

Civil-Military Cooperation: An Assessment of Pakistan's  
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Measures



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## **Abstract**

Intrastate conflicts have long emerged as a major security challenge for the world. In addition to this, terrorism and insurgency are now common threats numerous states have to contend with. While the widening reach of threats cannot be eliminated solely by military approach, hence cause to move beyond the traditional approach. This then calls for civil and military actors to work hand in gloves; in cooperation against terrorism and insurgency. It necessitates the civil and military cooperation to combat and halt terrorism. UN CIMIC, which is an interface between civil, police, and military component in peace operation, sets a good example of how civil and military combine efforts can together confront intrastate threats. The application of UN CIMIC model in a domestic setting provides an opportunity for national civil and military institutions to cooperate and coordinate to defeat terrorism. Terrorism and insurgency are hardly new internal threat for Pakistan as it has been a menace for almost two decades. Such threats produced cohesion in the country irrespective of the divergences present in state's institutions. Though CIMIC is not new in Pakistan, there have been numerous stages and time, when both actors would be on same page, but same unity is highly instrumental and required if terrorism must be cleared from the notebook of the country. Applying UN CIMIC structure on Pakistan's efforts will provide an opportunity to present Pakistan's CIMIC structure in efforts to counterterrorism and counter insurgency.



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# CHAPTER 1

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The emergence of intrastate threats, such as terrorism and insurgency, posed an existential threat to numerous states in the world. The rise of such threats made the nature and scope of state's security more complex and unpredictable (Nielsen, 2006). In order to halt and combat it, state needs to confront with befitting strategies. It necessitates vigorous action from a legitimate civil government, supported by military and its people. It calls for enhanced cooperation between actors involved in the efforts such as, civil and military institutions of a state.

Civil and military institutions are the two primary and substantial forces that provide strong basis for an effective working of a state against threats. Though both hold their own significant duties, but responsibilities change with the nature of the threats. In a country, strong civilian control is needed when an external threat is higher than internal threat. But when internal threat surpasses external threats situation deteriorates (Bruneau & Christina, 2013). Military's influence increases when the country is faced with grave internal challenges, such as terrorism (Rizvi, 2017). The armed forces of a state ought to perform more than their accustomed duties for the security of homeland against threats. And as military's role increases, both civil and military have to adjust their duties and practices (Nielsen, 2006).

With the emergence of the concerns regarding state's survivability under the threat of terrorism, policy makers started considering strong military as an integral part of a state's survival strategy (PILDAT, 2005). Military became main actor in state's internal security policies. Military approach has commonly been employed in response to the terrorism in the world (Hughes, 2011). But, the employing of merely military might is not adequate to combat the threats. Historically, and presently the military based counter terrorism efforts can have negative political and strategic effects (Zaalberg, 2006; Hughes, 2011).

Moreover, only containing of the conflict is not enough. Military victory in field is only one contributor to large success in irregular warfare<sup>1</sup> (Ehsan, 2018). The other elements to combat

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<sup>1</sup> US doctrine define irregular warfare as, "A violent struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and control over relevant population". Irregular warfare encompasses counterterrorism and counter insurgency (Givan, 2007).

internal threats is socio-political application of national power; such as, development, rehabilitation, introduction, integration and implementation of policies, and most importantly strengthening the local capacities to eventually handle indigenously peace and security (Ibid). Civil and military institutions of government hold equal pre-eminence in CT and COIN efforts.

The cross government cooperation proves to be effective for homeland security (Nielsen, 2006). To counter insurgency and terrorism is the responsibility of both civil and military institutions of a state. It is the fusion of practices, techniques and strategies employed by military and government, and the resultant cooperation among all against terrorists (Kolodkin, 2017). It, additionally, engulfs institution building and support from various fields of civilian expertise such as the rule of law, police, human rights, good governance and monitoring (Henriksson, 2008). Thence, planning and implementation of the policies rest on the civil and military institutions of a country.

The achievement of strategic objective to combat terrorism call for the significant pillars of a state such as, civil (government institutions) and military institutions of a state to work in corporation and counter internal security threats. Cooperation is the precondition for a state to combat the challenges effectively (Brzoska, 2014). Both institutions, though hold different responsibilities towards the state and divergences exists between the two agencies, yet cooperation takes place in the course of achieving mutual objectives of prosperity and survival of state. Thus, the cooperation at all levels in efforts against terrorism and insurgency can be termed as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC lacks the due understanding in the world. It is a crucial approach in efforts to counter intrastate conflict. It has the basic tenet—definitional approach—which has been explained as;

Any civil and military actor's combined and cooperative actions, goals, means and process which will help to increase each other effectiveness at levels such as; operational, tactical and strategic level(Smits, 2016).

Civil-military cooperation, as it is argued, depends on a right structure for joint planning processes; clear distribution of functions and responsibilities; clarity as to chain of command; information sharing; joint exercises and evaluation (Nielsen, 2006). CIMIC covers cohesive, interactive and collaborative relationship— ranging from fighting external threats to the country to combating internal destabilizing elements, between civilian and military institutions. Military and civil government cooperation is indispensable to counter internal

challenges (Flückiger, 2008). Thus, CIMIC is of paramount importance for any country to face threats in general and Pakistan in specific.

Pakistan is faced with grave internal challenges. Although, India continues to pose serious external threats, but Pakistan's immediate enemy appeared to be within the country (Nawaz, 2016; Safdar, 2004; Weinbaum, 2016). Terrorism and insurgency are the two main challenges that Pakistan continues to face since 9/11. The struggle against terrorism from last 18 years has cost Pakistan a lot in terms of human and financial loss (Khan, 2017).

Terrorism entrenched the Pakistan's military into internal security matters. Because of massive internal security challenges, military has to cope with a lot more than their accustomed duties. Additionally, the pitfalls in the civil institutions to deal with the grave internal security problems pulled military in to the political realm more than ever before, and increased civil reliance on the military (Hussain, 2016; Nawaz, 2011). It, thus, led to the problem that counterterrorism operations were solely military based, which remained a weakness of the country for a long time (Javed, 2017). There is a persistent argument that Pakistan has typical approach of engage, destroy and negotiate strategy (Balachandran & Greenwood, 2014). But, now Pakistan's approach to CT and COIN has evolved significantly over the last few years.

Pakistan has made a wide range of efforts, including kinetic and non-kinetic. Numerous efforts that are comprised of multiple military operations, developing policies, enactment of laws, and the formation of institutions have been made to combat terrorism. Civil and military are united against terrorism, but in order to combat terrorism effectively and decisively, policies ought to connect both institutions of the country (Rumi, 2015).

The increasing cataclysmic threat of terrorism, considering the importance of civil and military cooperation, urges a stronger and more cohesive civil-military response in Pakistan, both at provincial and national level (Afzal, 2017). In order to counter terrorism and extremism, Pakistan needs to harness both civil and military institutions (Rumi, 2015). A multifaceted response to the terrorism that includes increased financial commitments, an active NACTA, parliamentary participation, incorporated national intelligence directorate, provincial counterterrorism strategies and altering public narratives is needed in the country (Ibid., 2.).

### **1.1.1 Problem of the Statement**

Though much has been achieved, yet there remains a necessity for greater cooperation between civil and military institutions to counter terrorism and insurgency. Keeping in view the significance of comprehensive approach to combat terrorism, research highlights the issue of inadequacy of Pakistan's civil and military cooperation particularly in the area of CT and COIN measure, and how it has halted the measures taken to combat terrorism and insurgency to become completely successful.

### **1.2 Research Questions**

- 1: Does the CIMIC concept have any significance in Pakistan's efforts to counter terrorism and insurgency?
- 2: How do civil-military institutional divergences affect efforts to counter terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan?
- 3: Does the military increased role in counterterrorism efforts undermine civil institutional capabilities to address the issue of terrorism and insurgency?
- 4: To what extent can intrinsic and extrinsic factors prompt joint cooperation in civil and military institutions to combat terrorism and insurgency?

### **1.3 Objectives**

Aim of the study is to highlight Pakistan's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts from the perspective of civil military cooperation. Research aims to explore what and why there has been visible divergence in civil-military cooperation over counter terrorism.

### **1.4 Significance of study**

Research reiterates the pattern of convergence and divergence between Pakistan's civil and military in the efforts to counter terrorism and counter insurgency in the period of 2001-2018. Research adds to the existing literature based on the effects and gravity of civil-military divergences in the time when all the institutions need to cooperate to counter the formidable challenges facing the country.

## 1.5 Theoretical Framework

Theory of Conflict functionalism by Lewis A. Coser, will be used to understand how conflict compel and become integrating force that brings different elements of the country together towards a common goal, objective or combating a common issue.

Lewis Coser (1956) argues in his book *The Function of Social Conflict (1956)* that social conflict is designed to resolve divergent dualism; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity. Lewis Coser illuminated that conflict might not be good in moral sense but may serve some positive outcomes. Conflict serves to remove disassociating elements and re-establish unity (Coser, 1957). It establishes boundaries and maintains identities.

Outside conflict unites the group and heightens morale. Internal cohesion is likely to be increased in the group which faces outside conflict. But cohesion depends upon the degree of group cohesion before the outbreak of the conflict. If a group is lacking basic consensus, outside threat leads not to increased cohesion, but to general apathy, and the group is consequently threatened with disintegration. Additionally, Coser highlights that lack of consensus and lack of solidarity is not synonymous with divergences in conflict. He, further, elaborated that not all the conflicts have positive functions, but those which goals, interest or values do not contradict the basic assumption on which the relationship is established (Coser, 1957).

Given a social group which is a "going concern," a sensed outside threat to the group as a whole will result in heightened internal cohesion. . . . However [this general principle] holds true only under very specific conditions: (a) the group must be a "going concern," i.e., there must be present a minimal consensus among the constituent individuals that the aggregate is a group, and that its preservation as an entity is worthwhile; (b) there must be recognition of an outside threat which is thought to menace the group as a whole, not just some part of it (ibid., 93.)

Terrorism has deeply threatened the security and stability of Pakistan. Millions of people have been killed as a result of terrorism activities irrespective of their identities and beliefs. As a result of terrorism, an unprecedented unity in the face of terrorism has been witnessed in Pakistan; especially the Army Public School (APS) attack breathed a new life into the country's national unity and solidarity (Khan, 2015). The attack was considered the attack on Pakistan. The incident of APS led to historic national unity, and nation was encouraged to

express firm resolve for collectively launching decisive action against common threat terrorism (Hindustan Times, 2017). A prominent change in public attitudes was witnessed, even the Islamist groups ceased to advocate peace (Lieven, 2017; Basit, 2018).

The attack proved turning point for the military and civil leadership to strengthen resolve against anti state actors (Khan, 2015). After this particular incident, as all the nation was mourning for the loss, National Action Plan strategy was chalked out, which portrayed the willingness of the nation to curb and eliminate terrorism. It showed the process which is duly explained by Jeannotte (2008)<sup>2</sup> as how society cooperate willingly to achieve collective goal.

National action plan is a national way and unity combat a common threat of terrorism (Salahuddin, 2017). Leadership, both military and civil, considering the threat to the whole country, according to Coser's definition, sat together to iron out a counterterrorism strategy. This theoretical framework will present the opportunity to analyse the Civil-military cooperation in Pakistan's efforts to Counter terrorism and Counter insurgency.

### **1.6 Reversal application UN CIMIC Model**

CIMIC is the internationally most applied mechanism between the agents from civil and military to work together. Though interaction between civil and military is not the new phenomenon as it was very much there from very long time in history, but the end of cold war gave rise to the new challenges and trends for the interaction between them (Parepa, 2013). Concept of UN CIMIC evolved after cold war.

UN-CIMIC is the international framework for civil-military coordination for the full spectrum of peace and security activities (Holshek, 2013). United Nations civil-military coordination provides the interaction between military actors of UN peace operations, the developmental, political, human rights, and rule of law (ROL) component of the mission, including many other external actors in larger peace building system. UN CIMIC is to coordinate civil and military activities in peacekeeping. It has been explained that United Nations civil military coordination is the strategic endeavour to manage the interaction between players involved in peace process.

United Nations conception of CIMIC will be employed to explain the national level civil military cooperation to combat the national terrorism and insurgency, and concurrently, to

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<sup>2</sup> Cohesion has been defined as, "Based on the willingness of individuals to cooperate and work together at all levels of society to achieve collective goals" (Jeannotte, 2008).

move beyond military specificity of the concept. The systematic coordination of UN bodies will be explained and implemented on Pakistan's government structure, suitable in its own context, which would include military, police, ministries of finance, ministry of policy making and implementation, and ministry of development and humanitarian affairs to institutionalize the Pakistan's CIMIC in efforts against terrorism and insurgency.

### **1.7 Research Structure**

Research is divided in six chapters. The second chapter will consist of literature review. Chapter three will be based on the detailed account of theoretical framework, and elaboration of methodological choices and arrangement of the thesis. Furthermore, fourth chapter will present explanation of UN CIMIC concept and its reversal application on national level. The fifth chapter will be the main portion of discussion, which will be based on assessment of the kinetic and non-kinetic measures that have been taken in time period 2001-2018. The last chapter will present the conclusion of the research and recommendations based on Pakistan CIMIC structure and definition.



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Pakistan's efforts to combat terrorism and insurgency have evolved significantly. It has now civil and military institutions involved in measures against terrorism and insurgency. This chapter presents the review of the literature based on Pakistan's CT and COIN efforts. It sheds light on the efforts made to counter terrorism, concurrently, highlights the problems that impede efforts.

The rise of terrorism has produced all new challenges for state and their militaries. History has plethora of literature that any sort of threat to state's citizenry and boundary transforms state's approaches. Military might become involved in activities that it might have avoided as to counter unconventional threats calls for arrangements different from conventional warfare (Bean, 2008). The arrangements call for military's more domestic role in order to combat unconventional threats. Similarly, state's response to such threats demands the crossing of the boundaries of the civil and military institutions of a state. It integrates national security, law enforcement agencies, and emergency management. Following the argument of integration of civil and military institution, it has been argued that in such threats, conflicts of interest become more pervasive than in conventional threats, as role of civil and military institutions gets more tangled to combat unconventional threats (Ibid., 2.).

In order to combat unconventional threats, measures that had been taken in Pakistan encompassed so far the talks with insurgents (peace accords), independent military operations, and a combination of military operation and civil efforts (Rehman et al., 2017). It has portrayed that civil and military united in efforts against the threats. But against the claims that Pakistan civil and military are on the same page in efforts, Shuja Nawaz (2016) presents contrary argument. He mentions that facts portray something distinct from the claims. Seems like, both the institutions are on the same page, but of the different books to counter the mutual threats (Nawaz, 2016).

The topic of civil-military divide remains at the core of Pakistan's affairs at home and in international front. As it has been argued that the friction present between both institutions might undermine the most thought out plan and policies (Nielsen, 2006). There are many issues that pits civil and military against each other, which is as devastating for country's efforts against terrorism and militancy as it is for its international reflection. After Lahore

attack, people anticipated the unison efforts from the civil government as well as military institutions in the country. Only one tweet from DG ISPR exposed the civil military divide in the nation, which was least expected when every eye was looking for the better coordination in civilian government and military (Abbasi, 2016). There were wide spread speculations on the day of an attack in Lahore on Christian community that civil and military were not on the same page against terrorism (Abrar, 2016). It was the need of the hour to overcome the differences and work in coordination against the common enemy. The open confrontation directly affected the prevailing efforts in the country. The government was questioned afterwards about its authorisation of military operations in Punjab, which was apparently started unilaterally by military. Later on both the civil and military expressed their resolve against terrorists.

