancestors converted to Islam in the fourteenth to sixteenth century, when Muslim traders arrived to the region. Lumad is the collective name of some 30 tribes of indigenous peoples that never converted to Islam. Together, these two groups make up the original population of Mindanao, although the term 'indigenous peoples' (IPs) is usually reserved for the Lumad (Montiel et al. 2012: 73–74).

At the heart of the major conflict on Mindanao is the political future of the Moros. Armed insurgents demand the secession of Mindanao from the Republic of the Philippines. The major 'liberation fronts', the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its break-away successor the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have by now softened their demands to some form of autonomy for the part of Mindanao where Moros form the majority of the population, but the precise nature and

[5] In the remainder of this chapter, I will use the term 'settlers' do denote those peace workers whose (grand)parents were immigrants to Mindanao from other parts of the Philippines. I prefer 'settler peace workers' over 'Christian peace workers', because not all of them self-identify as Christians and about half of them say their idea of peace is not influenced by their religion.

extent of this autonomy have led to bitter conflicts, split-offs, legal challenges and open violence.

Besides this conflict, Mindanao is plagued by at least three other sources of armed violence. First, especially the north suffers from violence by the Philippine-wide communist insurgency led by the New People's Army (NPA). Their struggle is more socio-economically inspired than that of the Moros and their ideology continues to exert some influence on economically marginalized peasants (Domingo 2013). Secondly, there is some IS/Al Qaeda inspired religious terrorism, carried out by organizations that link the Moro struggle for self-determination to wider issues of *jihad* against the global West. In the last couple of years (but after the interviews on which this chapter is based were held) this kind of violence appears to be on the rise (Heydarian 2017; Quimpo 2016). Finally, there are innumerable instances of *rido*, or clan warfare, primarily amongst the Moros. Most of this *rido* is generated by cycles of vengeance between families or communities, but its widespread existence and tendency to flare up in times of crisis means that it sometimes affects the other conflicts as well (Torres III 2014).

However, both the major international actors and most of the peace-workers interviewed for this research work in the context of the Moro struggle for self-determination. Hence, the other conflicts will be touched upon where applicable, but when talking about 'the conflict' on Mindanao, I refer to this struggle.

Depending on one's perspective, the conflict in Mindanao is up to 400 years old (Montiel et al. 2012: 74). Moro activists stress that the inclusion of Mindanao in the Republic of the Philippines is merely a continuation of colonial occupation.[6] Even before the Philippines became independent from the United States in 1946, various Moro leaders petitioned the government to be left outside the new state (Montiel et al. 2012: 78). The situation in Mindanao deteriorated in the late 1960's, with the formation of both settler and Moro militias. In 1972 a four year civil war erupted between the MNLF and the central Philippine government. The fighting led to an estimated 100.00–120.000 casualties and ended in a peace agreement known as the Tripoli agreement, although low-level violence continued until 2000 (Montiel et al. 2012: 79). In 1990 an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established under MNLF leadership

[6] Before independence, the Philippines were colonized by Spain and, after the 1898 Spanish-American war, by the United States of America.

in 4 out of the 13 provinces of Mindanao. A 'Final Peace Agreement on the Final Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement' was signed only in 1996. When a break-away faction of the MNLF, the MILF, rejected this final peace agreement and took up arms again, president Estrada in 2000 launched an 'all-out war' against them. The offensive led to the capture and destruction of several MILF training camps, but many fighters retreated into more remote areas. The resulting war of attrition led to close to one million internally displaced persons (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005: 3, 5). The first decade of the twenty first century was characterized by intermittent rounds of fighting, until a Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and then a Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) were signed between the MILF and the government in respectively 2012 and 2014. Since then, the situation has stabilized, although splinter groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Abu Sayyaf are still committing sporadic acts of violence to which the Philippine Armed Forces react with military operations (Lau 2014).[7]

The latest round in the negotiations between the government and the MILF has focused on drafting a Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), spelling out the exact division of powers between the central Philippine government and a new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, that should replace the defunct ARMM. In these negotiations, the Lumad have stepped forward to present their own claim to self-determination, based on the Philippine's 1997 Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA). At the time the interviews were held (November 2015), two versions of the BBL were being discussed by the Philippine parliament. The original BBL negotiated between the government and the MILF and a substitute bill introduced by senator Marcos that included provisions for the Lumad as well. To further complicate the issue, this senator Marcos is the son of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos, which makes especially older peace workers very suspicious of his motives for taking up the cause of the Lumad.[8]

[7] The conflict also still shows up as a minor conflict in the UCDP armed conflict dataset. See (Melander et al. 2016). In May 2017, after this research had ended, an operation to capture a rebel leader ran out of hand, leading to renewed fighting between the army and an hitherto unknown rebel group that claims to be affiliated to Islamic State.

[8] See, e.g., interviews Elvira Ang Sinco (retired) and Mae Fe Ancheeta (Inpeace).

8.2 Visions of Peace in Mindanao

We saw in Chap. 3 that the Mindanaoan civil society peace workers who participated in the Q study, overwhelmingly see peace as a personal endeavour. The average level of correspondence to this vision is about six times as high as for any of the other visions.[9] However, this seeming consensus hides some deep and important divisions in how peace is envisioned that were not captured by the Q set. From the semi-structured interviews, as well as respondents' remarks in their post-sorting interviews accompanying their Q sorts, a markedly different picture emerges. Civil society peace workers on Mindanao are working on five different visions of peace. Two of these are short-term goals: peace-as-agreement (comparable to the first visions of peace of Dutch diplomats) and freedom from fear—similar to what Dutch military say they are working on. This stands in sharp contrast to the findings from Lebanon, where neither vision of peace was mentioned by any of the interviewees. Probably this is because the conflict in Mindanao has ended much more recently[10] and most of the interviewees have worked on, or lobbied for, the establishment of one of these two peaces in the past decade. Section 8.2.1 describes these two visions in more detail.

However, both visions were always mentioned with a caveat that neither of them is in itself enough to speak of veritable peace. Moreover, most of the peace workers interviewed stress that neither of these two is the vision of peace they are really trying to achieve through their work. Instead, when asked about the long-term objectives of their peace work, Mindanaoan peace workers offer three other visions of peace. For most of the Moro interviewees, peace is primarily associated with 'justice', in the sense of them getting what is theirs, including their own Bangsamoro homeland, but also (chances for) socio-economic development. For the Lumad interviewed, peace is first of all associated with keeping one's peace of mind, a position that comes close to the idea of peace as a personal endeavour. For the interviewees with a settler background, peace mostly means civil peace between the three different groups.[11] In Sects. 8.2.2, 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 these three visions are explored.

[9] See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2 and Appendix D for the exact levels of support for each vision.

[10] If it can be said to have 'ended' at all.

[11] Of course, these distinctions are not watertight. Some Moros for example stress that in Islam, inner peace is also a key value that should be taught to children, whereas some Lumad stress that they are working to attain justice for their tribe. However, we will see in Sect. 8.3

8.2.1 Not Yet Peace: Peace Agreements and Freedom from Fear

The first vision of peace on Mindanao is peace as an agreement between the two fighting parties.[12] The Mindanao conflict has seen many of those agreements, first between the government and the MNLF, now between the government and the MILF. The BBL is the latest of these peaces. 25 of the 31 interviewees mention their engagement with the BBL-process and their wishes for what should be included in it at some point in the interview. Moreover, when asking for names of other people 'working for peace', often the first suggestions were people engaged in the BBL-process. In itself, this is not surprising, considering that the BBL was being discussed in parliament at the time the interviews were done, keeping this peace process on top of everyone's mind. Moreover, as was explained above, the issue of self-governance is at the core of the conflict between the government and the MILF.[13]

However, that does not mean it is also at the heart of peace work in Mindanao. Without exception all the peace workers interviewed stated that peace is more than the absence of armed conflict and that ratifying the BBL would not be enough to speak of peace. A senior Moro activist nicely summed this up by saying that he looked 'at the BBL as a key to open the door to the real problems.'[14] This attitude towards the BBL was common to all interviewees.

The second vision of peace that interviewees flag as important but subsequently dismiss as not the long-term objective of their work, is what in Chap. 3 was called freedom from fear: the possibility to live one's life without fear of violence.[15] Eleven interviewees mention aspects of this vision of peace in their interviews. They describe it with phrases such as 'that children can go to school'[16] or 'to sleep soundly at night, without any

that the relative importance of these three visions of peace is different for the different groups and that this has consequences for their position in the BBL negotiations.

[12] Cf. the diplomats' vision of peace-as-agreement in Sect. 5.1.

[13] See Sect. 8.1 above.

[14] Interview Sammy Maulana (Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)).

[15] See Sects. 3.1.3 and 4.1.

[16] Interview Jo Genna Jover (Kutawato Council for Justice and Peace (KCJP)). Similar views were expressed by Ang Sinco, Ong, Mendoza, Ancheta, Mahdie Amella (Mindanao Action for Peace And Development (MAPAD)), Orson Sargado (Catholic Relief Services (CRS)), Rexall Kaalim (Non-violent Peace Force (NVPF)), Arkan Momin Confederated Descendants of Rajah Mamalu (CDRM) and Mariam Daud (Nurus Salaam).

bombings'.[17] Especially interviewees—from all three groups—working with grassroots communities stress that ordinary people have a very simple idea of what peace is, that should be taken into account in the struggles for political ideals. As a retired social-worker-turned-peace-activist put it: 'Why make it so abstract? It is part of our lives. For me it is very very basic. (…) I will just echo what some people say, but they just want to be able to sleep. To have a sound sleep. Because if there is war you cannot sleep. Or for the children, they just want their children to be able to go to school. Or for the women to do their housework, without always being evacuated. For me [the objective of my work] is to help people, ordinary people, to just do their work. So that they have a quality of life. Because how can you have a good peaceful family life if there is war going on?'[18]

However, except for the interviewee quoted above, most peace workers insist that this is not primarily the kind of peace they are aiming at. Rather, this is the kind of peace that 'ordinary people',[19] 'people at the grassroots level'[20] or 'the taxi drivers'[21] might be satisfied with, but not they, as professional peace workers. In their view, freedom from fear is a short-term peace, that in the long run is dependent on one of the other three visions of peace. We will now turn to those.

8.2.2 Peace-as-Justice

The first of these three visions of long-term peace is best summed up as *peace-as-justice*. About half of the interviewees—sixteen out of 31—stress that peace can only be achieved if past injustices done to the Moros, including their colonization and consequent lack of self-rule, are amended. A typical Moro response to the question what peace means is for example 'When we say peace, for us, peace is respecting our rights.'[22] The autonomy promised in the peace agreements between the MILF and the

[17] Interview Ong. Similar views were expressed by Ang Sinco, Sargado and Ali Ayoub (BTC).

[18] Interview Ang Sinco.

[19] Interview Prieto.

[20] Interview Dats Magon (United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD)).

[21] Interview Ong.

[22] Interview Guiamel Alim (CBCS). Similar views were expressed by a.o. Maulana, Ayoub, Amella, Duma Mascud (Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre (MINHRAC)), Harris Tanjili (Al Qalam) and Mary Therese Norbe (Mindanao Peoples' Peace Movement (MPPM)).

government is part of these 'rights', but in itself not enough. Some interviewees even point out that the rights granted to the Moros in the BBL might turn out to be less substantial than the autonomy they already have.[23] Previous peace agreements between the MNLF and the central government also included provisions for autonomy, that led to the establishment of the ARMM. However, the establishment of the ARMM failed to deliver justice to the mass of the people. Instead, it is perceived as merely a vehicle for the MNLF leadership to enrich themselves and continue their hold on power.[24] Thus, civil society peace workers warn that if justice is not done, the armed struggle might flare up again.[25]

On closer inspection, this 'justice' thus entails two things. First of all, it means self-governance. Many of the Moro interviewees feel that the government in Manila does not have their best interests at heart, but sees Mindanao only as a source of income. As one interviewee put it: 'All the resources go to Manilla and then we have to see what we get back.'[26] Both the historical experience of Christian settlers from the northern islands getting large land grants as well as deals with large multinational mining corporations to exploit Mindanao's natural resources add to this feeling of being treated unfairly.[27] Many interviewees express the hope that with the BBL in place, the Moros at last will have the chance to make their own decisions. As one of them put it: 'We need development, in all aspects. In comparison with the rest of the country, we are 20 years behind. […] But if we are given the chance to govern ourselves, we can do that.'[28]

Secondly, as both of these quotes show, there is an underlying desire for (socio-economic) development. Thus, justice also refers to socio-economic justice, the fair or equitable allocation of resources. This socio-economic dimension is at least as important as formal self-government. Peace is supposed to be followed by socio-economic development that will benefit not just the elites (either in Manila or in Mindanao), but the people more broadly. A typical remark on this topic is for instance: 'When peace happens, developments will follow. And this is justice for the Bangsamoro. We have lots of minerals. If there is really peace, we can develop those. […] Peace alone, without implementing any programmes for the people, will

[23] E.g. interviews Ong and Maulana.
[24] E.g. interviews Ong and Prieto.
[25] Interviews Mascud and Amella.
[26] Interview Tanjili. Similar views were expressed by a.o. Ong and Mascud.
[27] E.g. interviews Sargado and Prieto.
[28] Interview Ayoub.

again lead to unpeace.'[29] Although the word 'peace' here refers to a peace agreement only, the idea that such a peace can only last if it is combined with equitable socio-economic development, and that this is something that peace workers have to be engaged in, is widely spread amongst the interviewees.[30]

8.2.3 Civil Peace

The second vision of peace that Mindanaoan civil society peace workers are working on is civil peace. Interviewees stress for example that they want to 'develop relationships so that they will have peace in their communities.'[31] Or, as a young peacebuilder put it, that peace is about 'people understanding each other, respecting each other. Understanding that we are different and that's ok. Especially in Mindanao that is important, because of all the different groups. A lot of people see 'being different' as 'being wrong'.[32]

Although they do not call it civil peace, the vision comes close to what Lebanese civil society peace workers are also working on: developing good relationships between the different groups in society. However, unlike the Lebanese, they stress that these good relationships also depend on political action. As a seasoned Catholic peace worker put it: 'It's not just about bringing the three peoples together, having dialogue and then kumbaya.'[33] He explained that for his organization, Catholic Relief Services, this realization only came slowly. In his own words: 'I would say that from (…) 1996 until around 2003, 2005, we were able to address a huge personal relational transformation, in the communities where we worked. (…) How we contributed to the changes in society was mostly on this personal relational level, helping people to build relationships. And efforts in schools and communities, focusing on cultural changes. From 2008 we developed a more intentional focus on governance programming.'[34] The reason behind this shift in focus was that one of the rather unexpected

[29] Interview Mascud.

[30] Interviews Mascud, Tanjili, Magon, Ayoub, Sargado, Norbe, Mussolini Lidasan (Al Qalam) and Mitzi Austero Non-violence International (NVI).

[31] Interview Fr. Layson.

[32] Interview Rhea Silvosa (Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI)).

[33] Interview Sargado.

[34] Interview Sargado.

parties to lobby for the unconstitutionality of the MOA-AD,[35] were local politicians in the municipalities that were supposed to be added to the ARMM. Regardless of their good relations with Moros and Lumad, this was something they did not want and, more importantly, were willing to risk another war over. Other peace workers likewise stress that good relationships also partly depend on inclusive socio-economic policies and addressing past injustices.[36]

8.2.4 Peace of Mind

Finally, many peace workers mention that peace is (also) a very personal endeavour. A way of life, a desire to live in harmony with oneself and—for religious people—one's creator. As one senior peace worker put it: 'Subjectively, I would say that peace is something that will give you the calmness that you are in harmony with yourself. And with the environment. You are present and in harmony with the people around you. Meaning there will also be harmonious relationships. And ultimately you will be at peace. You are at peace when you don't use force, you don't use might, not even harsh words.'[37] This is in line with the findings from the Q-study, but in their interviews many respondents point out that this is more their personal motivation to take up (and keep up) peace work, rather than a goal they think they can realistically achieve for others through their work. They might set an example,[38] or create some of the conditions for people to experience this kind of peace,[39] but for most of the interviewees, achieving peace of mind is not a direct goal of their, often more political, work.

However, there is one group of civil society peace workers that forms an interesting exception to this rule. For the Lumad, peace of mind—or *kefiyo fedew* in their own language—*is* the primary kind of peace they seek. Lumad interviewees stress, for example, that 'peace is a psychological

[35] Memorandum Of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, a 2008 peace agreement between the government and the MILF that was declared unconstitutional by the supreme court and hence never implemented. This led to new outbursts of violence on both sides.

[36] E.g. interviews Prieto, Norbe, Ancheta, Austero and Fr. Layson.

[37] Interview Prieto.

[38] E.g. interviews Silvosa, Alfredo Lubang (Phillippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL)), Fr. Layson.

[39] E.g. interviews Joji Pantoja (Coffee for Peace (CfP)/Peacebuilders Community Inc.), Prieto, Fr. Layson.

problem'; that 'IPs [indigenous peoples] always want to be at peace, in any settlement'; that 'for the IPs, it [peace] is about peacefulness of mind, about not hurting other people'; or that 'you have to address the emotions first'.[40] All of these quotes point to a similar concern: if people do not have peace of mind, other kinds of peace also will not last.

For their own peace of mind, the Lumad interviewees consider two things to be important. Harmony in their interpersonal relations and harmony with nature: taking good care for the ancestral lands on which they live. In the context of the Mindanao conflict, and especially the BBL peace process, these two desires for harmony draw the Lumad in opposite directions.

