

**ISSUES, PROMISES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM REPATRIATED FAMILIES
OF SWAT VALLEY**



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
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Dedication

All effort put in this research work is dedicated to our parents, who had an unwavering belief in us throughout, and to our supervisor, Dr. Rifaat Hussain, for his constant inspiration and motivation, without whom this wouldn't have been possible.

We would also like to dedicate this research to everyone who has suffered from internal/temporary displacement, and survived it. You are the real heroes!

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1 LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------|--|
| IDPs | Internally Displaced People ¹ |
| FATA | Federally Administered Tribal Area |
| KPK | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| MDTF | Multi Donor Trust Fund |
| TTP | Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan |
| FC | Frontier Corps |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissions for Refugees |
| UPAP | UAE Pakistan Assistant Program |
| NDMA | National Disaster Management Authority |
| NDMC | National Disaster Management Commission |
| NEOC | National Emergency Operations Center |
| NADRA | National Database and Registration Authority |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| SACH | Struggle for Change |
| SRSP | Sarhad Rural Support Program |
| PRO | Public Relations Officer |

¹ Now changed to TDPs (temporarily displaced people)

2 MAP OF SWAT



(Map 1)

(Google, 2016)



Swat, Pakistan

(Map 2)

3 INTRODUCTION

Pakistan has seen waves of radical violence since 2002 when the Taliban government in Afghanistan was forcibly removed from power by a US-led military alliance. Fragments of the Taliban traversed the absorbent Afghanistan-Pakistan border to take asylum in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Soon Pakistan saw an advent of Pakistani Taliban who ultimately fabricated strongholds in the connecting KPK province, and expanded control over Swat Valley in 2007. In February 2009, the provincial government of KPK signed a peace deal with the militant group in order to stop their terrorist attacks but this negotiation period was short lived, and after a series of flagrant suicide bombings, in 2009, the government launched military operations to drive out the Taliban from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; this caused a colossal humanitarian crisis. (Anon., March 20, 2013)

Since then, Pakistan experienced large-scale internal displacement due to variety of reasons. The internal displacement in the spring of 2009 because of military operations against militants in Malakand region of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, led to an exodus of about 2.3 million people. The Pakistani military's operation in Swat forced over two million IDPs to leave the area. Massive displacement occurred in Pakistan in August and September 2010 again after the worst flooding to hit the country affected 20 million people, forcing over 7 million people from their homes, including Swat. (Din, October 2010) These people were sent to different areas and were kept in the internally displaced persons' camps. Gradually when the security situation of Swat got better, these IDP's were asked to shift back. Due to military operations and the floods, the infrastructure of Swat got completely destroyed and livelihoods were severely damaged. Hence the government made certain promises to these IDPs which included: increased levels of security, improved access to basic necessities such as food, shelter, health, education etc.

The government promised to augment the levels of security in Swat and along with it the infrastructural redevelopment. Due to military operations and the targeted destruction of schools and hospitals by TTP, the entire infrastructure of public health and education was decimated. The government wanted to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure as part of its recovery drive Addressing these relief and recovery efforts were troublesome for the government due to lack of funds and the

implementation gaps. They carried on this relief efforts in collaboration with the international community, civil society, aid actors and NGO's.

3.1 PROMISES MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT

The following are the promises made to the people of Swat by the government, as narrated by a renowned media person nationwide. Against each promise, the fulfillment situation also follows:

1. Diminishing of Talibanization

Three levels of militancy groups existed in Swat pre-operation phase:

- a. Low level taliban
- b. Hardcore taliban
- c. Abettors and sympathizer groups

The government promised to diminish all these groups, restoring complete peace to prevail in the Taliban held area of Swat, as they asked the citizens to evacuate. To-date Army officials can be seen patrolling the streets of Swat to make sure no unusual activity takes places, which leads to one conclusion, namely, if the Army retreats, the situation may get back to what it was before.

2. Reconstruction

The government specifically made a promise about not only the reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure in Swat, but envisioned that Swat would be made a role model city. Notwithstanding the many exaggerated tales of reconstruction, the fact remains that the government played a minimal role in reconstructing schools and hospitals.

3. Improving the education standard

The government made a promise to raise the standard of education in Swat, by announcing to establish a national level university in Swat. Needless to say, there has been no actions taken in this regard. The building of University of Swat is in a vulnerable condition to-date. Digging deep in history, Swat was home to 200 universities in the Buddhist era. Today the education rate is running very low 35% male and 18% female education in one of the biggest districts of Pakistan.

4. Revamping the tourism industry

The government promised to take measures for rehabilitation and preservation of historical and tourist sites in Swat, to improve the socio-economic conditions in the area. As discussed in this study, the tourism industry of Swat is in a crumbling condition.

3.2 NEED OF THE STUDY

It has been almost half a decade since the repatriated IDPs have moved back to Swat, and the government has failed so far, to meet the demands of the repatriated IDPs. Lives, infrastructure and livelihood were the major factors affected by Operation Raah-e-Rast (2009), and while the residents of Swat fled their homes in hope of a better day after they returned, their hopes were crushed when they travelled back and found a devastating situation in their valley. This research aims to highlight the socio-economic situations faced by the repatriated IDPs of Swat to-date, and also sheds light on how vulnerable the repatriated IDPs are to funding from the government. Needless to say, the vulnerability in human nature can have very many negative consequences such as increase in crime rate, uprising against the government due to increase in frustration, and the last resort might be adopted by the families most vulnerable; joining hands with terrorist groups.

The research aims to analyze the extent to which promises made by the government have been fulfilled and the ultimate purpose of this study is to bring attention to these issues and have them resolved smoothly before the government falls prey to a bigger and dangerous consequence, such as brewing of more terrorists in the Swat valley due to deprivation of basic needs.

3.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main objectives of the study include the evaluation of the general socio-economic conditions of the population in Swat after their return, identification of immediate needs/priorities of the repatriated IDPs and whether or not they were provided with what they wanted, assessment of the food security and health situation of the people and whether it got improved/declined after their

return, collection of information regarding the residents' access to water and awareness about sanitation & hygiene practices.

3.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the social, economic and psychological impact on the repatriated families of Swat due to lack of national policies regarding IDPs?
2. How has the lack of proper government attention affected tourism in Swat?
3. What is the effect on crime rate in Swat post operation, due to economic deterioration?

3.5 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

H1: Due to absence of National policies for IDPs and implementation gaps, the immediate needs of the repatriated IDPs were not (adequately) addressed by the government, which led to social, economic and psychological deterioration.

H2: Due to deterioration of economic situation, the crime rates have increased in Swat.

H3: Insufficient government attention has led to deterioration of historical and tourist spots in Swat.

4 BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH

Swat is a valley and administrative district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. It is the upper valley of the Swat River, which ascends in the Hindu Kush range. The capital of Swat is Saidu Sharif, however the major town in the Swat valley is Mingora. The valley of Swat is known for its mesmerizing natural beauty, snowcapped peaks, countless waterfalls and glaciers, streams, thick woods, natural parks, lakes and dark forests. It is one of the most beautiful and much greener valleys of the Northern Pakistan and is well connected to the rest of Pakistan. It is truly labeled as the mini- Switzerland of Pakistan. Before the operation it was considered to be modern resort and tourist attractive destination in Pakistan.

4.1 Geography

The total area of Swat is 5.337 square kilometers with a population of about 1.250.000. The Swat valley is located in the north of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 35° north latitude and 72° and 30° east longitude, and is surrounded by the mountains. Chitral and Gilgit–Baltistan are located in the north, Dir in the west, and Mardan in the south. The Indus River detaches it from Hazara in the east.

4.2 Climate

The summer in lower Swat valley is short and moderate while it is cool and refreshing in the upper northern part. The hottest month is June with mean maximum and minimum temperature of 33°C and 16°C, respectively. The coldest month is January with mean maximum and minimum temperature of 11°C and -2°C, respectively. The winter season is long and extends from November to March, rain and snowfall occurs during this season.

4.3 Strategic importance

Swat valley has great strategic importance because it is surrounded by Hindukush Range in the West and North West and Karakorum Range in the East and North East. Across the Hindukush Range is Afghanistan and Central Asia whereas beyond Karakorum in the North East is China and further down East is the Indian occupied Kashmir. So Swat valley is an integral part of the

strategic and significant region where three parts of the Asian continent—South Asia, Central Asia and China, meet. (See Map 1)

4.4 Physical features

Large parts of Swat are covered by mountains and plains. The valley of Swat is divided into two physical regions, i.e., Swat-Kohistan and Swat Proper. Swat-Kohistan is the mountainous region on the upper reaches of the Swat river up to Ain in the south while the whole of south of Ain is Swat proper. Ain is subdivided into Bar (upper Swat) and Kuz (lower Swat). Swat River and its streams drain Swat valley. So valley is very fertile and it is made up of fine alluvial soil. River Swat, beside the main source of irrigation water for agriculture, also serves as a permanent fishery for the area by providing fish round the year. Mahseer fish is common in lower areas and Trout fish is abundant in upper areas where the water is very cold. About 20 percent of the land area of the Swat district is covered by forests. Beyond the height of 4500 ft, there are vast amounts of forests of coniferous trees that consist of pines, dewdar, dedar, byar etc. In the low land of Swat, the temperature is comparatively high, plants and trees of broad leaves such as poplar, banyan and willow are common.

4.5 Mineral resources

Swat valley is also rich of mineral resources such as limestone, granite, emerald and china clay. China clay is used for white ware and special type of cement and also as a paper and rubber filling. In various parts of swat good quality of green and white marble are available. These reserves are present in Saidu Sharif and Malam Jabba.

4.6 POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECT

Swat valley has a variety of ethnic groups, i.e.; Pashtuns, Kohistani and Gujjars. Their distinctive beauty lies in the physical characteristics, such as blonde hair and blue eyes. Pashtu is predominantly understood and spoken in Swat valley totaling up to 93 percent of the population that speaks it. The people of Swat take honor in preserving their heritage and culture, where women still wear the colorful and traditional shirts and shalwars, while men wear shalwar-kamiz and a silk turban or embroidered caps. The gender role is well defined, where men are the manifestation of

honor, dignity and courage, and deal with political and social affairs, while women are inclined to carry out domestic jobs. But despite the reserved view for women, a flexible mobility has been noticed in women education and access to health services and jobs.

Agriculture and tourism are the main sources of livelihood for the people of Swat, however after the severed militant attacks and Army operations, these have declined tremendously, leaving most people unemployed. Swat is also famous for handicrafts, which include woolen shawls, rugs, bedspreads and carvings. Women play a huge role in contributing towards the handicraft industry by weaving and decorating fabrics with beautiful needlework, which are in high demand all over the country. A respectable livelihood is drawn from this exquisite work and also helps overcome the post-war trauma.

The people of Swat tend to resolve their issues through setting up a jirgah, as is traditional in the Pashtun culture and Islam as well. Local matters regarding land, family ties and related issues are usually what calls for a jirgah, which affirms that the decision making system includes all levels of society and passes unprejudiced judgment. This system brings together all the layers of the society and makes sure everyone's point of view is respected and through mutual consensus a decision is reached, and thereafter the head of the Jirga passes the final verdict.

4.7 INFRASTRUCTURE

Military operation to clear Swat from the vices resulted in enormous destruction. The militancy and military operation caused large scale devastation to physical and social infrastructure, agriculture, tourism sector, health and mainly the education sector with deep physical, mental and psychological repercussions. A large number of people died in Swat due to the operation. The misfortunes in crop, losses in production and massive damages to the infrastructures (houses, hospitals and schools) were also the apparent consequences. However, these material misfortunes are likewise critical, for they undermine the capacity of survivors to survive and recover. Swat's environment was very clean and healthy", as said by Haji Mazanoor (one of the IDPs from Masud tribe) "but it has changed now, continuous armed conflict has augmented skin infections and eye eruptions." Fresh fruits and vegetables, clean air and clear water were plentiful once. (Mehsud, 2014)

There have been several initiatives undertaken to carry out the rehabilitation activities in Swat. UNDP in collaboration with Saudi government started a project known as Community Infrastructure Restoration and Rehabilitation. They intended to target 6 tehsils of District Swat. The basic aim of this project was to recover affected communities' access to basic services and facilities by reestablishing and restoring community physical infrastructure schemes. Another initiative was under taken by Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in Swat to: restore damaged infrastructure & disrupted services, to improve local service delivery, to support livelihoods and developing skills. (MDTF, n.d.) There are many other initiatives carried out to improve the living conditions of the IDP's but the extent to which these programs were/are successful still tends to be an enigma.

4.8 MILITANCY IN SWAT

Since the start of war on terror in 2001, militants in Pakistan have been using various ways to destabilize the country, one of which is the forcibly control of Fazlullah, the then Chief of TTP on Swat district in the beginning of 2007. He waged a campaign to attack schools; police check posts and started kidnapping security personnel. In April 2008, the ruling party, Awami National Party (ANP) signed a six points agreement with Maulana Sufi Mohammad however, the situation again deteriorated and in February 2009, government allowed to enforce Sharia Law. This agreement could not last longer due to lack of trust from both the sides, which apparently led towards an operation against the militants in 2009.

Army operation caused a large scale socio-economic destruction in the region. Millions of people were internally displaced. These internally displaced people now returned back to their region but are facing immense post conflict complications. (Bangash, December 2012) The means of production and infrastructure have been badly devastated. Many researches study that many men, women and children died during the operation and some died during the process of displacement. The agriculture sector and local trade devastated due to the conflict and then because of the army operation.

Moreover, after the conflict ended many militants were detained by army, some surrendered and some were handed over to army by their families. Pak army launched a program for the rehabilitation and de-radicalization of those militants who were once part of the society. Three components of the program were; Project Sabaon, which focused on juveniles, Project Mishal

focused on the adult detainees and Project Sparlay for the family members of the detainees. Army then provided education opportunities to the young detainees and arranges counseling sessions and psychological workshops to let them live better life.

The most vulnerable segment of the conflicted region, were women and children who were easiest targets. Fazullah used FM radio broadcasting to grab the support of women who then let their men support Fazullah. The women even donated their jewelry to financially support Fazullah as they were highly brain washed.

During the Taliban reign, armed militants used to stop and search residents at checkpoints in different parts of Swat. But after the military operation, security forces now only have main checkpoints. Residents say that the number of army checkpoints has been reduced now, although the army is also stationed on peaks of mountains surrounding the valley. The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI)-led Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, after winning polls in May 2013 in the Swat valley and all of KP, worked towards a plan for the withdrawal of army from Swat. But according to a PTI parliamentarian elected from Swat the security situation, especially the assassinations of pro-government elders and the killing of Niazi, made pulling out the army impossible.

According to DAWN news, now, the Pakistani military is constructing three cantonments in the Swat district to prevent attacks from the Taliban militants. Swat's residents are divided over the presence of the army and the construction of cantonments in the valley. (REHMAN, APR 19, 2015)

Currently, the mission of Pak Army to abolish all types of militants from country has brought peace in the region. The recent peace festival in Swat is a case in point of peaceful Swat. People of Swat now support government and army to bring peace back to the region.

5 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section examines and reviews studies conducted by different national and international organizations and think tanks in regard of Internally Displaced People (IDPs), now known as Temporarily Displaced People (TDPs), due to military operations. Further the section also explores studies in context of repatriated IDPs of Swat and the arduous situation they are going through still, which can subsequently have an overarching effect on the vulnerability of the population.

IDPs are defined as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border." (Anon., 1998)

But the concept of IDPs is not only fleeing their hometowns and resettling elsewhere. It may mean seeking a safe place to settle in and looking for better socioeconomic opportunities. This may be a case in prolonged displacements, however many such cases were seen in the Swat displacement as well. People with a good economic backing moved to developed cities for the sake of safety as well as better livelihood opportunities. The rest of the population resettled in temporary camps or with host families but were unrestful as they feared having lost their only sources of livelihood for good along with their properties and other precious belongings.

During 2008 to 2010, due to terrorism and war on terror, over 3.3 million people were forced to leave their homes. In May 2009, a massive military operation was launched and the Pakistan Army led the successful military operation, 'Rah-e-Rast', against the local Taliban group led by TTP commander Mullah Fazlullah and TSNM leader Sufi Muhammad in Swat valley. The beautiful Swat valley was badly destroyed by militants, which as a result affected socio-economic conditions of the inhabitants. Since then, Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps (FC) are involved in reconstruction and rehabilitation processes in the valley.

In the following passages, we shall uncover the facts and figures about the displacements the operation caused and the challenges these people still face to-date.

5.1 PHYSICAL DAMAGES INFLICTED DUE TO OPERATION RAH-E-RAST

The launch of Operation Rah-e-Rast resulted in massive destruction. The militancy and military operation caused large scale devastation to physical and social infrastructure, agriculture, tourism sector, health and mainly the education sector with deep physical, mental and psychological implications. The repatriated refugees are still facing immense post war complications.

“Over 400 schools, and almost 8,500 houses, shops and hotels were either partially damaged or completely destroyed during the period of Taliban control as well as during the subsequent fighting between militants and security forces, according to numbers provided by the military Inter-Service Public Relations” (Jan, May 25, 2010) According to survey conducted by PARRSA “almost 8400 houses were either destroyed or damaged in 65 union councils of swat district” (Khaliq, April 7, 2011) F16 fighter jets, Tanks used during the military operation razed the houses, hotels and mosques to the ground.

5.2 EFFECTS ON ENERGY SECTOR

“The energy and power infrastructure also suffered due to the conflict and the estimated cost of the damage reaches up to PKR 300 million, causing severe blow to the local industry, particularly the farming and mining industry of district Swat”. (Bangash, December 2012,) In addition to this large number of industries including silk industry was completely destroyed during militancy period. “Up to 30 factories were completely destroyed during the militancy period. Many were directly hit by the shelling, and then many others were looted.” (AFP, MAR 05, 2014). It is evident from the above figures that war of terror in Swat had cause immense destruction.

5.3 EFFECTS ON THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR

The economy of Swat is highly dependent on its agriculture sector. It is the primary source of livelihood of the people. Roads, bridges and orchards were immensely destroyed due to the operation which disturbed the cycle of fruit production. As a result of which landowners, farmers faced loss of billions of rupees and it negatively impacted the economy of Swat. Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy in April 2009 has estimated the losses to the Swat farming sector due to the crisis. “An area of 153730 hectares is normally brought under cultivation in Swat

including 130369 hectares in cereal crops (like wheat, maize and rice), 12218 hectares for fruit orchards and 11143 hectares for vegetables. Gross output from this area is around PKR 9 billion per annum or PKR. 55,000 per hectare. On the basis of data collected from field, aggregate losses to this sector are around PKR 4 billion per annum or PKR 25000 per hectare. The total impact during 17 months war period from crop production alone is PKR 7914 million” (Bangash, December 2012,) .The environmental impacts of armed conflicts are very immense. They have adverse impacts on ecosystems as in case of Swat, agriculture was not only immensely affected because of the damaged land. But military operations also generated toxic and hazardous wastes which contaminated the water and soil of the area.