Hussain Nadim (2008) explains in his article that civil and military are on same page when it comes to state's foreign and security policies. He mentions that convergences exist between both institutions, but problems start over methods to achieve these goals. He highlights the time when civil and military were split over the issues of tackling terrorist's safe heavens in the country. In 2013, PML-N government was not interested in conducting operation against extremism and terrorism in the country. Government started peace talks with terrorists, despite of the repeated advice from the military (Nadim, 2018). Pakistan army pressed on the view that terrorists are using "peace talks" to regroup, develop credibility and then launch attacks again when the government is vulnerable.

In the same vein as above, Pakistan's policies to combat terrorism are pulled in two directions; military focusing on military operations and military strategies, whereas, civil leadership serving other many important national interests (Ehsan, 2018). In addition, Ayesha Siddiqi in her article in *The New York Times* presents different argument. She highlights that although ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Shareef and ex-Chief of Army staff Gen. Raheel Shareef have promised to go after all the terrorists groups, which shows the presence of consensus between both sides, but National Counterterrorism Authority has largely been ineffectual and government granted bail to Zakhi ur Rehman Lakhvi who is the suspected terrorist involved in Mumbai attacks (Siddiqi, 2014). Furthermore, she adds that Pakistan military, even though has conducted major counterterrorism operations, refrained to go after Haqqani network.

Moreover, Nielsen et al. (2015) highlights the actual problem that is lack of cooperation between civil and military in efforts to combat terrorism and insurgency. They state that

considerably successful operation in swat was a fragile success as it lacked civilian long-term backup plan. There was no civilian follow-up to make the peace permanent through different development plans (Nielsen et al., 2015). Such measures can't end terrorism, which can be attributed to the civilian lack of vision of development and stability operations.

Muhammad Omar Fazal has explained in his article that to counter terrorism is not merely about to stop attacks. It engulfs the process, which starts from recruiting to the attacks (Fazal, 2017). In Pakistan's effort to counter terrorism and militancy, more cooperated endeavours between civil and military institutions could prove to be more effective. Their more integrated efforts can reduce the burden on military and empower the civilian agencies. He further notes that in Pakistan, civil law enforcement agencies haven't accepted countering militancy and terrorism as part of their duties.

In Pakistan, police stations retain their historical role as an emblem of government authority and to maintain law and order in the country. Additionally, continuous political interference of the politicians has caused immense problem for them to play their role (Pervez & Perito, 2014). Less progress in the policing structure also halted its role in the counterterrorism efforts.

In addition to above, problem lies in institutions of the country. In many instances, unfortunate for Pakistan, interests of few in the government are put before the lives of many Pakistanis. For many years Islamabad has denied the grave nature of threat. Islamabad, even after realising the problem the country is faced with, has still failed to muster the political will to eliminate it all together (Khattak, 2016). Pakistan shall enforce Anti-terrorism Act (ATA), and to overhaul National Counter Terrorism Authority. NACTA was mandated to play a crucial role in countering terrorism, but it has been robbed by the arrogance of interior minister. Similarly, it is no surprise for anyone that Pakistan has failed to produce counter narrative of terrorists. Many madrasah are still unregistered and unreformed. As it is known that they play a central role in radicalising and recruiting, Islamabad has failed to take steps against these religious schools. He has further argued that may be it is against Islamabad political will, as action against religious schools will deracinate "good Taliban".

Similarly, a game changer event of 16<sup>th</sup> December, 2014, led to the apparently comprehensive plan to counterterrorism in the country. Both government and military unveiled a new strategy name National Action Plan (NAP), which was consisted of twenty points. But after some time, whilst continued terror attacks, NAP seemed just a mere wish-list

devised for public satisfaction in the moment of crisis. Raza Rumi elaborates that NAP underlined the government commitment to counterterrorism, but efforts were affected by civil-military divide (Rumi, 2015). Whereas, lifting of ban on moratorium on death penalty and establishing military courts has portrayed the military based nature of Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts. According to the report of International Crisis Group (ICG), increased military intervention has weakened the constitutional protection and due process in the country (ICG, 2015).

Additionally, the decision of the reforms in federally administered Area (FATA) is the rigorous step towards security. After Army Public School attack, in which more than hundred students were killed, the idea resurfaced again. The administered and developmental reforms made a massive part of counter terrorism strategy in National Action Plan (NAP) (Hammad, 2017). Soon after the formulation and adoption of NAP, government of Pakistan after eleven months formed a committee. Committee, under the leadership of Sartaj Aziz, was consisted of civil leadership including Rtd. Lt Generals and many other governmental representatives. The committee took 14 months in developing the administrative and developmental reforms proposal. Everyone including military and civil societies welcomed the proposal. But the stride towards FATA reforms, due to the objection from right wing political parties, yields no significant results.

Civil and military has now started moving on the path, which if not smooth but holds something fruitions for the country. On January 3, 2015 Provincial apex committee was formed, which includes both military and civil leader ship (ISPR, 2015). It was formed in a bid to coordinate the security and national action plan. Special meetings of Punjab apex committee held at corps commander headquarter. The high dignitaries of Punjab government were present in the meeting. Considering the significance of civil military coordination, Gen Raheel Sharif also attended the meeting. The main discussion took place about the security situation in the province in the context of National action plan. Gen Sharif in the meeting repeatedly emphasized on the significance of coordination between civil government and military to counter terrorism. Additionally, he assured the army full support to provincial government in judicious and speedy action against all evils on the land.

Additionally, creation of National internal security plan (NISP) illustrates the inclusive approach towards the efforts made to face internal challenges. The principles behind its formation are to counter internal challenges under the democratically elected government.

This step engulfs the efforts toward rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation of national narrative and legal reforms (MOI, 2014). By working in coordination with public and private sectors such as, civil societies and Law enforcement agencies (LEAs), government of Pakistan would curb terrorism and militancy penetration.

## CHAPTER 3

### THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND METHODOLOGY

Keeping in view the threat that Pakistan is faced with, the research focuses on theories offering multidimensional, cohesive, and integrated approach towards combating terrorism. There is plethora of literature exists on how different states try to contain and fight their socio-economic and political menace. In the case of the forgoing research, the research has employed arguments of conflict functionalism and social cohesion. The adoption of these narratives reinforces the significance of pluralist approach to political issues, and in the case of Pakistan, the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

#### 3.1 Conflict Functionalism

Conflict functionalism proved to be supportive to elaborate how conflict in the country urges the nation to exhibit united/cohesive front as a group against internal conflict. Lewis Coser in his book, *function of social conflict*, termed function of conflict as *conflict functionalism* (Johnson, 2008). Doyle Paul Johnson, in book *Contemporary Sociological Theory: An Integrated Multi-Level Approach* refers to Lewis Coser argument that managing conflict effectively leads to social integration. Lewis Coser viewed conflict as one of the factor that leads to social interaction, and to cooperation—in complex term. The discussion is aimed to highlight the positive outcome of a conflict on the system in which it occurs. Coser simply denounces the idea that conflict is good in moral sense, but he emphasized that conflict has sociological consequences.

While explaining Emile Durkheim's point of view, Michelle Dillon (2004) argues that crisis—disruptive events—have positive effects on the society (Dillon, 2004). The disturbances in society lead to the social unity. Conflict, which he has referred as social disturbance—*resultantly*—strengthens the society than to weaken its social cohesion (Dillon, 2014; Schacht et al., 2013). In this vein, Moore says that conflict have constructive consequences for *group solidarity* (E.Moore, 1978). Dillon, moreover, has highlighted the conflict affects on society, with the example of social cohesion that has been witnessed as a result of incident of 9/11. The attack, an incident that changed international perceptions on threats and security, brought together people of United States of America from different background to one platform. It generated the unity among people and produced consensus to be together against a common threat.

Sachet et al. (2007) highlights while quoting Durkheim that conflict is functional for society. The internal conflict among political parties and the social groups dissolve as they unite against common enemy. It generates the sense of heightened awareness against common enemy among the general public. It, eventually, leads to increased moral bonding and social cohesion (Schacht et al., 2013). They, moreover, elaborate that war produces common enemy. It evokes sense of belonging among people—*us vs. them*— of the country.

Robert F. Murphy says that conflict promotes social cohesion, and the solidarity is important if the group wants to take effective common action against the threat (Murphy, 1957). Whereas, Lewis Coser also illuminated that the intensification of conflict strengthens the boundary of groups, which enables the group to experience the solidarity and internal cohesiveness. Whilst strengthening the boundaries, the group which experience the conflict produces a more centralized government structure.

It has been argued that external conflict increases internal cohesion (Stein, 1976; Cohn & Markides, 1982), if only threat is considered against entire group—as Coser argued. Cohn and Markides specified the conditions, under which internal cohesion generates. They highlighted that threat must be perceived against entire group, and not just a part of it. Stein added that conflict bring people together who have nothing to do with one another—otherwise (Stein, 1976). Whereas, Randall L. Schweller in his book *Unanswered threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of the Power* quoted Coser's that intergroup conflict enforces harmony on the conflicting elements —isolated actors, present within the group (Schweller, 2006). Similarly, Coser (1956), explains that conflict leads to the mobilization of energies of the member of the group, which increases cohesion. He adds that conflict always increases in-group coherence as the result of conflict with out-group. The group lacking of solidarity in the time of conflict might leads to disintegration of the group.

Moreover, Dahrendorf while calling the external conflict/ internal cohesion hypothesis a general law adds that human group reacts to the external pressure by internal coherence. Moreover, Fritz and Williams (1957) argued that solidarity is the function of sharing common threat, common enemy and common suffering, and the sentiments of solidarity extend to the feeling of extinction of prior social distinctions. Richard Jackson (2005) is arguing in his book *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism* that unity becomes more important in conflict, as policy makers believe that modern wars cannot be

won without unity—efforts shall include entire nation. He has added that any sign of disunity will affect the struggle, and simultaneously endangering the community.

### **3.12 Social Cohesion**

Janet McLeod and Kathryn von Treuer (2013) explicate the cohesion as inclination of members to forge bonding and stay united as a group. They referred to the definition given by De Backer et al., (2011) that social cohesion is the dynamic process that is projected in the group's tendency to stick together and stay united in the chase of mutual objectives (McLeod & Treuer, 2013). Similarly, Piper et al. (1983) defined cohesion as a *basic bond or uniting force* (Ibid, p.3)

Cohesion in contemporary studies has been defined as *stick-togetherness* of a group (Salisbury et al., 2008). With the passage of time, the focus of social cohesion has been broadened to include all the societies within the boundaries of a nation state. For instance, Pervaiz et al., (2013) explain the cohesion as a phenomenon of togetherness which may keep all the society united. Common identities and shared values are not necessary for cohesion. Furthermore, Gross and Martin (1952) explained the coherence as resistance of the group against the disruptive forces.

Protap Mukherjee and Lopamudra Ray Saraswati explained social cohesion in their report *Levels and Patterns of Social Cohesion and Its Relationship with Development in India: A Woman's Perspective Approach* in multiple ways. They have stated that social cohesion is the state of affairs concerning the horizontal and vertical interaction among the member of society as characterized by attitudes and norms that includes the sense of belongingness and willingness to participate and help (Saraswati & Mukherjee, n.d.).

### **3.13 Application of Theoretical Framework**

Threat of terrorism is the major threat that Pakistan has been combating from last many years. Taylor and Andersen (2008) in their book applied the concept of *function of crime in society* to terrorism in country. They argue that terrorism —crime *per se*—is deviation from normal circumstances (Taylor & Andersen, 2008). It—terrorists or insurgents— employs different instrument to torment people and can yield constructive results for a country. It has been explained that the common threat, which has disturbed society, evokes mutual hatred. It brings people together against common enemy and, thus, becomes functional for a nation.



But owing to its changing nature that has threatened every aspect of life—whilst distorting life, calls for cohesion and cooperation to counter it.

Shahid Ahmad Afridi (2016) explains in his article that Pakistan has launched multiple operations that had involved civil and military institutions combined efforts against the threat. Operations were divided in two parts; such as, kinetic and non-kinetic. Pakistan military conducted kinetic operations, whereas, civil and political government were expected to carry out non-kinetic activities; such as, de-radicalisation programs, legal aspects, economic development and governance aspect (Afridi, 2016).

The violent conflict that Pakistan is faced with crossed the threshold on 16 Dec, 2014; an attack on army public school leaving 150 dead (News, 2017), including students, faculty and school staff. The incident proved to be a game changer for the country (ICG, 2015). The attacked sparked a massive reaction. Tragedy urged nation to the historic national cohesion—forced public, political parties, religious parties, and journalists to condemn and convey resolve to eliminate this scourge (Ashraf, 2015; Ramay, 2016; Perkins, 2015; Qureshi et al., 2016). After the incident whole nation stood united and expressed solidarity against the common threat they all are faced with—brought people of different identities together against mutual threats.

Raza Rabbani said that APS attack breathed a new life into national unity (Associate Press of Pakistan, 2015). Pakistan political stakeholders set aside their differences and sat together to iron out a counterterrorism strategy. In report of International Crisis Group, it is said that a week later of attack—a game changer in history, Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and military leadership vowed to counter terrorism groups without exception and, resultantly, chalked out National action plan (NAP) (ICG, 2015). The plan had support of the parliament and military leadership (The News, 2014). Alongside leadership, all the segments of the society welcomed the step taken to counter terrorism (Ibid). Resultantly, the military courts were established to try hardcore terrorists and civilians too.

### **3.2 Methodology**

The overall purpose of the research is to assess civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in the Pakistan's efforts to combat terrorism. Prior to the analysis, it was imperative to understand the general internationally prevailing concept of CIMIC. Owing to Pakistan's government

structure, United Nations concept of civil-military cooperation had been understood and reversely applied on Pakistan's national efforts to CT and COIN.

Furthermore, in order to understand Pakistan's efforts to CT and COIN, data was gathered from both primary and secondary sources. For secondary data collection purpose, extended secondary sources, such as books, articles and newspapers were consulted to obtain in-depth information. And in order to collect primary data, method of primary data collection of qualitative research approach was employed. Primary data was also obtained from different newspapers.

### **3.21 Research Approach**

The qualitative research approach was used in the research. The research was exploratory in nature. The aim of choosing this approach was to explore the divergences and convergences in civil and military institutions. The selection of such approach was aimed to seek in-depth answers to the research questions, and to explore the application of the phenomenon in question on Pakistan. It allowed more spontaneous, yet extended and enlightening interaction with the targeted participants. Participants tended to answer more elaborately, as any researcher would wish to obtain. It duly helped in having an insight of the topic.

### **3.22 Sample**

The method of interviews in qualitative research approach was used for primary data collection. A sample of 14 people was selected from the civil and military institutions in equal proportion. People from NACTA, Ministry of Interior, and serving military personals were involved in the sample. A sample had equal ratio of members from each institution. Keeping the topic in view, sampling was done randomly. Same questions were asked from everyone in sample.

