

Culture at Conflict: Exploring the Case of Authoritarianism in Pakistan



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I certify that this research work titled “*Culture At Conflict: Exploring The Case Of Authoritarianism In Pakistan* ” is my own work. The work has not been presented elsewhere for assessment. The material that has been used from other sources it has been properly acknowledged / referred.

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Chapter 1

The Culture at Conflict: Exploring the Case of Authoritarianism in Pakistan

1.1. Introduction

Culture and authority are interrelated and the ways through which the notion of authority is enunciated, it is not detachable from culture (Aijaz, 2017). In case of Pakistan, the culture promotes collectivism over individualism making indebtedness a cultural expression of allegiance. The cultural settings encourages the people to consider the social position of a group and the authority associated with it to be a reflection of their individual authority and strength. The household economy renders it to be the only way out as majority of the household members don't work outside for instance women of the household living inside are usually dependent upon their males counterpart or male relatives as far as their 'public sphere' interaction in the society is concerned. (Askari, 1986). Similarly the unemployed sons of the household are dependent upon their fathers to provide them all the basic necessities which include housing , education and clothing to name a few. These kind of interventions impact both positively and negatively (Alavi, 1972). The reciprocal intervention prospects and mutual are transferred to non-kin and manifests itself into the patron client role. Patronage often uses the family metaphor without really considering family

as a building block of patronage but when it comes to Pakistan strong counter parts exists between the behavior of individuals with Kin and Non-Kin. (Eglar, 1960).

1.2. Literature Review

1.2.1. The Role of Authority in Pakistani Culture

The description of authority is certainly not a minor task. They are the phenomena's which are evident and adjusted on the bases of different conflicts of the required interests where the term referred to as authority is unmistakably recognizable. There are other marvels which are unmistakably hard to There are other marvels or phenomena's which are undeniably harder to be observed, in any case these include the articulations of authority (Aijaz, 2017). It would be irrelevant to demand that authority must be comprehended through investigating the conflict; yet there are hazards in trying to explain or investigate circumstances without thinking about conflict as the articulations of authority. The capacity to govern individuals might either be constructive or contrary; having the authority to either influence someone else to accomplish something or to keep someone else from accomplishing somewhat achieved by them (Waterbury, 1977). Authority governs both material and in addition the cultural assets. It does not have to be coercive, however it might be. Moreover, it needs not be seen by the affected individual as imposed, however once more, it might be. The mechanics of building up authority change in various occurrences and as indicated by the position in which it began for an individual or a collective group (Kardar, 2013). The measurements regarding authority, then again, might be more particular. If the authority has the capability to impact the surrounding climate, including individuals, at that point one can quantify the event of such occurrences and contrast it with examples when endeavors with impact of the attempts to make changes that have failed. Thusly, one may get a better idea of a relative measure of a person's authority. It might in this way be less demanding in any case as an assessment of the degrees of authority of various people and authority asserting groups before disassembling the procedures of achieving that level of authority. Therefore, explaining authority is complex phenomena (Michels, 1962).

Weber's classification offers great apprehension for the enlargement of authority and components through which instantiation can be done. Weber characterizes authority, "Authority' (Macht) is the likelihood that one actor inside a social relationship will be in a situation to do his own will notwithstanding obstruction, paying little respect to the premise on which this likelihood rests (Gabennesch, 1972). One of the many ways through which authority can be authorized is basic control: 'Basic control', is the likelihood that summon a particular given substance, will be obeyed by a prescribed group of people (Weber, 1947). Although, this doesn't portray each and every one of the cases that this thesis concerns, it is a relatively the most significant. This thesis will address circumstances in which one individual or a collective group is capable to do things according to their own particular will, as well as control others to comply with their will. To this end the thesis requires a meaning of authority which can be connected in an assortment of circumstances (Lewis, 1961). In fact, as Lukes brings up, authority to be more about exercising controlling potential outcomes as occasions, "Is it not the incomparable and guileful application of authority to anticipate individuals, from holding grievances through molding recognitions, inclinations and comprehensions so they acknowledge the part in current specified order, on the grounds that they can see or envision no contrasting option to it, or in light of the fact that they consider it to be unchangeable and natural, or in light of the fact that they esteem it as appointed divinely and gainful? (Seymour, 1960)

The family is often referred as the founding stone of the society of Pakistan. Cooperation inside the Pakistani kins shows consent with various classified authority affairs (Ilhan, 2008). Kids are educated to identify with kin groups as opposed to separate individuals. As they mature, they have to face dangers which they are unequipped for managing alone. A portion of those dangers, in fact, exude from inside the family itself, yet the different solutions and support likewise originate from inside the family (Baxter, 1985). At the point when men move toward becoming chiefs of families, they basically become an essential cradle of help, insurance for their joint family system, they depend on the recourse links of their family that pull in more clients and benefactors (Henry, 2011). The newly found client and patron at that point turn out to be a piece of the resource networks of the family and add to the standing of the whole family. For all intents and purposes everything a Pakistani individual does, affects the family. Pakistanis are socially urged to identify with various representatives of groups as opposed to different individuals (Chotiner, 2017). Boissevain (1966) and Gellner (1977) believed that an incentive in barring patronage from the kin

associations. Whereas in Mediterranean setting the concept appeared to be plausible and in reality exceptionally suitable for kin relations since the 1960's. The patronage /client parts certainly exist in Pakistan, however agreeing with Boissevain and Gellner view that joint or nuclear family connections not to be considered patronal. The Boissevain school of thought, specifically, characterizing the kin correspondence as an unexpected request in comparison to patronal relations carefully, expresses 'a dissimilarity that can be easily made between different kins-men, from one perspective, companionship and patronage, on the other hand. Oblivious to the fact that in the actual activity of the framework they overlap each other' (1966) (Daron Acemoglu, 2014). It might, subsequently, be pragmatic to presume while there are valuable differences between these two, the likeness for the social desires and role imply that. Enclosure of the Pakistani nuclear kins aggregate for instance of patronage is thus hazardous (Anwar, 2016). Expanded kin relations, in any case, ought to not be prohibited frame thought as patronal relations. The basics of patronage are associated by family and optionally that client/patron as the outflows of kin based relations. Early youth socialization is a period when the basic and most important estimations of the way of life and the society are passed on. Pakistani views and beliefs of hierarchy and patronage are ingrained before youngsters can convey these thoughts verbally. Pakistani youth and early adulthood strengthen the group reliance amongst the individuals (Ilhan, 2008). Additionally the time frame when Pakistanis grab a chance in order to satisfy a portion of prerequisites they meet in life later. The grown-ups, the two landlords and non-landlords take part in patronage connections as component to adapt to various impediments found throughout everyday life. Rivalry is for assets state based structures increment reliance on kin based sets. Fundamental kin based group affairs is rule of patronage and hierarchy. Childhood characterized as time to take in 'devices' of hierarchy and patronage that enable grown-ups to accept situations inside the society (Yong, 2005). A chance is given by the Landlords to make a contrast between roles of the kin and the roles that are obviously the roles associated with patronage, utilizing the same people, and make speculations regarding the idea of both the roles.

Villagers in Pakistan don't have land disputes as compared to the scale of the landholders yet they do have them (Alavi, 1972). Cousins go after similar assets. Men who die young leave their youngsters in an extremely ungainly circumstance on the off chance that they have not had sufficient time to be ready and prepared to take on the part of head of family unit (Jalal, 1995). The sibling's kids might not be recognized intimately. Accordingly, the men who die young leave

youngsters who are helpless before their uncles and granddads. Whatever riches the father had gathered at that point dangers being distributed amongst the individuals of the family. Family individuals should be looked after, yet they additionally give the most conceivably lucrative asset accessible. Thus, the more defenseless individuals from the family wind up confronting a decision of losing everything, or surrendering a things based on short term process which in return for longer term assurance (Hamza, 2017). The selection of a patron, or tolerating patronage the individuals who propose it, people settle on choices about their long haul objectives and plans. They should stick around for their chance and sit tight for period when they are in minority authority less can accept a portion of their patron, for such situation family part, assumed on their position. Price that required to payed is very great. Some family based patron can be unnecessarily arduous (Kardar, 1987). Indeed, ones who demand the most must satisfy their side of the relationship. This role of patronage turns out to be progressively imperative when an individual has to deal with members of a different family. For villagers and landholders, the primary purpose of dealings in conflict, mostly the eldest from the particular family, either joint or nuclear. The client/patron connections are the persevering and steadiest of all client/patron connections that are Pakistan based. A politician, bureaucrat be a patron for a period, afterward end up being a client to his previous associations (Yaduveer, 2013). The individual might elect to maintain a strategic distance from his family patrons more often than not, and an extremely fortunate individual may prevail with regards to most of the times requiring no mediation from family based patrons, yet which is outstanding in the Pakistani society. Besides, it should be a person who will enable himself and his family to suffer the consequences and ill effects from time to time (Levine, 1973).

Pakistanis, tend to force some kind of kin connections and relationships on all people with whom they collaborate on routinely bases, it is then a little step in the process of forcing the same kinds of clear cut roles to those individuals (Weber, 1947). One be obliged submission to their fathers, granddads, elders, uncles, siblings and counterparts, in any event when still a child, to grandmas, moms and close relatives (except if there exists a huge gap of age, like sisters that are elder are not by and large announced as being authority figures over their male siblings) (Waterbury, 1977). Pakistanis discover that the vast majority of the general population around them ought to either obey them, or ought to be complied. At the point when a Pakistani at that point alters this arrangement of kin based relations onto non-kin based, a portion of loyalty and dutifulness crosses.

This, thus, advises financial, religious and political exercises. Socialization and grownup conduct don't frame single variable, circumstances and end results formulae. The experience of Pakistanis in adolescence are important to sustain culture of patronage which exists in the Pakistani society, yet it is somewhat deficient and difficult to maintain that particular framework (Syed, 1992). Once past the age of early socialization. A person's situation inside a system might be subordinate, yet in the event that the system is very influential and incorporates individuals who are prevailing in the more extensive society, at that point the most minimal rungs of that system will discover favorable circumstances in the more extensive society too. An imperative piece of my contention is the part that socialization within the family plays an important role in giving the substance of the system of the Pakistani based patronage (Shaw, 2000).

