

**CONTEXTUALIZING THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN
THROUGH ACADEMIC AND NON-ACADEMIC DISCOURSE**



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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MS Peace and Conflict Studies

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DECLARATION

I certify that this research work titled “Contextualizing the System of Governance in Pakistan through Academic and Non-Academic Discourse” is my own work. The work has not been presented elsewhere for assessment. The material that has been used from other sources has been properly acknowledged/referred.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere gratitude goes first and foremost to my supervisor, Dr. Najimdeen Bakare, for his tireless efforts, patient support and strong motivation that led me to produce this research work. He has been my mentor, my navigator, and my most valued advisor during the research process, as well as during my time at CIPS. I also treasure the productive interaction and the intellectual guidance provided by the other faculty members who were always a ‘knock at the door’ away. In addition, I am thankful to the department itself, which provided a conducive and a learning environment for my academic endeavors.

These acknowledgements are incomplete without appreciating the support of my parents. They have always been present right around the corner for all my academic achievements. They share a vision for where they wish to see me one day, and have held my hand tight to walk me up to the flag at the top.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the interviewees who made themselves available for their insightful, accurate and primary information. Their input has greatly enhanced the credibility and vitality of my research work.

ABSTRACT

This research is a discourse analysis that explores the semiotic and representational practices surrounding the civil and military governing fabric of Pakistan. It investigates a quadrant knowledge base of university based publications, policy discourse, practitioners' discourse and media discourse to evaluate the regime of representation for civil and military governance in Pakistan. This quadrant knowledge base thereby, provides the essential source of knowledge production on the subject, and assists in deconstructing the constructed meanings and identity for civil and military rule in the country. The research delivers on its core objectives to dissect the discursive practices that exist for the system of governance in Pakistan, in order to indicate what discourse prefers as the most suitable governing system for Pakistan, and identify the ontological objectivism regarding governance in general. A data set of HEC (2019) recognized journal articles of Universities and think tanks, stretching over a period of ten years (2008-2018), are reviewed. Additionally, the research has conducted structured open-ended interviews of a purposive and representative sample of bureaucrats, practitioners and media personnel to build up its findings.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Higher Education Commission (HEC)

Member National Assembly (MNA)

Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)

Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In theory, politics is a gamble for civil bureaucracy, while defense is the motto of a country's armed forces. However, in practice, the political environment of Pakistan has often been observed in a state of tussle between its civil leadership and military authority. Soon after the independence (1947), Pakistan went through her first military takeover under Gen. Ayub Khan as Chief Marshal Law administrator in 1958, followed by Gen. Yahya Khan in 1969, then came Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, and finally Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 1999 (Marcinkowska, 2008). These military regimes were supplemented by civil democracies that came along with their own manifestos to govern Pakistan.

This see-saw nature of politics in Pakistan, with military on one side and democracy on the other, represents the political maturity that Pakistan has yet not attained. It is due to the vacuum of power and responsibility that a tussle between civil leadership and military authority is nurtured. In the light of this, the research shall contextualize the governing system of Pakistan. This aim will be driven by the discourse that exists on the civil and military fabric of Pakistan. It will provide the researcher with an insight on how language and representational practices surrounding the civil and military rule in Pakistan, constructs an implicit identity of the two, and shape the subjective meanings of their political reality.

In this manner, the research will explore the regime of representation surrounding the civil and military governance in Pakistan. It will also indicate what the discourse prefers as the most viable governing system for Pakistan. These explorations will simultaneously provide an insight into the objective ontology that maintains a universal acceptability towards democracy and its

colorful slogans of liberty, fraternity and equality, and therefore, anything against or restrictive of it, is disregarded and immediately considered inadequate.

Such a research process will take aid of academic as well as non-academic writings and discussions. This data will be confined to and acquired from a domestic quadrant knowledge base; university based journals, policy makers (think tanks and bureaucracy), practitioners (military personnel and political party representatives) and media (electronic and print). A qualitative method of analysis will be adopted over a purposive and representative sample, as well as publications of HEC recognized journals (2019), that stretch over a period of 10 years (2008-2018). This will facilitate our understanding of what the contemporary discourse considers as the better and most suitable governing system for Pakistan, and how it is constructing meanings and identities for the civil and military governance, and thereby, the political reality of Pakistan.

1.1 Literature Review

The entire world is juggling between their preference towards military authority or democratic leadership. According to a report published by the *Pew Research Center* in 2017, the significant chunk of the world opinion is sided with democracy while only a small percentage aligns with governance by a military ruler (and authoritarian regimes) (Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017). It is also observed in this report that military is rather supported by minorities and opposed by majorities, and as for democracy, it is itself divided into support for representative democracy, direct democracy and championship for technocracy by the public (Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017).

In the past few decades, democracy has struggled with military regimes in many parts of Africa (Khadiagala, 1995), Latin America (Hoskin, 1997) and Asian (May & Selochan, 2004) countries. Though of recent, there has been an embracement of democracy in the world over.

Democracy is being celebrated as international norms, upon which a country gets representation within the comity of nations and members of the international community. Being part of nations that have grappled with experimentation between democratic dispensation and military regime, Pakistan is of course an adequate country worthy of such research.

For a country like Pakistan, C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro (2014), argue that militant and destructive tendencies may be reduced if democratic liberal values are brought into the governing structure of the country. However, through their 6,000 person provincially representative survey, they came to understand that principles of democracy have been used to legitimize the demand of Kashmiri freedom and Pakistan's support for their cause. Hence, conventional wisdom of peace and stability in the society through liberal values has not been met entirely in the same direction.

Rasul Bakhsh Rais (2014-2015) recognizes this nationalist streak that hinders the democratic aspirations of Pakistan, but posits that the country is continually struggling for true and stable democracy. According to Rais, dynastic leaders of political parties, slow process of accepting new social forces, incapacity of state institutions, and vulnerability of direct military involvement have proven problematic for Pakistan's complete transition into democratic governance. For Rais, this explains that the importance and practice of democracy in a country stands tall and the failure of its wishful working is constituted to the socially, politically, militarily and economically restraining elements of Pakistan rather than the principle of democracy itself.

In this view, Pakistan does not harness a conducive environment that sustains democracy and promotes its prevalence. Therefore, S. Akbar Zaidi (2009) criticizes the government of Pakistan that leads toward the failure of governing system (democratic system) in Pakistan. He explains that the discontent for the elected government of Pakistan is misinterpreted as a

disapproval for promoting and strengthening democracy in Pakistan (Zaidi, 2009). If anything, it must be regarded as the most viable option for a stable and secure Pakistan (Zaidi, 2009).

These claims have been accompanied by Nasreen Akhtar (2009) who adds ethno-religious groups, fragmentation in the political culture and lust for power in the list of reasons that have resulted in the failure of democracy in Pakistan. She points out the widely accepted assumption that democracy is levered to legitimize the power of the influential class.

This may be attributed to the reality that democracy has not met the needs of Pakistan indigenously and have rather been artificially enforced as an external concept consistent with the West. Ironically, the West (prominently United States) may have endorsed democracy as its core governing principle, but in practice, it is witnessed that authoritarian regimes in Pakistan received more US military and economic aid than democratic governments (Ali, 2009). Such attention and importance to military takeovers in Pakistan by external forces (particularly US), has undermined democratic rule (Zaidi, 2009) and contributed little in nurturing a strong democracy (Bora, 2010).

This shows that research on the subject at hand cannot be rightly guided without bringing the prominent role of military in the equation of governing Pakistan and shaping its politics. According to Sadaf Farooq (2012), military has always played an instrumental role in governing Pakistan and dominated the political process of the country. While on the other hand, Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long (2004), suggest that democracies improve and enhance military effectiveness. This is accompanied by Dennis C. Blair (2012, pg. 9) who says that the “most advanced, most skilled and most respected armed forces in the world are those of the mature democratic countries.”

As a result, a constant tug of assertions are raised - whether Pakistan’s military flourishes under democracy or democracy in Pakistan is compromised due to military intervention in state

policy and functioning. Nasreen Akhtar (2009) has accused military's "guided democracy" efforts for the derailment of the parliamentary system in Pakistan. She asserts that military has deliberately created political fragmentation in Pakistan to accrue advantage for itself. This may be coupled by the words of Owen Bennett Jones (2002, pg. 290), who says "Pakistan's military is not the solution to the country's problems, it, in fact, is part of the problem."

Such maneuvering of democracy under the military is eminent from the words of Christine Faire (2018), who makes an explicit argument suggesting that Army had an integral role to play in making Imran Khan, walk his road up to the Prime Minister house. This articulation of internal state policy reasserts Stephen Cohen's (2003) words that since Pakistan's military is more aware and better understands the threats faced by Pakistan, therefore, it legitimizes its actions on the pretext of securing Pakistan's national objectives.

This widely circulated narrative is backed by authors that have no personal experience in the military itself, which naturally produces knowledge that is not in support of military regimes. It must be brought into attention that talking about military, while excluding its own representative knowledge does not give an accurate insight of the complete reality. Nonetheless, Sadaf Farooq (2012) points out that military has gained a good reputation for its role during Pakistan's arduous times of emergency. It has dispensed its technical skills and organizational resources to fill the civilian governments' lapse and maintain law and order in the country (Rizvi, 1984).

Aqil Shah (2011) recognizes that public may trust the military, but that does not signify public support and acceptance towards military rule. While on the other side, public resentment is also witnessed for civil governments when they fail to provide effectively and efficiently for their citizens. (Shah, 2011). Thereby, a push and pull of public opinion is observed in terms of their preference towards military rule or democratic governance, usually measured in the backdrop of

one school of thought against the other. In view of external influence over political consciousness of the public, it is detected that the Anti-American sentiments that have widely spread in Pakistanis over time have caused an unwelcoming attitude towards military rule, which has received the most support (moral and monetary) from America in Pakistan (Amin, Naseer & Khan, 2013).

The literature indicates that the knowledge production around civil and military leadership is gripping the scholarly discussion from the corner of support, as well as opposition. This existing work deliberates on the civil-military dimension of governing the state of Pakistan, which itself is a part of discourse that enables the researcher to understand the meanings and identity associated to the military and democratic rule and the subsequent tilt towards any one of the two.

Even though the work is being weighed in terms of championship of democracy, deficits of democracy, hailing of military and de-meriting of military, however, no research has yet been focused on how the literature is itself a section of the larger discourse on the subject, which resonates the preferred system of governance. This is in turn influencing the production of similar discourse and hence, the political consciousness and reality of Pakistan. A discourse analysis of civil and military governance in Pakistan (under the ambit of social constructivism) has not yet been dealt with. This research identifies such an untouched area of analysis in literature, and therefore, indulges to explore the civil and military duopoly in Pakistan from this novel approach.

1.2 Aims & Objectives

1. To ascertain whether the identified quadrant knowledge base forms the prominent source of discourse in Pakistan.
2. To inquire if the contemporary discourse constructs meanings and identities for military rule and democratic leadership in Pakistan.

3. To access if the discourse is tilted in support of military rule or civil regime as the most preferable governing system for Pakistan.
4. To identify the objective ontology regarding the acceptable system of governance in Pakistan
5. To examine whether the discursive practices of the quadrant knowledge bases are integrative or generate a polarizing effect within and across each other.

1.3 Research Questions

Q.1 Does the quadrant knowledge base form the essential source of contemporary discourse in Pakistan?

Q.2 Does the academic and non-academic discourse in Pakistan construct meanings and identities for military rule and civil governance in Pakistan?

Q.3 Does the discourse in Pakistan consider civil democracy as better than the military form of governance or vice versa?

Q.4 What is the objective ontology regarding the system of governance in Pakistan?

Q. 5 Does the discourse in Pakistan create centripetal or centrifugal waves within and across the knowledge producers of Pakistan?

1.4 Methodology

To understand the overreaching question regarding the preferred system of governance by the contemporary discourse in Pakistan, this study adopts a cross-sectional research design that will engage in a discourse analysis under the purview of social constructivism. For this purpose, a quadrant domestic knowledge base will be explored as the prominent source of knowledge production in Pakistan. This will assist the research to contextualize how an understanding

regarding the civil and military governance (which are two variables under study) is developed in the country.

A qualitative strategy of inquiry will reveal that the discourse generated through academics, policy makers, practitioners and media influence the bent of mind for either military rule or democracy. For this purpose, the work of Jennifer Milliken in her article “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods” comes in handy. She has suggested three theoretical commitments that would be utilized as foundational understanding of knowledge production in our society. Her work focuses on the discourse of international relations scholarship, however, in view of the study in question, the researcher attempts to modify her theoretical commitments according to the conditions that best suit the research at hand. These three theoretical commitments; systems of signification, discourse productivity, and play of practice (explained in Chapter II and III), have been used to extract methodological steps and assess the discourse in question. They provide the researcher with shades of analysis to reason how knowledge rolls out to produce meanings and identities. Therefore, Milliken’s work becomes reflective of how discourse on a subject may be assessed.

This facilitates the researcher to ascertain a three staged analysis, using which the data will be scrutinized in Chapter III:

1. Language practices (in both text and spoken)
2. Regime of representation (or truth)
3. Construction of meanings and identities

In case of academic discourse, a content analysis of university based publications produced by HEC recognized Journals (2019 list) relevant to the field of Social Sciences, and falling under the sub-category of International Relations and Political Science, is carried out. The knowledge

produced by this secondary form of data (stretching over a period of ten years, 2008-2018) will be assessed in terms of the language practices it adopts to represent the civil and military governance in Pakistan. Histograms will be utilized to indicate the no. of times military rule and civil democracy has been discussed each year in each issue of all HEC recognized field relevant journals. Such a graphical assessment will indicate the existence of particular language and representational practices for the two variables. This will then enable the researcher to contextualize the regime of representation for the civil and military governance in Pakistan, and determine the meanings and identities that have developed for the two.

As for the policy discourse, two sub-fields of analysis have been developed; think tank journals and civil bureaucracy. A data set of HEC recognized think tank journals (2019 list), under the field of Social Sciences and sub-category of International Relations and Political Science, will be incorporated stretching across a ten years timeframe (2008-2018). To analyze the said data, the same strategy will be adopted as was used for university based publications.

The said qualitative method of analysis, in the form of a structured open-ended interview on a purposive and representative sample (as a source of primary data) is taken, which reveals the common sense understandings of the policy (for the sub-field of bureaucracy), practitioners and media representatives of contemporary discourse. The set pattern of questions is carried out for all respondents alike and the questions are articulated along the lines of assessing language and representational practices that constitute a particular meanings for civil and military governance and construct their respective identities. The respondents were ensured of their anonymity, and were engaged in a comfortable discussion where only the theme of the research was conveyed, while the intent of the research was not informed in order for them to not be cautious of what terms, phrases, metaphors and contexts they use to answer the questions asked. The findings are

then displayed in accordance to the three staged analysis (as mentioned earlier), to attain and answer the objectives of this research.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The governing system of Pakistan and its estrangement to civil-military influence has been a focus of discussion since the inception of the country itself. Post 1947, the civil military relationship and their tug of war over the governing system of Pakistan has captivated readers and writers over this subject. However, this subject has not yet been explored from the lens of a discourse analysis. Through a discursive interpretation of civil democracy and military rule in Pakistan, the study appears as a novel contribution to the existing literature in the way civil and military fabric of Pakistan is analyzed.

1.6 Research Assumption

The research claims that the discourse on civil democracy and military rule of Pakistan constructs an identity for the two systems of governance. The knowledge production surrounding the two system of governance is subjective and repetition of such representations develop common sense understandings that the knowledge consumers accept as truth and their political reality.

1.7 Statement of the Problem

To understand what language and representational practices have been adopted to describe civil democracy and military rule in Pakistan, and to identify the constructed meanings and identities for the two systems of governance.