### **3.23 Data Collections**

Open ended questionnaires were made in order to gain more information on the topic. Questionnaires were based on four main questions, and each was sub divided in 3 further questions. The method of unstructured interviews was chosen for the sake of exploration of interviewees' perception and description. Furthermore, the unstructured interviews also helped in gaining significance information about the topic. Face to face interviews was helpful in terms of narrowing down to concerned information. As the topic, considering the

significance of it, is little if not completely unknown, thus, this method was significantly selected which demanded detailed account of the problems. It provided the privilege of flexibility while asking the questions and gathering the data.

### **3.24 Limitations**

There were few limitations while conducting interviews. Considering the nature of the topic, people refrained to provide desired insights of the problems. Resultantly, the research was complemented with secondary data.

### **3.25 Delimitations**

Considering the topic, only few major military CT and COIN measures have been assessed in the context of CIMIC.

### **3.26 Data Obtained**

The names of the interviewees were kept anonymous—owing to the nature of the questions. In few places the point of views were mentioned in the course of the research, which was quoted with the name of the institution of the interviewees. Therefore, the data obtained from interviews, newspapers, books, and journal articles was carefully explained and analyzed in chapter 5.

## CHAPTER 4

### CIMIC: AN INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT

With the emerging of new threats, responsibilities of civil and military transformed as well. The prior general understanding deemed military an actor for offensive and defensive purpose, whereas civilian actors hold humanitarian responsibilities such as reconstruction and helping victims (Ankersen, 2008). The role conventionally played by the two different actors multiplied and tangled with the passage of time. Besides the tasks — core and traditional— military has to engage now in peace support operations, law enforcement duties coupled with struggle against terrorism and organized crimes, and humanitarian activities (Parepa, 2013). Military remained a major component in the field, but now is accompanied with—unlike history— increased number of civilians; including humanitarian actors and other agencies providing multiple assistances. Thus, CIMIC is a concept that describes occasions in which actors from military and civilian entities collaborate for achievement of mutual objectives.

The concept, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), is relatively new in the literature. It came to the knowledge of the wider public in 1990's with the interferences of international community in violent intrastate conflicts (Zurn et al., 2012). With the commencement of international intervention in intrastate conflicts came the increased interaction between international armed forces, humanitarian actors and national actors' i-e civil and military.

The concept of CIMIC has been devised to highlight the interaction and activities between civil and military. Its emergence is ascribed to the transpiring complications and complex environment where military operations were conducted, and civilian actors with their own objectives and agenda were present (Grigorov, 2017). The rising need of finding a way of coordination and cooperation between civil (humanitarian actors and national actors) and military (national and international) gave rise to the concept. Furthermore, it explains how they can best interact to achieve the political/military goals (Gjørsv, 2016).

The concept holds —thus far— a variety of different meaning and multiple usages given the diverse contexts. The concept in question—owing to its significance— has been termed differently by states that suit their form and functions. Multiple nations, owing to their national scenario, have adhered and adopted someone else's definition. Though, the widely known CIMIC—as a concept— is used by NATO, EU and other countries in Europe, yet UN requires and presents comprehension and approach, which go well with the scenarios it has to

cope with (Coning, 2007). United Kingdom adopted United Nations' CIMIC definition with minor changes. Whereas, Canada drew its definition from US Civil-Affairs (USCA) with slight amendments.

NATO defines civil-military cooperation as:

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies." (IMS, 2002).

European Union defines civil-military cooperation (CIMCO) as:

Civil-military cooperation is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military component of EU-led crisis management operations and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies" (Ankersen, 2008).

Civil-military coordination, as defined by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is:

The system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels, between military elements and humanitarian organisations, development organisations and the local civilian population to achieve UN objectives" (Coning, 2010).

The usage of acronym *CIMIC* for civil-military interaction on operational/tactical level strategically implies differently for different institutions. An explicit understanding ushers to the explanation that it is a strategic endeavour for the management of multiple actors involved in peace operation (Holshek & Coning, 2017). The civil military coordination is aimed to achieve *unity of efforts* (Egnell, 2013).

The major similarity between EU, NATO and US concept of CIMIC, which makes them different from UN CIMIC, is that they see civil-military cooperation as a tool for command and control, and is done in the service of the commander and the military mission. Whereas, UN CIMIC in peace operations has an integrated military, civilian, and police mandate, and mission structure (Coning, 2012). UN CIMIC is the interface and dialogue among police,

civil, and military regarding the development, humanitarian, security, and political to achieve UN objectives (Ibid., 13.).

United Nations conception of coordination has been employed to explain the national level civil military cooperation to combat the national terrorism and insurgency, and concurrently, to move beyond military specificity of the concept.

#### **4.1 United Nation CIMIC**

End of Cold war gave rise to new security challenges to the world. Until the end of cold war, UN missions were deployed just for the purpose of dealing with interstate conflict, ceasefire monitoring as a neutral body and creating buffer zones (Rehse, 2004). But soon after the beginning of 1990s, UN Peacekeeping forces were applied to intra-state conflicts and civil wars. Many post cold war operations are termed as “second generation” operations, which have more emphasis on settling the conflict, rather than just fulfilling the purpose of policing ceasefire (Hatzenbichler, 2001).

The system of UN—conventionally designed to respond to interstate wars— had faced difficulty confronting intrastate, more brutal and disastrous, wars. The intense sufferings that began with the intrastate changed the face of international crisis management (Carvalho & Haugevik, 2007). The challenges posed by intrastate conflict required multidimensional and integrated approach to peace operations. The new face of warfare necessitated interconnectedness and integration among all the organizations (Weir, 2006).

The end of cold war— change in international environment, ushered UN to espouse multidimensional approach in peacekeeping operations (UN, 2008). Resultantly, the UN peacekeeping missions, since first mission deployed in 1956, have evolved significantly (Friis, 2010). Missions now have mix characteristics of military, civilian and police. Contemporary peace operations are multidimensional and multifaceted (Pierre, 2008).

The multidimensional approach —as described to consolidate the individual as well as collective impact— was aimed to integrate political, economic, developmental, policing and military agenda (Marín, 2017). It incorporates political, economic, social, and military security components, which includes a range of tasks such as protection of civilians, human rights, governance, rule of law, and security (Pierre, 2008). UN endorsed the importance of multidimensional approach in peacekeeping operation (UN, 2013).




Figure 1: Authority, Command, Control Structure in Multidimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Novosseloff & Abilova, 2016).

In a UN peace support operation context, this coordination is called “UN-CIMIC” which is to facilitate the interface between the military and civilian components of a mission, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, in order to support UN mission objectives (UN, 2010). Coordination is a critical function in complex peace support operations, and it is an effort to ensure that the integration model of peace, development, and security is directed towards common objectives (Coning, 2005).

UN-CIMIC at the operational/tactical level is the framework for the full spectrum of peace and security actions. Peace support operations are deployed with a mandate from the UNSC (UN, 2008). The United Nations Security Council — missions authorizing authority—has approved the multi-tasked, multidimensional integrated peace operations, which have a mandate to undertake political, military and civilian actions (Metcalf et al., 2012). UN peace support operations are of their own kind, as they bring together the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, the Secretariat, troops, police contributors, finance contributors and other national and international organizations. Cooperation between military, police and civilian actors is a necessary integral part of operations (UN, 2010). The deployment of a mission takes place through a proper structure, in which all of the UN family is involved.

The development of conflict or in case it gets deteriorated, consultation occurs among the member states, the potential contributors of troops, the police, finance and resources regarding the needs of UN possible presence (UN, 2003). Consultation is followed by a visit, as soon as security allows, of an integrated technical assistance mission involving UN relevant departments, funds and programmes, for assessment of military, security, humanitarian and human rights, where mission needs to be established. After an assessment, UNSG presents a report in Security Council. UNSC passes a resolution which authorizes the mission and determines its size and mandate.

The Security Council gives legal authority, high level strategic directions and political guidance to all the peacekeeping operations (UN, 2011). UNSC authorizes the use of forces in the case of threat to international peace and security. Matter regarding budget and resources are subjected to UN General Assembly's approval (UN, 2003). UNSG appoints a senior representative who holds experience and may have served in UN good offices to head the operation. Meanwhile, the planning of different aspect of the mission such as political, military, and operational and support continues with Special Representative of Secretary General (SRS<sup>3</sup>). The phase of planning includes integrated mission task forces or headquarter based working group with involvement of UN departments, funds and programmes. After the mission deployment UNSG reports to Security Council concerning the activities of mission (Ibid, p.4).

In UN context, coordination takes place under SRS, and no element be it military, civilian, police or humanitarian, should be a focal point around which mission revolves. Office of SRGC is created for the coordination purpose. Coordination is the crucial factor for success in multidisciplinary UN peace mission (Coning, 1999). Such coordination and integration at strategic level assists in separation of actors and their responsibilities in field (Egnell, 2013). Clear command and control arrangements support greater cohesiveness amongst all mission elements, leading to efficient and effective implementation of mandates and strengthening the mission's preparedness to handle crisis situations (UN, 2011).

UN multilateral peace operations have been conducted in the countries, including the areas where terrorism and insurgencies are active and peace can be seen nowhere in near future. UN reiterated that UN peace operations can't conduct counterterrorism operations. But

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<sup>3</sup> There is also a special representative of secretary general, which has responsibility of overlooking the whole operation.



Mali's case presents the opposite case. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has already crossed the Counter Terrorism line (Karlsurd, 2017). In case of Mali, it has proved to be effective in containing the conflict (Briscoe, 2015).

Thus, without civil-military functioning interface, success in operation is unlikely (Engell, 2008). It has imperative implications to any endeavour to elevate sufferings and save lives in dire threats. CIMIC has hitherto a significance purpose in international peace operation—irrespective of the institution that is carrying out the task. In contemporary cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, operation in which military and civil are crowded in one place, lack of civil-military coordination has been considered the cause of failure to achieve success (Ibid). Historically, and in present operations it works as a force multiplier, enabling small task force to achieve conclusive achievement. Civil-military coordination has nevertheless been a vital element to attain objectives of mission.

#### **4.2 Reversal Application of Civil-Military Cooperation**

CIMIC, as a general concept, portrays the international involvement in the domestic conflicts that pose challenge to the international peace and stability. While the concept, considering the activities that civil and military shall carry out together to curb terrorism and insurgency at national level, has relevant application on national level with slight alteration in definitions and further explanation. The cooperation and coordination between civil and military for a national counter terrorism and counter insurgency efforts ought to be elaborated.

The 9/11 attacks on world trade centre—a *major turn in international threat and security perception*—lead us all in the new era of civil-military cooperation. It changed the perspective on the dire threats and mechanisms to counter it (efr, 2017). As stated by George W. Bush that struggle against terrorism is different from any other war in the history. He reiterated the need to move from using only military might against terrorism and insurgency to coordinated engagement of military and economy, law enforcement agencies, intelligence, thus, incorporate entire national power to defeat the common threat (CIA, 2003).

Trinity of government, people and military is vital for any nation to face any threat. Elimination of one actor from the triangle will render the efforts — *plans, policies and strategies* — ineffective. Military and people elements are wholesome actors, whereas, civil factor is divided into multiple actors; such as, government, bureaucracy, political parties,

intelligentsia, private sector and non-governmental organisations. All the elements from the trinity agree on the role of military, which is mandated to provide national security, as they share same heritage, history and values (Shahab & Makki, 2015). Civil-military coordination and cooperation is indispensable for nation's struggle of bringing peace to the country.

The successful implementation of counterterrorism measures at national level necessitates synergy in efforts made by civil and military, and interagency/departmental cooperation (UN, 2009). An objective to combat terrorism, in addition to security and law enforcement agencies, demands the involvement of civil actors for multiple reasons, such as human rights, developmental and social services, finance contributors, and all those stakeholders who traditionally were not involved in counter terrorism efforts (Ibid., v.) The efforts— multidimensional, integrated and coordinated — shall range from military to judiciary, public, proper planning body — *a body which has representative from across the country*, and an authorizing authority. It also includes non traditional actors in counter terrorism actors; such as, finance providing actors in country. Thus, in an institutional state, all elements from civil and military present in a state are consulted for policy making (Shahab & Makki, 2015).

Moreover, as it has been said that defence of a country is a shared responsibility, synergy is required not just in strategic but organisational, operational as well as in social domain. It's result rest on involvement of the entire nation. Effective public involvement is the cornerstone of counterterrorism operations. General population remained a main target of terrorists and insurgents. Public engagement and its mobilization in support of counterterrorism planning are critical for its success (McGee, 2009). Their involvement could possibly pave way for the national objectives to defeat terrorism. Thus a “whole of a nation” approach is needed to counterterrorism in the country, which is based on cooperative civil-military relation. It shall be ensured that all the actors in the efforts against terrorism — highlighting the importance of a term *on the same page* — are pulling in the same direction (UN, 2009).

In order to move on the path to counter mutual menace, national interest shall be identified by both civil and military actors. Considering the threat in question, national security policies and national security agencies shall provide a clear vision of national security objectives. These national objectives can play vital role in bridging the gap between civil and military institutions. Mutual expectations can play role in dictating actions of both sides (Paul, 2013).

Simultaneously, results in embodiment of national objectives into irrefutable strategies against terrorism and insurgency.

Strategies to achieve the objective are placed on multiple vital components. It should encompass five key elements; such as, consensus based outline, steady, a balanced approach, effective, and respect human rights and lives (UN, 2009). Every pillar adds crucially to the implementation of the strategies. Steady approach will help authorities to not over react and lose focus because of one attack. A balanced approach had dual implementation. One requires state to employ repressive measures; such as, border control, and second is to address the prevention and countering measures. Effective component refers to the changing nature of threats, which includes counter terrorism related policies (operations) and counterterrorism relevant policies (interfaith dialogue). Consensus based approach—*a cornerstone of strategies*—illuminate the liaison between parliamentarians and civil societies (Ibid., 6.). It focuses on the matter of addressing the concerns of parliamentarians—an entire nation representatives—and the people of the country. Efficacious struggle at international level can yield desired results only when the member states employ comprehensive approach to counter terrorism in their own countries.

Considering the nations struggle with the problem of insurgency and terrorism—irrespective of their origin—can apply CIMIC concept on their operational and strategic level. Emphasizing the fact that there is no one size fits all solution, but policies must be integrated against terrorism. Terrorism is turning into the comparatively critical threat and cooperation is prerequisite to counter it for the world in general and Pakistan in particular.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN'S COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY MEASURES**

In order to study the cooperation between civil and military institutions in Pakistan, research necessitates evaluation of both kinetic and non kinetic measures. This chapter will present an assessment of Pakistan's main military operations against terrorists and insurgents, post conflict efforts to rehabilitate and de radicalise, CT and COIN initiatives and policies, and the role of criminal justice system and police department in the given sequence. Assessment will be done in the context of civil and military divergences, and their lack of cooperation and coordination in the efforts.

#### **5.1.0 Pakistan's Kinetic Measures**

In order to meet national objectives against internal threats, hand in gloves by civil and military institutions is important. Counterterrorism, as has been explained earlier, is the amalgam of multiple efforts including civil and military. As defined by oxford dictionary, Counter terrorism is:

Political, military measures or actions intended to prevent, or deter terrorism, sometimes with the implication that the methods utilized resemble those of the terrorism (Javed, 2017).