Hardiman (1982) argues that investigating South Asian political conduct over groups , by expansion, over the lense of patron/client connections. In view of Hardiman , political conflict amid the provincial administration (Hardiman, 1982). He depicts a circumstance in which groups were characterized by their organization together, Gandhi's nationalist movement. Hardiman recognizes at first glance these groups can be seen as political groups or supporter/customer systems . He contends, distorts what occurred intended for various motives. Firstly, the leaders didn't act 'factional' leaders. A pioneer of an Gandhi movement, Vallabhai Patel, act on behalf of essentially as fomenter and didn't 'lead' the laborers into the challenge movements (Shafqat, 1998). Rather, Hardiman composes, Vallabhai Patel essentially took after the workers toward the path in which they were at that point moving. Patel didn't instantiate any client patron affiliation keeping in mind the end goal to start laborer action. Hardiman argues that other gathering leaders likewise did not fit in with practices related with factional based leaders(Ilhan, 2008). Rather than separatist leaders impacting the worker engagements, Hardiman contends this to be a laborer or class based political movement in which a portion of the neighborhood privileged just came. Hardiman focuses on cases in which the patrons neglected to uphold their motivation (Shaw, 2000). At last Hardiman contends that there are 'no genuine justification on behalf of trusting factionalism to be more key to Indian political life than strife between classes (Taimur-ul-Hassan, 2009).While exhibiting a portion of the confinements of a factionalist way to deal with understanding both Area and town level governmental issues, Hardiman's investigate is dangerous. On the off chance that one attempts, similar to Lewis (1958), comprehends Indian political conduct as connection between megalithic groups that join 'high' position family groups with

'truncated' station kinfolk groups, at that point there Hardiman can without much of a stretch point to odd cases which successfully nullify the approach (Lewis, 1961). Notwithstanding, in the event that one takes a gander at supporter/customer roles and connections as the establishment for individual connections that don't require any individual from the dyad to be a 'world class', at that point Hardiman's contextual analysis does not invalidate a benefactor/customer approach. Hardiman's gathering leaders don't fit in with Lewis' factional pioneer generalizations, however they did receive the parts of support in their collaboration with other people? Hardiman doesn't state nonetheless rather intrigues to identify precisely in what way they took action (Werbner 1991) is anything but a novel idea however it is one that Hardiman disregards. Along these lines it is very unessential whether Hardiman's gathering leaders expected formal, public roles of leadership of groups that rose up out of past clashes. What is significant is the social apparatuses they utilized in their association with laborers and others (Lieven, 2011). Patrons exercise public power components that are effortlessly likened by the forces that state endeavors. The clients must depend on the other power instruments that might go unacknowledged however may have impressive impact on practices.

1.2.2. Explaining the Authoritarian Community Structure

As has been shown all through the history of Pakistan, regardless of how great the expectations of a military ruler, the discount desired swing chosen overbearing. "So wherein lies the blame? Not in the characteristics or imperfections of character of Pakistan's military rulers yet in the basic and scholarly restrictions of their govern" (Aziz, 1999). It isn't that one-man manage or absolutism is dependably and wherever awful. Britain separated, the Europe that we see today is a result of different types of majesty and tyranny. Majority rules system made a late landing in a significant part of the mainland. East Asian flourishing, including China's rise as a financial authorityhouse, depends on the governmental issues of dictatorship. It is only that a similar arrangement does not fit each circumstance (Sohail, 1997). The Pakistani model of tyranny which infers its authenticity and cash from the armed force is defective in light of the fact that the current instrument, the Pakistan armed force, isn't prepared to convey the wages of good organization (the fundamental condition for monetary thriving).The people of Pakistan still awaits for democracy in true spirit.

Following is a short review of history of South Asia of the past six decades that suggests that the democratic system faces these problems in independent states: The people of South Asia embraced a very constricted definition of democracy. They chose to govern the people without making them a part of process of governance (Akhter, 2011). The rulers were not able to meet the challenges as this restricted ability damaged their capacity to fulfill the requirements. India also faced similar challenges after independence but they were not trying to sanctioning the masses too. Elite people had led the contest for freedom and thus saved the democratic infrastructure from demolishing. In South Asia the rulers aren't ready to share authority. Here the democratic model is based on parties who form their own dictatorial models (Jalal, 1995). Parties aren't structured at all and they are nothing but a form of political heritage. They are the support for military for autocracies. There are two chief defects in governmental parties.

Authoritarianism can be termed as a disquietude that resulted in corrupte Pakistani governmental issues since independence. Autocrat control has additionally influenced the media flexibility of the nation, which has negatively impacted the democratic system . There are incalculable purposes behind this however to comprehend the wonder of political authoritarianism in South Asia, especially Pakistan, one needs to follow its foundations to the pre-segment time of Indian Subcontinent. From extraordinary Mauryan ruler Asoka to the Mughals, all rulers have rehearsed authoritarianism in one way or the other. The English were the same. They honed their own arrangement of authoritarianism (Anne M. Cizmar, 2014). In the end a long time of the English raj in India, the twin rationalizations of centralism and regionalism, and nationalism and communalism merged in complex ways, tearing separated the solidarity yet holding the substance of the exceptionally concentrated regulatory structure which had broadened the frontier state's hold over Indian culture. A setback of segment but then the most forcing heritage of imperialism, the division of the English Indian managerial structure is a key factor in evaluating the differential legacies of India and Pakistan. While India acquired the pioneer state's unitary focal contraption without truly bursting its connections with the lower rungs of the organization, Pakistan needed to develop an altogether new focal government before it could start planning the issues of the common, area and neighborhood levels of society (Kardar, 1987). The flight of English and Muslim authorities of the Indian common administration without a doubt muddled India's errand of resettling a large number of outcasts escaping both the eastern and the western wings of Pakistan, and finishing the mix of the royal states which had appreciated a semi self-ruling status

under the vital frontier authority. Of an aggregate of approximately 955 ICS officers before parcel, barring Muslims yet including English officers, 392 stayed in India in the prompt outcome of segment (M.Yousaf., 1988).

By differentiate, the nonattendance of an essential apparatus connecting the different levels of the organization, a grave lack of able and experienced faculty and the unenviable status of having withdrawn from a globally perceived sovereign and autonomous state intensified Pakistan's issues in declaring focal authority over regions isolated by finished a thousand miles (Sohail, 1997). Despite the differential authoritative heritages, the two India and Pakistan drew vigorously on the pioneer state's techniques for bureaucratic control and centralization. The government of India demonstration of 1935, reinforcing the extremely bureaucratic 'steel outline' of the English raj that had been the bete noire of Indian patriots, was adjusted to fill in as the protected structure in the two nations (Quigley, 1999). On a basic level, a promise to the perfect of democracy in view of the Westminster model of parliamentary government guaranteed a formal division between the organization and an agent political official (Malik H. , 2003). Be that as it may, in genuine practice the bureaucratic authoritarianism characteristic in the pioneer state structure remained to a great extent unblemished. It demonstrated troublesome at the simple beginning to build up the rule of administrative matchless quality over the official. In spite of the general academic view which follows its starting point to a later time of institutional decay, the attractions of customized support before long wound up pervasive in the tasks of as far as anyone knows govern bound organizations, chose and additionally non-chose. In the expressions of a spectator of the Indian authoritative organization in the quick repercussions of autonomy, 'the manage of law was ever twisted to subserve either official activity in the organization or the will of overwhelming components of society' (Rais, 1985). A more prominent affinity for official activity by legislators fortified the hands of the managerial administration, the past non-chose delegates, a large number of whom transparently criticized the achievability of democracy in subcontinental conditions (Hamza, 2017). However the legitimizing power of democracy in the wake of autonomy was excessively solid and unavoidable, making it impossible to be disposed of for authoritative comfort. Rather than undertaking a gigantic rearrangement of the managerial contraption of the frontier state to ensure the matchless quality of chose foundations, the Indian and Pakistani political administration alike shaped cooperations of comfort with individuals from the common organization (Naeem, 2011).

1.2.3. Establishing a link between culture and political process

With regards to the standards of democracy, the accentuation in the post freedom period was on reinforcing the bond between the chose agent and the voter, in contradistinction to that between the neighborhood civil servant and the ordinary citizens amid the pilgrim time frame (Mustaq, 1963). Be that as it may, these deliberate gestures toward agent democracy, louder in Congress-overwhelmed India than in Pakistan, hardly masked the reliance of the two arrangements of administration on the frontier organization. Without a certified pledge to a philosophy of financial improvement, allowed Congress' communist talk and the Muslim Group's serene interests to Islamic social equity, relations amongst voters and their agents were to a great extent constrained to decisions (Syed, 1992). Albeit nearby civil servants were hypothetically in a subordinate position to the chose delegates, they stayed by goodness of their vicinity and openness for every single down to earth reason the principle agents of the everyday citizens. Barely any government officials could hope to summon bolster in a body electorate without in any event the inferred support of the nearby organization. Newness to the workings of both the political and regulatory foundations of the state was another motivation behind why most lawmakers needed to attempt and build up a working, and frequently a needy, association with the nearby administrator (Seymour, 1960). So at the nearby levels of society in the two territories where most of the voters were packed there was minimal subjective change in a critical position between the chose and non-chose institutions. In the Indian Subcontinent, the entire idea of the authority of the ruler varied from that of European feudalism, in which the lord had authority over all people and things in his area. This authority was designated to the rulers and the nobles who pledged loyalty to him. In this manner, the pecking order of authority was developed. Both the terrains and the general population associated with it had a place with the primitive master and through him to the ruler. This was an advancement of the Roman idea of the territory. In India, the lord had the privilege to gather certain expenses from the land, and this income gathering authority was assigned to others. With grievous outcomes, the English separated the conventional town cooperatives known as Panchayats and presented severe feudalism." Feudalism in itself is a type of authoritarianism (Shuji, 2000).