5.4 SOCIAL EFFECTS

The war on terror also had deep social effects in Swat. One of the effects of the conflict is radicalization of the society. Many elements including obliviousness and poverty were responsible for the radicalization of society which led to the conflict. One of the major challenges confronted by the authorities after the termination of conflict in Swat was to address this concern. According to Muhammad Amir Rana for the rehabilitation and de-radicalization of those extremists the Pakistan Army launched a comprehensive program in Swat. “The program was initially providing funding of PKR 4.4 million by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The program had three main components: one called Project Sabaoon, which focused on juveniles; Project Mishal, for adult detainees; and Project Sparlay for family members of detained persons. The rehabilitation efforts have been divided into four main modules, including an educational module comprising formal education, especially for juveniles to enable them to continue their education. Another module includes psychological counseling and therapy for developing independent and logical thinking. The social module included social issues and family participation and the fourth module includes vocational training, such as repairing home appliances, etc., to equip the detainees with skills which could enable them to make a decent living.” (Rana, April-june 2011)

5.5 EFFECTS ON HEALTH SECTOR

In addition to this health sector in Swat also suffered due to the conflict. The militants mainly targeted the primary health care programs, like family planning. They prohibited the polio eradication campaigns for children. Many health workers were harassed and also killed by the militants as they regarded these programs not in accordance with the Islamic tenets. These

programs were against their interpretation of Islam. “29 percent of health facilities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been damaged in the conflict between the Taliban and the government forces. Total of 18 health care facilities have been immensely affected during the conflict”. (Mumtaz, et al., 21 March 2012,)

5.6 EFFECTS ON EDUCATION SECTOR

As far as the education sector is concerned, huge numbers of schools were also destroyed which highly affected the progress and development of education system in Swat. Large numbers of students were deprived from education. According to PARRSA a “total of 134 schools were destroyed in Swat, 21 in Upper Dir, 17 in Buner, five in Lower Dir and three in Shangla”. (Anon., OCT 05, 2012) “In this most were girl schools and almost 42% of the boys schools were destroyed by the militants. Out of these schools 190 were government schools and rest were private sector, results of 8,000 female teachers unemployed. It is stated that during the war between the state and non-state actors against terrorism in Swat during 2009, 404 schools were destroyed, either completely flattened or damaged, during the offensive; with the majority being girl’s schools”. (israr & shehryar, n.d.)

5.7 EFFECTS ON TOURISM

Swat because of its fascinating landscapes and rich history is popular destination for the tourist from all around the world. “Tourism the third largest industry to swat economy where half million are indirectly working for earning the livelihood with a number of hotels and restaurants stand with a total of 885 within active worker force of 15000 workers” (ali, et al., November 2012) Tourist sector was immensely damaged during the militancy period. “Taliban bombed PTDC’s Malam Jabba ski-cum-resort and destroyed the 800-metre long chair lift”. (SIRAJ, JANUARY 25, 2012)

The government made several promises to rehabilitate and make the tourist spots accessible, but to-date no such step has been taken to revamp the tourism industry in Swat, which is in a crumbling state.

5.8 DISPLACEMENT OF PEOPLE

The fall of Afghan Taliban government in late 2001 and the ascending parallel violent exercises and the resultant military operations in the tribal regions of Pakistan forced a large number of individuals to leave their homes behind and escape to a safe haven. When the armed forces tackled Mullah Fazalillah in 2009, an enormous mass relocation took place and an expected 3 million individuals were uprooted because of battling between the government and the Taliban in Swat, Buner and Dir areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Somewhere in the range of 90% of IDPs were taken in by receiving families, as per Pashtun convention. The Pakistani government had no sufficient arrangements to take care of this convergence—just a small amount of which had been given temporary haven in camps. As indicated by UNICEF, the dominant part of IDPs – 80% – were children. The IDPs confronted tons of issues while away from their homes causing hundreds of deaths as consequences, and a material loss of more than hundred billions.

5.9 LIFE AS AN IDP

The capital provided immediate assistance for the IDPs who had left everything behind and migrated to much safer parts of Pakistan. This included make-shift tents, food supply, first aid, and other facilities. However, the refugees claimed to have lived a life where the future was very much uncertain, since they were told to leave their homes by being given a very short notice. Living in bulks in the tents provided by UNHCR, at the edge of Swabi, these unrestful people accused the government on being unfair, “For the past two years, the government hasn’t killed the Taliban. They only kill our women and children.” A man said, “They killed us there. Now they are killing us here.” He continued.

Another man, a farmer said, “The UNHCR has been helpful, but so far no government official has come to ask how we are.”

The people in camps complained that they haven’t been officiated or registered, however the closest they came to being registered were, when the tents were being distributed amongst them by the UNHCR.

The IDPs living in these camps, had many immediate fears, but upon inquiry, their foremost fear was that they might never get their land back, and it may be handed over to someone else, or worse, to some other country. They complained that they had been shelled by military helicopters which

still scared their children. All of this lead to a major demand from the IDPs to return to their homes. (PEARSON, June 13th, 2009)

5.10 REPATRIATION OF THE IDPS

Almost a year after the extensive combat, peace was finally restored in Swat valley, which compelled the IDPs especially from Malakand to return home paying little respect to lives and occupations. While some may without a doubt have decided to settle in the facilitating regions, most were prone to hold up until viciousness had finished and recovery had started before returning. Following quite a while of dislodging, numerous were attempting to supplement the pay of the family unit facilitating them and to diminish their own weight, or just to back their arrival. Such people were neither financial transients nor activist sympathizers. Hurrying returns gambled excluding individuals who were naturally suspicious of the military's rehashed cases of having restored peace. The remaining IDPs were portrayed either as monetary vagrants who did not require help, or as terrorists who ought not to get it. Almost 1.5 million of them remained uprooted in adjacent areas in November 2009. This neglected individual vulnerabilities and reasons not to return. By 31 May 2010, the administration wiped out the IDP status of Swat's uprooted populace, as more than 0.6 million IDPs returned home.

5.11 POST-OPERATION SITUATION

The IDPs allegedly came back to discover their homes devastated and while the government may not have provided much incentive for the locals to move out as the greatest incentive for them was to save their and their family's lives, the repatriated refugees certainly needed financial assistance upon returning. They expected the government to assist them in rebuilding their lives, whereas the government or the military had not expected these challenges in advance. They failed to cater the needs of the people immediately, which they had not foreseen before. And although the IDPs were well looked after when they were in camps, the setup of government bureaucracy made sure the people would be trapped and helpless. However, soon after their return, the government announced compensation up to Rs.0.4 million to approximately 8,000 families whose houses had been destroyed. But, due to implementation gaps, the locals complained they never got the

compensation even though the provincial government claimed to have allocated the funds. (Khaliq, April 7, 2011)

The circumstances confronting the repatriated IDPs were troublesome, with genuine security issues, including the vicinity of landmine. People of the beautiful Swat valley lived the first winter after returning in their destroyed homes, being prone to different diseases but were unable to pay for their health facilities, due to lack of money. The repatriated IDPs after having sought nothing from the government, went to lengths of acquiring loans to repair their home. It was evident that people to accuse government of not fulfilling their promises were not less, and only after the non-governmental sector intervention, were these issues to some extent handled. However, the problem was not only the revival of their houses but other socio-economic factors, like livelihood, education, health, food security, gender based violence, child protection, petty crimes as well. (Renno, April 16, 2010)

5.12 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT, ARMY AND OTHER CIVIL SOCIETIES

Safety, repatriation, rehabilitation and restoration of IDPs to their original state and condition was one of the prime responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments, as per their promises made to the IDPs at the time of their movement and evacuation from the operation area of Swat. Hence, the federal and provincial governments (KPK) took several steps and initiated programs for the repatriation and rehabilitation of IDPs of Swat, along with their financial assistance.

In this regard, according to Express Tribune, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) Chief Minister Pervez Khattak stated that “the provincial government had released Rs350 million for the new IDPs, the federal government Rs500 million and the Civil Secretariat, FATA Rs100 million,” by June 2014. Furthermore, to everyone’s surprise, foreign aid was not appealed for by the provincial and federal governments for the support of thousands of IDPs of Swat. However, “a report published by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding in July, 2009, regarding the previous IDP crisis, conservatively estimated the rehabilitation of IDPs to cost billions of dollars.” (Khan, June 20, 2014)

In addition to the role of federal and provincial governments in rehabilitation and repatriation of the IDPs, Army and different NGOs also played a significant role in the repatriation and rehabilitation of the Swat IDPs.

According to a report on the role of Pakistan Army in Development of FATA and Swat, “the Pakistan Army through its presence has done an outstanding job in the rehabilitation in FATA and Swat divisions and organized number of activities and facilities to improve the quality of life of Swat and FATA people.” Furthermore, “Pakistan army cleared the area from the terrorists in the record time of three months. Afterwards it had to resettle the IDPs by helping them in rehabilitation work etc. Pakistan army is still there as civil administration has failed to deliver,” and “is working on various development projects in different sectors in district Swat and FATA including education, tourism, health and sports,” so that the repatriated IDPs are able to continue their lives in a safe and prosperous way. (Naz, August 12, 2012)

On the other hand, the peace festival in 2010 after the kick out of the local militants from Swat valley is one of the signs that army brought peace back to the scenic valley. This successful event proved the triumph of Pakistan Army on war on terror.

5.13 INTERNATIONAL AID FOR THE REPATRIATED

Many world communities, National and International Non-government organizations have played their role in repatriating the Swat IDPs. USA in such situations has always assisted Pakistan. The Secretary of the States, Hillary Clinton announced a “Text Swat” campaign where individuals could text the word ‘SWAT’ to the number ‘20222’ which as a result would donate \$5 US Pakistan Relief Fund to provide medicine, food, education, shelter and many other needs of the effected repatriated refugees. (ISPU, 2015) She said on World Refugee Day, “Supporting refugees is not only the purview of governments and NGOs. It's a job for all of us... the Obama Administration announced more than \$100 million in aid to support the waves of refugees fleeing the fighting with the Taliban in Pakistan's Swat Valley”. (APP, June 21, 2009)


Similarly, UAE took active part in rebuilding infrastructure in Swat and Malakand division with a broad vision to revive the livelihood in the affected areas and create opportunities for youth. The 45 Engineers Division of Pakistan Army with the assistance of UAE, carried out the construction of 53 educational institutions, 7 hospitals and 64 water supply schemes in the affected regions. (Anon., Apr 10, 2014) Moreover, UAE Pakistan Assistant Program (UPAP) has huge impact on the lives of the FATA and other affected areas, for instance, 30,000 students have been enrolled in UPAP schools and millions of the people are supplied with the safe drinking water supplied by UPAP. This again needs the support of the KPK government to maintain the good work of world communities and Pakistan Army.

Apart from Government and financial aid from other countries, many NGOs have been playing their role in resettlement of IDPs. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Pakistan is highly engaged in resettlement of Afghan refugees in Pakistan but generally its goal is to rehabilitate all IDPs. There were many challenges for NGOs to work in FATA and KPK, and the main challenge was of security concerns so, such NGOs needed government to ensure secure environment. The implementing partners of UNHCR-Pakistan were Government Agencies and other NGOs. (UNHCR, 2015)

6 METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research is to analyze the government role in assisting the IDPs of Swat Valley; highlighting the role of implementation gaps and lack of national policies for such a crisis. For this purpose, a theoretical framework is designed, which is inclusive of different dependent and independent variables that need to be tested upon through quantitative and qualitative research methods.

6.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK



The local community of Swat faced major challenges in the evacuation and repatriation process in 2009. Meanwhile, there were no national policies in place for such massive internal displacement and the government showed minimal responsibility. Lack of policies led to hurdles in provision of basic amenities to the IDPs. It in turn affected their social, economic and psychological situation, with decreased opportunities of health and education. Due to deterioration of economic situation, an increase in petty crimes was seen across the city. The minimal role of government is also having a negative impact on the historical and tourist spots in Swat. All these variables are tested through different qualitative and quantitative tools and techniques.

6.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

6.2.1 Population and Sample Size

A mixed method approach is used to collect the data from repatriated families in Swat. The sample size is set to be 37 families, which is inclusive of almost 150 persons. The sample size is taken from representatives in different areas of Swat valley that were affected by the operation, either due to Army postings in the area or the militants occupying the area.

Simple random technique is applied for the data collection, including mostly male representatives of families aged 25 and above. The data is collected in a specific manner from each area, owing to the geographical location of Swat and the scattered sets of affected areas.

6.2.2 Quantitative Data Collection

A primary questionnaire is constructed for the quantitative data collection. The purpose of this questionnaire is to connect the crisis the people of Swat face to date with the minimal role of government in the whole evacuation and repatriation process. The questionnaire helps in identifying the situation of basic amenities (education, health, livelihood, etc.) pre and post

operation. It also helps in chalking out which organization helped the most in the overall process these families went through.

The questions are constructed in such a way that they help map out families that did or did not get relief, houses demolished (fully or partially) and whether they have been funded for reconstruction, and the quality of other basic services. Priority questions are also included in the questionnaire to help address the facilities that are needed on urgent basis in Swat.

Most of the quantitative data has been collected through telephonic interviews, after retrieving the contact information of several beneficiaries from Awaz Foundation, while the rest has been taken in person during the visit to Swat. Snowball sampling has been used to retrieve the contact information of the people that evacuated and repatriated Swat during operation, which essentially involved getting information of the rest of the population from the several beneficiaries of Awaz Foundation. Before proceeding of all questions, consent was taken. (Annex attached)

6.2.3 Qualitative Data Collection

For the qualitative data collection, 9 semi-structured, in-depth interviews are conducted from the officials of various government and non-government organizations involved in evacuation and repatriation process of Swat IDPs. A generic questionnaire is constructed which inquires the role of each organization in assisting the Swat IDPs. The purpose is to analyze the IDPs crisis from organizational perspective, and to identify the loop holes in the performance and coordination of the agencies involved. For this purpose, Director Risk Reduction and Director Risk Management of NDMA, Project Head of food provision (Malakand division) of WFP, ISPR officials, officials from UNHCR, SACH and SRSP, media persons, social mobilizers and officials from ski resort were interviewed.

Focus group discussions were also conducted with the beneficiaries to gain in-depth knowledge about the situation they faced while they were asked to evacuate their homes. The subjective stories of these families were revealed during these focus group discussions, and was helpful in exploring the IDPs' feelings, perceptions and expectation from the different agencies involved. These focus group discussions helped us analyze the provision of basic amenities by each organization, their involvement in the repatriation process and the level of frustration of IDPs towards each of these

organizations. A focus group discussion was also conducted with the Malam Jabba Ski resort employees who got affected by its demolition, which gave a perspective on how tourism is in a vulnerable condition in Swat.

The narrative method is used for analyzing and concluding the qualitative data obtained from interviews and focused group discussions. These stories narrated by all the participants play an essential role in the description and conclusion of the whole analysis. This qualitative analysis helps us to look at the entire crisis situation from the perspective of social mobilizers who played the most important role in catering the influx of IDPs. These stories highlight the mandate of each organization and the difference between their policies and actual service delivery. The analysis also helps us view the hurdles and limitation these organizations faced while catering the IDPs of Swat.

6.2.4 Tools and Techniques

SPSS version 21 is used for the analysis of the quantitative data. To chalk down the links between dependent and independent variables, cross tabulation technique is used. Frequency tables are used to find out the percentage of people responding in positive and negative to the provision of basic amenities, social, economic and psychological rehabilitation of the affected families. This helped us identify what percentage of people thought the government service delivery as efficient and effective, as the frequency table can give a clear statistical result in this regard. The pictorial representation of the responses is provided with the help of bar charts and pie charts.

6.3 RESEARCH MODEL

The research is conducted in different phases and through various methods, i.e; qualitative and quantitative methods. To find out the results, explanatory model is used. Explanatory model is used to find the correlation between two variable X and Y and the cause of the problem is identified on the basis of this correlation and statistical modeling. (Shmueli, 2011) Hypothesis are tested and re-tested through the responses from all the participating actors in this research, including the IDPs, the government, Army and all other non-governmental organizations. The research is conducted in phases, so that firstly the intensity of the crisis is identified, as in the case of quantitative research. We then move to qualitative research, where through several focus group discussions

and interviews, we explored the underlying facts of this crisis. The quantitative research focuses only on the IDP crisis, which is complemented by the qualitative research through interviews with governmental and non-governmental organizations. The model developed a much better understanding of the crisis and all the actors involved in it.

6.4 RESEARCH APPROACH

Babbie asserts that the deductive research approach begins with the construction of hypothesis or general statements and after valid reasoning, conclusion is chalked out on the basis of a theory (Babbie, 2010). The deductive research approach has been used for the entire research, conducted through the construction of three hypothesis and research questions. These hypothesis statements are tested by theory of relative deprivation. The crisis of IDPs of Swat has been analyzed through questionnaires, focus group discussions and interviews and then the findings are tested by this theory to find out the link between the dependent and independent variables of this research.

The theory of relative deprivation explains that every individual has their own desires, which they want to be fulfilled but when a gap exists between their expectations and capabilities, which is when deprivation occurs. The gap between what an individual is rightfully entitled to receive and what he actually receives, maybe due to unjust behavior on the part of government towards one or more groups. (Gurr, 1970) A sense of frustration rises in individuals when they are stripped off of their basic rights and treated unjustly and unfairly. This connects to another theory by Gurr, the frustration- aggression theory. When the society is socially, economically and psychologically deprived, the building frustration comes out as aggression as a resultant force. In the case of Swat, this deprivation lead to increased crimes in the society.

7 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

This section of the research studies the IDP crisis from the lens of the IDPs themselves. Here we have analyzed the vulnerabilities IDPs faced, which agencies supported them the most, inquiries about their house damages and the compensation they got for it. Light has also been shed on the infrastructure situation i.e.; restoring of schools, hospitals, roads, etc. We also look into the economic aspect of the IDP chapter, exploring the livelihood opportunities the IDPs were given. The questionnaire also assesses the security situation and the crime rates situation in Swat after repatriation.

Deterioration of economic, social and psychological situation has been the main trend post-repatriation, which has led to increased crime rate in the Swat Valley. The villages in the periphery of Mingora has been keen targets of government and non-governmental organizations, however the areas more vulnerable, scattered and on a higher altitude, which were hard to access but easier to be kept hostage by the militants, were mostly ignored. Many areas, away from the main periphery did receive no fund whatsoever from the government and had to flee on their own in order to save their lives.

The Army has been a helping hand in evacuating most of the areas, by transferring people to safe sites, but due to lack of time and mismanagement between several organizations, there were cases that were not satisfied with the performance of Army.

7.1 Livelihood

The primary sources of livelihood for the people of Swat are Agriculture and Tourism, which were severely affected by the Operation “Raah –e – Raast” in 2009 and 2010. This section involves the

study and analysis of the income level of the TDPs, effect on their source of income of the Military Operation, and the agencies that supported the TDPs most in the repatriation process and revitalizing their livelihoods.