Pakistan had begun its efforts to combat terrorists in the country soon after 9/11. Pakistan military has conducted ten major and multiple minor operations against militant outfits in KPK and FATA, and currently Operation Rad-ul-fassad is in progress to dismantle, neutralise terrorists sleeping cells and nullify the menace of dormant radicalism (Zahid, 2018).

#### **5.1.1 Pakistan's Military Operations**

The collapsing of Taliban regime in Afghanistan led Afghans, Uzbeks and other foreign militants to take refuge in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). After acquiring support from local militant figures, Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants managed to conduct destructive attacks on Pakistan's establishment in the area of Azam Warsak in South Waziristan, leaving 12 Pakistani security personals dead (Ahmed, 2014). After several attacks on security establishment—

simultaneously urged by United States, Pakistan Army conducted first operation named *Al-Mizan*, 2002-2006, to combat militants in FATA (Fair & Jones, 2011). Troops, 70,000 to 80,000 in numbers, were dispatched to FATA region of the country (Ahmed, 2014; 7.). Operation was aimed to liberate the place from the foreign and local militants, extremist and international terrorists who had posed significant threat to the country's security, integrity and survivability (Roy & Khalid, 2016; Witter, 2011).

#### **5.1.1.1 Failure of military operations because of absence of CIMIC**

Operation Al-Mizan couldn't yield desired results, as terrorists didn't vacate the area (Roy & Gates, 2014). The lapse in the policies can be attributed to the Musharaf's lack of comprehension of the threat. As duly pointed out by an interviewee, serving brigadier, that Gen Musharaf represented both civil and military institutions. His opting for coercive measures, whilst completely ignoring soft means such as development, rehabilitation and reconstruction in FATA, proved to be detrimental in path of the success in the operation (Khattak & Mushtaq, 2015). The efforts made were largely based on sweeps, searches and bloody battles. Additionally, the resistance from religious conservative parties also became a reason in hindering government initiatives (Jones & Fair, 2010).

The deteriorating security condition and attacks on Army camps in Bajur area of South Waziristan, led to another military operation in the area of South Waziristan. Pakistan Army launched "search-and-destroy" operation, named operation Kalosha II in 2004 (Ahmed, 2014). In this operation, Pakistan military killed considerable number of local and foreign militants, whilst interrupting Al-Qaeda main command and control system, and raided multiple underground networks. But this operation also could not dislocate terrorist contrary to the claim made by Pakistan military (Khalid & Roy, 2016; Abbasi et al., 2018). The failure of this operation is credited to the lack of communication and coordination between military, frontier corps and intelligence agencies (Abbasi et al., 2018).

Additionally, there were multiple factors; such as the nature of Frontier constabulary, frontier corps<sup>4</sup>, and police force that halted military operations from becoming fully successful. As a result of 2002 elections<sup>5</sup>, Islamist parties, the Mutahida Majlis e Amal (MMA), formed provincial government in NWFP (now KPK). Resultantly, civil LEAs of the province under MMA government were less than wholehearted in their opposition against Islamist militancy

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<sup>4</sup> Frontier Corps comes under Ministry of Interior.

<sup>5</sup> Gen. Musharaf conducted general elections in 2002.

(Abbas, 2011). Furthermore, Islamist parties had campaigned against Pakistan's alliance with USA (Lieven, 2017). It results in solidification of public perception against military operations.

The high number of casualties in the operation Kalosha II led to the peace deal between terrorists and Pakistan government—peace deal was used as ratification of military failure in field. The political parties like Jamiat Ulama e Islam (JUI)<sup>6</sup> convinced Musharaf to pursue peace talk (Fair & Jones, 2011). Government chose the conciliatory option, whilst abandoning offensive means, and made peace accord named *Shakai agreement* with terrorists. Agreement was signed between the military and Nek Mohammed, a militant commander in 2004 (Shaukat & Shah, 2007). As a result of this accord, a general pardon and economic incentives were promised given that militants will display positive behaviour and loyalty to the state of Pakistan by renouncing militant activities. In return militants asked to lift the cordon, reconstruction of demolished houses in the operation Kalosha. Additionally, they demanded army to remain confined to the cantonments and don't meddle in internal and local matters (Khalid & Roy, 2016). The deal collapsed when Nek Muhammad got killed in drone strike. The failure of deal led to another attempt on the peace agreement termed as *Sararogha agreement* between Pakistan army and militants.

The Sararogha agreement, 2005, was signed between Pakistan military and Baitullah Masood—the successor of Nek Muhammad. The deal, like previous deal, failed and Baitullah Masood began suicide-bombing campaign in Pakistan, which persisted until his death in August 2009 (Khattak & Mushtaq, 2015). Peace deals failed to halt terrorists and their penetration in the country. Meanwhile, Taliban expanded to other areas of the country.

#### **5.1.1.2 Penetration of Talibans due of lack of CIMIC**

The phenomenon of “Talibinzation” which was previously limited to South and North Waziristan started to spread to the other regions. Taliban penetrated to the other areas, such as Bajaur agency, Orakzai agency, Khurram agency, and frontier areas of Bannu, Lakhi Marwat, DI Khan, Tank, Kohat and Swat (Fair & Jones, 2010). The most common reason for Taliban's success in penetration was poor socio-economic condition, governance failure including poor justice system, and frustration with government corruption. In addition, Fair

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<sup>6</sup> Musharaf's Party, Pakistan Muslim League-Q, had government in coalition with JUI in Baluchistan. JUI was part of the coalition government by Islamist parties in KPK as well. Gen. Musharaf couldn't risk tussles with the party.

and Jones attributed the expansion of the groups to government failure to provide security to the public against Taliban, and to the military's excessive use of force.

We seem to be agreeing that ill-governance was also an issue which resulted in the rise of militancy, the rise of militants in Swat being an example. We need to work on the governance front (Sheikh, 2017).

Moreover, public support is important for the government to counter terrorism. Discontent in public regarding government creates vacuum—a gap between people and government, which gives terrorists chance to find sympathizers (Mustafa, 2017). And selling the military mission to the public remains a duty of civilian leadership (Ehsan, 2018). Lack of public support<sup>7</sup> to military operations is stated as one cause of extension of terrorists and failure in achieving desired outcome of operations. The general public of the country opposed military operation, till early 2009 (Ahmed & Cheema, 2010). The opinions of the populace changed after 2009, when the atrocities and ambition of militants became too great to ignore (Lieven, 2017). In 2007, Pakistan military forces started battling the Group Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah-e-Mohammadia (TNSM) in Swat region (Fair, 2007).

Pakistan army conducted first operation in Swat Valley named *Operation Mountain Viper*. The title, as was aimed, failed to garner the support from locals in fight against local Islamist militants, and bound to be changed to inculcate sense of the bonding. Major General Nasser Janjua renamed the operation as *Operation Rah-e-Haq aimed* to give the Islamic basis to the operation. As explained in Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, that security of population is of utmost importance in efforts in combat operations (Jones & Fair, 2010). Thus, to reduce human loss/causalities, Maj. Gen Janjua cordoned the area and carried multiple searches to draw out insurgents. Concurrently, *military* kept supplying medics and food items to the affected areas. Selling the military mission to the public remains a duty of civilian leadership (Ehsan, 2018).

In 2008, an effort was made by Pakistan People's Party's (PPP) government to pull together a joint resolution to declare war on terrorism in parliament (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2008). But resolution met a failure as no follow up actions were taken to implement the objectives (Nawaz, 2016). Few right wing parties sounded differently in their comments

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<sup>7</sup> The perception that Pakistan is fighting America's war was present in the general public of Pakistan. Resultantly, Pakistan army faced lack of support for military operations.

regarding war on terrorism. Resultantly, PPP in his five years failed to take charge of counter terrorism operations. By 2009, security condition was worst than before in the country.

Pakistan was a most severe terrorism hit country in 2009 unlike previous years. (ICG, 2010). Country had crossed even Iraq and Afghanistan in death toll (Walsh, 2010). Pakistan army initiated final stage of operation Rah-e-Haq in Swat, but it ended with peace accord termed as *Malakand Agreement* (Khalid & Roy, 2016). In 2009, Pakistan military, after the failure of Malakand Agreement, conducted a final operation named Rah-e-Rast in Swat, and operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan the same year (Sheikh, 2014).

### **5.1.1.3 Civil Military divergences delayed CT and COIN operations**

After the operation against militants in South Waziristan and Swat, the great influx of terrorists took place in North Waziristan (NW) (Javaid, 2015). The military operation in NW was needed to combat talibans in the area. Government was divided on the matter of operation: some were in favour and the others in complete opposition (Express Tribune, 2014; Jamil, 2017). The PPP's leader Asif Ali Zardari tried to make political consensus to conduct military operation (Javaid, 2015). Despite of the severity threats, civil government couldn't unite on the matter. Concurrently, Gen Kiyani couldn't generate consensus in case of operation in NW (Nawaz, 2016). After all the pressure and assurances to USA, General Kiyani failed to launch operation in NW because he wished to have national consensus, which he couldn't produce. But, according to some, military was reluctant to conduct operation.

After five years of government, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani asserted that the PPP-led government wanted to launch a military operation in NW, but then military chief General Ashfaq Kayani was "reluctant" to do so (Tunio, 2014). Raza Rumi mentions in his report, that PPP government, which abdicated its responsibility of devising a strong national counterterrorism strategy in its five years tenure, when expressed its resolve to launch operation in NW was jeopardized by Gen Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani owing to his reluctance to do so (Rumi, 2015).

The most needed operation delayed due to divergences present between civil and military, and lack of proper counterterrorism policy and its implementation (Javaid, 2015). The area became the main sanctuary and heaven for militants, and they picked up their lost impetus in NW. The delay in decision provided time to militants to strengthen their hold in the region



(Express Tribune, 2014). The loophole, which was needed to be plugged, caused a lot the nation in the terms of human loss and socio-economic degradation.

In 2013, the then leadership after convening All Parties Conference (APC), after years of delay, considered the option of talks and decided to call terrorists to the negotiation table (Basit, 2015). Despite the peace talks, which were proposed by leaders of Tehrik e Taliban (TTP) themselves, attacks by militants never cessed (Javaid, 2015). This time reconciliatory policy by failed again after militants captured 23 FC soldiers and assassinated them in February, 2014 (Sherazi, 2014). Similarly, the assassination of three-star Gen Sana Ullah Niazi also prompted military for offensive action against talibans. But even then military didn't extinguish peace talks, and did not start operation unilaterally.

It has been argued that military leaders usually avoid opting for military operation until confident that they have broad popular backing (Weinbaum, 2017). In order to gain support, Pakistan needed consensual narrative on war on terrorism, which it lacked over the past years. Army while conducting operation termed it Pakistan's war, whereas, parties such as; PTI<sup>8</sup>, JI and JUI-F called it America's war. It, eventually, deprived military of popular support because of which not only military's determination was questioned but also hampered Pakistan's counterterrorism strategies (Ahmed, 2014). Thence, international pressure has rarely worked on Pakistan military to opt for offensive means until faced with the internal pressure (e.g. have popular support) after high profile terrorist attack on the soft targets in the country (Weinbaum, 2017).

Attack on Karachi airport on 8<sup>th</sup> June, 2014, was the final blow to the peace talks with militants (Zulfqar, 2017). The attack caused anger in public, and country solidly demanded military major ground assault against terrorists (Jamil, 2017; Weinbaum, 2017). As one of the civil interviewee highlighted in his interview that civil and military unite in the time of conflict, and both institutions cooperate under the internal pressure. In the result of terrorist attack, PM Nawaz Shareef had to abandon his ill fated peace talk approach and gave permission to go offensive and launch military operation in NW (Ali, 2016). Leadership of civil and military together decided to go for operation named *Zarb-e-Azab* (Javaid, 2015).

Zarb-e-Azab is a full scale and inclusive operation that has been launched in July, 2014, in the area of NW agency and FATA. According to Fazl ur Rehman—head of JUI-F, military

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<sup>8</sup> PTI emerged a ruling party in KPK after 2013 elections

decided operation and parliament merely approved it (Khan, 2014). He reiterated that parliament is helpless in front of military. Whereas, Sardar Mehtab Khan Abbasi made the claims opposite of JUI-F leader and asserted that civil and military is on the same page regarding the military operation Zarb-e-Azab (Express Tribune, 2014).

Operation achieved success to some extent as the stark relative decrease in attacks has been witnessed. The victory achieved by Operation Zarb-e-Azab is lauded by United States (Express Tribune, 2016). The factors; such as, full mandate given to army to destroy terrorist networks, national unity, full support from political parties, and civilian leadership contributed and made the successes of the operation possible (Javaid, 2015). It brought an end to the militant occupation, and restored government writ in the area. It also changed the internal political discourse of the country, and resultantly, has proved that negotiations or reconciliation approach is futile (Basit, 2016). But, successes of the operation couldn't overshadow the setbacks, which stopped operation to achieve complete success.

In the aftermath of Operation Zarb-e-Azab, government could not politically, socially and economically locate the displaced people (Afzal, 2017). Additionally, lack of implementation of NAP and civil authorities' slow progress has hindered operation to achieve desired results (Yousaf, 2016). Army carried out operation in tribal areas, whereas government has made little efforts to thwart terrorist attack i-e sectarian attacks in other parts of the country (Ibid., 47.). Notwithstanding the success, the narrow focus of Operation drew criticism as terrorist and militants were thriving in other parts of the country, especially in Punjab (Weinbaum, 2016). The start of operation Rad-ul-Fassad left those claiming *100 percent* success of operation Zarb-e-Azab in predicament (Hussain, 2017).

Operation in mainland of the country was as needed as any other operation in tribal regions. As it was said by one official who was the part of Operation Zarb-e-Azab that no operation can be successful and sustained without the corresponding action in heartland (Ali, 2016). The more terrorism is defeated at home, the more secure the borders will become (Hussain, 2017). Operation in Punjab was crucial but delayed owing to provincial political expediency (Yousaf, 2017).

There government of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) is criticized of being soft on the armed terrorist organisation present in Punjab. PML-N appeared to tolerate armed terrorists groups as long as they only launched attacks in other provinces (Lieven, 2017). Punjab talibans came back to home province, once they were driven out of NW and Tribal

Regions as a result of military operation (Hussain, 2017). One major terrorist group Jamat-ul-Ahrar resides in Punjab Province. It is a TTP splinter group, which has claimed responsibility of Easter day attack (Cookman, 2016). Notwithstanding the deadly attacks, Punjab Chief Minister turned down military's demand to grant armed force permission to enter into the province. Punjab Government resisted operation in Punjab (Qaiser, n.d.; Rafiq, 2017). One reason given for resistance was that party expects some kind of political support from the groups in the province (Salahuddin, 2017; Qaiser, n.d.). The delay in operation gave militants ample space and time to regroup in province (Hussain, 2017).

Civil government declined military call to provide legal cover for military deployment in the province (Ali, 2016). As Punjab Chief minister's brother was running federal government, no green light was expected from Islamabad either (Rafiq, 2017). Though civil government expressed its resolve against terrorism in the country, but did not utter a word on operation in Punjab. Prime Minister in his public speech, while referring to counterterrorism operations in general terms, did not talk about the one in Punjab (Abrar, 2016). Government, like past operations, failed to take ownership of the counterterrorism operation (Hussain, 2017).