1.8 Structure of the Study

Chapter I: Introduction

This chapter gives a preliminary overview of the research at hand. It presents what the literature has generically discussed regarding the civil democracy (in terms of its merits and de-

merits) and military rule (with regards to their good and bad features) in Pakistan. It also acquaints the reader to the objectives of the research and the significance that this research carries.

Chapter II: Theoretical Framework: Opting for Discourse Analysis

In this section, the research lays down the theoretical framework that becomes the foundation of analysis for the study at hand. It introduces what discourse analysis is, and explains the elements that develop a discourse itself. This chapter does not explain the theoretical framework in isolation, but rather applies the framework on the study in question.

Chapter III: Data Analysis: Dissecting the Quadrant Knowledge Base of Pakistan

This section of the study spreads the entire data into distinct categories. It takes aid of graphical representations to display the gathered data and provides a clear picture of what the data represents. The purposive and representative sample is laid out in context of the three stages of analysis; language and representational practices, regime of representation and construction of identity.

Chapter IV: Findings and Discussion

The final chapter of the research expound the findings of the study. In view of the objectives of the research, the chapter aims to analyze the gathered data, indicate what the discourse prefers as the most preferable governing system for Pakistan, identify whether the discourse serves as a melting pot or creates a polarizing impact within and across the knowledge bases, and expands on how the objective ontology regarding governance influence the common sense understandings of respondents and literature.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: OPTING FOR DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

2.1 Understanding the Theoretical Framework of the Study

The knowledge surrounding the civil-military domain of politics in Pakistan has multiple interpretations for various observers. These interpretations when interact with each other aim at developing meaning for the observed reality, whereby, constructing an identity for it. The research at hand, seeks to comprehend the various meanings and identities attached to the system of governance in Pakistan. For this purpose, the research shall undertake a constructionist discourse theory analysis to contextualize, through the knowledge producers of the country, what the discourse prefers as the most suitable system of governance in Pakistan. From this point of analysis, the intertwining behavior of theory and method in discourse analysis becomes assistive; as the researcher can not only derive assertions for a subject, but may validate them simultaneously as well.

An investigation into the discourse surrounding civil and military leadership will highlight the patterns of meanings that have established in Pakistan over the period of seven decades. The experiences under true military takeovers and wavering nature of democracies have exposed the society to construct a reality of affairs for each case of governance.

Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) have explained that there is no neutrality in the ways we talk about things and therefore, our social relations, identities and realities are all constructed and constantly changing. The idea of non-fixation in discourse may be complemented by the work of Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996; 6), who regards discourse to be “open-ended and incomplete”. She explains this by suggesting that discourse does not have the character of being fixed. On the contrary, discourse is “always in the process of being articulated” (Doty, 1996; 6).

However, she supplements this assertion by suggesting that discourse, at times, may assume an “overlapping quality” that implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) denote meanings and an identity to a reality, which displays its nature of “partial fixity”, and enables one to associate an understanding to things as we know it (Dotty, 1996; 6). In this manner, we may understand why military rule and democratic leadership have certain connotations attached to their system of governance within the understanding of the public and political sphere. The research, being equipped with such background theoretical knowledge, can examine what the present discourse may indicate as the preferred governing system for Pakistan.

The identity attached to military rule or civilian democracy expatiates out of the “circuit of culture” explained by Stuart Hall (1997). In this concept, he discusses that language is the principle medium and carrier of shared meanings, that operates in a representational system. Stuart Hall (1997) has interchangeably employed ‘language’ and ‘semiotics’ (science of signs) in explaining the modes of representations. The forthcoming (shared) meanings produced and exchanged within the representational circuit, construct an identity. In short, representations through semiotics give meanings, form associations and construct an identity; the compact process of which contribute in the formation of discourse.




Figure 1 – Circuit of Culture (Stuart Hall, 1997)

The circuit of culture is explained by Doty’s as “representational practices” to expand on the productivity of semiotics. She explains that the regime of truth produced by these representations, through the employment of language, constructs a certain reality for the observer, which necessarily might not be true, but is perceived as the truth due to constant proliferation and circulation of that knowledge. In this manner, Doty believes that identities are constructed and manipulated. The constitutive process of meaning, representation, culture and power (explained later) is referred as “discursive practices” in the words of Stuart Hall (1997).

The implicit nerve of discourse rolls out as explicit identity, recognized as the material and performative character of discourse (Doty, 1996). This performative character of discourse is regarded as discursive approach by Stuart Hall (1997), through which he illustrates that the “regime of representation” has certain “effects and consequences”. In this respect, discursive practices are concerned firstly, with how language interacts with its actors to produce meaning, and secondly, with how the knowledge produced connects with power (explained later in this section) to substantiate subjectivities and identities and define their representations.

This relationship of language (or semiotics) to the polity of representation may be expressed through Jonathan Culler (1976;19), who cites Saussure's explanation of "language as a system of signs". This system has two aspects attached; the *signifier*, relating to the actual form of sign that may be physically observed, and the *signified*, relating to the corresponding concept that is stimulated as a response. In this respect, the phrase 'democracy in Pakistan' brings to mind connotations based on personal experiences of the individual with it. Similarly, the phrase 'military in Pakistan' triggers a concept or idea that one has personally come to terms with over the period of time.

The ping pong relation that the signifier has with the signified displays the influence of *Knowledge and Power* over it, as explained by Michael Foucault in his work 'Genealogy of Power' (Drolet, 2015). The character of knowledge to seem liberating on the outside but functioning as enslavement on the inside, explains how the knowledge around us is a constructed illusion. Foucault's post-structurally epistemic examination of knowledge, makes him believe language as the vehicle of constructing the social reality in the post-modern world. In this milieu, Foucault illuminates that the existing social structure (or the social stratification) facilitates power to exercise its dominance over knowledge. Therefore, the more powerful certain discourse is, the more hammering effect it will have on its consumers, in contrast to the weaker discourse.

The above understanding of discourse analysis is further polished by the work of Jennifer Milliken (1999) who spells out the process of social interactions that result in constructing our social reality. She offers certain rational (deductive) steps that can be regarded as a foundational understanding for this research, to study and evaluate the discourse in question. Starting off with "discourses as systems of signification", Milliken states that sign systems construct meaning of how we see the world and comprehend it. These semiotic engagements develop subjective

identification and differentiation practices. Since a defined method to analyze structures of signification does not explicitly exist, therefore, Milliken (1999) provides *predicate analysis* to investigate language practices in texts, as well as *metaphorical analysis* that relate one domain with another (a third method of narrative analysis is suggested by Lincoln, 1989).

The second theoretical step is “discourse productivity” that entails operationalization of discourse (regime of representation) in action. This brings our attention to the innate ability of discourse to produce and reproduce meanings and identity; by classifying some as privileged (who have authority over knowledge, or as Milliken (1999) puts it “subjects authorized to speak and to act”) while others as not, by legitimizing certain policies that condition people’s lifestyle, and by developing common sense (through repetition and circulation) for the world as we know it.

Finally, the third theoretical commitment posed by Milliken (1999) talks about the “play of practice”. This method assists a researcher to analyze how meanings become dominant and fixed, and resist its innate character of flexibility, variation and discontinuity (as mentioned by Doty). Through this approach, a researcher may take into account subjugated knowledge, alternate and dissident discourses that are overshadowed by hegemonic discourses. This method assists a researcher to analyze how meanings become dominant and fixed, and develop resistance against its innate character of flexibility, variation and discontinuity.

In this purview, discourse analysis fits perfectly as a theoretical framework, since it lays the necessary ground to recognize, analyze, interpret and explicate the meanings, their interactions, consequent representations and finally the discursive construction of the knowledge surrounding civil and military leadership in Pakistan. A research under discourse analysis, may assist the researcher to pursue the stated objectives of the study.

2.2 Application of the Theoretical Framework

Having established discourse analysis as the preferred theoretical framework for the research, one can detect its utility by dissecting and inquiring the (predefined) quadrant knowledge base of Pakistan. For this purpose, the theoretical construct will assist the researcher to derive answers for four prominent questions; how semiotic and representational practices construct meaning and identity for civil leadership and military rule in Pakistan, what the expert/privileged knowledge on civil-military governance is, how the knowledge producers themselves (are part of and) represent the cycle of reproducing influenced interpretations, and consequently how the knowledge produced is maneuvering our present political reality.

Politics of partiality are the primary essence of discourse regarding civil and military governance. As explained by Marianne Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips (2002), our entire knowledge of the truth is constructed, therefore, it lacks credible fact driven representation and is inclined to take sides of either democracy or military rule in the context of Pakistan. Even though Doty (1996) discusses the discontinuous, changing and non-fixated character of discourse, however, the over-lapping quality of discourse (Doty, 1996) on the subject of civil-military leadership has induced our common sense (Milliken, 1999) with subjective connotations for each system of governance.

The theoretical framework also encompasses Stuart Hall's circuit of culture, which enlightens our understanding of the language practices (and semiotics) that have gradually constructed meanings for military rule and democratic leadership in Pakistan. For example, the term "discipline" has been generally used to represent the working structure of the Army in Pakistan. This does not necessitate that our knowledge of military is the truth about the military,

but it reflects that our reality about military is constructed through knowledge acquired from repeated and widely circulated language and representational practices regarding the military.

This compilation of semiotics develop a system of representation (Hall, 1997) for the nature of civil-military governance in Pakistan. In this context, the constructed perceptions seem to speak louder than the reality because the implicit nerve of discourse rolls out as an explicit identity for each governing paradigm in Pakistan. Therefore, identities, associations and meanings contribute to produce discourse surrounding civil and military governing systems. This is what Doty (1996) mentions as the material and performative character of discourse, described as the effects and consequences of discursive practices (or constitutive processes) by Stuart Hall (1997).

The core of the research sits upon the representational practices (driven by semiotics) that define and describe civil and military governance in Pakistan. While recapitulating the literature review, it is observed that scholarship on one hand indicates that democracy in Pakistan have legitimized the freedom movement of Kashmiris (Rais, 2014-2015) or it is a medium to exercise the lust of power by the influential class (Akhtar, 2009). While on the other hand, democracy is regarded as the most viable option for a stable and secure region (Zaidi, 2009).

Similarly, terms such as “guided democracy” (serving as signifier) have been used to explain the involvement of military in the governance of Pakistan (the subject that is being signified). This is accompanied by the words of Owen Bennett Jones (2002, pg. 290), who says “Pakistan’s military is not the solution to the country’s problems, it, in fact, is part of the problem.” however, on a completely opposite angle, Sadaf Farooq (2012), points out that military has gained a good reputation for its role during Pakistan’s arduous times of emergency.

These examples reveal how language, its expression and semiotics carry implicit and explicit representations about democracy and military in Pakistan. This explanation reiterates

Jennifer Milliken's (1999) words that experts on the subject have the power to speak and to act, and therefore, their words have the capacity to paint a partial social/political reality. For example, professors who have published their work on civil-military rule in Pakistan have certain degree of power over the narrative building around the subject. Similarly, politicians share a privileged social status in the country, whereby, giving their words power over the truth that is being produced and circulated regarding the military or civilian governance.

This stands true for all privileged subjects in the discourse producing sphere of Pakistan (academics, policymakers, practitioners, and electronic media). In the same manner, publishing practices of certain journals or print media also skew power to dominate over others, consequently, empowering one discourse over the other.

The arising tussle between the subjugated or dissident knowledge is based on the binary opposition (Doty, 1996); civil leadership being acknowledged as the most suitable governing system for Pakistan in contrast to military rule or vice versa. These binary oppositions pave way for centripetal or centrifugal discursive practices over civil or military leadership, thereby, polarizing the knowledge producing segments of the society. Such a discursive polarization shall be discussed at length in the later chapter.

Keeping in view this entire examination, the research takes into account all the academic and non-academic discourse (in the form of textual content and interviews) in perspective, as it explores the patterns of constructionist practices, and recognize the social consequences of various discursive representations on the present political reality. Since the quadrant knowledge base are themselves part of the cultural circuit under study, therefore, they collectively share many common sense understandings. These naturalized understandings are deeply seeped in the discourse. The job of the researcher (who is also part of the same cultural circuit) is to dissect the knowledge

produced, navigate those common sense understandings, and present an objective reality of the truth. In this manner, the theoretical framework provides the foundational understanding to carry out a discourse analysis on the said subject, and deliver on the objectives of the research critically as well as comprehensively.

CHAPTER III

DISSECTING THE QUADRANT KNOWLEDGE BASE OF PAKISTAN

3.1 Overview

Expanding on the theoretical framework of the study, this chapter brings into account the quadrant knowledge base of Pakistan, and analyzes its operational effect on constructing meanings and identities for civil and military governance in the country. The research has confined its data set to the knowledge base of academic discourse, policy discourse, practitioners' discourse, and media discourse, since the research considers these four shades of discourse as the most prominent and primary source of knowledge production in our society, that contribute into developing a regime of representation for civil and military governing fabric of Pakistan.

This assertion is hammered by the words of Jennifer Milliken (1999), who claims that “subjects authorized to speak and to act” influence knowledge production in a society. Since the quadrant knowledge base is believed to incorporate all segments of knowledge production in Pakistan, therefore, it is accepted as the truth for the society and a credible source of assessment for the study. A brief overview of the aforementioned knowledge bases includes:

3.1.1 Academic Discourse:

This category of discourse includes the university-based publications in the form of journal articles. Only Higher Education Commission (HEC) recognized journals (according to latest list of 2019), which fall under the category of Social Sciences (further classified into International Relations and Political Science subfield) have been analyzed. The data set has been constricted to the last ten years of publications (2008-2018) and articles that directly or (even) remotely indicate their discussion over the civil and/or military governance in Pakistan (from the title of the paper or the abstract) have been incorporated.

3.1.2 Policy Discourse:

There are two strands to examine policy discourse in Pakistan, which the research has divided into think tank publications and interviews from bureaucracy. In case of think tank publications, only the HEC recognized journals (according to latest data of 2019) produced by think tanks have been taken under examination. These journals belong to the Social Sciences group, with a further classification into the subfields of International Relations and Political Science. Only the last ten years' publications (2008-2018) have been considered, that not only include the journal articles but also supplementary documents produced by the think tank group. Articles and supplementary documents that remotely indicate their discussion on civil and military governance in Pakistan have been picked up, keeping in view the title of the paper and its abstract.

As for analyzing the discourse produced by the bureaucracy in Pakistan, a data set of civil servants has been developed. By employing the qualitative method of structured open-ended interviews on a purposive and representative sample, the respondents have been engaged in a comfortable discussion (without prior knowledge of the research's intent to examine their language and representational practices) on the civil and military governance in Pakistan.

3.1.3 Practitioners' Discourse:

This category of discourse has been divided into two branches, comprising of army personnel and political party representatives, for a holistic picture of the said domain under study. The army personnel were a blend of Major, Brigadier and General ranks to analyze a clear picture of their understanding and common sense practices at each level of command, decision and strategic policy making. Whereas, the political party representatives were a mixture of all political parties of the country (PTI, PML-N, PPP, and MMA) that made up the established government and opposition government with majority member seats in the National Assembly (the hub of

policy discussion and decision making platform) and prominently influenced politics in the country.

Through a qualitative method of analysis, structured open-ended interviews were carried out over a purposive and representative sample, where the respondents were involved in a comfortable discussion (without prior knowledge of the research's intent to examine their language practices) on the civil and military governance in Pakistan.

3.1.4 Media Discourse:

This is the most influential and significant source of discourse in our society (as ranked by the respondents of the study as well). The qualitative mode of inquiry (in the form of structured open-ended questions) is adopted to assess the natural responses of the purposive and representative sample. This discourse has been limited to representatives of the print and electronic media in Pakistan. The respondents displayed their subjective understanding when posed with questions relating to the civil and military governance in Pakistan (having no prior knowledge of being assessed upon their language practices for the purpose of the study).

