

The Political Economy of Conflict: Case study of Swat



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The Political Economy of Conflict in Pakistan: Case study of Swat

MASTERS THESIS

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Abstract

The main concern of this thesis is to analyze conflict in Pakistan, mainly the conflict in Swat through political economic perspective. It builds a case that conflict in Swat has produced a relationship of violence and wealth which is providing economic benefits to the conflicting parties. This is a qualitative research relying on both primary and secondary sources for data collection. In addition to that, thesis also contains an analysis of the factors, tools and methods employed by the Taliban to politicize the economy of conflict. The thesis attempts to explore the relationship between political economy and conflict in Swat by setting up the Rational Choice Theory as theoretical framework .The conflict is then explained with the help of the decay of institutions of conflict management. These include both the formal and informal types. The findings further suggest that Taliban have used various techniques including illicit trade of natural resources, ransom, kidnappings and extortion money. The Taliban has also employed techniques adapted to these structural strata to maximize their economic benefits. A composite view of the explanatory framework of conflict in Swat is attempted in this thesis which will help formulate better policy options for conflict resolution, avoidance, mediation and management.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Generally a conflict takes place when two or more than two individuals or groups engage in violence. It is a disagreement which is characterized by the hostility or antagonism. Conflict is usually fuelled by the opposition between two or more than two parties in an attempt by the parties to obtain their desired objectives in a different way from each other. The elements involved in the conflict have varying and different sets of values and principles which results in the occurrence of conflict. Differences can take place due to number of reasons (e.g., over economic resources or opportunities; ideological, ethnic, or religious tensions; politics and borders). Conflict and disputes are natural in human nature; it is the clash of ideas and thoughts as part of the human understanding. If left uncontrolled, conflict can become very destructive in nature. Conflict can also be constructive in nature as positive outcomes can also be obtained through it (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010).

Armed conflicts are always extremely costly. A violent armed conflict causes huge human suffering, internal displacement, damage to resources and loss of human life. Effectively war is the reverse of development (Collier et al. 2003). Given the consequences at societal level, the emergence of conflict itself seems to be a puzzle for many observers. But analyzing the conflict from the political economy perspective, for one or more actors which are entering into the conflict, they must expect the benefits of conflict (e.g. economic, social and political outcomes) exceeds the overall costs and suffering. Understanding why this calculus favors the emergence of conflict is central to the understanding of political economy of conflict. While examining the reasoning of political violence it require the gears of public choice economics through highlighting the opportunities, constraints and incentives facing different political actors (e.g. military, rebels, leaders, terrorists, insurgents, diplomats, officers and episodic firms) to understand reason behind emergence of conflict (Acemoglu , 2003). This move towards the understanding war through political economy perspective places significant importance on the character of establishment, legal system, bureaucratise, and governance as these institutions have an impact on the motivation, chances and constraints on the confronting political factors. For example, we have to go through the fact that why the ineffective and weak political institutions

are not able to protect and avoid the binding constraints for the emergence of conflict, the rights of people and exploitation of their possessions. In addition to that, fragile legal institutions may prevent the resolution of disagreements by reasonable means or may not enforce the contracts impartially. Weak political institutions can damage the ability of political players to commit the peace negotiations in a credible manner, which provides rational explanation for the occurrence of conflict (Fearon 1995). Weak politics at the institutional level hardly gives the idea of proper cost of the societal conflict which has to be internalized in the decision making calculus of political leadership. These kinds of factors set the underlying conditions at the structural level which provides the opportunities for conflict and exploitation.

Political economy of conflicts as a term refers to two features associated and interconnected with the concept of new wars. This debate has been going on since the late 1990's about the transformation of warfare in modern era by the scholars and their argument on its importance, emergence and the factors that triggers the conflict in contemporary times. 'The new wars' have different features from that of classical civil wars and the intrastate wars (Münkler 2002). This concept of new wars has been characterized by the involvement of numerous internally fragmented and private actors, criminal activities for funding of conflict, increasing importance of economic motives and the violence against civilians (terrorism). In relation to that political economy of conflict commonly refers to two of the features mentioned above, criminalization of the war economy, economization of motives (Heupel, 2005). This research focuses on the features associated with the term 'Political economy of conflict' and particularly the natural resources as means of warfare funding.

As already mentioned, the concept of 'political economy of conflict' relates to two intersected process. First one refers to the criminalization and corruption of conflicting economies. At the end of the cold war era, the super powers, which supported the rebel groups in the developing countries, halted their support. The rebel groups that were aiming for a long term conflict had to look for a different source of income. In specific, they went for smuggling of natural resources and other different commodities with the collaboration of transnational criminal groups for supporting the continuation of violent activities and conflict. This is the so-called Shadow-Trade, which provides the outlaw groups the necessary goods for import and they also get the assistance of criminal groups in terms of arms, ammunitions and necessary goods required for

conflict in order to ensure proper functioning of the process (Ross, 2004). For example in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, many rebel groups obtained the finances for their criminal activities and private militias through the cultivation and trading of opium and heroin (International Crisis Group 2003). Similarly there is example of Democratic Republic of Congo, where various rebel groups obtained their finances through the illicit trade of gold, coffee, copper and cotton (Paes, 2004). Lastly, the clandestine from Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina obtained their finance through the illicit trade of looted goods across the borders and frontlines to sustain the conflict (Andreas, 2004).

Political economy of conflict refers to opposing parties going for financial benefits which may include the cultural clashes, civil wars interconnected with economical finances. In the start economic advantages don't play a big role but as soon the clash reaches a peak the conflicting groups start developing interest for a source of sustenance for prolonging the conflict (Chojnacki/Eberwein 2000: 20; Nietzsche 2003: 4;). The rebel groups do not wish to take over governments but they try to gain economic power in the country which further leads to a better future and more profit. Cultural and ideological wars do not vanish in thin air they exist inside the hearts of people and can be utilized when economic motivation is required (Münkler 2005; Collier 2000). Cambodian Khmer Rouge were inspired by Mao school of thought during the cold war, they started to generate profits through precious stones and wood during the early 1990s (Lechervy 1999). Blood diamond in Sierra Leone is a significant example when the rebel groups RUF5 attempted to overthrow the government by giving the reason that it is corrupted with having economic and military elites as the corruption partners. They blamed that the corruption has led to poor socio economic status of the society, while the main motive of the RUF5 was to gain control of diamond mines (Hirsch, 2001).

With the passage of time rebellious and terrorist organizations have been evolved in terms of their operational strategies, size, motivations, capabilities and recruitments, but at the same time their strategies to utilize, move and raise the funds at large remains the same (FATF, 2015). Though the funding for terrorism and such organizations is not only specified to its operations, but also for managing the favorable environment which is necessary for prolonging the militant conflict in any specified area. For the terrorist organizations to survive alone only on the ideology is not possible, but they also need to maintain strong operational and financial structure

in order to spread their area of influence and become more violent. That's why these organization needs opportunism and adaptability to meet their economic necessities. For understanding the finance mechanism of these organizations, to ensure their activities and survival there has been limited work done to shed light on these mechanism and resources used for economic activities.

The case of Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an active organization in Pakistan and it formed in December 2007. Initially TTP introduced itself as the extension of Tehreek e Taliban in Afghanistan but in contradiction to Taliban movement if Afghanistan never owned the Pakistan Taliban. TTP formed the movement on the basic goals; Enforcement of Islamic rule (Sharia), Jihad against Pak army in FATA and KPK and US army in Afghanistan; Unity against coalition forces.

Initially the TTP was given warm welcome by the local agencies and tribe of the area, who were against the alliance of Pakistan with NATO and US. Therefore TTP further altered the opinion of public against the Pak Army in the region of KPK and FATA (Qandeel Siddique, 2010). These factors played a huge role developing a link between the TTP's local and international support in term of manpower and finance. TTP also started to manage its funds from many different resources, ranging from low profile crimes to high level organized crimes, for example, extortion, exploitation, kidnapping for ransom, robberies, illicit trade of natural resources in KPK and FATA, trafficking of drugs through Border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, collections of the funds through the religious institutions (Madrassas) and control on the important archeological sites (Qandeel Siddique, 2010).. Likewise, the smooth economic operations of TTP became more fluent when the organization started to receive the Charity based findings from the foreign countries as assistance for their operations. TTP also started collecting the revenue by dividing the tribal areas and agencies into separate administrative zones. In the given context, many international and local military organizations like, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Sharia-e-Muhammadi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Al-Qaeda and Islamic movement of Uzbekistan supported the agenda of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and assisted the organization in extending their finance circle within and across the borders of Pakistan (Suliman et al, 2009).

Similarly the terrorist organization Tehreek-e-Taliban in Swat particularly is known for twisting religion into politics, was involved in destabilizing the social and political structure in the valley, creating a conflictual environment that could breathe terror on its own. The existence of Taliban in swat valley and their revolution existed for almost four years (2002-2007) clearly enlightens the structure that has been altered in order to spread violence and control the minds of people using fear as a weapon and brute force to take over the wealth of innocent people. By observing the actions of Molvi Fazlullah (Leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) and how he started his campaign and eventually fleeing from swat to Buneer , robbing all what he could on his way goes against his claims of following the 'sharia or sacrifice'(following the Islamic jurisprudence or giving ones live in the name of the Creator).The Taliban occupation proves the way the Tehreek-e-Taliban leader in Swat lived his live shows that it suits Taliban not what the religion tells them. This organization governed and leaned towards the materialism can possibly explain that why religious movements turn into the profit seeking groups (Muhammad Feyyaz, 2010). It can be said that if the reign of Fazlullah has been characterized by Kleptocracy and loot-seeking. This repressive regime reflects the political economy of conflict, a process in which revenue is generated through conflict and in order to create maximum profits, the prolonged conflict is in the interest of conflicting parties. In case of Swat many tactics and tools has been employed to generate revenue through conflict, from timber trade, extortion, kidnapping, illicit trade of precious gemstone to loot seeking. Considering this background, this research aims to understand: How TTP exploited the natural resources of Swat through ideological based conflict? that is to say; understanding the self-financing mechanism of TTP?; and, what was the negative impact of the conflict on the local community?

Terrorism has been effecting Pakistan for a long time , it has brought bad image Pakistan internationally ,though these terrorist have been generating their own revenues through different means , one of the root cause that effects the process directly is the funding and the finances that terrorist generate through conflict for economic benefits , this research analyzes the process of politicization of economy through conflict by taking the Taliban occupation of swat valley as case study, further this research will help in better understanding of Politicization of economy through conflict and will be helpful in highlighting the role of economy in sustainability of conflict.

The main body of this thesis is based on the political economy of conflict in Pakistan, mainly the finances generated by Taliban in Swat valley through emerald, timber and other means, in this research qualitative method of research has been used in this research with its focus particularly on case study of swat. This research is explanatory in nature; the approach to this research is based secondary data, literate review and studies, so data collection has been done through secondary resources, the sources will be based on books general publications work published in academic generals, publications from think tanks and research institutes.

Chapter-2

Introduction to Conflict

One can track the beginning of conflict to the creation of mankind. Humans will fight even when they don't have the means and violence is in the nature of human being. As a scholar Morgenthau mentions that even if there are no tools for fighting man will fight with their bare fists. Humans start their journey from the beginning they are born, the cry of a baby is a sign of a conflict (Morgenthau 1948). When the time passes by the baby tries to bite and scratch his fingers to shown up hunger or he is in need of something. From this we can conclude that it is in human nature to fight as long desire and emotions of love and hate are present, sadness and happiness, angry or to be pleased, as long humans have other humans around and differences, disputes exist because of multiple interests who may lead to dispute or conflict. A society and community of humans has the capability of volatile attitude. If observed from religious and extreme side, conflict characterizes two different natures of human being, good and evil characteristics of a human (St. Augustine, 1950). Conflict exhibits signs of war, hatred, quarrel, killing, destruction or anger. Any unpleasant environment having the capability of producing

impunity, self-centeredness, rudeness, greed, covetousness, discontent, arrogance, envy are some actions that leads to conflict in human relations. To some extent it can be said that these immoralities are the inborn characteristics of the conflictual nature of man. We cannot specify reasons for the conflict. The emergence of conflict can occur for many different reasons in our society. This section focuses on the causes and types of the conflict with the aim to derive the common patterns of conflict present in the society.