In 2017, Pakistan army decided another operation Rad-ul-Fassad in the result of deadliest spate of terrorist attacks, especially attack on Sufi Shrine, in the country (Chawla, 2017). After series of attacks, Islamabad after approving request forwarded by Punjab government permitted Rangers deployment into Punjab (Bukhari, 2017). The whole nation including political leadership, even the otherwise divergent political factions for one reason or another stood behind military (Jamil, 2017). The operation was announced as continuance of National Action Plan (Shaukat, 2017). It was aimed at consolidating the gains from previous operations, ensuring security of borders and elimination of latent threat of extremism and terrorism across the country. This operation is unique per se as it was the first time government allowed Pakistan military entered one of the most populated province of the country (Salahuddin, 2017).

### **5.1.2 Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Baluchistan**

Pakistan's ineptness to manage multi ethnicity has caused severe problems in the country. In Baluchistan, the biggest province area wise, managing and incorporation of different ethnic identities has always been a bone of conflict. Though multiple military operations have been conducted in other parts of the country and the menace of Taliban remains the highlights of the country's news, but Baluchistan insurgency predominantly and deliberately has long been

concealed from the country's general public (Khurshid, 2015). The insurgency has failed to attract required media attention for a long time in the country. The crisis prevailing in the province caught national attention in past few years (Ansari, 2012).

Baluchistan, which holds the geostrategic importance for the world, has been struggling with the insurgency from last many years. After the killing of Akbar Bugti, the political figure of the province and head of Bugti tribe, province became politically polarised (Ibid). Killing of Akbar Bugti started fourth generation of insurgency in the province (Ahmar, 2016). It was the point which seemed of *no return* for Baluchistan. The new series of rebellious kicked off and spree of bombing, abduction and killing begun in the province in 2006 (Meer, 2016). The situation, attacks on Punjab settlers and Hazara community in the province caused the security emergency and threatened to derail development projects in the province, which urged security forces of the country to start operation against Baloch people.

Military in corporation with intelligence agencies such as, IB and ISI, and FC, police levies, and death squad of the country cracked down and attempted to crush the insurgency in the province. Military operations further aggravated the nationalist tendencies (Javaid, n.d.). The major security operation that had been conducted in Baluchistan resulted in 200,000 internally displaced people (IDPs). The problems mainly of political nature which could have been solved with political solution, resort to use of force by Musharaf deteriorated the situation (ICG, 2006). The use of more sticks than carrots proved counterproductive (Ahmar, 2016).

The approach includes the killing and dumping operation and human rights abuses have been attributed to the security agencies (AFP, 2012). With the crisis in the country picking momentum and attracting national attention, many voices have been raised by major political parties in the country. Supreme Court of Pakistan has taken the notice of the missing person's case (ibid).

Despite of multiple development projects initiated by government of Musharaf's who believed it would break the stronghold of Saradars in the region; it further breeds resentments because Baloch have diminutive access to the benefits. Similarly, adding fuel to the fire, heavy handed handling of the problem stimulated the nationalist sympathies. They, whilst losing faith in political system and power sharing in the country, showed strong resentment towards Punjabis and military (Javaid, n.d.).

Moreover, since 2008 government of Pakistan as a part of reforms has devolved the power to the provincial government, passed special rights package, and increase Baluchistan shares in the federal revenue (Ansari, 2012). Government has also offered amnesty to the militants and rebels of the province, which has yielded positive results and many, have surrendered (Nabeel, 2017). Though the efforts are made to address the issue in the province and give an end to the insurgency, but poor governance has led to poor implementations of the efforts. Additionally, underdevelopment of the area provides ideal conditions for armed groups to operate in the province (Sadaat, 2018).

As has been explained;

I don't see much seriousness by the provincial or the federal governments to confront terror. Qazi Faiz Isa Report says a lot regarding the failure of the government in formulating a cohesive and sustainable policy to tackle terror (Hasan, 2017).

### **Lack of civil and military coordination and cooperation (C&C) affected kinetic efforts**

Pakistan's efforts though are based on widespread military operations aimed to free the area from terrorists, and put an end to this threat, but it lacked civil and military cooperation and coordination. As it has been discussed before that employment of only military means is bound to affect efforts, Pakistan earlier efforts in KPK and Baluchistan prove this case. The merely containing the threat backfired in many aspects. Gen. Musharaf's choices to crush the threat, whilst completely ignoring civil national power affected the measures to combat.

Furthermore, considering the importance of perceptions, the civil government failure to galvanize public support has provided Taliban a chance to sell their narrative and attracting more people towards their ambitions. Similarly, the lack of civil cooperation to the military not only halted military operations to achieve desired objectives but also caused terrorist penetration to the other areas.

Moreover, the divergences between civil and military have caused the delay in most needed military operation to halt the penetration of talibans in the country. Civil and military coordination and cooperation includes mutual support, negotiation, de-confliction and planning between institutions at all levels. But it has been observed in cases of Zarb-e-Azab and Rad-ul-Fassad that lack of civil government support to military, their lack of planning

based on cooperation, failure to de-conflict over military operations has delayed efforts, which were important to strengthen the gains of previous military operations. The lack of cooperation between civil and military stopped a comprehensive operation like Zarb-e-Azab from gaining complete success, and caused country in terms of human loss. Similarly, the military operation in Punjab was delayed, which was necessary to consolidate Zarb-e-Azab achievements, and to stop Punjabi Taliban from consolidating places in the province of Punjab and eliminate them.

In addition to above, civil and military responded to internal pressure formed in the result of major terrorist attack in the country. As it has been witnessed in last two military operations, major terrorists attack push civil and military to cooperate. They overcome their divergences and cooperate in the face of massive loss. Thence, terrorist attacks in the country unite civil and military institutions.

### **5.2.0 Civil-Military Cooperation in Post Conflict Rehabilitation**

Counterterrorism is the task that never ends with military victory. It is a task starting from the planning that engulfs all the aspects of combating terrorism to during conflict handling of the issues, and extends to post conflict rehabilitation. The kinetic and non kinetic means to combat terrorism work hand in hand (Salahuddin, 2017). But, the post war implementation of rehabilitation policies is not military responsibility, but political in nature (Ehsan, 2018). The lack of implementation of such policies leads to the diffusion of the very purpose for which military force was originally used (Ibid).

Pakistan has conducted around 14 major operations against anti state elements. The task of Pakistan military was to carry military operations, whereas, non-kinetic responsibilities such as de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, governance and politico-administrative reforms were on civil government (Afridi, 2016). Pakistan has conducted multiple operations against terrorism, most of which were hardly followed by political efforts.

### **3.2.1 Lack of CIMIC in Rehabilitation and Reintegration efforts**

One of the major operations in history of Pakistan has been conducted in Swat valley. Though, after the operation, military took lead in the rehabilitation projects, but Apex Committee<sup>9</sup> approved the timeline for transition from military to civilian control. Both civil

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<sup>9</sup> A body consists of senior-level civil and military officials.

and military, members of Apex Committee, devised strategy together for governance responsibilities transition to the civilian government (Flieschner, 2011). Additionally, with civil and military representation, the regional committee was established just to improve coordination to facilitate transition. Despite of all the efforts, transition couldn't materialize because of civil government failure to galvanize public opinion in favour of the new political system (ibid., p,7.). Military cleared the area from militants, but government fell short in implementation of COIN strategy in building phase. Marvin G. Weinbaum explains COIN strategy in his article *Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan*:

A population-centric approach is designed mainly through development programs to win over the loyalty, trust and confidence of local populations. To gain this popular support, civil authority is expected to take the lead from the military in providing educational and health facilities, greater economic opportunities, and a quality of governance that can inspire confidence (Weinbaum, 2017).

Pakistan government when given an opportunity to take a lead showed an absence of either will or capacity (Ibid., p,42.). Local people have blamed Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Settlement Authority (PARSA) for slow recovery and governmental mismanagement (Conway, 2011). People have claimed that Swat could again become hub of terrorists if social and economical issues don't get addresses, which is not military but political government's job. Pakistan army played a great role, and has done solely developmental work in area (Hali, 2018).

Military has been key institution in carrying out tasks of security and development. The major tasks ranging from reconstruction of schools and roads to even electrification of the villages were carried out by military after operation in swat (Dawn, 2010). Pakistan military mobilised resources for the developmental work, and federal government and provincial government put funds to undertake the projects (Ibid). Whereas, army helped government in raising Swat levies and community police force to develop their capacities to retain area once army evacuate. Furthermore, after the devastating flood in Swat military remained a critical force for stability in the region. Whilst political administration of Swat remained determined, military, police and government officials have also made concerted efforts to introduce institutions and new programmes for counterterrorism and rebuilding (Flieschner, 2011).

Similarly, in the aftermath of operation Zarb-e-Azab a large influx of temporary displaced people occurred. Only within first week of operation, 450,000 people vacated the agency (Weinbaum, 2017). It was high time for government to be prepared in order to address the issues arising during and post operation. Government of Pakistan was ill equipped to deal with the humanitarian crisis (Hameed, 2015). The pledges made by the government, Nawaz Shareef, to repatriate refugees met the failure (Weinbaum, 2017). Government has no comprehensive resettlement plan of IDPs (Hameed, 2015).

Moreover, military had expressed concerns over delay in release of funds for IDP's rehabilitation and repatriation (Jamil, 2016). The same achievements, just as successes achieved in operation in Zarb e Azab, could not be made in politico development areas with the same pace by other national powers due to the lack of will for reasons of political expediencies (Khattak, 2017).

### **5.2.2 De-Radicalisation Programmes**

We have long entered the era in which War on Terrorism is transitioning to the war of Idea. The mere widespread efforts to deprogram bomb can't yield conclusive results if not accompanied with deprogramming of humans. More is needed than just to defeat terrorism and militancy to win the war of ideas. Combating terrorism and countering extremism needs an inclusive strategies and concrete planning.

A consensus prevails that to fight terrorism, there is need to go beyond intelligence and security approach, and shall embrace proactive measures to save susceptible individuals from radicalising and rehabilitating those who have embraced extremism (Pettyjohn et al., 2010). De-radicalisation and disengagement are measures to deprogram and rehabilitate radicalised individuals (Munir, 2018). The de-radicalisation is a process after which an individual forgo his extremist views, renounce violence and accept more incremental pluralist views (Khan, 2015). The lessons learnt from America in Iraq and Afghanistan projects that the usage of only kinetic means are capital offensive, long drawn and time consuming. Thus, despite the efforts, pulls people to militancy and further deteriorates situation (Basit, 2015).

Psychological measures have to be included in counterterrorism operation in order to lure people away from terrorist groups (Khan, 2018). The repeated operations in Pakistan with the aim to drive militants out of the tribal belt of the country, failed to reduce the intensity of their acts, which ushered country to acknowledge/recognize the importance of soft power in



the military operations. It was later on acknowledged in Pakistan that kinetic measures fail to prove effective if not accompanied with non-kinetic means (Afridi, 2016). The concentration of youth who were the suicide bombers among the detainees apprehended in Swat Operation, in the program, exposed the problems attached to the kinetic measures against terrorists (Basit, 2015). Afterwards, security forces changed their conventional counterterrorism approaches to the hard measures combine with soft measures approach.

Pakistan's policy of soft power is a mixture of de-radicalisation and counter radicalisation, which not only aimed to de-radicalise extremist but also prevent society from absorbing violent ideas (Munir, 2018). A wide array of de-radicalisation programmes were initiated by Pakistan army with the help of local civil society *Hum Pakistan Foundation* in Swat region of KPK, in 2009 (Afridi, 2016).

Programs that were initiated are referred to as De-radicalisation and Emancipation Program (DREP). They were based on rehabilitation of detained militants in operation (Kaiser, 2014). The initiatives started were aimed to have cost effective and result oriented approach to address the concerns regarding tangible and non tangible aspects of terrorism. The programs were also designed to provide the environment favourable for self –respect restoration (Azam & Fatima, 2017).

Programmes had involved three programmes named *Sabawoon* for juveniles 12-18, *Mashal* for adults' detainees, and *Sparlay* for the families of the detainees (ibid). All of the three programmes were aimed to educated detainees, and the curricula included education including corrective religious education, vocational training, the therapy, and counselling. Programmes also include discussions sessions based on module of social issues, and discussion sessions with the family of detainees (Khan, 2015).

Currently, there are ten militants rehabilitation centres are operating in different parts of the country (Basit, 2015). The programmes are six in numbers, including above three, named Rastoon for 18-25, Phytion, Heila project (Basit, 2015). In addition, programs like FEAST, Punjab Rehabilitation centres—though dysfunctional, Khyber programmes, Navi Sahar are other initiatives being carried out in the country.

Authorities claimed 99 percent success rate in which near to 2500 Taliban fighters had been re-formed and de-radicalised (Khan, 2015; Azam & Fatima, 2017). Along with the programme many non-governmental organisations also conducted de-radicalisation

programmes, which were comprised of interfaith dialogues to counter the established extremist narratives. Simultaneously, later de radicalisation program was also initiated in FATA and Punjab (Basit, 2015).

In 2011, a special programme of rehabilitation and training programme was also initiated in two areas; Bawalupur and Rajanpur of Punjab province. It was conducted as a pilot programme under joint management of Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (Tevta) (Shabbir, 2011; Munir, 2018). Program was aimed for specific individuals, those who have taken part in Afghanistan and Kashmir jihad. The program rehabilitated people from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and anti Shia groups such as Lashar-e-Jangvi (LeJ) Sipha-e-Sahaba (SSP) (Basit, 2015). The total number of 311 former militants completed their training.

In 2012, program was shelved due to fund scarcity (Munir, 2018), and discontinuity in the programme has also been linked to non-seriousness of the authorities, and least priority given by Punjab government to counter raising extremisms and terrorism (Ghumman, 2014). Resultantly, 1,300 people who were supposed to undergo program could not be taken on board (Ibid).

#### **5.2.2.1 CIMIC in De-Radicalisation Efforts**

Moreover, after operation in North and South Waziristan Government of Pakistan initiated other de-radicalisation camps and madrasah reforms across the country under NAP in January, 2015. Programmes of rehabilitation, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation started on the pattern of Swat de-radicalisation programme (Awan, 2015). It was aimed to mainstream radicalised and extremist elements. Camps were supervised by provincial governments with the assistance of psychologist, psychiatrist, and experts from intelligence agencies and military<sup>10</sup> (Khan, 2016). Financial Assistance scheme of Rs. 9.33 millions was accordingly approved by the government for the programme.

In 2015, another de-radicalisation program also started for nine months. Program was executed by Punjab CTD with an assistance of Provincial Strategic Council and Board and Swat de-radicalisation experts. Punjab home minister Shuja Khanzada (late) elaborated when asked that in order to pursue National Action Plan many steps are taken, and programmes of rehabilitation are most significant one started (Awan, 2015).

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<sup>10</sup> Military experts who ran Swat de-radicalisation program.

