RETHINKING PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES
Series Editor: Oliver P. Richmond

Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding

Development of Local Peacebuilding Models

SungYong Lee

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

Series Editor
Oliver P. Richmond
University of Manchester
Manchester, UK

This agenda-setting series of research monographs, now more than a decade old, provides an interdisciplinary forum aimed at advancing innovative new agendas for approaches to, and understandings of, peace and conflict studies and International Relations. Many of the critical volumes the series has so far hosted have contributed to new avenues of analysis directly or indirectly related to the search for positive, emancipatory, and hybrid forms of peace. New perspectives on peacemaking in practice and in theory, their implications for the international peace architecture, and different conflict-affected regions around the world, remain crucial. This series' contributions offers both theoretical and empirical insights into many of the world's most intractable conflicts and any subsequent attempts to build a new and more sustainable peace, responsive to the needs and norms of those who are its subjects.

More information about this series at
http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14500

SungYong Lee

Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding

Development of Local Peacebuilding Models

palgrave
macmillan

SungYong Lee
University of Otago
Dunedin, New Zealand

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies
ISBN 978-3-319-98610-4 ISBN 978-3-319-98611-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018951035

Cover credit: AWSeebaran/GettyImages

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This research project is indebted to support from numerous people. I am immensely grateful to all those who spent time to sit and share with me their experience, knowledge, wisdom, and insights relevant to the research. Although I decided not to give their names to avoid any unintended consequences as a result of this publication, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to them.

My debt of gratitude is owed to Jeremy Simons and Bunly Soeung who, during my field studies, went out of their way to facilitate contacts, organise interviews, answer my numerous questions, and test my findings and arguments. I am grateful for great advice from Ed Garcia, Fr. Albert E. Alejo, Hyeyoung Shin, and Sowath Loeurm on the case studies of Mindanao and Cambodia. Without their considerate support, I would have been unable to identify the mistakes and limitations in the earlier drafts.

Thanks are due to the students who did great RA work: Jonathan Sutton, Aidan Gnoth, Nick Tobia, Mahdis Azarmandi, and Joanna Tang. Rosemary McBryde deserves special mention for her limitless support in editing and proofreading the manuscript.

I would like to thank my colleagues—Kevin Clements, Richard Jackson, Heather Devere, Katerina Standish, Mariska Kappmeier, Rachel Rafferty and Ria Shibata—and students at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, who have helped shape my thoughts on the project. Outside the University of Otago,

Patrik Johansson, WookBeom Park, Yuji Uesugi, Yoshiaki Furuzawa, and Alpaslan Özerdem have all contributed to my thinking on this topic.

I am grateful for the research grants from the University of Otago, which enabled my field studies to Cambodia and Mindanao, the Philippines in 2016 as well as a few more related field visits.

During my half year research and study leave in 2018, Professors Jae Woo Hong, Sang Hyeb Lee, and Soyeon Kim very kindly invited me to their institutes as a visiting scholar. Thanks to their hospitality, I was able to develop and finish this book volume.

I would like to acknowledge the work of Professor Oliver Richmond (the series editor) as well as Sarah Roughley (the commissioning editor) and Oliver Foster (editorial assistant) at Palgrave Macmillan. It is a bit awkward to highlight the contribution of Oliver Richmond in this part since Professor Richmond's academic work is foundational to my project.

My academic advisers, Professor Roger Mac Ginty, Professor Shin-wha Lee, and Professor Alan Hunter deserve special mention for their constant inspiration and care.

Dr. Daisaku Ikeda has provided much philosophical foundation for my journey of peace research.

In Korean tradition, the most important people are mentioned in the last section. I express my heartfelt thanks to Eunyoung Judy Cho for her love, wisdom, and constant encouragement. My two kids, Suhyun and Soyul: although you more often obstructed than supported my work on this project, your healthy growth proves that I can be a father, husband, teacher, and researcher at the same time. Thank you.

Contents

Abbreviations

A3B	Applying Binding, Bonding and Bridging, a series of capacity building programmes implemented by CRS (Mindanao)
ADHOC	The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (Cambodia)
ALTSEAN-Burma	The Alternative ASEAN Network for Burma
APCET	The Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor
APSOC	The Asia-Pacific Solidarity Coalition
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BIFF	The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (Mindanao)
BMWF	The Bangsa Moro Women's Foundation (Mindanao)
BP	Banteay Prieb (Cambodia)
CARHRIHL	Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (Mindanao)
CBCS	The Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (Mindanao)
CBOs	Community-based organisations
CCC	The Cooperative Committee for Cambodia (Cambodia)
CEDAC	The Cambodian Center for Study and Development in Agriculture (Cambodia)
CGDK	The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia)
CIDSE	Cooperation International pour le Development et la Solidarite, the forerunner of DPA (Cambodia)
CPBC	The Convention of Philippine Baptist Churches (Mindanao)
CPP	The Communist Party of the Philippines (Mindanao)
CRS	Catholic Relief Service

DPA	Development and Partnership (Cambodia)
FA	Village level farmers' associations (Cambodia)
FUNCINPEC	The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Cambodia)
GPH	The Government of the Philippines
GPPAC	The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
ICRtoP	The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (Mindanao)
IID	Initiatives for International Dialogue, a local peacebuilding organisation in Mindanao (Mindanao)
ILFARM-TK	Improvement of Livelihood of Small Farmers in Tram Kok, a project for the intensification and diversification of agricultural products (Cambodia)
IMNSJ	The Independent Monk Network for Social Justice (Cambodia)
JICA	The Japan International Cooperation Agency
JMA	Jamaah Al Muhajirin wal Anshor (Mindanao)
KEAP	The Khmer Buddhist Education Assistance Project (Cambodia)
KPNLF	The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (Cambodia)
KUFNS	The Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (Cambodia)
MFIs	Microfinancing institutes/units
MILF	The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Mindanao)
MinCODE	The Mindanao Caucus of Development NGO Networks (Mindanao)
MNLF	The Moro National Liberation Front (Mindanao)
MPC	Mindanao Peoples Caucus (Mindanao)
MPPM	Mindanao People's Peace Movement (Mindanao)
MPW	The Mindanao Peaceweavers (Mindanao)
MVP	The Madaris Volunteer Programme (Mindanao)
NAP	Natural Agri-Product Cooperative (Cambodia)
NCCP	The National Council of Churches in the Philippines (Mindanao)
NCDD	The National Committee for Democratic Development at the Sub-National Democratic Development (Cambodia)
NDF	The National Democratic Front of the Philippines (Mindanao)
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
NPA	New People's Army (Mindanao)

OND	The Society of Oblates of Notre Dame, a congregation of female apostolates in Cotabato (Mindanao)
POs	People's organisations
PRA	Peacebuilding practitioner who requested anonimity
PRK	The People's Republic of Kampuchea (Cambodia)
PWD	People with disability
SALAM	The Social Amelioration and Literacy Agenda for Muslims (Mindanao)
SIDA	The Swedish International Development Agency
SRI	System of Rice Intensification, a type of agricultural programme
TACDRUP	The Technical Assistance Center for Development of Rural and Urban Poor (Mindanao)
TVET	The Technical Vocational Education and Training
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	The UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTAC	The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Cambodia)
WDO	The Wholistic Development Organisation (Cambodia)
WFDA	The World Forum for Democratization in Asia (Mindanao)

List of Figures

List of Tables

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Local ownership has been a buzzword in international peacebuilding over the past two decades. Since the late 1990s when the limitations of mainstream liberal peacebuilding models became evident, various ways to promote local ownership as an alternative or supplement to the liberal models have been explored in both academic debates and the field practice of peacebuilding. The assumption is that peacebuilding will be more legitimate and sustainable when local people control and/or influence the design and implementation of their own peacebuilding programmes. In field practice, the UN recognised national/local ownership as "the single most important determinant" of effective peacebuilding (UNSG 2002) and acknowledged that no international initiative "imposed from the outside can hope to be successful or sustainable" (UNSG 2004). Major seminal documents of the UN in this period emphasised local ownership as a central feature of its peacebuilding, some of which include *No Exit Without Strategy* (2001), *the Brahimi Report* (2000), *Responsibility to Protect* (2001), *In Larger Freedom* (2005), and *Governance for Peace* (2012).

Supporting this new direction, many international organisations and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in the peacebuilding sector have developed and applied various strategies to enable local actors to participate in their own peacebuilding programmes at both national and sub-national levels. Such commitment was reconfirmed in the documents issued in major international conferences of peacebuilding actors, such as *the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1_1

(2005), *the Accra Agenda for Action* (2008), and *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (2012). By the mid-2000s, the promotion of local ownership emerged as "a key principle of civil conflict management" (Ropers 2000, cited in Reich 2006, 27).

In academic debates, an extensive discourse has developed to explore how local peacebuilding actors develop their own models of post-conflict reconstruction, and examine various dimensions of local ownership from conceptual, theoretical and empirical perspectives. Although detailed arguments vary, these studies by and large rectify the perceived 'hubris' of liberal interventions and support context sensitive bottom-up approaches that respect and reflect local/indigenous knowledge (Richmond 2008; Mac Ginty 2008; Smillie 2001; Campbell et al. 2011; Donais 2012; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). While rooted in the practice/discourse of international development, the term 'local turn' is now one of the central debates in the peacebuilding discourse.

Nevertheless, the contemporary ownership development programmes tend to focus primarily on local capacity building programmes operated by external donor agencies. The local partners for capacity building were selected from the elites who could foster liberal themes. Although these programmes have encouraged more proactive roles for indigenous people, they inevitably contained many paternalistic elements and the real transfer of responsibilities to local structures, politicians and stakeholders has rarely been carried out. Hence, they failed to demonstrate how local actors can develop real ownership under the external actors' paternalistic advocacy. Pointing out this limitation, studies state that the previous attempt for local ownership had frequently been not much more than lip service (Boege et al. 2009a), more about locals' ownership based on externals' ideas (Suhrke 2007), and limited to institutional ownership only while the decision making power still belong to the internationals (Reich 2006, similar views are discussed in Wetterberg et al. 2015; Sommers 2002; Harris 2004; Hasselskog and Schierenbeck 2015; Richmond 2010). Some studies contend that the concept of local ownership itself is being co-opted to meet donors' demands and justify a continued international presence (Scheye and Peake 2005; Chesterman 2007; Pietz and von Carlowitz 2007).

Between 2012 and 2014, I had a chance to review the local ownership promotion programmes implemented by international agencies (mainly the UN agencies) in nine different countries, and the key findings are in

line with the above critiques. The project discovered that the reviewed programmes have adopted innovative and interesting features, and subsequently, the level of local participation in various peacebuilding activities was significantly improved. At the same time, it was obvious that the power disparity in favour of international donors clearly persisted. While most donors studied as part of this project made many efforts to acknowledge the local counterparts' perspectives and needs, they still assumed that the promotion of local ownership requires the development of local capacity through the advocacy of external supporters as a prerequisite. Hence, our conclusion was that donors still played the role of agenda setters and the role of local peacebuilding actors tended to remain that of 'customers' who are selecting one of the options provided by external actors or who give feedback and comments on the ongoing programmes (Lee and Özerdem 2015).

Ideas for *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding* were developed in this context. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been approximately. For the first ten years, liberal peacebuilding was uncritically implemented. In the following fifteen years, many international peacebuilding programmes were involved with various efforts to address the limitations of such liberal models and to respect and reflect local contexts. However, as of the mid 2010s, the outputs of such efforts were highly limited, and efforts to address the very structural issue failed.

If this is the case, is it ever possible for authentic local ownership to be developed under the strong influence and advocacy of external intervention? Studies have pointed out various issues ranging from perceptual limitations of the donor community to practical challenges in the post-conflict contexts, which should be transformed in order to promote real local ownership (Donais 2012; Thiessen 2013; Shinoda 2015; Mackenzie-Smith 2015). However, if such perceptual and technical issues are addressed, can the power disparity between donors and local peacebuilders be overcome? Moreover, if this is possible, through what strategies do local peacebuilders develop their own models of peacebuilding? How different are they from the liberal models? What are their significance and limitations as locally-owned peacebuildings?

As will be discussed in the following sections, while the importance and necessity of the local turn has been emphasised and explored in the contemporary academic discourse, in-depth studies on these contexts

have not extensively been undertaken yet. Many of the empirical studies until today come with sizeable caveats: the recognition of limitations such as co-operation and limited data-sets. Moreover, many of them rely on description of local contexts incorporated in certain peacebuilding programmes and their achievements, assuming that such cultural reflection was indeed a critical factor. Hence, many important questions related to local ownership of peacebuilding, including the central question of this book, still remain barely analysed.

Thus, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding* primarily aims to investigate and analyse the empirical evidence observed in Cambodia and Mindanao, which will further develop the ongoing academic debates on local turn. Based on the author's field studies in both countries, this study examines specifically how local agencies in Cambodia and Mindanao (the Philippines) have developed their own models of peacebuilding under the strong influence of external intervention. It identifies four distinct patterns in the development of local peacebuilders' ownership: ownership inheritance from external advocates, mobilisation of alternative funding sources, incorporation of local perspectives within conventional models of collaboration, and utilisation of religious/traditional leadership. This book then analyses each pattern, focusing on its operational features, its significance and its limitations as a model of locally-driven peacebuilding.

In addition, this book intends to report up-to-date information on the peacebuilding development in the two Southeast Asian countries. While a wide range of examples from the peace processes in Africa, Europe and Latin America have been recognised and discussed, the contemporary efforts for promoting locally-led peacebuilding models in Asia have attracted significantly less academic attention. Although the post-war reconstruction processes in Cambodia and Timor-Leste were subject to extensive debates in the early phases of their development, studies of recent developments in these countries are much less abundant and generally only examine a couple of particular field programmes. Hence, greater efforts need to be made to combine, compare, and contrast these scattered findings and arguments regarding local ownership promotion in Asia. This book will address this gap by analysing a dozen selected grassroots peacebuilding programmes developed in the two Southeast Asian countries.

Key Concepts and Bedrock Theories

This section will clarify core concepts and theoretical discussions that form the central framework for analysis. In the first part, it will introduce how this volume defines key terms: peacebuilding, local, local peacebuilder, and external agencies. The latter half will offer a concise overview of the conventional debates on three theoretical concepts: local ownership, hybrid peace and everyday peace.

Key Definitions

Firstly, in selecting peacebuilding activities, the meaning of peace in this study is in line with Barash and Webel (2009, 7)'s definition of positive peace: "a social condition in which exploitation is minimized or eliminated and in which there is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying structural violence". Moreover, the term peacebuilding broadly denotes a wide range of institutionalised programs or less formal activities that pursue such positive peace in conflict-affected societies. The peacebuilding agencies usually "frame their campaigns, services and other activities within a peace perspective or advocacy for peace, or at the least undertake peace-related activities and consider themselves peace organis[s]ations" (Coronel-Ferrer 2005, 1). These agencies may be organisations that put peace and peacebuilding in their core identity, or may be the entities whose primary identity is set in other frames but include peace-supporting activities as their core programmes.

The case studies are selected according to the social, historical and political context of Cambodia and Mindanao (the Philippines). As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, while relief and protection, conflict resolution, and social reconciliation are particularly highlighted as major agenda in Mindanao, various types of development are becoming more dominant forms of peacebuilding in Cambodia. Moreover, this study limits the scope of empirical analysis to the more institutionalised and/or visible forms of peacebuilding. Such institutionalised programmes are just a small part of the peacebuilding in a society, which involves a lot more than official project-based activities. This limit is set because institutionalised forms are more suitable in exploring the central question in that they normally emerge through the interaction between external supporters and local peacebuilding actors.

Secondly, to define and identify 'local' in peacebuilding is not straightforward. Since the academic debates on local turn were developed, 'who we mean by local?' has formed a core conceptual discourse (Mac Ginty 2011). In the previous political or scholarly discourse, 'local' was used to denote the actors at different levels of governance or geographical areas, ranging from a sub-continent (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) to a small village (Lee and Özerdem 2015). Moreover, the same level of governance can consist of various groups of locals who have dissimilar and frequently contradictory interests and ideas.

Out of various locals in a society, which local does this study denote? To offer a universal definition or to integrate the theoretical discussions on this topic is not the objective of this study. Instead, this study pays particular attention to the 'locals at grassroots levels'. Although there are exceptions, by using the terms 'local,' 'local community' or 'community residents,' it denotes people at fundamental units (e.g., *phum* or village in Cambodia and *barangayi* in Mindanao) or targeted specific groups of people (e.g., victims of land distributions in Cambodia or returnees from evacuation in Mindanao). Moreover, main case studies are selected from peacebuilding programmes that enjoy high popularity among the target communities. In other words, while these programmes may not incorporate the priorities of *all* locals, they are recognised as important and necessary by the majority of locals.

Moreover, this study uses the terms like local peacebuilders, local agencies, or local actors to denote the key promoters of local peacebuilding. These terms denote agencies at grassroots levels (e.g., individuals, non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, or informal associations) who make deliberate efforts to nurture peaceful coexistence between different social groups and/or to foster sustainable social development. Since the identification of locals and local peacebuilders needs nuanced and extensive discussion, Chapter 2 is allocated to introduce the locals and local peacebuilders in Cambodia and Mindanao, the Philippines and this section will not touch upon these issues.

However, it should be mentioned that local peacebuilders do not necessarily share the same identity with the grassroots population in the target areas of their programmes. In many cases the peacebuilders are local elites in terms of family background, level of education and/or accessibility to resources. Moreover, especially in Mindanao, local

peacebuilders may not be people from the areas where their programmes are implemented. Hence, although these peacebuilders make serious efforts to reflect and represent the local communities' interests and perspectives, this study assumes that they may have their own interests distinct from local communities. In this sense, they tend to play the role of mediator who links local communities with external actors (e.g., especially international aid agencies in this study) rather than function a part of the local communities.

Finally, the terms external supporters, advocates, and interveners denote the peace supporting agencies that have a central leadership role outside of the areas and are usually involved in peacebuilding activities in other areas as well. In many conventional studies, local ownership has been analysed based on the binary categorisation of local vs. international. Hence, external influence was frequently conceptualised as something coming from foreign actors who represent a liberal peacebuilding agenda. Nevertheless, as discussed in recent studies (Belloni 2012; Kappler 2015; Hellmüller 2017), international peacebuilding actors are by no means a monogamous group. Particularly in Mindanao, the peacebuilders who are considered as 'external' by local communities frequently move beyond the boundary of foreigners and include, for example, Filipino agencies like humanitarian organisations from northern islands and the 'Christian' civil society actors in non-Islamic areas.

Moreover, the areas of contention between local and external actors are not limited to liberal norms. Local peacebuilders have been introduced to a variety of ideas by external actors, which range from fundamental life philosophy (i.e., the Christian value of self-dedication, the meaning of compassion) to highly practical and operational features (i.e. age range of youth, regulations for financial transparency); these ideas have influenced and restricted the activities of local peacebuilders in different ways. Hence, in this volume, the term 'external' will be preferred to 'international' for denoting external actors who have influence on local peacebuilding practice unless it specifically indicates the so called 'international community' or particular foreign agencies. Moreover, the term 'norm' will be broadly used to denote various ways of thinking, standards, criteria and patterns, applied by external peacebuilding supporters.

Local Ownership, Hybrid Peace, and Everyday Peace

Of a wide range of theoretical debates on *local turn* of peacebuilding, this study aims to make contributions to four specific lines of discussions, namely norm diffusions into local communities, binary conceptualisation of international vs. local, power disparity between donors and aid recipients, and the complexities in the identities of local. Each of these debates will be reviewed and critically revisited based on the findings in the four case studies chapters and the conclusion.

Before developing discussions on such specific debates, however, this section offers a concise overview of the previous academic discourse on *local turn* in peacebuilding, which forms a theoretical and conceptual bedrock of the analytical framework of this study. Specifically, it will introduce and review the conventional academic debates on local ownership, hybrid peace and everyday peace, and explain how these concepts were adopted and applied in the empirical examination of the case studies of Cambodia and Mindanao.

Local Ownership

Until the 1980s, the discourse on 'local ownership and control' had been conducted in anthropological, sociological and developmental studies from the post-colonialist perspectives and 'people centred development'. From these perspectives, returning the ownership of local governance was considered a form of 'justice' that brings the sovereignty back to the people in the society. For instance, David Korten (1990, 218) mentioned "the people must control their own resources, have access to relevant information, and have the means to hold the officials of government accountable" in order to gain freedom and democracy.

Local ownership was emphasized in Peace and Conflict Studies with a call for a context sensitive bottom-up approach that emphasizes local/indigenous knowledge as an alternative to the dominant liberal peacebuilding models (Craig and Porter 2006; Richmond 2006, 2011; Orr 2005; Paris 1997, 2010; Mac Ginty 2011). Normative discussions advocated the promotion of local ownership as *desirable* in that it supports local people's rights to self-determination and offers more emancipatory modes for participation. In the studies developed from post-colonial perspectives, in particular, the concept of local ownership was framed in the context of foreign interference of local sovereignty, and local's

development of ownership was considered as a tool to resist against international forces, especially Western states.

In addition, an increasing number of studies empirically demonstrated the practical utilities of local models. These studies argue that the peacebuilding models developed by sub-national agencies and local actors can be more effective and efficient as they are more context sensitive, specific and therefore relatable and relevant (Paffenholz 2015). One area to which many studies pay attention, for example, is the legitimacy of peacebuilding and studies confirm that the legitimacy of new governance/peacebuilding programmes can be strengthened by adopting authentic local values and norms and generating a more nuanced understanding of local contexts (Kappler 2015; Arandel et al. 2015). In addition, the adoption of local perspectives may enable peacebuilders to overcome the operational limitations set by liberal peacebuilding (e.g., blueprint-type operational plans, institution-oriented approaches) and come up with innovative and culturally more compatible strategies (Arandel et al. 2015; Gibson and Woolcock 2008). Local actors may also be better in mobilizing local resources and expanding social networks, which are essential for settling peacebuilding at local levels (Hughes 2011).

In contrast, advanced local ownership and the hybridity incorporating local contexts do not necessarily bring about desired outcomes. More cautious studies warn that local contexts shouldn't be romanticized, questioning 'if the local contexts are so perfect, why had the societies gone through long and violent armed conflicts?' Instead, many conflict-affected countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia have been serious affected by a long history of colonization and/or economic inequality. Moreover, in the aftermath of armed conflicts, a society presents a wide range of social problems such as psychological war-trauma, a distorted war economy, widespread violence, and a high level of corruption. Under such circumstances, the simple transfer of the ownership of peacebuilding programmes to a local population is risky and is likely to end in failure (Richmond 2009; Mac Ginty 2011; Futamura and Notaras 2011; Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Reich 2006).

Hence, indigenous cultures do not necessarily provide good sources of stable peace and sustainable development. Previous studies warn of potential/evident problems generated by advanced local ownership, which include local attempts to overturn the peace arrangement, peacebuilding exclusive serving the interests of local elites, self-harming

practices of unprofessional locals, and constant disputes between local agencies at different levels (Barnett et al. 2014; Nadarajah and Rampton 2015; Millar 2014; Wallis et al. 2016; Mickler 2013; Raeymaekers 2013; Jarstad and Olsson 2012). Moreover, other studies highlight locally-driven peacebuilding's limited structural impact. For instance, Henriques (2011, 173) presents that while Peace Laboratories in Colombia have "shown remarkable success at the micro level," the overall trends in Colombia head "in the precise opposite direction."

Hybrid Peace

'Hybridity' or 'hybrid peace' has been conceptualised as a way to understand how actual processes of peacebuilding are formed. Studies utilise the concept to move beyond a binary conceptualisation of external/indigenous dichotomy and explore peacebuilding as a more flexible and dynamic process.

As contemporary peacebuilding emerged in the post-Cold War period, few local actors can be insulated from the strong influence of Western donor agencies. All mainstream reconstruction processes from emergency relief to social reconciliation are either promoted or advocated by various types of Western supporters, the new central government or other local NGOs. Hence, apart from a number of initiatives led by local religious leaders, there are few grassroots organisations that can promote entirely free from external influence (Richmond 2010). In contrast, although such external interveners' influence is strong, the implementation of Western interveners' values and perspectives can only be done through local agencies' "refurbishing and interpretation" and the final forms of implementation become the locally-driven contextualisation of the external models (as seen, for example, in the discussions of Reynolds et al. 2006, 298; Boyden and Mann 2005; White 2002; Woodhead 2006; Merry 2006, on the international norms of children's rights and women's rights).

From this perspective, a large number of studies demonstrate that, since the presence of the local is a constitutive marker of hybridity, to elucidate the local also serves to substantiate hybridity. For instance, Öjendal and Lilja (2009) explained how the patron-client system tradition was institutionalized within a formal democratic governing structure during the democratisation process in post-war Cambodia. By focusing on everyday agencies (individuals or organisations) of peacebuilding, an

edited volume of Richmond and Mitchell (2011) presents many examples of hybrid peace, which were formed through constant interaction between external interveners' perspectives and their local counterparts' responses. Höglund and Orjuela (2012) argue and describe how the dissimilar and frequently contradictory positions of external donor groups and national actors complicate the interaction between them. A large volume of studies empirically examine the hybrid nature of the peacebuilding processes in different areas, some of which include Congo (Raeymaekers 2013), Sierra Leone (Tom 2013), Iraq (Henrizi 2015), Somalia (Moe 2015), Bouganville (Wallis 2012), Laos (Owen 2010), and Haiti (Donais and Burt 2015).

Hybrid peace can be either positive or negative. When it is utilized to address and resolve tensions between local and international peacebuilders, hybrid peace can be emancipatory and contributive. It may balance and legitimise multiple levels/different versions of peacebuilding practice. From this perspective, studies have proposed certain models of hybridity as goals to pursue, which can offer a better space for reflecting and harmonizing both non-Western norms and ideas as well as Western peacebuilding structures and delivery modes (Boege et al. 2008, 2009a, b; Barcham 2005; Clements 2009; Richmond 2010; Hoehne 2006; Moe 2009). A representative example of such academic studies by Boege et al. (2009b) that proposes various suggestions for incorporating liberal institutionalism with locally-available resources for peacebuilding in Pacific countries like Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. By using the concept of 'grounded legitimacy,' the study particularly demonstrates the different ways to develop linkages between central state institutions and local customary authorities. The examination of the UNDP's *Infrastructures for Peace* projects by Kumar and Haye (2012) highlights that the success of hybrid peace is determined more by the process (i.e., constant and close dialogue between actors) than the final outputs (i.e., certain types of hybrid governance).

In contrast, in the contemporary peacebuilding processes a wide range of hybrid models appeared that are negatively instrumentalised, artificial, hegemonic, and one-sided (either highly international or local) (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016). In these models, the framework of hybridity tended to be utilized by the power holders as a conceptual tool to ignore tension with their counterparts (mostly locals whose interests are subordinated) and obscure the power distribution between them.

Hence, the hybrid governance models may eventually sustain the structural status quo in the conflict-affected societies (Richmond 2015; Dibley 2014). Millar (2014) proposes a typology of hybridity with four models—institutional, practical, ritual, and conceptual—and describes how these models may fail to deal with complex challenges in post-conflict societies. Tardy (2014) argues that hybrid peace may be more vulnerable to challenges such as institutional redundancy, incoherence, and accountability.

Everyday Peace

Although the locally-driven models of peacebuilding reviewed in this publication are not limited to the forms of everyday peace, the contemporary academic debates on everyday peace offer many insights relevant to this project. According to Roger Mac Ginty (2014), everyday peace denotes "the practices and norms deployed by individuals and groups in deeply divided societies to avoid and minimi[s]e conflict and awkward situations at both inter- and intra-group levels" (Mac Ginty 2014, 553). A few examples of such everyday practice are avoidance (of contentious topics of conversation, offensive displays or high-risk people), ambiguity (with sensitive issues), ritualised politeness, telling of social identification/categorisation, and blame deferring to outsiders.

The discourse on *everyday* in peacebuilding is relatively new. Many studies emerged in the late 2000s while attempting to identify and address the limitations of conventional liberal peacebuilding. It is risky to disconnect many of such liberal models, that primarily focus on formal institutional spheres, from the everyday lives of those in conflicts; thus, studies acknowledge the significance of less visible practices of peacebuilding that are carried out by local populations, and the proposed conceptual framework to properly examine these practices, by focusing on indigenous cultural/social resources or local communities' *everyday*. From a more normative perspective, such everyday forms of peacebuilding can constitute more *emancipatory* and *bottom-up* approaches placing locals at the centre of peacebuilding (Brāuchler 2015; Richmond and Mitchell 2011; Mac Ginty 2014; Berents and McEvoy-Levy 2015; Felix da Costa and Karlsrud 2012; Tadjbakhsh 2011).

The utilities of everyday have been explored from conceptual, theoretical and practical perspectives (Randazzo 2016). A group of studies highlight that the non-institutional qualities of everyday enable researchers

and field practitioners to avoid unrealistic notions of linear process or sequential time and accurately see the complex reality (Castañeda 2009; Mac Ginty 2008). Moreover, the discourse on everyday brings into the mainstream academic debates many dimensions of peacebuilding that occur in local people's lives such as identify transformation, continued inter-personal and inter-group engagement, unofficial negotiation between elites and *ordinary* people (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008; Lidén 2009; Richmond 2009, 2010).

Out of various insights that such discourse has generated, one contention that is particularly relevant to local ownership building is that there are a wide range of local societies' inner resources that cannot be fully recognised, utilized or developed through the analytical lens of external actors. Hence, if local actors' modes of peacebuilding are to be fully applied and developed, supporters argue, the fundamental approaches to peacebuilding have to be constructed from local actors' perspectives. These modes cover a much wider range of practice (which appear in people's everyday lives) than the official or institutional arenas of peacebuilding that the mainstream post-war reconstruction processes primarily emphasise.

There have been criticisms of some limitations of everyday peace practices. For instance, everyday peace is frequently designed and implemented within (rather than challenging) a power context that is in favour of one certain social group over others. Moreover, the strategies for everyday peace may include the actions of insincerity, which require more prudent and careful examination to identify the real intention lying behind an action. The actions of everyday peace may be more about conflict management to control the level of violence and risk at stake, rather than conflict transformation that attempts to address root causes of social conflicts (Mac Ginty 2014). These features are relevant to many locally-driven models of peacebuilding in Mindanao and Cambodia. As will appear in the case study chapters, however, these features of local-level peacebuilding do not necessarily present the *limitations*. Instead, many operational features, designed to bring about consolidated peace in a conflict-driven society, that may look insufficient or undesirable from external commentators' perspectives, are the deliberate choices of local peacebuilders. Local peacebuilders work to maintain their peacebuilding programmes more sustainably in the given structural, social and cultural conditions that they cannot transform immediately.

Conceptual Framework

This section will introduce the central framework for analysis adopted in this volume, which includes the meaning of peacebuilding, a typology of local peacebuilders' strategies for ownership building, analytical approaches to the process and forms of ownership development, and the selection of case studies. Moreover, it will explain how the concepts and theoretical discussions introduced above are critically adopted in the formation of the central framework.

Firstly, this study analyses the promotion of local ownership as an outcome of the interaction between local peacebuilders and other relevant stakeholders (particularly, international donor agencies). The development of local models of peacebuilding is understood as a gradual and positive process through which local peacebuilders can challenge, compromise or modify the forms and standards set by external intervention (e.g., international donors, central government agencies). In terms of the specific analytical framework, this study proposes four distinct patterns of local peacebuilders' ownership development that were prevalent outstanding during the author's field visits to Cambodia and Mindanao and follow-up interviews conducted between 2014 and 2017. These are (1) ownership inheritance from an external advocate, (2) management of external influence, (3) friction-avoiding approaches, and (4) utilisation of religious/traditional leadership.

Moreover, local peacebuilding practices should be recognized as something evolving rather than fixed and as able to adapt to new or transforming realities and the changes in local contexts can be more rapid and radical than academic researchers or peacebuilding practitioners have previous surmised (Wallis 2012; Lee and Park 2018). Hence, while the four patterns above are prevalent with the agencies studied by the author, a more systematic study of a wider range of examples from a longer term perspective to confirm if the model can be generalised, which is beyond the scope of this project.

Secondly, theories of hybrid peace will be utilised to conceptualize various forms of peacebuilding, and the outputs of interaction between different actors. In particular, this study moves beyond the binary conceptualisation of an external/indigenous dichotomy and instead understands peacebuilding as a more flexible and dynamic process (Mac Ginty 2011; Zaum 2012; Belloni 2012). In examining these grassroots models,

it is neither practically useful nor realistic to judge whether a local peacebuilder promotes a purely local model of peacebuilding. The local peacebuilders interviewed during the author's field visits to Cambodia and Mindanao (some of whom are introduced in this book) do not aim to develop 'anti-liberal' or 'non-Western' models of peacebuilding. They tend to be open to *any* strategies or features that are more useful in pursuing their goals, and the models that they promote blend different forms, standards and values promoted by different actors with various backgrounds (e.g., the critical scholars in the global North, traditional rituals prevalent in the local areas, operational tools developed by another NGO in a neighbouring country).

The concept of hybridity is adopted and applied in examining the forms and procedures of local peacebuilding developed in Mindanao and Cambodia. Hybridity is useful in capturing the nature of peacebuilding development, which is determined and transformed by the compromise between different motivations posed by the actors involved. Moreover, the concept encourages people to pay balanced attention to the roles of local actors and international actors in building different peacebuilding models; thus, it offers a good conceptual ground to examine the procedures and outcomes of the interaction of different actors involved in peacebuilding. In short, the Asian models of peacebuilding are investigated in this study as outputs of the grassroots agencies' interaction with other stakeholders; present hybrid forms reflecting both local norms, values and interests as well as Western liberal peacebuilding standards.

Thirdly, the adoption of everyday peace as an analytical framework enables us to examine "mechanisms deployed by so-called ordinary people" who have previously been conceptualised as "insular and passive" (Mac Ginty 2014, 551). In this sense, the analytical foci of this study highlights the strategic behaviour of *local grassroots peacebuilding agencies* vis-à-vis external actors. This is an attempt to address a methodological limitation observed in a wide range of previous empirical studies, which have focused on 'how *international supporters* can foster local peacebuilders'. Although these studies contain a lot of constructive proposals and fair analysis, few of them approach such an issue from the local actors' perspectives. In this sense, this book will turn its attention to local actors, questioning 'how have the grassroots agencies in Asia developed their own models of peacebuilding?' It will present critical reflections on the strategies implemented in two Southeast Asian countries, as well as lessons for promoting effective strategies for local actors

in similar social contexts to develop their own capacities. This approach is expected to reveal that these peacebuilding models are determined and transformed by the compromise between different motivations posed by the actors involved. A few relevant theories which include power and dominance theories (Lukes 2005; Foucault 1979, 1982; Lenski 1984; Gaventa 2003; Vinthagen and Lilja 2015) and theories of social resistance (Scott 1987, 1992; Abu-Lughod 1990; Brown 1996; Helgesson 1999; Lilja et al. 2015) will be used to explain why and how local actors and external interveners interact to determine the key directions of peacebuilding in a certain society.

Fourthly, in evaluating the development of local peacebuilders' ownership, this study adopts two most important indicators: changes in the composition of leadership and/or changes in the dynamics of interaction between locals and externals in the decision making process. Leadership change is a particularly important issue in the NGOs that were established and advocated from their outset (e.g., the Cambodian branch of Oxfam International). In these agencies, the leadership turn-over from foreign staff to local staff is an institutional indicator of local ownership promotion. For local organisations or civil associations that were formed by local actors, one main question is who determines the key direction of peacebuilding programmes. Although it is local people who operate peacebuilding agencies, external donors frequently have strong leverage over the nature of the programmes. These donors' two most important leverages have been financial aid (funding) and skills/knowledge relevant to their projects.

Finally, the peacebuilding programmes in Cambodia and Mindanao are selected for in-depth case studies. What benefits do we get by looking at these two geographical areas in achieving the objective? One main reason for the selection is that Mindanao and Cambodia have long histories of promoting conflict resolution and peacebuilding, which started in the early 1990s. For just under 30 years, the local peacebuilding agencies have mobilised a variety of programmes for conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and the features of many 'older' programmes at local levels have developed and transformed throughout this period of time. Hence, compared to other countries that have a shorter history of peacebuilding, Mindanao and Cambodia have had a longer time for local peacebuilders to mobilise and revisit the unique peacebuilding models.

Another reason is that the presence of the international community was clear and influential in both areas. Cambodia experienced one of

the first *new* interventions of the UN and other international organisations for post-war reconstruction emergent in the post-cold war period (Mayall 1996). The UN assumed the roles of a transitional government until 1993, and approximately 13% of Cambodia's GDP relied on international economic aid during the first 10 years of post-war reconstruction (Ear 2007). Although Mindanao has not gone through such a total upsurge of international intervention, the number of international agencies that initiated or began to support peacebuilding programmes in Mindanao has rapidly increased since the late 1980s, especially after the Marcos regime collapsed. The increased influx of foreign assistance created the dynamics of peacebuilding in the area through interaction with civil society actors who had moved from northern parts of the Philippines, social elites in the local communities, and representatives of indigenous peoples in Mindanao. Hence, most local peacebuilding actors have mobilised and maintained their programmes through the constant interaction with their international advocates.

The study of the two cases requires a couple of caveats. One major caveat is that this project does not aim to generalise the findings to demonstrate common features of *Asian* peacebuilding. In addition to the small number of the research targets, the geographic proximity between the two areas increases the risk of research bias that marginalise the features apparent in other areas. Thus, the aim of this volume is primarily to identify the patterns of local ownership development that are outstanding in two Asian peacebuilding processes as of the mid 2010s. While the conclusion of this volume explores the applicability of the key findings to peacebuilding in other areas, the primary objective of this book is on understanding and explaining Mindanao and Cambodia.

Moreover, while examples from the two areas are occasionally analysed from a comparative perspective, this study does not posit them as the targets for a strict comparative study that aims to "examine patterns of similarities and differences across cases and try to come to terms with their diversity" (Ragin 1994, 107 cited in Neuman 2006, 437). In Mindanao and Cambodia there are a wide range of peacebuilding agencies that have dissimilar backgrounds, structural features, and types of operations. In addition, the four patterns are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Moreover, one peacebuilding agency may demonstrate the strategies relevant to multiple categories of Fig. 1.1. Hence, the identification and analysis of some common features will be limited to the extent to which they are acknowledged by the research participants from



Fig. 1.1 Four patterns of local peacebuilders' ownership development

the local areas. Moreover, although the investigation of various reasons behind different operational features of peacebuilding programmes is important to the understanding of the nature of local peacebuilding, this area of analysis is omitted from the scope of this study due to the size of this volume.

Outline of the Book

This research monograph consists of seven chapters including this introduction. Before moving on to the main empirical studies, Chapter 2 offers readers background information about the two case studies from a comparative perspective. The first half of each case study aims to introduce the historical, social, and contextual issues that determined the nature of peacebuilding and the relations between local stakeholders. The second half explains the major types of peacebuilding programmes and key features of local peacebuilders active in Cambodia and Mindanao.

The following four chapters (Chapters 3–6) examine four behavioural patterns of local peacebuilders as stated above. They examine how the four types of ownership promotion have been employed in the two areas, focusing specifically on the strategies local actors utilize to develop their unique models of peacebuilding, the distinguishing features of each of

these, and their limitations as models of authentically local peacebuilding. Specifically, Chapter 3 introduces the ownership inheritance cases where local actors strengthen their commitment to the peacebuilding programmes concerned through external actors' voluntary ownership transfer. Such ownership inheritance frequently takes place while an organisation initially established by external peacebuilding actors attempts to localise. In other cases, local actors' high-level of commitment is designed and encouraged by external advocates from the outset. From a theoretical perspective, the chapter discusses that the local peacebuilders who inherit the ownership are likely to present different forms of norm diffusion and internalisation, adopting and internalising the value systems or core objectives set by the donor agencies.

Chapter 4 introduces a contrasting approach to ownership development, that entails grassroots peacebuilders' efforts to reduce the influence from external donors by gaining more financial independence. While some peacebuilders operate social entreprise to mobilise their own funding sources, others attempt to diversify donor agencies or create an alliance of local peacebuilding agencies so that they can reduce their reliance on particular donors. Moreover, this chapter explains that the features of peacebuilding models developed by the grassroots peacebuilders may not present non-Western or anti-liberal forms.

In Chapter 5, a non-frictional model of promoting local ownership is explored. In both Cambodia and Mindanao, a large number of local actors choose not to overtly challenge the demands from their international donors. Instead, they attempt to push forward their agenda in the conventional structure for international-local collaboration, by redefining and operationalising the themes proposed by donors and occasionally use smoke-and-mirror strategies. This empirical finding questions whether conventional assumptions of power disparity in favour of donors is indeed valid. The theoretical significance of friction-avoiding approaches as a model of ownership promotion was discussed from two perspectives. On one hand, it offers concrete empirical examples relevant to informal and subtle forms of resistance in local communities' 'everyday peacebuilding'. On the other hand, it discovers the presence of a dual structure of power: while international aid donors may control the official and financial aspects of peacebuilding, it is local actors who determine the unofficial/procedural/operational mechanisms.

Chapter 6 examines a number of peacebuilding programmes developed by religious or traditional leaders in the local communities.

Compared to other types of peacebuilders, religious or traditional leaders have more social capital for mobilising peacebuilding movements and their programmes frequently require less financial resources to maintain. Thus, the peacebuilding in this category is less reliant on external funding and more likely to demonstrate local actors' unique perspectives and cultural contexts from the early stages of their development. At the same time, these leaders' key interests and vision for peace are in many cases significantly different from the perspectives of other community residents, especially youth. Hence, their objectives for peacebuilding programmes may not be supported by wider communities. Based on this, Chapter 6 discusses the identity of local peacebuilders who work for the benefits of local communities but do maintain their own distinct interests and views.