Conflict is an enduring state of enmity and disagreement between more than one people which means more than two groups are not on the same page leading to different goals and unable to get along (Nicholson,1992). Putting it in a different way, one can say conflict states as difference of opinion, position or stance. In political conflict one can be more clearly defined as when two or more than two people oppose each other in struggle to overcome values or status, resources or power the goal is to eliminate, injure or neutralize the opponent (Jeong, 2000). Conflict is manifestation of disagreements of similar or distinct groups which leads to political violence, when political violence is put into context, violence and politics is an acceptable weapon of public anger. Inconsistency in goals indicates diametrically opposed intentions for example, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United states of America (USA) were chasing irreconcilable goals (socialist and capitalism respectively) during 1945 and 1990's, this period historically known as the cold war, the word 'war' refers to the conflict that existed among irreconcilability of foreign policies and conflict of ideologies. Conflict also indicates different insights, which may or may not result in kindness. Which leads us to understand conflict means 'different insights' or perception (Brash and Webel, 2002). In our context, it may mean different versions of achieving power or different perspective. This may compromise values, customs, religion or cosmologies. These differences may not end with direct or acute encounters. Looking from the global perspective, an environment of differences outcome is the extreme point of conflict. Inter faith conflict is an important example of such breakdowns. When goals inconstancy or visuals/values reach a certain level the chances of clashes and hostility increase with it. Literal meaning of conflict is interchangeable when assigned with other terms. Here it becomes relevant to consider terms and words that constitute synonyms of conflict. This may consist of feud, struggle, contrast, strife, disharmony, discord, contest, clash, contention, fight, brawl, combat, battle, fisticuff, and war. If we consider politics it is not that much

different, however, conflict can be related to disagreements between two parties considering an issue.

However it is essential to know conflict does not only refers to war. Literally most wars are in some sort of conflict whereas most conflict situations are not in a war condition. The reason behind this is, war is a situation in which two or more parties are in a state of anger proceeded by armed or uninformed soldiers, having the information and has observed i.e. the neutral party which knows that the actions are controlled by the rules of oppositions (Waltz,2007).

However any situation not composing of these criteria's cannot be denoted as war. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo is not considered as war but conflict situation. The opposing parties cannot be considered as a state army and does not hold legal state legal authorities to declare it as war. They are rebels that want to through over the government. However, there are some exceptions, where one or more states face fighting against an unconventional army.

The fight against terrorism is an example of the state of war, because the United Nations is waging a legal war against al-Qaeda. What makes it is that the "war" is that it is not only implemented collectively with the UN mission, but now the al Qaeda leader has declared war on the West and the allies.

The Somali crisis can be sent as a "conflict" and a "war," because "the Abyss" is an unholy Islamic group that rejects the country's unconstitutional sharia law at the head of a secular institution. In both cases, governments have not declared war, but only these criminal groups within the state hang in groups. Controversy is a common statement of chaotic conditions, including conditions of war. The types of conflict in human society illustrate that there are many degrees of conflict. There are types of conflicts like psychology has been promoted as management in internal conflict. Sociology recognized international intervention as well as controversy with the Inter Unit. Political science and History have defined international conflict and conflict as well as international conflicts.

Internal conflict refers to the state of an individual's personality in the state of mind. However, it is important to know that this human condition is largely determined by the circumstances surrounding it. Such attitudes can lead to anger, depression, and confusion, which can be

aggressive, unusual behavior, addiction, extreme situations, and suicide (Ross, 1993). It is a kind of conflict that is described as "a man against himself" (Memo, 2008), where a person fights with his mind and habits. Smoking, drug abuse, alcohol, lying lies in some addiction that a person can fight, even if he wants to stop himself. The alienation dispute between "human versus human" is described in the strict sense as personal conflict. This type of collision can be directly opposed, such as running, gun or exchange of stolen goods, or between the wishes of two or more persons who may have a more dispute (Nicolezio, 2005). A boxing match or a five-boat is a kind of games, but it seems to mat the controversy. In this sense, there is a war between the people in terms of conflict. However, conflict will not always translate into material exchange. Male or "cold behavior" seeks to end each other's conflicts. Such conflicts also mean opposition. It may not be clear to the third party but the neutral parties actually believe that there is a disadvantaged situation between them. A man against society; this is an exciting kind of clash against nature. Murray (2009) explains that "man vs. society" creates a kind of conflict when a person is created against the institution or behavior. This includes slavery, human trafficking and child abuse, including human rights violations, neglect, corruption, misconduct and participation. Accordingly, "human against humanity" conflicts can be a shadow of "man against society". "Human against humanity" is a kind of conflict that has a position of conflict between humans and its environment (Mima, 2008). As global warming, climate change, rain, storms, desert, malaria resistance, deadly insects and katra, this is a situation where man fights and controls nature. Family conflict in such a controversial family event describes internal unity dispute. In most cases, conflict is caused by the crisis, as a result of the family's role, expectations and role in the conflict. For example, the son of the parent, the mother, wife of the husband, brother's sister engaged in disputes. It can also affect a cousin, uncle, uncle, daughter of his wife or brother. These conflicts may be due to simpler factors such as simplicity, adult demands, dimensions, school directions, lies. Extreme cases such as land, property, inheritance and disputes. Conflict between groups has controversy or connotation occurring in places between two or more sectarian or religious groups, ethnic groups, groups or interest groups. Nigeria is an example of conflicts between Christians and Muslims. Nigeria faces controversy with the clashes between the two decades of the 1980s. Maitatsin riots in Kaunas, Bulumkutu crisis in Maiduguri, Sokoto campus riots without Uthman using the daughter of Fodiosfhynt on the page, Ibrahim vs. Cross University Cross Crisis, the worst ideas (Folarin, 1997). Despite the Islamic terrorism of

the Boko Haram party against Christians and since 2009, it may be worse in the declarations of religious conflict in Nigeria. The ethnic conflict, that the Ibo- rubbish began after the coup in 1966, after the end of the civil war in 1967, aykyk the Epipede conflict, the intervention of the Turf-Jukun, the Fulani rattles clashes and Arab controversies-a frightening miracle in the Niger Delta. Ice mudkyk within or ethnic conflicts in the international community, agluryamulry, auruny-ogonek, and aybyba over (created) clashes. Conflict between States is such unrestricted conflicts within the borders of an independent State. Such economic factors as land, abnormal development, control of resources, and income sharing formulas can cause conflicts within the state. Sudan may also dispute the difference between price as a social factor. In Nigerian case of ethnic cleansing in 1994 in Rwanda and Nigeria - byafra racial chapter incident, it is also a factor. Political factors such as power sharing, equality in electricity or public administration can be controversial,. Other examples of internal conflicts include the differences between the financial crisis, the Ivorian crisis, the Libyan conflict, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. These types of conflicts are also known as international conflict or conflict between two or more countries.

In some cases, these conflicts are widespread in war.Cuba issues from the United States and Cuba 1962 conflict with crisis. An example of the international conflicts that led to the 1980-1988 war in the war between the United Kingdom and Argentina on Falklands, America - the Afghanistan war. Global conflicts also face interests because of international conflicts. However, such transfers of international conflict in a manner involving two or more independent States. It is, however, recommended to note that a conflict between two or more States can be an entirely global conflict. The conflict between Serbia and Austria in 1914 led to the First World War. In the Second War, the German-British conflict ended in 1939. There are also global issues that do not directly concern the states. Terrorism increases global conflicts in which the entire world fights the global threat of terrorism and acts in concert to fight it. There are some forms or expressions of conflicts in conflict, which need to be quick and open for a brief period. We have now fought, reviewing the insurgency, the insurgency, the slander, and (at least) the protest. Insurgencies refer to the popular rebellion against the order of the regime. In some cases, the revolution can end and end in the revolution, which can be fully identified, or through a constant and popular movement, changing the attitude. The protest refers only to a government, work or unusual policy / critical demonstration against the decision. This protest may be peaceful or

violent, and may be greeted by the target or brush, resulting in resulting violence. For example, in 2012, South African police killed 34 villagers who were protesting against the disadvantages of peace. Insurgents are not regarded as disobedience to the army or rebellion in the security forces against its supreme commander or its commander-in-chief, the purpose of eliminating the decree of the judiciary, and thus the elimination of government institutions will be when an unfortunate process fails, criminals usually face the military court (military court) The phrases from the end of death are varied. Insurgencies refer to a rebellion against the state. It can be led by a religious, ethnic or sectarian group. The intention is to strengthen the state for listening or recognition, as well as to control or control state affairs. The revolutions in world politics created new states. These include Eritrea, which was born of ancient Ethiopia. Southern Sudan came from Sudan and Slovakia, which was born from the old Czechoslovakia. Some revolutions failed to achieve the desired results, but the self-governing countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Kosovo and Niger are the result of the worst disaster.

Political economy of conflict

Throughout the history, economic factors played a major role in the war. Recently, however, the economic dimensions of urban warfare have received less attention in politics, which is alleged to have been systematically diagnosed. In the mid-1990s, with the growing academic and policy research cluster, the political economy of the armed conflict of political conflict changed (Jane and Roven 1996; May 1998; Collier and Hoover 2000; Peral and Malone 2000). The new key insight was born. This new vector research has increased the influence of large analysts and policymakers, many of which have become self-financing civil wars increasingly (Balance and Shermanen 2003) in nature. Lack of support from the superpowers . After the end of the Cold War, both insurgents and governments are looking for alternatives to income to maintain their military campaigns. In addition to the traditional resources of continuity and stress, profits have become increasingly important sources of natural resources, trade remittances, and fighters (Jane and Rufen, 1996). Fighters have benefited from weak organized organizations and weak states in the developing world and have benefited from trade issues with criminal networks, arms smugglers and gangs, compared to the global market for markets. Large financial centers also improved (Defender 1999). Given the role of natural resources for fuel in war economies, the term "war resources" has become common among analysts and policymakers. Some are also considered armed conflicts (Cilliers 2000; Rain 2002).

However, a broad focus on the economy of conflict has expressed the concept of a "war economy". Seeing conflicting conflicts with the point of view of the political economy can help to understand the main dynamics of civilian warriors today. This can be understood in a further systematic manner as to how conflict resolution and subsequent conflicts affect these peace issues. In this way, the political economy of armed conflicts, such as Governments, international organizations, donor agencies, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, linked to war and peace, constitutes a significant increase in the analysis of economic conflicts and policy development. This chapter provides an overview of key discussions and policy development in this fairly modern subfield to analyze conflicts. This starts with a brief overview of major

analytical approaches and the formation of policies and research, including the hegemony of "greed or complaint" on the capabilities and limitations of diatomium, which discusses initial research and policy on the economic dimension. Is it then to stress the importance of reducing the negative and non-negative effects of the development of policy mechanisms to highlight the importance of defining the interests of the economies of war. The overall comprehensive group mechanisms available to the international community are estimated in the following section: oversight to prevent the flow of resources by combatants and to try to change the legitimate causes of war and war efforts.

1. Economic dimensions of civil war: Greed and Out of complaint

Although the growing consensus is that the economy is a matter of conflict, how important it is for how it affects and how it relates to other political, social, cultural and identity factors. For some analysts, economic factors are analyzed by other factors, through complex causes and improved war movement; for others, they become an economic-oriented framework for conflict analysis. Each approach has specific implications for policy development and implementation.

The insurgency is an essential element in civil wars because both are empirically linked to the debate over armed conflict causes in areas (Balentine Karen 2003), political and economic factors in the causes of difficulty, though separate, greed (profit acquisition) or unhappiness (disaster recovery) . (Baltian Key 2003). This approach is based on its systematic approach to core work based on Pool Cooler and Anke Hoeffler (2000 Research Group). His model of greed and dissatisfaction gives the sacrifice of greed as a major cause of civilian warriors. Therefore, they say, the known identity factors of the conflict do not affect the outcome of the conflict. (Andrea Diaya, 1999). The result is not adapted (Philippe Le Billion in 2006), "civil war caused strong complaint the original letter, but the power of silent greed." As a result of Collier's combinations, the number of criminal behavior by an armed group is effective and the study of economic determinism and identity in conceptual civil wars to reveal in the past two decades, both empirically and to the main result is that the group's goal is only the source through which their heads are moved forward. This ongoing struggle engages in the relationship between crime and conflict and is also the center of conflicts in the face of the complaint (Jacob Cockayne 2010). In essence, "explains the discussion of motivation and the disabled" the motive of the

violence that war always fights for the ultimate victory or political development, but "not to win the main objective of conflict, but it is contrary to economic reasons to maintain" (d keen, 2000).