1.3. Problem Statement

This thesis isn't just about authority inside the family. Or maybe, it is about authority in the public arena and how uneven authority relations shape the foundation of Pakistani society. The major social affiliation Pakistanis reach out to different people is hilter kilter. Close relations of fairness are hazardous for its people and appear to happen just in exceptionally restricted circumstances (Anne M. Cizmar, 2014). This can prompt strain when two obscure people don't have a similar appraisal of other's person lifestyle. Authority and status aren't similar but rather are inter-connected. Superior status, seemingly obligates greater authority. Truncated status requires an alternate sort of authority. A wide range of authority must be used in particular ways on the off chance that they are not to reverse discharge (Ali, 1988). The State is accused for neglecting to give established infrastructural options however nobody accuses the way of life for keeping the State from doing as such. In any case, the outcome is that Pakistanis people have developed a habit depend vigorously on irregularity and imbalance. At the point when people end up looked with issues they should depend on individual connections to manage them. The feeble need greater authority construct supporters to work for light of their sake. The theory will endeavor to build up a more prominent comprehension of connections of authority in a support ruled culture and how it contributed towards the developed reality of Authoritarianism in our general public. This proposal is about the solid connection the general population of Pakistan have with authority and authority based administrations and how authoritarianism articulations rise up out of culture. At last it will center around the standards which sort out Pakistanis. We may consider three integral sorts of connections hidden in Pakistani social groups : family relationship political construction and positions.

1.4. Significance of the Study

This thesis shall attempt to develop a better considerate of relationships of authority in a patronage dominated culture and how it contributed to Authoritarianism in our society. This thesis is about the strong affiliation the people of Pakistan have with authority and authority based regimes and how authoritarianism expressions emerge from culture. There is existing literature on patronage

and culture and authority relations but no one has tried to bring them together and comprehend how the culture penetrates abuse of authority into the political culture. Therefore, this thesis tries to explore the construction of authority abuse from culture through kinship and patronage.

1.5. Objectives

To explore the causal variables of kinship and patronage within the culture of Pakistan and analyze their transcendental transformation into the political culture of Pakistan manifested through democracy.

- Exploring how kinship patterns in Pakistan contribute to the construction of its political culture.
- Exploring and analyzing how the authority when transcended through the culture manifests itself into the political culture.

1.6. Methodology

Research strategy is an efficient way to deal with deal with an issue. It is an investigation of focus how research is to be finished. The methodologies by which researchers approach their work of portraying, clearing up, and envisioning ponders are called research technique. It is moreover described as the examination of techniques by which data is grabbed. Its point is to give research intend to research.

1.6.1 Importance of Research Methodology

In Research it is vital for an analyst to plan a philosophy for the issue picked. One should take note of that regardless of whether the strategies considered in two issues are same the strategy may be unique. It is critical for the scientist to know not just the exploration techniques vital for the examination under taken yet in addition the philosophy (Gelles, 1992). In a connected research, one tackles certain issues utilizing surely understood and acknowledged speculations and

standards. The vast majority of the test investigate, contextual investigations and between disciplinary research are basically connected research (Mendelsohn, 1993). Connected research is useful for fundamental research. An exploration, the result of which has prompt application is additionally named as connected research. Such an exploration is of commonsense use to current action. For instance, investigates on social issues have prompt utilize. Connected research is worried about genuine life research, for example, look into on expanding proficiency of a machine, expanding pick up factor of generation of a material, contamination control, getting ready inoculation for a malady, and so forth. Clearly, they have quick potential applications (Garrett and Libbey, 1997).

1.6.2. Significance of Qualitative Research

Qualitative analysis method was selected as the most suitable for this study as “Qualitative research begins with assumption, a world view, the possible use of a theoretical lens and the study of research problems inquiring the meaning of individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (Creswell, 2007). Qualitative research helps to measure the change in terms of certain standards that are appropriate for measuring the process of domestic violence in order to find the perceived changes regarding domestic violence. The strength of qualitative research lies in its ability for providence of complex textual descriptions related to how people experience it. In the context of understanding, prevailing perceptions and attitudes of people towards domestic violence qualitative research was more appropriate. The reason is that it gives data about human side of an issue that is the frequently conflicting practices, convictions, conclusions, feelings and connections of people (Waal, 2007). Subjective research technique helps in distinguishing elusive components like social standards, financial status, sexual orientation parts, ethnicity, and religion that assumes an essential part in recognizing hidden reasons for abusive behavior at home. Subjective techniques discovers why how when where and what by breaking down the subjective information as words both talked and composed, on occasion visual pictures. Explanations and conclusions of the issue are derived through analyzing the collected empirical data that includes the evidence collected from field. The main reason for choosing qualitative research was that unlike quantitative research that shows some trends qualitative research focuses on descriptive study (Stein, 1984).

1.6.3. Selecting Study Method

The thesis focuses primarily on exploring the causal variables of kinship and patronage within the culture of Pakistan and analyzing their transcendental transformation into the political culture of Pakistan. Its an exploratory study in nature and exploratory research is the researcher's tool to understand an issue more thoroughly, this thesis is trying to explore and comprehend the role of culture in breeding authority through kinship and patronage and how this leads to construction of political culture. This research is qualitative and so the case study method was used. The contextual investigation strategy is ordinarily utilized when 'a how or why question is being gotten some information about a contemporary arrangement of occasions over which the examiner has practically zero control' (Yin,1994). Further, the contextual analysis strategy utilizes devices, for example, 'records, chronicled investigation, reviews and meetings' to give a more profound and point by point composition of 'contemporary occasions when the important conduct can't be controlled' (Rowley, 2002). In such a case, given that the inquiries encapsulated by this proposition take after a 'how' and 'why' design, the contextual investigation strategy appears most reasonable technique for investigating the causal factors of family relationship and support inside the way of life of Pakistan and breaking down their supernatural change into the political culture of Pakistan showed through democracy . Assist Yin contends that 'a contextual analysis is an experimental request that examines a contemporary marvel inside its genuine setting, particularly when the limits amongst wonder and setting are not plainly apparent' (Yin, 1994). Since the proposal, tries to give a clarification of how our general public breeds authority through connection and support which have not been broke down in detail and along these lines a contextual investigation of Pakistani culture is the most proper technique to break down how the way of life breeds authority. In this way, keeping in see these devices, semi organized meetings of respondents are taken. For investigating the causal connection between family relationship/support and culture, the postulation try to illustrate the accompanying measurements of connection/support and systems: 1) connections between connection/benefactor gather individuals; 2) associations between connection/supporter gatherings and formal foundations of the state; and 3) the fundamental qualities and practices. To lead an examination incorporating these measurements, ethnographic strategies were utilized, incorporating interviews with individuals from various connection

gatherings and individuals from formal state establishments. Specifically, a scope of family relationship bunches were met, including land-owning and benefit arranged gatherings. Inside family relationship gatherings, landholders were talked with who were in a place of chain of importance and in addition normal families. To make a superior comprehension for joins between family relationship gatherings and political foundations, individuals from the national get together were additionally met.

1.6.4. Target Population

The study area is Attock District. The sample size consists 30 respondents and target population was stratified according to the needs of the thesis. For this purpose the Data was divided into two major categories. One focused on how the authority breeds through kinship and patronage and the other explored how it works when it is transformed into the political culture. For the first part data collection was focused in Attock in which through stratified sampling target population was broken down in stratas which included two feudal lords, two prominent and influential elders or 'Barey' ,Eight household member ; four males and four females (In which two males and females were further stratified upon literate and illiterate bases) , Two Dharra members and one Jirga member of their Jirga/ panchait settings. The sampling techniques used for the first part of the Data were stratified random sampling and snowball sampling technique, it was only through snowball sampling that stratas were made and then broken down. One respondent through their social network referred me to other potential respondents for my study. In the follow up calls upon receiving conformation about their willingness, further appointment and plans were compiled for interviews. This made a total of fifteen respondents. The second part focused on political culture and for that purpose elected MNA's of that area namely Sheikh Aftab Ahmed and Malik Ihtebar Khan were interviewed. Along with them other prominent politicians were also interviewed in the Parliament House of Pakistan which include Ex Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, Ex interior minister Chaudry Nisaar, Ex Deputy speaker National Assembly Murtaza Javed Abbasi, Ex Speaker National Assembly Ayaz Sadiq , Ex Interior Minister Talal Chaudry , Chaudhry Muhammad Munir Azhar, , Ex foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Ex chief minister Chaudary Pervez Elahi , Ex Prime minister Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali , Shamas-un-Nisa , Shazia

Marri and Women reserved seat MNA's Farhana Qamar and Shazia Sohail Mir based upon purposive random sampling

1.6.5.Data Collection Technique

The proposition utilizes both essential and optional sources to help its contention. This utilization of essential sources chips away at two levels. At one level, it gives a clear scene of contemporary and past occasions as they happened, by breaking down narrative sources, for example, the declassified reports and at another level, the meetings of Pakistani government officials offer a more insightful knowledge to how the examples of connection and support influence them specifically. The first class meeting led for this proposal is enlivened by Richards (1996, 199-200) understanding who contends that , 'A standout amongst the most imperative elements of a tip top meeting is to attempt to help the political researcher in understanding the hypothetical position of the interviewee; his/her recognitions, convictions and philosophies. Such data can once in a while be gathered from inspecting books, reports or records. By their extremely nature, world class interviewees give a subjective record of an occasion or issue. In this way, first class meeting ought not be led with a view to building up 'reality', in an unrefined, positivist way. Its capacity is to give the political researcher a knowledge into the outlook of the performers who have assumed a part in forming the general public in which we live and an interviewee's subjective examination of a specific scene or circumstance.' In this sense at that point, the suppositions of thirty Pakistani lawmakers assembled through tip top talking, gives us a comprehension of Pakistan's way of life and how it shows authority. The interview questionnaire was open-ended and semi-structured. The questionnaire thus focused on a 'broad number of themes/areas, rather than a rigid set of formal questions'. These themes included the kinship patterns, patronage patterns their roles and influence in the election, their significance for a candidate contesting elections and exploring the give and take relationship between kinship and patronage patterns and the politician. In order to understand how the culture penetrates authority , MNA's namely Sheikh Aftab Ahmed , Malik Ihtebbar Khan , Ex Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, Ex interior minister Chaudry Nisaar, Ex Deputy speaker National Assembly Murtaza Javed Abbasi, Ex Speaker National Assembly Ayaz Sadiq , Ex Interior Minister Talal Chaudry , Chaudhry Muhammad Munir Azhar, , Ex foreign minister

Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Ex chief minister Chaudary Pervez Elahi , Ex Prime minister Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali , Shamas-un-Nisa , Shazia Marri and Women reserved seat MNA's Farhana Qamar and Shazia Sohail Mir based upon purposive random sampling. The data was collected over a course of two months starting from April 2018 to End of May 2018.