Most of the de-radicalisation programmes have been led by military, and has little connection with the scattered efforts made by police and government elsewhere in the country (Khan, 2015). Two separate de-radicalisation programmes are present in the country, one is led by military in tribal regions, and other one is led by Punjab civil authorities with assistance of military experts from Swat de-radicalisation assistance. But in order to get desired results government is needed to device more active and integrated strategies (Khan, 2015). Pakistan needs national de-radicalisation programmes (Ayubi, 2017), which could integrate the two programmes being run in the country.

In post conflict scenario, civil and military have manifested cooperation. Though, both have worked together for the resettlement and for the de-radicalisation of masses, yet gaps remained there. As it has been discussed in UN CIMIC part that CIMIC entails mutual support between both the institutions, but it has been lagging in Pakistan's case. Military fought earth-scorched war but lacked civil backup to implement COIN strategies afterwards. Military remained the front force in the efforts, whereas, civil government showed ineptness. The delay in funds, and not playing their role effectively in rehabilitation of IDPs generated widespread concerns in the country. As many concerns prevailed that if IDPs remain unemployed and deprived, militants might avail the opportunity and use it against state.

Similarly, in efforts to fight the extremist mindset, de radicalisation programs were started by military. Though a program in Punjab was started by civil government, but lack of interests by the authorities halted the efforts. Later on, military helped civil government to start their own program in other areas of the country. Civil and military together made efforts to de-radicalise people from main terrorist groups.

### **5.3.0 Counter Terrorism Policies and Initiatives**

Pakistan, notwithstanding the internal flaw, has stayed secured in the face of multiple external and internal threats due to the efforts of civil and military efforts. However inadequately, both the *superstructure* institutions have ensured that borders of the state stay intact, law and orders is maintained, and daily governmental affairs don't get jeopardized (Ahmad, 2016). Internal threats have not weakened the will of the state's institution to fight and combat for the survivability of the state. The resilience of the civil and military institutions, however much they underperform, should not be undermined (Weinbaum, 2017). Both institutions have manifested unity in the form of civil and military combined efforts in CT and COIN.

Pakistan's efforts have evolved significantly over last few years. Civil and military institutions have united against the terrorism in the country. A wide range of measures to counter terrorism have been taken together by civil and military institutions, but still there is a gap that has to be filled. There are multiple factors that have contributed and affected the measures, including infrastructures, taken by Pakistan to become fully successful. Following are the few major measures, which includes national policies, institutions and committees, taken in country to counter terrorism and extremism.

### **5.3.1 National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)**

Pakistan's efforts in contemporary time to counter terrorism and insurgency are not limited to offensive means. In 2008, National Counter terrorism Authority was formed and set up in 2009 by then civil government of Pakistan's People's party to draft National Counter Terrorism and Extremism strategy (Yusuf, 2014). But the act of NACTA, after the lapse of five years, was passed by parliament in 2013 to provide it a legal cover (Tarar, 2017).

NACTA was formed to be homeland security coordination body; a primary civil body entrusted with counterterrorism, counter extremism, and de-radicalisation efforts of the state (Yusuf, 2014). It was established with the mandate to unify civil and military intelligence agencies (Hussain, 2012). In essence, it was aimed to coordinate nationwide efforts made by federal, provincial, military, LEA's and civilian intelligence agencies to combat terrorism (ICG, 2015).

To combat the possible blowback from terrorism in effective manner necessitates the cooperation of multiple actors involved in national counter terrorism efforts. The active nature of NACTA was the priority for the achievement of these objectives. But, NACTA had long gone from being an umbrella organization, as was conceived, to just a government think tank (Yusuf, 2014). It remained a fundamental challenge for the country.

#### **3.3.1.1 NACTA: A victim of civil military factionalism/ lack of cooperation and coordination**

NACTA provides the example of how civil military factionalism have affected/undermined positive steps to bring coherence in national policies. Additionally, the effort did not achieve full success in past because of multiple reasons; such as, dual control over the institutions, and problems on information sharing between Ministry of Interior and intelligence agencies (Rumi, 2015; Pervez, 2014). It remained inactive since its inception till 2013 because of turf

of war over the control between powerful Pakistan military and civil government (Zahid, 2016; Basit, 2016). After years of discord, its authority like Intelligence bureau and ISI was placed under prime minister (Pervez, 2014). And in order to solve problem related to Intelligence sharing, an endeavour was made to form Joint Intelligence Directorate.

The formation of JID, reworked version of Directorate of Internal Security proposed in NISP<sup>11</sup>, under NACTA was the need of the hour. Through JID, all intelligence agencies had to share intelligence through NACTA with federal and provincial government (Rumi, 2015). As Rumi (2015) mentions that ISI has shown reluctance to share intelligence with NACTA because agency is sensitive regarding the security of intelligence information, mostly military oriented, coming from its sources (ibid., 10.). As one of the interview from civil side has mentioned that trust deficit between civil and military institution has slowed down many efforts to combat terrorism. It has been argued that military does not want to relinquish turf to the civil (Haider, 2014). Resultantly, it remained a pipeline dream due to trust deficit between civil and military on one hand, and federal and provincial government on the other hand (Rehman et al., 2018).

Moreover, sharing of information between police and intelligence agencies is also almost absent owing to poor cooperation between departments, and due to NACTA's ineffectual status (Cheema & Qurat-ul-Ain, 2016). The ex-National Coordination (NC), head of NACTA, highlighted that no province sends or shares data owing to NACTA's ineffectiveness (Saeed & Khan, 2015). Additionally, the lack of coordination among police, civil intelligence apparatus, and military intelligence agency has affected police capacity to counter terrorism and insurgency effectively.

NACTA is a primary body of overlooking national CT ad COIN policies, which has not been established effectively, and remained unproductive (Dogar, 2017). Many claims have been made, without a single proof, by government about the function and operational nature of NACTA (Pakistan Observer, 2018). Though, JID has been established under NACTA consisting of 413 members from MI, ISI, and other security agencies, but not much is known about its functioning and achievements (Rana, 2017). It posed direct challenge to the seriousness of the government regarding the threats. NAP also emphasised on empowering of institution (Khan et al., 2016).

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<sup>11</sup> National internal security policy has been explained in coming sections.

The friction between civil and military, like many other efforts, has affected the national institute against terrorism. The dilemma, despite of the problems the country has been going through, over the control on institutions between civil and military delayed the working of the institution. The gap between the establishing of NACTA and passing its act in 2013 portrays the problems that lie in the very roots of the country. It impeded the process, and even hindered the growth of a significant institution to combat terrorism in the country. Though, NAP helped in removing the dichotomy of control and remove hurdles in coordination between ministries and agencies, but it still has a long way to become fully functional national counterterrorism institution.

Civil and military institutions, despite of sharing mutual threat and being on the same page against it, fell short to cooperate and coordinate adequately. Following UN CMIC's definition, civil and military support each other and exchange information at all levels. Absence of said elements has left NACTA ineffective. NACTA, which could be utilized as best tool/institution of national power against terrorism and insurgency, yields no satisfactory results owing to lack of CIMIC. The unity is unprecedented, but both institutions have to cooperate and coordinate more adequately to make NACTA successful.

### **5.3.2 Cabinet Committee on National Security**

A collective thinking is sought in democratic country to device short, medium and long term strategies (Business Recorder, 2015). The major problem that remained in Pakistan is that all the decisions i-e defence, security, and even foreign affairs independently were taken by military leadership (Masood, 2013). Resultantly, lacking institutional decision making resulted in looking into the problem in compartments, and not holistically (Ibid). According to PILDAT report, there was a need for institutionalization of decision making in national security affairs, for which Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) was created.

#### **5.3.2.1 CCNS: Embodiment of civil military unity and coordination**

In 2013, Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) soon after taking hold of the offices renamed cabinet committee of defence as CCNS (Dawn, 2013) It was formed as a subcommittee of a federal cabinet (Rumi, 2015). It is consisted of Federal, Interior, Finance, and Defence Ministers, head of three wings of Defence Forces, and Joint Chief of Staff Committee (Dawn, 2013). It was an exemplary action in history where all the leaders came

together on one forum in history under one political leadership. CCNS is practically the highest forum for civil-military coordination (Syed, 2016).

The formation of CCNS was the sound decision (Masood, 2013). The essence of committee was to seek better coordination with military on national security issues (Rumi, 2015). It was formed with the assertion that federal cabinet and Prime Minister are the authorities over national security decision making and implementation (The Express Tribune, 2018). The decision was taken that committee would devise policies, which would provide guidance and framework to all other subsidiary policies such as, defence policies, foreign policies and internal policies on national defence and security (PMO, 2013). For the Support and the effective working of the committee, National Security Division was also formed (Rumi, 2015).

CCNS though has been termed as a positive step, yet not remained uncriticized. It has faced some vital condemnation. It has been argued that military not one lead any effort but also is very much part of the all initiatives taken by civil government. Military based internal security institutions poses challenges to the civil government/institutions, where government and internal security institutions have to share its power, responsibilities, and even resources with military (Rana, 2018). Similarly, it has been argued that military role translates into an incursion into the domain of police force of the provinces by playing additional functions than just assigned role (Chaudhry, 2014). Where all the three chiefs of the forces are the part of cabinet committee on national security, no police head from all the Pakistan, who constitutionally are responsible for national security, are part of such process/initiatives (ibid., 21.).

Formation of CCNS has portrayed the cohesion present in civil military institutions against common menace. The criticism that CCNS has to face has ignored the nature of changing threats, and the arrangements it demands for from a country. As it has been mentioned earlier that in time of sever internal threats role of military increases as compare to conventional threats. Resultantly, civil and military institutions need to adjust owing to the changing demands. Additionally, head of minister of interior, the ministry under which all the LEAs operate, is the member of CCNS. It has presented the Pakistan's changing approach of including all the actors, old and new, in the efforts against threats it has been faced with from last many years.

### **5.3.3 National Internal Security Policy**

Every state needs guidelines in the form of national security policy (NSP) to address the concerns of the security of the people and the state. NSP does not only illuminate the threat perception, but, concurrently, present integrated approach to counter threats that a state is faced within borders (Haris, 2014). National Security Policy presents an analysis of all threats that a state is faced with, and ways of facing them. Thence, allow for coherent comprehension, and implementation of the policies made to address security issues by all actors' involved in national security (Flückiger, 2008).

Historically, Pakistan had tried to cope up with its internal security threats through military operations, and country had failed to devise comprehensive national security strategy (Haider, 2014). Devising national security policy has always been mind boggling task for people of Pakistan (Yasmin et al., 2017). But formation of NISP overcame the above said problems.

#### **5.3.3.1 Formation of NISP: An important endeavour to CT and COIN**

The Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, successor of Pakistan People's party, was pushed by then Chief of Army Staff Gen Pervez Kiyani to hasten the creation of national security policy (Nawaz, 2016). The then PM Nawaz Shareef's close acquaintance, Interior minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, was entrusted with the task. All the efforts, conceived and formulated by Ministry of Interior incorporation with NACTA, yield the results in the form of NISP, 2014-2018. It was an unprecedented effort made in Pakistan's history, which was one of its own kind (Farooq & Zaidi, 2014).

Pakistan's strategy for internal security has been explained under the NISP. It has defined the policy structure which engulfed the integrated and institutionalised efforts under the democratic leadership of the Pakistan (Farooq & Zaidi, 2014). NISP also chalked down the course of action in order to execute the strategies (Khalid & Kanwal, 2015).

It was the first ever effort by civil government, and the first time political government announced its vision on internal security. CCNS reviewed and approved the document, whereas, approved by full federal cabinet in 2014 (Rumi, 2015). Later in same year the document was presented in National Assembly, which is the representative body of the country, to gain political consensus for counterterrorism strategies. NISP, as has been claimed, has succeeded to produce unprecedented consent from the people from whole



country (Niaz, 2018). But, meanwhile, provinces were not fully consulted in policy formation; neither discussed the policy in Parliament (Rana, 2017; Rumi, 2015).

NISP had detailed and determined implementation plan. It termed Ministry of Interior as a lead institution which is tasked with implementing the policies (NACTA, 2014). It was mentioned in 11 pager document that since Pakistan is faced with non conventional threats; such as militancy, terrorism, sectarianism and extremism, thence, it is beyond the control of any one single state's institution. It had planned division of responsibilities between federal and the provinces. The initiatives were also divided in hard and soft means given along the suggested timeline and financial resources. The intelligence sharing was absent owing to poor cooperation between security agencies, and due to non-operational nature of NACTA, which has duly been addressed by NISP (Cheema & Ain, 2016). Moreover, NISP primary purpose is to improve coordination between intelligence agencies of the country, which includes both civil and military agencies (Rehman et al., 2018).

The document covers a wide array of measures to counter terrorism, insurgency and extremisms. The “whole of Nation” approach has been used in policy formulation process (Niaz, 2018). Though it was a significant endeavour to include broad-based approach to counter terrorism and provide a chance to civil institutions to nurture and strengthen—meanwhile, yet lacked short to connect military counterterrorism efforts with the approaches that civilians have accentuated (Ibid).

### **5.3.3.2 Lack of CIMIC hindered NISP**

Civil and military institution had failed to reach the common planning for the implementation of NISP (Zahid, 2016). Its attempt to achieve desired objectives has been curtailed by military intelligence apparatus, and lack of the cooperation from provinces to get on board in reference to their required commitments (Rumi, 2015). It has been said that when institutions system aren't in place, every policy becomes reactive (Nawaz, 2016). Owing to flaws in Pakistan's institutions no one of the NISP policies has been implemented, and no visible results based on civil-military coordinated and joint planning could be seen anywhere (Nawaz, 2016) .

Moreover, the lack in implementation can also be attributed to the problem prevailing between the government and opposition i-e PTI and PMLN. The sit-ins in the capital of the country actually added to the already troubled situation, and it diverted government attention

from policy making to the struggle of its own survival (Rumi, 2015). Similarly, the lack of priority given to NSP in terms of funding by provincial and federal government also halted it.

Furthermore, the underperformance of a national institution affected national security policy. Rehman et al. (2018) explain that policy is just a piece of paper unless and until implemented in its true spirit. NACTA has been assigned with the task of NISP implementation, materializing the text of national policy, which itself is not a fully functional and an efficient institution (Rehman et al., 2018).

The policy document has been renewed for the period of 2018-2023 by the PML-N government on the last day of its tenure (Niaz, 2018). Ihsan Iqbal was tasked to divulge the policy features but due of the shortage of time ministry had to release the summary. The new document included the lessons taught in past years and the future course of security actions against threats such as Daesh (IS).

NISP fulfilled the country's need to have a national policy that addresses all the issues and presents measures to overcome them, but lack of CIMIC jeopardized its success. Owing to civil and military lack of trust, and their way to prioritize their institutional interests, NISP had to face the same fate as many other efforts.

### **5.3.4 National Action Plan (NAP)**

#### **5.3.4.1 NAP: An unprecedented unity between civil and military institutions in the country**

In December, 2014, after the heart-wrenching killing of school children in Peshawar, KPK, the unprecedented national cohesion was witnessed. After the attack civil and military leadership put their heads together to devise action plans against the terrorism that was attacking the heart<sup>12</sup> of the nation. The NAP, like many other efforts, was the outcome of a severe terrorist attack in the country. With the development of NAP, a line has been drawn between the whole nation and coward terrorists (Khan et al., 2016).