Finally, Chapter 7 integrates the key findings appearing in the previous chapters and discusses their theoretical and practical implications. After summarising the key findings by focusing on three subordinate questions presented above, it revisits the conceptual and theoretical discussions on the meaning of ownership and the forms of local-external collaboration, and elaborates on how they should be interpreted in the context of local peacebuilding in Mindanao and Cambodia.

References

Abu-Lughod, Lila. 1990. The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power Through Bedouin Women. *American Ethnologist* 17 (1): 41–55.

Arandel, Christian, Derick W. Brinkerhoff, and Marissa M. Bell. 2015. Reducing Fragility Through Strengthening Local Governance in Guinea. *Third World Quarterly* 36 (5): 985–1006.

Barash, David, and Charles Webel. 2009. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Barcham, Manuhuia. 2005. Conflict, Violence and Development in the Southwest Pacific: Taking the Indigenous Context Seriously. Working Paper 4/2005, Centre for Indigenous Governance and Development, Massey University, Palmerston North.

Barnett, Michael, Songying Fang, and Christoph Zürcher. 2014. Compromised Peacebuilding. *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (1): 608–620.

Belloni, Roberto. 2012. Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Significance. *Global Governance* 18: 21–38.

Berents, Helen, and Siobhan McEvoy-Levy. 2015. Theorising Youth and Everyday Peace(Building). *Peacebuilding* 3 (2): 115–125.

Boege, Volker, M. Anne Brown, Kevin Clements, and Anna Nolan. 2008. *On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility'*. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict management.

Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clments, and Anna Nolan. 2009a. On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What Is Failing? States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West? In *Building Peace in the Absence of States, Challenging the Discourse on State Failure*, ed. Martina Fisher and Beatrix Schmelzle. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre.

Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clments, and Anna Nolan. 2009b. Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders. *International Peacekeeping* 16 (5): 599–615.

Boyden, Jo, and Gillian Mann. 2005. Children's Risk, Resilience, and Coping in Extreme Situations. In *Handbook for Working with Children and Youth: Pathways to Resilience Across Cultures and Contexts*, ed. Michael Ungar, 3–25. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Brāuchler, Birgit. 2015. *The Cultural Dimension of Peace: Decentralization and Reconciliation in Indonesia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brown, Michael. 1996. On Resisting Resistance. *American Anthropologist* 98 (4): 729–735.

Campbell, Susanna, David Chandler, Meera Sabaratnam, and Others. 2011. *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books.

Castañeda, Carla. 2009. How Liberal Peacebuilding May Be Failing Sierra Leone. *Review of African Political Economy* 36 (120): 235–251.

Chesterman, Simon. 2007. Owership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1 (1): 3–26.

Clements, Kevin. 2009. Internal Dynamics and External Interventions. *Peace Review* 21 (1): 1–12.

Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam. 2005. Institutional Response: Civil Society. A Background paper submitted for the Philippine Human Development Report, The Human Development Network Foundation, Quezon City.

Craig, David, and Doug Porter. 2006. *Development Beyond Neoliberalism?* New York and London: Routledge.

Dibley, Thushara. 2014. *Partnership, Power and Peacebuilding: NGOs as Agents of Peace in Aceh and Timor-Leste*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Donais, Timothy. 2012. *Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Post-conflict Consensus Building*. London and New York: Routledge.

Donais, Timothy, and Geoff Burt. 2015. Peace-Building in Haiti: The Case for Vertical Integration. *Conflict, Security and Development* 15 (1): 1–22.

Ear, Sophal. 2007. The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia. *Asian Journal of Political Science* 15 (1): 68–96.

Felix da Costa, Diana, and John Karlsrud. 2012. Contestualising Libeal Peacebuilding for Local Circumstances: Unmiss and Local Peacebuilding In South Sudan. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7 (2): 53–66.

Foucault, Michel. 1979. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1982. The Subject and Power. *Critical Inquiry* 8 (4): 777–795.

Futamura, Madoka, and Mark Notaras. 2011. *Local Perspectives on International Peacebuilding*. Research Article Series. Tokyo: United Nations University. Available at http://unu.edu/publications/articles/local-perspectives-on-international-peacebuilding.html#info.

Gaventa, John. 2003. *Power After Lukes: A Review of the Literature*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Gibson, Christopher, and Michael Woolcock. 2008. Empowerment, Deliberative Development, and Local-Level Politics in Indonesia: Participatory Projects as a Source of Countervailing Power. *Studies in International Comparative Development* 43 (3–4): 151–180.

Harris, Ian. 2004. Peace Education Theory. *Journal of Peace Education* 1 (1): 5–20.

Hasselskog, Malin, and Isabell Schierenbeck. 2015. National Policy in Local Practice: The Case of Rwanda. *Third World Quarterly* 36 (5): 950–966.

Heathershaw, John, and Daniel Lambach. 2008. Introduction: Post-conflict Spaces and Approaches to Statebuilding. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2 (3): 269–289.

Helgesson, Stefan. 1999. *Sports of Culture: Writing the Resistant Subject in South Africa*. Uppsala: Litteraturvetenska-pilga Institution.

Hellmüller, Sara. 2017. *The Interaction Between Local and International Peacebuilding Actors: Partenrs for Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Henriques, Miguel Barreto. 2011. Peacebuilding from Below in Colombia: The Case Study of the Peace Laboratories. In *Conflict Society and Peacebuilding: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Raffaele Machetti and Natalie Tocci, 173. London and New York: Routledge.

Henrizi, Annika. 2015. Building Peace in Hybrid Spaces: Women's Agency in Iraqi NGOs. *Peacebuilding* 3 (1): 75–89.

Hoehne, Markus. 2006. Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict in Northern Somalia. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 44 (3): 397–414.

Höglund, Kristine, and Camilla Orjuela. 2012. Hybrid Peace Governance and Illiberal Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. *Global Governance* 18 (1): 89–104.

Hughes, Caroline. 2011. The Politics of Knowledge: Ethnicity, Capacity and Return in Post-conflict Reconstruction Policy. *Review of International Studies* 37 (4): 1493–1514.

Jarstad, Anna K., and L. Olsson. 2012. Hybrid Peace Ownership in Afghanistan: International Perspectives of Who Owns What and When. *Global Governance* 18 (1): 105–119.

Kappler, Stefanie. 2015. They Dynamic Local: Delocalisation and (Re-) Localisation in the Search for Peacebuilding Identity. *The Third World Quarterly* 36 (5): 875–889.

Korten, David. 1990. *Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and Global Agenda*. West Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Kumar, Chetan, and Jos De la Haye. 2012. Hybrid Peacemaking: Building National "Infrastructures for Peace". *Global Governance* 18 (1): 13–20.

Lee, SungYong, and Alpaslan Özerdem (eds.). 2015. *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lee, SungYong, and WookBeom Park. 2018. The Dual Track of Democracy Promotion in Post-war Peacebuilding in Cambodia: The Gap Between Institutional Development and Civil Society Mobilisation. *Peacebuilding*. Advance Publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2018.1498671.

Lenski, Gerhard E. 1984. *Power & Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Lidén, Kristoffer. 2009. Building Peace Between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding. *International Peacekeeping* 16 (5): 616–634.

Lilja, Mona, Mikael Baaz, and Stellan Vinthagen. 2015. Fighting with and Against the Time: The Environmental Movement's Queering of Time as Resistance. *Journal of Civil Society* 11 (4): 408–423.

Lukes, Steven. 2005. *Power: A Radical View*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2008. Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace. *Cooperation and Conflict* 43 (2): 139–163.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2014. Everyday Peace: Bottom-Up and Local Agency in Conflict-Affected Societies. *Security Dialogue* 45 (6): 548–564.

Mac Ginty, Roger, and Oliver P. Richmond. 2016. The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders: A Reappraisal of the Hybrid Turn in Peacebuilding. *International Peacekeeping* 23 (2): 219–239.

Mackenzie-Smith, Alex. 2015. Complex Challenges Facing Contemporary Local Ownership Programmes: A Case Study of South Sudan. In *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*, ed. SungYong Lee and Alpaslan Özerdem, 55–73. London and New York: Routledge.

Mayall, James. 1996. *The New Interventionism, 1991–1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Merry, Sally E. 2006. *Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Mickler, D. 2013. UNAMID: A Hybrid Solution to a Human Security Problem in Darfur? *Conflict, Security & Development* 13 (5): 487–511.

Millar, Geroid. 2014. Disaggregating Hybridity: Why Hybrid Institutions Do Not Produce Predictable Experiences of Peace. *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (4): 501–514.

Moe, Louise Wiuff. 2009. Negotiating Political Legitimacy: The Case of State Formation in Post-conflict Somaliland. Issue Paper 10, Centre for International Governance and Justice, Australian National University, Canberra.

Moe, Louise Wiuff. 2015. The Strange Wars of Liberal Peace: Hybridity, Complexity and the Governing Rationalities of Counterinsurgency in Somalia. *Peacebuilding* 4 (1): 99–117.

Nadarajah, S., and D. Rampton. 2015. The Limits of Hybridity and the Crisis of Liberal Peace. *Review of International Studies* 41 (1): 49–72.

Neuman, W.Lawrence. 2006. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Toronto: Pearson.

Öjendal, Joakim, and Mona Lilja (eds.). 2009. *Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-conflict Society*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Orr, Robert. 2005. Governing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation. *The Washington Quarterly* 25 (4): 139–152.

Owen, John. 2010. Listening to the Rice Grow: The Local–Expat Interface in Lao-Based International NGOs. *Development in Practice* 20 (1): 99–112.

Paffenholz, Thania. 2015. Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment Towards an Agenda for Future Research. *Third World Quarterly* 36 (5): 857–874.

Paris, Roland. 1997. Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism. *International Security* 22 (2): 54–89.

Paris, Roland. 2010. Saving Liberal Peacebuilding. *Review of International Studies* 36 (2): 337–365.

Pietz, Tobias, and Leopold von Carlowitz. 2007. Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Process in Failed States: Approaches, Experiences, and Prerequisites for Success. ZIF Report, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin.

Raeymaekers, Timothy. 2013. Post-war Conflict and the Market for Protection: The Challenges to Congo's Hybrid Peace. *International Peacekeeping* 20 (5): 600–617.

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. 2011. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. London: Polity.

Randazzo, Elisa. 2016. The Paradoxes of the 'Everyday': Scrutinizing the Local Turn in Peace Building. *Third World Quarterly* 37 (8): 1351–1370.

Reich, Hannah. 2006. 'Local Ownership' in Conflict Transformation Projects: Partnership, Participation or Patronage? Berghof Occasional Paper 27, Berghof Research Center for Conflict Management, Berlin.

Reynolds, Pamela, Olga Nieuwenhuys, and Karl Hanson. 2006. Refractions of Children's Rights in Development Practice: A View from Anthropology. *Childhood* 13 (3): 291–302.

Richmond, Oliver. 2006. The Problem of Peace: Understanding the "Liberal Peace". *Conflict, Security & Development* 6 (3): 291–314.

Richmond, Oliver. 2008. Reclaiming Peace in International Relations. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 36 (3): 439–470.

Richmond, Oliver P. 2009. Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3 (3): 324–344.

Richmond, Oliver. 2010. Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 38 (3): 665–692.

Richmond, Oliver. 2011. Beyond Local Ownership in the Architecture of International Peacebuilding. *Ethnopolitics* 11 (4): 354–375.

Richmond, Oliver P. 2015. The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive? *Cooperation and Conflict* 50 (1): 50–68.

Mac Ginty, Roger, and Oliver Richmond. 2013. The Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical Agenda for Peace. *Third World Quarterly* 34 (5): 763–783.

Richmond, Oliver, and Audra Mitchell. 2011. *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-liberalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Scheye, Eric, and Gordon Peake. 2005. Unknotting Local Ownership. In *After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership*, ed. Anja H. Ebnöther and Philipp Fluri. Vienna: Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence.

Scott, James. 1992. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scott, James. 1987. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shinoda, Hideaki. 2015. Local Ownership as a Strategic Guideline for Peacebuilding. In *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*, ed. SungYong Lee and Alpaslan Özerdem, 39–54. London and New York: Routledge.

Smillie, Ian. 2001. *Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Sommers, M. 2002. *Children, Education and War: Reaching Education for All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Suhrke, Astri. 2007. Reconstruction as Modernisation: The 'Post-conflict' Project in Afghanistan. *Third World Quarterly* 28 (7): 1291–1308.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. 2011. Introduction: Liberal Peace in Dispute. In *Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives*, ed. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, 1–16. London: Routledge.

Tardy, Thierry. 2014. Hybrid Peace Operations: Rationale and Challenges. *Global Governance* 20 (1): 95–118.

Thiessen, Chuck. 2013. *Local Ownership of Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility for Sustainable Peace and Development*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Tom, Patrick. 2013. In Search for Emancipatory Hybridity: The Case of Post-war Sierra Leone. *Peacebuilding* 1 (2): 239–255.

UNSG. 2002. United Nations System Support for Capacity Building: Report of the Secretary-General. UN doc E/2002/58 (14 May 2002), United Nations, New York.

UNSG. 2004. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies. UN doc S/2004/616 (23 August 2004), United Nations, New York.

Vinthagen, Stellan, and Mona Lilja. 2015. Resistance Studies Mission Statement. Available at http://www.resistancestudies.org/files/Missions-tatement.doc. Accessed 12 Feb 2015.

Wallis, Joanne. 2012. Building a Liberal-Local Hybrid Peace and State in Bougainville. *Pacific Review* 25 (5): 613–635.

Wallis, Joanne, Renee Jeffery, and Lisa Kent. 2016. Political Reconciliation in Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville: The Dark Side of Hybridity. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70 (2): 159–178.

Wetterberg, Anna, Derick Brinkerhoff, and Jana Hertz. 2015. From Compliant to Capable: Balanced Capacity Development for Local Organisations. *Development in Practice* 25 (7): 966–985.

White, S. 2002. Being, Becoming and Relationship: Conceptual Challenges of a Child Rights Approach in Development. *Journal of International Development* 14 (8): 1095–1104.

Woodhead, Martin. 2006. Changing Perspectives on Early Childhood: Theory, Research and Policy. Background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2007, UNESCO. Available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001474/147499e.pdf. Accessed 16 June 2018.

Zaum, Dominik. 2012. Beyond the "Liberal Peace". *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 18 (1): 121–132.

CHAPTER 2

Peacebuilding and Local Peacebuilders in Cambodia and Mindanao

All social developments are contextual and so is local peacebuilding. The peacebuilding models promoted by local actors are subject to the social, cultural and structural conditions of the society and reflect the local actors' views and interests constructed within such contexts. The local models of peacebuilding in Mindanao and Cambodia, in this sense, present significant discrepancies in terms of the identity of local peacebuilders, the organisational structure of these agencies, types of programmes, strategies for ownership enhancement, and resources to be mobilised and utilised for operation. This chapter offers information on three contextual factors of the demographic and cultural contexts in the area, the nature of conflicts, and evolution of peacebuilding communities, and the distinct features of the local peacebuilding programmes in the two areas, which evolved under the influence of the contextual factors. Moreover, it will summarise the types of local-external collaboration widely observed in peacebuilding operations in the two areas.

To put the conclusion first, the long history of Khmer as a single political and cultural entity, the total civil war that has little relevance to local populations' interests, and the externally-led peacebuilding in the aftermath of the civil war formed a relatively more homogenous group of local peacebuilders in Cambodia. In Mindanao, in contrast, the coexistence of three cultural and ethnic groups (Christian, Muslim, and indigenous tribes), a complex series of conflicts that reflect multiple-layers of tensions, and multiple trends of peacebuilding supported by varied actors who have distinct historical, ideological and structural backgrounds,

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1_2

developed a few distinct groups of local peacebuilders who frequently have contradictory views and interests.

The identity of local peacebuilders has been influenced by such contextual issues. In Mindanao, the local communities are roughly categorised into three different ethnic/religious/cultural groups—Christian migrants, Moro and Lumad. The peacebuilders' communities initially evolved following such cultural divisions although the people from different backgrounds have collaborated with each other. In Cambodia, a dominant number of Cambodians are ethnic Khmer and Buddhist and have maintained the same national and political entity for a thousand years. Although there are ethnic, religious and cultural minorities such as Cham Muslims, their presence in the public sphere has been limited. Moreover, the majority of peacebuilding agencies have developed since the post-war construction in 1993, in the form of institutionalised NGOs. Hence, local peacebuilders in the country usually meant Khmer civil society actors or traditional/religious leaders who operated peace-oriented programmes in different parts of Cambodia.

The following two sections introduce the background information and peacebuilding activities in Mindanao and Cambodia. Each section will firstly offer a brief overview of historical and cultural contexts that largely influenced the formation of local identity and the types of peacebuilding in each area: ethnic, religious and cultural divisions; the nature (sources) of conflicts; and the pathways of peacebuilding development. It will then explain major forms of peacebuilding particularly significant in the area and local peacebuilding agencies. In the last section, this chapter will describe three ways in which the international-local partnership is structured in the two areas: contract-based relationship; partner-driven partnership; and advocacy under integrated structure.

Mindanao (the Philippines)

Ethnic, Religious and Cultural Divisions in Mindanao

Mindanao consists of six administrative regions of Zamboanga, Northern Mindanao, Davao, Soccskasargen, Caraga, and Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which are further divided into 25 provinces (Fig. 2.1). The population is approximately 21 million and the people in Mindanao are normally categorised into three general groups based on their ethnic, cultural and religious identity (Arillo 2015).

Fig. 2.1 Map of Mindanao (*Source* Modified from OCHA/ReliefWeb (Ref. OCHA_PHL_Mindanao_v1_060920))

First, there are approximately 3.5 million indigenous Lumad peoples, whose lives were strongly affected by the external occupation since Spanish colonialism.[1] Until the US occupation of the Philippines, the 18 Lumad tribes lived across Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago and Palawan, cultivating swidden farms, hunting and gathering. Without forming centralised socio-political systems, their public lives were managed within their clan-size communities, which made them vulnerable to external pressure. Thus, a series of external interventions including the US colonial powers' land grab in the early 1900s, the migration of Filipinos from northern islands in the first half of the twentieth century, economic powers' plantation industry, and the central government's mass development projects under Marcos and Corazon Aquino, forced Lumad to resettle in more mountainous areas or deep rainforests (Rodil 1994). Recently,

[1]While the term Lumad has been used in different ways, recent studies on Mindanao generally follow Tiu (2013)'s definition "indigenous tribes in Mindanao who were not Islami[s]ed."

most Lumad reside in the mountainous areas in eastern, southern and norther Mindanao.

Second, Moro communities comprise 13 Muslim tribes in Mindanao with an estimated total population of some 4 million. The Muslim population is significant in the coastal and inland areas known as Bangsamoro (the land of Moro), and their presence is particularly concentrated in four provinces—Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Mguindandao and Lanao del Sur, and nine cities. Ethnically, Tausug, Magindanaw and Maranaw are major Islamic groups in the areas. The Islamisation of Mindanao started as early as the thirteenth century when Arab traders started doing business in the area. The Muslim society was organised as an autonomous quasi-state system of sultanates and their economic prosperity was pursued through the maritime trade with China and the Middle East. In the Islamic traditions in Southeast Asia including Mindanao, rulers rather than religious leaders/scholars gained local legitimacy and political power for governance. At local governance level, *Datu*s were respected as the protector of the Islamic faith and the shadow of God and feared for having the power to influence people's lives (Bentley 1995).[2] The control of colonial powers over the Philippines since the early sixteenth century had significantly transformed the lives of Moros, constantly reducing the power of traditional Islamic leaderships and affecting their traditional agricultural and trade-oriented business.

Third, a large number of Filipinos from the northern and central Philippines have migrated since the early twentieth century, forming the third cultural/religious group in Mindanao. The US direct rule in Mindanao was the main reason behind this migration. The colonial land laws that ignored previous landholding of Moro and Lumad and required all claims to be registered, effectively deprived most Moros of their land ownership. Once the free land with no ownership claim was identified, the colonial government encouraged the people from northern islands of Luzon and the Visayas to migrate and offered them the title for 16 hectares of land.[3] After the migration of thousands from the

[2] In a survey conducted in ARMM in 2011, 89% of the respondents said that they trust religious leaders (strongly trust 67%, somewhat trust 22%), 71% trust the heads of Barangayi (40% strongly trust, somewhat trust 31%), 77% trust local elders (strongly trust 39%, somewhat trust 38%) (SWS 2011, cited in Kim 2017, 203).

[3] The maximum size of land title later increased to 24 hectare 1919, then back to 16 in 1936.

north almost every week up until the 1960s, these migrants and their descendants became the major population in Mindanao accounting for approximately 60% (12.5 million) (Anasarias and Berliner 2009; Arillo 2015). While they are ethnically diverse comprising 64 different groups, Lumad and Moro generally consider them to be a group with a common settlers' identity built in northern Philippines, and call them 'Christian'.

Multi-layered Conflicts with Different Sources

The ongoing conflicts in Mindanao are multi-layered. There are various types of conflicts that emerge due to the multiple and partially interconnected sources including separatism, communist ideology and banditry.

Firstly, the conflict most well-known to outsiders is the military warfare between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and Islamic Moro's revolutionary groups. These conflicts are based on the ethnic/religious/cultural divisions between the three groups stated above. The US occupation in the twentieth century had a more direct and strong impact on the formation of Moro nationalism.[4] As explained above, for instance, the land laws that did not recognise previous land ownership of Moros and required the registration of privately occupied lands, became a major source of Moro's antagonism against the external rule. Hence, the Moro resistance movements against the US occupation started as soon as the colonial power arrived, including a few significant examples like Tausug leaders' opposition in 1906–1909 and the battle at Bud Bagsak in 1913 (Bara 2015). Moreover, the colonial power's 'divide and rule' policy created tension between the majority Moros and some elites who took advantage of collaboration with the US colonial power, which diminished the unity within the Moro communities. Since the Philippines' independence from the US occupation was gained in 1946, Moro's resistance continued against the domination of the Christian powers from northern Philippines. The resistance became more intense as the Marcos regimes' power grab intensified.

The first major revolutionary group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed by its charismatic leader Nur Misuari in 1968 and an intense military conflict was initiated from the early 1970s.

[4]Although the Spanish rule's constant attempts to control the area caused gradual demise of the economic prosperity of the Muslim areas, its influence was relatively indirect limited to eastern seashores and Zamboanga peninsula.

MNLF splintered to form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, formed in 1977) which split with the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). After intense military warfare, both GPH and the Moro resistance groups continued with combat and peace negotiation. A few major peace agreements that they have reached include the Tripoli Agreement (1976), the Jeddah Accord (1987) the Final Peace Agreement (1996), and the agreement between President Benigno Aquino III and Murad Ebrahim MILF leader (2012). Nevertheless, multiple rounds of peace processes, including those listed above, failed to bring about the termination of conflicts, and Mindanao has experienced a repetition of conflict over the past decades. A few recent examples include the Estrada administration's *All-Out War* in 2000 that caused the displacement of one million people, and the military uprisings in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2011.

Although the scale of conflicts is smaller, there are two other types of conflicts against the central government. Firstly, a number of Islamic extremist groups relying primarily on guerrilla warfare, such as *Abu Sayyaf* and *Jamaah Al Muhajirin wal Anshor* (JMA). Distinct from other Moro revolutionary movements, these groups stick to the self-declared forms of Islamic *jihad* and their *jihad* frequently target civilians. They do not particularly emphasise the identity of Moros either. With little popular support, these groups tend to rely on intermittent guerrilla attacks, bomb explosions and kidnapping of civilians (Conciliation Resources 1999). Although an accurate amount was never identified, the group receives overseas funding through the border with Indonesia and Malaysia. It has become more notorious with its kidnapping operations targeting civilians since the early 1990s (McKirdy and Watson 2017). Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the line between religious jihad and banditry is becoming blurred in some of these organisations. Young members tend to join these organisations seeking incomes or sources of livelihood rather than because of religious beliefs. Many of their actions such as kidnapping for ransom have no particular links with their objective of jihad (Concepciòn et al. 2003). Moreover, an increasing incidence of banditry or kidnappings is committed by former units of Moro revolutionary groups or other insurgent movements. These actions are general crimes that do not pursue any particular ideological or religious disciplines and are not regulated by commandership.

Secondly, the dynamics of military conflicts become more complex as a result of the Communist group's ideology-based revolutionary

movement. This movement is directly associated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its umbrella network organisation the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDF). CPP's military front, New People's Army (NPA), has strong military bases in northern and eastern Mindanao. While the GPH and the NDF reached a Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in 1998, no major peace process followed. Although it has gone through a series of splits and factionalisation, the NDF is still believed to have a strong capacity to mobilise mass movements (Conciliation Resources 2018).

At local levels, another major source of conflict is violent clashes between clans and families, usually called Rido. Although it is not a constant or systematically organised form of conflicts, it has huge impacts on social stability due to the high level of violence occasionally involving mass killing. A survey project conducted by the Asia Foundation, for example, recorded 1266 occurences of Rido between 1930s and 2005, and an estimated 5500 casualties with a lot more displaced people. Moreover, 64% of this Rido violence remained unresolved, fuelling further violence (Torres III 2007).

Moreover, its implications are usually wide and chronic as it causes a series of retaliations which tend to become more critical when Rido is intertwined with larger separatist movements. The sources of the conflicts vary context by context, ranging from simple theft to homicide although the most frequently observed issues are disputes over land ownership and political rivalries. However, once conflict involves violence, it tends to become an issue of honour, shame and reciprocity between families/clans, and causes acts of revenge. Due to the proliferation of weapons and the weak internal conflict resolution mechanisms, the level of violence intensifies as the retaliation continues. Moreover, in the process of violence escalation or conflict resolution, Rido frequently involve the Moro resistance groups and the government agencies that attempt to ensure their influence over the concerned communities. Hence, Rido occasionally becomes the source of major military confrontation and has complex impacts on the ongoing peace processes between GPH and the Moro revolutionary groups (Torres III 2007).

Although not the central focus of this study, the number of conflicts between farmers and landowners or between laborers and employers are increasing. In a survey conducted in 2002 in Mindanao, 15% of the

Table 2.1 Conflicts in Mindanao

Resistance against GPH across Mindanao	Moro struggles for autonomous governance/ independence Islamic extremist groups Communist revolutionary movements
Local level	Rido (Inter-tribal conflicts) Conflicts between farmers and landlords or between labourers and employers

respondents said that this type of conflict is important in their communities (Rood 2005) (Table 2.1).

To summarise, the conflicts in Mindanao are multi-layered, based on dissimilar sources, and involve different groups of people. Moreover, most conflicts are initiated and triggered by the population's anxiety over ethnic/cultural identity, core interests and honour of kinship. Hence, conflict resolution and social reconciliation between individuals, families, clans, and between the GPH and resistance groups became a core element of peacebuilding in Mindanao. Moreover, the dissimilar perspectives and interests between the three major cultural groups, and between the sub-groups, play important roles in determining local people's understanding of the peacebuilding agencies in the local areas in which they live.

Development of Peacebuilding

Earlier forms of peacebuilding in Mindanao emerged in the 1970s in order to address the hostilities and violence caused by the authoritarian governance of Ferdinand Marcos. A number of church groups, development NGOs and business groups developed interreligious dialogues, a coalition of community representatives, and media advocacy. Moreover, during the 1980s, various forms of peace education were implemented by formal and informal education institutes in order to pursue peaceful coexistence of people from different backgrounds (Rood 2005; Interview No. I).

The number of peacebuilding agencies rapidly increased in the mid 1990s when a series of peace negotiations was undertaken between the GPH and Moro resistance groups. Another momentum to boost local

peacebuilding was the All-Out War conducted by the Estrada government in 2000. A large number of civil society actors from northern Philippines and international peacebuilding agencies started their programmes. A few examples of the international aid agencies that have been active in Mindanao since then are AusAid, CIDA, USAID, JICA, the World Bank, ADB, and EU (Coronel-Ferrer 2002, 23).

It is unrealistic to generalise and categorise the variety of peacebuilding programmes undertaken in different parts of Mindanao. Nevertheless, existing seminal documents generally agree that four main areas of peacebuilding activities are more active than others: relief and protection, conflict resolution, peaceful coexistence, and rehabilitation and development.

Relief and protection denotes a range of activities that aim to assist with people subject to a high level of violence. In addition to material aid to internally displaced people (IDPs), a key area that many local peacebuilders in Mindanao pay attention to was the establishment of Peace Zones. Peace Zones are geographic areas designated and declared by local communities as zones with no violence, and are frequently acknowledged by other relevant authorities (both the GPH and other military groups). Another key area of peacebuilding activities is *conflict resolution*. As the continuation of violent conflicts has critically affected the area, efforts for resolving and handling the conflicts became a critical goal. One direction of such efforts was to get direct involvement in the ongoing peace process between the GPH and the resistance groups through consultation, policy proposals, monitoring and the like. Civilian-led mechanisms for monitoring of ceasefire and peace agreements have been attempted by organisations like the Maguindanaon Professionals and Employees Association. Another direction is to come up with innovative and integrated mechanisms for effectively handling inter-tribal and inter-community feuds.

Moving beyond the immediate conflict resolution, there are programmes to encourage the peaceful coexistence of the people with different perspectives and needs. The two most representative examples are various forms of peace education and advocacy for nurturing a '*culture of peace*'. Before many international actors began to pay attention to Mindanao, varied forms of peace education had been facilitated by a few local universities and grassroots organisations. As the UN and other international organisations promoted the Global Initiatives on Culture

of Peace in the mid 1990s, a wide range of peace advocacy programmes were facilitated with strong external support (Interview No. I). Inter-faith dialogue facilitated primarily by religious leaders and church-affiliate institutes is another outstanding example. Starting from *Duyog* Ramadan (Accompany Ramadan, 1977) and the *Sisilah* Peace Dialogue (1984), a large number of dialogues that nurture mutual understanding between Christian and Islamic communities have been conducted over the past four decades (Rood 2005).

Finally, the programmes aiming at *rehabilitation and development* are prominent in Mindanao. The progress in the peace process between GPH and the MILF meant that many agencies began to promote long-term plans to bring about 'development' and 'good governance' in Mindanao. As "human development indices in the ARMM are the lowest in the country" (Chaulia 2007), boosting economic growth and elevating life standards in the central and western Mindanao was pursued as a key objective by many peacebuilding agencies. In the same period, the international donor communities in Mindanao began to escape from its 'relief-oriented' policies. Hence, an increasing number of international aid agencies has moved to pursue *peace through development*. The international aid sector in this period advocated the peace and development paradigm that asserts that the resolution of long-standing conflicts requires social and economic development. Out of various development issues, poverty and displacement were considered particularly significant (Table 2.2).

A noteworthy feature is that varied types for conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence comprise the majority of the peacebuilding in Mindanao. While the development-oriented peacebuilding projects are considered important, to address the ongoing violence and serious inter-community tensions that affect people's livelihood remains a central theme in the area. Hence, the composition of the main peacebuilding programmes is strikingly different from Cambodia where the majority of peacebuilding programmes are in the form of development, supporting the idea of *peace through development* (see the Cambodia section for more details).

Local and Local Peacebuilders in Mindanao

Then, what does it mean by local in the peacebuilding in Mindanao and who are local peacebuilders? What is the relation between local communities and local peacebuilders? Due to the contexts described above,

Table 2.2 Types of contemporary peacebuilding activities in Mindanao

Areas	*Types of programmes*	*Examples*
Relief and protection	Zone of Peace	Pikit Spaces for Peace in Pikit (North Cotabato) Peace Zones in Dinas (Zamboanga del Sur) and Barangay Maladeg (Lanao del Sur)
	Emergency Relief	Delivery of programmes for societal reconstruction
Conflict resolution	Commitment to Peace Process	Policy advocacy Monitoring of Ceasefire
	Mediation for conflict-settlement at community levels	Campaign for forging of ceasefires Creation of consultative mechanisms to peace process
Peaceful coexistence	Interfaith dialogues	Inter-religious forums between Catholic Bishops and Ulama
	Peace education Training (Capacity building)	Formal education and informal training on peace-related agenda (especially pursuing the vision of a 'culture of peace'
Rehabilitation and development	Community support	Advocacy work, organizing and networking of the community-driven initiatives
	Social development	Psycho-socio trauma services Economic, livelihood/development, environmental projects

Source This table is partly adapted from Coronel-Ferrer (2002, 5)

identifying and defining local and local peacebuilders in Mindanao is not straightforward. Regarding the locals in peacebuilding, different from Cambodia, the distinction is more than just Mindanao vs. international. Instead, there are three layers of division, which need to be applied according to the types of conflicts that a certain peacebuilding programme aim to address.

One layer is the division between the people from Mindanao (Mindanawon) and outsiders (especially outside of the Philippines). Mindanawon in the context of peacebuilding includes anyone who lives

in Mindanao and is affected by the conflicts in the area. As the victims of the conflicts, Mindanwon across the island occasionally get together to call for peace. This distinction best fits the concepts discussed in conventional studies on local ownership, and many examples and case studies adopted in this volume fall into this category.

Another frequently applied distinction lies between indigenous locals (*Moro and Lumad*) and migrants (*Christian migrants*), following Mindanao's ethno-cultural divisions. The tensions between these groups occasionally affect the relations between peacebuilding agencies that are based on different ethnocultural backgrounds. For instance, during the 1990s, many Islamic peacebuilding agencies were reluctant to collaborate with the NGOs led by the Christians from northern islands (Interview No. II). Occasionally, Lumad consider both Moro and Christians as externals who have affected their self-determination. They see themselves as victimised by the 'Moro' resistance, which is strictly speaking not their issue.

When dealing with Rido at local levels, moreover, *sub-tribal divisions* are highly important. Anyone outside their own clan, village or families is considered an outsider who needs to earn trust from insiders in order to play a role in the conflict resolution process. While Rido is usually triggered by conflicts of interests, the underlying issues are closely associated with different clan identities, cultural interpretations of nature and resources, and unity and face-saving of families. Hence, the involvement of the people from outside of the families, villages and clans is frequently considered as inappropriate external intervention.

The local peacebuilding agencies have mobilised their programmes while reflecting such unique social contexts. Then, who are the local peacebuilders in practice? The section below gives a brief overview of the grassroots peacebuilding agencies in Mindanao based on three rough categories: NGOs, people's organisations (POs) and religious agencies.

NGOs

Although no accurate number of the NGOs in Mindanao is available, the Mindanao Caucus of Development NGO Networks (MinCODE), the largest NGO network in the area, has approximately 500 member oganisations. As the ethnic, cultural, and religious divisions are clear, the NGO sector in the area is also roughly categorised along these lines.

Firstly, there are peacebuilding agencies that have close association with the civil society outside Mindanao (mainly in the northern islands). Some of the key organisers of these agencies had undertaken underground social movements against the Marcos authoritarianism and transformed their direction to developmental NGOs in the post-Marcos period. They had had extensive experience of mobilising and organising social movements by the time they came down to Mindanao. Some of these organisations were particularly prominent in "relief in evacuation centres, social-psychological support to trauma victims, early rehabilitation (e.g., housing and social infrastructure) and livelihood projects in communities of return" (Colletta 2006, 24). Many of these organisations such as Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and the Peace Advocates Zamboanga Inc., were either established as a Mindanao branch of a global faith-based structure, or have close association with it, and offer varied advocacy programmes for community-based peace initiatives.

Secondly, although less significant than its Christian counterpart, peacebuilding NGOs were also developed in Moro areas. While an early model of civil organisations can be found from the 1960s, the contemporary form of Moro peacebuilding agencies was developed since the GPH-MNLF Peace Agreement in 1996 (Coronel-Ferrer 2002). Many of these organisations such as the Moro People's Resource Center, Inc and the Technical Assistance Center for Development of Rural and Urban Poor (TACDRUP) are led by the children of Moro aristocracy or middle-class urban-based professionals. Moreover, the Moro resistance groups also formed agencies like the Bangsa Moro Women's Foundation (BMWF) and the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro as their mass bases to explore negotiated peace and to implement development assistance projects. Organisations like Kadtuntaya Foundation, Inc., play important roles in facilitating the network and consortium of the NGOs in the Muslim society. In general, these NGOs in Moro areas usually work closely with religious leaders and Islamic institutions.

Moreover, the roles of academic institutes, especially universities, in local peacebuilding are worthy of mention. In most cases, these universities were established and funded by Christian institutes. For instance, Notre Dame University in Cotabato City that operates a peace education centre. A few faculty of Mindanao State University also play important roles in the peace process between the GPH and Moro resistance groups. Ateneo de Davao has a few research units that support grassroots peace movements. Moreover, different forms of peace

education are widely conducted across the area, including as a representative example Miriam College's Peace Education Center.

People's Organisations (POs)

People's organisation denotes "an organi[s]ation of individuals drawn from among grassroots communities, sectors or other groupings, committed to advance their shared rights and welfare" (Coronel-Ferrer 2002, 9). Although they may not have a permanent institutional/administrative structure, they are normally based on united mass support from community residents in a territorial and/or sectoral unit who share a common cause.

One outstanding type of PO initiatives is the Peace Zones that have been developed as community-based peace initiatives to terminate or reduce violence. Sanctuaries of Peace were declared in 56 communities in Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Lanao del Sur between 2000 and 2003 (see Chapter 6 for more details). Two such examples are Bantay Ceasfire, an independent community mechanism formed in 2003 to monitor the ceasefire mechanism between the GPH and MILF, and the Sulong CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law) formed in 2004 to support the agreement between GPH and NDF.

Considering Rido at local levels, a variety of hybrid mechanisms adopting the official peace initiatives and traditional forms of conflict resolution are being developed and applied. In these mechanisms, local community representatives, religious leaders and/or government officers work together to come up with more effective and culturally-sensitive measures to deal with violent conflicts. Some examples are the Joint Ulama Municipal Peace and Order Council in Barira, Maguindanao, the Walay na Bitiara in Sultan Kudarat municipality in Maguindanao and the Mayor's Council "tri-people" conflict resolution body in North Upi, Maguindanao.

Moreover, Lumad representatives have attempted to consolidate their common voices for self-determination and engage in the official peace process between GPH and the resistance movements. The first significant momentum was mobilised in 1986 when the representatives of 16 Lumad representatives formed a congress called Lumad Mindanao. They have managed to organise a number of opportunities where different indigenous groups get together and express their common will,

which include the Tribal Governance Conference (2004), the Mindanao Indigenous Peoples Congress for Peace and Development (2003), and the Mindanao Indigenous Peoples Peace Forum (2001). In these events, they demanded that the government, the military groups and other people in Mindanao respect "indigenous governance and conflict settlement customs, rights, practices and lands" (Coronel-Ferrer 2002, 26).

Although they don't exactly fit the concept of POs, business associations play significant roles in building trust and collaborative relations among communities and addressing extreme economic polarization. The Mindanao Business Council in Davao and the ARMM Business Council in Cotabato City are particularly prominent in Christian and Islamic areas, respectively.

Religious Organisations

The Roman Catholic Church has played a major role in facilitating interfaith dialogue, offering basic services and mobilising peace-related campaigns. The Catholic Churches in the Philippines have organised various inter-faith dialogues since the mid 1960s and these conversations became regular from the 1980s. One of the earliest interfaith dialogues at the national level was the dialogue between Fr. Jose Anter (the Oblates of Mary Immaculate) and Datu Michael Mastura in 1974. Another was the Silsilah dialogue movement in Zamboanga city, an initiative primarily concerning Mindanao, which was first organised by Catholic missionaries in 1984 and became one of the longest-running Christian-Muslim dialogues in the area. The number increased in the 1990s when the Catholic churches created the Episcopal Commission on Interreligious Dialogue. The Bishops-Ulama Forum is one representative example that has facilitated multiple rounds of discussions between the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) representatives and more "liberal-minded" ulama (Muslim clerics) since 1996. This forum later organised a Mindanao Peace Week that offered a variety of peacebuilding actors a space for expressing their views (Cagoco-Guiam 1999; Coronel-Ferrer 2002; Colletta 2006).

These national networks also coordinate and mobilise peace campaigns which their followers are encouraged to attend. The network frequently mobilises common actions. For instance, in June 1996, a group of Catholic bishops, priests and other religious workers organised the Mindanao-Sulu Church Peace Congress to make consolidated voices for

peace. At the national level, a few networks of churches such as CPBC, NCCP, and the Philippines Council of Evangelical Churches make their position statements, offer support to local churches in Mindanao, and facilitate the meetings with Islamic leaders (Coronel-Ferrer 2002; Interview No. XXXXIV). The most proactive on the ground unit was Basic Christian Communities, which are organised at *barangay* (village) level; the statements issued by the Convention of Philippine Baptist Churches (CPBC) for example were read out and disseminated in Sunday masses.

The faith-based peace movements in Moro areas are less proactive than their Christian counterparts. During the 1990s, for instance, a series of regional conferences of ulama and imams was conducted from which emerged a National Congress of Ulamas of the Philippines (Coronel-Ferrer 2002, 27). More liberal ulama have assumed the central pillars of many Bishop-Ulama conferences facilitated over the past decades. There are also civil society organisations that were either established by or under strong advocacy of religious leaders, which include the Social Amelioration and Literacy Agenda for Muslims (SALAM), an organisation in Zamboanga that actively engages in Islamic aspects of governance and peace (Rood 2005).