Statistics

| | | Income level | Disturbance of source of income | Government assistance in revitalizing livelihood | No. of agencies involved in assistance | Most supporting agency |
|---|---------|--------------|---------------------------------|--|--|------------------------|
| N | Valid | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 |
| | Missing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


Level of Income:

Income level

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid 10,000-15,000 | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 24.3 |
| 15,000-20,000 | 8 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 45.9 |
| 20,000-25,000 | 7 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 64.9 |
| 25,000-30,000 | 4 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 75.7 |
| 30,000 & above | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The Frequency Test shows that out of the sample size of 37, majority of the TDPs (and their families) have income level between Rs. 10,000 – 15,000 or Rs. 30,000 & above, 24.3% each out of the 100%, making it 48.6% in total. 21.6% of the respondents that filled the questionnaire claimed to have income level between Rs 15,000 – 20,000, 18.9% respondents have income level between Rs 20,000 – 25,000, and 10.8% earn between Rs 25,000 – 30,000 respectively.

The results may reveal that either the families are relatively poor considering the large number of family members in one household, or sufficiently of middle-income level given the earnings above Rs 30,000. Hence, it can be concluded or generalized from these results that the families with income level between Rs. 10,000 – 15,000 do not yield a large amount of money/income from their occupations, mostly being farmers, taxi drivers, shopkeepers etc.



However, families owning a lot of land and doing plantation over those fields as part of farming and agriculture, earn an adequate amount of income for their families.


Disturbance of source of income

Disturbance of source of income

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 6 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 16.2 |
| | Yes | 31 | 83.8 | 83.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The test results show that 83.8% of respondents (31 families) got their livelihood affected and disturbed due to the Operation and 16.2% respondents did not get their livelihood disturbed by the Operation. Responding to the question during the interview, one respondent narrated:


“I used to work as an electrician and had a shop of electrical appliances before the Operation, but my whole shop was destroyed due to shelling during the operation, but the government did not support me in any way to rebuild my shop or get a new job. So, now I work as a plumber and go to different houses to earn some money for my family.”
 (Interview, April 4th, 2016)



Government assistance in this regard

Government assistance in revitalizing livelihood

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 26 | 70.3 | 70.3 | 70.3 |
| | Yes | 8 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 91.9 |
| | Not applicable | 3 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |



As evident from the pie chart and table, out of the 83.8% respondents that got their livelihood affected due to Operation, majority of them did not get any assistance from the government agencies in its resumption or recommencement in any form. This is visible through the personal narratives of the respondents and locals of Swat, as one of the farmer sadly and disappointedly recounted:

“All of my fields were destroyed during the Operation and for a year and more, my family and all other families of farmers suffered severely because the fruits and vegetables in our fields were not harvested at the right time. So, whatever little we earned from these fields, we were unable to earn any sufficient money and provide food to our families ourselves. However, the people of government did not care for us a bit and no one from the government ever came to us to help us in this regard.”


Such narratives demonstrate the lack of actions taken by the government agencies either at national or provincial level to support the TDPs in revival of their earnings and livelihoods.

Number of agencies involved in assistance

No. of agencies involved in assistance

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | One | 8 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 21.6 |
| | Two | 11 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 51.4 |
| | Three | 17 | 45.9 | 45.9 | 97.3 |
| | Four | 1 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Three agencies including Army, government and International NGOs supported 45.9% of the respondents and their families in the repatriation process, as revealed by the Frequency Test. 29.7% and 21.6% of the respondents were helped by two and one agencies respectively, two agencies being Army and Government and one agency being Pakistan Army, respectively. Most of the respondents claimed support from Army for evacuation and repatriation process but in many cases though, the government did not provide transportation for evacuation and repatriation to the TDPs and hence, many families moved out on their own. However, many families did not move out at all due to shortage of money for arranging the transport for evacuation.



Most supporting agency


Most supporting agency

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Government | 4 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 10.8 |
| Army | 16 | 43.2 | 43.2 | 54.1 |
| Local/National NGO's | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 78.4 |
| International NGO's | 8 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

43.2% of the respondents claimed that Pakistan Army supported them in repatriation process after the Operation ended and security situation was relatively stabilized in the Swat and Malakand region by the Army. Moreover, 24.3% and 21.6% respondents said that Local/National NGOs and International NGOs helped them in the repatriation process, respectively. As per

expectations and to our dismay, only 10.8% respondents (4 families) claimed that provincial or national government supported them in repatriation and rehabilitation process.

The results of the test evidently reveal that the Government failed to support the TDP families in repatriation process, lest making the policies for the proper repatriation and



rehabilitation of the IDPs and implementing them effectively. On the other hand, Pakistan Army, not being solely responsible for the welfare of the public, ensured safe repatriation of the IDP families to their homelands. Along with Pakistan Army, local NGOs and International agencies facilitated the families in repatriation process.

The Government supported the TDPs by providing financial assistance in the form of giving Rs. 25, 000 to the families of the TDPs. In addition to that, Pakistan Army supported the families most by safely evacuating the families and transporting them to different IDP camps in other cities initially and providing them with food, shelter, health and education services in the camps, rebuilding infrastructure (roads, schools, hospitals etc in the Swat region), repatriation and rehabilitation process of the TDPs and by providing financial aid to the families as well. Moreover, the International Organizations like World Food Program, UN-Habitat and UNHCR provided ration/food packages and shelter to the TDPs, and many foreign governments provided financial aid and human resources to help rebuild schools, hospitals, water filtration plants etc in the region with the cooperation of Pakistan Army. Similarly, the local NGOs also helped many IDPs in evacuation and repatriation and provided food and shelter to the families which could not be reached by other agencies. They also took initiatives to build infrastructure like schools, shops, small health clinics etc.

7.2 Finances

Assistance from Agency


| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| Yes | 35 | 94.6 | 94.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

When repatriated IDP's were inquired about assistance from the government during operation, 94.6% of respondents said that they got the assistance while remaining 5.4% didn't get any kind of assistance. They were mainly from Malam Jabba.

One of the respondent from Malam Jabba said;

“We along with our families were trapped in Malam Jabba. For days we were without food and nobody bothered to help us.”

Focus group discussion with IDP's revealed that 48.6% of respondents were given cash, food and shelter. 37.8% of respondents only got food and shelter. 5.4% got cash and food. 2.7% only got cash. 5.4% didn't get any assistance.




Form of Assistance:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Cash, food | 2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| Food, cash, shelter | 18 | 48.6 | 48.6 | 54.1 |
| Shelter, food | 14 | 37.8 | 37.8 | 91.9 |
| Only Cash | 1 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 94.6 |
| None | 2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Government of Pakistan provided monthly cash assistance to repatriated IDP's for one

year with the help of Benazir Income Support Program. Monthly cash aid of Rs20,000 to

30,000 was distributed through United Bank Limited with Benazir card. A total of around Rs. 2.2 Billion were distributed during this period. 56.8% of respondent asserted that they were beneficiary of Benazir Income support program and received monthly cash assistance .43.2% of respondents didn't receive any kind of monthly cash assistance.




Beneficiary of Benazir Income Support Program

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 16 | 43.2 | 43.2 | 43.2 |
| Yes | 21 | 56.8 | 56.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

When inquired about the reason of not getting monthly cash assistance 27% of respondents said that there was fault in registration and 10.8% of respondents said that there was fault in CNIC There were also people who didn't have their CNIC and were not able to get cash assistance.

One of the respondent said that;


“Some agents were demanding Rs.2000 for registration per family but we had no money to pay them.”



Sufficient for family needs

83.8% of respondents believed that aid was not sufficient to their family needs. One of the respondent mentioned;

“Swat operation had adverse impact on our livelihood and the government assistance was not enough to meet our daily basic needs”.



Sufficient for Family Needs

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 31 | 83.8 | 83.8 | 83.8 |
| Yes | 4 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 94.6 |
| Not Applicable | 2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Swat operation took place when crops were ready to harvest and owing to this large amount of crops were damaged. Operation lead to destruction of fields due to which IDP’s lost their mean of livelihood. When repatriated IDP’s were inquired about the rehabilitation of livelihood 89.2 % of respondents were not satisfied by the process of rehabilitation of livelihood.

Satisfaction with Rehabilitation Process of Livelihood

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 33 | 89.2 | 89.2 | 89.2 |
| | Yes | 4 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |



One of the respondent mentioned;

“During operation my fields were completely destroyed and for a year we suffered because the fruits and vegetables in fields didn’t get cut in harvest season, but government didn’t do anything regarding that.

Effects on economic Situation of households

22% of respondents stated that their economic situation of household remained same after repatriation while 15% of respondents felt that their economic situation has become worse after repatriation. Economic situation was deteriorated as their livelihood got affected.

Economic Situation of Household after Repatriation


| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Worse | 15 | 40.5 | 40.5 | 40.5 |
| | Same | 22 | 59.5 | 59.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

One of the respondents mentioned that “During operation my shop was completely destroyed due to shelling, but the government didn’t do anything, now I am a plumber and does work by going to different places as I don’t have a shop.”

One of the taxi driver mentioned:

Tourism spots are not maintained by the government or roads leading to them are not in safe conditions, people don’t go to far

flung areas like Kalam etc anymore and hence his livelihood still remains in a crucial”.



Elements to be improved

3 things to be improved

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Water and Sanitation System, Gas, Health | 11 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 29.7 |
| Water, shelter, Security | 2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 35.1 |
| Water, Education, Health | 24 | 64.9 | 64.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |


Another respondent mentioned:

“People usually cut trees because we don’t have gas which is not only affecting the natural beauty but also causing pollution.”

When IDP’s were inquired about the three things they want to improve in their area,64.9% of respondents stated water/irrigation system, education and health need immediate attention.29.7 % of respondents felt that water/irrigation, gas and health should be improved.

One of the farmer stated:

“During operation irrigation channel was damaged so now we have to go to far off areas to bring water for the fields.”



7.3 Infrastructure


House damages

House Damage

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 11 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 29.7 |
| | Yes | 26 | 70.3 | 70.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The operation in Swat spanned over the whole valley, leaving many buildings in a demolished state by the end of it. The buildings included buildings in residential areas, hospitals, schools, tourist spots, commercial areas and government offices.

After repatriating, many people found their homes in a completely or partially demolished state. Our interviews revealed 70.3% houses being damaged, either fully or partially while only 29.7% repatriated families responded with a negative when asked about any sort of damage to their homes.



Most of the houses were damaged completely during cross fire between the two sides, shelling and bombing around Swat at the time of Operation Rah-e-Rast. But some houses got affected partially, but upon returning the repatriated families found them not suitable to reside in and they had to seek refuge elsewhere once again.

A respondent said, "The Army had stationed tanks beside my house, and due to that huge cracks had appeared in the walls, but I was not compensated for it, as they were only compensating the


people whose houses had completely demolished. The house was not in a condition to live in, so I left my family at a relative's house and repaired it in my own expense before returning.”

A villager said, “Every house lost something. If it was not walls or windowpanes, it was furniture or crockery they lost. When we came back, our houses were raided of any valuable thing that we had left behind. The government only compensated those who had completely demolished homes.”

Extent of Damage

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Fully | 15 | 40.5 | 40.5 | 40.5 |
| | Partially | 11 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 70.3 |
| | Not Applicable | 11 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |


The general trend was to compensate those who had suffered loss of the whole house, otherwise partial damages to houses were not compensated by the government or Army. However, even the compensation for the fully demolished houses was usually not enough. A respondent said, “When we returned, I couldn't believe my eyes to find my house completely demolished. We thought the crisis had ended but after seeing the condition of our house, a whole new crisis overtook us. The government compensated us, but only partially. It was only 1/3 part of the money I actually spent on rebuilding the house.”



However this was the case only in the periphery of main Swat. People from Malam Jabba suffered greatly as their main source of income i.e; the Ski Resort was destroyed by the Taliban, including the houses surrounding it, usually of the lower staff. These were the people that got no compensation whatsoever from the government to rebuild their houses, and most of them still reside in informal settlements.

The citizens usually had to rebuild their houses on their own expenses or leave the location and shifted to a rented house instead. But those too poor to avail any of these options had to continue living in the partially demolished house, even if it were in a dangerous state,

Other odd cases arose as well, as a respondent narrated, “When my family returned, I was delighted to find our house in a good state, however after a few days a government office overtook our house and asked us to move out. We were living in that house for Rs. 600 per month. The new house that we rented costs me Rs. 8000 per month now.”




Financial Compensation

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 17 | 45.9 | 45.9 | 45.9 |
| Yes | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 70.3 |
| Not Applicable | 11 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Form of Compensation

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Cash | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 24.3 |
| | Not Applicable | 28 | 75.7 | 75.7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The form of compensation given, if any, was cash by the government agencies, however it deemed to be not enough for the citizens. This resulted in them being stranded in a crisis state even after the operation had ended. Terrified and vulnerable, the newly repatriated families had to look out for other options, such as temporary camps provided by other agencies, or stay with a host family until their homes were rebuilt.



Sufficiency of Funds for Rebuilding Houses

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 24.3 |
| | Not Applicable | 28 | 75.7 | 75.7 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Most of the respondents live in the same house as their previous house, however, they had to repair it themselves in most cases. If this was not the case, and their house was completely damaged, they had to rent a house or to-date remain in an informal settlement

Current Residence

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Previous House | 26 | 70.3 | 70.3 | 70.3 |
| Rental House | 8 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 91.9 |
| Informal Settlement | 3 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Restoration of Schools and Hospitals


Many respondents said that the schools had been rebuilt by non-governmental organizations. SRSP initiated the semi-permanent school program, in which they put up temporary walls to make a space, so that people could return to schools.

A villager said, “The schools were reconstructed by NGOs, however there was no hospital in the villages, but clinics and dispensaries were available, which haven’t restored up till now, as doctors are still afraid to return.

Reconstruction of Damaged Schools, Hospitals & Govt. Buildings

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 3 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.1 |
| Yes | 5 | 13.5 | 13.5 | 21.6 |
| Partially | 29 | 78.4 | 78.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

However, all schools have not been restored, or even if they have been, the educational level is deteriorating day by day. An educated villager said, “My daughter goes to a faraway school now as the Girls school near our house has not been restored. She was supposed to choose between Science and Arts group last year in her 9th grade, but the school does not have a Science Group, as faculty is not available. Students who have a caliber for Science Group are forced to choose the Arts Group.”




The quality of schools and hospitals have deteriorated over time, roads leading to hospitals are in a terrible condition. Some schools have been restored while others not, and hence people now have to cover a much longer distance in order to send their children to school. A villager said, “My granddaughters had to cease their education, as they had to travel a very long distance to the nearest school.”

Satisfaction with Quality of Reconstruction

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 21 | 56.8 | 56.8 | 56.8 |
| Partially | 13 | 35.1 | 35.1 | 91.9 |
| Not Applicable | 3 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |


The condition of hospitals is much worse. In most villages only a small dispensary is available and usually there is no doctor. People who face unforeseen events have to travel a long distance to get to a proper doctor.



Reconstruction of Damaged Roads & Bridges

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 6 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 16.2 |
| Yes | 1 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 18.9 |
| Partially | 30 | 81.1 | 81.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Main roads that reach up to main Swat have been reconstructed, yet they remain in a poor condition. But the roads to areas away from Swat are still in a terrible condition, e.g.; the road leading to Kalam. A reporter said, “The project for repairing the road to Kalam has been pending since many years. It keeps getting worse every day and is prone to landslides when it rains down heavily. This is also deteriorating the opportunity of tourism for Swat Valley.”



Satisfaction with Quality of Reconstruction

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 30 | 81.1 | 81.1 | 81.1 |
| | Yes | 1 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 83.8 |
| | Partially | 6 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Only a couple of bridges span the whole length of the whole Swat River, which makes it very hard for people to go from one side to another. A villager said, “My fields are on the opposite side of the river to my house. The government officials promised a bridge near our village in 2002, but the project is still pending. I have to travel 15 km every morning to get to them and 15 km in the evening to get back.”

Overall the condition is highly unsatisfactory.

Restoration of Shops & Markets


| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Yes | 7 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 18.9 |
| | Partially | 30 | 81.1 | 81.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Main markets are concentrated in Mingora and the surrounding areas, while moving away from the periphery, markets are seldom found.

Accessibility to the Shops & Markets

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 25 | 67.6 | 67.6 | 67.6 |
| | Yes | 12 | 32.4 | 32.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |


Shops fulfilling essential needs are available in the small towns, however the main markets have failed to emerge post-operation. But even so, work is in progress on them and the markets are made available for the people, and easily accessible.



Restoration of Damaged Irrigation Channels by the Government

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|----------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No (Other agencies helped) | 20 | 54.1 | 54.1 | 54.1 |
| | Yes | 2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 59.5 |
| | Self-funded by Citizens | 15 | 40.5 | 40.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The irrigation channels play an essential role in the lives of citizens of Swat. Agriculture prevails in this land, but the availability of water channels for fields is a huge obstacle. After operation, many non-governmental organizations helped the citizens restore the irrigation channels, so that they could resume their lives and earn for themselves. However, in many cases, the people self-funded to restore irrigation channels in their areas.



The irrigation channels play an essential role in the lives of citizens of Swat. Agriculture prevails in this land, but the availability of water channels for fields is a huge obstacle. After operation, many non-governmental organizations helped the citizens restore the irrigation channels, so that they could resume their lives and earn for themselves. However, in many cases, the people self-funded to restore irrigation channels in their areas.

Satisfaction with Quality of Restoration

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 35 | 94.6 | 94.6 | 94.6 |
| Yes | 2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |


The quality of these irrigation channels is not satisfactory, as no proper planning was done before restoring them and hence usually water shortage becomes an obstacle. A farmer said, “We usually have to do our work at night, as in the morning water is not available. It is dangerous and risky but we don’t have any other option.

7.4 Health

Access to Health Services Prior to Operation

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 3 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.1 |
| Yes | 11 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 37.8 |
| Partially | 23 | 62.2 | 62.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

According to 8.1% respondents there was poor or no access to the health services prior to the operation. These respondents stated that they had no access to proper medical facilities and the available hospitals were very far from their areas and that too were not in a good condition. According to 29.7 % of respondents they had access to health services prior to the operation. These were the people who lived in the areas or near the areas where small dispensaries or hospitals were situated. 62.2% of the respondents stated that they had partial access to the health facilities prior to the operation rah-e-rast.




Access to Health Services After Repatriation

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 16 | 43.2 | 43.2 | 43.2 |
| Yes | 6 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 59.5 |
| Partially | 15 | 40.5 | 40.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

After the operation access to health services were such that hospitals were very far away, about 12-15 km from the surrounding villages of Mingora. Hospital were present in Swat but in far flung areas so people who needed immediate relief due to any unforeseen event had to travel so far to get to a proper treatment. About 43.2% of respondents stated that they had no access to the health facilities after the operation that's mainly because the hospitals were bombarded during the operation and the government did not reconstruct them. About 40.5% respondents said that had partial access to the hospitals after the operation and 16.2% of respondents stated that had

complete access to the hospitals after the operation. The road to eye hospital is in a very bad condition and mostly old people travel on that road for eye checkup and hence suffer a lot.




Satisfaction with Quality of Health Services

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 21 | 56.8 | 56.8 | 56.8 |
| | Yes | 4 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 67.6 |
| | Partially | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 91.9 |
| | Not Applicable | 3 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

A huge chunk of our survey sample were not satisfied with the quality of the health services. These were about 56.8% of the respondents. The road to eye hospital is in a very bad condition and mostly old people travel on that road for eye checkup and hence suffer a lot. A small dispensary is available usually in the villages but doctors are not available, because they are being threatened by some extremists. In the initial months, NGOs helped by providing medical relief but after they backed away, proper doctors are not available due to threats. About 10% of the people responded that they were satisfied with the quality of the health services. About

24.3% of the respondents stated they were partially satisfied with the quality of the health services.