1.2.Economic action of violence in armed conflict

More recently, global writing on civil society has tried to cure "socially" economically and materially as an arbitrary disorder. During the mid-1990s, according to empirical research on specific conflicts such as Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, this effective investigation was challenged effectively. Psychological perspectives of violence and civil war show that political, social and economic activities often serve individuals away from unnecessary or erroneous violence and instability (Birgal and Can 1997). In fact, where "war is more than winning" those who exploit violence may have an economic interest in conflict. These findings also challenge the fundamental interests of long-term policy guidance and guidance in conflict resolution. In fact, the idea of a "comprehensive political solution" shows a special interruption to previous samples of conflict and violence, referring to many statements of peace talks in due time in the 1990s. On the contrary, the verbal approach shows that "rather than shifts from peace of war, rather than" identifying political interests, reforming economic strategies, approving violence, clean ships, stolen production, or democracy with injustice "(Badal and May 1997).

1.3.Greed or Grievances: Partnerships and Constraints

No other work on politics may have affected the economic causes of the civil war compared to Paul Collier's study of economics, and the introduction of "greed or complaint" did not affect the diet much. According to several significant results, the most widely reported is the average state dependence on natural resources (measured as exports of basic materials as part of GDP) in a more serious conflict. According to their controversial greedy articles, there is much

synchronization with the onset of conflict compared to economic movements and opportunities, or ethnic, socio-economic or political problems. This is why the source makes it able to rebel by encouraging opportunity and rebellion through resources. As a matter of complaints, Collier has ensured that they use revolutions and their initial activities that support those who want to use the mask.

In 2000 the idea is that the insurgency works through rebellion and in particular to appeal to some policymakers in the early 1990s, showing the complexity and turmoil of "ethnic" and religious conflicts. If there is much controversy with economic conflicts with economic conflicts, resources are more than to resolve such cases that can be identified as racism, religious or ideological rather than controversy. Greed politics, corrupt and turbulent leaders of the countries are the major principle of conflict.

However, among scientists not only those who are satisfied with the lack of a minimum study committee have identified the development of greedy thesis procedures and analytical shortcomings and the problem of interpretation provides audacity (Blunt 2003, Bullin and Elizabeth 2003). First, there is a risk of preventing individual drivers from the data relationship (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). The truth is that the combatants involved in the economic activities of defeat are trusted leaders of their major agreements. Some people can participate in war economies that "getting out of war" may require others to stay, but there are still others who can be sent to their work and land. Additionally, individual animations can change over time to change conflicts. Conflicts that may begin in the first place problem. At the same time some more foreign targets. In fact, this kind of change can be seen in the long conflict between Colombia and Angola. The motivational type needs a more accurate evaluation in a different way and test verification is performed. Second, most initial research It is clear that Collier was the "center of the revolutionaries," both government agencies and institutions have been ignoring either for a long time or because of the conflict. The unique concept was that "the rebels -" effects the analysis and policy process of government and cause conflicts. The theories of rebellion provide a complete picture of the beginning of the conflict. In the light of an analysis of state behavior, the truth is that as long as they can take advantage of the costs of the combatants, the legal leaders of a corrupt state can be legally legitimate. Indeed, the country's bias was evident in the debate on UN trade sanctions, which is described as the resources used by the

rebel movements or their allies in financial debate. Its goal is to reduce legitimate governments (United Nations, 2001 and 2002).

Thirdly, the candidates Narcos in Colombia involved in criminal organizations for many observers today and accordingly (Collier 2000a) should be treated. However, although today's conflicts have a lot of insurgency. While criminal organizations face violence in the sole pursuit of profit, experts agree that armed groups pursue military and political objectives in economic activities (Guevirers Sun, 2003; Williams and Pilly, coming). Instead of political activities, the insurgency can be examined until the chances for a diplomatic solution are enhanced. A quarter of the insurgency does not depend on the availability of each resource. Instead, the government's main failures are rebel interventions. The weak state becomes more and more rebellious, whether the goal is to end a collective system or just get a piece of cake. Finally, many natural resources are results conflicts and conflicts based on global resources. Ongoing political conflicts need to be avoided in favor of more comprehensive models of sight exposure and focus on a wide range of economic issues. Indeed, the Qualifications Study shows that insurgents are not the sole cause or even the main cause of the economic objectives of self-government and economic opportunities for mobilization. Instead, with interest in economic interests and social, cultural, political and economic problems, comment on the end of the conflict (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). Greed against greed had made a significant contribution to the study of civil war and policy development. The quantitative study initiated by Collier and others plays an important role in increasing the system and analyzing policy on most of the economic dimensions of violence and civil war. More importantly, they have established combatants as the subject of economic research from focusing on measures of war and peace. Using the methods of selecting conflict analysis, the highest conflict with regard to both research and policy in the mid-1990 civil war based on greedy model of old hatred is the presentation of this discussions. Finally, natural resources provides a promotional framework to focus on the legitimate reduction of armed conflict and the economic development strategy under consideration in the prospects of development policies.

Violent Conflicts and Resource Categorization

Natural resources and to analyze the complex relationships between the beginning and duration of armed conflict. Frame work that analysis the complex conflicts based on natural resources has been developed for systematic analysis (Li Buulon 2001; Ross 2003). There is a fundamental difference between unlootable and loot able resources and the associated conflict and indivisibility. lootable resources (eg Geogas, drug crops, timber, or waterways are generally associated with non-separatist revolutions such as Sierra Leone, Colombia and Afghanistan. They are easily able to exploit and transport small groups of extraordinary workers. In this way, they provide easy access to the area of resource expansion, but local residents also need to work hard. Access to strong resources can be longer, because vulnerable parties can avoid "avoiding disturbances" by creating the funds needed to continue the battles. When armed groups rely on resources that are easily accessible, there is a greater risk of conflict and conflict between the land groups. Resources (such as diamond, deep shaft minerals, oils, and natural gas) will occur, inconsistent with the separation. First of all, the economy and other costs are created by communities in the exploitation zone, often deprived of cultures or morally, often from the majority. Mining and mining drilling can cause environmental pollution and socio-cultural deficit (influx of foreign workers, traditional roughness, risk is considered, etc.) due to local problems. Where corruption, did not succeed then government used resources to provide adequate public goods and services, giving the sense of economic deprivation enhances other local exceptions (Reagan 2003; International Criminal Court 2002; Lewis 2004).

Studies that systematically analyse the impact of conflict and dynamics, different types of conflicts in natural resources a frame work has been developed for such studies this way, the study also why diamonds of Sierra Leone was a source of instability. This question can be twice the answer. The first is to provide the need for heavy equipment and sufficient capital for discovered in West Africa easy prey for militants to use diamond as financial resource. Secondly, however, the Sierra Leone diamond region was largely rich since 1950. Some of the remaining official revenues were spent by various governments for development. In Botswana, on the contrary, the physical control of the transparent and generally corrupt power of macroeconomic and financial management of the state apparatus ensures that diamonds is a blessing rather than a curse become.

Stake holders Analysis in War Economy: Who Benefits and who loses?

It is now clear that economic or any other form of life cannot exist during any war. Instead, it is adjusted and takes new forms. Often referred to as "war economy", actual activities in vertical activities serve different functions for different participants. The political economy of conflict gives more understanding of how conflict in targeted policies work Each dispute has its own history, dynamics, and subcontractors. However, those who tried to end the war and need to ask many questions to avoid their restoration: Who are the main actors to participate in the economies of war? What are the goals of their participation in war economies? What encourages them to achieve peace? Who controls the meaning of violence? Jonathan Gndynd to correctly assess the different functions of the economy of "war", "shadow", and "transport" of the economy (Gndynd, 2004) suggests a particularly useful meaning. As distinguished during shopping, each of them possesses a special set of actions, based on the economic realities that sustain real war, they play a variety of role, including the State Security Service (the army, parliament, police) and rebel groups, as well as domestic and foreign "dispute companies" that provide a (Bummy Busters and Pice 2003). The priority means of resource generation, illegal resources, illicit and illegal activities, the destruction of local businesses, exploitation of resource exploitation natural resources, "customs" or road clashes in border areas implementation of tax on resources .The right capture foreign aid or to exploit foreign companies.

Economy, actors, objectives and activities during armed conflict (adapted from Good hand 2004)

	The Combat Economy	The Shadow Economy	The Coping Economy
<i>Who? Key Actors</i>	Commanders, “conflict entrepreneurs”, fighters, suppliers of weapons and matériel	Profiteers, transport sector, businessmen, drug traffickers, “downstream” actors (truck drivers, poppy farmers)	Poor families and communities
<i>Why? Motivations and Incentives for War and Peace</i>	To fund the war efforts or achieve military objectives Peace may not be in their interest as it may lead to decreased power, status, and wealth Fighters may have an interest in peace if there are alternative sources of livelihoods available	To make a profit on the margins of a conflict Peace could be in their interest if it encourages long-term investment and licit entrepreneurial activity Peace requires alternatives to the shadow economy; otherwise a criminalised war economy will become a criminalised peace economy	To cope and maintain asset bases through low-risk activities, or to survive through asset erosion Peace could enable families to move beyond subsistence
<i>How? Key Activities and Commodities</i>	Taxation of licit and illicit economic activities; money, arms, equipment, and mercenaries from external state and non-state supporters; economic blockages of dissenting areas; asset stripping and looting; aid manipulation	Smuggling of high-value commodities; mass extraction of natural resources; Hawalla (currency order and exchange system); aid manipulation	Employment of diverse livelihood strategies to spread risk; subsistence agriculture; petty trade and small businesses; on-farm and off-farm wage labour; labour migration and remittances; redistribution through family networks; humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance

The shadow economy (also called the "black market economy") involves a wide range of informal economic relations that fall from the ordinary framework of the state. Major actors have much less "anti-profit" eyelashes, including desperate criminals and who take advantage of business opportunities that open the most incredible and extraordinary battle. Expanding the profit margin further under the sanction rules, which control the power and access to activities

across the border accurate, such as Sierra Leone, as in Afghanistan and the Balkans. In general, the shadow economy spreads before the spread of conflict and there is a factor in allowing conflicts when it helps to eliminate violence or make insurgents a source of income. Once the conflict is over, the shadow economy can easily be penetrated through battles, and in this way the highly corrupted often becomes the basis of the economy. In Sierraleone was a shocking and informal diamond industry, RUF rebels and their sponsors, Lbryn left President Uardrd, Charles Taylor (symmetrical, Gabor) hjlysn 2000; hrsr 2001; clay, Coupad and Gods 2003). In Kosovo, the non-traditional economy, based on drug-trafficking and disaster-related activities, is resisting the long-term peaceful resistance against Ibrahim Rugova. Weapons were smuggled from Albania, but the KLA quickly regained its economic activity to finance its armed rebellion (Greek 2003).

The Shadow economy consists of many economic issues during armed conflict, which provide the benefits of urban populations, especially the poor and the most vulnerable. These functions are much more important for the urban economy, where formal economies and traditional economies are impossible to destroy or maintain (Monsoon 2000; Collinson, 2003). Transport economies often focus on gold resources, such as kolakia, cocoa, and plant in Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mineral economy includes stable agriculture, copper trade and cross-border trade, or external financial transfers that help citizens and their families to survive. In addition to every effort to overcome the complex set of social interactions, there are types that surround these fields. In the promotion of armed conflicts, by definition, it can be mixed and can change over time. To prevent conflicts and those who promote more effective mitigation policies, those involved in armed clashes for profit and power between these actors, who are forced to participate in the economies of war their citizens need to maintain the economy. The main thing is that the impact of a war economy at the individual, local or community level needs to be reviewed. There is a requirement to meet the vulnerability assessment policies in these groups. Can provide important information about the overseas Institute of Development allows human rights network work methods and frameworks for human rights, which are based on contradictory positions on channel analysis of contradictory economy and equipment, policy makers (Lee Boulogne 2000; Collinson 2003)

Political Economy of Conflict in Pakistan

Having been established in December 2007, TTP has significantly announced an extension of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Afghan Taliban leadership has never owned a TTP. Later, TTP claimed

three main objectives of the application of Sharia (Islamic law) against coalition forces, coalition and defense against the United States.. In FATA, Afghanistan and the Pakistani and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.(KP) (Kandil Siddiqui, 2010). The Taliban movement Pakistan initially welcomed and supported these areas in the tribal and local authorities, which were not in favor of the United States and the United Nations alliance with NATO.