3.2 Basis of Evaluating the Data Gathered

The research dissects the aforementioned knowledge bases by breaking the findings into three segments; language practices, consequent regime of representation, and the construction of meanings and identity. For this purpose, the work of Jennifer Milliken (1999) comes in handy. She has suggested three "theoretical commitments" that would be utilized as foundational understanding of knowledge production in our society. Her work focuses on the discourse of international relations scholarship, however, in view of the study in question, the research modifies her theoretical commitments according to the conditions that best suit the study at hand. The three theoretical commitments have been used to extract methodological steps to assess the discourse in

question. They provide the researcher with shades of analysis to reason how knowledge rolls out to produce meanings and identity. Therefore, Milliken's (1999) work becomes reflective of how discourse on a subject may be assessed;

3.2.1 Systems of Signification

While carrying out discourse analysis of social realities, it is observed that meanings get attached to specific phrases, words and symbols that trigger a certain understanding of the subject. Under this theoretical commitment, as underlined by Jennifer Milliken (1999), exists a constructivist understanding of the meanings attached to all language and representational practices.

In addition, Milliken (1999) points out the works of two scholars Saussure and Derrida, as discussed in the previous chapter. Saussure elaborates on the relationship between signifier and signified, where a subject (signifier) is positioned to produce a particular meaning (signified) in a social setting. While Derrida talks about binary oppositions as previously mentioned through Doty's lens. These oppositions are discussed in terms of first world and third world by Doty, thereby, establishing power of one (the privileged) over the other. In context of the research, these binary opposition will determine whether discourse prefers democracy over military rule or vice versa. All of this explanation will help constitute the discursive practices surrounding military rule and civil democracy in Pakistan.

3.2.3 Discourse Productivity

The compilation of semiotics develop a 'regime of truth' for subjects in a social setting. In case of the study at hand, a particular regime of truth (or representation) has been developed for civil and military fabric of Pakistan. This regime of truth is a result of the experts authorized to speak and to act, and therefore have the power to produce knowledge on the subject, and mark it

as truth. The operationalization of such a regime of truth, excludes other possible meanings and identities, and thereby, gives shape to common sense understandings that circulate in the society. In this manner, space for other interpretations gets reduced, and a rather subjugated character is given to dissident meanings and identities present for the same subject.

The knowledge bases of the research highlight such movers and shakers of knowledge production, having attained an authorized position to establish truth(s). In this light, the hierarchy among these knowledge bases is also evident, where one has a privileged position while the other is considered as subjugated knowledge (due to the status it has received in the knowledge-power nexus).

3.2.3 Play of Practice

The final theoretical commitment is not only a critique of hegemonic discourse that works to fix meanings, but is suggestive of simultaneously constructing an identity of the subject under scrutiny. Milliken (1999) refers to Doty's (1996) work on fixation of discourse, where she talks about overlapping quality of discourse. Milliken (1999) and Doty (1996) (along with Ashley, 1989) infer that the when discourse interacts with other discourse with similar trajectories, it has become fixed, denotes meaning and constructs a partial identity. Therefore, rather than assuming an overlapping quality, a discourse must always be overflowing and incomplete. This will "open spaces for change, discontinuity, and variation" (Doty, 1996). In contrast, the discourse on military rule and civil democracy denies space to undergo change, and therefore, it assumes a definitive quality due to circulating inside the same frame of determined meaning and identity.

It is clear from Milliken's (1999) all three theoretical commitments that discourse is not isolated, but is a result of subject-object and object-subject interactions. Repetition becomes retention, and common sense understandings are developed by privileged/expert knowledge

producers in the society. Subjugated knowledge is disregarded, and fails to counter (or become an anti-thesis of) the established social (or political) reality, which itself further consolidates the position of hegemonic discourse. Therefore, subjectivities develop, meanings become grounded and identities are constructed.

3.3 Data Analysis

In order to shape the research findings, it is important that the data gathered is first assessed under each shade of Milliken's (1999) theoretical commitments. In this manner, the discourse produced on the civil-military governance of Pakistan can become comprehensible and weighable. Therefore, each knowledge base will be reflected in terms of three distinct grounds;

1. Language and representational practices (in both text and spoken)
2. Regime of representation (or truth)
3. Construction of meanings and identities

By running the data gathered on civil-military governance in Pakistan through the above three stages of analysis set by the study, the research may come to identify the discursive practices surrounding the discourse in question. The data analysis of journal articles have shaped its findings around the respective semiotics, their connotations, and overall framing of identity. As for the data gathered through interviews, the responses have been clustered under the elements of good governance, decade of governance most appreciated, subjectivities within knowledge bases, and system of governance most preferred (see appendix II,III,IV,V,VI).

This data will not only showcase the language and representational practices surrounding civil and military governing fabric of Pakistan, but it will also highlight the regime of truth developed for each of the two. Thereby, indicating the prevailing (constructed) meanings and identities for military rule and civil democracy in Pakistan. In this manner, the research will reveal the

interaction of knowledge producers and knowledge consumers; as the knowledge producers not only influence the knowledge consumers but are also representative of being influenced by the continuously circulated discourse. The discourse therefore, highlights a web of influence and interactions that jointly construct a social reality, where no knowledge production holds an independent origin. Such an evaluatory process will be followed for each of the knowledge base as follows;

3.3.1 University-Based Journals

According to the HEC 2019 list of recognized Social Sciences journals in Pakistan, only 12 journals fall under the International Relations and Political Science category. Out of these 12 journals, the research picked up on all the articles that had keywords such as governance, civil leadership, democracy, elections, military rule, federation, female participation in governance, national integration and public policy making. Apart from these keywords, titles and abstracts of journals indicating even a remote discussion on civil and military governance in Pakistan (for example, Kashmir issue, Kargil conflict, Balochistan or Pakistan's nuclear program, as it may direct towards the governing behavior of civil and military leadership in such cases etc.) were also accommodated, as there was not enough published work that directly focused on civil democracy or military rule in Pakistan. Therefore, implicit and explicit expressions regarding the governing behavior of democratic and military leadership have been added to the data. The research focused on a ten year time bracket for these journal publications, starting from 2008 to 2018.

A graphical representation showcasing the language and representational practices in favor of military governance and civil democracy, and against military governance and civil democracy may be observed below. Such a graphically displayed data gives the researcher and the reader a clear view of the discursive practices surrounding the study in question. The histograms below

indicate the number of times civil-military governance has popped up each year (from 2008-2018) in each of the 12 journals. This will be followed by a discussion on the terminologies, phrases, metaphors and contexts that have continuously been used to describe the civil-military governance in Pakistan. Thereby, indicating the regime of representation for the said subject at hand. In this manner, it becomes easier for the researcher to assess the meanings associated to civil-military governance in Pakistan and consequently the constructed identity for each.




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9




Figure 10



Figure 11



Figure 12



Figure 13

It is interesting to observe that universities have not published much on the subject of civil democracy and military rule in Pakistan. Additionally, after going through the data of 10 years, it is witnessed that universities have produced very little work on simply governance in Pakistan for that matter. From an average of 18 articles published each year by one journal (out of an average of 2 issues per year), the data shows that a maximum of 6 articles (by South Asian Studies journal) were produced that highlighted the aspect of civil and military governing fabric of Pakistan, while a minimum of only 1 article (by Journal of Indian Studies) were produced on the aforementioned subject.

This graphical assessment of the number of times civil democracy and military rule has been implicitly or explicitly discussed, ascertains the use of language and representational practices for the said variables under study. A close analysis of the content produced on civil and military governance in Pakistan displays the pattern that constitutes a regime of representation for civil and military governance in Pakistan, respectively. For example, military has mostly been

accompanied by descriptions like “dictatorial rule”, “guided democracy” (which has come particularly been cited for Ayub’s regime), “quasi-governance” (mostly been cited for Musharraf’s regime), “derailment of constitutional democracy”, “despotic system” and “authoritarian rule” among others. These words when penetrate in the minds of the knowledge consumers, creates a common sense understanding for the military to be doing more bad than good for the country. Additionally, when military is quoted along with democracy, it has been characterized to further worsen the situation of democracy in the country.

On the surface one may state that literature commends military over its administration, and at times as an institution (as well) that has worked for the rehabilitation of conflict ridden areas such as Swat and FATA, and aimed at pushing the menace of terrorism out of the country. However, it generally displays dissatisfaction for all the military regimes Pakistan has come to face till date.

With respect to how democracy has been painted in literature, it is observed to be cited with “freedom of media”, “inclusiveness”, and “representative” at one hand, while on the other, it has been described as “controlled democracy”, “deliberative democracy” (when linked with media), and “a system that is being practiced in a muddled form”.

Apart from this, the academic writings has repeatedly pointed out the ills of our political governments and where they have lacked to deliver in Pakistan. It has been observed to not only probe the causes for Pakistan being regarded as a “failed state”, but it has also been witnessed to suggest remedial measures and solutions to the ill practices of political governments.

When literature brings military rule in contact with civil democracy, varying descriptions are observed. For example, it is cited that traditional-military rule “aggressively enforced and promoted a culture of prohibiting political debate”. While this system was reversed during political

governments when they were faced with judicial crisis. On the contrary, political governments have been slammed of “not managing an efficient system of local governments” and have rather hesitated in doing so. Whereas, military rulers have been portrayed as more “proactive and interested in introducing local government systems”. Nonetheless, military has faced a harder backlash from academic discourse. At one instance, it has been alleged that “co-option and sponsorship of religious groups by successive military governments have brought Pakistan to a point where religious activism threatens to erode the roots of the state and society”.

Similarly, the “disciplined”, “controlling” and “authoritative” image of military (which is highlighted later in the responses of the interviewees as well) has been expressed by an article in the South Asian Journal (2012) as “Pakistan military is not merely protector of Pakistan geographic borders. With the passage of time with further advance in political sphere, it claimed itself to be the protector of Pakistan’s State, Nation, Domestic and Political arrangements as well. Along with this it became the sole guardian of Pakistan’s ideological frontiers, defining what was permissible under its own interpretation of what Pakistan meant”.

When the academic writings confront the military alongside democracy, binary oppositions develop that assume democracy to be better at governing the country rather than military rule. Even though the incompatible political governments in Pakistan have been expressed with a pile of problems, but the question as to why is this system of governance being preferred by academic discourse still remains un-answered (this will be explained later in the next chapter).

On the basis of the supplementary themes that have been used to represent military and civil governance in Pakistan, the research streamlines their respective regime of representation in the scope of consequent construction of their social realities. In this manner, the researcher can identify the meanings that have contextualized the understanding of military and civil governance

and therefore, indicate the subjective identity that has taken shape for both. Hence, the regime of truth (or representation) developed, reinforces the identity for each research variable, and establishes it as the widely accepted political reality of Pakistan.

The research observes, after such careful scrutiny of the university-based journal publications, that universities have not only fell short of contributing to a significant subject area that requires attention, but they have also been partial towards their assessment of the two.

3.3.2 Policy Discourse

As previously explained, there are two sub-categories of policy discourse that assist to identify the common sense understandings in the shape of language and representational practices;

3.3.2.1 Think-tank Journal Publications

A similar pattern of assessment is adopted for think tank journals, as has been displayed for university-based publications. According to the HEC 2019 list of recognized Social Sciences journals in Pakistan, only 5 journals fall under the International Relations and Political Science category. From these 5 journals, the research picked up on all the articles that had keywords such as democracy, military, good governance, constitution, federalism, statecraft, US aid, foreign policy, FATA, Baluchistan and Kashmir in their titles or abstracts. These wide range of related and (even) remotely related keywords were accommodated mainly because there was not enough published work that directly focused on civil democracy or military rule in Pakistan.

The below graphical representation of the data set extends from 2008-2018 and displays the number of times civil democracy and military rule have been discussed in terms of their governing capacity each year. The charts will lead on to a discussion on the terminologies, phrases, metaphors and contexts that have continuously been used to define the civil-military governance in Pakistan. These will assist in pointing out the regime of representation developed for each of

the two governing systems in Pakistan, and help ascertain how knowledge produced by the think tank journals is contributing towards constructing meanings and identities for civil democracy and military rule in Pakistan, thereby, influencing the political consciousness of the knowledge consumers.




Figure 14



Figure 15



Figure 16



Figure 17




Figure 18

From an average of 16 articles published each year by one journal (out of an average of 2 issues per year), the data shows that a maximum of only 4 articles (published by policy perspective) and a minimum of only 1 article (published by the Journal of Strategic Studies) highlight the language and representational practices for democratic and military rule in Pakistan.

These charts display a similarity in the pattern of discussion and the content produced by both university-based journals and think tanks produced publications on two grounds. Firstly, the knowledge produced by both of these sections of discourse is limited and rarely engages in an analysis of the system of governance in Pakistan. Secondly, for the knowledge produced over the two research variables, a tilt and partiality is observed in the language and representational practices of the author and hence, a subjectively constructed identity is associated to the two.

After careful reviewing the content of these journals, the research has understood the policy writings to interpret democracy as a system that promotes “peaceful negotiations”, “negates violence”, “a system of consultation for decision making”, “backbone of dialogue”, “political participation” etc. However, this description of democracy is void of practice and ascribed unsatisfactory when put in the case of Pakistan.

Phrases such as “derailment of democracy”, “thwarted march towards democracy”, and “oscillation of control between civil and military rule” have been used to describe the widely accepted understanding of democracy developed in Pakistan. This understanding may display democracy as a “crippling system” of governance, nonetheless, the knowledge produced has implicitly adopted an overall positive connotation when declaring Pakistan to be a democratic country.

While on the other side, the causes for bad governing behavior in Pakistan under democracy have been associated with “lacking in well organized and well established political

parties that could carry the representative system of governance forward”. This signifies that democracy itself is an effective system of governance, however, the very practitioners of this system in Pakistan have not been able to pull out the benefits from it. Therefore, democracy is not bashed, but the environment that cultures democracy has been labeled unfit, in context to Pakistan.

As for the military rule, the think tank journal articles have taken aid of adjectives such as “autocratic”, “authoritarian” and “dictatorship”, all of which have assumed a synonymy for military rule outside of literature as well. While in case of governance, think tank publications have commended military in statements like, “after seven years of instability (1951-58), in which as many as seven prime ministers rose and fell, the military regime put the country on the path of economic and political stability”.

In contrast, some authors are pessimistic and claim that military takeovers came at a time when there was a dire need of a healthy democratic environment. Additionally, authors believe that “military regimes, being more favored for foreign aid, have undermined and stifled the development of democratic institutions in Pakistan”. Thereby, insinuating that countries like US have carried forth their own interests in Pakistan, through military dictators at the forefront. Therefore, military rule has been painted to “cast a long shadow over politics and national agenda”.

When both civilian and military rule are discussed together in think tank publications, the experts who are “authorized to speak and to act” (Milliken, 1999) claim that “one of the accepted norms in a democratic set-up is healthy civil-military relationship where an elected civilian government enjoys the overall control of the military”. While on the other side, authors have quoted examples such as that of Gen. Zia ul Haq’s regime, where military rule had resulted to weaken the democracy in Pakistan.

By analyzing the knowledge produced for civil democracy and military rule in Pakistan, the research understands that there is a constant struggle to guard democracy in Pakistan. The authors have generally followed a pattern of wooing for democratic governance in Pakistan and sided for the preservation of democracy, even when they acknowledge the ills of the present distorted political system in place. Nonetheless, military rule has never been considered as an alternate or accepted option, and stability and economic prosperity that the military rule brought forward is portrayed as ulterior motives.