1.7. Limitations Of the Study

However this tool of data collection comes with its shortcomings. Firstly, 'inevitably, elite interview samples tend to be a lot smaller' . The thesis was further complicated because during the time these interviews were planned and conducted the government was completing its term and making room for interviews was challenging. Thus the sample size of these interviews, which was already small, was further reduced because some of the interviewees declined to participate in the interview. Further, most of the elites who were interviewed were ministers and sitting government representatives, a few opposition members were interviewed due to their long absence from the parliament house. And for the data collected from District Attock, as an outsider it was firstly difficult to communicate with them due to the language barrier. Secondly, I had to go re do the starting interviews because in the start people were not comfortable opening up on certain matters. The attock based data collection was very time consuming and hectic because of two reasons. Firstly, I had to travel to Attock on daily bases and secondly my selected respondents weren't available on half of my visits, so the day would go in waste because of their unprofessionalism. One of the major limitations that faced in Attock was that the society was biased when it came to the kind of pressure kinship patronage builds on the electable whereas when it came to the electables they spoke openly about the paramount role of kinship and patronage in their election process and the kind of peer pressure they build upon them. Therefore, in short the major limitation of the study was time constraint, problems in elite interviewing and collection of Data from Attock mainly due to their unfriendly and not welcoming behavior.

1.8. Chapters Distribution

In the first chapter, an understanding is developed with the help of literature on how the role of authority in Pakistani culture and linking it to Pakistani political process.

In the second chapter, an argument will be developed at the ways the kinship and patronage play their part in breeding authority and how they influence the authority politics just through biradirism and how through client patron theory Pakistani culture manifest authority which then transcends into the political culture through democracy.

In the third chapter, a critical over view based on the history of Pakistan is presented highlighting how culture has and still breeds authority and how it influences the political system of Pakistan through the lens of patron-client theory is explained.

Chapter 2

Kinship And Patronage Pattern in Pakistan

2.1. Introduction

Eglar elaborately sheds light on relations of the caste in Pakistani society. As Ahmad (1977), who piloted a study ten years after the fact, Eglar had already distinguished the essential position divisions between ‘zamindar’, ‘landowner/farmer’, and ‘kammi’ (Eglar, 1960). Ahmad (1977) characterizes the imperative positions of a caste being a ‘cultivator’ and ‘non-cultivator’ (however he rapidly discards standing as valuable explanatory evidence and looks at them moderately as classes). In view of Eglar's , the zamindar, be that as it may, isn't just a farmer. She clearly argues that a zamindar is not made only by acquiring the ownership land neither does it make a kammi' or, doubtlessly, she further argues that the reality of developing and owning area since the arain

(who is a cultivator found in expansive numbers in different parts of the province of Punjab) rank individuals, that develop vegetables assure their claims are likewise denied the status of a zamindar (Martin, 2014). Zamindars are the landowning administrative position; yet as opposed to Ahmad, the point that Eglar makes no endeavor as this relationship is not broken down as one of class. She portrays the kammi and zamindar positions as personally linked through a relationship which is identified as a seyp. A Seyp which is, in every single down to earth regard, just another word for the Indian jajmani relationship. It being a long haul association of topsy-turvy communication between the various families. The providence of basic necessities is assured to the kammi's by the zamindar for his administrations and work. Every 50% of this relationship gives dependability and security to the next. Barth's (1960) endeavors to set up standing as an all-inclusive assisting class enabled him to break down station amongst the Pukhtuns in various ways which strengthen the seyp ideas. The basic part of standing for Eglar, Barth and future anthropologists like Chaudhary (1999) is the long haul connections of hilter kilter correspondence between different families which are portrayed by monetary relationship. Barth gives this avocation for utilizing the idea and term standing in non-Hindu settings (Barth, 1960).

This is a arrangement of stable social gatherings which is leveled at various points, varying significantly in riches, benefit, influence, and the regard assured to them by the other. In such frameworks the association of one division may just sincerely be depicted with the reference to the associations to the next divisions. Both Leach (1960) and Dumont (1970), in any case, contend that the universalization of station is deceiving. Or maybe it is the fundamental social belief system which goes with these various leveled connections which is the notable element of standing. In the event that Quigley's contentions and ethnographic proof of genuine position settings is to be overlooked, at that point clearly Leach and Dumont are right and standing can't be connected past the setting of the Hindus. Opposing the ideas of Demonian examinations for India's Hindus, Barth's application may fill in as an intriguing culturally diverse correlation of standing like connections. Ahmad rejects position as a reasonable calculated apparatus for breaking down the social stratification which was done in the then West Pakistan. Rank, as an arrangement of stratification, he says, it is just relevant among kammi's, or town craftsmen (Barth, 1960). The Kammi's, he reports, have a more 'characterized and particular' progressive system, 'proposing a more station like structure', in any case, this position based chain of command isn't critical when zamindars and kammi's, and tenant farmers are accumulated organized collectively. At different levels of

cooperation between these financial gatherings, As Ahmad(1977) discovers that 'social structure can be best portrayed as class, or of a word related order' (Ahmed S. , 1977).

2.2. The role of class in kinship

According to the Marxist motivated anthropologist's investigations of legally binding and basic practical examination, a standout amongst the most ground-breaking research has originated from marxists like Asad and Ahmad (Ahmed D. M., 2006). Asad contends that in his research Barth has disregarded the significance of the class in the political activities of swat. Ahmad further goes on to endeavors to create an ethnography of a Punjabi town which is class based. The imminence given to the riches and status restraints the importance and propose that class may fill in as a valuable systematic similar apparatus. Eventually, in any case, the class which is a poor indicator of various political conduct in Pakistan. While financial position is exceptionally significant to the techniques accessible to people, examinations based on a Marxist point of view are to a great extent insufficient as a system in which to clarify or depict the different Pakistani subcultures. Class and Authority according to Saghir Ahmad's in a Village of Punjab was distributed in 1977 after his untimely coincidental passing. He had done his handle work from 1964-1965 and his after death production was a revised adaptation of his doctoral proposal. Asad and Ahmad reflect each other in doling out authority to class classifications in clarifications of different Pakistani social association. They analyze the basic limitations on singular activity in which Barth's legally binding organizations together and Eglar's ties of correspondence overlook. In order to understand Ahmad's investigation it is important to take note that his utilization of the term occupation isn't intended to show the tasks an individual performs, which would negate Marx's dissent of 'the condition of class with wage or occupation. Or maybe he utilizes the word related terms to allude to positions inside the association of generation. He refers to Marx as characterizing these situations as 'the manner by which an individual collaborates with others in the fulfillment of his fundamental needs of sustenance, like a dress to cover his body and housing where he can safely reside' (Michels, 1962) . Ahmad joins occupation, alluding to rank name, to financial status classes. He characterizes the financial status as a 'position that an entire family or individual is involved in with the reference to winning basic necessities of social belonging's (Ahmad, 1977).

As perceived by Ahmad the vital need to adjust Marxist classifications to the small scale level and thus distinguish between the two different classes inside the town: noncultivators and cultivators (reminiscent of Eglar's kammi and zamindar, though in fact very unique). He contends that occupation enrollment compares very closely to financial status. This is a superior marker of conduct either religious practices or information, or "qaum" participation, which Ahmad reports just like a different ascribed category from word related position . He further contends that financial status ought not be dealt with as the deciding variable either since it is debilitated by the 'changing quality appended to social belonging's . Financial status along these lines is a variable which is dependent on, class or occupation, there being two unmistakable classes characterized for the Punjabi town (Of the particular) , that includes cultivator and non-cultivator. Asad, embracing a comparative Marxist strategy, contends that Barth did not perceive the vastness of class intrigues when concentrating on dyadic authoritative connections in Pakistan (Asad, 1972). Asad's evaluate of Barth's investigation fixates on the degree to which people are genuinely ready to go into revocable authoritative organizations together. Asad would offer authority to the class interests of proprietors versus non-landowners: However (the landlord) secures his political expert by excellence of his participation in a politically irresistible class, not only by convincing uninhibitedly consenting people to wind up the political devotees (M.Yousaf., 1988)

Although it is factual of Asad to attract concern for the way that class restrains the potential legally binding collusions into which an individual can enter, it isn't valid that proprietors secure political expert exclusively 'by prudence of (their) participation in a politically dominant class'. Participation in the politically overwhelming class is regularly a fundamental essential yet it confers political specialist independent from anyone else, any more than it presents political authority. Expert and authority must both be collected through transactions and activities (Levine, 1973). Participation in the politically overwhelming class gives potential political specialist which must be completed and it is these procedures with which Barth is concerned. For Barth, the contemplations of Asad are full scale highlights which rise up out of activities and choices that individuals make. Society, he contends : "how things happen mainly because of the way of these exercises and conditions. The purpose of the investigations isn't to demonstrate that it must be this way, yet to indicate what must be since it resembles this that is, to find the major deciding components and procedures" (Barth, 1981).

Barth (1981) opposes that Class and history, don't imitate themselves; they are somewhat, the aftereffect of an individual who is settling on choices and computing the best choice inside any given arrangement of imperatives. Gathering participation, at that point, permits certain sorts of collusions and practices to become instantiated and to render others as infeasible, in any case, there is no certification that those cooperations and practices will be instantiated. Barth offers a conscious portrayal of one of the procedures by which the people may sometimes actualise or instantiate, certain possibilities radiating from amass participation. The examinations of Barth and my own ought to be set inside the setting of various leveled social orders in which decisions are halfway directed by one's situation inside the chain of command. This ought not, nonetheless, prompt the conclusion that learning of the progressive positions is an adequate reason for understanding the components of the society. Ahmad, as Asad, tends to disregard individual moving in his decisions. In Ahmad's ethnographic record of intensity connections, be that as it may, he doesn't seek after these same Marxist roused class groupings. Rather he portrays a circumstance in which cultivator and non cultivator end up peripheral to articulations and activities of intensity. The 'significant source' of expert and authority is held by the non-attendant proprietors. Their authority is practiced by nearby chiefs. The town is isolated into two patti, or divisions of rural land claimed by various proprietors. Each patti has its sharecroppers and town workers whose devotion, or acquiescence to the landowner of their patti might be expected. The town craftsmans, or administration workers, might be subject to solely one proprietor (Salman, 2015). At last, a few villagers are not financially subject to either landowner, or patti, and hence they may pick one patti over the other at various circumstances.