As a result, the Pakistani Taliban changed public opinion to strengthen its objectives and strategy against Pakistani security forces in the tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These proposals have also helped to develop a strong bridge of domestic and international financial assistance through the work of TTP. The Pakistani government has also abducted money taken from low-crime crimes to exploit natural resources in the drug trade through compensation, extortion, bank robbery, FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Managed number and control the Pakistani-Afghan border for archaeological sites and raise funds (Kandil Friend 2010) by religious institutions, where they began to receive funding and assistance from foreign charities. Flow has become more flexible. TTP leadership also divided the tribal areas and tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in administrative areas to collect revenue. This approach, in local and international unions such as Lashkar-e Jahangi (LJJ), the sharia movement, the Mohammadi (TNSM), the spa sahabah of Pakistan (SSP), the Islamic Movement Uzbekistan (IMU) has supported the TTP agenda and improved the development of generating funds within and outside Pakistan . The Taliban of Pakistan (TTP) has decided to strengthen people with Shiite intentions and to declare Islamic and Western practices against the democratic system in Pakistan. The program helped convince local people to spread their message to the message and described the violence as a "jihad" against the defense forces and allied forces in Afghanistan.

TTP collect income from local population in terms of taxes, attacks and weapons. Other sources include Islamic institutions that collect "donations" from the supporters of the Taliban inside and out of Pakistan. They utilized the charities coming from the immigrants living in the Arab world, especially the United Arab Emirates, and the use of Hundi system i.e.transfer of money that the TTP contributes to the economy of Pakistan, and thus getting thousands of Dhiraams each year (Ecclesiastes ET al., 2009). Apart from the robbery of military vehicles and ammunitions, the Cabinet increasing the TTP edge. This group belongs to drug trafficking and drug trafficking in Afghanistan (International Crisis Group 2009). The tribal areas (FATA) and Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa exploit the natural resource of the Taliban, which is the source of funds. Money should come from al Qaeda as foreign terrorist groups. The claim (Imam Arabinda 2009) found the investigation in the Pakistan Administration that a \$ 15 million electronic move was provided with the Taliban by a charity-based group in Saudi Arabia, September 2009 to affiliate groups in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda-linked organizations used to channel funds, from Alharmain, which was based in Saudi Arabia. (New 2009) Another source of revenue for Taliban patriarchies in Karachi is the monopoly on transport and transportation of Pakistani Taliban to ensure the safety of business operations, where the largest community (Acharya ET Almighty, 2009). Established the "Intelligence Network" Karachi, it is allowed to carry goods to NATO trucks in Afghanistan and information was carried out to the Taliban from Pakistan, got from the militants, or the vehicles and what they stole from the Nato Army. (Arabinda 2009) Karachi Mayor recently launched a Taliban-based engine in Karachi. In Karachi, along with: (Daily Times, 2009) ,the received reports from the Pakistani police from the existence of criminal activities including Al-Qaeda kidnapping for compensation, bank robbery, street crime and protection of Taliban members. With a variety of funds from Waziristan. (Algeria, 2009). Use "for the soldiers of God" in Karachi to steal for the survival of Taliban, use it for kidnapping, and especially on the other hand. However, it should be remembered Karachi, by a large number of Pashtun population, not everyone's banking system is used to fund the Taliban in Karachi throughout Pakistan: funds deposited to their families to respected Pashtuns. Gold can be sent. Another source of income for TTP is heroin trade, and drugs from Karachi are exported to foreign countries. 24 August 2009, terrorists arrested Lashkar e jangwi and the Taliban in Karachi, Pakistan acknowledged export heroin to countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, China and the United Arab Emirates, Europe and America (Sales Ben Pervez 2009). Channeling of funds from Taliban leaders in different parts of the country and to the relatives of the captured prisoners(Sales Ben Pervez 2009). the main decision makers use to sort out how the income was distributed among the TTP members. According to the reports, Pakistani Taliban in all tribal areas have been divided into administrative areas in Waziristan. A central authority is sent through tribal agencies, then funds will be distributed in different areas run by the monthly basis like salarie, and the majority of the members of Baituallah gourp the major share (Arabinda 2009). Taliban militants in North Waziristan have collected "tax" on road transport, for example, ten wheels to secure an access road for a period of six months (Alba 2006), Waziristan wage The

trucks entering were asked to pay Rs 1500. The TTP has also accused FATA / NWFP and the trafficking of "safe way" from Balochistan to Afghanistan. Jizyah is also being asked by the minorities i.e. non-Muslim minorities. For example, in April 2009, the Sikh community agreed to pay the Taliban, 20 million Pakistani rupees, as the militants captured their homes and organized Sikh leader Erghalam. (Indian News 2009). Economic sanctions have also been imposed, especially those who are legally infringed. Also provides additional funds to TTP for financial assistance campaigns. It includes donations from the families of Waziristan families living in other provinces outside the tribal areas. It is also believed that "command teams" were instructed to abduct the militants for abusing. Enormous increase in local traders and security personnel and government officials in NGO workers and North-West Frontier Province. In June 2007, a non-governmental organization, a government employee in the district Bannu and employee of bank director in the North-West Frontier Province, to get an offense of kidnapping. \$ 1.2 million, was paid. (Anitaullah Khan 2007). Businessmen and rich were a popular target. For example, the Swat activist arrested, "Afghan Najibullah, a wealthy businessman and the owner of the company from the Hayatabad to Khayberphaktoonkuh was asked for compensation, received an abduction of 10 billion rupees for their release." (Shakeel Angom 2009). Soldiers and government officials were attacking regularly for corruption. In August 2007, to liberate 280 abducted soldiers were released by the terrorists after the payment of the ransom money. On 6 February 11, 2008, Afghanistan ambassador Tariq Azizuddin was kidnapped and then the Pakistani ambassador and was released for the payment of \$ 2.5 million paid to Bethelullah Mehsud (Ismail Khan 2008). Similarly, militants recently asked Pakistan, Abdul Khaleq to exchange Rs 25 lakh to release the nominated Afghan ambassador (Nation 2009). This is collected by third parties, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Islamic Movement of Mujahideen's shelter and in exchange for training of TTP, Pakistan as a gift or charity. According to the reports, the Afghan Taliban has also funded the Pak Taliban. For example, it is said to be given about \$ 70,000 baituallah Masood in March 2006 to attack the embassies by participating in the cartoon newspapers of Mullah Omar's states (Mohammad Shehzad 2006). The Afghan role is not clear in providing financial assistance to its Pakistani counterparts. Rehman Malik, Advisor of the Interior Ministry of Pakistan, has made controversial statements about the financial support provided by the Taliban to the Afghan Taliban. In September 2008, the owner said: "Suicide bomber based on his handlers and his sponsors in Pakistan" (Tariq Butt

2008). In other statements, he said that militants in the tribal areas "provided financial assistance to foreigners." In April 2008 (Geo Urdu 2009), armed men took extension of Marbella in TTP and Mohmand Agency (FATA) and the economic life line of organization. (As Asia Times 2009, on March 25, 2009, Swat has taken emerald in the Taliban separation region, according to the news, and started digging. (Ashfaq Yusufzai 2009) Earlier, this was the Shamuzi and Gujjar Kali Was mine and "were gentle and dramatic operation and marketing Taliban spokesman Swat valley, Muslim Khan is permissible." (Ashfaq Yusufzai 2009), due to the high value and profit of the gesture he created "The goodness of God has been created from all these minerals "and this group is likely to be a financial boost. Perhaps, Orakzai's capital The Pakistani Taliban has also taken several Coal Commissions from the shareholders. M Agency (Kazim Hussain 2009), in addition to the mine control, reported that Taliban militants were involved in robbing out of archaeological sites in chattering. In addition to the wood mafia valley swat cleared a big area to benefit from the money. However, at the bottom of some sources, mining the economic importance at the bottom for the Taliban: From this perspective, mining minerals were not related to, did not work as a major financial resource for Pakistani Taliban.

On the other hand, Malakand province is the main source of abduction-kidnapping for abducted politicians or rich people in the province. (Soil Qalandar 2009). According to an abduction of the movement, TTP fighters referenced rescue as "a kind of jihad." (Dawn 2009) Question: "Where does the electronic ammunitions of the Taliban come to such a long war with the Pakistani army?" "Local people help us." Taliban commander Commander Hafifullah said in Swat. Everyone knows when Maulana Fadlullah asked the people for charity through his FM channels, in a few minutes. 1 - 2 crores (10-20 million) was gathered by the local people cooperation. We rob those infidels [army] including their vehicles and other equipment, night vision goggles, launchers, RPG 7, M-15, etc. Anything taken from the Americans offered to them as maale-ganeemat. In swat, by doing daily attacks on the army and to restore such "blessings". (Hafeez Allah 2009) It is worth mentioning that if this is the only source of Hafizullah's proposed Taliban's reservations. Armed men take the military personnel and facilities that they can take possession as a rebel process; if it is enough to face one of the largest forces in the world, however, it is a controversial problem, As well as militants in Swat are receiving support from the local population, whether it is a question. If the Taliban can get many local people, they agree with the extremists rather than to be sympathetic.

UNDERSTANDING THE SELF FINANCE MECHANISM

Terrorism financing comes from criminal activities related to high-level crime. Similarly, TTP followed the same pattern to strengthen its roots in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In this process, factors such as social, economic and historical structure have created a more favorable environment for the development of TTP, in these areas. It is the fact that insurgents are an important part of the insurgency's strategy to reduce the financial strength of the groups (Katherine Collins 2010) Local armed groups have been mixing with Pakistani tribal areas and the fighting the army in different areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in various areas. Subsequently, these are Pakistani Taliban groups. Fadrullah who is also famous because the Pakistani Taliban messages known as "Mullah Radio" for excessive use of local FM radio stations to call people to obtain funding and dissemination, FATA three messages to the public and KP, providing with education and work for children and solutions to the conflicting land. They were also given a fair fund to build a large religious school for religious education and student education (Siddiqui, 2010). Seven tribal organizations in the seven tribal areas (geographical regions) and several areas. Swat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Lucky Marut, Kohistan, Malakand and Buner in Pakistan, Pakistan Taliban (APP Jamal, 2015) published the most fertile areas in terms of recruitment and funding. The local financial resources of the Trade Point Program are linked directly to terrorist organizations' operational capabilities from the financing of terrorism. In order to ensure and maintain a stable income, these organizations must be linked to the current environment in this area who wishes to continue their violent activities.

So, TTP They followed the same samples and maintained the flow of funds using local sources with local populations and terrorist organizations (Jamal 2015). Initially received Pakistani Taliban areas, including Swat valley divisions, Tank, Lucky Marut, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Mardan, Kohat, Kohistan Swat and Buner. However, the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa areas were not limited to the border; their presence gradually increased in other provinces, other radical groups (Suleiman 2009). Assistance (J EMA) - Taliban Administration The military wing

of Punjab, Mali, SSP, LEJ and JEM and employment have different sectarian groups(2010 Kandil Siddiq).

In cooperation with the Association of Traders Associations, manages funds for the Afghan / Pashtun (Diahrman 2013). In December 2010, a report was submitted that some TTP members belong to political parties, which cannot continue. Long ago, however, many Taliban members of Pakistan remain in contact with religious political parties in Pakistan, especially the jamiat ulma Islam (JUI) and the Association of Muslim Scholars (TAM)drug trafficking allowed them to collect handsome amount/appropriate amounts to meet their needs, financial assistance is one of the means of conflict, TTP benefited from this as Pakistan's most profitable fund that they took advantage of is that they benefited from Afghan drug trade as a source and income for weapons. But all the systematic areas bordering Pakistan along the border, Pakistani Taliban in foreign countries through Karachi (Saddique 2010) was exported drugs on 24 August 2009, terrorist was captured in Karachi and TTP agents who were exporting heroine in countries such as Singapore, China, Malaysia, Arab countries, Europe, Africa, America, Baluchistan , in the FATA region army captured the Taliban leader and militias, in the region of jundiwalah, revealing that natural resources (Zia-ur-Rehman 2013) had been consumed in large quantities.

In April 2008, TTP took control of the marble mine at Mohmand Agency. Earlier, Shamozaï and Gujar mine located in swat were captured , the resources were exported through Afghanistan a spokesperson of the Pakistani Taliban(Kandil Friend 2010).Because "all minerals and natural resources have been created by God for creation be benefit from the goods, the spokes person of Pakistani Taliban further mentions, the coal mines of Orakzai Agency were givng huge profit to the talibans ". (Qundeel saddiqie 2010).

The militants involved in the theft of archaeological sites in Khyber Pakhtun Khwa and exploitation. They have maintained strong ties with the Swat wood Mafia to produce more investments by selling wood in the market. According to the Regional Survey of the Ariya Institute for research advocacy Peshawar, R & D estimated that the rare forests (oak, pine and olive), timber transport, gemstones, worth of \$ 100 million were generated for the Pakistani Taliban. (Qandeel Saddique 2010).