3.3.2.2 Civil Bureaucracy

The knowledge produced by civil bureaucracy has also been incorporated under policy discourse, in order to assess a complete picture of the discursive practices pouring out of this knowledge base. A purposive and representative sample constituting of 5 respondents were taken (see appendix II). These includes civil servants that had a pivotal role in their respective domain of service. The respondents were chosen from three generations; one, that has seen Pakistan evolve in its initial years and come at the upper age bracket, second, being in their late 30s, and third, a comparatively young mind who has freshly entered in bureaucracy.

These three age brackets, not only indicate the differences in approach and interpretations but also display the experience that has led to form their respective ideas. It also highlights the common grounds (if any) that the three groups within the same category have, thereby, indicating the circle of discursive practices that keeps reiterating itself in the conscious of each individual, and consequently (and eventually) interacts with the political consciousness of the individuals outside of this category.

By analyzing the responses of the interviewees, the research observes that superlative impressions have been adopted to define and describe civil democracy and military rule in

Pakistan. The respondents have represented military rule as a “shackled system” where there is “no freedom of speech and expression”, “dictatorship prevails”, “devoid of merited rulers”, “institutional structures have not developed”, and “non-elected representation of the people” exists.

These language and representational practices for military rule are not limited to their governance alone, but the practitioners (military leaders) were also a subject of their common sense interpretations and association of an identity, when the question of military rule is brought up. For example, Gen. Zia ul Haq was quoted by one of the respondents when he was asked about his perception of the military rule. The respondent stated (as an accepted fact) that “Gen. Zia was the most ruthless, and the worst thing to happen to Pakistan”. He called him “a hypocrite and a typical product of security oriented politics that has plagued the present and future of Pakistan”.

This example (coupled by other leader-focused examples for both military and civilian rule) indicates that civil democracy or military rule is not just understood as an abstract or governance centric concept, but the respective leaders have developed a certain well-circulated and grounded image of each of the two governing systems of Pakistan.

On the other side, when the interviewees were inquired about what they think of democracy and democratic leadership, the interviewees’ respond that “it is a system that is essential and required”. The language practices surrounding this system of governance were, “unsatisfactory”, “not performing”, “representation”, “freedom of speech” among a few others. Additionally, the respondents have claimed that “the civilian leadership has imposed a system of democracy that is not in sync with the mindset of our people”, and “the repeated failure of the system has been accorded to impatience of the public to let the leaders perform”, as well as “personal agendas of political representatives that have overridden the national agenda (of the state)”.

Interestingly, while assessing the language and representational practices surrounding the governing capability of civilian and military rule, the respondents have commended the military rule more in comparison to the workings of the political governments. This is observed when the respondents claim that during military rule there has been “merit based postings of people”, “formal and clear decisions have been taken”, “local governments have been strengthened”, “(Gen. Musharraf had created) more space for the people to dissent (in views and opinion)”, “a capacity to run facets of public life was developed”, “the population felt more secure”, “invested more on infrastructure, investments flowed in and better developments at the international arena among others”.

While on the other side, democracy and democratic governments have been discussed very little in response to the questions asked, and for the times they were discussed, the respondents pointed out that “there has not been any control on corruption”. One of the respondent summed the negligence and workings of Pakistan’s democratic system very precisely; “koi gal nahe badshaho! (it doesn’t matter kings!)”.

Even when democracy is praised, it is praised for what it can deliver as a system, rather than being praised in terms of its applicability in Pakistan. For example, one of the respondent said that “democracy feels more responsible for its actions”, institutions exist to ensure this responsibility”, and ‘the public accounts committee’ was given as a reference point. However, the question is how fruitfully has the system served Pakistan and taken the responsibility to improve the status of life for the public?

It may also be observed that in spite of civil democracy being preferred over military rule in the responses of the interviewees, Gen. Ayub Khan’s tenure is considered to be the most prominently appreciated decade of governance in Pakistan. Nonetheless, the respondents were still

more inclined to choose democracy over military rule and label military governance as illegitimate (both implicitly and explicitly), even when democratic governments have been the subject of non-performance during their discussions. For the respondents, the decision to choose democracy no matter what, was conclusive and unquestionable (except for one interviewee who felt that “we need to chalk out a system that works for our country, that does not necessarily have to be democratic but it must represent our ethos”).

This natural leaning towards democracy shows the influence discourse and identity politics has on the political consciousness of the knowledge consumers as well as the knowledge producers (as mentioned earlier). This is a consequential result of the forces that label military rule as unacceptable, and democracy as acceptable (even though the governing capacity for both systems may suggest otherwise).

3.3.3 Practitioners’ Discourse

This knowledge base is another prominent section of discourse that contributes to the discursive practices surrounding civil and military rule in Pakistan. This segment of discourse has a privileged position (similar to other knowledge bases) in the construction of identity of the research variables, since, it constitutes of the personalities who practice civil or military rule in Pakistan. The practitioners’ discourse is divided into two parts; political party representatives and military personnel. They have a direct and active role in contributing to the language and representational practices for not only themselves but for each other as well.

Their responses were gathered through structured open-ended interviews of a purposive and representative sample size of six individuals, which indicated the influence they may generate on the surrounding political reality as well as highlight their own bent of mind, due to the existing circuit of culture.

3.3.3.1 Political Party Representatives

In order to analyze the discourse of political party representatives, the research took interviews from the four most prominent political parties of Pakistan. These four prominent political parties were chosen on the basis of the established government and the prominent opposition government; Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) being at one end and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) on the other. Those interviewees were chosen who had served for at least two terms in politics in order to gather more aware and rich responses (unlike for civil bureaucracy, where a generational comparison was carried out to gauge the approach and responses of the interviewees). All of the interviewees are members of the National Assembly for Pakistan.

The language and representational practices adopted by these respondents about military rule showcased their strong dislike for military governance. The interviewees deliberated that the military created a “false sense of stability” in the country. According to them, “military may be better when it comes to maintaining discipline and an organized institutional structure”, however, “military has proven to be destructive for our society, has destroyed its norms, distorted the whole structure in which politics is carried out, as well as spoiled the incentives for current and aspiring generation of politicians”. Additionally, words like fear, anger and helplessness were also used while describing what they thought about military rule in Pakistan.

Some of the respondents were of the view that it was a “bad gesture of the military to intervene in politics” since it was not their area of work, while others claimed that “if military had not intervened when it did, Pakistan would have seen the same fate as that of Libya, Syria etc”.

As for their instantaneous responses when inquired about civil democracy, there is a natural comfort and likeness for the system. The respondents claimed that “there is no doubt that the

system should exist, and is definitely the right way to run affairs of the country”. It is a system that “promotes freedom of speech and freedom of life”. However, the interviewees’ regrettably said that democratic leadership is “for an education nation only”. One of the respondents implied that since “military interferes in democratic governance”, this is why it has become “restrictive” and “not performing”. Another respondent claimed that as “the feathers of democracy have often been cut off, no real good can now come forth from it”. The respondents maintained that democracy is “under a severe clout of pressure, and politicians have been branded as incurably corrupt, which is why the public views democracy as synonymous to corruption”.

These language and representational practices for democracy and democratic leadership in Pakistan, display a blame game that points towards external factors to be responsible for the ill-working of the system and political leadership in Pakistan, rather than acknowledging such problems to inevitably result from system failure itself.

In terms of describing the governing capability of civilian and military rule, the responses of the political party representatives’ have been mix; both the goods and the bads have been addressed. For example, the respondents highlight that “democracy creates space for other institutions to develop”, constitution of Pakistan developed under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (a democratic ruler), economic reforms and motorways developed under Nawaz Sharif (a democratic leader), voice against women and transgender rights raised (Nawaz Sharif government), and the National Action Plan was developed. s

While on the other side, PTI government has been bashed to have shown “the worst governing capability”. It has made “people face more social and economic burden”. Respondents also claim that the other problems like “poverty and lack of education increased during political governments”, “nationalization policy and land distribution by Bhutto started the decline of our

country” and compared democracy to a “dictatorship or a civilian Martial Law...where authority is withheld from the local governments and other backward areas of Pakistan and their rights have not been provided to them”.

Since the questions were not direct, and inherently demanded factual answers relating to governance, the respondents (although being hesitant) could not shy away from acknowledging that the military rule on the other side, provided “peace, security and stability” to the people, “which is an essential requirement for a prosperous country”. Other acclamations for military rule include that “rule of law is observed” more during military tenures, “foreign policy, agriculture, development, (and) education” have all been witnessed during the decade of Gen. Ayub Khan.

One respondent could not help but accept that “even though I am against military (rule), but Musharraf’s era had provided health services and road infrastructure”. Although good governing capabilities of the military rule were highlighted in the responses of political party representatives, one of the interviewee mentioned that “even though military had showcased good governance but it has been a source of resentment and anger, primarily because democratic governments do not perform that well”.

It is not only observed after reviewing the responses, but has also been claimed by one of the respondent, that “military has more good features as compared to its bad features” when it comes to their governing capacity. As for the non-performance of democratic governments, most of the responses by these political party representatives constitute it be the fault of the military. In this respect, however, contradiction is observed within the same knowledge base, since according to one of the respondent “it’s unfortunate when political parties criticize army, because if democratic leaders had delivered, army would not have intervened”. One respondent even claimed that “the country grew during dictatorship and declined during democracy”.

The discursive practices that are used to highlight the influence of military over political activities are observed in the responses of interviewees, who assert that military is responsible for the “splintering of Pakistan”, “no (political) government has ever been given complete independence in their work”, and “the nation has suffered at the hand of military interventions”. Another political party representative emphasized that since “military cannot handle criticism, (therefore,) who ever does so is labelled as a traitor.” A reflection of this statement was also observed during the interview with one of the army personnel, who believed that military saw itself as superior to the civilians, and therefore, whoever did not satisfy their standards, army was discriminatory towards them.

Additionally, it is interesting to observe how certain national achievements that should rather be accounted to the pocket of military, have been accorded to political leaders and their governing tenures. For instance, Bhutto has been commended for his contribution in developing the Nuclear Program of Pakistan, and Nawaz Sharif has been praised to curtail terrorism in Pakistan. However, these two examples have a strong role of military in the background, which has led these developments to see the light of the day. On the contrary, certain tasks have been associated as a duty for the military which in theory and practice, is the job of political governments to ensure. For example, one of a respondent said, “during floods and other work military provides assistance; obviously no politicians, lawyer or doctor will come forth for such a job, it is the job of the military”.

These interpretations showcase that there is a lack of clarity and understanding regarding what governance really is, and what the duties of the government in place should be. The responses also indicate that political leaders have hammered most faults of their political system and its

working over military rule and interference. They fail to acknowledge their faults and take a stand to fix the system of democracy present in Pakistan.

In addition, women political party representatives appear to not have the proper political grooming and structured thought process, especially those who have acquired their nomination into the system over reserve seat quota. They're very loyal to the party because they are so thankful to have found a place in it. They do not possess an independent thought out of their political party and continuously build it up undeniably.

3.3.3.2 Army Personnel

Pakistan has had a long history of army take overs, therefore, this second sub-category of practitioners' discourse forms a vital part of the knowledge production on the subject. A data set of six army personnel was developed, and a structured open-ended interview was carried out. The purposive and representative sample was selected on the basis of their ranks in the army. These ranks (3 Brigadiers, 1 Maj. General and 1 Lt. General) were determined in terms of the importance of their role at the strategic, and decision making level. In this manner, the research ensures a sample that is well experienced, and well aware of the institution, the history and the role of army in state affairs. A retired Major was also interviewed so that the research may observe the understanding that a subordinate had developed over the course of his time in the army, and outside it.

These retired army personnel are now serving in universities, think tanks or as ambassadors, which opens the scope of assessment for the research as well, since they have become part of other knowledge bases, and so their contribution into discourse on one side (from their experience in the army), and consumption of discourse on the other (interacting with

knowledge producing forces outside of the army), widens the space of their influence and representation of the said research variables.

Interestingly, when this data sample was inquired about what comes to their mind when military rule is mentioned, their responses were similar to those of political party representatives, in terms of calling military rule “illegitimate”, “abrogation of the constitution”, and that it is “not appropriate for military to govern.” However, their responses (obviously) did not carry a flavor of hatred, anger or fear for military and its rule, as was the case with political party representatives. The army personnel had clarity in their statements, and displayed insight in their responses.

The language and representational practices surrounding military rule gathered from the interviews were; “adventurism”, “dictatorship”, “authoritarianism”, “accountability”, “less-corrupt”, “influential institution”, “only functional institution”, “short-sighted (in policies)”, “grip over societies and government”, “better at governance or management”, “comparatively progressive”, “lack of accessibility”, and “hatred for civilian rule”. These are some of the phrases the respondents had used to describe the regime of truth they have developed for military rule in Pakistan.

In context to the most observed statement from political party representatives that military interferes in state politics, one of the army personnel responded by saying that “perceptions have developed that military calls the shot” in a rather negating tone. The interviewees also (in a way) responded to the accusations of political party representatives by claiming that “civilian rulers were responsible for bringing the military rule” and “it was necessitated and in the interest of Pakistan for the military to take over the country” as was accepted by one of the respondents of PTI.

However, another respondent accepts that military rule “is not in the favor of the state” and so military must only “put things on the correct path (or to rectify) and leave”. One respondent comments that “the democratic system has not been given the chance to prosper due to military hiccups”. However, it is rather stated as a fact that “had Ayub Khan not taken over then, Pakistan would have become a desert”. Therefore, these exchange of statements are not definitive, and do not diagnose whether or not military intervened on its own or was caused to do so. Various parallel or alternate discourse exist on military’s entrance into state governance, but one may settle this point over the statement by one of the respondents’ that military’s involvement were “mistakes driven by apparently very good intentions.”

The research also observes a discursive interaction among the two knowledge bases of political party representatives and army personnel, where if one opposes the others’ course of administration, the other responds with same force and reasoning. This interaction reiterates the theoretical foundation of this study, that when knowledge interacts, discourse is produced and spreads discursive waves around, thereby, establishing a political reality of the subject in question.

With reference to what the respondents think about democracy and democratic leadership in Pakistan, the interviewees used words and phrases like “oligarchic”, “infancy”, “corrupt”, “uneducated”, “inexperienced”, “dynastic system”, “no self-less leadership”, “not mature because of military intervention”, “associations to personalities”, “egoistic policies”, “greater debate”, “coming to power through the popular vote”, and “plurality of political parties” among a few others.

As the research looks at the governing capability of civil and military rule in Pakistan, one of the respondent claimed that “statistics indicate that military (rule) was better at governance or management”. Military has been more “disciplined”, “selfless”, “better at organizational skills”

and effectively carried out the rule of law. Gen. Ayub Khan has been praised to have “brought the lower strata of population up”. There were also “no artificially controlled foreign exchange rates” during military tenures.

In terms of development, a respondent states that “development of the country was the best during no. 1. Ayub, no. 2. Zia and on no. 3. Musharraf (regimes)”. There is “monitoring and regulation of various institutions” under the military and therefore, it also ensures “punishment for those who got involved in bad governing practices”. The respondents suggest that “what became the strength for military is their apolitical and non-vindictive behavior” and so it was “when military tried to be democratic (as another respondent pointed this out for Gen. Musharraf’s tenure), that is when they all faulted”. One respondent pointed out that Gen. Musharraf, being a military leader, had the ability to take strong decisions, but preferred to work things out politically and democratically, in order to be gain legitimacy by the people. Therefore, even though his tenure was well governed, but he could not steer the country to the heights it could have reached otherwise.

While for democracy, it is believed that there exists “no (real) democracy in the classical sense”. There has been “constant interruptions from both military and democracy, which have always caused each to start afresh every time, and therefore cannot be effective.” However, the “1973-77 was somewhat better”. During this “land reforms” were also brought about. But Bhutto’s “de-nationalization policy damaged Pakistan” and his “the economic structure was destroyed by Bhutto”. Whereas, Imran Khan is lauded for transparency and accountability in his governing practices, as well as for creating “more political awareness”.

