A New Secure Authentication Based Distance Bounding Protocol

Abstract

We have numerous systems being used in daily life where two entities authenticate each other over a range of distance. The distance involved is relatively small, but still attacks were documented. Distance Bounding (DB) Protocol were introduced to cater for the security requirements. The schemes, however are still prone to several threats; mainly the Relay Attack (Terrorist and Mafia Fraud). In Mafia Fraud, attempts are made to get accepted as the prover either by replaying of messages or by the help a malicious key. This can further be executed by Impersonation Fraud and Man in the Middle attack. In Terrorist fraud, attempt is made to extract the secret from the verifying entity as to get accepted. This is carried out by extracting the key from the message captured or by physically tempering the verifying/ proving entity. Given the nature of the attacks, their mitigation is necessary, and should be achieved as to not put computational overhead on the scheme. There is thus a need for a more secure protocol which can ensure confidentiality, integrity and authentication. This thesis presents a comprehensive and comparative performance analysis of twelve DB protocols; including the detailed description of the protocol, the means of defence against the attack and explains the means by which the protocol was compromised. Based on the results concluded, a protocol is proposed which incorporates the design elements needed for added security, computationally easy to implement and resistant to most of the threats mentioned. Analysis of the protocol is carried out against the security requirement. We simulated the proposed protocol in Python Language. The analysis yields that the protocol can withstand attacks such as; relay Attack (Terrorist and Mafia Fraud), Replay Attack, Distance Fraud and De – synchronization Attack.