Donation Campaign and Fundraising through Religious Institutions

Raising funds in Pakistan for any society or state transporting the well-being of the poor Mujahideen, is quiet easy due to zakah fund raisers(Suleiman 2009) Fazlur Rahman Khalil of harkatul Mujahadeen, Maulana Abdulla Shah of jamat ul furqan , new names for organizations associated with al-Qaeda hardliners, charitable donations and small community organization Amnesty International and Ghalba Islam movement, collected donations to establish their supporters fundraising networks with new names (Bhattacharya 2016) Islamic messages to improve stakeholders, fund collection in the form of small boxes in mosques in urban areas of Pakistan and other public places of for example jewelry shops , pharmacies (medical stores), railway stations and bus stations are favorable places to collect charity through ‘charity boxes’, transfer of funds and support by various Islamic centers and organizations.

Kidnapping for Ransom

One of the fastest growing sources of income for terrorist groups and organizations was kidnapping. Each abduction produces relative savings to almost 50 percent of the total annual expenses for the terrorist group, but on the basis of the economic situation of the group's structure and operating area (FATF 2015). This is done by organized criminal groups and terrorist organizations who are involved in these activities around the world. Muslim terrorist organizations often practice abduction by saying "a mujahid who captured a kafir soldier (Ashraf 2010), a journalist or a foreign workers, the prisoner has the right to ask about right amount of money or exchange of Taliban prisoners". (Catherine 2010) In August 2009, after the death of bait ullah Masood , the possibility of increasing TTP kidnapping process went to a next level in Pakistan, especially in cities like Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta (Ashraf Ali 2010). They trained and hired commando militants "Commando Squad" unofficial staff to abduct local businessmen, NGO workers ,bank managers and others for ransom . In June 2007, armed men abducted a bank manager of the Bannu area ransom was paid by his family Rs.1.2 million.

(Qandil Siddiq 2010). . Similarly, traders and rich have been targeted by Pakistani Taliban, when Swat Valley was captured in the armed conflict."Najibullah Afghani, the owner of a cement transport company in Peshawar and Hayatabad was released after payment of ransom of Rs 1 crores. "Consequently, Pakistani Taliban had targeted military personnel and government officials in many parts of Pakistan. In August 2007, TTP asked rupees 60 million to free 280 abducted soldiers. On February 11, 2008, Pakistani Ambassador Tariq Azizuddin was kidnapped and released after receiving a \$ 2.5 million of ransom. Similarly. The Afghan ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Khaleq was captured in Karachi and was released after a payment of 25million rupees, it has long been claimed that the Taliban are involved in the abduction of the rapidly growing element for militants. December 5, 2011, Karachi police successfully succeeded when three armed men belonging to the Pakistani Taliban group including Karachi head Qari Shahid were killed in a rescue operation, they rescued Riyadh Chennai, a businessman and an industrialist. According to media reports, insurgents had asked rupees 70 million as ransom money. According to the media 39 bank robberies, kidnapping for ransom were done by the TTP. In October 2008, the Pakistani Taliban kidnapped Sachish Anand filmmaker in Karachi and released him after receiving a ransom of 16 million, he was release from North Waziristan in March 2009

Illegal taxation, sanctions and Extortion from the Local People

In the tribal areas, central and regional governments did not use real control to regularize the rule of law. Therefore, the tax mafia and illegal terrorism maintained their hold and dependence on local areas of FATA and especially Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. For passenger buses, you have to pay \$ 30 per month, while \$ 6 per month for small vehicles (Katherine Collins 2010). In bajor Gas stations were ordered free fueling for the members of the TTP in the area. Similarly, Taliban leaders collected \$ 1.25 a month from each home in Waziristan agency. The same procedure was also applied to urban areas of Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad and Quetta, where traders, officials and merchants were harassed for tax and extortion by the Taliban and local criminals (Catherine Collins 2010) In Waziristan, the TTP command divided saturated areas for funds collection and gathering information. In North Waziristan, the trucks which entered had to pay 1,500 rupees tax for six months (Kandil Siddiq 2010), and they also charged mafias and smugglers for safe road

passage of FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and illegal deliveries to Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and as a result, minorities were forced to pay money to protect them as part of the Jizyah. Thus, in April 2009, the Taliban forced the Sikh community in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to pay jizyah of rupees 20 million. (Kandil al-Siddiq 2010), the transporters who were originally from FATA or tribal agencies had to pay billions of rupees to keep their families and relatives safe (Zia-ur-Rehman 2013) the NATO supplies to Afghanistan, especially trucks carrying oil to Afghanistan, regularly paid thousands of rupees on daily basis many major shopping malls, especially real estate owner and mobile companies had to pay ransom. Similarly, the tax collection of heavy vehicles, local trucks and minibus services was under a Mehsud group from Soharab Ghuth, implemented illegal taxes to transport associations. The Pakistani Taliban's Electronic Checks for regular and transparent resources in the distribution of funds to various projects outside Pakistan's borders. Intelligence reports indicated that TTP nominated six accountants to manage the amount and transparency of the capital including Karachi in Sindh province (Rahman 2013).

External Financial Sources: Foreign charitable aid or Funds

Foreign based funding's charities is one of the main factors facilitating large terrorist organizations. The type of adventure of these funds is increasingly complex while highlighting the real flow of funds. Therefore, it is widely believed that the amount of relief funds or donations is usually transferred to armed organizations under social welfare. The United States of America (USA) launched a separate investigation to highlight the factors responsible for the different parts of the Fund. US Inspector General Diana Dinker investigated the obstacles that led to the change of USAID. One from Afghanistan. "The investigators have faced a lot of complications and shed light on the very difficult factors, but they are acceptable as a challenge, but that does not mean that we will stop trying" said the US inspector general.

Financial assistance discovered from Afghan residents / backgrounds

Diaspora plays an important role in promoting financial assistance organizational and organizational structure of a terrorist organization. After the American invasion in Afghanistan and operational initiatives in tribal areas in Afghanistan, most of the militants moved to many neighboring countries, especially Gulf States and Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia. This transition also has an important impact on the efforts of the international community to eliminate terrorist

finances. In this context, funds raised by the Diaspora community have become a source of financial funding in the region for Terror (Sadiya Suleiman 2009). Another credible source of financial assistance is TTP funded by Afghans or Pashtuns, political activist in Pakistan, Dr. Alam Mehsud said, it is memorable that rich Afghan traders and Pashtuns donated more than \$ 100,000 during financial assistance. Financial resources and fundraising campaigns are permanent life-blood for terrorist organizations worldwide, and an important dimension of anti-terrorism strategy against eliminating them.

In countries such as Pakistan, where companies are always prove to be more fertile for extremists religious, sectarian and terrorist organizations, and the obstacles of such organizations become more difficult, even if they have implemented a series of anti-strategy and policies. Therefore, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Taliban group have engaged in terrorist activities in tribal areas and tribal areas using Pakistan's social, economic and political risks, where central and provincial governments have been controlled less. While studying the financial resources of PTT, he concluded that domestic and international factors promote terrorism in the country. Pakistani Taliban based solid organization and financial institutions made a deadly terrorist organization, demanding people to do it participated in defensive jihad against Pakistan and the United States / NATO forces, rejecting the structure of democracy clearly, and called for the law of Sharia in the country. There is a need for a combination of terrorist networks and financial resources through the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and National Action Plan (NAP). Similarly, the media can be condemned by the elements involved in terrorism and terrorism funding as the fourth most important state. To end terrorism, there is a need to promote cooperation between all institutions. The government in the country should also address the social, economic and political problems of the tribal areas and the KP residents. Therefore, Pakistan should change the policy of terrorism-response into an active perspective, which can lead to satisfactory results for the future of Pakistan.

Political economy of the Swat conflict

The Taliban terror campaign in Swat (TTS), is characterized by religious and political reasons, the unusual structure and growth, the emergence of economic policy the role of of women engagement in the adjustment of violence has added a reactionary war a specific dimension. This study tries to describes and analyzes how TTS is fully operational and organized. This document begins with the ideological interpretation of the concept of political economy and armed conflict, after discussion on the beginning of the conflict in Swat. The leader's fazlullah path/way to power, how he established and reconstituted the militants with the strong support of other actors. It also includes the outstanding features and operational strategies by defining the In particular, the research explains the movement that encouraged women in Swat to contribute to building the foundation of local militancy . The political and economic dimensions of the conflict are the main objectives of the next section. The paper that concludes the geopolitical policy and the wealth deposits, not the public benefit, and In this document, the geographical area under test is known as Swat. Although the TTS range has been spent in the Malakand section in full, it comprises six provinces and tribal agencies and the Department of Kohistan has some neighboring regional constituencies. Malakand including Buner, known as Swat and Shangla Governorates (PATA) Provincially administrated tribal agency , also includes tribal areas under other areas in Upper Dir, Dir, Chitral, Tribal agencies also called Malakand, upper dir. The provincial governor can change the laws with the permission of the president under the article of 247 of the constitution. The criminal laws does not applies to PATA region, though it is under jurisdiction of Pakistan(PCNA 2011).

Thus, this concept of political economy of conflict was first expressed by the French writer Montchretiende Watteville in the year 1615, as a political economic system.(Ankie Hoogvelt 1997). On the contrary, in subsequent centuries, to maintain a large army, because of the

expansion of Adam Smith's concept of wealth, not only the concept of economy (Ankie Hoogvelt, 1997). Russian writer Nikiten said in 1960 "bourgeois political economy, the system has become the first interests of those brakes on social development," but from a socialist perspective, deals with the relationship class and maintains the main own interests. (P. Nixen 1966). During the Cold War, there was a competing ideological function of armed conflicts supported by theories. A change in the international order would break this link, setting an example of conflict on one side of the political-economic conflict, war organizations and other means of non-structural financing of non-structural financial resources. A sharp debate on contemporary armed conflicts in emerging political and social sciences, due to the expansion of the political literature of the conflict on the economy. The role of political violence is linked to politics, economics, crime and violence as the center of recent research. While globalization [easy] identity, corrupt elites, employers controversy and criminal networks, economic use links very violent state renter of the economy as a commodity in the market (William Reno 2011) to adjust is built on "war and international markets." Social and illegal fields, criminal development of the rebels economic transactions, development and official state enterprise gain that the political economy of their current peaceful conflict was implicit, and in the latter case, even if one see economic issues based on ideas: the economy has emerged Which has emerged as "the distribution of power and wealth among different groups and individuals, and the preservation, maintenance and change of their relations at an additional time." This complex network of motivation and interaction has created a potential link between economic and civilian warriors. To the economy of political conflicts, especially in Africa, which may have alleged cross-border activities (Peter Chak 2001) or with some armed organizations to create a link between the political elite and organized crime groups responsible for drug trafficking. There is no evidence acceptable for economic reasons because of political activists in the government, and support the view of the active network in government. Thus, the armed conflicts used in this article, Abadan, towards the political economy, mainly include operations within the framework of the organization of the militant group, as well as those that organize patrols or mafia crime groups.

Drivers of the Swat Conflict

In 1915, Britain declared swat a state, Swat state and Chitral joined late with Pakistan as of in 1969. And through the Valley Swat Magistrate Courts, access to justice under the wali

(Governor) of Swat Valley, Swat People were given Nizam Adl through these courts . (Noor ul Haq 2011), and on the posts of tribal areas, Article FCR (Border Crime Regulations) was based on the judicial system in Swat Valley. In 1974, the FCR's elimination in the Valley Swat and the law or the traditional law, was in the army in Swat valley in the context of its history, and secular central government in Pakistan, whose popular demands do not meet the rules it has been changed by. The desire to enforce the Shi'a law failed to regain justice. It also saw the formation of militants in the Valley Swat by the institution in June, 1989. Implementation Shariat e-Mohammadi (movement for the implementation of Islamic law), or movement of implementation by Molvi Fazlullah father in law Sufi Muhammad ,asked for a change of Traditional law with the shariyah law, TNSM rejected traditional tribal law. The Afghan tribal fighters affected the TNSM and obtained funding from the drug reserves in the Qabli area with the Afghan border. Slowly the implementation of Shariat Muhammadi's public support has got public support and then became violent in 1994. Federal government led a determination to resolve Shariat Muhammadi (Hassan Abbas, 2011), the situation of movement through the federal government of Benazir Bhutto made a compromist. The provincial government announced the rules of "Shria", and resolved the situation. In 1999, the nizam e adle law was improved and implemented as an organization by Shari Nizame Adl. However, people criticized the system and the shariyah nizam collapsed within in months, failing in the first decade of this century. On February 16, 2009, under the agreement, the approval by the President of Pakistan signed by the Governor of the Northwestern Frontier Province under the agreement, signed by the Governor of NWFP, Provincial Government (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Sufi Muhammad. The Najam was followed by electronic justice under the regulation; in 2009(CNN). Molvi Fazlallah, enacted Islamic laws in both the agreements. Peace treaties have demolished within a few months (Abbas Hassan 2015). Swat increased the attention of the world in April 2009, when the follower of Fazlullah led the area of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This incident was a milestone for all the supporters involved in the politics of Swat. The class consciousness is not a response to the judicial system that the US government has made anxiety over pro-government policies and the war of Afghanistan and the wali of Afghanistan supported the Afghan conflict in the swat valley through the religious school. (Surat Khan 2008). However, some critics say it is wrong that there was more than a dangerous effort to restore the immediate effort of Swat's state against the state. The Taliban had a ruthless program due to political and economic concerns. His

language was intentional and purposeful to create a resonance between citizens referring to Islamic and fast justice (Modi Yusuf 2009). Structural deficiencies in the part of the waiver coming back to solve social emissions issues have played an important role in the emergence of social power to Fadlallah and his militants.