In accordance with Ahmad's proposal the most prominent amongst the most important contentions is that a political position that is reliant on financial position. He looks at the connections of intensity between landowners, directors, subordinate inhabitants and workers, subordinate craftsmen and autonomous villagers similar to a measure of monetary position. Ahmad takes a look at the ways arrive redistribution and vote based system changes under Ayub Khan influenced rustic Punjab (Lieven, 2012). Races, he says, moved toward becoming vehicles of political position for landowners, but regularly as a substitute. Proprietors did not have to introduce themselves, or one of their own 'class', with a specific end goal to anchor political position, they required only support somebody faithful to themselves and their motivation, which, Ahmad contends, is the assurance of their own class determined interests (Ahmed S. , 1977).The ensuing dialog of the

systems utilized for political position demonstrate that financial position is in fact essential. Enrollment in either the noncultivator or the cultivator 'class' impacts on the position an individual may conceivably accept in the groups. An examination of Ahmad's different patti groups and also Barth's mentioned political coalitions is informational; the premise of chain of command inside each is to some extent got from arrive possession. Responsibility for presents potential initiative on individuals. Ahmad portrays a circumstance in which the proprietors of the land are themselves truant, so it is their operators who advantage from potential authority (Ahmed S. , 1977).

2.3. Kinship being a source of breeding authority in Attock District

Friedman (1961), al-Mujahid (1965), Maniruzzaman (1966) and Weinbaum (1977) when writing about the formal political process in Pakistan, give an unmistakable diagram of the nearby, common place and national level races that occurred in the years instantly following parcel. Concentrating particularly on Punjab, Wilder (1999) gives an comprehensive perspective of the region's appointive history, recognizing the presence of totally unique provincial and urban constituent progression in Punjab, and providing proof to recommend that governmental issues in the wide open keeps on being ruled by benefactor customer ties and biraderi linkages. For the lion's share of Pakistanis, connection is the most basic premise of personality, superseding even enrollment to a specific religious order, social gathering, or monetary class. Family relationship bunches depend on class, geology, and occupation, following the Hindu-standing structure, a structure that was acquired by Pakistan following the parcel of the two nations in 1947. In contemporary writing, Pakistani society has been portrayed as a supporter customer structure, stressing a primitive based framework, where unmistakable proprietors furnish the generally rustic populace with some measure of security in return for work and political help amid decision years. Be that as it may, this writing misses the mark concerning looking at the mind boggling trade between the state, family relationship gatherings, and their individuals. Specifically, the current writing has frequently shed a light on both the organization of the villagers in removing favors and to some degree responsibility from their proprietors (Kardar, 1987). There is additionally broad recounted confirm that these connection systems assume a critical part amid decisions as far as assembling voters and handling competitors. In the years following parcel, social researchers

attempted documented contemplates on the structure of connection, frequently in class-based terms

There are a huge number of neighborhood pioneers ever since Pakistan's autonomy and the foundational parliamentary frameworks (Jilani, 2016). While the numberdar remains an essential position locally, today he is never again the principle illustrative of the state. The part of mediators has tumbled to proprietors who are heads of landowning family relationship gatherings. Family relationship based limits in Pakistan have truly been characterized in view of access to land. Hamza Alavi, an anthropologist, plots four classes of connection gatherings: 1) extensive landholders, 2) little landholders, 3) benefit based gatherings or kammiss, and 4) laborers who work the land (Alavi, 1971). While there are many connection gatherings, they for the most part fit into these four classes. These classes extensively relate to the land dissemination arrangements of the British pioneer organization. Supporting this point, Andrew Wilder, a political researcher, recognizes four sorts of land awards to: 'worker proprietors' who gotten one square of land (28 sections of land), 'yeoman agriculturists' who gotten four to five squares of land, and the landed tip top or 'innate landed nobility' (Wilder, 1999). The fourth classification was gifts given for the rearing of camels and ponies for the military. More out of control contends that with these gifts to the landed upper class, the British organization wanted to revive a landed class, which had decreased in the nineteenth century because of subdivisions of land legacy caused by legacy laws and the moderate ascent of the white collar class in the towns.

The political and financial method followed by the pioneer organization of reasoning had to revive the landed upper class. The British viewed the provincial first class as steadier and less demanding to control. Setting up a political foundation through the landholders in rustic zones, where most of the populace lived, permitted the British organization more prominent political control through techniques that depended both on compulsion and support (Caton, 2004). Likewise the British organization built up cooperations within neighborhoods arrive owning families to address the test of providing basic necessities to a growing populace. Along these lines, the land assignment process upheld the double requirement for political supporters and agrarian makers. During this time the British lead was particularly critical in characterizing the limits of family relationship gatherings. In the first place, the British made a feeling of social request in light of the predominance of single-ancestry family relationship gatherings. The British remunerated gatherings that were faithful to them and undermined the ones that they thought about political

dangers. For instance, Gilmartin takes note of that the British allowed the Hayats and Tiwanas, as of now two of the biggest landowning families in Pakistan, extensive bundles of flooded land to remunerate them for their steadfastness in overcoming the Sikh rulers in Punjab (Gilmartin, 1988). Such land gifts emauthorized these families to accept political and financial control of huge swaths of land. On the purpose of social control, Brian Caton discusses that Panjabi responsiveness to the material prizes of British projects delivered expanding adaptability in the meaning of the social classifications overseers looked to characterize all the more barely, yielding a verifiably developing talk through which Punjabis and government attempted to anchor control over property and social request (Caton, 2004). Muhammad Chaudhry, a lawful anthropologist Mounting on the views of Alavi, identifies a few contending speculations in regards to the structures of family relationship gatherings. As indicated by Chaudhry, biraderi (family relationship gathering) or quom (individuals) are the broadest units of investigation. The term quom is utilized all the more normally in Pakistan to allude to connection gathering, while biraderi is frequently connected with family relationship bunches from the Punjab region (McGrath, 1996). As per Caton, these ancestry bunches positively originate before the British provinces and he refers to that the Indian subcontinent was known to have 'unilinear family' with some corporate basic leadership frameworks since the Mughal control (Caton, 2004). The convention of connection bunches isn't unmistakable through a corporate basic leadership framework alone, yet in addition through account ancestries of verifiable figures and families, supporting the diffuseness of the gatherings (Caton, 2004). Family relationship bunches are additionally recognized by topography particularly as there was critical relocation following parcel, and specific gatherings fragmented and received a geographic character. The writing isn't clear with respect to the span of connection gatherings, however recommends that these systems are very vast, potentially stretching out the nation over or even universally. They are hard to delineate, much of the time the system lies lethargic and the connections are not significant except if they are enacted, for instance through governmental issues. Chaudhry additionally talks about the sub-structures under the general family relationship bunch that depend on patrilineal associations called sharika. Chaudhry takes note of that the refinements between the substructures are not generally clear and more extensive family relationship characters might be enacted just amid specific circumstances of the year, for example, amid race season or amid a debate (Chaudhry, 1999). The progressive system of family relationship bunches isn't solid and there is frequently furious rivalry inside a specific gathering for general

initiative. Nonetheless, pioneers who hold formal positions inside the legislature turn into the apostate leader of the connection gathering, in any event while their formal residency endures. This thought of rivalry inside connection bunches gives bits of knowledge about the authority relations inside family relationship gatherings, As the heads of family relationship gatherings, they react to claims made by neighborhood connection gatherings and intercede nearby debate determination. They for the most part designate different individuals from their family relationship gathering to address the everyday worries of the village, adding to the chain of command and making a hover of nearby operators. Be that as it may, for genuine cases, for example, ones including murder, family relationship heads will be called upon to intercede specifically or to utilize their impact with foundations of the state. Basically, these heads of family relationship bunches expect true administrative and legal expert at the village level.

2.4. Establishing a link between kinship networks and politics of Pakistan

The link between different decisions and kinship networks is completely recorded in the writing. Stephen Lyon, an anthropologist, discusses the foundation of the Pakistani state in 1947, kinship networks were installed inside political institutions. He reports how kinship bunches intervened between focal institutions of the state to access assets. For instance, neighborhood pioneers regularly utilized kinship binds to access a scope of capacities from getting a phone trade in a village and consulting with the nearby police, to picking up occupations. This narrated confirm depicts on how kinship bunches upgrade their nearby positions by incorporating with institutions of the state (Anwar S. , 1996). A few times the connections between kinship networks and political institutions are much more straightforward. For instance, nearby landholders keep running for neighborhood and national decisions, upheld by both their kinship gatherings and the kammiss that worked for them. In return for discretionary help, the chosen kinship head would guide state institutions to his kinship gathering. Supporting this dialog, Talbot, a history specialist, expresses: "Standard records (of Pakistani groups) have in this manner missed a portion of the genuine stuff of political movement [such as the part of kinship groups] and host introduced different groups as well 'present day' in their association and electioneering techniques" like groups currently in the West (Talbot 2009: 10). Truth be told, be that as it may, they depend widely on the deep rooted

networks of kinship for votes (Talbot 2009). As indicated by antiquarians, the utilization of kinship networks to activate voters has its specific roots in national races composed by General Zia-ul Haq in 1985. General Zia-ul Haq entered governmental issues in Pakistan through a military overthrow, which brought about the hanging of Prime Minister Bhutto, the founder of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). To undermine bolster for the PPP and fabricate his own particular authenticity, Zia held open races, however prohibited political groups from taking an interest. Applicants remained for conventional and national decision as people without anyone else justify (Ali, 1988). Through this strategy, "Zia endeavored to return to the early pioneer method of region governmental issues in which neighborhood influentials got chose into the territory portrayed by the ties of clan, standing, group or tenurial relations" (Waseem 1993). Further, broadly perceived lawmakers were banished from remaining for race, which strengthened the significance of nearby ties (Wilder 1999).

