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The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society

Towards Strategic Peacebuilding

Dong Jin Kim

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

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Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies
ISBN 978-3-319-97099-8 ISBN 978-3-319-97100-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950562

Cover credit: Jaewon Lee/Alamy Stock Photo

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the funding provided by the Irish Research Council and from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 713279, that enabled me to advance my research on strategic peacebuilding and to complete this book project. Some of the ideas in this book, Chapters 5 and 7 in particular, were developed from my previous articles, "Building Relationships Across the Boundaries: The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in the Korean Peninsula," *International Peacekeeping*, 24:4 (2017), and "Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula," *The Pacific Review*, 29:4 (2016). However, they bear little resemblance to the previous material. Over two-thirds of those chapters are completely new material, and the rest has also been significantly updated and revised.

The romanisation of the Korean words in this book generally follows the McCune-Reischauer system, except for the names of people and the regions that are commonly known by the South Korean Ministry of Culture romanisation system. I have followed the standard usage of the Korean names, in which the surname precedes the given name. I have placed romanised Korean in parentheses in order to clarify the exact meaning in the Korean context. In the case of the Korean words widely recognised by Korea experts, researchers and watchers in the Anglophone context, I used romanised Korean in the text and then provided the English translation in parentheses.

I owe special thanks to former and current South Korean government officials, civil society leaders, NGO staff and international organisation staff, who have given generously of their time, stories and thoughts through interviews. The evolution of this research has benefited significantly from the interaction with mentors, teachers, colleagues, students and friends at various academic and peacebuilding organisations, including the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin, the University of North Korean Studies, the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, Hanshin University, the Korean Sharing Movement, Okedongmu Children in Korea, the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea and Corrymeela.

I am grateful to the staff at Palgrave Macmillan for supporting this project and bringing it to publication. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Oliver Richmond for reviewing and including this project in the Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies Series of Palgrave Macmillan. It is my great privilege to be part of the series.

I would like to thank Jan Grosvenor for her invaluable copyediting help with professionalism and goodwill.

Finally, this project would not have reached fruition without the support of my family to whom I am indebted and is my primary motivation and inspiration for my ongoing peace research and practice.

Contents

Abbreviations

BDA	Banco Delta Asia
CAP UN	Consolidated Appeals Processes
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CPR	Civil and Political Rights
CPRK	Committee for Peaceful Reunification of Korea
CPVF	Chinese People's Volunteers Force
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBCF	Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation
ESCR	Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
FALU	Food Aid Liaison Unit
GARES	Agricultural Research and Extension Services of Gyeonggi Province
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBDP	Integrated Community Based Development Project
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IPB	International Peace Bureau
KAPES	Korea-America Private Exchange Society
KAPPC	Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee

KCF	Korean Christian Federation
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KCPEEC	Korean Committee for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation (North Korea)
KECCA	Korean-European Cooperation Coordination Agency
KNCCK	Korean NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea
KPA	Korean People's Army
KPG	Korean Provisional Government
KSM	Korean Sharing Movement
KWAU	Korean Women's Association United
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NAE	National Alliance of Evangelism
NCC	National Coordinating Committee
NCCJ	National Christian Council in Japan
NCCK	National Council of Churches in Korea
NCPCRJ	National Catholic Priests' Corps for the Realisation of Justice
NCRC	National Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation
NECF	National Economic Cooperation Federation
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NHRCK	National Human Rights Commission of Korea (South Korea)
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NKDB	Database Center for North Korean Human Rights
NKHRA	North Korean Human Rights Act
NKnet	Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights
NL	National Liberation
NLL	Northern Limitation Line
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSL	National Security Law
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OKCK	Okedongmu Children in Korea
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PD	People's Democracy
PDS	Public Distribution System
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCNR	Supreme Council for National Reconstruction
SOEs	state-owned enterprises
SOFA	US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement

THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNC	United Nations Command
UNDAC	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	UN Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNTCOK	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
USAMGIK	US Army Military government in Korea
WCC	World Council of Churches
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

List of Figures

List of Tables

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Peace Process and Civil Society Peacebuilding

The Post-Cold War era witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of peace agreements between parties mired in deep-rooted conflict. However, many of these agreements quickly broke down. Nearly 90% of armed conflicts in the twenty-first century are repetitive conflicts.[1] The involvement of civil society in peace processes is increasingly viewed as important to societies affected by protracted conflict. Expectations for the role of civil society are growing due to the limitations of high-level peace negotiations, both in reaching an agreement and sustaining the peace process. Top-level political and military leaders in the limelight, sitting across a negotiation table, tend to be locked into positions and publicly stated goals. High-level negotiations often focus on "an issue-oriented and short-term achievement" and have a record of destroying rather than building platforms for peace.[2] Then, how much impact can civil society have and what roles can it take in a peace process? Is civil society peacebuilding an alternative to mainstream high-level political negotiations?

To answer this question, this book looks at the Korean peace process and the role of civil society. The Korean conflict emerged from the impact of a changing global order during and after the Second World

[1] Barbara F. Walter, *Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), 1.

[2] John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Reprint edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 60.

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1_1

War. The Korean peninsula was divided by the US and the Soviet occupations in 1945, following 36 years of Japanese colonial rule. Despite efforts through the UN to create a unified Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established in the North and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in the South in 1948. It was not only a partition of a territory, but also a division of politics, economy, society, culture, family, ideology and even religion. Additionally, the Korean War (1950–1953) and the Cold War turned this division into a protracted conflict. The experience of the Korean War initiated the dominance of a Cold War identity for both Koreas, and this identity weakened the collective identity of Korea as a whole nation so radically that even following the Cold War, inter-Korean identity politics did not turn around.[3]

In some ways, peace seems to have been kept in the Korean peninsula, considering that there has not been a large scale battle between North Korea and South Korea since the armistice agreement was signed in 1953. There were several breakthroughs in the peace process such as the July 4 Communique of 1972; the 1991 Basic Agreement; the June 15 Joint Declaration; and the October 4 Joint Declaration between North and South Korea; and the September 19 Joint statement and the February 13 Agreement in the six-party talks. However, these high-level agreements were never fully implemented and the mistrust between North and South Korea still appears to be a major obstacle to a sustainable peace in the Korean peninsula. Although the inter-Korean summits, followed by the US–North Korea summit in June, 2018 once again raised hopes for the resumption of the Korean peace process and an official end to the Korean War,[4] there is always the possibility of a reoccurrence of war, given the serious provocations among the conflict parties until early 2018, and the competition for armament, including the development of nuclear and missile technology.[5]

[3] Samuel S. Kim, *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3.

[4] Russell Goldman and Choe Sang-Hun, 'North and South Korea Summit Is Short on Details, but Long on Theater', *The New York Times*, 27 April 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/world/asia/north-korea-south-border.html.

[5] Choe Sang-Hun, '2 Days after North Korea Missile Test, a Show of U.S. Airpower', *The New York Times*, 31 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/world/asia/north-korea-south-korea-us-joint-exercises.html.

The civil society in the Korean peninsula took on the peacebuilding role by building relationships across the boundaries of the Korean conflict, by influencing public opinion for social justice and peace, and by providing aid to vulnerable people in North Korea. But, it has been very difficult and sometimes quite dangerous for the Korean civil society to sustain these roles, as the governments have been tightly controlling contact between the people of South and North Korea in the name of national security. It became even more difficult for the civil society to continue their work after several breakdowns of the peace process. But, still many people in civil society are putting despair and fear aside, and trying to overcome limitations to build sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula.

This book applies the core concepts and theories of peacebuilding in the field of Peace and Conflict studies to critically examine the Korean peace process and the role of civil society in strategic peacebuilding. A brief discussion about the three key concepts of this book, 'Peace Process', 'Peacebuilding' and 'Civil Society', is necessary.

Peace Process

The term 'peace process' came into being during the international peace negotiations of the 1970s, such as the one between Israel, Syria, and Egypt, and became more and more popular during the 1990s, to refer to the tentative rapprochement between parties in a protracted conflict, and to the practice of building peace through staged negotiations. Jan Selby explains it as "phased processes for negotiating and nurturing peace".[6] John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty provide observations on the four phases of a peace process, which are pre-negotiation, the management of the process, the peace accord, and post-accord reconstruction. The pre-negotiation phase involves bringing the parties together and initiating talks. In order to create the momentum for negotiation, a combination of several triggers is required, for example secret talks and contacts at the civil society level, mediation by third parties, the aspirations of the people for peace, and a hospitable geopolitical situation. When negotiations begin, the management of the process is important. People in societies

[6]Jan Selby, 'The Political Economy of Peace Processes', in *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*, ed. Micheal Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 12.

affected by a protracted conflict tend to have deep animosity and mistrust toward the other parties in the conflict. Therefore, a negotiation process is highly vulnerable to opposition from those within the conflict parties who do not agree with the peace process. To reach a negotiated settlement, questions about addressing the root causes and central grievances of the conflict would be key, but dealing with these questions may only extend stalemates. For this reason, in many cases, the most contentious issues are left unaddressed, so as to reach an agreement, bring the physical violence to an end, and create an institutional framework; a power-sharing structure, for example. Finally, following the peace accord, cementing the peace through the reconstruction of the societies is pursued. The implementation of the agreement and the resolution of the issues which were deferred to the post-accord phase, are now the areas of focus. The final phase generally includes demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), healing trauma, transitional justice, reconciliation, and socioeconomic development.[7]

According to Darby and Mac Ginty, these four phases do not necessarily occur in a linear fashion, because the context "peculiar to each country accounts for the distinctive sequencing of each process".[8] However, scholars point out that, despite different contexts, many peace processes share similar challenges, most of which are related to maintaining the process after the agreement. According to Jonathan Tonge, over half the peace processes since the end of the Second World War witnessed a recurrence of violence within two years following an agreement. Tonge says "Acceptance of the term 'peace process' requires understanding that transitions towards non-violence and the permanent eradication of conflict are non-linear, subject to regression and rarely short".[9]

There are several theoretical and practical discussions pertaining to conditions under which peace is durable and the recurrence of violence is preventable. Amongst them, 'liberal peace theory' is the most widely accepted by major international organisations and government agencies. Liberal peace theory assumes that state weakness or failure is the main

[7] John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, 'Conclusion: Peace Processes, Present and Future', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes*, ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 256–64.

[8] Darby and Ginty, 256.

[9] Jonathan Tonge, *Comparative Peace Processes* (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 6–11.

cause of violence; and the establishment of liberal political institutions and economic liberalisation are essential conditions for peace.[10] A market economy is expected to be the catalyst for consolidating the process by increasing contact and reducing barriers between the conflict parties. The economic exchanges would spill over into the political sectors and foster regional integration, as in the case of the European Union. Additionally, liberal economic development would overcome the vicious circle of poverty and violence. This liberal agenda also appears to be in line with the facilitation of globalisation. However, as Selby points out, historically, the liberal approach did not guarantee the sustainability of peace processes such as the Palestine-Israeli peace process and the peace process between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government. Moreover, the liberal discourse is "largely silent on questions of economic inequality and unevenness," and their political implications.[11]

On the formation of a liberal democracy, Bruce Russett argues that the growth of the number of liberal democratic states could be a plausible explanation for the declining number of armed conflicts in recent decades. He says democratic leaders or parties who have to be re-elected would not want protracted violence or war, as it would cost them votes, whereas dictators would not be concerned about initiating a war or maintaining violence, as it helps them stay in power. Therefore, in the view of liberal peace theory, democratic reform can promote peace.[12] On the other hand, John Brewer says one of the most crucial reasons behind the fragility of contemporary peace processes can be found in the reduction of the processes to governmental reforms. He argues democratic elections were unable to prevent communal violence in several conflict-affected societies. State-level institutional reforms can neglect local realities and socio-cultural issues, giving preference to the desired goals of the major donor states over the aspirations of the local population. Moreover, the liberal democratic concept could be interpreted as an

[10] Oliver Richmond and Audra Mitchell, 'Introduction—Towards a Post-Liberal Peace: Exploring Hybridity via Everyday Forms of Resistance, Agency and Autonomy', in *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism*, ed. Oliver Richmond and Audra Mitchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1–39.

[11] Selby, 'The Political Economy of Peace Processes', 14–18.

[12] Bruce Russett, 'Peace in the Twenty-First Century?', *Current History* 109, no. 723 (2010): 13.

initiative of the West and cause unnecessary antipathy toward peace processes in societies that experienced a history of colonisation.[13]

Most of the critics of liberal orthodoxy on peace processes argue that, in order for a peace process to be sustainable, the process must have strong local ownership and commitment, rather than being an externally applied remedy.[14] The background to the argument is that the proportion of peace processes "negotiated by the parties primarily engaged in the conflict" has grown since the end of the Cold War.[15] Nevertheless, the emphasis on local ownership alone, was not able to overcome the limitations of the liberal approach to a peace process and guarantee the sustainability of that process. The question is, who represents the local populations. Selby says that peace processes usually fail because they are an 'inter-elite political accommodation'. The elites tend to be interested in the political benefits coming out of peace processes, not in 'the social transformations necessary for sustainable peace'.[16] Although they belong to the local conflict parties, political elites do not automatically advance the interests of the local people over their own political interests. There are many international and local non-governmental agencies operating for peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries. But, these organisations tend to compete for funding and are vulnerable to donor preferences, who have hidden interests beyond the needs of the local people. For this reason, Darby and Mac Ginty say, "contemporary peace processes run the risk of freezing conflicts into a negative peace", and frustrating public expectations.[17] Oliver Richmond emphasises the need to build local infrastructures for peace processes, over elite-oriented mechanisms and

[13] John D. Brewer, *Peace Processes: A Sociological Approach* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 37–42.

[14] Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P Richmond, 'The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace', *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (June 2013): 763–83.

[15] John Darby, 'Borrowing and Lending in Peace Processes', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 246.

[16] Selby, 'The Political Economy of Peace Processes', 13.

[17] John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, 'Introduction: What Peace? What Process?', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes*, ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 5.

some NGO activities which are based on external funding. This brings us to the discussion of the concept of peacebuilding and its local turn.[18]

Peacebuilding

Wendy Lambourne defines peacebuilding as "strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not occur or recur".[19] This definition of peacebuilding pursues more than the suspension of war; it also focuses on the conditions under which a peace process is sustainable. The term peacebuilding began to be widely used by the international community when former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali introduced the term in his 1992 report, 'An Agenda for Peace':

> ····Post-Conflict peace-building [is an] action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.····Peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.[20]

Boutros-Ghali's use of the term peacebuilding is reflective of the situation in the early 1990s when the international community saw a dramatic rise and fall in the number of peace processes. The introduction of peacebuilding into the peace operations of the international community was expected to meet the need for a local peace infrastructure, as suggested by Richmond in the previous section on peace processes. However, the peacebuilding practices of the international community, since the Agenda for Peace report, have been viewed mainly as a liberal exercise in the final

[18]Oliver P. Richmond, 'Peace Formation and Local Infrastructures for Peace', *Alternatives* 38, no. 4 (2013): 271–79.

[19]Wendy Lambourne, 'Justice in the Aftermath of Mass Crimes: International Law and Peacebuilding', in *The Challenge of Conflict: International Law Responds*, ed. Ustinia Dolgopol and Judith Gardam (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 269.

[20]Boutros Boutros-Gali, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992', UN Documents Gathering a body of global agreements, 17 June 1992, http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm.

stages of a peace process following a peace agreement, an attempt to transplant a liberal structure for political and economic reconstruction in post-conflict societies, rather than identifying and supporting local structures for sustainable peace. Post-conflict societies were deemed 'a near empty space', where "statebuilding and international assistance can assist local communities to achieve security and well-being".[21] Therefore, it was inevitable that these liberal practices would receive strong criticism from peace researchers for reducing peacebuilding to a top-down institutional remedy, delivered by outside intervention representing a global hierarchy and the self-interests of elite countries, and lacking an awareness of the context of the conflict.[22]

Peacebuilding, first developed in the 1970s by researchers in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, such as Johan Galtung, was not a model for post-conflict activity following peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, but an evolving concept based on the critical reflection of conventional peace operations which employed a state-centric top down approach and was dismissive of local realities. In Galtung's view, the only possible result for conventional peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking is the absence of physical violence. Furthermore, peacekeeping lines, which are drawn to contain physical violence, tend to impede interaction, not only between the militaries, but also between the ordinary people. Hence, the discussion of the root causes of the conflict is likely to be deferred and hostilities toward the other would most likely continue. Moreover, the political leadership can use this hostility to strengthen public support for their regime, resulting in the increased possibility for a recurrence of war. Galtung emphasises that, "To be of any value in the fight against violence it must be built within nations as well as between nations", and suggests the concept of peacebuilding, which is building the structures of peace that "remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur".[23] In order to decrease hostility between conflict parties and prevent the escalation of conflict, relationship building between ordinary local people, based on understanding the root causes of the conflict, is essential. This should not be differed

[21] Mac Ginty and Richmond, 'The Local Turn in Peace Building', 765.

[22] Mac Ginty and Richmond, 772–77.

[23] Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding', in *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research II* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), 297–303.

to the post agreement period. Stephen Ryan explains, "whereas peace-keeping is about building barriers between the warriors, peace-building tries to build bridges between the ordinary people".[24]

In response to criticism of the concept of UN peacebuilding, the UN Security Council, in its 2001 Presidential Statement, recognised that "peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms."[25] As we can see in this statement, the term peacebuilding was no longer limited to post-war activity but began to embrace multiple activities in multiple sectors "during armed conflict, in its wake, or, as an attempt to prevent an anticipated armed conflict from starting".[26] However, although the pre-agreement period of a peace process is regarded as negotiations between local parties, 'post-conflict' peacebuilding in the post-agreement period is still generally considered to be the domain of international organisations and Western experts.[27] Mac Ginty and Richmond say this is because the term 'local' has been absent from the peacebuilding agenda of the international organisations. International peacebuilding interventions appeared to see the local actors as conflict oriented rather than peace oriented, and therefore not capable of building peace themselves. International experts have been accused of being uninterested in the root causes of the conflict and the local culture, and more interested in preaching democracy, human rights and market economy. Such peacebuilding initiatives did not seem to recognise residue from long-lasting global injustices of the colonisation era; and that the roots of the conflict stem from the colonisation and division imposed by former colonial powers. Therefore, critics of liberal peace building have been putting more emphasis on the role of local people

[24]Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (Wiltshire: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 129.

[25]UN Security Council, 'S/PRST/2001/5 Statement by the President of the Security Council', United Nations Official Documents, 2001, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2001/5.

[26]Dan Smith, 'Toward a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together: Overview Report of the Joint Ustein Study of Peacebuilding' (The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), 20.

[27]Selby, 'The Political Economy of Peace Processes', 13–14.

in connection with the original idea of peacebuilding from Peace and Conflict Studies.[28]

In addition, several Peace and Conflict Studies scholars argue that peacebuilding takes people from all levels of all the conflict parties involved, and "there are peacebuilding tasks for everybody."[29] In reality, however, the top-level still appears to dominate the agenda, not only at the level of peace negotiations, but also in many cases of peacebuilding practices, and peace activities at other levels are either simply dismissed, or merely fill roles complementary to the top-level activities. This is because liberal external actors are interested mainly in the institution building by the top-level leadership of the local society rather than engaging with the people who are the subjects of the peace. As Galtung points out earlier, the structure created by the top-level leadership cannot guarantee the sustainability of peacebuilding. John Paul Lederach argues that top leadership seems to assess the outcome of peacebuilding according to their own political and economic influence. 'Visibility' and 'profile' are essential for them "to consolidate and maintain a leader's base and legitimacy". Therefore, it is difficult to expect top leadership to have a long-term plan.[30] Furthermore, Richmond says the institutions created by external intervention "are likely to be co-opted by the very elites that conducted conflict in the first place," marginalising the grievances of the ordinary people. Consequently, the notion of a civil society, which incorporates diverse non-government local actors, has become an important indicator in assessing the validity of peacebuilding strategies and objectives, which can meet the human and societal needs of local people.[31]

Civil Society

Although there is no common agreement about the definition of 'civil society', the widely used definition from the Centre for Civil Society (CCS) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

[28] Mac Ginty and Richmond, 'The Local Turn in Peace Building', 771–74.

[29] Chadwick F. Alger, 'There Are Peacebuilding Tasks for Everybody', *International Studies Review* 9, no. 3 (2007): 534–54.

[30] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 40–45.

[31] Oliver P. Richmond, 'Welfare and the Civil Peace: Poverty with Rights?', in *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*, ed. Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 288, 294.

says, "Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values", and "are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, non-government developmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups."[32] As shown in this definition, civil society has been understood to be a voluntary association with positive values, distinct from negative, attributed to the state and market.[33] However, the boundaries between good civil society and bad state or market are quite complex and obscure. For example, NGOs in civil society are considered to be antithetic to the state, but at the same time they often need the state to protect them and/or fund them. In some cases, NGOs have agendas that involve the powers of government and work as quasi-autonomous agencies.[34] For this reason, scholars, such as Elaine Sternberg, who have concerns about the possibility of NGOs becoming servants of the state, call for distinguishing the "valuable work done by voluntary civil society organisations from the more questionable activities of many NGOs".[35]

Furthermore, there are debates around which non-governmental actors can be included in the category of civil society. Some organisations, such as non-state terrorist organisations, are strictly antithetic to the state, yet do not necessarily share good values or purposes. Also disputed are the good values which civil societies share, as they often imply only liberal values.[36] Finally, it appears that some civil society organisations are not entirely non-profit organisations, competing for funding as a contractor and service provider.[37] Because of this complexity of the

[32] Centre for Civil Society (CCS), *Report on Activities 2005–06* (The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2006), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29398/1/CCSReport05_06.pdf.

[33] Udaya Wagle, 'The Civil Society Sector in the Developing World', *Public Administration & Management* 4, no. 4 (1999): 525–26.

[34] Iain Atack, 'Four Criteria of Development NGO Legitimacy', *World Development* 27, no. 5 (1999): 863.

[35] Elaine Sternberg, 'NGOs vs Civil Society: Reflections on the Illiberal, the Illegitimate and the Unaccountable', *Economic Affairs* 30, no. 3 (2010): 24.

[36] Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, 'Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding', *Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction* 36 (2006): 6.

[37] Nicola Banks, David Hulme, and Michael Edwards, 'NGOs, States, and Donors Revisited: Still Too Close for Comfort?', *World Development* 66 (2015): 708.

concept of civil society, many researchers began to adapt a functional approach to analyse diverse forms of civil society, focusing on the particular role of a civil society rather than the identity. For example, in the context of peacebuilding, Birte Vogel defines that civil society usually means groups of citizens that "actively engage in resolving conflict in a multitude of forms."[38] In this regard, Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk suggest seven roles for civil society in relation to peacebuilding, which are: protection of citizens against 'attacks and despotism by the state or other authorities'; monitoring for the accountability of 'central powers, state apparatus and government'; advocacy and public communication for social issues such as peace and human rights; socialization for promoting 'tolerance, mutual trust and the ability to find compromise'; community building by bridging societal cleavages and strengthening bonds among citizens; intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state by 'establishing diverse relations'; and service delivery, such as provision of 'shelter, heath or education'.[39]

Joseph Montville describes these peacebuilding roles of civil society, in his concept of track-two diplomacy. According to Montville, track-two diplomacy is "an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations" to help resolve their conflict. It is not a substitute for official track-one diplomacy but to assist official leaders to explore "possible solutions out of the public view and without the requirements of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage". In other words, the peacebuilding role of civil society is complementary to the official peace process in track-two diplomacy. There are three distinct peacebuilding functions by civil society, which could contribute to track-two diplomacy. First, civil society leaders from different conflict parties get together and develop a workable relationship, and these track-two meetings would reduce the sense of victimhood of the parties and re-humanise the adversary. These unofficial meetings would be helpful to explore creative solutions for the high-level negotiations, as they are not bound by visibility and by official statements. Particularly, meetings, which bring people together by profession such as religious leaders, academics, women, businessmen, can generate diverse opinions and ideas

[38] Birte Vogel, 'Civil Society Capture: Top-Down Interventions from Below?', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 10, no. 4 (2016): 475.

[39] Paffenholz and Spurk, 'Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding', 13–24.

about how to expand cooperation between conflict parties for peace and prosperity. Second, civil society engagement would be able to create a hospitable public opinion for top-level leadership to take positive steps in the negotiations, and initiate cooperation in diverse sectors to increase the quality of life of the people. Montville says support for peace process is difficult to obtain as "the existence of a clear, unambiguous, "all bad" enemy plays an important stabilizing function" for human society. In order to address the issue of dehumanisation and encourage politicians to abandon their rhetorical use of the common enemy, civil society can influence public opinion. Finally, cooperative development by civil society organisations can provide incentives for peacebuilding and increase the possibility of continuity in peace processes. Economic benefit from peacebuilding can be attractive for conflict parties in fragile economic conditions to begin and continue cooperation with each other. The day-to-day collaboration work can build sustainable relationships.[40]

Since Montville's suggestion of track-two diplomacy, more widely discussed theory based upon multi-level peacebuilding was developed by John Paul Lederach. Similar to Montville, Lederach says a civil society can be called, 'middle-range leadership' in the levels of societal leaderships. However, unlike Montville, Lederach argues, civil society consists of "fundamental ingredients that make up the ecosystem in which peace must live". In other words, civil society is not a complementary element to the high-level peace process, but a key actor for a sustainable peacebuilding.[41] Lederach presents the role of civil society as closing the prevailing gaps in contemporary peacebuilding, namely the 'interdependence gap', 'the justice gap', and 'the process-structure gap'. The interdependence gap is the lack of responsive and coordinated relationships up and down the levels of leadership in a society affected by protracted violent conflict. According to Lederach, coordinating both horizontal and vertical relationship building with the opposing party, and within your own party, is an essential part of the ecosystem of sustainable peacebuilding. The justice gap is a

[40] Joseph V. Montville, 'The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy', in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Concepts and Theories*, ed. Vamik D. Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius, and Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 162–64.

[41] John Paul Lederach, 'Civil Society and Reconciliation', in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 854.

gap between people's expectations for a peace agreement and what that agreement actually delivers. The direct violence may diminish after a peace agreement, but the expectations for social transformation are rarely realised. Therefore, Lederach stresses the need to integrate social justice building in the peace process. Lastly, there is the process-structure gap in peacebuilding, which is the tendency to think that peace is a process up to the point of accords or agreements, and then becomes a structure. However, in his view, peace is neither a process nor a structure, it is both. He explains, "to conceptualize peace as process-structure moves us away from a myopic focus on agreements and events and toward a commitment of embracing the permanency of relationship building".[42]

The role of civil society is crucial in closing these three gaps in peacebuilding. Lederach calls this role a middle-out approach, comparing it with top-down approaches from top-level leaders and bottom-up approaches from the grassroots. Middle-range civil society leaders are likely to be known by the top-level leadership and they are likely to know the suffering and injustice in the grassroots level. So, they have the potential to close the interdependency gap and justice gap by being a bridge to build vertical relationships between the top-level and the grassroots, and putting social justice on the agenda in peacebuilding. Civil society also has the potential to close the process-structure gap as they tend to have horizontal relationships with people across the geography of the conflict. With their vertical and horizontal relationships in the conflict, they can be a determinant location in the ecosystem to create a platform for ongoing relationship building.[43] Catherine Barnes agrees with Lederach that the relationship building activities of civil society between top-level leadership and grassroots within a conflict party, as well as between different conflict parties, are crucial in the sustainable peacebuilding. She describes these activities as 'web-weaving'. Barnes says the wider system of conflict would not be transformed without the peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots level. However, it is difficult for the actions of the grassroots

[42] John Paul Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 27–35. See Chapter 2.

[43] Lederach, *Building Peace*, 41–42. The peacebuilding theory of Lederach will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2.

to be seriously considered by top-level leadership. It is equally hard for those at the grassroots to take the wider context, such as geopolitics, into consideration for their actions. The web-weaving role of civil society can contribute to overcoming this challenge by increasing interactions among different actors at different levels.[44]

Vogel says civil society is also expected to "bridge the gap between international and local conceptions of peace", and "localize and contextualize peacebuilding".[45] However, the dilemma of civil society peacebuilding is that civil society in conflict affected societies is likely to be weak. The development of a civil society requires economic and political support. For this reason, the international community has been interested in nurturing local civil societies in fragile countries. But, international assistance often dominates the local civil society, resulting in the slow growth of civil society.[46] Mac Ginty and Richmond point out that many international organisations and donor states pay "lip-service to 'the local' while continuing with top-down policies".[47] In a similar line, Barnes summarises the challenges of local civil society peacebuilding as following. First, many civil society organisations are "too small and too isolated to make the kind of difference that is needed". Second, the capacity of civil society appears to be too weak to deal with the global political economy of war and domestic political interests that "sustain conflicts as a tug-of-war for dominance". Third, several civil society organisations tend to "start initiatives that are beyond their skills and capacities and their legitimacy is questioned". Finally, there are lack of coordination and cooperation among local civil society organisations. They are in competition for scarce resources and continuously undermined by the international organisations.[48]

[44]Catherine Barnes, 'Weaving the Web: Civil-Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace', in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*, ed. Paul Van Tongeren et al. (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 22.

[45]Vogel, 'Civil Society Capture', 476.

[46]Henry F. Carey, *Privatizing the Democratic Peace: Policy Dilemmas of NGO Peacebuilding* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 25–26.

[47]Mac Ginty and Richmond, 'The Local Turn in Peace Building', 777.

[48]Barnes, 'Weaving the Web: Civil-Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace', 21–22.

In addition to these challenges, Richmond argues that, even though local civil society is "claimed to be empowered from above in order to represent" the local people, in many cases, it represents the Western point of view of non-governmental actors, reflecting the neoliberal ideology of the developed states.[49] For this reason, Iain Atack distinguishes between two different forms of civil peace movement on the basis of the attitude of civil society towards the state. First, there are civil society groups which aim "to defend the principles and institutions associated with the liberal democratic state, such as regular democratic elections and human rights or civil liberties". Atack says, although these civil groups resist dictatorship, they accept the state's monopoly of violence. But, there are also groups of people, who pursue transformative nonviolence actions, which aim to develop "new forms of social and political organisation that do not depend upon institutionalised violence as a method of domination, control and security and that liberate, rather than suppress, the popular power central to its effectiveness as a mechanism of political change".[50]

To address the challenges of local civil society peacebuilding, and to pursue the transformation of a conflict-affected society to be more than a transition towards liberal state institutions, some scholars and practitioners call for a global civil society. It is expected that a global civil society would be resistant to the negative impact of globalisation based on a liberal market economy and support a local civil society. Mary Kaldor says that a global civil society could "make alliances across borders", "address not just the state but international institutions", and offer "a way of understanding the process of globalisation in terms of subjective human agency instead of a disembodied deterministic process of 'interconnectedness'".[51] In other words, a global civil society network is a cooperative and horizontal network to present alternative viewpoints and help each other out, which is different from the top-down approaches of the international organisations funded by official governments or development agencies.[52] One of the best-known theories about the role of global civil society is the

[49] Richmond, 'Welfare and the Civil Peace: Poverty with Rights?', 288, 292.

[50] Iain Atack, *Nonviolence in Political Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 96.

[51] Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 76, 142.

[52] Paffenholz and Spurk, 'Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding', 6.

'boomerang theory'. According to this theory, a global civil society could provide space for the suppressed voices in a local society to be heard in the world, and those voices could echo back to the local government, with international support. This would be a major shift in the balance of power between states and individuals.[53] However, critics of a global civil society question the independent nature of a global civil society from the influence of the states, similar to the case of local civil societies, and whether a transnational network could be coordinated to make desired changes.[54]

As we will see in Chapter 2 of this book, the recent discussions of strategic peacebuilding try to overcome these limitations of both local and global civil society peacebuilding by creating a strategic platform. Lederach and Appleby argue, "peacebuilding that is strategic draws intentionally and shrewdly on the overlapping and imperfectly coordinated presences, activities and resources of various international, transnational, national, regional and local institutions, agencies and movements that influence the causes, expressions and outcomes of conflict".[55] However the development of strategic peacebuilding theories is still in the early stages. It still appears that the top-level is dominating the agenda and all the other levels are merely taking complementary roles in peace negotiations. Therefore, to further develop a strategic approach in peacebuilding, more case studies evaluating and assessing the diverse roles of civil society and their relationships with other levels of peacebuilding initiatives are required.

Civil Society Peacebuilding in the Korean Peace Process

There are some concerns, among the scholars in the Korean studies, about using external and imported perspectives and concepts for the analysis of the historical events in the Korean peninsula. 'Civil society' is one of them. John Duncan says, with regard to civil society, "the unconditioned,

[53] David Chandler, *Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 36.

[54] Paffenholz and Spurk, 'Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding', 6.

[55] John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby, 'Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview', in *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, ed. Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 22.

nonreflexive use of Western models privileges the modern Western experience and relegates countries like Korea to a kind of enduring subalternation".[56] Even though the concept of civil society was developed in the Western countries, the formation of the Korean civil society was not something implanted by the Western intervention. The scope and scale of civil society in the Korean peninsula has been closely related to the history of the people's struggle against the colonisation and violence in the Korean peninsula. Under the Japanese rule, people in the diverse sectors of the Korean society were mobilised for nonviolent civil disobedience movement against the colonial power, as represented in the March 1 Movement in 1919. Despite the lack of media and no freedom of assembly, local leaders from different religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, and other Korean traditional religions, as well as school teachers led the movement. Approximately 2 million people participated in over 1500 demonstrations all across the country. This movement led to the birth of labour, farmers' and women's movement in Korea.[57]

Since liberation from Japanese colonial rule and immediate division of the two Koreas in 1945, the number of volunteer organisations in the diverse sectors of the society increased and they actively participated in the socio-political activities.[58] Popular voices among them advocated for social justice, and peacefully unified Korea. Comparing to South Korea, North Korean leadership was more active in responding to the people's aspirations for retributive justice against the people who were complicit to the Japanese colonialism.[59] But, North Korea went through a series of dictatorships. The North Korean 'Democratic' People's Republic of Korea was their own particular version of democracy. Similarly, for South Korea, although the rulers referred to their republic as a liberal democracy, they maintained an authoritarian leadership until the late

[56]John Duncan, 'The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism: The Question of "Civil Society" in Choson Dynasty Korea', in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 49.

[57]Nishi Masayuki, 'March 1 and May 4, 1919 in Korea, China & Japan: Toward an International History of East Asian Independence Movements', *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 5, no. 10 (2007): 3–7.

[58]Woongjae Ryoo, 'The Public Sphere and the Rise of South Korean Civil Society', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 39, no. 1 (1 February 2009): 25.

[59]Bruce Cumings, 'Civil Society in West and East', in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 22.

1980s. The demand for peace and unification of the Korea was discouraged by the Korean War (1950–1953) and the Armistice Agreement of 1953. After the Armistice Agreement, North and South Korean governments strengthened their dictatorial rule using the circumstance of the armistice.[60]

During the Cold War period, the North Korean leadership purged, one after the other, all political factions other than their own, until the leader was in undisputed control of the party, state, and army.[61] Although the authority of the state has declined since the end of the Cold War and the severe famine in the 1990s, the leadership appears to have a strong control over the society and there is no significant sign of a development of civil society in North Korea. On the other hand, the South Korean dictatorship was much less stable and therefore less monolithic than that of North Korea. South Korean civil society was able to initiate a democratisation movement and maintained the struggle, despite the oppression from the state.[62] Bruce Cumings says the South Korean dictatorships misjudged "the hidden strengths and growing maturity of the public sphere" in South Korea. Extensive military and police forces, almost ubiquitous presence of the intelligent operatives at the different parts of the society, and massive propaganda about the national security and industrialisation could not prevent the civil resistance against social injustice by dictatorship.[63]

During the 1960s and 70s, the priority of the South Korean civil society leadership was the democratisation of South Korea. Anyone who opposed the government and spoke about peace and unification was easily portrayed as a communist sympathiser, and they would not have wanted to provide excuses for the government to suppress the democratisation movement. But, when they once more faced by another military dictatorship and its brutal use of force against May 18 Gwangju People's uprising in the 1980, their awareness grew that it was the system of division in the

[60] Michael Breen, *The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, What Their Future Lies* (New York: Tomas Dune, 2004), 196.

[61] Gavan McCormack, *Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe* (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 54.

[62] Charles K. Armstrong, 'Introduction', in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 5–6.

[63] Cumings, 'Civil Society in West and East', 23.

Korean peninsula that consistently hampered democracy in South Korea. They realised that as long as this system remained, military dictatorships could appear again and again under the ruse of national security.[64] This new understanding initiated several peacebuilding activities from diverse civil society sectors including religious, academia, peace and unification movements, and women's peace groups. The peacebuilding role of South Korean civil society has three distinctive features, as seen in the ideas of Montville. First, the civil society groups began to bring people from South and North Korea together. Second, they continued to raise awareness of the issues of division-system and to advocate for peace in opposition to militarism. Finally, after a severe famine devastated much of North Korea in 1990s, humanitarian and development NGOs began to provide aid to North Korea in the expectation that this aid would pave the way for a reconciliation of the two Koreas.

In the meantime, South Korean civil society went on their democratic movement with the support from the global civil society. Several civil society leaders including religious leaders and university professors issued statements about democracy in spite of severe suppression by the government. Students groups were mobilised to protest against the dictatorship. On top of that, diverse civil society groups organised mass rallies for democracy, which grew significantly after the report that a university student was tortured to death by police. In June, 1987, more than million people participated in these rallies. Finally, the South Korean government announced concessions to the request of civil society and promised the constitutional reform through the national referendum in 1987 for the direct election of the president.[65] South Korean political institutions became much more democratised and civil society became more influential, going through the direct presidential elections. Armstrong says, throughout the 1990s, contentious relationship between the state and civil society began to change because of the "growth of intermediate, voluntary associations which influences the political process but not of it".[66]

[64] Sam-ryul Lee, 'Han'guk Kidokkyowa T'ongil Undong [Korean Christianity and Reunification Movement]', *Kidokkyo Sasang [Journal of Christian Thought]*, no. 355 (1988): 17.

[65] Sunhyuk Kim, 'Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea', in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 54–58.

[66] Armstrong, 'Introduction', 2.

The Korean peace process also began to move forward. High-level negotiations between the two Koreas in the late 1980s produced Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea in 1991 (the 1991 Basic Agreement). The number of civil society organisations who aimed for peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula also grew significantly particularly after the introduction of the Sunshine policy by the Kim Dae-Jung Administration in 1998. Many civil society organisations participated in the provision of aid to North Korea to address the humanitarian needs as well as to increase interactions between the ordinary people. Civil groups who felt urgent needs to deal with the violations of the civil and political rights in North Korea began campaigns for North Korean human rights.[67] However, the improved relationship between the state and civil society did not last long. Since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak government in 2008, civil society lost the systematic ties to the mainstream political community.[68] The Lee government's neoliberal and big business friendly policy in the labour market and financial sectors increased economic disparity and decreased social mobility in the South Korean society.[69] The inter-Korean relations also deteriorated. South Korea imposed strict conditions, which were denuclearisation and liberal reform of the country, on the economic aid to North Koreas, and adopted regulatory policies governing any peacebuilding activities by the South Korean civil society.[70] In the end, most of the civil exchanges between the two Koreas have been suspended since 2010. The fluctuation of the Korean peace process shows the high dependency of the process on the role of the governments, with civil society filling complementary roles only, matching the descriptions of Lederach's peacebuilding gaps: Interdependency, Justice, and Process-Structure.

[67] Michael Richardson, 'Civil Society and the State in South Korea', in *2007 SAIS US Korea Yearbook*, ed. US Korea Institute at SAIS (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, 2007), 168.

[68] Jennifer S. Oh, 'Strong State and Strong Civil Society in Contemporary South Korea: Challenges to Democratic Governance', *Asian Survey* 52, no. 3 (2012): 549.

[69] Chung-Sok Suh and Seung-Ho Kwon, 'Whither the Developmental State in South Korea? Balancing Welfare and Neoliberalism', *Asian Studies Review* 38, no. 4 (2014): 688.

[70] Yon-chul Kim, '2009, North and South Korean Relation: Issues and Prospect', in *T'ongiljõllyakp'orõmbokosõ* (Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 2009), 21.

In the mist of this, there have been serious debates in the South Korean society about how to build peace with North Korea. Those who support socio-cultural exchange and economic cooperation with North Korea argue that engaging with North Korea is the best way to deter the further development of nuclear weapons or possibly make North Korea to give up the nuclear weapon. For them, increased interactions with North Korea will ensure security by improving the relationship with North Korea and economic cooperation will eventually guide North Korea towards self-reform. And improve North Korean human rights as well. They argued non-engagement and criticism will only make the regime toughen political oppression.[71] However, those who oppose the engagement with North Korea maintain that it will undermine international security, by giving the failing North Korea the opportunity to survive and to build nuclear weapons. In their view, the best way to build peace on the Korean peninsula is to walk away from North Korea, waiting for the intensification of hunger that will contribute to regime collapse. They say North Korean regime will never reform itself and economic cooperation will only feed the corrupted authoritarian regime. Therefore, they argue that we should use sticks like economic sanctions for the sake of North Korean human rights instead of carrots like providing humanitarian and development aid.[72]

The South Korean civil society took on the roles of resisting dictatorship and militarism, and building relationships between North and South Koreans, for a durable peace process. But, the issues of social justice and peacebuilding remain unresolved in the Korean peninsula, while the states are almost completely monopolising the peace process. Even though top-level leaderships of the parties to the Korean conflict were able to negotiate the cessation of physical violence, they were not able to meet the people's needs for justice and guarantee a sustainable peace, as witnessed from the North and South dictatorships and series of breakdowns of the peace process. One of the largest remaining obstacles to civil society peacebuilding in

[71] Glogio Maragliano, 'Seven Years of Humanitarian Aid: A Balanced and a Possible War Forward', *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 11, no. 2 (2002): 187.

[72] Associated Press in Seoul, '"Regime Collapse" Awaits North Korea, Says South's Leader in Nuclear Warning', *The Guardian*, 16 February 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/16/regime-collapse-awaits-north-korea-says-souths-leader-in-nuclear-warning.

Korea has been that North Korea continues to be an authoritarian regime. On top of that, the suspension of the peace process and the debate around peacebuilding with North Korea in South Korean society, show the diverse peacebuilding activities of civil society are still vulnerable to the South Korean political environments, as long as they are under tight control of the government.

In this regard, this book aims to seek how to make the Korean peace process more sustainable, by looking at the history of the Korean conflict, the ups and downs of the Korean peace process, and the peacebuilding activities of the Korean civil society from the perspective of strategic peacebuilding.

Structure of the Book

This opening chapter introduces the concept of peace process, peacebuilding, and civil society. Then, this chapter presents the relevance of these three concepts in the context of the Korean conflict. The Korean civil society emerged while resisting the Japanese colonial rule. Compared to the restricted civic space in North Korea, South Korea saw a significant growth of civil society activities amid the struggle against the dictatorships. Since democratisation in the late 1980s, the South Korean civil society has initiated diverse peacebuilding activities. During this time, the Korean peace process made several breakthroughs, but eventually broke down in 2010. This chapter suggests the needs to study the durability of the Korean peace process, and the possible contribution of civil society peacebuilding on the peace process.

In order to explore the Korean peace process and the peacebuilding role of civil society, this book takes the perspective of strategic peacebuilding under the premise that a local civil society can have a positive impact on the sustainability of a peace process if its activities are strategically connected to a broader peacebuilding framework. Chapter 2 reviews the development of peacebuilding concepts and theories within the field of Peace and Conflict Studies and discusses potential contributions of Peace and Conflict Studies to strategic peacebuilding research in the Korean peninsula, in comparison to major international relations theories, such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Chapter 3 describes the historical background of the Korean conflict, in order to provide context for the analysis of the Korean peace process. The Korean War is studied as direct violence. The dictatorships in

the Korean peninsula are examined as structural violence. The chapter also examines how both North and South Korean dictatorships justified their structural violence using nationalism and the Korean conflict situation. Although negative peace has been sustained since the Armistice Agreement of 1953 in the Korean peninsula, Chapter 3 demonstrates why addressing structural violence is essential to building a just and sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula.

Chapter 4 then examines the ups and downs of high-level negotiations in the Korean peace process. Statements and agreements made in the high-level negotiations were never fully implemented. To understand obstructions to the implementation of the agreements in the high-level negotiations, the chapter analyses the state parties in the Korean conflict with reference to the ideas of peacebuilding gap theory. Chapter 4 discusses the need to build a platform where diverse actors from multiple levels of society participate and cooperate.

Having established the argument in Chapters 3 and 4 that high-level negotiation is limited in resolving the impasse in the Korean conflict, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 explore how Korean civil society has been operating as a middle-level leadership in peacebuilding. These three chapters identify the role of civil society in interdependent peacebuilding, building just peace, and highlighting strategic links for peacebuilding. Diverse civil society activities are reviewed from the perspective of strategic peacebuilding.

Chapter 5 conducts a case study on the ecumenical movement for peace and unification in the Korean peninsula, which is one of the earliest and most well-recognised efforts to bring people from North and South Korea together. With the assistance of the World Council of Churches (WCC), South and North Korean ecumenical organisations were able to realise the first non-governmental meeting between the two Koreas in 1986, in Switzerland, since the Armistice Agreement of 1953. The chapter analyses the role of the ecumenical peace movement in the Korean peace process and explores the potential of civil society in filling the interdependence gap in peacebuilding.

Chapter 6 examines the growth of diverse civil movements in the Korean peninsula and the role of civil society in mobilising public opinion about social justice and peace process. Beginning with the March 1 movement, under Japanese colonial rule, this chapter provides a historical review of the South Korean democratisation, peace, and unification movements, the women's peace movement, the antimilitarism

movement, and the North Korean human rights movement in South Korea. The chapter then discusses the role of civil society in closing the justice gap and building just peace.

Chapter 7 discusses the link between peacebuilding and development in the Korean peace process. For the past 20 years, South Korean aid to North Korea has fluctuated greatly, due to the process-structure gap in Korean peacebuilding. Building on the conceptual framework of conflict sensitive development and strategic peacebuilding, this chapter examines the humanitarian and development aid of South Korean civil society to North Korea in the context of the Korean conflict and examines the challenges and opportunities for South Korean civil society in creating and implementing strategies for overcoming the process-structure gap in peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula.

The final chapter, Chapter 8, more fully develops the general conclusions in the view of strategic peacebuilding, which are the results of the analysis throughout of the book, following from each chapter.

CHAPTER 2

Researching Peacebuilding in Korea: A Peace and Conflict Studies Approach

This chapter reviews the influence of Peace and Conflict Studies on the development of peacebuilding concepts and theories, and discusses potential contributions of Peace and Conflict Studies to peacebuilding research in the Korean peninsula. Studies on the issues surrounding peace in the Korean conflict have been predominated by major International Relations (IR) theories and research methods, particularly realism and liberalism. Research based on these theories tends to adopt a positivist approach, in which the researcher is asked to maintain an objective attitude to the research subject. Although the main focus of the research is to interpret and theorise on the nature of international relations using a social scientific method, the epistemological implications of these studies have informed policies on how to deal with the Korean conflict by the majority of concerned governments. With regard to the critical differences between the perspectives of Peace and Conflict Studies and the dominant approaches of IR research, Carolyn Stephenson says "Peace Studies is value explicit, with both a positive valuation of peace itself and a commitment to examine trade-offs between values, while values tend to be more hidden in much International Relations research, with some IR scholars still claiming that research can be 'value-free'". According to Stephenson, the dominant paradigms of this 'value-free' research could be used to justify existing power relations and violence related values in the name of reality, and researchers cannot be free from the responsibility for the use of their research outcomes, even though they claim to have no

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1_2

hidden agenda.[1] Furthermore, the realities of the world in which major IR theorists present nation-states as the main actors has been changing. Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond say, "Everyday emancipation, political awakenings, resistance, questions about the role of the state and authority of international actors and donors, as well as the problems raised by the hierarchical state-system, ideological donor-system, the hidden arms trade and the goals of emerging donors, are changing the landscape of IR [International Relations] and of peace and conflict."[2]

Research within the field of Peace and Conflict Studies does not veil normative concern and practical orientation while exploring the changing context of peace and conflict in the world. Peace and Conflict Studies favours peace and non-violence over war and violence. This does not mean that Peace and Conflict Studies is not scientific research. According to David Barash, Peace and Conflict Studies is an academic effort, which includes a social scientific positivist approach, to take an ethical responsibility toward research, as well as being practice-oriented research, to bring about positive change, similar to medical science or environmental studies.[3] This normative concern and practice orientation of researchers in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies is evident in their exploration of the concept of peace, which has led to the formation of the term 'peacebuilding', and to the development of practical theories for peacebuilding, such as 'strategic peacebuilding'. This chapter will begin with the introduction of conceptual and theoretical discussions of the leading scholars in Peace and Conflict Studies, move on to critical reflection on international peacebuilding practices, and conclude with presenting potential contributions by Peace and Conflict Studies to peacebuilding research in the Korean peninsula.

What Peace Are We to Build?

Peace and Conflict Studies is not value-free, but it does not share a fixed ontological assumption and universal meaning for a positive valuation of peace. It continues to explore the meaning of peace in different contexts.

[1] Carolyn M. Stephenson, 'Peace Studies, Overview', in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, ed. Lester Kurtz, vol. 2 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), 811.

[2] Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, 'The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace', *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 5 (June 2013): 773.

[3] David P. Barash, *Introduction to Peace Studies* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991), 26.

Johan Galtung is considered to be one of the forefathers of Peace and Conflict Studies because of his attempt to better understand the concept of peace. According to Galtung, peace has been generally regarded as the 'absence of war', particularly in the context of the Cold War, but in his view, this is a clear case of 'obscurum per obscurius'. When people claim there is no war in their society, this does not mean that their society is peaceful, because aspects of the social order can still be violent. As Galtung observes, "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations". The present is unsatisfactory compared to what could have been. Although the present situation is avoidable, it cannot be avoided while present influences exist. Therefore, if we accept this definition of violence, violence is more than just physical violence such as war. There can be various influences, which Galtung refers to as violence, which "increases the distance between the potential and the actual" and "impedes the decrease of this distance".[4]

First, there is 'direct violence'. Direct violence means realisations are directly destroyed. It refers to physical, verbal and psychological abuse, and/or infliction of pain, caused by specific actors. Direct violence involves humiliation, beating, sexual assault, torture, killing, as well as the threat of force. There are clear subject–action–object relationships in this form of violence. Therefore, it is visible, manifest, personal, and non-structural.[5] On the other hand, there are invisible influences in which realisations are impeded, due to the monopolisation of resources or insight by a group, class, gender or nationality. Galtung calls this, 'structural violence'. Structural violence is often invisible, as it is built into the structure of social institutions; there may not be any specific person who directly inflicts pain on another. Although this is clearly avoidable, people are suffering. For example, when the life expectancy of the upper class is twice as high as that of the lower classes, there is structural violence present in that society.[6] Structural violence has the effect of denying people the rights, opportunities, and powers which

[4] Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–68.

[5] Galtung, 169; Ho-Won Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 19–20.

[6] Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', 171.

are important to realise one's potential. It is directly related to social injustice issues such as poverty, hunger, repression, illiteracy, and social alienation.[7]

Meanwhile, there can also be violence which is unintended. People sometimes participate in violence without the intention of hurting other people. This is a common phenomenon in the case of structural violence. People can harm others without knowing when they are just living their daily lives. People might feel compassion or pity for those who are affected by structural violence, but seldom feel guilty. This is also possible in the case of direct violence. Sometimes societies use direct violence and yet people do not feel guilty, because they do not consider it an intentional violence, for example, corporal punishment, imprisonment or capital punishment. This is possible due to influences which make direct and structural violence appear normal. Galtung call this influence, 'cultural violence'. He explains cultural violence as "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence", "that can be used to justify or legitimate direct or structural violence". Noticeably, Galtung uses the expression, 'aspects of culture' to avoid cultural stereotypes. It is not as if the entire culture is violent, only some aspects of the culture, as exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science, which can be used to make some forms of violence look normal or inevitable.[8]

This conceptualisation of violence is at the heart of Galtung's concept of peace and peacebuilding theory. He argues that peace should be not only the absence of direct violence but also the absence of structural and cultural violence. He refers to the absence of direct violence as 'negative peace', and the absence of all violence as 'positive peace'.[9] As we discussed in Chapter 1, Galtung emphasises the importance of building structures of positive peace that remove the causes of conflict and offer alternatives to conflict in situations where war might occur. In Galtung's point of view, negative peace is likely to be bought at the expense of positive peace. Even with the absence of direct violence, there is no interaction between the conflict parties because of the structural and cultural violence within the conflict parties. Top-level leadership tends to use this

[7] Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 20–22.

[8] Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence', *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291.

[9] Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', 183.

conflict to justify structural and cultural violence. He argues that a pattern of cooperation and interaction is possible only in positive peace, by eliminating existing structural and cultural violence.[10]

Since Galtung's introduction of negative and positive peace, there have been several efforts to explore peace beyond the absence of war within and between states. There has been research ranging from a broader concept of peace, such as 'holistic peace', which expands the scope of peace to a level of spiritual maturity of human beings, to a more specific concept of peace, such as 'quality peace', which presupposes practical qualities of peace, including dignity, security and predictability.[11] As well, some researchers have also developed a concept of peace which engages with dominant international norms such as 'liberal peace', which present human rights, democracy and market economy as conditions for peace. Other researchers suggest a concept of peace more critical to universal liberal norms and practices, such as 'emancipatory peace', which moves beyond "the installation of a hegemonic peace" and focuses on understanding "politics of peace resting upon a just social order and solidarity".[12] The interactions between concepts and practices of peace have brought about new conceptual discussions of peace, according to an ever-evolving focus by the researchers. Amongst them, the concept of 'just peace' has been widely used in the spheres of Peace and Conflict Studies and peacebuilding practice as a concept based on a social justice structure, supported by a positive peace scaffold, and embracing relational concern for reconciliation in a society affected by protracted conflict.

John Paul Lederach promotes the concept of 'just peace' through critical reflection on three gaps in mainstream peacebuilding practices, the 'interdependence gap', 'the justice gap', and 'the process-structure gap'. As we discussed in Chapter 1, the interdependence gap represents the lack of responsive and coordinated relationships up and down the levels of leadership in a society affected by protracted violent conflict. Track-two diplomacy often brings people at the non-governmental

[10]Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding', in *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research II* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), 297–303.

