Pacifism's Appeal

Ethos, History, Politics

Edited by
Jorg Kustermans
Tom Sauer
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Barbara Segaert

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Introduction: Why Pacifism?

*Jorg Kustermans, Tom Sauer, Dominiek Lootens
and Barbara Segaert*

1.1   WHY WRITE ABOUT PACIFISM?

It strikes us as undeniable that the notion of pacifism—the ideas and attitudes that the notion encapsulates—appeals to people's moral intuitions. Although many of us enjoy the vicarious experience of (stylized) violence (when we watch a film or read a novel), most of us feel much less comfortable with the actual exercise or firsthand witnessing of real,

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in-the-flesh acts of violence. When we do end up committing an act of undeniable violence, many of us will feel guilty. When we are forced to commit an act of violence against our will, many of us will try to evade the command or follow up on it half-heartedly. As was documented in multiple wars of the nineteenth and twentieth century, soldiers, especially the conscripted ones, would often deliberately miss their targets. They would not fire at the enemy, but shoot their bullets in the air (Grossman 2009, pp. 12–13). Human beings are certainly capable of aggression, and there are situations where we might expect human beings to act and react violently, but most human beings do not seem to be fond of violence. It causes them distress to watch it live and they feel remorse when they have engaged in it.[1] Or more precisely: *when they know themselves to have engaged in violence*. It follows that at least the core idea of pacifism—that violence ought to be shunned—will appeal to many a (modern) person.

Pacifism, one could say, chimes with a basic human instinct to shy away from violence. There is a good reason, then, to assume that many people would call themselves pacifists, but this turns out not to be the case, neither among laypeople nor among intellectual elites. Committed pacifism remains a minority position. 'Within international relations in recent decades,' notes a recent paper in the same vein, 'pacifism has been a marginalised position, most often figuring as a foil to just war theory in debates over the ethics of war' (Hutchings 2018, p. 176; Jackson 2018). This invites a number of questions. Why is it that pacifism fails to persuade a general audience (in spite of its intuitive appeal)? Why is it that just-war-thinking has managed to become the dominant framework to think about questions of war and peace, and that, as a consequence, so many of us are busy contemplating and elaborating justifications for violence (notwithstanding our seemingly inherent dislike of it)? How ought the pacifists' appeal be expressed for it not to be experienced—as we think it often is—as a siren song, and thus not to be warned against for its dangerous allure?

We are posing these questions at a time when pacifism seems to be staging a comeback. Recent years have witnessed the publication of a number of texts that take up the 'defence of pacifism' and do so articulately (e.g., Howes 2016; Hutchings 2018). This very volume could easily be read as a part of that movement of pacifistic resurgence. Many of our contributors write from a pacifist (or 'pacificist') position and express an awareness that pacifism cries for an update. A shifting geopolitical and geocultural context certainly motivates them to rethink the

pacifistic project and to reinvigorate the pacifistic tradition. But it is also (their reading of) that same shifting context that strengthens their conviction that pacifism ought to have wider resonance. They argue that the theory of just war had its chance, but all it did was to strengthen the military-industrial-entertainment complex. The concept of a just war sounds virtuous—it suggests 'wisdom' and 'courage'—but it serves to sustain a vicious international order. Such is many of our contributor's appraisal of the current situation, which leads them again to make the plea for the appeal of pacifism. Whether this appeal will resonate, and to what extent it will do so, remains an open question. In the conclusion to this volume, in an attempt to respond to these questions, we ascertain the promise of pacifism's renewed appeal.

1.2   What to Write About Pacifism?

But first we let our authors speak. As its subtitle suggests, this volume consists of three parts. The first part articulates a contemporary '**ethos of pacifism**' and develops a coherent proposition as to what pacifism could—and maybe should—mean today. Cheyney Ryan defends the continuing viability of a pacifist stance in response to the continuing existence and operation of (what he dubs) the war system. Amanda Cawston radicalizes Ryan's reflections: it is not just warfare that ought to concern us, but violence more generally, and much as with contemporary warfare, we have become alienated from today's violence. In order to reinvigorate pacifism, she suggests, we need to 're-appropriate violence'. The appeal of pacifism will be undeniable once we recognize our implication in modern society's manifold structures and processes of violence.

Ryan's and Cawston's chapters are steeped in the history of pacifism. Their contemporary articulation of the pacifist position clearly draws sustenance from earlier forms of pacifism, as well as from debates in and about those earlier forms. Their historical resources are mainly Euro-American in origin. However, if pacifism wants to achieve wider appeal, if it truly wants to weigh in on international debates in our post-Western world, then it should 'de-provincialize' its repertoire of intellectual resources. Such is the intuition that animates the second part of the volume, which begins the reconstruction of a '**global intellectual history of pacifism**'. To de-provincialize need not mean to ignore the province of Europe, especially not in our particular case, given that the very concept of 'pacifism' is undeniably of European

stock. Martin Ceadel documents the Western European history of pacifism, paying specific attention to the internal debates within the British pacifist camp. Iain Atack then begins the move east. He describes the pacifism of Lev Tolstoy and emphasizes its radical nature by comparing it to the peace-thinking of Immanuel Kant. Meena Sharify Funk continues the move east and turns southward as well. She excavates pacifistic strands from within the (polysemous) traditions of Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. Mark Gelber closes of the second part with a similar exploration of the presence (and position) of pacifistic ideas in Jewish and Zionist thought. Pacifism is clearly not a prerogative solely of Western civilization: there have been pacifists in all great civilizations. Even if pacifism is definitive of none of the world traditions, it is nonetheless a presence within all of them.

It is very clear from Cheyney Ryan's opening chapter that pacifism need not entail a withdrawal from the world—although pacifist expectations are maybe bound to be disappointed and, as a result, the allure of a retreat from the world sometimes great. Pacifists oftentimes engage the world politically. They want to make peace (*pacem facere*). They are peacebuilders. Traditionally, this has often meant that pacifists have sketched out plans to redesign the institutional architecture of world politics. Today's pacifism will have to engage in that task as well, although it cannot simply copy old models. Some have proven inadequate, and, more generally, it can simply not be assumed that that which worked in the past will work in the present or the future too. Changed circumstances demand revisions to any plan for perpetual peace. In this light, the third part of this volume investigates the prospects of a '**pacifistic global order**'. It begins with a chapter by Heikki Patomäki, with a sketch of what he calls a 'concrete utopia'. In the spirit of Karl Deutsch (1968), he imagines the establishment of a global security community committed to processes of peaceful change. The utopia is a concrete one. Patomäki spells out its cultural and institutional prerequisites. A global security community, he insists, must build on democratic institutions with self-transformative capacity and these institutions must in turn be grounded in a commitment to dialogical hermeneutics. However, Bart Dessein's chapter on China's world-political discourse—in which metaphors of peacefulness abound—makes it clear that the establishment of a global security community will not come easily. China is on the rise and it speaks the language of peace (even when it often acts otherwise). It is committed to an orderly international environment, but its conception

of a peaceful international order is uncomfortable with Patomäki's conception of a pacifistic international order. Other than the rise of China (and other emerging powers), the resurgence of religion is also often portrayed as an obstacle to (oftentimes) secular plans for perpetual peace. Nathan Funk takes up this matter. He accepts that religion can be a source of conflict, but nonetheless defends the moral agency of religious communities in its capacity for cooperative governance, beyond state-centric thinking. He promotes just peacemaking as an organizing framework and interfaith dialogue as its cornerstone. Religions can promote peace, he argues, if they shake off their pretensions to unqualified truth and allow themselves to show 'holy envy'; if, that is, they accept the need for self-transformation.

In a concluding chapter, the editors of this volume will reflect '**on the appeal of pacifism**'. Precisely what is its appeal? How has its appeal evolved over time? How far does its appeal reach? And in light of these questions (and our answers to them): what can pacifism accomplish? What are its limits?

1.3   How to Write About Pacifism?

The study of pacifism, as a body of thought aspiring to influence political praxis, can happen either from a position of involvement or a position of detachment. In the former case, one sets out to evaluate the intellectual *and* political merits of pacifism and, at the conclusion of one's efforts, one invariably comes out against pacifism or in favour of it. One either defends the value of pacifism or one puts its merit into doubt. Such an exercise will never happen in an intellectual vacuum. The merit of pacifism (or any other body of political thought) is typically a relative merit. One does not simply defend pacifism; rather, one defends it against attacks. One reconstructs it in light of earlier (politically motivated) misrepresentations. One does not promote pacifism in the abstract; one champions it in light of the deficiencies of rival doctrines (such as just-war-thinking) and in light of one's reading of the changing circumstances (such as the consolidation of the military-industrial-entertainment complex). The same argument applies to those assessments that conclude that pacifism is a dubious set of ideas. But whether one defends or attacks pacifism, in both cases one studies it from a position of involvement. One wants to see it succeed or see it fail. One wants to add to or subtract from its political power. As mentioned before, most

of our contributors write from such a position of involvement. What is more, they want to see pacifism succeed. They want to add to its political power. They come out in defence of pacifism.

As editors of this volume, and as organizers of the workshop that constituted its conception, we do not share our contributors' involvement with pacifism. We are writing from a position of detachment. By this we do not mean that we are keeping the question of pacifism's ultimate merit in balance. Although we do not necessarily agree among each other about the value of pacifism, each of us certainly has an idea of where we stand individually. However, when we choose to write from a position of detachment, we choose to approach the question of pacifism with a different concern in mind. Rather than assess the (relative) merit of pacifism, we want to understand pacifism as a social phenomenon, as a historically situated and historically evolving way of thinking, feeling, and acting. We wish to contextualize its emergence, its transformation, and thus also the vagaries, the ebb and flow, of its appeal. Rather than defend pacifism, we will attempt to give an interpretive account of it.

Obviously, the two approaches to the study of pacifism—involvement and detachment—do not exclude each other and neither are they unrelated. The defence of pacifism that our authors stage forms the most important resource for our understanding of pacifism and thus also for our account of its appeal. And, in reverse, our account of pacifism's appeal can eventually feed back into the arguments that our contributors make—for better or worse. It will become very clear in the chapters that follow that the pacifism of today is not the same as the pacifism of yesterday and neither will the pacifism of tomorrow necessarily be the same as the pacifism of today. Whether its appeal will sound stronger tomorrow than it does today remains to be seen.

1.4   A Word of Thanks

This volume consists of papers presented at a workshop organized in Antwerp on the 6th, 7th and 8th of December 2017. All chapters were substantially revised after the workshop and many of them bear clear traces of the discussions that we had during our three-day gathering. For a variety of reasons, not all of the papers presented then could be included in this volume. We would nonetheless like to thank all of those who participated in the workshop for having contributed to the lively debates that marked the event. The workshop was organized and

sponsored by the University Centre Saint Ignatius Antwerp (UCSIA) as a first in a series of three workshops on War & Peace. We would like to thank UCSIA's board for sharing our belief that questions of war and peace are in need of continuous consideration and that a purely scholarly workshop remains an apt setting within which to pursue such questions.

NOTE

1. But cf. Schinkel (2004), who points out that at least some people revel in the exercise of violence. They commit violence for its own sake. Schinkel develops the concept of autotelic violence to come to terms with this phenomenon. Our point of departure is that incidents of autotelic violence form an exception to the general rule that people do not enjoy the direct experience of real violence.

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Contemporary Ethos of Pacifism

War, Hostilities, Terrorism: A Pacifist Perspective

Cheyney Ryan

Discussions of terrorism since the events of 9/11 have been part of a larger discussion about the changing nature of war, a central concern of which has been what is meant by 'war'. The immediate occasion was Sir Michael Howard's questioning the notion of a 'War on Terror'—not just practically but conceptually. Did the open ended, ambiguous enterprise, thus envisioned, constitute a 'war' in any true sense? (Howard 2002; Mégret 2002).

Replies to Sir Michael have insisted that yes, they are wars—but not of the traditional type:

The case against calling the War on Terror a 'war', writes one authority, rests on the mistaken assumption that wars must have a beginning, a middle, and an end, that their aims must be clearly stated, or stated at all, that they must be fought by recognizable combatants, and must lead to one side or another winning. But today we are dealing with what another authority calls 'non-linear war', to which none of these notions apply; indeed, the whole distinction between war and peace is blurred (Gerasimov 2014). Other names proposed are 'hybrid wars', 'postmodern

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wars', and 'wars of the third kind' (Duffield 2001; Gray 2007; Hoffman 2007; Kaldor 1999; Munkler 2005; Smith 2005). If we just scuttle archaic notions, if we conceive of war instead as something with no defined beginning or end, no particular aims, no clear adversaries, and no decisive outcome—then enterprises like the 'War on Terror' fit right in.

And there are historical precedents, it is claimed. One authority finds them in ancient times, likening them—without irony, as it did not end well—to the 'the kind of long struggle with exterior barbarians that characterized the wars of the later Roman Empire' (Brown 2004). Others find parallels in more recent experiences of colonialism. Philip Bobbitt concludes *The Shield of Achilles* by likening America's predicament today to that of 'Indian Summer', but with the term's original, menacing implications. 'The early American settlers were often forced to take shelter in stockades to protect themselves from attacks by tribes of Native Americans.' They knew such tribes would retire once winter came, but a break in the approaching winter—a so-called 'Indian Summer'—could leave them vulnerable to attack. Likewise the attacks of 9/11, Bobbitt writes, occurring on a 'warm, summerlike day' on America's East Coast (where colonists once resided), were both 'the herald of further savagery and the call for defenses', for a war that will have 'no final victory', just the ongoing project of '*avoiding defeat*'.[1]

If some think they've encountered this picture of war before, they have. 'War has changed its character', we have read before. The fighting 'takes place on vague frontiers whose whereabouts the average man can only guess at'. In the past war was something that 'sooner or later came to an end, usually in unmistakable victory or defeat', but now it is 'literally continuous' to the point that the whole distinction between war and peace 'has ceased to exist'. 'Strictly speaking, it has not always been the same war', though 'to trace out who was fighting whom at any given moment would be literally impossible'. In contrast to the mass wars of the past, war now involves 'very small numbers of people, mostly highly trained specialists, and causes comparatively few casualties'. But this does not mean that attitudes are 'less bloodthirsty or more chivalrous'. On the contrary, 'war hysteria is continuous and universal'. Hence, the enemy, whoever they are at the time, 'always represent absolute evil, and it follows that any past or future agreement with them is impossible'.

The author is George Orwell and the book is *1984*. Orwell had launched a spirited defense of Allied bombing against the objections of pacifist Vera Brittain. But he nevertheless had grim forebodings of where

that type of war could go, and his picture of war has disturbing similarities to features endorsed today. War in modernity has always made a fetish of newness, most notably in its fascination with new technologies. The 'Revolution in Military Affairs' is a recent example of the constant claims we encounter that the latest technologies will 'change everything'; another is the current preoccupation with drones. But here the claims pertain to the social *practice* of war. And I reference Orwell to raise the question that should naturally occur to the pacifist: Are the conflicts of today truly a qualitative break with the past or are they just the *reductio ad absurdum* of the same old thing?

What should pacifism's perspective on all this be?

Pacifism has meant different things.[2] In my own case, my understanding of pacifism is deeply influenced by American thinkers who are the main ones referenced here. In Sect. 2.1 I say some things about the view of pacifism that I've developed in other writings (Ryan 2015, 2016, 2017a, b).[3] Of special importance is the distinction between personal pacifism and political pacifism, as this chapter adopts the latter perspective. I turn in Sect. 2.2 to political pacifism's understanding of and critique of the 'war system'. The question, then, is how the current changes in war, real and imagined, fit within this analysis. Section 2.3 addresses terrorism as an aspect of the war system. I conclude in Sect. 2.4 with some remarks on current prospects, and the challenges of opposing war.

2.1   Pacifism(s)—Some Distinctions

Pacifism seems to invite endless debate over what it means to be a pacifist. We've seen this elsewhere. There used to be endless debates over, say, what it meant to be a Marxist, or what it meant to be a feminist. I'm skeptical of how far such debates take us, but in an essay of this sort, concerned with 'the pacifist view X', it's necessary to begin with some words on its meaning.

2.1.1   Personal and Political

As I see it, there are two main strands of western pacifism.

One is *personal* pacifism. It opposes killing as a personal act, hence it opposes any social practice involving that act—like war, but also practices like capital punishment. This pacifism arose with the first Christians, it assumed a shadowy existence after Augustine and Christian just war theory,

then reemerged with the Protestant Reformation in the so-called left wing of that movement with groups like Mennonites and later the Quakers. It almost always has a religious colouring. In the United States, recent figures have included Dorothy Day and theologian John Howard Yoder.[4]

The other type is *political* pacifism. It focuses on social institutions, and opposes war as a social practice much as many oppose capital punishment as a social practice. Its objection is not to killing per se but to the *kind* of killing that war involves, much as critics of capital punishment do not oppose killing per se but to the kind of killing it involves. Key twentieth century American figures were Randolph Bourne and the late Jonathan Schell. The difference is illustrated in their approach to self-defense. Personal pacifists typically reject killing even in self-defense, while the political pacifist's opposition to war as a social system does not imply questioning killing in self-defense any more than opposition to the death penalty means questioning killing in self-defense; rather, this position insists that war and self-defense have nothing to do with each other. Personal pacifism approaches things from the bottom up (individual actions), political pacifism approaches things from the top down (social institutions).

I stress the question of killing here, but it's a mistake to construe killing as pacifism's only concern, as both types of pacifism have been equally concerned with *power*. The sinfulness Christian pacifists see in the taking of human life is in claiming a kind of power that should be the sole province of God. The objection of the first Christians to the Roman Empire was as much an objection to its self-idolatry in claiming divine power, blurring the distinction between the sacred and the profane. Early modern Christian pacifists, responding to the rising market order, equated this with treating human life as a commodity instead of a gift, as something that could be 'taken' like any other piece of property. Personal pacifists are wary of power per se; at most, they prefer an apolitical quiet power. Political pacifists stress the *corruption* of political power implicit in employing killing for political ends (much as death penalty opponents stress the corruption of power implicit in employing killing for legal ends). Their objection to empire is its exemplifying how predatory political power results from its centralization/concentration. Hence its affinities with the anarchist tradition. Both the personal pacifist's concern with idolatry and the political pacifist's concern with corruption regard the upshot as a loss of any sense of personal responsibility in matters of war.

I've found that people often equate what I call the personal pacifist with the 'true' pacifist, 'real' pacifist, or 'absolute' pacifist. This is nonsense. In the United States, the term pacifist was coined in part to *distinguish* political pacifism from the personal sort, which was then termed 'non-resistance'. So neither can claim priority over the other and both are 'absolute' in their own way. I've put this in terms of contrasts but they are not mutually exclusive. One way to understand the significance of Martin Luther King Jr., the leading pacifist in American history, is that he combined both orientations.[5]

2.1.2   *Appraising and Opposing*

A second distinction cuts across these types of pacifism and pertains to other positions like pacifism. It is the distinction between pacifism as a theoretical position, or what I shall term a way of *appraising* war, and pacifism as a practical position, or what I shall term a way of *opposing* war.

To explain, consider the parallels with another radical position.

In nineteenth century America, 'abolitionism' denoted two things. An abolitionist was someone whose views of slavery were ones of unconditional *condemnation*. And an abolitionist was someone whose actions toward slavery were ones of absolute *opposition*. One without the other was not enough. There were people whose attitudes to slavery were ones of unconditional condemnation, but their reasons were ones that implied that nothing could be done about it; hence, they were not considered Abolitionists.

What needs to be stressed, though, is that within this framework there was room for a great deal of disagreement. Theoretically, Abolitionists disagreed about *why* slavery should be unconditionally condemned. As with pacifism, some did so for religious reasons, others for secular ones. And practically, they disagreed about *how* slavery should be absolutely opposed. Some saw it is a purely personal matter: opposition meant not engaging in slavery oneself (leading to arguments about what constituted 'engaging in slavery'). Others saw it as a more political matter, and here the disagreements were even greater. Some felt that absolute opposition meant working through existing political channels, for others it meant activities of education/moral uplift, for others it meant acts of terrorist violence. Abolitionists often agreed more with non-abolitionists on what to do, while still agreeing with each other in their unconditional condemnation of slavery.

The same schema—and its room for disagreements—can be applied to pacifism.

Theoretically, a pacifist is someone who unconditionally condemns war. 'Unconditional' means that the pacifist does not distinguish between good and bad wars, or allow for the occasional exception to the badness of war, any more than the Abolitionist distinguishes good or bad slavery, or allows for the occasional exception. Practically, as I understand it, a pacifist is someone who absolutely opposes war, where 'absolute' means a wholehearted commitment to its abolition. The difference here is evident in the different accusations they invite. The pacifists' unconditional condemnation elicits the charge of *dogmatism*, while their absolute opposition elicits the charge of *fanaticism*. The same charges were leveled against the Abolitionists and are probably leveled against any radical movement. Again, I think both are necessary. It's possible that one's reasons for condemning war are ones that imply absolutely nothing can be done about it; if so, one might just as well work in the arms industry if it pays better, or vote for a warmonger if they're better on other issues. This position, it seems to me, would not be pacifism.

But I note some of the disagreements that have occurred within this.

One concerns the theoretical appraisal of war. Pacifists have agreed on their unconditional condemnation of war while disagreeing about what *counts* as 'war'. The same was true of abolitionists: they unconditionally condemned slavery but disagreed about what constituted slavery, most importantly whether prisons were a form of slavery. So too, pacifists have disagreed about what constitutes war. For example, they have disagreed whether acts of collective self-defense count as war; that seems strange to us, accustomed as we are to think that acts of self-defense are paradigmatic just wars, but the two were often distinguished (the United States Constitution distinguishes them in its account of the 'war power'). Another was whether the action/arrangements of collective security count as war. The thinking here is that many pacifists do not oppose a domestic police force, so why should they oppose a global version of the same? Both issues warrant more attention to *why* the pacifist condemns war, hence whether that condemnation extends to these other matters (Yoder 2009, pp. 215ff.).

Practically, pacifists have disagreed as much as Abolitionists on the meaning of absolute opposition, and along very much the same lines. In both cases, I think it's hardly surprising there would be such disagreement given the entrenched, all-encompassing character of what is being

opposed. You find the same problem in how to oppose the systematic degradation of the environment today. I'd also note that people who *support* war can also disagree on what it means to do so. When I was a young man, it was just assumed that supporting a war meant serving in it yourself, if need be, and paying whatever taxes were needed. A 'pacifist', then, was someone who refused to do these things.[6] Today, in the United States at least, people see absolutely no connection between supporting a war and serving in it themselves or helping pay for it. So, the distinction between war-supporters and war-opposers has blurred insofar as *neither* believes they should do the fighting themselves.

2.2   Political Pacifism and the War System

I turn to political pacifism, insofar as it provides the framework for approaching the changes of war in our time.

2.2.1   War Making and War Building

Political pacifism in the United States emerged in response to the Napoleonic Wars, and as a continuation of civic republican strains in the county's founding ideology that championed its special status as a 'peace nation'. A major voice was Charles Sumner, who popularized the term 'war system'. I follow others like Andrew Alexandra and Jonathan Schell in articulating this notion by referencing Clausewitz, a contemporary of the first political pacifists who also wrestled with the problem of modern warfare, especially its penchant to escape all human control (Alexandra 2003; Schell 2004; on Clausewitz, see also Keegan 1994, chapter one) (Clausewitz speaks of mass warfare in chapter twenty six of *On War*, 'Arming the Nation', as 'bursting through its old formal limits', and suggests this 'modern intensification of the military element' raises 'the question of war itself'[7]).

The notion of a 'war system' holds that war has two dimensions: it involves both war *making* and war *building*. Analyzing war means analyzing both and their relation to each other.

War making, at its heart, is the collective enterprise of killing and dying. It is natural to equate this with battle, 'the sharp end of war' as it were, and in so doing see war as fundamentally an act of violence. Clausewitz suggests that this is a mistake, albeit a natural one. Violence (soldiers killing soldiers) is what war most dramatically involves, but

what war is most dramatically about is *power*—states compelling states. Clausewitz claims we ignore this by conflating war with battle, and in so doing fail to grasp war's political 'essence': all politics is about the exercise of power; war is a collective exercise of power (aimed at dominating the enemy's will) through collective acts of violence (aimed at damaging the enemy's forces). Killing is thus the means compelling the end: for Clausewitz, the greatest challenge in both the theory and practice of modern war is keeping these in their proper relation—so that the means do not become the end, or violence become an end-in-itself (Clausewitz 1989, esp. pp. 133–148).

Policy theorists call this the 'Clausewitzian Problem' (Rose 2010, chapter one). Political pacifists maintain it cannot be resolved.

War building is the mobilization of human and material resources for the purpose of war making. Clausewitz holds that success in one is the key to success in the other, i.e. victory in battle rests on who can bring the most human and material resources to it (this is ignored if we conflate war with battle); we dominate the enemy, or disempower them, by *over*powering them. This too is a political matter, not of asserting power *against* another society but of exercising power *over* one's own society. Thus acts of war making by states reflect the organization of war building within states. This explains war's impact on social organization generally. Since Max Weber, political sociologists have argued for the centrality of war in political development. They've shown that the state prevailed over competing political forms by its superior ability to mobilize the human and material resources for war.[8] This was not just a matter of doing so more effectively but, as an aspect of that, doing so more *responsibly*; subsuming war making under sovereign states seemed to introduce a discipline that earlier times lacked. In Charles Tilly's phrase, 'War made the state and the state made war' (Tilly 1975, p. 144; see also Downing 1992; Porter 1994; Ertman 1997). And once states arose, war determined the *character* of the state: types of states succeeded each other based on their superior ability at war building. I turn to this shortly to understand the nation state.

The imperatives of war building explain why the state system is a *war* system, one constantly given to conflict due to ends and means again reversed: war building becomes the aim of war making. Survival in the state system creates a competition for war resources that compels states to endless expansion in the name of 'security'. The impulse to empire is thus implicit in the state, with its paranoid logic that the bigger the

empire the less secure it feels. This was exacerbated in the late nineteenth century with Social Darwinism's conception of states as organic-type entities abiding by a 'survival of the fittest' ideology. The upshot was World War I in which all sides conceived themselves as fighting in 'self-defense', which they all identified with defending 'civilization'. World War II further dramatized the dynamic of such imperialist conflicts. Late arrivals to the imperialist system, Germany and Japan, determined that self-sufficiency in strategic materials could only be achieved by territorial expansion, given the depression-induced barriers to free trade (Mann 2012, pp. 423–456).

Let us consider how this explains the dominant form in recent times, the *nation state*.

2.2.2   *The Nation State*

I see the consolidation of the nation state as a matter of both inclusion and exclusion. Both are involved in the construction of the 'nation' as that which both serves and is served by the state in war.[9]

On the one hand, the creation of nations involves the homogenization of peoples via the constitution of a shared identity. At its heart is the transformation of 'subjects' into 'citizens'. It is achieved through a kind of bargain. The first states were constituted by such bargains: sovereigns provided security in return for economic resources from landlords in countryside, in the case of weaker states, or from capitalists in the cities, in the case of stronger states. Political rights emerged from the claims extracted by landlords/capitalists for their resources.[10] This was reflected in the different political discourses that emerged with the state. In the dialectic of cities and sovereigns, for example, the former gave rise to the 'civil society' discourses and their ethics of reciprocity, the latter to statist discourses and their ethics of hierarchy. The upshot was 'civilized' society as modernity came to know it. Tilly puts in terms of a paradox: 'The central paradox of European state formation', he writes, is how 'the pursuit of war and military capacity … as a sort of by-product, led to a civilianization of government and domestic politics' (Tilly 1992, p. 206; see also Tarrow 2015; Tilly 1999).

The nation state basically extended this bargain to the populace as a whole. Now, the bargain was between the populace who provide their bodies (in the form of military service) and their resources (in the form of taxes) in return for the rights of citizenship—political rights initially,

like voting, social rights eventually, like economic security.[11] In the United States, wartime contributions were principally rewarded by political rights. Every extension of the voting franchise has resulted from such a reward. Prussia/Germany rewarded with social rights like health insurance, workman's compensation, and retirement pensions. Political philosophers speak of the 'sexual contract' or the 'racial contract'. I call the bargain underlying the modern state the '*war contract*'. The politics resulting from it I call 'martial liberalism'.

Marx held that capitalism rested on a kind of exchange between capital and labour, but the ambiguities if not fraudulence of that exchange underlay the contradictions of capitalism. I think something similar holds for the nation state. Consider: at a time when labour generally was being commodified, military service was increasingly socialized: it was no longer bought and sold in the marketplace, as it had been in the eighteenth century, but was increasingly subject to state compulsion in the form of conscription, which some have seen as the defining institution of the nation state.[12] The nineteenth century saw the expansion of the market and its individualism, but it also saw the strengthening of the state and its nationalism. These tensions would contribute to the unraveling of the nation state/martial liberalism starting in the late twentieth century.

Initially the wars of the nation state were about which type of state would prevail. The American Revolution and the French Revolution inaugurated conflicts in North America and in Europe between the older dynastic empires/federations model and the newer nation state model. The conflict between these models would not be resolved until World War I. By then two further types of conflicts were prominent: conflicts between nation states over the control of nationally mixed territories, and conflicts within nation states over which national group would dominate. This presents, as it were, the rosier side of things in stressing how war contributed to the expansion of political and social rights. But there has been a darker side to all this, evoking what Michael Mann calls 'the dark side of democracy' (Mann 2004).

The dialectic of nation building and war building has also meant the repression if not elimination of those seen as standing in the way of these projects, or who were usefully stigmatized as part of such nation/war building. The French Revolution inaugurated the 'nationalization' of war via its *levee en masse*, equating French nationality and military contribution. (The first use of the term 'terror' was by French revolutionaries to describe their own revolutionary violence.) This was achieved

by much internal violence, most dramatically in the War of the Vendée, prompted by the uprising of an entire region against the imposition of conscription and resulting in repression that some scholars, albeit controversially, have deemed the first modern genocide.[13] Variations of such conflicts engaged racial/ethnic differences. The American Revolution mobilized citizens by lumping together British, Native Americans, and rebellious African slaves as the common enemy, contributing to the enduring racial divisions in American society.

This explains why internal conflicts and civil wars have been intimately linked to the point of being indistinguishable. Modern revolutions have invariably resulted from the exigencies of war building. Both the American and French Revolutions were sparked by taxation measures to pay off. The Russian Revolution resulted from the government's World War I failures at every level, the Chinese Revolution from similar failures in World War II. World War II was a jumble of interstate conflicts and domestic conflicts (Ferguson 2009, p. 456). The catastrophic civil wars meant that in the twentieth century you were as much if not more likely to be killed by your own government as by a foreign one. Up through the Cold War, genocides were artifacts of war, rationalized as the necessary elimination of Armenians, Jews, etc. for the purpose of national solidarity. Martin Shaw has argued that in this and other ways the genocidal impulse has been essential to the logic of modern war (Shaw 2003).

The question of identity is always central to the war system: how both individual and collective identity are constituted by and conducive to violence. On the individual level, the link between identity and violence seems primarily the construction of gender. On the collective level it is the construction of nationalism. The central question is whether nationalism's excesses are intrinsic to it or a perversion of it; whether a nonviolent nationalism is possible or whether some form of cosmopolitanism is necessary. In Europe, nationalism arose very much as a response to imperialism. The failures of 1848 clearly pushed it in a more truculent direction, and it became increasingly illiberal in the late nineteenth century, which some ascribe to its alliance with imperialism (Mommsen 1990).[14] Michael Mann suggests the problem lies in construing nationality in ethnic/racial terms, hence salvation lies in decoupling the two. By contrast Sir Michael Howard argues that national identity is invariably constructed through the differentiation from others, meaning it will always be characterized by some degree of bellicosity. National stories are invariably ones of war, thus nationalism's nineteenth

century theorists–Mazzini in Italy and Fichte, Hegel, and Treitschke in Germany—saw a positive value in war. (Lincoln, America's founding nationalist, saw the Civil War as a necessary act of purification.)

I suspect the whole idea of the nation—hence the 'nation state'—is probably a myth. It tends to obscure the realities of empire. Great Britain was an empire, not a single, homogeneous 'nation state' as it is often portrayed; it is just now becoming a single 'nation' as it implodes. The idea of the 'nation' provides a useful context for war building, yet 'nationality' needs attachment to something perceived as more substantial like race/ethnicity because otherwise it is so empty. (Marx said this is why exchange value must attach itself to use value.) The problem is that race/ethnicity have proved to be fictions too, or cultural constructions incapable of bearing the importance vested in them. Yet these have been the drivers of global conflict. Niall Ferguson asks how we are to explain the 'puzzle', in his words: 'the willingness of groups of men to identify one another as aliens when they are all biologically so very similar? For it was this willingness that lay at the root of much of the twentieth century's worst violence. How could Göring's "great racial war" happen if there were no races?' How, in other words, can wars be about *nothing*?

2.2.3   The Critique of the War System

In light of all this, the war system can be criticized in three distinct but related ways.

One focuses on its *injustice*. The concern with justice is central to just war tradition, which in its current guise equates it with respect for individual rights—the respect for such rights both in why war is fought (*jus ad bellum*) and how war is fought (*jus in bello*). One pacifist critique builds on this, regarding war making as incapable of abiding by these standards. (Contingent pacifists especially stress its inability to abide by *jus in bello* principles.) It goes beyond this critique in stressing the injustices of *war building*. Repression and elimination noted above are extreme examples. Less extreme are the rights violations that occur in even the most stable societies in war time, such as 1863 New York City Draft Riots (the largest public disturbance in American history) or the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II (the most egregious violation of civil liberties in twentieth century United States). These elude the standard just war framework which addresses the justice *of* war and justice *in* war, but ignores what we might call justice *at* war, how a state treats its own members.

A second criticism focuses on what I call the *inhumanity* of the war system.

This is my term for the concern that war takes on a life of its own in ways that escape all human agency and ignores, to the point of negating, all legitimate human ends. The previous criticism holds that war is not an instrument of ethical purpose, whereas this criticism holds it is not an 'instrument' of anything at all. It exemplifies what Hannah Arendt called the 'Rule of Nobody'; it becomes an 'automatic subject'—Marx's term for capital acquiring a life of its own. Historically, I think this criticism most came to prominence in World War I (also when the critical term 'totality' entered philosophical discourse). Its most eloquent American voice here was Randolph Bourne, who put it in terms of war's 'exigencies' while ridiculing John Dewey for imagining war could be an 'instrument' for social good. It was developed by Lewis Mumford, who saw the state as a 'mega-machine' generating more power than it could rationally manage (Bourne 1999; Mumford 1973, p. 321; 1974; 2010, p. 190).

This critique harkens back to civic republican critiques of 'standing armies' such as that found in Kant. Kant held that just as the sin of speculative metaphysics was acquiring a life of its own independent of any rational purpose, standing armies—fueled by the irresponsible finances of 'the British system'—lent themselves to the apparently endless pointless wars that characterized the monarchies of his day (Kant 2007). If this earlier critique addressed war's arbitrariness, the later critique addresses its aimlessness. It is rooted in the logic of the nation state. The war contract rewards everyone making a contribution to the war's prosecution, with everyone's having a say in the war's direction, or at least an influence. This is what Clausewitz had in mind in speaking of war as an extension of 'policy'—policy being something inherently contested and transitory. The same logic that increasingly magnifies the war power renders it increasingly unmanageable. The upshot of this aimlessness is war becoming an end in itself. Lacking any outside purpose it becomes its own purpose. Tilly suggests that the state system can be understood as a kind of protection racket in which individuals—or in this case, states—are compelled to pay damages to an individual—or in this case, system—which the individual/system itself creates. 'If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war risking and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organized crime' (Tilly 1985).

This segues to a final criticism: war's *futility.*

Clausewitz anticipated part of the problem in his discussion of 'Arming the Nation'.[15] War aims to bend the will of the enemy, i.e. politically dominate them, through the infliction of violence, i.e. militarily degrading them. The problem arises when political organization is sufficiently strong, or supple, that no amount of violence is capable of achieving its political objectives. Clausewitz foresaw this in guerilla wars of the type Spain waged in the Peninsular War. A more recent case is the American experience in Vietnam, Jonathan Schell's reference point in claiming that popular wars of resistance were one factor that had undermined the efficacy of all war. Another variation has been developed by Mary Kaldor, first in her writings on the Cold War and then in her writings on New Wars. What if war is not in fact a real conflict between two parties, but an enterprise in which they are colluding to maintain the trappings of conflict with no real interest or expectation of prevailing, but to maintain a social system based on war? This seems to be part of the picture that Orwell paints, of a world in which war is more a public relations enterprise than anything else. Kaldor has characterized the Cold War as an 'imaginary' war—war building with no real aim of war making but solely for political consolidation at home. It was a continued replaying of World War II, or that type of conflict, but only in the mind. It was seriously delegitimized in the United States from the Vietnam War having pierced the illusions by bringing the real costs of war home.

2.3   Hostilities, Terrorism, etc.

The question for political pacifism is how terrorism fits into this picture. To address this, we must complicate the account of the war system a bit more.

Since Greek times, Western culture has distinguished between two types of conflicts and two types of enemies. One type of war takes place between 'civilized' peoples—we might call it war, proper. Wars of this sort are discrete acts, constituted by discrete battles, bound by rules, with a finite beginning and end, where the opponent is conceived as a worthy adversary, to be welcomed back into the larger community when the conflict ends. In later times, wars between Christians would be thought of in this way, as would later wars between Europeans. The rules by which such parties fought gained force in part from the common interest in the stability of that larger community; thus Grotius spoke of the 'law of nations' as agreements grounded in that common concern.

Hostilities, by contrast, were conflicts between 'uncivilized' peoples or between the 'civilized' and the 'uncivilized', with allowances to be noted in a moment. They were not discrete acts so much as an ongoing condition, constituted not by discrete battles but by vague skirmishes, bound by no particular rules, where the opponent was viewed as an implacable enemy hence the conflict only ended when one of the parties was destroyed or completely subjugated. Students of American military history speak of the 'Indian Wars', and there is perhaps some logic to parsing the particular encounters and the actions within them; thus, one can look at, say, the Ute Wars case-by-case, from the Battle at Fort Utah (1850) through the Black Hawk War (1865–1872) up to the Bluff Skirmish and Posey War of the 1920s. But to thus assess them one by one would be to fundamentally misconceive the matter at hand. In truth, the relation between European Americans and Native Americans was one of ongoing hostility, and one minimizes the problem by assessing each encounter case-by-case, just as one would minimize the problem of the lynching of African-Americans by whites in the post-Civil War era by looking at each lynching case-by-case.

These two types of conflicts are importantly linked to two different notions of self-defense. In war proper, self-defense is the discrete act of repelling attack, hence the analogy between states defending themselves against other states and individuals defending themselves against other individuals, for instance on the street corner. This picture of self-defense is linked with the notion of defined borders, hence the integrity of a state's territory is likened to the integrity of a person's body. In hostilities, by contrast, self-defense is not the discrete act of repelling attack but an ongoing project of securing survival, confronted by an implacable enemy. And there are no defined boundaries but rather vague frontiers, the securing of which has been a traditional justification for expansionist projects of empire. In *Imperialism and Social Classes*, Joseph Schumpeter provided a classical description of this paranoid logic with reference to Roman imperialism. (The parallels with the United States today should be clear.) 'Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbors, always fighting for a breathing space. The whole world was pervaded by a host of enemies, and it was manifestly Rome's duty to guard against their indubitably aggressive designs.' Hence there was 'no corner of the known world' where Rome was safe from attack—and its fighting 'was always invested with an aura of legality' (Schumpeter 2007, p. 51).

Hostilities have always had a genocidal dimension. An enduring justification for this was that to fight the savage one had to become the savage. Bobbitt anticipates this in suggesting that in the future 'states will employ tactics, as we shall see in the next chapter, that are indistinguishable from those of terrorists' (Bobbitt 2008, p. 44). The claim that this reversion to savagery has been a dominant theme of American culture has been articulated in a number of remarkable studies by Richard Slotkin (2018). But the reality has always been more complicated than this insofar as Europeans have often rationalized their hegemony by appealing to their alleged superior virtue as 'civilized', and one form of their alleged superiority has been their fighting by moral constraints even against those alleged to fight with no such constraints. Hence, conflict between the 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' has tended the seesaw back and forth between something that looks like 'war proper' and something that looks like hostilities.

This illuminates an important fact about European warfare that explains the emergence of groups that anticipate today's category of terrorists. One of the ways Europeans engaged in conflict while maintaining their own standards of propriety was by enlisting 'savage' type elements to do their dirty work for them. Hence, the emergence of so-called 'irregular' fighters that have been an enduring feature of modern warfare.

The clearest case for our purposes, referring back to the Indian Summer image, is the enlistment of indigenous tribes by European powers in America in their conflict with other indigenous tribes. Britain and France mainly used the Iroquois and the Algonquin, in what has been called a first form of state-sponsored terror. Every conflict between the United States government and Native American tribes involved the enlistment of native peoples, a practice that continued in the American occupation of the Philippines and the bloody guerrilla war that followed. It had the benefit of exacerbating divisions between native tribes in ways that facilitated their ultimate subjugation. Such irregular forces were also found within Europe for the purpose of Europeans fighting each other. Think of Cossacks, Highlanders, and the hussars, who all held such roles. Magyar light cavalrymen—hussars—were recruited from Hungary and Christian refugees (loosely known as 'Albanians') from the Ottoman Balkans. The latter are figures in Mozart's *Così Fan Tutte*, where they exemplify the mystery around such wild figures. Another example from popular culture is the

'headless horseman' in Washington Irving's 'The Legend of Sleepy Hollow'—a former British irregular whose head was blown off in a skirmish, now brought back to life.

Terrorists as a distinct category emerged out of the project of state consolidation as groups neither appropriated nor annihilated but relegated to the margins. They constituted an implicit challenge to the state's claim to a monopoly of force. It has been argued, then, that changes in the state system bring with them changes in the nature of terrorism. A case in point is piracy. So-called 'buccaneers' emerged in the seventeenth century as 'Brethren of the Coast' (one of their designations), independent sailors/ships, many of them Europeans transplanted to the Caribbean. They were enlisted as independent contractors by England and France primarily to harass Spain, giving them legal status as so-called 'privateers'. In this role they were heroes, lauded in popular culture and even knighted, like Henry Morgan by Charles II. Like other irregulars, they were useful for their indifference to the touted rules of civilized warfare, a fact that made them a special object of opprobrium when they ceased being instruments of state-sponsored terror and became agents in their own right, redefined as 'pirates' and branded as criminals. Scholarship today takes special interest in the distinct political societies that pirates formed, a kind of martial counterculture that was Spartan in its egalitarianism (Linebaugh and Rediker 2013; Rediker 1989, 2015). The pirate as terrorist, but representing a challenge to an alternative to the dominant political order also impressed itself on popular culture. As late as 1870, Jules Vern could envision such a figure in his '20,000 Leagues under the Sea' in the form of Captain Nemo.

It takes little imagination to see here intimations of what America, at least, confronts now in its 'War on Terror'. For much of the twentieth century, terrorism was principally a response to existing state arrangements by people seeking a state of their own; hence its role in national liberation/anti-colonial struggles. In the Philippines, for example, indigenous terrorist actions met American state-sponsored terrorist actions. In the waning decade of the Cold War the practice of sponsoring native irregulars to harass an opponent on the frontier found a clear parallel in American sponsorship of Islamic groups fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda, we might say, began as the equivalent of privateers; then later transformed into the equivalent of pirates, also creating their own independent society from which to attack the so-called civilized world.

Drawing on the work of others, my claim here is that much of what is happening today fits within the framework of wars/hostilities that illuminate, among other things, earlier forms of terrorism. But things have also changed, due mainly to the distinctive form of globalization today. I will note here some of what I see as the important changes.

Since the end of the Cold War, state military forces have been increasingly privatized, reversing the process of socialization identified with the nation state. This is part of a larger movement of the commodification of killing generally. A Marxist might see this as the ultimate triumph of capitalism and its impulse to commodify everything over those aspects of the state representing a different form of power. The line between war and crime is increasingly blurred. Terrorist organizations increasingly resemble Visa or MasterCard organizations in their decentred non-hierarchical structure. Most importantly, the state is losing its monopoly over the means of mass destruction. The system seems to be moving back to a pre-modern model except that the powers to inflict death are magnified exponentially.

Previously, wars have been an agent of state consolidation, if not the major agent. State building and war building have gone hand-in-hand, built on what I've called the war contract. Many people have not been included in this contract, of course. Moreover, outside the European state system, war has typically served to undermine states, meaning the duality wars/hostilities has meant the duality strong states/weak or no states. Hostilities, now identified with 'New Wars', continue to block the creation of strong states, or undermine the political structures already in place. What is truly new, it seems to me, is the weakening of previously strong states—driven, most dramatically in the United States, by the unraveling of the war contract. Before, what Sir Michael Howard has called the 'nationalization' of war meant that in return for participating and contributing to war, citizens received both political and social rights; this was the logic of being a citizen of the country—an 'American', for example. Now, the 'denationalization' of war has meant the end of the social solidarity it implied. In the United States, national identity is increasingly seen as a set of privileges for which no complementary sacrifices are required. In the current political climate, 'Putting America First' implies Americans have to serve their country by (at most) paying taxes rather than through, for example, obligatory military service. The upshot is that no one really has any idea what the national identity means, except that its privileges should be denied to others. No wonder that the political culture is spinning out of control.

A prominent suggestion is that the two types of wars we have today complement each other, in the way that Kaldor has spoken of as 'collusion'.[16] The terror wars in far-off places are met with media friendly high-technology 'spectacle wars' aimed at providing the semblance of political solidarity at home that real wars used to provide. Here, and throughout, we hear the echoes of Orwell. But the solidarity is a fragile one. The apparent endlessness of the wars reflects their fundamental aimlessness—obscured, if only in part, by their cosmic pretensions. In America's so-called 'War on Terror', for example, both sides have at times said—in remarkably similar language—that their aim was to eradicate evil in the world. Bin Laden's global aspirations were countered by George W. Bush's protestations that he would eradicate evil 'in our lifetime', an ambitious goal that neither Moses, nor Jesus, nor Mohammed managed to achieve. But the point is not to win, per se, because neither side can say what winning means.

If I drift into the polemical mode it is to motivate my suggestion at the start that what we are seeing is as much the *reductio ad absurdum* of war as it has always been. The attitudes and arrangements of the just war tradition can be understood as aiming to prevent the degeneration of war into hostilities, for example to prevent initially measured conflicts between states—like those that preceded World War I—from morphing into the kind of global state of hostility found in World War I itself. Political pacifism maintains that such efforts at containing war will invariably prove futile. Even when we think we've contained if not ended one type of war, as it seemed in 1989, it's just transformed into a new type of war. One response, that of Philip Bobbitt's, is to see this as inevitable and shield oneself against attack. Another response is to state that the only reasonable position is to condemn war itself. The question, then, is what this means for our practical opposition.

2.4   Conclusion

War is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure of society intact. The very word 'war', therefore, has become misleading. It would probably be accurate to say that by becoming continuous war has ceased to exist. (Orwell 1984)

The analysis of the war system distinguished war making and war building. Accordingly, pacifists have approached practical opposition on two levels, *peace making* and *peace building*. The picture of both has until now been tied to traditional models of nation state war. Peace making focused on working to end whatever war was being waged or to prevent its outbreak. Peace building worked to unravel with the aim of ending the institutions of war building as well as constructing counter institutions of peace.

In the past what peace making meant, i.e. working to end/prevent a particular conflict, was always clearer than what peace building meant. It seems to me that things are now reversed. It's hard to know how we work to end the particular war or wars we are waging if it is so difficult to say *what* they really are. The logic of war building in the context of the United States today, however, strikes me as fairly clear: it is almost entirely political—to provide a kind of faux national identity when the previous substance of national identity has been largely drained away. It's also fairly clear, then, that peace building importantly involves institutions and attitudes of a cosmopolitan character that reflect and nurture an alternative, cosmopolitan identity. One need not be a pacifist to believe this, of course.

[1]/

I began with Sir Michael Howard's reservations about talk of war. More than a decade and a half after America's war on terror was declared, I return to some of his predictions.

War talk, Sir Michael said, creates a 'war psychosis' demanding spectacular military action and the expectation of decisive results. Any suggestion of 'less heroic' means of destroying the adversary is dismissed as 'appeasement'. Serious reflection on the real challenges is confronted by a 'media stoked frenzy for results'. Ultimately, war is a purveyor of ignorance. For most Americans, he wrote, 'it must be said that Islam remains one vast terra incognita – and one, like those blank areas on medieval maps, inhabited very largely by dragons'. 'The danger of nuclear war, at least on a global scale, has now ebbed, if only for the moment', he wrote. 'But it has been replaced by another threat, and one no less alarming: the likelihood of an ongoing and continuous confrontation of cultures that will not only divide the world but shatter the internal cohesion of our increasingly multicultural societies' (Howard 2002).

