Peacebuilding in the United Nations

Coming into Life

Fernando Cavalcante

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Acknowledgements

Writing a monograph is by definition a lonely endeavour. However, I learned over the course of my Ph.D. studies that doing research, despite periods of seemingly unending confinement, is an inherently social practice. It is about making sense of the world(s) in which we live by interpreting ours and others' experiences; it necessarily requires establishing dialogue and lines of communication with audiences in particular (and often in distinct) contexts; and it requires documenting our progress to ensure that others can engage with our interpretations. Published without updates five years after the conclusion of my doctoral research at the University of Coimbra (Portugal), this book represents a partial product of my social experience as a Ph.D. student and reflects the support I have received from a range of institutions and individuals during that journey.

Dozens of individuals played a direct or indirect role in the process. I am indebted to the support provided by my thesis advisor, Paula Duarte

Lopes, every step of the way. In Coimbra, Bradford and elsewhere, academics and fellow colleagues offered their friendship and constructive comments to my research at various stages, facilitated contacts and often went the extra mile to help me reach the next step. They include, among many others: Alistair Edgar, André Barrinha, Branislav Gosovic, Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, Charles Call, Christian Bueger, Fernando Ludwig, Gearoid Millar, Gilberto Oliveira, James Wanki, Jim Whitman, Johan Galtung, José Manuel Pureza, Lisa McCann, Maria João Barata, Maria Raquel Freire, Marisa Borges, Nizar Messari, Oliver Richmond, Pascoal Pereira, Pedro Pezarat Correia, Piki Ish-Shalom, Ramon Blanco, Roberta Maschietto, Roger A. Coate, Sharon Wiharta, Shepard Forman, Stefano Guzzini, Teresa Cravo, Thomas Weiss, Timothy Sisk and Vanessa Wyeth. I am also grateful to the dozens of interviewees who graciously offered their time and insights so that I could try to have a better understanding of how the United Nations (UN) worked.

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Finally, research leading to this book would have never been completed without the never-ending love, support and encouragement from my parents, my brother, my entire family and my dearest friends—whom I hope will forgive me for omitting their names to respect their privacy. And, of course, M. offered all the motivation for my application to a Ph.D. programme in the first place, as well as unfaltering inspiration and energy to complete it—which she also did by walking the entire journey with me.

Despite their gracious support, the views advanced in this book are my own and I take full responsibility for any inaccuracies, mistakes and/or omissions.

Finally, a disclaimer: I have joined the United Nations after completing the Ph.D. thesis upon which this book is based. Therefore, nothing in this book is attributable to my current position as an international civil servant. The views herein expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

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Introduction

Boutros Boutros-Ghali served as the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) between 1992 and 1996. In his memoirs, reflecting on the importance of writing in his métier, he remarked: "I knew that policy was made by the written word, that texts made things happen in the realm of high diplomacy and statecraft. Writing forces concepts into life" (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 26). As a veteran diplomat, jurist and scholar of international law and politics when he took office, Boutros-Ghali was well aware of the potential power of the written word, of texts, of concepts, in shaping the reality of world politics. This book departs from one particular concept advanced by that Egyptian diplomat to investigate how peacebuilding 'came into life' in the UN of the early 1990s and the implications of this process for the Organisation's approach to societies affected by armed conflicts.

Boutros-Ghali first advanced that concept in a report titled *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, wherein he defined peacebuilding, or more precisely 'post-conflict peacebuilding', as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 21). Since the release of the document, the concept of peacebuilding has informed international initiatives in dozens of armed conflicts and post-conflict situations.

In the UN, those actions have often, albeit not always, been carried out against the backdrop of peacekeeping operations.[1] From El Salvador (1991–1995) and Mozambique (1992–1994), to Cambodia (1991–1992) and Yugoslavia (1992–1995), to Kosovo (1999–Present) and Timor-Leste (2006–2012), UN-led peacebuilding initiatives included, but were not limited to: support to and management of electoral processes; reforms of institutions in the security sector; training of police, judges and other law enforcement officials; promotion of human rights; drafting of national laws, including constitutions; and, on occasions, the administration of the most basic services in countries and territories. As of writing, the UN has more than 20 missions, including multidimensional peacekeeping operations carrying out peacebuilding tasks and special political missions, operating all over the world. At UN headquarters in New York, the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in 2005–2006 represents the ultimate embodiment of the concept of peacebuilding in the UN. From the 'written word' contained in Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, the concept of peacebuilding has fully come into life in the UN context, that is, it has become influential to the extent of having concrete, tangible, manifestations in world politics.

My main argument in this book is that the way peacebuilding appeared and gained prominence in the context of the UN in the early 1990s had a profound and lasting influence in the Organisation's provision of support to societies affected by armed conflict, not only influencing the core meaning underlying peacebuilding in the UN but also preventing substantial changes in that meaning. Peacebuilding has come into life via a process of simplification and politicisation of academic theories about the democratic peace thesis, which holds that democratic societies rarely fight with each other (see e.g., Russett 1993; Doyle 1983a, b). In the early 1990s, a simplified and politicised interpretation of such theories gained foothold in the UN as a strong political view about the promotion, via peacebuilding, of democracies in

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[1] Herein understood as field operations deployed "to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers" (DPKO and DFS 2008: 97). Peacebuilding tasks are often, although not always, carried out by multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, which comprise a "a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace" (DPKO and DFS 2008: 97).

societies affected by armed conflict. This political view, herein dubbed the 'liberal democratic peace', has since been at the core of the concept of peacebuilding around the UN, providing the rationale and informing the structures whose interplay motivate, legitimate, justify and enact concrete initiatives in the field. As a result of the influence of the liberal democratic peace, UN peacebuilding initiatives in the field have been remarkably concerned with "democratization and marketization" since the early 1990s (Paris 2004: 19; see also Mac Ginty 2006: 45). At headquarters, the functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, whose establishment in 2005–2006 may be seen as an attempt to solve some of the inconsistencies of the liberal democratic peace underlying the UN approach to peacebuilding, has not yet necessarily provoked deep structural changes to that meaning—that is, changes at the ideational and material dimensions of the UN relating to peacebuilding. Rather, the three entities have often replicated and reinforced the liberal democratic peace, which attests to its profound and lasting influence in the Organisation.

Examining how peacebuilding has come into life and the implications of this process to the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict is both significant and interesting for two reasons. First, because it provides another illustration of the power of non-material aspects (e.g. ideas, concepts, theories, norms, worldviews) in shaping and being shaped by social reality in general and world politics in particular. Analyses on the role of ideas in world politics, at least until the mid-1990s, had been largely neglected in the field of International Relations (IR) (Woods 1995: 164). Whereas the interest of scholars on the role of ideas in world politics has since flourished (see, e.g., Chwieroth 2010; Jolly et al. 2009; Rushton 2008; Mandelbaum 2002; Philpott 2001; Emmerij et al. 2001; Brooks and Wohlforth 2000–2001; Checkel 1997; Goldstein and Keohane 1993),[2] only a few have engaged comprehensively with the trajectory of the concept of peacebuilding in the specific context of the UN (see Jenkins 2013). This book thus

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[2] In what concerns the UN, a particularly interesting initiative on the influence of ideas in world politics was the UN Intellectual History Project, which produced 17 studies over a period of more than 10 years focusing on different social and economic ideas connected with the Organisation. A summary with some conclusions of the project was published as Jolly et al. (2005). In IR, the recent attention to the role of ideas in world politics is linked with the development of constructivism, a theoretical framework further explored in the following chapter.

addresses an understudied case of the influence of concepts in international organisations in general and in the UN in particular.

Second, because the analysis herein carried out presents an apparently underexplored vantage point to study the limits and shortcomings of UN peacebuilding. Scholars from different traditions and with different purposes have long highlighted the UN mixed results keeping and building peace, particularly via multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations encompassing peacebuilding tasks (e.g., Richmond and Franks 2009; Berdal and Economides 2007; Durch 1993a, 1996, 2006; MacQueen 2006; Dobbins et al. 2005; Paris 2004; Boulden 2001; Cousens et al. 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Those studies, however, have generally examined the UN approach to peacebuilding either by highlighting the mismatch between the goals and the actual implementation of specific initiatives, or by focusing on the inability of peacebuilders to create the conditions for sustainable peace. In both cases, the analyses were produced from the perspective of developments taking place in the field,[3] that is, where peacebuilding initiatives were concretely carried out. This book, however, takes a step back and explores the limits and shortcomings of UN peacebuilding departing from the analysis of the underlying features associated with the conceptualisation and design of peacebuilding strategies and policies in the first place. Spatially, this book thus shifts the site of analysis from the field to UN headquarters in New York. Whereas not claiming that it is better or worse, more or less important, to focus on one place or the other, this book suggests that more complementarity is needed between analyses situated in multiple sites of relevance to contemporary peacebuilding.

This book examines how the UN has conceived and envisioned peacebuilding programmes and actions over a period of more than 20 years, looking into the interplay between concepts and practices of peacebuilding and their concrete manifestations in distinct historical contexts. This approach enables the book to uncover and expose underlying assumptions about world politics that are often replicated and/or simply taken for granted in and around the United Nations in the realm of peacebuilding, as well as to explore how such assumptions influence

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[3] Given their focus on developments in the field, it is puzzling that some of those studies overemphasised desk research over in loco first-hand observation. Compare, for instance, the heavy reliance on fieldwork found in Richmond and Franks (2009) with the statistical methodology adopted by Doyle and Sambanis (2000).

concrete initiatives undertaken by the Organisation at the field level. The ensuing chapters propose a theoretically informed narrative about the coming into life of peacebuilding and its implications for the development of peacebuilding policies and programmes in the Organisation from the late 1980s and early 1990s to the early 2010s, when research leading to this book was concluded. In constructing this narrative, the book explores the limits of the liberal democratic peace framework since its origins in the UN and brings its analysis straight to the site where peacebuilding policies and programmes are contemporarily envisioned in the Organisation, most particularly the PBC and PBSO. At the same time, this narrative opens the black box of international organisations by delving into the daily functioning of the UN Secretariat, thus highlighting the importance of non-material aspects, bureaucratic structures and the agency of purposive individuals in shaping the UN conceptualisation and practices in peacebuilding.

The Scholarly Contribution

This book offers two contributions to contemporary scholarship on peacebuilding. First, it sheds new light into the origins of the concept of peacebuilding in the UN, particularly as defined in *An Agenda for Peace*. Second, it uses insights produced by the critique of the liberal peace scholarship to examine the establishment and functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF from the perspective of developments taking place inside the UN.

The Origins of the Concept of Peacebuilding in the United Nations

Whereas Boutros-Ghali was responsible for bringing the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding to the political debate in the UN in 1992, the origins of the academic concept of peacebuilding are usually associated with the tradition of the Nordic school of peace studies. In specialised circles, it is common to attribute the first mention of the term and concept to a book chapter published by Johan Galtung in 1976— although the chapter is the expanded version of an article published the year before. The relationship between both concepts, however, seems unexplored in the academic literature, which has not delved into much detail on the historical origins of Boutros-Ghali's concept or on whether Galtung's concept might have indeed gained foothold in the

Organisation in the specific context of the 1990s.[4] In engaging with such an underexplored matter, this research sheds light into how *An Agenda for Peace* and its concept of peacebuilding were conceived in the particular context of the UN in the early 1990s, while at the same time identifying the academic roots of post-conflict peacebuilding.

There seems to be two contending views about the origins of peacebuilding in the UN. The first holds that the concept is a brainchild of Boutros-Ghali, unrelated to Galtung's earlier writings. Charles-Philippe David leaves no doubt about the authorship of peacebuilding when remarking that the "recognised origin of the concept is found in the 1992 and 1995 editions of *An Agenda for Peace*, proposed by then-UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali" (David 2002: 20). Also supporting this view, Karns contends that the concept of peacebuilding was carved in a moment of "conceptual epiphany" by the Secretary-General during a "trip to South America in April [1992]" (Karns 2012: 72). This view seems to be partially corroborated by Jenkins, who writes that "Boutros-Ghali was reported to have first uttered the words [post-conflict peacebuilding] at 30,000 feet, en route to examine progress on various Central American peace accords" (Jenkins 2013: 19). Naturally, Boutros-Ghali himself claimed the authorship of the concept on a few occasions, stating that "[he] developed […] this new concept of *peace building*, which is not included in the Charter, that means consolidation, or construction, of peace" (Boutros-Ghali 2002: 72; see also Boutros-Ghali 1999: 26–27; UNIHP 2007a: 38).

The second view, on the other hand, holds that Boutros-Ghali's post-conflict peacebuilding is connected with the original academic concept advanced within the tradition of peace studies. According to Ramsbotham,

> [d]rawing on this tradition, but narrowing it so that it applied specifically to post-war reconstruction, the UN Secretary-General distinguished 'post-conflict peacebuilding' from pre-conflict 'preventive diplomacy' in

[4] Karns (2012) is a notable exception, as she uses the concept of peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace* as a case study to analyse the agency, autonomy and leadership of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat in world politics. I only came across her research, in the format of an undated working paper, as I was finalising my own research. Some of the sources in her chapter were also used in this book; some of the individuals Karns and I interviewed are the same.

his June 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, while retaining the original contrast between peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peacemaking. (Ramsbotham 2000: 171)

Trenkov-Wermuth also argues that Boutros-Ghali's concept of peacebuilding is "entirely inspired by Galtung and it builds on his term, both in terms of the phraseology, as well as in terms of its underlying idea and aims" (Trenkov-Wermuth 2007: 44). Other writings, both academic and policy-oriented, have also implied or referred to this connection, as if Boutros-Ghali's concept stemmed directly from Galtung's (e.g., Ponzio 2011: footnote 1 of Introduction; Väyrynen 2010: 139; PBSO 2010: 5; Chetail 2009: 2; Call and Wyeth 2008: 4; Call and Cook 2003: 235; Richmond 2002: footnote 5 of Ch. 5; Pugh 1995: 321). Whereas those writings usually identify similarities and differences between the two concepts in terms of content, they rarely address the actual process through which one may have influenced the other.

This book engages with those two views by conducting an in-depth analysis not only of the meaning of the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace*, but also of the conditions under which the report was conceived. Based on the analysis of unpublished and archival documents, it constructs a narrative recreating the process of its drafting and showing that the concept of peacebuilding came out influenced by internal discussions of senior officials in Boutros-Ghali's cabinet. Over the course of this research, it emerged that some members of that team, including Boutros-Ghali himself, knew Galtung and were familiar with his work. Moreover, *An Agenda for Peace* addressed not only peacebuilding, but also peacekeeping and peacemaking, as in Galtung (1976), thus leading to the tempting conclusion that both concepts are indeed related. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis of the drafting process and the meaning behind the labels of 'peacebuilding' in the two concepts reveals rather different connotations, with Boutros-Ghali's version being much narrower, restricted to the post-conflict phase and closely informed and/or inspired by research on the democratic peace thesis being produced in the United States (US) at the time. The two concepts hence seem to be interrelated only to the extent that they share the same label of 'peacebuilding', with their substantial content varying significantly.

In carrying out this analysis and showing that the content of Galtung's and Boutros-Ghali's concepts varies remarkably, this book

contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the construction of the meaning of peacebuilding and its underlying assumptions in the UN of the early 1990s. Furthermore, since its research is supported by the analysis of several unpublished documents, this book contributes to recasting a new light into the historical process leading to an oft-quoted definition of peacebuilding in and around the UN.

Connecting the Liberal Peace and the Peacebuilding Architecture

The second contribution of this book is to depart from insights produced by the so-called 'critique of the liberal peace' to examine the establishment and functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. This critique has produced a range of works challenging key assumptions and inconsistencies of the liberal (democratic) peace, highlighting several inherent problems and shortcomings of contemporary peacebuilding.[5] For instance, by identifying liberal internationalism as its core paradigm, Paris contended that contemporary peacebuilding efforts were working towards the globalisation of "a particular model of domestic governance—liberal market democracy—from the core to the periphery of the international system" (Paris 2002: 638). Richmond has explored the implications of that paradigm in shaping the type of peace actually achieved by (liberal democratic) peacebuilding interventions in situations such as Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Cambodia (Richmond and Franks 2009; Richmond 2005). He has similarly explored issues such as the resistance of local populations to externally driven frameworks and indigenous processes of peace formation that counterbalance liberal peacebuilding (Richmond 2011, 2013). The critique of the liberal peace has contributed to evince the state-centric nature and Western liberal bias of contemporary peacebuilding, as well as to recover invisible forms of subjectivity and agency generally left out of externally-led peacebuilding frameworks—including inter alia subnational actors and marginalised

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[5] For good references, see, among many others, the works of Richmond (2002, 2004a, b, 2005, 2011, 2013), Roberts (2011), Mac Ginty (2006, 2011), Chandler (2006, 2010), Richmond and Franks (2009), Duffield (2001, 2007), Pugh (1995, 2005) and Paris (1997, 2002, 2004). For good edited volumes exploring crosscutting themes or case studies, see, for instance, Campbell et al. (2011), Tadjbakhsh (2011), Richmond (2010), Newman et al. (2009b), and Pugh et al. (2008). For literature reviews, see, for instance, Chandler (2011), Paris (2010), and Cooper (2007).

groups such as women, youth and indigenous populations. As a whole, the critique of the liberal peace has contributed to highlighting a core problem in contemporary peacebuilding: that "under the guise of universalising Western liberal frameworks of democracy and the market, the needs and interests of those subject to intervention are often ignored, resulting in the maintenance of inequalities and conflicts and undermining the asserted goals of external interveners" (Chandler 2011: 174).

Despite its breadth and depth, the critique of the liberal peace has more often explored the inconsistencies and problems of contemporary peacebuilding from the perspective of implications and developments in the sites where peacebuilding policies and initiatives are implemented (that is, in 'the field'), usually not engaging to the same extent with those aspects from the perspective of political dynamics in and around UN headquarters, where most of the Secretariat's thinking and approach to the problematic is conceptualised. Moreover, the critique has rarely engaged with the establishment and functioning of the more recent PBC and associated entities. Most of the studies on those organs have largely focused on descriptive analyses of their formats and configurations, mandates and institutional assessments, often neglecting broader issues related to the internal inconsistencies or power discrepancies associated with the liberal peace framework that underlies contemporary peacebuilding.

The PBC, PBSO and PBF were established in the UN in 2005–2006 following more directly a recommendation contained in the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 263). Together, they are often referred to as the UN 'peacebuilding architecture', a label that may be misleading given the existence of institutional structures dealing with peacebuilding prior to their establishment. The first writings on those three entities appeared right after the release of the Panel's report. Produced in 2005–2006, such analyses were mostly policy-oriented, with a focus on the description of the political and institutional processes that had led to the creation of the three organs, their mandates and functions, as well as recommendations, prospects for functioning and/or partial assessments of their early activities (see, e.g., Security Council Report 2006; Ponzio 2005; Almqvist 2005; Forman 2005; CSIS 2005; Lidén and Eneström 2005; Schneckener and Weinlich 2005). The primarily descriptive and prospective character of those early writings largely reflect the broader context in which they were produced, when concrete recommendations

from the Panel's report were still under the scrutiny of the UN Secretariat and member states—at this stage, a commission for peace-building was in practice a 'work in progress'.

A few years later, exploring the origins and the process leading to the establishment of the PBC, Lisa McCann analysed the creation of the PBC as a case of global public policy, identifying the proposal of a Strategic Recovery Facility (SRF) as the "direct precursor" of the PBC (McCann 2012: 81) and exploring how purposive individuals contributed to bring that proposal to the political agenda of the UN around 2004. Salomons, one of the authors of the original SRF proposal, goes further back in time and connects the earlier seeds of the PBC as we know it with the process leading to the establishment of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1960s and 1970s. According to him, the PBC may be seen as part of the evolving extension of the UN development activities towards states in transition (Salomons 2010: 196). In both analyses, the Commission and the associated PBSO and PBF are perceived to emerge as part of a gradual process that sought to overcome concrete problems identified with peacebuilding, particularly the lack of coordination among global peacebuilding actors. McCann and Salomons provide insightful information on the origins of the new UN institutional arrangement, but they do not engage with questions related to broader topics in world politics, such as the potential connections between those entities and underlying norms and representations of global order.

Roland Paris' analysis on the origins and early workings of the PBC, PBSO and PBF points out how certain peacebuilding challenges, such as the "coordination problem", has on occasions become a "catch-all for deeper disagreements and uncertainties over the strategy and purposes of peacebuilding" (Paris 2009: 60). The author does not deny that lack of coordination is a cause of severe problems for contemporary peacebuilding at several levels (Paris 2009: 56). He notes, however, that there is "something peculiar" (Paris 2009: 58) about the extent to which claims for better coordination are often assumed to solve and overcome such deeper disagreements, rightly claiming that too many issues have been misplaced under the rubric of 'lack of coordination'. In the process leading to the establishment of the PBC, for instance, negotiations were frequently marked by overwhelmingly technical and procedural issues that hid deeper tensions and problems, which oftentimes obscured the "highly political—and contentious—core" of the challenges associated with peacebuilding (Paris 2009: 60).

The overemphasis on technical and procedural issues throughout the process becomes all the more apparent if one analyses the inter-governmental negotiations preceding the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. Two insider accounts are provided by John Bolton (2007: esp. 220–245), Permanent Representative of the US to the UN in 2005–2006, and by Gilda Neves (2009: esp. 119–150), diplomat in the Mission of Brazil to the UN who covered the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the creation of the three entities.[6] The analysis of both accounts reveals that the final format and configuration of the Commission and the associated entities more often reflected political and diplomatic imperatives of member states in New York than the concerns of the recipients of peacebuilding in the field. Berdal's portrayal of this process as the "rise and fall of a good idea", hence, does not seem exaggerated (Berdal 2008b: 356).

As those organs started to operate, other analyses focused on different aspects and advanced distinct arguments about the workings and impact of the PBC, PBSO and PBF (e.g., Jenkins 2013, 2008; Olonisakin and Ikpe 2012; Bellamy 2010; Bueger 2010; Otobo 2010; Paris 2009; Berdal 2009: 135–169; Scott 2008; CIC and IPI 2008; Spernbauer 2008; Ponzio 2007; Wegter 2007; Miall 2007; Chesterman 2005; Stahn 2005). Some analysts followed the workings of the PBC focusing on specific countries in the agenda for the Commission. Forman et al. (2010), Iro (2009), Street et al. (2008), Lambourne (2008), and ActionAid et al. (2007), for instance, carried out field-based analyses of the PBC performance in Burundi and Sierra Leone, the first two countries included on the Commission's agenda. Most of such analyses have failed to engage with the scholarship produced by the critique of the liberal peace or to seriously engage on broader questions related to world order. A notable exception is a book chapter produced by Caplan and Ponzio, who explored some of the normative underpinnings of the Commission in its first years of functioning. In their analysis, they contend that the "promotion of liberal democracy and marked-oriented economic reforms has been a centrepiece" in the Commission's efforts to engage with the countries in its agenda (Caplan and Ponzio 2011: 189).

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[6] See also Traub (2006: esp. 359–398), who accompanied Annan on several occasions during this period and describes important events in the run-up to the 2005 World Summit.

In 2010, Roland Paris coordinated a research project focusing on several aspects of the so-called 'peacebuilding architecture'. Some of the project's papers focused on the institutional configuration of the three entities (Tschirgi 2010), their current operational mechanisms (Aning and Lartey 2010) and, although to varying degree, on potential alternatives to strengthen their political and institutional roles (de Coning 2010; Jenkins 2010; McAskie 2010). In a particularly interesting paper, Biersteker and Jütersonke reviewed what some IR theories might contribute to the understanding of the origins of the organs and "their operational dynamics, their challenges, their constraints, their pathologies, and their realistic possibilities" (Biersteker and Jütersonke 2010: 5). Eli Stamnes (2010), in turn, offered some suggestions on how those entities could benefit from the work thus far produced by the liberal peace critique, which makes her work stand out as another exception among studies on the PBC, PBSO and PBF at the time.

More recently, Jenkins (2013) has engaged more extensively with the internal functioning and activities of those entities. To a great extent, Jenkins' book is similar to this one, particularly as we both understand the concept of peacebuilding as a driving force behind recent developments in the UN bureaucratic structures (such as the very creation of the PBC, PBSO and PBF). In addition, we both carried out our research based on direct observation and interpretation of events and developments at UN headquarters (Jenkins worked in the PBSO for a few months in 2010), and we both relied on first-hand interviews and internal UN documents to support our analyses. There are, however, significant differences between Jenkin's and this book. In terms of focus and scope, the weight of Jenkins' analysis is on the so-called 'peacebuilding architecture': he generally looks into the influence of the concept of peacebuilding in leading to its establishment, shaping its format and driving its workings. In this book, my main concern is with the concept of peacebuilding itself and its trajectory in the UN: I provide a continuous narrative (albeit one that is not necessarily linear and straightforward, nor that is to be taken as definitive) connecting the period when peacebuilding gained foothold in the UN, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the workings of the PBC and associated entities until the early 2010s. This element of continuity enables an analysis of the influence of the concept of peacebuilding in driving concrete policy outcomes in the UN throughout the 1990s and until the first few years following the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF.

The single major difference between both works, however, is that this book departs from the scholarship produced by the critique of the liberal peace to offer insights on both the 'coming into life' and the implications of this process to the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict. Whereas Jenkins (2013: 4, 26) only briefly refers to the critique of the liberal peace or to the notion of liberal peacebuilding, they both constitute the key objects of analysis in this book. In addition, this book seeks to uncover and identify underlying assumptions about world politics that are replicated and/or simply taken for granted in and around the UN in what concerns peacebuilding. My analysis, as such, is firmly based on a critical, rather than on a problem-solving approach to peacebuilding (see Pugh 2004; Bellamy 2004).

In sum, studies on the workings of the PBC, PBSO and PBF have thus far mostly focused on descriptions about their establishment and functioning. Fewer analyses, however, have delved into issues such as the normative underpinnings that led to the establishment of those organs in the first place, or on whether and how their workings may relate to broader representations of global order and norms. The literature on the PBC, PBSO and PBF, in other words, has been more often informed by problem-solving than by critical approaches. By the same token, critical scholars have largely focused their analyses of peacebuilding initiatives and power disparities reproduced in the field, but they have not always elaborated on those aspects from the perspective of political dynamics inside and around UN headquarters, where UN-led peacebuilding initiatives are conceptualised and designed in the first place. By focusing on the New York-based implications of the 'coming into life' of the concept of peacebuilding in the UN, this book thus establishes a dialogue between those two strands of scholarship, potentially facilitating a broader dialogue between students of international organisations and peacebuilding scholars.

On the Influence of Ideational Aspects on World Politics

Studying how the concept of peacebuilding gained life and its subsequent trajectory in the UN is only possible if one embraces the importance of ideational, non-material aspects in shaping policymaking and its outcomes in world politics. In IR, this understanding has been pushed forward perhaps most notably by social constructivism (or, more simply,

constructivism), an approach mainly concerned with the construction of social reality in general and world politics in particular (see, e.g., Ish-Shalom 2006a; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Paris 2003; Hopf 2002; Reus-Smit 2001; Guzzini 2000; Wendt 1992, 1999; Weldes 1996, 1999; Ruggie 1998a; Kubálková et al. 1998; Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Onuf 1989, 1998; Checkel 1997; Adler 1997; Klotz 1995; Kratochwil 1989).

Conventional IR theories, especially those within the traditions of realism and liberalism, whilst subscribing to the tenets of positivism, have largely explained phenomena in world politics as highly dependent upon an individualistic understanding of material resources such as military capabilities or economic wealth. For instance, in his chef-d'œuvre, Kenneth Waltz (1979: esp. 79–101) uses an analogy with microeconomic theories to depict an international system (structure) that is constituted by units (states) behaving according to their capabilities in order to serve their own interests. In theories such as Waltz's neorealism, world politics is thus seen as mostly made of "behavioral responses to the forces of physics that act on material objects from the outside" (Adler 1997: 321).

Theories informed by constructivism, on the other hand, adopt a more sociologically-informed perspective to challenge the materialist assumptions underlying 'traditional' IR theories. They reduce the weight of material aspects and emphasise that the 'reality' of world politics is not exogenously given, but rather constructed by a combination of material aspects and meanings (non-material, ideational aspects) about reality that are shared by social agents. In those theories, non-material aspects are often discussed in terms of, for instance, norms (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995), identity (e.g., Hopf 2002; Wendt 1999), culture (e.g., Paris 2003; Inayatullah and Blaney 1996; Katzenstein 1996), rules (e.g., Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989) and theories (e.g., Ish-Shalom 2013). Within this understanding, the *social* dimension of world politics acquires a particular significance, as it is within this context that specific meanings become shared—i.e. they become intersubjective to such an extent that they are simply taken for granted—and provide actors with collective understandings about themselves and others that will influence their own courses of action.

Piki Ish-Shalom (2006a, 2013) offers a theoretical model to explain the potential influence of social science theories (which may be generically understood as one kind of idea) in policy outcomes and

political practice. According to the author, this influence occurs via a hermeneutical mechanism that converts those theories into simplified and politicised views in the public domains outside academe; in other words, that converts one kind of discourse, eminently academic and theoretical, into a simplified and politicised discourse in public spheres (Ish-Shalom 2013: esp. 14–38). Once those discourses are converted, simplified and politicised, they may shape individuals' understandings of world politics and consequently frame their choice of specific courses of political action. Given their potential to do so, social science theories, reformulated as social constructs by Ish-Shalom, thus have the potential to shape social reality and influence concrete policy outcomes. Whereas Ish-Shalom uses his theory to explore Israel's policies towards the Oslo peace accords and the US approach to democracy promotion in the Middle East, I use his theory in the context of the international organisation par excellence, the UN.

Based on constructivist tenets about the social construction of reality and the influence of ideational aspects (such as concepts) in world politics, I address the 'coming into life' of peacebuilding in the UN and the subsequent implications of this process to the Organisation's approach to societies affected by armed conflict. This process, as theorised in Chapter 3, took place gradually as academic theories on the democratic peace thesis were simplified and politicised via a hermeneutical mechanism that resulted, in UN circles in the early 1990s, in a strong political view about the promotion of democracies to societies affected by armed conflict. This strong political view became the main framework through which individuals in UN circles understood peacebuilding and consequently shaped their choices of specific courses of action in that realm. Consequently, this strong political view (a simplified and politicised version of theories about the democratic peace) has served to legitimate, justify, motivate and enact UN concepts and practices in peacebuilding since the early 1990s. In order to highlight the prolonged influence of that political view on UN concepts and practices in peacebuilding, I delve into the establishment and workings of the PBC, PBSO and PBF in New York around the mid-2000s.

To take seriously constructivist tenets about the construction of social reality and the influence of ideational aspects in policy outcomes and political actions, this book is based on a "sobjectivist-with-an-O methodology" (Pouliot 2007: 367; see esp. 364–368). This methodological approach is theoretically justified since it reflects constructivism's

premise that the meanings of ideational aspects (such as the concept of peacebuilding) are not fixed, and since it enables the identification of the precise space and time wherein different meanings are produced. Put differently, a sobjectivist methodology is best suited for this analysis due to its capacity to develop both subjective and objective knowledge about social reality. Based on a sobjectivist methodology, this book presents a theoretically informed and contextually located narrative about how peacebuilding came into life in the UN and the implications of this process for the Organisation's approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. Multiple methods were used and combined to gather and interpret the information required, and to produce the final narrative presented in the following chapters. Those methods included participant observation of the workings of the UN in New York; qualitative semi-structured interviews with individuals directly involved in key processes and dynamics herein analysed; content analysis, documental and archival research, used to both collect and analyse written texts; and the construction of a main narrative that allows for the apprehension of the argument herein sustained.

Book Outline

The remainder of the book is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying this research, which are influenced by constructivism due to its emphasis on the study of world politics as a reflection of not only material but also ideational aspects. In reviewing the origins of constructivism in IR and exploring the implications of assuming reality as socially constructed, this chapter provides the basis for analysing the influence of ideational aspects in social reality in general and world politics in particular. As constructivism is herein understood as a set of social science tenets for the study of world politics, the chapter also presents a theory about how social science theories may influence policy outcomes and political action in world politics via a hermeneutical mechanism that attaches meaning to political concepts (Ish-Shalom 2006a, 2013).

The framework for the analysis herein carried out is elaborated in Chapter 3, which outlines the main questions to be addressed and provides an analytical 'toolkit' for answering them. After defining precisely the core elements analysed in the book, namely the liberal peace framework and the concept of peacebuilding, the chapter theorises about the dynamics that contribute to understanding how the latter came into life

influenced by the former in the context of the UN, as well as the implications of this process for the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. Finally, the methodological strategy adopted for the proposed analysis is also articulated in this chapter, according to the understanding that constructivist-inspired research should develop both subjective and objective knowledge about social reality.

Chapters 4 through 6 explore how peacebuilding gained life in the context of the UN, shedding light into how a particular meaning of peacebuilding, that of liberal democratic peacebuilding, was constructed and became minimally intelligible in and around the UN. In Chapters 4 and 5, I explore the meaning that would be associated with peacebuilding in the UN in the early 1990s by contending that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as a hermeneutical mechanism that attaches meanings to concepts and that may potentially drive political action (Ish-Shalom 2006a, 2013). The two chapters analyse the functioning of this mechanism by creating a narrative on the migration of theories about the democratic peace thesis from academe to public spheres, and on the subsequent simplification and politicisation of such theories in and around the UN. Simplified and politicised, a particular understanding of theories about the democratic peace was eventually embodied in a key UN document at the time: Boutros-Ghali's report *An Agenda for Peace*. The document essentially articulated a political view about the promotion of democratic procedures in post-armed conflict situations via peacebuilding. In order to capture this process, Chapters 4 and 5 explore in detail the drafting of Boutros-Ghali's report, highlighting how this politicised version of a social science theory was eventually incorporated in the document and subsequently in the UN lexicon.

In Chapter 6, I explore how that specific meaning of peacebuilding became generally accepted in and around the UN, subsequently serving as the main framework through which individuals understood and conceptualised peacebuilding. I contend that this occurred via the gradual assimilation of the meaning of peacebuilding pushed forward in *An Agenda for Peace* in the constitutive dimensions of the UN, both ideational and material. In the ideational dimension, concepts and ideas related to liberal democratic peacebuilding were pushed forward rhetorically both in oral statements and in relevant UN documents. In the material dimension, bureaucratic structures were created and/or modified based on the assumptions of the liberal democratic peace. While offering an overview of peacebuilding initiatives concretely carried out

by the UN in the field between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s, this chapter also starts to analyse some of the implications associated with how peacebuilding came into life in the UN.

Chapters 7 and 8 focus on some of the implications associated with liberal democratic peacebuilding for the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflicts. Following the proposal to focus on developments taking place where peacebuilding policies and initiatives are conceptualised and designed in the first place, the two chapters seek for traces of the liberal democratic peace in the establishment and functioning of the so-called 'peacebuilding architecture', which encompasses the PBC, PBSO and PBF, to ascertain its continued influence in the UN approach to peacebuilding more than 20 years after the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*. The three entities are discussed as a response to some of the challenges and problems associated with liberal democratic peacebuilding, such as repeated failures to avoid relapses into armed conflict or the need to more actively involve local civil society actors. The two chapters show, however, that the establishment and the functioning of those three entities have provoked little substantial changes in the area due to the continued influence of the liberal democratic peace in and around the UN. As a result of such continued influence, the functioning of those entities has often contributed instead to reproducing and replicating the liberal democratic peace framework that informs the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding.

The conclusion summarises the proposed analysis and recovers the main argument of this research study, highlighting some of its academic and policy implications.

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On the Influence of Ideational
Aspects in World Politics

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the broader theoretical framework informing this research study: social constructivism or, simply, constructivism. The standing of constructivism in International Relations (IR) is not uncontested. While there seems to be an overall agreement that constructivism opposes rationalism on ontological grounds (Katzenstein et al. 1998: esp. 670–678), some depict constructivism as a *via media* between different epistemological approaches: between "rationalists" and "adherents of interpretive epistemologies" (Adler 1997: 319), or between "positivists" and "post-positivists" (Wendt 1999: 38–40), for instance. These apparently divergent positions, which exist even among IR theorists inclined towards constructivism, demonstrate that speaking of constructivism in that field of studies entails different meanings and understandings at different levels. I use this chapter to clearly outline the understanding of constructivism that sets the theoretical basis for this book.

In the following section, I start the discussion by offering an account of the origins of constructivism in the field of IR. Constructivism was initially developed in other areas of inquiry within social sciences, but a conjunction of factors converging around the 1980s led IR scholars to resort to constructivism, amongst other theoretical frameworks, when striving to elaborate more critical readings of phenomena in world politics. With a basic understanding about its origins, the second section delves into

a discussion of what constructivism generally is all about: a set of social theory tenets providing helpful insights for the study of social relations in general and world politics in particular. In that section, I also elaborate on the ontological and epistemological implications of assuming something as socially constructed for IR theories. As constructivism thus understood is not an IR theory per se, but rather a set of tenets informing specific theories, the third section presents Piki Ish-Shalom's theory about how social science theories may influence political outcomes in world politics. By analysing what happens if and when such a potential is materialised (that is, if and when the hermeneutical mechanism is completed), the following chapter presents the research framework that allows for a discussion on how the concept of peacebuilding gained life and its implications for the United Nations approach to societies affected by armed conflict.

The Origins of Constructivism in IR

At the outset, I stress that what follows is not the only possible account of the origins of constructivism in this particular field of studies.[1] Nor do I claim that this narrative accounts for all the views or represents every single IR theorist interested in constructivism. Rather, this section builds upon some of the more broadly accepted meanings absorbed by constructivism in IR to offer a plausible and consistent—though not single and dominant—reading of constructivism as a broader social theory with relevant insights into the theoretical framework underlying this research.

Constructivism per se is not a direct product of theorising in IR, but a social science approach developed in other fields of studies—such as philosophy (Fierke and Jørgensen 2001: 4–5), social theory (Onuf 1989: 37), biology and sociology (Kratochwil 2000: 74)—whose insights have later been incorporated into IR theories and the study of world politics. The term constructivism itself is usually said to have been introduced in IR scholarship by Nicholas Onuf in his *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations.*[2] In the book, Onuf relied heavily on Wittgenstein's theories about language and Giddens' structuration theory to develop his own understanding of constructivism

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[1] The ensuing narrative mainly builds upon Jørgensen (2010: esp. 155–164), Kratochwil (2001), Fierke and Jørgensen (2001), Guzzini (2000), and Price and Reus-Smit (1998).

[2] To the best of my knowledge, the best overview of and engagement with Onuf's reading of constructivism in IR is found in Zehfuss (2002: 151–195).

and thus propose a reconstruction of the "self-consciously organized field of study" of IR (Onuf 1989: 1). According to Onuf (1989: 7), the field had thus far been remarkably influenced from the beginning by Morgenthau's concern with clashes of power and interest, as well as his devotion to positivist scientific inquiry (see Morgenthau 2006).[3] Onuf's rejection of Morgenthau's views would hence directly influence his robust attempt to 'reconstruct' IR.

Onuf's engagement with constructivism and his attempt to use it in the field of IR, however, cannot be dissociated from broader trends in social sciences and the study of world politics. Indeed, the debut of constructivism in IR, as well as the engagement of IR theorists in either supporting or rejecting the 'new' approach, seems to have been facilitated by three factors, both external and internal to that particular field of studies. Externally, those factors refer to the idea of 'reflexive modernity' and to the theoretical implications of the end of the cold war for IR scholarship (Guzzini 2000; Price and Reus-Smit 1998). The former points to Ulrich Beck's conception of modernity as a still open and on-going—rather than an already accomplished—project of the European Renaissance. According to some, this project "is understood as the belief that, with its technical capacities, humankind can assure never ending progress" (Guzzini 2000: 151). Such technical capacities were boosted in early modern Europe by the Industrial Revolution and would have an important effect in well-known developments in a number of areas of human activities, from trade relations to political institutions to scientific knowledge. Those changes were so profound that they would lead to the emergence of an industrial—as opposed to feudal—society in Europe from the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries onwards.[4] In the beginning of the twentieth century, however, some gradually started to become conscious about the fact that "the increase of individual and social power was not matched by any increase in moral certitudes" (Guzzini 2000: 152), leading to critiques of modernity and its belief in never-ending progress. As those critiques grew, some—the so-called post-moderns—demanded abandoning modernity entirely and moving beyond it.

[3]Contemporary scholars, however, do not necessarily equate Morgenthau's defence of scientific inquiry with positivism; see, e.g., Ish-Shalom (2006b) and Bain (2000).

[4]For a good overview of this process, see Toulmin (1992: esp. 45–137).

Instead of abandoning it, however, Beck proposed a re-assessment of modernity, for he believed that modernity had been misinterpreted as an accomplished project due to a straightforwardly assumed link with the industrial society (Beck 1992: 10). As a result of that misinterpretation, he continued, critiques against that particular form of social organisation had also been quickly directed to modernity itself—hence, it appeared as if modernity was an already accomplished project. By proposing an assessment of modernity rather as an open project, and thus disconnecting it from the industrial society, Beck suggested that modernity had recently reached a new stage: a reflexive one. As such, he posed that "*[j]ust as modernization [had] dissolved the structure of feudal society in the nineteenth century and produced the industrial society, modernization [was then] dissolving industrial society and another modernity [was] coming into being*" (Beck 1992: 10; emphasis in the original). Modernity, hence, had turned against itself and became reflexive (Guzzini 2000: 152–153); and since modernity affected social sciences—and, of course, IR—so did this reflexive 'other modernity'.

The entrance of constructivism in IR should be understood in that context. According to Guzzini, when IR scholars in the early twentieth century realised that the European 'international society'—as in the English School's concept—was simply one society in the midst of others, they could no longer assume their own rules as "universally shared" (Guzzini 2000: 153). With the appearance of the so-called 'third world' into the panorama of world politics, the European perspective of international politics was deeply affected, making it impossible to "overlook the fact that the international system was ruled in a way which had little to do with [modern] liberal principles, and that the story of economic progress had forgotten several parts of the world" (Guzzini 2000: 153). As such, Western social science—including IR—started to look into itself in search of "redefinitions of its own and hence [of] others' identity" (Guzzini 2000: 153). This broader critique of the modernity project and its related assumptions about scientificity, rationality and progress were decisive in shaping a number of post-modern social theories in the late twentieth century—including post-modernists in social sciences and IR. It is within this context of critiques against mainstream theories in social sciences that Onuf's attempt to 'reconstruct' the field of IR may be understood. In fact, in *World of Our Making*, he proposed constructivism as a "place to begin" (Onuf 1989: 40) theorising that aimed at moving beyond the positivist, rationalist and empiricist assumptions underlying theorising in IR at least since Morgenthau.

The second external factor in this account are the theoretical implications associated with the end of the cold war, with the subsequent peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union. These events acquire particular relevance for any account of the origins of constructivism because they set the stage for fierce criticisms of the explanatory power of the dominant positivist IR theories, most notably those associated with the realist tradition, which had seemed to represent world politics well enough during the cold war. To be fair, scholars had already presented several concerns about the limits of mainstream schools of thought in IR before the end of the cold war. For instance, Richard Ashley, departing from a Bourdieusian perspective, vigorously criticised neorealism and depicted it as "a self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist, and structuralist commitments" that "anticipate[d], legitimize[d], and orient[ed] a totalitarian project of global proportions: the rationalization of global politics" (Ashley 1984: 228). Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), in another vein, emphasised the problematic nature of regime theories within the liberal tradition, arguing that they relied on a fundamentally contradictory combination of an intersubjective ontology—regimes are constituted by shared principles and beliefs—and a positivist epistemology that claimed a clear separation between object and subject (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 764). Those critiques may be said to follow what Onuf identified as a "revival of theory" that had been occurring in IR since the mid-1970s and that had as its starting point "a repudiation of the positivist model of science as a canonical characterization of theory and its relation to methods of inquiry" (Onuf 1989: 10). However, it would be only with the advent of the politically driven end of the cold war and the subsequent peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union that those criticisms would more vigorously reverberate within IR scholarship.

In this sense, the most important theoretical implication of the end of the cold war for constructivism was the failure of mainstream IR theories to explain the peaceful and domestically driven nature of its demise. According to Guzzini, it was not that theories within the realist tradition were unable to predict the end of the cold war and the subsequent changes in world politics; rather, the problem was that they "did not even recognize the possibility that it would happen in the first place" (Guzzini 2000: 155). Until then, mainstream theoretical traditions in IR mainly assumed that world politics developed within an objective, externally given structure that exists independently 'out there': the structure

of international anarchy, wherein no entity is hierarchically superior to sovereign states and material aspects determine states' interests and subsequent behaviour (see, e.g., Morgenthau 2006; Keohane 1984; Gilpin 1981; Waltz 1969, 1979). However, unlike realist predictions that such a change would only take place as a result of defeat in armed conflicts or changes in the distribution of capabilities among states, the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred via political processes driven by domestic forces. Against this backdrop, it became appealing for theorists dissatisfied with modernity's tradition of positivism and rationalist theorising, including constructivism-inspired ones, to engage in meta-theoretical discussions concerning issues such as the explanatory power of mainstream theories or their underlying assumptions—in other words, they engaged in debates over the "very foundations of existing theories" (Jørgensen 2010: 157).[5]

The internal factor leading to the entrance of constructivism in IR is intrinsically related to the external factors discussed above and refers to the most recent foundational debate of the discipline—the third (Lapid 1989) or the fourth (Wæver 1996), depending on the perspective adopted. In this debate, positivists and post-positivists opposed each other on meta-theoretical grounds, most notably in what concerns their understanding of science and of how the study of world politics could or should be (better) conducted. In the third or fourth debate, IR scholars discussed issues such as the emphasis given to agents and/or structure in their theories, the implications of such choices, the different levels of analyses and the attitudes of cooperation or conflict adopted by states (see Jarvis 2002; da Rocha 2002: esp. 201–259; Lapid 1989). In addition, scholars on the post-positivist side of the debate challenged the epistemological and methodological assumptions of mainstream IR theories, thus addressing issues such as their philosophical foundations, what constitutes 'knowledge' in that field of studies and which meta-theoretical positions were more favourable for the production of such 'knowledge' (da Rocha 2002: esp. 201–259). Within this context, post-positivist insights brought from social theories provided critical IR scholars with different perspectives to challenge mainstream theories and their

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[5] For references on what constitutes meta-theorising in social sciences and on the implications and usefulness of this exercise, see Ritzer et al. (2002) and Ritzer (1990). For discussions about meta-theory in IR, see Chernoff (2007), da Rocha (2002), and Neufeld (1995).

"positivist choice of the empirically corroborated law or generalization as the fundamental unit of scientific achievement" (Lapid 1989: 239).

According to this brief account, it is then impossible to dissociate the inception of constructivism in IR from a critical impetus to challenge mainstream theories such as those in the realist and liberal traditions. Because its most distinctive feature was and remains a concern with the process of social construction of world politics, constructivism poses a serious challenge to the rationalist understanding of world politics that orients most theories within the realist and liberal traditions. As discussed in the next section, constructivism necessarily entails uncovering and understanding how social construction came into being in the first place, as well as its constitutive parts. As such, constructivism is necessarily about providing a deeper and broader understanding of the current state of things—the status quo—and it may be considered a critical theory to the extent that it "stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about" (Cox 1981: 129; see also Price and Reus-Smit 1998).[6] Constructivism nevertheless should not be automatically equated with other critical theories because, unlike some critical counterparts such as post-structuralism, it usually acknowledges the "possibility of a social science and a willingness to engage openly in scholarly debate with rationalism" (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 677). It is at this epistemological level that controversies tend to be raised about what constitutes constructivism in IR, as discussed in the following section.

'Social Construction of' in Social Sciences and IR

From the narrative above, it emerges that constructivism is better understood as a social theory 'approach' rather than an IR theory per se. As it emphasises the social dimension of (social) reality, constructivism can be seen as a set of tenets in social theory providing useful insights for the study of social relations in general and world politics in particular. Constructivism's assumptions have informed a number of specific IR theories—whether or not authors have been explicit about it. For instance,

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[6]Giddens also suggests that social science—and theorising in social science—is a critique in itself, as it is a practice of social life. According to him, "theories and findings in the social sciences are likely to have practical (and political) consequences regardless of whether or not the sociological observer or policy-maker decides that they can be 'applied' to a given practical issue" (Giddens 1984: xxxv).

rather than focusing simply on the role of military might or economic wealth, scholars such as Zehfuss (2002), Hopf (2002), Goldstein and Keohane (1993), and Checkel (1997) have also analysed the role of collective ideas in foreign policy decision-making and policy change. Others have focused on, amongst others: the impact of norms in shaping states' interests and positions (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995); how particular understandings, including scientific ones, are pushed forward by specific groups to advance their interests (e.g., Chwieroth 2010; Pio 2001; Haas 1992); the influence of social science theories in policy outcomes (Ish-Shalom 2006a); how institutions built upon specific ideas may contribute to reproducing a particular kind of world order (e.g., Ruggie 1982); the structural nature of the international system (e.g., Wendt 1992); the identity of specific agents such as the European Union (e.g., Jupille et al. 2003) or Russia (e.g., Hopf 2002); and methodological strategies for research carried out based on constructivist tenets (e.g., Klotz and Lynch 2007; Pouliot 2007).[7] In all those examples, the fundamental common aspect is that those authors, albeit to varying degrees and sometimes within different research traditions, have built their theories about specific aspects of world politics based on the assumption that their objects of study were somehow socially constructed.

Using a recurrent language in logics, philosopher Ian Hacking identifies the major claims of constructivists. According to him, the precondition for an analysis of the social construction of a given X such as gender or national interest is that "[i]n the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable" (Hacking 1999: 12). Hence, unless this precondition is met, there is no sense in considering something as socially constructed—presumably because otherwise "everybody knows that X is the contingent upshot of social arrangements" (Hacking 1999: 12). When this condition is met, constructivists usually make the following claim about the social construction of X: "X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable" (Hacking 1999: 6).[8]

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[7] For reviews of research inspired by constructivism in IR, see Checkel (1998, 2004), Pouliot (2004), Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), and Hopf (1998).

[8] Hacking goes on, stating that constructivists often hold two other claims in their writings: that "X is quite bad as it is" and that "We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed" (Hacking 1999: 6).

If X is socially constructed, then X in its current form is not the same X that could otherwise have occurred or existed. In fact, X could have simply been something completely different. This is because X is not a product of a reality that exists independently 'out there'—'it is not determined by the nature of things'—but it is rather dependent upon and is "brought into existence or shaped by social events, forces, history, all of which could well have been different" (Hacking 1999: 7). If any of the social events, forces, moments of history or any other element leading to X had been different, they could have assumed a different meaning and X would not be as it currently is—or X could have not come into being in the first place! As a social construction, therefore, X is not inevitable.