Fazlullah's Path to Power

To the elusive concept of fadlullah's power mission, ranging from which he forced married the daughter of Sophie Muhammad (religious leader) to get control of the religious groups in swat valley. This unusual discourse of attraction while homeopathic reputation, the jihad in Afghanistan together at the end of 2001 against the US-led coalition and youth peace stands among the people. The talent of virtue has enhanced the discourse of the ,FM radio(mullah Radio) channel to the extent of its access to domestic life. The public through data of social injustice and self-defense services. Do not politically open the main place to obtain the appropriate religious support Silence, political and religious alliance of the MMA provincial government. Since 2002 MMA, the regional government has also encouraged further harm. The wave of national crisis, the summer of 2007 during Islamabad especially in the tales of the killing of girls in the Swat valley by security forces against religious extremists of the Red Mosque, has a strong reason that it has become a bad leadership power for lack of popular confidence in the government. (Ahmed 2010) it was dissatisfying regime of Pervez Musharraf in 2002 for Pervez Musharraf's autocratic government and the provincial law to Afghanistan in conjunction with the political wing plot the absence of political scene Sufi Muhammad and arrested resentment were sympathetic authorities that allowed Fazlullah to build his own strength. The growing influence of Afghan scientists saturated with the Saudi authoritarian version of Islam and rural areas has been shown to be effective in saving capital without conflicts, without much effort on the oppressor.

First Phase : About 2.5 million practicing Muslim, Malakand and home to the Swat division, in particular, a high level of education and health care from a strong civil society and adjacent areas in the tribal areas (AI Claims International 2010) There are many difficulties in establishing militant networks. Therefore, Fadlullah built an organizational structure in the statement of "Sharia." Limited criminals have become the main base area include Swat operations, especially

from the original owner of the opposition in the valley, but was seized in the Swat Taliban merger claim was their land the local farmers was one of the first to join the ranks (Shah 2010) complained in 1917, his supporters (sheikh Milli 2009) based on the award of historical injustice Crown "gangs" when canceling the waiver of the circulatory system.

It is a guide to demonstrating how to encourage women through a series of encouragement during the early phase of Fadlullah's response. To start, Fadlallah used his right to fight social companions who use legal rights to inherit women, mah'r "Seal" (the amount paid by the groom to the bride), divorce and other family rituals. (Mohammad Sajjad, 2011). The gold jewelry donated to build Fadlullah's school was the direct result of these monuments. FGD's discussion with swat groups in Swat showed clearly that people in Swat and women generally play an active role in providing moral and financial support for TTS (Forezie Barri 2011). One local resident made an interesting observation during an interview, claiming his main inspiration for acquiring the lost relationship with the seductive dancers in an attempt to protect the citizenship of women as she appealed to Islam's eligibility for. Similarly, the young women who left behind their foreign countries were socially independent and misused by the sermons of Fadlallah. After his appeal for jihad, conservative women and competencies, who earned a higher degree of secular society but had less knowledge of the Qur'an, provided an agricultural environment to promote their version of Islam. Fadlallah emphasized women in his radio propaganda, encouraged them in every speech and promised to send their children and their husbands to jihad. This is reflected in the fact that post-conflict women also suffered a lot. It has been reported that the main local leader in Swat had mostly two or three, or even four wives, despite local social standards. Those who oppose the development of the Taliban are playing with their lives or relatives, as well as lying down on unauthorized charges.

Second phase: Effective supply of power through God's grace by threatening and oppression in 2004. Its subordinate movement started with the introduction of Sharia Muhammadi factions without the leader movement. With active organizations and a wide range of foreign relations in other countries, the borders in Afghanistan include TNSM in their new partners, for example not restricted to Bajaur, the Jeshe Muhammad (JM), led by Maulvi Liaqat joined the Taliban Pakistan, Waziristan and the Afghan Taliban. In 2007, Fadlallah established a militant training camp and started making a huge complex of Mam Dheer near Mingora's town. (Management

Science 2009). Courts established after announcing the implementation of Sharia version that he started "the administration of the court". The attack on "Lal Masjid" in July 2007, Fadlallah and his armed men have given the best way to deal with the state security system and their supporters gain sympathies due to this incident. In Swat the building of Taliban leadership levels showed the demand to stop for Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the later movement Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to stop military operations in the relationship between the main groups of TTS. This alliance led the entire Malakand division of the province and surrounding areas, the Pakistani Taliban later led in the confession of the province Fadlallah in the title of Taliban's rich in the house of God and North Kyhber Pakhtunkhwa. Prior to this union of hands, TTS movement in Brawls and attacks bombardments, mainly the base on guerrillas tactics including sniper attacks and explosive devices (IEDs). It is claimed that Taliban fighting skills have recently worsened the war against the Soviets and then Americans (Chaudhry, 2009), not Russia, any psychological experience in a possible war, the experience of Taliban under the Taliban government. And the development of TTS strength at the time of peak was 1,5000 and 2,0000 fighters, , and the armed forces in Swat 4000-4500, and supporters of 8,000 to 9,000 This is the maximum strength of TTS, which includes a large number of foreign fighters (including Uzbeks and Chechens), and dozens of illegal radio channels 2007.fazdullah the founder of the foreign fighters, supported the political political parties' funding, and the support of the vast majority of the resources.

Consolidation: Fazlullah has strengthened his power has increased his military, and now Amir of wadi Swat, the possibility of craftsmanship, has been considered, and the operation and policy objectives TTS volume is now more and more maximum now to take complete workforce power in the Valley Swat. The police were killed in the region, a civilian administration and judiciary from Swat to a real-time religious system was implemented ,all the armed groups in the country were gathered to help and looked at fadlullah to establish shariyah in the country, and they believe that in future political power will be gained militants in Afghanistan will also be helped. These can be different motives in which there is no unusual thing with these religious groups, but the desire to share political power and eager to control the state (Persia Bari 2010).

The fact is that Fazlullah faced resistance from the military government and was not quite popular in the establishment. Swat had a shadow of his political behavior and his political

behavior against his loyal guns. Now he referred to the parts of the social capital that was his power. The application of the element of fear on all the fields of population, and the government has become the main element of the infrastructure of the TTS violent philosophy. Model rural areas include violence, religious liberalism and blind-mindedness of brightness and enriched urban centers to compel local population in submission. People have become familiar with the destruction of the local elite and police officers, the frontier police of the border ,were publically executed become normal during Fazlullah time, as it was the responsibility of the MMA's government to maintain law and order but they quiet due to political reasons. Radio Broadcast of Fazlullah was not just a theory or propaganda programs, but as they are regularly used to advertise members of obligatory Qatl (probably be killed). In this way, government officials, including local police, have been targeted. These serious threats were taken by security forces from their positions to withdraw from some of the police forces and border guards and the exception of local newspapers (Amnesty International 2009). Parallel government Valley Swat, the current debate of state conflicts, is that there was a legal and administrative holiday behind rising violence, which embarked on, "Most of the objectives are not affiliating with the truth" (Sartaj Khan 2010). In his article "Behind the crisis in Swat," Sartaj Khan has claimed that "current religious militancy in Swat is a class struggle." Sartaj Khan , said: "I have attacked the political parties in their political commitment, and their struggle, the size of the class, presented in the context of centuries of exploitation, and severe terrorism,". Fighting "is the social situation in Swat valley and the rise in its history due to the movement," (Farhat Taj, 2010) in Swat is a class battle in a resident of Tajwadi Swat Valley, indicating "The fact that Islamic militants Khan is attacking politically-established AIDS, there may be a barrier in the way of medieval wild arrangements, which is the local and foreign jihad Swat wants to enforce "(Farhat Taj 2010). He confessed to a statement that Taliban only attacked the political active Khan:" poor political parties, especially the National awami Party, are being targeted not because of Khan but because they are national and secular (Farhat Taj 2010). For all purposes, Fazlullah does not know from the local ethnic group only. Instead, the beliefs have assumed dimensions of anti-Pakhtunkhwa, and opposed Nationalist and anti-feudalism, the opposition of the traditional leadership of pakhtoon and the clear differences in Islamist increased. (Khalid Aziz 2007) In many ways, a function of opposition to the oppression of Sodararat (justice), or injustice is obtained from some people in vain (whether searching for a private benefit) Andra de Soysa 2010) can clearly see.

On this peak, TTS was at least a modern and intelligent army. Executive leadership includes a diverse range, high quality, as well as the part of Central Spokesperson Muslim Khan and the head of the cellular complaints Fadlallah's council council. Apart from the design of the FM radio network of knowledge based on the long run period of the United States. One Muslim Khan was responsible for joining the Taliban network based on FATA and Karachi. Each leader had a different team capable of carrying out different responsibilities. The second class was based on the commands set to the commander and the dear soldiers. Explosive experts, network-based FM Swat, Treasury, Training Centers, Jails and TTS's integrated logistics capabilities are offices, courts and recruitment and propaganda stations, including a large complex. TTS was too late to provide "fund" to its executives and agents. According to the hostages that have not ransom to give to the non-resident fighters who have continued the supply funds. However, there are many of the women who were punished publically due to fallen charges by mothers who initially asked the army to eliminate the "TTS" "Taliban". Widespread dissatisfaction with political parties against the militant forces and innocent violence against innocent violence, even the Muslim army, so that the Taliban public opinion in Swat as part of their efforts to resume the street so they can take advantage of a significant change in the militants government and Pakistani army have created support in their operations. (Greensburg Paterson 2010).

Cost of conflict

Which did not only get public support, implemented by the "Rahe E. Rast" soldier, which began in May 2009, but also supported all the political decisions of a rare consensus showing the use of power in Swat. Due to the military operation against the Taliban in the biggest movement of people with conspiracy, it sent 2.3 million people fleeing from camps for displaced people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Gregory Petersen 2010). In June 2009, the government of Pakistan the Taliban had already been announced and began to encourage homes to return to their homes, and

their vast majority in some cases, conditions were clearly serious and impossible. (Amnesty International) announced that the military had defeated the Taliban, announced the success of military operations in August 2009 (Amnesty International). It was at biggest dispersion after the rawanda genocide most population escaped before the operation. Currently, we have kept away from Swat militants and are largely restoring the state mandate. Most of the households have returned home, many are still waiting to rebuild their homes and to restore their business, the next Richmond praised the efforts of the huge Pakistan (Pakistan horizon) of the international community. It had about 2,000 civilians and 500 soldiers were killed in disputes. According to the army, 3,000 and 3,400 militants were killed.