For evidence of such xenophobia/ignorance, one may look at how the United States government has closed its borders to refugees from those *terra incognita* cultures, especially refugees from wars America created or contributed to. There are 65 million refugees in the world today. In 2018, the United States has accepted exactly 29 refugees from Iraq, a 99% decrease from 2016, 11 refugees from Syria, a 98% decrease from 2016, and 0 refugees from Libya and Yemen.

But I think there has been a dramatic change since Sir Michael wrote these words.

The 'War on Terror' was part of a long-term effort to revive the credibility of war that began in the United States with 'Operation Desert Storm' in the early 1990s. That effort consisted of engaging in conflicts with Third World countries incapable of standing up to the United States military as long as the conflicts were fairly conventional. The 'War on Terror' was presented as a recycling of World War II, a cosmic engagement with the forces of evil, but the uncertainties from the start as to whether or what kind of 'war' it represented might have suggested it was doomed to frustration. It is hard to rally people for a sustained period of time against an enemy they know nothing about, fought in places they can't place on a map, for purposes best described as 'not losing'. The upshot has been an ever increasing detachment from anything rightly described as the realities of war. Halfway through 2018, the United States projected it would be spending $45 billion a year on the effort in Afghanistan, with $5 billion directly to Afghan forces, $13 billion directly to US forces inside Afghanistan, and the rest for logistical support. (It is difficult to identify the final destination of this 'logistical support' budget.)

Forty-five billion dollars is about four times the entire budget of the state of Oregon. What have such expenditures multiplied over more than a decade and a half achieved? In January 2018, the BBC reported that half the population of Afghanistan lives an area controlled by the Taliban or where the Taliban is the dominant presence. The organization controls or is the dominant presence in 277 (or 70%) of the country's districts. At the time of writing this, there are reports that they have captured the capital of the western province of Farah, though this is disputed by government officials and their American military backers.

[2]/
Such futility can only go on for so long. But I'd suggest there is a larger dialectic at work. One can identify a rhythm in the relation of wars proper and hostilities since the rise of the European/Western state system. Eras of war proper, between so-called civilized powers, are followed by eras of hostilities, between so-called non-civilized powers, followed by eras of war proper, etc. Seen in this framework, the Thirty Years War was followed by the first era of imperialism, primarily in the Americas, the Napoleonic Wars followed by the second era of imperialism, primarily in Africa and Asia, the two World Wars followed in turn by conflicts, first in Asia and then in the Middle East. What we might expect, then, is that the hostilities comprising the 'War on Terror' will be followed by the spectre of great power conflict.

This may explain the sudden and otherwise inexplicable preoccupation of the United States government/military with the South China Sea.

'U.S. will "compete vigorously" in South China Sea, Mattis warns Beijing' a recent headline read (Wong 2018). 'Make no mistake', Secretary of Defense James Mattis proclaimed, 'America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our priority theater.' The article continued, 'Mattis' speech came amid increased rivalry between China and the U.S., as Washington again challenged Beijing's increasing maritime dominance in the region, mainly over its vast territorial claims and militarization of islands in strategic waters.' How the South China Sea became a hotbed of contention between the United States and China is somewhat mysterious. The South China Sea is, after all, near China. It is no more surprising that China would take a 'strategic interest' in it than it is that the United States takes a 'strategic interest' in the Caribbean, a realm it has regularly invaded. What is surprising is why the China Sea would be, in Mattis's words, a 'priority theater'. The South China Sea is an important commercial waterway but mainly for China, 64% of whose maritime trade relies on it. By contrast, 14% of America's maritime trade passes through it, which is equivalent to about 5% of all goods traded. Tension in the area first began with Chinese complaints about Indian naval presence, which is likely driven by the idea that the region contains substantial oil deposits.

But all this reflects a reengineering of America's strategic priorities away from hostilities and back to the traditional war model, which, after all, America's traditional military forces has more confidence fighting.

The United States' 2018 National Defense Strategy begins with the usual alarm that the American military has deteriorated on every level, due to insufficient funding. It proceeds to list the five major challenges to America's 'security interests', priority no longer given to terrorism as before but to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran in that order. It states, 'The U.S. military will bias (sic) toward competing with China and Russia, most likely in the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, and Europe, respectively.' Its 'global operating model' aims to make the US military more 'lethal, agile, and resilient', all in line with facilitating the emphasis on 'fighting and winning conflicts with China or Russia' (Klare 2018).

This is simply about perpetuating the war system.

[3]/

I finished the first draft of this chapter on America's 'Veterans Day'. This is the yearly holiday now given over to Americans 'Thanking soldiers for their service'—where with each passing year Americas have less and less idea of what specifically they are thanking them for. When I was in the Reserved Officers Training Corps, at the height of the Cold War, we were tested on naming the places at which American troops were stationed. I wonder if more than a handful of American officials could do this today, and they are probably prevented from doing so by national security. Anyway, I thought I would take note of some of the things America's 'War on Terror' means on a daily basis:

1. As part of America's heightened airstrikes against 'targets' in Somalia, it had just bombed a gathering 60 miles north of Mogadishu that included an unnamed number of civilians along with 'several' al-Shabaab militants also claimed to be killed. The article reporting this noted that, when asked what the United States was doing in Somalia, the Pentagon official referred the question to another office.

2. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reported he was 'absolutely confident' they will have 'enough' troops in Afghanistan by 2018, clarifying that by 'enough' he meant capable of retraining enough Afghan troops to at least replace those that constantly deserted. In a separate article, it was reported that opium production had increased 87% the past year in Afghanistan, despite an American program totaling $8.6 billion so far to stop it.

3. Lawyers for Guantánamo Bay detainee Ahmed Rabbani told a federal court that their client's weight had now dropped to less than 90 pounds. Having been detained for over 13 years without being charged, he is one of a group of similar detainees now on hunger strike.

4. In response to the recent earthquake in Iran, medical professional Tohid Najafi established a Facebook account for helping donations that elicited a remarkable 65,000 responses and raised over $200,000 in less than two weeks. He was then informed by Facebook that the United States treasury would not authorize the release of those funds due to the American boycott of Iran.

5. At the beginning of October, four American soldiers were ambushed and killed in Tongo, Niger. While their deaths were honored for 'defending our freedom', even highly placed administration and congressional figures had little idea what they were doing there. A month and a half later, responding to reports that Sgt. La David Johnson had been captured and tortured for several days, the Pentagon was still 'asking for patience as it tries to piece together what really happened on that deadly night'. No one thought to ask how the military could know enough facts to send them there in the first place, but still could not determine the facts regarding why they never came back.

The omnipresence and now amorphousness of war makes it hard to know where to begin in challenging it. There may be consolation in the fact you can begin about anywhere.

NOTES

1. It's unclear how, if we don't know what victory is, we can know what defeat it, or how to avoid it. Phillip Bobbitt (2011). For another statement of the parallels, see Max Boot (2002). The Indian Wars analogy was anticipated in a classic text on the Korean War by T. R. Fehrenbach (2000), 'Like the Indian Wars, [the new type of war—CR] would leave a troubled feeling, a trauma, in its wake. Crusades, even when failures, are emotionally satisfying. Wars of containment, wars of policy, are not.'

2. Martin Ceadel (1987). On the different forms of pacifism see the works of Peter Brock, such as his *Pacifism in Europe to 1914* (1972). On pacifism as tradition of argument, see Cortwright (2008).

3. On American pacifism, see Ryan (2017b).
4. I would especially recommend the works of Yoder. See Yoder (1994, 2009).
5. King's personal pacifism was nurtured by his upbringing in African-American prophetic Christianity. His political pacifism was evidenced in his conception of non-violence as constituting a new form of politics by defining a new form of power. Here, the major influences were African-American figures like James Howard Lawson with deep connections to Gandhi's movement in India.
6. An interesting fact about how war once presented itself to ordinary citizens, when conscription was in force, was that any practical differences between personal pacifism and political pacifism tended to be blurred.
7. Compare Frederick Engels: 'The army has become the main purpose of the state, and an end in itself; the peoples are there only to provide soldiers and feed them. Militarism dominates and is swallowing Europe. But this militarism also bears within itself the seed of its own destruction. What the bourgeois democracy of 1848 could not accomplish, just because it was bourgeois and not proletarian, namely, to give the labouring masses a will whose content would be in accord with their class position–socialism will infallibly secure. And this will mean the bursting asunder from within of militarism and with it of all standing armies' (Engels 1947).
8. There is a large literature on this. For an overview, see Malešević (2010). Early versions are in Weber (1968) and Oppenheimer (1926), who wrote 'States are maintained in accordance with the same principles that called them into being. The primitive state is the creation of warlike robbery; and by warlike robbery it can be preserved' (p. 57). Otto Hintze (1975) linked the rise and expansion of states to the development of military organizations; see also Schumpeter (1954). More recent statements include Brewer (1990), Giddens (1985), Mann (1988, 1993), Tilly (1992), and van Creveld (1999).
9. See Andreas Wimmer (2013, 2018) for two good recent discussions of this.
10. The relation/conflict between states and landlords/capitalists can be related to the two different logics in modernity of coercion/domination on the one hand and capital/exploitation on the other. David Harvey contrasts the logic of the state as place-bound to the logic of capital as time-bound in his *The New Imperialism* (2005).
11. See, among others, Dwork (1987), Titmuss (1958), and Winter (1986). The relation of war and democracy in Ancient Greece has been much studied. See Hale (2009).

12. On how the nation state and conscription came into existence at the same time, see Gooch (1980, pp. 1–144), Kiernan (1973). Lewis Mumford (1974, p. 239) rightly notes, 'The significance of national conscription (politely called "universal service") as an essential instrument of mass control, has been passed over by modern political and historical scholars with incredible frivolity or equally incredible blindness. Though no other factor has done more to add to the destructiveness of war, and to condition the large populations to the rituals of human massacre, the scholarly literature on the subject is negligible.'

13. For a strong statement of this view, see Reynald Secher (2003).

14. Mommsen observes that the more power became identified with 'people', the greater the need became to impose unity on population at large; he speaks of this as the integralist variety of the nation state.

15. I think the futility of war is implicit in Hannah Arendt's distinction between violence and power, suggesting that the former can never achieve the ultimate political goal of persuasion (Arendt 1970).

16. Alfred McCoy sees a larger significance: 'However counterintuitive, as their power wanes, empires often plunge into ill-advised military misadventures, providing countless possibilities for defeat or even disaster. This phenomenon is known among historians of empire as 'micro-militarism' and seems to involve psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the sting of retreat or defeat by occupying new territories, however briefly or catastrophically' (McCoy 2017, p. 182).

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Pacifism as Re-appropriated Violence

Amanda Cawston

In this chapter, I introduce a novel conception of pacifism. This conception arises out of considering two key insights drawn from Cheyney Ryan's work. The first concerns his characterization of the 'pacifist impulse' as a *felt* rejection of killing rather than the impassioned outcome of rational argument. I expand on this initial sketch and point to related claims to further motivate this approach. The second insight draws on Ryan's analysis of contemporary Western attitudes to war and methods of fighting, as reflecting a condition of *alienated* war. I expand on this claim to argue that our alienated condition extends beyond the case of war and that most forms of modern violence are most appropriately described as *alienated*. I argue that recognition of these two points reveals an important problem for pacifism as initially characterized. Specifically, one consequence of the alienated condition of contemporary violence is that the pacifist impulse is rendered impotent with respect to its usual function, i.e. to inhibit violence. In other words, alienated violence enables individuals to engage in violence while bypassing the emotional and attitudinal mechanisms that would otherwise prompt resistance. However, pairing these insights also reveals resources for

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reconceptualizing pacifism. Recognizing the alienated nature of contemporary violence raises questions about what it means to reject violence, and problematizes how to respond to its (alienated and institutional) incarnations. Thus, I aim to develop a version of pacifism that is suited to the alienated nature of contemporary violence. I begin in Sect. 3.1 by briefly introducing the two initial insights that frame the subsequent analysis. Section 3.2 further develops and supports Ryan's characterization of the pacifist impulse by appealing to the notion of fellow-creature feeling. Section 3.3 extends Ryan's insight regarding alienated war and offers a comprehensive analysis of contemporary violence as alienated. Finally, Sect. 3.4 examines the consequences of our alienated condition for acting on the pacifist impulse. This examination highlights the limitations of an ahistorical approach to pacifism and proposes an alternative that marries the attitudinal understanding of pacifism with an awareness of the material and institutional requirements for its effectiveness. Building on the Marxist-Hegelian notion of alienation and re-appropriation, I describe this proposed alternative view of pacifism as re-appropriated violence.

3.1   STARTING POINTS

I begin by highlighting the two central claims foundational to this investigation. The first is found in Ryan's 1983 essay *Self-defense, Pacifism, and the Possibility of Killing*, wherein he characterizes pacifism as a sceptical position arising from the failure to justify defensive force. He supplements this essentially negative understanding by describing what he calls the 'pacifist impulse', the positive, and, importantly, *moral* motivations against killing. To illustrate, Ryan points to Orwell's famous account of finding himself unwilling to fire at a half-dressed enemy soldier running while holding up his trousers. In such a state, Orwell saw the soldier as a 'fellow creature' rather than a 'Fascist', and thus did not 'feel like shooting him' (Ryan 1983, p. 521). For Ryan, Orwell's unwillingness to fire is not a product of recognizing the soldier's rights, nor of squeamishness. Rather, in that moment, the label 'Fascist', which had made the soldier killable, fell away, revealing the other as a fellow creature 'similar to yourself' (Ryan 1983, p. 521). The pacifist impulse, says Ryan, is not a set of moral principles or arguments against killing, but is rather a sensitivity to others' status as fellow creatures, paired with a refusal to create the distance that obscures this feeling and thereby make killing possible.

The pacifist does not refrain from killing because, after considering the arguments, she concludes killing is morally wrong; rather she 'cannot *bring* [herself] to do it' (Ryan 1983, p. 521).[1]

The second claim I wish to highlight is drawn from Ryan's (2009) *The Chickenhawk Syndrome* wherein Ryan points to important changes in how the West conducts and conceives of war. Key here are two related phenomena: the institutional arrangements that protect citizens from the costs of war, and the sense that being at war does not demand concrete sacrifice by the average citizen. For Ryan, these phenomena are characteristic of the *alienated* condition of modern war. He writes, '[w]ar has become an abstraction for most people – something that other people fight, in lands they cannot identify, for reasons they barely understand. We have entered an age of *alienated* war' (Ryan 2009, p. 5). These developments function to offload responsibility, depoliticize war, and, most worryingly, make it easier to go to war.

We have then these two initial claims to hand: first, the pacifist impulse marks a sensitivity to the fellow-creature feeling and the denial of the distance that renders one insensitive; and second, that key institutional and phenomenological aspects of modern war create conditions for alienated war. I take these two claims to be broadly correct, though deeply problematic when considered together. In the following, I explore and develop these claims, drawing out the difficulties they reveal for pacifism when combined.

3.2   Fellow-Creature Feeling

I think Ryan is correct to characterize the pacifist impulse as a felt recognition or feeling rather than the rational conclusion of argument. Moreover, I do not think this characterization lessens the position, but rather echoes a recurring, and in my view, important moral insight. Whether or not pacifists (and others) *ought* to have this impulse is a further question, and one that I will not be able to explore here. Instead, I here point to others who have noted a similar phenomenon and thereby provide further details and support for the view.

Cora Diamond, for instance, makes a related reference to the role of fellow-creature feeling on the subject of vegetarianism. She notes that we do not refrain from eating people (or companion animals) out of recognition of their interests or respect for their rights, but because that is simply not something we do to *people*. To think of a person as edible is

to not have the right disposition. Diamond critiques attempts to ground animal rights in shared capacities or interests, arguing this devalues the human rather than elevates the non-human animal.[2] To recognize a fellow creature is to see the other as 'being in a certain boat, as it were, […] as our fellows in mortality, in life on this earth…' (Diamond 1978, p. 474). It also means seeing fellow-creatures as able to make moral demands, appeal to our sense of pity, and plead with us to relent. It is the feeling stemming from this recognition/perspective that Diamond believes is the correct foundation for vegetarianism.

Tolstoy's essay *The First Step*, in which he recounts his visit to a slaughterhouse, hints at a similar position. He takes the standpoint of an impassioned observer, though his descriptions powerfully convey the butchers' insensitivity to the creatures they kill. They do not aim at cruelty, but in going about their work, they unreflectively *murder*. His descriptions obviously reflect his inclusion of these creatures as fellows, and as making moral demands. The text is not a simple reaction against suffering—it documents the *inhuman* treatment of fellow creatures by those who do not see. It is an account of betrayal, relentlessness, insensitive utility, and of loss. Tolstoy also, of course, endorses an attitudinal approach in his writings on pacifism and peace. For Tolstoy, pacifism is fundamentally grounded in love (drawn from the Christian tradition) extended towards one's enemies. Moreover, love may be responsive to understanding, but not to considerations of reason or utility. Tolstoy writes, '[m]an does not love because it is advantageous for him to love this man or these men, but because love is the essence of his soul – because he cannot help loving' (Tolstoy 2011, p. 60). Love, argues Tolstoy is the basis of the Christian concept of life and its pacifist dimensions.

Other notable theorists of non-violence, including M. K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., make similar claims about the attitudinal grounds of non-violence. Gandhi's *ahimsa* (or non-violence) does not denote a prohibited list of actions, but rather an attitude of love towards self and others. And Martin Luther King Jr. famously appeals to the ancient Greek notion of *agape* to expound his understanding of non-violent resistance. For King, *agape* describes the highest form of love, namely 'the love of God operating in the human heart', and is reflected in the ability to love one's enemy (2007, p. 442). Finally, feminist theorists including Nel Noddings and Sara Ruddick highlight connections between peace politics and the sentiments and practices of care.[3] Ryan's

characterization then of the pacifist impulse as a form of feeling echoes similar claims made by a diverse group of theorists and traditions of thought. Moreover, as many of the theorists cited describe themselves as part of the pacifist and peace tradition, their reflections on what this means for them has added weight. So while this brief survey is insufficient for drawing final conclusions, it suggests a recurring insight, i.e. pacifist action and thought is deeply connected to a sensitivity to a fellow-creature feeling.

This approach to understanding pacifism has however, suffered from persistent neglect and dismissal. On this point, Diamond notes that the dominant approach in animal ethics tries to distance itself from the above sentiment and instead offers universal principles and impassioned reason in support of animal rights. She attributes this strategy in part to the worry that talk of fellow-creature feelings or the inability to kill will be dismissed as mere squeamishness, sentimentalism, or even moral weakness.[4] A similar worry pervades debates in the ethics of war, and is related to the quick dismissal of pacifism as unrealistic, idealistic, or naïve. However, as Diamond argues, this dismissal is not only too quick, but the alternative, traditional approaches to morality risk undermining the foundations of moral obligation. Diamond worries that the Singer-Regan strategy for grounding the moral status of animals, for instance, is counterproductive: by misrepresenting the source of moral obligation (i.e. the fellow-creature feeling), they undermine and weaken it. And again, I think we risk the same in the case of the pacifist impulse. The danger is that by discussing the permissions and restrictions on justified killing, we dissolve the basis of human moral obligation. Another way to frame this worry comes from Luban's (2008) argument against torture. Luban extends Žižek's idea that some acts are considered 'unthinkable': we do not seriously argue whether rape, for example, is morally wrong or not—we rightly take the wrongness of rape as a given. Luban wants torture to fall in this category—it should not be an option that we consider but ultimately reject; rather, it should not even enter our minds to question its merits. Williams (1985) offers a similar opinion with respect to moral incapacity. One way for a moral community to prohibit an act is to make it such that it never even crosses people's minds. It is disconcerting, notes Williams, to hear a man 'who in the course of a discussion of how to deal with political or business rivals says, "Of course, we could have them killed, but we should lay that aside right from the beginning". It should never have come into his hands to be laid aside' (Williams

1985, p. 185). Luban worries that engaging with 'ticking bomb' scenarios in order to evaluate the permissibility conditions around torture treats an 'unthinkable' act as thinkable. Similarly, one could argue that standard discussions of justifiable force prominent in the ethics of war problematically treat what pacifists feel is an unthinkable act (killing), as thinkable.

So, the pacifist impulse is, in my view, appropriately characterized in terms of a fellow-creature feeling, a feeling that precludes certain actions or treatment, including killing.[5] Seeing another as a fellow-creature often means one cannot 'bring oneself' to kill or injure them, and such treatment lies in the realm of the unthinkable.[6] However, as Ryan observed, various mechanisms can interfere with the ability to see another as a fellow creature, and thus make killing possible. Ryan talks about these mechanisms in terms of introducing *distance*. In Orwell's case, thinking of the soldier as a 'Fascist' precluded Orwell's thinking of him as a fellow-creature. In this way, it provided a type of distance—Orwell was not *confronted* with the moral appeals of a fellow-creature but only a Fascist target to be killed. The introduction of distance thus enabled killing by dulling or obscuring fellow-creature feeling.

3.3   ALIENATED VIOLENCE

I turn now to Ryan's second claim, namely the idea that our current age is one of *alienated* war. Here again, I broadly agree with Ryan. The following expands his view in two ways: first, it explicitly employs a more robust notion of alienation, and second, it extends the analysis beyond war to characterize modern violence, more generally, as alienated.

First, while Ryan does not specify what he means by 'alienation', his analysis implies he uses the term to characterize the public's detachment from war, i.e. the feeling that war is a remote event and that support for war entails no sacrifices for your average civilian. This feeling is then supported by specific policies, politicians, and the media, which Ryan roundly criticizes for enabling and exploiting this disconnect. His primary focus, however, is on the shift from conscription to a professional (and mercenary) military force. That is, his concern is with alienation in terms of *delegation* within the context of *war*. Subsequently, Ryan's critique then turns somewhat naturally to issues of responsibility, civic duty, and moral consistency. However, the question of who does the fighting is but one possible dimension of alienation to consider—there are further

ways in which modern war is fought that can be described as alienated and that when taken together, comprise a more complete and complex picture of the workings of alienated war. This includes consideration of the bureaucratic, technological, and ideological developments that conceal the violence of war and undermine our ability to recognize, understand, and respond to it. A wider conception of alienation allows us to focus on how familiar practices, institutions, and ideologies make certain relations possible and palatable.

To this end, I propose extending our view beyond alienation as delegation, and our study beyond the subject of war to violence more generally. On the first point, I intend to draw explicitly on the wide-ranging and substantive Marxist-Hegelian notion of alienation. For Hegel, a human power is alienated when its proper connection to its possessor is obstructed or obscured. Something that should be experienced as a part of me, as an expression of myself, or as belonging to me, instead appears as independent of me. The object I have created, or the act I have performed, appears separate and distinct and is experienced as not belonging to me, nor as an expression of myself. Furthermore, since it is distinct, the object/act is therefore not under my control, and may instead appear as a controlling force itself, indifferent or even hostile to my interests. For example, according to Marx, human productive power should be experienced as belonging to oneself (and hence as an expression of oneself) but is alienated under capitalism as wage labour.[7] The labourer cannot see herself in the products she helps make, nor does she control those products. Moreover, her productive power, which should be seen as a cooperative social power, is instead placed in competition with those of other labourers. Crucially, alienation does not denote a merely psychological state, it describes concrete material conditions of separation and disconnect. It is not simply the *feeling* of alienation, but the *condition* of alienation. I propose applying this concept to the subject of violence.

On the second point, I argue we can extend the analysis beyond the case of war to our relations to violence more generally. I suspect many of Ryan's observations regarding war will have parallels in other domains and thus, that it is fair to describe our age not only as one of alienated war, but as one of *alienated violence*.[8] I include familiar institutions such as domestic policing and the supporting judiciary, practices of criminal punishment, border patrols, detentions, and deportations, systemic domestic abuse and sexual violence, and structural violence connected with poverty and racism

in this analysis.[9] These institutions and social practices exemplify the modern organization and conceptualization of violence as essentially alienated. In the remainder of this section, I illustrate our alienated condition via discussion of selected features of the above institutions. My discussion draws parallels with Marx's analysis of alienated labour with reference to the product, process, others, and the self.

I turn first to the 'product'. In Marx's analysis of wage labour, workers are alienated from the objects they produce in that they do not own them (rather, produced objects are owned by the capitalist) nor control them (they have no control over who the produced objects are to be sold to, how they are used, etc.). The modern organization and conceptualization of violence allows for a similar mode of alienation, both in terms of ownership and control. Weber famously defines the modern state as the body that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This monopoly consists in part of restricting *which* individuals are authorized to use violence on behalf of the state. Some individuals are permitted, in fact employed, to be violent on behalf of the state, while the rest of us are prohibited from using violence. Moreover, police, military, and intelligence agencies are bureaucratically separated and protected from direct civilian input. *Someone else* decides when we deploy the military: against whom, with what weapons, in what manner, etc. It is someone else's decision how many police or prison guards are employed where, when water cannons will be used, which laws will be enthusiastically enforced, and so on. Even in democratic states where there is at least theoretical control of these institutions via elected representatives, such representatives rely heavily on information provided by the military, police, and other bodies protected from direct democratic influence. The result is that the civilian public has little, if any, control over when, how, against whom, and to what extent, state violence is used.

There is a potentially hostile element to our externalized and organized violence and its separate mechanisms of control.[10] That is, while justification for such measures frequently appeals to their role in protecting the public from violence, they can facilitate the organized use of violence against citizens. Modern history is littered with military coups and dictatorships that exercise violence with indifference or hostility to the interests of their general populations. Related worries were raised by some members of the Gates Commission, a team tasked with evaluating the proposed shift from conscription to an all-volunteer

(i.e. professionalized) military in the USA. The worry was that an all-volunteer force would lack individuals sceptical of authority and command and who would weaken the ability of military leaders to rely on the obedience of their troops.[11] In the end, the Commission supported an all-volunteer force, suggesting that:

> There are responsibilities to be met in maintaining civilian control, but they must be exercised from above rather than at the lowest level of the enlisted ranks. They reside in the Halls of Congress, and in the White House as well as in the military hierarchy. (Gates et al. 1970, p. 14)

This response highlights the felt disconnect and potential for hostility posed by an externalized volunteer-force: control of a potentially threatening military is not to be gained internally, but rather via another, similarly disconnected (i.e. alienated) institutional body; in this case, the US Government.

Alienation from the 'process' of violence captures the ways in which the activity and experience of violence is disconnected from its effects. This includes the decision to act, which in the military and police for example, is broken down into a number of decisions made by different individuals. As a result, the individual state agent makes very restricted decisions. It may be true that it is the soldier's final decision to pull the trigger, but it was not the soldier's decision to be shipped overseas, to classify the individuals across the border as 'enemies', to be placed in a situation in which she may have to shoot to protect her colleagues. A soldier does not get to decide his role, in which wars he is deployed, which weapons he will use, who he is commanded to kill, or when to risk 'collateral damage'.

A further layer of alienation comes in the form of actual physical distance or remoteness from the process of violence. Modern technology enables the delivery of violence from both a physical and emotional distance. Technicians can identify and fire on targets using unmanned drone aircraft. The resulting violence is distant both in the sense that the violence could be on the other side of the globe, and in the sense that the type of action (e.g. gently pushing a button) seems fundamentally disconnected from the nature of the result (e.g. killing people). Modern technology allows even those most directly involved in violence to be violent via actions that do not *feel* like they are being violent.

While the degree of disconnect and amount of distance made possible by modern technology is particularly striking, innovation along this dimension (i.e. greater alienation with respect to the 'process' of violence) is not new. The introduction of firearms for example, similarly increases the physical distance at which one can effect violence and changes the way in which it is performed (e.g. pulling a trigger). When compared to previous technologies such as the use of swords, clubs, or even older methods such as the use of hands, feet, etc. to commit violence, the introduction of firearms similarly represents greater alienation. This is consistent with the Marxist-Hegelian notion of alienation, in that the status of a power is always *relative* (e.g. drones as compared to muskets, and muskets as compared to bare hands).

Similarly, the various institutional and ideological arrangements of modern violence produce distorted and alienated relations between individuals. Echoing the relations between the capitalist bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the relations between the civilian (or noncombatants) and the various state agents tasked with the labour of violence (combatants) could be described as exploitative and conflictual.[12] Noncombatants divest themselves both of the unwanted business and moral burden of violence onto combatants. As the face of state violence, combatants also provide the target for people's anger and frustration. For example, it is the police officer beating an anti-capitalism protester who represents the 'enemy', not the masses of civilians with mutual funds driving the demand for profit. Moreover, the civilian public has become dependent on, but also wary of the police, military, and judiciary—these highly organized and equipped bodies do genuinely pose a substantial threat.[13] Existence of this fear does affect the relations between civilians and those employed in state violence.

Delegating our security work to others also affects the relations between civilians and weakens the demands we place on each other for security and assistance. Under modern institutions of the state, civilians have very limited duties to help others in distress or when threatened, consisting mainly of a duty to alert the appropriate authority (i.e. to 'call security'). Reliance on state agents to intervene results in a reduced civilian ability to deal with human conflict (i.e. a de-skilling), and a reduction in trust among civilians that others will help when needed.

Finally, Marx's analysis of alienation from the self draws on Feuerbach's notion of species-being, or an awareness of oneself as belonging to the human species. Species-being denotes conscious action

directed at our interdependence and cognisance of human interconnection. Alienation from the self refers to the distorted emphasis on individualism, false notions of independence, and the disconnect between individual and social development.

We can thus note how the current organization of violence supports certain (distorted) notions of the nature of our interrelations and obscures the role that violence plays in enabling ways of life. The separation between civilian and soldier, and police and public, means the majority of individuals do not engage in direct physical violence as part of their everyday lives. Civilians are not confronted with the violence that sustains their way of life and thus form the distorted belief that our daily interactions are naturally sociable and unmediated, when they in fact depend on substantial violence. For example, familiar Western forms of life require exclusionary state sovereignty practices that coercively deny non-residents access to state territory and associated resources and rights. This is in addition to domestic practices of incarceration and punishment that maintain and enforce exploitative relations of property ownership and conditions of poverty. These violent practices and their role in the maintenance of apparently civil relations go largely unnoticed by the average citizen. Moreover, as establishing and maintaining security is delegated to the state (and its officers), civilians are therefore relieved of the task of developing conflict resolution skills, and avoid the necessity of developing friendly and respectful relations with others.[14] The task of enabling sociability has been outsourced to the state, which as an impersonal and external body, relies on authority, force, and threats. Individuals then, mistake externalized force as the basis of security, and the apparent absence of violence from their daily lives as evidence of their civilized, non-violent character. The civilian is thus enabled to deny aspects of herself, to refuse to identify with certain violent qualities. In failing to recognize the violence that supports her way of life, the civilian fails to recognize herself as a violent being and remains ignorant of her nature.

In sum, a Marxist-Hegelian notion of alienation provides a wide-ranging and robust theoretical lens through which to examine violence across numerous dimensions of modern life, including the organization, phenomenology, and distribution of violence. It calls for the examination of concrete relations and the mechanisms and machinery that mediate or support these relations. Furthermore, it draws attention to broader historical developments and to questions about our attitudes towards violence.

One of the key features of alienated violence is the division of labour, meaning the vast majority of us are no longer directly involved with the business of violence. This distance has allowed us to become sensitized to direct, physical violence. Alienation from direct forms of violence provides the space in which such sensitivity can be either cultivated or allowed re-expression. Furthermore, our alienation allows us to come to think of violence as *morally* wrong. If violence were something many of us had to do frequently, we would likely become morally accustomed to it—we'd see it as 'less wrong'.[15]

Another effect of alienated violence is how it allows us to think about *ourselves* as non-violent people. And we *like* to think of ourselves as such—there are very few individuals who *want* to think of themselves as violent. The hidden, externalized nature of much modern violence engenders this: we are able to go about our daily lives feeling as if we never harm or wrong anyone. This self-perception is a direct consequence of our alienation from violence. It is precisely its concealed nature that allows us to develop this sensitivity to and distaste for violence, but also to (falsely) think of ourselves as non-violent. Distance makes us less aware of the very violence we do in fact engage in.

These consequences of alienated violence are not entirely accidental but reflect in some sense the relationship with violence we *desire* to have. The alienation of violence is not an unintended side effect of chance technological invention, but the product of developments made to achieve certain relations with violence, specifically, alienated relations. This is in contrast with (the Marxist-Hegelian theory of) alienated productive power, where alienation can be understood as a kind of means used to achieve the end of increased production. With violence, alienation is itself (at least partly) the desired end; we want to distance ourselves from our violence. But note that this does not conflict with the Marxist-Hegelian theory of alienation—rather, it complements it. Drawing on Feuerbach, Marx claims that humans have a fundamental need for self-affirmation, which is achieved in part by recognizing and valuing oneself through the effects of one's productive powers. However, this self-affirmation can be undermined as we run up against our frailties and limitations, and experience of failure. Both Feuerbach (2012) and Marx argue that, in response to these failures, and driven by our need for self-affirmation, we develop religion, placing our ideals in a separate 'God'. Embodied in this 'perfect' being, our affirmations are

protected from our failures, while offering a substitute source of meaning and value.

But, as Rubinoff (1974) suggests, our ability to self-affirm is threatened not only by our failures to achieve our ideals, but also by the existence of our capacities for 'evil'. We therefore frequently make use of similar externalizing schemes to protect us from identifying with these capacities that challenge our ability to self-affirm. As we imagine a benevolent and powerful God, we also imagine a malevolent power (Satan) to whom we credit the evils in the world, including in our own behaviour. Rubinoff describes how the myth of Satan functions as an excuse, a story that can be appealed to when trying to explain the existence of evil both in the world and in ourselves. Such stories allow us to act on our aggression without seeing it as our own, allowing us to appeal to an external cause when we try to explain our actions. For example, it is not that we *wanted* to act violently, an impulse that undermines our ability to affirm ourselves; rather, we were *forced* to violence via some external necessity (e.g. possession by the devil). This leads Rubinoff to argue that modern forms of this same desire and externalizing strategy abound, including, for example, the 'I was just doing my job' excuse offered by those running concentration camps.

It is clear a similar story can be told for violence. The desire to externalize and distance oneself from one's own violence is driven by the recognition of how violence interferes with our ability to self-affirm. We cannot (in the modern world) *value* ourselves as violent beings. Therefore, we seek technologies and ideologies that allow us to think of ourselves as non-violent. This in turn motivates the other side of the dialectic: as noted above, our increased distance from violence allows us to come to see it as 'more wrong', and to (falsely) see ourselves as less violent. Thus, the combination of our dislike of violence and our desire to think of ourselves as non-violent pushes us towards taking alienated violence to be an end in itself.

3.4   Re-appropriated Violence

We have now extended and developed Ryan's two initial insights. The pacifist impulse is tied to a fellow-creature feeling that makes killing and violence unthinkable; and a historically-informed analysis of contemporary violence as primarily alienated. What is revealed by considering

these phenomena together? As described, alienation introduces dimensions of distance. This distance is sometimes physical, emotional, moral, agential, and phenomenological. Moreover, this distance seems to enable greater violence. Individuals are removed or isolated from the workings of violence in ways that obscure or minimize its perception and felt effect. As a result, there is less impetus, and less ability, to stop violence. But, contrary to our earlier characterizations drawn from Orwell and Ryan, the distance that alienated violence introduces does not inhibit our fellow-creature feeling. That is, many individuals are not violent as a consequence of *lacking* fellow-creature feeling.[16] Rather, it enables a development of *greater* sensitivity to our fellow creatures and their moral demands.

The problem of alienated violence then is not the familiar worries about desensitization or dehumanization that enables violence. The problem lies in the *disconnect* it introduces between fellow-creature feelings and our actions. It is not the case that alienated violence causes our fellow-creature feeling to be dulled or overridden when confronted with killing another. Rather, it organizes violence such that the confrontation is avoided and our fellow-creature feeling has little to no chance to work. Our alienated condition facilitates (or even requires) participation in violent structures and practices with little or even no awareness on our part. It is difficult to know how our actions reflect contempt or indifference for our fellows. For instance, an individual may contribute to a coercive border system through paying taxes and political apathy. But this individual does not face the desperate migrant's struggling to cross the border and is not required to personally use force to turn them away or incarcerate them. Thus, the individual benefits from a deeply coercive system without having to face the violence it requires or her role in its perpetuation. One's treatment of others as an 'enemy' is hidden from oneself, and even lives comfortably alongside explicit commitment to cultivate fellow-creature feelings. In a sense, alienation serves to render the fellow-creature feeling impotent with respect to its usual function, i.e. to inhibit violence. Being sensitive to fellow-creature feeling is thus insufficient for preventing or inhibiting violence.

Recognition of this effect helps to pinpoint the problem and to suggest an alternative focus: the focus ought not be (only) on cultivating fellow-creature feeling, or faulting others for their apparent insensitivity to others' fellow-creature status. The problem is not that individuals lack sensitivity, but that we have created technologies of violence that do not

depend on individual insensitivity to work. In my view, this analysis is helpful not only for reconceiving the problem, but also for pointing us towards alternative resources for a response. To see how, we must first return briefly to the Marxist-Hegelian notion of alienation.

Importantly, alienation is the second in a three-stage process of human development.[17] In the first stage, we experience the immediate effects of our powers, though unreflectively. Our powers are exercised directly, but they provide only a limited basis for self-affirmation. In the second stage (alienation), externalization allows these powers to be developed further, though this development is disconnected from its potential to support self-affirmation. The third and final stage consists of a re-appropriation of our developed powers, such that they are able to serve as the basis for self-affirmation. Consequently, on Hegel's view, alienation is a necessary step in human development, though it is eventually to be overcome as alienated powers are re-appropriated. Marx challenges aspects of Hegel's view, in particular, the idea that we can overcome alienation simply by coming to understand our condition. Importantly for Marx, overcoming alienation (in religion, the state, or in labour) requires concrete *re-appropriation* of developed powers. Re-appropriated labour for Marx, does not entail a return to undeveloped, agrarian forms of production. It is not a 'going back' to earlier relations. Rather, re-appropriation describes a reclaiming of control and ownership over the means of production, and the proper utilization of these powers for the fulfilment of social needs and as grounds for self-affirmation.

I suggest applying this notion of re-appropriation to the subject of alienated violence. As Ryan notes, acknowledging the problems around alienated war should not lead one to conclude that the solution is to pursue *unalienated* war; the solution is not to return to prior arrangements and practices concerning war.[18] Rather, I suggest that re-appropriated violence consists of taking back control of how violence is used and re-engaging with the process of violence in ways that incorporate the developed sensitivity to the fellow-creature feeling. This could involve identifying the ways in which one's participation in or support of violence has been co-opted, and to engage in relevant non-cooperation strategies.[19] Or relatedly, one could engage in efforts to make the violence in alienated structures tangible, for instance by orchestrating encounters that evoke fellow-creature feeling, perhaps via non-violent confrontations and self-subjection to violence. In this way, institutions

are brought concretely under civilian control rather than the mere theoretical control of today's institutions.

Control and engagement mark only two of our four dimensions of alienation. Re-appropriating violence ought also to be paired with recognition of one's own violence. Complementing Marx's insight on the connection between re-appropriated labour and self-affirmation, re-appropriated violence provides the grounds for truthful self-understanding and altered relations with others. Non-cooperation efforts make salient the ways in which one's life is dependent on and participates in violent practices or institutions and undermine our denial of these aspects of ourselves. And, when paired with a developed fellow-creature feeling, this self-understanding motivates efforts to lessen our violence. Re-appropriated violence, therefore, is the reconciling of our developed felt rejection of violence with developed skills of sociability and dismantling of institutional violence, a reconciliation that provides social and individual resources for understanding the self and our place. Finally, I suggest it is appropriate to call this re-appropriated violence, *pacifism*. It incorporates the pacifist impulse developed through the process of alienation, but dissolves the distance associated with alienated violence that rendered this impulse impotent. Pacifism, in my view, is not an ahistorical or idealist moral commitment, but rather a materialist position that requires changes in the relations of violence as well as in our understanding of violence.

3.5   CONCLUSION

The above offers only an initial sketch of pacifism understood as re-appropriated violence, though its value lies not in its concrete details but in its ability to prompt an alternative way of conceiving of pacifism in light of our alienated condition. Moreover, this ambiguity is theoretically fitting given the move away from conceiving pacifism as a set of idealized principles. As re-appropriated violence, and the material realization of a fellow-creature feeling, pacifism could take many different forms. In this way, the above analysis again follows Marx, who famously refrained from specifying the form that communism would take. The task then is not to speculate on the resulting institutions or final shape of pacifism, but to collectively reflect on the violence in our lives and how to bring our fellow-creature feeling to bear upon it.

Notes

1. This characterization is in tension with traditional understandings of pacifism as representing either a staunch commitment to certain principles, or a pragmatic choice having evaluated the effectiveness of non-violent tactics. Ryan's observation suggests another way of thinking about pacifism that moves away from the above dichotomy. See Atack (2012, pp. 158–160) for a survey of existing theories of pacifism and nonviolence, categorized as either principled or pragmatic.
2. Diamond also appeals to Orwell's notion of a fellow-creature feeling.
3. See Noddings (2010) and Ruddick (1995).
4. Carol Adams (2015) connects this dismissal to a gendered rejection of the value of emotion, and in particular, the rejection of care for non-human animals as 'womanly' or feminine.
5. I agree with Diamond that mercy killing can be compatible with, or expressive of fellow-creature feeling.
6. As formulated, the fellow-creature feeling is cast as having primarily negative effects, i.e. it inhibits or prevents certain actions. I think this is too narrow. Rather, a more complete characterization, which I will not be able to expand on here, will include motivation to engage in positive actions as well. Ruddick's (1995) position, for example, seems to offer a more complete and positive account.
7. See Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* for his analysis of alienation (1970).
8. While I have argued elsewhere in support of a (non-standard) attitudinal conception of violence (Cawston 2015), the following analysis does not hinge on accepting a specific formulation of 'violence' and should therefore appeal to a wide group. Specifically, it is compatible with 'restricted' definitions that characterize violence in terms of direct, personal, forceful action typically resulting in harm or injury, and with 'wide' definitions that acknowledge more indirect and impersonal modes of causing harm.
9. While not the subject of this chapter, I am happy to include environmental violence and the degradation of non-human animals in an analysis of modern alienated violence.
10. In her historical analysis of the use of mercenaries, Percy (2007) describes the recurring worries about control of a mercenary army, or conversely, how fears about standing armies influenced support for volunteer armies. See also Tilly (1985) for similar worries about the ways in which the state's monopoly on violence promises protection while simultaneously constituting a threat to one's security.
11. See Fiala (2010, pp. 53–65) for a related discussion of the conflicting issues concerning civilian control of the military.

12. See Strawser and Robillard (forthcoming).

13. The threat may be greater for some groups or communities within a state, for example, the mass incarceration, racial profiling, and police-related deaths of African Americans that prompted the 'Black Lives Matter' movement in 2012.

14. While conflict resolution measures and relationship building may be part of our private friendships and family lives, such forms of interaction are often thought to be unsuitable as the model for socio-political life. Some theorists however, resist this dismissal, including Gandhi, who writes 'there is no reason to believe that there is one law for families and another for nations' (2009, p. 88), and Ruddick (1995), who argues that the practice of mothering can usefully be applied to the realm of international politics. But such proposals are notable for their divergence from the standard view, which is to consider family relations as the site for care in contrast to our economic and political relations. Thank you to the editors for raising this point.

15. As Tolstoy points out, '[t]here is no stench, no sound, no monstrosity, to which a man cannot get used, so that he no longer notices what is startling to a man who is not used to it. The same is true in the moral sphere' (Tolstoy 2009, p. 21).

16. Some individuals, of course, do lack fellow-creature feeling and are cause for concern. However, it is widely recognized that such individuals are worrisome, whereas those who are sensitive to it (at least to some degree) are generally left unscrutinized. It is the actions and attitudes of this moderately caring cohort, however, that facilitate some of the greatest contemporary violence and therefore justify this focus.

17. This is not at the individual level, but rather describes a socio-historical phenomenon.

18. For instance, one might advocate a return to conscription as a way to reduce alienation. Rather than delegating the direct violence of war to a professional (voluntary) military, a conscripted force requires individuals engage directly with the violence of state warfare. To be clear, Ryan explicitly rejects this approach as a way to respond to his analysis of alienated war.

19. As Gandhi (2009), Václav Havel (1985) and Gene Sharp (2013) argue, totalitarian regimes depend on mass cooperation and thus the public does have a dimension of control that can be exercised non-violently via non-cooperation tactics.

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Global Intellectual History of Pacifism

CHAPTER 4

The Pacifisms of the Peace Movement

Martin Ceadel

4.1   Introduction

As the contributions to this volume indicate, pacifism is a contested concept that is variously defined and categorized according to the purposes of the analyst. My definition and categorization, and therefore also my analytical bias, arise from the structure and arguments of the movement that has long campaigned for the abolition of war. This 'peace movement' has always possessed two distinct wings, absolutist and reformist. The former, inspired by sectarian Protestantism, has immediately and unconditionally rejected armed force: it has thus proposed to abolish war through mass conscientious objection. The latter, inspired by the Enlightenment, has believed that international relations can be made peaceful by the application of reason: until this transformative programme of reform is complete, however, armed force may be retained for certain purposes, such as self-defence and the upholding of international law.

In 1901 Émile Arnaud of the *Ligue international de la paix et de la liberté*, a French peace association, coined '*le Pacifisme*' as an umbrella term for the full range of the peace movement's thinking. His new word soon caught on in most European languages, unlike 'paxism', which

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some British peace activists had been unsuccessfully promoting since 1897 (*Concord* 1897, p. 90). But during the First World War 'pacifism' became more narrowly associated with absolutism, a shift of meaning which occurred because so many reformists supported their national war efforts—including Arnaud himself, who became a decorated war hero—that it was widely considered counter-intuitive still to call them 'pacifists' when conscientious objectors and other war resisters seemed to merit the label more. For that reason I have always used 'pacifism' in an absolutist sense only, and have borrowed '*pacificism*', which I italicize in order to avoid visual confusion, from the historian and campaigner against nuclear weapons A. J. P. Taylor (1957, p. 51) when referring to the reformist strand of peace-movement thinking. The labels chosen are, however, much less important than the recognition that the absolutist and reformist positions are fundamentally distinct. Both, moreover, are complex and diverse viewpoints in their own right, as I shall demonstrate.

4.2   The Peace Movement

How was a social movement able to claim 'peace' as its particular goal, given that—apart from a handful of militarists who believe that war advances civilization, and a few crusaders who believe that aggression can promote justice (Ceadel 1987, chs. 3–4)—most people have always sought to avoid international conflict? The answer is that most war-averse people assumed that the best way to prevent it was to maintain strong and vigilant national defences—a view which I call 'defencism' (Ceadel 1987, ch. 5) and which academic students of international relations subsume into their category of 'realism'. Defencists or realists thus believed that the best to which the international system could aspire was an armed truce between watchful and well-defended states. By contrast, the peace movement asserted the possibility of 'peace' of a more positive and permanent kind. In doing so, it was inspired not only by longstanding religious or secular ideals but also by a new confidence in civil society's ability to turn such ideals into reality through pressure-group action.

Historically, the peace movement can be traced back to the campaign in Britain against the country's involvement in the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars of 1793–1815. A minority of these 'friends of peace', as they then called themselves, were absolutists: the first texts arguing that absolute pacifism was the correct interpretation of their faith for all Christians, and not just for those who belong to peculiar sects

such as Mennonites or Quakers, were published in London during 1796 (Ceadel 1996, pp. 171–174). But the peace campaign was mainly conducted by merchants of Unitarian faith who were reformists (Cookson 1982). Towards the end of those French wars a similar campaign was launched in the United States by both absolutists and reformists against its involvement in a war with Britain that began in 1812 and was settled by a peace treaty signed in December 1814, some months ahead of Napoleon's final defeat in Europe.

In both countries pacifists and *pacificists* alike agreed that they could not institutionalize their campaigns until their country's war ended. In consequence, the world's first peace associations were founded in New York and Massachusetts during 1815 and in London during 1816. From the start these associations clearly understood the distinction between absolutism and reformism: indeed, the first four of them adopted four different strategies for dealing with it. The first, the New York Peace Society set up in August 1815, stated that only pacifists could join—a restrictively purist view which it eventually had to modify. The second, the Massachusetts Peace Society launched four months later, admitted *pacificists* on an equal basis with pacifists. The third, the Society for Abolishing War formed in London during March 1816, was exclusively for *pacificists*, dismissing pacifists as utopians. The fourth, the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace established in London during June 1816, catered for both types of peace activists, albeit in a hierarchical way: its leadership was strictly pacifist, which satisfied its Quaker backers, whose financial support was crucial; but it allowed *pacificists* to join as ordinary members, which broadened its base.