IR theorist Karin Fierke provides a less philosophical and more concrete illustration of what it means to say that something is socially constructed:

> To construct something is an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist. For instance, a material substance, such as wood, exists in nature, but it can be formed into any number of objects, for instance the beam in a house, a riffle, a musical instrument, or a totem pole. Although these represent material objects in and of themselves, they do not exist in nature but have come about through acts of human creation. Once created, each of these objects has a particular meaning and use within a context. They are social constructs in so far as their shape and form is imbued with social values, norms, and assumptions rather than being the product of purely individual thought or meaning. (Fierke 2010: 179)

Hence, saying that something is socially constructed only makes sense if one takes due consideration of its meaning and usage in a particular context constituted of norms, values and assumptions. In fact, it is only with a proper understanding of the meaning acquired by a given object in a particular context that one may consider, for instance, a hollow piece of wood (a material substance) as a musical instrument called flute (a social construct).

Referring to a given X such as anarchy or national interest as social constructs thus means that X is not simply given and that it is dependent upon the social processes and forces that constituted X in the first place. A socially constructed X thus resembles an empty shell, as it may assume different meanings in different contexts. It is based on this assumption

that Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999) affirms that anarchy may assume different configurations depending on its intersubjective logic (the 'shared meaning') according to which states interpret and act in world politics—hence his well-coined expression "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt 1992: 395; 1999: 6). Accordingly, what is defined as 'national interest' for one state may be—and often is—very different from the 'national interest' of another state, or it can simply assume completely different meanings for the same state in different historical moments. This is because the 'national interest' (with '...' to indicate that it is a label with varying meanings) is a social construct that depends on the representations of world politics shared by foreign policy decision-makers in a given time and space (see Weldes 1999: esp. 97–119). In both cases, 'anarchy' and 'national interest' assume different meanings because the social events and forces that shaped and/or brought them into existence may vary greatly in terms of both space and time.

In what follows, I discuss the ontological and epistemological implications of stating that something is 'socially constructed', thus identifying what IR theories premised on constructivism might look like. According to the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, ontology, or metaphysics, refers to "the philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality". Ontological inquiries are carried out at a higher level of abstraction since they engage with "questions science does not address but [with] the answers to which it presupposes" (Audi 1999: 563). Inquiries at this level relate to assumptions about the nature, the structure, the components (units) and the dynamics that are to be known, which are all within what is generally referred to as 'reality'. Ontological questions, in sum, relate to *what one assumes to constitute reality.*

Ontologically, saying that something is socially constructed means that reality is made of intersubjective understandings, i.e., of the meanings or functions that actors collectively attribute to each other and to reality itself. Because intersubjective, this (socially constructed) reality or a given phenomenon of such reality can never be reduced to how a single individual experiences it or to a mere sum of beliefs individuals share about it (Adler 1997: 327). Nor can reality be reduced to material aspects only, since "a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive construction of the world out there" (Guzzini 2000: 159)—that is, they are associated to some material manifestation. Ontologically, constructivism is thus about the process that constitutes reality or a particular phenomenon of that reality. As for an illustration,

one may think of a given *X* such as language. As a social construct, "language cannot be reduced to the simple material support for communication (voice or other)" (Guzzini 2000: 164). Moreover, it "does not exist independently from its use" and "its use cannot be reduced to individual choices—language cannot be reduced to meanings that individuals attach to it" (Guzzini 2000: 164). As such, language is always intersubjective, following its own rules and reproducing its own (intersubjective) practices. Intersubjective phenomena such as language are the core of what constructivism attributes to constitute social reality.

Constructivism's intersubjective ontology thus entails some implications for specific theories. First, there are two distinct 'worlds' that co-exist: a natural and a social world. The former is a world external to our thoughts, which exists independently 'out there' and is constituted by facts that exist independently of human volition; this world is constituted by what Searle (1995: 2) calls "brute facts". The latter world is constituted by 'facts' that "exist only because we attribute a certain function or meaning to them" (Guzzini 2000: 160; see also Adler 1997: 323); this world is constituted by social or "institutional facts" (Searle 1995: 2). Money is a recurrent illustration of the interplay between material and non-material aspects in social reality, between the brute facts of a natural world and the social or institutional facts of a social world. Materially, money is simply a piece of paper or a small round flat piece of metal. However, a complex system of socially shared meanings enables individuals to interpret pieces of paper or metal as bills or coins used to buy things. Similarly, another system of socially shared meanings enables individuals to associate relative values to bills and coins, or to convert those values into nominal figures in dollars, euros or yen, for instance. Hence, although constructivism is more interested in institutional facts (Guzzini 2000: 160), institutional facts often need some kind of material support that ought to be considered in constructivist theories.

The second ontological implication for theories inspired by constructivism is that agents and structures are mutually constituted by an interactive process that takes place over time. This process of mutual constitution of agents and structures has been approached from several angles by IR theories inspired by constructivism: for instance, Wendt (1987) explained this mutual constitution departing from Giddens' structuration theory; Guzzini (2000) adopted Bourdieu's sociology; and others departed from theories of discursive practice and communicative action (see, e.g., Risse 2000; Onuf 1989; Kratochwil 1989). In all

those cases, the interaction of agents and structures does not simply follow a behavioural response of utility-maximising agents, as in rationalist IR theories. Rather, in an intersubjective ontology, structures constitute and constrain agents by influencing their identities, interests and actions, whilst agents constitute structures as they understand social phenomena and act according to their interpretation of structural constraints. Because agents may potentially reinterpret their own interpretations during this process, they may eventually change structures by modifying the meanings they attach to social phenomena—i.e., they have the potential to change the content of those constraints and eventually the very structures in which they are embedded. This is a remarkable ontological implication and a significant departure from rationalist IR theories, as this insight on the mutual constitution of reality allows constructivism to account for the possibility of systemic change in world politics.

Finally, the third implication of constructivism's intersubjective ontology refers to how agents act in social reality. In IR theories within the realist and liberal traditions, it is usually materialism and an individualist understanding of rationality that determines behaviour. According to Morgenthau, for instance, states act to safeguard their national interest, which is primarily defined in terms of power (Morgenthau 2006: 5). Waltz, in turn, draws from microeconomics theory to formulate a systemic theory in which the primary concern of states "is not to maximize power, but to maintain their position in the system" (Waltz 1979: 126). In both cases, actions taken by individual states are simply a behaviouralist response to external structural constraints—namely, international anarchy, an exogenously given state of affairs understood in realist accounts as the absence of entities hierarchically superior to states in world politics.[9]

For constructivism, however, materialism and rationality alone cannot account for the behaviour of agents because non-material aspects play a role in framing how social agents attach meaning to phenomena and subsequently adopt specific courses of action based on those meanings. Moreover, as constructivism entails an intersubjective—as opposed to individualist—character, interests and whatever else may prompt agents to action are not given a priori but are formed in the very social context in which action takes place (Guzzini 2000: 149). As such, any option

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[9] Elsewhere (Cavalcante 2011: esp. 24–27), I provide an overview of 'anarchy' in realist writings and discuss its meaning in Wendt's earlier works.

for a specific course of action is also related to the collective meanings shared by agents in that context. Hence, what is 'rational' for an agent is not purely drawn from individual interests, but also from the legitimacy that the agent attributes to the action based on shared values and norms found in existing institutions or other social structures (Fierke 2010: 181). Consequently, how agents see themselves and others, as well as the collective norms, values and rules existing in that context, are important aspects for understanding the "material and structural conditions in which they [agents] find themselves" (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 574) and how they frame their actions subsequently.

There are also epistemological implications associated with considering something as 'socially constructed'. Epistemology or the theory of knowledge, according once again to the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, refers to "the study of the nature of knowledge and justification", especially their defining characteristics, substantial conditions and sources, as well as their limits and justification (Audi 1999: 273). Hence, when one speaks of epistemology one speaks of what s/he considers as knowledge, what s/he considers as the basis for that knowledge, what can be known and what criteria matters to justify his or her knowledge as knowledge—and not a belief or something else. Epistemology, in sum, relates to claims about *what is knowledge and how can one know about something*.

Notwithstanding an overall agreement about the intersubjective constitution of social reality in general and world politics in particular, constructivism is more debatable epistemologically in the field of IR. According to their epistemological standings, scholars have proposed different characterisations of constructivism as, inter alia, conventional and critical (Hopf 1998; Katzenstein et al. 1998); modernist and post-modernist (Price and Reus-Smit 1998); conventional, interpretative and critical (Checkel 2004); and neo-classical, post-modernist and naturalistic (Ruggie 1998b). Instead of strictly assuming either one of those typified positions, however, I follow Klotz and Lynch's pragmatic and "less rigid" proposal and assume that constructivism may be more easily captured in terms of a spectrum ranging from "positivist-leaning to post-positivist positions" (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 11). Consistent with this understanding and with the narrative on the emergence of constructivism in IR presented in the previous section, constructivism's epistemology as herein discussed leans towards the post-positivist end of that spectrum.

As aforementioned, assuming that a given X is socially constructed means that there is a socially shared agreement about a specific meaning of X among agents in a specific space and at a given time. Ontologically, constructivism is interested in the process leading to the social construction of X itself or the 'world' in which X exists—i.e. its reality. As this reality or X are socially shared, they cannot be reduced to a mechanicist/behaviouralist "stimulus-reaction chain" (Guzzini 2000: 161). Rather, this reality or X only entails some meaning to the extent that they are intelligible and count as meaningful to social agents within a given context—which, by definition, is situated in a given space and time. The capacity of social agents to "attach the 'right' meaning to [i.e., to interpret] a social event depends on the[ir] capacity to share a system of meanings within the society" (Guzzini 2000: 162). As such, "[w]hat counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive construction of the world out there" (Guzzini 2000: 159). Hence, if ontologically constructivism is interested in the process leading to the social construction of reality or of a given phenomenon X, constructivism is epistemologically about the process of (social) construction of the meaning of reality or X. In Guzzini's words, therefore, constructivism "is epistemologically about the *social construction of knowledge* [i.e., the socially shared meaning of a given X], and ontologically about the *construction of social reality*" [i.e., X itself or its reality] (Guzzini 2000: 160).

Four epistemological implications follow for theories inspired by constructivism as herein presented. First, as constructivism is ontologically about the construction of social reality and epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge, constructivism must conjecture about the relationship between the two. In fact, as Searle rightly argues, one still requires language to state a brute fact (1995: 2). This is so because it is through the analysis of the meanings or functions that a given X collectively entails that one may understand how X came into being with those particular meanings or functions. Consequently, in constructivism, theories of action must be followed by a theory of knowledge (Guzzini 2000: 160).

Second, by ontologically distinguishing between a natural and a social world, as discussed above, constructivism does not deny the existence of a material reality, as opposed to 'radical' non-positivist theories such as post-structuralism, for instance. Epistemologically, what constructivism does assume, however, is that such a material reality cannot be meaningfully apprehended without due consideration of socially shared practices

that are constituted by non-material (i.e. ideational) aspects such as norms, values, language, identities and/or rules (Guzzini 2000: 160; Adler 1997: 323). For instance, recalling the illustration of money from above, if nobody believed that a piece of paper or metal was money, it would cease being 'money' in the social world even if it remained a piece of paper or metal in the natural world (Guzzini 2000: 160). In analysing either language or money, hence, theories inspired by constructivism should not restrict their analysis to the human voice or the metallic properties of coins alone (theory of action), but also to the meanings and functions they assume socially in a given context (theory of knowledge).

Third, as constructivism grants relevance to the social context in which the production of knowledge takes place, it poses a challenge to empiricism and objectivism at the epistemological level. Epistemological empiricism, according to Steve Smith, relates to the position with a "tremendous reliance on the belief that it is empirical validation or falsification that is the hallmark of 'real' enquiry" (Smith 1996: 16). This position, according to Guzzini, underlies Waltz's defence of testing in the scientific inquiry, which may be roughly formulated as: "although we have no direct access to the outside world, and although our theories are only heuristic models with no claim to represent reality 'as it is', the testing procedure can be done on the neutral ground of empirical reality" (Guzzini 2000: 157). Since constructivism assumes that the production of knowledge takes place in a specific social context—and consequently it is not simply gathered 'out there' but is socially constructed (Guzzini 2000: 160)—it denies the possibility of 'neutral' and 'objective' knowledge, challenging empiricism and objectivism.

Finally, as constructivism is epistemologically about the process through which a given X acquires meaning, the very production of knowledge—and therefore the scientific exercise itself—is a meaningful action. Recalling Hacking's definition of what the 'social construction of' entails, constructivism may be seen fundamentally as a counterfactual statement of how things could be or could have been different and not as of how they may be determined by their (brute) characteristics in the natural world (Guzzini 2000: 150). As such, given that attributing meaning to social phenomena and narratives or counter-narratives about them is in itself an exercise of power, the relationship between power and knowledge in theories inspired by constructivism assumes relevance not only in the scientific inquiry, but also in practice and policymaking.

In sum, constructivism as herein presented is better understood as a social theory approach than an IR theory per se. Its main assumption refers to the idea that reality in general and phenomena in world politics in particular are socially constructed. Assuming a given X as socially constructed means that agents in a given time and space collectively share an agreement about a specific meaning of X.[10] As a social theory 'approach', constructivism provides useful insights for specific IR theories. If such theories are to be consistent, they have to consider the ontological and epistemological implications of assuming something as socially constructed. Ontologically, those implications relate to the assumptions that: a natural and a social world co-exist; agents and structures are mutually constituted; and that both material and non-material aspects influence agents' courses of action. Epistemologically, those implications refer to the following assumptions: constructivist theories about the social construction of a given X must be followed by a theory about the social construction of the shared meaning of X; social reality cannot be apprehended without resort to the analysis of both material and non-material aspects; the production of strictly 'neutral' and 'objective' knowledge is impossible; and the production of meanings of and knowledge about social constructs is a meaningful action.

Constructivism thus understood provides a useful approach to analyse phenomena in social reality in general and world politics in particular. If incorporated as a substrate for specific IR theories, it helps to identify and explore issues such as, for instance, the worldviews of policymakers (i.e., how they understand world politics and which locus they assign to the institutions they represent, such as states or international organisations), their identities (how they see themselves and the institutions they represent) and their interests (what they want and why). Carried out in those terms, constructivist analyses of social processes and interactions in world politics highlight the importance of non-material aspects in those processes, thus undermining the views that assign an excessive or exclusive weight to material aspects such as military capabilities.

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[10]That is, at least a minimum form of agreement. In the following chapter, I introduce the notion of minimal intelligibility to highlight this feature.

An IR Theory Inspired by Constructivism: The Hermeneutical Mechanism and How Social Science Theories May Influence Policy Outcomes

As the examples presented throughout the previous section demonstrate, IR scholars have developed many theories based on the assumptions of constructivism. According to Jørgensen (2010: 162), they did so fundamentally via two different strategies: engaging in a meta-theoretical exercise of assessing constructivism and IR theories in order to amend specific aspects of either or both when necessary; or employing broader theories compatible with constructivism in order to develop concrete analytical frameworks. Following the former strategy, for instance, Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: esp. 765–766) outlined concrete proposals for a reformulation of regime theories that could reduce the problematic tension between their social ontology and their positivist epistemology. Jutta Weldes (1996, 1999), in the same vein, re-theorised the concept of 'national interest' as a social construct to overcome the undetermined and perennial character it assumed in realist writings. A good illustration of the latter strategy outlined by Jørgensen, I suggest, is Piki Ish-Shalom's hermeneutical mechanism, a concrete theoretical framework about the influence of theories in policy outcomes (Ish-Shalom 2006a, 2013). To elaborate his own theory, the author builds upon other compatible theories emphasising the social construction of reality, such as Freeden's theories on ideology, Gramsci's notion of hegemony, and constructivist writings on the role of knowledge in the social construction of reality (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 567). The remainder of this section explores this mechanism.

Ish-Shalom's main goal is to develop a theory to explain the influence of the democratic peace thesis in policy outcomes outlined by decision-makers in the United States and Israel. According to him, this influence takes place via a hermeneutical mechanism through which a specific kind of discourse (academic and theoretical) is converted into another at the public and political levels, "shaping the understanding of world politics [and consequently] framing the menu of acceptable policies" available to decision-makers (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 566–567). In accordance with constructivism's tenets about the social construction of reality, and reformulating theory as a social construct, it is via this mechanism that, according to the author, theories help to shape social reality and influence policy outcomes. In the author's theory, Gramsci's notion

of hegemony is used to reconstruct constructivism from "a purely social theory" to a "sociopolitical theory that considers seriously the political dimension of social reality" (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 566; 2011).

There are two key concepts for understanding Ish-Shalom's mechanism: theory and hermeneutics. Theories are re-defined as political thoughts. Following Michael Freeden's work on ideology (see Freeden 1996), Ish-Shalom defines political thoughts as an "assembling together of political concepts", which, in turn, are "the basic building blocks of every mode of political thought" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 17). Political concepts, however, do not entail meanings in themselves, but they gain "meaning, viability, and political significance only in the context of a complete configuration of political concepts" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 17). Hence, although political concepts such as 'peace' or 'war' may entail different understandings individually, they confer particular meanings to each other when arranged together within the framework of specific political thoughts—such as concrete political theories or ideologies. For instance, realism-inspired balance of power theories are only intelligible when conceived vis-à-vis a set of concepts (e.g., alliances, equilibrium, deterrence, military power) that provide particular meanings to each other; similarly, those concepts only acquire those particular meanings against the backdrop of balance of power theories.

A distinctive feature of re-defining theories as political thoughts refers to the latter's capacity to eventually drive political action—a cornerstone assumption for the functioning of the hermeneutical mechanism (Ish-Shalom 2013: 17–18). This mainly follows from the diversity of meanings political concepts may assume, as well as from the array of available political practices associated with each meaning. Within the tradition of peace studies, for instance, as discussed in the following chapter, the concept of peace may assume either a negative or a positive meaning: in the former case, it is the absence of direct violence, whereas in the latter, peace is virtually equated with social justice (see Galtung 1969: 183, also footnote 131). For each one of those meanings, there is a variety of political alternatives available for policymakers and practitioners interested in achieving peace. A viable policy for achieving a situation of negative peace, for instance, is the adoption of peacekeeping, the dissociative approach, wherein antagonists are kept away from each other—with or without the support of third parties (Galtung 1976: 282). On the other hand, achieving a situation of positive peace could entail the adoption of peacebuilding, the associative approach, as it potentially removes

the deep causes of violent conflict and simultaneously offer alternatives in situations where they may happen (Galtung 1976: 298). The same rationale applies both for political concepts such as 'social justice', 'war', 'security' or 'development', as well as for the respective policies designed and eventually implemented to achieve them.

Given the multiplicity of meanings political concepts may assume, as well as the array of available political practices associated with each meaning, Ish-Shalom rightly ascertains that "persuading people to accept one meaning rather than another leads them into one political practice rather than another" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 17). Recalling the discussion carried out in the previous section, this follows from constructivism's epistemological implication that the production of meanings is in itself a (political) action. Resuming the illustration above, persuading one to accept either a negative or a positive understanding of peace may lead to the adoption of different approaches to peace—either a dissociative or an associative approach, for example. If theories as political thoughts provide meaning to political concepts, and if political concepts are the basis of political thoughts, it follows that theories as political thoughts not only explain and/or make intelligible specific phenomena or dynamics in the social world, but they also provide "comprehensive readings" of those very phenomena and dynamics (Ish-Shalom 2013: 18). To the extent that they assign meaning to political concepts, theories as political thoughts may be used to "persuade people and motivate them to political action" (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 568; 2013: 17). In sum, theories as political thoughts not only render phenomena or dynamics intelligible in the social world, but they also shape those phenomena or dynamics by driving individuals to political action.

The second concept for understanding Ish-Shalom's mechanism is hermeneutics itself. Rather than understanding hermeneutics in its traditional sense as simply the "art of reading and interpreting texts" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 14), the author stresses its double nature. In social sciences, according to Giddens, the double nature of hermeneutics implies duality, since "reflection on social processes (theories, and observations about them) continually enter into, become disentangled with and re-enter the universe of events that they describe" (Giddens 1984: xxxiii). Consequently, "the 'findings' of social science do not remain isolated from the 'subject-matter' to which they refer, but consistently re-enter and reshape it" (Giddens 1993: 9). The double nature of hermeneutics thus means not only interpreting already-written texts, but

also the context in which interpretation is produced, that is, the very process of interpretation. In these terms, reality is conceived "as an unwritten text that encompasses social entities such as practices, norms, and ideas" (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 566). If reality is understood as an unwritten text, Ish-Shalom suggests that the process of theorisation can be conceived as "a hermeneutical process of understanding reality" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 23). Recalling that theorising reality means attaching meaning to political concepts, the author ascertains that "theoretical constructs have the potential to frame both our understanding and our political action". And when theory actually does so, he continues, "it uses what [he] describe[s] as the hermeneutical mechanism—the active aspects and implications of hermeneutics—the art of interpretation" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 24). It is this hermeneutic mechanism that, according to Ish-Shalom, explains how theoretical constructs influence political practices by attaching meanings to political concepts and potentially driving political action.

Ish-Shalom's hermeneutical mechanism is explained as a three-stage process. At first, since theories attach meanings to political concepts and provide a framework in which such concepts are understood in meaningful ways, they are understood as theoretical constructs. Such constructs not only help to understand specific aspects of social reality, but they may also frame individuals' understanding and political action (Ish-Shalom 2013: 17–18). This 'framing' does not occur a posteriori, but rather "on a prior and deeper level" where political concepts are defined and where they equip individuals with "a road map to navigate the world" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 68). In proving this road map, political concepts shape individuals' views about the world, their position as well as their interests in this world. Theoretical constructs thus provide a framework wherein political concepts are assembled together, but they are predominantly elaborated and usually remain restricted to academia. At some points, however, a combination of material and ideational factors create a conducive environment to the expansion of theoretical constructs into the public domain. It is only if and when these moments occur that theories may "have a real political impact" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 68).

The second stage refers to the transformation of theoretical constructs into public conventions, which happens when there is a convergence of enabling material and ideational conditions around an axis of common identity collectively shared by individuals (Ish-Shalom 2013: 25). Identity, in this context, provides individuals with a common reading

that helps them to analyse, interpret and act according to how they understand their own condition vis-à-vis others (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 574). When those factors converge, theoretical constructs may be converted into public conventions. At this stage, theory is "politicized and simplified" (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 572; 2013: 33–38), that is, they lose the critical sense typical of academia and are understood in quasi absolute terms, being uncritically taken for granted. At the public sphere, those theories are understood as "general background knowledge about the world that is taken for granted and shapes the commonsensical codes of thinking and behavior" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 5, 21).[11] As such, the author contends that public conventions are nothing but Gramsci's notion of hegemony understood in its political rather than in its ideologist meaning (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 571). In shaping codes of thinking and providing a rationale for behaviour, public conventions acquire political relevance due to their potential to affect social reality. This potential is what enables the third stage of the hermeneutical mechanism: the transformation of public conventions into political convictions.

This third stage of the hermeneutical mechanism includes political agency and may happen under two circumstances. In the first scenario, competent individuals mobilise public conventions with the purpose of advancing their own political interests (Ish-Shalom 2013: 25). Those politically motivated individuals do so by building upon the rhetorical

[11]Thus understood, Ish-Shalom's notion of public conventions may be closely associated with at least four other concepts. First, with Searle's Background, defined as "set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable intentional states of function" (Searle 1995: 129). Second, to Berger and Luckmann's definition of common-sense as "the knowledge I [impersonal 'I'] share with others in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 37). Third, they are close to Habermas' notion of lifeworld, understood as "the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements" (Habermas 1987: 126). Finally, public conventions also mirror Bourdieu's concept of habitus, understood as "a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a *matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions*" (Bourdieu 1977: 82–83; emphasis in original). In all cases, individuals simply assume as correct and take for granted knowledge they have about social reality. It is worth noting that the first three concepts are rather broad, referring to such things as money and its shared understanding among a large number of people. The concepts of habitus and public conventions are more restricted socially, in the sense that they refer to specific social groups in particular contexts.

capital[12] of theories to create a discourse that justifies and enacts a specific course of action as the only one available—or at least, the most favourable for advancing the interest of the particular political constituency to whom the discourse is addressed. In the second scenario, public conventions are already embedded in influential sectors such as policy and political elites in issue-areas such as public health or world politics. When that is the case, public conventions frame the thinking of individuals in those sectors and consequently how they plan and implement policies in their respective fields (Ish-Shalom 2013: 26). In either case, human political agency helps to gradually convert public conventions into political convictions, articulating public conventions in terms of a "strong, opinionated view that necessitates political action" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 22). Political convictions, in sum, ultimately represent theoretical constructs simplified as public convictions and subsequently "politicized and dogmatized […] in absolute terms of yes and no" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 5).

Using this mechanism, Ish-Shalom explains how the democratic peace thesis has influenced policies and political actions in two cases: Israel's critical policies towards the Oslo peace accords, and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East by US Presidents Bill Clinton (1993–2001) and George W. Bush (2001–2009). The Israeli case illustrates the first scenario depicted above, as political elites in Israel mobilised politically the rhetorical capital of the theory to secure their political agenda of delaying or avoiding negotiations with Palestinians after the signature of the 1993 Oslo Agreement (Ish-Shalom 2013: 85–111). In the second case, a political (mis)representation of the theory framed the thinking of US neoconservatives and government offices, who were then prompted to push forward an agenda for regime change in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq (Ish-Shalom 2013: 112–141). In both cases, a simplified and uncritical version of a social science theory, reconfigured as public convention and subsequently as political conviction, helped shape social reality by driving political action. Considering the double hermeneutic nature of the process, reality was thus being socially constructed throughout the process and, similarly, public conventions and political convictions were redefined as political actions unfolded.

It is worth stressing three aspects related to the hermeneutical mechanism outlined above. The first is that the migration of theoretical

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[12]The author elaborates in more detail the concept of rhetorical capital in Ish-Shalom (2008).

constructs to public spheres takes "an all-but-one-way route": as theoretical constructs are transformed into public conventions, the latter may also influence how theoretical constructs are discussed and formulated in academic circles (Ish-Shalom 2013: 70). The second aspect is related: the hermeneutical mechanism is not necessarily linear and straightforward, either chronologically or spatially. Rather, the migration of theoretical constructs to public spheres is a fuzzy process, occasionally going back and forth in time and occurring at different paces in different spatial contexts. This is because the hermeneutical mechanism offers a framework for the analysis of the transformation of one kind of *discourse* (academic) into another (public and subsequently political), not necessarily how this process develops in concrete instances; in other words, the hermeneutical mechanism is more about *discourse* tracing than *process* tracing (Ish-Shalom 2013: 3–4).

Finally, the third aspect worth stressing relates to the issue of agency. In the second step of the hermeneutical mechanism, individuals resort to theoretical constructs and simplify them rhetorically in their discourses. At this stage, however, those individuals may not necessarily have clear political goals in mind, nor are they necessarily conscious about their role in helping to transform a theoretical construct into public convention. Nevertheless, their rhetorical use of academic theories is marked by the lack of some distinctive attributes of academic discourses, such as their probabilistic nature (Ish-Shalom 2013: 36). Hence, although most likely unaware and perhaps unintentionally, individuals' rhetoric use of theories may contribute to their simplification and migration away from academe and into public spheres. Due consideration was given to these three aspects when designing the framework for analysis presented in Chapter 3 and constructing the narrative outlined in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter explored the IR scholarship on constructivism and presented a specific theory about the potential influence of social science theories, a non-material aspect, in policy practice. Although acknowledging different views and interpretations, I outlined constructivism as a broader approach to the study of social relations in general and world politics in particular. Understood as such, constructivism entails specific ontological and epistemological assumptions that were discussed in this chapter with a view to clearly delineating the main implications and limits

of theorising about non-material (i.e., ideational) aspects in the study of world politics. As it is compatible with the understanding of constructivism herein proposed, I also presented Ish-Shalom's theory of how social sciences theories may eventually affect policy outcomes via a hermeneutical mechanism of attaching meaning to political concepts.

A key insight offered by constructivism for this research study is that 'peacebuilding' may be understood as an empty shell, as a label that may assume different connotations according to its inter-subjectively shared meaning in a given context. Based on that understanding, I use the hermeneutical mechanism to explore how one particular meaning of 'peacebuilding' became inter-subjectively shared in the United Nations in the early 1990s based on a simplified and politicised version of academic theories, that is, based on a particular political conviction. As political convictions require political action, the concept of 'peacebuilding', beyond embodying a specific meaning, also presupposes different policy prescriptions and may lead to distinct concrete courses of political action. I turn to those issues in the following chapter as I present the book's analytical framework.

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Framework for Analysis

Introduction

According to Giddens, "in social science, […] conceptual schemes that order and inform processes of inquiry into social life are in large part what 'theory' is and what it is for" (1984: Preface). Having outlined the purpose of this book in the Introduction, this chapter presents the elements informing its underlying analysis—that it, its research design. It outlines the main questions addressed, the most recurrently used concepts, the conceptual proposal and the methodological approach herein adopted.

This book seeks to answer two main research questions: how the concept of peacebuilding 'came into life' in the United Nations, that is, became influential to the extent of motivating, justifying, legitimating and/or enacting specific policy outcomes or concrete courses of action? And whether and how the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) have affected the United Nations (UN) concept and practice of peacebuilding after their establishment?

In addressing those questions, the book delves into contemporary debates about the underpinnings of contemporary peacebuilding and the influence of the liberal (democratic) peace framework in the Organisation's approach to armed conflict and post-armed conflict situations. It engages, moreover, with the workings of the so-called 'peacebuilding architecture', the institutional arrangement designed to enhance

the UN's capacities in peacebuilding following the identification of critical gaps and mixed results of the world body in providing assistance to societies affected by armed conflicts. In doing so, the book analyses the coming into life and the trajectory of the concept of 'peacebuilding' in the UN, which is not mentioned anywhere in the UN Charter and yet has become one of the central concerns of the Organisation in the area of international peace and security at least since the end of the cold war.

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CONCEPTUAL APPARATUS:
BUILDING BLOCKS AND TERMINOLOGY

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The book's 'building blocks' includes the concept of United Nations, and the notions of minimal intelligibility and milieu. This section outlines how they are herein understood to avoid conceptual confusion and lack of clarity.

Inspired by Inis Claude Jr. (1996), this book analyses the United Nations in terms of two images: first, as an international secretariat composed of international civil servants and bureaucratic structures located in places such as New York and Geneva; and second, as a body composed of member states "who employ an international secretariat to support their joint deliberations and activities" (Claude Jr. 1996: 290–291). For analytical purposes, I distinguish between those two images by using the concepts of international bureaucracy and international organisation, respectively.[1] By doing so, Claude's two images become more precise conceptually and it becomes clearer that the two cannot be separated, but that they rather co-exist.

International organisations are herein understood as a form of international institution, which in turn may be defined as a system of "norms, rules and decision-making procedures that give[s] rise to social practices, that assign[s] roles to participants in these practices, and that guide[s] interactions among participants" (Biermann et al. 2009: 39). International institutions may be informal and based on unwritten agreements, as it is often the case, for instance, of alliances in world politics (e.g., the allied powers during World War II). International institutions (e.g., the international trade regime), however, may occasionally be embodied in formal structures (e.g., the World Trade Organisation). When that is the

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[1] Given the scope of this book, the international organisations herein addressed are intergovernmental in nature.

case, those structures are usually in the form of organisations that entail "explicit rules, specific assignments of roles to individuals and groups, and the capacity for action" (Keohane 1988: 384, footnote 382).

In this book, I depart from Biermann et al. (2009: 39) to define international organisations as institutional arrangements combining three constitutive dimensions: ideational, intergovernmental and bureaucratic.[2] The ideational dimension of international organisations is a non-material substrate that reflects ideas (broadly understood), values, principles, norms, rules, concepts and beliefs that are inter-subjectively shared by individuals in the context of an international organisation.[3] According to their level of generality and abstraction, those ideational aspects can be grouped into three categories: deep core, programmes and policies (Schmidt 2008: 306). The first category, deep core, refers to the world-views found at the deepest level of the ideational substrate. Ideational aspects at this level of abstraction and generality embody the strongest values, principles and philosophical underpinnings of the organisation. They represent the envisaged goals and the more general purposes that led to the founding of the organisation in the first place and that informs its functioning in the present. At this level, ideas generally "sit in the background", often being taken for granted and only rarely being questioned or challenged (Schmidt 2008: 306).

The second category of ideas constituting that ideational substrate is programmes, which refer to the main assumptions underlying specific policies and courses of action adopted by international organisations. Ideational aspects at the level of programmes "define the problems to be solved by such policies; the issues to be considered; the goals to be achieved; the norms, methods, and instruments to be applied; and the ideals that frame the more immediate policy ideas proposed to solve any given problem" (Schmidt 2008: 306). Programme-level ideational

[2] Biermann et al. (2009) refer to the first of these dimensions as 'normative framework', but they fail to elaborate further on its definition. In developing more precisely what I understand by this first dimension, I employ the term 'ideational dimension' to capture a wider range and the distinct levels of non-material aspects of international organisations, including inter alia ideas, values, principles, norms, rules and concepts. As for the second dimension, I use 'intergovernmental' instead of 'membership' given the scope of this book, which addresses an international organisation that is intergovernmental in nature.

[3] Or, in other words, that are minimally intelligible for individuals in the international organisation's milieu. The notions of minimal intelligibility and milieu are elaborated below.

aspects thus provide a frame of reference for policymakers in identifying problems and coming up with solutions in specific areas of interest to international organisations. Finally, the third category refers to the specific policies outlined by policymakers, that is, to the proposed solutions they come up with as responses to identified problems in issue-areas such as environment, human rights, refugees, development, or peace and security (Schmidt 2008: 306). From the deep core to programmes to policies, ideational aspects become gradually less general and are conceived at more superficial levels of abstraction.

The second constitutive dimension of international organisations, intergovernmental, refers not only to its members, but also to the non-bureaucratic (i.e. intergovernmental) instances of international organisations that are responsible for making decisions and establishing the overall courses of action of the organisation and its secretariat. Finally, the bureaucratic dimension is herein defined as "a hierarchically organized group of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures within the context of a policy area" (Biermann et al. 2009: 37).

Based on those distinctions, the United Nations is herein understood as an international organisation encompassing an ideational, an intergovernmental and a bureaucratic dimension. The first constitutive dimension is made of ideational aspects at three different levels. The elements at the most basic level, the deep core, are embodied in the UN Charter, most particularly its Preamble and its Purposes and Principles, and undergird the United Nations in all areas and at all levels, being more often taken for granted and rarely challenged. At the levels of programmes and policies, the elements in the UN ideational substrate become gradually more specific and vary according to particular issue-areas such as international peace and security, human rights and development. The UN ideational substrate is further explored in Chapter 6, with particular focus on the Organisation's international peace and security agenda in general and peacebuilding in particular.

The UN also entails an intergovernmental dimension. According to its Charter (1945), the Organisation is open to all "peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the [...] Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations" (Art. 4(1)). Members of the United Nations have to meet specific criteria of statehood according to international law, namely, "a defined territory and a permanent population effectively controlled by

an independent government" (Simma et al. 2012: 346).[4] Established in 1945 with 51 members, the United Nations is composed of 193 member states as of writing.[5] In addition to membership per se, the second constitutive dimension of the Organisation includes a range of forums for intergovernmental decision-making, such as the Security Council and the General Assembly. In this book, I do not explore the second constitutive dimension in depth since membership as such (that is, the provisions of Art. 4(1): criteria of statehood in international law and the number of UN member states) is not affected by how the concept of peacebuilding gained life in the UN. The second UN constitutive dimension is explored only to the extent that its intergovernmental structures are affected by that process.

Finally, the United Nations is also constituted by a bureaucratic dimension. The UN bureaucracy includes both material (e.g., staff, office buildings) and ideational aspects (e.g., mandate, rules, values, organisational culture). The interaction between these material and ideational aspects constitute international organisations as herein defined, and they should be analysed accordingly. For example, whereas material aspects such as the configuration of administrative and institutional bodies reflect ideational assumptions, ideational aspects are also influenced over time by the continuity or discontinuity of material aspects such as routine practices of member states and staff. Figure 3.1 provides a visual representation of the United Nations as herein outlined.

Related to the definition of United Nations outlined above are two notions recurrently used throughout the book. The notion of minimal intelligibility is used instead of the phrase 'inter-subjectively shared', often found in IR studies informed by constructivism, to underscore that individuals in a given context may not always necessarily agree on the precise meaning of ideational aspects and yet interact in a meaningful way. In addition to leaving open the possibility of disagreement over ideational constructs among purposive individuals, the expression conveys the understanding that ideational aspects serve as a basic frame of reference for the interaction of individuals in a particular context and that individuals may not necessarily take such ideational aspects for granted or abide by them to the same extent. Although they may not agree on all

[4] For an elaboration on the definition of membership and on other criteria for admission into the UN, see Simma et al. (2012: 342–352).

[5] For an overview of the growth in UN membership, see United Nations (2013).

Fig. 3.1   UN constitutive dimensions

of its features at all times, individuals rely on minimally intelligible ideational constructs to such an extent that they eventually become embedded in everyday discourses and practices of international organisations.

For instance, although they may not necessarily agree on a precise definition of concepts such as 'sovereignty' or 'non-interference', representatives of member states to the United Nations are (presumably) conscious that sovereignty and non-interference are core principles underlying the UN Charter. As such, even though there may be intense political disagreement among member states about, say, the extent to which those principles may or may not be breached under specific circumstances (e.g., in cases of flagrant violations of human rights), concepts such as 'sovereignty' and 'non-interference' provide at a minimum a basis for the interaction of individuals in the context of the United Nations (e.g., permanent representatives in sessions of the General Assembly or the Security Council). In other words, both concepts are minimally intelligible because they allow for meaningful interaction among individuals in the UN milieu.

As for the second notion, milieu is used to indicate that the ideational substrate of international organisations is not necessarily restricted to the corridors of the concerned organisation. Recalling the illustration above, there is a whole array of individuals and entities to whom discussions about 'sovereignty' and 'non-interference' will not only be familiar, but will also be part of their own discourses, practices and activities. Such individuals may include, amongst many others: diplomatic representatives of UN member states based in national capitals; politicians and national civil servants working in specialised agencies; analysts in think tanks;

representatives of specialised non-governmental organisations; academics; correspondents and other media staff covering news about world politics; and even a portion of citizens well informed and/or concerned with particular issues in world politics. Although the reach of their opinions, views and positions in the UN itself vary enormously, and although they may not necessarily interact with permanent representatives during that illustrative session above, the use of concepts such as 'sovereignty' and 'non-interference' in the context of the United Nations will also be minimally intelligible to those individuals. As such, the notion of milieu as herein adopted refers not only to the physical structures of international organisations (e.g., office buildings, meeting rooms), but also to organisational structures (e.g., organs, commissions, secretariats), ideational constructs (e.g., principles, norms, values, rules) and the whole array of individuals and institutions with potential influence on the activities of international organisations (e.g., foreign policy pundits, think tanks), as well as their interactions. The notion of milieu as herein outlined thus encompasses both material and ideational aspects around international organisations.

The Objects of Analysis

To address the main research questions outlined above, this book analyses two core elements: the liberal democratic peace framework and the concept of 'peacebuilding'.

The Liberal (Democratic) Peace

IR scholars have addressed the liberal peace both as a concept and a framework: in the former sense, it refers to the ontological state of peace shared by liberal or democratic[6] states within an imaginary geographical zone; in the latter, it is said to inform specific policies and actions with the ultimate goal of establishing such a (liberal or democratic) peace.

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[6]When referring to the liberal peace as a concept, the terms 'liberal' and 'democratic' are often used interchangeably in the specialised literature—see, for instance, the articles published in a special section of *International Security* (1994) dedicated to the topic and the exchange of notes published as Russett et al. (1995). When referring to the concept, I do not distinguish between 'liberal' and 'democratic' in this book for two reasons: first, because it facilitates dialogue with the specialised literature that makes no distinction between the two; and second, because the visions of 'democracy' in the United Nations are inherently based on the Western liberal tradition, as discussed in this chapter.

Either as a concept or a framework, the notion of a liberal democratic peace emerges from a longstanding tradition of thinking in the West that goes back to at least as early as Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, first published in 1795.[7] In the twentieth century, Kant's ideas have been recovered and associated with a number of writings in the fields of Political Science and IR after a relevant empirical phenomenon was observed in the 1960s: the absence of wars, between 1789 and 1941, among "independent nations with elective governments" (Babst 1964: 10). Although this empirical observation could as well have been regarded as a simple correlation between 'democracy' and 'peace', some scholars have tried to explain the virtual absence of wars among liberal/democratic societies as a result of their governance regime—i.e. they sought to demonstrate that a causal relation existed between a 'liberal' or 'democracy' society and 'peace' (see Owen 1994, 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Doyle 1983a, b; see also Rummel 1983).

Michael Doyle has been one of the most vocal contemporary articulators of the concept of a liberal/democratic peace[8] in the fields of IR and Political Science. In a two-parted article in which he sought to update Kant's views, Doyle conceptualises the liberal/democratic peace as the "separate peace" that exists in an imaginary zone constituted by liberal/democratic states (Doyle 1983a: 232). According to him, there are three conditions required for the existence of that zone of peace: a representative republican government; a principled respect for non-discriminatory human rights; and social and economic interdependence (Doyle 1997: 286–287).[9] In Doyle's writings, none of the three conditions alone is sufficient, "but together (and only where together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace" (Doyle 1983a: 232; see also Doyle 1986: 1162; 1997: 284). In the realm of world politics, Doyle contends that such a zone of

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[7]For a genealogical analysis of the origins and intellectual roots of the liberal peace, including sources other than Kant, see Richmond (2005: esp. 23–51).

[8]Henceforth, I use 'liberal/democratic peace' when referring to the concept, which denotes that 'liberal' and 'democratic' are interchangeable terms (see footnote 6). I use 'liberal democratic peace' when referring to the framework to highlight that the envisaged 'peace' is both liberal and democratic.

[9]Doyle uses the three aspects to explain not only the tendency of liberal states to act peacefully toward each other, but also to make war with non-liberal states.

liberal/democratic peace exists, that it began to take shape in the eighteenth century as liberal democratic states "gained deeper domestic foundations and longer international experience", and that this zone has been slowly expanding ever since (Doyle 1997: 260). The most significant feature of interstate relations in that zone, according to him, has been the "apparent absence of war [...] for almost two hundred years" (Doyle 1983a: 217).

Another leading theorist on the topic, Bruce Russett, categorises explanations about the absence of war among liberal/democratic states—that is, theories about the liberal/democratic peace (as a concept)—in two main strands.[10] The first, cultural/normative, explains the phenomenon as a result of states' adherence to democratic norms and cultures—as in Doyle's writings (see Doyle 1997: 277–284). According to such theories, it is the ideas or norms they entail—such as "social diversity, perceptions of individual rights, overlapping group membership, cross-pressures, shifting coalitions, expectations of limited government, and toleration of dissent by a presumably loyal opposition" (Russett 1993: 31)—that prevent liberal/democratic regimes from fighting one another. In those theories, liberal/democratic political processes and institutions may resolve disputes without the use of force by contending parties, with due balance given to ensure "both majority rule and minority rights" (Russett 1993: 31). As such, in case a conflict emerges, liberal/democratic societies act according to a norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts towards other liberal/democratic societies, expecting that other liberal/democratic societies reciprocate accordingly (Russett 1993: 35). The immediate consequence, according to normative theories about the liberal/democratic peace, is the absence of wars among liberal/democratic societies.

The second strand of theories, structural/institutional, on the other hand, explains the absence of wars among liberal/democratic states as a result of the structures of checks and balances found in their regimes. According to such theories, liberal/democratic states are constrained from engaging in war by "the need to ensure broad popular support" (Russett 1993: 38), which is often a time-consuming process involving several instances of government bureaucracies. Moreover, as this process of mobilisation occurs much more publicly in liberal/democratic societies than in authoritarian regimes, citizens will often need to be convinced

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[10]A detailed review of theories within these two strands is found in Ish-Shalom (2013: 39–67). See also Kurki (2010: esp. 365–370).

about the real necessity of resorting to warfare before giving their consent.[11] Consequently, "leaders will not readily embark on an effort to prepare the country for war unless they are confident they can demonstrate a favorable ratio of costs and benefits to be achieved, at acceptable risk" (Russett 1993: 38). Once a conflict emerges, liberal/democratic leaders will expect to have enough time for non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms to function before they opt for a violent course of action (Russett 1993: 41). It is, in sum, the proper functioning of processes and institutions that discourages liberal democratic states from going to war with each other. Although disagreeing on the specific causal relations and mechanisms, both cultural/normative and structural/institutional theories provide sound explanations for the absence of wars among liberal/democratic states, that is, about the liberal/democratic peace (as a concept).

The liberal democratic peace as a framework is broader than the liberal/democratic peace as a concept: whereas the concept is mainly about the international implications of a specific domestic political system, the framework is about the "character of peace in civil and societal, political, economic, security, and international spheres" (Richmond 2011: 5). As a framework, the liberal democratic peace entails a wide and pro-active understanding about the promotion of liberal/democratic societies based fundamentally on the assumption that those are more peaceful than others in the conduct of their domestic and international relations (Newman et al. 2009a: 11; Paris 2004: 41).[12] In this broader sense, the liberal democratic peace is often defined in terms of an "international security framework" (Chandler 2004: 60), a "theoretical underpinning" (Newman et al. 2009a: 11), an "intellectual framework" (Sabaratnam 2011: 13) or a "core set of ideas and practices"

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[11] Kant is rather eloquent in elaborating on citizens' reluctance to easily consenting to war: "If [...] the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which are always impending" (Kant 1917: 122–123).

[12] Or, conversely, that "authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling parties" have more "aggressive instincts [that] make for war" (Doyle 1986: 1151).

(Mac Ginty 2010: 146).[13] Regardless of the specific label, the liberal democratic peace in this broader sense justifies, supports, motivates, legitimates and/or impinges policies, programmes and actions with the projected goal of creating liberal/democratic societies.

In peacebuilding scholarship, theorisations about the liberal democratic peace in this broader sense emerged out of a scholarly critique aimed at highlighting and moving beyond the inherent flaws and limits associated with the external promotion of democratic polities and free market economies in armed conflict and post-armed conflict situations (see, among others, Richmond 2004a, b, 2005, 2011; Roberts 2011; Tadjbakhsh 2011; Campbell et al. 2011; Chandler 2006, 2010; Mac Ginty 2006, 2010; Newman et al. 2009b; International Peacekeeping 2009; Richmond and Franks 2009; Pugh et al. 2008; Duffield 2001, 2007; Pugh 2005; Paris 2002, 2004). Oliver Richmond, one of the leading theorists in this body of scholarship, depicts the liberal democratic peace in this broader sense as a "discourse, framework and structure" (Richmond 2005: 206) that embodies a longstanding, mainly Western-led, tradition of dealing with armed conflicts and theorising about peace. A liberal/democratic peace (as a concept) is assumed to be universal and achievable as long as the "correct methods" and agreed strategies are used effectively by different actors (Richmond 2005: 183). These methods and strategies include technologies such as conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, among others. Conceived as such, the liberal democratic peace framework entails a top-down and state-centric approach that oftentimes ignores or neglects the everyday needs and social-economic realities of societies affected by armed conflicts, usually falling short of achieving a sustainable peace and preventing the emergence of a real social contract in those societies (Richmond 2011: esp. 4–13).

The Western imprint in the liberal democratic peace framework becomes evident as one looks into what Richmond refers to as its four constitutive strands of thinking or discourses about peace. The first is the victor's peace, the limited and short-lived peace associated with the top-down use of military force, especially by hegemonic powers. The two following strands of thinking are heavily influenced by the Western European enlightenment project: the constitutional peace, which reflects

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[13] In this broader sense, the liberal peace is sometimes also referred to as 'liberal internationalism'; see, e.g., Paris (1997) and Doyle (1997: esp. 258–277).

the defence, especially by early pacifist movements, of ideas such as cosmopolitanism, disarmament, democracy, free trade and humanitarian law; and the institutional peace, based upon judicial norms and regulation via international institutions. Finally, the fourth strand of thinking that constitutes the liberal peace is the civil peace, which is strongly marked by humanitarianism and focuses particularly on social actors and movements (Richmond 2005: 202–214). The "fine balance" between the four strands produces the liberal democratic peace and reflects its aspiration for "freedom and mutual regulation" (Richmond and Franks 2009: 5).

A distinctive feature of the liberal peace framework, which is particularly prominent in the places where peacebuilding policies and programmes are conceptualised and designed in the first place, such as UN headquarters, refers to its technocratic nature. Roger Mac Ginty defines technocracy as the "systems and behaviours that prioritize bureaucratic rationality". It is, he continues, at least in theory, "directed from above, pursues the imposition of a single policy paradigm and is immune to social context" (Mac Ginty 2012: 289). In the realm of peacebuilding, technocracy has led to the creation of homogenised technologies and languages that describe armed conflict situations within specific frames that tend to influence the very solutions elaborated as responses to problems. The technocratic approach associated with contemporary policies that are given expression by the liberal democratic peace may be "particularly intrusive and expansive, and is often associated with coercion" (Mac Ginty 2012: 291). Whereas it may be, and often is, contested at different levels, technocracy is often fostered and sustained by arguments that seeks to emphasise neutrality and efficiency, although it inherently reflects ideological underpinnings—Mac Ginty (2012: 291) suggests that technocracy is an ideology in itself. The technocratic feature of the liberal democratic peace, although often associated with neutral bureaucratic practices and procedures at the headquarters level, has also an important role shaping contemporary practices of peacebuilding in the field.

The historical record of virtual absence of wars among liberal/democratic states has been influential not only in academic, but also in policy and political circles. In academe, it has been conceptualised and theorised as the state of peace experienced among liberal/democratic states within specific geographical boundaries—the liberal/democratic peace as a concept. In policy and political circles, it has also offered a substrate for the development of a broader and pro-active understanding

that justifies, supports, motivates, legitimates and/or impinges concrete policies and programmes designed and implemented by global actors—usually states or their surrogates—with a view to creating liberal/democratic societies—the liberal democratic peace as framework. In the latter case, the liberal democratic peace framework has played a key role in how 'peacebuilding' gained life in the United Nations, particularly by providing meanings and influencing its content, as explored in the following chapters.