On the one hand, their desire for harmonious relations with other people makes them cautious. Lumad interviewees stress that they do not want to anger the Moros, or in any way diminish their accomplishments in the negotiations with the government.[41] For example, the supreme chieftain of the Teduray and Lambangian tribes told of a civil society meeting about the peace process he had attended the day before the interview. Although he did not particularly like what he heard there, he decided not to speak out, because the issue was already in Congress and he did not want to create any conflicts with other participants.[42] One of the Lumad commissioners in the Bangsamoro Transition Commission—the commission that had drafted the BBL—told that she often took a similar cautious stand, because 'peace is also about the feelings of people. If you hurt their feelings, there is no peace.'[43]

This attention for the feelings of others appears to be deeply entrenched in Lumad conflict resolution.[44] Traditional dispute resolution is aimed at achieving *kefiyo fedew*, or peace of mind, for all parties to the conflict. This translates into a preference for win-win situations and solutions that are acceptable to all (Cisnero 2008: 107). For some, keeping everyone's peace of mind is even considered to be more important than achieving a favourable solution to the conflict. As the same BTC commissioner put it: 'I may

[40] Interviews Momin, Jover, Mendoza and Rodello Ambangan (MPPM).

[41] E.g. interviews Saturnino Cuyong (Lumad Development Sector Inc. (LDS)/Timuay Justice and Governance (TJG)), Leticio Datuwata (MPPM), Mendoza, Jover and Ambangan.

[42] Interview Sannie Bello (TJG).

[43] Interview Mendoza.

[44] Interviews Bello, Ambangan, Momin and Jover. See also (Cisnero 2008).

not put the minimal provisions in the BBL for the IPs, but that is not the end of the world.'[45]

On the other hand 'living in harmony' for the Lumad also means 'living in harmony with the land'. Their ancestral domains are very important to them, as they believe that their existence is closely bound to the land on which they live. Any threats to these lands, whether from battles raging near places they consider to be holy or from mining companies digging up minerals, make the Lumad lose their peace of mind. According to some interviewees this is because the ancestral domains are seen as 'an extension of our self', implying that hurt done to the land feels as hurt done to them as a people.[46] In the context of the Bangsamoro struggle for independence, this strong attachment to their ancestral domains made the Lumad decide to speak up, as they fear to lose their land to a newly formed Bangsamoro homeland. In the interviews with Lumad peace workers, 'protecting our land' is invariably mentioned as one core reason to become politically active.

This tension between loyalty to their ancestral domains and not wanting to hurt the feelings of their Moro 'brothers' in order to keep their own peace of mind, means that the Lumad have chosen a cautious strategy. Mostly they stress their existing legal rights under Philippine and international law. As the BTC commissioner put it: 'The only thing we ask is that our rights are entrenched in this law [the BBL].'[47] However, their modesty makes it easier for the other parties in the BTC to ignore the voice of the Lumad, a risk the commissioner seemed to be well aware of: 'in the BTC I am a minority voice. I was the only one to vote for the non-derogation clause [stipulating that the BBL does not derogate from any existing rights granted to the Lumad]. But the important thing is that we participated. That makes that the IPs have peace of mind.'[48]

8.3 A Hierarchical Division?

As was already indicated above, the three visions outlined in the section above—peace-as-justice, civil peace and peace of mind—are unequally distributed amongst the three groups that make up the Mindanaoan

[45] Interview Mendoza.
[46] Interviews Mendoza and Bello.
[47] Interview Mendoza. Similar views were expressed by Datuwata, Ambangan and Cuyong.
[48] Interview Mendoza.

population. More research would be required to test this claim—also amongst the broader population—but the data suggest that this distribution mirrors the hierarchy between the three ethnic groups. Civil peace is mentioned as a goal of their work mostly by settler interviewees, who belong to the dominant group in the Mindanao conflict. Peace-as-justice is mentioned mostly by Moro interviewees, who are the primary contenders in the conflict. Finally, peace of mind is mentioned most of all by Lumad interviewees, who are the most marginalized in the political peace process.

Although there are certainly exceptions to this 'ethnic' division, including some interviewees who adhere to more than one vision, the fact that the visions appear to be distributed according to a hierarchical order is interesting enough to merit close attention. Therefore this section elaborates on this idea by carefully considering who adheres to which vision(s) and why. We will start with the vision most prominent amongst respondents from the dominant settler group—civil peace.

Of the ten interviewees who mention some sort of civil peace as (one of) the long-term objective(s) of their work, seven have a settler background. The settler interviewees are also the most vocal supporters of the vision, arguing for example that 'when you're coming from an area where there is a lot of conflict, you always want harmony'[49] or that 'The heart of peace is the peace of heart. Meaning no problems: no war, no political conflict, but also no discrimination and respect of identity.'[50]

In contrast, the one Moro and two Lumad interviewees who mention civil peace do so only very briefly, immediately mentioning that it can only be achieved if the rights of their group are respected. For example, one of the Lumads who expressed adherence to this vision said: 'Peace means we have to unite and respect one another. If there is no respect for the culture and identity of the other, not for their rights, this is causing conflicts.'[51] The other non-settlers similarly followed up their summary of civil peace with statements that it cannot be achieved as long as the rights of some groups are oppressed.[52]

Peace as justice is the most popular vision of peace amongst the respondents. 16 of the 31 interviewees mention it as part of what they would like

[49] Interview Austero.
[50] Interview Fr. Layson.
[51] Interview Datuwata (MPPM).
[52] Interviews Lidasan and Ambangan.

to achieve. They come from all groups: eight are Moros, four settlers, three Lumad and one did not disclose his background. We already saw above that the Moros are very blunt in their assertion that peace means that their rights are respected. As one of them put it: 'give me my justice. Which is a really nice peace, not the kind of peace that controls me.'[53] Moreover, the settler respondents who mentioned the 'historical injustices' done to the Bangsamoro and the Lumad as a problem that needs to be solved mostly consider 'justice for the Bangsamoro' as one precondition to achieving peace, not as its fulfilment.[54] For that, creating harmony and understanding between the groups—civil peace—is considered to be much more crucial. Moreover, when settler peace activists talk about rights, they present these as universal human rights, rather than the specific rights of a certain group. As one outspoken critic of the Moros' call for self-determination put it: 'Why do you need a name to get your rights? The more you put labels, the more you isolate yourself.'[55]

Some of the Lumad interviewees also refer to justice and state for instance that they want an explicit recognition of their right to self-determination and their separate identity in the BBL. However, because of their desire to keep everyone's peace of mind, they frame this not as a new demand, but rather as a guarantee that their already existing rights will be upheld in the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.[56] Moreover, they seem very much aware of the possible 'unpeace' their claims to certain rights might cause the other groups and actively strive to minimize their infringement on other people's peace of mind. For example, one young tribal leader who had been deeply involved in the lobby for IP rights said about the version of the BBL that did include provisions for the Lumad: 'We are not happy though, because some of the provisions intended for the Bangsamoro are now totally diluted. Our right is recognized, but the rights of the Bangsamoro should also be recognized. So now we have a bad version of the BBL.'[57]

[53] Interview Mascud. Similar views were expressed by Alim, Maulana, Ayoub, Amella and Tanjili. See Sect. 8.2.2 above.

[54] With the exception of Mary Therese Norbe (MPPM), who holds that peace is equal to achieving social justice.

[55] Interview Aveen Acuño-Gulo (independent consultant). Similar universalist views were expressed by, e.g., Ancheta and Fr. Layson.

[56] E.g. interviews Datuwata, Ambangan, Mendoza, Bello and Jover.

[57] Interview Datuwata. A similar view was expressed by Mendoza.

This tendency to also take the other person's point of view into account is characteristic for how the Lumad think of peace. Although peace of mind, like the other visions, has adherents amongst all three groups, only the Lumad insist that this is the most important vision of peace.[58] Respondents with a different ethnic background consider peace of mind mostly as a religious fulfilment, rather than a political or psychological goal. They link it to 'being in harmony with yourself and your creator', or say it is important to them 'as a Muslim'.[59] Thus, although they might consider helping others to 'live in peace' a religious duty,[60] they do not stop to consider the impact that their work on other visions of peace—for example peace-as-justice—has on the peace of mind of people from a different ethnic group.

Based on the available data, it is impossible to say whether the unequal division of the visions of peace over the ethnic groups is a cause of the power imbalances between the three groups, a consequence of it, or an intriguing coincidence. However, what becomes clear from this short discussion is that the division of the different visions of peace over the respondents from the three ethnic groups at least reflects the power differences between them. Civil society peace workers from the most powerful group unreflexively call for a peace that supports the status quo, by insisting that everyone live in harmony—described by a Lumad interviewee as 'a box you cannot get out of'[61]—and respect for each other. Peace workers with a Moro background challenge this status quo by calling for justice. Finally, Lumad civil society peace workers unwittingly continue their own marginalization by their careful consideration of the effect their actions might have on the peace of mind of people with a different ethnic background.

8.4 Underlying Dimensions

In order to compare the Mindanaoan visions of peace to those of the other groups, it is useful to map them onto the four underlying dimensions of the peace cube. Figure 8.1 graphically depicts the three visions that are most relevant to the work of civil society peacebuilders in Mindanao on

[58] See Sect. 8.2.4 above. Allowing people to have peace of mind is mentioned as a goal of their work by nine respondents: four Lumad, three Moros and two settlers.

[59] Interviews Pantoja, Magon and Daud.

[60] E.g. interviews Magon and Daud.

[61] Interview Mendoza.



Fig. 8.1 Dimensions of the three Mindanaoan visions of peace

our four-dimensional framework. The figure shows a consensus on two out of the four dimensions. First, all visions are depicted as rather larger boxes, in order to show that Mindanaoans all tend to have a rather holistic vision of peace. Second, they are all located at the back of the peace cube, because all interviewees stress that peace is a continuous and dynamic process, rather than a goal. The visions differ on the other two dimensions, most importantly on the personal/political one. The vision of peace of mind is the most personal, whereas the vision of peace as justice is squarely political. Civil peace hangs in the middle, as it depends both on political agreements, but also on tackling prejudices and reconciling the different groups. On the fourth dimension, the adherents to the vision of peace-of-mind stress that peace is found in individuals, civil peace is embedded both in (groups of) individuals and in institutions and peace-as-justice is mostly an institutional phenomenon, although some of its adherents also stress that it is a form of justice that should be felt by people in their individual lives. In the remainder of this section, we will explore each of these dimensions in turn, starting with the two on which there is a relative consensus: scope and ontology.

8.4.1 Scope

More strongly than any of the other groups, Mindanaoan peace workers stress that peace is a holistic phenomenon. In Chap. 6 we saw that Dutch

civil society activists tend to have an implicit understanding that peace is a holistic affair, but then focus on only some aspects of it in their actual work. In contrast, thirteen of the 31 Mindanaoans interviewed explicitly state that peace is a holistic phenomenon and many more implicitly assert this, for example by insisting that it requires efforts in different domains and on different levels to establish sustainable peace. For example, one respondent started out saying her work would be finished when 'the non-state actors settle their differences politically'. However, she then continued to expand the list of preconditions for sustainable peace to include a.o. healing relationships, cultivating respect for cultural differences, linking grassroots initiatives to political agendas, environmental protection, affirmative action for minorities, addressing socio-economic inequality, ensuring access to basic services for all and countering both real and imagined Islamic radicalization.[62]

Likewise, other interviewees stress that what they want to achieve 'is both personal, structural and economic peace', issues that have to be addressed 'simultaneously'.[63] Or that lasting peace requires not only a political solution to the conflict, but also socio-economic development of marginalized communities, upholding human rights standards and sometimes even addressing environmental concerns.[64] As we saw above, not a single interviewee thought that solving the political conflict (by passing the BBL in parliament) in itself would be enough to speak of peace in Mindanao. Those working for organizations with a broad mandate pride themselves on the fact that their organization is 'at least trying to' address all dimensions of peace simultaneously.[65]

The Mindanaoan peace workers interviewed identify at least five different dimensions along which peace can (and should) be furthered: physical security, socio-economic development, political/institutional arrangements, interpersonal relations and inner peace, or peace of mind.[66]

[62] Interview Prieto, who started out saying that her work would be finished when 'the non-state actors (…) settle their differences politically', but then kept adding other elements of her peace work until she reached the conclusion that probably peace is an everlasting process.

[63] Interview Fr. Layson.

[64] E.g. interviews Ang Sinco, Pantoja, Ancheta and Ong. Also Lumad of peace. See, e.g., interviews Mendoza and Ambangan.

[65] E.g. interviews Magon, Sargado and Prieto.

[66] Some religious actors include a sixth, spiritual, dimension of establishing peace with your creator (e.g., Pantoja, and Fr. Layson). However, for practical purposes this can be included in the notion of inner peace.

As we saw above, peace workers working with grassroots communities stress that for the people at grassroots level physical security, or freedom from fear, has absolute priority. Although the interviewed civil society peace workers say this is not enough to speak of 'real' peace, there is widespread agreement that freedom from fear is a necessary condition for any other form of peace.

Socio-economic development is the second dimension that is mentioned quite often as an important part of what peace means at the grassroots level. As a peace worker originally from Manila put it: 'when I started managing projects and working with the grassroots organizations, peace came to mean socio-economic development, education, job security.'[67] In this, they are different from the other groups interviewed, with the exception of Dutch diplomats with a background in development aid.

The third dimension is a political-institutional one, with the BBL as the prime example of what needs to be done. The BBL is not just a cease-fire agreement, but contains detailed provisions for the self-governance of the Bangsamoro. Similarly, some Lumad lobby for the BBL to also include articles on self-governance for the indigenous peoples.[68] As with socio-economic development, getting the BBL through parliament is not considered sufficient for peace, but many interviewees stress that it is a necessary component of it. Especially since they fear that failure would play into the hands of hardliners and lead to renewed rounds of fighting. A similar dynamic led to outbursts of violence after the MOA-AD was declared unconstitutional in 2008.

The fourth dimension consists of interpersonal relations. Interviewees stress, e.g., that peace will not be possible 'as long as there is that unseen war going on in the hearts of the people here, the Lumads, Muslims and Christians.'[69] In order to address that 'unseen war', efforts at reconciliation and developing harmonious interpersonal relationships are needed. As we saw, settler peace workers are especially keen on stressing this aspect of peace. However, also Lumad and Moros stress the importance of developing good interpersonal relations.[70]

[67] Interview Austero. Similar views were expressed by, e.g., Ong, Lidasan, Mascud, Kaalim and Ancheta.

[68] E.g. interviews Jover, Datuwata, Ambangan and Cuyong.

[69] Interview Fr. Layson.

[70] E.g. interviews Mendoza, Tanjili and Magon.

The fifth dimension, peace of mind, is central to the Lumad vision of peace, but also mentioned by settlers[71] and Moros.[72] The main difference is that for these two groups, peace of mind is not the final objective of their work, but merely one effect. Interviewees stress that peace should not be limited to achieving inner peace and then forgetting the larger problems in the world. One Moro said for example that 'if it is going to be too personal, then we can have people that are so peaceful within themselves, but they do differently in real life.'[73]

If we zoom in on how holistic the different visions described above are in themselves, we get a similar picture. All of the visions are multidimensional. The vision of peace-as-justice entails not only autonomy, but also an equitable distribution of resources and addressing 400 years of past grievances. Peace of mind is dependent on both harmonious relations with other people, as well as harmony with nature. Finally, respondents working on civil peace stress that harmonious relations between the different groups partly depend on achieving a just solution to the Moro desire for self-determination, addressing the basic needs of all people and changing the culture of violence.

8.4.2 Ontology: A Process, Rather Than a Goal

Like their Lebanese and Dutch counterparts, the Mindanaoan civil society peace workers stress that peace is a process, not a goal. Of the 31 persons interviewed, none talked of peace as a goal to be achieved. Four said peace is both a process and a goal, but with the goal more of a guiding principle or a 'dream' rather than a specific organizational target.[74] All the rest stressed the importance of thinking of peace as a continuous and dynamic process. As a senior peacebuilder quipped: 'you cannot achieve absolute peace, unless you are dead. And you rest in peace.'[75]

Partly this is because they tend to think of peace as a holistic phenomenon. If one part of it is established, there are other parts that demand attention and if those are established there will yet be other problems to solve before they can truly 'live in peace'. As a young Moro put it: 'it is a

[71] E.g. interviews Pantoja, Layson and Prieto.

[72] E.g. interviews Kaalim and Daud.

[73] Interview Lidasan. Similar views were expressed by, e.g., Ang Sinco, Acuña-Gulo and Prieto.

[74] Interviews Ang Sinco, Magon, Lidasan and Sargado.

[75] Interview Pantoja.

continuing process. Once you have addressed the armed conflict. So now there is a treaty. Then you have to address the socio-economic part. Even if you have settled the armed conflict, but people have nothing to eat, there is always the possibility of conflict coming back.'[76]

Partly it is also the result of the protracted nature of the Mindanao conflict. Peace agreements have been established before, but so far they have never lasted for more than a few years and they have never been signed by all the armed groups. Civil society peace workers are well aware that when the conflict flares up again, or a splinter movement decides that the peace agreement is not good enough, peace agreements will break down, once again causing massive suffering amongst the general population.[77] In the words of an interviewee: 'that is the critique of the activists: you have been talking peace for 40 years. Now there is the 3rd peace agreement, we have 'peace' again, but it is less than what has already been granted.'[78] Therefore, civil society peace workers focus more on changing relationships and stressing alternatives to violent demands for change, rather than on lobbying to get the BBL through parliament.