In discussing local peacebuilding agencies in Mindanao, it is worth mentioning that Mindanao's local peacebuilders have been highly outstanding with the formation of coalitions and networks. Since the mid 1990s, the peacebuilding agencies in Mindanao have developed varied types of "network of effective actors" in order to improve the effectiveness of their activities by gathering "different information for planning," integrating ideas for action, offering help that each other needs, and strengthening their pressure toward the government or other counterparts (Ricigliano 2002, cited in Coronel-Ferrer 2002, 15). Some examples of these networks are MinCODE, Mindanao Peace Weavers, the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, Mindanao People's Caucus, and Mindanao Solidarity Network.

Cambodia

Long History as a Unified Political and Cultural Entity

Cambodia has a long history of existing as a unified entity while experiencing strong threats from other regional powers, dating back to the

Funan dynasty of the first century AD. Throughout the periods of developing into the Angkor Empire in the region until the sixteenth centuries, and into a less powerful Khmer kingdoms until late nineteenth century, the country has maintained its federal structure and the Khmer nation has developed a strong common identity (Luco 2002). Patron-client communitarianism had been inherent to its social structure and its autonomous hierarchical local social system was loosely connected to the central political power (Neher and Marlay 1995). While Brahmanism formed the early cultural and social distinctions in the region including a pyramidal hierarchical structure, placing the Devaraj, the god-king, at the top, Theravada Buddhism has been a most influential religious authority since its introduction to Cambodia in the thirteenth century (Peang-Meth 1991). Moreover, since the demise of the Angkor Empire, the repeated invasions from neighbouring regional powers like Vietnam and Thailand had set formidable threats and nurtured strong anti-colonialist nationalism in the country.

Cambodia was then subject to French colonialism between 1863 and 1953, but its relatively short and indirect colonisation had limited influence over the social and cultural aspects of the country. Considering the changes in French control over the central political power, the colonialist period can be divided into four phases: early protectorate (1863–1884), suppression of national resistance (1984–1904), conciliation with the monarch and systemised colonialism (1904–1941), and the final phase until full independence (1941–1953). Nevertheless, from the perspectives of most Cambodian citizens in the eras, Cambodian societies still practiced kingship (with god-kings still seen as ruling the country) and local governance was still practiced with the concept of loyalty to the monarchy (Chandler 2007). Although national leaders in this period were exposed to the French (more generally Western) education system, Western culture did not penetrate peasant societies (Fig. 2.2).

Hence, when French colonialism came to an end in 1953, it was seen as a natural consequence for most Cambodians that Prince Sihanouk took over the authority over the country's armed forces, judiciary and foreign affairs. Sihanouk had maintained strong political power, changing his official title from a prince (de facto king) to prime minister, and head of state until 1970. During this period, the country had adopted various institutions and mechanisms of democratic governance such as election and the separation of three powers, and some early models of the civil society emerged. Nevertheless, in reality, such democratic

Fig. 2.2 Map of Cambodia (*Source* UN Map No. 3860 Rev. 4)

governance remained limited to some political groups and elites and intellectuals in Phnom Penh while the majority of the population in rural areas still considered the country a kingdom.

Then with support from the US, General Lon Nol deposed Sihanouk and established the Khmer Republic. The Republic was overthrown by a socialist military group called the Khmer Rouge[5] in 1975. During its four-year rule, the Khmer Rouge launched radical socialist projects such as a collective agricultural system, depopulation of cities, and prohibition of markets, which caused the deaths of approximately 1.5 million

[5]The group that established Democratic Kampuchea is commonly known as the Khmer Rouge in the West. The term Khmer Rouge (meaning Red Khmer in French) was originally coined by Prince Sihanouk and is commonly used to refer to the faction.

people.[6] A group of Khmer Rouge officers who were opposed to the direction the party had taken escaped to Vietnam and formed an anti-Khmer Rouge socialist movement called the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS).

Elite-Driven Civil War in 1979

The civil war occurred in 1979 when the KUFNS, with backing from Vietnam, overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime and established the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), appointing Heng Samrin as the head of state. Although Foreign Minister Hun Sen was the youngest of the PRK's top leaders, his political leadership and political skills resulted in him becoming prime minister in 1985 (Slocomb 2004, 195). Initially, the government operated under strong Vietnamese influence. Most bureaucratic issues were managed by people trained in Vietnam, and Vietnamese soldiers controlled the major cities. With the lack of capable civil workers and the regime's low popularity, the PRK achieved only limited success in building an effective state structure, leaving a large proportion of rural areas outside its control until the peace negotiation began in the mid-1980s (Slocomb 2004; Gottesman 2004).

Opposing the PRK government were three military movements led by former national leaders stated above. Above all, the ousted faction the Khmer Rouge remained a grave threat to the PRK. The Khmer Rouge had emerged from the Cambodian communist party, which had been formed in 1951 with the support of the Vietnamese communists. During the 1960s and 1970s under the leadership of Pol Pot, the party developed its own unique political ideas that reflected its anti-colonialist stance. It managed to overthrow the pro-American Lon Nol regime and governed the country between 1975 and 1979. When it lost Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979, the Khmer Rouge regrouped in a region near the Thai border and began to undertake guerrilla operations (Chandler 1998; Kiernan 2002; Heder 1999).

[6]Although the number of people killed under the Khmer Rouge regime is still disputed, many sources generally agree with an approximation of between 1.5 million and 2 million. For instance, the Cambodian Genocide Program at Yale University suggests that 1.7 million died (The CGP 2010), while Short argues that the number of victims should be estimated at 1.5 million (2005). Kiernan (1992, 2002) and Heder (1999) also agree with a figure of between 1.5 and 1.7 million deaths.

Furthermore, there are two non-communist resistance groups. Immediately after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime, the followers of Prince Sihanouk organised a resistance movement called the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) in 1981. Although the key administrative and military organisations were led by a group of people who had been exiled in Western countries, including Norodom Ranarridh and Lu Lay Sreng, it was Prince Sihanouk's legitimacy and material support from Western countries that sustained FUNCINPEC. Finally, the former prime minister Son Sann and his associates established the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), which pursued the formation of a republican government from 1979. Son Sann, ex-President of the Cambodian National Bank and Prime Minister (1967–1968), exiled in France, was a key organiser. Although internally fractured and beset by infighting, as the largest non-communist group, it controlled approximately 160,000 refugees in the camps in Thailand.

Despite their different views, rivalries and targets, a common objective of 'removing the Vietnamese forces from the Cambodian territory' and strong encouragement from other advocate countries enabled the three parties to form a coalition named the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982 (Sihanouk 2005). After fierce external combat and turbulent internal struggles, Hun Sen became the new prime minister of the PRK, and peace talks between the government and the CGDK began in 1987 (Brown and Zasloff 1998).

To summarise, the civil war in Cambodia between 1979 and 1991 was an elite-driven military conflict mobilised and led by political leaders who had governed in the previous decades. While there are many reasons that generated the conflicts, tension, and collaboration between the four factions, which include ideological discrepancies between two Communist groups (PRK and the Khmer Rouge) as well as between the other non-Communist groups (FUNCINPEC and KPNLF), political rivalry, individual abhorrence and distrust, and fear from the previous governance and foreign colonial rule, such reasons were relevant to political elites only. Although a wide range of ideological campaigns were conducted by all four factions to gain popular support, their popular grounds were very limited and such low popularity offered an important reason for the military factions becoming more active in peace negotiation (Lee 2013).

Formation of Peacebuilding and the Civil Society

When the Paris Peace Agreement was signed in 1991, grassroots movement was almost nonexistent in Cambodia. While a small number of elitist civil organisions were burgeoning during the Lon Nol regime (1972–1975), the radical socialist campaigns by the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1979) and the following civil war (1979–1991) completely wiped out the space for civilian public activities. Although a number of international organisations started their humanitarian aid programmes to Cambodia in the 1980s, the space for interacting and supporting local communities was highly limited (UNDP 1990, cited in Clarke 1998, 27).

Hence, the post-civil war reconstruction and peacebuilding were primarily led by international actors. It was the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) that first fostered the civil society organisations in post-war Cambodia. Being the official 'authority' to handle the transitional period, the UN set the promotion of democratic procedures as a "plank for peacebuilding" (Hughes 2003, 138). Since UNTAC completed its mission in 1993, major international organisations, bilateral aid agencies, and international NGOs became proactive in developing a wide range of peacebuilding and development programmes. A few examples include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Development Programme (UNDP), the EU Mission to Cambodia, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), AusAid, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Oxfam, Save the Children, and the International Human Rights Law Group.

The peacebuilding programmes at local levels in this period were conducted as part of such externally-driven national reconstruction campaigns. A wide spread type of peacebuilding in the aftermath of the civil war was *rehabilitation* and *emergency relief*. The programmes like resettlement of war refugees, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, reconstruction of infrastructure, and resumption of education were conducted across the country. In addition to rehabilitation, three key terms that penetrated the majority of peacebuilding programmes in the early phase were *human rights*, *democratic governance*, and *development*.

Firstly, the international communities' attempts for democratization were two fold: demand of the government good governance and foster civil society. Until the mid 1990s, most new Cambodian NGOs and associations, backed up with the external advocate, have focused

on varied themes relevant to democratic values and human rights (i.e., child welfare/rights, gender and women's issues, disability and rehabilitation). The democracy and human rights agenda became less prominent from the late 1990s. While the Hun Sen government that consolidated its power base through the palace coup in 1997 tightened the voices of the human rights NGOs, more peacebuilding agencies began to focus on development issues.

As time went by, the development agenda became more prominent in the country. Sharing the *peace through development* paradigm, these organisations pursued sustainable development in social and economic sectors. A few areas to which these organisations pay attention include health and nutrition, community development, environmental protection, water and sanitation, micro-credit, and income generation. The Cambodian government began to incorporate development NGOs into its local-level governance procedures. Moreover, many human rights NGOs also developed a rather collaborative relationship with the government and gradually emerged as "intermediate institutions, acting as a channel between government ministries and particular constituencies and linking a range of organisations and institutions" (Clarke 1998, 45).

Since the early 2000s, various types of development projects became the majority of peacebuilding activities in the country. For instance, according to Malena and Chhim (2009)'s report, seventy per cent of registered Cambodian NGOs are working on development related social services whereas the proportion of human rights and democracy advocates are a mere seven per cent. Nevertheless, as land distribution has recently created a major social issue, many human rights NGOs pay attention to supporting the victims of the process by offering legal advice, organisational support and a platform to be linked to overseas communities.

Different from Mindanao, conflict resolution and the Peace Zones did not take a central place in the Cambodian peacebuilding process. Since the war was mainly mobilized by political elites, the sources of conflicts did not seriously affect people's lives once the conflict was terminated. Moreover, although a number of activities for social reconciliation, truth-finding, and transitional justice were conducted, most programmes were targeting the relations between the former Khmer Rouge leaders/cadres and their victims, since the PRK was still wielding dominant political power in post-war Cambodia. As the local level disputes over land ownership are increasing, however, there are peacebuilding agencies that

Table 2.3 Types of contemporary peacebuilding activities in Cambodia

Areas	*Types of programmes*	*Examples*
Rehabilitation and development	Community support	Advocacy work, organizing and networking of the community-driven initiatives
	Social development	Psycho-socio trauma services Economic, livelihood/development, environmental projects
Relief and protection	Human rights protection	Protection of land management victims Support of the illegal migrants from Kampuchea Krom
Conflict resolution	Mediation for conflict-settlement at community levels	Mediation of local peasants in disputes over land ownership
Peaceful coexistence	Peace education Training (Capacity building)	Formal education and informal training on peace-related agenda (especially pursuing the vision of a culture of peace)

aim to come up with more innovative forms of conflict resolution on the ownership issues (Table 2.3).

In short, Cambodia has maintained a fairly solid singular identity as Khmer, the civil war between 1979 and 1991 was primarily elite-driven, and most peacebuilders' community was established and developed under the strong advocacy of the UN and international aiders since the end of the war. Hence, compared to Mindanao, local peacebuilders in Cambodia share a higher level of similarity and present relatively less significant mutual-tensions based on different identities. The majority of contemporary peacebuilding programmes in the country therefore are working on various development issues.

Local and Local Peacebuilders in Cambodia

In understanding the nature of peacebuilding in Cambodia, the sub-division of locals and the dissimilar interests and perspectives between them is highly important. The contrasting ideas between the urban and

the rural, power elites and other populations, the older generation and the younger generation, as well as men and women, play important roles in determining the effectiveness of peacebuilding programmes. Nevertheless, in contrast to Mindanao, a majority of the Cambodian peacebuilding actors mostly share a common cultural identity as ethnic Khmer and Buddhist. Hence, the identity conflict between these sub-divisions is not so serious as to create distinction of 'local and external' or 'us and them' between Cambodian peacebuilders or between local communities and Cambodian peacebuilders. In this sense, the distinction of locals vs. external in the Cambodian grassroots peacebuilding movements mainly lies between Cambodian and international.

Moreover, the contemporary peacebuilding communities have been developed only since the end of the civil war in 1991, with strong advocacy from international supporters. Hence, a vast majority of local peacebuilding agencies are in the form of NGOs although an increasing number of less formal people's associations and religious agencies are being developed. In this section, the types of local peacebuilders will be explained by distinguishing such less formal, community-based agencies from the majority of NGOs.

NGOs

The NGO sector in Cambodia was created in the aftermath of the civil war in 1991. Starting from the formation of a few human rights organisations such as KHEMARA and the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC), a large number of organisations were initiated with the support from various international actors. As a wide range of organisations were established and disestablished in this period, the exact number is difficult to be identified. However, there are a few figures from which a rough number can be guessed. In 2013, for instance, the number of local NGOs registered to the Cooperative Committee for Cambodia (CCC, one of the biggest umbrella organisations in the country) is approximately 3500.

One challenge that many Cambodian NGOs commonly face is their separation from the grassroots. The government frequently controlled the terrain on which the peacebuilding organisations could extend their connections to the local population. Moreover, they primarily relied on international donors for their operational funding. Hence, the ability of these organisations to mobilise the membership from the

local population remained low (Christie 2013). Thus, when people use the term civil society, it frequently denotes the country's most prominent NGOs that may not necessarily represent the needs and perspectives of the local population that the NGOs claim to support (Hughes 2003). In this sense, many NGOs in Cambodia do not fit traditional definitions that denote "private, non-profit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals" (Clarke 1998, 2–3) and the civil society sector in Cambodia during the 1990s was a good example demonstrating Norman Uphoff's distinction between 'non-governmental' organisations and grassroots organisations (Uphoff 1993).

POs

Two distinct types of people's organisations are active in Cambodia. Although less successful than the attempts to build the NGO sector, many external peacebuilding agencies have made efforts to advocate the emergence of 'modern' community-based organisations (CBOs). These CBOs are usually developed for particular groups of people who are believed to need more social support, such as women, youth, farmers and fishermen, and are involved in small-scale developments, self-help initiatives, or project implementation. In many cases, these organisations' activities are developed in collaboration with local Buddhist monasteries or traditional leaderships (Pellini and Ayres 2007).

As the majority of the population is under 30 years, a large number of youth organisations/clubs have been nurtured and supported by youth-focused NGOs like Youth Star Cambodia and Youth Council of Cambodia. These informal clubs or community associations conduct activities that aim to enable the youth to make more significant contributions to social development and political and democratic activities, and to offer platforms for their networking. Recently, CBOs in rural areas like farmers' associations and fishermen's association have been organised by external initiatives, which include the Village Networks organised in Kampot and Kampong Thom Province by GTZ. According to Malena and Chhim (2009, 44), for instance, roughly 1000 village-based farmers' associations were established, representing approximately 27,500 households. Some key areas that these farmers' associations engage in are ecological agriculture, natural resource management, cooperative business and community development (Malena and Chhim 2009).

The roles of CBOs in local governance became more significant since the early 2000s when the Cambodian government conducted decentralisation of governance, encouraging more local-level development issues to be decided and managed by sub-national governments in consultation with these CBOs (Lee and Park 2015; Pellini and Ayres 2007). Nevertheless, many CBOs have demonstrated clear limitations with their external engagement, hence do not play major roles in obtaining the government's new policies, identifying the data on local governance, linking local communities with external actors and the like (Malena and Chhim 2009).

Moreover, there are many occasions that *traditional self-help associations* play major roles in peacebuilding although they are not deliberately developed for nor exclusively aimed at peacebuilding. Under the structure of traditional local communities, it is the community elder (*chas tum*) and government representative like the village chief (*mephum*) who are most frequently involved in conflict resolution or peacebuilding programmes. These elders and village chiefs are in general respected as people who have good knowledge of social principles and good moral standards to make a judgement, and are accessible and approachable for community residents (Luco 2002). Village chiefs especially are the first reference for seeking advice and to gain 'grant' on various social activities at village levels. Moreover, monthly pagoda committee meetings are frequently utilised to discuss fundraising to help families in need or to mobilise collective labour for village development (Ear 2010, 63). In rather rare occasions where the members of local communities are victimised by unfair public policies or are in dispute with other communities, traditional self-help organisations such as farmers associations and committees related to Buddhist monasteries association would offer space for expressing the local voice (Malena and Chhim 2009)

Religious Agencies

Regarding faith-based peacebuilding, renowned Buddhist monk Maha Ghosananda's mobilisation of an annual peace march called *dhammayietra* in the aftermath of the civil war was considered a surprise to many people who had believed that the Buddhist tradition had been discontinued during the Khmer Rouge's rule and the following civil war. However, since the military coup in 1997, Buddhist monks' participation in political actions was banned and no significant Buddhism-based

activism was developed for a while. From the mid 2000s, peacebuilding movements led by religious leaders became more discernible. Although the absolute majority of these programmes are in the form of non-political charity, a number of Buddhist monks such as But Buntenh, Loun Sovath and Bun Saluth have mobilised more politically sensitive activities for human rights protection, environmental protection, and monitoring of government activities (see Chapter 6 for more details).

The civil society actors including most peacebuilding agencies have attempted to form various coalitions or networks so that they can consolidate their voices; these efforts have achieved only partial success. Although a few national-level networks such as CCC, NGO Forum and Star Kampuchea play important roles as the hub for collaboration, the level of cooperation in these networks is usually limited to information sharing and issuance of joint declarations on common concerns. The coalition at the sub-national level is even more limited, demonstrating that they are at the early stages of their development without stable funding in most areas. Hence, a lack of effective network and alliances remains a key challenge in the Cambodian NGO sector (Malena and Chhim 2009).

Types of Local-International Interactions at Local Level Peacebuilding

The interaction between local peacebuilders and their external counterparts is determined based on how the partnership is structured. From its structural viewpoint, the local-international partnership in peacebuilding in Cambodia and Mindanao can be categorised into three forms: *contract-based relationship, partner-driven partnership, and advocacy under integrated structure.*

Firstly and probably most frequently, local actors maintain varying degrees of *contract-based relationship* with external funders. In this type of partnership, international organisations or donor agencies select local agencies to implement particular projects for a certain period of time, and develop short-term fee-for-service arrangements. Some donor agencies open calls for proposals and allocate the funding to the selected proposals whereas others have pre-determined programmes and approach potential local partners who can implement them.

The donors' values and agenda are emphasized in the proposal selection process or initial work-partnership development and local counterparts are frequently pressurized to reflect them during the implementation process. Donors who are involved in this type of partnership demonstrate their preference for local agencies that look more like Western NGOs and have good records of meeting donors' requirements (Sivhouch and Sedara 2013). Moreover, they tend to focus on the effective implementation of the programmes they fund, and do not pay attention to the conditions in which local counterparts operate the programmes. There is little incentive for local peacebuilders to push forward ideas for changing/improving the nature of the programmes or facilitate better communication with their counterparts. Moreover, such project-based funding tends to be short-term and sporadic; local peacebuilders are under constant pressure to secure further funding to continue their programmes and to find supplementary work to address any funding shortage (Dibley 2014).

Second, there is *partner-driven partnership* to use Dibley (2014)'s term. In such cases, local agencies maintain their independent status but receive comprehensive advocacy from external agencies. The international agencies aim to building stronger collaboration with their local counterparts than contract-based models; the donors tend to offer core funding to cover organizational and administrative costs, with the predictability of a more stable funding flow, and relevant skills training. They also attempt to have regular meetings to discuss and determine the directions of the programmes that they fund.

For the local peacebuilders that had experienced mostly contract based relations, to have partner-driven partnership meant a significant improvement. The NGO practitioners in Cambodia and Mindanao that I interviewed in 2016–2017 particularly appreciated the value of *core funding* and a *lump-sum grant*[7] that these advocate agencies offer. While having more sustainable funding sources to support the organizational management and flexible usage, local actors can demonstrate a great flexibility in operating their projects (Interview No. III). In this type of partnership, however, donors' agenda is frequently delivered and internalized through such constant interaction. Donor representatives' regular visits for discussions and skills training are frequently utilized to

[7]Lump sum grant is a type of financial grant that does not designate the specific purposes, so its usage can be more under the control of aid recipients.

develop *common visions* for operation. Moreover, when advocate agencies consider local counterparts as the agents to implement their visions, such advocacy relationships risk being unequal and imposing. With an increasing number of new donors from Asia coming in, this risk is getting particularly high in Cambodia (Interview No. IV, Interview No. V).

Finally, there are local peacebuilding agencies established and operated as sub-units or project sites of international organisations, international NGOs, or external charity organisations. The level of autonomy of these branches or offices varies depending on the principles of their headquarters; nevertheless, research participants generally confirm that this type of local peacebuilder faces more organizational challenges to the enhancement of local ownership. In many cases, for instance, key managerial positions tend to be assumed by the staff dispatched from the headquarters. Moreover, the main objectives or operational priorities may be determined or conditioned by the headquarters' multi-year plan although local offices largely control specific decisions about field operations. Multiple interview participants also report that once the major direction of a programme is determined, the decision is less likely to be changed in a short period even in cases where the local office raises issues with them (Interview No. I; Interview No. VI; Interview No. VII). Such an institutional environment offers limited opportunities for local staff to propose and develop their own models of peacebuilding.

Conclusion

Thus far, this chapter has offered background information relevant to the analysis of local peacebuilding and peacebuilders in Mindanao and Cambodia. First, it explained the historical contexts that determined the identity of local and local peacebuilders, by focusing on the cultural and historical background, the nature of conflicts, and the types of peacebuilding developed in the areas. In Mindanao, the division of three cultural and ethnic groups—Christian settlers, Moro, and Lumad-, multi-layered sources of conflicts that are closely associated with local communities, and multiple trends of peacebuilding formed the distinction of local peacebuilders' communities divided along the line of local Mindanao. Contrastingly, Cambodia's long history as a unified nation, elite-oriented mobilization of conflicts, and the externally-driven peacebuilding in the aftermath of the total civil war, did create a more

homogeneous group of local peacebuilders who share a similar national and religious identity.

Then, this chapter offered more detailed information on the main peacebuilding programmes, locals and local peacebuilders in the contexts of Mindanao and Cambodia. In Mindanao where a large proportion of the local population is still suffering ongoing violence and inter-community disputes, the programmes to facilitate peaceful coexistence of different social groups (i.e., conflict resolution, inter-faith dialogue) and to support the victims of violence (i.e., Peace Zone) are proactively implemented together with development projects. Nevertheless, after the post-war rehabilitation period, the majority of the programmes are in the form of development projects promoted by NGOs.

Finally, three types of local-international interactions that the peacebuilding agencies examined in this research project are introduced: contract-based relationship, partner-driven partnership, and advocacy under integrated structure. These forms of interaction offer different types of challenges that constrain the development of local ownership of peacebuilding in Cambodia and Mindanao. The local peacebuilding actors examined in this volume have developed and managed their programmes under one of the above three structures of local-international partnership.

Over time, these local peacebuilders gradually learned how to handle "a hierarchy emerging from material inequalities" (Hughes 2001, 145) and found ways for "increasingly 'owning' the process through active intervention / participation" (Coronel-Ferrer 2002, 33). In the following four case study chapters, the process and strategies used by these local peacebuilders in promoting their ownership will be analysed.

References

Anasarias, Ernesto, and Peter Berliner. 2009. Chapter 6: Human Rights and Peacebuilding. In *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace*, ed. Joseph de Rivera, 181–195. New York: Springer Verlag.

Arillo, Cecilio T. 2015. The Mindanao Problem: History, Geography and Democraphy. *Business Mirror*, February 13. Available at https://businessmirror.com.ph/the-mindanao-problem-history-geography-and-demography-part2/. Accessed 16 June 2018.

Bara, Hannbal. 2015. *The History of the Muslim in the Philippines, National Commission for Culture and the Arts, the Government of the Philippines.*

National Commission for Culture and Arts, the Government of the Philppines. Available at http://ncca.gov.ph/subcommissions/subcommission-on-cultural-communities-and-traditional-arts-sccta/central-cultural-communities/the-history-of-the-muslim-in-the-philippines/. Accessed 19 Mar 2018.

Bentley, G. Carter. 1995. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo: A Modern Maranao Datu. In *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, 243–284. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Brown, Macalister, and Joseph Zasloff. 1998. *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 1979–1998*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Cagoco-Guiam, Rufa. 1999. A Critical Partnership: Civil Society and the Peace Process. *Accord* 6: 56–63.

Chandler, David. 1998. Cambodia's Historical Legacy. *Accord* 5. Available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/historical-legacy.php. Accessed 11 Apr 2017.

Chandler, David. 2007. *A History of Cambodia*. London and New York: Routledge.

Chaulia, Sreeram. 2007. International Organisations in Mindanao: To Protect or Not? *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, February 1. Available at https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/21. Accessed 15 Mar 2018.

Christie, Ryerson. 2013. *Peacebuilding and NGOs: State-Civil Society Interactions*. London and New York: Routledge.

Clarke, Gerard. 1998. *The Politics of NGOs in South-East Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines*. London: Routledge.

Colletta, Nat. 2006. Citizen Security—The Role of NGOs and Broader Civil Society in Ceasefire Monitoring: Lessons from Mindanao. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 2 (3): 21–34.

Concepciòn, Sylvia, Larry Digal, Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Romulo de la Rosa, and Mara Stankovitch. 2003. Breaking the Links Between Economics and Conflict in Mindanao. Discussion Paper, London, International Alert. Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?-doi=10.1.1.200.5712&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Accessed 20 Mar 2018.

Conciliation Resources. 1999. *Accord* 6. London: Conciliation Resources.

Conciliation Resources. 2018. History: The National Democratic Front—Philippines Conflict. Available at http://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/south-east-asia/history-national-democratic-front-philippines-conflict. Accessed 15 Mar 2018.

Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam. 2002. Philippines National Unification Commission: National Consultation and the 'Six Paths to Peace.' In *Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking*, *Accord*, vol. 13, ed. Catherine Barnes. London: Conciliation Resources. Available at www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/phi.htm. Accessed 18 June 2018.

Dibley, Thushara. 2014. *Partnership, Power and Peacebuilding: NGOs as Agents of Peace in Aceh and Timor-Leste*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ear, Chariya. 2010. *Cambodia's Rural Communities and Social Capital Formation: Lessons Learned from Tram Kak District, Takeo Province*. Master's Disseration, Tokyo: University of Tokyo.

Gottesman, Evan. 2004. *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Heder, Stephen. 1999. *Pol Pot at Bay: People's War and the Breakdown of the 1991 Paris Agreements*. PhD, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Hughes, Caroline. 2001. *The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991–2001*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon.

Hughes, Caroline. 2003. *The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991–2001*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon.

Kiernan, Ben. 1992. Behind the Peace Agreement in Cambodia. *Viet Nam Generation Journal & Newsletter* 3 (4). Available at http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Kiernan_Peace_Agreement.html. Accessed 2 June 2017.

Kiernan, Ben. 2002. *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kim, Dongyeob. 2017. *Philippines Bangsamoro Islam Jeongdang-ui Jangrae: Lanao Del Sur-ui Ompia-dang-I Namgin Gyihun-ul Jungsim-uro* (The Future of Islamic Political Parties in Bansamoro, Philippines: Lessons from Ompia Party in Lanao Del Sur). In *Dong-nam-a-ui Islam-hua: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam-esuui Jeongchi, Sahoemunhua-ui Dayangsung-gua Galdung* (The Islamization in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Cultural Diversity and Conflicts in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam), ed. Hyungjun Kim and Seokjun Hong, 167–219. Seoul: Nulmin.

Lee, SungYong. 2013. Lost in Translation: The Problem of Perceptual Limitations in Civil War Peace Negotiation. *International Interactions* 39 (2): 144–166.

Lee, SungYong, and Wookbeom Park. 2015. Nurturing Local Voice: The UNDP's Local Empowerment Programmes in Cambodia. In *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*, ed. SungYong Lee and Alpaslan Özerdem, 135–155. London and New York: Routledge.

Luco, Fabienne. 2002. *Between a Tiger and a Crocodile*. Phnom Penh: UNESCO.

Malena, Carmen, and Kristina Chhim. 2009. *Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia*. New York: World Bank.

McKirdy, Euan, and Ivan Watson. 2017. Former Abu Sayyaf Fighter Warns Worse to Come in the Philippines. *CNN*, July 2. Available at https://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/02/asia/former-abu-sayyaf-militant-abu-jihad/index.html. Accessed 15 Mar 2018.

Neher, Clark. D., and Ross Marlay. 1995. *Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of Change*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Peang-Meth, A. 1991. Understanding the Khmer. *Asian Survey* 31 (5): 442–455.

Pellini, Arnaldo, and David Ayres. 2007. Community Participation in Local Governance in Cambodia: Learning from the Village Networks Approach. *Development in Practice* 17 (3): 404–409.

Rodil, B.R. 1994. *The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago*. Manila: Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao.

Rood, Steven. 2005. *Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society*—Policy Studies 17. Washington, DC: East-Weste Center.

Sihanouk, Norodom. 2005. *Shadow Over Angkor*, 254–255. Phnom Penh: Monument Books, Osborne, 1994.

Sivhouch, Ou, and Kim Sedara. 2013. *20 Years' Strengthening Civil Society: Time for Reflection*. Phnom Penh: CDRI.

Slocomb, Margaret. 2004. *The People's Republic of Kampuchea: The Revolution After Pol Pot*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Tiu, Marcario. 2013. *Davao: Reconstructing History Text Memory*. Manila: Ateneo de Davao University.

Torres III, Wilfredo Magno (eds.). 2007. *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila Press.

Uphoff, Norman. 1993. Grassroots Organisations and NGOs in Rural Development: Opportunities with Diminishing States and Expanding Markets. *World Development* 24: 607–622.

CHAPTER 3

Ownership Inheritance from External Advocate

This chapter will examine local peacebuilding actors' ownership inheritance from external actors, a type of local ownership development usually found in the organisations that are established or led by international advocates. The term inheritance in this chapter broadly covers a range of activities of local peacebuilders taking part in the donor-driven process of invitation, facilitation, promotion, and transfer of peacebuilding ownership. In both Cambodia and Mindanao, many international interveners including the UN agencies began to recognise "the importance of using national capacities to undertake programmes and projects" (UNDP 2006, cited in Chaulia 2007) and attempted to include substantial areas in which the government officials and the representatives of local communities can participate. In the late 1990s, there was "a growing trend in participatory approaches to development" (Hiwasa 2014).

Such an externally-oriented process for promoting local ownership was implemented primarily in two ways. Firstly, a significant number of internationally-funded organisations have set long-term plans for capacity building and leadership transfer to local staff, sometimes since their establishment. These organisations usually train local staff by letting them participate in various programmes and then select a few prominent individuals as the potential leadership successors. After being promoted to higher positions over time, these local staff members assume key leadership roles in the organisations. Secondly, local stakeholders can be invited to play key roles in externally-facilitated peacebuilding

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1_3

programmes. A large number of local-level programmes for conflict resolution, social reconciliation and development funded by international organisations consider local participation high priority and are designed to encourage local communities to include their ideas and feedback throughout the whole process of development.

Compared to the conventional forms of local ownership promotion that tended to end up with local actors' 'ownership as customers' (Lee and Özerdem 2015), the examples of ownership inheritance in Cambodia and Mindanao demonstrate a higher-level of local ownership. In terms of organisational structure, local peacebuilders take over most leadership positions from foreign staff or are facilitated to assume core positions through the process of ownership inheritance. During the decision making process, local actors' decisions are usually not restricted under the influence of their international supporters. Hence, these peacebuilding agencies frequently present features that had not appeared before the ownership inheritance.

Having said this, such ownership inheritance is externally-driven, being initiated and advocated by the external actors' voluntary plan for ownership transfer. In some cases, it occurs at the end of the paternalistic capacity building process. The local staff who take over managerial roles had usually worked for their organisations for decades and had received various training on relevant skills and human capacity. In addition, during the ownership transfer process, foreign managers carefully select their successors from the local people who are more willing to accept their visions. Hence, by the time they assume the leadership roles, these local staff have comprehended and internalised the underlying philosophy and principles of the organisations.

This chapter comprises three major sections. In the first two parts, this chapter will distinguish two major patterns of ownership transfer that are briefly stated above—localisation of peacebuilding initiatives and invited local involvement—and describe how these two types of ownership inheritance work in practice by using the examples of the vocational training at Banteay Prieb in Cambodia and the Applying, Binding, Bonding and Bridging (A3B) programmes of Christian Relief Service. Finally, it will introduce and analyse two outstanding features that the process of ownership inheritance demonstrates as a model of local ownership development: varied patterns of local peacebuilders' norm internalisation and new forms of local-international collaboration within an organisation.

Localisation of Peacebuilding Initiatives

Localisation of peacebuilding initiatives refers to external actors' voluntary transfer of leadership or managerial roles of certain peacebuilding agencies to local actors. Donor agencies who are interested in localisation have internal plans to withdraw their direct involvement a few years after the inception of their peacebuilding programs. In such cases, localisation normally follows the process of capacity building and the transfer of leadership roles is made to local staff. The importance of gradual empowerment of local staff is emphasised in the process. At the end of the leadership transfer, foreign staff or their international headquarters may retain their presence by offering advisory services or may completely pull out of their commitments.

During the author's field survey between 2014 and 2017, localisation of peacebuilding initiatives was what most local practitioners in Cambodia and Mindanao had in mind as a typical model of ownership promotion. To my questions of 'How do you define the promotion of local ownership?' and 'Do you know any examples of local ownership development?', the largest number of respondents referred to the examples relevant to this model. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the number of local peacebuilders that have gone through ownership inheritance is particularly bigger than other models. In fact, upon my question of 'if they know any clear examples of ownership inheritance,' a significant number of respondents repeatedly referred to the same small number of examples.

One of the reasons is that ownership inheritance is a most 'visible' model. For many local peacebuilders, it was a striking scene when the managerial positions once fully assumed by foreign faces were taken over by locals who they had known for a long time. Moreover, many local organisations that had gone through such ownership inheritance developed new decision making process with different mechanisms for incorporating the voices from local communities. Another reason is that the localisation of peacebuilding initiatives was a type that they were most familiar with. When local peacebuilders were introduced to the concept of local ownership in different training or workshops, they were encouraged to enhance their capacities to get ready to take over the leadership from their foreign seniors. In a sense, localisation was what many local peacebuilders had previously heard in the name of the promotion of local ownership.

The development of Banteay Prieb in Cambodia demonstrates a good example of the gradual and multi-layered process of ownership inheritance. Banteay Prieb (BP), or Centre of Doves, is a vocational training centre providing educational service to Cambodians with disabilities. In the post-war peacebuilding, the Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) for people with disability (PWD) was an important element. The number of PWDs had constantly increased due to the chronic military warfare. During the civil war in the 1980s especially, a large number of combatants and civilians were wounded during fighting and victimised by landmines. Moreover, in the aftermath of the civil war, the social conditions in Cambodia did not offer PWDs good opportunities to manage economic and public life. An absolute majority of the PWDs had to live within their houses, relying on the income of their families.

BP was established by Jesuit priests in 1991 while the civil conflict was still ongoing. The school firstly set an exclusive target group of disabled ex-combatants. Later, the target groups were expanded to include all PWDs who struggle to maintain their basic livelihood due to their physical disabilities. As of 2017, the school offers education services in seven subjects (electronics, mechanics, sewing, agriculture, phone-repairing, cosmetic make-up, and a special education for mentally challenged persons). Every year, approximately 120 new students are enrolled (Lee 2017, Interview No. VIII).

The ownership development has been an important objective of BP. Moreover, for this school, the targets of ownership development were more than the organisation's operational leadership. First, the primary level of ownership was for students with a physical disability who usually have limited opportunities to engage in public or economic life. In the Cambodian tradition of Buddhism, life difficulties were frequently considered as a punishment or supranatural retribution for one's misbehaviour or bad karma (Luco 2002, 22). They are frequently discouraged from taking part in domestic activities like cooking or going out of their own villages. Thus, during the skill training, the school aimed to encourage all students to develop self-dignity as the owners of their lives. From this perspective, Jub Phokthavi, the first director of BP mentioned "Skills are just tools. (…) the whole dynamic and whole activities are aimed at improving the personal dignity. That is the main of our work" (cited in Lee 2017, 67).

In this process, students' community life was a key method. All students of BP are expected to live in a student residential house, which is designed to accommodate 10–12 students and one resident teacher. The students in the same residential house form a small community, sharing the responsibilities for daily life (i.e., grocery shopping, cooking, laundry, and cleaning). In addition, the school appoints two student-care teachers (one male and one female) who offer counselling services regarding the issues with their study, health and family. Then, the twelve student houses and other areas used for teaching, administration, production workshops, and public relations create a small community. While sharing the responsibilities of managing their daily activities, students confirmed that they learned how to live and manage their lives and develop their self-confidence and independence (Lee 2017).

At another level, BP pursued the local ownership of teaching and related work. The Jesuit leaders wanted the school to be operated by Cambodians, especially graduates of the school. When the school was firstly opened, all operational leadership was assumed by foreign Jesuit priests and nuns and teachings posts were recruited from foreign countries (especially Thailand). Nevertheless, two years from the inception of education, BP has gradually filled teaching posts with their graduates. Once they were recruited as teachers and staff, these graduates were exposed to constant interaction with Jesuit priests, foreign volunteers (most of whom were strong Catholic practitioners) who demonstrated Christian ways of operating education programmes. Moreover, in order to encourage the teachers to develop the communities that they hope for, BP appointed resident teachers who stay with students to offer necessary care with students' study, health, family issues and other aspects of life. As of 2017, there are twenty-three teachers (thirteen subject teachers, eleven resident teachers, five literacy teachers, two student-care teachers) and a number of outreach team members who recruit new students and look after graduates. All these teaching posts are occupied by the former students of BP.

Finally, some of the teachers have been promoted to the position of school principal and other managerial posts, which demonstrates the type of 'local ownership of peacebuilding' that this volume primarily considers. All key leadership roles including the school principal, the outreach team manager as well as key teaching posts are taken by Cambodians. The former and current principals of the school, Klieng Vann and Chrek

Vuthda are representative examples. Moreover, BP's structure enables these Cambodian staff to make most decisions relating to the schools operation. Officially, the final decision on BP's major direction should be made by the director of BP, a role which has always been assumed by foreign Jesuit priests. However, at least over the past 10 years, the director's decisions were largely based on consensus within the staff meetings.

Especially regarding the technical and operational issues, the director's roles are more as a communication mediator with Jesuit Service Cambodia (JSC, the Jesuit organisation that BP officially belongs to) and facilitator of discussions, rather than decision maker. More specifically, the operation of BP is managed through discussions in three types of meetings: daily managers' meetings, weekly resident teachers' meetings, and weekly all-staff meetings. The way of life for students in residential areas is fully determined at the weekly residential teachers' meetings in which resident teachers, school principal, the Centre's director, and student-care teachers participate. Except for the director of BP, all participants are Cambodians who graduated from BP. All detailed decisions are made based on the discussions between teachers; the director usually makes brief advisory comments at the end of each meeting. Moreover, resident teachers determine how to respond to various issues emerging at each residential house, without getting prior permission from other staff. Decisions on major issues are discussed at daily managers' meetings, and all Cambodian managers confirmed that they feel free to express their ideas (Lee 2017, Interview No. VIII; Interview No. IX; Interview No. X).

The replacement of all staff with former students brought about many positive consequences. Most importantly, since the teachers are from the same cultural backgrounds and have the same life-challenges as PWDs, teachers were in a good position to comprehend the needs and perspectives of the students and communicate with them better. Moreover, a significant number of new programmes to support the current and former students as well as new teaching courses reflecting changing needs from the society were developed based on the proposals from the Cambodian staff. At the same time, the Cambodian staff also gradually learned and internalised the Jesuit values and principles such as dedication of self to God, altruistic love and mutual care and explained these concepts with their own experiences. For instance, many teachers at BP, regardless of their religious association, widely used the term of self-dedication and highlighted the importance of selfless dedication to students' happiness (Interview No. VIII; Interview No. IX).

In other cases, international supporters may discontinue their involvement in daily peacebuilding operations, as can be seen from the establishment of Development and Partnership in Action (DPA) in Cambodia. DPA was firstly established in 1979 as a Cambodian office of Cooperation International pour le Development et la Solidarite (CIDSE), an aid organisation covering Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, based on a consortium of 16 organisations in Europe and North America. The separation and localisation of each country office was decided in 1996, with the aiInm that each office "become independent and self-reliant development organisations" (DPA 2017). Under a roughly ten-year-long plan, the consortium had gone through a series of consultation meetings and training sessions with the staff of each country's office but maintained the same financial and operational structure of the three countries until 2002. The final separation process for ensuring the independent operation of each country office continued until 2005 when CIDSE-Cambodia became an independent DPA. During this process, DPA created its own board entirely comprising Cambodian figures and the operational connection with former European representatives of CIDSE was terminated.