It is worth stressing that understood as such, the liberal democratic peace framework is not a global Western conspiracy or the by-product of overt and goal-oriented decision-making processes. Rather, the liberal democratic peace framework, as further explored in the following chapters, results from a simplified and politicised discourse originally produced in academe. It reflects prolonged adherence to that discourse and its assimilation among key individuals who may genuinely believe it, but which is not necessarily an overt agreement about what to do when confronted with armed conflict situations. It is also worth stressing that the liberal democratic peace is not only shaped and sustained rhetorically by Western, liberal-inspired articulators, but also by other concrete manifestations such as institutions, bureaucracies and policies. Furthermore, the liberal democratic peace is not necessarily detached from local dynamics in the places where peacebuilding initiatives take place, but they are also "part of a complex process in which many local actors may be complicit and willing participants" (Mac Ginty 2012: 302).

Peacebuilding: In Academia and in the United Nations

The second core element in this book is 'peacebuilding', a difficult concept to define precisely—ironically, not due to the lack but rather to the abundance of definitions. A survey of the academic literature by Goetze and Guzina (2008) reveals that peacebuilding has assumed rather different meanings according to distinct scholarly paradigms: it has been addressed as a blueprint of democratisation, based on the belief that democracies rarely fight each other (e.g., Paris 2004); as a security policy aimed at making states work (better), especially in the context of 'failing' or 'fragile' states and normally as a response to the chaos provoked by what Kaldor (1999) called 'new wars' (e.g., Helman and Ratner 1993); as an activity aimed at saving and/or improving people's lives in societies affected by armed conflict via external interventions concerned with

human security (e.g., Thakur 2006); and as a tool for the maintenance of the macrostructures of global governance (e.g., Chandler 2010). Similarly, in policy circles, different global actors have approached peacebuilding in varied ways, according to how peacebuilding is framed in their institutional mandates (Barnett et al. 2007). It is thus not surprising that Carolyn McAskie, who became the first UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support in 2006, noted that "[t]here are as many definitions of peacebuilding as there are peacebuilders" (McAskie 2010: 5).

Instead of carrying out yet another survey of existing definitions or advancing an original one, this book addresses 'peacebuilding' as a concept entailing a specific meaning that is minimally intelligible for individuals in the UN milieu. That specific meaning is not fixed, but changes in different historical contexts, as discussed in subsequent chapters. To lay the groundwork for such discussion, the remainder of this section provides a brief overview of selected definitions of 'peacebuilding' in academe and in UN circles.

As anticipated in the Introduction, it is often assumed that peacebuilding has its conceptual roots in the tradition of fields such as peace studies and conflict resolution, most notably in the writings of scholars such as Johan Galtung, John Paul Lederach and Kenneth E. Boulding, to name but a few.[14] While proposing theoretical models for the formation and dynamics of armed conflicts, their writings provide insightful conceptualisations of peace and how it may be achieved. More than simply reinforcing the understanding that peace is attainable by halting direct armed violence or by implementing the specific provisions of peace agreements, as in approaches that simply oppose peace to war, the tradition of peace and conflict studies has rather focused on the more ambitious idea of eradicating the deepest underlying causes of armed conflicts. This school of thought has generally envisaged "liberating communities from the oppression and misery of violence in a project whose main goal has been the cultivation of cultures and structures of peace" (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 235). Within this tradition of thinking and theorising about peace, peacebuilding has generally been understood as a process aimed at overcoming the violence embedded in societies and eradicating the structural barriers to the attainment of lasting peace.

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[14] For accounts on the history, development and relevance of contemporary peace studies, see Wallensteen (1988, 2011), Wiberg (2005), Dunn (2005), Patomäki (2001), Singer (1976), and Reid and Yanarella (1976).

Johan Galtung is a key scholar in this tradition, having fruitfully contributed to theorising about peace at the early stages of peace and conflict studies as institutionalised fields of academic research, especially in the 1960s and 1970s (see Lawler 1995). His definition of peacebuilding is supported by his own theory of peace. In his earlier writings, peace is not directly linked with wars and armed conflicts, as in more conventional IR theories, but instead to violence, understood as "*the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual*" achievement in human activities (Galtung 1969: 168; emphasis in original; see also Galtung 1964, 1981, 1996).[15] Violence is not, as such, understood only in terms of its narrower and commonsensical meaning as a physical or personal act, but also in terms of influence, and is present "*when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations*" (Galtung 1969: 168; emphasis in original). When violence is inflicted by an actor, Galtung refers to direct or physical violence; in the absence of such an actor, he refers to structural or indirect violence (Galtung 1969: 170).

Within this framework, Galtung relates the concept of peace to violence, defining the former as the absence of the latter (Galtung 1969: 168; see also Galtung 1981, 1996). Recalling the two-folded view on violence in terms of direct and structural, it follows that peace can be narrowly understood both as the absence of personal or direct violence—which Galtung refers to as negative peace—or, in a broader sense, as the absence of structural violence—positive peace (Galtung 1969: 183). Conceived as such, peace may be intimately associated with both armed conflict and development. It is thus no coincidence that Galtung equates positive peace with social justice, that is, "the egalitarian distribution of power and resources" across society (Galtung 1969: 183).

It is this theoretical framework that underlies Galtung's *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding*, the text usually referred to when connections are implied between the original academic concept of peacebuilding and the one embraced in the United Nations in the early 1990s.[16] In the text, Galtung depicts a

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[15]The definition is followed by a lengthy discussion on several underlying dimensions of violence; see Galtung (1969: 168–174).

[16]The text usually quoted is a book chapter dated 1976 as the expanded version of an article published as Galtung (1975). I refer and quote the book chapter as it is the one more often cited by peacebuilding scholars.

three-dimension framework of approaches to achieve peace in world politics. The first is peacekeeping, or the dissociative approach, which aims to achieve peace by simply keeping antagonists separated from each other, with the support of third parties if necessary (Galtung 1976: 282–290). Peacemaking, the conflict resolution approach, seeks to "get rid of the source of tension" and leave the "rest" to "take care of itself" (Galtung 1976: 290). According to Galtung, resolving conflicts via peacemaking may involve either eliminating the incompatibility that caused violence in the first place or persuading actors not to pursue goals that lead to violent confrontation, even if ultimately preserving incompatibilities (Galtung 1976: 290–297). Finally, anchored on his understanding of peace as opposed to structural violence, Galtung presents peacebuilding, the associative approach, which focuses on the deepest causes of armed conflicts between the parties involved (Galtung 1976: 297). Peacebuilding in Galtung's writings is thus about the construction of structural conditions that "*remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur*" (Galtung 1976: 298; emphasis in original); peacebuilding, in other words, is about positive peace (Galtung 2012).

In this conceptualisation, the three approaches gradually move from mechanisms that potentially lead to situations of negative peace—absence of direct violence—to mechanisms leading to a situation of positive peace or social justice. Indeed, by keeping warring parties apart from each other via peacekeeping, the outcome is usually the absence of direct armed conflict between the antagonists, but not necessarily progress addressing the sources of conflict. Peacemaking mechanisms seek to attain a situation beyond a negative peace, but one that is still too fragile to be self-sustaining and avoid a relapse into conflict. According to Galtung, one of the reasons for the fragility of such a peace is that agreements between antagonists are often reached under the pressure of a third party (Galtung 1976: 296–297). On the other end of the spectrum, since it deals with the root causes of armed conflicts, peacebuilding is more likely to achieve a situation of positive peace, according to the author, due to its focus on the structural causes of conflict. In the tradition of peace and conflict studies, in sum, peacebuilding has been originally conceived as a broad and holistic process aimed at achieving positive peace.

In the UN, the term and the concept of 'peacebuilding' became part of the political lexicon more vividly only in 1992, when then

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released the report *An Agenda for Peace*. The report is further explored in Chapter 5, but for now it suffices to reiterate that it defined peacebuilding, or post-conflict peacebuilding more precisely, as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 21). Subsequent documents further elaborated definitions for peacebuilding and its associated tasks over the next years (see Chapter 6), but it remains difficult to outline a common and straightforward formulation of the concept in the UN milieu. In fact, right after the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, more than 20 years after the entrance of 'peacebuilding' in the UN, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) pointed out in an internal report that the lack of agreement on a clear framework for peacebuilding remained one of the main challenges affecting the UN's capacities in that area (EOSG 2006: 6).

With a view to minimising that gap, the Secretary-General' Policy Committee adopted, in May 2007, a definition of peacebuilding that ought to be used as a 'conceptual basis' across the UN system—whether or not this basis has since been harmoniously incorporated by the different entities involved in peacebuilding in the system remains an open question. The conceptual basis is formulated as follows:

> Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (United Nations 2007: 1)

From this formulation and from the analysis of several definitions that will be explored in Chapter 6, it becomes clear that peacebuilding in the UN has not always necessarily been understood as a process, as in the tradition of peace studies. Rather, it has more often been perceived as a set of "measures" (United Nations 2007: 1), "actions" (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 21) or "activities" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 13) carried out especially in post-armed conflict situations (although sometimes during conflicts) with the

ultimate goal of avoiding a relapse into armed conflict and creating an enabling environment for peace.[17]

COMING INTO LIFE AND REMAINING INFLUENTIAL

This section outlines the set of theorised dynamics that helps to unpack the process through which the concept of peacebuilding gained life and the implications of this process in the UN milieu. To construct and sustain my main argument, I proceed in three analytical steps.

The first step is to demonstrate that *the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as hermeneutical mechanism*. Theories about the liberal/democratic peace may be understood as theoretical constructs that assemble political concepts such as 'liberal democracy' and 'peace' together, serving as a framework in which both concepts assume and endow particular meanings vis-à-vis each other. As a theoretical construct, however, the liberal democratic peace is restricted to academe and does not necessarily drive individuals to political action. It is only if and when it migrates to public spheres that it may have a real political impact in legitimating, justifying, informing and enacting concrete policies or political actions. Hence, if the liberal democratic peace framework indeed supports and enacts contemporary peacebuilding practices with the projected goal of creating liberal democratic societies, as pointed out by the critique of the liberal peace scholarship, the liberal democratic peace framework must have been converted from theoretical construct into public convention and political conviction via a hermeneutical mechanism of attaching meaning to political concepts.

The completion of the hermeneutical mechanism provides a meaning to 'peacebuilding' that requires political action, but it does not necessarily and straightforwardly lead to the implementation of policies by the United Nations. Before it can happen, that meaning needs to gain foothold among individuals in the UN milieu to frame and inform their views on peacebuilding. The second analytical step is thus to demonstrate that *the concept of 'peacebuilding' informed by the liberal democratic peace as political conviction gradually became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu after the release of An Agenda for Peace*. This is not to say that such a meaning was necessarily accepted by all individuals in the UN

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[17] References to peacebuilding as a process would only be found in UN documents much later; see, e.g. UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393: para. 15).

milieu at all times and to the same extent, but that the liberal democratic peace has served as the main referential around UN circles for framing and informing how individuals understand 'peacebuilding', the activities it entails and how peacebuilding initiatives should be carried out in the field.

I posit that political convictions and related ideational aspects (e.g. concepts, norms, discourses) became minimally intelligible in international organisations via two paths: rhetorical and bureaucratic. The rhetorical path refers to the assimilation of political convictions in the organisation's ideational substrate. This may occur via the recurrent rhetorical use of political convictions in the organisation's everyday practices and activities, such as oral statements, meetings, agenda items or appearances in official documents. For instance, member states' diplomats may use political convictions to legitimate and/or support their discourses, and international civil servants may use them, implicitly or explicitly, in relevant documents (e.g., working papers, internal reports). Whereas being referred to on such occasions does not necessarily imply their acceptance by individuals or institutions, the recurrent appearance of political convictions and related ideational aspects in discourse and official documents demonstrate their frequent usage and discursive relevance in the organisation's milieu, contributing to gradually rendering them minimally intelligible in that context.

The second path, bureaucratic, refers to the assimilation of political convictions in the organisation's bureaucratic structures. Assimilation via this path tends to occur—albeit this is not necessarily a prerequisite—after political convictions and related ideational aspects have already been assimilated in the ideational substrate, as outlined above, since it helps to legitimate, justify and provide meaning for adjustments aimed to have political convictions reflected in bureaucratic structures. For example, political convictions related to the importance of environmental considerations in international peace and security issues may become assimilated in the bureaucracy of an international organisation via a variety of means, including inter alia: changes in the mandate of a security-oriented department to include environmental concerns; the creation of a staff position to cover responsibilities related to environmental issues in a unit primarily dedicated to international peace and security; and the creation or reform of existing bureaucratic structures to address both topics simultaneously. In all cases, it is likely that concepts, documents or policy directives have already taken root in the ideational substrate, thus

providing the basis for bureaucratic reforms in the concerned international organisation.

Individuals who contribute to the assimilation of political convictions and related ideational aspects via a rhetorical path does not necessarily have to be part (e.g., member of staff) of the concerned international organisation or hold hierarchically high positions in its bureaucratic structures, but they need at a minimum to take part or be vocal within the relevant policymaking community so that their rhetoric may have an impact. In other words, those individuals need to be part of and/or have influence on the organisation's milieu. When that is the case, individuals may foster their ideas and influence others, shaping the content or meaning of relevant elements in the organisation's ideational substrate. Conversely, in the bureaucratic path of assimilation, individuals who decide upon or carry out the specified course of action (e.g., creation of a new organ or reform of an existing one) need to be part of the concerned international organisation, either of its bureaucratic or intergovernmental dimension (e.g. member of staff or member state representative). This requirement does not exclude the potential participation of external individuals (i.e. non-members of staff) in proposing or advocating the specified course of action; however, strictly speaking, they cannot be the ones effectively carrying out or approving such proposals at the level of the organisation's bureaucratic structures.

The two analytical steps outlined above correspond to the 'coming into life' of peacebuilding in the UN and to dynamics taking place in the UN milieu from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, approximately. Initially, 'peacebuilding' entered and gradually became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu bearing a particular meaning. Influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework, that meaning subsequently served as the main framework through which 'peacebuilding' has been conceptualised and implemented in the United Nations, motivating, legitimating, justifying and enacting concrete UN actions. Since the liberal democratic peace as political conviction entails "a strong, opinionated view that necessitates political action" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 22), it is reasonable to assume that dissociating the meaning offered by the liberal democratic peace from the concept of 'peacebuilding' once it has been assimilated in the UN milieu would prove difficult and time-consuming. To demonstrate the continued influence of the liberal democratic peace as the main source of meaning for 'peacebuilding' in the Organisation, the third and final analytical step is thus to demonstrate that *the establishment and*

functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund in the United Nations were and remain largely predicated on, and even reinforce, the concept of peacebuilding informed by the liberal democratic peace.

Following these three analytical steps, I construct and sustain the main argument of this research study: that the way the concept of peacebuilding came into life in the particular context of the United Nations in the early 1990s had a profound and lasting influence in the Organisation's provision of support to societies affected by armed conflict. From the early 1990s to the present, the meaning of 'peacebuilding', as informed by the liberal democratic peace, has not only served to shape and provide meaning to political concepts such as 'liberal democracy' and 'peace', but also offered a rationale (at the ideational level) and informed the structures (at the bureaucratic level) that, combined, served to motivate, legitimate, justify and enact concrete UN peacebuilding initiatives in the field.

Methodological Approach

To reflect constructivism's tenets about the construction of social reality, the social construction of knowledge about that reality and the interplay between the two, this book is informed by what Pouliot (2007: esp. 364–368) defined as a "sobjectivist-with-an-O methodology". This methodology is simultaneously inductive, interpretive and historical. Inductive since its starting point is what social agents take for granted rather than what analysts believe to be 'real', which allows for the identification of the meanings that relevant agents (e.g., individuals in the UN milieu) ascribe to social aspects (e.g., the meaning of 'peacebuilding'). Interpretative because the explanations it aims to produce involve an in-depth comprehension of those meanings, including both conjectures from data analysis and the interpretation of those conjectures—what Pouliot refers to as developing "meanings about meanings" (Pouliot 2007: 365). Finally, a sobjectivist methodology is historical since social aspects do not exist independently 'out there', but are created by social dynamics rooted in a particular spatial and temporal context (Pouliot 2007: 367). A sobjectivist methodology, in sum, allows for the development of both subjective knowledge about "the meanings that social agents attribute to their own reality" and objectified knowledge derived "from 'standing back' from a given situation by contextualizing and historicizing it" (Pouliot 2007: 367).

Accordingly, the analysis in the ensuing chapters was constructed following three non-linear methodological steps (see Pouliot 2007: 368–377). The first was identifying the subjective meaning that relevant agents in the UN milieu attributed to their social reality with a view to grasping social reality through their own perspective—at least to the extent that this is possible. This included being aware of, for instance, understandings and points of view that are often taken for granted by those individuals—e.g., concepts such as 'peacebuilding' or everyday practices in the UN Secretariat such as language. The second methodological step was to objectify those meanings by putting them in a wider context. In constructivist-inspired research, it is hardly individual, isolated meanings that matter for analytical purposes, but rather those minimally intelligible in a given social context. When put into context, those meanings become "part of an intersubjective web [of meanings] inside of which every text or practice refers and stands in relation to others" (Pouliot 2007: 374). Finally, the third methodological step was to introduce time and history to the analysis, that is, to "historicize intersubjectivity so as to account for the temporal dimension in the mutual constitution of social reality and knowledge" (see Pouliot 2007: 372). Interpreting webs of meanings in a temporal dimension is what enables the consideration of power relations, since they highlight competition and contestation as meanings are being constructed and adjusted in a particular social and political setting.

A variety of methods was used to gather and analyse information to recover, objectify and historicise meanings. Such variety of methods helped ensure a comprehensive basis for the interpretation carried out in the second analytical step outlined above and to 'triangulate' interpretation combining different inductive methods (Pouliot 2007: 370). To develop subjective knowledge about meanings in the UN milieu, I carried out a three-month period of participant observation at UN headquarters in New York between October and December 2010, which enabled my active participation in recurrent activities for individuals in the UN milieu, as well as first-hand observation and interpretation of my own participation and observation in that context. Given my affiliation to the permanent mission of a member state during that period, I was able to experience and better understand everyday practices and dynamics in the UN milieu from an insider's perspective, as well as to develop what Neumann (2008: esp. 63–65) called "cultural competence".

Qualitative semi-structured interviews were also extensively used to gather subject meanings of individuals in the UN milieu (e.g., their understanding of 'peacebuilding' and the UN role in building peace), and obtain insider's knowledge and "understand the meaning of respondents' experiences and life worlds" (Warren 2001: 83). Interviewees represent a sample of individuals actively working on peace and security issues in general and peacebuilding in particular the UN milieu from the late 1980s to mid-2013. This sample includes approximately 60 persons from academics and other external observers to member states' diplomats to UN staff members. Subjective knowledge was also gained through the analysis of other sources, including interviewees' own books, articles, biographies, memoirs, collected papers, public statements and/or public interviews.

Content analysis was instrumental to objectify and put subjective meanings into a wider context. According to the constructivist framework outlined in the previous chapter, this analysis focused on both written and unwritten texts (see Ish-Shalom 2006a: 566). Unwritten texts were mostly gathered from participant observation and interviews, and included, inter alia, ideas, concepts, social practices, social hierarchies, oral statements and the background context in which discourses were produced. Written texts, on the other hand, included UN official and internal documents, and other materials. The former included texts in a variety of formats (e.g. resolutions, reports, verbatim records of meetings) and were useful to identify and explore agreed positions over particular meanings (as in Security Council resolutions) or the record for the analysis of contending meanings (as in statements registered in meeting records). Other materials varied significantly and included, for instance, preliminary/advanced copies of reports, internal studies/reports, and memoranda between internal offices in the Secretariat. Their analysis helped to identify contending views about particular meanings and to establish an accurate chronology of events. I collected other materials from a range of sources, including the UN Archives and the personal files of individuals directly involved in key processes or events of interest.

Finally, in the third step, a narrative was constructed to historicise meanings and bring about a "new, objectified form of knowledge about the past and the present" (Pouliot 2007: 373). In doing so, this book proposes "an *explanatory* narrative which organizes a sequence of

discourses and practices around a plot" (Pouliot 2007: 377; emphasis in original). This plot centres on how the concept of 'peacebuilding' came into life in the UN milieu and the implications of this process for the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict. Because the ensuing narrative is constructed from an interpretation (even if a sobjective one), what follows in the following chapters is not *the*, but *a* plot. Moreover, as in any attempt to address and account for, in a single narrative, dynamics with a global impact during a period spanning more than 20 years, what follows will inevitably contain gaps and blank spots. I do not, therefore, claim or expect to provide a definitive narrative, or that all the individuals interviewed or involved in the processes and events herein described will necessarily agree with my arguments or conclusions. I do expect, however, that the narrative will identify relevant agents in the UN milieu and the (minimally intelligible) meanings that they attached and attach to concepts and practices of 'peacebuilding', and that it will shed light into how those meanings have been constructed and have impacted social reality in general and world politics in particular.

Chapter Summary

This chapter outlined the framework for the analysis developed in the remainder of the book. It introduced concepts and notions, and advanced a conceptual proposal that reflects constructivism's tenets about the construction of social reality and the influence of ideational aspects in policy outcomes and political actions. The proposed methodological strategy is justified theoretically: it not only assumes that understandings of ideational aspects are not fixed, but also seeks to locate historically the contexts in which those understandings are produced as well as the power relations between different actors. The framework for analysis herein outlined reinforces the inherently contextual nature of knowledge and research production, and the existence of power relations between distinct actors in specific processes.

In the following chapter, I start to construct a narrative about the coming into life of peacebuilding in the United Nations and its implications for the Organisation's approach to societies affected by armed conflict. The narrative describes how a particular meaning of 'peacebuilding' was originally constructed in the UN milieu in connection with the drafting of the Secretary-General's report *An Agenda for Peace*. It continues by outlining how that meaning was gradually assimilated in

the UN milieu and the UN constitutive dimensions via rhetorical and bureaucratic paths. Finally, in a narrative-cum-case-study-analysis, it focuses on the functioning of the so-called UN 'peacebuilding architecture' to demonstrate the prolonged influence of the liberal peace, which, more than 20 years after gaining foothold the UN following the publication of Boutros-Ghali's report, continues to serve as the main referential for understanding 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu. Initiating that narrative, the following chapter demonstrates that the liberal peace is a successful case of theory as a hermeneutical mechanism.

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The Origins of UN Peacebuilding (I): The Academic Roots

INTRODUCTION

According to the theoretical framework and the conceptual proposal outlined in the previous chapter, 'peacebuilding' may be understood as a concept entailing a specific meaning that is minimally intelligible for individuals in the United Nations (UN) milieu. This meaning, as extensively explored by the critique of the liberal peace scholarship, is given by the liberal democratic peace, which, in essence, reflects "the idea that certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are" (Newman et al. 2009a: 11). In this and in the following chapter, I use Ish-Shalom's hermeneutical mechanism to shed light into how such a particular meaning of 'peacebuilding' became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu. In the narrative, the Secretary-General's report *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, of 1992, has a pivotal role for contributing to the dissemination of that particular meaning of 'peacebuilding' around the UN milieu in the early 1990s.[1]

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[1] It is worth noting, however, that the term 'peacebuilding' did appear earlier in UN documents. Over the course of my research, I found the term in summary records of General Assembly meetings (e.g., UN Docs. A/C.5/45/SR.15; A/C.2/45/SR.26; A/C.1/45/PV.14) and even in a report of the Secretary-General issued during the mandate of Boutros-Ghali's predecessor (UN Doc. A/46/549). The term and concept, however, only gained widespread currency in the UN milieu following the release of *An Agenda for Peace*.

By characterising the liberal democratic peace as a theoretical construct, I argue that the meaning of 'peacebuilding' that became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu in the early 1990s entailed a strong and entrenched view about the promotion of liberal/democratic states in post-armed conflict societies. This view was essentially built upon a politicised and simplified version of academic theories about the liberal/democratic peace (not upon the theories themselves), which had migrated from academe to public spheres as public conventions and subsequently became political convictions. This and the following chapter focus on this migration process to explore the book's first analytical step: to demonstrate that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as a hermeneutical mechanism that attaches meaning to political concepts such as 'liberal democracy', 'peace' and 'peacebuilding'.

En route, both chapters challenge the two views outlined in the Introduction about the origins of the concept of peacebuilding in the United Nations: that it was created from scratch by Boutros-Ghali himself, and that it stems directly from Galtung's earlier writings on peace and peacebuilding. I challenge the first view by delving into historical documents that ascertain Boutros-Ghali's acquaintance with the term 'peacebuilding' as part of the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace*. Hence, despite his direct influence in shaping the meaning of peacebuilding in the final report, he had been influenced by earlier discussions on the topic before the moment of "conceptual epiphany" in which he is said to have conceived the concept (Karns 2012: 72). I also challenge the second view by enquiring into the academic sources of 'peacebuilding' in Boutros-Ghali's report. Whereas a connection probably exists between Galtung's and Boutros-Ghali's concepts, their meanings are rather distinct, with the latter being heavily influenced by the then growing US scholarship on the democratic peace and on the Secretary-General's views on democracy and democratisation. As a result, whereas Galtung advances peacebuilding as a holistic process involving concerns with a broad range of social, political and economic issues, Boutros-Ghali strongly associates peacebuilding with the promotion of democracies in post-armed conflict situations. The narrative presented in these two chapters recasts a new understanding about the origins and the meaning of 'peacebuilding' in the United Nations in the early 1990s.

This chapter is organised into three sections. The first characterises the liberal democratic peace framework (not the concept) as a theoretical

construct that assembles political concepts such as liberal democracy and peace in an intelligible framework. As a theoretical construct, however, the liberal democratic peace was essentially restricted to academic circles, so it had to migrate to public spheres before it could have any potential influence in policy outcomes and political courses of action. The remainder of the chapter thus outlines how the liberal democratic peace migrated from academic circles to public spheres in general and the UN milieu in particular in the early 1990s. The second section identifies the material and ideational factors facilitating this migration, whereas the third discusses how Boutros-Ghali's public usage of the thesis that democracies rarely fight each other triggered and drove the gradual migration of the liberal democratic peace as theoretical construct away from academe and into the highest levels of decision-making in the UN Secretariat. This chapter, in sum, explores the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from theoretical construct into public convention. The final step of the hermeneutical mechanism, the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from public convention into political conviction, is explored in Chapter 5.

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PEACE AS THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT

The liberal democratic peace framework may be broken down into its two core concepts: 'liberal democracy' and 'peace'. Separately, each one of those concepts may assume such a variety of meanings that agreement on a categorical common definition of either liberal democracy or peace is virtually impossible. For each one of the meanings that those concepts may assume there is an associated discourse supporting specific policy practices. Hence, when arranged together against the framework of a configuration of contested concepts, the concepts of 'liberal democracy' and 'peace' acquire viable meanings that potentially lead to political action. Since the different meanings of both concepts may be arranged in different configurations, it follows that the liberal democratic peace may also entail different meanings—and consequently, a different pool of associated political praxis. The liberal democratic peace may thus be understood as a theoretical construct as defined by Ish-Shalom.

The concepts of 'liberal democracy' and 'peace' are illustrative of what philosopher W. B. Gallie referred to as essentially contested concepts, that is, those "concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users"

(Gallie 1956: 168). 'Democracy', he claims, is "*the* appraisive political concept *par excellence*" (Gallie 1956: 184; emphasis in original). If etymologically the term entails the notion of 'rule by the people', the idea of democracy reflects a complex history with diverging interpretations: from Athens to today's globalised world, Held (2006) identifies and explores over a dozen models and variants of democracy in the Western tradition. In the same vein but in a less scholarly tone, Manglapus (1987) reviews democratic practices in several societies in non-Western traditions, including but not limited to ancient Mesopotamia, the Incas and some islands in Southeast Asia.

In this book, I employ Haack's democratic continuum to represent the multiplicity of images and concepts entailed by liberal democracy in the study of world politics in general and the UN milieu in particular.[2] The continuum represents "the liberal democratic paradigm of Western democracy theory, and the numerous visions of democracy offered by it" (Haack 2011: 33). Its reference point is a minimalist understanding of democracy as the 'rule by the people', where democracy focuses on procedural aspects such as elections, thus limiting peoples' exercise of rule to the act of voting. In this view, the electoral process is fundamental because it connects those who rule and those who are ruled both by enabling control (e.g., the rulers need to be accountable to the people if they wish to remain in power) and by conferring legitimacy (e.g., to the actors who run for office). Institutions contemporarily associated with democracy in the West, such as free parties and parliament, state bureaucratic institutions and the separation of powers, are also important in this minimal version. Haack contends, however, that in the minimalist view those institutions are "instrumental rather than conceptual" because their primary aim is "not to define democracy but to manage the outcomes of competitive elections" (Haack 2011: 23). As such, in its minimalist-procedural connotation, democracy is understood as a system with effectively functioning democratic procedures and processes.

In Haack's democratic continuum, conceptions of democracies outside the liberal paradigm of Western democracy are represented by a dotted line departing from the continuum's reference point—a minimalist understanding of 'democracy'. The author illustrates one such

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[2]For other readings, see Ish-Shalom (2013: 39–67) and Kurki (2010: 365–369).

possibility with the loya jirga, a traditional decision-making instance in Afghanistan where individuals are represented by others not because they were voted by the majority, but by virtue of their age or position in their clans or tribes (Haack 2011: 16). To the right of its reference point, the democratic continuum moves indefinitely, in a solid line, towards a maximalist view of 'democracy', one that goes beyond the right to vote and to be voted to include concerns with what takes place between elections in multiple facets of social life. In this view, the personal becomes political and democracy is not only about elections and democratic institutions, but also about democratic outcomes such as the achievement of the "common good" and the "good life" (Haack 2011: 23, 27). Thus understood, democracy aims at promoting the values of freedom and equality, having at its core "questions about equality, justice, human development and participation" (Haack 2011: 23). In this clearly normative conceptualisation, democracy does not entail a definitive concept, but it may be understood as "a form of polity in which some degree of communitarian responsibility leads to policies, institutions and structures that try to ameliorate the effects of market activity and other social dynamics in general and particularly for those without a voice and conflict potential of their own" (Haack 2011: 28). The lack of a categorical definition indicates that this maximalist-substantive version of democracy may be achieved through "various combinations of institutions, principles, rights and processes" (Haack 2011: 33), which means that democracy in this connotation is not static but in constant development.

Haack's democratic continuum is useful for the purposes of this book for two reasons. First, because it was developed in a research about 'democracy' in the context of the UN. Hence, when outlining the trajectory of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu, particularly in this chapter, her work serves as a reference on the visions of 'democracy' in the Organisation at different moments. The second reason is that, according to the author, the democratic continuum precludes descriptions of the different meanings of democracy in terms of "better or worse" or "more and less" (Haack 2011: 16). Rather than stalling with conceptual and methodological tensions to assess democracy vis-à-vis other systems or different democracies, the continuum offers a framework to "compare mainstream [Western liberal] democracy theory with possible interpretations used by the UN and to locate these

interpretations between the poles of minimal-procedural and maximal-substantive" (Haack 2011: 33).

'Peace' is the second core concept in the liberal democratic peace framework. It is also a strongly contested concept, understood differently by people(s) across space and time and assuming meanings that vary greatly within either societies and civilisations (e.g., Kende 1989; Galtung 1981) or specialised fields of study (e.g., Richmond 2008). In IR, different theoretical traditions have perceived peace in various ways—even if often implicitly. Realist theorists, for instance, mainly inspired by the writings of Hobbes (1651), conceive world politics chiefly as an everlasting struggle for power recurrently marked by war and armed conflicts. In *Theory of International Politics*, a key reference in this tradition of thought in IR, Waltz ascertains that "[a]mong states, the state of nature is a state of war" (Waltz 1979: 102). Based on such a narrow ontological universe, peace is primarily understood in relation to those events: it can be the result of either a truce or the imposition of the will of the strongest; either way, peace is simply the temporary absence of, an interregnum in between, wars. Against this backdrop, peace "will always be limited, brief, tragic and illusory" (Richmond 2008: 49). Theorists in the idealist tradition, on the other hand, refer to peace as a "future possibility […] in which states and individuals are free, prosperous and unthreatened" (Richmond 2008: 9). Their view represents a normative view of a universal state of affairs sustained by harmony between peoples and institutions, that is, the "absence of any form of violence" (Richmond 2008: 154, see also 121–139).

A good summary of many other conceptualisations of 'peace' in IR may be found in the following passage of Richmond's research into the different approaches to the idea of peace in IR scholarship:

> Structuralism and Marxist approaches see peace as lying in the absence of certain types of structural violence, often in structures which promote economic and class domination. Cosmopolitanism extends the liberal argument to include the development of a universal discourse between states, organisations and actors for mutual accord. Constructivism combines these understandings, allowing identities and ideas to modify state behaviour but retaining the core of realism which sees states as underpinning order and peace as limited to institutional cooperation and a limited recognition of individual agency. Critical approaches see peace as a consequence of a cosmopolitan, communicative transcendence of parochial understandings

of global responsibility and action. Post-structuralism represents peace as resulting from the identification of the deep-rooted structures of dominance and their revolutionary replacement as a consequence of that identification by multiple and coexisting concepts of peace which respect the difference of others. (Richmond 2008: 9–10)

In sum, 'peace' may acquire such different meanings in IR scholarship that a common and categorical definition is virtually impossible among theorists of world politics.

To make sense of this variety of definitions, I arrange different conceptualisations of 'peace' in IR in a spectrum ranging from negative to positive peace, mirroring Galtung's dual understanding of peace—Fig. 4.1. In this spectrum, I consider IR conceptualisations according to both their ideal vision of 'peace' and their ontological correspondent—that is, their correspondent in 'reality'. Whereas in theory they all seemingly converge to the positive side of the spectrum, what they actually accomplish is usually more limited, leaning towards the negative end. For instance, although they both seem to envision a situation of positive peace in theory, the realist ontological correspondent of peace as essentially the absence of war will be closer to the negative end of the spectrum, whilst the idealist correspondent will be closer to the positive end. The remaining conceptualisations mentioned above are placed within both poles, closer to one or to the other, according to whether they understand peace as the absence of direct or structural violence.

From this brief overview, it emerges that there is hardly a common and definitive concept of 'liberal democracy' or 'peace' upon which IR or peace scholars may agree. Both are heavily contested concepts, assuming a wide range of meanings when considered separately. They do not entail viable meanings in themselves, but rather, as political concepts, they gain "meaning, visibility, and political significance only in

Fig. 4.1   Sample of academic conceptualisations of peace in IR

the context of a whole configuration of political concepts" (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 569). This configuration is given by the liberal democratic peace framework, which, I argue, may be understood as a theoretical construct. Understood against the framework of the liberal democratic peace as theoretical construct, the concepts of 'liberal democracy' and 'peace' endow each other with meaning, with each meaning of the former providing a specific meaning to the latter and vice versa.

Consider, for instance, structural/institutional theories about the phenomenon of the liberal/democratic peace—as a concept, not as a framework. In those theories, as discussed in Chapter 3, wars between liberal/democratic societies are avoided due to the existence of effective institutional constraints such as a structure of division of powers and checks and balances (Russett 1993: 38–40). Liberal democracy, hence, is depicted in its minimal-procedural sense as a political system of functioning processes, procedures and institutions (Haack 2011: 16–23). One of the most crucial aspects of such a minimal connotation of liberal democracy refers to citizens' right to vote and to be voted, with free and fair elections guaranteeing control and legitimacy to the system. In case of disruption of this system, democracies may quickly revert into another type of political regime since society itself is not 'truly democratic'. In this scenario, liberal democracy is restricted to a political *system*, not to a *society*; as such, it is not very stable. Recalling that the existence of a zone of separate peace among liberal/democratic societies is dependent upon the stability of their domestic political system, it follows that the liberal/democratic peace in this scenario will only last as long as the respective domestic liberal/democratic political systems endure. Consequently, the liberal/democratic peace in a particular imaginary zone is ontologically less stable, leaning towards the negative side of the spectrum of peace depicted above. The liberal/democratic peace shared by minimalist-procedural liberal democracies represented by elections, in sum, is a short-lived one.

On the other hand, normative/cultural theories stress the existence of liberal/democratic norms and values to explain the rare occurrence of wars among liberal/democratic societies (Russett 1993: 30–38). In such explanations, internalised norms such as the peaceful settlement of disputes are more important than the existence of a functioning electoral system alone. Accordingly, democracy is closely associated with political *societies* embodying democratic elements, that is, with a

maximalist-substantive version of liberal democracy (Haack 2011: 23–29). Liberal democracies are thus presumably more "stable and comprehensive", since they result from a combined set of "institutions, principles, rights and processes" deeply embedded in several aspects of societal life (Haack 2011: 33). The liberal/democratic peace that exists among such societies, consequently, tends to be more stable and comprehensive, leaning towards the positive end of the spectrum of peace in Fig. 4.1. Whether or not this peace achieves and/or represents an ideal-type condition of social justice is questionable, but peace in this context, at least in theory, entails more than the simple absence of war.

As discussed in Chapter 3, and as embraced in Ish-Shalom's hermeneutical mechanism, re-defining theories about the liberal/democratic peace as political thoughts means that they may ultimately drive political action. Indeed, the author contends, once "one accepts that democracies do not fight each other, the policy implication should be to support democratization abroad" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 44). Consequently, for each understanding assumed by theories about the liberal/democratic peace, there is an associated pool of meanings assumed by the concepts of 'liberal democracy' and 'peace', as well as of policy practices about how to promote and/or achieve them.

In the first scenario outlined above, structural/institutional theories lead to democratisation policies and prescriptions that emphasise the creation of electoral structures and institutions for the functioning of a minimal-procedural democracy. This arises from the underlying conceptualisation of liberal democracy as a system of universal suffrage and peace in its negative-leaning connotation. In contemporary peacebuilding scholarship, Roland Paris may be said to represent this view given his assumption that a country is democratic when it "possesses all the political institutions characteristic of a modem representative government with universal or near universal suffrage" (Paris 1997: 56, footnote 58). On the other hand, normative/cultural theories about the rare occurrence of wars among liberal/democratic societies will generate policies and prescriptions for actions that aim not only at creating procedures, processes and institutions, but also at embedding those aspects, principles and rights in all societal aspects abroad. Those policies and prescriptions stem from a conceptualisation of liberal democracy in its maximalist-substantive version and of peace in its positive-leaning understanding. Due to their emphasis on aspects such as political participation and the

functioning of the rule of law in between elections, among other aspects, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) may be said to represent this view in contemporary peacebuilding scholarship. Figure 4.2 offers a visual summary of this discussion.

The liberal democratic peace framework may thus be understood as a theoretical construct that assembles the political concepts of 'liberal democracy' and 'peace' together. In academic circles, despite entailing different connotations separately, the two concepts endow specific meanings to each other when arranged together, resulting in different configurations and understandings about the imaginary zone of peace shared by liberal/democratic societies. For each of those combined meanings, there is an associated discourse supporting particular policies and courses of action, which, in this case, refers to democratisation. Those combined meanings have the potential to affect the 'reality' of and phenomena in world politics to the extent that they assign meanings to each other and may be used to "persuade people and motivate them to political action" (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 568; 2013: 17). Having argued that the liberal democratic peace may be understood as a theoretical construct, the first step of the hermeneutical mechanism is given. However, to become influential to such an extent as to potentially influence policy outcomes, the liberal democratic peace as theoretical construct has to go through a process of migration from academe to public spheres.

Liberal/democratic peace framework			Policy implication
	Concepts of liberal democracy	⟷ Concepts of peace	
Structural/institutional theories about the liberal/democratic peace	Minimalist-procedural	⟷ Negative	Structural democratisation
Normative/cultural theories about the liberal/democratic peace	Maximalist-substantive	⟷ Positive	Normative democratisation

Fig. 4.2 Competing meanings of the liberal democratic peace as theoretical construct

From Academe to Public Spheres: The Liberal Democratic Peace as Public Convention

In the remainder of this chapter, I address the second stage of the hermeneutical mechanism, which refers to its migration to public spheres in general and the UN milieu in particular. Although what follows focuses on this transformation against the backdrop of the UN milieu due to the focus of this research, the migration of the liberal democratic peace framework to public spheres was not restricted to or occurred only due to dynamics confined to that socio-political environment. In fact, Ish-Shalom rightly notes that the migration of theoretical constructs to public spheres usually takes "an all-but-one-way route" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 70). In his book, he provides a detailed account of this migration with a focus on US domestic political circles (Ish-Shalom 2013: 112–141). My focus on the UN milieu thus should not preclude the analysis of this process in other spatial and/or temporal contexts.

Theories about the liberal/democratic peace had achieved a considerable status in academic circles by the early 1990s. By then, IR scholars had already been exposed to Doyle's two-fold article discussed in Chapter 3 and Rummel's study about the absence of violence between "libertarian states" (Rummel 1983: 29), and Russett was already sowing the seeds of his 1993 *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (see, e.g., Russett and Antholis 1992; Ember et al. 1992; Maoz and Russett 1992; Russett 1990a, b).[3] By that time, despite the existence of dissonant voices (e.g., Spiro 1994; Layne 1994; Vincent 1987; Chan 1984; for pieces published later, see also Rosato 2003; Schwartz and Skinner 2002), theories supporting the thesis that democracies rarely go to war with each other due to their liberal/democratic form of government were reaching such a status in IR that they had already been hailed to be "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (Levy 1988: 662). Some scholars then claimed that there was an "overwhelming" agreement (Russett 1990a: 123) or a "near-consensus" (Gleditsch 1992: 369–370) about

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[3] During an interview, Russett remarked that he had been interested in the phenomenon of the absence of wars among democracies since the early 1980s. According to him, his publications in the early 1990s were already "in pretty good shape", but he would only become fully "confident" after finishing the work for his 1993 book (Russett 2012).

the empirical observation that liberal/democratic states do not go to war with each other.[4]

This 'near-consensus' on the liberal/democratic peace thesis was by then mostly restricted to academic circles. The overall context of the end of the cold war, however, created a propitious environment that facilitated its migration from academe to public spheres. In the UN milieu in particular, that context was strongly marked by an intricately related set of aspects, both material and ideational, that paved the way for the embracement of simplified versions of theories about the liberal/democratic peace thesis within the highest levels of decision-making in the Secretariat.

Material Aspects

Four major "objective, material, and structural" aspects (Ish-Shalom 2006a: 574) contributed to the migration of those theories to the UN milieu. The first refers to the gradual rapprochement of the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1980s, which contributed to eroding structural constraints on the UN activities in the realm of international peace and security. In the cold war years, and hence during most of its existence, UN activities in international peace and security had been virtually paralysed due to the constant use (or the threat of use) of the veto power by those two countries. The stalemate prevented the effective functioning of the organ that was primarily responsible for peace and security issues within the world body, the Security Council—according to one count, this exclusive prerogative of the Council's permanent members was used on 193 occasions between the UN early days and 1989 (Weiss 2003: 150).[5]

Against this backdrop, only in a few instances did the Security Council (SC) seem to work effectively. In some of those occasions, SC members managed to find a way to forge a minimum agreement on specific courses of action, as illustrated by the deployment of peace

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[4]After Kant, scholars have explored this observation empirically at least since Babst's article of 1964. Gleditsch notes, however, that Babst was a criminologist and that his paper was published in an "extremely obscure" journal from the perspective of IR or peace studies. Hence, according to him, "professional jealousy" may help explain why it took so long before the empirical observation was widely accepted in IR circles (Gleditsch 1992: 371).

[5]To put those in context, as of writing, the veto has been invoked on 27 occasions since January 1990 (UN Library 2013).

operations by the Council to places such as Cyprus, Lebanon, Yemen and the India-Pakistan border (see MacQueen 2006: 92–107). In other cases, the Council was 'bypassed' by political manoeuvres enabling the UN to play some role in conflict situations, as was the case of the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis, which was authorised by a General Assembly resolution (see Adebajo 2011: esp. 34–38). Given the overall context of the cold war, however, most of those operations were rather limited in their purposes, as they primarily aimed at halting direct armed confrontation between belligerent parties and supervising cease-fire agreements, normally without taking up further actions.[6]

In the late 1980s, the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union gradually allowed for the circumvention of those constraints. Da Fontoura (2005: 84–89) provides an overview of how this process unfolded by looking at several instances in which the two major powers progressively signalled their intention to soften overt confrontation and engage more constructively in international peace and security issues. Amongst those instances, the author highlights the publication of Mikhail Gorbachev's famous 1987 article in *Pravda* and George Bush's address to the UN General Assembly in 1989. Both statements carried messages about a "new attitude" between the United States and the Soviet Union (Bush 1989), about the need for a "comprehensive system of international security" (Gorbachev 1987: 3), as well as for a strengthened role for the UN in the realm of international peace and security.[7] In what is perhaps the most remarkable moment of this process, the foreign affairs ministers of both countries addressed a joint letter to the Secretary-General in 1990 pledging to "implement and strengthen the principles and the system of

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[6]The UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (UNTEA, 1962–1963) and the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–1964) represent two important exceptions to the limited purposes of UN operations during the cold war; see MacQueen (2006: 107–111 and 180–192, respectively). The volume edited by Durch (1993a) remains an important reference for an overview of UN peacekeeping operations deployed during the cold war and the early 1990s.

[7]The US President remarked that the UN "must redouble its support for the peace efforts […] underway in regions of conflict all over the world" (Bush 1989). Gorbachev noted that the Soviets were "arriving at the conclusion that wider use should be made of United Nations' military observers and United Nations' peace-keeping forces" (Gorbachev 1987: 9). Gorbachev's words are rather remarkable if one recalls the Soviet historical reticence about and lack of engagement with UN peacekeeping (see Sagramoso 2003).

international peace, security and international co-operation laid down in the Charter" (UN Doc. A/45/598-S/21854: 5). Pérez de Cuéllar, UN Secretary-General between 1982 and 1991, interpreted those developments as a "new willingness", albeit "very cautious", on the part of both countries to cooperate more closely in the Security Council (Pérez de Cuéllar 1997: 15).[8] With their rapprochement and the end of the cold war, the structural constraints on the UN ability to carry out bolder and more robust peacekeeping operations seemed to be over.

The second material aspect accounting for the creation of a propitious environment wherein the liberal democratic peace could migrate to public spheres refers to the intensification of the process of globalisation[9] in the late twentieth century, which contributed to expanding liberal norms and values worldwide. According to Held et al. (1999: esp. 424–435), the years following the end of World War II, but especially the last quarter of the twentieth century, were marked by a "renewed wave of global flows and interconnections" in several areas of social life, including political and military relations, trade and economics, migration and industrial production. In matters related to international peace and security, the impact of the intensification of globalisation became even more evident with the demise of the cold war, for the 'victory' of the West in 1989 enabled the "spread of the Western model of governance characterized by market economy, democracy and human rights to the rest of the world" (Jakobsen 2002: 268). Thus understood, globalisation provided a platform for the expansion of Western liberal norms and values, as well as for changes in the ontology of armed conflict and international security in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

[8] In an internal Secretariat document of the time, Gorbachev's article was qualified as having "major importance" to the UN, as it represented "a significant departure from what has [until then] been judged as the Soviet Union's approach to the work of international organizations" (Jonah 1987: 1).

[9] Following a 'transformationalist' perspective, globalisation is herein understood in broad terms as "*a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power*" (Held et al. 1999: 16; emphasis in original). The definition is useful for enabling consideration of both material (e.g., flows of goods, people and capital) and ideational aspects (e.g., norms, rules and regimes in areas such as human rights or trade) associated with the contemporary process of globalisation.

The third material aspect refers to the changing nature of armed conflicts globally, which highlighted that the UN had inadequate capacities to deal with armed conflicts within the boundaries of states. At the time, whereas the end of the cold war seemed to represent the end of inter-state armed conflicts, intra-state conflicts became more visible. At the time, Wallensteen and Axell (1994) noted that all armed conflicts fought in the world in 1993 occurred within the borders of states. In most cases, those conflicts were taking place in the global South, in countries that allegedly lacked the distinctive attributes of a sovereign state—they were hence, often labelled as failed, collapsed, fragile, weak or quasi-states (e.g., Rotberg 2002; Zartman 1995; Jackson 1990; see also Bates 2008). In most of those armed conflicts, violence was perpetrated by non-state actors (such as rebel groups and militias) and via non-official means (such as guerrilla wars). They were thus essentially different from the more traditional inter-states armed conflicts that had characterised the UN approach to international peace and security for most of its existence.

Finally, the fourth material aspect facilitating the migration of the liberal democratic peace as theoretical construct to the UN milieu was the Organisation's past and growing experience assisting member states with electoral processes, which would pave the way for the advocacy of an increased role for the Organisation in that area in the early 1990s. In the cold war years, the UN had played a key role in facilitating the conduct of elections, plebiscites and referenda in the context of decolonisation processes of trust and/or non-self-governing territories, particularly in Africa and Asia (Beigbeder 1994). In articulation with the principle of self-determination under Article 1(2) of the UN Charter and the objective of the trusteeship system in furthering international peace and security (Article 76(a)), such assistance was provided according to the idea that "peace would only be assured if people were free of external domination and oppression" (Haack 2011: 62). During those years, the UN concern with democracy was limited by the strict respect for sovereignty and the prohibition of UN interference in member states' domestic affairs, as set forth in Article 2(7) of the Charter.

In the late 1980s, however, with its membership substantially increased due to independence and decolonisation processes, democratic principles have been gradually accepted as a "universally recognized value" (Beigbeder 1994: 91) by a series of five annual resolutions adopted by the General Assembly between 1988 and 1992 under the title *Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic*

and Genuine Elections (UN Docs. A/RES/47/138; A/RES/46/137; A/RES/45/150; A/RES/44/146; A/RES/43/157). At the same time, requirements for the provision of electoral support from member states increased substantially. The demand, according to Robin Ludwig (2004), a veteran UN electoral expert, was fuelled by the end of the cold war in three important ways, as it: was enabled by the signature of peace accords in armed conflicts that had previously reflected the East-West confrontation (e.g., Cambodia and El Salvador), many of which included provisions related to the conduct of elections; was boosted by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which resulted in several independent republics eager to establish more democratic forms of governance; and represented the elimination of the Soviet socialism as an alternative to "Western liberal-democratic modes of governance" (Ludwig 2004: 115–116). In this context, and regarding the UN as a neutral actor, several countries turned to the Organisation for assistance to hold their transition processes, particularly by supervising (e.g., Namibia in 1989) and providing technical assistance to electoral processes (e.g., Nicaragua in 1990, Angola in 1992) (Ludwig 2004: esp. 133–162).