For many decades, this inclusive but hierarchical formula worked well: the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace—soon known in Britain as the Peace Society for short, and abroad as the London Peace Society—was the acknowledged international leader of the movement (Ceadel 2017). It organized the first world peace congress, in London in 1843, and along with the American pacifist Elihu Burritt co-organized the larger and more genuinely international gatherings held in Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, and London in 1848–1851 (Ceadel 1996, chs. 8–10). However, during the second half of the nineteenth century, peace associations of a secular and *pacificist* kind began to be formed, particularly in continental Europe, where Christian pacifism was much weaker. In particular, as France faced a growing challenge from a united and industrialized Germany, it developed *pacificist*

associations committed to the development an enforcement of international law. Moreover, these associations became prominent in the international movement, which organized a series of 'universal' peace congresses on an annual basis from 1889 onwards (Cooper 1991). By 1914, therefore, the peace movement, though still weak in authoritarian countries, was an established feature in western Europe as well as in the English-speaking world. Moreover, in consequence of the horrors of trench warfare, the development of military aviation and the creation of the League of Nations its influence was to reach a peak during the inter-war period, particularly in Britain.

The structure and internal arguments of the peace movement lie at the heart of my classification of pacifism, which (to reiterate) I distinguish sharply from *pacificism*. Before separately analysing these two strands of thought, I must acknowledge three limiting consequences of deriving my classification in this way.

First, although thinking about peace goes back centuries—indeed, Christian pacifists believed they were reviving the practice of the early church—and although it can also be found in many cultures across the globe, the civil-society activism that produced the peace movement emerged at a particular time and place. I shall therefore have little to say here about the ancient, non-western, and non-Christian worlds; and I shall draw most of my illustrations from inter-war Britain, because it possessed the strongest and most opinionated peace movement.

Second, although the just-war tradition has been a dominant strand in Christian thinking, particularly among Roman Catholics, it has aspired to civilize war by restricting the methods by which it can be conducted and the reasons for which it can be started. By contrast, the peace movement has aspired to abolish war, which it has regarded as irredeemably horrific, and has suspected that efforts to civilize warfare are designed to make it more acceptable. The just-war tradition is therefore here treated as a form of defencism, albeit of a constructive and influential kind, rather than as a form of pacifism however broadly defined.

Third, the peace movement's belief that war can be abolished also differentiates it from the fellow travellers which it acquires at moments when some defencists lose confidence in their capacity to deter aggression. These fellow travellers have most famously included America's inter-war isolationists who reacted against their country's intervention in the First World War, the British Conservatives who endorsed Neville Chamberlain's policy of concessions to Germany out of fear of

the *Luftwaffe*, and the supporters of the accommodation with Hitler made by France's authoritarian Vichy regime. Their anti-war policies—neutrality, appeasement, and collaboration—were short-term defencist expedients adopted for prudential reasons. Although they were sometimes supported by the peace movement, they cannot meaningfully be described as either pacifist or *pacificist*.

4.3   Varieties of Pacificism

I shall begin my analysis with *pacificism* because it has always inspired the larger of the peace movement's two wings. It has been a highly diverse body of thought, because so many different approaches have been taken to the reform of international relations, just as they have been to the reform of domestic politics (Ceadel 1987, ch. 6). Among peace activists, these differences have usually been ideological: for example, liberals have believed that free-trade capitalism creates an economic interdependence that is conducive to peace and should therefore be encouraged; but socialists, especially of a Marxist persuasion, have argued that it generates social and international conflict and should therefore be abolished. Among academic participants in the same debate, differences have also been methodological, as rival disciplines prioritize factors of particular relevance to them: for example, lawyers have tended to regard international law as crucial for the abolition of war; political scientists have been more likely to regard the political structure, either domestic or international, as the key determinant; and economists have been naturally predisposed towards economic influences.

The earliest coherent *pacificist* theory put forward by British peace campaigners identified regime type as the crucial factor. Monarchical and aristocratic government caused war, which could therefore only be abolished by creating a republican regime that prioritized the interests of ordinary citizens. Put forward in the 1790s by radical admirers of the French revolution such as William Godwin, this theory lost support as the true nature of France's revolutionary regime revealed itself. But the domestic political structure re-surfaced as a *pacificist* priority more than a century later, in the form of calls from radicals during the anxious years before the First World War for the democratic control of foreign policy to counter the perceived malign influence of secretive diplomats and arms traders. Thus, the first and largest peace association to be created in Britain during that war called itself the Union of Democratic Control

(Swarz 1971). And three quarters of a century later, as the Cold War ended, many American academics and politicians took up the argument that democratization was the best way to abolish war because it was social-scientifically proven that democracies did not fight each other (Babst 1964; Chan 1997; Doyle 1983). Statistical logic indicated that the greater the proportion of democratic states in the international system, the lesser the chance of conflict, so that once every state had democratized, there could be no war.

In the mid-nineteenth century, as the industrial revolution began to generate far greater wealth than could be seized in an aggressive war, English liberals such as Richard Cobden started arguing that free international commerce was the most effective way to bind nations together in prosperity and peace. When the British government was persuaded in 1846 to espouse free trade and thereby forfeit its considerable income from agricultural tariffs, Cobden feared it would raise income tax instead. He therefore called for a cut in British public expenditure, and realized that this was best achieved by reducing spending on armaments; and, to minimize any security risk attached to such a reduction, he began calling for the arbitration of international disputes (Ceadel 2006). The resultant Cobdenite package of free trade, armaments reduction, and international arbitration became the most influential strand of *pacificist* thinking in Britain, and also found some adherents in continental Europe. However, prior to the First World War most British liberals believed that international agreements would somehow be self-enforcing. By contrast, their counterparts in the United States, who were influenced by their federal system and its supreme court, and in France, who anticipated that any arbitration agreement would be flouted by Germany, both argued for a supranational authority that could enforce international law. It was only after the outbreak of war in 1914 that British liberals came up with the idea of a League of Nations, and the American president Woodrow Wilson did the most to bring it into being (Ceadel 2013). The League was the great *pacificist* hope of the inter-war era. Its evident failure in the Abyssinian crisis of 1935–1936 was a painful blow from which the liberal strand of *pacificist* thinking has still not recovered. Because of its Security Council, the United Nations, which replaced the League of Nations in 1945, has operated more as a concert of great powers than as a democracy of nations: in consequence, despite helping to avoid a third world war and resolving many conflicts, it has never aroused the same liberal enthusiasm as its predecessor.

The ideological movement that put itself forward as a progressive alternative to liberalism in domestic politics also produced its own brand of *pacificism*. The socialist parties that appeared in the late nineteenth century accused capitalism of causing international conflict, and, pending its overthrow, called for a general strike against a capitalist government that prepared for war. In 1916 the Russian revolutionary Lenin concluded that it was in the form of imperialism that capitalism was most bellicose. However, socialist *pacificism* was seriously damaged by its subsequent association with the Soviet Union.

Single-issue explanations were also sometimes advanced. For example, the foreign secretary who took Britain into the First World War singled out the arms race as the root cause of that conflict (Grey of Fallodon 1925, i, pp. 91–92). My favourite such theory is dietary: 'The soldiers march, because of starch' (Avrich 2005, p. 35). In principle, of course, there is an almost unlimited range of possible *pacificisms.*

Indeed, two new varieties have appeared since the Second World War: more explicitly than the women's movement had previously done, feminists held patriarchy responsible for war; and green parties blamed the upsetting of the ecological balance. Yet the rise of human rights as a rival progressive priority soon harmed *pacificism*. That rise has been partly caused by a decline in the use of armed force *between* states but an increase *within* failed or repressive states since the end of the Cold War. But it has also arisen from a general loss of confidence in grand ideologies which has affected even advanced states (Moyn 2010). Once upon a time, French republicans were convinced that their type of regime automatically ensured the rights of man: they therefore considered it impossible to invoke a human right, such as a right to conscientious objection, *against* their republic. Many Americans once thought the same about their liberal constitution, as did the Soviet Union and its satellites about their communist systems. But now almost all progressives accept that no regime can be ideologically so perfect as to be immune from human-rights challenges. This loss of ideological self-belief has meant that few *pacificists* now promote their theories with the intellectual confidence of a Godwin, a Cobden, or a Lenin. Indeed, much peace campaigning since the Second World War has focused more narrowly on particular weapons (nuclear warheads, landmines, drones) and on particular military interventions (the Vietnam War, the invasion of Iraq in 2003) rather than on grand, war-abolishing schemes. The one seeming exception, democratic peace theory, was (as has been noted) the grand project

not of the peace movement but of American political science, for which it represented a remarkable swerve away from realist theory; and it was also enthusiastically promoted by Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The recent preoccupation with human rights also led to demands for so-called humanitarian interventions and to the United Nations doctrine of 'R2P' (the responsibility to protect). Thus for the first time in the modern political era keeping the peace has been trumped as a progressive aim; and as a result *pacificism* has suffered.

4.4   Varieties of Pacifism

I now come finally and in greater detail to my analysis of pacifism of the absolutist variety. But first I make a distinction between it and mere 'exemptionism', or 'quasi-pacifism' as I originally called it (Ceadel 1980, pp. 10, 20–21, 43–46, 69, 160). Exemptionism is an objection to military service on the grounds of some special quality possessed by the objector. This quality is not possessed by most of the objector's fellow citizens, who are therefore allowed (or even encouraged) to fight in defence of society as a whole. The special quality in question can be either religious or aesthetic understanding. The International Bible Students Association, formed in London in June 1914 and known since 1931 as Jehovah's Witnesses, has supplied some of the most tenacious and courageous conscientious objectors over the last hundred years. But its members were from the outset urged 'to be peculiar, and separate and distinct from the world'. Upon the outbreak of the First World War they were instructed not to enlist in the army yet; also not 'to interfere in any manner with the world's course in respect to enlistment. Let the worldly use their own judgement while God's consecrated people use theirs' (Perkins 2016, pp. 15, 16). Likewise, although the Quakers have historically been the most important contributors to Britain's pacifist tradition, from the late nineteenth century a few of them began claiming that pacifism was binding only for 'thoroughgoing Christians' like themselves, whose duty moreover was 'to leaven, not to govern the world'. And during the First World War at least one of them argued privately that 'it was a good thing that there were not too many pacifists, as that might undermine the strength of the Allies and lead to a German victory' (Ceadel 2000, pp. 122, 162, 190). During that same conflict, moreover, several artists belonging to London's Bloomsbury Group became conscientious objectors, one of whom, when asked by a

woman why he was not fighting for civilization like his fellow countrymen, supposedly replied: 'Madam, *I* am the civilization they are fighting for' (Holroyd 1971, pp. 628–629). Exemptionists thus seek to be excused from military service because they constitute either the spiritual elect or the cultural élite. True pacifists, by contrast, believe that theirs is a viewpoint that everyone can and should embrace. They are, in other words, universalists; and although they may formulate their viewpoint in terms of a particular ideological revelation such as Christianity or socialism, they want everyone to embrace their creed, and believe this to be possible. My view of exemptionists as being distinct from pacifists is confirmed by the fact that they have stood aloof from the activities of the peace movement.

Though a seemingly simple position, pacifism is a multi-dimensional one—a fact which I have been credited with pointing out (Clough 2007, p. 374). Some of its dimensions are more of interest to philosophers than to activists. An example is the distinction between a deontological pacifism, which is asserted as a binding moral imperative—whatever its results—and a consequentialist one, which is asserted in the belief that it produces the best outcomes. There is moreover a further philosophical distinction between an absolute and a contingent version of consequentialist pacifism: the former asserts that war always has a bad outcome, whereas the latter asserts merely that it is so overwhelmingly likely to have one that the most prudent policy is always to oppose it. These distinctions can indeed be detected within pacifist discourse, but they pale into insignificance when compared with the three main issues that have differentiated and divided pacifists: where they draw the line; where they derive their inspiration; and what view they take of political action.

The first of these dimensions of pacifist disagreement measures the degree of violence that makes war unacceptable. At the most fastidious end of the pacifist spectrum, the Russian novelist and moralist Leo Tolstoy drew it at force of any kind: he therefore rejected even its benevolent use to restrain a lunatic, arguing that the true Christian 'will always prefer to be killed by a madman rather than to deprive him of his liberty' (Brock 1972, p. 463). Slightly more permissively the American non-resistant Adin Ballou allowed the non-injurious use of force, though in thus drawing the line at coercion he too implicitly questioned the police function within society. And a rather larger minority of pacifists drew the line at killing, which logically required the rejection of the death penalty too.

Drawing the line at force, coercion, or killing caused some embarrass-ment to the majority of pacifists, who drew it at armed force—in other words at the use of destructive weaponry by soldiers to kill other soldiers rather than at the use of more limited weaponry by police to restrain criminals. For example, after the London Peace Society was created in 1816 it took great care to dissociate itself from opposition either to the police function or to the death penalty, because it did not want the gov-ernment to regard it as a seditiously political organization rather than as an idealistically religious one. The society formally rejected war but implicitly defined this as the use of military weapons. It thus opposed not only conflicts between sovereign states but the conquest and repression of colonies by imperial powers. It also condemned the American Civil War of 1861–1865, though the vast majority of American pacifists sup-ported the northern cause as a police action despite the fact that it was prosecuted by methods that were less humane than those of most inter-national wars. (Even so, many northern-cause-supporting American pac-ifists refused personally to fight—a problematical position which I shall shortly discuss.) Likewise in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 some socialists, notably in Britain's Independent Labour Party, participated in the armed struggle against Franco but then opposed the Second World War. For such pacifists, the use of armed force in support of a legitimate and progressive government was acceptable, whereas its use in an inter-national conflict was not.

Drawing the line so as to allow civil but not international war is intel-lectually coherent, because when a sovereign state fights another, it can-not claim to be enforcing agreed law to the same extent as a legitimate government when it fights domestic rebels. Nonetheless, it has never had much emotional appeal. Thus the American Peace Society's reputation as a pacifist association was lastingly damaged by its approval of the war against the southern states. And when in 1943 a group of British con-scientious objectors discovered that one of their number was a socialist who had fought in the international brigade against Franco, they could not understand why he refused to fight in the British army against Hitler (Spring 1975, p. 50).

Some pacifists (of a consequentialist persuasion) have drawn the line at modern technological developments which have rendered war impermissible, whereas in the past it had sometimes been justifiable. For example, when the utilitarian philosopher and peace campaigner Bertrand Russell espoused absolute pacifism in 1936, he did so because

he believed that the aerial weapons that had recently become available made war too destructive to ever be justified, though he accepted the legitimacy of certain historical conflicts. After the Second World War others used a similar argument with respect to nuclear weapons: they argued that prior to their invention, some wars—notably that of 1939–1945—had been worth waging; but thereafter the danger of nuclear escalation was such that no war, even one started with conventional weapons only, could ever again be risked. However, although the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament called for Britain unilaterally to renounce its nuclear weapons, and attracted considerable support for this policy during both 1958–1964 and 1980–1983, few of its activists concluded that as long as nuclear weapons existed they should additionally embrace pacifism.

The second dimension of debate has concerned the inspiration or motivation for the absolute pacifism being propounded. For almost all early pacifists, this was Christianity, which they claimed to understand better than Europe's church authorities. There are indeed passages in the New Testament that seem compatible with pacifism; and early Christians included some like Tertullian, who opposed military service. But the claim that the church was originally absolutist—which had been an article of faith for some inter-war pacifists such as the Congregationalist minister and Oxford scholar Cecil J. Cadoux (1925)—is no longer generally accepted, the new scholarly consensus being that 'at least from the end of the 2nd century Christian opinion and practice on the matter were divided' and that 'throughout the 3rd century Christian support for military service grew (which is why Tertullian was provoked to write against it)' (Biggar 2013, p. 27). The pacifist interpretation of Christianity has thus been affected by the shifting modes of academic fashion. It did comparatively well in the early twentieth century when the immanent beliefs of liberal Christians were in vogue. But it suffered in the mid-1930s when academic theology turned towards the transcendentalism of the Swiss-born professor Karl Barth, especially as mediated through the writings of the influential American pastor and lapsed pacifist Reinhold Niebuhr.

If as a result of a major theological shift official Christianity were in future to declare itself pacifist, then it would have become a major world religion under false pretences. Had it not officially accepted the legitimacy of military service, it would never have been adopted by the Roman Empire after 312 AD. And without this crucial event, it

would never have become the dominant religion in Europe and, in due course, also one of the major faiths across the rest of the globe. A pacifist Christianity, if it had survived at all, would almost certainly have remained a minor sect.

By the time of the First World War a political, as distinct from religious, inspiration for pacifism had also established itself: some socialists and anarchists had begun to claim that this was the correct interpretation of their ideologies. And during the inter-war period ethical theories such as utilitarianism and humanitarianism were taken to pacifist conclusions by some of their adherents, such as Russell, as just noted, and the high-brow novelist Aldous Huxley. These new sources of inspiration for pacifism explain why new associations were formed: for example, in Britain during the last two months of 1914 the No-Conscription Fellowship (re-born in 1921 as the No More War Movement) was established for socialist pacifists, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation for Christian pacifists; and in May 1936 the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) was set up primarily for humanitarian and utilitarian pacifists.

The comparative success of this last association (which in 1937 absorbed the No More War Movement) reflected the fact that it not only mobilized those of ethical inspiration but also united them with religious and political pacifists. Indeed, pacifists have generally found less difficulty in dealing with pacifists of different inspirations than they have in dealing with non-pacifists coming from the same religious, political, or ethical starting point as themselves. This is because pacifists have usually been in a small minority within their particular inspiration, and have therefore felt close to similarly embattled minoritarians from other intellectual traditions. The vast majority of Christians have accepted the doctrine of the just war; and historically the biggest challenge to this defencist orthodoxy came not from pacifism but from the doctrine of the holy war (in other words, from crusading). Likewise, the overwhelming majority of socialists, utilitarians, and humanitarians had concluded by mid-1940 at the latest that Hitlerism was a greater evil than modern war. Only the anarchists—a tiny and inchoate political movement—seem to have been mostly predisposed in favour of pacifism.

The third dimension of debate within pacifism has concerned its policy implications, in times of both peace and war. At one extreme, optimists (usually of a consequentialist persuasion) have been convinced that pacifism can work as a defence policy in the world as it is. There have been two versions of this conviction: either aggressors will be deterred

from attacking by a country's disarmed and non-resisting stance; or, if even so they do attack, they will be wrong-footed by a strategy of non-violent (as distinct from armed) resistance. The first version was put forward by the early peace associations because of an evangelical faith in divine providence. Thus according to the London Peace Society in 1820: 'The Friends of Peace believe, that a nation and its government who are, upon purely scriptural principles, averse to all War, would be covered with a protecting panoply' (*Herald of Peace* 1820, p. 117). The second version, developed a century later under the influence of the non-violent campaigner for Indian independence Mohandas K. Gandhi, was based on the belief that even authoritarian regimes had become too civilized to massacre those resisting by non-violent means only. Thus Gandhi's leading American disciple, Richard B. Gregg, admitted in the mid-1930s that his 'basic assumption' was that all adversaries, 'no matter how forbidding externally, or no matter what their past history, are at bottom decent and have in their hearts at least a spark of good spirit which can eventually be aroused and strengthened into action' (Gregg 1935, p. 65). Gregg's ideas for non-violent training were taken up in its early months by the PPU, one of whose activists, the writer John Middleton Murry, went so far as to claim in 1937 that it 'was as near to a certainty as human reckoning can attain that against a Pacifist England, a Fascist Germany would be incapable of making war' (Murry 1937, p. 114). However, even if non-violent resistance was working reasonably well against Britain's colonial administrators in India, it was hard to see how it could prove similarly effective against the much more ruthless *Reichswehr*, not to mention the *SS* or the *Luftwaffe* in the skies above.

During wartime, optimistic pacifists have favoured defiance of the war effort. Thus, when the Second World War broke out, the PPU's optimists launched a 'Forward Movement' to condemn the war. Some of them refused even to register as conscientious objectors; and others rejected alternative service and chose prison instead. But they found themselves in a minority: most pacifists, grateful for the British state's comparatively generous treatment of them, wished to act neither subversively nor provocatively.

At the other end of pacifism's policy spectrum, pessimists (usually of a deontological persuasion) have never believed that they can currently offer what in worldly terms is a practical policy. They have regarded pacifism as a faith that they are morally impelled to profess but not as a 'stop-the-war trick', to quote a phrase used by the Fellowship

of Reconciliation, whose pacifism was always predominantly quietist (*Reconciliation* 1935, pp. 145–147). They have also felt that non-violent resistance, though morally preferable to the violent kind, was nonetheless a technique of conflict rather than a strategy of harmonization. Pessimistic pacifists have been convinced that their duty is simply to witness to values which will not be embraced by their fellow citizens in the foreseeable future. Many of them have therefore withdrawn from political activity altogether, though some have sought to form communities on peaceful lines that could in the long term demonstrate how a pacifist political order might be built up from below. In the late 1930s, as the PPU's pessimists began to distance themselves from its optimists, they became particularly enthusiastic about the idea of pacifist communities, partly because in the short term these could provide employment and support for conscientious objectors if war broke out.

By the time this outbreak duly occurred, the PPU's leading pessimists, who had organized themselves as a 'Forethought Committee', refused to obstruct the war effort. They generally co-operated with the procedures for conscientious objection: for example, a number of them performed alternative service as agricultural labourers in pacifist communities. In general, however, their community experiments proved to be disappointing: pacifists were for the most part too individualistic to live and work co-operatively together (Ceadel 1980, p. 308). Moreover, the most sensitive of them were painfully aware of consuming food which had been imported by the navy at great risk, and realized that for the pacifist who wished not to be a burden on a society at war 'the only perfectly logical thing to do is suicide', in the words of a prominent Christian pacifist (Ceadel 1980, p. 305).

The pacifist mainstream has always thought that optimistic pacifism indulges in wishful thinking, and that pessimistic pacifism is dispiritingly long-termist. It has therefore sought a middle course, which involves immediate support for *pacificism* as, though a second best, nonetheless a step in the right direction. Some *pacificist* policies—for example, the multilateral reduction of armaments—do not involve the threat or use of armed force, and so present the pacifist with few difficulties, though nineteenth-century British Quakers disliked calling for armaments reduction because this implied that a reduced level of armaments was acceptable, which as absolutists they denied.

By the mid-1930s, however, the most plausible *pacificist* policy for a mainstream pacifist to support as a second best was collective security either through the League of Nations or, as that body became

discredited, though an alternative mechanism such as a 'peace front' of progressive states. However, despite their euphemistic re-branding, collective-security operations were merely *New Wars for Old*, according to the title of a 1934 pamphlet by one of the British peace movement's veterans, Helena M. Swanwick (herself, incidentally, a *pacificist* with isolationist instincts rather than a pacifist). Some professed pacifists were prepared to accept Swanwick's claim that collective security was as horrific as war while nonetheless regarding it as a step in the right direction because it was not organized on a purely national basis. Yet they were not willing to fight even in an international army. This position of politically supporting the collective use of armed force while still excusing themselves from personal participation was taken by several prominent British absolutists during the 1930s, including Lord Allen of Hurtwood (who as Clifford Allen had been a leading socialist conscientious objector during the First World War), the humanitarian pacifist C. E. M. Joad, and the Christian pacifists Charles Raven and Leyton Richards (Ceadel 2000, pp. 138–139, 315–316).

Moreover, early in the Second World War, Cadoux wrote a book arguing that the conflict was 'relatively justified' and therefore 'better victoriously carried through' than 'discontinued before the undertaking is completed', while still claiming to be a pacifist (1940, p. 216). However, most mainstream pacifists did not endorse the military effort like Cadoux. Wishing neither to defy the state like the optimists, nor to retreat into communities like the pessimists, they preferred instead to carry out social service such as helping the victims of air raids, though they were criticized for thereby implying that a cup of tea handed out by a pacifist was somehow more significant than one dispensed by a non-pacifist (Ceadel 1980, p. 305). Thus pacifism's mainstream orientation towards political action proved to be no less problematical in its own way than those of its optimist and pessimist extremes. And, as will have become apparent from my frequent references to policy disagreements within the PPU, this third dimension of debate within pacifism caused much more friction than those over line-drawing and motivation (Ceadel 1980, pp. 138–139).

After the First World War had ended, and more especially after the failure of the League of Nations had become apparent, there was a brief moment, in Britain at least, when it seemed that pacifism might become politically significant. But Hitler's aggression and holocaust killed that possibility so decisively that even the subsequent appearance of nuclear

weapons did not boost pacifism as much as might otherwise have been expected, given the massive increase in the destructive potential of all-out war. Since the Second World War, though propounded by distinguished academics such as Stanley Hauerwas, Richard B. Hays, and John Howard Yoder, pacifism has attracted little public attention. Its assured political marginality, as well as the fact that the ordinary citizen's potential contribution to defence has steadily declined as war has become almost entirely a professional and highly technological activity, have helped it make its one significant breakthrough during this period: most countries have made legal provision for conscientious objectors, whereas in the First World War the only combatant states to do so were Britain, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada. Indeed, thanks largely to the efforts of Jehovah's Witnesses, conscientious objection—albeit to combatant military service only—has recently come to be accepted in Europe as a human right (Ceadel 2015, p. 202).

4.5   Conclusion

The classification I have here put forward reflects two historical facts. The first is that those most actively dedicated to abolishing war (as distinct from merely civilizing it) have from the outset been divided into absolutists and reformists. Peace associations that tried to cater to both groups found this hard: the National Peace Council that attempted after 1904 to co-ordinate the whole British movement was dismissed by one of its leading members during the 1930s as 'a kind of eunuch organization, unable to take a decision one way or another' because of the unbridgeable divide between pacifists and *pacificists*; and the Women's International League, which had been organized according to gender rather than according to policy, split in 1940 when pacifists captured it and its *pacificists* largely seceded (Ceadel 2000, pp. 317, 407). The second fact is that in the English-speaking world it is the absolutists who are more usually called 'pacifists' than the reformists. Even so, *pacificists* have always been more numerous, although their various reform projects for abolishing war have all required an ideological confidence that has lately been in short supply. Pacifism of the absolute kind has been a minority faith of considerable diversity given its cleavages over line-drawing, motivation, and political action. It enjoyed a brief moment of potential political relevance in the late 1930s; but it has had little public impact since the Second World War, which paradoxically has encouraged a widespread legal toleration of conscientious objection.

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Tolstoy's Pacifism and the Critique of State Violence

Iain Atack

The great Russian novelist and writer Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) became an eloquent and influential proponent of pacifism during the final phase of his life. He promoted these views widely through essays, books and correspondence. Tolstoy developed an unequivocal and unconditional form of pacifism that rejected not only war but all forms of individual and collective violence, based on his highly personal and perhaps idiosyncratic interpretation of Christian doctrine as expressed in general through the Gospels, in particular in the Sermon on the Mount.

Tolstoy extended his pacifism to include a rejection of the state as a form of institutionalized violence, expressed through war and internal repression. The military infrastructure of the state, in the form of its armaments and armed forces, was deployed through wars and violent conflict, resulting in widespread destruction and death. The state also depended upon and utilized systematic violence as the basis of its rule over its subjects and citizens, according to Tolstoy. Thus, Tolstoy is often identified as not only a pacifist but also as an anarchist, because of the

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inextricable link he saw between the state and violence as an instrument of aggression, power and control.

There are two interconnected dimensions to Tolstoy's pacifism, the normative and the political. The normative dimension is expressed through his rejection of violence, based on his interpretation of the ethical requirements of Christianity. The political dimension involves his critique of the state as a form of institutionalized violence, expressed most obviously in its dependence on the military and its use of armed force to defend and further the interests of the elites who dominate it and control it.

The normative dimension takes priority for Tolstoy, because it is his interpretation of the ethical requirements of Christianity that provides the basis for his pacifism and his critique of the state. Tolstoy views Christianity, and the Gospels in particular, as primarily a moral doctrine, based on the 'law of love' and the injunction to 'resist not evil'. Thus, Tolstoy regards normative change, or a change of values and beliefs, as the key to social and political change. The basis of social change for Tolstoy is a transformation of human consciousness rather than a change in material and political conditions. In other words, Tolstoy emphasizes the significance of normative change (in accordance with the values and ideals of Christianity) for achieving institutional or political change, such as the pacifist objective of abolishing or eliminating war.

5.1   Pacifism and Christianity

Tolstoy's commitment to pacifism and nonviolence is derived from his distinctive and perhaps idiosyncratic interpretation of Christianity. Tolstoy underwent a profound personal crisis following the publication of his novel *Anna Karenina*, and turned to Christianity for solace. Tolstoy's interest in Christianity was primarily moral and humanistic, rather than explicitly religious or theological, and he claimed that the teachings of Christ provided the basis for a good and meaningful life for human beings. 'Christianity, for him, was about ethics, not mysticism, liturgy or theology', according to Alexandre Christoyannopoulos (2008b, p. 47).

Christ's message of universal love and non-resistance to evil were the central elements of his teaching, according to Tolstoy, and these provided the inspiration for Tolstoy's own commitment to pacifism and his rejection of the state as institutionalized violence. According to R. V. Sampson, for Tolstoy: 'The basis of man's welfare in this world was

the Christian teaching of the law of love and nonviolence, the law of suffering evil, of not returning it' (1973, p. 171).

Tolstoy wrote numerous essays, tracts and books during this latter phase of his life, expounding his interpretation of Christianity, his Christian commitment to pacifism and nonviolence, and the political and social significance of Christian pacifism. Tolstoy learned Greek, translated the four gospels of the New Testament and provided his own extensive commentary. An abridged version of this work was published as *The Gospel in Brief* (Tolstoy 2010 [1893]). Tolstoy's version of the four gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John) provided the basis for his own interpretation of Christianity, focused on the teaching and message of Christ rather than unnecessary accretions concerning his birth, his miracles, his resurrection and so on.

Tolstoy not only provided his own translation of the Gospels, he also re-organized them into twelve chapters, each of which consists of extracts from the different gospels and focuses on a specific aspect of Christ's teaching. Thus, according to Tolstoy, *The Gospel in Brief* involves 'the fusion of the four Gospels into one, according to the real sense of the teaching' (2010 [1893], p. 1).

Jay Parini, in his 'Introduction' to *The Gospel in Brief*, states that Tolstoy:

> wanted to find the essential story of Jesus and his message. This work involved stripping away most of the details of Christ's background, birth and upbringing, getting rid of the miracles, and discarding the resurrection. These were, in Tolstoy's unusual view, distractions that kept devout men and women from confronting the core teachings of Christ. (2010, p. ix)

As Tolstoy puts it in his preface: 'I sought a solution of the problem of life, and not of a theological or historical question; and that is why I was indifferent to know whether Jesus Christ is or is not God, and from whom proceeds the Holy Spirit, etc.' (2010 [1893], p. 7).

This results in a 'severely rationalist reading' of the gospels, according to Terry Hopton, in which 'the divinity of Christ is denied, and all the elements of mystery and the miraculous are stripped away from Christianity'.

> Instead, Christ is presented as a great ethical teacher. The rational essence of Christian doctrine is ascribed to the Sermon on the Mount, which is

taken as requiring unconditional love and non-violence. This radical view of Christianity brought Tolstoy into conflict with both church and state. (Hopton 2000, p. 35)

The Christian churches and the teachings of Christ are contradictory for Tolstoy, because the churches emphasized the mystical (and authoritarian) elements of Christian doctrine at the expense of Christ's central ethical message. Tolstoy's challenge to the church based on his interpretation of Christianity resulted in his excommunication by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1901 (Hopton 2000, p. 36).

Tolstoy's interpretation of the moral and social significance of the Christian message is perhaps best encapsulated in his use of the phrase 'the kingdom of God is within you', which provided the title for Tolstoy's most extensive treatment of Christianity, pacifism and his critique of the state (Tolstoy 2012 [1893]). This phrase is taken from Luke, Chapter 17, Verses 20–21, and according to Parini Tolstoy treated it as 'the crucial phrase in the Gospels' (2010, p. x). 'Tolstoy wanted nothing less than a total transformation of human society, and he saw [his] distillation of the Gospels as one way to bring about God's kingdom on earth' (Parini 2010, p. xii).

The kingdom of God can only be realized through strict obedience to God's will, as expressed in Christ's five commandments in the Sermon on the Mount, according to Tolstoy. This implies a strict focus on individual moral responsibility in accordance with God's will. The consequences of collective action are unpredictable and unforeseeable, according to Tolstoy, so we must focus on our own responsibility to obey God's will. 'God's will is that we love—and do no violence. This means that the immediate consequences [of our actions], which we *can* foresee and control, cannot be wrong' (Hopton 2000, p. 43). This emphasis on individual obedience to God's will, as the kingdom of God within us, requires denying or bypassing all other sources of authority, including the church and the state (Hopton 2000, p. 44).

Tolstoy identified (and in some cases re-phrased and made his own additions to) five commandments from the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew, Chapter 5), which he emphasized as being at the core of the Christian moral message. These five commandments are the basis of Christian teaching, as interpreted by Tolstoy. Each of these points are addressed in turn in Matthew, Chapter 5 (Verses 21–48) as part of the Sermon on the Mount, but Tolstoy provides his own version of these

verses and then expresses what he sees as their prescriptive essence in the form of these five commandments.

Tolstoy summarizes the five commandments as follows (in his own words and without direct reference to the New Testament).

> And so: I. Do not be angry, but be at peace with all men. II. Do not seek delight in sexual gratification. III. Do not swear anything to anyone. IV. Do not oppose evil, do not judge, and do not go to law. V. Do not make any distinction among men as to nationality, and love strangers like your own people. (Tolstoy 2010 [1893], p. 44)

Our primary moral responsibility as human beings is to follow these five commandments, which are God's will as expressed through Christ's teachings. Furthermore, obedience to these commandments is the realization of 'the kingdom of God within us' and the basis for transforming and creating human relationships and society in accordance with God's will, according to Tolstoy.

The fourth and the fifth commandments in particular provide a basis for Tolstoy's pacifism and his critique of the state, expressed as the doctrine of non-resistance and the law of love.

> And, therefore, the fourth commandment is: However men may wrong you, do not resist evil, do not judge and do not go to law, do not complain and do not punish. (Tolstoy 2010 [1893], p. 43)

> And, therefore, this is the fifth commandment: Behave equally well toward foreigners, as I told you to behave among yourselves. Before the Father of all men there are neither different nations nor different kingdoms: all are brothers, all sons of one Father. Make no distinction among people as to nations and kingdoms. (Tolstoy 2010 [1893], pp. 43–44)

We can see in these commandments the basis for Tolstoy's commitment to pacifism and nonviolence, in his stringent interpretation of and emphasis upon the doctrine of non-resistance to evil combined with a requirement for universal love of all humanity, friend and stranger alike, as the core of Christ's unique teaching and message to humankind.

A source of the doctrine of non-resistance in the gospels is Chapter 5, Verses 38–39 of Matthew, which says: 'Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn

to him the other also' (King James Version, n.d. [1611]). Tolstoy elaborates upon the significance of the five commandments and the doctrine of non-resistance in particular in his version of Matthew, Chapter 12, Verses 25–28, in which Jesus says:

> You say that I drive out evil with evil. But no power destroys itself. If it destroys itself, then it would not be. You would drive out evil with threats, executions, murders; but evil, nevertheless, is not destroyed, precisely because evil cannot make head against itself. But I drive out evil by other means than you do; that is to say, not with evil. I drive out evil by summoning people to fulfil the will of the Spirit, the Father, who gives life to all. Five commandments express the will of the Spirit which gives happiness and life. And these commandments destroy evil. By their doing so, you have a proof that they are true. If men were not sons of one spirit, it would not be possible to overcome evil… (Tolstoy 2010 [1893], p. 60)

Similarly, Tolstoy's version of Matthew, Verse 39 is: 'But I tell you: Do not wrestle with evil by evil. Not only do not take by law an ox for an ox, a slave for a slave, a life for a life, but do not resist evil at all' (2010 [1893], p. 42).

The purpose of the doctrine of non-resistance is to prevent us from perpetuating and multiplying evil in the world by resisting evil with evil or violence with violence (Tolstoy 1968 [1893], pp. 225–226). Non-resistance does not mean 'that one should offer no resistance to evil whatsoever', but rather that it 'should be understood literally as Christ taught it—that is, not to return evil for evil' (Tolstoy 1968 [1893], p. 222). Evil or wrong-doing can only be overcome by its opposite, 'true non-resistance' or obedience to the teachings of Christ and the law of love.

Tolstoy did not accept the legitimacy or the morality of violence under any circumstances, in response to any perceived or actual evil, based on this uncompromising interpretation of the doctrine of non-resistance, as expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. 'It is worth emphasising that Tolstoy's rejection of violence is absolute. It is not permitted even if it is to prevent violence, or protect the innocent' (Hopton 2000, p. 36), because one must not respond to evil with evil, or to violence with violence.

A source of the law of love in the gospels is Chapter 5, Verses 43–44 of Matthew, which state: 'Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you,

and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you' (King James Version, n.d. [1611]). Tolstoy's exposition of these verses (43–46) is as follows:

> In the former law it was said: 'Do good to men of your own nation, and do evil to strangers.' But I tell you, love not only your own countrymen, but people of other nations. Let strangers hate you, let them fall upon you, wrong you; but you speak well of them, and do them good. If you are only attached to your countrymen, why, all men are thus attached to their own countrymen, and hence wars arise. Behave equally well toward men of all nations, and you will be the sons of the Father. All men are his children, and therefore all are brothers to you. (2010 [1893], p. 43)

The law of love is, in a sense, the inverse of or active complement to the doctrine of non-resistance. Non-resistance tells us that we should not react with conflict and violence, while the law of love provides us with an alternative basis for action. We need to identify with all human beings, and not only with our fellow citizens or members of our own group. We need to respond to all human beings equally, on the basis of universal love and empathy, including those who behave towards us as enemies. According to Tolstoy this is the only way that we can overcome war and violence.

Tolstoy states this connection between the law of love and nonviolence very clearly in a letter he wrote to Mahatma Gandhi shortly before his death in 1910. Tolstoy writes in this letter that Christ 'knew…that the use of force is incompatible with love as the fundamental law of life, that as soon as violence is permitted, in whichever case it may be, the insufficiency of the law of love is acknowledged, and by this the very law is denied' (1971 [1910], p. 62).

Tolstoy expressed his admiration for Gandhi's pioneering use of nonviolence in South Africa as 'the most essential work, the most important of all the work now being done in the world' and linked this directly to the law of love (1971 [1910], p. 64). Tolstoy wrote in this letter that:

> passive resistance…is in reality nothing else than the teaching of love, uncorrupted by false interpretations. That love—i.e. the striving for the union of human souls and the activity derived from this striving—is the highest and only law of human life. (1971 [1910], p. 62)

Furthermore, although Tolstoy thinks that 'this law was most clearly expressed by Christ', it is a universal law for all humanity, appearing in all

cultures and throughout history. 'This law was proclaimed by all—by the Indian as by the Chinese, Hebrew, Greek and Roman sages of the world' (Tolstoy 1971 [1910], p. 62).

Tolstoy goes on to elaborate upon the law of love as the basis for a pacifist critique of contemporary Christianity and its support of the state and state violence.

> The difference between the Christian nations and all other nations is only that in the Christian world the law of love was expressed clearly and definitely, whereas it was so expressed in the religious teaching, and that the people of the Christian world have solemnly accepted this law, whilst at the same time they have permitted violence, and built their lives on violence, and that is why the whole life of the Christian peoples is a continuous contradiction between that which they profess and the principles on which they order their lives—a contradiction between love accepted as the law of life and violence which is recognized and praised, acknowledged even as a necessity in different phases of life, such as the power of the rulers, courts and armies. (Tolstoy 1971 [1910], pp. 62–63)

Tolstoy challenges the contradiction between what he sees as a central message of Christianity, in the form of the law of love, and the mechanisms of the state, including the violence that is used to defend it. This contradiction between Christianity and Christian principles and ideals, and the social and political institutions and practices (such as war and the military) by which we organize ourselves is a theme to which Tolstoy often returns in his exposition of what he perceives to be the true meaning of Christ's teaching.

5.2   CRITIQUE OF THE STATE

Tolstoy's belief in the immanence of the kingdom of God, or the kingdom of God within us, achieved through human obedience to the law of love and the doctrine of non-resistance, led him to a rejection of the state as a form of political organization. 'A Christian frees himself from the dominion of State law by not requiring it either for himself or for others, by accounting human life better secured by the law of love which he professes, than by laws relying on violence for their maintenance' (Tolstoy 2012 [1893], p. 414).

Tolstoy proclaims quite unequivocally the contradiction between the ethical requirements of Christianity and the state as a form of political organization in *The Kingdom of God Is Within You.*

> Christianity in its true sense puts an end to the State. It was so understood from its very beginning, and for that Christ was crucified….the incompatibility of true Christianity (the doctrine of humility, forgiveness and love) with the State and its pomp, violence, executions, and wars, is quite obvious. The profession of true Christianity not only excludes the possibility of recognizing the State, but even destroys its foundations. (Tolstoy 2012 [1893], p. 259)

Obedience to God's will as expressed in the law of love and the doctrine of non-resistance both excludes and supplants the need for the state as a political institution that depends ultimately on coercion and violence.

Tolstoy rejected the state as a form of political organization because it is based upon the highly organized, systematic and deliberately destructive use of violence. 'Tolstoy's simple and categorical objection to the state is that it is the dominant form of violence' (Hopton 2000, p. 36). According to Tolstoy, the authority of the state is ultimately based on violence.

> If men submit to authority, it is only because they fear the punishment that would follow their disobedience. All the requirements of the State…which people seem to obey of their own free will, are all based on physical violence or the threat of it. (Tolstoy 1990 [1893], p. 98)

The coercive capacity of the state is epitomized by its army, as both the symbolic representation of its sovereignty and the source of its functional ability to enforce its rule over its citizens and their submission to the government and its laws. 'The basis of authority is physical violence. The possibility of exercising physical violence is given by organizations of armed men….Such assemblies of armed men submitting to one will constitute the army' (Tolstoy 1990 [1893], p. 98).

War and the level of destruction associated with and required for war epitomizes the violence of the state for Tolstoy. 'War is the social conception of violence and the essential nature of the state made most visible' (Hopton 2000, p. 37). Thus, Christoyannopoulos argues that Tolstoy's rejection of the state is 'inseparable from his Christian pacifism' (2008b,

p. 48), because of his opposition to war in particular as well as to all forms of state violence and coercion. 'For Tolstoy, to demand the end of war is to demand the end of the state. Neither can continue without the other' (Hopton 2000, p. 38).

Tolstoy was opposed to the state in all its forms and variations, and not merely to specific government policies or particular types of government. His rejection of the state applies to all versions of the state, whether 'autocracy, monarchy, *Convent*, consulship, empire, constitutional monarch, commune or a republic', because they all ultimately rely on coercion and violence to maintain themselves (cited in Boot 2009, p. 140). A monopoly over the legitimate use of violence is a defining feature of any state, whether it is democratic or dictatorial, according to Weber's classic definition of the state. This is epitomized by the military, the police, the prison system and all the mechanisms employed by the state to defend itself against external and internal threats by means of violence. Thus, according to W. B. Gallie, for Tolstoy 'war is an evil necessity of *all* governments, constitutional as well as arbitrary' (1978, p. 123). The supposed primacy of each state's own national interests, including the defence of individual state sovereignty, is supported by every state's insistence on its right to maintain an army and engage in the use of military force.

Sampson agrees that the supreme coercive power associated with state sovereignty is linked inextricably to a capacity for military force.

> All States are coercive by nature, otherwise they would not be sovereign…. Consequently, all States, including the most 'democratic' are based ultimately on force ….and they maintain their separate political existence only in so far as they are backed by the appropriate military force. (Sampson 1973, p. 182)

A state's sovereignty and its control over its territory and citizens is ultimately guaranteed by this capacity for coercive violence and military force.

Tolstoy was also vociferous in his critique of the economic and social costs of war and preparations for war, and in his condemnation of an unequal economic system defended ultimately by state violence and war. Militarization and the infrastructure required to prepare for and engage in war and armed conflict undermine 'the benefits of social life' in the form of 'the security given to property and labour, and in the mutual

cooperation towards the general welfare' ostensibly provided and protected by the state, according to Tolstoy. The financial costs of preparing and maintaining this infrastructure in the form of armaments and armies 'absorb the greater part of the products of that labour' supposedly protected by the coercive capacity of the state. Furthermore, war and '[t]he menace of war….renders vain and profitless all improvements of social life' (Tolstoy 1990 [1893], p. 104).

Tolstoy also condemned the inequalities he associated with the economic system defended by the state, both because of the indirect violence he associated with the exploitation that produced such inequalities and the direct violence needed to maintain this unequal system of production, ownership and consumption. 'Tolstoy condemns the economic system as slavery and as contrary to Christianity', according to Hopton. 'The poor are denied the means of subsistence, their poverty forcing them to work in dehumanising conditions' (Hopton 2000, p. 39).

> Exploitation is also inextricably linked to violence in Tolstoy's view. At its simplest level exploitation *is* violence. It is, however, a form of violence that is more subtle and more pervasive than direct physical force. In addition, of course, it can entail the threat, or use, of direct force when the state and its law enforce things like unequal property holdings. Exploitation is as bad as physical violence. (Hopton 2000, p. 39)

The systematic or institutionalized violence of the state is associated not only with external aggression and war for Tolstoy, but also with the economic inequalities resulting from an exploitative economic system. State violence is expressed not only externally through war and armed conflict, but also internally through its defence of an exploitative economic system that requires repression to maintain itself.

Thus, the armed forces of the state have two main purposes, according to Tolstoy, domestically to enforce economic exploitation for the benefit of the elite and externally to engage in aggressive wars and the conquest of other countries (Horowitz 1973, pp. 73–74). As Sampson points out, for Tolstoy:

> in every State the people who ruled and organized the defence of their power against their external rivals beyond the frontiers were invariably the richest group in their community and also organized the defence of their riches against any threat to property within the State. Morally speaking,

the entire structure with its attendant culture rested on an allegedly universal right to self-defence. (1973, p. 169)

In other words, the real function of the state violence that is justified in terms of defence of state sovereignty against aggression and defence of the rule of law is to protect the wealth and property of ruling elites from either external or internal threats.

The state infrastructure of violence defends the unequal distribution of wealth within a society, and also protects such wealth against elites in other countries that seek to acquire it.

> Troops are needed by every Government chiefly to keep its subjects in submission, and to usurp the products of their labour. But no Government stands alone; beyond its frontiers is another State which also uses violence to despoil its subjects, and is ever ready to rob its neighbour of the toil of its enslaved people. Therefore every Government requires an army not only for internal work, but also for the defence of its plunder against foreign marauders. (Tolstoy 1990 [1893], p. 103)

State security forces are required to defend the unequal division of wealth within a society on behalf of those who are beneficiaries of the existing social order, as well as to defend this wealth from other states or governments similarly based on the unequal accumulation of wealth.

Furthermore, the more a government relies on military strength and state violence to defend this unequal division of wealth within a society, the more it has the capacity to engage in external aggression as well, and is seen as a threat by other states, prompting them to boost their own military strength in a version of the classic security dilemma. 'Every increase in the army of one State, directed against its own subjects, becomes dangerous for its neighbour also, and excites a similar increase in all other States' (Tolstoy 1990 [1893], p. 103).

This results in a reciprocal process for Tolstoy, in which the need for elites to defend themselves against internal threats by means of state violence also produces both a capacity to engage in external aggression and a need to defend themselves against the potential aggression of other states caught up in a similar escalating dynamic of state violence and militarization. 'The increase of armies results simultaneously from two causes which reciprocally call forth one another: troops are required both for defence against internal enemies and for safeguard against foreign

aggressions. One is the result of the other' (Tolstoy 1990 [1893], p. 103).

Finally, the capacity of a state to engage in internal suppression increases with the military strength and resources it can deploy to defend itself against external threats. The capacity of governments to engage in internal repression increases with their capacity to exert and employ military force externally, just as their ability to threaten other states militarily increases with their capacity for internal repression in a reciprocal dynamic and spiral of state violence and militarization. As Tolstoy writes: 'The despotism of Governments grows in proportion to their external success and the increase and strength of their armies; the aggressiveness of Governments grows in proportion to the increase of internal despotism' (Tolstoy 1990 [1893], p. 103).