The active conflict, continued for more than 21 months, during which mass massacre caused by public suffering, and affected by the worst disaster besides fields of education, agriculture and tourism. The RIPORT report recently identified 12,025 psychologists affected in Swat. (Malagaro kor 2011). According to official estimates, Taliban attacks prevented more than 50,000 students' education. Only after the implementation of the judicial system in April 2009, 4,000 schools were closed to provide education for over 40,000 girls. (Amnestiy International) About Khyber Pakhtunkhwa facilities, schools, housing, educational and poor shelters, about 8 percent (427 out of 5347). Of which 237 were destroyed and 190 partially destroyed. Among them, children were destroyed by girls and 66 schools in school 149 schools. Damage is 2,696 million. (ADP and WB200), 934 9 housing units were destroyed and 7280 units were damaged in different degrees. Residential stock damaged the Swat district. There was total loss in the energy sector. \$ 2,406 USD (US \$ 30m). The main impact of real estate assets was handled by the Peshawar Electric Supply Company (Pike), which was the only distributor of electricity in the area. Budget losses were estimated directly. \$ 769 million (9.7 billion US dollars) while indirect loss (revenue loss during the crisis) was estimated. \$ 1,045 million (\$ 13.1 million). "Pisco" has suffered indirect losses in the form of aid provided to home camps, including electricity generation and providing electricity to the camps. The loss of transport sector is 804 million (\$ 10 million). There has been somewhat a serious error in the health sector, but water supply and sanitation losses estimate about Rs. 000. \$ 62 million (0.8 million dollars). It is estimated that one million people are directly affected by this loss. Security sector is almost almost baptized in the region, its investment is to be guaranteed. 7.787 million (US \$ 3.3 million) to recover in a three-year period. (ADP and WB 2009) militants are not only the destruction of

the local infrastructure of violence and terrorism, schools, health centers and roads, but also destroy the rural and urban economies in the region (Farzan Bari) the main tourist places and hospitals were destroyed during the military operations which destroyed the image of Swat Valley. Small traders, hotels and transport companies were greatly affected. In the agricultural sector, fruits and income crops have been largely destroyed, depriving people of their economy. And not to mention the destruction of the cultural heritage of Malam Jabbah, other costs of conflict, including the destruction of Malam jabbah resort, preferred (Zaid Sahib). (Ravi Olah 2010) takes a long time to go back to Swat on their previous crisis with the assessment of a requirement provided about \$ 860 million for the reconstruction of the infrastructure in Malakand area.

Exploitation of Natural Resources

Between the other things, the unusual benefits of movement including low cost raw materials, electricity and duty-free vehicles are expected. (Swat Tax 2009) due to the ongoing changes in the administrative structure, Swat Tax and Scope remained outside. In addition to investing in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, women's smuggling, and aft of wood, ect on a small scale, and illegal activities, in silk, cosmetics and tourism industry. The region has become a virtual virtual economy, criminal mafia. Continuous flow of weapons from Afghanistan is due to the militancy of the environment, as well as the organizational basis of violence committed by mafia organized groups. To a certain extent, conditions were bad to promote high level crime.

, but gradually took a different criminal role from the viewpoint of other militants in Pakistan. Although it is not always possible that non-state actors should be encouraged by greed or black armed, but balance over time often changes. The utility of a group of militants encouraged you to work on the basis of the political reasons found in their work for an additional reason to continue the war against illegally (Greens Patrick 2010), and thus After that there could be lots of indications in this conflict and many others. There is a form of organized violence among many non-governmental solutions to unlock illegal funds and bring their interests forward in the future (Jacob Elahwal drunk 2009) "where the structure of open power is illegal Is. Contrary to terrorists based on organizations, traditional business, five different means of funding/donations

from individuals and charity organizations, and direct contribution to state retreat, and tenth shareholders of legitimate business Profit; Criminal Benefits; Funded Revenues, including Revenue and People's Blackmail (Jacob Shapero, 2005). All sources, in spite of the exception of the official sponsor, appear to be guilty of the slavery of a system organized at different times. Therefore, millions of donations received from the local people have never become TNSM.

From January to December 2005, the first group of TTS fund-raising campaigns can be considered, the revenue was reported. 154 million rupees to 184 million, mostly such as jewelry, weapons and construction materials. Women were at the top of donation. In 2005, cameras arrested in Swat valley, the first photographs were standing in the pile of Taliban, donations, money, along with wooden cards, received from local level, while women 's bags and ornaments' youth the AK-47 (Shahan's Murdey 2009) and the target of the security situation between January 2006 and November 2007 was the TTS, the money-making weapons and ammunitions and the huge network salaries now brought to the masked rifles. Started using all possible resources to pay. Weapon Group has widely expanded the vast array of resources to include all sources that indicate international crimes. Many criminal elements joined TTS for promoting their interests, for instance a trusted operation commander of Fadlullah, was told that the former TNSM deputy vice president was associated with wooden business. Was it to encourage them to join the militant organization, it was to exploit the wooden wealth without official restrictions. During the conflict, a disaster was demonstrated on a unique scale in the rubble with the local mafia taxi. The government has estimated a loss of \$ 800 million annually and annual losses from illegal wood trade in Malakand division. (Asif Mian 2010) and the destruction of Swat valley in 2008 was more difficult and stolen trees were calculated more than what was done in two decades. Survey (Tom Burghardt 2010), Arana Institute has revealed in 2009 for regional research and defense that the Swat Jungle area has suffered more than just rupees,.Rs: 8 billion during the last 16 months. When there is complicated investors, the wood mafia thinks that he has spent his share of profits for funding militancy (Mr Irfan Ashraf, 2009), local leaders reach rupees. 25,000 and regularly the Taliban pay Rs 10,000 as a monthly salary. However, regular salary and care packages were set up to send or send to those in their real areas. During this period (average cash) the estimates were estimated at Rs .150 million and 170 million.

From November 2007 to May 2009, TTS made the unmanned assault, controlled by the entire scope of crime, whose government repeatedly supported the government with a peace deal. Their income is almost doubled by different sources. Militants searched for hotels and resorts by public auctions, silver, carpet and worn furniture (Inmates Roll 2009). Perhaps the most notable where they started firing at activists Malam Jabbah Ski Station in June 2008, was looted, then burnt half of impressive lifts and burned the buildings. In another case, armed men fired in the development bureaucracy of provincial tourism and auctioned millions of rupees on computer and office equipment. Tourism industry, who employed more people than any other source of economy in Swat, angered many local residents. In addition to hotels and tourist places, workers lost homes and shops to escape from residents, as well as food storage tanks, a planned global food shop. they broke dozens of vehicles, especially off-road vehicles and jeeps from various governments and non governmental organizations (Greensburg Paterson 2010). they stole his neighbors, Nigai and Diuna Baba's hospitals, and took all the valuable equipment including Ambulance. . (Greensburg Paterson 2010).

Incomplete tax-collecting network was expanded in almost all areas of the Malakand Division. In addition to kidnapping for compensation, citizens were asked to pay monthly taxes. Swat does not seem to have a militancy policy that militants demand from the citizens. In some areas Taliban, for example, pay part of black mail fixed in Khoazakila, pay out \$ 360 per month for the local commander of TTS, regardless of shop owners. Meanwhile, the Swaty family, who received foreign exchange from abroad, had half of this amount of fighters. . (Greensburg Paterson 2010). The difficulties also directed all the charities to not give government and non-governmental organizations to pay for them to pay. The supporters and governments of the Partners have donated financial assistance to Pakistani Diaspora and supporters across the country and started its flow. Rs. 708.6 million to 819.6 million. In addition to the exploitation of the archaeological discoveries of thick pine forest, diamonds and whatever important.(Syed Irfan Ashraf, 2010) sources of revenue for the local secret economy. The Taliban caught three vertical mines in Northwest Swat in February 2009. Digging started at full speed. More than 200 workers participated in the extraction of precious stones and the Taliban pulled a third of the rocks. Initially the army took control of the mines of mines, and the sale of emeralds, which took place at least three months to the cabinet fighters and covered their insurgency which has helped fund the profit. (Hindustan Times 2009) sold to open tenders. Taliban earned \$ 50,000 a month from

the mines. (India Times 2009) According to landlords Astqsaiaan, "Prices start at \$ 50 per carat, starting from the market price very little ... [and] then it was smuggled in Jaipur, India before being moved. As soon as possible, Bangkok, Switzerland and Israel. "(Tom Burgardt 2010) The Taliban government in Swat commented by Tom's Burgard while commenting on the terrorist's political economy, that his net for the announcement of the crime The most important reason has been, "while the princes of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), through illegal schemes for various returns of natural resources in the region".

While the Taliban initially rely on soft power to gain popular appeal and radiation groups in Swat, then later put a criminal weapon. According to the results of a survey conducted by the Regional Policy Research and Training Institute (RIPORT), the rebels have made money by looting schools and hospitals', rich households.(Khalid Aziz 2010).

About two months after the signing of the peace deal with the government in April / April 2009, about 100 armed men tried to enter the banner across the valley of Gokand Corridor Kadar's guard. Hundreds of Taliban fighters have later occupied tribal elders' houses in a prominent and famous St. Pierre Baba and the lashkar Sultan's museum. Science laboratories, librarians and burning mobile schools Gadezi, Dagger Chamla and Chagharzi strains, similarly stole hospitals, office tools, cars and other things among health center machines.

The military operation from August / August 2009 is May / May in the last phase of the existence of TTS as a systematic force, supply line sinking and immediate access funds. After August 2009, there was a Taliban presence in Swat and the ability to raise funds was chocked. Most areas were ceased "to eliminate illegal behavior, while efforts often depend on criminal profits to survive only the flames of insurgency,(Greens Patrick 2011). In Swat, it was largely supported by the end of criminal networks that controlled them.

Negative impact on Institutions and local Community

After the rise in Islam, religious leadership in Swat in the centuries plays an important role in politics. According to Orakzai (2011), it is a dynamic importance to understand the Swat crisis. It had two levels in religious leadership: the steward (the descendants of the universe, but not the preacher mystical religious leaders, the Sufi and the preachers. These religious leaders play an

important role in the crisis in religious and tribal conflict. surmon plays role in interference in land conflicts. There is more impact on the time of crisis in Monday's relationship. Employment in the Swat Valley community and the local mosques imitations did not enjoy this discrimination (Lindholm, 1979: 489). In 1915, Mian Gul and Abdul Wakil of the Valley of Swat eliminated the quality of the preliminary interpretation of religious interpretation and decision making. The legal system created by it was a combination of Wali's decisions, behavior (tradition) and Islamic (Masood, 2009). It was not the legacy of women legacy involved in Islamic law, but a clear legacy law in the local Swat Riway, and women are not entitled to any legacy, but sometimes the sub-section of the earth, so that the law became a subsidiary of riway (Rome 2008: 120). When the 1973 Constitution of Swat transferred to one of the tribal areas of the provincial administration (PATA) in 1973, the organization was confirming that. With the advent of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's socialist politics, the religious element was more important than 1970 when religious leaders covered the interests of private times. This question again, during the second period of PPP in Pakistan, under Bhutto's daughter, Benazir in 1989, when women in private land and non-Islamic leadership were announced. According to Hussein (2013), Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, with the use of religion as a political weapon in the country, before the use of weapons, but the international dimension of later religion, September 11, 2001. It is popular in the region when it became an internationally Islam. The Taliban and its network of networks tried to solve the Pashtuns in their history and original narrative, and tried to isolate them from the rest of the world (Hussein, 2013). In a broader context, there are other factors associated with growing religious extremism in Pakistan: such as Bhutto and Zia, using Islam to promote their interests in the power of politicians; Afghan jihad and schools Impact of spread that has spread during the period; Hearing stress and development of shia sunni violence in the middle class was a growing success.

The lack of economic development, the local government, created a legal system of backward and ineffective social divisions, is not a major factor in conflict dispute in Swat Valley and political forces as movement in the region, Sharia Muhammadi and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan Birth can play a major role in birth. Under the royal government and with the best level of government, with a timely manner known Swat to manage economic justice: fast and cheap, and test / decisions and cases adjourned in the first or second session to kill Test (Rome 2011: 57). But after the integration of the region in Pakistan in 1967, the division of judicial division in

areas related to the division is subject to change in judicial reform and their constitutional status. Due to the extension of the National Justice System in the direction of the Valley Swat, due to the complications of PATA Systems and Riway's misuse, which is due to the increasing demand for Islamic law (Zafar, 2011). In the next 30 years, political parties have exploited domestic homelessness with the judiciary. According to Saffron (2011) and Roma (2011), these factors eliminated the judicial system, due to social disappointment and weakened the government's political and administrative mission. The delay in resolving many civil issues has made it possible for local ideological systems that exist before the dissolution of the original state (Rome, 2011). On February 12, 1994, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the Beta authority organization, without any effective judicial system except for the Swat and PATA region, is non-constitutional (MIR 2009). The Tehreek-i-Insaf (Muttahida Qaumi Movement-e-Muttahida Qaumi Movement) Mughaj-ul-Quran started to weaken the judicial system and the state structure, and promised a system of justice faster. Although the application of the establishment of Islamic courts was given, and was given by the government in 1994, but led by the Taliban Islamic Movement led by the Malakand Division (SDPI, 2012) in 1995. Aman's rule has worsened. Swat militants in Swat fight for the Pakistani government for years to control legal, judiciary and police structures in Swat. Zafar (2011) states that the failure of the government was unable to establish an effective management system as alternative to the TNSM and TPP law, which orders high speed justice. Instead of solving the rules in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa border areas, the government has prepared separate policies for these areas and agreed to develop parallel systems. Billing Institution Vacuum, TNSM and TPP supported. Zafar (2011) The main cause of political dimension / legal dispute, and the reversals of 2008-2009, is the basis of the implementation and movement implementation applications presented by the Sharia-i-Muhammad leaders, which is the basis for your goals. Is considered to be the result of unity.