[11]Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 30; Peter Wallensteen, *Quality Peace: Peacebuilding, Victory and World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 209.

[12]Oliver Richmond, *Peace in International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 109.

level together, however, high-level leaders rarely meet with civil society and grassroots leaders in the peace process in order to understand the broader needs of the people. This interdependence gap leads to a justice gap, which is the gap between the expectations of a peace agreement and what that agreement actually delivers. Iain Atack says, "The nation-state may have succeeded in containing the all-out violence of the state of nature, but only at the expense of centralising the capacity for violence in the state, which can use it against its own citizens".[13] Lastly, the process-structure gap in peacebuilding is the tendency to think that peace is a process up to the point of accord or agreement, and then converts to a structure. Lederach argues that peacebuilding is "a change process based on relationship building", rather than a bureaucratic structure for the implementation of an agreement. However, peacebuilding also requires "the development of support infrastructures that enhance our capacity to adapt and respond to relational needs".[14]

Therefore, according to Lederach, just peace is more than a social structure. It is a process-structure of human relationships characterised by "approaches that reduce violence and destructive cycles of social interaction and at the same time increase justice in any human relationships".[15] Just peace shares a similar orientation with positive peace, in terms of the absence of structural and cultural violence. Galtung is also interested in finding a shared framework for conflict parties to increase the human interaction but, Peter Wallensteen says, for Galtung the focus is more on a 'structure', and for Lederach, more on a 'transformation of relations'.[16] Lederach argues that the concept of just peace overcomes the paradox between Just War theory and pacifism by focusing on the dynamics of human relationships. According to Lederach, justice, which represents the search for individual and group rights, social restructuring, and restitution, can be in alignment with peace, which underscores the need for interdependence, well-being, and security when there is a shared vision

[13] Iain Atack, *Nonviolence in Political Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 70.

[14] John Paul Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 27–35.

[15] John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Reprint edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 182.

[16] Wallensteen, *Quality Peace*, 15.

for 'a common, connected future' in human relationships.[17] This view of the co-existence and interconnectedness of justice and peace is influenced by Lederach's understanding of human conflict. He considers conflict to be characterised by "deep rooted, intense animosity; fear; and severe stereotyping". He argues that since these characteristics are formed by real-life experience, subjective perceptions, and emotions, peacebuilding requires more than a structural approach, and "must be rooted in, and responsive to, the experiential and subjective realities shaping people's perspectives and needs".[18] For this reason, Lisa Schirch says this concept of just peace envisages not only a sustainable set of structures but also "processes that allow humanity to meet their basic human needs with an absence of both direct violence and structural violence".[19]

This conceptual discussion of peace and practical reflections of peacebuilding have influenced, and have been influenced, by research on conflict, as in the case of Lederach. Peace research linked with conflict research constitutes Peace and Conflict Studies and has developed peacebuilding theories on how to deal with conflict to achieve a more sustainable just/positive peace than negative peace.[20]

How to Deal with Conflict in Building Peace

As we have discussed above, the issues of a conflict are usually deferred to activities following a peace/armistice agreement, in order to achieve and maintain the absence of war. These issues are often taken for granted in societies affected by protracted conflict, although the threat of war continues to exist because of unresolved conflict. In addition, the negative perception of conflict also discourages attempts to address the causes of a conflict. Unlike a problem or dispute, it seems to be impossible to resolve a conflict, due to incompatibilities between the conflict parties in terms of goals, values, and needs. For example, the goals of South Korea and North Korea in the Korean conflict appear to be incompatible, as they each want to unify the Korean peninsula under their respective

[17] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 28–31.

[18] Lederach, 23–24.

[19] Lisa Schirch, 'Human Rights and Peacebuilding: Toward Justpeace' (International Studies Association Conference, New Orleans, 2002), 4.

[20] Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 98.

system. There seems to be no solution for both parties to achieve their goals simultaneously. Therefore, the ultimate strategy to accomplish one's goal would be to win over the other party, using whatever means necessary. But, conflict researchers argue that a conflict does not always have to be a negative tug of war that produces a winner and a loser, and that violence is simply a manifestation of, or response to, a conflict. There are always peaceful and constructive ways to resolve conflict. Sometimes conflict can be a positive catalyst for improved human relationships.[21] But, to find these ways, a better understanding of the conflict, through multidimensional analysis is necessary, particularly in terms of "the context and dynamics of adversarial relationships".[22]

Conflict researchers and theorists appear to share a criticism of reductionism in IR theories with researchers who focus on a better understanding of peace. Conflict studies is concerned with, not only conflict between states, but also, with conflict within states, covering organic interconnections of multiple levels of conflict. Conflict studies also considers the longer time continuum of these conflicts than does mainstream IR research, by including the time prior to the birth of nation-state, such as colonial history, and the prognosis for conflict in the future. In this regard, conflict researchers adopt interdisciplinary approaches to their research. For example, it is expected that a psychological analysis of the conflict parties in international conflict or research of novels, poems, music, and paintings produced by these parties, could compensate for the missing dimensions in the outcome of research based on IR theory and method.[23]

John Burton's 'Human Needs Theory' is one of the first interdisciplinary approaches in analysing international conflict and has contributed to the development of conflict resolution theory and practice for peacebuilding.[24] Burton borrows physiological analysis to better understand the parties in international conflicts. According to Burton, a theory with a hypothesis

[21] Gregory Tillett and Brendan French, *Resolving Conflict*, 3rd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9–15.

[22] Ho-Won Jeong, *Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2008), 20.

[23] Stephenson, 'Peace Studies, Overview', 810.

[24] Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 31.

on certain oncological needs of a conflict party in an international conflict can help explain the behaviour of a conflict party in international relations. Furthermore, he argues that searching for the source of international conflict in ontological human needs through this analysis "allows the parties to ascertain deeper motivations and to explore means to meet common human needs".[25] Although informed by the works of early 'needs theorists' such as clinical psychologist Abraham Maslow, and sociologist Paul Sites, who focused on individual needs as the source of power in social life, Burton put more emphasis on the socialisation of humans and their societal needs. Therefore he advocates "a holistic approach, wherein the entirety of the human, person and social is studied".[26]

Burton places the motivations of conflict parties into three categories, needs, values, and interests. Human beings are conditioned by biology to pursue their needs. If human needs are not met within the norms of a human society, it will lead to behaviours which are outside that social norm. Secondly, unlike human needs which are universal, values are characteristic of a particular social community. The defence of these values is linked to the needs for personal security and identity of the people within this society. Lastly, there are interests which are held in common within groups, but not always in common with the community as a whole. In Burton's view, these interests are "the occupational, social, political and economic aspirations of an individual, and of identity groups of individuals within a social system". Therefore, interests are easily competitive, but negotiable for a social gain. Unlike needs and values, particularly needs, which are non-negotiable. As Burton emphasises, this is a critical distinction to better understanding international conflict and to creating policies "calculated to avoid or to resolve them". Another distinction in Burton's theory is between goals and tactics. In Burton's view, it is important to distinguish tactics from goals in the analysis of conflict. Burton says, "similar goals are sought by different tactics". A tactic is used to achieve a goal. However, in many cases, the tactic can become a reason for the protraction of a conflict. By and large, the confusion between tactics and goals creates non-negotiable positions in a conflict as in the case of the nuclear weapons development

[25] John W. Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 36.

[26] Alan C. Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution* (London: Pinter, 1998), 77–80.

of North Korea. Although tactics are originally employed to achieve goals, the politics of the tactics are likely to lose sight of the ultimate goal in the bargaining process, and in doing so make the tactics appear non-negotiable.[27]

Burton's human needs theory has greatly influenced the development of conflict resolution. Ann Sanson and Di Bretherton say, "Conflict resolution provides techniques to deal with disputes in a manner which is non-violent, avoids dominance or oppression by one party over the other, and rather than exploiting one party, aims to meet the human needs of all."[28] Wallensteen defines conflict resolution as "a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other".[29] The concepts and theories of conflict resolution have relevance to Galtung's peacebuilding theory, which points out the limitations of peace negotiations which are trapped in un-negotiable tactics and neglect the human needs of the people in the conflict-affected societies, deferring conflict resolution to the aftermath of peace/armistice agreements. But, as Galtung argues, a solution to incompatibilities alone may not be able to cease violent action, as long as the polarisation of the human communities caused by those incompatibilities exists. Conflict does not automatically lead to violent action; Galtung finds a progression of polarisation and dehumanisation present in violent conflict. The more violent a conflict, the deeper the polarisation in the structure and culture of the society. Therefore, peacebuilding must pursue the transformation of this structure and culture in tandem with finding a creative solution to the conflict.[30]

Lederach agrees with Galtung's transformative approach in dealing with conflict by his preference of the term 'conflict transformation' rather than 'conflict resolution'. In his view, a dispute is a situation,

[27] Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, 36–44.

[28] Ann Sanson and Di Bretherton, 'Conflict Resolution: Theoretical and Practical Issues', in *Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century*, ed. Daniel J. Christie, Richard V. Wagner, and Deborah DuNann Winter (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2001), 193.

[29] Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, 4th edition (London: Sage, 2015), 8.

[30] Johan Galtung, 'Conflict, War and Peace: A Bird's Eye View', in *Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND*, ed. Johan Galtung, Carl G. Jacobsen, and Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 3–4.

where a resolution approach is applicable, such as a one-time business dispute between two parties who do not have a previous relationship, and do not expect a future relationship. But, a conflict, where there is a past relationships and the likelihood of a future relationship, needs a transformative approach to peacebuilding. According to Lederach, this conflict transformation approach is "especially important where there are repeated and deep-rooted cycles of conflict episodes".[31] This is why his peacebuilding approach is focused on "the restoration and rebuilding of relationships" rather than "the resolution of issues".[32] Lederach proposes depolarisation and humanisation by building relationships:

> Peacebuilding requires a vision of relationship. Stated bluntly, if there is no capacity to imagine the canvas of mutual relationships and situate oneself as part of that historic and ever-evolving web, peacebuilding collapses. The centrality of relationship provides the context and potential for breaking violence, for it brings people into the pregnant moments of the moral imagination: the space of recognition that ultimately the quality of our life is dependent on the quality of life of others. It recognizes that the well-being of our grandchildren is directly tied to the well-being of our enemy's grandchildren.[33]

As we discussed in Chapter 1, mainstream peacebuilding practices have a tendency to concentrate on building state institutions in the post-conflict phase of a peace process, rather than promoting a vision of a mutual relationship across the boundaries between ordinary people in local communities. This approach tends to prioritise the role of the elite of a society in making and implementing an agreement between conflict parties. It also appears to suggest universal prescriptions for political solutions, regardless of the local context. The reduction of peacebuilding to elite-oriented, post-conflict political activities, as well as a lack of coordination and cooperation among different levels of activities in diverse peacebuilding sectors, has affected the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding practices. In response, many donors, practitioners and researchers are increasingly recognising the need to "develop more

[31] John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (Intercourse: Good Books, 2003), 68–69.

[32] Lederach, *Building Peace*, 24.

[33] Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 35.

strategic, coherent and coordinated policies and programs in the field affected by conflict".[34]

Conflict Sensitivity and Strategic Peacebuilding

Schirch says, the field of peacebuilding comprises a wider variety of practices, because peacebuilding is to support diverse relationship building activities "at all levels of society; between individuals and within families; communities; organizations; businesses; governments; and cultural, religious, economic, and political institutions and movements".[35] For example, in his letter to the Security Council in 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested that peacebuilding actions "must be multidisciplinary in the widest sense" and should encompass multiple areas such as "negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, security stabilization, good governance, democratization and human rights, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian relief and sustainable development".[36] In a similar vein, the 2004 Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding categorises contemporary peacebuilding activities into four sectors: security, political, reconciliation and justice, and socio-economic foundation, recognising overlaps among the sectors.[37]

This effort to highlight the multidisciplinary aspect of peacebuilding was in line with the recognition of the international development aid community on the interconnection between development and peacebuilding in the 1990s. The desired goal remains unreachable, no matter how vast the amounts of human, financial and natural resources invested into the development projects in conflict affected societies. Any progress can be easily thwarted by the violence erupting in a conflict. Even in less violent situations, the sustainability of a development aid

[34] OECD, 'Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities' (OECD, 2008), 12, https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/39774573.pdf.

[35] Lisa Schirch, *Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding: A Vision and Framework for Peace with Justice* (Intercourse: Good Books, 2005), 8–10.

[36] Kofi A. Annan, 'S/2001/138—Letter Dated 12 February 2001 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council', eSubscription to United Nations Documents, 2001, http://undocs.org/en/S/2001/138.

[37] Dan Smith, *Toward a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together: Overview Report of the Joint Ustein Study of Peacebuilding* (The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), 28.

project tends to be impaired by the mistrust and hatred amongst conflict parties.[38] There were several field studies and feedback workshops, initiated by international and local aid organisations, to learn how to operate effectively in conflict settings throughout the 1990s. Mary Anderson argues that aid activities are almost always affected by the causes and the context of the conflict and, also influence the conflict. In other words, international development became "a part of that context and thus also of the conflict." Based on this rationale, she emphasises the need to develop a strategy, and to adjust already existing programmes in such a way as to strengthen local capacities for peace rather than "feeding into and exacerbating the conflict".[39]

There were also initiatives to assess the impact of the work by international organisations on conflict situations. Several methods were developed, beginning at the project level, and later at the macro-policy level, under the label of 'Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment' (PCIA). Many practitioners and academic researchers, as well as big donors such as the OECD and the EU contributed to the development of these methods and expanded on them. In the early periods, most assessment tools were mainly concerned with measuring the negative impact of aid. But, an increasing number of tools, inspired by peace research, attempted to evaluate the potential for peacebuilding.[40] Several international organisations including bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies, UN agencies, and NGOs created their own conflict analysis tools or adapted existing ones based upon this rationale and reflected them in programme design. They began to use the term 'conflict sensitivity' as an umbrella to encompass their approaches.[41] The most widely used definition of 'Conflict Sensitivity' refers to the abilities of peacebuilding and development

[38]World Bank, *2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 1.

[39]Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 1.

[40]Kenneth Bush, 'A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones, Working Paper No. 1' (The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative & The Evaluation Unit, 1998), 6.

[41]International Alert et al., *Resource Pack, Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding* (Africa Peace Forum, Various Agencies Collaborating, 2004); Thania Paffenholz, *Third-Generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace Approach* (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005), 3–4.

organisations to: "understand the context in which you operate; understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts".[42] In this way, certain mandates and programmes for peacebuilding actors in areas of conflict, began to merge. For example, Jonathan Goodhand and Philippa Atkinson say that some aid agencies working in conflict-affected countries were trying to design programmes that could "simultaneously address the three objectives, of responding to humanitarian needs, rebuilding livelihoods and supporting reconciliation".[43]

However, there have been debate and confusion about how to apply conflict sensitivity to practice. For instance, Nicole Goddard argues that 'conflict sensitive' aid projects cannot provide political solutions, which peacebuilding demands.[44] Along this line of thought, in some cases, particularly that of humanitarian emergency relief, integrating peacebuilding objectives into aid programmes might be not just inappropriate but also very dangerous. In order to guarantee the safety and security of aid workers, aid projects, and aid beneficiaries, maintaining the neutrality and independence of the aid organisation is critical in the context of the conflict.[45] For this reason, Van Brabant argues that 'conflict sensitivity' should not carry as many political connotations as peacebuilding.[46] On the other hand, there are concerns that these criticisms would lead to the reduction of conflict sensitivity to a strictly minimalist sense.[47] Any aid projects in conflict-affected societies cannot avoid political

[42] International Alert et al., 'Resource Pack, Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding', 1.

[43] Jonathan Goodhand and Philippa Atkinson, *Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of International Engagement: A Synthesis of Findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka* (London: International Alert, 2001), 12.

[44] Nicole Goddard, *Do No Harm and Peacebuilding: Five Lessons* (Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009), 1.

[45] Tim Midggley, Howard Mollett, and Ivan Campbell, 'Policy Brief: Promoting Conflict Sensitivity amongst Donor Agencies' (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012), 1.

[46] K. Van Brabant, *What Is Peacebuilding? Do No Harm, Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding* (Interpeace, 2010), 3.

[47] Adam Barbolet et al., 'The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity' (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005).

implications. Therefore, Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas say that treating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding as "entirely distinct and unrelated" could result in "poorly conceived programing and reduced effectiveness".[48] Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren argue that the confusion in practice is not because of integration between peacebuilding and development but because of the lack of strategic thinking. If the integration of peacebuilding sectors is driven, not only by conflict sensitivity at the project level, but also by conflict sensitivity at the broader strategic level, and involves all relevant actors in the conflict zone, then the confusion in practice would be reduced.[49]

As these strategic issues shaped recent discussions around conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, Peace and Conflict Studies researchers began to use a new term, 'strategic peacebuilding' to illustrate a more "localized, sensitized, multi-dimensional and multi-level peacebuilding".[50] Lederach and Appleby state that strategic peacebuilding is to "take advantage of emerging and established patterns of collaboration and interdependence", and to "encourage the deeper and more frequent convergence of mission, resources, expertise, insight, and benevolent self-interest that characterizes the most fruitful".[51] In this regard, Schirch describes strategic peacebuilding as a 'connecting space'. Peacebuilding actors often would not know how other peacebuilding activities of other actors could be beneficial or harmful to achieving their goals, or how their actions could contribute to, or interfere, with the work of others. If coordinated in a long-term framework, each activity can make a contribution and complement others. Coordination and collaboration requires a space, where different actors can connect with each other.[52]

[48] Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas, *A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding* (Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009), 2.

[49] Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren, eds., *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 6.

[50] Oliver P. Richmond, 'Conclusion: Strategic Peacebuilding beyond the Liberal Peace', in *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, ed. Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 365.

[51] John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby, 'Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview', in *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, ed. Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 22.

[52] Schirch, *Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding*, 11.

For example, development support of school education could be implemented to "provide educational opportunities to excluded communities", and "deliberately develop curricula that recognize cultural and language diversity and integrate peace education".[53] This suggestion shows that for peacebuilding to be strategic, it is necessary to "take into consideration both the immediate, micro-issues in the conflict and the broader, more systemic concerns"[54] and to look at how each of these levels is affected.[55] For this reason, Lederach and Appleby advocate the need for a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy, which could intentionally draw "on the overlapping and imperfectly coordinated presences, activities and resources of various international, transnational, national, regional and local institutions, agencies and movements that influence the causes, expressions and outcomes of conflict".[56]

It should also be noted that strategic peacebuilding researchers argue that it is important to encourage local cultural and social resources for peacebuilding to be more strategic and pragmatic, and therefore to develop peacebuilding policies and programmes, reflecting the local context and needs.[57] As mentioned above, peacebuilding operations have often been criticised for conflict insensitivity and "universal claims as defenders of peace and democracy, the top-down imposition of common approaches to programmes in different settings, a state-centric bias, the promotion of institutional rationality, and a dismissive approach to local realities."[58] The term 'liberal peace' is used disparagingly to describe the external peacebuilding interventions conducted by Western states, motivated by liberal state-building. Dominik Zaum states that "the underlying assumption of state weakness or failure as the main driver of conflict and the key obstacle to peace and development" is still widely accepted by major donors.[59]

[53] 'Nepal Peace and Development Strategy 2010–2015', 7 January 2011, 3, https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-peace-and-development-strategy-2010-2015.

[54] Lederach, *Building Peace*, 55.

[55] Maire Dugan, 'A Nested Theory of Conflict', *A Leadership Journal: Women in Leadership-Sharing the Vision* 1, no. 1 (1996): 9–20.

[56] Lederach and Appleby, 'Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview', 22.

[57] Richmond, 'Conclusion: Strategic Peacebuilding beyond the Liberal Peace', 364.

[58] Eleanor O'Gorman, *Conflict and Development: Development Matters* (New York: Zed Books, 2011), 115.

[59] Dominik Zaum, 'Beyond the "Liberal Peace"', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 18, no. 1 (2012): 121.

This assumption parallels the neoliberal development assistance model in which donors focus on state reforms by writing out institutional prescriptions. It implies stricter allocations of aid based on performance (rewarding good performers and cutting off bad performers).[60] However, universalist institutional prescriptions for both peacebuilding and development are doomed to failure, as in the cases of Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, because they do not engage with the context. In many cases, even though several agencies say they respect conflict sensitivity in principle and do perform the necessary conflict analysis, it is often only during the initial planning period of their projects. The agencies fail to monitor the subsequent impacts and so do not evaluate their work in response to those impacts. Subsequently, only minor adjustments can be made at the operational level, and the overall strategy and policy would not reflect learning around conflict sensitive practices.[61]

Amid the criticism of the liberal approaches by the international agencies, the importance of local actors, the civil society in particular, increased once again. Richmond and Mitchell argue that if peacebuilding interventions are to be "effective, sustainable, and ethically defensible," they must be "locally resonant". Local people represent "navigation points for policy" and perhaps "more so than any international blueprint can."[62] However, Mac Ginty warns about the danger of a simple binary approach between local and international, as well as, between traditional and modern. Although sustainable peacebuilding must be led by local people, indigenous peacebuilding does not mean that everything local is an absolute good for peace. For example, from the perspective of just peace, authoritarianism or human rights violations in a local society cannot be vindicated as a respected local tradition. In addition, often local society alone does not have the resources to make an impact on its geopolitical condition and/or cannot guarantee the sustainability of

[60]World Bank, *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), 6.

[61]Woodrow and Chigas, *A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding*, 2.

[62]O. Richmond and A. Mitchell, 'Introduction—Towards a Post-Liberal Peace: Exploring Hybridity via Everyday Forms of Resistance, Agency and Autonomy', in *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-liberalism*, ed. Oliver Richmond and Audra Mitchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 336–40.

peacebuilding projects.[63] Schirch says that only "local people can create the road maps to their future", but she argues, that it is important for the international actors to identify and to empower local peace initiatives that "help connect people and sustain an architecture of relationships to support peace".[64] Once again, this requires a strategic approach, which can maximise the collaboration between the local and the international. Lederach argues that the word 'strategy' prompts us "to ask how the activity impacts the broader setting and whether mechanisms are in place for sustaining the change sought and desired".[65]

Schirch presents five analytical queries to design a strategy for sustainable peacebuilding: what, who, when, where, and how. The strategic 'what' is a question about what peacebuilders need to do to foster "transformation at personal, relational, cultural and structural levels", which could be answered by a contextual and needs analysis. The strategic 'who' is about locating key people, who can "instigate significant change", such as civil society leaders, as suggested in the Lederach's middle-out peacebuilding theory.[66] The strategic 'when' highlights that peacebuilding "needs to occur before, during, and after violence" and requires "a variety of actions in each of these three time frames", such as building security, a political and economic framework and promoting reconciliation and justice. The strategic 'where' is a question to learn the symbolic or 'socially important places and spaces', which can encourage relationship building, such as schools, playgrounds, local clubs. Finally, the strategic 'how' is about the core principles of strategic peacebuilding "needed to coordinate peacebuilding actors and activities".[67]

The concepts and theories of Peace and Conflict Studies and a discussion of strategic peacebuilding, which highlight the coordinated roles of diverse actors, have been under-utilised in the research on the Korean conflict, compared to major IR theories, which concentrate on the role of states. The next section explores the potential contribution of Peace and Conflict Studies in researching and developing a viable strategy for Korean peacebuilding.

[63] Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 51–52.

[64] Schirch, *Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding*, 64.

[65] Lederach, *Building Peace*, 84.

[66] See Chapter 1.

[67] Schirch, *Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding*, 64–70.

Researching Peacebuilding in the Korean Context

The two dominant theories of international relations, realism and liberalism, have been popularly used to examine the issues of peace and conflict in the Korean peninsula. These theories are based on the idea that the main actor in international politics is the state, which is basically anarchy, but "defined by the hierarchy of military and economic power".[68] States will always act in accordance with their national interest. The general assumption of realism is that states always pursue relative gains in international relations, regardless of the character of that state. They will not cooperate with another state if they see their gain as smaller than the other's, even though it is still a gain for them. Therefore, it is almost impossible for states to cooperate with each other. States cannot build trust because they will always betray another state in the name of national interest. The ideals or moral rhetoric of a state do not drive the behaviour of the state, but are used to disguise a hidden agenda of the state. In this regard, from the perspective of realism, the most important value for states appears to be national security based on military power, and peace in international relations cannot be more than a negative peace achieved through a balance of power.[69]

Hwang Ji-Hwan, who has researched how major international relations theories interpret the inter-Korean relationship, offers two widespread realist approaches: Defensive realism and Offensive realism. Defensive realism perceives that, to ensure survival in anarchy, states often make a strategic decision to not offend other states by over expanding their military power. Defensive realism could explain why there has not been a recurrence of a major war in the Korean peninsula since the Armistice Agreement of 1953. Both North and South Korea must have perceived that defence, rather than offence, is the better policy in terms of the survival of their political regimes and preferred a balance of power. However, from the perspective of offensive realism, neither Korea can be satisfied with the status quo, as they cannot trust each other and would be afraid of having less power than the other.

[68] Walter C. Clemens, *Getting to Yes in Korea* (Boulder: Routledge, 2010), 161.

[69] Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 68; John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 4.

Therefore, offensive expansion of military power is the best defence. Both Koreas have continuously competed for more military power, even though the competition increased the security dilemma. This perspective can explain why North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons, despite the fact that this has escalated tensions in and around the Korean peninsula, and eventually increased insecurity for North Korea. North Korea had been militarily weaker than South Korea since the 1990s therefore, developing nuclear weapons to level the playing field would give North Korea the sense that they are no longer weaker than South Korea. But, the development of those nuclear weapons has invoked a strong military and diplomatic response from South Korea and its allies, the US and Japan.[70]

On the other hand, a general liberal assumption is that states sometimes pursue absolute gains in international relations, and therefore, will cooperate for mutual interests. International relations do not always have to be in conflict. Particularly, once cooperation between states sets a course, it will depend on the path. The longer the cooperation proceeds, the more durable it becomes, due to the integration and complexity of the diverse relationships among their citizens and private businesses. Liberal peace theory argues that this integration and complexity are best supported by instilling a democratic system into domestic politics. However, from the perspective of liberalism, even a democratic state is still selfish in nature and, in international relations, there are always the possibility of betrayal. In order to prevent a betrayal, states need to create international norms and institutions.[71]

In this sense, Hwang presents two popular explanations, based on liberalism, about inter-Korean relations: Functionalism and Institutionalism. In the view of functionalism, North and South Korea could initiate non-political cooperation first, in particular, economic cooperation, and eventually this cooperation would spill over into the political and military sectors, as in the case of the European Union. The number of interest groups in the Koreas who benefit from inter-Korean economic cooperation will increase and they will support durable inter-Korean relations in order to protect their group interests. The North and South Korean governments

[70] Ji-Hwan Hwang, 'Rethinking South Korea's Perception of the North Korean Issue: In Search of a New Approach', *Journal of Peace and Unification Studies* 3, no. 2 (2011): 14.

[71] Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, 105–7; Baylis and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 5.

would enhance their political relationship in order to meet the expectations of these groups. However, from the perspective of liberal institutionalism, non-political cooperation between states can still be vulnerable to changing political situations, despite mutual economic benefit and group interests between and within states, as in the cases of the suspension of the South Korean tourism projects in North Korea, such as the Mount Kumgang tour, and the inter-Korean economic projects, like the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Furthermore, the North Korean regime has been resistant to the introduction of a democratic system and market economy. Therefore, it is important for the parties in the Korean conflict to build an international institution and a principle of reciprocity. A state should respond to cooperation with cooperation, but also needs to be able to punish betrayal. For example, the best peacebuilding policy of South Korea would be to increase the economic dependency of North Korea, while getting more international support to build an institution for inter-Korean cooperation, to ensure that for North Korea the risk of betrayal is substantial. The important value of liberalism appears to be strong economic and diplomatic power, in order to increase leverage in a process of cooperation and to punish betrayal.[72]

Constructivist theory, which criticises the static assumptions of traditional international relations theory and emphasises that international relations is a social construction, has been gaining support in the understanding of the Korean conflict. International relations are not based only on fixed national interests. Identities, ideas and the history of the relationship between states could affect the attitude and behaviour of those states. For example, the relationship between South and North Korea is different from the relationship between the US and Canada. From the perspective of constructivism, whereas the US and Canada are long-time allies, South and North Korea share an identity of the enemy in a war, as well as an identity of one nation prior to a history of division and war. The national interests of South and North Korea in the Korean peace process are influenced by these identities, in addition to differing political ideologies and notions of Korean nationalism. Likewise, constructivism can compensate for missing dimensions in both realism and liberalism. But, when it comes to policy implications of the research, constructivism would simply be used to support policies produced by realism or liberalism. For example,

[72] Hwang, 'Rethinking South Korea's Perception of the North Korean Issue: In Search of a New Approach', 6–17.

constructivism can explain the differences in the relationship between the US and Canada and the relationship between South and North Korea. But how to deal with those differences would still follow a prescription from either a realist policy maker or a liberal policy maker because a constructivist could still see "states as underpinning order and peace as limited to institutional cooperation and a limited recognition of individual agency."[73]

Going back to the previous example of the relationships between the US and Canada, and South and North Korea, the US nuclear umbrella of South Korea and the joint military drills by South Korea and the US would be interpreted by Canadians as a harmless defensive mechanism. But, from the perspective of North Korea, they would be seen as a great threat, as they know that the US, a South Korean ally, once considered the use of atomic bombs during the Korean war, and North Korea would see it as hypocritical that their nuclear weapons are illegitimate while US nuclear weapons are legitimate from the perspective of the international law. In this case, a peacebuilding policy interpreted by constructivist research on the history of the Korean conflict, would be in line with or even give more ground to a policy option based on a realist approach, which is pursuing more military power.[74] On the other hand, constructivist research on the fluctuations of the Korean peace process would suggest that although there were accusations of hypocrisy in that conflict parties masked their national interest in a political rhetoric of peace somehow this rhetoric of peace can assist in increasing the validity of the peace process, as in the case of inter-Korean cooperation for addressing the humanitarian situation in the 1990s and the early 2000s. In other words, political rhetoric and hypocrisy works as, writes Richard Price, a "mechanism on the road to compliance with norms".[75] The suspension of inter-Korean cooperation could be interpreted as that cooperation needing more time to increase its dependency on the path. In this sense, peacebuilding policy informed by constructivist research would be in line with a policy option, based on a liberal approach, to build a strong institution for international cooperation.

[73] Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 9.

[74] Clemens, *Getting to Yes in Korea*, 171–72.

[75] Richard M. Price, 'Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics', in *Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics*, ed. Richard M. Price (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 29.

Alternatively, Peace and Conflict Studies would not stop at interpreting and theorising international relations from the perspectives of national security, economic interest, and identity, but would adopt a value explicit and practice-oriented approach to make positive change in all levels of human relationships. Unlike the realist approach, which is interested in making and keeping peace through a balance of power, a Peace and Conflict Studies approach would be more interested in eliminating the structural and cultural violence in the Korean conflict in order to build just/positive peace. North Korea is not only a state actor faced by the threat of direct violence, who has been growing its military capacity for the purpose of defence or offence, but also consists of people who have been suffering from the structural violence of poverty, famine, food shortages and severe human rights violations. South Korea is also culpable for structural violence in the context of the Korean conflict. Peace and Conflict Studies shares a positive research methodology with other social science disciplines, but the research interests in human needs and social injustice have expanded the scope of Peace and Conflict Studies research. Oliver Richmond says, the underlying ontology of Peace and Conflict Studies is "resistant to the notion that individuals are merely passive actors" and "it is heavily predicated upon the understanding that individual agency should and can be exerted to assuage human needs and lead to social justice."[76]

From the perspective of Peace and Conflict Studies, a realist approach, which focuses only on maintaining a balance of power by suppressing direct violence with strong military power and ignores individual agencies in the Korean peninsula, would persist or even aggravate the issue of structural and cultural violence. Furthermore, the Korean conflict is more than just a tug of war between two groups of states: North Korea and its allies such as China and Russia, on one side, and South Korea and its allies such as the US and Japan, on the other. The complex relationship among these actors cannot be defined by dualistic and reductionist approaches. Each state actor has its own diverse interest groups and conflict parties in a complex relationship web.[77] As Burton argues in his human needs theory, these diverse groups

[76] Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 103.

[77] Kab Woo Koo, *Pip'anjŏk p'yŏnghwayŏn'guwa Hanbanto* [Critical Peace Research and the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Humanitas, 2007), 162.

have multi-level and cross-boundary relationships based on different and common interests, values, fears and human needs. Therefore, the national interest of each state cannot simply be reduced to strong military power, which is not enough to meet the expectations of all stakeholders. For this reason, Richmond says that Peace and Conflict Studies adopts an epistemology which "engages with individuals, the local, and with society and its issues".[78] From the perspective of Peace and Conflict Studies, peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula is to strategically increase opportunities for building more just and peaceful transnational relationships among these stakeholders. Therefore, diverse peacebuilding activities such as humanitarian and development aid to North Korea, inter-Korean economic cooperation, and sociocultural exchange programmes, are required alongside high-level negotiations.[79]

Peace and Conflict Studies appears to share a similar cooperative approach with liberalism, which highlights the common interests of conflict parties. The difference between them is that the liberal approach is primarily a top-down reform process which focuses on economic power and institution building "associated with liberal-democratic free market frameworks, human rights and the rule of law, and development models", whereas Peace and Conflict Studies explores ways to develop a process-structure in which the human needs of all concerned parties are met and ordinary local people can build sustainable relationships. According to Richmond, liberal peace is a highly interventionary approach based on Western experience.[80] This liberal approach has been faced by strong resistance from North Korea, who is afraid of being absorbed into the South Korean liberal system. Furthermore, increased North Korean economic dependency on South Korea in the process of inter-Korean economic cooperation would instigate structural violence in the Korean society and become an obstacle to building just peace in the Korean peninsula. If this structural violence between the South and North Koreans persists, the growing relative deprivation[81] of North Koreans would also threaten negative peace. Consequently, the values,

[78] Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 116.

[79] Dong Jin Kim, 'A Peace Studies Approach to North Korean Studies', *Review of North Korean Studies* 16, no. 3 (2013): 40.

[80] Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 106–7.

[81] Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

just peace, in particular, which Peace and Conflict Studies would adopt in its research on the Korean peninsula, would be concerned with the public values of the Korean society, such as quality of life, employment, environment, culture, history, beyond value of state cooperation. Cho Dae Yop says, while respecting the basic human needs of each other and promoting the public values of the society at large, the people of South and North Korea would be able to transform the identity of 'the enemy' toward each other and build a new civic relationship.[82] From the perspective of Peace and Conflict Studies, building a process-structure for the transformation of relationships between people in North and South Korea, rather than merely implanting an institution based on the Western liberal model in North Korea, is required to bring more sustainability to Korean peacebuilding.[83]

There is a similarity between Peace and Conflict Studies and constructivism when it comes to interest in the value, norm, and identity of a state beyond the static national interests found in international relations. As we have discussed above, the constructivist approach is helpful in identifying diverse relationships among diverse actors in the Korean conflict. The division of the Korean peninsula emerged from the impact of a changing global order after the Second World War, which not only gave birth to two states, but also divided politics, economy, society, culture, family, ideology and even religions. In addition, the Korean War (1950–1953) and the Cold War have turned this division into a protracted conflict. The experience of the Korean War initiated the dominance of a Cold War identity for both Koreas, and this identity weakened the collective identity of Korea as a whole nation so radically that, following the end of the Cold War, inter-Korean identity politics did not rebound. Koreans still seem to have a deep-rooted animosity toward each other. The inter-Korean identity politics that identifies each other as 'the enemy' still appears to be a major obstacle to improving the relationship between North and South Korea.[84]

[82] Dae Yop Cho, 'The Peace-Reunification Movement of Korean Peninsula and Civic Identity', *Journal of Social Sciences* 49, no. 1 (2010): 175.

[83] Kim, 'A Peace Studies Approach to North Korean Studies', 41.

[84] Samuel S. Kim, *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3.

The constructivist can explain why high-level negotiations between the two Koreas have record of destroying, rather than building, sustainable platforms for peacebuilding, but the constructivist approach would simply be used to support the realist or liberal policy options, by focusing the role of states. Both South and North Korean governments seem to assess change and the validity of change "according to the power defined by military and economic influences" at the state level, as suggested by realism or liberalism, deeming the negative identities toward each other a given, with little effort to change them.[85] Peace and Conflict Studies would argue that the identities of North and South Korea matter in inter-Korean relations, as constructive research suggests. However, it moves beyond prescriptions from realism and liberalism, and tries to explore ways to transform these identities by building new relationships for just peace within and between all levels of societies.[86]

Although some research based on major international theories tends to argue that the outcome of the research is value free, and they cannot be held responsible for their epistemological implications of peace, they have been subjected to great criticism in that they merely reflect current power structures, and in this way, justify the values, such as militarism and economic power, of powerful states. Likewise, any research on conflict situations, including research on the Korean conflict, is easily subject to criticism that it is based on certain values or a hidden agenda. For some states, peacebuilding in the Korean peninsula could mean building security or economic development, but for others it could be seen as an imperial agenda engineering the collapse of a regime, a betrayal of their own community, and/or a large financial burden. On the other hand, Peace and Conflict researchers would not claim their research to be free from the impact of the Korean conflict, and explore ways to create a positive impact on the conflict, based on their positive valuation of peace. But, Koo Kab-woo says that Peace and Conflict Studies should not simply project their positive valuation of peace to the Korean case without reflecting on the meaning of peace in the local Korean context. The aim of Peace and Conflict Studies is not to impose a universal conflict resolution approach to the Korean conflict, but to

[85] Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 59–60.

[86] Kim, 'A Peace Studies Approach to North Korean Studies', 42.

explore what peace means for the diverse groups in the Korean conflict, and also analyse their needs within the context, in order to develop a sustainable peacebuilding strategy in the Korean peninsula.[87]

Conclusion

Because of its engagement in active combat, the UN intervention into the Korean War is not seen as a traditional peacekeeping operation. As well, the peacekeeping which was implemented upon the signing of the Armistice Agreement is seen as a US initiative over which the UN has no control.[88] However, the historical and current top-down approach to keeping peace, with almost no interaction between people across the highly militarised Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), makes the armistice machinery in the Korean peninsula subject to criticism by Galtung, and in need for the adoption of a peacebuilding approach.

The concept and theory of peacebuilding, proposed by peace researchers in the 1970s, has been widely practiced by the international community since the 1990s. The latest discussion of 'strategic peacebuilding' within Peace and Conflict studies is an effort to improve the effectiveness of this practice. Critical research on contemporary international peacebuilding practices in conflict-affected societies, led by Peace and Conflict Studies academics, appear to agree that if peacebuilding is to be effective, sustainable and ethically defensible, the process must be conflict sensitive and employ strategies which include a more comprehensive array of actors, activities, levels of society and links between societies.[89] As we will see in the next chapters, there have been various initiatives by local and international governments and civil society groups to build peace on the Korean peninsula, following Kofi Annan's description of peacebuilding; "negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, security stabilization, good governance, democratization and human rights, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian relief and

[87] Koo, *Pip'anjŏk p'yŏnghwayŏn'guwa Hanbanto* [Critical Peace Research and the Korean Peninsula], 96–98.

[88] Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 33–34.

[89] Lederach and Appleby, 'Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview', 40–41.

sustainable development".[90] However, most research on peace in the Korean peninsula has been focused on the role of the states. Researching peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula using the lens of strategic peacebuilding is expected to identify the needs of local people in both South and North Korea for peacebuilding and to contribute to developing viable peacebuilding strategies for not only state actors but also for the actors in multiple levels of the Korean societies.

[90]Annan, 'S/2001/138—Letter Dated 12 February 2001 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council'.

CHAPTER 3

The Korean Conflict and Society: A Historical Context

This chapter explores the historical context of the Korean conflict. Interpretations of the history of the Korean conflict are contested, as are other histories of conflict-affected societies. The intention of this chapter is not to engage in dispute about the history of the Korean conflict, but to provide a contextual background for the Korean peace process and civil society peacebuilding from the perspective of Peace and Conflict Studies. As pointed out by Peace and Conflict researchers who are critical of the institutional approach to international peacebuilding outlined in Chapter 2, understanding the impact of colonialism, division, and war, and the subsequent dictatorships of both North and South Korea on Korean society, is critical to creating a sustainable peacebuilding strategy for Korea.

Geopolitical Location and the Experience of Colonialism

Since the nineteenth century, the geopolitical position of the Korean peninsula, situated between great power-rivalries, has continually caused security predicaments for Koreans. Samuel Kim quotes an old Korean saying, "A shrimp gets crushed to death in the fight between whales" in order to explain the ramifications of geopolitical struggles on the Korean peninsula involving "the variations on the Big Four of contemporary

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1_3

Northeast Asian international relations"; China, Japan, Russia, and the USA.[1] Charles Armstrong explains how the geographical location of the Korean peninsula became strategically important in the nineteenth century, as Chinese influence in the region decreased and Western countries began to compete for power and control in East Asia. "The emergence of a new nexus of power, knowledge, and technology" made Japanese power much stronger and more assertive. By the end of the nineteenth century, Japan began to vie with China, and later with Russia, for influence in Korea. After winning the Sino-Japanese War of 1884–1895, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Japanese control of the Korean peninsula increased significantly and the Korean peninsula was annexed by Japan in 1910.[2]

The continuing political and economic oppression of Japanese colonialism strengthened Korean nationalism and intensified the independence movement, as demonstrated by the March 1 Movement in 1919. Nonviolent mass demonstrations, with people shouting '*Taehan tongnip manse*' (Long live an independent Korea), began on 1 March 1919, spread countrywide, and were violently suppressed by Japanese police. Alarmed by the nationwide protest, the Japanese soon adopted an appeasement policy which they called the 'cultural policy', promising more freedom in the political and cultural lives of Koreans and more opportunities in education.[3] However, as the Japanese advanced on the continent, with the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the second Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945), and the Pacific War (1941–1945), the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula grew. To maintain effective war mobilisation on the Korean peninsula, the Japanese colonial authority initiated a forced assimilation policy. Koreans were required to speak Japanese and to take Japanese names. Young men were conscripted into the Japanese military, and older men were forced to work in the construction of Japanese military fields. Women were rounded up and thrown into brothels to 'comfort' Japanese soldiers.[4]

[1] Samuel S. Kim, *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–2.

[2] Charles K. Armstrong, *The Koreas* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 6–9.

[3] Carter J. Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1991), 276–83.

[4] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 181–83.

In the meantime, ideological disagreements about the characteristics of a liberated Korean state emerged among the people in the independence movement. Some groups aspired to build a socialist state through social revolution, while others wanted a modernised Korean state achieved through gradual enlightenment. The first group was categorised as 'left' (*Chwap'a*) and the latter as 'right' (*Up'a*'). Japanese authority instigated the split in order to maintain colonial rule. Despite several efforts to unify the independence movement through the Korean Provisional Government (*Taehanmin'guk imsichŏngbu*, KPG, 1919–1948) and the *Sin'ganhoe* (New Korea Society, 1927–1931), fragmentation in the movement persisted, even after the end of the Japanese colonial rule in the Korean peninsula in 1945.[5] The geopolitical condition of the Korean peninsula, which resulted in Soviet occupation of the north and US occupation of the south immediately following the defeat of Japan, inflamed the conflict between left and right.[6]

A Divided Korean Peninsula and Incompatible Goals

At the end of Second World War in 1945, the Korean independence movement and the KPG, who had long fought Japanese colonial rule, were not acknowledged among the victors. Instead, the Korean peninsula was divided at the thirty-eighth parallel by the occupations of the Soviet Union and the US. As a well-known phrase from the Cairo Declaration (1943) implies, "in due course Korea shall become free and independent", allies from the Second World War, the US in particular, advocated the need for a multi-national trusteeship of the Korean peninsula. The US led the discussions of a multi-national trusteeship for Korea at the UN conferences in Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July 1945), in part, to deter sovietisation of the Korean peninsula. In addition to the trusteeship plan, according to Yi Boram, the US appeared to have expected that the use of atomic bombs on Japan "would pre-empt Soviet entry into the Pacific war and allow the United States to occupy Korea

[5] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 300–304; Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 104.

[6] Man Gil Kang, *Isipseki Uri Yŏksa* [20th Century Our History] (Seoul: Ch'angjakkwa pip'yŏngsa, 2009), 281.

unilaterally".[7] However, the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan prior to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, and quickly advanced onto the Korean peninsula on 12 August 1945. The US promptly demanded that the Soviet Union halt the military occupation at the thirty-eighth parallel and, after obtaining agreement from the Soviet Union, occupied the remaining Korean peninsula.[8] In December 1945, at the Moscow Conference, the US and Soviet Union agreed to form a Joint Soviet-American Commission, in order to establish an interim Korean government under a 5-year multi-national trusteeship. The Joint Soviet-American Commission met in 1946, and again in 1947, but failed to reach agreement on which groups of Koreans would embody the interim government.[9] Carter Eckert says that the Joint Commission was in trouble from the first set of meetings due to "the right-left polarization of Korean politics as a result of Soviet and American occupation policies." Before the first meeting of the commission in March 1946, both occupation forces had set up separate administrative bodies in Seoul and Pyongyang, and begun to sponsor their preferred Korean political leaders, Kim Il-sung by the USSR, and Rhee Syng-man by the US.[10] Meanwhile, passage across the thirty-eighth parallel became more and more tightly controlled by the US and Soviet militaries.[11]

In 1947, the US asked the UN General Assembly to discuss the issue of Korean independence, in spite of the contention by the Soviet Union that this was in violation of the Moscow Agreement. As a result, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was set up to secure and observe a nation-wide election. However, due to a boycott by the Soviet occupied zone, the mission of the Commission was not successful. In 1948, at the insistence of the US, the UN authorised the UNTCOK to observe and certify an election in the US occupied

[7] Boram Yi, 'Prelude to Conflict, 1910–1948', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, ed. James I. Matray and Donald W. Boose (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 16.

[8] William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 18–19.

[9] Kang, *Isipseki Uri Yŏksa* [20th Century Our History], 223–27.

[10] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 340–41.

[11] The United States The Department of State, *Korea 1945–1948* (Washington, DC: Division of Publication Office of Public Affairs, 1950), 3.

zone.[12] Despite opposition from the North and nationalists in the South, including Kim Ku, who was concerned about a permanent division of the Korean peninsula, an election was held in May 1948.[13] Consequently, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) was established on 15 August 1948. In response, the Soviet Union sponsored an election in the North and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) was formed on 9 September 1948. As the separate governments were inaugurated, the political division of the Korean peninsula created different economic and social systems on either side of the thirty-eighth parallel.[14] Both the ROK and the DPRK governments asserted sovereignty as the only legitimate government of the entire Korean peninsula. The incompatible goals for a unified Korean peninsula under their respective regime, cultivated a growing conflict between the ROK and the DPRK. Charles Armstrong says, "war was virtually inevitable; the only question was which side, South or North, would start it."[15]

However, as we discussed in Chapter 2, Peace and Conflict Studies researchers argue that incompatible goals do not automatically lead to violent action. For example, Johan Galtung describes a progression of polarisation and dehumanisation in a violent conflict. The more violent the conflict, the deeper the polarisation found in the structure of the society.[16] The Korean conflict was intensified through provocative rhetoric, insurrection and guerrilla warfare. Although South Korea lacked military force and struggled with unrest in most regions and socio-economic sectors, the first South Korean President Rhee Syng-man continued his "March North!" oratory, calling North Korean regime Russian puppets.[17] Rhee Syng-man was educated in the US, Harvard University

[12] Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947–1950* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 49–83.

[13] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 343.

[14] John Merrill, 'Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948–1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War', in *Child of Conflict: The Korean-America Relationship, 1943–1953*, ed. Bruce Cumings (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1983), 161.

[15] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 15.

[16] Johan Galtung, 'Conflict, War and Peace: A Bird's Eye View', in *Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND*, ed. Johan Galtung, Carl G. Jacobsen, and Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 3–4.

[17] Yong-Pyo Hong, *State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953–60* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 24–25.

(M.A.) and Princeton University (Ph.D. in International Law). When he returned from the US in 1945, he was seen as the obvious choice by the US Army Military government in Korea (USAMGIK) for Korean leader of the ROK. But, Eckert says the USAMGIK had concerns about Rhee's divisive rhetoric, not only towards the Soviet Union and Korean communists, but also towards those who were willing to negotiate with them. For some time, the USAMGIK supported Kim Ku, a renowned leader from the independence movement who was willing to engage in dialogue with the left, if necessary, to form a unified Korean government. However, in the end, the USAMGIK sponsored Rhee, as he had gained popular support from the right, who were in favour of the USAMGIK.[18]

Upon inception, the Rhee Syng-man government began to express a preference for unification by military means. Any dialogue or cooperation with the communists was not acceptable to Rhee. Hong Youngpyo argues that this aggressive policy toward North Korea appeared to be helpful to Rhee in bolstering his political status.[19] As the new South Korean president, Rhee had numerous challenges to face: a poorly institutionalised administration; low official salaries due to economic distress; personal patronage; endemic corruption; the influx of a million defectors from North Korea, many of whom were property owners fleeing communist rule, and class warfare; violent clashes between the left and the right extremists; ceaseless insurgences; guerrilla warfare sponsored by North Korea and the Soviet Union; and growing political opposition in the National Assembly.[20] Rhee employed anti-communist rhetoric and national security to suppress opposition, by outlawing communism and expanding security forces and the intelligence system. Kim Jinwung says the ROK became "a 'national security state' under Rhee's dictatorial rule".[21] According to William Stueck, approximately one hundred thousand South Koreans had been put to death by the Rhee government by the time the Korean War broke out in 1950.[22]

[18] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 342.

[19] Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, 25–26.

[20] Adrian Buzo, *The Making of Modern Korea* (London: Routledge, 2002), 71–74.

[21] Jinwung Kim, 'South Korea', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, ed. James I. Matray and Donald W. Boose (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 28.

[22] William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 68–69.

Compared to South Korea, the North Korean political, economic and social situation appeared to be gradually stabilising under the rule of Kim Il-sung, a former commander of the Soviet Army. The Soviet Union endorsed him as the leader of the northern Korean peninsula by promoting him as a national hero who had fought Japanese colonial rule, although there has since been some misgiving about the credibility of this identity. Robert Scalapino and Lee Chong-sik say there is some historical evidence which confirms that Kim Il-sung led a small-scale guerrilla raid against Japanese in the 1930s before joining the Soviet Army in the 1940s. But, they also say, "everything associated with him had grown out of all proportion to reality". Since he was introduced to the public on 14 October 1945 at a mass rally in the Pyongyang athletic field, many North Koreans were led to believe that Kim Il-sung was "a great Korean patriot who had roamed at will over Manchuria, repeatedly defeating vast numbers of Japanese".[23] During 1945–1950, under the supervision of the Soviet Union, Kim and other communist leaders facilitated a reform, by dispossessing landlords without compensation, nationalising all land and industry, and introducing a centrally planned economic system. The reform received strong support among North Koreans and Kim Il-sung's popularity surged. The leaders of the his Korean Workers' Party (KWP) became the new ruling elites, committed themselves to class warfare against the remnants of the old society, and pledged their loyalty to Kim Il-sung.[24] Andrei Lankov describes that the "dream of universal equality and affluence, enforced by a watchful, but benevolent, state, was difficult to resist—particularly when a blueprint for such a society was presented in the 'modern' and 'scientific' jargon of Marxism-Leninism".[25] Adrian Buzo says, "This ideologically driven sense of purpose in the North contrasted strongly with the disorganization and weakness of the South".[26]

Kim Il-sung claimed the legitimacy of the DPRK for the entire peninsula by presenting a Democratic Base (*Minju Kiji*). From Kim's perspective, reform in North Korea would enable the DPRK to become a

[23] Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea, Part I: The Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 222, 324.

[24] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 227–28.

[25] Andrei Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.

[26] Buzo, *The Making of Modern Korea*, 72–73.

democratic base for nationwide revolution in the Korean peninsula, including South Korea.[27] In this sense, until the revision in 1972, the constitutional capital of the DPRK was not Pyongyang, but Seoul. Like Rhee Syng-man, Kim was committed to unifying the Korean peninsula by force. Kim Il-sung kept asking permission from the Soviet Union to conquer South Korea, calling the ROK a puppet of the US.[28] Going beyond rhetoric and asking for cooperation from his communist allies, Kim Il-sung appeared to have been preparing for war, by strengthening the military capacity of North Korea. Hamm describes in his book, 'Arming the Two Koreas', how the North Korean army had become superior to the South Korean army by 1950. The Korean People's Army (KPA) has been established in February 1948, before the formation of the DPRK government. North Korean Army officers were recruited from the Pyongyang Academy and anti-Japanese partisans trained by the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet occupation forces left North Korea, the KPA expanded its strength through conscription and the recruitment of the Korean Volunteer Army which had fought in the Chinese Civil War. By June 1950, the number of soldiers in the KPA had grown to 135,000, while the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), South Korea had only 98,000. In terms of weapons and equipment, such as "artillery, automatic weapons, aircraft, and the 'invincible' tanks (Soviet-made T-34s)", the KPA held an almost absolute advantage over the ROKA, which had "no tanks, heavy artillery, combat aircraft or other heavy equipment".[29]

The Korean War

As polarisation and dehumanisation took their course in the Korean peninsula, the probability of using direct violence to resolve incompatible goals increased. The subject-action-object relationship of direct violence appeared to be clear to Kim Il-sung, who held "a profound, ideological conviction that the masses in the South would rally to the North if

[27] Sahoekwahakch'ulp'ansa, *Chŏngch'iyongŏsachŏn* [A Dictionary of Political Terminology] (Pyongyang: Sahoekwahakch'ulp'ansa, 1970), 200.

[28] Lankov, *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia*, 9–10.

[29] Taik-Young Hamm, *Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power* (London: Routledge, 1999), 63.

their government could be destabilized".[30] Park Myong-lim recounts what Kim Il-sung said to Stalin, Premier of the Soviet Union at the time of Kim's visit to the Soviet Union in 1949, in his extensive research on the Korean War, quoting diplomatic documents from the Soviet Union (*Soryŏnoekyomunsŏ*).