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available usually in the villages but doctors are not available, because they are being threatened by some extremists. In the initial months, NGOs helped by providing medical relief but after they backed away, proper doctors are not available due to threats. About 10% of the people responded that they were satisfied with the quality of the health services. About 24.3% of the respondents stated they were partially satisfied with the quality of the health services.

Accessibility to health services

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid None | 1 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Clinic | 10 | 27.0 | 27.0 | 29.7 |
| Hospital | 1 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 32.4 |
| Dispensary | 22 | 59.5 | 59.5 | 91.9 |
| Traditional healer | 3 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

About 2.7% of the respondents stated that they had no access to the health facilities. 27% of the respondents stated that they had access to small clinics only. 2.7% of the respondents stated that they had access to the hospital services. Little people had access to hospitals because they were situated in far flung areas. 59.5% people stated that they had access to small dispensaries and the rest of the people were dependent on the traditional healers.




Health conditions after repatriation

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|---------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Poor | 8 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 21.6 |
| | Average | 29 | 78.4 | 78.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Most of our survey respondents responded that health conditions after repatriation were average and few responded that the conditions were poor. That's mainly because during the operation sources of freshwater were heavily bombarded too which led to the contamination of the clean drinking water causing new forms of diseases. New forms of water borne diseases were identified and the environment also got very much

affected due to the usage of the nuclear weapons.




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Mental and psychological frustration after repatriation

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 2 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| Yes | 26 | 70.3 | 70.3 | 75.7 |
| partially (recovering with time) | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The operation rah e rast have deeply disturbed the socio-psychological fabric of society. Consequently, the overall atmosphere remains tense. The violence has a direct psychological impact on the people of Pakistan in general and the people living in the conflict zones. Their perpetual acquaintance to violence has created many psychological problems, in some cases in the form of serious mental illness. The dreadful sounds of cannon shelling on militants hideouts by the army remains stark in the minds of people, especially women and children, who are suffering from continuing psychological problems and trauma. Depression, anxiety, nightmares and suicidal tendencies have been cited as some of the common symptoms, often following the loss of a home or a family member. While feelings of insecurity, helplessness, fear and stress are common among displaced children and adults alike, the impact has been all the

more on the mental health of children. A large number of children in Swat witnessed acts of violence by the militants, including the bombing of their schools and the murder of their family members and teachers. Many had developed depression and other psychological conditions and needed counselling.



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Almost 60 per cent of the affected are women and they are suffering from fear, panic and post-traumatic stress. The men, however, mostly suffer from depression. The total number of such psychological patients may actually be much more than 54 per cent, as many people in far flung areas do not have access to medical centers. Our 70.3% respondents claimed that they had undergone frustration and mental disorders after the repatriation process.


7.5 Water and Sanitation

Accessibility to safe drinking water before operation

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 6 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 16.2 |
| | Yes | 10 | 27.0 | 27.0 | 43.2 |
| | Partially | 21 | 56.8 | 56.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |


Due to the operation and insurgencies in the area of Swat, the water and sanitation situation has worsened. Most of the people living in the area lie in poverty line. They have little to no access to proper clean water and sanitation/hygiene in the region. The wellspring of water are funneled water supply, secured and unprotected hand pumps, ensured wells, secured and unprotected springs are/were the most open/accessible and expected wellsprings of water for drinking, washing and domesticated animals. According to the statistics provided by UNICEF almost 16.5% of the functioning drinkable and usable water sources have been

destroyed after the disaster done due to operation against the Taliban in the region.



Accessibility to safe drinking water after repatriation

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 7 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 18.9 |
| Yes | 9 | 24.3 | 24.3 | 43.2 |
| Partially | 21 | 56.8 | 56.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |




According to the survey conducted it is noted that almost 16 percent of the people had no access to clean water before the operation and after the operation the number raised to be almost 19 percent. The people of Swat belong to the lower income level and hence they are more vulnerable to the bad quality of water, as they are unaware of the impacts this water has on their health. It is advised by the doctors to boil water before use, regardless very small number of people is using the filtered, clean water.

Hygienic condition after repatriation process

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|---------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Poor | 11 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 29.7 |
| | Average | 26 | 70.3 | 70.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The water and sanitation facilities in schools and communities were not suitable before the conflict but the quality has worsened in the conflict zone. According to the survey conducted almost 25 percent people claim that the sanitation facility in area has worsened after repatriation while the rest (almost 75 percent) claim sanitation to be average. Results lead to high risk diseases. In the most areas of Swat many households use community or shared washroom facilities and a large number of people use open fields for excretion purposes and due to lack of sanitation facilities people dispose their waste on empty plot near their housing.

The major problem in Swat is the drinking water quality, as the main water supply scheme for area is mostly from a rainy nullah, spring water, wells, tube well etc., having poor water quality; the government should take initiative on providing the basic facility of living i.e. clean drinkable water. Similarly the government should take initiative and make authority like CDA to collect the garbage and dispose them off properly and programs regarding proper hygiene should be initiated.



7.6 Law and Order


Safety of people after Repatriation process

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | No | 25 | 67.6 | 67.6 | 67.6 |
| | Yes | 8 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 89.2 |
| | Partially | 4 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The graph above shows that 67.6% of the local people were not satisfied with the security system. An affected local person said that safety is very important to live a

peaceful life and it is the duty of the state to ensure the safety of citizens but it has been six years, still the repatriated IDPs of Swat face security threats in one way or the other.

Mr. Sherin Zada, reporter of Express News and an affected person himself, doubted the security system and said, “what if army leaves the area, militants can re-enter into the valley if army leaves the area”, he added.



The internal migration of people of Swat is considered as one of the world’s massive displacements. The harsh situations before and during operation mentally and psychologically tortured the local people. They had lost their loved ones during the militancy and then during the operation which still disturb them, even after almost half a decade. The reporter was saddened to recall the situation as he had lost his sister during militancy. In addition to that, there could not be seen any coordination between civilian government and military forces in Swat. Maintenance of law and order is usually considered to be the duty of police but civilian government was inactive in the region.

21% on the other hand agreed that there were safety measures in Swat when they were back. We witnessed the whole Swat valley controlled by army, their check posts located on every few miles and their continuous patrolling all over the area inferred the good security system.

Peace in a locality after Repatriation process

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid No | 12 | 32.4 | 32.4 | 32.4 |
| Yes | 21 | 56.8 | 56.8 | 89.2 |
| Partially | 4 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

32.4% of the people did not agree that there is peace and security in their area while 56.8% responded positively which concludes that most of the people are satisfied with the security system. The presence of army in the area assures the security of the local people. Similarly, we witnessed the locals busy in their normal routine activities such as, the hustle and bustle in markets, children going to schools, women in shopping malls, visitors

enjoying the picturesque valley.



Army upon asking assured the security and peace in the area too. Moreover, the peace festival organized by Pak-Army, Swat Aman Festival and Ski Gala organized by UNDP are gestures of peace and stability in the breath-taking beautiful region. Many NGOs and Foreign governments arranged peace events and engaged with youth to distract people from the trauma and promote the message of peace.

H2: Due to deterioration of economic situation, the crime rates have increased in Swat.

Vulnerability to serious crimes after repatriation


| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Yes | 23 | 62.2 | 62.2 | 62.2 |
| Same situation as before | 14 | 37.8 | 37.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 37 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

The main source of income in Swat is agricultural sector which was devastated during operation. People were forced to use illegal and unethical ways of earning that led to serious crimes. During

our survey, 62.2 percent of the affected people agreed while 37.8 percent said the situation is same as before. The economic situation of people had subsequently deteriorated after they lost their jobs, and hence they had to shift their focus on other ways of earning money, which may have involved engaging in criminal activities.

Similarly, due to the enormous loopholes in the repatriation process, the powerful elite got a chance to use the vulnerable situation of people of Swat for their own benefit. Manipulation of funds from donors and other sources is still prevalent. Many international and local NGOs emerged pretending to work for the betterment of people but that led to “cosmetic work” as used by the media person. Many people and organizations might gain profit through unethical sources.

This outstanding amount of foreign funding may also lead to corruption in Government.



7.7 RESULTS AND FINDINGS

The above analysis clearly indicates that the role of government was minimal in assisting the IDPs, both in evacuation as well as repatriation process. IDPs from Swat have gone through harsh times the moment they were told to evacuate. Walking out of their homes, with only a few valuable belongings, mostly selling off their land at a throw away price so that they could afford to flee, yet not finding any market for it to be sold. The times were desperate but relief was minimal. Taking a leap of faith, and walking into the void, into absolutely uncertain future, unsure of even returning to their homeland, the people of Swat fled as the lives of their families were more precious to them than the love for their homeland.

It was not a voluntary evacuation, but when it came down to survival, the people had no other choice but to flee, but at what cost? The social, economic and psychological situation remains affected to-date – even after more than half a decade of the crisis. The people of Swat suffered mentally and physically, as they lost their loved ones, and many upon returning found their homes

to be partially or fully demolished – which had to be repaired at their own expenses, except for a meager sum provided by the government to those whose houses had completely been demolished. Livelihood opportunities declined post-operation, with every individual carrying their own story. Mostly the people from lower income level, including taxi drivers, shopkeepers, farmers, electricians, etc., suffered the most. Schools and hospitals have partially been restored, but they lack staff and faculty which render the buildings useless. There is no proper health or education facility farther away from the periphery of Mingora, and people have to travel several kilometers to reach a hospital in case of an emergency. The small clinics and dispensaries previously in villages have no proper doctors anymore, as they feel threatened by the militants and are not ready to serve in far off villages.

The prevailing factors have induced a constant sense of frustration the lives of the repatriated families of Swat. They have rebuilt their homes, or are paying a comparatively heavier sum to live in a rented house, but they have carried on with their lives, as an affected person narrated, “It’s been 6 years, we couldn’t wait for the government all these years to come and help us. Shelter is something we couldn’t survive without and so we had to rebuild our homes on our own expense. We had to find jobs, no matter how odd to for the sake of filling our stomachs.”

But lack of proper teachers and education system has led the young generation farther away from schools. The petty crime rates have increased in the area, which if not stopped may have a negative result once again. Due to improper coordination, and lack of justice and fairness system in the local politics, these people are being deprived of what they rightfully deserve. The impact of this situation may have a snowball effect, and the government should intervene before things get to the extreme.

The theory of relative deprivation is proved here which states that, “Relative deprivation is the term... used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence.” (Gurr, 1970)

According to this theory, if the ignorance from governmental organizations continued in the same manner towards the needs of people of Swat, it may give birth to yet another extremist movement in the area. Institutions need to be strengthened in order to stop this derivation from gaining a momentum that may prove to very harsh in the future.

8 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

This section evaluates the analysis of the actual mandate versus the performance delivered by the governmental and non-governmental organizations regarding IDPs crisis of Swat. This analysis looks into the actual implementation by these organizations, addressing the gaps between them.

The data has been collected by referring to the official reports of each organization, as well as the interviews with officials of each organization.

H1: Due to the absence of National Policies for IDPs and implementation gaps, the immediate needs of the repatriated IDPs were not addressed by the government, which lead to social, economic and psychological deterioration.

8.1 UNDERSTANDING OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Disillusionment and frustration among the population builds up when there is a difference between the perceived and actual welfare, given by the state. (Gurr, 1970)

The contextual perspective of the hypothesis regards Relative Deprivation Theory, which states that people take action in order to acquire a social change, which may include wealth, status or any other opportunity. When the people of Swat, evacuated their homeland and spread out all over Khyber Pakthunkhwa, they perceived to be aided by the government. But even in the phase of evacuating, the lack of any form of policies at the time, led to great challenges. The citizens who perceived aid from the government felt inferior and psychologically deteriorated.

In the wake of policies, formulated in the crisis state, taken into action by local and international organizations, along with Army, the IDPs of Swat went through the repatriation process, with minimal assistance from the government agencies. This led to frustration among the population towards the government organizations and a trust deficit.

The hypothesis proposed, suggests that the inefficient service delivery mechanisms in the process of evacuation and repatriation, have led to social, economic and psychological deprivation among the population. Furthermore, a trend of increased crime rates have been seen, which is the result of economic deprivation of families.

Education and Health services especially in the periphery farther away from main Swat have deteriorated after the repatriation process as the security threat still prevails. The role of local Police seems minimal even now, and actors of the Police Department seem completely absent. These trends have led to a trust deficit between the repatriated families and state institutions.

Pakistan is prone to such massive-scale movements, and national level policies are essential to tackle such crisis situations, rather than having to formulate policies in an emergency state.

8.2 ROLE AND MANDATE OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

8.2.1 National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA):

Creation, objectives and functions:

ISLAMABAD, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2010

PART I

Acts, Ordinances, President's Orders and Regulations

SENATE SECRETARIAT

Islamabad, the 11th December, 2010

No. F. 9 (28)/2010-Legis.—The following Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) received the assent of the President on 8th December, 2010 and is hereby published for general information:—

ACT NO. XXIV OF 2010

An Act to provide for the establishment of a National Disaster Management System for Pakistan

WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for an effective national disaster management system and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto;

AND WHEREAS the Provincial Assemblies of Balochistan, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the Punjab have passed resolutions under Article 144 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the effect that *Majlis-e-Shoora* (Parliament) may, by law, regulate the national disaster management system to overcome unforeseen situations:

National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), is the lead agency at the Federal level to deal with whole spectrum of Disaster Management Activities. It is the executive arm of the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC), which has been established under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, as the apex policy making body in the field of Disaster. In the event of a disaster all stakeholders, including Government Ministries/Departments/Organizations, Armed


Forces, INGOs, NGOs, and UN Agencies work through and from part of the NDMA to conduct one window operation. NDMA **aims** to develop sustainable operational capacity and professional competence to undertake the following task:-

- Complete spectrum of disaster risk management at national level.
- Act as Secretariat of the NDMC to facilitate implementation of DRM strategies.
- Map all hazards in the Country and conduct risk analysis on a regular basis.
- Develop guidelines and standards for national and provincial stakeholders regarding their role in disaster risk management.
- Ensure establishment of DM Authorities and Emergency Operations Centers at provincial, district and municipal levels in hazard-prone areas.
- Provide technical assistance to federal ministries, departments and provincial DM authorities for disaster risk management initiatives.
- Organize training and awareness raising activities for capacity development of stakeholders, particularly in hazard-prone areas.
- Collect, analyze process, and disseminate inter-sectoral information required in an all hazards management approach.
- Ensure appropriate regulations are framed to develop disaster response volunteer teams.
- Create requisite environment for participation of media in DRM activities.
- Serve as the lead agency for NGOs to ensure their performance matches accepted international standards, e.g. the SPHERE standards.
- Serve as the lead agency for international cooperation in disaster risk management. This will particular include, information sharing, early warning, surveillance, joint training, and common standards and protocols required for regional and international cooperation.
- Coordinate emergency response of federal government in the event of a national level disaster through the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC).
- Require any government department or agency to make available such men or resources as are available for the purpose of emergency response, rescue and relief. (NDMA, 2016)

Mandate of NDMA

- Act as the implementing, coordinating and monitoring body for disaster management.
- Prepare the National Plan to be approved by the National Commission.
- Implement, co-ordinate and monitor the implementation of the national policy.
- Lay down guidelines for preparing disaster management plans by different Ministries or Departments and the Provincial Authorities.
- Provide necessary technical assistance to the Provincial Governments and the Provincial Authorities for preparing their disaster management plans in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the National Commission.
- Co-ordinate response in the event of any threatening disaster situation or disaster.
- Lay down guidelines for or give directions to the concerned Ministries or Provincial Government and the Provincial Authorities regarding measures to be taken by them in response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster.
- For any specific purpose or for general assistance requisition the services of any person and such person shall be a co-opted member and exercise such power as conferred upon him by the Authority in writing.
- Promote general education and awareness in relation to disaster management.
- Perform such other functions as the NDMC may require it to perform. (NDMA, 2016)

In order to carry out the assigned tasks / functions, NDMA is divided into three wings; Administration & Finance, Disaster Risk Reduction and



Operations which have the following functions to play:-

- **Administration & Finance (A&F) Wing**

- Provide all administration support for NDMA Operations Wing.
- Ordering, procurement, transportation and record keeping of relief goods.
- Management of Human Resources related matters.
- Management / maintenance of NDMA transport vehicles.
- Management all administrative matters.
- All finance and Audit matters.

- **Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Wing**

- Handling all matters related to Disaster Risk Reduction Policies, Risk Insurance, Flood related issues, Disaster Awareness and National Disaster Management Committee (NDMC).
- All matters related to NDMP including implementation, project execution and evaluation.
- Monitoring and evaluation of plans, strategies at National, Provincial, District level as well as civil sector.
- Mainstreaming of Disaster Risk Reduction into development sector.
- Management of International Cooperation, Global Frameworks and regional organizations.
- Coordination with United Nations Agencies, Bilateral / Multilateral Organizations and International Non-Government Organizations (INGOs) / Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

- **Operations Wing**

- Operation of National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC).
- Relief and Rescue Operations (inland and foreign).
- Situation Updates / Briefs.
- Contingency Planning.
- All matters related to Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Teams.

- Briefs / Presentations for Prime Minister, President, Members of Senate & National Assembly and other Dignitaries.
- Coordination of relief efforts with Federal / Provincial Authorities, Armed Forces and Organizations.
- Contingency Plans for full spectrum of disasters faced by Pakistan.

Findings:

In order to assess government's role in the repatriation process of Swat's IDP's we visited NDMA (National disaster management authority). We interviewed a high official of NDMA, who had worked on the project of providing aid to Swat IDPs. The official shared useful piece of information about the repatriation process. Due to the operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat 382950 people were displaced according to NDMA (table attached). Since the start of returns process on 13 July 2009 some 33 percent of the over 2.3 million people verified as IDP's had returned to their places of origin according to the Provincial Governments' Emergency Response Unit (ERU) as of 4th Aug 2009. The five main host districts were: Nowshera, Swabi, Peshawar, Mardan and Charsadda. Relief Camps were setup by NDMA for the IDP's. There were a total of 553,929 IDP's in camps before 1 May 2009 in KPK, who were being looked after in terms of provision of food, healthcare, shelter and education. **(Annex A attached)**

According to NDMA their foremost priority during the repatriation process was to ensure smooth food supply. They collaborated with WFP and supplied food for six months. After six months the food supply program was dismantled. After six months of the initial repatriation phase NDMA issued ATM cards to all the internally displaced families through which each family was given Rs. 25000 monthly. These funds were disbursed with the help of NADRA and UBL. NADRA helped in verifying the CNIC's of the IDP's and prepared the database of the IDP's to facilitate the disbursement process.

However, the official also mentioned about the difficulties NDMA faced while implementing this system of issuing funds. He said initially there was duplication of funds but they immediately

addressed the problem with the help of NADRA which registered the IDP's CNICs. The second major hurdle was that mostly people were illiterate or old they didn't know how to use the ATM cards. According to NDMA's official they provided assistance to such people.