Ideational Aspects

Interrelated with the material aspects outlined above, three ideational aspects also contributed to the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from theoretical construct into public convention in the UN milieu in the early 1990s. The first aspect refers to the changing nature of the concepts of international security and armed conflict in the immediate years following the end of the cold war (Richmond 2004a: 134–135). Considering the changes in the ontology of armed conflicts, as outlined above, some scholars sought to rethink the Clausewitzian canons of warfare as violence among states. The traditional concept of security was thus simultaneously broadened to include threats beyond the sphere of the state—such as economic or environmental security (Buzan 1991; Homer-Dixon 1991)—and deepened to incorporate subjects of security alongside the state—such as individuals in the conceptualisation of human security (UNDP 1994). Throughout the 1990s, hence, "new" forms of warfare have been gradually incorporated into the realm of international peace and security (Kaldor 1999), which represented a gradual departure from the traditional meaning of security defined mainly as military inter-state security.

Accordingly, with the acceleration of globalisation, a number of those 'new threats' were gradually perceived to be of global reach. Outside academia and among policymakers, the responses formulated to those globalised threats went through a process of regionalisation that created new or reinforced existing mechanisms for international consultation and coordination on security issues, such as the Western European Union and the Organisation of American States. This process, according to Held and colleagues, represented a shift from reigning attitudes on security issues during the cold war and reflected "a strong perception that, in an interconnected world order, effective security [could not] be achieved merely through unilateral action. Rather, national and international security [were] considered in some degree indivisible" (Held et al. 1999: 126). Questions were thus raised about "how intervention should develop and whether it [could] or should be centrally organized and based upon universally-agreed processes of intervention and conflict settlement" (Richmond 2004a: 134). Policymakers sought to address those threats accordingly, including into their considerations over security issues such as the promotion of human rights or the combat against poverty. Such developments perhaps became more evident in the actions carried out by international organisations, non-governmental organisations and donors during the 1990s on the grounds of humanitarian responsibilities to enhance the security of individuals in fragile situations (see, e.g., Cohen and Deng 1998).

The second ideational aspect contributing to an environment conducive to the migration of theories about the liberal/democratic peace from academe to public spheres relates to the sense of triumph of liberalism and the West that emerged as the cold war drew to an end. The most representative feature of this euphoria is perhaps Fukuyama's 1989 article *The End of History?*, which went as far as to point out the "total exhaustion of viable systematic alternative to Western liberalism" and announce the "end of history as such" (Fukuyama 1989: 5). At the time, Fukuyama noted that a "remarkable consensus ha[d] developed in the world concerning the legitimacy and viability of liberal democracy" (Fukuyama 1989/1990: 22). The euphoria about the perceived victory of liberalism would soon inspire world leaders in Western capitals: the then US President advocated for a "new world order" wherein "the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak" (Bush 1990a). In the UN milieu,

this euphoria contributed to the generation of an optimistic sense that member states could cooperate more closely and that the SC would be more effective in discharging its duties in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Finally, the third ideational aspect refers to the optimistic sense of confidence that the UN Secretariat was then in a better position to play a prominent role in supporting the Security Council—at least as long as its members, particularly the permanent ones, cooperated. This confidence was essentially a result of the positive achievements of the Organisation in that area over the previous few years, particularly during Pérez de Cuéllar's second mandate as Secretary-General (1987–1991). In those years, the UN successfully participated in negotiations leading to the settlement of armed conflicts in Nicaragua, Cambodia and El Salvador (see, respectively, Nasi 2009; Song 1997; Levine 1997). In the three cases, but most particularly in the latter, the Secretary-General's mediation and good offices efforts, with resort to the then innovative mechanism of 'group of friends', played a key role in forging peace agreements between the parties to the armed conflicts (see Krasno 2003). Around the same time, the Peruvian Secretary-General addressed the Norwegian Nobel Committee on behalf of UN peacekeeping forces, who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 (see Pérez de Cuéllar 1988).

The Organisation also experienced several positive developments in UN peacekeeping in the final years of Pérez de Cuéllar.[10] In March 1990, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) ceased its operations after having assisted the transition of Namibia from South African rule to independency. At the time, UNTAG was hailed as "one of the few examples of highly successful peaceful solutions to conflict" (Fortna 1993b: 372), and today it is usually referred to as the first multi-dimensional peacekeeping since the UN efforts in the Congo and West New Guinea in the 1960s (Adebajo 2011: 110; Howard 2008: 52). Between UNTAG's termination and mid-1991, three 'traditional' peacekeeping operations would also be concluded with positive evaluations of their mandated tasks: the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)

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[10] For volumes addressing several cases of UN peace operations since the end of the cold war, see, among many others, Adebajo (2011), Newman et al. (2009b), Richmond and Franks (2009), Howard (2008), Berdal and Economides (2007), and MacQueen (2006).

(see, respectively, Birgisson 1993; Smith and Durch 1993; Fortna 1993a). Other five operations were established in 1991 alone (in Iraq-Kuwait, Western Sahara, Angola, El Salvador and Cambodia), including the very ambitious UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This operation was tasked with a quasi-sovereign mandate that included, inter alia, organising the electoral process and responsibilities in the national civil administration.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly among such positive developments, SC members, including the United States and the Soviet Union, seemed to be indeed entering a new era of cooperation as no veto had been registered between June 1990 and February 1993 (UN Library 2013). Moreover, in that short period, the Council had been able to concretely cooperate to authorise a multilateral 'coalition of the willing' sanctioned by Chapter VII to respond to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Malone 2006: esp. 54–83; see also Pérez de Cuéllar 1997: 237–282). Amid such developments, Pérez de Cuéllar saw the United Nations in the aftermath of the Gulf War as "a stronger force for peace in the world" and believed that the principle of collective security at its core had been proved to be "achievable" (Pérez de Cuéllar 1997: 237).[11]

A final event contributed significantly to creating such an optimistic atmosphere in the UN milieu at that time. Inspired by the prospects of a potentially more effective Security Council in the wake of the armed conflict in the Persian Gulf, the foreign ministers of the five permanent members met in September 1991, subsequently pledging "their commitment to a revitalised role for the United Nations in the building of a new world order" (Müller 2001: 48).[12] The meeting was followed, apparently under the suggestion of then French President François Mitterrand, by the first gathering ever of the Security Council at the level of heads of state and government. The holding of such a high-level meeting, on 31 January 1992, seemed to represent the cessation of decades of overt confrontation, and to materialise the generalised optimism and hope for

[11] Those words represent a stark contrast with the first years of Pérez de Cuéllar ahead of the UN. According to Burgess, "When [Pérez de Cuéllar] assumed the post in 1982, some observers were writing the UN's obituary. By the time he left, there was renewed hope for the world body and for its role in promoting world peace" (Burgess 2001: 7).

[12] In a biography of Kofi Annan, Meisler also remarks that "[t]he first Persian Gulf War created a grand illusion of power within the UN. That illusion spawned new attitudes towards the UN and greater expectations. […] That feeling fostered a mood of optimism even in a world bursting with crises" (Meisler 2007: 43).

a functioning Council as well as a more active United Nations in the future. The meeting itself, as well as the Council's Presidential Statement released afterwards, were such important landmarks that Álvaro de Soto (2012), a senior advisor to Pérez de Cuéllar at the time, later recalled such developments as "a first-class funeral for the cold war". According to other first-hand observers, that was "an exciting time at the UN" (Thornburgh 2012), a time when UN staff felt "very hopeful" (Dayal 2012) with the prospects for the future of the Organisation.[13]

It was around that time that the aspects addressed above, both material and ideational, converged to create an enabling environment for the migration of theories about the liberal/democratic peace from academe to public spheres. In the UN milieu, this migration was triggered by individuals at the highest levels of decision-making of the Organisation, including the Secretary-General. Based on their understanding of their professional role, those individuals perceived themselves as the ones responsible for ensuring an active role for the Organisation in the area of international peace and security in the post-cold war. Those individuals did so by using theories about the liberal/democratic peace rhetorically in their discourse to persuade their audiences, consequently influencing commonsensical perceptions and public discourses on issues related to peace and the promotion of democracy abroad.

BOUTROS-GHALI'S PUBLIC USE OF THEORIES ABOUT THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PEACE

In the UN milieu, the transformation of the liberal democratic peace from theoretical construct into public convention was triggered by individuals at the highest instances of decision-making in the Organisation, most especially the Secretary-General. Given his position, Boutros-Ghali believed it was part of his responsibility as Secretary-General to enable the UN to effectively fulfil its role in the maintenance of peace and security, especially by seizing the opportunity that the end of the cold war seemed to represent. Seeking to achieve that goal, he relied on theories about the liberal/democratic peace to advance this agenda rhetorically, particularly in public statements and UN official documents.

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[13] See also UNIHP (2007c: 36; 2007d: 37). As the interviews were carried out approximately 20 years after those events, some interviewees admitted that the 'euphoria' in the UN at that time seems rather naïve in retrospect.

While doing so, Boutros-Ghali contributed not only to the migration of theories about the liberal/democratic peace from academic to UN circles, but also to their simplification in public spheres.

The conversion of the liberal democratic peace from theoretical construct into public convention may be seen as an incidental consequence of Boutros-Ghali's efforts to foster a norm of democratic governance while advancing one of the cornerstone themes of his mandate: democratisation. Rushton (2008) provides a good analysis of the Secretary-General's attempts to advance this cause by looking particularly into how he framed that norm in his discourse: first, by arguing that 'democracy' was a principle in the UN Charter and that member states consequently had an obligation towards it; and second, by linking 'democracy' with other widely accepted concepts of relevance internationally, such as 'peace', 'human rights' and 'development' (Rushton 2008: esp. 100–104; see also Haack 2011: 67–75). While rhetorically linking 'democracy' with 'peace' in his discourse, Boutros-Ghali relied gradually upon the notion that 'democracies do not (or rarely) fight each other' to justify and legitimate the importance of democratisation in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Boutros-Ghali's first public reference to the connection between democracy and peace was made even before he had taken office as Secretary-General. In his acceptance speech, delivered to the General Assembly on 3 December 1991, he claimed that the democratisation of international relations and national institutions could "create a new dynamic for national peace and stability, which is as important as international peace and stability" (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 17). The connection between democracy and peace is rather timid, but it is important as it shows that Boutros-Ghali's articulation of the two issues would be progressively refined and reformulated over the years, becoming more explicit and well articulated. Furthermore, this passage seems to support a claim made later in his memoirs, that "early in [his] term of office, [his] conviction had deepened that democracy—especially the process of democratization that may lead to it—was crucial for the betterment of peoples in every sphere of life" (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 319).

In the next few years, Boutros-Ghali alluded to the connection between democracy and peace, human rights and development on several occasions (see Box 1). In one of the first such occasions, he concluded a lecture to the US Senate in May 1992 remarking that, "in today's multi-polar world, economic and social development, and the

promotion and reinforcement of democratic institutions, are an intrinsic part of maintaining peace" (Boutros-Ghali 2003d: 79). This underlying endorsement of the link between peace and democracy was repeated and/or reformulated as Boutros-Ghali continued to actively attempt to frame democracy as "essential for meeting the UN's other aims" (Rushton 2008: 102). Sometimes, the Secretary-General essentially reiterated the liberal/democratic peace thesis, straightforwardly claiming that "[d]emocracies almost never fight each other" (Boutros-Ghali 2003g: 614) or, conversely, that "authoritarian regimes are potential causes of war" (Boutros-Ghali 2003f: 682). He also referred to the idea of a liberal/democratic peace similarly as in academic formulations, when he wrote that democracies "are likely to be peace-loving and not likely to wage war on other democracies" (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 4). He failed, however, to identify the assumptions or the conditions under which such statement was valid, or to display any critical inclination towards it, which are distinctive features of academic discourses. On other occasions, connections were inferred from theories without being necessarily true or they overlooked the probabilistic and 'objective' nature generally present in academic debates, giving in for a more straightforward assumption about the link between 'democracy' and 'peace'—as was the case of his references to a "deeper truth" about the contribution of democracy to peace and security (UN Doc. A/51/761: para. 16).

Box 1: The relationship between democracy and peace in Boutros-Ghali's discourse

Democracies almost never fight each other. Democratization supports the cause of peace.

Statement to CNN correspondents' Conference, 5 May 1993, Atlanta (Boutros-Ghali 2003g: 614); also appeared in an academic journal, Summer 1993 (Boutros-Ghali 1993: 329)

Each passing day shows that authoritarian regimes are potential causes of war and of the extent to which, conversely, democracy is a guarantor of peace.

Statement at the opening of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 June 1993 (Boutros-Ghali 2003f: 682)

Three challenges are before us: peace, development, and democracy. Without peace, there can be no development and there can be no democracy. Without development, the basis for democracy will be lacking and societies will tend to fall into conflict.

And without democracy, no sustainable development can occur. Without sustainable development, peace cannot long be maintained.

Remarks at the Foreign Correspondents Club, Tokyo, 20 December 1993 (Boutros-Ghali 2003e: 905); repeated from the report on the work of the Organisation (UN Doc. A/48/1: para. 11)

[Democracy and development] are linked because democracy provides the only long-term basis for managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a way that minimizes the risk of violent internal conflict. [...] Without true democracy in international relations, peace will not endure, and a satisfactory pace of development cannot be assured.

An Agenda for Development, 6 May 1994 (UN Doc. A/48/935: para. 133)

Democracy within nations promotes respect for human rights and provides the conditions under which people can express their will. This process creates the social and political stability necessary for peace.

And democracy among nations engages all States, large and small, in decision-making on world affairs. This promotes the mutual respect that is necessary for peace.

Gauer Distinguished Lecture, National Legal Center for the Public Interest, New York, 18 October 1994 (Boutros-Ghali 2003a: 1299); repeated in lecture at the University of Warsaw, Poland, 10 November 1995 (Boutros-Ghali 2003c: 1765)

[...] democracy is one of the pillars on which a more peaceful, more equitable, and more secure world can be built. [...] Democracies are likely to be peace-loving and not likely to wage war on other democracies. The promotion of peace and security, the promotion of economic and social development, and the promotion of democracy are all, therefore, part of the same process.

Article in academic journal, Winter 1995 (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 3, 4)

[...] whatever evidence critics of democracy can find [...] must not be allowed to conceal a deeper truth: democracy contributes to preserving peace and security, securing justice and human rights, and promoting economic and social development. [...] [A]cademia is providing important new evidence on the complementarity among peace, development and democracy[.]

An Agenda for Democratization, 20 December 1996 (UN Doc. A/51/761: paras. 16, 93)

The extracts in Box 1 reveal that Boutros-Ghali's references became clearer and more articulated over the years. Such a gradual refinement was not accidental. According to a close aide to the Secretary-General at the time, Boutros-Ghali, a scholar himself, used his writings and statements to test and refine arguments, progressively developing further his views and ideas on specific topics (Hill 2012).[14] He would frequently do so not only in official documents and UN corridors, but also in public spheres while addressing informed audiences politically influential in the UN milieu. The Secretary-General also initiated the Blue Books series to disseminate to the general public UN documents and the Organisation's activities in key areas of concern, such as peacekeeping, human rights and nuclear non-proliferation. While striving to formulate and communicate his views and opinions to wider audiences, Boutros-Ghali was contributing, although possibly unaware and/or unintentionally, to the gradual conversion of the liberal democratic peace from theoretical construct to public convention. At this stage, the notion that liberal/democratic regimes are more peaceful than others was simply taken for granted as a truism out of its original academic context.

The context in which Boutros-Ghali took office, strongly marked by the material and ideational aspects outlined in the previous section, created the conditions under which he was able to build upon the thesis that liberal/democratic states rarely go to war with each other to advance core crosscutting themes of his mandate: democracy and democratisation. He used the thesis to legitimate and justify the link between 'democracy' and 'peace' in his discourse. He did so not only in official documents and UN corridors, but also in public spheres while addressing informed audiences politically influential around the UN. In drawing upon an eminently academic and theoretical discourse in a simplified manner in his public statements, the then-Secretary-General contributed to the gradual migration of those theories to UN circles. As they departed from the restricted circles of academe, those theories were simplified and subsequently politicised in Boutros-Ghali's rhetoric at the public and political domains.

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[14] In a first-hand account, Lombardo (2001) reviews the drafting of *An Agenda for Democratization* and describes how the Secretary-General used a public lecture to help build the conceptual foundations of that report.

Chapter Summary

This chapter started to explore the first analytical step of this book, demonstrating that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as hermeneutical mechanism. It focused on the first two steps of the hermeneutical mechanism by characterising the liberal democratic peace as a theoretical construct and addressing its subsequent conversion into public convention. Formulated primarily in the restricted circles of academia, the understanding that liberal democracies do not fight each other migrated to the public spheres in a simplified version following Boutros-Ghali's rhetorical use of the democratic peace thesis in his public discourses in the UN milieu and elsewhere in the early 1990s.

The following chapter continues the narrative by addressing the third step of the hermeneutical mechanism, that is, the transformation of the liberal democratic peace from public convention into political conviction. It outlines how that simplified version of theories about the democratic peace was politicised in the UN milieu, subsequently providing the meaning for the concept of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' in *An Agenda for Peace*. The analysis therein carried out offers an in-depth investigation of not only the 'written word' of *An Agenda for Peace*, but also the history behind its drafting; while doing so, I interpret both written and un-written aspects of social reality that influenced the meaning of peacebuilding as it appeared in the public version of Boutros-Ghali's report.

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The Origins of UN Peacebuilding (II): The Liberal Democratic Peace in the UN Milieu

Introduction

The previous chapter characterised the liberal democratic peace as a theoretical construct and explored its transformation in a public convention via Boutros-Ghali's simplified use of the thesis that liberal/democratic societies do not, or rarely, fight each other. This chapter continues the narrative and analysis by addressing the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from public convention to political conviction, the third and final step of Ish-Shalom's hermeneutical mechanism. At this stage of the mechanism, social science theories are politicised and rhetorically used by purposive individuals to advance their own political agendas. In this chapter, I discuss how this process unfolded by carefully analysing the making of the Secretary-General's report *An Agenda for Peace*, the document through which the concept of 'peacebuilding' initially gained foothold in the United Nations (UN) milieu in the early 1990s. The analysis demonstrates that the meaning of 'peacebuilding' in that document reflects Boutros-Ghali's articulation of the liberal democratic peace framework as a political conviction in the UN milieu. This chapter concludes the narrative of the transformation of one discourse into another as it migrated from academe to public spheres, showing how it gradually acquired the potential to shape the meaning of 'peacebuilding' and influence courses of political action in the UN milieu.

The remainder of the chapter is organised into four sections. The first section delves into the circumstances under which the document

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was produced as well as how it was produced, offering substantial elements for the analysis of its content in the second section. This approach allows for a better understanding of not only the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding in the United Nations in the early 1990s, but also how this concept was gradually constructed in that specific context. The third and fourth sections explore and engage with the two contending views about the direct academic sources of the meaning of 'peacebuilding' as it appeared in *An Agenda for Peace*, identifying those sources in the US scholarship on the democratic peace thesis rather than on the Nordic tradition of peace studies, as commonly assumed in specialised circles.

The Making of *An Agenda for Peace*

Upon taking office on 1 January 1992, Boutros-Ghali was immediately absorbed in the optimistic atmosphere prevailing in the UN milieu at that time, where expectations were fairly high about the future role of the Organisation in the post-cold war years. Boutros-Ghali later acknowledged that he was then under the impression that the end of the cold war had created a moment of opportunity similar in character to the ones created by the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the World Wars of the twentieth century (Boutros-Ghali 2013). This impression is captured in a passage of his first Report on the Work of the Organisation, of September 1992:

> it is possible to sense a new stirring of hope among the nations of the world and a recognition that an immense opportunity is here to be seized. Not since the end of the Second World War have the expectations of the world's peoples depended so much upon the capacity of the United Nations for widely supported and effective action. (A/47/1: para. 4)

In a stark contrast with the nearly paralysed UN of 1982, the year Pérez de Cuéllar took office, it seemed that the UN of 1992 could finally become the purposeful actor envisaged in 1945 to maintain international peace and security. The newly appointed Secretary-General was one of those who not only believed, but also attempted to fulfil such potential.

Taking over as the head of the UN at that crossroad, and abiding by what he perceived to be his role as Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali sought to prepare the world body for what he saw as a "new era" (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 89). Early on in his mandate, he was "under the illusion that [his] job would be to create a new United Nations,

or at least to make drastic changes in the system of the United Nations" (Boutros-Ghali 2013). And at least at that time, not only did he take this as one of his main goals, but he was also confident that member states, alongside the Secretariat he was leading, were in position to "seize this extraordinary opportunity to expand, adapt and reinvigorate the work of the United Nations so that the lofty goals as originally envisioned by the charter [could] begin to be realized" (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 89). To that end, the new Secretary-General had a clear and broad conceptual blueprint around four main areas, as stated in his inaugural speech: ensure the maintenance of international peace and security; strive for the attainment of economic development; reform the UN bureaucratic structures; and foster the role of the United Nations in promoting democracy (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 12–17; see also Boutros-Ghali 2002: 49–50).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Security Council (SC) held its first meeting at the level of heads of state and government on 31 January 1992. At the conclusion of the summit, the Council invited the Secretary-General to prepare an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework of provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping" (UN Doc. S/23500: 3). The invitation would enable Boutros-Ghali to submit his own views and proposals on the matter through the requested report. Looking backwards during an interview in 2001, Boutros-Ghali recalled that it appeared almost as if he had been given a carte blanche:

On the 31st of January, it was held this summit […] and if you read the discourses of the fifteen members of the Security Council—one must read them—the Heads of State give me some sort of full powers. They tell me: "Sir, you have reached a historical moment, it is incumbent on you to manage the post-cold war, that is, to reform the United Nations". (UNIHP 2007a: 33)

Determined to live up to the role of political leader entrusted to him by his mandate, as well as to assert the independence of his office, the new Secretary-General seemed resolute to seize this opportunity and use the report to imprint his own agenda ahead of the United Nations in the post-cold war.

The remainder of this section describes the three distinct phases of drafting of the report before the document was made public.

The First Phase of Drafting

To produce his report, Boutros-Ghali adopted an unconventional approach at the time. Usually, speeches, reports, statements and public addresses of the Secretary-General were primarily prepared by a team of speechwriters in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG). The team received input from relevant organs and departments on the substantial content of the issue at hand and then drafted a text for submission to the Secretary-General or close aides for approval—or for reviews, comments and subsequent corrections (see Lombardo 2001). For writing the report requested by the SC, however, Boutros-Ghali created a task force composed of senior officials in his cabinet, which was envisaged to serve as a "collegial body" to brainstorm ideas and assist with preparing the document (Petrovsky 1992c). The Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General, as it became known, was established in the Secretariat as an informal group, which allowed for, inter alia, contributions from external experts, former UN staff and other individuals in the UN milieu who were not members of the UN staff at the time.

The idea of a task force emerged as early as February, as recorded in an exchange of views among key aides of Boutros-Ghali on possible arrangements for the group (see Aimé 1992). The task force was constituted in March and was composed of: the two Under-Secretaries-General (USG) for Political Affairs, Vladimir Petrovsky (chairperson of the group) and James Jonah; the former Pérez de Cuéllar's chief of staff and senior advisor in Boutros-Ghali's cabinet, Virendra Dayal, who served as rapporteur of the group; the USG for Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding; the USG for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson; the USG for Administration and Management, Richard Thornburgh; and a senior political advisor to both Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali, Álvaro de Soto.[1] In addition, Tapio Kanninen, a Secretariat official who

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[1] List of participants compiled from the documents cited throughout the section and from interviews with Álvaro de Soto (2012), Richard Thornburgh (2012), James S. Sutterlin (2012a, b), Tapio Kanninen (2012, 2013), Virendra Dayal (2012), and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (2013). Carl-August Fleisschhauer, head of the Office of Legal Affairs, was mentioned as possible participant of the Task Force in the initial note prepared by Aimé (1992). His name, however, never came up in any of the interviews or appeared in several memos and notes exchanged among the members of the Task Force at the time— the only exception is a memo sent to him by Petrovsky (1992a) requesting Fleisschhauer's comments on a working draft of the report; I found no record of a response in the UN archives.

had previously worked in the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI),[2] provided secretariat and research support to the Task Force.

The first meeting of the Task Force was held on 10 March 1992 and focused on the scope, organisation, structure and tone of the report. According to a record in Kanninen's personal files,[3] the Task Force was initially divided about the scope of the document it would have to produce: while some members argued that the report should contain considerations about peace enforcement and peacebuilding, claiming that both were "implied" in the Security Council's Presidential Statement of 31 January 1992 and that the moment was opportune, others felt that moving beyond and including issues that were not explicitly requested by the Council could shift attention away from preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, as requested by the Council (Petrovsky 1992d).

In this meeting and over the following days, discussions centred on the conceptual approach of the report (Petrovsky 1992d). One of the core formulations found in *An Agenda for Peace* was already present in a paper produced at this early stage of conceptualisation of the future report, even if only incipiently formulated: "[p]reventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping should be seen as an integrated system, constituting basic elements for the structure of an enhanced collective security" (Kanninen 1992c). The document is in bullet-point format, lacks coherence and cohesion, especially conceptual, but it further elaborates that, in the report, the Task Force

> should move towards the broadening of a structure of collective security, including peace-building (e.g. creating socio-economic foundations for stability) as well as peace-enforcement. This new, even broader concept includes preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping as well as peace-building and peace-enforcement. These elements together should constitute a *new enhanced collective system in the making*, or the new world order in the making. (Kanninen 1992c; emphasis in the original)

[2] The Office was inter alia responsible for carrying out research in the Secretariat and producing analytical reports and statements to the Secretary-General (UN Doc. ST/SGB/225).

[3] In addition to working drafts of what would later become *An Agenda for Peace*, Kanninen kept several of the notes exchanged among members of the Task Force, as well as between the Chair of the group and the Secretary-General. Those documents were used to keep record of past decisions and regularly brief Boutros-Ghali on progress achieved, which makes his files invaluable for reconstituting the process herein depicted.

Despite successive discussions, intensive meetings, drafting and re-drafting by different individuals, a key message and a cornerstone concept (that of peacebuilding) delivered by the final version of the report seemed to have appeared in the earlier brainstorming sessions of the Task Force.

On 19 March 1992, Boutros-Ghali attended a meeting of the Task Force. By then, according a note of the meeting, the Secretary-General had decided that the report was to address peace enforcement and peacebuilding, while "concentrating on the 3Ps of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, and peace making" (Kanninen 1992b). In the discussions of the Task Force, the '3Ps' occasionally became '4Ps' when reference was made to peacebuilding (e.g., UNIHP 2007d: 10), and '5Ps' when peace enforcement was added to the list. Reference to such categories demonstrates that the Task Force started to consider the full range of conflict management and resolution aspects from its earlier brainstorming sessions.

Boutros-Ghali, a scholar himself, used the 19 March 1992 meeting to present statistics and quantitative data on wars and the nature of armed conflicts since 1945, requesting that those be considered by the Task Force in the report—the statistics presented by Boutros-Ghali were included as an attachment to a note produced on the occasion and found in the UN Archives. According to his figures, 177 wars had occurred between 1945 and 1989, the majority of which could no longer be typified as "classical international war". Rather, armed conflicts, particularly those in the "Third World", were then associated with processes of decolonisation, and were marked by confrontation between "modernistic and traditional societies" and wars of insurrection (Kanninen 1992a: Attachment 1). After the meeting, the Task Force produced a background note compiling more quantitative data drawn from academic research, including information that seemed to confirm that civil wars had become more recurrent and that the rise of armed conflicts observed at the time was connected with, inter alia, terrorism, anti-regime movements and disputes over natural resources (Kanninen 1992a). The discussions during that meeting have largely provided the basis for the 'changing context' section in the public version of *An Agenda for Peace* (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: paras. 8–19).

Another meeting of the Task Force was held in the last weekend of March 1992, again with the presence of Boutros-Ghali. The meeting served to consolidate a detailed outline for the future report around

three axes: an 'enhanced system of collective security' consisting in "measures to prevent or eliminate conditions which create conflict"; non-coercive measures to control or solve armed conflicts; and coercive measures to enforce peace and security (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General 1992b). The '3Ps' of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping fell within the non-coercive measures, according to the proposed outline. Peace enforcement was addressed to the extent that the outline raised questions about the need for enforcement capabilities in the peacekeeping scenarios emerging at the time—and which would first be put to test in Somalia in 1993. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, was not overtly mentioned anywhere, but the section of the report on measures to prevent and eliminate armed conflict would include, according to this outline, concerns over institution-building (including in the sectors of elections and judiciary), development and human rights. Those aspects, as explored below, would constitute key elements of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' in the final and public version of the report. This first detailed outline reflected the Task Force's option for a heavier emphasis on the '3Ps' mentioned in the original request from the Security Council. At the same time, it did not completely drop attention from the other '2Ps' of peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy.

At this juncture, on 7 April, an informal session was held at the Ford Foundation bringing together a small group of academics and diplomats to discuss substantive issues related to the content of the future report. Concerning the scope of the document, David Hannay, British representative to the Security Council during the United Kingdom's presidency in January 1992, expressed the view that

> *peace enforcement was neither included nor excluded* [from the note with the Council's request for the report]; that it was up to the Secretary-General how he wished to look at this. *The only exclusion was Charter change* as that would 'open too many cans of worms'. Nothing already in the Charter was excluded. If the SG decided on innovative use of Chapter 7 he should do so. (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General 1992a: 2)

Notwithstanding the clarification, the Task Force later agreed that the report should avoid the matter and "concentrate on the 3-Ps", noting that the "SG had decided to stick to the 3 Ps" (Chakravartty 1992: 2, 3).

By late March and early April 1992, the Task Force had held a number of meetings and discussed at length several aspects of the future report, but no attempt had yet been made to produce a fully-fledged draft of the document requested by the Security Council. To advance in that direction, a small drafting team was constituted under the lead of Bertrand Ramcharan, then head of the Secretary-General's speechwriting services (Petrovsky 1992b). According to Ramcharan (2012) and Kanninen (2012), the detailed report outline agreed by the members of the Task Force, and later by the Secretary-General himself, served as the basis for the work of the drafting team. While the drafting team produced a preliminary version of the report, Ramcharan and Kanninen exchanged views and received occasional input from James Sutterlin, who had worked as speechwriter and advisor to Pérez de Cuéllar and was then based at Yale University leading the War Risk Reduction Project (see Krasno 2005), which is discussed later in this chapter.

On the last weekend of April, the drafting team presented to the Task Force a first full draft of the Secretary-General's future report, then titled *Peace, Security and Stability Through Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-Keeping* (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General 1992c). A careful analysis of the 50-page text reveals that its substance closely mirrors the content of the previous working documents produced by the Task Force, with the '5Ps' referred to as "the elements for a comprehensive and effective international security system" (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General 1992c: 13). As previously decided by the Task Force, the text centred on the '3Ps', which were addressed separately. The '2Ps' of peace enforcement and peacebuilding received less attention in the text, being mentioned only in a few passages without further elaboration.

Despite its marginal focus in the text, the preliminary version produced by the Task Force's drafting team approached peacebuilding as follows:

> *Peace-building* embraces the efforts of the United Nations to remove the root causes of conflict, building the socio-economic foundations for stability. It, thus, includes efforts to enhance human dignity and freedom; to promote development and social progress; and to enhance equity in the governance of societies, national and international. This is what the founders of the United Nations had in mind in the Preamble to the Charter. This is also what they had in mind in Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter, which envisages the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human

rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. (Task Force on the Report of the Secretary-General 1992c: 13–14)

In this formulation, peacebuilding appears as a broad undertaking, one that bears some resemblance with the concept of peacebuilding in the tradition of peace studies to the extent that it focuses on the removal of the 'root causes of conflict' and provides due consideration to multiple aspects affecting armed conflict in the social, economic and development realms (see Galtung 1976: 297–298). Moreover, peacebuilding was not a 'post-conflict' endeavour: rather, owing to its all-encompassing nature, it is the very first definition advanced for the '5Ps' in the draft, even before preventive diplomacy.

Based on this preliminary draft, the usual process of revising and incorporating comments and feedback from members of the Task Force and the Secretary-General[4] followed suit. A revised version of the preliminary draft was submitted shortly afterwards to Boutros-Ghali (Kanninen and Piiparinen 2014).

The Second Phase of Drafting

According to some interviewees, Boutros-Ghali was not satisfied with the document received from the Task Force and thus requested Dayal to re-write it. With the Secretary-General's consent, Dayal invited James Sutterlin to assist in the assignment, as they had worked closely together in Pérez de Cuéllar's cabinet. According to interviews with Dayal (2012) and Sutterlin (2012a), both individuals worked separately on the document, with Dayal making most of the contacts with Boutros-Ghali about the content of the document.[5] Krasno (2005: 35) reports that Sutterlin only attended one of those meetings with Dayal, and that it was at that meeting that the title *An Agenda for Peace* for the final report appeared.

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[4]According to Kanninen (2012), Boutros-Ghali provided handwritten comments to the drafting team in his own copy of the draft.

[5]In his interview to the UNIHP, Dayal's recollection is as follows: "We had some meetings, discussed some ideas, and all the rest of it. But you know how it is. Basically, someone has got to pick up a pen and start writing the wretched thing. So I rang my friend Jim Sutterlin. I said, 'Jim, you and I have struggled along in this area terribly hard together. Why don't we try and sit down, you and I, and put together some thoughts on this whole thing?' Jim said, 'Sure.' So he and I sat down, and we said, 'I think these are the ideas we have between us. Why don't I write up some of them, you write up some of them, and then I'll match them together and we will see if it makes sense. Let that be our first working draft'" (UNIHP 2007c: 36–37).

Among the various drafts produced at this stage, I had access to one dated 8 May 1992, which might have been one of the earliest produced by Dayal and Sutterlin.[6] The new text mostly presented ideas re-worked from the initial draft produced by the Task Force. Based on a careful review of the document, and according to Sutterlin (2012a), Ramcharan (2012) and Kanninen (2012), the core message of the draft reflected the substantial content offered by earlier discussions of the Task Force, despite obvious differences in terms of style, content, structure and order of some passages. The message was: that "in conjunction with a broad peace-building undertaking", preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping could "provide a systemic means of realizing the collective security foreseen in the Charter" (Dayal and Sutterlin 1992: 10). Dayal and Sutterlin also included in the new draft ideas of their own. Both claimed, for instance, that the proposal of 'peace enforcement units' was included in the draft by Sutterlin at this stage (Dayal 2012; Sutterlin 2012a, b). Absent from the draft produced by the Task Force, dated 24 April 1992, the proposal for such units would make it to the final version of *An Agenda for Peace*.

In their draft, peacebuilding was elaborated under a section titled "Building Peace" and reflected an all-encompassing understanding that "[p]eace in its fullest sense depends on the well-being of humanity" and required aspects such as the "respect for the principles of justice and international law, for human rights and fundamental freedoms, coop-eration in the resolution of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems" (Dayal and Sutterlin 1992: 40). Formulated in those terms, peacebuilding remained closer to the concept advanced by Galtung and the Nordic school of peace studies.

The Third Phase of Drafting

The third and final stage of drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* started with the involvement of yet another drafter. By late May 1992, Boutros-Ghali was seemingly pleased with the content of the draft but was not "satisfied stylistically" with the document (UNIHP 2007c: 38).

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[6] This version was not yet titled *An Agenda for Peace*.

He thus handed it over to Charles Hill, who would soon become the head of the speechwriting services at the Secretariat. According to a record in the UN Archives, Hill proposed changes in the document in at least three levels: its tone and style, which he believed should be in the form of a bold statement rather than a speech; the "tour d'horizon" in the section outlining the changing context in which the Organisation was to take action, which in his view needed to be sharpened and deepened; and finally, he suggested using editorial and rhetorical means to display "initiative and ingenuity" more clearly in the recommendations contained in the draft (Hill 1992: 1). An analysis of the substance of the text ultimately adopted as *An Agenda for Peace* and the draft prepared by Sutterlin and Dayal, however, reveals that changes made were essentially restricted to the text's structure, language and style, with no major substantial modifications on ideas and proposals—according to Dayal, "about 80 percent of that remained totally unchanged" (UNIHP 2007c: 38).

This brief narrative of the drafting of the document reveals that notwithstanding its many drafters Boutros-Ghali remained closely involved during all stages of writing of *An Agenda for Peace*, helping to shape its overall scope and pointing out his views on the report's contents. His influence ensured, for example, that peacebuilding ultimately received substantial consideration in the final version of the report, despite an earlier decision of the Task Force not to delve too much attention to the issue. Moreover, the qualifier 'post-conflict' for peacebuilding, which did not appear in the drafts produced by the Task Force and by Dayal and Sutterlin, was introduced later–and, according to Sutterlin (2012a), only made it to the final report upon Boutros-Ghali's insistence. Given the strong role played by the Secretary-General in shaping the report and the strength of his own ideas in the document, it is thus not surprising that, upon publication, *An Agenda for Peace* has been "widely regarded as his personal testament and blueprint" (Meisler 1995: 286).

Seizing the 'Liberal Peace': The Liberal Peace as Political Conviction

Having outlined how *An Agenda for Peace* was produced, I now turn to the content of Boutros-Ghali's report, most particularly its concept of 'peacebuilding'. The document offered a rationale and a concrete

'toolkit' of conflict management and conflict resolution mechanisms to the Organisation. Through that rationale and those mechanisms, especially 'post-conflict peacebuilding', Boutros-Ghali articulated a simplified and politicised version of academic theories about the liberal/democratic peace to support his political agenda of strengthening the UN role in peace and security after the end of the cold war.

The final version of *An Agenda for Peace* was published on 17 June 1992. Since the Security Council had requested the Secretary-General to make his report available "to the members of the United Nations" (UN Doc. S/23500: 3), Boutros-Ghali submitted the text not only to the Council, but also to the General Assembly. He decided to give it even more visibility by having it published as a volume in the Blue Books series, which had a reach beyond the UN itself (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 26–27). Such actions were critical for explaining the far reach of the report in public spheres in the following years—the text is possibly one of the most widely known documents ever published by the Organisation.

An Agenda for Peace is a bold report, charting an active role for the United Nations in a 'new era'—and an era in which it was believed that the UN would be able to do more without the cold war constraints.[7] Remarkably, it asserted that the "time for absolute and exclusive sovereignty" had passed and that "leaders of States […had] to understand this" (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 17). These statements resulted from the perceived changing context after the end of the cold war, explored in detail in the first part of the document (paras. 8–19). The report also reflected the complexity and the changing nature of international security within that context: it entailed an understanding of security expanded beyond 'traditional' notions and considered a number of risks to global stability that were no longer restricted to the 'international', as discussed in the previous chapter. Hence, racial tensions, environmental degradation, poverty, disease and famine were recognised in *An Agenda for Peace* as serious risks to global stability, featuring in the text alongside 'traditional' threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (paras. 12–13). The report argued that it was necessary

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[7] In an editorial, the Washington Post (1992) ascertained that Boutros-Ghali's report reflected the "can-do spirit of the day", noting that the Council had requested the new Secretary-General to "outline the ways that the U.N., freed from a Cold War confrontation that [had] produced 279 council vetoes, could better contribute to peace".

to adapt and legitimate UN actions to this changing and 'new' context of "civil strife" (para. 55)—that is, at least as long as they could be characterised as threats to international peace and security by the Security Council. This core idea, as noted earlier, has been outlined during the initial deliberations of the Task Force constituted by Boutros-Ghali.

Mindful of this new context and sensitive to the changes of both the international system and the concept of international security, *An Agenda for Peace* sought to systematise and conceptually re-define the entire scope of UN actions related to the maintenance of international peace and security. Adjusting the UN role to such a new reality would require a range of mechanisms, of tools, that constituted the structure of an 'enhanced collective security', as conceived by the Task Force. In its final version, the report addressed the '5Ps', although not necessarily along the lines discussed by the Task Force: peace enforcement, for instance, rather than equated with the other '4Ps', was outlined as part of peacemaking efforts to restore or maintain cease-fires through the deployment of peace enforcement units (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 44). The proposal for those units was included in the report in the second drafting stage out of Sutterlin's reading that peacekeeping had become outdated and unable to adequately respond to the armed conflicts of that time (Sutterlin 2012a). The proposed units, dubbed in an early analysis as "perhaps the most eye-catching of all the recommendations" in Boutros-Ghali's report, proved to be one of the most controversial in the wider UN membership (Cox 1993: 10).

As mechanisms, as techniques, available to the UN to perform duties in the area of international peace and security, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding were envisaged as responses to different stages of armed conflicts. The rationale contained in the document is as follows: "preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out"; peacemaking and peacekeeping, after the cessation of hostilities; and "post-conflict peace-building", rather obviously, after the "termination" of the armed conflict (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 21). More precisely, the latter was defined as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (para. 21). Preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding were thus seen as somehow complementary activities: the former was designed to avoid a crisis, whilst the latter, to prevent its recurrence (para. 57).

The document assumed the four mechanisms as responses to specific phases of armed conflicts, which were in turn understood in a rather linear manner. A representative illustration of this sequential understanding may be found in an article by two senior officials in Boutros-Ghali's office at the time. In the text, they summarise the UN-sponsored peace process in El Salvador as follows:

> It began with the two-year negotiations that led to the January 1992 peace agreement – the peacemaking phase. It was followed by U.N. supervision of the dissipation of the military conflict – the peacekeeping phase. The U.N. then continued to play a central role in ensuring that far-reaching political, social, and institutional reforms agreed to in the negotiations were carried out to prevent recurrence of violence – the post-conflict peace-building phase. (de Soto and del Castillo 1994: 70)

One could then argue—which Boutros-Ghali did in the 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, as discussed in the following chapter—that continued support for those measures in El Salvador would contribute to preventing future crises, thus reverting the process in the country back to the beginning of the cycle, that is, the preventive diplomacy phase.

The section dedicated to post-conflict peacebuilding was the shortest amongst those concerning the four instruments, with only five paragraphs in length. Although the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding defined in paragraph 21 of the document is rather broad, and consequently somewhat vague, it gains substance as the ensuing paragraphs refer to the tasks and actions the UN could and/or should carry out as part of peacebuilding efforts. Amongst many others, they included: the disarmament of warring parties, as well as the custody and even the destruction of weapons; the repatriation of refugees; the monitoring of elections, reform of government institutions and the promotion of political participation (para. 55); projects focusing on economic and social development or aiming at cultural and education exchanges to reduce hostilities (para. 57); and de-mining (para. 58). Understood as such, post-conflict peacebuilding reflected the expanding notion of international security at the time, moving beyond the traditional strict concern with military security to include a broad range of activities in the social and economic spheres.

A key aspect of the document is the strong association of peacebuilding with the promotion of democracy internationally. This relationship is addressed in the last of the five paragraphs in the section dedicated to post-conflict peacebuilding and is advocated with an explicit reference to core ideas of the liberal democratic peace framework, namely the connection between peace and democracy, and the promotion of democracies as a mean to achieve peace. The paragraph reads as follows:

> There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. *There is an obvious connection between democratic practices—such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making—and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities.* (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 59; emphasis added)

According to Boutros-Ghali (2013), the connection between democracy and peace found in the report stemmed from the philosophical writings of Immanuel Kant and, as such, it was "not a new idea". In *An Agenda for Peace*, however, the connection was simplified and politicised as a view that required political action: since there was such an 'obvious connection' between democracy and peace, the former should be promoted to achieve the latter. And given that the rationale was articulated in this particular section of the Secretary-General's report, the promotion of democracy ought to be carried out through post-conflict peacebuilding in societies emerging from armed conflict.

The same rationale connecting democracy and peace in general, and peacebuilding and democratisation in post-armed conflict situations in particular, would be repeated a few months later in Boutros-Ghali's first Report on the Work of the Organisation. In the document, he argued that the "United Nations must foster, through its peace-building measures, the process of democratization in situations characterized by long-standing conflicts, both within and among nations" (UN Doc. A/47/1: para. 166). The argument would continue to be pushed forward in the following years, especially as he issued two other agendas: *An*

Agenda for Development in 1994 and *An Agenda for Democratization* in 1996. In the former, Boutros-Ghali argued that "democracy provide[d] the only long-term basis for managing competing ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a way that minimize[d] the risk of violent internal conflict" (UN Doc. A/48/935: para. 120). In the latter, he claimed that the promotion of democratisation internationally "amount[ed] to nothing less than peace-building at the international level, in the aftermath of the cold war" (UN Doc. A/51/761: para. 115).

In Boutros-Ghali's rhetoric, as well as in *An Agenda for Peace* and subsequent *Agendas*, the tacit endorsement and use of the liberal democratic peace as political conviction entailed particular meanings of 'democracy' and of how to promote it in post-armed conflict situations. Democracy, according to the former-Secretary-General, is fundamentally a "tool" to ensure that "decisions are not taken by one person", but rather by the majority (Boutros-Ghali 2013). Some of the core constitutive elements of democracy in this view include "human rights, equal rights, and government under law" (Boutros-Ghali 2003b: 540), "strong domestic institutions of participation" (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111: para. 81) as well as "informed citizens" (Boutros-Ghali 2003g: 614). It requires, moreover, "elections", "independent justice", "division of power" and limitations on how long elected rulers can remain in power (Boutros-Ghali 2013).

According to this understanding, democracy is present at both the national and the international levels. At the national level, it can assume "many forms and differ from culture to culture", but it may be "be found in all parts of the world, and in many different philosophies and religions" (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 3). Democracy is, hence, "an ideal [that] belongs to all of humanity" (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 3). Internationally, Boutros-Ghali (1995: 9) believed that democracy had lagged behind sovereignty, but that there were some instances where it might emerge in world politics. For instance, based on his understanding of democracy, he alluded to the democratic nature of the UN by contending that "[w]hether or not its Member States are democracies themselves, they are joined in a structure of equal representation" (Boutros-Ghali 2003b: 540).

Boutros-Ghali's understanding of democracy is thus closer to the one that essentially equates democracy with the rule by the people. It does presuppose elements contained in the substantive conceptualisation of democracies (e.g., division of powers), but it overemphasises the procedural and institutional elements of democracy, especially the holding of

elections. This understanding underlies Boutros-Ghali's reading of the initial words of the Preamble of the UN Charter ("We the peoples of the United Nations"), which he would take to infer that the "notion of democracy" was "central to the foundational document of the United Nations" (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 3; see also Rushton 2008: 100–102). The same rationale supports his reading of the UN as democratic due to the equal representation of member states in terms of votes, as outlined above. Finally, in his *An Agenda for Democratization*, released in his last days in office, democracy was defined, after years of refinement in different public statements and texts, in terms of "a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people" (UN Doc. A/51/761: para. 1). In such a definition, democracy becomes an important aspect of peace because "[i]ndividual involvement in the political process enhances the accountability and responsiveness of government. Governments which are responsive and accountable are likely to be stable and to promote peace" (UN Doc. A/51/761: para. 64). For Boutros-Ghali, in sum, the essence of democracy lies in the rule of the majority; it is therefore a minimalist-procedural form of democracy.

Based on this understanding, Boutros-Ghali argued for the promotion of democracies at different levels, nationally and internationally, that is, "within member states" and "among member states" (Boutros-Ghali 2013; see also Boutros-Ghali 1995; UNIHP 2007a: 32–35; UN Docs. A/51/761: paras. 63–65; A/47/277-S/24111: paras. 81–82; A/46/PV.59: 17). The difference between the two is not one of essence but scope. At the national level, the promotion of democracy is intrinsically associated with the promotion of development as an "an essential and indispensable stage in the economic and social development of nations" (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 16). At the international level, the promotion of democracy is "part of the responsibility of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security" since democracy is "one of the pillars on which a more peaceful, more equitable, and more secure world can be built" (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 3). Boutros-Ghali articulated the promotion of democratic values both within and among states as a mutual process: "[t]he democratisation of international relations should complete and amplify the democratisation of national institutions. This dual process can create a new dynamic for national peace and stability, which is as important as international peace and stability" (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 17). In this formulation, the strengthening of

"fundamental freedoms and democratic institutions" (UN Doc. A/46/PV.59: 17), which was part of the new role envisaged for the UN, was hence related to the maintenance of peace at both the national and international levels.

An Agenda for Peace embodies the conversion of the liberal democratic peace from public convention to political conviction in the UN milieu in the early 1990s, epitomising the meaning of peacebuilding in that particular context as the promotion of a minimalist version of democracies as a remedy to the challenges faced by societies affected by armed conflicts. Rather than simply explaining or providing an analytical framework—albeit a politicised and simplified one—for understanding the absence of armed conflicts between liberal/democratic regimes, the liberal democratic peace also provided the basis upon which individuals in the UN milieu understood phenomena in world politics and how they positioned themselves vis-à-vis the variety of available courses of political action. In the following years, the liberal democratic peace would become minimally intelligible in the UN milieu and, as a political conviction that required political action, would also gradually serve to motivate, legitimate, justify and enact concrete peacebuilding initiatives carried out by the Organisation in post-armed conflict scenarios, as explored in the following chapter.

The Academic Foundations of 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding'

Identifying the direct influences of academic research in UN reports is not always a direct and straightforward exercise since those documents normally bear no reference to the sources of data and ideas they reproduce. In the case of *An Agenda for Peace*, the exercise becomes even more difficult as references to academic sources or authorship of previous policy proposals were deliberately omitted, even in background documents and draft versions of the report. To overcome such difficulties, and in line with the proposed theoretical and methodological approach of the book, this and the previous chapter delved at length into both the content and the circumstances under which *An Agenda for Peace* was produced. This section reviews key aspects relating to the drafting of the document to shed light into the academic sources of the concept of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' advanced by Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 report.

The narrative of the previous two sections reveals that *An Agenda for Peace* was essentially a by-product of in-house efforts within the Secretariat. Drafters of the report, however, regularly interacted with and received input, directly or indirectly, formally or informally, from other individuals in the UN milieu. Indirectly, inputs were received, for instance, via research carried out by the members of the Task Force to support their analyses, as illustrated by the note of 23 March 1992 (see Kanninen 1992a), which compiled data on armed conflicts and provided the basis for the 'changing context' section of *An Agenda for Peace*. Directly, the Task Force received input from other individuals in the UN milieu, including during a session held at the Ford Foundation early in April 1992. Michael Doyle (2012), then Senior Fellow at the then International Peace Academy (IPA),[8] also recalls a similar event held at the New York-based think tank to brainstorm ideas for the upcoming report of the Secretary-General. Those instances are relevant since they help trace the process through which an academic discourse (theories on the liberal/democratic peace) has been converted into a non-academic discourse as it migrated to public spheres in general and the UN milieu in particular.

Among such instances, the background note of 23 March 1992 is of the utmost importance. Over the course of the workings of the Task Force, Petrovsky decided at some point that all references to academic works or policy proposals were to be eliminated from drafts and documents produced in connection with the future report of the Secretary-General (Kanninen 2012). In the context of the immediate end of the cold war, the decision reflected fears that proposals originated from one of the former East and West blocks could be opposed by the other. Despite Petrovsky's directive, and for unknown reasons, the note of 23 March 1992 does mention not only the sources used in its preparations but also a lengthy endnote explaining the origins of the sources.