Thus, Tolstoy rejected the state as a form of political organization because it was a mechanism for defending and furthering the interests of the elites who controlled it for their own benefit, at the expense of the vast majority of the population. State violence was not employed primarily to defend the rule of law equally on behalf of all citizens or subjects of the state, nor to defend those citizens against the threat of foreign or external aggression, but rather to preserve an economic, social and political system for the benefit of elites within a country or society while the rest of the population suffered the negative consequences of war, armed conflict and state violence.

> The people of every nation are being deluded by their rulers, who say to them, 'You, who are governed by us, are all in danger of being conquered by other nations; we are watching over your welfare and safety, and consequently we demand of you annually some millions of rubles—the fruit of your labour—to be used by us in the acquisition of arms, cannon, powder, and ships for your defence; we also demand that you yourselves shall enter institutions, organized by us, where you will become senseless particles of a huge machine—the army—which will be under our absolute control. On entering this army you will cease to be men with wills of your own; you will simply do what we require of you. But what we wish, above all else, is to exercise dominion; the means by which we dominate is killing, therefore we will instruct you to kill'. (Tolstoy 1968 [1898], p. 19)

State violence, armies, war and preparations for war support and enforce economic exploitation, dehumanization and the deliberate killing of

human beings. 'Armies are simply the brutal reality underpinning the delusions that people have about the state' for Tolstoy (Hopton 2000, p. 38).

Tolstoy is often connected to anarchism and the anarchist tradition of political thought and action, as well as to pacifism, because of his unequivocal objections to state violence and the state as a form of social and political organization. Tolstoy did not refer to himself as an anarchist, because he connected anarchism to the use of political violence to change society and also to a materialist and anti-Christian metaphysics or cosmology and ethics (see, for example, Tolstoy 1990 [1900], 1990 [1903]). Nonetheless, Tolstoy was sympathetic to the anarchist rejection of the state and was familiar with anarchist writings of the time. He had met Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and was influenced by his book *La guerre et la paix*, as reflected in the title of Tolstoy's novel of the same name (Woodcock 1979, p. 207). He was also aware of the work of his contemporary, the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, although they never met. According to George Woodcock, for example: 'What Kropotkin meant by "mutual aid" was not very far from what Tolstoy meant by "love"' (Woodcock 1979, p. 208), as a positive and unifying force for society.

Tolstoy rejected the state as well as all forms of authority and domination based on force, coercion and violence. This includes his opposition to the inequalities associated with private property, another common anarchist theme.

> Central to Tolstoy's social doctrine is his rejection of the state, but equally important is his denial of property. Indeed, he sees the two as interdependent. Property is a domination by some men over others, and the state exists to guarantee the perpetuation of property relationships. (Woodcock 1979, p. 216)

Furthermore, according to Woodcock, 'he does envisage a society where the state and law and property will all be abolished, and where cooperative production will take their place' (Woodcock 1979, p. 217).

Tolstoy's argument is that the state is an invented and unnecessary layer of social and political organization, the essential function of which is to enforce rule or government by a property-owning elite. It is not so much that new forms of social and political organization will need to be developed to replace the state, as that in the absence of the state, at least in the case of Russia, the people will be able to revert to more communal and egalitarian forms of social organization that already exist.

Wherever Russian people settle down without the intervention of Government they have always established an order not coercive but founded upon mutual agreement, communal, and with communal possession of land, which has completely satisfied the demands of peaceful social life….Therefore the Russian people, when abolishing Government, need not invent any new forms of combined life with which to replace the former. Such forms of combined life exist amongst the Russian people, have always been natural to them, and have satisfied their social demands. (Tolstoy 1990 [1905], pp. 40–41)

He goes on to say: 'The repudiation of coercion does not deprive men of the possibility of combination, but combination founded upon mutual agreement can be formed only when those founded upon violence are abolished' (Tolstoy (1990 [1905], p. 42).

Tolstoy also identified non-cooperation with the institutions of authority as the basic mechanism or instrument for achieving social and political change, another familiar anarchist theme. Disobedience of the state does not imply lawlessness for Tolstoy, because such disobedience requires obedience to a higher law, the law of God or the law of love: 'if one is not to obey the Government, one has to obey God and live a righteous life….It is possible not to obey men only when one obeys the higher law of God, common to all' (1990 [1905], p. 50). This 'higher law, common to all' is the basis of Tolstoy's pacifism as well as his rejection of the state.

Thus, according to Woodcock:

in its essentials Tolstoy's social teaching is a true anarchism, condemning the authoritarian order of existing society, proposing a new libertarian order, and suggesting the means by which it may be attained. Since his religion is a natural and rational one, and seeks its Kingdom in the reign of justice and love on this earth, it does not transcend his anarchist doctrine but is complementary to it. (1979, pp. 217–218)

Thus, the libertarian and anti-authoritarian foundations of Tolstoy's social and political thought, derived from his interpretation of Christianity and of which his critique of the state and state violence is one important aspect, connects him firmly to the anarchist tradition. Woodcock suggests that 'while he repudiated violence', Tolstoy's 'basic doctrine—and particularly his categorical rejection of the state and of property—fitted clearly into the general anarchist pattern' (1979, p. 207).

Nonetheless, Tolstoy's social and political philosophy was derived from his interpretation of Christianity, particularly the doctrine of non-resistance and the law of love, which remained the primary source of or basis for his political beliefs, sometimes categorized as a combination of Christian pacifism with Christian anarchism. According to Alexander Boot, for Tolstoy

> No state, including theocracy, can be included in the kingdom of God. That kingdom has to remain stateless, for the state is by definition coercive....The political ideal of the kingdom of God is not theocracy but Christian anarchy, the elimination of all secular power. (2000, p. 141)

The coercive state, whether secular or theocratic, contradicts the 'free union' between humans and God that forms the basis of the kingdom of God on earth, according to Tolstoy's interpretation of the Christian message (Boot 2009, p. 141). Thus, for Woodcock, Tolstoy's 'anarchism is the external aspect, expressed in behaviour, of his Christianity' (1979, p. 214).

Tolstoy rejects the state and the church not only as institutionalized forms of violence, domination and oppression, but also, and perhaps primarily, because they interfere with and challenge our one overriding duty, which is obedience to God's will. According to Tolstoy it is only through obedience to God's will (and God's authority), which is expressed through the teaching of Christ, that violence, domination and oppression can be replaced by the law of love.

The religious basis for Tolstoy's anarchism may present a difficulty for more secular and materialist anarchists and pacifists, however, because it involves replacing one source of externally-imposed authority, the state and its coercive capability, with another even more unequivocal and absolute form of authority for human behaviour within the kingdom of God on earth, in the form of Christ's teaching as the will of God.

> It is because of God's authority that all other authority, political or otherwise, is negated....Tolstoy's anarchism is thus unique in its acceptance of one absolute authority: although God's authority is unlike any other. (Hopton 2000, p. 48)

As Hopton points out, 'philosophically the very idea of God exemplified supreme authority and could be taken as the *absolute expression*

of the domination present in all other forms of authority' such as the state (2000, p. 47). This is a theme developed for example in Mikhail Bakunin's anarchist exposition of atheism, *God and the State* (1970 [1882]). Religion, and particularly Christianity 'also established another institutional form of domination alongside that of the state, in the form of the church' (Hopton 2000, p. 47), although Tolstoy rejected the church and institutionalized religion precisely for this reason and also because of its ostensible misinterpretation and manipulation of Christ's teaching.

Robert Goehlert also suggests that 'Tolstoy's anarchism was not very sophisticated', based on a dichotomy of 'the individual versus the state' and lacking any 'real originality' even in comparison to other anarchists (1981, p. 58). Tolstoy's Christian anarcho-pacifism revolved around his critique of the militarized state, which he claimed was in direct contravention of the teachings of Jesus, but he did not suggest a viable alternative beyond a rather idealized depiction of Russian peasant life. 'Though Tolstoy's religious anarchism was a powerful criticism of the state and its laws, besides urging men to follow the law of love and live simple agricultural lives, Tolstoy provided virtually no constructive proposals' (Goehlert 1981, p. 61).

5.3   Conclusion

Tolstoy's emphasis on Christianity as the key to social transformation shows that the basis of political change for Tolstoy is not a change in material and political conditions, but rather normative change, '[a] massive change in the collective conscience, in ideas and values' (Horowitz 1973, p. 73). 'The impasse of violence is, for Tolstoy, broken only by the ultimate triumph of conscience' which he translates into 'the law of universal love' (Horowitz 1973, pp. 75–76) exemplified by Christian ethics.

> Christ….has conquered the world, if men would but learn to believe in the strength of the weapon given by Him. And this weapon is the obedience of every man to his own reason and conscience….that law…which long ago forbade not murder only, but all hostility also. (Tolstoy 1968 [1898], p. 23)

Such normative change or a transformation of consciousness, and 'not the covenants of international jurisprudence', is the key to achieving

peace for Tolstoy (Horowitz 1973, p. 76). 'The alteration of character and life-conception of men inevitably brings with it the alteration of those forms in which men have lived', whereas a focus on political institutions can prevent real change 'by directing the attention and activity of men into a false channel' (Tolstoy 1990 [1903], p. 63).

Peace cannot be achieved through international conferences or treaties, for example, because such treaties are agreed between states, and states are sources of institutionalized or systematic violence.

> Since for Tolstoy, the cause of state violence lies in the very existence of the state, war, for instance, cannot be eradicated by peace conferences and alliances—for the scourge of war to disappear, the state itself must disappear….Peace treaties are based on cooperation between existing states, but according to Tolstoy, it is the very existence of these states that causes wars in the first place. (Christoyannopoulos 2008a, p. 32)

Peace conferences and peace treaties are based on and depend upon the state as a form of political organization, are aimed at the preservation of the state system of international relations, and hence ensure the continuation of the wars which are the inevitable consequence of the state and the state system. Peace treaties as a form of international law ultimately require enforcement, involving armies, military infrastructure and the militarized state (Hopton 2000, p. 38).

Normative change at the level of the individual must be expressed by direct individual action as the most effective way of eliminating war and militarism, through civil disobedience and conscientious objection for example, or 'refusing to take part in military service or to pay taxes to a government which uses them for military purposes' (Tolstoy 1968 [1899], p. 101). Thus, according to Tolstoy, 'the easiest and surest way to universal disarmament is by individuals refusing to take part in military service' (1968 [n.d.], p. 113). Tolstoy's emphasis on direct individual action rather than institutional change (including international peace treaties for example) is connected to his stress on individual moral responsibility and obedience to the Christian 'law of love' as the key to social transformation and achieving 'the kingdom of God on earth'.

Tolstoy's pacifism, with its focus upon normative change at the level of the individual, can be distinguished from other programmes for achieving world peace through institutional change or reform, such as

Immanuel Kant's project for perpetual peace. Kant suggests an ambitious programme involving democratic governance, a world federation of sovereign states, and cosmopolitan law (Kant 1992 [1795]). Kant's emphasis is upon the institutional requirements of perpetual peace, while Tolstoy stresses the moral transformation of individuals in accordance with the 'law of love'. Kant's project for perpetual peace shares the anti-war objective of Tolstoy's pacifism, but its focus upon institutional change and the rule of law at multiple levels depends upon the sovereign state and its capacity for self-defence, in the form of citizens' militia. Tolstoy's interpretation of Christianity and his emphasis upon normative change at the level of the individual in accordance with the law of love and the doctrine of non-resistance, on the other hand, implies a rejection of the state as a form of institutionalized violence.

Tolstoy can be associated with what Martin Ceadel refers to in his chapter in this book as the absolutist—as distinct from the reformist—wing of the broader peace movement, to which the label 'pacifist' is commonly applied. The peace movement shares a rejection of war and military aggression and a belief that war can be abolished, according to Ceadel, but is divided between absolutist and reformist approaches to achieving this abolition. The absolutist approach asserts that war can be eliminated immediately through individual and collective refusal to participate in it, or 'mass conscientious objection', according to Ceadel. Reformists, on the other hand, advocate a more gradual approach involving the development of the institutional, multilateral and international conditions for the abolition of war rather than an immediate renunciation of and opposition to all uses of military force and state violence (similar to Kant's project for perpetual peace, for example). Tolstoy can be firmly linked to what Ceadel characterizes as the absolutist or pacifist wing of the peace movement precisely because of his emphasis upon change at the level of individual consciousness (normative change) and direct and immediate collective action through refusing to participate in or support war (and the militarized state) as the only way to achieve the elimination of war.

Tolstoy's worldwide fame and his acknowledged status as a great writer provided him with a platform and an audience for his views on Christianity, pacifism and the state. He used his highly personal and selective interpretation of the Gospels to develop a powerful and influential ethical doctrine in support of nonviolence and pacifism, involving a rejection of violence under all circumstances, opposition to war and

militarization, and a critique of the state as a form of oppression and exploitation.

Irving Louis Horowitz, in his book *War and Peace in Contemporary Social and Philosophical Theory*, claims that:

> The purest and most widely accepted presentation of Christian pacifism was made by the great nineteenth century writer, Leo Tolstoy. It was through his reinterpretation of Christian ethics that pacifism achieves a status as a significant, if not fully developed social philosophy of contemporary civilization. Tolstoy is largely responsible for making pacifism the theoretical force it is in the western world. (1973, p. 69)

Other groups or individuals throughout history had promoted versions of pacifism and nonviolence, often from within their own religious traditions, and Tolstoy acknowledged this and sometimes quoted these authors and activists. He refers to the Quakers (as one of the peace churches within Christianity) in the opening chapter of *The Kingdom of God*, for example, and also quotes extensively from the nineteenth century U.S. anti-slavery activists William Garrison and Adin Ballou on Christian non-resistance (Tolstoy 2012 [1893], pp. 3–21). It was Tolstoy's combination of ethical commitment with his critical evaluation of contemporary political and social issues together with his fame and skill as a writer, however, which allowed him to promote the continuing and universal significance of pacifism as a relevant and persuasive response to war, violence and social conflict.

Tolstoy's idiosyncratic interpretation of Christianity, with its two core doctrines of non-resistance and the law of love, provides the basis for his uncompromising pacifism and his rejection of the use of violence under all circumstances. He combines this with his critique of the state as a form of institutionalized violence that depends upon war, the military and organized and systematic violence to sustain itself as a mechanism of social and economic inequality and oppression. Tolstoy's use of Christianity as the basis for his pacifism and his critique of state violence suggests that normative change leading to a transformation of human belief and behaviour at both the individual and collective level, rather than institutional change involving the sovereign state and reforms to the state-based system of international relations, will be the key to achieving the pacifist objective of a world without war.

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Toward a Global Understanding of Pacifism: Hindu, Islamic, and Buddhist Contributions

Meena Sharify-Funk

> Lalla 'Aziza walked out of the safety of the foothills and onto the harsh Marrakesh plains and stood—alone—before the great general and his army. She confronted al-Hintati with her words and her own faith. She spoke of God's demands for justice, the pull of the good, the wrong of harming God's creation. The general was overwhelmed by her. He later described the event to Ibn Qunfudh: 'O religious teacher! This one—she is a wonder. She answered me before I could ask anything of her. She knew what was going on inside of me… my internal thinking, my ideas. I was not able to counter her argument, to reject her requests'. (Combs-Schilling 2008)

The above account derives from testimony recorded more than six centuries ago by Ibn Qunfudh (d. 1407), a highly respected Algerian historian, jurist, mathematician and grammarian who held saints

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(*awliya'*, literally 'friends of God') in high regard and actively sought out stories of their deeds and wisdom.[1] In this particular story of Lalla 'Aziza of Seksawa, a female Sufi ascetic teacher whose tomb is still a place of pilgrimage in the High Atlas Mountains of Morocco, encountered the governor of Marrakesh and formidable general al-Hintati, who was attempting to conquer south Morocco with his 6000 men.

Having met both of these individuals while researching his *Uns al-faqir wa 'izz al-haqir* (*The Convivial Company of the Wandering Poor and the Honorable Strength of the Contemptible*), Ibn Qunfudh expressed great admiration towards Lalla 'Aziza for her saintly presence and peaceful power:

> Lalla 'Aziza blessed me with her goodness. I studied with her awhile … She was a teacher and had a number of followers, both men and women; they were involved in worship and in search for the divine … 'Aziza was eloquent in her speech, in her knowledge of the Qur'an and Arabic … People were always crowded around her. I never saw her but that she was doing good. She is filled with God's generosity. (Combs-Schilling 2008)

Though Ibn Qunfudh's account provided scholarly testimony to her spiritual qualities and personal charisma, esteem for Lalla 'Aziza has by no means been limited to prestigious and literate circles. As anthropologist Elaine Combs-Schilling reports, stories of Lalla 'Aziza are still being retold after 600 years, and her tomb continues to be used as a sanctuary and as a space for mediating conflicts. Even during the colonial age and the independence war with France, 'Aziza's tomb remained a safe haven where many people would seek peace and calm in the midst of the conflict.

Intriguingly, Lalla 'Aziza's refusal to show fear or deference in the face of a conquering general, combined with her profile as an esteemed spiritual leader, has given her story special resonance and enduring power. There is a clear correlation, Combs-Schilling reports, between Lalla 'Aziza's ascribed saintly status and the way in which her legacy has come to be associated with peace and security from harm:

> 'Aziza talked the general out of his conquest. She convinced him to leave the people of Seksawa unharmed. He marched his army back to Marrakesh, and she returned to the mountains. 'Aziza's confrontation with al-Hintati has been told and retold for generations. It is still told in the

high mountains: the story of a woman who dared to stand up to a general and his army, armed only with her faith… Down through the centuries people have sought refuge there, people fleeing the excesses of central power or local conflicts, people falsely accused of crimes, people who have done great harm. (1994, p. 17)

Stories like this account of Lalla 'Aziza are not typically discussed in relation to the subject of pacifism. Indeed, this particular story is not well known outside its region of origin. Although the encounter of Lalla 'Aziza and al-Hintati is gripping in character and has the capacity to resonate across cultural and religious boundaries, evoking deep human experiences with conflict and spirituality, the question of Lalla 'Aziza's possible status as a 'pacifist' is not often raised.

There are reasons why this is the case. As far as we know, Lalla 'Aziza did not expound an explicit anti-war doctrine. She did not initiate or promote a grassroots campaign against militarism. While it would appear that she opposed bloodshed and destruction as a matter of spiritual principle, her legacy is anecdotal in format rather than ideological or creedal, and she likely did not hold an absolute conviction on matters pertaining to the use of military force. Thus, by strict definitional standards she was not a pacifist. Or was she? A great deal depends on our definitions and our interests, and it is arguable that much that is good for the advancement of peace gets excluded from consideration when we limit our investigation of religion and pacifism to formalized doctrines, absolute principles, and unconditional stances.

Defining pacifism inclusively, in a manner that underscores active peacemaking initiatives and precepts that enable these efforts, opens the door not just to Lalla 'Aziza, but also to a great many inspiring peacemakers from the world's religious traditions, affirming the potential for common cause as well as fruitful dialogue among their more exemplary representatives. While not offering a conclusive study, this chapter aims to demonstrate this potential by highlighting substantive pacifist content in the lives of figures from the religions of Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism. While affirming the value of Western Christian understandings of pacifism that emerged around the turn of the twentieth century, the chapter takes a broad-angle approach to the subject matter and focuses on individuals and movements that have achieved a dynamic interplay between ideals of peace inherited from their religious traditions and deeds of peace which they sought to practice consistently. Focusing

less on categorical and unconditional opposition to war and more on commitment to active nonviolent peacemaking, this dynamic approach to pacifism aims to transcend purely negative constructs and avoids limitations inherent in taking an approach to the subject that is too closely bound to Western European experiences. Examples of pacifism as practiced within different times and places, by adherents of various religious and cultural traditions, will be offered to illustrate the value of reimagining the term and diversifying our understanding of its meanings and contexts.

6.1   Religion, Pacifism and Nonviolence

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the looming possibility of total war spurred peace advocates in many countries toward ideas of pacifism, understood as a principled rejection of war that might enable a total or perpetual peace. The convening of European peace congresses provided a context for the coining of the term 'pacifism' by French peace advocate Emile Arnaud in 1901, as a word constructed from the Latin roots *pacem facere* (literally, 'peace maker'). It was a term that had not only philosophical but, more importantly, socio-political connotations, highlighting advocacy to prevent war and preserve peace.

> Pacifism…meant social action. It was not merely a philosophy but a political program and a commitment to social change. It was distinct from the quietist tradition of some religious sects, whose members tended to withdraw from public life and cede to the state the realm of practical politics. This was not what the early twentieth-century pacifists had in mind. Arnaud sought to distinguish pacifists from those who merely hope or pray for peace. (Cortright 2008, p. 9)

As Arnaud was known for saying, 'We are not passive types… we are pacifists' (Cooper 1991, p. 60). With this statement, he acknowledged a broader cultural and religious heritage that had influenced desire for peace in the European context, even while seeking to correct what he saw as a spirit of detachment or disengagement that sometimes accompanied this legacy. On the one hand, it is arguable that Arnaud might not have been able to envision a new '-ism' involving active peace promotion without the background presence of religious ideals, and of groups with clearly articulated precepts regarding the renunciation of violence. On

the other hand, it would appear that he also regarded past expressions of peace-related idealism as limiting with respect to the purposes he had in mind. Christian religiosity was therefore present at the birth of modern pacifism in the European context. Yet the term that would inspire the numerous nonviolent activists and movements was not exclusively religious and reflected human responses to both dangers and opportunities of the historical juncture within which it was coined. Thus did pacifism become an ecumenical organizing framework for much discourse as well as practical activity centred around critiques of militarism, the promotion of disarmament, and the advancement of a more cooperative and just world order.

Religion would continue to be present within pacifist movements despite many setbacks, including two world wars, albeit in more varied and diverse ways than is often recognized. Significantly, some of the most dynamic and revolutionary developments associated with twentieth-century pacifism were influenced by religious actors who emerged from outside the contexts within which the discourse about 'pacifism' began, which as previously discussed were primarily populated by men of European Christian heritage. The importance of understanding pacifism in broad and inclusive terms becomes clear when one considers the religious, cultural, and gender diversity embodied by such influential peacemakers as Mohandas K. Gandhi (d. 1948), Abdul Ghaffar Khan (d. 1988), Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. (d. 1968), Dorothy Day (d. 1980), Thich Nhat Hahn, and Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel (d. 1972). Contributions by these and other actors transcended the Eurocentric, Christian-centric, and implicitly male character of the original conversation about pacifism, and broadened understandings of what it could mean to oppose war and violence. Over the course of several decades, conversations emerged across the hierarchies that had once defined the established world order, calling not only for a rethinking of power but also for a reimagining of human history in light of different religious and cultural understandings of peace and of nonviolent alternatives to war. These conversations paved the way for the emergence of what we might call 'global pacifism' as well as for the rise of future movements predicated on active nonviolence.

The formation of largely nonviolent movements for independence and civil rights in India, America, and other locales underscored the manner in which diversity (whether religious, cultural, racial, ethnic, economic, gender, etc.) was opening up the discourse of pacifism, and stimulating

cross-cultural discussion about the complexity and many faces of power. Prior to the advent of these movements, pacifism was often construed primarily in negative conceptual terms, as a principled refusal of war and armed violence, despite the activist content of the original definition and the broader social engagements of those who first used it. Gandhi, Khan, King, Nhat Hanh, and many others, however, infused pacifist thought with ideas of active nonviolence construed as 'soul force', 'the strength to love', 'moral suasion', or active compassion. Their contributions to pacifist discourse have profoundly enriched the conversation, enhancing its grassroots relevance as well as cross-cultural resonance.

Although pacifism as an absolute commitment to abstain from the use of armed force (and in some cases, even from the detentive force used in policing) remains a minority position in all religio-cultural traditions and an unpopular concept in many of them, the idea of moral power and spiritual presence has much broader resonance. It is therefore helpful to distinguish conceptually among different varieties of pacifist discourse and commitment, noting in particular themes that can effectively frame cross-cultural dialogue while still providing a clear sense of directionality with respect to active peacemaking and nonviolent social action against injustices that perpetuate violence.[2]

Throughout human history, religion has been a resource for both conflict and peace. While religious practitioners can and indeed must differentiate between legitimate uses and illegitimate abuses of their faith teachings, it remains true that manipulation of religious identities and symbols can result in horrific acts of violence. As R. Scott Appleby contends in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*, 'Most religious societies… have interpreted their experience of the sacred in such a way as to give religion a paradoxical role in human affairs – as the bearer of peace *and* the sword' (2000, p. 27). This observation, however, only makes it all the more urgent to pay heed to examples of pacific religious individuals, communities, and movements, and to document their roles in making and affirming peace.

All the world's religions have provided moral compasses inspiring philosophical and metaphysical understandings of moral values that are crucial for peacemaking, including forgiveness of others and remembrance of the transcendent as well as compassion, love, and peace. Religious teachings on peace build on such values, providing adherents with precepts that invite human transformation amidst experiences of

conflict, enjoining restorative and social justice as well as mystical aspiration. Religious exemplars and narratives, like the story of Lalla 'Aziza as described at the beginning of this chapter, have been instrumental for modeling beliefs and faith practices in ways that are congruent with the advancement of pacifism as a force that challenges violent destruction and builds peace. By engaging the myriad of discourses anchored in holy scriptures and creatively applying them within specific lived contexts, these faith leaders demonstrate a variety of different approaches to peace and peacemaking that resonate with deeper human needs and aspirations.

As this chapter will endeavour to show while focusing particularly on religious exemplars from Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism, pacifism can mean many things in addition to usages that define it as an absolute deontological ethic against violence or as a nonconformist refusal of conscription by a war-making nation-state. While such usages are indisputably integral to the history of pacifist discourse and practice, exploring the faith and advocacy of spiritual and activist personalities from many cultures and continents invites a broader and more ecumenical definition that recognizes diverse contributions to a dynamic and global conversation. Though different faith leaders offer distinctive cross-cultural contextualizations and reconstructions of pacifism, a great many advocates have understood the pacifist spirit in convergent or compatible terms, as active peacemaking informed by nonviolent forms of power. Attending to their varied and yet mutually resonant stories, and to specific teachings upon which they draw, can enable profoundly meaningful dialogue, within which roots of contemporary pacifist activity can be found in many quite different traditions and richly instructive examples.

6.2   Hinduism

In 1964 Thomas Merton (d. 1968), a Trappist Christian monk who was influenced by the activism of Martin Luther King, Jr., published an edited book of selected texts from Mohandas K. Gandhi's 'Non-violence in Peace and War'. This book, entitled *Gandhi on Non-violence*, opens with an essay in which Merton explores the foundations of Gandhi's thought and action in the Hindu understandings of *himsa* (violence) and *ahimsa* (non-violence).

> *Ahimsa* (non-violence) is for Gandhi the basic law of our being. That is why it can be used as the most effective principle for social action, since it is in deep accord with the truth of man's nature and corresponds to his innate desire for peace, justice, order, freedom, and personal dignity. Since *himsa* (violence) degrades and corrupts man, to meet force with force and hatred with hatred only increases man's progressive degeneration. Nonviolence, on the contrary, heals and restores man's nature, while giving him means to restore social order and justice. (1964, p. 23)

For Gandhi, the religious precept of *ahimsa* (or non-violence) was a key not just to personal moral observance but also to the larger field of human relations. Though formulated in negative terms as 'non-harming', Gandhi understood the principle expansively in relation to the great issues of his time—not just as a commitment to abstain from personal acts of direct violence, but also as a moral injunction to disapprove of larger patterns of violence and to refuse to partake in them. Thus for Gandhi pacifism transcended debates about just war and the interpretation of sacred scriptures like the *Bhagavad Gita* and *the Vedas*; rather it was about renouncing *himsa* as a part of a larger existential process known as *satyagraha*, 'clinging to the Truth'. Every human, according to Gandhi, has the inherent capacity to choose nonviolent action rather than violence and the ability to understand the long-term consequences of power based on inflicting harm to self and others. By making a choice to move beyond violence and the lower aspects of selfhood that it represents, Gandhi insisted that the nonviolent practitioner discovers a power which restores personal and collective dignity through the effort to change oppressive situations and confront illusions upon which they were founded.

As reflected in many Hindu sacred scriptures, such as the *Vedas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Mahabharata* and the *Bhagavad Gita*, there are a wide-range of meanings for *himsa* that can be recognized in the thought and activism of Gandhi:

Treating one's self as different from others.
Failing to realize the fundamental unity of all beings
Torturing or destroying one's own body by ignorance
Causing pain to others
Troubling others physically, mentally, or vocally
Hurting or injuring others by speech, mind, and body
Killing or separating the life force from the body of others

Destroying, knowingly or unknowingly, the properties and wealth of others
Exhibiting hatred towards others
Intimidating, beating, tying up, destroying and taking the livelihood of others
Stealing the property or belongings of others
Injuring other harmless beings for the sake of one's own pleasure
Hurting innocent beings by using harsh words
Oppressing or harassing people by levying undue taxes
Cutting down the various (especially medicinal) trees and plants
Acting against the wishes of parents and teachers
Abusing of students (by a teacher)
Exploiting and taking unfair advantage of others, wrong thinking, and
    wrong action. (Shastri and Shastri 2007, p. 58)

Ahimsa is a cure for these different types of violence, which in itself is the cause of all suffering in the world. For most Hindus, suffering is a natural result of a human's past experiences with *himsa* and it is, therefore, ideal to escape the endless cycle of reincarnations and the different births and deaths. *Moksha*, or self-realization or permanent union with God, is the ultimate objective: to be liberated from the illusions of the sensory world. Through *ahimsa* one is able to move toward *moksha* and transcend notions of 'selfishness', 'otherness' as well as 'disunity'.

Both traditional and innovative in his use and updating of religious concepts, Gandhi integrated *ahimsa* with other principles such as self-rule (*swaraj*), forgiveness (*kshama*), and inner peace (*shanti*) in a long-term campaign not just for independence from Britain but also for social reform and betterment—objectives that were often included under the banner of *sarvodaya*, a Sanskirt term which refers to the 'uplifting of all humanity' through meeting social needs and promulgating a universal call to emancipate all people from the superstitions of violence. Balancing this broader 'constructive program' with pro-independence campaigns such as the Non-cooperation Movement and the Salt March, Gandhi consistently linked political engagement with moral teachings. In the following discourse, Gandhi posed and then answered a question that was at the heart of his activism:

What is the meaning of eradicating violence from the heart?

If a dacoit [bandit] inspires anger or fear in my heart, it means that I have not yet purged myself of violence. To realize non-violence means to feel within you its strength, otherwise known as soul force, in short to know

God. One who has known Him is incapable of feeling or harbouring anger or fear within him, no matter how overpowering the cause for it may be. (Gandhi in Desai 1958, p. 42)

Such teachings placed spirituality at the centre of social engagement, and have inspired subsequent generations of 'Gandhian' activists.

One of Gandhi's more notable followers was Vinoba Bhave (d. 1982), whom some claim to have been his spiritual successor. Bhave continued Gandhi's legacy of *sardovaya* through nonviolent activism dedicated to the cause of social justice and poverty alleviation. In particular, Bhave is known for the Bhoodan and Gramdan project in which he led a sustained national campaign to encourage wealthy landowners to donate land (Bhoodan) and villages (Gramdan) to the poor. Due to his advocacy, 'over 170,000 villages were donated to the poor and the public good' (Smith and Burr 2007, p. 18). Bhave was greatly inspired by the *Bhagavad Gita* and its teachings on the importance of *bhakti*, or devotion to God:

> But if God is in all of creation, especially in every human, then worship of God includes service to other humans, especially those in need. The *Gita* says that we pay our debt (a) to the universe that sustains us by practicing sacrifice (*yajna*), (b) to the society of humans that we depend on by giving alms (*dana*), and (c) to our own bodies by spiritual discipline (*tapas*). By donating excess land or resources, we (a) express our devotion to God through service, (b) sacrifice to the universe in service, (c) give alms to society through service, and (d) exercise spiritual discipline through service. (Smith and Burr 2007, p. 19)

Following the example of Gandhi, Bhave backed his work with a powerful new reading of scriptures, reaffirming central principles while offering fresh contextual applications and interpreting material related to combat with external foes on a spiritual and allegorical level. In his book *Discourses on the Gita*, Gandhi cites a Hindu saying:

> Go forth into the world; serve one another and prosper. Look upon all creatures as gods. Serve and propitiate those gods, so that being pleased they will be gracious to you and fulfill your wishes unasked. (Gandhi, *Discourses on the Gita*, 1960, p. 16)

For Gandhi, nonviolent struggle was needed in order to cling to spiritual truth. Significantly, however, he did not regard himself or his own movement to have a total claim to the truth. Rather, struggle was itself an experiment which pitted the truth of the oppressed against whatever truth the oppressor might possess, potentially unveiling a larger truth in the process. Though responsible for what was to become a defining new paradigm for active pacifism, the process through which his practices evolved were experimental and open to many influences, including ideas from Tolstoy[3] as well as practices modeled by his friend and compatriot Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

6.3 Islam

Famously, Gandhi once differentiated what he called the 'nonviolence of the brave'—of people who are fully capable of using violence but choose to express themselves nonviolently—from the 'nonviolence of the weak'—that is, the nonviolence of those who are either unable or afraid to rebel violently. The former principle, he stated, had been upheld by no one better than Abdul Ghaffar Khan, one of the foremost leaders of the Pashtun people on the frontier with Afghanistan. Also known as 'Badshah Khan' (the 'king of khans'), 'the Frontier Gandhi', 'Fakhr-e-Afghan', or 'Fakhr-e-Hind', Khan became famous for his leadership capacity, particularly his ability to mobilize tribal peoples known principally for their martial spirit to the cause of nonviolent resistance.

Though prominent in the Indian independence movement, the roots of Khan's spiritually motivated activism can be found in his personal quest to find a compelling alternative to the hegemony of violence that dominated the North-West Frontier Province. His people had long suffered from bloody tribal rivalries as well as from the violent and repressive incursions of outsiders.[4] To achieve social progress and peace as well as independence from Britain, he roused thousands of his fellow Pathans—men as well as women—to a new consciousness of Islam that, in his view, had been largely dormant since the time of the Prophet Muhammad (Easwaran 1984, p. 103). He was remarkably effective in demonstrating to the people of his region, located in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass in present-day Pakistan, that dignified, nonviolent resistance to oppression is compatible with the essence of Islam, which he believed was equivalent to peace. His words and deeds, for which he endured

great hardship, won him respect throughout the subcontinent. Gandhi, Khan's close friend, remarked that his 'unconquerable spirit' made him a true 'man of God':

> He is unquestionably a man of God. He believes in His presence and knows that his movement will prosper only if God wills it. Having put his whole soul into his cause, he remains indifferent as to what happens…. [Khan] is a true *fakir* (pious human)…. (Tendulkar 1967, p. 527)

Although many, if not most, of Khan and Gandhi's ideas about non-violence and constructive programs of social change developed independently, each leader embodied the vision and aspirations of the other (Easwaran 1984, p. 168). Khan, whose imposing stature (6' 7'') impressed many, is said to have manifested a personality that was unbending—perhaps lion-like[5]—in the defense of human dignity, yet gentle and forgiving (Abdul Ghaffar means, literally, 'Servant of the Forgiving and Merciful Lord') so long as forgiveness did not mean submission to unjust human authority.

Through a balance of 'invincible gentleness' and 'Pathan fire', Khan adamantly challenged the Pathans to strive against colonial oppression and narrow Muslim traditions that kept them weak and divided (Tendulkar 1967, p. 11). Utilizing his knowledge of religious teachings, Khan called for reform and nonviolent activism, understood in Islamic terms: '*jihad* is to say the truth before the tyrant kings. If we are Muslims, then we should act on the sayings of our Prophet' (Tendulkar 1967, p. 85). He also is noted for saying:

> We must search within the light of Islamic teachings. "God has said: Don't lie, don't slay, don't strike, don't practice tyranny, don't grab other's property, do good, don't do evil, keep your body, your clothes, and your place clean. Treat not others in a way you do not like to be treated. Perform such acts and adopt such attitudes towards others, which you like to be adopted towards you. These are the Islamic laws and orders which the Koran commends. These are the principles of Islam and those who follow them are true Muslims." (Tendulkar 1967, p. 53)

> There is nothing surprising in a Muslim or a Pathan like me subscribing to the creed of nonviolence. It is not a new creed. It was followed fourteen hundred years ago by the Prophet all the time he was in Mecca, and it has since been followed by all those who wanted to throw off the oppressor's

yoke. But we had so far forgotten it that when Gandhiji placed it before us, we thought he was sponsoring a novel creed. (Easwaran 1984, p. 103)

> The Prophet faced many handicaps, but he never gave up hope, and finally triumphed. He has left that lesson behind, and if we face our difficulties in the same spirit, I do not see why we should ever fail. The cause of freedom is always just and the fight against slavery is always noble. (Easwaran 1984, p. 165)

Khan had an inner conviction that 'Islam means action', and that nonviolence was the key to liberating the Pathan people 'from the tyranny of the foreigners [colonial British] who have disgraced and dishonored them', and from the 'crass stupidity of the mullahs', who 'were set behind [the Pathans] to propagate that it was a sin to learn'.[6] Through his own example he taught Pathans to fight nonviolently against external tyranny and subjugation as well as internal tyranny—the tyranny of vengeance-stricken minds and provincial outlooks that brought divisiveness to the Pathans as a whole and special hardships to Pathan women. In Khan's view, men and women were equal, and women were vital participants in the reform of Pathan society and the struggle against oppression.[7]

A holistic approach to interpretation is implicit in Khan's thought. For Khan, the most important challenge of interpretation was to approach Islamic texts and traditions in light of what he perceived to be the deepest, and most authentic human needs of his time—needs for individual and collective dignity, for unity, for development and the diffusion of knowledge. Within Islamic texts and traditions, he found a repertoire of possible behaviours and repeated articulations of essential precepts. Basically, he gave special emphasis to those precedents that he believed could most effectively embody and fulfill essential Islamic precepts within his own time and context. Three principles that were essential to his vision of Islam were *'amal* (selfless service), *yakeen* (faith), and *muhabbat* (love):

> It is my inmost conviction that Islam is *amal*, *yakeen*, and *muhabbat* [selfless service, faith, and love] and without these the name Muslim is sounding brass and tinkling cymbal. The Koran makes it absolutely clear that faith in One God without a second, and good works, are enough to secure a man his salvation. (Easwaran 1984, p. 63)

For Khan, 'service of God' through 'the service of His creatures', was a path of complete surrender to God,[8] and he advocated this path of service as the basis of his movement, the Khudai Khidmatgars or 'Servants of God' (Tendulkar 1967, p. 247). For Khan, service meant becoming an empty vessel or instrument for the Divine. In organizing the Khudai Khidmatgars, he organized the first known professional nonviolent army, which engaged in acts of resistance as well as social service and educational programs (Easwaran 1984, p. 59). As a social and political entity, the Khudai Khidmatgar movement directed its efforts both at British oppression and at problems facing Pathan society. As Gandhi noted, this movement pursued its ends with a remarkable degree of focus and discipline, inspired by faith and an oath of nonviolence. Through the guidance of Khan and his fellow leaders, Pathans strove not just to fight nonviolently, but also to live nonviolently, for they were aware that after the British left India, they would continue to face difficulties unless they could live nonviolently and overcome traditional rivalries and embedded injustices.[9]

With Khan as *Salar-e-Azam*, or Commander-in-Chief, the Khudai Khidmatgars visited over 3000 villages (Korejo 1993, p. 16) in the NWFP 'pleading with people to give up blood feuds, educate their boys and girls, be kind to their women, reduce the marriage expenses, oppose all the oppressors, and always stand up for the oppressed' (Tendulkar 1967, p. 55). In a surprisingly short period of time, the Khudai Khidmatgars became a nonviolent 'army of God' with over 80,000 men and women serving its cause (Easwaran 1984, pp. 117, 127).

To join the Khudai Khidmatgars, each member had to take a voluntary oath to serve humanity as a nonviolent warrior. Their oath is as follows:

> I am a Servant of God, and as God needs no service, but serving his creation is serving him, I promise to serve humanity in the name of God.
>
> I promise to refrain from violence and from taking revenge. I promise to forgive those who oppress me or treat me with cruelty.
>
> I promise to refrain from taking part in feuds and quarrels and from creating enmity.
>
> I promise to treat every Pathan as my brother and friend.
> I promise to refrain from antisocial customs and practices.

I promise to live a simple life, to practice virtue and to refrain from evil.
I promise to practice good manners and good behavior and not to lead a
life of idleness. I promise to devote at least two hours a day to social work.
(Johansen 1997, p. 59)

This oath redirected traditional notions of Pathan chivalry and honour,
and provided focus those who saw their primary 'weapons' as 'their dis-
cipline, their faith, and their native mettle' (Sharp 1973, p. 790). As
Gene Sharp in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Volumes 1–3)* points out,
principles of nonviolence channeled the energy of the Pathans in a new
direction.

It seems clear from this extremely important case that there was no basic
change in the 'human nature' of the Pathans, but that the aggressiveness,
bravery and daring of those people found new nonviolent expressions
through the nonviolent technique. (p. 790)

This view is shared by Richard B. Gregg, who notes that 'Nonviolence
was their "effective moral substitute for war"' (1935, p. 102). The effec-
tiveness with which traditions that favoured violent revenge as a demon-
stration of bravery[10] were sublimated into willingness to confront an
armed enemy without weapons astonished many, yet fulfilled Gandhi's
vision of true bravery.

Cowards are ever exposed to the enmity of all. The way to the attainment
of courage lies not in the possession of the sword and efficiency in killing
one's opponent but in the refusal to recognize in any other human being
an enemy, along with the determination to lay down one's own life and yet
not surrender at the point of the sword. (Gandhi in Desai 1958, p. 71)

By protecting citizens nonviolently, the Khudai Khidmatgars believed
that they were protecting the true Islam. Through the demonstra-
tive power of their nonviolent actions, their goals of social reform were
also advanced, particularly through the promotion of education. 'The
spread of education was a passion for [Khan]' because it was forbidden
(Tendulkar 1967, p. 37).

It is most regrettable that the British had established no school for us,
and if there was any, the mullahs were set behind us to propagate that
it was a sin to learn. They wanted the Pakhtuns to remain illiterate and

ignorant. That is why the Pathans remained the most backward community throughout India…. The Pakhtuns had a yearning for education and most of them used to send their children for getting educated in the mosques. There were no other schools in the country-side and they were not aware of any other education. And if there was any school in any city, the mullahs would not allow people to avail of that education. They used to say that the education of the present day was <u>kufar</u>, un-Islamic. Those who learn at school, they do so for money. They will have no place in heaven and will find themselves in hell…. The mullahs feared that if the people were enlightened they would no more get alms and gifts. (Tendulkar 1967, pp. 15, 17, 22)

For many years, Khan pleaded with both the British and the mullahs, but both feared the consequence of education: cultivation of wisdom and critical awareness among people who were illiterate, ignorant, and impoverished. D. G. Tendulkar, author of *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith Is a Battle*,[11] notes that since 'ninety-eight percent of the Pathans were illiterate, a written piece of paper meant nothing to them, so [Khan] went from village to village talking to them' (p. 50). Such an illiteracy rate of 98% hinders any social movement, for no one can read pamphlets or books on subjects relevant to the cause. Unfortunately, the Pathan people were often their own worst enemies; the mullahs resisted Khan's overtures regarding the need for education, and his arguments that education is linked with the prosperity of people and the progress of a nation as a whole.

The building and maintenance of schools was a vital part of Khan's life-long advocacy, and an integral part of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement's agenda. When he was still young, Khan had devoted himself to helping the poor, the ignorant, and the apathetic by creating social reform through education, largely by building and maintaining schools. For those who had previously held a monopoly on education or who feared that the diffusion of learning would undermine their authority, education posed a threat and building schools thus constituted a heresy (Easwaran 1984, p. 78). Actually, it was the building of schools which started Khan along a road that would lead him to spend one out of three days in prison for a period of over seventy years in his long life. In 1911, before the Khudai Khidmatgars were formed, Khan and his friends founded the 'Dar-ul-Ulum' school, and soon organized 'Anjuman-Islah-ul-Afghina', an organization whose purpose was to spread education throughout the province (Tendulkar 1967, p. 22). Then in 1921 Azad High School was built in his

own village of Utmanzai (p. 37). Also in Utmanzai, Khan built one of the first girls' schools in the NWFP, 'a very rare thing in the Muslim North' (Easwaran 1984, p. 169). In addition to schools, Khan and others established centres to propagate a constructive program such as that envisioned by Gandhi. Khan wanted to inspire the Pathans to be 'united, educated, reformed and organized' (Tendulkar 1967, p. 26). Khudai Khidmatgars visited villages teaching the Pathans to be self-sufficient in material matters, like agriculture and sanitation, spinning and weaving (p. 254), and in political matters, like training individuals in strategic nonviolent action (systematic, nonviolent resistance to discriminatory legislation) and nonviolent principles (honor and freedom, willing sacrifice, selfless service, and forgiveness).

Drawing upon challenging new interpretations of Islam, Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars believed in the power of nonviolence to transform human affairs. They even went so far as to see nonviolence as a force that, when cultivated systematically, could root out exploitation and transmute anger into love in action. Of course, it was not Khan's process of reinterpretation alone that drove the movement, however important his ability to see old traditions in new ways may have been. In the final analysis, Khan's charismatic words and brave deeds inspired both men and women into action at a time of profound social distress that could have conceivably led to large-scale violence. Instead, the efforts of Khan and his contemporaries channeled Pathan resentment of the British into disciplined, nonviolent defiance of colonial authority, in campaigns that played a pivotal role in the Indian struggle for independence. Perhaps due to the remoteness of the NWFP, the British employed greater force in attempting to dissipate these campaigns and coerce obedience, yet these efforts failed despite their considerable intensity. Pathan men and women suffered—albeit probably to a considerably lesser extent than in the event of a guerrilla war—yet regained dignity in a struggle undertaken in the name of the Islamic ideal of service.

Like many peace advocates in Islam, Khan was influenced by the traditions of Sufism, through Islamic mystical teachings and narratives that had strongly influenced his culture. Throughout Muslim history Sufis have been known to emphasize the spiritual cosmology of unity and have also been recognized as Muslims who *embrace* pluralism within this unity as the expression of God's many qualities and self-manifestations. One of the greatest Sufi metaphysicians, Muhyi al-Din Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 1240),

eloquently articulated a vision in which the pluralism of creation and even of religious beliefs can be understood to manifest the vastness of divine reality:

> Beware of being bound up by a particular religion and rejecting all others as unbelief! If you do that you will fail to obtain a great benefit. Nay, you will fail to obtain the true knowledge of the reality. Try to make yourself a (kind of) Prime Matter for all forms of religious belief. God is wider and greater than to be confined to a particular religion to the exclusion of others. For He says: 'To whichever direction you turn, there surely is the Face of God'. God does not specify (in this verse) a particular place in which the Face of God is to be found. He only said: 'There is the Face of God.' The 'face' of a thing means its real essence. So God has admonished by this verse the hearts of the 'knowers' so that they might not be distracted by non-essential matters in the present world from being constantly conscious of this kind of thing. (Ibn al-'Arabi in Izutsu 1983, p. 254)

For Ibn al-'Arabi and many other Muslim mystics who influenced him, the diversity of the world's religions was itself a sign of God and a source of theophanic insight necessitating an attitude akin to what Krister Stendahl described as 'holy envy' (Sharify-Funk 2018). In Ibn al-'Arabi's teachings, respect for integrity manifest within non-Muslim systems of belief and worship was essential for being a fully realized Muslim—a spiritually developed person who surrenders to the grace of Truth no matter what symbolic form it might take.

Additionally, teachings from a variety of historical and contemporary Sufis underscore a spiritual understanding of human struggles depicted in sacred scriptures and relating these stories to the journey of each soul towards realization of God. A development of in-depth spiritual psychology is found within Sufi traditions and in them one finds teachings on the cultivation of divine virtues within one's personality and character. However, Sufi ethic demands that one is not passive in relation to the outside world; rather, Sufis would promote an ethic of brotherhood and service which considers actions directed towards others as actions towards God. In the contemporary era, many have found in this ethos a sentiment that resonates with cosmopolitan as well as humanitarian ideals. For example, at the entrance of the United Nations building, one finds a famous quote by Sa'di of Shiraz (d. 1292) entitled, *Bani Adam* ('The Children of Adam'):

> The children of Adam are limbs of one another
> And in their creation come from one substance
> When the world gives pain to one or another
> The other members find no rest.