For the provision of NFI's (Non-food items) government requested IOM to assist them as they could not do on their own. 35000 people were given the packages of NFI's by IOM. It was only as of 2010 later on government provided NFI's themselves. According to the official, their relief assistance camps created "Dependency syndrome". The dependency syndrome was that people became heavily dependent on the assistance provided by NDMA and they were not willing to leave the camps. Hence this slowed down the repatriation process. According to NDMA it has provided the relief to the repatriated IDP's successfully and in a proper manner.

When asked of those families that had lost their loved ones, and any form of assistance that might have been given to them (financial or psychological), they refused to accept any deaths that occurred due to the whole operation process.

8.2.2 Pakistan Army

Role, Mission and Objectives of Pakistan Army

Pakistan Army is known to be one of the finest, most professional and well trained Army in the world. Mission, mandate and objectives of Pakistan Army as land forces part of Pakistan Armed Forces, flow from the role assigned to this organization under constitution of Pakistan given in Article 245 which envisages that "the Armed Forces shall, under the directions of the Federal government, defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so". Therefore, the prime duty of defending Pakistan against any external aggression or threat of war lies upon the Armed Forces of Pakistan. (ISPR, 2016)

Mandate of Pakistan Army

Pakistan Army being a land component of Armed Forces is responsible for defending territorial integrity of Pakistan's geographical boundaries, as well thwart any internal threat which may pose risk to existence of the country.

Objectives of Pakistan Army

- a. Defeat any external and internal aggression on Pakistan.
- b. Provide for internal stability of the country by guarding internal front.
- c. Defeat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.
- d. Provide for national integration through representative recruitment system from all the areas of the country and act as a force of national cohesion.
- e. Participate in UN & other multinational operations as per the mandate.

Roles of Pakistan Army

- a. Duties in Aid Of Civil Power: Whenever called upon, act in support of civil power in maintenance of law and order particularly to quell riots and any other such situations which poses threat to life and property of people of Pakistan e.g. performance of duties in Muharram to maintain law and order or Army's operations in Karachi, Baluchistan and other areas of Pakistan against anti-state elements, fifth columnists, target killings, extortion and other organized crime. Conduct of Anti-dacoit operations in Sindh fall in the same realm. Security of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Gawadar port and important installations are all the manifestations of as how Army act in Aid of Civil Power.
- b. Disaster Relief and Management Operations: Being a well-organized force with a rapid reaction capability, Pakistan Army is always the first agency seen committed in helping the people when ever hit by natural calamities and disasters. Pakistan Army played a commendable role in search, rescue, relief and rehabilitation operations during Earthquake of October 2005. Besides this performance of Pakistan Army during numerous flood relief operations particularly cyclone relief operations of Badin and Thatta in 1999 and Flood Relief operation of 2010 and 2011 have been widely hailed.

- c. Nation Building Projects: Through its organizations like National Logistic Cooperation (NLC) and Frontier Works Organization(FWO), Pakistan Army have undertaken several developmental projects of national importance to include construction of dams (Kanpur Dam), motorways and highways including major part of CPEC in Baluchistan , and large scale logistic operations.

Participation in UN Military Operations and Other Multinational Assignments

Since 1960's Pakistan Army has contributed in almost all UN Military Operations all over the world and in the process laying several lives in call of duty. As of present over 10,000 troops of Pakistan Army are deployed in major UN Military Missions which include D R Congo, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor Haiti and Sierra Leone etc. Similarly, our troops were also invited for the protection of the Holy places and the government of UAE, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Jordan and other for training of their Armed Forces. Pakistan Army has also conducted disaster relief operations in several countries to include Tsunami Operations, China, Ache & Nepal earth quake operations etc. Pakistan Army's participation in UN Military Operations and its involvement in other multinational operations has been widely hailed by world community and it remains a great source of our diplomatic maneuvering and image building of the country. (ISPR, 2016)

War on Terrorism

Pakistan is the only front line state in the Global effort of War against Terrorism. Post 9/11, Pakistan remains in the eye of hail storm suffering the loss of over 50,000 human lives and estimated economical loss of over US\$ 100 billion. Pakistan Army, while remaining in fore front of effort has laid over 5000 lives in its war against terrorism. Under the leadership of General Raheel Sharif, valiant sons of Pakistan Army through their super human acts of valor and bravery have ensured that terrorists find no place to hide in our holy land. Operation Zarb e Azab being led by Pakistan Army and launched as a consequence to brutal terrorist act on Army Public School Peshawar on 16 December 2014 is manifestation of resolve of Pakistan Army to root out terrorism from the country. Operation Zarb e Azab is indicative of their resolve and commitment in protecting the future generations. This operation has significantly contributed towards enhanced confidence level of world community setting example as how to conduct war against terrorism. Pakistan Army's support to Sri Lanka in defeating Tamil Tigers has also been well recognized. As

of today Pakistan Army is helping many organizations in the country and abroad in their capacity building for conduct of effective security and law enforcement operations.

Developmental Activities in FATA

As a part of national effort, Pakistan Army is in the process of executing several infrastructure developmental projects in FATA which include construction of road networks, houses, schools, health centers, water schemes and markets etc. This effort will help in integration of FATA people in main stream Pakistan besides denying terrorists the sanctuaries and conditions conducive to their operations.

Rehabilitation of IDPs in Swat & FATA

Pakistan Army as part of their plan has played a significant role in rehabilitation of IDPs of Swat & FATA. This included safe exodus of people from troubled regions, their respectable living in camps, and provision of amenities, health care and education. Pakistan Army is ensuring that IDPs are rehabilitated in their original areas with honor and respect as soon as possible.

Organization to fulfill Roles

Pakistan Army is organized in a vertical manner fully integrated at all levels. Led by Chief of army Staff and assisted by several Principal Staff Officers at General Headquarters, command in the field is asserted through Corps and Divisions with their support elements. Pakistan Army is an all-time fully alert organization equipped with most modern weapons and equipment with robust intellectual strength of leaders. Imbued with high spirit of valor and sacrifice, each individual of Pakistan Army is fully motivated to defend the country against external and internal threats. Pakistan Army's conventional capability is backed up by strategic capability based on minimum nuclear deterrence while retaining the option of First Strike Capability.

Pakistan Army is pride of Pakistani nation as it provides for the security and integration of the country. They are the valiant sons of Pakistan army who always keep ready to sacrifice their today for our secure tomorrow. Known for its professionalism, high organizational standards and readiness to respond to all kinds of threats, may that be from enemies or in the event of natural calamities, Pakistan Army is equally regarded by its friends and foes.

Role of Pakistan Army in the Repatriation Process of Swat TDPs

As mentioned above, Pakistan Army has been actively involved in addressing all types of challenges, natural or man-made disasters in all the parts of the country. Similarly, during and after the military operation, “Operation Raah-e-Raast” in 2009, the Pakistan Army played a critical role in the rehabilitation and repatriation process of the IDPs of the region.

The subsequent evacuation and repatriation of the IDPs, as a result of the Operation Raah-e-Raast (2009-2010) in Swat and Malakand region, was one of the most successful programs/operations ever conducted by Pakistan Army in the history of Pakistan, and even in the whole world, according to the sources from Pakistan Army.

“It was a mass exodus of people at that time, as almost 2.5 million people were relocated, which mostly included innocent children and people”, said Public Relations Officer (PRO) Swat. A committee was made by Army which was responsible for making lists of IDPs and providing them with full security, lists of all the IDPs were properly made by the troops of Army in the region at that time; the camps were properly demarcated for security purposes, small dispensaries and hospitals were established and for children of the IDP families residing in the camps, small schools were built as well.

The Army personnel first visited each and every single house of the locals in the Operation region for their evacuation and verified all the affectees with the collaboration of the Union Councils, Tehsil governments and DCOs etc.

Many families arranged their own transportation for evacuation at the time of Operation, as the government of KPK provided them with very limited means of transportation. However, besides their personal arrangements, Army provided the IDP families with the transportation for evacuation from and repatriation to the region, too.

Furthermore, the PRO Malakand claimed that “99 percent of the efforts, for the repatriation of the IDPs and the reconstruction of infrastructure, houses, schools and markets etc, were made by the Pakistan Army along with the support of other international and national civil organizations.”

Even though it is not the mandate of the Army to provide all the goods and services and funds to the public for rehabilitation and repatriation process, however, 11 Corps arranged ration packages

for the IDPs and distributed among them in the camps. In addition to that, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and other international donor agencies released funds for the IDPs, but Army managed those funds and tried to ensure that the funds are not mismanaged and misplaced and received by the most affected families in the process, and maintained checks and balances in this regard.

Also, there was a budget specifically allotted for the IDP families by the Army (11 Corps), and after full ground check and proper damage assessment of the houses of the locals, funds were distributed among the affected people. “Rs.0.1 million was given to families who suffered serious injuries and Rs.0.3 million were given to those families whose family members died in the process,” claimed PRO Swat.

Immediately after the evacuation of IDPs and their settlement in the camps, Army’s main priority was to provide them with ration and food, packages arranged and distributed by themselves and through the support of international NGOs (WFP etc). Then, their second priority was to provide the IDPs with shelter in form of IDP camps that were established in Swabi, Mardan, Attock and other closer cities where there were no security threats and IDPs could be taken full care of. After repatriation, funds were provided to the IDPs to get their homes and damaged shops etc reconstructed. In fact, every action by Army was taken side by side to ensure the effectiveness of the repatriation program of the IDPs.

Additionally, according to PRO Malakand, “Army launched Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) with the cooperation of international organizations, built small schools and workshops with the help of UAE and Qatar governments, and European Union gave funds to rebuild filtration plants in the Swat and Malakand region,” damaged during the Operation either by the bombings and firing of terrorists or by Army.

Limitations:

Though the programs launched by the Army for repatriation and rehabilitation of the IDPs, and reconstruction in the region were relatively very effective, there were lots of hindrances faced by the Army troops in delivering the funds and services to the affectees. Initially, many residents were resistant towards moving out and leaving their assets behind, in the fear that local government, Taliban or others may acquire and sell their land and assets to other parties. So, to reduce the

casualties in the Operation, Army troops had to evacuate many residents forcefully. Afterwards, given our societal trends, the local residents of the Swat and Malakand region claimed more damage to their property or land and families, to get more funds by the army or the government, than they deserved. This act by the locals made it difficult for the Army to appropriately verify the damages, unless they visited the locations themselves, and provide the funds accordingly to the families. It also constrained the budget specified for the IDPs by the Army, and resultantly, many IDPs in the far flung, more affected areas did not receive funds and other supplies as much as they deserved.

Moreover, the local residents started making approaches to higher officials in the government or other agencies for funds and supplies, which they did not deserve at all. In this way, many severely affected and poor families remained neglected or got financial and physical support from the Army after a very long time.

Also, there was accessibility issue to some seriously damaged areas as there were no proper roads linking to those villages, or the roads were damaged during the operation. Hence, it took more than usual time for the Army troops to reach the affected people in those areas and provide them with sufficient supplies and funds.

8.2.3 UNHCR PAKISTAN:

United Nations Higher Commissioner for refugees in Pakistan is involved in providing refugees and asylum seekers basic necessities, and helps them in the repatriation process. Moreover, the organization also assists the repatriation process of internally displaced people, specifically in the North-West of the country. (UNHCR, 2016)

Objectives regarding IDPs:

UNHCR, in collaboration with the government, helps the displaced people by providing services and assistance. (UNHCR, 2016)

- Registration of newly displaced people immediately and the returning population as well (With the help of their project; SACH)
- Provision of tents and the setting up of tents, where required

- Provision of immediate relief to the newly displaced
- Provision and maintenance of basic necessities in cooperation with other humanitarian organizations
- Assistance in return shelter and transportation.

Three clusters lead by UNHCR for the internally displaced people :

- Camp Coordination and Camp management cluster
- Emergency Shelter Cluster
- Protection Cluster

UNHCR and the repatriation of Swat IDPs:

Up to 3 million people were reportedly displaced from the Swat valley due to Operation Raah-e-Rast, and the displacement was termed as the largest of its kind in the recent times. UNHCR, in collaboration with the government, International donors and other humanitarian actors, assisted the IDPs of Swat in settlement of camps, and provided immediate relief items.

The IDPs fleeing the fighting were immediately catered to by provision of 120 tons of relief supply for immediate distribution among them. It was a high-scale sudden disaster, which needed very quick response and UNHCR did not fail to fulfill its objectives.

The government of Pakistan made an official solicitation to the UN Office and other international organizations in Pakistan to help the government in assisting the IDPs of this crisis. The Humanitarian country Group agreed to the government's solicitation and a preliminary response plan was initiated, after which the assisting organizations team up to accompany the government on this specific issue.

After closing the chapter of immediate relief, the organization shifted its focus onto other major issues, such as the arrangement of shelter for the IDPs in the months of scorching heat. Arrangements were made for mosquito nets, plastic sheets for emergency shelter and plastic rolls for walls and privacy screens. Items including kitchen essentials, buckets, floor mats, jerry cans, quilts and blankets were also among the sheltering. The stock was shifted to Peshawar warehouse via trucks and then distributed all over the province where the camps for IDPs were set up.

Within a span of few days, up to 0.5 million IDPs were registered with UNHCR authorities, out of which 0.4 million chose to stay with relatives, friends or host families. The local communities played a huge role in sheltering IDPs as they opened their doors to the fleeing community. Among the initially registered, only up to 0.1 million IDPs, chose to stay in camps.

Settlement sites kept springing up all over the province as each day hordes of incoming people got registered. Camps were set up in schools, parks, flour mills and private land, etc, in areas all over the KPK, such as Mardan, Swabi, Kohat and Charsadda, etc. Moreover, over 6500 families and 39000 individuals were registered in Rawalpindi, and 541 families and 3642 individuals were registered in Attock.

In an interview with UNHCR official, it was revealed;

“The crisis was very sudden and immediate relief had to be given, without any delay. Our authorities in the specified areas came together and within a span of a couple of days, the plans had to be seen in action, however some problems were faced in the initial registration, which is due to lack of administrative authorities and checks and balances in the Swat Valley. The government needs to enhance its strategy regarding IDPs, so that in the future, such problems do not occur in a crisis state.”

UNHCR in collaboration of many different actors had a quick response for the settlement process of Swat IDPs; however a few shortcomings proved to be very crucial in such an emergency state. The foremost issue arose during the registration of IDPs. Female headed families or families from the lower class faced problems in the registration process due to the absence of Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs). Many families also didn't have record in the national database. These problems had to be readily resolved but due to the rigid processes of bureaucracy, the waiting line only got longer. Those families that failed to register also faced problems in getting relief, as being registered was mandatory for getting aids from the agencies.

UNHCR utilized its Cluster response planning for arrangement purposes, which is on the basis of having 6 members in each family, but this also created crucial situation due to joint-family systems or having large households.

All these issues, however, were forwarded to the Grievances Desk, whose chapter also had problems of their own. More than half of the percentage of issues arriving at the Grievances Desk proved to be invalid.

UNHCR urges the government to set up SOPs for the internally displaced persons, which can match the international benchmarks while keeping in mind the traditional and cultural context of each area in Pakistan. The conclusive effort will help international organizations to deliver their services in a more efficient manner.

UNHCR made sure that all returns to Swat after the curfew eased were voluntary and no one was forced to be moved back to their homes. Where many were glad to return to their soil, there were families who still had insecurities.

“Concerned fathers of younger children hesitated to move back to Swat until they were completely sure of peace having returned to their land,” said an official.

The UNHCR helped in assisting IDPs in transportation so that they could move back with ease, and not face the same problems again as they did when they were being moved out of Swat.

However, transportation was not the only problem faced by this vulnerable community. Most returned to completely or partially demolished homes, or being looted of their furniture, which added to their list of worries. Along with economic pressures, many were traumatized by the security situation even after things seemed to move to a much peaceful environment. Having lost their relatives or loved ones, these included mostly women and children. For the purpose of helping them, UNHCR set up welfare centers in multiple parts of Swat, and a renowned psychologist, Laila Shahnaz, was allotted in most of them to help the traumatized people by counseling and psych-social support. This was an initiative by the UNHCR to help the returnees recover from their ordeal.

Mental illnesses and psychological problems became prevalent after people returned to Swat. Children feared to resume schools and mothers feared sending them. Returning home had been done, but to return to normal way of living was far from reach. Hence UNHCR initiated these welfare centers so that those who had lost their loved one, or faced economic pressures, or children especially girls who feared resuming schools would get help.

Functioning of UNHCR:

“Besides the limitation of absence of CNICs and the problems it lead to, the major limitation for international agencies to work on such projects is security. The environment in which we have to operate is more often than not, not secure and some incidents occurred in which our officials had to face problems regarding security,” and official commented.

The government of Pakistan needs to enhance its relationship with the international organizations operating within their boundaries. There should be less rigidity regarding the issuing of No Objections Certificates (NOCs), and more collaboration of government departments and ministries with humanitarian organizations. The government should work towards bridging the gap between themselves and aiding agencies, so that communication can flow smoothly and conveniently. In this manner, the solutions chalked out would be feasible in countering the IDPs crisis.

Collaboration of all the stakeholders is the key to achieving synchronization in delivering services to those in immediate need in a crisis situation, and UNHCR should build and strengthen synergies with other organizations for the provision and maintenance of their objectives

8.2.4 SACH – STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE:

Established in 1994, SACH is non-governmental and non-profitable organization. The team of professionals work toward rehabilitation of survivors of organized torture and violence. Without discrimination, the organization uses a holistic approach and works towards the entire well-being of the survivors. (SACH, 2016)

Objectives of Sach:

- Help eliminate all forms of institutionalized Human Rights Abuses
- Help raise consciousness against violent activities and inhuman punishments
- Review policies of institutionalized Human Rights Abuses made by the government and make recommendations

- Conduct trainings, seminars and public meetings to spread awareness to work with victims of torture
- Coordinate and collaborate with other human rights groups

Sach's assistance to the Swat IDPs:

Sach contributed in the registration of millions of IDPs, fulfilling government request. UNHCR being the protection, camp management and shelter provision organization was initially assigned the task of registration. Sach being the implementing agency of UNHCR, assisted in registering in various parts of Rawalpindi and Attock. Pre-mapping approach was used for this purpose, which was pre-requisite for the registration of these IDPs and proved crucial in management of the crisis.

The objectives of this pre-mapping exercise were:

- Collect baseline information
- Identifying IDP concentration areas
- Overviewing the situation of living and needs of IDPs

Identification of families living with host families and/or relatives was the basic aim of this program. The IDPs arriving from Swat were indistinguishable in terms of family background, family size as well as whether they preferred to stay with relatives or self-rented houses.

“This was a project that needed immediate attention. Quick response strategy was used and within 3 days the implementation phase started,” an official reported during interview.

The activity was communicated with government officials to span a wider area, achieve population fixing as well as an overall review of the background of these IDPs.

The pre-mapping activity helped collect data of 6500 families, comprising of 39000 individuals in Rawalpindi, while 541 families comprising of 3642 individuals in Attock.

Sach issues identification cards to these families for better means of identification and relief provision.

