Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

Abstract

The profusion of variables in war has never discouraged the search for foolproof systems. Because war can be a matter of life and death to states and nations, few other fields of human activity have been so consistently, thoroughly, and actively analyzed. Ever since men have thought and fought (sometimes in the reverse order), attempts have been made to study war— philosophically, because the human mind loves, and needs to lean on, a frame of reference; practically, with the object of drawing useful lessons for the next war. Such studies have led, in extreme cases, to the denial that any lesson at all can be inferred from past wars, if it is asserted that the conduct of war is only a matter of inspiration and circumstances; or conversely, they have led to the construction of doctrines and their retention as rigid articles of faith, regardless of facts and situation. French military history offers a remarkable example of oscillation between these two poles. The French had no theory, no plan in the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War. In 1940, they duplicated a recipe proved during World War I and fought a 1918-type of war against the German panzer divisions. The result in both cases was disastrous. Nevertheless, from studies and accumulated experience, observations have emerged of certain recurrent facts that have been formulated into “laws” of war. They do not, of course, have the same strict value as laws in physical science. However, they cannot be seriously challenged, if only because they confirm what plain common sense tells us. And they are very few in number. Thus, it is the first law that the strongest camp usually wins; hence Napoleon’s axiom, “Victory goes to the large battalion.” If the contending camps are equally strong, the more resolute wins; this is the second law. If resolution is equally strong, then victory belongs to the camp that seizes and keeps the initiative—the third law. Surprise, according to the fourth law, may play a decisive role. These laws, substantiated by countless cases, constitute the ABC’s of warfare. They have, in turn, begotten guiding principles such as concentration of efforts, economy of forces, freedom of action, safety. Application of these principles may change from epoch to epoch as technology, armament, and other factors change, but they retain in general their value throughout the evolution of warfare. In most wars, the same laws and principles hold equally true