> Comrade Stalin. Now is the time to liberate the entire Korean peninsula by force. The South Korean anti-revolutionary group will never agree to peaceful unification. They want to maintain the division until they have enough power to invade us. Now, we have a great opportunity to conquer them. Our army is strong, and we have strong support from the partisan groups in South Korea.[31]

Kim Il-sung seemed to have viewed the incompatible goals between the ROK and the DPRK as a tug-of-war or zero-sum game. Therefore, his ultimate strategy to accomplish this goal would be victory over the ROK, using any violence necessary, before the US and Japan could gain a greater military presence in and around the Korean peninsula.[32] However, Stalin appeared cautious concerning a war, as he was worried about the possibility of an expansion of a Korean War into a war between the USSR and the US. Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong, second in command in the KWP and long-time communist leader in the South, attempted to persuade Stalin and Chinese communist leader Mao via several telegrams and secret meetings in April and May 1950. They were sure that North Korea could capture Seoul, the capital of South Korea quickly, that within a few days, a pro-North Korean uprising would occur in South Korea, and the US would not have time to intervene.[33] According to a telegram between Stalin and Mao on 14 May 1950, Stalin eventually gave permission to Kim Il-sung.[34]

[30] Buzo, *The Making of Modern Korea*, 77.

[31] Myong-lim Park, *Han'gukchŏnjaengŭi Palbalgwa Kiwŏn 1: Kyŏljŏnggwa Palbal* [The Origins and Breakout of the Korean War 1: Decision and Breakout] (Paju: Nanam, 2017), 108.

[32] Bruce Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947–1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 457–59.

[33] Lankov, *The Real North Korea*, 10; Kim, 'South Korea', 39.

[34] "Cable from Vyshinsky to Mao Zedong, Relaying Stalin's Stance on Permission for North Korea to attack South Korea," May 14, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, The document, from the Russian Presidential Archives, was given by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to South Korean President Kim Young-Sam

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army attacked South Korea. Park says, although, from the perspective of South Korea, the attack from North Korea was sudden, North Koreans had been preparing for the invasion for at least 6 months. Kim Il-sung not only secured support from the Soviet Union and China and internally strengthened military capacity, but also created a pretext for the attack, by proposing peaceful unification proposals which South Korea would not be able to accept.[35] In the early stages of the war, it seemed that North Korea would occupy the entire peninsula, as Kim expected. The timing of the invasion, on a Sunday morning when many South Korean officers and their American advisers were away from their units, gave North Korea the tactical advantage.[36] By the end of July, North Korea had swept south and occupied most of South Korea, except Pusan, a city in southeast of the Korean peninsula.[37]

The UN Security Council met immediately following the invasion of South Korea, passed Resolution 82, which urged the withdrawal of North Korea, and Resolution 83, which recommended the use of force to defend South Korea, and authorised the formation of a United Nations Command (UNC). These resolutions were possible due to the absence of the Soviet Union, which had boycotted the meeting in protest of a decision by the General Assembly to deny recognition to People's Republic of China (PRC) as a member. When the Soviet Union returned to the Security Council on 1 August 1950, the US initiated the Uniting for Peace resolution, passed in the General Assembly on 3 November 1950, which allows the General Assembly to consider the use of force if the Security Council fails to exercise its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.[38] In the midst of the UN squabble, the US appointed General Douglas MacArthur as UNC

during the latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994, and was made available to CWIHP by the South Korean Embassy in Washington. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115976.

[35] Park, *Han'gukchŏnjaengŭi Palbalgwa Kiwŏn 1: Kyŏljŏnggwa Palbal* [The Origins and Breakout of the Korean War 1: Decision and Breakout], 455.

[36] Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 68–69.

[37] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 268.

[38] Sven Bernhard Bernhard Gareis and Johannes Varwick, *The United Nations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 9–10.

commander and deployed over 300,000 soldiers to the Korean peninsula, and dispatched the Seventh Fleet of the US Navy to Taiwan Strait to contain the PRC. Following the decision of the General Assembly, by the end of 1950 fifteen countries besides the US, had committed forces to the UNC.[39] Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the US appeared to be moving toward improving relations with the PRC, but the Korean War caused the US position on the PRC to become more hostile.[40] Glenn Paige says the US decision to intervene in the Korean War "was accompanied by an abrupt reversal of American policy toward Communist China and seems to have initiated a period in which the United States is committed to prevent the extension by violence of Communist rule in Asia".[41]

When the US armed forces, led by General MacArthur, captured Incheon, a harbour city on the mid-west of the Korean peninsula, in September 1950, the North Korean army was forced to retreat. The thirty-eighth parallel military delineation was proclaimed by the end of that month, but the US army did not stop at the thirty-eighth parallel and continued to march into North Korea. By the end of October, almost every region in North Korea seemed to have fallen to the US/South Korean army, and the troop race toward the Manchurian border of the PRC appeared unopposed. In response, China dispatched the Chinese People's Volunteers Force (CPVF) into the Korean peninsula by reason of assisting a fellow communist country. There have been several interpretations of the rationale for Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Xia says the general consensus among historians is that the US involvement in the Korean War and the deployment of the US Fleet to the Taiwan Strait provoked Chinese military response to safeguard the Chinese-Korean border and to prevent the escalation of US influence in East Asia.[42] Telegrams between Mao and Stalin show that the Soviets also provided covert assistance to North Korea, in the form of

[39] Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 65.

[40] Yafeng Xia, 'The People's Republic of China', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, ed. James I. Matray and Donald W. Boose (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 66.

[41] Glenn D. Paige, *Korean Decision: June 24–30, 1950* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 4.

[42] Xia, 'The People's Republic of China', 64.

pilots, artillery personnel, and military goods.[43] Kathryn Weathersby says that the Soviet Union was careful not to be seen to be involved in the Korean War, to prevent the expansion of that war to a war with the US, but their role in providing arms and ammunition and keeping the route to the Korean peninsula open for Chinese troops and Soviet supplies was critical.[44] In the end, the Korean peninsula became an international battlefield. Stueck says, over half the military casualties were "non-Koreans, and a large portion of the casualties to Korean civilians would come at the hands of foreigners, particularly UN airmen bombing and strafing territory above the 38th parallel".[45]

When the Uniting for Peace resolution passed in November, MacArthur, as the Commander of the UN forces, ordered the destruction by air strikes of every installation, factory, city and village in North Korea. Seventy B-29 bombers dropped 330 tons of incendiary bombs with napalm between 8 and 25 November; seven hundred 500-pound bombs, napalm, and 175 tons of delayed-fuse demolition bombs were dropped on the 14 and 15 December; and from the 3 to 5 January 1951, North Korea was bombarded with 12,000 lb tarzon bombs.[46] On 24 December 1950, in order to cut off a Chinese advance into Korea, MacArthur requested a deployment of approximately thirty atomic bombs on the Chinese and North Korean borders. The US considered this request seriously during 1951, even running atomic bombing simulations on North Korea, but the request was never approved. Most European allies objected and appealed for a ceasefire out of concern that the Korean war would extend to the European continent.[47] As the stalemate near the thirty-eighth parallel continued, armistice negotiations began in July 1951. Rhee Syng-man strongly rejected the armistice. Similar to Kim Il-sung, particularly when Kim was planning war, Rhee

[43] "Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong," December 27, 1952, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, Fond 45, Op. 1, D. 343, L. 115–116 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110021.

[44] Kathryn Weathersby, 'The Soviet Union', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, ed. James I. Matray and Donald W. Boose (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 92.

[45] Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 65.

[46] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 275–94.

[47] Cumings, 293; Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 124.

had a zero-sum concept of the Korean conflict. Hong introduces Rhee's letter to US President Truman in 1950, in his book on Rhee Syng-man:

> It would be utter folly to attempt to restore the status quo ante bellum and then to await the enemy's pleasure for further attack when he had time to regroup, retain and re-equip. The time has come to cut out once and for all the cancer of imperialist aggression, the malignant growth artificially grown within the bosom of our country by world Communism.[48]

The Rhee government advised complete disarmament of North Korean communists as a precondition for armistice, something North Korea could not accept. Rhee argued an armistice without this condition would be a death sentence for the Korean people.[49] However, despite opposition by Rhee, the Armistice Agreement of 1953 was signed on 27 July 1953, by US General William Harrison, Jr., representing the UNC, and North Korean General Nam Il, representing the KPA and the CPVA. Stanley outlines the negotiation process to reach an armistice in relation to the changes in the domestic politics of major international parties, such as the inauguration of the Eisenhower administration in January and the death of Stalin in May.[50]

The Korean war was a setback for both the DPRK, who had been confident enough to initiate the war, and for the ROK, who did not want ceasefire, in their goal to unify Korea under their respective systems. The 3-year war did not resolve the zero-sum game, cost the lives of more than several million people, and destroyed much of the public infrastructure. Eckert says that the total military and civilian casualties reached 1.3 million in the South and 1.5 million in the North. Aerial bombardment "ravaged the countryside and reduced cities like Pyongyang to ashes and rubble."[51] Cummings explains that the Koreans went through a virtual holocaust, which "ravaged their country and turned the vibrant expectations of 1945 (liberation) into a nightmare".[52] Stueck argues, "The end reflected poignantly the depth of the situational

[48] Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, 31–32.

[49] Hong, 34.

[50] Elizabeth A. Stanley, *Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 231–36.

[51] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 1991, 345.

[52] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 298.

and ideological divide between the opposing parties in Korea".[53] Once considered as one nation, North Koreans and South Koreans had lost trust in, and developed hatred toward, each other. The re-established status quo has continued for over 65 years, and the root causes and tensions of the conflict remain.[54]

Meanwhile, the geopolitical condition of the Korean peninsula following the Korean War has not been favourable for North and South Korea in finding options for resolving their conflict beyond a zero-sum formula. According to Samuel Kim, the Korean War was instrumental in the rise of the US, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan to great powers during the Cold War era. The US and the Soviet Union established superpower identities in a bipolar world. China's participation in the war restored its status as a strong state in the communist bloc. Japan was able to reinstate its sovereignty earlier than expected and become a successful economic power in the capitalist bloc, furthered by the war economy as a logistical base and manufacturing centre for US war supplies. North and South Koreas belong to separate blocs, and the experience of the Korean War consolidated Cold War identities in their respective societies.[55] Domestically, the political leaders of the DPRK and the ROK used the Korean War and subsequent Cold War to strengthen their own political power. Lankov says, before the war, although he was the premier, Kim Il-sung was one of many communist leaders, but following the war, he became the only leader. As a result of the conflict situation Kim was able to promote his guerrilla friends and eliminate political competition.[56] Hong says, the war similarly helped Rhee Syng-man, who was facing strong political opposition, to rally public support and to become an authoritarian leader by emphasising the communist threat.[57]

The Dictatorships

As we discussed in Chapter 2, from the perspective of Galtung, negative peace is likely to be bought at the expense of positive peace. In order to maintain absence of war achieved by peace or an armistice agreement,

[53] Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 179.

[54] Christoph Bluth, *Korea* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 1–2.

[55] Kim, *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers*, 3–4.

[56] Lankov, *The Real North Korea*, 11.

[57] Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, 35.

armed forces would not be allowed to cross an armistice line. But this demarcation line could also block any positive interactions and cooperation between the conflict parties, including relationship building between ordinary people. For this reason, the root causes of conflict and antagonism would most likely persist. Additionally, the top-level leadership of the conflict parties tend to use the protracted conflict situation to validate internal structural violence.[58]

The Armistice Agreement of 1953 and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) were to stop the direct violence between North and South Korea. However, interactions of people across the DMZ have also been suspended for the past 65 years. The armistice machinery in the Korean peninsula is considered to be one of the most protracted and unstable negative peace situations in the world. As Galtung says, an approach to maintaining the absence of direct violence, which prevents any interaction between people in each conflict party, is vulnerable to the resumption of violence. The continuous war-like provocation by North Korea and the annual show of force, such as the joint military drills by South Korea and the US, continue to remind both Koreas that the war is not finished, only suspended.[59] During the Cold War, both Korean regimes began an arms race, and the strengthened military forces were loyal supporters of their respective regimes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, both North and South Koreas claimed their system was democratic. Although the North Koreans expressed this in the name, 'Democratic' People's Republic of Korea, it was their own particular version of democracy. South Korean leaders insisted they had modelled their republic on the American system and always referred to it as a liberal democracy, but until democratisation of South Korea in the late 1980s, the governments were authoritarian.[60] Galtung states, "North Korea has increasingly developed an absurd society with deep disjunction between propaganda and reality", and this was to some extent "mirrored in South Korea".[61]

[58] Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding', in *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research II* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), 297–303.

[59] Hamm, *Arming the Two Koreas*, 74–78.

[60] Michael Breen, *The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, What Their Future Lies* (New York: Tomas Dune, 2004), 196.

[61] Galtung, 'Conflict, War and Peace: A Bird's Eye View', 219.

In order to protect his dictatorship from the threats of internal division and external aggression, Kim Il-sung paid as much attention to social control as to defence preparation. The Korean conflict gave Kim Il-sung opportunities to purge, one after another, opposing political factions, until he had unquestioned control of the party, the state, and the army. North Koreans were monitored by overlapping military and quasi-military security organisations; all information was censored through this system.[62] Lankov says the majority of people who had led the communist movement in the Korean peninsula under Japanese rule, were purged during 1953–1955. Pak Hon-yong was among them. He was accused of being an American spy and executed in 1955.[63] Soon after the execution of Park, Kim Il-sung initiated purges of communist party members who had close ties with the Soviet Union and China, as part of the August Faction Incident (*8wŏljongp'asakŏn*) of 1956. In February 1956, Khrushchev's speech in a closed session of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union facilitated the 'de-Stalinization' campaign. Emboldened by the political changes in the Soviet Union, the pro-Soviet faction (*Soryŏnp'a*) and the pro-Chinese Yennan faction (*Yŏnanp'a*) of the KWP began to criticise Kim's personality cult and attempted to replace him.[64] Chung Young-chul says that the critics of Kim Il-sung also argued for a change in the economic development policy of North Korea, parallel to the economic policy changes of the Soviet Union. The pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions wanted to move away "from heavy industrialization toward increased production of consumption goods, and away from ideological commitment in favour of pragmatic materialism." According to Chung, Kim Il-sung regarded this criticism as a challenge to *Juche* (Self-reliance) and the "Korean communists' old habit of depending on the Soviet Union and China".[65] At the August Plenum of the Central Committee of the

[62] Gavan McCormack, *Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe* (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 54.

[63] Lankov, *The Real North Korea*, 11–13.

[64] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 61; Patrick McEachern, *Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-totalitarian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 57.

[65] Young Chul Chung, 'The Suryŏng System as the Center of Juche Institution: Politics of Development Strategy in Postwar North Korea', in *Origins of North Korea's Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development*, ed. Jae-Jung Suh (Lexington Books, 2014), 97.

KWP in 1956, Kim banished these factions from the party and began a widespread purge, which lasted until 1958. Kim Il-sung argued:

> The existence of capitalism in the world and the survivals of obsolete ideas in people's mind are reflected as factionalist tendency in the Party. We must thoroughly overcome the factionalist tendency to slander the Party centre and wreck the Party by combatting it mercilessly and with a high degree of vigilance and must uphold the Party centre's leadership till the end.[66]

Armstrong says, "From then on, the core of the DPRK leadership remained a group of loyalists with close personal ties to Kim Il Sung".[67]

In 1959, while economic aid for the reconstruction of the country from the socialist countries including the Soviet Union was decreasing, Kim Il-Sung launched the Ch'ŏllima Movement (*Ch'ŏllimaundong*), an ideological campaign to mobilise the industrial working masses for speedy economic development.[68] In 1961, Kim introduced the Taean management system (*Taeanŭi saŏpch'ekye*), which was intended to overcome the lack of inputs by maximising labour productivity.[69] Kim Byung-Yeon summarises the three principles of this management system: "the first was to place political priorities above economic ones, the second was to focus on moral and spiritual incentives rather than material rewards, and the third emphasized the role of the Workers' Party Committee over management in the supervision of firms."[70] In spite of some setbacks, such as the failure to meet the deadline for the seven year economic development plan of 1961–1967, until the mid-1960s the North Korean economy appeared to grow at a faster rate than South Korea. But, eventually, the drop in foreign aid and the excessive military expenditure, up to 30% of the government budget, slowed the

[66] Il-Sung Kim, *Kim Il Sung Works 10* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982), 328.

[67] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 62.

[68] Christopher Hale, 'Multifunctional Juche', in *Inter-Korean Relations: Family or Enemy?* ed. Kun Young Park (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym International Corporation, 2014), 108.

[69] Il-Sung Kim, *Kim Il Sung Works 15* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1983), 363–93.

[70] Byung-Yeon Kim, *Unveiling the North Korean Economy: Collapse and Transition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 44.

growth of the economy.[71] Furthermore, the slow growth was accompanied with "fatigue symptoms". As Chung says, "Witnessing a decreasing return for their revolutionary efforts, many began to question the revolution and elected to consider their self-interest before the larger cause of the nation". In response to the changing attitude of the workers, in 1967, some North Korean elites, such as Kapsan group (*Kapsanp'a*), began to suggest policies which embraced the individual needs of people. However, as with previous factions, they were soon removed by Kim Il-sung. According to Chung, consistent purges made North Korean society increasingly passive, following orders and losing revolutionary motivation.[72]

In 1972, the new 'Socialist Constitution' ensured an indisputable dictatorship for Kim Il-sung, by creating a presidency with no re-election limits.[73] In the meantime, in 1973, Kim Jong-il, the eldest son of Kim Il-sung rose as potential successor to his father, by taking charge of organisation, propaganda, and agitation in the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party. He led the Three Revolution Campaign, which was mass mobilisation project by the DPRK in ideology, technology, and culture. In 1974, Kim Jong-il began to be referred to as 'Party Centre' (*Tangjungang*), the unofficial second in power. In October 1980, his nomination as successor to his father became official at the Sixth Congress of the KWP. He obtained positions in the Secretariat, the Politburo, and the Military Commission.[74] Kim Jong-il consolidated his political power during the 1970s by facilitating ideological indoctrination, the idolisation of Kim Il-sung in particular, and in the 1980s began to fill senior leadership positions with people who were loyal to him.[75] In the early 1990s, Kim Jong-il expanded the role of the military into socioeconomic and political sectors. He became Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Commission in 1990, and Chairman of the Commission in 1993. He assumed leadership of the DPRK following the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. His rule has been described

[71] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 63–70.

[72] Chung, 'The Suryŏng System as the Center of Juche Institution: Politics of Development Strategy in Postwar North Korea', 101–7.

[73] Dae-Kyu Yoon, 'The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications', *Fordham International Law Journal* 27, no. 4 (2003): 1296.

[74] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 76.

[75] McEachern, *Inside the Red Box*, 65.

as "military-first politics" (*Sŏn'gunjŏngch'i*). The use of the military to consolidate his dictatorship was explained to the public as a provisional measure in the face of the insecurity and economic crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union. He attempted to maintain the economic development policies of his father, which were based on ideological mobilisation, by promoting militarism.[76] Andrew Scobell explains that 'a clearly identifiable enduring threat' was necessary to justify the regime's militarisation, and its repressive system of controls.[77]

The North Korean economy crashed in the late 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union severely affected its already weakened economy.[78] Furthermore, North Koreans endured massive natural disasters, including a series of floods, in the mid-1990s. The public distribution system in North Korea collapsed and the annual per capita income was estimated to be around US$1000.[79] The malnutrition rate was up to 30%, and a quarter of the entire population was dependant on external aid, which included United Nations World Food Program (WFP).[80] In spite of a struggling economy, North Korea has been spending large amounts of its financial and industrial resources to strengthen its military power. Hamm argues that, "due to the economic crisis and the weakening of ties with its allies, the North has concentrated on the more economical 'strategic weapons'".[81] The DPRK is still developing several weapons, including nuclear weapons, and attempting to use them as a leverage in relations with the US and South Korea.[82]

While the North Korean economy has been struggling, South Korea has achieved considerable economic growth. Armstrong says, "South Korea's rapid industrialization, the so-called 'miracle on the River Han',

[76] Chung, 'The Suryŏng System as the Center of Juche Institution: Politics of Development Strategy in Postwar North Korea', 110.

[77] Andrew Scobell, 'The Evolution of North Korea's Political System and Pyongyang's Potential for Conflict Management', *North Korean Review* 4, no. 1 (2008): 96.

[78] Karin Lee and Julia Choi, 'U.S. Sanctions and Treasury Department Actions against North Korea from 1955 to October 2007', *North Korean Review* 4, no. 1 (2008): 20–22.

[79] Dick K. Nanto, 'North Korea's Economic Crisis, Reforms, and Policy Implications', in *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival*, ed. Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 2006), 119.

[80] The UN Humanitarian Country Team, '2017 DPR Korea Needs and Priorities' (The UN Humanitarian Country Team in the DPRK, March 2017).

[81] Hamm, *Arming the Two Koreas*, 89.

[82] Kim, *Unveiling the North Korean Economy*, 1–2.

is a collaborative effort by government and big business, with government firmly in command". US aid and the patronage of the South Korean government contributed to export-oriented modernisation. The South Korean government took advantage of the Vietnam War to secure foreign capital, as well as receiving Japanese aid in return for normalisation of diplomatic relations. Consequently, the economic model dictated by the government generated a significant increase in the South Korean GNP in the 1970s. Politically, South Korea also underwent several dictatorships, although these dictatorships were much less stable, and therefore less monolithic, than North Korea.[83] South Korean dictators strengthened their political power by invoking anti-communist discourse, making North Korea the sworn enemy and therefore a constant threat. They employed this discourse to justify the need for a strong authoritarian rule. Differing political views were not tolerated, several politicians were arrested, media censorship was strengthened, and free speech, particularly in regard to North Korea and reunification, was banned.[84] Those who opposed them were painted as traitors or communists. The military was used, not only to defend the country, but also to govern the country. Ironically, the South Korean dictatorship, which had a strong anti-communist character, also conducted massive communist-style purges.[85]

Eckert says the South Korean government of Rhee Syng-man used the National Security Law (NSL) to implement "a campaign of anti-communist witch hunts that eventually affected tens of thousands of people, most of whom had no connection with the Communist Party." In 1954, Rhee initiated an amendment of the constitution, exempting him from the two-term limitation of the presidency. Faced by the widespread public dissatisfaction of his actions and growing popularity of the opposition party, Rhee extended the reach of the NSL to prohibit any criticism of his rule.[86] For example, in 1958, Cho Pong-am, the Progress Party leader who advocated peaceful unification, was arrested and sentenced to death and his party was outlawed, because he criticised Rhee's

[83] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 28.

[84] Roy Richard Grinker, *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War* (Bloomsburg: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 23.

[85] Henderson, *Korea*, 359; Breen, *The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, What Their Future Lies*, 216.

[86] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 349–50.

military approach to unification. In 1959, the Rhee government closed down the Kyunghyang Shinmun, a paper critical of his government.[87] In 1960, Rhee won the presidential election once again. He was almost unchallenged, due to sudden death of the opposition party candidate Cho Byeong-ok a few weeks before the election. However, soon after the election, it was revealed that secret instructions had been given to the police and election officials in order to ensure the election of his Vice-Presidential candidate. This election fraud ignited student-led protest, 'the April 19 revolution'. Rhee Syng-man responded with martial law and brutal oppression. But, Reeve says that Rhee did not comprehend "the strength of the genuinely popular disgust with his regime", which shortly thereafter forced Rhee to step down on April 26.[88]

In 1961, Major General Park Chung-hee launched a military coup and ousted the moderate successor government. Park's military junta dissolved the National Assembly and formed the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (*Kukkachaekŏnch'oekohoeŭi*, SCNR). The military regime strengthened the censorship of society by creating the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Although the SCNR pledged they would return power to a civilian government, the only change was in Park Chung-hee's title. Park alleged that he had retired from the military and he would like to rule the country as a civilian president, not military general.[89] But, as Seo Joong-seok says, Park kept "the government under the domination of the military" and military officers who "pledged their loyalty to" Park Chung-hee.[90] Park's authoritarian rule kept a firm grip on business and labour, initiating an economic strategy based on economic nationalism combined with import protection and export promotion. Moon Chung-in and Jun Byung-joon say, "the export competitiveness of many South Korean goods was an artificial construct of the dirigiste state".[91] The flow of foreign capital from the Vietnam War, as well as aid packages from the US and Japan, were

[87] Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, 113–30.

[88] W. D. Reeve, *The Republic of Korea* (Oxford University Press, 1963), 49–50.

[89] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 359–62.

[90] Joong-Seok Seo, *Korean Nationalism Betrayed* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007), 41.

[91] Chung-in Moon and Byung-joon Jun, 'Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Infuluences', in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 127.

vital to the success of the South Korean economy. Particularly, Kim Joo-hong says the Vietnam War "was defined as an opportunity to secure capital and export markets for economic modernization projects" as well as to modernise the South Korean military forces "with cutting-edge US weapons systems". In line with his economic policy, Park Chung-hee instigated an arms race with North Korea, including a clandestine nuclear program, for better military capability.[92]

In 1971, despite Park Chung-hee's control over the electoral process, opposition leader Kim Dae-jung, the leading figure in the democratisation movement, won almost 40% of the vote in the South Korean presidential election. In response, Park initiated martial law and revised the national constitution, the Yushin, to make himself a life-time president, which lasted until he was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, head of the KCIA, in October 1979. Only a few months after Park's assassination, in 1980, Major General Chun Doo-hwan led a military coup, supressing civilian demonstrations with armed force. Notably, he was responsible for the May 1980 massacre of over two thousand civilians protesting for democracy, in Gwangju, on the southwest of the Korean peninsula.[93] As did his predecessors, Chun used the Korean conflict to justify his dictatorship, Salie Yea argues, "There are many Koreans who, even today, consider that the measures the state took to repress the Gwangju Uprising were completely justified since, at that time, the threat of invasion from North Korea was supposedly palpable".[94]

[92] Joo-Hong Kim, 'The Armed Forces', in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 173–79.; http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114617.

[93] Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 10, 37–38.

[94] Salie Yea, 'Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea: The (Re) Presentation of the 1980 Gwangju Uprising Through Mangwol-Dong Cemetery', in *Korean Studies at the Dawn of the Millennium* (The Second Biennial Conference Korean Studies Association of Australasia, Australia: Monash Asia Institute Monash University, 2001), 437.

Justification of Violence

The authoritarian regimes of North and South Korea appealed to the collective trauma of Koreans caused by the outside forces, and promoted nationalism, in order to make direct and structural violence look normal or inevitable.[95] Seo says that, under such dictatorships, Koreans became filled with fear and high levels of distrust, and the suspicion that enemies were everywhere, both outside and inside.[96] The first half of the twentieth century was a period of severe deprivation for Koreans who suffered enormous material, status and cultural losses. The experiences and memories of colonisation, partition, and war became embedded in society, dividing people, and affecting national identity. This modern trauma of Koreans is often described by the Korean word, *han*. On one hand, *han* denotes a collective feeling of oppression and isolation, resentment, lament, un-avenged injustice and defeatism; on the other hand, it connotes a deep attachment to life and the survival instinct of the underdog. It was occasionally sublimated into art, painting, dance and literature.[97] Galtung says, "A high level of general Korean resentment (*han*)", against "the crime of denying the autonomy" and "the crime of dividing a people", makes the Korean conflict highly complicated.[98]

The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) commented on the structural violence in North Korea:

> Confucian social structures and the experience of the Japanese colonial occupation have, to some degree, informed the political structures and attitudes prevailing in the country today. The division imposed on the Korean peninsula, the massive destruction caused by the Korean War, and the impact of the Cold War, have engendered an isolationist mind-set and an aversion to outside powers, that are used to justify internal repression.[99]

[95] Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence', *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291.

[96] Seo, *Korean Nationalism Betrayed*, 57.

[97] Nam-dong Seo, *Minjungsinhagŭi t'amgu* [The Research of Minjung Theology] (Seoul: Hangil Sa, 1983), 87.

[98] Galtung, 'Conflict, War and Peace: A Bird's Eye View', 219.

[99] UNCHR, 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—A/HRC/25/63', United Nations Human Rights Council, 7 February 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.

As we have seen above, in Kim Il sung's propaganda, the Korean War was regarded as a means to liberate all Koreans from colonisation and to complete the revolution of the entire peninsula. Following the Korean War, this propaganda was elevated to extreme revolutionary nationalism, manipulating the *han* of Koreans. This strong nationalism was helpful for Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in promoting *Juche* ideology, purging political factions, and achieving unquestioned control of the country. *Juche* was conceived while Kim Il-sung was pursuing an independent position between the Soviet Union and China but was soon used to consolidate an indisputable dictatorship for Kim.[100] *Juche*, translated into English as 'self-reliance', highlights the autonomy of human beings against the oppression of the outside forces. But, this autonomy is based on collectivism, not individualism, and promoted by strong nationalism. Kim Il-sung said,

> Let's fight against selfish individualism, which prioritises individual pleasure, ignores community life in society and in country, and does not care about state properties. We must set up the new moral principle of people, which prioritises the collective interests of the whole society over the individual interests, loves country and cares for the state properties.[101]

Kim Jong-il argued that, "Man has a physical life and also social and political integrity. The physical life is what keeps a man alive as biological organism; social and political integrity is what keeps him alive as social being".[102] Chung says this collectivist interpretation about self-reliance gave birth to the *Suryŏngje*, "with Kim Il-sung, the Suryŏng (leader), at the centre, and all the other components of society organized in concentric units around him".[103] Kim Jong-il asserted that "Only when the masses of people are firmly united organizationally and ideologically

[100] Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, *North Korea through the Looking Glass* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 133–44; Roland Bleiker, *Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 14.

[101] Il-Sung Kim, *Kimilsŏngjŏchakchip Cheikwŏn* [Kim Il-Sung Works Vol. 2] (Pyongyang: Chosŏnnotongdangch'ulp'ansa, 1979), 563.

[102] Jong-il Kim, *Exposition of the Juche Idea* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1983), 24.

[103] Chung, 'The Suryŏng System as the Center of Juche Institution: Politics of Development Strategy in Postwar North Korea', 103.

around the party and the leader, the centre of unity and cohesion, and receive their guidance, can they become the genuine subject of history capable of carving out their destiny independently and creatively and developing society."[104]

Since the introduction of *Juche* and *Suryŏngje*, the North Korean regime promoted Kim Il-sung as the original socialist thinker based on nationalism by calling his idea, "Kim Il-sung-ism". Particularly, Kim Jong-il promoted 'Kimilsungism-isation of the whole society' (*Onsahoeŭi kimilsŏngjuŭihwa*), alongside 'Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System' (*Yuilsasangch'ekyehwangnip siptaewŏnch'ik*), which emphasised loyalty to the absolute authority of Kim Il-sung and reinforced Kim Jong-il's position as a successor to his father.[105] Scalapino and Lee say that Kim Il-sung was to be "enshrined both as father of his country and as foremost Marxist-Leninist theorist, one who made creative additions by applying Marxist concepts to the realities of Korean society."[106]

Although the North Korean regime claim their system evolved from old style socialism by calling their socio-political system 'our style socialism' (*Urisik sahoechuŭi*) and their support of Kim as 'socialist patriotism', the rule of Kim Il-sung became similar to a religion in some characteristics, which socialism criticises. Children are expected to memorise the major speeches made by the Kims, and they learn *Juche* ideology from the early ages. North Koreans above 16 years of age wear a badge with a portrait of the Kims, portraits of the Kims are placed at every office and house, the statues of the Kims were erected across the country. Lankov says, the media "was (and still is) full of stories about the heroic deeds of North Korean citizens who willingly sacrificed their lives to save portraits of the Great Leader and his son".[107] After Kim Jong-il took power and initiated military-first politics, the characteristics of the North Korean society became more militaristic. According to Chung, when North Korea faced security threats and economic crisis in the 1990s, "the

[104] Kim, *Exposition of the Juche Idea*, 53.

[105] Jong-il Kim, *Chuch'ehyŏngmyŏngwiŏbŭi Wansŏngŭl Wihayŏ 3* [Toward Completion of Juche Revolution Vol. 3] (Pyongyang: Chosŏnnotongdangch'ulp'ansa, 1987), 101–18, 173.

[106] Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea, Part II: The Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 865.

[107] Lankov, *The Real North Korea*, 51.

military, as the organization embodying the principle of organic unity between suryong and people, was the sole unit capable of reconstructing the collectivity and providing organizational capacity that the Suryongje needed". Therefore, Kim Jong-il tried to turn the whole society into the militaristic society, stressing discipline and self-sacrifice, in order to "underscore its absolute loyalty to the supreme commander."[108]

As we have seen in the previous section, Rhee Syng-man also utilised *han* of Koreans to promote nationalism and to solidify his rule. Particularly, Rhee resorted to a rhetoric of unresolved *han* against the North Korean communists who invaded South Korea in a way "to justify its repression of the opposition by externalizing the 'enemy within'."[109] Lee Namhee argues, "the continuing confrontation between the two Koreas made anticommunism in South Korea a particularly virulent form of social control, as well as an effective conduit for state power."[110] This anti-communism developed into aggressive nationalism with the belief that South Korea was chosen to fight against communism in the front line. The antagonism toward North Korea became a way of life in South Korean society. Prohibition of any discourse, which was favourable or even neutral toward North Korea was tightened. Any art such as paintings, literature and music produced by North Koreans was strictly banned.[111] A similar nationalistic rhetoric was used by Park Chung-hee to justify his rule. His military coup in 1961 and subsequent revision of the constitution in 1972 were portrayed as a 'save-the-nation movement' (*Kukugundong*). He argued that loyalty to the nation should come before freedom and democracy. Throughout his rule, any criticism against him was prohibited and severely punished. His regime described his dictatorship as a "Korean-style democracy that would enable the country to carry out the goals of military security, inter-Korean

[108] Chung, 'The Suryŏng System as the Center of Juche Institution: Politics of Development Strategy in Postwar North Korea', 110–11.

[109] Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, 154.

[110] Namhee Lee, 'From the Streets to the National Assembly: Democratic Transition and Demands for Truth about Kwangju in South Korea', in *State Violence in East Asia*, ed. N. Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 69.

[111] Chae-sung Chun, 'The Cold War and Its Transition for Koreans: Their Meaning from A Constructivist Viewpoint', in *Ending the Cold War in Korea: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Chung-in Moon and Odd Arne Wetad (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 132–33.

reconciliation, and economic modernization."[112] Park claimed that importing Western democracy would simply not work for Koreans and the Korean-style democracy requires a Korean-style leader, whose new leadership ideology is based on love for one's own country.[113]

Park Chung-hee used nationalism to promote his authoritarian industrialisation policy as well. Shin Gi-wook says, "Park skilfully fused nationalism into anti-communism and developmentalism in legitimizing his authoritarian politics."[114] Park Chung-hee said, "The nation is forever, (but) the life of the nation can be developed and grown only through the state. The ultimate goal of the (state), as the nurturer of our nation, is national unification and national renaissance," and appealed to the public to be loyal and to work hard under his rule for the industrialisation of the South Korean state.[115] Moon and Jun explain that the rational of the industrial nationalism of Park was that a state formed by a nation is "greater than the mere sum of the individuals that constitute it", and the modernisation of the state could be "achieved on the basis of self-reliance and self-help".[116] While focusing on heavy and military industry, Park launched the Saemŭl Undong (New Village movement), which was initially "a spiritual revolution based on the principles of self-reliance, self-help, and cooperation", and later became an integrated rural development program supported by the government funding.[117]

Meanwhile, Park frequently used the military to defend his regime from any protest inside South Korea. He also facilitated the militarisation

[112] Hyuk Baeg Im, 'The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled', in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 233.

[113] Chung-hee Park, *Kukkawa Hyŏngmyŏngqgwa Na* [Country, Revolution and I] (Seoul: Tosŏch'ulp'an chikuch'on, 1993), 260.

[114] Gi-Wook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 103–7.

[115] Chung-hee Park, *Minjokchunghŭngŭi Yŏksa* [The Road to the Revival of Our Nation] (Seoul: Kwangmyŏng ch'ulp'ansa, 1978), 22; Chung-in Moon and Byung-joon Jun, 'Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Infuluences', in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 125.

[116] Moon and Jun, 'Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Infuluences', 126.

[117] Young Jo Lee, 'The Countryside', in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 364–65.

of the society through a system of conscription and military education in post primary schools and universities, highlighting the threat from North Korea. Eckert says that "it had become difficult to separate the overlay of the military from earlier tiers of Korean history, and even today features of South Korean army culture and practice continue to be ingrained in government, business, education, and virtually every other sphere of social activity, as well as in many facets of everyday Korean life."[118] Criticising the protest of students against the military education, Park Chung-hee argued:

> It would have been acceptable not to provide military training for the students, if our enemy North Korea does not exist, or even if they do exist, at least if we could confirm that they do not have any intention to invade us. However, the enemy is now preparing to attack us, and are training even the primary school children militarily. Who could guarantee that we can successfully defend ourselves if North Korea attacks us, without the military training of our high school and university students?… The objective of the students' protest against the military education is not directed at the military training itself, but there is a hidden agenda. Our citizens should know that communist spies have infiltrated into our schools.[119]

The use of the military to oppress the citizens and the militarisation of South Korea were accelerated in the early period of the Chun Doo-hwan regime. With respect to the Chun massacre of people protesting for democracy in Gwangju, Eckert says, "Chun had clearly demonstrated to the country the terrifying force at his disposal and his even more frightening willingness to use it."[120] However, the increasing brutality of the oppression and long-time dissatisfaction of authoritarian rule in South Korea significantly weakened the invisibility of the existing structural violence. As we will see in Chapter 5, the Chun Doo-hwan regime could no longer suppress widespread protest against the dictatorship. The anti-communism and nationalism rhetoric was not persuasive enough to justify the killing of university students demonstrating for democracy. Finally, South Korean government announced a national referendum

[118] Carter J. Eckert, *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism, 1866–1945* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 2.

[119] Chung-hee Park, *Pakchŏnghŭi Taet'ongnyŏng Yŏnsŏlmunjip* [Speeches of President Park Chung-Hee Vol. 8] (Seoul: Taet'ongnyŏngbisŏsil, 1972), 262–63.

[120] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 375.

for constitutional revision, introducing direct presidential election, in 1987.[121]

Following the democratisation of South Korea, high-level negotiations between the two Koreas began to produce noticeable results in the late 1980s. As we will discuss in the next Chapter, the South-North Basic Agreement in 1991, and the first inter-Korean summit in 2000 appeared to have made the political exploitation of anti-communism and militant nationalism ineffective in South Korea. However, amid the conflict between the US and North Korea surrounding the North Korean nuclear development in the mid-2000s, some political groups revitalised the tactics that relegated those with different political opinions to the category of North Koreans, *Jongbuk* (North Korea sympathiser). Since the peace process between the two Koreas ground to a halt with the sinking of South Korean naval ship, Cheonan, and North Korean bombing on the South Korean Yonpeong Island in 2010, any reconciliatory position toward North Korea has been even more actively portrayed as *Jongbuk*, particularly at election time.[122]

Conclusion

At present, the Korean conflict is ongoing, and the Korean peninsula is still divided both geographically, and psychologically. Seo says, that, because of the system of division, which benefits the political elites in both North and South Korea, "the people in the divided society do not see those from the other society as a component of the same nation and feel uncomfortable to think of them as compatriots".[123] During the Cold War era both North and South Korean dictatorships developed their own narratives in relation to the Korean conflict, and used nationalism to mobilise their respective populations. Michael Robinson summarises the North Korean narrative as "its successful struggle against colonial and neo-colonial forces, the mass base of its politics, its autonomous economic and political development and its victimization by the intrusion of Western imperialism". He describes South Korean narrative as "the true inheritor of the nationalist mantle as it successfully guided the Korean

[121] Eckert et al., 381–82.

[122] Chung-in Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2012), 145–47.

[123] Seo, *Korean Nationalism Betrayed*, 57.

people onto the world stage, insinuated the nation-state into the world system and brought capitalist prosperity to the majority of its people".[124]

These narratives and hatred toward each other prevailed in Korean societies. Even after the end of the Cold War and during the period of the peace process, they have survived and are being promoted by the North Korean dictatorship and some political circles in the democratised South. With regards to the history of dictatorships in North and South Korea, Ryoo Kihl-jae and Shin Jong-dae point out the historical dynamics between domestic politics and inter-Korean relationships. South Korean factor influences North Korean politics and the North Korean factor influences the South Korean politics.[125] This dynamic is still applicable, particularly, due, in part, to the fact that North Korea is still under a dictatorship. The authoritarian nature of the North Korean regime and its nuclear and missile technology give some political groups in South Korea political grounds to criticise other groups who are advocating for dialogue as an option to build peace on the Korean peninsula. The US military alliance with South Korea provides a pretext for North Korea to consolidate its dictatorship and development of nuclear weapons and missile technology.[126]

These characteristics in North and South Korean societies show a high relevance to the conceptual framework suggested by Peace and Conflict Studies scholars, such as Galtung, in examining conflict-affected societies. The negative peace has been maintained since the Armistice Agreement of 1953, but in order to build a just and sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula, it appears that the continuing structural and cultural violence need to be addressed. As we will discuss in the subsequent chapters, this should not be a task for high-level leadership alone, but by all levels of the societies.

[124] Michael E. Robinson, *Korea's Twentieth-Century Odyssey* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 56–57.

[125] Kihl-jae Ryoo, 'Nambukhan Kwan'gyewa Pukhanŭi Kungnaechŏngch'i – Namhan Yoinŭn Kyŏljŏngjŏk Pyŏnsuin'ga? [The Inter-Korean Relationship and Domestic Politics in North Korea—Is the South Korean Factor a Decisive Variable?]', in *Nambukhan'gwan'gyeron*, ed. Kyŏngnamdaehakkyo pukhandaehagwŏn (Paju: Hanul, 205AD), 225–26; Jong-dae Shin, 'North Korea's Perception and Responses toward the May 16th Coup d'etat in South Korea', *Chŏngsinmunhwayŏn'gu* 118, no. Spring (2010): 82–99.

[126] The UN Humanitarian Country Team, '2017 DPR Korea Needs and Priorities'.

CHAPTER 4

The Ups and Downs of the Korean Peace Process: Domestic and Geo-Politics

This chapter will discuss the ups and downs of top-level negotiations in the Korean peace process. If we embrace the broad definition of peace processes as "phased processes for negotiating and nurturing peace",[1] the history of the Korean peace process goes back to the armistice negotiations of the Korean War. Charles Armstrong suggests the inter-Korean relationship can be categorised into four general stages.[2] The first stage was from the Armistice Agreement of 1953 to the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué in 1972 where, for the first time in 20 years, an official contact was negotiated. The second stage was the off and on talks which lasted from 1972 until the 1991 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation, which came after the democratisation of South Korea near the end of the Cold War. The third stage was an era of increased inter-Korean cooperation and exchange from 1991 to 2007 accelerated by the first and second inter-Korean summits in 2000 and in 2007. The fourth stage was the internationalisation of the peace process, represented by the six-party talks (two Koreas, Russia, China, Japan and the US). The beginning of the fourth stage, the US–North Korean nuclear conflict in 2003,

[1] Jan Selby, 'The Political Economy of Peace Processes', in *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*, ed. Micheal Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 12.

[2] Charles K. Armstrong, *The Koreas* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 132–34.

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1_4

overlapped the third stage and ended with the suspension of the talks in 2009. In addition to these four stages, this chapter will add a fifth stage, lasting from the 2010 breakdown of inter-Korean cooperation.

Not one of the statements and agreements, made at each stage of the Korean peace process for the past 70 years, were ever fully implemented. This chapter analyses the interplay of domestic and geopolitics throughout the history of the Korean peace process and explores the challenges which emerged in the process of making and implementing high-level agreements.

The Peace Process and the Authoritarian Regimes

The first meeting for the armistice negotiations of the Korean War was held in July 1951, followed by another 575 meetings over the next 2 years to produce the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953. The length of the negotiation process shows how difficult it was for the conflict parties to agree on terms for an armistice.[3] In order to first achieve a negative peace, the main issues of the Korean conflict were deferred to processes which were to follow the armistice agreement. Direct violence seems to have been supressed in the Korean conflict for the past 65 years, but the war has not officially ended. This corresponds with John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty's observation about one of the characteristics of contemporary peace processes, which is to "run the risk of freezing conflicts into a negative peace", by bypassing the root causes of the conflict.[4]

Balbina Hwang says, "although the approximately 20-page document contains great detail on narrow issues related to military hostilities, it is almost entirely devoid of political arrangements". For example, the conflict parties were able to agree on how to prevent further direct violence, by creating the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea, and forming the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) to monitor the DMZ and supervise the armistice, but discussions for a peaceful

[3] Elizabeth A. Stanley, *Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 65.

[4] John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, 'Introduction: What Peace? What Process?', in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes*, ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 5.

resolution of the Korean conflict were postponed to future negotiations.[5] Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement states:

> In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

The UN General Assembly on 28 August 1953 welcomed the idea of holding of a political conference following the armistice. But, preliminary talks for organising the conference, to be held at Panmunjom, the negotiation space in the DMZ, failed to reach a consensus in 1953. The conflict parties were unable to agree on several issues, including who should be invited to the conference, and whether the Soviet Union would be considered a neutral party in the negotiations. In January/February 1954, a foreign minister-level meeting among Britain, France, the US, and the Soviet Union, held in Berlin, decided that the Korean question would be discussed at the Geneva Conference in April–July 1954.[6] During the Geneva conference, South Korea argued that UN supervised elections should be held in North Korea only, as the Rhee Syng-man government of the ROK was the legitimate government of the Korean peninsula. South Korea also argued that Chinese forces should leave the Korean peninsula immediately, but UN forces must stay in place to maintain security. North Korea opposed the South Korean propositions, proposed holding elections in the entire Korean peninsula, and suggested the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Continued stalemates among North Korea, South Korea, their allies, and neutral countries prevented the conference from producing any tangible outcome regarding the Korean question.[7]

Since the failure to achieve a peaceful settlement for the Korean conflict at the 1954 Geneva Conference, strengthening domestic political support

[5] Balbina Y. Hwang, 'Reviving the Korean Armistice: Building Future Peace on Historical Precedents', *Korea Economic Institute Academic Paper Series* 6, no. 6 (2010): 4–5.

[6] Edwin W. Martin, *Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China* (The University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 218–22.

[7] Sydney D. Bailey, *The Korean Armistice* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 160–68.

had become the priority for both North and South Korean governments, and the problems of peace and unification were exploited for this purpose. Each applied varied approaches and political rhetoric to the peace and unification process at different stages, according to their domestic and geopolitical situations. In the beginning, North Korea appeared to be more aggressive, based on confidence in their political and economic system, which, until the early 1970s, was more stable than that of South Korea. In 1960, the North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung proposed a 'Federation Plan', which was essentially a 'one Korea' policy with two autonomous governments under a "Supreme National Committee",[8] a proposal that was rejected by South Korea. Jonsson argues that South Korea "feared that, through implementation, North Koreans would be able to impose their own social system on the South".[9] But, as the South Korean economy began to surpass that of North Korea in the mid-1970s, the economic success of South Korea prompted a policy change toward North Korea. Furthermore, the altered geopolitical situation during the Sino-American rapprochement and the American-Soviet détente in the early 1970s created an environment which allowed inter-Korean dialogue.[10]

On 15 August 1970, South Korean President Park Chung-hee announced that South and North Korea could coexist peacefully if North Korea refrained from attempting to communise South Korea through use of force, and proposed a "well-intentioned competition for development, construction and creation".[11] At the fifth Congress of the Worker's Party of Korea held in November 1970, Kim Il-sung dismissed this proposal, claiming that North Korea had already suggested measures for disarmament, non-aggression, and a peaceful unification plan, but it was South Korea who wanted to unify Korea by the use of force. He argued that the South Korean proposal was merely propaganda aimed at the international

[8] Hakjoon Kim, *Unification Policies of South and North Korea, 1945–1991* (Seoul: Seoul National University, 1992), 214.

[9] Gabriel Jonsson, *Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 50–51.

[10] Sergey Radchenko and Bernd Schaefer, '"Red on White": Kim Il Sung, Park Chung Hee, and the Failure of Korea's Reunification, 1971–1973', *Cold War History* 17, no. 3 (2017): 259.

[11] Ministry of Unification, *A Comparison of Unification Policies of South and North Korea* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1990), 81.

community.[12] But then, Kim Il-sung modified his position by publicly supporting the Sino-American rapprochement and saying that he was not afraid of meeting anyone from South Korea at any time.[13] Regarding the changed position of Kim Il-sung, Sergey Radchenko and Bernd Schaefer say that Kim appeared to see that "the Sino-American rapprochement offered a unique opportunity to affect an American withdrawal from Korea."[14] Park Chung-hee responded in his national address on 15 August 1971, saying that dialogue could be arranged at any time, once North Korea gives up on its plan to attack South Korea.[15] Then, abruptly, the Joint Communiqué between South and North Korea was announced on 4 July 1972 (the July 4 Joint Communiqué). The communiqué as the first agreement signed jointly by both North and South Korea since the division, had strong implications for the succeeding agreements with three important principles of 'independence', 'peace', and 'national unity':

> First, unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.
> Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other.
> Third, as a homogeneous people, a great national unity shall be sought above all, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.[16]

The drawback of this Communiqué was that it was the outcome of secret negotiations between representatives of two governments.[17] The July 4

[12] Il-sung Kim, *Choso˘n Rodongdang Che 5Ch'a Taehoeeso˘ Han Chungangwiwo˘nhoe Sao˘pch'onghwabogo* [Comprehensive Report on the Work of Central Committee at the Fifth Conference of the Korean Workers Party] (Rodong Sinmun, 3 November 1970).

[13] Il-sung Kim, *Kunjungdaehoeeso˘ Hasin Kimilso˘ng Susangŭi Yo˘nso˘l* [A Speech of Kim Il-Sung at the People's Conference] (Rodong Sinmun, 7 August 1971).

[14] Radchenko and Schaefer, '"Red on White"', 264.

[15] Chung-hee Park, 'Che 26Chunyo˘n Kwangbokcho˘l Kyo˘ngch'uksa [26th National Liberation Day Address]', in *Pakcho˘nghŭi Taet'ongnyo˘ng Yo˘nso˘lmunjip* [The Speeches of President Park Chung-Hee] (Seoul: Daetongryung Biseosil, 1972), 416.

[16] 'The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué', *UN Peacemaker*, 4 July 1972, https://peacemaker.un.org/korea-4july-communique72.

[17] "Note on Information provided by DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Kim Yong-taek, on 3 July 1972 for the Ambassadors and Acting Ambassadors of Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Romania, Hungary, and the GDR," 4 July 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PolA AA, MfAA, C 951/76. Obtained for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer and translated for NKIDP by Karen Riechert. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113783.

Joint Communiqué was not signed by the North Korean Leader and the South Korean President, but by the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director, Lee Hu-rak and the North Korean Director of Organisation and Guidance, Kim Young-joo, in order to avoid official recognition of each other's sovereignty.[18] Because contact between North and South Korean citizens had been strictly prohibited by both governments for national security reasons, this sudden announcement was a bombshell to ordinary citizens who had been continually told that the other was their enemy. The North-South Red Cross meetings and the establishment of the North–South Coordinating Commission, which were agreed to in the Communiqué, were high-level initiatives. There had been no opportunity for civil society to engage in the peace process, which exposed an interdependency gap in peacebuilding.[19] Ko states the inter-Korean dialogue in the early 1970s was not conducted with the intention to build mutual trust and relationship but was a strategic response by both the North and South Korean governments to the changing geopolitical situation.[20]

The priority for both appeared to be reinforcing domestic political power. In 1972, following the July 4 Joint Communiqué, both the North and South Korean governments revised their respective constitutions. The North Korean socialist constitution was revised to ensure an indisputable dictatorship for Kim Il-sung by creating a presidency with no re-election limitations.[21] In a similar vein, the new South Korean constitution, the Yushin, granted Park Chung-hee an indefinite South Korean presidency. The National Archives of Korea says that both North and South Korean leadership used the peace talks between the two governments as a way to strengthen their respective domestic political

[18] Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 25.

[19] John Paul Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 23–25.

[20] Byung-chul Ko, 'Nambukhan Kwan'gyeŭi Yŏksachŏk Maengnak: Han'gukchŏnjaeng Ihu Hyŏnjaekkachi [The Historical Context of the Inter-Korean Relationship: From the Korean War to the Present Time]', in *Nambukhan'gwan'gyeron*, ed. Kyŏngnamdaehakkyo pukhandaehagwŏn (Paju: Hanul, 2005), 47.

[21] Dae-Kyu Yoon, 'The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications', *Fordham International Law Journal* 27, no. 4 (2003): 1296.

positions.[22] As Lederach's concept of justice gap in peacebuilding suggests, there appeared to be a wide gap between the people's expectations of the July 4 Joint Communiqué and what it actually delivered.[23] Particularly, for the South Korean citizens who were fighting for human rights and democracy, the July 4 Joint Communiqué became a lesson that peace negotiations between dictatorships could only exacerbate social injustice and a genuine peace process would be possible only if the governments first became democratic.[24]

By mid-1973, the July 4 Joint Communiqué was at an impasse and following half a dozen meetings the talks were, for all intents and purposes, terminated.[25] Lederach suggests that one of the reasons behind the breakdown of a peace process is a process-structure gap. High-level negotiations tend to focus on agreements and events rather than on a commitment to maintain a relationship building process under an agreed structure.[26] The abrupt termination of the talks showed that both North and South Korean governments were uninterested in building a platform to maintain a relationship building process between the two Koreas. The authoritarian regimes, retained strong regulations around contact between South and North Korean citizens, during the period of the high-level negotiations after the July 4 Joint Communiqué. The talks were discontinued due to preconditions put forward by South and North Korea for progress in the inter-Korean relationship. In the meetings, South Korea argued that resolving humanitarian issues, particularly the reunion of separated families, should come as a prelude to significant high-level negotiations. Conversely, North Korea

[22] National Archives of Korea, '7.4 Nambuk Kongdong Soˇngmyoˇng [7.4 South-North Korea Joint Communique]', National Archives of Korea, 1972, http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/unikorea/%20seven/seven02.do.

[23] Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', 27–35.

[24] Soon Cho, '1980–1990 Kidokt'ongirundongŭi Iron'gwa Chaengjoˇm [1980–1990 Christian Unification Movement, the Theoretical Basis and Issues]', in *Han'guk Kaesin'gyoga Han'guk Kŭnhyoˇndaeŭi Sahoe.Munhwajoˇk Pyoˇndonge Kkich'in Yoˇnghyang Yoˇn'gu* [A Study on the Impact of the Korean Protestant Church on the Sociocultural Changes in Modern Korea], ed. Hanshin University Theological Institute (Seoul: Korea Theological Study Institute, 2005), 180–211.