Nevertheless, localisation of peacebuilding initiatives requires strong trust between the local and international staff, carefully prepared procedures, and prudent and flexible implementation. In fact, there are many examples demonstrating how rushed attempts at quick localisation fail. In these cases, international organisations and donor agencies usually aim to transfer all leadership and responsibilities to the local staff at once or with a short transitional period. In such cases, international agencies tend to exit either by a 'cut and run' strategy, or through 'phased withdrawal' within a short time period (Lee and Özerdem 2015), and the transfer of peacebuilding ownership is likely to be attempted in a rather quick and radical manner. Although the official procedures of ownership inheritance may seem identical, such quick localisation is different in that the process is imposed upon unprepared local actors due to external actors' needs. Consequently, many peacebuilding programmes were either closed down or significantly reduced in size as local staff with insufficient managerial experience experienced various challenges. Even in cases where the localised programmes survived, they had to compromise their key objectives to keep attracting the funding sources (Interview No. XIII).

Invited Local Involvement

Another frequently attempted form of ownership inheritance is *invited local involvement*, the cases where local actors' proactive involvement in peacebuilding programmes is facilitated and encouraged by external advocates. As the importance of local commitment was widely emphasised in the field practice, many peacebuilding programmes which developed since the mid 1990s attempted to create space for more proactive roles for local actors. Although the examples of invited local involvement may look similar to many conventional models, which requested local actors to contribute to the mechanisms set by international actors (Lee and Özerdem 2015), the programmes in the category of invited local involvement apply various methods to identify and value local perspectives and resources.

First, one of the most widely observable feature of these programmes is their emphasis on the process of relationship building. The facilitators of these peacebuilding programmes appreciated that relationship building is a key to the success of all social activities in both Cambodia and Mindanao with traditional hierarchical/collective cultures, patron–client communitarianism, and high-context communication systems. Thus, before encouraging local stake holders to get involved in peacebuilding, the facilitators spend a significant amount of time building trust with them.

Second, many facilitators make deliberate efforts to keep the operation of peacebuilding programmes flexible in order to incorporate and reflect the complex and unpredictable changes in local contexts. Some international organisations, for instance, try to achieve this goal by taking a 'learning process approaches' to peacebuilding. In contrast to a blueprint approach, which tends to design a programme containing a predetermined series of steps and a fixed implementation schedule, the learning process approach aims to develop a 'how to do' strategy by making mistakes, reflecting on them, and finding better ways of performing actions (Lee and Park 2015).

Third, external facilitators apply diverse strategies to enable local actors to incorporate their views and cultural elements in the planning, implementation and evaluation phases of these programmes. For instance, some organisations attempt to adopt more reflective and 'elicitive' models of meetings that minimise the imposition of facilitators' visions. In other cases, they conduct a series of individual dialogues with

youths and women whose voices tend to be relatively marginalised in official meetings.

One example of such invited local involvement can be found in the A3B project developed by Christian Relief Service (CRS) in Mindanao. CRS is an international aid organisation and its Philippines office was established in the mid 1940s in Manila. The CRS Mindanao office was set up in 1988, initially to address development issues like health and economic development at local community levels. Later, motivated by the massacre in Rwanda in 1994 where CRS also operated relief programmes, the direction of the global CRS began to transform. Rather than providing food and technical support only, CRS wanted to address broad social issues aiming to integrate relief and development. Coincidently, the Final Peace Agreement was signed in Mindanao in 1996. Thus, the whole peacebuilding programme of CRS in Mindanao began to transform, aiming to facilitate more social reconciliation.

From the outset, the CRS Mindanao office went through the gradual localization procedure stated above. The directorship of the Mindanao programme, initially held by an American officer, was soon assumed by a native Mindanaowon. Then, it recruited all programme operators from the Mindanao area. These newly recruited operators used to work for other peacebuilding/development programmes offered by UN agencies or NGOs; thus, they had relatively few confrontations with the staff in Manila. At the same time, they knew the conditions of peacebuilding in the area, the social and cultural contexts, as well as how international organizations work. When the Mindanao staff disagreed with the instruction from Manila, they were able to have discussions with them and, in most cases, Manila accepted the opinions from Mindanao (Interview No. XI).

In the 2000s, CRS brought the level of operations down to the community level. A wide range of inter-religious dialogues and local-level conflict resolutions were conducted at communities. Many prominent religious leaders participated in this series of programmes. As many religious leaders (especially Muslim leaders and indigenous religious leaders) in Mindanao are important political leaders at the same time, it was important to get these religious leaders' understanding about the ongoing peace processes. As CRS in Mindanao was affiliated to a global Catholic organisation, it was aware that non-Catholic Mindanawon might consider it as an external actor when CRS wanted to address community level disputes. Some community leaders even suspected

CRS's hidden intention to convert their religious identity. Thus, when it attempted to develop more innovative and integrated models for local conflict resolution, CRS set 'the models from locals' as a key principle and made efforts to utilize and reflect the local actors' knowledge and know-how in designing its peacebuilding programmes.

CRS's A3B programmes were designed to reflect the principle. A3B denotes a series of programmes implemented between April 2012 and September 2015, primarily in four municipalities in central Mindanao, aiming to building innovative and integrative local conflict resolution mechanisms that can effectively deal with local conflicts, especially conflicts over land ownership. In the 2010s, three types of land conflicts were particularly active in central Mindanao: boundary conflicts, mortgage or transactional disputes, and competing land claims. Behind these conflicts, the discrepancy between customary systems of collective land ownership and modern models of individual property rights was an important factor (World Bank 2013). Although there was *Lupong Tagapamayapa*, an official conflict resolution mechanism at barangay level,[1] their effectiveness was limited and CRS thought this ineffectiveness was partly due to the community leaders' lack of commitment. Thus, CRS intended to supplement the official mechanism by strengthening the roles of traditional and religious leaders as community peace facilitators. The process of A3B was comprised of two main components, discussed below.

Trust building—The primary goal in the initial phase of A3B was to build strong trust and collaborative relationships with local leaders. Since local traditional and religious leaders would face many challenges while getting prepared to be local peace facilitators, the successful implementation of A3B would not be possible without having such a strong foundation. Thus, CRS spent the first year of the three-year-long project for trust building, making the following efforts. Firstly, in order to reduce the initial suspicion from local communities on its hidden intention, CRS established close collaboration with the peacebuilding organisations developed within the local areas. Some of the key partners include

[1] *Lupong Tagapamayapa*, or Pacification Committees, is a community-based extrajudicial conflict resolution scheme. This committee system usually deals with minor disputes between residents within a same barangay, and, while it does not have judicial punishment power, the decisions made in *Lupong Tagapamayapa* are normally considered binding in many local communities.

the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS), the Society of Oblates of Notre Dame (OND, a congregation of female apostolates in Cotabato), and the imams in Maguindanao.

When local leaders allowed CRS to make visits without accompanying local partners, the representatives of CRS engaged with the leaders many times in the form of individual dialogues, courtesy visits, and invitations to workshops. At this stage of interaction, two main objectives were to let them accept CRS as a trustworthy partner and to convince them to consider the concerned local conflicts as their own issues that should be dealt by them. Many religious and traditional leaders had thought the conflicts were triggered by the government and major military groups and thus, the solutions were beyond their power.

During the trust building process, moreover, CRS paid attention to the engagement with two other types of local stakeholders. The peer officials at local governance was one group. In the conflict-affected zones in Mindanao, to get the government's understanding of and support for the community-driven peace initiatives was crucial for developing sustainable peacebuilding. Hence, CRS maintained close communication with the government official in order to prevent any potential conflicts of interests with the government. Moreover, when approaching potential local peace facilitators, CRS aimed to include the local leaders from Lumad as much as possible as, compared to Moro and Christian migrants, Lumad's voice had been more marginalized in the previous peacebuilding activities. In this sense, an important element of trust building of the A3B was to coordinate and incorporate various (and frequently contradictory) perspectives of the local stakeholders.

Training—In case local leaders present their interest in playing an active role as local mediators, CRS invites them to informal or formal training programmes. In the A3B programme, CRS operated three types of services and training (namely, binding, bonding and bridging) to traditional/religious leaders, Lupong Tagapamayapa members and other community representatives, aiming to encourage and assist them to get involved in the conflict resolution processes.

First, the programmes for binding are about individuals' self-transformation to heal their inner trauma and nurture more capability to be accommodating. Moreover, CRS offered these leaders various training on strengthening relations within same identity groups, which was named as 'bonding'. The activities like understanding-the-self workshop, dialogue for peace practice, and practice for conflict analysis and

resolution were conducted under this theme. Then, most directly relevant to local-level disputes, CRS provided 'bridging' activities to develop trust and communication between different identity groups, some of which include joint leaders training, joint assessments for specific land issues, and dialogues with conflicting parties. While teaching relevant skills and knowledge was one goal of the training, a more fundamental objective was to enable the local leaders from different communities to work together to come up with potential solutions to their local issues (Bolton and Leguro 2015; Leguro 2017).

Once traditional and religious leaders felt more confident after getting this training, CRS, together with other local peacebuilding agencies, assisted these leaders to play their roles as community peace facilitators and helped form networks between them. Although the achievements of A3B need more long-term evaluation, it is noteworthy that a total of 143 traditional and religious leaders assumed their roles as peace facilitators and established four municipal interfaith networks. These local leaders had come up with a wide range of solutions to local conflicts and generalisation from their initiatives are difficult to make. However, many of these local leaders became more proactive in utilising the available legal and institutional mechanisms to support the rights of indigenous peoples and the protection of environment (i.e., National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Another outstanding feature is the local leaders' involvement in the collaboration with other governance or conflict resolution schemes such as Municipal Interagency Working Groups. Some of these leaders also participated in the development of interfaith networks at municipality level, which aimed to strengthen cohesion between different identity groups (Bolton and Leguro 2015).

If CRS' A3B is a training oriented programme of invited local commitment, there are examples that restrict external involvement to the roles of dialogue facilitator only. The local engagement of iEmergence in Mindanao is one such example. iEmergence is a non-profit organization that aims to work alongside Indigenous communities to promote holistic approaches to development, spirituality, cultural affirmation, and conflict resolution. iEmergence is led by an Indigenous Canadian director with affiliation to a wider network called Indigenous Pathways. When building relationships with local communities, the representatives of iEmergence spend the first years entirely for engaging in dialogue with the stakeholders, visiting each community multiple times. Since relationship

is the core value of the organization, this time is critical in building a foundation of mutual understanding, trust and respect.

Moreover, applying 'we never go anywhere we are not invited' as its core principle, the organisation's involvement in any local setting or issue is made strictly based on the communities' invitation. During their engagement with a community the representatives of iEmergence assume the role of dialogue facilitators, asking questions relevant to the issues and sharing stories of how other Indigenous peoples around the world approach similar issues. The communities should find their answers. Once a community comes up with concrete ideas and begins to take action, iEmergence limits its presence, since the mere attendance of outsiders during decision-making can influence or change the power dynamic. At this point, they focus on maintaining relationships that encourage and support locally driven development initiatives (Interview No. XII).

Noticeable Features

Overall, the level of ownership that local peacebuilders have is significantly higher than the 'ownership as customers' discussed in Lee and Özerdem (2015). In both models, localisation of peacebuilding initiatives and invited local involvement, it is local peacebuilders who play central roles in planning and implementing their peacebuilding programmes. Although some of the local peacebuilders receive a substantial amount of material, advisory, and organisational support from external advocates, they do not feel pressure or restriction from the externals during the process of decision making. In this sense, such inter-generational leadership transfer can be a more advanced version of the externally-led capacity-building programmes that have been subject to extensive empirical studies.

Out of a number of attention-attracting features of ownership inheritance, this section will introduce a few forms of local-external collaboration. Since the power disparity in favour of international supporters has been highlighted as a core problem of conventional liberal peacebuilding, researchers have attempted to explore the question of "what types of relations will local peacebuilders and international aiders develop when more advanced local ownership is achieved?" Some local peacebuilders who had gone through ownership inheritance propose a few forms of collaboration relevant to the question, burgeoning in Mindanao

and Cambodia as of the late 2010s. Firstly, considering the roles of the former leadership or the headquarters of a wider global network, they tended to be assigned the roles of 'advisors' with little executive power in the following forms. One popular form is to set a foreign advisory board, which is mainly comprised of the former managers. While these advisors may have a permanent presence, more frequently, they make occasional visits to the agencies and review its performance. The Wholistic Development Organisation (WDO, Cambodia)'s relationship with its former programme officers after localisation is one such example (Devkota 2013).

In other cases, a few selected representatives of the former leadership are recruited as local advisory staff. For instance, when the UNDP's local empowerment programme was completed with the ownership transfer to the Cambodian government in 2010, key programme directors of the UNDP-Cambodia were requested to work as senior advisors to the National Committee for Democratic Development at the Sub-National Democratic Development (NCDD), the governmental body to take over the work (Lee and Park 2015).

Some previous advocates decide to completely withdraw from the management of the local peacebuilding programmes but still offer necessary support in official or unofficial ways. For instance, when the local religious and traditional leaders in Mindanao needed to identify and develop their own models for local-level peace mediation or facilitation, CRS continued to support them by assisting them to be linked to other local stakeholders or the venues for further discussions between the local leaders. Former advocate organisations that had formed the local peacebuilding programmes, frequently assume the role of strong external donor after localisation.

Moreover, some local peacebuilders present examples of how to define their relations with foreign staff *within* the same local peacebuilding agencies. Then new managers of the localised peacebuilding agencies have had extensive experience of working with international actors and value the contributions of the foreign staff. Hence, these local organisations are eager to work with international volunteers and contract-based staff. In these new work environments, local managers whose positions have usually been inferior in power to foreign staff, now need to build a new work relationship.

While there are wide variations in the details of the forms of operation, a significant number of local leaders in these localised peacebuilding

agencies commonly believe that they develop collaboration under a more horizontal relationship. International staff are usually vocal in putting their proposals and these ideas frequently help the local staff further develop the ongoing practice of peacebuilding. Regardless of their official positions, they say, international staff or volunteers (especially who those come from the global North) tend to be treated as special guests who have valuable expertise. Nevertheless, the ultimate decision-making power is with local managerial teams and most foreign staff understand and respect this (Interview No. XIII).

The local managers say that the new models for more horizontal local-international collaboration remained stunted yet, due to many practical challenges that prevent local actors properly working on it. For instance, the local organisations can't afford the full-time salary of international staff for a long time due to a lack of funding, therefore many of these staff and volunteers stay with the local organisations for a relatively short time period (between a few weeks to a couple of years). In this case, the international staff frequently do not have sufficient time to gain a nuanced understanding of the local peacebuilding programmes and related local contexts. Thus, local managers frequently end up with a more pragmatic 'division of labour' assigning international staff/volunteers to the types of work that can be operated more independently or that do not need long-term commitment. The local staff who were interviewed particularly appreciated the contributions of foreign staff with paperwork (i.e., proposal writing, preparing the mid-term review for donors) and public relations. Since these international volunteers are frequently from the same cultural backgrounds of donor agencies in the global North, they have better sense of what the donors expect.

Dynamics of Norm Regeneration

As discussed above, many local peacebuilding agencies in this category do not necessarily have strong anxiety about the imported values and collaboration with external actors. In some processes of localisation, local actors made efforts to convince international staff not to withdraw their commitment (Devkota 2013). The local leadership of these peacebuilding agencies appreciate the contributions that come from having external support. Hence, these local peacebuilders tend to present more positive responses to the norms and principles introduced by external actors.

In this section, some prevalent forms of local responses to the imported norms will be discussed by categorising them into four patterns.

This observation of local actors' responses to the norms introduced by external supporters is related to the concepts of *norm socialisation, norm diffusion* and *norm localisation*, which have been subject to extensive academic debate over the past decades. The concepts initially emerged as one of the main themes in International Relations and Development Studies in the 1990s, to explain why and how certain international norms are adopted by certain countries or actors (Björkdhal 2013). In these studies, local actors are usually understood as passive adopters of the introduced norms, and the primary analytical foci were on the strategies adopted by norm diffusers (international organisations, the states in the global North, and the network of the international communities); hence, the foci of the analysis were primarily on the motivation and behavioural features of the 'global community'. There are studies that offer models of such norm socialization, which include the norm life-cycle and the norm-diffusion spiral, frequently highlighting the regulative and constitutive functions of norms in international politics. Other studies focus more on the strategies and procedures of how transnational advocacy networks develop and apply the normative frames that are more adoptable by other states/actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Risse 2002; Cortell and Davis 2000).

Nevertheless, as time went by, an increasing number of studies began to acknowledge the roles of local actors/nation states as an independent and subjective determinant of norm adoption. Although some of them pay attention to the cases of full resistance against the international norm (due to political activities vetoing players or cultural barriers to the norm adoption), most studies instead examine a wide range of actions between full adoption and rejection, proposing concepts like *norm contestation*, *localisation*, and *decoupling*. In these studies, a simplistic interpretation of norm diffusion was criticized as norm internalization is involved in complex (often messy) process of local-international interactions for norm incorporation into local practice (Acharya 2004; Adamson 2005; Bettiza and Dionigi 2014; Boesenecker and Vinjamuri 2011).[2]

[2] See Chapter 7 for a more comprehensive review of the literature on norm diffusion and localisation.

Taking this discourse further, studies in Peace and Conflict Studies highlight the cultural friction and conflicts between the so called international community and local actors in conflict-affected/developing states, and examine the dynamics of local actors' proactive and subjective action to adopt, reject, internalise and modify the imported norms (Koenig and Dierkes 2012; Cobb 2014). 'Hybridity' is adopted to describe various forms of the mixture between imported norms and local actor's perspectives (Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2012; Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012; Peterson 2012; Shaw and Waldorf 2010; Sriram 2012; Bonacker et al. 2017).

Nevertheless, as Zimmermann (2016) acknowledges, these studies tend to focus on explaining the motivations, institutional conditions, and the outcomes of local actors' responses to external norms. Hence, the questions of 'how the process of such adoption, reinterpretation or rejection is developed within and between local actors?' and 'how such internalisation or modification influence the local practice of peacebuilding?' have been left barely explored.

Although it is unrealistic to generalise the patterns of local peacebuilders' responses to the imported norms and principles since there is a wide variation, the local peacebuilders with *ownership inheritance* studied in this chapter are by and large more eager to regenerate the previous visions or norms set by former managers, when compared to other models of local ownership development that will be discussed in the following chapters. This is understandable in that they may have a good chance to comprehend the philosophy underlying the international norms and incorporate such values and principles in their own peacebuilding operation having interacted with their external counterparts for a significant amount of time. Through such efforts, these local peacebuilders demonstrated a few different patterns of internalizing the values and principles that had been introduced by their external advocates.

First, when the time of local-external interaction is relatively short, local peacebuilders are more likely to straightforwardly adopt (or reject) the ideas that they have learned. Hence, when local peacebuilders decide to adopt them, key values of the original founders or external supporters are more likely to be regenerated. For instance, in the A3B programmes of CRS in Mindanao, local traditional and religious leaders are introduced to various ideas and examples relevant to concepts like 'culture of peace,' 'restorative justice,' and 'conflict transformation.' Although they are given the chances to internalise these concepts and creatively apply

them to fit the issues in their own communities, after the training, many local leaders reiterate what they had learned in their own workshops or dialogue.

In the cases where local actors have familiarised themselves with international norms, in contrast, local peacebuilding programmes can present a far more complex process of value internalisation and adaptation, as discussed in more detail below. In some cases, for example, local peacebuilders strengthen their belief in the values introduced by external advocates throughout their activities. The local leadership's thorough understanding of the social context is frequently utilized to promote their organization's values introduced by external supporters in ways that local populations find easier to accept. As briefly discussed above, for instance, the staff of Banteay Prieb adopt and internalise some Catholic based values of education and such values are reflected in the operational rules relevant to after-class community work and the roles of residential teachers, which are developed by Cambodian staff (Lee 2017; Interview No. VIII; Interview No. IX; Interview No. X). Moreover, these values are transmitted to the students through the activities of the staff. In a student survey conducted in 2016, many students of Banteay Prieb responded that they were inspired by the teachers' high level of dedication to their roles, and accepted them as 'mothers' and were willing to follow the teachers' models (Testimonial from a student, cited in Lee 2017).

Third, in other cases, while local peacebuilders appreciated the value of most international norms, they are also aware that universal and immediate application of these norms is likely to create friction with local communities. Thus, local peacebuilders aim to develop strategies to harmonise international normative standards and the cultural contexts of local areas so that they can pursue the values as a long-term goal. Regarding gender issues, for instance, in both Islamic and Catholic traditions in Mindanao, the position of women is considered inferior. Hence, conventional peace initiatives (e.g., interfaith dialogue) were by far more represented by men. Many localised peacebuilding agencies in Mindanao, however, do not overtly challenge such cultural tendencies or create institutional arrangements to immediately increase women's presence in such initiatives. Rather, these agencies accept such cultural bias as the given condition and aim to take a more gradual process to reflect the marginalized voice. CRS, for instance, sets 'women only'

and 'youth only' meetings parallel to conventional inter-faith dialogues. Other organisations may engage in individual dialogues with women and youth in local areas in advance of official meetings, and deliver the opinions that they had collected in the meetings (Interview No. XI).

Fourth, there are cases where local peacebuilders attempt to redefine or reinterpret the imported concepts or themes to fit local contexts. Through trial and error, they develop and transform the modes of delivery and practical approaches to the theme over time, which are more applicable to the unique and changing contexts. An example is DPA in Cambodia which has modified its approaches to the concept of 'working with communities' since the early 2000s. When the staff of CIDSE-Cambodia (the predecessor of DPA) were introduced to the concept, they were confused by the different definitions proposed by varied development paradigms imported from the Philippines, Europe, and Latin America. Thus, CIDSE-Cambodia firstly applied the concepts by increasing its services to local communities regarding health, shelter, agriculture and livelihood. 'Working with community' in this period meant providing more support to local communities. Soon, they realised that service delivery does not bring about sustainability, ownership and strong people participation. Thus, from the mid 2000s, DPA redefined its 'working with community' by assuming the role of facilitator. Instead of offering services, the organisation set the stage for community members to identify their needs and plan their activities to meet the needs. It also provided literacy education to community members so they were not cheated by middlemen who frequently took advantage of the farmers who could not read and calculate weights of products. Thus, during this period, 'working with community' meant capacity building.

In the 2010s, DPA explores more nuanced ways for collaboration with local communities. In a sense, it aims to mainstream people-led development, offering more decision making power to local communities. At the same time, it appreciates that NGOs and communities have different agendas. While some overlap, others can be contradictory. Especially, an NGO's long-term plan may compromise the daily livelihood plan of people in the community. Moreover, the local communities' desire for development may marginalise the voice of the poor. In this sense, 'working with community' in the recent period denotes the constant dialogue with local communities to nurture better mutual understanding (Interview No. XIV).

Summary and Further Reflection

This chapter has examined *ownership inheritance* as a type of local actors' ownership development outstanding in the peacebuilding in Mindanao and Cambodia. To reiterate, the enhancement of local ownership may happen by the deliberate efforts of external supporters. Two forms of ownership inheritance were particularly visible in Mindanao and Cambodia. One is the localisation of the peacebuilding programmes that were previously led by international leadership. The other form is when local actors' proactive involvement is deliberately planned from the outset of certain peacebuilding programmes, by external facilitators. Moreover, the new local leadership that experience such ownership inheritance normally present more positive attitudes in regenerating the values and principles introduced by international advocates in their peacebuilding practices, and are more willing to continue close collaboration with international peacebuilding supporters.

Of the four types of ownership development examined in this volume, ownership inheritance goes through the most externally-driven processes, frequently being developed from an early state of ownership development. Apart from a few cases of sudden ownership transfer conducted mainly as donors' exit strategies, new local leadership established through ownership inheritance normally present more positive manners to their international counterparts and the norms proposed by them.

In a sense, some examples of ownership inheritance present more flexible forms of the *ownership promotion through capacity building* approaches prevalent in the conventional practice. The conventional models' primary goal was on enabling local actors to learn the ideas, skills and procedures relevant to the conventional liberal models so that local actors can carry them out more effectively even after the withdrawal of externals. In contrast, the examples of localisation of peacebuilding programmes introduced some basic skills and ideas during the early phase of ownership transfer, but gradually expanded the space for incorporating local actors' perspectives. Moreover, the external actors who adopt invited local involvement usually assume supportive and facilitative roles from the outset.

Hence, while local peacebuilders are frequently influenced by international norms, they also have good opportunities to marry them with their own perspectives during the process of ownership inheritance. The above discussion discussed the theoretical implication of such models

focusing on the contemporary academic debates on norm diffusion and internalisation. From a practical perspective, moreover, the development of this ownership promotion may offer good insights for addressing the limitations of the unilateral ways of knowledge transfer in conventional capacity building models. Although the promoters of the above examples acknowledge that they are still searching for more suitable methods and procedures to pursue this goal, they at least demonstrate it is certainly possible to create and expand the opportunities to incorporate local perspectives even during the process of transferring skills and knowledge.

References

Acharya, Amitav. 2004. How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? *Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, International Organization* 58 (2): 239–275.

Adamson, Fiona. 2005. Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics. *International Studies Review* 7: 547–569.

Bettiza, Gregorio, and Filippo Dionigi. 2014. Beyond Constructivism's Liberal Bias: Islamic Norm Entrepreneurs in a Post-secular World Society. EUI Working Paper 10, Badia Fiesolana, European University Institute.

Björkdhal, Annika. 2013. Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy. *Swiss Political Science Review* 19 (3): 322–337.

Boesenecker, Aaron, and Leslie Vinjamuri. 2011. Lost in Translation? Civil Society, Faith-Based Organizations and the Negotiation of International Norms. *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 5: 345–365.

Bolton, Nell, and Myla Leguro. 2015. *Local Solutions to Land Conflict in Mindanao*. Manila: CRS Philippines.

Bonacker, Thorsten, Judith von Heusinger, and Kerstin Zimmer. 2017. *Localization in Development Aid: How Global Institutions Enter Local Lifeworlds*. Basingstoke: Routledge.

Chaulia, Sreeram. 2007. International Organisations in Mindanao: To Protect or Not? *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (February 1). Available at https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/21. Accessed 15 Mar 2018.

Cobb, Neil. 2014. Rethinking the 'World Polity' Perspective on Global Sodomy Law Reform. In *Handbook of LGBT Communities, Crime, and Justice*, ed. D. Peters and V.R. Panfil, 283–310. New York: Springer.

Cortell, Andrew, and James Davis. 2000. Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda. *International Studies Review* 2 (1): 65–87.

Devkota, Bharat Prasad. 2013. *Nationalisation of International NGO Programmes and Institutions: Transformation of Development Institutions in the Context of Cambodia*. Saarbrücken: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.

DPA. 2017. Development and Partnership in Action Website. Available at http://dpacam.org. Accessed 2 Feb 2016.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52 (4): 887–917.

Hiwasa, Ayako. 2014. Changing Gendered Boundaries in Rural Cambodia. In *Southeast Asia and the Civil Society Gaze: Scoping a Contested Concept in Cambodia and Vietnam*, ed. Gabi Waibel, Judith Ehlert, and Hart Feuer. London: Routledge (e-book).

Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Koenig, Mathias, and Julian Dierkes. 2012. Conflict in the World Polity: Neo-institutional Perspectives. *Acta Sociologica* 54 (1): 5–25.

Lee, Jeong-Hye. 2017. The Life and Learning in Banteay Prieb in Cambodia: Focusing on People-Centered Development in Technical Vocational Education and Training. Master's dissertation, Seoul National University, Seoul.

Lee, SungYong, and Alpaslan Özerdem (eds.). 2015. *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lee, SungYong, and Wookbeom Park. 2015. Nurturing Local Voice: The UNDP's Local Empowerment Programmes in Cambodia. In *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*, ed. SungYong Lee and Alpaslan Özerdem, 135–155. London and New York: Routledge.

Leguro, Myla, and the A3B Project Team. 2017. Mindanao: Binding, Bonding and Bridging. In *Interreligious Action for Peace*, ed. Tom Bamat, Nell Bolton, Myla Leguro, and Atalia Omer, 71–83. Baltimore, MD: Catholic Relief Services.

Luco, Fabienne. 2002. *Between a Tiger and a Crocodile*. Phnom Penh: UNESCO.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mac Ginty, Roger, and Gurchathen Sanghera. 2012. Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Development: An Introduction. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7 (2): 3–8.

Peterson, Jenny. 2012. A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of Power, Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7 (2): 9–22.

Richmond, Oliver, and Audra Mitchell. 2012. *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-liberalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Risse, Thomas. 2002. Transnational Actors and World Politics. In *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thoms Risse, and Beth Simmons. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Risse, Thomas, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shaw, Rosalind, and Lars Waldorf (eds.). 2010. *Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Sriram, Chandra Lekha. 2012. Post-conflict Justice and Hybridity in Peacebuilding. In *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-liberalism*, ed. Oliver Richmond and Audra Mitchell, 58–72. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

World Bank. 2013. Land: Territory, Domain, and Identity. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/968161490797321335/pdf/113866-WP-P156212-GSU02-PUBLIC-Land-Territory-Domain-and-Identity-Web.pdf. Accessed 16 June 2018.

Zimmermann, Lisbeth. 2016. *Same Same or Different? Norm Diffusion Between Resistance, Compliance, and Localization in Post-conflict State*. *International Studies Perspectives* 17 (1): 98–115.

CHAPTER 4

Management of External Reliance

If *ownership inheritance* is an externally-driven model of local ownership promotion, the process *management of external reliance*, which is introduced in this chapter, emerges from local actors aiming to gain stronger ownership over the peacebuilding programmes by reducing their reliance on certain advocates. In early phases of peacebuilding, many local peacebuilders in conflict-affected societies are left with little option but to rely heavily on external support. While facing a variety of challenges ranging from security instability to a lack of human resources, these local agencies seek help from supporters who have material resources and relevant skills. Nevertheless, in both Mindanao and Cambodia, the number of local agencies that overtly sought to reduce the dominant influence for their conventional advocates began to increase from the early 2000s.

Behind this trend were two major pull and push factors, which had different levels of influence over local peacebuilders. First, after a decade of effort working with international donors, some local peacebuilders became more aware of the incompatibility of the visions and operational principles between themselves and their international counterparts. As their programmes had gradually been stabilised, they also became more confident in seeking alternative directions of local-international collaboration. Second, the size of foreign aid began to significantly decrease since the late 1990s. Especially after the 9–11 terrorist attack, many aid

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1_4

agencies (especially American donors) moved their focus from Cambodia and the Philippines to strategically more important countries. From this period, moreover, the donor agencies frequently shifted their thematic foci to emphasise aid effectiveness, reducing the funding stability (Parks 2008; Interview No. XV; Interview No. XVI). Many donor agencies discontinued institutional funding covering staff salaries and organisational costs, and paid primary attention to more 'visible' programmes whose outcomes can be verified within short time periods (Interview No. XVII). Although each agency had its own unique motivations, in general, the combined impact of such internal motivation and external pressure meant that local peacebuilding agencies' effort to reduce their reliance on the material and advisory support from a small number of external supporters has been more proactive.

Local peacebuilders' management of external reliance in Mindanao and Cambodia has demonstrated two major patterns. Firstly, local agencies had sought funding sources available within the communities that they work with. Some began to charge fees for the services that they had done pro bono or to collect donations or membership fees from local communities. Others attempted to develop more sustainable income sources through business-oriented programmes. Secondly, another major direction was to build partnership with a wider group of external actors or to create a coalition of local peacbuilders. Frequently, local actors' anxiety was more with the bilateral aid agencies and major international NGOs that had demanded a lot of paperwork, procedural requirements, and short turnaround of outcomes. Hence, the new partnership was sought with civil society actors in the global North with less bureaucratic barriers. The alliance of local peacebuilding agencies offers an important foundation with which individual local actors can avoid their over reliance on particular donors.

This chapter will examine key features of management of external reliance in the following structure. The first two parts will offer a description of how the two patterns of external reliance management are attempted by looking at the local peacebuilding operations of the Cambodian Center for Study and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC) in Cambodia and Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) in Mindanao. Then, this chapter will highlight a few outstanding features of *management of external reliance* as a model of local peacebuilders' ownership promotion.

Creating Own Funding Source

The need to have a more sustainable funding source has become a central issue for many local peacebuilding agencies in both Cambodia and Mindanao since the early 2010s. While the main agenda in international aid radically shifted in this period, many local peacebuilders feared losing the funding for their conventional programmes. In addition, the local peacebuilders in Cambodia struggled more to secure funding as the society was becoming more stable following the turbulent aftermath of the civil war. A large number of international humanitarian agencies moved away from the country looking for areas with more urgent needs. Sensing the vulnerability from their over reliance on external aid, local peacebuilders began to seek more sustainable funding sources from within the communities.

Earlier models of such income generation programmes sought more direct and immediate funding sources. Some local peacebuilders charged service fees for their work such as informal consultancy on the local areas, coordination of external actors' visits, arranging meetings within local communities, and operation of peacebuilding activities assigned by other agencies, which they had considered as *pro bono* work. For instance, one local research institute in Cambodia that had been previously offered all its research reports and working papers free of charge now restricted the access to some sources to fee payers only. Another immediate funding source that they identified was collecting donations from local communities for which they work. They often host fundraising ceremonies inviting community residents and appeal for donations for particular projects beneficial to them. In other cases, local peacebuilders made their services for local communities more systematised, then, began to make it more exclusive to the affiliates who pay membership fees.

Moreover, some peacebuilding and development agencies operate social enterprise or ad hoc social service programmes, seeking more sustainable funding sources. These social enterprises usually aim to offer practical benefits to community residents, some of which include organic restaurants, community-based tourism, fair trade of local artisans' products, electricity supply, legal consultancy services, and renovation of irrigation systems. One of the most popular forms in this type of social service was microfinancing. Although microfinancing institutes/units (MFIs) were initially established by international NGOs to

offer small grants for ex-combatants and the poor, from the early 2000s, such empowerment-focused programmes turned into profit-oriented microlending and began to be understood as a way to generate a small profit for the peacebuilding agencies (Bylander 2016). These income generation programmes frequently started from one-off projects, usually with external funding, then later, more elements relevant to long-term peacebuilding or sustainable development were incorporated into these projects.

The funding mobilisation of the CEDAC demonstrates well how local peacebuilders mobilise their own funding soruces. CEDAC has operated a range of training and community-support programmes in rural areas, aiming to enhance farmers' lives through sustainable development of agriculture and effective social and cooperative business practices. A few priorities of CEDAC are to help farmers cultivate organic products through ecosystem management, develop their community associations at village level, create better platforms for selling their products, and learn skills relevant to their agricultural activities or community organisation.

It is difficult to accurately identify the figure for the farmers whom the organisation has supported or whose interests they have represented as their programmes have aimed at different target groups and offered support of different natures. For instance, its 'Improvement of Livelihood of Small Farmers in Tram Kok' (ILFARM-TK) project operated in 2001 and between 2003 and 2009 focused on the intensification and diversification of agricultural products for approximately 8000 farmers in 208 villages mainly in Takeo. The number of farmers who are regularly involve in CEDAC's 400 producer groups is about 2400. More self-sufficient village-based farmers' associations (FAs), had been established in 169 villages having approximate 5000 farmers as members. The number of beneficiaries of CEDAC's training programmes reach approximately 140,000 families (CEDAC 2006, 2009; Feuer 2014; Hiwasa 2014).

The need to have independent funding sources has been raised multiple times since its early operation in the 1990s. However, as an organisation whose expertise is the agricultural industry, CEDAC had few resources with which it could immediately develop business. Instead, it decided to develop strong farmers' communities that could make profit out of their work, then develop CEDAC's services for the communities and look for funding sources from the increased income of the communities. In the early 2000s, CEDAC's two priorities were to enhance

productivity of rural households and to organise better-functioning community-based self-help associations.

One of CEDAC's priorities was *productivity improvement* and *the development of self-help FAs*, and these projects were promoted entirely based on external funding, mainly provided by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a French NGO called GRET and an American business man. In post-war Cambodia, farmers in many rural areas had suffered from lack of food 3–6 months per year, hence could not manage their minimum-level livelihood based on agricultural work. Many farmers had to find extra work in urban areas during the dry season and send their children to manufacturing factories to address income shortage. This affected the traditional social structure in the areas due to continued resettlement of the local population.

In 2000, CEDAC adopted a series of new agricultural skills for making rice fields more productive and multi-purpose, called System of Rice Intensification (SRI), and attempted to further adapt and develop SRI to fit the Cambodian agricultural environment. It then gained funding to implement a one-off project called ILFARM-TK in selected communities in Take province, to apply the new skills between 2002 and 2005. Technology was further enhanced through the farmers' application of SRI and feedback. By the end of this project, households who were part of ILFARM-TK saw an increase in rice production, with surplus rice to sell. In 2006, for instance, the farmers participating in CEDAC's project sold around 600 tons of rice to the national market. Apart from rice, many families also produced other products such as chicken and palm sugar. Based on this positive outcome, CEDAC could extend ILFARM-TK for another three years and the Ministry of Agriculture of Cambodia officially adopted SRI and decided that every commune[1] in the country would have at least one plot of SRI trial field. When ILFARM-TK programmes concluded in 2009, CEDAC self-evaluated that the overall productivity of the participating households increased by fifty-five per cent over the previous four years (CEDAC 2009).

Another priority of CEDAC in this period was to organise FAs at village level so that they could make the new cultivation more sustainable and to deal with a broader range of development issues based on mutual support between them. Although FAs' primary goal was to

[1]Commune is a level of administrative division in rural Cambodia, usually consisting of 3–30 villages.

enable farmers to share new cultivation skills with one another, it was the FAs' saving and credit scheme that attracted farmers' attention most. Since farmers with financial challenges cannot borrow money from major banks or from private money lenders due to the demand for high deposits and high interests rates (usually 10–20% per month), farmers welcomed the idea of establishing their own saving units, where FA members do collective money saving and can request loans at low interest (Ear 2010). As of 2013, approximately 3000 saving and credit groups supported by CEDAC were up and running across the country, with funds of USD 13 million (Sivhouch and Sedara 2013, 13). In addition to saving and credit, FAs were particularly active in information sharing on new agricultural skills, conducting natural resources conservation, mobilising collective action for improving local infrastructure, and engaging with government representatives (CEDAC 2006; Malena and Chhim 2009). These FAs are appreciated by researchers as new solid platforms for civic engagement and civil society empowerment of the rural communities in Cambodia (Sivhuoch and Sedara 2013).

When these first goals were achieved by the mid 2000s, CEDAC began to explore a cooperative model that can replace external donation with the income generated from its collaborative work with the participating members. Firstly, CEDAC developed collective marketing strategies for the farmers who had production surplus but did not know how to make more profit out of it. By utilising the social network developed through FAs, CEDAC organised a comprehensive marketing network called Natural Agri-Product Cooperative (NAP, see Fig. 4.1).

As the network was independent from conventional local traders, linking farmers directly with consumers, these shops enabled farmers to gain more profits while meeting the market price. In exchange for the service, CEDAC gained a service charge and used the money for developing more programmes. In the case of organic rice, for instance, CEDAC purchased rice from the member farmers with a price roughly ten per cent higher than the normal market price, and sold it directly to the consumers in Phnom Penh through its own shops or exported it overseas (mostly to the United States). Through such direct links between farmers and consumers, NAP saved the broker charges and created further profit. CEDAC spent thirty per cent of the profit supporting the operational costs of FAs' activities in the participating communities.

The size of NAP rapidly increased until the late 2000s. Rice selling through the scheme reached annual sales of USD 100,000. Nevertheless,



Fig. 4.1 FA-based marketing network organised by CEDAC (*Source* Keosothea and Sovannarith 2009)

NAP faced challenges with consistent and reliable supply. Some participating farmers switched to conventional traders who offered better short-term profit and others gradually paid less attention to quality control. Due to these issues, CEDAC frequently struggled to meet the amount of products, previously agreed with the customers (Sothea and Samsen 2016; Interview No. XVIII).

After its peak in 2009, therefore, CEDAC transformed its direction into forming a more organised and stable structure for quality production. It firstly reduced the number of cooperative shops and participating families, and demanded the member households to follow CEDAC's strict Basic Organic Standard. On the other hand, it became more proactive in advertising the products through magazines, radio programmes and TV programmes. It also developed working relations with product processing companies, who wanted good quality ingredients. Its marketing strategy, which appealed to people's patriotic sentiments and branded ecological agriculture as a modern and progressive mode, enabled CEDAC to secure a more stable market (Feuer 2014).

In addition, CEDAC offered new services to support the members' agricultural business, which included introducing crop insurance and linking farmers with low-interest investment schemes. In this new phase of operation, CEDAC now collects annual membership fees, which is USD 20 per year per family as of 2016. Compared to the profit sharing, CEDAC as a social-development NGO can have a more stable stream of income. Moreover, CEDAC mobilises direct investment from farmers' communities for new development. For example, in 2016, around 10,000 members committed roughly USD 500,000 to build six new rice mills, where members can process their rice (Interview No. XVIII).

Although the detailed forms are different from what CEDAC developed, the development of self-help social/economic development through the cooperative models was also widely applied in the Moro areas of Mindanao. After the signing of the Final Peace Agreements, a large number of the MNLF's former combatants were reintegrated into the local communities, engaging in different community development and economic livelihood programmes. One popular form that they attempted to apply was local cooperatives based on the Islamic concept of Musharakah (joint venture). By mobilising collective endeavours from local community members (either in the form of financial investment or labour contribution), they developed new economic development cooperatives (i.e., a soap producing factory, artisanry, and organisations for exporting agriculture products). The International Labour Organization offered seed funding for these cooperative initiatives in the early phases of development. Many of these community-based cooperatives were either comprised entirely of female members or directed by women managers. One such example is the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-Purpose Cooperatives, an umbrella network organisation for the cooperatives established by Hadja Bainon Karon, a prominent former female officer of MNLF in 1999 (Interview No. XIX).