Other Sufi poets have been honoured in similar fashion, and recognized for their capacity to evoke inclusive and universalist visions. In 2007 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared 2007 the International Year of Rumi, in commemoration of the 800th anniversary of Sufi mystic and poet Jalal al-Din Rumi's birth in 1207 CE. During that year cultural events were organized around the world under the auspices of UNESCO. Inspired by phrases from the Qur'an that emphasize the unity of all being, Rumi's poetry reflects the human need for peace and human solidarity:

> *The conflicts among men stem from names*
> *Trace back the meaning and achieve accord.* (M2: 3680: Lewis 2000, p. 405)

> *Whether you are Arab or Greek or Turk –*
> *Learn the language without words!* (D 1183: Schimmel 1992, p. 44)

> *Every prophet, every saint has his path*
> *but as they return to God, all are one* (M2: 3086: Lewis 2000, p. 406)

> *Love's folk live beyond religious borders*
> *The community and creed of lovers is one: God.* (M2: 1770: Lewis 2000, p. 406)

Centuries after their passing, Sufi figures such as Rumi, Sa'di, and Ibn al-'Arabi continue to inspire new generations to build bridges. While they were not in their times known specifically for advocating nonviolent solutions to political problems, in the present era, marked as it is by intercultural rivalries and tensions, their universalist formulations of religious truth are being tapped as resources for international peace.

6.4   BUDDHISM

In Western contexts, Buddhism is often the first religion after Christianity to be considered as a significant source of nonviolent and peaceful spirituality. While it is important to acknowledge that all religious communities can generate exclusive dynamics, particularly when

religious identity becomes intertwined with ethnic nationalism, modern Buddhism has nonetheless produced a number of pacific leaders of considerable stature.

Historically linked to other religious traditions of South Asia, Buddhism shares with Hinduism and Jainism the principle of 'no harm' (*ahimsa*) and offers teachings on renunciation and detachment from worldly pleasures that resonate with other currents of spirituality cultivated on the subcontinent as well as with contemplative traditions within Western religions.

Although some currents of the Buddhist tradition can rightly be described as quietist or introspective in nature, contemporary pioneers of socially engaged Buddhism have found much in their teachings that lends itself to compassion for others, advocacy for social justice as well as ecological sustainability, and affirmation of a shared human need to live in peace. Key teachings such as the Four Noble Truths and the Eight-Fold Path continue to inspire these present-day peacemakers, together with teachings on emptiness, impermanance, nonattachment, interconnectivity of all beings, unconditional compassion, and the duty to liberate all beings from suffering. For engaged Buddhists, these principles offer guidance not only for living a life directed towards spiritual enlightenment, but also for guiding others toward a collective existence that is more nonviolent, principled, and conducive to human happiness.

Core Buddhist teachings suggest that much human conflict is driven by delusions born of fear, greed, and ignorance. Out of ignorance, people seek security or satisfaction in external things that are by their very nature impermanent, unsatisfying, and unreliable. Furthermore, they are driven by a false sense of separately existing selfhood to ignore their interconnectedness with others, and to thereby feel justified in inflicting harm and suffering the negative consequences of a violent existence. Thus, central Buddhist practices concerning liberation and enlightenment can be directly linked to overcoming the foundational illusions upon which destructive conflict is based. From a liberated standpoint, all beings are seen to be interconnected, and there is no separate 'self' that exists in isolation from the whole of reality. Acquiring knowledge of one's own contingent existence and interdependence with others can itself serve as a bridge to spiritual practice and efforts to overcome conditioning and the afflictive states that perpetuate suffering. For all its limitations, being born a human being is a tremendous gift, because only

by being human can one attain enlightenment (*nirvana*). Desire to help others achieve liberation can itself be a profound motivation for social activism. Compassion (*karuna*), a key Buddhist principle, arises from an understanding of the shared existential predicament and suffering of all sentient beings, and arises in conjunction with spiritual practice.

Though contemporary engaged Buddhists have gone beyond many traditional understandings in foregrounding social as well as psychological and spiritual causes of human suffering, their concern for social and political conditions is by no means unprecedented. One prominent example of socially engaged nonviolent practice in early Buddhism can be found in the leadership and advocacy of King Asoka Maurya, who reigned from 270–232 BCE in India and parts of today's Afghanistan. Before his conversion to Buddhism, King Ashoka had little regard for principles of nonviolence or pacifism. After years of bloody warfare throughout India, however, Asoka came to reflect on the suffering caused by war and sought to atone for the harm his desire for conquest had wrought. He henceforth committed himself to become as humane a leader as possible, and sought to usher in an era of relative peace. One way in which he sought to propagate a new, peaceful ethos was through the placement of 'peace pillars' or 'Rock Edicts' throughout his kingdom, each with an inscribed message of reconciliation such as the following:

> For many hundreds of years in the past, slaughter of animals, cruelty to living creatures, discourtesy to relatives, and disrespect for priests and ascetics have been increasing, But now… the sound of war drums has become the call to Dharma, summoning the people to exhibitions of the chariots of the gods, elephants, fireworks, and other divine displays. [Now the] inculcation of Dharma has increased, abstention from killing animals and from cruelty to living beings, kindliness in human and family relations, respect for priests and ascetics, and obedience to mother and father and elders. (Nikam and McKeon 1978, p. 31)

Asoka's solemn vow to do no more harm to any human or animal reflected his newfound devotion to the Buddhist principle of *dharma* (translated as 'truth' or 'righteous path' and even 'moral living'). Military conquest, for Asoka, only led to suffering, whereas 'conquest by *dharma*' enabled reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. By supporting not only *dharma* but also public works such as medical facilities and

animal hospitals, Asoka intended to educate his kingdom on the necessity to live a compassionate life while also taking concrete measures that supported the eventual liberation of all sentient beings.

If 'engaged Buddhism' had stirrings in Asoka, the term itself was not coined until the 1960s. It was at this time that the Vietnamese Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh[12] was seeking a nonviolent response to the unjust, hostile and brutal realities of the American-Indo-China War (otherwise known as the Vietnam War). In 1966 Nhat Hanh founded the Tiep Hien order (which literally means 'the Order of Interbeing') and ordained six members into the Order—three women and three men. All six were board members of the School of Youth for Social Service, which he had established the year before. Inspired by the Buddhist principles, Nhat Hahn and the members of Tiep Hien order articulated the following fourteen precepts to guide their spiritual practice and social action:

1. Do not be idolatrous about or bound to any doctrine, theory, or ideology, even Buddhist ones. Buddhist systems of thought are guiding means; they are not absolute truth.
2. Do not think the knowledge you presently possess is changeless, absolute truth. Avoid being narrow-minded and bound to present views. Learn and practice nonattachment from views in order to be open to receive others' viewpoints. Truth is found in life and not merely in conceptual knowledge. Be ready to learn throughout your entire life and to observe reality in yourself and in the world at all times.
3. Do not force others, including children, by any means whatsoever, to adopt your views, whether by authority, threat, money, propaganda, or even education. However, through compassionate dialogue, help others renounce fanaticism and narrowness.
4. Do not avoid contact with suffering or close your eyes before suffering. Do not lose awareness of the existence of suffering in the life of the world. Find ways to be with those who are suffering, including personal contact, visits, images, and sounds. By such means, awaken yourself and others to the reality of suffering in the world.
5. Do not accumulate wealth while millions are hungry. Do not take as the aim of your life fame, profit, wealth, or sensual pleasure. Live simply and share time, energy, and material resources with those who are in need.
6. Do not maintain anger or hatred. Learn to penetrate and transform them when they are still seeds in your consciousness. As soon as

they arise, turn your attention to your breath in order to see and understand the nature of your hatred.

7. Do not lose yourself in dispersion and in your surroundings. Practice mindful breathing to come back to what is happening in the present moment. Be in touch with what is wondrous, refreshing, and healing both inside and around you. Plant seeds of joy, peace, and understanding in yourself in order to facilitate the work of transformation in the depths of your consciousness.

8. Do not utter words that can create discord and cause the community to break. Make every effort to reconcile and resolve all conflicts, however small.

9. Do not say untruthful things for the sake of personal interest or to impress people. Do not utter words that cause division and hatred. Do not spread news that you do not know to be certain. Do not criticize or condemn things of which you are not sure. Always speak truthfully and constructively. Have the courage to speak out about situations of injustice, even when doing so may threaten your own safety.

10. Do not use the Buddhist community for personal gain or profit, or transform your community into a political party. A religious community, however, should take a clear stand against oppression and injustice and should strive to change the situation without engaging in partisan conflicts.

11. Do not live with a vocation that is harmful to humans and nature. Do not invest in companies that deprive others of their chance to live. Select a vocation that helps realize your ideal of compassion.

12. Do not kill. Do not let others kill. Find whatever means possible to protect life and prevent war.

13. Possess nothing that should belong to others. Respect the property of others, but prevent others from profiting from human suffering or the suffering of other species on Earth.

14. Do not mistreat your body. Learn to handle it with respect. Do not look on your body as only an instrument. Preserve vital energies (sexual, breath, spirit) for the realization of the Way. (For brothers and sisters who are not monks and nuns:) Sexual expression should not take place without love and commitment. In sexual relationships, be aware of future suffering that may be caused. To preserve the happiness of others, respect the rights and commitments of others. Be fully aware of the responsibility of bringing new lives into the world. Meditate on the world into which you are bringing new beings. (Nhat Hanh 1993)

It is interesting to point out that even in the midst of terrible violence, the members of Nhat Hanh's order did not choose a side; rather, they chose to call attention to the horrors of war by engaging in compassionate action towards all. This 'neutral' stance was not welcomed by political authorities, however, and Nhat Hanh was ultimately driven into exile. After a 'period of experimentation' which lasted until 1981, the Tiep Hien Order opened membership and currently there are thousands of individuals who regularly recite these precepts. Aspects of Nhat Hanh's teachings have been embraced by far more individuals, who have found in them a basis for integrating Buddhist wisdom into modern life as well as various forms of social activism.

Other contemporary Buddhist leaders noted for practicing 'engaged Buddhism' are Maha Ghosananda of Cambodia (d. 2007), Tenzin Gyatso (also predominantly known as the 14th Dalai Lama) of Tibet (1935–), A. T. Ariyaratne of Sri Lanka (1931–), and Daisaku Ikeda of Japan (1928–). Having experienced the horror of the Khmer Rouge era in the 1970s, Maha Ghosananda, a Cambodian Theravada Buddhist monk, co-established the Inter-Religious Mission for Peace in Cambodia, through which he proceeded to implement relief efforts for refugees as well as monks and nuns who had suffered grave persecution during the war. His efforts on behalf of his people included restorative projects to preserve Buddhist teachings which had been almost completely eradicated by the Khmer Rouge, as well as a peace advocacy campaign that revolved around annual marches to support the 1992 UN-supported peace agreement. In these marches, known as the Dhammayietra (literally, 'sacred pilgrimage'), hundreds of people would march together across the country, symbolically expressing their dedication to peace and desire for national reconciliation. In the early years these marches involved some danger, given the persistence of armed clashes and the presence of landmines in some regions. The appeal of the first marches led to the Dhammayietra becoming an annual tradition. Due to his advocacy for nonviolence and peace efforts, Maha Ghosananda came to be called 'the Gandhi of Cambodia' and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995, 1996, and 1997. He received the Peace Abbey Courage of Conscience Award in 1998. Here is an excerpt from an essay he entitled 'The Human Family',

There is no self. There are only causes and conditions. Therefore, to struggle with others and ourselves is useless. The wise ones know that the root causes and conditions of all conflicts are in the mind.

Victory creates hatred. Defeat creates suffering. The wise ones wish for neither victory nor defeat. We can oppose selfishness with the weapon of generosity. We can oppose ignorance with the weapon of wisdom. We can oppose hatred with the weapon of loving kindness….

Human rights begin when each man becomes a brother and each woman becomes a sister, when we honestly care for each other. Then Cambodians will help Jews, and Jews will help Africans, and Africans will help others. We will all become servants for each other's rights….When we accept that we are part of a great human family—that every man and every woman has the nature of Buddha, Allah, and Christ—then we will sit, talk, make peace, and bring humankind to its fullest flowering…. Peacemaking is at the heart of life. (Maha Ghosananda in Chappell 1999, pp. 153–154)

The most famous contemporary Buddhist public figure would be Tenzin Gyatso, mostly known as the Dalai Lama of Tibet. He is the 14th and current Dalai Lama who is seen as the reincarnation of the Avalokiteśvara, a Bodhisattva of Compassion. He comes from a long line of 'living Buddhas' who have upheld peaceful Buddhist principles and practices. As a result of being forced into exile in 1959, he has worked not only for Tibetan national independence and the preservation of Tibetan religions, cultures and education; he is also known for his advocacy of interreligious dialogue and peace efforts. In 1989 due to his nonviolent advocacy, the Dalai Lama became one of the few contemporary Buddhist leaders to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1994, along with many spiritual leaders, he also signed the *Declaration on the Role of Religion in the Promotion of a Culture of Peace* and in this document there is acknowledgment of the world's religious diversity and how religions offer a multitude of resources to contribute towards peacemaking and nonviolent action (Chappell 1999, pp. 237–241). In many of his writings the Dalai Lama is known for promoting what he calls 'internal disarmament', calling humans 'to reduce negative emotions such as hatred, anger, jealousy, extremism, and greed, and promote compassion, human affection, tolerance' (Dalai Lama in Chappell 1999, p. 190).

My own personal feeling is that often people fail to appreciate truly the real essence of religion. I personally see religion as a method to bring about an inner positive transformation. But people often use religion rather as a base of identity, something to make yourself feel that you belong to something, rather than understanding its true nature, as a spiritual guideline. So when that happens, given that human beings have emotions like anger, hatred, jealousy, then sometimes religion is used to further these negative emotions. (Dalai Lama in Chappell 1999, p. 196)

A. T. Ariyaratne of Sri Lanka was founder of the Buddhist social and spiritual movement called *Sarvodaya Shramadana* (literally, 'the awakening of all through labor for the common good'). Similar to Vinoba Bhave of India, Ariyaratne advocated against poverty and for the right of human needs (as reflected in his writings) and is known for influencing over 11,000 villages in Sri Lanka. He also helped in peacemaking efforts between the Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus; especially with his workshops for youth and seminars on peaceful coexistence. Due to the dangerous reality in war-torn Sri Lanka, Ariyaratne has often been threatened, as reflected in the following story of his:

One evening while [Ariyaratne] was praying his Buddhist devotions, he felt a strong force push him forward—a sort of spiritual energy. He went out of his house into the garden and found himself facing a man who was pointing a gun at him. He said, 'Go ahead. Shoot. But tell whoever sent you that I die with no hatred in my heart.' The man dropped his arm and said, 'I can't shoot you. Please go hide.' (Ariyaratne in Smith and Burr 2007, p. 49)

Like many other faith-based peace leaders, Ariyaratne has shown the capacity of spiritually committed activism to persist in the face of violent forces, bringing new dynamics into conflict zones.

Daisaku Ikeda is the third president of Soka Gokkai International (SGI which literally means 'value-creating society'), a Buddhist reform organization that has been one of the leading forces for nuclear disarmament. In *Prophets of Peace: Pacifism and Cultural Identity in Japan's New Religions*, Robert Kisela describes the 'theory of an all pervasive life force' that was developed by Toda Josei, the second president of SGI and teacher of Ikeda. This life force is ultimately all-encompassing and permeates the whole universe; it is the origin of all health, happiness, social well-being and peace. This life force lives in every human and must be valued. Toda believed that if this life force is subordinated by unjust

interests, it ultimately causes harm to all human welfare and peace. Ikeda promoted Toda's humanist call for action as reflected in his many dialogues with a variety of authorities on world peace:

> Global society today faces myriad interlocking crises. These include the issues of war, environmental degradation, the north-South development gap, divisions among people based on differences of ethnicity, religion and language. The list is long and familiar, and the road to solutions may seem all too distant and daunting.

> It is my view, however, that the root of all of these problems is our collective failure to make human being, human happiness, the consistent focus and goal in all fields of endeavor. The human being is the point to which we must return and from which we must depart anew. What is required is a human transformation—a human revolution.[13]

6.5   Concluding Thoughts: Nonviolent Social Hermeneutics?

Expressions of nonviolent and pacifist sentiment can be found throughout the world's religions. While it remains possible to mobilize religious identities for purposes contrary to those endorsed by the exemplars described above, shining a spotlight on peace leaders in the world religions attests to the potential for religious visionaries to appeal for unity and compassion in the face of conflict. Despite differences in theologies and belief systems, these examples point to patterns that can connect people, giving substance to ideals like love and peace. These patterns are evident not just in their conclusions with respect to values such as pacifism and nonviolence, but also in their modes of inquiry and interpretation—of hermeneutics.

Hermeneutics, in a nutshell, can be defined as the 'art of textual interpretation and understanding'. Though the study of hermeneutics has traditionally been conceptualized as a narrowly academic enterprise, there is also an important sense in which it is a profoundly social practice, in which interpreters approach texts seeking answers to questions that arise from widely experienced consequences of vicissitudes in social relations and questions of injustice. We as humans read our celebrated social sacred texts not only in light of philosophy and academic method, but also in light of timely human needs and fears created by our inescapable relationship with cultural otherness.

As Aristotle pointed out in his treatise, *Peri Hermeneias*, hermeneutics is both the theory of human comprehension and the assimilation of that comprehension (Ricoeur 1974, p. 4). In a traditional theoretical sense, hermeneutics evokes rigorous methodologies and abstract philosophies of textual understanding. In a broader sense, however, hermeneutics is a highly participatory endeavour. Authoritative interpreters of social texts are themselves authors of new understandings, and as such, write within—and indeed for—contexts of political contestation. They seek to communicate their comprehension of social texts in ways that are comprehensible to their contemporaries, and that answer fundamental questions of individual and collective identity and purpose: Who am I?/ Who are we? What do I believe/What do we stand for? What is my relationship/our relationship with *them*, with the Other? How do I/we read their intentions? What is distinctive about the actions of human beings in particular settings? How does context change? How do agents seek social change by drawing upon cultural values and symbols as resources and guidelines for action?

The hermeneutic act of interpretation and understanding is simultaneously textual and contextual. It is *textual* because as a reader of social reality, we seek understandings of whole books in relation to their parts, with special reference to the expressions of language chosen at a specific time and place. As a reader, we explore our relationship with the text and undergo an experience of approaching, engaging, deciphering, questioning, analyzing, and elucidating meaning from metaphorical language— from narratives, symbols and analogies. The hermeneutic act is also *contextual*, however, because the language of the text and the events to which it refers are derived from a multi-faceted environment that may be distant from our own experience. Moreover, we as interpreters are similarly embedded in a complex environment that surrounds us and penetrates us, often in ways that we cannot fully and consciously articulate. To develop contextual understanding, then, we negotiate interrelationships between our own multiple, overlapping identities and the settings in which the text has been written and subsequently read. Inevitably, we read ourselves into the text and the text into ourselves. The text as we read it reflects our world as we experience it, and our world comes to embody themes from the text.

Gandhi, Khan, Nhat Hahn, and others practiced what might be called 'nonviolent social hermeneutics' in which each interpreter offered a powerful new reading of traditional religious scriptures, concepts and practices. In their hermeneutics each reaffirmed central principles while providing fresh contextual applications and interpreting material related to combat with external foes on a spiritual and allegorical level. In doing so, each also redefined and reconceptualized notions of self and the necessity to self-critique one's own understanding and tradition.

Being both traditional and innovative, each interpreter used and updated essential religious concepts (i.e., *ahimsa*, *dharma, shalom*) vital for human transformation. Also, each shared the desire to cling to spiritual truth. Significantly, however, these interpreters did not regard their religions or their own movements to have a total claim to the truth, even when championing a cause linked to social justice. By recognizing the need for non-totalizing truth claims and religious pluralism, each advocated that perhaps there is a larger truth that neither oppressed or oppressor has discovered. As a result, there is an inclination towards humility found in the works of nonviolent practitioners, together with an emphasis on experimentation and dynamic social engagement within the advocacy of nonviolent interpreters.

Lastly, one could say that a 'holistic', humanist approach to interpretation is implicit in the thought of many of these examples. Though all of the individuals profiled would not describe themselves as pacifists in a strict or unconditional sense, we do consistently find in their beliefs and practices a pattern of nonviolence. Richard B. Gregg, an influential early theorist of nonviolent action, once stated that 'Nonviolent resistance in complete form is a dramatization of the idea of essential human unity' (Gregg 1935, p. 57). Like the practitioners of *satyagraha* in whom Gregg found this dynamic idea, so, too, have these peacebuilders from many faiths offered performances that evoke unity. In their religious ideas as well as in their examples, we find an ethos of responsiveness to human needs, of individual as well as collective dignity, of solidarity in the development of knowledge and practices for peace and unity.

NOTES

1. Ibn Qunfudh was born and lived most of his life in Constantine, Algeria, where he studied and published a variety of books on diverse subjects. In this book he portrays the lives and thought of many intellectual and spiritual personalities in North Africa. See Guergour (2008, pp. 1113–1114).

2. The author wants to acknowledge that there is ample scholarship on different typologies of pacifism (i.e., use of 'absolute' or 'purist' pacifism as a refusal to participate in any form of war and 'pragmatic', 'situational', or 'conditional' pacifism which advocates opposition to war but also accepts the use of violent force for self-defence). However, this chapter does not focus on these different definitions; rather, it portrays 'pacifism' and 'nonviolence' as terms that are interconnected and are ultimately interchangeable. Many scholars writing about the history of peace agree that the terms pacifism and nonviolence are intertwined, even as others insist on clear distinctions between the two terms.

3. It is interesting to note that as MLK Jr. was heavily inspired by the life and thought of Gandhi, so too would Gandhi be inspired by the writings of Leo Tolstoy, who started a Russian Christian anarchist movement. In particular, Gandhi often refers to Tolstoy's writings, *The Kingdom of God Is Within You: Christianity Not as a Mystic Religion But as a New Theory of Life* and *The Inevitable Revolution*.

4. Before Abdul Ghaffar Khan's leadership, Pathans as a people were widely viewed as 'steeped in the tradition of factious violence' as described in Easwaran (1984, p. 95).

5. Easwaran, p. 92. Abdul Ghaffar Khan rallied the Pathans with a Sufi story about a lion cub, after he finished the story he boomed, 'O Pathans! so I also say to you. You are lions, but you have been brought up in slavery. Stop bleating like sheep. Roar like lions.'

6. The first quote is from Tendulkar (1967, p. 13); the second is from Easwaran (1984, p. 3); and the third quote is from Tendulkar (1967, p. 15).

7. One of the difficult issues which faced the Khudai Khidmatgars when touring the villages was the oppressive tradition of *purdah*, the seclusion of women from society. The Khudai Khidmatgars proposed the eradication of *purdah*, on the grounds that all women and men are equal and no one in Islam is to be subjugated.

> He long lamented the traditional system of *purdah*, which restricts Muslim women from participating fully in society. He encouraged them to come out from behind the veil, as the women in his own family had done. His sisters became increasingly active in

his movement, until 1930 they were touring the districts of the Frontier and giving speeches. (Easwaran 1984, p. 104)

In Khan's view, *purdah* could be used to oppress or imprison women, and had dubious Islamic authenticity. Khan saw the oppressive qualities of *purdah* and felt that it negated true Islamic principles of equality:

All Muslims are equal according to Islamic law…. [*P*]*urdah* is not acceptable in nonviolence…. [F]emales are absent from the equation [of participatory decisionmaking] yet they do most of the survival deeds. (Tendulkar 1967, p. 53)

Purdah denied women the right to participate in society. It secluded them from society, which in turn excluded them from society. Khan encouraged women to 'come out behind their veil' and 'grid up your loins' (Tendulkar 1967, p. 102). Many women responded, including his own sisters, and became very active in 'the movement for social reform and political independence' (Johansen 1997, p. 61). One form of educative protest in 1928 was the creation of *Pakhtun*, a liberal journal published in the Pakhtu, the language of the Pathans (Tendulkar 1967, pp. 50–55). Women used this vehicle to voice their opinions to their fellow compatriots.

8. Easwaran (1984, p. 131). Khan stated, 'I have one standard of measure and that is the measure of one's surrender to God.'
9. An interesting study could be made on the breakup of India and the creation of the world's first Islamic republic, Pakistan, and what this breakup symbolized for the world and Islamic countries. What message was sent to the rest of the Islamic world? What if Muslims and Hindus could have remained in a unified India? What would have been the effects? For Khan, it was not Iran but rather Pakistan who formed the first Islamic Republic. Did Gandhi and Khan see the partition's repercussions as a symbol of deviating from the Islamic (*tawhid*) and Hindu (*advaita*) ideal of unity?
10. Khan advocated for the eradication of *badal*, vengeance, from the Pathan's consciousness through nonviolent training. Khan fought for nonviolence in a province dominated by the idea that to die seeking revenge was more honourable.
11. This book is the most comprehensive study on Khan's life and message. It was written after the completion of *Mahatma*, eight volumes commemorating Gandhi's life works. This book was seen as the last volume of the series, insofar as it completed Gandhi's message.
12. Thich Nhat Hahn wrote in 1967, *Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire*, in which he describes the emergence of the term: 'In the 1930s, the Buddhist scholars [in Vietnam] had already discussed the engagement of Buddhism

in modern society and called it *Nhan Gian Phat Giao* or engaged Buddhism' (p. 42).

13. This quote comes from a speech entitled, 'Thoughts on Education of Global Citizenship' given at Columbia University, 13 June 1996. It can be found in Christopher S. Queen's 'The Peace Wheel: Nonviolent Activism in the Buddhist Tradition', in *Subverting Hatred: The Challenge of Nonviolence in Religious Traditions*, ed. Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, 2007, p. 37.

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Judaism, Zionism and Pacifism: Past, Present, Future

Mark H. Gelber

It must be made clear from the beginning that Judaism, the religion, does not promote pacifism. Like Christianity, its daughter religion, it is not pacifistic. However, just as there are for Christianity, there are many varieties, streams or expressions of Judaism, and there are minority pacifistic strands in both. They have been inspired by religious tenets and paradigms in scripture considered holy by adherents of these different religions. In the first part of this chapter, I consider the pacifistic heritage in Judaism, taking the Jewish textual tradition into account, especially the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh, תנ״ך) and the Talmud. In a second step, I bring this consideration to bear on 'Jewish praxis'. That is, I focus on the relationship of this textual and commentary tradition to Jewish life as it has been lived over the centuries. Perhaps this section gives some credence to debatable statements, like one attributed to Jean Paul Sartre, that Jewish males, who are 'the mildest of men', possess 'an obstinate sweetness' and are 'passionately hostile to violence' (Sartre, as cited in Horowitz 2006,

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p. 187). In the second part of this chapter, I focus on pacifistic expressions in Zionism, the modern Jewish national movement. Zionism strove to establish a Jewish state and a Jewish cultural centre in the land of Israel and it accomplished this goal with the founding of Israel in 1948. Zionism is also not pacifistic—in fact, Zionism and the State of Israel are widely and regularly condemned for being brutally militaristic. However, Zionism is a complex ideology, actually a multi-faceted composite of ideas and movements, and there is a pacifistic strand or pacifistic strands and major pacifist personalities in Zionism as well. Since both Judaism and Zionism continue to develop in historical time, it may very well be that pacifistic elements and aspects of both may gain in importance over time, even if this prospect does not appear to be especially probable today.

For the purposes of this chapter, I utilize a broad conception of pacifism, which originates in the core Biblical injunction: 'Thou Shalt not Kill' (Exodus 20:13), which is sometimes translated into English from the Hebrew original as 'Thou Shalt not Murder'. Thus, my discussion and the examples I employ are not limited to objections to war and the refusal to kill in armed combat. Rather, they encompass the rejection of a wide range of violent and murderous acts.

7.1   Pacifism and the Jewish Religious Tradition

Traditional Jewish-religious teachings and tendencies regarding pacifism developed in the Talmudic and Jewish commentary literature throughout the centuries and many violent tendencies—capital punishment, calls to exact revenge by killing, to wage war, or to extirpate nations—were very often relativized or rendered inoperative by certain Talmudic mechanisms based on Rabbinic discussions. It is not sufficient to cite well-known 'sayings' or passages from the Hebrew Bible in order to give credence to a pacifistic kernel or aspect of Judaism. In this regard one may cite the Biblical commandment 'Thou shalt not kill', one of the core ten commandments of Judaism. Or, one may think of the passage in the prophetic book of Isaiah: 'And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore....' (Isa. 2:4). A more typical Jewish passage in this regard would be the well-known one from Ecclesiastes (3:1–8): '...a time to love, and a time to hate... a time for war and a time for peace...' 'To everything, there is a season....' That seems to sum up the way of the world from a Jewish point of view, while

Jewish tradition has always viewed Isaiah's prophecy of peace as a vision of the future during the Messianic Age. Regarding 'Thou shalt not murder'—certainly it is one of the Ten Commandments at the heart of Judaism, but, according to Jewish law, one has the legal right to kill in several well-defined situations, including and especially self-defense, when one's very life is threatened. Moreover, to kill those who belong to arch-enemy nations, like the Amalakites, is a Biblical injunction. Biblical passages like these and others may also be viewed from the point of view of one of the supreme Jewish values, the sanctity of human life itself (שפנ חוקיפ, Pikuakh Nefesh), which renders it encumbent on Jews to seek peace and avoid war and conflict. The Hebrew liturgy is replete with prayers for peace (םולש, Shalom) and the concept of 'Shalom' itself is central to Jewish life. However, the Jewish tradition deemed it imperative to qualify and enumerate carefully when and under what conditions war and killing might be justifiable or necessary. Wanton murder would never be condoned in Judaism, but several categories of justifiable killing and just wars were explicated in the commentary literature and were part and parcel of Jewish life for centuries.[1]

At this point, an explanation of the Talmudic process of relativizing or obviating killing should be useful because it is typical of Judaism in both theory and in practice. Capital punishment and its limitations are good examples of how the Talmud attempts to formulate a commentary on Biblical injunctions. One well-known case in the Hebrew Bible concerns the 'stubborn and rebellious son' or 'impudent and wanton son' (in Hebrew, בֶז ררוס ומורא) mentioned in the book of Deuteronomy (21:18–21) (Bellefontaine 1979). It is stated that this rebellious son should be stoned for not obeying or respecting his parents and for drinking their wine and eating their meat, that is, for stealing and consuming these items without their permission. Thus, a capital punishment is called for in the Bible: death by stoning. In the Talmudic tractate Sanhedrin (68–71), an extensive discussion by the Talmudic sages is recorded about this specific case and the injunction. Basically, numerous conditions and qualifications are debated and established by the Rabbis in order to render it virtually impossible to implement the commandment to stone the rebellious son. So many conditions need to be fulfilled in order for the execution to take place that it effectively cannot take place: there is but a tiny window of time (three months short of maturity) during which the son would have to display his repugnant, rebellious behaviour. Then, he would have to steal and consume a considerable and specific amount

of wine and meat in order to qualify for the punishment. Furthermore, the location of his act would have to be beyond the boundaries of his home. A court would also have had to warn him in advance, and even whipped him if necessary, in order to try to prevent him from carrying out his rebellious acts. After a prolonged discussion along these lines in the Talmud, Rabbi Shimon goes so far as to claim that 'there never was and never would be' the death penalty in a case of a 'stubborn and rebellious son'. The Talmudic expression is unambiguous: ארבנ אלו היה אל (which might be rendered into English as: it never happened and it never will). Thus the entire, prolonged discussion is undercut, which tends to emphasize its theoretical rather than practical nature. In a typical parting and aporetic Talmudic quip, Rabbi Yonatan reports that he nonetheless did once sit at the gravesite of such a culprit. To this statement, there is no further Talmudic response.

As a matter of fact, the Hebrew Bible stipulates different kinds of capital punishment: stoning, decapitation, burning, and strangulation. These various punishments and the crimes they fit—for example idolatry, incestuous relations, rape of a betrothed woman, false prophecy and others— are also discussed in great detail in the Talmudic tractate of Sanhedrin. But the majority opinion in the commentary and scholarly literature is that this discussion is a theoretical one, and that Jewish courts throughout the centuries never or hardly ever or only exceptionally demanded the death penalty for a crime. At least this has been the norm for the last two thousand years of Jewish life. The great Jewish sage of the Middle Ages, Maimonides (1135–1204), wrote that it was better to acquit one thousand guilty persons than to put one single guiltless person to death. Thus, Jewish legal discussions have tended over the centuries to view the death penalty more as a theoretical principle than a practical law to be implemented. In any case, for centuries or for millennia, Jews did not have the political power or legal mandate to adjudicate capital crimes and implement death penalties.[2]

7.2   Pacifism and Zionism

Despite the fact that the State of Israel came into existence following a vote in the United Nations in favour of the partition of Palestine in November, 1947, a declaration of independence in May, 1948, and a resulting war between Jews and Arabs and against belligerent neighbouring countries, the war is normally viewed by the Jewish side as a war of

self-defence. In any case, it needs to be understood as the culmination of an historical process. For more than half a century, Zionism argued for the national rights of the Jewish people, and for its right to establish a homeland or a state and/or a cultural centre for this largely diasporic nation in the land of Israel. The Zionist movement, or Zionisms, to use Scott Spector's term,[3] were variegated movements, which included political, cultural, practical, educational and other strands and programs, which coalesced to a degree and succeeded in galvanizing a portion of world Jewry and others sympathetic to its goals, enlisting them in its several causes. Political or diplomatic Zionism, usually associated with the name of Theodor Herzl (1848–1904), the founder and first president of the World Zionist Organization (established in 1897), is usually understood in Zionist historiography to have spearheaded the drive to establish a political entity, a nation-state for the Jewish people, that is a political homeland for a people scattered throughout the world, a nation in a global diaspora. Nevertheless, according to the parameters of political Zionism, this state, which would be comprised of a majority Jewish population, would inevitably include other peoples with different national and religious allegiances, for example Arab, Druse, Christian, Muslim, etc.

In the writings and discussions regarding Zionism, taking Theodor Herzl as a primary example, the issue of pacifism plays an interesting role. This aspect of early Zionism has long been forgotten and displaced, or even repressed, but it is certainly worthy of consideration in the context of a volume on pacifism. The topic and contexts are complex and will be generalized here for the sake of brevity.[4] Political Zionism was from the outset a predominantly secular, modern national movement, even though it often drew inspiration from traditional Jewish, especially Biblical, textual sources and precedents from recorded Jewish history. Herzl believed that the establishment of a Jewish homeland or state would be the best antidote and answer to the vicious and violent anti-Semitism characteristic of much of Europe, especially Eastern Europe, but also common throughout the world in the late nineteenth century. He sought to convince Jewry and then international leaders of the cogency of his plan. He was hopeful that the founding of a World Zionist organization might be instrumental in winning over a dominant country or influential world leader or forging a consensus of influential political leaders, whose countries would then lend a helping hand in establishing the Jewish state. This new political

entity would prove to be for the good of the host countries—that is, by reducing anti-Semitic discrimination and violence in those countries in which Jewish populations were resident—and also good for the Jews, who suffered from anti-Semitic prejudices and accompanying violence. Zionism would enable Jews to embark on new lives as a majority population in a state of their own without having to suffer anti-Semitic disabilities, exclusions and economic, educational, and other restrictions. The prospect of a Jewish state predicated on the influx of masses of Jewish immigrants to the land of Israel promised, according to Herzl, only benefits for the native populations resident in the land, mostly Arab or Palestinian Arab. The most important domains in this regard were medical care, economic prosperity, educational reform and improved access to, as well as a general but extensive modernization and technological upgrading of, the transportation and communication infrastructure in the Middle East. Herzl could never have imagined that the local Arab population would fail to understand and appreciate the tangible benefits that Zionism would bring to the non-Jewish populations of the region. He certainly viewed them as potential allies and partners in this endeavour. In his breakthrough publication, *The Jewish State* (*Der Judenstaat*, 1896), he pleaded for the desirability of founding a Jewish State, describing in detail the rationale for its establishment, as well as how the state would come into existence. He outlined numerous aspects of what this state would come to look like. Regarding an army, he wrote only a few sentences (Herzl 1946, p. 147).[5] First, he was convinced that the state would come into existence as a result of international consensus and cooperation and based on the basic and universal approval of his idea; and second, he envisioned the future Jewish State as a neutral one, a state not involved in any way in international conflicts. Its army would be more like a police force intended to keep order and enforce the law.

This very brief mentioning of the army in the Jewish State is a particularly interesting section of this publication in light of other aspects of Herzl's career and his approval of some militaristic political and cultural expressions. For example, the young Herzl glorified the aristocratic and student duelling culture, especially the ideal of 'Satisfaktionsfähigkeit', during his university years in Vienna and afterwards (Gelber 2000, pp. 56ff). He trained hard and became a master dueller, cultivating exaggerated notions of masculinity and Jewish pride, which easily lent themselves to the justification of different kinds of violent actions.

Nevertheless, he was declared by the military authorities to be 'dienstun-tauglich' (unfit for military service), owing to his physical condition or general health, and he never served in the Austrian army. Additionally, in his diaries, he clearly appears to be enamoured of Prussian aristocratic and militaristic culture (Bein 1943, p. 310). In general, it is fair to say that Herzl cultivated an aristocratic 'habitus', and he energetically sought to recruit influential European aristocrats to the Zionist cause, as a way to buttress its credibility as a viable and respectable movement inside and outside of Jewry.

7.3   Bertha von Suttner and Zionism

One such aristocrat who is central for a discussion of Zionism and pacifism is Bertha von Suttner (1843–1914). She was the renowned Austrian pacifist, who lobbied hard at the end of the nineteenth century for the establishment of an International Court of Justice, which would work towards peaceful solutions to international disputes in order to obviate wars. Her major literary work, the pacifist novel *Die Waffen nieder! (Lay Down Your Arms!)*, published in 1889, became an international bestseller, which was translated into a dozen languages. On the basis of her literary success, she became a famous public personality and major spokesperson for pacifism. She was the first woman recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, and she was successfully courted by Herzl for the Zionist movement. Herzl may have first met her through her husband, Arthur Gundaccar von Suttner, who was one of the founders of the Society for the Defense against Anti-Semitism in Austria (Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus in Österreich). He, too, was an Austrian writer and an engaged pacifist. In any case, Theodor Herzl and Bertha von Suttner became close friends. Like Herzl, she had published articles in the prestigious Viennese newspaper 'Die Neue Freie Presse'; Herzl became its commanding and highly influential feuilleton editor. It may be that Herzl paid for Bertha von Suttner's trip to the First Hague Convention in 1899 (Bein 1943, p. 319; Schäfer 1991, p. 558; von Suttner 1899a, *Die Welt*, 28, pp. 1–2; *Die Welt*, 31, pp. 1–3). Apparently she was engaged by him to interview leading personalities who attended the convention regarding their views of Zionism, with an eye toward publishing them in the Viennese Zionist newspaper, 'Die Welt', which he had founded in 1897 in order to aid him in the organization of the first World Zionist Congress in Basel.

There are two aspects of the relationship between Bertha von Suttner and Theodor Herzl, which should be emphasized in this context. First, Bertha von Suttner, who became a trusted friend of Herzl, contributed articles to 'Die Welt' and she could be counted on to intercede for Zionism—that is, to employ her connections when asked to do so for the sake of Zionist projects and goals (Wachten and Harel 1985, pp. 568–569). For example, he asked her for help in order to stop an outbreak of anti-Semitic violence in Eastern Europe; she had access to influential governmental circles and specific persons in powerful positions in Russia and elsewhere to whom concrete appeals might be made to this end. Secondly, she served as a conduit for Zionism to other leading non-Jewish European aristocrats. Herzl facilitated the publication of articles by Bertha von Suttner in 'Die Welt'. For example, the lead article of 'Die Welt' on May 26, 1899 was written by her and entitled 'Nach dem Haag!' It purported to convey her ideas during her train trip to The Hague, and utilized the technique of the interior monologue. The article was mostly devoted to her thoughts about Zionism within the larger framework of her work for peace and international understanding. Bertha von Suttner was certainly cognizant of the fundamental conflict between the individual nationality struggles of the time, with their bitter rivalries and bellicosities and her ideal of fraternity and international cooperation. Actually, she had initially dismissed Zionism for that very reason, because potentially fanatical national causes that might engender hatred between peoples and stimulate dangerous national and racial pride were not at all compatible with her way of thinking. But, as she came to know Zionism better—the more she came to understand it in terms of its roles of 'fortifying a persecuted and miserable people and seeking to provide an asylum for them'—she eventually came to view Zionism as the only feasible way to combat anti-Semitism (von Suttner 1899b, Nach dem Haag!, p. 2). Also, she agreed with many early and later Zionist thinkers that a secure national basis would make it possible for Jews to contribute more to internationalist causes. Martin Buber (1878–1965) and Max Brod (1884–1968) are good examples in this regard. She wrote: 'Only on that day, when the Jew has a fatherland, will he be able to become a cosmopolitan with dignity. The nationality principle should not be eliminated, but rather lead in a new direction – that of individual freedom.' Bertha von Suttner wrote that Zionism was one of the three major liberation movements of the day, which were waging battles to secure and guarantee fundamental human rights

within particular, delimited segments of the population. The other two were the workers' movement (Socialism) and the women's movement (Feminism). In her view, all three had tremendous potential to contribute significantly to the all-embracing global peace and human liberation movements.

7.4   Pacifism and Theodor Herzl's Utopian Zionist Novel, *Altneuland*

Herzl included a major pacifistic element in his late and controversial Zionist novel, *Altneuland* (Old New Land, 1902). This novel is divided into two parts; in the first one, the protagonists are introduced within a narrative set in the contemporary Vienna of the turn of the century. The second part, which takes place twenty years in the future in Palestine, presents a utopian vision of the New Society which has been established in the interim. It can be read in one sense as a literary reception of Herzl's earlier *The Jewish State*, since the Jewish homeland is depicted as already having come into existence. In the utopian section of the novel the protagonists tour the new society, visiting Haifa and Tiberius on the Sea of Galilee, and culminating in a visit to the holy city of Jerusalem. In the first section of the novel, Jerusalem is depicted as utterly neglected, dilapidated, backward, and filthy. Now, twenty years later, Jerusalem, like the other urban centres in this utopian landscape, has been completely renovated and transformed into one of the most impressive, technologically and humanly advanced modern cities on the globe. Regarding pacifism, what is of major interest is that under the aegis of Zionism, Herzl's utopian Jerusalem has been transformed into an international centre of peace. At its heart stood the 'Friedenspalast', the Palace of Peace:

> [Jerusalem] was different now. The streets and lanes were newly paved, as smooth and clean as a well-kept room. There were no more private dwellings in the Old City. All the buildings were either charitable offices or houses of worship for the different creeds. There were, of course, pilgrims' hostels, hospitals, and other institutions of the kind. One large square was entirely occupied by the grandiose building of the Peace Palace, where international congresses of the friends of peace, and also of scientists and scholars were held. So the Old City had become an international center, which all nationals might regard as their home, for this was the home of the common lot of all humankind – suffering. All the forms of alleviating

it were concentrated here – faith, love, science. It was impossible not to feel reverence when walking through these lanes, whatever one's attitude to formal religion. (Herzl 1960, p. 184)

The international character of the Peace Palace in Jerusalem, as depicted in the novel, underscores what Bertha von Suttner meant when she claimed that a secure national base would foster purposeful international activity, for the Jewish people and for others. The novel describes the mandate of the Peace Palace as follows:

…the Peace Palace. This fine building has become a unique centre for all kinds of charitable and social ventures. Here work is done not only for the Jewish land and the Jewish people, but for other lands and other peoples too….Here in the Peace Palace such universal efforts are channelled into one stream. Wherever in the world a catastrophe occurs – earthquake, flood, famine, drought, epidemic – the stricken country wires to this centre for help. Here there is always a stock of the necessary supplies, because both the gifts of such supplies and the requests for them are centralized here. A permanent Committee chosen from among all the nations sees to it that the distributions are justly made.

But this is also a centre for inventors, artists, who need aid and are attracted by the Latin motto carved above its portals – 'Humani nihil a me alienum puto' (I regard nothing human as alien to me). (Herzl 1960, p. 185)

It should be noted here that this particular motto, part of a Latin phrase derived from the writing of the Roman playwright Terence (second century B.C.), certainly conveys a universalistic, humanistic message in this context—and it is not derived from a Jewish source.[6]

Bertha von Suttner's tireless championship of pacifism, including her activism and leadership in international congresses for the causes of pacifism and world peace and her concrete efforts to establish a 'Friedenspalast' during Herzl's lifetime in order to promote the arbitration and reconciliation of international conflicts, are all reflected in this passage in Herzl's novel, even if she is not mentioned explicitly. Rather, she and her efforts are concealed to a degree in the background of the text. Zionist Jerusalem has become in Herzl's vision the global centre which coordinates reconciliation and peace efforts and the alleviation of world suffering. While Herzl was certainly cognizant of Bertha von

Suttner's and others' efforts to establish a Peace Palace, which accelerated and began to bear fruit after the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, he did not live long enough to see its realization. Herzl died in 1904, Bertha von Suttner was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1905, the cornerstone for the Peace Palace, a massive neo-Renaissance structure, was laid in 1907, and it finally opened its doors in The Hague in 1913. It still houses the International Court of Justice.

Zionist historiography counts several prominent Zionist personalities as prominent pacifists, who promoted pacifism within Zionism. The best known are the American-trained Rabbi Judah Magnes (1877–1948) and the Prague Zionist and nationality theorist, Hans Kohn (1891–1971). Still, pacifism and the various peace movements within Zionism, which were not always or exclusively pacifistic, have lost out in an ideological struggle with the Jewish self-defense movements within Zionism and subsequently with more militaristic and aggressive nationalist factions. Jewish self-defense as a movement originated in Eastern Europe in face of the devastating pogroms to which East European Jews were exceedingly vulnerable in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Given the animosities and sometimes violent actions of Zionist and the local Arab and Palestinian leaderships and populations in the land itself, the self-defense movements and the militant right gained significant ground during the Mandate Period in terms of winning public support. Nevertheless, movements like Brit Shalom (*covenant of peace*) 1925–33, which involved figures like Magnes, Kohn, Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem (1897–1982) and others sought peaceful dialogue, mutual respect, and coexistence with local Arab populations in a continuing Mandate Palestine or in a bi-national Arab-Jewish state. However, the rise of Nazism and the devastation of Jewish life in Europe during the Holocaust appeared to seal the fate of Zionist pacifism, rendering it marginal or irrelevant to the mainstream of Zionist opinions and endeavours up through the time of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and lasting until today.[7] This topic is a complex one which deserves critical attention in its own right, but its parameters go well beyond the boundaries of this chapter.

While there continue to be several Jewish, Israeli or Zionist groups which comprise a peace movement, like Shalom Achshav (*peace now*), Oz VShalom (*power and peace*), the Jewish Peace Fellowship, or Rabbis for

Peace, only a tiny, radical minority of individuals embrace pacifism within Judaism or Zionism today, or understand it as viable and as an inextricable aspect of the Jewish religious heritage. Whether or not this situation will change is purely a matter of speculation today.

Postscript (May, 2018)

Several months following the UCSIA conference on Pacifism in Antwerp, at which I gave a lecture on the topic of this chapter, and some time after the submission of a revised version of the lecture for publication, I came across an article in the 'International New York Times' (May 16, 2018, p. 10) written by James Loeffler: 'Zionist Founders and Human Rights'. I wish to alert readers to this article, as well as to a new book by this same author, which has come to my attention. It was published by Yale University Press in May, 2018 and entitled: *Rooted Cosmopolitans: Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*. Although the book and the newspaper article do not deal specifically with pacifism, they are both very pertinent to the issue of human rights and Zionism, which is directly related to my contribution to this volume. What Loeffler claims in the article is that 'Zionism and the modern human rights movement share a braided history'. For example, he points out that the Polish-born jurist, Hersch Zvi Lauterpacht, a widely regarded international lawyer of the twentieth century and 'the founding father of international human rights law', 'crafted influential drafts of the Israeli Declaration of Independence and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. He advised Zionist leaders on their legal strategies for statehood at the same time that he advised the American prosecutors at Nuremberg…. [H]e coined the term 'crimes against humanity'.' Loeffler mentions other human rights activists who were associated with or committed to Zionism, including Peter Benenson, the founder of Amnesty International. Loeffler argues that Zionism was the starting point for the internationalist and human rights activities of key figures in the human rights movement. While Zionism or the image of it internationally has certainly undergone change over the course of more than a century of Zionist activity and seventy years after the establishment of the State of Israel, the connection between Zionism and the modern human rights movement can evidently be traced in some leading figures—a fact that is not well known, to say the least. One of the blurbs

advertizing Loeffler's new book points to 'surprising and unknown connections between Zionism and the origins of human rights'. This aspect will have to be taken into account in future considerations of the connections between Judaism, Zionism and Pacifism and human rights in general.

Notes

1. For a useful overview and a selection of source material regarding the rabbinic understanding of war and peace, see Jacob Neusner (2011). Cf. Lawrence Schiffman and Joel B. Wolowelsky (2007).