The association between the government officials and landlords can be viewed as an advantageous one. On one hand, the government official methodologies landlords that have a specific measure of social capital, made by their neighborhood nearness and their dynamic development of connections among the village (Baxter, 1985). Then again, the proprietors' entrance to the legislator additionally makes capital, a political capital that enables him to get to institutions of the state, for example, the police. Numerous numbers of immediate landholders alluded to the way that in return for their constituent help, they would give their impact in regards to neighborhood police cases or they may give financial motivations, for example, access to arrive concessions. This cooperative relationship affirms Bourdieu's dialog of the compatibility of capital. That is, there is a solid association between class position and the capital that people can create in view of their social and political associations (Andrew, 1999). Following Tilly's dialog of trust networks, the political gatherings appear to give the purpose of access to kinship networks to be incorporated inside the state. In the keep running up to the races, political gatherings give tickets to kinship networks. This procedure of deciding to whom tickets are given can be comprehended through Tilly's exchange of bargaining, where both the gathering and kinship organize can impact the result. kinship networks in provincial regions are much more compelling than in the city as far as recognizing the suitable competitors, as government officials don't have guide associations with the general population, and in this way should experience the dharras (Alavi, 1971). Dharras likewise exist in the city, however their domain is to some degree more constrained. Nonetheless,

even in the urban communities kinship networks will figure out which kinship networks will get tickets.

The part of the dharra and the kinship organize in assigning possibility for decisions is vital to consider while analyzing the vote based character of Pakistan's region institutions. On one hand, the capacity of kinship networks to impact the determination of parliamentary instruments makes an intense criticism component for kinship gatherings to impact national level rivalry. Given the significance of the dharra as a preparing system, a point that it is investigated all the more profoundly underneath, government officials depend on these kinship networks, enabling them to have some office in considering the legislators responsible. Further, given the accentuation put on building agreement and looking after authenticity, kinship networks are responsible to their individuals to some degree. Then again, as the cases talked about below will uncover, constituent legislative issues are commanded via arrive holding gatherings, and reject countless from benefit giving gatherings and different minorities. Drawing on Tilly's prior work, Charrad takes note of that that privileging kinship ties was a typical system for present pioneer states on set up the specialist of the focal state. My exploration focuses to how national pioneers adjust themselves inside neighborhood kinship networks to assemble voters. In any case, Charrad's approach proposes that such a relationship might be turned around and shape focal political institutions. That is, she proposes that the incorporation of kinship networks into the state likewise is past the extent of this undertaking, yet would be a vital measurement to investigate later on (Charrad, 2011).

2.5. The nature of political leadership

Almost all systems of political authority revolt out of financial, social and sociological situations. Pakistan has vibrant equivalents for the impression of party-political administration over northern areas of Punjab and Khyber Paktunkawa. Frameworks related to mediation, organization together and support, represent salient examples of comparability among these regions (Hassan, 2011). Barth recognized an imperative social wonder and built up a hypothetical model which represents individual politicking. His studies related to the Pakistani society focuses on pioneering of the political groups. Barth is worried about the process through which the factional are interested in organizations together and enroll the supporters essential for their group to be reasonable; and

maybe in particular, how they figure out how to have generally quiet conjunction with regards to rough ideological talks which seem to request slaughter in countering for certain actions (Barth, 1959).

Political solidarity between interruptions even when it is not an assumed part of some other relationship, for example, basic drop or kinship, normal enrollment of a gathering, regional relationship, and so on. It is a different subject of legally binding assertion and in this manner of free individual decisions (Barth 1959). In times of a conflict Pakistanis expect their partners, instead of their family or neighbors, to come to their help. Barth goes ahead to portray a portion of the qualities of cooperation. Partnerships, he argues are made made with people which aren't rivals. Similarly, in the case of significance of cousin disagreement, there is nothing unexpected then that people endeavor to shape partnerships outside their own particular kinfolk gatherings. Similar kind of arrangement related to land redeployment which Barth argues was done before 1920's uncertainty added in putting pressure inside heredity gatherings (Barth, 1960).

The basic need of the Family is not just to control inheritance issues on the demise of their senior relatives, yet additionally needed to arrange or finish the redistribution of the land. In another place Barth utilizes amusement hypothesis to describe the 'standards' of political activity (Khan F. K., 2014). He stands out segmented ancestry from diversion hypothesis and contends that Pakistanis are propelled by a longing to expand their political freedom (Anwar M. F., 2016). It is the political impact, not the financial aspects, which is the prize for regional Pakistani leaders. It is a diversion which in a perfect world does not realize the aggregate loss of the members be that as it may. A considerable lot of the studies engaged with these initiative 'recreations', are in truth contrived to forestall unnecessary aggregation of intensity by any one of the groups. (Azeez, 2014). Various Pakistani groups in villages, Barth contends, are long haul, however not permanent, and like segmented genealogy partnerships, might be called upon when necessary and scattered in different circumstances. Dissimilar to segmented genealogy collusions, the arrangement of authoritative assertions does not show the possibly extraordinary qualities of the combination and splitting. Maybe this is on account in which they are not as unchangeable as family collusions and along these lines more consistency is required on the off chance that they are not to vanish out. These legally binding cooperation's don't displace different commitments. They insured a limited arrangement of latent questions. So though one may approach one's legally binding partners previously family or neighbors in a few settings, in others, this isn't the situation. 'Clashes with

regards to respect' are not some portion of legally binding complicities (Chaterjee, 2004). These must be taken care of by a person's 'own particular may' (Azeez, 2014). Be that as it may, siblings, children and fatherly cousins are involved by each other's respect .

Now and again the 'casualty' did not actually take an interest , yet were depended only on activities of the individuals belonging to his kingroup. Respect isn't the property or normal for people yet of gatherings. In reality on the off chance that one uses Davis' meanings of respect (Davis, 1977), it is hard to perceive how one may survey a person's respect without reference to aggregate connections. the standards of segmentary genealogy hypothesis smear in the illustrations of respect, which additionally recommends that there might exist a belief system of humans redressal of respect infringement, anyway practically speaking that must just once in a while be the situation. (Halvorssen, 2017) Different parts of South Asia additionally appear to show comparable examples of political administration. In view of Pettigrew, factional collusions are the way to understand Sikh political connotation. She contends , the Punjabi groups observed by her, saw amid her hands on work have inception based upon conventional standards of societal relationship , she states that Groups, make vertical connections which cut crosswise over kinfolk and private gatherings and serve to attach neighborhood individuals to more extensive territorial and state networks (Lieven, 2012).

The two qaums discussed, include the Gujars, that are beyond a doubt a grander majority of the district, in the view of this they might not be as prosperous in captivating offices. A maximum number of the important seats are held by the Khattars for the District of Attock and all of its important tehsil seats. Gujars around contest and win the Union Council elections , however they usually don't make it to the chairmen of district council or be an MPA, MNA. The MPA ,MNA seats are held for the minority qaum, the K'hattars. K'hattars have dealt with this by astutely circulating themselves daintily across the District of Attock. In accordance with this there are no towns which have a K'hattar majority, yet most towns are under the ownership of the Khattars (as in all the land was customarily under the ownership by Khattars , essentially wholly farming land claimed by Khattars). A significant number of Khattar influenced towns are comprised of a greater part consisting Gujars. The Gujars in those towns don't vote in adequate amounts the Gujar candidates, and circumstances don't handle their own particular competitors. They vote to help the competitor who is chosen by the landholder who claims the land where they are needy. Its is a decent case of how basically qaum loyalties are just a single of a large group of conceivable

associations . In these K'hattar towns, with regards to legislative issues, qaum isn't the unequivocal factor; essential client/patron alliance outweighs everything else. Further, even in the Gujar controlled and commanded town, for those key workplaces which are K'hattar held, the authority ful Gujars reinforce K'hattars against each other. The Gujar landlord family has experienced issues previously, handling possibility for workplaces higher than Union Council. Their own inner divisions have kept them from contending effectively with their K'hattar neighbors and they have, for as far back as 30 years, bolstered the K'hattar MPA's. This is of an unexpected request in comparison to K'hattar peasants supporting them be that as it may. Gujar landlord bolster is profitable to K'hattar politicians yet not ensured, so they can impact the government officials as though they were qaumi siblings. To some degree they additionally see themselves as sharing a typical motivation. They are both families of the landlords and they both need the elected government to give more help to the farmers the landholders who are farmers as well, have low amounts of desire for receiving governmental help for the defaulter landlords or for peasants.

The winning politically families serves the interests of a specific part of the populace, which shares their own particular political along with economic plan. Since they are a the minority qaum, they are not regularly called to work for the benefits of their qaum over their monetary accomplices. They are reliant on non-qaumi landlords in the elections and consequently they have built something like a rational qaum of the landholders that do not in any case permit intermarriages. In this occasion, the original qaum the one in which the person is born and figures out who one ought to specially wed, does not assume a huge part, but rather is subsumed under regular economic goals. While this may have a tendency to propose the kind of investigation which Asad ,1972 Ahmad ,1977, or Hardiman,1982 contend is suitable for South Asia, it neither clarifies nor portrays the components inside the framework in general. Class-like unity is appropriate on a few events in a few fields, yet it neglects to clarify more extensive and more key parts of the relations at an interpersonal level. The accompanying example given shows the kind of conduct that is normal after the elections which viably refutes the class solidarity utilized for certain appointive purposes manifestation of patronage into state politics.

Pakistani villagers are mostly illiterate along with this their interaction with the government is also very inadequate. They have the right, however not the commitment, to go to five long periods of primary school. the Current information recommend that under 40% of Pakistani students completely finish five long years of the basic education of the elementary level schools

(PEDF Data 2001). As grown-ups they should beat bureaucratic systems to get their much needed identification cards. The police that are broadly scattered in the rural areas of the country one police station with not as much as twelve policemen commonly serves a few villages at one time so they are not for the most part a noteworthy consistent factor for individuals who don't go as far away from their village. Whether they see the state as, generous, inept or vindictive, they know that it is there however they don't really consider it to be an organization which serves their interests or in any capacity benefits them. Villagers revealed they don't trust they have any impact in state policies or activities. While they express a craving for security and assets from state foundations, in actuality they expect almost no favour or benefit in return. The degree of this separation between Pakistani villagers and the state is profoundly imbued, to a degree that even after years in different nations, they hold a key conviction that the state exists just for the authorityful and rich citizens (Kaplan, 2013).