8.4.3 Personal or Political

The interviewees are divided on the question whether peace is a personal or a political phenomenon. We saw above that for most of the Lumad interviewees, peace is primarily a personal concern. They want to keep their peace of mind, even if this comes at the expense of political gains.[79] It is not that they do not see the political dimension of peace, but they value their personal peace more highly. Even people working explicitly on a lobby to get Lumad rights entrenched in the BBL, stress that whether this will lead to true peace depends on whether people will accept the new institutions. Peace 'depends on how the people feel and perceive this condition.'[80] Also other interviewees, especially those who cite a religious inspiration for their peace work, stress that peace is (also) a personal endeavour, saying for instance that 'as muslims, we always inculcate the concept of peace into our children.'[81] However, this more personal vision

[76] Interview Tanjili.
[77] E.g. interviews Amella and Fr. Layson.
[78] Interview Ong.
[79] See Sect. 8.2.2 above.
[80] Interview Ambangan.
[81] Interview Magon.

of peace is more their motivation for taking up peace work, rather than the aim of that work. Interviewees stress for example that there is a religious obligation to work for peace, that coupled to their personal experience of conflict led them to do their present work.[82] The most forceful expression of this sentiment came from a peace worker who said he became a peace activist after much of his family was killed in a government attack on a mosque. 'That's why I joined the civil society. Not to revenge, but to restore the peace.'[83]

However, in contrast to Lebanon, much of the work that civil society peace workers in Mindanao do, is highly political and aimed at the establishment of political visions of peace, like peace-as-agreement (the BBL) or peace-as-justice. Although some do express that 'there is always a transformation within the self, before you can transform others around you',[84] peace workers stress that personal transformation is not enough to speak of peace. One senior peace worker said for instance that 'you cannot achieve peace if you think only for yourself. You have to reach out to your family, your village, the city your village is part of' and went on to say that such efforts should be linked to 'the formal peace talks' in order for peace to become sustainable.[85] Above (in Sect. 8.2.3) another peace worker was quoted who said that his organization had developed a more political focus after a 'huge personal relational transformation' did not prevent the mayors of certain Mindanaoan towns from petitioning the high court to declare the MOA-AD unconstitutional.[86] Similarly, the civil peace that some peace workers are trying to establish depends both on political action like the BBL process and on solving 'that unseen war (…) in the hearts of the people here'.[87] In line with the holism observed earlier, this means that for most of the interviewees peace is both a personal and a political phenomenon, with the two partly dependent on each other and neither entirely sufficient in itself.

8.4.4 Individuals and Institutions

On the embedding of peace, opinions are much less divided. Nineteen of the 31 interviewees say that peace is ultimately to be found in individuals,

[82] E.g. interviews Tanjili, Amella and Kaalim.
[83] Interview Amella.
[84] Interview Silvosa. Similar views were expressed by Austero and Prieto.
[85] Interview Prieto.
[86] Interview Sargado.
[87] Interview Fr. Layson.

not in institutions. As one Lumad interviewee remarked in response to the Q statement that said exactly this: 'individuals need peace, not the institutions'.[88] Similar observations came from the other interviewees, remarking for example that peace 'cannot be demanded of people, you have to live it', that peace is 'where people live decently' or that 'it should be experienced on a personal level'.[89]

This is not to say that they do not work on structural reforms as well. One interviewee explained that in his previous job, he had worked on a project that 'tried to make the area peaceful by making the government work. To set up peace and development committees, to make the government deliver some social services.'[90] However, he soon found out that once the government delivered some services, people immediately demanded more and remained unsatisfied. This led him to conclude that he could not really say whether the project had been a success. If it could be considered a success, this was mostly because it improved the dialogue between the different groups in the area. As he explained: 'before they did not talk. There was a sense of othering: those are others, they have a different way of live, they have a different constitution. But when we break through those barriers, they were able to connect and among themselves to find what is peaceful for their group. […]it starts with the relationship.'[91]

We can note the similarities to the vision of peace-as-process that was described in Chap. 6, but more importantly for the present discussion it shows two reasons why peace, in the opinion of this peace worker, depends on people, rather than on institutions. First, even if the institutions 'work'—deliver the services they are supposed to—people will still be disgruntled because they develop new demands. Although in a more indirect way than the Lumad described in Sect. 8.2.4, this is evidence that he considers the ultimate goal of his efforts to be people's peace of mind. However, peace is not just about individuals' peace of mind, because what he considers to have been the success of the project is the fact that people from the different groups are now talking to each other and hence developing better interpersonal relationships.

Seven other interviewees stated that peace requires work on both individuals and institutions. This shows not only in the example of the organi-

[88] Interview Moner Jaapar al Hadj (CDRM).
[89] Interviews Acuña-Gulo, Ancheta and Prieto.
[90] Interview Lidasan.
[91] Interview Lidasan.

zation that had started out working on personal and relational changes, but then switched to a include a governance approach,[92] but was also mentioned by other interviewees that took the political situation in the Philippines into account. Most often, they would argue that institutional change was needed, because 'once you put good people into the political system, they automatically become corrupted.'[93] Thus, as a non-violent activist put it, 'peace can be attained at the personal and community level, but really it is […] in the system'.[94]

The five peace workers who say that peace is to be found in institutions all adhere to the vision of 'peace-as-justice'.[95] They all stress the importance of enshrining the rights of their group—either the Moros or the Lumad—in the BBL and insist that this is their primary occupation now. Even though all of them also concede that in itself adopting the BBL will not be enough to achieve peace-as-justice, they all stress that peace-as-justice is meaningless if it is not anchored in formal legal documents. A Lumad peace worker said for example that 'the rights of the indigenous peoples must be respected, if there is this kind of Bangsamoro government. And the only way to do so is if it is stipulated in the BBL.'[96]

8.5 Conclusion

This final case study looked into the visions of peace held by civil society peace workers from Mindanao. The most important finding from this chapter is that these visions appear to be divided over respondents from the different ethnic groups in a way that reflects the hierarchy between the three groups. Civil peace—the existence of harmonious relations between the different ethnic groups—is mentioned as a goal of their work mostly by peace workers with a settler background, who are also the dominant group in the Mindanao conflict. In contrast, most of the Moro interviewees—coming from the contender group—adhere to the vision of peace-as-justice, according to which peace mostly means self-determination for the indigenous population and a more equitable sharing of Mindanao's natural resources. Finally, keeping everyone's peace of mind is

[92] Interview Sargado. See also Sects. 8.2.3 and 8.4.3 above.
[93] Interview Acuña-Gulo. A similar view was expressed by Norbe and Jover.
[94] Interview Jover.
[95] Interviews Ong, Alim, Ambangan, Ayoub and Amella.
[96] Interview Ambangan.

considered an important goal of their work mostly by Lumad interviewees—the most marginalized ethnic group.

Given the interviewees predominantly holistic visions of peace, all of these three visions should probably be seen as different building blocks of a large and comprehensive peace, rather than as directly competing. Still, in order to understand the 'peace dynamics'[97] in this particular context, it is important to keep in mind that there are different points of view on what is the most important element of this holistic peace. This also nuances the findings from the Q study, that showed a remarkable level of consensus amongst the Mindanaoan respondents on the vision of peace as a personal endeavour.[98]

A second important finding is that there is a third perspective in what is often considered a conflict between two parties. This is important, because conflict researchers tend to conceptualize conflicts such as the one on Mindanao as a struggle between a group that wants to keep the status quo—the settlers—and a group that wants to change it—the indigenous Moros and Lumad. This tendency to reduce conflicts to dyads, means that the visions of (marginalized) third parties are easily missed. Especially if, like the Lumad, these groups prefer to keep everyone's peace of mind over achieving certain political goals for themselves and thus does not play an active role in the (political or armed) conflict. The literature on indigenous concepts of peace shows that a concern for balance rather than individual or group gains is a common feature of indigenous thought, a feature that does not help them to overcome their own marginalization, even if it does show an important alternative to Western modes of conflict resolution (see e.g. Brigg and Walker 2016: 261–262).

Third, even if future research would show that the division of the different visions over the three ethnic groups is more nuanced than the present interviews suggest, or the division is peculiar to the Mindanaoan context, the differences between the visions themselves are quite significant for our understanding of peace and peacebuilding. Whether the objective of peacebuilding is considered to be civil peace or peace-as-justice has consequences for whether peacebuilding should be supportive

[97] Referring to the ways in which a group of actors tries to establish peace. Usually academics focus on 'conflict dynamics', the various ways in which actors wage a conflict (see e.g. Wallensteen 2015b: 38–42; Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 7–9; Jones and Metzger 2018).

[98] See Chap. 3, Sects. 3.1.1 and 3.2.

of the status quo or seek to change it, or—to use the liberal peace terminology—whether it is conservative or emancipatory (Richmond 2005: 214–215). Similarly, as some of the Lumad interviews show, there is an inherent tension between the desire to establish peace-as-justice and the desire not to disturb everyone's peace of mind.

Finally, two other visions of peace were found that the interviewees did not consider to be sufficient to speak of 'real' peace. The first is peace-as-agreement: the signing and implementation of a peace agreement—the BBL—amongst the major fighting parties. Almost all of the respondents are somehow engaged in the BBL process, but they all stress that their work is not done once the BBL is in place. The second is freedom from fear—absence of the fear of violent attacks in one's immediate future. Although interviewees from all groups mention that this might be how 'ordinary people at the grassroots level' might interpret peace, they insist that much more needs to be done before they themselves would say that Mindanao is 'at peace'.

This is also an important finding, especially because these two visions feature prominently amongst Dutch diplomats and military officers and, in slightly different formulations, also amongst peace researchers mostly interested in negative peace. This contrast between a definition of peace as an attainable goal and peace as a holistic process is one of the tensions that will be explored in the final chapter of this dissertation.

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion: Visions, Divisions, Tensions and Solutions

When I was still doing research, peace had a lot to do with governance. (…) [But] when I started managing projects and work with grassroots organizations, I found out that it had a lot do to with socio-economic development, education, job security. So it's not a universal phenomenon, it really depends on your experience.
(Interview Mitzi Austero (Non-violence International, Mindanao))

The subject of this book has been the meaning of peace according to (some of) the people who strive to build it: Dutch military officers and diplomats as well as civil society peace workers from the Netherlands, Lebanon and Mindanao on the Philippines. By inductively studying the visions of peace these peace workers themselves espouse, five important insights can be added to the academic literature on peace and peacebuilding.

First, there is no sign of a liberal peace consensus amongst any of the groups interviewed for this study. The Dutch diplomats come closest, given that most of them work on peace-as-governance. However, this governance is neither necessarily 'liberal', in the sense that it promotes democracy and free-market capitalism (Paris 2004: 5; Richmond 2005: 121), nor are the Dutch diplomats convinced of the universal applicability of their vision of peace. (Dutch) military officers, a group that is hardly studied at all in the peacebuilding literature, are even more relativistic

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about peace and modest about what they can contribute to it. Although this does not preclude the possibility that peace workers from other Western countries do work on a liberal peace, it means that the supposed 'Western consensus' at least needs to be qualified.

Secondly, a large majority of the non-Westerners interviewed—Lebanese and Mindanaoans—stress that peace is first of all a personal concern, rather than a political one. I will argue in this chapter that we can think of this dichotomy as UNESCO versus Security Council peace. UNESCO's tagline is 'peace in the minds of men and women' and the organization works on things like peace education and establishing cultures of peace as two important strategies to achieve this. The Security Council on the other hand is concerned with peace as a political phenomenon, using political and economic pressure to prevent political conflicts turning into armed conflict. The differences between the mandates of these two institutions resemble the differences between non-Western (Lebanese and Mindanaoan) and Western (Dutch) visions of peace. The dichotomy is also relevant for the academic debate on peacebuilding because most scholars writing about peacebuilding focus almost exclusively on its political aspects (e.g. Shinko 2008; Richmond 2011; Mac Ginty 2012; Aggestam et al. 2015; Chandler and Richmond 2015; De Coning 2018a). If the study of peace is to take seriously its 'local', 'hybrid' or 'practice turn', as different authors suggest (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 2016; Paffenholz 2015; Autesserre 2010; De Coning 2018a) much more attention should be devoted to this UNESCO, rather than to Security Council peace.

However, we saw in Chaps. 7 and 8 that labelling the Lebanese and Mindanaoan focus on UNESCO peace a 'non-Western consensus'—as was provisionally done in Chap. 3—is underestimating the amount of diversity found in the case studies. This leads to the third major insight. If we look at the political positions of (sub)groups of peace workers, we find that visions that stress good intergroup contacts, harmony and tolerance (that is: *civil peace*)[1] are found mostly amongst peace workers coming from politically advantaged groups—the elite. Visions calling for peace-as-justice[2] on the other hand, are espoused mostly by groups that feel marginalized. This was observed most clearly in Mindanao where peace workers with a Moro background framed their efforts as aimed at peace-

[1] See Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.3 and Chap. 8, Sect. 8.2.3.
[2] See Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.2 and Chap. 8, Sect. 8.2.2.

as-justice, whereas peace workers with a settler background said they were working for civil peace. Similar findings have been reported from other (post-)conflict areas (e.g. Beirne and Knox 2014: 27; Klem 2018: 243–244; see also Bloomfield 2006: 7; Abu-Nimer 2001), although the distinction is sometimes framed as one between human rights and conflict resolution workers, rather than between groups with different power positions (Parlevliet 2015). Taking this distinction into account would help prevent peace researchers from 'romanticizing' any specific local perspective (cf. Richmond 2009b; van Leeuwen et al. 2012).

Fourth, the findings suggest that as a positive, or substantive, phenomenon, peace is envisioned mostly as a continuous process rather than a distinctive and observable state of affairs. Interestingly, this is also how the UN now approaches peacebuilding with the concept of 'sustaining peace': a new way of looking at peacebuilding as an 'inherently political process' requiring long-term commitment, broad and inclusive participation and a holistic and integrated approach on the part of the various United Nations organs (Advisory Group of Experts 2015: 12–13). This implies that if the study of peace(building) is to move beyond a narrow focus on armed conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2014), peace researchers will need to do more than add further measurable variables to a basically negative concept of peace (as in, e.g., Wallensteen 2015a). Incorporating theories like dynamical systems theory (Nowak et al. 2012), complexity theory (De Coning 2016; Brusset et al. 2016) or a critical reflection on the concept of resilience (Chandler 2014) into the peacebuilding literature might prove much more fruitful.

In this concluding chapter, I will discuss these four issues in depth and map a way forward for the empirical study of peace as a positive phenomenon. First however, I will briefly recapitulate the findings so far by answering the three research questions stipulated in the introduction: what are the different peaces professional peace workers are working on? How are these visions different for different kinds of peace workers and peace workers from different countries? And do differences between the visions of different groups of actors lead to complementarity, friction or blind spots on the part of these actors?

To do this, Sect. 9.1 briefly recapitulates the new conceptual model proposed in this book—the peace cube—and compares it to other theoretical tools to study peace. In Sect. 9.2 the different visions of peace found amongst the five groups are summarized with the help of this model. In Sect. 9.3, the main fault-lines (question 2) are explored between

the visions of governmental and civil society actors on the one hand (Sect. 9.3.1), and between Dutch and non-Western actors on the other (Sect. 9.3.2). Section 9.4 provides an answer to question 3 by summarizing the main complementarities, blind spots and tensions between groups that these differences lead to. Section 9.5 links the findings of this study to the four debates in the study of peacebuilding that were introduced in Chap. 2 and suggests ways to move ahead in and beyond those debates. Finally, Sect. 9.6 ends the conclusion with a short reflection on what I hope to have achieved with this study.

9.1 A New Conceptual Model: The Peace Cube

One of the main ideas proposed in this book is that peace should be thought of as a concept with a plural: it means something different to different people. I am not the first to make this claim (see e.g. Dietrich and Sützl 1997; Dietrich 2012; Höglund and Kovacs 2010; Firchow 2018), but this book is the first to propose a conceptual model that allows researchers to compare and contrast these different peaces along multiple dimensions. Firchow, for instance, does categorize her everyday peace indicators, but only distinguishes them according to domain: security, development, human rights and social relations (Firchow 2018: 110–111). Moreover, although previous studies often called for the inclusion of different conceptions of peace into peacebuilding policies, only rarely (De la Rey and McKay 2006; Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005) did they focus on the views of professional peace workers. Doing so allows us to get closer to the practice of peacebuilding and understand the complex dynamics involved in inter-organizational cooperation like a comprehensive approach.

The model was arrived at by comparing the ways in which academic concepts of peace differ from each other (Chap. 2) to how peace workers' operational visions of peace differ from one another (Chap. 3). The result was a four-dimensional conceptual model: the peace cube. The operational visions of professional peace workers were found to differ in their scope (how holistic the vision is), in their ontology (whether peace is considered a goal or a process), their domain of application (whether peace is considered a personal or a political objective) and their embedding (whether peace is thought to reside in individuals or in institutions).

As argued in Chap. 3, conceptualizing peace in this way has two advantages over previous approaches to the study of peacebuilding. First, previ-

ous conceptual tools like hybridity, friction, top-down vs. bottom up or peace formation, but also new ones like adaptive peacebuilding, all focus on the way peace is brought about, rather than on what is being brought about. I do not want to deny that, for instance, power differences between local and international actors play a role in what kind of peace is established in a (post-)conflict area, nor that it would be useful to have more attention for bottom-up initiatives. However, the argument developed in this book is that at least part of the friction in international peacebuilding comes from actors just not working on the same kind of peace. Hence, part of the problem of reconciling, for instance, bottom-up and top-down efforts at peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016) is that bottom-up peacebuilders (like the civil society peace workers from Lebanon and Mindanao) are working on a different peace—personal peace—than top-down peace workers like the Dutch diplomats who focus on institution-building. Scholars studying these dynamics should therefore always ask what kind of peace is being built by a specific actor.

Second, new concepts like post-liberal peace or sustaining peace still fall for the fallacy that 'all roads lead to Rome' or that all peacebuilding activities can be subsumed under one 'deliberate meta policy' (Mahmoud and Makoond 2017: 3). As we will see below,[3] some differences between visions can be seen as complementarities, but others lead to real tensions. Moreover, every organization in the peacebuilding field has its own mandate, mission and vision, specialized personnel and limited resources. If we want to understand the complex dynamics of inter-organizational cooperation, it might be more useful to think of these different peacebuilding actors as working on different peaces, rather than endlessly expanding the concept of peace until it covers any activity undertaken in either post- or pre-conflict settings.