According to the endnote, the sources used in the note were mainly produced by US scholars or US-based scholars who mostly "came from the so-called quantitative school of international relations that remained committed to the United Nations throughout the dark days of the Cold War" (Kanninen 1992a: endnote 1). Contact with those scholars, the endnote continues, had been made mainly via the extinct ORCI,

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[8] In 2008, the IPA was renamed International Peace Institute (IPI).

which had been led by Jonah and de Soto, and where Kanninen and Ramcharan had worked in the past. As the entity responsible for, inter alia, the research and drafting of texts for the Secretary-General, ORCI had been in constant contact with academics during its brief five years of existence (1987–1992).[9] Amongst the scholars with whom ORCI had had contact and which are explicitly cited in the 23 March 1992 note, one finds: Bruce Russett (Yale University), Lincoln Bloomfield and Hayward Alker (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT), Ernst Haas (University of California at Berkeley), J. David Singer (University of Michigan) and Peter Wallensteen (Uppsala University) (Kanninen 1992a: endnote 1). The note itself does not refer to theories about the liberal/democratic peace, but the name of Bruce Russett as a 'contact scholar' demonstrates that individuals in the Task Force, at least the ones with previous experience in the ORCI, were probably familiar with his ideas about the connection between 'democracy' and 'peace', on which Russett had by then been working for years.

In addition to his indirect (i.e. via published works) links to ORCI, the participation of Russett in the War Risk Reduction Project represents another door through which theories about the liberal/democratic peace might have made their way into the Secretary-General's report. The origins of the War Risk Reduction Project were laid out in 1984–1985, when a few officials in the UN Secretariat started to get together with scholars to discuss some of the major issues related to the UN practice in the area of international peace and security. Since there was not much dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time, one of the main concerns of the project was to engage academics and policymakers from the two superpowers through a conference on conflict prevention and nuclear war prevention (Kanninen 2012). Their ambition was to foster closer relationships between academics and policymakers from both sides to discuss and develop proposals and recommendations to make the UN work more effectively in preventing an eventual nuclear war (Sutterlin 2012a; Krasno 2012). Participants in the project could not predict the end of the cold war then, but a short while later, after Gorbachev ascended to power in the Soviet Union, some of them sensed an emerging context in which change was possible (Krasno 2012).

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[9]For more information on the Office, see Kanninen and Kumar (2005) and Ramcharan (1991).

By the time of their first preliminary meeting at Yale University in 1984–1985, some of the individuals involved in the project included: James Sutterlin, Tapio Kanninen and David Biggs, from the UN Secretariat; Bruce Russett and Paul Bracken, from Yale University (United States); Thomas Boudreau, from the School for International Training; David Cox, from Queen's University (Canada); Raimo Väyrynen, then at the University of Helsinki (Finland); and James F. Tierney and Jean Krasno, from the US-based non-governmental organisation The Fund for Peace (Sutterlin 2012a, b; Kanninen 2012; Krasno 2012). Those individuals initially constituted what they called the Core Group of the War Risk Reduction Project (Sutterlin 2012a, b; Krasno 2012).

When Sutterlin retired from the UN in 1987, he became a fellow at Yale University and had more time to lead the Core Group (Krasno 2005). He went on to expand the scope of the War Risk Reduction Project beyond conflict prevention and to organise several conferences on other topics in both sides of the iron curtain, including Canada, Poland and Ukraine (Sutterlin 2012b). Those conferences provided an opportunity for exchanges not only between scholars and UN officials, but also between ideas and proposals coming from the West and some more progressive officials under Gorbachev. In the conferences organised by the Core Group in the late 1980s, participants from the then Soviet Union included, for example: Vladimir Petrovsky, then Deputy Minister in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Andrei Kozyrev, who would become the Russian Foreign Minister under Boris Yeltsin in 1991.[10] As summarised by Bruce Russett in the foreword to one of Sutterlin's books, those conferences "brought together scholars and policymakers who, perhaps to their surprise, found they had much to share, in terms of experience, ideas, and a growing sense that some enhancement of the UN's role in international peace and security might indeed be feasible" (Russett apud Sutterlin 2003: viii).

Whereas it is not my intention to assess the project or its accomplishments, the War Risk Reduction Project played an important role in shaping the meaning of 'peacebuilding' in *An Agenda for Peace* on at least

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[10]The reports of the conferences held in Poland and Canada were published as Cox et al. (1989) and International Security and Arms Control (1989), respectively. Both reports include lists of participants and the former, in addition, contains the speech delivered by Petrovsky on the occasion. I am indebted to James Sutterlin for authorising and Jean Krasno for facilitating my access to their files on the War Risk Reduction Project.

three counts. Firstly, for serving as a repository of concepts and ideas for individuals involved in the making of Boutros-Ghali's report. From the narrative in this chapter, there is compelling evidence suggesting that the discussions carried out within the framework of the War Risk Reduction Project reached those involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace*. In addition to Petrovsky, who participated in some activities promoted by the War Risk Reduction Project, two of the Project's core members (Sutterlin and Kanninen) participated directly and actively in the drafting of the Secretary-General's report. It thus seems only natural that they would take such opportunity to circulate ideas between the two groups—which they did. According to Kanninen (2012), several of the concrete proposals he outlined in advance of Task Force meetings had been previously discussed by participants in the War Risk Reduction Project. Sutterlin (2012a) also recalls building upon some of the discussions and proposals outlined within the framework of the Project to inform his drafting of Boutros-Ghali's report. Both individuals served as links between the two groups, between academe and policymakers in the UN milieu. Less direct exchanges also occurred between the two groups, as illustrated by the note dated 23 March 1992, which was circulated for members of the Task Force and cited one member of the Yale-based project: Bruce Russett.

Secondly, and as a result of the existing links between the Project and the making of Boutros-Ghali's report, the activities of the Yale-based project made individuals involved in different stages of the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* familiar with the observation that democracies rarely fought with each other. Evidence supporting this claim is plenty. First, as aforementioned, Russett appears as 'contact scholar' of ORCI on the 23 March 1992 note. By then, he had not yet published *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, his major statement on the subject, but he had already published academic journal articles paving the way for the book and his future research agenda. Members of the Task Force, at least those in ORCI, were thus presumably acquainted with the connection between 'democracy' and 'peace' in academic circles. Second, individuals involved in the Core Group were also familiar with the democratic peace thesis. In a letter dated 28 January 1991, contained in the records of the War Risk Reduction Project, Sutterlin expresses to a Soviet scholar his interest in promoting a conference on the UN role in strengthening democratic processes under the framework of the War Risk Reduction Project. Among the subjects tentatively proposed to be covered in

the conference, there is one reading "Democracy and Peace—The Encouragement of Democratic Trends as within the Mandate of the UN for the Preservation of Peace—A Viable Assumption?" (Sutterlin 1991).

A third illustrative instance that individuals involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace* were aware of the academic claim that democracies did not fight each other refers to informal interactions between Sutterlin and Russett, who were both based at Yale University around that time. According to interviews with both Russett (2012) and Sutterlin (2012a, b), Russett's work on theories about the liberal/democratic peace was not carried out within the framework of the War Risk Reduction Project. Sutterlin and Russett, however, shared similar academic interests on the UN and multilateralism[11] and constantly exchanged views about their academic works, including on Russett's on-going work towards the formulation of explanations for the existence of the liberal/democratic peace. Russett (2012) recalls, for instance, that Sutterlin encouraged him to flesh out the connections underlying his theory at an early stage of his writings, which confirms that Sutterlin was aware of the connection between 'democracy' and 'peace' in academic circles by the time he became involved in the drafting of *An Agenda for Peace*—and he then believed it in the validity of such connection (Sutterlin 2012a).

Finally, the War Risk Reduction Project played an important role in shaping the meaning of peacebuilding in Boutros-Ghali's report for advancing the idea of peacebuilding as a proposal related to the innovative use of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-cold war. Sutterlin (2012a) notes that in the late 1980s, the War Risk Reduction Project was discussing such proposals based on the understanding that, "for peacekeeping to ultimately be successful, it had to be combined with social and economic measures that would provide a sounder basis for peace in the future". This understanding clearly pointed to a departure from the 'traditional' understanding of peacekeeping as primarily a military endeavour focusing on 'hard' security aspects, as had been the case during most of the cold war years, to one that was more multi-dimensional and sensitive to other areas affecting armed conflict.

In the context of such new proposals, Sutterlin addressed 'peacebuilding' in a piece published in May 1992, a month before the public release

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[11] They even co-authored journal articles about the United Nations, one of which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* about a year before the release of *An Agenda for Peace* (see Russett et al. 1996; Russett and Sutterlin 1991).

of *An Agenda for Peace*. In the paper, Sutterlin referred to peacebuilding as an "amorphous" concept that meant "strengthening the bases for peaceful societies and for peace among nations", arguing that it could potentially cover a wide range of "well-meaning platitudes", from education to economic development (Sutterlin 1992: 14). Owing to such a wide array of possible intervention areas, he contended that it was in the strengthening of democratic processes that UN peacebuilding could actually make a difference. According to him, this was so since

> [d]omestically, freely elected governments tend to be responsive to the will of the people and therefore show respect for the human rights of the population. Internationally, [because] *in the modern era democratic countries have, almost without exception, not fought against other democratic countries.* (Sutterlin 1992: 14; emphasis added)

As explored in the previous section, the concept of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' in Boutros-Ghali's report bears a clear resemblance with the conceptualisation of peacebuilding in Sutterlin's text of May 1992. Both definitions encompassed varied activities under the rubric of peacebuilding and a component of democracy promotion. This component, as demonstrated by the passage quoted above, was based on a simplified version of the liberal democratic peace as theoretical construct, which would also underlie Boutros-Ghali's 'post-conflict peacebuilding'. A key difference between the two concepts, however, is that Sutterlin (1992) did not refer to peacebuilding as a 'post-conflict' endeavour, whereas Boutros-Ghali restricted the scope of his concept to the aftermath of armed conflicts.

This in-depth analysis of the origins of 'peacebuilding' in the UN reveals that the academic sources of the concept are closely associated to US research seeking to explain the existence of the liberal/democratic peace in the early 1990s. This connection was made possible by direct and indirect exchanges between those involved in the making of *An Agenda for Peace*, and scholars undertaking research to corroborate the liberal/democratic peace thesis and seeking to make policy-oriented recommendations to enhance the UN role in peace and security in the post-cold war. By identifying the academic sources of peacebuilding in the scholarly work on the liberal/democratic peace thesis, this narrative raises questions about the two views on the origins of the concept in the UN, as discussed next.

Revisiting the Debate on the Origins of 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding'

As discussed in the Introduction, there are two contending views about the origins of peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace*. The first view holds that the concept was a brainchild of Boutros-Ghali and, as such, unrelated to Galtung's earlier concept. The second view, on the other hand, holds that Boutros-Ghali's definition stemmed from Galtung's concept in the tradition of peace studies, as implied or directly referred to in both academic and policy-oriented writings. Based on the narrative constructed in this and in the previous chapter, this section partially deconstructs and partially corroborates these two views, arguing that while 'post-conflict peacebuilding' may bear Galtung's label of 'peacebuilding' due to the likely acquaintance between the two scholars, the meaning of peacebuilding is remarkably different for Galtung and Boutros-Ghali.

The narrative herein constructed corroborates the first view to the extent that the *meaning* of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' was largely shaped by Boutros-Ghali and his views on democracy and democratisation. The analysis of this and the previous chapter reveals, however, that the former Secretary-General did not coin the term peacebuilding on board of an aircraft during one of his official travels, as observed by Karns (2012: 72) and Jenkins (2013: 19). As explored in the first section of this chapter, there are archival records demonstrating that Boutros-Ghali was involved in discussions about the '5Ps', one of which was peacebuilding itself, in the early stages of drafting of *An Agenda for Peace*. Furthermore, in addition to the term itself, an attempt to define peacebuilding had been made in the first preliminary draft

produced by the Task Force, which Boutros-Ghali has read and commented. Boutros-Ghali, hence, had already been introduced to the term by the time he allegedly carved the concept of 'peacebuilding' on his own.[12]

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[12]The record of Boutros-Ghali's travels in the first half of 1992 also raises questions about the historical accuracy of this first view. According to those records (see Hill 2003: Appendix 2), Boutros-Ghali made only one travel in connection with the Central American peace accords in that period: he visited Mexico on 15–16 January 1992 to sign the Salvadorian peace accord, and then El Salvador, on 16–17 January 1992, to visit the headquarters of ONUSAL. He also travelled to Colombia on 7–10 February 1992 to meet President Gaviria in connection with the eighth UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which might have included considerations about Central

As for the second view about the origins of 'peacebuilding' in *An Agenda for Peace*, it may be corroborated to the extent that the concepts of both Galtung and Boutros-Ghali bear the same label. The use of the term could be a result of personal acquaintances and the familiarity of drafters of Boutros-Ghali's report with the earlier writings of Galtung. According to Galtung (2012), he and Boutros-Ghali met in 1971, during his stay as Visiting Professor at the University of Cairo, in Egypt, where the future Secretary-General have taught international law and politics between 1949 and 1977.[13] Similarly, as Galtung was one of the most reputed social scientists from the Nordic countries at that time, he was also known to Kanninen, a national of Finland, and they had both met in person before Kanninen was appointed secretary of Boutros-Ghali's Task Force (Kanninen 2012, 2013). As such, it is possible that the label of peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace* draws from Galtung's earlier writings.[14]

At the same time, this narrative challenges the second view about the origins of 'peacebuilding' in Boutros-Ghali's report by looking more deeply into its meaning and the process of construction of that meaning.

American peace accords given Colombia's position as a member of the Contadora Group. Whereas the first of those travels occurred before the Security Council meeting of 31 January 1992, the second took place shortly afterwards, so it is unlikely that the concept of 'peacebuilding' was carved in either one of those trips. Similarly, Boutros-Ghali only travelled to South America again in June: he went to Brazil for the opening and closing of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) on 1–4 June 1992 and 8–14 June 1992; and he paid an official visit to Uruguay between 4 and 8 June 1992. By the time of those travels in June, drafts of the report bearing the term and definitions of 'peacebuilding' had already been produced by both the Task Force (in April) and Dayal and Sutterlin (in May).

[13] Galtung (2012) recalls that Boutros-Ghali helped to promote a community plan he had designed for the Middle East at the time. According to Venturi (2009: 290), Boutros-Ghali requested around that time permission to translate into Arabic an article in which Galtung argued for a two-state solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Boutros-Ghali's years at the University of Cairo, see UNIHP (2007a: 6, 11).

[14] Kanninen does not recall any discussion about Galtung's work within the framework of the Task Force and he does not believe that Galtung's concept of 'peacebuilding' had any particular or direct influence on the Task Force's thinking on 'post-conflict peacebuilding' (Kanninen 2013). Nevertheless, the fact that *An Agenda for Peace* addresses the 'three approaches to peace' outlined by Galtung (1976), including peacebuilding, is hardly a simple coincidence given the aforementioned personal acquaintances and Galtung's reputation in academic circles at that time.

This analysis suggests that, as it appeared in *An Agenda for Peace*, the meaning of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' was more closely influenced by the US academic scholarship on the democratic peace thesis than by the Nordic school of peace studies. This influence resulted from interactions between individuals who were aware and believed in the validity of the thesis, and those who had a direct role in the drafting of Boutros-Ghali's report. In the document, 'post-conflict peacebuilding' is heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace as political conviction and is closely associated with the promotion of liberal/democratic states in post-armed conflict situations. Understood as such, 'post-conflict peacebuilding' entails a rather narrow meaning in comparison with the earlier version advanced by Galtung. As discussed in Chapter 3, Galtung's understanding of peacebuilding was directly opposed to structural violence and, as such, its main concern was the elimination of the deepest causes of armed conflicts (Galtung 1976: 297) rather than the promotion of liberal democracies in its minimal-procedural connotation, as in Boutros-Ghali's report. In Galtung's writings, consequently, peacebuilding is related to the promotion of social justice or positive peace—and not necessarily democracy or elections.

In sum, despite similarities in their labels, the meanings underlying Boutros-Ghali's concept of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' and Galtung's concept of 'peacebuilding' are remarkably different. This conclusion partially corroborates and partially challenges both views seeking to account for the origins and the meaning of peacebuilding in the UN in the early 1990s, and points instead to simplified and politicised versions of theories about the liberal/democratic peace in US scholarship as the key source of meaning for UN peacebuilding in the UN milieu of the early 1990s.

Chapter Summary

This and the previous chapter demonstrated that the liberal democratic peace is a successful case of theory as a hermeneutical mechanism of attaching meanings to political concepts. Formulated primarily in the restricted circles of academia, the understanding that liberal/democratic societies do not or rarely fight each other migrated to the public spheres in a simplified and politicised version following the convergence of intricately related material and ideational aspects by the late 1980s and early 1990s. This migration was triggered and made possible by key

individuals in the UN milieu, most especially Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in connection with his efforts to establish a link between peace and democracy to rhetorically justify and legitimate his views on democratisation. In *An Agenda for Peace*, however, the connection made between 'democracy' and 'peace' was not incidental: it was used with the political aim of legitimating and justifying the UN role in 'post-conflict peacebuilding', most particularly in what concerns support to electoral processes in societies emerging from conflict. This and the previous chapter, in sum, explored the process of conversion of the liberal peace framework from theoretical construct to public convention to political conviction.

In order to demonstrate that the liberal peace is a successful case of theory as hermeneutical mechanism, I carried out an in-depth analysis of multifaceted sources and constructed a narrative about the drafting of Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*. In addition to providing a more nuanced understanding of the origins and meaning of peacebuilding in the UN milieu at a critical moment in the early 1990s, this narrative engaged with two other views about the origins of peacebuilding in the UN: one holding that Boutros-Ghali created the concept from scratch during one of his travels as Secretary-General, and other claiming that Boutros-Ghali's concept stemmed fully from early academic writings of Johan Galtung. By recasting the origins of peacebuilding in new light, this narrative instead associated the concept of peacebuilding more closely to academic writings in the US democratic peace scholarship. Of note, it was not the academic theories per se that influenced and gave meaning to peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace*, but rather a simplified and politicised version of those theories, one that entailed a strong view in need of concrete political action.

The concept of peacebuilding that appeared in Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* was informed by a strong and entrenched view (the liberal peace as political conviction) about the promotion of liberal/democratic societies as a remedy to the challenges faced by societies affected by armed conflict. The liberal democratic peace as political conviction frames understandings about phenomena in world politics and consequently influences how individuals position themselves via-à-via several possible courses of political action. Moreover, as a strong and opinionated view, the liberal democratic peace requires political action. Hence, in the United Nations of the early 1990s, the concept of peacebuilding informed by the liberal peace as political conviction was gradually used to motivate, legitimate, justify and enact one particular course of action

in the UN milieu: the promotion of a minimalist version of democracies as a remedy to the challenges faced by societies affected by armed conflict. The following chapter explores how this version of peacebuilding became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu following the release of *An Agenda for Peace*, thus serving as the main framework underlying most of the UN peace operations deployed in post-armed conflict situations in the 1990s.

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Towards UN Liberal Democratic Peacebuilding(s)

INTRODUCTION

Halfway into his second year in office, Boutros-Ghali remarked that "[w]e have only to look at the mandates given to the United Nations forces to see the connection which the Organization is making, at the operational level and in the most concrete terms possible, between peace-keeping, the establishment of democracy to and the safeguarding of human rights" (Boutros-Ghali 2003f, 682). The assertion provides a good overview of how peace operations were being carried out by the United Nations (UN) following the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*. As discussed in the previous chapters, the understanding of peacebuilding in that document reflected the political conviction that a minimalist-procedural sort of democracy ought to be promoted in societies affected by armed conflict as a means to achieving peace— and a liberal/democratic kind of peace. While the previous chapter explored the migration of that understanding from academic circles to the UN milieu, this and the following chapters explore the trajectory of peacebuilding in the United Nations from the release of *An Agenda for Peace* to the early 2010s, approximately, analysing the interplay between that understanding, organisational arrangements and concrete initiatives in the field—and how they reflected, as observed by Boutros-Ghali, an increasing connection between peace operations and the promotion of democracy.

In this chapter, I argue that this liberal democratic understanding of 'peacebuilding' became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu from the early 1990s onwards, gradually informing how individuals understood the concept and practice of peacebuilding and offering a rationale for the promotion of liberal democracies in post-armed conflict situations. As a political conviction, however, the liberal democratic peace is not immutable and its meaning is not fixed. Rather, as discussed in Chapter 3, the meaning assumed by the liberal democratic peace framework hinges upon the meanings of its core concepts: 'liberal democracy' and 'peace'. I thus further argue that whereas the liberal democratic peace framework remained the main referential of how peacebuilding was understood by individuals in the UN milieu and carried out by the United Nations, its meaning gradually shifted from the promotion of a minimalist, procedural, version of liberal democracy towards a maximalist, substantive, version of liberal democracy. Either in its minimalist or maximalist version, the political conviction of the liberal democratic peace has served to motivate, legitimate, justify and enact concrete peacebuilding initiatives carried out by the United Nations for many years following the release of *An Agenda for Peace*.

This chapter reviews those developments focusing on the period spanning from the release of *An Agenda for Peace* to 2004, one year before the establishment of the so-called peacebuilding architecture. The following section explores the factors facilitating the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace as the minimally intelligible meaning of 'peacebuilding' in and around the UN following the release of *An Agenda for Peace*. The two subsequent sections explore the UN approach to peacebuilding under Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, respectively. The analysis herein carried out reinforces the argument that peacebuilding has been progressively expanded in terms of scope, phases and activities that ought to be undertaken by the Organisation, particularly in post-armed conflict situations (Call 2004: 3; see also Call and Cousens 2008: 3). This expansion took place as the core concept of liberal democracy constituting the liberal democratic peace framework moved away from a minimalist, procedural, and towards a maximalist, substantive, understanding. Whereas this shift reflected different views of liberal democracy and how to promote it, the UN approach to peacebuilding remained nevertheless influenced by the liberal democratic peace as political conviction during the entire period.

Factors Facilitating the Assimilation of the Liberal Democratic Peace in the UN Milieu

The liberal democratic peace framework underlying 'peacebuilding' in *An Agenda for Peace* did not enter the UN in a vacuum. Rather, the prevailing worldviews and the previous practice of the Organisation in peace and security played an important role in that process. This section explores two key factors facilitating the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace as the minimally intelligible meaning of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu in the early 1990s, namely the strong Western, liberal, imprint found at the most basic level of the Organisation's ideational dimension and its previous experience supporting democratic processes and promoting human rights through peacekeeping operations.

The Western Liberal Imprint at the Deep Core of the UN Ideational Substrate

A good starting point to identify and understand the elements in the deep core of the UN ideational substrate are the worldviews upon which the Organisation was founded. In the process leading to the establishment of the UN, contending views existed on a range of aspects relating to the organisation that was to succeed the League of Nations, from its political nature to its powers to the number and exact prerogatives of its main body, the Security Council (SC).[1] Notwithstanding such differences, the worldviews underlying the founding of the UN essentially resembled the experience of inter-state relations and multilateral institutional arrangements that had prevailed in Western Europe since the seventeenth century (see Mazower 2009, 2012; Knight 2000).

Such worldviews and experiences include, but are not limited to: the practice of great power management, particularly as embodied by the Concert of Europe; the Austinian legal positivism and the Grotian natural law tradition, which sought to create stability and reduce uncertainty in inter-state relations; the notions of pacific settlement of disputes, disarmament and collective security, all of which experienced attempts of global institutionalisation after the Hague Conferences; the principle

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[1] For detailed and well-informed accounts of the negotiations in Dumbarton Oaks (August–October 1944), Yalta (February 1945) and San Francisco (April–June 1945), see, respectively, Hilderbrand (1990), Plokhy (2010), and Schlesinger (2003).

of self-defence, which stemmed from earlier attempts to make illegal the threat or the use of force in inter-state relations; the tenets of non-intervention and state sovereignty, which conditioned Western inter-states relations for centuries following the treaties of Westphalia; the practice of multilateral meetings convened to address common problems; and the legacy of functionalism, particularly as advanced by the experience of technical and specialised international entities created during the nineteenth century (Knight 2000: 61–81). Those legacies, elements found at the deep core of the UN ideational substrate, are generally taken for granted and rarely challenged in the UN milieu, and have provided the basis for the establishment of the Organisation and its subsequent functioning.

One may find these legacies and macro views reflected in the constitutive treaty of the UN, especially as embodied in its Preamble, Purposes (Article 1) and Principles (Article 2). The Preamble is considered an integral part of the Charter, serving as a "statement of motivating ideas and purposes that the members of the Organization have in mind" (Goodrich et al. 1969: 20). It is the Preamble that one reads, for example, that the United Nations was founded to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" (United Nations 1945). Similarly, the Purposes offer the basis for the interpretation of the obligations derived from the Principles—or, according to Simma et al. (2012: 122), "the principles provide the means to achieve the purposes".[2] The Purposes and Principles are thus interrelated: for instance, whereas Article 1(1) defines the primary purpose of the Organisation as the maintenance of international peace and security, such a quest must be pursued in accordance with the respect to the principle of state sovereignty, as contained in Article 2(1). Considered together, in sum, the three parts offer a "guide" (Simma et al. 2012: 108), the "standards of conduct" (Goodrich et al. 1969: 36) for the United Nations.

In addition to reflecting specific understandings about world politics, inter-state relations, the United Nations and its role in the world, the Preamble, Purposes and Principles create the basis for the existence and

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[2] This rationale is also given by Edward Stettinius, head of the US Delegation in the San Francisco conference, while reporting on negotiations about the Charter to the US President. According to him, the Purposes "are binding on the Organization, its organs, and its agencies, indicating the direction their activities should take and the limitations within which their activities should proceed" (Stettinius apud Goodrich et al. 1969: 25).

functioning of the Organisation itself. The Security Council, for instance, is shaped and constrained by the Purposes and Principles since it must act in accordance with them while "discharging [its] duties"(Article 24[2]). The Preamble, Articles 1 and 2 may also constitute the basis for decisions taken by UN organs: they "guided", for example, the General Assembly and the SC while adopting the resolutions that rendered the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) operational (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: 1; S/RES/1645: 1). The Preamble, Purposes and Principles are thus a constant feature of the activities of the Organisation, even though they may not be visible at all times.

Also telling about the macro views on world politics that undergird the foundation of the UN is the Western-inspired and state-centric system of collective security designed to fulfil the Organisation's primary purpose to maintain international peace and security. Conceptually, collective security refers to a complex system of pledged commitments made by members of a community of states that is intended to protect themselves in case of aggression from another member of that community (Claude 1964: 223–260).[3] In such a system, all community members, even those not directly affected by the aggression, are obliged to provide assistance to those under assault. In other words, in a system of collective security, any aggression or attack directed to a member state is considered as an attack to all—hence the resemblance with the maxim 'one for all, and all for one'.

The UN system of collective security is centred on the provisions of the Charter, particularly those in Chapters VI and VII, and on the Security Council, which holds the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as per Article 24. Reflecting the balance of power of the post-World War II, the then major powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China) were not only given a permanent seat at the Council, but also benefited from constitutional prerogatives that granted each and all of them the power to reject proposals they disapproved—the veto power derived from Article 27(3). Chapters VI and VII outline several courses of action available for the Council in the discharge of its duties.

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[3]Weiss et al. (2007: 4, 5) depict collective security as an expansion of the notion of collective self-defence, in which states may use force to protect themselves from an external attack. A system of collective security should not be confused with a system of collective self-defence; see Kelsen (1948) for an elaboration.

The former refers to measures available for the pacific settlement of disputes, including, among others, negotiation, mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement. If and when such measures fail or are deemed inadequate, and where it is determined the existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (Article 39), the Council may adopt the stronger measures outlined in Chapter VII. These measures gradually range from non-forceful actions, such as the interruption of economic relations (Article 41), to others "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Article 42). The wording of the latter article, in practice, grants the Council the power to authorise the use of force under certain circumstances defined by the Council itself.

In a context influenced by worldviews and experiences of Western, liberal, inter-state relations, the liberal democratic peace framework would find a fertile ground in the UN milieu around the early 1990s, as explored in the following sections.

The Experience of Early Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations

The second set of aspects facilitating the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace framework as the minimally intelligible meaning of 'peacebuilding' in the UN in the early 1990s refers to peacekeeping operations deployed to carry out multi-dimensional mandates in the previous decade. Peace operations were not foreseen in the UN Charter, but they have developed over the years out of observation missions and peacekeeping operations established by the Security Council—and more rarely by the General Assembly—on different circumstances since the early days of the Organisation.[4] Initially established in the 1950s with purposes such as the interposition of belligerent parties, peace operations established during Pérez de Cuéllar's second tenure in office (1987–1991) have been gradually mandated to carry out a plethora of complex tasks in the military, political, social and economic domains, which would facilitate and contribute to the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace in the UN milieu.

The first of such operations was the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, a territory under South Africa's administration

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[4]For good analyses on the origins of peacekeeping and early operations, see, among others, Bellamy et al. (2010: 71–92), Berdal (2008a), Fetherston (1994: 8–16), Goulding (1993), and Diehl (1993: 14–31). The review in this section builds upon a range of references, including Adebajo (2011), Bellamy et al. (2010), MacQueen (2006), and Durch (1993a).

officially known as South West Africa. The region had long suffered from colonial exploitation and from the dynamics inherent to the cold war, but from the 1960s onwards, it also experienced armed violence between local armed groups fighting for independence (Howard 2002: 100–102). With the involvement of Western powers and the UN in negotiations for the independence of Namibia, a peace settlement plan was eventually agreed in 1978 calling for the establishment of a UN operation to oversee elections for a Constituent Assembly and supervise the transition to independence. Responsibility for the overall electoral process, including administering the actual casting of ballots, would remain with South Africa's Administrator General for the territory, but the Special Representative of the Secretary-General could "make proposals in regard to any aspect of the political process" (UN Doc. S/12636: para. 5).

UNTAG was deployed in 1989 following lengthy and difficult mediation and negotiations over the plan to settle the conflict. Notwithstanding the prolonged wait, the operation, unlike its cold war predecessors, was mandated to carry out tasks beyond the observation of the cease-fire, including support to the electoral process and, for the first time, the use of civilian police monitoring (Adebajo 2011: 111). Compared to peacekeeping operations deployed at the time, UNTAG displayed rather unique features:

> In many ways, UNTAG was the first operation of its kind. It was a large composite mission, with a substantial non-military component. UNTAG involved more police work than had previous operations and was the first mission charged with preparing a nation for elections and independence. (Fortna 1993b: 372; see also Howard 2002: 100)

From the perspective of future developments relating to UN activities in peacebuilding, UNTAG was an important mission for departing from the overly security-focused mandates of 'traditional' operations deployed during the cold war.

The second operation reflecting broader peacekeeping mandates was deployed to the North of Africa. In April 1991, following years of mediation efforts by the UN Secretary-General and the Organisation of African Unity, the Security Council authorised the deployment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The territory had been a Spanish colony until 1976, when Spain withdrew

and ceded control over Western Sahara to Mauritania and Morocco. While the former shortly renounced claims over the land, Morocco displayed its intention to integrate Western Sahara into its territorial domains—a decision strongly contested by the Algeria-backed Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sanguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front). With the deployment of MINURSO, Sahrawis were provided an opportunity to choose between independence, as advocated by the POLISARIO Front, or full integration into Morocco. In addition to the traditional component of monitoring the cease-fire between the parties involved, MINURSO was tasked with the full implementation of the referendum "from start to finish" (Durch 1993b: 413).

While the ceasefire has largely been kept by MINURSO since 1991, the transitional period preceding the referendum has never really been implemented due to sustained divergence among the parties on issues such as the identification of voters. As of writing, the referendum is yet to take place. Nevertheless, MINURSO was entrusted with an ambitious and thus far unusual mandate: not only to monitor and oversee elections, as in Namibia, but also to carry out and de facto administer an electoral process. This innovative aspect in MINURSO's mandate would soon become a more recurrent feature of the UN engagement in post-armed conflict situations, providing both a precedent and 'hands-on' experience for the Organisation in that area over the following years.

Finally, the third peacekeeping operation with a multi-dimensional mandate established by the Security Council in the last years of Pérez de Cuéllar's term was the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). By the late 1980s, the UN had been involved in El Salvador through both its mediation efforts and its Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The Observer Group was a 'traditional' peacekeeping operation responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Esquipulas II peace accords, signed in 1987 by the governments of Central American as a plan for settling the armed conflicts in the region. In March 1990, the mandate of ONUCA was extended to include support for demobilisation and disarmament, which represented the first instance in which the Council mandated a peacekeeping operation to engage in demobilising and disarming a guerrilla group (Smith and Durch 1993: 453). However, it is ONUSAL's mandate in the area of human rights that makes the mission even more distinctive for future peacebuilding endeavours: owing to massive violations of human rights in the region,

ONUSAL was mandated not only to monitor the human rights situation, as in previous peacekeeping mandates, but also to investigate alleged cases of human rights violations and to promote human rights (UN Doc. S/22494: para. 8). The Mission thus broke new ground in UN peacekeeping due to its emphasis on actively promoting rather than simply monitoring the human rights situation in El Salvador.

These three peacekeeping operations, deployed as the cold war ended, are precursors of the multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations that would become recurrent from the 1990s onwards. Their emphasis in areas such as elections and human rights, according to de Soto (2012), sought to address specific situations and were adopted on an ad hoc basis during Pérez de Cuéllar's second mandate as Secretary-General. With the release of *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, however, an official UN document would provide the missing framework (the liberal democratic peace) for a more explicit articulation between future UN peace operations and their support to electoral processes and the promotion of human rights. The document would thus provide the basis for the deployment of peace operations influenced by the liberal democratic peace as political conviction.

The two sets of aspects outlined in this section facilitated the assimilation of the liberal democratic peace as political conviction in the UN milieu in the early 1990s. The Western imprint found at the most basic level of the UN ideational substrate facilitated the acceptance, without strong contestation, of the tenets associated with the liberal democratic peace by individuals in the UN milieu since they generally resonated with the macro views underlying the functioning of the Organisation. Similarly, the gradual expansion of peacekeeping operations to include tasks and responsibilities in the area of, for instance, electoral support and the promotion of human rights, offered a departure point for UN initiatives influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework in post-conflict situations. Against this backdrop, the remainder of this chapter traces the process through which the liberal democratic peace gradually informed how individuals in the UN milieu assimilated the concept and practice of 'peacebuilding' (ideational dimension) and how corresponding institutional arrangements in the UN Secretariat were created or adjusted as a result (bureaucratic dimension), as well as how those two dimensions affected each other.

Liberal Democratic Peacebuilding
Under Boutros-Ghali (1992–1996)

The United Nations approach to 'peacebuilding' during Boutros-Ghali's tenure in office became heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the meaning associated with the liberal democratic peace is not fixed and Boutros-Ghali favoured a more restricted version of the framework based on his understanding of liberal democracy in a minimalist-procedural connotation. This view influenced the concepts of 'peacebuilding' within the Secretariat and in the UN milieu, and was instrumental in shaping the UN's bureaucratic structures associated with peacebuilding in the years following the release of *An Agenda for Peace*. Whereas standing bureaucratic structures for peacebuilding would only be created in the Secretariat in 2005–2006, previous attempts to consolidate organisational arrangements and advance key features of the liberal democratic peace are rather telling about the influence of this framework in the UN milieu at the time. In the field, the interplay between the concepts of peacebuilding advanced at the ideational level and the structures created in the UN bureaucracy led to initiatives that ought to promote a restricted, procedural, form of liberal democracy to societies affected by armed conflicts. In the process, UN peacebuilding gradually became 'UN liberal democratic peacebuilding'.

Ideational Dimension

Following its release, *An Agenda for Peace* spurred considerable debate in the UN milieu. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly considered the report and its content on several occasions. Between June 1992 and the end of Boutros-Ghali's term, the Council, following consultations, meetings or informal discussions, issued 15 statements on *An Agenda for Peace* or issues directly connected with the report, including on the 'new' concept of peacebuilding (Table 6.1). In the General Assembly, discussions started early in the following session, with an informal working group created to move forward with recommendations contained in the report (see UN Doc. A/47/WG/WP.1).[5]

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[5] Kanninen and Piiparinen (2014) offer an overview of the activities of the working group with a focus on issues related to early warning and preventive diplomacy.

Table 6.1 Security Council statements between 1992 and 1996 in connection with the report *An Agenda for Peace*

UN doc.	Date	Main topic
S/24210	30 June 1992	Report as a whole
S/24728	29 October 1992	Council's examination of *An Agenda for Peace*
S/24872	30 November 1992	Fact-finding as a tool of preventive diplomacy
S/25036	30 December 1992	Economic problems of states as a result of sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter
S/25184	29 January 1993	Cooperation with regional arrangements and organisations
S/25344	26 February 1993	The question of humanitarian assistance and its relationship with peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding
S/25493	31 March 1993	The safety of UN forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife
S/25696	30 April 1993	Post-conflict peacebuilding
S/25859	28 May 1993	Report as a whole
S/PRST/1994/22	3 May 1994	Peacekeeping (improving the UN capacity for peacekeeping)
S/PRST/1994/36	27 July 1994	Peacekeeping (stand-by arrangements for peacekeeping)
S/PRST/1994/62	4 November 1994	Peacekeeping (communication between members and non-members of the Security Council in particular troop-contributing countries)
S/PRST/1995/9	22 February 1995	Supplement to *An Agenda for Peace*
S/PRST/1995/61	19 December 1995	Peacekeeping (stand-by arrangements for peacekeeping)
S/PRST/1996/13	28 March 1996	Peacekeeping (communication between members and non-members of the Security Council in particular troop-contributing countries)

The Assembly also adopted two resolutions on the report in its 47th Session (UN Docs. A/RES/47/120A; A/RES/47/120B). Boutros-Ghali's report was also considered in other instances, such as the Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening the Role of the Organisation, and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (UN Doc. A/49/1: para. 397). Such references and discussions on *An Agenda for Peace*, as well as its related issues and themes, contributed to the dissemination of 'peacebuilding', as defined in the document, in the UN milieu and to its gradual assimilation in the UN ideational substrate.

Concerning the content of references to and discussions of the report, the meaning underlying 'peacebuilding' was closely connected with a specific understanding: one that emphasised democratisation and the provision of support to electoral processes in post-armed conflict situations. Illustrative of this association is the 15 June 1993 report by which the Secretary-General informed the UN membership about actions taken to implement the recommendations outlined a year before in *An Agenda for Peace* (UN Doc. A/47/965-S/25944). In the document, democratisation and electoral assistance appear as core features of peacebuilding: as democratisation was reportedly being regarded as "a crucial factor in political stability, social harmony and economic advancement" (para. 35), the UN was responding positively to frequent requests for electoral assistance. More interestingly, the two-page long section on peacebuilding identifies only one concrete, tangible, measure taken up by the Secretary-General over the past year: the creation of the Electoral Assistance Unit (EAU) in Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (para. 37). In official documents produced at the highest levels of decision-making in the United Nations following *An Agenda for Peace*, peacebuilding was thus being strongly associated with the promotion of democracies—and a minimalist version of democracy—and the provision of support to electoral processes.

Although *An Agenda for Peace* was generally well received in the midst of the optimistic euphoria that reigned in the UN milieu in the post-cold war years, some of its proposals have not been concretely taken up by member states. In early 1995, in the aftermath of the ill-fated operation in Somalia and the failure to deter the genocide in Rwanda, Boutros-Ghali issued another document revisiting some of the areas in which difficulties had been more evident: a position paper titled *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1: para. 6). As in the original *Agenda*, the *Supplement* remained clearly supported by the understanding that armed conflicts developed in a linear sequence and, consequently, the instruments available to the UN (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding) were to be used accordingly. In the *Supplement*, however, Boutros-Ghali attributed a clearer preventive dimension to peacebuilding by adding that it was as "valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred" (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1: para. 47).[6]

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[6]As anticipated in the previous chapter, this contention adds a fourth part to the sequence outlined by de Soto and del Castillo (1994: 70) when illustrating the UN intervention in El Salvador.

Furthermore, the document acknowledged that peacekeeping operations could carry out peacebuilding activities (para. 50), which seemed to indicate that peacebuilding remained conceptually placed at the post-conflict phase of conflicts but could also address conflicts at different stages. Despite such nuances, peacebuilding was still outlined in terms of "post-conflict peace-building" (paras. 47–56), as an initiative at the far end of the continuum outlined in *An Agenda for Peace*.

Boutros-Ghali also recognised in the *Supplement* that activities in the realm of peacebuilding fell within "the mandates of the various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system with responsibilities in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields" (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1: para. 53). Peacebuilding initiatives were thus said to focus, inter alia, on "improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development" (para. 47). Thus understood, peacebuilding no longer seemed to be so closely associated with the 'traditional' mandates of peacekeeping operations, but was now expanded to include more clearly activities in the realms of politics and development, reflecting the experience of emerging multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations at the time. Against this backdrop, the Secretary-General acknowledged that the implementation of peacebuilding could be "complicated" (para. 48) unless integrated and coordinated both at UN headquarters and in the field.[7] Despite this seemingly expanded understanding, peacebuilding remained concerned with the "creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace" (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1: para. 49), which continued to reflect the idea of 'identifying and supporting structures to strengthen and solidify peace' outlined in the 1992 *Agenda*.

The minimally intelligible meaning of peacebuilding during Boutros-Ghali's tenure in office was thus closely associated with the understanding of post-conflict peacebuilding advanced in *An Agenda for Peace*. As explored at length in the previous chapters, that meaning was heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework and essentially entailed the promotion of a minimalist-procedural version of democracies in post-armed conflict situations. This connotation gained foothold

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[7] Following the identified need for integration and coordination, Boutros-Ghali established an interdepartmental task force to produce an inventory of instruments available at the time to the United Nations in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding. The inventory is available as DESIPA (1996).

in the UN milieu as *An Agenda for Peace* was discussed in several instances within the Organisation, contributing to the dissemination and assimilation of the content of the report and its concept of 'peace-building'. This liberal democratic version of 'peacebuilding' gradually informed individuals' views on the issue and offered a rationale for the promotion of liberal democracies in societies emerging from armed conflicts. It also informed bureaucratic arrangements and reforms carried out in the Secretariat at the time.

Bureaucratic Dimension

Reforming the United Nations was a priority for Boutros-Ghali from his very first days in office (UNIHP 2007a: 32; Burgess 2001: esp. 200–202; Boutros-Ghali 1999: 15). By February 1992, the new Secretary-General had already been introduced to a variety of proposals to reform the Organisation from several sources, including former UN staff, non-governmental organisations and diplomats in New York (Müller 2001: 41–53). In one of his first measures ahead of the UN, Boutros-Ghali implemented major changes in the structures of the Secretariat, including the abolishment of several high-level posts and the creation, extinction and/or merge of several departments. The rationale for such a bold restructuring was to adapt the Secretariat to "respond to the needs of a world in rapid transformation" (UN Doc. A/46/882: para. 1). The reforms sought to decentralise and streamline structures and procedures in the Secretariat, reducing problems of coordination and making the Organisation more effective from a management perspective.[8] Boutros-Ghali's early measures in this area, according to Thant and Scott (2007: 86), represented "the most sweeping" package of Secretariat reforms since Hammarskjöld.

In the area of peace and security, the most relevant aspect of the Secretariat reform at that time was the creation of the DPA and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The creation of both

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[8] The latter had become particularly high in the priority of UN reforms following the conservative administration of Ronald Reagan in the United States (1981–1989), which had held back funding to the UN system based on claims over inefficiency and lack of accountability. For an overview of the UN financial crisis in the 1980s, see Taylor (1991). In 1993, in his report as the outgoing Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Administration and Management, Thornburgh (1993) depicted the UN as an institution lacking efficient and adequate management systems to deal with the requirements of the post-cold war world.

organs, effective on 1 March 1992, reflected concerns about enhancing the Organisation's capacity in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, as envisaged in the medium-term plan for 1992–1997 (see UN Doc. A/45/6/Rev.1) and highlighted during the Security Council's high-level meeting of 31 January 1992. The new DPA was an amalgamation of several existing departments and offices, including the Department for Political and Security Council Affairs, the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) and the Department of Special Political Questions (UN Doc. ST/SGB/248). DPKO, in turn, was essentially a new name for the former Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA), which had been largely responsible for peacekeeping in the cold war years. According to de Soto (2012) and Goulding (2002), the end of the cold war and the apparent appeasement between the United States and the Soviet Union enabled Boutros-Ghali to have a department bearing the term 'peacekeeping', to which the Soviet Union had usually opposed claiming that it did not appear in the Charter.

The establishment of the two Departments created some confusion as to the precise boundaries between their respective roles. According to Marrack Goulding, the first head of DPKO, Boutros-Ghali tried to eschew the confusion by insisting that the arrangement was rather "simple": DPA was responsible for the "political work" and DPKO for the "operational work" (Goulding 2002: 31–32). Later in the year, the roles of DPA and DPKO started to gain more defined contours. The mandate of the DPA was outlined to, among others, support the use of the Secretary-General's good offices and mediation, the settlement process in the Middle East and the support for electoral assistance (UN Doc. A/C.5/47/CRP.2: 2–5). DPKO maintained the structure and overall mandate of the old SPA, incorporating additional responsibilities for the operational tasks of missions deployed in the field, which had until then been carried out by the Field Operations Division of the Department of Administration and Management (UN Doc. A/46/882: para. 7; see also Shimura 2001: 49). Despite this apparently clear division of responsibilities and tasks, however, Thant and Scott (2007: 85) note that, in practice, "DPKO led all the new peacekeeping operations, while DPA was left looking for a role".

In 1993, Boutros-Ghali strengthened the role of DPA in the area of electoral support by designating one of its two USGs as focal point in the Secretariat for electoral assistance. The designated focal point would be responsible to

assist the Secretary-General to coordinate and consider requests for elec-
toral verification and to channel requests for electoral assistance to the
appropriate office or programme, to ensure careful consideration of
requests for electoral verification, to build on experience gained to develop
an institutional memory, to develop and maintain a roster of international
experts who could provide technical assistance as well as assist in the ver-
ification of electoral processes and to maintain contact with regional and
other intergovernmental organizations to ensure appropriate working
arrangements with them and the avoidance of duplication of efforts. (UN
Doc. A/RES/46/137: para. 9)

In addition, the Secretary-General created the EAU in the Department.
By the end of the year, the Unit had reportedly assisted 36 member
states on electoral-related issues (UN Doc. A/48/1: para. 464).

The creation of EAU is a symptomatic development in the assimila-
tion of the liberal democratic peace framework in the United Nations
in the early 1990s for two reasons. Firstly, Boutros-Ghali's initiative to
establish the Unit was inspired by a proposal originally outlined by the
United States (Beigbeder 1994: 102–103), a country whose foreign pol-
icy, albeit to varying extents and intensity, has been historically marked
by the promotion of democracy abroad (see Smith 1994). George H.
Bush (1990b) had proposed the creation of a 'special coordinator' for
electoral assistance in his address at the plenary meeting of the General
Assembly in 1990, only a few days after sharing his views on the post-
cold war "new world order", which entailed a component of democracy
promotion abroad (Bush 1990a). Bush's proposal was later reinforced
by the US Ambassador to the UN in discussions related to the adoption
of the third General Assembly resolution on *Enhancing the effectiveness
of the principle of periodic and genuine elections* (UN Doc. A/C.3/45/
SR.38: 11–12). Hence, although not necessarily related to developments
in UN peace operations specifically, the proposal to create a unit focus-
ing on electoral support was embedded in and carried the Wilsonian
legacy of democracy promotion abroad as a means to achieving peace.
Moreover, the Unit would become the resource hub for the provision of
technical expertise on electoral support as peace operations were increas-
ingly mandated to perform tasks in that area in the following years.

The establishment of the EAU is also revealing of the assimilation
of the liberal democratic peace in the United Nations for a second rea-
son: the Unit was established within DPA, the new Secretariat entity

responsible for the 'political work' of peace operations. According to an EAU officer at the time, there was some quarrel over the organisational location of the new entity in the beginning: some member states and UN officials favoured placing the new Unit in the Centre for Human Rights, in Geneva, while others favoured its installation in the New York-based DPA. The latter view eventually prevailed since electoral assistance was by then closely associated with conflict resolution efforts in the UN milieu, especially as an "adjunct to peacekeeping operations" (Ludwig 2004: 119). This perception had been generated partially by the fact that most of the requests for electoral assistance in the late 1980s and early 1990s were associated with the holding of elections following the signature of peace accords, as it had been the case in Namibia and Nicaragua (Ludwig 2004: 119; see also 133–161). The creation of EAU thus represents an important step in the gradual assimilation of the liberal democratic peace in the UN bureaucratic structures. Moreover, its location in the newly established DPA indicates that democracy promotion—and a minimalist version of democracy—had by the early 1990s been assumed in the UN milieu as a key element in the Organisation's toolkit of responses to armed conflicts.

Towards Procedural Liberal Democratic Peacebuilding

UN peacekeeping mandates expanded considerably during Boutros-Ghali's first years as Secretary-General. The UN deployed 19 DPKO-led peacekeeping operations during his mandate—a remarkable number, considering that his tenure in office lasted only five years. In these operations, rather than simply overseeing cease-fires, substantial attention was increasingly given to issues such as electoral assistance and the promotion of human rights, as reflected in Boutros-Ghali's words in the beginning of this chapter. This growing role of UN peace operations reflected not only the overall material and ideational context of world politics in the early 1990s, but also the minimal intelligibility of the liberal peace framework in the UN milieu at the time and the related bureaucratic arrangements put in place by Boutros-Ghali in the Secretariat.

A remarkable multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation of the early 1990s was the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Established by the Security Council in March 1992, UNTAC was mainly tasked with the implementation of the Paris Agreement reached by the

warring parties following years of armed conflict over political power in the country (Berdal and Leifer 1996: esp. 26–36). With UNTAC, the UN assumed responsibilities of a national civil administrator in Cambodia in areas such as public security, agriculture and foreign affairs (see Richmond and Franks 2009: 18–53; Paris 2004: 79–90; Berdal and Leifer 1996). According to Richmond and Franks, elections acquired the greatest importance among those aspects given the assumption that they could create "a power-sharing political alternative to the violent struggle of the civil war" (Richmond and Franks 2009: 21). This assumption was reflected in the Security Council's conviction that "free and fair elections [were] essential to produce a just and durable settlement to the Cambodia conflict, thereby contributing to regional and international peace and security" (UN Doc. S/RES/745: preamble). With such extensive powers, UNTAC was responsible for organising the entire electoral process, including "establishing electoral laws and procedures, invalidating existing laws that would not further the settlement, setting up the polling, responding to complaints, arranging for foreign observation and certifying the elections as free and fair" (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994: 122). On 5 October 1993, only a few months after the polls (in May 1993) and the proclamation of a new constitution (September 1993), the Council praised the "successful completion" of the mission's mandate (UN Doc. S/26531).

