Abstract:
Political clientelism exists in both developed and developing countries, with the latter having a higher level of clientelism. Political actors in power use patronage networks to acquire political support by influencing state institutions. Political clientelism has infiltrated Pakistan's state institutions, making them extractive and ineffective in providing services to the collective public.
Rather than limiting the role of bureaucracy to that of a mere facilitator in patronage, this multidisciplinary qualitative study aims to identify elements in four spheres: political, economic, legal, and technical reason, to develop a broad picture of collective forces influencing bureaucracy to participate in Pakistan's patronage politics. The in-depth interviews of experienced civil servants involved in the research are invaluable in identifying flaws in the system of state institutions and developing policy recommendations to address those flaws while also reducing political clientelism for inclusive and strong state institutions, as required by the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal-16.
The findings of the study show that, aside from the law, various elements in Pakistan might affect and drive bureaucracy to participate in political clientelism. These variables are divided into three categories: technical, political, and economic.