[25] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 146.

[26] Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', 34–35.

maintained that humanitarian issues would be resolved as a matter of course, as a result of achieving security assurances, including the withdrawal of the US military forces from the Korean peninsula, and replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.[27]

According to Radchenko and Schaefer, the differing positions became an obstacle in reaching an agreement between the two Koreas, not because of incompatibility, but because of the hidden agendas of the North and South Korean governments. They argue that Kim Il-sung had expressed his willingness to negotiate with South Korea in the early 1970s, out of a conviction that the North Korean system would be more attractive to South Koreans, both politically and economically. He had therefore "acted from strength, not weakness", but, as the South Korean economy surpassed that of North Korea, Kim Il-sung appeared to have lost "confidence of Northern superiority" and became very cautious of opening up the country.[28] On the other hand, South Korean governments had been highlighting the need for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, although the policy titles and the capacities for implementation varied, depending on the administration in place. From the perspective of South Korean policy makers, increasing the exposure of North Koreans to a more competent South Korean system would eventually win over the support of North Koreans. Therefore, peaceful engagement with North Korea would be to their strategic advantage in achieving the goal of unification under a South Korean system.[29]

The North/South stalemate continued into the 1980s. In October 1980, at the 6th Congress of the KWP, Kim Il-sung announced a new unification plan, called the 'Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo' (*Koryŏyŏnbangje*), in which he proposed a federal state as the ideal unified Korea.[30] In this plan, Kim emphasised the need for accepting

[27] Adrian Buzo, *The Making of Modern Korea* (London: Routledge, 2002), 124.

[28] Radchenko and Schaefer, '"Red on White"', 276.

[29] Jong-Yun Bae, 'South Korean Strategic Thinking toward North Korea: The Evolution of the Engagement Politcy and Its Impact upon U.S.-ROK Relations', in *The Politics and International Relations of Modern Korea*, ed. John Nilsson-Wright, vol. 1 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 121.

[30] Jae Kyu Park, 'A Critique on "the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo"', *Journal of East and West Studies* 12, no. 1 (1983): 13.

ideological and institutional differences between North and South Korea, and advocated the unification of Korea under a federal system with a standing committee, the 'Supreme National Federal Assembly', respecting the autonomy of both North and South Korean governments.[31] In January 1982, the South Korean Chun Doo-hwan government proclaimed, the 'Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification' (*Minjokhwahap minjut'ongilbangan*). In this formula, Chun also acknowledged that it would not be realistic to expect the Korean peninsula to be united instantly under single system, of either North Korea or South Korea. But unlike the North Korean proposal for immediate unification and autonomy under a federal system, Chun advocated the need for a reconciliation process between the two Koreas and then, in due course, for unification under one constitution.[32]

Shim Ji-yeon says that, by 1980s, both North and South Korea had formally embraced the reality of two systems in the Korean peninsula and the need for peaceful coexistence.[33] However, the new proposals of the early 1980s were never implemented. In North Korea, Kim Jong-il became the official successor of his father at the 6th Congress of the KWP, where the control and ideological indoctrination of the North Korean society, and idolisation of Kim Il-sung were further strengthened.[34] In South Korea, despite the political rhetoric about reconciliation, Chun suppressed any discussion of peace and unification with North Korea within South Korean society. It appeared that Chun

[31] Suk Chang, *Kimjŏngiljanggun Chokukt'ongillon Yŏn'gu* [A Study of the General Kim Jong-Il's Thought on the National Unification] (Pyongyang: P'yŏngyangch'ulp'ansa, 2002), 67.

[32] Doo-hwan Chun, 'T'ongirhŏnbŏp Mandŭrŏ Minjokhwahap Minjut'ongirŭl [Making the Unification Constitution for National Harmony and Democratic Unification]', in *Chŏnduhwandaet'ongnyŏngyŏnsŏlmunjip Che 2 Chip* (Seoul: Daet'ongnyŏngbisŏsil, 1982), 356–58.

[33] Ji-yeon Shim, *Nambukhan t'ongilbanganŭi Chŏn'gaewa Suryŏm: 1948–2001 Chachuhwa Kukchehwaŭi Kwanjŏmesŏ Pon t'ongilbangan Yŏn'guwa Charyo* [The Process and Convergence of the South and North Korean Unification Formula: 1948–2001 From the Perspective of Liberty and Internationalization] (Seoul: Tolbegae, 2001), 78.

[34] Young Chul Chung, 'The Suryŏng System as the Center of Juche Institution: Politics of Development Strategy in Postwar North Korea', in *Origins of North Korea's Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development*, ed. Jae-Jung Suh (Lexington Books, 2014), 133–34. See also Chapter 3.

Doo-hwan, who had taken power by a military coup, still needed the narrative of a North Korean threat to justify his dictatorship. Shim argues that the new unification plans of both North and South Korea in the early 1980s were announced out of a need to maintain the Korean conflict at a low-tension level to allow the governments to concentrate on the domestic political transitions inside each country.[35]

Noticeably, while supressing domestic voices for reconciliation between the two Koreas, the Chun Doo-hwan government expressed willingness to normalise relationships with the Soviet Union and China through 'Nordpolitk' (*Pukpangjŏngch'aek*, Northern Policy), which was modelled on West Germany's 'Ostpolitik'. The term, the Northern Policy was first used by the former Foreign Minister Lee Bum-suk. Park Sang-seek, translates and quotes a speech made by Lee at the National Defence University in 1983.

> Our most important foreign policy goal in the 1980s is to prevent the recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula, and our most important diplomatic task is to pursue the northern policy successfully which aims at normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and China…It is true that northern policy will be successful if inter-Korean relations are normalized. It is also true that if northern policy is successful, inter-Korean relations will improve.[36]

However, the Chun government's Northern Policy did not make much progress as the focus was to contain potential violence in the Korean conflict, while strengthening domestic control. Although the official rhetoric towards each other and their allies had often shifted to a more reconciliatory tone in the 1970s and 1980s, both the North and South Korean dictatorships appeared to be more interested in strengthening their respective domestic political power than in implementing their rhetoric.

[35] Ji-yeon Shim, *Nambukhan t'ongilbanganŭi Chŏn'gaewa Suryŏm: 1948–2001 Chachuhwa Kukchehwaŭi Kwanjŏmesŏ Pon t'ongilbangan Yŏn'guwa Charyo* [The Process and Convergence of the South and North Korean Unification Formula: 1948–2001 from the Perspective of Liberty and Internationalization], 76–77.

[36] Sang-seek Park, 'Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations', in *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations*, ed. James Cotton (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian National University, 1993), 218–19.

The End of the Cold War and the Peace Process

The interplay between the domestic and geopolitical changes influenced the Korean conflict parties to revive dialogue once more in the late 1980s. In 1987, in the geopolitical atmosphere of the ending of the Cold War, South Korea made the transition to democracy through a national referendum on a constitutional revision, which introduced direct presidential election. Rho Tae-woo, a former four-star general, won the presidency in 1987, and took power in 1988. His election was a disappointment to the South Korean democratisation movement, because Rho was the Chun Doo-hwan designated candidate. However, the new democratic mood of the society forced Rho to be conscious of public opinion and the growing political power of the opposition.[37]

The South Korean government of Rho Tae-woo adopted the Northern Policy of his predecessor. Unlike the previous dictatorship era, the implementation process of the Northern Policy by the new government showed a strong will to produce actual results. Internationally, the successful hosting of the 1988 Olympic games in Seoul required strong security assurance in the Korean peninsula, to guarantee the safety of foreign participants in the Seoul Olympic. Domestically, the new democratic government needed to give more attention to the voice of the South Korean civil society for peace and unification.[38] On 7 July 1988, Rho announced his plan to promote civilian exchanges between South and North Korea in the 'Special Declaration by the President in the Interest of National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity' (the July 7 Declaration):

> We will actively promote exchanges of visits between the people of South and North Korea, including politicians, businessmen, journalists, religious leaders, cultural leaders, artists, academics and students and will make

[37] Robert Bedeski, *The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth Republic Under Roh Tae Woo, 1987–1992* (London: Routledge, 1994), 69–71.

[38] Perry Wood, 'The Strategic Equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s', in *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations*, ed. James Cotton (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian National University, 1993), 192–93; Hak-Joon Kim, 'Korean Reunification: A Seoul Perspective', in *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations*, ed. James Cotton (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian National University, 1993), 277–78.

> necessary arrangements to ensure that Koreans residing overseas can freely visit both parts of Korea.[39]

This was unimaginable, as under the National Security Law (NSL), South Korean citizens had been strictly prohibited contact or engagement with people in North Korea. Lim Dong Won says:

> The July 7 Declaration was a turning point in the government policy. If it were not a presidential declaration, it would have been considered to be a violation of the National Security Law. This was the time the Cold War began to end and there were high expectations about democracy in the public, and the unification issue was actively discussed in the civil society.[40]

Park Chul-un commented that the peace process of the late 1980s was initiated in response to the changing geopolitics, and highlighted the fact that those who had recognised the changes in international relations were able to take important positions in the new Rho government following democratisation.

> There were people in the government who saw that the Cold War system was weakening. They thought it was important to reconcile with North Korea as soon as possible, to open and reform North Korea. The July 7 Declaration resulted from their thinking.[41]

In 1989, the government announced a new unification proposal, 'the Korean National Community Unification Formula' (*Hanminjokkongdongch'et'ongilbangan*) which was based on confidence-building through a South-North dialogue. The South Korean National Assembly passed the 'Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act' (*Nambukkyoryuhyŏmnyŏkpŏp*), along with the 'Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Act' (*Nambukhyŏmnyŏkkikŭmbŏp*) to provide legal basis for the new

[39] Roh Tae-woo, 'A Single National Community; Special Declaration in the Interest of National Self-Respect, Unification and Prosperity, July 7, 1988', in *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations*, ed. James Cotton (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian National University, 1993), 329–30.

[40] Lim Dong-won, former South Korean negotiator, Unification minister, interview by author, Seoul, 25 January, 2010.

[41] Park Chul-un, former South Korean negotiator, State minister, interview by author, Seoul, 13 May 2010.

unification plan. Lee Hong-gu explains that the creation and motivation to implement the new unification policy was the culmination of a collective consciousness that the change should be done through dialogue, not confrontation, in an era of democratisation and the end of the Cold War.[42]

The Northern Policy of the Rho government began to make progress in the early 1990s. South Korea normalised relationships with the Soviet Union and China in 1990.[43] The high-level talks between North and South Korea enabled their Prime Ministers to sign the 1991 Basic Agreement, in which they pledged to resolve political and military confrontation, and to promote exchange and cooperation.[44] The 1991 Basic Agreement stipulates in the preface:

> Reaffirming the three basic principles of unification set forth in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972; Determined to end the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation; Also determined to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, and to ensure the lessening of tension and the establishment of peace; Expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to promote interests and prosperity common to the Korean people.[45]

Jeong Se-hyun describes this agreement as a modus vivendi "existing between the South and North for the transitional period in the course of achieving reconciliation and before attaining unification". Succeeding government agreements between North and South Korea have inherited a definition of the inter-Korean relationship, not as that between

[42] Hong-koo Lee, 'Unification Through a Korean Commonwealth: Blueprint for a National Community', in *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations*, ed. James Cotton (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian National University, 1993), 304–6; Hong-koo Lee, former Prime minister, interview by author, Seoul, 4 February 2010.

[43] Hak-Joon Kim, 'The Republic of Korea's Northern Policy: Origin, Development, and Prospects', in *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations*, ed. James Cotton (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with Australian National University, 1993), 260–63.

[44] Jonsson, *Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation*, 57.

[45] UN Peacemaker, 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea', 13 December 1991, https://peacemaker.un.org/korea-reconciliation-nonaggression91.

two sovereign states but as between two special interim political subjects in the process of unification.[46] In his comments on the progress of the inter-Korean relationship, Chung Won-shik speculates that the collapse of the Eastern European countries must have caused a sense of crisis in the North Korean leadership, who then attempted to overcome this crisis by promoting reconciliation with South Korea.[47]

Noticeably, as indicated above, this agreement reaffirms the three principles of the July 4 Communiqué of 1972. However, unlike the peace talks in the 1970s, significant measures were taken to build mutual trust for reaching and implementing the agreement. During the summer of 1991, US tactical nuclear weapons were removed from South Korea. Pollack says although the US decision was based on their relationship with the Soviet Union during the period of détente, "it had major repercussions on the peninsula".[48] On 7 January 1992, the US and South Korean governments declared a suspension of the annual joint military training exercise between the US and South Korea, and, at the same time, North Korea announced that they would allow comprehensive inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On 20 January 1992, South and North Korea signed the 'Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula'.[49]

Nevertheless, relations between North and South Korea began to decline once more, following the October 1992 announcement of the resumption of the joint military drills between the US and South Korea. Jun says that North Korea seemed to have expected a permanent cancelation of the joint military drills. On realising that the cancelation was only a temporary concession, North Korea resumed its nuclear development activities.[50] The confrontation between North Korea and the

[46] Sehyun Jeong, 'The Characteristics of the South-North Agreement: Legality and Political Significance', *East Asian Review* 4, no. 2 (1992): 4–5.

[47] Chung, Won-shik, former Prime minister, interview by author, Seoul, 28 January, 2010.

[48] Jonathan D. Pollack, *No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 106.

[49] John Delury and Tae-ho Kang, *Bound by Destiny: Donald Gregg, Kim Dae-Jung and Turning Points in the US-ROK Alliance* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2014), 59–61.

[50] Bong-Geun Jun, 'Cyclical Patterns of North Korean Nuclear Crises and Solutions: A South Korean Perspective', in *Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea*, ed. Jungmin Kang (New York: Springer, 2013), 56.

new US Clinton administration over North Korean nuclear weapons programme in 1993 re-escalated the tension in the Korean peninsula.[51] Ramon Pacheco Pardo says the Clinton administration, inaugurated in January 1993, adopted 'a wait-and-see' approach towards communist governments in East Asia, including North Korea, "in the hope that domestic revolutions would end communist rule" as in Eastern European countries. As a response, North Korea employed brinkmanship tactics to draw attention from the US. In March 1993, when the Soviet Union promised to provide North Korea with light water reactors for energy production, North Korea announced they would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty which they had joined in 1985.[52] In May 1994, the removal of nuclear fuel rods from the reactor in Yongbyon, without supervision by the IAEA, raised concerns in the international community and the US began to consider military action against North Korea. Then, following a visit by former US President Jimmy Carter to North Korea and his meeting with Kim Il-sung in June, the US and North Korea re-engaged in negotiations and signed the 'US–DPRK Agreed Framework' in October 1994. In return for freezing its nuclear weapon development plan, North Korea was promised heavy fuel oil energy assistance from the US and two light-water reactors to be used for peaceful production of nuclear energy.[53]

Despite the 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the US, the already increased tension between North Korea and the newly elected President Kim Young-sam in South Korea could not be resolved easily.[54] In March 1994, harsh comments were made about South Korea's expected participation in UN sanctions against North Korea, the upcoming US–South Korean joint military drills, and the alleged contemplation by the South Korean government to deploy US Patriot missiles. These harsh remarks surged back and forth between North and South Korean representatives in a working level meeting at Panmunjom,

[51] Edward A. Olsen, *Korea, The Divided Nation* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2005), 158.

[52] Ramon Pacheco Pardo, *North Korea–US Relations under Kim Jong Il: The Quest for Normalization?* (London: Routledge, 2014), 23–25.

[53] Samuel S. Kim, *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 246–47.

[54] Jonsson, *Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation*, 57–58.

located in the DMZ between the North and South Korean borders. The mounting tension placed military forces on high alert, and eventually, the deployment of US Patriot missiles to South Korea was approved that April. However, Carter's June visit to North and South Korea paved the way to an agreement at an inter-Korean summit on 25 July 1994. Oberdofer says both Kim Il-sung and Kim Young-sam appeared to have high expectations for the planned summit. Unfortunately, the summit was cancelled due to sudden death of Kim Il-sung on 8 July 1994.[55]

The First Inter-Korean Summit and the Peace Process

In 1998, newly elected South Korean President Kim Dae-jung announced the 'Sunshine Policy' (*Haetpyŏtchŏngch'aek*), a positive engagement policy towards North Korea. Kim laid down three principles for his policy. First, no acts of military threat or armed provocation by North Korea were to be tolerated. Second, to rule out the absorption of North Korea as a means of achieving reunification. Third, to promote reconciliation and cooperation in a positive manner through the resumption of the 1991 Basic Agreement.[56] Moon says the position of the Kim Dae-jung government was that "encouraging North Korea to come out of isolation and confrontation was better than trying to force it".[57] The new North Korean Kim Jong-il regime called the Sunshine Policy a vicious, cunning policy to disarm the North and undermine the integrity of its people.[58] There was also strong criticism of Kim Dae-jung from conservative sectors in South Korea, who portrayed it as an appeasement policy which could endanger national security.[59]

But, the Kim Dae-jung government continued to promote the benefits of inter-Korean cooperation and the legitimacy of their policy. Particularly,

[55] Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 303–4.

[56] Office of the President, the Republic of Korea, *Government of the People-Collected Speeches of President Kim Dae-jung* (Seoul: The ROK Government, 1999), 64–65.

[57] Chung-in Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2012), 20.

[58] Oknim Chung, 'The Role of South Korea's NGOs: The Political Context', in *Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea*, ed. L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 90.

[59] Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea*, 43.

in 1999, the South Korean government provided chemical fertilizers to North Korea who had been suffering from severe famine since mid-1990s.[60] It is estimated that between 1994 and 1998, approximately 5% of the population died of famine.[61] It was during this humanitarian crisis that Kim Jong-il became the official leader of North Korea, following a three-year mourning period after the death of his father Kim Il-sung.[62] Lim says the South Korean government promoted reconciliation and mutual trust to prevent a potential war or terror attack caused by the fragile conditions in North Korea. He also argues that the capability of the South Korean system over North Korea gave the Kim Dae-jung government a strategic advantage to move beyond rhetoric and to suggest practical projects, such as constructing a joint economic complex and institutionalising South Korean tour programmes to North Korea.[63]

Before long, North Korea began to show a more hospitable attitude towards South Korea. In June 2000, the first inter-Korean summit between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung was held in Pyongyang, and the North–South Joint Declaration (the June 15 Joint Declaration) was signed by the two Kims on 15 June. The June 15 Joint Declaration consisted of five items, which were:

> 1. The North and the South agreed to solve the question of the country's reunification independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it.
>
> 2. The North and the South, recognising that a proposal for federation of lower stage advanced by the North side and a proposal for confederation put forth by the South side for the reunification of the country have elements in common, agreed to work for the reunification in this direction in the future.

[60] Brendan Howe and Dong Jin Kim, 'The Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance: Aid and Security on the Korean Peninsula', in *The South Korean Development Experience: Beyond Aid*, ed. Eun Mee Kim and Pil Ho Kim (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 147.

[61] Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea* (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005), 9–11.

[62] Patrick McEachern, *Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-Totalitarian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 72–75.

[63] Lim Dong-won, former South Korean negotiator, Unification minister, interview by author, Seoul, 25 January, 2010.

> 3. The North and the South agreed to settle humanitarian issues, including exchange of visiting groups of separated families and relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term prisoners, as early as possible on the occasion of August 15 this year.
>
> 4. The North and the South agreed to promote the balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchanges in all fields, social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and so on.
>
> 5. The North and the South agreed to hold dialogues between the authorities as soon as possible to implement the above-mentioned agreed points in the near future.[64]

Item 1 reaffirmed the principle of the July 4 Joint Communiqué. Item 2 showed the convergence of North and South Korean unification discourses, that Korean unification needed a step by step approach. It seemed to be a meaningful compromise from North Korea, who had always argued for immediate withdrawal of the US forces from South Korea before any kind of inter-Korean cooperation and exchange could begin. With this consensus, humanitarian issues were addressed by Item 3, and the economic cooperation and cultural exchanges of Item 4 were facilitated. Finally, in recognising each other's authority, the fifth item opened a channel of dialogue at the inter-governmental level.[65]

As argued by Lim, the increased inter-Korean cooperation and exchange seemed to have contributed to building confidence in the prevention of war on the Korean peninsula. North Korea allowed access by South Korean tourists to Mt. Kumgang, a strategic location for the North Korean military, and agreed to the establishment of an industrial complex in Kaesong, which required the relocation of North Korean troops away from the border.[66] Sabine Burghart and Rudiger Frank say that despite criticism from

[64] 'North-South Joint Declaration', *BBC News*, 15 June 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/791691.stm.

[65] Moon Chung-in, 'The Sunshine Policy and Ending the Cold War Structure: Assessing Impacts of the Korean Summit', in *Ending the Cold War in Korea: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Moon Chung-in, Westad Odd Arne, and Kahng Gyoo-hyoung (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 296–301.

[66] Lim Dong-won, former South Korean negotiator, Unification minister, interview by author, Seoul, 25 January 2010.

conservative South Korean groups toward the Kim Dae-jung government for giving away too much, the June 15 Joint Declaration was a milestone in inter-Korean relations. Since the Declaration, over 2 million people have crossed the border between South and North Korea for a multitude of purposes, such as humanitarian aid, sociocultural exchange, economic cooperation, and tourism. More than 16,000 Koreans met with their separated family members at family reunion events. Burghart and Frank argue "After decades of having been exposed exclusively to mostly derogative propaganda about the other side, North Koreans learn quickly that South Koreans are much more affluent than themselves, and that they are willing to cooperate and lend a helping hand when needed".[67]

Meanwhile, in an effort to increase the sustainability of the Korean peace process, the South Korean government pursued building confidence in the East Asian region. Kim Sung-jae says Kim Dae-jung persuaded the US, Japan, China, and Russia to support the Korean peace process, arguing that peace on the Korean peninsula was critical for the peace and prosperity of the East Asian region.[68] The diplomatic efforts of Kim Dae-jung appeared to contribute to improving the relationship between the US and North Korea. In October 2000, North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myung-rok visited Washington, and in return, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang. The US and North Korea agreed to advance their relationship "free from past enmity".[69] Armstrong says, "The two sides renewed their commitment to work toward normal relations, and North Korea appeared to be on the verge of agreeing to curtail its missile development and exports, one of Washington's chief concerns".[70] Additionally, South Korea encouraged the international community to form diplomatic relationships with North Korea. For the first two years after the summit, North Korea formed diplomatic relations with many South Korean allies, such as Western European countries, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

[67] Sabine Burghart and Rudiger Frank, 'Inter-Korean Cooperation 2000–2008: Commercial and Non-commercial Transactions and Human Exchanges', *Vienna Working Papers on East Asian Economy and Society* 1, no. 1 (2008): 2–24.

[68] Kim Sung-jae, former South Korean Minister of Culture and Tourism, interview by author, Seoul, 15 August 2016.

[69] Pollack, *No Exit*, 128.

[70] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 153.

The EU actively engaged in dialogue with North Korea and supported several capacity-building programs "that were de facto projects of official development assistance (ODA)".[71] As described by Armstrong, "Improvement in inter-Korean relations was part and parcel of this trend toward North Korea becoming a more normal country"[72]

However, while inter-Korean relations improved, the relationship between North Korea and the US once again faced obstacles. The new Bush administration designated North Korea as part of an 'Axis of Evil' in his State of the Union address in 2002.[73] Armstrong says that the hopes for reconciliation and reunification, raised by the June 15 Joint Declaration were "soon overtaken by renewed distrust and mutual hostility", and "setback with the coming of the more hawkish Bush administration".[74] Mikael Weissmann argues that Bush reversed Clinton's policy, arguing that Clinton and South Korean government gave "North Korea new leverage to pursue brinkmanship tactics".[75] David Sanger says there was "a certainty (in the Bush Administration) that if Clinton or Kim Dae Jung had shown enough toughness, America would not now be facing blackmail by a two-bit regime."[76] With regard to the change in US policy, former US special envoy to North Korea, Charles Pritchard, introduces an anecdote with Bush in his book, 'Failed diplomacy':

> When President Kim (Kim Dae-jung) began telling the president (Bush) about the need to engage North Korea, the president put his hand over the mouthpiece of the telephone and said, "Who is this guy? I can't believe how naïve he is!"

Prichard says, "Whoever was responsible for briefing Bush on North Korea during the campaign and transition did such a thorough job of painting North Korea and Kim Jong-il as evil personified". He attests

[71] Burghart and Frank, 'Inter-Korean Cooperation 2000–2008: Commercial and Non-commercial Transactions and Human Exchanges', 10.

[72] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 154.

[73] 'President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address', *The Washington Post*, 29 January 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm.

[74] Armstrong, *The Koreas*, 133–34.

[75] Mikael Weissmann, *The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 120.

[76] David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power* (London: Bantam Press, 2009), 303–4.

that Bush found people who did not share his hatred of North Korea useless, and in this regard, "President Kim Dae-jung was the first but certainly not the last casualty".[77] The US accused North Korea of having a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework, although North Korea argued it was the US who first ignored promises to provide light water reactors.[78] Siegfried Hecker argues that the termination of the Agreed Framework was due to domestic political divisions in the US, and by scraping his predecessor's agreement, the Bush administration, "traded a potential threat that would have taken years to turn into bombs for one that took months".[79]

The Six-Party Talks and the Peace Process

In an effort to decrease tensions between North Korea and the US, and to not be excluded from any negotiations on the Korean conflict, South Korea proposed that the US and North Korea resolve nuclear issues in multilateral cooperation.[80] The multilateral approach was not new. In the 1990s, the US Clinton administration and the South Korean Kim Young-sam government had considered a four-party formula (South and North Korea, the US and China) to resolve the Korean conflict. But, North Korea insisted on bilateral talks with the US, while both Clinton and Kim Young-sam were unenthusiastic about the plan, as they were expecting a regime collapse in North Korea.[81] Until the early 2000s, North Korea had continuously insisted on bilateral talks with the US,

[77] Charles L. Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb:* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 52–71.

[78] Keun-sik Kim, 'North Korea's Nuclear Program: Its Rationale, Intentions, and Military-First Politics', in *Inter-Korean Relations: Family or Enemy?* ed. Kun Young Park (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym International Corporation, 2014), 139.

[79] Siegfried S. Hecker, 'Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises', in *The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations*, ed. Suk Hi Kim, Bernhard Seliger, and Terence Roehrig (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 227.

[80] Leszek Buszynski, *Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 59.

[81] Chung-in Moon and Taehwan Kim, 'South Korea's International Relations: Challenges to Developmental Realism?', in *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 261–62.

but eventually agreed to the Six-Party Talks including the US, China, Japan, Russia and North and South Korea in 2003.[82]

In the meantime, the new South Korean Rho Moo-hyun administration appointed special prosecutors in 2003 to investigate alleged collusion between the Kim Dae-jung government and the Hyundai Asan company in sending secret remittances to North Korea prior to the inter-Korean Summit Meeting. The remittance scandal and investigation fuelled criticism of the Sunshine policy by conservative groups in South Korea, and negatively affected the relationship of the new South Korean government with North Korea.[83] Simultaneously, the Six-Party Talks stalled, as the US and North Korean relationship continued to worsen. In 2004, the US Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act, signed by President Bush. The new Act was to fund human rights programmes which condemn the North Korean regime.[84] In January 2005, the inauguration speech by the new US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice in which she referred to North Korea as an "outpost of tyranny", provoked North Korea into suspending its participation in Six-Party Talks.[85] In February 2005, North Korea announced that they possessed "manufactured nukes" and had become "a nuclear weapons state".[86]

But, the US and North Korea began to moderate their rhetoric and the tension between them began to deescalate. On 31 May 2005, US president Bush used 'Mr.' when referring to Kim Jong-il

[82] Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb*, 101.

[83] Sung Chull Kim, 'The State-Business Coalition for South Korea's Engagement with North Korea', in *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, ed. Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang (New York: State University of New York Press, 2010), 154; Key-young Son, *South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 118–19.

[84] Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, *North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation* (Cogressional Research Service, 15 January 2016), 21.

[85] 'Rice Names "Outposts of Tyranny"', *BBC News*, 19 January 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4186241.stm.

[86] 'DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period', Korean Central News Agency, 10 February 2005, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200502/news02/11.htm#1.

in his comments about North Korea. The North Korean Central News Agency stated, "We will closely follow if his remarks would not change day and night."[87] A bilateral meeting in July 2005 between US envoy, Christopher Hill, and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Kye-gawn, revived the Six-Party Talks. The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks convened in July 2005 and made enough progress to issue the September 19 Joint Statement, under the principle "commitment for commitment, action for action". North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in return for the provision of a light water reactor. Additionally, the US and Japan agreed to take steps to normalise their relations with North Korea. China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US offered to provide energy assistance to North Korea.[88] The September 19 Joint Statement appeared to be a good example of conflict resolution. As observed in Chapter 2, John Burton states that finding common interests, while respecting human needs, are critical in reaching a conflict resolution.[89] The September 19 Joint Statement seemed to guarantee two basic needs of North Korea; security and physical.

However, in the same month, the US Treasury Department accused Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in Macau, of assisting North Korea in laundering money obtained through counterfeiting. The US ban of BDA forced Macau banking authorities to freeze North Korean accounts. North Korea reacted indignantly, and Six-Party Talks were suspended for more than a year.[90] Pardo says, "The timing of the imposition of sanctions on Banco Delta Asia suggests that the hawks were still trying to topple the Kim Jong Il government".[91] During the suspension of the

[87] 'Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Bush's Remarks', Korean Central News Agency, 3 June 2005, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200502/news02/11.htm#1.

[88] Christopher R. Hill, *Outpost: Life on the Front Lines of American Diplomacy: A Memoir* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014).

[89] John W. Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 36–44.

[90] Christopher R. Hill, 'The Elusive Vision of a Non-nuclear North Korea', in *The Politics and International Relations of Modern Korea*, ed. John Nilsson-Wright, vol. 1 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 187–88.

[91] Pardo, *North Korea–US Relations under Kim Jong Il*, 69.

Six-Party Talks, North Korea conducted eight missile tests in July 2006, and on 9 October, executed its first nuclear test. The UN condemned the North Korean tests, called for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, and placed sanctions on North Korea by way of Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718.[92]

The US position on North Korea continued to vacillate, particularly following the defeat of the Republican Party in the mid-term election and the November 2006 resignations of US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and UN Ambassador Bolton. The Six Party Talks resumed that month, during which the BDA issue and possible removal of North Korea from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism were discussed in a bilateral meeting between US envoy Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Kye-gawn, in January 2007. On 13 February 2007, the Six-Party Talks issued an agreement on Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (the February 13 Agreement).[93] North Korea agreed to freeze plutonium production and processing, and to allow IAEA inspectors back into the country. The Six Parties agreed to form five working groups to implement the September 19 Joint Statement: (1) Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula; (2) Normalisation of DPRK–US relations; (3) Normalisation of DPRK–Japan relations; (4) Economy and Energy Cooperation; and (5) Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism. Following the agreement, the Macau Authority released the frozen North Korean funds, and, on 14 July 2007, North Korea announced they had shut down Yongbyon Nuclear facilities.[94]

After the Six-Party Talk reached an agreement, the inter-Korean relationship also made progress and the second inter-Korean summit between Rho Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il, was held in Pyongyang in October 2007. In the October 4, South–North Joint Declaration, North Korea and South Korea agreed "to end the current armistice regime and

[92] Gabriel Jonsson, *South Korea in the United Nations: Global Governance, Inter-Korean Relations and Peace Building* (New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd, 2017), 109–10.

[93] Pardo, *North Korea - US Relations under Kim Jong Il*, 74–76; IISS, *North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011).

[94] Brian Myers, 'America's Position in Regard to the Six-Party Talks', *Sahoekwahagyŏn'gu* 8 (Winter, 2007): 174.

build a permanent peace regime" and "to facilitate, expand, and further develop inter-Korean economic cooperation projects on a continual basis for a balanced economic development and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula".[95] But, the declaration faced significant criticism from conservative groups in South Korea. First, the critics argued that the declaration did not have a clear commentary on the denuclearisation of North Korea. Second, the expression of ending the war was too ambiguous to realise. Third, the costs, which South Korea had agreed to pay for economic cooperation, were too high. However, the biggest challenge to implementation for the declaration was that it was an agreement by an outgoing South Korean administration.[96]

In December 2007, Lee Myung-bak, a conservative candidate, won the South Korean presidential election. Following his inauguration in 2008, he declared North Korean denuclearisation to be a precondition for future inter-Korean cooperation.[97] The new government policy had four principles. The first principle was that North Korea should transform its centrally planned economy into a market friendly system. Second, inter-Korean cooperation must be controlled according to the progress of denuclearisation. The third principle was a combined use of enticement and coercion. Finally, the North Korean human rights should be dealt with as a violation of the universal values. This new South Korean policy was interpreted by North Korea as an 'indifferent policy' in that the South would ignore the existence of North until North Korea entirely gave up its system.[98] During the increased tension between the two Koreas, a female South Korean tourist was shot dead by a North Korean guard at Kumgang Mountain in North Korea on 11 July 2008.

[95] 'Two Koreas Issue "Peace Declaration"', *The Chosun Ilbo*, 4 October 2007, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/10/04/2007100461031.html.

[96] Norimitsu Onishi, 'Pledging Peace, Koreans Agree on Economic Projects', *The New York Times*, 4 October 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/world/asia/04korea.html; Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea*, 70–75.

[97] Kyoung-Soo Kim, 'Lee Myung-Bak Government's Paradigm for Foreign and Security Policy', *Korea and World Affairs* 32, no. 1 (2008): 8.

[98] Yon-chul Kim, '2009, North and South Korean Relation: Issues and Prospect', in *T'ongiljŏllyakp'orŏmbokosŏ* (Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 2009), 21.

She was said to have crossed into a military area by mistake. The South Korean government suspended the tour programme.[99]

Despite the difficulties of the inter-Korean relationship, the US and North Korean relationship seemed to be moving forward in 2008. The New York Philharmonic visited Pyongyang for the first time, and CNN was invited to North Korea to report the demolition of the cooling tower, the key nuclear facility in Yongbyon, on live TV. In August 2008, Bush deleted North Korea from the US List of States Sponsoring Terrorism. But, this rapprochement did not last long. In August, during the days leading up to the final act in the nuclear negotiations between the US Bush administration and North Korea, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, reportedly suffered a stroke. Rumours about his condition abounded.[100] South Korean activists began to launch balloons directed toward North Korea, stuffed with flyers and leaflets saying, "Your great leader's last days are approaching. The dictator has collapsed from illness".[101] North Korea reacted indignantly, issuing a warning of 'great consequences' at the working level military talks between North and South Koreas in October 2008.[102]

In December 2008, the six-party talks ended in an impasse due to their failure to reach a consensus about verification measures for the denuclearisation of North Korea. Although North Korea had agreed to "allow visits to declared nuclear facilities, a review of documents and interviews with technical personnel" in a bilateral meeting with the US in July 2008, the US made requests for "records of all imports or exports of nuclear materials and nuclear-related equipment" and "full access to any site, facility or location" declared or determined to be related to a nuclear programme by any relevant parties. South Korea and Japan insisted on denial of energy aid to North Korea without a formal and tough six-party verification protocol.[103]

[99] Jonathan Watts, 'South Korean Tourist Shot Dead in North Korea', *The Guardian*, 11 July 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/11/korea.

[100] Sanger, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*, 340–41.

[101] 'Balloon Campaign Assails N Korea', *BBC News*, November 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7739098.stm.

[102] 'North Demands South Stop Propaganda', *The Korea Times*, 2 October 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/04/205_32073.html.

[103] IISS, *North Korean Security Challenges.*

Pritchard explains the reason behind the failure of Six-Party Talks from the US perspective:

> The answer, unfortunately, is that the (Bush) administration's commitment to negotiating a settlement with North Korea through the six-party process exists in name only. North Korea policy has been fully captured by those in the administration who seek regime change.[104]

It seemed that this tactic by the US Bush administration, which sought denuclearisation through the regime change of North Korea, was intensified following Kim Jong-il's stroke. This was paired with the approach to North Korea by the new South Korean government. The suspension of the Six Party Talks shows, that without meeting the security needs of a conflict party, it is not possible to resolve conflict peacefully, as suggested by Burton's human needs theory. On top of that, North Korea began to equate the tactic with the goal, creating a non-negotiable position. Burton says, even though a tactic is originally employed to achieve a goal, the politics of the tactic is likely to lose sight of the ultimate goal in the bargaining process, and so make the tactic non-negotiable.[105] Although having nuclear weapons could be considered as a tactic toward the goal of regime survival, this becomes more and more non-negotiable to the extent that it increases the threat to survival for the North Korean regime.

Suspension of the Peace Process and Escalated Tension

In 2009, the inauguration of the Obama administration raised expectations that the US would resume dialogue with North Korea. But, the new US government appeared to have reservations about putting effort into resuming talks with North Korea. Jeffrey Bader says the new US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton "felt the Chinese, who regarded the Six-Party Talks as their major diplomatic achievement, would feel a greater sense of urgency about persuading North Korea to undertake serious actions towards denuclearization". The Obama administration took the position that it would not engage in a dialogue with North Korea unless North

[104] Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb*, 131.

[105] Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, 36–44.

Korea took serious action toward denuclearisation.[106] In March 2009, the South Korea and US military began a series of joint military drills, dubbed 'the Key Resolve Exercise'. North Korea called these drills a preparation for invasion.[107] On 5 April 2009, North Korea conducted a long-range missile test. On the 13 April, the UN Security Council issued a statement condemning the launch. In reaction, on 15 April, North Korea announced it was withdrawing from denuclearisation talks and began to restore the disabled nuclear facilities. On 25 May 2009, North Korean conducted a second underground nuclear test. The UN Security Council made a unanimous decision, through Resolution 1874, to increase economic pressure on the North Korean government to stop further missile and nuclear testing. An IISS report says, "Rather than respond to North Korean provocations, the Obama administration attempted to follow a policy of 'strategic patience'" and focus on "enforcing the sanctions mandated by" the UNSC Resolution 1874.[108]

But, tension in the Korean peninsula continued to increase as a result of the 2010 sinking of South Korean naval ship, Cheonan, and the bombing of South Korean Yeonpyeong Island by North Korea. The South Korean government said that unless North Korea apologised for these incidents, particularly the sinking of the Cheonan, there would be no dialogue. North Korea denied any responsibility for the sinking of Cheonan and said the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was self-defence in response to the shelling exercise by South Korea,[109] and on 24 May 2010, South Korea suspended all forms of exchange and economic cooperation with North Korea, except for the Kaesong industrial complex and a few humanitarian aid programmes. Critics of the May 24 measure argued that the damage would be to South Korean companies only because North Korea could always turn to China, but the South Korean

[106] Jeffrey A. Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 33.

[107] '[Analysis] What's behind the North's Opposition to Key Resolve?', *Hankyoreh*, 10 March 2009, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/343241.html.

[108] IISS, *North Korean Security Challenges.*

[109] Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea*, 129–39.

government and conservative voices maintained that this was the price of national security in the face of North Korean provocation.[110]

In December 2011, Kim Jong-il passed away, and his son Kim Jong-un, who had been designated as a successor in 2009, took over as the leader of North Korea. Since taking over, Kim Jong-un has intensified political purges in order to consolidate power. For example, in 2013, he publicly removed his uncle, Jang Song-taek from his position as Vice Chairman of the National Defence Commission and had him executed.[111] During this time, Kim Jong-un also announced the 'Byungjin line' (the simultaneous development of the economy and nuclear weapons), in the March 2013 plenary meeting of the Workers' Party Central Committee. The meeting report argued "The true superiority of the new Byungjin line is that, by virtue of decisively improving our deterrent and national defense capabilities without spending more on defense expenditure, we will be able to concentrate on improving people's lives and economic construction."[112] But, there appeared to be a paradox in this new policy, seeing that nuclear development would likely increase international sanctions, worsening the overall economy. The leadership transition in North Korea increased expectations of regime collapse among US and South Korean policy makers and North Korea experts. When he inherited the regime in 2011, Kim Jong-un appeared unprepared and inexperienced in comparison to his father. The brutal purges and the paradox of the Byungjin line seemed proof of imminent collapse of North Korea.[113]

The US government engaged in a brief dialogue with the new North Korean regime and reached an agreement on 29 February 2012 (the Leap Day Agreement). In exchange for a North Korean moratorium on nuclear and missile tests, the Obama administration pledged nutritional aid to North Korea. But, this agreement broke down when, in April

[110] John Swenson-Wright, 'Inter-Korean Relations and the Challenge of North-East Asian Regional Security', in *The Politics and International Relations of Modern Korea*, ed. John Nilsson-Wright, vol. 4 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 211.

[111] Roberto Bendini, 'Policy Briefing, North Korea: Kim Jong-un's Great Purge' (European Union, January 2014), 6.

[112] 'Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee', Korean Central News Agency, 31 March 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201303/news31/20130331-24ee.html.

[113] Swenson-Wright, 'Inter-Korean Relations and the Challenge of North-East Asian Regional Security', 214.

2012, North Korea launched a long-range rocket, claiming it was a space rocket, not a missile.[114] The new North Korean regime accelerated the development of its nuclear and missile technology, and indicated that it would never give up nuclear weapons, by including a proclamation of being a nuclear power in the revised constitution of April 2012. Since then, it has advanced its nuclear and missile technology through yearly short, mid and long-range missile tests, as well as a series of nuclear tests, in February 2013, January 2016, September 2016, and September 2017. The Kim Jong-un regime appears to have become much more confident concerning regime security. Contrary to the expectations of many North Korea watchers, the economic situation of North Korea has shown some improvement, despite reinforced sanctions due to the missile and nuclear tests (UNSC Resolution, 2087, 2094, 2270, 2321, 2371, 2375).[115]

In 2012, Park Geun-hye defeated her rival Moon Jae-in, a former chief of staff to former President Rho Moo-hyun, by a narrow margin of 1.2%. During the campaign, her party revisited the second inter-Korean summit, accusing Rho Moo-hyun government of giving up the Northern Limitation Line (NLL) to North Korea.[116] Since her inauguration in 2013, Park Guen-hye had tried to differentiate herself from her predecessor with regard to North Korea. She introduced 'Trustpolitik', a two-pronged approach, which emphasised a balance between strong deterrence/defence and dialog/cooperation. But, as the tension on the Korean peninsula intensified following the third nuclear test of North Korea in February 2013, the Trustpolitik balance has shifted toward a more hard-line policy.[117] In March 2013, North Korea declared an abrogation of the armistice agreement in protest to the annual joint military drills in which the US dispatched nuclear bombers and performed a

[114] Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin, 'North Korea: U.S. Relationas, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation', 7–8.

[115] Byung-Yeon Kim, *Unveiling the North Korean Economy: Collapse and Transition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 55–56.

[116] 'Presidential Hopefuls Clash over NLL, Liberal Camp's Single Candidacy', Yonhap News Agency, 16 October 2012, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/topics/2012/10/16/14/4609010000AEN20121016007800315F.HTML.

[117] Katharine H. S. Moon and Paul Park, 'Trustpolitik on the Korean Peninsula: Dead or Dormant?', *The Diplomat*, 3 August 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/trustpolitik-on-the-korean-peninsula-dead-or-dormant/.

mock nuclear bombing.[118] The number and political power of those who preferred a hard-line policy increased in response to heightened tension toward North Korea on the Korean peninsula. Following the fourth nuclear test by North Korea in January 2016, and the subsequent launch of a long-range rocket in February, the South Korean government shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex, despite the protests of the South Korean companies who had monetary interests in the complex. According to Business Korea, a total of 124 South Korean firms, with 54,763 North Korean and 803 South Korean employees, were located in the industrial complex, and approximately 3000 Korean firms were in business with them.[119]

The relationship between North Korea and the US also continued to deteriorate. The Obama administration continued to refuse any official dialogue with North Korea unless the North took serious steps toward denuclearisation. In 2013, Glyn Davies, the US special representative for North Korea policy, asserted that the top priority of the US policy on North Korea was to send a common signal to North Korea from the international community. Noticeably, China also voted in favour of UN sanctions on North Korea. Shinichi Ogawa says that mounting tensions in East Asia, due to the nuclear and missile tests in North Korea, would be a significant security threat to China.[120]

But, this did not mean that China would be ready to cut North Korea off, when doing so would cause destabilisation in the China–North Korea border area. Furthermore, in the face of the US attempt to enhance its presence in East Asia, through the 'Pivot to Asia' initiative, North Korea still seemed to be an important ally to China. Former US Secretary Clinton had announced the US 'Pivot to Asia' in her Foreign Policy article, 'America's Pacific Century' in 2011. In the article, Clinton pledged to strengthen military alliances with Japan and

[118] Ken E. Gause, *North Korean Leadership Dynamics and Decision-Making under Kim Jong-un* (CAN Analysis and Solutions, September 2013), 142–43.

[119] Jung Min-hee, 'Losses of Companies in Kaesong Industrial Complex Likely to Snowball', Text, *BusinessKorea*, 11 February 2016, http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/politics/13802-symbol-inter-korean-cooperation-losses-companies-kaesong-industrial-complex.

[120] Shinichi Ogawa, 'North Korea's Nuclear Development, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime, and Regional Security', in *The North Korea Crisis and Regional Responses*, ed. Utpal Vyas, Ching-Chang Chen, and Denny Roy (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2015), 30.

South Korea against North Korean provocation, as well as to engage in free-trade agreements with Asian countries, such as the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In a nutshell, 'Pivot to Asia', which included US military redeployment to Asia, was to redirect US resources from the Middle East. From the Chinese perspective, this new policy was intended to contain the rise of China in East Asia, although US policy-makers strongly denied this.[121] Particularly, the US plan to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea was faced by strong opposition from China, as well as from North Korea. The US argued a THAAD deployment was to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat, but China expressed concern that the THADD surveillance system would not only be targeted toward North Korea, but also toward China. China seemed to believe that the THAAD deployment could give the US strategic advantage over China.[122]

In 2017, both the US and South Korea underwent a leadership change. Donald Trump, a Republican candidate, who promoted an 'America First' slogan, won the US presidential election and took power. In South Korea Park Guen-hye was impeached due to a corruption scandal and Moon Jae-in, an opposition party candidate, was elected as President of South Korea in May 2017. Before he was elected, Moon Jae-in appeared to pursue South Korean national interest over the alliance with the US, but changed his position once he became President, and allowed the US THAAD deployment in South Korea.[123] In addition, the US augmented its military presence in East Asia by sending a navy strike force with strategic bombers. International sanctions against North Korea were reinforced. North Korea continued missile and nuclear tests, claiming they have the capability for a nuclear attack on the US mainland. As a response, Trump hinted at the use of a military option, while North

[121] Bjørnar Sverdrup-Thygeson, Marc Lanteigne, and Ulf Sverdrup, *"For Every Action…" The American Pivot to Asia and Fragmented European Responses* (Brookings, January 2016), 3–4.

[122] Ankit Panda, 'What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?', *The Diplomat*, 25 February 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/.

[123] Christine Kim and Michelle Nichols, 'South Korea Deploys Final Pieces to THAAD Anti-Missile System as US Seeks Tough North Korea Sanctions', *Business Insider*, 7 September 2017, http://uk.businessinsider.com/thaad-deployed-south-korea-2017-9.

Korea pledged full retaliation of any US attack. In the meantime, South Korean purchases of the US military equipment in 2017 increased significantly as tensions heightened between the US and North Korea.[124]

Conclusion

In 2018, the North Korean participation in the South Korean Pyongchang Winter Olympics brought hope for the full resumption of the peace process.[125] The expectations for the peace process were amplified by the news about the inter-Korean and the US–North Korea summits.[126] But, there are still many groups, advocating North Korea regime change or collapse as the best strategy to resolve the Korean conflict. The abysmal image of the Kim Jong-un regime and its human rights violation are adding to the justification of this strategy. Meanwhile, since the suspension of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation in 2010, the Korean peace process have relied almost exclusively on high-level negotiations, as it did before the South Korean democratisation, increasing interdependency peacebuilding gap.

According to Lederach, high-level negotiations tend to concentrate on "an issue-oriented and short-term achievement". Usually they need a short-term achievement to obtain support from within and outside of the country; 'visibility' and 'profile' are essential for top leaders "to consolidate and maintain a leader's base and legitimacy". This chapter showed how the peace process has been used to benefit the dictatorship in the 1970s, from the perspective of justice gap in peacebuilding. This chapter also discussed how the negotiation process for the denuclearisation of North Korea in 2000s has been oriented by the interests and needs at the state-level. For this reason, the peace process has focused on implementing what have been agreed through the conflict resolution

[124] Dong Jin Kim, 'The Two Koreas Have Tried to Make Peace before—And They Could Do So Again', *The Conversation*, 12 December 2017, http://theconversation.com/the-two-koreas-have-tried-to-make-peace-before-and-they-could-do-so-again-86809.

[125] Jay Song, 'Two Koreas Working Together on Winter Olympics Is a Small but Important Step toward Peace', *The Conversation*, 9 February 2018, http://theconversation.com/two-koreas-working-together-on-winter-olympics-is-a-small-but-important-step-toward-peace-90931.

[126] Russell Goldman and Choe Sang-Hun, 'North and South Korea Summit Is Short on Details, but Long on Theater', *The New York Times*, 27 April 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/world/asia/north-korea-south-border.html.

approach among governments rather than transforming the relationships at all levels of the societies.

Making agreements in high-level negotiations are very important to build peace. But, without building a sustainable platform where people can build just and peaceful relationships, the process-structure gap in peacebuilding will increase and peace processes will always face an impasse in the implementation process.[127] Considering historical mistrust among the conflict parties, a viable strategy for building peace should be oriented by diverse peacebuilding activities at diverse levels of the societies, not by short-term political gains at the state-level. In this regard, research on civil society peacebuilding is needed, alongside with research on state level peace processes, as the next chapters demonstrate.

[127] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 40–45.

CHAPTER 5

Bringing People Together: Interdependent Peacebuilding

The aim of this chapter is to explore the role of civil society in bringing people together in a peace process and to conduct a case study on the Christian ecumenical movement for peace and unification in the Korean peninsula. Joseph Montville argues that civil society leaders from different conflict parties can get together and develop a workable relationship by reducing the sense of victimhood in the parties and by re-humanising the image of the adversary.[1] According to John Paul Lederach, the role of civil society leaders is essential in filling the interdependence gap in peacebuilding, because they are likely to be known to top-level leadership and they are also likely to be aware of the challenges at the grassroots level.[2]

This chapter describes the historical background of the ecumenical movement in Korea to show its significance as a civil society actor in the Korean conflict. It then explores the role of ecumenical church leaders in bringing people from North and South Korea together. The chapter goes on to analyse the influence of the ecumenical movement on the

[1] Joseph V. Montville, 'The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy', in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Concepts and Theories*, ed. Vamik D. Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius, and Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 163–64.

[2] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 41–42.

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1_5

Korean peace process, and discusses the current challenges in peacebuilding. Finally, this chapter concludes by highlighting the role of civil society in filling the interdependence gap in peacebuilding.

The History of the Ecumenical Movement in the Korean Conflict

The ecumenical movement is commonly understood as a Christian movement for reconciliation and unity among different denominations, Catholic and Protestant Churches in particular.[3] However, as the original Greek word, 'Oikoumene' which means 'inhabited earth' or 'whole world', demonstrates, the ecumenical movement has been a movement for peaceful cooperation in the world, beyond church unity.[4] Philip Potter says, "the whole burden of the ecumenical movement is to cooperate with God in making the oikumene an oikos, a home, a family of men and women, of young and old, of varied gifts, cultures, possibilities, where openness, trust, love and justice reign".[5] The world ecumenical movement encouraged the formation of national church bodies such as the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK).[6] Founded in Amsterdam in 1948, the World Council of Churches (WCC) became the cornerstone of the ecumenical movement for peacebuilding in the twentieth century.[7] The constitution of the WCC states its commitment to "serving human need, breaking down barriers between people, promoting one human family in justice and peace, and upholding the integrity of creation".[8]

Christianity in Korea was spread by foreign missionaries, the majority of whom were North Americans, in the late nineteenth century,

[3] Gideon Goosen, *Bringing Churches Together: A Popular Introduction to Ecumenism* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2001), 11.

[4] Nicholas Lossky et al., *Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement* (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1991).

[5] Philip A. Potter, 'One Obedience to the Whole Gospel', *The Ecumenical Review* 29, no. 4 (1977): 363.

[6] O. L. Snaitang, *A History of Ecumenical Movement: An Introduction* (Bangalore: BTESSC/SATHRI, 2004), 98–99, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/005868173.

[7] Goosen, *Bringing Churches Together* (2001), 23–24.

[8] 'Constitution and Rules—World Council of Churches', Page, accessed 5 March 2018, https://www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us/self-understanding-vision/constitution-rules.

although, since the eighteenth century there had been Korean intellectuals interested in the egalitarian ideas of Christian literature. In the early twentieth century, this new faith was adopted by several leaders in the independence movement under the Japanese colonial rule.[9] Early Korean Christians actively participated in the ecumenical movement, and sent representatives to world ecumenical gatherings such as the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference in 1910. Following the liberation, and subsequent division of the Korean peninsula, the NCCK was formed in South Korea in 1946, with five churches, the Presbyterian Church of Korea, the Anglican Church of Korea, the Evangelical Church in Korea, the Salvation Army and the Korean Methodist Church, as founding members. At that time more than 90% of Korean Christians belonged to these five churches; almost all individual Protestant churches joined the NCCK.[10]

However, since the 1950s, there has been debate in the Presbyterian Church of Korea about whether the WCC embraced communist ideals. The controversy was not limited to South Korea, the majority of the ecumenical movements in the world were affected by the Cold War. At times, the WCC was viewed as a Western European community to the extent that people would joke that it was the religious equivalent of NATO. Conversely, it seemed that whenever the WCC became involved in social justice issues, their decisions or programs were denounced as communist inspired. Gideon Goosen describes, "criticism that the World Council of Churches was communist-inspired has been well matched over the years by critics at the other end of the spectrum who see it as an agent of capitalism".[11] Not surprisingly, this criticism from both sides continued to affect the ecumenical movement in the Korean peninsula.[12] In 1959, the National Alliance of Evangelism (NAE), was formed by

[9]Ministry of Culture and Tourism Republic of Korea, *Religion in Korea* (Seoul: Religious Affairs Office Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2003), 20.

[10]John Briggs, Mercy Amba Oduyoye, and Georges Tsetsis, eds., *A History of the Ecumenical Movement: Vol III: 1968–2000* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2004), 514.