Brief experiments that have been conducted by integrating villagers into the discourse of the country and more broad consideration (Orenstein, 1980). One of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's interesting quality, among Pakistani politicians at the national level, was the capacity to catch the creative imagination of poor villagers. A portion of the poor Pakistani villagers in the 1970's accepted, for a short time, that the state existed to ensure them and fulfill their rights which would further roll out improvements for the betterment of their lives. The disturbing execution of Bhutto persuaded the greater part of the villagers that the state was not there for them, and would dispense with any individual who attempted to alter it toward that path (Malik H. , 2003). Landlords might be similarly disparaging of the state, however they are personally engaged with the procedures of the state. Landlords effectively take an interest in decision making, either as the candidates 'kingmakers' working from behind the scenes. Villagers, regardless of whether they know about it or not, are an essential component in the political procedure. A landlord will vow all or part of his town bolster for a competitor or a group. In the pre-Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto period, he likely guaranteed, and conveyed, all the town. Nowadays there is more political disagreement between cousins of landholder families and in numerous villages there are maybe a couple solid willed men who recall the guarantee of the Z. A. Bhutto period. A huge level of landholder's chance is spent in government workplaces in tehsil or district seats. Attock District's vicinity to Islamabad and the nearby Divisions,

National as well as provincial workplaces are additionally moderately simple for men with private cars owned by them. Landlords are frequently worried about the state's political issues and attempt their best to impact the state's action along with various policies. The role of the landlord in the villages abandons them with the part of the representation of the villagers and also to the state organizations as well. While the villagers have a belief that the state has little effect on their everyday lives, they may not know about exactly how much time landlords give to controlling the state which doesn't state they are successful in doing so, however they commit an extensive part of their time interfacing with state authorities. Some of what landlords do this for the benefit of the villagers, for instance the purpose of getting loans and funding for schools and hospitals, various projects related to water or more other required projects, for example, perusing and filling the official documents. The critical and vital role of the state in the villages is hard to characterize. Not very many landlords are a part of the state, those that do hold some official position generally do as such in low maintenance limit with next to zero compensation such as the Numberdars, Khidemat Committees the Zakat Committees and so forth (Khan D. R., 2018). Most landlords, in any case, have no other option other than to help the villagers in ways that would be done by the state in the West. They do this, when conceivable, by making state assets work for them. They attempt to control their resource systems of human to a point where issues might be settled with the minutest interruption to their own particular financial and social interests. The Pakistani State isn't viewed as something unmistakable from its way of life and culture. People inside the State components are still unpredictably attached to their recourse systems which should also be made their priority (Inayatullah, 1994) . Ways of entry into the processes of the State are seen, in this way, not as a methods for benefit for the general people, but as one technique for the capitalization of resources for the benefit of a particular network of human resources.

2.6. Landlord's involvement in political processes of the state

When Members of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs) such as Tahir Sadiq, began to make a name for himself as one of the most prominent successors out of them was Choudry Shajaat Hussain who was a part of one of the wings of the Muslim League, therefor government officials around

the District of Attock needed to adjust accordingly. Distancing Tahir Sadiq as a fellow was maybe insignificant, as he was like the other landlords, not in a situation to perform freely as per the acclimated interests of the landlords. Notwithstanding, the Muslim League authority merchants in Gujerat depended on him to convey his supportive constituency and in addition impact different supporters in the District of the Attock region. A MPA from a moderately minor area of the region of Punjab, with no significant material or industrial assets, had turned into a conductor to both National and Provincial networks for generating impact as well as authority. A MNA from the district of Hazro, Tahir Shah, concluded that he was to give his full support along with help to Chaudary Sahab. He greeted religious leaders and landlords from all over the District of Attock to accompany him in order to give a welcome to Tahir Sadiq in the Hazro region.

It was an extraordinary event the welcome included material artefacts that were used at the 'Jalsa' were akin to those traditionally used at nuptial ceremonies. The marquees locally referred to as shamiyanas, or, which are very frequently used at weddings all through the South Asian region, were set up in front of Khanzada's house. The chairs for the jalsa were aligned in a particular manner similar to the way done for a walima ceremony the event also included musicians, khusras otherwise referred to as transsexuals or transvestites along with beggars were also attended the spectacular event. Tahir Sadiq was given a garland, which he to some extent appeared to be mortified by. After the crowd had taken their seats and all upright people were seated in the first row, the young men present at the back began firing guns into the open air, which is a very, communal exercise at local weddings.

Similarly at an "Urs", which is a celebration done in order to honor either the birth or the death of a pir by the followers, in this event there promises of loyalty were presented to the Major along with Khanzada Khan. In accordance with this few men pushed two men who were in their way to embrace and shake hands with the prominent dignitaries present there. Every single political rally in Pakistan start with a prayer which is always recited by by a maulvi. The maulvi is regularly not an exceptionally popular or compelling man in this field and may just be a neighbor who is exceptionally talented in the recitation. The keynote discourse which is delivered at these gatherings is by and large concerning a headline making hot issue, usually pointing out the insufficiency of the government and the economic problems present. This is typically done by somebody who isn't the focal point of the gathering. This is frequently trailed by more settled, and additionally engaging discourses by individuals more fundamental to the specific gathering. There

will likewise be somebody from different tehsils and District bodies and in addition to the Union Council, the present men usually doesn't talk much, rather preside on stage and joke around, pray, appreciate efforts being made. Majority of the politicians very serious when it comes to incorporating no less than one prayer into each discourse. Some like to include several prayers in a single discourse. Too much praying at political events is regularly scrutinized by a large number of the land owners, who interrogate genuineness and furthermore contend that Allah usually doesn't take sides on the issues concerning the political parties, but rather they generally stay quiet rather than addressing this matter out in the open

The speeches that are made at gatherings like these are of little to no interest to the people who are present at this events. In spite of the fact that they fill in as the reason for the social event however in these kind of event the discourse are often the main thing being offered, It is speculated that only few individuals would attend. The statements stated below are the average replies of needy individuals in the wake of going to such gatherings. Political gatherings are for everybody except for the poor and providing them just is a troublesome task. As the Zamindars referred to as landlords have family connections such as siblings of the person or cousins are often judges or the AC or DC in the area, Justice in these villages comes through contacts, with them being the closer the better. . Matlob, a respondent stated that, "Political Jalsey or meetings are our way to tell our problems to the electable". Political gatherings can enable the poor individuals to discuss their problems however not so much resolve them.

While reviewing the political gatherings the landlord, Chaudary Sahab granted me the permission to ask infinite questions from the locals, be that as it may, they silenced any individual who attempted to react. Amid such social events one may expect, the landlords who go to the gatherings consider the issues all the more emphatically however this was not an attempt to show transparency and accountability reflecting through giving absolute freedom to answer to local people but infact was a way to exhibit their political supremacy in the area.

Attempt to keep villagers from giving their concerned opinions, but instead enabled the landlords' craving to re-watch the political discourses all the more deliberately. At last when the addresses finally came to an end, there is typically a dinner hosted for the people attending the event. This specific circumstance enables him to portray political affiliations, making a point to individuals who his companions and enemies and in addition, degree of his accommodation is also made.

The dinner given at the end of an event, is normally the thing most discussed when the guests finally leave the event.

Chapter 3

Building the Case Study of Patronage and the role it plays in the transformed Political Culture of Pakistan

3.1. Introduction

Following is a short review of history of South Asia of the past six decades that suggests that the democratic system faces these problems in independent states: The people of South Asia embraced a very constricted definition of democracy. They chose to govern the people without making them a part of process of governance. The rulers were not able to meet the challenges as this restricted ability damaged their capacity to fulfill the requirements. India also faced similar challenges after

independence but they were not trying to sanctioning the masses too. Elite people had led the contest for freedom and thus saved the democratic infrastructure from demolishing. In South Asia the rulers aren't ready to share authority. Here the democratic model is based on parties who form their own dictatorial models. Parties aren't structured at all and they are nothing but a form of political heritage. They are the support for military for autocracies. There are two chief defects in governmental parties.

Authoritarianism seems to be something that has corrupted Pakistani politics. It is a malady that has ruined Pakistan since the time it has been established. Experts say that there are numerous reasons for this situation. It is also said that this phenomenon of dictatorship has its roots in South Asia even before the partition of the Subcontinent. This is due to the fact that all the people who governed the Subcontinent i.e. all the emperors from Mauryan ruler Asoka to Mughals have put despotism in custom. The British did the same. Moreover, they added their own set of rules to the already existing authoritarianism. In the Subcontinent, the king had authority and right over all the people and belongings that existed in his region. This right of authority could be transferred to the lords and the industrialists who were loyal to him and in this way the authority was organized. All of this hierarchy and association were based on Roman concept of domain and authority. They did so to prove their domination and control over the protectorate. In South Asia, the king collected certain taxes from the land. Afterwards the authority of collecting the returns was passed to others. The British came and completely demolished the communes in villages. They replaced the Panchayats system with tyrannical feudalism which itself is a type of authoritarianism. However, the British tried to end the formal political atmosphere here in South Asia and aimed at introducing the colonial system and social collaboration which would ensure a firmer control. This created an oppressive atmosphere and Pakistan and India both inherited this dictatorship thing as it was very dominant in the constitutional system of these newly formed republics. After liberation of India the rules were somehow changed but it was meant to serve either the executive part or the dominant elements of the government. They, however, seem to be quite successful. But Pakistan failed to make any visible transition after getting separated from the colonial system implemented by the British. The colonial state was immediately replaced by civilian and military rulers.

3.2. Analyzing Pakistan's Political History through the lens of Patron-Client Relationship

It is an understood thing that since independence not over 200 families have shared the civil supremacy in Pakistan. They have made use of the country by collaborating with the military. This manipulation and subjugation has proved to be devastating for Pakistan. The authorityful people in the country were not interested in conducting elections so there was no political development and the situation was chaotic. In the past ten years, there were almost seven prime ministers. Liaquat Ali Khan who spent 50 years in the office was murdered; Khwaja Nazimuddin worked for 17 months, Mohammed Ali Bogra for 29 months, Choudry Mohammed Ali for 13 months, Shaheed Suhrawardy served for 13 months too; I.I. Chundrigar (2 months); and Firoz Khan Noon (11 months). All of them turned out to be the targets of the dominant people. During 1950s, Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza being bureaucrats reacted violently towards the government. Ghulam Mohammed set a wrong example in April 1953, when he dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin and replaced him with Bogra. He did so in order to resolve the crisis the country was facing, however, his decision proved to be wrong. Bogra tried to restrict the presiding governor general's control so Ghulam Mohammed sacked him from his office. And this went on and on which led to a situation of instability in the country.