2. The State of Israel has utilized capital punishment but once in its history, that is in its prosecution and subsequent execution of Adolf Eichmann. However, at the present time (December 2017/January 2018) parliamentary discussions in Jerusalem centre on a proposal to make terrorism a capital crime with the death penalty as its punishment. Rabbinical opinions regarding this proposal have also been cited in the press.

3. The term is used by Scott Spector (2000).

4. For a basic introduction to Zionism, Political Zionism and to Herzl, see: Arthur Hertzberg (Hertzberg 1969, pp. 15–107, 199–231); Shmuel Almog (1987); Mark H. Gelber and Vivian Liska (2007). It is important to note that in Herzl's *Der Judenstaat* (1896), his first Jewish national publication, he is technically speaking more as a 'territorialist' rather than strictly a Zionist. That is, Herzl was initially a pragmatist and non-committal about the future location of the Jewish State he wished to establish. For example, in this publication he was certainly open to the possibility of it being established in Argentina (or elsewhere) and not necessarily in the land of Israel, in Zion. See Mark H. Gelber (2000).

5. Theodor Herzl (1946, p. 147). The section on the army—in its entirety—reads as follows: 'The Jewish State is conceived as a neutral one. It will therefore require only a professional army, equipped, of course, with every requisite of modern warfare, to preserve order internally and externally.'

6. Herzl was severely criticized by some within Zionism for ignoring or of being ignorant of Jewish textual sources and contexts in his writing, while employing non-Jewish sources and contexts in their stead. His literary employment of the motto by Terence, an ancient Roman author, could be cited as one such example.

7. There have been several less well known pacifist activists in Israel. Natan Hofshi, for example, should be mentioned in this context. See Evelyn Wilcock (1994, pp. 192ff).

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A Pacifist Global Order?

Emancipation from Violence Through Global Law and Institutions: A Post-Deutschian Perspective

Heikki Patomäki

8.1 Introduction

Plausible categorical, context-independent ethico-political principles are hard to come by. This applies to pacifism too, especially if it is supposed to mean the rejection of the use of physical violence to obtain any aim by any actor under any circumstances. Pacifism in this sense would for instance eliminate essential aspects of the institution of law. A possible moral aim and priority is, however, to minimize the need for any kind of violence. A position of prioritizing non-violence and seeking to minimize all forms of violence could be called *pacific-ism*, in contrast to straightforward pacifism (Ceadel 1987, pp. 101–165). Different dimensions of pacific-ism is best understood in terms of the ethical circle as depicted

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
Fig. 8.1 The ethical circle of non-violence (pacific-ism) (*Source* Developed from the ethical circle of Bhaskar [1993, p. 248])

in Fig. 8.1. This circle can become virtuous when actions strengthen the virtues and norms of non-violence and when the consequences of action reduce or eliminate expectations of future violence.[1]

The ethical circle includes the possibility of legitimate enforcement of norms, which spawns ambiguity in the otherwise potentially virtuous circle. Even when law is not retributive, it must rely on some notion of legitimate violence. This also makes peace and progress through legal institutions somewhat problematic. We have good reasons to believe that the imposition of common laws and institutions, especially if combined with a capability of violent enforcement of norms, may well decrease rather than increase the chances of peace. In the 1950s, a group of eight scholars led by Karl Deutsch systematically studied the past experience of Germany, the Habsburg Empire, Italy, Norway-Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to learn what history might tell us about the problem (Deutsch et al. 1957). This work has been extended to cover the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first century and, most importantly, the world outside the North Atlantic area.[2]

From a Deutschian perspective, common institutions may aggravate the problem, but they can also be part of its solution. Deutsch and his colleagues concluded that in a security community, common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change. By peaceful change is meant the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force. Deutsch et al. further distinguished between an amalgamated (centralized, state-like, with a strong we-identity) and pluralist (decentralized,

weak common identity) security community. This suggests that the type and quality of institutions matter.

In the twenty-first century, common problems are manifold and new ones arise continuously because of complex and dynamic global and local processes in which actors and issues are tightly interwoven and spatial scales interconnected.[3] As Deutsch et al. argued, it is not possible to tame or freeze history for a long time. In any given context, whether fully peaceful or not, new interests and claims will emerge and new messages demanding changes in some respects will be sent and made public (if the context allows for that) (Deutsch et al. 1957, pp. 66, 111 etc.). Consequently, changes will be attempted, either peacefully or by means of violent enforcement. History is not going to stand still. Rather the opposite is true: nothing in history repeats itself as such. Even the best of our historical analogies are only partial; they must idealize and abstract from their source. A historical analogy is best viewed as a candidate for illuminating some essential characteristics of the geo-historical context and process under study.

Although focussing on processes and changes, Deutsch and his associates were nonetheless looking for (complex, conditional and probabilistic) regularities between variables. However, in open systems we can, at best, find only contrastive demi-regularities, which are context-bound, i.e. they are liable to change with the context.[4] This raises a deeper question about what is it that could explain when and why conflicts are resolved by peaceful means and through peaceful changes? We need an account either of a mechanism or of a structured process that is transfactually efficacious across a large number of geo-historical contexts and that is independent of any particular contrastive demi-regularities between events, factors or variables.

In this chapter, I first discuss the concept of security community in some detail. Second, I outline how those common problems that need to be resolved by means of peaceful changes arise from shared processes, especially those of global political economy. Third, I explain how contradictions can be overcome through learning and building common institutions. Fourth, I argue that social contexts differ in terms of their self-transformative capacity—making them more or less open to peaceful changes—and that this capacity is closely related to the question of democracy. Actors, rules and institutions structure the processes through which common problems are tackled and resolved. A hardening will means trouble, whether constituted through the categories of nation,

religion or class or something else. But actors, rules and institutions can be made more open to challenge and revision. In essence, what emerges from these considerations is a normative vision of, and an argument for, pluralism and democratic governance of the world system. However, at the end of the chapter I also explicate contingencies between self-transformative capacity, democracy and peace. Concrete utopias[5] must be dynamic, reflexively critical and responsible.

8.2   The Concept of Security Community

Increasingly since the World War II, most political violence, and most wars, have concerned the 'inside' of states rather than been wars between sovereign states. International wars have in fact been relatively rare; only a fraction of armed conflicts are inter-state wars. Neither is a peaceful system associated exclusively with the confines of the more stable states. The security dilemma, as conventionally understood, seems to be a problem only in relations between some states (Gates et al. 2016). Many groupings of states and regions have rather developed into a community within which the conventionally understood security dilemma appears irrelevant. The democratic peace hypothesis, according to which liberal-democratic states do not fight each other, covers some but not all of these actual and possible security communities.

These general characterizations were especially true in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. They continue to hold in 2018, although (i) the world has gradually been reverting to nationalist statism, militarized conflicts and arms races especially since the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Patomäki 2018), and although (ii) in the 2010s we have seen an upward trend in the number of fatalities incurred by organized violence.[6] Most wars remain intrastate and there are no on-going inter-state wars. Moreover, most inter-state relations are not characterized by a security dilemma. The concept of security community[7] can explain why, in particular but possibly long-standing geo-historical contexts, wars are more common within states than between them.[8] The concept is applicable to different spatial scales. It can also be deterritorialized. A context can be about the global without comprising everything (think about functional international organizations). A global security community, even if conceived territorially, does not imply that every locality on earth must be a security community.

The crux of Deutsch et al.'s argument comes down to a simple point: the existence of the state is not a necessary or a sufficient condition for peace, nor is the non-existence of the state a necessary or a sufficient condition for the prevalence of the acute threat of political violence. These connections are contingent. The imposition of a common government, with its capability of violent enforcement of norms, may well decrease rather than increase the chances of peace. Besides claiming that there is no axiomatic relationship between the absence of state machinery of violence (or anything equivalent), and the condition of war, Deutsch and his associates tried to disprove the empirical hypothesis that the absence of a world state explains the recurrence of war.

In developing alternative and more processual hypotheses about the sources of war and peace, Deutsch et al. distinguished between an amalgamated and pluralist security community. Deutsch conceived both as *political* communities, characterized by a process of political communication and the existence of some shared rules and practices. I have slightly modified Deutsch's definitions to make them more general:

> **Amalgamated community**: A single governmental whole with a process of political communication, a single supreme decision-making centre, some machinery for enforcement, and practices of compliance.
> **Security community**: A group of actors, which has become integrated:
>
> - By *integration* is meant the attainment of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among the members of the community.
> - By *sense of community* is meant that there is a belief on the part of actors that they have to come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems can and must be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'.
> - By *peaceful change* is meant the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resorting to large-scale physical force.

A security community is one in which there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes and conflicts in some peaceful way. If the entire globe were an integrated security community, wars and large-scale political violence would have mostly been eliminated (although an integrated

whole in the above sense does not exclude categorically the possibility of violent intra-member conflicts). Amalgamated political communities may or may not be security communities, and vice versa. Thus, two types of security communities can be distinguished. Deutsch's well-known 2×2 conceptual scheme, presented schematically in Table 8.1, is based on these distinctions. Examples in Table 8.1 are references to historical cases, but these concepts can be applied to future possibilities at different spatial scales as well as non-territorially.

Deutsch suggested twelve essential background conditions for an amalgamated security community to emerge and succeed. These include the mutual compatibility of main values; a distinctive way of life; capabilities and processes of cross-cutting communication; high geographic and social mobility; multiplicity and balance of transactions; a significant frequency of some interchange in group roles; a broadening of the political elite; and high political and administrative capabilities. They also include the willingness and ability of the majority of the politically relevant strata: (i) to accept and support common governmental institutions; (ii) to extend generalized political loyalty to them; (iii) and to operate these common institutions with adequate mutual attention and responsiveness to the messages and needs of all participating units. These are the most essential background conditions. Deutsch et al. claim that success is improbable in the absence of the essential conditions (Deutsch et al. 1957, pp. 11–13). However, they also argue that these are not sufficient, for in any concrete context, other conditions may be—and typically are—needed

Table 8.1   Amalgamation and integration

	Non-amalgamation	*Amalgamation*
Integration	**Pluralistic security-community** examples Norden, the EU, Canada-US, South-East Asia (?)	**Amalgamated security-community** examples Largely: OECD countries, China
Non-integration	**Not amalgamated, not security community** examples US-SU during the Cold War India-Pakistan, US-'rogue states', US-China	**Amalgamated but not security community** examples Habsburg Empire 1914 Yugoslavia 1975–2000 Syria before the civil war

Source Author's own compilation

as well. Moreover, 'we cannot assume that because conditions in one century led to certain effects, even roughly parallel conditions in another century would lead to similar effects' (Deutsch et al. 1957, p. 11). The implication of all this is that there are no timeless necessary and sufficient conditions.

Even if achieved, an amalgamated political community will remain contingent. It is vulnerable to strife, secession and civil war (Deutsch et al. 1957, pp. 29–31). Deutsch et al. argue that pluralistic security communities are easier to establish and maintain. Of the twelve conditions 'that appeared essential for the success of an amalgamated security community', only the compatibility of major political values, responsiveness to one another's messages and needs, and partial mutual predictability is required (Deutsch et al. 1957, p. 66).

The notion of security community is not only explanatory but can also be seen as a concrete (though generic) utopia, with the power to guide political practices (Deutsch et al. 1957, pp. 3–4, 7, 10–11).[9] A concrete utopia involves lessons drawn from past or contemporary models; counterfactual reasoning about the possible effects of an altered context; as well as thought-experiments about the consequences of the transformed practices and systems. The future is uncertain and unintended consequences are ubiquitous. A concrete utopia may be based on anticipations that will turn out to be false. Thus concrete utopias must be open to revision on the basis of historical experiences.

8.3   THE EMERGENCE OF COMMON PROBLEMS

Common problems arise from shared processes. From 1450 to 1800, European expansionism brought the major regional economies in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas into increased contact (O'Brien and Williams 2016, ch. 3). The industrial revolution intensified these developments, sparking an 'indomitable surge toward a planetary economy' (Polanyi 1957, p. 89). Although not all processes can or should be reduced to political economy, global political economy forms a complex, dynamic mega-process, in which states and other actors are tightly interwoven and in which a large variety of issues arise. For instance, already the First World War indicated how the wide-scale application of industrial technology to warfare have given collective actors an unprecedented ability to harm one another. Modern security complexes can arise from various political economy processes also more directly (Adler and Barnett 1998; Chang 2016).

The same is true of the causes of environmental problems. Transnational and global environmental problems, including climate change, are outcomes of the processes of industrialization and economic growth.

Processes are open-ended and flowing, with one process capable of sliding into another, and with smaller processes combining to form larger processes. Entities such as states are not only products and manifestations of processes, but they also relational, and nearly all relevant relations concern political economy directly or indirectly. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the world economy has been grounded on cooperative institutional arrangements revolving around 'free trade' and related ideas, but its dynamics can generate contradictions and instigate conflicts.[10] States' economic policies can be contradictory precisely because states are so closely interrelated and their fates so tightly intertwined in the liberal-capitalist world economy. Because of these contradictions, and for various historical-institutional reasons, states can be unable to solve common problems also in areas such as security and environment. The current 'gridlock of global governance', which is partly an unintended second-order effect of the liberal institution-building that followed World War II, is a dynamic process involving potential for further conflict escalation (see Hale et al. 2013).[11]

States' attempts to be more 'competitive' or 'secure' than other states, or to have balanced budgets or ensure long-term fiscal sustainability, can result in self-defeating outcomes. The compositional fallacy occurs when it is assumed that what is possible for a single given actor at a given time is possible for all of them simultaneously.[12] For instance, trade deficits and surpluses cancel each other out, so it is impossible that most states would be simultaneously running surpluses. Countries with trade surpluses tend to accumulate savings surpluses, whereas countries with trade deficits tend to accumulate debt, resulting in global imbalances. Therefore simultaneous attempts by all or most states to improve their trade balance tend be contradictory. The likely overall result is a reduction in effective aggregate demand in the world economy as a whole, affecting negatively most parts. Common institutions—consider the cases of EMU and IMF—can be geared toward strengthening the contradiction. This in turn may lead to a spiral of responses that can aggravate the original problem, especially at the time of downturns and crises in the world economy. Short-sighted concerns over competitiveness can also override the potential for environmental cooperation.

Real world contradictions are not categorical because whether the contradicting forces cancel each other out—or whether one force in the end annuls the other—depends on contingent circumstances. It is possible for states to try to export their economic problems to other states by various means (e.g. through corporate tax competition), or even control exclusively conceived raw material sources and markets by imperial means, but if sufficient numbers of them attempt to do so simultaneously the result is a fallacy of composition, feeding conflicts among states and other actors.[13] This kind of problem-generating process can by deepened by uncertainty about the future and by boom-and-bust cycles in finance (Kindleberger 2000; Minsky 2008). The financial crisis of 2008–2009 was the most serious crisis of the world economy since the 1930s and 1940s. This crisis almost produced a new great depression— the world economy verged on collapse in late 2008 and early 2009— but automatic stabilizers, rescue and stimulus packages averted the worst. The global financial crisis nonetheless brought about a world-historical saddle point, inducing stasis and regression (Patomäki 2018, pp. 122–128).

Moreover, differences in demand problems can result in uneven development—long-run growth divergences across countries or regions. This is because processes of uneven growth in the world economy involve not only vicious but also virtuous circles of cumulative causation. For instance, the Keynesian demand-led Kaldor-Verdoorn's effect may generate a virtuous circle between output and productivity growth (Kaldor 1966). Claims about the Kaldor-Verdoorn's effect were originally based on an empirical observation that in the long run productivity generally grows proportionally to the square root of output. Output can only grow if there is sufficient demand for the produced goods, so an increase in demand can lead to investments and higher productivity.[14] Sustained uneven growth is likely to result in major imbalances in trade and finance, as can be seen for example from the US-China disputes over terms of trade and currency rates in the 2000s and 2010s.

Short-sighted and contradictory ways of responding to the existing and emerging problems of the world economy are both the cause and effect of those problems. The process tends to reinforce itself, partly because dynamics lead to political changes within and across states, often deepening and entrenching myopic self-regarding orientations. Many mechanisms can work toward this. For instance, rising unemployment, widening social disparities and increasing uncertainty

and dependence can generate existential insecurity among citizenry. Economic problems tend to threaten identity, as not only one's earnings but also one's social worth, rights and duties are tied to a position as an employee, entrepreneur or capitalist. The volatile and shifting public opinion responds to changing conditions and sentiments, shaping state and other responses toward a more myopic and self-regarding direction.

Economic problems can endanger social integration (Habermas 1988, pp. 20–31) and result in regressive ethico-political learning. Given characteristic difficulties and pathologies of socialization in a complex market society, and related crises of embodied personality, the blend of capitalist world markets and separate national states involve great potential for increasingly antagonistic social relations. For instance, the consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the subsequent Euro crisis heightened existential insecurities in Ukraine. Ukrainian GDP collapsed by almost 15% in 2009, suddenly ending nearly a decade of economic growth and poverty-reduction. The drastic downturn also caused an acute financial crisis for the Ukrainian state. By 2013–2014 the IMF and the EU demanded strict measures of austerity and extensive neoliberal reforms such as abolition of subsidies, deregulation and privatization, as well as measures against widespread corruption. Russia offered an alternative, less conditional loan. These developments provided the politico-economic context for the Euromaidan demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine. It was in this context that the conflict between Russia and the EU, NATO and US escalated. The point is not to argue for some sort of political economy determinism of outcomes. Most drastic turndowns or rises in unemployment or precariousness do not bring about revolutions or wars, but they do increase the proclivity to escalation of conflicts, and this proclivity may actualize if there are enough other forces and processes pushing developments in the same direction (Patomäki 2018, ch. 3).

The self-reinforcing negative dynamics of the world economy largely explain why the world has been reverting to nationalist statism, militarized conflicts and arms races. Especially in the 2010s, the international political environment has become less benign. An arms race may follow from (i) particular responses to economic problems and (ii) a related fallacy of composition. For instance, a state may decide to stimulate its economy by spending more on armaments (i.e. resort to military Keynesianism) and to keep a 'security margin' by trying to be better armed than its actual or potential military adversaries. If all

relevant states—or even just two of them—try the same, the result can be an arms race, which may even escalate to war.[15]

The idea that common problems arise from shared processes can be expressed in still more general terms. Everything is processual. Agents, structures and social relations change in the course of world history, not only through the dynamics of complex systems of co-operation[16] but also through absenting of absences, overcoming contradictions, and creating something new.[17] These processes are laden with potential for conflicts at various spatial scales and also in non-territorial social contexts (functional, identity-based etc.). But geo-historical processes are also laden with potential for new cooperation. A lot hinges upon the nature of common institutions. If the prevailing modes of agency and action and types of institutions enable the resolution of conflicts by means of peaceful changes—or, at the minimum, involve the reliable expectation that peaceful changes are possible if and when legitimate conditions are met—will minimize and possibly erase the threat of violence entirely.

8.4   Overcoming Contradictions Through Learning and Building Common Institutions

At the most general level, contradictions can arise from incorrect beliefs about how things work or from the lack of generalizability. Fallacy of composition is a typical but not the only form of social contradiction. For instance, contradictions can also occur at the level of social systems, if there are organizing principles that work against each other. The positive point is that contradictions can be overcome by means of collective action and by revising old or building new institutions. This overcoming involves learning and development of consciousness. Actors must first recognize that their environment consists of other similarly concerned and reflexive actors, all interwoven in the same problematic as 'we'.

From a logical perspective we can analyse the learning process in terms of abstract stages of consciousness, as in Fig. 8.2. In this scheme, the starting point is that actors take the environment as fixed in relation to their choices. When actors realize that others are actually facing the same situation, the problem of organizing collective actions may, in their minds, appear first as a strategic game. If the costs of initiating and organizing collective action seem high, instrumentally rational calculation shows no point in collaborating. Even if some activities were already being organized, many might still refrain from action in the belief of not

Mode$_1$: **parametric consciousness** (environment is fixed in relation to his choice)

-problem of providing public good

Mode$_2$: **strategic consciousness** (anticipation of the moves of others)

-strategic game (PD)

Mode$_3$: **realization of the contradiction** at the level of the whole → attempts to organize collective action

-still subject to free riding & strategic considerations

Mode$_4$: **attempts to build trust, solidarity and commitments** → common institutions

-success depends on agency and socio-historical conditions

Fig. 8.2 From counterfinality to social and political change (*Source* Author's own compilation)

being decisive for the outcome. This is the classic free riding or, with a higher level of consciousness, Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situation, which in the world of myopic and self-regarding actors, can result in a collectively deficient outcome.[18] Something more is needed.

Hence, there is a contradiction specific to each moment of the learning process. Each contradiction has to be overcome before efficient collective action becomes possible. Trust and solidarity help to organize collective actions, but in any social system they not only depend on the prevailing modes of agency but are potentially subject to manipulation by the powerful actors. Communication is the first key and development of trust and solidarity the second key to the successful organization of collective action. In the past, communication often required frequent physical presence, but with the new technologies actors can communicate across space in real time much more easily. However, unless members of the contradiction-generating group come to know and trust each other on a face-to-face basis, 'it is hardly to be expected that they will be able to overcome the contradiction' (Elster 1978, p. 141).

The scheme of Fig. 8.2 can be analytically helpful, but if taken to imply that modes 1 and 2 are primordial, it is misleading. In complex societies with conscious actors, pre-existing social structures are conditions of possibility for agency and action. The parametric and strategic stages of consciousness of rational choice theory are best seen as

products of geo-history, rather than as original states of the human mind. Trust, solidarity, long-term commitments and common institutions can be—and to a degree must be—constitutive of the context in which actors are formed and socialized. The applications of rational choice theory and neoclassical economics to the social world may well impose a movement: $mode_4 \rightarrow mode_3 \rightarrow mode_2 \rightarrow mode_1$.

There are nonetheless geo-historical developments that seem to accord with the schematic movement from counterfinality to change. This movement can characterize also inter-state relations. Contradictions of the world economy can be overcome by collective action and by building better common institutions. Collective actors such as states are complex social systems, however, and this can complicate the movement from counterfinality to change. Those acting in the name of a state occupy simultaneous positions at multiple sites of power and levels of organization.[19]

Consider the case of the Bretton Woods negotiations in 1944. Keynes analysed the source of the problem (a potential contradiction in trade policies) and convinced others about the counterfinal nature of orthodox economic policies. Keynes developed a design for an international clearing union. His idea was to create an impartial system for the management of currencies, and a world central bank responsible for a common world unit of currency, the bancor (Keynes 1942/1969, pp. 9–18; 1943/1969, pp. 19–36). Obligations would be made systemic, with financial positions defined against the rest of the world, not individual countries. Keynes also proposed mechanisms for transferring resources from surplus to deficit countries. The aim was to enable a 'new deal' everywhere.

The negotiations involved various intra-state and inter-state differences of opinion and conflicts. The outcome resembled Keynes's concrete utopia only in some regards. The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement did not include a world central bank or bancor or system of taxing the surplus. Over time, both the IMF and the World Bank started to apply structural adjustment policies to crisis countries. The burden of adjustment was shifted onto deficit countries, frequently resulting in deep recession, high social costs and further accumulation of debt. This amounts to imposing an obligation on weak and troubled states to follow contradictory economic policies.

Keynes's original proposal has been renewed and developed further by the Brandt Commission (Brandt 1980) and, more recently, by Paul

Davidson (1992–1993, 2002, 2004) and Joseph Stiglitz (2006, pp. 245–268).[20] What is important in this context is that variations among the proposed schemes—even in the camp of like-minded reformist thinkers who attempt to build trust, solidarity and commitments on a global scale—stem from differences not only in economic theory but also in ethical and political principles. This indicates that the setting up of new common institutions also involves ethico-political conflicts. The question is how to ensure that those conflicts are resolved peacefully.

8.5   THE SELF-TRANSFORMATIVE CAPACITY OF CONTEXTS

There will always be disputes and conflicts among social forces. This implies that there can never be a stable 'order', an eternally fixed set of practices and institutions. Security communities are characterized by the expectation that future changes are going to be peaceful. Integration generates non-preparedness to use violence. This can be explicated as follows, in line with the ethical circle of non-violence (Patomäki 2002, ch. 8, especially pp. 200–202):

> A1. If a social system has become integrated, no relevant actor has any reasons to prepare for the use of political violence.
>
> A2. As actors know (A1), they do not expect anybody to use political violence either to preserve the status quo or to foster changes.
>
> B1. Non-preparedness becomes a generally followed and rarely, if ever, questioned rule of action.
>
> B2. In the course of social time, (A2) becomes an automatic, routine-like and self-evident presupposition of political thought, argumentation and action.

A security community presupposes both (A1) and (A2). If the practical experience of actors confirms in the longer run (A1) and (A2), the security community becomes sedimented in the *longue durée* of social time, i.e. becomes institutionalized. (B1) and (B2) describe an institutionalized security community, such as the Nordic countries from, at the latest, the early 1950s onwards.

Are there any general conditions for the generation of (A1 and A2) and (B1 and B2), for the virtuous circle of the development of security community? The inner structures of actors, communication and

learning are socially conditioned. For instance, the scope and diversity of the narratives and scenarios an actor is capable of generating is the result of past learning of shared cultural meanings and forms the basis for contemporary moral and strategic choices. However, available narratives also depend on the mechanisms of choice which select and amalgamate them. A system of domination can control or structure communication, and thereby shape not only available narratives, but also trust and loyalty between actors. Moreover, actors and actions are structured and stratified. Constitutive and regulative rules define and position an actor, who has stratified and structured reasons for her actions that occur in the context of unintended consequences of action. Reified and naturalized, hierarchical or heteronomic relations of domination may sustain particular practices and related patterns of practical reasoning and rationalization.

According to Roberto Unger, it is possible to change not only the content but also the force of social contexts (Unger 1987a, pp. 35–36, 277–312; 1987b, pp. 155–157). By force of contexts is meant their relative immunity to challenge in the midst of everyday practices, the rigidity of positions of their positioned practices, and the consequent rigidity of social division and hierarchy. Social contexts can be distinguished with respect to their openness to transformation. Unger refer to this openness as the 'negative capability', but I think the term self-transformative capability of contexts describes the idea better. It means the facility to challenge the context in the midst of everyday practices and the disengagement of actors' 'practical and passionate dealings from a preexisting structure of roles and hierarchies' (Unger 1987a, pp. 278–279 [note 40]). Since only agents in social relations can carry out context-transformations and since this is social activity, the conditions for individual self-transcendence and collective context-transformation are embedded in the context. On the basis of this reasoning, a general hypothesis emerges, according to which it is the self-transformative capability of contexts that determines the possibilities for a pluralist and amalgamated security community. Therefore, the expectation of peaceful changes should be higher in the more self-transformative contexts.

To put it as simply as possible, contexts differ in their openness to change, and this is crucial for the emergence and maintenance of a security community. The question thus emerges, to what extent do the relevant rules and relations have self-transformative capacity? One indicator is whether preparations are being made for violence against (potentially) deviant or context-challenging groups or states within the global

community. It also matters whether actors categorize themselves as parts of a wider whole. Among the relevant actors, is there a shared belief in the existence of a larger community? A security community may require agreement on a number of things, and may lead to collective identity-formation. Any sense of community can, however, develop and harden into a will that expects others to comply.

The preparedness to use violence is typically based on the necessitarian assumption about the unchangeable essence of both oneself (members of community) and others (outsiders). Manichean conceptions make a strict distinction between us and them. Manicheanism is constituted by a dichotomy of good vs. evil and an epic story about a struggle between the forces of light and darkness. Violence against evil is often seen as justified (Harle 2000, pp. 48–52 *et passim*). When a conflict escalates, a Manichean dichotomy can lead to the idea that evil must be eliminated. A less extreme aim is to teach 'them' lessons by means of sanctions and painful experiences. When fear of the dark other dominates, actors can resort to repression or deterrence against norm-violators. Military deterrence also relies on essentialist assumptions: practitioners of military deterrence have a propensity to presuppose that the other is likely to attack and conquer if given a chance. By increasing the cost of attack, it can be made less likely. These kinds of assumptions are not generalizable due to a fallacy of composition. When both sides resort to suspicion and deterrence, the likely outcome is a spiral of conflict.[21]

The self-transformative capacity of contexts is not compatible with illusions and mystifications about, or reifications and naturalizations of others, or of social realities more generally. Conversely, the denaturalization of understandings can contribute to the openness and responsiveness of the community. The ethical circle of non-violence of Fig. 8.1 includes the idea that actions shape agents and norms. It is one of the key tasks of human sciences to make contexts more open to revision (which does not mean that all changes are justified). Figure 8.3 situates critical social sciences in the complex that is capable of generating a security community, emphasizing the role of knowledge. Generation of a security community is also an educational process.

First, there is the definition of a security community. A security community consists of geo-historical social systems in which actors do not prepare for the use of organized violence against each other. Mere separate indifference is not enough for a community—there must be some real interconnectedness of elements of the systems. Integration generates

Fig. 8.3 Generation of a security community (*Source* Modified from Patomäki [2002, p. 204])

the non-preparedness for the use of political violence. Integration consists of sense of community and expectation of peaceful changes. Critical social scientific explanations works for enhancing the self-transformative capability of contexts by criticizing untrue naturalizations, reifications and fetishations of social being and related mystifications of knowledge; by making arguments for peaceful transformations; and by creating mechanisms of reflective learning. Modes of agency are a key component of social contexts.

To reiterate, a lot depends on how identities and modes of agency are constructed. The demystification and denaturalization of understandings can contribute to openness and responsiveness through transforming prevailing modes of agency and constitution of actor-identities. In the desecularized world of the early twenty-first century (Berger 1999), an important aspect of ethico-political identity concerns religion. The world religions that were born during the axial age between 800 and 200 BCE and became dominant in the course of the first millennium ACE try to respond to the deep existential and moral questions that emerged during this period.[22] The problem is that these world religions tend to generate a hardened will among some of their adherents.

Abrahamic religions have repeatedly been interpreted as well as perpetrated as Manichean. Also other axial world religions have shown a lot of potential for antagonistic self-other relations and violence—even

Buddhism, which is often thought to be the most peaceful of religions.[23] It is not religion in isolation that generates violence. Rather social processes can activate the inner structures of religious systems, shape religious meanings and practices, and provide justifications for struggles that originate elsewhere. For instance, neoliberal globalization has prompted developments toward religious intolerance and hard will.[24] There is no simple automatic logic or deterministic law according to which monotheism—or religion more generally—must lead to intolerance, repression and violence. Religion can just as well underlie pacifism and tolerance or pluralism.[25] And notably, modern scientism can also be Manichean insofar as it tends to juxtapose religious violence against secular rationality. In the early twenty-first century, this form of Manicheanism is most typically antagonistic toward political Islam.[26]

A lot hinges upon epistemology: how certain are actors about beliefs and stories constituting their group identities and interests? A belief in literal and necessary truths, whether revealed in sacred texts or by reductionist theories of modern science, is liable to constitute a hardened will (Reitan 2009, pp. 210–220). It is, however, possible to combine ontological realism about god and divinity with epistemological relativism. The latter implies that god or divinity can manifest itself in a variety of ways; and is accessed by different people in different traditions in a plurality of ways.[27] 'Obviously once you accept epistemological relativism you must accept tolerance and pluralism' (Bhaskar 2012, p. 32).

Relativism does not mean that we cannot have better or worse grounds for adopting some particular god-oriented beliefs or spiritual practice. Our claims to knowledge of god are fallible, like anything else. While any hypothesis about god or divinity can fail, it does not mean that they all must fail. Globalization in the deeper sense, as a coming-together of humanity, requires an open-ended dialogue about the fundamentals, including in terms of religion (whatever forms it may assume). This dialogue has ethico-political implications, for giving a voice to others is not neutral; dialogue entails recognition of equality and corresponding institutions (Patomäki 2003). Dialogical, planetary religions and philosophies thus accord with the notion of a global 'democracy-to-come' (Derrida 1992, pp. 35–42, 76–83).[28] Resultant forms of religion are unlikely to cultivate anthropomorphic conceptions of god and more likely see divinity in the mystery of being and in the processes of cosmic evolution, of which we humans are a part.

Religion is only one possible source of identity-constituting differences. A variety of causal processes can accentuate language-based differences into intensely and perhaps violently negative self-other relations. The generation of a security community (Fig. 8.3) requires explanations of these causal processes, characteristically in terms of political economy, and critical understandings of the underlying logic of differences (Patomäki 2017b). At a deep level, criticisms may also concern, say, the alienation and oppression characteristic of the capitalist market economy (Bhaskar 1986, p. 194).

A key problem in the early twenty-first century is that the presently prevailing market globalism can acknowledge neither the role of identity-constituting differences nor the significance of socio-economic privileges. This is one of the key reasons why the concerns and anxieties of everyday life are nowadays so often mobilized for antagonistic politics, mostly in terms of frames, categories, metaphors and myths that have been sedimented into the deep structures of national and/or religious imaginary.

8.6   Concluding Remarks: A Few Qualifications

All social relations, practices and institutions can be revised. Common institutions can be built to overcome prevailing contradictions. It is one of the tasks of social sciences to propose concrete utopias, which must be consistent with the ethical circle of non-violence (Fig. 8.1) and with processes generating and sustaining security community within the relevant context (Fig. 8.3). The more capable common institutions are, the more amalgamated the community.

Global context is not the only context that matters, but global dynamics tend to shape developments in local contexts too. The conditions for collective context-transformation are thus not only local, national or regional but also global, and in many areas increasingly so. It is thus important to revise the existing and construct new global institutions in order to tackle common problems in an adequate way. The revised and new institutions should be more open to differences and revision than what the post-WWII institutions have been. Self-transformative capacity generates dependable expectation of peaceful changes and qualifies the sense of community, fostering malleable, tolerant and pluralist group-identities (assuming sufficient socio-economic security, fair absence of privileges, and other contextual factors).

Characteristically, the opening up of various global contexts for peaceful changes—for increasing their self-transformative capacity—amounts to global democratization. And yet the two are not synonymous. While democratization and the development of security community are often mutually supportive, this is not always the case. Since the development of a security community is a long and complicated process of institutionalization of mutual acceptance, trust and procedures and practices of peaceful change, and since it is always vulnerable to escalation of conflicts, an unthinking attempt at global democratization may eventually be counterproductive. Steps toward amalgamation, while needed, increase the risks of counterproductivity.

A Eurocentric and closed model of democracy, based on a linear conception of time and progress, has the potential to justify exclusions and repression—particularly in contexts characterized by insecurities and privileges. A rigid model of global democracy may similarly contribute to escalation of violence rather than to global democratization.[29] Ethico-political judgements must always be context-sensitive and take seriously the consequences of uncertainty and openness of geo-historical processes. Moreover, democracy is best conceived not as a fixed model of any sort, but as an open-ended and continuous process.

NOTES

1. For different meanings of uncertainty, including epistemological & ontological chance and openness of social systems & reflexivity of anticipations, see Patomäki (2017a).
2. A well-known collection is Adler and Barnett (1998); whereas an example of a rather critical application is Chang (2016).
3. This is a key theme of my books Patomäki (2008, 2018).
4. In the 1970s, philosophers such as J. L. Mackie, Rom Harré and Roy Bhaskar developed complex realist accounts of causation. For a concise summary of the relevance and consequences of the distinction between open and closed system, see the 'Appendix: Realist Ontology and the Possibility of Emancipatory Social Science' to my 2001 *Journal of Peace Research*. The notion of contrastive demi-regularity has been developed by Lawson (1997, pp. 204–213).
5. Ernst Bloch introduced the concept of concrete utopia in his *The Principle of Hope* that was published successively in three volumes in 1954, 1955, and 1959. The term has been adopted by various critical theorists, including Bhaskar (1993, pp. 286, 297). The term *u-topia* is a bit misleading, as it means a place nowhere. A positive, hope-inspiring

counterpart to dystopia is actually *eutopia*, which could be translated as 'a good place' (or: a place enabling human flourishing).

6. However, the dramatic increase in the number of fatalities in organized violence, seen between 2011 and 2014, did not continue in 2015 and 2016. See Allansson et al. (2017).

7. For an excellent summary and discussion, see Lijphart (1981).

8. Moreover, ample evidence suggests that overall violence and war in human society has been declining for centuries (notably violent deaths per annum relative to population). This thesis is now often associated with Pinker (2011).

9. Deutsch et al. do not use the terminology of concrete utopia.

10. I discuss the problems of free trade based theories of peace in Patomäki (2016, pp. 32–42). There is no space here to discuss the decisive role of increasing income and wealth inequalities in the world system, but see Patomäki (2018), especially ch. 5.

11. Hale et al. (2013) explain the current obstacles to developing global governance further by referring to various second-order effects such as institutional inertia, fragmentation, and harder problems (extensity: scope of problems has increased; intensity: problems penetrate more deeply into societies). They also discuss the effects of growing multipolarity. What they lack is a systematic analysis of the contradictions of global political economy.

12. For a general philosophical account of the fallacies of composition and division, see Rescher (2006, ch. 5); for an analytical social-theoretical account, see Elster (1978, pp. 97–106); and as applied to economic theory and global political economy, Patomäki (2013, chs. 2 and 8).

13. This is what J. M. Keynes realized already during the Versailles negotiations and developed more systematically during the World War II. For an excellent exposition, see Markwell (2006).

14. This is also because investments depend on fluctuations of uncertainty that are directly linked to effective total demand; for a first systematic articulation of this claim, see Keynes (1937).

15. For Richardson's explosive arms race model, where parties seek a 'security margin', see Rapoport (1960, pp. 15–30). Robert Jervis's Spiral Model is more sophisticated, since it explicitly incorporates misperceptions, self-fulfilling prophecies, lessons drawn from history etc. Jervis (1976, pp. 62–82 *et passim*).

16. The taken-for-granted background assumptions of any social situation—including those rare situations that are violently conflictual—involve numerous ties of cooperation. The modern world society is based on such deep interdependence and division of labour that our everyday lives form a worldwide cooperative system.

17. This terminology may be closer to Bhaskar than Rescher, but here I synthesize the two. See especially Rescher (1977, 1996), and Bhaskar (1993).
18. This account is in essence, from a critical realist perspective, a summary of Elster (1978, ch. 5). I first attempted to apply this scheme to world politics in Patomäki (2008, pp. 198–200). I agree with Sonja Amadae (2015), however, that game theory is best seen as constitutive of state practices rather than as their external explanation; yet it can be applied in historical-constructivist explanations.
19. One very well-known articulation of this idea is that of Putnam (1988); a more structurally oriented perspective is provided by Jessop (2012).
20. Stiglitz's model was originally developed in an earlier edition of Greenwald and Stiglitz (2010).
21. A classic exposition of this problematic is Jervis (1976, esp. ch. 3, pp. 58–115). Jervis maintains that although modern adolf hitlers are rare, some agents may in some historical contexts be likely to attack and conquer.
22. 'What is new about this [axial] age, in all three areas of the world, is that man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and his own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and redemption' (Jaspers 1953, p. 2).
23. For a simple but informative overview of the latent fundamentalism of all world religions, and on the historical circumstances of that potential becoming actual, see Ruthven (2007, on Buddhism e.g. p. 104).
24. '[D]efence of tradition only tends to take on the shrill tone it assumes today in the context of detraditionalization, globalization and diasporic cultural exchanges. […] This is why fundamentalist positions can arise even in religions (like Hinduism and Buddhism) which have hitherto been very ecumenical and tolerant of other beliefs' (Giddens 1994, p. 85). For an account about how neoliberal economic policies tend to generate existential insecurities encouraging moves of securitization and negative other-building, see Patomäki (2018).
25. A contribution to the complex ongoing debate, arguing that faith in god can be consistent with reason and morally benign, is Reitan (2009).
26. This is typically a second-order form of Manicheanism, becoming Manichean by way of accusing especially Abrahamic religions of Manicheanism: 'Christianity used to be the most dangerous religion. Now Islam is.' Richard Dawkins in an interview by Samuel Osborne: 'Richard Dawkins responds to the suggestion atheists are violent' (Osborne 2016).

27. Ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rational-ism, as applied to religion; see Bhaskar (2000, e.g. pp. 20, 89).

28. Any contemporary specification of rights or democracy also excludes and, thereby, tends to be violent. For Jacques Derrida, the democracy-to-come recognizes this aporia and thereby opens itself up to the possibility of further transformations, to taking up other directions, to becoming its other, also by means of dialogue and interactions with concrete others at any point in time.

29. For a critical discussion over this problematic, see Held and Patomäki (2006).

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'Pacifism', and China's 'Peaceful Rise' and 'Peaceful Development'

Bart Dessein

9.1 Introduction

The transformations China has undergone since the launching of its 'reform and opening-up' policies (*gaige kaifang*) in the late 1970s have first been referred to in China as the country's 'peaceful rise' (*heping jueqi*) and 'peaceful development' (*heping fazhan*). This development not only fundamentally changed the daily lives of 1.3 billion Chinese, but has also had global ramifications. China's rising self-esteem that accompanied its growing global influence was reflected in terms such as the 'China model' (*Zhongguo moshi*), and this 'China model' was advocated as an alternative developmental path for other developing countries in Africa and Latin America that shared their histories of (semi-)colonialism with China.[1] The claim is that this 'China model' is primarily aimed at the creation of a 'harmonious society' (*hexie shehui*), and will eventually lead to the creation of a 'harmonious world' (*hexie shijie*).

With Xi Jinping's 2013 inauguration as China's State President, the terms 'China's rejuvenation' (*fuxing*) and 'China/Chinese dream'

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(*Zhongguo meng*)—also jointly referred to as 'the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' (*Zhonghua minzu weida fuxingde Zhongguo meng*)—were added to the country's political vocabulary. 'China's rise' may be perceived as having an 'aggressive' tone—Napoléon Bonaparte allegedly stated that 'China is a sleeping giant. Let it sleep, for when it wakes it will move the world'[2]—but the current Chinese leadership emphasizes that China's political and philosophical tradition is one of upholding peace (*heping*) and harmony (*hexie*). Political leaders and academics alike hereby refer to China's Confucian past.

Answering the questions what the nature of China's 'peaceful rise', 'peaceful development', 'harmonious society', and 'harmonious world', and the relation of these concepts to the country's self-proclaimed attitude of pacifism is therefore requires an analysis of China's Confucian politico-philosophical past.

9.2   Peace, Not as Opposed to War, But as Opposed to Social Turmoil

Before the fifth century BCE, part of the territory we now call 'China' had been a conglomeration of a number of petty agricultural 'states' (*guo*), all situated in the valleys of the Yellow River (Huanghe) and its tributaries. The introduction of bronze around 1700 BCE[3] made it possible to expand both the area of potential agricultural land and the efficiency with which this could be done. Each of these *guo* could thus nourish a larger population than before, but this growing population also made it necessary to cultivate an ever larger area of farmland. As arable land was scarce—farming was only possible on the fertile plains in the valleys of the Yellow River and its tributaries—the point unavoidably came when extension of farmland was only possible to the detriment of the neighbouring *guo*. By the fifth century BCE, the economic crisis that had set in around 770 BCE thus developed into the so-called 'Warring States' (*Zhanguo*; 435–221 BCE) period: basically a war over farmland. 'Warfare' that had up to that moment primarily been a ceremonial undertaking developed into a fight for survival. When Shang Yang (390–338 BCE), Prime Minister of Wei, one of the *guo* that constituted the 'China' of that time, characterized the era since the fifth century BCE as one in which war and agriculture became the two most important professions,[4] he pointed both at the economic basis of China and at the precariousness of this basis. This political economic situation

was analysed since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) by what have been referred to as Confucian (*rujia*), Daoist (*daojia*), Legalist (*fajia*), and other thinkers, and these thinkers formulated measures to alleviate this dire situation. This explains why the period of the 'Warring States' is known as the period of the 'One Hundred Philosophical Schools' (*bai jia*) in China's intellectual history.[5] What these different schools had in common was the wish to restore good order (*zhi*) in society, and all of them, with the exception of Legalism, saw this restoration as the return to one or the other glorified historical period, predating the political and social turmoil (*luan*) of their time.[6]

Augustinus of Hippo (354–430) interpreted the apparently unavoidable existence of war as part of a 'divine plan' that rests with God, and that serves to remind mankind of the value of a right way of living with the eventual aim to let human beings who only exist because of God attain liberation through rebirth in Him[7]; but for the Confucians, and this in accordance with the orientation of Chinese philosophy towards this world, there is no divine plan that directs human action towards liberation in God. According to Confucian holistic thinking, human action has to serve the maintenance of the 'social order' inherited from the forefathers, and war, or any other type of turmoil (*luan*), is interpreted as a sign that the ruling Confucian elite has failed to correctly exert the mandate to rule over the known world (referred to as 'all-under-heaven', *tianxia*). Any disruption of the existing social order has to be restored to that original state of order (*zhi*). The 'Warring States' should therefore be seen as a rupture of social and political order within the Chinese 'all-under-heaven' more than as an interstate war. The activity of maintaining and restoring good order is called 'harmonizing' (*he*), and the Confucians regarded the capability to 'harmonize' as unique to the *junzi* (the Confucian literati). This is evident from the use of the term *he* in the Confucian *Lunyu* (*Analects*), a work that assembles all aphorisms attributed to Confucius (trad. 551–479 BCE) and that must have been compiled by later generations of disciples, based on notes of Confucius's direct disciples.[8] In *Lunyu* 13.23, we read:

> The Master said: "The *junzi* harmonize, but do not equalize (*he er bu tong*); ordinary men equalize, but do not harmonize".[9]

Combined with the concept *ping* (flat, even, level), this *he* has become the common Chinese word for 'peace', *heping*, and 'pacifism' has been

rendered as *heping zhuyi* (harmonizing-ism). In traditional Chinese understanding, therefore, 'peace' is not the conceptual 'absence of war', but the 'harmonizing' (*he*) of social antagonism so as to restore the inherited good social and political order, i.e. to pacify society.[10] Phrased differently, 'harmonizing' is a means, not a philosophical/political goal.

Harmonizing society in the sense of pacifying it attained a peculiar interpretation in the Legalist philosophy. According to the school's most prominent thinker Hanfeizi (279–233 BCE):

> [a]we-inspiring power can repress outrage, whereas virtue and kindness are insufficient to bring a halt to turmoil (*luan*). In ordering (*zhi*) a *guo*, the wise man does not depend on men who do good of themselves, but he makes sure that nothing wrong can be done. If one were to depend on men who do good of themselves, there would be no more than ten of them within the borders (of a *guo*). When one makes sure that nothing wrong can be done, then the whole *guo* can be brought (*shi*) into balance (*qi*).[11]

Attention should be drawn here on the last two words of the passage: *shi* and *qi*. *Shi* is an indicator of the causative form, and *qi* means 'to be equal, even, level'. The sentence thus means: 'causing equality in the *guo*'. This Legalist principle of government enables the ruler to rule through 'non-activity' (*wuwei*), i.e. the ruler's use of severe laws and harsh punishments will 'cause' the people to be obedient to his rule, to the extent that they will all become equally non-active—a pacified society indeed. In fact, as shown by Robert H. Gassmann (2000) who builds his argumentation on a linguistic analysis, also in the Daoist *Daodejing*—the concept *wuwei* has especially become known as a Daoist concept—the term *wuwei* had a causative meaning: 'making non-active'.[12] As remarked by Fung Yu-lan (1953, pp. 331–332), the Daoist Zhuangzi (ca.369–ca.286 BCE) states that:

> Through non-activity (*wuwei*), (the wise ruler) can effect activity among "all-under-heaven" (*tianxia*) and still have energy to spare; but through activity he is himself put to use by "all-under-heaven" and is still insufficient. Therefore the men of old valued (the principle of) non-activity. When superiors have non-activity, their inferiors will also have non-activity, which will mean that inferiors will be equal in virtue (*de*) to their superiors. When inferiors are equal in virtue to their superiors, they will no longer be their subjects. (On the other hand,) when inferiors practice activity, superiors will also practice activity, and superiors will have the same way

of conduct (*dao*) as their inferiors. When superiors have the same way of conduct as their inferiors, they will no longer be rulers. The superior must (therefore) practice non-activity, and put "all-under-heaven" to use; inferiors must practice activity in order to put to use in "all-under-heaven". This is the invariable way of conduct (*dao*).[13]

It is obvious that this passage can only mean that a ruler has to 'actively' practice '*wuwei*' (non-activity), i.e. he has to rule in such a way that his subordinates are made to act for the benefit of the country. This hints at a historical connection between Legalist and Daoist thought.