While both authors calling for more attention to local processes of peace formation and those working on sustaining peace may be right that it is important for international efforts to 'build on what is already there' (Funk 2012) the focus on peace as a concept with a plural allows us to see that maybe these local efforts are aimed at a different kind of peace than the international community envisages. Hence, the conceptual tool of the peace cube, that allows us to compare different operational visions of what constitutes peace, might turn out to be the most salient contribution this book makes to the existing peacebuilding literature.

[3] In Sect. 9.4.

9.2 The Visions

Each of the case study Chaps. (4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) ended with a description of how the visions of peace of the actors described in that chapter fit onto the four-dimensional peace cube that was introduced in Chap. 3. Figures 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 graphically summarize these findings. They also reflect, to some extent, visions I to V found in Chap. 3. Since



Fig. 9.1 Dutch military visions of peace



Fig. 9.2 Dutch diplomats' visions of peace



Fig. 9.3 Dutch civil society visions of peace



Fig. 9.4 Lebanese civil society visions of peace

the case study chapters have both elaborated and further subdivided these five original visions, these will not be discussed separately in this section.

Dutch military peace workers work on three visions of peace, that most of them see as three steps in a multi-stage process, or 'stairway' of peace. The most common vision, and the most basic step, is *freedom from fear*. In their own words, this means they are working on an environment in which individual people feel safe from harm. According to some respondents, this freedom from fear can only be guaranteed in the longer run if there is



Fig. 9.5 Mindanaoan civil society visions of peace

a *functioning state authority*—the second vision and, according to its adherents, the next step on the stairway to the kind of peace we enjoy in the global West. Interestingly however, virtually all military respondents—including the ones who say the next step of peace is such a functioning state authority—stress that they can only play a limited role in such state-building processes and that these should be left mostly to the local population. In this, they are more relativist than any of the other groups. Finally, some military officers stress that peace is not so much something they 'bring' to conflict affected areas, but rather something they defend at home in the Netherlands. The interviewees who have this vision, define this peace very broadly as *freedom*: the final step on a (much longer) stairway of peace. In line with the observed relativism (and contrary to the liberal peace thesis), they stress that they cannot impose that same freedom on people in conflict areas. Thus, when it comes to the peace they build (in (post-) conflict areas), *freedom from fear* is their primary vision, also for the respondents who have a broader vision as well.

When Dutch diplomats talk about peace, they talk about governance. Their vision of *peace-as-governance* is the only operational vision that stresses that peace is found in institutions rather than individuals. Although this is a more ambitious goal than the establishment of freedom from fear, it still has a rather narrow scope, especially when compared to the civil society visions of peace. Diplomats stress that peace primarily means the absence of armed conflict and that adding too many other aspects risks a

loss of focus that might endanger the establishment of any kind of peace.[4] In the short term stopping armed conflicts might also require the signing and implementation of peace agreements, an operational vision I have labelled *peace-as-agreement*. In the long run however, most of them agree that the sustainability of peace depends on the build-up of effective (state) institutions.

Many of the Dutch civil society peace workers interviewed have a vision of peace that is the opposite of the diplomats'. Instead of conceptualizing peace as a limited institutional goal, they regard peace as a holistic all-encompassing vision that implies not only that armed conflicts are ended, but also that their root causes are solved: (political) oppression, human rights violations, unequal income distribution, underdevelopment and (for some) even interpersonal conflicts. Borrowing from Anderson and Olson (2003: 12) this vision was labelled *Peace Writ Large*. When asked to operationalize such a broad vision, interviewees' come up with two more operational visions of peace. The first is *peace-as-process*, which treats peace as a never-ending (both political and interpersonal) process that requires continuous dialogue, monitoring and intervention. According to this vision, the specific short-term objectives of this process are less relevant, what matters is that 'the conversation is kept going'.[5] When they do think of peace as a goal, they tend to agree with the military that the first priority is for people in conflict areas to experience *freedom from fear*. Although in majority they see this more as a political goal (and the objective of international intervention) rather than an individually felt experience, a nuance which is captured by calling this vision *human security*.[6]

The Lebanese civil society peace workers I interviewed work on three visions of peace, none of which is a political goal per se. Rather, they stress the importance of *civil peace* (*silim* in Arabic), the quality of the relations between the different groups that make up Lebanese society. Or, moving even farther away from peace as a political phenomenon, they say that they work on *peace as a personal endeavour*: what every individual can do to maintain peaceful interpersonal relations. The few peace workers I spoke with who do have a political view of peace stress that they see peace primarily as a method (*non-violent activism*), with 'justice' as its goal.

[4] See Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.2.
[5] Interview Joost van Puijenbroek (PAX, the Netherlands). See also Sect. 6.2.
[6] See Sects. 6.3 and 9.3.2 below.

A similar set of concepts, but with a slightly different focus, was found on Mindanao. Civil society peace workers there insist that the signing and implementation of a political peace agreement—in their case the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro—in itself is not sufficient to speak of peace. Nor is *freedom from fear*, although some respondents stress that ordinary people might consider this to be all the peace they want.[7] Peace workers, however, work on three other visions of peace. First, *peace-as-justice*, similar to non-violent activism in Lebanon, but with more stress on the desired outcome—'justice', meaning self-governance and a larger share of the natural resources that Mindanao has for the Moros—rather than the process. Secondly, *peace of mind*, a mostly indigenous vision that stresses the priority of good relationships over (political or economic) gains. Finally, like their Lebanese colleagues, Mindanaoan peace workers with a non-indigenous background stress that in the end all three groups should live together in *civil peace*.

9.3 The Differences

The summary above points to two main divides in how peace workers envision the peace they are working for. The first is a divide between peace as an attainable goal or a holistic process. The second is between peace as a personal or a political phenomenon. On the first divide, opinions are split along functional lines: Dutch military officers and diplomats tend to see peace as a neatly circumscribed policy goal, that should, at least in principle, be attainable. The civil society peacebuilders on the other hand see peace as a holistic process that will never be finished. On the second divide, the split is geographical: interviewees from Mindanao and Lebanon stress that peace is a personal concern, Dutch interviewees in majority see it as a political phenomenon, although there are some interesting exceptions to this general trend, as we will see below.

9.3.1 Attainable Goal or Holistic Process

If we look at the differences between the visions summarized above, we see that along two dimensions—their scope and whether peace is seen as a goal or a process—they are split along the same, functional, lines. Dutch governmental actors think peace is a well-defined, precisely circumscribed

[7] See Chap. 8, Sect. 8.2.4.

policy goal. In contrast, most civil society peace workers from all three countries see it as a holistic and never-ending process. I will argue that both dimensions—scope and ontology—are connected. Military and diplomats think of peace as a goal that should be attainable, and thus want to keep it limited in scope. Civil society peace activists think of peace as large and holistic and thus stress the importance of peace as a process. Let us briefly consider the arguments of each group in turn, starting with the diplomats.

Many of the interviewed diplomats stress that peace should not be made too big, because then it will never be achieved. They offer two reasons why peace should be seen as an attainable goal. The first is empirical: many (if not most) countries in the world *are* in fact peaceful, so empirically peace should be defined as an achievable goal. The second reason is more politically driven: their political bosses want to see observable results, preferably within their time of office, so they define peace in such a way as to make this possible. The signing of a peace agreement, but also holding elections or having implemented certain policy reforms, are clear targets that could all count as having established 'peace' in a country. Anything else—and especially more 'personal' visions of peace—is considered too vague to be useful as a policy goal.

Military officers also like to keep peace a small and well-defined target. Mostly because they have only limited time available to achieve some results in a situation that is not very peaceful to start with. Achieving freedom from fear for a conflict-affected population is already quite a challenge in places like Iraq or Afghanistan. However, also when they do have a broader vision of peace—peace-as-freedom for example—they stress that this peace can only be achieved one small step at a time. This 'stairway model' of peace leads them to define the next step after achieving freedom from fear again in rather narrow terms: it is the establishment of 'some form of' functioning state authority. Further demands on this state, like democratic accountability, are again 'next steps'. Moreover, they are next steps the local population itself should take, that thus fall outside their operational vision of peace.

In contrast to military and diplomatic peace workers, civil society peace workers express far less of this goal-orientation. According to Dutch civil society peace workers, if peace is a goal, it is such a large goal that it is probably impossible to achieve.[8] Thus, they rather stress that peace is

[8] See, e.g., the comparison with achieving 100% vaccination coverage by the WHO, mentioned in Sect. 6.1.

(also) an everlasting process. The goals that diplomats and military officers set (like signing peace agreements and establishing freedom from fear) are important steps in this process, but never the end of it.[9]

Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers who see peace as a personal endeavour, also stress that this means that peace is a continuous process.[10] It is also conceived as a multi-level process, where an individual has to live in harmony with himself, with other people, with society at large and perhaps even with nature or God before we can say that he 'lives in peace'. Constant changes on all of these levels mean that peace is a continuous striving, rather than a state of being that can be enjoyed 'forever' once it is achieved.[11]

Adopting a position on either side of this divide has consequences. Not only for tensions, blind spots and complementarities between groups, as we will see in the next section, but also for one's own vision of peace. On the 'governmental' side, perhaps the most important consequence is that the more narrowly peace is defined, the easier it is to see it as universal. This came out quite strongly in the Q-study (Chap. 3), where the vision of peace as a universal ideal—vision II—also comprised a rather narrow interpretation of peace. Also in their interviews, diplomats stated, for example, that maybe what a peace agreement looks like is different for different countries, but stressed that the desire to live a life that is not marked by large-scale violence is probably universal.[12] Military, though generally relativistic about the meanings of peace, likewise cannot imagine anyone not agreeing with their minimal vision of freedom from fear.

Although such a desire to feel secure from major threats to life and limb might indeed be universal, Dutch military as well as civil society peace workers from both Lebanon and Mindanaopoint out that other interpretations of peace, like peace-as-freedom or peace-as-justice, might still trump this desire for a peaceful life. We saw in Chap. 4 that many Dutch military profess that they are willing to use violence to defend the freedom of their Dutch compatriots. For them, freedom is a higher form of peace than the absence of war. In a similar way some of the Moro interviewees claim that they are choosing peaceful means to advance their struggle for

[9] See Chap. 8, Sect. 8.2.4.
[10] See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.1.
[11] See Chap. 7, Sect. 7.3.2 and Chap. 8, Sect. 8.4.2.
[12] See Chap. 5, Sect. 5.4.

self-determination, but the goal is justice, not peace.[13] And a Lebanese former-fighter-turned-pacifist openly doubted whether he would remain committed to his pacifism if Islamic State would arise in Lebanon as well.[14] In other words, the absence of large scale violence might be a universal desire, but it is not the *ultimate* desire for everyone. Not even for all of the interviewed peace workers. If this multiplicity of peace is not taken into account, diplomatic peace workers (as well as Dutch civil society peace workers, that on average also scored fairly high on vision II) risk imposing their narrow conception of peace on a population that is looking for more. This insight adds an important element to the debate about the universal character of (liberal) peace. The problem with assumptions of universality is not only that they lead to overly technocratic solutions (a point explicitly addressed in the new discourse on sustaining peace (Fernandez-Taranco 2016)), but also that the 'supply and demand' of peace might be for different kinds of peace.

On the other side of the divide, the fact that peace is seen as a continuous process implies, amongst other things, that the binary opposition between peace and conflict as two mutually exclusive states of affairs for a certain area, will have to be rethought (cf. Richards 2005; Cramer 2006). Not only because both are geographically dispersed phenomena (Björkdahl and Kappler 2017; Autesserre 2010), but also because as processes, both can take place simultaneously, even within the same area.

On the conflict side, this has been acknowledged by authors who stress that conflicts are ever present but need to be fought out without using violent means (Sharp 2012; Mallat 2015; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) or be transformed rather than solved (Galtung 2007; Lederach 1995; Paffenholz 2014). However, since we are interested in peace as a positive phenomenon, we will also need to look beyond the transformation of conflicts to other processes that sustain peace. Using findings from the literature on peace education, or UNESCO peace more broadly (see below), might help move this understanding of peace forward. After all, peace education is also often portrayed as a never-ending process (for an overview, see e.g. Burns and Aspeslagh 2014; for a conceptual framework Lopes Cardozo and Shah 2016).

[13] See Sect. 8.2.2. A similar move can be observed amongst Lebanese non-violent activists. See Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.2.

[14] Interview Ziad Saab (Fighters for Peace, Lebanon).

Finally, one major advantage of thinking about peace as a process rather than the goal of international peacebuilding efforts is that it leaves open the exact details of what is to be established in a post-conflict area.[15] Thus, it is less susceptible to criticisms of blueprint thinking (e.g. Mac Ginty 2012) or imposing Western modes of governance on unwilling populations. Rather, perhaps international peace workers should be seen as one factor influencing processes (of both conflict and peace) taking place in the areas where they are deployed. This calls both for a certain modesty in what we expect from international peacebuilding, but also far more attention to how both the arrival and the exit of peace workers (of various kinds) impact these processes.

9.3.2 Security Council and UNESCO Peace

The second major divide is between visions of peace as a political or a personal phenomenon. Here, the main divide is between the Dutch and the non-Dutch. As we saw in Chap. 3, the interviewees from both Lebanon and Mindanao overwhelmingly treat peace as a personal phenomenon.[16] In contrast, amongst the Dutch the more political visions of peace (peace as a universal ideal and peace-as-politics) got the most prominent scores, although the Dutch picture was more mixed as well. In Chaps. 4, 5 and 6, we saw that both amongst the Dutch diplomats and the Dutch civil society peace workers, the overall sentiment is that experiencing peace in one's personal life might be important, but not something that foreign peace workers like themselves can very much contribute to. Thus, what they focus on in their work is political peace.[17]

In the international arena, these two kinds of peace—political and personal—are the domain of two different UN bodies. The UN Security Council (UNSC) deals with peace as a political phenomenon, trying to prevent, ameliorate or stop outbursts of violence by applying political (and in some cases economic) pressure on national governments. In contrast, the tagline of UNESCO is 'building peace in the minds of men and women', with programmes focusing on peace education, cultures of peace and intercultural dialogue.

[15] See Sect. 6.2.

[16] See Sect. 3.1.1. See also Sects. 7.3.3 and 8.4.3.

[17] In Chap. 6, it was shown that the political reading of peace was also more popular amongst more 'senior' civil society peace workers, including the interviewed directors of Dutch NGOs. See Sects. 6.4.4 and 5.3.1. I will return to this point below.

With only mild exaggeration, one can say argue most of the Dutch work on "Security Council peace", whereas most of the Lebanese and Mindanaoans are working on "UNESCO peace". This framing allows us not only to intuitively grasp the difference between their visions of peace as a political or a personal phenomenon, but also says something about the different readings of civil peace encountered in Chap. 7 and the hierarchical status of these two types of peace. I will briefly reflect on these three points.

First, if we accept the validity of the dichotomy, the military interviewees take up an interesting position. Many of them stress that in the end sustainable peace requires a political solution (i.e. Security Council peace) and almost all of their international missions take place within a political framework literally based on Security Council resolutions.[18] However, they also indicate that what they primarily seek to establish in (post-)conflict areas is a freedom from fear that should be felt by individuals in their everyday lives, regardless of what happens at the political level. This indicates at least a sensitivity for UNESCO peace that is not found to a similar degree amongst Dutch diplomats or civil society peace workers.

Secondly, the tension between Security Council peace and UNESCO peace also comes out in the different views actors have of civil peace. In Chap. 7 we saw that civil peace is located somewhere in the middle of the personal/political dimension.[19] As a collective form of peace it transcends the personal, but it is not necessarily political either. Especially the Lebanese interviewees stress that civil peace is not political, but rather an extension of interpersonal peace to the inter-group level: it depends on individuals 'making peace' with individuals who belong to another group. In contrast, the Dutch diplomats who mention civil peace, see it as the outcome of their efforts at designing governance structures in which all groups are treated equally. Likewise, Dutch civil society actors stress that civil peace can support more political forms of peace, also linking it to the political rather than the personal.

Thirdly, labelling the tension Security Council versus UNESCO peace also draws out the fact that this is a hierarchical ordering. At the United

[18] Although sometimes this mandate is contested, as, e.g., the Dutch involvement in the 2003 Iraq war shows. The point here, however, is that the Dutch Army is never asked to intervene in an area by UNESCO, making their deployment intrinsically part of political, rather than personal, peacebuilding efforts. Cf. also the second military vision of peace as a functioning state authority in Sect. 4.2.

[19] See Chap. 7, Sect. 7.3.3.

Nations, the Security Council is one of the five principal organs, perhaps even the UN's primary organ.[20] In contrast, UNESCO is 'merely' a specialized agency, and not even the most prestigious or powerful one. We can observe a similar hierarchical order in the types of organizations and individuals that promote Security Council peace or UNESCO peace. At the international level the Dutch (that is: Western) interviewees in majority work on Security Council peace, whereas the Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers in majority work on UNESCO peace. But also within the group of Dutch civil society peace workers, most of the more senior peace workers[21] tended to stress the political character of their work and express some discomfort with peace as a more personal concern. In contrast, it was mainly the more junior staff, including all but one of the administrative staff members interviewed, who described peace as a personal phenomenon. Finally, amongst the indigenous Mindanaoans, it is the relatively more dominant Moros who stress that peace is a political phenomenon (peace-as-justice) whereas the Lumad treat peace as a personal phenomenon (peace of mind).[22] And, although this did not come out of the present study very clearly, other studies also report that the division is gendered, with women having a preference for UNESCO peace (De la Rey and McKay 2006; Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2005).