It should be acknowledged that such income generation programmes do not always go as local peacebuilders hoped. In contrast, they face many challenges such as lack of community participation, lack of skills, political corruption, and the government's tightening of regulations (CIVICUS 2015).[2] The peacebuilding agencies' lack of a popular base

[2]While hundreds of community-based cooperatives were developed in ARMM during the 2000s, dozens of them seemed to be actively up and running during the field visit in 2016.

and the economic hardships of local communities are particularly challenging obstacles. As discussed in Chapter 2, for instance, many peacebuilding agencies in Cambodia have been developed by local elites or civil society leaders, through the interaction with international advocates. Hence, their base in the grassroots population tends to be limited. Moreover, in the post-conflict settings, community residents with strong economic hardships rarely experienced paying for social services. For most community members, NGO work is what they receive free of charge (Interview No. XX; Interview No. XXI). Hence, social enterprise that demanded community residents' financial and labour commitment frequently faced a lack of participation.

In addition, local organisations' zeal to attain a sustainable income source occasionally encouraged them to put means before ends. In the process, the very people that these agencies aimed to support became the victims of such enterprise programmes. For instance, microfinancing that was first adopted as a method to support local populations who could not borrow money from mainstream finance institutes, began to be widely adopted by the Cambodia NGO sector in the mid-2010s. Then, as the interest from loans became an important income source, many NGOs implemented campaigns encouraging local farmers to borrow money. Moreover, the interest rate also increased to as high as thirty per cent per annum (Xinhua 2017). This created a serious debt issue in already-impoverished rural Cambodia and offered a good excuse for the government's increased intervention.

Despite these challenges, the development of an independent income source is pursued as a core objective of many peacebuilding agencies especially in Cambodia. For instance, in a survey to some 238 civil society organisations in Cambodia, some nineteen per cent of the responding organisations have mobilised parts of their operational funding from their own income generation programme (CCC 2013).

Reducing Influence of Particular Donors

Another form of local peacebuilders' management of external reliance is to avoid the situation where the local peacebuilders' operation heavily relies on small number of donors. After having decades' of peacebuilding operation, some local peacebuilders in Cambodia and Mindanao realised that the more they rely on support from particular aids, the more they

become vulnerable to the demands from and policy changes of the partners. Thus, these local actors attempt to increase their voices further by diversifying external partnerships and creating coalitions with other local peacebuilders.

Diversifying Partnership

Some local agencies attempted to reduce their reliance on conventional advocates by building collaborative relationships with a wider range of external partners. During my field visits, many local peacebuilders expressed their anxiety particularly with the behaviour of a few international organisations (including the UN agencies) and bilateral development agencies. Although these donors may offer voluminous funding which is useful for expanding their programmes, such funding usually comes with many operational conditions, requires visible, quantifiable outcomes relevant to the themes set by the donors, and demands much interim administrative work. Moreover, these donors rarely offer organisational costs and, most importantly, their funding is less likely to be renewed. In addition, the changes in the mainstream agenda of US aid in favour of counter-terrorism and of the UN in favour of conflict transformation, caused sudden, unexpected, and radical shifts in the funding flow into the area.

Local agencies gradually sensed that the funding from such governmental and inter-governmental agencies was less stable and reliable, was not prudent enough to enable local actors to develop programmes according to the local conditions, and tended to treat them as the operators of the programmes that the funding wants to implement whenever and wherever they want to (Interview No. XXII; Interview No. XXIII). As long as they rely entirely on this type of funding, local peacebuilding agencies may not use their time and energy to develop more creative and contextualised forms of peacebuilding.

Accordingly, local actors have attempted to build partnership with more diverse types of external actors, who have different ideological backgrounds, operational principles, and long-term visions for peace.[3] Some types of new partners that local agencies like to work with are civil

[3]Although briefly mentioned in the introduction, it should be acknowledged that not all local peacebuilders reacted to bilateral and international agencies in the ways described in this chapter. Facing a significant reduction of external funding and a shift in the agenda

society organisations in the global North, diaspora groups in overseas countries, or faith-based charity organisations (CIVICUS 2015). These partners frequently offer funding to cover organisational and operational costs that local agencies struggle to mobilise from other sources and tend to present a lot more flexibility around time-frame. Referring to the relationship with a new partner, one local field practitioner in Mindanao stated "We are lucky to have found one organisation that supports us. It is a very small organisation but they've always been there supporting [the name of her organisation] in all these processes" (Interview No. XXXXII).

Moreover, interview participants emphasise that a few international faith-based networks take more holistic approaches in relationship building, based on regular mutual-communications and frequent human exchanges. Diaspora groups are less reliable in that they don't offer regular funding; however, these people usually have a good understanding of the contextual issues lying behind local peacebuilding and offer wholehearted support to the local peacebuilding programmes. Such constant support, despite much trial-and-error in the process of development, is a great emotional support that enables many local actors to continue their commitment.

Nevertheless, identifying and engaging with new aid partners is not easy for many local peacebuilders who have limited external networks. There are a small number of faith-based networks and civil society associations from the global North, which are actively engaging in peacebuilding programmes in Cambodia and Mindanao. Moreover, as these agencies tend to be more interested in developing long-term relationship with their existing local partners than expanding their network. Hence, although many local peacebuilders are well aware of the value of having such partners, it is difficult for them to find good partners locally. Moreover, as small-size organisations with few external human networks, it is a challenge to find relevant civil society actors in the global North. Things are becoming more difficult as of 2017, as prominent civil society and faith-based agencies in Europe have significantly reduced the size of their international aid.

from the international communities, a larger volume of local NGOs in Cambodia, for example, attempted to secure funding by sticking more tightly to the new themes and operational demands (Interview No. XXI). See Chapter 5 for more details.

Coalition Building

In Mindanao, a strong coalition network is utilised as a platform on which local peacebuilders can mitigate external influence. Since civilian peacebuilding activities were actively promoted in the 1990s, a significant number of coalition and informal networks were formed to foster a holistic approach to peacebuilding and facilitate mutual support between the agencies. Some aimed at more practical objectives of information sharing, skill development on planning and organising civil movements, and expanding the scope of activities through collective action while others intended to develop more 'solidarity' for sharing the visions for peace and coordinating collective actions (Coronel-Ferrer 2002). A few examples include the Mindanao Caucus of Development NGOs Network (MINCODE), Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, Mindanao Peace Advocates' Conference, and Mindanao People's Caucus.

Advocacy organisations such as Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) Kusog Mindanaw (Mindanao Force), and Mindanao People's Peace Movement (MPPM) have paid attention to developing such networks (Rood 2005). For example, IID is a Davao-based advocacy organisation for which the primary areas of work are human rights, democratic governance, and the peace process between the GPH and the Mindanao resistance groups. While IID's key activities consist of three types of activities—legislative lobbying for legalising Bangsamoro's self-determination, collective campaigns like public demonstrations regarding human rights issues, and advocacy and coordination of the civil society actors within and outside Mindanao, this organisation is particularly well-known for its support of various networks and coalitions of peacebuilding agencies at local, regional and global levels.

IID's solidarity initially focused more on building international network between the civil societies in the global South. Resisting the power dominance of the global North, IID aimed to gather and consolidate voices from the global South. At regional levels, for instance, IID established and supported the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET), the Asia-Pacific Solidarity Coalition (APSOC), and the Alternative ASEAN Network for Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma). At a global level, IID took a lead in organising the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and the World Forum for Democratization in Asia (WFDA), and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP).

IID's promotion of the solidarity between the civil society actors in Mindanao started in the late 1990s. These Mindanao-based networks



Fig. 4.2 The structure of Mindanao Peace Weavers (*Source* Coronel-Ferrer 2002, 17)

mostly aimed to coordinate collective actions of grassroots organisations vis-à-vis the ongoing peace processes between the Mindanao resistance groups and the GPH. For instance, IID formed Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC) in 2001 in order to encourage and support the grassroots actors representing three different religious/cultural groups (tri-peoples) to engage more in the ongoing peace processes. In addition to lobbying on the peace negotiations, MPC supported the creation of Bantay Ceasefirea, a civilian ceasefire monitoring mechanism. Moreover, IID became a founding member of the Mindanao Peace Weavers (MPW), a broad umbrella network that supports other networks and coalitions of grassroots actors. MPW's decisions are consensus-based and IID facilitate a wide range of contacts and discussions behind the scenes when MPW conduct collective actions (Fig. 4.2).

In organising and operating the solidarity networks in Mindanao, IID facilitates regular conferences and workshops so that member organisations can share their concerns, exchange information, and mobilise collective activities. Moreover, it offers a wide range of training programmes to member agencies, which primarily focus on new staff and youth volunteers of the member organisations. These youth have good

opportunities to build trust with one another by spending a significant amount of time together and developing similar philosophical grounds by getting workshop-style training from IID on key themes of peacebuilding and development (Interview No. I).

Another example of the local peacebuilders' coalition is Mindanao People's Peace Movement (MPPM), an advocacy and network organisation that is based on the communities of tri-peoples of migrant settlers, Moro and Lumad, has offered a space for the tri-people constituency to connect with each other and discuss issues relevant to them. As of April 2017, some 170 grassroots associations and organisations have direct/indirect relations with MPPM and some of the members are or used to be affiliated to MILF, MNLF and the NPA. This was once a loose group of tri-people which turned into an organised network after experiencing the All-Out-War in 2000. Seeing the return of the US military troops to the Philippines after the 9–11 terrorist attacks and the multiple recurrence of high-level violence even after several years' efforts for terminating violence, grassroots activists began to mobilise more collective actions to apply stronger pressure on the Moro resistance groups as well as the GPH, supported the movements for self-determination in Bangsamoro, and involved in the local consultation processes led by the GPH and the UN on the future directions of Mindanao.

In addition to the community-supporting project and engagement with the GPH, one key activity of MPPM is to building and strengthen the network of grassroots organisations. It first makes visits to various grassroots organisations and clan/village representatives for relationship building. Moreover, it offers them an organisational platform on which they can join together. As the number of grassroots organisations involved in MPPM is large, this network does not push forward a certain agenda or promote a high-level of consensus. Instead, it attempts to offer a free and comfortable space where all participating organisations and representatives express and exchange their opinions, and based on such interaction, promote an evolving consensus in respect to the right to self-determination and building inclusivity.

These coalitions and networks offer local peacebuilders a space to gather, integrate and further develop their ideas and proposals on various peace-related issues in Mindanao. During the official peace negotiations between GPH and the military resistance groups, these coalitions have reflected the ideas consolidated through internal discourse, by proposing sets of agenda to the negotiating parties, conducting public demonstrations, and offering consultation to the relevant actors.

When focusing on local peacebuilders' collaboration with external donors and advocates, these local coalitions are a useful tool to mitigate the demand or direction from international organisations and external donors. Firstly, enhanced mutual collaboration within such coalitions enabled local peacebuilders to reduce the impact of the decisions made by external funders. For instance, as many donor agencies frequently shift the areas of peacebuilding that they fund, local actors attempted to survive such unstable cashflow by sharing operational costs. The organisations that develop mutual trust within such coalitions can share offices and information technology, lend and borrow tools and resources, and take other organisations' requests when they travel overseas or to metro Manila. The operation of MPPM, for instance, is committed by three core member organisations (called *tri-pillars*) including Southern Christian College and Tri-Peoples Organizations Against Disasters, Inc, so that a small coordinating body is not overwhelmed by the amount of work and excessive funding responsibility (Interview No. XXIV).

Moreover, when a coalition is supported by an effective core that has good organisational skills and maintains close relations with external actors, other member organisations at grassroots level can develop and maintain more localised programmes by using the core as secretariats and a hub for further networking. The members of the same coalition occasionally create operational funding, and share resources mobilised from the communities with which the member agencies work (Coronel-Ferrer 2002).

Moreover, when one member agency gets funding from external donors, the organisation outsources a few sub-programmes to other member organisations of its coalition, according to expertise and specialisation. For instance, when IID invite youth in other conflict-affected Asian countries such as Myanmar so that the youth can get under-graduate level education, IID convinced local universities like Ateneo de Davao and Miriam College to offer places to these students and share the responsibility of looking after them. A more advanced form of such collaboration is that, from the early stages of a funding application, a number of member agencies of such networks (especially MPW) create consortiums and co-develop the application document to incorporate different expertise and perspectives.

Noticeable Features

Local peacebuilders' programmes for internal fundraising and efforts for reducing influence from particular donors usually do not enable them to avoid collaboration with the conventional supporters. In fact, none of

the local agencies that developed their own funding sources interviewed during my field studies raised funding sufficient to cover all operational costs. However, some of these agencies were able to maintain the funding to continue their core programmes regardless of the availability of external aid. These local peacebuilders say that the ability to keep core programmes significantly increased their negotiation power in building new work relationships with external donor agencies.

Likewise, reducing external influence through diversification of external partners and the development of local coalition does not bring about new funding sources that can replace the conventional donors' offer. The new external partners, usually the civil society actors in the global North, offer funding the size of which is a lot smaller than the grants offered by bilateral or multilateral organisations. Hence, for developing new major programmes, local peacebuilders still have to rely on funding assistance from the conventional aiders. In addition, the effectiveness of the local coalition as a tool for mitigating external influence was largely determined by the level of trust/closeness between individual members of the coalition. Despite these challenges, however, many local peacebuilders confirm that it is important for them to have the capacity to mitigate the dominant influence for particular external donors or to avoid the immediate impact of radical funding shifts.

From this perspective, a local practitioner in Mindanao acknowledged the importance of the coalitions of local actors, saying "This is about people to people solidarity, south supporting each other's south. (…) Yes, we are supporting self-determination, self-determining peoples in Southeast Asia. (…) economically we will globalise, but at the same time our alternative movements need to globalise itself (…) globalise our networks, globalise our own systems, globalise our own frameworks" (Interview No. XXXXIII).

Considering outstanding features of *management of external reliance* as a model for developing local ownership, it is discernible that many local peacebuilders in this category implement the types of programmes or forms of operation that had previous been restricted or discouraged by the external advocates. This section will take a closer look at this dynamic by considering two frequently-observed processes: the formation of new programmes that would be unlikely to be funded by external donors and the application of operational features that may not be compatible with donors' directions.

Firstly, there are many cases where local peacebuilders implement programmes that local communities consider necessary and important for their livelihood but which do not fit the external donors' thematic criteria for funding. Some of these selection criteria are related to the themes targetted by international aiders. Although the number of bilateral/international agencies is fairly big, many of them set a limited range of thematic areas of peacebuilding and development, which include food security, literacy education, human rights advocacy, agriculture, renewable energy, disaster risk management, and public sector leadership. Moreover, most international actors' funding has pre-determined purposes for expenditure and such earmarked funding designates detailed types of fundable work.[4] Hence, many programmes that fall outside of such categories, regardless of how important they are for local communities, are less likely to be considered for funding.

When they relied on a few major donors for most of their funding, local peacebuilders had little choice but to abandon their plans for peacebuilding in case they didn't fit the donors' agenda. With their own funding sources, the local peacebuilders can now continue to carry out a few selected core programmes that they value. As an example, one Cambodian organisation that offers mental health care and psychosocial support to the victims of violence has faced many challenges in maintaining their support. One challenge was that most donors had specific target groups to support (e.g., women, children, refugees and the victims of the Khmer Rouge-related violence) and aspects of mental health (e.g., war trauma and domestic violence). Another challenge was that few donors had a budget line to cover the salary of staff. However, the support of mental health requires holistic and long-term approaches to the target groups and such long-term support needs the constant involvement of medical doctors, counsellors, community health supporters and administrative staff. To find ways to offer systematic and constant support to their target groups, this organisation developed a number of training programmes tailored for the governmental agencies, NGO sector and the managers of private companies, which now became the pipeline for essential funding for selected core programmes (Interview No. XXV).

[4]For instance, seventy-nine per cent of the total funding revenues of 16 major UN agencies involved in peacebuilding is earmarked (Dahlbert 2017 cited in McKechnie 2018).

When initiating new programmes, moreover, local peacebuilders can create opportunities to conduct some pilot projects and demonstrate the value and utility of their plans. Based on the initial outcomes, they occasionally make successful funding applications for expansion. For instance, Tompeang Russey Khmer Association (TRK), a grassroots organisation in Svay Rieng Provice of Cambodia set up electricity lines between the villages that it supported and the main electricity-supply route. The proposal for this programme had initially been rejected by a few external funding agencies who believed it a commercial project that would benefit private electricity companies. However, as neither the government nor private companies had any plan for extending electricity lines to their communities in the near future, local residents in the areas had to manage their livelihood without getting constant electricity supply. Then, TRK gained a small amount of funding from a civil society organisation in South Korea, and mobilised funding to cover the remaining costs from local households who wanted to get electricity. The electricity supply continued through TRK, which collected electricity bill payments on behalf of the regional electricity company, until the government decided to establish official electricity cables (Interview No. XX).

Secondly, such strategies for managing external reliance allow local peacebuilders to maintain operational features that may seem contradictory to traditional Western assumptions or concepts, which include the utilisation of people's nationalist sentiments, collaboration with social hierarchy, and traditional authorities. A representative example is the acceptance of and collaboration with the state authorities. Although the concept of civil society has been defined in various ways, many mainstream donor agencies understood it to be a sector "between state and family" and it should maintain "autonomy in relation to the state" (White 1994, 377–378). Hence, when donor agencies supported the development of the civil society in Mindanao and Cambodia, they expected the civil societies' roles as autonomous watchdog of the political authority.

Nevertheless, such an expectation is frequently accepted by local peacebuilders as unrealistic or undesirable, as the nature of the government–civilian relationship and the influence of such relations on the operations of grassroots peacebuilding is a lot more complex than many international advocates expect. In many Asian societies, the relations between the government(s) and civilian actors are complex and it is not always practical to distinguish purely non-governmental actors.

NGOs are frequently financially supported, politically influenced, or practically patronised by the local governments.

For instance, in Moro areas of Mindanao, the application of the Western concept of the civil society is unrealistic. Conceptually, a lack of separation between the Islamic religious order and other institutions in the society like the state and civil society, makes it difficult to apply the Western notion of the civil society. Culturally, in Mindanao under constant Islamic-Moro struggle, the civil society actors in Moro areas have limited space to develop ideological lines other than Moro grievances whereas the civil society actors in other parts are strongly encouraged towards collective public action between the state and the civil society. Moreover, when certain civil society actors present anti-government postures, they immediately attract attention from the government security forces (especially when they are not based on Christian backgrounds) (Cagoco-Guiam 2002; Rood 2005). Hence, one local peacebuilder mentioned that, when a UN agency demanded her organisation to do the mid-term review based on the feedback from 'local civil society representatives,' she spent two thirds of the given time for review in finding feedback providers since the categories of the civil society sectors given by the UN agency didn't fit the local communities (Interview No. XXXIII).

In Cambodia, apart from human rights advocacy organisations, local peacebuilders in general felt the demand from donor agencies to maintain an autonomous (and occasionally critical) position to the government irrelevant to them. Some interviewees thought the Cambodian society is not 'ripe' enough for civil society actors to take such roles; others believed that such demands are incompatible with Cambodian people's approaches to the government. Although the detailed answers vary, the common ideas underlying the responses were fear and need. No peacebuilding programmes can succeed without getting strong backing from the government, and their health and safety can be in danger once they overtly challenge the government.

The peacebuilding agencies introduced above generally reflect their views on the relationship between authority and the civil society. For instance, when CEDAC in Cambodia attempted to enhance the roles and structure of FAs in the early 2010s, the engagement and collaboration with the government officials was set as a key element of the FAs' participation in local development. There were two main types of engagement.

First, the FA leaders joined the government-directed events and activities and promoted further collaboration with local governments. Especially, the FA representatives' regularly attended the village and commune meetings and discussed community-related issues with the government officials. While to offer feedback to the local governance issue is at the centre of the meetings, the FA representatives occasionally proposed their contributions to the local governance such as offering labour for local infrastructure building or mobilising funding to support local charity institutes (Ear 2010). Second, CEDAC made efforts to link their FA representatives with the local government offices by providing training to government-affiliated workers, valorising small farming households, and nurturing the development of local markets. The initiation and development of these programmes offered the FA representatives more opportunities to meet with the government officials and explain the FAs ideas and visions for local development.

In fact, the FAs' engagement with local governance has presented strong potential to play roles in the checks-and-balances of the authorities in the future and it was one of the government's main concerns. However, at least until the mid 2010s, the engagement with the government has primarily aimed to maintain "amicable relationship" with the political authority (Feuer 2014, 246). In a survey conducted in 2009, ninety per cent of the responding FA members said that they maintained 'good' or 'better' cooperation with the local authorities (Ear 2010, 63). Hence, when some of CEDAC's projects proved to be successful, such enhanced relationships enabled CEDAC to get the bureaucratic support for spreading out these projects to other parts of the country.

In short, the ownership development through management of external reliance does not bring about overt changes in power relations or ownership structure in that local peacebuilding does not mobilise entirely independent funding sources. Nevertheless, compared to the local peacebuilding based on ownership inheritance, this model tends to develop peacebuilding programmes that are more independent from external intervention.

Summary and Further Reflection

This chapter introduced a bottom-up process for the promotion of local ownership—*management of external reliance*. Local peacebuilders in this category have attempted to compromise the dominant influence of

external advocates by reducing the financial reliance on these small number of advocates. One direction of such efforts was to mobilise their own funding sources either by directly collecting money from the local communities or by conducting social enterprise. The other direction is to reduce the influence of external donors by creating local peacebuilders' coalitions or diversifying external partners. Although these types of activities do not mobilise sufficient power to enable local peacebuilders to be insulated from the external reliance, they offer good opportunities to develop the types of activities that reflect local actors' needs and values. One particularly outstanding change developed through management of external reliance is the development of peacebuilding programmes that are unlikely to be funded by external donors. Moreover, local peacebuilders are able to adopt operational features that may be incompatible with the values and principles of the conventional donor groups.

In examining the cases relevant to *management of external reliance*, it is important to acknowledge the changes in local contexts including local peacebuilders' capacity development, which can be significantly more rapid and radical than what external donor agencies may think. Scholars and donor agencies frequently ignore the extreme fluidity of local contexts that reshape and transform the conditions for peacebuilding. Moreover, many local organisations in Mindanao and Cambodia that once used to struggle to catch up to Western norms and skills of peacebuilding, have accumulated extensive knowledge and experience while developing local programmes for many years. During the field interviews, many interview participants presented a thorough understanding of the philosophical backgrounds of major international peacebuilding agencies and bilateral donor agencies, as well as the practical limitations in applying the norms set by them. Although their primary concerns were frequently limited to the issues relevant to their local areas, these local peacebuilders also proposed various ideas about how they could better undertake peacebuilding programmes if they were given the opportunity.

A lack of close local-international collaboration in many cases is due to external supporters' ignorance or disinterest in such a speedy development of local contexts. One of the key motivations for promoting management of external reliance is the local actors' anxiety about the externals' such ignorance or lack of interest. Although this chapter excludes these issues from the analysis, a few particularly acute frictions were observed in recent local peacebuilding sectors, as inexperienced charity organisations and donor agencies from new Asian donor

countries (e.g., China and South Korea) attempted to rigidly apply their operational principles without appreciating the knowhow of local actors which has been advanced through long-term operation. Many external supporters still present a tendency to treat local actors as incapable and ignorant aid recipients although things have changed radically since the mid-1990s.

References

Bylander, Maryann. 2016. Micro-saturated: The Promises and Pitfalls of Microcredit as a Development Solution. In *The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia*. ed. Simon Springer and Katherine Brickell. London and New York: Routledge.

Cagoco-Guiam, Rufa. 2002. *An Exploratory Study of Civil Society Organizations Among Muslim Communities in Two Provinces in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao*. Davao: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs.

CEDAC. 2006. Improving Livelihood of Small Farmer in Tramkak: A Sustainable Solution for Rice Farmer. CEDAC Completion Report, January 2003–December 2005.

CEDAC. 2009. *Internal Evaluation Report of the Project: ILFARM-TK* (June 2009). Phnom Penh: CEDAC.

CIVICUS. 2015. Snapshot of Civil Society in the Philippines: Questionnaire to AGNA Members, CIVICUS. Available at http://www.civicus.org/images/Snapshot_of_CS_in_The_Philippines.pdf. Accessed 15 Mar 2018.

Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC). 2013. *CSO Contributions to the Development of Cambodia 2012*. Phnom Penh: Cooperation Committee for Cambodia.

Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam. 2002. Philippines National Unification Commission: National Consultation and the 'Six Paths to Peace.' In *Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking*, ed. Catherine Barnes. *Accord* 13. London: Conciliation Resources. Available at www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/phi.htm. Accessed 18 June 2018.

Ear, Chariya. 2010. *Cambodia's Rural Communities and Social Capital Formation: Lessons Learned from Tram Kak District, Takeo Province*. Master's Disseration, Tokyo: University of Tokyo.

Feuer, Hart. 2014. Competitive Discourse in Civil Society: Pluralism in Cambodia's Agricultural Development Platform. In *Southeast Asia and the Civil Society Gaze: Scoping a Contested Concept in Cambodia and Vietnam*, ed. Gabi Waibel, Judith Ehlert, and Hart Feuer. London: Routledge.

Hiwasa, Ayako. 2014. Changing Gendered Boundaries in Rural Cambodia. In *Southeast Asia and the Civil Society Gaze: Scoping a Contested Concept in Cambodia and Vietnam*, ed. Gabi Waibel, Judith Ehlert, and Hart Feuer. London: Routledge.

Keosothea, Nou, and So Sovannarith. 2009. *The Assessment of Project Approach for Promoting Farmers Associations (FAs) in Cambodia (ILFARM-TK I&II 2003–3008/9)*. Phnom Penh: CEDAC.

Malena, Carmen, and Kristina Chhim. 2009. *Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia*. New York: World Bank.

McKechnie, Alastair. 2018. Sustaining Peace: How Can the Multilateral Humanitarian and Development System Deliver? A Presentation Delivered at the University of Otago, May 14.

Parks, Thomas. 2008. The Rise and Fall of Donor Funding for Advocacy NGOs. *Development in Practice* 18 (2): 213–222.

Rood, Steven. 2005. *Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society—Policy Studies 17*. Washington DC: East-Weste Center.

Sivhouch, Ou, and Kim Sedara. 2013. *20 Years' Strengthening Civil Society: Time for Reflection*. Phnom Penh: CDRI.

Sothea, Oum, and Neak Samsen. 2016. Inclusive Business Model in Cambodia: Case Study on Vegetable—A Presentation Delivered at Smallholder-Inclusive Food Value Chain Models for Local and Global Markets, June 4–6, Bali.

White, Gordon. 1994. Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical Ground. *Democratization* 1 (2): 375–390.

Xinhua. 2017. Cambodia Caps Interest Rates on Microfinance Institution Loans, 13 March. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/13/c_136125874.htm. Accessed 29 May 2018.

CHAPTER 5

Friction-Avoiding Approaches

Introduction

This chapter introduces and analyses *friction-avoiding approaches*, the name given to more subtle and informal methods used by local peacebuilders to push forward their agenda. Local peacebuilders are aware that many previous problems relevant to liberal peace were caused either by international organisations (e.g., UNDP and the World Bank) or by bilateral development agencies (e.g., USAID, DFID and JICA). As the representatives of their governments or home organisations, the local offices of these agencies rigidly apply their principles to all programmes funded by them. After experiencing high levels of intervention over previous decades, an increasing number of local NGOs have begun to seek partnership with civilian actors in economically developed countries.

Even in the case where local peacebuilders disagree with the donors' agenda or are anxious about their operational principles, local actors do not always attempt to address such issues by challenging them or by developing alternative forms of local-international collaboration. There are many factors that prevent local actors' overt resistance, which include the risk of losing the ongoing support, the potential friction with other involved actors, a lack of confidence with their own ideas, and the simple reluctance to make substantial changes to the status quo. In particular, the difficulties in securing funding was highlighted by many local peacebuilders as the main challenge. As the opportunities to get international funding have significantly decreased since the

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1_5

early 2000s, the competition among local peacebuilding agencies to get funding has become more intense. A report from Sivhouch and Sedara (2013, 9) conveys the statements of local actors on this issue, some of which include the following: "We suffer from the lack of funding support: though we have fundraising strategies in place and I have to work through weekends till I get sick, it remains unsecured." and "As of the end of 2011, whenever and wherever there is a grant, NGOs crowd in like ants gathering to eat sugar." Hence, smaller peacebuilders in Mindanao and Cambodia have become more vulnerable to the demands from funding bodies (Un 2006).

At the same time, the conventional forms of interaction with international supporters have not offered local actors good opportunities to raise their concerns and propose ideas to address them. In Cambodia and Mindanao in the mid 2010s, two factors were particularly noteworthy. Firstly, the channels for communication were limited. Apart from some exceptional partners (including the ones introduced as 'new partners' in Chapter 4), most local peacebuilders interviewed during the author's field study stated that external supporters offered limited numbers of chances for direct communication with them. In many cases, extensive communication can be done only through paperwork once or twice during the whole period of a collaborative project, in the form of mid-term and final reports. Secondly, mutual communication was more limited. Even in the case where external supporters and donor agencies made physical visits or maintained more frequent (sometimes regular) communication, the risk of losing face and affecting relationship building prevented them from honestly talking about their issues (Interview No. XXIII; Interview No. XXIX; Interview No. XXVI).

Hence, a large number of local actors choose to build a more pragmatic form of collaboration with international donors, with more quiet and subtle strategies for pushing the incorporation of their needs, interests and perspectives within the same overarching structure of collaboration. After having dealt with various types of international agencies for decades, many local peacebuilders in Cambodia and Mindanao have a good understanding of which themes, operational principles and outcomes donors like to see and they have developed 'knowhow' for pushing forward their agenda without hampering the relations between them. According to the research participants, more chances for 'quietly' incorporating their needs can be found when they work with some bilateral aid agencies that lack rigorous and regular systems for implementation

monitoring. The opportunities for developing the strategies for subtle changes have increased as many international peacebuilding agencies have become more interested in cultural diversity, the utilisation of local capacity and equal partnership since the mid 2000s.

This chapter examines a selected range of such friction avoiding strategies that were particularly apparent during the field visits to Mindanao and Cambodia. For the convenience of analysis, the sections below put the strategies into the following broad categories: contextualisation of the external demands; reconceptualisation of the programme identity; disclosure of partial truth (keeping silence and smoke and mirror); and deliberate misconduct. Although the forms of strategies are different, their common goal is to make their programmes look compatible with the donors' agenda while the operation of the programmes contributes to the pursuit of local peacebuilders' objectives. Hence, when they are constructively applied, local peacebuilding agencies were able to incorporate the interests and perspectives of the local communities that they support as well as the agenda of external interveners at the same time. For each category, the sections below will explain some contextual issues that motivate local peacebuilders to apply the strategy, offer a couple of examples of how the strategy is applied in field practice, and discuss the practical implications.[1]

In the final section, this chapter will present the theoretical significance of friction avoiding approaches in relation to the power relations between international and local peacebuilders. Considering the conventional academic discussions on local resistance against the liberal peacebuilding models, friction avoiding approaches demonstrate a range of subtle strategies for resistance. Moreover, considering the concept of power in peacebuilding, it reveals a dual structure of power in the implementation of peacebuilding programmes; although international supporters seem to wield power based on their control of funding, the friction avoiding approaches confirm that it is ultimately local peacebuilders who determine what programmes and ideas are to be implemented in the practice of peacebuilding.

[1]To avoid any potential impacts on the local peacebuilders who shared the examples introduced in this chapter, all names and information that may reveal the identity of the local peacebuilders are deleted from the texts.

Contextualisation of the External Demands

Contextualisation of the external demands is adopted usually when local peacebuilders consider that the principles or operational regulations set by the international actors are unrealistic or undesirable for implementation in their local contexts. Some areas of such practical demands include procedural regulations, evaluation criteria, the scope of programmes, and the relations between local peacebuilders and the local communities. In some cases, the direct application of these principles and regulations may create serious tensions between local peacebuilders and the communities that they support. In other cases, these regulations may encourage the corruption or passivity of local communities. Sometimes people simply don't get the concepts or detailed procedures demanded by donors. In worse cases, the regulations prohibit local peacebuilding from implementing the programmes or from gaining funding to initiate programmes. Thus, in order to implement programmes in a sustainable way, local peacebuilders need to operationalise these principles and regulations to be more realistic and context-sensitive.

For instance, one demand that many local peacebuilders pointed out as being unrealistic was the requirement for short-term programme outcomes in the form of quantifiable figures. Although there are practical challenges such as excessive workload and complaints from local communities, many research participants highlight a more fundamental issue: the demand for quantifiable short-term outcomes is incompatible with the fundamental objectives of their peacebuilding operation. Many of their programmes are long-term operations by nature and many types of (frequently the most important) results are not quantifiable. For instance, a local organisation's advocacy and education programmes in Mindanao recently faced serious challenges as many international funding bodies decided to reduce or completely discontinue their support for 'fleeting' programmes that 'do not leave marks behind' (Interview No. XXVII). Apart from the number of participants who joined the training events and coordination meetings, the organisation's advocacy work has few results to demonstrate with figures. Moreover, it thought, such numbers do not represent what its advocacy programmes are really about.

As another example, the continued efforts of a local agency to enhance agricultural skills are made primarily based on 'trial and error' strategies; it trains new university graduates for a half year, lets them

work with the farmers to apply the skills that they learned, and get feedback to enhance their knowledge and skills based on the experience. This type of skill development is unlikely to be funded by external donors who don't usually set any funding category for 'new development' and emphasise 'financial/time efficiency'. However, it believes that farmers can develop more contextually-applicable agricultural methods through such trial and error methods, and can nurture more organisational capacity for mutual-help (Interview No. XXVIII). Having experienced similar demands, one field practitioner working in Mindanao (November 2016) said

> The project officers before kept asking 'What's the outcome, what's the impact, how many communities have you supported?' (Then, I say) 'You can't see the gains right away. You don't build roads.' (…) But if you see people's relationships building over the years, how they develop friendships and solidarity, I think for us that's most important evidence. It will take a long time. I've been working on this project since 2002 and I feel that it's still an on-going process. Some of my friends say 'But you cannot see (the outputs). It must be tiring to not really be able to see what you have been doing all these years.' I said, 'Yeah of course, but if you see how people's behaviours, attitudes and mind-sets change, even just for one community or a few people, then you have done something.' (Interview No. XXXXII)

Such demands for visible evidence of the impact, which have became a lot more obvious since the mid 2000s, raise serious challenges for many local peacebuilders. In fact, a large number of local organisations have had to reduce the size of their programmes or discontinue them, as their types of work simply don't fit such demands. When they fail to produce such outputs, they tend to be treated as unprofessional or unaccountable.

Nevertheless, a significant number of local actors have also developed their strategies for handling the challenges. One example is to change the criteria for evaluating outcomes to the number of activities, number of programme participants, or the size of the areas in which the programme was conducted, which are easier to quantify but are not necessarily really about the achievement. Another method referred to commonly by a few local agencies is to add ad hoc projects to the main programme, which can produce more immediate outcomes (e.g., capacity building

with ad hoc literacy education programmes). In some cases, local peacebuilders include the achievements of the target communities, regardless of whether the achievements are directly made by their peacebuilding programmes.

External actors' biased definitions of key operational concepts, unrealistic categories and standards for operation, and the scope of the peacebuilding programmes can create challenges to the implementation process. To come up with friction avoiding strategies in response, local peacebuilders tend to make the regulations and definitions more realistic without officially reporting the change to their international counterparts. Although the detailed measurements and arrangements vary, while developing the arrangements, many local actors commonly asked questions like 'what the concept means in the local context,' 'how ordinary people cope with the criteria,' and 'how the scope can fit the ongoing programmes in the area.'

In terms of biased concepts, during the interviews, the concepts of democracy, human rights, accountability and transparency were subject to extensive debates. For instance, transparency is a key concept with which peacebuilding agencies' performance is evaluated. The problem is, in Cambodia, transparency was referred to only in the debates on the government and NGO activities, mostly in the context of financial transparency. This reflects the international agencies' demands for professional operation of local agencies in the early phase of the post-war reconstruction (Hughes 2003). While the usage of the term transformed over time to include wider conceptual areas (e.g. transparency in all governance procedures), most residents of local communities have not heard the term often, and do not relate to its wider conceptual areas (CCC 2010). Hence, although local agencies include some questions regarding transparency as part of their evaluation survey of local communities, these questions are mostly limited to specific issues relevant to financial administration (i.e., Has the main operator issued one receipt only after paying for labour?).

Considering operational criteria, moreover, one international organisation conducted a series of programmes to support child soldiers' demilitarisation and reintegration to civilian life in Mindanao. A part of the programmes was to convince the military commanders of the MILF to demobilise the child soldiers, aged under 18, in their ranks to protect human rights of children. Upon such requests, however, almost all

revolutionary leaders responded that they "do not accept 18 as the age at which a person ceases being a child" and such a demand ignores a grown-up social actors' responsibility "to serve the community's right to protect itself" (Chaulia 2007, 153). To some commanders, the application of the age criterion meant that the international organisation is very much influenced by Western (Christian) worldviews and they are not willing to accept the realities in Mindanao. Moreover, one local agency in Cambodia that supported agricultural projects, for instance, received funding earmarked for *building the capacity of farmers in agricultural techniques related to climate change*. Both agricultural techniques and climate change were highlighted as requisite conditions. The local agency believed this condition was impractical in that successful capacity building is about more than just technique training and farmers will not be interested in training relevant only to climate change.

In these cases, local actors attempted to operationalise the definitions of youth and the scope of programmes, by reflecting the reality in the field. Regarding the definition, based on an informal survey of 'what age range is normally considered as childhood in the Moro areas', local peacebuilders figured out the age range that gives a less controversial age limit. However, to make an official change to the age criterion was not an easy task for the local peacebuilders since the criterion was widely applied in children-related human rights programmes in other parts of the world. Any change to this definition would require substantial justification that could convince the evaluators of the programme and the wider public to whom the host organisation needs to be accountable. Hence, in the conversation with the MILF commanders, they primarily focused on young children, not mentioning the official category.

A similar response was made by the local peacebuilder in Cambodia regarding the limited scope. While keeping all the documents submitted to the donor unchanged, the agency included a wider range of training sessions with a broader aim: the development of agri-entrepreneurship that enhances productivity, profit, and the management of climate change. Moreover, although the titles of all sessions were exactly in line with what was reported to the donor, they covered a much wider range of issues than techniques for handling climate change, which included farm management, farm planning, and general agriculture techniques (Interview No. XXVIII).

Reconceptualisation of Programme Identity

Reconceptualisation of programme identity denotes local actors' efforts to make their collaboration with international actors easier and more effective by reconceptualising the nature of their local peacebuilding programmes, in line with the external actors' conceptual framework. Over the past decades of operating programmes, many local peacebuilders learned that choosing the right concepts to identify their programmes is critically important in building collaborative relations with international agencies. It was of course important to maintain the high quality of programmes, to operate transparently, and to maintain close and sincere relations with the international actors. Nevertheless, the experience of these local actors' indicates that their work needs to fit the areas of the international supporters' areas of expertise for the first stage of relationship building. Regardless of how good the programmes that they operate or how serious the local needs that they address, donors and advocate agencies do not express their interest if the programmes are not in their areas of expertise.

During the 1990s and 2000s in Mindanao and Cambodia, local peacebuilders identified a few areas of work and thematic principles to which international agencies paid particular attention. In terms of project areas, a few popular keywords were rehabilitation, education, democracy, human rights (especially women's rights and children's rights), the culture of peace, capacity building, conflict resolution, community support, and recovery of local livelihood. Regarding the themes of operational principles, many international actors emphasised participation (inclusiveness), sustainability, and transparency. Moreover, the areas and themes being emphasised transformed over the time, usually following the shifts in the UN's primary directions in peace-supporting activities.

Local peacebuilders soon learned that it was important to keep the identity of their local programmes in line with these themes and agenda to develop working relations with these international supporters and to get more funding from donor agencies. Since many programmes that they had operated are somehow relevant to these themes directly and indirectly, to many local peacebuilders, it was more about 'putting old wine in a new bottle' to make their programmes fit the donors' agenda.

For instance, one local agency in Mindanao has changed key themes of its operation several times over the past two decades, following changes in the UN agenda. It was the culture of peace during the mid

1990s, then conflict prevention in the mid 2000s. It later changed to conflict transformation in the late 2000s. Since the formation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, it now emphasises the theme of peace sustainability. In reality, this local agency continued its core programmes as its key objectives were relevant to all of these thematic areas. All they needed to do was to re-conceptualise and re-justify the value of their programmes. While explaining the changes in identity, a representative of this agency mentioned with humour, "But anyway that's the UN jargon so what can we do? Just go along with the UN jargon because what is more important is to [*this agency's main areas*]. Anyway we still do the same stuff [laughs]. Let's not debate with them" (Interview No. XXVII).

Rebranding and readjusting practice may occur at planning stages, occasionally at the request of external agencies. Local peacebuilders may need to adjust the existing programmes or their plan for a new programme to fit such an external agenda. Nevertheless, such an adjustment usually does not affect their central aims. A grassroots organisation in Cambodia, for example, was approached by a foreign agency that wanted to initiate a programme for women's empowerment. Hence, this Cambodian organisation explained a local bakery programme that was being planned to support the community's livelihood. Since new types of bakery and coffee products became popular in main cities, this grassroots organisation wanted to create a team of community residents who could operate a bakery shop targeting passing tourists.