Another mission with an elections-related mandate was established by the Council in December 1992: the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, from the acronym in Portuguese). Tasked with playing a central role in the Mozambican peace process, including assuming the leadership of a commission in charge of implementing the General Peace Agreement, ONUMOZ also held responsibilities in the electoral process, being tasked with the organisation and monitoring of presidential and legislative elections (MacQueen 2006: 199–200; Howard 2008: 186–188). As in Cambodia, ONUMOZ left Mozambique shortly after the results of the elections had been confirmed (MacQueen 2006: 200). In both cases, the holding elections represented not only a key element in the package of electoral assistance provided to societies emerging from armed conflict via UN peacekeeping, but also a milestone against which the completion of UN peacekeeping mandates was ascertained—in fact, Haack (2011: 77) defined such relatively quick departures as part of an "election-as-exit strategy" by UN peacekeeping at the time. By overemphasising the importance of elections, these

peacekeeping operations simultaneously replicated and contributed to further embedding in the UN milieu the political conviction that the promotion of a minimalist-procedural form of democracy was a remedy to achieving peace in post-armed conflict situations.

During Boutros-Ghali's tenure in office, the UN sought to assist states in their transition from war to peace by fostering peacebuilding processes that aimed to create liberal/democratic political structures in post-armed conflict societies. In the ideational dimension, mainly inspired by the framework provided by *An Agenda for Peace*, the concept of 'liberal democracy' underlying UN programmes and initiatives in the area of peacebuilding at the time were closely associated with the structural/institutional strand of theorising about the liberal/democratic peace. A similar understanding was replicated in the bureaucratic dimension, where structures were created or adjusted with a focus on electoral support as part of efforts to build peace after conflict. The concept of 'peacebuilding' in the UN thus became gradually influenced by a particular notion of 'liberal democracy', one that emphasised processes and procedures of a democratic *system* (such as the holding of elections) over norms and institutions typical of a democratic *society*, as discussed in Chapter 4. Consequently, as the ideational and bureaucratic dimensions interplayed, UN peacebuilding activities under Boutros-Ghali increasingly sought to create minimalist-procedural liberal democracies in post-armed conflict situations.

Liberal Democratic Peacebuilding Under Kofi Annan (1997–2004)

Under Boutros-Ghali's successor, the United Nations approach to 'peacebuilding' remained heavily motivated, legitimated and justified by the liberal democratic peace framework. Kofi Annan, however, had a different understanding of 'liberal democracy', which ultimately resulted in a somewhat different approach to liberal democratic peacebuilding. This section focuses on the United Nations approach to liberal democratic peacebuilding during most of Annan's years ahead of the United Nations, from 1997 to 2004—the years 2005 and 2006 are discussed in the following chapters, in connection with the establishment and the first year of functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. Following a brief analysis of Annan's views on democracy, this section reviews developments

related to the understanding of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu and in the Organisation's bureaucratic structures during his tenure in office, and explore how their interplay led to initiatives in the field aimed at promoting a broader and more substantive form of liberal/democratic societies than in previous years.

Annan's views on 'liberal democracy' and its connection with 'peace' were articulated in speeches delivered in 2000 and 2001 (Annan 2012a, b, c, d).[9] The views contained in those speeches differed significantly from Boutros-Ghali's to the extent that Annan "realised that the promise of the democratic peace [as concept] was not as straightforward as Boutros-Ghali and other politicians had asserted in the early 1990s" (Haack 2011: 99). This is not to say that Annan dismissed the proposition that liberal/democratic societies rarely fought each other: in fact, in a lecture delivered at the University of Oxford in June 2001, Annan contended that "the history of the last 200 years ha[d] proved [Kant] right" (Annan 2012a: 1529).[10] Annan remarked, however, that a qualification of the democratic peace proposition was necessary since "history shows that young democracies, or ones that are just emerging as great Powers, can behave in quite an aggressive way. […] So perhaps", he continued, "we should confine ourselves to saying that war is less likely between *mature* democracies" (Annan 2012a: 1529; emphasis added).

In Annan's view, democracy was more than elections, which had been overemphasised in the procedural-minimalist understanding minimally intelligible in the UN milieu during Boutros-Ghali's tenure in office. Annan did not neglect the importance of elections for democracy, but he stressed the key role of norms, values and institutions that make for a liberal democratic state. In fact, opposing mature democracies, Annan defined "fig-leaf" democracies as regimes wherein "rulers attempt to legitimize or perpetuate their power by holding flawed elections, that are not really free" (Annan 2012a: 1531). Considering such scenarios, he underlined that "what happens in between elections is at least as important for democracy as what happens during them" (Annan 2012a: 1530–1531). Hence, in Annan's view, in addition to free and fair elections,

[9] Michael Doyle, then Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, remembers being actively involved in the drafting of those statements (Doyle 2012).

[10] According to Annan, what Kant defined as 'republic' was "essentially what today we call liberal or pluralistic democracies" (Annan 2012a: 1529).

mature democracies entailed several other aspects, such as guarantees for the rights of minorities, mechanisms to ensure participation from opposition parties, the rule of law, functioning independent courts and police, a framework for the protection of human rights and good governance (Annan 2012a: 1530–1531).

With the foundations of an agenda for democracy in the post-cold war laid down by his predecessor, Annan recast a new conceptualisation of democracy in the UN milieu by linking democratisation with governance (UN Doc. A/52/513: para 6). According to Haack, this enabled Annan to create a new framework for democracy assistance, one that was multi-disciplinary in nature and "joined up the loose ends that remained from Boutros-Ghali's conceptual development" (Haack 2011: 100). This new framework for democracy was advanced against the backdrop of the UN previous experience in the area and included 11 principles:

> (1) an effective public sector; (2) accountability/transparency of processes and institutions; (3) effective participation of civil society/political empowerment; (4) effective decentralization of power; (5) access to knowledge, information and education; (6) political pluralism/freedom of association and expression; (7) rule of law/respect for human rights; (8) legitimacy/consensus; (9) attitudes and values fostering responsibility, solidarity and tolerance; (10) equity/voice for the poor; and (11) gender equality. (UN Doc. A/52/513: para. 24)

Those principles, according to Annan, "reflect the fundamental principles of a democratic *society*" (para. 25; emphasis added). And if considered in conjunction with a twelfth principle of 'free and fair elections', he continues, "all essential elements for a solid framework for democratization assistance by the United Nations anywhere in the world today would be in place" (para. 25).

Thus defined, democracy and democratisation were closely connected with practices of 'good governance' that went far beyond elections per se. Rather than an overwhelming concern with democratic processes and procedures, Annan's version of liberal democracy was more concerned with democratic norms and institutions, thus leaning towards a maximalist-substantive version of 'liberal democracy'. As a core concept in the liberal democratic peace framework that informed the minimally intelligible concept of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu, this maximalist-substantive understanding of 'liberal democracy' consequently

led to a variant of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding that was broader in aims and scope than the one minimally intelligible during Boutros-Ghali's years. This broader understanding would consequently influence how 'peacebuilding' was grasped conceptually in the UN ideational dimension and how the Organisation's structures would deal with peacebuilding in the bureaucratic dimension, resulting in a different approach to peacebuilding initiatives in the field.

Ideational Dimension

Peacebuilding remained high in the international peace and security agenda in the UN milieu during Annan's tenure in office. Between 1997 and 2004, the Security Council, for one, considered topics directly related to peacebuilding on nine different occasions, excluding the Council's consideration of particular countries where peacebuilding activities were being carried out (Table 6.2). As the concept was disseminated and gained widespread recognition in the UN milieu, references to peacebuilding in UN official documents were also accompanied, implicitly or explicitly, by definitions and elaborations on what sort of activities

Table 6.2 Meetings of the security council on peacebuilding, 1997–2004

Date of meeting	Topic	Security Council action
16 and 23 December 1998	Post-conflict peacebuilding	No action
29 December 1998	Post-conflict peacebuilding	S/PRST/1998/38
8 July 1999	Post-conflict peacebuilding (DDR in peacekeeping environment)	S/PRST/1999/21
23 March 2000	Post-conflict peacebuilding (DDR in peacekeeping environment)	S/PRST/2000/10
5 February 2001	Peacebuilding: towards a comprehensive approach	No action
20 February 2001	Peacebuilding: towards a comprehensive approach	S/PRST/2001/5
15 April 2004	Role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding	No action
22 June 2004	Role of civil society in post-conflict peacebuilding	No action
22 September 2004	Civilian aspects of conflict management and peace-building	S/PRST/2004/33

constituted peacebuilding, as well as under what circumstances the UN should be involved in those activities.

A key document focusing on peacebuilding in Annan's earlier years as Secretary-General was his report *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, of 1998. The document was produced following a ministerial-level meeting of the Security Council on 25 September 1997 seeking to focus "the attention of the international community on the situation in Africa" (UN Doc. S/PV.3819: 2). Annan's report defined peacebuilding as "actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation" (UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318: para. 63). It is in the list of identified tasks that may fall within the realm of peacebuilding, however, that Annan stressed the character of peacebuilding as requiring more than "purely diplomatic and military action", including tasks in the realm of institution-building and the promotion of human rights, among others (para. 63). Despite concern with other areas, security remained a "crucial underlying need" (para. 64) in this conceptualisation.

In 2000, Annan convened the high-level Panel on UN Peace Operations to carry out a thorough review of and propose recommendations on the Organisation's activities in international peace and security (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: i). The report of the Panel, informally known as the Brahimi report in honour of its chairperson, Lakhdar Brahimi, provided a rather frank assessment of the UN record in peace operations in general and peacekeeping in particular. The report defined peacebuilding in terms of "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 13). The definition was faithful to the original formulation of *An Agenda for Peace*, particularly as armed conflicts continued to be perceived as part of a continuum wherein peacebuilding would only be employed 'on the far side of conflict'. The activities enlisted as part of peacebuilding in the Brahimi report (para. 13), however, added substantially to lists previously outlined in Boutros-Ghali's and Annan's reports, including, for instance, the reintegration of combatants and concerns about the development of conflict resolution techniques. Whereas the report did not develop the concept of peacebuilding any further, it explicitly formulated the goal of building a peace in post-armed conflict situations that was more than the absence of war, that is, a 'positive peace'.

In 2001, two other documents explicitly tackled peacebuilding and provided some guidance on how peacebuilding was conceptually addressed in the UN milieu at the time, although they did not outline precise definitions. In February, the Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement recognising that peacebuilding was "aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasse[d] a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms" (UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/5: 1). According to the Council, peacebuilding initiatives focused on "fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights" (UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/5: 2). In the second document, Annan's report *No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, peacebuilding was understood as "an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution" (UN Doc. S/2001/394: para. 11). Peacebuilding activities, hence, were to be included in the mandate of peace operations to facilitate a transition from armed conflicts to an institutional framework for the settlement of disputes (para. 10) or they could serve as a "follow-on" UN presence after the departure of peacekeeping operations (paras. 33 and 56). In both documents, as in the Brahimi report, despite their wide range, peacebuilding activities were nevertheless seen almost as a 'natural' step following the exit of peacekeepers, that is, as tools or instruments to be deployed in the 'post-' phase of armed conflicts.

The report *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of 2004, and which proposed a dedicated commission for peacebuilding in the UN system, offers a two-folded concept of peacebuilding. In the document, peacebuilding is understood both as part of the role of peacekeepers (UN Doc. A/59/565: paras. 221–223) and as a larger task closely related to the "longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions" (para. 224). In the former case, peacebuilding is associated with post-conflict actions, especially during the phase of implementation of peace agreements. Peacekeepers could thus undertake peacebuilding activities and initiatives in areas such as confidence building, provision of security, mediation, implementation of peace agreements and policing (paras. 221–223). In the latter case, the broader understanding of peacebuilding concretely entails

the performance of activities such as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation of combatants; police, judicial and rule-of-law reform; capacity-building for human rights; reconciliation and public sector service (paras. 224–230). In this two-folded conceptualisation, the short-term, narrower understanding of peacebuilding is more concerned with security-related issues, while the long-term and broader understanding is closely related to the building of institutions. As summarised in the report, along "with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law" (para. 229). Table 6.3 offers a summary of key features of the selected documents reviewed in this section.

From Boutros-Ghali to Annan, the minimally intelligible meaning of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu reflected different understandings about the core concept of 'liberal democracy' in the liberal democratic peace framework. As the understanding gradually shifted from Boutros-Ghali's minimalist-procedural to Annan's maximalist-substantive version of 'liberal democracy', so did the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' in the field. This shift reinforces and provides substance to Call's argument that the concept of peacebuilding has been gradually expanded in the United Nations in terms of scope, phases and related activities (Call 2004: 3; see also Call and Cousens 2008: 3). The documents reviewed in this section demonstrate that, from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, the array of means and activities envisaged as part of peacebuilding in the UN milieu has been widened beyond the realm of security to increasingly include development-related aspects. Similarly, 'peacebuilding' has been increasingly related to preventive actions and, perhaps most notably during the 1990s, to activities carried out via multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. In the process, the number of activities and the range of areas associated under the umbrella of 'peacebuilding' in the UN over the last two decades have increased remarkably. Despite such shifts, the liberal democratic peace has remained as the underlying framework informing, legitimating and justifying the UN approach to peacebuilding in those years.

Bureaucratic Dimension

As a veteran officer in the UN system, Annan started his term well aware of the need to reform several parts of the Organisation. Whereas Boutros-Ghali had previously framed his reform proposals against the changing context of the end of the cold war, Annan articulated

Table 6.3 The concept of peacebuilding in selected UN documents, 1992–2004

Document	Definition	Phase	Actions/activities envisaged
An Agenda for Peace (1992)	Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict	Post-conflict	Disarmament of combatants, custody of weapons, restoration of order, advisory for security personnel, elections, advancing human rights, reforming governmental institutions
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995)	Creation of structures for the institutionalisation of peace	Post-conflict, with a role in prevention	Demilitarisation, control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development
The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa (1998)	Actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation	Post-conflict	Creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development. It builds on, adds to and reorients ongoing humanitarian and development activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery

Table 6.3 (continued)

Document	Definition	Phase	Actions/activities envisaged
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations—Brahimi Report (2000)	Activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war	Post-conflict	Reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. Complemented by support for fight against corruption, implementation of humanitarian demining programmes, combat against HIV/AIDS
Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2001/5 (2001)	Peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms	Short- and long-term actions	Sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence

(continued)

Table 6.3 (continued)

Document	Definition	Phase	Actions/activities envisaged
No Exit without Strategy (2001)	An attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution	Before (preventive action), during (included in peacekeeping operations) and post-conflict (follow-on UN presence)	Monitoring the separation of forces and technical assistance in humanitarian mine action; coordinating and assisting UN actors in the return and resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced
A More Secure World (2004)	Along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law	Immediate post (during the phase of implementation of peace agreements) and long term (long-term recovery)	Tasks that may be performed by peacekeepers: build confidence, provide security, mediation, implementation of peace agreements, policing. Long-term recovery: "process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions"—disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation of combatants; police, judicial and rule-of-law reform, capacity-building for human rights, reconciliation and public sector service

his proposals vis-à-vis the perceived need to re-adapt and revitalise the Organisation for the twenty-first century (Annan 1998). In his acceptance speech, Annan voiced his "wish to make the United Nations leaner, more efficient and more effective, more responsive to the wishes and needs of its members and more realistic in its goals and commitments" (Müller 2006: 8). With those goals in mind, he carried out what he called a "quiet revolution" aimed at fostering a "fundamental, not piecemeal, reform" to reduce the perceived gap between the UN purposes and aspirations, and its actual achievements (Annan 1998: 128). At the core of Annan's reform efforts, stood the "[r]eorganization, consolidation of country-level efforts and reaching out to civil society and the private sector as partners" (Müller 2006: 9). His proposals thus focused more on strengthening existing structures and making them work better than on creating new rearrangements almost from scratch, as Boutros-Ghali had done before him.

In his first months as Secretary-General, Annan established a new form of management of the world body and decided to gather several departments, offices and programmes around four main cluster-areas. For each area, he established a cabinet-style forum in the form of Executive Committees focusing on Peace and Security (ECPS), Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA), Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and Development Cooperation—the so-called UN Development Group (UNDG) (UN Docs. A/51/950: paras. 27–33). The Committees were designed, according to Annan, as "instruments of policy development, decision-making and management" (UN Doc. A/51/950: para. 29). The convenors to the Committees, alongside other senior managers at the UN system, would constitute the Senior Management Group (SMG), tasked to "assist the Secretary-General in leading the process of change and instituting sound management throughout the Organization" (UN Doc. A/51/950: para. 35).

In the area of peace and security in general and peacebuilding in particular, one of the earlier measures adopted by Annan was to institute DPA as focal point for peacebuilding in the UN system. The measure stemmed from a proposal elaborated earlier by Margaret Anstee, another veteran UN official. The idea started to take shape after the holding of a high-level event on strategies for post-conflict reconstruction held in Vienna with key players in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief across the UN system (see UN Doc. A/50/345: para. 38). Anstee had further developed and presented the proposal in reports to

Boutros-Ghali, in 1996, and to Annan in 1997 (UNIHP 2007b: 158). She contends that her reports described "very simply how the UN should function in a conflict situation in an absolutely integrated fashion without creating any new organizations or any new coordinating mechanisms" (UNIHP 2007b: 158). Annan eventually designated DPA as focal point for peacebuilding in July 1997 due to its position as convenor of ECPS (UN Doc. A/51/950: para. 121). The measure, however, created some confusion and internal discussions about what this role entailed precisely, which resulted, according to Anstee, in delays in the consolidation of effective peacebuilding arrangements in the Secretariat (UNIHP 2007b: 159).

The convening of the aforementioned panel led by Brahimi, tasked with reviewing UN peace operations, may also be understood within the broader reform efforts pushed forward by Annan. In fact, the Panel was tasked with not only reviewing UN peace operations but also offering "specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities in the future" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: i). The report identified several causes of weaknesses and deficiencies in UN peace operations, including "a fundamental deficiency in the way [the United Nations system] ha[d] conceived of, funded and implemented peace-building strategies and activities" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: ix). Against this backdrop, the report concluded with several proposals for enhancing UN capacities in peace operations, many of which included reforms in the UN institutional structures for peacekeeping and peacebuilding (paras. 54–58). The recommendations affected peacebuilding in several areas, including doctrine (e.g., para. 47) and organisational arrangements (e.g., para. 243), and would take several years before taking root in the UN system.

The reforms proposed and carried out by Boutros-Ghali and Annan were not only matters of an administrative or organisational nature, but reflected deeper conceptual underpinnings and assumptions about the UN role in the area of peace and security. The creation of DPA and DPKO by Boutros-Ghali is an elucidative example, as their domains of responsibilities, ranging from prevention to peacemaking to peacekeeping, were inspired by and reflected the conceptual framework presented in *An Agenda for Peace*. In addition, the expansion in the mandates and the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations, despite connected with other internal and external factors, as discussed in the previous chapter, cannot be dissociated from the establishment of DPKO and

the strengthening of the Secretariat's related capacity in peacekeeping—not least because the new department was better structured and staffed than the former SPA. With the Secretariat's structure consolidated, attention could thus be given to the reformulation of military actions and the 'new' activities carried out in the political, humanitarian, social and economic realms, including the promotion of democracy and human rights. Such activities were essential aspects in the mandates of peace operations created at that time and reflected a view of 'peacebuilding' that was essentially informed by the liberal democratic peace as political conviction. Under Kofi Annan, however, the resulting practice of liberal democratic peacebuilding would gradually assume broader contours than it had during the first half of the 1990s.

Towards Substantive Liberal Democratic Peacebuilding

Between 1997 and 2004, under Annan's tenure in office, the United Nations established 17 peacekeeping operations, many of which entailed a strong component focusing on peacebuilding initiatives such as strengthening the rule of law through institutional reforms in the security sector and enhancing good governance. Only a few of those operations (Central African Republic, 1998–2000; Sierra Leone, 1999–2005; and Burundi, 2004–2006) contained provisions directly related to supporting electoral processes. This shift in the focus may be partially attributed to the maximalist-substantive version of 'liberal democracy' in the UN milieu at the time, which, as advocated by Annan, privileged governance and democratic norms and institutions over processes and procedures such as elections.

One of the most representative illustrations of efforts to construct a maximalist-substantial sort of liberal democracy during this period is the Organisation's initial involvement in Timor-Leste.[11] In the context of a civil war following decades of Indonesian domination, the Security Council established, in June 1999, the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to "organize and conduct" a referendum about the self-determination of the territory (UN Doc. S/RES/1246: op. 1). Following the announcement that the vast majority of the

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[11] For in-depth analyses of the UN role in the country, see Hughes (2009), Richmond and Franks (2009: 83–108), Howard (2008: 260–298), Smith and Dee (2006), and Chopra (2000).

population had opted for independence, violence erupted and a Security Council-sanctioned multinational force was deployed to the territory to "restore peace and security" (UN Doc. S/RES/1264: op. 3). Subsequently, the Council established the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to assume "overall responsibility for the administration" of the territory, with powers to "exercise all legislative and executive authority" (UN Doc. S/RES/1272: op. 1). As simply summarised by Howard, UNTAET was charged not only with Chapter VII responsibilities in "peacekeeping, civilian policing, and humanitarian assistance, but also [with] the governing of an entire country" (Howard 2008: 260).

The approach adopted in Timor-Leste was a significant departure from what Haack (2011: 77) defined as an "election-as-exit strategy" that prevailed during Boutros-Ghali's tenure in office. Instead, as the Organisation seemed to embrace the growing sense that elections were simply an entry point for assistance in Timor-Leste (Haack 2011: 110), it might be said that the UN was adopting an 'election-as-entry-strategy' consisting in the implementation, following elections, of a range of activities aimed at establishing or reforming the norms and institutions of a democratic *society* in post-armed conflict situations. The rationale underlying UNTAET was, according to Richmond and Franks, to fully create an enduring liberal state and "prepare national government for independence" (Richmond and Franks 2009: 87). The UN Authority was mandated to provide security, maintain law and order, establish and keep functioning the administration of the territory, help developing civil and social services, coordinate the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance, offer capacity-building for the self-government of the population and support the creation of conditions for development (UN Doc. S/RES/1272: op. 2). By focusing on those aspects of societal life, the UN clearly mirrored what, according to Annan, constituted the "fundamental principles of a democratic society" (UN Doc. A/52/513: para. 25), as listed earlier in this section.

In addition to promoting democratisation and other 'peacebuilding' initiatives under the framework of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, the United Nations also established 'peacebuilding offices' in the field under Annan. Such offices, which should not be confused with the New York-based Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) created in 2005, grew out of attempts to strengthen the Organisation's capacities to continue assisting post-armed conflict societies after the departure

of peacekeepers. The first of such offices was the UN Office in Liberia (UNOL), established in 1997 as a follow-up field presence to the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) amid considerations about potential instability in the country after the departure of peacekeepers (DPA and UNDP 2001: 9). According to an internal report, such peace-building offices would assist "newly-elected authorities" to continue the provision of "support to nurture and consolidate a fragile peace", thus strengthening UN efforts to address the root causes of armed conflicts (DPA and UNDP 2001: 9). According to Call, however, the establish-ment of a "troopless, and thus toothless" office in Liberia reflected the lack of diplomatic support for larger and more resourced military deploy-ments to the country after the election of Charles Taylor (Call 2012: 89). Other peacebuilding offices would subsequently be established dur-ing the period under review in places such as Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, Tajikistan and Sierra Leone.

From Boutros-Ghali's to Annan's tenure in office, the United Nations approach to peacebuilding has been heavily motivated, justified, legiti-mated and informed by the liberal democratic peace framework, which has also informed bureaucratic adjustments in the Secretariat and enacted concrete initiatives in the field. UN peace operations undertaking peace-building initiatives and the so-called peacebuilding offices were shaped by different political circumstances, operated in distinct environments and had different mandates, focus, institutional structures and personnel. Despite all differences, however, peace operations were rhetorically artic-ulated throughout the 1990s as instruments or techniques that sought to achieve peace through the promotion of elections and/or liberal dem-ocratic institutions, good governance, Western-inspired state structures and market-oriented economies. Such understanding was replicated in adjustments made to the UN bureaucracy and ultimately informed and influenced concrete actions at the field level, including tasks related to democratisation, good governance, and the promotion of human rights, rule of law and economic reforms. At least since the late 1980s, the UN has thus progressively linked the promotion of 'liberal democracies' and the establishment of related institutions, including inter alia market econ-omies, elections, human rights and good governance, with the goal of achieving 'peace', accordingly framing its political actions, particularly through peace operations.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter explored the trajectory of UN 'peacebuilding' from *An Agenda for Peace* to circa 2004. Since it was first outlined in Boutros-Ghali's report, 'peacebuilding' remained heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework, serving to motivate, legitimate and justify the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' as well as to enact concrete courses of action in several contexts. The core concept of 'liberal democracy' underlying peacebuilding actions and related policies, however, did not remain fixed and changed significantly over time, particularly as the two top diplomats in the Organisation understood 'liberal democracy' and its promotion in different ways. Whereas Boutros-Ghali overemphasised processes and procedures in his view of 'liberal democracy', Annan attributed to them an equally relevant degree of importance vis-à-vis norms and institutions typical of 'liberal democracies'. As 'liberal democracy' is a core concept in the liberal democratic peace as political conviction, the political courses of action implemented by the Organisation from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s varied according to those different connotations. Nevertheless, despite different understandings in the UN milieu concerning 'liberal democracy' and how to promote it, the UN carried out peacebuilding initiatives mainly informed by the liberal democratic peace framework. UN peacebuilding, consequently, gradually became UN liberal democratic peacebuilding.

The following two chapters continue to explore the trajectory of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu since 2005, focusing particularly on the establishment and functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. Conceived to overcome some of the limits and shortcomings associated with the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' throughout the 1990s, the establishment of those entities may be seen as an attempt to address some of the inconsistencies of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding. However, changing the meaning of (liberal democratic) peacebuilding embedded in the UN ideational and bureaucratic dimensions would prove difficult and time-consuming. Hence, rather than provoking substantial changes in liberal democratic peacebuilding(s), those three entities instead have thus far stumbled in its deeper underlying influence and ended up replicating and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace framework as the minimally intelligible meaning and main reference for understanding peacebuilding in the UN milieu.

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The Limits of Liberal Democratic Peacebuilding(s) and the Peacebuilding Architecture

Introduction

In 2000, the Brahimi report pointed to an adverse record in the performance of United Nations (UN) peace operations in the 1990s and stated that the Organisation required "significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of Member States" to meet the requirements of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the future (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 1). In the decade preceding the report, the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' had been largely informed by a political conviction about the promotion of liberal democracies, either in its minimalist-procedural or maximalist-substantive version, as a remedy to societies emerging from armed conflict. This political conviction, which was gradually assimilated in the UN ideational and bureaucratic dimensions following the release of *An Agenda for Peace*, has since remained influential in the UN milieu, informing the views of individuals, providing a rationale for bureaucratic arrangements in the Secretariat, and informing and enacting concrete peacebuilding policies and initiatives in several post-armed conflict situations. As that approach was being rendered operational, problems and shortcomings such as the ones underscored by the Brahimi report started to emerge and several proposals were outlined in response.

This and the following chapter continue to explore the trajectory of the concept of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu, focusing on what is arguably the most robust response to the problems and shortcomings of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding: the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the associated Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Whereas acknowledging that this arrangement is no panacea, they have been conceived in response to some obstacles faced by UN peacebuilding in the past, such as the lack of coordination among donors and UN entities, and the need to more actively involve local civil society organisations to ensure that UN peacebuilding was more responsive to field-level realities. Moreover, their consolidation in the UN bureaucratic dimension addressed what had been identified as the lack of a formal "home" for peacebuilding in the UN structures (Tschirgi 2004: 5) and was expected to have a significant impact on UN peacebuilding initiatives at the field level. The establishment of those entities in 2005–2006 thus represents, to a great extent, the ultimate embodiment of liberal democratic peacebuilding in the constitutive dimensions of the Organisation.

The remainder of the chapter is organised into four sections. The first offers a brief overview of key problems identified in connection with the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' during the 1990s and early 2000s. The following section reviews some of the responses outlined in the UN milieu to address those problems—or at least some of them. To the extent that such problems are connected with the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' as informed by the liberal democratic peace framework, this section contends that the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF may be seen as responses to the limits and shortcomings of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding(s). The third section reviews some of the concrete proposals affecting the final shape and format of the actual PBC, PBSO and PBF to demonstrate that despite the aim of responding to problems and shortcomings often identified at the field level, the format and configuration of the three entities have been largely shaped by political, diplomatic and technocratic concerns prevailing in the UN milieu in New York. This shift resulted from a simplification and depoliticisation of complex problems faced by UN liberal democratic peacebuilding into more manageable issues, which attests to the strong technocratic nature of the liberal peace framework and its continued influence in the UN milieu. The fourth and final section presents the structure and mandates of the three entities, providing the basis for the discussion in the next chapter.

The Limits of UN Liberal Democratic Peacebuilding(s)

As the UN operationalised its approach to 'peacebuilding', shortcomings related to its provision of support to societies emerging from armed conflict became evident. During the 1990s, successive failures of peace operations with a peacebuilding component starkly exposed the UN deficiencies in realms that included but were not limited to politics, doctrine, organisation and management.[1] In Angola and Rwanda, for instance, UN peace operations failed to implement the provisions of the 1991 Bicesse Agreement and the 1993 Arusha Accords, respectively. Those failures would result in "[t]he two worst outbreaks of massive violence in the 1990s" and claim the lives of approximately 350,000 persons in Angola and 800,000 in Rwanda (Stedman 2002: 1). In Somalia, the UN was unable to create a secure environment and had its reputation and morale severely affected by the slaughter of US soldiers by rebel groups, whereas in the former-Yugoslavia it failed to prevent the massacre of Srebrenica. In other cases, such as Cambodia, the Organisation was simply unable to achieve all the ambitious goals initially set by the Security Council (SC), although it was able to successfully help the return and resettlement of a significant part of the population to the country.[2] The problems or causes of those failures relate to varied aspects, including inter alia the lack of political will, deficiencies in the command of the operation, lack of adequate resources or an inadequate ability to fully understand the causes of armed conflicts. Such problems provide an illustration of the multifaceted challenges faced by the UN in the 1990s while supporting societies to build peace.

In addition to shortcomings faced in specific instances, the relapse into conflict of countries where the United Nations had acted in the past through multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations contributed to focus the attention of individuals in the UN milieu on the need to

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[1] Distinctions in terms of such categories are relevant analytically, but the reality in which peace operations carry out their functions is much more complex. For a first-hand account evincing the interrelationship of those categories, see, for instance, the memoirs of Roméo Dallaire (2004), force commander of the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda.

[2] For volumes exploring multiple peace operations since the 1990s, see, among others, Adebajo (2002, 2011), Bellamy et al. (2010), Richmond and Franks (2009), Fortna (2008), Berdal and Economides (2007), Durch (1996, 2006), MacQueen (2006), Paris (2004), Goulding (2002), Otunnu and Doyle (1998), and Doyle et al. (1997).

sustain peacebuilding and development activities after the departure of peacekeepers. Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti and Burundi illustrate situations where local populations experienced renewed violence after the closure of a UN peace operation. In 2004, for instance, as internal instability drove Haiti to the verge of violence, the UN deployed a major peacekeeping operation to the country after having already deployed four other UN-led operations during the 1990s (Mani 2006; Shamsie and Thompson 2006; Daudet 1996). In Timor-Leste, a similar situation emerged as the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was deployed in 2006 following a resumption of violence approximately one year after the departure of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) (Hughes 2009). In those instances, not only was the UN 'failing', but those failures were connected with subsequent outbreaks of violence requiring a new UN presence. UN peace operations tasked with maintaining, keeping or building peace, hence, were not being able in some instances to create environments to avoid relapses into conflicts, let alone create stable conditions for sustainable peace and development.

Shortcomings associated with UN peacebuilding were quickly detected in the UN milieu. One critical review was undertaken in 2000 by the Panel on UN Peace Operations. Led by Brahimi, the Panel was tasked to "undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities" and provide a "clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations" for future operations (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: i). It was commissioned, according to William Durch, principal researcher in the office of the Panel's chairperson, "because UN peace operations, and peacekeeping in particular, were in crisis" (Durch et al. 2003: 3). In addition to the UN failures of the 1990s, as outlined above, the decision to assemble the Panel followed a number of other factors, including: the adoption of a General Assembly resolution ending DPKO's prerogative to use 'gratis military personnel' (see UN Doc. A/RES/51/243); the rapid surge in demand for peacekeeping in the late 1990s, including the call to act as quasi-sovereign entities in Kosovo and Timor-Leste; as well as the release of official reports on the UN failures to stop the genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in Srebrenica (Durch et al. 2003: 3–5). Against this backdrop, the decision to establish a blue-ribbon commission to thoroughly address UN peace operations was in itself another reminder of the perceived

underperformance of UN peace operations—and UN liberal democratic peacebuilding.

The Panel presented a comprehensive review of the UN past experience and existing capacities to carry out peace operations. Right in its first paragraph, the Brahimi report bluntly ascertained that "the United Nations ha[d] repeatedly failed to meet the challenge" of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 1). More specifically, the report noted that UN peace operations had "addressed no more than one third of the conflict situations of the 1990s" (para. 29). It identified several causes of UN weaknesses and deficiencies in the area, ranging from doctrinal and strategic issues (e.g., mismatch between mandates and resources available to implement peace operations [paras. 56–64]) to operational (e.g., deficiency in deploying peace operations rapidly and effectively [paras. 84–169]) to managerial and administrative issues (e.g., shortage of staff and funding [paras. 172–197]). Concerning peacebuilding, the Panel identified "a fundamental deficiency in the way [the UN system] ha[d] conceived of, funded and implemented peace-building strategies and activities" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: ix). Against this context of repeated failures and lack of operational and bureaucratic capacities, the Brahimi report called for "renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: viii).

In academia, there was no shortage of analyses of the UN record in building peace. George Downs and Stephen Stedman noted that between 1980 and 1997 the UN had been clearly successful in only five (Namibia, Nicaragua, Mozambique, El Salvador and Guatemala) of the 10 cases in which it had served as the main implementer of peace agreements reached among warring parties in civil wars (Downs and Stedman 2002: 59). The authors indicated that the cases of failure (Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia and twice in Angola) had been due to the Organisation's incapacity to inter alia understand the nuances and complexities of particular contexts and/or gather the necessary resources to effectively implement agreements once they had been reached (Downs and Stedman 2002). In another study, Paris argued that out of the 14 major peacebuilding missions established by the UN between 1989 and 1999, only two had been "clear successes": UNTAG in Namibia and

the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) (Paris 2004: 151). In other cases, the situation had not improved considerably for varied reasons. In particular cases such as Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, Paris contended that the UN not only did little to remedy the armed conflict, but also prescribed policies of economic liberalisation that in fact contributed to reinforcing social inequalities that had led to armed conflict in the first place (Paris 2004: esp. 112–134). Similarly, looking into policies aimed at political liberalisation, Call and Cook pointed out that 13 out of 18 UN-led operations carried out since 1988 had been deployed to countries "classified as some form of authoritarian regime as of 2002" (Call and Cook 2003: 234).

A World Bank research led by Paul Collier and published in the early 2000s would become particularly relevant in the UN milieu: *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. The study focused on the economics of civil wars, including considerations on their determinants worldwide and how civil wars simultaneously affected and were affected by development—according to the study, "[w]ar retards development, but conversely, development retards war" (Collier et al. 2003: 1). One of the main contentions of the study is that the failure of economic development represents the most important cause of conflict and as such, the persistence of economic underdevelopment increases the chances of a country falling into a conflict trap, that is, a situation in which "powerful forces keep a conflict going, while the international community appears almost impotent to stop it" (Collier et al. 2003: 83). The researchers indicated that approximately 44% of post-conflict countries fell into that conflict trap within five years (Collier et al. 2003: 83). The estimate, as discussed by Suhrke and Samset (2007) and elaborated below, gained widespread acceptance in the UN milieu and would be used rhetorically to justify and legitimate the creation of the PBC in 2005.

The limits and shortcomings of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding have also been evinced by a substantial body of critical scholarship.[3] Richmond and Franks, for instance, highlighted a major gap in UN peacebuilding: despite its wide-ranging ambitious goals, peacebuilding has seldom achieved anything more than a negative peace in post-armed conflict societies (Richmond and Franks 2009: 203).

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[3] The scholarship on the critique of the liberal peace was explored in Chapters 1 and 3.

In the African context, for instance, where UN peacebuilding efforts had been intense, Salih showed that the liberal democratic approach to peacebuilding had "failed to address major developmental problems such as poverty, exclusion, the social justice deficit and inadequate access to basic human needs" (Salih 2009). This scholarly critique revealed that liberal democratic peacebuilding efforts had been closely associated with an intrusive practice that often "promote[d] a form of economic control and regulation to establish marked correctives in societies that ha[d] been resistant to conventional marketisation imperatives" (Pugh 2005: 24). Against this backdrop, the positive peace envisaged by liberal interveners has rarely been achieved. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of academic studies had exposed UN peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict situations as no guarantee of a successful transition from war to peace or a successful recovery towards peace and development in the long term. The ultimate goal of achieving sustainable peace via peace operations promoting liberal democratic norms, values and institutions, hence, had by then not produced the results initially expected in the UN milieu.

The studies outlined above were produced by different individuals and with different purposes, both in the UN milieu and in academia. Nevertheless, their analyses converge to identify several problems associated with the United Nations (liberal democratic) approach to 'peacebuilding' in several areas and at different levels (Box 1). Those limits and shortcomings included, for instance, the inability to implement peace agreements and gather the necessary resources for bold actions, the inappropriate sequencing of liberalisation policies, and even the inherent flaws associated with external assistance via liberal democratic peacebuilding(s). Those factors had a rather negative impact on UN peace operations and proved major setbacks to the aspiration prevailing in the early 1990s that the UN could effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-cold war. Indeed, the relapse of armed conflicts in places where peace operations had been previously deployed, such as Haiti or Liberia, as well as the challenges and difficulties increasingly associated with building peace in other situations, gradually highlighted that although peace operations could be relatively successful, further efforts were necessary to effectively create durable conditions for peace.

Box 1: Summary of key UN peacebuilding problems and challenges

Ideational dimension
Inability to fully grasp the causes of armed conflict
Mismatch between peacebuilding policies and realities in the field
Bureaucratic dimension
Mismatch between mandates and organisational capacities
Lack of adequate resources (e.g., personnel, structures, financial)
Lack of capacity to ensure support after the departure of peacekeepers
Lack of intra-system coordination
Member states politics
Lack of political will
Limited financial support
Implementation level
Failure to implement peace accords
Lack of coordination between agencies in the field
Failure to achieve ambitious goals
Failure to prevent relapse into armed conflict

The New 'Peacebuilding Architecture': Origins and Rationale

As the problems outlined in the previous section emerged, specific responses were designed and some were implemented to address them. In the late 1990s, for instance, some UN officials advocated for the creation of a unit for peacebuilding in the Department of Political Affairs (Anstee 1998; see also DPA 2003). In DPKO, an integrated planning framework was developed to improve coordination between several entities working on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the UN system (Benner et al. 2011: 187–196). Outside the Secretariat, UNDP established the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) to address issues relating to security sector reform, mine action and natural disaster recovery (McCann 2012). However, the single most important and comprehensive response to the shortcomings of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding was arguably the creation of what became known as the 'peacebuilding architecture': an institutional arrangement consisting of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. All such proposals had different goals, rationales and implementing agencies, but they were mostly outlined

with a view to addressing identified shortcomings and failures, as well as enhancing the UN's capacities, to support societies build peace.

This section focuses on the ideational origins and the rationale for the establishment of the PBC and associated entities. Reviewing the process leading to their establishment highlights the strong technocratic nature of UN liberal democratic peacebuilding(s) and the difficulty in changing the meaning of 'peacebuilding' for individuals in the UN milieu once it has been assimilated in the UN constitutive dimensions.

According to Lisa McCann (2012: 81), the "direct precursor" idea to the PBC is the Strategic Recovery Facility (SRF), a mechanism conceived in the early 2000s by a team of researchers led by Shepard Forman, from the New York University's Center on International Cooperation (CIC-NYU). Based on the findings of a multi-year research (see Forman and Patrick 2000), the team conceived the SRF to address the problem of coordination and lack of sustainable funding in peacebuilding through a mechanism that could bring key stakeholders together. The Facility was envisioned as a multilateral mechanism to facilitate coordination among entities across the UN system, regional organisations, international donors and NGO representatives (Forman et al. 2000: 26). In addition, the SRF would facilitate interaction with local representatives to ensure that they could take ownership of reconstruction and peacebuilding processes, and would involve international experts to carry out adequate needs assessments. According to Forman (2012), the Facility was conceived as a multilateral mechanism for coordination, but it would neither be constituted as an international organisation per se nor be part of the United Nations.[4] In the original proposal, the SRF would have a small governing board with representatives from different sectors (e.g., UN, World Bank, governments, NGOs), would be co-chaired by the President of the World Bank and the UN Secretary-General, and would receive secretariat support from the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Finally, the SRF was supposed to have "a standing trust fund or a pre-negotiated stand-by funding arrangement to jump-start recovery" (Forman et al. 2000: 26).

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[4]When addressing the SRF, Jenkins seems to overlook the latter aspect of the Facility, claiming that the presentation of the proposal outlined by Forman and colleagues was "the moment when the idea of a dedicated, *UN-centered*, but genuinely inclusive, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction entity came recognizably into view" (Jenkins 2013: 56; emphasis added).

McCann (2012: 49–50) contends that the proposal for such a facility gained the support of individuals in important multilateral and bilateral donors, such as the World Bank and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Kingdom and Norway. Despite disagreement about specific details of the proposal, such as its physical location or funding levels, individuals involved in the process essentially agreed with the establishment of the mechanism. In the UN, however, Secretariat organs such as DPA and DPKO were not too interested in the implementation of the Facility and efforts towards its establishment have virtually come to an end after one of its key supporters, Marc Malloch Brown, left the World Bank to join UNDP and started working towards the establishment of BCPR (Forman 2012). Established in UNDP, the BCPR was not a replacement for the SRF, although both had the same overall goal, according to McCann (2012: 50). The SRF per se thus never became a reality.

Similarly, it may be said that the forerunner of the PBSO was an equally ill-fated proposal to create a peacebuilding unit in the Department of Political Affairs. The proposal first emerged following Annan's 1997 decision to convert DPA as focal point for peacebuilding in the UN system, as discussed in the previous chapter. Margaret Anstee, who had advocated during Boutros-Ghali's tenure in office that such a role be given to DPA, presented recommendations on how the Department could serve as focal point for peacebuilding after Annan's decision (UNIHP 2007b: 158). One of her recommendations included the creation of a special peacebuilding unit in the Department whose main functions would be inter alia to: promote and coordinate DPA activities in peacebuilding, liaise and cooperate with other UN entities, and advise the head of Department on peacebuilding matters (Anstee 1998: paras. 18–19). The proposal gained support within DPA and an internal decision was made to implement the unit (DPA 2003: 1). Some member states even pledged extra-budgetary resources, but the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) later rejected DPA's request for funds to the unit (DPA 2003: 1).

In 2000, the Brahimi Report provided further support to the proposal, noting that "there is great merit in creating a consolidated and permanent institutional capacity [for peacebuilding] within the United Nations system" (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: para. 44). By the time of this endorsement, however, the proposal for a DPA unit had

started to face resistance at both the intergovernmental and bureaucratic levels. Among member states, the resistance was due to the unit's association as a close affiliate (see para. 71) to a brand new proposal presented by the Brahimi Panel: the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). Idealised as an analytical arm to support the Executive Committee's advisory role on peace and security issues, EISAS was conceived to improve the UN's capacities in information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809: paras. 65–74). According to Durch, lead researcher of the team who drafted the Brahimi report, EISAS "drew suspicions" among members from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), especially as some seemed to fear that it could threaten their sovereignty by exposing risks of instability or armed conflicts (Durch et al. 2003: 39). In the Secretariat, according to Michael Doyle, then Special Advisor in EOSG, some staff members were also doubtful that DPA, mainly tasked with peacemaking, mediation and good offices, was the ideal place to address systemic peacebuilding needs (Doyle 2012). Against such resistance, and owing to other factors, including a new rejection of budgetary provisions from ACABQ in 2002, a unit for peacebuilding was never established in DPA (Call 2005: 2; see also DPA 2003).

Although they have never been implemented, the proposals of the SRF and a peacebuilding unit in DPA provided important elements to shape debates in the UN milieu on the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. Both proposals were eventually recovered and modified by the High-level Panel (HLP) on Threats, Challenges and Change, established by Annan in November 2003 after he claimed that the Organisation had reached a "fork in the road" and required a comprehensive assessment to make it fit to the challenges of the twenty-first century (Annan 2003). This blue-ribbon commission was tasked with "examining the major threats and challenges the world face[d] in the broad field of peace and security, including economic and social issues insofar as they relate[d] to peace and security, and making recommendations for the elements of a collective response" (UN Doc. A/58/612: 1). In its final report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, the Panel offered a number of recommendations in the area of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (paras. 210–230), amongst which the establishment of a commission for peacebuilding (para. 263) and a PBSO in the Secretariat (para. 266) to enhance UN's capacities in the area.

According to McCann (2012: 118–119), the recommendation of a commission for peacebuilding in the HLP report stemmed partially from advocacy efforts by Bruce Jones, Forman's deputy in CIC-NYU and a member of the Panel's research team. Jones, who was familiar with the SRF proposal and later succeeded Forman, "revived" the dormant proposal of the SRF, brought it to the attention of the Panel and subsequently pushed for its endorsement (McCann 2012: 119). Jones, however, made some adjustments in the original proposal, such as changing its name to avoid an undesirable association with the ill-fated SRF and its institutional locus: rather than a stand-alone multilateral arrangement, the proposed commission would be part of the United Nations (McCann 2012: 83–85). The Panel's endorsement of the revised SRF proposal brought to the UN milieu questions such as whether to establish such a commission and under what specific format or configuration, as discussed in the following section.

Identifying and understanding the proposals that informed aspects such as the format and configuration of the PBC, however, do not answer the question of *why* such a commission was necessary in the first place. The rationale offered by the Panel for establishing the commission was rather simplistic, formulated along the lines of a particular institutional deficiency: the United Nations and the so-called 'international community' were not "well organized to assist countries attempting to build peace" due to a "key institutional gap", the lack of organisational structures "explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace" (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 261). In the Panel's assessment, "a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding" was thus necessary (para. 225). In addition, a support office was required to assist with "the broader aspects of peacebuilding strategy" (para. 230) and deliver appropriate secretariat support to the proposed commission (para. 266).

The Panel's rationale was not unprecedented and had influenced a range of multilateral and bilateral donors in the last two decades. By the mid-2000s, key donors had restructured their domestic organisations as responses to, among others, "[f]rustrations with persistent gaps in international civilian capacities, the short attention span of donors once crisis have fallen from the headlines, and problems of interagency coordination" (Call and Wyeth 2008: 4). Members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had adopted 'whole of government' approaches to bring together a wide array of

government structures working in foreign and economic affairs, defence and development (OECD 2006).[5] Among those members, the United States had created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation, the United Kingdom had established the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit and Canada had set up the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Bensahel 2007; Patrick and Brown 2006). By the same token, international organisations such as the World Bank and the European Union (EU) had rearranged their organisational structures to enhance capacities in peacebuilding (Call and Wyeth 2008: 4; Bensahel 2007). The overly technocratic rationale was that establishing specialised bureaucratic capacities in their structures would gradually develop those actors' tools for conflict analysis and the management and evaluation of peacebuilding interventions, presumably enhancing their effectiveness (Mac Ginty 2012; Goetschel and Hagmann 2009: 58–60).

Underlying the rationale advanced by those actors lies the assumption that reforms in the organisational structures of international organisations (such as the United Nations and the EU) or member states (such as the United States and Canada) will lead to substantial improvement in peacebuilding initiatives in the field. According to this view, reforms in organisational structures represent the "least glamorous but most important" way to address the lack of capacity of governments and international organisations to perform peacebuilding tasks (Bensahel 2007: 43). The presumed causal connection between headquarters-based organisational reforms and the improvement in peacebuilding efforts in the field, however, is problematic at best. It relies on what Goetschel and Hagmann (2009: 62) call a "project management philosophy" according to which "peace can be externally engineered if one possesses the adequate knowledge, local partners and financial means". The problem with this assumption is that conflict-related interventions are carried out in complex contexts where knowledge, local partnerships and economic resources are not always straightforward and hardly represent any guarantee of success.

Concerning the proposal to establish a PBC specifically, such technocratic rationale depoliticised and oversimplified highly political and complex issues, namely peace and peacebuilding, for the sake of bureaucratic

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[5]The approach is defined as "one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government's agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives" (OECD 2006: 14).

and managerial rationality. At the same time, it ensured that decisions on those issues remained within the purview of New York-based actors, which essentially shifted the locus of power from the contexts where peacebuilding initiatives were carried out to an intergovernmental organ based New York. Hence, and paradoxically, although several of the limits and shortcomings associated with UN liberal democratic peacebuilding(s) had been identified at the field level, the major response designed in the UN milieu at the time was an organisational rearrangement at headquarters. The single major consequence of this shift was that future peacebuilding initiatives would be highly influenced by interests and values set by political dynamics, as well as diplomatic and technocratic concerns, at headquarters level rather than by the priorities and needs identified by local peacebuilding actors and the populations affected by armed conflict.

Whereas the following chapter explores the consequences of the Panel's recommendations against the backdrop of the functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, the following section shows that the political and diplomatic concerns of member states were instrumental in shaping their configuration and functioning even before those entities have been formally established.

The Politics Behind the Establishment of the 'New' Architecture

Notwithstanding the narrow and problematic rationale offered by the HLP report, the proposal for establishing a commission for peacebuilding became part of the political agenda of the UN milieu in 2005. The proposal for such a commission, alongside any other recommendation of the Panel that required a decision from member states, was addressed at length in negotiations throughout the year. As the proposal was considered, it went through modifications that substantially affected the final format and configuration of the PBC as we know it. A set of four documents embody the original proposal and the gradual modifications that contributed to shape the actual PBC, PBSO and PBF: the HLP report, of 2 December 2004; Annan's report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, of 21 March 2005; the *Outcome Document* adopted on 16 September 2005 at the 2005 World Summit; and three resolutions adopted almost simultaneously by the Security Council and the General Assembly in late December 2005.