From a broader and general viewpoint, “hierarchy and institutions (during democratic governance in Pakistan) are involved in corrupt practices.” It has “never aimed at serving the

people”. The “economic needs, health (services), clean drinking water and education have not been provided”, there has been “no law and order maintained” and the “political governments have more quantum of debt than military”. It has also been claimed by the respondents that “political governments had picked up their own specific sectors of development; (such as) real estate, motorways (etc.), these were for their own interest, (but) as a byproduct it was advantageous for public and state (as well)”.

Even though, the regime of representation has regarded military rule to have done a far better and comprehensive job at governance, and the integral agenda of “local governments have only been (practiced) during the time of military rule, (while) civilian government has been reluctant to introduce it.” Nonetheless, it is felt by this knowledge base of army personnel that “military is an institution (only) in aid of civil governance”. In spite of the fact that “military has been given the opportunity to intervene because of ineffective governance of democratic governments”, but it concurred that “military is not trained to govern”, it “is not acceptable in any context” and “only a representative system of governance gives the country strength”. But for now, the case rests on the assertion that “military is not the ideal solution, but so far it has done a better job at governance”.

The responses of army personnel showed a degree of structure and clarity in their conceptualization of civil and military rule, as compared to the political party representatives. They did not let their emotions run the course of their answers (as was the case with political party representatives). Their answers were direct, in-depth, and suggestive of reasoning.

3.3.4 Media Discourse

This is one of the most influential, subjective and bias source of knowledge production in the society (as is accepted by almost all of the interviewees as well). In order to gauge the language

and representational practices that the media discourse promulgates, a purposive and representative sample of media – from both electronic and print – has been incorporated for the study. The interviewees were engaged in a structured open-ended discussion to evaluate how they describe the civil and military rule in Pakistan, and how do they label the governing practices of each.

The responses of interviewees belonging to print (4 experts) and electronic (4 experts) media represented a similar line of thought, and therefore, have been laid out in this section together. An experienced sample of respondents (who have been part of the media for at least 10 years) were selected, as they may be well acquainted with the political environment of Pakistan, and therefore, the discourse being analyzed may be regarded as an expert opinion having the ability to influence.

The media discourse describes military rule in Pakistan through language and representational practices of “strict”, “predominant authoritarian approach”, “running the country from behind the scenes rather than directly taking charge of the affairs”, “focused approach”, “no freedom of speech, rights are effected, one man rule, pick and choose system, non-representative people lead, impose decisions according to their will, non-inclusion of people in the call for their rights, voices are suppressed by inhumane behavior, unconstitutional courts, imprisonment and house arrest of people who spoke for their rights”, “represents the repeated interventions of military in Pakistan”, “dictatorship has strengthened the forces of disintegration in Pakistan”, and “a disciplined organization, (with) more strategic making skills and means” among others (see appendix V and VI). The major chunk of these discursive practices for the military paint its rule to be all shades of wrong, problematic, violating, and intruding.

As for the case of democracy and democratic leadership, the common sense understandings reflected in the answers of media personnel are; “in prison”, “elections”, “there is no democracy, only politics to look down upon others”, “the major reason for this (bad experience) has been military...Martial Law has affected the democratic process”, “democracy, even the word D, has not touched the feudal, monarchical based system (in Pakistan)”, “shammed democracy”, “controlled democracy”, “power hungry, deteriorated, and self-interest focused people”, “selected people”, “the real democratic leadership in Pakistan has not been able to develop”, “the leaders in Pakistan are a bunch of buffoons”, and “governance in Pakistan is a paradise for idiots” among a few others interpretations (see appendix V and VI). These discursive practices have been summed up in very precise words by one respondent who says, “Pakistan so far, has not been able to develop an organic, home grown, mature, genuine, democratic leadership, that wins it because of trust or demonstrating its capability, talent and ability to lead the people that understands the problems of Pakistan, not only in terms of the rhetoric but also in terms of the real challenges faced by them”.

The media discourse is observed to have also identified the prominent causes for the democracy to be considered weak, and non-performing in Pakistan. One of the respondent highlighted that “the foundational reason for democratic governments to not perform is because we have more problems than we can bear, and the political leader are not trained and educated, hence they cannot make strategies and so politics fail in Pakistan”. He further added that “when politicians fight with each other, discredit each other, or paint a disrespectful image of each other, distorts or weakens the trust of the people in a particular institution or political party, and so gradually politicians become irrelevant and a vacuum develops.” In these reasons, one of the respondents brought the element of intervention (again) which seems to have clouded over all acts and failures of political governments, and have rather assumed a shape of an excuse for their non-

performance. In his words, “Civilians did not get a free hand to run Pakistan, and because of that they did not get enough opportunities to develop their capacity. Since they were not running the affairs, therefore, they did not have enough resources to develop civilian institutions.”

As for the good governing capabilities showcased by democratic leadership, the media discourse indicates that the “beauty of political governments is their flexibility.” The respondent cited that “deep political issues were tackled better by political governments”. On the contrary, one of the respondents defined the situation under democratic governments as “unfortunate” and where “the leadership of the political parties has been very elitist and disconnected with the plight of the common man, they have been wooing and exploiting the common poor masses, (while they) led their own life as rajas (princes) and maharajas (kings).” Some respondents claimed that these democratic governments have only been good at making slogans to attract population towards their party, but “the general practice in Pakistan is that the manifestos do not get implemented”. For example “Bhutto’s slogan was ‘roti, kapra, aur makaan (food, shelter and house)’ but practically this was not provided. Nawaz Sharif’s slogan was ‘qarz utaro, mulk sanwaro (pay the debts off, improve the state of the country)’ - neither was the debt paid off, nor did the country prosper, but some people sure did. And now during PTI it was said that in ‘naya Pakistan (new Pakistan)’ the common man will be given a house and education. But this has yet not been seen.”

This directs us towards another respondent who has similar views; “in democratic governments, there has been a lot of hot air and exploitation of the public sentiment, which is poorly educated and without a world view”. There has been “no infrastructural work done and health services provided in rural areas by democracy”. “Parliamentary debates are not taken seriously and there is indulgence (of political governments) in kitchen cabinets only”.

While on the international front, democratic government have also not secured much praise from back home or outside, “The political forces have terribly been unsuccessful in foreign affairs and making the case for Pakistan internationally. We’re now known as a terrorist state”. Another respondent reminds us of Pakistan being labelled as a “failed state” internationally, due to its incompetence. In view of this, media discourse recognizes that “democracy cannot produce anything good unless good leaders come forward, systems are strengthened and allowed to perform”. Unlike the last decade “where the parties were playing a game of you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”. This behavior is confirmed by another respondent who says, “we now know that even though they (the government) kept on giving explanation that it (the economy) was bad due to war against terrorism and oil prices, but in hindsight, in 2020, we know that they had managed the economy very badly - there was corruption and abuse of the public office”.

On the other side, when military governance was brought in for discussion, one of the respondent replied “I am not in favor of attaching good governing capabilities or bad to military rule because it is an illegitimate rule to begin with. Why must we attribute good when it started with wrong in the first place”. The research observes that the discourse in general and the media discourse in particular repel the idea of military rule in place, even though it is accepted that “military is overall good at administration”. There has been countless times when the regimes of Gen. Ayub Khan have been praised for his development and economic performance; “It is heard that during Ayub Khan’s time, Pakistan was performing, economy was better and other countries had tried to incorporate our models in their governing structures”, and Gen. Musharraf has also joined the list of being acknowledged for his good governing efforts; “Musharraf had taken more decisive steps in terms of devolution, police reform, education reform, creating new provinces, resource distribution..”. One of the respondent, who is observed to be very pessimistic about both

military and civilian rule in Pakistan, and did not even want to comment on the good or bad governing capabilities of military, states that “relatively speaking, (Gen.) Ayub Khan’s era was a good decade in so far honesty of masses in bureaucracy is concerned. Rest are all by and large the same”.

However, military governance has not just been quoted with all hearts and flowers. Gen. Zia ul Haq, though appreciated for “ensuring the security of the state”, has been labelled for bringing corruption to Pakistan. He has also been stated that “...by large from 1970s onwards, the leadership has been manufactured by Gen. Zia and Gen. Jillani itself, who manufactured the house of Sharif.” It was also pointed out that since the “military lacked public support”, Gen Zia ul Haq has been alleged to rely “on marginal groups, (and) promoted sectarian groups. MQM is a product of his era.” It is stated that “this was the weakest point of military dictatorships (that Pakistan had seen)”.

Additionally, some respondents even claimed that “I am a little hesitant in saying that military rules were good, because problems were suppressed (during them), whether they were economic or regulatory issues”. The media discourse suggests that “military does not have a political vision, no expertise in foreign affairs, and lacked in political and economic areas as well”. It is believed that military, upon entering governance, gets entangled into the issues of legitimacy, which is why it suffers.

The media discourse deliberates that “military mind cannot understand public sentiments. It has been trained to fight, not to run the state. They delivered because they were lucky to have a good team (stated with reference to Gen. Musharraf)”. “Military is not flexible and not well acquainted with when to move back and when to stop (like political governments), this is why it becomes their failure and people get annoyed”. The respondents are observed to be so fixated on

accepting a democratic system in place that even when they appreciate Gen. Musharraf's regime, and consider it to have performed, they suggest that it was "because it was not purely a Martial Law".

In spite of all the odds, the media discourse also sides with military's discourse over the essential need for the military to take over political governments. It says that "the tussle between politicians went to a level where it became essential for military to take over". Another respondents claims that "military being the quintessentially fundamental core organ of the state, it is pushed in to fix the state."

The representatives of media have done a thorough job to formulate an image about the performance of political governments in Pakistan. They have also been fair to criticize the military tenures that the history of Pakistan has witnessed. Nonetheless, it is observed that the good governing capabilities described by the media discourse weigh more towards the military rule; "Grudgingly, I will accept that military rule periods were probably one of those bright spots in the sense that in those phases the lower and middle class benefited". But when faced with a direct question of whether military rule may or may not be a better system of governance for the country, the media discourse has gripped democracy with both its hands - as one respondent calls it "a time-tested universal value". This deliberates on the construction of identity for the military. It explains how discursive practices have enjoined the majority representatives of discourse in building a negative identity for the military. Such expert knowledge producers then pick a side that seems more sensible and politically correct, rather than the one (which even) they claim to be better at governing Pakistan. This is evident from the words of one of the respondent who claims that "the worst kind of democracy is still better than the best kind of dictatorship".

3.4 Analyzing the subjectivities within the Knowledge Bases

Apart from the separate analysis of each knowledge base, the respondents were inquired about their opinion on whether they think university-based publications, think tanks publications and media discourse are subjective in their assessment of civil and military rule in Pakistan. In addition, they were also asked whether civil bureaucracy functions on the basis of who is in charge of governance or works irrespective of it. From such an analysis, the research aimed at exploring (through the responses of the interviewees) the understanding of the knowledge bases about each other (and themselves) as well as determining the existence of partiality in discourse, from the source of knowledge production itself.

Upon this it was observed, that a major chunk of interviewees don't really have much of an idea about the knowledge being produced by the university-based publications. The responses that did come forth were based on a common sense understanding that universities would not speak ill of either democracy, or military rule, and therefore they assume it to be neutral in this respect. Their assertion lacked credible evidence, and was based on a general awareness regarding university's publications and the academic environment it provides for its students.

With respect to their understanding of whether think tanks publications objectively or subjectively describe civil and military rule in Pakistan, majority of the respondents claimed that think tanks are almost always funded, and so the publications that would be produced by them will follow the same direction as deemed fit by their respective sponsor. They indicated that if a think tank is being run by the state, it may be against military rule, whereas if a think tank is being funded by military, it may paint a better picture for military rule. These assertions were again based on their common sense understanding of how think tanks are being run.

Whereas, the research found that out of all the HEC recognized (2019 list) think tank journals, the publications coming out of them rarely ever took upon the topic of governance, let alone analyze it in terms of civil democracy or military rule. Such a small percentage of work done on the subject also indicate (on the sides) that not enough work has been done for policy promotion, especially in areas of governance, which appears to be a subject of interest left for the academic community only. This also suggests an absence of liaison between the think tanks and academicians, and identifies that no solution oriented policy relating to seems to spur out of the country's recognized think tanks.

Therefore, it was interesting to observe that the interviewees had tagged think tanks to be producing subjective publications, without actually being familiar with what these think tank publications were actually addressing. They were associating such subjectivities based on the circulated understanding that since think tanks are funded, they are bound to follow the same bent of mind as that of their sponsors, in their publications as well.

In case of civil bureaucracy, when the interviewees were asked whether they think civil bureaucracy is inclined towards the government in charge, or it functions irrespective of the government in place, two strands of opinions came out; one section felt that civil bureaucracy works effectively and is not concerned with the system of governance in place, while the other section of respondents suggested that bureaucracy is under influence, and maintains a partial attitude, synced with the government in place, regarding its working. However, one respondent rightly pointed out (based on logic) that "They (bureaucracy) do not act independently, by virtue of its architecture, it is controlled by the one at the top". In light of these responses, there is definitely a possibility for policy discourse to possess a certain bent of mind and biasness.

Finally, while gauging the existence of a subjective attitude by the media discourse, majority of the respondents accepted that media is not only subjective in portraying civil and military fabric of Pakistan, but the private channels are also funded and are therefore agenda driven. Therefore, it is impossible for the content coming out from the media portals (both print and electronic) to be objective, impartial, without prejudice, neutral or even the truth for that matter. This suggests that media discourse constructs the political reality in a manner that portrays it to be truth and factual.

From the above account, the assumption of this research gets authenticated to a good extent. The knowledge bases have the power to establish subjective knowledge, which gets repeated and reiterated over the period of time, thereby, contributing such language and representational practices that work towards constructing meanings and identities for civil and military governance in Pakistan. The knowledge producers possess a bent of mind that is reflected in the discourse produced by them, when such a discourse interacts with other knowledge bases, it gains more strength and develops a status of truth for itself. Which then is accepted by the society as the political reality of their country. This shows that the knowledge producers are not only the representatives of the discourse but are also at the receiving end of it, which further acts to hammer the common sense understandings regarding the subject, and disseminate it to their surroundings.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

After laying out the entire data in the previous chapter, and building a case of language and representational practices to have constructed an identity for civil and military governance in Pakistan, this section of the research pours out the observed findings from the data gathered. In the pretext of the objectives of the research, this chapter spells out the suggestive interpretations of the data, and explains it in a comprehensive manner. In this way, the research calibrates how the research assumption stands correct, and fulfils the outlined aims of the study.

Chapter III has made a vigilant case that the quadrant knowledge base of Pakistan has functioned implicitly to stimulate explicit (constructed) meanings and identity for civil democracy and military rule in Pakistan. This identity is embedded so deeply and has been repeating over a period of time that it has assumed a fixed character in the minds of the knowledge consumers, and therefore has acquired the status of a common sense understanding and the dominant discourse.

This means that every time a social actor interacts with other subjects in the society over civil democracy, they accept political governments to be “non-performing” but democracy to be the “ultimate solution of all problems” (as quoted by one of the respondents). On the other side, when a social actor is dealt with the question of military rule, the immediate response is of an “organized”, “authoritative” and “disciplined” organization, whose job is to only defend the borders and not to indulge in politics.

In this purview, the research observes that the discursive see-saw is bent more on the side of civil democracy, as compared to the military rule. The discourse prefers civil democracy as the most preferred and viable option for governance in Pakistan, while it repels and strongly condemns the idea of military rule to govern Pakistan. The interviewees maintained that political

governments have fell short of performance, as in the words of a media respondents who states “no political government has ever performed in Pakistan”. The quadrant knowledge base has also identified the various sections where political governments have lagged; “social, economic and political environment has not been observed to be better in any system of governance yet - this can only be done during the political tenures, which have not been able to perform”.

