Cyber and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Challenge

Abstract

The international security landscape is under stress, because of a worldwide new security concept and of the increasing threats of non-state actors, including terrorist groups, as well as of the difficulty to design long-term counter measures and security initiatives. In particular, conventional terrorist attacks could increase the general instability, but we cannot exclude nonconventional, asymmetric, hybrid attacks by nonstate actors or states through proxy actors. Among the nonconventional attacks, the governmental agencies, think tanks, and academies should consider the persisting proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNe) assets and the related cyber (Cy) systems involved. It is essential to analyze the evolution of the threats in order to enforce the safety, security, and CBRNeCy risk management. In general, to achieve this goal, a multidisciplinary approach is needed, a multilayer strategy is demanded, and different users should be involved, spanning from the academy to the NGOs/think tanks and to the governmental agencies. Not only could the CBRNeCy threats directly impact on several critical infrastructures, but they have a wider impact; therefore, a large spectrum of challenges should be considered. These are related to global security issues, like the reduction of fossil energy resources, the massive exploitation of potable water resources, and, in general, catastrophic events related to climate change. The control of energy and water resources might be pursued, in an asymmetric hybrid warfare scenario, through CBRNeCy events. On the other side, major environmental destructive events might be triggered by criminal or unintentional actions such as the Bhopal chemical accident. Moreover, major nuclear/radiological events, like the Fukushima Daiichi one, that are the consequence of a tsunami or an earthquake, can also be the result of a deliberate attack against the safety and security systems of a nuclear power plant. From the academic point of view, the risk management of these major CBRNeCy events, considering their low probability and their high destructive potential, falls under the definition of “black swan” events that require a further boost in the preparedness, prevention, mitigation, and response phases, with respect to conventional events. An additional CBRNeCy threat is represented by the growing diffusion and availability of scientific knowledge and expertise in this field that represents the