[11]Gideon Goosen, *Bringing Churches Together*, 2001, 28.

[12]Hyuk Baeg Im, 'Korean Christian Churches in Democratization Movement: Motivations, Contributions, and Strategies', in *Democratic Movements and Korean Society: Historical Documents and Korean Studies*, ed. Sang-young Rhyu (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2007), 107–8.

churches who seceded from the NCCK. Since then, member churches of NCCK faithful to the ecumenical movement are considered progressive, while those who withdrew, or did not join, are regarded as conservative.[13] Park Jong-hwa says that the ecumenical movement caused the division of South Korea churches, "because its spirit of unity could not satisfy the desire of Christians in the situation in which 'belligerent anti-communism' became nationalized".[14]

Soon after the division of the Korean peninsula, many Christians in North Korea crossed the border to South Korea to avoid the newly established communist rule. Kim Heung-soo and Ryoo Dae-young say that, at first, it appeared that the conflict between North Korean communists and Christians was not about religion, but about communist style land reform in North Korea. Many Christians who had owned land, and several private schools run by Christians, became victims of the nationalisation of lands and schools. In 1946, pro-communist Christians, led by Rev. Kang Ryang-wook, an uncle of Kim Il-sung, formed the Korean Christian Federation (KCF), the official North Korean Church equivalent to the NCCK in South Korea. As a leader of the KCF, Rev. Kang argued that there was no persecution of Christians by communist rule, and that the issue was land, not religion.[15] However, before long, the anti-religious campaign in North Korea strengthened. Kim Il-sung claimed that US spies were posing as Christian pastors, and that many Christians had fallen for the religious propaganda of the US, worshipping the US as their god, betraying their own nation for dollars. He argued that Christians should believe in a god of Korea, not a god of another country.[16] In spite of efforts by pro-communist Christians in supporting the Kim Il-sung regime and condemning the US as the

[13] Jae-soon Park, 'The Tradition and Theological Heritage of Korean Ecumenical Movement', *SinhakSasang* [The Journal of Theological Thought], no. 128 Spring (2005): 104–5.

[14] Jong-hwa Park, 'South Korean Churches and Ecumenical Movement: A Task and a Prospect', *SinhakSasang* [The Journal of Theological Thought], no. 100 Spring (1998): 257.

[15] Heung-soo Kim and Dae-young Ryoo, *Pukhanjonggyoŭi Saeroun Ihae* [New Understanding of the North Korean Religion] (Seoul: Tasan'gŭlbang, 2002), 72–74.

[16] Il-Sung Kim, *Kimilsŏngjŏchakchip Cheikwŏn* [Kim Il-Sung Works Vol. 2] (Pyongyang: Chosŏnnotongdangch'ulp'ansa, 1979), 520.

"anti-Christ and Judas, a betrayer of Jesus",[17] Christians in North Korea became widely understood as pawns of the US during the Korean War. Kim Il-sung accused US missionaries of attacking innocent women and children with rifles and tanks instead of the cross.[18]

On the other hand, Christians in South Korea enjoyed special privileges since the US occupation in 1945. Several Christians, who learned English from the missionaries, were employed by the US military, and were able to increase their social influence through so-called 'translation politics'.[19] Anti-communism among Christians in South Korea grew with the influx of Christians from North Korea in the late 1940s and the North Korean attack in June 1950. The NCCK General Secretary Nam Kung-hyuk reported to the WCC about the Korean War and asked for help.[20] The WCC issued a 'Statement on the Korean Situation and World Order' in which they advocated UN military intervention in the Korean peninsula, a statement which caused conflict in the world ecumenical movement. In particular, the Eastern European churches showed a strong objection.[21] Meanwhile, many Christians in South Korea participated in military action against North Korea, and advocated the use of a US atomic bomb on North Korea.[22] The NCCK continued to make appeals to the world ecumenical movement about atrocities by North Korean communists. As the Korean War protracted, the WCC began to urge for an armistice and attempted to facilitate peace

[17] 'Chŏnjosŏn Aekukchŏk Kitokkyototŭlgwa Chŏnch'e Chonggyoindŭleke Ponaenŭn Hosomun [An Appeal to All the Patriotic Christians and Religious People in Chosun]', *Rodong Sinmun*, 7 August 1950.

[18] Il-Sung Kim, *Kimilsŏngjŏchakchip Che12kwŏn* [Kim Il-Sung Works Vol. 12] (Pyongyang: Chosŏnnotongdangch'ulp'ansa, 1995), 32–33.

[19] Myong-sub Huh, *Haepangihu Han'gukkyohoeŭi Chaehyŏngsŏng* [Reformation of the Korean Church After the Independence 1945–1960] (Seoul: Sŏulsinhaktaehakkyoch'ulp'anbu, 2009), 145–58.

[20] C. W. Ranson, 'Telegram, Ranson to H. Namkung, 26 June 1950', in *WCC Tosŏkwan Sochang Han'gukkyohoesacharyochip-Han'gukchŏnjaeng p'yŏn* (Seoul: Han'gukkitokkyoyŏksayŏn'guso, 2003), 1.

[21] WCC, 'The Korean Situation and World Order, Central Committee of the World Council of Churches, 13 July 1950', in *WCC Tosŏkwan Sochang Han'gukkyohoesacharyochip-Han'gukchŏnjaeng p'yŏn* (Seoul: Han'gukkitokkyoyŏksayŏn'guso, 2003), 22–23.

[22] Byung-wook Chang, *6.25 Kongsannamch'imgwa Kyohoe* [6.25 Communist Invasion to South Korea and Church] (Seoul: Han'gukkyoyukkongsa, 1983), 282–92.

negotiations. However, according to a WCC staff member who visited Korea in June 1953, many South Korean ecumenical leaders objected to an armistice and wanted to unify Korea under the South Korean system, by any means.[23]

Following the Armistice Agreement of 1953, the NCCK became more concerned with democratic transformation of the South Korean political system than with peace and unification. There were three main reasons for this. First, it was easy to portray anyone who opposed the authoritarian government, and spoke about peace and unification, as a communist sympathiser. The NCCK would not have wanted to provide an excuse for the government to suppress the democratisation movement. Second, the South Korean ecumenical movement actively maintained a strong anti-communist position. For example, although the NCCK advocated for a democratic transition of the military regime in South Korea, they supported the military coup by Park Chung-hee, and his decision to participate in the Vietnam War, on the basis that these measures were to combat communism. The NCCK even went further, criticising the world ecumenical movement who objected the Vietnam War, claiming that the world church did not know the horrible nature of communism, and peace negotiations with the deceitful communists was naïve and unrealistic.[24] Last, from the perspective of the ecumenical movement, unification talks between the two dictatorships would only increase the justice gap, as in the case of the secret negotiations between the two Koreas in the early 1970s. Therefore, from the perspective of South Korean citizens, a genuine unification process in the Korean peninsula would be possible only if the South Korean government first became democratic.[25]

[23]Fredrick O. Nolde, 'Dr. Nolde Speaking on His Trip to Korea, August, 1953', in *WCC Tosŏkwan Sochang Han'gukkyohoesacharyochip-Han'gukchŏnjaeng p'yŏn* (Seoul: Han'gukkitokkyoyŏksayŏn'guso, 2003), 383–84.

[24]Dae-young Ryoo, *Han'guk Kŭnhyŏndaesawa Kitokkyo* [The Modern History of Korea and Christianity] (Seoul: P'urŭnyŏksa, 2009), 263.

[25]Soon Cho, '1980–1990 Kidokt'ongirundongŭi Iron'gwa Chaengjo˘m [1980–1990 Christian Unification Movement, the Theoretical Basis and Issues]', in *Han'guk Kaesin'gyoga Han'guk Kŭnhyo˘ndaeŭi Sahoe.Munhwajo˘k Pyo˘ndonge Kkich'in Yo˘nghyang Yo˘n'gu* [A Study on the Impact of the Korean Protestant Church on the Sociocultural Changes in Modern Korea], ed. Hanshin University Theological Institute (Seoul: Korea Theological Study Institute, 2005), 180–211.

Meanwhile, the North Korean Christian community faced continuous challenges under the Kim Il-sung regime. Kim claimed that many North Koreans voluntarily gave up Christianity and turned to Juche ideology, because they saw that the Christian God was helpless in protecting them from US attacks on North Korean Christians and Churches. However, Keum Jooseop argues, the North Korean regime institutionalised "social discrimination against Christians, the execution of some underground Christian leaders and much anti-Christian propaganda".[26] The purge by Kim Il-sung, which is described by North Korean authors as an anti-factional struggle against whoever appeared to create or belong to a faction other than his own party, created the social atmosphere for an anti-religious movement. The North Korean regime maintained that they respected freedom of religion, but they also claimed that freedom of religion does not mean that anti-revolutionary factional behaviour of religious people should be allowed.[27]

Amid the anti-religious sentiment of North Korean society, the KCF retained its official status by pledging loyalty to Kim Il-sung's socialist revolution. Although the KCF temporarily disappeared from the official documents of North Korea between 1966 and 1972, it soon resumed external activities. In August 1972, Kang Ryang-wook and Kim Sung-ryul from the KCF participated in the North-South Red Cross meeting. In September, Kang suggested an inter-Korean Christian dialogue with the South Korean Church.[28] While taking part in the Christian Peace Conference, initiated by Eastern European Christians, the KCF wrote letters to the WCC, criticising the South Korean dictatorship and human rights violations, and asking about the possibility of joining the WCC.[29]

[26] Jooseop Keum, 'Remnants and Renewal: A History of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with Special Reference to Issues of Church and State, 1945–1994' (The University of Edinburgh, 2002), 228.

[27] Ha-chul Chung, *Urinŭn Wae Chonggyorŭl Pandaehanŭn'ga?* [Why Do We Oppose Religion?] (Pyongyang: Chosŏnrotongdang ch'ulp'ansa, 1959); Il-Sung Kim, *Kim Il Sung Works 10* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982), 328.

[28] Han'gukkitokkyoyŏksayŏn'guso pukhan'gyohoesachipp'ilwiwŏnhoe, *Pukhan'gyohoesa* [History of North Korean Church] (Seoul: Han'gukkitokkyoyŏksayŏn'guso, 1999), 441–47.

[29] Dwain Epps, 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dwain Epps to Ninan Koshy and S. J. Park, 29 August 1974', in *WCC Tosŏkwan Sochang Han'gukkyohoesacharyochip-Chosŏn'gŭrisŭtokyoyŏnmaeng p'yŏn* (Seoul: Han'gukkitokkyoyŏksayŏn'guso, 2003), 29; Alan A. Brash, 'Visit of Ambassador and Second Secretary of North Korea,' Alan A. Brash

During that time, the North Korean government had been working to become a member of several international organisations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), in order to develop its economy and increase its diplomatic influence. In this regard, the WCC and the NCCK were suspicious of the dialogue initiative by the KCF in that could be propaganda by the North Korean regime. They were also reluctant to agree to the KCF suggestions, and thereby give the South Korean regime an excuse to quash the NCCK democratisation movement as a communist affiliated activity.[30]

Meeting Counterparts

The appearance of the Chun Doo-hwan regime and the Gwangju massacre in 1980 frustrated the hopes of the South Korean ecumenical movement for democracy. Years of struggle had not been able to prevent another dictatorship, and once again, they faced the use of force by a military dictatorship. During this time, some ecumenical movement leaders reasoned that it was the division of the Korean peninsula that had been consistently hampering true democracy in South Korea, and as long as the conflict between North and South Korea remained, military dictatorships would appear, again and again, under the ruse of national security.[31]

Although South Korean ecumenical civil society leaders recognised the interconnection between the Korean conflict and ongoing dictatorship in the Korean peninsula, and attempted to address this issue, a very real danger of being vilified as communists by the government persisted for those who spoke out for peace with North Korea. Therefore, the NCCK decided to ask the WCC to mediate between North and South

to Philip Poter, 27 October 1976', in *WCC Tosŏkwan Sochang Han'gukkyohoesacharyochip-Chosŏn'gŭrisŭtokyoyŏnmaeng p'yŏn* (Seoul: Han'gukkitokkyoyŏksayŏn'guso, 2003), 26.

[30]Park Kyung-seo, former WCC Asia Secretary, interview by author, Seoul, 25 February 2010.

[31]Sam-ryul Lee, 'Han'guk Kidokkyowa T'ongil Undong [Korean Christianity and Reunification Movement]', *Kidokkyo Sasang* [Journal of Christian Thought], no. 355 (1988): 17.

Korean Christians.[32] Meanwhile, the South Korean government was becoming more conscious of the growing international attention because of the Gwangju massacre in the 1980s, to its own human rights record. The WCC, in particular, had consistently raised and publicised the social injustices by the South Korean dictatorship, and the struggle to overcome the injustices, including the Gwangju uprising, in its publications, circulated to the world churches, international organisations, and governments.[33] Both the WCC and the NCCK used this international attention on the South Korean government, in order to press the government to allow people-to-people relationship-building between North and South Korea. For example, the NCCK invited WCC international staff to Seoul and arranged a meeting with a high-level intelligence officer at the National Intelligence Service. In the meeting, the WCC staff asked the intelligence officer about the possibility of South Korean Church's participation in the WCC international gathering, where the North Korean Church was also to be invited. The WCC staff received verbal assurance from the officer that the South Korean ecumenical leaders who were to attend the meeting would not be punished upon their return.[34] This was presumed to be tacit approval from the South Korean government for the meeting between the NCCK and the KCF, on the expectation that the NCCK would represent the views of the South Korean government in the meeting.[35]

Finally, in 1984, the WCC organised the Conference on Peace and Justice in North-East Asia, in Tozanso, Japan, where the NCCK participated. Although the KCF was not able to participate in this conference, they sent a message of greeting. The Tozanso conference made a resolution which contains the recommendation that the "WCC should seek to facilitate opportunities where it would be possible for Christians from both North and South Korea to meet in dialogue". To fulfil this

[32] Dong Jin Kim, 'Building Relationships Across the Boundaries: The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in the Korean Peninsula', *International Peacekeeping* 24, no. 4 (2017): 522.

[33] Victor Hsu, former WCC director of the UN programme, interview by author, Seoul, 5 November 2015.

[34] Erich Weingartner, former WCC Executive Secretary of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, interview by author, Seoul, 5 November 2015.

[35] Oh Jae-shik, former WCC Director of the Commission of the Churches' Participation in Development, interview by author, Seoul, 15 January 2010.

recommendation, WCC staff visited both Koreas in turn, in 1985. They met with North Korean president Kim Il-sung and South Korean Vice-Minister of Culture and Information, Kim Yoon-whan, and asked for their cooperation for a meeting of Christians from both Koreas. According to the report of the WCC visit, the intention of North Korean government's meeting with the WCC staff seemed to be justification and promotion for the position of North Korea to the international group, whereas South Korean government appeared to be more interested in persuading the Church groups to leave the work of peace processes to the government.[36]

However, both the North and South Korean governments eventually allowed a meeting between Christians. For the first time since the division of Korea, North Korean and South Korean Christians were able to meet at the WCC 'Seminar on the Biblical and Theological Foundation of Christian Concern for Peace' in Glion, Switzerland, from the 2 to the 5 of September 1986. Both North and South Korean governments were engaged in preparing Church delegations for the meetings. South Korean participants attest that they had to meet with intelligence service people, and they could see that North Korean participants had also been well briefed by their government.[37] In the beginning, it seemed difficult for South Korean ecumenical leaders to build a relationship with the North Koreans, as they still had an anti-communist position. Former Asia Secretary of the WCC, Park Kyung-seo says, "Some circles question whether these people (KCF) are 'real' Christians or whether they have been planted by the government (North Korea) to serve as propaganda to the outside world".[38] A former Executive Secretary of the WCC, Erich Weingartner stated that this meeting "began with fear and trembling, as each side tested the other, openly confessing their mistrust". But, he continues saying:

[36] Erich Weingartner, 'The Tozanso Process: An Ecumenical Contribution to the Struggle for Peace and Justice in North-East Asia', in *WCC Tosŏkwan Sochang Han'gukkyohoesacharyochip-Chosŏn'gŭrisŭtokyoyŏnmaeng p'yŏn* (Seoul: Han'gukkitokkyoyŏksayŏn'guso, 2003), 89–108.

[37] Moon-kyu Kang et al., 'Hŭinyŏndaetam- T'ongilgwa p'yŏnghwarŭl Wihan Kyohoeŭi Noryŏkkwa Hŭinyŏnsŏngch'wiŭi Kil [Jubilee Talk-The Way to Achieve Jubilee and the Efforts of Churches for Unification and Peace]', *Kidokkyo Sasang* [Journal of Christian Thought], no. 433 (1995): 80.

[38] Kyung Seo Park, *Reconciliation Reunification: The Ecumenical Approach to Korean Peninsula* (Hong Kong: Christian Conference of Asia, 1998), 26.

> The celebration of the Eucharist at the conclusion, a powerful symbol of the unity of all children of God, broke down the invisible walls of separation that have tormented the Korean nation for too long. Participants from North and South dissolved into tears and embraces. The Tozanso Process began to take root.[39]

As the testimony of Weingartner and Park indicates, the track-two diplomacy of the Korean ecumenical movement took fruit with the strong support of the world ecumenical churches. North and South Korean Christians began to build a relationship through a series of ecumenical meetings for peace on the Korean peninsula.[40] This news about the track-two meetings was broadcast in South Korean society by the South Korean newspaper, Dong-A Ilbo. The newspaper reported that the relationship between South and North Korean Church leaders were grown to the extent that they sang Korean folk songs such as 'Arirang' and songs about hometowns and flowers together.[41]

Despite the progress in building trust in these meetings, the vertical relationships between Church representatives and their governments continued to influence the horizontal relationships between the representatives. The participants in these meetings attest that North Korean Church leaders strongly presented the view of their government, which was the resolution of political and military issues first, and South Korean Church leaders just as unwaveringly presented the view of their government, which was civilian exchange and economic cooperation first. However, they were able to produce a joint statement on 'Peace and Unification in the Korean Peninsula' in the ecumenical meeting in Glion in November 1988. It was the first North and South civilian-level agreement since the Korean War. Kang says, "It was really hard to narrow down the differences. It was not just because of the different perspectives on the issues, but the subtle differences about the interpretation of the sentences. However, we were able to produce an agreement in

[39] Erich Weingartner, 'Twentieth Anniversary Reminiscences on the Tozanso Process: Ecumenical Peace Efforts in Korea', in *Windows into Ecumenism*, ed. Geoff Alves (Hong Kong: Christian Conference of Asia, 2005), 376–78.

[40] Keum, 'Remnants and Renewal: A History of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with Special Reference to Issues of Church and State, 1945–1994', 268–69.

[41] 'Nambukhan Kaesin'gyo Chŏnggikyoryu Ch'uchin [South-North Korean Protestant Church Regular Exchange Is Pursued]', *Dong-A Ilbo*, 25 November 1988.

the end."[42] In the statement, the NCCK and the KCF jointly declared the year 1995, which is the 50th anniversary of Korean liberation, and 50 years since the division of the Korean nation, as the 'Year of Jubilee for reunification'. Secondly, they agreed to issue a joint prayer for the Sunday service just before 15 August every year. Thirdly, built on the principle of peaceful coexistence, this statement also emphasised democratic participation as the basic principle of the unification process. Finally, the statement included advocacy for both the North Korean government priority of resolution of the political and military issues, and the South Korean government priority of economic and social exchange.[43]

After the productive meetings organised by the WCC in Switzerland, the US and Japanese Churches organised meetings for South and North Korean ecumenical leaders in Washington and Tokyo in 1989. In Washington, the NCCK and the KCF decided to institutionalise their relationship building effort. First, they agreed to use the WCC as an international platform for guaranteeing the sustainability of their relationship. Second, they agreed that the NCCK will accompany the KCF visits to world ecumenical Churches. Third, they agreed to organise meetings in Moscow and Beijing in addition to the meetings in Washington and Tokyo. Finally, they agreed to facilitate exchange visits to Pyongyang and Seoul. In Tokyo, more specific plans were discussed to implement the agreement in Washington. The KCF asked the NCCK to issue them an official invitation to Seoul and to discuss this with the South Korean government. They also discussed ways to promote the 1995 Jubilee Year. In case of disconnection due to the political situation, a contingency plan was prepared to get help from the WCC. Finally, the NCCK pledged to send Christian resources from South Korea to the KCF.[44]

[42] Kang et al., 'Hŭinyŏndaetam- T'ongilgwa p'yŏnghwarŭl Wihan Kyohoeŭi Noryŏkkwa Hŭinyŏnsŏngch'wiŭi Kil [Jubilee Talk-The Way to Achieve Jubilee and the Efforts of Churches for Unification and Peace]', 183–84.

[43] NCCK, *1980–2000 Han'guk Kyohoe P'yo˘nghwa T'ongil Undong Charyojip* [Documents of Korean Church's Peace and Unification Movement 1980–2000] (Seoul: National Council of Churches in Korea, 2000), 148–49.

[44] Dong Jin Kim, *Hanbando p'yŏnghwakuch'ukkwa Kitokkyo Ecumenical Undong* [Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula and the Christian Ecumenical Movement] (Seoul: The Korea Theological Study Institute, 2011).

The 88 Declaration

In addition to building a relationship with their North Korean counterparts, the South Korean ecumenical movement began to actively engage with the South Korean public. The NCCK announced the 'Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace' (the 88 Declaration) on 29 February 1988, at the 37th Assembly of the NCCK. They saw that the democratisation of South Korea in 1987 had created a public space for discussions around peace and unification, and the new, democratically elected government was obligated to take public opinion more seriously in the peace process with North Korea. Baik Nak-chung says that the 88 Declaration was the first time that South Korean civil society included the principle of democratic participation for all people in the unification process. He argues, "when ordinary people's participation expands further, we can call it a democratic process from the theoretical perspective and we will finally be able to see a real unified society."[45] In regards to this, Choi Jang-jip said:

> The Cold War and the division justified authoritarianism. Therefore, democratisation was related to the changes in the post-Cold War world. The frontline of the Cold War was Berlin and the Korean peninsula. In other words, the democratisation in Korea was interconnected with the dismantlement of the Cold War. In this regard, the 88 Declaration after the democratisation in 1987 expanded the meaning of democratisation. The issue of unification became one of the components of democratisation.[46]

The 88 Declaration recognised the importance of high-level negotiations in the Korean peace process by acknowledging the need to respect the three principles of the July 4 Joint Communiqué; 'independence', 'peace', and 'national unity', and proposed two additional principles for the unification process, highlighting the roles of all levels of society: respecting human rights, and guaranteeing democratic participation for all people.[47] The 88 Declaration began by presenting the context of the

[45] Nak-chung Baik, *Oˇ Diga Chungdomyoˇ Oˇ Tchaesoˇ Pyoˇnhyoˇgin'ga* [Where We Can Call Moderate and Why the Change] (Paju: Changbi, 2009), 186–90.

[46] Choi Jang-jip, Political scientist, Civil society leader, interview by author, Seoul, 2 February 2010.

[47] Kim, 'Building Relationships Across the Boundaries', 522.

Korea conflict and how the North and South Korean dictatorships justified the structural violence in their societies.

> The prolongation of the division has led to violations of human rights under both systems, in the name of security and ideology; thus, we have seen repression of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association. And the complete suspension by both sides of postal service, travel, visitation and communication has turned the two halves of Korea into the two most distant and different countries on earth. The education and propaganda activities of north and south share the goal of mutual vilification, each perceiving the other as the most hated enemy to be weakened and eliminated through the competition of the two systems.[48]

The Declaration re-storied the negative narratives of the Korean conflict. According to Lederach, peacebuilding is a space and time challenging profession. He stresses that even though we cannot change the past, we can create meaning in the present through a continuous process of re-storying.[49] In the 88 Declaration, the ecumenical movement re-storied the true enemy not as each other, but as the ideologies of the division-systems. They used the Bible, in order to highlight ways Korean Christians had disregarded the essential teachings of Christianity due to these ideologies.[50]

The Declaration first referred to Matthew 22:39, "Love your neighbour as yourself". It argued that Korean Christians have been guilty of the sin of violating God's commandment of love. Second, the Declaration pointed out that Korean Christians have supported rearmament with the newest and most powerful weapons, plus reinforcement of troops and expenditures, in the name of preventing another war; however, Psalm 33:16 says, "No king is saved by the size of his army; no warrior escapes by his great strength". Third, according to the Declaration, the Christians of both the North and South had made absolute idols of

[48] NCCK, *1980–2000 Han'guk Kyohoe P'yo˘nghwa T'ongil Undong Charyojip* [Documents of Korean Church's Peace and Unification Movement 1980–2000], 102–10.

[49] John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 146–49.

[50] Dong-jin Kim, 'The Peacebuilding Role of the Ecumenical Movement in Korea during the 1980s', in *Mining Truth Mining Truth: Festschrift in Honour of Geraldine Smyth OP—Ecumenical Theologian and Peacebuilder*, ed. John O'Grady, Cathy Higgins, and Jude Lal Fernando (EOS, 2015), 279–80.

the ideologies enforced by their respective systems. This is a sin, for in the view of Acts 4:19, the church must follow the will of God rather than the will of any political regime, "Judge for yourselves whether it is right in God's sight to obey you rather than God". Finally, the Declaration referred to John 13:17, "Now that you know these things, you will be blessed if you do them". It concluded that Korean Christians had not only violated the commandments of love, but also had committed a sin of indifference toward their neighbours who suffered, and continue to suffer, under the national division.[51]

At the end of the Declaration, the NCCK made seven appeals for peace and unification for both North and South Korean governments: ceasing all hostile actions against each other; terminating the Korean war and signing a peace treaty; revising diplomatic and defence agreements and treaties with international allies in the interests of the Korean people; reducing and controlling arms; opening and expanding inter-Korean economic cooperation; promoting socio-cultural exchange between the two Koreas; allowing the reunion of separated families at all times.[52] These peace appeals were deemed to be dangerous ideas, because any reconciliatory remark about North Korea could be portrayed as pro-communist. For this reason, when announcing the 88 Declaration, the South Korean ecumenical movement leaders underlined the fact that Christians had been considered to be anti-communist:

> I believe Christians were able to promote reconciliation between the two Koreas because they were considered to be an anti-communist group. If leftists said the same thing in the 88 Declaration, they could easily have been prosecuted under the National Security Law.[53]

From the statement above, it seemed the NCCK appeal for reconciliation between the two Koreas was effective, as it came from Christians who were deemed anti-North Korea.[54] Kang Man-gil recalls:

[51] NCCK, *1980–2000 Han'guk Kyohoe P'yo˘nghwa T'ongil Undong Charyojip* [Documents of Korean Church's Peace and Unification Movement 1980–2000], 102–10.

[52] NCCK, *1980–2000 Han'guk Kyohoe P'yo˘nghwa T'ongil Undong Charyojip* [Documents of Korean Church's Peace and Unification Movement 1980–2000], 102–10.

[53] Lee Sam-ryul, Peace academic/activist, interview by author, Seoul, 14 January 2010.

[54] Yu-na Lee, '88 So˘no˘n Cho˘nhu Sigi NCCKŭi T'ongirundonggwa Han'guk Kidokkyo [Before and After 88 Declaration: NCCK Unification Movement and Civil Unification Movement]', *Han'guk Kidokkyo Yo˘ksa Yo˘n'guso Sosik*, no. 89 (2010): 30–38.

> If it were not for Christians, the government could have easily accused anyone who spoke peace and unification of being communists. Therefore, the peace and unification discourse of Christians had a role to protect general discourses about peace and unification in the civil society.[55]

Not long after the 88 Declaration, the South Korean policy towards North Korea began to change. As we have seen in Chapter 4, in 1988, in a new international environment of detente, the South Korean government adopted an engagement policy and began high-level peace negotiations with North Korea. On 7 July, President Rho announced his plan to promote civilian exchanges between South and North Korea in the July 7 Declaration. Furthermore, the high-level talks between North and South Korea led their Prime Ministers to sign the 1991 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation in which they pledged to respect each other and to promote reconciliation and cooperation.[56] The ecumenical movement expressed strong support for this agreement and emphasised that the key proposals of the 88 Declaration were also in the 1991 Basic Agreement: "Korean churches' Reunification Declaration reflected on the South and North Korean government: A Comparison between the 1991 Basic Agreement and the 88 Declaration" (Table 5.1).

Highlighting the similarities between their appeal for peace and the high-level agreement, the NCCK appeared to be convinced of the influence of South Korean civil society on the Korean peace process. This perception by the NCCK showed changes, compared to the 1970s, in the interdependency and justice gaps in Korean peacebuilding. Lim Dong-won, a former South Korean government negotiator, who participated in the high-level talks for the 1991 Basic Agreement, recalls in his memoir 'Peacemaker' that the 88 Declaration was positively recognised by policy makers in the Rho Tae-woo government.[57]

[55] Kang Man-gil, Historian, Civil society leader, Email interview by author, 29 January 2010.

[56] Gabriel Jonsson, *Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 57.

[57] Dong-won Lim, *Peacemaker* (Seoul: Jung-ang Books, 2008), 170–71.

Table 5.1 A comparison between the 1991 Basic Agreement and the 88 Declaration[a]

	The 88 Declaration	*The 1991 Basic Agreement*
Mutual respect	North and South Korea must put an end to all mutual hostility and aggressive inclinations, and must eliminate exclusivism which leads to the slandering and vilification of one another. In addition, each must modify its extreme, emotional censure of the other's differing ideology and system and offer in its place mutually constructive criticism (3. A.)	South and North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of each other. (1.1.) South and North Korea shall not interfere in the internal affairs of each other. (1.2.) South and North Korea shall not slander or defame each other (1. 3.) South and North Korea shall refrain from any acts of sabotage or insurrection against each other (1. 4.)
Nonaggression	In order to prevent war and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, a peace treaty must immediately be concluded to terminate the existing state of war. To this end, it is urgent that negotiations be opened by the governments of North and South Korea, the United States, China which participated in the Korean Conflict, to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty which also includes a non-aggression pact (4. A.)	South and North Korea shall together endeavour to transform the present state of armistice into a firm state of peace between the two sides and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until such a state of peace is realized. (1. 5.) South and North Korea shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other (2. 9.) South and North Korea shall resolve peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation, any differences of views and disputes arising between them (2. 10.)
Diplomacy	Both North and South Korea must either revise or abrogate all diplomatic agreements and treaties which undermine rather than support the life and interests of the Korean people. North and South Korea must also reach mutual agreement in regard to all international alliances and associations, examining them to make certain that common good of all Koreans is their primary objective (5. B.)	South and North Korea shall cease to compete with or confront each other, and instead shall cooperate and endeavour to promote the racial dignity and interests of Korea in the international arena (1. 6.)

(continued)

Table 5.1 (continued)

	The 88 Declaration	*The 1991 Basic Agreement*
Disarmament	The excessive military competition between North and South Korea is the greatest obstacle to peaceful reunification and is moreover counter-productive to economic progress Therefore, following negotiations between north and south, mutual military strength must be reduced and military expenditures must be cut, with a switchover to industrial production for peace (4. C.)	In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression, the South and the North shall establish a South-North Joint Military Commission within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss problems and carry out steps to build up military confidence and realize arms reduction, in particular, the mutual notification and control of large-scale movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof (2. 12.)
Economic cooperation	Since economic exchanges between north and south will not only benefit the people but will also provide opportunities for mutual understanding, they should be opened to the greatest possible extent (3. D.)	In order to promote the integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the South and the North shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as intra-Korean commerce and joint ventures (3. 15.)
Cultural exchange	In order to restore the sense of common ethnic identity, north-south exchanges and cooperative research must be promoted in such academic areas as language, history, geography, biology and natural resources; while exchanges must also be carried out in the areas of culture, the arts, religion and sports (3. C.)	South and North Korea shall carry out exchanges and promote cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, literature and the arts, health, sports, the environment, journalism and media including newspapers, radio, television broadcasts, and other publications (3. 16.)

(continued)

Table 5.1 (continued)

	The 88 Declaration	*The 1991 Basic Agreement*
Freedom of movement and communication	First of all, the separated families, who–as the victims of the division–have endured all sorts of suffering during the past 40 some years, must be reunited and allowed to live together, and must be guaranteed the right to move freely to whatever place they choose to live (1. A.) Even before reunification is achieved, all persons living in separation from family members in north or south must be freely permitted to visit their relatives and home areas for definite periods, on an annual basis (perhaps at Chusok or some other holiday season) (1. B.)	South and North Korea shall implement freedom of intra-Korean travel and contact among the members of the Korean people (3. 17.) South and North Korea shall permit free correspondence, movement between the two sides, meetings, and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives, promote their voluntary reunion, and take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues (3. 18.)

[a]NCCK, *1980–2000 Han'guk Kyohoe P'yo˘nghwa T'ongil Undong Charyojip* [Documents of Korean Church's Peace and Unification Movement 1980–2000], 223–32

Interdependent Relationship Building

The ecumenical movement perceived, that not only horizontal relations with North Korean counterparts, but also that intermediation of the vertical relationship between citizens and state, would be crucial in bringing about positive change in inter-Korean relations.[58] As we have discussed in Chapter 3, a nationwide demonstration for democracy on 10 June 1987 had forced the Chun Doo-hwan government to announce a national referendum. To the surprise and great disappointment of civil society, Rho Tae-woo, a former four-star general and Chun's designated successor, won the presidential election, and took power in 1988. However, the new government allowed relatively more freedom of speech and assembly for civil society. The ecumenical movement leaders,

[58]Park Kyung-seo, former WCC Asia Secretary, interview by author, Seoul, 25 February 2010.

such as Park Jong-wha, says that there were officials in the new democratically elected government who shared similar views on the peace process with the ecumenical movement, and the ecumenical movement encouraged and supported these officials in the public domain.[59]

For example, some of the key authors of the 88 Declaration were invited by the Unification Minister of the Rho Tae-woo government to give a briefing about the peacebuilding work of the ecumenical movement at the Ministry of Unification. The Unification Minister and the ecumenical civil society leaders had pre-existing relationships through meetings organised by South Korean ecumenical peacebuilding organisations, such as the Christian Academy, in 1970s and 1980s. According to Lee Hong-koo, the key authors of the 88 Declaration were invited to the Unification Ministry because these civil society leaders shared similar views on peace and unification with the newly developing government policy and it would be helpful for the government officials to hear the voice of civil society.[60] Suh Kwang-sun recalls that he spoke at the Ministry of Unification about why the ecumenical movement pursued reconciliation with North Korea, introducing his personal story about his father who was killed by the North Korean communist regime. Suh told the government officials that he pledged himself to working for a Korean peninsula where no one has to worry about war at his father's funeral, and stressed that this was not only his wish but the wish of all Koreans.[61]

Most government officials working in the North Korea policy circle argued that shifting international politics was the main reason behind the changes in the government policy toward North Korea, but they also recognised the role of civil society in domestic politics towards North Korea. The South Korean public had become accustomed to the division and animosity toward North Korea, therefore, it appeared the new government had to be conscious of public opinion. Former State Minister, Park Chul-un, one of the key authors of Northern Policy, argues that Rho Tae-woo listened to the advice of the government officials, who observed the geopolitical changes at the end of the Cold War, about

[59] Park Jong-wha, Presbyterian minister, former chairman of the international committee of NCCK, interview by author, Seoul, 7 January 2010.

[60] Lee Hong-koo, former Unification minister, Prime minister, interview by author, Seoul, 4 February 2010.

[61] Suh Kwang-sun, Theologian, leading author of the 88 Declaration, interview by author, Seoul, 13 January 2010.

the need for reconciliation with North Korea, in spite of strong opposition from a significant number of pro-American right-wing groups. In the changing international environment, the South Korean government came to the conclusion that peace on the Korean peninsula would be critical to reform and open North Korea, but the Northern policy would not be pursued without the consensus of the people in the newly democratised South Korea. For this reason, Park says that the 88 Declaration was helpful in shaping a public opinion, which approved the new government policy toward North Korea.[62]

South Korean ecumenical leaders recognised the synergistic effect of interdependent relationship building in North Korea as well. Park Jong-wha argues that the North Korean government approved the attendance of the KCF to ecumenical meetings with the NCCK and the WCC for regime propaganda purposes, and most of the KCF members were low-level party officials, but he could sense that "some of them really started to accept the religious teachings" and "their power was growing inside the party after receiving aid from the world churches".[63] Park Kyung-seo says that, in the 1980s, North Korea wanted the WCC to provide humanitarian and development aid to North Korea and allowed unprecedented access to the rural areas.[64] Former Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, who signed the 1991 Basic Agreement on behalf of South Korea, gave a cautious judgement that the peacebuilding activities of the ecumenical movement may have played an indirect role in changing the North Korean approach to South Korea. He says that, during this period, the North Korean government seemed to have a sense of crisis upon observing the collapse of Eastern European countries and attempted to address the geopolitical threats by promoting reconciliation with South Korea. But, there was disagreement between hawkish military groups and moderate elite groups in North Korea. Chung speculates that the South Korean civil peacebuilding, including the ecumenical movement, "may have given the moderate elites the opportunity to suggest a reconciliatory move to their leader."[65]

[62] Park Chul-un, former State minister, interview by author, Seoul, 13 May 2010.

[63] Park Jong-wha, Presbyterian minister, former chairman of the international committee of NCCK, interview by author, Seoul, 7 January 2010.

[64] Park Kyung-seo, former WCC Asia Secretary, interview by author, Seoul, 25 February 2010.

[65] Chung Won-shik, former Prime minister, interview by author, 28 January 2010.

This interdependent relationship building by the South Korean ecumenical movement accomplished an official visit by the General Secretary of NCCK to North Korea in January 1992. The main purpose of the ecumenical visit was to consolidate the relationship with their North Korean counterparts. As well, Kwon Ho-kyung says that the South Korean government permitted the civilian visit by the NCCK General Secretary to North Korea to learn of the practicalities of the Basic Agreement, which was signed in December 1991, in terms of how serious the North Korean government was in recognising it, and of how hospitable South Korean public opinion would be toward keeping the Basic Agreement. The North Korean government seemed to take the visit very seriously to the extent the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung met with the NCCK General Secretary. Kwon argues that he used the opportunity to raise the profile of the North Korean church in North Korean society by including the KCF pastors in the meeting with Kim Il-sung. Kwon states that during the meeting with the NCCK, the North Korean leader said he would not oppose religion and recognised the role of the ecumenical movement in peacebuilding.[66]

All these accounts confirm the role of South Korean civil society in closing the interdependency gap in peacebuilding during the 1980s and 1990s. Im Chun-gun concludes, in his extensive research on the Northern Policy, that the North Korea policy of the Rho Tae-woo government was conceptualized in response to changes in the international environment, but the strategy to implement this policy was shaped in response to public opinion.[67] As per the appraisal of the government and the ecumenical movement testimonies above, the North Korean government also seemed to be conscious of the role of South Korean civil society. In the end, the peace process of the 1980s and 1990s was similar to that of the 1970s in that it was in response to changes in international politics, but it also appears the two peace processes were different in relation to the peacebuilding role of civil society. As we saw in Chapter 4, the secret talks between the two Koreas in the 1970s never

[66] Kwon Ho-kyung, former General Secretary of NCCK, interview by author, Seoul, 12 February 2010.

[67] Chun-gun Im, *Pukpangjo˘ngch'aekkwa Han'gukcho˘ngch'iŭi Cho˘ngch'aek Kyo˘lcho˘ng* [Nordpolitik and the Policy Making in the Korean Politics] (Paju: Korean Studies Information, 2008), 235–47.

considered the expectations of civil society, and authoritarian controls were strengthened significantly in both Koreas following the July 4 Joint Communiqué. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, as seen in NCCK documentation, the South Korean civil society found their expectations for peacebuilding were reflected in the high-level negotiations.

Challenges and Possibilities in Interdependent Peacebuilding

Although the high-level peace process fluctuated due to the nuclear conflict between the US and North Korea and the sudden death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, North and South Korean Church leaders were able to continue their relationship-building activities until mid-1990s. During this time, the ecumenical movement adopted the concept of "Jubilee" in the Bible. According to the Book of Leviticus 25, a Jubilee, which occurs every fiftieth year, is the year when slaves, prisoners, and debts should be freed. Campaigning 1995 as a Jubilee year, 50 years after the liberation from Japanese colonial rule and division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, was expected to mobilise Christians for peace in the Korean peninsula and beyond.[68] The NCCK says:

> The year of jubilee is a "year of liberation"…The Korean churches proclaim 1995, the fiftieth year after Liberation, as a Jubilee Year, to express our belief in the historical presence of God, who has ruled over those fifty years of history -indeed, over all of human history; to proclaim the restoration of the covenant community of peace; and to declare our resolution to achieve this restoration in the history of the Korean peninsula today.[69]

In the fourth international ecumenical consultation on peace and reunification in Korea held in Kyoto, 1995, the NCCK and the KCF agreed on objectives for the Jubilee year[70]:

[68] Volker Küster, *A Protestant Theology of Passion: Korean Minjung Theology Revisited* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 134–35.

[69] NCCK, *1980–2000 Han'guk Kyohoe P'yo˘nghwa T'ongil Undong Charyojip* [Documents of Korean Church's Peace and Unification Movement 1980–2000], 102–10.

[70] Park, *Reconciliation Reunification: The Ecumenical Approach to Korean Peninsula*, 140–41.

1. Together in Jubilee the consultation welcomed the agreement reached by the KCF and the NCCK to hold a joint worship service at Panmunjom, on the occasion of liberation day 15 August, 1995, as a high point of the Jubilee year,
2. Removing legal obstacles contained in the National Security Law and other laws to the reunification of Korea,
3. Implementing the 13 December, 1991 North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation,
4. Realizing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula,
5. Addressing urgent humanitarian concerns.

Contrary to expectations, Jubilee Year 1995 was not able to produce a noticeable difference in the Korean peace process. The South Korean Kim Young-Sam government disapproved of the idea of a joint worship service at Panmunjom, located in the DMZ between North and South Korea. As the humanitarian crisis in North Korea, due to severe famine in the 1990s, became better known in South Korean society, most of the NCCK programs and resources concentrated on humanitarian assistance to North Korea, rather than track-two meetings to discuss peace and unification issues.[71] Meanwhile, the high-level peace process gained momentum, following the entrance of the Sunshine Policy in 1998 and the first inter-Korean summit in 2000. Many South Korean companies invested in North-South economic cooperation projects, and the number and influence of the NGOs working for North Korean humanitarian and development assistance increased significantly. With less of a sense of urgency in initiating a peace process and addressing human needs, the peacebuilding role of the ecumenical movement appeared to lessen.[72]

However, following the 'axis of evil' speech by US President Bush in 2002, the peace mood between the two Koreas changed once again. The NCCK expressed concern about a nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula

[71] Hyuk-ryul Kwon, 'Kitokkyot'ongilundongŭi Ch'ulbalsinho, 88nyŏn t'ongilsŏnŏn [The Start of the Christian Reunification Movement, 88 Reunification Declaration]', *Kidokkyo Sasang* [Journal of Christian Thought] 44, no. 6 (2000): 109–10.

[72] Hae-yong Sung, *2002nyŏn Han'gukkyohoe Chŏnghwang* [The Situation of Korean Churches in 2002] (Seoul: Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development, 2003), 58–59.

in their 'Peace Statement Against War and Nuclear Weapons' in 2003.[73] In 2004, the NCCK welcomed the Six-Party Talks by the concerned states for a negotiated settlement regarding the denuclearisation of North Korea.[74] In addition to expressing their support for the high-level negotiations on denuclearisation of North Korea, the NCCK activated their global civil society network. According to 'boomerang theory', as discussed in Chapter 1, a global civil society could provide space for the voices of local civil society to be heard in the world, and those voices could echo back to their respective governments, with international support.[75] In 2005, the NCCK, the NCCUSA, and the National Christian Council in Japan (NCCJ) called upon the US government to adopt a more positive attitude toward North Korea, encouraged the South Korean government to initiate more positive legal and structural measures, and urged the Japanese government to address historical matters with North Korea.[76] In 2007, the WCC organised a meeting of churches in the countries which were participating in the Six-Party Talks.[77] In February, 2008, the 'Ecumenical Forum for Peace, Reunification, and Development Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula' (the Ecumenical Forum) was formed as a parallel platform to the Six-Party Talks for the ecumenical movement.[78] As suggested by the boomerang theory, at the

[73]NCCK, 'Peace Statement Against War and Nuclear Weapons', National Council of Churches in Korea, 12 March 2003, http://kncc.or.kr/eng/Databoard/BoardView.asp?idx=31&bbsKind=pds_document&pg=3&sch=&keyword=.

[74]NCCK, 'Our Position on the Second Six-Party Talks in Beijing', National Council of Churches in Korea, 24 February 2004, http://kncc.or.kr/eng/Databoard/BoardView.asp?idx=40&bbsKind=pds_document&pg=2&sch=&keyword=.

[75]David Chandler, *Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 36.

[76]NCCK, 'Three NCC's Common Statement on Six Party Talks', National Council of Churches in Korea, 22 July 2005, http://kncc.or.kr/eng/Databoard/BoardView.asp?idx=48&bbsKind=pds_document&pg=2&sch=&keyword=.

[77]NCCK, 'Our Commitment to Peace and Unification in the Korean Peninsula', National Council of Churches in Korea, 16 August 2007, http://kncc.or.kr/eng/Databoard/BoardView.asp?idx=55&bbsKind=pds_document&pg=1&sch=&keyword=.

[78]NCCK, 'Ecumenical Forum for Peace, Reunification, and Development Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula', National Council of Churches in Korea, February 2008, http://kncc.or.kr/eng/news/BoardView.asp?idx=66&bbsKind=bbs_news&pg=1&sch=&keyword=.

2008 Ecumenical Forum held in Nanjing, China,[79] it was decided that the WCC General Secretary would send a letter to South Korean president Lee Myung-bak asking him to reconsider the South Korean government's 'indifferent policy'[80] on North Korea.[81]

Despite the efforts of South Korean and global civil society, tensions between the US and North Korea, as well as South and North Korea, continued to increase. In 2013, the delegates of the 10th Assembly of the WCC meeting in Busan, South Korea, adopted the "Statement on Peace and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula". The statement recognised "that the prevailing geo-political context of the Korean peninsula warrants that the ecumenical movement develops new ways of accompaniment and engagement," and the need to provide platforms for ordinary people, particularly younger generations in North and South Korea, to meet with each other "in order to advance towards reconciliation and peace". In order to implement the WCC statement, the WCC organised a meeting with the NCCK and the KCF in Geneva in 2014. The Geneva meeting agreed to hold the next Ecumenical Forum meeting in Pyongyang. As a result, the "Ecumenical Forum for Peace, Reunification and Development Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula" was held in Pyongyang in October 2015. In spite of the worsening relationship between the North and South Korean governments in 2015, 12 South Korean ecumenical leaders, including the NCCK General Secretary, participated in the meeting. The participants demonstrated a solidarity among North and South Korean churches for peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula.[82]

Since the late 2000s, during a period of worsening inter-Korean relations, the South Korean ecumenical movement has committed itself

[79] NCCK, 'Summarized Report of Nanjing Meeting', National Council of Churches in Korea, May 2009, http://kncc.or.kr/eng/news/BoardView.asp?idx=69&bbsKind=bbs_news&pg=1&sch=&keyword=.

[80] See Chapter 4.

[81] WCC, 'Letter to President Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea', World Council of Churches, July 2009, http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/general-secretary/messages-and-letters/01-07-08-letter-to-the-south-korean-president-lee-myung-bak.html.

[82] Narae Kim and Marion Kim, 'Religious Figures' North Korea Visits Stir Hopes for Enhanced South-North Relations', *Kukmin Daily*, 27 October 2015, http://www.kukmindaily.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0010001544.

to the web of peacebuilding processes in North East Asia, beyond the Korean peninsula. The global civil society network of the ecumenical movement has contributed to maintaining the relationship between the NCCK and the KCF as well as to advocating a negotiated settlement among the concerned state parties in the Korean peninsula. As we discussed in Chapter 4, each state has adapted seemingly non-negotiable tactics to the extent that, due to mutual distrust, they obstruct the achievement of their original goals. Lederach says, for this reason, a peace process should shift its focus, from agreements between governments, to constructing a platform for permanent relationship building.[83] But, as critics of global civil society say, whether a transnational network of the ecumenical movement could be coordinated to make desired changes remains to be seen.[84] As we will discuss in the next Chapters, the fact that most of the inter-Korean peacebuilding effort by South Korean civil society was suspended by the government appears to suggest a need for a more comprehensive platform, which can embrace more diverse groups in society, beyond the network built by the ecumenical movement.

Conclusion

The ups and downs of the Korean peace process seem to be reflected in the criticism of the top-down approaches of track-two diplomacy. The high-level negotiators would set up the agenda and monopolise the peace process, and civil society would simply support the governments in reaching and implementing the peace agreement of the states. At the end of the day, the main actors of the peace process are high-level officials representing the states. However, the peacebuilding activities of the ecumenical movement in the Korean peninsula has shown the potential role of civil society, which needs be more than complementary, as

[83]John Paul Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 27–35.

[84]Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, 'Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding', *Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction* 36 (2006): 6.

argued by Lederach's peacebuilding theory. Lederach maintains that civil society consists of "fundamental ingredients that make up the ecosystem in which peace must live". According to Lederach, building and coordinating both horizontal and vertical relationship building with the opposing party, and within your own party, is essential for a sustainable peacebuilding.[85]

For example, what track-two diplomacy suggests appears to be true, that the less public and visible horizontal meetings by civil society across lines of the conflict, such as the ecumenical movement, could assist governments in reaching agreement by increasing understanding and building confidence. But, the peacebuilding activities of the South Korean ecumenical movement have been more than supporting functions for government negotiations. The ecumenical civil society leaders developed vertical relationships within South Korean society to reflect people's expectations in the peace process. The South Korean ecumenical movement also utilised global civil society networks, to build and coordinate horizontal and vertical relationships across the boundaries of the Korean conflict. During the period of the flourishing peace process, the influence of the ecumenical movement decreased, but the fact that the NCCK and WCC have been actively advocating peace on the Korean peninsula and maintaining a relationship with KCF, despite the breakdown of the peace process, shows how critical the role of civil society is for a sustainable peacebuilding.

However, it is also true that the space for civil society to contribute in the Korean peace process requires interdependency in the roles of high level and civil society leadership in the interplay between domestic and international political environments. The role of the ecumenical church groups alone cannot guarantee a breakthrough and/or durability in a peace process, but if it is coordinated with vertical capacity, civil society peacebuilding is an essential plank in the platform for sustainable peacebuilding.

Although South Korea has been democratised, North Korea remains a dictatorship and does not allow space for civil society. However, since the

[85] John Paul Lederach, 'Civil Society and Reconciliation', in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 854.

famine in the 1990s, the North Korean regime has been under pressure to placate its domestic population by developing the economy. As we will discuss in Chapters 6 and 7, this would mean there is still potential for South Korean civil society to engage with their counterparts and eventually promote a parallel civil society in North Korea.[86]

[86] Kim, 'Building Relationships Across the Boundaries', 534.

CHAPTER 6

Mobilising People in Response to State Violence: Building Just Peace

This chapter analyses the growth of the civil movements for social justice and peace in Korea. In advocating the concept, just peace, John Paul Lederach argues that, in order to make peacebuilding sustainable, justice gaps should be addressed and approaches that "increase justice in any human relationships" are required.[1] The justice gap refers to a phenomenon that peacebuilding does not meet the expectations of people for social transformation. As we discussed in Chapter 1, Lederach stresses the need to integrate social justice building in civil society peacebuilding.[2] The struggle by the people to build just peace in the Korean peninsula goes back to the independence movement under Japanese colonial rule, but the growth of Korean civil society is closely related to the democratisation process of South Korea. Although the Korean peninsula was freed from Japanese rule, it was divided and put under a series of dictatorships. As we saw in Chapter 5, South Korean civil society leaders observed the recurring use of the Korean division and armistice situation as rationale for state violence.

[1] John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Reprint edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 182.

[2] John Paul Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 27–35. See Chapter 2.

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1_6

Following the democratisation of South Korea, diverse civil society groups turned their attention from the issue of building a unified state on the Korean peninsula to the just and peaceful transformation of both South and North Korean societies, in line with Iain Atack's definition of transformative nonviolence in Chapter 1.[3] In particular, Korean women's peace movements, in alliance with international women's groups from the US, Europe and Asia, brought an awareness of the effect of militarism. Many other South Korean civil society groups also found that the militarism of state parties in the Korean conflict to be a major obstacle in addressing state violence and building just peace. In the meantime, the human rights situation in North Korea caused debate in South Korea on how to improve the lives of North Koreans affected by the state violence. This chapter provides a historical review of these civil society activities and discusses relationships between diverse civil movements for just peace and the Korean peace process.

Mobilising People Against State Violence

The history of nonviolent struggle against state violence in the Korean peninsula goes back nearly 100 years. On 1 March 1919, inspired by a 1918 speech by US President Wilson on the self-determination, the Declaration of Independence was signed by thirty-three national representatives. The Declaration which was read in Seoul, was circulated to Japanese authorities, international diplomats, and the domestic public. Subsequently, nonviolent mass demonstrations, with demonstrators shouting '*Taehan tongnip manse*' (long live an independent Korea) began to spread countrywide. Approximately 2 million people participated in over 1500 demonstrations across the country. The March 1 Movement became a cornerstone for the birth of Korean civil society. The movement was led by local leaders from different religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, and other Korean traditional religions, along with school teachers. The organisation of the March 1 nonviolent civil movement later contributed to the initiation of labour, farmers' and women's movements, and to the formation of various grassroots groups, such as youth, health, social, saving and purchasing cooperatives, tenant,

[3] Iain Atack, *Nonviolence in Political Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 96.

and children's groups in Korea. By the end of 1922, the number of these organisations had grown to nearly 6000.[4]

But, the March 1 Movement was quickly confronted with violent suppression by the Japanese police, resulting approximately 7500 deaths, 15,000 injured, and 45,000 arrests. A Canadian missionary James Gale writes, in his report to the British Consulate-General in Seoul, in March 1919:

> It required a great deal of courage for men to meet and march through the streets in bands shouting their watch-word "Independence forever!" I saw them up and down the main streets of Seoul waving their caps in front of the police offices. Most of them are in prison now, and it is assuredly no joke to be in a Japanese prison as a political offender. Though a sincere friend and admirer of Japan in many ways, I would prefer to shoulder a meet to go and rifle the Germans on the Western front to being a weaponless Corean guilty of shouting "My Country Forever!" against Japan, and have to face the gendarmerie and police who apparently still resort to the thumbscrew if not the stake in their efforts to obtain the names of others and extort evidence.[5]

In addition to violent oppression, the Japanese authority attempted to instigate a split in the independence movement, in order to effectively maintain colonial rule. The Japanese colonialists adopted a 'Cultural Policy' to placate Korean nationalists.[6] This appeasement policy temporarily allowed a relative freedom in the social life of Koreans. As a result, the number of Korean grassroots organisations grew.[7] However, as Japan began to advance to the continent by occupying Manchuria in 1931, colonial rule reverted to violent suppression. The Japanese initiated a forced assimilation policy and military mobilisation in the Korean

[4] Carter J. Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1991), 278–86; Nishi Masayuki, 'March 1 and May 4, 1919 in Korea, China & Japan: Toward an International History of East Asian Independence Movements', *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 5, no. 10 (2007): 3–7.