Such an inflexible and adamant regime of representation constructed by the discourse disregards its own statements that “army has always been better at administration”, “it was necessitated and in the interest of Pakistan for the military to take over the country” and that “the country grew during dictatorship and declined during democracy”. It rather believes that “military is an institution in aid of civil governance” and therefore asserts that even “the worst kind of democracy is still better than the best kind of dictatorship”.

The discourse from all the four knowledge bases serves as a melting pot for a common understanding for what may be the preferred system of governance for Pakistan. The respondents and the data sample of university based and think tanks journals, all seem to overlap on common grounds and appear to be somewhat integrative in approach, arguments and inclinations. In this respect, the research observes no polarization within and across the knowledge bases, rather the knowledge produced by each of them converges to the same point of choosing democratic governance over military rule, and hence grants it the status of the dominant discourse.

The discourse is also observed to be ignorant of the facts and has therefore, resorted to accept the constructed political reality. It is important to note here that the research does not intend to suggest that military rule should be considered better and must replace democracy, since the governance under military rules have been better performing (as described by discourse), than democratic government. The research only aims to highlight that even though on ground realities

may not support democratic governments (in practice), the discourse is timid to accept military rule as a better system of governance. It has somewhat adopted a strong disdain towards it.

Such discursive practices indicate the effect of ‘ontological objectivism’ over social phenomenon. Ontological objectivism identifies social practices as a result of what is accepted as an incontestable reality. This classification is believed to be pre-determined and remains unaffected by the social actors present in the system. For a better understanding of ontological objectivism, one may regard it as a contextual reality (or norm) that is permanent and non-negotiable.

With respect to governing systems for example, it is observed during the 18th century that absolute sovereignty lied with the monarchs of that time. The concept of kingship was an accepted norm of governance and any social actor that objected to it or proposed an alternate system of governance was dealt with force and reaction. It was not until the age of enlightenment that social actors combined their energy to revolt against the system in place, and were received by a severe blood bath in the process (such as during the French Revolution).

The point to take away from this example is that ontological objectivism of ‘how things ought to be’ is so deeply embedded in the minds of the people that their natural responses have aligned with that of accepted social reality. Any understanding that may propose to derail from the established truth, is met with strong resistance. Keeping this in view, when the respondents were engaged in questions regarding the ‘social, economic and political environment of Pakistan’, as well as during which time the ‘system of governance played a better role in providing human security, protecting sovereign integrity, securing national interest, and contributed to the overall development’, the respondents mostly pointed out the governing periods of Gen. Ayub Khan and Gen. Musharraf. However, when the interviewees were directly asked if they think ‘democracy in

Pakistan may or may not provide a better system of governance for the country’ or ‘military in Pakistan may or may not provide a better system of governance for the country’, the discourse is observed to be hesitant in accepting military rule as legitimate, or an alternate option to replace democracy. The knowledge bases reflect a strong desire for democracy, in spite of recognizing the ills it has delivered for Pakistan. This is also evident from the statements of one of the respondent who says “due to an unknown fear, people do not generally express their real opinions because when it comes to civil-military relations, this is a sensitive, rather dangerous subject.”

Such ambivalence in the responses of the interviewees show the play out of ontological objectivism and how it acts to bend the mind of individuals towards its specified and (implicitly) ordained direction. The influence of such ontological objectivism observed in the words of an army personnel who hammers that “it is a universal fact that it (democracy) is the better system”. From this reasoning, the research claims that discourse does not function responsibly, it relies on circulated subjective understandings of civil and military governance, and constructs a political reality that may possibly lack credibility in practice.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I

Interview Questions

1. What comes to your mind when I ask about ‘military rule’ in context to Pakistan?
2. What comes to your mind when I ask about ‘democratic leadership’ in context to Pakistan?
3. According to you, which factors indicate that a particular governing system is doing a good job for the country (Pakistan)?
4. During which decade of governance do you think that Pakistan had achieved optimum level of the above mentioned factors (as answered in Q.3)?
5. During which governing period do you feel that the social, economic and political environment of Pakistan was better, and why?
6. Which system of governance has played a better role in providing human security, protecting sovereign integrity, securing national interest, and contributed to the overall development of Pakistan?
7. State a few good features of previous democratic governments in Pakistan?
8. In which areas of governance do you think democratic leadership in Pakistan has failed to deliver?
9. State a few good governing capabilities that the military showcased during its rule?
10. Where do you think the military leadership in Pakistan lacked during their governing period?

11. How do you think the University based journals are portraying military and democratic governance in Pakistan?
12. Do you think the think tanks are subjective in their assessment of the military or democratic system of governance in Pakistan?
13. Do you think bureaucracy in Pakistan supports the government in place or functions irrespective of the system (civil or military)?
14. Do you think democracy in Pakistan may or may not be a better system of governance for the country?
15. Do you think military in Pakistan may or may not provide a better system of governance for the country?
16. Do you think electronic and print media are objective in their projection of civil and military governance in Pakistan?
17. To what extent do you think University based journals, policy makers (think tanks and bureaucracy), practitioners (politicians and army personals) and media (electronic and print) influence the political consciousness of the public?

Appendix II

POLICY DISCOURSE: CIVIL BUREAUCRACY

Code	Respondent 1	Respondent 2	Respondent 3	Respondent 4	Respondent 5
Designation of Respondent	Additional Director	Deputy Director at Prime Minister's Secretariat	Federal Secretary	Federal Secretary	Head of Research & Development (Ministry)
Experience	11 years	11 years	36 years	35 years	2 years

LANGUAGE & REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES

Military rule	Dictatorship, shackled system that is chained, no freedom of expression, devoid of merit rulers, institutional structures not developed, dominated most of country's history	Civil governments stops/unable to deliver, blindfolding believing that anyone who is not military is neither competent or honest enough to deliver	Failure of the regular civilian democratic system, as it exists even today, military failed in political area	Zia ul Haq was the most ruthless, and the worst thing to happen, typical product of security oriented politics, feudalism and religion, an epitome of West Pakistan's culture, a master hypocrite	Non-elected representation of the people
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<p>Civil democracy</p>	<p>Unsatisfactory, not performed (reasons being public impatience, not allowed to prosper), freedom of speech, continuous replacement of leaders</p>	<p>Formal and required, nothing very satisfying</p>	<p>Imposed a system of democracy that is not in sync with the mindset of our people, repeated failures of system (because the personal agendas of political representatives overrides the national agenda</p>	<p>PM Junejo, freedom of speech</p>	<p>Representation of the people who elect them, relatively better but not satisfactory, inclusiveness has not been given attention</p>
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ASSESSING CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN

<p>Administration</p>	<p>Discipline in military</p>	<p>Cabinet became more active in the last two years, merit based postings of people (military), formal and clear decisions (military)</p>	<p>Military delivers better because of low interference, merit system was better during PM Junejo, local governments not strengthened during democracy</p>	<p>Military has developed a ‘capacity’ to run facets of public life</p>	<p>Musharraf created space for people to dissent</p>
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Responsibility			Democracy feels more responsible for its actions (institutions exist to ensure this; public accounts committee)		
Transparency			Extremely low corruption (PM Junejo)		
Accountability	Democratic governments not been able to control corruption		Not once was I told to do something that was wrong (Musharraf era)		
Development	Military has provided infrastructure, Motorway (PML-N)	Last ten years became better (democratic governments)			Barring the last year, it has improved in the last decade
National interest	Sense of security provided by military, better international arena	Democratic governments	No government has ever deliberately compromised it, events have forced	Military has Predominant pre-occupation with the security	

	developments by military, investments promoted (Musharraf era)		such situations (he justified Zia's involvement in Afghan War or Musharraf's role after 9/11)	paradigm of the state	
Other remarks		Military governance is illegitimate, military should only work as an institution	Mindset of people is not democratic and lacks civic sense, KPK is the most democratic, and it is extremely negligible in Punjab – “koi gal nai badshaho”	Dire need of an educated population for the system to work	18 th amendment commended (democracy), extremely strong resistance to military to be discussed in connection to ‘governance’
Governing period most appreciated	Ayub's era, 1985,1986,1987 (PM Benazir's period)	Ayub's era, last ten years	Ayub's era, Musharraf tenure, PM Muhammad Khan Junejo		Last ten years
ANALYSING POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVITY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE BASES					
University-based journals	No idea	Not sure about the authenticity and	No idea	No idea	Fair in their assessments to both and equal

		validity of the research			
Think tank journals	Subjective (funded, working on own agenda)	Subjective (funded), but would not rely on their research	Subjective (sponsored), very few are independent	Subjective (funded)	Subjective
Civil bureaucracy	Becomes subject to whims and wishes of politicians	Functions irrespective of the government (80% dedicated to country, 20% opportunist)	There was a time (for a long time) that it functioned irrespectively, last few decades it has been compromised	-	Functions irrespective of the government
Media (electronic and print)	Subjective	Subjective, Worst in our case, very manipulative	Subjective	Subjective	Subjective

SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE MOST PREFERRED

Military rule/Civil democracy	Give democracy a chance to flourish	Professional (evidence based) opinion: Democracy is the best form of governance	We need democracy, we cannot do without, military is not an alternative – it is an institution	We need to chalk out a system that works for our country, that does not necessarily have to be democratic but it	Democracy is the best form of governance and the way forward
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		Personal (non-evidence based) opinion: don't feel comfortable in democracy; Presidential system is what I support because of the single person making decision		represents our ethos Military – Why not!	
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Appendix III

PRACTITIONERS' DISCOURSE: ARMY PERSONNEL						
Code	Respondent 1	Respondent 2	Respondent 3	Respondent 4	Respondent 5	Respondent 6
Designation of Respondent	Major (R)	Brigadier (R)	Brigadier (R)	Brigadier (R)	Maj. General (R)	Lt. General (R)
Experience	Commissioned in 1990 (presently teaching at University)	Commissioned in 1975 (presently working at a think tank)	Commissioned in 1982 (presently working at a think tank)	Commissioned in 1979 (presently working in a research)	Div. Commander - commissioned in 1976 (presently	Corps Commander (commissioned in 1968)

				capacity at University)	working as an ambassador)	
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LANGUAGE & REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES

Military rule	Gen. Zia's rule in the classical sense; his grip over societies and government, abrogation of constitution, hatred for civilian rule, short-sighted, illegitimate	Perceptions have developed that military calls the shot, influential institution, only functional institutional system, it is not appropriate for military to govern	Beyond constitution, not in favor of state, to put things on the correct (or to rectify) path and leave, unfortunately involved in political affairs, dictatorship	Authoritative, comparatively progressive, less corrupt, better governance/management, local tier population may not get benefits that democracy can offer, lack of accessibility	Civilian rulers were responsible for bringing the military rule	Adventurism, mistakes driven by apparently very good intentions, but somewhere along the line personal ambitions also come in the way
Civil democracy	Oligarchic, no democracy in classical sense, no self-less leadership, 1973-77 was	coming to power through the popular vote, greater debate,	Infancy, corrupt, elected through a system,	Local and municipal committees present, not mature because of	Democratic leader has yet not been there in Pakistan, except for	Politicians had no base at the inception of Pakistan, uneducated, inexperienced,

	<p>somewhat better, thought to practice was missing, plurality of political parties, Bhutto created FSF made to target political rivals</p>	<p>dynastic system</p>		<p>military intervention, self-interest, associations to personalities, egoistic policies, power is a source of attraction</p>	<p>Quaid e Azam and Liaqat Anyone who came democratically has been looting the country, rather than work for the people of the country</p>	
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ASSESSING CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN

Administratio n	<p>Imran khan does not know how to lead, Ayub Khan brought the lower strata of population up</p>	<p>Organizational skills (military) Institutions are weak (democratic governments in Pakistan) Local governments have only been</p>	<p>Military is an institution in aid of civil governance Political governments have more quantum of debt than military</p>	<p>Law and order not maintained (democracy)</p>	<p>Discipline, selflessness and rule of law (military)</p>	
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		during the time of military rule, civilian government has been reluctant to introduce it				
Responsibility		Economic needs, health, clean drinking water and education have not been provided (democracy)		Monitoring and regulation of various institutions (military) Punishment for those who got involved in bad governing practices (military)	Never aimed at serving the people (democracy)	
Transparency	Imran Khan		No artificially controlled foreign exchange rates (military)	Corruption is much low (military) Hierarchy and institutions		

				involved in corrupt practices (democracy)		
Accountability	Imran Khan	Rule of law (military)		Military system has more accountability		
Development	Economic prosperity Musharraf era (post 2002), Ayub's era (land reforms), Bhutto's era (land reforms)	Development Plan (Ayub Khan) that South Africa adopted but we never implemented it	De-nationalization policy damaged Pakistan (Bhutto), infrastructure and mega projects (Ayub)	Development Plan (Ayub Khan) that South Africa adopted but we never implemented it	Development of the country was the best during 1. Ayub, 2. Zia and on 3. Musharraf	Economic structure destroyed by Bhutto
National interest	Military has exposed the country to powers that are	Pakistan was considered a modern country internationally	Political governments had picked up their own specific sectors	Acceptability internationally and regionally was much more (military)	Working for the people is essential which has not yet been seen	It was necessitated and in the interest of Pakistan for

	<p>against the state</p> <p>Democracy is oligarchic</p>	<p>Highest per capita income in South Asia until the late 1980s</p> <p>Ill-conceived policy of nationalization (Bhutto)</p>	<p>of development; real estate, motorways</p> <p>These were for their own interest, as a byproduct it was advantageous for public and state</p>	<p>Political disarray, stress factor was much less (military)</p> <p>Foreign relations were better during democracy</p> <p>Public and state gap (military)</p>	<p>under any system of governance</p>	<p>the military to take over the country</p>
<p>Other remarks</p>	<p>Presidential system preferred but no Ayub's and Zia's sort, Bhutto's era</p> <p>our political environment and foreign relation was better,</p>	<p>Military has been given the opportunity to intervene because of ineffective governance of democratic governments</p> <p>Only a representative</p>	<p>Constant interruptions from both military and democracy have always caused each to start afresh every time and therefore</p>	<p>Democratic system has not been given the chance to prosper due to military hiccups</p> <p>What became the strength for military is their apolitical and</p>	<p>When military tried to be democratic, that is when they all faulted</p>	<p>Had Ayyub khan not taken over then, Pakistan would have become a desert</p>

	education needs to be worked upon for mental maturity of the youth	system of governance which gives the country strength	cannot be effective Private state grown and public sector suffered (democratic government)	non-vindictive behavior		
Governing period most appreciated	Ayub's era was better, Bhutto was better	Ayub's era	Ayub's era	Ayub's era	Ayub's era	Ayub's era, to a degree Musharraf's time

ANALYSING POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVITY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE BASES

University- based journals	Not up to the standard	Hardly any credible journals	No idea	Balanced job	More theoretical in nature, they don't cater to the real picture of Pakistan	
Think tank journals	Subjective - Anti-army (not most but a few)	Subjective – no independent think tank	Subjective – not able to grow because there is no	Subjective (as a forum what they think is right and	Same as above	

			collaboration with state institutions	wrong is displayed) But think tanks are not biased for any one of the two governing system		
Civil bureaucracy	Irrespective of the system of governance	It used to be independent, last two-three decades, it has strong political affiliations	Major factor of Pakistan's decline is bureaucracy	Politicians used bureaucracy for their own agenda Bureaucracy has portrayed itself the way the military wanted, so that they could accrue their own personal gains	So far functioned much better under the military rule Whereas, in democracy they have sided with it	

Media (electronic and print)	Subjective (sponsored)	Subjective – extreme views		To some extent they are objective, but biases exist (financial reasons)	Subjective	
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SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE MOST PREFERRED