Functioning:

The registration was carried out using the organization's expertise in the field. Using both door-to-door, and a proper set-up of registration points approach, the team that came together for this

purpose had the right linguistic knowledge i.e; Pashto and technical expertise, and in addition were proficient in field work as well. Besides the vocational team members, volunteers from different universities were summoned, who had the right linguistic knowledge.

The team members recorded detailed information of each person, processed their thumbprints, identifying their vulnerabilities, such as health status, educational background, etc.

These forms were on the behalf of SAFRON and provided by UNHCR. A copy of the form was given to the IDP, one was kept in Sach records and one was forwarded to UNHCR.

Out of 53558 people, 9978 cases were verified and cards were issued, 3336 cases were inactive, 7 missing, while 37 cases were pending with UNHCR. 44 cases refused to take the cards.

NFIs distribution:

Sach also assisted UNHCR in receiving and distributing the non-food item kits. These were packaged by SRSP and then sent to Sach. They immediately dispatched them according to the lists provided by UNHCR, through sending mobile teams.

“2433 kits were distributed in Attock, while our team distributed 4825 NFI kits in Rawapindi,” an official said in an interview.

Sach operated as an implementing agency for UNHCR, and was provided funding and prepared kits by partnering organizations. The biggest imitation they faced in their operations was security issue.

“Certain cases of security threats occurred in the areas we tried to operate, especially Attock. We had to coordinate with police on daily basis to keep the threats at minimal,” commented an official during interview.

With adequate cooperation from partnering organizations, the government officials and police, the implementation process was made easier. Sach suggests that the government should review their policies of internally displaced people and bring them with par to the international standards so that in a crisis state, policy formulation is not a requirement, rather more work is done towards the implementation.

8.2.5 Sarhad Rural Support Program (SRSP):

SRSP is part of the Rural Support Programs initiated by United Nations Environment Program in 1989. It is the largest Non-Governmental Organization working in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The main purpose of SRSP is to the community and work toward social and economic development. It aims to develop social mobilization, capacity and infrastructure building, gender development, humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution.

Objectives regarding IDPs:

SRSP aims toward economic and social development of the community, providing financial services to enhance social mobility and improve livelihood. However, assisting UNHCR, SRSP emerged as the largest implementing partner, and reached out to the IDPs of Swat Operation in 2009, being significant in the following areas:

- Provision of humanitarian assistance and leveraging of resources in the disaster affected areas
- Helped rebuild the demolished infrastructure
- Set up Basic Health Units (BHUs)

Assistance of IDPs of Swat:

SRSP partnered with UNHCR to provide Non-food Items (NFIs) to more 23,915 families which involved 156,490 IDPs. The distribution was made to the areas where IDPs camps had been set up, i.e.; Swabi, Mardan, Kohat, etc.

Besides the provision of non-food Items, SRSP assisted UNHCR in setting up Transit Facilitation Centers (TFCs), which were reception points that facilitated the transition of IDPs from conflict areas to the camping settlements.

The function of these TFCs involved the following:

- Provision of free transport facilities for IDPs to their host communities, camping settlements or the schools allotted for the IDPs to settle into.
- Waiting sheds with basic facilities (refreshments, electric fans, etc.)

- Information regarding Extended Distribution points set up by the UN, registration points set up in each district, addresses of the available BHUs, information regarding the settlement facilities and concerned persons contact information were made available at these TFCs.

“Our team set up waiting sheds made out of bamboos, privacy screens and tents shades immediately as advised by the WFP and provided by UNHCR. These structures had to be set up in numerous amounts and then stocked up with basic facilities, and had to be done in a very short span of time. Sometimes we felt more like labourers than Engineers, and had to work in the scorching heat in the month of Ramadhan, but we were determined and motivated to help our unfortunate fellows” A senior Engineer said in an interview.

In addition to these reception points, SRSP in collaboration with UNHCR also set up a Humanitarian Response Center to facilitate all the donors, fund-raisers and philanthropists, etc. These centers were set up for the purpose of providing capacity to the efforts of all individuals, donors, charities and philanthropists, and to provide them an adequate point of gaining information about any immediate needs, that had to be addressed.

SRSP assisted other donor organization in the repatriation and post repatriation process as well. The organization involved in activities of reconstruction of schools and other buildings. Semi-permanent schools were set-up until fully constructed schools could be made available again.

An official said, “There was a lot of reluctance to semi-permanent schools. People wanted fully reconstructed building before they could return to school, but once they were set up; there was a lot of appreciation for it.”

The schools were immediately set up, as pre-fabricated structure was used in building them. The SRSP engineers designed and implemented the plans. The local community, thriving to go back to normal life, helped tremendously in these projects.

SRSP’s Humanitarian Program section worked closely with the community, and facilitated them in every way possible, making the IDPs feel at home, which was very hard as they had gone through such traumatic experience. It was also not easy to coordinate with all the donor organizations and government, keeping security situations in mind as well. But SRSP reported

that, with determination and hard work, their team made it possible. The communication that flowed during this IDP crisis was the most convenient seen in the organization's history.

“We wanted the IDPs to be satisfied and return to their homes safe and sound. They had already been through a lot, and we tried our best, so that when they returned home they wouldn't feel like the world didn't stand beside them in their time of trials and tribulations,” said an official.

SRSP also initiated the program “Cash for Work”, which encouraged the repatriated families to participate in rebuilding their lives. This initiative proved very successful as everyone who participated, worked towards a positive change in their vicinity and got compensated for it as well, giving them both economic and moral support.

8.2.6 WFP (WORLD FOOD PROGRAM)

WFP is the world largest humanitarian agency fighting global hunger. It is the food assistance branch of United Nations system which addresses and promotes food security which is defined as access of all people at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. WFP recommends policies, strategies and operations that directly benefit the poor and hungry. It partners with other United Nations agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society and the private sector to enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food needs. Main mandate of WFP is to provide food assistance to most vulnerable and poor people and use food aid to support economic and social development. They play active role in meeting the IDP's and other emergency food needs, and the associated logistics support; and also promote world food security in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and Food and Agriculture organization (FAO). They provide assistance in improving the nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives; and also help to build assets and promote the self-reliance of poor people and communities, particularly through labor-intensive works programs. (WFP, 2016)

Strategic objectives

WFP's Strategic Plan for 2014-2017 provides the framework for WFP's operations and its role in achieving a world with zero hunger.

1. Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies;
2. Support food security and nutrition and (re)build livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies;
3. Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs;
4. Reduce under nutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger.

Coordination

WFP has been working closely with Government at both federal and provincial level, UN agencies, NGO's and donors to provide food assistance in the country. WFP also coordinates with the Ministry of National Food Security and Research on achieving the "Right to Food" for all Pakistanis. WFP ensures that its strategies are designed and implemented in accordance with the national priorities supporting food and nutrition security as well as enhance national disaster preparedness and response. WFP continues to collaborate closely with the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR, National disaster management authority (NDMA) and other relevant agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the response to emergencies and humanitarian crises. (WFP, 2016)

Role of WFP in Swat Operation

WFP provides assistance in enhancing food security and nutrition amongst vulnerable populations and provides technical support in developing relevant national strategies. During the operation in Swat, as per the government policy, initially government provided cooked food to the IDP'S and it took help from International food agencies like WFP. WFP worked closely with UN partners, NDMA, and civil military liaison in providing the food aid to the IDPS. Data was mainly collected by the UNHCR and NDMA and then food was distributed through online verification process. WFP did rapid assessment and distributed the food within 24 hours.

During the interview the official of WFP mentioned that, "For swat operation WFP budget was one billion dollar and didn't receive any kind of funding from the government. Later on, the Government of Pakistan has donated 150,000 metric tons of wheat to WFP in 2013. Valued at

US\$52 million (PKR 5.5 billion), this contribution placed Pakistan as WFP's second largest donor in the country in 2013 (Pakistan ranked the 20th largest donor to WFP globally in 2012)."

During the operation, about 20 humanitarian hubs were established inside Malakand division. 15 WFP hubs were established in Swat. Online verification database system was used for food distribution which helped in eliminating duplication.

According to the official of WFP Peshawar, it was revealed that; "More than 3 million IDPS were assisted with 537,278 MTS. A total of 93% of food was distributed through online verification process. 173,057 families were assisted from Swat district. 149,015 MT food was distributed among Swat IDP's."

Official also mentioned in the interview that; "During the Swat operation, WFP main priority was to provide food, shelter and livelihood to IDP's and reduces **under nutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger.**"

WFP formed partnership with number of cooperating partners like CERD, PEACE and Hujra for distribution of the food. WFP also launched different nutrition programs like education school feeding program in order to promote sustainability and food security. Beneficiary feedback Banners were displayed at all hubs including Swat in order to get feedback of IDP's so that they can improve their performance and address the IDP's needs in more effective manner. Grievances desk were established at all the hubs to get to know about the concern of IDP's. These desks were setup for people with complaints regarding registration in hubs. Protection clusters were responsible for addressing the complaints of IDP's. According to official, 30% valid and 70% invalid complaints came under notice of WFP and proper action was taken for the valid complaints. 2000 cases were resolved out of 3000. According to WFP there were no quality issues. Basic calorie intake of normal person is 2100 calories and food basket was equivalent to it. Food baskets consisted of basic food necessities along with high energy biscuits and oil. Later on there was also revision in food basket due to resource constraints. All the repatriated families were phased out after six months of food package provision. They were given six months food assistance after repatriation so that they can get back to normal life. In 2009, Government did the announcement of return of IDP's and by mid of 2010 there was the end of food package. WFP Peshawar was given best office award by the government as they successfully distributed the food to IDP's.

Limitations

WFP faced number of limitation during the operation. They faced volatile security situation.

During the interview official narrated; “There was a bomb blast in jalozai camp which killed 17 people including the WFP workers. As a result of which WFP had to suspend the food distribution.”

Issuance of No objection certificates (NOC) is the biggest problem for WFP. NOC’s are required for launching new projects and issued by PDMA and FDMA. So during operation one of the limitations that WFP faced was issuance of NOC’s. Another challenge for WFP was that beneficiaries used to sell the food in market along with this there were also access problems. Large number of people was affected and biggest challenge was the access to these people. Only limited staff was available for the distribution of food.

8.2.7 SOCIAL MOBILIZERS

Social mobilizers are concerned with improving social conditions, delivering needed services, and strengthening community participation on volunteer basis. To do this successfully, they need to have a clear understanding of their role *vis à vis* the people they are attempting to organize.

Social mobilization in UNICEF is a process that engages and motivates a wide range of partners and allies at national and local levels to raise awareness of and demand for a particular development objective through dialogue. Members of institutions, community networks, civic and religious groups and others work in a coordinated way to reach specific groups of people for dialogue with planned messages. In other words, social mobilization seeks to facilitate change through a range of players engaged in interrelated and complementary efforts. (UNICEF, 2016)

Objectives

The main objective of the social mobilizers was to provide assistance to the local people on immediate basis, when they fled their homes. Mostly the social mobilizers were stationed in the outskirts of Swat Valley such as Thana, where they were safe from the wrath of operation. These

social mobilizers took immediate action and with consensus in the community raised funds and used empty buildings such as schools, for the people to stay in. Steps were taken to create sense of belonging, which helped the people in psychological terms as well.

Working mechanism

The social mobilizers of the Swat region used to work on the basis of self service. For the proper functioning of the tasks and for providing basic necessities, the local people who had the means to provide funds in form of money, gold, accommodation, food, clothing, etc. came forward to help. Funds were raised to assist the affected people. They were provided with day-to-day necessities, such as shelter, food and clothes.

The Government school for Girls (Thana) was allotted to women and children for temporary residence, while Government School for Boys (Thana) was allotted to men. The social mobilizers made different departments (transportation, food, clothing, registration, etc.) for helping the IDPs in an organized manner.

Role of social mobilizer in assisting IDPs of Swat

Two social mobilizers, a male and a female, were interviewed. These social mobilizers were belonged to Thana, which is at the outskirts of Swat Valley and fortunately was comparatively safer from other areas. The local community of this area played a vital role in assisting the influx of people from Swat. These social mobilizers assisted them with basic amenities like transportation, food, clothing, etc. They even catered their recreational needs in order for them to feel home in their temporary homes.

“We used to make hairstyles and apply henna on young girls’ hands, so that they would feel at home, and not missed their loved ones,” said the female social mobilizer.

The first step, after the influx began was to come together and raise funds. Fund raising was assisted by the elite of the area, and anything the rest of the community could afford to contribute. In the midst of Army mishandling cases, these social mobilizers proved as a safe haven for the IDPs.

One of the social mobilizer narrated, “The elderly fellows of our community were mishandled by Army, as they could not walk faster or cross streams without bridges. In many cases, the elderly felt abused when they were forced to move faster.”

During harsh times, a little kindness and affection is more than enough, which was what the governmental and non-governmental organizations could not provide, and the local community had to intervene. They welcomed the IDPs as their own family and with open arms, let them share their homes or stay in their barns. These social mobilizers and dozens of volunteers working with them spent most part of their days catering these IDPs, so that they would not feel alienated.

“The crisis was very sudden, meaning that many plans of daily lives were disturbed, including marriages. We organized 10 weddings, which proved to be a distraction from the trauma these IDPs had gone through,” narrated a social mobilizer.

There was no standard time for curfew, as every day there was a new time and got imposed all of a sudden. This resulted in creating huge difficulties for people travelling from far off places. Shoot at sight was followed during curfew times, and due to this many innocent lives were lost, as people were unaware of the curfew timings. A social mobilizer narrated, “I have seen many atrocities during the entire length of the operation, but one incident that haunts me to-date is when during curfew time, a passenger bus was travelling and was shot by Army officials. The people of Thana rushed for their aid, and a young woman with an injured arm handed me a bundle. When I looked down at the bundle, it was a dead baby.”

The mismanagements at the art of different organizations involved caused more than economic damage to people, it caused physical and emotional damage as well. The volunteers and social mobilizers went through all odds to cater the IDPs and minimize their suffering, but since they were not the most powerful participants even if the most important, they had certain limitations of their own.

Limitations

It is not humanly possible to satisfy each and every individual in a population size. The social mobilizers recalled that only 70% people that they catered were satisfied with their performance, while the rest remained agitated. There were many underlying factors behind this. The main reason for not fulfillment of every individual’s needs were the limited amount of funds. Since the funds

were raised locally, and no donor organization assisted in this regard, the limited fund drained down too soon.

“The provincial and national government allocated a certain amount of funds for the IDPs residing in Thana, but the system is so centralized that the already meager amount of sum becomes almost non-existent when it reaches the rightfully deserving person travelling through the tall hierarchy. Government officials such as nazims and tehsil nazims played a vital role in taking commissions out of the funds. In our case, we received no such funds even though we were told that we’d be assisted by the government,” said a social mobilizer during interview.

8.2.8 MEDIA

The crucial role of Pakistani media cannot be ignored, thus for a better qualitative research, we interviewed some important media persons who were also the locals of Swat and being eye witnesses of Swat operation added value to our findings.

Mr. Mehboob Ali, the Bureau Chief of Geo Malakand Division, elaborated the culture of locals² as soil lovers. Unlike people of Malakand, residents of Swat love their land and they were insisting to go back to their homes immediately after the operation ended. The cooperation of local people is important to tackle any kind of insurgence and local people did cooperate in case of Swat operation. The grand week of **Hafta Mehman Nawazi** was arranged by the local people of Swabi and Mardan to welcome the displaced people to their homes. Government and NGOs alone could not resolve the issues of IDPs. There were almost 80 NGOs working during rehabilitation process but none did work on any real issue. Most of them did cosmetic-work, he added.

Mr. Mehboob further told the rich educational and cultural history of Swat valley that had been devastated during Swat operation and/or during insurgence. The beautiful valley was once known for the center of Buddhism, many Buddhist from other countries used to visit Swat for religious purposes but unfortunately many statues of Buddha were destroyed by militants. In addition to that, there were 200 universities only in Swat when Swat was Buddhists’ center. 410 schools were damaged by militants but 90% of which have been reconstructed. Swat has the second highest

² Locals* is used for people of Swat.

literacy rate in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa but still very low as compared to other provinces i.e female 18% and male 35%. Similarly, there were 2200 historical sites and museums.

The foreign countries' contribution was appreciable in Swat, for instance, Italian government has been working in the maintenance of historical sites in Swat, Mingora and all other regions since 1956. UAE, UK and many others still work on development projects in Swat. Local government is now preserving the historical sites too, he appreciated.

The second journalist was Sherin Zada, reporter Express News Swat and Malakand Division, an eyewitness and affected person himself. He provided us a long history of Swat, its people and their culture. Responding to the question of why the condition got so severe, he said, "MMA government gave slip to Mullah Fazlullah's team, Mullah Fazlullah started FM radio program to brain wash people especially the women above 40 years supported him financially by giving their jewelry and let their husbands support his cause," he explained.

"The situation was extremely heart wrenching, people were leaving their homes but did not know where to go, screams of children and women everywhere, saw dogs eating dead bodies and how can I forget to mention that I lost my lovely sister. The situation was going worst but nothing could be done immediately to cease the fire and this all was because of implementation gap. An outstanding number of people were taken for granted and human rights were violated," said Sherin Zada.

Both the journalists claimed government to be responsible for the huge loss because what government needed to do was done by Army, local volunteers and foreign countries. Both of them recommended that the offices of NDMA should be localized; help improve the historical sites and work to improve the infrastructure. Government never fulfilled its promises for instance; Kalam road is not being built or repaired since 20 years. Government needs to have sustainable policies to reduce any future man-made or natural disaster. There are chances of militants to take-over again once army leaves Swat, both the reporters feared.

8.3 IMPACT OF OPERATION RAAH-E-RAST ON TOURISM IN SWAT AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

H3: Deterioration of tourist spots due to insufficient government attention.

Tourism has been one of the essential source of livelihood of Swat, for its pre-historic roots. Followers of Buddha from all over the world, specifically Thailand and Myanmar used to come to visit their holy temples. Moreover, due to its scenic beauty, Swat remained a favorite among the local population as well as the international community. The ski resort in Malam Jabba was famous for its yearly ski competitions, which was attended by people all over the world.

During and before the operation started, Taliban attacked multiple tourist spots including the Malam Jabba Ski Resort. This tourist spot was turned into a militancy ground before it was pulled apart.

“The ski resort was destroyed and the only hotel there was set ablaze,” said an employee at the resort.

Even though in 2009, the Army retook the area, it was a very hard job to bring back all the skiing enthusiasts but with the help of Army officials, the ski instructors revamped the festive event of ski competition in 2010. However, not all responsibility lies on Army or the skiing instructors, and government intervention is necessary to assist the young skiers.

Another employee said, “We lost most of the equipment due to the attack, and we have made multiple requests to the government to aid us in this regard, however their response has not been very good. So, we were forced to ask international donors, for example, the Norwegian Embassy in Islamabad has helped us in arranging the ski festival.”

It was revealed that in 2014 an MoU was signed to revamp skiing in Malam Jabba however, no impact of it has been seen up till now.

The extremists also attacked statues of Buddha in different sites of Swat, which as myth says, have emerged on their own in the rock. Since the rock was too hard, the Taliban only succeeded in destroying the faces of statues of Buddha in multiple sites, including in Tasil Barikot and Jehanabad.