[5] P'yŏnjippu, 'Charyo: 3.1 Undonge Kwanhan Yŏnggugyŏngsaŭi Pokosŏ, The Case of Corea [Document: A Report of the British Consul on 3.1 Movement]', *Hyŏnsanggwainsik* 3, no. 1 (1979): 107–16.

[6] Mary E. Connor, ed., *The Koreas* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 37.

[7] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 276–83.

peninsula. The severe suppression of Korean social organisations continued until the end of the Second World War in 1945.[8]

Meanwhile, Korean society was divided according to differing ideological expectations of a future independent Korea; the left (*Chwap'a*) and the right (*Up'a*'). The left aspired to a socialist state through social revolution, while the right wanted a modernised Korea through gradual reform. There were several efforts to unify the independent movement such as the Sin'ganhoe (New Korea Society). The Sin'ganhoe was founded in 1927 as a platform for the independent movement activities of both the left and the right. By 1930, it had formed a nationwide network of almost 400 branches with nearly 80,000 members and coordinated diverse groups including youth, labour, famers groups and academic societies. Although the Sin'ganhoe showed a great potential for a coordinated effort by Korean civil society for just peace, the continuing division between left and right and the growing oppression by the Japanese authority eventually suspended its activities in the early 1930s. The fragmentation in Korean society persisted during the colonial period, and was aggravated by the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945.[9]

As we have discussed in Chapter 3, while addressing issues of fragmentation within their societies, both North and South Koreans came under dictatorship. But, the Kim Il-sung regime of North Korea appeared to be more stable than the South Korean Rhee Syng-man regime. By exploiting nationalism and the Korean conflict situation, the North Korean dictatorships successfully turned the attention of North Koreans away from their own private interest to state projects. Particularly in the early period of the North Korean state, socialist style land reform and the retributive justice against the elite who had cooperated with Japanese colonial rule gained popular support. The popularity of the leader was helpful in mobilising people and continuing the propaganda of the regime. In the end, the citizens in North Korea were socialised into collective subjectivities dictated to, and represented, by authoritarian leaders, who maintained a benevolent image of parents in

[8] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 181–83.

[9] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 300–304; Man Gil Kang, *Isipseki Uri Yŏksa* [20th Century Our History] (Seoul: Ch'angjakkwa pip'yŏngsa, 2009), 168–79; Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 104.

a family. Until the present, there seems to have been "no active dissent, much less open revolt" in North Korea.[10]

On the other hand, the South Korean dictatorships were never able to achieve the full support of the public.[11] The first South Korean President Rhee Syng-man used the rhetoric of the Korean conflict to mobilise people to support him, as the North Korean dictatorship did. But, unlike North Korea, his government was unable to sufficiently address the legacy of colonialism and to combat the rampant corruption. The South Korean government maintained suppression of civil society by outlawing any opposition to the government as communism, and by expanding security forces and the intelligence system.[12] However, the attempt of the Rhee government to sustain power by manipulating election results ignited a wide student-led protest, 'the April 19 revolution' in 1960.[13] Approximately 30,000 university and high school students participated in a nonviolent march in Seoul. The government violently suppressed the students' demonstration. The brutality by the South Korean police resulted in the deaths of approximately 130 students and nearly 1000 injured.[14] Soon, many citizens, including university professors, joined the protests against the dictatorship. Although the Rhee government tried to portray these protests as a communist-inspired movement, public dissatisfaction with the government appeared too great to be swayed by rhetoric about the Korean conflict. Eventually, the US government asked Rhee Syng-man to step down, and Rhee announced his resignation on 26 April 1960.[15]

However, the movement for democracy was frustrated by the military coup of Lieutenant General Park Chung-hee on 16 May 1961. After taking power, Park and his military associates claimed they had inherited

[10]Charles K. Armstrong, 'Beyond the DMZ: The Possibility of Civil Society in North Korea', in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 188–90.

[11]Adrian Buzo, *The Making of Modern Korea* (London: Routledge, 2002), 71–74.

[12]Jinwung Kim, 'South Korea', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War*, ed. James I. Matray and Donald W. Boose (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), 28.

[13]W.D. Reeve, *The Republic of Korea* (Oxford University Press, 1963), 49–50.

[14]Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 355.

[15]Yong-Pyo Hong, *State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953–60* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 140–42.

spirit of April 19 and would carry on with civil revolution. But, Park Chung-hee dissolved the democratically-elected government and later the National Assembly. He ruled South Korea until he was assassinated in 1979 by his chief intelligence officer. Under Park's dictatorship, South Korean civil society began several human rights and democratisation movements. The unilateral decision by the government to normalise relationships with Japan, without an apology from Japan about colonial rule, provoked nation-wide civil demonstrations in mid-1960s. Lee says university students were the most active protesters among the civil society groups resisting the military dictatorship. For instance, from March 1964 to September 1965, a total of 3 million students participated in protest activities such as rallies and hunger strikes. Park suppressed civil disobedience activities by declaring martial law and implementing emergency measures, such as arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and executions.[16]

However, the cruelty of the dictatorship intensified participation by civil society in civil resistance. In 1969, the People's Council Fighting against the Revision of Constitution to allow Park Chung-hee the 3rd Term (*Sam Sŏn'gaehŏnbandae Pŏmgungmint'uchaengwiwŏnhoe*) was formed.[17] Following the Yushin Constitution, which made Park a lifetime President in 1972, the will of the people to fight the regime appeared to grow even more. South Korean civil society organised an extensive network of underground human rights organisations. The civil resistance culture flourished in poems and music.[18] Religious leaders acquired documents detailing human rights abuses by the South Korean dictatorship and conveyed them to Western missionaries covertly.[19] Some South Korean religious organisations provided shelter to human rights activists, who took refuge in the Churches and temples. For example, the Korean Christian Center at Jongno 5-ga and Jogyesa Buddhist Temple in downtown Seoul, became a well-known location for sit-ins, hunger strikes, and news conferences by activists.[20]

[16]Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 31–33.

[17]Hyug Baeg Im, op. cit., pp. 109–13.

[18]Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 368–69.

[19]Donald Baker, 'The International Christian Network for Korea's Democratization', in *Democratic Movements and Korean Society: Historical Documents and Korean Studies*, ed. Sang-young Rhyu (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2007), p. 148.

[20]Hyug Baeg Im, 'Korean Christian Churches in Democratization Movement', p. 115.

Meanwhile, the labour movement of South Korean civil society was galvanised to resist Park Chung-hee's export-oriented development which had instigated inhumane working conditions in the export manufacturing industries. In particular, female workers were forced to work in harsher conditions than male workers. Lee describes, many of them as "young girls, working up to sixteen hours a day, with thirteen to fifteen girls cooped up in a two-p'yong (about seventy-two square feet room)" earning 30 dollars a month.[21] Workers had to endure the inhumane treatment in the cause of boosting national economy. On 13 November, 1970, a young factory worker, Chun Tae-il, set himself on fire, protesting the inhumane working conditions of the young girls and to raise awareness of social justice. His self-immolation ignited a labour justice movement with many civil society leaders from human rights and democratisation movements also joining the democratic union movement.[22]

Following the death of Park Chung-hee in 1979, Major General Chun Doo-hwan led another military coup which provoked nationwide protest. In May 1980, over two thousand civilians, protesting for democracy in Gwangju, were massacred by military forces.[23] The new military dictatorship branded the Gwangju uprising as armed violence by mobs, instigated by North Korean spies, and filtered all information concerning the massacre from the news. However, the process of remembering the Gwangju massacre "as a people's uprising for democracy and justice" persisted in opposition to the official narrative by the dictatorship as a part of the democratisation movement.[24] Lewis says, "throughout the 1980s demonstrators were arrested every May," in connection with events commemorating Gwangju.[25] The civil society

[21] Lee, *The Making of Minjung*, 218–19.

[22] Hagen Koo, 'Engendering Civil Society: The Role of the Labor Mvoement', in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 74–75.

[23] Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 10, 37–38.

[24] Roy Richard Grinker, *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War* (Bloomsburg: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 23.

[25] Linda S. Lewis, 'Commemorating Gwangju: The 5.18 Movement and Civil Society at the Millennium', in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 146.

network continued to expand under the Chun military dictatorship. By 1984, university students had formed the National Student Coalition for the Struggle for Democracy (*Chŏn'gungminjuhaksaengyŏnmaeng*), and the labour movement founded the Korean Council for Labour Welfare (*Han'gungnotongjapokchihyŏpŭihoe*). The following year, diverse civil society groups, including students, labour, academics, famers, and religious groups, created a national umbrella organisation, the People's Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (*Minjut'ongilminjungundongyŏnhap*, PMCDR). Together with opposition party politicians, PMCDR continued to organise nationwide mass rallies for democracy.[26]

In May 1987, the National Catholic Priests' Corps for the Realisation of Justice (Chŏngŭikuhyŏnsachetan, NCPCRJ) discovered that a Seoul National University student protesting for democracy, Park Jong-chul, had been tortured to death by the police. His death became the touchstone which ignited nationwide peace parades that June, in which more than a million citizens participated. The Chun Doo-hwan regime was unable to contain the widespread protests of the dictatorship and, on 29 June 1987, announced a national referendum for constitutional revision, which introduced direct presidential election in South Korea.[27]

Overcoming the Division-System

Recognition by the South Korean civil society of the effects of the division-system on the Korean conflict goes back to the 1960s. In the atmosphere of the democratic achievement to overthrow the Rhee Syngman dictatorship, South Korean university students initiated a movement for the unification of the Korean peninsula by forming the Alliance for National Unification (*Minjok t'ongil yŏnmaeng*) in 1960, and proposed a meeting with their North Korean counterparts to discuss unification issues in the Truce Village, Panmoonjom, in the DMZ. Many students joined the movement, asking the interim South Korean government to start negotiations with North Korea. Kang Man-gil says this movement was worrisome for right-wing groups in the society, particularly when

[26] Sunhyuk Kim, 'Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea', in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 54–57.

[27] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 381–82.

many people still remembered the brutality of the Korean war. This concern about the student unification movement was exploited by Park Chung-hee in his justification of his military coup in 1961.[28]

After observing the 1972 Yushin constitution following the July 4 Joint Communiqué, a consensus on *Sŏn minju hu t'ongillon* (democracy first, unification later) grew in South Korean civil society, that unless South Korea achieves sustainable democracy first, any discussion about the Korean unification process would be used to strengthen dictatorships. However, the continuing suppression by the dictatorship, on the pretext of defending South Korea against the North Korean threat, evoked alternative voices in South Korean civil society, saying that democratisation and unification should not be separate issues. From their perspective, unification would effectively discredit the rationale of the dictatorships. For this reason, Moon Ik-whan claimed in his article, 'Minju hoepokkwa minjokt'ongil' (Recovery of Democracy and National Unification) in 1978, that "Unification cannot be achieved without democratisation, and democratisation cannot be achieved without unification".[29]

Opinions of the link between democratisation and unification strengthened when people observed the emergence of yet another dictatorship in South Korea and the Gwangju massacre in 1980. Erich Weingartner says, "the awareness grew that the division of Korea is serving as a justification for dictatorship and that therefore the struggle for peace and unification is an integral component of the struggle for justice and democratization".[30] Several civil society scholars such as Kang Man-gil, Seo Joong-Seok, and Baik Nak-chung portrayed the history of the dictatorship as the nature of 'the division' between North and South Korea. Seo says, "By relying on the other's existence, the rulers of each side reinforced their power and firmly established a regime of hostility and confrontation towards each other".[31] Baik argues that "the Korean conflict

[28] Kang, *Isipseki Uri Yŏksa* [20th Century Our History], 325.

[29] Ik-whan Moon, 'Minju Hoepokkwa Minjokt'ongil [Recovery of Democracy and National Unification]', *Ssiarŭi Sori* 75, no. 7–8 (1987): 26.

[30] Erich Weingartner, 'The Tozanso Process: An Ecumenical Contribution to the Struggle for Peace and Justice in North-East Asia', in *Documents of the WCC Library: Korean Christian Federation*, ed. Kim Heung Soo (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 91.

[31] Joong-Seok Seo, *Korean Nationalism Betrayed* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007), 57.

is not just a conflict between two different states or regimes, but also a conflict between those who obtain their interests from the division and those who suffer from it" and suggests calling the Korean division 'the division-system'.[32] However, as *Sŏn minju hu t'ongillon* suggested, both South and North Korean dictatorships used the discussion of unification in South Korean civil society for their own benefit. The South Korean regime repressed civil society activities by portraying them as communist-inspired. The North Korean regime used the opportunity to promote its political propaganda in South Korean society. For example, some South Korean student movement groups, known as *Chusap'a* (the students who adopted *Juche* ideology as the guiding principle for their movement), claimed that they "receive more information from North Korean radio than from the one-sided coverage" of the South Korean media. Lee Namhee says these groups' lack of "first-hand knowledge about the North, their tendency to simplify the issues at hand as black and white, and their own nationalist disposition" allowed them to fall for North Korean propaganda, with the oppressive nature of the North Korean regime blotted out of their minds. The appearance of these pro-North Korean groups in South Korea provided the South Korean government with fodder to maintain the division-system.[33]

After South Korean democratisation and the election of Rho Tae-woo in 1987, the PMCDR, chaired by Moon Ik-hwan, actively engaged with various civil groups including religious, labour, academics and college student unions, to bring awareness of the division-system. On 10 June 1988, university students and the PMCDR rallied at the DMZ, in order to achieve a meeting between South and North Korean university students. The South Korean government did not approve of the meeting.[34] In March 1989, Moon Ik-hwan visited North Korea without the permission of the South Korean government. Moon met with Kim Il-sung and discussed a possible unification process. He claimed that the North Korean government's priority in addressing political and military issues and the South Korean government's priority in promoting inter-Korean

[32]Nak-chung Baik, *Hanbandosik t'ongil, Hyŏnjae Chinhaenghyŏng* [The Unification of the Korean Peninsula, Present Continuous] (Paju: Changbi, 2006), 81.

[33]Lee, *The Making of Minjung*, 127–44.

[34]Yu-na Lee, '88 Soˇnoˇn Choˇnhu Sigi NCCKŭi T'ongirundonggwa Han'guk Kidokkyo [Before and After 88 Declaration: NCCK Unification Movement and Civil Unification Movement]', *Han'guk Kidokkyo Yoˇksa Yoˇn'guso Sosik*, no. 89 (2010): 37.

cooperation and exchange were not incompatible and could be pursued simultaneously.[35] Moon was instantly arrested upon his return to South Korea and put in jail for violating the National Security Law (NSL). The NCCK appealed for immediate release of Moon in a statement, arguing that Moon's visit to North Korea was a civil disobedience action against the South Korean government's unilateral application of the NSL.[36] In the same year, Im Su-kyung, from the Association of University Student Representatives, and Moon Kyu-hyun from NCPCRJ visited Pyongyang, and participated in the Thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students. They were arrested upon their return to South Korea.[37]

Since then, more civil society organisations have been addressing the issue of the NSL. In 1993, the Network of Korean NGOs for the UN World Conference on Human Rights organised an international gathering on 'Human Rights Violations under the National Security Laws in Asian Countries'. At this event, Park Won-soon argued that the Korean NSL violated several articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). He said, "to take only one step toward democracy and reunification of Korea is impossible with the law entirely unchanged. The law will keep a number of students, workers and citizens in the endless procession to prison for the sole reason that they called for democracy and reunification".[38] Despite regulations by the NSL, the unification movement continued to grow in South Korean civil society. In 1990, the Pan-Korean Alliance for Unification (*Chokuk t'ongil pŏmminjok yŏnhap*), which consisted of domestic and overseas Korean civil society organisations, was founded. Student movements

[35] 'Chokukp'yŏnghwat'ongirwiwŏnhoe Kwan'gyeilgundŭlgwa Namjosŏnŭi 'Chŏnmillyŏn' Komunin Munikhwan Moksa Irhaeng Saiŭi Hoetamesŏ Kongdongsŏngmyŏng Ch'aet'aek: Kongdongsŏngmyŏng [A Joint Statement between Moon Ilk-Whan and Chokukp'yŏnghwat'ongirwiwŏnhoe]', *Rodong Sinmun*, April 3, 1989.

[36] NCCK, *1980–2000 Han'guk Kyohoe P'yo˘nghwa T'ongil Undong Charyojip* [Documents of Korean Church's Peace and Unification Movement 1980–2000] (Seoul: National Council of Churches in Korea, 2000), 155–57.

[37] Seungsook Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 103–4.

[38] Won-Soon Park, 'The National Security Law: The Symbol of Korean Human Rights Adversity', in *Human Rights Violations Under the National Security Laws in Asian Countries*, ed. Korea NGOs' Network for The UN World Conference on Human Rights (Seoul: Korea NGOs' Network for The UN World Conference on Human Rights, 1993), 29–30.

such as the National Council of Student Representatives (*Chŏn'guk taehaksaeng hyŏbŭihoe*) and the National Federation of Student Associations (*Han'guk taehaksaeng ch'ongyŏnhaphoe*) actively participated in the radical unification movement.[39]

Amid the growth of the unification movement, there were debates in South Korean civil society around issues of social formation (*Sahoe kusŏngch'e nonjaeng*). Some groups argued that class is the major social contradiction of Korean society, while other groups saw the division is the major social contradiction. Despite the ideological debates of the mid-1980s, civil society maintained solidarity in the fight against the Chun dictatorship. But, the debates created splits within the civil society groups, National Liberation (NL) and People's Democracy (PD). Lee says that, in the end, the ideological debate "became extremely pedantic", and many small and underground groups "gathered and scattered along ideological divisions".[40] According to Baik Nak-chung, suggesting the use of the concept, 'the division-system' was a practical way to integrate the ideological split of civil society at that time.[41] Both NL and PD wanted to address the social injustices in South Korean society caused by the division-system. From his perspective, the pursuit of social justice could not be separated from the context of the Korean conflict. Baik argues that the process of dismantling the division-system does not exclude "the possibility that the working class will become the main agents in the long-term movements for the transformation of the world-system".[42] Choi Jang-jip agrees with Baik's holistic approach, but he has a different emphasis. He says "the issue of labour justice and polarisation is the violence inside of South Korea. Although the South Korean economy grew, ordinary people as well as marginalised people still suffer from social injustice. This makes peace in Korea impossible." From his perspective, the South Korean unification movement would not be able to understand North Korean people without understanding

[39] Dae Yop Cho, 'Outlooks on a Civil Society-Initiated Unification', in *Inter-Korean Relations: Family or Enemy?* ed. Kun Young Park (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym International Corporation, 2014), 260–61.

[40] Lee, *The Making of Minjung*, 254.

[41] Baik Nak-chung, Literary scholar, civil society leader, interview by author, Seoul, 27 January 2010.

[42] Nak-chung Baik, *O˘ Diga Chungdomyo˘ O˘ Tchaeso˘ Pyo˘nhyo˘gin'ga* [Where We Can Call Moderate and Why the Change] (Paju: Changbi, 2009), 61–62.

South Korean social injustice issues. Therefore, addressing the issue of social justice is essential to the peace and unification process.[43]

During this time, the voices addressing the gender injustices in South Korean society also increased. Under the dictatorship era, women had been marginalised as workers, and mobilised as 'biological and domestic reproducers' despite their contribution to the labour force in industrialising the South Korean economy. Moon Seungsook says that women were asked "to be dutiful nationals, performing patriotic forms of contraception and managing the household rationally".[44] Throughout the 1970s several feminism-oriented groups began to advocate for women's rights and gender equality. In the 1980s, many of these groups actively participated in the democratisation movement and began to institutionalise their movement. For example, in 1987, the Korean Women's Association United (*Han'gugyŏsŏngdanch'eyŏnhap*, KWAU) was formed as an umbrella organisation for 24 women's organisations and engaged in various social actions beyond issues relating directly to the women.[45]

Similar to the debate between NL and PD, there were discussions among feminist groups about the need for women to discuss the issues around unification, rather than focusing only on gender equality in South Korean society. The feminists, in general, saw nationalism as a cultivator of patriarchy worldwide. Therefore, some women activists wanted to distance themselves from the unification movement which appeared to them to be associated with nationalism.[46] In spite of reservations from some groups, there were several women movements who perceived a role for women in overcoming the division-system. For example, the KWAU formed a special committee on national unification, and attempted to address the issues of the division-system. In 1991, KWAU organised a meeting with North Korean women in Tokyo, with progressive Christian women's groups and Japanese women's groups, under the theme of 'Peace in Asia: The Role of Women'. After the first meeting,

[43]Choi Jang-jip, Political scientist, civil society leader, interview by author, Seoul, 2 February 2010.

[44]Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea*, 93–94.

[45]Aie-Rie Lee and Hyun-Chool Lee, 'The Women's Movement in South Korea Revisited', *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 40, no. 2 (2013): 43–57.

[46]Hyun-baek Chung, 'Han'guk Yŏsŏngt'ongirundongŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Kwache [The Current Situation and Task of the Korean Women's Unification Movement]', *Women and Peace* 1 (2000): 165.

KWAU organised subsequent meetings in Seoul, Pyongyang, and Tokyo until 1993. In these meetings, North and South Korean women discussed issues of unification, the threat of war and nuclear weapons, the legacy of Japanese colonisation and comfort women, as well as gender equality in their societies.[47] As in the case of the NCCK initiative in Chapter 5, the meetings between North and South Korean women showed the potential and the limitations of civil society. Chung Hyunbaek says that it was very encouraging that North and South Korean women were able to build relationships with each other. But, North Korean women strongly presented their government's view, which was the resolution of political and military issues first, and South Korean women maintained the view of their own government, which was civilian exchange and economic cooperation first.[48] Furthermore, unlike South Korean women, North Korean women were not able to acknowledge that North Korean society had issues of gender injustice. They claimed that socialist revolution in North Korea had resolved the issues of gender inequality in their society.[49]

Despite these limitations, an important contribution by the women's movements to Korean peacebuilding was that they highlighted issues of division from the perspective of peace and antimilitarism movements. It was a paradigm shift from the effort to overcome the division-system by political unification, to the effort to overcome division by promoting peace and resisting to militarism. Many women's organisations came to the conclusion that the goal of struggle against the injustices of the division-system would not necessarily include the unification of North and South Korean states.[50] Particularly, women's movements began to recognise that the link between masculisation and militarisation in South Korean society. During the 1990s, the percentage of government

[47] Mi-kyung Lee, 'Nambugyŏsŏnggyoryuŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Chŏnmang [The Current Situation and the Prospect of South-North Women's Meetings]', *Yŏsŏnggwa Sahoe* 4 (1993): 234–37; Chung, "Han'guk Yŏsŏngt'ongirundongŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Kwache [The Current Situation and Task of the Korean Women's Unification Movement]," 165–67.

[48] Chung, 'Han'guk Yŏsŏngt'ongirundongŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Kwache [The Current Situation and Task of the Korean Women's Unification Movement]', 166–67.

[49] Lee, 'Nambugyŏsŏnggyoryuŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Chŏnmang [The Current Situation and the Prospect of South-North Women's Meetings]', 237.

[50] A Peace Activist, Women Making Peace (WMP Korea), interview with author, Dublin, 9 July 2016.

expenditures on national defence was approximately 20%, while the welfare cost for women was less than 0.4%.[51] Furthermore, Moon says awareness grew that while compulsory "military service denied men fundamental civil rights at a more basic level, it contributed to the maintenance of their position as modern patriarchs". The militarised society and culture were used to justify structural violence against men and women and maintain the division-system in the Korean peninsula. But, from the perspective of women, the Korean unification movement alone would not resolve the militarisation of the society. It appeared that the issue of militarisation needed to be overcome in the process of a peaceful and nonviolent transformation of the Korean conflict.[52]

Promoting Peace Against the Militarism

Upon the realisation that the militarisation of South Korean society validates the structural violence and sustains the division system, several women's groups initiated action against militarism in the Korean peninsula. An example, as Chung argues, is that women peace activists turned their attention to arms reduction earlier than other civil society organisations. They understood that defence expenditure by the South Korean government is directly linked to violation of women's rights. In the early 1990s, women's organisations, including the KWAU, began campaigns for the reduction of defence spending. They collected 1000 signatures, held press conferences, and went to the National Assembly to explain the need for arms control. In September 1992, the Coalition for Reduction of National Defence Budget (*Pangwipi sakkamŭl wihan yŏndae moim*) was formed. The Coalition initiated a 'letter writing campaign' to promote the issue and monitored government defence expenditures. It also researched methods to reduce the defence budget and tried to bring an awareness of the link between arms reduction and the growth of the women's welfare budget. In February 1994, the KWAU organised the Women's Meeting Opposing the Dispatch of Patriot Missiles (*P'aet'ŭriŏt'ŭ misail paech'irŭl pandaehanŭn yŏsŏngmoim*) together

[51] Chung, 'Han'guk Yŏsŏngt'ongirundongŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Kwache [The Current Situation and Task of the Korean Women's Unification Movement]', 170.

[52] Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea*, 179; Atack, *Nonviolence in Political Theory*, 96.

with 8 other women's organisations. In 1997, Women Making Peace (*P'yŏnghwarŭl yŏnŭn yŏsŏnghoe*, WMP) was created. WMP promoted 1998 as the Year of Disarmament and initiated diverse campaigns and education projects.[53]

In addition to issues of disarmament and arms control, women activists attempted to address the discrimination of women in the labour market caused by coupling military services with employment. The military dictatorships had rewarded men's military duty with economic advantages, such as extra points for employment, faster promotion, and extra pay, over women and those who did not serve in the military. Throughout the 1990s, the women groups, in coalition with human rights movements for people with disabilities, focused on abolishing the military service extra-points employment system. They initiated campaigns and a constitutional lawsuit. This movement caused national controversy. Many people, especially the conservative public, resisted the idea of abolishing the favouritism towards men who served in the military. They argued that military service should be recognised as work experience and deserved to receive extra-points both in employment and in promotion. However, in December 1999, the Constitutional Court finally ruled that "the extra-points system described in the Veterans Assistance Act (Clause 1 of Article 8) and its Enforcement Ordinance (Article 9) were unconstitutional."[54]

Meanwhile, more and more civil society organisations reasoned that the absence of peace in South Korean society could be an obstacle to reconciliation between North and South Korea. In line with the approach of the women's movement, these civic groups committed to tackling structural violence and militarisation in South Korea.[55] In 1989, five hundred civil society leaders founded the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (*Kyŏngjechŏngŭisilch'ŏnsiminyŏnha,* CCEJ). From the perspective of the leadership of the CCEJ, the major issues in South Korean social injustice were all related to the militarised industrialisation during the dictatorship. In this regard, the CCEJ pursued socioeconomic democratisation for South Korea, in tandem with political, procedural

[53]Chung, 'Han'guk Yŏsŏngt'ongirundongŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Kwache [The Current Situation and Task of the Korean Women's Unification Movement]', 170–72.

[54]Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea*, 161–63.

[55]Chung, 'Han'guk Yŏsŏngt'ongirundongŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Kwache [The Current Situation and Task of the Korean Women's Unification Movement]', 191.

democratisation and the unification movement. Within 10 years, the national membership of the CCEJ grew to more than ten thousand. In 1993, the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (*Hwan'gyŏngundongyŏnhap*, KFEM) was formed by eight local environmental groups. The KFEM was conscious of the environmental destruction caused by the military dictatorships in the name of industrialisation and defence against North Korea. Therefore, the KFEM connected their environmental movement to other social issues, such as economic disparity, human rights, and peace and unification. At the same time, the KFEM promoted the ecological value of life to other civil society organisations who were also addressing the above issues. In less than 10 years, the number of the KFEM members rose to 85,000 with nearly 50 local branches.[56]

Cho Dae-yop describes the birth of these new civil society organisations as the emergence of the civil peace movement from the cycle of civil society-initiated democratisation and unification movements. During the dictatorships, democracy was the common goal which united diverse civil society organisations. As the procedural democracy of South Korea took its course, unification seemed to be the obvious common goal of the South Korean civil society. But, many South Korean civil organisations began to perceive themselves as part of the peace movement rather than national unification movements. To many South Korean civil society organisations, peace was the universal ideal that "surpasses the boundaries of state, national and ideology". Peace movements appeared to be able to incorporate the diverse aspirations of people in South Korean and global society, beyond the political unification of Korea.[57]

Under the banner of the peace movement, various South Korean civil society organisations came together to address the issue of militarisation. The People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (*Ch'amyŏyŏndae*, PSPD) became one of the key organisers for the civil solidarity movement against militarism. The PSPD was established by human rights and democratisation activists in 1994, with a mandate to promote "people's participation in the government decision making processes" and to monitor "the abuse of power of the state and corporations" by enhancing transparency and accountability. Currently, there are

[56] Moon, *Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea*, 113–14.

[57] Cho, 'Outlooks on a Civil Society-Initiated Unification', 261–62.

approximately 15,000 members in the PSPD.[58] In 2002, the PSPD initiated a campaign opposing the South Korean purchase of F-15 k fighter aircraft. In 2003, the PSPD founded the Center for Peace and Disarmament to research disarmament, including denuclearisation, to facilitate international events on peace and disarmament, to monitor the government's defence spending, and to promote civil peace education.[59] Civil society organisations including the PSPD, organised a conference for peace activists from across South Korea, in 2004, to exchange views and find a way to work together. The conference became an annual peace conference and, except for 2010, has been held every year since.[60] In 2008, civil society organisations from many sectors including women, religion, environment, human rights, unification, democracy, humanitarian and development aid, formed the Civil Peace Forum, to provide solidarity among peace activists.[61]

The increased cooperation across various civil society sectors contributed to organising joint peace movements, events and protests, such as the campaign opposing the construction of the Jeju naval base. In the late 2000s, the government's decision to build a naval base in Gangjeong Village in Jeju caused controversy due to the non-democratic decision-making process and negative impact on the environment. The majority of the village residents objected to the construction of a military base in an area designated as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. Despite the nonviolent protest by Jeju civil society organisations, the construction of the naval base began in 2011. Shortly after the start of construction, 125 civil society organisations formed the 'Nationwide Coalition to Stop the Construction of Jeju Naval Base' (*Chechuhaekun'gichi kŏnsŏl paekchihwarŭl wihan chŏn'guktaech'aekhoeŭi*). The PSPD took on the role of Secretariat of the Coalition.[62] Another example is the NGO Coalition against THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) Deployment

[58] 'About PSPD', People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, June 9, 2017, http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/39340.

[59] Bo-hyuk Suh, 'Is Another Peace Possible? A Pacifist Perspective of the Crisis on the Korean Peninsula', *Journal of Peace and Unification* 7, no. 2 (2017): 16.

[60] 'About PSPD.'

[61] 'Civil Peace Forum', October 1, 2008, http://www.civilnet.net/xe/civilpeace?ckattempt=1.

[62] 'PSPD Center for Peace and Disarmament', People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, March 7, 2015, http://www.peoplepower21.org/Peace/575305.

in South Korea. In July 2016, the South Korean government officially announced the approval of the US deployment of the THAAD battery to South Korea. More than 100 civil society organisations, including the PSPD, participated in the NGO Coalition and initiated an anti-deployment campaign.[63]

These civil peace actions also received a considerable amount of global attention and support. In 2015, Gangjeong village received the Sean MacBride Peace Award from the International Peace Bureau (IPB) for their non-violent struggle against the construction of the naval base. The IPB explains the reason for the selection of Gangjeong village:

> Many have spent days or weeks or months in jail, including a well-known film critic Yoon Mo Yong who spent 550 days in prison after committing multiple acts of civil disobedience. The energy and commitment shown by the villagers has attracted the support (and participation) of activists from around the world.[64]

In 2017, 102 international peace activists issued a joint statement about the THAAD deployment. They argued:

> An existing crisis is already escalating in Northeast Asia over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system that the South Korean and U.S. Governments have decided to deploy in South Korea. All these acts of military bravado, taking hostage the lives and peace of Koreans, must cease now.[65]

This international support was in part due to the international networking by South Korean civil society organisations. South Korean NGOs, such as PSPD and WMP, actively participated in the Global

[63]Tim Beal, 'The Deployment of THAAD in Korea and the Struggle over US Global Hegemony', *Journal of Political Criticism* 19 (2016): 19–20; Suh, 'Is Another Peace Possible? A Pacifist Perspective of the Crisis on the Korean Peninsula', 16–17.

[64]'Gangjeong, One of the Co-Recipients of the Sean MacBride Award!' Save Jeju Now, August 30, 2015, http://savejejunow.org/gangjeong-the-co-recipients-of-the-sean-macbride-award/.

[65]'From Our Member PSPD, South Korea—Now Is the Time for Dialogue on Denuclearisation and Not Military Action That Will Escalate the Crisis on the Korean Peninsula', Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, May 16, 2017, https://www.forum-asia.org/?p=23897.

Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the expansion of the global civil society-led network for peacebuilding in his 2001 report on conflict prevention, which led to the creation of the GPPAC in 2005.[66] South Korean civil society participated in the GPPAC preparation meeting in 2003 and took a leading role in initiating GPPAC in Northeast Asia (GPPAC-NEA) in 2005. During the period of the ongoing peace process in the Korean peninsula, South Korean NGOs organised the 2006 GPPAC-NEA meeting in Kumgang Mountain in North Korea.[67] As tensions in the Korean peninsula heightened in relation to the nuclear development of North Korea, GPPAC organised a track-two meeting among peace activists and civil society leaders from US, China, Russia, Japan, North and South Korea, in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia in 2015, which was called the Ulaanbaatar Process.[68] Since then, two additional rounds of the Ulaanbaatar Process dialogue were held in 2016 and in 2017. Participants in the three meetings discussed ways to create a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia, how to replace the armistice agreement with a peace treaty in the Korean peninsula, and how to expand the peacebuilding role of civil society.[69]

Meanwhile, rather than focusing solely on Korean issues, South Korean civil society organisations expanded their concerns to issues such as the 'Anti-Iraq War Peace Movement' (*Irak'ŭpanjŏnp'yŏnghwaundong*). Steve Lok-Wai Chung says, "The campaign against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan offered a historical moment for South Koreans to consider their responsibility and role as world citizens". In 2003, when the US government made a formal request to the South Korean government to deploy military units to Iraq, more than 300 civil society organisations

[66] Kofi A. Annan, 'Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/985–S/2001/574' (United Nations, June 7, 2001), http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005902.pdf.

[67] 'PSPD Center for Peace and Disarmament.'

[68] 'Ulaanbaatar Process, A Civil Society Dialogue for Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia: Framework Document' (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, June 24, 2015), https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/131936949/0/Ulaanbaatar+Process+-+Framework+Document+FNL.pdf/6a61b441-5e46-4689-8180-4be15b5dd342.

[69] 'GPPAC Ulaanbaatar Process', Peace Portal, accessed March 11, 2018, https://www.peaceportal.org/web/ulaanbaatar-process/meetings;jsessionid=C3B6CD5223D7056727A1C28F05283228.

participated in the 'People's Coalition for Action Against Troop Deployment in Iraq' (*Irak'ŭp'apyŏngbandaekungminhaengdong*). The coalition, together with trade unions and several civil society leaders, organised candlelight vigils, anti-war declarations, "press conference and online signature collection campaigns against the war and the deployment of troops".[70] However, in April 2003, the South Korean government and the National Assembly did approve the dispatch of South Korean soldiers to Iraq. South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, argued that he decided "to dispatch troops, despite ongoing anti-war protests, because of the fate of our country and the people". He said, in his speech to the National Assembly, "In order to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue peacefully, it is important to maintain strong cooperation with the US".[71] From the realistic perspective of the South Korean government, South Korea needed the support of the US in peacebuilding with North Korea as much as it did in defence against North Korea. Therefore, despite the negative public opinion, South Korea seemed bound to support the US in international conflict situations as well as in the Korean conflict situation.

To many South Korean civil peace organisations, the government's decision to send South Korean troops to Iraq was confirmation of a historical link between the Korean conflict and the US global agenda. As we saw in Chapter 3, the history of the formal military alliance between the US and South Korea goes back to the Korean War. After the Armistice Agreement of 1953, South Korea granted the US military the right to stay in South Korean territory and voluntarily gave up the control of its military to the US, through the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty in October 1953. In 1967, the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) came into force.[72] During the military dictatorship of South Korea, the issue of sovereignty and the complicit nature of the US-ROK military alliance triggered anti-American sentiment among South Korean

[70] Steve Lok-Wai Chung, 'Peace Movements in South Korea and Their Impacts on the Politics of the Korean Peninsula', *Journal of Comparative Asian Development* 10, no. 2 (2011): 265–67.

[71] Howard W. French, 'Despite Protests, Seoul to Send Troops to Iraq for Reconstruction', *The New York Times*, April 2, 2003, sec. Asia Pacific, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/02/international/asia/despite-protests-seoul-to-send-troops-to-iraq-for.html.

[72] Daniel Oh, 'US-Korea Military Alliance', Wilson Center Digital Archive, accessed March 11, 2018, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/modern-korean-history-portal/us-korea-military-alliance.

human rights and democratisation activists. From the perspective of these activists, the Gwangju massacre by the Chun Doo-hwan regime in 1980 would not have happened without the approval or tacit permission by the US, given the US-ROK Defense Treaty. The student movement also actively resisted the US-ROK military alliance. They protested the annual compulsory military training for the university students in the 1980s, arguing that they did not want to become American mercenaries.[73] Although SOFA went through revisions in 1991 and again in 2001, many South Korean civil groups are still not satisfied with the agreement, in terms of criminal jurisdiction and environmental contamination.[74] Furthermore, the increasing financial burden of paying for the US troops has resulted in several civil actions against the US military base in South Korea. Particularly after a US armoured vehicle ran over and killed two female middle-school students in 2002, national wide candlelight vigils against the US military base were organised by a broad range of civic groups.[75]

In the meantime, conservative groups in South Korea, such as veterans' affairs associations and conservative Christian groups mobilised a series of pro-US rallies opposing the antimilitarism movement. They waved US flags and pro-US banners, and burned North Korean flags in rallies, advocating for a continuous US presence in South Korea. From the perspective of these groups, the US had saved South Korea from attack by North Korea during the Korean War, and South Korea still needed the US to defend the country against the threat of North Korea.[76] The division within South Korean society about the role of the US overlaps the polarised views on human rights violations within South Korean civil society.

[73] Lee, *The Making of Minjung*, 120–25.

[74] CSIS International Security Program, *Path to an Agreement: The U.S.–Republic of Korea Status of Forces Agreement Revision Process, A CSIS International Security Program Report* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), 1–4.

[75] Chung, 'Peace Movements in South Korea and Their Impacts on the Politics of the Korean Peninsula', 264–65.

[76] Victor D. Cha, 'Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Role in Inter-Korean Relations', in *Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics*, ed. David I. Steinberg (New York: Routledge, 2004), 129–30.

Advocating for North Korean Human Rights in South Korea

Unlike South Korea, there has not been any noticeable civil resistance to the dictatorship or human rights movements in North Korea. Armstrong argues that the North Korean authoritarian regime "has drastically reduced the autonomous space for civil society more by absorbing its energies than by merely suppressing it".[77] Since 1990s, South Korean NGOs and international organisations began to bring up issues about North Korean human rights violations on behalf of North Korean citizens. This was in part due to growing interaction with North Korea and the testimonies of those who left North Korea. First, the number of visits by international organisations, such as UN agencies, North American NGOs, and European NGOs to North Korea, grew because of their work to address the severe famine in North Korea during the 1990s. Second, as the Korean peace process progressed in the 2000s, the number of South Korean visits to North Korea increased. Finally, the number of North Korean defectors and refugees had been rising every year, since the famine. These increasing contacts with North Koreans raised the concerns of the international community, and especially within South Korean society, about human rights in North Korea.[78]

In 1994, a few South Korean civil society leaders formed the Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (*Pukhanin'gwŏnsiminyŏnhap*, Citizen's Alliance) to more widely publicise the human rights situation in North Korea and to coordinate activities related to North Korean human rights advocacy. In the early stages, the Citizen's Alliance tried to advocate for the need to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea, and then became more and more focused on civil and political rights protection for North Korean citizens. As an increasing number of North Koreans defected to South Korea, the Citizen's Alliance held the International Conference on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees in Seoul in 1998 and in 1999. These conferences contributed to creating awareness of the need to discuss the issue of North Korean human rights in South Korea. In 1999, the Network for North Korean Democracy and Human

[77] Armstrong, 'Beyond the DMZ: The Possibility of Civil Society in North Korea', 188.

[78] Bo-hyuk Suh, *North Korean Human Rights: Crafting a More Effective Framework* (Seoul: The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University, 2016), 78.

Rights (*Pukhan minjuhwa Network*, NKnet) was created. Compared to the Citizen's Alliance, the NKnet have been more focused on disseminating information from North Korea to a wider public. In order to achieve their goal, the NKnet organised various events, campaigns and press conferences, and published newsletters.[79] Especially, the Daily NK, an online newspaper, founded by the NKnet in 2004, attracted domestic and international attention. The Daily NK publishes news on North Korean human rights issues using sources in the Sino-North Korean border area, inside North Korea, stories from North Korean defectors, and the North Korean media.[80]

However, the North Korean regime continues to deny any human rights abuses within the country. The tight control of the North Korean dictatorship on its society has made access to information about North Korean human rights violations very challenging. The testimonies of North Korean defectors are often discredited or found to be non-verifiable. Therefore, the need to authenticate and accumulate reliable data and to provide objective analysis of North Korean human rights was raised in South Korean civil society. For this reason, the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) was established in 2003. The founding goals of the NKDB state that it was established to "collect, analyze, and sort information" about human rights violations by the North Korean government and "to protect and support the victims of these cases". NKDB set up operation principles of objectivity, international credibility and non-political, nonreligious and non-profit action, in order to address the issue of data reliability.[81] In addition to the efforts of human rights NGOs, formed mainly by the South Korean civil society, the North Korean defectors also created human rights NGOs, such as Young Defectors' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (*Pukhanin'gwŏnt'albukch'ŏngnyŏnyŏnhap*) to advocate for human rights in North Korea as well as for the human rights of North Korean defectors in South Korea.[82]

[79] Kyungyon, Moon, 'South Korean Civil Society Organizations, Human Rights Norms, and North Korea', *Critical Asian Studies* 46, no. 1 (2014): 72–73.

[80] 'DailyNK', accessed March 11, 2018, http://english.dailynk.com/english/index.php.

[81] 'NKDB About Us', Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, accessed March 11, 2018, http://nkdb.org/en/about/goals.php.

[82] Moon, 'South Korean Civil Society Organizations, Human Rights Norms, and North Korea', 79.

Meanwhile, efforts by international human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, led to the adoption of UN resolutions on North Korean human rights in 2003.[83] In 2004, a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea was established by UN.[84] In the same year, the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) was signed into US law by the President Bush, after receiving the support of both the US Senate and the Congress. The main purpose of the NKHRA was to improve the effectiveness of US humanitarian aid to North Korea, to increase the flow of information in and out of North Korea, and to support North Korean human rights and democracy programmes. In order to implement this, the US government appointed a special envoy on North Korean human rights, and from 2005 to 2008, allocated approximately $100 million.[85]

At the time of the adoption of the NKHRA, some South Korean human rights NGOs advocating for North Korean human rights were receiving financial support from the US government. For example, a US Congress-funded foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), funded the Citizen's Alliance's work for North Korean civil and political rights. The 2004 NKHRA supported the continuing and new activities of South Korean human rights NGOs, such as the Daily NK, through NED funding. However, the active promotion of North Korean human rights facilitated by the NKHRA caused controversy in South Korean society and created division between the South Korean NGOs who were advocating for civil and political rights in North Korea, and the NGOs, who were advocating for humanitarian aid to North Korea.[86] For those who argued for the need to address issues such as of freedom of expression, association, and religion in North Korea, it was clear that

[83]'Press Release HR/CN/1036, Commission on Human Rights Adopts Measures on Situations in North Korea, Turkmenistan, Myanmar', United Nations, April 16, 2003, http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/hrcn1036.doc.htm.

[84]'Special Rapporteur on Democratic People´s Republic of Korea', United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, accessed March 11, 2018, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/CountriesMandates/KP/Pages/SRDPRKorea.aspx.

[85]Bo-hyuk Suh, 'Controversies over North Korean Human Rights in South Korean Society', *Asian Perspective* 31, no. 2 (2007): 37.

[86]Moon, 'South Korean Civil Society Organizations, Human Rights Norms, and North Korea', 73–76.

the North Korean government was intentionally violating those human rights. Therefore, regime change in North Korea would be the best solution. However, from the perspective of those who promoted North Korean people's right to adequate food, the causality of the humanitarian situation appeared to be more complicated than the failure by the North Korean government to protect human rights. For example, the protracted conflict in the Korean peninsula, and geopolitical condition of North Korea had to be considered in producing a more realistic policy on North Korean human rights. In this regard, the latter group preferred a gradual approach to inducing change inside the North Korean society, by improving people's livelihood.[87]

This dispute was often criticised as being the return of the old debate between Civil and Political Rights (CPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) under the Cold War, which disregarded the indivisible nature of the universal human rights. The United Nations Conference on Human Rights which met in Vienna in 1993, after the end of the Cold War, refuted the division between CRP and ESCR. The 1993 Vienna Declaration stated, "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated".[88] However, from the perspective of progressive South Korean civil society groups, the controversy over North Korean human rights was more than a debate between CPR and ESCR. They perceived a match in the interests of the US administration in using North Korean human rights issues as their North Korea policy instrument, and in the interests of the South Korean conservative groups in utilising the negative image of North Korea for their political gains. Christine Hong says, "This era would moreover spawn a coalition spectrum of anti-communist, neoconservative, evangelical, and defector-based NGOs in both the United States and South Korea". Therefore, while recognising that the North Korean dictatorship had been violating the CPR in North Korea, the criticism against "the consolidation of a U.S.-funded transnational advocacy, propaganda, and intelligence network under the elastic banner of North Korean human rights" increased.[89]

[87] Katharine H.S. Moon, 'Beyond Demonization: A Mew Strategy for Human Rights in North Korea', *Current History* 107, no. 710 (2008): 267.

[88] 'Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action', United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, accessed March 11, 2018, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx.

[89] Christine Hong, 'Reframing North Korean Human Rights', *Critical Asian Studies* 45, no. 4 (2013): 518.

Furthermore, since the Axis of Evil speech by Bush in 2002, some North Korean human rights NGOs in South Korea opposed the peace process with North Korea, in line with the hostile policy of the US toward North Korea. They accused South Korean Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun governments of being complicit with North Korean human rights violations, because the Kim and Rho governments recognised the North Korean government as their counterpart in the peace process. The North Korean human rights NGOs demanded that the South Korean government and the National Assembly adopt a South Korean version of the NKHRA. As a response to this, progressive human rights NGOs in South Korea, such as the Sarangbang Group for Human Rights (*In'gwŏnundongsarangbang*), and the Lawyers for a Democratic Society (*Minjusahoerŭl wihan pyŏnhosa moim*) and the PSPD, raised concerns that conservative human rights groups' actions were politically motivated and biased. According to Suh Bo-hyuk, these NGOs argued that "the main purpose for the adoption of the North Korean Human Rights Act would be to pressure North Korea and has the political intention to reduce human rights to a confrontational interest". From the viewpoint of progressive civil society in South Korea, many of the people who advocated for North Korean human rights seemed to be those who had been silent about South Korean human rights during the South Korean dictatorships or had even supported those dictatorships. Therefore, their human rights movement appeared to be hypocritical and emerging from their hatred of North Korea. On the other hand, from the perspective of the conservative civil society, the progressive civil society groups seemed to be North Korea sympathisers (*Jongbuk*) and betrayers of South Korea.[90]

In the late 2000s, the election of the conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and the suspension of the peace process created a much more hospitable environment for the NGOs advocating North Korean human rights in South Korea. As the confrontation between North and South Korea intensified, the more conservative civil groups participated in North Korean human rights advocacy. In 2008, 28 conservative NGOs and religious groups formed the Association of North Korean Defector Organisations, supporting the human rights

[90] Suh, *North Korean Human Rights: Crafting a More Effective Framework*, 60–63.

campaign to stop Chinese repatriation of North Korean defectors and advocating for regime change in North Korea. In 2010, more than 30 conservative civil society groups, such as the New Right National Solidarity (*New Right Chŏn'gugyŏnhap*), organised 'Liberty in North Korea Week in the US and South Korea. Moon says that the civil society groups advocated for civil and political rights in North Korea became more and more predominant in South Korean society through support from the Lee Myung-bak government.[91] Suh sees this phenomenon as the prevalence of 'human rights fundamentalism', which "neglects the process that the international human rights regime has developed over the years", and argues for a comprehensive perspective on human rights in the whole Korean peninsula, instead of the separate and selective approaches to the North Korean or South Korean human rights.[92]

Holding States Accountable for the just Peace Process

Despite the concerns about political exploitation of North Korean human rights issues in South Korea, the North Korean human rights movement has made some progress internationally. As a member of the UN, North Korea is currently a signatory of the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as well as international human rights conventions such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD). Although North Korea rejected all accusations about its human rights records and refused to cooperate with the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (2013–2014), continuing international pressure has forced North Korea to participate in the UNHRC's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) from 2008 to 2011, and 2012 to 2015. The UPR is a UN peer review process by member states to make recommendations on improving human rights in their countries. Jonathan Chow says, "Since the UPR imposes

[91] Moon, 'South Korean Civil Society Organizations, Human Rights Norms, and North Korea', 84–86.

[92] Bo-hyuk Suh, 'Beyond Silence and Blaming: Revisiting South Korea's Role in North Korean Human Rights', *Asian Perspective* 37, no. 1 (2013): 81–95. Bo-hyuk Suh, peace academic/activist, interview with the author, Seoul, 4 August 2016.

identical requirements on all states, it has the potential to hold North Korea to account for its claims before the international community and identify areas where the international community can cooperate with North Korea to improve its human rights practices". Particularly the North Korean "willingness to accept some specific recommendations suggests opportunities for multilateral cooperation to nudge its human rights toward international standards".[93]

However, controversy about how to address North Korean human rights continued in the South Korean society, while human rights issues in South Korea were neglected under the South Korean government. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Chinsirhwahaerŭl wihan kwakŏsachŏngniwiwŏnhoe*, TRC) in South Korea, established in 2005, to investigate cases of state violence by the South Korean dictatorship, was closed down in 2010, with several cases unresolved. Civil Society groups created the 'Truth and Justice Forum' in 2008 and attempted to continue the work of the TRC with former staff from the TRC, despite the lack of the support from the government.[94] In the meantime, the need to prepare a truth-seeking process in case of the collapse of the North Korean regime or the unification of the Korean peninsula was highlighted within North Korean human rights advocacy groups. As a result, in 2013, the Commission for Transitional Justice in North Korea was established in Seoul.[95] Suh says the South Korean National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) also started to focus on the human rights issues in North Korea rather than its original mandate of protecting the human rights of South Korean citizens. The NHRCK supported anti-North Korea civil society groups and their work on sending propaganda leaflets and broadcasts towards North Korea. Progressive civil society groups criticised the NHRCK arguing that the NHRCK lost its status of independence from the government.[96]

[93] Jonathan T. Chow, 'North Korea's Participation in the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 2 (2017): 159.

[94] Mark Selden and Dong-choon Kim, 'South Korea's Embattled Truth and Reconciliation Commission', *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 8, no. 4 (2010): 1–6.

[95] 'Commission for Transitional Justice in North Korea', Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, accessed March 11, 2018, http://nkdb.org/en/activities/commission.php.

[96] Suh, *North Korean Human Rights: Crafting a More Effective Framework*, 65–68.

The polarisation of South Korean society persisted under the Park Geun-hye government (2013–2017). As the daughter of the former military dictator, Park Chung-hee, Park Guen-hye still appeared to believe that her father's military coup was not a coup, but an action to save the country from a potential North Korean attack. Therefore, for the progressive South Korean civil society, it was unimaginable to see her elected as the South Korean President in 2012. Park utilised the national security rhetoric and nostalgia for her father's rule among the conservative voters and won the election by a narrow margin of 1.2%. After the election, Park used the NSL to restrict freedom of expression in South Korea to the extent that Amnesty International issued the public statement, "South Korea: National Security Law continues to restrict freedom of expression" in 2015. The statement said, "South Korea broadened the application of the NSL to new categories and additional groups of individuals, such as politicians and even serving parliamentarians, and now foreign nationals."[97] Freedom House also indicated in its 2016 report that "The administration of President Park Geun-hye continued its efforts to suppress criticism of its policies, invoking the National Security Law and a criminal ban on defamation. The government also introduced a series of regulatory measures that could curtail freedom of the press or expression, such as stricter requirements for registering an online newspaper and a provision allowing third parties to request the removal of defamatory internet content."[98]

Meanwhile, the political use of North Korean human rights issues continued to increase, especially to discredit appeals by progressive civil society for South Korean human rights and for the resumption of the Korean peace process. A binary frame on the human rights was promulgated by the South Korean government: If one advocated for North Korean human rights, then one would be a conservative and supportive of the Park Guen-hye government; If one advocated for South Korean human rights, then one would be a progressive and critical of the Park Guen-hye government. The South Korean government went further to use the National Intelligence Service (NIS) so that anyone criticised

[97] Amnesty International, 'South Korea: National Security Law Continues to Restrict Freedom of Expression' (Amnesty International, January 20, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/212000/asa250012015en.pdf.