9.4 Complementarities, Blind Spots and Tensions

Having established what visions of peace the professional peace workers in the five cases espouse and what the two major fault lines between these visions are, we will now look at the consequences of these divides. Does the fact that different groups of peace workers have different visions of peace lead to complementarities, blind spots or tensions between them? In the previous chapters we have encountered numerous examples of where adopting a certain vision leads to complementarity, a blind spot or a tension with peace workers who have a different vision.[23] Rather than listing all of them again, this section goes into the most important findings in each category, starting with the complementarities.

[20] As it is the only organ that can issue binding resolutions on member states.

[21] In terms of position (e.g. NGO directors), not necessarily age or experience.

[22] Though arguably also the majority of the settler interviewees treats—civil—peace as a personal phenomenon, a position dealt with below.

[23] E.g., in Sects. 4.5, 5.3.4, 6.4.4 and 6.5.

The group that most strikingly offers possibilities for complementarity were the Dutch military officers.[24] Although their primary operational vision—freedom from fear—is a rather limited goal, they do not have a blind spot when it comes to other goals, nor do they see these as competitive. Rather, their ingrained relativism and their modesty about their own contribution makes them treat other visions of peace as equally important 'next steps' on the stairway to positive peace. On top of this, the fact that freedom from fear is seen as an individual experience rather than a political state of affairs, makes them sensitive to more personal concepts of peace, like the ones espoused by many Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers.

The only thing that stands in the way of this complementarity[25] is the military tendency to stress that these steps are consecutive rather than simultaneous. Their insistence that freedom from fear must be guaranteed before further steps can be taken leads to tensions with civil society actors who view peace as a continuous process. According to the latter, peace is not some flat-pack peace from IKEA, that can be easily divided over three separate boxes, where the contents of box two fit neatly into the framework built from box one.[26] Especially if freedom from fear is established by military means, these means might disrupt the continuous dialogue that civil society peace builders envision.

The most important blind spot found is for peace as a personal phenomenon or UNESCO peace as it was dubbed above. Both the Dutch diplomats and an important part of the Dutch civil society peace workers do not see the relevance of working on this kind of peace, considering it some sort of vague religious or spiritual goal.[27] At most, some diplomats see it as part of a division of tasks between themselves and civil society peace workers. They work on building the political institutions whilst civil society actors work on people's peace of mind and cultural change.[28]

[24] The visions of Dutch civil society peace workers also offer many possibilities for complementarity, but given their rather holistic view of 'Peace Writ Large' and the insistence by part of them that the process is more important than the outcome (see Sect. 9.3.1 above), this should not come as a surprise.

[25] At the level of operational visions that is, for more practical problems see, e.g. (De Coning and Friis 2011).

[26] To expand a metaphor originally developed in (Mac Ginty 2008: 145).

[27] See Sect. 5.3.1. We saw in par 6.3.4 that part of the Dutch civil society peace workers suffers from the same blind spot for any kind of peace that is not political in nature.

[28] E.g., anonymous interview diplomat #5 (Dutch MoFA, North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM)). See Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.4.

Beside the fact that many civil society peace workers do not share this view on the division of tasks, the blind spot leads to two problems. First, it makes it easier to develop a technocratic approach to peacebuilding, since institutions are more readily seen as offering a universal blueprint for peace (Mac Ginty 2012: 290). Second, it widens the gap between international and local interpretations of whether a country is 'at peace', because international actors do not have any eye for how peace is experienced by local populations (Autesserre 2010: 82–83).

As to the first problem, we saw in Chap. 5 that diplomats seek to build institutions that are 'disconnected from individuals and their interests'[29] and come up with definitions of peace that will make it measurable as a Sustainable Development Goal.[30] In itself these are understandable efforts to overcome nepotism and improve accountability and transparency. But they might also lead to a technocratic approach to peacebuilding, that focuses on building the 'right' kind of institutions, without pausing to consider how these function in practice. In Chap. 5 we saw a former diplomat criticizing this approach in Bosnia for building institutions that are 'in principle democratic', but in practice run by 'the same old elites that fought the war.' This is problematic both because it sustains the political status quo, but also because it might decrease people's satisfaction with, and thus acceptance of, the political situation in their country. The diplomat described this as there being no peace 'in the hearts of people', with levels of distrust between the different ethnic groups still very high.[31]

Secondly, by thinking of peace as an abstract political state of affairs, rather than an individually felt experience, the divide between international and local actors is widened. Both Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers stress the importance of the latter interpretation of peace when it comes to their work. International actors that do not have any eye for this, risk estranging possible local counterparts whose primary motivation to work for peace is personal.[32] Or it might lead international peace workers to declare a country 'at peace', even if large parts of its

[29] Anonymous interview diplomat #1 (Dutch MoFA, Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH))

[30] Anonymous interview diplomat #3 Dutch MoFA, DSH).

[31] Interview Rosalie Sluijter (retired diplomat, the Netherlands). See Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.4. See also (Richmond and Franks 2009: 54–82) on the failure of statebuilding in Bosnia; (Whitt 2010) on levels of distrust; and (Puljek-Shank 2017) on how local civil society organizations deal with the neopatrimonial character of Bosnian institutions.

[32] See also Chap. 6, Sect. 6.4.4.

population do not experience peace in their personal lives. In her book on international peacebuilding in Congo, Severine Autesserre describes the consequences of this neglect: new outbursts of violence almost always took the international community by surprise (Autesserre 2010: 126). Thus, these internationals' blind spot for what happens 'in the hearts of people' might undermine not only the local legitimacy, but also the effectiveness of international peacebuilding efforts.

Besides the tensions arising from this particular blind spot, there are also tensions between the visions themselves. Most importantly, there is an inherent tension between civil peace and peace-as-justice. This was observed most forcefully on Mindanao, but has a wider relevance. As was shown in Chap. 8, peace workers from the dominant settler group tend to work on a civil peace that consists of the development of harmonious relations between the different groups.[33] In contrast, peace workers with a Moro background stress that first of all they want justice: self-determination and a greater share of Mindanao's natural resources. Although they have chosen to use only non-violent means to attain this justice, they stress that they share the same objective as the armed groups fighting for independence.[34] This goal is more important to them than keeping good relations and perhaps, as we saw above, even more important than their desire for freedom from fear.[35] Conversely, the stress on keeping good (harmonious) intergroup relations, might also—unwittingly—support a status-quo that is in favour of the dominant group.

The tension is less obvious in Lebanon, partly because the balance of power between the different groups there is more even than in Mindanao. Thus, it could be argued that harmonious intergroup relations are favourable to all, something that might explain the popularity of the vision of civil peace there. However, also in Lebanon peace-as-justice is sought. By non-violent activists that somehow feel they are fighting an unresponsive political elite, lending further credence to the idea that justice is mostly a demand of the weaker side in a conflict. The tension also comes up very clearly in Lebanon's rather asymmetrical conflict with Israel. If this subject is broached, almost all interviewees are adamant that they want justice, not peace—if not for themselves, at least for the Palestinians. As was shown in Chap. 7, the very notion of peace as a political phenomenon (*salaam*) is

[33] See Chap. 8, Sect. 8.4.
[34] See Chap. 8, Sect. 8.2.1.
[35] See Sect. 9.3.1.

highly unpopular in Lebanon, partly because it is not seen as justice, but rather as accepting the status-quo.[36] Other studies into justice and reconciliation in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict point in the same direction (see e.g. the edited volume by Abu-Nimer 2001).

Finally, the fact that peace-as-justice is hardly mentioned at all by Dutch interviewees[37] is also indicative of the fact that this is mostly a vision espoused by more marginalized groups. Both the diplomats' stress on peace-as-governance and the civil society peace workers' insistence that peace is a continuous process of harmonious dialogue, as well as the general Dutch blind spot for the fact that some people might prefer an armed struggle for justice over a life in freedom from fear, mean that their efforts at working for peace might—again unwittingly—be at odds with a striving for peace-as-justice.

9.5 Revisiting the Liberal Peace Debate

In Chap. 2, the liberal peace debate was introduced. There, the argument was put forward that the four lines of critique on the supposed liberal peace consensus—it is incorrectly considered to be universal, it is too technocratic, it does not have enough attention for welfare and it does not have sufficient impact on people's everyday lives—could each be understood as a call for a different conceptualization of peace.[38] Armed with our knowledge of how professional peace workers envision peace, we can revisit this debate in order to see how the concepts of peace that are at stake there compare to the visions of peace elaborated in this book. I will do so first for the liberal peace, then for its critiques. For each critique we will both see whether it is warranted—given the Dutch visions of peace—and whether it is in fact shared by the Lebanese and Mindanaoan peace workers or perhaps merely a continuation of 'intellectual Eurocentrism' (Sabaratnam 2013: 259).

[36] See Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.3. A similar conclusion is drawn by Anne de Jong in her work on joint non-violent protesters in Israel and Palestine (De Jong 2011).

[37] With the interesting exception of a few civil society peace workers who had worked closely with marginalized groups such as Palestinians or Kashmiri. E.g., interviews Marjolein Wijninckx (PAX, the Netherlands), Marjan Lucas (independent consultant, the Netherlands).

[38] See Chap. 2, Sects. 2.3 and 2.4.

9.5.1 A Liberal Peace?

As was already stated above, no evidence was found that there is any kind of peacebuilding consensus amongst the Dutch peace workers, liberal or otherwise, except for the idea that peace is a political, rather than a personal, goal. All three groups work on multiple visions of peace and tensions between these visions exist both within and between groups. The only group that comes close to working on what could be called a liberal peace are the diplomats. As we saw in Chap. 2, the liberal peace is conceptualized as a political-economic mode of governance, consisting (in its original formulation) of a combination of democracy and free-market capitalism.[39] This original formulation is rejected by almost all of the Dutch interviewees. Most of them are very hesitant about the promotion of democracy and free-market capitalism is hardly mentioned at all. Nevertheless, the diplomats in majority *do* think of peace as a political-economic phenomenon, that they work on primarily by building institutions.[40] This could be interpreted as a liberal peace 'light', in line with Paris' call for 'institutionalization before liberalization' and the statebuilding paradigm (Paris 2004: 7). However, they do not perceive this as a universal blueprint, but rather stress that such institutions, as well as their peacebuilding efforts more generally, should fit the local context. In this, the findings are in line with recent developments at the UN, such as the rise of the sustainable peace discourse.

The two other Dutch groups, military and civil society peace workers, display hardly any signs of promoting a liberal peace at all. Dutch civil society actors are divided amongst themselves on what constitutes peace, but the majority opinion is that peace is either an ongoing and holistic process, or a rather limited 'human security'.[41] Governance is not a major theme in their interviews. Amongst the military officers, there is some support for a vision of peace as a *functioning state authority*, but, even more than the diplomats, they stress that the exact form of such a state authority is different for different countries.

The evidence that Dutch peace workers see peace as a liberal peace and play an active role in the spreading of this 'hegemonic' concept of

[39] See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.

[40] For their attitudes towards democracy, see a.o. their low scores for the Q-statement 'peace means living in a democratic state with rule of law' reported in Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.2 and Appendix B. For the political/economic character of peace, see Sects. 5.2 and 5.3.1.

[41] See Chap. 6, Sects. 6.4.2 and 6.4.3.

peace, is thus rather limited. Combined with the new stress on sustaining peace in UN discourse, it might indeed be high time for peace researchers to move beyond discussing peacebuilding in terms of a liberal peace (Heathershaw 2013; Chandler 2017). However, the liberal peace hypothesis cannot yet be entirely rejected, at least not based on this study alone. There are two reasons for this. First, from the global West, only Dutch peace workers were interviewed. Although in the introduction it was argued why it is worthwhile to investigate their visions of peace, these cannot be taken to be representative for the visions of 'Western' peace workers more generally. It might very well be that American or British peace workers (or French, German or Swedish, who—like the Dutch—are also underrepresented in the liberal peace literature) have different visions that fit the liberal peace paradigm more closely. Although the UN discourse has now taken in much of the critique on liberal peace, more research would be required to establish whether this is also being taken up by peace workers from the different member states. Second, this research has dealt only with what peace workers themselves say they are working for. Thus, although it can be concluded that they are not actively promoting a liberal peace, it might still be that the *effect* of their efforts is the spread of certain liberal values and Western modes of governance. However, a different research design, focusing more on the effects of, rather than the intentions behind peace work, would be needed to establish this.

9.5.2 Universalism vs. Hybridity

As we saw in Chap. 2, the first critique on the liberal peace is that peace is treated as a universal phenomenon, while in practice it takes different forms in different conflict areas (Mac Ginty 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). Thus, peace is always a hybrid peace, consisting of both imported and local elements. This book has shown that many of the peace workers interviewed share this critique. Especially Dutch military officers are very explicit in their rejection of a universalizing concept of peace beyond *freedom from fear*. In Chap. 4 it was reported many of them stress that local actors are the ones who should decide on the future of their country, with internationals acting only as a temporary pacifier. As far as I can tell, this relativistic attitude of military peace workers has not been

reported before in peace studies, but it is an area worth exploring for those interested in less universalistic and more hybrid forms of peace.[42]

Also amongst the diplomats, there is a strong realization that other people have a different vision of peace and that somehow this needs to be accounted for in their work. When explicitly asked whether peace is a universal phenomenon, only six (out of 21) diplomats interviewed said it was. Moreover, what is universal is again a negative peace: when given the choice, everyone will want to live in peace rather than under war. As soon as interviewees are prompted to think of a peace that is more than the absence of war, almost all of them say that what such a peace looks like depends on the context in which it has to be built. A similar finding was reported in Chap. 3, where the only factor with a negative score on the statement that peace means something different for different people was the vision of peace as a universal, but limited, ideal.[43]

Interestingly though, about half of the civil society peace workers interviewed (from all three countries) *do* say that the peace they are working on is a universal phenomenon. However, from their interviews it becomes clear that most of them are not talking about governance mechanisms, but rather about peace as a personal experience. This presents a problem with the proposed alternative of focusing on hybrid peace institutions. Since most of the civil society peace workers interviewed reject the notion that peace can be established by institutional design, their visions do not support the idea that there is a specific need for hybridity in institutional designs.[44] There might be a need for incorporating the visions of peace that local people in (post-)conflict areas have into the goals of international peacebuilding efforts, as some of the critical literature suggests (Noma et al. 2012; Firchow 2018; Paarlberg-Kvam 2018; Boege et al. 2008; Richmond and Mitchell 2012). However, as far as the civil society peace workers interviewed for this study are concerned, this would rather imply having more attention for personal peace than more attention for local governance mechanisms.

[42] Though not necessarily more emancipatory forms of peace, since military officers tend to stress the need for a functioning state authority as a second step in building peace.

[43] See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.2.

[44] Although arguably they also do not explicitly reject it. See also the debates in (Millar 2014; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016).

9.5.3 Technocracy vs. Agonism

We now move to the second critique—that liberal peace is a technocratic affair that needs to be re-politicized (Mac Ginty 2012; Donais 2009). Also here, the critique is only partially to the point. Diplomats do tend to stress that peace is a governance issue that can best be promoted by working on impartial institutions. Although their visions are relatively influential, since the mandates of most international peacebuilding missions are drafted by diplomats and they control a large part of the funding of such missions as well, none of the other groups looks for peace in institutions. Both Dutch military and civil society peace workers stress that peace depends very much on individual agency, just like the critical authors. And, like the first critique, also this one is largely addressed in the new sustaining peace paradigm, that explicitly states that 'peacebuilding is an inherently political process' (Advisory Group of Experts 2015: 13).

More importantly, the call to re-politicize peace might miss the mark, depending on which local voices one listens to. As we saw in Chap. 3, the large majority of peace workers from Lebanon and Mindanao sees peace as a personal, rather than a political endeavour. For them, a focus on individuals does not mean a focus on political agency, but rather on interpersonal relations, people's capacities to engage in everyday actions for peace and individuals' peace of mind: UNESCO peace. The alternative of agonistic peace—a peace that embraces conflict but seeks to transform it into non-violent forms (Aggestam et al. 2015; Shinko 2008)—is embraced only by the Lebanese non-violent activists and the more politically engaged of the Moro interviewees on Mindanao.

As was remarked above, this suggests that agonistic peace, with its focus on justice rather than peace, is a concept of peace particularly liked by people who feel they are, and always have been, the political 'underdogs' in a struggle for power. Both the non-violent activists from Lebanon and the Moros can be seen as such, the first vis-à-vis an unresponsive political class, the second vis-à-vis a central government they describe as 'colonial'. In this light it is perhaps also more than coincidence that three recent case-studies of agonistic peacebuilding are all about asymmetrical conflicts: Palestine (Aggestam et al. 2015), Turkish Kurds (Rumelili and Çelik 2017) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic 2016).

However, even if agonistic peace is a concept of peace that highlights the struggles of political underdogs, it does not necessarily reflect the

cultural preferences of all of these. The Mindanao case also showed that the indigenous Lumad have a strong culturally determined preference for keeping everyone's peace of mind over the achievement of political goals. Politicizing their now primarily legal and cultural struggle for self-determination might be considered a fruitful way forward from an agonistic peace worker's point of view, but risks further threatening their valued peace of mind since other parties (like the Moros) might start treating them as political competitors, rather than cultural 'brothers'.