Dictatorship means that there will be no accountability and the people could having authority could do anything they want. The authority shifted from one elite to another and this cycle continued. In such conditions Muslim League started to decline and it was nearly dead in 1954. There was no focus on ideologies or policies. Money wasn't being spent on people and there was no development in the country. All the spending was done on enhancing the army influence. All these activities were being carried out as there was no one to question the army and the politicians. That's why Pakistan fell deep in the well of authoritarianism. Army is expected to protect the nation but in Pakistan the army was busy ruling over the civilians.

Bhutto was too a dictator by nature so his aim was to strengthen the military infrastructure. This became the root cause of this own downfall. He tried to establish strict rule which led him to rely on intelligence agencies. However, all of his efforts seem to promote his personalized rule. He didn't trust anyone and this led to breakdown of democratic institutions and created a vacuum for the authority which provided Bonapartist general favorable conditions to takeover. Bhutto had surrounded himself with people who were not sincere to him and after overthrowing Bhutto, General Zia ul Haq became the leader of the country. General Zia ul Haq wasn't popular at all like

Bhutto. Bhutto was so famous among the people that he would have been elected prime minister if the elections were held once more. General Zia ul Haq didn't have charismatic personality like Bhutto. He didn't even have the support of the public. Moreover, he was not an intellectual and visionary person. The foreign media started to call him a reluctant military ruler as he was not accepted by general public but soon he developed taste for authority. Since Pakistan came into being there were a lot of problems and crisis along with regional conflicts between people belonging to different cultures. This confirmed that there is a incredulity about the Islamic state and Islamic unity. There were clashes amid The West Pakistanis and Bengali's , Sindhi's and Punjabis and Pashtuns and Punjabi's.

Firstly, there is no credible infrastructure for participation of general public. People are appointed on basis of references. There are special seats for elites. These parties suspend and appoint people on the basis of sects and factions. Change in leadership of party through elections is a very rare thing. Head of the party imposes authoritarianism within the party as well. So no one in the party can present his own view and no one is allowed to debate on anything which goes against the leader. PPP which declares itself as the most liberal party chose the Bhutto family as the lifetime president for the party. Similarly, Nawaz family remains the head of PML (N).

Secondly, there are no democratic choices within the party too. The elections within the parties aren't conventional; Torturous schemes are designed for those who tend to go against the culture of the party. General Zia died in a unexplainable jet crash. In this way oppressive era came to an end and people of Pakistan got relieved. This led to the beginning of a new era in which Bhutto's daughter Benazir Bhutto came and the general people became excited. However, they didn't know that Benazir's rule would prove to be a transition from direct to indirect military rule. So many things didn't change at all. After quite a time, things began to become worse. Benazir hurt the feelings of the public by not only betraying them but also collaborating with the military and not making any reforms which may interest the public in general. The majority of the people who were excited at first when Benazir came were disappointed badly. The excitement with which public had greeted her dissipated as soon as she got charge of the office. This was one of the few occasions in which the leader lost so much goodwill so quickly. Benazir, like the previous prime ministers, followed the Machiavelli's saying, "*the first rule of politics is to stay in authority*". After Benazir, Nawaz Sharif took charge of management in 1991. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was the president during this time and he wanted everything to happen according to his wish. Moreover, he wasn't happy

with the Nawaz government. The government of Nawaz was becoming independent day by day and Ghulam Ishaq Khan saw this as a threat to his aims and ambitions of authority. There were serious conflicts of interest among President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif. They argued over appointment of chief of army staff, economic stability and relations with other parties.

Due to all the arguments and other stuff, Nawaz government was terminated and Benazir became prime minister in 1993. After getting into authority, Benazir followed the same principles as she did during her first rule. She learned nothing from that disaster and that's why second time her regime proved to be even more disastrous. This became the worst period of our history. The state's institutions became weak and the rulers began to dictate the masses. Nawaz Sharif came into authority again in 1997. But he concentrated on making his place stronger. He oppressed the journalists who wrote against him. He ordered inquiries of the reporters who were printing hypercritical articles about him. He also tackled the courts and judges his way. In a case in which Sharif was a respondent, his supports threatened and terrified the judges. Moreover, he also enforced his authority over Farooq Leghari and compelled him to resign. By the year 1998, army was the only sector that he hadn't put his hands on till then. But when the chief of army staff General Jehangir Karamat spoke against accomplishments of the government, Nawaz Sharif was left with no other option than to sack him. Sharif was being overly furious while tackling the army so when the next general Pervaiz Musharraf came, he behaved in a conventional manner and took over the country by imposing martial law. He forced Nawaz to leave the authoritative position at gun point. Military, however, kept its position strong even when there was civilian rule. Both the governments of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif tried to satisfy the army by providing them economic benefits. That's why other institutions suffered as major part of budget was allocated to the army. Our military force consists of 700,000 personnel and is considered as the most authorityful institution of the country. No democratic institution has this much number of members. In our democratic system the institutions are quite weak.

People of Pakistan were contented when Musharraf took over in 1999 which clearly shows that we hadn't learnt anything from the past. It is difficult for them to leave the authority. They promise to return to their camps however they are still not ready to leave the authority. They have political goals and ambitions which forces them to expand their rule and never give up the authority. But the fact is that they can't continue ruling over the masses for an unspecified period of time under martial law or for that matter situation of emergency. An administrative infrastructure needs to be

established in order to replenish the military rule. However, they plan all this stuff in such a way that it doesn't affect the interests of the military and their position remains secure. Throughout the history of Pakistan, we have seen that no matter how much good a ruler be the rule however turns out to be really tyrannical. So where and what is the fault? The fault isn't in the character of the rulers but it is in the infrastructure that limits the rulers. One man rule hasn't always been bad in the world; in England there were various forms of kingship and dictatorship and democracy arrived really late. Moreover, China also prospered under the government of authoritarianism. The same may not be fit in every situation.

3.3. State Politics and Patronage

State politics in our country is a very clear example of relations with the supporters. Alliances are created by contacting those people who have great resources. Such famous people are used by the parties to get votes across a region. Anyone who begins a campaign must have the support of these populist people otherwise they won't allow the individual to win the elections. Gaining support creates a network and serves as an entry point to the relations of patronage and clientage. This is how provincial politics is controlled and exploited by a few groups. Industrialists and landlords always get authority in Punjab due to support of military. When military came into authority in 1999, they drew themselves from these oligarchies. Leadership and authority in Punjab has always been in the hands of influential parties. Nawaz Sharif won the election of 1980s and 1990s due to support of the chief industrialists of Lahore and Gujarat. After that Nawaz started to attack the authority of military and military became intolerant. Even before coup occurred Nawaz had lost the support of the industrialists, the military and the general public too.

Choudry Shajaat Hussain was the man who supported Nawaz Sharif very much and he belonged to a leading business family of Gujarat. They weren't successful only in the industry but also proved to be great local politicians since the time of independence. They were with the Muslim League since the beginning that's why they also supported Nawaz Sharif. Moreover they also

understood the rivalry party politics of their area. The family of Choudry Shajaat Hussain had good terms with pronounced leaders throughout Punjab. They have won loyalty and support as they had distributed favors and resources. Choudry Shajaat permitted the native chiefs in the surroundings to accommodate the natives of Punjab. Choudry Shajaat was the interior minister so he could approve or reject the appointments. However, all the posts were not allocated to the local leaders. Certain seats were saved for those men who were recommended by the political leaders of other regions. The more the support they provided the more dominant they became. Rawalpindi was important part of Punjab so Choudry Shajaat wooed the leaders from the districts and they placed their own people for supporting him.

As Choudry Shajaat offered the community services posts, the local politicians offered themselves to assist him within the Muslim League. However, this wasn't that simple as Nawaz and Choudry were supporting each other. When Nawaz's authority was corroded, it led to problems and put few of the politicians in difficult positions. Some clever leaders played with both the camps within the League. Military didn't step in this entire situation. If it stepped in then all of them would have been compelled to make some sturdy choices. There were inner separations within the Muslim League and it was clear that the party wasn't united at all. These divisions had the support of different industrialists. These bonds were created to accomplish certain goals which may help them achieve some long-term benefits.

In this section we will be viewing the examples of national level political leaders who intervened on behalf of local landlords. The problems that aroused weren't of any interest to the politicians and they weren't in the interest of the state too. The appeal was made on behalf of a family of a landholder for appointment of job. After a few attempts the request was considered and acknowledged in order to satisfy people. There is no reason why there was so much political influence there. In another case, which was a minor incident but it presented that the landlord had good terms with a national level politician which also enhanced his own status too as he then belonged to the faction of that man. Now coming towards the regional administrative appointments; Malik Zahir allied with the local management at provincial level in early 1990s and he began to serve as Chief Officer in rural areas. Everything that was necessary to make the government run smoothly was done. He also served as organizer for the meetings and as a negotiator whenever there was a dispute among the elected people of his domain.

Malik Zahir lived in Punjab with his wife and children. However they were getting tired of living in the city for so long far away from their home town. They wanted a placement which was close to Rawalpindi. They never wanted to reside in the lower Punjab. Then he was posted to Lahore for some reason. This was done as it was thought due to the new motorway it would be easier for him and his family to visit the Attock district. Malik Zahir had so much influence that he could get himself appointed but unfortunately he was under the elected official of People's Party of Pakistan. The PPP official told him to visit the office to read the newspaper and to drink tea. He told him not to intervene in his office matters. Malik Zahir became disheartened due to his dormancy and came back to his village. He told his relatives about the entire situation so that they could help him in getting another posting which is near his home and has Muslim League representative in charge. His Uncle and brother considered his appeal and passed it to a regional MPA who was in faction of the Choudry Shajaat . After a span of few weeks he was offered a position which was away from his home village and was even hotter than Lahore. Malik Zahir courteously refused to accept the offer. For the next eight months he kept refusing the postings offered to him because all of them were away from his village and they were extremely hot too. After quite some time he was offered a post in Gujarat city which was the hub of the Choudry Shajaat. Lahore had been a disaster for him and his posting to Gujarat was his first urban real post. This appointment was made by displacing a senior who was not in the group of the Choudry Shajaat's allies. This was a form of open favoritism. Moreover, the man he was displacing was senior than him. However, the appointment was said not to be made on Malik's abilities or his family connections or resources. It was said to be a reward for MPA of district of Attock. He chose Malik Zahir for this appointment on the basis of family connections and not on the basis of his competence. His relatives had considerable influence in Attock and their support was vital for MPA's election that's why the local MPA considered and approved their request for transfer of Malik Zahir to a better city.

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