[98] 'South Korea', Freedom House, March 10, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/south-korea.

who Park Guen-hye could be portrayed as a North Korea sympathiser. Meanwhile, the tension on the Korean peninsula mounted and the government unilaterally closed down the Kaesong Industrial Complex in 2016.[99]

Observing the breakdown of the peace process, many South Korean civil society groups attempted to hold the governments in the Korean peninsula accountable for violating their inter-Korean agreements, such as the June 15 Joint Declaration in 2000, the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, and the October 4 Joint Declaration in 2007. Particularly, the South Korean Committee for Implementation of the June 15 Joint Declaration (*615 Kongdongsŏnŏnsilch'ŏn mamch'ŭgwiwŏnhoe*, the June 15 South Committee) continued to advocate for the need for the resumption of the Korean peace process. The June 15 South Committee was formed in 2005 by more than 100 civil society leaders from diverse civil society groups such as peace, human rights, religion, women, labour, and unification, to monitor the implementation of the June 15 Joint Declaration and to guarantee sustainability of the Korean peace process. During the Lee Myung-bak and Park Guen hye governments, the June 15 Committee demanded that the South Korean governments honour the South-North joint declaration and allow the resumption of the June 15 Declaration anniversary event, jointly celebrated with their North Korean counterparts, which had been suspended since 2009.[100]

In 2013, the NCCK began a signature campaign for a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula. The NCCK highlighted the fact that the concerned states in the Korean conflict had failed to carry out the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, which said, "The direct parties, in a separate and appropriate platform, will proceed with negotiations to establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula." The NCCK also urged the North and South Korean governments to implement the October 4 Joint Declaration in 2007, in which South and North Korea agreed to "cooperate to push through the issue of declaring a formal end to the war". By 2015, 13,000 people had

[99] Dave Hazzan, 'Is South Korea Regressing into a Dictatorship?' *Foreign Policy*, accessed March 11, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/14/is-south-korea-regressing-into-a-dictatorship-park-geun-hye/.

[100] 'The South Korean Committee for Implementation of the June 15 Joint Declaration', accessed March 11, 2018, http://www.i615.net/.

participated in the signature campaign in the Korean peninsula and throughout the world. On July 2015, the 62nd anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, the NCCK, together with YMCA and YWCA, delivered the signatures to the South Korean government.[101]

While highlighting the government's role in inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, some civil society organisations, such as the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (*Minjokhwahaehyŏmnyŏkpŏmgungminhyŏbŭihoe*, KCRC), tried to resolve division within the South Korean civil society about the government policy on North Korea. The KCRC was created in 1998, as a comprehensive consultation body between political sectors and civil society sectors on the issue of peace and unification of the Korean peninsula. The Kim Dae-jung government supported the formation of the KCRC, in order to assure the sustainability of the peace process. The KCRC was promoted as an organisation for both progressive and conservative groups in South Korea. More than 200 civil society organisations as well as major political parties from the left to the right in their political orientation joined the KCRC.[102] Since its foundation, the KCRC became a platform for politicians and civil society leaders to discuss peace and unification. At the height of the polarisation of South Korean society in how to deal with North Korea, the KCRC launched the Unification Consensus Forum (*T'ongil konggam* Forum) in May 2016, as an organisation focusing on "the South-South Dialogue". The forum initiated a series of dialogues among government ministers, politicians, academics, civil society activists from different political spectrums, to increase communication and understanding of the each other's position on unification, diplomacy, and the security policy of the government. The forum aimed to create a participatory process to hold the government accountable for creating and implementing a policy on the inter-Korean relations, based on the social consensus.[103]

[101] 'Global Campaign for a Peace Treaty', January 9, 2017, https://koreapeacetreatyncck.wordpress.com/about/.

[102] Cho, 'Outlooks on a Civil Society-Initiated Unification', 270.

[103] 'T'ongil Konggam Forum [Unification Consensus Forum]', Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, accessed March 11, 2018, https://www.kcrc.or.kr/08/01/.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown, as Lederach and Galtung put forward, justice in human relationships is essential for sustainable peacebuilding,[104] and "to be of any value in the fight against violence, it must be built within" a state, as well as between states.[105] Since the armistice, the political leadership has continued to utilise the division and conflict in the Korean peninsula to maintain their rule, at times using violence against their population. Atack says, "The nation-state may have succeeded in containing the all-out violence of the state of nature, but only at the expense of centralising the capacity for violence in the state, which can use it against its own citizens".[106] For this reason, peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula cannot be left to top-level political leaders at a negotiation table; the role of civil society is critical in building just peace not only between different conflict parties, but also between a state and its populations.

In reaction to the state violence, diverse South Korean civil society groups have promoted peace movements, even though there were differences in terms of which Korean state they were most concerned: South Korean state, North Korean state, or a unified Korean state. South Korean democratisation and the high-level Korean peace process in the 1990s and 2000s raised hopes in civil society for just peace. However, the Korean peace process broke down in 2010, without meeting expectations for social justice in Korean society.[107] The unilateral suspension of the peace process by the government shows the lack of independence of South Korean civil society and the justice gap in peacebuilding. Even though civil society groups argued that overcoming the division-system cannot be equated with the issue of unified national state-building, the governments subsumed the peace process into a unification process, which is basically state business. Furthermore, many civil society groups received funding from both the progressive and conservative governments, depending on the preferences of the respective governments.

[104] Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 182.

[105] Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding', in *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research II* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), 297–303.

[106] Atack, *Nonviolence in Political Theory*, 70.

[107] Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 182.

Although government support contributed to the expansion of civil society activities, the support affected the independence of those civil society groups and caused further division among them.[108]

As we have seen in this chapter, many South Korean civil society groups have continued to advocate for diverse issues to realise just peace in the Korean peninsula, despite the fluctuations of the Korean peace process. But, the current situation of the Korean conflict seems to require a more coordinated and strategic civil action, beyond the political spectrum of Korean society, in order to overcome the monopolisation of the peace process by the states, and reduce the justice gap in peacebuilding.

[108] Yi Kiho, Peace academic/activist, interview with the author, Dublin, 14 May 2016.

CHAPTER 7

Cooperating with People in Need: Strategic Overlaps for Peacebuilding

Devising and implementing an effective strategy for humanitarian and development cooperation in any country is a complicated job and even more challenging for a conflict-affected country. As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been growing recognition of the interconnections between aid cooperation and peacebuilding in countries affected by protracted conflict.[1] Both aid and peacebuilding organisations have been trying to increase conflict sensitivity in their activities, to improve coordination among different organisations in the diverse sectors, and to assess the dynamics between micro-level intervention and macro-level geopolitical impact. Andria Wisler sees the shifts toward simultaneous and integrative approaches as an opportunity to enhance strategic cross-sector cooperation.[2]

The ongoing discussion about strategic overlaps between aid cooperation and peacebuilding is applicable to the aid to North Korea provided by South Korean NGOs. Aid activities, both development and humanitarian cooperation, in North Korea cannot be detached from the context of the Korean conflict. When the humanitarian crisis in North Korea gained the attention of the international community in mid-1990s,

[1]Adam Barbolet et al., *The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity* (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005), 15.

[2]Andria Wisler, 'International Development and Peacebuilding', in *Integrated Peacebuilding: Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict*, ed. Craig Zelizer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 57–75.

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1_7

South Korean civil society reached out to North Korea, with a sense of responsibility to help their fellow Koreans, and with an expectation that this would be a step forward, toward peace and reunification for the two Koreas. However, the North Korean humanitarian situation is continuing and the Korean conflict has not been resolved. In fact, the Korean conflict has been one of the greatest obstacles for aid activities by South Korean NGOs. The nuclear aspirations of Pyongyang, in particular, have provoked negative emotional response from South Korean society.[3]

Since 1990s, South Korean NGOs' aid to North Korea has faced several impediments, amid the widening process-structure gap in Korean peacebuilding. John Paul Lederach says that there is a tendency to think of peace as a process up to the point of agreements, and then it becomes a structure, and this affects the durability of peacebuilding. This tendency is not only applicable to high-level actors, but also to civil society groups. Many civil society activities in the field often lack a connection to the broader peacebuilding processes, focusing only on their own objectives and functions within the agreed structure. When this happens, the life span of civil society activities becomes dependent on the structure, and when the agreed structure breaks down, these activities are also put on hold.[4] As the peace process collapsed in 2010, most South Korean civil society engagement projects with North Korea were suspended, leaving North Korea still one of the poorest countries in the World.

This chapter examines the challenges and opportunities for South Korean civil society in designing and implementing development strategies that contribute toward overcoming the process-structure gap in peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula. This chapter first outlines the background for the current humanitarian situation in North Korea, then analyses the process of humanitarian and development aid cooperation by South Korean NGOs within the context of the Korean conflict. Finally, the chapter goes on to explore the potential for South Korean civil society aid cooperation in North Korea aimed at sustainable peacebuilding in the Korean peninsula.

[3] Dong Jin Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', *The Pacific Review* 29, no. 4 (2016): 474.

[4] John Paul Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 35.

The Humanitarian Situation in North Korea

The 2017 Global Hunger Index (GHI) ranked North Korea 93rd out of 119 states, in the category of 'serious' hunger.[5] In the 2017 UN DPRK Country team report on needs and priorities, 41% of the entire population are undernourished, and 1 out of 5 North Koreans do not have access to clean water and adequate sanitation.[6] According to the North Korean Central Bureau of Statistics (*Chungangt'onggyekuk*, CBS) National Nutrition Survey in 2012, supported by the UNICEF, WFP and WHO in North Korea, chronic malnutrition of children under 5 years old is at 27.9% and acute malnutrition is at 4%. Furthermore, 23.3% of women of reproductive age are malnourished.[7] This is because of chronic food shortages for the past 20 years. Crop production in North Korea has been consistently lower than minimum requirement of 5.5 million tonnes to feed the population of approximately 24.5 million.[8] On top of that, the WFP report on Food and Nutrition Security in 2013 highlights nutrient-specific deficits, particularly protein deficits[9]; currently, 70% of the population, almost 18 million people, rely on the Public Distribution System (PDS) of cereal and potatoes, and do not have access to an adequately diverse diet. The North Korean government's PDS target is an average of 573 grams/person/day, but, according to the UN, the actual monthly average in 2016 was between 300 and 400 grams/person/day.[10]

[5] Klaus von Grebmer et al., *2017 Global Hunger Index: The Inequalities of Hunger* (Washington, DC, Bonn, and Dublin: International Food Policy Research Institute, Welthungerhilfe, and Concern Worldwide, 2017), 13–15, https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896292710.

[6] The UN Humanitarian Country Team, *2017 DPR Korea Needs and Priorities* (The UN Humanitarian Country Team in the DPRK, March 2017), 5.

[7] CBS et al., *Democratic People's Republic of Korea Final Report of the National Nutrition Survey 2012: September 17th to October 17th 2012* (Central Bureau of Statistics, March 2013), 7–9.

[8] Tae-jin Kwon, 'North Korea's Food Situation and Direction of Agricultural Cooperation with North Korea', in *Sustainable Development and Peace on the Korean Peninsula*, vol. 2 (2017 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Jeju, Fridrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2017), 152–53.

[9] WFP, *Food and Nutritional Security in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (WFP VAM Food Security Analysis, September 2013).

[10] The UN Humanitarian Country Team, *2017 DPR Korea Needs and Priorities*, 6.

The root causes of the humanitarian situation in North Korea differ according to researchers. However, many scholars agree that the humanitarian crisis occurred due to a combination of external factors, such as the collapse of the Soviet bloc and natural disasters in the 1990s, and internal factors, such as the failure of socio-economic policies and the concentration of resources on the military spending. Environmental conditions in North Korea are not favourable for food production. The landmass of North Korea is approximately 120,000 sq. km, or 55% of the Korean peninsula. But, most of the land is mountainous, with only 17% arable land. In addition, North Korea is subject to flooding each year because of heavy rains and typhoons, and the growing irregularity of precipitation caused droughts due to climate change.[11] However, Kim Byung-yeon argues the fundamental causes of the humanitarian situation in North Korea are "structural rather than natural".[12] In order to overcome the disadvantages of topography, the North Korean government initiated 'the Nature Remaking Policy' (*Chayŏn'gaechochŏngch'aek*), which expanded the amount of cultivated land. North Korean also promoted the Juche Farming Method (*Chuch'enongbŏp*), which was to increase productivity by high-density planting, double cropping, and the extensive use of chemical fertilisers. However, the Nature Remaking Policy led to deforestation and soil erosion, leading to increased damage from floods. The exhaustion of the land, as a result of the Juche Farming Method, accelerated soil depletion of farmable land, and the heavy use of chemical fertilisers caused acidification of the soil. As soil productivity dropped, people began to cultivate hillsides, which further accelerated the deforestation of the North Korean mountains and increased the number and severity of landslides during rainfall season.[13]

As we discussed in Chapter 3, until the 1960s, the North Korean economic situation was better than that of South Korea. However, since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s, North

[11] Jong Moo Lee et al., *The White Paper on Gyeonggi Province's Inter-Korean Exchanges & Cooperation 2001–2011* (Gyeonggi Province: GyeongGi-Do, 2012), 108–9.

[12] Byung-Yeon Kim, *Unveiling the North Korean Economy: Collapse and Transition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 48.

[13] Lee et al., *The White Paper on Gyeonggi Province's Inter-Korean Exchanges & Cooperation 2001–2011*, 99–109.

Korea lost their primary source of trade and outside resources and has endured a significant economic crisis.[14] Particularly, North Korea was no longer able to meet the demand for oil for its heavy industries and the production of electricity, for which they had depended upon the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia demanded hard currency for its oil exports to North Korea. As a result, Kim says "the capacity utilisation ratio of North Korean firms in the mid-1990s fell by approximately 50% in the late 1980s."[15] As well, massive natural disasters, including a series of floods in the mid-1990s, battered an already weakened economy, resulting in a sharp decline in food availability. According to Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, the 1995 flood alone caused "nearly two million tons of lost grain, the destruction of over 300,000 hectares of cropland, and the displacement of 5.4 million people."[16] The PDS broke down as a result of the food crisis, and ordinary people in North Korea were no longer able to rely on the government distribution of food but had to find other options. Hazel Smith says, "Hundreds of thousands of people were reduced to eating grass and tree bark, which staved off acute hunger pains, but which were useless for survival. Worse, eating such "alternative" foods caused both acute and chronic damage to digestive systems". Moreover, the floods damaged sewage systems as well as energy generation and distribution systems, which severely affected the water and sanitation of the country. Diarrheal diseases and respiratory illnesses were rampant, and an outbreak of cholera added to the number of deaths during the famine. Eventually, the national health system almost completely collapsed; North Koreans began to call the famine, 'the Arduous March' (*Konanŭi haenggun*).[17]

Haggard and Noland say that, although the estimates vary, approximately five percent of the population or as many as one million

[14] Scott C. Bradford, Dong-jin Kim, and Kerk L. Phillips, 'Potential Economic Reforms in North Korea: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model', *Journal of Economic Policy Reform* 14, no. 4 (2011): 321.

[15] Kim, *Unveiling the North Korean Economy*, 47.

[16] Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea* (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005), 34.

[17] Hazel Smith, *Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 66–71.

people were killed by the famine. They argue that the North Korean government could have reduced the death toll, if there had been 'plausible policy adjustments' for open access of aid workers to the hardest hit parts of the country, food availability, and a relocation of expenditures from military to the economy.[18] In 1995, as the humanitarian situation in North Korea continued to deteriorate, the North Korean government made an international appeal for assistance to meet the dire needs of its population. In response, the UN dispatched the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) to assess the situation, and begin humanitarian operations through UN agencies such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), the World Food Program (WFP) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) in North Korea.[19] There have been 11 consecutive UN Consolidated Appeals Processes (CAP) since 1995, and currently 6 UN agencies, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, and UNFPA are stationed in North Korea, addressing the ongoing humanitarian situation.[20] As well, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) established an office in Pyongyang to respond to recurrent natural disasters. Several European NGOs, such as Concern Worldwide, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam also set up offices in North Korea. Many North American NGOs began humanitarian missions although they did not have an office in North Korea. Some of these NGOs worked through the NGO-funded Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU) in the WFP North Korean office. Soon, however, a number of international agencies began to raise concerns about operating conditions in North Korea. The major concerns were direct access to the beneficiaries and the monitoring of aid distribution. Consequently, some international agencies, such as Oxfam and MSF, withdrew from North Korea, but Smith says most agencies stayed in North Korea and attempted to improve conditions for their operations by engaging with North Korean government.[21]

[18] Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea*, 9–11.

[19] UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 'DHA-GENEVA 95/0261 DPR Korea—Floods Situation Report No.3', ReliefWeb, 31 August 1995, https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/dpr-korea-floods-situation-report-no3.

[20] 'United Nations in DPR Korea', accessed 14 February 2018, http://kp.one.un.org/.

[21] Hazel Smith, *USIP Special Report: Overcoming Humanitarian Dilemmas in the DPRK (North Korea)* (United States Institute of Peace, July 2002), 1–15.

As the relationship between the international agencies working in North Korea and the North Korean government developed over the years, there was some improvement in the North Korean adoption of the humanitarian principles of international agencies. Particularly, North Korea began to allow more field visits and monitoring missions by the aid agencies.[22] Hong Yang-ho says, "the North Korean government has begun to realize the practical necessity of procuring outside aid and has gained a better understanding of international organizations and NGO activities."[23] The North Korean government also attempted to reform its socio-economic policy, through 'agricultural revolution' and the July 1 Measures in 2002. The reforms included an increase of investment in agriculture, price reform, legalising certain commercial activities, providing more autonomy to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the establishment of a special economic zone. But, Balazs Szalontai and Choi Changyong say that these measures were "essentially a belated official recognition of the small-scale commercial activities which had been widely practised by ordinary citizens since the famine."[24] North Korean government continued to maintain authoritarian rule based on the Military-First Policy. While providing humanitarian aid, the international community has also been strengthening sanctions against North Korea, because of human rights violations by the North Korean dictatorship and the pursuit of military technology, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Continuous international sanctions have become a significant obstacle to the growth on the North Korean economy.[25]

Meanwhile, South Korea, along with the international society, has been providing humanitarian and development aid to North Korea since the late 1990s. Unlike the international agencies, the South Korean civil

[22] Erich Weingartner, 'NGO Cooperation and Coordination: The Example of FALU', in *Response to the Food Shortage in the DPRK and International Cooperation for Economic Development* (2011 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2011), 117–18.

[23] Yang-ho Hong, 'Humanitarian Aid Toward North Korea: A Global Peace-Building Process', *East Asian Review* 13, no. 4 (2001): 25.

[24] Balazs Szalontai and Changyong Choi, 'The Prospects of Economic Reform in North Korea: Comparisons with China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia', *Europe-Asia Studies* 64, no. 2 (2012): 231.

[25] Kim Bradford and Phillips, 'Potential Economic Reforms in North Korea', 321; Kim, *Unveiling the North Korean Economy*, 145.

society saw aid to North Korea as a way to build peace on the Korean peninsula. Edward Reed says, "While delivering needed assistance to people in the North is the first-order objective of South Korean NGOs, closely related is the objective of contributing to reconciliation between South and North."[26] However, aid to North Korea also caused significant controversy in South Korea, because it could be interpreted as assisting the enemy.

South Korean NGOs' Aid to North Korea in the Context of the Korean Conflict

As described in the 1991 Basic Agreement, North and South Korea are not only in conflict with each other but are also in a special relationship "constituted temporarily in the process of unification".[27] In this regard, South Korean aid to North Korea has carried undeniable political connotations from the beginning, more than international aid to any other fragile state. From the perspective of South Koreans, the humanitarian crisis in North Korea meant the suffering of the enemy, who are at the same time, their brothers and sisters.[28]

As North Korea went through the 'Arduous March', tensions over nuclear issues continued to grow between North Korea and the US. These tensions resulted in the worsening of the inter-Korean relationship. The circumstances surrounding the unexpected death of North Korean President Kim Il-sung in July 1994, a few weeks before his planned summit with South Korean President Kim Young-sam, also increased mutual suspicion.[29] According to Sung Ki-young, the Kim Young-sam government attempted to use humanitarian aid as leverage

[26] Edward P. Reed, 'From Charity to Partnership: South Korean NGO Engagement with North Korea', in *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, ed. Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang (New York: State University of New York Press, 2010), 211.

[27] UN Peacemaker, 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea', 13 December 1991, https://peacemaker.un.org/korea-reconciliation-nonaggression91.

[28] Seung-Mi Han, 'Nationalism and beyond: Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea (DPRK) and the Case of the Korean Sharing Movement', *Korean Social Science Journal* 35, no. 2 (2008): 80–81.

[29] Adam de Bear, 'From Sunshine to Storm Clouds: An Examination of South Korea's Policy on North Korea', *Michigan State International Law Review* 23, no. 3 (2015): 851.

to resolve the issues in the Korean conflict, such as North Korean nuclear programme. For example, the South Korean government argued that there will be no South Korean aid to North Korea unless North Korea agreed to the four-party talks, proposed by the US and South Korea, to discuss the nuclear issue. As well, the South Korean government tried to project an image of '*Hyŏngnim*' (big brothership) in the North Korean humanitarian situation. Sung says that from Kim Young Sam's point of view, "South Korea was regarded as a generous carer of the deprived brother", and North Korea "was a country which desperately needed '*Hyŏngnim*'s' benevolent caring."[30] However, these goals of the Kim Young-sam government were not realised because of the fluctuation of the South Korean position between the use of aid as political leverage and the image of *Hyŏngnim*. In the early periods of North Korean humanitarian crisis, the South Korean government maintained its position of using aid as leverage in nuclear negotiations with North Korea, but then abruptly reversed its policy and provided North Korea with emergency food aid in 1995. But, the policy was once again changed, because of the controversies caused in the process of shipping aid to North Korea. For example, the South Korean vessel was forced to fly the North Korean flag in order to enter North Korean controlled waters. Some crewmembers of a South Korean ship were accused of espionage and detained by North Korean authorities. Following these incidents, the Kim Yong-sam administration suspended not only the aid by the government, but also aid by civil society and argued that North Korea had overstated the humanitarian crisis.[31] However, by 1997, when it became clear that the North Koreans were not exaggerating their humanitarian situation, the South Korean government approved aid by the civil society to North Korea. But, the decision of the government appeared to be based on the political use of aid, rather than humanitarianism.[32] Washington Post reported that the South Korean government's

[30] Ki-Young Sung, 'Success and Failure in Dealing with North Korea: Has Issue-Linkage Worked?', in *BISA 35th Annual Conference* (British International Studies Association, Leicester: University of Leicester, 2009), 2–3.

[31] Brendan Howe and Dong Jin Kim, 'The Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance: Aid and Security on the Korean Peninsula', in *The South Korean Development Experience: Beyond Aid*, ed. Eun Mee Kim and Pil Ho Kim (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 144–46.

[32] Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 481.

decision was "a move apparently designed to coax the North into joining peace talks." South Korean civil society organisations still welcomed the decision of the government as a humanitarian gesture to North Korea.[33]

Before lifting the ban on some food aid by South Korean NGOs, the Kim Yong-sam government placed restrictions on all private aid to North Korea in the name of national security. In 1995, the Pan-Religious Order Promotion Committees to Help North Korean Flood Victims (*Pŏmjonggyopukhansuhaemindopkich'uchinwiwŏnhoe*) was formed by six major South Korean religious groups in an attempt to provide aid to North Korea. But, in the same year, the government introduced 'a policy to unify private aid to North Korea through the Red Cross channel' (*Taepukchiwŏn chŏksipchasa ch'anggu tanirhwa pangch'im*), to control any humanitarian assistance by South Korean civil society to North Korea under the banner of the Korean Red Cross. No South Korean NGOs were allowed to make direct contact with North Koreans. Even fundraising activities by the NGOs were tightly regulated. On top of that, conservative anti-communist groups, who were worried about North Korean abuse of aid for military purposes, strongly opposed civil humanitarian action for North Korea. They argued that "food sent to the North would return as bullets targeting" the South. As a response, several South Korean civil society groups started a nation-wide campaign to change "the public image of North Koreans from the enemy to devastated brothers and sisters."[34]

Many South Korean civil society leaders continued to raise relief funds, and found humanitarian NGOs to assist North Koreans, despite the government regulations. Reed says that the unprecedented access by the international NGOs to North Korea, and the detailed information about the humanitarian conditions of North Koreans, especially "heart-wrenching images of starving children", made great impact on South Korean civil society and NGOs.[35] South Korean civil society leaders maintained that providing aid to their fellow Koreans was not only

[33] Kevin Sullivan, 'South Korea Lifts Ban on Rice to the North', *Washington Post*, 1 April 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/04/01/south-korea-lifts-ban-on-rice-to-the-north/1d35a2e0-c3f1-4f72-8f82-2ac7899e7bf1/.

[34] Howe and Kim, 'The Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance: Aid and Security on the Korean Peninsula', 158–59.

[35] Reed, 'From Charity to Partnership: South Korean NGO Engagement with North Korea', 201.

the responsibility of South Korean citizens, but also it would be a step toward reconciliation between the two Koreas. Religious groups led the public sphere discussions of the link between humanitarian aid and peace. They organised a peace conference in 1996 and founded the Korean Sharing Movement (*Uriminjoksŏrotopkiundong*, KSM), with other secular civil society leaders. In this sense, the KSM was set up as both a humanitarian NGO and a peace NGO. Chung Oknim says that "KSM stressed the importance of efforts to seek peace" and organised campaigns that included discussions and debates about transforming the policy environment as well as public opinion for humanitarian aid to North Korea. For example, the KSM organised an international congress on the food crisis in North Korea, with the Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation (EBCF) and the WCC, in March 1997, and, in April 1997, hosted a fundraising dinner for 700 representatives from political parties, companies, religious organisations, and civil society groups. The participants issued an appeal to the public join in humanitarian action for people in need in North Korea and for Korean reconciliation.[36]

In 1996, another South Korean NGO, Okedongmu Children in Korea (*Ŏriniŏkkaetongmu*, OKCK), which highlights the link between aid and peace in the Korean peninsula, was founded. The OKCK concentrates on providing nutritional, medical, and educational support to vulnerable North Korean children, but, also provides diverse peace education activities in South Korean and promotes the need for South and North Korean children to meet and learn about each other. The meaning of Okedongmu is "the friendship gesture of wrapping their arms around another's shoulders". Concerning the stunting due to the high percentage of malnutrition in North Korean children, the OKCK vision statement says, "We hope that both South and North Korean children can grow to be the same height" in the friendship of Okedongmu. The statement also contends that "OKCK strives to build a bridge of peace among South and North Korean and East Asian Children, enabling peaceful meetings where children learn to have an open mind and better understand of another". While sending and advocating humanitarian aid to North Korea through 'the Rice to North Korean Children' (*Pungnyŏk ŏrinieke ssarŭl*) campaign, the OKCK launched 'Hello? Friend' (*Annyŏng? Ch'in'guya*)

[36]Oknim Chung, 'The Role of South Korea's NGOs: The Political Context', in *Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea*, ed. L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 82–85.

campaign, where North and South Korean children exchanged letters with self-portraits, introducing themselves to each other.[37] Despite regulations from both South and North Korean governments, the OKCK continued to exchange the children's letters until 2003. In 2004, the OKCK finally realised a visit of 11 South Korean children to North Korea. According to former secretary general, Hwang Yoon Ok, they were able to meet "North Korean children, danced and sang with them, and practiced activities relating to the peaceful coexistence of North and South Korean children."[38]

In the meantime, there were South Korean civil society efforts to utilise overseas channels, in order to work around governmental restrictions. They used international organisations, such as the WCC, the EBCF, or UN agencies, as intermediaries to deliver South Korean aid to North Korea.[39] In the case of World Vision Korea, who already had an extensive international network, international cooperation was helpful in initiating and developing humanitarian work in North Korea, overcoming the difficulties in the context of the Korean conflict. World Vision was founded in 1950 by an American, Bob Pierce, to support vulnerable children in Korea during the Korean war and grew to become an international humanitarian and development NGO. World Vision was able to provide food, medicines and clothing to North Korean children and families immediately following the international appeal by the North Korean government in the mid-1990s.[40] The international network enabled the World Vision to make an agreement with the North Korean Committee for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation (*Taeoekyŏngjehyŏmnyŏkchŭngjinwiwŏnhoe*, KCPEEC) for their aid cooperation, while other South Korean NGOs were still under the restrictions of the South Korean government policy to unify private aid

[37] Okedongmu Children in Korea, *Okedongmu Children in Korea 2009 Annual Report* (Okedongmu Children in Korea, 2009), 3–7.

[38] Yoon Ok Hwang, 'Korean NGO: Okedongmu Children in Korea', in *Current Humanitarian Situation and International Cooperation* (2009 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2009), 78.

[39] Howe and Kim, 'The Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance: Aid and Security on the Korean Peninsula', 159.

[40] 'North Korea,' World Vision International, 23 August 2012, http://www.wvi.org/north-korea.

to North Korea through the Red Cross.[41] With international access to North Korea and relationship building with North Korean counterparts, World Vision expanded aid activities from short-term humanitarian relief to longer-term development projects within three years. According a World Vision report in 1998, World Vision provided support to "over 3000 farm families on four cooperative farms, including fertilizer, crop protection chemicals, tractor tires, plastic sheeting for green houses, and winter clothing"; conducted "agricultural research projects in the areas of oilseed development to produce more edible oil and hydroponics to grow vegetables using less land"; and supplied "machines and flour to six sites for production of noodles for feeding approximately 60,000 children a day."[42]

The working environment of South Korean NGOs in providing aid to North Korea improved considerably once the South Korean Kim Dae-jung government adopted the 'Sunshine Policy' in 1998.[43] First, the new South Korean government allowed NGOs to raise funds through 'The Measure to Revitalise Private Aid to North Korea' (*Taepungmin'ganjiwŏn hwalsŏnghwa choch'i*) in March 1998. Within a month of the announcement of the new government policy, more than a hundred South Korean civil society organisations organised 'The International Day of Fasting for People in North Korea' (*Kukche kŭmsikŭi nal*) on 25 April 1998. Several South Korean broadcast networks and newspapers sponsored the event. High-profile figures such as Pope John Paul II, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and former US President Jimmy Carter, agreed to fast on the day of the event. Second, the government announced a plan to diversify aid negotiations and delivery channels with North Korea in February 1999. It meant that South Korean NGOs could directly contact and work with their North Korean counterparts without going through the Red Cross. In response, the North Korean government "opened channels of contact with South Korean NGOs", such as the Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee (*Chosŏnasiat'aep'yŏngyangp'yŏnghwawiwŏnhoe*, KAPPC),

[41] 'World Vision Korea,' accessed 30 January 2018, http://www.worldvision.or.kr/eng/serviceIntroduction/DPRK/HumanitarianEmergencyAffairs.asp.

[42] World Vision, 'World Vision Will Continue Its Aid Program in North Korea', ReliefWeb, 13 October 1998, https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/world-vision-will-continue-its-aid-program-north-korea.

[43] See Chapter 4.

the National Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (*Minjokhwahaehyŏbŭihoe*, NCRC), and the National Economic Cooperation Federation (*Minjokkyŏngjehyŏmnyŏgyŏnhaphoe*, NECF)."[44] According to the Korean NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea *Taepukchiwŏnmin'gandanch'ehyŏbŭihoe*, KNCCK), forty-nine South Korean NGO workers visited North Korea to meet with their counterparts and to deliver aid in 1999.[45] Finally, in 2000, the government began to fund aid operations of South Korean NGOs in North Korea through the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (*Nambukkyoryuhyŏmnyŏkkikŭm*). South Korean NGOs were encouraged to apply for matching funding from the government. Reed says 7 NGOs received a total of approximately $3 million in government grants in 2000. By 2006, the number had grown to 33 NGOs, receiving around $10 million from the government.[46]

The Expanded Role and Relationship Building of South Korean NGOs in North Korea

As aid activities by South Korean NGOs in North Korea increased, many civil society leaders began to highlight the need to share information. In April 1999, several NGOs, including KSM and World Vision, facilitated regular gatherings for NGOs providing aid to North Korea. In February 2001, they launched the KNCCK, as the official coordination body for South Korean NGOs providing aid to North Korea. The KNCCK say they had three purposes for establishment: to promote information exchange among South Korean NGOs about humanitarian aid to North Korea; to cooperate with the South Korean government for the development of aid projects in North Korea; and to improve

[44] Howe and Kim, 'The Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance: Aid and Security on the Korean Peninsula', 160; Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea and The Civilian-Government Council, *Taepukchiwŏn10nyŏnbaeksŏ* [White Paper on Aid to North Korea for the Past 10 Years] (Seoul: KNCCK and the Civilian-Government Council, 2005), 54–56.

[45] Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea and The Civilian-Government Council, *Taepukchiwŏn10nyŏnbaeksŏ* [White Paper on Aid to North Korea for the Past 10 Years], 66.

[46] Reed, 'From Charity to Partnership: South Korean NGO Engagement with North Korea', 205.

international cooperation.[47] While trying to improve coordination and cooperation with each other, South Korean NGOs also attempted to engage with the government to enhance the cooperation between civil society and the government in addressing the North Korean humanitarian situation. For example, they continued to ask the government to include civil society representatives in the South Korean Governmental Council for the Promotion of Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation (*Nambukkyoryuhyŏmnyŏkch'uchinwiwŏnhoe*). Additionally, they argued for the need to establish a consultation body between South Korean NGOs and the government. As a result, in September 2004, the South Korean government founded the Council for the Civilian-Government Joint Policy Discussion for the Aid to North Korea (*Taepukchiwŏnmin'gwanjŏngch'aekhyŏbŭihoe*, the Civilian-Government Council). This council consisted of representatives from the KNCCK, and the officials from various government ministries, such as Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The Civilian-Government Council was co-chaired by the president of the KNCCK and the Vice-Minister of Unification.[48]

The new government of Rho Moo-hyun (2003–2008) maintained that the new North Korea policy would be more reciprocal than that of the previous Kim Dae-jung government, responding to the increasing criticism of aid to North Korea by conservative South Korean groups. The heightened tension between the US and North Korea over the nuclear issue also affected South Korean policy toward North Korea.[49] Moon Kyungyon says that the Rho government attempted to use government to government aid as political leverage and as a means to punish bad behaviour. The Rho government did, however, continue to approve private aid to North Korea, and the number of the South Korean NGOs with the North Korean bilateral channels grew from 25 in 2002 to 77 in 2007.[50]

[47] 'Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea', accessed 31 January 2018, http://www.kncck.or.kr/eng/index.html.

[48] Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea and The Civilian-Government Council, *Taepukchiwŏn10nyŏnbaeksŏ* [White Paper on Aid to North Korea for the Past 10 Years], 225.

[49] Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 481.

[50] Kyungyon Moon, 'The Role of Humanitarian NGOs: Impact on South Korean Food Aid Policy towards North Korea from 1995–2007' (Cranfield University, 2011), 386; Howe and Kim, 'The Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance: Aid and Security on the Korean Peninsula', 161.

During this time, many South Korean NGOs, reflecting upon the humanitarian aid over the previous 10 years, argued that more attention should be brought to long-term goals of sustainable growth. As well, the North Korean government expressed a preference for receiving development aid rather than humanitarian relief. Consequently, the UN agencies closed down CAP, and several other international NGOs also discontinued their humanitarian operations and had withdrawn from North Korea by 2005. The remaining resident UN agencies and NGOs were agencies who were already running development projects or starting the new projects. During this time, more and more South Korean NGOs initiated development aid projects in North Korea.[51] The examples of aid activities by South Korean NGOs in different sectors of North Korea can be found in Table 7.1.

As we have discussed above, World Vision was the one of the earliest NGOs to initiate development assistance projects in North Korea. In 1997, North Korean officials working in agricultural sectors requested assistance from World Vision in addressing issues of low food production. World Vision began agricultural development projects on cooperative farms in South Pyongan Province in 1998 and expanded their projects to include South Hamgyong Province by early 2000s. The signature project of the World Vision agricultural development assistance in North Korea has been the potato production project. With the technical and material support of World Vision, North Korean potato production saw significant growth, especially in the production of a non-virus pre-basic seed potato which accomplished nearly double its target by 2005. In addition to assistance to the cooperative farms and potato production, World Vision built polytunnels and provided training and resources for production of fruit and vegetables.[52] World Vision has also conducted several capacity development projects. It promoted the exchange of technical knowledge and research of agriculture between the two Koreas and held a Joint Agricultural Science Symposium for North and South Korean agricultural scientists in Beijing in 2001, the

[51] Howe and Kim, 'The Politicization of Humanitarian Assistance: Aid and Security on the Korean Peninsula', 162–63.

[52] Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea and The Civilian-Government Council, *Taepukchiwŏn10nyŏnbaeksŏ* [White Paper on Aid to North Korea for the Past 10 Years], 110–11.

Table 7.1 The examples of South Korean NGOs' aid activities in North Korea[a]

Category	*Activities*	*Locations*
Food security and Emergency relief	Flood and disaster recovery aid Emergency food aid Emergency medical support Nutritional aid for children Building soymilk, bread, noodle factory	North Hwanghae Province North Pyongan Province North Hamgyong Province Ryanggang Province Pyongyang, Nampo, Kaesong, the whole regions
Health and medical	Malaria Control Project Medicine Provision Hospital Rehabilitation Construction and Operation of Children's Hospitals Dental Care Project Pharmaceutical Production Water and Sanitation	South Pyongan Province, Pyongyang, Nampo, Kaesong, the whole regions
Agricultural and livestock, environment	Integrated agro-livestock collective farm with sustainable self-supporting system Integrated community based development project Livestock farming support Increase crop productivity through the support of rice and vegetable farming commodities and the provision of agricultural machinery Supplying fertilizer Support plastics for rice seedbeds Building milling factory Develop, produce and distribute quality virus-free seed potatoes Trees and forestry rehabilitation	North Hamgyong Province, Ryanggang Province, Pyongyang, Nampo, Kaesong, South Pyongan Province, the whole regions
Capacity building	Training program on medical techniques Agricultural training programs Building greenhouses to increase household incomes Fruit and vegetable research project Building a local agricultural machinery repair center and run training programs	North Hwanghae Province, Pyongyang

[a]The Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, 'Overview of Member Organisations', The Korea NGO Council for Cooperationa with North Korea, accessed 4 May 2018, http://www.kncck.or.kr/eng/sub_0201.html; Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 483–84

first time since the division of the Korean peninsula. Despite the fluctuations in the peace process, the symposium was organised every year until 2015. Overall, 274 scientists from South Korea and 154 scientists from North Korea participated, many of whom were regulars.[53] Noticeably, the interactions between South Korea and North Korea through development projects by South Korean NGOs built personal relationships between North and South Koreans. For example, a senior staff of World Vision says that both South and North Korean scientists who met at the first symposium would engage only in the scientific and technical discussions in the early periods, but after attending a few more symposiums, they were beginning to chat about each other's families and became very friendly with each other.[54]

Inter-personal relationship building was greatly expanded when South Korean local governments took a considerable role in the transition of aid projects from humanitarian relief to development cooperation in North Korea, by mobilising substantial financial and human resources. The collaboration between the local governments and NGOs enabled the partipation of South Korean experts from various disciplines, including agriculture, medical care and architecture in aid projects in North Korea.[55] The KSM partnership with Gyeonggi Province is considered to be an exemplary case. In the mid-2000s, KSM and Gyeonggi Province initiated an Integrated Community Based Development Project (ICBDP) in North Korea, which was a comprehensive development project on the Danggok-ri cooperative farm in North Korea. This ICBDP project included rice, fruit, and vegetable farming support, setting up and assisting with the operation of a local agricultural machinery repair centre, a water and sanitation project, the

[53] Jusung Lee, 'North Korea Capacity Development Program: South Korean NGOs' Experiences and Way Forward', in *Sustainable Development and Peace on the Korean Peninsula* (2017 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Jeju, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2017), 153.

[54] A senior staff of World Vision, Interview with the author, Seoul, 29 August 2017.

[55] Jong Moo Lee, 'The History of South Korean Aid to DPRK and Its Transition to Development Assistance: Aid to DPRK in the Context of the Inter-Korean Relationship', in *Current Humanitarian Situation and International Cooperation* (2009 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2009), 131–32.

construction and renovation of houses, kindergartens, day care centres, elementary schools, community centres, a factory to produce soy milk for infants and children, and widening and paving farm roads. North Korea agreed to the ICBDP project after seeing the success of a joint rice cultivation project by KSM, Gyeonggi Province and the North Korean Academy of Agricultural Sciences (*Nongŏpkwahagwŏn*) in North Korea in 2005. Several South Korean experts from the Agricultural Research and Extension Services of Gyeonggi Province (*Kyŏnggito nongŏpkisurwŏn*, GARES) had worked with North Korean experts for that rice project and the ICBDP project and conducted diverse capacity development training.[56] A South Korean agriculture scientist from GARES attests that despite the differences in terminology between North and South Korea in vegetable farming, North Korean farmers were enthusiastic about learning from him. A high-level Gyeonggi Province official also recounts that Danggok-ri villagers were eager to cooperate with people from KSM and Gyeonggi Province, and he was touched by the villagers' sincerity and passion.[57]

The OKCK also continued to increase contacts and build relationships between people in North and South Korea, including children, by initiating development projects in nutrition, health and education. Beginning in 2001, the OKCK conducted numerous development projects for North Korean Children, such as building and supporting soymilk factories, stationary factories, and hospitals. They worked with several medical schools from South Korean universities, including the Seoul National University, in order to deliver technical and material assistance to medical sectors in North Korea. Since 2004, OKCK has provided technical training and built clinics and hospitals, such as the Pyongyang Okedongmu Children's Clinic, Jangkyo-ri People's Clinic, and Pyongyang Okedongmu Paediatric Ward in Pyongyang Medical College Hospital. In addition, OKCK organised workshops, where South Korean and North Korean medical

[56]Yonghwan Choi, 'Tasks for the Transformation of Development Cooperation between the Two Koreas at the Local Government Level: Focusing on the Experience of Gyeonggi-Do', in *70 Years of Division and 20 Years of Aid to North Korea* (2015 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2015), 424–26.

[57]Lee et al., *The White Paper on Gyeonggi Province's Inter-Korean Exchanges & Cooperation 2001–2011*, 118–22.

experts could meet and exchange knowledge. For example, seven medical staff from Seoul National University Hospital and National Cancer Center met with nine colleagues from the Paediatric Hospital in Pyongyang Medical College Hospital in an OKCK organised workshop in China in 2009. All these development projects multiplied the number of interactions between North and South Korea at the non-governmental level. But what was most noticeable was that OKCK development projects increased opportunities for meetings between North Korean and South Korean children. At many opportunities for donor visits, such as opening ceremonies for the factories and hospital, the OKCK would invite South Korean children to join them at these events and organise visits with children at North Korean educational institutions.[58] OKCK Chief Director, Lee Gi-beom says that the OKCK's humanitarian and development aid to North Korea has been not only for reducing the unnecessary suffering of North Koreans, but also "the practice of peace education". According to Lee, linking aid projects with peace education was an effort to bring an awareness that people in North and South Korea could care about each other and build a peace community together.[59]

By mid-2000, more and more South Korean NGOs recognised the potential of aid to North Korea as a way to build peace on the Korean peninsula. For example, Corea Peace 3000 (*P'yŏnghwasamch'ŏn*, Peace 3000) made the link between aid and peace explicit in its mandate. Peace 3000 was founded in 2003 by civil society leaders, particularly Catholic priests, most of whom were active members of the National Catholic Priests' Corps for the Realisation of Justice (*Chŏngŭikuhyŏnsachetan*, NCPCRJ). Peace 3000 initiated several humanitarian and development projects including natural disaster relief, building and supporting soymilk and tofu factories, and farming assistance. In addition, Peace 3000 provided technical and material support to modernise athletic facilities, such as soccer parks.[60] Chang-il Park, Chair of the Executive Committee of Peace 3000, who took a key role of bringing an awareness of the North

[58] Hwang, 'Korean NGO: Okedongmu Children in Korea', 73–78; Okedongmu Children in Korea, *Okedongmu Children in Korea 2009 Annual Report*, 7–13.

[59] Gi-Beom Lee, *Peace Education and Relational Ethics in the Context of Divided Korea* (Educating for Peace in Northern Ireland and Korea, Dublin: Okedongmu Children in Korea, The Irish School of Ecumenics Trinity College Dublin, 2017), 4–5.

[60] 'Corea Peace 3000', accessed 4 February 2018, http://peace3000.net/?page_id=3589.

Korean humanitarian situation in the mid-1990s, and has been involved in various humanitarian aid projects in North Korea, explains the inevitable link between aid and peace on the Korean peninsula:

> I believe it is not just me, but also many other aid workers must have experienced the same. If we help people who are in need, without hurting their self-esteem, they get to feel that we all share humanity and care about each other. I witnessed their hearts changing. They were very kind to us and expressed such gratitude. What is peace or even unification anyway? If we could reduce hatred against each other, that is peace. The purpose of humanitarian aid is to help people live like human beings in peace.[61]

The Secretary General of OKCK, Choi Hae-kyung says that South Korean NGOs' aid to North Korea was a 'learning process' for both North and South Koreans. The relationship building during this process "relieved some of the hostility North Koreans hold against South Korea and led North Korean residents to express thanks for the assistance". At the same time, South Koreans began to understand the position of North Koreans and became more interested in building a peaceful relationship with North Korea. Choi says that "South Korean NGOs encouraged South Koreans to visit North Korea and also come into contact with North Korean people."[62] For this reason, the Secretary General of KSM, Kang Young-sik says, many South Korean NGOs "take pride in having played an important role not only in solving the humanitarian problems of North Korea by providing aid, but also in having contributed to building peaceful relations between the two Koreas."[63]

[61] Chang-il Park, Chair of the Executive Committee of Peace 3000, interview with the author, Seoul, 5 August 2016.

[62] Hae-Kyung Choi, 'Evaluation of South Korean NGOs' 20 Years of Assistance to North Korea and Future Tasks', in *70 Years of Division and 20 Years of Aid to North Korea* (2015 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2015), 240.

[63] Youngsik Kang, 'Providing Aid to North Korea and Peace in the Korean Peninsula', in *70 Years of Division and 20 Years of Aid to North Korea* (2015 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2015), 321.

The Suspension of Aid and South-South Conflict

However, the fluctuation of the political peace process continued to be an obstacle for South Korean aid activities in North Korea. Despite the humanitarian situation, the North Korean government has spent vast amounts of financial and industrial resources to strengthen its nuclear capability, in the name of protecting its people from the combined threat of the US and South Korea. According to Hamm Taik-young, "due to the economic crisis and the weakening of ties with its allies, the North has concentrated on the more economical 'strategic weapons', i.e. both conventional and non-conventional deterrents".[64] In the late 2000s, the increased tension surrounding North Korean nuclear development negatively affected South Korean aid to North Korea, not only from the government, but also from South Korean NGOs. After inauguration, the Lee Myung-bak government (2.2008–2.2013) introduced his 'Vision 3000' policy, which was an attempt to implant the South Korean style of liberal institutions in North Korea. The Lee government stated that if North Korea would implement a complete and verifiable dismantling of its nuclear weapons program and introduce a market-oriented, open economic system, South Korea would assist North Korea in improving its economy, education, finance and welfare systems. The South Korean government claimed that the introduction of liberal institutions would result in a per capita GDP of up to US $3000 in North Korea within 10 years.[65] However, North Korea dismissed the South Korean Vision 3000 policy and the Six Party Talks collapsed in 2009. The South Korean government put limits on private visits to North Korea and cut off the financial support to South Korean NGOs' aid cooperation in North Korea.[66] The worsened relationship between North and South Korea deteriorated even further following the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, on 26 March 2010. The South Korea government

[64] Taik-Young Hamm, *Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power* (London: Routledge, 1999), 89.

[65] Jae Jean Suh, *The Lee Myung-Bak Government's North Korea Policy—A Study on Its Historical and Theoretical Foundation* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009), 3–6.

[66] Hyeong-jung Park, 'South Korea's Official Aid Policy to North Korea: Objectives, Types, and Political Debates', in *Modernization and Opening-Up of North Korean Economy: Roles and Efforts of Neighboring Countries* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009), 119–23.

Table 7.2 The amount of South Korean aid to North Korea (in 100 Million Won)[a]

President	*Actor*	*1st Year*	*2nd Year*	*3rd Year*	*4th Year*	*5th Year*
Kim Young-sam	State	–	–	1854	24	240
(2.1993–2.1998)	NGO	–	–	2	12	182
Kim Dae-jung	State	154	339	978	975	1140
(2.1998–2.2003)	NGO	275	223	387	782	576
Rho Moo-hyun	State	1097	1313	1360	2273	1983
(2.2003–2.2008)	NGO	766	1558	779	709	909
Lee Myung Bak	State	438	294	204	65	23
(2.2008–2.2013)	NGO	725	377	200	131	118
Park Guen-hye	State	133	141	140	1	–
(2.2013–3.2017)	NGO	51	54	114	28	11

[a]The Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, '2018 Nyŏndo Chŏnggich'onghoe [2018 Annual General Assembly]' (The Korean NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, 17 January 2018), 30

accused North Korea of attacking the ship and killing 46 lives on board. On 24 May 2010, South Korea announced the 'May 24 Measures', which suspended all inter-Korean cooperation, with the exception of the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Park. Since then, only a small number of South Korean NGO aid projects for flood relief, and infants and children have been occasionally approved by the South Korean government. These South Korean sanctions continued for the duration of the Lee Myung-bak and the Park Guen-hye presidencies (Table 7.2).[67]

Eleanor O'Gorman says that there are different approaches which donors and aid agencies tend to adopt in relation to the conflict sensitivity of their work. First, some aid organisations would work around the conflict, in an effort to prevent a negative impact. They emphasise the political neutrality of their humanitarian work and try to avoid any involvement in the conflict by suspending potentially disputable aid projects. Second, some organisations attempt to find a way to work in the conflict by increasing their understanding about the context of the conflict, and by reflecting that understanding in their aid activities, rather than suspending the activities. Third, there are aid agencies, who try to work with conflict more directly by linking development with

[67]Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 484.

peacebuilding. From their perspective, aid projects can have a positive impact not only on issues of humanitarian and economic crisis, but also on the causes and dynamics of a conflict.[68] All three approaches have been observed in the Korean peninsula.

As a response to regulations by the Lee government, in order to sustain their aid projects, many South Korean NGOs attempted to delink aid from the context of the Korean conflict. They highlighted the humanitarian needs of infants and children in North Korea, arguing that their aid was based purely upon humanitarianism, not related to any political agenda. The NGOs claimed that, at the very least, the government should allow the provision of private aid to North Korea, regardless of tensions between the two governments. However, most of these NGOs, soon, realised that even humanitarian aid could not be separated from the context of the Korean conflict. They found themselves caught between governments with a mutual distrust toward each other. The South Korean government asserted that several provisions, including agricultural machinery and construction materials, could be diverted for military use. As a result, most of the development assistance projects by South Korean NGOs in North Korea were suspended indefinitely.[69]

In 2012, the KNCCK initiated a process to build a social consensus in South Korean society around aid to North Korea. This was an effort to recognise differing views about the Korean conflict, and to find ways to work in the context of the conflict. The KNCCK organised a series of meetings and policy discussions and conducted a research project on public opinion; one survey being of members of the South Korean National Assembly. Among the respondents, approximately 44% were from the ruling party (*Saenuritang*) and 43% from the main opposition party (*Minjut'onghaptang*). Approximately 70% of legislators regarded the social conflict around the issue of aid to North Korea as significant, and 73% of the respondents agreed that humanitarian aid to North Korea should be delivered to people in need. During the process of building social consensus, the KNCCK observed the polarisation of South Korean society on aid to North Korea, not because of disagreement about the humanitarian

[68] Eleanor O'Gorman, *Conflict and Development: Development Matters* (New York: Zed Books, 2011), 1–19.

[69] Dong-jin Kim, *South Korean NGOs: Aid in the Conflict-Affected Context* (2012 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2012), 35–43.

nature of aid to North Korea, but because of the ideological divide between left and right, which had been reinforced by the protracted conflict. In order to overcome this divide, the KNCCK proposed a social pact for South Korean NGOs' aid to North Korea based on four principles: humanitarianism, neutrality, independence, and sustainability. In January 2013, 500 South Korean civil society leaders signed the pact.[70]

Following her inauguration in 2013, South Korean President Park Guen-hye emphasised the difference between Lee Myung-bak and herself regarding North Korea. She promoted a balanced approach between strong deterrence/defence and dialog/cooperation, but the third nuclear test by North Korea in February 2013, pushed her toward a more hard-line policy. Therefore, the South Korean NGOs' aid projects in North Korea remained suspended. Public opinion about aid to North Korea also became increasingly negative. According to the 2007 Inter-Korean Integration Index of Seoul National University, 78.4% of South Korean respondents said that South Korea should cooperate economically with North Korea and it is okay to provide assistance to North Korea.[71] Although this number dropped to 63.7% in 2011, as the inter-Korean relationship worsened, it was still more than half.[72] But, the increased tension between the two Koreas under the Park Guen-hye government continued to negatively affect public opinion on aid to North Korea. In 2017, those who opposed aid to North Korea was 65%, compared to the 32% who were in support of aid.[73]

[70]Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, 'Indochŏk Taepukchiwŏne Kwanhan Sahoe Hyŏbyak Kongsik Ch'uchin [The Official Launch of the Social Pact for Humanitarian Aid to North Korea]' (Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea Press Release, 16 January 2013); Dong Wan Kang and Dong Jin Kim, 'Indochŏk Taepukchiwŏnŭi Sahoechŏk Habŭie Taehan '19 Tae Kukhoeŭiwŏn' Sŏlmunjosa Kyŏlgwa Punsŏk [An Analysis of the Opinion Poll by the Members of the 19th National Assembly about the Social Pact on Humanitarian Aid to North Korea]' (Indochŏk taepukchiwŏnŭi sahoechŏk habŭie, The Korean National Assembly, Seoul: Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, 2013).

[71]Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS), *Inter-Korean Integration Index, 1989–2007* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2009), 154–56.

[72]Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS), *2011 Unification Attitude Survey* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2011), 44–45.

[73]Chung-min Noh and Dae-woong Park, 'Namhan Sahoe, Indochŏk Taepukchiwŏn Nollan Pulgŏchyŏ [A Growing Controversy on the Humanitarian Aid to North Korea in the South Korean Society]', *Radio Free Asia*, 25 September 2017, https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_international_org/ne-jn-09252017101625.html.