Hearing this plan, the Korean donor agency proposed to offer funding for training these community residents and for renovating buildings to open a shop, as long as all beneficiaries were to be women. Moreover, it requested that the grassroots organisation develop a few more education programmes for women in the future. Eventually, the programme was initiated with more female trainees based on the common understanding. A few male residents of the local community who had expressed initial interests in joining the training, were recruited as marketing and administrative supporters. Recalling how the programme had been developed, a representative of the organisation mentioned "Women's benefits or men's benefits (doesn't matter). It is the people who get benefit. That's what we do here. But, I know it is important for them to have the name of women" (Interview No. XXX).

Another local organisation in Cambodia has conducted programmes to offer material and mental support to the survivors of the Khmer Rouge's radical social campaigns. Nevertheless, the programme suffered

from a lack of funding since the late 1990s when a large portion of the international funding for emergency relief and post-war rehabilitation terminated. While the needs of the survivors still continued and diversified from materials supports to social services and medical (mental) care over time, the support for war-time survivors was not an attractive theme to most donors any more. Hence, this organisation has bid for many funding rounds in different areas ranging from research into social capital to medical aids for the communities in remote areas. Then, in selecting the participants in or beneficiaries of the programmes, it has given the first priority to the Khmer Rouge survivors who it had previously identified. Moreover, it maintained the same operational pillars for handling the survivors, in the operation process regardless of which programmes it was undertaking. By doing so, a representative of this agency says "we can somehow get funding, but still use the same approach to the people we want to support" (Interview No. XXVI).

Disclosure of Partial Truth

Disclosure of partial truth denotes the situation that local peacebuilders disclose only part of the full information to their international counterparts, in order to achieve their goals. If contextualization of external demands is a process motivated by the biased demands from international actors, disclosure of partial truth is a process undertaken mainly due to local actors' self-motivation to pursue their goals. The goals pursued through the disclosure of partial truth strategies can be norm-based objectives like support based on need rather than merit, or more pragmatic purposes like the enhancement of funding efficiency, the relationship management with local communities, and the promotion of the agencies' reputation.

The strategies for disclosing partial truth can be divided into two different types of actions, according to the level of manipulation: *keeping silence* and *smoke and mirror*. Firstly, the actions of keeping silence should be distinguished from telling a lie in that peacebuilders do not deliver any wrong information. Instead, they do not proactively share some areas of information hoping that the international supporters do not notice. Moreover, in most cases, such strategies usually meet the promises that they make to the international counterparts. However, the programmes supported by international advocates are utilised as well for pursuing local peacebuilders' goals, outside of the advocates' awareness.

For instance, one local agency in Cambodia was hiring a part-time programme manager with good qualifications and extensive work experience, in order to operate an outreach community support programmes. To recruit and keep good quality human resources is a constant challenge to local peacebuilding agencies with a limited budget. Since they cannot afford the salary of established workers with a good reputation, wide human network and highly developed skills, local peacebuilders usually recruit early career staff and train them with relevant work skills. However, these junior staff are likely to move to employers offering a better salary or work environment when they acquire decent work skills. Hence, many local agencies endeavour to secure funding to keep hiring capable staff.

This agency was no exception. The primary targets of the support programmes that it was operating, were primary school teachers and community leaders; hence, it required staff to have a good understanding of child education, skills of conflict resolution and the intellectual background to deal with local leaders at different levels. However, due to her qualification and experience, this programme manager was frequently approached by other employers who offered full-time work for limited periods. Hence, the quality of the childcare outreach programme was affected by the programme managers' temporary leave for taking such short-term full-time jobs. When this local agency gained funding for childcare in rural areas, which also covered a full-time salary of a project officer, it used the funding to recruit her as a full-time staff. The salary was calculated for the workload of 36 hours per week, which the childcare work will not require. The staff's priority was to meet the expectation of the donor agency on the childcare project; however, she was also assigned to be in charge of continuing the outreach community support programme as well.

Secondly, disclosure of partial truth may adopt a more proactive form of *smoke and mirror*. Moving beyond keeping silence, local peacebuilders can change the forms or procedures of operating the programmes, and make deliberate efforts not to report the changes to their international counterparts. As a consequence, although the overall projects do not apparently look significantly different, the programmes may not achieve the goals exactly as set by the international donors.

A local NGO in rural Cambodia has supported children in financially challenged families so that they could complete primary education, and has been supported by an international fundraising agency

to mobilise money to operate its programmes. The main issue in the local-international collaboration was the international agency's strategies for promotion. As many individual donors wanted to see how their money was spent, the agency created a website that listed the children who need financial support (with photos and appealing stories) and enabled these donors to choose who they wanted to support. Once an individual donor choose a child, a 1:1 advocacy relation was formed and the child was supposed to get constant financial support for the promised period.

While this was an attractive fundraising strategy, the application of the project as it was advertised would significantly affect the other community development programmes in which the organisation was engaged. In the livelihood support for local communities, material support should follow the 'proportionality to need' principle and selective support to the children chosen by individual donors contradicted this principle. Although it is obvious that these children face relatively more financial challenges, most children in their schools and villages had similar issues. The operation of 1:1 advocacy programme under such a circumstance was likely to create serious tension between the children, and more importantly, to raise the wrong desire to look for external support to deal with their challenges. Due to some serious friction among pupils caused by such advocacy, a few local schools requested the NGO to stop its support programme.

Hence, this NGO decided to spend a large portion of the money meeting the pre-surveyed needs of children in general, such as purchasing fruits and vitamin tablets for children, buying notebooks for the entire school, and hiring school shuttles for children in remote areas. It instead considered the children chosen for individual support as the representatives of their communities or schools. The children took minor extra benefits from the advocacy programme and, in exchange for this, they were requested to keep sending letters of thanks to the donors (Interview No. XXXI). However, although this organisation believed that it was the right decision for the whole community, it did not directly report the changes in the forms of operation to the international fundraising agency, worrying that this change might disrupt its relationship with the agency. The disclosure of partial truth continued until the fundraising agency officially dropped the marketing strategy after two years.

Deliberate Misconduct

Some local agencies adopt such quiet, friction avoiding strategies for unscrupulous purposes. Such strategies are in many cases related to the international donor agencies' tendency to rely on documents and many local agencies attempt to take advantages of this. Although these donors usually go through a rigorous process of evaluating proposals when selecting the project to fund, they rarely make field visits to monitor how the projects are implemented and what the actual achievements are. Instead, such interim and final evaluation is mostly done based on the written reports that the local agencies produce. Even in rare cases that they make field visits, they are unlikely to notice the realities behind the 'show cases' that local agencies deliberately create.

Although the number is less significant compared to the local peacebuilders that are genuinely interested in building constructive collaboration with international supporters, there are local actors that attempt to take advantage of such a gap in operations. When their programmes fail to develop in the ways they hoped, for instance, these agencies adopt various strategies to hide such failure or partial success by adjusting evaluation criteria or methods. For instance, when their programmes are now well accepted by local communities, the feedback survey questionnaire can be carefully rephrased so that they get more positive responses. Subtle language changes that reflect cultural connotations (thus, that will not obviously appear in the English translation) can be adopted in this process. In other occasions, local agencies attempt to justify such partial success by referring to many challenges that are not directly relevant to the project concerned. Although all reasons mentioned in the reports are facts, they didn't necessarily have a direct impact on the progress of the projects. It was not unusual for local agencies to simply report that they have achieved the goals, hiding the reality. All of these strategies can be adopted in one report.

The problems arising from less rigorous monitoring and evaluation processes were quite serious in some programmes implemented during the early 2000s in the islands of Mindanao. The issue of monitoring was difficult to avoid due to two challenges. First, during the period, many international organisations were emphasising community-driven development as their priority. Hence, wherever possible, they attempted to let local agencies to take a lead in peacebuilding operations. Second, from a practical perspective, as a large number of islands are scattered over a vast

area, to make visits to each island to monitor the implementation process is difficult. Sometimes a local barangay has 100 islands in its administrative support area.

Accordingly, the monitoring and evaluating the programmes funded by international organisations (or international NGOs) were frequently taken care by other local NGOs in the same areas. When there was no local agent to take the job, international actors occasionally requested the formation of 'people's organisations' for this purpose. In such cases, the composition of the monitoring teams was dominated by the close associates of political elites or the implementor of the programme being evaluated. In other cases, the evaluation was also left to the implementing body. Under such circumstances, applying a 'checks-and-balances' system was almost impossible.[2]

In worse cases, local actors promise goals that they know are unachievable at the funding application stage to attract donors' attention, or give deliberately wrong information about the objectives of their programmes. Although this issue is particularly problematic in the early phases of post-conflict reconstruction when there are especially many 'mushroom organisations' that are established mainly to secure income from foreign-based funders (Özerdem and Lee 2016), similar issues were identified in recent periods in Cambodia and Mindanao as well. For instance, one agency in Cambodia that had operated education programmes for the 'orphans' in the local communities for fifteen years, had received various material and financial support from many overseas organisations. In 2016, however, a former project officer who had supported it, discovered that almost ninety per cent of the children in the programme were not orphans (Interview No. XXXII).

Local peacebuilders are aware that these strategies will eventually create their own barriers and cause them to lose credibility with external funders. While providing examples relevant to this category of strategies, the research participants emphasized that these examples were done by

[2] I was introduced to the examples of how the ill-managed programmes were hidden from donors in this area. Some of them were about the private appropriation of the project funding by local elites and the project managers. Some are about deliberate manipulation of assessment criteria. Others are about evaluators' inability to identify and assess the complex reality. There were examples of a discrepancy between what's written on the reports and what they observed in the field. However, due to the potential risk of their identity being revealed, most research participants requested not to be referred to in this volume.

other organisations and they were not committed to such unscrupulous strategies. At the same time, while they explained how prevalent it *used to be* in the past, they say the problem of evaluation is still valid. One interviewee said "during that period of time, the international organisations' evaluation was just a waste of money" (Interview No. XXXIII). In other words, although there is a high moral risk of adopting these strategies, they were also confident that the international actors were unable to identify them.

Noticeable Features

Thus far, this chapter has explained more subtle and pragmatic methods of local peacebuilders for incorporating their needs, interests and views into the existing structure of local-external collaboration. Four rough categories were suggested for the convenience of examination: contextualisation of the external demands; reconceptualisation of the programme identity; disclosure of partial truth; and deliberate misconduct. These activities demonstrate a variety of features in terms of the motivation for adopting the strategies (from normative reasons to pursuit of selfish interests), levels of commitment (from simple rephrasing of the titles on documents to the restructuring of programmes), and the areas of changes (from procedural issues to dishonest reporting).

Moreover, although the number of relevant information sources was too small to be conceptualised into the above typology, a few examples that could be categorised as *subtle lobbying/sabotaging* are worthy of mention. Three interview participants (one from Mindanao and two from Cambodia) mentioned the lobbying/sabotaging strategies that are applied to redirect the externally-driven process of implementation. In all cases, they were applied to non-local agencies based in the same country which make occasional visits to local peacebuilders. It is named as 'subtle' in that these methods do not directly challenge the directions of the external supporters' decision. Instead, local actors attempt to highlight the problems of the external supporters' ideas without losing face from both sides, by blaming other actors/factors for expected problems, toning down the significance of the issue as minor, and involving local authorities to renegotiate operational features.

For instance, when school building projects were particularly delayed in a few villages in Cambodia, the local peacebuilding agency continued to give reasons like the challenges of the rainy season, lack of

participation from community residents, and frequent leave taken by skilled workers. However, it later turned out that local agency was unhappy with the selection of the project sites, and was worried that the funding could run out before all construction was complete. Hence, it wanted to concentrate more skilled human resources in the villages that needed school building more urgently but did not want to directly point out the problem in the overall plan (Interview No. XXX).

One common feature underlying the above types of friction avoiding approaches, which this chapter pays attention to, is local peacebuilders' desire to achieve their goals without overtly challenging the demands from external supporters. In most of the cases revealed during the author's field visits, local peacebuilders assumed that their international counterparts had not been aware of the friction avoiding approaches. Even in cases where the international actors were aware, they were unlikely to notice what the local actors had attempted to achieve through the strategies.

From a structural perspective, such friction avoiding approaches may not seem to offer theoretical significance. They do not present any clear shifts in the power structure between international supporters and donors and local peacebuilders nor demonstrate highly visible operational features reflecting local cultures. Drawing on established theories of biopower and governmentality, the above examples present a more nuanced structure of power generation in local peacebuilding. While international aid donors may control the official and financial aspects of peacebuilding, there are a wider range of stakeholders who determine the unofficial, procedural or operational mechanisms through which peacebuilding programmes are undertaken.

In fact, a large number of conventional studies present the assumption of power disparity in favour of donors and the negative consequences of such power disparity, and less successful attempts to address it in recent periods. In the post-conflict settings, according to these studies, the major forms and procedures for social and economic reconstruction in the aftermath of wars have been strongly influenced by the international peacebuilding activities. Hence, the framework and priorities chosen by international organisations (especially the UN agencies) and major bilateral organisations were at the centre of the process. Even after the immediate rehabilitation process is finished, the power domination of the international actors continues. Many international NGOs can choose the local movements that confirm their

vision on peace and development, and direct them to pursue the vision. Hence, the local actors who demonstrate radical positions and seem more likely to resist the international NGOs' demands, are likely to be excluded from their collaborators pool. Such power disparity tends to be more obvious when focusing on the relations between international donor agencies and the peacebuilders at grassroots level (just a few examples out of numerous relevant references, Carothers and De Gramont 2013; Groves and Hinton 2004; Duffield 2002; Lister 2000; Lee and Özerdem 2015).

In exploring the response of local actors toward such dominant influence from international counterparts, the forms and dynamics of local actors' 'resistance' has attracted academic attention. Many studies pay attention to the motivation against liberal peace movements, presenting a range of empirical evidence to show the friction between the concepts of the liberal peace and local contexts. In some studies, the locals' resistance was understood from post-colonialist perspectives (Mac Ginty 2011). In terms of the forms of resistance, earlier studies tend to conceptualise resistance as a type of organized, collective, principled and systematic action (Vinthagen and Lilja 2007; Galvanek 2013); hence, the empirical studies tended to focus on organized forms of political campaigns (Alfred and Corntassel 2005; Newman and Richmond 2006; Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2006).

In short, many conventional research outputs on the interaction between the international interveners and local peacebuilding practitioners in the critical scholarship of Peace and Conflict Studies tended to focus on the domination of powerful external actors and the resistance of local actors. The examples of friction avoiding approaches introduced in this chapter, however, call for the need to revisit such conceptualisation particularly from two perspectives: the complexity of local resistance and the conceptualisation of power.

First, in terms of the dynamics of local resistance, the above examples confirm and contribute to the recent discussions on *everyday*. Since the concept of everyday was introduced as a site of "resistance, assimilation, adaptation and of hidden agencies" (Richmond 2010, 677) in the late 2000s, a more complex feature of resistance began to be illuminated in the academic studies. The empirical studies highlight that the reactions of grassroots actors toward international influence can be "spontaneous rather than organised, tactical rather than principled, accidental rather than systematic, or even unintentional" (Lee 2015, 1441). In addition,

the forms of resistance are a lot wider than collective demonstration, which include modification, alternation, non-participation, foot-dragging and false compliance (Hellmüller 2014; Dougherty 2004; Visoka 2017).

The four types of friction avoiding approaches offer empirical evidence that support and confirm the arguments presented in line with everyday resistance. For instance, the motivations of local peacebuilding for mitigating international demands and influence are a lot wider than the normative anxiety with the Western perspectives. Local actors' motivation was more frequently related to their concern about procedural regulations or evaluation criteria, the desire to continue their core programmes under uncertainly with funding flow, their hope to maximise the opportunities given by the limited support from the external actors, and their personal aspiration to take advantage of the external funding. In many cases, these friction avoiding methods were not conceptualised as forms of resistance and local actors did not have any deliberate intention to resist their international supporters. At the same time, however, the interview participants had assumed that their friction avoiding methods would make their programmes more in line with the objectives set by themselves.

Through the interaction between the international demands and the local desire to pushing forward their agenda, a few hybrid forms of operation have materialised. Regarding the forms of hybridity, in some cases, the programmes operated by the same local peacebuilder may have a set of coherent central objectives in addition to the main objectives set by international donors (especially in reconceptualisation of the programme identity and disclosure of partial truth). There are occasions where the central goals or operational principles are modified to the extent that international actors may not notice or care (contextualisation and smoke and mirror). Although the forms of hybridity may look similar, these hybrid models are distinct from the hybrid forms introduced in Chapter 3. While the hybrid forms in Chapter 3 were developed while attempting to apply the imported norms and agenda more effectively, the examples introduced in Chapter 5 were produced based on the opposite motivation. In this sense, the hybrid forms of peacebuilding formed through friction avoiding approaches capture well how subtle everyday resistance materialises in local level peacebuilding operations and what consequences such resistance brings about.

Second, from a more fundamental perspective, the examples in this chapter revisit the conceptualisation of *power in peacebuilding*. In many previous studies on local ownership, it was assumed that international

supporters are a strong suppressor while locals are the considerably weaker suppressed. When focusing on the official aspects of peacebuilding development, it is an uncontestable fact that international interveners have the power to control the forms and procedures for institution building and dominate the channels for transmitting funding. They are in many cases overwhelmingly superior to local actors in terms of overall material resources, technological skills, political influence, and education levels.

Nevertheless, taking a closer look at the field practice of peacebuilding from a long-term perspective, there are more components of power than those possessed by many international actors. The material or political power of outsiders can be balanced by local actors' greater understanding of local contexts, high legitimacy, extensive human networks, normative or religious ties, and the like. For instance, in the particular geographic, temporal, cultural, and relational contexts where a certain peacebuilding programme operates, local peacebuilders are usually considered as the parties that have executive power. For most community residents, it is the peacebuilding agencies who decide what is to be implemented, regardless of where the original funding source is and to whom the programme is eventually accountable. Such executive power frequently plays an important role in manipulating the directions of programmes and in formulating collaborative relations with local communities.

Moreover, extensive knowledge of social and cultural contexts in the local areas on one hand enables peacebuilders to accurate evaluate the values and practicality of the programmes proposed by international supporters. On the other hand, when they decide to pursue their goals that are different from those of the international supporters', such knowledge enables local peacebuilders to create and apply a wide range of strategies (including indirect and subtle strategies) to achieve the goals. Another type of knowledge that they gain through long-term interaction with international donor agencies is about the normative preference, operational tendency, and the limitations of the bureaucracy that many international/bilateral organisations possess. Through the understanding, many local actors are now able to handle the challenges posed by different types of international actors, according to the styles of their work.

Through such executive power, normative legitimacy, and extensive local knowledge, the local peacebuilders introduced in this chapter made their international counterparts either disregard, acquiesce, or consent to

the goals and operational features that are different to what they initially thought. While the success of long-term peace consolidation in people's day-to-day lives is entirely dependent on local peacebuilders' wills and capacity (Benton 2001; De Sousa Santos 2004), more importantly, in the process, the international counterparts do not come across any coercive manners of local actors. In this regard, while it may not seem ethically desirable nor strategically sustainable, deliberate misconduct clearly demonstrates who owns the power of implementation. Regardless of various methods adopted by international counterparts to supervise and monitor the implementation process, there are always areas that such methods cannot cover. When local actors decide to do so, they can take advantage of the operational gaps in the international actors' methods.

In understanding the dynamics of power, the concept of biopower proposed by Michel Foucault is helpful (Richmond 2010). In his conceptualisation, power is a complex flow of relations between various social entities, which determine truths subjugating the *docile body*. Hence, it exists everywhere and is embodied in various forms of knowledge, which include public discourse, group narratives, history, institution, government policy, organizational principles, bureaucracies, cultural traditions, and social norms (Foucault 1979; Rabinow 1984; Gaventa 2003; Vinthagen and Lilja 2007). Foucault's ideas of power help researchers comprehend the complexity of power relations between different actors involved in the peacebuilding process. Especially, a dual structure of generating power in peacebuilding practice can be conceptualized: whereas international aiders control the official process for promoting development, aid recipients dominate unofficial mechanism in which the peacebuilding is undertaken.

Taking the conceptualisation into consideration, the procedures of how local peacebuilders adopt and apply friction avoiding approaches reveals dual structures of power in local peacebuilding programmes: while external supporters have a strong influence on the official processes for promoting development, local peacebuilders wield determinant power on the unofficial mechanisms through which peacebuilding is undertaken. It is still questionable if the above examples represents the forms of self-determination or self-government that Foucault mentioned in this late work (Foucault 1986) in that the power-disparity in the official arena is so obvious. However, it can be observed that, when noticing discrepancies between their own needs and what their counterparts expect, local

peacebuilders seek or create depoliticized spaces in which these discrepancies can be addressed quietly under the conventional power structure.

Summary and Further Reflection

This chapter introduced five types of actions taken by local peacebuilders to incorporate their needs and perspectives into the programmes supported by external advocates, without overtly challenging the apparent power dominance of international actors. All in all, this chapter calls for a revisiting of what local actors apply in their everyday practice. Due to their institution-oriented framework or post-colonialist perspectives, many external peacebuilding agencies and researchers have underestimated the significance of the friction avoiding methods. In a sense, the whole range of strategies that look incremental, tactical or subtle at first glance, may be insufficient (and occasionally unethical) as models of the promotion of local peacebuilding. Nevertheless, despite their limitations, the strategies reflect the efforts of local agencies to incorporate their needs, interests and perspectives under the formidable power disparity in the institutional mechanisms of local-international interaction.

In summary, operationalization/contextualisation of the external demands is the local peacebuilders' efforts to address the problems caused by unrealistic or contextually inappropriate demands from international actors. Reconceptualisation of programme identity is an action to develop and enhance the local-external collaboration without significantly affecting the fundamental nature and objectives of the local peacebuilders' central programmes, by utilising the concepts and terms that are more familiar to the international counterparts. Disclosure of partial truth denotes local actors' strategies not to share some areas of information hoping that the international supporters do not notice. This type of action was further categorised into two groups based on the level of manipulation: keeping silence, and smoke and mirror. Finally, this chapter introduced the cases of deliberate misconduct of local actors for unscrupulous purposes.

Moreover, this chapter discussed the theoretical implications of the friction avoiding approaches as a model of local ownership development. The above examples firstly demonstrate a range of subtle and indirect forms of local resistance towards the demands from international agencies, which local actors thought problematic. The five types introduced above in this sense support recent academic debates in Peace and

Conflict Studies to move beyond the conventional concepts of resistance, illuminating less organised, informal forms of resistance based on a wide range of motivations. In addition, the power of local peacebuilders to determine the forms and procedures of peacebuilding implementation under the power disparity in favour of international agencies, demonstrates the dual structure of power in local peacebuilding.

References

Alfred, Taiaiake, and Jeff Corntassel. 2005. Being Indigenous: Resurgences Against Contemporary Colonialism. *Government and Opposition* 40 (4): 597–614.

Benton, Lauren. 2001. *Law and Colonial Cultures 1400–1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna. 2006. Peace on Whose Terms? War Veterans' Associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, 200–218, ed. E. Newman and O. Richmond. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Carothers, Thomas, and Diane De Gramont. 2013. *Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Chaulia, Sreeram. 2007. International Organisations in Mindanao: To Protect or Not? *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (February 1). Available at https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/21. Accessed 15 Mar 2018.

Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC). 2010. *Reflections, Challenges, and Choices: 2010 Review of NGO Sector in Cambodia*. Phnom Penh: Cooperation Committee for Cambodia.

De Sousa Santos, Boiaventura. 2004. *Toward a New Legal Common Sense*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dougherty, Beth. 2004. Right Sizing International Criminal Justice: The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. *International Affairs* 80 (2): 311–328.

Duffield, Mark. 2002. Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance. *Development and Change* 33 (5): 1049–1071.

Foucault, Michel. 1979. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: New York Vintage Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1986. Of Other Spaces. *Diacritics* 16 (1): 22–27.

Galvanek, J. 2013. *Translating Peacebuilding Rationalities into Practice: Local Agency and Everyday Resistance*. Berlin: Berghof Foundation.

Gaventa, John. 2003. *Power After Lukes: A Review of the Literature*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Groves, Leslie, and Rachel Hinton. 2004. *Inclusive Aid: Changing Power and Relationships in International Development*. London: Earthscan.

Hellmüller, Sara. 2014. A Story of Mutual Adaptation?: The Interaction Between Local and International Peacebuilding Actors in Ituri. *Peacebuilding* 2 (2): 188–201.

Hughes, Caroline. 2003. *The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991–2001*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon.

Lee, SungYong. 2015. Motivations for Local Resistance in International Peacebuilding. *Third World Quarterly* 36 (8): 1437–1452.

Lee, SungYong, and Alpaslan Özerdem (eds.). 2015. *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lister, Sarah. 2000. Power in Partnership? An Analysis of an NGO's Relationships with its Partners. *Journal of International Development* 12 (2): 227–239.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Newman, Edward, and Oliver Richmond (eds.). 2006. *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Özerdem, Alpaslan, and SungYong Lee. 2016. *International Peacebuilding: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.

Rabinow, P. (ed.). 1984. *The Foucault Reader*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Richmond, Oliver. 2010. Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 38 (3): 665–692.

Sivhouch, Ou, and Kim Sedara. 2013. *20 Years' Strengthening Civil Society: Time for Reflection*. Phnom Penh: CDRI.

Un, Kheang. 2006. State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia. *Pacific Affairs* 79 (2): 225–245.

Vinthagen, Stellan, and Mona Lilja. 2007. The State of Resistance Studies. A Paper Presented at the European Sociologist Association Conference, Glasgow, Scotland.

Visoka, Gëzim. 2017. *Local Resistance and the Politics of Self-Determination*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 6

Utilisation of Religious/Traditional Leadership

The models of local ownership promotion examined in this chapter are the initiatives developed by traditional/religious leaders associated with the local communities of Cambodia and Mindanao. Here, local religious/traditional leaders refers to the prominent individuals in the traditional structure of the societies where peacebuilding programmes are conducted, such as priests, Buddhist monks, imam, ustadz, village chiefs, community leaders, heads of traditional associations, and school teachers. Although it is a more recent phenomenon that traditional/religious leaders mobilise official forms of programmes under the themes of conflict resolution, peacebuilding or development, many elements of their traditional work have largely been involved in the local communities' activities for livelihood management, development, conflict resolution and social reconciliation. Many community residents in the traditional societies rely heavily for the solution of their everyday problems on the involvement of these leaders due to the local contexts such as lack of confidence in institutions, emotional distance to the political authorities, and tendency to rely on personal relations (Malena and Chhim 2009).

The peacebuilding programmes developed by religious/traditional leaders present in a variety of forms, ranging from a small scale charity to the national-level inter-faith dialogue. While some are integrated into the leaders' missionary programmes or local development plan, others are more independent of the leaders' occupational responsibilities. However, as a model of local ownership promotion, it is discernable that many of these peacebuilding programmes present distinct features that

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1_6

reflect unique ideas, needs and interests of local people. One factor that generates such unique features is that, while local peacebuilders in other models were dependent on external reliance during the initial phases of the development, many religious/traditional leaders had fairly abundant social assets from the outset with which they could mobilise and operate programmes without the direct involvement of international supporters.

For instance, their in-depth knowledge of the history and traditions of the local society enable them to have strong legitimacy when making suggestions for actions to address social issues. Their roles as the repositories of local knowledge tend to be more important in the areas where conflicts are escalated due to cultural identity issues (Harpviken and Røislien 2008; Tambiah 1996; USAID 2009; Kadayifci-Orellana 2008; Gopin 2000). In addition, religious leaders' religious authority as the deliverers and interpreters of the messages from the God or the Lord Buddha offers them strong social assets with which they can develop peacebuilding activities (Bouta et al. 2005; Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009). Moreover, religious/traditional leaders have good opportunities to expand and strengthen their social network with community residents. From a birth ceremony to a funeral, people's traditional life events are mostly involved with the roles of traditional/religious leaders. The institutional network within religious organisations also frequently offers a kind of logistical vehicle for building networks well (Bouta et al. 2005).

Regarding operational costs, although the detailed formats of their programmes vary, traditional/religious leaders tended to develop the programmes based on the social resources available to them. For example, local traditional leaders with little material resources developed programme forms needing less a formal structureor physical offices, such as irregular public campaigns, brokering reconciliatory negotiations, occasional material support to individual or groups, and connecting people. The representatives of bigger religious institutes mobilised nation-wide public campaigns for peace by utilising the extensive human network of their organisations. Due to such social assets and forms of programmes, many religious or traditional leaders who are involved in peacebuilding activities in Mindanao and Cambodia have had less need to collaborate with international donors and so maintain relatively strong independence from external pressure.

Accordingly, the objectives, methods and procedures of their peacebuilding programmes are developed primarily reflecting the perspectives

of these local leaders. Although they frequently collaborate with secular activists and adopt the values and ideas of the collaborators, traditional/religious leaders take the leadership role in the collaboration and proactively select what ideas they want to adopt. In this sense, out of the four models of local ownership development, the utilisation of religious/traditional leadership presents the examples closest to an ideal type of locally-driven peacebuilding.

This chapter will examine these features focusing on three main case studies: the Peace Zone initiatives and the Madaris Volunteer Programme (MVP) in Mindanao as well as Buddhist monks' peace initiatives in Cambodia. While the case studies from Mindanao demonstrate how local leaders develop wide support from different stakeholders by utilising their normative legitimacy and extensive knowledge, the case studies from Cambodia present how local leaders utilise their social network and cultural understanding in order to protect themselves and their peacebuilding programmes from political suppression. In the final section, this chapter will revisit the conventional academic debates on the multiplicity of locals, by reviewing the Buddhist peacebuilding in Cambodia as relevant examples.

Mobilisation of Wide Social Support

In this section, the peacebuilding efforts of religious leaders and local community members will be examined to demonstrate how wide support for a peace initiative was mobilised. The variety of peacebuilding programmes studied in Mindanao and Cambodia were mainly related to human behaviour rather than material or institutional factors, which include conflict resolution, human rights advocacy, community development, peace education, social reconciliation, environmental protection, and the like. In these activities, to get support from key stakeholders is a critically important factor. Nevertheless, to mobilise wide social support is frequently not a straightforward task in a divided society with a long history of violent conflicts. Throughout the chronic inter-group confrontations, local cultures tends to be influenced by the politicization of social division, and are sustained through local actors' constant resistance against the central government's repression. Under such circumstances, the religious/traditional figures' positions can be controversial. When they concentrate on support of the people within their own religious/cultural communities, they are likely to be targeted by other social

groups as the figures authorising and intensifying their own group's exclusive and self-centred unity. In contrast, when traditional/religious leaders speak or behave in contradiction to such nationalism or exclusive sentiments, these leaders are likely to be considered as 'traitors' (Lee 2014). This social constraint sometimes significantly reduces the space for peacebuilding activities.

The Peace Zone in Pikit, Mindanao

One well-known example in Mindanao is the efforts that Father Roberto (or Bert) Layson made to develop the Peace Zone in Pikit, under constant high risk of armed conflicts. Peace Zone denotes "a geographic area within which war and any other forms of armed hostility may no longer be waged, and where peacebuilding program[me]s will address roots and manifestations of the conflict in the communities" (Garcia and Hernandez 1989, cited in Coronel-Ferrer 2002, 10). In the Philippines, the idea of Peace Zone was first adopted and implemented in Cordillera, northern Philippines. Having been subjected to constant violence between the government and communist rebel groups (New People's Army, NPA), the people in Cordillera declared the area as a 'zone of life' and convinced the communist military groups to move away from their own areas in 1989 (Avruch and Jose 2007). Since then, the idea of the zone of peace has been implemented in dozens of different places in the country, including Mindanao (Santos 2005).

An outstanding feature of the Peace Zones in Mindanao is that they demonstrate a high level of collaboration between religious leaders, local civil society organisations, and the grassroots level residents in the areas. The key organisers of the Peace Zones (including religious leaders in most cases) pay strong attention to respect and organise the network of kinship ties and alliances during the development (George Mason University 2017). The Peace Zone in Pikit is one of the first initiatives in this kind in Mindanao. The municipality of Pikit in the central-south of Mindanao and its nearby areas had long been subject to severe fighting due to its strategic location. Especially, the impact of violence during the All-Out War in 2000 was critical to the residents of Pikit.

Fr. Bert Layson was a former parish priest of Pikit and prominent local peacebuilder who had provided the support for emergency relief and rehabilitation to the internally-displaced people (IDPs). Together with *Tabang Mindanao*, a local advocacy organisation, Fr. Bert went in

between the direct parties speaking to the leaders of the revolutionary groups, visiting the sites of combat and recording the victimisation of local communities. Moreover, the supporters including Fr. Bert mobilised resources for economic assistance to the IDPs, especially materials related to the returnees' agricultural activities. Then, immediately after the All-Out War, he proposed to establish a Peace Zone to prevent the recurrence of conflicts.

His idea to adopt the concept of the Peace Zone immediately received strong support. His status and previous work as a Christian priest laid a strong foundation for gaining such support. Firstly, his religious authority as a priest appealed to the Christian communities (and other communities to a lesser degree) to join his initiatives and offered him good chances to meet with people and facilitate dialogue. Secondly, a large number of *bakwit* (the IDPs returned home) who had been victimised by the conflict, actively joined his efforts by organising various demonstrations, public campaigns, recruitment of more participants, and visits to local stakeholders. Having seen Fr. Bert's constant and dedicated support to them and understanding the need for conflict prevention, the number of *bakwit* who joined the movements rapidly increased. Such voluntary organisation of conflict prevention and rehabilitation of IDPs was later named as *Bakwit Power*. Thirdly, while conducting his ministry, he made visits to many combatant camps meeting military officers at different ranks, which gradually instilled trust from the military groups for his sincere commitment to peace mediation. Thus, during the peace negotiation between the Filipino government and the Islamic military groups, Fr. Bert was considered as the central figure who facilitated on the ground communication between the two sides. He utilised "dialogical approach, rather than confrontational" based on the belief that "no one has the monopoly of goodness, or of evil" (interview with Fr. Roberto Layson, cited in Smith 2015, 25).

Then, Fr. Bert and other key organisers conducted outreach visits to communities for consultation and workshops preparing the declaration; the key organisers opened a space where community residents and local leaders could express their concerns about the ongoing issues and offer ideas for formulating a manifesto for a peace zone. Such a consultation process was taken seriously as an important means to rebuild connections between returnees by sharing common grief, hardships, and shared hope for peace (Layson 2003).

Moreover, the organisers of the Peace Zone were well aware that the zone was not sustainable without getting proper acknowledgement from MILF and other military groups. As MILF fighters frequent turning up in local villages raised security concerns, the representatives continued to meet with MILF leaders to request the detachment of the military groups from civilian villages. Through the continued conversations with MILF commanders, both sides agreed that MILF would respect the space as a conflict free zone in exchange for the government's agreement not to challenge MILF's passing by the village in September 2000 (Anasarias and Berliner 2009). Even in cases where the Moro military leaders occasionally felt uncomfortable with Fr. Bert's visits and requests, they attempted to accommodate his demands as they were concerned about their reputation within the communities that they claimed to support (Neumann and Emmer 2012).

Based on such mobilisation of social support, the initiative for the Peace Zone was materialised. The first village to adopt this idea was Nalapaan. The Space for Peace in Nalapaan village was officially initiated on 1 February 2001. The power of Nalapaan's Space for Peace was clearly demonstrated during the five months' warfare in 2003. While most areas of Pikit were subject to intense military combat and one third of the whole population was displaced, neither the government military forces nor MILF attempted to use Nalapaan as a combat space. Rigorous evaluation of the security risk was repeated and the negotiation with MILF continued throughout the warfare.

Gradually, other areas of Pikit joined and agreed to form a wider Peace Zone, called GiNaPaLaDTaka Space for Peace. The name was comprised of the names that appear in many villages in the area. The GiNaPaLaDTaka was declared on 29 November 2004, with the signatures from roughly 5000 residents of the seven local villages (barangays). Both the government and MILF representatives signed the declaration panel in the ceremony. This ceremony of declaration was accompanied by a wide range of pre- and post-ceremonial events such as "festive parades, songs, dances, performances, and food" (Anasarias and Berliner 2009, 186). The representatives from local civil society, international humanitarian agencies, the United Nations, Roman Catholic authority, and evacuees endorsed and backed up the declaration. The main objectives are to "promote socio-economic, political, cultural, and religious rights of everybody and to denounce human rights violations" (Anasarias and Berliner 2009, 183). The Peace Zone in Pikit had a quite simple

structure, and this structure was flexibly maintained according to the changing local contexts and the development of conflicts or other peacebuilding processes.

After the Peace Zone was declared, various activities were developed in order to maintain the principle of nonviolence in the area and nurture 'the culture of peace in the area.' For instance, the key organisers continued to facilitate leadership training, the culture of peace seminar series where varied modes to uphold restorative justice were explored (Neumann and Emmer 2012; Layson 2003). In addition, they organised varied events in which different religious groups can participate, under the theme of interreligious dialogue. In the three years following the initiation, the key organisers developed a number of monitoring teams at regional and local levels in order to monitor the national ceasefire agreements (Rood 2005). Finally, the Peace Zone representatives participated in the wider network of peace activists such as the Mindanao Peace Caucus (Neumann and Emmer 2012).

The Madaris Volunteer Programmes

As discussed above, in divided societies, religious/traditional leaders' efforts for conflict resolution or peacebuilding sometimes face challenges due to the leaders' religious affiliation. In the societies where the division is delineated along religious identities, efforts for social reconciliation by one religious group frequently raise suspicion from other religious groups about the hidden intention behind them. In other cases, their efforts for nuturing mutual understanding may be seen by their own religious communities as the action of betrayal.

Similar issues were outstanding in many local peacebuilding initiatives in Mindanao. Hence, there were local religious leaders who attempted to overcome such challenges by building inter-faith collaboration. The Madaris Volunteer Programme (MVP, or more officially, CEAP-NABEI Volunteer Programme) initiated in 2015 is one such example. MVP was proposed and developed primarily by Rev. Fr. Joel E. Tabora, a Manila-born Catholic father and the long-term president of Ateneo de Davao, a local university in Mindanao.

The primary object of MVP was to elevate the level of education in ARMM area, offering better learning opportunities to the youth studying at local Madaris. In most Islamic areas in Mindanao, there is a problem of the duality of the education system where mainstream public

schools follow the governmental curricular and private Madaris[1] incorporate Islamic values and Arabic language. However due to the lack of human resources, the level of education at local Madaris had been compromised and many students from the Madaris had failed to pass national exams. The key idea is that MVP recruits volunteer teachers who have expertise on the subjects that local Madaris need support with, from outside of Mindanao. Then, these volunteer teachers will stay in the local village for an academic year and teach for local Madras.

At the same time, this education programme also aimed to facilitate cultural exchange between Islamic and Christian communities in the Philippines. Most of volunteer teachers for MVP were recruited from outside Mindanao, mainly from Luzon, a Christianity-dominant area. Thus, host communities in ARMM needed to accept and accommodate their co-existence with Christians and respect them as teachers for a long period of time. For the Christian volunteer teachers, such teaching was a great opportunity to deepen their understanding of Islamic culture.

Although the idea was welcomed by the top leaders of MILF, the GPH and the Catholic Education Association, there were various challenges ranging from security instability to deep-rooted mutual prejudice between different religious communities. Hence, during the preparation phase, the coordination team spent a significant amount of time building collaborative relations with key local stakeholders. They firstly visited all possible local leaders from mayors to local councillors, as well as traditional/religious leaders (Pandita, Datu) to explain the purposes of the programme. Since the influence of these local leaders is strong over both local populations as well as key military leaders, it should be the first step to seek a certain level of understanding/acceptance from them. Then, the coordination team approached security actors such as the MILF commanders, the Philippine National Police, and the governmental military in order to guarantee security for volunteer teachers. Once this process was done, the team also visited civilian agencies coordinating administration in the area. On average, the team made 30 visits to each village during the preparation period so that the team could build trust and a working relationship with key stakeholders.

In this process, one major challenge was the local communities' strong suspicion of the intention behind the programmes. The key promoter was

[1]Madaris is a plural of Madras (or Madrasah), the term denoting traditional Islamic schools.

a prominent Catholic father, the coordinating body was Ateneo de Davao, a Catholic university, and most volunteers teachers were Christians from outside of Mindanao. Hence, there was a high risk that local communities considered MVP as a frontline programme for Catholic missionary work.

Hence, Rev. Tabora ensured the coordination team comprised both Muslims and Christians and appointed a Muslim as the main coordinator. Moreover, the operation of the programmes was designed to be led by *Al Qalam Institute for Islamic Identities and Dialogue in Southeast Asia*, a key research unit in Ateneo de Davao promoting Islamic studies under the leadership of a prominent Datu. The team acknowledged and adopted Islamic values in the conversations with stakeholders. For instance, when talking to religious leaders, the coordination team used a number of quotes from Islamic teachings, to lower people's aggressive manner towards Christians. A couple of examples include "The seeking of knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim" and "Seek knowledge, even if you have to go to China." The team also spent a significant amount of time to make sure that the programme did not incorporate any evangelical purpose. Instead, they identified it as a partnership project between Christian and Muslim, highlighting the strong support from MILF. Moreover, since the teachers in Madris are highly respected in Moro areas, the coordination team made constant efforts to express their respect to them.

Thanks to such efforts, in the first two years of its operation between 2015 and 2016, 14 local Madaris in mainland Mindanao participated in the programme, and no volunteer teachers faced serious security threats. Instead, the MVP managed to establish communication channels between MILF and the volunteer teachers. Thus, when volunteer teachers sensed signs of insecurity (e.g., sound of gun fire), the MILF offers confirmed the situation and recommended whether the teachers should stay or leave. This demonstrated that maintaining a decent level of security is possible through civilian efforts even while military conflict is ongoing.