What follows provides the context of those negotiations and outlines the main features of the proposed Commission in each one of those four documents, highlighting particularly the political and technocratic aspects that ultimately shaped the format and configuration of the PBC, PBSO and PBF as we know them.[6]

The Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

Under the title *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, the HLP report proposed that a commission for peacebuilding be established by the Security Council, "acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations" (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 263). This meant that the new body would be constituted as a subsidiary body of the Council: its powers and functions would be determined by the Council, to whom it would report directly.[7] As for the mandate, the report of the Panel outlined the primary functions of the proposed intergovernmental body as:

> to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary. (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 264)

A More Secure World refrained from defining the composition, internal procedures and reporting lines of the proposed commission, limiting its recommendation to generic guidelines. Amongst them, the

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[6] For other analyses, see Jenkins (2013: 51–72), Bellamy (2010: 196–201), Berdal (2009: 135–169) and Ponzio (2005, 2007). Relevant first-hand, non-academic, accounts of the processes revised in this section are provided by John Bolton (2007: esp. 220–245), US Ambassador to the UN in 2005–2006, and Gilda Neves (2009: esp. 119–150), a Brazilian diplomat who covered the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the establishment of the PBC.

[7] Peacekeeping operations, sanctions committees and international tribunals are perhaps the best examples of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council. For a detailed comment on Article 29, see Simma et al. (2012: 983–1027). For a good analysis of the functions and workings of Security Council subsidiary bodies, see Bailey (1998: 333–378).

report recommended that the commission be constituted as a "reasonably small" body and functioned under multiple configurations (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 265[a] and [b]). The proposed entity was to be chaired by a member "approved" by the Security Council and represented by member states from the Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSO) (para. 265[c] and [d]). Other actors were also to be invited and represented: national representatives from the countries under consideration; representatives from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and from regional development banks, when appropriate; representatives from donor countries and, when appropriate, troop-contributing countries; and representatives from regional and sub-regional organisations, when active in the country concerned (para. 265[e] to [h]). As outlined in the previous section, the HLP proposal resembled the SRF idea of enhancing coordination among key actors by bringing them to the table.

Alongside an intergovernmental body, the HLP report proposed the creation of a support office in the Secretariat. This entity was supposed to provide the necessary "Secretariat support" for the commission and "ensure that the Secretary-General [was] able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations" (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 266). The office envisioned by the HLP was relatively small—"about 20 or more"—but adequately skilled, as its staff should have "different backgrounds" and "significant experience in peacebuilding strategy and operations" (para. 267). Further to its secretariat role, the office could, upon request, assist and advise the UN leadership in the field and national authorities (para. 267). The new office was also tasked with maintaining a roster of experts on peacebuilding (para. 268). The idea of a support office in the Secretariat was a departure from the mechanism originally proposed by Forman et al. (2000), as the SRF, had it been created, was to have received secretariat and administrative support from UNOPS.

A More Secure World also proposed a standing fund for peacebuilding with a two-folded scope: finance "the recurrent expenditures of a nascent Government" and "critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration" (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 228). The Panel did not go into detail about the fund, but no direct connection was made in the report between the proposed fund and commission. As conceived by the HLP, the new fund was to play a major role in peacebuilding, with responsibilities ranging from preventing countries from falling into armed

conflict in the first place to ensuring sustained attention and availability of resources to the reconstruction of countries once armed conflicts were over. This original mandate, in sum, would cover "everything from early-warning to post-conflict reconstruction" (Bellamy 2010: 198). Defined in those terms, such functions, unsurprisingly, reflected the understanding of armed conflicts as part of a linear continuum that ought to be tackled by different mechanisms according to the phase of conflict—an understanding with roots in Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*.

The Secretary-General's In Larger Freedom *Report*

Following the release of the HLP report, the tone of discussions about the establishment of a commission for peacebuilding seemed promising, with individuals in the UN milieu excited about the prospects of such an organ. During a meeting held in New York in early 2005 by a non-profit organisation bringing together several individuals involved in the process, participants regarded the commission as an idea "whose time ha[d] come" and a proposal that "most countries could support" (The Stanley Foundation 2005: 12). Enthusiasm for the proposal, however, did not necessarily imply general agreement on its operationalisation. In fact, the overall tone of the negotiations that would take place until the end of the year would be marked by a relatively clear political divide in the UN membership among developing and developed countries.

The following passage, extracted from an internal document summarising one of the first informal meetings of the General Assembly to consider *A More Secure World*, aptly captures the general lines of the division:

> Though the alignment of both delegations and regional groups along the north-south/security-development axis was obviously foreseen, the degree of entrenchment frequently indicated and the polarization of views expressed were both somewhat surprising. Delegations on both sides of the divide clearly felt compelled to use these meetings to leverage points and positions with a view to influencing the upcoming March report by the Secretary-General [*In Larger Freedom*], which they seemed to anticipate as both a synthesis of the HLP [*A More Secure World*] and Sachs Report [*Investing in Development*] processes and as a watershed in its own right. Beyond it, the September summit clearly loomed equally large on their horizon as well. The divide along the north-south/security-development axis would only deepen in the following months. (DGACM 2012: 3293)

On 21 March 2005, in the report *In Larger Freedom*, Kofi Annan presented his consolidated views on the broader UN reform initiated following his 'fork in the road' speech. The report was partially inspired on two broad reviews of the UN activities in the areas of peace and security, and development: respectively, the HLP report; and the final report of the UN Millennium Project (2005), *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, which proposed a plan of action to implement the Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000. *In Larger Freedom* was received in hyperbolic terms as "without question the most sweeping program of reform ever proposed by the UN itself" (Traub 2006: 320).

Concerning topics in international peace and security in general and peacebuilding in particular, Annan's report did not differ substantially from *A More Secure World*. The Secretary-General did not delve into its conceptual aspects, but straightforwardly endorsed the Panel's recommendation to establish a commission for peacebuilding. The rationale offered by Annan mirrored the one outlined by the HLP: a commission for peacebuilding was necessary to fill in a "gaping hole" in the UN since "no part of the United Nations system effectively addresse[d] the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace" (UN Doc. A/59/2005: para. 114). Underlying the rationales offered in both reports lied the belief prevailing in the UN milieu that the challenges of contemporary peacebuilding could be addressed by the establishment of a New York-based intergovernmental organ.

In terms of content, however, Annan modified two key aspects of the proposal outlined in *A More Secure World* based on "reactions from Member States" (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2: para. 3). In the realm of high-level diplomacy, the modifications were undoubtedly an attempt to minimise the North-South/security-development divide and ensure the broadest basis of support as possible from member states. In fact, although the Secretary-General was presenting a report with his own views, the proposal for a PBC required the approval of member states. Amending the HLP proposal thus required aptly crafting and transmitting to member states a tangible, concrete and acceptable outline for the commission.

The first key modification proposed by Annan referred to the institutional locus and reporting lines of the new commission. Rather than a subsidiary body reporting exclusively to the Security Council, he argued

that a commission for peacebuilding "would best combine efficiency with legitimacy if it were to advise the Security Council and the ECOSOC in sequence, depending on the state of recovery" (UN Doc. A/59/2005/ Add.2: para. 25). The proposed modification sought to mediate diverging views on the preferred institutional locus of the commission. On the one hand, some developed countries, including the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), favoured addressing peacebuilding as a security issue and were "determined that the PBC not become a backseat driver for the Security Council" (Bolton 2007: 226). On the other hand, developing countries tended to see the need to include developmental concerns when addressing peacebuilding and thus favoured a balance between the principal organs of the United Nations, especially by linking the proposed commission to the ECOSOC (Neves 2009: 114).

The second key modification referred to the removal of the preventive function of the commission, as originally outlined in *A More Secure World*. The reasons behind the Secretary-General's decision lay both in the intergovernmental and bureaucratic dimensions of the United Nations. On the one hand, member states have generally been reticent about measures to seriously strengthen the UN's capacities in conflict prevention: whereas permanent members of the Council are normally wary that increasing the UN capacities might be detrimental to the Council's primary role in international peace and security issues (Bellamy 2010: 198), developing countries fear that granting bolder early warning and monitoring roles for the UN may potentially threaten the principle of non-intervention (Berdal 2009: 152). The brief existence of ORCI in the late 1980s and early 1990s is a telling illustration of the difficulty to strike a balance between the two views (see Kanninen and Kumar 2005; Ramcharan 1991). On the other hand, given that a range of conflict prevention activities were already in place across the UN system, there were doubts that the proposed new commission and its support office would be able to play any meaningful distinctive role in the area (Almqvist 2005: 7). It should not, as such, come as a surprise that Annan justified removing an early-warning function from the commission in his revised proposal by arguing that "other mechanisms" already existed in the UN system (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2: para. 17). Moreover, it is not unlikely that other entities in the system, acting to protect their own turfs, resisted the inclusion of another player in conflict prevention in the Secretariat.

The Outcome Document

The *Outcome Document* was adopted as a General Assembly resolution on 16 September 2005 and reflected lengthy negotiations among member states following the release of *In Larger Freedom*. The High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly, the so-called 2005 World Summit, was originally conceived as a follow-up to the 2000 Millennium Summit. However, Annan's reform proposals, developed against the backdrop of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent split in the UN membership over the US-led invasion of Iraq, generated a change in the global agenda that resulted in a meeting that would more directly review the broader issues of UN reform and matters related to international peace and security rather than concerns over development alone (Neves 2009: 117–118). According to Gilda Neves, a Brazilian delegate in the negotiations preceding the World Summit, "the impressive range of topics under discussion, the short time available and the lack of leadership (the Secretary-General [was] initially absorbed with the oil-for-food issue)" contributed to making that process of intergovernmental negotiations a "rather troubled" one (Neves 2009: 126). The burst of enthusiasm with which individuals in the UN milieu had initially greeted the proposal for a PBC in February 2005 was thus soon accompanied by an intense and controversial period of intergovernmental negotiations, which were once again marked by a divide within the Secretariat and among member states along the North-South/security-development axis.

According to individuals directly involved in the process, two broad sets of issues proved more contentious until the end: the institutional locus of the commission and its membership (Neves 2009: 127; Bolton 2007: 229). Concerning the former, member states were divided as to whether the Commission should be organisationally located under the Security Council as a subsidiary body or elsewhere under a different arrangement. The existing options in the latter case included creating a commission reporting to the Council *and* the General Assembly and/or ECOSOC. Member states such as Brazil, India, Iran and Switzerland, for different reasons, favoured this option and expressed discontent with a PBC being created as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council without additional reporting lines (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66). Conversely, permanent members of the Security Council sought to avoid that the new commission meddled with affairs within the purview of the Council (Bolton 2007: 226). As for membership, division lines emerged in terms

of the number and origins of members of the commission: whereas developing countries seemed to favour a more inclusive body, Western donor countries seemed interested to keep the Commission "restricted to 20 member countries […] and to limit the categories of members to those foreseen in the Secretary-General's report (Security Council, ECOSOC, financial contributors and troop contributors), as well as to ensure that the five members from the Security Council were the P5" (Neves 2009: 130).

As no consensus could be forged on those issues before the World Summit, the deadline set for the intergovernmental negotiations, the *Outcome Document* turned out as somewhat vague on key features of the new organ. According to the resolution, member states decided to "establish a Peacebuilding Commission" with the aim to "bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery" (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: para. 97–98). In addition, the Commission was to: focus on relevant issues for reconstruction and assist in the development of "integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development"; offer recommendations and information to improve coordination among peacebuilding actors; develop best practices; help ensure predictability in the availability of funds for "early recovery activities"; and "extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery" (para. 98). Despite its wide-range functions, the new Commission had been precluded to carry out early warning functions, in line with Annan's proposal.

The *Document* defined that the Commission should make decisions on the basis of consensus (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: para. 98). It also specified the distinct configurations under which the Commission would operate: as country-specific meetings (currently Country-Specific Configurations, or CSCs) and as an Organizational Committee (OC) (paras. 100–101). The membership of the Commission would consist in the four categories previously outlined in both *A More Secure World* and *In Larger Freedom*: representatives from the Council, ECOSOC, the major financial contributors, and the major troop-contributing countries (para. 101). Of note, the wording of the document referred to categories of members, but did not specify the number of members to be represented in the Commission from each category, or how they would be selected. These issues would only be addressed in the context of negotiations of the resolutions subsequently adopted by the SC and the General Assembly to 'operationalise' the Commission, as discussed below.

The *Outcome Document* also requested that the Secretary-General established a PBF and a support office in the Secretariat (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: paras. 103–104). The document connected the three entities for the first time, given that the HLP report did not tie the recommendation of a PBF to its proposed commission for peacebuilding. Finally, the resolution conveyed member states' decision that the PBC started to operate "no later than 31 December 2005" (para. 105).

The Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions

The adoption of the *Outcome Document* did not solve all contending issues related to the PBC, which were largely left purposely unresolved in the wording of the *Outcome Document*.[8] Further negotiations were thus carried out among member states between September and December 2005. The purpose of this new round was to adopt a resolution with a more specific text to enable the functioning of the new body. The negotiations, according to Neves (2009: 133), was a "déjà-vu" of the process preceding the World Summit, but with one further contending issue:

> the Western countries wanted to "create" the PBC in the body of the resolution that was beginning to be discussed and position it functionally under the aegis of the Security Council, while most of the other countries argued that the organ had already been created by the previous resolution (Outcome Document) and [that] it remained [for member states] to define its parameters of action and make it operational. (Neves 2009: 134)

Discussions about the new UN body thus remained polarised along the North-South/security-development axis.

On 20 December 2005, member states adopted, almost simultaneously, two identical resolutions in the SC and the General Assembly to "operationalize" the decision of the World Summit and to "establish" the PBC (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 1; S/RES/1645: op.

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[8] The use of ambiguous wording in this and other instances related to the establishment of the PBC is a recurrent practice in high-level diplomacy. This practice, called constructive ambiguity, may be defined as "[t]he deliberate use of imprecise language in the drafting of an agreement on a sensitive issue. The aim is to secure its approval in the hope (perhaps purported and often in vain) that its actual approval will encourage further and more substantive steps towards an agreement" (Berridge and James 2003: 51).

1). The second operative paragraph of Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) and General Assembly resolution 60/180 outlined the purposes of the PBC with the exact same wording of the *Outcome Document*. Substantially, the resolutions specified that the Commission would be composed of 31 member states chosen from the four categories outlined above, in addition to a fifth category of members from the General Assembly (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 4; S/RES/1645: op. 4). This category was reportedly included to balance the geographical representation of the PBC membership.

A few hours before the adoption of the two resolutions, Denmark and France proposed a third and unexpected resolution at the Security Council with a wording that essentially turned all the Council's permanent members into permanent members of the PBC. In the key paragraph of the document adopted as Security Council resolution 1646 (2005), the Council decided:

> pursuant to paragraph 4(a) of resolution 1645 (2005) that *the* permanent members listed in article 23(1) of the Charter shall be members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission and that, in addition, the Council shall select annually two of its elected members to participate in the Organizational Committee. (UN Doc. S/RES/1646: op. 1; emphasis added)

The new resolution was received with surprise and disappointment by several member states, particularly from the global South (Neves 2009: 142). The issue revolved around the particle "the": paragraph 101(a) of the *Outcome Document* stated that, among others, the OC of the PBC should comprise "Members of the Security Council, including permanent members". Without the particle, the wording purposely denoted that not necessarily all, but only some of the P5 would also be members of the PBC, which was the position of member states in the South-development quadrant. With the adoption of resolution 1646 (2005) introducing the particle, member states favouring the North-security approach to the new organ achieved an important victory in the negotiations.[9]

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[9] Given the proportions of the debate over a single particle, Bolton ironically noted, not without personal satisfaction, that "[n]o wonder defending the United States at the UN requires picky negotiators!" (Bolton 2007: 230).

From the HLP recommendation of a commission for peacebuilding, in November 2004, to the actual establishment of the PBC, in September or December 2005 (depending on the perspective adopted), the PBC had its purpose and configuration dramatically changed. According to Berdal (2009: 148), the process represented a "death by many cuts". From an entity designed to make the UN more effective in the "whole continuum" from early warning to post-conflict peacebuilding (UN Doc. A/59/565: para. 263), the PBC was eventually constituted with a more limited mandate, with no provisions on early warning and preventive diplomacy. The process, as reviewed in this section, reflected more the political and diplomatic dynamics, as well as technocratic concerns, of the UN milieu than the needs and priorities of societies affected by armed conflict.

Although somewhat unsurprising, since the arrangement was implemented in the realm of an intergovernmental organisation, the politicisation of discussions on aspects so removed from the realities in which UN peacebuilding initiatives were being undertaken reveals a strong reliance on the technocratic assumption that bureaucratic adjustments in the UN structures at headquarters would necessarily lead to positive impacts at the field level. At no point, this assumption, which underlined the rationale advanced by both the HLP and Kofi Annan, was seriously questioned or challenged during the process leading to the establishment of the new entities. The heavy influence of technocracy underlying and informing discussions on UN peacebuilding thus attests to the continued influence of the liberal peace framework on the meaning of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu.

The 'New Elements' of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

Following a review of the contentious process leading to their establishment, this section describes the exact contours of the PBC, PBSO and PBF as they became operational in 2005–2006. The section offers an overview of their structures and mandates, providing a context for the following chapter.

According to Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) and General Assembly resolution 60/180, the PBC was established as an intergovernmental advisory body with the following purposes:

a. To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and recovery;

b. To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-build-ing efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and

c. To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 2; S/RES/1645: op. 2).

The PBC operates under three different configurations. The first is the Organizational Committee, which sets the PBC agenda and tackles oper-ational and administrative matters, as well as some crosscutting substan-tial peacebuilding issues. The OC is composed of 31 member states who serve two-year renewable mandates. They are elected from members of the following organs and groups: Security Council (seven members elected); ECOSOC (seven); General Assembly (seven); the group of the top contributors to the UN budget and voluntary contributions (five); and the group of the top contributors of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions (five) (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 4).[10] The second configuration under which the PBC operates are the Country-Specific Configurations, wherein issues related to each one of the coun-tries on the PBC agenda are discussed separately. Membership of CSCs is defined according to the specificities of each country concerned, usually including member states from the same region, international financial institutions and civil society organisations. Finally, the third configura-tion is the Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL), responsible for drawing lessons from past experiences and preparing recommendations on the planning and implementation of peacebuilding actions.

The CSCs are created after countries are placed on the PBC agenda by the Organizational Committee. Resolutions 60/180 and 1645

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[10]As of writing, the updated membership of the Peacebuilding Commission in its differ-ent configurations is available as Peacebuilding Commission (2013).

(2005) contained no substantial provisions or criteria guiding the decision to include countries on the PBC agenda, outlining only the modalities through which that may happen: via requests for advice from the Security Council; ECOSOC or General Assembly; member states; and the Secretary-General (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 12). When countries are referred to the PBC by ECOSOC or the General Assembly, three requirements need to be met: the countries concerned have to consent to the referral; they have to be in "exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict"; and they should not be "seized" by (that is, they should not be on the agenda of) the Council (op. 12[b]). Finally, when member states require the inclusion of a country on the PBC agenda, such countries have to be under "exceptional circumstances" and not on the Council's agenda. As of writing, six countries are in the PBC agenda: Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea (Conakry), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The PBC was created alongside a Secretariat office and a Secretary-General's standing fund for peacebuilding. In the resolutions operationalising the Commission, the Secretary-General was requested to establish a "small" peacebuilding office in the Secretariat, "within the existing resources" and "staffed by qualified experts" (UN Docs. A/RES/60/180: op. 23; S/RES/1645: op. 23). The main purpose of the office was to "assist and support" the PBC, which potentially included "gathering and analysing information relating to the availability of financial resources, relevant United Nations in-country planning activities, progress towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals and best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues" (op. 23). In addition, PBSO was envisioned to coordinate and foster coherence across the UN system by assisting the Secretary-General with strategic guidance and policy advice, and with managing the PBF (United Nations 2005a). Whereas the mandate of PBSO to assist the Commission and manage the Fund emanated from the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions that operationalised the Commission, the PBSO mandate to coordinate and foster coherence across the system (the so-called 'second mandate') derived from the "Secretary-General's standing mandate to coordinate the UN system's peacebuilding efforts" (United Nations 2007: 4). The management of the Fund is carried out in accordance with the PBF terms of reference (ToR). Institutionally, the PBSO is placed in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and headed by an Assistant Secretary-General (ASG). This arrangement

enables to Office to have direct contact with EOSG, rather than a mediated contact via another entity such as DPKO or DPA.

The PBF was created as a response to the needs of countries undergoing a transition from a situation of war to a situation of peace, with special emphasis on the early stage of the peacebuilding process and when other sources of funding are not available. The Fund was envisaged as a quick and flexible mechanism to provide direct support to immediate peacebuilding needs, rather than long-term development processes. Instead of a mechanism to finance all peacebuilding-related initiatives, the Fund was designed to support targeted efforts that could potentially spill over to other areas, thus creating the conditions for sustained engagement from traditional international donors and development agencies. Of note, the Fund is not a PBC's fund, but a multi-year standing fund established by the Secretary-General, following the request originally contained in the Outcome Document (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: para. 103).

From a functional perspective, the PBF was placed under the responsibility of the head of PSBO, who provides "overall direction and guidance on programme management of the PBF and monitor[s] its operations" (UN Doc. A/63/818: Annex, para. 4.1). As such, relevant policy decisions concerning the PBF are usually taken by the head of PBSO, acting under the authority of the Secretary-General and often in consultation with senior officials from relevant UN entities. The financial management of the Fund is made by the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office, which acts as the PBF administrative agent under the authority of the head of PBSO (Annex, para. 4.1). An independent Advisory Group composed of individuals with reputable knowledge and experience in peacebuilding issues provides advice and oversees PBF allocations (Annex, para. 5.3).

Shortly after the creation of those three entities, they started to be collectively referred to as the UN 'peacebuilding architecture' (see e.g. United Nations 2010). According to McAskie (2012), first ASG for Peacebuilding Support, the expression sought to capture the notion of an infrastructure composed of closely related entities dealing with peacebuilding.[11] According to interviews with UN staff members, the

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[11] The same reasoning probably explains the references to a 'gender architecture' or 'gender equality architecture' which I heard on occasions during my period of participant observation in New York. The UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), said to embody this architecture, had been created only a few months earlier.

Fig. 7.1 The UN broader architecture for peacebuilding

expression attracted some resistance from entities such as DPA and DPKO, as it seemed to imply that activities in the realm of peacebuilding were only carried out by those three entities or that other parts of the UN system had not been involved in peacebuilding before the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. As discussed in Chapter 5, however, other entities in the UN system had been carrying out peacebuilding tasks since the late 1980s and early 1990s. Hence, the PBC, PBSO and PBF are perhaps better understood as 'new elements' or 'new entities' in a broader UN 'peacebuilding architecture'. Figure 7.1 offers a visual sketch of that broader architecture and the place of its 'new elements' vis-à-vis some of the older ones.

Chapter Summary

As the liberal democratic peace as political convention was being assimilated in the UN milieu and the Organisation's constitutive dimensions, several problems and obstacles associated with its operationalisation and practice became evident. Over time, these problems largely exposed the UN limited capacity to build peace in societies affected by armed

conflict, particularly in light of repeated instances of relapse into armed conflict by societies who had previously received support from the Organisation to transition from war to peace—often via multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations entailing peacebuilding tasks. Such problems highlighted the inconsistencies generated by a top-down and state-centric approach to building peace based on the promotion of liberal democratic norms, values, institutions, processes and procedures in post-conflict societies. When faced with the need to address those problems, individuals in the UN milieu outlined several responses, including the proposal of a commission for peacebuilding and associated entities in the UN structures.

This chapter explored the process leading to the operationalisation of one of those responses, namely the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF. It demonstrated that this process was heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework and its meaning of 'peacebuilding', which had been assimilated in the UN constitutive dimensions over the previous years. Such influence may be perceived, for instance, as complex issues such as the problems faced by UN liberal democratic peacebuilding at the field level were simplified and depoliticised in terms of an 'institutional gap' or 'gaping hole' requiring an overly technocratic solution, namely the adjustment of the UN bureaucracy at headquarters. Furthermore, political and technocratic concerns of member states and the Secretariat played a stronger role in shaping the format and configuration of those three entities than the actual needs of societies affected by armed conflicts, which ensured that the locus of power and decision-making remained at headquarters, from where Western-inspired and state-centric solutions could continue to be designed to address peacebuilding challenges in the field.

While this chapter sought to identify traces of the liberal democratic peace framework and its influence on the process that shaped the format and configuration of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, the following chapter explores the functioning of those three entities in their first few years of existence. As the process leading to their creation has been heavily shaped by the underlying liberal democratic peace framework, which had led to some of the very problems those entities sought to address in the first place, the continued influence of the liberal democratic peace on the design of the PBC, PBSO and PBF at a minimum raises questions about their added value—not to mention about their expected impact on peacebuilding initiatives in the field, which were fairly high around 2005.

The following chapter engages with some of those questions by exploring the functioning of those entities until the early 2010s, when research leading to this book was concluded.

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The Functioning of the 'New Elements' of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

INTRODUCTION

A few minutes before putting to a vote one of the resolutions that would operationalise—or establish—the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Jan Eliasson, then President of the General Assembly, regarded the moment as "truly historical". According to him, the resolution would, "for the first time in the history of the United Nations", create an organ able to effectively support countries emerging from armed conflict. He added that the adoption of the resolution would represent "our best chance to reverse the trend which we have seen around the world in recent years, where half of the countries emerging from conflict are lapsing back into it again within five years" (UN Doc. A/60/PV.66: 1). Upon the adoption of the resolution, others followed suit, deeming the establishment of the PBC as historical (e.g., Annan and representatives of El Salvador, Haiti, India and United Kingdom) and expressing hopes that it would have a real impact in the field (e.g., representatives of Australia and United States). Notwithstanding the likely exaggeration of such statements due to the occasion, the degree to which those individuals expressed expectations that a new institutional arrangement in New York would lead to a significant impact on the way the United Nations (UN) carried out peacebuilding initiatives in the field is rather remarkable.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the process leading to the establishment of the PBC, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and

the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was influenced by the liberal democratic peace framework and its technocratic imprint, and reflected the difficulty to modify the underlying meaning(s) of 'peacebuilding' once they had been assimilated in the UN constitutive dimensions. This chapter continues that analysis by focusing on key aspects in the functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF in the first few years after their establishment. It contends that the PBC, PBSO and PBF have so far been unable to depart significantly from the UN approach to peacebuilding and to societies affected by armed conflict prevailing in the UN milieu since the early 1990s, having often contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace framework as the minimally intelligible meaning for 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu. In different moments, as elaborated below, those organs have continued to provide and support methodologies (e.g., provision of technical expertise, institution building, sectorial reforms, democratisation) and focus on areas (e.g., elections, rule of law, state reforms) that are illustrative of an interventionist and state-centric notion of peacebuilding from the top-down. While doing so, they have responded primarily to political, diplomatic and bureaucratic concerns typical of the UN milieu in New York rather than to the needs faced by societies affected by armed conflict.

The chapter is organised into two extended sections that focus on key aspects of the functioning of those three entities. The first section focuses on the workings of the PBSO and PBF, highlighting how the bureaucratic dimension of the new elements of the UN broader peacebuilding architecture have contributed to replicating and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace as the minimally intelligible meaning for 'peacebuilding' in the UN. The second focuses on the PBC and how member states have used the new body to determine what counts as 'peacebuilding', as well as to elaborate peacebuilding strategies that more often reflect their own political agendas than the needs and priorities identified by the subjects of peacebuilding in the field. The chapter is thus less concerned with assessing the organisational performance or impact of those organs and more with identifying traces of the liberal democratic peace framework in their functioning. In doing so, the chapter explores the extent to which those organs may have affected the UN approach to peacebuilding—that is, its understanding of the concept of 'peacebuilding' informed by the liberal democratic peace—and some

manifestations of that approach in the UN bureaucracy and initiatives carried out in the field.

The Bureaucratic Dimension: The Peacebuilding Support Office and the PBF

As outlined in the previous chapter, the key functions of the PBSO are to: provide secretariat support to the PBC; ensure coherence across the UN system on the design and implementation of adequate strategies for peacebuilding; and manage the PBF. This section explores the functioning of the Office with a view to identifying traces of the liberal democratic peace in the last two of those three functions—the first one is explored in the following section. Although it is not an operational office, the day-to-day functioning of PBSO produces impact and outcomes that may be seen on a range of concrete areas due to its role in peacebuilding policymaking in the UN milieu. Before focusing on its activities, I briefly sketch the internal process leading to the creation of the Office, as it is telling about the environment in which it operates in the UN milieu.

The PBSO was officially launched in May 2006, with the appointment of Carolyn McAskie as Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Peacebuilding Support and Head of PBSO. Preparations for the creation of the Office, however, had begun at least as early as July 2005, when the newly established Secretary-General Policy Committee[1] spelled out the terms of reference (ToR) of the still inexistent office. The terms referred to the provision of support to the substantial functions of the PBC and its role assisting the Secretary-General in developing effective strategies for peacebuilding across the UN system (United Nations

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[1] The Policy and the Management Committees were created by Annan in 2005 to strengthen decision-making at the executive level in the Secretariat. Both consider issues requiring policy and/or strategic guidance and direction, with the former focusing on thematic and country-specific issues and the latter on internal reform and other management-related matters. The Policy Committee normally meets once every week and is constituted, among others, by the chairs of ECPS, ECESA, ECHA and UNDG, and the head of the DPKO (UN Doc. ST/SGB/2005/16).

2005b). Outlined as such, the initial terms of reference for the PBSO closely reflected some of the tentative functions proposed by Annan in his report *In Larger Freedom* (UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.2: para. 21). A few months later, a transitional team was constituted in January 2006 to start working "immediately" to set up the Office (Malloch Brown 2012b: 3794). In addition to setting up the PBSO, this small group assumed two other tasks: support the start-up of the PBC and its country-specific configurations (CSCs), and to prepare the terms of reference for the Secretary-General's standing fund for peacebuilding.

The launch of PBSO in mid-2006 was not immediately translated into its smooth functioning due to the lack of adequate resources. By the time the Office was launched, the lines created during the run-up to the World Summit were still visible and member states were still divided over what they expected or where they wanted the PBC, PBSO and PBF to go (McAskie 2008: 12). The allocation of resources to PBSO thus involved rather politicised debates that were once again dictated by New York-based political and diplomatic concerns. Illustrative of such dynamics was the cut, by the Fifth Committee, of Annan's required resources for creating the PBSO. The Secretary-General had initially estimated that the new office would need 21 staff members and USD 4.2 million to carry out its functions (UN Doc. A/60/537: paras. 40–43). Based on the recommendation that the office be "small" and established "from within existing resources" (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1: para. 104), however, the Fifth Committee decided that the Secretary-General should submit a new proposal revisiting his initial estimates (UN Doc. A/60/598: para. 5). The Committee's decision and rhetoric disguised the position of some developing countries, who were still dissatisfied with the issue of representation of developing countries in the PBC. In the end, after more exchanges between the Secretary-General and the Fifth Committee, the General Assembly approved only USD 1.6 million to PBSO and decided to "revert to the issue" of its structures later, in connection with the discussions for the next biannual programme budget (UN Doc. A/RES/60/255: op. 5). The overemphasis on budgetary technicalities in this and other instances camouflaged member states' political and diplomatic concerns that continued to shape how the new entities in the broader UN architecture would operate in the following years.

According to a report authored by McAskie by the end of her assignment, PBSO had had a hard time to secure the re-allocations promised by member states, effectively operating with only three professional staff until December 2006 (McAskie 2008: 11). In addition to limited human resources in PBSO, significant changes of officials at the top echelons of the UN following the inauguration of Ban Ki-moon's tenure in office in January 2007 posed obstacles to the effective functioning of the Office. During this time, the role of PBSO as convenor of the UN system in peacebuilding remained a "faint hope" (McAskie 2008: 11) and the Office struggled to provide the adequate secretariat support to the two countries already placed in the PBC agenda: Burundi and Sierra Leone.

Providing a Meaning to 'Peacebuilding'

Despite its limited capacity initially, and in addition to its regular advisory functions to the UN senior leadership, PBSO received a significant task from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in its first year: to develop a common definition of 'peacebuilding' for the UN system. Although it has been around since the early 1990s, 'peacebuilding' remained—and remains—a difficult concept to grasp harmoniously across the UN system, with "critical differences" existing in what concerns its conceptualisation and operationalisation by different entities (Barnett et al. 2007: 36). According to an inventory produced by EOSG (2006) in the context of the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, there were at least 31 entities in the UN system at the time carrying out tasks and activities that could be placed under the label of 'peacebuilding'.[2] The report was precise in diagnosing key diverging views:

> Some [UN] actors associate peacebuilding with 'security' and therefore differentiate it from 'development' activities. Others regard peacebuilding as a 'transitional' set of activities and distinguish it from the 'security' field. 'Crisis' (combining natural disaster and conflict-related situations), 'humanitarian,' 'peacekeeping,' and 'development' remain the dominant conceptual frameworks and funding channels, in large part as a result of existing organizational mandates and interests. This lack of a common understanding on the meaning of peacebuilding has operational consequences, as donors and UN entities hold differing views as to how it should be approached and funded. (EOSG 2006: 6)

[2] For a somewhat similar inventory produced a decade earlier, see DESIPA (1996).

The report thus contended that finding a clearer framework for 'peace-building' remained a major challenge for the Organisation in the area (EOSG 2006: 6).

To minimise the gap, the Secretary-General's Policy Committee decided that the PBSO should lead consultations to forge a common definition of 'peacebuilding' to inform UN efforts in the area. To that end, the Policy Committee offered the following formulation as a start-ing point for consultations:

> In determining strategies and operational plans, 'peacebuilding' entails efforts to support a country's transition from conflict to sustainable peace, with a stable political order and basic institutions in place, the risk of relapse into conflict substantially reduced, and the country able to move to more normal development processes. Peacebuilding strategies must be tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (United Nations 2006a: 1)

Outlined as such, this formulation reflects a somehow sequential under-standing, essentially locating 'peacebuilding' between 'armed conflict' and 'normal development'. Members of the Policy Committee agreed that this was a "good starting point" for further discussions, but they diverged on other aspects: some believed that the inherently political character of peacebuilding was not present in the formulation; some claimed it missed considerations over human security at the local level; and others thought it was "too top down" or "supply driven" (United Nations 2006b: para. 3).

As a result of PBSO-led consultations based on the formulation above, the following conceptual basis was developed and subsequently endorsed by the Policy Committee in May 2007:

> Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tai-lored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (United Nations 2007: 1)

According to a UN staff who followed those consultations closely, whereas the earlier formulation seemed to disregard the issue of human security, members of the Policy Committee with peacekeeping background seemed to consider the revised conceptual basis as too oriented towards development (Confidential B 2012).

At the core of the different readings of those conceptual bases, there are two stylised views about 'peacebuilding' in the United Nations. The first formulation was carved by the secretariat team of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee, which had mostly been drawn from staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In the EOSG (2006: 6) inventory, DPKO is depicted as one of the entities that normally associate peacebuilding with 'security', differentiating it from 'development'. This view, according to the same staff member, holds that peacebuilding is all about measures to prevent a relapse into conflict, which is an understanding closely related to the one outlined in Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*. This view does not necessarily preclude peacebuilding initiatives from incorporating development aspects or tasks, as illustrated by a range of peacebuilding activities carried out by multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. According to this view, however, not all development activities should be carried out by means of peacebuilding (Confidential B 2012). As the first formulation outlined by the Policy Committee was closer to this understanding of peacebuilding, it framed peacebuilding goals in terms of avoiding a relapse into conflict and its means as a limited set of activities aimed at that goal.

On the other hand, the definition endorsed in May 2007 following the PBSO-led consultations leans closer to the view of the 'development' side of the UN. Within this perspective, peacebuilding is more closely associated with a range of development activities carried out in societies affected by armed conflicts, such as the reconstruction and strengthening of state institutions by means of sectorial reforms, for example. In this view, peacebuilding is not a sequel to peacekeeping, but it may be undertaken in different stages as a response to armed conflict. According to a range of interviews carried out with individuals in the UN milieu, this development-leaning view prevailed in the newly established PBSO around that time, as the Office was composed of senior officials who shared a background in peacebuilding and development rather than

peacekeeping.[3] Possibly reflecting their influence as facilitators of the consultative process, this view strongly underlies the 'conceptual basis' endorsed by the Policy Committee.

At their core, both formulations reflected traces of the liberal democratic peace as political conviction. Despite the absence of direct references to democracy promotion, they refer to 'institutions' and 'strengthening of national capacities' as part of peacebuilding. In the state-centric environment of the UN, those formulations were usually translated into concrete initiatives with a bias towards Western-led norms and institutions, such as security sector reform and the strengthening of good governance—that is, the focus remained on the promotion of norms and institutions typical of a democratic *society*. Both formulations also entailed the idea of peacebuilding not as the holistic process of removing all kinds of violence from societies, as in the tradition of peace and conflict studies, but as a set of measures, actions or activities ought to be carried out especially in post-armed conflict situations (although sometimes during armed conflicts) with the ultimate goal of avoiding a relapse into conflict and creating an enabling environment for sustainable peace—as in *An Agenda for Peace*. Finally, references to national ownership notwithstanding, both formulations departed from a state-centric and top-down approach in what concerns the provision of external assistance.

Outlining the process leading to the endorsement of a conceptual basis by the Policy Committee reveals that the PBSO played a substantial role in advancing particular views about 'peacebuilding' in the Secretariat in virtue of its institutional mandate and expertise. While it is true that the final text of the conceptual basis endorsed by the Policy Committee did not necessarily reflect the views of the PBSO alone, the new Office was able to have an influential voice and advance particular understandings on topics such as what kind of activities were part of 'peacebuilding', or when they should be carried out by the UN. Those views implicitly carried out traces of the liberal democratic peace framework to the extent that they continued to be conceived on the basis of a state-centric and top-down approach promoting and/or projecting particular kinds of institutions in states affected by armed conflict.

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[3] In addition to McAskie, other senior staff members in PBSO at the time, including in key positions ahead of PBC support and policymaking, were drawn from the 'development' and not the 'peacekeeping' side of the UN.

Shaping Peacebuilding Initiatives Through the PBF[4]

The PBF was established under the authority of the Secretary-General and is administered on his behalf by the PBSO. The Office played an important role in the development of the PBF terms of reference, shaping the Fund's scope and priorities. This section reviews the Fund's priorities, as defined in its ToR, and its pattern of resources disbursement. The analysis suggests that the Fund has thus far offered incentives for local and international peacebuilders to focus on key areas within the liberal democratic peace framework, such as security sector and judiciary reforms, and strengthening good governance. Those areas, as elaborated below, project the construction and/or strengthening of norms and institutions associated with liberal/democratic societies as a remedy to the consequences of armed conflict. Consequently, and although the PBF may have contributed to reducing resource gaps to immediate peacebuilding needs,[5] it has thus far operated heavily informed by the liberal democratic peace framework.

The PBF ToR is a technical document outlining aspects such as the scope, process of resource allocation, management and governance, and reporting lines of the Fund. Those aspects, however, are of critical political importance since they ultimately define who may be supported by the Fund, the modalities of such support and the conditions under which the Fund may be used. The ToR thus exceeds purely technical elements and acquires rather political contours—and defining those terms is therefore an exercise of power and not simply of bureaucratic rationality.

Efforts to outline terms of reference for the Fund were initiated by the transitional team established by Annan in January 2006. The original terms were conceived by a team of experts following "extensive consultations" with relevant parts of the system, interested member states and the PBC Chair—Angola—and Vice-Chairs—El Salvador and Norway (Malloch Brown 2012a: 4150). According to Malloch Brown, then Deputy Secretary-General, the PBF ToR reflected the "consensus" of the technical team and member states consulted (Malloch Brown 2012a: 4151).

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[4] Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this section are in current US dollars and based on data retrieved from the website of the MPTF Office (2013). All figures for 2013 are as of 30 June 2013.

[5] For evaluations of the PBF in general, see especially Ball and van Beijnum (2009) and OIOS (2008). Other evaluations, including on PBF support to initiatives on specific countries, are available on the PBF website (UNPBF 2013).

When adopting the original ToR, the Secretary-General determined that they should be reviewed "no later than two years after their adoption" (UN Doc. A/60/984: Annex, para. 8.1). The initial terms were consequently revised in 2008, following consultations with the PBF Advisory Group and the results of an independent external evaluation by Ball and van Beijnum (2009). The ensuing discussion departs from the most recent PBF ToR.

According to its current ToR, the PBF may support peacebuilding initiatives in four main areas:

a. Activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, in particular in relation to strengthening of national institutions and processes set up under those agreements;

b. Activities undertaken to build and/or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peacebuilding activities;

c. Activities undertaken in support of efforts to revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends for the population at large;

d. Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities which may include, in exceptional circumstances and over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs. (UN Doc. A/63/818: para. 2.1)

As aforementioned, the PBC, PBSO and PBF are not operational entities. PBF funds are channelled to concrete projects exclusively through other entities in the UN system, such as UNDP and UNICEF—the so-called Recipient UN Organisations or RUNOs. Under this arrangement, NGOs or other civil society entities cannot have direct access to PBF support, although they are entitled to implement activities when carried out in partnership with eligible RUNOs (PBSO 2009).

Contributions to the Fund are made on a voluntary basis and have their origins in member states, intergovernmental organisations and other sources such as the private sector. Cumulative from its launch in October 2006 to June 2013, 52 donors have contributed USD 512.4 million to the PBF. The bulk of such contributions, unsurprisingly, were made by member states though national agencies such as the

United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). To date, the overwhelming majority of deposits (96% or USD 491 million) had origins in 28 OECD countries, with 22 non-OECD countries contributing only USD 21.4 million (4%) to the Fund. The top five major contributors, cumulative as of June 2013, were from the former group.

As of writing, Sweden and the United Kingdom stand out as the single major donors to the Fund, each of them having made almost one fifth of all contributions (19% and 18%, respectively). The amount of contributions to the Fund from member states in the global North is not surprising due to their economic power. However, four out the top five (six of the top 10) major contributors to the PBF, all from the global North, have assumed key coordination positions in the PBC—see Table 8.1. Particularly in the initial years, this coincidence contributed to reviving concerns, including but not limited to developing countries, that the Commission might "look more like a standing pledging conference" (Chesterman 2005: 171) than a robust body dedicated to effectively enhancing coordination, sustaining attention and marshalling resources to building peace in post-armed conflict societies.

PBF support is channelled through RUNOs via two different mechanisms: the *project-based mechanism*, known as the Immediate Response Facility (IRF), and the programme-based mechanism or Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF).[6] In the first mechanism, beneficiaries are countries emerging from emergency situations and in need of immediate support to carry out peacebuilding and reconstruction actions. The PRF, on the other hand, is designed to support structured processes of peacebuilding in accordance with a needs-driven priority plan jointly developed by national authorities and the UN country presence (UN Doc. A/63/818: para. 3.3). In the latter mechanism, priority plans developed for countries in the PBC agenda are informed by the integrated peacebuilding strategy outlined by the Commission—discussed in the following section.

From its launch in October 2006 to June 2013, the PBF supported 251 initiatives in 26 countries across the globe. Initiatives supported by PBF monies may be distributed in four main Thematic Areas. In

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[6]The IRF was previously known as the PBF Emergency Window (Window III), whilst the PRF was once divided between the PBF Window I (for countries on the PBC agenda) and Window II (for countries not on the PBC agenda, but declared eligible by the Secretary-General).

Table 8.1 Top 10 contributors to the PBF and respective roles in the PBC

	Member state	Cumulative contributions	% of total contributions to PBF	PBC coordination role
1	Sweden	94.5	19	Chair of CSC-Burundi (2008–2009); Chair of CSC-Liberia (since 2012)
2	United Kingdom	92.3	18	–
3	Netherlands	60.7	12	Chair of CSC-Sierra Leone (2006–2009)
4	Norway	42.5	8	Chair of CSC-Burundi (2006–2008)
5	Canada	33.9	7	Chair of CSC-Sierra Leone (since 2009)
6	Japan	32.5	6	Chair of the PBC (2007–2008); Chair of the WGLL (2009–2010)
7	Germany	25.5	5	Chair of the PBC (2009–2010)
8	Denmark	17.8	4	–
9	Spain	17.5	3	–
10	Finland	17.1	3	–
Total		**434.3**	**85**	

Source Based on MPTF Office (2013) and annual reports of the PBC. See also Appendix C
Note Figures are in current USD and cumulative until 30 June 2013

that period, the vast amount of PBF resources have been allocated to Thematic Areas 1 (*Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue*) and 2 (*Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict*). Together, they corresponded to 176 projects (71% of all PBF-funded projects) and accounted for USD 245.8 million (67%) of global net transfers for all PBF-funded initiatives. In Thematic Area 1, such initiatives focus inter alia on strengthening and/or reforming security and justice institutions, as well as supporting processes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Of the total initiatives funded by the Fund, the 89 projects under Thematic Area 1 had received USD 154.3 million from the PBF as of writing, which corresponds to 42% of the PBF global net funded amount. The single major project in this Area was designed with the primary purpose of enhancing capacities of the National Police in Burundi, enabling its "transformation" into a "neighbourhood police" (MPTF Office 2010b: 6). The project, implemented by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) and national security forces of the country, received USD 6.8 million in transfers from the Fund to, among others, acquire individual uniforms and equipment such as vehicles and computers to the Police (MPTF Office 2010b: 15–18).

Initiatives under Thematic Area 2 typically aim at the promotion of democratic governance and human rights, as well as at the strengthening of institutions that promote social cohesion. One of the PBF-supported initiatives in Liberia under the sub-category of national reconciliation, for instance, supported a series of social dialogues to promote reconciliation and alleviate potential armed conflict between distinct ethnic groups in the Nimba County (MPTF Office 2010a). In what concerns democratic governance, PBF monies were used, among others, to assist the South Sudanese diaspora in several countries to cast ballots in the referendum on whether or not the South was to remain united with the North (MPTF Office 2011). Projects receiving support under Thematic Area 3 (*Revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends*), focus on the creation of opportunities and conditions for job creation (especially for the youth), as well as at improving the economy. Finally, projects under Thematic Area 4 (*Establish or re-establish essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities*), seek to create and/or rebuild the infrastructures and services of governments at the country level. Table 8.2 summarises the distribution of PBF funds by thematic areas.

Table 8.2 Distribution of PBF funding, by Thematic Areas and sub-categories (current USD million)

Priority areas and sub-categories	Projects		Net transfers	
	Number	%	USD million	%
1. Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue	**89**	**36**	**154.3**	**42**
1.1. Security Sector Reform (SSR)	30	12	70.0	19
1.2. Rule of Law (RoL)	33	13	44.7	12
1.3. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)	21	9	36.1	10
1.4. Enhancing political dialogue	5	2	3.5	1
2. Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict	**87**	**35**	**91.5**	**25**
2.1. National reconciliation	68	27	76.2	21
2.2. Democratic governance	16	7	11.8	3
2.3. Management of natural resources (including land)	3	1	3.5	1
3. Revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends	**41**	**16**	**66.8**	**18**
3.1. Creating short-term job opportunities	21	8	30.6	8
3.2. Creating sustainable livelihoods	20	8	36.2	10
4. (Re)establish essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities	**33**	**13**	**53.0**	**15**
4.1. Restoring administrative infrastructure (public administration)	19	8	18.4	5
4.2. Provision of basic public services (including infrastructure)	14	5	34.6	10
Not applicable	**1**	**–**	**0.3**	**–**
Total	**251**	**100**	**365.9**	**100**

This brief overview of PBF disbursement had no intention to assess the impact of PBF-funded initiatives or how they might have contributed to peacebuilding in the field. Its aim was limited to identifying the imprint of the liberal democratic peace in the functioning of the Fund. This analysis reveals that the largest amounts of resources from the PBF have thus far been used to foster initiatives in Thematic Areas 1 and 2, focusing on issues such as elections, democratic governance, police work and the rule of law. Within the liberal democratic peace framework, those areas are perceived to require improvements or consolidation to foster liberal/democratic *societies*—as opposed to *systems*. In this understanding, 'liberal democracy' assumes a meaning that leans towards the substantive-maximalist side of the democratic spectrum discussed in Chapter 4. This review thus suggests that, by channelling its resources to areas closely associated with liberal democratic peacebuilding, the Fund has so far, at a more fundamental level, served as a mechanism that reinforces the understanding of the liberal democratic peace as political conviction in the UN.

This section demonstrated the continued influence of the liberal democratic peace in the new UN bureaucracy for peacebuilding. It identified traces of that framework in the functioning of the PBSO as the office built upon the liberal democratic peace to influence, through the development of a conceptual basis, how 'peacebuilding' ought to be understood in the UN milieu and implemented in the field, advancing a particular meaning for the concept, what it entailed and what kind of activities were to be carried out under its rubric. The Office has also shaped the scope and priorities in the use of PBF funds, allocating monies to priority areas that were in line with its views on peacebuilding. As such, to the extent that the meaning of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu has continued to be heavily shaped by the liberal democratic peace as a political conviction and its underlying meaning of 'peacebuilding', PBSO has thus far changed little of significance in the UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict.

The Intergovernmental Dimension: The Peacebuilding Commission

This section continues to seek for traces of the liberal peacebuilding framework in the functioning of the new elements of the UN peacebuilding architecture, with a focus on the PBC. Before doing so, it provides a brief overview of the Commission's formative years. The first two

years of functioning of the PBC were strongly marked by procedural and organisational discussions. Following its first formal meeting on 23 June 2006,[7] the Organizational Committee (OC) held four other meetings until the end of the year, most of them focusing on procedural matters such as its working methods and the modalities of the participation of international organisations and civil society in PBC sessions. While such discussions were necessary as part of the process leading to the setup of a new body in the UN structures, they prevented the Commission from delving into substantial peacebuilding aspects of countries already on its agenda.

Two episodes in the last of those meetings, on 12 December 2006, are particularly representative of the sort of debates held in the OC at the time. First, upon the decision to appoint the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands as Chair of the CSC-Sierra Leone, the Brazilian Ambassador noted that not appointing one of the Vice-Chairpersons of the OC as Chair of the CSC-Sierra Leone might send a "troubling signal" as to the nature of the PBC (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 2). The statement was a clear reference to the fact that El Salvador had not been appointed to the position due to resistance from some member states, whereas the representative of Norway had already been appointed Chair of the CSC-Burundi. Neves contends that such resistance was due to the "perhaps distorted perception" that donor countries should play the role of CSC Chairs so that the "Commission had greater capacity to raise contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund" (Neves 2009: 161). Diplomats of countries such as Brazil, India and Egypt believed that having yet another European donor country in a key PBC position might signal that the new body had become a forum to "rubber-stamp agreements reached between donors and recipients" (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 2).