The fact that in Chinese philosophy and politics *he* primarily means 'harmonizing' social antagonism in 'all-under-heaven' can also be deduced from the *Sunzi bingfa* (*Sunzi's Art of War*), the most famous of China's seven military classics, most likely written during the fourth century BCE.[14] Confronted with the apparent inevitability of war, Sunzi wrote his work as a guidebook for the careful planning of war based on five 'preliminary calculations': the 'good way of conduct' (*dao*), command, doctrine, weather, and terrain.[15] By the 'good way of conduct', he meant that which

> [c]auses the people to be fully in accord with the ruler, so that they will die with him, will live with him, and have no fear in battle.[16]

According to Sunzi, loyalty to the leaders is instrumental for national unity, and national unity and the morale of the army are at least as important in battle as military strength.[17] Command refers to the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness. Doctrine involves the organization, control and assignment of military ranks, as well as the organization of logistics. Weather refers to the consideration of the appropriate season to go to war; and terrain regards the physical situation of the battlefield. Only a precise knowledge of these elements would, according to Sunzi, ensure that victory is gained (1) in the shortest possible time, (2) with the least effort, and (3) with the fewest possible casualties both within the own ranks and within the troops of the enemy.[18] Sunzi's work itself does not inform us on the reason why as few as possible casualties should be made within the troops of the enemy, but Zhang Yu, a Southern Song dynasty (1127–1271/1279) commentator on the text, explains that this was to ensure that once the war was over, the soldiers of the enemy could be employed to the profit of the

conqueror. In the same line of reasoning, Sunzi himself states that ruining a conquered state is inferior to taking a state intact:

> Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities. […] Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys other people's states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of "preservation". Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives.[19]

The importance Sunzi attaches to taking a state intact and harming as few enemy troops as possible is in line with the concept of *he* understood as 'pacifying all-under-heaven', as this enables peaceful cohabitation once the war is over. The emphasis put on morality and loyalty and on the intellectual and strategic aspects of war rather than on military power as such echoes elements which we also find in the earliest works of the Confucian doctrine. It is therefore to the Confucian concept *he* that I draw the attention now.

9.3   THE CHINESE EMPIRE AND THE PACIFICATION OF THE WORLD

When Confucianism was installed as state orthodoxy in 136 BCE, the views of Xunzi (ca.300–ca.230 BCE) gained prominence.[20] Building on the ideas of Confucius, *Xunzi* 8.7 states the following:

> For the common people, inner power consists in considering goodness to be following customary usages, considering the greatest treasure to be wealth and material possessions, and taking the highest Way to be nurturing one's life.[21]

That, on the one hand, common people are inclined to follow customary practices and are primarily oriented towards the satisfaction of their direct material needs, and that, on the other hand, material goods are in short supply, explains why *Xunzi* 5.4 insists on the importance of drawing boundaries between social classes:

> What is it that makes a man human? I say that it lies in his ability to draw boundaries […] Of such boundaries, none is more important than that between social classes (*fen*). Of the instruments for distinguishing social classes, none is more important than ritual principles (*li*).[22]

According to Xunzi, rituals that are in accordance with the existing social order avoid everyone feeling entitled to the same things—which would, given the scarcity of goods, lead to chaos (*luan*). It is human intellect that creates these rituals in conformance with social distinctions. In this respect, Loubna El Amine (2015, p. 99) stated the following:

> Rituals, by clarifying positions and social distinctions, contribute to the avoidance of conflict in society.

This, so she claims, is because rituals have the possibility to assure that commoners delay the immediate satisfaction of their desires. Rituals thus create (*zhi*) order (*zhi*). While, on the one hand, providing a guideline for individual proper conduct, rituals, on the other hand, also serve to adjust this same individual conduct to the needs of society at large.[23] Therefore, as Heiner Roetz (1998, p. 91) stated,

> [i]n general, the Confucians legitimize political rule as a precondition of a safe, peaceful, and civilized living together of men in a hierarchical society organized by division of labor.

Prior to Xunzi, such a hierarchical social and political construct had already been expressed by the Confucian disciple Mengzi (ca.371–289 BCE) when he suggested (*Mengzi* 1A7) that 'people should learn about ritual principles (*li*) and right conduct (*yi*)'[24] and stated (*Mengzi* 3A4) that

> There are those who use their minds and there are those who use their muscles. The former rule (*zhi*); the latter are ruled.[25]

The common people are thus expected to behave in such a way that the orderly society ruled by the Confucian elite is not disturbed. A 'harmonious' or a 'peaceful society', to again quote Loubna El Amine (2015, p. 14), is therefore 'achieved through the maintenance of a system of rituals (*li*) that all members of society abide by'.[26] In *Xunzi* 4.11, we thus read that social distinctions

[w]ill cause anyone born to the world to consider the long view of things and think of the consequences, thereby protecting a myriad of generations.[27]

Phrased in modern political terms, Confucian China did not develop a civil society, understood as the intermediate public sphere between the state and the individual that is used by the people—be it individually or in group—to interact or negotiate with the state, i.e. with political participation of the masses.[28] Furthermore, given that with the development of societies new interests and claims will emerge and new messages demanding changes in some respects will be sent and made public, and given that these changes, as noted by Heikki Patomäki earlier in this volume 'will be attempted, either peacefully or by means of violent enforcement', the Confucian emphasis on 'harmonization' in a dual society could, for the commoners, only result in adjusted compliance with the Confucian order. In extreme situations, the commoners had no choice but to resort to violent uprisings. When a military suppression of such social and political violence—the only institutionalized procedure available—appeared ineffective, the Confucian elite explained this apparent impossibility to 'pacify' society as the outcome of their shortcoming in functioning as 'model' for the commoners. This explains why Mengzi stated that a successful uprising legitimated itself.[29] The interrelation among 'harmony', 'pacifying' and 'moral goodness' was actually already elaborated in the Mawangdui documents of the Daoist *Laozi*, dating back to at least the third century BCE:

[w]hat "humaneness" (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), ritual (*li*), and knowledge (*zhi*) arise from [...] is that "when [things are] harmonized (*he*), they have been equalized (*tong*); and when equalized, there is goodness (*shan*)".[30]

This statement obviously corroborates what I have stated above about the Daoist interpretation of *wuwei* in its relation to the Legalist understanding of this term.

This homeland interpretation of *he* was supplemented with an international aspect. Referring to an idealized past, the 39th chapter of the Han dynasty Confucian political handbook *Liji* (*Records of Ritual*) states:

The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order (*zhi*) to their states. Those who wished to bring

order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world.[31]

It is important to note here that 'peace' in Chan Wing-tsit's translation is the translation of the Chinese term '*ping*': flat, even, level. The international meaning of '(*he-*)*ping*', 'world peace' thus is an extension of the national meaning of '*he*(*-ping*)', i.e. harmonizing. This meaning could also be inferred from Zhang Yu's commentary to the *Sunzi bingfa*.

The worldview described in the *Liji* was the outcome of the politico-cultural reality of the Han dynasty. Therefore, historical developments that impacted the contours of the unified Han Empire had their consequences for the way the world was interpreted. Whereas during the Han dynasty this worldview was interpreted in terms of the harmonious co-existence of Chinese and non-Chinese who surrounded them and who did not follow the 'Chinese way',[32] the rise to the throne of an ethnic non-Han ruling house with their Tang dynasty (618–907) after a period of disunity of the Chinese empire that had started with the fall of the Han dynasty in 220 CE had as an important consequence that the earlier Han *tianxia* concept that had been characterized by a 'self'-'other' dichotomy was reinterpreted as a form of benign pluralism. This is evident from the famous statement Tang Emperor Taizong (reigned 627–649) made in 630, when the 'chiefs of the four barbarians (*siyi junzhang*) went to the palace and ritually requested that the emperor take the title of Heavenly Qaghan (*tian kehan*)'. His statement that he regarded himself as 'The Son of the Heavenly Qaghan!'[33] shows that cultural contacts of China with her neighbouring territories influenced China as much as China influenced others. A similar phenomenon of interculturalism occurred when the Chinese cultural sphere was incorporated in the Mongolian Yuan empire between 1279 and 1368,

and again when the Manchus took over the throne in Beijing in 1644. Different from the Mongol rulers who had combined their traditional structures and policies with those of the Chinese, the Manchu rulers of the last Chinese imperial dynasty of the Qing (1644–1911) adopted Chinese Confucianism as the state doctrine. An important consequence of this choice was that the traditional Confucian elites became convinced of the 'transformative' capacity (*tonghuali*) of Confucianism. That is to say, the Confucian elites were convinced that Confucianism was able to 'Confucianize' non-Chinese, i.e. to peacefully incorporate the non-Chinese into the Chinese, and that 'all-under-heaven' was thus bound to be a Confucian unity.[34] The 'Huang-Qing zhigong tu' (Descriptions from the Tributary Offices of the August Qing), a work finished in 1757, suggests that even Europe could become part of this new interpretation of 'all-under-heaven'.[35] These consecutive interpretations of the 'all-under-heaven' concept have in common that 'all-under-heaven' is seen as devoid of political or other borders or boundaries, i.e. *tianxia* is a universalizing cultural concept.

9.4   THE AGE OF NEW CONFUCIANISM

With the end of the First Opium War (*Yapian zhanzheng*; 1839–1942) began the so-called 'century of humiliation' (*bainian guochi*), characterized, among others, by the conclusion of 'unequal treaties' (*bu pingdeng tiaoyue*).[36] Reminiscent of the traditional Confucian '*he er bu tong*' concept (*Lunyu* 13,23) in the sense that China (and Africa) are equated with the *junzi*, the traditional Confucian literati, and Europe with the 'ordinary men', Liang Qichao (1873–1929) characterized the difference between a colonizing Europe and the peoples of Asia (and Africa) as the difference between '[w]hite races not turning away from competition' and 'other races preferring peace (*heping*)'.[37]

Many Chinese political thinkers and intellectuals of the period envisaged a return to a harmonious 'all-under-heaven', i.e. a world in which China would enjoy an 'equal' (*pingdeng*) status with Western countries. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) gave a speech 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship' (*Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng*) on 30 June 1949, on the occasion of the commemoration of the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (*Zhongguo gongchandang*; CCP), i.e. a few months before he proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China from the Gate of Heavenly Peace.

In the speech he urged 'New China' to '[u]nite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals (*pingdeng*)',[38] thereby transforming the Confucian ideal of 'harmony' into a practical instrument. For the homeland, this meant 'equalizing' all social classes through the class struggle. Mao Zedong's failure to create a modern nation through the class struggle had become clearly visible when he died on 9 September 1976. In order to lift the country out of poverty, Deng Xiaoping (1904–1993) brought economic reforms into the Maoist framework.[39] These so-called 'reform and opening-up' (*gaige kaifang*) policies spurred China into an unprecedented economic growth. During the early years, this growth was termed 'peaceful rise' (*heping jueqi*) and 'peaceful development' (*heping fazhan*). In the Hu Jintao years (2003–2013) these terms were replaced by 'harmonious society' (*hexie shehui*), and supplemented with the term 'harmonious world' (*hexie shijie*). While the latter term became more dominant in the Xi Jinping era (2013–present), China's rise has also been termed 'China's rejuvenation' (*fuxing*) by the present leadership. This term, as well as the terms 'China/Chinese Dream' (*Zhongguo meng*) and 'China Model' (*Zhongguo moshi*) embody China's regained self-esteem and the way the country portrays herself on the world-stage. The importance of these new terms appears to be that, different from earlier terms, they comprise a 'universal' aspect and aspiration, and thus project 'Chinese values' on the world at large. The question has therefore been raised as to how China's renewed focus on Confucian values such as 'harmony' should be understood, and whether this renewed attention for Confucianism is illustrative of a more profound wish to cease defining the Chinese tradition in European terms—as was done from the late nineteenth century onwards in an attempt to catch up with the technologically advanced West—but rather to reinterpret the European tradition in Chinese terms.[40] In what follows, I will turn to the importance and significance of these terms.

As phrased above, the traditional Confucian '*he er bu tong*' (harmonizing but not equalizing) in practice boiled down to compliance with ritualized rules laid out by the Confucian political elite. In contemporary China, the concept 'harmonious society' (*hexie shehui*) is also a concept advanced by the CCP and thus is an elite concept—the CCP portrays itself as the political vanguard that knows what is best for the common people. If, for the homeland, 'harmony' is that behaviour that does not infringe on the policies laid out by the CCP elite, i.e. a traditional 'pacifying' of society,[41] what does this imply on an international level? How

should the 'harmonious world' be understood? Is a 'harmonious world' a world of compliance to the new Confucian 'universal' norm, a world in which 'harmony' (*he*) becomes 'universal sameness' (*tong*)?[42]

Reflecting on the deeper meaning and impact of 'universality', Jean Baudrillard (2002, pp. 156–158) has interestingly stated the following:

> Every culture which universalizes itself loses its singularity and dies away. This is how it is with those we have destroyed by their enforced assimilation, but it is also how it is with ours in its pretention to universality […] as triumphant globalization sweeps away all differences and all values, ushering in a perfectly in-different (un)culture […].[43]

Apart from conceptual concerns, there are also practical concerns and implications. It is not the place here to discuss the veracity of the contemporary Confucian revival, but, even if it were true that East Asian political cultures are still substantially Confucian, this does not necessarily imply that this is what they should be, what people want them to be, or that it would have to remain so. If it is claimed that Western values are not suitable for China, then why should Chinese Confucianism be suitable for the West?[44] Moreover, the precise interpretation of Confucian values and concepts has changed throughout China's imperial history. An 'absolutized' Confucianism as overarching ideology for a new 'universalism' would, in fact, mean that the West would conceptually have to go back in time, to the period when Christianity was the universal authority for the world as it was then known. Gradually, since the sixteenth century, this Christian ideology devolved to the geopolitical unit of the nation-state, as the nation-state was perceived to be a more suitable basis to establish relations with other societies, especially those that had their own religious tradition.[45]

9.5   Conclusion

China's rise has set in motion a series of local and global processes, and has fundamentally changed the twentieth- and twenty-first-century world order. The question whether or not this development will be peaceful is a relevant one, made clear from the fact that, to ensure the world of its peaceful intention, China herself is emphasizing that her (Confucian) tradition is one of upholding peace (*heping*) and harmony (*hexie*).

As stated by Heikki Patomäki in this volume, 'social contexts differ in terms of their self-transformative capacity – making them more or less open to peaceful changes – and this capacity is closely related to the question of democracy'. Since the end of the Second World War, Europe has gradually developed into a non-amalgamated pluralistic security-community, based on democratic institutions, and integrated in organs of global governance. The absence of war within the integrated European Union shows that building common institutions creates the possibility to overcome contradictions in a peaceful manner, and the absence of repression likewise shows the value of civil society. As much as traditional Confucian China did not develop a civil society, understood as the intermediate public sphere between the state and the individual in which changes are dealt with through peaceful negotiation, the amalgamated non-pluralistic security-system of authoritarian Communist China likewise prevented the development of a true civil society. Quoting Heikki Patomäki again, since it is the 'democratic agents, actions and institutionalized procedures that can structure the processes through which common problems – be they local or global – are tackled and resolved', China's at least rhetorical return to Confucianism as well as its at least temporary halt to further democratization threaten to jeopardize the creation of a true 'harmonious world'.[46] Given that the existent international system has shown that the very multi-faceted nature of social phenomena does not allow one unit to monopolize human social identification,[47] the best case scenario for a 'harmonious world' would mean a [non-hostile] cohabitation of different nation-states. It is, however, integration, not interconnectedness, that generates the non-preparedness for the use of political violence. What essentially emerges from the above considerations is an argument for 'global democracy', not for a 'harmonious world'.

Notes

1. This 'China model' of economic liberalization under an authoritarian political regime was coined 'Beijing Consensus' (*Beijing gongshi*) in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo. The term 'Beijing Consensus' places China's developmental model in opposition with the Western developmental model, referred to as the 'Washington Consensus'.
2. In French, this statement is generally known as 'Quand la Chine s'éveillera, le monde tremblera'. Napoléon is said to have made this statement

in 1816, after having read Lord Macartney's *Voyage dans l'intérieur de la China, et en Tartarie, fait dans les années 1792, 1793 et 1794.*

3. On this point see Fitzgerald-Huber (1995, p. 67).

4. See Griffith (1963, p. 24), note #1.

5. The first mentioning of these 'schools' of philosophy was in the 'Treatise on Literature' (*Yiwen zhi*), included in Ban Gu's *Hanshu* (*Dynastic History of the Han*). This work differentiates nine 'schools': Confucians (*rujia*), Daoists (*daojia*), Naturalists (*yinyangjia*), Legalists (*fajia*), Dialecticians (*mingjia*), Mohists (*mojia*), Diplomats (*zonghengjia*), Eclectics (*zajia*), and Agriculturalists (*nongjia*).

6. Bauer (2006, p. 37).

7. See Brachtendorf (2012, pp. 52–53). Also see Augustinus (2004a): *Confessions* book 11, XXIX, p. 39 (Ed. P. Schaff 2004, p. 174). Also see Augustinus (2004b) *The city of God*, XIX, 12 (Ed. P. Schaff 2004), where he writes that '*Pacis igitur intentione geruntur et bella*': wars, too, are waged with the intention of peace. See Praet (2017, p. 87). For Thomas Aquinas' indebtedness to Augustinian thinking: see Kany (2012). It can also be remembered here that Augustinus rejected the conception that 'Christians are doomed to idly stand by and allow injustice and barbarity to spread'. See Kany (2012, p. 38). That Augustinus did not reject war in absolute terms is also clear from his three criteria that make a war 'just': the power to declare war should belong to those who hold the supreme authority in a state, a war should avenge wrongs, and a war should be waged with the right intention.

8. For the nature and history of the compilation of the *Lunyu*: see Roetz (1998, pp. 23–25). Roetz (1998, p. 26) defines the *Lunyu* as the 'basic text' of the Confucian doctrine as canonized under Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty (reigned 140–86 BCE).

9. http://ctext.org/analects/zi-lu/zh, last accessed 11 November 2017.

10. Another ancient Chinese term, commonly translated as 'peace' is *an*. An analysis of the *Anshi fangzhong ge* (lit.: songs to pacify the world, for internal use) which are collected in Ban Gu's *Hanshu*, shows that also *an* should be understood as appeasing the world, or finding rest or happiness with the existing social order. See Chavannes (1967, Vol. 3, pp. 605–611).

11. http://ctext.org/hanfeizi/xian-xue/zh, last accessed 11 November 2017.

12. Gassmann (2000, p. 37) summarizes that *wuwei* means (1) not to do anything unnatural, (2) to make a certain type of acting disappear, whereby it is not the acting by the ruler, but the acting of the subjects that has to disappear, and (3) that also the acting of the ruler is not fully autonomous, as wrong actions may lead to him losing his rule. Also the ruler therefore has to be non-active. See below.

13. http://ctext.org/zhuangzi/tian-dao/zh, last accessed 11 November 2017.
14. The other six military classics are the *Sima fa* (Methods of Sima), the *Wei Liaozi* (Master Wei Liao), the *Tai Gong Liu Tao* (Six Secret Teachings of Tai Gong), the *Wuzi* (Master Wu), the *Huang Shigong San Lüe* (Three Strategies of Huang Shigong), and the *Tang Taizong Li Weigong Wendui* (Questions and Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong). The last one of these military classics is the account of a discussion between Emperor Taizong (reigned 626–649) of the Tang dynasty (618–907) and Li Jing (571–649) one of his earliest associates and supporters in the battle against the Western Turks who, after the Gokturks had split into the Eastern and Western Turks, had expanded their territory. The other six military classics all date from the 'Warring States' period and are associated with one of the many *guo* that constituted 'Warring States' China. See Dessein (2017, pp. 26–27). On the battle against the Western Turks: see Wechsler (1979, pp. 220–224).
15. Note that according to Cleary (1988), the *Sunzi Bingfa* is a Daoist book.
16. http://ctext.org/art-of-war/laying-plans/zh, last accessed 11 November 2017. Translation: Sawyer (1993, p. 157).
17. See Griffith (1963, pp. 39–44).
18. See http://ctext.org/art-of-war/waging-war/zh, last accessed 11 November 2018. Also see Sawyer (1993, p. 160). Note that also according to Augustinus, a 'peace-loving state, established on Christian principles, will similarly demonstrate benevolence toward the enemy even in war and generally ensure that evil is contained'. See Kany (2012, p. 38).
19. http://ctext.org/art-of-war/attack-by-stratagem/zh, last accessed 11 November 2018. Translation: Sawyer (1993, p. 161).
20. For the nature and history of the compilation of the *Xunzi*: see Eno (1990, p. 136) and Sato (2003, p. 38).
21. https://ctext.org/xunzi/ru-xiao/zh, last accessed 26 April 2018. Translation: Knoblock (1994, Vol. II, p. 75).
22. https://ctext.org/xunzi/fei-xiang/zh, last accessed 26 April 2018. Translation: Knoblock (1988, Vol. I, p. 206).
23. See El Amine (2015, p. 92).
24. https://ctext.org/mengzi/liang-hui-wang-i/zhs, last accessed 18 March 2018.
25. http://ctext.org/mengzi/teng-wen-gong-i/zhs, last accessed 18 March 2018.
26. El Amine (2015, p. 33) suggests seeing the dispositions sought for the common people (to refrain from stealing, to work hard, and to be 'correct') as dispositions relating to orderliness rather than virtuousness.

27. https://ctext.org/xunzi/rong-ru/zh, last accessed 26 April 2018. Translation: Knoblock (1988, Vol. I, p. 194).
28. Also see Pines (2009, pp. 209–211).
29. *Mengzi*, 1B8: 'The robber and ruffian we call a mere fellow. I have heard of the cutting off of the fellow Zhou, but I have not heard of the putting a sovereign to death, in his case'. https://ctext.org/mengzi/liang-hui-wang-ii/zhs, last accessed 18 March 2018.
30. http://www.chinesewords.org/dict/70182-932.html, last accessed 11 November 2017.
31. http://ctext.org/liji/da-xue/zh, last accessed 11 November 2017. Translation: Chan (1963, p. 84).
32. See Harnisch (2016, pp. 39–40).
33. Quoted from Skaff (2012, p. 120). Also see Sima (1976, Vol. 193, p. 6073), Wang (1957, Vol. 73, p. 1312 and Vol. 100, p. 1796).
34. See Harnisch (2016, p. 40).
35. See Dessein (2016, p. 27).
36. According to Wang (2003, p. 402), it was especially after the 1870s that notions of 'humiliation' entered the writings of Qing dynasty scholars and diplomatic officials, and (2003: 407) it was only in 1924 that Sun Yatsen (1866–1925) started to speak of the 'unequal treaties'.
37. Liang (1936), http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=900281&searchu=%E4%BB%96%E7%A8%AE%E4%BA%BA, last accessed 11 November 2017.
38. https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19490630.htm, last accessed 11 November 2017. Translation: Mao (1969, p. 411).
39. These policies have been termed 'developmental nationalism' by Chang (1998).
40. See on this Kaufman (2010, pp. 11–12). Such a change in attitude was already presaged by Gu Mu (1914–2009), one of the chief ideologues of Chinese modernization, who, in his speech on the occasion of the 2540th anniversary of Confucius's birth in 1989, emphasized the importance of a correct relation to traditional national culture, and stressed that in the synthesis of the Chinese tradition and Western ideas, the Chinese tradition should predominate over the Western one. See Rošker (2013, p. 5) with reference to Motoh (2009, p. 91).
41. See Nordin (2016, p. 43). Also see Rošker (2013, p. 7).
42. Nordin (2016, p. 42) defines 'harmonizing' as 'excluding, rejecting, or transforming the other, the non-Chinese'. In an article published in the *China Daily*, entitled 'A Powerful knowledge system can spread values', Zheng Yongnian (2016, p. 41) stated that: '[A]s far as China is

concerned, international order is no more than an outward extension of internal order'.

43. Yurdusev (2003, p. 101) stated that 'increasing exchanges between societies with distinct civilizational identities may lead to the loosening of the very civilizational identities'.

44. On the 'Asian Values' debate: see Ignatieff (2001).

45. See Yurdusev (2003, pp. 113, 121–122).

46. For a theoretical approach: see Peerenboom (2007, pp. 31–32).

47. See Yurdusev (2003, p. 149).

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Just Peacemaking as a Bridge to Ecumenical and Interfaith Solidarity for Peace

Nathan C. Funk

10.1 Introduction

Together with an ecumenical group of colleagues, US-based theologian and peace advocate Glen Stassen (1936–2014) actively sought to transcend the traditional, 'just war versus pacifism' divide in Christian ethics by proposing a third way that emphasizes proactive war-prevention and peacemaking efforts. Characterizing this third, consensus-seeking approach as 'just peacemaking', Stassen (1992, 2008) attempted to shift the frame of Christian discussions about war and peace away from narrow concern with when and under what circumstances the state might resort to military force, and towards a more forward-looking and comprehensive effort to discover faith-related normative practices that bridge differences and establish foundations for sustainable peace. While not purporting to dispense with debates about whether war might ever be justified, Stassen believed that Christians from diverse denominational backgrounds could share an emphatic commitment to peacemaking in an era defined by the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. Without dispensing with

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long-held convictions, all church communities could become more substantially engaged with inclusive public conversations about effective peacemaking practices that warrant broad support, and that are not exclusively the prerogative of states.

Though best known for his efforts to foster consensus-seeking dialogue among mainline Protestant, Catholic, evangelical, and historic peace-church denominations of Christianity, in his later years Stassen also became involved in meaningful interfaith conversations on just peacemaking, particularly among Christians, Muslims, and Jews (Thistlethwaite 2011). Focusing particularly on the need for active approaches to peacemaking at a time when religious resources for peace are too often underutilized, neglected, or even misappropriated for polemical purposes, this chapter emphasizes the relevance of the just peacemaking paradigm for seeking productive forms of interfaith engagement that highlight opportunities to translate both pacifist and rigorously understood just war commitments into cooperative action for peace. Although themes related to just peacemaking can still play a dynamic role in ecumenical Christian conversations, the just peacemaking approach also carries potential for enhancing both the motivation for interfaith outreach and the potential richness of the resulting dialogue.

To demonstrate the contemporary value and applicability of the just peacemaking approach I will first retrace the logic and development of Stassen's approach, drawing from his published work and its contextualization within Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 settings. This section of the chapter will highlight non-constructive aspects of the just war versus the pacifism debate, particularly the preoccupation with war and military force rather than with active peacemaking, and the loss of opportunities to push beyond state-centric or anti-statist thinking towards modes of thought that highlight the moral agency of religious communities and the relevance of civil society to broader processes of transnational consensus-building. As Patomäki has emphasized in his chapter in this volume, exploring factors conducive to the formation of security communities, finding points of compatibility between the salient political values of different societies is vital to the development of more genuinely cooperative and humane global governance processes. The value of relating normative religious discourse to empirical realities and the findings of social science research will also be explored.

The next section of the chapter will examine potential critiques of the just peacemaking discourse, as well as extensions of the just peacemaking discourse into the interfaith domain. After addressing questions concerning the relevance of just peacemaking beyond a specifically North American religious and cultural context, attention will be given to ways in which the just peacemaking framework can invite creative thinking about the need for bridging discourses that build solidarity for practical interfaith peace advocacy on issues that align with core values of different religious traditions, even while acknowledging the internal ethical pluralism of these traditions (Appleby 1999). Whereas affirmation of common values and concerns is essential for coexistence in an interdependent and pluralistic world, recognition of each religion's internal ethical pluralism also serves an important function by challenging stereotypes and inviting the development of more deeply grounded forms of interreligious respect, which necessarily involves learning more about the faith history of the 'other' and coming to appreciate how adherents of every religion have struggled to realize their distinctive visions for peace and justice. While religions may differ in the unique meanings they attribute to their terms for shared values such as peace and justice, adherents of each religion have also differed amongst themselves, arriving at multiple syntheses of precept and practice. Though derived as a meta-framework for ecumenical Christian discussions, just peacemaking's key virtues (a shift in focus from debating war to developing more dynamic peace practices, affirmation of social agency in addressing systemic problems, valuation of consensus-seeking dialogue as a means of engaging pluralism, and careful attention to historical context as well as empirical realities when attempting to translate ideals into practices) can meaningfully enrich interfaith conversations. At a time of intercommunal polarization and nativist political movements, even invocations of religious peace precepts are sometimes diverted into exclusionary and chauvinist forms of identity politics—for example, in widespread internet memes suggesting that a particular religion is the 'real' religion of peace whereas another religion is not. In providing a platform for forward-looking and inclusive peace discourse, the just peacemaking paradigm is relevant to peacemaking practice that transcends the North American Cold War context in which it originated.

This discussion of interfaith just peacemaking will be followed by prospective thinking about how greater attention to just peacemaking might help to overcome common stumbling blocks in Christian-Muslim

discussions about peace, particularly those resulting from abstract comparison of ideals, from debates over the relative priority placed on key values (e.g., peace, forgiveness, and justice), from reliance on historical narratives with significant blind spots, and from other common errors such as comparing 'our best' with 'their worst' (Marmur 2018). I will also note that representatives of both religious communities often perceive a distinct lack of correspondence between precept and practice in the conduct of the religious 'other'. In the absence of well-developed interreligious relationships such perceptions foster defensiveness and self-justification. Sustained dialogue about bases for active peacemaking, however, can yield insight into surprising symmetries in each side's perceptions of 'self' and 'other', and can serve as a stepping stone toward interreligious solidarity as well as shared efforts to address sources of conflict and to identify bases for more pacific relations between Christians and Muslims.

10.2   The Development of Just Peacemaking

Glen Stassen was nine years old in 1945 and was deeply affected by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. He would later credit his desire to engage in activism against nuclear war to the vast human suffering caused by the Fat Man and Little Boy bombs dropped on August 6 and August 9, 1945. Driven by a sense of Christian vocation, he pursued and completed a degree in nuclear physics as an undergraduate student at the University of Virginia (Stassen 1983, p. 6), before turning to the study of Christian theology at Union Theological Seminary and social ethics at Duke University.

As a theologian, Stassen's central interests revolved around theological ethics, and theological engagement with contemporary issues of peace, politics, and social justice. Stassen attributed this concern with the political to his faith commitments and to the nature of the times in which he lived, though it is also worth noting that, given his family background, preoccupation with things political came naturally to him. His father, Harold Stassen, had served as governor of the state of Minnesota and became known as a perennial candidate for the Republican presidential nomination during the post-World War II era. An outlier in an ideologically shifting Republican Party, the elder Stassen was recognized as a leader within the American Baptist Churches denomination, and accompanied Martin Luther King Jr. as president of the American Baptist Convention during the March on Washington in 1963.

In his 1983 book, *The Journey into Peacemaking*, Glen Stassen suggested that 'Peacemaking involves effective political action on moral issues' (p. 10). This book, addressed particularly to a church readership, asserted that Christians should not be content with simply maintaining a vibrant ethical conversation amongst themselves, or with periodically giving voice to the implications of faith for public life. Rather, Stassen argued, 'The point… is not only to make a witness but to seek conversion' (p. 10). Convinced that the Cold War was fundamentally idolatrous, with the superpowers wastefully diverting resources to a precarious arms race while also failing to support human rights or alleviate world hunger, Stassen believed that it was obligatory for Christians to speak to issues of the day and offer prescriptions that might help the cause of peace. The call for political engagement concerning the dangerous US-Soviet rivalry, he proposed, was as morally compelling as the case against racial prejudice that had animated faith-based action during the civil rights movement:

> As racial justice required a clear appeal to the conscience of the majority in our nation rather than simply a strategy for a small, righteous minority, so peacemaking needs to appeal for and expect majority support within the churches and the nation.

> Peacemaking for us has not meant a purely pacifist witness or a purely 'just war' witness, although we include adherents of both those traditions. The real issue worth debating is the question of our own involvement in action: What practical steps and initiatives should we urge our political representatives, our churches, and ourselves to make in order to move away from an increasingly dangerous and destructive nuclear buildup, and to move instead toward shalom – peace and justice? (Stassen 1983, pp. 10–11)

This central concern with faith-based action, persuasion, and impact drove Stassen to call for practically oriented Christian thinking that transcended the 'just war vs. pacifism' divide and that gave larger constituencies an understanding of what specific forms faithful and effective action might take.

While Stassen offered many such prescriptions during the 1980s, it was in 1992 that he articulated a fuller agenda in his book, *Just Peacemaking: Transforming Initiatives for Justice and Peace*. In this text he described his own rootedness in Christian realism as well as in the twentieth-century *experience* of confronting the prospect of nuclear war. He noted also

the inspiration he had derived from revolutions in Eastern Europe, and from dialogue with East Germans. Further and more bracing edification, he suggested, could be obtained from examining shortcomings in discourse preceding the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq. Whereas the revolutions in Eastern Europe demonstrated the hope-producing power of nonviolent practice, Christian ethical critiques of the war against Iraq had not transformed the larger framework of debate. Whatever the merit of the just war and pacifist arguments presented, they had not fundamentally challenged the perception that the alternative to war was inaction (Stassen 1992, p. 16). Inability to offer coherent prescriptions for active peacemaking—alternative visions of what might be done *instead of war*—was a major limitation of anti-war discourse.

Stassen framed his own contribution as an effort to help forge a 'third paradigm' for Christian ethics, beyond just war and pacifism, emphasizing conflict resolution and active peacemaking as well as issues of justice and human rights. The vision for this paradigm was shaped by the New Testament call for 'transforming initiatives' in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, and 'grounded in realistic but persistent hope-creating experience' (p. 18). While aspiring to establish a stronger Christian consensus on what forms faithful action might take, this just peacemaking ethic was also intended to contribute to a broader and more inclusive 'public ethic' appealing to reason and experience (p. 93).

In this 1992 articulation of just peacemaking, Stassen advocated seven practices that provided, in his view, the substance of a just peacemaking ethic. These practices were as follows: (1) affirm common security; (2) take independent initiatives; (3) talk with your enemy; (4) seek human rights and justice; (5) acknowledge vicious cycles and participate in peacemaking processes; (6) end judgmental propaganda and make amends; and (7) work with citizens' groups to advocate the truth (pp. 89–113). Stassen believed these practices to be faithful expressions of Jesus' 'transforming initiatives' as conveyed by the New Testament, as well as reflections of wisdom derived from reflection on the Cold War and related experiences.

Stassen went on to update these just peacemaking practices in subsequent volumes on the subject published in 2004 and 2008. Working collaboratively with an ecumenical and interdisciplinary group of Christian scholars, Stassen expanded his list from seven to ten practices: (1) support nonviolent direct action; (2) take independent initiatives to reduce hostility and threat; (3) use cooperative conflict resolution;

(4) acknowledge responsibility for conflict and injustice and seek repentance and forgiveness; (5) advance democracy, human rights, and interdependence; (6) foster just and sustainable economic development; (7) work with emerging cooperative forces in the international system; (8) strengthen the UN and international efforts for cooperation and human rights; (9) reduce offensive weapons and weapons trade; and (10) encourage grassroots peacemaking groups and voluntary associations (Stassen 2008). These practices rearticulated and reformulated the seven practices identified in 1992, while adding additional injunctions to acknowledge significant advances in the theory and practice of nonviolent direct action and to address poverty as well as ecology through just and sustainable economic development (see Table 10.1). Stassen and

Table 10.1   Comparing the original 7 practices to the updated list of 10 practices

The 10 practices advocated in 2008	*Relation to practices identified in 1992*
Peacemaking initiatives	
1. Support nonviolent direct action	
2. Take independent initiatives to reduce hostility and threat	2. Take independent initiatives
3. Use cooperative conflict resolution	3. Talk with your enemy
	5. Acknowledge vicious cycles: participate in peacemaking process
4. Acknowledge responsibility for conflict and injustice and seek repentance and forgiveness	3. Talk with your enemy
	6. End judgmental propaganda, make amends
Justice	
5. Advance democracy, human rights, and interdependence	4. Seek human rights and justice
6. Foster just and sustainable economic development	
Love and community	
7. Work with emerging cooperative forces in the international system	1. Affirm common security
8. Strengthen the UN and international efforts for cooperation and human rights	4. Seek human rights and justice
9. Reduce offensive weapons and weapons trade	1. Affirm common security
10. Encourage grassroots peacemaking groups and voluntary associations	7. Work with citizens' groups to advocate the truth

Source Synthesized material from G. H. Stassen (1992, 2008)

his colleagues also grouped the expanded list of ten practices into three overarching categories: peacemaking initiatives, justice, and love and community (see Table 10.1). Stassen saw the first grouping of practices to be rooted in scriptural teaching as well as in the experience of pioneers who contributed to the development of nonviolent action practices. The second grouping, on justice, pertains to 'a central biblical theme' whereas the third grouping relates to 'love understood realistically rather than sentimentally: a key dimension of love in scriptural teaching is breaking down barriers to community and participation in cooperative community' (Stassen 2009b, p. 65).

With this new articulation of just peacemaking ethics, Stassen expanded on his work from the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and sought, in the company of other scholars, to develop a broad, consensus-seeking framework for building peace amidst the sobering dynamics of the post-2001 era. Together with colleagues trained in various academic disciplines, including political science, Stassen added content emphasizing how the prescribed practices addressed root causes of terrorism,[1] and identified a range of areas in which Christians and others could advance a comprehensive, peace-promoting public ethic. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to unpack each of the prescriptions in depth, a quick examination of the ten practices reveals content that relates to multiple priorities that are central to a holistically understood Christian ethic: using peaceful means to address conflict; promoting right relationship through attention to social justice issues; repenting for one's own sins against others, individually as well as collectively; taking the moral initiative in social life; adopting a proactive concern for the common good; and embracing lessons of human history with respect to governance and the translation of values into publicly shared, rights-based discourse.

Stassen reported that his intent was not to replace traditional just war and pacifist discourses about war, and he acknowledged that these frameworks for moral evaluation would remain relevant because just peacemaking practices could not always prevent wars (2008, p. 9). He and his colleagues remained convinced, however, with respect to problems with the prevailing structure of intellectual debate in the Christian ethics of war and peace, in which just war formed a mainstream tradition perennially juxtaposed against a dissident pacifist tradition commonly dismissed as impractical. While recognizing the integrity of longstanding arguments and noting that a just peacemaking commitment does

not exclude a pacifist or just war stance (Stassen 2003, p. 177), Stassen aspired to extend just peacemaking theory beyond pacifist and just war modes of thinking through rooted engagement with historical experience and contemporary issues, 'based on interactive and participative rationality' (2003, p. 187).

As a framework for the ethics of war and peace, just peacemaking theory is distinctive in several important respects. First, *where the traditional paradigms focus debate around war, the paradigm of just peacemaking is <u>centred around peace</u> and the identification of peace-promoting practices.* Stassen's writing on just peacemaking manifests a deep concern that, in a world armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), both traditional just war theory and traditional pacifism face significant limitations. On the one hand, just war continues to render war 'thinkable', despite the grave planetary risks that now accompany escalation of conflict to military confrontation. On the other hand, traditional as well as activist forms of pacifism remain minority positions, and refusal to engage in warfare does not invariably translate into a proactive commitment to address causes of war.

While just war theory has informed modern international humanitarian law through its *jus in bello* ('justice in war') prescriptions underscoring proportionality and discrimination, critics nonetheless point to tensions between theoretical intent and actual usage.[2] These tensions are evident in efforts to apply the criteria of *jus ad bellum* (concerning the justifiability of going to war), which are generally applied more rigorously by philosophers than by political leaders and can have the effect of rationalizing the resort to war rather than regulating it (Smock 1995, p. 17). Leaders themselves may be inclined to apply just war criteria such as 'last resort' impressionistically, based on the conviction that armed force is an *effective* trump card to be played when ordinary measures falter. Even when applied strictly, however, the criteria provided by just war thinking do little to illuminate alternatives to military action, or to invite systematic thinking about conditions that perpetuate longstanding and destructive cycles of violence. It remains arguable that reliance on just war thinking as a primary frame of reference helps to lock in perpetual warfare against non-state actors and so-called 'rogue states', insofar as military actions deemed justifiable by one constellation of actors are subjected to profoundly different interpretations by members of adversary communities (Ross 2002).

Though the same line of criticism may seem strange with respect to pacifism, Stassen and other 'just peacemaking' advocates have argued that much pacifist thinking is primarily organized around the question of whether or not to go to war, and insufficiently engaged with generating accessible options for building peace. This critique applies most obviously to narrowly constructed forms of personal pacifism, but is also oriented towards what Stassen regarded as a shortcoming of political pacifist messaging within the public sphere. While Cheney Ryan's chapter for this volume rightly observes that many past as well as contemporary pacifists have firmly embraced both a personal nonviolent ethic and critical engagement with the political challenges of ending or preventing wars, powerful pacifist critiques of war-making and war systems often face significant barriers to widespread public acceptance. Resistance to a pacifist ethic defined primarily in anti-war terms can be particularly potent in contexts characterized by the pervasive belief that a security community does not and cannot exist between a given polity and 'adversary' nations or cultures. Those who regret destructive conflict without embracing the full sociopolitical critique of political pacifists, or who hope to tame the forces of armed conflict through a cosmopolitan project linked to international humanitarian law, may also fail to appreciate the potential to make common cause with protagonists of an anti-war position they regard as overly purist or as detached from the incremental practicalities of fostering political change and a broadly acceptable public ethic.

In his critique of politically 'passive' forms of pacifism as well as of primary reliance on anti-war messaging, Stassen aspired to construct a peacemaking stance that might include both engaged pacifists and critically minded just war thinkers. Stassen's hesitation to define his position as a form of active pacifism may also have been driven by strategic considerations, insofar as he regarded pacifism as a stance that was unlikely to prevail in the American public sphere. Arguing against a war, he stated, tends to be a losing proposition (Stassen 2004, p. 172). Offering constructive alternatives, in contrast, preserves a sense of agency and guards against the impression of passivity (2004, p. 175). In Stassen's view, both just war and pacifist logics dealt with war more substantively than peace, and could be construed as reactive rather than oriented towards active peacemaking. Thus, both just war theory and pacifism remain preoccupied with an old question: 'When, if ever, are war and military force justified?' (2008, p. 9). Though the question remained

pertinent, much more energy could potentially be invested into a new question: 'What practices of war-prevention and peacemaking should we be supporting?' (p. 9).

A second area in which just peacemaking theory aims to be distinctive is in its *emphasis on a* <u>*multilevel approach to war prevention*</u> *rather than on a reactive focus on what states should or should not do in the event of a crisis.* In the prevailing structure of arguments involving just war and pacifism, the state remains more firmly at the centre of discourse than social and political processes through which a more peaceful order might be constructed. Just war thinking, obviously, regards the state as an entity with a monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force, and sets out to define the criteria according to which this force might be applied. Pacifism, traditionally understood, has in turn sought to challenge this resort to force by the state—sometimes to clear the way for action at other levels, but in many cases without focused argumentation on what options might be better than war. Some strands of pacifism, such as Tolstoy's, have condemned the state itself as an obstacle to the desired social ethic, while offering limited guidance as to how states might be subdued or reformed. Just peacemaking, in contrast, proactively enjoins a defined set of peace-promoting practices and objectives that might conceivably be promoted by actors at different levels of social and political agency, from international organizations and states to civil society groups and churches. The paradigm acknowledges a common critique of religious discourse—that it deals with general principles that may sound abstract and disembodied, leading Stassen and his colleagues to intentionally adopt a framework of practices rather than ideals.[3] Because these practices provide roles for many different types of actors, multiple and complementary forms of agency are affirmed, as is an inclusive process of consensus building on norms for just and cooperative international governance.

A third characteristic of just peacemaking is its <u>*attempt to offer a consensus platform*</u> *for Christian peace action on the basis of values and practices that all Christians ought to endorse.* While Christian just war and pacifist thought similarly attempt to appeal to all Christians, advocacy for each position necessarily involves articulating a stance that proponents of the rival position are compelled to oppose. Just peacemaking, in contrast, refrains from comment as to whether or not war might be justifiable under extreme circumstances, yet aims to recruit adherents of both just war thinking and pacifism to its cause. Rather than try to 'win'

the 'just war vs. pacifism' argument, the just peacemaking approach takes ethical pluralism for granted and seeks to generate practical agreement on constructive responses to salient peace and justice issues. Presuming that most people of faith are also people of goodwill, Stassen and his colleagues attempt to promote a vision within which individuals who differ concerning the ultimate legitimacy of military force might conceivably work together to address injustices and overcome cycles of destructive conflict.

Finally, just peacemaking is defined by its _embrace of knowledge derived from the social sciences as a complement to ethical reflection_. For Stassen, there was much to be gained from relating normative religious discourse to critical examination of historical experience as well as to the findings of social science research in areas of inquiry such as international relations. Consistently, Stassen's collaborations on the subject of just peacemaking were constructed through collaboration with social scientists willing to bring empirical findings to bear on themes pertaining to contemporary peacemaking practice (Stassen 1992, 2008). While just war and pacifist approaches to the ethics of war and peace do not necessarily reject pragmatic insights from the social sciences, just peacemaking is explicit in calling for the mobilization of all relevant intellectual resources for the tasks of practical peacemaking, in relation to defined norms, values, and biblical themes.

Taken together, these four distinctive aspects of just peacemaking theory—being centred around challenges of active peacemaking, offering a multilevel approach to war prevention that invites social engagement, attempting to build consensus across different doctrinal and ideological positions, and affirming openness to insights derived from critical examination of historical experience, particularly as derived from the social sciences—account for much of the impact of Stassen's approach in North America where his works have been widely cited, as well as in international contexts (SPECIAL ISSUE 2014). The just peacemaking paradigm has significantly impacted conversations about war and peacemaking among Christian ethicists and peace campaigners, and in the pages of US publications such as _Sojourners_. Although writers working within Catholic and ecumenical settings have also developed a complementary framework for 'justpeace',[4] Stassen's emphasis on hope-predicated practices and social activism was well received across multiple Christian denominations as well as within academic contexts.[5]

10.3   Toward Interfaith Just Peacemaking

As a framework for efforts to advance a pacifist or 'pacificist' ethic in the contemporary world, the just peacemaking paradigm arguably has enduring relevance and offers a perspective that can complement other perspectives from ethics, political philosophy, theology, and the social sciences. By connecting an ethical commitment to peace to a range of interrelated, normative practices that embody this commitment, just peacemaking offers a model for focusing public as well as religious ethics on practices through which dangers of armed conflict might be reduced and peace consolidated. The result is an integrated way of thinking about how individuals as well as communities can move beyond abstractions when engaging issues of conflict and peace, by enjoining focused efforts to advance values within diverse yet interrelated areas of application including sustainable development, social justice, human rights, nonviolent action, arms control, conflict resolution, enhancement of international institutions, and grassroots civic engagement. Although subject to critique like any other intellectual or activist paradigm, just peacemaking retains considerable relevance amidst contemporary debates on globalization and resurgent nationalism as well as forced migration and ethnoreligious conflict. While care must be taken not to glibly impose a model derived from North American Christian deliberations on pluralistic contexts, the overall approach manifest within just peacemaking is nonetheless relevant and worthy of consideration, especially but by no means exclusively in Christian-Muslim relations.

One of the most obvious potential critiques of just peacemaking relates to its North American Christian context of origin. It could be argued, for example, that just peacemaking arose within a particular historical, cultural, and political context and is therefore of limited relevance to other contexts. The insistence on the constitutive role faith-based ethics can have within the broader field of public ethics may strike some intellectuals as a stance that suits American political culture better than the political cultures of other nations, and which may not apply in a 'post-Christendom' (Murray 2004) era or in settings where religious actors are both anxious to express their particularity and wary of discourses that might appear overly 'public' and to that extent secularized. Others might suggest that the Cold War context provided optimal conditions for the ecumenical, activist, and consensus-seeking framework

that Stassen and his colleagues sought to promote within North American churches, and was responsive to concerns about the instability of nuclear deterrence and the perceived need for Christian communities to present alternatives to just war at a time when the prospect of war consistently evoked disastrous scenarios.

From a more philosophical or social science standpoint, just peacemaking might also be critiqued as a voluntarist position that places undue weight on the capacities of religious communities and other social actors to adopt new paradigms that dramatically improve their capacity to engage proactively with social justice and peace concerns. Does not such a stance privilege agency over structure? Furthermore, the aspiration to develop a common-ground agenda for pacifists and just war thinkers could also be criticized for insufficient attention to conceptual and moral incompatibilities between these perspectives, or for being insufficiently concerned with (or critical of) the role of the state.

Additional critiques may arise with respect to its relevance in religiously pluralistic settings. Despite just peacemaking's aspiration to offer a public and ecumenical platform for moral discourse, it is nonetheless rooted in Christian moral deliberations and debates, while also bearing the mark of Western social science research on sustainable development, nonviolence, human rights, and international relations. Might not such a discourse serve as a Trojan Horse for inauthentic religious and cultural assumptions? Could it be suitable for non-Christian and non-Western contexts? In seeking common ground with the social sciences, has it in effect placed religious labels on secular activist practices?