In short, Fr. Tabora's religious legitimacy, his personal connection with Moro military leaders, and his position within the institutional structure of a local university enabled him to quickly materialise his vision for MVP. During the implementation process, moreover, more inter-faith composition of the operation team was an effective measure to reduce the risk of raising local communities' unnecessary suspicion of

the hidden intention behind the programme. Although the members of the operational team were not priests or religious leaders, the team leaders' extensive knowledge of religious canons and local contexts as well as the kudos of the heads of the operational team (Fr. Tabora and Datu Mussolini Sinsuat Lidasan) made the process of engagement with stakeholders more effective.

Development of Culturally-Adapted Forms of Peaceuilding

While getting support from key stakeholders, especially political and religious authorities, is an important element for successful peacebuilding, there are peacebuilding activities that cannot avoid confrontation with such authorities due to the nature of the programmes. In such cases, the religious/traditional leaders face various constraints and suppression set by these authorities. While political authorities apply various strategies to disband the activities, ranging from physical attacks on key organisers to legal accusations against them, religious authorities raise public defamation against them and occasionally ostracise religious actors involved in the movements.

In response, religious/traditional leaders utilise various strategies to gain wide social support for their peacebuilding initiatives and to overcome challenges set by political/religious authorities. From the stand point of utilisation of religious/traditional leadership as a model for developing local ownership, these strategies of religious actors demonstrate significant features of peacebuilding that reflect the needs and perspectives of local society. A number of peace movements mobilised by Buddhist monks in Cambodia clearly demonstrate such dynamics.

The first Buddhist peace activism in post-war Cambodia was Maha Ghosananda's mobilisation of the annual peace march called *dhammayietra* (marching for truth). Since 1992, while violent conflict was still ongoing, the march took place in March every year, spending days visiting many local communities across Cambodia to raise public awareness of many social issues related to peace (Poethig 2002). Nevertheless, the religious actors' social engagement had gone through a period of 'silence' from the late 1990s when the Hun Sen government consolidated its powerbase and suppress religious actors' political engagement.

A new wave of Buddhist peace movements emerged in the late 2000s and demonstrated particularly prominent activities in three areas: peace marches, human rights advocacy, and environmental protection (Soeung and Lee 2017). Firstly, the peace march has been considered to be a representative form of public awareness campaign organized by Buddhist monks. While Maha Ghosanda's *dhammayietra* has continued since 1992, although its size and social influence became significantly weakened following the prominent monk's absence in the late 1990s, a group of Buddhist monks and the Independent Monk Network for Social Justice (IMNSJ) in 2006 institutionalised another form of peace march called *Sithiyietra*, or marching for peace/justice. In these annual marches, Buddhist monks and other lay followers walk though the country for approximately 10 days, engaging in various forms of dialogue about peace-related issues with people in the villages that they visit for alms taking.

Secondly, these Buddhist monks have supported the victims of human rights violations. Although the protection of human rights is an area that Buddhist monasteries have long been involved with, the majority of such support was in the form of charity programmes targeting community residents who have financial challenges. Nevertheless, an increasing number of monks now take action in politically sensitive advocacy programmes by mobilizing protests, championing such protests by standing at the frontlines, recording and disseminating the information on the suppression that these people face, providing them with material aid and giving sermons (RFA 2013; LICADHO 2014). Two groups of people to whom Buddhist peace activists pay particular attention are the people affected by the government's land confiscation policy and the Cambodians living in Kampuchea Krom, a former Cambodian territory currently occupied by Vietnam.

Thirdly, some Buddhist groups develop campaigns for environmental protection, which has emerged as one of the most urgent social issues in Cambodia. While pursuing rapid economic recovery from the civil war, the natural resources, especially timber, have been subject to indiscriminate destruction. While small households logged trees for daily livelihood, a large number of private companies destroyed forests for their industrial purposes. To address this issue, people like Ven. Bun Saluth have developed a commercial/agricultural business that is more environmentally-friendly, public campaigns for conservation work, and political lobbying calling for the government's policy change.

As many of these new Buddhism-based peace movements undermined the legitimacy of the government by uncovering its misconduct, the political authorities and religious sangha[2] orders that are closely associated with the government applied heavy suppression to these movements (Sreang 2008). The government agencies violently dispersed public campaigns, disbanded many Buddhist groups related to these movements, constantly watched over monasteries related to such activist monks, and tailed and surveilled the activists monks. A significant number of monks were assassinated and, while no substantial clues to show the link were identified, people suspected that the government was behind such killing. Moreover, the authorities of two mainstream Buddhist orders (*Thommayut* and *Mahanikay*) also supported such political suppression. They first banned all monks under the authorities from any political activities including elections, publicly denounced the activist monks as fake priests, and excommunicated a few prominent activists refusing to offer them shelter (Sreang 2008; Öjendal and Lilja 2009; Interview No. XXXIV). In the Buddhist society where the moral and ethical decisions made by Buddhist authorities have great influence on people's behaviour, such criticisms offered serious challenges to the religious peace activists.

Facing such challenges, the organisers of peace activities attempted to come up with strategies to continue their activities, which were developed into two major directions: increasing moral legitimacy and enhancing connections with lay supporters.

Firstly, as the supreme Buddhist authorities' criticism strongly affected the legitimacy of their peace-supporting movements, the monks attempted to strengthen the justification of their movements by utilising their knowledge of Buddhist teachings and local contexts. For instance, in response to the criticisms that monks are not supposed in engage in secular matters, they referred to the Cambodians' belief in that Buddha will help those who face injustice and repression. Then they identified their activities as an attempt to embody the Buddha's teachings of compassion in the area of corruption, human rights violations and social violence.

Moreover, when they explained the importance of maintaining non-violence as a key principle of public campaigns, Buddhist activists referred to the Buddhist principles of *sachadhamma* (dialogue seeking

[2]Sangha denotes Buddhist order or community that usually consists of professional priests (monks, nuns) but occasionally includes lay leaders.

truth) and the *sila* (five key precepts) of Buddhist practitioners (no killing, no stealing, no misusing sex, no lying and no abusing intoxicants). When talking to non-Buddhist groups or people who don't have good knowledge about Buddhist teachings, the monks utilised Cambodian myths or metaphors that encourage the importance of nonviolent means (Interview No. XXXIV).

Such normative justification is a core element that motivates many lay followers to support the new religious peace movements in this country. For example, when such non-violent resistance strikingly contrasted with the regime's violent actions for suppression, this mobilized a big reaction from the people. At a deeper level, however, the identification of these principles as Buddhist themes encouraged confidence in those who are against the suppression of these faith-based peace movements. For instance, Ven. Loun Sovath, a key organizer of human rights protection movements, mobilised increased popular support and participation due to the hostile and intimidating acts applied by political authorities towards him. This, in turn, led to the intelligent tactical adjustment of *dhammayietra* and increased support and participation, thus putting the government in a dilemma as to how to control them (Interview No. XXXIV; Interview No. XXXV).

Secondly, traditional/religious actors attempt to solidify the popular ground through strengthening their human network with lay followers. In the Cambodian traditions, monks have various opportunities to engage with local communities. Buddhist monasteries are the heart of community life through which most community-level activities are facilitated (Kent 2003; Marston and Guthrie 2004). Buddhist monks engage in all community events such as births, engagements, marriages, funerals, house moving and completion of a new building, as well as annual festivals (Daravuth 2003). Local monasteries also form community laity committees that function as local mediators and play key roles in information transmission between monasteries and villages, explaining the messages from monks. Buddhist peace activists utilize their involvement of such local events and their local networks to gather information relevant to their activities, identify local people's needs, and recruit supporters for their activities (Interview No. XXXIV).

Moreover, many male youth spend a period of their lives in such monasteries, either taking the opportunity to experience life as a monk or to get free accommodation during their studies (Swearer 2010). Youth who live in monasteries with the Buddhist leaders develop strong emotional

bonds with their local monasteries and become familiarized with Buddhist doctrines and rituals (Swearer 2010). Such constant and close interaction with youth offers Buddhist peace activists a good opportunity to expand the secular support for their activities. In addition to direct dialogue with peace activists, the youth who share monasteries with these monks naturally interact with other peace activists, the social minorities that the monks support, and foreign media who interview the monks. Moreover, when Buddhist peace activists conduct charity programmes (e.g., giving stationery to children, providing religious counselling services), these youth frequently participate as assistants.

Under constant suppression from the authorities, however, these Buddhist activists needed to develop more concrete supporters groups; their activities pursuing this goal targeted three groups. Firstly, they engaged with the civil society organisations who are involved in similar areas of activities. As these monks usually do not have strong expertise in legal and organisational issues, for instance, many local human rights NGOs have provided advice with the organisation of their activities, shifting the activities from individual initiatives to sustainable movements, and ensuring legal protection from malicious accusations. Other organisations offer them training on public speaking, foreign concepts relevant to civil activities, and organisational skills. Through these civil society actors, some Buddhist monks extend their network of collaboration to the human rights advocates and media outside of the country (Interview No. XXXVI).

Secondly, the people who once received the support from these monks turn into strong promoters of these programmes. As they realise the importance of having external advocates, some of these lay people actively attempt to protect the monks by participating in the events organised by these Buddhist groups, spreading the relevant information through their network, and introducing their children and relatives in Phnom Penh and other regions to the monks. Especially, as the number of people who are affected by the government's poor management of land distribution across the country rapidly increased over the past decade, such human networking through the victims of the government's human rights violation is also increasing.

Finally, some Buddhist activists proactively utilise new media technology to disseminate the information about their activities quickly and widely without being affected by the government's censorship. Especially, inexpensive mobile phones became available from the mid 2000s;

internet-based media channels and social networks such as Facebook and Youtube are widely used among youth. Some Buddhist activists/activist groups quickly increased their 'subscribers' during this period; Ven. Luon Sovath and IMNSJ both have approximately 10,000 followers. The newsfeed that they post through such media is disseminated widely though the followers' network. A majority of our research participants said that they trusted the information that they received through the internet more than that which came from TV, radio or newspapers which they believed were under the control of the government (Interview No. XXXVII; Interview No. XXXVII; Interview No. XXXXV).

While these Buddhist monks' peacebuilding demonstrates the unique contributions of religious/traditional leaders in the development of local peacebuilding programmes, a number of research participants also expressed their concerns about such Buddhist peace movements as of the late 2010s. One issue was that some Buddhist peace activists regenerate and strengthen Cambodia's exclusive nationalism, especially against Vietnam. Buddhist peace activists frequently include nationalistic themes in their political statements or speeches during their campaigns, to gain popular support. Moreover, they sometimes redefine terms or concepts relevant to their campaigns in line with such nationalistic ideas. For example, a prominent peace activist defined democracy as the situation where "all people have freedom and the country is fully independent from colonial powers" (Interview No. XXXIV).

It would be unfair to criticise such a nationalist position as simply unpeaceful, as to have an independent nation is an important agenda of many Cambodians and there are social issues that are closely associated with the dominant regional powers (e.g., the political/social status of the ethnic Khmer in Kampuchea Krom). Strategically, moreover, such nationalism is a useful ideological rationale with which to criticize the current Hun Sen government that has been backed by Vietnam from the outset and to support Cambodian minority groups who live in the areas bordering Vietnam (Chandler 1998).

Nevertheless, during my field visits in 2014 and 2017, peace-supporting activists and youth expressed their concern at some monks' attempts to galvanise people's anti-Vietnam sentiments. According to them, these provocative statements occasionally encouraged Cambodian's aggression towards the Vietnamese diaspora in Cambodia. Hence, they questioned if such views accurately propose the future of the Cambodian peace (Interview No. XXXIX; Interview No. XXXVI).

In terms of the organisation and operation of activities, a few people pointed out top-down ways of communication and the lack of financial transparency. As the peace movements and organisations were developed mainly based on their personal kudos, the Buddhist activists have a high level of personalisation of leadership roles among the key organisers. Moreover, although they engage in various dialogues with community residents and youth, the monks usually rely on one way of communication for giving sermons or speeches. Despite continued requests from other civil society activists to develop more close collaboration between them, prominent Buddhist peace activists still prefer to work individually.

Partly related to the above point, transparent financial management is another area with which many (however not all) monks are weak. Different from the donation to other peacebuilding NGOs, the financial contributions to the Buddhist peace activists are usually made in the form of religious alms to priests or donations with no condition. In the Buddhist tradition in Southeast Asia, lay followers are not supposed to question how the donation is being spent once alms are donated to priests. Moreover, many of these Buddhist monks have not been trained in how to deal with project management. Although they get various support from secular lay followers, they tend to mobilise their peace-supporting activities as a one-man-band and, even in cases where they establish institutional organisations, such organisations ares small in size and their operation is usually controlled by the personal leadership of the prominent monks. Thus, although there are some exceptional cases, the expenditure of funding mobilised for these Buddhist peace movements has largely been made according to individual monks' subjective decisions without proper monitoring (Interview No. XXXVI; Interview XXXX).

Noticeable Features

Thus far, this chapter has introduced and analysed a few examples of *utilisation of religious/traditional leadership*. In the first section, it argued that the social resources of religious/traditional leaders enable them to mobilise wide social support for their peacebuilding programmes by examining two peacebuilding initiatives in Mindanao. Fr. Bert was in a good position to facilitate and maintain the link and communication with key stakeholders (i.e., the central GPH, the two major Moro military groups and key traditional and Islamic leaders) in that he was a part

of the Catholic religious authority, he undertook constant action to support IDPs and to bring about ceasefire during warfare which raised his strong normative kudo, and he was considered a trustworthy and neutral mediator and communicator, who as a Christian priest had a genuine interest in supporting people. Moreover, when religious leaders' peace initiatives faced challenges due to their religious affiliation, many of these leaders attempted to deal with the challenges by facilitating inter-faith collaboration.

The Cambodian case study focused more on how religious/traditional leaders utilise their religious legitimacy and extensive local knowledge, and strengthen their social network in order to resist the political suppression. It is also presented that these Buddhist monks developed or adopted unique forms and procedural features that reflect local populations' understanding of religious and cultural traditions. Specifically, they justified the principles and forms of their peace movements by referring to the Buddhist precepts and local myths related to Buddhism, and, in order to make their movements more acceptable to local communities, they chose the locations with symbolic significance in local cosmology and incorporated Buddhist ceremonial procedures into their activities. In addition, these Buddhist activists tried to strengthen their connection with secular supporters (especially youth) by relying not only on the traditional forms of networking (i.e., Buddhist monasteries' social involvement) but also new technologies (i.e., internet-based social network services).

The examples of utilisation of religious/traditional leaderships in Mindanao and Cambodia demonstrate various (and frequently inconsistent) features, which have theoretical implications as models of local ownership. For instance, the Cambodian monks' peacebuilding movements present many unique operational features that reflect Cambodian cultural symbols, rituals and cosmologies. The justification for non-violent peace campaigns is made frequently by referring to the Buddhist principles of the middle way and non-violence while the formats of *dhammayietra* (peace march) are developed with reference to important cosmological centers of Cambodian Buddhism. In addition, the forest preservation campaigns organized by the Fukhavon Monk Forest Community adopted a 'tree ordination ceremony' as a key activity. By hanging Buddhist robes on trees, the Buddhist leaders symbolically ordained the trees as non-human monks and ask community residents to respect and protect the trees (Soeung and Lee 2017).

It is also noteworthy that such culturally-adapted forms of peacebuilding do not necessarily mean that religious/traditional leaders reproduce the traditional modes of lives. There are many examples of these leaders attempting to move away from their older systems, seeking better ways to contribute to their objectives. One such example, which appeared above, is some Cambodian monks' utilization of internet-based social media for expanding and strengthening popular support. Their willingness to adopt and utilise new technology as well as proactively engage in secular groups was considered surprising to many people in that monks in Cambodia had traditionally been considered most conservative, non-secular and behind the times in terms of the adoption of new technology. Moreover, a few Buddhist peace organisations such as the Khmer Buddhist Education Assistance Project (KEAP) included Buddhist nuns in their education support. In the conventional structure of the Cambodian Buddhist order that is male dominant, the inclusion of females in the target support group challenged widespread customs in the Buddhist tradition.

In contrast, for those who want to see 'unique' operational features, the Zone of Peace in Pikit may not seem ground breaking in that many of them follow the forms and procedures of seminars, workshops or individual dialogues that can be found in many other places. In a sense, the modes of operation widely adopt the typical models found in European society. Nevertheless, the procedures of mobilising the support from local stakeholders and building bottom-up participatory procedures of planning and implementing programmes presents an important aspect of local ownership. A large number of inhabitants of the Peace Zone "develop[ed] their own concepts, perspectives, and projects reaching a high level of participation" (Neumann and Emmer 2012, 241). Moreover, most of these activities were participated in and guaranteed by multi-sectoral and multiethnic groups (particularly, the tri-people of Islamic communities, Lumads, and Christian settlers). For instance, while the operation of the Ceasefire Monitoring Teams and restorative justice mechanisms developed in the Peace Zone in Pikit are led more by local elite groups, the formation process of these institutional arrangements came about through consultation with the community stakeholders as well as workshops/seminars that were constantly facilitated by the Peace Zone organisers, and backed up by local NGOs.

Despite distinct aspects of religious/traditional peacebuilding, these examples demonstrate one common feature: all of them were developed with indirect support and influence from external advocates. The primary driving force behind these traditional/religious leaders' activities was wide support from local key stakeholders as well as lay communities in the areas, mobilised through the leaders' constant engagement and communication with the lay followers. The religious/traditional leaders' social resources such as extensive local knowledge, their human network, and religious legitimacy played important roles in the process. Although the Christian leaders received institutional support from the wider Catholic structure and many Buddhist monks asked for the legal and advisory support of civil society organisations, the involvement from international actors was either indirect and insignificant. Even in cases where a few traditional/religious leaders/institutes received financial support from foreign actors, the support was made mostly in the form of religious alms or donations with no conditions.

Complexities of Local: Who Do Local Peacebuilders Represent?

In examining peacebuilding programmes with a higher level of local ownership, which include the above examples, questions on the relations between local peacebuilding agencies and local people becomes more significant. Whose interests and visions for peace do these local peacebuilders represent? When do the needs and interests of the two sides become more compatible and when more contradictory? When the gap between the perspectives of peacebuilders and other local communities is clear, how do they react to such a discrepancy? What are the roles of local peacebuilders in the context of wider peacebuilding and development in the areas?

From a theoretical perspective, these questions are related to the ongoing academic debates questioning 'who is local?' In fact, the wealth of previous discussion on this question has not created a clear consensus on the concept. Instead, many discussions confirmed local is by no means a monolithic entity and clarified the multiple identities of locals (William 2000; Lemay-Hébert 2011; Benedix and Stanley 2008; Reich 2006; Wilén 2009). The term local is being used in extremely various contexts to denote different groups of people, ranging from

indigenous people in a small village-level unit to multiple countries in a sub-continent. A large number of studies on local ownership focus on specific communities of local residents (e.g., indigenous groups and women's associations) at the sub-national levels. In many seminal documents of peacebuilding, in contrast, national ownership and local ownership are frequently used interchangeably, describing central governments' efforts to mobilise national interests as an action for strengthening ownership vis-à-vis the intervention from the international donor groups. In some contexts, local means a wide geographical region beyond state territory, as can be seen from the political statements made by the leaders of sub-Saharan Africa (Lee and Özerdem 2015; Pouligny 2009).

The more diverse the groups of people included in the concept of local, the more discrepancies in interests and views of people are identified. For instance, locals at different governance levels in a society are likely to demonstrate different priorities of peacebuilding. The interests and perspectives of individual power elites at national/subnational also play important roles in formulating such mid- or long-term plans for development and peacebuilding. Even when limiting the scope of analysis to the non-state actors at sub-national levels, such discrepancies and diversity are still striking. The different perceptions between social elders and youth, men and women, economic better offs and worse offs, urban citizens and rural peasants, and the like, frequently create important dynamics that determine the directions of peacebuilding development. In particular, the mistrust and tensions between social actors prohibit close mutual collaboration for building sustainable peace (Richmond 2010).

The views, interests and contextual conditions of local are constantly changing as well. Communities are likely to contain a fluid mix of gatekeepers, social entrepreneurs, leaders and followers, the politicized and the non-politicized (Mac Ginty 2014, 551). Moreover, both the character and composition of local communities can significantly change according to the shifts in social contexts (Pouligny 2009). The perspectives of local populations can change in complex directions (which can be contradictory to each other) and at rapid speeds (Lee and Park 2018).

The peacebuilding examples discussed in this volume demonstrate how the complexity of locals, the discrepancies in interests and views of these locals, and the fluidity of local contexts develop the dynamics of peacebuilding. Moreover, some of the examples present how local peacebuilding agencies attempt to address such complexities and discrepancies.

For instance, while the Cambodian Buddhist monks' support of vehement nationalism was discussed as an area of controversy above, on the other hand it demonstrates the perceptual gap between the perspectives of the mainstream civil society and the Buddhist sangha regarding peace and peacebuilding in the country. In a country that has long been subject to the threat from regional powers (mainly Thailand and Vietnam), the protection of the Khmer national against external threat has been considered as a role of Buddhist sangha (Hansen 2004). During the French colonialism in the nineteenth Century, for instance, many Buddhist monks mobilised and participated in anti-colonial movements. Through this process, the Buddhist order reflected nationalistic elements in the sermons and rituals, believing nationalism to be Cambodia's 'most powerful, creative, and historically significant project' (Caṭṭopādhyāẏa and Chatterjee 1986, 6; Harris 2004). During the civil war and the post-war reconstruction where Vietnam's involvement was considered strong, such nationalist 'tradition' was intensifying (Swearer 2010). In this sense, a few Buddhist peace activists' support to vehement nationalism against Vietnam well reflects the widespread perspectives within the sangha community in Cambodia.

In contrast, the civil society activists and youth in urban areas, many of whom were born after the end of the civil war, have been introduced to Western notions of peacebuilding and democratic governance. Although they share concerns about Vietnam's strong influence over their country as well as the Hun Sen government's reliance on the strong neighbour, they are reluctant to bring the anti-Vietnam propaganda into their activities. Some believe such nationalism is more likely to generate more social tensions and violence rather than reconciliation, and is "inappropriate as a future vision for peace of Cambodia" (Interview No. XXXVI). Hence, once their immediate goal for democratising the state governance is achieved, the perceptual gaps between the civil society actors and the religious leaders may create overt tensions between them.

During the field visits to Mindanao, perceptual distance between religious peacebuilders and their religious communities on a similar issue was found but in an apparently opposite direction. For instance, the majority of the Christian population in the Philippines had preferred more firm and resolute policies against the Moro resistance movements, which left the Christian priests limited space for nurturing mutual understandings with Islamic groups in Mindanao. Hence, for many decades, only limited groups of the Catholic priests were able to actively involve

in interfaith dialogue with their Islamic counterparts (Coronel-Ferrer 2002). Similarly, a large number of Islamic leaders in Moro areas take a cautious stance in building collaboration with Christian representatives or peacebuilding agencies with Christian backgrounds, in an effort not to create misunderstanding within local communities about their intentions (Interview No. XI).

While discrepancies between local peacebuilders and the communities are more observable with traditional/religious leaders, other types of local peacebuilders also face similar issues. For instance, one of the key challenges that Development and Partnership in Action (DPA) in Cambodia face during its community engagement programmes is the different priorities of social development. One DPA practitioner confirms this by saying:

> [The] development paradigm introduced by development practitioners is different from daily livelihood of the community people. That is the biggest challenge. We have different agenda. Let's say this is NGO agenda, NGO plan. This is community plan, community people daily livelihood plan. Sometimes, it is not against each other, but sometimes, it overlapped but partly but not the same one. That is the challenge. (Interview No. XIV)

For instance, when DPA facilitates community-led plenary meetings for local development, community residents usually prioritise the programmes aiming at immediate and direct benefits relevant to their livelihood whereas DPA representatives hope to come up with plans for more long-term capacity building of the communities. In other cases, local peacebuilding agencies' needs for organisational survival clash with the interests of local communities, as observed in the high interest rates of micro-finance programmes in Chapter 4.

One strategy that the peacebuilders adopt to address such discrepancies is constant engagement with local communities. For instance, the Christian leaders and faith-based NGOs in Mindanao pay serious attention to relationship building with the Moro and Lumad communities before substantial development of peacebuilding operations. They knew such relationship building should be comprehensive, including varied stakeholders in the communities themselves, the Moro resistance groups in the relevant areas, the representatives of the government at local and central levels, and other peacebuilding agencies. Similarly, DPA's main

strategy to address the gap is committing to constant exchanges of views. By making constant visits to key community members and sitting in the communities' meetings, the representatives of DPA say, they could develop 'trust' with which they could still work together despite discrepancies in interests and views. Many Buddhist activists in Cambodia also constantly engage in dialogue with other peacebuilding agencies and the general public. However, the format of such engagement is rather one-way communication, where monks deliver their views as respected priests to lay followers. Hence, when there is significant gap in views, civil society activists and other community residents (especially youth) have limited opportunities to express and convince their perspectives.

The discrepancies are sometimes due to multi-layered power relations in the local societies to which local peacebuilders belong. For instance, although grassroots NGOs' leaders normally aim to represent the community residents' interests and perspectives while they deal with external actors, from the community residents' viewpoint, the same organisations' activities may be viewed as delivery of internationally-funded programmes. Due to such multiple positions and roles of grassroots NGOs as perceived and interpreted by the stakeholders, the grassroots peacebuilders may be considered a part of the international communities, local societies, or neither, depending on the issues involved.

In short, while they develop various features of peacebuilding that reflect unique local contexts and (some of) the local actors' perspectives, their position is frequently one of social elites who have more prominent social status and better access to resources. Although they are local peacebuilders and key drivers of locally-driven models of peacebuilding, their perspectives and interests are frequently different from the needs and desires of the local communities. The binary conceptualisation of 'local vs. international' that is adopted in a wide range of academic studies on local ownership is less relevant; the examples in this volume call for a more comprehensive examination of the complexity of local by reflecting the identity of local peacebuilding. In a sense, local peacebuilders are more like mediators who mediate for local communities with the types and modes of peacebuilding selected through their own visions for peace and interests. In another sense, they are part of a group of key local actors who create new dynamics of social contexts that determine and constrain the future direction of peace and development in local societies.

Summary and Further Reflection

This chapter examined the model of peacebuilding that utilise religious/traditional leadership, with particular focus on faith-based peacebuilding initiatives in Mindanao and Cambodia. In terms of operational features, utilisation of religious/traditional leadership presents the most obvious forms of locally-oriented peacebuilding models. Local peacebuilders take full control over the peacebuilding process leaving external supporters with supportive and supplementary roles only. These programmes, hence, adopt many operational elements that reflect religious cannons, social hierarchy, local myths, cosmology, and communication systems.

To summarise, religious/traditional leaders are frequently in good positions to develop peacebuilding movements due to their normative legitimacy, extensive local knowledge and formal/informal human networks. Such social resources enable them to mobilise support for their initiatives from a wide range of stakeholders and to develop forms of peacebuilding that are more appealing to local community populations. In case their initiatives face challenges due to their religious affiliation, the leaders attempt to overcome the challenges by facilitating inter-religious collaboration. Moreover, by utilising their extensive local knowledge, the leaders develop the forms and procedures of peacebuilding that can be better accepted by community residents.

This chapter acknowledged discrepancies in the interests and views between peacebuilding agencies and local communities. While such discrepancies are not exclusively relevant to religious leaders, they were more prevalent in religious/traditional peacebuilding. In fact, a significant number of research participants appealed that collaboration with traditional/religious leaders occasionally faces challenges due to the leaders' strong opinions on the agenda and procedural elements, which are different from other local agencies' views. Moreover, although many traditional/religious leaders actively engage in dialogue with lay followers on peacebuilding issues, due to their social status as leaders, the communication in many cases is unilateral.

This chapter discussed the issues relevant to different views and interests which were elaborated on in relation to the ongoing theoretical debates on the complex identities of local. From a practitioner's perspective, however, it also highlights a challenge in the peacebuilding sector: how can other social actors encourage and support religious/traditional leaders to be involved in peace activities? In conflict-prone societies, the

social resources of religious/traditional like religious legitimacy, personal kudos, extensive local knowledge and a strong network can be a sword with two blades. While there are many local leaders who are involved in peacebuilding activities, many previous studies also reported and analysed how the same types of social resources were utilised for galvanising social tensions and intensifying violence. Many civil society actors have made efforts to connect religious/traditional leaders to wider peacebuilding networks, where the leaders' actions and ideas can be shared and 'socialised' to contribute to wider social peace; however, their efforts come across many challenges due to the issues stated above (especially local peacebuilders in Cambodia). In this sense, the facilitation of space for mutually-respectful inter-generational and priest/lay communication is likely to be a key practical task for the promotion of local peacebuilding in Mindanao and Cambodia in the near future.

References

Anasarias, Ernesto, and Peter Berliner. 2009. Chapter 6: Human Rights and Peacebuilding. In *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace*, ed. Joseph de Rivera, 181–195. New York: Springer.

Avruch, Kevin, and Roberto Jose. 2007. Peace Zones in the Philippines. In *Zones of Peace*, ed. Landon Hancock and Christopher Mitchell, 51–70. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Benedix, Daniel, and Ruth Stanley. 2008. Deconstructing Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Review of the Literature. *African Security Review* 17 (2): 93–104.

Bercovitch, Jacob, and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana. 2009. Religion and Mediation: Role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution. *International Negotiation* 14: 175–204.

Bouta, Tsjeard, Ayse Kadayfci-Orellana, and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. 2005. *Faith-Based Peacebuilding: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute of International Relations. Available at http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20051100_cru_paper_faith-based%20peace-building.pdf. Accessed 12 Mar 2016.

Caṭṭopādhyāẏa, Pārtha, and Partha Chatterjee. 1986. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. London: Zed Books.

Chandler, David. 1998. Cambodia's Historical Legacy. *Accord*, 5. Available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/historical-legacy.php. Accessed 11 Apr 2017.

Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam. 2002. Philippines National Unification Commission: National Consultation and the 'Six Paths to Peace'. In *Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking, Accord* 13, ed. Catherine Barnes. London: Conciliation Resources. Available at www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/phi.htm. Accessed 18 June 2018.

Daravuth, Ly. 2003. *Notes on Pchum Ben*. Available at http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/peacebuildingarts/pdfs/peacebuildingarts/ly%20notes_on_pchum_ben-2.pdf. Accessed 5 Mar 2016.

George Mason University. 2017. Overview of Peace Zones in the Philppines. School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University. Available at http://activity.scar.gmu.edu/zones-of-peace/-overview-peace-zones-philippines. Accessed 17 Jan 2018.

Gopin, Marc. 2000. *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hansen, Anne. 2004. Khmer Identity and Theravāda Buddhism. In *History, Buddhism, and New Religious Movements in Cambodia*, ed. John Marston and Elizabeth Guthrie. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Harpviken, Kristian Bert, and Hanne Eggen Røislien. 2008. Faithful Brokers? Potentials and Pitfalls of Religion in Peacemaking. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 25 (3): 351–379.

Harris, Ian. 2004. Peace Education Theory. *Journal of Peace Education* 1 (1): 5–20.

Kadayifci-Orellana, S. Ayse. 2008. Chapter 14: Ethno-religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution. In *The Sage Handbook on Conflict Resolution*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremeremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, 264–284. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, and Washington, DC: Sage.

Kent, Alexandra. 2003. Recovery of the Collective Spirit: The Role of the Revival of Buddhism in Cambodia. Working Paper No. 8, Department of Social Anthropology, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg.

Layson, Robert. 2003. Space for Peace: A Nalapaan Experience in Grassroots Peace-Building. A paper presented at the conference: Looking at Conflict in the Eye for Local Resource Partners of the Philippine-Canada Local Developement Support Program, Davao City, Philippines.

Lee, SungYong. 2014. Peacebuilding and Islamic Leadership in Southern Thailand. *Peace Review* 27 (3): 328–336.

Lee, SungYong, and Alpaslan Özerdem. 2015. *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lee, SungYong, and Wookbeom Park. 2015. Nurturing Local Voice: The UNDP's Local Empowerment Programmes in Cambodia. In *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*, ed. SungYong Lee and Alpaslan Özerdem, 135–155. London and New York: Routledge.

Lee, SungYong, and WookBeom Park. 2018. The Dual Track of Democracy Promotion in Post-war Peacebuilding in Cambodia: The Gap Between Institutional Development and Civil Society Mobilisation. *Peacebuilding*. Advanced Publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2018.1498671.

Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas. 2011. The Potential and Limits of the Local Ownership Paradigm for Future Peace Missions. A Paper Submitted for the Conference – Perspectives on Conflict and Security, July 11–12.

LICADHO. 2014. *Human Rights in 2013: The Year in Review*. Available at http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/reports/files/194LICADHOReportHumanRightsReview2013English.pdf. Accessed 18 June 2018.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2014. Everyday Peace: Bottom-Up and Local Agency in Conflict-Affected Societies. *Security Dialogue* 45 (6): 548–564.

Malena, Carmen, and Kristina Chhim. 2009. *Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia*. New York: World Bank.

Marston, John, and Elizabeth Guthrie (eds.). 2004. *History, Buddhism, and New Religious Movements in Cambodia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Neumann, Hannah, and Martin Emmer. 2012. Peace Communication: Building a Local Culture of Peace Through Communication. In *Forming a Culture of Peace: Reframing Narratives of Intergroup Relations, Equity, and Justice*, ed. Karina V. Korostelina, 227–254. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.

Öjendal, Joakim, and Mona Lilja (eds.). 2009. *Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-conflict Society*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Poethig, Kathryn. 2002. Movable Peace: Engaging the Transnational in Cambodia's Dhammayietra. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41 (1): 19–28.

Pouligny, Béatrice. 2009. Local Ownership. In *Post-conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, ed. Vincent Chetail. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Radio Free Asia (RFA). 2013. In Largest Protest Since Polls, Cambodians Demand Re-Election. Available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/demand-12222013144758.html. Accessed June 2016.

Reich, Hannah. 2006. 'Local Ownership' in Conflict Transformation Projects: Partnership, Participation or Patronage? Occasional Paper No. 27, Berlin, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.

Richmond, Oliver. 2010. Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 38 (3): 665–692.

Rood, Steven. 2005. *Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society*. Policy Studies 17, Washington, DC: East-West Center.

Santos, Soliman. 2005. *Peace Zones in the Philippines: Concept, Policy, and Instruments*. Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute and The Asia Foundation.

Smith, Corinne. 2015. Brokering Peace: The Conflict Through the Eyes of Father Bert. Available at sites.miis.edu/reflections/files/2013/08/Reflection-2015-Fr.-Bert.pdf. Accessed 20 Jan 2018.

Soeung, Bunly, and SungYong Lee. 2017. The Revitalization of Buddhist Peace Activism in Post-war Cambodia. *Conflict, Security & Development* 17 (2): 141–161.

Sreang, Heng. 2008. The Scope and Limitations of Political Participation by Buddhist Monks. In *People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Moral Order in Cambodia Today*, ed. Alexandra Kent and David Chandler. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Swearer, Donald. 2010. *The Buddhist World of Southeast Asia*, 2nd ed. New York: SUNY Press.

Tambiah, Stanley. 1996. *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

USAID. 2009. *Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding: An Introductory Programming Guide*. Washington, DC: USAID.

Wilén, Nina. 2009. Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking? Legitimizing Concepts in Peace and Development Operations. *International Peacekeeping* 16 (3): 337–341.

William, Rocklyn. 2000. Africa and the Challenge of Security Sector Reform. In *Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Annika Hilding-Norberg. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

This volume has explored the endeavour of local peacebuilders in Mindanao and Cambodia to gain a greater sense of ownership over the peacebuilding programmes that they operate. Through the analysis, it has explored if more genuine local ownership can be developed under the extensive external intervention already present in the conflict-affected societies, and if so, what it looks like in practice. Specifically, it has paid particular attention to three areas of analysis—the strategies for strengthening local ownership, distinct features of locally-driven models, and the major contributions and potential limitations of such local models in consolidating peace.

Through the analysis, this study aimed to address the paucity of empirical literature on local ownership. The first area is a lack of a specific focus on local agency. Although the central argument for the local turn is the recognition of local agency, local agencies' perspectives on the promotion of ownership has not been extensively examined in previous literature. Another area is a lacunae in evaluative studies of locally-driven models in practice. While much of the literature supports locally-driven peace from normative perspectives or based on the assumption of its positive roles, empirical analysis of the unique features of locally-driven peacebuilding models has been limited to selected types of peacebuilding (especially traditional/indigenous forms and the programmes led by state agencies). Another gap in the literature relates to the possibility of equal power relations between local peacebuilders and external supporters. Can local ownership really change the power relations long-term? Or is it all

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1_7

merely a rhetorical stratagem deployed for international actors? Despite the importance of the questions, academic studies that introduce and analyse relevant field practice are limited in number.

In this chapter, I will revisit the key findings presented in the previous chapters, and discuss how they are relevant to the three major gaps in the research. Firstly, the chapter will overview and summarise the findings presented in the case studies chapters. The discussion will particularly focus on the four types of strategies adopted by local peacebuilders for developing local peacebuilding models, following the structure of this volume. It will then reorganise and analyse the findings with regard to two areas that are not comprehensively discussed in the case study chapters: the forms of local-international collaboration developed in Mindanao and Cambodia, and varied responses of local peacebuilders to international norms.

Strategies for Promoting Local Ownership

To reiterate, the term local peacebuilder in this research denotes grassroots non-governmental organisations or informal associations that make deliberate efforts to nurture peaceful coexistence between different social groups and/or sustainable social development in their own geographic areas. Due to a lack of sufficient material resources, relevant skills and knowledge during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts, many local peacebuilders are destined to rely heavily on support from external actors in the process of developing peacebuilding programmes. Such external reliance generates a power disparity that favours international actors, while local peacebuilders are treated as implementers of the external agenda. Although the programmes for promoting local ownership have been proactively implemented in many peacebuilding processes since the end of the 1990s, many conventional programmes achieved limited success, frequently leaving local actors to assume the roles of the customers who choose from the options prepared by the external actors.

Under such circumstances, local peacebuilders in Cambodia and Mindanao have developed a range of strategies for incorporating their needs, interests, and perspectives into the programmes implemented by them. This volume identified four types of strategies frequently observed in field practice.

Ownership Inheritance

Peacebuilding agencies that were once primarily directed by external actors have later gone through a voluntary ownership transfer process. The previous external leadership has facilitated more participatory forms of operation in order to offer local staff or community leaders more active roles, by adopting two main types of ownership transfer. First, the organisations that were established under foreign leadership recruit local staff, offer them a range of training for capacity building, promote them to higher posts, and eventually transfer managerial roles to them. Second, when designing local peacebuilding programmes, external peacebuilders put local communities at the centre of the operation from the outset. Local communities are invited to take a lead in programmes from their initiation, while external actors assume more supportive roles. Successful development of ownership inheritance brings about high levels of local ownership in terms of the organizational structure of peacebuilding agencies and the decision making process, where local representatives assume important roles. At the same time, local actors who inherit ownership through the processes tend to demonstrate more eagerness to keep working with external supporters and to keep incorporating into the peacebuilding programmes the norms and principles introduced by them.

Management of External Reliance

There are many local agencies that have maintained fairly independent leadership and management systems in terms of the institutional structure but the operation of their peacebuilding programmes is under strong external influence. External actors tend to direct and restrict the scope and nature of the programmes by applying limited selection criteria for the funding awarded, conducting evaluations to determine the continuity of funding supply, and offering skills training. Local peacebuilders under this condition have come up with strategies to mitigate the external influence, three of which were selected for analysis in this volume. One popular way is to develop income generation schemes, in which funding sources are sought from collaboration with local communities and their own services for work partners. Moreover, local peacebuilders frequently adopt two types of actions to reduce their over-reliance on a small number of external supporters: diversification

of partnership and local coalition building. Although the detailed forms vary, the fundamental common goal of these strategies is to reduce their vulnerability to the demands from particular donors by creating financial and institutional barriers for protecting their identity and objectives. While these efforts are unlikely to bring about complete autonomy for local peacebuilders, successful examples significantly increase their negotiation power vis-à-vis the demands from external actors, in terms of selecting the programmes to be initiated and those which will continue to operate, and determining operational features.

Friction-Avoiding Approaches

Local peacebuilders' efforts for incorporating their own ideas can be developed in subtle and indirect ways. Due to various challenges and obstacles, many local actors in Cambodia and Mindanao prefer to adopt such 'quiet' strategies rather than overtly challenge the existing structure for the local-international partnership. In other words, local actors looked for ways to push forward their ideas to the extent that they can handle themselves rather than renegotiate or resist the demands from external supporters. Chapter 5 summarised a few common patterns which emerged from dozens of examples: contextualisation of the external demands; reconceptualisation of the programme identity; disclosure of partial truth (keeping silence and smoke and mirror); and deliberate misconduct. These strategies do not apparently look significant in that they don't bring about structural change. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 discussed that they have important theoretical implications from two perspectives. Firstly, they present good examples of *everyday resistance* in post-conflict peacebuilding, which has been theorised since the 2000s. Secondly, they call for revisiting the conventional approaches to power relations in local peacebuilding, demonstrating dual structures of power in which external and local peacebuilders respectively control official/institutional processes and unofficial/implementation processes.