9.5.4 Free Market Capitalism vs. Welfare

The third critique focuses on the economic side of peacebuilding, arguing that international peacebuilders ought to have much more attention for people's (economic) welfare, rather than for promoting free market capitalism (Pugh 2010; Pugh et al. 2008; Richmond 2008b). As remarked above, no evidence was found that any Dutch peace workers are actively promoting free market capitalism. Attention for people's welfare was mentioned by some of the interviewees, but overall the welfare critique is not a significant part of the visions of peace that these professional peace workers adhere to. We find it mostly in two visions of peace: freedom from fear and peace-as-justice. To start with the first, the vision of freedom from fear includes a limited economic ('freedom from want') component, captured in the idea that if people's basic needs are not met, it is impossible for them to experience peace. This vision was found mostly amongst Dutch military and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers. Interestingly, the Dutch civil society peace workers who say that human security is their political operationalization of peace, have less attention for this economic dimension. This might be because they want to delimit their own work from that of development NGOs more broadly or fear that the inclusion of an economic component dilutes the usefulness of human security as a policy concept, because it loses some of its distinctiveness (cf. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2012: 40–41).[45]

Secondly, both in Mindanao and in Lebanon the idea that peace equals justice was found. There is considerable debate over what constitutes justice, both in academic circles (Fraser 2005; Allan 2006; Sriram 2010; Abu-Nimer 2001) and amongst practitioners. However, it was found that

[45] The interviews did not provide sufficient data to draw any conclusions on this, but future research more focused on this particular question could.

at least on the Philippines, justice includes a strong socio-economic component, not unlike the stress on an equal distribution of resources of authors such as Klein and Zizek (Klein 2007; Zizek 2009). The Moros demand the benefits of resources that are 'rightfully theirs', since they are located in the Bangsamoro homeland. In Lebanon this seems to play less of a role, at least amongst the civil society peace workers interviewed.

The welfare-critique contains elements of both of these ideas—freedom from want and a more equal distribution as part of what peace-as-justice means—as well as a third, that people who have something to lose will be less inclined to go to war. Hence, a general (and equitable) rise in GDP per capita is thought to increase the chances for peace, narrowly defined as the absence of armed conflict. Interestingly, this slightly more abstract reasoning is found mostly amongst Dutch diplomats with a background in development cooperation. Thus, a threefold distinction can be made between satisfying people's basic needs as part of a broader interpretation of what human security entails; having a more equitable distribution of resources as part of what peace-as-justice means and macro-economic development in order to make an outbreak of armed conflict less likely. By making this distinction and looking more specifically into the things that (international) peace workers do and do not have attention for in their work, the welfare critique stands to gain in clarity as well as empirical support.

9.5.5 Everyday Peace

The final critique is that international peacebuilding efforts fail to positively affect the everyday lives of the population in a (post-)conflict area (Millar 2014; Autesserre 2010; Mac Ginty 2014; Richmond 2009a). The findings from this study indicate that, at least for Dutch peace workers, this might be because the focus is on political, rather than personal visions of peace. Especially Dutch diplomats seem to assume that personal peace will follow 'automatically' once the right institutions are in place. Dutch civil society peace workers are less certain about this, but in practice still often work on supporting political peaces, even though some of them concede that this will never be enough.[46] The only group of peace workers

[46] See Chap. 6, Sect. 6.4.4.

that stresses that peace is a personal experience are the military officers, especially the adherents to the vision of freedom from fear.[47]

However, as we saw, freedom from fear is a vision with a rather limited scope. Peace is an experience, but it is a negatively defined experience: the absence of fear of violence. Everyday peace, the concept of peace proposed as an alternative by the authors who pursue this line of critique, is much more multidimensional (Firchow 2018: 108–109) and explicitly includes elements from the vision of peace as a personal endeavour as well (Mac Ginty 2014: 553–555; Firchow 2018: 26). As such, it is a promising attempt to further our understanding of what peace means in a certain context, even if more attention could be paid to how different groups (of peaceworkers, but also of local citizens) might have different concepts of peace.

All in all we can conclude that the liberal peace debate only partially captures the ways that Dutch, Lebanese and Mindanaoan peace workers envision peace. By explicitly unravelling the visions of peace of the most common types of Dutch peacebuilders (diplomats, military and civil society) we found that the liberal peace 'consensus' applies at most to the first group. Although this is an influential group, that both designs a lot of the frameworks for international peacebuilding missions and controls most of the money involved in peacebuilding, taking their visions as representative of the entire community of peace workers is a gross oversimplification. Moreover, also amongst the diplomats, neither democracy nor free-market capitalism (or any other economic perspective on peacebuilding) was found to be a central element in their visions. In contrast, some of the criticism on the liberal peace—especially the idea that peace is not a universal phenomenon at all—is in fact widely shared by Dutch peace workers. When we look at the visions of Lebanese and Mindanaoan civil society peace workers, we find that rather than focusing on local governance mechanisms or welfare issues, they have much more attention for peace as an (inter-) personal phenomenon or for achieving justice—whatever that may exactly entail—rather than peace. Both of these issues deserve more attention in the peacebuilding literature.

Still, it should be stressed (again) that the results of this study are valid only for the five groups under review. Peace workers from other countries, be they Western, (post-)conflict or others (see, e.g., De Carvalho and De Coning 2013) might have different visions of peace that more closely

[47] See Chap. 4, Sect. 4.1 and Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.3.

reflect either the liberal peace consensus or some of the criticisms on it. In order to move the liberal peace debate forward, two things are needed. First, more empirical studies on what peace means in a certain context, rather than on how it is brought about. This is a project that is now taken up by a number of authors (Firchow 2018; Paarlberg-Kvam 2018). Second, however, we should also develop conceptual models that allow peace researchers to compare the different visions found in different contexts. The peace cube introduced in this book is one such model. I hope it will prove to be useful both to academics and to practitioners.

9.6 The Peaces We Build

Peace is a positive phenomenon. It is something that can be, and is being, built. By peace workers such as the ones who have been interviewed for this study. They form a global community, a 'we' that builds peace. At the same time, a division is often made between 'we' Western, international, global, peace workers and 'they', local actors in conflict areas. To some extent, also this study is guilty of reifying that divide by having separate chapters on two local case studies. However, it does not join the chorus of critical scholars lamenting that 'we' are imposing our own preconceived ideas on an unwilling 'them'.

Rather, it has sought to pry apart where all of us differ in our visions of what constitutes peace.

As peace researchers, we might not be building peace in the usual sense of that combination of words. But we are building concepts of peace that have real-world ramifications. We teach them to our students and we use them to evaluate the performance of those other peacebuilders. Therefore, we ought to be as careful as those who are building peace out there. We should at least try not to do any harm with the concepts we create. And if possible, build concepts that help peace workers to get a grip on what they are doing. I sincerely hope this rather detailed and empirically grounded conceptual exercise will prove to be a contribution to that kind of research.

9.7 Summary

This book sets out to explore the meaning of peace according to (some of) the people who make it. It empirically studies the visions of peace that are being held by peaceworkers from a mid-sized internationally active Western country—the Netherlands—and two (post-)conflict areas—

Lebanon and Mindanao. Drawing on interviews with Dutch diplomats, military officers and civil society peace workers, as well as with civil society peace workers from Lebanon and Mindanao, it seeks to answer three main questions: 1) what are the different peaces professional peace workers are working on? 2) how are these visions different for different kinds of peace workers and peace workers from different countries? And 3) do differences between the visions of different groups of actors lead to complementarity, friction or blind spots on the part of these actors?

The literature suggests two answers to these questions: a 'liberal peace consensus' amongst Western peace workers and a divide between the visions of Western and non-Western peace workers. The first—a liberal peace consensus—was not found amongst the Dutch respondents, whose visions of peace are much more diverse than the liberal peace thesis suggests. The second—a divide between Western (i.e., Dutch) and non-Western (i.e., Lebanese and Mindanaoan) visions of peace—was found, but along different lines than usually proposed. Dutch peace workers envision peace primarily as a political phenomenon, whereas Lebanese and Mindanaoan peace workers see it primarily as a personal endeavour—a vision of peace usually not addressed in the peacebuilding literature. Additionally, it was found that governmental peace workers (Dutch diplomats and military officers) tend to see peace as an attainable goal, whereas civil society peace workers stress that it is a continuous process. Finally, there is a tension between the visions of *civil peace*, or good relations between all groups in a society, and *peace-as-justice*, which stresses that peace requires first of all that past injustices done to a marginalized group are corrected. The first of these two visions was found more often amongst peace workers from the dominant groups in the study (including all Dutch groups), whereas the second vision was found more often amongst peace workers from more marginalized groups.

The different chapters of the study can be summarized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the research questions, elaborates on the research design, provides an argument for the selection of cases and respondents within these cases and introduces the two methodologies used: semi-structured interviews and Q. Specifically, it gives an account of how these two methodologies were used to set up a very inductive research design. In the 87 semi-structured interviews, interviewees were given ample room to elaborate on their own visions of peace, free from any pre-conceived theoretical ideas. 91 interviews following the Q sort were guided by the statements in the Q set and might thus be considered to be less spontaneous.

However, since the Q-set was built from quotes from previous interviews, rather than from existing literature, also here the inductive design is kept. The advantage of this "double method" approach is further that it allows both a reliable comparison of the visions held by the different groups (in Chap. 3, using Q) and a much more detailed, inductive, description of the visions found in each of the case studies (Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8).

Chapter 2 contextualizes the otherwise inductive design of the book by providing an overview of the way peace has been conceptualized by academics from the start of peace studies as a separate academic discipline to the present. It shows that academic conceptualizations of peace differ along seven dimensions. The most well-known of these is whether peace is a negative or a positive phenomenon (Galtung 1969; Grewal 2003), denoting the absence of something (armed conflict) or the presence of something (for instance justice, equality or development). But peace is also conceptualized in different domains (e.g., as a political, a cultural or a psychological phenomenon; on different levels (personal, national, international); as a process or a goal; as something to be found in individuals or in institutions (or in structure or agency); as a short-term or a long-term goal; and as resembling different other values (e.g. justice, order or harmony (Banks 1987)). These seven dimensions form a preliminary conceptual framework, that will be put to the empirical test in Chap. 3, to see which of them is also useful to distinguish different operational visions of peace. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the swath of literature known collectively as 'the liberal peace debate(/s)'. This debate is presented as a conversation between different groups of authors that all implicitly or explicitly have a different understanding of what peace means, that drives the debate between them on how to establish peace. The novelty of this approach is the insight that what matters in the liberal peace debate is not so much the *how*, but the *what* of peacebuilding. To defendants of the liberal peace (most notably Paris 2004, 2010; Call 2008) peace is a medium-term, national level, political and economic goal, to be found (or solidified) in institutions. It is mostly driven by a normative focus on (individual) freedom and (societal) stability.

Critics of the liberal peace suggest four alternative understandings of what peace means. To the proponents of hybrid peace (Chopra and Hohe 2004; Mac Ginty 2010; e.g. Richmond and Mitchell 2012; Belloni 2012; Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012a), peace is a long-term process rather than a goal, taking place at different levels beyond the national (Millar 2014: 502; Schia and Karlsrud 2013: 235) and starting from a different normative

background, calling for emancipation rather than stability and inclusivity and (local) legitimacy rather than individual freedom (Boege 2012: 96–97; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016: 227; Johnson and Hutchison 2012: 48–49).

The second critical alternative is the concept of agonistic peace (Aggestam et al. 2015; Shinko 2008; Polat 2010; Nagle 2014). Authors arguing for this stress that peace is a continuous conflictual relationship in which different individuals actors will have to establish non-violent relationships (for a similar view of peace, see also Ramsbotham 2010; Lederach 2015).

The third alternative is more economic in nature. Authors calling for a 'welfare' approach to peace (Pugh et al. 2008: 394–396; Cooper et al. 2011: 2000–2001; Klein 2007; Millar 2016) point to the conflicts (or structural violence) inherent in neo-liberalism as an economic order and suggest that peace should offer an alternative for capitalist competition. Where the previous two alternatives look for peace in subnational levels, this critique concerns itself much more with the international order, driven by concerns about (economic) equality rather than stability or liberty.

The fourth alternative is everyday peace. This is also conceived as a process, but at the level of individual 'ordinary people' in (post-)conflict areas, that just try to get along regardless of the political situation in their country. Authors arguing for this alternative (Mac Ginty 2014; Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016; Richmond 2009a; Autesserre 2010; Firchow 2018; Berents and McEvoy-Levy 2015) thus see peace as a social, or perhaps even psychological, phenomenon, to be found in individuals rather than institutions and concerned with care and empathy rather than stability and freedom.

To sum up, Chap. 2 argues that also academic debates on how to achieve peace in (post-)conflict societies, are driven to a large extent by different interpretations of what constitutes peace and that these interpretations can be compared using a multi-dimensional conceptual framework.

Chapter 3 investigates which of the seven dimensions identified in the literature are most relevant in distinguishing the different operational visions of professional peace builders. To this end, a Q study was performed amongst 91 respondents from all five groups under scrutiny. They were asked to rank-order a series of statements about peace according to how well they described the peace they were trying to establish through their work. This study yielded five different visions of peace: peace as a personal endeavour, peace as a universal ideal, everyday peace,

peace-as-process and peace-as-politics. These five visions differed along four of the seven dimensions. The dichotomous positive-negative dimension turned out to be rather a continuum of more or less *holistic* visions of peace (dimension 1: scope). The most prominent difference between peace on different levels and in different domains turned out to be a distinction between peace as a *personal or political* phenomenon (dimension 2: personal/political). The difference between peace as a *process or a goal* was found to be a relevant dimension (dimension 3: ontology) as was the difference between looking for peace in *individuals or institutions* (dimension 4: embedding).

In the subsequent case-study Chaps. (4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), both the post-sorting interviews from the Q study and 87 semi-structured interviews with a further 65 respondents are used to provide an in-depth understanding of how the different groups envision the peace(s) they are working on. Chapter 4 shows that Dutch military peace workers work on three visions of peace, that most of them see as three steps in a multi-stage process, or 'stairway' of peace. The most common vision—and the first step—is *freedom from fear*. In their own words, this means they are working on an environment in which individual people feel safe from harm. According to some respondents, this freedom from fear can only be guaranteed in the longer run if there is a *functioning state authority*—the second vision and next step on the stairway to the kind of peace we enjoy in the global West. Interestingly however, virtually all military respondents—including the ones who say the next step of peace is such a functioning state authority—stress that they can only play a limited role in these statebuilding processes and that they should be left mostly to the local population. In this, they are more relativist than any of the other groups. Finally, some military officers stress that peace is not so much something they seek to 'bring' to conflict affected areas, but rather something they defend at home in the Netherlands. The interviewees who have this vision, define this peace very broadly as *freedom*: the final step on a (much longer) stairway of peace. In line with the observed relativism (and contrary to the liberal peace thesis), they stress that they cannot impose that same freedom on people in conflict areas. Thus, when it comes to the peace they build in (post-)conflict areas, *freedom from fear* is the primary military vision, also for the respondents who have a broader vision as well.

Chapter 5 shows that when Dutch diplomats talk about peace, they talk about governance. Their vision of *peace-as-governance* is the only vision that stresses that peace is found in institutions rather than in individuals.

Although this is a more ambitious goal than the establishment of freedom from fear, it still has a rather narrow scope, especially when compared to the civil society visions of peace. Diplomats stress that peace primarily means the absence of armed conflict and that adding too many other aspects risks a loss of focus that might endanger the establishment of any kind of peace. In the short term, stopping armed conflicts requires the signing and implementation of peace agreements, a vision I have labelled *peace-as-agreement*. In the long run however, the sustainability of peace depends on the build-up of effective (state) institutions: *peace-as-governance*.

Chapter 6 shows that many of the Dutch civil society peace workers interviewed have a vision of peace that is the opposite of the diplomats'. Instead of conceptualizing peace as a limited institutional goal, they regard peace as a holistic all-encompassing vision that implies not only that armed conflicts are ended, but also that their root causes are solved: (political) oppression, human rights violations, unequal income distribution, underdevelopment and (for some) even interpersonal conflicts. Following Anderson and Olson (Anderson and Olson 2003) I have labeled this vision *Peace Writ Large*. When asked to operationalize this broad vision in the context of the work they do, interviewees come up with two other visions of peace. The first is *peace-as-process*, which treats peace as a never-ending process (both political and interpersonal) that requires continuous dialogue, monitoring and intervention. The specific short-term objectives of this process are less relevant, what matters is that 'the conversation is kept going'. When they do think of peace as a goal, they tend to agree with the military that the first priority is for people in conflict areas to experience *freedom from fear*.

Chapter 7 discusses the Lebanese visions of peace. The interviewed Lebanese civil society peace workers work on three visions of peace, none of which is a political goal per se. Rather, they stress the importance of *civil peace* (*silim* in Arabic): the quality of the relations between the different groups that make up Lebanese society. Or, moving even further away from peace as a political phenomenon, they say that they work on *peace as a personal endeavour*: what every individual can do to maintain peaceful interpersonal relations. The few peace workers I spoke with who do have a political view of peace stress that they see peace primarily as a method (*non-violent activism*), with 'justice' as its goal.

Chapter 8 finds a similar set of concepts, but with a slightly different focus, on Mindanao. Civil society peace workers there insist that the

signing and implementation of a political peace agreement—in their case the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro—is not in itself sufficient to speak of peace. Nor is *freedom from fear*, although some respondents concede that ordinary people might consider this to be all the peace they want. Professional peace workers however, work on three other visions of peace. First, *peace-as-justice*, similar to non-violent activism in Lebanon, but with more stress on the desired outcome ('justice', meaning self-governance and a larger share of the natural resources that Mindanao has for the Moros) rather than the process. Secondly, *peace of mind*, a mostly indigenous vision that stresses the priority of good relationships over (political or economic) gains. Finally, like their Lebanese colleagues, Mindanaoan peace workers und stress that in the end all three groups should live together in *civil peace*.

Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the research project. Specifically, it introduces the idea that Dutch peace workers tend to work on what is called 'Security Council peace'—peace as a political phenomenon—whereas the Lebanese and Mindanaoans work primarily on 'UNESCO peace'—peace 'in the minds of men and women'. It then goes on to compare the findings from this study to the different critiques on the liberal peace. It draws four lessons for these critiques. First, it debunks the idea that there is a liberal peace 'consensus' at all, at least if we look at the operational visions of actual peace workers in the countries under study. This strengthens arguments made in the literature that the liberal peace is actually a strawman set up for critique (Chandler 2010; Heathershaw 2013) and reinforces calls to move beyond this debate (Heathershaw 2013; Richmond 2011; Klem 2018). Second, and relatedly, it shows that the idea that peace is not a universal phenomenon is widely held amongst the respondents, thus strengthening calls for a 'pluralization' and contextualization of peace (Dietrich 2002; Stamnes and Osland 2016; De Coning 2016). If interviewees mention that peace is universal, this is most often at the level of human experience. This suggests, amongst other things, that the notion of 'everyday peace' (Richmond 2009a; Mac Ginty 2014; Berents and McEvoy-Levy 2015; Firchow 2018) might be a fruitful way forward when thinking about models or lessons learnt. The third lesson thus is that this approach, and related approaches from the fields of peace education and/or peace psychology, should be much more on the radar of people providing (or studying) more political forms of peacebuilding. The idea often found amongst Dutch diplomats (Chap. 5) that once political institutions are in place, personal experiences of peace will follow more or less

automatically is strongly rejected by civil society peace workers in (post-) conflict areas. More intentional focus on 'UNESCO peace' (also by those who study peacebuilding) and what this means for people's experiences of everyday peace, is highly recommended. Finally, the finding that agonistic peace comes closest to what peace workers from marginalized communities say they are working on ('peace as justice') underscores the importance of keeping a sharp eye on power relations when thinking about what kind of peace the international community ought to promote. However, many of the people working on peace-as-justice also stress that peace starts as a personal, rather than a political, endeavour. Therefore, efforts to 're-politicize' peace (Mac Ginty 2012; Shinko 2008; Aggestam et al. 2015) can also miss the mark, if they make peace a purely political project again.

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Appendix A: List of Interviewees

Dutch Military

Name	*Organization/ department*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Anonymous army chaplain	Dutch army	The Hague		27-11-2014
Anonymous captain	Dutch army, Land Training Centre	Amersfoort		27-8-2015
Anonymous colonel	Dutch army	Beirut		24-6-2014
Anonymous interview	Ministry of Defence, evaluations division	The Hague		2-7-2015
Anonymous interview	Ministry of Defence, International Military Co-operation division	The Hague		16-7-2015
Anonymous pilot	Dutch Airforce	Soesterberg		27-8-2015
Brinkel, Theo	Royal Military Academy (KMA)	Breda		21-10-2014
Major Daan Boissevain	Ministry of Defence, Current Reporting Desk	The Hague		2-4-2015

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27975-2

Name	*Organization/ department*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Major General (ret.) Patrick Cammaert	Dutch Navy/United Nations	The Hague		6-8-2015
Colonel (ret.) Willem van Dullemen	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations	New York	6-4-2016	
Fonteyn, Henk	Dutch army chaplain, retired	Culemborg		14-11-2014
Major Martijn Hädicke	Dutch army	't Harde	18-5-2015	18-5-2015
Major Lenny Hazelbag	Dutch army	Utrecht		4-6-2015
Lieutenant Colonel Björn de Heer	Ministry of Defence, CIMIC division	The Hague	9-4-2014	18-12-2014
Colonel Erwin Hoogland	Ministry of Defence, department of operations	The Hague		18-12-2014
van Koppen, Jasper	Dutch army, national reserve	The Hague		18-12-2014
Lieutenant General Mart de Kruif	Dutch army	Utrecht		1-5-2015
Colonel Kees Matthijssen	Military advisor at the ministry of Foreign Affairs/former ISAF-commander	The Hague	8-4-2014	
Lieutenant Erik Noordam	Dutch navy, CIMIC officer	Utrecht		17-4-2015
Lieutenant General (ret.) Lex Oostendorp	Dutch army	The Hague		6-5-2015
Overtoom, Eric	Dutch army, national reserve	Alkmaar		27-7-2015
Suchard, Derek	Army chaplain	The Hague		1-10-2014
Major General Marc van Uhm	Dutch army	Utrecht		23-3-2014
Colonel Dr. Wagemaker, Allard	Defense attaché South and Central Asia, New Delhi	via Skype	4-4-2014	

Dutch Diplomats

Name	*Organization/department*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Anonymous diplomat #1	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MofA), Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH)	The Hague	20-3-2014	
Anonymous diplomat #2	Dutch MoFA, DSH	The Hague		31-10-2014
Anonymous diplomat #3	Dutch MoFA, DSH	The Hague		24-2-2015
Anonymous diplomat #4	Dutch MoFA, Security Policy Department (DVB)	The Hague		22-9-2015
Anonymous diplomat #5	Dutch MoFA, North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM)	The Hague		29-9-2015
Anonymous diplomat #6	Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to NATO	Brussels	21-1-2014	
Anonymous diplomat #7	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (UNPBSO)	New York	5-4-2016	
Anonymous former diplomat #1	Dutch MoFA (retired)	The Hague	8-9-2015	
Anonymous former diplomat #2	Dutch MoFA (retired)	The Hague		11-9-2015
Anten, Louise	Dutch MoFA, former director of Peacebuilding and Governance Department	The Hague	25-9-2014	
Braam, Ernesto	Dutch MoFA, DAM	The Hague	23-4-2014	
Carstens, Andre	former Director of Governance, Dutch ISAF mission	The Hague		6-3-2015
Davidse, Koen	Dutch MoFA, Special envoy post-2015 development goals	The Hague	9-4-2014	
Van Houwelingen, Heino	European External Action Service (EEAS)	Brussels	22-1-2014	
Knoope, Peter	International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT)	The Hague	20-3-2014	

Name	*Organization/department*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Povel, Eric	NATO	Brussels	23-1-2014	
Rentenaar, Michel	Dutch MoFA, former Political Advisor to ISAF	The Hague		13-3-2015
Reyn, Sebastian	Dutch Ministry of Defence, project director integrated policy	The Hague		27-11-2014
Singleton, Mark	International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT)	The Hague		11-9-2015
Sluijter, Valerie	Dutch MoFA (retired)	The Hague		2-9-2015
van Walsum, Peter	Dutch MoFA (retired)	The Hague	2-9-2015	

Dutch Civil Society

Name	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Anonymous programme officer #1	PAX	Utrecht	18-6-2013	6-11-2014
Anonymous programme officer #2	PAX	Utrecht	17-10-2013	14-4-2015
Anonymous programme officer #3	PAX	Utrecht	31-10-2013	
Anonymous programme officer	Cordaid	The Hague	2-12-2013	29-10-2014
Bakker, Jogien	PAX	Utrecht	31-10-2013	8-10-2014
Berg, Dion van den	PAX	Utrecht	14-11-2013	6-11-2014
Beugeling, Amanda	Dialogue Advisory Group (DAG)	Amsterdam	15-11-2013	

Name	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Bolling, Rojan	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)	The Hague	13-12-2013	
Brandt, Marianne	PAX	Utrecht	28-11-2013	
Broek, Kees van den	PAX	Utrecht	11-10-2013	
Danilovich, Puco	PAX	Utrecht	14-11-2013	
Deggeller, Han	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)	The Hague	12-11-2013	6-3-2015
Deventer, Fulco van	Human security Collective	The Hague	13-12-2013	7-4-2015
Geuskens, Isabelle	Women's Peacemakers Program	The Hague	12-11-2013	7-4-2015
Graaf Bierbrauwer, Guido de	PAX	Utrecht	5-6-2013	8-10-2014
Grit, Evert-Jan	PAX	Utrecht	21-11-2013	
Grotenhuis, René	Independent consultant, formerly director of Cordaid	Utrecht		8-10-2014
Gruiters, Jan	PAX	Utrecht	4-3-2014	
Hal, Albert van	Cordaid	The Hague	8-11-2013	
Halma, Piet	PAX	Utrecht	21-11-2013	
Hermans, Mathieu	PAX	Utrecht	11-4-2014	5-3-2015
Hijkoop, Christa	Peace Brigades International	Utrecht	4-2-2014	
Jonge, Wilco de	Amnesty International (AI)	Amsterdam	1-11-2013	
Ketelaar, Sara	PAX	Utrecht	31-10-2013	23-3-2015
Kuik, Jannie	PAX	Utrecht	8-10-2013	6-11-2014
Landmeter, Freek	PAX	Utrecht	8-1-2014	
Leemput, Guido van	United Civilians for Peace (UCP)	Amsterdam	8-11-2013	
Lucas, Marjan	Independent consultant	Nijmegen	14-1-2014	
Meijer, Guus	Independent consultant	The Hague		24-2-2015
Oosterzee, Jan Jaap van	PAX	Utrecht	17-10-2013	8-10-2014
Plooijer, Nico	PAX	Utrecht	5-12-2013	23-3-2015

Name	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Puijenbroek, Joost van	PAX	Utrecht	7-11-2013	14-4-2015
Regt, Wim de	Amnesty International (AI)	Amsterdam	15-11-2013	
Rouw, Hans	PAX	Utrecht	18-6-2013	
Ruigrok, Edwin	PAX	Utrecht	5-12-2013	6-11-2014
Sabitha Ribai	PAX	Utrecht		8-10-2014
Savriti, Amber	PAX	Utrecht		8-10-2014
Scheffers, Victor	Justice and Peace Netherlands	The Hague	20-3-2014	31-10-2014
Schoenmakers, René	PAX	Utrecht	28-11-2013	6-11-2014
Schrama, Astrid	PAX	Brussels, Belgium	22-1-2014	
Sluijs, Peter van	Cordaid/New Deal for Peace	The Hague		24-2-2015
Struyk, Miriam	PAX	Utrecht	21-11-2013	
Sweeris, Annemarie	PAX	Utrecht	7-11-2013	8-10-2014
Teunen, Regina	PAX	Utrecht	5-2-2014	
Tuijl, Peter van	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)	The Hague	20-3-2014	
Velzen, Krista van	PAX	Utrecht	28-11-2013	
Vogelaar, Gabriella	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)	The Hague	28-2-2014	6-3-2015
Vriens, Lennart	Kerk en vrede [Church and Peace]	Utrecht	8-1-2014	
Wesselink, Egbert	PAX	Utrecht	11-10-2013	
Wijninckx, Marjolein	PAX	Amsterdam	27-1-2014	
Zijden, Wilbert van der	PAX	Utrecht		5-3-2014

Lebanese Civil Society

Name	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Abdul Salam, Maan	Etana	Beirut	24-6-2014	
Abi Allam, Fadi	Permanent Peace Movement (PPM)	Beirut	25-6-2014	
Abou Hamdan, Mazen	Chaml	Beirut		12-6-2014
Abouaoun, Elie	United States Institute for Peace (USIP)	Beirut		24-6-2014
Anonymous employee #1	Association Justice et Misericordia (AJEM)	Roumieh		16-6-2014
Anonymous employee #2	Association Justice et Misericordia (AJEM)	Roumieh		16-6-2014
Anonymous employee #3	Association Justice et Misericordia (AJEM)	Roumieh		16-6-2014
Anonymous employee #4	Association Justice et Misericordia (AJEM)	Roumieh		16-6-2014
Barakat, Hoda	Adyan	Beirut		18-6-2014
Chaftari, Assad	Whadatouna Khalasouna	Ain Saad		18-6-2014
Chahine, Ali	Independent consultant	Beirut		23-6-2014
Chami, Jean Paul	Independent consultant	Beirut		25-6-2014
Daccache, Michel	Forum for Development, Culture and Dialogue (FDCD)	Beirut		12-6-2014
Daou, Fadi	Adyan	Beirut	18-6-2014	
Dirani, Fouad	Fighters for Peace (FfP)	Beirut	17-6-2014	
El Chaar, Lama	Womens International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)	Beirut		20-6-2014
Fazah, Rania	Independent consultant	Beirut		11-6-2014
Frayha, Nemer	Lebanese University	Beirut		13-6-2014
Haid, Mustafa	Dawlaty	Beirut	19-6-2014	
Jarjour, Riad	Forum for Development, Culture and Dialogue (FDCD)	Beirut		12-6-2014
Mallat, Chibli	Right to Non-violence (RNV)	via Skype	2-7-2014	
Merhej, Ramzi	Search for Common Ground (SFCG)	Beirut		11-6-2014

Name	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Messarra, Antoine	Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace (LFPCP)	Beirut	23-6-2014	
Moukaddem, Manal	Center for Lebanese Studies	Beirut		17-6-2014
Mourad, Maysa	Independent peace educator	Beirut		10-6-2014
Nassif, Hana	Association Justice et Misericordia (AJEM)	Roumieh		18-6-2014
Ouaiss, Makram	Whadatouna Khalasouna	Beirut		17-6-2014
Saab, Ziad	Fighters for Peace (FfP)	Beirut	12-6-2014	
Salloum, Nibal	Nuon Organization for Peace-Building	Beirut	13-6-2014	

Mindanaon Civil Society

Name	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Acuña-Gulo, Aveen	Freelance peacebuilding consultant	Cotabato City	2-11-2015	
Alim, Guiamel M.	Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)	Cotabato City	25-10-2015	
Ambangan, Rodello	Mindanao Peoples' Peace Movement (MPPM)	Midsayap	31-10-2015	
Amella, Mahdie	Mindanao Action for Peace And Development (MAPAD)	Cotabato City		3-11-2015
Ancheta, Mae Fe	Inpeace	Davao		30-10-2015
Ang Sinco, Elvyra	retired, formerly Forum ZFD	Davao	23-10-2015	
Austero, Mitzi	Non-violence International (NVI)	Cotabato City		4-11-2015
Ayoub, Ali	Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)	Cotabato City		4-11-2015
Bello, Sannie S.	Timuay Justice and Governance (TJG)	Awang		6-11-2015

Name	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Cuyong Jr., Saturnino C.	Lumad Development Sector Inc. (LDS)/Timuay Justice and Governance (TJG)	Awang		6-11-2015
Datuwata, Leticio	Mindanao Peoples' Peace Movement (MPPM)	Cotabato City	4-11-2015	
Daud, Mariam	Nurus Salaam	Cotabato City		5-11-2015
Jaapar al Hadj, Moner	Confederated Descendants of Rajah Mamalu (CDRM)	Cotabato City		4-11-2015
Jover, Jo Genna	Kutawato Council for Justice and Peace (KCJP)	Cotabato City	5-11-2015	
Kaalim, Rexall	Non-violent Peace Force (NVPF)	Samal	8-11-2015	
Layson, Roberto	Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI)	Cotabato City	6-11-2015	
Lidasan, Mussolini	Al Qalam Institute	Davao		26-10-2015
Lubang, Alfredo	Phillippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL)	Cotabato City		1-11-2015
Magon, Dats	United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD)	Cotabato City		3-11-2016
Mascud, Duma	Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre (MINHRAC)	Cotabato City	4-11-2015	
Maulana, Sammy	Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)	Cotabato City	2-11-2015	
Mendoza, Froilyn	Teduray Lambangian Women's Organization (TLWO)/Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)	Cotabato City	4-11-2015	
Momin, Arkan G.	Confederated Descendants of Rajah Mamalu (CDRM)	Cotabato City		4-11-2015
Norbe, Mary Therese	Mindanao Peoples' Peace Movement (MPPM)	Cotabato City	4-11-2015	
Olubalang, Allan T.	Teduray Lambangian Youth and Student Association	Awang	6-11-2015	
Ong, Danny	Forum Ziviler Friedens Dienst (ZFD)	Cotabato City	25-10-2015	
Pantoja, Joji	Coffee for Peace (CfP)/ Peacebuilders Community Inc.	Davao	10-11-2015	

Name	*Organization*	*Place*	*Date semi-structured interview*	*Date Q sort*
Prieto, Lyndee	International Initiatives for Development (IID)/ Mindanao Peace Weavers (MPW)	Davao	28-10-2015	
Sargado, Orson	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	Davao	21-10-2015	
Silvosa, Rhea	Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI)	Davao		22-10-2015
Tanjili, Harris	Al Qalam Institute	Davao		26-10-2015

Appendix B: Factor Array Showing Idealized Q Sorts for Visions 1–5

Statement	*Visions*				
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*
1. Peace is an experience, that should be felt by people in their daily lives.	3	0	4	1	3
2. Peace is attainable.	5	4	−4	−1	1
3. Peace is a moral compass: it implies that people work from a certain moral attitude, certain moral values.	1	5	−1	2	2
4. Peace is relational. It lies in the way individuals or groups relate to others.	1	3	2	3	1
5. Sometimes you have to impose peace, if people are unable to make peace amongst themselves.	−3	1	−1	1	2
6. Peace is a situation of 'normality': normal people can just live their normal lives.	−1	0	5	0	0
7. Peace is an observable state of affairs, as, e.g., measured by the Global Peace Index.	−2	−1	−2	−2	0
8. Peace is a vague container-notion that can mean anything. Peace is too abstract to be of any practical value in my work.	−3	−5	−1	−4	−1
9. Working on peace means upholding the social contract between rulers and ruled.	−1	−1	1	0	−1
10. Perfect peace is a vision, and dangerous if you don't accept that you will always fail to reach it.	−2	−5	3	−3	1

