DESIGN OF A MAC ADDRESS BASED SECURE COMMUNICATION SCHEME

Abstract

The storage of cryptographic keys is a significant concern in security systems, as keys can become a target for adversaries. The centralized storage of keys brings about the concern of a single point of failure, where if an adversary gains access to the central storage location, all keys stored within it could be compromised. Additionally, storing keys on devices poses a risk of key theft through physical attacks on the device or through remote attacks where an adversary gains access to the device through a vulnerability in the system. Modern solutions, including PUF and TPM, give rise to inherent problems like cost, stability and reproducibility. Moreover, with the proliferation of keys, the management complexity escalates, which can make it difficult to maintain the security and integrity of cryptographic systems. In addition to the costs associated with key storage, there are also costs associated with the maintenance and management of keys. This includes the cost of personnel who are responsible for managing the keys, as well as the cost of systems and processes that are used to guarantee protection and soundness of the keys. Symmetric keys, in particular, are susceptible to theft since they are typically stored in plaintext form, making them easy to identify and use for unauthorized access. The theft of symmetric keys can have severe consequences, such as the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information or the manipulation of data. To tackle these issues, this research presents a novel MAC address based key extraction and secrecy scheme that eliminates the need for stored keys and improves the security of cryptographic systems by utilizing a device's unique MAC address to derive a symmetric key. This scheme can be used for both one-to-one and group communication and can also be integrated with modern symmetric key algorithms.