Such lines of critique must necessarily be taken seriously, and cast doubt on any effort to simply transfer conclusions of the just peacemaking project across cultural and religious boundaries. If viewed as a finished product that is fully embodied in the last edition of Stassen's various edited volumes on the subject, just peacemaking does indeed face obstacles in religiously pluralistic as well as highly secularist contexts. However, if regarded in more general terms as an *approach* to fostering enriched moral discourse in diverse settings where fundamental convictions about pacifism differ and enhanced social engagement is desired, just peacemaking arguably has considerable relevance.

If taken as an approach to dialogue on issues of conflict and violence rather than as a finished product, just peacemaking has characteristics that enhance its value as a flexible platform for interfaith engagement

within current global and national contexts, which are in many respects defined by increasing polarization over ethnic and religious forms of identity. First of all, as an ecumenical 'meta-paradigm' for Christian ethics, just peacemaking has historically sought common ground among people with differing convictions, and has regarded this common ground a meaningful reality rather than as a 'watering down' of purer elements. Thus, just peacemaking is a non-totalizing discourse, and can be embraced in tandem with other commitments. It offers a framework for dialogue and relationship building around issues of common concern and invites diverse parties to more skillfully apply values that are frequently espoused but seldom fully realized. Just peacemaking does not, however, insist on uniformity; it instead allows space for differing convictions. Within a Christian context this has amounted to a purposeful engagement with the religion's internal pluralism, together with the elaboration of an ecumenical platform for collective witness and action on peace issues. Applied to interfaith relations, the just peacemaking approach can similarly acknowledge the internal pluralism of each religion as well as religious diversity more generally.

Second, just peacemaking is directly concerned with connecting areas of ethical consensus to action in the public sphere. By calling for a *re-prioritization of practices and 'transforming initiatives'* and not merely for reaffirmation of abstract ideals, just peacemaking invites greater activism on the part of religious communities, as well as critical reflection on historical and contemporary ways in which religious peace precepts and ideals have either been practiced or ignored. This latter, critical aspect of just peacemaking practice is significant, because all too often religious peace discourse stops at the level of reciting ideals derived from sacred texts and theological deductions, while remaining either detached or selective with respect to actual practice in the external world. While this may have some functionality as an articulation of religious values and communal identity, just peacemaking aims to find relevant contemporary pathways for practices that have impact, and is willing to draw more intensively from lessons of history and of empirical analysis. Recent social science research on nonviolent action and civil resistance, for example, can invite Christians as well as followers of other religious traditions to renew thinking about modalities of active peacemaking in ways that can be beneficial for just war thinkers and pacifists alike.

These defining characteristics make for excellent starting points from which interfaith dialogue and cooperation can grow. Engagement across boundaries reveals that all deeply rooted religions possess both peace ideals and historical experiences in which these ideals have been imperfectly realized. All established religious traditions have experienced tensions between peace precepts and peace practice, and most have experienced phenomena such as religiously sanctioned war and oppression even while offering powerful life-affirming visions (Smith-Christopher 2007). To the extent that dialogues convened in alignment with a just peacemaking approach offer opportunities for a deepening of relationship and for honest acknowledgment historical imperfections, they can create what might be called a 'safe space' for reexamining the historical record without defensiveness. Recognition, for example, that just war constituencies have fought unjust wars of colonization or that pacifists have sometimes favoured a 'separate peace' contracted with unjust authorities need not be taken as an invalidation of identity and belief. Rather, such inconsistencies and imperfections can be appreciated as reflections of the human condition, and as sources of motivation for redoubled efforts that make precepts more central to lived experience. Public-minded engagement with similarities and differences between ideals as well as experiences can foster not just meaningful relationship but also discoveries of common ground and bases for collective action (Heft 2004; Smock 2002; Wuye and Ashafa 2005).

In addition to encouraging more critical historical consciousness and consideration of new options for contemporary peace practice, interfaith approaches to just peacemaking also hold out the promise of more profound self-knowledge among adherents of different religions. Religions do differ with respect to the meanings they associate with ideals and practices of peace and justice (Smith and Burr 2007). Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist peace concepts, for example, have distinctive emphases. Christian peace concepts frequently include salient themes related to forgiveness whereas Islamic peace concepts tend to prioritize justice—even while both religious traditions regard forgiveness and justice as important values. In contrast to peace concepts in the Abrahamic religions, Buddhist peace concepts place a greater overall emphasis on internal and psychological dimensions of peace, while still including social dimensions. Interfaith dialogue focused on peace practices can draw out these relative emphases and strengths, while also putting a check on tendencies to use them as bases for apologetic discourse that can distort or oversimplify the beliefs of others.

Just as strikingly, sustained interreligious dialogue can also reveal more profoundly the fissures within religious traditions. Despite broadly distinctive themes in the patterning of each religion's peace concepts, coreligionists have also differed significantly amongst themselves, arriving at divergent syntheses of precept and practice. In addition to insights about what might make each religion's peace witness unique, deep dialogue also has the potential to reveal that similarities between would-be peacemakers from different religions may be at least as profound as those that tie them to their co-religionists.

Although the full package of just peacemaking practices derived from within a contemporary Christian context may not suit all religions and religious community experiences equally, key features of the approach may in many contexts serve to strengthen religious engagement with peace issues. The previously mentioned virtues of just peacemaking (moving beyond preoccupation with war and state centrism, affirmation of multilevel agency, valuation of consensus-seeking dialogue, and careful attention to empirical realities) can meaningfully enrich interfaith as well as intrafaith conversations, by revealing historical patterns that contemporary believers may wish to reevaluate. Most established religions, for example, have been impacted by historical experiences within which alignment with political power was perceived as necessary for communal protection and advancement. Many also developed increasingly hierarchical authority structures over time, often with explicit ties to the political institutions of society. As Sharify-Funk's contribution to this volume underscores, Christianity is by no means alone in giving rise to exemplary peacemakers as well as to currents of thought emphasizing the state's prerogative to make war. Reflecting on the contextual realities that shaped these different intellectual and practical currents can invite a renewal of thinking, together with intrareligious dialogue on longstanding divisive issues. Thus, while care should be exercised to avoid imposing one tradition's prevailing epistemological, hermeneutical, textual, and narrative/historical dimensions upon another's, just peacemaking's invitation to think beyond historical syntheses and past forms of religious-state integration can have beneficial consequences.

Significantly, during the early years of the twenty-first century Stassen began engaging in collaborations oriented towards interfaith just peacemaking, prioritizing Abrahamic relationships among Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Working with colleagues at Fuller Theological Seminary as well as with Susan Thistlethwaite of Chicago Theological

Seminary, Stassen experimented with broader conversations addressing new realities of international and interreligious relations. Content related to Abrahamic as well as specifically Christian-Muslim dialogues can be found in publications such as Thistlethwaite and Stassen's 'Abrahamic Alternatives to War: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives on Just Peacemaking' (2008) as well as in Thistlethwaite's edited volume *Interfaith Just Peacemaking* (2011) and in Abu-Nimer and Augsburger, eds., *Peace-Building by, Between, and Beyond Muslims and Evangelical Christians* (2009).

Thistlethwaite and Stassen's 'Abrahamic Alternatives to War', published as a special report by the United States Institute of Peace, derives from a conference of Jewish, Muslim and Christian scholar-leaders who met to discuss nonviolent practices from each traditions that could work to help resolve global conflict and injustice (2008, p. 2). Participants in the conference wrote papers on how their religious texts have been used to justify war, on how to counter misguided use of scriptures, and on the spiritual measures each religion takes to prevent war and create peace (p. 2). In addition to reaching agreement that improved historical criticism, translation, and contextual knowledge are needed to counter the misapplication of scriptural passages that appear to condone armed conflict (pp. 6–7), participants also expressed general support for a faith-based just peacemaking paradigm. Many also articulated frustration that their religious communities' theological commitments to peace were not sufficiently matched by collective actions taken to support peace (p. 12), and concurred with the premise that 'any scripturally based abstract principles for peace and justice must be translated into practical steps that faith communities can take' (p. 13). Representatives of the faiths assembled were able to agree on key elements of an 'Abrahamic Just Peacemaking paradigm', including: (1) 'Develop and Promote Processes of Nonviolent Conflict Resolution' (p. 13); (2) 'Pursue Social and Economic Justice' (p. 14); and (3) 'Promote Political Justice, Human Rights, and Religious Tolerance for All People' (p. 14).

Abu-Nimer and Augsburger's volume on *Peace-Building by, Between, and Beyond Muslims and Evangelical Christians* consists of articles authored by Muslims and Christians in conversation with each other about ways in which their perspectives overlap, with an intent 'to deepen their shared understandings, common resources, and relationships' (Abu-Nimer and Augsburger 2009, p. xi). The consultations from

which the book was derived were convened in 2005 and 2006 through the cooperative work of Fuller Theological Seminary, the Salam Institute of Peace & Justice, and the Islamic Society of North America (p. xii). Stassen's two contributions to the book, the first a response to a chapter written by S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana and the second a re-articulation of the just peacemaking perspective, provide insight into his style of inter-faith engagement.

In his contribution on practices of just peacemaking theory, Stassen was careful to differentiate just peacemaking from an unconditional assertion of pacifism, and also underscored the centrality of justice concerns in nonviolent peacemaking strategies.

> Neither Muslims nor Christians need to say that war is never ever justified in order to be able to say that much war is destructive and often wrong and that it is good if we can develop an ethic of just peacemaking that is effective in preventing much war. …[I]t is about articulating effective practices for reducing injustice by nonviolent means so we can avoid war that can be prevented. (Stassen 2009b, p. 62)

In emphasizing these themes, Stassen no doubt sought to assuage possible Muslim concerns about absolute pacifism and insufficient concern for establishing just conditions. When discussing peace-making initiatives, Stassen was also careful to note sources of inspiration from beyond as well as within his scriptural sources, and credited both Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan for 'pioneering some of these initiatives' (p. 65).

Stassen's response to Kadayifci-Orellana's 'Muslim Perspectives on War and Peace' is significant not just for its appreciative tone, but also for his forthcoming statements about shortcomings in Christian understanding and practice. After voicing affirmation for Kadayifci-Orellana's concrete references to specific practices derived from Islamic sources, Stassen explained his own insistence on grounded discussion of practice among Christians:

> We have found among Christians that often they say they are in favor of peace but are so vague and indefinite about what they actually mean to do about it that it amounts to very little in actual practice. In fact, it can amount to self-deception and false consciousness. (Stassen 2009a, p. 49)

In articulating this statement, Stassen voices an implicit critique of much internal Christian as well as interfaith peace discourse, preoccupied as it is with generalities and with ideals detached from specific contexts of application or focused commitments. Stassen goes further with this assertion of the need for concreteness, as well as with a critique of empty and even manipulated religious discourse, by noting how readily religious messages can be co-opted:

> Some American demagogues in 'Christian' clothing (Matthew 7 and Revelation 13) corrupt the churches and the gospel by entangling Jesus with nationalism, militarism, and authoritarianism. I know some Muslim leaders have a similar sense of responsibility among Muslims, analogous to the burden and the calling that I feel among my people. Having a specific just-peacemaking ethic with concrete and definite practices of peacemaking helps enormously in correcting errors of unknowing self-delusion and empty self-congratulation. (Stassen 2009a, p. 60)

These statements demonstrate Stassen's critical awareness of how religious identities and sources can be instrumentalized, and respond to powerful dynamics at work in times of increasing polarization.

When discussing major themes in Christian and Muslim sources, Stassen's comments reflect a nuanced capacity to communicate about the relative emphasis given to specific peace-related values in religious communities, without resorting to simplistic generalities or self-serving comparisons. To the extent that Muslims give greater emphasis to justice and Christians place more weight on forgiveness, each community may be able to learn something from the other:

> I wonder whether the emphasis on justice is greater in Islam than in Christianity, although the four words for justice appear 1,060 times in the Bible. God is a God of compassion who cares deeply for the powerless, and who wills that justice flow down like a mighty stream (Amos 5:24). Here is a place where I believe Christians should repent and deepen our practice of faith. (p. 52)

> I wonder whether this [forgiveness] is a place where Christian faith puts more emphasis, although the character of God and the Qur'an do encourage great emphasis here by Muslims as well. This would be an interesting question for dialogue among Muslims and Christians. I predict we all could learn from each other. (p. 54)

From these and other statements, Stassen demonstrates the potential value of interfaith conversation for correcting blind spots and generating greater resolve to apply one's own scripturally rooted values. Stassen clearly recognized that Christianity is not alone in its emphasis on peace and justice or in having divergent internal syntheses on the ethics of war and peace (p. 56), and expressed hope that further articulations of Muslim just-peacemaking theory would provide impetus to ongoing dialogue with Christian ethicists. Not just that, but

> Muslim just-peacemaking ethics can… strengthen the hand of those Christians who are working to help Christians become more concrete about what they mean when they say they are followers of Jesus, the Prince of Peace. We can strengthen each other's hands in dramatic ways. We can call attention to the peacemaking practices that we are both articulating and can embrace each other as brother and sister peacemakers. And together we can point to the experience of history and the results of political science: these practices of peacemaking do in fact often work (p. 56).

Stassen's approach to Christian-Muslim engagement helpfully avoided the temptation of seeking to reduce 'the other' to a singular essence that can be contrasted apologetically to 'the self', and recognized that both Christians and followers of other religions are similarly impeded by a tendency to focus on ideals more than contextually adapted, faithful practices that might be applied more rigorously. Stassen sought to demonstrate that, amid protracted conflict, interfaith engagement can help to counter those promoting ideas of 'radical otherness' without eclipsing the distinctiveness and particularity of each religious tradition. Just peacemaking, he proposed, can help each religion to live its own values more effectively, while providing a platform for dialogue and a basis for building common cause and solidarity.

Without the focus a just peacemaking paradigm can provide, interfaith conversations often fail to move beyond what might be called highly 'preliminary' stages, focusing on relatively introductory expositions of theological concepts and useful but not necessarily practical or social engaged comparisons of ideals and core precepts. In many cases, interfaith dialogue is conducted in ways that do little to illuminate the internal pluralism of the religious traditions involved, or to probe how diverse historical and social contexts have shaped different syntheses—distinct ways of translating precepts into actual practices and applications.

The just peacemaking framework has potential to generate forms of interfaith engagement that are less detached from contexts and applications, and more concerned with creative ways in which core convictions of given faith traditions can be applied to present concerns such as political violence, mutual radicalization, nativist politics, poverty, interreligious coexistence, and climate change mitigation. With its built-in assumptions concerning intra-religious pluralism and competing, historically influenced paradigms for practice within each religion, just peacemaking can also reduce the need for defensive or apologetic stances. Using just peacemaking as an organizing framework can help to refocus discussions to take historical dynamics as well as normative ideals more rigorously into account, and to place greater emphasis on possibilities for creative contemporary application. Such an approach can uncover promising options for cooperation as well as areas in which convergent, faith-based peace practices might be reaffirmed and reinvigorated.

10.4   Potential Contributions to Muslim-Christian Dialogue

There are many stumbling blocks to substantial change in Christian-Muslim interfaith relations, and expectations from any singular framework should necessarily be guarded. Nonetheless, the just peacemaking paradigm has the potential to shed light on a number of negative patterns in Christian-Muslim relations that can surface in conversations about peace and peacemaking.

Sadly, far too much misinformation and propaganda about the 'religious other' is circulating within different encapsulated spheres of the worldwide web. The English-language internet, for example, contains unsettling amounts of anti-Muslim content, much of it organized around racialized and bigoted caricatures about Muslims in general as well as about Islamic capacity for peace. This content breaks Stendahl's rules for good-faith interfaith relations, which stipulate that one should learn about other religions from their adherents, avoid comparing one's best with the other's worst, and leave room for 'holy envy'—that is, for experiences of profound respect for aspects of a religious tradition that is not one's own (Marmur 2018). Anti-Islamic (and yes, anti-Christian) internet propaganda circumvents the need to become acquainted with the other. It relies a great deal on self-serving and unfair comparisons, and regards notions such as holy envy—seeing integrity and even beauty in the other—as entirely inconceivable.

Simply put, in the print content that reaches the widest audiences and achieves the most hits on Google, there is far too much material that fails to manifest religious empathy or respect for the other's virtues. Islam is routinely treated as a monolith by its greatest detractors, and even some people of goodwill are inclined to maintain this undifferentiated perspective—albeit with a less negative overall characterization. Incidentally, even many Muslim writers project this image of the Islamic experience as a reality that ideally *should* be monolithic, not just on traditional theological grounds but also as a bulwark against imperialism, sectarianism, and cultural Westernization. As a result, anti-Muslim thinkers as well as many participants in Muslim-Christian dialogue often lack any obvious interest in the sort of creative undercurrents within a religious tradition that can make for active religious peacebuilding. Even so notable a figure as Abdul Ghaffar Khan, one of the most consequential and steadfastly nonviolent figures of the Indian independence movement (see Sharify-Funk in this volume), has been largely overlooked as an exemplar of nonviolent Muslim resistance to oppression as well as of dynamic engagement with issues pertaining to education, women's rights, interreligious coexistence, and the prevention of violent social conflict.

Part of the problem has to do with a profound disjuncture between the macro-historical narratives about Islam and Christianity. This problem with narratives is arguably a deeper issue that forms the constitutive context for various prejudices and preconceptions, as well as for varieties of defensiveness that shut out consideration of one's own rich diversity and capacity for creative agency (particularly among Muslims) or that dampen reflection on the lingering effects of colonialism and unequal power relations (among Christians). While many reject the notion of a fateful 'clash of civilizations' as an unpleasant and simplistic form of self-fulfilling prophecy, perceptions of the cultural and religious 'self' as under assault by the Christian or Muslim 'other' are more widespread. Many on each side of the interreligious relationship see themselves as historical victims of an aggressive rival. When defensiveness grows particularly acute, defenders of the communal self focus with particular intensity on the seeming 'incoherence of the other' in contemporary settings, emphasizing contradictions between proclaimed peaceful intentions or precepts and the bitterly harmful actions committed by real human beings. The current salience of political violence in Western-Islamic relations, manifest in European and American military interventions in regions such as the Middle East as well as in the actions of extremist organizations and

networks such as ISIS, does much to fuel partisan narratives in which one's own macro-cultural identity group can take at best limited responsibility for aggressive actions and is largely playing 'defense' in the face of the other side's provocations (Funk and Said 2004, 2009).

Only forming genuine relationships and engaging in deeper study and conversation can reliably protect against such mirror-image perceptions, and just peacemaking may have much to contribute in this regard. For Christians, the just peacemaking paradigm offers a different way of engaging and seeing Islam, beyond debates about the folly of adding more war to terrorism or about the need to overcome passivity in responding to extremist groups. By focusing on the possibility of shared calls to action in the midst of real diversity and multidimensional conflict situations, just peacemaking offers practices that might be affirmed together in ways that generate ongoing relationship and deeper knowledge of the other. For Muslims, just peacemaking offers similar opportunities to escape from debates about how best to 'react' to the other's trespasses, while also advancing useful internal investigations of neglected resources for peace and justice. By highlighting the dynamic interplay of peace and justice, the findings of empirical research on nonviolence and peacebuilding, and the potential for united stands that do not deny underlying diversity, conversations organized around themes related to just peacemaking may also prove beneficial among Muslims. Christians and Muslims alike have much to gain from just peacemaking's insistence on discussing practices, and not simply expecting that meaningful actions flow from the repeated invocation of shared ideals.

Another interfaith relations issue that just peacemaking might help correct is the problem of simplistic value comparisons, which all too often undergird self-serving contrasts with the religious other. As Paulus Widjaja has observed from engagement with Muslim and Christian community dialogue processes in Indonesia, members of both communities often have different starting points for discussing complex aspirations such as reconciliation. Quite often, the Christians begin by talking about values such as forgiveness, while the Muslims begin with justice. Although these starting points reflect real emphases within each religious tradition, it would be a great distortion to claim that the other religion did not also appreciate the complementary value—for Christians, justice, and for Muslims, forgiveness. The problem, therefore, cannot be ascribed to incompatible values. Rather, the issue is the relative emphasis each community places on each value in its public peace stance (Widjaja 2005),

which can reflect not just theological centrality but also the positioning of one's own community amidst the world's conflicts. Dialogue organized around how to make peace would reveal that Christian peace campaigners tend to care quite deeply about justice and reject the misuse of forgiveness to maintain the status quo, even as Muslim practitioners of community reconciliation rely heavily on the promotion of forgiveness and uphold the granting of pardon as a deed that reflects moral strength rather than weakness. For example, traditional Arab-Islamic processes of reconciliation such as *sulh* are predicated on both of these values, and encompass reparations for harm as well as solemn public declarations of forgiveness and rituals that renew social relations between estranged family groups (Irani and Funk 1998). In conversations centred around broader issues of war and peace, dialogue might also reveal that actual mainstream positions on just war are less different than is commonly believed, and that both religious communities are imperfectly served by traditional just war discourse.

There are, of course, limits to applying the just peacemaking framework in interreligious contexts, one of which involves the possibility that it will be perceived as an imposition. For example, in his 'Response to Stassen's *Ten Just-Peacemaking Practices That Work*', Karim Douglas Crow (2009) agrees with Stassen's suggestion that Muslims have potential to innovate more concrete practices of peacemaking that live out their ideals in present-day contexts (p. 81), and acknowledges that Muslims have the potential to refine their thinking about what causes violence as well as about why many non-Muslims believe that Islam condones violence (p. 82). At the same time, he also notes that Stassen has drawn upon political science and other academic disciplines to develop some of the ten just peacemaking practices, which could be questioned by Muslims who are reluctant to embrace models adopted from Western systems (pp. 83–84). In addition, Crow cautions that all proponents of ideas such as just peacemaking must demonstrate great dedication to the actual practice of what they are professing and integrate the knowledge at a personal level—otherwise that which is proclaimed will lose its meaning (p. 85). Such precautions warrant attention, and any attempts to apply just peacemaking approaches more expansively in Muslim-Christian relations must necessarily allow space for explorations of dissonance as well as harmony, and for calls to very substantially revise past formulations of principles to reflect the authentic perspectives of those contributing.

On the balance, however, incorporating a just peacemaking sensibility into interfaith dialogue and cooperation has significant potential to advance interfaith relationships as well as knowledge of how Christians and Muslims are entangled with one another, in global as well as national and local contexts. While just peacemaking should not be promoted as 'the latest new Western idea', it does present the inviting premise that solidarity based on a convergence of horizons need not require uniformity of belief or an identical religious standpoint. By offering a positive, capacious framework for dialogue, just peacemaking supports proactive social engagement inspired by values and beliefs that are mutually embraced, without forcing agreement on areas of divergence or demanding shared adherence to a singular definition of pacifism. In the process, it seeks productive insight into roots of conflict as well as options for practical peacemaking that arguably manifest the spirit of historical pacifism and relate it to present circumstances. The very name of the approach, 'just peacemaking', emphasizes the interdependency of two principles that are central to both faiths, yet inadequately realized in contemporary relations. As a basis for solidarity across boundaries, just peacemaking holds the promise of substantially deepened conversations and invites the discovery of new meaning in actions that are already being undertaken.

NOTES

1. 'We need initiatives to correct the injustices that cause terrorism; structures of justice that dry up the sources of recruitment of terrorists; we need international networks of cooperation against terrorism' (Stassen 2008, p. 2).
2. As Diana Francis argues in *Rethinking War and Peace* (2004, pp. 87–92), there are unavoidable tensions between the inherent logic of war (which seeks victory through whatever means necessary) and rules intended to civilize armed conflict by constraining military options. See also Maguire (2007, pp. 24–25).
3. Stassen emphasizes that the Sermon on the Mount was not merely a set of ideals, but rather an invitation to participate in God's transforming action (1985, p. 260). See also Stassen and Gushee (2003, p. 35).
4. Lederach and Appleby (2010) define justpeace as 'a dynamic state of affairs in which the reduction and management of violence and the achievement of social and economic justice are undertaken as mutual, reinforcing dimensions of constructive change' (p. 22).

5. After Stassen's recent passing in 2013, his significant contributions to Christian as well as public and ecumenical ethical discourse have received affirmation in commemorative volumes (Axtell and Westmoreland-White 2014; SPECIAL ISSUE 2014, p. 5).

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CHAPTER 11

Conclusion: On the Appeal of Pacifism

Jorg Kustermans, Tom Sauer and Barbara Segaert

The Antichrist argues that since our enemies would assail us, we should assail them first, and then we shall have peace. Here I think that the Devil deceives men by false reasoning. What man with any sense cannot see its fallacy? I know well that angels stand against fiends, and many men resist their enemies by the strength of law; and yet they do not kill them or fight with them. Wise men withhold their strength, and vanquish their enemies without a stroke, and men of the gospel vanquish with patience and come to rest and peace by suffering death. Though men seize our estate and possessions, we should suffer with patience, even if they do worse to us. This is the advice of Christ. Well I know that men with worldly minds will scorn this, but men who would be martyrs for the love of God will agree with it.

(John Wyclif, 'On the Seven Deadly Sins', 1845, ch. XIV)

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Our task in concluding this volume is twofold. First, we think it necessary to draw out some of the major findings of the volume as a whole. Obviously, each chapter has its own conclusion, wherein its author puts emphasis on those aspects of the argument that s/he felt it necessary to emphasize. But the conclusion of an edited volume should aspire to more than a mere recapitulation of the various conclusions of the separate chapters. The purpose of this conclusion is to conjure up a 'whole' that the reader may recognize as amounting to more than the sum of its 'parts'. With this end in mind, we will tease out from the contributions to the volume the answers to three overarching questions.

- How does today's pacifism—as it emerges from the contributions to our volume—define and defend itself? Which arguments does it bring to the fore? How does it 'read' the political environment and how does its reading of the current situation inform its redefinition and its defence?
- How does today's pacifism—as it emerges from the contributions to our volume—differ from earlier versions of pacifism? Pacifism is a historical phenomenon: it emerged in a particular historical context and develops—fades away, emerges again, changes in form—in a changing historical context. How did it change in the course of its history? Or, alternatively, how much does today's pacifism take account of a changing context? How adaptive does it show itself to be?
- What are the main points of dispute within today's pacifism? Pacifism is a tradition of thought. Traditions of thought, because they develop through time and incorporate disparate elements in the process, will inevitably end up being multi-vocal in character. Differences can be smoothed over or become points of contention. Any assessment of today's pacifism must pay attention to (manifest and latent) elements of disagreement.

Answering these three questions will enable us to finally offer our own appreciation of the appeal of pacifism. As we wrote in the introduction, many of our contributors show themselves to be in favour of pacifism. They stage an active defence of it, although typically not without first redefining or updating it. They wish to persuade the reader of pacifism's appeal and would like to see its popularity and influence grow. As editors of this volume, we are not expressly committed to pacifism and prefer to analyse it from a certain distance instead. If most of our authors'

contributions have sounded the appeal of pacifism, we (as editors) stay in the business of examining it. We approach it as a 'social fact'. We are intrigued by pacifism. We hear—nay, *feel*—its appeal. But we simultaneously observe the relatively small number of people answering its appeal—not just today, but across history. And we also experience our own reluctance to embrace pacifism without qualification. This invites the question why the appeal of pacifism does not resonate more and it is with our answer to that question that we will end this volume.

11.1   How Pacifism Defends Itself

11.1.1   *Pacifism as Common Sense*

The best defence is common sense. The best defence is to pretend, in any case, that one's particular ideas represent common sense. It is to pretend that one's ideas capture an intuitive moral truth. The best way to pretend that one's ideas represent common sense is not to defend them and not even to claim that they represent common sense. To stage a defence, or even to advance a claim, is always, at least implicitly, to agree that whatever one posits has not become common sense yet. As a strategy of defence, to pretend to represent common sense entails precisely that one does not *claim* to represent common sense and one does not *stage* a defence of one's claims. At most, one tells an anecdote that conveys—of which one hopes that it conveys—the commonsensical nature of one's position. But much as with a joke, the story loses its force, or loses its appeal, if one explains it too much. The story must convey its truth intuitively. To explain or to analyse it in too much detail is to undo its intuitive appeal. In the history of pacifistic thought, Lev Tolstoy did the most to sell the tenets of pacifism as intuitive moral truths, ultimately writing them up in *A Calendar of Wisdom* (1997). We find a similar evocation of pacifism as common sense in some of the contributions to this volume, typically in the form of a well-chosen anecdote. Meena Sharify-Funk opens her chapter on pacifism in Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism with the story about Lalla 'Aziza's (pacifistic) confrontation of general al-Hintati, describing how she 'walked out of the safety of the foothills and onto the harsh Marrakesh plains and [how she] stood – alone – before the general and his army'. There is no real, elaborate argument in the description. The description itself is the argument. Similarly, in what is otherwise a fairly technical chapter, Amanda

Cawston (with reference to earlier work by Cheyney Ryan) recalls George Orwell's refusal to 'fire at a half-dressed enemy soldier running while holding up his trousers'. And again, the anecdote explains itself. It does not need much further explanation. It conveys pacifism's intuitive moral truth. It expresses—or so we are hoped to concur—common sense.

11.1.2   Pacifism, Not Passivism

Pacifism is a political program that emerged from a longer-standing tradition of thought. When Martin Ceadel discusses the history of pacifism as a history of the ideas that animated the (British) peace movement of the twentieth century, he is well aware that that movement could and did draw inspiration from a much older tradition. We have quoted John Wyclif at the beginning of this chapter and this fourteenth-century theologian is often portrayed as one of the carriers of pacifism-before-pacifism. He embodied and expressed a pacifistic ethos, before the invention of the concept. Such early articulations can be a source of strength, but they can become a burden too, especially when they appear to confirm the (alleged) inadequacies of one's program. In our particular case, Wyclif's recommendation that people 'should suffer with patience' whatever calamity befalls them, including when they are faced with physical aggression, will frustrate the *modern* pacifist. Time and again, including in our present time, pacifists have been accused of counselling a suicidal passivism. Also time and again, including in the contributions to the present volume, pacifists have denied the charge and have insisted that pacifism does not imply a passive, suffering attitude in the face of violence. The charge of passivity was familiar to the peace movement of the early twentieth-century too and it may shed some light on the debate about its choice of name. Martin Ceadel recalls how different names were in the running at the turn of the twentieth century. *Pacifism* (as proposed by the Frenchman Arnaud) won out, whereas *paxism* (as promoted by the Brit Perris) was lost to oblivion. It at least appears meaningful that the etymology of pacifism ('pax' + 'facere' + '-ism') implies a commitment to bring about ('facere': to do, to make) peace. The *paxist* is devoted to peace, certainly, but only the *pacifist* is devoted to bringing about peace. That is what the choice of name expresses—at least implicitly. The pacifist engages the world and seeks to bring about change. Pacifism is a modern notion.

It is a modern stance, in this sense that it expresses a fundamental belief in the possibility of making the world a better place. Whenever the viability, or the practicality, of the pacifist position is put into doubt, as happens time and again, the pacifist will insist that such criticism amounts to a wilful misrepresentation. Modern pacifism, insists the modern pacifist, has left that aspect (the Wyclifian aspect) of the tradition behind.[1] If early twentieth-century pacifism still counted 'paxists' among its membership, they are no meaningful subgroup of twenty-first-century pacifism, certainly not as presented in this volume. Cheyney Ryan, in his chapter, makes it very clear that he is a *political* pacifist, which means nothing if not that he thinks that pacifism makes for a viable political program that should motivate us to engage the world actively. Heikki Patomäki takes the same position in his chapter, as does Nathan Funk, who ups the ante and proposes to substitute the notion of 'just peacemaking' for the notion of 'pacifism'. Given the etymology of pacifism and the arguments of many of our authors, there is not necessarily a substantive difference between the two. It seems rather that the concept of 'just peacemaking' is meant to finally rid the pacifistic tradition of its association with passivity.

11.1.3   Systems and Structures, Not Events

The mere fact that pacifism implies a program of action does not yet imply that it is the right one. All modern political thought implies an active engagement with the world. When pacifism insists that it does not recommend a passive 'suffering of the world', it is really only fighting off those opponents who claim otherwise. When it insists that pacifism defines a *political* project indeed, it is staging a 'defensive defence'. But pacifists also appreciate the importance of going on the offensive, of pointing up weaknesses of contending doctrines and projects. In those situations, as becomes clear both from Ceadel's reconstruction of the ideas of the peace movement, from Atack's discussion of Tolstoy's pacifistic thought, and, very importantly, from Ryan's and Cawston's case for pacifism's continuing relevance, pacifists are prone to flag their superior appraisal of the problem of war (and violence) (and thus counter just-war-theorists' claim to the same effect). Pacifism explains that the problem of war is not a problem of discreet battles or even discreet wars. Similarly, pacifism explains that the problem of violence is not a problem of discreet incidents of violence or discreet acts of aggression.

Rather, as Ryan sets out in his contribution, the problem of war is the problem of the 'war-system' and of the institutionalization of (what he calls) 'war-building'. Nineteenth-century liberals explained in a similar vein that the problem was not this or that war, but monarchism or protectionism or capitalism, the social and political structures that lay at the root of all particular wars. More radically still, Tolstoy claimed that the problem was not particular acts of war, but the fact of power, of which he thought that it could only have coercive, violent implications. Just-war-thinkers will often explain that pacifists are overly absolutist in their rejection of war, that they do not appraise the circumstances which occasion the use of force in sufficient detail or with a sufficient sense of tragedy. However, pacifists counter that it is just-war-thinkers who fail to grasp the moral reality of war. They read the current situation in an unconvincing fashion, seeing only discreet events and individual decisions where they should be seeing violence-generating (and, in Cawston's view, violence-occluding) structures.

11.2   A Chastened Pacifism

We mentioned already that the (proto-)pacifism of a thinker like John Wyclif differs on crucial points from the pacifism of the early-twentieth century peace movement, with the main difference being that the pacifism of the twentieth century by and large abandons the seeming passivity of its late-medieval predecessor. Pacifism became a political program. We have further indicated that twenty-first-century pacifism, as it transpires from this volume, also remains a political program, that it understands pacifism to be a program for action, that it wants to engage constructively with the world and to transform it. This suggest continuity. But at the same time, pacifism exists in historical time and it would be odd if pacifism had not changed in accordance with broader societal or epistemic developments. Because pacifism is a historical phenomenon—a phenomenon embedded in and more or less attuned to a shifting historical context—one would expect change as much as continuity. On the basis of our reading of the chapters of this volume, we would draw attention to one crucial difference between the pacifism of this century and that of the previous century. We find that twenty-first-century pacifism presents itself in a more subdued tone than did twentieth-century pacifism. One could say that twenty-first-century pacifism is a chastened pacifism.

Consider Martin Ceadel's account of the varieties of pacifism in the twentieth-century peace movement. He makes a distinction between 'absolute pacifism' and 'reformist pacifism' (or 'pacificism'). The latter strand of pacifism reflected on how to reform the institutions and practices of international relations in order to reduce the likelihood of war and, ultimately, make it impossible altogether. These pacifistic proposals would typically be presented with great certainty. They identified a root cause and did not hesitate in offering a solution. Consider Ceadel's reconstruction of the 'republican' argument:

> Monarchical and aristocratic government caused war, which could therefore only be abolished by creating a republican regime that prioritized the interests of ordinary citizens.

A great sense of self-confidence resounds in that argument. It does not consider possible limits to the validity of the claim; neither does it examine 'under what conditions' aristocratic governments are war-prone, nor 'under what conditions' republican regimes are peaceful. The relation is supposed to hold forever—and to be unambiguous. A similar observation applies to contemporary arguments about free trade and peace (or, reversely, about capitalism and war) and, *a fortiori,* to the single-cause-explanations of war and peace that Ceadel identifies. Modern pacifism came of age in an era of ideological grand-standing and shared in the epistemological certainties of its time. Ceadel intimates in his chapter that twenty-first-century pacifism no longer feels itself as secure. He senses 'a loss of ideological self-belief', which 'has meant that few *pacifists* now promote their theories with the intellectual confidence of a Godwin, a Cobden, or a Lenin'. '[Much] peace campaigning since the Second World War', he continues, 'has focused more narrowly on particular weapons […] and on particular military interventions […] rather than on grand war-abolishing schemes.'

Ceadel may be right about the campaigning of the present-day peace movement. But we think he is partially wrong about the state of pacifism as a scholarly enterprise. Judging on the basis of the contributions to our volume, especially the chapters by Heikki Patomäki and Amanda Cawston, there is very much a desire among contemporary pacifists (Cawston) and pacificists (Patomäki) to imagine 'grand war-abolishing schemes'. Patomäki's concrete utopia, his blueprint for a global security community, is nothing if not grand and has the very real objective to

institutionalize, on a global scale, processes of peaceful change. Similarly, Cawston's redefinition of pacifism as 're-appropriated violence' is embedded in an encompassing analysis of (each and everyone's implication in) modern society's structures of violence and has as its (implicit) ambition to bring about greater awareness about people's implication in these structures, which would, in turn, be the basis for a thorough re-structuring of the organization of modern society. To change how people think (about themselves) is nothing if not a grand ambition.

At the same time, however, these new—rather grand—articulations of the pacifistic project shun epistemological arrogance. They are grand, but conscious about the intrinsic difficulties of grand theorizing. Hence our description of them as the expression of a form of chastened pacifism. Most significant, in this context, is Heikki Patomäki's promotion of global democratization as a necessary corollary of the establishment of a global security community. The idea clearly resembles, and belongs to the tradition of, republican-peace-thinking, as Ceadel reconstructed it for early twentieth-century pacifism. But Patomäki adds a warning. He knows about the violent abuses of the democratic peace and, as a result, develops a chastened version of the argument. He ends his chapter with a twenty-first-century addendum to a twentieth-century argument, writing that

> A Eurocentric and closed model of democracy, based on a linear conception of time and progress, has the potential to justify exclusions and repression – particularly in contexts characterized by insecurities and privileges. A rigid model of global democracy may similarly contribute to escalation of violence rather than global democratization. Ethico-political judgments must always be context-sensitive […]

The chastened character of twenty-first century pacifism is apparent in a number of the chapters that make up this book. Besides Patomäki's cautionary note, there is also Sharify-Funk's insistence on the importance of a 'non-violent social hermeneutics', which entails, in Sharify-Funk's reading, 'an inclination towards humility'. We find a similar idea expressed in Nathan Funk's chapter on just peacemaking. Funk recommends an attitude of 'holy envy', which would have practitioners of one religion approach the practitioners of another religion with the conviction that their religion's truth is only partial and thus with the conviction that their religion's recipes for peace may be lacking vital ingredients.

The Christian pacifist can discover the importance of justice from the Muslim pacifist, and the Muslim pacifist can learn about the importance of forgiveness from the Christian pacifist. Instead of grounding pacifism in a strong interpretation of a religious doctrine, as a pacifist like Tolstoy did, the contemporary religious pacifist grounds his stance in the impossibility of doctrinal finality. Cawston's redefinition of pacifism, one could argue, shares that chastened stance. There is a sense in which Cawston expresses doubt about the feasibility of her own project. We are violent, she writes. We are implicated in violence in numerous ways, and ought to become aware of this; if we do so, there is at least a chance that we will reorganize society so as to make it less violent. But—and this is crucial—the chance of us waking up and reorganizing society is ever only a chance, a possibility, in Cawston's account. The idea of us being (encompassingly) implicated in the exercise of violence sounds like an echo of the concept of original sin. With both ideas, the chances of escape are limited. Both ideas warn against ethico-political triumphalism. Both ideas inspire a chastened form of pacifism. The concept of original sin would have informed medieval forms of 'suffering' pacifism. The idea that we are implicated in structures of violence, for its part, informs contemporary forms of political-yet-chastened pacifism.

11.3   About the Status of Religion in Contemporary Pacifism

Thus far we have identified four elements that the chapters of this volume, particularly those that identify with the pacifist cause, have in common. As it transpires from the contributions to this book, pacifism (1) presents its core assumption—that violence ought to be shunned—as an intuitive moral truth, (2) entails a program for political action, and thereby does not entail an attitude of resignation, (3) appraises the problem of war (and violence) more comprehensively than does just-war-thinking, its main intellectual competitor. Finally, we saw that contemporary pacifism (4) has, in an important sense, adopted an attitude of epistemic humility. It knows that the problems with which it engages are difficult to fix. It is confident in its analysis of the problem (war), but it shows itself chastened in its claim to know the solution (peace).

Thus a relatively coherent picture emerges. But this does not mean that our authors are in agreement on each and every point. If we take Ceadel's chapter as our point of departure again, one learns that pacifists have historically disagreed on a number of issues: whether to condemn *all* use of force, from which source of inspiration to draw sustenance, and which practical or policy implications to connect to the pacifist position. Of these, the second debate features most prominently in the chapters of this volume and it mainly concerns the role of religion in bringing about (or ensuring, which is not the same) a peaceful international order. It should not be surprising that many of our authors emphasize the contribution that religion has made and can still make to the pacifist cause. One reason is that the workshop that lies at the basis of the present volume was sponsored by a Jesuit institute (UCSIA) and the organizers of the workshop explicitly called for contributions about the place and interpretation of pacifism within the various 'world traditions'. A second reason, however, is that historically pacifist thought has often been fostered by religious thinkers. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century European pacifism was for the most part of Christian inspiration (but—nota bene—not necessarily nineteenth- and twentieth-century European *pacificism*). Meena Sharify-Funk's careful reconstruction of religious pacifisms in other parts of the world suggests a similar pattern. In any case, all of these chapters—Atack on Tolstoy's Christian pacifism, Sharify-Funk on pacifism in Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, Gelber on pacifism in Judaism, Funk on Stassen's ecumenical practice of just-peacemaking—suggest that the traditional religions still have a vital role to play in animating the project of pacifism. Or at least that they could play that role if they are suitably interpreted.

Against this view stands that of Heikki Patomäki, who writes in his chapter that

> [in] the desecularized world of the early 21st century, an important aspect of ethico-political identity concerns religion. The world-religions that were born during the axial age between 800 and 200 BCE and became dominant in the course of the first Millennium ACE, try to respond to the deep existential and moral questions that emerged during this period. *The problem is that these world-religions remain susceptible to generating a hardened will.* (emphasis added)

One has to be careful in interpreting what Patomäki is saying here. He is not saying that religion *cannot* be an important resource for the project of pacifism, but rather that the religions of yesteryear, so to speak, might not be the most suitable such resource. Patomäki values religion, but he expresses scepticism about the practical value of the old, 'axial age' religions, finding them too burdened by their past, too implicated in non-pacifistic politics, international and otherwise. One can interpret them in an ecumenical spirit, but those interpretations will not resonate. (Bart Dessein's chapter on past, present and future Chinese experiences—and its rather different conception of pacifism and religion—serves to underline that point.) As a consequence, Patomäki advises that we begin to think about post-axial religions and how they can contribute to a truly contemporary pacifistic project. He observes that

> [dialogical], planetary religions and philosophies thus accord with the notion of a global 'democracy-to-come'. Resultant forms of religion are unlikely to cultivate anthropomorphic conceptions of god and more likely see divinity in the mystery of being in the processes of cosmic evolution, of which we humans are part.

There is a real debate here. It does not concern the question *whether* religion has a role to play in inspiring pacifistic action and in sustaining a peaceful order. This much people agree about. And to the extent that the answer is a positive one, the agreement indicates that we may be leaving the desecularized world behind (in spite of Patomäki's use of the expression) and are living in a post-secular world instead. The disagreement rather concerns the form that religion should take in such a post-secular world for it to be able to inform contemporary pacifism fruitfully. Is it enough to cultivate 'holy envy'? Or do we need a more radical transformation of religion towards a 'planetary, post-anthropomorphic' conception of it? This is a difficult question, the complexity of which exceeds the scope of this volume. What we do find significant about the two options is that they both confirm that contemporary pacifism must be a chastened pacifism.

11.4   WHAT, ULTIMATELY, IS THE APPEAL OF PACIFISM?

Thus far we have been sketching a profile of contemporary pacifism. We have largely been discussing it on its own terms. The description, let us say, has been an 'emic' one; one that stays close to the self-description of the actors. Obviously, when a political or intellectual program describes itself, it will paint a positive picture. *What is not to like about pacifism?* And yet, as many of our authors concede, the actual appeal of pacifism has historically been limited. When Meena Sharify-Funk brings to light pacifistic strands in Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, it sometimes feels as though she has engaged in an excavation, or that she has dug up a long-dead tradition, of which it is unclear how strongly it stood in its own time. Sharify-Funk herself explicitly recognizes that 'pacifism as an absolute commitment to abstain from the use of armed force […] remains a minority position in all religio-cultural positions and an unpopular concept in many of them'. David Gelber reaches a similar conclusion in his chapter on (what he himself calls) 'minority pacifistic strands' in Judaism and Zionism, and the discussion of which he ends by observing that the experience of Nazism and the Holocaust '[rendered pacifism] marginal or irrelevant to the mainstream of Zionist opinions and endeavours up through the time of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and lasting until today'. Martin Ceadel makes a similar remark about the popularity of Christian pacifism: as early as the third century, official Christianity stopped being a pacifistic religion. 'A pacifistic Christianity,' Ceadel explains further, 'if it had survived at all, would almost certainly have remained a minor sect'. He ends his chapter on a similar note, ascribing to pacifism more generally (not just Christian pacifism) an 'assured political marginality'. When it comes to the appeal of Heikki Patomäki's *concrete utopia* of a peaceful, democratic global security community, Bart Dessein's analysis of China's rise is equally sobering. 'China's at least rhetorical return to Confucianism as well as its at least temporary halt to further democratization threaten to jeopardize the creation of a true "harmonious world".'

The conclusion seems clear enough: the appeal of pacifism was, is, and will probably remain limited. Pacifism embodies a truth (let us agree), but a truth which the majority of people does not feel compelled to live by. Pacifism embodies a truth, that is, but a truth that many people experience as either unconvincing, or as inconvenient.

Pacifism's inability to persuade people of the truth of its tenets could easily be attributed to the institutional strength of its opponents. Precisely because it is a minority faith, pacifism lacks institutional power. Its message is cancelled out by stronger voices with more airplay. Mainstream thought ridicules pacifism and distorts its message. Mainstream thought constantly repeats the charge that pacifism leaves people defenceless. In response, pacifists could insist on making a distinction between the short-run and the long-run and argue that in the long term, pacifism offers a better chance at security than does just-war-thinking. But this raises a second and rather serious problem for the pacifist. All of us live in the short term, and we need to survive the short term in order to make it to the long term. Pacifists like John Wyclif and Lev Tolstoy recognized the problem as a real conundrum, and counselled, in consequence, that the pacifist must accept that s/he may not survive. The modern pacifist does not make that argument anymore and probably s/he cannot as a result of thorough changes in cultural attitudes. With the invention of the Self, comes an ineffaceable right to self-defence. And when the pacifist accepts the right to self-defence, not just at the level of the individual person, but also at the level of the group, the community, or even the state, then the pacifist all but stops being a pacifist. If not in theory, then at least in practice, the pacifist then risks becoming indistinguishable from the just-war-theorist.

But as we mentioned, we think that the problem of inconvenience is a bigger one. Pacifism is a demanding doctrine. As Cheyney Ryan writes in his chapter, pacifism can be personal or political, but is always absolute. Or consider Cawston's demand that we should finally recognize ourselves for being the violent beings that we are. Or Sharify-Funk's reproduction of the precepts of the pacifistic Tiep Hien order, which include such rules as 'living simply' and 'not avoiding contact with suffering'. These are demanding precepts. They sound simple, but they are not, not psychologically and not in our present social environment. As with so many of the observations that we have made in this concluding chapter, Martin Ceadel has grasped the basic problem when he recounts how, during the Second World War, pacifist communities of agricultural labourers quickly disintegrated. '[Their] community experiments', he writes, 'proved to be disappointing: pacifists were for the most part too individualistic to live and work cooperatively together'.

The ideas of pacifism thus place a demand on people that many of us experience as overwhelming. Even those who accept their truth tend to shy away from living by them. The one question this leaves us with is whether a twenty-first-century 'chastened pacifism' can escape its predecessor's fate.

Note

1. Re-evaluating its tradition does not necessarily mean abandoning the tradition. John Wyclif can safely be forgotten, but with other, more mythical figures such forgetting would be inappropriate (or too much of a rhetorical loss). They need to be kept within the tradition and, to that end, their words must be re-interpreted. Compare the evolving representation of the figure of Jesus Christ. If John Wyclif still maintained that suffering violence with patience was the obvious 'advice of Christ', the modern pacifist interprets his sayings radically differently. Well-known, in his regard, is Walter Wink's (1992) interpretation of Jesus's injunction to 'turn the other cheek' as a call to active (physically non-violent) resistance.

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