The National Action Plan is considered a milestone that a country has achieved in the history of Pakistan. Brigd. Nasir Saleem Akhtar, in his interview mentioned that NAP was an effective and multipronged national plan. He further reiterated that NAP generated an outstanding example of cooperation between civil and military institution after the APS

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<sup>12</sup> As said by then Chief of Army staff, that terrorist attacked the kids. They have attacked our hearts.

massacre. It was a most significant, unlike past measures, because of generating consensus in otherwise resentfully divergent political parties’—besides civil-military agreement (PILDAT, 2015; Salahuddin, 2016). It, simultaneously, helped country change its approaches towards terrorism and insurgency.

Pakistan has shifted its approach, and weaves together both soft and hard measures through NAP to counter terrorism and extremism (Orakzai, 2017). It was aimed at producing generic goals and specific policies as well as target extremism and terrorism in the country. Primarily the move was aimed to come hard on the elements that have been targeting country, and has massively affected its economy. Later with the collaboration of civil government—federal and provincial, scope of the plan has been widened to not only target terrorists in FATA, but the urban financiers, abettors and supporters of the terrorism (Khurshid, 2015). The plan consists of 20 points; mostly NISP objectives and goals were rearticulated/ reemphasized, except the addition of two extra points; such as lifting moratorium on death penalty and establishment of military courts (NUST Research Team, 2015).

The enactment of NAP points towards the void left in the prior measures take to combat terrorism and insurgency; such as, NISP (NUST Research Team, 2015; Zahid, 2015). The twenty points covered and addressed widespread concerns. The points, such as issues of madrasah, finance choking issue of terrorists, targeting the communication networks, media and social media usage for disseminating messages, reformation criminal justice system, concluding operation in Karachi, strengthening of NACTA, solution to FATA, forbidding all the extreme armed organization from the country, and countering hate speech etc., included nearly all the issues that were necessarily to be concentrated on in the war on terrorism in the country.

#### **5.3.4.2 Military hinders the growth of civil institutions in the country**

The civil and military institutions of Pakistan have their significant role in addressing the threat, and implementing NAP. Establishing of military courts after 21<sup>st</sup> amendment in ATA 1887 is a salient aspect for faster conviction of terrorists (Weinbaum, 2016). But it has hindered the most needed reformation in civil institution. Though criminal justice system is less efficient and sufficient for the country, but military courts further slowed down it’s working (Zahid, 2015). It would be damaging for the working of both institutions (Beg, 2015). It is imperative to breathe life in Pakistan’s justice system, area in which NAP

completely failed because of lack of initiative from federal and provincial government (Qureshi, 2018).

Moreover, some observers claim that NAP is military in nature, it squeezed the place of civilian (Zahid, 2015). Military occupies a key role in the efforts against terrorism and extremism. Most of the people argued that military centric approach is limited in capacity to address root causes of the problem and is not sustainable and perpetual solution (Salahuddin, 2016). Similarly, it has been mentioned by one of the interviewee that CT and COIN is not military specialized area. But contrary to such claims, NACTA<sup>13</sup> which has responsibility to implement NAP has no human power, vision and capacity. Ultimately, security agency had to fill the void and take over the initiatives (Rana, 2017).

#### **5.3.4.3 Lack of CMIC has made NAP a partially successful policy effort**

NAP though has achieved some success and 45<sup>14</sup> percent reduction in terrorist activities in year 2015 has been witnessed—just a year after its formation, but it's successfully implementation demands cooperation between civil and military institutions (Shamil & Cheema, 2017). The expedition in execution of civil aspect of NAP is important to make military operation successful<sup>15</sup>, which lags far behind (Afzal, 2017). One of the interviewee from military highlighted in his interview that military has been doing its part in NAP, whereas civil lags behind in cooperation to perform its tasks. As in addition to delays in other areas, the lack of cooperation from right wing parties has halted the state's action against madrasah. As action against madrasah is an important point in NAP, they refused to support NAP if madrasah were attacked (Salahuddin, 2016). The interviewee also mentioned in his interview that, owing to internal flaws, implementation of NAP is not at the desirable pace. Pakistan army has time and again expressed its concerns regarding the points in NAP that are not being addressed by political leadership (Shamil & Cheema, 2017). Thence, political–military lack of cooperation has turned NAP into national inaction plan (Hussain, 2018).

Moreover, lack of provincial and inter-provincial cooperation has affected NAP<sup>16</sup> (Warraich, 2017). Some political parties in provinces, especially in Sindh, consider that rangers and anti-

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<sup>13</sup> According to PILDAT report, ministry of interior and NACTA has vague, wavering and weak role in implementation of NAP.

<sup>14</sup> Anwar Iqbal, "Statistics Show Marked Drop in Terrorist Attacks" Dawn, September 5, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1282160>

<sup>15</sup> After Operation Zarb-e-azab, Government has failed to integrate economically, socially and politically displaced people.

<sup>16</sup> NAP has 5-point federal components and 15-points provincial component (The News, 2015).

terror laws are working against them, which also contributed in hampering implementation as they not go all out for NAP (PILDAT, 2017). Moreover, according to one of the interviewee from civil side, NAP fell short to achieve its objectives because of lack of cooperation from the provinces. The lack of coordination and cooperation among state institutions, and civil-military discord remained a major challenge in NAP's successful implementation (Rana, 2016).

NAP is, undoubtedly, an epitome of civil military unity at time of severe threats. The efforts was aimed to bring cooperation and coordination between different institutions of the state, has failed due to divergences present in the country. It has fell victim of political expediencies and institutional arrogance. Political parties prioritize their interests, and completely ignore the needs of the country. The civil lack of cooperation to military made the historical effort a partial success. Hence, ineffective nature of NAP can be attributed to the political will that it lacks in many areas. It demands full commitment from both institutions, if it is to be made a complete success.

### **5.3.5 Formation of Provincial Apex Committee**

#### **5.3.5.1 Civil Military unity against common threats**

State of Pakistan didn't limit its endeavours and efforts to only presenting of policy structure. Formation of NAP was followed by the making of Provincial Apex Committees (PACs) (Syed, 2015). It includes civil and military leadership, which projected the desire of both institutions to implement NAP in its true essence. The aim of establishment of committees is to oversee the implementation of NAP (Zahid, 2015). The establishing of PACs, according to Inter Services Public Relation, marked the beginning of NAP implementation (Syed, 2015).

The PACs are tasked to work as a coordinating body between civil and government at provincial level. The panel would include the provincial civil head and the Army corps commanders present in the provinces. First meeting took place in Lahore headquarters. Meeting had representatives from civil leadership, such as Chief minister Shahbaz Shareef, heads of provincial governments, and military leadership including Chief of army Staff and corps commanders across the provinces (ICG, 2015).

COAS, in the first meeting of PACs in Lahore, emphasized on the approach of *whole of the Nation* in the effort to counter terrorism approach (The Nation, 2015). He illuminated that the participation from society and harmonised relation between intelligence agencies and law

enforcement agencies are key to success. COAS rest assured the military full backing and support to the committee in its efforts against all the threats, which can be termed as cooperative gesture of support to its civil counterpart— *specifically provincial governments*. It has also been claimed that provision of PACs fills the gap of coordination between civil and military, which was absent previously (Syed, 2015). Civil government welcomed and appreciated the military support in their efforts and reiterated its resolve to eliminated terrorism and militancy. Similarly, KPK apex committee inaugural meeting held in January, 2015, which was comprised of COAS, chief minster KPK, corps commander Peshawar, DG ISI, and governor of KPK.

Formation of Apex Committees did not go uncriticized. There were widespread doubts that military has been taking all the decisions in Apex committees. It has been argued that formation of Apex committee as a focal institute has sidelined federal and provincial governments (ICG, 2015).

The formation of PACs is an epitome of civil and military unity against terrorism, and manifestation of their changed approaches to combat the threats to the country. Both institutions' high echelons have come together on one platform and cooperate to make efforts, which is an important achievement keeping in view the tremulous history of the country.

### **5.3.6 Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) merger**

Since Pakistan Military has conducted multiple operation in South and North Waziristan, but results required government to go some extra lengths for consolidation of success achieved in operation. The area, which military claimed is free of militants, called for mainstreaming of FATA and proactive development in administration, economic and infrastructure (Ali, 2018).

Since 9/11, FATA became heaven for multiple terrorists' outfits when most of Al-Qaeda belonging terrorists retreated in the region after collapse of Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Hilali, 2010). It remained the boiling region for the country, which believably exported terrorists to the urban areas and hinterland (Khan, 2011). Additionally, underdevelopment and neglected status, due to the system prevailed in the region, was manipulated by the militants.

FATA political and legal system, which was ruled under Federal Criminal Regulation (FCR) of the British era, differed significantly from the rest of the country. People over there are

deprived of the numerous rights that Pakistan's constitution provides to its citizen (Haider, 2009; Hilali, 2010). FCR was introduced in British Era but Pakistan civil and military leadership continues with these practices, and never tried to change those draconian laws. It is imperative to illuminate the truth that military operation extricated militants from the region, but militants could fill the vacuum that the military departure will create. Moreover, due to same ethno-linguistic group present in FATA and Khyber PakhtunKhwā (KPK), events occurring in FATA had spill over affects in KPK too (Khalid, 2016). Reforms in the region became imperative to nip the evil in the bud.

The region in the country from very beginning required the reformation and mainstreaming. The merger has been a long cherished demand of the Pakhtoons nationalist led by Awami National Party leader. As mentioned by one of the ANP leader that ANP was never against reforms in FCR, but due to changing condition and raising militancy in FATA, government has to do more than just reforms to resume/regain its writ in the region (Khan, 2012). It was deemed as an opportunity to bring pakhtoons of the country together; it would increase the economic and financial share of the people of the FATA in the country, and would be represented more in the political sphere by increased number of seats in the parliament. Thence, consensus prevails that FATA shall be brought under legal system and government authority (Ali, 2018). Consensus was duly followed by efforts, but political expediencies and lack of cooperation thwarted the efforts.

#### **5.3.6.1 FATA mainstreaming delayed due to lack of CIMIC**

The most required action needed from the government fell victim of multiple factors that contributed equally in jeopardizing its mainstreaming and reformation. Efforts to bring FATA into mainstream and make it part of Northern Western Frontier Province (NWFP) is not new. Besides the efforts done in history, PPP in its government made a historic announcement regarding repealing FCR (Dawn, 2008), but could not move beyond just announcement. Similarly, PPP leader Asif Ali Zardari made announcement for reform packaged in the region, which was suspended by military<sup>17</sup> (Siddique, 2014). Whereas, some argues that it had faced resistance from politicians who had vested interests in maintaining traditional practices in the region (Weinbaum, 2017). Despite of multiple efforts and launching programmes, there had been no noticeable progress made so far to mainstream FATA (Khan,

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<sup>17</sup> Military wanted to keep the area isolated as it continued operation there.

2012). Despite of nature of problem, leadership kept their interests above national interests, which delayed the most important and needed step to halt penetration of terrorism.

The latest wave of efforts started in 2015 when then Prime Minister set up a committee headed by Sartaj Aziz. It was comprised of six members for FATA reforms (Aziz, 2017). The committee was aimed to set the concrete future course for FATA political mainstreaming. Committee undertook deep analysis of the failure of the attempts made in past decade. It occurred to them the complex nature of the task, as it involved legal, administrative and security mainstreaming (Ibid). The first report submitted to the Prime Minister after 10 months of the thorough and vigorous study and discussion with stake holders by the committee.

In 2016, Sartaj Aziz presented a report in which committee recommended FATA merger with KPK province. It raised the spree of debates with some supporting the merger, whereas, others were commenting on the futility of merger. It also faced strong resistance from strong tribal influential people, who are of the thought those mergers of the area against their historic norms and cultural practices (Dawn, 2016). The tribesmen were against this decision from very beginning and have rejected the idea of merging. They were hesitant, as they said; merge would bring together two corrupt systems together and rather demanded reforms in their own system which ensures their freedom (Wazir, 2012).

### **5.3.6.2 Civil-Military cooperation made FATA merger successful**

The report on FATA reforms caused political uproar, which, further, halted the decision (Akhter, 2017). Prime minister Nawaz Shareef delayed the decision of FATA mainstreaming in the face of resistance, but his successor Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi reinitiated the discussion, whilst giving due importance to the problem, and announced that change in FATA is necessity to end status quo. In 2017, federal cabinet approved the ex-post facto formation of National Implementation Committee (NIC) to expedite FATA reforms. (Waseem, 2017). NIS, a high level implementation body, was consisted of ex-Defence Minister Khurram Dastagir Khan, ex-Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission Sartaj Aziz, ex-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor Iqbal Zafar Jhagra, ex-Chief Minister Pervez Khattak and the Peshawar corps commander, and was headed by ex-PM Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and COAS Qamar Javaid Bajwa. Decision to expedite the FATA reform process was taken in a meeting of NIC attended by military and civil (Sikander, 2017).



Moreover, military, which is present in the region for over a decade, wholeheartedly supported merger as an only vital solution to the problem prevailing in the country. Military helped in breaking the deadlock that prevailed between the government and the opposition parties over the years on the issue of FATA merger. The meeting of the top brass from military with Moulana Fazl ul Rehman, the leader of a major resistance party, was seen as a major development to solve the problems and bring region into national ambit (Nation, 2017).

Finally National Security Committee (NSC), which is the top body, consists of civil and military, approved the FATA merger (Dawn, 2018). In 23<sup>rd</sup> meeting held at PM house attended by key ministers from civil side and military leadership; including, military spymaster, Joint Chief of staff Committee and heads of three wings signalled go-ahead after evaluating all pros and cons of the FATA merger with KPK. Furthermore, PM Abbasi had explained the committee that his discussion with other party heads in parliament shows the consensus of other in this matter (Sikander, 2018).

Considering the fact that FATA remained a main challenge in CT and COIN efforts, civil and military for a long time failed to address this issue. Civil side fell short to cooperate, and solve the most needed problem that posed a major threat to the country. It was only after recently that this issue was given the due importance, and with help of military all the parties consented for FATA mainstreaming.

### **5.3.7 Criminal Justice System**

It has been said that no counterterrorism efforts can be deemed comprehensive unless it includes judiciary component of the government. Law and order are pre-requisites in anti-terror efforts. The foundation of country's justice system under the representative government is built upon the effectiveness of criminal justice system (Chaudhry, 2014).

Negative experiences with criminal justice system corrode public trust in rule of law, whilst hindering their effectiveness and generating grievances. These conditions are conducive to violent extremism and bolster terrorist recruitment (Saeed & Peters, 2017). An effective criminal justice system is an imperative tier to drive counterterrorism efforts towards peace in any country, especially in Pakistan.

Pakistan has a long history of anti-terrorism legislation. Historically, before 9/11 these laws were devised against potential threat to the state; such as, suppression of political opponent

by the political party, and in order to target sectarian terrorists which were at peak in 1990's (Ahmed, 2015). Prime minister Bhutto issued ordinance for suppression of terrorist activities in 1975, which after parliament approval became an Act (Ibrahim, 2017). In 1990s', then government of PMLN was forced to promulgate Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) aimed at to keep law and order in the country and carry out speedy trails against suspected terrorists. ACT 1975 was repealed after the enactment of ATA 1997. Similarly, Anti Terrorism Courts (ATC) was also established under ATA 1997 to dispense quick justice for those charged with terrorism activities (Yusuf, 2010).