The second episode took place immediately afterwards, while OC members debated a proposal to invite the representative of Canada to attend a meeting of the CSC-Sierra Leone scheduled for the next day. At the time, Canada was not a member of either the Organizational Committee or the CSC-Sierra Leone, but its representative was the

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[7]The first time the members of the PBC met was in an informal environment, during a one-day seminar jointly held by the then-International Peace Academy (IPA, currently International Peace Institute) and the CIC-NYU (see IPA and CIC 2006). It was not an official meeting of the PBC, but it ended up by serving as an informal meeting due to the presence of all the newly appointed members of the OC.

Chairperson of the Management Committee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Given the position of the Canadian representative, the Dutch Ambassador proposed the invitation to inform CSC members on the "integral part played by the Special Court in peacebuilding" in the country (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5: 3). The Dutch proposal faced resistance from countries such as Egypt, India and Russia, this time out of concerns that addressing topics related to the security situation in Sierra Leone was a matter under the responsibility of the Security Council (SC) and not the PBC. In light of the lack of necessary support for the proposed invitation, it was subsequently decided that Canada would not attend the meeting (see UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.5).

Behind these procedural and seemingly superficial discussions, there were genuine political concerns by some member states. In the first event, the call for strict compliance with the rules of procedures reflected the view of developing countries that the Commission had become too unbalanced towards developed countries, most particularly European donors. In the second event, the position expressed by Russia reflected concerns that the new body might be meddling with matters within the purview of the Security Council. In both instances, member states were essentially continuing the heated discussions that had marked the negotiations leading to the adoption of the *Outcome Document* over issues such as the membership and reporting lines of the Commission, as discussed in the previous chapter. They would also continue to do so more consistently within the framework of a working group established in November to address procedural and organisational matters that had not yet been agreed upon—an understanding on the participation of civil society organisations in PBC meetings, for instance, would only be reached by June 2007 (see UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/12).

The sort of discussions held in the PBC at that time, according to an early assessment, contributed to create the overall impression of "many meetings and new acronyms, but an absence of dynamism" regarding the Commission (Scott 2008: 9–10). The existence of debates about operational and procedural aspects are not surprising since the Commission could not have functioned without an agreement on such topics, which had not been reached before its launch. Debating over such issues only after the new body had been established, however, took too long and resulted in undesirable polarisations either within the PBC membership, especially between members of the Security Council (particularly France, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the G77/China

(Wegter 2007: 344–345), or between developing countries and the Secretariat (Neves 2009: 161–162). What is perhaps more surprising about that contentious process is that despite such vivid discussions in the OC, it later emerged that only a few countries seemed to be clear about the Commission's actual mandate (McAskie 2008: 12). As a consequence, a major challenge in the first months of functioning of the PBSO was "talking to individual member states that were on the Commission, the donors, the developing countries, the troop-contributing countries, etc., and trying to get them to have a cohesive concept of what the Commission was all about" (McAskie 2012). Hence, rather than an entity capable of delivering in the field the positive results initially expected, the PBC started to operate as a new forum where member states could continue to address their usual political and diplomatic issues.

The Agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission

As outlined in the previous chapter, the PBC may include particular countries in its agenda to consider their situations in Country-Specific Configurations. However, except for provisions concerning the routes through which countries may be included on the PBC agenda (UN Docs. S/RES/1645: op. 12; A/RES/60/180: op. 12), there are no clearly defined criteria or guidelines to orient the selection of those countries and the decision is thus essentially political. While the lack of specific criteria creates opportunity for flexibility in the workings of the Commission, it made some member states initially unclear about the role of the new body. Countries that might have considered expressing their interest and willingness to be included on the agenda of the Commission at that early stage were unaware of what exactly this would require from them. For one, being placed in the PBC agenda could have represented an additional layer of contact with the UN system, not to mention bilateral donors and the PBC itself. The issue was not only one of duplication but also of capacity, since potential 'candidates' for the agenda of the Commission usually lack adequate resources (e.g., financial and personnel) to engage at an appropriate level and frequency with such a range of interlocutors. Moreover, as stated during an interview by a diplomat from one of the countries on the PBC agenda, "being on the agenda of the PBC itself gives a different picture of that country to the world, so no country really wants to be there. And when you are there, you do not want to be there forever" (Confidential A 2012).

The first countries included on the agenda of the PBC were Burundi and Sierra Leone, following the Security Council's request for advice on their respective situations and expressions of interest from the two countries (UN Doc. PBC/1/OC/SR.1).[8] The inclusion of both countries was a politicised issue among PBC members and the Secretariat, one that would be discussed in private rather than in open meetings. Carolyn McAskie, who had been appointed as Head of PBSO in May 2006, advocated for the inclusion of both on the PBC agenda. Some member states, however, advocated the inclusion of countries that were not "too far" beyond their armed conflicts (McAskie 2008: 11), whilst others were concerned with ensuring some geographically balanced representation in the agenda of the new organ (Neves 2009: 166–167). A few countries were initially thought of as the first options for the PBC: Burundi and Sierra Leone, supported by France and the United Kingdom, respectively, as well as by the PBSO; Liberia, supported by the United States and apparently the preferred option for "some member states" at first (Wilton Park Conference 2006: 14); and Haiti, Timor-Leste and Guinea-Bissau, with the backing of countries such as Brazil. Eventually, however, it seems that no other country except for Burundi and Sierra Leone formally expressed interest in being included on the Commission's agenda at the time. In the OC meeting of 13 July 2006, it was decided that the PBC would address the situation of both countries, thus including them officially on the agenda of the new organ (see PBC/1/OC/SR.2).

In the absence of official criteria, McAskie clarifies some of the elements that made Burundi and Sierra Leone the first two countries addressed by the Commission: consent, as both had expressed their interest in being addressed by the PBC; suitability, as they were not in the aftermath of conflict but were "far enough" in their respective post-conflict peace process, having experienced recognised elections that produced legitimate governments able to speak on behalf of their country and population; past experience engaging with the UN; lack of sustained international attention, as both countries

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[8] By a letter dated 27 February 2006 to the President of the General Assembly, the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone submitted a request for the PBC to "operate" in the country (Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations 2006: 1). The Mission of Burundi reiterated the same desire on 8 June 2006 by means of a letter to the President of the General Assembly (Permanent Mission of Burundi to the United Nations 2006).

had attracted interest and attention from only a few donors and multilateral agencies; and membership balance, as one was franco-phone and the other was anglophone (McAskie 2012). In addition, it is reasonable that PBC members and other individuals involved with the Commission at the time had a particular interest in including those two countries as they might provide good peacebuilding results in a relatively short period.

Guinea-Bissau was included on the PBC agenda in the following year. As aforementioned, the country had initially been thought of as one of the first to be addressed by the Commission, particularly as it had been previously considered within the framework of ad hoc groups established in the ECOSOC focusing on development aspects related to states emerging from armed conflicts in Africa (see Prantl 2006). Interest from the country in being included on the PBC agenda, however, was formally expressed only in July 2007. On 11 December, the Security Council submitted a request for advice from the PBC on the country's situation. Contrary to its request on Burundi and Sierra Leone, the Council now outlined specific areas in which it would prefer to receive advice. Those areas were: government capacity in the areas of national finance, public sector reform and anti-corruption; previous actions aimed at developing or strengthening the security system, the judiciary and the rule of law; and developments on democratic practices and the prepara-tion of the 2008 elections (UN Doc. S/2007/744). On 19 December 2007, the OC decided to include Guinea-Bissau on its agenda and to establish a CSC for the country under the leadership of the Permanent Representative of Brazil (PBC/2/OC/SR.5).

The fourth country included on the PBC agenda was the Central African Republic. The initial request by the country to have its situation considered by the PBC was addressed in a letter dated 6 March 2008 to the Commission itself, but as the country figured on the agenda of the Security Council, the request was forwarded to this organ. On 30 May, the Council requested advice from the PBC on the situation in the Central African Republic on the following areas: establishment of an inclusive political dialogue; previous actions aimed at develop-ing an "effective, accountable and sustainable" national security sector system; and restoration of the rule of law, including good governance and respect for human rights (UN Doc. S/2008/383). On 12 June, the OC decided to include the Central African Republic on its agenda,

thus establishing a CSC for the country chaired by the Ambassador of Belgium to the UN (UN Doc. PBC/2/OC/SR.6).

Liberia would become the fifth country in the PBC agenda following its request, dated 27 May 2010, to the Secretary-General, who forwarded it to the Security Council. On 20 July 2010, the Council requested the PBC advice on peacebuilding in Liberia in the following areas: rule of law; security sector reform; and national reconciliation (UN Doc. S/2010/389). While the country's referral by the Council did not differ significantly from previous cases, the engagement of the PBC with Liberia started much earlier. In fact, upon the request of the Liberian government, a PBC delegation undertook a field visit to the country in August, even before it had been formally included on the PBC agenda. The main purpose of this two-week visit was to "identify the main challenges and risks to peacebuilding in the country, including current gaps, and discuss how best the PBC should support the Government of Liberia in addressing the peacebuilding priorities" already identified by the government (Peacebuilding Commission 2010). The holding of a mission at this early stage facilitated the identification of priorities for the country, as it was reported that the PBC delegation spoke with more than 500 individuals in Liberia: during an informal meeting of the CSC-Liberia held on 6 October 2010, which I attended, one participant in the mission referred that they had followed a "wisdom-of-the-crowd" methodology to identify those preliminary priorities. On 16 September, with priorities already identified, the OC formally included Liberia on the PBC agenda, officially creating a CSC for the country under the leadership of the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the UN (UN Doc. PBC/4/OC/SR.2).

The most recent addition to the pool of countries considered by the PBC was Guinea (Conakry). The country's request was submitted directly to the PBC by a letter of 21 October 2010. Unlike the Central African Republic, however, Guinea was not on the Security Council's agenda and the letter was thus shared directly with the Commission on 26 October. Following presidential elections in November 2010, the new government reaffirmed the original request, paving the way for the inclusion of Guinea as the sixth country on the PBC agenda during the OC meeting of 23 February 2011. In the same meeting, the CSC for the country was formally created under the chairpersonship of Luxembourg

Table 8.3 Chronological and documental reference guide on the inclusion of countries on the PBC agenda

Country	Form and date of first formal request	Modality of inclusion in the PBC agenda[a]	Related UN Doc.	Date of inclusion on the agenda
Burundi	Letter to the General Assembly dated 8 June 2006 (retransmitted to the SC on 16 June 2006)	Request for advice from the Security Council	PBC/1/OC/2 16 May 2007	13 July 2006 (PBC/1/OC/SR.2)
Sierra Leone	Letter to the General Assembly dated 27 February 2006	Request for advice from the Security Council	PBC/1/OC/2 16 May 2007	13 July 2006 (PBC/1/OC/SR.2)
Guinea-Bissau	Letter to the Secretary-General dated 11 July 2007 (forwarded to the UNSC on 26 July 2007)	Request for advice from the Security Council	A/62/736-S/2007/744 14 December 2007	19 December 2007 (PBC/2/OC/SR.5)
Central African Republic	Letter to the PBC dated 6 March 2008 (forwarded to the Security Council on 10 April 2008)	Request for advice from the Security Council	A/62/864-S/2008/383 11 June 2008	12 June 2008 (PBC/2/OC/SR.6)
Liberia	Letter to the Secretary-General dated 27 May 2010 (forwarded to the UNSC on 14 June 2010)	Request for advice from the Security Council	A/64/870-S/2010/389 20 July 2010	16 September 2010 (PBC/4/OC/SR.2)
Guinea	Letter to the PBC dated 21 October 2010	Request for advice from member state that is not in the Security Council's agenda	Letter dated 2 March 2011 from the PBC[b]	23 February 2011[b]

[a]In accordance with op. 12 of General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645
[b]No record found as UN official document, but available on the PBC website

(United Nations 2011). Subsequently, two missions were undertaken to Guinea, first by the CSC-Chair in April and then by a UN technical mission in May. By June, an initial draft orienting the PBC's engagement with the country had been produced. Before it was adopted, the CSC-Chair carried out a second field visit to finalise the document with national authorities in Conakry. On 23 September 2011, the Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Guinea was adopted during a CSC meeting (UN Doc. A/66/675-S/2012/70: para. 83). Table 8.3 summarises key process and documental information on the inclusion of countries on the PBC agenda.

Designing New York-Based Peacebuilding Strategies

What follows focuses on the process leading to the adoption of the strategic frameworks for Burundi and Sierra Leone, as this process would heavily influence how future strategies would be designed and adopted by the PBC. The first formal meeting of the CSCs for the first two countries in the PBC agenda, Sierra Leone and Burundi, took place separately on 12 and 13 October, respectively. A few days before the sessions, a paper was circulated to members of each one of the CSCs with background information on the social-political and economic situation of their respective countries. The documents also identified existing development strategies under way and some of the most critical issues for the consolidation of peace in each one of the two countries (see UN Docs. PBC/2/SIL/CRP.1; PBC/2/BUR/CRP.2). The meetings counted with the participation, via videoconference, of high-level authorities from the governments of Sierra Leone and Burundi, who provided comprehensive overviews detailing specific measures undertaken by national authorities, as well as their own readings of the most pressing challenges ahead for each country. Although the tone of the statements made by CSC members on the occasion was rather generic,[9] some critical challenges were identified for each situation in the respective meetings, providing a basis for further conversations.

Following the first meeting, efforts were made by national authorities, with the support of entities in the UN system, international financial

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[9]The Summary Records of the meetings are available as PBC/1/SLE/SR.1 (2007) and PBC/1/SLE/SR.2 (2007) for CSC-Sierra Leone, and PBC/1/BDI/SR.1 (2007) and PBC/1/BDI/SR.2 (2007) for CSC-Burundi.

institutions and donors, to identify priorities and gaps to be addressed in both countries. Early UN efforts included, for instance, a visit of PBSO staff to Burundi and Sierra Leone in November. The visit, which was said to be "fruitful" by one account (UN Doc. PBC/1/SLE/SR.3: 2), provided input for a preliminary mapping of current and/or planned external interventions on relevant areas for peacebuilding in both cases. As a result of these early efforts, by the second meeting of the respective CSCs, in December 2006, broad thematic areas for engagement had already been outlined by the government of the countries concerned, in close cooperation with UN entities: for Burundi, such areas included, for instance, good governance, security, the strengthening of justice and the promotion of human rights (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/SR.3: 2); for Sierra Leone, they comprised social and youth empowerment and employment, consolidation of democracy and good governance, and justice and security sector reform (PBSO 2006: 1–2).

A more structured plan for engagement with Burundi and Sierra Leone was adopted by PBSO for each CSC in early 2007 (PBSO 2007b, c). The plan conceived in three phases. Phase I referred to the identification of peacebuilding priorities by national authorities and relevant stakeholders, which had already taken place between June and December 2006. Phase II, expected to last between January and June 2007, referred to the development of an integrated peacebuilding strategy for each country. Finally, from June 2007 onwards, the final phase was the review, monitoring and sustained implementation of each strategy, which envisaged eventual modifications in light of new developments (PBSO 2007b, c). The Burundi workplan was implemented according to the initial schedule, but the Sierra Leonean document would be delayed for a few months due to upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, initially scheduled for July and later postponed to August. The development of these workplans was important for establishing the general lines and rationale that would later be used by the Commission, more or less explicitly, upon the inclusion of new countries on its agenda.

With the first stage concluded, Phase II was initiated with a consultative process to develop and consolidate integrated strategies for the PBC's engagement with Burundi and Sierra Leone. This phase unfolded in different fronts, in New York and at the country level. The objective was to include voices from the field in the design of those strategies. At UN headquarters, the Commission promoted several informal country-specific thematic discussions on the priority areas previously identified

for the two countries. The discussions were open and brought together not only representatives from member states in New York, but also relevant external actors, including at the country level. One of those sessions, for instance, focused on community recovery in Burundi and was attended, in addition to member states in New York, by Bujumbura-based representatives from the national government, UN agencies at the country level and other relevant stakeholders (PBSO 2007a). Other discussions on Burundi focused on the promotion of good governance, rule of law and security sector reform. Informal thematic discussions on Sierra Leone addressed justice sector reform and development as well as youth employment and unemployment.[10]

Two other initiatives were carried out in New York as part of efforts to develop the integrated peacebuilding strategies for the two countries. First, it was proposed that the Vice-Chair of the PBC established a mechanism for wider discussions on 'lessons learned' and experiences that could "enrich the deliberations and the work of the Commission with respect to the countries on its agenda" (UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458: para. 25)—the creation of this mechanism, it appears, was in fact an agreed solution to relieve the diplomatic distress caused by the appointment of the Netherlands instead of El Salvador for the position of Chair of the CSC-Sierra Leone. When the proposal was presented, it was initially envisaged that the Working Group would focus on the priority areas identified for Sierra Leone in Phase I of its workplan. Eventually, however, those priorities were discussed within the framework of the aforementioned 'informal country-specific thematic discussions' and the Working Group on Lessons Learned held its initial session in February 2007 focusing on the Sierra Leone upcoming elections (see PBSO 2007d).

The second initiative was the holding of a seminar on integrated peacebuilding strategies, which was co-organised in March 2007 by the PBSO, the then International Peace Academy (IPA, currently IPI) and the NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC). As it was not yet clear at this stage what such integrated peacebuilding strategies should look like, the event brought together PBC members, PBSO staff and other Secretariat organs, as well as external experts, to discuss the format and content of those strategies (see IPA and CIC 2007). Some of the

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[10]A list of relevant events and meetings for each CSC in that year is available as Annex IV of UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458.

individuals who had been involved in the process leading to the establishment of the PBC continued somehow involved in these early phases of functioning of the new body. For example: Bruce Jones, who, as elaborated in the previous chapter, may be partially credited for pushing forward the proposal of a commission for peacebuilding in the UN in the first place, participated in that meeting on integrated peacebuilding strategies (IPA and CIC 2007: 6–7).

Still as part of Phase II, two inter-related processes unfolded at the country level, first as PBC delegations travelled to Sierra Leone and Burundi, and then as information started to be more regularly exchanged with relevant actors in both countries. The field missions sought to: gather information about the situation on the ground; assess the main peacebuilding challenges; discuss with relevant stakeholders the priorities areas to be included in the respective integrated peacebuilding strategies; and focus the attention of the 'international community' on the two countries (see UN Docs. PBC/1/SLE/2: Annex; PBC/1/BDI/2: Annex I). At the same time, the UN presence at the country level launched consultations with stakeholders in both countries. In Burundi, the process was facilitated by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), whereas in Sierra Leone it was carried out by a technical mission dispatched from UN headquarters. In both countries, consultations reportedly included "civil society organizations, the private sector, religious communities, political parties, United Nations agencies and bilateral and multilateral partners, with input from the Commission including during its field visit"(A/62/137-S/2007/458: para. 16).

Almost a year after the inclusion of Burundi on the PBC agenda, the country's Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding was adopted on 20 June 2007. The document was conceived as an "important step" (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4: 1), one envisaged to serve as the Commission's primary instrument of engagement and dialogue with Burundi. It outlined the main principles guiding the engagement of stakeholders, including the principles of national ownership and mutual cooperation—both of which would be present in all the instruments of engagement adopted by the Commission in the future, as discussed below. In addition, the document contained an analysis of the major peacebuilding priorities identified for the country over the past six months as well as the specific commitments assumed by stakeholders to the process.

In the case of the CSC-Sierra Leone, the implementation of the work plan for the development of the integrated peacebuilding strategy was delayed for a few months due to the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections. Consultations held in New York were suspended during that period and were resumed once the elections had been held (McAskie 2008: 14). The Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework was adopted by the PBC in December 2007, 18 months after the addition of the country to the PBC agenda. As in the strategy for Burundi, the document laid out engagement principles and outlined the peacebuilding priorities agreed between the government of Sierra Leone and the PBC.

Whereas working towards the development of integrated peacebuilding strategies, the PBC replicated and reinforced key aspects of the liberal democratic peace, such as its top-down and state-centric nature, and was guided by political and diplomatic dynamics of New York. In response to this top-down approach and perceived lack of engagement with local populations, attempts were made to engage more consistently with national authorities and other stakeholders at the country level. More frequent contact and communication with those actors, however, did not necessarily lead to increased or better engagement. The visits of PBC delegations, for instance, were deemed "useful in providing crucial information from the ground", according to the Secretariat (UN Doc. A/62/137-S/2007/458: para. 35), but they focused mostly on government and UN representatives, with only limited engagement with representatives from civil society or other sectors. In a four-day visit to Burundi, for example, less than two hours have been dedicated to meetings with religious groups and representatives from the private sector, and only a few hours were spent outside the capital Bujumbura (see UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/2: Annex II). The attempt to develop a peacebuilding strategy in close cooperation with stakeholders at the country level thus resulted in only "a distorted picture of needs and a lack of involvement from rural areas" (Scott 2008: 10). In the same vein, the voice of such groups in PBC meetings in New York was still underrepresented during most of the process of drafting of the strategic frameworks for Burundi and Sierra Leone, especially as guidelines for the participation of civil society organisations in PBC meetings would not be adopted until June 2007.

Establishing Priorities for Peacebuilding Support

As a result of how they were produced (i.e. in New York, informed mostly by member states' and Secretariat's concerns than by more direct involvement from field-based peacebuilding actors), the content of the peacebuilding strategies outlined by the PBC remained largely associated with priority areas that, within the liberal peace framework, are perceived to require support to produce liberal democratic *societies* (not systems), such as good governance and reforms in the State, as well in the security and justice sectors. The remainder of this section reviews the integrated peacebuilding strategies developed for countries on the PBC agenda, highlighting their emphasis on those areas.

The strategy outlined for Burundi included four peacebuilding priorities. First, *the promotion of good governance*, which was understood in terms of consolidating a culture of democracy in the country, particularly via engagement with all actors of society (including the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu—Forces nationales de libération PALIPEHUTU-FNL), strengthening the country's emerging democracy and enhancing the legitimacy of its new institutions. The second priority was the *strengthening of the rule of law within the security forces*, considered necessary to effectively integrate former belligerents, and to restore the confidence of the population on the National Defence Force and the Burundi National Police. The *strengthening of justice, promotion of human rights, reconciliation and action to combat impunity* was the third peacebuilding priority in Burundi, as the independence of the judiciary seemed compromised and required reforms. Efforts in this area would focus particularly on reaching a broad understanding on transitional justice mechanisms. Finally, the fourth priority identified was *the land issue and community-based recovery*, necessary to ensure the resettlement of repatriated Burundians in their own lands after the armed conflict, with special attention to the needs of women and young people (UN Doc. PBC/1/BDI/4: 5, 7–12).

The PBC's instrument of engagement with Sierra Leone identified five priority areas. The first was *youth employment and empowerment*, understood as indispensible to create economic opportunities and jobs for the youth, as well as long-term economic growth and an enabling environment for the private sector. Second, *justice and security sector reform*, which included concerns with access to justice and programmes on constitutional reviews and reforms. The third priority

was the *consolidation of democracy and good governance*, particularly via the strengthening of national institutions (e.g., Parliament, National Commission for Democracy and the Human Rights Commission) and the enhancement of civil society participation in politics. Fourth, *capacity-building*, "in its broadest sense and at all levels" (para. 20), including reforms in the civil service and a broad review of existing institutions. Finally, *the development of the energy sector in the country*, since the enormous electricity needs in Sierra Leone were identified as a cross-cutting challenge to all priority areas (UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1: 4–8).

On 1 October 2008, the CSC-Guinea-Bissau adopted the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the country, with six areas of concern. The first was *elections and institutional support to the Electoral Commission*, with a particular focus in ensuring sufficient funding for the holding of the 2008 legislative elections, considered an "important milestone" in the country's path towards stability and democracy. Second, *measures to jump-start the economy and rehabilitate the infrastructure, in particular in the energy sector*, identified as necessary to reactivate and diversify the economic activities of Guinea-Bissau to generate wealth for the population and income for the government. Considering the poor conditions of infrastructure in Guinea-Bissau, especially the energy sector, the area was included as a priority sector in the peacebuilding strategy. The third priority area was *security and defence sector reform*, which reflected concerns over the previous history of armed conflict in the country due to the strong role of the military in national politics. Fourth, *strengthening of the justice sector, consolidating the rule of law and fighting against drug trafficking*, which essentially focused on reforms aimed at enhancing the capacities of the judiciary. The combat against drug trafficking was included in this area considering its transnational dimension. The fifth priority was *public administration reform*, which was essentially concerned with making the state more efficient and accountable, particularly by improving its capacity to manage public finance and implement public policies. Finally, *social issues critical to peacebuilding*, including areas such as education, public health and youth employment, were also identified as a priority area in the PBC's engagement with Guinea-Bissau (UN Doc. PBC/3/GNB/3: 5–12). This was the first time that explicit mention was made to social aspects in the integrated peacebuilding strategies outlined by the PBC.

For Central African Republic, three priorities were identified. The first was *security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilisation*

and reintegration, which primarily aimed at the reorganisation and training of security forces, as well as restoring the confidence of the population on national security institutions. Particular attention was also given to the development and implementation of a DDR programme to former combatants. Second, *governance and the rule of law*, which would give particular attention to the organisation of general elections and the strengthening of state institutions in the area. Finally, the PBC strategy for the country prioritised the implementation of *development poles*, envisaged as "regional growth engines" spread throughout the country to rehabilitate and reconstruct a series of community services (UN Doc. PBC/3/CAF/7: 6–10).

The Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Liberia was adopted on 15 November 2010 and included three priority areas. First, *strengthening the rule of law*, including a review of the legislative, increased access to and strengthening of the justice system. The second priority was identified as *supporting security sector reform*, aimed at filling some gaps for the successive completion of actions in the area of legislative in the country. Finally, the third area was the *promotion of national reconciliation*, with a particular attention to issues related to land rights and the strengthening of national identity (UN Doc. PBC/4/LBR/2: 2–7).

The priorities outlined in the PBC peacebuilding strategy for Guinea reflect the country's lack of experience with armed conflict, but rather with a long period of authoritarian regime. As such, the first priority outlined for the country was the *promotion of national reconciliation and unity*, with a special focus on the combat against impunity with respect to government acts during a prolonged period of authoritarianism. The second priority was *security and defence sector reform*, aimed at consolidating the rule of law and strengthening justice institutions under civilian control. Finally, *youth and women's employment policy*, particularly via the development and implementation of training and employment programmes focused on those two segments of the population (UN Doc. PBC/5/GUI/2: 2–8). Some of the key aspects of the PBC's instruments of engagement towards the six countries in its agenda are outlined in Table 8.4.

Whereas including six countries in its agenda and designing their respective peacebuilding strategies, the Commission has sought to advise national authorities and peacebuilding actors, and engage with concrete peacebuilding situations on the ground. However, what emerges from

Table 8.4 PBC's instrument of engagement with concerned countries

Country	PBC's Instrument of engagement	Date of approval	Priority areas[a]
Burundi	Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi (PBC/1/BDI/4)	20 June 2007 (PBC/1/BDI/SR.5)	• **Good governance** • **Strengthening the rule of law within the security forces** • Strengthening of justice, promotion of human rights, reconciliation and action to combat impunity • Land issue, with particular reference to the reintegration of affected populations, and community-based recovery
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework (PBC/2/SLE/1)	12 December 2007 (PBC/2/SLE/SR.1)	• Youth employment and empowerment • **Consolidation of democracy and good governance** • **Justice and security sector reform** • Capacity-building • Energy-sector development
Guinea-Bissau	Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau (PBC/3/GNB/3)	1 October 2008 (PBC/3/GNB/SR.1)	• **Elections** and institutional support to the Electoral Commission • Measures to jump-start the economy and rehabilitate the infrastructure, in particular in the energy sector • Security and defence sector reform • **Strengthening of the justice sector, consolidating the rule of law** and fighting against drug trafficking • **Public administration reform** • Social issues critical to peacebuilding

Table 8.4 (continued)

Country	PBC's Instrument of engagement	Date of approval	Priority areas[a]
Central African Republic	Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic, 2009–2011 (PBC/3/CAF/7)	6 May 2009 (PBC/3/CAF/SR.3)	• **Security sector reform**, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration • **Governance and the rule of law** • Development poles
Liberia	Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Liberia (PBC/4/LBR/2)	15 November 2010 (PBC/4/LBR/SR.1)	• **Strengthening the rule of law** • **Supporting security sector reform** • Promoting national reconciliation
Guinea	Statement of Mutual Commitments on Peacebuilding in Guinea between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC/5/GUI/2)	23 September 2011 (PBC/5/GUI/SR.1)	• Promotion of national reconciliation and unity • **Security and defence sector reform** Youth and women's employment policy

[a] The areas in bold represent those of particular relevance for the functioning of Western liberal/democracies in the liberal democratic peace framework

a review of the development and the content of those strategies, as outlined in this section, is a restricted participation of relevant segments of the societies concerned in the identification of priorities, which remained largely limited to national authorities, with support from UN entities (both PBSO in New York and the UN presence in the country) and with only limited involvement of civil society representatives who had experienced more directly the consequences of armed conflict, such as victims, former combatants, ethnic minorities and/or religious groups—except in the case of Liberia, perhaps, due to an extended preliminary visit. Moreover, the substance of those strategies largely focused on strengthening state institutions or areas/sectors of particular importance in the liberal democratic peace framework, such as elections, good governance, rule of law and security sector reform. Consequently, the strategies outlined by the PBC tended to be formulated in terms of a state-centric and top-down external support that projected liberal democratic norms, institutions and values, with limited involvement from the societies in peacebuilding contexts. While the extent to which the involvement of the PBC has led to tangible results in the peacebuilding processes at the country level is not yet clear (and has not been the focus of this chapter), several of the interviewees expressed concerns that concrete peacebuilding results in the countries concerned would hardly come from an advisory body sitting in New York. Although not necessarily surprising, such concerns contrast starkly with the expectations of those involved in the establishment of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, who believed that the new entities would have a significant impact at the field level.

Chapter Summary

This chapter explored key aspects in the functioning of the new elements in the UN broader peacebuilding architecture, seeking to identify traces of the liberal democratic peace as political conviction in the UN milieu after their establishment. It argued that the functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF continued to reproduce and reinforce the liberal democratic peace framework as the minimally intelligible meaning for peacebuilding in the UN milieu. Consequently, the functioning of those new entities have thus far been unable to provoke substantial changes in the UN approach to peacebuilding that has prevailed in the UN milieu at least since the early 1990s.

The PBSO was designed as a Secretariat office composed of the "best expertise available" (A/RES/60/1: para. 104) to provide technical

support and advise to the PBC and the UN system. Such support has often focused, even if implicitly, on the promotion of values, norms and institutions most commonly found in Western liberal/democratic societies. In different instances, including while leading the development of a conceptual basis for peacebuilding, the Office sought to advance particular views and positions on what constitutes 'peacebuilding' or what kind of activities may be characterised as peacebuilding. Similarly, PBF funds have been channelled to initiatives in areas closely associated with the functioning of Western liberal democratic societies, such as electoral processes, institutional reforms in the security sector and the strengthening of the rule of law. Hence, although the PBSO is not an operational entity such as DPKO or DPA, the outcomes of its activities have thus far had an impact on how 'peacebuilding' was understood in the UN milieu, and influenced concrete dimensions of the Organisation's approach to peacebuilding given its position in key policymaking processes in the Secretariat and its role managing the PBF. Such an impact, however, did not necessarily provoke a significant departure from the meaning of 'peacebuilding' as informed by the liberal democratic peace framework.

This chapter also identified traces of the liberal democratic peace as political conviction in the functioning of the PBC. While designing strategies aimed at ensuring a coordinated and coherent approach to peacebuilding in the field, the new organ continued to replicate and reinforce the liberal democratic peace as the minimum intelligible meaning of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu to the extent that the substance of those strategies projected liberal democratic norms, institutions and values as a remedy to the challenges faced by post-armed conflict societies. Concerning the process through which those strategies were developed, and illustrative of the technocratic spirit of the liberal democratic peace, the PBC has also been largely unable to meaningfully engage with the realities of the countries on its agenda, having generally produced documents that were not necessarily in line with the realities on the ground.

From this overview of the functioning of those three entities, it appears that rather than the innovative institutional arrangement that some expected it would become, the PBC, PBSO and PBF have thus far contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace as the minimally intelligible meaning for 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu. The UN approach to societies affected by armed conflict has thus changed little in substantial terms: the establishment of the three new elements modified the UN bureaucracy since they created new

organisational actors and interlocutors, as well as new policies, processes and procedures; at a deeper level, however, they have thus far largely continued to engage with peacebuilding processes based on a strong political view about the promotion of a maximalist-substantial version of liberal/democratic states to societies affected by armed conflict. Consequently, the new elements may represent a somewhat superficial solution that did not necessarily address the complex problems and challenges that they were expected to address in the first place.

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Conclusion

Margaret Anstee, a former senior United Nations (UN) official, once remarked that "[t]he whole new concept of peacebuilding developed in the 1990s is a fascinating example of how ideas evolve in and through the UN" (UNIHP 2007b: 160). Indeed, from the written word of a concept advanced by one Secretary-General in a report, 'peacebuilding' has come fully into life in the context of the United Nations. More than 20 years after its appearance in *An Agenda for Peace*, peacebuilding has been and remains a core activity of the Organisation in the realm of international peace and security. Throughout that period, the meaning(s) behind that concept has(-ve) provided the rationale, motivated, legitimated and informed the structures whose interplay enacted concrete policies in several post-armed conflict scenarios, from El Salvador to Mozambique to Cambodia to Timor-Leste. This book engaged with the trajectory of 'peacebuilding' in the United Nations by examining its origins in the early 1990s and its implications for the Organisation's approach to societies affected by armed conflict ever since, including an analysis of the establishment and functioning of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). I explored this trajectory by constructing a narrative that sought to offers a better understanding of the origins of 'peacebuilding' in the United Nations, its minimally intelligible meanings in the UN milieu in distinct historical moments and how those meanings have contributed to

affect the UN ideational and bureaucratic dimensions, as well as the manifestations of the interplay between those two dimensions in UN peacebuilding initiatives carried out at the field level.

Against the backdrop of the trajectory of 'peacebuilding' from a concept to concrete bureaucratic arrangements in the UN and initiatives in the field, the book engages with two main questions. The first question was how the concept of peacebuilding 'came into life' in the United Nations, that is, became influential to the extent of motivating, justifying, legitimating and/or enacting specific policy outcomes or concrete courses of action. As discussed particularly in Chapters 4 through 6, the concept of 'peacebuilding' gained life in the UN context via a hermeneutical mechanism that attaches meanings to political concepts. In the early 1990s, against the backdrop of the end of the cold war, theories about the liberal/democratic peace migrated from academe to the highest levels of decision-making in the UN Secretariat, going through a process of simplification and politicisation as they were gradually converted from theoretical constructs to public conventions to political convictions. The simplified and politicised version of those theories, the liberal democratic peace framework, gained foothold in the UN milieu as a strong and politicised view about the promotion of (liberal) democracies to societies affected by armed conflicts. As such a strong view, it required political action, which was articulated in Boutros-Ghali's report *An Agenda for Peace*. The document built upon the liberal democratic peace and fostered the concept of 'post-conflict peacebuilding' as a tool, an instrument to achieve peace through the promotion of a minimalist-procedural version of liberal democracies to societies affected by armed conflict. This concept of 'peacebuilding' gradually became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu, providing the rationale and informing the structures whose interplay motivated, legitimated, justified and enacted concrete UN peacebuilding initiatives in the field. Through this process, the concept of 'peacebuilding' has fully come into life, having informed UN actions in several post-armed conflict situations since the early 1990s.

The second question was whether and how the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF have affected the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding after their establishment. According to the narrative constructed in the previous chapters, the three new elements in the UN broader peacebuilding architecture have thus far changed little of significance in the UN concept and practice of peacebuilding to the extent that they have

remained largely predicated upon a meaning of 'peacebuilding' informed by the liberal democratic peace. The three entities were created in 2005–2006 partially as a response to some of the problems and challenges associated with the UN approach to peacebuilding, such as the lack of coordination among donors and the need to more actively engage civil society in local peacebuilding contexts, among others. The design of the formats, mandates and constitution of those entities, however, was heavily shaped by political, diplomatic and bureaucratic concerns typical of the UN milieu in New York, reflecting an underlying influence of the liberal democratic peace in how individuals in that context understood and engaged with 'peacebuilding'. As a result of how they were designed and established, the functioning of those entities has also been largely shaped by the liberal democratic peace framework. Hence, despite having modified the UN broader architecture for peacebuilding by creating new organisational actors and spaces for discussion, as well as by outlining new policies, processes and frameworks for engagement in peacebuilding processes, the PBC, the PBSO and PBF have often contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal peace framework in the UN milieu. Therefore, the establishment and functioning of those new entities has not yet been able to significantly affect the UN approach to peacebuilding, as initially expected.

The remainder of this chapter summarises the main narrative constructed in the substantial chapters of the book and discusses some implications of the analysis carried out.

Summary of Narrative Constructed and Main Argument

The starting point of the book was the restricted circles of Western IR and political science academe. My initial contention was that the liberal democratic peace framework could be characterised as a theoretical construct that assembles the political concepts of 'liberal democracy' and 'peace' together. Separately, the two concepts assume a plethora of meanings that are not necessarily related. However, when considered against the backdrop of academic theories that seek to explain the apparent absence of wars among liberal/democratic states, the concepts of 'liberal democracy' and 'peace' endow viable meanings to each other and acquire the potential to drive political action. Understood as a theoretical construct, the liberal democratic peace thus not only offers a framework for understanding a particular aspect of world politics (the absence of

wars among liberal/democratic societies), but also assumes the potential to shape individuals' views about social reality and about their position and interests in that reality. By the early 1990s, the theoretical construct of the liberal democratic peace was rather prominent in academic circles, but it only started to become known and accepted in and around the United Nations following the migration of that theoretical, eminently academic discourse, to public spheres.

The migration of the liberal democratic peace as theoretical construct from academe to public spheres in general and the UN milieu in particular was facilitated by the convergence of key material and ideational aspects intricately interrelated against the broader context of the end of the cold war. Those factors included: the UN past experience in supporting electoral processes; a sense that Western liberalism had overcome all alternative models of governance; and an unusual feeling, at the highest levels of decision-making in the Secretariat, that the United Nations was in position to play a substantial role in international peace and security in a 'new era' after 1989. In this context, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was instrumental in contributing to the migration of the liberal democratic peace to public spheres by rhetorically connecting the concepts of 'democracy' and 'peace' in his public discourse. On such occasions, Boutros-Ghali often resorted to the simplistic rhetorical construction that 'democracies do not (or rarely) fight each other' to reach out to his audiences. As this process unfolded, the liberal democratic peace as theoretical construct was gradually converted into a public convention, that is, a simplified discourse that is readily taken for granted and shapes "commonsensical codes of thinking and behavior" (Ish-Shalom 2013: 5, 21).

Boutros-Ghali started to build upon this simplified version of theories about the liberal/democratic peace to advance a clear political agenda of supporting electoral processes and promoting democracies in societies affected by armed conflict with a view to achieving peace. The rationale and goals of this agenda are embodied in the Secretary-General's report *An Agenda for Peace*, of 17 June 1992. The document was produced by a task force composed of senior officials in the Secretariat, with substantial intellectual and strategic guidance from Boutros-Ghali himself. The Task Force of the Secretary-General had direct and indirect contact with the emerging academic scholarship on the democratic peace, which around that time was starting to develop more robust quantitative models to sustain the thesis that liberal/democratic societies did not or

rarely fought against each other. Drawing insights from this scholarship and from Boutros-Ghali's own thoughts on democracy and democratisation, which were heavily centred on procedural aspects such as elections, the report advanced a simplified, politicised and dogmatised version of theories about the liberal/democratic peace, one that advocated the promotion of a minimalist-procedural version of (liberal) democracies to societies affected by armed conflict via 'post-conflict peacebuilding'. In advancing this view, Boutros-Ghali contributed to the gradual conversion of the liberal democratic peace (as a framework) from public convention to political conviction. In the UN milieu, the release of *An Agenda for Peace* epitomises this conversion.

The concept of peacebuilding—or, more accurately, 'post-conflict peacebuilding'—thus entered the United Nations heavily informed by the liberal democratic peace framework. As *An Agenda for Peace* attracted a great deal of attention and as member states and the Secretariat discussed the concept, this particular meaning of 'peacebuilding' gradually became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu, informing debates and deliberations among member states in the General Assembly and the Security Council, and being addressed in several documents of the Organisation. In the aftermath of *An Agenda for Peace* and for the remainder of the 1990s, 'peacebuilding' has not overtly been converted into concrete structures in the UN bureaucracy, but the liberal democratic peace underlying and informing the concept has provided the rationale for bureaucratic (re)arrangements that sought to make the Secretariat better equipped to support societies affected by armed conflict. For instance, an Electoral Assistance Unit was created in the Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs in 1993. Accordingly, peacekeeping operations deployed at that time gradually reflected in their mandates and activities a political view favouring the promotion of (liberal) democracies, particularly via support to electoral processes, as a mean to achieve peace.

As it became minimally intelligible in the UN milieu and informed bureaucratic arrangements in the Organisation, 'peacebuilding' gradually gained life, leading to concrete manifestations in world politics throughout the 1990s. Those manifestations reflected the liberal democratic peace framework informing and undergirding 'peacebuilding' at the time, which varied in accordance to the meaning of 'liberal democracy' it entailed at a given moment. During Boutros-Ghali's tenure in office, the minimally intelligible connotation of 'liberal democracy' in the

UN milieu overemphasised processes and procedures, leading to initiatives that ought to create liberal democratic *systems* in peacebuilding contexts such as Cambodia and Mozambique. This understanding of 'liberal democracy' was gradually expanded during Annan's tenure in office towards a maximalist-substantive version that emphasised norms and institutions over elections. As a result, UN liberal democratic peacebuilding initiatives gradually expanded in scope to create liberal democratic *societies*, as illustrated by the UN involvement in Timor-Leste. Regardless of differences concerning the envisaged version of 'liberal democracy', the UN approach to peacebuilding remained heavily influenced by the liberal democratic peace as political conviction throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

Despite having become minimally intelligible in the UN milieu, and despite its manifestations in concrete initiatives in the field, liberal democratic peacebuilding only became ultimately embodied in the UN bureaucratic structures in 2005–2006, with the establishment of the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF. The three entities were established partially as a response to some of the problems associated with the UN (liberal democratic) approach to peacebuilding, such as the repeated failures to avoid relapses into armed conflict and the need to more actively involve local civil society in post-armed conflict contexts. The design of the formats, mandates and structures of those new elements in the UN broader peacebuilding architecture, however, have been shaped by political and bureaucratic interests of member states and the Secretariat in the UN milieu in New York, reflecting the strong influence of the state-centric and technocratic nature of the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' and its minimally intelligible meaning among individuals in the UN milieu.

As a result of their own design and the process leading to their establishment, the subsequent functioning of the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF has been largely predicated on the liberal democratic peace framework. For instance, the PBC's instruments of engagement towards the countries in its agenda have clearly focused on priorities that reflect a maximalist-substantial version of 'liberal democracy', which has remained the meaning of 'liberal democracy' minimally intelligible in the UN milieu. The PBSO works by providing specialised technical assistance to national authorities of countries on the PBC agenda, reproducing the project management philosophy and technocratic features of the liberal democratic peace in its day-to-day activities. The PBF, finally, has offered incentives for local and international peacebuilders to carry out

their initiatives in areas such as, for instance, the holding of elections and the reform of state institutions, which are key priorities in the liberal democratic peace framework. As those organs operate according to political and diplomatic concerns typical of New York, as well as to the meaning of liberal democratic peace that informs the minimally intelligible concept of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu, the establishment and functioning of those entities have so far contributed to reproducing and reinforcing the liberal democratic peace as political conviction in the United Nations.

Based on that narrative, I argued in this book that the way peacebuilding 'came into life' in the particular context of the United Nations in the early 1990s had a profound and lasting influence in the Organisation's provision of support to societies affected by armed conflict, not only influencing the core meaning underlying 'peacebuilding' in the UN but also resisting to substantial changes in that meaning. Pushed forward by then Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in the early 1990s, the concept gained life as a concrete policy and tangible manifestations in world politics via a hermeneutical mechanism that attaches meaning to political concepts. Through this mechanism, academic theories on the liberal/democratic peace (a non-material aspect and type of discourse) were simplified and politicised in terms of a strong, opinionated and dogmatised view about the promotion of liberal democracies in post-armed conflict situations. As it became evident in the narrative summarised above, this same view has thus far remained the main source of meaning informing the concept of 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu. Consequently, the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' has, since the early 1990s, been remarkably concerned with the promotion of liberal democracies—defined first in its minimalist-procedural, and then in its maximalist-substantive connotation. Therefore, the establishment and the functioning of the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF have not thus far affected that meaning substantially; rather, they have often contributed to its reproduction and reinforcement in the UN milieu.

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

This narrative and its findings presents implications for at least three areas: IR constructivism, peacebuilding scholarship and UN peacebuilding policy.

The narrative presented in the previous chapters was constructed based on the constructivist understanding that non-material aspects such as ideas, discourses, academic theories, norms, rules and social practices are relevant in shaping policymaking and its outcomes in world politics. This standing represents a challenge to 'traditional' IR theories in the realist and liberal traditions, which place heavier emphasis on material aspects such as military might or economic wealth to shed light on phenomena in world politics. In this book, constructivist premises and its overarching framework as a social theory approach (as opposed to a theory per se) was instrumental for understanding 'peacebuilding' as an empty shell whose meaning(s) and manifestations are largely dependent upon the views and interpretations of actors in a specific context. This insight, in turn, allowed for the exploration of the different meanings assumed by 'peacebuilding' in the UN milieu, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, have been largely influenced by the liberal democratic peace. Nevertheless, the meaning of 'peacebuilding' entailed variations within that framework to the extent that one of its core components, 'liberal democracy', was interpreted differently and entailed distinct meanings to key individuals in the UN milieu. The use of constructivism in the book thus enabled a more nuanced understanding of the construction of the meaning of 'peacebuilding' and its different conceptualisations and associated practices in the United Nations during a period of more than 20 years.

To explore the meaning of 'peacebuilding' as it gained foothold in the UN milieu in the early 1990s, I applied Ish-Shalom's hermeneutical mechanism. The author had originally formulated his theory in the context of domestic and foreign policy to explain Israel's positions towards the Oslo peace accords and US democratisation policies in the post-cold war. In this book, I adopted Ish-Shalom's theory in the context of the international organisation par excellence and followed the discursive process through which an academic discourse (theories on the liberal/democratic peace) was simplified and politicised as it migrated from academic circles to the UN milieu. This book went further than Ish-Shalom's original work on the hermeneutical mechanism to the extent that it combined his discourse-tracing methodology with process tracing, not only exploring how academic theories on the liberal/democratic peace have been transformed into a simplified, politicised and dogmatised discourse in the UN milieu in the early 1990s, but also identifying and analysing corresponding events that have shaped and been shaped

by that transformation. The combination of the two approaches proved relevant for enabling a more comprehensive understanding of the inter-action between the interplay between material and ideational aspects in that transformation. This enabled opening the black box of the UN Secretariat, delving into daily discursive, political and diplomatic practices in the UN milieu, as well as identifying purposive individuals and their role in shaping the UN approach to 'peacebuilding' in distinct historical contexts.

The analysis herein carried out also offered two original contribu-tions for peacebuilding scholarship. First, it offered a better under-standing of the origins of the concept of peacebuilding as advanced by Boutros-Ghali in the UN milieu in the early 1990s. The book's narra-tive challenged two views concerning that process, namely: that the concept of 'peacebuilding' was a brainchild of the Egyptian Secretary-General, and that the concept of 'peacebuilding' in *An Agenda for Peace* stemmed from Galtung's early writings. While recognising that personal acquaintances and the similarity in the labels of 'peacebuilding' make Galtung's and Boutros-Ghali's concepts rather close—it is indeed likely that Galtung's writings played some role in shaping the overall concep-tual framework of Boutros-Ghali's report—the book explored unwritten aspects associated with the concept of 'peacebuilding' beyond the written word of UN reports. While adopting this approach, it emerged that the meaning of Boutros-Ghali's concept was narrower than 'peacebuilding' as defined by Galtung and was strongly associated with the promotion of a minimalist-procedural version of 'liberal democracies' in post-armed conflict situations. For peacebuilding scholars, this finding represents an invitation to rethinking unchallenged premises about the substance of 'peacebuilding' in the UN of the early 1990s, particularly in what con-cerns its implied links with the Nordic tradition of peace studies and its broader and more encompassing understanding of peacebuilding.

This narrative has also established a dialogue between the critique of the liberal peace and students of the new elements of the broader UN peacebuilding architecture: the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF. As explored in the Introduction, those two strands of contemporary research on peacebuilding have produced insightful studies, but they have largely failed to exchange views with each other—with a few excep-tions. By exploring their establishment and key aspects in the function-ing of those entities in their first few years on the basis of concepts and insights gained by a close reading of the critique of the liberal peace

scholarship, this book sought to establish a bridge to facilitate future dialogues between both strands of research as well as between students of peacebuilding and international organisations.

For UN peacebuilding policy, the single major implication of this book's analysis is that a reconsideration of the New York-based institutional arrangement that have been initially expected to have a real impact at the field level may be in order. The book advanced the argument that the establishment and functioning of the PBC, PBSO and PBF have not yet produced significant changes in the Organisation's approach to peacebuilding and to societies affected by armed conflict. Those entities have been partially established as a response to some of the problems identified in the UN approach to peacebuilding throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, such as the failure to avoid relapses into conflict, the need for more active involvement with local civil societies and the lack of coordination among donors. Although recognising that the PBC, PBSO and PBF are no panacea, the argument that they reproduce, at a prior and deeper level, the same commitments to the liberal democratic peace framework that informed the UN approach to (liberal democratic) peacebuilding during most of the post-cold war years seems to represent a major blow to efforts aimed at enhancing the UN's capacities in international peace and security. This argument thus raises the question of what has thus far been the real added-value of those entities vis-à-vis the UN approach to peacebuilding prior to their establishment. Considering that the continued reliance of these new entities on the liberal democratic peace framework is likely to produce only a limited impact in the countries currently in the PBC agenda, this narrative also raises questions about whose interests have been served with their establishment. Answers to those questions might shed further light into how the Organisation and other international actors have been engaging in peacebuilding, as well as the limits of their interventions.

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