ADB (2010) states that through the backwardness of non-equality and non-equality, both tribal areas and backwardness are held in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (KP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, militants benefited from erosion, corruption, and economic and social deficit and widespread decades: it has a large number of population due to the instability of strong stability in the region. High levels of risk. An important aspect of Mian Gul Abdul Wakil's rule was the development plan for Swat's condition.

Under his rule, schools and hospitals were established, weapons were controlled and attempts were made to eliminate social reasons for the Swat Peace and Development Area (Orakzai, 2011). It has also tried to modernize the society for maintaining the traditional power structure and changes in education, communication and health (Rome 2011: 54). These development policies continued after the integration of Swat in 1969, but did not agree with the speed of the development prior to 1969 (draft, 2009). In addition, to support the ongoing movement and non-equality of equitable owners and non-equitable equitable resources and access to resources and access to different groups of political and economic domination, to support Sharia Muhammadi and TTP (power 2015). Specifically, it is a belief that the Islamic government will facilitate more fair distribution of resources, and has encouraged groups to support the militancy network (Elahi, 2015). TNMS members were primarily with limited access to power from one class, but they benefited new opportunities to collect money, power and social status (Halai, 2009). In his search of Taliban appeal in Pakistan, Zaidi (2010) Taliban villagers claim to have benefited from a very sharp displeasure who are suffering from social injustice and non-equality in the distribution of poor lands. It also indicates a significant indication of the lack of unemployment rate and growth between the youth in tribal areas, whose factors increase the focus of battles. Finally, economic factors cannot be a factor in dispute, but significant damage to the conflict infrastructure (Rome, 2011) has affected the economy of the Swat Valley though. People's disadvantages were destroyed as well as shelling and government forces shelling citizens and government infrastructure. It has also been compensated for partially damaged government buildings, but it was not paid for any compensation (Rome, 2011) for the destruction of homes and crops.

The economy of the economy belongs to the activities and tactics by the conflict, which is useful for increasing funding for terrorist activities. It can be from such private and corporate profits, and can help raise charity, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, fraud, kidnapping, kidnapping for kidnapping and extortion. The main objective of terrorism financing in the promotion of a terrorist network is to threaten people or to kill or force government to participate in injury or risk or material loss, or seriousness with basic services and systems intervention(Duhaime 2014).

"The financing of terrorists",as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are putting a track to the funning ofterrorists in any form or anyone who encourage to fund them

(Sener Delayan 2008).) and for those people who attend or participate in it. It is already necessary to track the financial resources of terrorists, when the implementation of the United Nations Convention against the recruitment of the UN General Assembly terrorist's use of financial assistance and training has been done in 1986. . This convention was adopted in 1994, December 1989. 4 Besides, the United Nations General Assembly focused on the growing relationship between drug traffickers and terrorists. In the light of these decisions, the United Nations General Assembly adopted an International Convention for Decision for Terrorism financing in December 1999 (Kshitij's Praba 2015). Finance is not a new trend. However, in the management strategy, funding-saving campaigns varies to maintain stability. This context, whatever motives and objectives or organization or goals of a terrorist group and other militant organizations, must be achieved or changed, necessary financial resources for achieving the end and objectives (FATF) While the head of the financial office of Al-Sayyed Aid-Masri said, "Without money, jihad is closed." (Similarly, terrorist groups in South Asia such as Al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Tamil Elam (LTTE), Lashkar (Lashkar-e-Taybah), Jamaat-e-Islam Bangladesh (JMB) and Maoists in India These ideas are but all the ideas based on nationalists to enable all religious views, separatism and activities, but these techniques are generally to collect donations of less or more (Saadiya Solomon 2009).) One of the most innovative and effective forms of use of these organizations is easily facilitated to facilitate armed generation and fund transfer of non-profit organizations. The International Network (NPO) is a regular channel anywhere in the world.

These nonprofit organizations are an effective and useful to gain legitimacy in funds movement. Generally, this intense movement of funds is being developed from the developed economies and is further organized and backward countries (Saadia Solomon 2010). Governments in Muslim countries often ignore the charity and religious schools, including the procedures for maintaining the quality of registration and recording, and the integrity of input and output control and the integrity of the financial control system. Armed organizations have to benefit from the situation. In this way, in Pakistan, where charity works are part of religious duties, and many extremist organizations involved in charity and social assistance are commonly used for recruitment, propaganda and terrorist acts (Mohammad Ali Babakhail 2015).

Chapter-4

Theoretical Analysis

Religious stress was increasing in the dispute of Swat, which can cause violence and add a large number of people. This understanding not only matters of real violence, but also in the situation where the possibility of group violence is increasing. However, we should realize that there is no final connection between religious conflicts and violence. As Harton wrote, "The conflict

between ethnic groups is common," while "severe violence in such groups is very low" (Harden, 2016: 155). In other words, religious conflicts are not included in the definition of violence or therefore there is no degree of violence or ethnic conflict in ethnic violence (Brubaker and Laitin 1998, 432) ", which is a distinctive form of conflict with special dynamics". So according to the theory the conflict doesn't evolved for the violence in the Swat it was stage which came later. Analyzing closely reveals that Molvi Fazlullah has economic benefits and intentions attached to the ideological based conflict in Swat which was self-financing in the nature. So the sustainability of conflict was in the favor of the Molvi Fazlullah he brainwashed people to lure them into conflict to loot resources use them as their army for making as much revenue as they can in short span of time Molvi Fazlullah army collected huge revenue through various techniques. On behalf of the TTP commander and the aides close to him it was the rational decision to trap people into religious propaganda and use them for economic benefits through the conflict. They even brainwashed the women to donate their precious jewelry in the name of religion towards the Fazlullah cause. Abbas a resident of Swat described that "It was result of Mullah Fazalulah's continues struggle of two and half years. He was running the administration and role of agencies were also had a core factor. He was justifying the issues in regard of Islamic perspective because in swat religions have a great importance and Fazlullah was considerably a scholar. He brainwashed people and particularly women using religion to aid this sacred cause in any way they can and women contributed their jewelry thinking as they are contributing to religious cause" (Abbas, 2018). He further describes the reason for this propaganda as, "it was the unsupported agenda which we can call a Jihad and those who died were called a martyred (Shaheed). The purpose behind the jihad was to set up the Islamic rules in Afghanistan and Pakistan which they call the 'Shariyet'. This system of shariyet started by the Sufi Muhammad (Mullah Fazalulah's Father in Law) further led by Mullah Fazalulah. Mullah Fazalulah told people of swat that he will built the madarsaa were Islamic teaching will be shared and further he will convert it into collage and the into university. In regard to this madrassa he asked people to contribute money and people contribute a lot. Even women sell their jewelleryes and those who construct the madrasah are volunteers then are not taking any money for their work. During these days a heavy blast happened at night and Mullah Fazalulah told people that this blast was happened due to fire erupted in oil tank but in actual it was a bomb test by Mullah Fazalulah to set the power means and further he established the organization to rule the system of shariyet in

Afghanistan and Pakistan. The back funding was actually by the people who contributed their money on the name of Islam and its teachings” (Abbas, 2018). Not only had they used religion as tool to mind wash people but they also took financial benefits Abbas further states that, “When they captured the area like mangora and nearby areas then those areas were belongs to them and resources were also belongs to them. I don’t have idea how they use and sale and used these resources but they definitely got financial benefits from these resources” (Abbas, 2018)

It clearly indicates that the rationale behind the Fazlullah decision to declare the Jihad against the state was to take economic and political benefits and he used religion as the tool to propagate his agenda and his benefits were exceeding comparing to his costs through the conflict.

Conclusion

In modern era, most of the conflicts are complex amalgamation of social, economic, ethnic, political and religious dynamics. It's hard to pick any one cause or dimension to explain the conflict. Analyzing the case study of Swat through concept of Political economy of the conflict give an explanation to the conflict through economic perspective by taking various dynamics as tools to politicization of conflict for economic benefits. In case of Swat Molvi Fazlullah used religion as the tool to propagate his agenda of bringing Sharia law in Swat, by doing so Molvi Fazlullah gave birth a conflict with the state of Pakistan. This conflict was originally ideological in nature challenging the status quo, political system and ruling authorities of the state. Later this conflict turned out to be contest over power, identity and resources. This contest resulted in self-financing nature of the conflict as the conflict generates its own revenue through loot and resources, extortion money, ransom, kidnapping and charity money. Fazlullah used religion as the tool to brainwash people and lured them into the conflict to fight for him in the name of the religion. Rational choice theory asserts before taking a decision rational actor will have cost and benefit analysis and he/she will only take that decision if the benefits exceeds the cost. It's important to note here that Fazlullah's rationality behind the conflict was economic benefits and

power, according to his cost and benefit analysis, the benefits from the conflict was exceeding comparing to his personal loss and that gave him the force to prolong the conflict as long as he can for his political and economic benefits. That's why Financial sources and fund collection campaigns are of essence to terrorist organizations throughout the world.

And this particularly started the terrorist activities carried out by the Pakistani Taliban in the use of social, economic and political weaknesses in Pakistan in the areas controlled by the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Central Governments. While studying the financial resources of PTT, he concluded that domestic and international factors promote terrorism in the country. A solid organizational and financial, became a deadly terrorist organization, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), appealed to people / NATO, US and Pakistani forces to strictly refuse to participate in a defense jihad against democratic construction, and Sharia law in the country. Based on which structure demanded.

The above tests provide quick snapshot of a large set of criminal behavior through TTS steps. The statement describes the violence-based speech-making strategy to convince the audience and catch the campaign mainly to fight the battle on Fadlallah aerospace hunter. In the four years of Swat and the Taliban emerging in the year 2002-2006, this clearly shows the development of the diverse groups of brothers and many levels. In order to gain public support with the initial discounted exception, and the subsequent actions of Fazlullah, especially, after the peace deal in 2009, and the owner of slavery and "slavery and martyrdom" in Boner With difficulties in the end of the country (the implementation of law or testimony). According to this guide, the guide highlighted the way of interpretation of TTP and TTS leaders as well as the interpretation of religious orders. Explains organizational prejudice of materialism because religious movement is a group of pensions. Such is that if the rule of Fazlullah is allowed to retain, the priests and can be assumed that the pursuit of all the guerrillas governments has followed the path. In addition, despite the confirmation of Berry Frozen, it is wrong to conclude this from physical absence

In the organization of terrorists where women do not pay or cannot play an active role in terrorist activities, women are involved at the point of strengthening almost TTS's ideological motives. However, there is no evidence that they are active activists in the criminal activity of God's leader. Restoration of traditional Swat culture and heritage to ensure that the repetition of militancy repeat, and to re-ensure the development of multi-mode communication in the layout.

Design strategies The militancy and regulatory secrets provide oxygen for entrepreneurs in the economic instruments dispute to isolate financial benefits, to encourage the Government and politics of organizational structure to stimulate the economy and to trash trends. It is important that all local communities including its foundations of class, have been politically and legally tried to expand. It covers all contemporary models emerging from contemporary civilizations and conflicts in Africa, Latin America and other demonstrations, in which the organized crime organization and academic thinking are also necessary for the development of a systematic political economy. It is important to inform the citizens of Quran's true teachings through the conduct of communication and information. It can be built to create a national building to overcome extremism in order to combat the growing threat of social utility, especially for women in the rural areas. There is a lot of historical and archaeological significance among the Civilization of Pakistan in Swat. It is important to try out the statements. There will be a tragedy to promote this heritage.

To tackle the menace of terrorism in Pakistan it is important that all relevant institution should be on the same page and their main agenda should have to cut the finances and findings for terrorists. Economic revenue is bloodline for the terrorist organization all around the world so cutting the bloodline of the terrorist organization will help in preventing the further rise of new terrorist organization and the decay of the old ones. Although it has been discussed in new policy guidelines by the government of Pakistan regarding the terrorism in Pakistan that cutting the funding's for terrorism is part of state policy but this needs to be taken seriously in order get rid of terrorism in Pakistan. Similarly, the media can be condemned by the elements involved in terrorism and terrorism funding as the fourth most important state. To meet terrorism, there is a need for a framework of cooperation between all the state institutions. The government needs social, economic and political problems in the tribal areas and the population of the population. Therefore, Pakistan should change the policy of counter-terrorism in an active aspect, which can produce more satisfactory results for Pakistan's peace future.

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