The government of Pakistan is involved at a minimal level in the welfare of tourism in Swat valley. The citizens have urged and requested the government on multiple occasions to pay sufficient attention to the deteriorating condition of Tourism in Swat, so that the people would economically improve, and the Swat shall develop as a result.

Roads leading to beautiful and scenic tourist spots are in a terrible condition, not repaired for up to 20 years, but the government has turned a blind eye towards it.

“Swat is a beautiful valley. People can enjoy by only sightseeing as well, but to let that happen, these places have to be made accessible. Proper roads are not available to most scenic places. The government should invest in the construction of these roads, which will prove economically fruitful not only for Swat but for all Pakistan,” a respondent said.

8.4 SHORTCOMINGS IN THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

8.4.1 Administrative issues and lack of coordination among the institutions involved

The institutions which were dealing with crisis situation in Swat were: NDMA, Army, Local NGO's and International NGO's. The most important institution tasked with fostering safety and development in Swat has been the army. Nevertheless, the institutional shortcomings had outnumbered the efforts of these institutions in many instances. An anonymous person narrated while giving the interview that it was government's inefficient management and oversight that deteriorated security situation in Swat. Had government controlled the extremists for example banned Mullah Fazal Ullah's F.M channel on time who used to preach his own version of Islam and requested women to give away the precious belongings to help so called 'Jihadi's'. This way he generated a lot of revenue to fund the extremist activities. These inefficiencies on the part of the government led to talibanisation of Swat and hence the beautiful valley had to face extensive military operation to get rid of the terrorists.

Established on the historical background of the region it can be inferred that it was not the talibanization that led to the conflict ultimately, but in fact it was the negligence towards the local extremist group rising in Swat that was the crucial one. TNSM started out as an organization demanding faster justice through the Sharia law just like Swat had in the days of Wali-e-Swat.

Moreover, also the lack of development works in Swat and the Government's maladroit reaction during crisis period like the floods and the earthquakes further irritated the local people who sided with the TNSM as it was seen as an opposition to the government. So potentially, if the Government had invested time in clearing up the political status of Swat and more importantly establishing state institutions there, the chances of TNSM and other such organizations coming about would have been drastically reduced if not ended. In some instances the military operations by the Pakistan Army have resulted in strong resentment among many people against the army and the government. Moreover, the military intervention into tribal areas is perceived by tribal leaders as a threat to their authority and traditional tribal values.

In post operation scenario after closely analyzing each stakeholder's role we have deduced a common attribute i.e. one institution blames other institutions for the shortcomings in the repatriation process. In the case of NDMA they claim that they had successfully provided all the facilities as per their institutional capacity. But when we interviewed the IDPs, most of them were unsatisfied by the government's role in the repatriation process. Most of the people claimed that army had played a vital role. On the other hand when we visited Swat to collect the primary data we observed army is still there and managing law and order. Still the government is not playing an active role and to ensure security within Swat the police is still absent. On the other hand the role of NGOs had remained satisfactory to some point. They helped government in Disaster Need assessment by identifying IDPs in collaboration with NADRA. And also provided humanitarian relief to the people. According to our analysis the locals had a lot of grievances against the government's role in the repatriation process.

According to NDMA they had no administrative problems as such except for the duplication of funds in the initial stage which they resolved by identifying IDP's in collaboration with NADRA. But nonetheless lack of coordination with other institutions had remained to be the cornerstone of shortcomings. The Army personnel while giving the interview also blamed the government's inability to coordinate the activities such didn't provide the statistics on time which happened to be a hurdle in quick response. Lastly, The NGOs were very much satisfied by their roles in repatriation process and our survey respondents also did not have much grievances, they found their role satisfactory. However, one main issue for every institution was the prevailing security dangers.

8.4.2 Relative Deprivation and Trust deficits between people and authorities:

Relative Deprivation:

According to the Relative Deprivation Theory, people tend to take action to attain a social change when they are deprived of their rights such as basic health and education services, food, shelter, status or any other prospect. (Gurr, 1970) Likewise, in case of Swat Operation in 2009-2010, the people deprived from the government aid, either financial or in form of food and shelter, felt inferior and many opted for erroneous means to receive the aid/funds from government, Army, local NGOs or international organizations. In our interviews with the senior media personnel/journalists, to our disappointment, it was revealed that many well-reputed citizens used their contacts in the government to receive funds and aid, and many government officials also distributed funds specified for the IDPs to their relatives or families in their own villages. Such actions from officials have led to increased frustration among the deprived population towards the government authorities and trust deficit as well. Also, the inefficient service delivery mechanisms in the process of evacuation and repatriation, have led to social, economic and psychological deprivation among the citizens of Swat region.

Trust Deficit:

The interaction with the families of the affected people from the 'Operation Raah – e Raast', during our visit to different localities of Swat, clearly showed a pattern of distrust or trust deficit among the TDPs and the government authorities and local NGOs. At the time of Army Operation, the forceful evacuation from Swat and Malakand region and the prompt repatriation within six months of the evacuation left most of the IDPs disturbed, frustrated and angry on the state institutions for their unsatisfactory dealing(s) of/with the affectees.

Majority of the people especially expressed their anger and frustration towards the 'provincial government' for not fulfilling their promises of providing improved accommodations, infrastructure, health and education services, security and financial aid. Some policies have been made by the provincial and national government for effective evacuation and repatriation process and reconstruction of the infrastructure in the region. However, most of the tasks were carried out by Pakistan Army, local NGOs and International Organizations. This sentiment was articulated by

all the TDPs interviewed during our visit to the Swat region, as one of the interviewee spoke on behalf of all the affected:

“The government did not help us in any case, when we were forced to leave our homes, lands, livestock and everything back here, and when we returned, our houses and shops were destroyed, our fields were damaged and most of our cattle was missing. The government officials promised that our homes and all the belongings would be safe on our arrival back home, but nothing was normal like before and most of us got help from the local residents and ‘apni madad aap ke tehat’ or Army supported us a bit when we were evacuated and during our repatriation.” (Personal Interview, April 2nd, 2016)

Besides, some locals were skeptical of the role of Army in the administration of the region and were disappointed with the way Army personnel treated the females, children and elder family members at the time of evacuation. A social/local mobilizer told us that “the way the respect and dignity of the females and elders of the families was besieged during operation was heart-wrenching” for them. Although many families were resistant to leave but those who were to leave were also not given sufficient time for arranging transportation, and were forced to evacuate in a humiliating manner.

On the other hand, our interview with the NDMA officials also highlighted the fact that many people took financial aid and food packages from the government schemes through wrongful and unfair means, which further leads to mistrust of the state institutions over the public for their inappropriate behavior at times of crisis. Responding on the behavior of IDPs on receiving aid from the government agencies, one of the officials elucidated:

“People of our country are never satisfied with the blessings they have and although we ensured that all the affected and the most-deserving ones received financial aid from our scheme, however, many people from well-established families or less-affected during the Operation manipulated the process and took the aid allocated for the most affected and poor families during the Operation.”

Hence, sentiments from both sides especially public, depict trust deficits among them to a great extent, which the government needs to seriously work on and for future lessons, make the policies regarding IDPs and implementation more effective than in 2009-2010 and onwards.

8.4.3 Lack of National policies regarding IDP's:

One of the major shortcomings in the role of government was that there is no legislation and national policy regarding IDP's. Pakistan is vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters. A major earthquake in 2005 and floods and militancy in 2009-2010 resulted in large scale displacements of population, still we depend on ad hoc measures in times of crisis. Lack of national policies lead to confusion among various government agencies to address IDP crisis which leads to inefficiency of government institutions. Although Pakistan has a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMA) and a FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) to tackle with both natural and man-made disasters and its aftermath; however, there is no statutory or legal framework exists to guide various government institutions on pre-displacement measures to provide protection, assistance, relief and rehabilitation to the IDPs. At the national level, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) focuses on displacement caused by disasters, while the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) coordinates the response to that triggered by violence. The FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) and provincial disaster management authorities (PDMAs) in KP, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan coordinate the response at the provincial level. NADRA is responsible for issuing CNICs and registering IDPs. (Begum, Aug 29,2014)

The government has made substantial efforts to address IDPs' needs over the years. Registration has enabled hundreds of thousands of people, including large numbers who live outside camps, to receive assistance. Immediate relief has generally included shelter, cash grants, and food, water, sanitation and healthcare services. Despite of these efforts, significant challenges remain in policy terms. Provincial-level frameworks have been put in place in KP and FATA to guide the response to displacement caused by both violence and disasters, including the FATA early recovery assistance framework (ERF), but Pakistan has no national policy or legislation for IDPs' protection. To address the policy gap on IDPs, the UNOCHA and FDMA agreed on a "Return Policy Framework" in 2010 to facilitate the return and rehabilitation of FATA IDPs. In April 2015, the FATA authorities launched a sustainable return and rehabilitation strategy for 2015 and 2016, developed with technical support from UNDP and financial support from the World Bank. Apart from this NGO's like International Human Rights Observer (IHRO) conducted conferences for promoting IDP's rights.

The lack of IDPs specific legislation and a national policy adversely affects the rights of IDPs to health and education, adequate shelter and housing, documentation, economic activities, employment, and also their political rights if the displacement is prolonged. Article 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan entitles its citizens to freedom of movement throughout Pakistan and “to reside and settle in any part thereof”; however, some provinces put a ban on the movement of IDPs. This is clear violation of the constitution but taking advantage of the devolution of powers after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, provinces have taken upon themselves to decide on matters that have implications for the Federation. Freedom of movement is guaranteed under Article 15 of the Constitution which cannot be taken away. It is the responsibility of the government as well as society to ensure that the IDPs who are victims of man-made disaster enjoy their fundamental rights. (Glatz, 2015)

Pakistan needs to immediately put in place a comprehensive regulatory and policy framework on IDPs which would enable to anticipate disasters, prepare national plans of action, and focus on various phases of the displacements from relief to early recovery and rehabilitation.

8.4.4 Dependence on Army and absence of police authorities

The police role has been quite disappointing in past when the talibanisation started to boost in the Swat in 2007. The police officials didn't take any actions against Mullah Fazulluah in his early days of preaching shariah through local FM channel in Swat. When he illegally started his campaign against the government and to establish Nafaz-e-shariah, the local police were the silent observers and let everything run smoothly for the leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. (TTP).

According the media persons, the bureau chief of the Swat division, narrated the incident of the cruelty of Taliban when they used to hang people and slaughtered people on a chowk and police officials used to be spectators.

When the operation in the area started, the army took control and the police in the area were sidelined. They (police) were/are deployed on smaller check posts in the conflict zone area whereas the army operates on larger scale.

After interviewing the locals of the area, it was uncovered that they showed more trust in the stance of army than in the police forces. The army still patrols the area even after such a long time after the operation has ended.

8.4.5 Increase in crime rates due to economic deterioration in Swat after repatriation:

When we study history, we come to know that the socio-cultural and socio-political differences already existed in Swat valley since last few decades but the militancy, a new geo-strategic scenario, dragged the peaceful valley into the critical stage of terrorism. The people of Swat belong to marginalized groups in socio-economic structure which was why they were easily influenced by Mullah Fazlullah as he voiced their frustrations as his own. They lacked basic livelihood opportunities and agriculture was considered as the only source of earning. The influence of Fazlullah was enormous as they felt empowered and joined hands to hands for his cause. In our interview with reporter Express News Malakand and Swat division we get to know that youth of Swat rapidly joined his (Fazlullah's) group and women gave their jewelry to support him financially. In this way the local people joined militant groups for money and became threat to their own region merely because of poverty and ignorance.

During the displacement period, crops were ready to harvest, fruits were ready to ripe but people had to leave everything behind. Agriculture has been the main source of income in Swat which was devastated during operation and when people were back to their homes, their routines were badly disturbed. Their homes and schools were used for army camps and the infrastructure, roads and bridges were destroyed which as a result forced the locals to use unethical and illegal sources to earn money. Crimes such as robbery, misuse of someone else's property, exploitation of public goods, etc emerged as a result of economic crisis.

Similarly, during the survey, a community worker responded that people of Swat either depend on agriculture or they do small local level businesses but during operation their businesses were affected, even if they started business, they lost their customers because people were still scared of militancy and could not openly roam around for shopping as usual. All such unusual circumstances led to crimes of different forms. For instance, youth could not go school and got involved in criminal activities, people misused funds coming from donor organizations and NGOs.

8.4.6 Deterioration of tourist spots and lack of maintenance

Besides being least involved in the evacuation and repatriation process, the government also showed least interest in the tourism of Swat. Swat is a scenic valley which used to attract tourists not only from Pakistan but from abroad as well. Followers of Buddhism used to visit their holy sites in Swat, as Swat was a huge center of Gandhara civilization.

Unfortunately, when the militants took control of Swat, they destroyed many of the historical sites of the Gandhara community, but the government took no step to stop them, or restore these sites even after the Army had cleared the area.

The government has also turned a blind eye towards the maintenance of tourists' spots like the Malam Jabba Ski Resort, which was restored by the local community with the help of Army. Roads leading off to beautiful places from Swat are in a terrible condition, yet government doesn't bother to reconstruct them. If these sites are restored, it can help mobilize livelihood, and encourage the international community to resume visiting their holy places.

5.4.7 Conclusion:

The socioeconomic and geographical situation of Swat IDPs plays a vital role in the decision making phase. Widespread illiteracy coupled with sensitive culture and demographics made the vulnerability of these IDPs multifold. On top of that, frustration peaked when there appeared a wide gap between the governmental promises and the delivered results. Governmental actions can be justified by the fact that a displacement of such a large scale is not easily manageable, however the traces of this displacement in infrastructure, livelihood and basic facilities are still visible, which causes several accusations to rise against the government.

Many different organizations, local, national and international catered to the needs of the IDPs both pre and post repatriation, however the major trends that led to most vulnerable situations for IDPs was the lack of coordination among the organizations. The positive government role entirely cannot be denied, however it was insufficient and with multiple loop holes.

8.5 HYPOTHESIS ACCEPTANCE/ REJECTION:

In the context of the devised theoretical framework, that crime rates, deterioration of socioeconomic conditions and tourism is the consequence of the minimal government attention towards these sectors after Operation Rah-e-Rast, the above analysis based on field trips, various focus group discussions and interviews with officials of different organizations, we, hereby, conclude the validity of the three different proposed hypothesis (H1) i.e., Due to absence of National policies for IDPs and implementation gaps, the immediate needs of the repatriated IDPs were not addressed by the government, which lead to social, economic and psychological deterioration, (H2) Due to deterioration of economic situation, the crime rates have increased in Swat, and (H3) Insufficient government attention has led to deterioration of historical and tourist spots in Swat are accepted.

9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Below are some of the limitations of the study:

1. The people of Swat have been through treacherous times, which has increased their lack of trust, and hence they still remain uncomfortable when they are being asked about the 2009 crisis. Unable to distinguish and identify the people who are actually there to help them, they choose to remain quiet on sensitive topics which might have tainted the findings somewhat.
2. Mingora, which is the most developed area in Swat has been provided with necessary security along with its surroundings and life as it used to be is restored to a greater extent. However, moving away from the periphery to far off villages and towns made the researchers conscious of the security situation and hence those areas could not be explored properly.
3. As an all females group, research in Swat valley proved to be arduous. The security situation remained a constant barrier for in-depth research, and areas at huge distances from periphery of Mingora remained unexplored.
4. Time factor played a vital role in the research. As the beneficiaries of different organizations were scattered throughout the Swat Valley, it was time consuming to travel

to different areas for interviews. The group had allotted only a certain amount of time to each locality which have resulted in interviewing only the representatives of that area

10 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations attempt to provide useful policies and frameworks for the decision makers, which are at par with international standards of service provision to internally displaced and repatriated people. These recommendations also highlight the implementation gaps during service delivery, and solutions to overcome these problems in the future. It is essential to address the problems faced by the most vulnerable section of the society, as they are more prone to turn to militancy and crimes.

10.1 Policy framework regarding internal displacement

Pakistan is striving to deal with large scale internal displacement ever since 2009. Disasters induced by natural hazards such as monsoon rains and earthquakes along with a separatist insurgency and military operations have resulted in alarming rise in the number of IDP's. The policy decisions regarding the IDP's at national and regional level needs immediate attention due to the global war on terrorism. Pakistan has no national policy or legislation on internal displacement, and no longer-term strategy to facilitate durable solutions. In order to address this gap, it will be in the best interest of Pakistan to develop a national framework for dealing with natural and man-made disasters in a more efficient manner. There should be policies dealing with pre-displacement issues to during displacement, and return and rehabilitation comprehensively. There should be permanent and comprehensive policy framework that pertain to legal status, provision of basic services and other civil and political rights with an appropriate strategy that defines the role of every single relevant organization and coordination between the federal and provincial government and most importantly between civilian and military institutions.

A regulatory and policy framework on IDPs should be designed in a way that enables to anticipate disasters, prepare national plans of action for security and support of IDP's, and focus on various phases of the displacements from relief to early recovery and rehabilitation.

There is a need to develop and include a strategy for implementing the policy when adopted as this would go a long way in effective implementation and assigning responsibilities and activities in the policy. Government should form a National commission for IDP's for effective implementation of the policy and ensure that the fundamental rights of IDP's are protected which includes long term safety and security assurance, right to dignity and integrity, protection, basic human rights (food, water, health, shelter, clothing), rights on economic, social, and cultural protection needs (right to work, compensation on loss of property, education), and rights related to civil and political protection (personal documentation, political participation, access to courts, right to vote, freedom of movement). Federal government needs to speedily develop and adopt the national policy on IDP's as well as strengthen all the relevant institutions that have a role to play in its effective implementation.

The rights pertaining to political participation, freedom and full integration of IDPs, especially women and other marginalized groups should be immediately incorporated into the policy before adoption. Government should make sure that IDP's are given freedom of movement right according to the article 15 of constitution of Pakistan.

The roles and responsibilities of the every agency should be duly specified, eliminating overlapping responsibilities of agencies of the government, international and locally based humanitarian actors.

Preferentially, the civilian and military institutions should outline strategies to prevent the internal displacements from occurring, the following measures should be taken:

- Early identification of threats
- Closer and continued assessment and anticipation
- Monitoring of Risks
- Adopting appropriate response

Government should take the responsibility of security and welfare of IDP's. The strategies regarding assessing and responding to requirements of IDP's must be according to the recognized international human rights.

Registration of IDP's is not comprehensive and effective, the criteria for doing so should be brought into line with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement so as to make all IDPs

eligible for assistance based on their needs. Guiding principles on internal Displacement is important international framework for the protection of IDP's. Registration and the distribution of aid should ensure that the most vulnerable, including women, children, older and disabled people, have access to the help that they require.

Nor should the lack of registration deprive IDPs of their entitlements under human rights and humanitarian law. Return plans should be guided by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)'s framework on durable solutions, and local integration and settlement elsewhere in the country should be supported as settlement options if safe and sustainable returns are not possible.

10.2 Institutional Strengthening

Main causes of terrorism include poverty, unemployment, injustice, corruption and the lack of education. In case of Swat it can be seen that there did exist poverty, people were seasonally employed because of heavy dependence on the agricultural activities, unjust treatment in a way that the area remained deprived of basic facilities and necessities and on the top of all people were uneducated due to lack of schools and because parents were reluctant to send their children to schools.