Utilisation of Religious/Traditional Leadership

The models of local peacebuilding can be promoted through the contributions of religious/traditional leaders who are considered the repository of local knowledge and the legitimate power holders in local governance. Due to the leaders' legitimacy, strong social network, and

extensive local knowledge, the peacebuilding programmes developed by them frequently maintain more autonomous positions, relatively free of external influence. Out of various strengths of religious/traditional leadership, Chapter 6 paid attention to their positive roles in mobilising wide social support and legitimising the raison d'etre of the programmes. In addition, due to such autonomous power, the peacebuilding programmes tend to demonstrate fundamental objectives and operational features that are more authentically local. As representative examples, the chapter described how religious leaders in Cambodia utilise Buddhist cannons and precepts to explain key principles of nonviolence, reflect local cosmology, myths, and rituals to make their programmes more relevant to lay people. However, the perspectives and interests of these traditional/religious leaders do not necessarily reflect the views of the majority population in the local areas. The observation of the discrepancies between the perception of these leaders and wider local communities contributes to the on-going theoretical debates on the multiple and complex identities of local.

Outstanding Features of Local Peacebuilding Models

Two more questions that this volume has examined are: How different are the local models developed in Mindanao and Cambodia from the liberal peacebuilding models? and What are their significance and limitations as locally-owned peacebuildings? It is difficult to offer definite answers to these question since various and frequently contrasting features have been formed reflecting the dissimilar contexts of each local community and interactions with different types of actors involved in peacebuilding processes. Moreover, the development of grassroots actors' own peacebuilding models in the two areas is a continuing process and many examples introduced in this volume are at an early stage of their development. Nevertheless, there are a few outstanding features commonly demonstrated by a significant number of local peacebuilding programmes, which is summarised here.

The Identification of Local Needs

Considering fundamental objectives of peacebuilding, it is noteworthy that local peacebuilders' approaches to local needs can be significantly different from the framework adopted by external supporters or donor

agencies. These needs are in many cases, therefore, excluded from the main areas of peacebuilding to which major external supporters pay attention. For instance, many local peacebuilders had previously failed to get funding for many community-support programmes, mainly because the programmes do not fall within any of the funding purposes such as food security, literacy education, human rights advocacy, agriculture, renewable energy, disaster risk management, and public sector leadership. Challenges had also been set by the operational restrictions from donor agencies like requirements for short turnaround of programme outcomes, exclusion of profit-making programmes from support, and short-term contracts without the certain prospect of renewal.

Local actors are in good positions to identify local needs in the same way that local communities do since they closely follow developments in different social contexts in the local areas and constantly engage with communities to get their views and feedback. A few types of programmes that some local actors managed to implement only since gaining stronger ownership are exploration of local conflict resolution schemes, organisation of unions of factory workers, support to diaspora returned to the homeland, outreach legal consultation services for local communities, and utility services in collaboration with private companies (i.e., electricity, water). Although the specific challenges that they face are different, the local peacebuilders in Mindanao and Cambodia highlight the same issue: external supporters (especially major donor agencies) fail to identify and reflect the real needs of local communities due to their limited scope of peacebuilding.

Culturally-Adapted Operational Features

There are numerous examples of local models of peacebuilding which are shaped in the ways that local communities can better access and adopt. The most widely found feature is the adaptation of forms or procedures to fit local contexts. A variety of unique features have been identified during the field visits, ranging from choosing the venues for events based on local cosmological beliefs to holding local conflict resolution meetings following traditional rituals. These forms and procedures can be adopted for more pragmatic reasons, regardless of what the fundamental goals are. In other words, while they are frequently adopted as a part of the development of authentic local peacebuilding models, they can also be utilised for effectively pursuing more liberal norms.

Some features are related to more fundamental and perceptual contexts of local areas. For example, there are cases where objectives and principles of peacebuilding are justified and explained utilising religious cannons, local beliefs, nationalism, and the like that affect people's perception. In the Moro areas of Mindanao and in Cambodia, the quotes from religious cannons like Quran and sutras, religious precepts, episodes related to religious figures, and the stories of local heroes were frequently utilised. In addition, a few examples are related to the unit of operation, which may contradict the individualist approaches taken by many international organisations. Many peacebuilding agencies working with traditional communities and indigenous groups emphasise the importance of considering the impact of a programme on the whole community or tribe. Hence, in many local areas, equal distribution of material support to the whole community is preferred over selecting targets for assistance.

Reflection of Structural Contexts

Underneath these visible operational features, some features of local peacebuilding models are also about structural and communicational contexts of the society. First, in both Mindanao and Cambodia, the incorporation of a high-context communication system and social hierarchy is an important feature that frequently determines the success or failure of programmes. Due to such contexts, for example, many local peacebuilding actors invest a long period of time in building trust and collaborative relations with key stakeholders in local communities before they operate programmes. Moreover, as the (hidden) pre-discussion for decision making is important, local peacebuilders attempt to build their relationships with multi-layered social groups and engage in informal communication procedures (i.e., hanging out with village leaders, informal chat between women in the communities).

The relations between local peacebuilders and the state/religious authorities are another major structural issue. In the Islamic traditions in Mindanao and the society of Cambodia, it is frequently not practical to delineate clear borderlines between political authorities, religious leadership and civil society. Especially in Mindanao, peacebuilders' ideological backgrounds are closely associated with religious beliefs, and their institutional stands are backed up by local religious/traditional authorities. In Cambodia, the two main Buddhist orders that most Buddhist monks belong to have close political association with the political leaders.

In both areas, non-governmental organisations cannot operate without getting the government's political endorsement, financial assistance, practical patronage, and/or operational support. Hence, apart from the peacebuilders whose work by nature is about providing checks and balances on the government's activities, many local agencies in the two areas have made deliberate efforts to develop collaborative relations with both religious and political authorities.

In short, peacebuilding models developed by many local actors in Mindanao and Cambodia demonstrate unique features that look incompatible to traditional Western assumptions or concepts about the civil society or peacebuilding. Then, are these unique features better in facilitating more consolidated peace in the local areas? The answers should be different according to how local actors utilise both their local knowledge and such operational features. As described in the previous chapters, there are many examples where their activities play more positive roles in identifying and incorporating local needs, and in developing the forms of peacebuilding that are more relevant to local communities.

Nevertheless, such indigenous models do not always provide good sources of stable peace and sustainable development. For instance, regarding the identification of local needs, the above examples do not confirm that local actors are always in line with local communities' perspectives and are better at identifying and reflecting local needs than external actors. Many local peacebuilding agencies confirmed that local stakeholders frequently challenge their proposals as they have different views on the fundamental issues lying behind apparent problems and the way to address the issues. Particularly the tension between quick fixes and long-term solutions is identified as a core issue of contention, which indirectly reflects local peacebuilding agencies' paternalistic attitudes. Moreover, there is a risk that local agencies' identification of community needs can be significantly distorted by their organisational needs and connection to local power groups.

Another example can be local peacebuilders' efforts to reflect social hierarchy and the patron-client relationship. From a short-term perspective, there are social conditions that should be dealt with carefully in promoting successfully peacebuilding programmes. Moreover, there are many examples showing that local patrons and political elites play important roles in supporting peacebuilding programmes. However, there are examples that show that the vision these social elites have about their own society's future is frequently contradictory to the perspectives of

other social members, especially youth. Moreover, the strong cartel of these power holders works to sustain and intensify the social structure that generated the violent conflicts and suppression in society. Hence, local peacebuilders' pursuit of short-term benefits resulting from collaboration with this social hierarchy should also be revisited in terms of the long-term consequence of collaboration.

This observation precludes any universal conclusions about the strengths and limitations of local models in bringing about peace. Many local peacebuilders have been going through the *process* of developing and revisiting their own models and much trial-and-error is being attempted. Hence, it is a naïve assumption that simply transferring the ownership of peacebuilding programmes will bring about immediate improvements in field practice, as discussed in some previous studies (Richmond 2009; Mac Ginty 2011; Futamura and Notaras 2011).

This volume, moreover, does not propose that the findings are a general feature of peacebuilding models in Asia. As discussed many times in the previous sections of this volume, models of local peacebuilding develop in various directions reflecting the complex nature of local contexts. The nature of peacebuilding programmes constantly changes as the programmes evolve through interaction with various stakeholders including external supporters and donor agencies. Hence, the features observed with dozens of peacebuilding agencies in Mindanao and Cambodia in the mid-2010s cannot represent the entire peacebuilding situation in Asia.

Nevertheless, most of the peacebuilding agencies introduced and examined in this volume developed since the early/mid 1990s when the conventional liberal models emerged as the standard of post-war peacebuilding. The evolution of these local peacebuilding programmes has been achieved while constantly reflecting transformation in the global agenda for peacebuilding and development over the past twenty-five years. Moreover, structural and practical challenges in the contexts of armed conflicts offer limited space for local peacebuilding. In addition, a few cultural contexts introduced in this volume are significant factors in determining the environment for peacebuilding in other conflict-affected areas in Asia, which include unclear separation among political authority, religious authority and civil society, authoritarian but limited roles of state bureaucracy, and the communitarian nature of local governance (Cheesman et al. 2012; Porter and Bagshaw 2009; Stobbe 2015; Dibley 2014). In this sense, the local peacebuilders introduced in this volume

have faced many of the challenges dealt with by many local actors in other Asian countries. Thus, the analysis in this volume can be a good empirical resource for future comparative studies.

Relations Between Local Peacebuilders and External Supporters

Thus far, this chapter has revisited the main findings presented in the case study chapters by focusing on three areas of analysis: the strategies for strengthening local ownership, distinct features of locally-driven models, and major contributions and potential limitations of such local models in consolidating peace. Moreover, the related discussions aimed to address three areas of theoretical gap in the conventional studies: the strategies and behaviour of local agencies; the utilities of local peacebuilding models; and the power relations between local peacebuilders and external supporters.

Based on these findings, the following two sections will elaborate on two further theoretical discussions: local-international relations in local peacebuilding and the local responses to international norms. Some preliminary discussions on these themes were outlined in the case study chapters by focusing on the examples relevant to each chapter. The sections below will attempt to offer more comprehensive examination of the topics by integrating the relevant examples observed in this project.

Firstly, what types of ownership have been achieved through the above strategies of local peacebuilders? This examination is related to the previous academic debates on the meaning of *ownership*. Looking at the conventional studies on this question, two approaches to the concept have dominated earlier debates. First, a group of studies, especially the ones from post-colonial perspectives, propose maximalist definitions of local ownership, conceptualising it as local actors' full control, autonomy, or exclusive power. These studies have explored and advocated the promotion of local ownership as a way to address the power domination of international actors. Although detailed discussions are different, these studies generally agree that, local populations have full rights and responsibilities to plan, implement and evaluate their peacebuilding programmes and the forms of programmes should fully reflect their ideas. Moreover, the roles of external actors should be minimal, usually limited to pure advisory roles (Edomwonyi 2003; Chopra and Hohe 2004;

Olawale 2008; Orr 2004). From these perspectives, the examination of local ownership models naturally focuses on 'how authentic is a local model?'

In contrast, a group of studies understands local ownership with terms like participatory governance, collaborative peacebuilding, and reflection of local voices (Reich 2006; Hughes and Pupavac 2005). The goal of promoting ownership from this perspective is to develop methods that are most suitable to implement peacebuilding programmes (including liberal models) in the particular local contexts. In this sense, Hughes and Pupavac (2005, 883) explain that the practice of local ownership in field practice is about "taking responsibility for implementing a pre-existing (and externally defined) set of policy prescriptions." This approach is associated with the conventional ideas of local capacity building, which was defined to nurture local actors' knowledge and skills in regards to the operational models that international peacebuilders bring in (Smillie 2001). In these perspectives, although the ultimate responsibility for consolidating peace in their own societies may lie with local actors, the active involvement of external actors can be effective in implementing the planned programmes in the areas.

More recent studies explored the forms of local ownership in between the above two perspectives. For instance, Lidén (2009, 616) proposes a cosmopolitan model that "exemplifies a model of global governance where a cosmopolitan human rights agenda is consistent with the communitarian defence of political autonomy and cultural diversity" (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008 also presents a similar view). More importantly, as discussed in Chapter 1, extensive debates on hybrid peace explored various forms and standards of peace in which different actors' needs and perspectives are intermingled. From this perspective, ideal forms of local ownership can be equal and mutually respectful partnerships between local and international actors for peacebuilding, and the detail of ideal forms of collaboration can vary according to the contexts.

When I conducted a review project on field practice for promoting local ownership in the early 2010s, various ideas that reflect the above three perspectives were adopted by field practitioners without a clear distinction of the discrepancies between them. Even the people who were considered as key proponents of local ownership interchangeably utilised the concepts and ideas that represent different approaches. Moreover, regardless of what ideas they adopted, most externally-driven forms of local ownership promotion in practice pursued better implementation

of conventional peacebuilding models. While the third perspective on hybridity was attracting practitioners' attention, they were not sure how such hybridity would work since there have been few examples of local peacebuilders overcome the power-disparity in favour of international donors; the practical forms of the inclusive and mutually-respectful models of local-international collaboration have not commonly been introduced to academic debates (Lee and Özerdem 2015).

Taking these points into consideration, this project examined the forms of local ownership by paying attention to the level of institutional independence (from both structural and procedural aspects) and the level of local-international engagement. To evaluate this aspect, the project revisited the case study examples by asking two questions: (1) how overt is the institutional independence developed by local peacebuilders vis-à-vis the demands from international advocacy? and (2) to what extent do local peacebuilders engage with external actors?

The findings confirm that the direction of local ownership promotion as of the late 2010s within many local peacebuilding agencies in Mindanao and Cambodia, is heading towards building more equal partnership between local and international actors rather than either consolidating local's exclusive control or developing practical local-international collaborations for the pursuit of conventional liberal goals. While the level of institutional independence varies depending on the models, in terms of engagement, the point of commonality is that most peacebuilders are maintaining or strengthening the collaboration with external actors.

More specifically, the examples of religious/traditional peacebuilding demonstrate the highest level of institutional independence. From the outset, the peacebuilding initiatives in this model are primarily developed under local leadership and based on strong backing from local communities. While they pay primary attention to strengthening the foundation within the communities, a number of traditional/religious leaders pay more attention to building collaborative relations with external actors. Some targets for collaboration include diaspora groups overseas, religious networks, and civil society organisations outside of the areas (including the global North) involved in similar areas of work. In such collaborations, the external actors are largely limited to supportive roles such as communication channelling with the wider public within and outside the areas, fundraising, technical assistance with public media, and advice regarding administrative or legal issues.

Although the cases relevant to the *management of external reliance* continue their efforts to gain stronger ownership and mitigate excessive external influence, few of them have achieved and aim to achieve complete self-rule of their programmes. Moreover, while attempting to reduce their vulnerability to the demands from some particular supporters, at the same time they acknowledged the positive contributions from having external support and advice. Many research participants questioned if they could operate successful peacebuilding programmes without the monitoring, advisory inputs, and challenges from external actors (Interview No. X; Interview No. IV; Interview No. XXI). From a more practical perspective, they sometimes needed foreign actors' commitment to protect them from excessive intervention from local authorities (Lee 2017).

In this model, the roles of external actors can be directive as funding controllers or informal counselors, in addition to the roles stated above. Nevertheless, while still being proactive in engaging with external supporters, these local actors aimed at creating a bigger institutional space to express and reflect their desires and concerns in the ongoing peacebuilding programmes, by utilising the protective measures that they developed.

Apparently, the case studies of *ownership inheritance* and *friction avoiding approaches* demonstrate similar features. The official leadership roles are assumed by local actors and their decision making process in theory belongs to local organisations as well. However, due to their reliance on external funding and lack of external networks, the development of peacebuilding programmes tends to be strongly influenced by the demands from international actors. External actors may assume the roles of board members, external advisers and primary funding providers.

When examining the development procedures, nevertheless, the two have demonstrated significantly different directions. Ownership inheritance presents the structural feature during the transition from a part of external organisation to a more consolidated local ownership. The advisory roles of external actors are more frequently assumed according to local peacebuilders' requests. Nevertheless, many local peacebuilders adopting friction-avoiding approaches have accepted external actors' influence as a condition to maintain funding from them, they nevertheless find more tactical and subtle strategies to integrate their needs and ideas into the peacebuilding programmes without giving strong signs of resistance to their external counterparts.

In short, in the peacebuilding promotion in Mindanao and Cambodia, it is neither practically useful nor realistic to conceptualise advance local ownership either as a form of pure and authentic local peacebuilding or as capacity building for better implementing liberal peacebuilding. For research purposes, it may be a convenient framework for analysis to approach local ownership as the process of local actors' enhancement of exclusive control over their peacebuilding programmes based on the binary assumption of 'local vs. international.' However, such conventional ideas are likely to fail to capture the complexities in the process of developing local ownership. At least, few peacebuilding practitioners approach the development of their ownership as building exclusive power/model against external involvement. At the same time, the practice of many local actors has moved beyond their conventional roles of 'effectively implementing the agenda set by external donors.' Although many local peacebuilders are still at early stages of development and are frequently influenced by many practical challenges, they have developed and are still crafting various structural and procedural models in order to redefine the roles of external actors after the further development of local ownership.

Local Responses to International Norms

In relation to the ongoing academic discourse on norm diffusion and norm localisation, this section will discuss how local peacebuilders in Mindanao and Cambodia have responded to the norms and principles introduced by external supporters. During the process of ownership enhancement, local peacebuilders in Mindanao and Cambodia adopted and regenerated the values and principles to which they had been introduced by their international counterparts. While some amend/add relatively minor operational elements to reflect contextual issues keeping the previous values and principles at the core of the programmes, others attempt to integrate such Western values into the new *modus vivendi* based on the needs and perspectives of local actors. While relying on a linear scale to demonstrate varied degrees of local responses that have been developed in many previous studies (Risse et al. 1999; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006), the analysis in this section will address the limitation of over-simplification of such linear conceptualisation by acknowledging the complexities of norm internalisation and the changes in local actors' responses over time.

As introduced in Chapter 3, the question of 'how the actors in conflict-affected societies or developing countries react to the norms introduced by the so-called international community' has been subject to extensive academic discussions since the end of the cold war period, in International Relations, Development Studies, and more recently Peace and Conflict Studies. Earlier studies tend to focus on regulative and constitutive functions of international norms and consider the states in the global South and local actors as passive adopters of the introduced norms. The terms of norm socialization and diffusion were conceptualized to describe such process of transplanting international norms.

Nevertheless, increasing number of studies began to pay attention to the proactive roles of local actors/nation states in selecting the norms to be adopted and interpreting how the norms should be applied in their own contexts. The concepts like *norm contestation*, *localisation*, and *decoupling* became popular in such new debates (Acharya 2004; Adamson 2005; Bettiza and Dionigi 2014; Boesenecker and Vinjamuri 2011). To explain the reasons behind such contestation and decoupling, some studies pay attention to *local filters*, the structural, institutional or political constraints that affect the behavior of local actors in adopting international norms (Meyer et al. 1997; Risse 2002). In relation to local peacebuilding practice, the literature on cultural filters is particularly relevant. The key argument is that the adoption of certain norms is largely affected by whether the norm is compatible with domestic norms embedded in people's daily discourse, social institutions and bureaucratic agencies (Elbasani 2004).

Moreover, dynamics and consequences of such norm contestation have also been subject to extensive research. For instance, measuring different levels and conditions of local actors' norm engagement was studied in varied ways. Some studies demonstrate the degrees of norm adoption that exist between full adoption and flat refusal: interpretation, reshaping/modification, partial compliance, incomplete internalisation and embedding. Many of these studies pay particular attention to the discrepancies between the rhetoric acceptance of local actors and the norm application in practice (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Jetschke and Rüland 2009; Schmitz and Sikkink 2013; Noutcheva 2009; Goodman and Jinks 2008).

Taking this discourse further, many studies in Peace and Conflict Studies and Development Studies highlight the cultural friction and conflicts between the so called international community and local actors in

Table 7.1 Local peacebuilders' response to imported values/principles

1	Full acceptance
2	Adoption of core values/principles, with modification of operational elements
3	Adaptation of core values/principles to fit local contexts
4	Practical mingling of imported and local features
5	Locally-oriented values with selected acceptance of imported norms
6	Resistanceand rejection

conflict-affected/developing states, and examine the dynamics and consequences of local actors' active and subjective actions in adopting and internalising the imported norms (Buttel 2000; Koenig and Dierkes 2012; Cobb 2014). Two concepts of *norm localisation* and *hybrid peace* are frequently utilised. While the term 'localisation' is used to illuminate how local actors interpret, contend, and reconstruct norms (Bözel and Risse 2009; Cortell and Davis 2000; Reus-Smit 2001; Sandholtz 2008; van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007), 'hybridity' is adopted to describe various forms of the mixture of imported norms and local actor's perspectives (Richmond and Mitchell 2012; Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012; Peterson 2012; Shaw and Waldorf 2010; Sriram 2012; Bonacker et al. 2017). The varied attitudes of local actors toward imported norms are conceptualised as 'mimickers, selective localisers, vernacularizers, glocalisers, and in resistance' (Bonacker et al. 2017).

The examples introduced in this volume demonstrate how individual peacebuilding agencies at sub-state levels select, adopt, and transform the values and principles introduced from external actors. In examining the wide variations in local peacebuilders' responses, a typology of six different levels of norm adoption from full acceptance to full rejection is identified (see Table 7.1).

Full Acceptance

The cases where local peacebuilders simply accept imported values and principles as exactly as they are introduced, are less observable. Through the continuing process of interacting with international actors, local peacebuilders tend to revisit, internalize and modify the imported ideas to make them more relevant to their local programmes. One of the few examples identified in this project was the Cambodian staff of Banteay Prieb (a vocational training institute for people with disabilities, Chapter 3) who presented sincere attitudes toward the Catholic values introduced by

Jesuit priests, even though the staff were not necessarily Christian. They attempted to internalise and apply the concepts and values into the school operation.

Moreover, the way that many human rights advocate organisations understand the concept of democracy and human rights, was mostly in line with the conceptualisations within Western communities of academics and human rights activists. The key representatives of these organisations have developed these conceptual ideas through constant interaction with overseas human rights advocates, study experience in foreign countries, and efforts to protect the victims of state violence. Moreover, although this volume did not include them in the analysis, there are a large number of examples of local agencies fully adopting practical/operational features for promoting participatory decision making, transparent administration, and accountable project management, which were introduced by international actors.[1]

Adoption of Key Values/Principles, with Modification of Operational Elements

Apart from a few exceptions (such as the Cambodian monks' peace movements), this type of acceptance of norms with minor modification was found in almost every local peacebuilding programme studied in this project. Regardless of their overall attitudes towards international supporters or donor agencies, local peacebuilders usually have adopted some key values/concepts introduced by international actors, and they attempt to uphold the values. Their extensive local knowledge, in such cases, is utilised to design their programmes in such a way that the local population can comprehend and better accept such values. For instance, the peacebuilding agencies in Mindanao considered children's rights and women's rights as core parts of basic human rights, which the people in Mindanao should promote as a universal value. In implementing their belief, however, many local peacebuilders had to find forms to fit the widespread perception in the communities

[1]For instance, upon my question regarding any discrepancy between Cambodians and international donors in understanding human rights, the activist who requested anonymity, responded: "Is there still that debate? I think it is already gone. There are people who say that we can't bring the U.S. democracy in Cambodia and Cambodia should have its own model of democracy. Tell me, what is Cambodia democracy model?" (Interview No. XXXXI).

regarding gender roles and the ideas relevant to children. One organisation facilitated a series of 'women only' and 'youth only' meetings in order to hear their voices on social reconciliation and local governance. Other organisations unofficially modified the standard age range of children in order to operate their support for child soldiers in the Moro areas more effectively.

Adaptation of Core Values to Fit Local Contexts

Another type of local actors' reaction to imported norms frequently observed in the process of ownership building, is attempts to redefine and modify some aspects of the norms. While they agree with the importance of such values and concepts in principle, they consider some elements to be incompatible with the context within which they operate programmes. Such incompatibility can be about the values of the society (i.e., ideas of social hierarchy) or more practical issues (i.e., non-existence of the civil society defined in the European traditions). Hence, local agencies adjust the concepts to fit such local contexts. For instance, Chapter 3 introduced a local agency that has transformed their approaches toward the theme of 'working with communities' that have constantly been supported by international donors. Initially confused by different versions of ideas introduced by different external groups, it had shifted its operational approaches one after another according to changes in its goals and the development of its capacity. Some examples of 'contextualisation' in Chapter 5 are also relevant to this type of local reaction. For instance, the concept of transparency has been redefined as limited to meaning financial transparency mainly because the term has been proposed and utilised in Cambodia to denote only this aspect, especially in the context of the government's policies and NGO activities.

Practical Mingling of Imported and Local Features

There are local actors who maintain very practical attitudes toward norms, believing that they will do anything that may help people. Many interview participants state that the challenges they face do not allow them to have the luxury to think of long-term directions and value-based operations of their programmes. Hence, while they are eager to adopt and apply the concepts and principles demanded by international actors, the level of commitment and application is rather shallow.

When such concepts and principles contradict local contexts, they frequently choose the forms of mitigation that are best to continue the peacebuilding programmes. Although many of them were not introduced in Chapter 5, a few examples of 'reconceptualisation of programme identity' and 'disclosure of partial truth' are implemented based on such motivation. As long as they could get funding to continue their programmes, they were ready to adopt any brands to define the programmes. Conversely if they were going to harm the operation, they were ready to abandon or modify these concepts and principles. One such example is a local child-support agency that decided to use the funding designated to support one child for all of the community and the school to which the child belonged.

Locally-Oriented Values with Selected Acceptance of Imported Norms

Although the number was not highly significant, there were cases where local actors made the local norms or contexts central to their operation. The international norms and principles are selectively adopted when they fit such local norms or are reconceptualised to make them relevant. This type of local response is possible when local actors do not need to rely on external support, as seen in the cases of the religious/traditional leaders' peace movements. The traditional concepts of the civil society was rejected in many peacebuilding programmes mobilized by traditional/religious leaders in the Moro areas of Mindanao as it didn't reflect the social context in the area. In addition, the concept of democracy was significantly modified by Buddhist monks, according to the need to justify and legitimize their human rights advocacy programmes.

Resistance and Rejection

During the author's field studies in the mid-2010s, no example perfectly relevant to full rejection was identified. This is understandable because it is unrealistic for local peacebuilders to maintain their programmes completely insulated from the values, themes and principles that are widespread in their societies. Nevertheless, the author's previous studies confirm that this type of flat rejection occasionally appears in the early phase of peacebuilding, when local actors who had suffered from colonialism or foreign intervention during warfare, refuse to accept any involvement from foreign powers (Lee 2015).

Examining the empirical examples introduced in this volume, two main factors that determine the attitudes of local agencies toward imported values and principles are significant: the need for external reliance and the frequency and depth of local-international interaction. While the former decides the *need* to adopt imported norms, the latter determines the *attitudes* of local agencies toward the norms. When they need *and* want to adopt the norms, they normally demonstrate more active forms of adoption (Type 1 and Type 2). When they need to but do not want to adopt the norms, the forms of norm adoption tend to be more pragmatic and compromised (Type 3 and 4). Nevertheless, when they may not adopt the norms when they don't want to, they present more subjective attitudes (Type 5 and Type 6). In this sense, the examples of the latter types generally support the studies of Zimmerman (2016) and Reus-Smit (2001), which demonstrate that local actors selectively adopt the norms that have good utilities to advocate for their interests, utilise them in a way that achieves their practical goals, and reject in the case where they are no longer useful, frequently by branding such resistance as a local struggle. Through such process of subjective interpretation, international norms can be redesigned to be unrecognizable to people as imported norms (Reus-Smit 2001; Sandholtz 2008; van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007).

Concluding Discussion

As a final note, a few caveats on the research findings need to be reiterated. Firstly, the categories, typologies and distinctions presented in this volume are roughly conceptualised for the convenience of analysis. Strict application of these concepts and categories risks the over-generalisation of the complex reality, as highlighted in Zimmermann (2016). There are many case examples that cannot perfectly be categorised into one of the types. For instance, regarding the level of norm adoption stated above, there are many local actors who emphasise the importance of maintaining local identity (which is more relevant to Type 5) but present highly pragmatic attitudes in adopting and modifying international values and principles to fit the nature of their programmes (which is more frequently observed in Type 4). Moreover, one local agency may demonstrate various (often contradictory) forms of reaction toward imported norms. It is not unusual to see local peacebuilers who are against the

institutional arrangements for liberal democracy but highly value the principle of inclusive consensus as a principle of decisionmaking.

Secondly, adopting the ideas from rationalist explanation like Levitsky and Murillo (2005), the discussions in the previous chapters pay primary attention to the motivation and intention of local actors as a key determinant factor of their behaviour. Nevertheless, the forms and directions of the development of local ownership reflect many intervening factors such as institutional challenges, involvement of political actors, local actors' level of capacity and local actors' level of willingness. For instance, a study by Gellman (2010) on an NGO in Cambodia points out a few challenges that prevent local peacebuilding agencies from incorporating and internalizing imported norms (by using an example of democracy) even though they want to. These factors are related to the lack of individual peacebuilding practitioners' capacity (i.e., education level), institutional obstacles within and outside peacebuilding organisations (i.e., individual staff members' participation in the decision-making process, bureaucratic resistance to changes), the perceptual gap between junior practitioners and senior leaders within the civil society sector. To keep the coherence of the research project, I chose to highlight actor's intentions as the central focus and to elaborate the overall discussion centred on this aspect. Further data relevant to other determinant factors which lie behind the variations in how local actors at the grassroots levels adopt international norms, will be shared in future opportunities.

Third, it shouldn't be neglected that local peacebuilders' approaches and strategies may change over time. A number of conventional studies have clarified that the negotiation between the external and local over peacebuilding continues, which keeps reshaping the contour of many features of the programmes in different direction (Capie 2008; Harris-Short 2003; Liese 2009; Wiener 2009; Mac Ginty 2011; Lee and Park 2018). For instance, the behaviour of local agencies in Cambodia working on democratic governance significantly transformed their performance over the past 2.5 decades. During the 1990s, their application of the international norms relevant to democracy was mainly concerned with their outreach programmes for training and advocacy. Their international structure tended to be hierarchical and the internal decision making process was centred on a few leaders. The internal consultation process was superficial and their efforts to be connected to local constituents was rather limited (Hughes 2003). Nevertheless, a few of these organisations have changed such internal practices and structures

radically over the past 10–15 years by emphasising professionalism, and now have structural and operational features very similar to the civil society organisations in the global North. Moreover, during the development of the practice, a significant number of peacebuilders realised the importance of working with local communities through their activities, and thus expanding their network in the local communities and developing closer connections to the perceptual and cultural features in the local areas.

Importantly in this regard, this work has no ambitions to assert that local ownership in peacebuilding is advancing nor to propose concrete models of locally-oriented peacebuilding. The findings in this study are valid in the particular local contexts in Mindanao and Cambodia as of the mid-2010s. Having said this, this research has identified a number examples of local peacebuilding agencies that are developing various pathways to incorporate their ideas and concerns into peacebuilding practice, only some of which could be substantially elaborated in this monograph. In addition to the theoretical and conceptual implications, I argue, these examples effectively challenge two types of reservation prevalent in some communities of practitioners and academics, in relation to the possibility of advancing local ownership.

On one hand, field practitioners including local peacebuilders themselves tend to underestimate the capacities of local actors. In the interviews, they frequently highlight serious challenges that they face and their lack of capability in handling these obstacles. Under such circumstances, they say, the promotion of advanced local ownership seems an illusive future goal for many local peacebuilders. On the other hand, researchers tend to undervalue the innovation made by many NGO-type peacebuilding agencies. Some studies consider local as the cultural and social contexts in the pre-war period or pre-colonial societies. From this perspective, anything but indigenous or traditional should be judged as unauthentic.

In response to such views, this project revisited and highlighted the significance of the continued battles faced by local actors in coming up with a better practice of peacebuilding under various challenges. It may be true that many local peacebuilders in conflict-affected countries struggle with various challenges and a lack of capacity. Nevertheless, it is not a reason to undervalue the local practice. Instead, the examples demonstrate that the promotion of local ownership is a continuing process in which key actors seek their own solutions to various obstacles. To be fair,

the civil society actors in the global North who may be considered to solidly own their models also face many challenges and suffer from a lack of capacity. In a sense, to gain ownership is about having opportunities to go through and overcome challenges by developing and utilising their ideas and inner resources.

Talking about authencity, it is important to trace the origins of the cultural and social identity and revitalise the traditions and culture that local people value. However, such efforts should not neglect that local identity is constantly changing. In many post-conflict societies, an absolute majority of the peacebuilding sector has been developed and consolidated by modern forms of NGOs for decades. Many peacebuilding programmes led by traditional/religious leaders are evolving further by actively engaging in international organisations. Through the concepts and typologies discussed above, this study demonstrates the strategies and practices being developed in field practice at the moment, and presents how models of local ownership are evolving in some local communities in Asia.

References

Acharya, Amitav. 2004. How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. *International Organization* 58 (2): 239–275.

Adamson, Fiona. 2005. Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics. *International Studies Review* 7: 547–569.

Bettiza, Gregorio, and Filippo Dionigi. 2014. Beyond Constructivism's Liberal Bias: Islamic Norm Entrepreneurs in a Post-secular World Society. EUI Working Paper 10. European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana.

Boesenecker, Aaron, and Leslie Vinjamuri. 2011. Lost in Translation? Civil Society, Faith-Based Organizations and the Negotiation of International Norms. *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 5: 345–365.

Bonacker, Thorsten, Judith von Heusinger, and Kerstin Zimmer (eds.). 2017. *Localization in Development Aid: How Global Institutions Enter Local Lifeworlds.* London and New York: Routeldge.

Bözel, Tanja, and Thomas Risse. 2009. The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas. KFG Working Paper 1.

Buttel, Frederick. 2000. World Society, the Nation State, and Environmental Protection. *American Sociological Review* 65 (1): 117–121.

Capie, David. 2008. Localization as Resistance: The Contested Diffusion and Small Arms Norms in Southeast Asia. *Security Dialogue* 39 (6): 637–658.

Cheesman, Nick, Monique Skidmore, and Trevor Wilson. 2012. *Myanmar's Transition: Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Chopra, Jarat, and Tanja Hohe. 2004. Participatory Peacebuilding. In *Building Sustainable Peace*, ed. Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight, 241–262. Edmonton and Tokyo: University of Alberta Press/United Nations University.

Cobb, Neil. 2014. Rethinking the 'World Polity' Perspective on Global Sodomy Law Reform. In *Handbook of LGBT Communities, Crime, and Justice*, ed. D. Peters and V.R. Panfil, 283–310. New York: Springer.

Cortell, Andrew, and James Davis. 2000. Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda. *International Studies Review* 2 (1): 65–87.

Dibley, Thushara. 2014. *Partnership, Power and Peacebuilding: NGOs as Agents of Peace in Aceh and Timor-Leste*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Edomwonyi, O. 2003. Rwanda: The Importance of Local Ownership of the Post-conflict Reconstruction. Available at http://www.eldis.org/go/home&id=17223&type=Document. Accessed on 2 Feb 2016.

Elbasani, Arolda. 2004. Albania in Transition: Manipulation or Appropriation of International Norms? *Southeast European Politics* 5: 24–44.

Futamura, Madoka, and Mark Notaras. 2011. *Local Perspectives on International Peacebuilding*. Research Article Series. Tokyo: United Nations University. Available at http://unu.edu/publications/articles/local-perspectives-on-international-peacebuilding.html#info. Accessed on 3 May 2016.

Gellman, M. 2010. World Views in Peace Building: A Post-conflict Reconstruction Challenge in Cambodia. *Development in Practice* 20 (1): 85–98.

Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. 2008. Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law. *European Journal of International Law* 19: 725–748.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises. *American Journal of Sociology* 110: 1373–1411.

Harris-Short, Sonia. 2003. International Human Rights Law: Imperialist Inept and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. *Human Rights Quarterly* 25 (1): 130–181.

Heathershaw, John, and Daniel Lambach. 2008. Introduction: Post-conflict Spaces and Approaches to Statebuilding. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2 (3): 269–289.

Hughes, Caroline. 2003. *The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991–2001*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon.

Hughes, Caroline, and Vanessa Pupavac. 2005. Framing Post-conflict Societies: International Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States. *Third World Quarterly* 26 (6): 873–889.

Jetschke, Anja, and Jürgen Rüland. 2009. Decoupling Rhetoric and Practice: The Cultural Limits of Asean Cooperation. *The Pacific Review* 22: 179–203.

Koenig, Mathias, and Julian Dierkes. 2012. Conflict in the World Polity: Neo-institutional Perspectives. *Acta Sociologica* 54 (1): 5–25.

Lee, Jeong-Hye. 2017. The Life and Learning in Banteay Prieb in Cambodia: Focusing on People-Centered Development in Technical Vocational Education and Training. Master's dissertation, Seoul National University, Seoul.

Lee, SungYong. 2015. Motivations for Local Resistance in International Peacebuilding. *Third World Quarterly* 36 (8): 1437–1452.

Lee, SungYong, and Alpaslan Özerdem (eds.). 2015. *Local Ownership in International Peacebuilding: Key Theoretical and Practical Issues*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lee, SungYong, and WookBeom Park. 2018. The Dual Track of Democracy Promotion in Post-war Peacebuilding in Cambodia: The Gap Between Institutional Development and Civil Society Mobilisation. *Peacebuilding*. Advanced Publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2018.1498671.

Levitsky, Steven, and María Victoria Murillo. 2005. Theorizing About Weak Institutions: Lessons from the Argentine Case. In *Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness*, ed. Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo. University Park: Penn State University Press.

Lidén, Kristoffer. 2009. Building Peace Between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding. *International Peacekeeping* 16 (5): 616–634.

Liese, Andrea. 2009. Exceptional Necessity: How Liberal Democracies Contest the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment When Countering Terrorism. *Journal of International Law and International Relations* 5 (17): 17–47.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mac Ginty, Roger, and Gurchathen Sanghera. 2012. Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Development: An Introduction. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7 (2): 3–8.

Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. World Society and the Nation-State. *American Journal of Sociology* 103: 144–181.

Noutcheva, Gergana. 2009. Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU's Normative Power in the Western Balkans. *Journal of European Public Policy* 16: 1065–1084.

Olawale, Ismail. 2008. Enabling Local Ownership: Participation and Capacity-Building in SSR. In *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, ed. Timothy Donais, 127–148. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Münster: LIT Verlag.

Orr, Robert. 2004. *An American Strategy for Post Conflict Resolution*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Peterson, Jenny H. 2012. A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of Power, Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7: 9–22.

Porter, Elisabeth, and Dale Bagshaw. 2009. *Mediation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Transforming Conflicts and Building Peace*. London and New York: Routledge.

Reich, Hannah. 2006. "Local Ownership" in Conflict Transformation Projects: Partnership, Participation or Patronage? Berghof Occasional Paper No. 27, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin.

Reus-Smit, Christian. 2001. Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty. *Review of International Studies* 27 (4): 519–538.

Richmond, Oliver. 2009. The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture, and Peace-Building. *The International Spectator* 44 (1): 149–169.

Richmond, Oliver, and Audra Mitchell. 2012. *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-liberalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Risse, Thomas. 2002. Transnational Actors and World Politics. In *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Risse, Thomas, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sandholtz, Wayne. 2008. Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules Against Wartime Plunder. *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (1): 101–131.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel. 2006. *International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schmitz, Hans, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2013. International Human Rights. In *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons. London: Sage.

Shaw, Rosalind, and Lars Waldorf (eds.). 2010. *Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Smillie, Ian. 2001. *Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Sriram, Chandra Lekha. 2012. Post-conflict Justice and Hybridity in Peacebuilding: Resistance or Cooptation? In *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-liberalism*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stobbe, Stephanie Phetsamay. 2015. *Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Laos: Perspective for Today's World*. Abingdon: Routledge.

van Kersbergen, Kees, and Bertjan Verbeek. 2007. The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union. *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (2): 217–238.

Wiener, Antje. 2009. Enacting Meaning-In-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations. *Review of International Studies* 35 (1): 175–193.

Zimmermann, Lisbeth. 2016. Same Same or Different? Norm Diffusion Between Resistance, Compliance, and Localization in Post-conflict State. *International Studies Perspectives* 17 (1): 98–115.

Appendix: List of Cited Interviews

Interview No. I—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. II—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. III—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. IV—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Svay Rieng, November 2016.
Interview No. V—Non-local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Skype Interview, June 2017.
Interview No. VI—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Manila, November 2016.
Interview No. VII—Non-local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Skype Interview, June 2017.
Interview No. VIII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. IX—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. X—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XI—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1

Interview No. XII—Non-local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. XIII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XIV—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XV—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XVI—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XVII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. XVIII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XIX—Researcher (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. XX—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2014.
Interview No. XXI—Researcher (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XXII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. XXIII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. XXIV—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Manila, November 2016.
Interview No. XXV—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XXVI—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XXVII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.
Interview No. XXVIII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XXIX—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.
Interview No. XXX—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Battambang, November 2016.

Interview No. XXXI—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2014.

Interview No. XXXII—Non-local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.

Interview No. XXXIII—Researcher (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.

Interview No. XXXIV—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2014.

Interview No. XXXV—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2014.

Interview No. XXXVI—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Skype Interview, June 2017.

Interview No. XXXVII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2014.

Interview No. XXXVIII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2014.

Interview No. XXXIX—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2014.

Interview No. XXXX—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.

Interview No. XXXXI—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2014.

Interview No. XXXXII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Manila, November 2016.

Interview No. XXXXIII—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.

Interview No. XXXXIV—Researcher (Mindanao), Davao, November 2016.

Interview No. XXXXV—Local Peacebuilding Practitioner (Cambodia), Phnom Penh, November 2016.

Index

S. Lee, *Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98611-1