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Statement	*Visions*				
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*
11. You can identify more or less peacefulness within societies or countries, but having 'peace' as a state of affairs is impossible.	−3	−3	0	0	0
12. Peace is the institutional capacity to manage conflicts.	0	3	1	−1	1
13. Peace is a process in which everyone is heard, based on inclusivity and equality.	3	0	2	4	0
14. Peace is a moment, the perfect moment when all comes together and is in balance. The objective of peacebuilding is for more people to experience more of those moments more often.	0	−2	3	0	−2
15. Peace means empathy. Seeing the humanity of the other, even if you disagree with him.	5	0	−2	5	1
16. Peace means that basic human needs are met, both material (e.g. food, shelter) and immaterial (e.g. identity, freedom of religion, freedom of expression).	2	−1	0	1	0
17. Living in peace means living in freedom: having the ability to do what you want to do, or to be who you want to be, as long as you don't hinder anyone else with it.	1	2	0	−2	5
18. It would really help my work if people would stop thinking about peace as harmony.	−2	−4	−2	1	0
19. The objective of peace operations is to uphold and promote the international rule of law.	0	5	1	−3	3
20. Peace is security, the ability to deal with whatever threats the future will hold.	−1	3	1	2	0
21. Working for peace is working on a more just, equal and better world, so that people will no longer have any reason to go to war with others.	3	3	−3	2	2
22. Peace is not just about human beings, it also relates to living in harmony with the environment, the wholeness of creation.	4	−2	0	−4	−3
23. Peace means the universal observance of all human rights.	2	1	0	0	1
24. Peace is a set of conditions that allow everyone to come into his/her full potential.	2	−3	1	−1	−2
25. Peace is restorative. It is aimed at restoring something that was violated in war.	0	2	−3	3	−2
26. Peacebuilding means working on a basis of respect, not of power. "Showing your muscles" only works for a short period of time.	1	−1	0	1	−1
27. Peace is the ability to live a "boring" life, within a predictably stable environment.	−4	0	2	−5	−2

Statement	*Visions*				
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*
28. Working for peace means working altruistically, not purely promoting your own interests, but taking the other as a starting point.	2	2	1	−2	0
29. Peace is intrinsically political, so whether or not it has been reached will always be contested.	−1	−2	−2	2	5
30. A peaceful society is a society that can change itself without using violence.	1	2	−3	2	4
31. Peace is revolutionary: it is about changing unjust systems and power relations.	1	−1	−1	0	−1
32. You have to make sure that the state operates smoothly, without reliance on military force. Then you have peace.	−1	−1	−5	0	−2
33. Peace starts as an internal state of mind of a person and is then projected outwards.	4	0	−2	3	−1
34. Peace is the absence of war. Nothing more, nothing less.	−4	2	0	−2	−3
35. Peace is not necessarily a desirable objective.	−5	−4	−4	−1	−4
36. What peace looks like depends on what the conflict is about.	−2	−2	2	−2	1
37. Peace means living in ‘a democratic state with rule of law’.	−1	1	−5	−1	−1
38. In peace work, people are central, not politics or institutions.	0	−2	−3	4	−4
39. Peace is embedding the use of violence in a legal framework.	−3	1	0	−3	−5
40. Peace is always related to situations of war. Therefore, peacebuilding in (e.g.) the Netherlands is a nonsensical activity.	−5	0	−1	−3	−3
41. Peace is a dualistic concept. On the one hand there is the ideal, on the other what you can do in practice.	0	−1	4	−1	2
42. Peace means that war is unthinkable as a means of solving conflicts.	0	1	−1	−1	−3
43. Human rights, development and peace are inextricably linked: both human rights and development are part of peace.	3	1	2	1	4
44. The objective of peacebuilding interventions is not peace as a state of affairs, but to ‘keep the conversation going’.	−1	1	3	5	−1
45. What peace looks like is different for different people.	0	−3	3	0	3
46. Peacebuilding should just be a matter of ‘what needs to get done’, without any political interference.	−2	−3	−1	−5	−5
47. Peace does not imply the absence of conflict, since conflict is also a force for change.	2	0	1	1	3
48. Peace is made between or within communities.	1	4	5	3	2

Appendix C: Correlations of Individual Q Sorts to Factors

		Factor 1	*Factor 2*	*Factor 3*	*Factor 4*	*Factor 5*
	Dutch Civil Society					
1	Savriti	0.6090X	−0.1914	0.0343	0.1555	0.0947
2	Ribai	0.5626X	0.3140	−0.1342	0.0313	0.2177
3	Grotenhuis	−0.1286	0.2964	0.3583	0.4722	0.2269
4	Van Oosterzee	0.0765	0.1070	−0.0637	0.3612	0.1284
5	Sweeris	0.4493	−0.0683	0.4967	0.3560	0.0753
6	De Graaf Bierbrauwer	0.1943	0.1128	0.0034	0.0456	0.4549
7	Anonymous programme officer Cordaid	0.5186X	0.2282	0.2485	0.1519	0.1869
8	Bakker	−0.5054	0.5264	−0.2465	0.3939	0.0620
9	Ruigrok	0.3101	0.3242	−0.1611	0.1269	0.5645
10	Schoenmakers	0.3106	0.0743	0.0534	0.4733X	0.1604
11	Kuik	−0.0868	0.3824	−0.0684	0.2260	0.3584
12	Anonymous programme officer #1, PAX	0.1337	0.0259	0.0396	0.4391X	−0.0097
13	Van den Berg	0.0037	0.0419	0.0831	0.4390	0.3959
14	Meijer	−0.0569	0.2042	0.2652	0.0297	0.4922
15	Van der Zijden	0.4742	0.4164	0.0523	0.3026	0.0517
16	Deggeller	0.3600	0.2494	0.1019	0.1668	0.2043
17	Vogelaar	0.1737	0.1559	0.0957	0.4103	0.5914X
18	Hermans	0.7216X	0.2476	0.0385	0.1864	0.1727
19	Plooijer	0.3255	0.1108	−0.1373	0.0529	0.1766
20	Van Sluijs	0.3538	0.2745	0.1582	0.1041	0.4263

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		Factor 1	*Factor 2*	*Factor 3*	*Factor 4*	*Factor 5*
21	Scheffers	0.5817X	0.3083	0.2305	0.1481	0.0043
22	Ketelaar	0.1447	0.4518X	−0.1111	0.1077	−0.0031
23	Geuskens	0.4825	0.0601	−0.0820	0.4461	0.2495
24	Deventer	0.5474X	0.0557	0.1848	0.3223	0.2308
25	Van Puijenbroek	0.2459	−0.0096	0.0445	0.3199	0.0551
26	Anonymous programme officer #2, PAX	0.6953X	0.2930	−0.1042	0.1374	0.0410
	Dutch Diplomats					
27	Reyn	0.0420	0.0270	−0.0614	−0.0242	0.6515X
28	Anonymous diplomat #2	0.0333	0.5550	−0.0668	−0.0424	0.6284X
29	Anonymous diplomat #3	0.2160	0.0625	−0.0381	0.4985X	0.0578
30	Carstens	0.2868	0.5592X	0.0749	−0.0020	0.0993
31	Rentenaar	0.1777	0.1222	0.2740	0.0277	0.1862
32	Sluijter	−0.1119	0.1632	0.2638	0.1349	0.4160
33	Singleton	0.3898	0.1189	0.0153	0.1427	0.5340
34	Anonymous former diplomat #2	0.3403	0.2769	−0.0479	0.0678	0.4058
35	Anonymous diplomat #4	0.0450	0.2253	0.0039	0.3401	0.3980
36	Anonymous diplomat #5	0.1065	0.4802X	0.2317	0.1596	0.0985
	Dutch Military					
37	Brinkel	0.3280	0.0636	0.1314	−0.0901	0.2661
38	Suchard	−0.1859	0.3689	−0.1291	0.0995	0.1886
39	vanUhm	0.2061	0.3508	0.0906	−0.0637	0.4146
40	Hoogland	0.3006	−0.3365	0.4011	0.3520	0.2095
41	Noordam	0.2066	0.1739	0.3280	0.2585	0.3638
42	Boissevain	0.2840	−0.0273	0.2883	0.0550	0.5579X
43	Anonymous colonel	0.3157	0.0112	0.1790	0.2106	0.4179
44	De Heer	0.1237	−0.1622	0.1040	0.0883	0.6126X
45	Van Koppen	0.1726	0.3515	0.2293	0.0954	0.6101X
46	Oostendorp	0.5975X	−0.1107	0.1282	0.1430	0.2152
47	Fonteyn	0.2560	0.1704	0.4693	0.2724	0.4225
48	Anonymous army chaplain	−0.1895	−0.0747	0.4056X	−0.0225	−0.0014
49	De Kruif	0.5443	0.2326	0.0583	0.1205	0.3997
50	Maurice	0.1863	−0.0354	0.5402X	−0.0192	0.1667
51	Hazelbag	0.4826	0.1415	0.4089	0.1289	0.2332
52	Hädicke	0.4402	0.2585	0.0395	−0.0474	0.3737
53	Anonymous lt. colonel	−0.3872	0.1428	−0.2301	−0.0416	0.3737
54	Overtoom	0.4099	−0.1068	0.2241	0.1378	0.3985
55	Cammaert	0.3644	0.4248	0.1797	0.0684	0.3221
56	Anonymous pilot	0.1430	−0.2694	0.1758	0.0860	0.5495X
57	Anonymous captain	−0.4279	0.1623	0.0714	−0.1257	0.2668

		Factor 1	*Factor 2*	*Factor 3*	*Factor 4*	*Factor 5*
	Lebanese Civil Society					
58	Anonymous employee #3, AJEM	0.7967X	−0.0881	−0.0288	0.0595	0.1095
59	Anonymous employee #4, AJEM	0.5469	0.1835	0.2647	−0.0135	0.0110
60	Anonymous employee #2, AJEM	0.6671X	−0.0473	0.1555	0.1686	0.1324
61	Jarjour	0.4003X	0.1562	−0.2124	−0.0440	0.0787
62	Fazah	0.4444	−0.0975	−0.0832	−0.0245	0.1007
63	Merhej	0.6651X	−0.1901	0.1333	−0.0642	0.3552
64	Anonymous employee #1, AJEM	0.2928	0.0598	0.0459	0.1167	0.0784
65	Daccache	0.1072	0.0035	−0.0383	0.0397	0.5665X
66	Abou Hamdan	0.4628	0.1823	−0.0811	0.2918	0.4108
67	Mourad	0.7092X	0.0396	0.1341	0.2137	0.0217
68	Moukaddem	0.6568X	0.1161	−0.0215	0.0270	0.3724
69	Ouaiss	0.5310	0.2282	0.1738	0.0594	0.4483
70	El Chaar	0.5263	−0.0886	0.2273	−0.0241	0.1550
71	Chami	0.5902X	0.1732	−0.1471	0.3003	0.3054
72	Barakat	0.6499X	−0.0104	0.1083	0.0765	0.1007
73	Nassif	0.6719X	0.2409	0.1007	0.2485	0.0240
74	Frayha	0.7481X	−0.0189	−0.0148	−0.0423	−0.0087
75	Abouaoun	0.3803	−0.1020	0.0756	0.3108	0.3196
76	Chaftari	0.8234X	−0.0551	0.0848	0.1895	0.1126
77	Chahine	0.2675	0.1327	0.2702	0.3629	0.3846
	Mindanao Civil Society					
78	Ancheeta	0.5915X	0.1410	−0.0407	−0.0960	0.2677
79	Tanjili	0.4374X	0.1481	−0.1160	0.1585	0.0641
80	Lidasan	0.7308X	0.1091	0.1655	0.0285	0.0274
81	Silvosa	0.8303X	0.1714	0.0869	0.0821	0.0600
82	Jaapar al Hadj	0.0521	0.0958	0.5649X	0.0409	0.0825
83	Momin	0.1014	0.0348	0.0373	0.0710	−0.0578
84	Cuyong	0.4993X	0.0084	−0.0802	0.0530	0.0485
85	Owbalang	0.3728	0.0771	−0.2613	−0.2459	−0.3244
86	Ayoub	0.6267X	0.1132	0.0194	0.0016	0.2950
87	Austero	0.5217	−0.3610	0.0617	0.1745	0.3659
88	Amella	0.3272	0.0448	0.0072	−0.0700	0.1219
89	Daud	0.4087	−0.2952	0.1775	0.3893	−0.0786
90	Magon	0.5735X	0.1254	0.0607	0.0710	0.1187
91	Lubang	0.6311X	0.2685	0.0036	0.3277	0.1305

X indicates a defining sort for that factor

Appendix D: Mean Group Scores and Standard Errors Per Factor

Group	*Mean score*	*SE*	*Lower*	*Upper*	*Factor*
NL Mil	0.1986	0.0614	0.0782	0.3190	Personal endeavour
NL Dipl	0.1526	0.0499	0.0547	0.2504	
NL CS	0.2883	0.0569	0.1768	0.3999	
Leb CS	0.5469	0.0422	0.4641	0.6297	
Min CS	0.4789	0.0584	0.3644	0.5934	
NL Mil	0.0824	0.0467	−0.0091	0.1739	Universal ideal
NL Dipl	0.2590	0.0640	0.1337	0.3844	
NL CS	0.1920	0.0334	0.1265	0.2574	
Leb CS	0.0409	0.0286	−0.0152	0.0970	
Min CS	0.0487	0.0461	−0.0416	0.1390	
NL Mil	0.1949	0.0416	0.1133	0.2765	Freedom from fear
NL Dipl	0.0649	0.0440	−0.0212	0.1511	
NL CS	0.0531	0.0339	−0.0133	0.1195	
Leb CS	0.0574	0.0299	−0.0012	0.1159	
Min CS	0.0490	0.0498	−0.0485	0.1466	
NL Mil	0.0812	0.0274	0.0275	0.1350	Peace as process
NL Dipl	0.1303	0.0544	0.0237	0.2369	
NL CS	0.2464	0.0298	0.1879	0.3049	
Leb CS	0.1126	0.0308	0.0523	0.1729	
Min CS	0.0704	0.0433	−0.0145	0.1554	

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Group	*Mean score*	*SE*	*Lower*	*Upper*	*Factor*
NL Mil	0.3243	0.0455	0.2351	0.4135	Peace as politics
NL Dipl	0.3476	0.0707	0.2089	0.4862	
NL CS	0.2157	0.0350	0.1472	0.2843	
Leb CS	0.2039	0.0386	0.1282	0.2797	
Min CS	0.0801	0.0458	−0.0096	0.1698	

Appendix E: Interview Guide

1. Tell me about your work. Could you describe what it is you are presently doing?
2. How would you describe yourself in this professional capacity?
3. Do you consider yourself to be a "peace worker"? Peace activist? Conflict manager? Development agent??
4. Can you give an example of a success in your work?
5. What does peace mean to you?
6. What do you want to accomplish by your work? when is your work finished?
7. What words come to mind when you think about the peace [or whatever else] you are trying to build? [+expand: what is their relation to your concept of peace?]
8. Do you associate peace with any values?
   8b: e.g.: order, security, harmony, justice, freedom, care, equality, tolerance, respect?
9. How does your concept of peace relate to justice? What do you mean with justice (e.g. socio-econ. equality, ending political grievances, procedural or legal justice (accountability or upholding hr. standards). Or other, i.e.)
10. What 'kind' of phenomenon is peace?
    10b. is it a psychological, political, social, legal, economic, other phenomenon?

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11. What do you need to make peace in the conflict you are working on? What are the prerequisites for peace?

    11b. E.g. Reconciliation, development, civ. Soc, education, human rights, military intervention, disarmament, democracy, personal growth, compensation for victims, tribunals, a state, rule of law.
12. At which level do you (primarily) work for peace (International, national, community, interpersonal, personal)?/Is the peace you are trying to accomplish something international, a peace between communities, between individuals, something personal etc.?
13. Is your vision of peace attainable?
14. Is your concept of peace universal or 'only' local? (Is it the answer to all conflicts?)
15. Is peace aimed at a restoration of 'how things were before the war', maintenance of the status quo or change? How much change? Or, in other words, is peace work restorative, conservative or progressive?

    15b: Is peace revolutionary, i.e., does it require systemic change?
16. How political is your peace work? (Does it e.g. require political choices (e.g. about how to organize society) that people may disagree with? Or is it neutral, impartial?
17. Does peacebuilding require a certain expertise? That can be transferred to people who face a conflict?
18. Is peace a process or a goal?/a way of doing things, e.g. solving conflicts (peacefully) or a state of the world?
19. Does peace require that people (enemies?) come together or is it sometimes necessary to separate them? And how does this relate to your work?
20. Is peace the natural state of affairs for human beings?

Finally, some question about your personal background and the relation between you as a person and the peace you are trying to make.

21. How long have you been involved in peace work?
22. What triggered you to do your current (peace) work?
23. Is peace a 'job' or a 'commitment'? Would you do this job if you were not paid to do it? (/for volunteers: would you like to make it your job?)

24. Have you had any (academic) training in 'peace work'?/ peace studies?
25. Are you familiar with academic literature on war and peace? Could you name some authors or books that have influenced your thinking about peace?
26. What do you think of this literature?
27. Is your view of peace inspired by some kind of religion?
    24b. Are you religious?
28. Are there any other people (colleagues/heroes/partners/victims of conflict), books and/or experiences that have notably influenced your idea of peace?
29. Do you have any firsthand experience of war?
    b. If so: which war?/type of involvement/when was this/influenced thinking yes/no?
30. Could you name anyone I should interview whom you know has a different opinion on peace from yours? (+do you mind if I use your name when contacting this person?)

Part 2: background information.

31. Man/woman:
32. Age/year of birth:
33. Number of years of experience in peace work:
34. Study:
35. Self-ascription: peace activist/peace worker/other, i.e.:
36. Function (level/type): support staff/program staff (junior/ senior)/policy/management/director/board/other:
37. Organizational affiliation:
38. Nationality:
39. Diplomat//INGO-staff (Development/human rights/peace)// local peacebuilder (conflict/non-conflict area)//military
40. Level of anonymity: full name/name of organization/description of function/anonymous
41. Willing to participate in follow-up Q sort: yes/no

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