Institutions can be strengthened only after they are made omnipresent. Governmental organizations need to be present not only in each province's capital but in major cities of all districts. Areas more prone to natural or man-made disasters shall have offices of disaster management in the district, rather than consulting the provincial or national level offices in time of need. Pakistan Army and local NGOs worked vigorously and robustly for the rehabilitation of the IDPs, which should have been done by the provincial and federal government/state institutions basically. Therefore, to make the rehabilitation process effective and smoother, the first step to be considered is *Decentralization* in policy-making and implementation. Most importantly and immediately, the government should make offices of NDMA & PDMA in all the areas that are prone to disasters of any type – man-made or natural, so that they can timely initiate the activities of rehabilitation with the support of local NGOs and other organizations. Moreover, the programs and schemes for the aid and rehabilitation of the IDPs should be implemented in the context of the policy decisions considering the previous implementation gaps and institutional lapses.

Institutions whether private companies , local, national or international NGO's and the public sector institutions should be strengthened in order to deal with such issues which eventually cause resentment among the people and leads to extremist or terrorist activities.

Poverty reduction:

Poverty appears to be the foremost reason of terrorism. Meager resources to make ends meet have galvanized this danger. Sturdy initiatives are essential to reduce poverty. It is poverty which forces people to join terrorism. Masterminds use such deprived people to commit atrocious crimes and persuade them for suicidal attacks after brainwashing them to believe in incentives like being rewarded a place in heaven. The governmental and non-governmental sectors should strengthen their respective institutions to bring poverty reduction on their agenda. Government can launch certain schemes in collaboration with the NGO's or with other philanthropists. On the other hand international NGO's specifically working on the poverty reduction can/should target the areas like Swat so that the poverty does not drag poor people to commit such crimes. Reducing poverty can have massive effect on reducing the level of terrorism. As many people will not fall prey to these nefarious extremists.

Decrease Unemployment:

Unemployment likewise is one of the key sources that aid terrorism to proliferate. When people have no jobs, they don't find prospects to get a job to support their families and eventually they are made hostages in the hands of terrorists. Similarly in case of Swat the area is too underdeveloped and people have fewer job opportunities. Moreover, people in Swat heavily rely on agricultural goods which is a risky source of income because often natural calamities destroy the agricultural output. Terrorists offer such people a huge sum of money. The national and local government should provide special job quotas for the people living in Swat and other such areas to eliminate unemployment and thus the poverty. There is a severe need to create employment prospects so that people should not indulge in deleterious activities.

End Inequality:

There is too much of unequal distribution of wealth and income nearly everywhere particularly in the third world countries like in the tribal belt between Afghanistan & Pakistan, the condition is very alarming in terms of obtaining justice. People cannot get prompt justice. Injustice in the system has buttressed in increasing terrorism and therefore people take laws in their hands. In Pakistan, people generally have lost trust in judicial and police system. Rich are becoming richer whereas the poor are becoming poorer. This gap between the rich and poor has caused people to move towards terrorism as they need shelter, food, cloth, for their families and terrorist masterminds assure them that they will. Similarly in the case of Swat the people felt that they were not getting enough of attention and resources needed for respectable living. There were no developmental projects carried out in the area, leaving the area underdeveloped and an arising sense of being left out among the poor people of Swat. We recommend that the National and local governments should strengthen their financial institutions in order to reduce the fiscal gaps in the area. Progressive type of tax should be levied which takes away more money from the rich and lesser from the poor. And the money collected should be fairly and impartially used for the developmental and for the other purposes. Overall reforms are needed to improve the performance of judiciary and the police as to restore the faith of people in these institutions. Generally what we see is that the justice is delivered too slowly. A common saying denotes “justice delayed is justice denied”. To restore justice and reduce inequality the law enforcing agencies need to play a pivotal role so that the people could be safeguarded from falling into the traps of such terrorist groups.

Eliminating Corruption:

Corruption is increasing in our political system with each passing day. Political leaders especially in the third world countries seem to have no concern with the economic problems and terrorism and they are busy in making money through unfair means. They believe that they won't be able to get next chance to come in power. Corruption has left no stone unturned in supplementing the hardships of the people. In the third world countries this situation is pathetic and one cannot even get their legal work done without offering bribery. To eliminate corruption we suggest that there should be a proper auditing agency in place which should see whether the funds given for certain use are being used appropriately or not. Moreover, the funds should be decentralized and not held with the national or provincial governments. The funds should be given to the local governments

as they best know the needs of the local people. As mentioned by a local mobilizer in Swat, “The biggest obstacle in aiding the influx of IDPs was lack of fund. Even though the fund that had been approved for IDPs took a long process to reach to the bottom level.”

Moreover, the local government should be allowed to levy and collect some taxes in order generate revenues to meet their needs. Strict audits of such funds should be done to eliminate any chances of using the funds in a wrong manner.

Lack of Education or low quality educational facilities:

Lack of education generally forces the youth to join hands in anti-social elements. Access to schools and lack of faculty and other essentials caused a huge obstacle for students to be educated. Moreover, the overall culture of Swat did not give much importance to the education especially they condemned to send girls to schools. The lack of education kept people unaware of the progressive world, and it was easy for the terrorists to make the illiterate people follow the path of darkness. There is a dire need to create prospects for people so that they could educate their children. We recommend that government should set up schools offering low fees and the damaged schools and universities should be rebuilt immediately. The **ministry of education** should play a pivotal role to improve educational facilities in Swat so that the children could attain quality education and be safeguarded from the evils. If people are given education free of cost, or even at minimized costs the trend of tilting towards extremism and terrorism can be reduced.

Non-Governmental Organizations both local and international can help in this prospect. They can raise door to door awareness campaigns to elucidate the parents about the pros of the education. Also they can help to provide certain incentives such as free textbooks, uniforms or monthly stipends in order to attract the parents to send their children to the schools.

10.3 Rehabilitation and economic opportunities after repatriation

Rehabilitation of the IDPs should be the top priority of the federal and provincial governments through offices of NDMA and PDMA, along with the support of local NGOs and International Organizations like WFP and others. However, the absence of national level policies for the rehabilitation of the IDPs and ineffectiveness of the then made policies call for creation of new

policies and improvement in the implementation of the available policies for the IDPs, through different schemes and programs.

The government must stimulate the economic prospects of IDPs by rebuilding economic infrastructure e.g. shops, markets, etc and provide job opportunities to the affected people who do not have any source of earning yet. In the Swat and Malakand region, the economic opportunities are for males mostly (as the culture is extremely conservative and male-dominating), but there have been many widowed families, and females constitute a major portion of the population, so *all-inclusive economic approach* should be devised.

Support programs for the females should be introduced to financially enable and empower them as well. Many families lost their male members during the Swat Operation 2009-10, so the females should also be enabled to earn for their families. Women can prove to be a helping hand in the handicraft industry, as most of the females are already skilled with this art.

In an effort to provide employment opportunities to the repatriated IDPs, the government should restore the tourist spots as they were and are one of the main sources of employment for many locals of the region.

10.4 Women Empowerment

Girls were barred from going to schools during Taliban's control in Swat. Their schools were destroyed; women were restricted to their homes and they were not allowed to leave their homes without male relatives. Even when Government writ was restored, women were not given their rights. The orthodox minds and conservative customs of the valley still consider women as second-class citizens because of which they are subservient to male in their society. One of the root causes of such negligence is illiteracy and lack of awareness in the region. For instance, according to Sherin Zada, reporter Express News Swat, Women in Swat supported Mullah Fazlullah financially by giving their expensive jewelry and encouraging their husbands and sons to join the militant groups. The women undoubtedly, were unaware of the consequences because they were uneducated and could not articulate things.

Apart from that, women in Swat also face early marriages and are prone to domestic abuse which was highlighted by media when Tahira was married at the age of 12. In remote areas including Swat, girls are married as soon as they hit puberty. Young Tahira suffered after her husband poured acid on her face and died of the unbearable injuries, but no justice was provided.

The above injustices towards women in Swat and in many remote areas of Pakistan needs to be addressed. Government shall make and enforce laws to empower women and women protection act shall be passed. Education for all, especially girls' education shall be promoted and girls shall be encouraged and provided safe environment to get quality education. Secondly, studies show that, poverty is the reason behind all evil activities, which shall be alleviated by providing fair and equal job opportunities. Qualitative school system shall be established along with career counseling centers. Moreover, scholarships should be offered to deserving girls of the valley to reduce dropouts.

Our survey inferred that there is Jirga system in tribal areas and Swat valley where decisions are made by male and in favor of male. Women involvement and participation in Jirga system shall be ensured so that they can highlight the challenges women face.

There is a friction between social customs and religion in Swat where women are not given inherited land rights. They consider it against their societal norms and male Jirga system decides against such issues. Laws shall be made to protect the basic rights of women and they shall be given their inherited property rights. Jirga system should be placed by proper justice system or it shall be aligned with the modern justice system to avoid complications. Similarly, women should be empowered by allowing them get their desired jobs and work within an environment of their choice.

10.5 Policy recommendation for response to local threat

Due to lack of checks and balances and the absence of local regulatory authorities, the local threats keep increasing in magnitude, until they become very arduous to overcome. The government of Pakistan should establish an emergency support team which can identify and tackle the problems at early stages before they gain momentum and local support. As in the case of Mullah Fazalullah who was an ordinary chairlift operator in Swat valley, but on the account of establishing sharia

law in the area, he shared his voice with general public through radio FM. The government had turned a blind eye towards the escalating danger until the situation became hazardous.

The lack of implementation of policies has been the root cause of all the upheaval in the area. Due to absence of law enforcement and regulatory agencies, the Swat Valley was alienated from the rest of the country in terms of security, and hence it gave the local threats a chance to grow.

The government should consider initiating the following programs:

- ‘Hotline service’ on which people can file complaints and inform the responsible officials to take actions against the illegal activities so that the criminal activities don’t aggravate.
- Active local intelligence agencies should set up, and informants be deployed in the several localities. Suspicious activities should reported immediately to these agencies.
- Government should also monitor the area through technical intelligence i.e. by surveillance cameras.
- The government should have regular checks on all the local clerics through active and passive measures.
- The local authorities should take measures to control and check on subversive material distributed in the area.
- Census should be conducted to evaluate the population size of the area, which can also be helpful to tackle any problems in future endeavors.

10.6 Preservation of Historical and Tourist sites:

Tourism has been one of the major areas affected by the 2009 operation in Swat, which also happens to be a major source of livelihood for most of the people. Due to its geographical location, Swat valley is considered to be one of the most beautiful places in Pakistan. Surrounded by a range of mountain, the valley has a breathtaking and pollutant-free view, however this image of the valley was tarnished after Operation Rah-e-Rast, and even though it is relatively safe now, people hesitate before visiting Swat. And this can be justified, as the historical sites remain in a demolished state, being deteriorated every day, with no one to rehabilitate them. Moreover, people usually visit Swat for the lush green beauty, cool temperature even in summers and visit hill stations and resorts such as Kalam, Malam Jabbam, Miandam, etc. But roads leading to these sites are in a very poor condition, and mostly blocked due to land sliding or heavy snowfall.

Government needs to initiate programs for the welfare of tourism in Swat. This will not only mobilize livelihood, but put forward a positive image of Swat not only in Pakistan but worldwide. The historical sites of the Gandhara community (attacked and partially demolished by Taliban) should be looked and reconstructed if the need be, or preserved, so that their natural essence is not lost. The Gandhara community shall be invited to resume their visits to Pakistan.

The government, in collaboration with tourism community, should hold annual skiing competition in Malam Jabba to increase community mobilization and encourage young skiers to participate and showcase their talent. This shall subsequently increase rate of employment in the locality as well.

Projects should be undertaken for the betterment of accessibility to all the tourism sites in the area i.e; roads with prior planning and safety checks should be built, which can brace heavy rainfalls.

11 CONCLUSION

Thousands of families got displaced due to Operation Rah-e-Rast, forcing people to stay in temporary camp settlements, or host families hundreds of miles away from their hometowns. Caught between the cross-fires of armed war brewing between the Pakistan Army and the militants, the evacuation and rehabilitation of Swat IDPs is considered to be one of the greatest internal displacement in recent history, and while the operation and the repatriation process was deemed successful, the deep insight this study provided showed varying results. Just the fact that to-date no national policies for IDPs exist, shows the minimal interest of government in this regard. This displacement is not the only displacement that occurred in Pakistan and certainly not the last one – even currently people of Waziristan are displaced due to Operation Zarb-e-Azab. Moreover government is characterized by lack of coordination, provision of insufficient funds, no clear roles or objectives, duplicate roles, and lack of institutional capacity which has subsequently led to increasing frustration in the repatriated families and a declining situation in the socioeconomic situation leading to increased crime rates. The question that if Army claims an operation to be successful after massive killings of Taliban needs to be answered – the Army has been successful in driving the Taliban out of Swat, recapturing the area, but leaving the affected people of such a crisis in a vulnerable condition can lead to more problems for the state at later stages, if after a snowball affect these people retaliate due to the inequality and injustices done to them. It should be made clear that making the people safe is not only by making the area safe security-wise, rather a population is categorized safe when they are given shelter, food and livelihood opportunities. Measures should be undertaken to achieve effective service delivery mechanisms, freedom of speech, provision of justice and right to a better living.

12 APPENDIX

12.1 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SUPPLY SIDE

SUPPLY SIDE QUESTIONNAIRE (For concerned organizations)

1. Organization Name:
2. Name of person:
3. Designation:
4. Scope of the organization:
5. Funded by:
6. Budget for IDPs:
7. Is it ongoing or not?
8. How did you carry out your work? (modes)
9. Did you pay in cash or provide services?
10. What kinds of jobs were offered if any?
11. Were the families of the affected people, like those who were killed given any kind of help?
12. What was the first priority to address? (Livelihood, health, sanitation, infrastructure)
13. Was there any rehabilitation provided to the repatriated refugees?
14. (If government organization) Were you vulnerable enough that you asked NGOs for help?
15. How much help was provided by the government? Did they provided enough funds for the services they promised to provide?
16. Implementation/ Feedback?
17. How many IDPs have been registered with you so far?
18. What are the criteria of providing services? (do you conduct the surveys for providing services or do you provide services accordingly without asking for the needs of people?)

12.2 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEMAND SIDE

Questionnaire for the Repatriated families In Swat

Name:

Contact:

Age:

Address:

Number of family members:

Displaced to:

Location:

Email:

Livelihood

1) Source of income:

- Before the operation:
- After the operation:

2) Income Level:

- A) 10,000-15,000
- B) 15,000-20,000
- C) 20,000-25,000
- D) 25,000-30,000
- E) 30,000 and above

3) Was your source of income disturbed due to the operation?

- A) Yes
- B) No

3.1) Did government help you in this regard?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Not Applicable

4) How many of the following agencies supported you the most in repatriation process?

- A) One
- B) Two
- C) Three
- D) Four

5) Which agency supported you the most in repatriation process?

- E) Government
- F) Army
- G) Local/National NGOs
- H) International NGOs

Finances

6) Did you get any assistance from the agency?

- A) Yes
- B) No

6.1) If yes, in what form?

- A) Cash, Food
- B) Cash, Food, Shelter
- C) Shelter, Food
- D) Only Cash
- E) None

7) How much funds the agency gave you?

- A) 10,000-20,000
- B) 20,000-30,000
- C) 30,000 and above
- D) None

8) Were you a beneficiary of the Benazir Income support?

- A) Yes
- B) No

8.1) If not, please state reason

- A) Fault in CNIC
- B) Fault in Registration
- C) Not Applicable

9) Was it sufficient for your family needs?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Not Applicable

10) Are you satisfied by the rehabilitation of livelihood after repatriation process?

- A) Yes
- B) No

11) How do you compare the overall economic situation of your household after repatriation process?

- A) Worse
- B) Same
- C) Better

12) What are the three things that should be improved in your area?

- A) Water and sanitation, Gas, Health
- B) Water, shelter, security
- C) Education, Health, Access to food
- D) Water, Education, Health

Infrastructure

13) Has your house been damaged during operation?

- A) Yes
- B) No

13.1) If yes, then

- A) Fully
- B) Partially

14) Have you got any financial compensation from the agency (Government, Military etc) for this purpose?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Not Applicable

14.1) If yes, then in what form?

- A) cash
- B) cheques
- C) Not Applicable

15) Was it sufficient to get your house rebuilt?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Not Applicable

16) Where do you live now with your family?

- A) Previous house (before operation)
- B) Rental house
- C) at the house of relatives or friend
- D) Temporary Camps
- E) Informal settlement

17) Have the school, hospital, government building damaged during operation been reconstructed in your area?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially

17.1) If yes, are you satisfied with its quality?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially
- D) Not Applicable

18) Have the roads, bridges damaged during operation been reconstructed in your area?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially

18.1) If yes, are you satisfied with its quality?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially
- D) Not Applicable

19) Have the shops, markets damaged in the locality, been restored?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially

19.1) If yes, are they easily accessible?

- A) Yes
- B) No

20) Has the damaged irrigation channel or tube well been restored by the government?

- A) Yes
- B) No, other agencies helped
- C) They are still in the same condition
- D) Self-funded by the citizens

20.1) If yes, are you satisfied with its quality?

- A) Yes
- B) No

Health

21) Did you have access to basic health services prior to operation?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially

22) Do you have access to basic health services (hospitals, clinics, doctors, nurses, medicine) in your area after repatriation now?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially

22.1) If yes, are you satisfied with its quality?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially
- D) Not Applicable

23) When you need health advice, which of the following facilities are accessible to you?

- A) None
- B) Clinic / mobile clinic
- C) Hospital
- D) Traditional healer (Homeopathic etc)
- E) Dispensary
- F) Private doctor

24) How would you rate health conditions in your area after the repatriation process?

- A. Very poor
- B. Poor
- C. Average
- D. Good
- E. Very good

25) Do you feel frustrated or mentally and psychologically disturbed after the repatriation process?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially – recovering with time

Water and Sanitation

26) Did you have access to safe drinking water before operation?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially

27) Do you have access to safe drinking water after repatriation?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Partially

28) How would you rate hygienic condition of the area after the repatriation process?

- A. Very poor
- B. Poor
- C. Average
- D. Good
- E. Very good

Law & Order

29) Do you feel safe and secure after repatriation process?

- A) Yes
- B) No

30) Does peace prevail in your area after repatriation process?

- A) Yes
- B) No

31) Is your area vulnerable to serious crimes like robbery, theft after the repatriation?

- A) Yes
- B) No
- C) Same situation as before

32) Is it okay if we visit your area/home for any physical evidence? (Yes/No)

12.3 Consent Form

[Since most interviews were conducted on the phone, consent was taken verbally. During in-person interviews, consent was also taken before the proceeding of questions]

We retrieved your information from Awaz Foundation (or in the case of snowball effect, mentioned the name of the person that forwarded the information). The following questions are asked regarding Operation Rah-e-Rast (2009), for the purpose of a student research. Your identity shall be kept confidential if you are willing to answer some questions regarding your experience of the evacuation and repatriation process, which will be used only for the purpose of this research.

Proceed with questioning only if the communicated person is willing.

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