Military rule/Civil democracy	Mold democracy according to our society, military is not trained to govern	Democracy is always good – but depends on the forms of it, adapt it to our environment, must no adopt Westminster form of democratic practices, necessary to be accepted by international community	Military rule is not acceptable in any context Democracy is the acceptable norm world over Present democratic system is faulty, presidential system should be brought about	In the long run, democracy is a better system – in order to remain relevant internationally Military is not accepted world over	It is supposed to be better system, provided it is the real form of democracy, which does not exist in Pakistan It is a universal fact that it is the better system Military is not the ideal solution, but so	
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					far it has done a better job at governance	
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Appendix IV

PRACTITIONERS' DISCOURSE: POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTATIVES						
Code	Respondent 1	Respondent 2	Respondent 3	Respondent 4	Respondent 5	Respondent 6
Designation of Respondent	PTI	PTI	PML-N	PML-N	PPP	MMA
Experience	8 years (MNA)	10 years (MNA)	6 years (MNA)	Ex-Minister(11 years)	4 years (MNA)	6 years (MNA)

LANGUAGE & REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES

Military rule	Ayub Khan's era (most development in Pakistan) Zia ul Haq (peace and stability in Pakistan) If there had been no	Dictatorship	I don't want to think of this since we are a democratic state	Destructive for our society, destroyed the norms, distorted the whole structure in which politics is discussed, distorted	Border security forces Discipline and punctuality is a good feature of the military	Establishment, fear, and anger Want to do things that we can't do It is a bad gesture of military to intervene in politics
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	<p>military in the government, Pakistan would have seen the same fate as Libya, Syria etc.</p>			<p>incentives for politicians, distorted whole generation of current and aspiring politicians</p>		
<p>Civil democracy</p>	<p>No doubt it should exist, very important for the people of Pakistan</p>	<p>It is for an educated nation</p>	<p>It is not that strong – by the people, for the people, because of the people, democracy is definitely the right way to proceed, restrictive and interrupted</p>	<p>Under a severe clout and pressure, it has manifested itself as; (1950s) politicians branded as incurably corrupt, public views democracy is synonymous to corruption, uncertainty of</p>	<p>Freedom of speech and freedom of life</p>	<p>The feathers of democracy have often been cut off, and no real good to come about</p>

				tenure, forced into making short term policies		
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ASSESSING CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN

Administratio n	Less bad features and more good features of governance by military It's unfortunate when political parties criticize army, because if democratic leaders had delivered, army would not have intervened	Democratic governments have failed in implementing their policies on the ground. Not trickled down to the common man.	Terrorism was curtailed (PML-N 2013), democratic leadership is still struggling (for being democratic), good administrators and good organizers (military)	Splintering of Pakistan (military), need to reform police, education, health services by democratic governments (systematic efforts have been funded by 2013 PML-N)	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto carried out teamwork There is dictatorship or a Civilian Martial Law observed during democracy where authority is withheld from the local governments and other backward areas of	No good administrative work has yet been observed – we have always been beaten down due to administration
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					Pakistan and their rights have not been provided to them	
Responsibility	Peace, security and stability provided by military (Zia ul Haq time) - an essential requirement for a prosperous country National Action Plan was a good contribution of democracy		The present government (Riyasat-e-Madinah) has not anything, they don't take any stand, military does not understand the pulse of the people	All sections of society are given a voice (democracy), military is great at logistics (flood times)	During the 2008-2013 (Zardari) government; less burden on the people PTI has made people face more social and economic burden	No government has ever showcased complete independence in their work PTI has showed the worst governing capability; education, clean water, peace and stability It has often said that

						<p>during floods and other work military provides assistance; obviously no politicians, lawyer or doctor will come forth for such job, it is the job of military</p>
Transparency						<p>In current times, an image is being created that politicians are corrupt, inefficient, a thief, and unable to run the assembly</p>

Accountability	When democratic leaders are arrested, human rights are violated according to bearers of democracy			Democracy creates space for other institutions to develop		
Development	Economic development and Foreign Direct Investment reduced, sea blind, nationalized industries during military	Poverty and lack of education increased and values decreased (democratic governments)	Economic, social and moral improvement	Inflation controlled, investments came, military distorted economy, economic reforms and motorways (1 st government of Nawaz)	Developed constitution (Bhutto)	There has not been much observable improvement and is continuously deteriorating
National interest	Took the Nuclear Program	Foreign policy, agriculture, development,	It may not be a Marshall Law, but it sure	Military suppressed long terms		Even though I am against military, but

	<p>forward (Bhutto)</p> <p>Foreign policy making and international image building lacked during democratic rule</p>	<p>education (Ayub's time)</p> <p>Nationalization policy and land distribution by Bhutto started the decline of our country</p>	<p>seems like it (present government of Imran Khan)</p>	<p>issues & failed at keeping the country together</p>		<p>Musharraf's era had provided health services and road infrastructure</p>
<p>Other remarks</p>	<p>If democracy needs to work, then security institutions must be taken hand in hand</p> <p>Requirement of democracy and military team work</p> <p>Political awareness brought about by PTI</p>	<p>Country grew during dictatorship- and declined during democracy</p> <p>Rule of law is observed more during military</p>	<p>2013 government was very democratic, Paigham-e-Pakistan, Aasia Bibi case, voice raised for human rights violation, transgender rights</p>	<p>False sense of stability by military, military cannot handle criticism and who ever does so is labelled as a traitor</p>	<p>A divide and rule mentality exists in our governing systems</p> <p>Discriminatory behavior observed by the military (cants are off limits for civilians, while no permission is required for</p>	<p>We are a nation that has suffered at the hand of military interventions, which is why no progress is witnessed in Pakistan</p> <p>Even though military had showcased good</p>

					military to enter outside cantonment areas)	governance but it has been a source of resentment and anger, primarily because democratic governments do not perform that well
Governing period most appreciated	Ayub' era	Ayub's era	Last transaction, 2013 government of Nawaz Sharif, was very strong	2013 made tremendous progress, 1960s was better but in the longer run in created problems	No prominent leaning towards any one	No prominent leaning towards any one
ANALYZING POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVITY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE BASES						
University-based journals	No idea	No idea	-	-	Anti-military and pro-military stance	No idea

					that has created confusion for the students	
Think tank journals	Subjective	Talking against the army is not right (we are all part of army in shape of brothers, sons or fathers)	Not neutral (funded)	-	Not playing a role that internationally acclaimed think tanks are playing	Some are neutral, but I am a witness that some think tanks are arranged to tailor the political consciousness of the public
Civil bureaucracy	Inclinations exist – personal interest are preferred than nations’ interest	More performing under military Own frame of mind – they have forgotten their duties unfortunately Not delivering	Whoever is on their head, they have to follow their lead and are their actions are influenced by them	It does not serve the country and the people, need of fresh eyes	Different behavior depending on government Be it civil or military they suffer It has become so resistant	Supports the government in charge; be it military or democracy Very few show loyalty to one of the two at all times

					that they are able to do what they want now	
Media (electronic and print)	Subjective (funded) It must work with honesty and dutifully	Media consumers are naturalizing to what the media says – most influential	Biased (directed by someone at the back)	-	Subjective - Media houses at the time of recruiting inquire about the persons' political affiliation and support by the military	Media is influential and wide ranged

SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE PREFERRED

Military rule/Civil democracy	No system better than democracy, but such a person should be elected and selected who is a friend of the	Democracy is negative if your nation is not educated If Presidential rule or democracy does not perform than	Democracy is the solution for everything, otherwise who will run the show	Democracy is the only way to keep the country together and move forward	Democracy should be there But a proper democracy must be there that has discipline and rules	Certainly democracy should be there No other solution than democracy
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	<p>people and loyal to them</p> <p>If military comes into governance, then internationally it may seem that the country has no system of governance</p>	<p>military may be put into place</p>				
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Appendix V

MEDIA DISCOURSE (PRINT)				
Code	Respondent 1	Respondent 2	Respondent 3	Respondent 4
Designation of Respondent	Print Media	Print Media	Print Media	Print Media
Experience	23 years	10 years	25 years	30 years

LANGUAGE & REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES

<p>Military rule</p>	<p>Strict rule Implementation exists</p>	<p>Martial Law</p>	<p>A major reason for Pakistan's problems is military rule Discouraged form of governance all over the world No freedom of speech, rights are effected, one man rule, pick and choose system, non-representative people lead, impose decisions according to their will, non-inclusion of people in the call for their rights, voices are suppressed by inhumane behavior, unconstitutional courts, imprisonment and house arrest of people who spoke for their rights</p>	<p>Since it is a disciplined organization, it has more strategic making skills and means. Focused approach The tussle between politicians went to a level where it became essential for military to take over Hardness of military creates political problems Dictatorship has strengthened the forces of disintegration in Pakistan</p>
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<p>Civil democracy</p>	<p>In prison There is no democracy, only politics to look down upon others</p>	<p>Elections</p>	<p>The experience has not been too good. The major reason for this has been military as well. Martial Law has affected the democratic process. Zia ul Haq conducted non-party elections, through that the strong politicians, who could have brought trouble for him, were discouraged, and the people who were not competent, and might not even be able to convince their family to vote for them, had the support of Martial law and so they were made part of the system, they were driven to political and moral financial corruption, so that they</p>	<p>The foundational reason for democratic governments to not perform is because we have more problems than we can bear, and the political leader are not trained and educated, hence they cannot make strategies and so politics fail in Pakistan. When politicians fight with each other, discredit each other, or paint a disrespectful image of each other, distorts or weakens the trust of the people in a particular institution or political party, and so gradually politicians</p>
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			could be advantageous to military. Therefore, democracy and its system is not strong and could not deliver, and the traces of that time have trickled down to this day as well.	become irrelevant and a vacuum develops. The beauty of political governments is their flexibility
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ASSESSING CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN

Administratio n	No infrastructural work done and health services provided in rural areas by democracy	Parliamentary debates are not taken seriously and there is indulgence in kitchen cabinets only (democracy) Military is overall good at administration Military rule fails when it involves itself into politics, and give and take conditions are adopted	Efforts to deliver has been observed during PM Benazir time Democracy cannot produce anything good unless good leaders come forward, systems are strengthened and allowed to perform – hopeful for the tenure of PM Imran Khan It is heard that during Ayub Khan’s time, Pakistan was performing, economy was better and	<u>Political governments</u> Policies are there, but when it comes to execution, the political parties are unable to perform; we don’t have the group strength, training or educational background to produce results. The institutions are not making leaders, they’re producing individuals that
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			<p>other countries had tried to incorporate our models in their governing structures.</p> <p>Musharraf's time was also performing because it was not purely a Martial Law.</p>	<p>possess only a clerical capacity to work. The political governments are not aware about their population and thereby cannot gauge how to take them forward; not made use of human capital.</p> <p>Political governments lack in their vision to take the country out of debt trap (PTI has yet not done something about it)</p> <p><u>Military rule</u></p> <p>Development plans during Ayub era have been well acknowledged.</p> <p>Military is not flexible and not well acquainted with when</p>
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				to move back and when to stop (like political governments), this is why it becomes their failure and people get annoyed
Responsibility	Political awareness brought about by PTI	Due respect to democracy is not given	Justice, freedom of courts, health services, and education have yet not been provided by any system of governance in Pakistan	Human capital have not been worked upon and brought into use. Education has been sidelined as well. (during all times of governance) Military mind cannot understand public sentiments. It has been trained to fight, not to run the state. They delivered because they were lucky to have a good team (Musharraf)

Transparency	NAB performance has improved (PTI)	-	Benazir period claims that no political leaders were kept in jail Bhutto had not a single corruption allegation on him, people say that there was not corruption till his time. Corruption was brought in during the time of Zia ul Haq. Zardari family and Sharif family did corruption in this country, nonetheless people still support them because of lack of political education	
Accountability			Due to bringing hand-picked people, corruption was brought in during democratic times	
Development	Industries and dams were built, and overall economic and political	Economic situation of Pakistan was better; inflation reduced, jobs	when there is no participation of people in governance or the people	Military has apparently worked towards infrastructural

	environment (Ayub Khan)	creation (2013 government of Nawaz Sharif)	who understand the problems of public, development gets hindered, society does not progress, so the system is not strong, and therefore the country does not prosper – this is why military is discouraged	developments, while democratic governments have comparatively not focused on this GDP increased more during the military rules
National interest	Gen. Zia ensured security of the State	CPEC, 18 th Amendment, Gilgit-Baltistan issue resolved (good features of democracy)	Social, economic and political environment have yet not been observed to be better in any system of governance; this can only be done during the political tenures, which have not been able to perform. This is also because democratic governments were not let to complete their	No system of governance could cater to the real issues of Pakistan because of the strategic and domestic environment of the country. During the Musharraf time, there was considerable economic stability However, the deep political issues were

			governing period, and the next government disregarded the efforts of the previous one rather than take them forward.	tackled better by political governments (Benazir Bhutto)
Other remarks	No good features of Democracy (Did not want to speak about the laggings of military rule)	Freedom of speech, and overall social, economic and political environment was better to a considerable level (2013 Nawaz Sharif government) (most of my opinions are based on post 2001 scenario in Pakistan – I do not have much idea of the conditions before that as I was a kid myself)	What has been read, seen and heard from people, the three years of PM Junejo had performed well. The lifestyle of political leaders and military personnel were made simpler and the government seemed to be performing Military spoiled the political environment of Pakistan, weakened the political institutions and corrupted our politicians	Political governments are more flexible Baluchistan separation movements started during military rules. Sindhudesh issue came up in Zia ul Haq time which was neutralized by Benazir government, similarly Pashtunistan issue dealt with better by political governments Political governments have the ability to resist political shocks and tackle them

				Political governments simply put up a clap show and the audience or the speaker do not genuinely think about what has to be done regarding the said matter
Governing period most appreciated	Ayub Khan	No prominent leaning towards any of the two	No prominent leaning towards any of the two	Leaning towards military for economy but inclination towards democracy in terms of carrying out politics
ANALYSING POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVITY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE BASES				
University-based journals	No idea	No idea (they cannot influence any one's opinion, generally neutral)	No idea, I have not studied them	No idea
Think tank journals	Alright (not neutral)	Neutral (depending on the think tanks as well)	To a great extent, they are neutral	Nothing is neutral in today's time (depends on who is funding them)

<p>Civil bureaucracy</p>	<p>Wrong image of bureaucracy, especially among public</p>	<p>Functions irrespective of the government in charge It is a mafia itself It is always at the driving seat of decisions and prefers its own interests Root of all problems is civil bureaucracy For example, Dr. Waqar Masood (Finance Secretary for 17 years) had served during the time of Musharraf, Zardari and Nawaz Sharif – every coming government would blame the previous for its financial incompetence but no one changed the secretary himself</p>	<p>A lot of corruption in bureaucracy, it has also been made corrupt. They are biased. Imran khan says himself that bureaucracy is not supporting his government, because they are used to Nawaz Sharif time, when they could have undue advantages and live their preferred lifestyle</p>	<p>All of them are not same; neither are all good or all bad. It is not most careful section of our society. They are understanding things but stay silent, they see what wrong is being done but they are not organized. The majority have a slavery mentality of supporting who is in charge of the government, they feel it's not concern and rather the practitioners will suffer from their decisions themselves.</p>
<p>Media (electronic and print)</p>	<p>Biased</p>	<p>Subjective (serving their own interests)</p>	<p>Media is not neutral. It has not matured as yet.</p>	<p>Not neutral</p>

SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE PREFERRED

<p>Military rule/Civil democracy</p>	<p>If democracy is right only if it is articulated rightly Military can provide a somewhat better system of governance for Pakistan</p>	<p>Democracy may definitely serve as a better system of governance for Pakistan</p>	<p>Democracy may serve as a better system of governance for Pakistan because the rights are preserved in this system</p>	<p>The worst kind of democracy is still better than the best kind of dictatorship because of their flexibility and skill to understand problems Democracy is the ultimate solution</p>
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Appendix VI