The ATA of 1997 has been amended 17 times to acclimatize it with the changing nature of the terrorism (Pervez & Rani, 2015). ATA contributed in counterterrorism by laying the framework for offences of terrorism and terrorism act. Whereas, its section 19 gives the 30 days limitation to police to finalize investigation, and specify ATC to hear cases on daily basis and decide cases within seven working days<sup>18</sup> (Malik, 2014). Simultaneously, ATA has been supplement with other laws; such as, Fair trial Act (2013) and Protection of Pakistan Act (2014), to cover the terrorist acts that are not covered by ATA (Ibid). But despite of efforts, it fell short to make an effective criminal justice system of the country.

### **3.3.7.1 Lack of civil cooperation affected military gains**

The deteriorating security condition was indeed the result of failure criminal justice system. Pakistan response to counterterrorism as a legal system is miserable (Soofi, 2013). Anti-terrorist courts have failed to deliver their primary mandate of quick justice, owing to many factors such as insufficient funds provided by government (Yusuf, 2010). Moreover, many in Pakistan have claimed that ATA (1997) has proved to be insufficient—owing to its ambiguous definition of terrorism<sup>19</sup>, to deal with Pakistan's extra ordinary circumstances (Asad, 2016).

The ineptness of criminal justice system is the major concern in Pakistan. The nature of the justice system, where concerned the nation, concurrently it is expected that militants who were apprehended in military operations, and due in Anti-terrorism courts (ATCs) have been released or have been given negligible conviction (Yusuf, 2010). There is also lack of efforts to develop effective anti-terrorism legislatures which can speed up the process of convictions

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<sup>18</sup> Section 7 of section 19 of ATA 1997 defines the procedure and power of ATC.

<sup>19</sup> Ejaz Haider mentions in his article *What's the Plan?* about the ambiguous definition of terrorism in ATA 1997. He, further, discuss that instead of refining the definition, ATA throws everything into the terrorism, which are not terrorism in the first place.

of hard core terrorist and the facilitators of terrorists (Nabeel, 2017). Notwithstanding the creation of 54 anti terrorism courts, conviction rate still remains low (Zaidi, 2016).

It affects national efforts to combat terrorism. For instance; the suspects involved in Marriott Hotel, Islamabad, which left fifty-four people dead and 250 injured became a serious concern for the nation (Pervez & Rani, 2015). Similarly, Major Haroon Ashiq<sup>20</sup>, killer of Major-General Faisal Alvi, has also been acquitted by ATC in Adiyala Jail (Ahmed, 2012). It also creates discontent in military over the performance of ATCs. For instance, those acquitted in 2010 alone were accused of attacks on military, ISI personals, police, Frontier Constabulary, Pakistan Air Force and Special Braches etc (The News, 2011). Similarly, according to one report only 20 terror cases have been heard in five years in KPK, which shows the acquittal rate in the province (News Desk, 2018). Simultaneously, it internationally undermines Pakistan's efforts and image by exposing Pakistan's vulnerabilities. In 2010, Pakistan's anti terror legal system was termed as almost incapable to prosecute terrorists (Pervez & Rani, 2015).

Government of Pakistan has taken measures to enact laws for prosecution of terrorists. Promulgation of Pakistan Protection Act (PoPA), 2014, is one in those steps and as claimed by authorities was a war-time law (Asad, 2016). It gave additional power to Pakistan's security forces to arrest suspect and search houses without warrant (Afridi, 2016). It was also aimed at speedy conviction of hardcore terrorists, which fall victim to the redundancies and lack of interests of concerned authorities and PoPA reached the end of its life (Asad, 2016). PoPA has seen same faith as many other CT and COIN policies.

### **5.3.8 Military and Police Force**

In Pakistan, police and military has been working together to combat terrorism (Cheema & Qurat-ul-Ain, 2016). After the operation Rah-e-Haq in Malakand division, following the clear, hold, build, and transfer strategy, Police moved into the region to bring back the area to normalcy and re-establish law and order (Fair, 2010). Police played an effective role in the region even when military did not even vacate the area. It, simultaneously, played a significant role in "transfer" and "shape" strategy of COIN in Malakand division (Biberman et al., 2016).

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<sup>20</sup> He was the brother of Captain Khurram Ashiq who was involved in attack on Zarar Company, which was involved in Lal Masjid operation. Attack left 22 commandos dead.

Similarly in 2012, cooperation between police, IB and Rangers initially yield positive results but, owing to legal affairs, Karachi's commander was removed (Khalid, 2017). IG wasn't replaced for a long time, which, resultantly, slowed down the pace of operation in Karachi, which was the need of the hour in the city. Police force contributes but its role in CT and COIN efforts remained limited (Biberman et al., 2016).

Where an occurring of single terrorist attack in the country points towards military's counterterrorism operation, equally highlights the ineffectiveness of police force of the country (Ahmed, 2017). While researches shows that police operations are more effective at combating terrorism than military force, but Pakistan's police force is under-resourced and plagued by corruption, heavy-handed, and lack civilian trust (Peters, 2014). The backwardness of police—result of multiple factors, hinders its role in counterterrorism efforts.

One research mentions that the bloody clash/crisis of Lal Masjid in Islamabad could have been avoided if police force had taken effective action in time (2004-2005) (Abbas, 2009). It has been argued that police lacked authority from different state's institutions to legally pursue the clerics in mosques (ibid). It, further, can be accredited to politicized nature of police, which hinders its role in CT and COIN.

Unfortunately, in the time of severe threats, police department is poorly equipped and ill prepared (Pervez & Perito, 2014), chronically corrupt and deeply politicized (Abbas, 2009). The failure of police department to cope with the changing threats can be also attributed to the government's failure to effectively invest in law enforcement sector's reforms and modernization. According to a report, published by Asian society New York, 2012, Government of Pakistan lacks political will to reform police department (Abbas, 2012). The missing cooperation between institutes is also affecting police role. The lack of coordination and cooperation between police force and intelligence outfits<sup>21</sup> has been a long standing concern for Pakistani law enforcers (Jaffrelot, 2016).

Moreover, cooperation took place between intelligence agency, police of KPK and Federal, whereas, civil and military intelligence agency have accused Punjab police of non-cooperation in past. Military official claimed that Punjab police has been non cooperative to advance information provided by military regarding the suspected terrorists belonging to

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<sup>21</sup> Inter Services Intelligence and Intelligence Bureau are two intelligence outfits.

banded outfits; such as, Lashkar-e-Jangvi and Sipha-e-Sahaba (Awan, 2010). Likewise, the attacks on Ahmedis in Punjab were blamed on Punjab police for their non-cooperation (Ibid).

In this area, Punjab government has made some efforts to create centre for integrated command, control and communication (PPIC3), where all police units are integrated (The News, 2015). Through this centre, civil and military will become part of an integrated security and rescue operation in case of an emergency (Khan, 2018). Thus, Punjab police is claiming that is now prepared and vigilant to combat terrorism with the cooperation of LEA's, government, and military (Punjab Police, 2015).

The criminal justice system and police are, undoubtedly, two important actors in Pakistan's efforts to CT and COIN. But the problems prevailing in these institutions owing to civil government ineptness have affected the measures that have been taken hitherto. Military courts and armed forces cannot alone impart justice and carry out tasks of providing security to the people after operation. It is ATCs' duty to effectively carry out task of imparting justice and convicting hard core terrorists. The criminal justice system is needed to give military gains a final touch, but lagging of the system affected the measures.

Additionally, lack of cooperation between police and intelligence agencies has affected measures against banned outfits in the country. Similarly, police department beforehand action can prevent military from going to all out offensive operation. As we have discussed in Lal Masjid operation, prioritizing political interest caused Pakistan a lot. Civil government needs to empower and depoliticize police department.

## CONCLUSION

People of Pakistan, though primarily were divided on the matter of terrorism, have expressed their firm resolve against terrorism as one nation. Terrorism in the country brought the otherwise divergent civil and military institutions together against common threat to their country. The firm resolve of the country, and civil and military united front against terrorism has kept this country intact. Time and again, efforts are made by both institutions, such as military operations supported by civil government are conducted, laws are enacted, institutions and committees are formed, and policies are introduced to counter terrorism and insurgency. Though unity has been witnessed in Pakistan's efforts to counter terrorism and insurgency, but failure to cooperate and coordinate passably has hindered the measures taken hitherto to achieve complete success.

Both institutions are on the same page in the efforts, yet the gap that has been left jeopardized measures. It has remained a problem of both; cooperation and coordination in kinetic and non-kinetic measures to combat threats. Considering the example of NACTA, which is an important institution in internal security architecture and was expected to work as national counterterrorism institutions, falls short to full fill its purpose due to lack of cooperation and coordination among institutions. Government needs to grant NACTA an autonomous status in order to have national institution for conducting and integrating national efforts. It can effectively be utilized to supervise national policies to counter terrorism and extremism implementation.

The national policies made to CT and COIN has also failed to yield desirable objectives. The lack of cooperation and coordination between provinces, and among the civil and military institutions has halted the policies to achieve the success. The aim of creation of JID for internal security with civil and military representation was delayed. The trust building among institutions is need of the hour. JID and many other measures that have been impeded because of trust deficit can be restored afterwards. Furthermore, FATA merger was an issue that demanded a solution, but owing to inertia present in institutions delayed the process.

Moreover, the failure of civil government and military to develop consensus for operation in NW resulted in terrorists not only consolidate their places, but continued lethal attacks in the other parts country. If Operation Zarb-e-Azab had been conducted few years back, many lethal terrorist attacks could have been prevented. Similarly, Zarb-e-Azab could have yield

significant results to secure the gains of operation conducted prior to it. Pakistan civil and military has to jointly decide military operation, but beforehand. It shall not be the case that every operation follows a major terror attack in country. It would require joint assessment of the threat in a proper CIMIC structure, and certainly would call for keeping national interest above self interests.

The lack of civil government proper backup plan to rehabilitate left IDP's to the mercy of God and then to military. There is next to none presence of civil humanitarian and developmental actors in military operations. Military has been leading task of rehabilitation and reconstruction of area, which shows the unwillingness and ineptness of civil government. Civil lack of cooperation to military can nullify achievements of military operations, political government, alongside planning an operation with military, shall device strategies for rehabilitation and reconstruction. It necessitates government to assign already present disaster management authorities with the rehabilitation task. Proper integrating national disaster management authorities in national internal security policy will cover above said task of political government.

The ineptness of civil LEAs is also matter of concern in the country. Civil government has to full fill their responsibility in this area as well. Empowering, depoliticizing, and up grading of police department according to international standards shall be the priority of the government to enable them to replace military effectively. Military has trained Punjab and Baluchistan anti-terrorism squads which is a good step towards building police capacity to deal with terrorism. But, Pakistan needs all inclusive strong police department to effectively trace and tackle perpetrators of terrorism. Similarly, Government needs to strengthen criminal justice system as Pakistan needs it the most in such critical time.

Nevertheless, public perception has long been ignored in CT and COIN efforts. It has affected efforts to halt terrorist's penetration in other parts of the country. Pakistan needs to work on changing its public perception. It is high time to work when country is surrounded by even more fatal threat of Islamic State. Moreover, the problem that still looms large is the lack of consensus as whose war we are fighting. Pakistan army termed it Pakistan's war, contrary to political parties, whereas, political parties feed into the perception that we are fighting America's war. NACTA can play an effective role in changing people's perception.

Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts require the *whole* approach —comprehensive approach, whilst integrating all the institutions in the efforts. The devising of NAP, which at

least on the page included all the actors to play their role in combating terrorism. But the important aspect which is judiciary in the whole efforts is neglected. The absence of the judiciary would hinder whatever progress military and LEAs make in the efforts against extremist and terrorists.


Notwithstanding a proper governmental structures and policies, there is less to be seen from civil government. Pakistan needs its own model of civil military cooperation to counter terrorism. Though there are already present multiple institutions working for the purpose in question, but to counter terrorism and insurgency Pakistan needs to completely integrate required departments in the efforts. Counterterrorism measures shall be institutionalized as is shown in below given figures 4 and 4.1, which would have active participation of all the actors that surround the CIMIC.

## Recommendation

### Pakistan’s CIMIC Structure

Pakistan government has a well defined structure— an internal security architecture. Constitution of the Pakistan is above everything. It, further, splits into provincial and federal government. Federal government (FG) has CCNS, which has both civil and military representation. CCNS splits up further into four institutions; Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, National Counter Terrorism Authority(NACTA) and civilian intelligence apparatus. Ministry of Interior is responsible for law and order and security within the country (Ministry of Interior, n.d.). Ministry of defence is mandated to regulate matters related to three wings of security forces of Pakistan. Below is the Pakistan internal security architecture (Rumi, 2015).

**Figure 2: Pakistan Internal Security Architecture**







CCNS has representatives of civil and military. Instead of being a subcommittee of federal government, it shall be treated as separate entity. It would be imperative to give opposition leaders, especially provincial heads, civil armed forces and criminal justice system, and disaster management authorities’ representation in CCNS. It would cease the space for criticism over military leading CT and COIN efforts. Additionally, it will give chance to integrate ensure their active role in national internal security policies. Head of judicial system (criminal justice system) can directly provide their expertise and guide the committee in the concerned area. Committee can accordingly devise polices to ensure justice is served timely and aptly.

Besides heads of Ministry of Interior, NACTA, civil intelligence agencies, and Ministry of Defence, having direct police department representation, head of judiciary, provincial heads and disaster management authority in CCNS would provide an opportunity to integrate all the relevant departments in one structure in efforts to CT and COIN. Below are the figures 4 and 4.1, which can be presented as Pakistan CIMIC structure in efforts to combat terrorism.

**Figure 3 and Figure 3.1**





Following the UN CIMIC structure, CCNS can afterwards be presented as a strategic CIMIC forum and structure for discussion over CT and COIN matters. It engulfs planning at all level between civil, police, and military actors. Prime minster holds a significant place in the system, and system works under constitution of the country. Through CCNS, PM would be the one after thorough discussion with representatives of all the actors and assessment of threats will authorize suitable measures. Likewise, the mission that PM approves would ensure integration of political, military and civilian actions. Every department can subsequently contribute accordingly after the proper authorization of measures by PM.

It would provide a proper system/structure of interaction between all the civil actors and military. It would offer the interface between civil, military and police component of CT and COIN efforts. It would help segregating the responsibilities, whilst giving a comprehensive multidimensional approach to CT and COIN. Furthermore, after integrating all the department in one body would end suspicions about military's role in subduing civil government. Simultaneously, the representation of all the political parties in CIMIC would give an end to perception of Pakistan fighting America's war. It will give an opportunity to LEAs to replace military effectively in troubled areas.

**Pakistan's Civil-Military Cooperation and Coordination body (CIMICC):**

Following UN CIMIC definition, it provided an opportunity to develop a definition for Pakistan's civil military coordination and cooperation after the comprehensive assessment to Pakistan's efforts to CT and COIN. Following is the Pakistan's CIMIC definition:

*The comprehensive system for interaction, de-confliction, mutual support, exchange of information, and planning at all levels, between military elements and civil institutions, including ministries, national developmental and counter terrorism authorities to achieve national security and peace objectives.*

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