Abstract:
The meticulousness of safety critical control system design has always been of
vital signi cance as even a tri
ing glitch in the design analysis may result in
grievous penalties, even in the loss of human life. To ensure the correctness
of the system, traditionally it based on paper and pencil proofs. With the
beginning of the modern age, simulations and computer algebra systems were
employed to ensure the correctness of design. However, the said techniques
compromise the accuracy of the analysis and thus are not a viable option
for the analysis of safety critical systems. Over the years Formal Veri cation
has emerged as one of the most viable option for the veri cation of hardware
and software systems. It combines the strong paper and pencil mathematics
along with modern computer aided tool to ensure correctness. Since the new
formal model must satisfy the existing mathematical reasoning, therefore
the chance to catch critical design errors increases which are often ignored
otherwise. This thesis makes use of formal methods to establish a higher-
order logic based framework to reason about the correctness of safety critical
control systems.
In particular, we rst provide a generic platform to express a wide variety
of control systems in terms of their formal model. We identi ed the least
basic blocks which can be arranged in various topologies to express a wide
range of systems. We then provide theorems which can be used to reason
v
vi
various properties of these systems. Moreover, a generic expression for the
steady-state error of unity-feedback control systems using the multivariate
analysis theories of HOL-Light has been veri ed. The unique feature of this
expression is that it can be used to reason about the steady-state error of any
system type and input. Moreover, it facilitates reusability when reasoning
about the state-state error of the same system while considering di erent
inputs. The quest for minimizing the user interaction in the higher-order-
logic theorem-proving based analysis for steady-state errors led us to develop
this useful relationship, which to the best of our knowledge has not been
reported in the control systems literature before. In order to illustrate the
utilization and practical e ectiveness of the formalization for verifying real-
world control systems, two case studied have been conducted. The steady-
state error analysis of the Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) push-pull DC-
DC converters, which is used in power electronics and many safety-critical
aerospace applications and the steady-state error analysis of a Solar Tacking
control systems developed for aerospace applications.