Colition Formation Game for Heterogeneous Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks

Abstract

Heterogeneity of available spectrum for secondary access by cognitive radio (CRN), with respect to its various quality of service parameters, leads to contention among collocated CRNs which results in interference and wastage of spectrum opportunity. Self-coexistence problem of CRNs approached in Coexistence Beacon Protocol (CBP) of IEEE 802.22 WRAN assumes that the contending networks do not have any preference over the set of available channels. Rationally all CRNs will contend for the best available channels and increased interference will occur resulting in inefficient utilization of available spectrum. In this paper, we analyze this situation from a game theoretic perspective and model coexistence of CRNs by proposing a novel form of coalition games called the C-Partition form. We model the situation of collocated CRN for heterogeneous spectrum using proposed algorithm and show that it is in every player interest to be a part of this game, form bigger coalitions ultimately leading to the formation of a grand coalition. Using proposed algorithm and its distributed implementation of rules, cooperation amongst different partitions can be enforced in contrast with coalition formation game in Partition form where no controlling mechanism exists between contending players. In this paper we proved that the final resulting C-Partition will be in Nash equilibrium (NE) and no player will have any incentive to deviate from strategy of c-partition.