Consequently, several South Korean NGOs, including the KSM, recognised the need to work on the context of the conflict more strategically. In this regard, they began to highlight the role of NGOs for peace as more than meeting humanitarian needs in North Korea. The Secretary General of the KSM, Kang Young-sik says:

> It would not be possible for the South Korean NGOs, who have been providing aid to North Korea, to resolve the issue of nuclear weapons development in North Korea. That is not the job of the humanitarian NGOs but the job of the government and the international community, as it requires a political solution. However, by increasing contacts between the two Koreas, NGOs could contribute to alleviating tension on the Korean peninsula, while there could be ups and downs in the political negotiations. The work of NGOs would be able to guarantee the continuation of inter-Korean interactions, even at its worst moment of the inter-governmental relationships.[74]

Nevertheless, the potential role for NGOs in sustaining the Korean peace process appeared to be limited by government policy and dependent on high-level agreement, particularly once the NGOs began to receive funding from the government following the first inter-Korean summit in 2000. Lederach says that peacebuilders tend to be more responsive to the changing situation during the negotiation process to reach an agreement. But, after the agreement, they could be trapped in the "'peace' functions in bureaucracies implementing time-bound mandates with little capacity to adapt and change to on-the-ground real-life needs". Lederach argues that a strategic platform, which responds to relational needs based on restoring trust, rather than focusing on functions and agreements, is needed to overcome this process-structure gap.[75]

Aid for Peace and Building a Platform

During the Lee Myung-bak and Park Guen-hye presidencies, South Korean NGOs seemed to have lost their platform for relationship building, not only with their North Korean counterparts, but also with counterparts

[74] Kang Young-sik, Secretary General, the Korean Sharing Movement, Interview with the author, 3 August 2016.

[75] Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', 35.

in the South Korean government. The Civilian-Government Council was suspended indefinitely. In the meantime, the debate about aid to North Korea by South Korean NGOs grew so heated within South Korean society that it was called the South-South Conflict (*Namnamgaldŭng*). It seemed as though the positive and negative impacts of South Korean NGOs on the context of the Korean conflict had been over-simplified into a 'yes' or 'no' debate, according to people's attitudes toward South Korean government policies toward North Korea. In other words, the debate around South Korean NGOs had been shaped by the context of the Korean conflict, not by the actual functions of the NGOs.[76]

For example, the supporters of the South Korean government hard-line policies toward North Korea argued that aid from South Korean NGOs to North Korea would always endanger national security by assisting the North Korean regime and by undermining the readiness for a potential attack from North Korea. From their perspective, South Korean aid NGOs were being played by the North Korean regime and neglect the fact that North Korea had been developing nuclear and missile technology at the cost of vulnerable people. The North Korean humanitarian situation does not change the fact that North Korea is the enemy of South Korea. Promoting aid to North Korea would give the false hope that South Korea can make peace with North Korea. Instead, South Korea should use this situation to facilitate the collapse of the North Korean regime. Given the appalling human rights records of the regime, removal of the regime would be the best way to help North Koreans in the end.[77]

On the other hand, the supporters of positive engagement policies toward North Korea by South Korean governments claimed that South

[76] Kevin Shepard, 'Rethinking Engagement on the Korean Peninsula: Confidence to Trust to Peace', *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 19, no. 1 (2010): 112–17.

[77] Glogio Maragliano, 'Seven Years of Humanitarian Aid: A Balanced and a Possible War Forward', *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 11, no. 2 (2002): 186; Associated Press in Seoul, ''Regime Collapse' Awaits North Korea, Says South's Leader in Nuclear Warning', *the Guardian*, 16 February 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/16/regime-collapse-awaits-north-korea-says-souths-leader-in-nuclear-warning; Andrew Wolman, 'South Korea's Response to Human Rights Abuses in North Korea: An Analysis of Policy Options', *Asia Pacific Issues*, no. 110 (June 2013), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/south-koreas-response-human-rights-abuses-in-north-korea-analysis-policy-options; and Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 485–87.

Korean NGOs had been contributing to peace on the Korean peninsula by increasing contact between South and North Korean citizens and by building peaceful relationships among them. From the perspective of people who prefer engagement with North Korea, maintaining the perception of the other as the enemy would be the greater threat to national security, as it could cause the resumption of war. If North and South Koreans no longer see each other as enemy, the North Korean regime would lose the justification for nuclear weapons and authoritarian rule. Furthermore, the collapse of North Korea would not only be very costly, but also dangerous for South Korea, considering the potential refugee situation. Therefore, the best way to guarantee national security, denuclearisation, and North Korean human rights would be to support aid from South Korean NGOs.[78]

As we have seen above, the debate around aid to North Korea was not only affected by the context of the Korean conflict, but also affected the context, because of the interconnection between the debate and South Korean government policies toward North Korea. Kang says that "The aid for North Korea that should bring about a virtuous cycle of expanding trust between the two Koreas and building peace in the Korean peninsula is actually in the midst of a vicious cycle of the two sides accusing and antagonizing each other."[79] While the South-South conflict has been polarising the society, rarely has the following question been asked on both sides: Is there a way to realise the assumption that South Korean NGOs could contribute to security, disarmament, political reform, and human rights protection in the Korean peninsula by providing aid to North Korea? If the assumption could become

[78] Hyun-Back Chung, 'Aid for North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Go Hand in Hand', in *70 Years of Division and 20 Years of Aid to North Korea* (2015 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2015), 298; Kwangwoo Han and Yoonsoo Jang, 'A Study on the Ideological Debate over North Korea with the Progressive and Conservative in South Korea', *Korean Political Science Review* 46, no. 1 (2012): 80; Moon-soo Yang, 'The Economic and Social Effects of Humanitarian Aid to North Korea', *Journal of Korean Social Trend and Perspective* 70 (2007): 255; Dong Han Kim, 'Sunshine Policy and Human Rights of North Korea', *Hanyang Law Review* 21 (2007): 157; Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 485–87.

[79] Kang, 'Providing Aid to North Korea and Peace in the Korean Peninsula', 323.

reality, those who oppose aid to North Korea would no longer dispute the merit of that aid. However, in order to answer this strategic question and to overcome the dependency on government policies, South Korean NGOs need a comprehensive understanding of the context of the Korean conflict and the interaction between the context and themselves, and develop a strategy based on this understanding which could encompass the multiple issues and develop interdependent relationships in the Korean conflict.[80]

In line with the emerging concept of strategic peacebuilding, some initiatives by South Korean NGOs are noteworthy. For example, the KNCCK have been reviewing their aid strategies from the perspective of relationship building. Since 2014, the KNCCK initiated series of strategic workshops among NGO workers, experts, and civil society leaders, to discuss "a new strategic framework which integrates both peacebuilding in the Korean peninsula as well as supporting the development of North Korea".[81] The KNCCK also started a campaign to revive the Civilian-Government Council and institutionalise the council as a platform for constructive discussions around South Korean aid to North Korea among diverse civil society groups and the government.[82] Furthermore, South Korean NGOs have increased their efforts to build an international platform for aid to North Korea. Since 2009, the KSM has organised an annual International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, in partnership with Gyeonggi Province and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. There were similar efforts among international and South Korean NGOs to share information and experiences about their aid work in North Korea, in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2005. But, the new conference tries to include more people, not only from NGOs but also from GOs and IGOs. Representatives of NGOs, governments, United Nations agencies, IFRC, and academics from several countries have participated in the annual conference. The conference has become the only platform where people between resident and non-resident, international and South Korean

[80] Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 488.

[81] Kang, 323.

[82] Bo-guen Kim, 'Indochŏk taepuk chiwŏn, chŏngbu tokchŏm malgo min'ganhyŏmnyŏkkikusŏ nonŭihaeya [Humanitarian Aid to North Korea needs to be discussed in the Civilian-Government Council, not just dictated by the government]', The Hankyoreh, 8 December 2016, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/773774.html.

agencies, government and NGOs, and practitioners and academics, could meet and discuss issues on aid to North Korea. This annual conference has established a network among the people mentioned above, but the task of strengthening cooperation and improving coordination among agencies with different mandates has been challenging.[83]

First of all, aid agencies have different counterparts in North Korea. International agencies work with diverse organisations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, UN agencies have a partnership with the National Coordinating Committee (NCC); the European NGOs with the Korean-European Cooperation Coordination Agency (KECCA); the US NGOs with the Korea-America Private Exchange Society (KAPES); and the IFRC with the North Korean Red Cross. On the other hand, the counterparts for South Korean NGOs are organisations in the United Front Department, such as NCRC and NECF. Lee describes this situation as a fragmentation of aid in North Korea. Having different partners in North Korea makes it difficult for international and South Korean aid agencies to coordinate and cooperate with each other, their aid projects often overlap or are in competition.[84] Therefore, annual international conferences on humanitarian and development aid to North Korea have focused on how to develop more coordinated action and cooperation between one another, and also with North Korean counterparts, beyond sharing information. Particularly, due to series of UN sanctions, the increased tension in the Korean peninsula affected not only South Korean aid but also international aid. South Korean NGOs have continuously highlighted the need to understand the context of the Korean conflict and work strategically for peacebuilding in order to increase the effectiveness and sustainability of aid cooperation in North Korea.[85]

[83] Dong Jin Kim and Sabine Burghart, *A Report on the 2013 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK* (2013 International Conference On Humanitarian and Development Assistance To the DPRK, Beijing: Korean Sharing Movement, Gyeonggi Province, and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013), 105–9.

[84] Jong Moo Lee, 'Partnership and Development Cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Aid Organizations', in *Response to the Food Shortage in the DPRK and International Cooperation for Economic Development* (2011 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2011), 131–44.

[85] Dong Jin Kim and Sabine Burghart, *A Report on the 2017 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK* (2017 International Conference On Humanitarian and Development Assistance To the DPRK, Beijing: Korean Sharing Movement, Gyeonggi Province, and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017).

There is still no joint strategic framework for all the aid agencies and their North Korean partners as mentioned above, and North Korean partners have never participated in the annual international conference. But, the relationship building among these agencies shows potential for the South Korean NGOs and international agencies to cooperate with each other as they navigate through the impediments emerging from the Korean conflict. For example, instead of directly sending aid, the KNCCK supported the humanitarian relief work of the IFRC in North Korea in 2016, as the South Korean government did not allow private aid to North Korea. The IFRC welcomed this initiative, as funding for their project had been affected by the increased tension in the Korean peninsula. The South Korean government expressed doubts about the international aid cooperation by the KNCCK, saying that it is not appropriate to send aid to North Korea when North Korea is developing nuclear and missile technology.[86] In addition to the aid cooperation, diverse agencies have participated in aid for peace advocacy. As we discussed in Chapter 1, transnational civil society networking could provide space for the suppressed voices in a local society to be heard in the world, and those voices, with international support, could echo back to local government.[87] In 2015, South Korean and international aid agencies jointly issued a statement on "Aid to North Korea and Peace on the Korean Peninsula". The statement says, "Aid can make a tangible contribution to improving understanding. At this crucial time, it is vitally important that it continue, and participants expressed the hope that governments and the international community will support these steps towards promoting peace on the Korean peninsula".[88]

[86] Hwan-yong Kim, 'Han'guk pungminhyŏp, kukchechŏksipcha t'onghae taepuksuhae-chiwŏn'gŭm chŏndal [KNCCK Delivered Flood Aid to North Korea through the IFRC]', VOA, 12 October 2016, https://www.voakorea.com/a/3547331.html.

[87] David Chandler, *Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 36.

[88] The Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, Statement on Aid to North Korea and Peace on the Korean Peninsula', in *70 Years of Division and 20 Years of Aid to North Korea* (2015 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul: GyeongGi-Do, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Korean Sharing Movement, 2015).

Conclusion

This chapter discussed humanitarian and development cooperation by South Korean NGOs in North Korea in the context of the Korean conflict, where there are repeated and deep-rooted cycles of conflict. The challenges facing South Korean NGOs in providing aid to North Korea vary with the causes of the Korean conflict and changes in the relationship between the two parties. The increased tension in the Korean conflict and attempts by South Korean governments to implant a liberal system in North Korea, dismissing local realities and the conflict context, caused the disruption of the South Korean NGOs' aid cooperation in North Korea. The dependency on government policies and the high-level peace process show the need to overcome a process-structure gap. In order to overcome the bureaucratic understanding of the role of NGOs and to increase sustainability in their activities, a strategic platform is required to ask how to collaborate.[89]

As is aforementioned, aid cooperation to address the most concerning humanitarian needs, as well as development aid, which intended to satisfy structural needs, have been affected by the conflict. The South-South conflict about aid to North Korea aggravated the polarisation of the South Korean society concerning the North Korea policy. Although South Korean governments and NGOs argued on occasion that South Korean aid cooperation would contribute to building trust with North Korea, the suspension of South Korean aid projects in North Korea shows that the negative impact of the Korean conflict-context on the aid projects was greater than the positive impact they had on the conflict-context. Even aid cooperation to address the child malnutrition in North Korea has been tightly controlled by both North and South Korean governments and has fluctuated according to the inter-Korean relations, despite strong protest by South Korean NGOs that aid for children should be non-political.

However, this does not mean that, unless there is peace on the Korean peninsula, aid to North Korea would not be worthwhile to attempt. Humanitarian and development aid to North Korea is not just a complementary, but necessary, component in building peace on the Korean peninsula. For instance, the ongoing issue of child malnutrition in North Korea cannot be considered separate from peacebuilding, as the North

[89]Wisler, 'International Development and Peacebuilding', 57–75.

Korean children are the future partners of the South Korean children in building peace on the Korean peninsula, as well as the future citizens of a united Korean peninsula. Considering the current economic disparity and aggressive competition within South Korean society, the disparity between North and South Korean children would significantly undermine any effort to build peace on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, humanitarian and development aid cooperation to address child malnutrition is not merely helpful to building trust between North and South Koreans, but is critical to sustainable peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula.[90]

For this reason, peacebuilding is more than just a political technique by the top-level leadership, as the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali maintains in his report, 'Agenda for Development' in 1995, that "only sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation".[91] The strategic overlaps between peacebuilding and development suggests a future possibility of aid for peace on the Korean peninsula. As the conflict-sensitive approach suggests, aid activities cannot achieve their desired goals without understanding the context, respecting local people, and the interaction between intervention and context. Recognising the strategic overlaps will allow the construction of a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy for Korean NGOs, based on conflict-sensitive, multi-dimensional, simultaneous and integrative approaches. This strategy is expected to create a platform for sustainable relationship building between the two Koreas, which can be more flexible than a structure dictated by governments, while addressing the humanitarian situation in North Korea.

[90] Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 494–95.

[91] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Development* (New York: United Nations, 1995).

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion: Towards Strategic Peacebuilding

In 2018, expectations for the resumption of the peace process were heightened by news of the inter-Korean and the US–North Korea summits. These events of high-level diplomacy are considered to be significant breakthroughs, given that the tension in and around the Korean peninsula had been very high until 2017.[1] It was reported that the US Trump administration had come up with a plan for a preventive airstrike on North Korean missile and/or nuclear facilities, a so-called 'bloody nose' strike strategy. North Korea pledged to respond to any such attack by launching a nuclear strike onto the US mainland.[2] The sudden changes from harsh rhetoric and military posturing to negotiation and dialogue in 2018 showed, yet again, that a peace process is not a linear process, as discussed in previous chapters. Chapter 4 showed that a protracted conflict could be given new opportunities to make breakthroughs in a peace process. However, a peace process would always face crisis, unless there is the effort to create sustainable platforms to build interdependent relationships. There have been explanations for the recent

[1] Lily Kuo, 'Kim Jong-Un Agrees to Meet South Korea President at Summit on 27 April', *The Guardian*, 29 March 2018, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/29/kim-jong-un-agrees-to-meet-south-korea-president-at-summit-on-27-april.

[2] Michael E. O'Hanlon and James Kirchick, 'A "Bloody Nose" Attack in Korea Would Have Lasting Consequences', *Brookings* (blog), 26 February 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/26/a-bloody-nose-attack-in-korea-would-have-lasting-consequences/.

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1_8

peace overture in the Korean peninsula, such as the growing economic and military pressure on North Korea by international sanctions, domestic politics in the US and South Korea, and the North Korean desire to be recognised as a legitimate party in negotiations with other parties in the Korean conflict.[3] As we can infer from these explanations, the breakthroughs in 2018 appear to be the result of the interplay of domestic and geopolitics, not an outcome of a long-term peacebuilding strategy.

This book showed that the historical top-down approach to keeping peace, with states controlling interactions between people across the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), has made the armistice machinery in the Korean peninsula one of the world's most protracted and unstable peacekeeping mechanisms, subject to criticism by Peace and Conflict Studies scholars, and in need of the adoption of a strategic peacebuilding approach. These findings are highly relevant to the current situation. High-level agreements are critical in creating breakthroughs in the Korean peace process, but they cannot guarantee the sustainability of the process. The final chapter of this book reviews key discoveries of this study on the Korean peace process and discusses a potential comprehensive peacebuilding strategy for the Korean peninsula, with which diverse actors, including governments, civil society and international community can improve coordination and cooperation for a sustainable peace.

Why Do We Need a Sustainable Peacebuilding Strategy?

For the past 70 years, there have been several breakthroughs in the Korean peace process, such as the Armistice Agreement of 1953; the July 4 Communique of 1972; the 1991 Basic Agreement; the June 15 Joint Declaration; the October 4 Joint Declaration between North and South Korea; the September 19 Joint statement; and the February 13 Agreement in the six-party talks. However, none of these agreements were ever fully implemented. The incompatible goals of the Korean conflict remain unresolved, sustaining mistrust and uncertainty. Although North Korea does not seem to be capable of realising their goal, many South Koreans still believe the North Korean goal of unifying the Korean peninsula under their regime has not changed. From the North

[3] Andrew Yeo, 'Analysis | Why North Korea Wants a Summit with Trump', *Washington Post*, 14 March 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/14/why-north-korea-wants-a-summit-with-trump/.

Korean perspective, the US and South Korea are still pursuing regime change in North Korea and unification under South Korean rule, even though the North Korean regime has proved that they will not go away anytime soon. This shows the need for a peacebuilding approach that goes beyond keeping negative peace in the Korean peninsula.[4]

The potential for peace in the Korean peninsula has been explored using the predominantly mainstream International Relations (IR) theories, which focus on relationships between states, rather than relationships between people. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the realist theory of balance of power can explain how negative peace has been kept in the Korean peninsula since the Armistice Agreement of 1953. The realist perspective would also be helpful in understanding how the security dilemma, due to competition of conflict parties for more military power, has increased the possibility for a recurrence of war in the Korean peninsula.[5] As we have seen in Chapter 4, not only the current US President, Donald Trump, but also former US President Clinton, once considered bombing North Korean nuclear and missile facilities in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a potential nuclear attack on the US mainland. Kim Suk-hi and Bernhard J. Seliger argue, "Such a strike would risk a North Korean counterattack that could devastate South Korea, subject Japan to missile attacks, and even trigger a broader regional war involving China". But, they are sceptical that the US would actually go forward with such action. They say that the US cannot dismiss the risk of war involving China, Japan, and South Korea, which "possess more than half of the world's total foreign reserves and comprise three of the world's ten largest economies". Therefore, "dialogue is the only viable way to resolve" the conflict.[6]

The argument of economic interests appears to prove the liberalism point about the benefits of economic cooperation and integration for international peace. From the view of functionalism, the best option

[4] Chung-in Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2012), 9–12.

[5] Ji-Hwan Hwang, 'Rethinking South Korea's Perception of the North Korean Issue: In Search of a New Approach', *Journal of Peace and Unification Studies* 3, no. 2 (2011): 14.

[6] Suk Hi Kim and Bernhard J. Seliger, 'U.S. Policy Options on a Nuclear North Korea', in *The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations*, ed. Suk Hi Kim, Bernhard Seliger, and Terence Roehrig (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 254.

for the prevention of war in the Korean peninsula would be to facilitate cooperation and integration in the non-political sectors among all the states concerned, including North Korea. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 showed that non-political cooperation between the two Koreas is highly vulnerable to changing domestic and geo-political situations. This appears to prove the liberal institutionalism point about the need to build an international institution, which can increase leverage in international cooperation, and punish betrayal, by using sanctions, for example.[7] However, the varied sanctions imposed on North Korea by the international community, so far, have not appeared to change the determination of the North Korean leadership to ensure their survival through the development of nuclear and missile technology. As well, despite the series of UN sanctions, the North Korean regime does not conform to international norms for human rights. The US and South Korea lost leverage on North Korea by applying punitive measures before North Korea became fully integrated into the world economic system. Chang and Kim say the sanctions only increased North Korean dependence on China as a trading partner, and South Korea lost a chance to disseminate "greater information among North Koreans regarding the freedom and the high quality of life in the rest of the world, and keep North Korea from depending more on China, that leaders in South Korea should find alarming."[8]

The reasons for the increased North Korean economic dependency on China and the ineffectiveness of sanctions are supported by constructivism, which criticises the assumptions of stasis by traditional IR theories and emphasises that state relations are a social construction. Identities, ideas and the history of relationships between states influence the formation of national interests by those states. Chapter 4 showed how the Korean peace process was suspended in the 2000s. From the perspectives of the US and South Korea, the North Korea could not be trusted because of the character of the regime and history of animosity. North Korea has always been suspicious of the motivations of South Korea and

[7] Hwang, 'Rethinking South Korea's Perception of the North Korean Issue: In Search of a New Approach', 6–17.

[8] Semoon Chang and Hwa-Kyung Kim, 'Economic Reform and Alternatives for North Korea', in *The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations*, ed. Suk Hi Kim, Bernhard Seliger, and Terence Roehrig (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2011), 97.

the US in the peace process for the same reasons. On the other hand, China is a long-time socialist ally, who fought with North Korea in the Korean war. Although China opposes North Korean nuclear weapons development, it cannot afford to risk the collapse of the North Korean regime because of the effect on border security and stability of the region.[9] This context of relationships can compensate for missing dimensions in the two previous approaches. But, as we discussed in Chapter 2, policy makers in the governments have a tendency of not moving beyond policy options informed by realist or liberal approaches because of their focus on the role of states. Governments seem to assess change and the validity of change "according to the power defined by military and economic influences" at the state level, with little effort to change the negative identities of each other.[10] In other words, a realist approach, for example, exercising more military power, such as sending US aircraft carriers to East Asia or a liberal approach, for instance, such as increasing pressure on China to be on board with the US led sanctions on North Korea, would be preferred over the strategies for peaceful transformations of identity among states in East Asia.[11]

Furthermore, the rising voice in the US advocating a preventive attack during the heightened tensions between US and North Korea, appeared to show how identities, and inter-state relationships could have less value, when it comes to national interests. This voice seemed to be based on the premise that IR is anarchy, and US national interests should always come first. For example, Edward Luttwak says, although South Korea is a US ally, the vulnerability of South Koreans to potential North Korean retaliation is not the responsibility of the US, but the responsibility of the South Korean government. He argues the US and South Korean relationship "cannot be allowed to paralyze the United States in the face of immense danger to its own national interests."[12] Similarly, the risk of toughening sanctions and aggravating North Korean

[9]Eleanor Albert, 'Understanding the China-North Korea Relationship', Council on Foreign Relations, 28 March 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.

[10]John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Reprint edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 59–60.

[11]Walter C. Clemens, *Getting to Yes in Korea* (Boulder: Routledge, 2010), 171–72.

[12]Edward Luttwak, 'It's Time to Bomb North Korea', *Foreign Policy* (blog), 8 January 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/08/its-time-to-bomb-north-korea/.

food insecurity has been justified by attributing the responsibility for the humanitarian situation to the North Korean regime. In both cases, the lives of people in other countries, regardless of being friends or enemies, could be dismissed for reasons of national interest, as those people are the responsibility of the other state.[13]

From the perspective of these state-centric approaches, the peacebuilding goals of the prevention of war and of international cooperation for peace and prosperity in the Korean peninsula and East Asia, could be equated with the surrender of North Korea to the military and economic power of the other conflict parties in the Korean peace process. So far, these approaches have not been effective, and the peace process has been fluctuating. Richmond argues that it is because "such approaches are related to either state power structures or international norms, rarely engaging with the positionality of their subjects (i.e. conflict-affected populations)."[14] For this reason, Peace and Conflict Studies scholars argue that a peace process requires a more comprehensive peacebuilding strategy beyond high-level negotiations. The underlying ontology of Peace and Conflict Studies is based on the understanding that not only state but also individual agencies can, and should, take a role to build peace by peaceful means and to achieve social justice.[15] A renowned critic of the state-centric approach on peacebuilding, John Paul Lederach, suggests a middle-out approach, highlighting the role of civil society in closing peacebuilding gaps; 'the interdependence gap', 'the justice gap', and 'the process-structure gap'.[16] He argues that civil society can contribute to creating a platform to build ongoing interdependent relationships between the top-levels and the grassroots, by putting social justice on the agenda in peacebuilding, as well as between people across the boundaries of the conflict.[17] In order to explore the potential for

[13] 'UN Warns Tough North Korea Sanctions Risk Hurting Millions in Need of Aid', *The Guardian*, 11 December 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/11/north-korea-sanctions-human-rights-toll-united-nations.

[14] Oliver P. Richmond, 'Rescuing Peacebuilding? Anthropology and Peace Formation', *Global Society*, 2018, 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2018.1451828.

[15] Oliver Richmond, *Peace in International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 103.

[16] John Paul Lederach, 'Justpeace: The Challenge of the 21st Century', in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 27–35.

[17] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 41–42.

sustainable peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula, this book has adopted a Peace and Conflict Studies approach which focuses on all levels of human relationships, including IR, and the transformation of social structures, as well as these relationships.

The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in the Korean Peninsula

The history of the Korean conflict in Chapter 3 showed the prevalence of direct and structural violence, not only between the states, but also between a state and its population. During the period of the Korean War and the Cold War, both the North and South Korean leadership justified their dictatorships using the Korean conflict situation and nationalism.[18] The legacy of direct and structural violence was not fully addressed, even once the Cold War ended, which negatively affected the peace process. North Korea is still under a dictatorship. Although South Korea made the transition to a democracy at the end of the Cold War, the authoritarian nature of the North Korean regime and the continuous North Korean nuclear and missile tests have been used as a political pretext to defend the legacy of dictatorship in South Korea. At the same time, the annual US and South Korean military drills have been used as justification by North Korea to maintain the dictatorship and to develop missile technology and nuclear weapons, while its population suffers from the protracted humanitarian situation.[19]

Chapter 4 identified peacebuilding gaps in the Korean peace process. Both North and South Korean governments have tightly controlled any contact and interaction of people between the two Koreas. The lack of responsive and coordinated relationships increased the interdependency peacebuilding gap. During the high-level negotiations, the interests and needs of the states were considered above those of the respective populations. At times the high-level leaderships connected national interest with their own interests, as in the case of the peace process in the 1970s, which was used to strengthen the dictatorships of both North and South Koreas, thereby widening justice gap between the expectations of a

[18] Joong-Seok Seo, *Korean Nationalism Betrayed* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007), 57.

[19] The UN Humanitarian Country Team, '2017 DPR Korea Needs and Priorities' (The UN Humanitarian Country Team in the DPRK, March 2017).

peace agreement and what that agreement would actually deliver. In late 2000s, the Korean peace process broke down because of the focus on the agreements among the governments, rather than on the transformation of relationships at all levels of the societies. It showed the process-structure gap in the Korean peace process.

There have been efforts by South Korean civil society to address direct and structural violence and to close peacebuilding gaps. Chapter 6 discussed the movement of Korean civil society in relation to nonviolent resistance to state violence, such as the independence movement while under Japanese colonial rule and the democratisation movement of South Korea. The March 1 nonviolent civil disobedience movement in 1919 cultivated diverse civil and grassroots movements and led to organisation by groups such as labour, farmers, students, and women.[20] Immediately following the division of the Korean peninsula, the relationship between the state and these groups was more confrontational in South Korea than in the North. The popularity of the leader, due to the socialist style land reform and retributive justice against those who had cooperated with Japanese colonial rule, was helpful in sustaining the state propaganda and to socialise people into collective subjectivities dictated by an authoritarian state.[21] On the other hand, the South Korean government attempted to maintain the dictatorship by outlawing any opposition to the government as communism, and by expanding the security force and intelligence system, while the legacy of colonialism and the corruption in society were not addressed. There was constant struggle by South Korean civil society to resist oppression by the state, for example, 'the April 19 revolution' in 1960.[22] Although the military dictators in South Korea continuously used the rhetoric of the North Korean threat to justify their authoritarian rule, a second military coup d'état and the Gwangju massacre in 1980 raised awareness of the interconnection between the Korean conflict and South Korean dictatorship, called 'the division-system' by South Korean civil society.[23]

[20] Carter J. Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1991), 278–86; Nishi Masayuki, "March 1 and May 4, 1919 in Korea, China & Japan: Toward an International History of East Asian Independence Movements", *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 5, no. 10 (2007): 3–7.

[21] Charles K. Armstrong, "Beyond the DMZ: The Possibility of Civil Society in North Korea", in *Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 2007), 188–90.

[22] W. D. Reeve, *The Republic of Korea* (Oxford University Press, 1963), 49–50.

[23] Nak-chung Baik, *Hanbandosik t'ongil, Hyŏnjae Chinhaenghyŏng* [The Unification of the Korean Peninsula, Present Continuous] (Paju: Changbi, 2006), 81.

Chapter 5 explored the role of the religious civil society in promoting peace and unification in the Korean peninsula in the 1980s. The ecumenical civil society groups, represented by the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) , built both horizontal and vertical relationships across the boundaries of the Korean conflict in order to address the division-system. The World Council of Churches (WCC), the international ecumenical network, assisted in organising the meeting between the NCCK and the Korean Christian Federation (KCF), its North Korean counterpart, in 1986. This meeting was the first civilian-level contact between the two Koreas since the Armistice Agreement of 1953. The NCCK also brought awareness, through the 88 Declaration on peace and unification, to South Korean society about the political use of the Korean conflict by the governments, inspiring many other civil society organisations to participate in the peace and unification movement. The testimonies of former South Korean government officials confirmed the indirect impact of civil society in the 1980s and 1990s on government policy and high-level negotiations, in creating a hospitable public atmosphere for the peace process.[24] This showed that the peacebuilding gaps were getting narrower in the 1980s and 1990s.

It should be noted that the space for civil society to contribute in the Korean peace process required the interplay between international and domestic political environments. In 1987, South Korea finally underwent a democratic transition owing to the nationwide peace parades in June of that year, in which more than a million citizens participated.[25] In 1988, in a new international environment of détente at the end of the Cold War, the South Korean government promoted an engagement policy, the Northern Policy, and began high-level peace negotiations with North Korea.[26] The end of the Cold War and the democratisation of South Korea created space for South Korean civil society to fill the interdependency peacebuilding gap. However, since the 1990s, the peacebuilding role of South Korean civil society has fluctuated greatly, due to changes in government policies

[24] Dong-won Lim, *Peacemaker* (Seoul: Jung-ang Books, 2008), 170–71.

[25] Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, 381–82.

[26] Gabriel Jonsson, *Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation* (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 57.

and relationships among the major political players such as the US, China and North Korea and South Korea governments. There were times, especially after the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, that South Korean civil society was allowed increased contact with North Korea and expanded their peacebuilding role, but when tensions in and around the Korean peninsula rose in the late 2010s, the South Korean government strongly regulated the civil society peacebuilding activities.[27] This seems to reflect the criticism of top-down approaches to peacebuilding, in that the top-level tends to dominate the agenda, once again increasing peacebuilding gaps.

The high dependency on the top-level in the Korean peace process is in part due to the fact that the Korean conflict has been considered to be a conflict about the state-building, particularly about the character of a unified Korean state. Therefore, it seems inevitable that the South and North Korean governments are the main actors in the Korean peace process. But, more and more civil society groups turned their attention from the issue of state unification to the issue of social transformation toward peace and justice for all Korean people.[28] For example, Chapter 6 discussed how the South Korean women's movements recognised that addressing the vicious circle between gender inequality and the Korean conflict would not necessarily be resolved by political unification. They raised the issue of militarism and initiated peace movements. Many other civil society groups, who worked for diverse social justice issues such as democracy, human rights, economic justice, and the environment, also identified the militarism of the state parties in the Korean conflict as the major obstacle to building peace and achieving social justice in the Korean peninsula.[29]

Meanwhile, human rights violations in North Korea caused debate in South Korea on how to improve the lives of North Koreans. The South Korean human rights NGOs advocating civil and political rights in North Korea focus on bringing an awareness of the North

[27] John Swenson-Wright, 'Inter-Korean Relations and the Challenge of North-East Asian Regional Security', in *The Politics and International Relations of Modern Korea*, ed. John Nilsson-Wright, vol. IV (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 211.

[28] Iain Atack, *Nonviolence in Political Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 96.

[29] Bo-hyuk Suh, 'Is Another Peace Possible? A Pacifist Perspective of the Crisis on the Korean Peninsula', *Journal of Peace and Unification* 7, no. 2 (2017): 16–17.

Korean human rights condition and the role of the North Korean dictatorship in violating their citizens' rights. They value the universal norms of the international community regarding the international human rights. From their viewpoint, any state who violates or is unable to protect the human rights of its citizens must take full responsibility. However, from the perspective of those who promote the Korean peace process, focusing on the responsibility of the individual state alone cannot produce a realistic policy on North Korean human rights. For these groups, human rights campaigns against the North Korean regime by the South Korean groups are seen as not only ineffective but also damaging to the improvement of the lives of North Koreans, by providing the state with a pretext to portray human rights movements as psychological warfare by the US and South Korea. In this regard, they prefer a gradual approach to inducing change inside North Korea by providing aid and increasing contact between people, thereby neutralising the division-system.[30]

Chapter 7 examined the humanitarian situation in North Korea and the aid to North Korea by South Korean NGOs. The collapse of the Soviet bloc coupled with natural disasters, and the failure of the socio-economic policies of the North Korean dictatorship created a severe humanitarian crisis in 1990s, resulting in the death of more than a million people. South Korean civil society, along with the international society, has provided humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. South Korean humanitarian NGOs, especially, saw their aid cooperation as a way to build peace on the Korean peninsula. These South Korean NGOs deliberately expanded contact between North and South Koreans, by inviting diverse groups, such as local government officials, politicians, religious leaders, doctors, technicians, scientists, teachers, and children from South Korean society to join their field visits to North Korea. The donors who did not visit North Korea learned of the work of NGOs through reports and videos. Edward Reed says "This indicates that the NGO goal of providing a means for South Korean civilians to participate in engagement with the North has succeeded to some extent."[31]

[30] Katharine H.S. Moon, 'Beyond Demonization: A Mew Strategy for Human Rights in North Korea', *Current History* 107, no. 710 (2008): 267.

[31] Edward P. Reed, 'From Charity to Partnership: South Korean NGO Engagement with North Korea', in *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, ed. Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang (New York: State University of New York Press, 2010), 214.

However, like other peacebuilding activities, South Korean aid to North Korea fluctuated according to the ups and downs of the Korean peace process. Since 2010, most of the aid projects in North Korea by South Korean NGOs have been suspended by the government, fueling the controversy in South Korean society about aid to North Korea. Those who agreed with the government decision saw the activities by the NGOs as benefiting the North Korean regime, a human rights violator, as well as a security threat to South Korea. But, the humanitarian NGOs argued that their approach to empowering people in North Korea will not only improve the quality of life but also lead gradual social change.[32]

The polarisation in South Korean society on how to address the North Korean human rights and humanitarian situation is tied to the fluctuating positions of the governments regarding the Korean peace process.[33] For example, the South Korean governments who initiated peace processes with North Korea, expanded NGOs' aid to North Korea. The South Korean governments who suspended the peace process, promoted North Korean human rights. In the meantime, North Korean authorities also have not been consistent in giving access to NGOs, responding to the changes in inter-Korean politics. Particularly, the North Korean government attempted to avoid what they saw as unnecessary people to people contact. The worsened relationship at the government level was used as a pretext to deny field assessments and monitoring visits by South Korean NGOs.[34] Because of these government gatekeepers, it has been difficult for civil society to sustain the relationship building process between people in the North and those in the South. Unless the activities of civil society are considered as part of a broader peacebuilding picture and incorporated into a comprehensive strategy, they would very likely face another course of simple 'yes or no' debates.[35]

[32] Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea*, 229–30.

[33] Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang, 'Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion', in *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, ed. Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang (New York: State University of New York Press, 2010), 13.

[34] Seung-Mi Han, 'Nationalism and beyond: Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea (DPRK) and the Case of the Korean Sharing Movement', *Korean Social Science Journal* 35, no. 2 (2008): 113.

[35] Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 182.

There have been several attempts, such as campaigns and dialogue forums, by South Korean civil society to close peacebuilding gaps since the suspension of the peace process. But, the majority of civil peacebuilding activities still appear to be dependent on government policies and the outcome of high-level negotiations, and there is no comprehensive peacebuilding strategy. Meanwhile, the division-system was repeatedly used by political groups in South Korea to win elections and consolidate political power. North Korea continued to develop nuclear and missile technologies, while the US increased its military presence in East Asia. The tension in and around the Korean peninsula increased to the extent that North Korea declared the end of the armistice and the US contemplated a preventive attack on North Korean nuclear and missile facilities. Although North Korean participation in the South Korean Pyongchang Winter Olympics in 2018 brought hope for a full resumption of the peace process, through summits between political leaders, previous chapters show that peacebuilding on the Korean peninsula requires diverse groups of people from multiple levels of societies, in addition to high-level negotiations. Without coordinated and strategic actions to transform relationships between people in conflict affected societies, peacebuilding is not able to overcome dependency on high-level leadership, and become sustainable.

Creating a Sustainable Peacebuilding Strategy

The Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding demonstrates that, "with a strategic deficit, however good each individual activity is, there is a deficiency of control, therefore of responsibility and accountability, and it is less likely that the goals of policy will be achieved".[36] It is for this reason that Lederach says peacebuilding requires strategic "multiplicity, interdependency, and simultaneity".[37] As we have seen in the strategic peacebuilding discussions, this understanding requires us to look at all levels of response: the issue, relationships, state-systems and division-systems.

[36] Dan Smith, 'Toward a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together: Overview Report of the Joint Ustein Study of Peacebuilding' (The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), 43.

[37] Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 33.



Fig. 8.1 An example of levels of response and peacebuilding activities (The design of this figure was inspired by Dong Jin Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', *The Pacific Review* 29, no. 4 (2016): 493)

As we have discussed above, any peacebuilding activity in the Korean peninsula should take into consideration the division-system in the Korean conflict, which emerged from the impact of a changing global order after World War II and consolidated during the Cold War. Major international parties of the Cold War, such as the US, China, Japan and Russia are still dominating the geopolitical condition of the division-system. Secondly, there are state-system levels of response to the Korean conflict coming from the different political and economic systems of governments and societies. Both North and South Korean governments used the division-system as a means of justifying their dictatorships during the Cold War period. North Korea is still an authoritarian state, with North Koreans suffering from severe oppression and inequality between the ordinary people and the elite. On the other hand, South Korea democratised in the late 1980s. But, the legacy of dictatorship and economic inequality still remains. Thirdly, there are relational levels of response in the Korean conflict. The experiences of the Korean War strengthened a Cold War mentality for both Koreas. This mind-set did not change once the Cold War ended; both North and South Koreans

still appear to have a deep-rooted animosity toward each other.[38] Last, but not least, there are social issues surrounding structural and relational levels in the Korean conflict, for example, humanitarian needs and human rights, which requires the improvement of social, economic and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights (Fig. 8.1).

According to the UN Commission of Inquiry Report in 2014 and the UN DPRK Country Team Report in 2017, many North Koreans are still experiencing food insecurity and deteriorating living conditions, as well as violations of civil and political rights.[39] These social issues of human rights and humanitarian needs cannot be resolved without simultaneously addressing the other levels of the Korean conflict and being strategically connected to other peacebuilding activities. For instance, Scott Bradford, Kim Dong-jin, and Kerk Phillips say that without lifting international sanctions and without the reform of the country, North Korea "will remain stagnant and backward, perhaps even falling further into poverty".[40] North Korea appears to be much more confident of regime security, particularly following the nuclear and missile tests in 2017, and is now attempting to increase foreign investment. Although the economy has improved since the extreme famine of the mid-1990s, if the Kim Jong-un regime is to maintain authority and legitimacy, it must make visible achievement in improving the economic situation, as well as achieving guarantees for security.[41] North Korea called it the 'Byungjin line', simultaneously developing the people's economy and strengthening nuclear deterrence.[42] However, there is a paradox in this policy.

[38] Samuel S. Kim, *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[39] The UN Humanitarian Country Team, '2017 DPR Korea Needs and Priorities' (The UN Humanitarian Country Team in the DPRK, March 2017); UNCHR, 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—A/HRC/25/63', United Nations Human Rights Council, 7 February 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.

[40] Scott C. Bradford, Dong-jin Kim, and Kerk L. Phillips, 'Potential Economic Reforms in North Korea: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model', *Journal of Economic Policy Reform* 14, no. 4 (2011): 321–22.

[41] Byung-Yeon Kim, *Unveiling the North Korean Economy: Collapse and Transition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 123–98.

[42] 'Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee', *Korean Central News Agency*, 31 March 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201303/news31/20130331-24ee.html.

North Korea was put under sanctions primarily because of the country's nuclear weapons program and the development of long-range rocket systems. The US Obama Administration had been adamant that it would not negotiate with North Korea unless North Korea showed its intention for denuclearisation, and continued to impose sanctions on North Korea, calling it a 'strategic patience' policy.[43] After the inauguration in 2017, the US Trump administration initiated 'the maximum pressure' campaign, which is to shut down all sources of revenue to North Korea, and persuaded China to be on board with the campaign.[44] Although China had not been fully committed to the campaign, its increasing participation in the US sanctions against North Korea had a negative impact on the operation of aid agencies, worsening the humanitarian situations in North Korea.[45]

The North Korean civil and political rights situation is also closely linked to other levels of the Korean conflict. The UN COI report says "The division imposed on the Korean peninsula, the massive destruction caused by the Korean War, and the impact of the Cold War, have engendered an isolationist mind-set and an aversion to outside powers, that are used to justify internal repression."[46] The North Korean regime continuously justified its human rights violations using the rhetoric of external threat and regime security, but ironically, the human rights record of the regime has negatively affected North Korean security. As a response to the UN COI report, North Korean ambassador to the United Nations, So Se Pyong said that the US and "other hostile forces" wrote "a fictional report" in order to "defame the dignified image of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and eventually eliminate its social

[43] Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin, 'North Korea: U.S. Relationas, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation', 6–7.

[44] Daniel Blumenthal, 'Give "Maximum Pressure" a Chance', *Foreign Policy* (blog), 15 February 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/15/maximum-pressure-needs-more-time-trump-pence-united-states-north-korea/.

[45] Kevin Gray, 'Tighter Sanctions on North Korea Could Have a Harsh Humanitarian Impact', The Conversation, 22 September 2017, http://theconversation.com/tighter-sanctions-on-north-korea-could-have-a-harsh-humanitarian-impact-84299.

[46] UNCHR, 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—A/HRC/25/63', United Nations Human Rights Council, 7 February 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.

system."[47] Despite North Korean refutation of its human rights records, US President Trump appeared to build a moral case for a US preventive attack on North Korea, using the North Korean human rights situation. He invited the father of Otto Warmbier, who passed away after returning from North Korea in a coma, and North Korean defector, Ji Seoug-ho, to his State of the Union speech in 2018. US Vice President Mike Pence accompanied them to the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea to show his intention to highlight the brutal nature of North Korean dictatorship in South Korea. These actions implied a US military option would be not only for stopping the nuclear and missile development of North Korea, but also for saving North Koreans from the human rights violations.[48]

However, bombing the country would not be an effective strategy to improve human rights in North Korea. As pointed out above, the resumption of war on the Korean peninsula would create a humanitarian crisis and make the people's lives worse than the current situation. Maximum pressure strategy by the US, through the international sanctions, also does not seem to be effective in achieving its goal. Although China and South Korea have been more willing to participate in international sanctions against North Korea, Park Kyung-Ae says, the collapse of the North Korean regime, "either through implosion or explosion, is a potential time bomb" for China and South Korea, given the potential terror risks and influx of refugees. They would not be able to continue maximum pressure on North Korea to the extent that it endangers their own national security. Therefore, paradoxically, "North Korea's vulnerability works as a great strength for" North Korean regime.[49]

Meanwhile, expectations have grown in South Korean civil society that the timing is ideal to resume their peacebuilding project. South Korean President, Moon Jae-In, seems to be willing to improve

[47] Madison Park, 'North Korea, China Slam U.N. Human Rights Report', CNN, 18 March 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/18/world/asia/north-korea-human-rights-response/index.html.

[48] Elise Labott, 'As North Koreans Arrive at Olympics, Pence Points to Defectors to Counter Regime', CNN, 9 February 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/09/politics/pence-south-korea-olympics/index.html.

[49] Kyung-Ae Park, 'People's Exit, Regime Stability, and North Korean Diplomacy', in *New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy*, ed. Kyung-Ae Park (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 56.

the relationship with North Korea. Compared to the two previous Presidents, he is more open to restarting the peace process. The increasing tension between US and North Korea has been worrisome, and a potential US attack on North Korea would cause a serious damage not only to North Korea, but also to South Korea. An improved inter-Korean relationship would be the best way to deter US from using a military option in the Korean peninsula. The inter-Korean summit between Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in on 27 April, 2018, particularly the image of North and South Korean political leaders crossing the border together, appeared to signal the resumption of the Korean peace process.[50] But, Moon Jae-in cannot afford to give the impression that the South Korean government prefers a better relationship with North Korea than with the US. To many South Koreans, a US-South Korea Alliance is key to defending the country from the North Korean threat. Any position of the government on peacebuilding with North Korea could increase the polarisation of the society. On top of that, Trump has linked nuclear negotiations with North Korea and US trade talks with South Korea in order to put pressure on the South Korean government to be tough on North Korea.[51] It shows that the South Korean engagement with North Korea has been a triple-edged policy. The South Korean government needs to consider domestic reactions, North Korean reactions, and international reactions, particularly the US and China. For this reason, the current South Korean government seems to prefer the resumption of civil society peacebuilding projects in North Korea, rather than government-initiated projects, in order to contain domestic and international repercussions.[52]

However, reinstating civil society engagement with North Korea will not somehow inevitably build trust. Kim Sung-chull and David C.

[50]Anthony Kuhn, 'In South Korea, Summit With North Korea Is Greeted With Hope—And Skepticism', NPR.org, 27 April 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/04/27/606358775/in-south-korea-summit-with-north-korea-is-greeted-with-hope-and-skepticism.

[51]KBS, 'Trump Seeks to Keep Seoul Tough on N. Korean Denuclearization', KBS World Radio, 30 March 2018, http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_Po_detail.htm?No=135103.

[52]'Seoul Lets NGO Contact North Korea to Discuss Renewed Cooperation', *The Japan Times*, 26 May 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/05/26/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/seoul-lets-ngo-contact-north-korea-discuss-renewed-cooperation/.

Kang point out that improving the inter-Korean relationship is "tied up with credibility issues that arise in the course of conditional, tit-for-tat engagement".[53] Without considering the division-system, state-system, and the relational level in the Korean conflict, any civil society peacebuilding activities would be unrealistic and ineffective. North Korea has been always suspicious of South Korean civil society intentions and has limited what they consider to be unnecessary interaction. The North Korean regime can always deny access for South Korean NGOs to North Korea. South Korean civil society peacebuilding is not independent from South Korean government control as well; the South Korean government can always halt the work of South Korean NGOs in North Korea. Noticeably, the suspension of South Korean civil peacebuilding in 2010 greatly affected the trust-building process with their counterparts in North Korea. The vulnerability of civil peacebuilding in the Korean peninsula highlights the fact that any civil peacebuilding projects in the Korean peninsula needs a conflict sensitive strategy, which includes rigorous conflict analysis, constant monitoring and a responsive evaluation, and simultaneously takes into consideration the different levels of response and peacebuilding objectives in the Korean conflict.

This strategic discussion is not only applicable to peacebuilding activities at social issue and relational levels, but also at the state and division-system levels, such as the high-level negotiations for the denuclearisation of North Korea. There have been several suggestions and agreements on simultaneously pursuing "a formal end of the Korean War through normalized relations with the United States" and the denuclearisation of North Korea.[54] However, Lederach says "signed papers do not make a difference, and the agreements collapse unless the processes of genuine engagement are created".[55] An agreement reached in a political peace process is the beginning of a new relationship and trust building process between the conflict parties under the agreed structure.

[53]Kim and Kang, 'Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion', 12–14.

[54]Yongshik D. Bong, 'Wating to Reap the Final Harvest: U.S. Engagement Policy to Denuclearize North Korea', in *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, ed. Sung Chull Kim and David C. Kang (New York: State University of New York Press, 2010), 40.

[55]John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, Reprint edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 49.

But, Chapter 4 showed how the high-level negotiations on North Korean denuclearisation have been driven by events and the agreements between states, instead of building relationships in different levels of society. The agreements on denuclearisation, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework and the September 19 Joint Declaration, broke down, due to mistrust among the conflict parties about the implementation of the agreements. This mistrust still exists. During his visit to China in 2018, Kim Jong-un was reported to have said, "If South Korea and the United States respond with goodwill to our efforts, and create an atmosphere of peace and stability, and take phased, synchronized measures to achieve peace, the issue of the denuclearization of the peninsula can reach resolution."[56] But, the US seems to prefer that North Korea denuclearise before they take any action for peacebuilding with North Korea. This would not be agreeable for North Korea and the negotiation will face an impasse if the current US administration requires that North Korea gives in first, as in the case of Libya.[57]

As we have discussed, placing too much emphasis on state level implementation can decrease the chances of making progresses in negotiations, as well as the durability of an agreement, because of the historical mistrust among the conflict parties. This is why negotiations on the denuclearisation of North Korea need to be reflected by other peacebuilding activities at other levels of the societies. Maria Lange says "certain types of activities cannot in themselves lead to sustainable peace, but need to be linked to the wider efforts of other actors."[58] A sustainable peace process requires a sustainable platform where diverse actors can maintain and increase interdependent relationship building capacities alongside high-level efforts, to reach and implement formal peace agreements. Kim and Kang say that in order to "convince North Korea that full cooperation for denuclearization would serve the country's

[56]Steven Lee Myers and Jane Perlez, 'Kim Jong-Un Met With Xi Jinping in Secret Beijing Visit', *The New York Times*, 27 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/world/asia/kim-jong-un-china-north-korea.html.

[57]'Trump Should Insist on Libya-Style Denuclearization for North: Bolton', *Reuters*, 23 March 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-bolton-northkorea/trump-should-insist-on-libya-style-denuclearization-for-north-korea-bolton-idUSKBN1GZ37A.

[58]Maria Lange, *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice: The Case of International NGOs* (London: International Alert, 2004), 8.



Fig. 8.2 An example of strategic overlaps (The design of this figure was inspired by the 'Nepal Peace and Development Strategy 2010–2015', 7 January 2011, 3, https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-peace-and-development-strategy-2010-2015 and Kim, 'Aid to the Enemy: Linking Development and Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula', 493)

best national interest", the conflict parties need "to construct foundations that will help the peninsula distance itself from the legacy of the Korean War and facilitate the normalization of relations between the two countries".[59] In other words, denuclearisation negotiations in the Korean conflict must consider not only the role of the states, but also the role of civil society groups working on diverse social and relational issues in the Korean conflict, in order to construct these foundations. For example, peacebuilding activities of the South Korean and US NGOs in North Korea could be strategically linked to confidence building measures in the denuclearisation process by changing the perception of North Korean citizens about the need for nuclear weapons. An example of broad picture and strategic overlaps of comprehensive peacebuilding strategy on the Korean peninsula may look like this as shown in Fig. 8.2.

Another case of strategic overlap would be civil society efforts to address child malnutrition in North Korea, which require both

[59] Kim and Kang, 'Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion', 14.

immediate nutritious food assistance and longer-term development assistance, linked directly with the peace and unification process at the state level. As discussed in Chapter 7, if Korea politically reunited today, issues related to North Korean children, such as health and education, would cause serious conflict, and possibly violence, given the existing economic inequality and the fierce competition in education in South Korea. That is why we must find the strategic overlaps between diverse peacebuilding activities and ask 'how' to collaborate, instead of being stuck in one's own silo. And, in order to guarantee sustainability and effectiveness, collaboration needs to be connected to the broader peacebuilding strategy, agreed to by all the conflict parties, including North Korea.

As discussed above, the North Korean government has been suspicious of the intentions of South Korean civil society groups and international organisations working in North Korea. From the perspective of the North Korean regime, South Korean and international NGOs could be seen as agents to facilitate western style liberal reforms in North Korea. Therefore, a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy, which reflects the local context and the needs of the North Korean people, must be developed in partnership with North Korea, as in the argument of strategic peacebuilding. Dean Ouellette says, "points of contact must be found within the spaces where the North Korean leadership feels less threatened and/or willing to allow for positive people-to-people interaction".[60] If peacebuilding actors insists on their own prescriptions, the civil society interactions with North Korean society would be continuously limited.

In conclusion, a sustainable peacebuilding strategy requires genuine spaces of accessible public engagement and coordination of multiple activities and multiple roles, at multiple levels, rather than focusing only on the government-level negotiations, and liberal state-building. As we discussed throughout this book, civil society has a great potential to fill the peacebuilding gaps in the Korean peace process. But, civil society alone cannot make peacebuilding sustainable. A viable peacebuilding strategic framework in the Korean peninsula, based on an exploration of the meaning of peace for the diverse groups in the Korean conflict, and the analysis of their needs in the context, is required to

[60] Dean Ouellette, 'Building Trust on the Margins of Inter-Korean Relations: Revitalizing the Role of South Korean NGOs', *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 22, no. 2 (2013): 130.

develop a sustainable platform for people to build just and peaceful relationships.[61] If linked with this strategic framework, comprehensively agreed to by the concerned actors, including governments, there is a better chance for the diverse civil society actors in the Korean peace process to contribute to a denuclearisation process, better inter-Korean relations, and improved quality of life and human rights of citizens in both North and South Korea.

[61] Kab Woo Koo, *Pip'anjŏk p'yŏnghwayŏn'guwa Hanbanto* [Critical Peace Research and the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Humanitas, 2007), 96–98.

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Index

D. J. Kim, *The Korean Peace Process and Civil Society*,
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97100-1

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