MEDIA DISCOURSE (ELECTRONIC)

Code	Respondent 1	Respondent 2	Respondent 3	Respondent 4
Designation of respondent	Electronic Media	Electronic Media	Electronic Media	Electronic Media
Experience	Chief Bureau of a News Channel (25 years)	Media Expert/talk show host (21 years)	Media Expert/talk show host (15 years)	Media Expert/talk show host (10 years)

LANGUAGE & REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES

<p>Military rule</p>	<p>Its rule developed a new dimension after the Afghan invasion (Zia ul Haq) and the role Pakistan played relieved them of the worry that they will be accepted only on the basis of their performance, this worry was replaced by an acknowledgement that the Pakistan had a pivotal role to play in international affairs – this was confirmed by the fact that military rule continued in spite of non-favorable public opinion during Zia’s tenure.</p> <p>Predominant authoritarian approach</p>	<p>Technically military rule meant that military is directly running the state, but over the past decade or so, this definition should be redefined to military rule as running the country from behind the scenes rather than directly taking charge of the affairs.</p> <p>We don’t need to qualify what military rule means now as it is taken in terms of military top brass as intervening in civilian domain or the executive function</p> <p>Concentration of power is the only</p>	<p>It represents the repeated interventions of military in Pakistan. It represents the breakdown in the constitutional form of government. Academically and substantively speaking, it means that the form of government in Pakistan and the key institutions and elite who make decisions have repeatedly fail to develop a system of governance that can run smoothly and can sustain itself and can address the fundamental problems and needs of the population, the regional conflicts and the international requirements and obligations. Military being the quintessentially</p>	<p>Any rule which is directly or indirectly engineered, installed or managed by military establishment</p>
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		<p>positive thing of military rule, and civil/military rift subsides.</p>	<p>fundamental core organ of the state is pushed in to fix the state. It gets sucked in, it suffers as an institution, maybe some military officers are corrupt in between, but principally it is an institutional imbalance, failure of (political) governance, it's an inability on part of Pakistani institutions, political processes, political parties, elites, that have not been able to develop a sustainable form of governance.</p>	
<p>Civil democracy</p>	<p>Payam-e-Pakistan was itself a good effort of political leader. Presently, the parliamentary democracy we</p>	<p>It means representatives that have been elected by the people, but now we can come to</p>	<p>The real democratic leadership in Pakistan has not been able to develop. There were flashes and moments of Pakistan when it threw up leadership from</p>	<p>I have to yet to see that in Pakistan Democracy, even the word D, has not touched the feudal, monarchial based</p>

	<p>adopted, it did not continue in the best way.</p> <p>When there is no system in place, merit is not upheld, and no belief in fair play, then the good and visionary people isolate themselves. Same is the case for Pakistan.</p> <p>Power hungry, deteriorated, and self-interest focused people</p>	<p>develop another variant of ‘selected’</p> <p>No one (even internationally) has second opinion about what it means, unlike military rule that has a different definition for Pakistan.</p>	<p>the bottom, maybe in the struggle in 1960s, when Bhutto and Sheikh Mujeeb, leaders emerged and were able to develop organic support for the grass roots, communities (etc), but by large from 1970s onwards, the leadership has been manufactured by Gen. Zia and Gen. Jillani itself, who manufactured the house of Sharif. So Pakistan so far, has not been able to develop an organic, home grown, mature, genuine, democratic leadership that wins it because of trust or demonstrating its capability, talent and ability to lead the people that understands the</p>	<p>system (in Pakistan), for which both masses and the rulers are equally responsible and have brought this sham democracy. This concept has not reached Pakistan; (because) no importance of constitution, branding of Islam, and a confusion between ideology of religion and norms of western democracy.</p>
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			problems of Pakistan, not only in terms of the rhetoric but also in terms of the real challenges faced by them.	
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CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNANCE

Administratio n	<p>Bhutto’s slogan was “roti, kapra, aur makaan” but practically this was not provided.</p> <p>Nawaz Sharif’s slogan was “qarz utaro, mulk sawaaro” - neither was the debt paid off, nor did the country prosper, but some people sure did</p> <p>And now during PTI it was said that in “naya Pakistan”, the common man will be given a house and</p>	<p>Civilians did not get a free hand to run Pakistan, and because of that they did not get enough opportunities to develop their capacity. Since they were not running the affairs, therefore, they did not have enough resources to develop civilian institutions.</p> <p>Long periods of direct military intervention in Pakistan inhibited (the above)</p>	<p>The jury is still out, the present government (PTI) is showing a lot of responsibility in engaging international situation in context to Pakistan.</p> <p>Ayub and Musharraf era were far better than other eras in providing human security, protecting sovereign integrity, securing the national interest and overall development of Pakistan; economic growth rate, external leveraging, political peace, raising</p>	<p>Relatively speaking, Ayub’s era was a good decade in so far honesty of masses in bureaucracy is concerned. Rest are all by and large the same.</p> <p>I am not in favor of attaching good governing capabilities or bad to military rule because it is an illegitimate rule to begin with. Why must we attribute good when it started with wrong in the first place.</p>
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	<p>education. But this has yet not been seen. The general practice in Pakistan is that the manifestos do not get implemented. Bhutto's era had seen the most implementation; national organizations and national policies were formed, steel mills, nuclear program, and the best vision to lead a country was observed on paper and to some extent in practice too. The social, economic and political environment of Pakistan was better during Bhutto's time.</p>	<p>Whatever the civilian leadership has done in the country or is trying to do, they have done a fairly good job. The only thing is that they (civilian leadership) needs to enjoy more freedom in deciding the policies. Unfortunately that is not happening. I have heard bad things about Ayub, but I don't really know because I was out of country, but from my parents I have heard good things</p>	<p>quality of life, doing privatization, creating institutions and running them. Bhutto's time had significant contribution in terms of giving Pakistan a constitution on which there was a consensus, expanding Pakistan's defense outlay, the military was then very small, so the military-industrial complex took place. Gave the political and self-consciousness to the people, the income inequality should be bridged. The disproportionate advantage that the military has when it comes to decision making is that</p>	
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	<p>Although at some level political victimization was also observed – but this shows that there was enough space of political activity to integrate such forces and lodge a campaign against Bhutto.</p>		<p>they can very easily achieve consensus over it. the problem with this is that those decisions become controversial (that since the military decided them they must not be kept into practice after they’ve left) – this was also their lacking as they often were not able to build consensus</p>	
Responsibility	<p>Democratic governments took decision in favor of national interest, they advocated the case of Pakistan on international fronts, and good decision were made to revive the economy.</p>	<p>Military lacked public support – Zia ul Haq relied on marginal groups, promoted sectarian groups, MQM is a product of his era. This was the weakest point of military dictatorships</p>	<p>In democratic governments, there has been a lot of hot air and exploitation of the public sentiment, which is poorly educated and without a world view. Military very quickly sets itself into motion of political engagement after coming into power, so the</p>	

	<p>The political forces have terribly been unsuccessful in foreign affairs and making the case for Pakistan internationally. We're now known as a terrorist state.</p>		<p>argument is that Musharraf should have reformed institutions, created new states and changed the equation between the rich and the poor, but very quickly he suffered from the question of legitimacy, may be it is Pakistan's relationship with the external stake holders, like US, India etc, that compels Pakistan to get into the trap of legitimization. So if Musharraf had taken more decisive steps in terms of devolution, police reform, education reform, creating new provinces, resource distribution, rather than engaging with Chaudhary (tribe) and creating PML-Q for political legitimacy,</p>	
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			maybe Pakistan under Musharraf would have given better results.	
Transparency				
Accountability				
Development	<p>Ayub Khan's era is remembered for improving the economy of Pakistan.</p> <p>It can play a very good role for national building, if they have no political motives.</p>	<p>Ayub era is what I have heard to be a time where better social, political and economic environment existed; I don't agree, but this is what I have heard.</p> <p>Same thing was repeated during Musharraf era when there was little political contestation. They were not able to address structural problems, and brushed them under the carpet.</p>	<p>Social, economic and political environment was pretty balanced in the Ayub era. Also, during Gen. Musharraf allowed the re-grooming of a political process that led to the transition back to the civilian democracy in 2008.</p> <p>During 2008-2013, the social, economic and political environment remained much better; much less polarization, the government was tolerant of media, its criticism and</p>	

		<p>But it was a period of some economic growth and middle class became more prosperous. Quality of life going up</p> <p>Economy is the major issue where democracy has failed to deliver; due to capacity issue, they were shy/timid to addressing or taking difficult decisions. For example, Ishaq Dar’s decision to keep the value of rupee fixed stagnated our exports..</p>	<p>opponents. We know that even though they kept on giving explanation that it was bad due to war against terrorism and oil prices, but in hindsight, in 2020, we know that they managed the economy very badly – there was corruption and abuse of the public office.</p>	
<p>National interest</p>	<p>Performance based rule of Ayub Khan (green revolution, mega projects and</p>	<p>The last ten years of government have tried to expand their operational space, however the present</p>	<p>The only time period in which Pakistan consolidated itself as a state initially, and developed a very well-</p>	<p>No governing system provided a good social, economic and political environment</p>

	<p>other such developments)</p> <p>Political and religious tolerance was observed during Bhutto's time. On economic grounds, people did not cry out for high inflation, although I was young back then, but generally people were spending a prosperous lifestyle.</p> <p>Military has played an internationally unprecedented role in countering terrorism</p>	<p>government (PTI) has completely submitted itself</p> <p>Grudgingly, I will accept that military rule periods were probably one of those bright spots in the sense that in those phases the lower and middle class benefited. But it was at the cost of ignoring real problems.</p> <p>Their (Sharif's government) corruption contributed to public debt</p>	<p>reasoned economy and a very well high self-image for itself was during the Ayub era. Industrial class, entrepreneurial class, hydroelectric projects were created, improved its agriculture, quality of life, and export capability.</p> <p>Took Pakistan to one of the 4 or 5 emerging nations in the world.</p> <p>During Bhutto's time, the political leadership laid the foundation of Pakistan's weapon sized nuclear program in a much hidden clandestine fashion, and the state interest was being served.</p>	<p>During Zia's time, weapons, drugs and jihad were imported</p> <p>Bhutto had people killed and there was no freedom of expression.</p> <p>Army's rule split West and East Pakistan</p> <p>No system of governance in Pakistan has provided human security, protecting sovereign integrity, securing national interest, and contributed to the overall development of Pakistan.</p>
<p>Other remarks</p>	<p>Performance by military was intended to create acceptance</p>	<p>There is more controlled democracy in the country – this is</p>	<p>So far Pakistan has not been able to find an ideal governing system that</p>	<p>Pakistan seems to be a failed state which has become ungovernable,</p>

<p>for their rule in the people</p> <p>Military do not have a political vision, no expertise in foreign affairs, and lacked in political and economic areas as well. If they come out of a state of denial in these areas, develop a good forum and take actions thereafter, then Pakistan can come out of its difficult situation.</p> <p>Due to an unknown fear, people don't generally express their real opinions because when it comes to civil-military relations, this is a</p>	<p>not a speculation but is public knowledge, as we can see in the National Development Council in which the army has its representation</p> <p>Short term gains (for country) were manufactured because they had a free hand.</p> <p>I am a little hesitant in saying that military rules were good, because problems were suppressed, whether they were economic or regulatory issues.</p> <p>I am cautious because I don't want to endorse this impression in the</p>	<p>would have done very well for Pakistan.</p> <p>I personally do not believe Ayub's era was responsible to split Pakistan in 1971.</p> <p>Unfortunately, the leadership of the political parties has been very elitist and disconnected with the plight of the common man, they have been wooing and exploiting the common poor masses, (while they) led their own life as rajas and maharajas.</p> <p>We cannot say that the system of the 60s was good, so it should be brought back, because it was being run by Field Marshal and he was not a directly elected man.</p>	<p>partly because of the confusion related to theory and practice of democracy in an Islamic ideological state, from judiciary to the institutions, the responsible rule of law, governance and absence of governance, define each of these institutions; making Pakistan a less progressive and less developed state.</p> <p>Governance in Pakistan is a paradise for idiots.</p> <p>Role of military establishment is observed everywhere.</p> <p>It is not the military's job to govern a state.</p>	
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	<p>sensitive, rather dangerous subject.</p> <p>Army has a certain role in defense, and if it plays their best role in defense, it can also contribute in economy.</p>	<p>country that is going on, some people are trying to project that the Presidential system is suited for the country because one person controls everything. Political disputes are relegated in that affair. As far as that is concerned, they have a point but it harms the country in the longer run.</p> <p>Military, by getting involved in governance is effecting their professionalism and they need to focus on their own job</p>	<p>During the system of the 90s there was a lot of political instability, where political parties were trying to overthrow each other.</p> <p>Musharraf era was good, but once against he was a General</p> <p>The next ten years are of extreme financial mismanagement, where the parties were playing a game of you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours.</p> <p>Military is a trained institution, which has the ability to help the government in Islamabad in all areas.</p> <p>People sometimes say they are centuries, they are guards who have to be</p>	<p>The leaders in Pakistan are a bunch of buffoons</p>
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			<p>posted on borders. This is once again such a stupid, childish, and ridiculous argument in 21st century.</p> <p>Where is the war going to place on the border? It is going to take place inside Pakistan in the shape of its domestic issues.</p>	
Governing period most appreciated	Bhutto's time	2008-2018	Ayub's and Musharraf era	Ayub, Zia, Bhutto, Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif, all claimed to not be good
ANALYSING POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVITY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE BASES				
University-based journals	Don't show the real picture	No idea	Commercial based journals have more readership than university based journals – it is difficult to make an objective assessment of what these journal are actually doing	No independent journal producing objective research on controversial issues.

<p>Think tank journals</p>	<p>Subjective</p>	<p>I don't agree with the assessment of the think tanks because most of them are funded</p>	<p>There are different kinds of think tanks; some funded by state, some funded by military, some are privately funded and some have foreign funding. Every think tank follows the broader contours and interests of their financing agencies.</p>	<p>Not aware</p>
<p>Civil bureaucracy</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>They do not act independently, by virtue of its architecture, it is controlled by the one at the top. They receive orders and policies from the top and they are supposed to implement them. Whether they're effective or honest in implementing them is a different debate.</p>	<p>Pakistan's bureaucracy is shadowed by influence, nepotism and everything that goes against merit – it is not efficient and unbiased</p>

<p>Media (electronic and print)</p>	<p>Not at all objective</p>	<p>Certainly not</p>	<p>It has a done huge positive things, in terms of defining (and) redefining the Pakistani government, the system of governance, the Pakistani political process and the Pakistani society. it has become far more visible and transparent (because of it). It is depends on who finances the media – some of them are very pro-military, some of them are very anti-military, some supports one political party, some another – the media cannot be defined as a monolith, or one single entity; it is not.</p>	<p>Partly yes and partly no</p>
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SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE PREFERRED

<p>Military rule/Civil democracy</p>	<p>Democracy is the only best system that can deliver in Pakistan and it is established in the rest of the world. Incompetency of the government should not blame the system. This system has delivered in a lot of countries around the world. Particularly, Europe that has the welfare state concept, the system of democracy has delivered there.</p>	<p>If we have democracy and if the politicians are able to deliver, that will be the best system for Pakistan and address their problems. It is important to strengthen the federation and all the solutions to the problems we face today lie in collective decisions rather than imposing decision on the people</p>	<p>One thing is for sure that the governing system has to be a civilian led democratic set up, and it should be with the political parties that have grass root support of middle class leadership.</p>	<p>Of course democracy may be a better system of governance for Pakistan. It is a time-tested universal value. But the pre-requisite for it is a literate population.</p>
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